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THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RE-ORIENTATION OF KANO EMIRATE,
NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1882-1940

By

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ABSTRACT

The independent kingdom of Kano has a long history dating from about the middle of the seventh century A.D. The kingdom became a Muslim theocracy as from the reign of Muhammed Rumfa during the second half of the fifteenth century. As a result of the jihad led by Usman dan Fodio early in the nineteenth century, Kano was conquered and subsequently became a self-governing emirate in the Sokoto Caliphate. A Fulani dynasty was established and Kano's rulers recognized the suzerainty of the Sultans of Sokoto. A bureaucratic-like political system was instituted in which slave functionaries played a major role. During the later nineteenth century, internal stresses and conflict plagued the emirate. Already beset with its own internal problems, Kano was threatened by external enemies and in 1903 was forced to succumb to the military conquest of the Europeans. Incorporation into the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria had far-reaching effects on the state of the economy, especially on the pattern of the emirate's extensive commercial relations with the outside world. The Kano ruling groups responded to the British by co-operating in matters tending to maintain or enhance their privileges. This in turn led to the reorganization of taxation, the development of the colonial Native Treasury, modification of the Islamic shari'a to suit British ideas, and the emergence of a specially trained class of administrators capable of writing in Roman script which the British understood. The masses or talakawa, on the other hand, at first viewed the arrival of the British as signalling the end of all worldly obligations but in the end they had to adapt to the colonial situation. The advent of the railway and the development of the groundnut trade played a major role in the history

of social change and the consolidation of a cash-based economy. In the so-called 'golden age' of British overrule from about 1926-40, the rulers of Kano had established a satisfactory working relationship with the British, thus enabling the latter to successfully goad the Native Administration into taking on further responsibilities. This period also saw the undertaking of a considerable number of important welfare projects, as for example the provision of pipe-borne water, electricity, and a well-equipped hospital. In the colonial laissez faire economy, the Kano business community were able to prosper in the kola and cattle trade to and from the southern coast. It is suggested that Indirect Rule as practised in Kano and Northern Nigeria was inevitable in view of the problems the British had had to tackle and the authoritarian nature of Hausa-Fulani society.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- B.S.O.A.S. - Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
- C.O. - Colonial Office; Records of the Colonial Office at the Public Record Office, London.
- D.H. - District Head.
- D.O. - District Officer.
- J.A.H. - Journal of African History.
- J.A.S. - Journal of the African Society.
- J.H.S.N. - Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
- K.P.O. - Materials deposited at the Kano Provincial Office (now designated as Local Government Division, Military Governor's Office, Kano).
- N.A. - Native Authority/Native Administration.
- N.A.K. - National Archives, Kaduna.
- NAK/SNP - Records of the Northern Nigeria/Northern Provinces Secretariat Group.
- NAK/KANOPROF - Records of the Provincial Office Kano at the National Archives, Kaduna.
- W.A.F.F. - West African Frontier Force.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION SURVEY: EARLIEST TIMES TO 1882.

The kingdom or emirate¹ of Kano has a long history extending over several centuries. In ancient times it had contacts with the early empires of the Western Sudan - Ghana, Mali and Songhay. During the eighteenth century Kano became tributary to Bornu. In the nineteenth century Kano, together with the other Hausa States, was conquered by the Fulani as a result of the jihad (Muslim holy war) led by Usman dan Fodio. Throughout its recorded history, Kano would seem to have been a notable agricultural, industrial and commercial centre. These factors reinforced its contacts with neighbouring kingdoms in the central Sudan and even beyond. There developed trade routes between the kingdom and areas near and far, thereby further integrating Kano into the broader context of West African history. Of great significance was the development of the trans-Saharan trade routes which brought Kano into contact with North Africa and the Mediterranean. These communications brought to Kano not only an expansion of trade but cultural influences as well. At first in a trickle but later in greater numbers, traders, Islamic preachers and settlers converged on Kano City (the emirate's name is derived from its capital) making it not only cosmopolitan but a meeting-point of diverse peoples and cultures.

Our study concerns Kano under British colonial rule up until 1940. However, any study of Kano's response to this alien overrule - which also imposed a new economic regime - must take into account both

1. For the sake of convenience we will hereafter refer to it as the emirate, though to avoid confusion the term kingdom will be used for the period up to 1804.

the emirate's long history as well as its human and geographical configuration. Hence the inclusion of these themes in the early chapters.

The period of our study, c. 1882 - 1940, has been chosen so that we can focus on the pre-colonial scene and then compare and contrast this with the emirate's political and economic circumstances under British rule from 1903 onwards. Such a study is of relevance to an understanding of the colonial period because Kano has had an immense influence in the development of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria.¹ Policies first conceived and implemented in Kano did have profound consequences for other Northern Nigerian emirates and even other colonies far beyond the borders of Nigeria when, for a while, Indirect Rule became the accepted dogma in many British African possessions.

Geographical, topographical and human background.

The emirate of Kano (the Kanawa or people of Kano call it Kasar Kano - the land of Kano) occupies a north-central position in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It lies between latitude 10°30'N. and 13°N. and between longitude 7°40'E and 10°35'E. The emirate, which takes its name from its capital city (H. Birni), has an area of 12,087 square miles and an officially estimated population totalling 4.8 million.² Kano city and its environs (officially termed

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1. The term 'Northern Nigeria' is no longer in use administratively. By a decree of 27th May, 1967, the military regime of the Federation of Nigeria divided the old Northern Region into six autonomous states. Kano emirate, together with the four small emirates comprising the then Kano Province, became Kano State.
 2. Kano State of Nigeria (Ministry of Information, Kano, 1969), p.6.

Metropolitan Kano), at a mean height of 1570 feet above sea level and with an estimated cosmopolitan population in excess of 300,000 people¹ has been, at least since the Jihad of Usman dan Fodio early in the nineteenth century, the pre-eminent commercial and industrial centre of its economic region, the largest town in Northern Nigeria and the third largest urban conglomerate in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.² Largely because of its economic and demographic importance, Kano has played a major role in a variety of political contexts since at least the fourteenth century A.D. Internally, however, Kano has been an Islamic theocracy, in theory if not in practice, since the reign of Muhammed Rumfa (1463 - 1499).

Kano emirate has fewer and less marked features of geographical or picturesque interest than any other of the major emirates in Northern Nigeria. The emirate falls mostly within the Sudan vegetation zone and the country, generally speaking, consists entirely of flat or gently undulating plains sloping to the north-east and presenting a uniformly park-like appearance while its rivers, as a rule dry for seven or eight months in the year, flow in almost imperceptible valleys in sandy channels. The highest point in the emirate is just over 2,000 feet, while in the capital city itself the monotonously flat landscape is broken by two hills - called Dutsen Dalla and Goron Dutse - less than 200 feet high above the level of the city. Elsewhere in the emirate the scenery is marginally more diversified by hills to the west, south and south-east borders but north of the latitude of Kano city and east of its meridian hardly a single cluster of rocks or a boulder of any kind can be found.

1. ibid., p.5

2. ibid.

The larger rivers which traverse the emirate rise in the central Jos Plateau to the south of Kano and drain eventually north-eastwards towards Lake Chad just over two hundred miles to the north-east. These rivers, which for much of the year are little more than large streams, are found mainly in the south of the emirate, for in the northern parts there are no water courses of any significance. In any case the majority of the rivers flow in the wet season only. The largest river in the emirate is the River Kano (H. Kogin Kano) whose source is in the Ririwai Hills in the extreme south-eastern projection of the state. Smaller streams worth mentioning are the Duduru and Igi rivers which rise near the emirate's southern boundary and eventually flow into the Kogin Kano. It should also be noted that the watershed separating the extensive hydrographic systems of Northern Nigeria, the Niger and Chad basins, roughly delimits the western boundary of Kano emirate.

