

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

**THE ADMINISTRATION OF WARFARE: THE SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING OF
THE OTTOMAN ARMY IN HUNGARY, 1593 - 1606.**

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the administration of the Ottoman army during the series of military campaigns which were conducted annually against the Hapsburgs in Hungary between 1593 and 1606. In 1526 the Ottoman army under Süleyman the Magnificent beat the Hungarian army at the battle of Mohács, resulting in a power struggle between the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs in Hungary. Between 1541 and 1566 the Ottomans established full control over the central part of the country through measures which included the taxation of the inhabitants and the garrisoning of strongholds. A peace treaty between Ottoman and Hapsburg was concluded in 1568, and a state of official peace existed until the renewed outbreak of war in 1593; after the treaty of Zsitvatorok in 1606, peace was again maintained until the 1660s.

The introduction is followed by a short chapter outlining the events of the Ottoman presence in Hungary between 1526 and 1606; the main body of the study discusses how the Ottomans mobilised an army to fight on the northwest border of the Empire, kept this army fed, and attempted to ensure that sufficient money was available to fund it. The administration of the provision of three of the elements which comprise the logistic bases of warfare are therefore discussed in three Parts: in Part I, manpower; in Part II, food; and in Part III, finance.

This study is based on contemporary Ottoman documents and chronicles. By asking of the contemporary Ottoman data the same sorts of questions as are asked of their material by historians of western Europe, it is hoped that those aspects of the Ottoman Empire with which we are here concerned may be better understood. It should thus become possible to escape from the broad generalisations which often characterise the views of those unfamiliar with the primary sources for Ottoman history. This is a study of a particular epoch in the history of Central Europe; it is an attempt to demonstrate the valuable contribution which Ottoman source material can make to European history.

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INTRODUCTION

This study concerns the Ottoman administration of warfare during the thirteen years from 1593 to 1606 in which the army conducted annual campaigns against the Hapsburgs in Hungary. Essentially, it is a study of how the Ottomans used the resources at their disposal in order to enable them to fight over a long period in a border area far distant from the centre of government in Istanbul.

In terms of military history, the administration of war is the study of the logistic branch of military endeavour:

"In its broadest definition the term logistics signifies the total process by which the resources of a nation - material and human - are mobilised and directed toward the accomplishment of military ends... It can be understood only in its relation on the one hand to the end which it serves, and on the other to the sources from which it springs".¹

This twentieth-century definition of logistics, drawn from a work on the United States navy in the Second World War, applies equally to the operation of a land army 400 years ago, for, despite the obvious technological improvements in transport and communications over the intervening period, the underlying problems facing those responsible for the conduct of war have not changed. Logistics deals with what may be termed the 'nuts and bolts' of war, the fundamental problems of mobilising, moving and supplying the large and disparate body which constitutes an army. The successful administration of such a body was perhaps the most demanding task confronting those in power within the early modern

1. Ballantine (1947) p.1

state. The Ottoman Empire was frequently at war, and the administration of warfare was central to the life of the Empire: a detailed study of how the demands of warfare were met provides an opportunity to see how the state operated in pursuit of a definite goal.

The impetus for the present study comes, in particular, from the article Harb which Vernon Parry contributed to the Encyclopedia of Islam.² In this article Parry describes in general terms how the Ottomans organised for war and how a military campaign was conducted. He stresses the challenges facing the Ottoman army on campaign: the distances to be travelled, the supply of war material and of food for the troops, the assembling of transport animals, carts and wagons. His short study is inevitably no more than a sketch, based on sources ^{which} are, almost without exception, non-Ottoman. The present study is based primarily on Ottoman source material, and attempts to give substance to some of the areas defined by Parry by examining the functioning of the army in a particular series of campaigns.

The end of the sixteenth century is generally recognised as a period of far-reaching structural change in the Ottoman polity. A recent article by Inalcik has further served to define the direction of the present study. In this article he discusses the changes in military manpower and in methods of taxation which came to be adopted during the seventeenth century. The two significant developments which he notes were the widening of the scope of military recruitment to include mercenary companies of reaya (subject population) origin, and the introduction of new taxes - as well as the regularisation of existing ones - to meet the central

2. Parry, art. Harb (EI)

government's ever-growing demand for cash.³

The matters dealt with in this thesis, then, are the provision of three of the elements which comprise the logistic bases of warfare: manpower, food and finance. A short introductory narrative of the main events of these campaigns in Hungary is followed by three long chapters, each of which has its own introductory section. Part I is a discussion of how the troops of the army were recruited, mobilised and paid. Part II looks at the administrative measures taken by the state to ensure their food supply, as well as diet. Part III is based on the accounts of the Campaign Treasury, and the management of the financial resources necessary for the the support of the war effort.

In examining the logistics of these campaigns, I have not chosen to place emphasis on how the various components of logistic support were calculated and administered during the course of each individual campaign, as has been done, for instance, for the campaigns of Alexander the Great by Donald Engels,⁴ or by Martin van Creveld for a number of modern campaigns. This is partly on account of limitations imposed by the archival data at my disposal, which have chronological lacunae, and partly because it is necessary to treat with scepticism the figures given in the accounts of contemporary historians.⁵ A further reason why the treatment adopted here is more synoptic is that analysis of the ways in which particular logistic problems were solved is more telling of the general approach to such problems which the Ottomans adopted. So, too, the similarities and differences between the Ottomans and their western contemporaries

3. Inalcık (1980) esp. pp.286,311-13

4. Engels (1978)

5. An interesting and salutary discussion of the reliability of the Ottoman historians is to be found in Schmidt (1985), in which he compares contemporary accounts of the Egrı (Eger) campaign of 1596.

become clearer through such an overview. So far as I am aware, the only other study which takes such a comparative approach is a short article by Majer, in which he raises some of the general issues to be considered in a comparison of Ottoman and Hapsburg logistics at the end of the seventeenth century.⁶

Both modern military historians and those of earlier times have tended to ignore the logistic aspect of military campaigning in favour of analysis of strategy and tactics. Yet, whatever the military objectives envisaged, without an effective logistic system, there can be no strategy: simply, if men and materials are not where they should be, any pre-determined plan of battle must fail. Matters of a logistical nature limit and define the operating possibilities for an army and therefore circumscribe the strategy that may be proposed.

This raises the question of how far, in the early modern age, the authorities were capable of taking account of the multiplicity of factors which were involved in arriving at any informed decision in military planning. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was able to expand from its obscure beginnings in Anatolia to occupy a large part of Europe and threaten even the Hapsburg Empire has led European historians to assume that the Ottoman army, and thus the state, must have been able to plan and define its logistic requirements with some precision. Writing particularly of the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary, the Hungarian military historian Géza Perjés, has suggested in a recent article that Turkish military policy was rational:

6. Majer (1981): this paper, which was contributed to a symposium on Austrian-Turkish relations, is a preliminary to the longer, detailed study of the subject which he is currently preparing.

"It is quite inconceivable that an empire as large as Turkey could have been built and maintained for centuries without planning that reasonably took into account the objectives and the means available".

His incorporation of these objectives and means into a model of the Hungarian-Turkish wars rests on the assumption that the Turkish authorities were capable of executing their policy in the light of an accurate assessment of logistic factors:

"The investigator encounters no difficulty in reckoning the daily, monthly and yearly quantities of provisions and fodder needed by an army of a given number of men or in pinpointing the amount of transportation and the number of depots required for shifting and concentrating supplies".⁷

Although he admits of the current state of ignorance of the Ottoman side of the equation, Perjés' discussion of the issue is intended to show that the Ottomans did not annex the whole of Hungary after the battle of Mohaç because they were keenly aware of the limits of their logistic capability, and realised that they were not able to wage, in Clausewitz's terms, a war of annihilation against the Hungarians, but could only envisage one of limited aims.⁸

A counter to this view that logistic options are subject to calculation is that of van Creveld, who, in his excellent study of several campaigns in the modern period, concludes that even in campaigns during this century, with immeasurably more sophisticated tools at the disposal of

7. Perjés (1981) pp.155-56

8. For the Prussian writer and soldier, these were the two possible types of war: see Howard (1983) pp.47-58. A full text of Clausewitz's classic work, On War, is Clausewitz (1976).

those responsible for determining the course of war, there is little evidence to suggest that a thorough-going attempt was made to take into account all the possible factors which might have a bearing on the conduct of campaign. In the light of his research on campaigns between 1805-1944, he observes that:

"...most armies seem to have prepared their campaigns as best they could on an ad hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated, efforts to gather together the largest possible number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops etc., while giving little, if any, thought to the 'ideal' combination which, in theory, would have carried them the furthest."⁹

van Creveld's conclusion as to the apparent impossibility of co-ordinating provision and supply does not bring us full circle to a point where we can say that logistic matters received scant attention, simply because there was no chance of all possible aspects being considered; rather, this very uncertainty does allow us to assess how flexible the logistic apparatus could be and how it could respond to the unquantifiable and incalculable.

One important issue is that of assessing the extent to which state agencies controlled, and were responsible for, logistic planning. Writing of Tudor England, Davies has described military provisioning as "the prime test of governmental efficiency",¹⁰ and this could doubtless be extended to the logistic effort as a whole. The present study of the logistics of the Ottoman campaigns in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth century attempts to discover how the government of that Empire harnessed the resources available to it in the pursuit of a military goal.

9. Creveld (1980) p.236

10. Davies (1963) p.3

THE OTTOMAN PRESENCE IN HUNGARY, AND THE EVENTS OF
THE 1593-1606 WAR.¹

The Hapsburg - Ottoman war of 1593-1606 in Hungary was fought during the middle years of what was to be a one and a half centuries long period of Ottoman administration of the central part of the country. Although it was not until 1541 that the vilayet of Buda was constituted and direct Ottoman rule imposed there, Süleyman's successful siege of Belgrade in 1521, the third attempt on the city by the Ottoman military forces,² had already removed the final barrier to an expansion of Ottoman power northwards into the Hungarian plain.

Hopes of a common Hungarian defensive front against the Ottoman threat fell victim to internal struggles between the royal house and the nobility, and in 1526 the Hungarian army under King Lajos II was smashed by Süleyman's army at Mohaç (Mohács); this resulted in de facto partition of the country between the candidates of the two foreign powers contending for control in Hungary, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans. Further Ottoman advances to Vienna in 1529, and to Güns (Kőszeg) in 1531, served as a reminder to the Hapsburgs that they could not treat with impunity the power which the Ottomans exercised in Hungary through their vassal, John Zápolya. The impetus for the full application of Ottoman power came with the death of Zápolya in 1540, and the sub-

1. The purpose of this chapter is to recount briefly the major events of the period with the aim of providing a background narrative to the main part of the study; the broad chronology of events is not in contention.

2. The two earlier Ottoman assaults on Belgrade had been those of Murad II in 1440, and of Mehmed II in 1456.

sequent attack on Buda by the Emperor Ferdinand I. Zápolya's infant son John-Sigismund was confirmed as Ottoman vassal in Transylvania, while Süleyman retained control of the central part of the country.

Between 1521 and 1566, the year of Süleyman's death at the siege of Sigetvar (Szigetvár), the Ottomans consolidated their rule in Hungary, constituting as sancaks the area north of the Drava and lower Danube.³ The vilayet of Temeşvar (Timișoara) was established in 1552, in response to Ferdinand's attempt to gain control of Transylvania. Süleyman's death signalled the end of this expansive period, his successor Selim II concluding a peace treaty with the Hapsburgs at Edirne in 1568, and leaving the Hapsburgs free to pursue the Counter Reformation. This treaty was renewed in 1576, 1584 and 1591.⁴

Although the years between 1568 and the outbreak of full war in 1593 were disturbed by the Kleinkrieg, a state of intermittent raid and counter-raid along the length of the extensive and ill-defined border demarcating the Ottoman and Hapsburg spheres of influence, both sides lacked the will and the strength to open official hostilities. Both were keen that the activities of the Uskoks on the one hand and the apparently spontaneous and independent actions of the Ottoman border troops on the other should not be allowed to escalate into a full-scale confrontation. The Emperor Maximilian II, and after him those who formulated policy in the name of the reclusive Rudolph II, carefully maintained diplomatic relations with the Porte by delivering the annual tribute, and thus the 1568 truce was maintained.

3. For the dates of the establishment of the sancaks of the province of Buda see Káldy-Nagy, art. Macaristan (EI).

4. Nouradounghian (1897) I pp. 32,34-36.

In the presentation of contemporary Ottoman historians, war begins again in 1593 with the campaign of the grand vezir Koca Sinan Pasha to avenge the defeat of the troops of the beylerbeyi of Bosnia, Telli Hasan Pasha, by an Austrian force. This famous rout took place in June of that year at Siska (Sisak) at the confluence of the rivers Kupa and Sava. For the Hungarians, however, 1591 was the crucial date, and they accordingly refer to the events of these years as "the fifteen years war". Although in that year no particular event stands out as decisive in strictly Ottoman - Hungarian relations, 1591 saw a Turkish offensive by Hasan Pasha on the Croatian border between Ottoman and Hapsburg, in which a number of forts were taken. In particular, the building of the fortress of Yenihisar (Petrinja) on the Kupa in 1592 was seen as an aggressive act. The successful Ottoman siege of the Hapsburg stronghold of Behke (Bihaç) on the R.Una in 1592 brought realisation of the neglected state of Austrian defences against the Turks.⁵

The contemporary European view of Ottoman designs, culled, at least in part, from the reports of agents and diplomats in Constantinople, was that, immediately upon the conclusion of the twelve-year long war with Persia in 1590, the Porte was preparing to go to war again.⁶ There were said to be eight possible targets of its aggressive plans, and the pros and cons of each case were apparently carefully considered by the vizirs. The options before them were: to renew the war with Persia, or to attack either Morocco, Spain, Malta, Venice, some part of Italy, Poland or else the Hapsburg Emperor and the kingdom of Hungary. The decision to make war in Central Europe having been taken, the energies of Hasan Pasha of Bosnia, who was, according to Peçevi, the

5. HAMMER IV pp.216-17: the chronology of the events of the war is found in HAMMER IV pp.209-396; Rothenburg (1960) p.56

6. Knolles (1621) pp.1008-14; see also THOU XI pp.605-17.

especial favourite of the sultan, Murad III,⁷ were given a free rein. In addition to the harrassment of the Austrians' Croatian border defences, 1592 saw an unsuccessful Ottoman strike at Tokaj, to the north-east of Buda.

To judge from Ottoman documentary sources from the time of the peace with Persia - letters passing between the Porte and its representatives on the western borders of the Empire, and the correspondence of the pashas of Buda with the Hapsburg command - European views that such provocative actions were receiving covert support from Istanbul appear to have had some substance. It is true, too, that it was the personal ambition of Koca Sinan Pasha, his star now in the ascendant, which was a dominant voice in the shaping of policy at this time. Reports of events in Bosnia reached the Porte primarily from Hasan Pasha himself, and there was no chance for independent assessment of the seriousness of the Uskok menace or the threat of an imminent Hapsburg attack. If the events at Siska in June 1593 ultimately provided the pretext for a full-scale Ottoman campaign, the late arrival of the annual tribute from Vienna in the previous years had been used by the pashas of Buda to threaten the Hapsburgs with retaliatory action.⁸

Orders issued prior to Hasan Pasha's offensive of 1591 had directed the beys of the vilayet of Buda not to infringe the provisions of the peace;⁹ however, if the Christian forces in Bosnia, and the Uskoks in particular, persisted in harrassing Ottoman subjects in that area, action would have to be taken against them.¹⁰ In August 1591, at the time of Hasan Pasha's Croatian offensive, orders were sent to all

7. PEÇEVI II p.124

8. Bayerle (1972)

9. See, for instance, MD 67/43

10. MD 67/295

beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis of the vilayets of Buda, Bosnia and Temesvar that they should continue to hold to the peace treaty with Austria, but, in its terminology, these orders convey a change in the spirit which would thenceforth guide the activity of the Ottoman military forces in these border provinces. In these documents the term müdara, used, for example, in the phrase "...öte canible müdara edüp", appears for the first time.¹¹ Müdara is an aspect of the Islamic doctrine of cihad (holy war) which did not have a place in the practice of agreeing peace-treaties as this was understood by the Christians; Kissling interprets müdara as a state of terminable co-existence ("kundbare Koexistenz"): ¹² it covers the contradiction between cihad as the principle of perpetual war against the inhabitants of the dar ül-harb and the obvious impossibility of being actively engaged in permanent warfare. Peace-treaties were therefore seen as a truce of limited duration. The implication of the use of the term müdara in orders addressed to those in command of the western borders of the Empire was that there had been a change of attitude at the Porte, that there should be greater readiness than there had been hitherto to actively prepare for war. The spirit of apparent quiescence by the Porte can be seen to have masked an intention to fight the Hapsburgs when the time was ripe.¹³ Subsequent orders continue this policy: in November 1592 Hasan Pasha was told

11. MD 68/124; MD 68/127

12. Kissling (1974) p.10: this difficult and important essay discusses cihad in terms of the objective relations existing between Islam and the West in particular (I am grateful to Peter Brod for help with translation).

13. As will be mentioned again, the fact that cihad was a principle of seriat law, and "perpetual war" incumbent upon Muslims, does not justify the deterministic analysis which sees the opening of the Ottoman campaigns from 1593 as a result of the need to act according to this principle.

to act with restraint, since the tribute was shortly expected,¹⁴ but by early 1593 Sinan Pasha's impatience over the matter of the tribute was growing, and the troops of Rumeli were ordered to mobilise at the plain of Sirem (Srem), between the rivers Danube and Sava.¹⁵

Sinan Pasha left Istanbul for the mustering ground at Daud Pasha, outside the walls of the city, on 19 July 1593;¹⁶ such swift response to Hasan Pasha's defeat in the previous month could not have been possible unless the imperial manufactories of military equipment had been kept in production in the three years since there had been peace with Persia. In this first short season of the war, the troops of Anatolia could not be mustered, but even with those which he had available, Sinan Pasha was able to take the fortresses of Vesprem (Veszprém) and Palota (Várpalota), although, later in the season the Ottomans were to lose to the Christians a number of strongholds to the northeast of Buda. In the spring of 1594, the Hapsburgs embarked on a two-pronged attack, with Archduke Matthias, brother of Emperor Rudolph, besieging Estergon (Esztergom), whose commanding position on the Danube made it, at that time, the Ottoman-held position closest and most threatening to Vienna. Meanwhile, General Teuffenbach attacked Hatvan to the northeast. Such an attack was potentially dangerous for the Ottomans, but news of the arrival of their relief forces, strengthened for the 1594 season by the addition of Anatolian cavalry troops and extra troops sent from Istanbul, caused Teuffenbach to raise his siege. Indeed, in 1594, the Ottoman army, having saved Estergon, took the smaller fortresses of Tata and Samartin (Szent Márton), and most significantly, lying even further west on the

14. MD 69/509

15. MD 70/118

16. KK 253 p.215 (19 Şevval 1001)

Danube than Estergon, the fortress of Yanık (Győr) which was then made the seat of a new Ottoman vilayet. Arriving late, the han of the Crimea, Gazi Giray, took Papa (Pápa) from the Christian force defending it. Intending to press home his advantage, Sinan Pasha's army laid siege to Komran (Komárom), but the lateness of the season and the consequent recalcitrance of the troops prevented a successful outcome to this endeavour.¹⁷

After the Ottomans had consolidated their position in upper Hungary in 1594, the thrust of their campaigns in 1595 was to be along the lower Danube against their former vassals, the principalities of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia. Late in 1594 these vassal states had sought Hapsburg protection against the Ottomans, seeing in the present struggle a chance to free themselves from Ottoman overlordship. The history of these territories is one of complicated dynastic rivalries, aggravated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by their position in the Ottoman-Hapsburg struggle for control in eastern Europe, in which each was obliged to seek some form of protection from one or other of these 'great powers', and yet hoped to retain its independence. The strategic importance to the Ottomans of these lands was as providers of raw materials and foodstuffs in peace as well as for the war effort, so that their defection was considered to be a serious blow to the Ottoman cause. In particular, the use of the Danube bank as a route for the transport of military equipment, which went by boat to Varna from Istanbul and thence by cart into Hungary,¹⁸ was hindered by this action, which imposed on the Ottomans the need to have a permanent and active defensive force along this river.

17. For contemporary drawings of the Hungarian castles see, for instance, Dillich (1609) esp. pt.I

18. AK ff.16r,53v

The difficulties caused to the Ottomans by the opening up of two fronts in Europe were apparent in the results of the 1595 campaign season. As Sinan pursued an attack against Wallachia,¹⁹ leaving the defence of northwest Hungary to his son Mehmed, lately beylerbeyi of Buda, the revitalised Hapsburg forces launched a strong attack on Estergon, wishing to bring to a satisfactory conclusion the action in which they had failed in the previous year. The Ottomans initially had some success in the east, a brief attempt being made to bring Wallachia and Moldavia under full Ottoman administrative control as vilayets. But the second part of the summer saw Estergon fall to the Christians, and also Vişegrad (Visegrád), on the Danube Bend between Estergon and Buda. The combined actions of the voyvodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, Stephen Razvan and Michael Viteazul, and of the prince of Transylvania, Sigismund Báthory, culminated in the disastrous rout of Sinan Pasha's forces at the Yergöğü (Giurgiu) bridge. Although briefly demoted from the post of grand vezir - and not surprisingly in view of the events of the summer - Sinan Pasha, now in his eighties, was soon reinstated following the death of his successor Lala Mehmed Pasha who had held the office for only a few days. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, where the seeds of the conflict had been allowed to germinate, the castles of the border continued to change hands. *Which way?*

There was, however, one event in 1595 from which the Ottomans could draw some solace: Moldavia was prised from the Hapsburg embrace through the negotiations of the Polish chancellor, Zamoyski, and Gazi Giray, the Tatar han. Zamoyski was no lover of the Hapsburgs, and saw a semi-

19. Sinan's great rival Ferhad Pasha was briefly reappointed grand vezir in early 1595, and it was he who initially led the Wallachian campaign until he was dismissed in favour of Sinan.

autonomous Moldavia on his borders as a buffer against the Hapsburgs. Zamoyski's appointee as voyvode, Jeremia Movila, was recognised by the sultan in place of Stephen Razvan who was favoured by the pro-Hapsburg Transylvanian prince Sigismond Báthory.²⁰

On Sinan's death in April 1596, Damad Ibrahim Pasha was appointed grand vezir. The events of this year, in which the presence of the Sultan Mehmed III on campaign showed that the Ottomans were throwing all their resources into a major confrontation, are well-known.²¹ Confrontations at Lipova and Temeşvar, and at Vaç (Vác) and Hatvan earlier in the season, were followed in October by the capitulation to the Ottomans of the fortress of Eğri (Eger), which lay on the access route of the Hapsburgs to their ally Transylvania. It was against the Hapsburg relief force commanded by the Archduke Maximilian, that the Ottomans fought the single large field battle of the war at Mezókeresztes. This late-season Ottoman victory was closely-contested, the too-early assumption of success by the Hapsburg army leaving it victim to a final onslaught by the Ottoman forces. The third vezir Cigalazade Sinan Pasha was rewarded for his part in the action at Hatvan, Eğri and Mezokeresztes with the office of grand vezir, but after only a month this office was restored to Damad Ibrahim.

The Ottomans were, however, unable to exploit these successes in northeast Hungary. In the northwest, they maintained their hold on Yanık, which managed to withstand a Hapsburg siege in 1597. The grand vezir did not himself participate in the fighting of that season, feeling that he

20. Kortepeter (1972) pp.145-46

21. It was the first time since 1566, and the death of Süleyman at the siege of Sigetvar, that the Ottoman sultan had personally led his army on campaign.

should stay in Istanbul in order to protect his position in the intrigues which were endemic in court circles. Command of the army was left to the former beylerbeyi of Anatolia, Satirci Mehmed Pasha, who accomplished little more than the recovery of Tata, his assault on Vaç having resulted in a stalemate. Temeşvar, like Yanik, was the object of a siege by Báthory, but escaped falling to the prince.

In spite of his presence in Istanbul, Damad Ibrahim was replaced as grand vezir in late 1597 by Hadim Hasan Pasha, who was himself deposed in favour of Cerrah Mehmed Pasha in the following spring. The Christian forces under the command of the generals Palffy and Schwarzenburg had a notable success in March 1598 when they were able to take from the Ottomans the fortress of Yanik, which had been left all but unguarded by its garrison. Yanik was never again to fall into Ottoman hands. By this time, then, the Christians held all the major fortresses commanding the Danube as far east as Vaç and Vişegrad. Rather than attempting to push back the Hapsburgs with a major siege of one of these strongholds, the Ottoman campaign plan for 1598 was to try to cripple Transylvania as an ally of the Hapsburgs. Varad (Oradea) was to be the target of the combined forces of Satirci Mehmed Pasha and Gazi Giray Han. However, such a concentration of manpower left Buda and the area to the northwest of Lake Balaton open to attack, and the Christians followed up their success at Yanik by taking Vesprem, Tata and Palota; luckily for the Ottomans, however, they besieged Buda too late in the season to achieve any conclusive result. The lateness of the season meant, too, that Satirci Mehmed had to raise the siege of Varad and struggle back to winter quarters in Belgrade with his army in disarray. As if to compound the problems which faced the Ottomans, Michael of Wallachia defeated the troops of the beylerbeyi of Bosnia, Hadim Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, at Niğbolu (Nikopol) on the lower Danube.

The parlous state of the Ottoman war effort by the end of the 1598 season resulted in the dismissal of Satirci Mehmed

and Cerrah Mehmed. Reinstated as both grand vezir and commander-in-chief, Damad Ibrahim Pasha held inconclusive peace talks with the Hapsburgs in 1599, and then marched against Uyvar (N.Zámky) but returned to Belgrade for the winter before an attack could be mounted.

Two unconnected events of 1599 were of major significance for the future of Ottoman participation in the war. The existing balance of power between the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans was altered by the decision of Michael of Wallachia to submit to the Sultan in 1599. The somewhat unstable Sigismund Báthory had departed from Transylvania for Poland for the third time in as many years, leaving, as in 1597, his cousin the cardinal András in control. This was the opportunity for Michael to fulfil his territorial ambition of uniting with Wallachia the Vlachs under Transylvanian rule; the insecurity of his position between Hapsburgs, Poles and Ottomans led him to send emissaries to the Porte, and he was duly accepted as a vassal by Mehmed III. Moldavia, too, was to fall to him in 1600. On the negative side, 1599 was the first year in which the activities of the Celali rebels in Anatolia provoked the Ottoman state into taking firm measures against them: this was a portent of continuing trouble.²²

In 1600, Damad Ibrahim was able to more than retrieve his reputation, with the successful Ottoman siege of Kanije (Nagykanisza), described in a contemporary source as "Schlüssel Deutschlands" and "hohen Trost der deutschen Nation".²³ That Vienna was assumed by the Hapsburgs to be the goal of Ottoman military aspirations is clear from, for example, the detailed plan for its defence which was prepared in 1598 by Giorgio Basta, the Hapsburg military

22. For a narrative of the events of these years in Anatolia, see Griswold (1983).

23. Cerwinka (1968) p.412

commander of upper Hungary.²⁴ The Danube route to Vienna was effectively closed to the Ottomans after 1598, but a more southerly thrust at this strategically important fortress was undertaken, and, aided by the mutiny of the garrison, resulted in victory for the Ottomans after a siege of more than a month. A new beylerbeyilik was established with its centre at Kanije: beylerbeyiliks had earlier been established after the Ottoman capture of the other important fortresses of Yanik and Egri.²⁵

As the Ottoman army was setting out from Belgrade in July 1601, Damad Ibrahim Pasha died at Zemun. Yemişci Hasan Pasha, was appointed grand vezir and commander-in-chief in his place. Leaving Istanbul late, he did not reach Belgrade until early in September, by which time the Hapsburgs had succeeded in capturing the castle of Istolni Belgrad (Szekesfehervár). He was forced to prepare to retire to winter quarters, but received news that the Archduke Ferdinand was attempting to retake Kanije. After a hard battle Kanije was saved for the Ottomans, and was to remain in their hands until 1690. In 1601 the political manoeuvrings of Michael of Wallachia came to an end with his murder on the orders of his implacable enemy Basta, after which Sigismund Báthory was proclaimed prince of Transylvania for the fourth time.²⁶

The next three seasons, from 1602-04, saw only desultory

24. HHStA Kriegsakten 35, January-October 1598: ff.19-24r

25. There is also evidence that there had been a beylerbeyilik centred on Sigetvar for at least some months in 1595 viz: MD 73/289; MD 73/905; MD 73/1146. Neither Birken (1976) nor Fekete (1949) make reference to such a province, which was presumably reduced in status in 1600 to become a sancak of the vilayet of Kanije.

26. For details of events in the Principalities between 1597 and 1601 see Lefaivre (1902) I pp.231-250

action. Buda was the target of Hapsburg efforts. In October 1602 they succeeded in taking Pest from the Ottomans, only to lose it in 1604, after the Ottoman forces had failed to retake it in 1603. Yemişci Hasan Pasha had retaken Istolni Belgrad in 1602, after it had been only a few months in enemy hands. The military situation of the Ottomans in Hungary was not favourable in these years, and the activities of the rebels in Anatolia were giving ever-increasing cause for concern. More seriously still, in 1603 Shah Abbas marched northwest to reconquer the Caucasian territory which he had signed away to the Ottomans in 1590: this war on the Ottomans' eastern front was to last until 1612.

Yemişci Hasan Pasha was executed in the autumn of 1603; in his place, the beylerbeyi of Egypt, Malkoç Ali Pasha was appointed, but, having arrived from Egypt by December 1603, he was to die of fever at Belgrade before he was able to lead his troops into the field. December 1603 also saw the death of the Sultan Mehmed III and the accession of Ahmed I. The demands of renewed war against Persia led to the creation of two separate military commands, that of the east, to which was appointed the one-time grand vezir Çigalazade Sinan Pasha, while the position briefly occupied by Malkoç Ali, that of grand vezir and commander-in-chief of the western front, in summer 1604 was given to the former beylerbeyi of Rumeli and Buda, Lala Mehmed Pasha. Besides the retaking of Pest by the Ottomans in 1604, Vaç and Hatvan both fell to them. A late-season siege of Estergon, although showing that their military strength was not all spent, had to be raised in November.

Despite the strains imposed by having to fight enemies in both east and west, the Ottomans were better able to sustain their efforts in Hungary than were the Hapsburgs. The Hapsburgs were plagued by problems of financial administration and a shifting pattern of alliances both within the body of their Empire and without; they suffered fatal blow to their hopes of military success in Hungary with the

realignment of Transylvania on the Ottoman side in 1605. The tensions created by the Counter Reformation could not produce a consistent policy in those caught between Hapsburg and Ottoman rivalry in Hungary, and the ferocity of the Hapsburg war administration in Transylvania as suffered by the Hungarian nobility there culminated in the anti-Hapsburg revolt led by István Bocskai. In recognition of his co-operation with the Ottoman forces, he was crowned king of Hungary by the grand vezir Lala Mehmed Pasha. Bocskai's revolt added to the Ottoman war effort a powerful, if financially impoverished, body of manpower and resources.²⁷ In 1605, therefore, the Ottomans were able to take Vişegrad, Vesprem, and Palota, and most importantly, Estergon.

Thus, the Ottomans were able to enter the peace negotiations of 1606 from a position of relative strength, as had not been the case in earlier attempts at peace. In June 1606 the Hapsburgs recognised Bocskai as prince of Transylvania, and conceded that they could no more interfere in matters of religion in his domain. In November, the Treaty of Zsitvatorok concluded the war between the Emperor and the Sultan. A struggle, the impetus for whose beginnings may, at least in part, have come from Koca Sinan Pasha, was ended thirteen years later without substantial territorial gain to either side. Although it is true that the Ottomans had only added to their Empire the fortresses of Kanije and Eğri during these years, they retained as defence for Buda the key stronghold of Estergon, which they were to hold until 1683. In strategic terms this was not such "meagre reward" as it is commonly held to be.²⁸

27. For details of Bocskai's revolt, see Lefavre (1902) I pp.268-76. Concerning the composition of his army, see Makkai (1982).

28. Parry (1976) p.121

PART I:

MANPOWER AND MOBILISATION

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Ii. Introduction

When discussing the nature of the Ottoman Empire, many modern scholars accept as valid the importance of the ideological substructure on which that state is supposed to have been founded. Inalcik, for example, sums up this idea and his confidence in its vitality and reality for the contemporary bureaucrats who,

"...following the age-old notions of Persian statecraft, thoroughly believed that the well-being of the state depended first of all on the strict separation of the different estates and on keeping the masses in their proper place- an ancient ideal of Near-Eastern statecraft which, indeed, was approximated by the Ottoman Empire in its classical period."¹

Thus, this so-called "classical" ideology of the Ottoman state drew a fundamental distinction between the reaya, who were the creators of wealth through their labour, primarily agricultural, and the consumers, the askeri or "military" class.² In so far as it had relevance for military manpower, the practical consequence of this dichotomy was that reaya should not be permitted to infiltrate the askeri class, and thus the cohesion and military effectiveness of the latter corps would be preserved and enhanced.

A refinement of the askeri/reaya dichotomy is the distinction within the askeri class itself as between kul

1. Inalcik (1980) pp.283-84; see also Inalcik (1975/a) pp.65-69.

2. For a list of those considered as askeri, see, for example, the kanunname first published by Arif (KANUNNAME p.39), in which the mutual exclusivity of the reaya and askeri classes is stressed.

troops and timariot (= sipahi) troops. Although the askeri/reaya distinction had probably never existed in a pure form in practice, it is easier to pinpoint the salient characteristics of each of these two groups than it is to define precisely the kul/timariot dichotomy on which analysis of the forces of the Ottoman army is traditionally based. There is no definition of the word kul which captures the full complexity of the meaning of this term within the Ottoman system: in the context of discussion of the Ottoman army it is used to refer to the primarily 'cash-based' troops of the sultan, the kapukulu, in distinction to the 'land-based' provincial sipahis.³ It is not easy to devise a framework of analysis of the Ottoman military forces which avoids treating as the most significant variable the difference between the kapukulu troops and the sipahis. Although the distinction between these two sections of military manpower was not strictly observed in terms of their rights and duties, the registers which record the composition of the military forces do rely on such a distinction. These registers were drawn up with a financial intent, their main interest for their compilers being whether those listed therein were paid directly from the state coffers, receiving a trimensal salary, or whether, in the case of the sipahis, they were rewarded from revenue sources which had been alienated by the state. This second type of remuneration was outside the purview of the annual state accounts of the Central Treasury.

So much more flexible was the military organisation of the Ottoman Empire in practice than in theory, that none of the models of analysis proposed to date is adequate to explain the functioning of the army within the contemporary historical context. In place of the traditional categories

3. For a discussion of the meaning of the term kul see Ménage (1966) esp. pp.66-69.

of kul and sipahi, which overtly rely on the method of remuneration as one of the factors distinguishing one class from the other, we may suggest as being more significant the functional dichotomy between garrison and mobile troops, or that between combat and auxiliary troops. But such categories were not sharply-enough distinguished in the Ottoman army at this time; although such terms will be used in the discussion which follows, they do not pretend to have any significance beyond the purely descriptive.

In attempting to escape from the straitjacket imposed by most surveys of the Ottoman army at this period, the present chapter on manpower and mobilisation will look instead for answers to rather more general questions, and the discussion will be ordered accordingly. These questions are: (a) Who were the troops of the Ottoman army fighting in the 1593-1606 Hungarian campaigns? (b) How were they mobilised, and what was the pattern of their attendance over the years of the war? and (c) What were the levels of remuneration of the cash-paid troops, and what was the pattern of the payment of their wages? Additional sections describe those 'foreign' troops who fought as part of the Ottoman army, and finally, and briefly, the auxiliary forces whose duty it was to ensure logistic support for the combat army.

Iii. Army Recruitment and Composition

The first question, then, is how the Ottoman army in Hungary at this time was recruited, and what was the identity of the troops who participated in the campaigns. Our concern is less with the social and ethnic origins of the soldiers, but rather with their identity as defined in terms of their military status. It was true of the Ottoman Empire, as of the contemporary European powers, that with the introduction of new techniques of war its military manpower had seen a steady growth in numbers and a change in the balance between the various components of the army.⁴ For the Ottomans, certain changes in the structure and size of the army were imposed by the gradual transition from the early days, when expansion into, and then control over, a territory could be effected by the raids and field battles of a mobile army of predominantly cavalry troops (often serving for no longer than one campaigning season), to an Empire with more or less stable borders protected by garrison troops.⁵ Once the nature of warfare had changed so radically, continuing reliance on an army which had a preponderance of cavalry who functioned as cavalry troops had traditionally functioned, was inappropriate. Among other factors, the relative cheapness of equipping musketeer infantry allowed a concomitant increase in numbers, which in turn made military service an option available to a much wider group.

A provincial sipahi was a horseman who was obliged to appear as required on military campaigns, in return for which he had the power of collection and appropriation of certain

4. Parker (1976) discusses the changes which took place in contemporary European armies.

5. For a study of the administrative measures used by the Ottomans to consolidate their hold over conquered territories, see Inalcik (1954).

agricultural and other state dues. Depending on the size of his benefice (dirlik), he was further obliged to bring with him to campaign a certain number of armed men (cebelü) and retainers. Provisions regarding the number of such followers were laid down in kanun,⁶ and for sipahis with smaller benefices of up to 10,000 akçe yield p.a., did not exceed three or four. These stipulations were the legal minimum, and Koçi Bey is probably correct when he says that "in former times" the better-off sipahis used to take with them large numbers of men, although his suggestion that they did so purely from the desire to please God is less easy to credit.⁷

The broad outlines of the recruitment of the provincial cavalry are known, but it is not immediately apparent who their cebelü were. In the secondary literature they are usually described as horsemen, but there appears to be no conclusive evidence that they were all mounted: mobilisation orders, as preserved in the Mühimme registers, give no

6. Ayn-i Ali (AYN-I ALI/a p.10) indicates as much, under the heading kanun-i mirmiran, and (ibid. pp.11-36) gives a list of the numbers of cebelü to be expected from each sancak. The date to which his list applies is not clear; having no indications to the contrary, it appears that the ratio between the number of cebelü whom a timariot was obliged to bring to campaign, and the size of his benefice, did not change over time, at least officially, even as the structure of the timar system changed.

7. KOÇI BEY p.26. In MUSTETAB (pp.15-16) the numbers of cebelü attending campaign with beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis are given: while the beylerbeyis used to campaign with at least 200-300 "yarar cebelüleri" and "now" bring only 40-50 at most, the number brought by sancakbeyis had similarly shown a decline from 100-150 to 10-15 each.

indication that they were required to be on horseback.⁸ It is likely that these cebelü were members of the sipahi's household with askeri rather than reaya status.⁹ For the beneficiaries of the smaller dirliks this distinction is not particularly significant, but in the case of the beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis who did have large personal retinues, members of their households would have had a greater stake in the success of the military enterprise, which would have accordingly swollen the numbers of those willing to go on campaign.¹⁰ There are indications in the terminology employed in the mobilisation orders, that the kul of beys did campaign freely with their masters, the designations "adam", and "tabi..." being equivalent with kul in this context,¹¹ where kul merely indicates 'retainer'.¹²

In the early stages of the 1593-1606 war, as we shall see, there was flexibility as to which of the provincial sipahi forces would be called-up in any year and which would stay at home as a local security force. As manpower demands

8. Concerning the cebelü accompanying the timariots, typical descriptions, of which there were many variations in wording but not in content, are: "...ve sen dahi kanun üzere cebe ve cevşen ve cebelülerinle müheyya ve hazır olasın" (MD 71/81), or "...kanun üzere cebelülerin ile müretteb ve mükemmel düşman yarağıyle..." (MD 77/74).

9. Cvetkova (1978) p.10 considers it probable that it was the "serviteurs" of the beys who fought with them as cebelü in the early days.

10. Our knowledge of the composition and nature of the households of the provincial beys is almost negligible, almost the sole efforts at understanding them being those of Abou-el-Haj (1974) & Kunt (1981;1983).

11. Röhrborn (1973) pp.65,66. For examples, see MD 73/470: "...sen yarar ve tuvana müsellaah ve mükemmel adamlar besleyüp"; MD 77/432: "...yanında olan yarar adamlarınla muaccelen kalkup".

12. Ménage (1966) p.66 notes that the terms kulluk and hizmet were often interchangeable, and denoted 'service' without implication of 'servitude'.

became more pressing, the purview of the orders for the mobilisation of the provincial sipahis came to include also those who were at the time out of office (mazul) or were awaiting confirmation of their appointment to a dirlik (known as eli emrlü).¹³ Also considered as eli emrlü may have been those described as "iptidadan ve sülüsan üzere zeamet ve timara ellerinde ahkam-i şerife olanlar ve havadan berat edenler", whose claims would be implemented if they performed well on campaign.¹⁴ There could never be a perfect equilibrium between the number of kiliç timaris available and the number of potential sipahis, so there were always some of the sipahi class unable to be accommodated.¹⁵ Although they must have been locally registered, these two groups, and those described as mütekaid (retired members of the sipahi class who were no longer competing for dirliks), fall outside the scope of estimates of the number of sipahis in the Empire, since such surveys are based on the number of kiliç timaris, that is the number of sipahis who were

13. Röhrborn (1973) p.91.

14. MD 71/59. An iptida timar was the first timar held by a new entrant to the provincial sipahi class (Röhrborn, 1973 p.91). A sülüsan timar was conferred on someone who had formerly been receiving cash remuneration from the state: if his pay had been y akçe p.d., he was entitled to a timar yielding two-thirds of y x 1000 akçe p.a. (Röhrborn, 1973 pp.33-34; Akdağ, 1975 p.375). The description "havadan berat edenler" is not well-attested, but may refer to those who held worthless timar deeds, and may perhaps be equated with those whose timars had been abolished: in 1595, all the zuama and timariots whose zeamets and timars had been abolished ("mensuhattan zeamet ve timara mutasarrif olan...") were ordered to go on campaign with the imperial fleet (MD 73/182).

15. The kiliç timari was the basic core-unit of timar land, always assigned intact, and to which additional land-parcels were added to create timar holdings of varying size. The number of kiliç timaris in the Empire set a maximum to the number of sipahis registered in possession of timar lands.

actually in receipt of alienated revenues at any time.¹⁶

Outstanding service on campaign, often assessed by the tally of heads brought in, had always been rewarded with timars,¹⁷ and this incentive was offered as an encouragement to those who fell outside a more restricted application of the rules for eligibility for consideration as a timar-holder.¹⁸ Such men initially went on campaign without compensation, except that of booty,¹⁹ and in the hope that they would be upgraded in status to the ranks of the timariots.²⁰ They were referred to as gönüllü and garip yiğitler.²¹ In late 1605 an order was sent to the beylerbeyis of the vilayets of Eğri, Buda, Kanije and Bosnia that a differential rate of pay was to be applied to those who volunteered on foot and on horseback;²² not long after, however, to be mounted was set as a condition of entry into the gönüllü corps, those who did not

16. MD 77 contains many orders to these categories of soldier; see also Fekete A.DVN.1011.11.15 n.3827.

17. For some earlier examples, see Barkan, art. Timar (IA) pp.313-14.

18. Röhrborn (1973) p.29: into the second half of the sixteenth century, it was the sons of timariots who monopolised the vacancies which occurred.

19. MD 77/202; MD 77/204; MD 77/539

20. AK f.131v; AK f.161v, while the troops were at Şikloş (Siklós) on the way to besiege Kanije in 1600: "..gönüllü garip yiğitler dirlik ümidi ile defter olurup"; MD 75/385: "...ve sair dirliğe taleb olan yarar yiğitler".

21. The term gönüllü was widely used to describe any who volunteered to serve; see, for instance, MD 75/492: "...ve gazadan safası olan gönüllü yarar yiğitler". Inalcık, art. Gönüllü (EI) notes that it could also be applied to a specific class of garrison troops. Röhrborn (1973) p.31 shows how, in the sixteenth century, those who were sons of timariots without an automatic right to a dirlik could win that right by meritorious military service as gönüllü.

22. MD 77/230

have horses and the correct arms and equipment being demoted to the rank of foot soldiers (yaya, yayak).²³

A practice inconsistent with the distinction between a 'land-based' provincial force and a 'cash-based' central force was that of awarding timars to officials of the central administration. Müteferrikas and çavuşes, and clerks (katib) and apprentices (sagird) of the bureaucracy were awarded timar revenues, and, in consequence, like the sipahi forces, were often required to mobilise in event of a campaign. On the Hotin campaign in 1621, the number of such men present was over 4,000, within a total of c.14,000 timariots from the same provinces,²⁴ but it is also apparent that there were many such on the Estergon campaign of 1605.²⁵ Despite being government officials (ehl-i kalem) in origin, they took part in the fighting along with other combat troops.²⁶ Instructions regarding the call-up of these troops were contained in the same orders as those for the provincial sipahis. However, it seems that after such an initial order had been sent, usually to the beylerbeyi of a province, their departure to campaign was separately organised. It was counted a great affliction for them that they should have to go together with the sipahis, and they went separately, as had always been the case ("kadimden olageldüğü üzere").²⁷ The tension between these ehl-i kalem and the sipahi troops is illustrated in a letter sent to the Porte by the sipahis of Bosnia, in which they complained

23. MD 77/513

24. Barkan, art. Timar (IA) p.327

25. Mutafchieva (1968) pp.22-23.

26. MD 77/375: "...when Estergon castle was conquered, they served in the trenches and in the assaults many times, and participated in the repair of the castles of Estergon and Tepedelen". (Tepedelen was a castle within the town of Estergon).

27. MD 77/375

that the best timars were being conferred on these officers of the central administration and few kilic timaris were available for the traditional provincial class.²⁸

The age at which the son of a provincial sipahi who graduated to his deceased father's timar was obliged to go to war in person, was raised in 1536 from 10 years old to 16 years old.²⁹ Whether the same age limit was common to all categories of troops is not clear: there certainly was a limit of some sort, since those considered as juveniles (sabi) served under special conditions. The underage sons of çavuşes and katibs of the Porte who had timars and who had served in the capture of Estergon were subsequently not to be considered eligible for campaign, but ordered to serve instead in the divan.³⁰ Juveniles who volunteered to serve as gönüllü on campaign were not to be admitted into the regular army.³¹

The units of the altı bölük, the six regiments of the sultan's household cavalry, were the sipahiyan, the silahdaran, the ulufeciyan-i yemin and -yesar, and the gurebayan-i yemin and -yesar. They were part of the kapukulu ocakları, the standing army of the Porte, whose other principal units, besides the janissaries, were the armourers (cebeci), cannoners (topçu), and those in charge of the gun carriages (top arabacısı).³² At any time there were kapukulu troops scattered throughout the Empire as well as in Istanbul, policing and garrisoning its towns and fortresses. Kapukulu troops serving in the provinces were

28. MD 72/536

29. Gökbilgin (1968) p.44.

30. MD 77/511

31. MD 77/230: they were not be given a gedik, a permanent place in one of the corps.

32. The standard work on the kapukulu ocakları is Uzunçarşılı (1943).

designated as such by the epithet ...-i dergah-i ali. There were also men serving outside Istanbul who bore the same designation as their kapukulu counterparts, but who were not directly associated with the Porte. These latter are referred to by Uzunçarşılı as "yerli" ("local") janissaries, cebecis etc,³³ and the distinction between them and the Porte troops is drawn in the separate categories according to which their wages were paid: for the wages of the troops in the account of the vilayet of Buda in 1008 AH (1599-1600), for instance, separate items of expenditure record:

a) be-cihet-i mevacib-i cemaat-i müstahfizan ve topçuyan ve arabacıyan ve cebeciyan...ve farisan...ve azeban ve martolosan...,

and

b) be-cihet-i mevacib-i...cebeciyan ve topçuyan ve arabacıyan-i dergah-i ali der muhafaza-yi Budun...³⁴

The former were locally-recruited men who served permanently on the borders, rather than merely doing so on a rotational basis (be-nöbet), as did, in principle, the dergah-i ali troops.³⁵

The departure on campaign of the kapukulu, and especially of the janissaries,³⁶ created a gap in the local security forces. Those who were not ehl-i sefer (eligible for

33. Uzunçarşılı (1943) I pp.3-4

34. Mxt.638 f.2v

35. Georgieva (1970) describes exactly this distinction with reference to the janissaries of Bulgaria. Although much of her material is from the eighteenth century, her conclusions square well with the information we have for Hungary during this war.

36. Mobilisation orders suggest that all janissaries were obliged to go on campaign, e.g. MD 72/827; MD 73/135; MD 73/141; MD 73/874.

campaign), the korucus and oturaks (janissaries no longer capable of campaign duty on account of age or incapacity)³⁷ were sent back to Istanbul to their barracks,³⁸ from where they could maintain public order in that city. Hence, with the korucus and oturaks in Istanbul, and the yasakcis³⁹ (janissary police officials) summoned from the towns and sent on campaign,⁴⁰ others had to be found to keep the peace. How far the security responsibility of the sipahis who stayed at home to guard the provinces extended to fill the gaps left in the security forces in time of war is not clear. In the summer of 1605, solak Ahmed was appointed to take on the duties of the yasakcis of the 6 kazas of Ahyoli, Misivri, Rusi-kasri, Karinabad, Hatun-ili and Aydos,⁴¹ a major task which he clearly could not have fulfilled without local assistance.

The janissary corps in Damascus was the subject of special orders, and 5-600 of its members were summoned to come to campaign in Hungary.⁴² In the opinion of a contemporary Italian consul, these Syrian musket-men were the best in the sultan's army.⁴³ Greater care was paid to filling vacancies in their ranks than was the case elsewhere. It was from the ranks of the rum beyleri that new recruits were to be selected, and then only with the consent of the Porte, since those described as arab, tat and cepni were not considered

37. KAVANIN ff.40r,49r,63v.

38. MD 74/37; MD 74/211; MD 75/44; MD 75/82; MD 75/451

39. Georgieva (1970) pp.327-30

40. MD 75/44; MD 75/451

41. MD 75/86: "...zikr olunan kazalarda olan yasakcilar ref olunup yerlerine solak Ahmed...tayin olunup".

42. MD 72/184; MD 72/343; MD 72/437; MD 72/438

43. Griswold (1983) p.246: the consul observed that 500 went to the war in Hungary every year.

of high enough calibre.⁴⁴ The special status of this group of janissaries derived from their role as guardians of the sacred standard of the Prophet, which was taken on campaign in Hungary for the first time in 1593.⁴⁵ When they arrived at Osek (Osijek) in July 1600 for the Kanije campaign, they were described by Abdülkadir as being armed with muskets, which was usual for janissaries at this time, and also as being mounted,⁴⁶ which was not.⁴⁷

The kapukulu were particularly assiduous in their attempts to evade campaign duty, a practice common in the army at this time. Some obtained orders to the effect that they had official employment in Egypt, and therefore contrived to be put on the pay-roll of the Egyptian Treasury. When their subterfuge was discovered, and they were ordered to mobilise for campaign, the authorities in Egypt were told not to pay them any longer, in the hope that they would be forced to return to their proper duties.⁴⁸

It is abundantly clear that whatever validity the earlier principle of distinguishing askeri and reaya may have had, the military authorities were in no way exclusive about recruitment into the army by the 1590s. Nor could they

44. MD 72/271. A similar order was made in 1577: the term rum in this context is explained by Heyd as referring to the provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli; tat refers to those of non-Turkish origin, while cepni was a widespread tribe of Anatolia centred around Trabzon (Heyd, 1960 pp.57,68).

45. Uzunçarşılı (1945) pp.248-50.

46. AK f.129v; further references to their presence on campaign during this war may be found at AK ff.4r,32r,52r,61v.

47. MD 72/834 also makes reference to the many mounted janissaries with the janissary agha ("hayli atlu").

48. MD 73/644; MD 75/199

afford to be. The demand for manpower overrode all other considerations regarding the preservation of a 'pure' askeri class, regret at the demise of which is exemplified in the writings of authors such as Koçi Bey. Just as there was competition for recruits from central Europe between the two parts of the Hapsburg army, the one fighting in Flanders and the other in Hungary,⁴⁹ so it is evident that the services of the populations on their common border were competed for by Hapsburg and Ottoman. The Ottoman policy of encouraging reaya settlement in the borderlands by means of tax exemptions was aimed as much at increasing the pool of available fighters as at future treasury gains. It was particularly toward the close of the war, after a measure of peace had been achieved in eastern Hungary with the successful anti-Hapsburg rebellion of Bocskai, that there was a movement of people from Hapsburg-held into Ottoman-held territory.⁵⁰

When a border was left insufficiently protected, as happened in Bosnia in 1595 when the soldiers of Bosnia were deployed in Buda, the reaya had no alternative but to take up arms in self-defence.⁵¹ In the same year, the attack by Michael of Wallachia on the briefly Ottoman-held Tergovište (Tirgovište) led Sinan Pasha to call up everyone he could.⁵² By the end of the war, when demands on the Persian front tied up a large part of the Anatolian troops, all able-bodied men were enlisted. The main recruiting ground was Bosnia, which previously had been a prime source for the devşirme levies, and whose fighting men had a reputation for bravery.⁵³ Those with horses were preferred ("ata ve dona

49. Parker (1981) p.42

50. MD 77/210; MD 77/270; MD 77/563; MD 77/600; MD 77/650

51. MD 73/188

52. AK f.44r: "...ve her canibden Eflak ve Boğdan reayaların sürüp".

53. Majer (1984) pp.105-6.

kadir"),⁵⁴ but any fit reaya was acceptable.⁵⁵

Indeed, the formal and widescale recruitment of reaya into the Ottoman army was perhaps the single most significant feature of its composition in this war. The permanent garrisoning of the border did not begin with the 1593-1606 war: describing the Hungarian army of the sixteenth century, Maksay notes that in the first half of the century the number of its infantry troops was much smaller than the number of cavalry, while by the end of the century this gap was considerably narrowed, and the ratio perhaps even reversed. He attributes the impetus for this trend to the development of the fortress system from about 1550.⁵⁶ It is no surprise that the composition of the Ottoman army in Hungary followed a similar path. Warfare in Europe had become static by this time, with sieges rather than field-battles being the usual form of military engagement. The Hungarian plain, where much of the activity of this war took place, was dominated by a few large towns and a network of fortresses: the struggle for control was thus a struggle for control over these garrisoned strongholds. Braudel aptly describes such an environment as a "continental island".⁵⁷

The demand for extra manpower was primarily a demand for musketeers (tüfenkendaz) to fight the Hapsburgs on their own terms. This demand could be met quickly and cheaply through

54. MD 77/202; MD 77/213: "ata ve dona kadir olan kasabat ve kura halkı"; MD 77/221.

55. MD 77/194: "...zuama ve erbab-i timar ve dahi reaya ve gönüllü taifesinden vafir asker tedarik edüp"; MD 77/214: "...cenk ve harba kadir raiyyet taifesıyla...". A general mobilisation (nefir-i am) was ordered in the province of Buda in 1597: "...yarar ve kiliç eri bir ferd kalmayup gönül birliğin edüp hemen mübaşeret edelim" (AK f.95r).

56. Maksay (1982) p.262

57. Quoted in Parker (1976) p.204

the recruitment of reaya. Although the state had to pay the salaries of some of these troops (others were furnished on a rotation basis from among their peers),⁵⁸ the necessary skills were quickly learnt, and the units became operationally effective within a short time. There were many names used for the various units, some of which are attested from the earliest times of Ottoman conquest in the Balkans. Some of the terms adopted had originally denoted the specific tasks performed by the men comprising these units, but were by now more a matter of taxonomical rather than functional differentiation. Among these units, which we shall denote by the generic name levend,⁵⁹ were martolos, faris, azeb, müstahfiz, hisar eri, etc.⁶⁰ In terms of their capacity to meet the manpower needs of the Ottoman army on this border, they filled a vital gap, and their recruitment in large numbers marked the final demise of any pretence that the Ottoman army consisted in the efficient balance between kul

58. A description of this arrangement is found at Inalcik, art. Eshkindji (EI): it did not only apply to auxiliary forces.

59. Cezar (1965) pp.3-29 discusses the changing historical usages of the term levend and its sometime equivalent sekban. In Inalcik's usage, levend denotes a landless vagrant peasant, while sekbans were the armed bands into which such individuals were formed (Inalcik, 1980 pp.285,290). My usage is thus compatible with Cezar's miri levend (Cezar, 1965 pp.343-67), that is, soldiers conscripted by the government when it had need of extra manpower, and who were paid by the state, in contrast to the companies of levend-sekbans of Inalcik, whose character and role is discussed at length below.

60. Cvetkova (1978) pp.32-39. There is a wide, and to me inaccessible, literature in serbo-croat on these border troops. Of particular interest to present-day Yugoslav historians are the groups with non-muslim, and therefore pre-ottoman, antecedents, for instance, premkir, knez, martolos, voynuk and pandor. On one example of such incorporation into the Ottoman military structure, see Vasić (1977) pp.30-41. See also MD 77/456; 77/544; MD 77/545; MD 77/568; MD 77/643; MD 77/659.

and sipahi.

We will here turn to an analysis of the substance of Inalcik's recent perspective on the recruitment of troops into the Ottoman army during the Hungarian war. He has proposed that the Ottoman army's increasing demand for military manpower, a demand which it was unable to fill from traditional sources, had a wider importance than the purely military. He cites it as the critical factor drawing men away from the land, and thus as being a cause of the Celali revolts of the turn of the seventeenth century. He contends that once demobilised, and retaining their firearms, men who had been recruited to make up for a shortage of manpower were able to sell their services to the highest bidder and so constitute a disruptive force in the provinces. In favour of this new interpretation, he gives less importance to previous theories that the Celali unrest was either due to a general economic deterioration, or to population pressure as manifested in an imbalance between population growth and production output.⁶¹

In so far as it concerns our attempt to determine who were the troops of reaya origin fighting in this war, the main thrust of Inalcik's argument is that the Ottomans hired companies of men armed with muskets and known as sekban, who owed allegiance only to their immediate commanders:

"What distinguished the sixteenth-century practice...was that this time the recruitment was, in Anatolia, from among the vagrant levends armed with muskets, and that the new recruits were grouped

61. Inalcik (1975/b) esp. pp.196-201; Inalcik (1980) esp. pp.285-86.

into special companies called sekban bölükleri".⁶²

He also contends that Anatolia was the most important area for the hiring of such troops.⁶³ Thus, in our present examination of the composition of the Ottoman forces in Hungary we should expect to find evidence of the significant role played by companies of musketmen, recruited in Anatolia, and bearing the name sekban.

Close attention to the contemporary evidence shows, however, that there is room for some modification to Inalcik's assessment of army composition in the 1593-1606 war.⁶⁴ It is clear that the Ottomans did recruit large numbers of extra men during the course of the war, both through expanding the established kapukulu corps such as the janissaries,⁶⁵ and also by the employment of reaya musketmen, designated as tüfenkendaz. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which such tüfenkendaz troops of reaya origin were demobilised after the Hungarian campaigns. While it is still a

62. Inalcik (1980) p.292; Griswold (1983) pp.12,25,47,63 draws a strict, but, as Cezar shows, unwarranted distinction between sekban as infantry, and levend as mounted musketmen. The word sekban is thought to derive from the Persian sag: dog, and ban: guardian. The sekban were the keepers of the sultan's dogs in early Ottoman times, and a division of the janissary corps. How the term came to be used for the provincial soldiers whose role is under discussion here, is not clear: see Joel, art. Sekban (IA).

63. Inalcik (1975/b) p.200.

64. A further elaboration to the hypothesis concerning these 'irregular' troops, which does not yet appear well-substantiated, is that the musketmen discharged at the end of the Persian wars in 1590 started to cause trouble in Anatolia, and that official concern that such potentially disruptive elements be controlled and usefully employed gave impetus to a policy of warfare in Hungary (Griswold, 1983 p.10).

65. Inalcik (1980) pp.288-91.

matter of debate whether the men who deserted the field of battle at Mezőkeresztes in 1596 were an important injection of expertise and discontent into the ranks of the Celali forces,⁶⁶ so there is no convincing evidence of the mass demobilisation of tüfenkendaz troops at the end of the war.

In reassessing Inalcık's hypothesis on the basis of the primary source material for this Hungarian war, three conclusions may be drawn. First, it is hard to get any idea of the numbers of men demobilised from the Hungarian front at the end of the war; it seems, rather, that the numbers of reaya who enlisted in the army more permanently, as garrison troops, were greater than those men only temporarily recruited. Since the border had to be effectively garrisoned in peace too, there was a continuingly high demand by the Ottomans for military manpower in Hungary; the Persian wars had started again, and the laying-off of such

66. Compare Akdağ (1975) pp.374-76, the essence of whose argument is that it was not the sipahis who fled at Mezőkeresztes who played a major role in the Celali revolts, and Griswold (1983) p.19-21,26. Those of the alti bölük who had fled and consequently been stripped of their commissions were reinstated after campaign service in the following year (KK 254 p.90).

troops only to recruit anew would be surprising.⁶⁷

Secondly, the idea that Anatolia was the most important region for the hiring of tüfenkendaz appears to have no relevance for the Hungarian war. As Inalcık agrees, Bosnia and Albania were the areas from which the Ottomans drew their best troops, and references to the hiring of men from these regions are common in the sources of the period.⁶⁸

Inalcık supports his insistence on Asia Minor as "the most important region of tüfenkendaz soldiers"⁶⁹ for the Hungarian war of 1593-1606 with only one document, in which, in 1605, the grand vezir asks that the sancakbeyi of Menteşe be ordered to come quickly to the Hungarian campaign "...küllü

67. Inalcık does not seem to be certain about the extent to which the reaya were demobilised viz. Inalcık (1980) p.292: "While before the reaya used to return home to resume their regular way of living after a campaign, they now (i.e. in the sixteenth century) stayed on as professional soldiers"; compare Inalcık (1975/b) p.200-01 in which he describes the enrolment of sekban, observing how each company was given a standard by the sultan which was taken back when the company was dissolved; he notes that "After their contract of service had expired, the sekban...looked for new employment in the service of the pashas of the beys." The references on which Inalcık bases this later passage do not, however, give proof that such sekban companies were important in the Hungarian war of 1593-1606 viz.: Cezar (1965) p.383 describes the formation of a süvari (cavalry) levend company in 1008 AH (1599-1600), in Anatolia, and for the assistance of the beylerbeyi of Baghdad at Hamadan, and does not use the term sekban; Cezar (1965) p.399 refers to a campaign in 1102 AH (1690-91). I have been unable to consult Uluçay, Ç. Saruhan'da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri pp.464-47 (Istanbul, 1944).

68. The campaign account for 1007-09 AH (1599-1601) has an entry showing that there were also musketeers from Tunis and Algiers: "İnam-i bazı tüfenkendazan ki an Cezayir ve Turus ve Bosna amedend" (KK 1879 p.15).

69. Inalcık (1975/b) p.200

tüfenkendaz sekban ve cebelü ile".⁷⁰ The importance of Anatolia as a recruiting ground thus appears to be more relevant for events in that area, rather than on the Hungarian front. The numbers of demobilised tüfenkendaz in Bosnia and Albania was clearly not so great as to cause a Celali-type revolt in those provinces, which alone suggests that conditions on the two sides of the Empire should not be equated.

A third point is that it does not seem that the numbers of sekbans participating in this war were very considerable. Cezar quotes several references from Naima's History regarding their presence in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth century;⁷¹ however, Naima's History is, as Lewis Thomas has shown, a compilation and not a primary source,⁷² and we cannot therefore be certain that the first-hand accounts which he used had employed the term sekban. One example chosen by Cezar to prove his thesis particularly catches our attention: he cites Naima quoting the passage in Peçevi's History in which Peçevi guesses at the numbers of troops going to campaign in 1594.⁷³ Naima says:

70. Orhonlu (1970) p.98 quoted by Inalcık (1980) p.288.

71. Cezar (1965) pp.364-67. In addition to Naima's use of the term sekban, Cezar (ibid. p.18) notes that it is the later writers Silahdar and Raşid who use the term frequently; this must reflect the greater significance of the sekban in the second half of the seventeenth century.

72. See Thomas (1972) for discussion of the sources of Naima's History.

73. Cezar (1965) p.366.

"...Sultan Süleyman merhumdan sonra Engürus seferi vaki olmamağla, halk ganimet ümidiyle teşne idi; Rumeli askeri kadar dirliksiz asker gelmişti."⁷⁴

Cezar proposes that these troops who did not have benefices (dirliksiz), who were equal in number to the sipahis of Rumeli, were levend and sekban. Looking at the original text of Peçevi, we find:

"...Sultan Süleyman Han'dan sonra Engüruse sefer olmamağla dünya Engürus seferine arzumend olmağla belki gelen mazulleri ve ganimet ümidin eden bahadırlar başka Rumeli askeri kadar leşker idi."⁷⁵

Leaving aside criticism of Cezar for failing to compare the Naima passage with that of Peçevi, Naima's declared source, on the basis of the Naima passage alone, by equating dirliksiz with levend and sekban, Cezar is using the most general definition of these terms, which is surprising in view of the well-documented attempt to understand the meaning of the terms which his book for the most part embodies. Peçevi's passage suggests, rather, that Naima's dirliksiz troops are those whom we have earlier referred to as mazul, gönüllü and garip yiğitler, rather than sekban in the somewhat pejorative sense in which Inalcık uses the term.

Turning to Abdülkadir's account of the Hungarian wars, we find that he rarely makes reference to sekban companies:

74. NAIMA I pp.167-68: "Because there had been no Hungarian campaign since the (time of the) late Sultan Süleyman, the people were yearning for booty; as many soldiers 'without benefices' (dirliksiz) came as there were Rumeli troops".

75. PEÇEVI II p.156: "Because there had been no Hungarian campaign after (the time of) Sultan Süleyman Han, (and) because everyone wished for a campaign in Hungary, perhaps as many troops came of those 'out of office' (mazul) and of heroes hoping for booty, as there were Rumeli troops".

those which he does mention appear to be a force attached to the person of the grand vezir Damad Ibrahim Pasha, under the command of his kethüda, Mehmed.⁷⁶ In Abdülkadir's account, these sekbans are first encountered as Ibrahim Pasha leaves Istanbul for Hungary in 1599, and they number 500;⁷⁷ at the loss of Istolni Belgrad in 1601, Peçevi refers to the same sekban force of Mehmed kethüda, putting their number at 600,⁷⁸ while Abdulkadir says that they numbered 1,000 at this time.⁷⁹ In November of the same year, Mehmed kethüda's sekbans were appointed to Buda, to garrison the city through the winter.⁸⁰ Few of the available sultanic orders for the Hungarian war mention sekbans, and of these, fewer still are relevant to the composition of the Ottoman forces in Hungary. Three documents date from March 1594: two of these require that the sancakbeyis of Kars, Aintab and İçil should recruit "otuz nefer yarar tüfenkendaz sekbanlar", in addition to the timariot forces with whom they were to come to the Hungarian campaign,⁸¹ while the third orders 30 tüfenkendaz sekbans from each of the sancaks of the vilayet of Rum.⁸² For the 1605 campaign season, when the Persian war limited the numbers of Anatolian troops available to fight in Hungary, orders were sent that something over 1,300 tüfenkendaz sekbans should be raised from fifteen of the

76. AK f.142v

77. AK f.113v

78. PEÇEVI II p.237

79. AK ff.142v,146v

80. AK ff.149v

81. MD 72/221; MD 72/222: since these orders were copied to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, the hakims of Adana and Uzeyr, and the beys of Tripoli and Sis, it is probable that they too each had to bring 30 sekbans; see also MD 72/774.

82. MD 72/886

Balkan sancaks, in addition to the cebelüs of the area.⁸³ In the context of the great numbers of men fighting in this war, sekban contingents of this size can hardly be considered significant.

To sum up then, Inalcık's hypothesis that the increased numbers of men who had access to handguns was a factor of great significance in the ensuing decades of decentralisation is not contested here. But the details of the dynamics of such an arming of the reaya in the 1593-1606 war do need clarification. First of all, evidence suggests that the so-called sekban units, organised under local auspices, and recruited rather in the manner of the military contractors of contemporary Europe,⁸⁴ were not of tremendous importance in Hungary in 1593-1606; the evidence available for sekban participation shows that rather small numbers were involved.

Secondly, musketeers for the Hungarian wars were, for the most part, locally recruited. Without entering into further discussion of the meaning of the term sekban at this time, the significance of this is that the recruitment for these Hungarian wars differed from the later pattern of recruitment in which such companies of musketeers acted as mercenaries in the true sense of the word: when not employed in government service, they sold their services to the highest bidder, a fact which, as Inalcık says, had far-reaching consequences in the establishment of local power bases able to oppose the monopoly of power by the central

83. MD 77/69: from Iskenderiye 500 sekbans were to be sent to campaign; from Yanya, 300; from Avlonya, 100; from Köstendil, 60; from Mora, Tirhala and Ohri, 50 each; from Selanik and Vulçitrin, 40 each; from Delvine and Alacahisar, 30 each; from Usküb and Elbasan, 20 each; and from Hersek and Klis, an unspecified number.

84. Inalcık (1980) p.296

state.

Looting and raiding in the vanguard of the army during the early days of the Ottoman presence in the Balkans, on the margins of the expanding state, were the irregular cavalry (akinci). They were a force used mainly in Europe rather than Anatolia.⁸⁵ They were a highly mobile force who benefited from tax exemptions and the hope of booty in exchange for performing this task.⁸⁶ Akinci status passed from father to son,⁸⁷ and all those registered as such had to appear on campaign, an obligation which overrode any other identity which the individual may have acquired. The excuses of those akinci and their sons who had managed to become servants of the state in another capacity, as garrison troops for instance, and for which service they had managed to obtain remuneration from the state in the form of dirlik, were warned that they were first of all akinci, and therefore their presence was required on campaign.⁸⁸ To escape their obligations they sought refuge with provincial office-holders, who were clearly content to protect them.⁸⁹

Although the numbers of akinci had undoubtedly declined since the days when they had a well-defined role to play in warfare, it appears that the authorities were concerned that they should keep their traditional status. This was for financial reasons: it was more desirable that they should not lose their identity and have to be paid by the state. The opportunities for raiding were considerably reduced by the time of these campaigns, and the akinci had to compete

85. Decei, art. Akinci (EI)

86. MD 77/542

87. MD 77/540

88. MD 77/98; MD 77/506

89. MD 75/388; MD 77/98

with the Tatars for a declining share in the spoils of war. Shortly after the war, Koçi Bey remarked ruefully that if the numbers of akinci had not declined so, it would have been unnecessary to call on Tatar assistance in campaigns.⁹⁰ As we will see later, the participation of the Tatars on campaign was considered to be a necessary evil. During this war, the akinci were employed both in auxiliary tasks such as clearing trees which obstructed the way, and bridge-building, as well as in the work performed by the mass of the undifferentiated troops who served in the trenches during sieges.⁹¹

90. KOÇI BEY p.26.

91. AK ff.18v,36v,131r,131v,191v

Iiii. Mobilisation

The pattern of mobilisation of the provincial cavalry remained basically unchanged over a long period. Orders sent out in the winter gave details of which sections of the sipahi forces were expected to be present on campaign the following spring, where they were to muster in the theatre of war, and the date by which they were to have arrived.⁹² The troops gathered first in small groups, at district (nahiye) level, these nahiye groups combining at kaza level. The troops of the kazas of each sancak joined together, and then the sancaks of each vilayet under the overall command of the beylerbeyi. The mustering of the troops of each sancak were the responsibility of the alaybeyi, chosen from among the sipahis of each sancak. The assembled troops of the Anatolian provinces were usually ferried across from Asia at Gelibolu, well away from the capital where their presence would undoubtedly have caused some disruption. In an attempt to avoid disturbance at the crossing points, it was strictly ordered that wine should not be sold, with the threat of severe penalty for those vendors who ignored the warning.⁹³

Once across at Gelibolu, the Asian sipahis made for Belgrade. If, as frequently happened, the serdar had wintered there, the Asian troops were required to muster in Sirem, the area between the rivers Sava and Danube to the west of Belgrade. The European sipahis joined the main body of the army along the way, as they emerged from winter quarters. The official start of campaign was on Ruz-i Hizr,

92. Parry, art. Harb (EI) refers to primarily western sources describing Ottoman mobilisation. For the mobilisation of Süleyman's forces for the campaign of 1566, see Káldy-Nagy (1977) pp.174-83.

93. MD 72/103

St. Georges Day, which fell on 3 May N.S., and orders typically required that the sipahis should leave their homes on Nevruz (21 March N.S.), to arrive at the mustering point on Ruz-i Hizr.⁹⁴ Here a full roll-call (yoklama) was taken of those present, interim roll-calls having been made during the time that the troops were gathering in the provinces.

In reality, there were always circumstances which distorted this neat picture of the mobilisation of the army. The numbers of those available in any year were dependent on the demands of local security, both internally, to counter possible bandit activity, and also, later in the war, to meet the external threat posed by renewed hostilities on the Persian border. Early in the war, in 1594, when it was clearly not expected that it would last for so many years, the framers of the mobilisation orders were able to adopt a rather relaxed attitude. The Persian war was recently over, and the Persians were in no position to create disturbance in Anatolia. There appears to have been [no] significant internal unrest in Anatolia at this time, and so in the east Anatolian provinces a security force composed of timariots with benefices yielding less than 6,000 akçe annually was directed to remain at home, while timariots with larger benefices went to campaign.⁹⁵ For the vilayet of Anadolu, the cut-off point was set lower, and the sancaks of Hüdavendigâr, Hamid, Kastamonu, Kangri, Bolu and Teke were each to be guarded by 40 timariots with benefices yielding

94. The official end of campaign fell on Ruz-i Kasım, 5 November N.S., which was St. Demetrius' Day; before the change from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar in 1582, Ruz-i Hizr fell on 23 April O.S. and Ruz-i Kasım on 26 October O.S. Nevruz was formerly on 11 March O.S.

95. MD 71/266 (re. vilayet of Sivas); MD 72/283 (Rum); MD 72/330 (Zulkadriye); MD 72/342 (Rum, Zulkadriye, Aleppo); MD 72/347, MD 72/359 (Rum, Zulkadriye); MD 72/774 (Maraş). Rum was an alternative name for the vilayet of Sivas in this period (Birken, 1976 p.142).

less than 3,000 akçe p.a., under the command of a retired sipahi who held a benefice of more than 6,000 akçe.⁹⁶

The sending of mobilisation orders was of course no guarantee that the recipients would appear on campaign, despite the threat of losing their timars, or, indeed, of execution, if they failed to do so. The problem of dating many of these orders is of especial significance in this connection. The reiteration of mobilisation orders late in the season attests to the difficulty of raising the Anatolian sipahis in particular, as they did not exert themselves to be on time, and the frequency of a succession of conflicting orders being sent out, makes it impossible to say with certainty who did appear.⁹⁷ The start of the war in 1593 came only three years after peace had been concluded with Persia, and the sipahi troops were both physically and financially exhausted from their participation in a conflict which had lasted for the same length of time as the Hungarian war was to.⁹⁸ Just as cavalry from as far away as south-eastern Anatolia was called upon to fight in the Hungarian war, so there had been men from Bosnia and Ethiopia fighting against Persia in the east up to 1590.⁹⁹

96. MD 71/273: this stipulation was subsequently modified, with the sancak of Ankara being left to the care of 30 timariots with benefices of less than 3,000 akçe p.a., under the command of a çavuş (MD 72/775).

97. Káldy-Nagy (1977) pp.174-183 points out a similar conflict in instructions in charting the sequence of orders issued in the mobilisation for the final campaign of Süleyman in 1566.

98. PEÇEVI II p.133 records the use of this argument by the historian Hoca Saadüddin in his attempt to dissuade Sinan Pasha from opening hostilities with the Hapsburgs, although Peçevi himself says elsewhere (*ibid.* p.156) that the troops were keen to go on campaign in Hungary, because there had not been a campaign in that area since the death of Süleyman (this passage is quoted above at p.45).

99. B.Kütükoğlu (1962) p.203

Only a month elapsed between the defeat of Hasan Pasha at Siska in June 1593 and the departure of Sinan Pasha from Istanbul for the front. The amount of military equipment which had been stockpiled was sufficient to allow Sinan to score some successes in this first season of the war, but the haste with which an official state of war was declared did not allow for full mobilisation in 1593. Although Abdülkadir notes that orders were sent out for the troops of Anadolu, Karaman, Sivas, Maraş, Aleppo, Diyarbakir and Rakka to reach Sirem by mid-October,¹⁰⁰ it is probable that Sinan had in reality more limited support. For some time before the start of the war, the European troops had been kept in a state of readiness for military action against the Hapsburgs,¹⁰¹ but it seems that Sinan, whether from hubris or due to his failure to understand that a single retaliatory strike would not exhaust Hapsburg energies, did not initially take with him a large force.¹⁰² Abdülkadir further adds that the troops of ten sancaks of Anadolu joined the army at Belgrade,¹⁰³ and those of Karaman did not reach the army until after the Ottoman capture of Vespem in October.¹⁰⁴

100. AK f.4r: in fact, he mistakenly gives the date by which they were expected to arrive as Muharrem 1001, which is October 1592.

101. e.g. MD 69/111; MD 69/142; MD 69/160; MD 69/171, all dating from late in 1592.

102. MD 71/241 is an order apparently dating from late in the season which calls for the mobilisation of all the sancakbeyis and timariots of Rumeli, since the force with Sinan was not sufficient to resist Christian attack: "küffar-ı haksarın ziyade hareketi olup..vezir-i azam serdar Sinan Paşa...nin yanında mukavemete kadir asker olmamağa...". The Rumeli sipahis were not to be allowed to use the excuse of their unpreparedness and the lateness of the season in an attempt to avoid campaign duty.

103. AK f.10r

104. AK f.13r

On 29 May 1594, Sinan Pasha replied to a letter which he had received from the Sultan, saying that, despite the repeated orders which he had sent out since the previous autumn, his threats, and the despatch of officials to supervise the crossing of the troops at Gelibolu and Uskudar, it had been impossible to get the troops to mobilise quickly.¹⁰⁵ However, while the army was camped at Mohaç shortly after this date, the beylerbeyis of Diyarbakır, Aleppo and Erzurum arrived, the sipahis of some of the sancaks of Sivas and the soldiers of Maraş having done so shortly before.¹⁰⁶ The cavalry of the vilayets of Rumeli, Bosnia and Buda had not the excuse of distance in their efforts to avoid campaign duty, and were prominent in every campaign season.

From the mobilisation orders preserved in the Mühimme series it is not usually possible to tell the whereabouts of the addressee. Thus, it is not clear whether the recipient of an order was in winter quarters in the European provinces, or whether he had returned to his home province. There is a contradiction between the sources used by Hammer, which say that the troops of Sivas, Rakka, Diyarbakır, Aleppo and Damascus returned home to spend the winter of 1594/5, and Abdülkadir, who reports only that those of Sivas were assigned to Buda together with those of Anadolu, while the beylerbeyi of Karaman was sent to winter in Istolni Belgrad. There is agreement, however, that the European troops were assigned winter quarters in the theatre of war in that year.¹⁰⁷

In 1595 there was less scope for latitude in the extent of the mobilisation than had been possible in 1594. The urgent

105. MD 72/604

106. AK ff.16v,17r

107. HAMMER IV p.224; AK ff.27v,28r

need for manpower as the army fought on two fronts, having to meet a challenge to Estergon while simultaneously campaigning against Wallachia in the later part of the season, demanded a general mobilisation of timar troops, with little regard able to be given to the internal security of the Asian provinces. The qualification that those with small timars should remain at home is rarely met with in the surviving orders for this season's mobilisation: in Rum, the conditions were similar to those imposed in 1594, with only men with timars of over 6,000 akçe being called up;¹⁰⁸ from Aleppo, whose troops had been present in Hungary as stipulated in 1594, with only those having timars of over 6,000 akçe having to report for duty, the initial order that all should appear on the 1595 campaign was altered on account of fears that Arab bandits would harrass the pilgrims going to Mecca. The decision was therefore taken that those with timars of less than 3,000 akçe should stay at home after all, to maintain local security.¹⁰⁹ Christian military activity on the north-west frontier of the Empire injected an unmistakeable note of desperation into orders concerning the deployment of sipahi troops in that area. Military conditions which had required the main concentration of troops to deal with Michael of Wallachia early in the season, and which had had to take account (mistakenly as it turned out) of a possible threat to Sigetvar in mid-season,¹¹⁰ finally had to respond to the attack in which the fortress of Estergon was lost in early September 1595 while Sinan Pasha was still deeply committed in Wallachia.

In June of 1595, before the threat to Estergon had become

108. MD 73/288; MD 73/1067

109. MD 73/457: "eskiya-yi arab", these were probably Bedouin.

110. MD 73/905: the fear of the possibility of an attack on Sigetvar was based on information given by prisoners taken from the Christians. They reported that the Christian forces were assembled only 3 or 4 days away.

apparent, the troops of Anadolu, Rumeli and Karaman were ordered to support Sinan Pasha in Wallachia.¹¹¹ News of the need for manpower on the Buda border in July sent Anadolu and Rumeli troops to the northwest of Hungary, however.¹¹² The unexpected severity of the Christian attack led to a belated demand for strenuous efforts on the part of those who so far had neglected to turn up for the campaign, and for the mobilisation of greater numbers of men than had earlier been required, including those who had returned to Istanbul upon the dismissal of Ferhad Pasha from command of the Wallachian campaign. The kapucu başı Veli Agha was ordered to mobilise them, with the assistance of a team of çavuşes. Those who did not comply with the mobilisation order were to be executed on the spot ("...bulundugun yerde salb ve siyaset eyleyesin"). These reinforcements from the Istanbul area were to be commanded by the vezir Hadım Cafer Pasha.¹¹³ By August, Estergon was under siege, and vezir Mehmed Pasha, son of Koca Sinan, was ordered to join with the reinforcements and take whatever action was necessary to repulse the enemy.¹¹⁴ The sancakbeyis of Bosnia were put on the alert.¹¹⁵ The beylerbeyi of Karaman received a special admonitory order since he was still some distance away from Estergon, the punishment for continuing procrastination being the loss of his head.¹¹⁶

111. MD 73/330

112. MD 73/130; MD 73/877

113. MD 73/1107; MD 73/1146. On corporal punishment, see Heyd (1973) pp.259-71. KK 1874 is the campaign account covering Cafer Pasha's progress to Hungary.

114. MD 73/1

115. MD 73/58

116. MD 73/653

After 1595, our information as to the annual deployment of the provincial sipahis is more sporadic, owing to lacunae in the main source for mobilisation orders, the Mühimme registers. Aside from chronicle sources, we have information that in 1597, for instance, certain of the timariots of the eastern provinces were exempted from campaign duty on account of the distance which they had to travel, and their weakness. From Aleppo, Maraş, Sivas, Karaman and Diyarbakır only those with timars of over 5,000 akçe were required, from Damascus only the zuama, and from Erzurum only zuama and müteferrikas. The timariots of Trabzon and Tripoli were all exempted.¹¹⁷ Those sipahis with smaller holdings were clearly suffering greatly from the constant campaigning.

In 1605 the fortress of Estergon was successfully wrested back from Hapsburg control. For that action we possess what is apparently the sole surviving yoklama register of the 1593-1606 war, which records the names of the sipahis who had turned up to take part in that campaign. Such a document should be the most promising source from which to ascertain the actual numbers of sipahis mobilised. However, the main concern of the publisher of this register was to use the rather small numbers of sipahis registered therein as an indictment of the timar system.¹¹⁸ In consequence, some very important aspects of the register have been neglected, aspects which would more nearly enable us to establish its

117. MM 7336 p.74:"...mesafe-yi baidede" and "...adem-i kudretleri olduđu ecelden".

118. Mutafchieva (1968): the reference number of this register, which is in the Bulgarian archives, is not given and the material is presented in a confusing fashion: "En premier lieu, ces yoklama-defteris nous fournissent la réponse à une question primordiale concernant le système des timars - celle de l'effectif numérique des sipahis en campagne" (p.10).

value as an indication of the strength of these cavalry troops at the siege of Estergon.

On the basis of the figures given in this yoklama list, Mutafchieva concludes that of the Rumelian sipahis eligible for campaign, not more than 70% took part in the Estergon campaign, and of this number, only 54% were confirmed as present at a second inspection.¹¹⁹ The method employed to arrive at this conclusion is to compare the figures in the 1605-6 yoklama register with the global figures of Ayn-i Ali. Whenever attempts are made to determine how many sipahis there were in the Empire, that is, how many core units of land grant (kiliç timaris) existed at any time from the mid-sixteenth century until the time of Mehmed IV, it is frequently the data of Ayn-i Ali that are taken as the standard. However, his Kavanin-i al-i osman der hulasa-yi mezamin-i defter-i divan has to be used with care since it is not certain to which date his details of the timar system apply, and he himself admits that they were compiled from registers of various dates.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the tendency has usually been for modern historians to use them as strictly representative of the situation in 1608-09 regardless, after (sometimes) expressing their misgivings. Káldy-Nagy has pointed out that part of Ayn-i Ali's Kavanin... is copied from an order of Süleyman's of 1531.¹²¹

There has not yet been a serious attempt to date the components of Ayn-i Ali's sancak lists. Comparison with those published by Kunt gives an indication of the constant flux

119. Mutafchieva (1968) pp.13-14.

120. AYN-I ALI/a p.4:"...defatir-i atike ve cedideden ve kanunnamelerden bu muhtasari ketb ve tahrir eyleyüp".

121. Káldy-Nagy (1977) pp.154-55.

within the system.¹²² Ayn-i Ali shows Cyprus as an eyalet,¹²³ and it may therefore be assumed that this part of the work may be dated to after 1571; and since Eğri and Kanije do not feature as independent eyalets, they, together with the sancaks of Filek, Hatvan, Seğedin and Solnok still being entered as part of the eyalet of Buda,¹²⁴ that it dates from before 1596. In the absence of a study devoted to the intricacies of its compilation, it should be disregarded as a source which can provide reliable information for any particular date.

An assessment of the total number of timars in the Empire at this time is not of present concern. The vital point which Mutafchieva omits to consider is that in 1605 there were military encounters against the Hapsburgs on two other fronts besides the siege at Estergon. For the latter engagement the yoklama register shows a total of 4,596 timar-holders mobilised in the eyalet of Rumeli, of whom only 3,464 were indicated as being present when a second roll-call of the same names was taken. There were a further 396 from Semendre (in Buda eyaleti), 725 from Bosnia and 327 from Kütahya, Kastamonu and Saruhan (in the eyalet of Anadolu).¹²⁵ Ottoman troops had, however, been supporting the revolt of the Transylvanian leader, István Bocskai, since the previous year, and were raiding into Slavonia and further with the Hungarian commander Némethi from the south-western border of Ottoman Hungary.¹²⁶

Mobilisation orders for the 1605 season state clearly where the troops of each sancak were to serve, although it should

122. Kunt (1978) pp.125-198

123. AYN-I ALI/a p.7

124. AYN-I ALI/a pp.17-18

125. Mutafchieva (1968) pp.13-14

126. PEÇEVI II pp.308-9

be reiterated that an order to mobilise was certainly no guarantee that it was obeyed, nor that it was not later changed. The orders available to us show that the Kanije border was under the command of the beylerbeyi of Kanije, Ibrahim Pasha, with 20,000 soldiers from the eyalets of Bosnia and Kanije.¹²⁷ These latter included those of the sancaks of Peçuy and Sigetvar.¹²⁸ Orders had been sent out demanding the participation of the sipahis of Hersek,¹²⁹ Pozega, Kilis, and all the (provincial cavalry) soldiers of Bosnia,¹³⁰ as well as those of the Buda sancaks of Mohaç, Sirem, Semendre,¹³¹ and Kopan.¹³²

To the assistance of Bocskai himself, fighting the Hapsburg troops under the command of Giorgio Basta in upper Hungary, were ordered the cavalry of the Rumeli sancaks of Kırkkilise, Çirmen, Vize, Niğbolu, Vidin and Silistre,¹³³ and those of the eyalet of Eğri.¹³⁴ Yet, troops from Kırkkilise, Çirmen, Vize and Niğbolu appear also in the Estergon yoklama list. Three possible reasons may be adduced in attempting to explain this apparent incongruence. First of all, it is not certain where this roll-call was taken; the troops of these sancaks could have fought first with Bocskai and then been sent to the siege of Estergon; secondly, it is possible

127. PEÇEVI II p.308; MD 77/518: "...Izvornik ve Bosna sancaklarında zeamet ve timarları olanlardan yirmi bin nefer kimesne", which suggests that the 20,000 men came from only these two sancaks, and, by implication, that the total on that border must have been still greater. cf. HAMMER IV p.375.

128. MD 77/197

129. MD 77/206

130. MD 77/208

131. MD 77/198

132. MD 77/201

133. MD 77/88; see also MD 77/70; MD 77/154; MD 77/474; MD 77/537.

134. MD 77/207

that the mobilisation orders of which copies are available could have been subsequently altered; and thirdly, all the timariot troops of any sancak were not invariably deployed in one place. Some of those of Niğbolu were explicitly stated to have been at Estergon in 1605, and others in Transylvania.¹³⁵ Of the troops of Silistre too, some were employed at the R.Sava bridge in Belgrade, some were helping in the storehouses, others were defending the castle of Irşova and still others were on campaign with the beylerbeyi of Kanije.¹³⁶

The Estergon yoklama shows the presence of the troops of only three sancaks of Anadolu, since the war on the eastern frontier claimed the services of the sipahis of all the provinces of Anatolia excepting some of those of Anadolu and Karaman.¹³⁷ Mobilisation was hard, since these men had served in the east in 1604, and were undoubtedly reluctant to make the journey to Hungary in the next year.¹³⁸ Abdülkadir notes that some Anadolu troops joined the main army at Cankurtaran (Adony) while a decision was being taken as to the most effective course of action that season, but he makes no further reference to them, nor to the presence of any from Karaman.¹³⁹

We have, then, three sources which may be compared in trying to see which Rumeli sancaks actually took part in the Estergon siege of 1605; these are the yoklama lists as given by Mutafcieva, the mobilisation orders found in the Mühimme registers, and the account of Abdülkadir who, although he

135. MD 77/537

136. MD 77/512

137. MD 77/83; MD 77/84; MD 77/85; MD 77/86; MD 77/87; MD 77/99; MD 77/100

138. MD 77/99

139. AK f.206v

does not specifically say so, was probably present.¹⁴⁰ Despite a comparison of these three sources, it is still not possible to deduce where the yoklama was made. Taking this document as our starting point, we can see how it differs from information available in the other two sources. There are several sancaks of Rumeli which appear on the Estergon yoklama, but whose troops are not mentioned by Abdülkadir as having arrived at the menzil of Hisarcık (Grocka), outside Belgrade, in June 1605, nor as having been in Belgrade immediately after.¹⁴¹ These are Vize, Kirkkilise, Niğbolu, Çirmen, Vulçitrin, Yanya and Iskenderiye. We have seen that all but the last three were ordered to go to help Bocskai, and have evidence that the troops of Niğbolu at least were present both at Estergon and with Bocskai.¹⁴² The timar-holders of Iskenderiye and Yanya were called upon to serve in the Hungarian campaign in May 1605 in common with those of many other Rumeli sancaks, without any details as to their eventual deployment.¹⁴³ Not mentioned in the yoklama are the soldiers of the sancaks of Alacahisar, Üsküb, Delvine and Selanik, but they were present on campaign too: those of Alacahisar and Üsküb joined the army at Hisarcık,¹⁴⁴ while those of Delvine and Selanik reached Belgrade in July 1605.¹⁴⁵

Even if available sources did give enough information for us to be able to discern how the troops of each sancak were deployed at any time, we would still have to make an

140. Peçevi was certainly present at the siege, but does not have anything to say about the provincial sipahi forces taking part (PEÇEVI II pp.302-08).

141. AK f.205v

142. MD 77/537

143. MD 77/74: the sancak of Vulçitrin is not mentioned here.

144. MD 77/74; AK f.205v

145. MD 77/74; AK f.206r

estimate of the number of cebelü present with each sipahi. If we accept without further analysis the figures in the Estergon yoklama, a total of 6,044 kilic timaris would give us a provincial force of, say, 24,000 men,¹⁴⁶ to be added to the 20,000 who were fighting under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, the beylerbeyi, of Kanije, and to the forces in Transylvania under the command of the beylerbeyi of Silistre, Ali Pasha. Thus, whatever estimate may be made of provincial cavalry participation in 1605, it should be recognised that the actual figure was undoubtedly lower than in some earlier years of the war, owing to the demand for troops to campaign in the east again.

The foregoing shows that there is little hope of discovering the numbers of troops taking part in the combats of this war. The problems involved in giving any meaningful measure of the size of the Ottoman army are insurmountable. The Ottoman army did not move in one body: just as the total number of sipahis in the Empire is not of relevance to an understanding of how many sipahis actually mobilised for any campaign, so the total number of kapukulu troops on the state pay-roll contributes nothing to our knowledge of how many men, and with what expertise, were deployed in any engagement, nor how the various corps acted in co-ordination with one another. To know that in 1574 the number of janissaries was probably around 13,500, while by 1595 the number was more than 26,000 and by 1609 over 37,500, is more relevant as an indication of how the standing army was

146. Mutafchieva (1968) pp.13-14: $4956+396+725+327 = 6044$. KOÇI BEY p.69 says that, ideally, 100,000 timariots could mean a total force of 4-500,000, an average of 3 or 4 cebelü with each timariot; thus $6044 \times 4 = 24,176$.

increasing and therefore costing the state ever more.¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately such figures tell us little of the true effects of the changing methods of recruitment into the army over the turn of the seventeenth century, and the changing balance of the different types of troops.

If it is hard to be satisfied with the numbers of troops given in the Ottoman sources as an expression of how many men there were in any place at any time, still less help is to be gained from the patently exaggerated estimates of European observers of the Ottoman army in action. In 1605 the French ambassador Savary de Brèves wrote of the provincial forces at the sultan's disposal that "le nombre passe huict cent mil hommes".¹⁴⁸ More modestly, Tarducci said that the Ottomans could put an army of 300,000 in the field,¹⁴⁹ and Soranzo comes up with a similar figure for the number of Ottoman troops at Eğri in 1596,¹⁵⁰ while Knolles' sources give only half this figure for the number of men besieging Eğri.¹⁵¹ There is ^{no} way of proving that any one figure was closer to the truth than another, and this is also true of the estimates of observers on the Ottoman side.

Perhaps the most easily ascertainable of all the profusion of troop figures are those which give information of a more specific nature, the statistics regarding the size and composition of the garrisons on the Ottoman borders. From a series of such statistics over the course of the war, as

147. Röhrborn (1973) p.78 gives a summary list of the numbers of janissaries and alti bölük cavalry between 1514 and 1632 from contemporary Ottoman sources: alti bölük numbers are not so frequently mentioned in the sources as those of the janissaries.

148. Savary de Brèves (1628) p.16

149. Tarducci (1597) p.60

150. Soranzo (1603) p.69

151. Knolles (1621) p.1094

well as in peacetime, we could learn the relative importance attached to each section of the border by the Ottoman command, and how great was the perceived threat to any area. Partial lists of the numbers of garrison troops abound, but since calculation of the size of the Ottoman army in its combat and garrison components is of marginal interest in the present study, the matter cannot be pursued here.

A final aspect of the mobilisation of the Ottoman troops, and one which must await fuller treatment elsewhere, is that of the military road, the route by which the troops reached the front in Hungary and the Balkans. This route was of ancient origin. Of the three main branches (kol) leading from Istanbul, that running west (sol kol) followed the Via Egnatia; the central branch (orta kol), also for the most part having a Roman foundation, ran to Belgrade; the northernmost route (sağ kol) led to the Crimea.¹⁵²

Geographical circumstances dictated the direction of these routes and their various offshoots: the orta kol, which was the artery along which troops moved to reach the main theatre of war in Hungary during these years, crossed the rolling hills of Thrace to Edirne, whence it followed the valley of the Maritza through Filibe (Plovdiv) towards Sofya. From midway between Sofya and Niş the valley of the Nişava was followed, and then, from Niş onwards, the Morava to Semendre and the Danube to Belgrade. The river valleys provided the vital link through the Balkan ranges, and at only a few points did awkward passes have to be negotiated.¹⁵³

152. The history of these routes from earliest times is discussed in Jirecık (1877).

153. HACI HALİFE pp.189-90 gives information regarding 7 difficult passes between Belgrade and Istanbul. For those between Niş and Edirne, see map in Hynková (1973) pp.100-01.

Once at Belgrade, the north-south alignment of the Hungarian rivers, particularly the Danube and the Tisza, was of tremendous logistic value in promoting ease of communication for both men and equipment between Belgrade and the forward military centre of Buda.¹⁵⁴ Most importantly, water was always available to men and beasts.

Only part of the army was actually concentrated on the road at any one time, since, as we have seen, the different sections mobilised and travelled at various dates. The condition of roads in the pre-modern period was generally poor, though, given the obvious solidity of Ottoman public works in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it should not come as a surprise to discover that wagon (and mule) were the predominant means of transport in the Balkans at this time.¹⁵⁵ A major military route would obviously have been given priority over all others, and would have been as serviceable as was possible with the available technology. This military road passed through territory securely in Ottoman hands, unlike the other great contemporary military road, that followed by Spanish troops going to the Netherlands. Sensitivity to the kind of international political pressures which influenced the use of this latter road was not a consideration for the Ottoman army travelling towards its battlegrounds.¹⁵⁶ The total Ottoman control of the road may therefore have encouraged an investment of resources which would not have been an attractive proposition to their Spanish Hapsburg counterparts.

154. The north-south alignment of the Hungarian rivers to the north of the Drava-Sava line assisted Ottoman incursion into central Hungary, for there was no natural defensive line which was fortifiable to the south of the mountains of northern Hungary (Szakály, 1982 p.154).

155. Faroqi (1982) p.535

156. Parker (1981) pp.50-79

Before the army moved along the military road, men were sent ahead to ensure that it was well-signed. They chopped down trees blocking the way, and made the marshy areas passable. Such duties were performed even by members of the alti bölük: as the contemporary chronicler possessing the most intimate knowledge of such matters, Abdülkadir describes how the route was prepared before the troops set out from Istanbul at the start of the war saying that silahdars were sent ahead to check that bridges were passable and swamps clear. The road was also signed by heaps of earth being piled up on the right hand side.¹⁵⁷ Although some bridges were permanent, such as the Cısr-ı Mustafa Pasha which took the road over the Maritza to the west of Edirne, and which can still be seen today, most were constructed as needed, thrown across rivers and marshes on pontoons.

The section of the army about whose journey through the Balkans we have most information was that part which travelled from Istanbul, since it was together with this body that the bureaucracy, the record-keepers, went. Several records survive to give information about the progress of the troops on various campaigns. Various sources survive to tell us of the menzils and konaks (way-stations) at which the troops stopped for the night on their way to

157. AK f.6v

the front.¹⁵⁸ While the same general route was used on each campaign, there was some variation in the precise way-stations used on different campaigns. All troops starting from Istanbul followed the same route except the janissaries who, to avoid overcrowding, went by a more northerly branch of the orta kol, via Saray, Vize, Kirkkilise (Kirkklareli), Yeni Zagora (Nova Zagora) and Kazanlik (Kazanlak), rejoining the main force at Sofya.¹⁵⁹ The daily stage on the march was between 12 and 20 miles p.d. Thus, with rest-days, it took about 6 weeks to cover the more than 600 miles from Istanbul to Belgrade, a road along which lay about 40 way-stations.¹⁶⁰ Details of the routes and progress of the provincial sipahis only emerge where they acted so as to give the local populations cause for complaint to the central bureaucracy: having crossed from Anatolia at Gelibolu, the Asian sipahis must have followed either the orta kol, or else the sol kol via Selanik and Usküb.

158. Lists of the places at which the army stopped for the night, and those at which a few days rest were ordered, are found at various points in the accounts of Abdülkadir and Hasanbeyzade in particular. In addition, the following archival sources also list way-stations for particular campaigns: MD 77/76; MD 77/109; KK 1874; KK 1876. More comprehensive data for earlier campaigns are the following: for Süleyman's Hungarian campaigns of 1521 and 1526, see Schaendlinger (1978); for Süleyman's Estergon campaign of 1543, see Yurdaydin (1976) - the manuscript source for this article is TKS Hazine 1608, Tarih-i feth-i Şikloş ve Estergon ve Istuni Belgrad. Jirecik (1877) pp.122-33 gives a general list of the stops along the route from Belgrade to Istanbul, while Nehring (1984) is a concordance of Ottoman and European place-names for the way-stations along the route from Vienna to Istanbul, drawn from sixteenth-century European accounts.

159. AK f.116v: "...asakire izdiham olmasın".

160. The average speed of the Spanish army along its military road in the second half of the sixteenth century was almost identical: Parker (1981) p.280.

Iiv. Remuneration and Reward

For the Ottoman state, the burden of paying its troops was the single greatest drain on funds. Although it is impossible to gauge accurately what proportion of total campaign expenditure is represented by the campaign account books analysed in the final part of this study, it can be said that troop wages consumed at least 70% of the campaign running costs documented in these accounts.¹⁶¹ The critical point is that the enormous amounts of money needed to pay the troops whose remuneration is recorded in these accounts had to be found in cash. Despite the assertion that the influx of bullion into the Mediterranean was the most salient phenomenon of the period - a phenomenon which apparently does not square with the hypothesis that money was tight¹⁶² - the sources make it very clear that it was hard to find ready cash. Thus, there is a strong case to be made that the essential crisis of this period was a cash crisis as military demand increased, and with it, the need for liquid funds to pay the troops.

For the soldier in the pay of the Ottoman state, the military life clearly had potential rewards which outweighed the inconveniences of having to fight when called upon to do so. The peasant life to which the majority of Ottoman subjects were born was a precarious existence at the best of

161. KK 1879: 86.8%; KK 1885: 71.7%; KK 1887: 81.8%; KK 1889: 78.9%;
KK 1890: 81.3%

162. Citing the "influx of bullion" argument, Cook (1972) p.31 questions Akdağ's insistence on an increasingly inadequate money supply as causal in the Celali revolts (in: Akdağ, M. Celali İsyanları, Ankara 1963). Analysis of the economic history of this period is far from resolution, and needs an understanding, which we do not yet possess, of the intricacies of the circulation of money at the time.

times. At the mercy of all, from taxman to timariot, from exigencies of natural disaster to those of warfare, the peasant was at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid, and held no power.¹⁶³ Military life was one of the few avenues of upward mobility in Ottoman society, since entry into the askeri class provided the incumbent with the lifetime of financial support which accompanied the change in status from 'producer' to 'consumer'.

Large fortunes were amassed by those at the top of the military hierarchy. Two sources which illustrate this clearly are, first, the campaign account books in which are recorded the size of the loans made by such individuals in order to meet temporary shortages of cash while on campaign and, secondly, the registers which record the estates of deceased janissaries and others.¹⁶⁴ The conditions enabling the process of accumulation to begin seem to have existed even for those in the lowest reaches of the corps hierarchy: the discovery of promissory notes between one janissary and another at the Egyptian fortress of Ibrim in the seventeenth century indicates that a well-established system of personal loans was in operation there.¹⁶⁵

The opportunities for commerce afforded by the permanent garrison life to which many soldiers were consigned did not

163. It is of course true that it was open to all alike to make representations to the sultan, and the Mühimme series contains many orders indicating that even the most humble availed themselves of this right, but for every wrong righted, there must have been many infringements that went unremedied. It did not require an event of the magnitude of the Celali revolt to underline the powerlessness of the peasant community.

164. A detailed study of the second of these sources is that of Barkan (1966). Both this and the war loans are discussed in Part III below.

165. This material is shortly to be published by Ménage and Hinds (198.).

go unnoticed by contemporary writers, who saw janissary intervention in urban life as a factor destroying the moral fibre of the corps.¹⁶⁶ Turning to trade they neglected their military duties, and marriage was similarly considered detrimental, and as having serious consequences: the re-taking of the fortress of Yanik in 1598 by the Hapsburgs was accomplished with little resistance from the garrison because most of the janissaries and armourers (cebeci) were married and living in Kopan (Törökkoppány), Peçuy (Pécs) and Istolni Belgrad, and the fortress was therefore empty of its defensive force.¹⁶⁷

Members of the janissary corps operated as money-lenders to the hard-pressed peasantry on their own account, charging high rates of interest.¹⁶⁸ Before the janissaries serving in Wallachia were sent off for the campaign of 1594, orders were sent to the voyvode that their business affairs should first be settled: the janissaries had lent money to the local people, and the Porte was concerned that they should be repaid in accordance with the promissory notes (temessük) which they held. They had also stood surety on behalf of others to whom money was owed ("...aharın akçesine vekil olmuşlar"). Reliable men were to be sent out to collect this money, and, presumably to avoid conflict, the janissaries were not to be sent to the reaya to do so themselves.¹⁶⁹ 'Regimental' funds were also lent out (undoubtedly for interest) to those short of cash: in 1605, the sancak-beyi of Vize was ordered to repay the 22,000 akçe which he

166. See, for instance, SELANIKI ff.51v-52r; KAVANIN f.53v.

167. PEÇEVI II p.211

168. Faroqhi (1979) p.139 refers to a case in Tokat in the 1590s when janissaries and acemi oğlanı were lending at a rate of 30% per month. Jennings (1973) pp.197-78, in his work on early seventeenth-century Kayseri, shows that janissaries (and provincial sipahis too) were frequent borrowers and lenders at interest.

169. MD 71/729; MD 72/86; see also MD 70/120.

had borrowed 5 years earlier from the 26th janissary bölük.¹⁷⁰

By virtue of their monopoly of the instruments of force in Ottoman society, the janissaries, and an ever-widening group of other troops, were held in considerable awe both by those whom they were supposed to serve and by the reaya. The simple fact of their possession of firearms gave them tremendous strength: the truism that a loyal army is the first essential for a ruler could be profitably exploited by the men of the army as they influenced the pattern of power in the state. Shortly after this war, palace struggles were to result in the death of the Sultan Osman II in 1622. The pragmatic resolution of the many janissary and other kapukulu revolts of the period is eloquent testimony of the leverage they held, and the Celali rebellions are an indication of the close central supervision to which large groups of armed men had to be subjected in order to avoid decentralisation of power. Given the serious cash shortage and the need to placate the troops on whom the preservation of the internal structure and the securing of the external defence of the Empire relied, efforts were made to use most efficiently the resources available. In this connection the timing of the payment of the wages and incentives suggest that troop remuneration was used as an instrument of state policy.

The variety of ways in which the troops of the Ottoman army could be remunerated should be made clear. It should be noted that no one method of remuneration applied to all troops of any particular type: such absolute congruence was not found in reality. First of all, there was cash payment from the treasury, which is normally associated with the troops of the standing army. Secondly, there was remuneration in the form of the right of revenue collection

170. MD 75/166

such as was enjoyed by the provincial sipahis. Timar lands were assigned also to certain garrison troops in Hungary, a practice which the Hungarians themselves adopted as a means of paying their border garrisons.¹⁷¹ This relieved Istanbul of the need to find the cash, but put the reaya working these timar-lands at the mercy of the garrison troops whom they were supporting. In order to save the reaya from hardship through the war, the government asked that local surveys be carried out to ascertain which lands were continuing to produce and which were unproductive; thus could the burdens on the reaya be reassigned as necessary.¹⁷² Garrison troops could also be paid from mukataa (tax-farm) revenue, either on a permanent or one-off basis, or from the provincial treasuries. As mentioned earlier, some garrison troops were supported from among their peers on a rotational basis, and therefore received no direct remuneration from the state. Another option was the exemption from certain taxes in exchange for military service of one kind or another. Many alternatives, therefore, lay along the spectrum between the two extremes of cash payment from central funds, and the largely 'in-kind' income collected by the provincial cavalryman from his timar.

Before considering the amounts of money needed to pay the army, and how the state performed the balancing act of staving-off potential revolt, we will look at the remuneration of the individual soldier. Several terms are used to indicate the components of his pay: mevacib and ulufe are

171. Káldy-Nagy (1968) p.183. A tapu register from the time of Selim II shows that the 96 officers and men in the fortress of Novigrad received a total annual income from timar-lands of 169,300 akçe, while 84 of the garrison of Diregel were entitled to 150,200 akçe (Bayerle, 1973 p.26).

172. MD 77/283

synonymous in the present context;¹⁷³ nafaka refers to an expense allowance, harclık to an interim advance, while ücret is used to describe the pay of those hired to perform incidental jobs, such as transport services. Pay-registers (mevacib defterleri) record the regular salaries of the kapukulu troops and those of the locally-hired troops who were paid in cash.¹⁷⁴ For the former, the name and identity of each man is recorded, together with his daily rate of pay. Payment was made on a three-monthly basis, with, at least for the kapukulu ocakları, each tranche being reckoned at 88.5 days. The three-monthly tranches were identified by acronyms based on the first or last letters of the months of the Hicri calendar viz. Masar (Muharrem, Safer, Rebi I), Recec (Rebi II, Cumada I, Cumada II), Reşen (Receb, Şaban, Ramazan) and Lezez (Şevval, Zilkade, Zilhicce). The 88.5 day period of each tranche is the average of the number of days in each of the three-month periods viz. the number of days in Masar (89) plus Recec (88) is 177, which, divided by 2, equals 88.5. So too for Reşen plus Lezez. Even to those familiar with the details of the pay registers, understanding them presented problems: as the author of the Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyan tells us "...yeniçeri yoldaşların

173. The distinction made in the following passage, where ulufe denotes the 3-monthly tranche, and mevacib denotes pay in general, is not, however, sustained throughout the work, nor in other contexts: "...muharrem'den masar ve recec ve reşen ve lezez mevacibine varınca yılda dört ulufe olur" (KAVANIN f.101r).

174. Fekete (1955) I pp.94-98, II docts.LV-LVI,LXXV-LXXX gives some information on this type of register. A detailed study devoted to the mevacib defterleri is much needed.

ahvalı beyan olunması müşkildir zira bu bir deryadır".¹⁷⁵

In order to lend some substance to the contention that the Ottoman soldier was not poorly paid, and could indeed accumulate wealth, the first measure to be ascertained is his daily pay. Only rarely do the extant registers for the kapukulu troops give sub-totals for the pay of the thousands of men who are recorded therein, and consequently the calculation of an average based on so many individual entries has not been attempted here. For the 1593-1606 war, registers which record all janissaries are rarer than those recording the names of those garrisoned in particular castles. Where such registers of complete corps do exist, the names are annotated according to the whereabouts of the individual concerned, information which was essential in keeping track of when and where he was to be paid.¹⁷⁶ In 1602-03, for instance, annotations indicate that janissaries were on duty in Belgrade, Kanije, Eğri, Rhodes, Bender, Salonika, Aleppo and with the Black Sea fleet, inter alia.¹⁷⁷ For the particular locations to which they were assigned, the registers on which their pay was based shows the status of each of the men at the time when they were to be paid. The presence of janissaries to receive their pay could be indicated by the letter mim, for mevcud (present), while there were many reasons for being absent (na-mevcud), this

175. KAVANIN f.49r; the author of this work was clearly much exercised by his attempt to explain the organisation of the registers since he makes the similar observation, that it was hard to explain the organisation of the janissary corps because it was like a sea, on two other occasions (KAVANIN ff.103r,107v).

176. On such more or less complete lists of janissaries, for instance, are seen annotations in red ink, to show those on campaign; cf. KAVANIN f.103v: "...ve eğer seferlerde yazılı iken üzerlerinde sürh olup".

177. MM 5772: Defter-i mevacib-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i ali der vacib-i masar, recec, reşen, lezez 1011.

designation being further differentiated according to whether the individual had deserted (firar kerde), retired (mütekaid), died (müteveffa şüd if the deceased was Muslim, and mürde if of Christian, that is devşirme or prisoner of war, origin).¹⁷⁸

Given that registers listing the full janissary corps are unwieldy for the calculation of average janissary pay, we have to turn to the registers which, on a castle-by-castle basis, list the smaller numbers of janissaries forming part of the border garrison force. Two further problems in the organisation of the janissary pay-registers are first, that there is no overt indication of their length of service of each individual and second, that not all members of each bölük were necessarily deployed at the same location; at least some part of the variation in bölük numbers to be found in the registers could be due to war losses, however.¹⁷⁹

The anonymous author of Kitab-ı Müstetab, writing in the reign of Osman II, notes that janissaries newly graduated from the acemioğlanıs used to earn a starting wage of 3 akçe

178. A register of janissaries garrisoning Kanije from Lezez 1011 to Masar 1014 AH (March 1603–August 1605) shows the further explanations: sipahi şüd (promoted into the sipahi corps); mande (remained behind ?in Istanbul); merd-i kale (disciplined by being posted to a fortress); merd-i timar şüd (disciplined by being sent to the provinces); sefere na-amed (did not appear on campaign); solak şüd (became a solak); the meanings of the remaining annotations are less clear, viz. teslim-i halife-yi ağa; baz acemi şüd; ba-tedbir şüd (MM 3731). In some instances, the term şehid is used to indicate death in action, rather than from other causes such as disease.

179. MM 5339 pp.486–511: of the bölüks of the janissaries of the 65th cemaat who were present on the campaign against Wallachia and Moldavia in the winter of 1594–95, the numbers of men in each bölük varied from 59 in the 61st, to only 7 in the 6th.

per day: by the time he wrote his work, however, he was complaining that this had risen to 5, 6 or even 7 akçe p.d.¹⁸⁰ The Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân tells us, more specifically, that new janissaries had customarily been paid 2 akçe p.d. until the accession of Ahmed I (in 1603), when the starting wage was raised to 3 akçe p.d.¹⁸¹ When we look at the pay registers themselves, however, we find 3 akçe p.d. to have been the starting rate of pay for janissaries garrisoning the border castles of Hungary even before Ahmed's accession: this may indicate that special conditions applied to those serving on the front, while the information found in the Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân may have reflected the situation in peacetime. As an example of pay conditions on the Hungarian border during this war, we may cite the garrison of Eğri in Masar 1005 AH (August-November 1596), into which newly-formed force many men were recruited, since the fortress had fallen into Ottoman hands only in October 1596. These new recruits, who had a starting wage of 3 akçe p.d., joined those brought from other duties to man this fortress.¹⁸² The pay lists for janissaries serving in the fortress of Kanije in 1012 AH (July 1603-May 1604) likewise shows the presence of many new recruits at a rate of 3 akçe p.d.: new recruits were indicated by the gloss "ba-tezkere-yi efendi", but it is not possible for us to ascertain whether new recruits were former acemioğlanıs, or came directly from the reaya. By checking the names of the individual janissaries at Kanije, it can be seen that this starting-pay figure of 3 akçe p.d. was soon, in the second half of the year, increased to 7 akçe p.d.¹⁸³

180. MUSTETAB p.13

181. KAVANIN f.40r

182. MM 5241

183. MM 3731 pp.25-44,49-70: the register contains data from Lezez 1011-Masar 1014 AH (March 1603-August 1605).

The accompanying table shows the average daily pay of janissaries garrisoning Eğri and some other Hungarian castles and serving on campaign in 1005 AH (August 1596-August 1597). From this limited sample, it can be seen that the average per diem, where calculable, lay between 5.5 and 7 akçe per day. The averages for each castle obviously reflect the numbers of new recruits who joined the corps in this period: thus if we compare the average daily pay of janissaries serving in Buda with that of those in Temeşvar, we find that Buda has a higher average. Tentatively, then, we may say that 7 akçe p.d. was the average daily pay of a janissary serving in the castles of the Hungarian borders at this time.¹⁸⁴

There is less information for the average pay of the altı bölük at this time. In Reşen 1008 AH (January-April 1600) 395 members of the gureba-yi yemin, of whom 20 were retired (mütekaid), received an average daily wage of 23 akçe.¹⁸⁵ The starting rate of pay for a janissary who was promoted into the altı bölük on account of valorous action on campaign ("dilaverlik edenler"), was 13 akçe per day.¹⁸⁶

After the janissaries and the altı bölük cavalry, the next most important of the kapukulu corps were the armourers (cebeci), cannoneers (topçu) and those who attended to the gun carriages (top arabacısı). The average daily pay of the topçus assigned to campaign duty in Reşen 1003 AH

184. See following page.

185. MM 6983 p.178

186. KAVANIN f.67r

MM 5241: Defter-i yeniçeriyan-i dergah-i ali der muhafaza
-yi kale-yi... 1005 AH (1596-97 AD)

(Register of janissaries of the Porte who were defending the castle of...)

	Masar	Recec	Reşen	Lezez
Buda	a) 2 676 b) 18 629 c) 6.96	2 475 17 178 6.94	2 403 16 537 6.88	2 298
Yanık	a) 370 b) 2 400 c) 6.49	293 2 344 8	286	288
Temeşvar	a) 1 414 b) 8 000 c) 5.66	1 307 7 516 5.75	1 264	
Eğri	a) 3 121 b) 17 055 c) 5.46			2 536
Eflak (Transylvanian theatre)	a) b) c)	1 429 9 606 6.72		
Sefer-i humayun (on campaign)	a) b) c)			9 202 61 415 6.67

key:

- a) is no. of janissaries
b) is total daily pay
c) is average daily pay in akçe

(March-June 1595) was 4.78 akçe.¹⁸⁷ The average daily pay of the topçus at Buda in Lezez 1012 AH (March-May 1604) was 5.85 akçe, at Kanije it was 6.23 akçe,¹⁸⁸ and for those at Istolni Belgrad the pay rate for the three preceding months was 5.56 akçe p.d.¹⁸⁹ Figures for Lezez 1006 AH (May-August 1598) show an interesting discrepancy as between the daily pay rates of topçus remaining in Istanbul and those on campaign and in the garrisons, with the latter having a significantly lower pay rate.¹⁹⁰ This disparity may be due to the enrollment of many new recruits on campaign and in the border castles.

Average daily pay rates for the cebecis were comparable to those for the topçus. The starting wage for those who joined the corps as part of the garrison of Yanik after it was taken by the Ottomans in 1594, was 4 akçe p.d.¹⁹¹ The cebecis at Hatvan in Masar 1013 AH (May-August 1604) averaged 4.1 akçe p.d. and those at Istolni Belgrad in the same period, the low rate of 3.55 akçe p.d., while they had averaged 5.42 akçe in the preceding three months.¹⁹² As has been noted above, the average at any period depended on the composition of the garrison at any time. The higher rates

187. MM 5524 p.42: of the 660 men assigned, only 469 were present at the time the wages were paid ("minha cemaat-i topçuyan-i dergah-i ali der vacib-i reşen 1003: mevcud, neferan...469"). The title of this register (p.26) is Defter-i mevacicib-i cemaat-i topçuyan-i dergah-i ali ki beray-i sefer-i humayun firistade budend der vacib-i reşen 1003, this being the campaign led by Ferhad Pasha against Wallachia in 1595.

188. MM 7540 p.373

189. MM 7540 p.327

190. MM 136 f.25v: the average rate for those in Istanbul was 7.43 akçe p.d., while the average rate for the whole corps was 4.81 akçe.

191. MM 6151 pp.148-9: "cebeciler ki der muhafaza-yi Yanik mande end...iptida yazılanların ulufeleri dörder akçedir".

192. MM 7540 p.163

of pay which the arabacıs appear to have had at Istolni Belgrad and other fortresses at the same period may thus be nothing more than a reflection of the fact that there were longer-serving arabacıs than there were members of the cebeci corps in that particular fortress.¹⁹³

The official pay rates of the kapukulu troops may not seem, from the foregoing, to have been sufficiently high to offer an irresistible incentive for military service. However, there were a range of regular and irregular supplements to these wages which made military service a more attractive way of life. The janissaries were awarded the small sum of 30 akçe p.a., together with their Lezez wages: this was known as kemanbaha or tirkeşbaha, probably because it had originally been intended that it should be put toward the cost of furnishing them with a bow.¹⁹⁴ Cebecıs garrisoning the castles and those on active campaign also received kemanbaha, as did, possibly, topçus and arabacıs.¹⁹⁵ Those on garrison duty also received the subsistence allowance known as nafaka, at the rate of 1 akçe p.d., although at this time the full allowance was not sent to the border, for

193. MM 7540 p.511

194. AYN-I ALI/b p.88; KAVANIN f.49r: yay akçesi. There are numerous documentary references to this pay supplement. MIHALOVIÇ p.159 notes that in his time, in the 1450s, it was paid at the rate of 1 gold piece p.a. The term tirkeşbaha has a second usage, to denote the 5 gold pieces given to those who joined the altı bölük (Barkan, 1954/b p.316).

195. MM 7540 records the pay of cebecıs, topçus and arabacıs on campaign in Hungary and serving as garrison troops in Hungary from Masar 1012 to Masar 1013 AH (June 1603–August 1605): although not all cebeci are recorded as having had kemanbaha paid with their Lezez wage payment, probably due to the lags in the system, there is no mention of topçus or arabacıs having had it at all. Similarly, AYN-I ALI/b (p.90) notes that cebeci received kemanbaha, but makes no mention of this allowance in relation to topçus and arabacıs.

fear of embezzlement by their officers.¹⁹⁶ Nafaka was paid in 3-monthly tranches of 90 akçe each.¹⁹⁷

Although, as we have seen, janissaries had the opportunity to make money, there were also those within the corps whose pay was insufficient, and who needed to borrow. The inability of the exchequer to ensure the availability of funds to pay wages when they fell due, and abuses by those responsible for ensuring that wages were distributed equitably, were presumably the major causes of the borrowing. Such borrowings could be made from the richer janissaries on an individual basis, as was the case in seventeenth-century Ibrim,¹⁹⁸ or else the needy were helped in the short-term by the state, through being given provisions in kind, for which they would reimburse the treasury when they eventually received their wages. A campaign account entry for 24 Cumada I 1015 (27 September 1606), shortly before the end of the war, shows how the cost of provisions given to some of the janissaries on campaign in Hungary was repaid to the treasury within a month of them receiving their wages, the payment of which was, in any case, in

196. KAVANIN ff.52v,83v

197. e.g. MM 7540 p.373; MM 7029 p.64; MM 3731 p.69; MM 6322 p.1088; Mxt.638 f.2v

198. Ménage and Hinds (198.)

arrears.¹⁹⁹ The evidence suggests that such a system pertained only to the kapukulu troops.

Members of the alti bölük were able to supplement their pay through the fees they earned in the performance of government business, and in particular by acting as agents in the collection of certain taxes on behalf of the treasury. The fee paid for the collection of the cizye (poll tax), for instance, was called gulamiye; Abdülkadir describes how the distribution of the gulamiye used to be an annual event, given to the alti bölük who collected the cizye at the rate of 10 akçe per tax-payer. Two men were responsible for each tax register, one acting in the capacity of steward (emin) and the other as clerk (katib). The performance of this service was rotated among the corps, and every year 700-800 benefited from the opportunity to earn gulamiye. However, the alti bölük members stationed

199. KK 1890 p.115 (24 Cum.I 1015): "an tahvil-i Ali Efendi emin-i nüzül-i humayun an paha-yi zahire-yi yeniçeriyân-i ordu-yi humayun an akçe-yi paha-yi peksimad ve şair ve rugan-i sade ve erz ki der vakt-i akın be sefer-i humayun tevzi şide bud ve hala kıymetş bi-hazine-yi amire averde an yed-i Mehmed çavuş-i yeniçeriyân"...416,693 akçe

The entry is completed by showing how this total is arrived at on the basis of the following prices charged for the provisions:

<u>şair</u> (barley)	29,645 <u>keyl</u> at 9 <u>akçe</u>	266,805
<u>erz</u> (rice)	705 <u>keyl</u> at 63 <u>akçe</u>	44,415
<u>peksimad</u> (biscuit)	2157.5 <u>kantar</u> at 45 <u>akçe</u>	97,087.5
<u>rugan-i sade</u> (plain oil)	599 <u>kiyye</u> at 14 <u>akçe</u>	8,386

416,693.5

See also the entries for 26 Cumada I (p.115) and 5 Cumada II (p.120) for cebecis and topçus respectively. That these transactions coincided with the payment of wages to the troops is clear from account entries to this effect viz. pp.112,114,120. See also MM 16320 p.54.

outside Istanbul complained that they did not have the opportunity to share in these rewards, and in 1012 AH (1603-04) it was widened so that all members of the altı bölük were eligible.²⁰⁰

The government's need to keep the loyalty of its troops, and to ensure that they performed their required duties also demanded that very substantial cash incentives be handed out periodically, either in the form of pay rises, or else on a one-off basis. Abdülkadir gives countless examples of money being handed out at the start of campaigns in the 1593-1606 war, before specific engagements, or in recognition of outstanding service. Such largesse makes the official rates of pay irrelevant as a measure of the extent of the remuneration which a soldier could earn. A few examples may be cited: after the capture of Yanık in 1594, a (? permanent) rise of 2 akçe was made to all mounted kapukulu troops and 1 akçe to each infantryman.²⁰¹ A further 500 akçe was given as a gift to encourage an immediately subsequent attack on Komran, which did not, incidentally, succeed.²⁰² To those bringing the head of a dead Christian at Niğbolu, 2 or 4 gold pieces were given, and 8 for a prisoner.²⁰³ After regaining Estergon in 1605, the kapukulu cavalry were awarded a pay rise of 2 akçe each, and foot soldiers 1 akçe each.²⁰⁴ These rewards made in the field were regarded as irregular - indeed as rüşvet (bribery) - by some, who saw in such unauthorised distribution of money another cause of the weakening of the treasury.²⁰⁵ The dispensation of such frequent and sizeable rewards cannot but have contributed to

200. AK ff.179v-180r; cf. Uzunçarşılı (1943) II pp.158-60

201. AK f.26r

202. AK f.27r

203. AK f.35r

204. AK ff.211r,211v

205. MUSTETAB pp.3-4

the financial problems of the Empire, but it is doubtful that the troops would have performed at all without such hand-outs. The accession of a new sultan called for the giving of bahşiş to his kul: the generosity with which this was done gave a chance to purchase their loyalty. At the accession of Mehmed III in 1595, 100 purses of gold were withdrawn from the Inner Treasury, and part of this was sent to Belgrade to cover the back-pay due to the troops there.²⁰⁶ Members of the kapukulu ocakları received a substantial present at this time.²⁰⁷

We have seen that the reaya were able to take the first step toward an improvement in their status by answering the general call to serve. For those who were not promised a timar for valorous conduct, promotion within the army depended on an initial period of service in a border garrison, after which the individual had earned the chance of being awarded the position to which he aspired. This incentive of future reward was used to dissuade disenchanted troops from mutiny. The practice of garrison service for new recruits was not peculiar to the Ottoman system, and the situation was remarkably similar for the troops of the Hapsburg army in the Netherlands at this time. The practical thinking behind this period of garrison service was that the inexperienced recruit could learn the discipline of military duty away from the thick of campaign; a second advantage was that garrison troops could be more conveniently left unpaid than those 'in action'.²⁰⁸ The usual period of such apprentice garrison duty was three

206. AK f.30v

207. AYN-I ALI/b p.109: he gives a list of the gifts made under the rubric Sultan Mehmed Han ibn Sultan Murad Han tahtına cülus ettikte kadimden olageldüğü üzere erkan-ı devlete verilen bahşıdır (pp.108-12); see also HAMMER IV p.645.

208. Parker (1981) p.34; Orhonlu (1970) p.62

years, and the conditions under which it was performed were termed "bölük şartıyla", indicating that the individual would proceed to full membership of one of the permanent regiments thereafter. A position in the janissary corps may have been desirable, but it was membership of the sultan's cavalry regiments that conferred most status.²⁰⁹ It was the group known as kuloğlu who were the main candidates for such promotion.²¹⁰ After the three year tour of duty was complete, such garrison troops were called onto the field of battle: while Pest was being defended against the Christians in 1600, 700 kuloğlu who had fulfilled their obligations and were ready for combat ("...vadeleri ve şartları tekmil olur") were summoned from Eğri, but they fled from fright at the sound of gunfire before they reached their destination.²¹¹ By volunteering for fortress service full members of the janissaries, cebecis and topçus could be promoted into the altı bölük.²¹² Agreeing to undertake garrison duty was also a way in which those who needed disciplining could ingratiate themselves again: for instance, the kapukulu troops who had earlier escaped from Yanık castle (presumably when it was taken by the Christians

209. Georgieva (1970) p.322. In January 1602, the promotion of 27 individuals into the altı bölük was recorded thus: "mukaddema vezir Mahmud Paşa hazretleri Tuna yalisında muhafazada iken bölük virüp südde—yi saadette makbul olmayın rica ettikte üç yıl Hatvan kalesinde muhafazada olmak şartıyla bölük buyurulmuştur fi 18 Receb 1010" (MM 6423 p.110).

210. In its strict usage this term does describe those who were the sons of kul, and therefore eligible to be kul themselves, but may have gained wider currency as military recruitment expanded. Koçi Bey recognised a wider meaning of the term in the passage in which he tells how it was Koca Sinan Pasha who stationed various men at the newly-captured fortress of Yanık in 1595 with the status of kuloğlu and the promise of entry into the altı bölük after 3 years service (KOÇI BEY p.42).

211. AK f.134v

212. AK ff.125v,141v

in 1598) were promised that they would be confirmed in their positions if they agreed to serve for three years in the castle of Buda.²¹³

Register MM 5158 contains details of the local troops garrisoning 51 castles of the vilayet of Buda from 1012-16 AH (1603-07).²¹⁴ The types of troops comprising each garrison are listed, as well as their p.d. pay, totals for each 3-month period being calculated on the basis of 85.5 days, in contrast to the 88.5 days used for the kapukulu troops. The reason why the period of reckoning is shorter is not apparent. Also unclear is the reason why some groups of men in some months received only exactly 70% of the figure shown as their official entitlement. From this 70% figure, further items were then subtracted, such as the fees for the renewal of their letters of appointment on the accession of Ahmed I (rüsum-i berevat-i cülus), an amount to cover provisions received in kind (bedel-i mevacib) and an amount

213. AK f.123r

214. This register is entitled Erkam-i mevacib-i neferat-i kıla ve palankaha tabi-yi eyalet-i Budun.

which had been advanced to them on two occasions (harclik).²¹⁵

It can thus be seen how the conditions of service of these border troops were different from those of the kapukulu troops. While the kapukulu had to repay the treasury on a pro rata basis for the provisions which were given to them when they were, for whatever reason, short of money to buy their own, provisions were an integral part of the remuneration of the border troops, and the value of the provisions given them was subsequently deducted from their wages. This

215. To illustrate how the pay was calculated we may look in detail at a typical example, the second farisan (cavalry) corps of the castle of Segedin:

Mevacib-i farisan-i sani-yi kale-yi Segedin vacib fi al-tarih al-mezbur: Masar, Recec 1012:

39 men at 411 p.d. = $411 \times 85.5 \times 2 = 70,280 \times 70\% = 49,196$

Reşen, Lezez 1012:

39 men at 411 p.d. = $411 \times 85.5 \times 2 = 70,280 \times 70\% = 49,196$

Masar, Recec 1013:

32 men at 341 p.d. = $341 \times 85.5 \times 2 = 58,310 \times 70\% = 40,817$

Reşen, Lezez 1013: no data

Masar, Recec 1014:

39 men at 411 p.d. = $411 \times 85.5 \times 2 = 70,280$

A note is appended to the effect that a further 35,490 akçe was to be deducted from the first of these six-monthly tranches viz:

<u>be-cihet-i rüsum-i berevat-i cülus-i humayun</u>	12,330
<u>be-cihet-i bedel-i mevacib: zahire dade</u>	3,000
<u>ber vech-i harclik dade</u>	9,360
<u>defa harclik dade</u>	10,800

35,490

It may easily be calculated that it cost each of these men more than 1 month's wages to renew their letters of appointment on the accession of the new sultan.

(source: MM 5158 p.10)

evidence contributes to the clarification of a point which puzzled Fekete: entries in a wage register for the castle of Lipova in 1591-92 suggested to him that provisions were an integral part of the remuneration paid to at least certain groups of troops, for the gloss "dahil-i galle" ("inclusive of grain") is to be seen beside entries recording the pay of the individual azebs garrisoning that castle. He considered that this probably indicated that there was a nominal amount to cover provisions included in the pay entitlement of each man:²¹⁶ for the Hungarian border troops whom we are considering, provisions were actually given in kind to the value of this nominal amount.

Average daily wage rates may be calculated for each of the types of troops manning these 51 castles during the period to which these accounts pertain. It has already been pointed out that the distinctive names by which they were known probably do not indicate any great specialisation of function by the end of the sixteenth century. As an example we will take the castle of Kopan:²¹⁷

	<u>akçe p.d.</u>
<u>Müstahfızan-i enderun</u>	7.1
<u>Müstahfızan-i birun</u>	8.4
<u>Farisan-i evvel</u>	10.54
<u>Farisan-i sani</u>	10.34
<u>Azeban-i atik</u>	7.4
<u>Azeban-i cedit</u>	2.0
<u>Azeban-i salis</u>	7.37
<u>Topçuyan</u>	8.37
<u>Martolosan</u>	5.45

216. Fekete (1955) I pp.504-5

217. MM 5158 pp.64-72: these rates apply to the six months of Resen and Lezez 1013 AH (November 1604-May 1605); there is no 30% deduction, nor any other deductions indicated, and so we are able to give an average pay figure based on the full cash wage. Kopan is adequately representative of the level of average pay over the sample of 51 castles.

These average daily rates compare favourably with those for the kapukulu troops. The bonuses which these local troops received were smaller and less regular than those given to the kapukulu, however, although there is note in the campaign accounts of cash gifts being made to garrisons whose members had served well, or performed particular services.²¹⁸

Register MM 5158 shows that the local border troops received their wages in 6-monthly tranches. In the quieter conditions before the outbreak of the war, the tranches were annual: a gloss to a summary account of the Buda Treasury for 1578-79 AD tells us that this was the case at least for the garrisons of that vilayet. It also confirms that harclik was, in this context, an interim advance which had to be repaid, and was not considered as a supplement to the wage, as was the nafaka of the kapukulu.²¹⁹

The idea that anyone whose home was in the dar ül-islam should be forced to stay in infidel hands was unacceptable to the Ottomans, and the efforts made to secure the release of prisoners are further evidence of concern for the welfare and well-being of the soldiery. The price paid to ransom prisoners must have been in accordance with their rank, but

218. e.g. KK 1885 p.14: "inam-i neferat-i kıla ve ağayan"; "inam-i bazı neferat-i kale-yi Kopan". KK 1887 p.14: "inam-i Mahmud ve Receb an gönüllüyan-i Eğri ki ba-ahbar amedend".

219. MM 498 p.5 (account for 21 Şevval 986-20 Şevval 987 AH)

The entry is: "der zimmat-i neferat-i kıla-yi vilayet-i Budun ki an hazine-yi amire bi-tarik-i harclik sitadend"...3,291,301, with the gloss: "ulufeleri senevi olmağın birer mikdar harclik tarikiyle karz virilüp sonra yıllık ulufeleri virildikte mahsub olurmuş".

we do not possess details of such a scale. Before the start of the war, horses were being used to ransom Ottoman captives in Christian hands - an activity which, in view of the strategic value which the Ottomans placed on horses, was ordered to be stopped.²²⁰ Prisoners taken by the enemy could be ransomed against a cash payment: in 1605 a request for help was made to the Porte by a certain Omer, whose relative Mehmed, a janissary of the 79th cemaat, had been taken prisoner near the Iron Gates as he was going on the Danube by boat. This led to the sending of an order to the voyvode of Wallachia, by this time again an ally of the Ottomans, that the sum of 500 gold pieces (flori) should be paid in order to secure Mehmed's release.²²¹

In 1605 there was an exchange of prisoners with the Hungarians who were by this time themselves struggling against Hapsburg domination: the beylerbeyi of Kanije was ordered to arrange that Hungarian prisoners (esir) held by the Ottomans were to be set free without money changing hands, while those muslim prisoners (tutsak) held by the Hungarians were to be ransomed against payment of the price at which the Hungarians had bought them from the Hapsburgs.²²² Despite the realignment of Wallachia and Moldavia with the Ottomans, over-zealous troops from Silistre were still, in 1605, taking prisoners from these principalities: it was ordered that this practice be stopped.²²³

The archives of the Hungarian Batthyány family, whose seat was at Körmend, some 100 km north-west of Kanije, show the account which was kept by the Hungarians of the value of

220. MD 70/61

221. MD 75/279; cf. MD 77/277: the ransom for a certain martolos held as prisoner was, by contrast, only 120 gurus.

222. MD 77/286

223. KK 70 p.82

goods lost by their villagers to Turkish raiders. Similarly, they kept careful records of the Turkish prisoners whom they took, such men being sent in person to collect their ransom, with their compatriots being held to guarantee their return with the money.²²⁴ Care was also taken of captives taken by the Ottomans:²²⁵ there was always a chance that information could be extracted from them, or that they could be sold as slaves.

Efforts were also made to give competent medical attention to the Ottoman wounded, and to equitable execution of the wills of the many who fell in battle or succumbed to plague or fever on campaign.²²⁶ Among these latter, the most eminent were the grand vezirs Ibrahim Pasha and Malkoç Ali Pasha, both of whom died of fever (humma-yi muharrike) in Belgrade.²²⁷ To attend to the medical care of the troops, doctors, surgeons (cerrah) and eye-doctors (kahhal) accompanied the army on campaign.²²⁸ In 1597, the appointment of a frenk doctor named Bartolomeo to serve on campaign is recorded; he had been in Belgrade for a long time, and, because he was known to be experienced, was called upon to replace another doctor who was considered incapable of this duty. He was to be paid 40 akçe p.d.²²⁹ Another call for a highly-regarded individual called Martino went out in 1605,

224. Sugar (1971) pp.82-91

225. MD 77/242; MD 77/281

226. The circumstances governing the distribution of the estates of dead soldiers are discussed in Part III below.

227. AK ff.143r,197v-198r; Parker (1981) p.100 refers to an article by Hrabak (1957), which makes reference to the Ottoman army's part in the spread of plague in the Balkans: working principally from the Dubrovnik archives, Hrabak has established a chronology of plague epidemics in the Balkans between 1450 and 1600.

228. AK ff.5r,157r,191v

229. KK 254 p.10

when it was especially asked that he be sent back from Dubrovnik.²³⁰ While those wounded by gunshot at the attack on Kanije in 1600 received the attentions of the surgeons free, those wounded in other ways were given 10 gold pieces.²³¹ Wounded janissaries were sent back to Istanbul on camels, the money for the mahaffe, the wooden frame which allowed two people to be carried on one animal, being provided by the state.²³²

Except where revenues were collected in the Balkans and Hungary and despatched directly to the front, cash to pay the troops fighting in Hungary had to be physically transported from Istanbul. This required a reliable escort, able to fend off the bandits (eşkiya, haramizade) who lay in wait along the route. Transportation was by mule,²³³ ox cart, pack horse or camel. The Ottoman exchequer did not have access to the sophisticated financial instruments which to some extent relieved their European contemporaries of this arduous undertaking: bills of exchange were considered indispensable as a means of effecting cash transfer for the payment of Hapsburg troops fighting in the Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century. Paper credit had the added advantage that the cash required for its redemption did not have all to be found at one time. The system of merchant credit broke down, however, when Spanish government

230. MD 77/167

231. AK f.132r. Abdülkadir also records that those wounded at Estergon in 1605 were given 4 or 10 gold pieces (AK f.209v).

232. MM 5145 p.9: under the heading Mühimmat-ı yeniçeriyân-ı şikestegan we find that 10 pairs of mahaffe were taken on the campaign against the Celali rebels in 1602, at a total cost of 1,200 akçe, together with lengths of rope to secure them. See also KAVANIN f.84v; MD 77/310.

233. AK f.30v

demands for loans became so enormous that a cash shortage ensued.²³⁴ If conditions in Europe had not allowed for the modification of the system in response to its overloading, the Hapsburg exchequer would have been confronted with logistic demands such as those with which the Ottomans had to contend: in 1605, for instance, there was an urgent need to send the enormous amount of 700 yük of akçe (70m.) to the Hungarian front for the pay of kapukulu and border troops until the end of the season's campaign. Such money had to be found immediately, and in toto, and transported by the long land route.²³⁵ This is a telling illustration of how acute was the cash crisis central to Ottoman troubles at this time.

The transportation problem could be eased by sending the bullion in a higher denomination coin than the silver akçe, particularly in gold.²³⁶ But gold coin was harder to find, and the loss of one camel-load of gold coin was a greater disaster than the loss of a load of silver akçe. Administrative arrangements for the sending of bullion appear to have been of two types. Transport was either organised on a kaza basis, with the cadi through whose area of jurisdiction the convoy passed being required to provide strong carts and well-nourished horses to replace the by now tired oxen and inadequate carts which had carried the bullion hitherto.²³⁷ Alternatively, camels were rented by the state to carry the wages to the borders.²³⁸ The rental of camels to

234. Parker (1981) pp.146-47

235. MD 77/493: there are numerous other examples of orders concerning the transport of cash.

236. MD 72/864

237. MD 72/582

238. For instance, MM 4435 p.47: "be-cihet-i kiraye-yi üstüran beray-i bürden-i akçe-yi mevacib-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i ali ki nöbetciyan-i kılâha...".

carry the wages of the janissaries to 22 castles, mostly in Rumeli, as recorded in an account for 1007 AH (1598-99) shows the number of camel-loads of akçe required per 3-month period to pay the janissaries garrisoning the castle in question. Five camel-loads of coin were required every 3 months for the wages of the janissaries in Buda, but this figure would have included the wages of the janissaries in all the castles of the vilayet. Also given is the transport cost per load, which depended on the distance from Istanbul: to carry to Buda the 25 loads of akçe which were due to the border troops in 1598-99 cost the exchequer 580 akçe per load, or a total of 11,600 akçe.²³⁹

The difficulties of getting coin to the troops in wartime, coupled with the apparent shortage of money, meant that some units did not get paid for many months, and had several tranches owing them. The government was, by default and by design, pragmatic in its pattern of wage payments. Those troops least able to cause trouble were neglected as long as was feasible, with signs of unrest being met with the payment of the outstanding wages.²⁴⁰ Those from whom there was most to fear, those with the greatest bargaining power, received their pay most regularly. That there was a danger of unpaid troops mutinying unless their back-pay was

239. KK 7102 f.35v (a/c for 9 Safar-20 Şevval 1007). Comparable accounts for the transportation of wages are found at MM 3903 p.59 (1 Receb 1004-29 Cum.I 1005 AH/March 1596-January 1597); MM 4435 p.47 (12 Zilkade 1005-29 Safar 1006 AH/June-October 1597): the latter refers to expenses incurred in 1003.

240. Among the annotations to be found beside the names of soldiers in the mevacib defterleri are, on occasion, numbers in red ink. It seems to me that the most plausible explanation for these numbers is that they record the amount of back-pay due to the individual: the highest number I found in the registers for this period was 25, indicating 25 tranches, that is, that the individual had not been paid for over 6 years.

forthcoming, was naturally recognised by the authorities. In a letter which he wrote to Sultan Mehmed III in August/September 1597, Satırcı Mehmed Pasha reveals his fears that the troops would not fight unless they were given their back-pay: he writes that wages had not been paid for 2 years, that 30 m. akçe were due, but that there was a chance of being able to stand against the Christians if this amount was sent to the front.²⁴¹

By the summer of 1595, the kul troops garrisoning the fortress at Sigetvar had not been paid for a year or a year and a half. The kapucu başı Abdülkerim was sent from Istanbul to inspect: the responsibility for the delay in payment was deemed to lie with the defterdar of Buda, who was told to find the outstanding money from the Buda Treasury or wherever else he could. Such an order is typical of the passing of the onus of responsibility from those at the centre to those on the spot,²⁴² although money should have earlier been made available to the Buda Treasury from the Central or Campaign Treasury for the very purpose of paying the wages of this garrison.²⁴³ At the same time, the defterdar of Bosnia was warned that he should take pains to increase the amount of revenue in the province, so that wages could be paid on time.²⁴⁴

Just as the timing of raises and the giving of bonuses were

241. SELANIKI f.383r

242. MD 73/223; MD 73/927

243. In the telhis surviving from the reign of Ahmed I (Orhonlu, 1970) may be discerned a disregard for the problems with which those in the field had to contend. Whether such an attitude was peculiar to this ruler, or whether it was shared by previous sultans cannot be said in the absence of detailed study of the personalities of the sultans and their relationship with their military commanders.

244. MD 73/57

used as special encouragements to the troops, so outstanding wages were paid immediately before an engagement. For garrison troops, another tactic was to postpone payment of wages until those due to receive them had moved to their new posting. In 1014 AH (1605), troops were to be sent to Palota from the castles of Üsek and Erdevik, but refused to move saying that they had not been paid. The solution was for them to be given a small interim allowance (harclik), and to be told that they would receive their full pay (ulufe) once they arrived at their destination.²⁴⁵ Such a technique did not always work, especially with the more powerful kapukulu troops. Those reluctant to leave for campaign in 1598 were told that three tranches of pay would await them in Edirne. However, the sipahis prevented the departure of this money from Istanbul, with the result that they were paid one tranche on the spot.²⁴⁶

On the basis of the information given by Abdülkadir, the pay of the kul on active campaign, in contrast to the garrison troops, was, as we would anticipate, never subject to appreciable delay.²⁴⁷ These men travelled in close proximity to those who controlled military operations and were the backbone of the army. Fear of mutiny meant that they came

245. MD 77/280; MD 77/249: the garrison troops at Egri in 1605 were so keen to remain there, rather than be posted to Estergon, that they were willing to renounce the pay increases which they had been awarded since the capture of the fortress by the Ottomans in 1596. Such reluctance is surely indication that they were well-entrenched in the life of the wider community at Egri, and profiting, no doubt, from local business opportunities.

246. SELANIKI f.392r

247. Abdülkadir's mentions of wage distribution to the kapukulu ocaklari are frequent e.g. Lezez 1003 wages paid in Muharrem 1004 (f.43r); Masar 1006 wages paid in Rebi II 1006 (f.96r); Masar 1009 wages paid in Cumada I 1009 (f.140v); Recec 1011 wages paid in Cumada II 1011 (f.164r); Reşen 1014 wages paid in Ramazan 1014 (f.213v).

first in the pay queue. In comparison with the immediate danger posed by insubordination amongst these troops, the threat represented by those in the garrisons was inconsiderable. The authorities had to husband their resources carefully in order to avoid mutiny, by balancing the competing demands of the various corps of the army within the limits of feasibility at any time.

IV. The 'Foreign' Troops: Tatars, French and Others

There was a substantial body of troops fighting in this war who did not live under direct Ottoman rule, but came from vassal states of the Ottoman sultan. Of these, the most numerous were the Tatar troops of the Crimea. On account of the fluid and mobile character of their warfare, and of the reputation as feared adversaries which stemmed from this, the Tatar forces had an important part to play in the campaigns of this war. Large numbers of their men could be put into the field at short notice: the Tatar army could mobilise on home ground in less than a month,²⁴⁸ and then after crossing the R.Bug (Aksu) at Ozü (Ochakov), and the R.Dneister at Akkerman (Belgorod) in boats provided by courtesy of the Porte,²⁴⁹ had the choice of two main routes for entry to the plains of Hungary, a northerly one through southern Poland and across Transylvania, or a southerly one across Moldavia and Wallachia and from thence westwards along the right bank of the Danube.²⁵⁰ The route followed from year to year depended upon the political circumstances of the time, as indeed did the han's decision whether to participate at all.²⁵¹

In the major engagements of this war, the Tatars appeared only irregularly as a contingent of the full army. In 1594 they played an important part in the action at Yanik; in 1596 Gazi Giray Han, who was otherwise han throughout the

248. Collins (1975) p.259

249. MD 72/604; MD 73/389; MD 73/514; SELANIKI ff.386r-386v

250. Esprincharde (1609) p.232r gives details of six variants of these two main routes.

251. Kortepeter (1972) pp.123-210 describes in detail the shifting position of the Tatars between the Christian and Ottoman powers, as well as the political intriguing amongst the han's family at home.

years of the war, was briefly deposed in favour of his brother Feth Giray who had distinguished himself at the battle of Mezőkeresztes.²⁵² Gazi Giray's personal participation in the campaigns was limited: in 1598 he supported Satirci Mehmed Pasha in the reduction of the fortress of Varad, but although he did not leave for the Crimea until October 1599, his contribution in that year was negligible. His son Toktamiş was present at the Ottoman capture of Kanije in 1600, and in 1601 Gazi Giray sent his nephew in his stead.²⁵³ Despite making the effort to come in person in 1602, he reached Belgrade only in October,²⁵⁴ after which he spent the famous winter in Peçuy with the historian Peçevi, and then returned home. During the last three seasons of the war, Toktamiş was again sent to represent him.²⁵⁵ Gazi Giray Han presented a convenient scapegoat on whom to pin blame for some of the failures of the Turkish effort. His friend Peçevi noted that although the Tatars assisted the war effort in some capacity in every year of the war until the 1605 season, Gazi Giray had led his troops in person on only three or four occasions, and he did not forbear from pointing out that the Tatars had arrived too late for the 1602 campaign, and left before the start of that of 1603.²⁵⁶ His other friend of many years, Satirci Mehmed Pasha, tried to suggest that his own lacklustre performance in the 1597 campaign was due to the Han's

252. PEÇEVI II p.205

253. PEÇEVI II p.250-52

254. Orhonlu (1970) p.53

255. Kortepeter (1972) p.179. See KK 1889 (icmal) for evidence of Toktamiş' presence in the 1604 season.

256. PEÇEVI II pp.269,292,309

failure to appear.²⁵⁷

In a despatch of 9 August 1593, some two weeks after Sinan Pasha had set out from Istanbul for Belgrade, an order was sent to Gazi Giray that he should mobilise his forces, under his own command or that of Feth Giray, and come to join up with Sinan, keeping Sinan informed of when he set out, and what progress he was making. He was apparently not expected to come for the campaign of 1593, but his services were required for that of 1594.²⁵⁸ A despatch of October of the same year reiterated the order, with the additional details that the Tatars should set out before Nevruz and reach the Belgrade-Buda area on Ruz-i Hizr, some one and a half months later.²⁵⁹ The awe in which the Tatars were held as adversaries is made plain in a letter sent in July 1593 by the beylerbeyi of Buda, Hasan Pasha, to the Hapsburg commander, the Archduke Matthias. Even though Tatar troops did not, by all accounts, appear on campaign in the few months of that season which remained, he stated that among the forces moving toward Belgrade with Sinan Pasha were 100,000 Tatars and sipahis.²⁶⁰ Gazi Giray was aware of the

257. PEÇEVI II p.213; Peçevi supposed that the friendship between Gazi Giray and Satırcı Mehmed went back to their time together in Istanbul, where Gazi Giray was after the death of Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha (ibid. p.222).

258. MD 71/571: "...evvel bahar-i huçeste-yi asarda"; Uzunçarşılı (1977) p.30 quotes part of this letter. Abdülkadir reports that Yemişçi Hasan Agha, at that time still a kapucu başı, was sent from Sinan's camp at Filibe with letters from the Sultan, a robe and a sum of money (harçlık) to encourage Gazi Giray to come (AK ff.8v-9r). Yemişçi Hasan returned from the Crimea in the summer of 1594 with the news that the Han would be coming, and was awarded the office of janissary agha (AK ff.19r-19v).

259. MD 71/649

260. Bayerle (1972) p.181: "...100,000 tatars and sipahis from five overseas provinces"

reputation of his men, and used this as a bargaining counter in trying to extract concessions from the Porte: later in the war, he reported to Mehmed III that the Christian forces which had been coming against Buda had retreated on hearing that the Tatars were to spend the winter in Hungary.²⁶¹

The Porte demanded that more than 50-60,000 Tatars be sent for the 1594 campaign: this was the same number as had been sent in Süleyman's time.²⁶² In his estimation of the numbers of men in the Ottoman army for the 1594 campaign, Peçevi puts the Tatar force at 30-40,000, although he had been told by the Han himself that there were 150,000.²⁶³ Abdülkadir's dependability as an observer appears to be called into question when he tells us that the number of Tatars at the siege of Yanik was 150,000, but he does not say that he was there in person, and it is probable that he accepted the exaggerated claims of the Han.²⁶⁴ The figure of 50-60,000 is also credible in view of the consensus which emerges from the researches of present-day scholars who suggest that the han could put more than 80,000 men into the field.²⁶⁵ According to Knolles, of the 85,000 Tatars who had gone to serve in Hungary, plague and famine had so thinned their ranks that a mere 8,000 remained by 1595.²⁶⁶

As well as the Tatars of the Crimea, Gazi Giray brought with him a number of Circassian troops. More than 10,000 (according to Abdülkadir), with the status of han kulları

261. Orhonlu (1970) p.53

262. MD 71/571: "...Sultan Süleyman Han..zamanında gönderildiği üzere...".

263. PEÇEVI II p.156

264. AK f.22v

265. Collins (1975) p.260

266. Knolles (1621) p.1061

were with him in 1594.²⁶⁷ Of the 100,000 men whom Gazi Giray proposed to bring with him for the 1598 campaign, a certain number were Circassian;²⁶⁸ there were 7,000 at Kanije in 1600,²⁶⁹ and Toktamış, Gazi Giray's son, included them in the force of 50,000 which was reported to be on its way for the 1605 Estergon campaign.²⁷⁰

Gazi Giray was caught between Ottoman summonses to appear with the army in Hungary and dynastic problems at home, but he did not disguise his expectations that he and his family would be rewarded for their loyalty with governorships within Ottoman borders.²⁷¹ Apart from the historic obligations between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars,²⁷² we may ask exactly what were the advantages and disadvantages to the Ottomans of Tatar participation in these campaigns. In military terms, they benefited from the presence of a large fighting force which, even in this period of predominantly siege warfare, retained its value as a highly mobile raiding body. The principal importance of the Tatars, even in the sieges of Yanık and Kanije, was as a diversionary force, drawing off part of the enemy from the

267. AK f.19v; the defterdar Etmekcizade Ahmed referred to "...hanın kapusu kullarından 300 nefer çerkes yigitler" (Orhonlu, 1970 p.56).

268. AK f.98v

269. AK f.131r

270. AK f.206r

271. Kortepeter (1972) p.169: after Satirci Mehmed Pasha had taken Varad in 1598, he awarded the revenues of Silistre to the Han who had assisted him in the siege. Kortepeter (p.145) also describes how Gazi Giray intended to install his relative Ahmed Bey, who was sancakbeyi of Bender, as voyvode of Moldavia in 1595. Later in the war, Yemişçi Hasan Pasha wrote to the Sultan saying that Gazi Giray had requested that Derviş Pasha, at that time beylerbeyi of Bosnia, be made a vezir (Orhonlu, 1970 p.76).

272. Inalcık, art. Giray (EI); Berningsen et al (1978) pp.4-5

central action. On their route between their homeland and Hungary, and during the winters, they were also of considerable importance in raiding into the principalities and the Hapsburg territories to the west of Ottoman Hungary.²⁷³

The rewards to be gained in raiding were clearly a major consideration in encouraging the Tatars to come to these campaigns: after the taking of Yanik, Gazi Giray let his men raid to Papa castle, which was surrendered to them, and as far as Vienna, after which they sold in the Ottoman camp the captives they had taken.²⁷⁴ As a condition of his coming to the 1598 campaign, Gazi Giray wrote saying that he wanted his men to be allowed to raid "...Alman dađlarina varınca", to Prague and Vienna.²⁷⁵ Undoubtedly such assurances also had the function of harnessing the energies of a group which could otherwise have been used against Gazi Giray by other members of his family. It was a matter of concern to the Ottomans that the Hapsburgs should not be encouraged by Gazi Giray's failure to appear on campaign in Hungary,²⁷⁶ but against the advantages of the extra and vital manpower provided by the Tatars in these campaigns has to be set their uncontrollability, and Gazi Giray, understanding the Ottoman need for manpower, did not hesitate to draw attention to this as a means of putting pressure on the

273. The wide extent of Tatar raids in the spring of 1603 is detailed in a letter of Gazi Giray (Orhonlu, 1970 pp.58-59); see also pp.26,60-61,92-93,101-02.

274. AK ff.26r,26v

275. AK f.99r

276. Orhonlu (1970) pp.52-53: in 1603, Yemiřci Hasan Pasha expressed such fears to the sultan in writing of the delicate matter of the amount of money needed to secure the han's co-operation, especially since he had not fought in the 1602 campaign.

Ottomans.²⁷⁷ One concession in particular caused friction with the Ottoman troops. This was the entry of Tatars into the kapukulu ocakları, an animosity which, in February 1606, resulted in a revolt by the cavalry of the Porte.²⁷⁸

Although their laying waste to Hapsburg lands which the Ottomans could not realistically envisage controlling themselves was permissible, unrestrained plundering by the Tatars did not accord with the broader intentions of the Ottomans, as will be discussed in Part II. It was against policy that the lands which they held in Hungary should be pillaged in the short-term interests of appeasing this element of their military support. After Wallachia temporarily became an Ottoman vilayet in 1594, it was forbidden for raids to be made into Moldavia,²⁷⁹ which too, after it had gone over to the Hapsburg cause, had been subdued by the Tatar Han.²⁸⁰ A warning to the same effect was issued in September 1604,²⁸¹ and in June 1605 a former beylerbeyi of Silistre was ordered to protect the Danube region from rampaging Tatars.²⁸²

Discipline amongst the Tatar soldiers seems to have become slacker as the war dragged on, presumably as the opportunities for booty were diminished, and also as the strong figure of Gazi Giray played a smaller part in the campaigns as he left the command to his son. That the Principalities were back within the Ottoman fold, and not open to plunder as they had

277. Orhonlu (1970) p.54: "...tatar askeri bir vahşi taifedür iltifat olmayacak bir vechile zabt olunması mümkündür".

278. HAMMER IV p.383. MM 6423 p.110 lists the names of 40 Tatars who joined the altı bölük regiments in 1601-02.

279. AK f.43r

280. PEÇEVI II p.174

281. MD 75/357

282. MD 77/323

been when they had constituted part of the dar ül-harb, made little difference to the energetic Tatars. They attacked the peasants whom the Ottomans were trying to encourage to settle, stealing their animals and taking the people themselves to sell as slaves.²⁸³

The relationship between the Ottoman sultan and the Tatars was expressed by the acute French agent Deshayes in 1621 as being parallel to that existing between the French king and his Swiss troops: the French maintained these mercenaries in peace as well as war, providing both money and clothing.²⁸⁴ The Ottoman treasury had to make substantial financial contributions to the han in the effort to persuade him to come to Hungary. Inalcık's statement that the sultan sent to the han a gift of 40,000 gold pieces known as çizme baha²⁸⁵ when he was expected to appear on campaign, was only the tip of the iceberg of the quite considerable monetary inducements which he demanded in return for his services. On top of the annual retainer (salyane) which the han received, and in addition to the usual gifts of robes, jewelled saddles and the like, expense money (harclık) was given to him at the start of the campaign, and feasts were held to greet him on his arrival in the Ottoman camp.²⁸⁶

The unsuccessful personal attempts made by Peçevi and Etmekcizade Ahmed to encourage Gazi Giray Han to stay in Hungary

283. MD 75/643; MD 77/252; MD 77/507

284. Deshayes (1645) p.206: Deshayes was sent by the French king to investigate the position of Christians in the Holy Land.

285. Inalcık, art. Giray (IA): his source for this is not made clear, and I have not found the term çizme baha (literally 'boot money') in sources for the 1593-1606 campaigns. Uzunçarşılı (1977) p.30 puts the rate of this çizme baha at only 5-15,000 gold pieces.

286. AK ff.22v,101v

for the 1603 campaign season²⁸⁷ were affirmed with substantial grants from the treasury. Of the 3,483,300 akçe which were expended on the costs of the Tatar presence between July 1602 and February 1603, a gift of 2,880,180 akçe was made to Gazi Giray himself, as well as smaller amounts for his mirzas.²⁸⁸ Between June 1599 and May 1601, over 1.5 million akçe had been spent on him and his men,²⁸⁹ and figures of similar magnitude could be quoted for other years. There were, apparently, certain notional limits on the amount of money and equipment which the Porte was prepared to set aside in order to buy the services of the Tatars. When Yemişci Hasan Pasha passed the Han's demands onto Mehmed III, probably in 1603, the reply came back that the standard had been set in the time of previous sultans, and this was not to be overstepped.²⁹⁰ Fifteen kantars of gunpowder and 35 kantars of raw lead were among the war materials sent to the Han from Istanbul in 1597-8 at the time of his departure for the Varad campaign.²⁹¹ These were presumably to be used in part for the manufacture of bullets.²⁹²

Peçevi concluded, most uncharitably for a friend, that the Han and his Tatar troops were more trouble than they were

287. PEÇEVI II pp.267-70

288. KK 1885 p.14: this was in addition to his salyane payment; the total of nearly 3.5 million akçe is obtained by adding up all the expenditures relating to the Tatars on pp.12-16 of this register.

289. KK 1879 pp.12,14,15,17. Around the same time, the Han received a loan approaching 200,000 gold pieces (Orhonlu, 1970 p.30).

290. Orhonlu (1970) p.57: "Babalarımız ve cedlerimiz niçe eylediler ise biz de ana göre eylerüz kanundan taşra bir iş olmasun".

291. MM 4435 p.65

292. Collins (1975) pp.262-3: the Tatars manufactured much of their campaign equipment themselves; by the eighteenth century, gunpowder was travelling in the opposite direction, from the works at Kaffa.

worth to the Ottoman war effort.²⁹³ However, although we cannot quantify precisely their usefulness as a fighting force, nor whether their presence was decisive to Ottoman success at any time, it is certain that their peculiar military skills were still of value at a time when the bow and arrow were giving way to the musket.²⁹⁴ Conditions of siege warfare did not favour their traditional methods of fighting, but there was room within this predominant mode of combat for the Tatars to make a vital contribution in their own style.²⁹⁵

In terms of numbers and fighting power, the Tatars were the most important of the 'foreign' troops participating in these campaigns. The vassal status of the Ottoman tributary states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania also imposed on them the obligation to provide manpower as it was demanded by the Ottoman army. During those years of the war in which these principalities deserted the Ottomans for the protection of the Hapsburgs, such obligation naturally went unfulfilled, but was reimposed at least from 1605.²⁹⁶ From the time of the anti-Hapsburg revolt of the Transylvanians, first led unsuccessfully by Moses Székely who was killed by Basta's troops in 1603, the campaign accounts show the payment of wages to non-muslim troops from Poland and

293. PEÇEVI II pp.269

294. The weapons and techniques of the Tatars continued to worry Basta, especially when they were employed against massed arquebusiers (Parry, 1975 p.231), even though, on Gazi Giray's own admission, the Tatars did not stand up well against firepower (Orhonlu, 1970 p.54).

295. Collins' statement that the northern raids of the Tatars were of greater significance than their participation in the Danubian wars should perhaps be modified (Collins, 1975 p.257).