Practically the whole Kano emirate is underlain by granites, schists and gneisses of the basement complex. Ancient pre-Cambrian rocks are separated from the younger sediments of the Chad basin to the east and north-east, while rounded inselbergs can be seen in the southern and western parts of the emirate and these latter are composed of coarse porphyritic granite. The basement rocks are overlain by a thin sheet of lateritic iron stone, while on the other hand the younger Chadic sediments are covered by soil and wind-blown sands and as such there are rarely any surface exposures.

In common with the rest of the northern parts of Nigeria, the climate of Kano emirate can be severe, characterised by wide and rapid changes in temperature and humidity. As a rule, however, the area falls within a zone of mostly dry weather conditions. The rainy season lasts from about May to October, with the rains falling mostly between July and September. The rains are normally preceded

by violent dust storms followed by tornadoes. These latter are more especially pronounced at the beginning and end of the rainy season. Rainfall has been measured at Kano since 1905 and the monthly averages give the city an average of 34.26 inches a year. Broadly speaking, this represents the mean average for the emirate in the current century.

The rainfall and other climatic conditions dictate the vegetation pattern and the occupation of the emirate's inhabitants.¹ The vegetation is characterised by orchard-bush common to the Savanna lands. Farming, which forms the chief occupation of the majority of the inhabitants of the emirate, is undertaken during the rainy season, even though dry-season or river-valley irrigation is not uncommon. The principal crops of the emirate are millets, guinea corn, beans and cassava which are grown for food; groundnut is the major cash crop (in this century Kano has been the centre of the groundnut cultivation and trade in Northern Nigeria) and cotton is grown as a less important cash crop in some districts. The largest yields of millet and guinea corn are to be found near the large centres of population, where pressure on land has taught the farmer the value of manuring and where manure (human, animal and artificial) is comparatively easily procured. In addition to the principal crops enumerated above, there are also cultivated, where the soil is suitable and irrigation (either natural or artificial) possible, maize, rice,

1. This and the following paragraph is based on K.M. Buchanan and J.C. Pugh, Land and People in Nigeria: The Human Geography of Nigeria and its Environmental Background (London, 1955); M.J. Mortimore and J. Wilson, Land and People in the Kano Close-Settled Zone (Zaria, 1965); and M.J. Mortimore, 'Land and Population Pressure in the Kano Close-Settled Zone', in The Advancement of Science (April, 1967). See also B.A.W. Trevallion, Metropolitan Kano, Report on the Twenty Year Development Plan 1963-83 (London, 1963), p.7.

sweet potatoes, onions, tomatoes, indigo, tobacco, wheat, sugar-cane and henna. Furthermore, throughout the year both petty and long-distance trade are undertaken as part or full-time occupations.

Finally, a very important and to some extent a unique feature of Kano emirate's configuration is the solid block of population in and around Kano city itself - for within a radius of about 30 miles of this ancient metropolis there are some one million people with a mean density of approximately 350 to the square mile, rising in parts to over 1,000 to the square mile, more especially in Metropolitan Kano. This concentration of people has caused an intensity of cultivation around the metropolis, not unlike what obtains in Holland. For a substantial distance almost every acre over hundreds of square miles is or has been recently cultivated, and hedged and fenced roads and fields portray an image of civilized and orderly ^{Agriculture} industry.

Early History - Antiquity to 1463

Very little is known about the territory comprising Kano emirate prior to the tenth century A.D. and what is known is mainly mythical and as such belongs to pre-historic times. As far as the present location of Kano city itself is concerned, there would seem to have been a flourishing sedentary community by about 635 A.D. (plus or minus 95 years) - a community from whose civilization an iron-working furnace has survived to the present.¹ As for the Habe or Hausa people at large, whose descendants form the bulk of

1. Frank Willett, 'A Survey of Recent Results in the Radiocarbon chronology of Western and Northern Africa', in J.A.H., XII, 3, (1971) p. 368.

the population inhabiting Kano emirate and Hausaland in general, tradition ascribes their origin to the cohabitation of a legendary hero - a certain Bayajida Prince of Baghdad - with a pre-historic Queen of Daura and their off-spring are said to have founded the original authentic seven Hausa States or Hausa Bakwai.¹ According to this legend, the founders of the seven Hausa States were all descended from the hero Bayajida. Biram, a son of Bayajida by a princess of Bornu, is said to have founded the ruling dynasty of Garun-Gabas, while Bawo, the son from the union of Bayajida and the Queen of Daura, fathered the founders of the remaining dynasties - Bagayida in Kano, Duma in Gobir, Gazaura in Daura, Gunguma in Zazzan, Kumayam in Katsina, and Zamna-Kogi in Rano.² This legend is of great antiquity, its author is unknown and its historical significance is yet to be established.

The establishment of the Bagayidawa dynasty in Kano probably marked the arrival of yet another group of new immigrants or conquerors. According to the Kano Chronicle³, this latest arrival of

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1. For versions of the Bayajida Legend, see H.R. Palmer, 'History of Daura', in Sudanese Memoirs, vol.III, (Lagos, 1928), p. 132-38; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, Kano ta Dabo Cigari (Zaria, 1958), p.17-19.
 2. Palmer, ibid., p.133-34; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, ibid., p.19; cf. Abdullahi Smith, 'The Early States of the Central Sudan', in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder eds. History of West Africa vol.I. (London, 1971), p.191. Other sources of early Hausaland history are Muhammad Bello, Infaqul Maisur (trans. and paraphrased by E.J. Arnett as the Rise of the Sokoto Fulani, Kano, 1922); and Landeroin in Documents Scientifiques de la Mission Tilho, vol.II (Paris, 1911).
 3. H.R. Palmer, 'The Kano Chronicle', in Sudanese Memoirs, vol.III (Lagos, 1928), p. 92-132. Dr. D.M. Dast has checked and verified the correctness of Palmer's dating (personal communication).

people was marked by conflict between the newcomers and the communities already settled in and around Kano. Indeed, for over two hundred years after the establishment of the Bagay⁴dawa dynasty in c.999 A.D. the rulers of Kano seem to have remained no more than primus inter pares, their powers balanced by that of other chiefly or priestly dynasts.¹ Despite this uneasy political arrangement, from very early on state formation proceeded apace. The third ruler (H. Sarki) Gijimasu (1095 - 1134) began the construction of Kano city's walls. This process was completed during the reign of his son and sixth Sarkin Kano, Naguji (1194 - 1247).² Hand in hand with the development of Kano as a large urban fortress-city or city-state, its rulers began to extend their territorial jurisdiction. According to some sources, Rano (thirty miles south of Kano) came under the tutelage of Kano almost from its very foundation, probably about 1,000 A.D.³ The demands of territorial expansion resulted in an innovation in the art of warfare: thus during the reign of Gijimasu shields (H. garkuwa) were for the first time used by the Kano troops.⁴ Also, most probably in aid of the same ends, Naguji (1194 - 1247) became the first ruler of Kano ever to collect a land

1. Palmer, ibid., p. 99ff.

2. ibid., p. 100-101; cf. Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 194. See also H.L.B. Moody, 'Ganuwa: the Walls of Kano City', in Nigeria Magazine (March, 1967).

3. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 19; Abdullahi Smith, op.cit., p. 191; Kano Provincial Office, Rano District Note Book (history), p. 1.

4. Palmer, op. cit., p. 101.

tax (H. kuridin kasa) of one-eighth of the crop from all husbandmen.¹ This tax in fact was a poll-tax levied on the head of each household. Then within less than another century, during the reign of Tsamiya (1307 - 1343), the rural inhabitants of the kingdom were being compelled to pay the jizi'a (a Muslim tithe imposed on conquered non-Muslims).²

The development of a taxation system obviously attests to the steady establishment of law and order and the consolidation of the rulers' authority. Thus, by the reign of Bugaya son of Tsamiya (1385 - 1390), the Kano Chronicle reveals that the country was peaceful and that regular taxes were being paid to the state authorities.³ It is apparent from this that even though a formal treasury (H. Gidan Ma'aji, A. beit-el-Mal) does not seem to have been constituted at Kano until the reign of Muhammed Rumfa (1463 - 99), a regular revenue was being raised by the rulers for a long while before then.

The progressive increase in the political authority of Kano's early rulers (H. Sarakuna) was accompanied by the elaboration of the outward symbols of that power. Not long after the establishment of the Bagaudawa dynasty in Kano, a number of political-administrative titles were instituted. Among these were the titles of Dan Buram (lit. son of Buram), Dan Isa (lit. son of Isa), Dan Baba (lit. son of Baba), Dan Kududdufi (lit. son of Kududdufi), and Dan Akasan (lit. son of Akasan).⁴ These titles were conferred on princes.

1. Ibid., p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 103.

3. Palmer, ibid., p. 107.

4. Ibid., p. 100; cf. Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 195. According to Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, among the titles instituted then were Dan Darman (lit. son of Darman) and Dan Goriba (lit. son of Goriba), see Dokaji, op. cit., p. 20.

From the literal meanings of these offices, it would seem that the first holders were sons or descendants of powerful nobles or princes who bore those names. The power of these princes and of the Sarki was counter-balanced by that of warrior and territorial chiefs, notably the Galadima,¹ Madaki,² Jarmai³, Barde⁴, and the territorial chiefs (Sarakuna) of such large walled towns like Gaya, Rano, Karaye, Birnin Kudu, Dutse, etc. These political developments were in turn followed by the evolution of elaborate court ceremonies and related state and warfare paraphernalia. In this regard, ceremonial long horns - blown in praise of the ruler - were introduced into the Kano rituals during the reign of Tsamiya son of Shekarau (1307 - 43). Then the reign of Kanajeji (1390 - 1410) witnessed the introduction of padded horse-armour (H. Lifidi), iron helmets (H. Kwalkwali) and coats of chain-mail (H. Sulke) into the Kano armoury.⁶ Trumpets, flags and ceremonial riding camels completed the process during the era 1421 - 1452 and by the latter date we can assume that the kingdom of Kano had acquired a more positive shape and the Sarki had probably

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1. The Galadima is the ruler's deputy or chief minister, and according to Barth, the title is of Bornu origin, see H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, vol.I. (London, 1890), p. 310.
 2. A corruption of the Hausa term mai dawaki which literally means 'owner of the horses'. The title thus approximates to 'commander of the cavalry'.
 3. A corruption of the Hausa word jarumi, the brave one. It approximates to a captain or battalion commander.
 4. This is a sort of commander-in-chief, though the ruler has discretion to appoint any State official to lead a particular expedition.
 5. Palmer, op. cit., p. 104.
 6. Ibid., p. 107; cf. Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 195.

begun to emerge as an autocrat. Horses, slaves and eunuchs were already numerous in the state and the rulers (and their chiefs) had a partial or complete monopoly of the supplies of these items. Also, by the middle of the fifteenth century the rulers of Kano had begun to re-insure their position by contracting dynastic marriages with a number of the territorial dynasts. For example the Sarki Abdullahi Burja (1438 - 52) is reported to have married the daughters of the Sarakuna of Dutse, Shira and Rano as well as a daughter of his own Galadima.¹ Thus all the elements tending to ensure political cohesion amongst the ruling group and buttress the stability of the state were at work by the second half of the fifteenth century.

The political and administrative evolution of the kingdom of Kano was not an isolated theme by itself. It was accompanied by developments in the economic and social spheres. Indeed, the very foundation of Birnin Kano itself would seem to make sense economically. From its earliest origins Kano City, apparently even then quite significant in size and population, has been centred round the twin iron-bearing hills of Dutsen Dalla and Goron Dutse and as such must have been an attractive centre to immigrants from near and far. The hills provided a strategically defensible position, iron could be worked for the manufacture of agricultural implements and weapons, and fresh water could be had from the hills' run-off which enabled the digging of shallow wells.² The land in the vicinity of Kano city is

1. Ibid., p. 110.

2. I am indebted to Mr. J. E. Lavers of Abdullahi Bayero College, Kano, for drawing my attention to some of these points.

also particularly fertile and therefore capable of supporting a large urban population with its varied and complex needs.¹ In fact it would seem that the majority of the inhabitants of the growing city of Kano composed of immigrants from the nearby countryside as well as from afar. In a survey of Kano city's 104 out of 142 administrative wards (H. Sing. unguwa, pl. unguwoyi) during the summer of 1968, it was discovered that almost all the wards owe their origin to a person or group of persons travelling from somewhere and settling in Kano.² Thus even though the growth of the walled city did not attain very large proportions until the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, as early as the reign of Bagauda (999 - 1063) immigrants of diverse origins came and settled in Kano, thereby founding the wards of Dala, Gwangwazo, Kankarofi, Sheshe, and Yakasai.³ In the course of the succeeding centuries, the cosmopolitan nature of Kano city became more and more pronounced.⁴

1. Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 188, see also above, p. 9.
2. Adamu Fika (assisted by Zubaira Mahmud), "Kano City Notes", unpublished MS, 26 pp. The manuscript is deposited in the Department of History, Abdullahi Bayero College, Kano. It contains information as to the names and location of the wards, how and why they were founded and named thus, the name or names of the founders, and the chief occupation of the majority of the inhabitants of these wards in pre-colonial times. My colleague Mr. J. E. Lavers inspired the project and provided many of the leading questions put to informants.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.; see also J. N. Paden, 'Urban Pluralism, Integration, and Adaptation of Communal Identity in Kano, Nigeria, in From Tribe to Nation in Africa (ed. R. Cohen and J. Middleton, Scranton, 1970), p. 242-270.

As a centre of settlement and various industrial and commercial undertakings, Kano seems to have become a significant trading and communications Centre from very early times. The connection between this and the consolidation of the polity's central authority would seem obvious.

The growth of Kano city and its accompanying prosperity resulted in increasing political, economic, social and religious contacts with other parts of Hausaland, the Central and Western Sudan and the world beyond, more especially with North Africa. Probably the most important aspect of these early contacts was the coming of Islam during the fourteenth century in the reign of Yaji (1349 - 85). As recorded in the Kano Chronicle:

In Yaji's time the Wangarawa came from Melle, bringing the Muhammadan religion. The name of their leader was Abdurahaman Zaité ... When they came they commanded the Sarki to observe the times of prayer. He complied, and made Gurdumus his Liman (Imam), and Laual his Muezzin (one who calls the faithful to prayer). Auta cut the throats of whatever flesh was eaten. Mandawali was Liman of all the Wangarawa and of the chief men of Kano. Zaité was their Alkali (judge). The Sarki commanded every town in Kano country to observe the times of prayer. So they all did so.¹

Several years before this notable event, an earlier ruler of Kano had already adopted the Islamic tax of jizi'a and levied it on his subjects.² This latest occurrence most likely signified the mass conversion of the ruler, his relatives, courtiers and servants or clients. Thus probably Islam became the dominant religion at court and within the ruling lineages. Trimmingham would have us believe that whenever this stage is reached - of Islam becoming an imperial cult - then the religion has attained a positive and more

1. Palmer, op.cit., p. 104-105; cf. Muhammad Al-Hajj, 'A Seventeenth Century Chronicle on the Origins and Missionary Activities of the Wangarawa', in Kano Studies, I, IV4, 1968, p. 7 - 16.