296. MD 71/108; MD 71/369; MD 77/67; MD 77/91; MD 77/92; MD 77/93; MD 77/103; KK 1887 pp.9,12

Transylvania,²⁹⁷ as well as gifts to Székely and to Gábor Bethlen,²⁹⁸ and later to István Bocskai.²⁹⁹

Troops from the vassal states of the Ottoman Empire were required to serve in the campaigns, and it was their changing allegiances during this war which dictated whether they did so or not. There is, on the other hand, one example during this war of a Hapsburg garrison deserting to the Ottoman side. In 1597, France had sent 3,000 men to Hungary at the request of the Hapsburgs. By early 1600, there were less than half this number remaining,³⁰⁰ and they were garrisoning the castle of Papa together with 400 Austrians (nemçe frengi). It was not usual for garrisons to be composed of troops from different 'nations' as Abdülkadir tells us, and, a fight between French and Austrians resulted in a French victory.³⁰¹

On hearing that the Hapsburg forces were preparing to come against them to avenge this massacre, the French sent word to the Ottomans that they were ready to go over to the Ottoman side, especially since they had not been paid for some time either. When the Hapsburgs discovered that the Ottoman response to this proposal was favourable, they attacked Papa, those who remained of the French troops

297. KK 1889 (icmal): "mevacib-i bazı gebran an canib-i Leh / an canib-i Erdel amedend...".

298. KK 1887 p.13

299. KK 1890 (icmal)

300. Gontaut-Biron (1888) p.398-99

301. AK ff.127r-127v; see also HBZ f.337v. Keeping the troops of the various 'nations' apart was presumably a commonplace of warfare with a multinational army; Parker (1981, p.29) notes that the troops of the different 'nations' were kept as separate administrative units to avoid friction.

fleeing to safety in Ottoman-held Istolni Belgrad.³⁰²

The services of these renegades were well-valued by the Ottomans. They were experienced musketeers, and this was a commodity of which, as we have seen, the Ottoman army was short. Soon after their defection, they participated in the siege of Kanije, taking the small fort (palanka) of Bulundvar on the way.³⁰³ In winter 1600-01 some of their number became muslims, one of their officers being made sancakbeyi of Semendre.³⁰⁴ The season of 1601 saw them defending Istolni Belgrad against the Hapsburgs,³⁰⁵ while in 1602, they served at the re-taking of that castle.³⁰⁶

The French renegades were remunerated directly from the Ottoman Central Treasury, or from the Campaign Treasury when a campaign was under way. Thus, they were treated as though they had kul status. In the first year of their conversion to the Ottoman cause, a minimum of 12 million akçe was spent on supporting them, in wages, as presents in cash and in kind, and in subsistence.³⁰⁷ For the eight-month period

302. PEÇEVI II pp.228-29

303. AK ff.135r,135v

304. AK ff.140v,141v

305. AK f.147r

306. AK f.155v

307. KK 1879 (campaign account for 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009/2 June 1599-10 May 1601) viz:

a) mevacib-i efrenca-i fransa ki an kale-yi Papa amedend ve itaat kerdend...11,830,820 akçe (icmal)

b) inam be-kapudanan-i fransa beray-i hodsan ve paha-yi /.../-yi mezburin...398,000 akçe (p.15)

c) al-mubayaat: an yed-i bazı kesan ki paha-yi esb ve zeyn-i sim ve raht ve gayrihi beray-i kapudanan-i efrenc ma' çoka ve /.../...131,160 akçe (p.16)

d) al-ihracat: be-cihet-i nafaka-yi me'kulat-i efrenca ma' hârc-i /.../ ... 17,960 akçe (p.17)

between July 1602-February 1603, the amount was over 3.5 million akçe, including 12,000 akçe for care of their wounded.³⁰⁸ Although it seems that some of them may have returned home, it is certain that others did not, for their remuneration continues to figure in the Ottoman account books:³⁰⁹ finding themselves unemployed after the war, these troops continued to embarrass the French ambassador with their disorderly behaviour.³¹⁰

308. KK 1885 (campaign account for 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011/ 1 July 1602-21 February 1603) viz:

- a) mevacib-i taife-yi efrenca-i fransa ki an kale-yi Papa amedend ve itaat kerdend..3,781,920 akçe (icmal)
- b) inam be-efrenca-i fransa..39,960 akçe (p.14)
- c) al-ihracat be-cihet-i harc-i mecruhan-i efrenca...12,000 akçe (p.15)

309. See entries in the income and expenditure accounts (icmal) of KK 1887; KK 1889; KK 1890

310. Gontaut-Biron (1888) pp.398-99

Ivi. Auxiliary Troops

Both for the social historian and in a study of military logistics, an understanding of the identity and responsibility of the troops who performed the many auxiliary tasks essential to the success of the campaign is of prime importance. However, a fine understanding can only be acquired on the basis of local documents, for the auxiliary groups were largely conscripted, some in exchange for certain tax-exemptions. In particular, and this is what makes it hard to generalise about these troops, the role of each corps altered significantly over the centuries: thus, in this brief section we will lay emphasis on documents pertaining to the 1593-1606 war, rather than attempting a more thorough treatment of the changing character of each corps which performed auxiliary duties for the Ottoman army at war.

There are many possible criteria according to which the auxiliary troops of the army could be categorised. If micro concerns regarding the (often) pre-Ottoman origin and community-based character of the terms of service of the corps are ignored, then auxiliary troops may be divided into four major categories: first there were the officials of the Chancery and Finance departments who accompanied the army on campaign in order to perform the normal bureaucratic functions of government. Secondly, there was the commissariat, which ensured the provision of food and supplies for the army: the title emin was accorded to the commissioners who were responsible for such provision, grain supply being the responsibility of the nüzül emini, mutton supply, that of the koyun emini etc.³¹¹ The intermediaries between commissioner and soldier were known as orducu:

311. These commissioners are discussed further in Part II.

the corps of orducuyan is of particular interest. Thirdly, there were those who undertook building and repair work, and fourthly, the various corps responsible for the transport of food and equipment. Additionally, we may recall groups such as those of the medical corps, cerrah (surgeons) and kahhal (eye-doctors) for instance.

As has been pointed out before, it is hard to draw a line between the combattant and non-combattant/auxiliary troops of the Ottoman army at this time. An added dimension of this problem is that while in peacetime their duties could be essentially auxiliary, such as keeping public order or guarding the roads, in war, the same group could be called upon to fight as part of a garrison. The martolos corps may be mentioned as an example.³¹²

One group which functioned only in wartime, though, was the orducus. Descriptions of the army setting off on campaign make vivid mention of how the members of the guilds came to sell their goods to the troops at the first halt outside the city walls: if the campaign was to be in Asia, this was Üsküdar, and Daud Pasha if the campaign was to be in Europe. Some of their number also went on campaign with the troops (as orducus) to meet the continuing need for goods and services throughout the length of the campaign. For the campaigns of 1594 and 1606 lists are available of some of the orducus who were conscripted. They include, in connection with the commissariat: butchers (kasap), bakers (etmekçi), cooks (aşçı), grocers (bakkal) and bozacıs, makers of the fermented millet drink much favoured in cold conditions. Dealing with the provision of certain items of clothing were bootmakers (çizmeci), cobblers (pabuççu), trouser-makers (çakşırcı), tailors (terzi), silk-makers (gazzaz) and cotton fluffers (hallaç). To ensure a measure

312. Vasiç (1977)

of hygiene went perfumers (attar) and barbers (berber). Making and repairing equipment were sword makers (kılıççı), bow-makers (yaycı) and gunsmiths (tüfenkçi).³¹³

A new ordu corps was raised for each campaign,³¹⁴ and the right of drafting its members was reserved to the kapucus, in return for which they would have received a fee.³¹⁵ Various sections of the army had their own ordu, that of the janissaries traditionally coming from Bursa.³¹⁶ That for the soldiers of Rumeli on the 1594 campaign numbered 41, and came from the towns of Sofya, Üsküb and Filibe,³¹⁷ while the needs of the troops going on campaign in Hungary from the vilayet of Anadolu were taken care of by guild members from that region.³¹⁸ Edirne was another source of recruitment,³¹⁹ as was Istanbul.³²⁰ The guilds had to pay the government a sum of money known as ordu akçesi for the privilege of selling their goods to the army, or, perhaps, in order for them to be able to purchase the materials necessary to the performance of their task:³²¹ this is one

313. Full details may be found in MD 72/80 and MD 77/529. For lists of those required to serve as orducu on earlier campaigns, see, inter alia, VELIYUDDIN 1970: ff.77v,95v (949 AH/1542-43); f.98v (978 AH/1570-71); f.152r (982 AH/1574-75); f.99r (988 AH/1580-81). Veinstein (198.) pp.39-42 lists those serving in Süleyman's campaigns of 1545 and 1552. Uzunçarşılı (1943) I pp.685-86 gives the texts of two orders relating to the Persian campaign of 985 AH/1578, to be found in MD 32.

314. See, for instance, AK ff.15v,32r,168r.

315. MD 75/470; MD 77/528

316. AK ff.7r,128v; cf. KK 70 p.80; RKS 1541 p.71r

317. MD 72/80: those for whom they were responsible are described merely as "Rumeli askeri".

318. MD 72/696: "Anadolu askeri".

319. AK ff.58r,88v,98v,113v

320. MD 72/240

321. MD 75/406

example of the mobilisation of capital which lay in the hands of extra-governmental groups, or in the hands of private individuals, which was practiced by the Ottoman government. It is doubtful that the guilds made profits from their campaign service, but rather that, like the celepkeşan (sheep drovers) whose role as providers of mutton to the army is discussed at length in Part II, they suffered financially.³²²

Just how the orducu corps functioned while the army was on active campaign is harder to ascertain. In particular, it is difficult to discover how they fitted into the day-to-day administrative organisation. Isolated references in Abdülkadir's chronicle show them selling supplies in the trenches before the Ottoman attack on Kanije in 1600,³²³ and cooking food for the troops in the trenches before the siege

322. It was sometimes necessary for the orducus to borrow from the treasury, presumably to meet the cash shortfall between the purchase of raw materials and their sale to the troops, but we cannot say, on such limited evidence, whether this was 'normal' practice or sign of hardship; see, for example, KK 1887 p.60: "an tahvil-i Hızr ve Mehmed ser orducusyan an akçe ki piş ezin an hizane-yi amire biddefaat ber vech-i karz dade bud ve hala averdend an yed-i hodsan an paha-yi dakik ve nemek ve rugan-i sade...".

323. AK f.136r: "ordudan bir mikdar ordu meterisinde haymeler kurup, levazımlar furuht olurdu" ("a part of the ordu corps set up tents (and) sold supplies.")

of Istolni Belgrad in June 1602.³²⁴ Thus, it seems that orducus connected with the supply of food to the troops both performed the mundane duty of cooking as well as the supply of their necessities. However, it is impossible to say for which types of troops they performed such services.

Services parallel to those exercised in relation to the army by the men designated as orducu were also performed by certain members of the kapukulu ocakları; this is clearly the case for the manufacture and repair of equipment which was carried out by the sword-makers, bow-makers and gunsmiths of the ordu. Within the corps of the armourers of the Porte (cemaat-i cebeciyan-i dergah-i ali) were also groups described as gunsmiths (tüfengeran), makers of armour for the protection of the arm (kolçakçıyan), sawyers (erreciyan) and silk manufacturers (gazzaz) etc.³²⁵ Thus it is perhaps mistaken to look for a well-defined administrative niche for the orducus during the 1593-1606 war: we have seen already how far the duties of the combat troops diverged from their original mould.

A further close parallel to the work of the orducus was that

324. AK f.156v: "...ve bir mikdar ordu meterislere tayin idi; taam haceti olan ordu karib masalihlerin icra ederdi; yeniçeri ağası meterislerde sadrazam hazretleri başka çergeler kurdular; ve matbahlar muayyen nimetler hazır meteris halkı biminnet taamlar alurlardı"; ("...and some of the ordu corps were appointed to the trenches; those of the ordu corps responsible for food requirements carried out their business nearby; the janissary agha was in the trenches (and) the grand vezir set up another tent; and the kitchens preparing various food, those serving in the trenches ate").

325. MM 7539 esp. pp.52,57; Uzunçarşılı (1943) II p.40 has drawn attention to such specialisation in the case of the corps of cannoners (topçu).

of the expert craftsmen sent on campaign from Istanbul. The status of the master builders among them as being employees of the state is indicated by the epithet hassa (cf. hassa mimar), while the carpenters (neccar), blacksmiths (demirci), miners (lağımci), builders (benna) etc. with them were presumably guild members, although they are not explicitly described as such. Nor are these craftsmen described as orducu. Where the orducu had to take with them their own equipment,³²⁶ that of the 250 craftsmen appointed to serve on the Egri campaign of 1596 was transported by the cebeci corps.³²⁷ The travelling expenses (harc-i rah) of the craftsmen on this campaign were to be given from the kaza of Galata, and, specifically, from the palaces there;³²⁸ their provisions were to be bought in the billets along the military road.³²⁹ It cannot be said whether these stipulations were peculiar to the Egri campaign, since the sultan was present in that year, but, as in the case of the status of the orducus, the information at our disposal leaves us unsure as to the status of the other craftsmen in question, whether they were Palace employees or were guild members.³³⁰ Palace employees could hardly have been required to contribute to the expenses of campaigning.³³¹

326. MD 72/80; MD 72/696; MD 77/529

327. MD 74/589: they were 10 master builders, 3 su yolcus (those responsible for water conduits), 40 blacksmiths, 87 builders and carpenters, 100 miners and 10 sawyers.

328. MD 74/183

329. MD 74/24

330. In addition to the documents cited, see also MD 71/585; MD 72/239; MD 77/536; cf. Refik (1931) pp.14,21.

331. MD 75/217: in 1605, an outstanding sum of 50,000 akçe which should have been collected for the previous year's campaign as the 'service-substitute' of the miners and carpenters ("lağımci ve neccar akçesi"), was ordered to be collected forthwith and sent to the treasury for the 1605 campaign.

Of the many different corps concerned with the transport of food and equipment for the army, only one, in the view of Majer, was well-organised: this was the top arabacıları.³³² Certainly this was a section of the kapukulu ocakları, and therefore of special concern to the authorities; the major part of the transport requirements of the army in war, however, was undertaken by groups recruited for particular tasks, and much of the burden was borne by those whose beasts were hired for the transport of specified materials and equipment from one point to another.

Even if only the top arabacılar were fully constituted as a permanent corps, the orders for service by other groups involved in transport were sent out by the central authorities. The most prominent of such groups was the yürüks, a nomadic people of Anatolia resettled in Rumeli in the earliest days of Ottoman expansion.³³³ They performed various tasks: as well as those related to transport, such as driving the oxen which pulled the cannon and military equipment (cebehane),³³⁴ they also worked in the mines making cannon balls.³³⁵ Like other corps who had earlier had a defined role to perform, the yürük were, by this time, involved with many of the day-to-day auxiliary operations of the army, including the clearing of trees and the building of bridges.³³⁶

332. Majer (1981) p.193

333. The classic work on the yürük is Gökbilgin (1957).

334. See e.g. AK ff.26v,44v,53v.

335. MD 75/145: the yürük had to provide their own tools and were ordered to bring with them 6 months' supply of provisions; the sizes of the cannon balls required were notified to them by the chief cannoneer (topçu başı). cf. MD 77/586; AK f.54r.

336. AK ff.18v,36v-37r

As in the case of the akıncı the state made half-hearted attempts to force the yürük to execute their traditional legal duties by forbidding them from entering the provincial sipahi class or becoming a janissary or cannonneer.³³⁷ The fiction regarding their special status was preserved in order that the state be able to exercise tighter control over them, and in particular, so that those who did not come on campaign could be traced, and a 'service-substitute' paid to the treasury.³³⁸

Orders concerning the war-service of the yürük often also contain details of the duties incumbent upon other auxiliary corps, especially the müsellem and the yaya. The changing status of these two corps, mounted and foot respectively, has been documented by Káldy-Nagy: the müsellem had had the task of riding a few days ahead of the army, mending roads and bridges, while the yaya were a transport corps. By the time of Süleyman's reign, these corps were in disarray, and were disbanded in 1582, only to be resurrected the following year.³³⁹ Although still the subject of mobilisation orders in the 1593-1606 campaigns, and although there is evidence of state concern that yürüks should not pose as müsellem,³⁴⁰ the work done by these corps did not distinguish them from the mass of troops performing auxiliary tasks.³⁴¹

Other examples could be quoted to illustrate the change in character of those corps whose auxiliary tasks had formerly been more or less clearly defined.³⁴² The broadening of army

337. MD 77/391 (cf. Gökbilgin, 1957 p.170); MD 77/635

338. MD 77/608

339. Káldy-Nagy (1976)

340. MD 77/391

341. MD 72/766; MD 72/776; MD 77/431

342. See, for instance, Fodor's detailed study of the cerehor corps (Fodor, 1984).

recruitment in general was accompanied by a diminution in the importance of the auxiliary corps which had been founded early in the life of the Empire; this would seem to run counter to the view that technological change, and particularly the widespread use of muskets, forced greater functional specialisation upon the organisation of the Ottoman army.

PART II:

PROVISIONING

PART II: PROVISIONING

III. Introduction

We have seen in Part I how changes in the nature of warfare in the sixteenth century altered the composition and size of the Ottoman army. In the context of western Europe, the widening of the military franchise has been viewed as one aspect of the so-called "military revolution" of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹ As the size of armies increased, and random foraging ceased to be efficient as a means of feeding the larger numbers of troops, the logistics of provisioning became the foremost concern of military command. The Hungarian historian Perjés succinctly describes this, when he suggests that the logistic primacy today accorded to the large amounts of munitions and fuel of modern (conventional) warfare was formerly attached to ensuring supplies for the troops.² On the basis of a hypothetical number of soldiers, non-combatants and animals which comprised part of the total force of a west European army of the seventeenth century, he arrives at figures for the enormous amounts of food and fodder essential to the pursuit of a campaign, and his results hint at the sophisticated administrative arrangements which were necessary in order to try to ensure that all demands were adequately met for the duration of a campaign.³ When we look at the provisioning of the Ottoman army, one of the most important issues is the extent of government control over this aspect of the administration of war during the years 1593-1606.

1. Parker (1976): the other aspects of this "military revolution" were changes in strategy and tactics, and the increased impact of the army on society as a whole.

2. Perjés (1972) pp.47-48

3. Perjés (1970) pp.5-11

There are two aspects to the administration of provisioning, the organisational and the financial. The former concerns the means by which victuals were physically transferred from 'civilian' producer to 'military' consumer. The latter concerns the question of whether the producers were paid for the supplies which they delivered to the army, and the circumstances under which the troops received supplies free, or, alternatively, had to pay for them. The analysis of the provisioning of the Ottoman army presented here does not always maintain this distinction overtly, but it underlies the discussion that follows.

So far as organisation is concerned, it is appropriate to divide campaign activity into three seasonal phases. The provisioning of the Ottoman army in Hungary at this period was not uniform in character, and one of the factors which dictated the means by which the army was provisioned was the time of the campaign year. First, when the troops were marching between Istanbul and Hungary at the start and finish of the campaign, provisions were prepared in advance at specified billets along the route of the march. During the summer months, when the Ottoman troops were actively engaged in fighting, provisions were supplied from the depots of the castles and strongholds located in the border zone of Ottoman Hungary: these depots were stocked with supplies brought up from the vast hinterland upon which the commissioners for provisions could call. The third season of the campaign year was the winter, when the army was quartered for some months in Hungary: as in the months of the summer campaign, this season also saw reliance on depots for provisions, but without the logistic uncertainties attendant on provisioning during the active period of engagement with the enemy. This framework is elaborated in the section on grainstuffs below.

Military provisioning is a subject which deals with potentially quantifiable items; the amounts of food and fodder for a given number of soldiers should, theoretically,

be readily calculable, as should, one might imagine, the costs involved. Perjés' "war-gaming" approach to logistics⁴ is certainly, in the Ottoman case, a poor approximation to conditions on the ground: the parameters within which the army operated were constantly shifting in ways which were not altogether predictable. It was not a question of move and counter-move, for, apart from the information which could be gleaned from spies and informants, decisions on provisioning had to be taken in ignorance of the intentions of the Hapsburg army.

Much of the material concerning the supply of the Ottoman troops during this war comes from the records of the maliye (financial) department. And yet it is surprisingly difficult to arrive at any reliable quantitative results with regard to even very basic factors. Inconsistencies in the data are pervasive, and attempts to arrive at global figures are invariably thwarted. A related caveat is that the most abundant and detailed information on provisioning concerns the standing army, the kapukulu ocakları, a body which by no means constituted even a near-majority of those participating in the Ottoman war-effort in Hungary. Given the nature of the sources at our disposal, there is no way in which this imbalance in the available data can be overcome. This very concentration of the sources on the provisioning of only a small section of the total army gives a first indication of the extent to which central government exercised control over the provisioning of the Ottoman army at this time. This chapter is not primarily concerned with detailed examination of [the impact of the presence of Ottoman troops in Hungary, but examines the subject from the Ottoman viewpoint.] *What do the men*

4. Perjés (1981)

III1. European Methods of Provisioning

As an introduction to a detailed consideration of the means by which the Ottoman army was able to provision its troops in Hungary, a broad look at the methods employed in contemporary Europe will put the workings of the Ottoman system into perspective. Differentiation of the organisation of the supply of the European troops according to the three seasons of the campaign year, the march, the period of engagement with the enemy in the theatre of war, and the period of winter-quartering, which are of particular relevance to the Ottoman case, is a less useful framework here. Rather, the basic dichotomy to emphasise is that between military activity on home territory, and that on hostile territory.

The traditional method of provisioning for European armies was on-the-spot requisitioning of supplies, often without compensation to the producers. Even when this system did work well, a few additional mouths could cause havoc in a rural community where there was no control over the amount of supplies which could reasonably be demanded by those passing through. At its worst, the result was no less than officially-sanctioned plunder.

Where troops were stationed in a permanent base, regular markets could be organised from which they could purchase their requirements. Such markets could also be set up on frequently-used routes,⁵ or the army might be accompanied by

5. Parker (1981) p.87: in the 1590s magazines were established in Milan to supply the Spanish troops in Lombardy who were fighting the French. It was not considered necessary, however, to establish permanent markets on the Spanish Road to the Netherlands, a route which was used only every year or two.

sutlers who made their living by selling to the troops the supplies which they needed.⁶

The billeting of armies on the move in nominally friendly territory acquired a theoretically more benevolent character as the scale of military activity increased during the sixteenth century. This was achieved by the étape system, whereby responsibility for supporting the soldiers devolved on the military authorities, with the cost of provisions being deducted from the mens' pay. A commissioner was sent ahead to arrange that the necessary supplies should be collected at the designated billets. The local communities were required to provide these supplies, for which they would be re-imbursed on presentation to the tax collector of chits demonstrating that they had fulfilled their obligation.⁷ The étape system allowed a more orderly passage of troops, even if payment to their hosts was not always as prompt as the latter might have hoped.⁸

Rather than being a distinct means of supplying provisions to the troops, the 'contributions' system, most closely associated with Wallenstein in the Thirty Years War but anticipated by the Spanish in the Netherlands in the 1570s,⁹ concerns financial administration at the macro level. As applied in its fully developed character by Wallenstein, the 'contributions' system relied on the exaction of irregular cash taxes from the population, rather than of provisions in kind. These sums were paid into the army's coffers, and the individual soldier was thus relieved of the need to shift

6. Creveld (1980) p.7

7. Parker (1981) p.89

8. Parker (1981) p.92 notes that it was eight years later that some villagers of Lorraine were reimbursed for providing for Spanish troops passing through in 1587.

9. Parker (1981) p.142

for himself, and could take advantage of the étapes which had been set up. Arbitrary in nature and subject to gross abuse, the demands for 'contributions' fell unevenly on those liable. The awful efficiency of Wallenstein's levies finds a parallel on the Ottoman side, in the commutation of former 'in-kind' wartime taxes (avarız) to 'in-cash' substitutes (bedel), a measure which is discussed at length below.

If the provisioning of European armies even on friendly territory was certainly not a trouble-free matter, the problems associated with the provisioning of troops passing through enemy territory were much greater. It was frequently impossible to coerce the hostile population into parting with their produce in an orderly fashion. The alternative was, in the first instance, plunder and robbery, which led to devastation of the sources of provision, crops and animals, and the secondary factors needed to make these functional, ovens and barns. Plunder allowed freedom from lines of communication, but was a short-sighted policy if the occupying force intended to make permanent its presence in the currently hostile environment. By the seventeenth century the size of European armies had so increased that even by such destructive requisitioning they could not be sustained.¹⁰

A subsequent development in provisioning methods was the introduction of magazine supply on a wide scale in the 1640s by the Frenchman Le Tellier, and its refinement by his son Louvois. In western Europe the latter elaborated a system which had, in the Hapsburg-Ottoman war of 1593-1606, been an important aspect of Ottoman practice during the summer campaign period, as well as for the garrisons established on their border with the Hapsburgs: one of Louvois' innovations

10. Creveld (1980) p.7

was to keep a ring of frontier strongholds permanently stocked, so that they could withstand a siege. In the transportation of supplies from stocked fortress to military camp, however, there were no novelties - carts and watercraft were requisitioned where needed, and the habitual vulnerability to enemy attack remained.¹¹

In the war of attrition which was that of 1593-1606, the offensive incursions by the Hapsburgs into land nominally held by the Ottomans, and against specific Ottoman strongholds, was an undertaking of serious difficulty. Problems dogged the enterprise, from the acquisition of the grain to keep the troops fed, to the logistic demands of supplying an army on enemy territory.

The very limited degree of compulsion which could be exerted by the Hapsburgs over the Estates on which they depended for support in their defence against the Ottomans, prevented an efficient and planned mobilisation of resources for the forthcoming campaign. It was far from certain that the necessary financial backing would be forthcoming, and the resulting delays in the purchase of grain meant that the authorities missed the opportunity to take advantage of seasonally favourable prices.

Within Austria, billets were prepared for the march of the Hapsburg troops,¹² a precaution designed to minimise the damage which would inevitably result from the passage of foreign mercenary soldiers, lured to war by the hope of booty. Similarly, for the annual withdrawal from campaign, efforts were made to designate billets. Particular areas were required to supply particular corps, while transport of food and fodder was a duty incumbent on the local

11. Creveld (1980) pp.17-18; Kiss (1975) p.157

12. Winter (1958) pp.134-35

population.¹³

Within Hapsburg-held Hungary, available grain-stocks were recorded, baking facilities inspected, and fodder delivered to where it might be needed. The 'granary' from which the Hapsburg authorities hoped to be able to draw most of their needs during this war was Bavaria, Moravia and Bohemia. Merchants were given patents empowering them to purchase grain for military purposes, the sight of private capital being more effective at encouraging sale than the vague promises of a high command which was continually in financial straits. The passage of this grain was exempted from tolls.¹⁴

Later in the seventeenth century, in autumn 1683, the recalcitrant nobles of the Carinthian Estates effectively formed a cartel when orders went out for grain purchase in the aftermath of the failed Ottoman siege of Vienna. They foresaw an imminent price rise due to the great demand for grain, and, wishing to profit therefrom, withheld their stocks. The merchants purchasing grain for the army therefore had no alternative but to buy at the high prices set by the sellers, but the Imperial authorities in Graz refused to reimburse them fully.¹⁵ In the 1593-1606 war, the results of such a lack of co-operation by the Estates was already manifest by 1600, by which time the farmlands of Bohemia, Moravia and Bavaria were exhausted, and the burden of supply fell on Upper Hungary and Austria. So little grain was there available that all stocks were carefully guarded. The peasants were forced to sell their produce to their lords at a compulsory (low) price, so that the latter could wait until prices rose in May or June when their

13. Winter (1958) p.137

14. Winter (1958) p.136

15. Pickl (1977) pp.17-18

controlled release of grain onto the market left no alternative than for those responsible for military purchases to fall victim to the seller's market thereby created.¹⁶

The many competing interests with which the Hapsburgs had to contend in their efforts to provision their troops was symptomatic of the attitude of those who saw in the extent of their willingness to participate in the defence against the Ottomans, a bargaining piece which could be used to their own political or economic advantage.¹⁷ The degree of central control which the Hapsburgs were able to exercise was so much more circumscribed than that available to the Ottoman ruling house; the tortuous negotiations which the military authorities had to conduct, let alone the more limited resources potentially available, suggest that the advantage in this field lay decidedly with the Ottomans.

The Hapsburg logistic position was further complicated by the limited options which they could exploit in order to restrain the Ottomans. In the 1593-1606 war, the main thrust of the Austrian offensive lay along the line of the Danube toward Buda, rather than, as in the 1680s, along the R.Drava. As at the later period, if supply along the river was difficult, attempts to operate away from this line posed logistic problems which did not allow the sustained or successful undertaking of a strategic design. Pickl well describes the vulnerability of the Hapsburg forces moving toward Osek in 1684, having to equip each stronghold along the Drava as a base of operations as they advanced, and yet unable to organise sufficiently even to be able to bake enough bread in their new forward position for the troops deployed there. Thus, at each further advance, the Hapsburg

16. Bog (1971) pp.22-25

17. On the history of the border, see Rothenburg (1960); on the attitude of the Estates, see Schulze (1978).

troops were more vulnerable to Ottoman counter-offensive, and provisions had to be transported an ever greater distance from base. Away from the river, where an enemy ambush could have occurred at any time, dependence on the riverside magazines continued, since adequate facilities for transporting sufficient grain, and milling and baking it in enemy land did not exist.¹⁸ It is calculated that an Austrian column could move forward a maximum of only 80-100 kilometres from base before provisioning became impossible, indication of its dependence on well-stocked magazines.¹⁹

The essential difficulties attending the Hapsburg thrusts into the Ottoman heartland in Hungary in 1593-1606 were not dissimilar from those which they faced at a later period. At each further approach along the Danube, they became more vulnerable to Ottoman retaliation through their greater proximity to the Ottoman base at Buda. It is perhaps surprising that they managed to hold Estergon for as long as they did, from 1595-1605, and that they could consolidate this position by seizing Vişegrad, which they held between 1595 and 1605 and Pest, which they held from 1602 to 1604.

The Hapsburgs were slow to stock depots during the years of this war. Unlike the Ottomans, they did not have an 'in-kind' irregular tax system, which could ensure at least part of their military requirement. In the Hapsburg endeavours against Bocskai in the final two years of the war, and against Gábor Bethlen in 1621-22, the advantages which the Hungarians opposing them could derive from having grainstocks levied as tithes again underlined how valuable such depots could be.²⁰

18. Pickl (1977) pp.130-33

19. Kiss (1980) p.49

20. Kiss (1975) pp.155-56, 158

IIiii. Irregular Taxation and Provisioning

In administrative terms, there were three formal methods by which provisions for the Ottoman army were obtained from the producers; in Turkish these are known as nüzül, sürsat, and ıştira. The precise legal status of these terms, and even their precise meanings, are a matter of some dispute: in the contemporary sources they are not clearly explained, while the secondary authors of today disagree as to the scope of each term. In part, the confusion of secondary authors is due to their search for a universal formulation, whereby each of these methods of provisioning, and the irregular taxation system of which they were a part, should be applied in the same way across the Empire, any changes in application which are detected, being considered to relate to chronological development rather than regional variation. In the analysis offered here we look first at what other historians have to say about the application of nüzül, sürsat and ıştira; our problem, however, is to try to understand how the different methods of provisioning open to the Ottomans were applied in the specific logistic circumstances of the 1593-1606 war in Hungary.

It is generally accepted that levies on the Ottoman subject population for the purpose of provisioning the army in war had the status of extraordinary or irregular taxes. This was in contradistinction to the regularly-levied ser'i and örfi taxes which had, respectively, a religious and a secular legal basis, and were detailed in the kanunnames.²¹ Such irregular wartime taxes had the generic name of avarız-i divaniye, which appears to be synonymous with tekalif-i

21. On the relationship between örf, which originally meant 'common usage', and the various meanings of kanun, see Heyd (1973) pp.167-70: in many cases örf may be synonymous with kanun.

örfiye. It is from this point in the discussion that there is disagreement among recent historians writing on the subject, since the available sources are frequently lacking in the details which enable definitive conclusions as to the nature and application of the irregular taxes.

The most diligent, if sometimes confusing, attempt to analyse how the Ottoman army was provisioned in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is that of Lütflü Güçer in his Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler.²² Güçer draws a distinction between nüzül, an 'in-kind' tax on agricultural producers whereby it was incumbent on them to provide provisions for the troops without any compensation, and sürsat, whose essential characteristic was that provisions levied under this rubric were bought from the producers. Both nüzül and sürsat were levies of specified quantities of supplies. Güçer also considers that ıştira, a word which merely means 'purchase', could be considered an extraordinary tax where the authorities specified the price as well as the amounts of goods they wished to buy.²³ He also notes two other types of ıştira, which he does not consider as taxes, but which he calls serbest ıştira: in these instances, either goods were bought and sold free of constraint on quantity, and at the ruling price (narh-i ruzi, narh-i cari) in the locality where the transaction took place, or, alternatively, conditions which Güçer denotes as serbest ıştira applied when there was no constraint on quantity, but the government fixed the price at which the transaction took place.²⁴

Barkan sees the term avarız as synonymous with avarız-ı divaniye, and the obligation to supply provisions as only

22. Güçer (1964) pp.67-145

23. Güçer (1964) pp.124-25

24. Güçer (1964) pp.121-22

one of a number of ways in which the reaya were enlisted to assist in the war effort.²⁵ Suceška, too, describes how the extraordinary obligations of war, the avarız-i divaniye, also extended to the performance of specific duties such as transport of equipment or the building of bridges: in contrast to Barkan, he uses the term avarız only in a narrow sense, as one type of avarız-i divaniye levy, not as being synonymous with it. Suceška, like Güçer, also considers iştira to be an avarız-i divaniye levy, because such purchase of provisions was made at fixed prices. But he differentiates this from sürsat by stressing that the latter was the purchase of specified amounts of provisions at fixed prices, while the amounts purchased as iştira were, (presumably) not previously specified.²⁶

More recent attempts to define the irregular levies under discussion here have added little to our understanding of how they were applied at specific times and in specific places. Inalcık recognises nüzül as a levy of provisions, and sürsat as the obligation on the reaya to bring and sell their goods at a specific location. He also subsumes the levy of oarsmen for the fleet, kürekçi, under the heading of avarız-i divaniye, and fourthly, like Barkan, he notes that such auxiliary military duties and services could be requested as cash under the rubric avarız akçesi.²⁷ McGowan deals in greater depth with irregular taxation in the sixteenth-seventeenth century, his analysis being more securely tied to how such taxation was applied in a particular area, that of the western half of the Ottoman Empire. His interpret-

25. Barkan, art. Avarız (IA): he makes specific reference only to sürsat here, and not to nüzül.

26. Suceška (1968) pp.91-92

27. Inalcık (1980) p.314: much of this article is a discussion of changes in the demand for irregular wartime levies, a subject which is discussed further below.

ation differs slightly from that of Barkan and Inalcık, in that he uses the term avarız (rather than avarız akçesi) to denote the irregular cash tax of the sixteenth century, while he sees nüzül as its 'in-kind' surrogate, and vice versa. It was by reason of their surrogate relationship that nüzül and avarız were not levied on the same district in the same year, a fact which Güçer had earlier noted.²⁸ McGowan suggests that the sürsat levy was introduced later in the sixteenth century since nüzül was, by that time largely collected in cash, and a need still existed for irregular levies in kind.²⁹

Although they are not in agreement on some of the basic points concerned with the definition of the irregular tax structure of the Ottoman Empire at this time, the studies of the authors quoted here are relevant to the discussion of the relationship between irregular avarız-i divaniye taxes and the provisioning of the troops of the Ottoman army during the 1593-1606 war in Hungary: it is primarily to documents which allow an understanding of the specific conditions in this war that we shall turn, since our aim is not to seek to detect a pattern of irregular taxation which had universal applicability. As already stated, the two most fundamental purposes in our discussion of provisioning during this series of campaigns are first, to try to define more rigorously how the provisions were obtained from the

28. McGowan (1981/a) pp.106-07; see also McGowan (1976). Güçer (1964) p.91: he uses the term avarız akçesi here, rather than simply avarız. McGowan quotes only one document in support of his claim for the surrogacy of nüzül and avarız, addressed to the beylerbeyi of Aleppo, the same or a closely-related document being one of those used by Güçer in support of his conclusion.

29. McGowan (1981/a) p.108; Veinstein (198.) p.11 does not record the use of the term sürsat in documents relating to Süleyman's campaigns of 1544-45, 1552, although he says that the practice existed.

producers, and, secondly, to discover how they were distributed to the troops, that is, whether they were sold or given. The interpretation offered here, like those of the historians quoted, relies on analysis of documents which are frequently not specific in their stipulations.

Based on the avarizhanesi system, nüzül was an 'in-kind' tax incumbent on those of the reaya who were not exempted from payment by reason of their performance of other essential wartime services.³⁰ Güçer maintains that sürsat, by contrast, was not tied to the avarizhanesi system, but fell also on those who, for other purposes, had a privileged tax status.³¹ As Güçer points out, and as is clear from the many orders for nüzül provisions during the 1593-1606 war, this tax covered the supply of flour and barley. Sürsat covered a wider range of supplies, including flour, bread, sheep (for mutton), oil, fodder (hay and straw), firewood and honey.³²

Most of the evidence which Güçer adduces in his analysis of irregular levies relates to the Persian wars before and after the period of the Hungarian campaigns, while Veinstein deals with Süleyman's period: it should not come as a surprise that, in so far as it is possible to fathom the subtleties of Güçer's exposition, the characteristics which he assigns to the irregular taxes being discussed here

30. For a description of the avarizhanesi system, whereby tax collection was based on the amalgamation of a number of household units whose number depended on the wealth of the households concerned, see Faroqhi (1979) p.124; McGowan (1981/a) p.106, following Barkan, tries to establish the precise number of household units which comprised one avarizhanesi tax unit through his researches in the sicils of Manastir in Yugoslavia.

31. Güçer (1964) pp.94-95

32. Güçer (1964) pp.67,93

appear to differ from Veinstein's interpretation. Güçer recognises ıstira in three guises, only one of which he calls a tax: the other two were, more or less, part of normal commercial trading. For Veinstein, ıstira means that the quantity of goods to be bought was fixed, but that the prices paid to the producers were "les prix locaux en vigueur".³³ This is presumably the narh-i ruzi, and not the government-determined price of Güçer's ıstira tax; if this was the case, then it is hard to see how Veinstein differentiates ıstira from sürsat, for he sees the latter as the sale of specified (or sometimes merely "sufficient") quantities of goods "au prix fixé du jour en vigueur (carı olan narh-i ruzi üzere)". One significant distinction between sürsat and ıstira which Veinstein notes, however, is that the state was not party to sürsat transactions.³⁴

When we look at the sources for the 1593-1606 war, the problem is to decide which of the orders for provisions apply to sürsat and which to ıstira, for it is thus that it is possible to discover how each was applied at this time. Nüzül orders, by contrast, are clearly stated. The only feature which both Veinstein and Güçer agree to have been a distinguishing feature of sürsat is that orders relating to this levy include the stipulation "...askere sa'at-i maişet ve eshabına bais-i ticaret ola", or some variation thereon.³⁵

33. Veinstein (198.) p.9

34. Veinstein (198.) pp.11,12: "les ventes sont faites cette fois directement par les producteurs ou marchands particuliers à la troupe, sans passer par l'étape intermédiaire d'un achat de l'Etat".

35. Veinstein (198.) p.12; Güçer (1964) p.93. This may be construed to mean "...that it be a means of subsistence for the soldiers, and a cause of trade for the producers": e.g. RKS 1542 f.94r; MD 73/955. See also AK f.54v: "...Rumeli eyaletinde vakı kazalarda zahire için nüzüller ve her menazillerde reaya ve ticaret eceliçün sürsat zahire getirüp akçeleri ile asakir-i islama satılmak hususunda ferman olunmağın...".

This indicates indisputably that sürsat provisions were sold to the troops. Secondary sources agree that such provisions were sold to the troops at artificially-fixed (low) prices, but it has not been possible to ascertain by how much the prices at which the producers sold their goods to the troops fell below those available on the open market. Many orders, however, while containing this phrase, do not refer to sürsat as the method of procurement of the provisions in question, but use terms such as ihrac etmek or tedarik etmek, literally, "to obtain" and "to prepare". There is, in such cases, no specific mention of ıstira as the alternative to sürsat, but it should perhaps be assumed that they related to sürsat supplies, as Veinstein and Güçer assume to have been the case during the periods which they examined.³⁶

For the time and place of our interest we are not in possession of registers of the series which enabled Güçer to arrive at his conclusions. These are primarily the mevkufat defterleri, which stipulate the amounts of nüzül and sürsat supplies required from designated kazas to be at specified menzils; nor are there avarızhanesi defterleri which list the composition and numbers of avarızhanesi tax-units across the Empire.³⁷ Orders relating to nüzül in the Mühimme series are vague, rarely specifying the destination of the provisions. The amounts to be levied are usually not mentioned, reference being made merely to an order sent

36. Compare, for instance, MD 72/140; MD 72/824; MD 72/883; MD 73/65; MD 77/106.

37. Güçer (1964) pp.73,186-. The only relevant mevkufat register for the 1593-1606 war is KK 2557 (1014 AH/1605 AD) which lists levies of barley for the Imperial stables. According to McGowan (1981/a) pp.115-20 the series of avarızhanesi registers in the BBA runs from 1029-1249 AH (1619-1834).

earlier, in which such information must have been given.³⁸ Güçer provides us, however, with examples of the terms in which nüzül orders could be couched: a certain amount of grain was demanded from each avarızhanesi, and often in a given proportion, for instance 25% flour and 75% barley from each of the avarızhanesi of some Anatolian vilayets in 987 AH (1579-80),³⁹ presumably for the Persian wars of that time. So too, in 1003 AH (1594-95), 2.5 keyl of flour and barley in the proportion 1:3 were demanded as nüzül from each of the 604 avarızhanesi of Peline kaza in the sancak of Izvornik;⁴⁰ such an arrangement may be considered typical.

The responsibility for ensuring that the stipulated quantities of provisions were ready at the menzils where the soldiers were to be billeted rested with the cadis, as perhaps did the responsibility to call forth provisions "in sufficient quantity". Where more than one kaza was required to provide provisions for a certain menzil, such local decision-making is again witnessed.⁴¹ The requirement for the cadi to fulfil this duty, on pain of severe reprimand,⁴² had to be judiciously balanced against the central government instructions that those without provisions to sell should not be harrassed,⁴³ and that payment should be made in full for the goods brought for sale to the troops.⁴⁴ Violations of these warnings there must have been, but they do demonstrate the state's concern to husband the resources at its disposal. So too, districts which, for whatever reason, were unable to provide sürsat were exempted from

38. e.g. MD 73/329; MD 73/955; MD 77/448

39. Güçer (1964) p.76

40. MM 7348 p.64

41. RKS 1540 f.84r; MD 74/489; MD 77/76; MD 77/109

42. MD 72/824; MD 77/316

43. MD 72/140; MD 72/883

44. e.g. AE Murad III/358

doing so for the needs of the current campaign.⁴⁵

The nüzül and sürsat levies do not seem to have been applied inside the war zone of Hungary.⁴⁶ Orders relating to such demands extend only to kazas as far as Belgrade, as well as northwards from Istanbul to the kazas on the lower Danube.⁴⁷ Bosnia was not customarily a source of such provisions either, being a frontier area and therefore vulnerable to enemy attack,⁴⁸ although by 1605, the nüzül levy was being demanded in cash form, as bedel-i nüzül, together with other campaign burdens.⁴⁹

İstira played a significant part in Ottoman military provisioning during these campaigns. The primary function of istira was to ensure sufficiency of provisions where demand could not be satisfied through the channels of nüzül and sürsat, where the obligation to produce supplies could not, for reason of distance or unavailability, realistically be met by these methods. Such an area was the theatre of war: here all depots had to be kept stocked in case provisions were unexpectedly required owing to the unforeseen troop movements characteristic of a state of war. The inevitable reduction of the stock of available resources in war also rendered istira a more practicable means of provisioning, since foodstuffs could be acquired from wherever there was a surplus over local needs on a pragmatic

45. RKS 1539 f.146v; MD 75/288

46. McGowan (1981/a) p.112 independently arrives at the same conclusion through his survey of the avarız defterleri from the mid-seventeenth century onwards.

47. MM 7426 p.5; MD 73/65; MD 73/955

48. MD 73/188; MD 77/373: the proposal of a new land survey (tahrir) for the sancak of Hersek was quashed when it was learnt how much the area had suffered in the previous years of campaigning.

49. MD 77/146

basis.

We have seen above that sürsat supplies were bought from the producers and sold to the troops: Güçer states that this transaction was not conducted as a market between producers and troops, but that supplies were handed over to an official known as the nüzül emini, the commissioner for supplies (of whose role we shall have more to say shortly), who then paid those who had brought the supplies.⁵⁰ This conflicts with Veinstein's view that there was no state intermediary between producer and consumer, but the campaign account books for 1593-1606 would seem to confirm that Veinstein's observation applied to these campaigns. The accounts do not have debit entries relating to the rôle of a government agent in sürsat transactions even in those accounts which cover the long weeks of the march from Istanbul to Belgrade. It seems that sürsat is, on the contrary, only mentioned in the accounts when provisions levied as sürsat had not been consumed, but were later sold off and the money thus earned was paid into the Campaign Treasury.⁵¹ We may therefore wonder from which source of finance were drawn the moneys with which the producers of sürsat supplies were compensated.

The accounting procedure adopted in the case of ıstıra provisions, however, clearly shows how money was paid out of the Campaign Treasury into the hands of those acting in the

50. Güçer (1964) p.103: "...menzillerde ordunun ıasesi için getirilen erzakin askerlere devrinde zahire sahipleri ile askerleri bir araya getiren bir pazar kurulmıyor...".

51. e.g. KK 1876 p.5: "an tahvil-i kazi-yi Babaeski an paha-yi dakik ve sair ki piş ezin der sefer-i Egri an kaza-yi mezbur bi-tarik-i sürsat cem kerdend ve hala fûruht şiden fermude..."; KK 1890 p.73: "an tahvil-i Mevlana Hasan kadı-yi Rudnik an akçe-yi paha-yi zahire-yi sürsat ki be-cihet-i asakir-i islam cem kerdend ve baki mande tevzi şide...".

capacity of agents charged with the task of effecting the purchases of provisions. Besides those officially designated as commissioner (emin), there were also defterdars, sancakbeyis, çavuşes and others acting as agents.⁵² On the distribution of the purchased provisions to those for whom they were intended, the money received in exchange was repaid into the treasury, as a credit on the account balance.⁵³ We must therefore conclude that ıstira provisions were sold to the troops, as were those levied as sürsat. Since there is no reference to nüzül provisions in the campaign accounts, though, it remains unclear whether, and by exactly which route, they were sold to the troops.

The relative importance of of nüzül, sürsat and ıstira as provisioning methods during these campaigns cannot be measured; this is due in part to our ignorance of the accounting procedures involved in recording the financial arrangements attending the procurement of provisions, but is also due to the lack of detail in the items which are recorded. The amounts of provisions distributed are rarely detailed, the unit-prices paid to the producers show wide variation, while those for whom they are intended are all too often described simply as "asakir-i mansure," which means 'victorious troops' and is used generally to describe the army. What can be said, though, is that the documentary evidence suggests that ıstira was most frequently conducted in conditions which fall into the category of Güçer's serbest ıstira, with no sign that the price to be paid to the producers was other than the local narh-i ruzi. This observation takes ıstira out of the ambit of irregular taxation. It can also be reiterated that ıstira was the

52. See, for instance, the entries in KK 1879 p.9 and KK 1885 pp.11-12.

53. e.g. KK 1885 p.8: "an akçe-yi paha-yi gıst-i ganem ki bi-asakir-i mansure tevzi şide..."; "an paha-yi rugan-i sade ki be-yeniçeriyân-i dergah-i ali dade...".

predominant mode of provisioning for the troops for whom the government took direct responsibility during these campaigns, since nüzül and sürsat supplies were not drawn from the theatre of war itself.

An integral part of the discussion of the nature of Ottoman provisioning methods concerns the circumstances under which levies of nüzül and sürsat were commuted into cash payments, termed bedel-i nüzül and bedel-i sürsat. By the mid-seventeenth century these irregular levies had apparently been established as regular, and onerous, cash taxes. Inalcık assumes that it was during this 1593-1606 war that the state's demand for extra cash sources necessitated these avarız taxes becoming monetary levies rather than impositions in kind for the specific purpose of feeding the troops.⁵⁴ Thus, the details of the supply system are closely related to the financing of the war effort, a matter we will turn to in more detail in Part III. The issue is complex: from the account-books it is clear that the bedel-i nüzül was well-entrenched as a cash tax existing side by side with the nüzül obligation in kind.⁵⁵ Bedel-i sürsat is less frequent, the years from Zilkade 1007-Zilkade 1009 AH (June 1599-May 1601) and from Şevval 1014-Muharrem 1016 AH (February 1606-May 1607) apparently being the only periods during which this levy was demanded in cash. In both periods it was a small amount, in 1599-1601, slightly over

54. Inalcık (1980) p.315

55. See section B.iii of campaign account transcripts in Appendix I.

nüzül.⁵⁶

A determining criterion as to whether nüzül was to be levied in cash or kind was the distance from the point of production of the provisions to the place where they were to be consumed.⁵⁷ Costs of transportation were high, and thus distance was a factor to be carefully considered, whether this cost was to be borne by the reaya whose responsibility it was to take the provisions which they were required to furnish to the designated menzil, or by the state, which alternatively had to hire transport services such as camels and mules. Where nüzül or sürsat was given in cash, as bedel, this money was then used to purchase provisions at a more suitable location; effectively it was transferred to the funds available for ıstira procurement.

The commutation of nüzül and sürsat into cash taxes is generally viewed in the context of the "decline" of the Ottoman Empire. Portents of the increasing weight of nüzül and sürsat, or rather of their cash surrogates, are certainly apparent during these campaigns, and earlier examples are mentioned by Güçer.⁵⁸ In spring 1594, for

56. KK 1879 p.5: bedel-i nüzül 23,479,180 akçe
bedel-i sürsat 169,194 akçe
 (bedel-i ganem ma' sürsat 4,276,469 akçe)

KK 1890 p.4:
bedel-i sürsat 16,000 akçe
 (bedel-i nüzül ve ganem (ve) navlun -i sefine
ve ücret-i mekkariyan 3,907,187 akçe)
 (bedel-i nüzül ve ganem ve tüfenkendazan
ve gayrihi 278,600 akçe)

57. RKS 1536 f.109v; RKS 1540 f.85v

58. Güçer (1964) pp.89-90

instance, the previously-ordered nüzül levy of an average 2.5 keyl of grain (tereke) from each avarızhanesi of the kaza of Roduscuk was subsequently altered to a cash substitute of 300 akçe per avarızhanesi. This was effectively a tripling of the burden, if it is assumed that one keyl of grain had an average value of 30-40 akçe.⁵⁹

The increases in taxation on the reaya which became apparent during the seventeenth century are not to be dismissed as unimportant, but nor should they be interpreted as symptoms of "decline". There were sound logistic reasons for the commutation of the 'in-kind' levies of nüzül and sürsat into their 'in-cash' substitutes: cash payment of formerly 'in-kind' levies gave enormous flexibility to the operation of the army in Hungary, the transfer of cash sums from Rumeli, where the relatively small numbers of troops passing through could be quantified, and where the available agricultural surplus must have been more than sufficient to meet demand, to Hungary, where the constantly-shifting pattern of military activity did not allow for precise calculations of the sort required in the assessment of the nüzül and sürsat burdens, enabled the Ottomans to purchase provisions from wherever they were available. For this reason we find ıstira as the prevalent form of provisions procurement in the theatre of war beyond Belgrade. A further advantage was the fact that the money from these taxes came into the Campaign Treasury throughout the year since, unlike provisions in kind, there was not so intimate a link to the

59. RKS 1536 f.109. McGowan (1981/a) p.110 states that the rate at which nüzül was collected in cash stabilized at the rate of 600 akçe per avarızhanesi by the mid-seventeenth century.

agricultural seasons.⁶⁰

60. This is clear from a survey of entries in the Campaign Treasury account books of the KK series. What is not clear is the effect which the need to realise irregular levies in cash must have had on the local markets.

IIiv. Grainstuffs

It is the supply of grain, the staple of the military diet, that we will consider first. The contemporary generic terms for grain were Arabic in origin, hububat and tereke.⁶¹ These are rarely met with in the sources however, the usual designation being zahire: this may mean provisions in general, but, unless otherwise specified, may be understood to signify grainstuffs in particular.⁶² A variety of terms of Arabic, Persian or Turkish derivation are used for specific types of grain: gendüm (P.) or buğday (T.) for wheat;⁶³ arpa (T.), cev (P.) or şair (A.) for barley; erzen (P.) or darı (T.) for millet;⁶⁴ and erz (P.) for rice.⁶⁵

-The aggregate supply of provisions

In his study of campaigns of the modern period, van Creveld has observed that, in the final analysis, the most that those charged with operating a logistic system could hope to do was to gather as much of the required goods as was

61. The term hinta (A.) for wheat has not been found, in contrast to its wide contemporary usage in the tahrir registers.

62. Meninski (1680) II p.1722 : hububat = 'grani', 'legumi'; the 1680 edition of this lexicon does not give a meaning for tereke, but Meninski (1780) II p.91 gives 'grana!'

63. Meninski (1680) II p.2231 gives the synonyms 'vittovaglie', 'proviande', 'viveri', inter alia, for zahire: the Ottoman archival sources provide the context for the narrower definition of 'grain'.

64. Darı may also mean maize, but since this cereal did not arrive in the Balkans until the seventeenth century, the word may be understood to mean 'millet' in the present context: Stoianovich & Haupt (1962).

65. The Turkish word piring has not been found in documents relating to the provisioning of the army at this time; it is used, however, in relation to the provisioning of Istanbul.

possible: to aim for more accurate planning was unrealistic, owing to the large number of unknowns.⁶⁶ The first measure which the Ottoman state took in order to try to ensure that as much grain as possible was available within the bounds of the Empire, was to impose a ban on its export, as well as that of other strategically vital goods. Such bans were incorporated into kanunnames and were periodically renewed.⁶⁷ Anticipation of the higher prices to be gained by selling outside the boundaries of the Empire caused such prohibitions on export to be frequently infringed by the merchants. Although the grain trade within the Empire was subject to a number of central government controls, efforts to regulate the prices at which grain was sold on the internal market were often thwarted, while illegal export of grain and other goods was especially hard to prevent.⁶⁸ The high cost of transportation of grainstuffs by land meant that government control of this illicit trade (through its provincial officers) was easier in land-locked kazas: it was in those within easy reach of the sea that especial vigilance was necessary. The Aegean coast was hard to control,⁶⁹ as was that of Bosnia, to which the markets of Italy, easily accessible through Dubrovnik, were temptingly close.⁷⁰ While Hasan Pasha of Bosnia had earlier permitted surplus grain to be sold to the Christians, conditions in September 1593, soon after the start of the war, required that action be taken to prevent this trade, which was leaving insufficient available on the market for purchase by

66. Creveld (1980) p.236

67. MD 69/92; MD 71/338; MD 77/3; VELIYUDDIN 1970 f.2v

68. MD 71/31; MD 71/601; MD 71/753; MD 74/287. For a study of the organisation of grain trade within the Ottoman Empire, and government attempts to control it, see Güçer (1949). Cook (1972) pp.2-6 gives some bibliographical references to the contraband trade of this period.

69. e.g. MD 73/220; MD 75/82

70. MD 71/338

the inhabitants of Bosnia.⁷¹

The counterpart of this illegal diversion of resources by sea, was grain speculation by those with enough money to be able to afford to buy up stocks, which they stored and subsequently sold at high prices when there was a demand. Such activity caused concern at Edirne in 1605, the more so since that town was on the military road and the availability of provisions at specific times and at the lowest possible price was essential.⁷²

The promulgation of prohibitions on the export of grains and other goods were taken by the European states as a sign of impending military or naval activity by the Ottomans. Although the sale of naval biscuit stores in Istanbul in January 1592 indicated that a serious campaign on the sea was not to be expected in that year, the concomitant ban on grain export left the Fugger agent in Venice bemused as to Turkish intentions.⁷³ The Hapsburgs, for their part, forbade the unauthorised export of grain and bread even to Hungary (apart from the needs of the troops there), a move presumably designed, as was the case in 1684, to hinder the resale of grain to the Turks by the villagers of the Hungarian border. The scarcity of supplies after 1600 provoked increased restrictions on the export of grain from Austria.⁷⁴

71. MD 71/173

72. MD 75/342

73. FUGGER p.235: "They say that the Turk has sold most of his stores of biscuit again. This is a token that no powerful fleet will sail. But at the same time he seems to have put a veto on further export of grain from his dominions."

74. Winter (1958) p.136; Bog (1971) p.22; Pickl (1977) p.119 refers to the ban on grain export in 1684.

The Ottoman government thus took certain basic administrative measures to keep its enemies from augmenting their own supplies of grain.⁷⁵ It was more for this reason, rather than because of any global shortage of grain that bans on export were enforced: the resources potentially available to the Ottomans within the Empire were enormous, and it was Hungary which was one of the most abundant areas. Both western and Ottoman contemporary writers are eloquent concerning the plenty which existed here; Knolles cites it as one of the reasons that war against the Hapsburgs was decided upon in 1593, in preference to any other possible adversary.⁷⁶ The ambassadors of west European states who passed through Hungary on their journey to Istanbul were similarly struck by its fertility,⁷⁷ while Abdülkadir makes particular mention of the lands along the Danube to the south of Belgrade which had lush orchards, and says that the areas around Eğri and Segedin were especially fertile.⁷⁸

References to winter retreats owing to bad weather are a commonplace in the chronicles of Ottoman military campaigns, and should not be taken as an index of bad weather in any absolute sense. There are indications, however, that the cool climatic conditions experienced in western Europe during the decade of the 1590s⁷⁹ had a parallel in conditions in Hungary and the east of the continent since contemporary European accounts refer to famine there in some years of the

75. It was apparently the case that Sultan Süleyman had taken the additional precaution of paying the Hungarian reaya to sow grain for the army (TALIKIZADE f.19v): evidence that this practice had been continued during the 1593-1606 war has not been found.

76. Knolles (1621) p.1013. See also Johnson (1603) pp.90,94

77. e.g. Deshayes (1645) p.54-55

78. AK ff.11r,69v,71v,92v,102v,122r

79. Ladurie (1971) p.67

1593-1606 war.⁸⁰ Such adverse conditions do not, by all accounts, seem to have been severe enough to interfere seriously with the provisioning of the army generally, although there were, of course, temporary shortages on account of unforeseen circumstances and administrative miscalculations.

Until recently, the assumption of historians has been that Ottoman domination of Hungary brought with it total devastation to the resources which existed there.⁸¹ This picture has been modified, and we can see both that the effects of the Turkish presence were not felt equally in all areas, and also that it was partly a shift in agricultural and habitation patterns that was the outcome of the presence, rather than a blanket destruction. Around Buda, and along the line of march for instance, the negative aspects of the Turkish occupation were especially evident.⁸² This differentiated pressure is evidenced by the ability of particular areas to provide for the demands of the army. The sources of grain purchase are frequently not mentioned in the available documents, but of those which are, Segedin, Mohaç, Peçuy, Sigetvar, Kopan and Sirem occur most often.⁸³ Fekete and Káldy-Nagy's study of the account books of the customs post at Buda earlier in the sixteenth century confirm that it was the surplus grainstuffs of southern Hungary which were shipped upstream for sale in Buda,⁸⁴ and these areas of rolling hills are still, today, a major producer of

80. THOU XIV p.284; Knolles (1621) pp.1060; Lefaiivre (1902) I p.219

81. See, for instance, the introduction to Maksay (1967).

82. Dávid (1974) pp.64-65. Kovácsics & Dávid (1973) pp.432-34 shows, for instance, that population of Hungary did not decline over the period of the Turkish occupation.

83. e.g. MM 5717 p.112; KK 1876 pp.17,94,97

84. Fekete & Káldy-Nagy (1962) p.716

Hungary's wheat.⁸⁵

The Ottoman army campaigning in Hungary and along the lower Danube against the Wallachians, had, therefore, an abundance of grain supplies on which to draw. The western part of the Empire was able to meet the demands of the troops in this war, with only rare recourse to the grain stocks of Anatolia. High transport costs discouraged the sending of supplies from Anatolia to Rumeli. The allocation and availability of grain for the army in Hungary was also determined by events in Anatolia itself; in 1596 the Celali revolts broke out, to be followed in 1603 by Shah Abbas' attack on Ottoman-held positions in the Caucasus. Ottoman response to these events required the existence of sufficient stocks of grain for the troops of the expeditions mounted to try to quell this disorder, a further competing demand for provisions. The most decisive factor, however, was that the Rumelian half of the Ottoman domain was well-able to produce sufficient grain within its own borders, and particularly within Hungary itself. In 1605, the Danubian sancaks of Niğbolu and Silistre were sending wheat and barley by sea to Trabzon for the soldiers fighting on the eastern front.⁸⁶

The loss to the army for some years after 1594 of provisions which had formerly been supplied by Moldavia and Wallachia in particular, does not seem to have caused any great shortages. One occasion when grain was transferred from some sancaks of Anatolia via the Black Sea ports to the army in Rumeli was, however, during the campaign of 1595, the first after the defection of the principalities to the Hapsburg cause. This transfer of grain was a substitute for the campaign service which was otherwise incumbent upon the

85. Enyedi (1976) p.182

86. MM 7426 p.5

holders of timars. The sipahis of Kastamonu, Kangri and Bolu who held dirliks of 3,000 akces and below were to send shipments of wheat to the serdar in Ibrail, on the Danube delta, at the rate of 10 kile for every 1,000 akce-worth of their benefice.⁸⁷ The amount of grain to be levied on the sipahis of the vilayet of Rum, in recognition of their failure to appear at the Hungarian campaigns in the same year, was the subject of conflicting orders. At the end of June they were asked for 15 kile of wheat per every 1,000 akces of their benefice; in mid-July, this was lowered to 5 kile, and two weeks later, an order was sent demanding that they should give 2 kile barley and 2 kile flour.⁸⁸ Such demands for the physical transfer of bulky grain to the western theatre of war are not typical, and did not serve to meet a defined need. They were, rather, the expression of the fulfilment of a traditional obligation which was soon to be turned into a cash tax levied as bedel-i timar. Details of the administration of this tax in 1603 show that the burdens were rated in a similar fashion as earlier, but that the levy, which was nominally in grain, was further assigned a cash value which was paid by those liable, and the money thus collected was then used for the purchase of grain nearer to the war zone.⁸⁹ This transfer of taxes in cash rather than in kind allowed the flexibility which did the commutation of the nüzül and sürsat taxes to their cash equivalents.

87. MD 73/325

88. MD 73/288: this order concerns those with timars of over 6,000 akce; MD 73/64; MD 73/1067.

89. MM 7727 p.20; AE Mehmed III/181 contains details of how this money was spent on the purchase of grain in the sancak of Semendre and various kazas.

-The aggregate demand for provisions

As was noted earlier, the campaign year falls into three seasons: (a) the march; (b) the period of active campaign; (c) the period of winter-quartering. The demand for provisions by the troops will be discussed on this basis.

(a) the march

During the march, which from Istanbul to the Hungarian front lasted two or three months, provisions were gathered in previously appointed billets (menzil, konak), whose locations, although lying along the same military corridor (kol), varied from year to year. Supplies were made ready at the billets before the arrival of the soldiers, an operation which required some precision in planning; it was frequently the case that the local authorities were responsible for such planning, orders from the Porte sometimes demanding only that 'sufficient' supplies be made available. The meadow of Daud Pasha, outside the walls to the west of Istanbul was the traditional starting-point, the first billet on the road to war in the western part of the Empire, and here the guilds demonstrated their skills and sold their wares to the troops at the current price. Stops were longer than one night at certain points along the way, at Edirne, for instance, or Filibe. Here feasts (ziyafet) would be provided for the troops. On arrival at Belgrade, the march phase ended, and the operation of the army moved into a different mode, the celebrations and feasts held here having the secondary purpose of galvanising the troops for the action of the months ahead, as well as permitting a much-needed rest.⁹⁰

The demand for the grain to stock billets to be used on the

90. AK ff.6r,6v,7v,32v,115r

march was met from the neighbouring kazas.⁹¹ The troops of the Ottoman army marching to fight in Hungary had the tremendous logistic advantage that they passed through territory which lay within the borders of the Empire. Thus, those responsible for meeting the demands of the troops did not have to rely on the co-operation of other states, and there was, brigands apart, little likelihood of supplies not reaching their appointed destination. In contrast, the situation of the troops of the Spanish Hapsburg army marching to fight in the Netherlands at this period was a constant concern to the military authorities. The Spanish Road to the Netherlands ran through territories at times hostile to Hapsburg military intentions, and careful diplomatic negotiations were necessary to ensure the safe passage of troops and that they would be fed en route to their destination.⁹² For the Ottomans, the annual pattern of grain demands on the march was fairly stable, supply being altered only in response to changes in local circumstances such as the inability of a particular area to furnish the provisions demanded in a particular year. The cadis were easily kept informed of such circumstances. In 1605 the cadi of Edirne wrote to the Porte to say that, while the kaza of Edirne had been ordered to provide for the janissaries at two billets on their march, the serdar was staying in Edirne for several days, and the kaza of Edirne was therefore unable to support such a burden. In response, the provisioning of the billet of Şeyh Pınarı was reassigned to the kaza of Cısr-ı Mustafa Pasha, as is shown by amendment to the copy of the original order.⁹³

The knowledge that those of the troops who would return to

91. MD 77/76; MD 77/109

92. Parker (1981) esp. pp.62,92

93. MD 77/68; MD 77/76: "...sonradan cısr-ı Mustafa Paşa'ya nakl olmuştur".

Istanbul at the end of the campaign season would have to pass along the same military corridor as on the outward journey required an awareness of the need to ensure the availability of grain and other foodstuffs at the start of winter too. Such an occasion was the return of Sultan Mehmed III from the Mezőkeresztes campaign in the autumn of 1596. Orders were sent to certain of the cadis along the route back to Istanbul that they should ensure the availability of 300 keyl barley and 200 keyl flour from the supplies that had previously been collected for the Sultan's progress to the front earlier in the year and not utilised, and that they should make a forced levy (sürsat) in their kazas to procure whatever eatables were to be found in order to make up the shortfall.⁹⁴

Quick response to demand implied a certain degree of flexibility in the provisioning system even on the march, however. In June 1605 the troops were held up for 5 or 6 days at Şehirköy (Piot) on the way to Belgrade. They could not cross the R. Morava since the bridge had been destroyed, and so the kazas of Sireşnik and Izenbol were charged with meeting the demand caused by this unforeseen delay. They had earlier been ordered to contribute to the provisioning of the billet of Sarı Brod (Dimitrovgrad) but had neglected to do so in time.⁹⁵

The archival and other documents available to us are primarily concerned with the demand for provisions by the kapukulu ocakları, the regiments of the Porte, and the bureaucrats and retainers who went with them along the military road from Istanbul to Hungary: thus we have details of the supply of only a relatively small section of the total army. This is important, and should be borne in mind

94. MD 74/489; MD 74/490

95. MD 77/76; MD 77/109; MD 77/316

throughout the present discussion. Clausewitz pointed out the ease with which the demands of an army on the march could be met, and the supply of grain to the relatively small numbers of men and animals using the corridor to Belgrade cannot have presented any serious problems: he observed that in an area in which the average population density was 2,000 to 3,000 per 25 square miles, a force of 150,000 fighting men could live off the local inhabitants and communities within a small area for a day or two.⁹⁶ The size of the Ottoman army marching through the Balkans at any time was smaller than this, and specific administrative measures were adopted to ensure that demand was met in an equitable fashion.⁹⁷

(b) the period of active campaign

The second and third seasons of the campaign year relied on provisioning from depots, what may be termed 'magazine supply'. These two periods, that of confrontation in the theatre of war and of winter inactivity in the field, may be differentiated from one another though: during the former, the army was on the move, and depots had to be kept supplied accordingly, while in the winter, after the season's hostilities had ceased, the various units of the army were stationed in specific locations, and more or less precise estimates could be made of their requirements.

Preparations made during the previous winter were essential as a contribution to the success of the summer's campaign. Grain was taken to Belgrade where it was put into the depots

96. Clausewitz (1976) pp.332-33

97. We have noted earlier that the janissaries were sent by a separate northerly route.

until the season began.⁹⁸ Belgrade's strategic importance on the Sava-Danube line, at the junction of the eyalet of Rumeli and the Hungarian lands, made it the secure base from which campaign supplies for the forward operation were prepared, safe as it was from enemy threat. From Belgrade, supplies were sent on to Buda by river, from thence to be distributed as needed to the Ottoman-held positions closer to the Hapsburg front.⁹⁹ All the depots of the castles of the area had to be kept supplied, but garrisoned positions which were not threatened, and lay away from active military confrontation, could be provided for from the surrounding agricultural districts. It was the strategically more important positions, exposed to enemy operations, such as Estergon, Yanik, Kanije and Eğri that had to be maintained by the organised distribution of foodstuffs.

Magazine provisioning for the Ottomans in Hungary meant stocking fortresses for the start of the season with as much provisions as was possible, and continuing to send convoys of supplies as they were needed. The nature of warfare on the Hungarian front was such that this could be achieved without overmuch difficulty. The Ottomans were not trying to set up a chain of magazines in enemy territory as were some European armies of the period after the Thirty Years War. The logistic problems which attended the operation of seventeenth century armies who were unable to form defensive lines, unable to dominate large areas and thus always vulnerable to cavalry raid from their enemy, were not so great a concern for the Ottoman army campaigning in Hungary

98. As an example, see MD 77/80, MD 77/81: in 1605, Osman, the sancakbeyi of Izvornik, was ordered to purchase 70,000 keyl of grain, and Ali, the commissioner for grain (nüzül emini), 100,000 keyl, which was to be sent to Belgrade to await the arrival of the military commander (serdar).

99. MD 77/476; MD 77/478; MM 7730 pp.2-14; AK ff.8r,57r,197v; HBZ f.344r

at the turn of the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁰ The chain of fortresses forming the 'border' between Ottoman and Hapsburg in Hungary was breached by several attempts to take the castles of the opposing forces. Actual successes by the Christians were few, and of rather little lasting importance in their effects on the Ottoman logistic network which radiated from Belgrade and Buda. The capture of Estergon by the Hapsburgs in 1595 was a strategic defeat and a blow to Ottoman morale, which perhaps made the eventual reconquest of Yanik inevitable, and put the Hapsburg army within striking distance of the heart of Ottoman Hungary, the Belgrade-Buda axis: it also hampered the functioning of Ottoman supply lines. Convoys were given guards to protect them on both land and water,¹⁰¹ and depots which were exposed had their garrison increased.¹⁰²

When the Ottoman army was fighting against Michael the Brave in Wallachia, securing supply lines was more difficult than was the case on its northwestern border. Michael's army was a more fluid force than the Imperial troops and the promising Ottoman conquest of Bucharest in September 1595 was soon followed by the ignominious retreat and defeat of Sinan Pasha and his men at the Yergözü bridge. In Wallachia, foraging was the only feasible solution to provisioning problems.¹⁰³

Within the theatre of war itself, there were, as on the

100. Creveld (1980) p.18

101. HBZ f.319r: 200 fighting men (cenkçi) were assigned to protect provisions' boats on the R.Danube at the time of the Egeri campaign in 1596.

102. MD 71/394 refers to the vulnerability of the fort of Balcık, on the R.Danube in the province of Temeşvar, which was a provisions depot.

103. AK f.43v: after the capture of Bucharest, the Ottoman troops were allowed 15 days' rest. This they used to go and gather supplies.

march from Istanbul, billets where the night was spent. On the frequently-used routes, such as that from Belgrade to Buda via Osek, a march of about 2 weeks, castles and forts were stocked as a matter of course. On other routes there was no choice than for the troops to carry their provisions with them, a load which made them more vulnerable to the possibility of hostile attack. The distribution of seven or eight days' supply of provisions to the cavalry regiments of the Porte in Belgrade in July 1599¹⁰⁴ makes Perjés' estimate that four days' bread ration was the maximum which could be carried seem low.¹⁰⁵

Reports from both the Ottoman and the Imperialist side tell of plentiful provisions. When the castle of Yanik was taken by the Hapsburg commander Schwartzenburg in 1598, he wrote: "It was also well-furnished with victuals and other provisions, and in almost every house was great store found". Despite this, the garrison had gone to bring provender from Istolni Belgrade, leaving the castle unguarded and open to Schwarzenburg's victory.¹⁰⁶ Fortresses could not, however, hold out against prolonged siege such as the 60-day beleaguering of Estergon by the Hapsburg forces in 1595, which left it without water or grain.¹⁰⁷

Ottoman sieges of Christian positions were subject to the greatest logistic strain when the Ottomans did not have

104. AK f.120v

105. Perjés (1970) p.8: his estimate may, however, rely on certain implicit assumptions as to the extent of baggage-train support available to the armies of seventeenth century Europe and the Ottoman army.

Troops of the Austrian army carried up to 10 days' provisions with them in their struggle against the Ottomans in 1683-86 (Pickl, 1977 p.137).

106. TRUE NEWS pp.6,8. Knolles (1621) p.1101 says that Yanik had, at this time, sufficient stocks of meal to feed 4,000 men for 18 months.

107. AK f.48r

control of a water-route to allow reinforcements to be brought in to supply the besieging force. When Satırcı Mehmed Pasha was attacking Varad in 1598, rain started early and the siege had to be raised in early November. Everything was soaked including the provisions. Eating some of the horses was the only solution, until the Tatars brought and sold wheat and barley in the camp, the former mixed with salt sufficing as a meal.¹⁰⁸ Shortage of provisions was experienced when the Ottomans tried to take Pest from the Hapsburgs in 1602: the Ottomans were unable to secure their supply lines from the south without enemy interference and could not easily bring provisions from Buda across the river. Prices escalated wildly, and horses were made into kebab: provisions ran out until small boats were eventually able to cross the river at night to bring supplies.¹⁰⁹

The Ottoman re-conquest of Estergon in August 1605 was possible because there was a clear passage to this stronghold along the Danube from Buda. This unimpeded route enabled boats to supply the Ottoman army besieging Estergon, with the result that provisions could be sold to the troops at low prices. Tatar raiding over the Danube to Uyvar was again a means of procuring extra supplies.¹¹⁰

108. AK f.104v

109. According to PEÇEVI II p.247, the price of flour rose to 20-22 hasene per keyl, and that of barley to 15 hasene per keyl, while Abdülkadir puts the increases even higher, at 30 hasene for a keyl of flour, and 20 hasene for a keyl of barley. At an exchange rate of 120 akçe to the hasene, this would have represented a staggering increase over the average price of grain: the average price paid for one keyl of barley by officials of the Buda Treasury in 1011 AH (1602-03) lay between 12 and 65 akçe per keyl (MM 6770 p.31).

110. AK f.209v

From the orders requesting provisions for the march, it is clear that it was from Belgrade onwards that the army was considered to have entered the theatre of war; apart from those orders for the stocking of depots which were addressed to officials in Belgrade at the start of the season, control over the provisioning of the troops during the campaign season itself was not centrally-directed from Istanbul. Whereas it had been the cadis who had practical responsibility for ensuring that the billets along the military corridor were supplied, the administration of supply in the theatre of war passed into the hands of a commissioner specifically appointed for the task of ensuring grain supplies, the nüzül emini.¹¹¹ Certainly, the nüzül emini had an overall administrative role to play on the march too, but from Belgrade onwards it was he who directed the purchase of grain within the financial constraints set by the campaign defterdar. This shift in organisation is mirrored in the archival material at our disposal, and is another index of the extent of central control over the provisioning of the troops. It has been stated already that the campaign account books have many entries relating to the purchase of provisions (ıstıra): it was this method of procuring provisions, rather than the levies of nüzül or sürsat, which was used during the campaign season in the theatre of war, perhaps to the exclusion of nüzül and sürsat: it does not appear to be the case, either, that grain supplies levied under the rubric of these two extraordinary taxes were transported beyond Belgrade for use

111. There were also commissioners in charge of the procurement of supplies other than grain: they will be referred to as we discuss the supplies for which they were responsible.

within Hungary.¹¹²

(c) the period of winter quartering (kışlak)

The demand for provisions in winter was of more quantifiable dimensions than was the case during the active campaigning season. In this respect there is similarity to provisioning on the march. Winter provisioning required the stocking of depots with sufficient for 3 or 4 months, and so the allocation of winter quarters to the troops had to be accomplished in an orderly manner. The serdar, when he did not return to Istanbul, stayed in Belgrade for these months. Here the depots were always kept stocked, and he could oversee preparations for the following year's military activity. The winter months were not a time of idleness, as we have seen from description of the measures which had to be taken to ensure that provisions for the year ahead were plentiful.

The garrisoning of all strongholds was important, the main consideration as to the winter deployment of cavalry troops of all corps being that they should have access to dry fodder. The lesson of the loss of Yanık in 1598 was a salutary one, Schwartzenburg's forces taking, early in the season, a tenuously-held Ottoman position which lay exposed to attack. Buda was kept well-protected, the janissaries usually being assigned here for the winter,

112. The situation in Hungary in 1593-1606 may be contrasted with that which pertained on the Persian border: Güçer (1964) pp.69,78-79,81 notes that nüzül provisions were used to stock the castles of the eastern border in the war of 1578-90; Veinstein (198.) pp.11,13 finds that the same had been true in Süleyman's time, with nüzül being used for the stocking of strategic depots, and sürsat supplies being reserved for the stocking of the billets (étape).

together with cebecis, arabacis and topçus.¹¹³ By the winter of 1598-99, the Christians held Yanık, Komran, Estergon and Vişegrad, and had thus tightened their grip on the Danube to the west of Buda, leaving that city in a position of great vulnerability. They could thus effectively harrass the supply lines of the garrison at Buda, seizing food convoys coming to the town and leaving the Ottomans short of provisions. While there was no global shortage of food in the theatre of war, the existence of such an unfavourable logistic situation well illustrates the importance to the Ottomans of holding these castles along the Danube, and of keeping substantial forces in Hungary during the winters. In an area where rivers were the preferred means of transport, the importance of logistics is underlined.

The selling-off of surplus grain stocks at the end of the campaign season, as was done by the Ottomans in their eastern campaigns of the mid-seventeenth century,¹¹⁴ seems to have been rare in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth. In view of the large numbers of troops who wintered in Hungary during these campaigns, it is unlikely that stocks would have been available for the post-campaign recirculation of grain, for this would have necessitated re-purchase in order to provide for the quartered troops. There is evidence that the type of wheat and barley grown in Hungary at this time was, surprisingly, able to survive some years without spoiling. An inventory of the grainstocks in an area near to Varad (Nagyvárad) in 1589 shows reserves remaining from 1577, which were, since they were considered available at

113. For the winter deployment of the troops during this war, see, in particular, the many references in Abdülkadir's chronicle viz. AK ff.13v- for 1593-94, ff.27v- for 1594-95, ff.48v- for 1595-96 etc.

114. Murphey (1979) pp.124,373.

the later date, still edible.¹¹⁵

-The allocation of grain to the individual soldier

The grains in greatest demand were wheat and barley. References to zahire in the sources may be understood to indicate those two cereals, and such specification is sometimes made. A salient point is that wherever there are details given of the purchase of specific quantities of wheat and barley, the amount of barley is invariably substantially greater than that of wheat. In such a context, both were the responsibility of the nüzül emini and his agents. The subsumption of barley as part of the troops' provisions points up an administrative and financial arrangement whereby the fodder for the animals which were the support of the corps in question was accounted for in a different manner than that which was for the beasts whose role was other than personal in nature, those which pulled the gun carriages and carried munitions, for instance. The supply of grain for these latter beasts was looked after by an official known as the sergi emini.

Dietary information for contemporary western Europe indicates that barley bread was consumed as a poor substitute for wheat, or that it could be mixed with wheat.¹¹⁶ The possibility cannot thus be excluded that some of the barley described as, for instance, "be-cihet-i zahire-yi yeniceriyan" was for human consumption. Sansovino

115. Kiss (1975) p.159. Grainstocks remaining from the Sigetvar campaign of 1566 were being sold off up to 6 years later: "an paha-yi zahire ki an sefer-i Sigetvar baki mande..." (MM 1561 pp.54,76,88).

116. Minchinton (1979) p.118-19; Braudel (1973) p.92; Braudel (1978) I p.241

describes the bread usually eaten by the Turks as "tristissimo e nero...e vi mettono dentro seme di cimino"; the sultan's bread, by contrast, was white.¹¹⁷ Barley bread was black in colour whereas that made from wheat was white, and Sansovino's description may be proposed as evidence that the former could have been eaten by the troops.

Whatever may have been its constituents, bread came in several qualities, at various prices.¹¹⁸ The term nan referred to a bread that was more expensive than that described as ekmek, the commonest type, and Abdülkadir mentions "uzun çakıl pideleri" on one occasion.¹¹⁹

Although it cannot be stated categorically that no part of the grain supply of these troops was given gratis, we have seen that individual rations were sold to the troops whose supply was a concern of the central bureaucracy, while a subsistence allowance (nafaka) was given to certain of them to assist with the costs of keeping themselves fed. The janissaries who were stationed in barracks in Istanbul during peacetime were the beneficiaries of a number of vakfs set up with the aim of providing food and other requisites at affordable prices.¹²⁰ During peacetime an amount of 10 akçe was cut from the wages of each janissary and paid into a fund known as kumaniye.¹²¹ This principal was put out to earn interest at a rate of 10-11%, which was then available

117. Sansovino (1582) p.60

118. For narh lists showing the prices of the different types of bread available in Istanbul, see M.Kütükoğlu (1978) p.22 and M.Kütükoğlu (1983) p.53.

119. AK f.209v: this flat bread was made on an occasion when there were no ovens available, which could imply that the bread of the troops was normally of a superior quality.