2. See above, p. ~~XIV~~ 16

assured position in that community.¹ Since Islam is basically an urban religion, from which base it spreads to the rural areas, its emergence as the imperial cult could not have been without some social and economic repercussions. We should recall, if only in passing, that in the Koran Muslims claim to have found an eternal code containing all the rules and regulations governing the life of the state and individual. In Kano, besides its potency for increasing the ruler's political and religious authority, Islam seems to have advanced the development of contacts with the outside world. Such contacts probably explains Kano's payment of its first tribute (gaisuwa) to the Bornu Caliphate during the reign of Abdullahi Burja (1438 - 52), and the opening up of a trade route to Gonja at about the same time.² It should also be remembered that even some years earlier, a group of Bornuese immigrants led by a certain Dagachi (lit. minor chief) came and settled near Kano city. The party certainly included a number of mallamai (Islamic scholars and teachers) and most probably some traders as well.³ Before the end of the first half of the fifteenth century, Kano raiding parties were enslaving the peoples living to the south beyond its own territory and settling them within the kingdom as farmers and industrialists.⁴ Quite

1. J. S. Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Oxford, 1959), p. 140.

2. Palmer, op. cit., p. 109; Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 197 fn., argues that it is unlikely Kano would have paid tribute to Bornu as early as that period i.e. mid-fifteenth century.

3. Palmer, ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 110.

possibly a new sense of Islamic zeal and the need for increased production of the kingdom's staple trade articles were at the root of such raids. Also, Kano's territorial expansion had already led to wars with Zazzar^u to the south.

Then, during the reign of the last ruler of the early epoch, Yakubu (1452 - 63), the Fulani came to Hausaland from Mali, bringing with them Islamic books on divinity and etymology. Formerly, the Kano mallamai had apparently possessed books only on the law (H. Shari'a) and the traditions (H. Hadisi) besides the Koran.¹ At about the same time Asbenawa (the Tuareg of Asben in the Sahara) are said to have come to Gobir and as a result salt is said to have become common in Hausaland. Similarly, merchants from Gonja began coming to Katsina and Kano. The period in fact witnessed quite an influx of immigrants. Bornawa or people of Bormu (H. Barebari) migrated to Kano and Katsina in large numbers. So also a colony of Arabs of unknown origin, some of whom settled in Katsina and the rest in Kano.² In addition the decade saw the opening of a trade route between Kano and Nupe on the Niger. The route was used mainly to exchange horses from Kano for eunuchs from Nupe.³ These events, all tending to strengthen Kano's commercial contacts with other polities in the Sudan, were made possible by the peaceful conditions which prevailed throughout Yakubu's reign.

1. Ibid., p. 111.

2. Ibid., p. 111; cf. Nehemia Levtzion, Muslims and Chiefs in West Africa (Oxford, 1968), p. 17.

3. Palmer, ibid., p. 111.

By the end of Yakubu's reign in 1463, certain positive developments in the evolution of the Kano kingdom could be discerned. Despite the steady arrival of newcomers in the kingdom, Birnin Kano had undergone a process of internal consolidation and central authority had become strengthened. This in turn had been aided by a building up of Kano's military might and improvements in weapons and organization. As the city-state seems to have had early on a source of horses, this made way for the introduction of shields, iron helmets and coats of mail. This military technological revolution had been crowned with the institution of a cadre of professional top-ranking military and administrative officials with distinctive titles. As a result Kano was able to expand its territory at a much faster pace by the turn of the fifteenth century. The arrival of Islam and its adoption as the imperial cult marked one phase in the internal political consolidation of the kingdom. The open-door policy towards immigrants and travellers brought Kano more and more into contact with the outside world. It also made possible the absorption of new arrivals, their techniques and professionalism.

Kano from 1463 to 1804

This period opens with the accession of Muhammed Rumfa (1463 - 99) and ends at the outbreak of the jihad led by Usman dan Fodio. As will be detailed, Kano appears to have reached the peak of its power in the reign of Muhammed Rumfa, who is regarded as an Islamic reformer and revivalist, a political and administrative innovator, and a great, though not very successful, warrior king. Not long after his reign, Kano was to lose much of its power while at

the same time its steady expansion, a continuing phenomenon since the eleventh century, was to be checked and even reversed. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kano was thus raided, besieged and occasionally temporarily defeated and outlying areas occupied or conquered, sometimes by its chief rivals among the Hausa states more especially Zazzam and Katsina, and sometimes by other states from near and further afield - the Kwararafa, Gobir, Zamfara, and the Kamuri of Bornu in particular. In the course of all these vicissitudes and its own internal dissensions, the essential life of the kingdom as a prosperous agricultural state having trade and other connections with polities near and far would continue with little dislocation.

The reign of Muhammed Rumfa was crowded with events which have since greatly influenced the social and political institutions of the present emirate, otherwise known as Kasar Kano. His achievements were of such far-ranging significance that he is remembered not only as a good king, learned and just, but also as one who can have no equal in might from the time of the founding of Kano until it shall end.¹ One of the most important landmarks of the reign was the arrival (c. 1493) at Birnin Kano, at the head of a sizable group of Muslim clerics, of Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karim al-Maghili the famous jurist. Al-Maghili settled for a time in Kano and subsequently wrote a treatise on the art of government for the enlightenment and guidance of Muhammed Rumfa.² In this wide-ranging treatise Al-Maghili sought

1. Palmer, ibid., p. 111; cf. J.O. Hunwick, 'Songhay, Bornu and Hausaland in the Sixteenth Century', in History of West Africa eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (London, 1971), p. 215.
2. This treatise was translated and edited by T.H. Baldwin as The Obligation of Princes (Beirut, 1932). The text seen by the writer is in N.A.K/KANOPROF 5/1 - 1068/ 1936. On leaving Kano finally, Al-Maghili is reported to have left behind three of his own sons together with a group of followers to continue teaching and preaching in Kano. Their leader, Sidi Fari, became a minor official, namely a ward head (H. mai unguwa) with the title of Sarkin Sharifai; cf. Abdullahi Smith, op.cit., p.198.

to guide the Sarki about all aspects of political and social policy.¹ It would seem that Muhammed Rumfa, in seeking to abide by the admonitions of the jurist, instituted a total of twelve innovations and 'reforms' which had a profound impact on Kano history. Abdullahi Smith has pointed out that Muhammed Rumfa should be seen as a mujaddid - a renewer and developer of Islamic Society in Kano - and as the first ruler 'who appears to have applied himself seriously to the problems of ruling a multireligious community in accordance with Islamic law'.²

The most profound effect of Muhammed Rumfa's commitment to an Islamic policy was the attainment by Kano of the major characteristics of an Islamic sultanate. Politically, a major aspect of this policy was the institution of a Council of State otherwise known as the Tara ta Kano (lit. the Kano Nine), composed of nine top military and administrative officials below the throne.³ As constituted by Muhammed Rumfa, the council is said to have comprised these officials in their order of precedence: Galadima, Madaki, Wambai,⁴ Makama,⁵

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1. An extract from the treatise is quoted in S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), p.191.
 2. Abdullahi Smith, op. cit., p. 197, 198.
 3. Palmer, op. cit., p. 112.
 4. A eunuch in charge of duties connected with the ruler's household, and a field commander in war; cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzan (Oxford, 1960), p. 61, 97.
 5. Literally means 'weapons'. The title was held by an important territorial chief who was also a cavalry commander ranking below the Galadima, Madaki and Wambai.

Sarkin Jarumai (^{umai} chief of the brave ones), Sarkin Bai,¹ Barde,² Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida,³ and Turaki.⁴ These officials shared power with the ruler of Kano and the titles were customarily given to non-royal chiefly or slave lineages. On the death of a Sarki they also normally selected his successor. By this arrangement it would seem that princes of the blood were debarred from membership of the Council of State and the electoral council. Therefore, to stand any chance of being elevated to the throne, theoretically at least, they had henceforth to prove themselves via military or administrative exploits, or proven piety in case of a deadlock in the electoral council.⁵ Despite this apparent attempt to restrain the ambitions of the princes, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the

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1. Chief of the slaves.
 2. During the reign of Muhammed Kisoli (1509 - 65), the Sarki expelled the Barde from the Tara ta Kano and replaced him with a prince, Dan Iya. Subsequently Barde came to be tenth in order of precedence amongst the ruler's officials.
 3. Literally caretaker of the palace horses.
 4. Caretaker of the royal bed-chamber. Sometime between the reign of Rumfa and that of the last Habe ruler of Kano (1781 - 1807), the Turaki was displaced from the Tara ta Kano and replaced by the Ciroma - normally the title of a reigning monarch's favourite, though not necessarily eldest, son. The turaki thereby reverted to eleventh in order of precedence.
 5. This and the next two paragraphs are based on the accounts of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, interview, Bichi, 8/8/1970 and 9/8/1970; Dagacin Wak Yahaya; Adamu Wamban Sankira; Alhaji Isiyaku Yola; and Alhaji Mai Sango. Alhaji Sanusi kindly discussed all aspects of Kano history with me and also gave me access to his papers which contain extensive and up-to-date genealogies of the emirate's present ruling groups up to 1970.

succession to the throne tended to follow the principles of primogeniture. Meanwhile in the lifetime of Muhammed Rumfa the princes continued to fill most of the remaining state offices, as they had done in the past and would continue to do in the years ahead.

In addition to the above cited politico-administrative reform, Muhammed Rumfa had to his credit several other achievements. Easily recalled are his extending the walls of the birni (thereby doubling the size of the fortified area of the metropolis), the construction of a central market (H. Kasuwan Kurmi) on the spot where hitherto had stood the fetish grove of Jakara, the building of a new palace (H. Fadan Sarki) some distance away from the old site which had been in an area of the birni dominated by un-Islamic influences, and the construction of a central Friday Mosque (Masallacin Jumma'a) at which the faithful were called upon to pray weekly and in honour of the annual Muslim festival at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and that of Id-el-Kabir (sallan azumi and sallan layya). In fact according to the Kano Chronicle the celebrations of these festivals were first observed in Kano during the reign of Muhammed Rumfa.

Coupled with these changes and innovations, Muhammed Rumfa is said to have begun the policy of political centralization through conferring key administrative and military titles on eunuchs - an indication that these latter had already been playing important roles in the affairs of state for a while. Even though the Kano Chronicle is somewhat confusing in this respect and some of the titles it reveals are no longer in existence in any meaningful sense, it seems that the major titles which went to the eunuchs were Dan Darman (son of Darman), Kasheka (chief scout), Ma'aji (treasurer), Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Gabas (defender of the eastern marches),

Sarkin Jigawa (chief of the plains), Sarkin Kofa (caretaker of the gates), Sarkin Tabarmi (caretaker of the mats), Sarkin Takubba (caretaker of the swords), Sarkin Tudu (chief of the hill), Sarkin Ruwa (caretaker of the water or wells), Turaki Manya, and Turakin Soro (caretaker of the halls). Thus, the functions assigned to these newly elevated dependents ranged from looking after the Sarki's household establishment and scouting into enemy-held territory to that of treasurership, protecting the gates of the birni, executing condemned criminals, and overseeing the collection of taxes from economically graded farmsteads.¹ As already noted, two of these eunuchs - Sarkin Bai and Turaki Manya - have already been included amongst the Tara ta Kano. The overall impact of the preferment of all these eunuchs would tend to strengthen the position of the ruler in relation to his prominent free-born subordinates whose claims to office seem to have been derived from 'ancient' hereditary rights and/or territorial and military might.

That all these changes enhanced the position of the ruler need not be doubted. In fact the increased power of the monarchy and therefore of the state can be discerned from the tradition which asserts that Muhammed Rumfa was the first Sarki to possess spare horses (H. dawakin zage or barga) when going into battle. He is also said to have been the first ruler ever to keep his free-born wives in purdah - the implication being that all the household menial tasks could be undertaken by slaves or servants. Furthermore, he

1. I benefitted from the extensive knowledge of Alhaji A.A. Mai Zaure with regards to the functions of these diverse offices. The present Sarkin Kofa (1971) of the emir's palace also provided invaluable comments on the slave 'bureaucracy'. For chronicled versions of Rumfa's changes, see H.R. Palmer, op. cit., p.111-112; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 29-30.

was the first to have kakaki (long metal horn blown in ^{hour} of rulers), figini (ostrich-feather fans) and ostrich-feather sandals.¹ Of no less significance and certainly indicative of the greatly increased power of the state and its prosperity was Muhammed Rumfa's institution of a treasury under the charge of a eunuch.

The place of Muhammed Rumfa's reforms and innovations in Kano's history and mythology cannot be over-emphasised. For even today the Sarkin Kano is popularly designated the Magajin Rumfa (successor of Rumfa) and the emir's palace (H. Fada) as the Gidan Magajin Rumfa (abode of the successor of Muhammed Rumfa.)² And the present Fulani ruling groups, who supplanted Rumfa's descendants, purport to be inspired in their administrative policies by the precedents he first established.³

Between the reign of Muhammed Rumfa and the end of the Habe dynasty early in the nineteenth century, a number of the rulers seem to have had occasion to create more titles and confer them on slaves, sons, favourites or distinguished military commanders. The Kano Chronicle is replete with the circumstances which led to the creation of these other titles or at least their emergence to prominence sufficiently to attract the attention of the chronicler. Thus, it is narrated that Muhammed Kisoki (1509 - 65) instituted the

1. Palmer, op. cit., p. 112; Alheji Abubaker Dokaji, op. cit., p.29.
2. See Alhaji Abubaker Dokaji, ibid., p. 29; also Adam b. Muhammad Al-Arabi b. Adam Alfindiki al-Kanawi, l'llah-bi-Tarikh Kano (An Exposition on the true history of Kano), MS, 49 pp. I am indebted to Alhaji Hassan Gwarzo, Mallam Brahim Mukoshy and Mallam Dahiru Abubakar for help in translating relevant sections into English or Hausa.
3. Information given in confidence by a member of the Sullubawa ruling family of Kano (1970).