120. KAVANIN f.38v

121. This derives from the Italian 'compagna': 'ship's provisions'; 'storeroom in a galley' (Kahane & Tietze, 1958 pp.76-77).

to assist those unable to afford sufficient provisions. When there was to be a campaign, each man had to contribute 2 gold pieces into the kumaniye fund.¹²²

If we take the average price of flour at this period to be 30 akçe per keyl,¹²³ and posit a baking ratio of 3:4 (i.e. 3 kg flour could produce 4 kg bread),¹²⁴ then the daily subsistence of 1 akçe which was given to the infantry regiments of the Porte could purchase 1.14 kg of bread. This compares well with the contemporary European military bread ration, which averaged one kg per man per day.¹²⁵ The Ottoman state was still, by 1600, providing a true subsistence ration for its soldiers. Over the preceding century, however, the amount of bread which could be bought for 1 akçe had more than halved.¹²⁶

Since the Ottoman bureaucracy was more concerned with the financial aspects of provisioning than ensuring that each

122. KAVANIN f.39v; cf. Deshayes (1645) p.199

123. This figure is based on the average price of flour (not statistically-derived) over the years of these campaigns, as given in the registers of the MM and KK series: see bibliography.

124. Perjés (1970) p.5: this is nothing more than a rough estimate and should not be accepted without qualification; Perjés assumes a 100% extraction rate of flour from grain, while Engels (1978) p.123 says the extraction rate of grain:flour to be 10:9, and (ibid. p.124) that 3.9 grain produces 3.5 bread, a ratio which is the obverse of Perjés'. Information on Ottoman milling and baking ratios is scanty: a list of market regulations (ih̄tisab̄ karunnamesi) for Istanbul around 1500 gives a grain:flour extraction ratio close to that of Engels' (Barkan, 1942 p.330).

125. Perjés (1970) p.5. See also Dilich (1608) p.216 who gives the daily bread ration of the (German?) troops of the time as the equivalent of 3 lb.

126. Inalcık (1982/a) p.127: around 1500, 1 akçe bought 2.3 kg of flour; at a baking ratio of 3:4, this would produce over 3 kg of bread.

man received a constant bread ration every day, the size of such a ration is hard to ascertain. The history of food-stuffs is a fairly recent concern of European social and economic history - Ottoman studies on this subject are in their infancy.¹²⁷

127. Aymard (1973) discusses some of the problems of the sources for a study of diet in the west European context.

IIv. Rice

Rice cultivation was introduced into Hungary as a legacy of the Ottoman occupation.¹²⁸ The supposition that rice formed a significant item in the diet of the Turkish troops is not borne out by the quantitative evidence available to us for the 1593-1606 war; pilav may have been an essential constituent of the Turkish meal, but evaluating its real importance is a more complex matter. When compared to wheat, the quantities of rice reaching Buda were insubstantial; in 1571, only about 1% as much rice as wheat (in kg) passed through the Buda customs. In 1573, rice taxed at this point was nearly triple the amount of rice taxed here in 1571, but by 1580, it had fallen back to little more than half its 1571 level.¹²⁹

Although the military road passed through one of the most productive of the rice-growing areas of the Empire, the Morava valley, the troops on their way to war were not supplied with rice. It is a notable omission from the list of foodstuffs to be prepared at the nightly billets. From this area, rice was sent to Istanbul for the sultan's kitchen, and the extent of its importance for this purpose may be illustrated by an undated sixteenth-century document which lists the foodstuffs to be taken on campaign for the delectation of the sultan and his entourage. Here, the supply of wheat is completely overshadowed by that of rice, the former constituting only one fifth as many camel-loads as the latter.¹³⁰ Each day, more than one camel-load of rice

128. I have been unable to establish the date when rice began to be cultivated in, as opposed to imported into, Hungary.

129. Fekete & Káldy-Nagy (1962) pp.722-23

130. TKS D8702 p.2: birinc 50 yük
buğday 10 yük

was consumed.¹³¹ It is clear from a document relating to the return of Mehmed III to Istanbul after the Eğri campaign of 1596 that grain was supplied through the sürsat levy even to the sultan's suite:¹³² thus, the relative importance of grain and rice may be distorted if sole reliance is placed on a list of provisions taken from Istanbul, and no allowance is made for the acquisition of supplies en route. For a more accurate assessment of the importance of rice in the diet of the average soldier, it may be noted that during the Revan campaign of 1635, less than 40,000 kg was calculated as sufficient rice for the troops on an 8-month expedition.¹³³

Inalcık states that the çeltik mukataaları system of state control over rice-growing was organised with the aim of ensuring supplies for the military.¹³⁴ While this may have been true at a time when the Ottoman state was establishing itself in Anatolia and Rumeli, it no longer appears to have been the case by the 1593-1606 Hungarian campaigns. Rice, Inalcık suggests, was generally four or six times more expensive than wheat.¹³⁵ This needs to be qualified by adding that, while this may be true on the basis of weight,

131. A gloss to the entry referring to rice in TKS D8702 p.2 notes: "günde bir yükden ziyade harc olunur". The weight which a camel was expected to carry was not standardised: Engels (1978) p.14 states that the average camel can carry 300 lb (net weight) for extended distances, while Faroqhi (1982) p.537 says that loads of up to 200 kg are attested from the seventeenth century; cf. Hinz (1955) p.13: 1 Kamelslast = 243 kg.

132. MD 74/489

133. Murphey (1979) pp.127,380: 2,928 (kile) x 12.82 = 37,537 kg.

134. Inalcık, art. Filaha (EI)

135. Inalcık (1982/a) p.128: the source which he cites for this information is a graph by Barkan in Braudel (1978) I p.518, which, however, does not yield such a result. It must therefore be assumed that he had other more convincing evidence for such a statement.

Murphey & ?

in terms of use-value, of calorific content, rice is richer than wheat, and so a comparison in terms of price per dry-weight becomes less valuable. Given the higher food-value per unit of weight of rice than wheat, and the consequently lower transport costs which rice incurred, it is perhaps surprising that it did not figure more prominently in the military diet.

The prices at which the small amounts of rice were sold to the troops in Hungary are higher than those which were current on the Istanbul market. This must reflect, in part at least, the cost of transport over the long distance from the river valleys of the Balkans. The price at which rice was sold to the janissaries, the cebecis and topçus in Hungary in the final year of the war averaged 75 akçe per kile.¹³⁶ This compares with an Istanbul market price of 37 akçe per kile in 1600.¹³⁷ In the year from autumn 1603 to autumn 1604, 100 akçe per kile was a more usual price for rice distributed from Buda.¹³⁸

As with biscuit, it appears that it was the janissaries who were the consumers of most of the rice that was sent upstream to Buda during these campaigns. Of the provisions reaching Buda by river from Belgrade during the twelve-month period from October 1603 until October 1604, rice comprised 54,793 kg compared with 359,883 kg of flour, 705,100 kg of wheat, and 6,064 kg of biscuit.¹³⁹ This was not, presumably, the total of grain supplies that came to Buda during that year: we would expect all rice, however, to have been transported by river since it reached Buda from the south.

136. KK 1890 pp.109,113,115,181

137. M.Kütükoğlu (1978) p.24: prior to the revaluation of the akçe in 1600, the Istanbul price was 54-56 akçe per kile.

138. MM 7730 (Cum.I 1012-Cum.I 1013 AH)

139. MM 7730 p.2

Such a supposition would serve further to diminish the relative place of rice in the military diet for the other grains must have been available in the immediate hinterland of Buda, and the quantities given for these were doubtless supplemented by supplies not carried on the river. Nearly one-third of this rice was allocated to the janissary force in Eğri by order of the vezir Kuyucu Murad Pasha, the beylerbeyi of Rumeli.¹⁴⁰

140. MM 7730 p.11

IIvi. Biscuit

Biscuit is known as the cornerstone of the naval diet. It did not spoil easily, and could therefore keep for long periods at sea when there was no chance of being able to stock up with more palatable fare.¹⁴¹ For the Ottoman troops fighting in Hungary it was also an important source of nourishment, as well as for those of the Hapsburgs, being considered indispensable by Montecuccoli.¹⁴² Marsigli's estimate of 160 grams as the daily ration of the Ottoman troops¹⁴³ again demonstrates the caution with which detailed quantitative information should be regarded, since this diverges substantially from the ration of Murad IV's men in the mid-seventeenth century, who, in the emptiness of the eastern front, were allowed 700 grams per day.¹⁴⁴

On the way to campaign, biscuit was not generally needed, fresh bread being made available at every halt.¹⁴⁵ Its value

141. See the following studies of the naval diet: Lane (1970); Davies (1970); Hémardinquer (1970). Biscuit emerges as the provider of bulk, being the foodstuff consumed in the greatest quantity, and having a high calorie content.

142. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59

143. Marsigli (1732) II p.67 (50 dirhems). It must be pointed out that Marsigli's observations do not apply specifically to conditions of war, and relate to a later period than that under consideration in the present study: he says that the treasury provided provisions for the troops, which is at variance with the evidence in contemporary Ottoman documents.

144. Murphey (1979) p.125

145. An exception was the unseasonal march to Wallachia of the forces of the serdar Cafer Pasha, which set out from Istanbul in October 1595. They had to rely on biscuit purchased in Sofya for their sustenance on the way (KK 1874 p.9).

as a source of food lay in its convenience when bread was not available, when uncertain conditions similar to those faced by the sailor pertained, such as in the instability of the war zone. Where bread was plentiful, biscuit was not in demand, and its price was consequently low.¹⁴⁶

During the winters, substantial stocks of biscuit were baked for the forthcoming season. Belgrade was the centre of operations for this activity,¹⁴⁷ but the baking also took place elsewhere.¹⁴⁸ From Belgrade, or the ovens where it was baked, the biscuit was transported in sacks,¹⁴⁹ by buffalo cart where shipping was impracticable.¹⁵⁰

Biscuit was made of wheat.¹⁵¹ The accounts show military purchase both of this raw material specifically for the manufacture of biscuit, and of 'biscuit' itself, the latter presumably ready to eat. The purchase of biscuit by the military authorities suggests that its manufacture was

146. At the Ottoman siege to retake Estergon in 1605, for instance: "nan ve nemek feravan...bir ferd peksimad taleb etmezlerdi" (AK f.209v).

147. AK ff.14r,50v,107v,120v; KK 1876 p.115

148. KK 1876 p.148: "an tahvil-i Ali subaşı-yi yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i ali an paha-yi peksimad-i miri ki der liva-yi Sirem ve Semendre tabh şide ve bi- cemaat-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i ali tevzi kerde..."; KK 1887 p.12: "teslim bi-ahali-yi kura-yi kaza-yi Filibe be-cihet-i harc-i tabh-i peksimad...7,080 akçe". The Venetian ambassador in Constantinople, Zane, reported a bread shortage in August 1593 caused by the baking of biscuit for the army (CSP p.98).

149. KK 1874 p.10 (Sofya, Rebi I 1004 AH/Dec.1595): the sacks (garar) cost 70 akçe each; the simultaneous purchase of goatskin covers to protect the biscuit is also registered ("keçe beray-i balapüş-i peksimad").

150. For instance, for the Eğri campaign in 1596, which took place away from navigable waterways (AK f.68v).

151. KK 1876 p.100; KK 1890 pp.44,49

undertaken by private concerns, presumably on a contractual basis.¹⁵² Accounting details serve to illustrate the distinction between manufacture which was contracted out and that which was internal, the accounting designation 'biscuit' presumably signifying purchase from a private bakery. In June 1597, an amount of 34,000 akçe was debited to the campaign account. This was the cooking cost of 1700 kantar of biscuit (95,880 kg) which had been cooked in Belgrade over the previous months at a unit-cost of 20 akçe per kantar.¹⁵³ If we assume an average 7 akçe per okka as the purchase price of ready biscuit by the state at this time,¹⁵⁴ then it can be calculated that of the 308 akçe per kantar purchase price, 15% went towards the cooking cost.

Prepared biscuit was also imported from Egypt. Much of this went to Istanbul for the victualling of the fleets which were based there, but some was also sent to Salonika where it was stored until needed for the Hungarian campaigns.¹⁵⁵ Those in charge of provisioning clearly could not make precise estimates of demand for biscuit, especially with respect to that from Egypt, and so stocks remaining after the season's end were sold off and the money thus earned was repaid into the Campaign Treasury.¹⁵⁶

As was the case with bread, there may have been more than one grade of biscuit, but the only evidence for this is Abdülkadir's allusion to peksimad-i beyaz. In July 1597, he

152. KK 1885 p.12; MM 6766 p.13; IBE Askeri 184

153. KK 1876 p.115: "...be-cihet-i tabh kerden-i peksimad...1,700 kantar, beher kantar fi 20".

154. This is the price at which biscuit was purchased for the soldiers a few months later (KK 1876 p.192).

155. MDZ 7 p.39. See also Shaw (1968) pp.62,174.

156. KK 1879 p.399; KK 1892 p.65

says, the price of this was low, at 5 akçe per okka.¹⁵⁷ Prices certainly fluctuated, but we may be justified in looking with circumspection at Abdülkadir's assertion that shortage at the siege of Pest by the Ottomans in 1602 caused a rise to 120 or even 240 akçe per okka, that is 240 akçe per 1.2 kg.¹⁵⁸

It appears that it was the janissaries who consumed most of the biscuit. Almost without exception, Abdülkadir's references to this food are qualified to make clear that it was for this corps.¹⁵⁹ The campaign accounts bear this out, with only rare references to biscuit for other classes of troops: for the arabacıyan-i top in September 1604,¹⁶⁰ for the cebecis in September 1606,¹⁶¹ and for others such as camel-eteers¹⁶² and miners.¹⁶³ Reliable external evidence is not available to elucidate whether this preponderance of sources describing biscuit for the janissaries reflects the reality of its consumption pattern.

Biscuit being a grain product, it came under the auspices of the nüzül emini and his agents. Although the nüzül emini continued to have an overall responsibility for grain provision until the end of the war, by 1603 the office of

157. AK f.100v. The price of biscuit in Istanbul in 1600 was fixed at 150 akçe per kantar, which is 3.4 akçe per okka; there appears to be only one type (M.Kütükoğlu, 1978 p.22).

158. AK f.160v

159. e.g. AK ff.67r,98r,100v,120v,146r

160. KK 1889 (unpag.: entry dated 2 Cum.I 1013)

161. KK 1890 p.115

162. MM 6770 p.39; KK 1887 p.2

163. MM 6770 p.39

emin-i peksimad had been created.¹⁶⁴ This aspect of the work of the nüzül emini could conveniently be separated off and entrusted to another official, who still remained under the wing of this superior commissioner.

164. The first mention of the emin-i peksimad in the sources for the 1593-1606 war is to be found at KK 1884 (unpag.: entry dated 29 Ramazan 1011 AH/March 1603) and this office existed until the end of the war, viz. KK 1887 p.29 (Aug.1603); KK 1887 p.183 (May 1604); KK 1889 (unpag.: entry dated 2 Cum.I 1013 AH/Sept.1604); KK 1890 p.46 (May 1606); KK 1890 p.113 (Sept.1606).

IIvii: Meat

The ability of the Ottoman troops on the Hungarian front to survive on minimal rations was a source of amazement to contemporary western commentators.¹⁶⁵ In the seventeenth century Montecuccoli remarked that his troops (for the most part mercenaries), were accustomed to good food, and unprepared for the rigours of warfare without. They were liable to desert if they considered themselves insufficiently provided for. The rations of the forces under Montecuccoli's command included 1 lb (.56 kg) of meat per man per day, an amount that was constant throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries for the Hapsburg armies, and equivalent to that of Rákóczi's army in the early eighteenth century.¹⁶⁶ Marsigli's observations of Ottoman troops, on the other hand, put their daily meat ration at less than 200 grams.¹⁶⁷

The more immediate access of the Ottoman army than the Hapsburg to grain supplies for feeding the troops was paralleled in the sufficiency of meat at their disposal. Livestock-farming in Austria and in that part of Hungary under Hapsburg control was less developed than was that of the areas on which the Ottomans were able to draw. Hungary was the source of a thriving cattle export trade to the west in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the Ottoman Balkans and the Black Sea principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were the home of productive sheep-raising, as was, to a lesser extent, Hungary itself.

165. e.g. Tarducci (1597) p.90; Botero, G. Relationi universali II p.124 (Brescia, 1599): quoted in Braudel (1978) I p.242.

166. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59; Kiss (1978) pp.83,89

167. Marsigli (1732) II pp.67-8

-Beef as a part of the Ottoman military diet

Agricultural patterns during the Turkish presence in Hungary may eventually be revealed by analysis of the Ottoman land and taxation surveys, the tahrir defterleri, but no details regarding the extent of cattle-rearing are to be found in their pages. Cattle were not directly taxed by the Ottoman treasury; they are not mentioned in the provincial kanunnames, and thus are absent from the tahrir registers. It is not clear why this should have been so.¹⁶⁸ They were, however, taxed as they passed through the customs posts at their point of export from Hungary, and registers recording the dues paid on them still survive.¹⁶⁹ When the surviving Ottoman customs registers are used in conjunction with contemporary non-Turkish sources it becomes clear that, despite the tripartite division of Hungary, the sixteenth century saw an expansion of cattle-rearing and increased export to the markets of Germany, Austria and Venice.¹⁷⁰ Much

168. Káldy-Nagy (1961) p.44: "Although cattle-breeding began to develop, this tendency did not increase the revenue of the treasury, since, as it is known, cattle-breeding was free of both tithe and tax." Káldy-Nagy (1968) pp.207-9 notes a dispute in the mid-sixteenth century over whether the reaya of Segedin should pay pasture tax or not. The reasons for the exemption of cattle from the system of Ottoman agricultural taxation have not been discussed by historians, nor given the importance which the subject deserves: although McGowan (1969) p.174 is aware that cattle and oxen are left out of the tahrirs, the results of his study of food supply and taxation on the Danube are distorted by his neglect of sources which would have enabled him to give cattle-rearing sufficient weight in the local economy; see also McGowan (1983) p.lxiv.

169. For studies of the export of beef animals as recorded in the customs registers of Vaç, see Vass (1971) pp.487,490 & Káldy-Nagy (1971) pp.245-56; for the customs post at Solnok (Szolnok), see Horváth (1969).

170. There is an extensive literature on the export of cattle from Eastern Europe to the West; a useful account is Pickl (1973).

of the export beef was raised in the Turkish sector of the country.¹⁷¹

Livestock-breeding may be considered a typical response to the unsettled conditions of borderland life. Accumulation in the form of goods that are not stationary, as are crops, was a safer investment in an area of ever-present uncertainty.¹⁷² Hungarian historians have tended not to see the success of cattle-raising as a positive aspect, but as a regression to the reimposition of the conditions of serfdom from which the peasants were beginning to free themselves by the time of the Turkish conquest of the early sixteenth century.¹⁷³ Land left by its owners, perhaps because it was close to the passage of troops, or was unsafe from marauders, was incorporated into the domains of the market towns as pasture. Towns which had started to develop as centres of diverse trades were delayed in this development, and former market towns stagnated.¹⁷⁴

Although Szakály maintains that most of the cattle were exported,¹⁷⁵ it is the success of cattle-raising as an agricultural activity which is of interest to us here. Hungary apparently functioned as a single economic unit from the point of view of export: on the basis of sixteenth century export figures, it has been calculated that the

171. Kiss (1979) pp.105-06

172. Hollander (1960) p.82

173. For example, Káldy-Nagy (1971); Szakály (1971)

174. Szakály (1971) pp.269-70

175. Szakály (1971) p.237: the benefits of cattle-raising thus fell to middlemen and not to the peasant producers. According to Glamann (1977) p.219 there was a ban on the export of cattle from Ottoman Hungary from 1568. No evidence is given in support of this assertion, nor has any reference to such a ban been found in the material consulted: the evidence suggests, rather, that this could not have been the case.

total number of beef animals in the whole country was around three million.¹⁷⁶ This leaves us in no doubt that the troops of the Ottoman army had, at least at the start of the war, the possibility of obtaining beef in quantity. Pickl has proposed that the main effect of the Ottoman presence in Hungary and of the 1593-1606 war on the country's cattle export was to cause a shift in the customary routes by which the animals travelled westwards;¹⁷⁷ not surprisingly, there is also evidence that the war had the additional consequence of cutting production and export.¹⁷⁸

The Ottoman army thus had access to fresh beef supplies in the Hungarian theatre of war, and there would appear to be no reason for salt beef to have been a staple of the Turkish soldier's diet as some contemporary European writers claimed.¹⁷⁹ In circumstances where it was impractical for fresh meat to be supplied, at time of military engagement perhaps, salt beef may have been substituted through necessity. Our chief contemporary Ottoman source, Abdülkadir, makes no mention of this in his descriptions of campaign preparations. Such a keen observer would surely have done so.

Beef cattle were referred to as gay, the term camus usually

176. Kiss (1979) pp.105-06

177. Pickl (1973) pp.150-53

178. Prickler (1971) pp.135-36 considers the 1593-1606 war to have been the main cause of the fall in the volume of Hungarian exports, of which cattle was the major one, which he detects after 1618.

179. e.g. Tarducci (1597) p.91: "...haurà il Turco per delitie...un pizzicotto di carne salata, ridotta in polvere, e temperata con acqua calda"; Soranzo (1603) p.27. There is not any mention of pastırma in the Ottoman sources consulted.

being reserved for draught beasts.¹⁸⁰ The available evidence suggests that they were purchased in southern Hungary for the most part, from Segedin, Üsek, Mohaç, Şimontorna, Sonbor, Uzice and Baçka.¹⁸¹ Money from the Campaign Treasury was given to a commissioner, the emin-i ganem or koyun emini (the terms are interchangeable) for the procurement of beef as for sheep.¹⁸² Once bought, the distribution of beef to the troops was the responsibility of the butcher attached to the corps for which it was intended. Thus, for example, we find as a credit in the accounts the entry:

"an tahvil-i Mehmed kasap-i ebna-yi sipahiyan an akçe-yi paha-yi guşt-i ganem ve gav ki bi-cemaat-i mezbur tevzi şide ve kiymetes hala bi-hazine averde...9,150 akçe.¹⁸³

This indicates that Mehmed, butcher of the sipahis of the Porte, had repaid 9,150 akçe to the treasury when he distributed (=sold) a certain amount of mutton and beef to members of this corps.

Beef was not a commodity that fell within the sürsat levy, but was purchased on the market in Hungary, and eaten by the troops once they were on campaign, rather than on the march

180. The word gav (P.) could be used also for draught animals, e.g. KK 1879 p.11: "...gav beray-i arabaha-yi top"; MM 16788 p.3: "...beray-i iştiray-yi gavan be-cihet-i mühimmat-i cebehane ve topha". Meninski (1680) II p.2959, III p.3856 equates gav with sigir (T. ox), in contrast to camus (A.), which he equates with su sigiri (water buffalo) (ibid. II p.1563).

181. KK 1876 pp.24,28,87; also mentioned as a source of cattle is the island of /.../ ('cezire-yi oğ'). Pickl (1973) p.162 says that the Hungarian plain to the east of these districts was the major source of export beasts.

182. e.g. KK 1876 pp.87,90,159

183. KK 1876 p.155; see other entries on same page, which show that each kapukulu corps had its own butcher.

to the theatre of war. Throughout the early years of the war, the purchase of cattle as a source of meat was more frequent than that of sheep. From the autumn of 1598, in which the Ottoman army unsuccessfully besieged Varad, there was apparently a change in the military diet.¹⁸⁴ The absence of cattle-meat purchases in the campaign accounts subsequent to 1598 could mean that this responsibility was transferred to another administrative authority, but there is no evidence for such a supposition. A more likely explanation is that beef supplies were no longer available due to the impact of the war; if this was the case, it is additional evidence in support of the conclusions reached by those working from non-Turkish sources.

-Mutton as part of the Ottoman military diet

Mutton was the most important of the commodities falling within the bounds of the sürsat levy, one of the extraordinary taxes imposed in times of war. Sheep were also, as we have seen, bought in the market. Overall responsibility for the supply of sheep, as for cattle, lay with the koyun emini; the sheep demanded for the needs of the troops were to be delivered to him. The various financial and administrative transactions involved in the free market purchase of sheep are not altogether clear. We have seen above how the money which the troops paid for their meat supplies was paid into the treasury. Each of the kapukulu corps had its own butcher or butchers, who were responsible for supplying that corps with meat. These butchers (meydan kasapları) were ordered to purchase sheep for the forthcoming campaign with their own money, and at the ruling price. In January 1606, for instance, the butchers attached

184. Unfortunately, we only have details of the meat supply of the kapukulu ocakları.

to the janissary corps, Hasan, Cafer and Yako, were ordered to purchase sheep for the army in the kazas of Rumeli from those who wished to sell.¹⁸⁵ On occasion the butchers could not afford to purchase the number of sheep required of them, and therefore had to borrow from the Campaign Treasury.¹⁸⁶ The relationship between the koyun emini and the kasaps as procurer of sheep is not clear; certainly money from the Campaign Treasury was given to the koyun emini (who generally held the rank of çavuş) for the purchase of sheep, but whether this was for the purchase of meat for the troops which did not have their own butchers (i.e. those other than the kapukulu ocakları), or whether it was a parallel administrative arrangement cannot be said.¹⁸⁷

The ways in which the army supplied its troops with sheep during wartime has only been given passing mention to date. Attention has been focused, rather, on the supply of sheep to the population of Istanbul, and to the janissaries and Palace in particular. Under conditions of peace, the meat supply of Istanbul was administered through the celepkeşan system, whereby wealthy individuals were ordered to supply live sheep to the city, which would be sold at below the market price in order to ensure that the janissaries, in

185. MD 77/628

186. KK 1876 p.129: "teslim be-Mehmed ve Mustafa ve diğer Mehmed ve Ahmed an kasapan-i ordu-yi humayun beray-i /.../-yi ganem be-cihet-i zahire-yi asakir-i mansure ber vech-i karz dade end".

187. e.g. KK 1879 p.10: "teslim be-Ali çavuş an çavuşan-i dergah-i ali emin-i ganem-i ordu-yi humayun be-cihet-i iştiray-i ganem...315,830 akçe"; on the same page is found reference to another çavuş, Sabr, who is also titled emin-i ganem which suggests that there may have been more than one such officer at any time. Alternatively, it could indicate that the post changed hands during the period covered by the register in question. KK 1885 p.12: "teslim be-Habib çavuş emin-i ganem be cihet-i iştiray-i ganem beray-i ordu-yi humayun...".

particular, were able to afford to buy meat.¹⁸⁸

On the basis of the information given by Cvetkova, we may summarise the essentials of the administrative structure: those registered as celepkeşan had to provide, either from their own farms or by buying in the market, a certain number of sheep as demanded by the state, which would be sold at prices lower than those they could expect to obtain on the free market. A mübaşir (agent) was sent from Istanbul to oversee this operation at the kaza level. The sheep were handed over to drovers (sürücü) who were responsible for delivering them to their destination, into the hands of the koyun emini, or the chief butcher (kasap başı) if they were intended for non-military consumption.¹⁸⁹ The celepkeşan system may thus be seen as having characteristics akin to sürsat, since the sale of sheep for the feeding of state dependents (or the Istanbul population in general?) was effected at prices determined by the government; it was also an onerous government service which brought exemption from other extraordinary taxation.¹⁹⁰

The financial relationship which existed between the celeps and the kasaps (butchers) has not been explored; we have no knowledge of the transactions by which the ownership of the sheep was transferred from one to the other. The celep

188. The most frequently cited studies of the celepkeşan system are Cvetkova (1966; 1970). The more penetrating inquiry of Greenwood (q.v.) should soon appear, and will encourage re-evaluation of Cvetkova's work, as well as adding to our knowledge of how Istanbul was supplied with meat. Faroqhi (1984) pp.221-41 has further details of the system: where Greenwood confines his analysis to the supply of mutton to the janissaries and the palace, Faroqhi writes in more general terms of the supply of mutton to the population of Istanbul.

189. Cvetkova (1966) p.161

190. Greenwood p.2

bought sheep from the producers, the sheep were driven to Istanbul by sürücüs (drovers); but it was the kasaps who had the obligation to supply the palaces and the janissaries with cheap mutton. Like the celeps, they were wealthy individuals recruited from the provinces, and like the celeps, they frequently went bankrupt, with the result that the state took certain financial measures to subsidise their operations. The sometimes quite substantial fortunes of those recruited as kasap were soon eroded by their obligation to sell meat at prices far below the market price. The unhappy fate of many of those conscripted into state service on account of their wealth meant that others who were eligible tried to avoid attempts by the state to harness the substantial amounts of capital which they had accumulated.¹⁹¹

The measures taken by the state to assist the Istanbul butchers with their financial problems, of which the most important was a cash levy on urban populations (sermaye-yi kasap), were seen to be insufficient by the last decade of the sixteenth century.¹⁹² This led to the introduction of a general customs levy of 1%, the zarar-i kasap, which was, by 1597, sent separately to the Porte and distributed to the butchers twice a year. This provided sufficient sums to allow the scrapping of previous measures aimed at providing meat to state dependents. In particular, the celepkeşan

191. Greenwood; Faroqhi (1984) pp.228-39

192. Greenwood pp.8-12 notes two funds which were in operation by this time (a) a cash vakf set up in 1565, whose interest was distributed for the assistance of hard-pressed butchers; (b) a regular cash levy on urban populations, the sermaye-yi kasap, which was to assist butchers on an individual basis, through particular communities providing for the support of a particular butcher. Faroqhi (1984) pp.233-38 treats these funds as being the same, and adds that the capital of this subvention fund was put out to interest, which moneys could then be granted to the butchers.

system was in disarray, and butchers went to the provinces to collect the celepkęsan sheep themselves.¹⁹³

In the light of what has recently been learnt about the supply of sheep to Istanbul, we are now in a position to discuss further the role of the butchers in the supply of sheep to the army on campaign in the 1593-1606 war. The question of whether the supply of sheep to the army had its own administration, parallel to that which ensured supply for Istanbul, remains open: a loan from the Campaign Treasury such as that made to the butchers Mustafa, Ahmed and the two Mehmeds, referred to above, may have been the usual source of additional finance for army butchers if, indeed, the supply of sheep for the army had its own administrative structure. Alternatively, such a loan may have been an exception, with the shortfall in the money at the butchers' disposal being made up from same funds which supported the Istanbul butchers.

Whether the butchers under discussion were those same men who were conscripted as butchers for the orducu corps is not clear. Like those supplying the janissaries and palaces in Istanbul, the butchers under discussion here had to be well-off, and had the responsibility to fund the supply of sheep to the army. As was the case with the Istanbul butchers, they could be supported in time of hardship from moneys

193. Greenwood pp.13-14

known as the kasap akçesi.¹⁹⁴ The butchers called up as part of the orducu corps, on the other hand, were supported by members of their guild, and there is no hint in the documents that the butchers' guild, rather than individuals, could have recourse to subvention moneys.

The demise of the celepkeşan system at the end of the sixteenth century which Greenwood has noted with regard to the supply of sheep to Istanbul, provides an explanation for the striking absence of documents ordering celeps to supply the army with sheep in the 1593-1606 campaigns. During Süleyman's campaigns in Hungary the system was intact, and the celeps of Bulgaria were responsible for supplying huge numbers of sheep to the troops both while they were on the march to Belgrade and once they had reached that city.¹⁹⁵ When the celepkeşan system ceased to function satisfactorily and the 'in-cash' substitute for this service, the bedel-i celepkeşan, began to be accepted in lieu, certainly by 1591,

194. MD 74/443: the kasap akçesi vakfı referred to in this document was funded, in part at least, from money levied on "Istanbul shops" viz: "...kasap akçesi için İstanbul dekakininden cem ve tahsis olunan akçeden...kasap akçesi vakfına zabt edüp olageldüğü üzere istirbah etdiresin". Greenwood (p.13) says that kasap akçesi could be the term for moneys raised from the 1% customs levy, the zarar-i kasabiye; it could also, however, refer to moneys raised by other levy or from the vakf. Faroqhi (1984) p.344 defines kasap akçesi as a payment made in lieu of service as a butcher in Istanbul. A further mention which adds to the confusion surrounding the meaning of this term is that the kasap akçesi fund, or part of it, was a mukataa by 1593-94 (MM 5294/69).

195. Refik (1933) pp.8-11. See, in particular, Veinstein (198.) pp.20-25, who gives a breakdown of the minimum of 175,000 (or 135,000?) sheep demanded for the Temeşvar campaign of 1552: of these, 30,000 each were to be given by the voyvodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, 40,000 by those registered as celep, and the remainder by other (unspecified) producers who wished to sell.

this cash levy was not used to finance provisions for the troops as were the 'in-cash' substitutes for the other services of nüzül and sürsat.¹⁹⁶

With the celepkeşan system no longer functioning as formerly, alternative methods of procuring sheep for the army had to be sought. The sürsat levy was able to cope with the relatively small numbers required to feed those troops passing along the military road to Belgrade or north through Bulgaria to the Danube. In April 1605, an average of 100 sheep were provided each night for the troops marching between Istanbul and Belgrade with the Grand Vezir Lala Mehmed Pasha. These did not include sheep for the janissaries, for whom a separate order required 300 sheep per night on their march, which was by a northerly branch of the orta kol.¹⁹⁷ If the 1605 march is typical, the sürsat sheep mostly came from kazas bordering the military road in Thrace and present-day Bulgaria, but conditions did not always permit this, and some of the beasts were brought from kazas up to 150 km distant from the line of march. The celepkeşan system for supplying Istanbul, by contrast, operated within a 600 km radius of Istanbul;¹⁹⁸ the provision of sürsat sheep for the march was, like that of grain supplies, easily coped with.

Towards Belgrade, it was from the mountainous kazas on either side of the orta kol that the sürsat sheep were

196. See the campaign account summaries in Appendix 1. The reason that the bedel-i celepkeşan was not paid into the Campaign Treasury may be that it was not considered an extraordinary obligation, being performed in peacetime and wartime alike during the sixteenth century; this could give us added insight into the nature of avarız taxation (Part III of this study deals with war financing).

197. MD 77/76; MD 77/109

198. Greenwood p.3

drawn, and from Macedonia.¹⁹⁹ For those which were to be consumed during the campaign itself, orders were sent for them to be ready at Belgrade for the start of the season, often by Ruz-i Hizr, or at any rate before the arrival of the serdar if he had not been wintering in Belgrade.²⁰⁰ From there they moved with the army as strategy dictated, and as logistic conditions permitted; they were cheap to transport and sometimes were even conveyed by boat.²⁰¹ Although sürsat was not levied as a means of securing sheep once the season's campaigning had started, incursions from Rumeli into enemy-held territory could be thus supplied. Sinan Pasha's ill-fated action against Michael of Wallachia in 1595 required sheep from Silistre.²⁰² Many sancaks of Rumeli, from Niğbolu on the Danube to Ağriboz in southern Greece also contributed to the general needs of the campaign in that year.²⁰³

The purchase of sheep, in distinction to their acquisition as a sürsat levy, took place throughout the months of the campaign. Conditions of warfare rendered istira a slightly uncertain business once the season's hostilities had begun in earnest. In the years 1602, 1605 and 1606, therefore, pre-campaign purchases were made from the fertile Kossovo plain of Macedonia. In 1605, 10,000 head were to be bought and sent to Belgrade, in addition to those obtained by

199. MD 77/76; MD 77/109

200. e.g. MD 77/434; MD 75/582: sheep were apparently available around Belgrade, since moneys from the bedel-i ganem levy of the kazas of Köstendil and Usküb were earmarked for the purchase of three-year old sheep in the Belgrade area in spring 1605.

201. KK 1876 p.24: "teslim be-Haci Mehmed Ağa...be-cihet-i mevacib-i azeban ve martolosan-i Budun ki ba-şaykaha be-Belgrad ganem amedend ve ba-sefineha zahire-yi ganem reften fermude şide...".

202. MD 73/955

203. MD 73/329

sürsat; in the same year the sancakbeyi of Iskenderiye had also undertaken to provide 8,000 head.²⁰⁴ In 1602 and 1605 the Porte stipulated that a price of 1 gold piece each (equal to 120 akçe) was to be paid for the sheep bought.²⁰⁵ The pressures on the border vilayet of Bosnia may have led to its exemption from irregular impositions, but early in the war, in spring 1597, 9,000 head of sheep were available for purchase by the koyun emini.²⁰⁶

Within Hungary itself, sheep-raising was a traditional activity which, as can be seen from the Ottoman land and taxation surveys (tahrir defterleri), continued to be important in the rural economy. Figures for the relative consumption of beef and sheep in some towns of Hungary show that, at least in an urban context, beef was decidedly more important in the sixteenth century.²⁰⁷ This is not however a reliable guide, since rural consumption is not recorded, nor are rural sheep production statistics easily available. The results of Káldy-Nagy's study of two hass estates in the vilayet of Buda may serve as indication of a general trend in Ottoman Hungary: over the period from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, although total agricultural production declined, the number of sheep increased.²⁰⁸ In the 1560s, an average of 25,000 sheep were annually exported via the customs post at Vaç for sale in Vienna, some in transit from Transylvania, it is true, but many also from Ottoman Hungary.²⁰⁹ The customs registers for Solnok, a

204. AE Ahmed I/815; MD 77/463; MD 77/439: 10,000 sheep were sent from Usküb to Niş as well, presumably to continue thence with the army into Hungary.

205. AE Mehmed III/174; AE Ahmed I/815

206. KK 1876 p.123

207. Kiss (1978) pp.85-86

208. Káldy-Nagy (1961) p.53

209. Káldy-Nagy (1974) pp.34-35

second important customs post, show an increase in the numbers of sheep crossing during the second half of the sixteenth century.²¹⁰ High export figures alone, for sheep as for cattle, are not a sufficient indicator of total numbers of beasts raised, but their value lies in showing that such an industry existed and was a potential source on which the army could draw.

The effect of the defection of the Danubian principalities in 1594 was felt in the following year, when few sheep were able to be sent from Wallachia and Moldavia to provision Istanbul. Most of the available sheep in Rumeli had been driven to the army and the cadis of the vilayets of Anadolu, Rum, Zulkadriye and Karaman were, for this reason, ordered to send sheep from those distant areas to meet the shortage in Istanbul.²¹¹ There had been more than 200,000 sheep in the Akkerman/Özü plain before 1593, clearly a productive region.²¹² The blocking of the direct route to Hungary would have prevented the use of these sheep for military provisioning in Hungary, if not for that of Istanbul.

The sheep of Wallachia were not altogether lost to the Ottoman army as a source of meat though. Opportunities for raiding presented themselves, and were used to advantage at the time of the brief period of success against Michael of Wallachia (the Brave) in 1595, where the peasants were

210. Horváth (1969) p.60

211. MD 73/74. Faroqhi (1984) pp.223-28 perhaps gives undue space to sheep brought from Anatolia to Istanbul, since her book is concerned with this area rather than with Rumeli; having studied the celepkasan registers in detail, Greenwood observes that sheep were only brought from east and central Anatolia to Istanbul in times of scarcity (Greenwood p.3). Abdülkadir refers to sheep being sent by the Turkoman for the Eğri campaign, presumably from eastern Anatolia (AK f.52r).

212. MD 71/332

robbed and their beasts sold in the army.²¹³ The Tatars were especially proficient at this, crossing into Transylvania at the time of the siege of Varad in 1598, and returning with wheat, sheep, oxen and other provisions which they sold in the camp.²¹⁴ The high prices charged by the Tatars for the supplies which they obtained in this manner was a further irritant to their already uneasy relations with the Ottoman troops.

The weight of beef animals available to the Ottoman army varied widely,²¹⁵ and the terms used in the Ottoman sources do not distinguish rigorously enough to allow understanding of which particular type of ox or cow is being alluded to. So it was with sheep. Sheep are described only as ganem (A.) and koyun (T.) in the Ottoman sources consulted with specific reference to these campaigns, unlike those in the celepkesan registers, which were described according to the season when they would arrive in Istanbul; sheep from particular areas arrived in Istanbul at particular times of year.²¹⁶ The average amount of meat which a Hungarian sheep yielded was apparently 10-15 kg, but there is no agreement on this critical point.²¹⁷ Ottoman sources give varied prices for sheep, but whether this is indicative of particular local market conditions, or of differences in sheep size, we cannot tell. With such confusing internal

213. AK ff.41v,43r

214. AK f.102v

215. Kiss (1979) pp.88-89

216. Greenwood p.4; see also KAVANIN f.60r

217. Maksay (1967) p.24. Dillich (1608) p.217 knew two sizes of sheep in contemporary Germany, Hamel at 30 lb and Schaff at 20 lb, which, given Maksay's figure, must have been meat- or deadweight. By contrast, McGowan (1969) p.168 puts Hungarian mature sheep at 12 kg liveweight, while Sugar (1977) p.126 assumes a small sheep yielded 50 okka of meat, which he equates with 45 lb.

evidence, attempts to give a daily meat consumption figure for the typical Ottoman soldier are in vain. Conversely, the use of western observations as a means of assessing troop numbers, such as Marsigli's of 60 dirhem (nearly 200 grams) per day for the janissaries, is doomed to failure: Abdulkadir repeatedly describes how food was distributed from army supplies to the poor of the areas through which the army passed. So too, sheep were needed for ritual purposes, at kurban bayramı for instance, and also to celebrate events such as the start of campaign or victory in some military undertaking: such sheep do not always appear in the accounts.

IIviii. Other Provisions

In addition to the several grain products and meat, the other essentials of the Ottoman military diet were oil and salt, and water to drink.

A list of provisions taken from Belgrade to Buda by water in the year from early October 1603 to late October 1604 includes these essentials, together with the grains already discussed, the full complement being flour, wheat, barley, millet, mixed grains (mahlut), rice, biscuit, plain oil (rugan-i sade) and salt (nemek).²¹⁸ In a diet in which rather tasteless grains held a dominant place, salt was the means of imparting some slight flavour. Braudel reminds us that 20 grams per head per day was consumed in contemporary Europe.²¹⁹ Montecuccoli allowed half a pound per week to make more palatable the weekly ration of 7 lb meat and 14 lb bread, which is a daily salt ration of more than 30 gm.²²⁰ Oil was used for cooking; olive oil being more expensive, it was the oil of other plants which was normally used.

The more diverse diet of the serdar and the troops marching to Belgrade for the 1605 campaign seems not to have been the norm during campaign itself; the provisions to be ready in the billets for the arrival of the troops were sürsat provisions, and we have seen that this levy was probably not applied within Hungary itself. On this occasion, the serdar and those with him had honey and chicken in addition to the standard fare of bread, sheepmeat and oil.²²¹ In 1594, however, at least in the billets of Halkalı, Inceğiz, Çatalca

218. MM 7730 p.2

219. Braudel (1973) p.141

220. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59

221. MD 77/76; MD 77/109

and (سورسات), rations to be made ready by the sürsat levy for the janissaries were, in addition to the basics, honey, yogurt, cheese, onions and garlic.²²²

Vinegar is not specifically referred to in the Ottoman sources, as it is in the European, being considered essential by Montecuccoli.²²³ The properties of vinegar were that it helped discourage scurvy and that it sweetened bad water.²²⁴ Water, the drink of the Ottoman soldier, caused illness to European troops, who were unaccustomed to drinking water in quantity at home, and so doubly unprepared for the local water available on campaign.²²⁵ Wine and beer were purer and therefore drunk in quantity by the European soldiers, a factor which contributed to the ill-discipline frequently encountered amongst them. Montecuccoli proposed that one reason why it was advantageous to make war against the Turks in winter was because, through drinking only water, they were less able to withstand the cold than the Christian troops.²²⁶

The English soldier of the mid-sixteenth century had 4.5 gallons (c.20 litres) of beer per week, which was of considerable calorific value,²²⁷ the sailor on the Tuscan galley of the same period, 80 cl of wine.²²⁸ The drinking-water of the janissaries was in the charge of the corps of water-carriers (sakayan), who were provided with horses (saka bargirleri) on which were transported the waterskins

222. MD 72/883

223. Montecuccoli (1735) p.59

224. Hémardinquer (1970) pp.88-89

225. Braudel (1973) pp.159-62 remarks on the impurity of European water in comparison with that of the springs of Istanbul.

226. Montecuccoli (1735) p.293

227. Davies (1963) p.139

228. Hémardinquer (1970) p.85

(meşk) in which fresh water was carried. Marsigli gives an illustration of this corps, together with the waterskins in position on the horses, noting that each of the kapukulu ocakları was served by such water-carriers, and that the water was used for washing as well as drinking.²²⁹ From the time of the Eđri campaign the money to support the saka corps and to purchase their equipment was given by the state; previously, horses to carry the equipment of the janissaries (seyishane bargirleri) had been bought at below market price from the people of Uskúdar, an arrangement which had caused financial hardship to the sellers.²³⁰ It is not clear how the sakayan fitted into the seyishane organisation, nor whether they were part of the orducu corps.

The main equipment associated with the transport of water were the waterskins themselves (meşk), and an item called musluk, which, both then and now, means tap or spigot.²³¹ Marsigli's illustration of the saka corps, showing the operation of the filling of the waterskins and their transport on horseback, does not make apparent any special device for the pouring of the water. These two items were among the most expensive taken on campaign; the word meşk may be accepted as meaning waterskin, but it has not been possible to discover the exact meaning of musluk, nor what

229. Marsigli (1732) I pp.80-81

230. AK f.15v. On the seyishane, see also KAVANIN ff.38r,38v.

231. Meninski (1680) II pp.4682-82; *ibid.* III p.4655: he did not know this usage in a military context.

it looked like. That of the aghas, at least, was made of leather.²³²

232. e.g. MM 383 pp.84,87; MM 5145 p.3; MM 5530 pp.125,126,127,128: see, in particular, p.126:

be-cihet-i mühimmat-i lazime-yi yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i alî

<u>meşkha</u>	375 pairs at 1,100 <u>akçe</u> each	412,500 <u>akçe</u>
<u>meşkha-yi diğér</u>	21 pairs at 1,050 <u>akçe</u> each	26,250 <u>akçe</u>
<u>musluk-i bulgari beray-i ağa-yi mezbur</u>		
	(complete) 3 at 2,380 <u>akçe</u> each	7,140 <u>akçe</u>
<u>musluk-i gösele beray-i ağa-yi mezbur</u>		
	(complete) 3 at 1,410 <u>akçe</u> each	4,230 <u>akçe</u>

Those of Russian leather (bulgari) were more expensive than those of common leather (gösele).

IIix. Fodder

Clausewitz' statement that a horse's ration weighed about ten times that of a man²³³ indicates the scale of the task of feeding an army which comprised not only the horses of the Tatar and sipahi forces, totalling tens of thousands of head, but relied on large numbers of camels, oxen, draught horses and mules as transport animals. We may add to this the need to temporarily sustain the sheep and cattle which were brought to the camp from sometimes distant kazas for consumption by the troops.

Engels' study of the logistics of Alexander the Great's campaigns provides precise figures for the amounts of provisions which animals require:

"On a military campaign, a horse doing moderate work will need from 20-24 lb of provisions or a daily ration of 24-32 lb. for hard work. Half this ration should be grain and the other half fodder. Military practice has shown that the cavalry and transport horses will require from 5 to 15 gal. of water per day, depending on the temperature; the average quantity is 8 gal. Hot weather and hard work will almost double ordinary water requirements. Mules require about the same rations as a horse. We will estimate that the average cavalry horse on Alexander's expedition consumed 10 lb grain, 10 lb of forage, and 8 gal. of water per day: the ration of a medium size horse doing moderate work.

The requirements are higher for camels: 10 lb of grain and 25 lb of straw per day. If only 8 lb of grain can be given, then 40-50 lb of straw; if 4 lb of grain 50-60 lb of straw; and if no grain can be given 70 lb of straw will be needed.... Camels ought to be watered daily and will need 10 gal. although if the animal has gone three or

233. Clausewitz (1976) p.331

four days without water, it may require 20 gal. at a time."²³⁴

Thus, those concerned with the provisioning of the Ottoman army in Hungary had to ensure that the animals received their supplies regularly, for they could not function without.

The eighteenth-century French general Puységur estimated that an acre of green fodder could feed 50 horses for a day.²³⁵ One square mile could therefore keep 32,000 horses for the same time. Such statistics do not give us information of value in a strictly quantitative sense, one deficiency being that we do not know how many head of animals accompanied the Ottoman army, but are presented in order to show that the demands on fodder resources were not so outrageous as a first impression may suggest. The troops of the army in Hungary were never all massed in one place, and the demands for fodder were thus dispersed.

Several terms are used to describe fodder in the Ottoman sources. Barley, the most important, is described as cev (P.), arpa (T.) and şair (A.), but others can be confusing, and the standard dictionary definition which translates them simply as 'fodder' adds little to our understanding. The assumption that the vocabulary employed in the Ottoman army to describe fodder was fairly specific is endorsed by Meninski's definitions, which accord most fully with the internal evidence, and it is on these that reliance may be placed. Thus, straw is designated as saman (T.) or kah (P.), hay as giyah-i huşk (P.), and grass as giyah (P.) or

234. Engels (1978) pp.126-27,129

235. Creveld (1980) p.34 quoting Puységur Art de la guerre par principes et règles II p.64 (Paris, 1743).

otluk (T.). The term alef (A.) meant, simply, fodder.²³⁶

The 'foraging year', for horses in particular, can be divided on a seasonal basis as were the phases of military activity according to which the provisioning of the troops has been discussed. A contributory cause to the late start of the campaign season was the requirement that the horses be grazed on the new spring grass to revitalise them after the winter months. For those coming from Istanbul, this entailed pasturing on the meadows at Daud Pasha, and along the military road to the theatre of war.²³⁷ The choice of Sirem as the assembly point for the troops was in no small degree influenced by its well-watered aspect, and consequent abundant grass.²³⁸ Similarly, the various places along the way to Hungary at which the contingents from Anatolia, the Crimea and Bosnia joined the main body of the army allowed the animals to regain their strength after the long journey they had undertaken.²³⁹ Frequent halts of a few days along the route ensured that the animals arrived in peak condition.

For those animals, cavalry and transport, which 'belonged' to the standing troops, and which marched with them from Istanbul, foraging on the new grass was supplemented by supplies prepared in the billets just as were those for

236. Meninski (1680):

saman = 'stramen' (ibid. II p.1986); kah = 'paglia' (ibid. III p.3857)

giyah = ot = 'erba', 'fieno' (ibid. III p.4108)

otluk = 'herbe', 'fieno' (ibid. I p.485)

alef = 'erba', 'fieno', 'pabolo' (ibid. II p.3314)

237. AK ff.32v,58r,143v; AK ff.190v,192r concern the grazing of camels at Çatalca.

238. AK f.129r

239. AK f.16v: Segedin; AK f.57r: Paņçova (Pancevo). Orhonlu (1970) p.42: Mohaç.

human consumption. The same orders for, for instance, sürsat supplies to be levied in the kazas en route for the soldiers, contain demands for the readying of barley, straw and grass for the beasts.²⁴⁰ During the shorter journey of the Rumeli sipahis in spring 1594, a warning was given that they were to desist from grazing their horses in the grain, millet and crops of the peasants; those who had done so were to be sent bound to Istanbul and were to lose their benefices.²⁴¹

After the animals had been grassed in the spring, the method of feeding during the campaign phase, from July, say, relied on the animals being given the dry feed harvested the previous autumn as well as foraging as best they may. Perjés identifies this period as comprising first, the 6-8 weeks prior to harvest, which was the time when the ripening crop was cut for fresh fodder, and secondly, the time from harvest to the start of winter, when the animals were given mainly dry fodder, with fresh where it was available.²⁴² We may assume the applicability of such a practice to the conditions of the Ottoman army's war effort in Hungary.

When he passed through Hungary in Süleyman's reign, Busbecq particularly remarked upon the abundance of hay there, so plentiful as to be valueless and free for the taking: "...as soon as we entered Hungary, the grass was so tall that it often hid the carriage in front from the ones that followed...".²⁴³ Straw was also fed to the animals: "no barley harvest, no war", was an apposite phrase to underline its vital importance in the Hapsburg-Ottoman

240. e.g. MD 72/883; MD 77/76; MD 77/109; RKS 1540 f.86v.

241. MD 72/621. See AK f.70r.

242. Perjés (1970) pp.15-16

243. Busbecq (1968) p.70

wars.²⁴⁴ During the summer, the animals must have foraged where they could, to supplement the dry feed which they were given, but details are scarce.

During winter-quartering, on the other hand, the provisions given to the animals were entirely dry, and this demand was the heaviest burden in the year. Over the years of the war, many of the provincial sipahi cavalry and the Tatars remained in Hungary for the winters, and the availability of fodder must have influenced their deployment as much as strategic considerations. In order to alleviate the pressure on the resources available in Hungary itself, camels and draught horses (bargir) were withdrawn for the winter. Camels traditionally retired to Filibe and Hirebolu, where the imperial stables were situated,²⁴⁵ while draught horses were sent to Edirne and Siroz.²⁴⁶ In the first winter of the war, in 1593-94, oxen were assigned to Sirem in the charge of the yürüks.²⁴⁷ The commissioner known as the sergi emini arranged the availability of supplies for the transport animals on campaign, as the nüzül emini did for the troops and their mounts.²⁴⁸

244. Braudel (1973) p.71

245. AK ff.5r,106v. AE Mehmed III/1; AE Mehmed III/112. MM 5717 pp.19,124. See also Faroqhi (1982).

246. MD 77/538. MM 5717 p.61

247. AK f.13v

248. e.g. KK 1876 p.65: "teslim be-Mehmed Çelebi emini sergi-yi humayun be-cihet-i paha-yi cev ve giyah ve kah beray-i bargiran-i arabaha-yi top ki be-kışla reftend an Belgrad ila Siroz...".

IIx. Provisioning of the Provincial Cavalry and the Tatars

Since the registers of the Ottoman bureaucracy were primarily concerned with central government activity, it is not surprising to discover that they contain little information about the provisioning of the provincial sipahis and the Tatars. These two groups comprised large numbers of men, and, because they were mounted, their impact on the local economy must have been correspondingly greater than that of the troops whose provisioning we have discussed so far.

-The provincial sipahis

To suggest without further qualification that the timariot forces coming to the Hungarian frontier from as far away as eastern Anatolia brought with them the provisions which they needed for the duration of the campaign, is to ignore the system by which they were able to provide for themselves independently of the arrangements made for the standing army by the central authorities.²⁴⁹ Parry appears to suggest that the burden of providing for all contingents of the army fell to the central government, and he fails to draw a distinction between the provisioning of the standing army and that of the rest of the troops.²⁵⁰ McGowan suggests that

249. Murphey (1979) p.121-22 writes of the campaigns of Murad IV: "While the provincial timariot forces were expected to provide their own supplies, from horses to weapons to personal provisions, at the outset of a campaign each eligible soldier was also given a ration of grain or cash equivalent." No reference has been found in the sources for the 1593-1606 war to suggest that such allowances were made to the sipahis at this time.

250. Parry, art. Harb (EI)

sipahis must frequently have been required to bring them to war the nüzül levies of their districts, but he does not elaborate whether these were to be consumed by the sipahis themselves or whether they were for general consumption.²⁵¹

It is only recently, with the appearance of Veinstein's study of how the sipahis supported themselves when they were quartered during the winters of Süleyman's campaigns, that an attempt has been made to understand how they were provisioned.²⁵² The institution which supported the sipahis was called harclık,²⁵³ those sipahis who were sent back to their sancaks to collect money for the support of their peers being designated harclıkçı. The cadis of the areas to which the harclıkçis were sent had to ensure that the cash taxes due to the sipahis had been collected in time to be taken back to their beneficiaries by the start of the campaign season. Secondly, the 'in-kind' tithes due to the sipahis had to be realised in cash. In addition to the burden which this placed on the cadis and the reaya of the areas to which the harclıkçis were sent, Veinstein notes two particular abuses of the system. The first of these was that those sipahis sent as harclıkçı would tend to sell the product of their own timars before that of their peers; secondly, harclıkçis could embezzle the cash due to their peers.

Veinstein presents a document from 1559 which advises the beylerbeyi of Rumeli of the measures to be adopted in order

251. McGowan (1981/a) p.107. This may be connected with Soranzo's (1603 p.27) observation that each sipahi took one load of corn for himself and the sancak from which he came sent meal, barley and grain whenever possible.

252. This use of the term harclık is not to be confused with its usage to denote part of the remuneration of garrison troops.

253. Veinstein (1983)

to expedite the collection of harclik: if the harclikçis were likely to be held up because they needed to wait until the grain was sold, the beylerbeyi was to borrow from those with spare cash, and was responsible for repaying them when the grain was eventually sold. So far as the cash taxes due to the sipahis were concerned, these were to be collected before their usual due date.²⁵⁴

The changes which took place in the organisation of the supply of sheep to the army on campaign between Süleyman's campaigns and the end of the sixteenth century should make us wary of extrapolating over the same period with regard to the functioning of the harclik institution on the basis of only one document from each period. However, the evidence available for the years 1593-1606 concerning the provisioning of the sipahi troops suggests that the harclik institution continued to function much as it had in the earlier period: in November 1605 the zuama and timariots of the sancak of Silistre were appointed to defend Buda during the coming winter. The beylerbeyi of Buda, Ali Pasha, wrote to the Porte expressing his concern that if it was necessary for the harclikçis to wait in Silistre until the produce (mahsul) could be sold in the markets, those left to defend Buda would be unsupplied, and the harclikçis would themselves be delayed in returning to defend Buda. He suggested that a solution to this problem was to let the cash equivalent of the sipahis' grain be obtained from the reaya at the ruling price and given to the harclikçis who could thus return quickly to Buda. The Porte replied, however, that the reaya should take the sipahis' produce, and their tithe (ösr) which was stored in the granaries, to the nearest market as stipulated in the kanun, and sell it

254. Veinstein (1983) pp.128-29

at the ruling price, giving the money to the harclikçis to take back to Buda.²⁵⁵

This raises questions concerning the effect of the harclik system on local markets. Unfortunately little is known about these. The effect which the need to realise cash at short notice must have had may be surmised though. Veinstein mentions three ways in which the operation of local markets must have been distorted, in part by the requirement that price levels be maintained. First, the need to sell quickly would have meant that it was the rich who bought the grain which had to be sold for the purpose of raising the cash to keep supplied the sipahis on campaign. Secondly, the cadi, who was responsible for the sale of the produce of the sipahis' timars would give priority to the grains being sold on behalf of the sipahi, rather than that of the peasants, creating a more or less temporary monopoly.²⁵⁶

Once the harclik money had been collected and brought to Hungary, it must have been spent by the sipahis in Hungary to keep themselves fed. Because the central government did not have direct responsibility for provisioning them, and because surviving documents are often vague, it has been impossible to ascertain how the money was spent. The effect of the demand for food by the sipahis in Hungary must have had a substantial impact on markets there; just as the lives of the reaya in their home regions must have been upset by the need to realise their goods in cash at short notice, so must the presence of thousands of soldiers from other areas of the Empire have had a substantial impact on the pattern of agricultural production in Hungary. This impact has, to the best of my knowledge, never been examined. The careful control which the Porte exercised

255. MD 77/260

256. Veinstein (1983) pp.122-23

over the supply of its kapukulu troops was due as much to an understanding of logistics as to a desire to ensure that this section of the army did not lack for anything. Although the sipahis were not supplied by the central authorities, it would have run counter to the principles of good husbandry if they had been allowed to take from the peasants as they wished, and on the occasions when this happened, orders were sent for their punishment.

When the provincial cavalry troops were marching to war through parts of the Empire which were at peace, they appear to have obtained their supplies in the markets along the way. Abdülkadir is imprecise on this point when he describes the passage of the former Celali leader, Deli Hasan Pasha, and his men from Anatolia to fight in Hungary in 1603:²⁵⁷

"...ve Bosna beylerbeyisi olan Deli Hasan Paşa Gelibolu'dan geçüp,...mahruse-yi Edirne'ye dahil oldukta Edirne'nin kadısı lazım olan zahirelerin şehirden alivirdiler badehu menazil kat ederek Belgrad'a dahil olduklarında anbardan zahirelerin tevzi ettiler."²⁵⁸

On the basis of this passage the most that can be said with certainty is that Deli Hasan's supplies came from the city of Edirne as he and his troops passed through, and that they received further supplies on arrival in Belgrade; what we cannot tell is whether they bought these provisions or whether they were given them free. A document relating to the passage of troops from Anatolia to Rumeli at the start of the war in 1593 is more precise in its terminology and shows that troops passing from Anatolia to Rumeli bought their supplies when they reached Gelibolu. The cadis of

257. See Griswold (1983) pp.39-46

258. AK f.132r

Şarköy, Evreşe and Keşan were ordered to provide sufficient provisions ("kifayet mikdarı zahire") and send them to Gelibolu for sale to the troops arriving there from Anatolia, as well as for the local population. Owing to the war, the normal sources of supply in Edirne and Rumeli had been cut off, and orders that ships from Egypt and Izmir should unload at Gelibolu had been ignored. The use of the phrase "umumen Anadolu askeri" to describe the soldiers covered by this order strongly suggests that they were largely provincial sipahis rather than merely central government agents stationed in the provinces.²⁵⁹

-The Tatars

Baron de Tott's observation that the Tatars considered 8 lb of millet to be sufficient food for fifty days on campaign,²⁶⁰ shows that they were accustomed to feed off the lands through which they passed and in which they fought. The conditions under which the Tatar army operated when fighting other nomads in the steppes to the north-east of the Crimea were very different, however, from those which they encountered when fighting for the Ottomans in Hungary. The passage of the Tatar troops from their homelands to join the Ottomans was anticipated with great trepidation by those through whose territory they passed, and measures were taken to minimise the damage they were expected to cause, even before it was certain which route they were to follow. Food was prepared at billets on the way, the han sometimes co-

259. MD 71/552

260. de Tott (1786) pp.166-67

operating by sending envoys to arrange this provisioning.²⁶¹

The Tatar way of life equipped them well for campaigns in Hungary, in that they required little for their sustenance. They tended, however, to take whatever they needed from wherever it could be found, raiding both friend and foe alike. Relations between the Tatar han and the Ottoman Porte were uneasy, and the han's control over his troops less than complete: despite reprimands, the Tatars often raided the Ottoman reaya, stealing their animals and possessions.²⁶² They were permitted to raid into the dar ül-harb, but attacks on the inhabitants of the dar ül-islam were a serious offence.

When some of the Tatar troops were destined to spend the winters in Ottoman Hungary, the problem of controlling them became more serious at a season when supplies were scarcer than at other times of the year. In winter 1594/5, the Tatars remaining in Hungary were assigned quarters at Vespem and Istolni Belgrad from whence they could easily raid into neighbouring Hapsburg-held territory to the north and west.²⁶³ 1602-03 was the winter which Gazi Giray spent in Peçuy with his friend the historian Peçevi, and his troops wintered in the towns and villages of the sancaks of Sigetvar, Kopan, Mohaç and Şimontorna, and between the

261. Kortepeter (1972) pp.135,137,138. In spring 1594, Michael of Wallachia was ordered to provide the Han with horses (bargir), a number of men as escort, and enough provisions that he should not go short, should the Han travel through Wallachia on his way to campaign (MD 72/837). Maksay (1967) pp.10,11 refers to European sources which describe the devastation caused by the Tatars in Hungary in 1597 and 1599.

262. MD 77/252; MD 77/507

263. AK f.28r. PEÇEVI II p.156: those at Istolni Belgrad camped outside the town under their small tents (yapunca).

rivers Drava and Sava ("...Drava nehrinin ma-verasi").²⁶⁴

A number of documents from the winter of 1605-06 illustrate the difficulties of ensuring that the Tatars quartered in Hungary during the winters were amply enough supplied to discourage them from harrasing the reaya, but that they should not be so well supplied as to put an intolerable burden on the reaya. Although there were relatively fewer Tatars in Hungary by this stage than during the early years of the war, their deployment and supply in this winter was a problem for the authorities. The 5,000 Tatars ordered to stay on the Kanije border refused to settle there, despite their provisions being found from that vilayet. They were to stay on the far side of the R.Rába, in what must have been disputed territory, for it was feared that they would otherwise destroy the more central areas of the vilayet, in particular, Sirem and Sigetvar.²⁶⁵ They also had a valuable defensive role to play on the border. It seems that it was impossible to get these Tatars to comply with the order, and shortly after, the beylerbeyi of Kanije was instructed to winter them on the shores of Lake Balaton, away from the katona: they had arrived in the Mohaç area and attacked the reaya.²⁶⁶

A further order addressed, to the beylerbeyi of Kanije and the sancakbeyis and cadis of Mohaç, Peçuy, Kopan and Sigetvar, contradicts those sent before. Now it was directed that, should it be necessary for Tatars to winter

264. PEÇEVI II p.251

265. MD 77/290

266. MD 77/587: katona is a Hungarian word which today means 'soldier'; the Redhouse dictionary definition is 'heavy cavalry soldier'. It is not clear which of the troops of the Ottoman army, or of the Transylvanian forces of Bocskai, which were by this time fighting on the Ottoman side, would have been described thus.

in the field, they should be settled in these kazas. Clearly the authorities' intention that they winter on the border, so that they could provision themselves by raiding into enemy-held territory, was not to be realised. Instead, provisions were to be levied on the reaya: each Tatar was to be given 1 kile of flour and 10 vukiye of meat each month, 3 kile of barley per two horses (bargir) per month, and sufficient firewood, straw (saman) and hay (otluk). This was to see them through until early March 1606, when, presumably, it was considered that their horses would be able to begin to forage on the young grass. Nothing more than the stipulated amounts of provisions was to be taken from the reaya.²⁶⁷

The lengthy months of winter-quartering presented the authorities with a quandary: at Alacahisar, the reaya complained about an additional demand of twelve gold pieces from each (avarız)hane, which was levied on them in order to supply the Tatars wintering in that kaza with an extra two months' provisions on top of the three months' which had previously been allotted them. This was deemed excessive by the Porte, which ordered that these reaya were not to be thus troubled, but there is no indication of what measures might have been taken to stretch out the provisions to which the Tatars were entitled, nor how they were prevented from oppressing the reaya.²⁶⁸

267. MD 77/590: assuming that the measures used here were those of Istanbul (which is by no means certain), this was the equivalent of, for the men, 56 kg flour and 12.8 kg meat, and for the horses 168 kg barley. Since this order is undated, we do not know for how long these provisions were to suffice.

268. MD 77/665. See also MD 77/564 & MD 77/589 which suggest that a similar dilemma had arisen in the kazas of Yenibazar and Tirovište in Bosnia.

Such large numbers of men and horses as those of the provincial sipahis and the Tatars were not, as the available documents show, allowed to raid and forage at whim, but were expected to supply themselves according to certain recognised limits which were in keeping with the provisioning 'policy' of the Ottoman military command in Hungary at this time. Raiding was permissible as long as it was conducted into enemy territory, and this must have been how the Tatars, in particular, met their requirements and those of their horses. In winter, when this was not possible, the authorities had to define exactly the amount of provisions to which they were entitled, and how they were to obtain them. We have seen that sufficient fodder was probably available for the horses during the summers, and we may suppose that the horses of those sipahis quartered in Hungary during the winters were given dry fodder from the depots of the areas to which they were assigned.

The dearth of information in the registers of the central bureaucracy concerning the provisioning of the Tatar and sipahi troops is a reflection of the extent of control which the government exercised over them. Only the provisioning of the kapukulu troops was closely supervised: since the money for that part of their supplies which was not met by extraordinary levies on the reaya came, in the first instance, from the treasury, account was kept of what they received. The fact that it was the financing of the purchase of provisions for these troops which was the major concern is apparent from the infrequency with which details are given of the amounts of provisions purchased, and for whom they were intended. The government did not have a direct financial stake in the provisioning of the Tatars and sipahis, except where they were provided for by extraordinary taxation. Similarly, we saw in Part I how the supply of local garrison and auxiliary troops was of concern to the bureaucracy only in so far as that proportion of their wage which they received in kind should be correctly calculated. The extent of control which the Ottoman state

exercised over the provisioning of its army can therefore be seen to have been clearly defined: there were notional 'rules' regarding the provisioning of all sections of the army. In numerical terms, however, it can be seen that the state was directly responsible for supplying only a small part of the total of its army with food and their animals with fodder.

-Local troops

For the sake of completeness, brief reference should be made to those groups who brought their own provisions with them on campaign. These were groups who were exempted from certain taxes, and may be broadly classified as auxiliary troops: some of the yürüks of Tanrıdağ were called up to work in the cannon ball mines of Banaluka (Banja Luka) for 6 months in 1605,²⁶⁹ and the yürüks of Selanik were ordered to similar duty at Maden-i Cedid (?) in the following year.²⁷⁰ They each had to bring with them their own provisions for this period, levied from among their peers. Extra defensive support for Buda in the early spring of 1606 was provided by martolos, pandor, azeb etc, who were ordered to serve there from until the main body of the army arrived: they were to bring their own provisions.²⁷¹ During the campaigns of the previous two summers, members of these same groups had been called to serve as musketeers with the (riverborne) fleet, and had to take with them the 4 months' supply of victuals which was considered sufficient to feed them from mid-July until the end of the campaign.²⁷² Since such locally-employed auxiliary corps of the Ottoman army served in one place, not moving with the troops who were actively engaged

269. MD 75/145

270. MD 77/586

271. MD 77/568; MD 77/643

272. MD 77/456; MD 77/457; cf. RKS 1539 f.155b

in campaigning, the burden of taking with them their own provisions would not have impeded the execution of their duties.

PART III:

THE FINANCING OF THE WAR

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IIIi. Introduction

An army must first of all be mobilised, and once mobilised, must be fed and equipped: the concern of generals that the necessary financial resources must at all costs be found in order for warfare to be conducted at all is expressed in Thucydides' oft-quoted dictum that money is the "sinews of war", and in Montecuccoli's statement that the three things necessary for war are "money, money and more money". In the predominantly siege warfare of the Hapsburg-Ottoman confrontation in Hungary, the conquest of a strategic fortress was not enough to deliver a crippling blow to the opposition's war effort, but, since, the respective military commands could not envisage precisely when the war would end, they had to husband their resources so as to be able to survive for an indeterminate number of campaigning seasons. In conditions where no clear victor emerged from year to year, neither side could make rational calculation of ways in which expenditure on war could be limited. More than any other factor, then, money may be considered decisive in the outcome of this war.

The pursuit of war is an expensive drain on any economy, but even a simple quantitative measure of the financial costs of war cannot easily be arrived at. Attempts to calculate the costs of warfare in early modern Europe have been made with a degree of confidence which is surprising to the Ottoman historian who is ever conscious of the shortcomings of the

data at his disposal.¹ Hale suggests, for instance, that the expenses of war were 8-9% of GNP for Spain and possibly 16% for the United Provinces.² A very different approach, and one which accords with our perception of the place of warfare in the Ottoman economy of the early modern period, is that of Bridbury, who, in writing of the Hundred Years War, proposes that one reason why it is misguided to try to assess the costs of warfare in the medieval economy is that war was a normal feature of contemporary social life, not an aberration.³ Thus there was no clear line between war and peace, and consequently between wartime and peacetime expenditures.

The effects of the "Türkenkrieg" on the economies of central Europe have been the subject of an impressive body of research, in particular, that of participants in the Graz Symposium of 1970.⁴ The papers presented on this occasion were concerned, for the most part, with the repercussions of the Hapsburg-Ottoman wars on trade relations in the Balkans, the financing of the Turkish wars being a topic of secondary importance. The economic historian Bog has written in this forum on the military financing of the Hapsburgs during the wars of the seventeenth century, with mention of the financial difficulties which beset them during the campaigns of 1593-1606.⁵ Beyond such largely descriptive treatment of the financing of war, there has

1. See, for example, the synoptic table in Hale (1985) pp.233-34, which gives the costs of various European wars between 1482 and 1617, as well as the annual revenues of the states taking part. Compare the cautious approach adopted in my forthcoming article in Byzantinische Forschungen, "The Costs of Ottoman Warfare and Defence".

2. Hale (1985) p.232

3. Bridbury (1976) p.81

4. Pickl (1971)

5. Bog (1971)

been little in the way of a more analytic approach to the topic. Analysis of how the financial resources of a state were directed to military ends, that is, for instance, which sectors of the economy bore the major burden of the financial costs of war and what administrative measures were taken to ensure that 'sufficient' funds were available for its pursuit, has been slow in being recognised as an important issue, and one which would illuminate the disposition of power within a state. The general theoretical essay of Bog may be read in this context.⁶

Within Ottoman studies, itself, there are few occasions on which warfare, one of the most regular and pervasive activities of the early modern state, has been discussed. The reasons for this neglect are hard to understand. Perhaps it is because the most intractable of all the problems of Ottoman history are to be found in the vicissitudes of its economic development, and to give detailed rather than general consideration to the place of warfare in the economy would be to bring additional 'unknowns' into the equation. Yet, the immediate military aspect is intimately linked to wider economic developments, since a constant, and more or less active or passive, preparedness for war, was a parameter which influenced the ways in which the Ottoman treasury administered the sources of finance available to it. Although the customary treatment of the Ottoman polity from mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth century within the context of the "decline" of the Empire is open to trenchant criticism, it is true that active warfare such as was waged against the Hapsburgs between 1593 and 1606 undoubtedly put particular strains on the economy, and more especially when campaigns were being pursued on two fronts simultaneously. The financial troubles of that other great empire of Spain under Philip

6. Bog (1980)

II, had similarly had their beginnings in earlier decades, for in both, the demands of military campaigning had repercussions whose effects permeated the administrative and economic structures.

McGowan's plea for Ottoman historians to perform their duty of providing the data for a wider understanding of Ottoman (and particularly Ottoman economic) history is admirable,⁷ and it may be hoped that such efforts will eventually yield results which are more critical than pioneering efforts in this direction have been hitherto. One of the most influential 'grand theories' concerning the Ottoman economy at this time is Braudel's postulation of a unified Mediterranean economy affected by a price inflation related to a sixteenth-century influx of cheap American silver, by population pressure and by a devalued akçe: this was perhaps too eagerly seized upon by Barkan, whose discussion of the

7. McGowan (1981/b) pp.62-63

Ottoman economy is now being questioned.⁸ The confusion which surrounds the continuing debate concerning the relationship between American silver and Mediterranean inflation should warn us to tread warily in attempting to satisfy the desire for an Ottoman economic history of comparable sophistication to the European at this stage.⁹

8. Barkan (1975): this is an abridged version of Barkan (1970). His emphasis on the inflation generated by an inflow of American silver is subject to attack on two main grounds. The first of these is that he stresses the exogenous causes of the "price revolution": "The decline of the established Ottoman social and economic order began as a result of developments entirely outside the area dominated by the Porte, and in particular as a consequence of the establishment in Western Europe of an 'Atlantic economy' of tremendous vitality and force" (Barkan, 1975 p.5). He continues in terms which exemplify the "decline" theory of Ottoman history: "The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a flaw inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but because of immense historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, arrested its natural economic evolution, and condemned its institutions to irreparable damage". This neglect of variables endogenous to Ottoman economy and society as causing change is criticised by Wallerstein and his 'school': see, for instance, Wallerstein et al (1983); Islamoglu & Keyder (1977). The second ground on which Barkan's thesis is criticised relies on reinterpretation of data which he himself supplied: in particular, as Gerber (1982) p.316 and Sundhaussen (1983) cogently argue, the annual real price increase of Barkan's "price revolution" was small, only an average of 1.4% between 1489 and 1606 (Sundhaussen, 1983 p.177). Further, criticism may be made of subsequent historians who base their generalisations about Ottoman economic and social conditions on Barkan's index for Ottoman prices from 1489-1666, for this is constructed from a very limited data set, primarily the accounts of three Istanbul imarets (Barkan, 1975 esp. pp.11).

9. The debate over the effects of the arrival of American silver in Europe is summarised in Wallerstein (1974) pp.69-77: Barkan seems to have been unaware of the many different views representative of those involved, and kept Braudel as his only theoretical guide.

Ottoman historians, in their attempt to make their object of study more acceptable to those historians of other times and areas who have more developed analytic tools at their disposal, need to be aware of the potential dangers of donning the garb of the economic historian: a return to first principles should therefore not be disparaged. The focus of the present Part of this study therefore lies outside the terms of reference imposed by Braudel and Wallerstein, and touches their preoccupations only obliquely. Clearer understanding of Ottoman financial administration and of monetary developments are essential preliminaries in the definition of the parameters of economic history, in that they establish the comparability of the objects being scrutinised. The basic units and their values at different times are still poorly understood, and such ignorance defeats the economic historian's aim of being able to arrive at "appropriate international comparisons".¹⁰ Sahillioğlu has substantially contributed to this goal in his presentation of the data for Ottoman monetary history.¹¹ In the first of his "budget" articles Barkan drew attention to the adverse effect which our poor understanding of Ottoman financial practice has had on our comprehension of the issues of Ottoman history.¹² In this, the final Part of this study, it is hoped that, by concentrating on a restricted set of data, primarily the campaign account books of the period, a critical examination of the available material may make a modest contribution to an understanding of Ottoman financial history, and particularly to the understanding of how Ottoman warfare was financed in this period.

10. McGowan (1981/b) p.63

11. Particularly in his unpublished Ph.D thesis: Kuruluşundan XVII^e asrın sonlarına kadar Osmanlı para tarihi hakkında bir deneme (Istanbul 1958), which was not available to me; see also Sahillioğlu (1978).

12. Barkan (1953/a) p.239

IIIIi. The Status of the Campaign Accounts

The intense period of Ottoman campaigning on the Hungarian front in 1593-1606 is recorded in a series of documents of the genre which, following Barkan's usage, has inappropriately acquired the epithet "budget". In fact, the "budgets" analysed here are the income and expenditure accounts of the 'Campaign Treasury', that is to say, the state funds allocated to the expenses of campaigning. The general title of the registers in which they are found is "varidat ve masarif-i hazine-yi amire der sefer-i humayun", which may be translated as "incomings and outgoings of the imperial treasury on imperial campaign". The account books analysed here appear to have no parallel in contemporary Europe, and are the earliest of such Ottoman accounts to have survived.

The particular interest of this series of registers for the 1593-1606 war lies in their presentation of the data at three levels of detail. The main body of each register, running to 300-600 pages, consists of entries recording the daily incomings and outgoings of the Campaign Treasury (ruznamce); this is the "daybook" which provides the raw data for the ten to twenty page summary of campaign income and expenditure (muhasabe) which constitutes the second level of detail. The further consolidation of this "daybook summary" results in a two page synopsis (icmal), which balances the sources of Campaign Treasury income against campaign expenditures: this is the "income and expenditure account".¹³

13. The following abbreviations will be used in what follows:

D = "daybook" (ruznamce); DS = "daybook summary" (muhasabe);

IE = "income and expenditure account" (icmal).

These registers are to be found in the Kamil Kepeci tasnifi (KK) of the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul. The title of the IE of each register, and the period which it covers is as follows:¹⁴

KK 1874: icmal-i varidat ve ihracat-i hizane-yi amire ki der sefer-i humayun vaki şid der zaman-ı destur-ı mükerrer müşir-ı müfahham serdar hazret-i Cafer Paşa...ve bi-marifet-i Abdi Efendi defterdar-ı orduyu humayun al-vaki fi 24 şehr-i Safarülmuzaffer sene 1004 ıla vasıt-ı şehr-i Ramazan-ı şerif al-mubarek sene-yi minhü.

(The campaign commander was Hadım Cafer Pasha, the treasury official, Abdi Efendi, and the account runs from 30 October 1595-mid May 1596.)

KK 1876: tarih ruznamçe-yi hazine-yi amire...der sefer-i humayun der zaman-ı...Mehmed Paşa vezir ve serdar-ı asakir-ı mansure.

(The campaign commander was Satırcı Mehmed Pasha, and the account runs from 1 Zilkade 1005-14 Ramazan 1007/16 June 1597-10 April 1599.)

KK 1879: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hazine-yi amire...der sefer-i Uyvar ve Kanije an 8 Zilkade sene 1007 ıla 7 Zilkade sene 1009 der zaman-ı destur-ı ekrem ve müşir-ı efham vezir-ı azam hazret-i İbrahim Paşa...serdar-ı asakir-ı mansure bi-marifet-i hazret-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-ı şıkk-ı evvel...

(The campaign commander was the grand vezir, Damad İbrahim Pasha, the treasury official, Etmekçizade Ahmed Efendi, who was chief of the First Finance Bureau, and the account runs from 2 June 1599-10 May 1601.)

14. Where there is no IE in a register, it is the heading of the D which is given instead. A full translation of each heading is not given since the details of the interpretation of these headings is central to what follows; with the exception of KK 1876 and KK 1884, which are not IEs but Ds, each heading may be summarised thus: "summary of incomings and outgoings of the Campaign Treasury in the time of (name of campaign commander) and with the cognizance of (name of treasury official) from (period covered by account)".

KK 1885: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hazine-yi amire...der zaman-i destur-i ekrem müşir-i eham sadrazam hazret-i Hasan Paşa...der sefer-i feth-i Istolni Belgrad bi-marifet-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-i şıkk-ı evvel...an 11 Muharremülharam sene 1011 ila 10 Ramazan sene-yi minhü.

(The campaign commander was the grand vezir, Yemişçi Hasan Pasha, the treasury official, Etmekçizade Ahmed Efendi, and the account runs from 1 July 1602-21 February 1603.)

KK 1884: tarikh ruznamçe-yi humayun...der sefer-i humayun...der zaman-i hazret-i Mehmed Paşa vezir ve serdar-i ekrem...ve hazret-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-i şıkk-ı evvel...an 11 Ramazan 1011 ila 15 Rebi I 1012.

(The campaign commander was Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury official, Etmekçizade Ahmed Efendi, and the account runs from 22 February 1603-23 August 1603.)

KK 1887: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i ruznamçe-yi hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun der zaman-i hazret-i Mehmed Paşa vezir ve serdar-i mükerrem...bi-marifet-i Ali Efendi kaimmakam-i hazret-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-i şıkk-ı evvel...ve bi-kalem-i Hüseyin al-hakir ruznamçe-yi sefer-i humayun an 16 Rebi I sene 1012 ila 21 şehri Safarülmuzaffer sene 1013.