offices of Dan Maje,¹ Dan Makwayo,² and Dan Iya.³ The Dan Iya, in effect, was made a member of the Council of State thereby displacing the Barde.⁴ Then Sarki Abubakar Kado (1565 - 73) instituted the office of Dan Kadai (son of Kadai) and Muhammed Shashere (1573 - 82), even though he did not create a new title, conferred the important title of Wambai on a eunuch for the first time.⁵ But the great innovator in the post-Rumfa era was the seventeenth century ruler Kutumbi (1623 - 48). Perhaps the most important title instituted by Kutumbi was that of Sarkin Shamu.⁶ This title was conferred on a slave who was then made responsible for collecting the jangali (cattle tax) from the Fulani living in Kano territory. Kutumbi further instituted the titles of Barde Kerarriya (commander of the bowmen?), Shamaki (caretaker of the stables), Sarkin Dogarai (chief of the police or bodyguards), and Sarkin Samari or leader of the youthful slaves. He may also have instituted the office of Sarkin Sirdi - the official in charge of the monarch's saddles.⁷ These

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1. Son of Maje or the late ruler, apparently a prince.
 2. Son of Makwayo, referring to a noble.
 3. Son of Iya or rather the Queen Mother, which implies that the first holder of the title was a brother of the ruler.
 4. Palmer, op. cit., p.113.
 5. Ibid., p. 115.
 6. Literally chief or overseer of the cattle herds. In practice the Sarkin Shamu also became the quarter-master-general. Also, though of middling rank in the kingdom's order of precedence, the incumbent customarily took charge of the capital in the absence of the ruler. This would suggest that the Habe rulers, like their Fulani successors during the nineteenth century, normally travelled together with their leading state functionaries; cf. H. Barth, Travels and Discoveries --- Vol. I., p. 310.
 7. Palmer, op. cit., p. 118. The rulers who succeeded Kutumbi for the rest of the Habe era are remembered as the Kutumbawa, the people of Kutumbi. This suggests that Kutumbi's reforms were sufficiently important as to merit a change in the name of the dynasty, even though succession remained in the same Bagaudawa dynasty.

measures suggest that Kutumbi was a significant contributor to the political centralization of the kingdom.

After Kutumbi, the tempo of creating new offices and titles slowed down. However, the Habe sarakuna still managed to institute a few more offices. For example, Bawa (1660 - 70) instituted the office of Dan Lawan (son of Lawan) and conferred it on a scholar whose duty was to call the faithful to prayers, probably at the central mosque. During the reign of Dadi (1670 - 1703) we hear of the Sarkin Rakuma, whose functions included looking after the ruler's camels. Even well into the eighteenth century, the Kano Chronicle mentions certain officials about whom nothing had been heard before. Among these were Lifidi,¹ Magajin Dan-Kana,² Galadiman Shamaki,³ and Galadiman Makama.⁴ Another official about whom the Kano Chronicle says nothing but who seems to have become an important dignitary during the eighteenth century was the Turakin Romo. His seat is said to have been the town of Minjibir (about 12 miles north of Kano) and his fief is said to have comprised, besides Minjibir, the nearby towns of Charo, Ruwantsa, Galoru, Hotoro, Dandake, Maraki and Yanteku. The holder of this fief is reported to have been always either a slave or freedman of the Habe rulers.⁵ It is also well

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1. Overseer of the royal padded horse-armour, a slave office.
 2. Literally successor of Dan-Kano, also a slave office.
 3. A slave title. Literally the Shamaki's deputy.
 4. Literally the Makama's deputy. Whether or not it was a slave office cannot be determined. See Palmer, op. cit., p.122-127.
 5. Kano Provincial Office, Minjibir District Note Book (history), p. 1. The original office would seem to have entailed serving the nice dishes to the monarch.

known that throughout Kano's recorded history the sarakuna of the major towns in the country have been important officials. Many of these, like the territorial magnates or sarakuna of Gaya, Bebeji, Karaye, Rano, Dutse, Sankara, Shanono, Takai, Jahun, Dabi, etc. performed important roles as military commanders, defenders of the marches and occasionally rebellious vassals who had to be subdued.

The political arrangements which the Kanawa had evolved for themselves ^{were} ~~was~~ in vogue when the jihad led by Usman dan Fodio commenced in 1804. This elaborate system called for the development of a method or methods whereby a regular and substantial revenue accrued to the state. For such a large group of titled officials (and their subordinates and dependents) can only be maintained on an assured income, either in cash or in kind. The first tax to be levied in the emirate was the Kuridin Kasa (land tax) during the reign of Naguji (1194 - 1247). In the time of Tsamiya (1307 - 43) the jizi'a (originally a poll-tax imposed on conquered non-Muslims) was levied in the emirate.¹ Then during the first half of the seventeenth century Sarki Kutumbi found it expedient to impose the jangali cattle tax on the herds of the Fulani.² Apparently all these sources of revenue were not enough to maintain the bureaucracy and meet the other obligations of the state. Hence the Kano Chronicle asserts that the two Sarakuna of the first half of the eighteenth century, Muhammadu Sharefa and Kumbari his son, had to resort to extreme measures to raise revenue. In the case of the former, the chronicler would have us believe that

1. H. R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 103.

2. ibid., p. 119.

He introduced seven practices in Kano all of which were robbery, namely, Karo, Rinsua, Matafada, Yan Dawaki, Kuaru, Jizia of maidens on marriage, and Jizian Kasuwan Kurmi. He invented many other methods of extortion.¹

Some of these imposts can no longer be identified, but one of them was an impost when a marriage was contracted while the other was a levy on users of the main city market. Muhammadu Sharefa's son, Kumbari, went even further. He is said to have collected the levy from the users of the central market so thoroughly that the market almost ceased to function. In addition he imposed a new tax, namely the jizi'a, on the Muslim population of Birnin Kano and compelled even the mallama' to pay. This was too much for the Arab merchants of Kano who therefore migrated en masse to Katsina and the poorer people of the city reportedly fled to the countryside.² It would thus be fair to conclude that by the end of the eighteenth century, the taxes and other imposts in Kasar Kano were onerous and many in number, besides being illegal in Muslim law.

But the evolution of an administrative system with numerous titled functionaries and the development of a taxation system are by no means the only themes in pre-1804 history of Kano. International relations, law and order, trade and industry as well as other pursuits were equally important. The known accounts of Kano's history indicate that between 1463 and the end of the Habe dynasty early in the nineteenth century Kano's international posture was dictated by its relations with Katsina, Zazzau, Gobir, Kwararafa, Zamfara and Bornu. The relationship between Kano and these neighbours and

1. ibid., p. 123.

2. H. R. Palmer, ibid., p. 124; cf. R.A. Adeleye, 'Hausaland and Bornu 1600 - 1800' in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder eds. History of West Africa Vol.I (London, 1971), p. 521.

rivals did not preclude political and other contacts with entities like Songhay, Asben, Nupe, Gonja and even Yawuri. It was in these contexts that Kano undertook its wars, diplomacy, and trading and social interaction with its neighbours as well as far-flung areas. It is even claimed that by the fourteenth century Kano had trade links with Ghat and North Africa.¹ This is unlikely as Kano does not seem to have emerged as a major trans-Saharan trade emporium until the nineteenth century.

According to the Kano Chronicle Kano's external relations up to the end of the eighteenth were dominated by warfare against its neighbours or resisting invasions from without. Thus Abdullahi (1499 - 1509) is said to have defeated Katsina and camped there for some time before setting out to invade Zazzau.² The next sarki, Muhammadu Kisoki (1509 - 65) had to sue for peace in the face of a successful Bornu invasion.³ During the reign of Abubakar Kado (1565 - 73) the Katsinawa not only invaded Kano successfully but besieged the city.⁴ While the Kano-Katsina wars became a regular feature of relations between the two states, the sequence was rudely disturbed by the first Kwararafa invasion of Kano in the period 1582 - 1618.⁵ This invasion and its resulting dislocations probably weakened Kano so much that Katsina took to the offensive once again.

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1. R. Mauny, Tableau Geographique de L'Ouest Africain Au Moyen Age (Dakar, 1961), p. 429-37.
 2. H. R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 112. For a summary of Kano-Katsina relations before the nineteenth century, see Yusifu Bala Usman, Some Aspects of the external relations of Katsina before 1804 (unpublished seminar paper, Zaria, 1972), p. 3-5.
 3. Palmer, ibid. p.113.
 4. ibid., p. 114.
 5. H.R. Palmer, ibid., p.116; the base of the Kwararafa was somewhere on the Benue, perhaps in the area of modern Wukari.

As a result Sarkin Kano Kutumbi (1623 - 48) was either killed in an indecisive battle in Katsina territory or died as a result of his wounds soon after. His son and successor Alhaji (1648 - 9) was quickly deposed, possibly because of failure to stem the tide of Katsina's successes.¹ The Kwararafa again advanced against Kano early in the seventeenth century; their victory was such that the Sarkin Kano had to flee and take refuge in Daura.² In this period Zamfara and Gobir (on its way to ascendancy amongst the Hausa States) all launched attacks against Kano. The Kanawa received a defeat at the hands of Zamfara during the reign of Sharefa (1703 - 31) and at the hands of Gobir when Kumbari (1731 - 43) was on the throne.³ In the same period probably the most important power in the central Sudan then intervened. This was the Caliphate of Bornu which was then consolidating its power west of Lake Chad.

The ruler of Bornu, Mai Ali invaded Kano territory c.1734 and besieged its capital city, threatening to burn it unless the Sarkin Kano paid the tribute due promptly.⁴ The Sarkin Kano and his mallamai had to plead for mercy and promise good behaviour henceforth. Among the mallamai or sheikhs who actively dissuaded the Mai Bornu from sacking Kano city was a certain Sheikh Attahiru, whose daughter was the mother of Ibrahim^M b. Mahmud, the founder of

1. ibid., p. 119-120.

2. ibid., p.122, cf. Albajo Abubakar Dokaji, p.39. According to Adam b. Muhammad Al-Arabi b. Adam Alfindiki al-Kanawi, op.cit., p.1, the Kwararafa succeeded in imposing their hegemony on all the Hausa States.

3. H.R. Palmer, ibid., p. 123, 124.

4. N.A.K/KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568, vol.II. Kano Pronvincial Gazetteer 1933 - 54, p. 18.

the Sullubawa Fulani ruling dynasty of Kano, which replaced the Habe rulers after the jihad about 1806/07.¹ In any case Kano seems to have fallen within Bornu's sphere of influence subsequent to that date. Thus tribute was paid to Bornu until Kano and the other Hausa States were conquered by the Fulani in the nineteenth century.

A few points need to be emphasised with regards to the wars and diplomacy of this period. The reasons for these wars are unknown. They seem not to have been motivated by a desire for territorial expansion or the control of any trade route. Also, no alliances seem to have been contracted between Kano and another Hausa state against one of their number, or between Kano and others against the incursions of the Kwararafa and Bornu from beyond the borders of Hausaland. Finally, peaceful social and trading contacts seem to have continued with little dislocation. Kano certainly seems to have maintained strong trading and other contacts with the polities lying to the south. Thus the algaita (a type of reed musical instrument) and special drums were introduced into Kano from Yauri during the reign of Sharefa in the first half of the eighteenth century.² In Sharefa's time also cowries were introduced into the exchange system of Hausaland from the southern route.³ Also, during the reign of Kumbari (1731 - 43), shields and guns were for the first

1. ibid., p. 18; cf. H.R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 124.

2. H.R. Palmer, ibid., p. 123.

3. For a discussion of the cowrie currency and its introduction into Hausaland, see M. Hiskett, 'Materials Relating to the Cowry-Currency of the Western Sudan, II, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS), XXIX, II, (1966), p.346ff; also M. Johnson, 'The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa', in Journal of African History, XI, I and 3 (1970).

time imported into Kano from Nupeland.¹ This would suggest that Kano's commercial and diplomatic relations with the Nupe Kingdom were very intimate, for these items were not only valuable but very scarce and expensive. As from this time Nupe also seems to have become a source of guns for Kano. This would seem to explain the Sarakunan Kano having a corps of musketeers as bodyguards from the reign of Babba Zaki (1768 - 76) onwards.² Finally, we can presume that daily pursuits and security were rarely disturbed. For immigrants, Muslim scholars, traders continued to trickle into Kano emirate all the time. Perhaps fortunately for Hausaland, unlike modern Europe, the failure or refusal of the Hausa states to ally with one another ensured that their wars were not especially destructive of life and property.

Thus by the end of the eighteenth century, Kano had an elaborate bureaucracy at the head of which stood the Sarkin Kano. To maintain this bureaucracy and meet the other obligations of the state, a system of taxation had been evolved and regular revenue was accruing to the central authorities. The sources of state revenue encompassed not only the well-known Muslim tithes of jizi'a and zakhat which are sanctioned by shari'a but also several imposts, notably jangali which was a cattle-tax the burden of which largely fell on the nomad Fulani. Ostensibly Kano, like the other Hausa kingdoms and Bornu, was an Islamic theocracy but it would seem that by then Islamic tenets were being violated with impunity and the talakawa had to put up with oppression, corruption, self-indulgence on the part of the

1. H.R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 124.

2. *ibid.*, p. 126.

nobility and innumerable technical offences against the Islamic code which should have provided the basis of a just political and social order. According to Usman dan Fodio, leader of the Fulani jihad, the rulers of Kano and Hausaland at large were by the turn of the nineteenth century not only guilty of practices considered illegal, especially in regard to taxation but they were in addition prone to luxurious living, abusing the Islamic legal processes by taking bribes, intimidation and relapsing into un-Islamic judicial decisions.¹ In short Islam was on the decline and its injunctions in regard to political and social policies were mostly ignored. And it was against this system that Usman dan Fodio launched his jihad in 1804. As such the nineteenth century jihad was both a social and political revolution.

1. For details and analysis, see Usman dan Fodio, Kitab al-Farq, ed. and trans. M. Hiskett, B.O.A.S., vol.23 (1960), p.558-79; and Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan, ed. and trans. A.D.H. Bivar, J.A.H., vol.II, No. 2, p.235-43; see also H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p.28-35; R.A. Adeleye, 'Hausaland and Bornu 1600 - 1800' in eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, History of West Africa, vol. I, (London, 1971), p. 525-528; M.R. Waldman, 'The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment', in J.A.H., vol. VI, No.3, p. 350-5.

Kano Emirate from 1804 - 1882.