(The campaign commander was Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury official, Ali Efendi, representing Etmekçizade Ahmed Efendi, and the account runs from 24 August 1603-19 July 1604.)

KK 1889: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire...der sefer-i humayun der zaman-i merhum Ali Paşa ve hazret-i Mehmed Paşa sadrazam ve serdar-i ekrem...bi-marifet-i Ahmed Paşa mirmiran-i Rumeli defterdar-i şıkk-ı evvel...an 4 Muharremülharam sene 1013 ila 3 Ramazanülmübarek sene-yi minhü.

(The campaign commanders were the grand vezirs Malkoç Ali Pasha and Lala Mehmed Pasha, the treasury official, Etmekçizade Ahmed Pasha, and the account runs from 2 June 1604-23 January 1605).

KK 1890: icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun-i Engürüs der zaman-i destu(r)-i ekrem müşir-i müfahham vezir-i azam serdar-i ekrem hazret-i Murad Paşa..ve Hasan Paşa mirmiran-i Rumeli al-vezir ve bi-marifet-i Mehmed Efendi defterdar-i orduyu humayun...an 10 Şevvalülmükerrrem sene 1013 ila 16 Muharremülharam sene 1016.

(The campaign commanders were the grand vezir, Kuyucu Murad Pasha, and the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Hasan Pasha, the treasury official was Mehmed Efendi, and the account runs from 18 February 1606–13 May 1607.)

Of these registers, KK 1876 and KK 1884 comprise only the D, KK 1874 and KK 1889 both lack the DS while the others contain the D, the DS and the IE. With the exception of the IEs, the registers are in a calligraphic siyakat hand; this final summary of the revenues and expenditures recorded in the register is in a cursive hand, with the figures (in akçe) written out in full as Turkish words. Sometimes the figures in the Ds give the gold equivalent of the unit of account, the akçe, indicating that the transaction in question was carried out in gold coin.

In considering the subject of the financing of war in the Ottoman Empire at this period, it is important to have a clear grasp of exactly which income and expenditure is recorded in the accounts to hand, and what these represent in administrative terms.¹⁵ The rubrics cited above accurately describe the function of these account books, which was to record the income and expenditure of treasury

15. The most widely-known examples of Ottoman accounts are those published by Barkan (1953/b;1954/a;1954/b;1955/a), which, unlike the accounts discussed here, each run for a year. As a more than cursory glance at these will show, confusion as to the precise parameters of the account entries and a lack of standardisation in entries over time, make it impossible to arrive at valid quantitative comparisons.

funds during a campaign. However, the terminology denoting the relative importance of the various campaigns is unfortunately not so closely adhered to as Murphey, writing of a period some twenty-five years later, suggests. Murphey writes:

"The supreme commander-in-chief, serdar-i ekrem, was appointed by the Sultan...(he) was inevitably also the grand vezir...The serdar-i ekrem only took part in full-scale campaigns involving all available fighting contingents. Such campaigns were called sefer-i hümayun...Below him came the commanders with the rank of vezir who led smaller armies comprising only a portion of the timariot cavalry, and without the participation of the sultan's kapu halkı, the janissaries and the altı bölük cavalry. The title of commander of a vezir ordusu was simply serdar.¹⁶

This point must be clarified in order to determine which of the registers listed above falls within the bounds of the analysis here, for it is the accounts of the main campaign in a particular season which will be of major concern to us, rather than the lesser engagements involving what Murphey would describe as a vezir ordusu.

To illustrate how inadvisable it is to rely solely on the title of a register as a guide to the scale of the undertaking recorded therein, I cite KK 1874. This account starts at the end of October 1595, when Hadım Cafer Pasha was appointed as a serdar on the dismissal of the grand vezir Koca Sinan Pasha after the loss of Estergon to the Hapsburgs.¹⁷ Cafer Pasha was sent to Belgrade to oversee

16. Murphey (1979) p.36

17. AK ff.48v: Lala Mehmed Pasha (Abdülkadir mistakenly refers to him as Lala Mustafa) was appointed sadrızam, and Hadım Cafer was appointed as serdar. Abdülkadir refers to Cafer as serdar-i ekrem after the siege of Eğri in October 1596 (AK f.76r), some time after the close of the account in question: this may further indicate how loosely the term was used.

preparations for the campaign of the coming season, together with some janissaries, cebecis and topçus, and taking some cannon.¹⁸

In December 1595 (Rebi II 1004), Cafer Pasha, together with some kapukulu troops, was ordered to the defence of Temeşvar, since an attack was anticipated.¹⁹ May 1596 (Ramazan 1004) sees the close of this account at the time of the start of the Eġri campaign, which may be called a sefer-i humayun in the most literal sense. Cafer Pasha's expedition then, although described as a sefer-i humayun in its register's title, saw no real military action and was merely a holding-operation between the deposition of one grand vezir and serdar-i ekrem, and the mounting of a new campaign which brought the appointment of a new serdar-i ekrem, Lala Mehmed Pasha.²⁰ The register KK 1874, then, does not bear comparison with the others cited above. This also serves to demonstrate the wide range of accounts that existed, even in the military area alone. By contrast, the title of KK 1879, which covers the major offensives of Uyvar and Kanije in 1599 and 1600, refers to the undertaking merely as sefer (-i Uyvar ve Kanije).

For present purposes then, the title of any register is not

18. KK 1874 pp.9,10 for example, confirm Abdülkadir's account, recording the purchase of provisions for these janissaries, and of fodder for the horses drawing the gun-carriages. See also AE Murad III/358, which is an order for the supply of fodder to these horses.

19. AK f.56v; PEÇEVI II pp.174-75

20. Lala Mehmed died within 10 days of his appointment, to be replaced by Koca Sinan again; Sinan died shortly after, and by the time of the Eġri campaign, the grand vezir was Damad Ibrahim Pasha. This Lala Mehmed should not be confused with the Lala Mehmed Pasha who commanded the campaigns covered in KK 1884, KK 1887 and KK 1889.

sufficient guide to the magnitude of the undertaking which it represents, and the criteria employed in selecting registers which are comparable derive from corroborative evidence to be found in the contents and in the historical context of a particular register. In chronological series with these campaign accounts there are accounts which refer to activities other than these major campaigns, such as those recording the daily expenses of high officials as they moved from Istanbul on state business.²¹ The register KK 1875, for example, is an account relating particularly to Sultan Mehmed III's participation in the Eğri campaign, the one season in this war in which the sultan took part.²² Although it covers some items similar to those found in the campaign accounts proper, its personal nature, exemplified, for instance, in the frequent entries for food for the imperial kitchens disqualifies it from our current consideration. A true Campaign Treasury account for the Eğri campaign is no longer extant.

At times when there were two distinct campaigns under way simultaneously, separate accounts must, therefore, have been kept for each. In 1603, the war with Persia began again, but the accounts for this military activity on the eastern

21. See also AE Mehmed III/181, which records the financial transactions of the ser bavvab Mustafa during the few weeks he spent in Belgrade in the late summer of 1603: Defter-i bazı irade ve masarîf-i Mustafa...ser bavvaban-î dergah-î ali der muhafaza-yî Belgrad an 14 Rebi I sene 1012 ila evahir-î Cumada II sene-yî mezbur; he was the kaimmakam (representative) of the serdar in Belgrade (MM 7727 p.1).

22. The title of this register is: Defter-i ruznamçe-yî humayun der vakt-î reften-î hazret-î padişah-î alempenah...bi-sefer-î humayun...; it runs from 3 Zilkade 1004-29 Rebi II 1005 (29 June-20 December 1596), which was more or less equivalent to the whole period of the Sultan's absence from Istanbul.

front seem not to have survived. Again, within a single theatre of war, such as that comprising the Balkans and Hungary, there was more than one zone of activity during a single season. The financing of secondary action, such as the unsuccessful defence of Estergon in 1595 by Koca Sinan's son Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyi of Buda and commander of the border with the Hapsburgs, must certainly have had its own set of accounts, as would the main action of that season, Sinan's ill-fated expedition against Michael of Wallachia.

The periods covered by these Campaign Treasury accounts are not uniform in length, in contrast to Barkan's "budgets" which run for a full financial (solar) year, from Nevruz to Nevruz.²³ Some of the campaign accounts run for only a few months, and others for up to 2 years: furthermore, they are based on the lunar rather than the solar calendar. This is related to the 'extraordinary' character of campaign expenditure. Among the contemporary registers in series with the campaign account registers with which we are here concerned, there are others which do run for exactly a year: these record treasury income and expenditure in ongoing activities which were independent of war and not affected by its indeterminate duration. If we allow for the somewhat uncertain chronology of Ottoman history at this period, it is possible to say that the months covered by each individual campaign account coincide with the tenure of office of the military commander whose name is cited in the title of the register concerned. In some cases at least, the title of the registers suggests this, by including a phrase "...der zaman-ı..." ("...during the time of..."). This strongly indicates the responsibility of the commander for accounting for the funds used during the period of his tenure; however, the break between KK 1884 and KK 1887,

23. Nevruz in the Perso-Ottoman solar calendar falls on 21 March.

occurring in the middle of a campaign led by Lala Mehmed Pasha, shows that it was the campaign defterdar who bore final responsibility for the financial administration of the campaign.

It can be seen that there is an overlap of some days between accounts KK 1887 and KK 1889. According to Naima, the new grand vezir and serdar Malkoç Ali Pasha left Istanbul for Belgrade on 1 Muharrem 1013 (30 May 1604),²⁴ to arrive in Belgrade by mid-July. Abdülkadir, who was with Malkoç Ali's entourage at this time, puts the departure from Istanbul some thirteen days later.²⁵ Naima gives the date of Malkoç Ali's arrival at the billet of Halkalı as 5 Muharrem (3 June), while Abdülkadir gives 20 Muharrem (18 June). It appears that Abdülkadir must be wrong in the details he gives on this point, and the source followed by Naima correct. The account for Malkoç Ali's campaign starts on 4 Muharrem (2 June), just at the time, then, when he set out along the military road. The concurrent month of Lala Mehmed Paşa's account must result from some items incurred during his tenure of the office of commander still being outstanding, and not being recorded until some weeks after they were incurred. The 'job-specific' nature of the campaign account registers is well illustrated by KK 1890, as is the continuing responsibility of the serdar and defterdar under whose auspices each account was prepared: although this register extends beyond the end of the war, it records war-related items, the financial transactions for

24. NAIMA I p.391

25. AK f.193v. This Lala Mehmed must be distinguished from the Lala Mehmed who was appointed grand vezir on Koca Sinan's dismissal.

which took some months more to complete.²⁶

The campaign accounts for this period of war are much less, then, than the "budget" of the Ottoman Central Treasury during a time of war, as Murphey believes to have been the case during the reign of Murad IV.²⁷ In this later period, he notes, there are two distinct accounting models to be distinguished: the first is organised with revenues categorised according to which of the regional financial bureaus was responsible for their collection.²⁸ The second model disregards the precise geographic source of the revenues, and categorises income according to whether it was collected directly under Central Treasury auspices or was collected regionally and periodically sent to the Central Treasury.²⁹ To explain this distinction, he suggests that the first (fuller) accounting model was that adopted in time of peace, since all government business was then conducted in one place, and the collection of revenues was easier than during wartime. The second type he considers to be representative of wartime accounting practice.³⁰ The practical consequence of such an interpretation is that "peacetime" and "wartime" accounts may conveniently be

26. The chronology of Ottoman history at this period, as at others, is not yet finally established: we can, however, be confident enough about the general sequence of events to offer analysis of these Campaign Treasury account books.

27. Murphey (1979) uses the term "budget" in his discussion: it will therefore be maintained in the following critique of his work.

28. These financial bureaus were sikk-i evvel ('First Bureau'), sikk-i sani ('Second Bureau') and the Anatolian Bureau.

29. Income in this "budget model" is recorded under the headings irsaliye (cash instalments), varidat-i mukarrere (regular revenues) and varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere (irregular revenues).

30. Murphey (1979) pp.228-35

compared in assessment of the different order of magnitude of income and expenditure in peace and war.³¹ Another interpretation is offered here.

The document which Murphey cites as an example of a "peacetime" account in illustration of the first of his "accounting models" covers the full solar year (sene-yi kamile) from March 1613-March 1614.³² As comparative "wartime" accounts he presents four documents from campaigns during the reign of Murad IV. These cover the periods June 1624-April 1625, January-December 1627, December 1627-December 1628, June 1630-June 1631 respectively; they are all designated in the headings of their IEs as accounts for sefer-i humayun or ordu-yi humayun.³³

By careful comparison of the campaign account registers

31. Murphey (1979) p.235: for instance, irregular revenues (which are found as a separate category in both "accounting models") constitute over 30% of total revenue in Murad IV's "wartime" accounts, and less than half of this figure in the "peacetime" accounts. This higher wartime figure arises, so Murphey maintains, because the 'extraordinary' avariz taxes were collected in time of war. His conclusion may be correct, but the alternative hypothesis presented here, suggests that such a comparison of "peacetime" and "wartime" account items is irrelevant.

32. Murphey (1979) pp.234,439-45: MM 2725

33. Murphey (1979) pp.237,248,446-56: MM 744 (24 Şaban 1033-29 Cum.II 1034); *ibid.* pp.238-39,249,457-62: KK 1919 (14 Rebi II 1036-13 Rebi II 1037); *ibid.* pp.240,250,463-69: KK 1921 (14 Rebi II 1037-13 Rebi II 1038); *ibid.* pp.241,251,470-79: KK 1927 (6 Zilkade 1039-5 Zilkade 1040). As is made clear in his bibliography, he also used other campaign accounts (*ibid.* pp.327-28), but since he does not give copies of these documents, our discussion cannot be extended to include them.

available to us from the 1593-1606 war with those cited by Murphey, it becomes apparent that Murphey's dichotomy between "wartime" and "peacetime" treasury accounts in the period of Murad IV is not tenable in the earlier period. The crux, then, is to try to discover whether the situation as he analyses it in Murad IV's reign was the result of significant developments in the accounting procedures of the Ottoman treasury in the intervening years, or whether, perhaps, Murphey's analysis of the character of the campaign accounts is mistaken in its conclusions.

While one of Murphey's "wartime" accounts runs for a period of ten months, the other three each cover a year. The ten months of MM 744 cover approximately the time from Grand Vezir Çerkes Mehmed Pasha's departure on campaign against the rebellious beylerbeyi of Erzurum, Abaza Mehmed Pasha in 1624, until shortly after the death of the former several weeks before the close of the account: as we have seen to be the case with KK 1890, it was the lags in completing all the financial transactions relating to a campaign which delayed the closure of the account, and, sure enough, Çerkes Mehmed is referred to as "merhum" (deceased) in the heading to MM 744.³⁴

KK 1919 covers the campaign in which the grand vezir Halil Pasha was defeated by Abaza Mehmed Pasha, but closes some months before his consequent dismissal in April 1628.³⁵ KK 1921, which begins on the day directly after the closure of KK 1919, covers the time from the army's retreat into winter quarters at Tokat until the return to Constantinople of the new grand vezir, Hüsrev Pasha, after the 1628 campaign in

34. HAMMER V pp.32-35,45-46; Murphey (1979) p.446

35. HAMMER V pp.72-79

which Abaza Mehmed surrendered to him.³⁶ The title of KK 1921 indicates that both Halil Pasha and Hüsrev Pasha held the office of grand vezir and serdar-i ekrem during its duration, for Halil was not dismissed until well into the period it covers.³⁷ Finally, KK 1927 begins with Hüsrev's departure from Istanbul in June 1630, covers the time of the sack of Hamadan and the siege of Baghdad, and ends with the start of the following year's campaign.³⁸

When these campaign accounts are compared with those for the 1593-1606 war, one obvious difference is that KK 1919, KK 1921 and KK 1927 all last for a full year of twelve lunar months: they do not coincide with the appointment of a new grand vezir or commander, nor, indeed, with that of a new defterdar, for it is Ebübekir who held that office in the consecutive years covered by KK 1919 and KK 1921. In series with these accounts of whose DSs and IEs Murphey gives full transliterations, there are a number of others which he also describes as "state treasury budgets", but which do not cover a full year.³⁹ It is therefore doubtful how much importance should be attached to the fact that some of Murphey's campaign "budgets" run for a full year, especially when this is a lunar year.⁴⁰

36. HAMMER V pp.76-82: this account closes on 13 Rebi II 1038, while Hüsrev made his triumphal entry into Istanbul on 12 Rebi II 1038 (ibid. p.82).

37. Murphey (1979) p.463: "icmal-i ruznamçe-yi varidat ve masarîf-i hizane-yi sefer-yi humayun der zaman-i destur-i mukerrem müşîr-i efram vezîr-i azam ve serdar-i ekrem Hüsrev Paşa ve Halil Paşa...".

38. HAMMER V pp.115-21,129

39. Murphey (1979) pp.327-38: in particular, KK 1918 (14 Muharrem 1035-29 Şaban 1035) and KK 1922 (11 Cum.II 1037-11 Safar 1038).

40. For the 1593-1606 war, KK 1879 is an example of a Campaign Treasury account which runs for exactly two lunar years.

In seeking to understand the place occupied in Ottoman financial administration by the campaign accounts for the 1593-1606 war, the significant point to be made in regard to the various types of Ottoman "budgets", and one which escapes Murphey, is that there was a hierarchy of Ds and of the summary IEs based on these. The "peacetime budgets" such as that for 1613-14, may be viewed as the closest approach to a full, annual "national account", GNP perhaps, while the "wartime budgets", for more reasons than that they do not each run for one solar year, may be more realistically characterised as merely one specific type of account among the many which would have contributed to such a full statement. Apart from the problems of quantifying in cash terms that part of state funds which was alienated in the form of dirliks (benefices),⁴¹ and of potential tax income whose collection was waived in exchange for the performance

of specific services, we should not assume that a comprehensive statement of even all cash transactions was produced every year: this means that we should not expect to find full annual Central Treasury accounts for the years when the army was on campaign, with a debit entry on the Central Treasury account giving rise to an equivalent credit to the Campaign Treasury. A comprehensive Central Treasury account would have required the combining of all the D registers recording the various types of income and expenditure relating to the Central Treasury, the hazine-yi amire, which would have been an impossible task, and have served no practical accounting purpose.

"Wartime" and "peacetime budgets" cannot, therefore, be

41. Barkan (1953/b) p.281 contains, exceptionally, an assessment of the value of timars.

considered comparable. The highly significant consequence of this is that "peacetime" and "wartime budgets" should not be used in an attempt to gauge the health of the Ottoman treasury by comparing the surplus balances on the accounts.⁴² Any attempt to reach quantitative conclusions on such a basis is invalid, and can only lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the financial position of the Ottoman Empire, since the entities being compared are not directly comparable.⁴³

Whatever changes there may have been in the accounting procedures of the Ottoman treasury between the 1600s and the 1620s, they were not such as to have altered the basic fact that the credits and debits of the hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun were only a part, albeit a large one, of those falling to the hazine-yi amire. This is emphasised by the

42. An example of such a comparison is found at Murphey (1979) pp.230-32: he points out that treasury income is higher in the "peaceful year of 1613-14 than in the "war" years with which he compares this account, because tribute moneys from Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania were paid into the treasury in 1613-14 and not during the "war" years. In fact, he should not be equating the accounts for the Central Treasury (hazine-yi amire) with those for the Campaign Treasury (hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun etc.). See also Murphey (1979) p.242.

43. Explicit evidence that campaign incomes and expenditures cannot be equated with those of the Central Treasury is provided in Campaign Treasury credit items which record cizye moneys as having been paid partly into the hazine-yi amire-yi astane-yi saadet and partly into the hazine-yi sefer-i humayun: e.g. "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi ziyade-yi cizye-yi gebran: tetimme-yi vilayet-i Edirne an vacib-i sene 1007 der uhde-yi Ahmed Mustafa an silahdaran...ve Receb Nasuh an cemaat-i m(ezbur)...ki piş ezin bi-hazine-yi amire-yi astane-yi saadet ve hazine-yi sefer-i humayun bittevarih-i muhtelifi teslim-i hazine kerde bud..." (KK 1879 p.21).

responsibility of the chief defterdar of the Empire for the Campaign Treasury in many of the 1593-1606 campaigns, as in those cited by Murphey. A more appropriate candidate for comparison with Murphey's 1613-14 Central Treasury annual account would be that for the year from March 1582-March 1583.⁴⁴ It runs from Nevruz to Nevruz, as does that for 1613-14, and is similarly organised according to finance bureaus. It is a "peacetime", and more or less full summary of Central Treasury income and expenditures, rather than merely those related to military campaign. Barkan has also published comparable annual accounts with a similar format, which show that Central Treasury, as opposed to Campaign, accounts, were based on the regional finance bureaus of şikk-i evvel, şikk-i sani etc., from at least the mid-sixteenth century.⁴⁵

In his discussion of Ottoman accounting procedures in the late seventeenth century, Sahillioğlu distinguishes several types of ruznamçe ("daybook") register. In particular, he writes:

"When the Sultan or the Grand Vezir were on campaign, and separate accounts were kept, these were called Rikab Ruznamçesi (ruznamçe of the Stirrup)".⁴⁶

During the 1593-1606 campaigns, the sultan went on campaign only once, in 1596, and it has been noted above that no full Campaign Treasury account survives for this campaign. However, Sahillioğlu's rikab ruznamçesi appears to be a later equivalent of our ruznamçe-yi hazine-yi amire der sefer-i humayun, for he assumes that, by the late

44. MM 893: that part of the account which lists the type of coin in the Central Treasury coffers is published in Sahillioğlu (1978) p.35.

45. Barkan (1954/a) pp.238-40; Barkan (1954/b) pp.300-02

46. Sahillioğlu (1982) p.66

seventeenth century, no special bureaucratic significance was attached to whether the sultan rather than the grand vezir led the campaign. When either of these men went, a full array of officials of the defterhane, the bureaucrats of the Ottoman treasury, went with him, so that there were, as Murphey puts it, in effect, two separate government establishments.⁴⁷ Uzunçarşılı gives 1593 as the first year in which the defterhane went on campaign without the sultan being there in person;⁴⁸ on the evidence of the lists of bureaucratic personnel accompanying the army on campaigns in Hungary which Abdülkadir gives, this statement needs closer examination than there is room for here: the number of defterhane bureaucrats accompanying the army on the 1596 Eğri campaign is clearly greater than in other years, suggesting a qualitative difference from other campaigns as well as a quantitative one.⁴⁹ During the campaigns recorded in Murphey's "war budgets", as all others of the 1593-1606 war, it was never the sultan who commanded the campaign: Murad IV did not personally participate in campaigns between 1624 and 1631, and Murphey's analysis of account typology cannot therefore be ascribed to peculiarities arising from this eventuality. Further critical examination of accounts pertaining to years when there were campaigns on two fronts should enable further elucidation of the interpretation offered here; the discussion of the credits and debits of the Campaign Treasury which follows should serve further to

47. Murphey (1979) p.229

48. Uzunçarşılı (1948) p.101: he cites as his reference FEZLEKE I p.12 where the only relevant reference is "padışah-i alişan sefere teveccüh etmeyince defterhane...gitmek kamun değil idi", and also (ibid. p.28) where it is simply recorded that the defterhane was sent on campaign with Sinan Pasha in 1593.

49. e.g. AK ff.4v,16r,32r,38r,52v,53r, etc.

illustrate the circumscribed nature of the Campaign Treasury accounts, and where they fit into the hierarchy of accounts of the Ottoman treasury.

The narrative of the following two sections is closely based on an examination of the entries in the Campaign Treasury accounts for the 1593-1606 war. The categories of revenue and expenditure listed in the IEs conveniently determine the treatment to be adopted, with details being provided by reference to the DSs and the Ds. It can be seen from the transliterations of these accounts (to be found in Appendix I) that the pattern of these IEs is not standardised, and their slightly varying format raises further problems in the attempt to put a precise and comprehensive figure to any specific income source or expenditure.⁵⁰

Despite the wealth of quantitative detail available in these accounts, the figures for particular items have limited meaning in isolation, and each needs to be considered in the wider context of other related figures which can be accurately established. This, however, is rarely possible. Of more significance are the percentage measures into which the raw figures may be transformed. Given the partial

50. Not all categories of revenue and expenditure are treated individually. For instance, certain of the outgoings of the Campaign Treasury can be matched with particular revenue sources, an obvious example being the repayment of loans: one component of the final category on the debit side of the accounts, eda-yi düyun, is the obverse of the revenue entries recording the receipt of these loans (karz), and records the restitution of borrowed moneys to the lenders. In the appended transliterations the order of the categories of revenue and expenditure has, in some cases, been slightly modified, in order to give a more standardised presentation for the purposes of the present discussion.

nature of these campaign accounts, as has been discussed and as will become still more apparent here, these percentages can only have relevance within the frame of the accounts themselves: we should not ask the material to deliver more answers than it reliably can. The approach, therefore, is primarily administrative. The practical problems of working through the voluminous Ds dictate that the analysis should be weighted in favour of the macro, with the rich vein of the individual D entries being only partially exploited.

IIIiii. Analysis of the Revenues of the Campaign Treasury

First of all, we will look at the broad divisions into which Campaign Treasury revenue was divided for accounting purposes. It is through the examination of the entries on this side of the account that we can go some way toward answering questions about the Ottoman financing of war in this period. As can be seen from the appended IEs, the Campaign Treasury was funded from two main sources:⁵¹ the first of these (A) was a subvention from the Central Treasury, the hazine-yi amire. The assignment of such a subvention for campaign purposes further corroborates our contention regarding the hierarchic structure of the accounting system of the Ottoman treasury.⁵² The other main category of revenue (B) was irad, current income due to the Central Treasury, but assigned directly for campaign purposes without passing through the medium of the Central Treasury.

This current income is itself divided into three distinct parts. The largest slice (B.1) is referred to as mahsulat, and comprises revenue from the poll-tax (cizye) and the sheep tax (adet-i aḡnam) as well as from tax farms (mukataat). Cizye, being a seri tax, was reserved for collection by the treasury, rather than being assigned for the support of provincial sipahis and other dirlik-holders.

51. The system of reference used here is as follows: specific entries in the IEs are indicated according to their codes in the transliterations viz. A,B,C for the credit side of the account, and P,Q,R,S,T,U,V for the debit side of the account; where no page number is given in the footnotes, it is the cited IE to which reference is being made.

52. Further, at the bottom of the debit side of the IE for the 1604 campaign, 6,235,320 akçe remaining from the amount allowed for campaign expenses is shown as being returned to the Central Treasury itself: "teslim bi-hazine-yi amire-yi astane-yi saadet..." (KK 1889).

The sheep tax of adet-i aḡnam, although it was widely assigned to timariots, as is clear from the collection of kanunnames published by Barkan, could also, as we see here, be paid to the treasury instead.⁵³ The second category of current income (B.ii), emval-i müteferrika is, as its name implies, a miscellany of income items, appropriately described by Murphey as being "irregular in volume (but) collected on a continuing basis".⁵⁴ The third section of current income (B.iii) is varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere, income which was specifically associated with wartime, being largely composed of extraordinary levies imposed to help meet the costs of the campaigns.

In addition to the major campaign revenue sources of (A) and (B), another credit item common to all these accounts is a fiscal adjustment (C) known as tefavüt, an accounting disparity between the values of coins entering and leaving the Campaign Treasury. KK 1885 and KK 1889 are also credited with a small cash-sum ("an bakiye-yi muhasebe...") remaining from the previous account: such an amount must have appeared as a surplus on the IE for the immediately preceding period when the final balance on the account was calculated.

The Central Treasury subvention (A) reached the Campaign Treasury in tranches (A.i etc), paid in under the auspices of officials such as the serdar himself or the janissary agha as need arose. The term "an yed-i..." (literally, "by hand of...") which describes this transaction, suggests that

53. Barkan (1943). Ottoman sheep taxes may bear the names adet-i aḡnam, resm-i ganem, koyun hakkı inter alia; it is not altogether clear whether these names may have been used interchangeably at various times, and if not, which were seri and which örfi taxes, and which groups of the population were liable for which sheep tax.

54. Murphey (1979) p.235

the official named in this context had no greater personal responsibility in the matter than to ensure that these funds reached the Campaign Treasury safely.⁵⁵ The entity described as hazine-yi amire has historically been considered co-terminous with the Outer Treasury (hazine-yi birun), that is, the 'public purse', while the revenues of the Inner Treasury (hazine-yi enderun) were reserved to the sultan.⁵⁶

There is dispute over the relationship between funds in the Inner and Outer Treasuries: writing of the later seventeenth century, Sahillioğlu implies that, despite the sultan's resistance to interference with the Inner Treasury, funds were freely switched between the two as surpluses accumulated or deficits arose in one or the other.⁵⁷ Röhrborn, on the other hand, criticises this view of the Inner Treasury simply as a source of funds to make up the shortfall in the Outer Treasury, maintaining that a firm

55. The term "an tahvil-i...", by contrast, refers to a financial transaction in which, in the context in which it is widely used in the Ds and DSs of these campaign accounts, the individual mentioned had active responsibility for the performance of the transaction in question. Fekete recognises this usage, when he gives "tahvil" the meaning "Verpflichtung", "Last" (Fekete, 1955 I p.237). In the 1593-1606 Campaign Treasury accounts, when "an tahvil-i..." is used to describe the receipt of certain current income moneys (irad), the implication is that the individual designated had the responsibility for the collection of these moneys for that Treasury. A random example illustrates the difference between the two terms: "an tahvil-i Mevlana Ahmed kadi-yi Istari Eflak der liva-yi Bosna an akçe-yi bedel-i tüfenkçıyan-i kaza-yi mezbur an vacib-i sene 1013 an yed-i Ahmed ve Şaban al-mübaşirin... 157,500 akçe" (KK 1890 p.23); the local cadi, Mevlana Ahmed, had the duty to collect this money, but Ahmed and Şaban actually paid it into the Campaign Treasury.

56. Sahillioğlu (1982) p.66

57. Sahillioğlu (1970) p.242

distinction was made between the uses to which funds in the Inner and Outer Treasuries were put.⁵⁸

This difference of view is relevant to the question of whether campaign expenses were 'normally' met from the Inner Treasury, or whether the use of Inner Treasury funds to meet campaign expenses is to be interpreted as indication that the war was putting severe financial strains on the Ottoman treasury. Although the rigidity of the functional divide between the Inner and Outer Treasuries at this time cannot easily be gauged, there is ample evidence of the sultans' attempts to protect their authority over the Inner Treasury, by jealously refusing funds for campaign expenses:⁵⁹ this suggests that Röhrborn's view is closer to the situation that pertained at this time (and, indeed, it is of a contemporary period that he writes).

The Campaign Treasury accounts show, nonetheless, that moneys were sent from the Inner Treasury to fund these

58. Röhrborn (1973) p.122

59. e.g. HAMMER IV p.228: in autumn 1593, at the start of the war, the grand vezir Koca Sinan Pasha asked a loan of 5m akçe from the sultan's private treasury, offering his own possessions as security; PEÇEVI II p.327: Ahmed III wanted to postpone the start of the eastern campaign, but the seyhülislam, Sunullah Efendi, suggested that he give money from the Inner Treasury for the purchase of provisions - this was met with a denial by the Sultan that money was available, and to Sunullah's further suggestion of the Egyptian Treasury as a source of funds the Sultan retorted that that was his personally; Orhonlu (1970) pp.32,33: the grand vezir Yemişci Hasan Pasha wanted to borrow money from the Inner Treasury in order to pay troop wages, the loan to be paid back when the expected revenue came in, but Sultan Mehmed III refused to accede to his desperate request; Orhonlu (1970) pp.33,34: Mehmed III would not accept as defterdar a man who did not refrain from asking funds from the Inner Treasury ("içerüden").

campaigns. In the account for the campaigns of 1599 and 1600, 60m akçe from the Inner Treasury (hazine-yi enderun) forms part of a revenue item described merely as "an hazine-yi amire...".⁶⁰ More strikingly, revenue from the Inner Treasury was apparently the only central subvention which the Campaign Treasury received for the 1604 campaign season.⁶¹

During these years, the Inner Treasury was frequently called upon to supply funds for the specific purpose of meeting the salary payments of the janissaries and other altı bölük troops.⁶² Since these units owed personal allegiance to the sultan, a case may perhaps be made for viewing the use of Inner Treasury money for this purpose as a legitimate call on these funds, rather than as a sign of extreme emergency.

60. KK 1879/A,A.11.a. SELANIKI f.435r (May 1599): 100,000 gold coins (12 million akçe) were given to the serdar, Grand Vezir Damad Ibrahim Pasha, from the Inner Treasury, and 6m akçe to kapucu başı Mustafa Agha for the purchase of provisions. This neatly coincides with the start of the campaign account running from 2 June 1599–10 May 1601 (KK 1879).

Looking at the IE for these two years, we see that the total amount handed over to the Campaign Treasury by Ibrahim Pasha was 72m akçe (A.1.a): it is not clear whether the 12m akçe mentioned by Selaniki were included in this sum or in the 60m akçe sent from the hazine-yi enderun. The name of Mustafa Agha does not appear at all in the IE of KK 1879, which indicates that there may have been more administrative juggling of funds than is evident from this document.

61. KK 1889/A

62. MD 73/818: 30m akçe was to be sent from the Inner Treasury to pay the kul troops on campaign in Hungary. TKS/D5527 is a receipt for the payment from the Inner Treasury of money for the wages of soldiers on campaign: "iç hazineden sefer-i humayun mevacibi için altmış kise altun çıkup her kisesi onar bin altundan altıyüz bin altun olur temessük taleb olmağın tahrir olundu al-vaki fi 14 Şevval 1007". There are many other such examples of wages being sent from the Inner Treasury.

It is perhaps mistaken to seek to ascertain the 'normal' relative responsibilities of the Inner and Outer Treasuries as a source of campaign revenue: most of the data at our disposal is from the later part of the war, when the grand vezirs were desperately searching for money to continue the fight. The different characters of the three sultans in the course of the war may be another factor which influenced the ease with which money could be extracted from the Inner Treasury to fund campaign expenses. The telhises edited by Orhonlu (q.v.) show the extreme difficulties which the grand vezirs had to persuade Mehmed III and Ahmed I to part with money from the Inner Treasury, although the campaign accounts being discussed here show that they were not always unsuccessful in this aim. Whether Murad III's magnanimous attitude towards Koca Sinan Pasha's conduct of military affairs is a reflection of that sultan's character or of the fact that money was more readily available earlier in the war, cannot be said with certainty.⁶³

The criteria according to which revenues such as those from mukataat, cizye and adet-i ağnam were diverted from the Central Treasury for payment directly into the Campaign Treasury, are not clear, but it seems that such decisions were taken by looking at each case or group of cases individually. The D entries show precisely which kazas

63. MD 73/818: "...bilcümle gerek Eflak ve Boğdan ve gerek Budin serhadlarında olan mühimmat-ı sefer ve gayri cümlesi senün rey-i rezine isabetkarinine tefviz olunmuştur...gerek hazine ve gerek yat ve yarağ ve asker ile bu canıbden imdad ve muavenette kusur konılmayıp".

paid these taxes into the Campaign Treasury.⁶⁴ So, too, the Mühimme series contains orders to cadis requiring that they deliver to the army the state moneys (miri akçesi) which they had collected.⁶⁵

For these campaigns in Europe, it was only the revenue arising in that part of the Empire which was paid directly into the Campaign Treasury. While this may not be evident from the IEs, it is confirmed by looking at the Ds. Comparable revenues for Asia were sent to the Central Treasury in the first instance, and it is therefore impossible to tell what proportion of them was subsequently included in the subvention coming from Istanbul for the benefit of these Hungarian campaigns.⁶⁶

The presence of cizye money from Moldavia and Wallachia as credit items in the campaign account for 1599-1601,⁶⁷ some time after these areas had opted to support the Hapsburg cause, does not necessarily indicate that they continued to pay their dues but merely that the procedure by which they paid was slow, for by the following year such cizye moneys

64. KK 1884 (unpag.: entry dated 1 Muharrem 1012): "an tahvil-i karye-yi Kızılkilise ve Bataynica ve Veliki ve Obratofci ve Belarica tabi-yi defter-i vilayet-i Sirem an vacib-i sene 1010 an cizye-yi hodşan bi-hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun averdend ve teslim kerdend an yed-i Derviş çavuş..", is representative of the format for D entries recording Campaign Treasury receipt of such taxes.

65. e.g. MD 77/437

66. MD 74/596: the adet-i ağnam and harac (= cizye) and other state moneys (mal-i miri) reaching Uskûdar and Gebze from Anadolu and Karaman and other places in Asia ("bilcümle öte yakadan..") were to be sent quickly to the Porte. Once the Persian wars resumed, such moneys were allocated to the commander of the eastern front (MD 75/593).

67. KK 1879/B.1.e,f

are not mentioned.⁶⁸ After Moldavia abandoned the Hapsburgs to return to the Ottoman fold, outstanding moneys, uncollected over the years of estrangement, were demanded in 1605, and were to be sent to Belgrade: this must have been a welcome addition to campaign funds.⁶⁹ At the start of the war, in November 1593, Dubrovnik was ordered by Koca Sinan Pasha to send its harac to him on campaign, as, too, were Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia and Poland.⁷⁰ A similar order was sent the following year.⁷¹

The war did not make the task of tax collection easier. As a proportion of current income (B), the mahsulat figures (B.1) over the course of the war vary from a low of 46% in 1603-4 to 74% in the following year,⁷² but no discernible significance can be attached to this comparison, especially when we remember the time-lags involved.⁷³ The vilayet of Rumeli, from whence came most of the mahsulat revenues, should have been little directly affected by the conditions

68. KK 1885

69. MD 77/182; MD 77/184 orders that part of Wallachia's outstanding cizye be paid to Istanbul in honey, and that the remainder be sent to Belgrade to pay troop wages.

70. Biegman (1967) p.127. Harac is to be equated with cizye in this context (ibid. p.30), since 'tribute' (harac) was regarded as commuted cizye, paid in a lump sum (cf. KK 1879/B.1.d: "...ber vech-i maktu"); it is frequently translated as 'tribute'.

71. Biegman (1967) pp.141-42. The annual sum to be paid by Dubrovnik to the Porte was 12,500 gold pieces (=1,500,000 akçe); the sum of 2,950,000 akçe recorded at KK 1879/B.1.d must therefore have been two year's worth. Unlike Wallachia and Moldavia, which were reluctant to pay their tribute, Dubrovnik always paid its harac.

72. KK 1887; KK 1889

73. A possible explanation for the low figure in KK 1887 is that since this account did not cover a major confrontation, less money was needed, and the slack was left in the mahsulat section.

of war, since this was an area far from the confrontation. Any problems in the collection of taxes were probably due to the indirect effects of the emergency on normal administration.

The area hardest hit was that along the Danube, bordering the rebellious Wallachia of Michael the Brave. His men would cross the Danube into Rumeli, burning villages and causing the inhabitants to flee: this deprived the Ottoman treasury of tax revenues. The mukataas along the Danube were part of the Tuna aklamı which had been constituted an independent finance bureau in 1587.⁷⁴ In 1603-4, some part of the income from this source was paid into the Campaign Treasury,⁷⁵ but difficulties caused by the rebellion in Wallachia were hindering the exploitation of the available potential. Those holding individual mukataas were unable to meet their payments to the treasury, and sent their excuses. The Danube crossings seem to have been particularly affected: with nobody crossing at Silistre and Nigbolu, the relevant dues were not forthcoming.⁷⁶ The inevitability of falling revenues from this area caused such desperation in official circles that the reunification of the Tuna aklamı with the financial bureau of Rumeli was seen as the only way in which the arrears could be collected and the area receive sound financial administration.⁷⁷

Two further points of confusion may be clarified. 33% of

74. Röhrborn (1972) p.119

75. KK 1887/B.1.d

76. MM 15546 pp.7,12 (1003 AH/1594-95), pp.9,10 (1005 AH/1596-97): these make it clear, incidentally, that the soldiers participating in the campaign were not exempt from such fees; MM 5294 n.69 (1006 AH/1597-98).

77. MD 77/79; in fact, the Tuna aklamı appears to have survived until 1625-26 (Röhrborn, 1972 p.119), indication, perhaps that the ending of the war saw an upturn in its fortunes.

total Campaign Treasury revenue in the 1603-4 account is represented by 4 instalments, totalling over 40m akçe, paid in by (Etmekçizade) Ahmed Efendi, the defterdar of the First Finance Bureau (sıkk-1 evvel), and an individual who played a major role in the administration of campaign finances during the later part of this war.⁷⁸ In this accounting period, while the Central Treasury subvention remained at the same level as in the other accounts, current income entered under the heading of mahsulat (B.1) fell to half its normal level as a percentage of total Campaign Treasury revenue. We thus become aware of a further administrative stratum in the collection of regular state revenue, namely, that it was not invariably paid straight into the Campaign Treasury, but could also be collected under the auspices of the finance bureaus, acting as intermediaries, and was

78. KK 1887/A⁺; all the subvention income shown in KK 1890 (= KK 1890/A⁺) was collected under the auspices of Ahmed Efendi, and paid straight into the Campaign Treasury. The defterdar-ı sıkk-1 evvel was the baş defterdar, the man with overall responsibility for the Ottoman treasury as a whole. The career of Etmekçizade Ahmed is of great interest, and the part which he played in keeping money flowing into the treasury during this war merits a separate study: he obviously had an acute financial sense, and despite having to cope with the temperaments of Sultans Mehmed III and Ahmed I, succeeded in ordering state finances so successfully that he won only jealousy from the 'military' establishment. Naima (NAIMA II p.157) remarked of him that most of the vezirs tried to destroy him, but thanks to his pleasant nature and lavish expenditure he died a natural death. In this context, Röhrborn (1972) pp.130-37, which concerns the rivalry between defterdars and vezirs, deserves a sequel. Etmekçizade Ahmed was, in fact, the first defterdar to hold the rank of vezir (AZIZ pp.5,44; KK 1890).

subsequently forwarded to the Campaign Treasury.⁷⁹ The apparent fall in the proportion of Campaign Treasury revenue represented by the regular revenues of mukataa, cizye and adet-i aġnam in this period is therefore an illusion.

In the 1599-1601 account, the amount collected by the defterdar Etmekçizade Ahmed Efendi is recorded under two headings. First, parallel to his responsibility for the more than 40,000,000 akçe which he collected in 1604-5, just discussed, in this earlier period he is specifically cited as having been responsible for the collection of current

79. KK 1894 is a register from the end of the war (July 1606-January 1607) which records revenues collected thus. Its IE is entitled "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire...an tahsil-i dustur-i mükerrerem müşir-i efham vezir Ahmed Paşa defterdar-i şakk-i evvel...al-vaki fi 4 Rebi I 1015 ila 17 Ramazan 1015". The use to which a large part of the revenue of this account was put is recorded on the debit side of its IE, under the heading "at-teslimat: irsaliye bi-hazret-i padişah..ve bi-hizane-yi astane-yi saadet ve bi-hizane-yi sefer-i humayun-i Engürüs..." (this register is unpaginated, but the breakdown of this item may be found under the head "at-teslimat" in its DS). Significantly, it does not appear that the revenue on this account found its way, at least directly, to support the Persian campaigns at this time. This register represents another layer in the accounting hierarchy to which reference was made above in section IIIii. (cf. Murphey's two "budget models"): the regular taxes and dues collected in Rumeli were one aspect of the Campaign Treasury account, which was, in turn, one aspect of the full hazine-yi amire account. In the case under consideration here, KK 1894 covers some six months of the 15 months covered by KK 1890: thus, the 32m akçe which was recorded in the DS of KK 1894 as a transfer to the Campaign Treasury ("irsaliye-yi hizane-yi sefer-i humayun-i Engürüs der canib-i Belgrad...") must be included in the 35,150,158 akçe credit item of the Campaign Treasury account for the period (KK 1890/A⁺).

income.⁸⁰ Secondly, over 3,000,000 akçe also collected by Ahmed Efendi, is subsumed under the category of emval-i müteferrika (B.ii).⁸¹ Bedel-i nüzül, the 'in cash' surrogate of the 'in kind' irregular nüzül tax, is included in this 3m akçe: in the account for 1604-05, the avarız levies of bedel-i nüzül and bedel-i ganem are included as regular income besides the dues from cizye, adet-i ağnam and mukataat income.⁸² Despite the apparently unrigorous compilation of these accounts, we may hypothesise that the inclusion of such bedel income in the categories mahsulat and emval-i müteferrika indicates that the kazas thus taxed had already, by this date, had these extraordinary levies transformed into a regular cash burden, in contrast to those kazas whose bedel-i ganem and bedel-i nüzül contributions were still recorded as being irregular revenue (varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere).

Emval-i müteferrika (B.ii) accounted for less than 20% of current Campaign Treasury revenue (irad). Any involvement of the people with bureaucracy which required the issuing of an official document, be it for an appointment or to redress an ill, brought fees which were a source of income to the state coffers, and formed a major part of emval-i müteferrika income.⁸³

80. KK 1879/B: the phrase "an tahvil-i..." acknowledges the extent of his accountability in this matter.

81. This is not shown in the IE for KK 1879, but is seen in its DS at KK 1879 p.4: "an tahsil-i hazret-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-i şıkk-i evvel an cizye ve adet-i ağnam ve bedel-i nüzül ve mukataat ve gayrihi"...3,490,000 akçe.

82. KK 1889/B.1.c

83. Such fees were rüsum-i berevat, rüsum-i tezakir and rüsum-i ahkam-i şikayat.

The income category emval-i müteferrika (B.ii) includes an element denoted beyt ül-mal, which is a term for those treasury revenues deriving from inheritances (muhallefat).⁸⁴ State servants who died without legitimate heirs had their estates seized for the treasury (musadere), as did those who were executed.⁸⁵ All such inheritances were temporarily held in trust by the treasury while legal heirs were sought. Details of this beyt ül-mal element found in the DSs reveals that it covers moneys accruing to the Campaign Treasury from the estates of prominent named military personnel, as well as of the kapukulu corps.⁸⁶ The largest of such estates falling to the Campaign Treasury during the course of the war, as recorded in the DSs, is that of the serdar Satırcı Mehmed Pasha, who left cash and effects amounting to over 10 million akçe.⁸⁷ He was executed in Belgrade by order of the sultan in July 1599, the immediate reason being his unauthorised conferral on Gazi Giray Han of the beylerbeyilik of Silistre.⁸⁸ His kethüda Ibrahim fled on hearing the news of his execution, and took refuge with Gazi Giray at Sonbor,⁸⁹ but did not long survive. He himself left over 1,000,000 akçe.⁹⁰

Despite the Ottoman state's ever-pressing need for cash, the rules regarding inheritance seem to have been observed, at least in part, with the legal heirs being given some consideration. Without careful scrutiny of the Ds, it is

84. Lewis, art. Bayt al-Mal (EI)

85. Baysun, art. Musadere (IA)

86. KK 1879 p.3; KK 1885 p.7; KK 1887 p.6; KK 1890 p.3

87. KK 1879 p.3: "an muhallefat ve nukud-i Satırcı Mehmed Paşa serdar-i sabık..10,321,106 akçe"

88. PEÇEVI II pp.224-26; NAIMA I pp.215-18. Kortepeter (1972) p.161

89. AK f.119v

90. KK 1879 p.3

impossible to say how closely the rules regarding the handling of the estates of the deceased were adhered to, and we cannot therefore say what proportion of the muhallefat recorded as a credit of the Campaign Treasury was a true credit, and what proportion was only temporarily at the disposal of the Campaign Treasury.⁹¹ The payment of claims against the estates of the deceased are recorded on the debit side of the Campaign Treasury account in the category

91. The degree of legality with which estates were handled is not always clearcut: see, for example, the examples in Baysun, art. Musadere (IA), and in Orhonlu (1970) e.g. pp.17-18,24-25,54-55,91,131.

eda-yi düyun (V).⁹² Also recorded in the category of eda-yi

92. For instance, KK 1979 p.21: "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi Mehmed veled-i Süleyman çavuş an müteferrikağan-i dergah-i ali an akçe-yi muhallefat-i Süleyman çavuş an müteferrikağan-i dergah-i ali an akçe-yi muhallefat-i müteveffa şide ve paha-yi muhallefateş bi-hazine-yi sefer-i humayun bittevarih-i muhtelifi an yed-i Ibrahim çavuş an çavuşan-i dergah-i ali emin-i beyt ül-mal-i orduyu humayun 93,523 akçe teslim-i hazine kerde bud hala Mehmed ağa an müteferrikağan-i dergah-i ali veled-i Süleyman çavuş al-merhum be-orduyu humayun amede ve ispat-i veraset kerde hala meblağ-i mezbur bi-hazine-yi amire daden fermude ber mucib-i hüccet-i Mevlana Mehmed...kadı-yi orduyu humayun ve ba-ferman-i şerif...93,529 akçe" (sic); this debit item of the Campaign Treasury records the payment of 93,529 akçe to a certain Mehmed, who had satisfactorily proved that he was the son of a Süleyman çavuş who had died in the Uyvar campaign of 1599: this money was the estate of Süleyman which had been paid into the treasury on his death until the legal heir appeared. KK 1887 p.28: "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi muhallefat-i Mevlana Osman kadı-yi sabık-i Saray ki der Belgrad müteveffa şide ve muhallefateşra Halil çavuş an çavuşan-i dergah-i ali emin-i beyt ül-mal-i hassa der Belgrad zabt kerde ve bi-hazine-yi amire an tahvil-i Mevlana Osman kadı-yi sabık-i Lofca an akçe-yi bakiye-yi nüzül-i kaza-yi mezbur an vacib-i sene 1003 an kesr-i keyl ber mucib-i muhasebe-yi Ali Efendi emin-i nüzül-i sabık der sefer-i Eflak ve Boğdan f1 19 Zilkade sene 1011 24,220 akçe f1 23 Zilkade 1011 11,255 akçe (ve) an tahvil-i Halil çavuş emin-i beyt ül-mal-i hassa an muhallefat-i merhum al-mezbur bi-hizane-yi amire f1 23 Zilkade sene 1011 3,148 akçe ki cemaan 38,623 akçe teslim-i hazine kerde ve hala Mehmed Çelebi veled-i müteveffa-yi mezbur asaleten ve Halil

(cont. over)

düyun are administrative fees in connection with the settling of estates which fell, in the first instance, to the Campaign Treasury.⁹³

The estates described as muhallefat represent the upper end of the beyt ül-mal-i hassa, which included all estates of

(note 92. cont.)

Abdülwahab an kibel-i Fatima ve Esmehan ve Emine benat-i müteveffa-yi mezbur vekaleten be-ordu-yi humayun amede ve ispat-i veraset ve vekalet kerde end ve müteveffa-yi mezbur bi-kaza-yi Lofca kadı /.../ ber mucib-i sureti ruznamçe-yi kadiasker davayı kerdend ve muhallefat-i müteveffa-yi mezbur taleb kerdend ve an Mevlana Ahmed Vildanzade kadı-yi Belgrad sitade end ve an hizane-yi amire daden fermude ber mucib-i ferman-i ali ve tezkere eda şide...38,623 akçe"; this debit item of the Campaign Treasury records the payment of nearly 40,000 akçe to the three daughters of Osman, who had been kadı of Saray and died in Belgrade leaving an estate which was seized by the local authorities there. Most of this sum had, in the interim, been paid into the treasury indirectly, in lieu of outstanding nüzül moneys due from the kaza of Lofca.

93. KK 1879 p.18: "be-cihet-i eda-yi resm-i kismet-i merhum Satırcı Mehmed Paşa bi-Mevlana Minkarızade kadı-yi orduyu humayun ve kaimmakam-i kadiasker-i Rumeli an muhallefat-i merhum Satırcı Paşa ki piş ezin paha-yi muhallefates bi-hazine-yi sefer-i humayun kabz kerde...30,000 akçe (For the payment of the fees for distribution of the estate of the late Satırcı Mehmed Pasha: paid to Mevlana Minkarızade, kadı of the imperial army and kaimmakam of the kadiasker of Rumeli, 30,000 akçe from the estate of the late Satırcı Pasha, this estate having earlier been seized for the Campaign Treasury). Resm-i kismet is the fee for supervising the division of inheritance.

over 10,000 akçe and was reserved to the sultan.⁹⁴ Estates of less than this amount were designated as beyt ül-mal-i amme.⁹⁵ Adjustments in the value of the coinage mean that it is not possible to compare the relative size, in real terms, of the estates recorded in the Campaign Treasury accounts with those of other members of the military class published by Barkan.⁹⁶ However, an estate such as Satırcı Mehmed Pasha's must be considered huge by any reckoning: the levying of resm-i kismet on the estate of this commander, who was executed, and whose estate was therefore liable for forfeit by the sultan, suggests that the c.10,000,000 akçe credited to the Campaign Treasury on his behalf was not the total of his worth, and it appears that, despite his being executed, part of his estate was distributed to his heirs.⁹⁷ Details concerning the size of the estates of deceased state officials are most valuable as an index of the possibilities for accumulation open to those holding high office.⁹⁸

Although the estates of some of the kapukulu regiments were credited to the Campaign Treasury, the janissaries had a

94. Sahillioğlu (1970) pp.242-43 says that (muhallefat) was a regular source of income for the Inner Treasury: the presence of substantial muhallefat revenue in the Campaign Treasury is thus a further index of the extent to which the sultan's private purse was fused with the public by this time.

95. cf. Lewis, art. Bayt al-Mal (EI)

96. Barkan (1966): on the revaluation of the coinage, see esp. pp.443-52.

97. His grave was paid for out of the Campaign Treasury: "teslim be-Sinan bavvab be-cihet-i bina-yi mezar-i merhum Satırcı Mehmed Paşa serdar-i sabık...30,500 akçe" (KK 1879 p.12).

98. A general study is Inalcık (1969); on the increased prevalence of the practice of confiscation from the seventeenth century, see Veinstein (1981).

separate beyt ül-mal.⁹⁹ A beyt ül-mal register for the janissaries who died at Kanije in 1600-1¹⁰⁰ gives interesting details parallel to those of the inheritance registers analysed by Barkan.¹⁰¹ 131 janissaries are mentioned, together with details of their effects which were subsequently sold. Including their cash holdings, the sum raised from the sale of these goods after the deduction of burial expenses and outstanding debts of certain of the janissaries, was 319,982 akçe. The largest individual estate was that of the infantry commander (ser piyadegan) which totalled 101,320 akçe. Four others exceeded 10,000 akçe, but there were many janissaries owning goods worth less than 200 akçe. In contrast to the splendid garments, decorated horse furniture and other ceremonial military trappings of the wealthiest, the possessions of those at the lower end of the scale were only the simple clothes worn in pursuit of their duties.¹⁰² The estates listed here do not, unlike Barkan's material, include immoveable property. This suggests that the figures given in this register are a minimum indication of wealth, and only cover janissaries' effects in the field.

The estates of 619 janissaries who met their end in May 1604

99. KK 1879 p.3: "beyt ül-mal-i sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve gayrihi..."; KK 1885 p.7, KK 1887 p.6: "beyt ül-mal-i sipahiyan..."; KK 1890 p.3: "beyt ül-mal-i cebeciyan..".

100. MM 101 ff.1-14: "defter-i müfredat-i beyt ül-mal-i yeniçeriyan-i dergah-i ali bi-muhafaza-yi kale-yi Kanije vaki şide der zaman-i Sefer Ağa ser turnacı ve emin Ahmed su başı an cemaat 58 ve katib al-hakir Mustafa fi l Cumada I ila gaye-yi sene 1009"

101. Barkan (1966)

102. These were a long robe (dolama), trousers (çakşır), vest (zebun), undershirt (astar) and a garment for protection against rain (barani); cf. MD 75/44; MD 75/82; KAVANIN ff.36v-37r.

in the Hungarian wars, amounted to 752,165 akçe.¹⁰³ The regimental purposes to which approximately 51,000 akçe of this was put were the provision of water supplies (seyishane) for those transporting campaign funds from place to place, and for new flags.¹⁰⁴ Part of the sum raised from the sale of the effects of those who had died at Kanije was also used for immediate expenses, such as aid to the wounded.¹⁰⁵

Further emval-i müteferrika (B.ii) items which are mentioned in the IEs are the peñcik-i esar, the 'fifth' owed to the state on prisoners taken in war,¹⁰⁶ and various gifts (pişkeş), given as a mark of respect.¹⁰⁷ Another item is beliyat ve ketmiyat-i bazı kesan, which appears to be moneys due to the treasury which had been misappropriated and only later traced.¹⁰⁸ Such embezzlement could be of enormous proportion: the abscondment of the former defterdar of the Danube finance bureau (Tuna aklamı) with over 2,000,000 akçe in 1605 was doubtless an additional reason for hoping that the area would yield more if this bureau was wound up,

103. MM 101 ff.21-60: of these, 3 estates amounted to over 100,000 akçe, and there were a further 8 between 10,000 and 100,000 akçe. On the evidence available, the janissaries fighting in the Hungarian campaigns were better off than their comrades on the eastern front: a beyt ül-mal list, dated Ramazan 1017 (December 1698), for 137 janissaries on the sefer-i şark, shows that only two had estates valued at over 10,000 akçe, and the estates of only 16 were over 2,000 akçe (KK 9421 pp.2-22.)

104. MM 101 f.59r

105. MM 101 f.14v

106. See also MD 73/1277; MD 77/261

107. KK 1889/B.ii.b shows gifts from those holding the office of reis (it is unclear to me who these are), and from the metropolitans of the Greek Orthodox church: on the metropolitans and their pişkes, see Inalcık (1982/b); Orhonlu (1970) pp.124-25. See also pişkes entries at KK 1885 p.7; KK 1887 p.7.

108. I have found no other reference to this term.

and the financial affairs of the area returned to the control of the First (Rumeli) Bureau (şikk-i evvel).¹⁰⁹ Once the culprit had been identified, the money due to the state was paid into the Campaign Treasury where appropriate. In cases where money had been wrongfully extorted from the reaya on the pretext of various wartime levies, efforts at restitution appear to have been made once the alleged misdemeanour had been investigated.¹¹⁰

The income item ziyade-yi mevacib¹¹¹ appears to have arisen when too much money which was given for the payment of wages to the troops, the surplus being returned to the Campaign Treasury. Similarly, money was sometimes allocated for the purchase of equipment and not spent.¹¹² Certain emval-i müteferrika revenues which are described in the DSs and Ds, although not in the IEs, are the selling off of animals (oxen, draught horses and camels) and equipment, from river craft (sefine) to carts which were no longer of use for the purpose of transporting provisions and materials of war; the money they fetched was credited to the Campaign Treasury.¹¹³

The greater part of the Campaign Treasury revenue category of varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere (B.iii) consists of a number of irregular levies imposed in consequence of the war; the

109. MD 75/230; cf. MD 75/343

110. e.g. MD 77/639

111. KK 1887/B.ii; see also KK 1879 p.4

112. KK 1890 B.ii; see also KK 1879 p.4: "an akçe ki beray-i bazı mühimmat-i miri dade bud sarf na-kerden baz bi-hazine teslim kerde...".

113. e.g. KK 1876 p.26; KK 1887 p.7; such items were described as amelmande (no longer suitable for work): "an tahvil-i Mehmed Çelebi emin-i sergi-yi humayun an akçe-yi paha-yi üstüran ve bargiran-i amelmande ki fûruht şide ve kiymeteş bi-hizane-yi amire averde..."^{26,100 akçe} (KK 1887 p.107).

imposition of such levies was a typical device of contemporary states with strong central government for the raising of extra funds. When these are examined in more detail than is afforded by the IE entries, a basis for categorisation becomes clear. A first group comprises the provisions-substitute taxes which have been discussed at length in Part II: bedel-i nüzül, bedel-i sürsat and bedel-i ganem.¹¹⁴ Discussed in the same place is a second group, money credited to the Campaign Treasury from the sale of provisions to the troops. Thirdly, there is the bedel-i timar, a levy on those who did not appear to serve in the campaign. The fourth group, in contrast to the first, which constitutes cash payment as a substitute for goods, consists, rather, of cash payments substituted for service and for the support of particular corps of troops. Fifthly, loans to the Campaign Treasury (karz) may be found included for accounting purposes with these irregular taxes.

During the early years of the 1593-1606 war, the main contributors of bedel-i timar were the provincial sipahis of Anatolia and the Aegean littoral.¹¹⁵ These areas were well away from the theatre of war, and not threatened by the possibility of active involvement in the campaigns against

114. Related to the obligation to supply provisions to the troops, which was discussed in Part IIIi, was the obligation upon the reaya to bear the freight cost of transporting such provisions to wherever they were required: this was called navlun akçesi. How this levy fitted into the avarız tax structure is not clear: see MD 73/325; KK 2557 is a register which lists the supply of barley from Silistre to the imperial stables, and in whose heading (ibid. p.4) it is stated that navlun-i sefine shall be taken at the rate of 5 akçe per keyl of barley supplied by each avarızhanesi. Alternatively, the reaya could transport such grain in their own craft instead of paying a cash sum to the treasury (MM 7348 p.64).

115. MD 72/647

the Hapsburgs, but the demand for troops for the Hungarian campaigns could not be met at risk of neglect to the duties of local policing and defence which were part of the contractual obligations of the timar-holders.¹¹⁶ Orders were sent out demanding the collection of this exemption fee, not only from those of the provincial cavalry whose appearance was not required that year, but also from central government agents who held such benefices (müteferrikas, çavuşes, and the clerks of the divan and maliye), and who were not called to serve on the campaign.¹¹⁷ Liability to pay the bedel-i timar was therefore not restricted to members of the provincial cavalry who did not participate in the campaign, but extended to include other dirlik-holders.

The amount to be levied as bedel akçesi was based on the official yield of the dirlik, as described in the document issued to the timar-holder on his appointment.¹¹⁸ It appears to have been usual for a sum equal to a whole year's income to have been demanded.¹¹⁹ In the early part of the war, the decision as to who was to go on campaign and who to stay at home, was related to the size of the benefice which the sipahi held, as we have seen in Part I.

Although contemporaries still considered it incumbent on

116. KK 1879 p.390 records the payment into the Campaign Treasury of the bedel-i timar of four sancaks of the vilayet of Rum, viz. Amasya, Divriği, Canik and Çorum, to a total of 279,349 akçe: "an tahvil-i mezkurin an akçe-yi bedel-i timar-i sipahiyan-i liva-yi mezburin ki der muhafaza tayin şüdens an vacib-i sene 1008 an yed-i Hüseyin çavuş..".

117. MD 72/11; MD 72/647

118. For instance, MD 72/775: "timarlarının beratları mucibince yazusuna göre...".

119. e.g. MM 7336 p.74: "timarlarının birer yıllık mahsulları miri için kabz olunmak...".

dirlik-holders that they should appear on campaign,¹²⁰ the documents quoted above demonstrate that the alternative of paying an exemption fee was prevalent, and the conditions under which this was to take place were laid down by central government decree. In 1594 a fetva was issued to the effect that those çavuşes, müteferrikas and clerks who held timars and zeamets and who did not go on campaign must pay a bedel to the treasury.¹²¹ The government's enjoyment of this latitude to decide which troops were required on campaign, and in which cases it was more convenient to have bedel cash with which other campaign costs could be met, did not last. In the latter years of the war, the difficulties of mobilisation are exemplified in the desperate tone of the proliferation of orders which demonstrate that government demands for the bedel akçesi were no longer simply a question of an option chosen on the basis of optimum resource allocation, but had become an attempt to make the best of a deteriorating situation in which troops refused to appear on campaign, and the levying of the bedel was a means of providing money with which to pay for local Balkan recruits. The extent to which the collection of the bedel could be enforced in such circumstances is not clear.¹²² The bedel-i timar changed in character to become a payment substituted for a service which the government had no longer the power to command, and by the mid-seventeenth century, the payment of bedel-i timar in lieu of campaign duty had

120. Röhrborn (1973) p.83

121. Röhrborn (1973) p.83

122. MD 77/467. Another related development in response to the need for money and the reluctance of troops to mobilise was the extension of the application of the bedel-i timar to Rumeli itself: AK f.228r. The added strains on resources occasioned by the Persian campaigns removed the option of being able to resort to Anatolia for troops or bedel-i timar financing for the Hungarian campaigns.

to do with grant of infantry?

been accepted as part of normal practice.¹²³

The payment of a cash levy in lieu of service was also applied to categories of auxiliary troops in Europe who, although summoned, neglected to appear on campaign. Cryptic terminology does not allow more than a hypothetical understanding of the circumstances in which this levy was exacted. Confusion centres around the use of the term cerime, and whether there is any technical difference between the cash revenues of bedel-i yürükan¹²⁴ and bedel-i cerime-yi yürükan,¹²⁵ for instance. The implication in the latter case is that these yürük were ordered to participate in the campaign, but did not appear, and were fined in consequence. The word cerime, and its variant cürm, may mean both 'crime' and 'fine',¹²⁶ and it seems that it should be understood in the present context as a penalty to be paid for disregarding the order to appear on campaign. It is possible that both versions are to be equated; alternatively, in the case where the word cerime is not included, it may be that these yürük were excused campaign duty, in the same way as timar-holders in the early years of this

123. Kunt (1983) p.88

124. KK 1885 p.8: the text of this item of income is "bedel-i yürükan sefer niyamedegan...".

125. KK 1887 p.8

126. Heyd (1973) p.276. The context in which we find this use of cerime differentiates it from other fines for infringements which are referred to in kanunnames of the yürüks: e.g. Barkan (1943) pp.260,263. See also Gökbilgin (1957) pp.44-45.

war.127

In addition to cash levies on the auxiliary yürüks, pandors, and voynuks, income was derived from bedel-i tüfenkçiyân (musketeers), bedel-i lağımciyan (miners), bedel-i neccaran (carpenters), bedel-i haddadan (blacksmiths). The participation of the former groups derived from historic practice, while the latter were constituted purely on a functional basis to meet the demands of warfare at this time. The service-substitutes (bedel) of these latter groups were cash levies demanded from the reaya to meet the costs of providing and equipping such units. There are signs of regional differentiation, with bedel-i lağımciyan being demanded from the sancak of Semendre in

127. MD 77/608: this demand for the bedel of the Kocacık yürüks, by putting a figure to, and demanding, the bedel for the following year also, suggests that a distinction can indeed be made according to whether the word 'cerime' appears in the account entry, since a fine for disobedience could not be demanded in advance of the transgression. Parallel usages are bedel-i cerime-yi pandoran (KK 1884, unpag.: entries dated 3 & 15 Muharrem 1012)) and bedel-i pandoran (KK 1890 p.76): the text of the two former entries specifies that the fine was taken because these pandoran, who were appointed to serve in Transylvania in the previous year, had fled. The same distinction may thus be applied to bedel-i cerime-yi kürekçiyân (KK 1887 p.8) and bedel-i cerime-yi voynuğan (KK 1885 p.8)

particular,¹²⁸ and bedel-i tüfenkçiyân from Bosnia.¹²⁹ These levies to support specialised troops became more prevalent as the war continued, and as earlier sources of recruitment and of funds were unable to meet the particular requirements of the war against the Hapsburgs at this time: they constitute an important new type of taxation, which, like the provisions-substitute taxes, was to become more permanent.

128. KK 1890 pp.35,39,48,54; it was, together with neccar akçesi, also demanded from the kaza of Galata (MD 75/217), from where builders, architects and other skilled workers were sent through the course of the war.

129. MD 77/664: in 1606, the bedel-i tüfenkçi (and also the bedel-i nüzül) was to be collected from all the reaya of this area, and delivered to Belgrade. Since the reaya of Bosnia were deemed inexperienced in the use of muskets ("ol caniblerin reayası tüfenk atmak babında mahir olmamağla...") the money collected as bedel-i tüfenkçi was to be used to pay the wages of recruits from elsewhere. Inalcık (1980) p.315 says "In the seventeenth century, the tüfenkçi bedeli, a new tax in cash, was introduced to cover the costs of increased musketeer enrolling": the data presented here give a more precise terminus a quo, and show (perhaps) that, during the period of this war, the bedel-i tüfenkçiyân had been established as a regular cash tax in some areas, while in others it was a substitute for service; in this connection, compare KK 1890 p.41: "an tahvil-i Mevlana Ahmed kadı-yi Teşne an akçe-yi bedel-i tüfenkçiyân-i kaza-yi mezbure an vacib-i sene 1013 an yed-i Malkoç al-mübaşır...39,754 akçe" (see also KK 1890 pp.45,48), and KK 1887 p.94: "an tahvil-i İbrahim ağa ser bavvab-i dergah-i ali an akçe ki piş ezin der mukabele-yi nüzül ve ganem ve navlun-i liva-yi Bosna beher 10 hane fi l neferan tüfenkçiyân tahrir şüden fermude ve tüfenkçiyân tahrir şüden ber mucib-i ivaz müyesser na-şüden ve badehu bedel-i tüfenkçiyân-i kaza-yi Yenibazar ve İstari Eflak ve Pirepoy ve Vişegrad an vacib-i sene 1010 an yed-i Ahmed sipahi muhavvil şüde...5,170 akçe" (see also KK 1884, unpag.: entries dated 18 Şevval, 23 Zilkade 1011).

Government borrowing to finance war constitutes a further element of irregular income (B.iii). The Ottoman state, more centralised at this date than its European neighbours, had a financial administration of greater sophistication. The Central Treasuries of the European states served only to furnish the expenses of warfare:

"Der "Staatsschatz", der in jedem Lande Europas im wesentlichen für die Kriegsführung gesammelt und gehortet worden ist, reichte für die unmittelbaren Kriegsvorbereitungen und für die Mobilmachung. Dann war er erschöpft."¹³⁰ - ?

Current revenues could cover only half of the money disbursed by Castile in 1574, and the shortfall was covered by massive borrowings.¹³¹ It was commonplace in contemporary Europe for belligerent states to take advantage of the availability of funds to be borrowed, but in striking contrast to the Ottomans, it was to the developed credit institutions of the international capital market that recourse was made.¹³² The scale of Ottoman borrowing was insignificant when compared with the chaotic Spanish financial situation.¹³³ The loans which the Ottoman military establishment made to the Campaign Treasury were often for a specific purpose, to meet a shortfall when cash was temporarily unavailable,¹³⁴ and were an internal response to a problem for which other states resorted to an external

130. Bog (1980) pp.17-18

131. Parker (1979) p.561; without giving a precise date, Bog (1980) p.18 says that war costs consumed 93% of the Spanish annual budget.

132. It was in the nineteenth century that the Ottoman Empire began to engage in foreign borrowing (Veinstein, 1981 p.123).

133. As a percentage of Campaign Treasury revenue, KK 1879: 1.9%; KK 1885: 5.2%; KK 1887: 2.8%; KK 1890: .3%.

134. e.g. KK 1885 p.8: "...karz der vakt-i muzayaka dade".

solution. The European states' ease of access to credit facilities cannot but have discouraged a more careful appraisal of other potential options.

On only some occasions do the DSs of these campaign accounts provide us with details of those making loans to the Campaign Treasury; usually the account entry merely says that loans were made to "some people" ("bazı kesan"). In the period from July 1602-February 1603, the largest loan, at 3,898,165 akçe, was provided by an individual identified simply as hazret-i efendi. This was to meet a shortfall in ready funds, as was the 1,394,320 akçe lent by hazret-i sahib-i saadet.¹³⁵ Of the various other contributions, a certain Muslih ül-din provided 1,260,000 akçe, Ali, the agha of the janissaries more than 1 million akçe, and a certain Receb subaşı, 240,000 akçe.¹³⁶ In the period August 1603-July 1604, the serdar Lala Mehmed Pasha lent over 2.5 million akçe to the Campaign Treasury.¹³⁷

Record of the repayment of such personal loans is found on the debit side of the Campaign Treasury accounts as eda-yi düyun (V). Since many of the loans were made to meet a temporary embarrassment of cash, repayment could be prompt. A loan of 60,000 akçe made by Nuh Pasha was repaid to him within the six months from July 1602-February 1603.¹³⁸ A Medhi Efendi also received 93,165 akçe in repayment of a loan for the same amount made during this period.¹³⁹ The

135. KK 1885 p.8: could hazret-i efendi be the seyhülislam? Likewise, the identity of hazret-i sahib-i saadet is uncertain: was this the sultan or the serdar?

136. KK 1885 p.8

137. KK 1887 p.8

138. KK 1885 pp.8,17; Nuh Pasha was beylerbeyi of Anadolu at this time.

139. KK 1885 pp.8,17

grand vezir and serdar Yemişci Hasan Pasha made loans totalling nearly 3,000,000 akçe to the Campaign Treasury in the spring of 1602, the season in which he retook Istolni Belgrad from the Hapsburgs: he had been repaid in full by July of the same year.¹⁴⁰ Repayment of the defterdar Etmekçizade Ahmed's huge loan of 4,365,770 akçe must have taken longer, for there is no mention of him having lent any money at all between July 1602 and February 1603.¹⁴¹

In the earliest Campaign Treasury account we have for this war, the only lender is the individual denoted as "hazret-i sahib-i saadet", who may perhaps be the sultan or grand vezir.¹⁴² This is also the account with one of the lowest loan:total revenue ratios. Subsequent accounts, as we have seen, show a range of lenders. This may indicate that it was, in the first instance, the sultan or grand vezir who lent when there was a shortfall in funds, but that later in the war, he was no longer able, or perhaps was merely unwilling, to do so. Writing of the later seventeenth century, Abou-el-Haj has this to say about

140. KK 1885 p.38 (20 Muharrem 1011/10 July 1602): "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi karz-i hazret-i sadrazam ve serdar-i ekrem Hasan Paşa...ki piş ezin der müzayaka-yi mevacic fi 18 Şevval ve fi 26 m(ezbur) ve fi 18 Zilkade sene 1010 bi-hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun ber vech-i karz dade bud hala 2,400,000 akçe eda şide...2,400,000 akçe"; KK 1885 (unpag.: entry dated 8 Safar 1011/29 July 1602): "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi karz-i hazret-i sadrazam ve serdar-i ekrem Hasan Paşa...ki piş ezin der hin-i müzayaka-yi mevacic fi 21 Zilhicce sene 1010 ve fi 8 Zilkade ber vech-i karz 1,300 sikke ve 500 sikkeyi cemaan 1,800 sikke-yi hasene dade bud hala eda şide...216,000 akçe". Both these texts also make it clear that repayment was in gold coin, as the loan had been, the akçe being the unit of account. The Campaign Treasury account for the (preceding) period in which Yemişci Hasan made this loan is not extant.

141. KK 1885 p.16: "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi karz-i Ahmed Efendi defterdar-i şikk-i evvel...4,365,770 akçe".

142. KK 1879/B.iii.b

such apparent "noblesse oblige" among the ruling class:

"...individual grandees' committing their personal talents and private wealth...to the "benefit" of Ottoman society, whether in the forms of equipping and sending a certain number of auxiliary troops to campaign at their personal expense, or contributing directly to the public treasure when the latter was short of cash...should not be allowed to totally mystify their parallel ideological purposes. In these practices, the ruling factions of the élite class do not differ from their counterparts in Europe...in the sense that they took responsibility for coming up with the resources in money and men to uphold a system of which they were after all the main beneficiaries."¹⁴³

During the 1593-1606 war, the chances of being reimbursed in full were high, and capital accumulated by high-ranking military officers could be put to useful purpose in the hope of future personal preferment, conveniently masquerading as zeal. Again, such personal loans to meet short-term shortage of cash to pay the troops, must, in view of the many reports of near-mutiny owing to the late arrival of the soldiers' pay, have been considered preferable to the risks of such insubordination. By lending money to the Campaign Treasury, members of the military establishment were acting so as to perpetuate the system and preserve their place within it.

The match of the amounts lent to the Campaign Treasury with the amounts repaid to any individual strongly indicates that interest was not paid on these loans: had interest been paid, it is probable that the D entries would have made reference to the fact. The opportunities for productive investment which were open to the Ottoman ruling class were few in the early modern period, and state borrowing by the

143. Abou-el-Haj (1985) p.182

Campaign Treasury was, like the celepkeşan system, a way in which available capital was harnessed for the benefit of the status quo.¹⁴⁴ Despite the record of repayment of loans being good, it may have been precisely because no interest was forthcoming that outside funding was not attracted as a source of finance for the war.¹⁴⁵ It may once have been different: when Yemişci Hasan Pasha wrote to Sultan Mehmed III that if it had been possible to raise loans for the payment of troop wages from the merchants, he would not have troubled the Sultan with the problem of having no money to pay these wages, he remarked:

"It is more than thirty years since public morals began to deteriorate, and since there is no security and justice, merchants and others refrain from business dealings: short of torture, there is no way to get a loan from anyone".¹⁴⁶

144. On the circulation of money in the Ottoman Empire, see Veinstein (1981).

145. There is evidence that Jewish merchants lent money for the purchase of military equipment in this war, but it is not clear how widespread this practice was, nor the circumstances under which the loans were made: MM 383 pp.84-88 is an account entitled "muhasebe-yi makbuzat ve ihracat beray-i mühimmat-i sefer-i humayun der vakt-i reften-i serdar...Ferhad Paşa ve der vakt-i reften-i Mustafa Bey ve Mustafa Ağa serdaran-i evvel ila Kara Boğdan ve Eflak al-vaki fi evail-i sene 1003..."; this covers both the purchase of equipment for the 1595 campaign, which was the responsibility of Ferhad Pasha, and for the small expedition led into Moldavia and Wallachia by the two Mustafas on the defection of these principalities late in 1594 (cf. PEÇEVI II pp.158-59). The debit balance on the account (MM 383 p.88) is made up of money owed to three individuals who had supplied equipment, a Sinan Bey, and the Jews Karakaş and Yasif: e.g. "deyn be-Karakaş Yahudi an paha-yi esbabha-yi mütenevvi...320,876 akçe".

146. Orhonlu (1970) pp.32-33

The final entry on the credit side of the Campaign Treasury account is an item entitled tefavüt-i hasene ve gurus (C), literally "discrepancy of gold and silver". As has been seen, the Ottoman treasury had at its disposal several devices for increasing revenue. Borrowings from the Inner Treasury, loans from affluent individuals and the creation of new taxes have been mentioned, and there is one further method, gains made through the manipulation of the akçe, which forms the final income item in these campaign accounts.¹⁴⁷ This was a treasury credit, based on the discrepancy between the different akçe values placed upon the coin in the treasury. Barkan describes the essence of the method by which the currency was manipulated:

"The 'discrepancy of gold' comes about thus, that gold coin entering the Treasury was deemed to be equivalent to 59 akçe, but on being

147. There were further means of raising money in present conditions of pressing urgency, evidence of which do not appear in these accounts. Tax-farming was the most widespread of such sales of the anticipated future revenues of government for a lump-sum payment by the assignee in the present. The mortgaging of future tax yield was practised with particularly disastrous consequences in contemporary Spain (Parker, 1979 pp.562-63). The sale of appointments was noted by the Fugger agent in Constantinople in February 1592, when 1,000 new çavuşes were created, for which favour each of those appointed had to pay 1,000 ducats for the building of new galleys (FUGGER p.236). The striking of new coin with a progressively lower silver content had been practised from the time of Mehmed II (Sahillioğlu, 1978 pp.8-); akçe were paid out from the Campaign Treasury to be restruck (very probably at a debased value) in Belgrade (KK 1879 p.13; KK 1885 p.12: "teslim be-.../ emin-i dar ül-darb-i Belgrad be-cihet-i büriden-i akçe-yi cedid der dar ül-darb-i mezbur...".)

paid out, was deemed to represent 60 akçe".¹⁴⁸

As the DSs show, the calculation of the 'discrepancy' was somewhat more complicated in reality. The akçe was both the money of account as well as a low-value silver coin also called nakdiye; other coinage in the Campaign Treasury comprised the variously-rated gold (hasene) and higher-value silver (guruş) coins in circulation, in addition to gold ingots (zer-i sebuke), pure silver (nukre-yi halis), and substandard akçe coins (nakdiye-yi hurde ve kem-ayar).¹⁴⁹ Before demonstrating just how the value of the 'discrepancy' was arrived at, it must first of all be pointed out that a summing of the figures for the amounts of each type of currency entering and leaving the Campaign Treasury, which are listed in the DSs immediately after the figure for the total revenue (al-asl) and total expenditure (al-masarif) for the period in question, does not tally with the total revenue and expenditure figures for the accounting period when calculated by the addition of the various categories of revenue and expenditure listed in the IEs.¹⁵⁰

In view of this inaccuracy in the conversion of different currencies into their akçe equivalents, it should be no

148. Barkan (1954/b) p.300: a comparable calculation was made for the silver guruş; cf. Fekete (1955) I pp.491-2.

149. KK 1879 pp.2,6; KK 1885 pp.6,9. The main hazine-yi amire account for 1582-83, prior to the big devaluation of the mid-1580's, shows a still wider range of values for the currency in the Central Treasury (Sahillioğlu, 1978 p.35).

150. This is demonstrated by the example of KK 1879 pp.2,6 (see Appendix 2/1,2/11). The greatest divergence is in KK 1885 p.9, where total expenditure based on the currency breakdown is nearly 10,000 akçe less than the total expenditure figure given in the IE (Appendix 2/iv). The expenditure side of KK 1887 p.9 (Appendix 2/vi) is the only instance to hand in which the sums tally.

surprise to discover that the 'discrepancy' figure given in each IE does not square with independent recalculation of the 'discrepancy' on the basis of the currency data in the DSs.

Theoretically, the 'discrepancy' is calculable by summing the akçe values of all moneys credited to the account at below the official rate of exchange, multiplied by the amount by which they fell below this official rate, and subtracting from this total the akçe values of moneys debited to the account at below the official rate of exchange, multiplied by the amount by which they fell below this official rate. Official exchange rates varied from place to place, and the fact that the government was trying to impose a rate of 120 akçe per gold piece and 70 akçe per silver guruş in Rum in winter 1593 does not mean that all government business was conducted on this basis.¹⁵¹ Selaniki notes that coinage debasement in 1589 brought official rates of exchange of 120 akçe to the gold piece, and 80 akçe to the guruş,¹⁵² and Abdülkadir confirms that the same rates still applied in Istanbul in December 1603.¹⁵³ It is clear from the data to hand that these were the official rates used in these campaign accounts.

151. MD 71/211

152. Ipşirli (1978) p.464

153. AK f.177v

The simplest example to use in illustration of the mathematics of calculating the 'discrepancy' appears in KK 1887:

(p.5)	gold: 27,651	x 2	=	55,302	
	silver: 19,926.5	x 2	=	39,853	
	"	14,349.5	x 10	=	143,495
	"	. 411	x 12	=	<u>4,932</u>
					243,582
(p.9)	silver: 14,807.5	x 10	=	<u>148,075-</u>	
					95,507 <u>akçe</u>

(see Appendix 2/v,vi)

This figure deviates by only 470 akçe from the 'discrepancy' figure of 95,977 akçe found in the IE.¹⁵⁴ By this manipulation, the treasury was able to make a small profit.¹⁵⁵

154. KK 1887/C. It should be noted that there is a further unidentified amount on the credit side (Appendix 2/v) which has not been taken into account in the above calculation.

155. During this war, insofar as can be judged from the available accounts, the 'discrepancy' never contributed more than .6% of total Campaign Treasury revenue. This compares with the figure of 5% in the account for the grand vezir Hüsrev Pasha's Baghdad campaign in 1630 (Murphey, 1979 pp.218-19,470-71). The greater value of the 'discrepancy' at the later date was due to a more significant divergence between the rates at which coin was paid into and out of the Campaign Treasury and the 'official' rate of exchange.

IIIiv. Analysis of the Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury

Unlike the revenue side of the IEs of the Campaign Treasury, which show some small variations in the order of the items, the expenditure sides of these accounts all consist of seven main categories presented in regular order. The first of these, comprising more than 70% of Campaign Treasury expenditure in the 1593-1606 war, is the payment of wages (mevacib) to the troops fighting in Hungary (P). This figure is not, in itself, of any particular significance within the context of the global sum of troop wages, for we saw in Part I that there were many different methods of paying the troops; however, it dwarfs the individual shares of the other six categories of campaign expenditure which together comprise the remaining 30%. From both an administrative and accounting perspective, these other items of expenditure are not without interest though, as we have seen already in the case of the details of debt repayment recorded in the category eda-yi düyun (V).

Categories P.i-P.iv of wages need little further amplification. The müşaherehoran (P.i) were the officers and bureaucrats of the troops whose pay was the direct responsibility of the Ottoman treasury; as is implied by the term used to denote them collectively, they were paid monthly, instead of three-monthly, as the common soldiers were. The soldiers mentioned in P.ii-P.iv were various regiments on the state payroll, including, in particular, the kapukulu ocakları. As was implied in the discussion of the wage registers (mevacib defterleri) in Part I, it is impossible to say how many men of each regiment were paid from the Campaign Treasury, and how many from, for instance, the Central Treasury. A further item common to the wage category of all accounts is headed neferat-i kıla (P.v): the DSs give no further detail as to exactly who these men were. From the information available here, it cannot be said whether they were "yerli" ("local") troops, or troops 'normally' resident in the Istanbul barracks, but on a 3-year tour of duty in the border castles (nöbetciyan), or,

indeed, whether they were troops of the category of levend. A clue may perhaps be found in the accounts of the Buda Treasury: each of those still extant for the 1593-1606 shows a credit category headed "an hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun..." ("from the imperial Campaign Treasury..."): although direct comparison of numbers of men and amounts of wages in the Campaign Treasury accounts and those of the Buda Treasury is not possible, it appears that the Campaign Treasury debit (P.v) was a credit to the Buda, and the other Hungarian, Treasuries.¹⁵⁶

A further item that is common to all the wage categories of the accounts discussed here is the pay of the French garrison of Papa who had defected to the Ottomans in 1600. These renegades were considered to have a special status, continuing to be paid from the Campaign Treasury throughout the remainder of the war (P.vi).¹⁵⁷ Until 1604 they were also singled out to receive a present on top of their wages (S), and the supply of their provisions was the responsibility of a special agent.¹⁵⁸ Wages were also paid out of the Campaign Treasury to the central European allies of the Ottomans toward the end of the war. In particular, the help received from the men of the Hungarian nobleman Moses Székely in briefly holding back the Hapsburg forces commanded by Giorgio Basta in Transylvania in 1603, was paid for from the

156. The accounts of the Hungarian provincial treasuries, and that of Buda in particular, are the subject of the next section IIIv.: this matter will be discussed more fully there.

157. In the final account for the war, they are described as being part of the "taife-yi hilaf-i millet" (KK 1890/P.vi).

158. KK 1879/S: "inamat-i efrenca-i Fransa"; KK 1885/S: "inamat bi-taife-yi efrenca..."; KK1887 p.14: "inam bi-bazi efrenciyan". KK 1879 p.13: "teslim be-Hüseyn çavuş emin-i mekulat-i efrenciyan-i Fransa..."

Campaign Treasury.¹⁵⁹ Bocskai's men, who were critically important in turning the course of the war in the Ottomans' favour in 1605, were also paid from the same source.¹⁶⁰

The second largest category of expenditure after wages is headed teslimat (Q), and counts for around 10% of campaign expenditure. Discussion of the provisioning of the army has shown how commissioners (emins) and other agents were responsible for the purchase of food: record of the moneys allocated to them for this task came from the Campaign Treasury, and constitute one of the items of expenditure under the heading of teslimat. As shown in the IEs, money for the purchase of some campaign equipment (mühimmat) is also recorded in this category.

What the IEs do not show, however, is that a significant part of the teslimat category of expenditure records loans made from the Campaign Treasury to named individuals.¹⁶¹ These loans were made almost exclusively to beylerbeyis or sancakbeyis, which suggests that such moneys were intended to assist such provincial governors to defray the heavy expenses occasioned by this intensive and prolonged period of campaigning. The largest loan recorded was the 540,000 akçe lent to the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Kuyucu Murad Pasha in 1603-04.¹⁶² In 1599-1601 and in the 1602-03 season the beylerbeyis of eastern Anatolia feature prominently as

159. KK 1887/P.vii; the expenses of Székely and his men were also met by the Campaign Treasury, and recorded, too, at KK 1887 pp.15,16. See also Orhonlu (1970) pp.43,98-99; PEÇEVI II pp.243-46.

160. KK 1890/P.vi.b

161. Details are found in the DSs viz: KK 1879 pp.9-10; KK 1885 p.11; KK 1887 p.10; KK 1889: no data; KK 1890: no loans made; as an example, KK 1887 p.10 may be cited: "teslim be-Süleyman Bey mirliva-yi Ohri ber vech-i karz...6,240 akçe".

162. KK 1887 p.10; he became grand vezir after the war.

recipients of loans from the Campaign Treasury.¹⁶³ Although war with Persia had broken out again in 1603, some eastern cavalry troops were still fighting on the Hungarian front, which is why loans to them are recorded in these accounts of the campaigns in Europe.¹⁶⁴

Although we have seen that members of the Ottoman élite were able to make loans to the Campaign Treasury at times when there was a shortage of cash to meet pressing demands, the record of borrowings from the Campaign Treasury shows that it was not the same group who were both lending and

163. Among the recipients of loans from the Campaign Treasury were the following: in 1599-1601, the beylerbeyis of Diyarbakır, Van, Karaman, Sofu Sinan Pasha (beylerbeyi of Eğri) and a certain Mustafa Pasha, and the sancakbeyis of Kangrı, Karesi, Canık, Amasya (KK 1879 pp,9-10); in 1602-03, the beylerbeyis of Aleppo, Erzurum, Karaman, Batum (sic), Kanije, Silistre, and sancakbeyis of Pozega, Vulçittrin, Kirka, Mora, Karesi (KK 1885 p.11); in 1603-04, only four loans are recorded, to the beylerbeyis of Rumeli and Karaman, and the sancakbeyis of Kirkkilise and Ohri (KK 1887 p.10).

164. The repayment by the Campaign Treasury of loans made to it is found recorded, as we have seen, in the debit category eda-yi düyun (V), receipt of the original loan having been recorded in varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere (B.iii). Omitted from discussion of the credit side of the IEs in Part IIIiii, however, was the fact that, concealed in the category emval-i müteferrika (B.ii), is the repayment of loans made previously by the Campaign Treasury: record of the repayment of these loans by the Campaign Treasury should thus be found on the credit side of a subsequent Campaign Treasury IE. This item of income is not made explicit in the IEs, but is spelt out in the DSs: e.g. "an mahsul ki bi-bazi kesan an hazine ber vech-i karz dade hala eda süde..." (KK 1879 p.4); see also KK 1885 p.7; KK 1887 p.6. These moneys for the repayment of loans to the Campaign Treasury are entered in the DSs as a lumpsum, and so it is impossible to match the original borrower with the subsequent repayment of his debt to the Campaign Treasury.

borrowing. Information in the DSs shows that those making loans to the Campaign Treasury were predominantly members of the Ottoman central bureaucratic and military establishment: they were most frequently officers of the kapukulu regiments or members of the corps of çavuş. By contrast, those borrowing from the Campaign Treasury were provincial governors, as has been pointed out. The increasing difficulty which the provincial governors, and, indeed, ordinary timariots, had in fulfilling their statutory obligation to campaign when ordered to so, has been a frequent theme in modern Ottoman history-writing. The earliest documentary record of loans made by the Ottoman treasury to this class is that which survives from the winter of 1516, after the Ottoman defeat of the Mamluk army at Marj Darbik.¹⁶⁵ The problems of campaigning far from home, and in particular, of wintering in the field, is the subject of Veinstein's recent article on the institution of harçlık, which was discussed in connection with the provisioning of the timariot army: Veinstein sees the need for the timariots to spend winters away from home and from the sources of income on which they relied for their livelihood, as the "Achilles Heel" of the "classical Ottoman system of military organisation".¹⁶⁶ The evidence concerning loans which we find in the Campaign Treasury accounts further demonstrates the inability of the sipahis of the timariot army to secure enough cash to see them through the campaigns.¹⁶⁷

There is a final small group of teslimat entries found only

165. Bacqué-Grammont (1982)

166. Veinstein (1983)

167. Filipović (1953) p.173 also refers briefly, but without citing any references, to borrowings by the sipahis of Bosnia from the Ottoman treasury.

in the account for 1603-04: here, grants rather than loans were made to certain sancakbeyis for the purpose of defraying the costs of campaigning. These grants are designated "be-cihet-i paha-yi sefer", and the recipients were the sancakbeyis of Hersek, Izvornik, Kirka and Pozega.¹⁶⁸ The enfeebled state of the Bosnian economy is often referred to in documents of the period, and this is doubtless the reason that special provision was made to help them.

Adat entries (R) fall into three groups. First, there is a regular payment made to the Tatar han to encourage his participation in support of the Ottoman cause. Secondly, there were annual salary payments made to some principal provincial office-holders, beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis and defterdars, as well as to some clerks of the chancery and finance departments. The third group of entries are the pay supplements of the kapukulu troops.

It was never certain whether Gazi Giray, who was han of the Tatars almost throughout the war, would come on campaign. The subvention which had been paid by the Ottomans to the Tatar hans since 1484,¹⁶⁹ was met partly from the Campaign Treasury during these campaigns.¹⁷⁰ In addition, the han

168. KK 1887 p.11

169. Inalcık, art. Giray (EI)

170. KK 1879 p.14: "adet-i şehriye-yi hazret-i han...108,000 akçe; KK 1885 p.13: "adet-i salyane-yi hazret-i han-i tataran...56,360 akçe; KK 1887 p.12: "adet-i şehriye-yi hazret-i han...150,000 akçe; this subvention appears sometimes to have been paid annually (salyane) and sometimes monthly (şehriye), but it is not clear what proportion of the total due to the han is represented in these accounts. At KK 1885 p.16, in the ihracat category (U), a şehriye payment to him of 200,000 akçe is recorded in the same period when he received 56,360 akçe as salyane.

and his men received gifts (inam)(S)¹⁷¹, as well as other material and financial support.

In Hungary, in the vilayets of Temeşvar, Eğri, Kanije and Buda, and the area along the Danube, the most productive towns and villages were kept in the hands of the sultan as havass-i humayun.¹⁷² High-ranking members of the establishment could therefore not be supported by the income of the lands over which they had administrative authority, but had to be paid an annual salary by the treasury. During these years of war, part of this salyane came from the Campaign Treasury. An additional reason for the unavailability of revenues to pay these men was the inevitable drop in agricultural revenues owing to the war.

The revenues of the Danube finance bureau (Tuna aklamı) were largely consigned as tax-farms (mukataat): the defterdar and the kapudan-i Tuna (commander of the Danube fleet) therefore received a salary from the Campaign Treasury which can notionally be considered as coming from the income paid into the Treasury by the tax-farmers of the area.¹⁷³ The sancakbeyis who are recorded as being recipients of an annual salary in July 1602-February 1603 were those of the Buda sancaks of Şimontorna, Estergon, Istolni Belgrad, the Rumelian sancak of Usküb, and Karesi in the vilayet of

171. KK 1879 p.15: 600,000 akçe were given to the han as a gift; KK 1885 p.14 records the substantial gift of 2,880,180 akçe to Gazi Giray as well as other gifts to his commanders: this account covers the winter months spent by Gazi Giray in Peçuy with his friend Ibrahim Peçevi, a period when he did not participate in the campaign.

172. Káldy-Nagy (1961) p.32

173. KK 1885 p.13; KK 1887 p.12; KK 1879 p.14 does not show a salyane payment to the defterdar-i Tuna, but a payment of 103,000 akçe to Ahmed Bey, mirliva-yi Tuna. KK 1890 p.8 records 128,000 akçe for Seyyid Mustafa, mirliva-yi nehr-i Tuna.

Anadolu.¹⁷⁴ During the period of the account for August 1603-June 1604, in addition to those of Şimontorna and Estergon, the sancakbeyis of Seçen and Seksar (both in the vilayet of Buda) also received salyane payments.¹⁷⁵

While the beylerbeyis of Buda, Temeşvar and Eğri appear regularly as salyane recipients,¹⁷⁶ the number of provincial defterdars receiving salyane widened from being only that of Eğri in 1599-1601 to include those of Kanije, Buda, Temeşvar and of the Danube Bureau. Since we do not have a complete series of Campaign Treasury accounts for the period of the war, we cannot be sure that the apparent widening of the group receiving salyane is not merely a quirk of the accounting system: it is impossible to say, at least from the DSs, whether the salyane amounts given in the campaign accounts are the sum of the monthly totals equivalent to the period covered by each register.¹⁷⁷

It is clear that the Campaign Treasury accounts do not tell the whole story. Accounts for the Buda Treasury which overlap with these campaign accounts show that the salyane of the officials highest in the hierarchy of that vilayet was also funded from local sources. In illustration, we may cite the year 1011 AH (1602-03), during which salyane payments for Ali, the beylerbeyi of Buda, for Ibrahim, defterdar of the Buda Treasury, and for Seyyid Mehmed, mirliva of Estergon were met from both the Campaign Treasury

174. KK 1885 p.13. Also given 6,000 akçe was Arslan Bey mirliva-yi çerakise, commander of an Egyptian cavalry corps (Shaw, 1968 p.9) which was on campaign in Hungary.

175. KK 1887 p.12

176. KK 1879 p.14; KK 1885 p.13; KK 1887 p.12; KK 1890 p.8 has only the beylerbeyis of Buda and Eğri.

177. Despite the name, salyane payments were credited on a monthly basis, at least in Egypt: see Shaw (1968) p.10.

(hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun)¹⁷⁸ and from the Buda Treasury (Buda hazinesi).¹⁷⁹

The third group of adat entries (R) comprises the various allowances paid to the kapukulu troops on campaign, nafaka, kemanbaha etc., to supplement their wages. These have been discussed in Part I.

The giving of gifts by the sultan or his representatives was an integral part of the reward system of the Ottoman Empire. The presents referred to in the accounts as inamat (S) were cash payments; the heading mubayaat (T) mainly describes the purchase for the Campaign Treasury of the robes and rich materials which would subsequently be presented as tokens of approbation to members of the military hierarchy, as well as some bureaucratic necessities such as the paper required for the issuing of orders.¹⁸⁰

Although the han and his commanders were the major recipients, cash inducements and awards were widely distributed to all classes of those participating in the campaigns. Abdülkadir makes frequent mention of cash being

178. KK 1885 p.13 (11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011):

adet-i salyane-yi Ali Paşa mirmiran-i Budin...366,000 akçe

" Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-i Budin...36,000 akçe

" Seyyid Mehmed mirliva-yi Estergon...12,000 akçe

179. MM 6766 p.13 (1 Safar-31 Zilhicce 1011):

adet-i salyane-yi Ali Paşa mirmiran-i Budin...31,800 akçe

" Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-i hazine-yi mezbur

...120,000 akçe

" Seyyid Mehmed mirliva-yi Estergon...42,760 akçe

180. Unlike the DSs of KK 1885, KK 1887 and KK 1890, the mubayaat section (T) of KK 1879 p.16 includes a small number of purchases of provisions and equipment.

given to the troops, particularly at the start of a campaign, or when it was felt that extra encouragement was required. Those digging the trenches for the siege of Yanık in 1594 were given gold and silver,¹⁸¹ and those bringing the earth for reinforcing the earthworks were presented with a purse of gold by the kethüda of the grand vezir Koca Sinan.¹⁸² At the halts on the way to Kanije in 1600, the grand vezir Ibrahim Pasha presented 8 gold pieces to each of the bölük halki, and there were gifts also for the janissaries and others, and for those who were in the thick of the fighting.¹⁸³

References in the accounts to the giving of gifts to those who performed particular services, such as the scouts (kilaguz) and those bringing intelligence, and those taking Christian prisoners,¹⁸⁴ are corroborated by Abdülkadir. For instance, there was a minor confrontation at Niğbolu in winter 1594-95 between the troops of Michael of Wallachia and troops commanded by the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, Hasan Pasha, during which, he reports, 8 gold coins were given to each of those bringing Christian captives.¹⁸⁵ Ambassadors from Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia were another group mentioned as receiving gifts.

181. AK f.22r

182. AK f.22v

183. AK f.132v; Damad Ibrahim was well-known for his generosity, as for the strict discipline which he maintained (PEÇEVI II pp.229-31). In the fighting around Buda and Pest in 1603-4, 60,000 akçe were given to those who fought the Christians in the trenches of Gürz Ilyas (Gellert Hill): "inam bi-bazı kesan der vakt-i ameden-yi küffar an canib-i Tuna der muharebe-yi metris der nezd-i Gürz Ilyas" (KK 1887 p.13).

184. e.g. KK 1879 p.15; KK 1885 p.14; KK 1887 pp.13-14

185. AK f.35r

Outgoings classified as ihracat (U) constitute less than 1% of Campaign Treasury expenditure. In his study of the first Ottoman "budget" for Cyprus, Sahillioğlu suggests that while expenses categorised as teslimat (Q) were made at the behest of orders coming from Istanbul, those designated ihracat were "mahallinde yapılan masraflar", expenses over which decision was taken locally.¹⁸⁶ These expenses were not enshrined in custom, as were, for instance, the subsistence payments for the janissaries, nor could they be anticipated in advance, like the perennial need to transport gunpowder from Selanik to Buda at the start of every season, but they were incidental, arising in the course of a campaign. Most prominent amongst the ihracat entries (U) are individual subsistence payments and travelling costs (harc-i rah), and the rental of carts to carry provisions and military equipment.¹⁸⁷

In addition to the two most important components of eda-yi düyun (V) which could be matched with a corresponding income entry in the Campaign Treasury account,¹⁸⁸ a third type of expenditure is recorded under this head. This arose where too much had been collected as the regular taxes of adet-i ağnam and cizye;¹⁸⁹ the excess, appearing as a debit for the Campaign Treasury, could subsequently be paid out for

186. Sahillioğlu (1967) pp.18-19

187. KK 1879 p.17; KK 1885 pp.15-16; KK 1887 pp.15-16; KK 1890 pp.9-10

188. See the discussions of karz and muhallefat above. KK 1879 pp.17-23 is the only one of the available DSs which provides precise details of the eda-yi düyun items.

189. At KK 1889/V this overpayment is recorded thus: "eda-yi akçe-yi bazı haraccıyan der hin-i mahsubates ziyade mahsub şiden hala eda şide" ("(re)payment of moneys of some (bringers of) the harac (tax, who) overpaid (and are) now reimbursed").

another specified purpose.¹⁹⁰

190. To give a couple of examples:

KK 1879 p.20: "be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi ziyade-yi cizye-yi gebran-i vilayet-i Ipek-i Iskenderiye an vacib-i sene 1007 der uhde-yi Ali Bulgar an silahdaran bölük 71 fi yevm 21 emin ve Bekir Ibrahim an cemaat-i mezbur bölük 123 fi yevm 20 katib ki piş ezin bi-hazine-yi sefer-i humayun bittevarih-i muhtelifi ziyade an al-asl teslim-i hazine kerde bud ziyade-yi mezburler bi-cizye-yi gebran-i vilayet-i Üsküb an vacib-i sene 1008 mahsub şiden fermude ba-ferman-i şerif" (Ali and Ibrahim had collected too much as polltax from Ipek-i Iskenderiye; the excess moneys were to be reassigned, for accounting purposes, to cover the polltax due from Üsküb);

KK 1879 p.21: "be-cihet-i eda-yi ziyade-yi akçe-yi adet-i ağnam-i kaza-yi Florina an vacib-i sene 1007 an tahvil-i Mahmud Sinan an silahdaran bölük 171 fi yevm 8 ve Mehmed Bosna an ebna-yi sipahiyan bölük 171 fi yevm 13 al-havalegan ki piş ezin bi-hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayun bittevarih-i muhtelifi ziyade an al-asl 20,000 akçe teslim kerde bud hala meblağ-i mezburler bi-hazine-yi daden fermude an tahvil-i Hasan çavuş emin-i ganem ki baha-yi guşt-i ganem mahsub şiden fermude ba-ferman-i şerif" (Mahmud and Mehmed were responsible for the collection of the 'sheep tax' from the kaza of Florina, but they had collected 20,000 akçe too much; this 20,000 akçe is now reassigned to the commissioner for sheep supplies for the purchase of mutton).

IIIv. The Accounts of the Hungarian Provincial Treasuries

Another type of documentary source to consider together with the Campaign Treasury account books in trying to understand the financial administration of the Ottoman treasury in wartime, and the financial costs of warfare, is the accounts of the provincial treasuries in Hungary. The Hungarian vilayets of Buda, Kanije, Temeşvar and Eğri, and the vilayet of Bosnia, each had their own local treasury: each of these provinces had its own defterdar, the financial administrator responsible for collecting the state revenues of the area in question.¹⁹¹

For the years of the 1593-1606 war, only one account for the Bosnia Treasury and one for the Kanije Treasury have been found.^{192,193} None for the Eğri Treasury has come to

191. By considering only those vilayets which were required to send the surplus balance on the IEs of their local treasuries to Istanbul, Sahillioğlu (1967) p.2 neglects to mention the existence of the local treasuries of Kanije and Eğri, in addition to those of Buda, Temeşvar and Bosnia.

192. MM 20160 pp.2,8: "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarîf-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Bosna der zaman-i Mehmed Efendi defterdar-i hazine-yi mezbure an 13 Ramazan sene 1010 ila gaye-yi Zilhicce sene 1010" (February-June 1602); this document is unfortunately damaged.

193. MM 5717 pp.111,114: "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarîf-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Kanije der zaman-i Cafer Efendi defterdar-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i mezbure bi-marîfet-i Ibrahim Paşa ve Mehmed Paşa mirmiran-i eyalet-i mezbure an 24 Şaban sene 1013 ila 27 Cumada II sene 1016" (January 1605-October 1607).

light.¹⁹⁴ It is for the Buda Treasury, however, that most data is available, both from the period of the war, and also from the preceding decades. Káldy-Nagy has published the Ds for the period from Receb 965-Zilhicce 967 (May 1558-September 1560);¹⁹⁵ in the Başbakanlık Archives in Istanbul there is an almost complete series of IEs for the years 977-989 AH (1570-81).¹⁹⁶ These accounts enable comparison of the administration of the Buda Treasury in peace and war.

The extant accounts of the Buda Treasury during the period of the 1593-1606 war are:

194. Although we have no accounts for the Eğri Treasury for the period of the war, there is reference to the appointment as defterdar of Eğri of a certain müteferrika, Abdi, one of the clerks of the divan in Safar 1007 AH/September 1598 (KK 255 p.145); see also Röhrborn (1972) p.129 concerning the defterdar of Eğri in 1597, who was also a sancakbeyi. cf. Fekete (1955) I pp.594-609 for the D of the Eğri Treasury in 1031 AH (1621-22).

195. Fekete & Káldy-Nagy (1962) pp.383-699, and commentary (ibid. pp.752-772). Based on this data is Káldy-Nagy (1962), which is concerned with the fiscal administration of the revenues of the Buda Treasury in these years.

196. Register MM 1561 contains the IEs and DSs of the Buda Treasury from 20 Ramazan 977-20 Şevval 986 AH (26 Feb.1570-20 Oct.1578), except for the eight months from 20 Rebi II-25 Zilhicce 985 (July 1577-March 1578); this register is torn, but its early pages appear to contain similar documents dating back to 975 AH (1567-68). MM 498 contains the IEs and DSs of the Buda Treasury from 21 Şevval 986-6 Safar 989 AH (21 Oct.1578-12 March 1581). Both these registers also contain the contemporary accounts for the distribution of wages in this vilayet: "muhasebe-yi tevzi-yi mevacicib...". Fekete records the existence of two further accounts of the Buda Treasury for years prior to the start of the war, both of which are in Leipzig: 987 AH/1579 (Fekete, 1955 I pp.374-93) is part of the D of MM 498 pp.42-43; 988 AH/1580 (Fekete, 1976 p.80).

"Income and Expenditure accounts" (IEs):

MM 6766 pp.4-5: "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Budin der zaman-i Mehmed Paşa mirmiran-i vilayet-i mezbure ve bi-marifet-i Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-i hizane-yi vilayet-i mesfure an 20 Şaban sene 1009 ila 15 Rebi I sene 1010"¹⁹⁷
 ("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the imperial treasury of the vilayet of Buda in the time of Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyi of that vilayet and with the cognizance of Ibrahim Efendi, defterdar of the treasury of that vilayet, from 24 February-13 September 1601").

MM 6766 pp.12-13: "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Budin der zaman-i Mehmed Paşa al-vezir hafiz-i vilayet-i mesfure ve bi-marifet-i Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-i hizane-yi vilayet-i mezbure an 15 Rebi II sene 1010 ila gayet-i Muharrem sene 1011"
 ("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the imperial treasury of the vilayet of Buda in the time of the vezir Mehmed Pasha, protector of that vilayet and with the cognizance of Ibrahim Efendi, defterdar of the treasury of that vilayet, from 13 September 1601-20 July 1602".)

MM 6766 pp.20-21: "icmal-i muhasebe-yi varidat ve masarif-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Budin der zaman-i hazret-i vezir Mehmed Paşa al-vezir mirmiran-i Rumeli ve bi-marifet-i Ibrahim defterdar-i hizane-yi amire-yi vilayet-i mezbure"
 ("summary account of the revenues and expenditures of the imperial treasury of the vilayet of Buda in the time of His Excellency vezir Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyi of Rumeli and with the cognizance of Ibrahim, defterdar of the imperial treasury of that vilayet"; this

197. The terminal date of this account should, in fact, be 15 Rebi II 1010.

account runs from 1 Safar-30 Zilhicce 1011/21 July 1602-10 June 1603.)¹⁹⁸

"Daybook Summaries" (DSs):

Mxt.638 ff.lv-6v: "muhasabe-yi irad ve masarif-i hazine-yi amire-yi vilayet-i Budun...ma' /.../-yi orduyu humayun der zaman-i Mehmed Paşa al-vezir mirmiran-i Rumeli ve Budun nazır-i emval-i Mehmed ve Hüseyin Bey defterdaran-i hizane-yi mezbure an 20 Rebi II sene 1008 ila gaye-yi Zilhicce sene-yi mezbur"¹⁹⁹

("account of the revenue and expenditures of the imperial treasury of the vilayet of Buda...together with the /.../ of the imperial army in the time of the vezir Mehmed Pasha, beylerbeyi of Rumeli and Buda, (and) superintendent of state revenues, and Hüseyin Bey, defterdar of the imperial treasury of Buda from 8 November 1599-12 July 1600".)

198. Transliterations of these IEs are to be found in Appendix 3. In what follows, MM 6766a signifies MM 6766 pp.4-5; MM 6766b = MM 6766 pp.12-13; MM 6766c = MM 6766 20-21.

199. A Hungarian translation of the IE of this account is found in Velics & Kammerer (1886) II pp.688-90.

Mxt.635 ff.22v-28r is the DS of MM 6766 pp.4-5,12-13^{200,201}

MM 6770 pp.30-40 is the DS of MM 6766 pp.20-21

"Daybooks" (Ds):

Mxt.635 ff.1v-20v is the D of MM 6766 pp.4-5,12-13

MM 6770 pp.4-23 is the D of MM 6766 pp.20-21

Comparison of those accounts of the Buda Treasury which cover periods during the war with those for the pre-war period is instructive in both administrative and financial terms. So too, is examination of the relationship between the accounts of the Buda Treasury and the Campaign Treasury. With this in mind, we will take the three IEs of the Buda Treasury during the war as the basis of the discussion that follows, and, unless otherwise stated, it is these to which

200. A Hungarian translation of the IE of this account is found in Velics & Kammerer (1886) II pp.691-95.

201. There is, however, a small, and at present inexplicable, discrepancy between categories of income and expenditure in these accounts; that is, the sum of particular items from MM 6766a and MM 6766b does not always equal that same item as recorded in Mxt.635 ff.22v-28r:

e.g. total income (asl):

MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 7,874,414 + 11,245,886 = 19,120,300 akçe

Mxt.635 = 18,771,278 akçe

tax farm income (mukataa):

MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 802,926 + 114,685 = 917,611 akçe

Mxt.635 = 915,821 akçe

etc.

However, poll tax (cizye-yi gebran):

MM 6766a + MM 6766b = 66,840 + 207,729 = 274,569 akçe

Mxt.635 = 274,569 akçe

It may be seen from the transliterations in Appendix 3 that the accounts of the Buda Treasury were quite often "fudged".

reference is made.²⁰² A full analysis of the Buda Treasury accounts available to us is not a project which can be undertaken in the present study; here we will emphasise those macro aspects of the financial administration of the war which can be understood from the IEs. Unlike the IEs of the Campaign Treasury, these are in a siyakat hand; the unit of account in these accounts is the akçe.²⁰³

Unlike the credit side of the Campaign Treasury accounts, those of the Buda Treasury do not have categories of emval-i müteferrika (B.ii) and varidat-i gayr-i mukarrere (B.iii); the latter category is absent because extraordinary income was paid straight to the Campaign Treasury, and such wartime levies were not, in any case, applied in Hungary, the theatre of war. As to the absence of a category emval-i müteferrika, some revenues which are found in this category in the Campaign Treasury accounts also appear in the Buda Treasury accounts, but recorded under the heading an mahsul-i... (BB).²⁰⁴ Such revenues are administrative fees (rüsum-i...), income from estates of the deceased (beyt ül-mal-i...), and from the sale of provisions to the troops (paha-yi zahire...). There were also certain local taxes which were a legacy of the pre-Ottoman period such as rental

202. i.e. those in register MM 6766. As may be seen from the headings of these IEs, quoted above, there is no obvious logic behind their periodisation: all three accounts were prepared under the auspices of the same officials, Mehmed Pasha and the defterdar Ibrahim. These accounts have no relationship to the solar or lunar year.

203. The IEs of the pre-war accounts of the Buda Treasury (MM 1561; MM 498) are written in a mixture of coin, gold, osmani and pénz being used within the same IE. The pénz was a Hungarian silver coin of approximately the same value as the akçe; the silver osmani had a 4:5 ratio to the akçe (Fekete, 1955 I p.238).

204. The codes according to which the Buda Treasury accounts are coded to the discussion here are AA, BB; PP, QQ, etc.

of shops (icare-yi dekakin) and the fee for a property title (resm-i tapu-yi zemin). In so far as we can extrapolate from the limited data at our disposal, the revenue arising in the vilayet of Buda itself averaged only 17% of the total income of the Buda Treasury during the war.²⁰⁵

The first item of revenue on the credit side of the IEs of the Buda Treasury is a subvention from the Campaign Treasury (AA). This subvention was more than 75% of total revenue. The extent to which the economy and defence of Buda had to be supported by revenues generated outside the vilayet is starkly clear. Comparison with the pre-war accounts of the Buda Treasury further underlines the destruction to the economy of Buda which these campaigns caused, for such a comparison shows that both in total, and in the variety of revenues which it was able to collect, the economy of Buda suffered. Most strikingly, while only 17% of Buda Treasury income was generated locally during the war, before the war this figure had been nearer 70%.²⁰⁶ Of the revenue of the vilayet of Kanije from January 1605-October 1607, almost 90% came from the Central Treasury.²⁰⁷

Before the war, the Buda Treasury received a subvention from the Temesvar Treasury: between the years 977-86 AH (1569-78), this amounted to almost 57m akçe, or an average of 5.5m

205. MM 6766a = 21%; MM 6766b = 14%; MM 6766c = 14.5%

206. This figure is arrived at on the basis of the IEs for the Buda Treasury from 983-89 AH/1575-81 (MM 1561 pp.192,262,300; MM 498 pp.2,42,44); where the mahsul figure itself is low in some of these accounts, it is because the amount brought forward from the previous account ("an bakiye-yi muhasebe-yi sene-yi maziye") is high: a high "bakiye" is in itself a sign of a thriving economy, since it is clear that the Buda Treasury did not remit its profit to the Central Treasury during these years.

207. MM 5717 p.111

akçe p.a. This was earmarked for paying the wages of the troops defending the vilayet of Buda. Between the years 975-78 AH (1567-70) the Central Treasury sent nearly 50m akçe, an average of 16,670,000 akçe p.a., also for wages.²⁰⁸ Thus, we may say that in the period about twenty years before the war, the wage bill of the troops defending the vilayet of Buda against the perceived threat from the Hapsburgs was being subsidised to the tune of over 21m akçe p.a. Between February 1601 and June 1603, this local wage bill amounted to over 28m akçe, or approximately 12 million akçe p.a.²⁰⁹

The apparently lower wage bill during the war may be easily put into its historical context. 975 AH (1566-67) was the first year of peace after the campaigns of Sultan Süleyman, and the subsequent years a time of reconstruction and continued apprehension concerning renewed Hapsburg military action. At such a time, substantial support from the Central Treasury was essential in order to make the province secure against future threat; as in the 1593-1606 war, local revenues were hard hit. However, during the years 983-989 AH (1575-81) there was no Central Treasury subvention for the Buda Treasury;²¹⁰ this was because the then beylerbeyi of Buda, Sokollu Mustafa Pasha, had managed to so increase local revenues that the annual transfer of money was no

208. MM 1561 pp.72-73: the exchange rate is given as 65 akçe to 1 gold coin.

209. The figure of 28 million akçe is a total of MM 6766a,b,c/PP. This figure merely indicates an order of magnitude and does not pretend to be a precise comparison; particular reasons for this are first, that in 992 AH (1584) the akçe was devalued, and secondly, as we have seen, the wages of the troops were often paid some months or years after they were due.

210. MM 1561 pp.192,262,300; MM 498 pp.2,42,44.

longer necessary.²¹¹ His success was such that even the wages of all the troops serving in Buda could be met from local revenues supplemented by the subvention from Temeşvar; the vilayet of Buda was, in times of peace, a highly productive area, and the vilayet of Temeşvar was a secure area before the renewal of Hapsburg-Ottoman warfare and the defection of the Principalities.

There is no trace of the revenue of the Egyptian Treasury (Mısr hazinesi) being credited to either the Buda Treasury, nor, indeed, to the Campaign Treasury. Both Fekete and Káldy-Nagy maintain that the 300,000 gold pieces of Egypt's annual remittance to the Ottoman treasury were sent directly to Buda for the payment of the troops stationed in Hungary.²¹² This may have been true in Süleyman's time, but even this remains to be proved;²¹³ the accounts of the Buda Treasury show that it was not the case between 1570 and 1581,²¹⁴ nor between 1599 and 1603.²¹⁵

211. MM 1561 p.156 (IE for 8 Cum.II 981-7 Cum.II 982/5 September 1573-24 September 1574): "bundan akdem vilayet-i Budun mevacibi için hizane-yi amireden 350,000-400,000 altun virilügelüp dokuz yıldan berü Mustafa Paşa kulları vilayet-i Budin'e vali olup vilayeti ve mal-i padişahi-yi tashih etmekle mahsulu masrafına vefa edüp hizane-yi amireden altun virilmeyüp ancak Temeşvar hazinesinden 4,000,000 akçe virilüp eyyam-i saadet-i padişahdan vilayet ma'mur olmağla 300,000-400,000 flori hazine-yi amireye sa'y olmuştur".

212. Fekete (1976), pp.63-64; Káldy-Nagy (1971) p.244. Their common source is PEÇEVI I p.36.

213. There is little evidence available on this matter: in 1547-48, (some part of) the Mısr hazinesi was certainly paid into the Central Treasury (Barkan, 1954/a p.246); Káldy-Nagy also adduces Fekete & Káldy-Nagy (1962) p.771 in support of his contention, but here there is no mention of the Mısr hazinesi to be found.

214. MM 1561; MM 498

215. Mxt.638; MM 6766

I

Looking at the Egyptian end of the transaction, we find in the account of the Egyptian Treasury for 1596-97 that over 4 million akçe was remitted to the Porte ("dergah-i ali").²¹⁶ Reference has already been made to Ahmed III's insistence that the Mısır hazinesi was part of his private purse, and his refusal to allow it to be used to subsidise the eastern campaign in 1606.²¹⁷ Money from the sultan's private purse, the Inner Treasury, was sent to finance the campaigns in Hungary; however, in view of the precision of the Ottoman accountants in describing the sources from whence came the incomes of the various treasuries, it is unlikely that the income of the Mısır hazinesi would have been concealed, being recorded indistinguishably in the subvention paid into the Campaign Treasury, and thence into the Buda Treasury, from the Central Treasury or from the Inner Treasury. The Buda Treasury accounts show, at the least, that the Mısır hazinesi was not sent "directly" to Buda in this period.

In the accounts of the Persian campaigns of Murad IV some 25 years later, there is overt evidence of moneys from Egypt having been expended in support of these military expeditions. In 1624-25, over 37 million akçe was sent from

216. Shaw (1968) pp.80-81. The ruling rate of exchange was 4 para:1 akçe (ibid. p.18). For 1604 there is evidence that the remittance from Egypt was ordered to be sent to Istanbul, and the wording of the order does not suggest that this was unusual: "Mısır'da vezir Mehmed Paşa hükmü ki her sene astane-yi saadetime irsal olunagelen hazineyi ve matbah-i amireme lazım olanları vakti ve zamaniyle ala at-tacil tedarik ve astane-yi saadetime irsal eyleyüp.." (MD 75/675). The size and destination of remittances for other years of the war are recorded in MM 1999 and MM 5672 (Shaw, 1968 p.16).

217. PEÇEVI II p.327: "...Mısır hazinesi bizim ceb harçlığımızdır ondan nice verilür...".

the Egyptian Treasury to the Campaign Treasury;²¹⁸ in 1626-27, nearly 49 million akçe was sent; in 1627-28, 57,526,920 akçe; and slightly less than this amount in 1630-31.²¹⁹

The debit side of the IEs of the Buda Treasury follows an almost similar pattern to that of the Campaign Treasury, lacking, in some cases, only the category of teslimat (Q). The items which comprised teslimat in the Campaign Treasury accounts, loans (karz) to high-ranking military officers, and moneys given to agents responsible for the purchase of provisions and equipment, were not funded from the Buda Treasury. Provisions for (some of) the soldiers garrisoning Buda are accounted for simply as purchases (mubayaat) (TT).

The category of Campaign Treasury expenditure relating to the payment of wages to the troops stationed in Hungary (P.v) and headed merely "mevacib-i neferat-i kila-yi...", could not be fully understood on the basis of those accounts alone. Although the periods covered by the available accounts of the Campaign Treasury and the Buda Treasury do not exactly coincide, some further elucidation is found in the IEs of the Buda Treasury accounts. Here, by far the major part of the wage burden of the Buda Treasury supported a similarly named group.²²⁰ From the DSs of these IEs, it may be seen that these "neferat-i kila..." were garrison troops: local ("yerli") topçus, cebecis etc., as well as the

218. Murphey (1979) p.447: three separate categories of subvention to the Campaign Treasury are shown here; these are the hazine-yi enderun, the hazine-yi birun and the hazine-yi Mısır.

219. Murphey (1979) pp.457,463,471

220. MM 6766a/PP.1; MM 6766b/PP.1; MM 6766c/PP.1: in the two former IEs, the gloss "ber mucib-i defter residan" indicates the existence of a separate account devoted to the details of distribution of the wages of this group (cf. note 221).

local troops designated levend, that is martolos, farisan etc.²²¹ The janissaries whose pay constitutes the second largest segment of the wage bill of the Buda Treasury at this time (PP.ii) are described as "...-i mahruse-yi Budin": it is not clear whether these were local janissaries or men of this corps stationed temporarily in Buda.²²²

These registers of the Buda Treasury are far from having been fully exploited; however, within the context of the financing of the 1593-1606 war, three general issues, already referred to in this study, have been clarified. The first of these is the extent to which the defence against the Hapsburgs relied on moneys generated outside the area, and the impoverishment of Hungary, and particularly of the vilayet of Buda, at this time; the pre-war accounts show productive the area could be. The cost of the border garrisons is a topic frequently referred to in the secondary literature, but without any quantitative data to back up the assertion. Indeed, the topic is usually discussed in order to demonstrate, fallaciously, that the Ottomans should not have incorporated Hungary into the Empire, for it cost them more to garrison than it produced in taxation. 61.2

The second matter which has been somewhat clarified is that we need a lot more detail than is usually available at the macro level in order to understand exactly which troops are being referred to in any particular context. The numbers of men included in any category is only clear at the micro

221. Each of the DSs Mxt.638, Mxt.635 and MM 6770 has an appendix giving further details of the distribution of wages to both these types of local troops; there are similar appendices for the pre-war period: MM 1561; MM 498 (cf. note 196 above).

222. Mxt.638 f.2v; Mxt.635 f.24v; MM 6770 p.32: the epithet "...-i dergah-i ali is not used to describe them.

level of detail, and global figures for the various types of troops, as well as for revenues and expenditures, are, at the best, inexact; the order of magnitude which they purport to give may be similarly inexact.

The third, related issue which has become still clearer through our discussion of the accounts of the Buda Treasury is the transfer of funds for administrative purposes, the way in which a debit on one type of account is recorded as a credit in another; this emphasises, once again, the hierarchy of accounts which, pieced together, enable us to build up a more accurate picture of the Ottoman accounting system. This is the subject of the next section.

IIIvi. The Campaign Treasury Accounts, the Ottoman Accounting System and the Financing of the War

Now that we have examined the details of the items of revenue and expenditure in the accounts which are a financial record of some of the Ottoman campaigns between 1593 and 1606, we are in a position to comment on the elusive matter of the "total cost" of Ottoman warfare at this time, to evaluate these accounts as a source for understanding the financing of the war, and also to be able to describe the Ottoman style of accounting as exemplified in these registers.

Notably absent from the Campaign Treasury accounts is the cost of heavy equipment and war material - what is described in the sources as mühimmat. During the course of a campaign many military equipment requirements were met locally, but each campaigning force also began the season with an extensive armoury, manufactured, for the most part, in Istanbul. The costs of this, cannon, guns, and a mass of ancillary equipment were not funded through the Campaign Treasury, but largely from Central Treasury moneys allocated to various accounts specifically for the purpose of producing such materials and equipment. It thus becomes apparent that these Campaign Treasury accounts may be considered as documenting only the 'running costs' of military campaigning during the period of the 1593-1606 war, that is, the expenditures which arose in the theatre of war. The 'capital costs' of the manufacture and supply of ordnance are, for the most part, recorded elsewhere.

Related to the character of the Campaign Treasury accounts as being a particular type of record of the events of the war, is the extent to which the 'great events' of the war, the major confrontations which have traditionally been the concern of military historians, are apparent in the account entries. Since the accounts are a record of the day-to-day conduct of campaigns, it may be expected that they would contain evidence of a military build-up before, for

instance, the onset of a siege. The major offensive actions covered by the campaign account registers are Satırcı Mehmed Pasha's unsuccessful siege of Varad in 1598 (KK 1876); Damad Ibrahim Pasha's attempted siege of Uyvar in 1599 and his successful expedition to take Kanije from the Hapsburgs in the following year (KK 1879); the recapture of Istolni Belgrad in 1602 (KK 1885); and the failed attempt by the Ottomans to retake Estergon in 1604 (KK 1889).

Scrutiny of the entries in the Ds around the weeks of these important actions do not, however, show much evidence of the mobilisation of military resources which are the sine qua non of siege warfare. For Satırcı Mehmed's late-autumn attempt to capture Varad, which came after his forces had successfully taken Çanad (Csanádpalota) some weeks earlier, payment for the transport of armaments to and from Varad is recorded.²²³ No account entries related so explicitly to a particular action are recorded around the time of the siege of Uyvar.

The steps taken in the aftermath of the capture of Kanije late in 1600 are more eloquently described than any preparations: these include the purchase of provisions for the troops who were appointed to garrison this fortress

223. e.g. KK 1876 p.166 (1 Rebi II 1007/1 November 1598) viz: "der menzil-i Varad: teslim be-Mehmed Çelebi katib-i cebehane-yi dergah-i ali be-cihet-i ücret-i arabacıyan ve sūtürbanan beray-i keşide-yi cebehane an Belgrad ila Varad..."; (ibid.): "teslim be-Ismail Paşa mirmiran-i Temesvar beray-i paha-yi gav beray-i keşide-yi top..."; (ibid. 5 Rebi II 1007/5 November 1598): "be-cihet-i paha-yi gav ve beray-i keşide-yi topha an Varad ila kale-yi Solnok biddefaat...". According to Danişmend's chronology (q.v.), the siege of Varad was raised on 3 Rebi II 1007 AH (3 November 1598).

which was now in Ottoman hands for the first time,²²⁴ and, more prominently, the payment of back wages to those assigned to garrison Kanije, who were posted there from Sigetvar and elsewhere. Some of these men had not been paid for 15 months.²²⁵ 2,671 janissaries, 30 cebecis, 72 topçus, 50 arabacis and 25 members of the altı bölük regiments were the kapukulu troops stationed in Kanije immediately after its capture.²²⁶ Just as the wages of the soldiers coming from Sigetvar and elsewhere were paid up to date, so large part of the pay of these kapukulu contingents was in gold. Many robes were presented to aghas and çavuşes, in particular, as was usual on such victorious occasions.²²⁷

The accounts do not contain evidence of great movement of materials for the siege of Istolni Belgrad in 1602; the same can be said with regard to the main confrontation of 1604, the unsuccessful Ottoman attempt to retake Estergon. The achievement of the peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606, however, necessitated the dispensing of largesse to very many dignitaries, Hapsburg, Ottoman and Hungarian, and resulted in a separate account which records the details of who received gifts of ceremonial robes.²²⁸

In siege warfare it is the besiegers who have the advantage of timing the engagement, and, for the Ottoman offensives

224. e.g. KK 1879 p.402 (23 Rebi II 1009/1 November 1600): "teslim be-Kara Ali çavuş an çavuşan-i dergah-i ali beray-i iştira-yi zahire-yi kale-yi Kanije der kaza-yi Sigetvar...". According to Danişmend (q.v.), Kanije surrendered on 13 Rebi II 1009/22 October 1600.

225. e.g. KK 1879 p.408 (25 Rebi II 1009/3 November 1600): "mevacib-i cemaat-i neferat-i Sigetvar ve gayrihi der kale-yi Kanije tayin vacib an gurre-yi masar sene 1008 ila gaye-yi Rebi II 1009...".

226. KK 1879 pp.409,411

227. KK 1879 p.411

228. KK 1890 pp.298-305

referred to here, it is certain that preparations other than those which were part of the normal activity of supporting an army in the field must have been made. Yet specific preparations for a specific engagement are not conspicuous in the Campaign Treasury accounts. The possible explanations for this apparent anomaly give further insight into these campaign accounts, and into the character of Ottoman accounting in general.

First of all, it may be that, even on the basis of the evidence in the Campaign Treasury accounts, more preparation was being made than is evident: since the D entries rarely give details of the source and destination of the materials being moved around, it cannot be said where such movements took place. Unless the scene of the engagement is mentioned, as are Varad and Kanije in the examples quoted above, movement of military equipment cannot be tied to a specific engagement. Secondly, the services performed by those who were tax-exempt in recognition of their performance of such auxiliary duties, for instance the yürüks who assisted in the transport of cannon, are not recorded in the accounts. The Campaign Treasury accounts record only goods and services that were paid for in cash: the fact that they do not contain evidence of extraordinary mobilisation of resources before any particular engagement is due to such mobilisation being a cost that was hidden in the state and military infrastructure. The major part of the cost of the services used in this war was built in to the wages of the troops on the state payroll and a major part of the cost of the military goods mobilised was accounted for elsewhere than in these accounts, for instance, in the accounts of the armoury (cebehane) or the cannon foundry (tophane). *Transport in 600?*

As an indication of the financial costs of war, then, the accounts of the Campaign Treasury have only limited

value.²²⁹ The financial costs of war are largely unquantifiable, but, if quantifiable and quantified, would be somewhat greater than the total expenditure shown in the IEs of the Campaign Treasury during these years of war. This impossibility of quantifying the costs of war in the Ottoman Empire is frustrating, because such quantification would give us one index of the importance of war in the global Ottoman economy, and thus, could address an important aspect of the theoretical question of the nature of the Ottoman state, the extent of its militarisation, and so on. Platitudes abound on the 'military' as the predominant characteristic of the Ottoman Empire, for instance, Andreski's view that "...the (Ottoman) state was really an army on the march",²³⁰ or Sugar's calculation that 96% of Ottoman expenditure was on troops alone.²³¹

Since these accounts of the Campaign Treasury are no reflection of the financial position of the Ottoman army at war during these years, it may be asked, therefore, what was the function of these accounts for their compilers? None of the contemporary western powers seems to have kept such a daily record of campaign revenues and expenditures. The integrity of the financial departments of the Ottoman Empire was preserved through the use of the siyakat script, a miniaturised and angular version of the cursive divani hand used for the work of other departments of state at this time. Numbers expressed in siyakat as Arabic words could not be read by those who had not learned the skill, but were

229. Imber (1972) pp.203-04 has emphasised this point in relation to an account relating to Barbarossa's 1539 Herceg Novi naval expedition.

230. Andreski (1968) p.137

231. Sugar (1978) p.98: the title of this article is "A near perfect military society: the Ottoman Empire"; in the simplistic analysis which he attempts, the author can only arrive at uninformative conclusions.

also hard to forge, since, for instance, extra noughts could not be added. In some of the Campaign Treasury account registers which we have analysed, daily totals of income and expenditure are given, but this practice is by no means prevalent. On occasion, specific sets of figures are summed in the margin, presumably when the summary accounts were being prepared, but such calculations are rare.

The shortcomings of siyakat as a practical tool of accounting in the sense in which we understand it today, or as it was understood in the contemporary European accounts of early capitalism, had no relevance for the Ottomans. War is not a commercial venture, and warfare has never been subject to the rationale of the balance sheet; thus, although the Ottomans, like any warring state, must have been concerned that they did not have to spend more than absolutely necessary, they had no opportunity to make informed decisions as to possible cost containment. No account could ever have altered that fact.

A clue to the function of the accounts of the Campaign Treasury accounts, as of other accounts of the Ottoman treasury, is given in the headings of the accounts themselves. Their function was primarily interdictive for, by coinciding with the appointment of named officials, it made those named officials responsible to the sultan for the moneys whose use is recorded in the accounts. This interdictive function was passed on to those who participated in the financial transactions which allowed the army to operate, by the careful documenting of each transaction on presentation to the accountant of the receipt (makbuz, temessük). During the 1593-1606 war, the IEs were shown to the sultan, who at least pretended an interest in the progress of the war, and

the conduct of his officers.²³²

The system of accounting was simple; the lags between the due date of moneys and the date when they were paid into the Campaign Treasury could be many months. The frequent late payment of wages was another device which distorts the value of these accounts as a global statement even of the cash revenues accruing and the cash expenditures which were incurred in the period defined in the account-heading. The financing of war was the most irresistible of all demands made on the resources of a state, and one whose parameters could not be predicted, but which had to be met quickly. In their mobilisation of the financial resources which would enable them to fight the 1593-1606 war, the Ottomans could not hope to act according to a predetermined plan, but could only use the variety of means at their disposal to raise as much money as was feasible.

Thus, although analysis of the accounts of the Campaign Treasury does not result in global measures which can enable us to posit confidently that any certain percentage of the resources of the Ottoman Empire was spent on the financing of war, these accounts are the piece of the jigsaw of "total cost" which is most diverse in character: accounts of the other costs of warfare at this time are more circumscribed in their detail, referring to more defined enterprises. It has, I hope, been shown that the accounts of the Campaign and Hungarian Treasuries are a most important source for an understanding of how money was raised for the war and how it was spent, and of the changes apparent in these activities even during the span of the war.

232. The phrase "paye-yi serir-i alaya okundu" followed by the date is noted in the IEs; on the first page of register KK 1879, for instance, which covers Zilkade 1007-Zilkade 1009, this date is Zilhicce 1012, three years after the close of the account.

CONCLUSION

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Logistics is the problem of allocating existing resources in the pursuit of an objective, as well as "creating" new resources for the same purpose. How the Ottomans performed these two related tasks with the objective of defending the north-western borders of their Empire against a perceived Hapsburg threat has been the subject of this study. Conclusions to be derived from this study are thus the restatement and amplification of certain themes already discussed, which often consolidate lines of enquiry indicated by others, as well as an attempt to suggest what such a detailed study of a period of only a few years may contribute to Ottoman history in more general terms. Consideration of the neglected subject of Ottoman warfare also hints at many abstract issues to which answers will only slowly be found.

The existence of a crisis in the Ottoman polity in the later part of the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth century is widely accepted, although its nature is subject to conflicting interpretations. This crisis concerns the disruption of the so-called "classical" pattern of land-holding and revenue extraction as exemplified in the timar system. The timar system linked the satisfaction of the major part of the military manpower needs of the Empire to the decentralised taxation of the subject population: the provincial cavalry, which was numerically the largest section of the army, itself collected the taxes which were its financial support, without direct state intervention.

In a sense, then, the administration of the provisioning of the army in the 1593-1606 war is an issue subsidiary to consideration of the administration of manpower and finance for the war, and it is to this subject that we will turn first. With the exception of Veinstein's two studies of the mechanics of the provisioning of the Ottoman army in

Süleyman's time,¹ this topic has not been discussed in depth before. The state was responsible for supplying only a small section of the total army, the kapukulu ocakları, the standing army of the Porte. Although this contingent was always increasing in size, it was relatively unimportant in the context of the tens of thousands of other Ottoman troops who were fighting in Hungary at this time and about whose provisioning we have only few details. The area from which the necessary supplies were drawn was a fertile one, and it is clear that sufficient food and fodder could be furnished from the European half of the Empire alone: even with areas of Bosnia and Hungary devastated by the war, the province of Rumeli remained secure and productive. In such favourable circumstances there were certain notional limits as to what was acceptable behaviour from those troops for whose provisioning the state was not directly responsible: in particular, the produce of the reaya was not to be taken gratis, and land over which the Ottomans could reasonably envisage gaining control was not to be plundered. To consider such limitations as a "provisioning policy" may, however, be an exaggeration.

By contrast, the situation of the troops fighting on the Persian border between 1578 and 1590, and again from 1603 to 1612, must have been very different, and the hand of the state may have been more in evidence. Kütükoğlu's study of the 1578-90 eastern campaigns does not set out to give a systematic treatment of provisioning, but he shows that the area from which supplies were drawn was much wider and more distant from the theatre of war, including Moldavia and Wallachia, the Danube area, Egypt and Cyprus.² Ensuring the supply of food and fodder for the troops in the east clearly put greater strain on the logistic apparatus than was the

1. Veinstein (1983); Veinstein (198.)

2. B.Kütükoğlu (1962) pp.31-34

case in Hungary.

Warfare inevitably stretches whatever resources a state can command, but of all the resources which had to be mobilised for this war in Hungary, it was food and fodder that was most readily available. Provisioning cannot, however, be treated in isolation. Through the medium of the extraordinary 'in-kind' and 'in-cash' taxes levied in time of war, an intimate relationship existed between food supply and taxation. There was a similarly close relationship between the mobilisation of the civilian population to perform certain wartime services, and the subsequent substitution of a cash burden for such services. In the present study, the logistic function served by the transformation from an 'in-kind' to an 'in-cash' burden has been emphasised, for this change obviated the need to transport huge amounts of provisions from where they were produced to where they were to be consumed, since it allowed greater flexibility in assigning tasks necessary to the conduct of the war. The subject of the increasing monetarisation of the economy has preoccupied other historians, and this important issue has been given further definition here, through close examination of the accounts of the Campaign Treasury.

The mobilisation of sufficient manpower to fight in Hungary was a problem of a different order from the supply of food and of auxiliary services. Apart from the obvious difficulties experienced by Asian sipahis in covering the distance to Hungary - where they often wintered in the field and yet needed to retain control over their affairs at home - two other trends are significant. First of all, the tendency for officials of the central bureaucracy to be awarded timar-lands as payment added to the disaffection of the traditional provincial class, as is shown in complaints that the best timars were being given to these parvenus, and in the desire of the sipahis to be subject to separate mobilisation arrangements. The state clearly made attempts to persuade this new class of land-holders to fight in the

campaigns, but the extent of their success is not ascertainable. The state's attempt to avoid having to find cash to pay its officials led to the awarding as income of provincial offices which had traditionally carried a military obligation, thus lessening whatever cohesion the class of military fief-holders might formerly have had.

A second trend affecting the provincial cavalry was part of the shared experience of all European armies over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There was a general shift in emphasis from cavalry to infantry, brought about by factors such as technological improvement in methods of warfare and the relative cheapness of equipping an infantryman.³ Reaya from Bosnia, in particular, were conscripted or attracted to join the army, often with the promise of a permanent place in the ranks in the future. The increased demand for manpower from the time of renewed war with Persia in 1603, and, prior to this, owing to government efforts to suppress the Celali revolts, was met in the only possible way, through widespread recruitment.

There can be no doubt that the widening of recruitment into the Ottoman army had profound financial repercussions. Traditional revenue sources were insufficient to meet the burden of the greater numbers of men who were paid, for the most part, in cash. Therefore, the government had to look for new sources of finance to pay the troops fighting in this war, and ample reference has been made to the ways in which money was raised through loans to the treasury, late payment of wages and increased monetarisation of the war economy. So too, erosion of the distinction between the personal revenues of the sultan and those of the public treasury, shown in the struggle between the sultan and his

3. Parker (1976) esp. pp.207-08: serious consideration of this article in the context of the Ottoman Empire would be valuable in demystifying the Ottoman "military revolution" of the sixteenth-seventeenth century.

military commanders over revenues which he had traditionally considered to be his, was a further "new" financial resource which was tapped to fund the war. The financial pressures exerted by the relentless demands for money brought about by years of campaigning were relieved by resort both to resources available within the higher echelons of the military-civil bureaucracy as well as by the imposition of heavier tax burdens on the subject population.

The financial crisis which was part of the upheaval in the traditional structure of Ottoman society also brought greater prominence to bureaucratic officials at the expense of the (admittedly far from homogenous) military classes. Röhrborn's excellent article on the rise of the financial bureaucracy at the end of the sixteenth century has not received the attention it merits.⁴ Finding the money to continue the war was the most important of all the administrative tasks facing the government: it has been pointed out that the Campaign Treasury accounts which were discussed in Part III are the earliest extant - they may well be the earliest to have existed, a fact which would underline the emergence of a new concern with financial husbandry.⁵ The part played by the defterdar Etmekçizade Ahmed Pasha has been mentioned before: his responsibility for direct collection of the revenues of Rumeli for the Campaign Treasury, which otherwise reached this treasury by way of a

4. Röhrborn (1972)

5. The significance of account books in the army of Ferdinand and Isabella is discussed in an interesting article by Stewart (1969): he emphasises the role of accounting practice in establishing central control over the army, and also implies that the existence of accounts could have a part in decisions as to future expenditures. Although this function of the accounts of the Ottoman Campaign Treasury has been underplayed in the present study, the existence of accounts may have had some such value in the longer term.

Central Treasury subvention, has been noted, as has the fact that he was the first defterdar to be made a pasha. The specific measures which he adopted in order to raise more money are not apparent, but further reading of the contemporary chronicles may yield such information. His methods may have relied simply on more efficient tax collection: the increase in the revenues of Buda which Sokollu Mustafa Pasha was able to bring about in the 1570s has shown that the efforts of a capable individual could bring results.

The costs of the Hungarian border defences were, as we have seen, borne by the central government. It was obviously considered desirable that Hungary should produce as much revenue as was feasible, but the taxation measures introduced when the area came under Ottoman control were not too onerous. Local revenues were minimal during the war and the area almost entirely dependent on external funding. Hungary was not subject to irregular taxation during the war, and Bosnia, too, was relieved of such burdens owing to its obvious inability to pay. Beyond orders to local treasury officials that they should make efforts to increase provincial revenues, it appears that no serious attempt was made to make the area pay for itself: this was clearly out of the question in any case.

The local resources of other contemporary states were not, either, sufficient to meet the costs of occupying and defending a border area considered essential to the integrity of the state. Spanish attempts to make the Netherlands pay for themselves in the second half of the sixteenth century were not realised, despite the imposition of taxes of such severity that many went over to the prince of Orange when he invaded in 1572,⁶ while the costs of the

6. Parker (1981) esp. pp.139-45

defence of the Austrian border in Croatia were considered too serious a matter to be a local responsibility.⁷ Unlike these other states, though, the Ottoman Empire responded to the demand for financial resources by reliance on those to be raised within its own borders. The longer-term consequences of these differing responses has not been considered from a comparative perspective, and cannot be discussed on the basis of the present study: it should, however, be raised as a possible avenue for further discussion.

The concept of the allocation of resources implies that there was a degree of choice open to those responsible for administering the raising of an army, for its food supply and for deciding from where would come the financial support to keep it functioning; in practice, the solutions adopted relied largely on custom and precedent, as well as on what was considered politically feasible. Frequent reference has been made throughout this study to "the military command", "the government" and "the Porte". The use of such generalisations to denote those responsible for directing the course of the war is dictated by the fact that Ottoman prosopographical studies are in their infancy. Prosopographical work done to date has tended to concentrate on the backgrounds of "élite" individuals and groups, for the most part ignoring their rôle as political actors. The struggles over the distribution of power in the Ottoman state have so far been little studied. Although Abdülkadir and Hasanbeyzade make some reference to discussion of certain strategic issues during the course of campaign, it has unfortunately not been possible to discover who made logistic decisions of either a general or particular nature.

7. Rothenburg (1960) pp.13-51

This study of warfare during a specific period raises wider theoretical questions concerning the place of warfare in the life of the Ottoman Empire. Hitherto, little serious attention has been given to this issue, with the result that discussion remains at best simplistic. The twin notions that the territorial conquests of the Ottoman Empire were the result of an irresistible drive inspired by cihad, and that the Empire went to war solely to win booty, remain resilient. Once the history of the Ottoman Empire is discussed in terms which are comparable to those according to which the history of other states is discussed, and less emphasis placed on the "peculiar" features of Ottoman society, then we will be in a better position to begin to understand the dynamic processes operating behind the static facade presented to contemporary western observers and to today's non-specialists.

Note of Abbreviations used

/.../ original text illegible

... a) original text omitted in transliteration for reasons of brevity, or, b) in the case of account entries, such a mark is used to connect text to the sum of money in question

() lacuna in original text

IE "Income and Expenditure Account"

DS "Daybook Summary"

D "Daybook"

Note on Weights

Understanding of the weights and measures used in the Ottoman Empire at various times is an essential preliminary for economic history: however, our knowledge of this matter is still scanty. An important study is Inalcik (1983). The metric equivalents used here are those in Hinz (1955) viz:

1 kantar = 56.443 kg

1 kile/keyl = 20 okka wheat or flour = 25.656 kg
= 10 okka rice = 12.828 kg

1 okka/vukiye/kiyye = 1.283 kg

1 dirhem = 3.086 gm

GAZETTEER and MAP

Two major problems make it difficult to be consistent in the form of place-names in the Ottoman Empire. First, in Hungary in particular, many places were known by as many as four different names: in the text, therefore, it is the Ottoman place-name which is used, with the present-day European name given in brackets at first mention. In the list below the Ottoman name is in the first column, the present name (or the English name) is in the second, and the contemporary German name has been added in the third column in some instances. However, those places most familiar to English readers are given in their English rendition, for instance, Vienna rather than Beç (Ottoman) or Wien (German).

Secondly, the boundaries of Ottoman administrative districts, vilayet/eyalet, sancak/liva and kaza appear to have shifted fairly frequently, and the boundaries of sancaks and kazas of the same name partially overlapped. Sancaks and kazas are therefore not delimited on the map: where it is the central town of such districts that is most frequently alluded to in the text, rather than the district itself, the town rather than the district is shown on the map. During a period of war, when land was being lost and won, such problems were compounded, for the border between Ottoman-held Hungary and Hapsburg-held Hungary shifted from month to month in these years.

Any map of the European domains of the Ottoman Empire must therefore be a compromise, and that given here is intended only for reference. Places in southern Greece and Albania as well as in the Asian part of the Empire which are mentioned in the text have not been included; the reader who wishes to establish the location of these must turn for further details to the publications available. Pitcher (1972) is the standard historical atlas of the Ottoman Empire; Birken (1976) gives lists and maps of the vilayets and sancaks of the Empire as they changed over time, while Özergin (1976) shows the location of the kazas of much of the Ottoman Balkans later in the seventeenth century.

Akkerman	Belgorod	
Alacahisar	Kruševac	
Arad		
Banaluka	Banja Luka	
Beç	(Vienna)	
Behke	Bihac	Wihitsch
Belgrad	Belgrade	Griechisch Weissenburg
Boğdan	(Moldavia)	
Brusa	Bursa	
Budin, Budun	Buda	Ofen
Bulundvar		
Bükreş	(Bucharest)	
Cankurtaran	Adony	
Cezayir	(Algeria)	
Cisr-i Mustafa	Svilengrad	
Paşa		
Çanad	Csanádpalota	
Çatalca		
Edirne (Adrianople)		
Eflak	(Wallachia)	
Eğri	Eger	Erlau
Engürüs	(Hungary)	
Erdel	(Transylvania)	
Erdevik		
Estergon	Esztergom	Gran
Filek	Fil'akovo	
Filibe	Plovdiv	
Gelibolu (Gallipoli)		
Güns	Kőszeg	
Haçova	Mezőkeresztes	
Halkali		
Hatvan		
Hirebolu	Hayrabolu	
Hisarcık	Grocka	
Ibrail	Braila	
Istolni Belgrad	Szekesfehérvár	Stuhlweissenburg
Kanije	Nagykanisza	
Kara Boğdan (see Boğdan)		
Kazanlık	Kazanlak	

Kırkkilise	Kırklareli
Komran	Komárom
Kopan	Törökkoppány
Krim	(Crimea)
Leh	(Poland)
Lipova	
Mısır	(Egypt)
Mohaç	Mohács
Nemce	(Austria)
Nigbolu	Nikopol
Niş	
Novigrad	Nógrád
Ossek	Osijek
Ozü	Ochakov
Palota	Várpalota
Pançova	Pančevo
Papa	Pápa
Peçuy	Pécs
Peşte	Pest
Rodoscuk (Rodosto)	Tekirdağ
Samartin	Szent Márton
Sarı Brod	Dimitrovgrad
Saray	
Seçen	Szécsény
Segedin	Szeged
Seksar	Szekszárd
Semendre	Smederevo
Sigetvar	Szigetvár
Sikloş	Siklós
Siroz	Serrai
Siska	Sisak
Sirem	Srem
Solnok	Szolnok
Sombor	Szombor
Şhirköy	Pirot
Şimontorna	Simontornya
Tata	
Temeşvar	Timișoara
Tergovişte	Tirgoviste

Tokaĵ		
Uyvar	N.Zámky	Neuhausel
Usküb	Skopje	
Usküdar (Scutari)		
Vaç	Vác	Waitzen
Varad	Oradea	Grosswardein
Varna		
Vesprem	Veszprém	
Vişegrad	Visegrád	
Vize		
Yanık	Győr	Raab
Yenihisar	Petrinja	
Yenipalanka	Drégelypalánk	
Yeni Zagora	Nova Zagora	
Yergögü	Giurgiu	
Zemun		Semlin


Map overleaf:

Ottoman Europe during the 1593-1606 Campaigns*

Key:

M O L D A V I A	major administrative districts: <u>vilayets</u> and vassal states
BUCHAREST •	towns and fortresses
Sigetvar •	
Ohri	minor administrative districts: <u>sancaks</u> and <u>kazas</u>
SAVA R.	rivers

* Prepared by Michael Chrysostomou



DANUBE R.

TRANSYLVANIA

MUREŞUL R.

MOLDAVIA

TEMEŞVAR

WALLACHIA

DANUBE R.

BLACK SEA

RUMELI

ADRIATIC SEA

TISZA R.

EĞRI

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A NOTE ON SOURCES

Chronicles

One of the problems which Ottoman historians continually have to contend with is that the historical literature which constitutes one of their main sources has received little analytic study. With such a wealth of literature available, and relatively few scholars working in this field, few critical editions of chronicles have been published to date. This means having to rely either on the manuscripts, or microfilms of those manuscripts, which are most easily accessible, or else on uncritical and predominantly nineteenth-century publications of often unspecified texts of chronicles. Basic study concerning the author, his sources, and the various versions of the texts of his work is, with few notable exceptions, only now being done.

A number of contemporary literary sources are relevant to the period of the 1593-1606 campaigns in Hungary: there are the poetic works of Talikzade, Hoca Saadüddin, Emini Çelebi, Derviş Agha and Nevizade Atai; there is also prose gazavatname literature, eulogistic works written in celebration of a victorious campaign; there is the nasihatname literature ("advice to princes") of this and the subsequent period, in which is recounted "abuses" which began in the sixteenth century. Most important for the present study, however, are the contemporary Histories of the war, written by Peçevi, Hasanbeyzade, Selaniki and Abdülkadir. These four chroniclers all had intimate connection with the campaigns being conducted in Hungary, and include in their Histories details of the appointments which they held. They are also referred to at various points in the Histories of their contemporaries.

Of these four, the most valuable witness of these campaigns is Abdülkadir Efendi, who, in his posts as topçular katibi (clerk of the corps of cannoneers) and later as cebeciler katibi (clerk of the corps of armourers) during this war, was responsible for military equipment and a keen observer of logistic matters.

Archival Material

The campaign account books to be found in the Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KK) and the accounts of the Buda Treasury in the Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler Tasnifi (MM) have been discussed at length in Part III of this study. Since the cataloguing of the registers and documents in the Prime Ministerial (Başbakanlık) Archives in Istanbul has been undertaken piecemeal over the years, the accessible material is dispersed over a number of classes which have been classified according to varying criteria. For instance, of the classes of document used here, those of the Ali Emiri Tasnifi (AE) are grouped by sultan; the Fekete Tasnifi is so called because it was catalogued by this scholar, and the documents are classified according to their bureaucratic provenance. I was, with rare exceptions, unable to consult this latter class of documents, which covers the period of the war and had, until recently, been open for research; it was unfortunately no longer available, having been broken up for recataloguing.

Another group of registers within the MM which has been used extensively is the wage registers (mevacib defterleri) of the troops paid from both the central and provincial treasuries. The MM also contains a number of registers concerning the military equipment used on these campaigns; these registers, together with Abdülkadir's chronicle, form the basis for my intended study of the fourth branch of logistics, the supply of war materials and equipment to the army fighting in Hungary during these campaigns. To date there is little written on Ottoman matériel, the study best-known to English readers being Parry (1970).

Of the Mühimme defterleri (MD), vols. 67-77 were consulted, as well as MDZ 6-7, and KK 70, the latter being a misclassified MD register. These registers run from 1590-1606, but with a lacuna between MD 74 and MD 75: this gap covers the years 1596-1602. Yet, despite the lack of mühimme documents for this period, which is approximately half of the war, it has been possible to suggest answers to the questions which are the subject of this study by recourse to the other types of document available. Only MD 77 of the MDs consulted contained substantial numbers of orders relating to the campaigns: such orders must also have been given in other years than 1605-1606, but if there existed registers

with copies of such orders, they are no longer extant.

A source which would undoubtedly have been of great value in the understanding of the effects of the war in Hungary and the parts of Rumeli through which the army passed and from which supplies were drawn is the kadı sicilleri, the registers of the cadi courts. However, those for Hungary no longer exist and those available in Bulgaria do not cover this period. It was only some of those for Rodoscuk (RKS) which I could consult in Topkapi Palace Archives, but it was clear in the short time at my disposal that they would yield further important details concerning, in particular, orders for provisions and military equipment.

LIST OF ARCHIVAL SOURCES USED

ISTANBULBaşbakanlık Arşivi (Prime Ministerial Archives)

Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KK):

70, 253, 254, 255, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1879, 1884, 1885,
1887, 1889, 1890, 1892, 7102, 9421

Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler Tasnifi (MM):

101, 136, 383, 498, 893, 1561, 3731, 3903, 4435, 5145,
5158, 5241, 5294, 5339, 5524, 5530, 5717, 5772, 6151,
6322, 6423, 6766, 6770, 6983, 7029, 7336, 7348, 7426,
7539, 7540, 7727, 7730, 15546, 16320, 20160

Mühimme Defterleri (Registers of Important Affairs) (MD):

see separate list

Fekete Tasnifi:

A.DVN.1011.11.15 n.3827

Ali Emiri Tasnifi (AE):

Murad III/358; Mehmed III/1, 112, 174, 181; Ahmed I/815

Ibn ül-Emin Tasnifi (IBE):

Askeri/184

Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi (Topkapı Palace Archives):

Palace Registers: TKS D5527, TKS D8702

Rodoscuk Kadı Sicilleri (Registers of the Rodoscuk Cadi Court) (RKS):

1536, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542

Bayazid Umumi Kütüphanesi (Bayazid General Library):
Veliyüddin 1970

VIENNA

Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
HHStA Kriegsakten 35, January–October 1598

Oesterreichische National Bibliothek
Mxt.635, Mxt.638

CHECKLIST OF MUHMME DEFTERLERI DOCUMENTS USED

Note: All these document references are prefaced MD in the text, with the sole exception of that falling between 77/74 and 77/76, which is prefaced MDZ(eyli).

Dates fall into three classes: a) A precise date is given where this appears at the top of the document itself or at the top of the page on which it is found, or on the previous page; b) c. denotes an estimated date according to the position of the document relative to other dated documents; c) nd indicates that the document is not dated, and that a more or less firm date cannot convincingly be assigned: such documents are dateable only to the year of those in series with them.

Hicri dates are abbreviated thus:

M	Muharrem	B	Receb
S	Safer	Ş	Şaban
Ra	Rebi I	N	Ramazan
R	Rebi II	L	Şevval
Ca	Cumada I	Za	Zilkade
C	Cumada II	Z	Zilhicce
El	Evail (first decade of month)		
Et	Evasit (middle decade of month)		
Er	Evahir (last decade of month)		

Doct. no.	Recipient(s) Copy to:	Date
67/43	Semendre beyine cc. suret-i mezbure üzere cemi Budun kaleminde olan beylere ahkam-i şerife yazılıp irsal olunmuştur	c. Z 998
67/295	Bosna beylerbeyisine	El C 999
68/124	Budun beylerbeyisine cc. Solnok, Istolni Belgrad, Novigrad, Sigetvar, Peçuy, Kopan, Seksar, Semendre, Sirem, Segedin,	20 L 999

- Mohaç, Şimontorna, Filek, Hatvan beylerine;
Temeşvar beylerbeyisine; Göle, Yanova, Lipova,
/.../ beylerine; Bosna beylerbeyisine; Pakrač,
Pozega, Klis, Hersek, Izvornik, Kırka beylerine
- 68/127 Bosna beylerbeyiliğinde vaki olan sancakbeyilerine 20 L 999
cc. Budun sancakbeyilerine; Temeşvar sancakbeyilerine
- 69/92 Bogdan voyvodasına Er Ca 1000
- 69/111 Prizren beyine 1 M 1001
cc. Alacahisar, Vulçitrin beylerine
- 69/142 Bosna'dan südde-yı saadetime gelince yol üzerinde nd
vaki olan sancakbeylerine ve kadılara
- 69/160 Budun beylerbeyisine nd
- 69/171 Rumeli beylerbeyisine c.Er C 1001
- 69/509 Bosna beylerbeyisine c.11 S 1001
- 70/61 Ruscuk ve Tuna yalılarında vaki olan kadılara nd
- 70/118 Bosna beylerbeyisine nd
- 70/120 Eflak voyvodasına c.C 1001
- 71/31 Silistre sancakbeyi Piri... 'e 13 Z 1001
cc. Bender, Akkerman beylerine
- 71/59 Anadolu beylerbeyisine 10 Z 1001
cc. Karaman, Zulkadriye, Rum, Rumeli, Temeşvar, Bosna
beylerbeyilerine; Kapudan Paşa'ya; Budun
muhafazasında olan vezir Hasan Paşa'ya
- 71/81 Karaman beylerbeyisine c.22 Za 1001
cc. Anadolu beylerbeyisine
- 71/108 Erdel voyvodasına c.El S 1002
- 71/173 Bosna beylerbeyisine ve Zagorya kadısına 21 Z 1001
- 71/211 Rum beylerbeyisine ve Rum beylerbeyiliğinde vaki c.Ra 1002
olan kadılara
cc. Kangrı beyine ve Kangrı livasında vaki olan
kadılara
- 71/241 Kapucu başı Veli Ağa'ya c.18 Ra 1002
- 71/266 Amasya sancakbeyi Süleyman... 'a nd
- 71/273 Anadolu beylerbeyisine c.20 Ra 1002
- 71/332 Silistre ve Bender beyine ve sabıka Varna kadısı
olup müfettiş al-emval olan Mevlana Mühyi ül-Din'e 16 B 1001
- 71/338 Elbasan beyine (ve) Drac kadısına c.23 B 1001
- 71/369 Erdel voyvodasına c.R 1002
- 71/394 Temeşvar beylerbeyisine ve defterdarına c.29/30 Z 1001

71/552	Şarköy ve Evreşe ve Kesan kadılarına	18 Za 1001
71/571	Kırım hanı Gazi Giray Han'e	11 Za 1001
71/585	Hassa mimarlarımdan İsmail... 'e	29 Za 1001
71/601	Mahruse-yi İstanbul'dan Kefe'ye varınca yalılarda vaki olan kadılara	16 Za 1001
71/649	Tatar han'ına	Er M 1002
71/729	Eflak voyvodasına	18 M 1002
71/753	Akkerman kadısına ve /.../ dergah-i muallam çavuşlarından Ali çavuş... 'a	17 Z 1001
72/11	Rum beylerbeyisine defter-i hakani katiblerinden olup vilayet-i Rum'un bedel akçeleri cemine memur olan katib Ahmed'e	
72/80	Sofya ve Usküb ve Filibe kadılarına	nd
72/86	Eflak voyvodasına	nd
72/103	Gelibolu ve Lapseki kadılarına	nd
72/140	Südde-yi saadetinden Belgrad'a varınca ulu yol üzerinde vaki olan kadılara	c.28 C 1002
	cc. Silivri, Çorlu, Burgaz, Havsa, Mustafa Paşa Köprüsü, Hasköy, Filibe, Tatarpazarcık, İhtiman kadılarına; Edirne: molla-yi saniye	
72/184	Şam yeniçerileri ağasına	1 Ş 1002
72/221	Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine	26 C 1002
	cc. Halep beylerbeyisine; Adana, Uzeyr hakimlerine	
72/222	İçil beyine	c.26 C 1002
	cc. Kars, Aintab, Trablus, Sis, Uzeyr beylerine; Adana hakimine	
72/239	İstanbul kadısına ve dergah-i muallam müteferrika- larından olup hala mimar başılık hizmette olan Daud'a	c.26 C 1002
	cc. Galata kadısına ve müşar ileyh on beş nefere	
72/240	Brusa kadısına	c.26 C 1002
72/271	Şam beylerbeyisine	c.14 B 1002
72/283	Rum beylerbeyisine ve defterdarına	c.7 Ş 1002
72/330	Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine	c.28 N 1002
72/342	Rum beylerbeyisine	c.1 C 1002
	cc. Zulkadriye, Halep beylerbeyilerine	
72/343	Şam beylerbeyisine	c.4 B 1002
72/347	Rum beylerbeyisine	c.4 B 1002
	cc. Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine	

72/359	Rum beylerbeyisine	29 C 1002
	cc. Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine	
72/437	Şam yeniçeri ağasına	c.R 1002
72/438	Haleb beylerbeyisi Mehmed... 'e	nd
72/536	Bosna beylerbeyisine	29 N 1002
72/582	Edirne kadısına	nd
	cc. İstanbul'dan Belgrad'a varınca yol üzerinde kadılara	
72/604	Serdar-ı alamikdar hazretlerine (= Koca Sinan)	9 N 1002
72/621	Halep beylerbeyisine	c.9 N 1002
	cc. Zulkadriye beylerbeyisine	
72/647	Anadolu beylerbeyiliğinde olan kadılara	20 Ş 1002
	cc. Karaman, Rumeli, Zulkadriye, Halep, Sivas beylerbeyiliğinde vaki olan kadılara; İçil, Alanya, Karesi, Girit, Kocaeli, Biga, Midilli, Inebahtı, Karlieli, Rodos, Gelibolu, Ağrıboz, /.../ sancaklarında vaki olan kadılara	
72/696	Anadolu beylerbeyisine	nd
72/766	Liva-yı Vize'de olan kadılara	nd
72/774	Maraş beylerbeyisine	3 L 1002
72/775	Dergah-ı muallam çavuşlarından olup Ankara sancağı muhafazasında olan Hasan çavuş'a	4 Ş 1002
72/776	Vize yürükleri subaşısına	c.4 Ş 1002
72/824	Südde-yi saadetinden Belgrad'a varınca yeniçeri kullarıma tayin olunan konakların iki canibde vaki olan kadılara	1 B 1002
72/827	Öte yakada Haleb'e varınca sağ kolda vaki olan beylerbeyilerine ve beylere ve kadılara	nd
72/834	Yeniçeri ağasına	nd
72/864	Belgrad kadısına ve Belgrad kalesi dizdarına	c.23 Ş 1002
72/883	Haslar kadısına	20 C 1002
72/886	Rum beylerbeyisine	26 C 1002
73/1	Budin muhafazasında olan vezir Mehmed Paşa'ya	nd
73/57	Bosna defterdarına	nd
73/58	Bosna'da olan sancakbeylerine	nd
73/64	Amasya kadısına	c.21 Za 1003
73/65	Südde-yi saadetinden Ruscug'a varınca yol üzerinde olan kadılara	c.21 Za 1003
73/74	Vilayet-1 Anadolu'da olan kadılara	nd

- cc. Zulkadriye, Karaman, Rum'da olan kadilarına
- 73/130 Südde-yi saadetinden Budun'a varınca yol üzerinde nd
olan kadilara
- 73/135 Rumeli'nde sağ kolda olan kadilara nd
- cc. sol kolda olan kadilara; Anadolu, Karaman, Batum
kadilarına
- 73/141 Karaman ve Rum ve Diyarbakır beylerbeyiliğinde nd
ve etrafında olan kadilara
- 73/182 Vezir kapudan Halil Paşa hazretlerine nd
- 73/188 Bosna beylerbeyisine nd
- 73/220 Rumeli'nde leb-i deryada vaki olan sancakbeyilerine 17 L 1003
ve kadilarına
- 73/223 Sigetvar serhadında olan kullar ağalarına ve sair 17 L 1003
gazilere
- 73/288 Rum beylerbeyisine ve vilayet-i mezburede olan nd
beylere ve kadilara ve ceribaşılara
- 73/289 Bosna beylerbeyisine nd
- cc. Sigetvar, Temeşvar beylerbeyilerine
- 73/325 Karadeniz yalısında olan kadilara ve dizdarlara nd
- 73/329 Kırkkilise sancağında vaki olan kadilara nd
- cc. Vize, Niğbolu, Köstendil, Alacahisar, Paşa,
Vulçitrin, Usküb, Selanik, Tirhala, Çirmen, Mora,
Elbasan, Yanya, Delvine, Prizren, Inebahtı,
Ağriboz, Ohri sancaklarında olan kadilara
- 73/330 Belgrad'a varınca yol üzerinde olan kadilara nd
- 73/389 Akkerman'da muhafazada olan dört kita kadırgalar nd
reislerine
- 73/457 Haleb beylerbeyisine 13 N 1003
- 73/470 Budun caniblerinde muhafazada olan vezir Mehmed nd
Paşa'ya
- 73/514 Kefe beylerbeyisine nd
- 73/644 Misr beylerbeyisine nd
- 73/653 Karaman beylerbeyisine nd
- 73/818 Serdar vezir-i azam olan Sinan Paşa...'ya c.20 Z 1003
- 73/874 Rumeli'nin sağ kolunda vaki olan kadilarına nd
- 73/877 Vezaret ile Rumeli beylerbeyisi Hasan Paşa'ya nd
- 73/905 Budun beylerbeyisine nd
- cc. Bosna beylerbeyisine
- 73/927 Budun defterdarına nd

73/955	Silistre sancağında vaki olan kadılara	5 Za 1003
73/1067	Amasya kadısı olup Rum beylerbeyliğinde zahire alınmak ferman olunan sipahilerden zahire cemine müfettiş olan Mevlana Mehmed'e ve vilayet-i Rum'da olan kadılara	6 Za 1003
73/1107	Dergah-i muallam kapucu başlarından Ali'ye	nd
73/1146	Budun muhafazasında olan vezir Mehmed Paşa'ya cc. Budun, Anadolu, Haleb, Temeşvar, Yanık, Papa, Sigetvar, Bosna beylerbeyilerine	nd
73/1277	Budin ve Sigetvar serhadlarında olan kadılarına	26 Ş 1003
74/24	Hassa mimarlarından üstad istima'iyile	17 Za 1004
74/37	Brusa ve Mihaliç ve Yenişehir kadılarına	19 Za 1004
74/183	Galata kadısına	27 L 1004
74/211	Diyarbakır muhafazasında olan Zalpaşaoğlu Mehmed Paşa'ya ve defterdarına	nd
74/287	Rodoscuk kadısına	nd
74/443	Istanbul kadısına ve kasap mütevellisine	nd
74/489	Havza ve Babaeskisi kadısına cc. Burgaz kadısına	nd
74/490	Ergene ve Dimotica kadılarına cc. Edirne, Çorlu kadılarına	nd
74/589	Cebeci başına	26 L 1004
74/596	Usküdar kadısına	28 Ş 1004
75/44	Gelibolu ve Şarköy ve Evreşe ve Keşan ve Malgara kadılarına	c.22 Za 1013
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75/86	Ahyolı ve Misivri ve Rusi-kasri ve Karınabad ve Hatun-ili ve Aydos kadılarına	c.22 Z 1013
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75/166	Sabika beylerbeyi olup hala Vize sancakbeyi olan Sinan Paşa'ya	c.17 L 1013
75/199	Misr beylerbeyisine ve defterdarına	c.19 L 1013
75/217	Galata kadısına	nd
75/230	Tuna yalısında olan müfettişlere ve kadılara	16 Za 1013
75/279	Eflak voyvodasına	nd
75/288	Gelibolu kadısına	nd

- 75/342 Edirne kadısına nd
- 75/343 Tuna yalilari muhafazasında olan vezir Hızır Paşa ve Tırnova kadisi ve müfettiş olan Çatalzade Mahmud Efendi'ye c.23 Z 1013
- 75/357 Silistre caniblerinde olan Tatarlar ağasına c.7 R 1013
cc. Akkerman, Bender beylerine
- 75/385 Hersek sancakbeyine ve liva-yi mezburde vaki olan kadılara nd
- 75/388 Akıncı taifesi sakın olduğu yerlerde vaki olan kadılara nd
- 75/406 Uskûdar kadısına nd
- 75/451 Ahyolı ve Misivri ve Aydos ve Karınabad ve Rusi-kasrı ve Hatur-ili kadılarına nd
- 75/470 Brusa kadısına nd
- 75/492 Alanya sancakbeyi Mehmed'e nd
- 75/593 Aydın sancakbeyi Hacı Bey'e nd
- 75/643 Han hazretlerine 5 L 1013
- 75/675 Mısır'da vezir Mehmed Paşa'ya 20 B 1013
- 77/3 Derya'ya verilmesi memnu olan meta bunlar dir 1 M 1014
- 77/67 Bogdan voyvodasına Eremya voyvoda'ya 23 Z 1013
cc. Eflak voyvodasına
- 77/68 Edirne kadısına 18 Z 1013
- 77/69 Sabıka Temeşvar beylerbeyisi olup haliya Avlonya sancağına ber vech-i arpalık mutasarrıf olan Ali Paşa'ya 18 Za 1013
cc. Mora, Delvine, Köstendil, Tırhala, Ohri, Selanik, Usküb, Elbasan, Hersek, Klis, Yanya, Iskenderiye, Alacahisar, Vulçitrin beylerine
- 77/70 Silistre beylerbeyisi Ali Paşa'ya 18 Za 1013
- 77/74 Usküb beyine 14 Z 1013
cc. Ohri, Avlonya, Yanya, Elbasan, Iskenderiye, Köstendil, Tırhala, Selanik beylerine; Rumeli'ne memur olan beylere; sağ kol ve sol kol alaybeylerine
- MDZ 7 p.9 Rodos beyine 13 Za 1013
- 77/76 Haslar kadısına 22 Za 1013
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- 77/79 Rumeli payesiyle baş defterdar olan Ahmed Paşa'ya El Za 1013

- 77/80 Belgrad'da serdar-ı zafer şiarımın kaimmakamı olan El Za 1013
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- 77/81 Sabika şikk-i sani defterdarı olup hala Belgrad'da El Za 1013
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- 77/83 Dergah-ı muallam kapucu başlarından olup öte c.El Za 1013
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- 77/84 Edirne kadısına c.El Za 1013
- 77/85 Cizre hakimi c.Za 1013
cc. Imadiye, Palu, Bitlis, /.../ hakimlerine
- 77/86
- 77/87 Rum beylerbeyine c.Za 1013
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Trablus, Şam, Van, Haleb, Çıldır, /.../
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- 77/88 Silistre beylerbeyisi Ali Paşa nd
cc. Kirkkilise beyine ve alaybeyine; Çirmen beyine
ve alaybeyine; akıncı beyine; sabıka Lahsa beyler-
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- 77/91 Eflak voyvodasına c.Za 1013
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- 77/92 Sabıkan Eflak voyvodasına olan Simon voyvoda'ya c.Za 1013
- 77/93 Eflak voyvodasına c.Za 1013
- 77/98 Akıncı beyi Hüseyin'e 14 Z 1013
- 77/99 Öte yakada eşkiya define memur olan vezir Nasuh 4 Z 1013
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- 77/100 Anadolu beylerbeyisine 4 Z 1013
cc. Karaman beylerbeyisine, Anadolu ve Karaman
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- 77/103 Eflak voyvodası Radul voyvoda'ya 14 Z 1013
- 77/106 Südde-yi saadetinden Belgrad'a varınca ordu-yi 18 Z 1013
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- 77/109 Haslar kadısına c.18 Z 1013
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- 77/154 Silistre eyaletinde vaki olan kadılara c.Za 1013
- 77/167 Dubrovnik beylerine nd

- 77/182 Boğdan voyvodasına Er C 1014
- 77/184 Eflak voyvodasına 5 N 1014
- 77/194 Kırka sancakbeyine c.15 M 1014
- 77/197 Kanije beylerbeyisi İbrahim Paşa'ya 9 S 1014
- 77/198 Sirem alaybeyine 10 S 1014
- cc. Semendre alaybeyine
- 77/201 Kopan sancakbeyine c.10 S 1014
- 77/202 Bosna eyaletinde vaki olan kadılara 11 S 1014
- cc. Hersek sancağında vaki olan kadılara
- 77/204 Sabika Bosna beylerbeyisi olan Duka(lu) Ahmed Paşa'ya 16 S 1014
- 77/206 Hersek sancağında vaki olan kadılara 21 S 1014
- 77/207 Eğri beylerbeyisi Şaban Paşa'ya 23 S 1014
- 77/208 Pozega beyine 24 S 10145
- cc. Hersek, Klis beylerine; Bosna eyaletinde olan kadılara ve alaybeyileri ve ceri başı ve ceri sürücüleri
- 77/210 Rumeli eyaletine mutasarrıf olup Budun muhafazasında olan vezir Hasan Paşa'ya 5 Za 1014
- cc. Budun kadısına
- 77/213 Saray menlasına ve Izvornik sancağında vaki olan kadılarına nd
- cc. Hersek, Klis sancaklarında olan kadılara
- 77/214 Pozega beyine nd
- 77/221 Saray menlasına ve Bosna vilayetinde vaki olan kadılara ve Bosna beylerbeyisinin kaimmakamına nd
- cc. Hersek, Klis sancaklarında vaki olan kadılara ve kaimmakamlarına
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- cc. Eğri, Kanije, Bosna beylerbeyilerine
- 77/242 Kanije beylerbeyisi İbrahim... 'e 10 C 1014
- 77/249 Eğri beylerbeyisine 16 C 1014
- 77/252 Temeşvar beylerbeyisine 12 C 1014
- cc. Segedin, Solnok, Göle sancakbeylerine ve kadılarına; Başka kadısına; Eğri'ye vezire
- 77/260 Silistre sancağında vaki olan kadılara 24 C 1014
- 77/270 Budun beylerbeyisine ve Budun kadısına 2 B 1014
- cc. Seksar ve Şikloş beylerine ve kadılarına; Eğri beylerbeyisine ve kadısına ve defterdarına

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77/280	Pozega beyi kaimmakamina dergah-ı ali müteferrikalarından ... 'e	nd
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77/286	Kanije beylerbeyisine	nd
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77/310	Ordu-yi humayundan Belgrad'a varınca yol üzerinde vaki olan kadılara	5 S 1014
77/316	Izenbol kadısına	9 S 1014
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77/323	Sabika Silistre beylerbeyisi olan Ahmed Paşa'ya	nd
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77/373	Sabika Bosna eyaletine mutasarrıf olup haliya Hersek sancakbeyi olan Mehmed Paşa'ya ve liva-yi mezburde olan kadılara	nd
77/375	Serdar hazretlerine	nd
77/391	Tanridağı yürükleri beyi Kalender'e	nd
77/431	Filiba kadısına	21 M 1014
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77/448	Belgrad ve havale kazalarına	c.12 S 1014
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77/467	Baş defterdar Ahmed Paşa'ya	9 Ra 1014
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77/476	Donanma-yi humayuna baş ve buğ tayin olunan Memi Paşa'ya	nd
77/478	Izvornik sancağıbeyi Osman... 'a	nd
77/493	Baş defterdar Ahmed Paşa'ya	nd
77/506	Silistre ve Niğbolu sancaklarında akıncı taifesi sakin oldukları yerlerin kadılarına	nd
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- tatar askerine baş ve buğ olan Arslan Mirza'ya
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- 77/511 () sancağında vaki olan kadılara nd
- 77/512 Budun beylerbeyisi Ali Paşa'ya 22 C 1014
- 77/513 Budun beylerbeyisine 22 C 1014
- 77/528 İstanbul kadısına 17 B 1014
- 77/529 Muşar ileyhe (= İstanbul kadısı) 17 B 1014
- 77/536 İstanbul kadısına 14 B 1014
- 77/537 Budun beylerbeyisi Ali Paşa'ya 14 B 1014
- 77/538 Edirne kadısına 28 B 1014
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- 77/539 Sağ kolda olan kadılara 28 B 1014
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- 77/540 Akıncılar sakin olduğu yerlerin kadılara 2 Ş 1014
- 77/542 Akıncı taifesi sakin oldukların kadılara (?) nd
- 77/544 Temeşvar beylerbeyisine nd
- 77/545 Semendre ve Yagodina ve (...) ve Beckerek kadılarına nd
- 77/563 Temeşvar beylerbeyisine nd
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- 77/564 Yenibazar kadısına nd
- 77/568 Valpova ve Avcılar kadılarına nd
- cc. Uzice, Pozegacuk, Rudnik, Çačka, Belgrad ve havalesi kadılarına
- 77/586 Selanik yürükleri sakin olduğu yerlerin kadılarına 3 N 1014
- 77/587 Kanije beylerbeyisi İbrahim Paşa'ya 3 N 1014
- 77/589 Yenibazar ve Tırgovişte kadılarına 14 N 1014
- 77/590 Kanije beylerbeyisine ve Mohaç ve Peçuy ve Kopan ve Sigetvar sancakları beylerine ve zikr olunan sancaklarda vaki olan kadılara nd
- 77/600 Zemun'dan Tolna'ya varınca iskelelerde vaki olan kadılara nd
- 77/608 Üsküb kadısı olan Mevlana /.../'ya 21 N 1014
- 77/628 Rumeli'nde vaki olan kadılara nd
- 77/639 Üsküb kadısı müfettiş Mevlana... ve Priştina ve Vulçitrin kadılarına ve ... vezir-i azam Mehmed Paşa...'nin kapucu başı olup dergah-ı muallam

- çavuşlarından Mahmud çavuş'a
- 77/643 Dimitrofvca kadısına nd
- 77/650 Segedin sancağında vaki olan kadılara nd
- cc. Mohaç, Solnok, Eğri, Hatvan, Göle, Lipova,
Çanad, Yanova, Temeşvar, Morava, Usek,
Şimontornya, Seksar, Istolni Belgrad sancaklarında
vaki olan kadılara
- 77/659 (ر'اغونجه) kadısına 23 N 1014
- 77/664 Bosna beylerbeyisi vezir Hüsrev Paşa'ya 3 L 1014
- cc. Hersek, Klis, /.../ beylerine
- 77/665 Alacahisar kadısına nd

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Decei	<u>Akinci</u>
Inalcık	<u>Eshkindji</u>
Inalcık	<u>Filaha</u>
Inalcık	<u>Giray</u>
Inalcık	<u>Gönüllü</u>
Káldy-Nagy	<u>Madjaristan</u>
Lewis	<u>Bayt al-Mal</u>
Parry	<u>Harb</u>

IA Islam Ansiklopedisi: Istanbul

Barkan	<u>Avariz</u>
Barkan	<u>Timar</u>
Baysun	<u>Musadere</u>
Inalcık	<u>Giray</u>
Joel	<u>Sekban</u>

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Abbreviations:

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<u>AOASH</u>	Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (Budapest)
<u>CUP</u>	Cambridge University Press
<u>EH</u>	Etudes Historiques (Sofia)
<u>IFM</u>	Istanbul Universitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası (Istanbul)
<u>IJMES</u>	International Journal of Middle East Studies (London & New York)
<u>IUTED</u>	Istanbul Universitesi Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi (Istanbul)
<u>JESHO</u>	Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (Leiden)
<u>JO/OA</u>	Journal of Ottoman Studies/Osmanlı Araştırmaları (Istanbul)
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<u>SF</u>	Südostrforschungen (Munich)
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Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)

source: KK 1879 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-1 mal an hazine-yi
amire-yi astane-yi saadet
ve an irad biddefaat

380 694 029

A. an hizane-yi amire-yi
astane-yi saadet
biddefaat 149 447 058

A.1 der defa-yi evvel be-
hazret-i sadrazam ve
Abdullah Ağa ser
bavvabin-i dergah-i ali 77 793 960

A.1.a be-hazret-i sadrazam 72 000 000
A.1.b an yed-i Abdullah 5 793 960
Ağa al-mezbur
(77 793 960)

A.11 der defa-yi sani an yed-i
Hasan Ağa-yi yeniçeriyar-ı
dergah-i ali 60 932 898

A.11.a an hazine-yi
enderun 60 000 000
A.11.b an hazine-yi
birun an pişin
-i cizye ve
adet-i aynam 932 898
(60 932 898)

A.111 defa an yed-i Omer çavuş
tabi-yi Nasuh Ağa kethüda-yi
bavvabin-i dergah-i ali 10 720 200
(149 447 058)

B. al-irad an tahvil-i
Ahmed Efendi al-muşar
ileyh: an mukataat
ve cizye ve adet-i
aynam ve emval-i
müteferrika ve varidat-ı
gayr-i mukarrere

231 156 971

(380 604 029)

B.1 an al-mahsulat 122 234 944

B.1.a an mahsul-ı
mukataat 33 712 513
B.1.b an mahsul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı vilayet-ı
Rumeli 73 055 440
B.1.c an mahsul-ı adet-ı
aynam 11 052 991
B.1.d an mahsul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Dubrovnik
ber vech-i maktu 2 950 000
B.1.e an mahsul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Kara
Boğdan 820 000
B.1.f an mahsul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Eflak 644 000
(122 234 944)

B.11 an emval-i müteferrika: 41 114 571

an rüsum-ı berevat ve
ahkam-ı şikayat tabi-yi
divan-ı humayun ve maliye
ve rüsum-ı tezakir-ı zuama
ve erbab-ı timar-ı vilayet-ı
Rumeli ve Anadolu ve
mirmiran-ı Rumeli ve beyt
ül-mal ve pencik-ı esar ve
emval-ı saire ve beliyat
(ve) ketmiyat-ı bazı kesan

B.111 an varidat-ı gayr-ı 66 129 629

mukarrere:
bedel-ı nüzül ve bedel-ı
ganem ve navlun-ı zahire
ve bedel-ı sürsat ve
bedel-ı timar ve baha-yi
zahire ve bedel-ı zahire-yi
kale-yi Budin ve karz-ı
bazı kesan

B.111.a an varidat-ı gayr-ı
mukarrere 58 928 729
B.111.b an karz-ı hazret-ı
sahib-ı saadet ve
gayrihi 7 200 900
(66 129 629)

C. an tefavüt-ı hasenat
ve gurus

1 677 827

(231 156 971)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

KK 1885 (total) income and expenditure account: Credit

Asl-1 mal an hazine-yi amire
-yi astane-yi saadet biddefaat
ve an irad ve an bakliye-yi
muhasebe-yi sene-yi mazkiye
ve tefavüt-1 hasenat ve gurus
ve karz-1 bazı kesan

190 628 798

A. an hazine-yi astane -yi saadet biddefaat an yed-1 mezburin				72 000 000
A1. an yed-1 Ali ağa-yi yeniçeriyar-1 dergah-1 all			60 000 000	
A.ii an yed-1 İbrahim ağa-yi sabik-1 ebna-yi sipahiyar			12 000 000	
			(72 000 000)	
B. al-irad				112 478 756
B.1 an al-mahsulat				71 919 135
B.1.a an mahsul-1 mukataat		15 434 083		
B.1.b an mahsul-1 cizye-yi gebran-1 vilayet-1 Rumeli		25 812 429		
B.1.c an mahsul-1 adet-1 ağnam		3 619 457		
B.1.d an mahsul-1 cizye ve adet-1 ağnam ve mukataat ve bedel-1 nüzül ve gayrini an canib-1 muhassilan		27 053 166		(71 919 135)
B.11 an emval-1 müteferrika ve (sic) rûsum-1 berevat ve ahkam-1 şikayat tabi-yi divan-1 humayun ve maliye ve rûsum-1 tezakir-1 zuama ve erbab-1 timar-1 vilayet-1 Rumeli ve Anadolu ve mirmiran-1 Rumeli ve beyt-ül mal ve pencik-1 esar ve beliyat (ve) ketmiyat-1 bazı kesan ve emval-1 sair				5 799 724
B.111 varidat-1 gayr-1 mukarerre an bedel-1 nüzül ve ganem ve naviur-1 zahire ve bedel-1 timar ve baha-yi zahire ve guşt-1 ganem ve beksimad ve rugan-1 sade ve karz-1 bazı kesan ve gayrihi				34 759 897
				(112 478 756)
	B.111.a an varidat-1 gayr-1 mukarerre	24 694 530		
	B.111.b an karz-1 bazı kesan	10 065 367		
				(34 759 897)
C. an tefavüt-1 hasenat ve gurus				1 205 632
an bakliye-yi muhasebe -yi sene-yi mazkiye				4 944 410
				(190 628 798)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebi I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)

source: KK 1887 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-1 mal f1 11 eşhür ve
ve 6 ayam

121 635 471

A.	an astane-yi saadet beray-1 mevacibat an yed-1 mezkurin biddefaat			47 996 142
	A.1	defa an yed-1 aza-yi yeniceriyan-1 dergah-1 ali beray-1 muhimmat-1 sefer-1 humayun	36 000 000	
	A.11	defa an yed-1 Mustafa Aza ser bavvabin-1 dergah-1 ali	9 600 000	
	A.111	defa an yed-1 Hüseyin çavuş beray-1 iştiray-1 zahire an baha-yi hasene ve gurus ve nakd	2 396 142	
				(47 996 142)
A ⁺	an canib-1 hazret-1 Ahmed Efendi defterdar-1 şikk-1 evvel			40 040 000
	A ⁺ .1	defa	5 000 000	
	A ⁺ .11	defa	20 000 000	
	A ⁺ .111	defa	10 000 000	
	A ⁺ .iv	defa	5 040 000	
B.	an al-irad			33 135 872
	B.1	an al-mahsulat	15 262 068	
	B.1.a	an al-mukataat	4 626 917	
	B.1.b	an cizye-yi gebran	8 432 891	
	B.1.c	an adet-1 ağnam	1 166 884	
	B.1.d	an akçe-yi aklam-1 Tuna	54 893	
	B.1.e	an akçe-yi haymanaha -yi vilayet-1 Sirem an tahvil-1 Rizvan çavuş	23 756	
	B.1.f	an akçe an canib-1 Mustafa Aza ser bavvabin-1 dergah-1 ali	219 500	
	B.1.g	an akçe-yi cizye-yi gebran ve adet-1 ağnam	737 227	
			(15 262 068)	
	B.11	an emval-1 müteferrika an akçe-yi rüsum-1 berevat-1 divan ve maliye ve beyt ül-mal ve bi-bazi kesan karz dade bud bila averdend ve ziyade-yi mevacib ve beliyat ve ketmlyat ve gayrihi	5 063 857	
	B.111	an varidat-1 gayr-1 mukarrere an akçe-yi bakije -yi bedel-1 nizil ve ganem ve navlun ve bedel-1 beksimad ve harc-1 beksimad ve baha-yi guşt ve bedel-1 timar ve bedel-1 lağmıcıyan ve haddadan ve bedel-1 cerime-yi yütrikan ve bedel-1 tüfenkçıyan ve baha-yi zahire-yi anbar-1 Belgrad ve Budin ve gayrihi ve baha-yi beksimad ve rugar-1 sade ve gayrihi ma' akçe-yi karz-1 bazı kesan	12 809 947	
				(33 135 872)
	E111.a	an akçe-yi varidat-1 gayr-1 mukarrere	9 400 388	
	E111.b	an akçe-yi karz-1 bazı kesan	3 409 559	
			(12 809 947)	
	an akçe-yi karz-1 bazı kesan ki der tahvilat dahil na-şüde			367 480
C.	an tefavit-1 hasene ve gurus			95 977
				(121 635 471)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3 Ramazan 1013 (2 June 1604-23 January 1605)

source: KK 1889 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Aslı-ı mal fî 8 eşhür an
hizane-yî amire-yî enderun
ve an al-ırad ve bakıye-yî
muhasabe-yî astane-yî saadet
ve tefavüt-î hasenat ve guriş

222 512 930

A. an hazine-yî enderun			110 600 000
B. an al-ırad			108 658 978
B.1	an al-mahsulat		80 433 595
B.1.a	an mahsul-i mukataat ma' cizye-yî Dubrovnik	14 630 928	
B.1.b	an mahsul-i cizye ve adet-î ağnam	50 943 557	
B.1.c	an mahsul-i cizye ve adet-î ağnam ve mukataat ve bedel-î nüzül ve bedel-î ganem ve gayrihi an canib-î muhasılan	14 859 110	(80 433 595)
B.11	an enval-î müteferrika ve (sic) an mahsul-î rûsum-î berevat ve ahkam-î şikayat tabî-yî divan-î humayun ve maliye ve rûsum-î defter-î hakani ve tezakir-î mirmiran-î Rumeli ve rûsum-î berevat-î neferat-î Bosna ve beyt ül-mal-î hassa ve sipahiyan ve gayrihi		9 540 575
B.11.a	an mahsul-î rûsum-î berevat-î divan-î humayun ve defter-î hakani ve rûsum-î maliye ve tezakir-î mirmiran-î Rumeli ve rûsum-î neferat	3 988 381	
B.11.b	an enval-î müteferrika ve (sic) pişkeş-î riyaset ve mitrobolid ve bazı beliyat ve ketmiyat	4 469 425	
B.11.c	an beyt ül-mal-î hassa	827 893	
B.11.d	an beyt ül-mal-î sipahiyan ve gayrihi	254 876	(9 540 575)
B.111	an varidat-î gayr-î mikarrere an bedel-î nüzül ve bedel-î ganem ve navlun-î sefine ve bedel-î timar ve bedel-î kürekçıyan ve yürükkan ve bedel-î lağmıcıyan ve eşkinçıyan ve baha-yî guşt-î ganem ve zevaid-î evkaf ve baha-yî zahire an anbar-î Belgrad ve Budin ve Istolni Belgrad ve baha-yî beksimad-î yeniçerıyan ve karz-î bazı kesan		18 684 808 (108 658 978)
C. an tefavüt-î hasenat ve guriş			1 053 952
an bakıye-yî muhasabe-yî astane-yî saadet			1 200 000
			(221 512 930)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 10 Şevval 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606-13 May 1607)

source: KK 1890 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-1 mal fi sene ve
3 eşhür ve 6 yevmen
an tahsil-1 hazret-1
Ahmed Paşa...ve an al-irad
ve an tefavüt-1 hasenat
ve guriş

74 209 976

A ⁺ . an tahsil-1 hazret-1 Ahmed Paşa al-vezir ve defterdar-1 şikk-1 evvel				35 150 158
B. an al-irad				38 858 306
B.1 an al-mahsulat				22 073 168
	B.1.a an akçe-yi mukataat	1 097 000		
	B.1.b an akçe-yi cizye-yi gebran	20 954 084		
	B.1.c an akçe-yi adet-1 ağnam	21 885		
		(22 072 969)		
B.1.1 an emval-1 müteferrika: an akçe-yi rûsum-1 berevat-1 divan ve maliye ve rûsum-1 tezakir-1 mirmiran-1 Rumeli ve beyt ül-mal-1 amme ve hassa ve muhallefât-1 Hamza Paşa ve Celali Hasan Paşa ve Hilseyñ Bey mirliya-yi Iskenderiye ve Hızır subaşı ve Ömer Efendi ve Mustafa Ağa ve gayrihi ve an akçe ki piş ezin an hizane-yi amire-yi beray-1 bazı mühimmat dade bud sarf na-kerde ve an belliyat ve ketniyat-1 bazı kesan an akçe-yi kral-1 macar beray-1 pişkes an yed-1 Mustafa Ağa irsal şüde ve hilaf-1 emr-1 şerif gayr-1 kral dade şüde ve baz muhallefât-1 mezbur tahsil şüde			5 027 010	
B.1.1.1 an varidat-1 gayr-1 mukarrere: an akçe-yi bedel-1 nizül ve ganem ve navlun-1 sefine ve ücret-1 mekarriyan ve bedel-1 beksimad ve bedel-1 tüfenkendazan ve pandoran ve kilrekçıyan ve lağimciyan ve bedel-1 timar-1 sipahiyan ve dümanciyan ve bedel-1 işçıyan-1 maden ve baha-yi zahire an anbar-1 Belgrad ve Budun ve Istolni Belgrad ve Estergon ve gayrihi ve baha-yi gus-t-1 ganem				11 758 128
				(38 858 306)
C. an tefavüt-1 hasenat ve guriş				201 512
				(74 209 976)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)

source: KK 1879 (icmal) income and expenditure/Debit

Al-masarif		331 229 352	381 406 212
P. al-mevacib			
P.i	mevacib-1 mişaherehoran	4 758 775	
P.ii	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 yeniçeriyar-1 dergah-1 ali ve gılman-1 acemiyar	88 790 668	
P.iii	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ebna-yi sipahiyar ve silahdarar ve ve ulufeciyyar-1 yemin ve yesar ve gureba-yi yemin ve yesar ve bazı sipahiyar ve silahdarar ve gayrisi der muhafaza-yi kıla ve eda-yi deyr-1 cizye ve adet-1 aynam	121 826 988	
P.iv	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 cebeciyar ve topçuyar ve arabacıyyar-1 top ve hademe-yi istabl-1 amire ve mehterar-1 hayme ve alem ve bavvabın-1 dergah-1 ali ve rdesa ve azeban ve kalafatçıyyar ve kumaracıyyar ve gayrihl	12 759 687	
P.v	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kıla -yi Budin ve Temeşvar ve Eğri ve Kaniçe ve tevabih	91 262 414	
P.vi	mevacib-1 efrençar-1 Fransa ki an kale-yi Papa amedend ve itaat kerdend	11 830 820	
		(331 229 352)	
Q. at-teslimat be- Abdülkerim Ağa ser bavvabın-1 dergah-1 ali ki be-astane-yi saadet irsal kerde ve teslimat-1 ümena-yi sergi-yi humayun ve emirnar-1 nüzül ve ümena -yi ganem ve teslimat-1 saire be-cihet-1 üret-1 külrekiyyar ve serahoran ve mühlumat-1 saire-yi sefer-1 humayun			31 735 534
R. al-adat:			8 629 165
	adet-1 şehriye-yi hazret-1 Han ve salyane-yi mirzayan-1 Temeşvar ve Eğri ve defterdarar ve adet-1 nafaka-yi kemanbaha-yi yeniçeriyar ve topçuyar ve cebeciyyar -1 dergah-1 ali ve gayrihl ve küttab		
S. inamat:			2 469 370
	inan-1 hazret-1 Han ve bazı tatarar ki der kişlak budend ve bazı yeniçeriyar-1 dergah-1 ali ki der muhafaza-yi kale-yi Budin ve Eğri ve Temeşvar budend ve efrençar-1 Fransa		
T. al-mübaaaat:			3 685 800
	baha-yi hilat-1 seraser-1 İstanbul ve çoka ve atlas ve gayrihl beray-1 mühimmat-1 hazine		
U. al-ihracat be- cihet-1 nafaka-1 elciyyar -1 Erdel ve Eflak ve Boğdan ve Beç ve harc-1 rah-1 mezburar ve nafaka -yi bazı mirzayan-1 tatarar ve nafaka-yi esirar-1 miri ve nafaka-yi bazı duaguyar ve kiraye-yi arabaha ve mekkariyyar ki barut-1 siyah ve kumbara ve cebehane averdend			1 625 388
V. eda-yi düyun:			2 030 603
	eda-yi deyr-1 bazı kesar ve Yusuf Paşa ve bazı ümena ve haracıyyar ve gayrihl		(381 405 212)
az-ziyade an al-ırad			-810 383
	an tefavüt: aded-1 vezn	802 182	(380 595 829)
	al-bakiye: mevcud der hazine an bakiye-yi muhasebe	8 200 (810 383)	

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

source: KK 1885 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Debit

Al-masraf			190 635 775
P. al-mevacib			136 735 903
	P.1	mevacib-1 müşaherehoran	3 030 527
	P.1i	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 yeniçeriyân-1 dergâh-1 alî ve gâilman-1 acemiyân	36 773 461
	P.1ii	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ebna-yî sipahiyan ve silâhdaran ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve yesar ve gureba-yî yemin ve yesar ve bazı ebna-yî sipahiyan ve silâhdaran ve vîldan-1 kul-1 Eğri ve Budin	60 408 148
	P.1iv	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 cebeciyan ve topçuyan ve arabacıyan-1 top ve hademe-yî İstabl-1 amîre ve mehteran-1 hayme ve alem ve bazı bavvaban-1 dergâh-1 alî ve rüesa ve azeban ve kumbaracıyan-1 hassa	6 134 940
	Pv.	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 neferat -1 kîla-yî Budin ve Temesvar ve Eğri ve Kanije ve tevabîha ve liva-yî Semendre	26 606 907
		Pv.a tabî-yî Budin ve Istolni Belgrad	17 682 064
		Pv.b tabî-yî Temesvar	4 004 813
		Pv.c tabî-yî Eğri	1 759 855
		Pv.d tabî-yî Kanije	2 235 420
		Pv.e tabî-yî liva-yî Semendre	788 755
		Pv.f /.../-1 cedid kî an dar ül-harb amedend ve itaat kerdend ve der muhafaza-yî kîla budend	136 000 (26 606 907)
	P.vi	mevacib-1 taife-yî efrencan-1 Fransa kî an kale-yî Papa amedend ve itaat kerdend	3 781 920 (136 735 903)
Q. at-teslimat be-emin-1 nûzûl ve ganem ve sergî-1 humayun ve beksimad-1 yeniçeriyân ve mûhimmat-1 sefer-1 humayun ve emin-1 harc-1 hassa			27 871 906
R. al-adat be-cihet-1 adet-1 nafaka-yî yeniçeriyân-1 dergâh-1 alî ve cebeciyan ve topçuyan ve arabacıyan-1 top ve adet-1 kemanbaha -yî eşan kî der muhafaza-yî kîla budend ve adet-1 salyane-yî mîrîmiran-1 Budin ve Temesvar ve Eğri ve Kanije ve defterdaran-1 vilayet-1 mezbure ve mir-1 Tuna ve kapudan-1 Tuna			5 544 064
S. inamat be-Gazî Giray Han ve bazı mirzayan-1 tataran ve yeniçeriyân -1 dergâh-1 alî ve bazı neferat-1 kîla ve gayrihi ve taife-yî efrencan			3 821 770
T. al-mübayaat: paha-yî hilat-1 seraser-1 İstanbul ve tafta ve çoka ve gayrihi beray-1 mûhimmat-1 hazine ve mûhimmat-1 Gazî Giray Han			1 942 259
U. al-ihracat be-cihet-1 ücret-1 mekkariyan ve nafaka-yî duaguyan ve nafaka ve harc-1 rah-1 Seykel Mo(ro)ş voyvoda-yî Erdel ve bazı elciyan-1 Boğdan ve Erlak ve gayrihi			1 547 640
V. eda-yî dilyun: eda-yî akçe-yî bazı kesan kî piş ezin der hîr-1 müzakaya-yî mevaciib ber veoh-1 karz dade budend ve eda-yî akçe-yî bazı kesan kî ba-nakl amedend ve ber mucib-1 hüccet eda şûde			13 172 233 (190 635 775)

az-ziyade an al-ırad

al-bakiye: mevcud der hazine İla tarih al-mezbur	25 967	
ziyade: adet-1 vezn	-19 000	
	(6 967)	

-6 977
190 628 798

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebi I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)

source: KK 1887 (icmal) income and expenditure account/Debit

Al-masarif					121 650 461
P. al-mevacib					99 506 765
P.i	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 müsherehoran			1 435 483	
P.ii	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 yeniçeriyar-1 dergah-1 all			19 828 158	
P.iii	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ebna-yi sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve yesar ve gureba-yi yemin ve gureba-yi yesar			43 102 758	
P.iv	mevacib-1 bayvaban ve hademe-yi istabl-1 amire ve cebeciyan ve topçuyan ve arabacıyan-1 top ve mehteran-1 hayme ve alem ve ehl-i hiref ve hayyatın ve sakayan ve kumaracıyan ve rüesa ve azaban ve gayrihi			5 763 325	
P.v	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi liva-yi mezkürin			27 456 072	
	Pv.a	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi livaya-yi Budun		14 0765 91	
	Pv.b	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi livaya-yi Egrî		6 083 171	
	Pv.c	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi livaya-yi Temeşvar		3 407 396	
	Pv.d	mevacib-1 neferat-1 liva-yi Kaniçe		3 122 570	
	Pv.e	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi livaya-yi Semendre		736 094	
	Pv.f	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi livaya-yi Vidin		30 250	
				(27 456 072)	
P.vi	mevacib-1 taife-yi efrencan			924 000	
P.vii	mevacib-1 merdûman-1 Seykel Morog ve miran-1 Erdel			247 730	
P.viii	mevacib-1 taife-yi kazakan-1 Özd ve Leh			750 238	
				(99 507 764)	
Q. at-teslimat be- cihet-1 bazı mühimmat ma' iştirar-yi zahire ve gayrihi					12 740 900
R. al-adat					4 899 786
S. al-inamat					488 065
T. al-mubayaat					662 280
U. al-ihracat					262 725
V. al-eda-yi düyun ma' karz-1 bazı kesân					3 089 940
					(121 650 461)
V.i	be-cihet-1 eda-yi düyun-1 bazı kesân			2 173 433	
V.ii	be-cihet-1 akçe-yi karz-1 bazı kesân			916 507	
				(3 089 940)	
az-ziyade an al-asl an tefavüt-i aded ve vezn					-14 990
					(121 635 471)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3 Haziran 1013 (2 June 1604-23 January 1605)

source: KK 1889 (total) income and expenditure/Debit

Al-masarif		168 941 306		214 197 895
P. al-mevacib				
P.1	mevacib-1 muahereshoran		2 707 638	
P.11	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 yenigeriyan-1 dergah-1 ali ve gilan-1 acoemiyen ve nafaka-yi nebeticyan ve adet-i mukarrere ve der yol bata (etc)		64 108 685	
		P.11.a	be-cihet-i mevacic-1 yenigeriyan-1 dergah-1 ali	58 816 230
		P.11.b	be-cihet-i gilan-1 acoemiyen al-mezbur	99 900
		P.11.c	be-cihet-i nafaka-yi yenigeriyan al-mezbur	5 192 555
			(64 108 685)	
P.111	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 etna-yi sipahiyan ve silahdarun ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve yesar ve garaba-yi yemin ve yesar ve vildan-1 kul-1 Budin ve ggrl ve gayrihi der muhafaza-yi kalay-1 Istolni Belgrad ve bazi bavvabin			60 444 747
P.1v	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 cebeciyan ve topquyan ve arabaciyan-1 top ve sehterun-1 alim ve hayme ve hadese-yi istabl-i andre ve ehl-i hirc ve sakayan-1 divan ve kilaryan tabl-yi matbah-1 andre ve rissa ve azaban ve kumaraciyan-1 Galata ve gayrihi			5 979 256
P.v	mevacib-1 meferat-1 kila			30 017 170
		P.v.a	der livay-1 Batin	11 135 608
		P.v.b	der livay-1 Demeqvar	3 051 410
		P.v.c	der livay-1 ggrl	7 531 000
		P.v.d	der livay-1 Kanije	7 330 260
		P.v.e	der livay-1 Semendre	968 892
			(30 017 170)	
P.vi	mevacib-1 bazi gubran-1 Fransa ve Leh ve Erdel			5 693 810
		P.vi.a	mevacib-1 efrenca-1 Fransa	2 583 560
		P.vi.b	mevacib-1 bazi gubran an canib-1 Erdel amedend	1 136 690
		P.vi.c	mevacib-1 bazi gubran an canib-1 Leh amedend	1 963 560
			(5 683 810)	
Q.	at-taslimat be-ali emir-i harri-1 hasna -yi Istanbul ve Ismail emir-i sergi ve Ibrahim emir-i ganes ve Ibrahim Aga ser cebeciyan ve Ali Efendi emir-i rikil beray-1 mshimata-1 mezburin			28 424 713
R.	al-adat: salyane-yi mirman ve defterdarun-1 vilayet-i Batin ve ggrl ve Kanije ve Demeqvar ve Istolni Belgrad ve gayrihi ve sayishane- baba-yi bazi katibin-1 divan ve nafaka-yi bazi cebeciyan ve topquyan ve gayrihi			2 006 054
S.	al-inamat be- Tuktamig Sultan veled-1 hazret-i Han ve yenigeriyan-1 dergah -1 ali der vakt-1 amedend-1 sefer ve der meterin-1 kalay-1 Estergon ve bazi sipahiyan ve silahdarun ve cebeciyan ve gayrihi beray-1 cilusa-1 hamayun			4 960 830
S.1	be-cihet-1 cilusa-1 hamayun beray-1 sipahiyan ve silahdarun ve gayrihi		3 650 580	
S.11	be-cihet-1 veled-1 hazret-i Han zi-ghan ve yenigeriyan ve bazi kesen		1 330 250	(4 980 830)
T.	al-mubayaat: paha-yi hilat-1 semaser-i Istanbul ve Amasya ve atlas (ve) tafta ve kagit ve pembe-1 murasa beray-1 mshimata-1 hazine			2 448 531
U.	al-ihraat be- cihet-1 kiraye-yi araba ve kiraye-yi mekarriyan ki barut-1 siyah tahmil gude ve cebatare ve bazi nafaka-yi sofiyan ve haro-1 ruh ve nafaka -yi gubran ki an canib-1 Erdel amedend			1 430 509
V.	al-eda-yi ahyan be- cihet-1 akce-yi bazi kesen ki der hin-1 mshayaka-yi mevacic ki bi-hazine-yi amire bir vech-1 karr dade ve eda-yi akce -yi mahallerat-1 bazi kesen ve eda-yi akce -yi bazi haraciyan der hin-1 muhasebatet ziyade muhtab gude hala eda gude		5 965 948	(214 197 891)
al-baki: mevoud-1 hazine				8 335 320
mevoud-1 ruzname	8 315 035	teslim bi-hazine-yi amire-yi astane-yi saadet	6 235 320	(822 533 215)
ziyade: tafavut-1 aded-i vech	20 285	teslim be-Mahmed Efendi defterdar-1 shah-1 Turu kalamkara-1 defterdar efendi	2 100 000	(8 335 320)
	(8 335 320)			

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 10 Şevval 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606-13 May 1607)

source: KK 1890 (10ml) income and expenditure account: Debit

Al-saarif				74 213 496
F. al-sevacib				60 337 045
	F.i	mevacib-i cemaat-1 müşaherehoran	580 453	
	F.ii	mevacib-i cemaat-1 yeniperiyan-1 dergah-1 ali	17 260 725	
	F.iii	mevacib-i cemaat-1 etra-yi sipahyan ve silahdaran ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve yesar ve gureba-yi yemin ve yesar ve bazı sipahyan ve bavvaban-1 dergah-1 ali	7 319 477	
	F.iv	mevacib-i cemaat-1 cebeciyan ve toppayan-1 dergah-1 ali ve arabaciyan-1 top ve mehteran-1 hayme ve ales ve hademe-yi istanb-1 amire ve hayyatın-1 hilat ve cecrahin-1 hasa ve gayrihi	4 642 273	
	F.v	mevacib-i meskurin tabi-yi kila: meferat-1 meskurin	29 438 917	
		P.v.a tabi-yi kale-yi Budun	18 340 360	
		P.v.b tabi-yi kale-yi Eğri	4 643 315	
		P.v.c tabi-yi kale-yi Kaniçe	3 287 424	
		P.v.d tabi-yi kale-yi Temegvar	3 166 788	
			(29 437 887)	
	F.vi	mevacib-i taife-yi hilat-1 millet	1 095 200	
			(60 337 045)	
		P.vi.a mevacib-i taife-yi afrenca-1 Fransa	495 200	
		P.vi.b mevacib-i bazı macaran ki an mezd-1 Hockayı amede	600 000	
			(1 095 200)	
Q. at-teahhat:				8 938 222
		Beşim be-Alli Efendi emir-i müzül-i anbar-1 Belgrad be-cihet-1 İştira-yi zahire beray-1 amir-i mansure ve Ali Ağa emir-i çarven ve Mehmed çavuş sergi ve Sinan çavuş emir-i bekisad ve Silegman çavuş emir-1 haro-1 hasa-yi Belgrad ve Mehmed Efendi defterdar-1 -1 Budun be-cihet bab-ı-yi zahire ve ruşno-1 made beray-1 kale-yi m(erbur) ve İbrahim Bey mirliya-yi İsvocin be-cihet-1 İtrakardan-1 sefine ve Mustafa Ağa sar bavvabin-1 dergah-1 ali be-cihet-1 bazı pişkeç beray-1 kral-1 Erdel firistade ve Ali Paşa mirmiran-1 Budun be-cihet-1 esb ve ruht ve ahayi ve gayrihi beray-1 elciyan-1 Nemce ki der vakt-1 musalaha amede ve gayri		
R. al-adedat: adet-1				1 549 235
		salıyan-yi Ali Paşa ve Siran Paşa mirmiran-1 Budun ve Eğri ve Mehmed Efendi defterdar-1 orduyi burayun ve diğer Mehmed Efendi defterdar-1 Budun ve Anar Efendi defterdar-1 Eğri ve Mehmed Efendi defterdar-1 Temegvar ve Cafer Efendi defterdar-1 Kaniçe ve adet-1 bazı mirliya ki der muhafaza budend ve adet-1 salıyan -yi bazı zatıhor-1 divan ve gayrihi		
S. al-inamat: inam be- kapadancu-1 macar ki an canib-1 Hockayı kral-1 Erdel amede ve bazı mirrayan-1 tataran ki der Eflak budend ve bazı elciyan ki an canib-1 Nemce amedend ve bazı kulaguzan ve bastiran ki bazı ahbar averde ve gayri				484 347
T. al-mubayaat: baha-yi hilat-1 seraser-1 İstanbul ve Amasya ve çoka-yi milenevira ve atlas ve tafta ve boğazi ve destar ve hayme ve gişir ve ruht ve gayri beray-1 mihimmat-1 hazine haride güd				633 055
U. al-ihracat be-cihet-1 kırıye-yi arababa-yi oamas beray-1 yeniperiyan ve cebeciyan ve sergi ve gayrihi der mukabele-yi İğdiran dade refren bi- sefer-1 hamayun ve rafaka yi elciyan-1 Nemce ve Macar ve Eflak ve Boğdan ve mihimmat-1 pişkeç be-cihet-1 /.../ kral-1 Erdel firistade ve bazı inamat-1 mihimmat-1 mirrayan-1 tataran ve ücret-1 kırıye-yi mekarriyan-1 hazine ve navlun ve sefine ve gayri				2 151 357
V. al-edeyi diyun be-cihet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi ziyade-yi ciye ve muhalifat-1 bazı kesun be-hazine-yi andire kabz güde bazı hala eda güde				120 237
				(74 213 496)

az-ıyude:
adet-1 vemm-3 521
(74 209 976)

APPENDIX 2:

Tables showing
Composition of Currency
paid into and out of
the Campaign Treasury

Composition of currency paid into the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)

ASL (total revenue) 380 604 029

denomination	amount of each type	exchange rate	amount in akçe
nakdiye (silver akçes)			96 512 952
hasenat (gold coins)	2 266 994 sikke		
	at	120 akçe ea.	1 539 677
	at	118 akçe ea.	727 317
			<u>(2 266 994)</u>
zer-i sebuke (gold ingots)	120 miskal	at 110 akçe ea.	13 200
guruşha-yi mitenevvi (large silver coins - various)	126 837 adet		
	at	80 akçe ea.	6 840.5
	at	78 akçe ea.	92 511.5
	at	70 akçe ea.	9 000.5
			18 485
			<u>(126 837.5)</u>
nukre-yi halis ma' nakdiye-yi hurde ve kem-ayar der vezn (pure & substandard silver: by weight)	310 744 dirhem		
	77 520 at	9 akçe ea.	697 680
	9 140 at	8.75 akçe ea.	79 975
	9 770 at	8 akçe ea.	78 160
	23 550 at	7 akçe ea.	164 850
	190 764 at	6 akçe ea.	1 144 584
	<u>(310 744)</u>		

an tefavüt-i hasene ve

guruş

(discrepancy of gold & silver)

1 677 827

- (380 604 026)

(source: KK 1879 p.2)

3

Composition of currency paid out of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)

Al-masarif (total expenditure) 381 406 212

<u>denomination</u>	<u>amount of each type</u>	<u>exchange rate</u>	<u>amount in akçe</u>
nakdiye (silver akçes)			96 385 883
hasenat (gold coin)	2 267 028 sikke	at 120 akçe ea.	272 043 360
zer-i sebuke (gold ingots)	120 miskal	at 120 akçe ea.	14 400
guruşha-yi mütenevvi (large silver coins - various)	127 172.5 adet	at 80 akçe ea. at 70 akçe ea.	108 494 18 678
			<u>(127 172)</u>
nukre-yi halise ma' nakdiye-yi hurde ve kem-ayar der vezn (pure & substandard silver: by weight)	439 861 dirhem	75 595 at 9 akçe ea. 9 140 at 8.75 akçe ea. 9 770 at 8 akçe ea. 23 550 at 7 akçe ea. 82 750 at 6.5 akçe ea. 239 056 at 6 akçe ea.	680 355 79 975 78 160 164 850 537 875 1 434 336
	<u>439861</u>		
			<u>-(381 406 174)</u>
			38

(source: KK 1879 p.6)

Composition of currency paid into the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

ASL (total revenue)

190 628 798

<u>denomination</u>	<u>amount of each type</u>	<u>exchange rate</u>	<u>amount in akçe</u>
nakdiye (silver akçes)			36 954 209
hasenat-1 mütenevvi (gold coins - various)	1 059 499 sikke		
	at	120 akçe ea.	749 327
	at	118 akçe ea.	310 167
	at	100 akçe ea.	5
			<u>(1 059 499)</u>
guruşha-yi mütenevvi (large silver coins - various)	333 035 adet		
	at	80 akçe ea.	36 040.5
	at	78 akçe ea.	252 420
	at	70 akçe ea.	4 345
	at	68 akçe ea.	40 229.5
			<u>2 735 606</u>
			(333 035)
mukre-yi halise (pure silver)	14 358 dirhem		
	1 578 at	8 akçe ea.	12 624
	11 500 at	8.75 akçe ea.	100 625
	1 280 at	8.5 akçe ea.	10 880
	<u>(14 358)</u>		
nakdiye-yi kem-ayar-1 mütenevvi (substandard akçe coins - various)	38 933 dirhem		
	6 400 at	7.5 akçe ea.	48 000
	1 200 at	7 akçe ea.	8 400
	600 at	6 akçe ea.	3 600
	30 733 at	5 akçe ea.	153 665
	<u>(38 933)</u>		
an tefavüt-1 hasene ve guruş (discrepancy of gold & silver)			1 205 632
			<u>- (190 628 837)</u>

Composition of currency paid out of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramadan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

Al-masarif (total expenditure) 190 635 775

<u>denomination</u>	<u>amount of each type</u>	<u>exchange rate</u>	<u>amount in akçe</u>
nakdiye (silver akçes)			36 878 857
hasenat (gold coins)	1 059 504 sikke	at 120 akçe ea.	127 140 480
guruşha-yi mütenevvi (large silver coins - various)	333 054.5 adet	at 80 akçe ea.	288 461.5
		at 70 akçe ea.	44 593
			<u>(333 054.5)</u>
mukre-yi halise (pure silver)	13 078 dirhem	1 578 at 11 500 at	12 624 100 625
			<u>(13 078)</u>
nakdiye-yi kem-ayar (substandard akçe coins)	37 688 dirhem	6 400 at 1 280 at 30 008 at	48 000 7 680 150 040
			<u>(37 688)</u>

- (190 536 736)

99 039

(source: KK 1885 p.9)

Composition of currency paid out of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebl I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)

121 650 461

Al-masarif (total expenditure)

<u>denomination</u>	<u>amount of each type</u>	<u>exchange rate</u>	<u>amount in akçe</u>
nakdiye (silver akçes)			30 117 816
hasenat (gold coins)	566 882 sikke at	120 akçe ea.	68 025 840
guruşha (large silver coins)	295 686 adet	at 80 akçe ea. at 70 akçe ea.	22 470 280 1 036 525
		(295 686)	-----
			- (121 650 461)

			0

(source: KK 1887 p.9)

APPENDIX 3:

Transliterations of
Buda Treasury Accounts

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 20 Şaban 1009-15 Rebi II 1010 (24 February-13 September 1601)

source: MM 6766(a) (İcmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asıl-ı mal fî 7 eşhür ve 25 eyyam

7 874 414

AA. an hizane-yi amlre
-yi sefer-i humayun
bidderaat

6 033 965

BB. an mahsul-ı
villayet-ı Budin

1 673 591

BB.1 an akçe-yi mukataat

806 926

BB.11 an akçe-yi cizye-yi
gebran

66 840

BB.111 an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal
-ı hassa ma' sipahlyan
ve gayrihi

51 796

BB.1v an akçe-yi rûsum-ı
derewat-ı neferat-ı
Budın ve tezaktır-ı
timarına

21 510

BB.v an akçe-yi baha-yi
zahire-yi mlrî
an akçe-yi icare-yi
dekkâkın ve resm-ı kapuyî
zemîn

706 813

BB.v1 an akçe-yi icare-yi
dekkâkın ve resm-ı kapuyî
zemîn

23 706

an bakıye-yi
muhasabe-yi sene-yi
mazıye der bazı
neferat harçlık mande

166 858

(7 874 414)

(1 677 591)

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 15 Rebl II 1010-30 Muharrrem 1011 (13 September 1601-20 July 1602)

source: MM 6766(b) (İcmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-ı mal f1 9 eşhür ve 15 eyyam

11 245 886

AA. an hizane-yi amire
-yi sefer-i humayun
biddefaat

9 283 850

BB. an mahsul-ı
villayet-i Budin

1 580 482

BB.1 an akçe-yi mukataat
BB.11 an akçe-yi cizye-yi

114 685
207 729

BB.111 an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal
-i sipahıyan ve gayrihı

49 652

BB.1v an akçe-yi rüsum-ı
berevat-ı neferat-ı

43 090

Budin ve tezakir-ı
timarha

BB.v an akçe-yi baha-yi
zahire ve gusl-ı ganem

889 884

BB.v1 an akçe-yi icare-yi
dekakin ve resm-ı kapuyi

28 002

BB.v11 an akçe-yi üstüran ve
camusan-ı Mehmed kethida

31 440

BB.v11.a be-cihet-ı camusan
BB.v11.b be-cihet-ı baha-yi
üstüran

6 000
25 440

(31 440)

72 000

BB.v111 an akçe-yi karz-ı
Mehmed Paşa

144 000

BB.1x an akçe-yi tefavüt-ı
hesab-ı yevmiye-yi /.../
an neferat ki der yoklama
beray-ı mhasebe-yi

(1 580 482)

/.../ nihade ve sarf şüde

an bakıye-yi
mhasebe-yi maziye

381 554

(11 245 886)

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: I Sarfar-30 Zillhicce 1011 (21 July 1602-10 June 1603)

source: MM 6766(c) (1cmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-1 mal f1 11 espür

12 829 309

AA. an hizane-yi amire
-yi sefer-i humayun
bidderaat

10 926 040

BB. an mahsul-1
vilayet-1 Buddin

1 864 202

BB.1 an akçe-yi mukataat

429 962

BB.1i an akçe-yi cizye-yi
gebran

7 440

BB.1ii an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal-1
sipahiyân ve gayrihi
-- an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal-1
hassa

51 394

42 800

BB.1iv

an akçe-yi rûsum-1
berevat ve ahkam-1
şikayat tabi-yi divan
der zaman-1 hazret-1 vezir
Mehmed Paşa

79 089

-- an akçe-yi rûsum-1

7 800

tezakîr-1 timarha
-- an akçe-yi rûsum-1
neferat-1 Buddin

49 490

BB.v

an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire
-yi edna-yi sipahiyân ve
silahdaran ve cebeciyân
ve topçuyân ve gayrihi
-- an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire
-yi yenigeriyân-1
dergâh-1 alî
-- an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire
-yi bazı kesân

128 122

443 251

575 572

BB.vi

an akçe-yi resm-1 tapuyî
zemîn ve icare-yi dekâkin

19 282

(1 834 202)

an bakîye-yi
muhasabe-yi sene-yi
mazîye

39 067

(12 829 309)

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 20 Şaban 1009-15 Rebi II 1010 (24 February-13 September 1601)

source: MM 6766(a) (Ismail) Income and expenditure account/Debit

Vuzia min zalike

7 492 760

PP.	al-mevacibat						
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 klla -yi liya-yi Buddin ber muclb-1 defter residan	4 862 014		6 408 310			
PP.11	mevacib-1 yeniçeriyar-1 mahruşe-yi Buddin	853 047					
PP.111	mevacib-1 bazı neferat-1 klla ve gayrihi	319 371					
PP.1v	mevacib-1 müteferrikan	52 080					
PP.v	mevacib-1 çavuşan-1 Buddin	104 676					
PP.v1	mevacib-1 ebna-yi sipahiyan ve gayrihi der muhafaza	11 541					
PP.v11	mevacib-1 müttekaidan-1 kale-yi Buddin	51 321					
PP.v111	mevacib-1 mehteran-1 Buddin	11 324					
PP.1x	mevacib-1 vazifehoran-1 cevaml-yi şerif-1 Buddin ve tevabih	142 936					
		(6 408 310)					
QQ.	teslim bi-hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-1 humayun fi gurre-yi Zillhicce sene 1008 an yed-1 Turhan gavuş emln-1 mukataa					20 000	
RR.	al-adat						
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yi Meirned Paşa mülmiran-1 Buddin	161 800		203 800			
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 İbrahim Efendi defterdar-1 m(ezbur)	7 000					
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yi Hasan Bey mülriya-yi ()	25 000					
RR.1v	adet-1 salyane-yi /.../ Ali Paşa	10 000					
		(203 800)					
SS.	Inam bi-gaziyar					1 200	
TT.	al-imbayaat						
TT.1	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zanire berry-1 mühlumat-1 asaklr-1 Buddin	223 200		401 865			
TT.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yi rujan ve /.../ ve elvah ma' baha-yi alam-1 /.../ berry-1 /.../	174 750					
TT.111	be-cihet-1 baha-yi agram berry-1 baha-yi kurban	3 915					
		(401 865)					
UU.	al-ihracat						
UU.1	be-cihet-1 haro-1 elciyan	12 120		146 722			
UU.11	be-cihet-1 ücret-1 şerifne ma' araba berry-1 averden-1	13 200					

TT. al-mubayaaat

TT. 1	be-cihet-1 bahâ-yi zahire beray-1 mihnimet-1 asakir-1 Buddin	223 200	401 865
TT. 11	be-cihet-1 bahâ-yi rûgan ve /.../ ve elvan ma' bahâ-yi alam-1 /.../ beray-1 /.../	174 750	
TT. 111	be-cihet-1 bahâ-yi aqşam beray-1 bahâ-yi kurban	3 915	
		<u>(401 865)</u>	

UU. al-İhracat

UU. 1	be-cihet-1 haro-1 elciyan be-cihet-1 ücret-1 serline	12 120	146 722
UU. 11	ma' araba beray-1 averden-1 hazine an Belğrad İla Buddin	13 200	
UU. 111	be-cihet-1 haro-1 rah-1 bazı keşan beray-1 averden-1 ahbar ve gavrihi	42 440	
UU. 1v	be-cihet-1 nafaka-yi bazı keşan	10 830	
UU. v	be-cihet-1 İhracat-1 esbabha-1 parkan-1 /.../	68 132	
		<u>(146 722)</u>	

VV. al-eda-yi düyün-1

310 963

VV. 1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi deyr-1 Yusuf ve Hasan yenigeri	120 000	
VV. 11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Meimed Efendi defterdar-1 sabık	1 100	
VV. 111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Hacı Halil	480	
VV. 1v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Ali kethüda-yi vildan-1 kul	24 700	
VV. v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Ömer ve Meimed yenigeri	16 880	
VV. v1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Ali	5 763	
VV. v11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Meimed Paşa an yenigeriyan mukaddema daklık işfıra şilde	100 000	
VV. v111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Meimed ağa-yi vildan-1 kul	7 000	
VV. 1x	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyr-1 Murad Paşa	35 040	
		<u>(310 963)</u>	

(7 492 860)

381 554

al-baki der hazine-yi
Buddin meyvud
(mahsub der muhasebe-yi
sene-yi atıye tamamen)

(7 874 314)

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 15 Rebl II 1010-30 Muharrrem 1011 (13 September 1601-20 July 1602)
 source: MM 6766(b) (Jemal) Income and expenditure account/Debit
 Vuzia mdn zalike

11 206 819

Code	Description	Amount	Total
PP.	al-mevacib-iat		
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi liya-yi Buddin ber mucib-1 der'fer residan mevacib-1 yeni'geriyan-1 Buddin	7 696 377	10 250 762
PP.11	mevacib-1 bazı neferat-1 kila tabi-yi Buddin	865 046	
PP.111	mevacib-1 mi'terferrikagan ve mi'saherhoran	674 667	
PP.1v	mevacib-1 bazı sipahlyan ve v'lidan-1 kul	17 380	
PP.v	mevacib-1 gavu'san-1 Buddin	186 354	
PP.v1	mevacib-1 mi'tbekaidan-1 Buddin	325 328	
PP.v11	mevacib-1 bazı cebeciyan mevacib-1 neferat-1 tulfenkliyan-1 Bosna der muha'faza-yi Kopan	117 407	
PP.v111	mevacib-1 hademe-yi cevami-yi serif-1 Buddin ve tevaaliba	9 600	
PP.1x	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ef'tencan ber vech-1 harcluk	24 000	
PP.x		165 603	
PP.x1		169 000	
		(10 250 762)	
QR.			
RR.	al-adat		
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yi Meimmed Pasa	185 540	366 062
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 Hiiseym Pasa	91 362	
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yi Ali Pasa	18 000	
RR.1v	adet-1 salyane-yi Ibrahim Ef'endi der'ferdar	45 960	
RR.v	adet-1 salyane-yi Bakr Bey	24 000	
RR.v1	adet-1 salyane-yi Emir Bey	1 200	
		(366 062)	
SS.	iram bi-bazi kesan		2 880
TT.	al-mubay'aat		
TT.1	be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz ve rugar-1 sade ki berry Egri firtstade	147 440	438 940
TT.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yi beksimad	15 040	
TT.111	be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz	15 000	
TT.1v	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair	125 680	
TT.v	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair ki mukadema sitade bud hala eda slide	120 000	
TT.v1	be-cihet-1 serfine-yi gam ve baha-yi ser-1 alem ve tabl ve soda	15 780	
		(438 940)	

RR.1v adet-1 salyane-yi Ibrahim Efendi der'vardar 45 960
 RR.v adet-1 salyane-yi Bakı Bey 24 000
 RR.vı adet-1 salyane-yi Emir Bey 1 200
 (366 062)

SS. İmam bî-bazı kesan 2 880

TT. al-mubayaaat 438 940

TT.1 be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz ve rügan-ı sade ki beray Egr'i fıristade 147 440
 TT.1ı be-cihet-1 baha-yi beksimad 15 040
 TT.111 be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz 15 000
 TT.1v be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair 125 680
 TT.v be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair ki mukadema sırade bud 120 000
 TT.vı hala eda şüde be-cihet-1 serline-yi gam ve baha-yi ser-ı alem ve tabl ve soba 15 780
 (438 940)

UU. al-ıhracat 124 517

UU.1 be-cihet-1 üret-1 necceran ve ırgadan ve ahengaran 26 960
 UU.11 be-cihet-1 baha-yi mesamir ve navlun-ı sefain ve nafaka-yi pandoran ve gayrihi 96 357
 UU.111 be-cihet-1 nafaka-yi elciyan 1 200
 (124 517)

V. al-eda-yi dıyun-ı bazı kesan 23 340

VV.1 be-cihet-1 eda-yi 3 000
 VV.11 deyn-ı Ali sipahi be-cihet-1 eda-yi 300
 VV.111 deyn-ı Reyzüllan Efendi be-cihet-1 eda-yi 1 200
 VV.1v deyn-ı mukataa-yi () be-cihet-1 eda-yi 1 040
 VV.v deyn-ı Mustafa be-cihet-1 eda-yi 6 620
 VV.vı deyn-ı Kasım çavuş sipahi be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-ı /.../ Ali 280
 VV.vı1 be-cihet-1 eda-yi mahallerat-ı Kızılbas Mustafa 4 000
 VV.vı11 be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-ı Ömer ve Mehmed 6 900
 (23 340)

(11 206 501)

al-bakiye
 (mahsub der muhasebe-yi
 sene-yi atıye tamamen)

39 067
 (11 245 886)

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 1 Safar-30 Zilhijce 1011 (21 July 1602-10 June 1603)
 source: MW 6766(c) (Icmal) Income and expenditure account/Debit
 Vuzla min zalike
 12 841 291

Code	Description	Amount	Total
PP.	al-mevacibbat		11 582 804
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kale-yl Buddin	7 144 638	
PP.11	mevacib-1 yenigeriyar-1 Buddin	1 930 256	
PP.111	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila -yl serhadd tabi-yl Buddin	69 290	
PP.1v	mevacib-1 bazı sipahiyar ve silahdaran ve vildan-1 kul ve gayrihl ki der muhafaza-yl Buddin	41 846	
PP.v	mevacibbes kesr amede mevacib-1 zuama ve erbab-1 tilmat-1 Buddin ve Pesbe ve gayrihl	199 455	
PP.v1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kale -yl Kopan ve Siirtotoma ve gayrihl	199 910	
PP.v11	mevacib-1 gavusan-1 kale -yl Buddin	517 525	
PP.v111	mevacib-1 vazifehoran ve mltekaldan ve duguyan-1 Buddin	392 996	
PP.1x	mevacib-1 neferat-1 Istolni Belgrad der muhafaza-yl ()	1 086 888	
		(11 582 804)	
QQ.			
RR.	al-adat		194 560
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yl Ali Raşa mirmiltan-1 Buddin	31 800	
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-1 hizane-yl mezbur	120 000	
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yl Seyyid Receb mrliva-yl Esvergon	42 760	
		(194 560)	
SS.	al-iramat		161 175
SS.1	be-cihet-1 iram bi-bazi toquyan ve cebeciyar ve gayrihl	88 775	
SS.11	be-cihet bi-bazi kesar beray-1 merhamba	12 000	
SS.111	be-cihet bi-bazi sipahiyar ve silahdaran ve vildan-1 kul ve gayrihl der vakt-1 muhafaza nasb siddend	60 400	
		(161 175)	
TT.	al-imbayaat		234 028
TT.1	be-cihet-1 baha-yl gokakna -yl mltenevvi beray-1 mltimmat-1 hazine-yl Buddin	7 060	
TT.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yl hilahta beray-1 mltimmat-1 hazine-yl Buddin	69 000	
TT.111	be-cihet-1 baha-yl tarfa	8 720	

TT. 1	al-mabayat	TT. 1	be-cihet-i baha-yi gokaha -yi mitenevvi berry-i mihimmat-i hazine-yi Budin	7 060	234 028
TT. 11		TT. 11	be-cihet-i baha-yi hilahta berry-i mihimmat-i hazine-yi Budin	69 000	
TT. 111		TT. 111	be-cihet-i baha-yi tarfa ve baha-yi hayme ve gayrihi	8 720	
TT. v		TT. v	be-cihet-i baha-yi zehalr-i mitenevvi berry-i asaklr-i mansure der mahafaza-yi Budin	149 248 (234 028)	
UU. 1	al-ihracat	UU. 1	be-cihet-i baha-yi elvan ve mesamir-i mitenevvi ve baha-yi sefirneha-yi gam an kulfar-i hakasar averdend be-cihet-i ihracat-i lazime-yi cevami-yi serif ve mesacid ve doret-i basbaban ve gayrihi	62 909	584 804
UU. 111		UU. 111	be-cihet-i nafaka-yi kapudanan ve bazi nafaka-yi sipahliyan ve yeniqerliyan	113 870	
UU. 1v		UU. 1v	be-cihet-i ihracat berry-i ab-i sakayan ve baha-yi barqiran berry-i esbab-i yeniqerliyan	30 190	
UU. v		UU. v	be-cihet-i tamir ve temim -i kale-yi Budin	69 144	
UU. v1		UU. v1	be-cihet-i ihracat-i lazime ve baha-yi kildid ma' cild-i gav ve bazi tecniz ve tekfin ve gayrihi	89 162	
UU. v11		UU. v11	be-cihet-i bazi mihimmat-i gürz liyas	154 320	
UU. v111		UU. v111	be-cihet-i baha-yi kurban	2 400	
			(562 105)		
WV. 1	al-eda-yi diyunr-i bazi kessan	WV. 1	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi ()	8 000	83 920
WV. 11		WV. 11	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi ()	42 280	
WV. 111		WV. 111	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi Habib Efendi	18 000	
WV. 1v		WV. 1v	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi Balli /.../	5 000	
WV. v		WV. v	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi Balli al-mazbur	10 000	
WV. v1		WV. v1	be-cihet-i eda-yi akçe-yi ()	265	
			(83 545)		
			(12 841 291)		

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 20 Şaban 1009-15 Rebi II 1010 (24 February-13 September 1601)

source: MM 6766(a) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-i mal fi 7 eşhür ve 25 eyyam

7 874 414

AA. an hizane-yi amire
-yi sefer-i humayun
biddefaat

6 033 965

BB. an mahsul-i
vilayet-i Budin

1 673 591

BB.i an akçe-yi mukataat

806 926

BB.ii an akçe-yi cizye-yi
gebran

66 840

BB.iii an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal
-i hassa ma' sipahiyân
ve gayrihi

51 796

BB.iv an akçe-yi rûsum-i
bervat-i neferat-i
Budin ve tezakir-i
timarha

21 510

BB.v an akçe-yi baha-yi
zahire-yi miri

706 813

BB.vi an akçe-yi icare-yi
dekakin ve resm-i kapuyi
zemin

23 706

(1 677 591)

an bakiye-yi
muhasabe-yi sene-yi
maziye der bazı
neferat harclik mande

166 858

(7 874 414)

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 15 Rebi II 1010-30 Muharrem 1011 (13 September 1601-20 July 1602)

source: MM 6766(b) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-i mal fi 9 eşhür ve 15 eyyam

AA. an hizane-yi amire
-yi sefer-i humayun
biddefaat

BB. an mahsul-i
vilayet-i Budin

BB.i an akçe-yi mukataat
BB.ii an akçe-yi cizye-yi
gebran
BB.iii an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal
-i sipahiyan ve gayrihi
BB.iv an akçe-yi rüsum-i
bervat-i neferat-i
Budin ve tezakir-i
timarha
BB.v an akçe-yi baha-yi
zahire ve guşt-i ganem
ve gav ve gayrihi
BB.vi an akçe-yi icare-yi
dekakin ve resm-i kapuyi
zemin ve esbabha
BB.vii an akçe-yi üstüran ve
camusan-i Mehmed kethüda

BB.vii.a be-cihet-i camusan
BB.vii.b be-cihet-i baha-yi
üstüran

BB.viii an akçe-yi karz-i
Mehmed Paşa
BB.ix an akçe-yi tefavüt-i
hesab-i yevmiye-yi /.../
an neferat ki der yoklama
beray-i muhasebe-yi
/.../ nihade ve sarf şüde

an bakiye-yi
muhasebe-yi maziye

11 245 886

9 283 850

1 580 482

114 685

207 729

49 652

43 090

889 884

28 002

31 440

6 000

25 440

(31 440)

72 000

144 000

(1 580 482)

381 554

(11 245 886)

Revenues of the Buda Treasury: 1 Safar-30 Zilhicce 1011 (21 July 1602-10 June 1603)

source: MM 6766(c) (icmal) income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-i mal fi ll eshür

12 829 309

AA.	an hizane-yi amire -yi sefer-i humayun biddefaat	10 926 040
BB.	an mahsul-i vilayet-i Budin	1 864 202
BB.i	an akçe-yi mukataat	429 962
BB.ii	an akçe-yi cizye-yi gebran	7 440
BB.iii	an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal-i sipahiyan ve gayrihi	51 394
	-- an akçe-yi beyt ül-mal-i hassa	42 800
BB.iv	an akçe-yi rüsum-i bervat ve ahkam-i şikayat tabi-yi divan der zaman-i hazret-i vezir Mehmed Paşa	79 089
	-- an akçe-yi rüsum-i tezakir-i timarha	7 800
	-- an akçe-yi rüsum-i neferat-i Budin	49 490
BB.v	an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire -yi ebna-yi sipahiyan ve silahdaran ve cebeciyan ve topçuyan ve gayrihi	128 122
	-- an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire -yi yeniçeriyani-i dergah-i ali	443 251
	-- an akçe-yi baha-yi zahire -yi bazı kesen	575 572
BB.vi	an akçe-yi resm-i tapuyi zemin ve icare-yi dekakin	19 282
		<hr/>
		(1 834 202)
	an bakiye-yi muhasabe-yi sene-yi maziye	39 067
		<hr/>
		(12 829 309)

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 20 Şaban 1009-15 Rebi II 1010 (24 February-13 September 1601)

source: MM 6/66(a) (Jomal) Income and expenditure account/Debit

Vuzia min zalike

7 492 760

PP. al-mevacibat					
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila -yi 11va-yi Buddin ber mucib-1 defter residan	4 862 014		6 408 310	
PP.11	mevacib-1 yenigeriyan-1 mahrus-e-yi Buddin	853 047			
PP.111	mevacib-1 bazı neferat-1 kila ve gayrihi	319 371			
PP.1v	mevacib-1 multeferrikagan	52 080			
PP.v	mevacib-1 çavuşan-1 Buddin	104 676			
PP.v1	mevacib-1 ebra-yi sipahiyan ve gayrihi der muhafaza	11 541			
PP.v11	mevacib-1 mitekaidan-1 kale-yi Buddin	51 321			
PP.v111	mevacib-1 mehteran-1 Buddin	11 324			
PP.1x	mevacib-1 vazifehoran-1 cevand-yi şerif-1 Buddin ve tevabih	142 936			
		(6 408 310)			
QQ. teslim bi-hizane-yi amire-yi sefer-1 humayun fi gur-re-yi Zilhice sene 1008 an yed-1 Turphan çavuş emir-1 mukataba					20 000
RR. al-abad					
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yi Mehmed Paşa mirmiran-1 Buddin	161 800		203 800	
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-1 m(ezbur)	7 000			
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yi Hasan Bey mirliya-yi ()	25 000			
RR.1v	adet-1 salyane-yi /.../ Ali Paşa	10 000			
		(203 800)			
SS. Inam bi-gaziyan					1 200
TT. al-mbayzat					
TT.1	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zahire beray-1 muhimat-1 asakir-1 Buddin	223 200		401 865	
TT.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yi rügan ve /.../ ve elyah ma' baha-yi alan-1 /.../ beray-1 /.../	174 750			
TT.111	be-cihet-1 baha-yi ağan beray-1 baha-yi kurban	3 915			
		(401 865)			
UU. al-ihracat					146 722
UU.1	be-cihet-1 haro-1 elciyan	12 120			
UU.11	be-cihet-1 ücret-1 sefine ma' araba beray-1 averden-1 hazine an Belgrad İla Buddin	13 200			
UU.111	be-cihet-1 haro-1 rah-1 bazı kesan beray-1 averden-1 ahbar ve gayrihi	42 440			
UU.1v	be-cihet-1 nafaka-yi bazı kesan	10 830			
UU.v	be-cihet-1 ihracat-1 esbabha-1 parkan-1 /.../	68 132			
		(146 722)			
VV. al-eda-yi diyun-1 bazı kesan					310 963
VV.1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi deyn-1 Yusuf ve Hasan yenigeri	120 000			
VV.11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Mehmed Efendi defterdar-1 sabık	1 100			
VV.111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Hacı Halil	480			
VV.1v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Ali kethüda-yi vildan-1 kul	24 700			
VV.v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Ömer ve Mehmed yenigeri	16 880			
VV.v1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Ali	5 763			
VV.v11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Mehmed Paşa an yenigeriyan mukadema dakik istira şüde	100 000			
VV.v111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Mehmed ağa-yi vildan-1 kul	7 000			
VV.1x	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Murad Paşa	35 040			
		(310 963)			
				(7 492 860)	

al-baki der hazine-yi

Budin mevud

(mahsub der muhasebe-yi sene-yi atıye tamam)

381 554

(7 874 314)

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 15 Rebi II 1010-30 Muharrem 1011 (13 September 1601-20 July 1602)

source: MM 6766(b) (Iamal) Income and expenditure account/Debit

11 206 819

Vuzla mln zalike

PP.	al-mevacibat						
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila-yi liva-yi Buddin ber mucib-1 defter residan mevacib-1 yenigerliyan-1 Buddin	7 696 377	10 250 762				
PP.11	mevacib-1 bazi neferat-1 kila tabi-yi Buddin	865 046					
PP.111	mevacib-1 miteferrihagan ve musaherehoran	674 667					
PP.1v	mevacib-1 bazi sipahliyan ve vildan-1 kul	17 380					
PP.v	mevacib-1 hademe-yi Budun	186 354					
PP.v1	mevacib-1 mitekaidan-1 Budun	325 328					
PP.v11	mevacib-1 bazi cebeciyan mevacib-1 neferat-1 tutrenkçiyar-1 Bosna der muhafaza-yi Kopan	117 407					
PP.v111	cevami-yi şerif-1 Budun ve tevatihha	9 600					
PP.1x	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 efrencan ber vech-1 harcılık	24 000					
PP.x		165 603					
PP.x1		169 000					
		<u>(10 250 762)</u>					
QQ.	al-adat						
RR.	al-adat						
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yi Meimed Paşa	185 540				366 062	
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 Hüseyin Paşa	91 362					
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yi Ali Paşa	18 000					
RR.1v	adet-1 salyane-yi Ibrahim Efendi defterdar	45 960					
RR.v	adet-1 salyane-yi Bakı Bey	24 000					
RR.v1	adet-1 salyane-yi Emir Bey	1 200					
		<u>(366 062)</u>					
SS.	inam bi-bazi kesan						
TT.	al-mubayaat						
TT.1	be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz ve ruga-1 sade ki beray Eğri firistade	147 440				438 940	
TT.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yi beksimad	15 040					
TT.111	be-cihet-1 baha-yi erz	15 000					
TT.1v	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair	125 680					
TT.v	be-cihet-1 baha-yi zehair ki mukadema sitade bud hala eda süde	120 000					
TT.v1	be-cihet-1 serf-1 alem ve baha-yi serf-1 alem ve tabl ve soba	15 780					
		<u>(438 940)</u>					
UU.	al-ihracat						
UU.1	be-cihet-1 ücret-1 neccaran ve ırgadan ve ahengeran	26 960				124 517	
UU.11	be-cihet-1 baha-yi mesamir ve navlun-1 sefain ve nafaka-yi pandoran ve gayrihi	96 357					
UU.111	be-cihet-1 nafaka-yi elciyan	1 200					
		<u>(124 517)</u>					
VV.	al-eda-yi diyun-1 bazi kesan						
VV.1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Ali sipahi	3 000				23 340	
VV.11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Feyzullah Efendi	300					
VV.111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 mukataa-yi ()	1 200					
VV.1v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Mustafa	1 040					
VV.v	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Kasım gavuş sipahi	6 620					
VV.v1	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 /.../ Ali	280					
VV.v11	be-cihet-1 eda-yi mhallefat-1 Kızılbaş Mustafa	4 000					
VV.v111	be-cihet-1 eda-yi deyn-1 Ömer ve Meimed	6 900					
		<u>(23 340)</u>					
		<u>(11 206 501)</u>					

al-bakiye
(mahsub der muhasebe-yi
sene-yi atıye tamamen)39 067
(11 245 886)

September 16011

Expenditures of the Buda Treasury: 1 Safar-30 Zilhicce 1011 (21 July 1602-10 June 1603)

Source: MM 6766(c) (Jamal) Income and expenditure account/Debit

uzia min zalike

12 841 291

PP.	al-mevacibat				
PP.1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kale-yi Buddin	7	144	638	11 582 804
PP.11	mevacib-1 yeni geriyen-1 Buddin	1	930	256	
PP.111	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kila -yi serhadd tabi-yi Buddin	69	290		
PP.1v	mevacib-1 bazı sipahyan ve silahdaran ve vildan-1 kul ve gayrihi ki der muhafaza-yi Buddin	41	846		
PP.v	mevacibates kestr amede mevacib-1 zuama ve erbab-1 timar-1 Buddin ve Peşte ve gayrihi	199	455		
PP.v1	mevacib-1 neferat-1 kale -yi kopan ve şimontorna ve gayrihi	199	910		
PP.v11	mevacib-1 gavuşan-1 kale -yi Buddin	517	525		
PP.v111	mevacib-1 vazifehoran ve müttekaidan ve duagyan-1 Buddin	392	996		
PP.1x	mevacib-1 neferat-1 Istolni Belgrad der muhafaza-yi ()	1	086	888	
				(11 582 804)	

QQ.					
RR.	al-adaat				
RR.1	adet-1 salyane-yi Ali Paşa mirmiran-1 Buddin	31	800		194 560
RR.11	adet-1 salyane-1 Ibrahim Efendi defterdar-1 hizane-yi mezbur	120	000		
RR.111	adet-1 salyane-yi Seyyid Receb mirliva-yi Esterigon	42	760		
				(194 560)	

SS.	al-ınnamat				
SS.1	be-cinet-1 inam bi-bazi topquyan ve cedeciyan ve gayrihi	88	775		161 175
SS.11	be-cinet bi-bazi kesan berry-1 merhamta	12	000		
SS.111	be-cinet bi-bazi sipahyan ve silahdaran ve vildan-1 kul ve gayrihi der vakt-1 muhafaza nasb şüdensi	60	400		
				(161 175)	

TT.	al-ımbayaat				
TT.1	be-cinet-1 baha-yi gokaha -yi mitenevvi berry-1 mülhimat-1 hazine-yi Buddin	7	060		234 028
TT.11	be-cinet-1 baha-yi hilatna berry-1 mülhimat-1 hazine-yi Buddin	69	000		
TT.111	be-cinet-1 baha-yi tarfa ve baha-yi hayme ve gayrihi	8	720		
TT.v	be-cinet-1 baha-yi zehar-1 mitenevvi berry-1 asakir-1 mansure der muhafaza-yi Buddin	149	248		
				(234 028)	

UU.	al-ıhracat				
UU.1	be-cinet-1 baha-yi ei'rah ve mesamir-1 mitenevvi ve baha-yi sefineha-yi gam an kulfar-1 haksar averdend	62	909		584 804
UU.11	be-cinet-1 ihracat-1 lazime-yi cevami-yi gerif ve mesacid ve ticret-1 basbanan ve gayrihi	40	110		
UU.111	be-cinet-1 nafaka-yi kapudanan ve bazı nafaka-yi sipahyan ve yeni geriyen	113	870		
UU.1v	be-cinet-1 ihracat berry-1 ab-1 sakayan ve baha-yi bargiran berry-1 esbab-1 yeni geriyen	30	190		
UU.v	be-cinet-1 tamir ve termim -1 kale-yi Buddin	69	144		
UU.v1	be-cinet-1 ihracat-1 lazime ve baha-yi kılıd ma' cild-1 gav ve bazı techiz ve tekfin ve gayrihi	89	162		
UU.v11	be-cinet-1 bazı mülhimat-1 (Gürz İlyas	154	320		
UU.v111	be-cinet-1 baha-yi kurban	2	400		
				(562 105)	

VV.	al-eda-yi düyun-1 bazı kesan				
VV.1	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi ()	8	000		83 920
VV.11	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi ()	42	280		
VV.111	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi Habib Efendi	18	000		
VV.1v	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi Ball /.../	5	000		
VV.v	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi Ball al-mezbur	10	000		
VV.v1	be-cinet-1 eda-yi akçe-yi ()	265			
				(83 545)	

1601-20 July 1602

(12 841 291)

-11 982

(12 829 309)

APPENDIX 4:

Facsimiles of Campaign
Treasury Accounts &
Buda Treasury Accounts

الاي احمد افندي المشار اليه عن مقاطعات وجزيره وعادات اعيان و اموال
عن حصيل متفرقه و واردات غير مفرقه
ايكي بيك و جيوزاون بريوك المي التي بيك طفوز يوز تيس برانجه

عن المحصولات
بيك ايكي يوز بيكرمي بيك يوك او توز درت بيك طفوز يوز فرق درت

عن حصول مقاطعات او جيوزا او توز يدي يوك و اوز ايكي بيك ايشتوز اوز اوج
عن حصول جزيره بكران ولايت روم ايكي يدي يوز او توز يوك المي التي بيك
عادات اعيان طفوز يوز طفسان تر

عن حصول جزيره بكران و ويره و بيك
عن حصول جزيره بكران فوه بغداد
عن حصول جزيره بكران اولاق
سكزي يوك بيكرمي بيك
سكزي يوك بيكرمي بيك
سكزي يوك بيكرمي بيك

عن اموال متفرقه عن رسوم بروان و احكام كشكيات بايع
ديوان همايون و مالمه و رسوم تدارك
زغما و ان ب تمام و ولايت روم ايكي
وانا طولي و منبر مهران روم ايكي و بيت المال
و بخشد اسارا و اموال سايره و بلعيا
كشكيات بعض كسان
در تيوز اوز بروان اوز درت بيك ايشتوز
نيس برانجه

عن واردات التمش بيك يوك بيكرمي بيك
عن واردات التمش بيك يوك بيكرمي بيك
عن واردات التمش بيك يوك بيكرمي بيك
عن واردات التمش بيك يوك بيكرمي بيك

عن تعاقب و غرويش
عن كشكيات و غرويش
اوز التي يوك تمش يدي بيك سكر يوز بيكرمي بيك

المصادر فتبين
التي كانت الكيوزا ون
اوج بيك سكر نيوزا ون التي يوت
اونوز دوت بيك الليوز تروقش

المواجبات
اوج بيك اوجيوزا ون ايكي يوت
بيك وطفوز بيك اوجيوزا الايكي

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التيوزا الفشر كز

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قوي ديكي يوت الي اسكر بيك يديور
تيش تيش

مواجب
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بيكيمان وعلمان وعلمان وعلمان
سكزيوز سكران ديكي يوت
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مواجب
افرنجان فرانسه كمن قلعها بايا آمدند
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بوزا ون سكر يوت اوتوز بيك
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مواجب
نقزات قراع بوديني وطلشوار
واكتر و قانيزه وخوا بعه
طفوز بوزا ون ايكي يوت التي يوت
در نيوزا ون دوت

اللسلمها نساغاسر تو این درگاه عالی
 لعبدالکریم اغاسر تو این درگاه عالی
 ناسنانه سعادت از سال کرده و تسلیم
 امنای سیرکی همایون و امیتیان نزل و امنای
 غنم و تسلیمات سایر همه اجرت کورجیان
 رسره خوران و مهمات سایر سفرهای
 او و جیوزا و نیدی بوک او تو زالتی
 بشیوزا و تو ز درت

العادی شهیدیه و حصیب خان و سالیان
 عادت شهیدیه و اکثره و د فیزداران و
 میران طمشوار و کمان بهای بکیربان و طو بحبان
 عادت نفقه و کمان بهای بکیربان و طو بحبان
 وجبهه جیان درگاه عالی و غیره و کتاب
 سکسان التي بوک بکیر و طقوز بک
 بوزالتی بک

نظاما بخصیصت خان و بعضی با نادران
 نظام بخصیصت خان و بعضی با نادران
 در تشنه بودند و بعضی بکیربان درگاه
 در محافظه بلعه بودین و اکثره و طمشوار بود
 و امیرجان و منسه التمش طقوز بک او جیوزا بک
 بکیر التي بوک طقسان بیدی بک
 سکر بوزا و ج

المایعلا تدر استانبول و حوقه
 نهای طغتا اسراستانبول و حوقه
 و اطلاس و غیره برای خصمات
 خزینه
 او تو زالتی بوک سکسان بک
 سکر بوز

الآخرها جان اردل و افلا و وبقه ان
 بحرت نفقه یا لسان اردل و افلا و وبقه ان
 و حج راه فروردان و نفقه بعضی صراران
 نادران و نفقه اسیران مری و نفقه بعضی عاکوبان
 و کرایه عرهما و مکاربان باروت سیاه و قوس
 و جبهه خانه از درند بکیر بوز بک او جیوز
 اون التي بوک بکیر بوز بک او جیوز
 سکسان بک

ادایه دیوبند سکسان
 ادایه دینی بعضی سکسان
 و بعضی تابان و بعضی امنای و خراجخان
 و غیره بکیر بوک او تو ز بک
 التی بوزا و ج
 آنکه براد اون بوک او تو ز بک التی بوزا و ج
 عن الامین اون بوک او تو ز بک التی بوزا و ج
 سکسان بک
 ۱۰۲۱

بکیر بوز بک
 التی بوزا و ج

احماله وارذاته ومصارف خزینه عامه محمد الله تعالی الی یوم الآخر در بیان
 دستور اکرم مشیر الفخیم صدر اعظم حضرت حسن پاشا ادام الله تعالی
 اجلاله در سفر فتح استولنی بلغراد بمعرفه احمد افندی دفتر دارش
 اول دامت معالیه عن اون بر خرم الحرام سنه ۱۰۱۱ الی اون رمضان
 سنه منه

مواحد
 شش هجده
 او توز

امال عن خزینه عامه استنامه سعادت بالذرفعات و عن ابراد و عن قبیله بحاسبه
 سنه ماضیه و نفاوت حسنات و غرض و قرض بعض کسان
 بیک طقوز بوزا الی بوک بیکرچی مکز بیک دیدیوز طقسان مکز

مواحد
 جماعت
 عاونجیاد
 و بعضی
 و ولدان
 الی

عن خزانة سعادت بالذرفعات خزینه بوزا
 دیدیوز بیکرچی بوک
 عن علی آغا بیکرچی بوک درگاه محالی
 الی بوزا بیکرچی بوک
 عن ماضیه سنه ماضیه
 فز طقوز بوک فز دقت بک در بوزا
 عن عیال و عن قریب
 اوز ای بیک بک بش بک الی بوزا
 الی

الای
 بیک بوز بیکرچی دوت بوک بکش مکز بیک دیدیوز الی الی

مواحد
 جماعت
 بود

عن المصولات
 دیدیوز اوز طقوز بوک اوز طقوز بیک بوزا و توش

مواحد
 جماعت
 بود

عن مصولات مقاطعات بوزا الی دوت بوک اوز توز در بیک	عن مصولات جزیه کمران ولایت دور الی ایکبوز الی مکز بوک اوز یکی بک در بوزا
عن مصولات عادت اغنام اوز الی بوک اوز طقوز بیک در بوزا	عن مصولات جزیه و عادت اغنام و مقاطعات و بدل و عن جانب بخصلان ایکبوز بکش بوک الی الی بک بوزا



الالا
بلك يوز بركي دوت بلك بيش سكر برك بديوز اللالي التي

عالمحصولا
بديوز اوز طفوز بوك اوز طفوز برك يوز اوز توش

عن محصول
مقاطعات
جزيرة كمران ولايت روم ايلي
ايك يوز اللالي سكر برك اوز لكي برك دز بوز

عن محصول
عادت اغنام
سكن وبع
حزبه وعادت اغنام ومقاطعات وبدل
وعنه عن جانب خصلان
ايك يوز بيش بوك اللالي اوج برك يوز القمش اللالي

عالم
ميروروات واحكام شكايات تابع ديوان همدايون وماليه ورسوم
بذكر زعما وازباب تمار ولايت روم ايلي واطولى وميرهران روم ايلي وبيت مال
ونجيك سارا وبلديات كميات بعض كسان واموال سايرة
اللي يدي بوك طفسان طفوز برك بديوز بركي دوت

واردا
غير مفره عن بدل نزل وغنم وتولون وحسنه وبدل تمار وبمهاد حنين
وكوشت غنم وبيكسما وورغن ساده وقرض بعض كسان وغيره
اوجبوز فرق يدي بوك اللالي طفوز برك سكر يوز طفسان يدي

عن واردا
غير مفره
ايك يوز فرق اللالي بوك طفسان دز برك
بستوز اوز توش
غرفه خصلان
بعض كسان
يوز بوك
القمش يدي

موا
جماعه
بودى
بور
اكر
اوز
نوبه
سند
يا
اللسا
اموز
يكجا
يار
ايا
العام
به عاد
در كا
اوجا
الاج
محت
وج
وآ

المصنف

بيل طقوز يوز التي يوك او توز بيل يد يوز نيمش

المواحا

بيل او جيزو الممش يدي يوك او توز بيل طقوز يوز ابع

مواحا حوران
جماعت پنجابان درگاه عالی و عمان نجمان
او جيزو الممش يدي يوك نيمش ابع بيل در تيز يوز

مواحا حوران
او توز يوك او توز بيل بشير يکري يدي

مواحا حوران
جماعت جبه جيان و طوجان و حورنجيان
و خدمه اصطلح عامه و موزان حمله و علم
و بعض يوا بان درگاه عالی و روسا و غرابان
و قومين جيان حاصه
الممش يري يوك او توز در بيل طقوز يوز

مواحا حوران
جماعت ابناء سپاهيان و سواران و
عابونجيان يمين و يسار و عبا يمين و يسار
و بعض ابناء سپاهيان و سواران
و ولدان فول کمر و بوردن
السيوز در بيل يوك سکر بيل يوز فرق يکري

مواحا نقرات قارح بوردن و طشوار و اکرم و فايژه و نوابها و لوايه سمندره
جماعت نقرات قارح بوردن و طشوار و اکرم و فايژه و نوابها و لوايه سمندره
ا بکينوز الممش التي يوك التي هي بيل طقوز يوز يدي

بوردن و استونخ بلغواد
يوز يمين التي يوك سکنس يکي بيل الممش در بيل

اکره
او ن يدي يوك التي طقوز بيل سکر يوز التي يوش

لوايه سمندره
يدي يوك سکنس يکي بيل يد يوز التي يوش

مواحا حوران
طايفة افغان در نه کم عن قلعه باپا آمدند و اطاعت کردند
او توز يدي يوك سکنس يکي بيل طقوز يوز يکري

لا حرة در زمان
ادام الله تعالی
فتو دارش
وز رمضان

محاسبة

بيل التي يوز او توز
بيل يکري يوز
بيل يکري يوز

س ر ا

يا
بيل يکري يوز
بيل يکري يوز

اطعات و بدل

بيل يوز الممش التي

جماعت نغراب قلاخ بودین و سرور

ایکبوز الفتح الی یوک

الهی بیک طغوز بوزیدی

بودین و استونلی بلواد

یوز تیش الی یوک سکسن کی بیک الفتح و تیش

اکره

اون یدی بیک الی طغوز بیک سکریوز الی تیش

یدی یوک سکسن سکریوز الی تیش

طشوار
فرق یوک درت بیک سکریوز اول مع

تانی
سکریوز بیک اونوز تیش بیک درت بوز بیک مع

بر بجا
کردند و در حفاظت قلاخ بودند

بوز اونوز الی بیک

مواخا طایفه ارچجان فرسته کرمی قلعه پاپا آمدند و اطاعت کردند
اونوز یدی یوک سکسن بر بیک طغوز بوز بیک

العیاذ باللہ
بخت عادت نفقه کجیان درگاه عالی
وضه جیان و طوجیان فرح جیان طوب
و عادت تمان بهاء انشان در حفاظت قلاخ
بودند و عادت بی سالیان به میرمان بود
و طشوار و اکره و تانی و دفترداران و ولایت
مزبوره و میهنه و بودان طونه
اللی تیش یوک فرق درت بیک الفتح و تیش

السلیمان
امین برل و عثم و سرکی بهما یون و کسهاد
یکجیان و مهمات سفر بهما یون و امین فرج خاصه
ایکبوز تیش سکریوز تیش بر بیک طغوز بوز الی

المبا
بها یحلفت سر سراسر استابول و طایفه
و حوق و غیر برای مهمات خزینه و مهمات
عازی کران تمان
اونوز سکریوز یوک فرق کی بیک سکریوز الی طغوز

الاعمال
به عادی کرای خان و بعضی مبر زمان ما ماران و کجیان
درگاه عالی و بعضی نغراب قلاخ و غیر و طایفه
ارچجان
اونوز سکریوز بیک بر بیک در بوز

ادا و دیو
ادا و لغه یعنی کسان که بیزارین در حق حفاظت
مواخا بروجه قرص زاده نوردند و ادا و لغه
بعضی تمان که با نقل آمدند و بر موجب بخت داشتند
بوز اونوز بر یوک تیش کی بیک سکریوز اونوز مع

الاحوال
بخت ارچجان بکار بیان و نفقه دعا کویان و نفقه
حج راه سسکل تون و یوده اردل و بعضی الجیان بعد از
و اخلاق و غیر
اونوز یوک فرق یدی بیک الی بوز فرق

موجود در خزینه الحامان فرورد
بیکر تیش بیک طغوز بوز تیش بیک
بعد از سکریوز
بیکر تیش بیک طغوز بوز تیش بیک

یا
بیکر تیش بیک طغوز بوز تیش بیک

اطاعت و بد لر

بیک یوز الفتح الی

به در سوم
بیت لمال

زخیر

بیکر تیش بیک طغوز بوز تیش بیک

احمال بحاسبه
 ذوات ومصارف روزنامه و حزانه و عامه و سفرها یون در زمان حضره محله
 وزیر و سایر اعیان و امثالهم و اهل الله تعالی اجلاله بمعرفة علی افندی قائم مقام حضرة احمد افندی
 دفتر دارالامانت معالیه و بقلم حسین الحقیق روزنامه سفرها یون عن - و ربيع الاول
 سنة ۱۲۰۰ هـ الى اثناء شهر صفر المظفر سنة ۱۲۰۱ هـ

اصا اسار و انا مال

بلك ايكى يوزاون التي يوك او توتوش بيك دورتيوز تيمش براچه

عن آ سعادت برای مواجبات عن يد مذکورين بالذفات

دورتيوز تيمش طقوز يوك طقسان التي بيك يوز قرق ايكى اچه

دفعه عن يد اغانى پلچريان درگاه
 عن يد مصطفى غاسر بواين درگاه عالی
 عن يد حسين چاوش برای اشرفي
 ذخيره عن بهاء حسنه وغروس
 ونقد

اوج يوز بيك اچه
 سلكسان بيك سكه
 طقسان التي يوك اچه
 بکری اوج يوك طقسان التي بيك
 يوز قرق ايكى اچه

عن جابر حضرت احمد افندی دفتر دار شق اول دامت معالیه

دورتيوز يوك و قرق بيك اچه

دفعه اللى يوك اچه
 دفعه ايكى يوز يوك اچه
 دفعه اللى يوك و قرق بيك اچه
 دفعه يوز يوك اچه

عن آحضرة بعض كسان كه در محتويات داخل شدن
 اوج يوك التشيدى بيك در تيوز
 سلكسان اچه

عن تفادى و عزوشها
 طقسان بش بيك طقوز يوز تيمش اچه



عن تقاوتها
حسنت وعزوتها
طقسان بش بيك طقوز بوز تيش ياقه

عن آله
فرض بعض كسان كه در محتويات داخل شدن
اوج يوك التمش يدي بيك در تيز
سكسان اچه

عن الا

اوچوز او تيز بريوك او تيز بش بيك سكز يوز تيش يكي اچه

عن محصولات
يوزا لي يكي يوك التمش يكي بيك التمش سكز اچه

عن المقاطعات
قرق التي بيك يكرمي التي بيك طقوز
يوزا ون يدي اچه

عن جز كبران
سكسان دورت يوك او تيز يكي بيك
سكز يوز طقسا ن اچه

عن عادات
اغنام
اون بر
ك التمش التي بيك سكز يوز
سكسان دورت اچه

عن اچه
اقلام صونه
الي دورت بيك سكز يوز طقسا اوج

عن اچه
حياتها بولايه سريم
تحويله وان حاوش
يكرمي اوج بيك يديوز
الي التي اچه

عن اچه
جانب مصطفى غاسر بواين
درگاه عالي
ايكي يوك اون طقوز بيك
بش يوز اچه

عن اچه
جزية لبران وعادات اغنام
يدي يوك او تيز يدي بيك
ايكي يوز يكرمي يدي اچه

عن اموال
متفرقة من اچه رسوم بروات ديوان
ومال من المال وبه بعض كسان فرض
داد بوي لا اوردندوز زياده مواجب
وبلعيا وكميات وغيره

عن واردات
غير مقرر عن اچه بقيه بدل نزل وعم ونولون
وبدل بكساد وخرج بكساد وبها كوشت وبدل تمار
وبدل لغنيا وحدادان وبدل جزية يركان وبها
توفكيمان وبها ذخير انبار بلغراد وبدو وغيره
وبها بكساد وروغن ساد وغيره مع اچه فرض
بعض كسان

التي يوز التمش اوج بيك سكز يوز
لي يدي اچه

عن اچه
طقسان دورت يوك اوج
بوز سكسان سكز يوز اچه
فرض بعض كسان
او تيز دورت يوك طقوز بيك
بش يوز الي طقوز يدي اچه

المصادر

بيك ايكي يوز اون التي يوك اللي بيك دورت
يوز التمش براجه

المواجبات

طقوز يوز طقسان بش يوك التي بيك يد يوز
التمش بش اجه

مواحد
جماعت يكيچريان درگاه عالي

يوز طقسان سكر يوك يكرمي سكر بيك
يوز اللي سكر اجه

مواحد
جماعت مشاهره حوران

اون دورت يوك اوتوز بشك دورت
يوز سكران اوج اجه

مواحد
بوابان وخدمه اصطل بل عامر وحب جيان
وطوب جيان وعرب جيان طوب ومهتران خيمه
وعلم واهل حرف وخطاطين وسفاليات
وقوتن جيان ورؤسا وعزبان وغيره

التي يدي يوك التمش اوج بيك اوج يوز
يكرمي بش اجه

مواحد
جماعت ابناء سيكهيان وسكدران
وعلو جيان عين ويسار وغرباء عين
وغرباء يسار

دورتم يوز اوتوز يوك ايكي بيك
يديوز اللي سكر اجه

مواحد
طائفه قزاغان اوزي ولح

يدي يوك اللي بيك ايكي يوز
اوتوز سكر اجه

مواحد
مردمان سيكهورش
وميران اردك

ايكي يوك قرق يدي بيك
يديوز اونوز اجه

مواحد
طائفه افرنجان

طقوز يوك يكرمي ورت بيك اجه

مواحد

نفرات قلاع لواء مذكورين

ايكي يوز تمش دورت يوك التي بيك تمش ايكي اجه

مواح
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ایکی یوز تیش و تریوک الی الی بیک تیش ایکی اچہ

مواح
نفرات قلاع لواء بدون

یوز قرق یوک تیش الی بیک
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مواح
نفرات قلاع لواء اکرن

آلمش یوک سکنا اوج
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مواح
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مواح
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اوتوز بر یوک یکر می ایکی بیک
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مواح
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یدی یوک اوتوز الی بیک
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مواح
نفرات قلاع لواء وین

اوتوز بیک ایکی یوز الی اچہ

المسلما
بجہت بعض مہمات مع اشتراء ذخیرہ
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بشیوز یدیوز اچہ
ادایہ اچہ
بکری بیک
دورت یوز اچہ

الز
عن الأصل عن تفرات عدووزن
اون درت بیک طقوز یوز طقسا اچہ

أجله محاسبه واردات و مصارف خزانة عامه هذا الله تعالى الى يوم الآخر در سفرها این
در زمان هجوم علی پاشا و حضرت محمد پاشا صدر اعظم و سردار آقچه آدام الله تعالی الجلال
بمعرفه احمد پاشا میر میران روم ایلی دفتر دار شوق اول لایمت مغالیه عن دورت
حجره الحراه سنه ۱۰۱۳ الی اوج رمضان المبارک سنه منه

مواجهه
مشاهرت
یکری بدی
الیوز آ

مال فی ثمانه اشهر عن خزانة عامه اندرون و عن الایراد و بقیة محاسبه استانه
سعادت و نفاوت حسنات و عروش

ایکی بیک ایکیوز یکری بش یوک اون ایکی بیک طقوز یوز اونوز ایچیه

عن نفاوت و عروش
حسنات الی اوج
اون یوک ایچیه
الی ایچیه

عن بقیة
محاسبه استانه سعادت
اون ایچیه یوک ایچیه

عن خزینة
الاندرون
بیک یوز اون الی یوک ایچیه

مواجهه
جماعت اناء
ولتسار و غریبه
واکرم و غیره
بعض بوابین
الیوز دور

عن الای
بیک سکسان الی یوک الی سکرنیک طقوز یوز تیش سکزانچیه

مواجهه
نفر

عن المحصولات
سکرنوز دورت یوک اونوز اوج بیک بشیوز طقسان بش ایچیه

الاندرون
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بیک سکرنیک
الیوز سکرنیک

عن محصول
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ایچیه

عن محصول
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عن محصول
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بشیوز الی

عن اموال
منفرقه و عن محصول رسوم بروات و احکام شکایات تابع دیوان همایون و مالیه و رسوم دفتر قاضی
تسلما ت

تسلما ت



سكرو دورت بوت او نور اوج بيك بشيور صفسان بس بجه

عن محصول
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بوز فرق النبيه ت او تون بيك طقوز يون
بكرتي سكر لچه

عن محصول
جزيره وعادت اغنام
بشيو ز طقوز يونك توقا رنج بيك بشيور الى دي
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عن محصول
جزيره وعادت اغنام ومقاطعات وبدل نزل وبدل غنم وغيره
عزجان مصلان
بوز فرق سكر يونك الى اطقوز بيك بوز اون اچنه

عن اموال
منفرد و عن محصول رسوم بروات واحكام شكايات تابع ديوان همايون وماليه ورسوم دفتر حاقي
وتذاكر ميرزاان رسوم بروات نفرت بوسنه وبيت المال خاصه وسپاهيان وغيره
طقسان بش يونك فرق بيك بشيور زمش بش اچنه

عن محصول
رسوم بروات ديوان همايون ودفتر حاقي
ورسوم ماليه وتذاكر ميرزاان رسوم ايلي ورسوم
نفرت
او تون طقوز ت سكر يونك اچيون
سكسان براچنه

عن اموال
منفرد و بشكش رياست ومدنه بوليد وبعض
بلعيات وكنيات
فرق دورت يونك التمش طقوز بيك دوپوز
بكرتي بش اچنه

عن بيت المال
خاصه وسپاهيان
اون يونك سكر يونك اچيون ت المش طقوز اچنه

عن بيت المال
خاصه
بكرتي دي بيك سكر يونك طقسا
اوج اچنه

عن بيت المال
سپاهيان وغيره
اچيون يونك سكر يونك ت المش طقوز اچنه

عن وارث
غير مقرر عن بدل نزل وبدل غنم وتولون سفينه وبدل تيار وبدل كورجيان ويوركان وبدل الاغنيان
واشكجيان وبهاء كوش غنم وزوايد و قاف وبهاء زخير عن تبار بلغراد و بودين واسوفي بلغراد و فها
بكرتي دي بيك سكر يونك اچيون
ت سكر يونك سكر يونك سكر يونك اچنه

وزاوان برو
بشيو بيك السوز

مواجر
بكرتي بش
بشيو

تسلما ت
لي امتين خرج
برهيم امين غم
امين نزل براي
ايكوز سكر
يدت

الانعامات
برطوختم سلط
دروقت امدن
سپاهيان وسك
فرق طقوز

بجته
جلو برهمايون براي
وسلطان و غير
او تون النبيه يونك
بشيو سكر يونك اچنه

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وبعض نفقه صوم
اون دورت

ل موجود جزيره
رسوم
روزنامه
سكسان اوج

المصارف

ايكي بيك يوز فرق بريك يوك طقسان يدي بيك سكر يوز طقسان بش ايجه

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بيك اليوز سكر طقسان طقسوز نيك فرق بريك او چوز الي ايجه

مشاهرين حوران

جماعت بچريان درگاه عالي و غلمان عجمان ونفقہ و نون بچيك
وعادت بقرن و دز بول بها

يکري يدي يوك يدي بيك
اليوز او توز سکر ايجه

مجموعه بچريان درگاه عالي
بش يوز سکر طقسان سکر يوك
اون الي بيك اليوز او توز ايجه
عجمان عجمان المزور
طقسان طقسوز نيك طقسوز
ايجه

جماعت ابناء سياهان و سلداران و علويان بن
و بشار و غراب و بيم مويسار و ولدان قول بودون
و اکرم و غير در محافظه قلعه او ستون بفراد و
بعض بوابين
اليوز دورت يوك و فرق دورت بيك يديوز
فرق يدي ايجه

جماعت جبه جيان و طول بچيان و عمر بچيان طوب
و مھتران علم و خيمه و خدمتہ اصطبل عامر و اھل خم
و سقايان ديوان و كيك ريان ما بع مطع عامر و رؤسا
و غريان و قومتره جيان غلطه و غرابين
الي طقسوز يوك و تيش طقسوز بيك اليوز الي ايجه

مواجبات
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او چوز يوك و اون يدي بيك يوز تيش ايجه

در سمنان
طقسوز يوك تيش سکر
سکر يوز طقسان ايجه

در اکره سوا در اکره سوا در اکره سوا
تيش بش يوك و او تيز تيش بش يوك و او تيز
ايکوز تيش ايجه
در اکره سوا در اکره سوا در اکره سوا
او تيز يوك و الي بيك او تيز يوك و الي بيك
دور يوز اون ايجه
دور يوز اون ايجه

بعض گبران فرانسه و ح و اردل

الي التي يوك و سکران و ج بيك سکر يوز اون ايجه

مواجبات
معض گبران عن جانب امدند
التمش اوج بيك

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مواجبات
يکري بش
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بعض کبران فرانسه وح واردل
آلی الی بوک و سکسان اوچ بیک سکریوز اون لچه

مواجر کبران فرانسه
بعض کبران عن جانب اردل آمدند
اون طقوز بوک و التمش اوچ بیک
بشبو التمش لچه

مواجر کبران فرانسه
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اون بر بوک و آووز الی بیک التوز
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مواجر کبران فرانسه
بعض کبران عن جانب اردل آمدند
اون بر بوک و آووز الی بیک التوز
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الاعادات
سالمانه مترنران و دفتر داران ولایت بدون
واکن و قاتین و طمشوار و آستونی بلغراد و غیر
و سیدسانه بها بعض کاتبان دیوان و نفقه بعض
جبهه جیان و طو بجمیان و غیر
بکری بوک و آلی بیک الی دورت لچه

تسلما
لی امتین خرج خاصه استانبول و استعیل امین
و برهم امین غم و برهم اغا سرجه جیان و علی افندی
امین نزل برای همتا مزبورین
ایکوز سکسان دورت بوک و بکری دورت بیک
بدیوز اون اوچ لچه

المباغات
لها خلقیت سراسر استانبول و اماستنه و اطلس افنه
و کاغد و شمیر مرصع برای همتا خزیننه
بکری دورت بوک و آلی بیک بشبو و توز لچه

الانفا ما
بر طو ختم سلطان ولد حضرت خان و یکجه بان در کله عالی
در وقت آمدن سفرو در مترنر قلعه آوستور غون بعض
سباهیان و سخداران و جبهه جیان و غیر برای جلوس همایون
فرق طقوز بوک و سکسان بیک سکریوز اون لچه
بجهت جلوس همایون برای سباهیان
و سخداران و غیر
اونوز الی بوک و آلی بیک
بشبو سکسان لچه

الاداء دیور
نجهت اداء لچه بعض کسان که در چین مضایقه
موجب که بحریننه عامن بر وجه قرض داده و اداء
لچه مختلفات بعض کسان و اداء لچه بعض خرجمیان
در چین محاسبانش زیاد محسوب شد حالا ادانش
الی لطقوز بوک و آلی بیک طقوز بوزرق سکری

الاجزایا
بجهت کرایه عهده و کرایه مکاران که ماروت سیاه بچیل شدن و جبهه بند
و بعض نفقه صوفیون و خرج راه و نفقه کبران که عن جانب اردل آمدند
اون دورت بوک و آلی بیک بشبو و طقوز لچه

ل موجود خزیننه
سکسان اوچ بیک و آووز بشبو بیک اوچوز بکری لچه

بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه

بجهت قرضه
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بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه
بجهت قرضه

اجمال
 محاسبه واردات و مصارف خزانه عامه سفر همایون انکرو من در زمان دستوارا
 مشیر منمخ وزیر اعظم و سردار اکرم حضرت مراد پاشا ادام الله تعالی اجلاله
 و حسن پاشا میر بران روم ایلی الوزیر و بمعرفة محمد افندی دفتر داراوردوی
 همایون دامت معالیه عن اون شوال المکر سنه ۱۰۱۲ الی اونات محرم الحرام سنه

اص
 مال فی سنه و ثلث اشهر و الت یوما عن تحصیل حضرت احمد پاشا ادام الله تعالی
 اجلاله و عن لایراد و عن تفاوت حسبات و غروش
 بیدوز فرق ایچی یوک طقوز بیک طفوز بیکش الی ایچیه

عن تحصیل حضرت احمد پاشا الوزیر و دفتر داراوردوی اول
 المشاریه
 اوچوز بیکش الی ایچی یوک
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عن تفاوت حسبات و غروش
 ایچی بیکش الی ایچی یوک
 ایچیه

عن الایراد

اوچوز سکسان سکر - الی سکر بیک اوچوز الی ایچیه



بزرگ بوزالی

نازل

عن نافع

عن الایراد

اوچوز سکسان سکزیوک الی سکزیبک اوچوزانی اچمه

عن المحصولا

ایکوز یکری بیک یتش اوچ بیک یوز التمش سکزان اچمه

عن اچمه
مقاطعات

اون بیک طقسان بدی بیک

طریق اچمه

عن اچمه
جزیره کبران

ایکوز صفوز بیک الی درت بیک

سکسان درت اچمه

غذات اغنام

یکری بیک سکزیوز سکسان بیک

عن اموال
منزله عن اچمه رسوم بروات دیوان و مالیته و رسوم تذاکر میرد و ایللی و بیت المال عامه و خزینه و مخلفات
خزانه پاشا و جلای حسن پاشا و حسین بک میرزا اسکندر و و غیره و عمر افندی و مصطفی غا و غیره و علی محمد پاشا
عن خزانة عامه برای بعضی مهمات داده بود صرف نکرده و عن بلعینات و کینیات بعضی کسان و عن اچمه قوال مجار برای
پیشکش عن بد مصطفی انا ارسال شد و خلاف امر شریف غیر قوال داده شد باز مخلفات مزبور تحصیل شده

الی بیک یکری بدی بیک اون اچمه

عن واردات
غیر مقرر عن اچمه بدل نزل و غنم و نولون سفینه و اجرت مکاربان و بدل کسماد و بدل تونک انداران و یادوران
و کور بکیان و لاغجیان و بدل تمار سپاهیان و د و حکمان و بدل اسحمان معادن و نهاء دخیم عن انبار بلغراد و بدون استوفیای
واشترغون و غیره و نهاء کوشت غنم

بوزا و نیدی بیک الی سکزیبک یوز یکری سکزان اچمه

المصارف
يديوز قرق ايكي بوك اون اوج بيك در تيوز طقسان سكرانچي

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جماعت يكيچان در كا عالي
يوز يتمش ايكي بوك التمش بيك يديون
يكرمي بش اچي

مواجبات
جماعت مشاهير حوران
بشيوز سكران بيك در تيوز
اللي اوج اچي

مواجبات
جماعت جبه جيان وطوبجيان در كا عالي وعمره بجيان
ومهران خيمه وعلم وخدمه واصطبل عامر وحياطين
خلعت وجراحين خاصه وغيره
قرق النبي بوك قرق ايكي بيك ايكيوز
يتمش اوج اچي

مواجبات
جماعت ابناء سپاهيان وسلحداران
وتلوجيان يمين ويسار وعمره با يمين ويسار
وتبعض سپاهيان وبوابان در كا عالي
يتمش اوج بوك اون طقوز بيك
در تيوز يتمش يدي اچي

مواجبات
مذكورين تابع قلاع نقرات مزبورين
ايكيوز طقسان درت بوك اونوز سكر بيك طقوز يوز
اون يدي اچي

تلقه بدون
قلاع طمشواربع
اونوز بيك التمش النبي
يديوز سكران سكر

تلقه قنيره
قلاع قنيره
اونوز ايكي بيك سكران
يدي بيك در تيوز يكرمي
درت اچي

تلقه اكرم
قرق النبي قرق اوج بيك
اوجيوز اون بش اچي

تلقه بدون
قلاع اكرم
يوز سكران اوج
ذوق بيك اوجيوز
التمش اچي

مواجبات
طائفه خلاف الملكه
اون بيك طقسان بش بيك ايكيوز اچي

پوزسکسان اوج
فرق بريك اوجبور
التمش اچمه

قلعه اسر
فرق التي بوت فرق اوج بريك
اوجپوز اوان بش اچمه

اوتوز بريك التمش التي بريك
اوتوز بريك سسكان
يدي بريك درت اچمه
يدي بريك سسكان سكر

مواجبا

طائفه خلاف الملكه

اون بوت طقسان بش بريك ايكوز اچمه

مواجبا
طائفه افرنجان فرانسه
درتوز طقسان بش بريك ايكوز اچمه

مواجبا
بعض بجانان كه عن نزد بوجفاي امده
التيان بريك اچمه

العدادان

عادات سالنامه علي باشا و سنان باشا مير بران بدون واكره و
محمد افندي دفتر دار آورد وي همايون و ديكر محمد افندي دفتر دار
بدون و عمر افندي دفتر دار اكره محمد افندي دفتر دار طمشوار
و جعفر افندي دفتر دار قنبره عادات بعض مير لوكه در محافظه
بود اند و عادات سالنامه بعض كاشان ديوان وغيره
اون بش بريك اوتوز بريك ايكوز اوتوز

التسليم
نسيم به علي افندي امين نزل انبار بلغراد بجهه اشتراء ذخيره بري
عساكر منصوره و علي اغا امين غنم و محمد جاوش سركي و سنان
جاوش امين بكسلاد و سلمان جاوش امين حج خاصه بلغراد و محمد
دفتر دار بدون بجهه بها ذخيره و روي ساده براي قلعه م و
ابراهيم بك مير لوكه اين و ريق بجهه بنا كردن سفينه و مصطفى اغا
بوركا عالي بجهه مير و پيشکش براي فرال اردل فرستاده و علي باشا
بدون بجهه هدايت و رخت و عباي و غيره براي الجيان بجهه كردد
وقت مصاحبه امده و غيري
سسكر بوت اوتوز سكر بريك ايكوز بريك اچمه

الانعامان

انعام به قيود انان بجانان عن جانب بوجفاي فرال اردل امده
و بعض ميرزا يان تاناران كه در افلاق بود اند و بعض الجيان
كه عن جانب بجهه امده و بعضي قول اغوزان و حاسرك كه بعض
اخبار آورده و غيري
درتوز سسكان درت بريك اوجپوز فرق اچمه

الماسه
بهاء خلعت سراسر استانبول و اما سته و جوقه متنوعه
و اطلاس و بافته و بوعاصي و دستار و خيمه و شمشير
و رخت و غيري براي كهنات خزينه خريد شد
التيوز اوتوز اوج بريك التي بش اچمه

الاجراجات

بجهه كرايه عربها جاموس براي بيجريان وجهه خيايه و سركي
و غيره در معامله اشتراك داده رفتن سفر همايون و نفقه
الجيان بجهه و بجانان و بغداد و مهمات پيشکش به جانب همولياي
فرال اردل فرستاده و بعض اجراجات مهمات ميرزا يان تاناران
واجرت كرايه مكارا يان خزينه و نولوز و سفينه و غيرك

الاداء ديون
بجهه اداء اچمه ديون جزيه و مختلفات بعض سكان
م خزينه عامه قبض شده بود حالا اداشيد
بوز بريك ايكوز اوتوز بريك اچمه

بكر بريك التي بريك اوجپوز البلي
يدي اچمه

النزيب عدوزن
اوج بريك بش بريك اچمه

بہار کے لئے... دیکھنا... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ان کے لئے... مائے... اور...

ERRATA

- p.8 1.15 "based on sources which are...
p.15 1.1 "In the presentation of today's Ottoman historians...
p.24 1.3 "southerly thrust at the strategically important fortress
of Kanije...
p.68 1.18 "There is no way of proving...
p.147 add final line: "0.7% of that levied as bedel-i...
p.151 reorder footnotes thus: 63; 61; 62
p.209 1.1 "been required to bring with them to war...
p.211 1.7 "Veinstein mentions two ways...
p.234 fn.23 "21 March N.S.
p.264 1.3 "the provision of horses (seyishane)...
p.272 fn.131 omit reference to Bog (1980)
p.284 fn.284 omit "record of the repayment....Campaign Treasury IE."
p.302 1.3 "has already been made to Ahmed I's insistence...



UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

**THE ADMINISTRATION OF WARFARE: THE SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING OF
THE OTTOMAN ARMY IN HUNGARY, 1593 - 1606.
(Volume II)**

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
June 1986

Caroline Finkel,
Department of History,
School of Oriental and African Studies.

APPENDIX 1:

Transliterations of
Campaign Treasury
Accounts

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)

source: KK 1879 (Jemal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-i mal an hazine-yi
amire-yi astane-yi saadet
ve an irad biddafaat

380 694 029

A. an hizane-yi amire-yi
astane-yi saadet
biddafaat

149 447 058

A.1 der defa-yi ewel be-
hazret-i sadrazam ve
Abdullah Aga ser
bavvabın-ı dergah-ı ali

77 793 960

A.1.a be-hazret-i sadrazam
A.1.b an yed-i Abdullah
Aga al-mezdur

72 000 000
5 793 960
(77 793 960)

A.11 der defa-yi sani an yed-i
Hasan aga-yi yenigeriyan-ı
dergah-ı ali

60 932 898

A.11.a an hazine-yi
enderun
A.11.b an hazine-yi
birun an pişin
-ı cizye ve
adet-i agram

60 000 000
932 898
(60 932 898)

A.111 defa an yed-i Omer gavus
tabi-yi Nasuh Aga kehnda-yi
bavvabın-ı dergah-ı ali

10 720 200
(149 447 058)

B. al-irad an tahvill-ı
Ahmed Efendi al-muşar
ileyh: an mukataat
ve cizye ve adet-ı
agram ve emval-ı
mitteferrika ve varidat-ı
gayr-ı mukarrefe

231 156 971
(380 604 029)

B.1 an al-mansulat

122 234 944

B.1.a an mansul-ı
mukataat
B.1.b an mansul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı vilayet-ı
Rumeli
B.1.c an mansul-ı adet-ı
agram
B.1.d an mansul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Durovnik
ber vech-ı maktu
B.1.e an mansul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Kara
Boğdan
B.1.f an mansul-ı cizye-yi
gebran-ı Erilak

33 712 513
73 055 440
11 052 991
2 950 000
820 000
644 000
(122 234 944)

B.11 an emval-ı mitteferrika:
an misim-ı havayrat ve

41 114 571

B.1.d	an mahsul-i cizye-yi gebran-ı Dubrovnik ber vech-i maknu	2 950 000
B.1.e	an mahsul-i cizye-yi gebran-ı Kara Boğdan	820 000
B.1.f	an mahsul-i cizye-yi gebran-ı Eflak	644 000
		<u>(122 234 944)</u>

41 114 571

B.11 an emval-i mteferrika:
an rısum-ı berevat ve
ahkam-ı şikayat tabi-yi
diyan-ı humayun ve maliye
ve rısum-ı tezakir-ı zuama
ve erbab-ı timar-ı vilayet-ı
Rumeli ve Anadolu ve
mırmıran-ı Rumeli ve beyt
ül-mal ve pencik-ı esar ve
emval-ı salre ve belliyat
(ve) kethıyat-ı bazı kesan

66 129 629

B.11. an varıdat-ı gayr-ı
mukarrere:
bedel-ı nizül ve bedel-ı
ganem ve navlır-ı zahire
ve bedel-ı sürsat ve
bedel-ı timar ve bahar-yı
zahire ve bedel-ı zahire-yi
kale-yi Buddin ve karz-ı
bazı kesan

B.111.a	an varıdat-ı gayr-ı mukarrere	58 928 729
B.111.b	an karz-ı hazret-ı sahib-ı saadet ve gayrındı	<u>7 200 900</u>
		(66 129 629)

1 677 827

(231 156 971)

C. an tefavüt-ı hasenat
ve gurus

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramazan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

KK 1885 (İcma) Income and expenditure account: Credit

190 628 798

Asl-ı mal an hazine-yi amire
-yi astane-yi saadet biddetfat
ve an irad ve an baklıye-yi
muhasebe-yi sene-yi mazlye
ve tefavüt-ı hasenat ve gırruş
ve karz-ı bazı kesan

A. an hazine-yi astane
-yi saadet biddetfat
an yed-ı mezburın

72 000 000

A1. an yed-ı All ağa-yı
yeniğeriyan-ı dergah-ı all
an yed-ı Ibrahim ağa-yı
A.11 sadık-ı ebna-yı sipahıyan

60 000 000
12 000 000
(72 000 000)

B. al-ırad

B.1 an al-mahsulat

71 919 135

B.1.a an mahsul-ı mukataat 15 434 083
B.1.b an mahsul-ı cizye-yi gebzan-ı vilayet-ı Rumeli 25 812 429
B.1.c an mahsul-ı adet-ı ağnam 3 619 457
B.1.d an mahsul-ı cizye ve adet-ı ağnam ve mukataat ve bedel-ı nüzul ve gayrihi an canib-ı muhassılan (71 919 135)

5 799 724

B.11 an emval-ı miteferrika ve (sic) rûsum-ı berevat ve ahkam-ı şikayat tabi-yi divar-ı humeyun ve maliye ve rûsum-ı tezakkir-ı zuama ve erbab-ı timar-ı vilayet-ı Rumeli ve Anadolu ve mîmliran-ı Rumeli ve beyt-ıll mal ve pencik-ı esar ve beliyat (ve) ketmiyat-ı bazı kesan ve emval-ı salne

B.111 varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarerre an bedel-ı nüzul ve ganem ve navlun-ı zahire ve bedel-ı timar ve baha-yi zahire ve gıst-ı ganem ve bekşimad ve rugar-ı sade ve karz-ı bazı kesan ve gayrihi

34 759 897
(112 478 756)

B.111.a an varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarerre 24 694 530
B.111.b an karz-ı bazı kesan 10 065 367

(34 759 897)

C. an tefavüt-ı hasenat ve gırruş

1 205 632

B.11 an emval-i miftferrika ve (sic) rûsum-i berevat ve ankam-i şikayat tabi-yi divan-ı humayun ve maliye ve rûsum-ı tezakkir-i zuama ve erbab-ı timar-ı vilayet-ı Rumeli ve Anadolu ve mülkhar-ı Rumeli ve beyt-ül mal ve pencik-i esar ve beliyat (ve) keramiyat-ı bazı kesan ve emval-i salire

34 759 897
(112 478 756)

B.111 varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarerre an bedel-ı müzül ve garan ve navlun-ı zahire ve bedel-ı timar ve baha-yı zahire ve güst-ı garan ve beksimad ve rugan-ı sade ve karz-ı bazı kesan ve gayr-ıhlı

B.111.a an varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarerre 24 694 530
B.111.b an karz-ı bazı kesan 10 065 367
(34 759 897)

C. an tefavit-ı hasenat ve gurus

an bekliye-yi mlhasabe -yi sene-yi mazliye

1 205 632
4 944 410
(190 628 798)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rabi I 1012-21 Safar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)

source: KK 1887 (İcmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-i mal fi 11 eshür ve ve 6 eyyam

121 635 471

47 996 142

36 000 000

9 600 000

2 396 142

(47 996 142)

40 040 000

5 000 000

20 000 000

10 000 000

5 040 000

33 135 872

15 262 068

B. an al-ırad

B.1 an al-mahsulat

B.1.a

an al-mukataat

4 626 917

B.1.b

an cizye-yi gebran

8 432 891

B.1.c

an adet-i ağram

1 166 884

B.1.d

an akçe-yi aklam-ı Tuna

54 893

B.1.e

an akçe-yi haymanana -yi vilayet-i Sirem an tanvil-i Rizvan gavuş an akçe an canib-i Mustafağa ser

23 756

B.1.f

bavvabın-ı dergah-ı all

219 500

B.1.g

an akçe-yi cizye-yi gebran ve adet-i ağram

737 227

B.1.h

gebran ve adet-i ağram

(15 262 068)

(15 262 068)

5 063 857

B.11 an emval-i müteferrika an akçe-yi rısum-ı berevat-ı divan ve maliye ve beyt ül-mal ve bi-bazı kesen kartz dade bud bila averdand ve ziyade-yi mevaciib ve belliyat ve kecmiyat ve gayrihi

B.111 an varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarrere an akçe-yi bakliye -yi bedel-ı nizmi ve ganem ve navlun ve bedel-ı beksimad ve harc-ı beksimad ve baha-yi gıst ve bedel-ı timar ve bedel-ı lahmıyan ve haddadan

B.111 an varidat-ı gayr-ı mukarrere an akçe-yi bakliye -yi bedel-ı nizmi ve ganem ve navlun ve bedel-ı beksimad ve harc-ı beksimad ve baha-yi gıst ve bedel-ı timar ve bedel-ı lahmıyan ve haddadan

12 809 947

(33 135 872)

B.1.e an akçe-yi daymanana
-yi vilâyet-i Sirem an
tahvil-i Rızvan çavuş
219 500

B.1.f Mustafa Ağa ser
bavvabın-ı dergah-ı all
an akçe-yi cizye-yi
737 227
Gebrani ve adet-ı
ağnam
(15 262 068)

B.11 an emval-i mîteferrika an
akçe-yi rûsum-ı berevat-ı
diyan ve maliye ve beyt
ül-mal ve bi-bazı kesan
karz dade bud bila averdend
ve ziyade-yi mevcud ve beliyat
ve ketmiyat ve gayrihi

B.111 an varidat-ı gayr-ı
mukarrere an akçe-yi baklıye
-yi bedel-ı nüzül ve ganim ve
navlın ve bedel-ı beksimad
ve haro-ı beksimad ve baha-yi
gust ve bedel-ı timar ve
bedel-ı lağımçıyan ve haddadan
ve bedel-ı cerime-yi
yürükkan ve bedel-ı tîfenkçıyan
ve baha-yi zahire-yi anbar-ı
Belgrad ve Budin ve gayrihi
ve baha-yi beksimad ve rugan-ı
sade ve gayrihi ma' akçe-yi
karz-ı bazı kesan

E111.a an akçe-yi varidat-ı
Gayr-ı mukarrere
9 400 388

E111.b an akçe-yi karz-ı
bazı kesan
3 409 559
(12 809 947)

C. an akçe-yi karz-ı
bazı kesan ki der
tahvilat dahil na-süde
an teravif-ı hasene
ve gurus

367 480

95 977
(121 635 471)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3 Ramazan 1013 (2 June 1604-23 January 1605)

source: KK 1889 (1cmal) Income and expenditure account/Credit

222 512 930

Asl-i mal r' 8 eshir an
hizane-yi amire-yi enderun
ve an al-irad ve bakliye-yi
muhasebe-yi astane-yi sadet
ve tefavit-i hasanat ve garus

A. an hazine-yi enderun

110 600 000

B. an al-irad

108 658 978

B.1 an al-mahsulat

B.1.a an mahsul-i

14 630 928

80 433 595

mukataat ma' cizye-yi
Dubrovnik

B.1.b an mahsul-i cizye ve

50 943 557

B.1.c an mahsul-i cizye ve

14 859 110

adet-i agram ve

(80 433 595)

mukataat ve bedel-i
nizil ve bedel-i ganem
ve gayrihi an canib-i
muhassilan

B.11 an emval-i miteferrika ve (sic)

9 540 575

an mahsul-i r'isum-i berevat
ve ahkam-i s'ikayat tabl-yi
divan-i humayun ve maliye
ve r'isum-i defter-i hakani ve
tezakir-i mirmlaran-i Rumeli
ve r'isum-i berevat-i neferat-i
Bosna ve beyt ul-mal-i
hassa ve sipahiyan ve
gayrihi

B.11.a an mahsul-i r'isum-i

berevat-i divan-i humayun
ve defter-i hakani ve
r'isum-i maliye ve
tezakir-i mirmlaran-i
Rumeli ve r'isum-i
neferat

3 988 381

B.11.b an emval-i miteferrika

4 469 425

ve (sic) pişkes-i
riyaset ve mitrobolid
ve bazı belliyat ve
kermiyat

B.11.c an beyt ul-mal-i

827 893

B.11.d an beyt ul-mal-i

254 876

sipahiyan ve gayrihi

(9 540 575)

B.111 an varidat-i gayri-i

18 684 808

mukarrere an bedel-i nizil

ve bedel-i ganem ve

navlun-i sefine ve bedel-i

timar ve bedel-i

kirekçiyen ve yurdukan ve

bedel-i lağımçıyan ve

eskiniciyan ve baha-yi

güşt-i ganem ve zevaid-i

(108 658 978)

1000000-1, 1000000-2 ve
tezakir-1 mihnat-1
Rumeli ve rüsum-1
neferat
B.11.b an emval-1 müteferrika
ve (sic) pişkes-1
rıyasat ve mütebidd
ve bazı beliyat ve
kemiyat
B.11.c an beyt ül-mal-1
hassa
B.11.d an beyt ül-mal-1
sipahiyan ve gayrihi

4 469 425

827 893

254 876

(9 540 575)

18 684 808

(108 658 978)

B.111 an varidat-1 gayri-1
mukarreme an bedel-1 mizül
ve bedel-1 ganem ve
navlun-1 sefine ve bedel-1
timar ve bedel-1
kürekçiyân ve yürükân ve
bedel-1 lağımçıyan ve
eskinçiyân ve baha-yi
guşt-1 ganem ve zevaid-1
evkaf ve baha-yi zahire
an anbar-1 Belgrad ve
Budın ve Istolni Belgrad
ve baha-yi bekisimad-1
yenigeriyan ve karz-1
bazı kesani

C. an tefavüt-1 hasenat
ve gurus

an bakıye-yi muhasabe
-yi astane-yi saadet

1 053 952

1 200 000

(221 512 930)

Revenues of the Campaign Treasury: 10 Şevval 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606-13 May 1607)

source: KK 1890 (Ismail) Income and expenditure account/Credit

Asl-ı mal fî sene ve
3 eşhur ve 6 yemmen
an tahsil-ı hazret-ı
Ahmed Paşa...ve an al-ırad
ve an tefavüt-ı hasenat
ve gurus

A* an tahsil-ı hazret-ı
Ahmed Paşa al-vezir
ve defterdar-ı
şlkk-ı evvel

B. an al-ırad

74 209 976

35 150 158

38 858 306

B.1 an al-mahsulat

22 073 168

B.1.a an akçe-yi mukataat

1 097 000

B.1.b an akçe-yi cizye-yi
gebran

20 954 084

B.1.c an akçe-yi adet-ı
atınam

21 885

(22 072 969)

B.11 an emval-ı müteferrika:

5 027 010

an akçe-yi rüşum-ı
berevat-ı divan ve
malîye ve rüşum-ı
tezakır-ı mîrmîran-ı
Rumelî ve beyt ül-mal-ı
anne ve hasse ve
muhallefat-ı Hamza
Paşa ve Celalî Hasan
Paşa ve Hüseyin Bey
mîrîlîva-yî İskenderîye
ve Hızır subaşı ve Ömer
Efendi ve Mustafa Ağa
ve Gayrîhî ve an akçe
ki piş ezin an hîzane-yî
amlre-yî beray-ı bazı
mühimmat dade bud sarf
na-kerde ve an beliyat
ve keremiyat-ı bazı
kesan an akçe-yî kral-ı
macar beray-ı pişkes an
yed-ı Mustafa Ağa irsal
şüde ve hıllaf-ı emr-ı
şerîf gayr-ı kral dade
şüde ve baz muhallefat-ı
mezbur tahsil şüde

B.111 an varidat-ı gayr-ı

11 758 128

mukarrere:

(38 858 306)

an akçe-yî bedel-ı
nüzül ve ganem ve navlun-ı
sefine ve üreft-ı

mekarriyan ve bedel-ı

beksimad ve bedel-ı
tüfenkendazan ve pandoran

ve kılreçkiyan ve lağımolan
ve bedel-ı tınar-ı

sıpanıyan ve dımançıyan ve

amlre-yi berry-1 bazı
mihimmat dade bud sarf
na-kerde ve an beliyat
ve ketmiyat-1 bazı
kesan an akge-yi kral-1
macar berry-1 pişkes an
yed-1 Mustafa Ağa İrsal
şüde ve hılar-1 emr-1
serif gayr-1 kral dade
şüd ve baz mahallerat-1
mezbur tansil şüde

B.111 an varıdat-1 gayr-1

mukarrere:

an akge-yi bedel-1
nizil ve gamem ve navlun-1
sefine ve ücret-1
mekarrıyan ve bedel-1
beksimad ve bedel-1
tıfenkendazan ve pandoran
ve kırekçıyan ve jagıncıyan
ve bedel-1 tımar-1
sipahıyan ve dımancıyan ve
bedel-1 işçıyan-1 maden
ve baha-yi zahire an
anbar-1 Belgrad ve Budun
ve Istolni Belgrad ve
Esterzon ve gayrini ve
baha-yi gıst-1 gamem

11 758 128

(38 858 306)

C. an tefavıt-1 hasenat
ve garus

201 512

(74 209 976)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 8 Zilkade 1007-7 Zilkade 1009 (2 June 1599-10 May 1601)
 source: KK 1879 (İsmal) Income and expenditure/Debit

Al-masarıf

P. al-mevacıb

P.1	mevacıb-ı müşaheretoran	4 758 775	331 229 352	381 406 212
P.11	mevacıb-ı cemaat-ı yeniçeriyar-ı dergah-ı alı ve fıllan-ı acemiyarı	88 790 668		

P.111	mevacıb-ı cemaat-ı ebra-yı sipahiyarı ve silahdaran ve ve ulıfeciyarı-ı yemlin ve yesar ve gureba-yı yemlin ve yesar ve bazı sipahiyarı ve silahdaran ve gayristi der mahafaza-yı kıla ve eda-yı deym-ı cizye ve adet-ı agram	121 826 988		
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P.1v	mevacıb-ı cemaat-ı cebeciyarı ve topquyan ve arabacıyan-ı top ve hademe-yı istabl-ı amlıre ve mehteran-ı hayme ve alan ve bavvadır-ı dergah-ı alı ve rüesa ve azeban ve kalaratçıyan ve kumbaracıyan ve gayrihi	12 759 687		
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P.v	mevacıb-ı neferat-ı kıla -yı Budın ve Temeşvar ve Eğri ve Kanije ve tevabihı	91 262 414		
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P.vı	mevacıb-ı efrencarı-ı Fransa ki an kale-yı Papa amedend ve İtaat kercend	11 830 820 <u>(331 229 352)</u>		
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Q. at-teslimat be-

Abdülkerim Ağa
ser bavvadır-ı dergah-ı
alı ki be-astane-yı
saadet ırsal kerde ve
teslimat-ı ümema-yı
sergi-yı humayun ve
emlınarı-ı nızulı ve ümema
-yı ganem ve teslimat-ı
sahre be-cinet-ı ücret-ı
kütrevkiyan ve serahoran
ve mühlmat-ı sairre-yı
sefer-ı humayun

R. al-adat:

adet-ı şehriye-yı
hazret-ı Han ve salıyane-yı
mımlıran-ı Temeşvar
ve Eğri ve defterdaran
ve adet-ı nafaka-yı
kemandıra-yı yeniçeriyarı
ve topquyan ve cebeciyarı

31 735 534

8 629 165

sergi-yi humayun ve
emliran-ı nizini ve ümna
-yi ganem ve teslimat-ı
salre be-cihet-ı ücret-ı
kurekçiyân ve serahoran
ve mühlumat-ı salre-yi
sefer-ı humayun

R. al-ıadat:

adet-ı şehriye-yi
hazret-ı Han ve sâlyane-yi
mırmıran-ı Temeşvar
ve Eğri ve defterdaran
ve adet-ı nâfaka-yi
kemaneba-yi yeniğeriyan
ve topçuyan ve cebeciyan
-ı dergah-ı ali ve
gayrihi ve kittab

8 629 165

S. İnanat:

İnan-ı hazret-ı Han ve
bazı tataran ki der
kışlak budend ve bazı
yeniğeriyan-ı dergah-ı
ali ki der mahfaza-yi
kale-yi Budin ve Eğri ve
Temeşvar budend
ve eftençan-ı Fransa

2 469 370

T. al-ımbayaat:

baha-yi hilat-ı seraser-ı
İstanbul ve çoka ve atlas
ve gayrihi beray-ı
mühimmat-ı hazine

3 685 800

U. al-ıincaat be-

cihet-ı nâfaka-ı elciyan
-ı Erdel ve Eflak ve
Boğdan ve Beg
ve haro-ı rah-ı
mezburan ve nâfaka
-yi bazı mırzayan-ı
tataran ve nâfaka-yi
esiran-ı mlri ve
nâfaka-yi bazı duşuyan
ve klraye-yi arabaha ve
mekkarıyan ki barut-ı
siyan ve kumbara ve
cebebane averdend

1 625 388

V. eda-yi diyyun:

eda-yi deyr-ı bazı kesan
ve İusuî Paşa ve bazı
ümna ve haracıyan ve
gayrihi

2 030 603

(381 405 212)

az-çiyade an al-ıirad

-810 383

an tafavit:

802 182

(380 595 829)

aded-ı vezn

8 200

al-bakiye:
mevud der hazine an
bakiye-yi mütasebe

(810 383)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 11 Muharrem-10 Ramadan 1011 (1 July 1602-21 February 1603)

source: KK 1885 (Icma1) Income and expenditure account/Debit

Al-masraf

P. al-mevacib

136 735 903

190 635 775

P.1 mevacib-1 musaherehoran

3 030 527

P.11 mevacib-1 cemaat-1

36 773 461

yemigeriyan-1 dergah-1
ali ve gillman-1 acemliyan

P.111 mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ebra-yi

60 408 148

sipahliyan ve silahdaran ve
ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve
yesar ve gureba-yi yemin
ve yesar ve bazi ebra-yi
sipahliyan ve silahdaran
ve vildan-1 kul-1 Egr-i
ve Buddin

P.1v mevacib-1 cemaat-1

6 134 940

cebeciyan ve topquyan
ve arabaciyan-1 top ve
hademe-yi istabl-1 amire
ve mehteran-1 hayme ve
alan ve bazi bavabari-1
dergah-1 ali ve rilesa ve
azeban ve kumbaraciyan-1
hasasa

P.v. mevacib-1 cemaat-1 neferat

26 606 907

-1 kila-yi Buddin ve
Temesvar ve Egr-i ve Kanije
ve tevarihla ve livay-yi
Semendre

Pv.a tabi-yi Buddin ve

17 682 064

Istolini Belgrad

Pv.b tabi-yi Temesvar

4 004 813

Pv.c tabi-yi Egr-i

1 759 855

Pv.d tabi-yi Kanije

2 235 420

Pv.e tabi-yi livay-yi

788 755

Semendre

Pv.f /.../-1 cedid ki an

136 000

dar ul-harb amedend
ve itaat kerdend ve
der muhafaza-yi kila
budend

(26 606 907)

P.vi mevacib-1 talfeyi

3 781 920

efrencar-1 Fransa ki an
kale-yi Papa amedend
ve itaat kerdend

(136 735 903)

Q. at-teslimat be-

27 871 906

emir-i nizli ve
ganem ve sergi-1
humayun ve beksimad-1
yemigeriyan ve mihlimat-1
sefer-1 humayun ve
emir-i haro-1 hasasa

R. al-adat be-ghet-1

5 544 064

adet-1 nafaka-yi
yemigeriyan-1 darrab-1

Q. at-teslimat be-
emlri-1 nizil ve
ganam ve sergi-1
humayun ve beksimad-1
yenigeriyan ve mihimmat-1
sefer-1 humayun ve
emlri-1 haro-1 hasa

R. al-adat be-cihet-1

adet-1 nafaka-yi
yenigeriyan-1 dergah-1
ali ve cebeciyan ve
topquyan ve arabacıyan-1
top ve adet-1 kemaibaha
-yi eşan ki der
muhafaza-yi kila budend
ve adet-1 salyane-yi
mihimmat-1 Budin ve
Temesyar ve Egri ve
Karije ve defterdaran-1
vilayet-1 mezbur ve
mir-1 Tuna ve kapudan-1
Tuna

5 544 064

S. inamat be-Gazi Giray

Han ve bazı mirzayan-1
tataran ve yenigeriyan
-1 dergah-1 ali ve bazı
neferat-1 kila ve
gayrihi ve talife-yi
efrencan

3 821 770

T. al-mubayaat:

paha-yi hilat-1 seraser-1
Istanbul ve tarfa ve goka
ve gayrihi beray-1
mihimmat-1 hazine ve
mihimmat-1 Gazi Giray Han

1 942 259

U. al-ihraat be-

cihet-1 ücret-1
mekariyan ve nafaka-yi
duaguyan ve nafaka ve
haro-1 rah-1 Seykel
Mo(ro)s voyvoda-yi
Erdel ve bazı
elciyan-1 Bogdan ve
Eflak ve gayrihi

1 547 640

V. eda-yi diyun:

eda-yi akce-yi bazı kesan
ki piş ezin der hin-1
mizakaya-yi mevajib ber
vech-1 karz dade budand
ve eda-yi akce-yi bazı
kesan ki ba-naki amedend
ve ber muclb-1 hüccet
eda süde

13 172 233

(190 635 775)

az-ziyade an al-irad

al-bakiye:

mevud der hazine ila
tarih al-mezbur

25 967

-6 977

190 628 798

ziyade: adet-1 vezn

-19 000

(6 967)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 16 Rebi I 1012-21 Saifar 1013 (24 August 1603-19 July 1604)

source: KK 1887 (Lamal) Income and expenditure account/Debit

Al-masarif

121 650 461

P. a1-mevacib

99 506 765

P. I mevacib-i cemaat-i
musaferhoran 1 435 483

P. II mevacib-i cemaat-i
yenigertyan-i dergah-i
ali 19 828 158

P. III mevacib-i cemaat-i ehna-yi
sipahiyani ve silahdaran ve
ve ulufeciyan-i yemini ve
yesar ve gureba-yi yemini
ve gureba-yi yesar 43 102 758

P. IV mevacib-i bavaban ve
hademe-yi istabl-i amlre
ve cebeciyan ve topquyan
ve arabaciyan-i top ve
mehterari hayme ve
alem ve ehl-i hiref ve
hayyatini ve sakayan ve
kumbarcaciyan ve rilesa ve
azeban ve gayrihi 5 763 325

P. V mevacib-i neferat-i kila-yi
liya-yi mezkurin 27 456 072

Pv. a mevacib-i neferat-i
kila-yi liya-yi Budun 14 0765 91
Pv. b mevacib-i neferat-i
kila-yi liya-yi Egrl 6 083 171
Pv. c mevacib-i neferat-i
kila-yi liya-yi Temeşvar 3 407 396
Pv. d mevacib-i neferat-i
liya-yi karije 3 122 570
Pv. e mevacib-i neferat-i
kila-yi liya-yi Semendire 736 094
Pv. f mevacib-i neferat-i
kila-yi liya-yi Vidin 30 250
(27 456 072)

P. VI mevacib-i talife-yi
efmencan 924 000

P. VII mevacib-i merduman-i
Seykei Morog ve mltiran-i
Erdei 247 730

P. VIII mevacib-i talife-yi
kazakan-i Ozul ve Leh 750 238

(99 507 764)

Q. at-teslimat be-

cihet-i bazı
mühimmat ma' iştirak-yi
zahire ve gayrihi 12 740 900

Pv.e	mevacib-i neferat-1 kila-yi liv-a-yi Semendre	736 094	
Pv.f	mevacib-i neferat-1 kila-yi liv-a-yi Vidin	30 250	
		(27 456 072)	
P.vi	mevacib-i talf-e-yi efrencan	924 000	
P.vii	mevacib-i merduman-1 Seykel Moros ve mlran-1 Erdel	247 730	
P.viii	mevacib-i talf-e-yi kazakan-1 Ozü ve Leh	750 238	
		(99 507 764)	
		12 740 900	
Q.	at-teslimat be- cihet-1 bazı mühimmat ma' iştirak-yi zahire ve gayrihi		4 899 786
R.	al-adat		488 065
S.	al-inamat		662 280
T.	al-imbayaat		262 725
U.	al-ihracat		3 089 940
V.	al-eda-yi diyun ma' karz-1 bazı kesen	2 173 433	(121 650 461)
V.i	be-cihet-1 eda-yi diyun-1 bazı kesen	916 507	
V.ii	be-cihet-1 akçe-yi karz-1 bazı kesen	(3 089 940)	

az-ziyade an al-asi
an tafavit-1 aded ve vezni

az-ziyade an al-asi
an tafavit-1 aded ve vezni

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 4 Muharrem-3 Ramazan 1013 (2 June 1604-23 January 1605)

source: KK 1889 (İsmail) Income and expenditure/Debit

Al-masarıf

P. al-mevacib

168 941 306

214 197 895

P.1	mevacib-1 müşaheretboran		2 707 638
P.11	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 yenigeriyan-1 dergah-1 all ve Gilman-1 acemiyan ve nafaka-yi nobetciyan ve adet-1 mukarrene ve der yol baha (sic)		64 108 685
P.11.a	be-ohet-1 mevacib-1 yenigeriyan-1 dergah-1 all	58 816 230	
P.11.b	be-ohet-1 Gilman-1 acemiyan al-mezbur	99 900	
P.11.c	be-ohet-1 nafaka-yi yenigeriyan al-mezbur	5 192 555	
		(64 108 685)	60 444 747
P.111	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 ebna-yi sipahiyan ve silahdararı ve ulufeciyan-1 yemin ve yesar ve gureba-yi yemin ve yesar ve vildan-1 kul-1 Budin ve Egr-1 ve gayrihi der muhafaza-yi kale-yi Istolni Belgrad ve bazı bavradin		5 979 256
P.1v	mevacib-1 cemaat-1 cebeciyan ve topquyan ve arabacıyan-1 top ve mehteran-1 alem ve hayme ve hademe-yi istabl-1 amire ve ehl-1 hıref ve sakayan-1 divan ve kılariyan taab-1 matbah-1 amire ve rüesa ve azaban ve kumbaracıyan-1 Galata ve gayrihi		30 017 170
P.v.v.a	der İlye-yi Budin	11 135 608	
P.v.v.b	der İlye-yi Temesvar	3 051 410	
P.v.v.c	der İlye-yi Egr-1	7 531 000	
P.v.v.d	der İlye-yi Kanije	7 330 260	
P.v.v.e	der İlye-yi Semendre	968 892	
		(30 017 170)	5 693 810
P.vi.a	mevacib-1 efrencar-1 Fransa	2 583 560	
P.vi.b	mevacib-1 bazı gebran an canib-1 Erdel amedend	1 136 690	
P.vi.c	mevacib-1 bazı gebran an canib-1 Leh amedend	1 963 560	
		(5 683 810)	

P.V.c der Liva-yı Karlıje 1 330 260
P.V.d der Liva-yı Karlıje 7 330 260
P.V.e der Liva-yı Semendire 968 892

P.VI mevacib-i bazı gebran-ı

Fransa ve Leh ve Erdel

(30 017 170)

5 693 810

P.VI.a mevacib-i efrencan-ı

Fransa

2 583 560

P.VI.b mevacib-i bazı gebran an canb-ı Erdel amedernd

1 136 690

P.VI.c mevacib-i bazı gebran an canb-ı Leh amedernd

1 963 560

(5 683 810)

28 424 713

Q. al-teslimat be-Alli

emir-i haro-ı hassa-yı Istanbul ve Ismail

emir-i sergi ve

Ibrahim emir-i Ganem ve

Ibrahim Ağa ser

cebeciyan ve Ali Efendi

emir-i nizil berry-ı

mihimmat-ı mezburin

R. al-adat: saljane-yı

mihimmat ve defterdaran-ı

vilayet-i Budun ve Egri

ve Karlıje ve Temesvar

ve Istolni Belgrad

ve gayrihi ve seyishane-

bana-yı bazı katibân-ı

divan ve nafaka-yı bazı

cebeciyan ve topçuyan

ve gayrihi

2 006 054

S. al-inamat be-

Toktamış Sultan

veled-i hazret-i Han

ve yenigeriyan-ı dergah

-ı ali der vakt-ı

amedernd-ı sefer ve der

meteris-ı kale-yı

Esterveron ve bazı

sipahiyan ve silahdaran

ve cebeciyan ve gayrihi

berry-ı cilus-ı

humayun

S.1

be-cihet-i cilus-ı humayun

berry-ı sipahiyan ve

silahdaran ve gayrihi

be-cihet-i veled-i

hazret-i Han zi-şan ve

yenigeriyan ve bazı kesan

3 650 580

1 330 250

(4 980 830)

4 980 830

T. al-mubyayat:

paha-yı hilat-ı

seraseer-ı Istanbul

ve Amasya ve atlas

(ve) tafta ve kağıt

ve semsih-ı mirassa

berry-ı mihimmat-ı

hazine

2 448 531

U. al-ihacat be-

cihet-i kiraye-yı

araba ve kiraye-yı

mekarrriyan ki barut-ı

siyan tahmil şide ve

cebehane ve bazı

nafaka-yı sofilyun

1 430 509

(ve) tafta ve kağıt
ve gemi-ri marasa
beray-ı mihrimat-ı
hazine

1 430 509

U. al-ıhracat be-
cihet-ı kiraye-yi
araba ve kiraye-yi
mekarrıyan ki barut-ı
siyah tahmli şüde ve
ceberane ve bazı
nafaka-yi sofıyyun
ve haro-ı rah ve nafaka
-yi gebran ki an canlıb-ı
Erdel amedend

5 965 948

(214 197 891)

V. al-ıgda-yi siyyun be-
cihet-ı akçe-yi bazı
kesan ki der hır-ı
mlzayaka-yi mevaciib
ki bı-hazine-yi
amire ber vech-ı karz
dade ve eda-yi akçe
-yi mahallıfat-ı bazı
kesan ve eda-yi akçe
-yi bazı haracıyan
der hır-ı mahasebatış
ziyade mahsub şüde
hala eda şüde

8 335 320

(222 533 215)

al-baki: mevcud-ı hazine

mevcud-ı ruzmançe
ziyade: tefavüt-ı
aded-ı vezn

8 315 035

20 285

(8 335 320)

teslim bı-hazine-yi
amire-yi astane-yi
saadet

6 235 320

teslim be-Mermed
Efendi defterdar-ı
sabık-ı Tuna
kalınmakam-ı defterdar
efendi

2 100 000

(8 335 320)

Expenditures of the Campaign Treasury: 10 Şevval 1013-16 Muharrem 1016 (18 February 1606-13 May 1607)
 source: KK 1890 (İsmail) Income and expenditure account:/Debit
 Al-masarif

P. a1-mevacib

60 337 045

74 213 498

P.1 mevaciib-i cemaat-1
 müşaheretoran

580 453

P.11 mevaciib-i cemaat-1
 yeniçeriyân-1 dergâh-1
 all

17 260 725

P.111 mevaciib-i cemaat-1 ebna-yi
 sipahiyân ve silâhdaran ve
 ulufeçiyân-1 yemîn ve
 yesar ve gureba-yi yemîn
 ve yesar ve bazı sipahiyân
 ve bavyadân-1 dergâh-1 all

7 319 477

P.1v mevaciib-i cemaat-1
 cebedçiyân ve topçuyân-1
 dergâh-1 all ve arabacıyân-1
 top ve mehterân-1 hayme ve
 âlem ve hademe-yi istvâb-1
 amîre ve hayyatîn-1
 hîlat ve cerrahîn-1 hassa
 ve gayrîn

4 642 273

P.v mevaciib-i mezkûrîn tabî-yi
 kâla: neferat-1 mezkûrîn

29 438 917

P.v.a tabî-yi kale-yi Budun 18 340 360
 P.v.b tabî-yi kale-yi Eğri 4 643 315
 P.v.c tabî-yi kale-yi Karıje 3 287 424
 P.v.d tabî-yi kale-yi Temeşvar 3 166 798

(29 437 887)

P.v1 mevaciib-i talfî-yi
 hîlar-1 millîet

1 095 200
 (60 337 045)

P.v1.a mevaciib-i talfî-yi
 efrıncâr-1 Fransa 495 200
 P.v1.b mevaciib-i bazı macarân
 K1 an nezîd-1 Bockay1 600 000
 amede (1 095 200)

8 938 222

Q. at-teslimat:

teslim be-Alli Efendi
 emîr-1 nizîll-1 anbar-1
 Belgrad be-cihet-1
 İstîra-yi zahire beray-1
 asakîr-1 mansure ve All
 Ağâ emîr-1 garım ve Mehmed
 çavuş sergi ve Sinan çavuş
 emîr-1 bekşimad ve
 Süleyman çavuş emîr-1
 harc-1 hassa-yi Belgrad
 ve Mehmed Efendi defterdâr-1
 -1 Budun be-cihet bahâ-vî

İşlir-ı zannire beray-ı
asakir-ı mansure ve Ali
Ağa emir-ı garrem ve Mehmed
çavuş sergi ve Sinan çavuş
emir-ı bekşimad ve
Süleyman çavuş emir-ı
harç-ı hassa-yi Belgrad
ve Mehmed Efendi defterdar-ı
-ı Budun be-cihet barı-yı
zahire ve ruğar-ı sade
beray-ı kale-yi m(ezbur)
ve İbrahim Bey mirliya-yı
Izvorlık be-cihet-ı
binakerden-ı sefine ve
Mustafa Ağa ser bawabın-ı
dergah-ı ali be-cihet-ı
bazı piskeş beray-ı
kral-ı Erdel fıristade
ve Ali Paşa mirmiran-ı
Budun be-cihet-ı esb
ve rant ve abay-ı ve
gayrihi beray-ı elciyan-ı
Nemce ki der vakt-ı
musalaha amede ve gayri

R. al-adat: adet-ı

salıyaneyi Ali Paşa
ve Sinan Paşa mirmiran-ı
Budun ve Egr-ı ve Mehmed
Efendi defterdar-ı ortıy-ı
humayun ve diğer Mehmed
Efendi defterdar-ı Budun
ve Ömer Efendi defterdar-ı
Egr-ı ve Mehmed Efendi
defterdar-ı Temesvar ve
Cafer Efendi defterdar-ı
Kanije ve adet-ı bazı
mirliya ki der muhafaza
budend ve adet-ı salıyaneyi
-ı bazı katıbar-ı
diyan ve gayrihi

1 549 235

S. al-irnat: inam be-

kapudanan-ı macar ki
an canlı-ı Boockay-ı
kral-ı Erdel amede
ve bazı mirzayan-ı
takaran ki der
Eflak budand ve bazı
elciyan ki an canlı-ı
Nemce amedend ve bazı
kullaguzan ve hasıran ki
bazı abbar averde
ve gayri

484 347

T. al-mubayrat: baha-yı

hılab-ı seraser-ı
İstanbul ve Amasya ve
goka-yı müterevliha ve
acılas ve tarfa ve bogası
ve destar ve hayme ve
sımsır ve rant ve gayri
beray-ı mühimmet-ı nazıne
haride şüd

633 055

U. al-irnaat be-cihet-ı

kiraye-yi arabaha-yı camus
beray-ı yenigerliyan ve
cebeciyan ve sergi ve
gayrihi der mukabele-yi
üstülan dade refen bi-

2 151 357

kral-1 Erdel amede
ve bazı mirzayan-1
tataran kl der
Eflak budand ve bazı
elciyan kl an carib-1
Nemce amedend ve bazı
kulaguzan ve hasiran kl
bazı ahbar averde
ve gayri

T. al-mubayaat: baha-yi

hılat-1 seraser-1
Istanbul ve Amasya ve
çoka-yi mltevevılha ve
atlas ve tafra ve bogası
ve destar ve hayme ve
şimsir ve rahit ve gayri
beray-1 mlhimmat-1 hazine
haride şüdd

633 055

U. al-ıhracat be-cihet-1

klraye-yi arabana-yi camus
beray-1 yenıgerıyan ve
cebecıyan ve sergi ve
gayrihl der mukabele-yi
üştıran dade refen bi-
sefer-1 humayun ve nafaka
yi elciyan-1 Nemce ve
Macar ve Eflak ve Bogdan
ve mlhimmat-1 pişkes
be-cihet-1 /.../
kral-1 Erdel fıristrade
ve bazı ıhracat-1
mlhimmat-1 mirzayan-1
tataran ve ücret-1
klraye-yi mekarlıyan-1
hazine ve navlun ve
sefine ve gayri

2 151 357

V. al-eda-yi diyun

be-cihet-1 eda-yi
akge-yi ziyade-yi
cizye ve muhallefat-1
bazı kesen be-hazine-yi
amire kabız süde bud
hala eda şüde

120 237

(74 213 498)

az-zıyade :
adet-1 vezn

-3 521

(74 209 976)