In 1804 the Fulani led by Usman dan Fodio launched their Jihad against the Hausa states.¹ In 1806/07 the Fulani overthrew the Habe rulers of Kano and placed a Fulani, the Emir Suleiman (1806 - 19), on the throne. From this time onwards the kingdom of Kano was designated an Emirate, part of the Sokoto Caliphate established by Usman dan Fodio, of which all the Hausa states eventually formed part. Suleiman reigned until 1819, and was succeeded by Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud, a member of the Sullubawa clan, whose dynasty held the throne peacefully until the civil war of 1893/94. However, the origin of this civil war can be traced to the reign of Muhammed Bello, who ascended the throne in 1882, which also marks the beginning of our study. As a background, we must now examine the origins of the Jihad in Kano, and the seventy years of Fulani rule prior to Muhammed Bello's accession.

The first advent of these Fulani conquerors into Kano is nowhere recorded definitely. They were numerous, however, according to the 'Kano Chronicle' in the reign of Muhammadu Rumfa (1463 - 99). During Rumfa's time and subsequent centuries, there were at least twelve principal 'clans' of Fulani settled in Kano territory, the names of most of these 'clans' were taken from the Habe towns near which the headquarters of the 'clan' were situated. Like the indigenous Habe and all other immigrant groups, the Fulani were subject to the Habe chiefs and the less nomadic among them would seem

1. Detailed accounts of the Jihad in Hausaland and Bornu are found in H.A.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London, 1967); D.M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate (London, 1967); see also H.F.C. Smith, 'A neglected theme of West African History: the Islamic Revolutions of the nineteenth century, J.H.S.N., II, 2, (1961).

to have intermarried with the Hausas and in many cases given up their nomadic life.

At the outbreak of the Fulani jihad in 1804 only six of the principal Fulani or quasi-Fulani 'clans' participated in the uprising. As soon as the news spread of the Fulani victory against Gobir in June, 1804, these clans sent a delegation to the Sheikh asking for a flag and his sanction for the conquest of Kano. The major groups involved were the Mundubawa or Modibbawa settled principally in Birnin Kano but of Bornu origin (Fulata-Barno), their name derived from the Fulani word Modibbe or learned man; the Sullubawa who were the most numerous 'clan' with their main base at Kiru thirty five miles south-west of Kano; the light-skinned Danejawa at Zuwa thirty miles south-west of Kano; the Yolawa- a section of the Ba'awa Fulani - from Yola to the west of Kano; the Dambazawa at Dambazaa north of the city; and the Jobawa based at Utei thirty miles east-south-east of Kano. At that time the main leaders of these groups were Muhammadu Dabo of the Dambazawa, Muhammadu Bakatsine of the Jobawa, Mallam Jibirin of the Yolawa, Mallam Dan Zabuwa of the Danejawa, and Mallam Jjammo Babba and Jjammo Karan^o of the Sullubawa. Two learned but by then less important leaders were Suleiman b. Abahama (emir 1806 - 19) and Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud (emir 1819 - 46).¹ These leaders delegated Dan Zubuwa to go to obtain a flag for the Muhammedan jihadists of Kano. This was granted by the Sheikh late in 1804 and the Fulani and their allies proceeded to attack Kano

1. Information based on interviews with descendants of these leaders; cf. H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p.66; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 49; N.A.K/KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568 vol.II, p. 19-20; E. J. Annett, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London, 1922), p.11.
W. F. Gowers,

but were unable to conquer it until some 18 months later. It is interesting that Dan Zabuwa was chosen to represent the Fulani of Kano not because of his learning but because he was the oldest of the clan leaders and the biggest cattle owner. Maybe because of this Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio granted a flag but did not appoint a leader for the Kano Fulani.

The course of the jihad in Kano can be briefly summarised. The revolt was carried out by a series of more or less independent and unco-ordinated attacks. Karaye, the major town in the emirate west of the capital, would seem to have been the first valuable prize the Fulani captured.¹ The Fulani next won a major victory at the battle of Kwazazzabo Yar Kwando south of Kano. Reportedly the battle lasted two days and the Habe Sarkin Kano Alwali (1781 - 1806) himself took to the field against the rebels, but on the second day the Fulani won the day by lulling the Habe forces into a feeling of false security.² Alwali and his followers thus retreated towards the capital. Finally, at Dan Yahaya, twenty five miles north of Kano, Alwali's forces were crushed c. 1806 - 07 and the Habe ruler fled for refuge in Zazzau.³ Alwali had no solace in Zazzau so he took refuge in Burumburum, a fortified town in the extreme south-eastern corner of Kano emirate. There, the Fulani forces led by Mallayai^m Jammo Babba of the Sullubawa and Goshi of the

1. Kano Provincial Office, Karaye District Note Book; cf. H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p. 66.

2. Kano Provincial Office, Kiru District Note Book; cf. H.A.S. Johnston, ibid., p. 67.

3. ^{W.F. Gowers} ~~E.J. Arnett~~, Gazetteer ----, p. 11; N.A.K./KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568, vol. II, p. 21; see also NAK/KANOPROF 5/1 - 1043/2820, Muhammed Bello, Infaqul Maisur (translation of E.J. Arnett and H.R. Palmer, 1920 - 48.

Yolawa besieged him for 40 days before they could reportedly break into the town. Fierce fighting followed and in the general slaughter Alwali himself was killed.¹

In the meantime the Fulani had taken possession of the capital. Elsewhere in the emirate the towns and villages do not seem to have offered much resistance. It is said that the Fulani living near to these towns and villages acted as intermediaries between their victorious kinsmen and the rural Kanawa, arranging terms of submission and securing for themselves the headships of these communities.² This would indicate that probably even those who were not active participants in the jihad threw in their lot as the movement started to gain ascendancy. Hence perhaps the emergence of certain clans, not involved in the original jihad, to positions of leadership in some towns. Most notable among these were the Jafunawa who obtained the chieftaincies of Jahun and Bebeji, the Dutsawa of Dutse east of Kano, the Yarimawa of Sankara north of Kano and the Rumawa based at Harbau.³ In that way most of the leaders of the Fulani groups came to have a stake in maintaining the hegemony of their race. Apparently even the conquered Habe were placated. It is said that a son of the last Habe Sarki, Alwali, personally went to Sokoto and surrendered to the Sheikh Usman dan Fodio. The latter then ordered the victorious Kano Fulani to give the former and his relations 'a part of their property.' Hence the son of Alwali was appointed Mai Unguwa (ward-head) Kutumbawa and

1. Kano Provincial Office, Tudun Wada District Note Book.

2. N.A.K/KANOPROF 5/1 - 960/2578, D.F.H. MacBride, Assessment Report on Dawaki ta Kudu District 1937 - 43.

3. Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi: and others, group interview, Bichi, 10/8/1970.

'given' 100 villages from whose revenue he was to support himself and his family.¹ This appeasement of the defeated foe may explain the incorporation of the Mai Unguwa Kutumbawa into the Fulani emirs' judicial council.²

Meanwhile with Kano emirate in their possession, the Fulani proceeded to establish a government. The Emirs who concern us here were Suleiman b. Abahama (1806 - 19), Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud (1819 - 46), Usman b. Ibrahim (1846 - 55), and Abdullahi b. Ibrahim (1855 - 82).³ The first Fulani Emir would seem to have been appointed by Usman dan Fodio as a compromise choice since the Kano leaders could not agree among themselves. Also, the source adds, the division of the spoils of victory was a cause of dissension, and to make matters worse, Suleiman is said to have been 'an unworldly scholar and evidently lacked the personality that leadership demanded'.⁴ The Kano Chronicle also records only Suleiman's disagreements with his officials and his unsuccessful attempts to control them.⁵ Pending a more permanent arrangement and the fact that even a weak administration can only operate when functions are allocated, the leaders of the Fulani clans assumed for themselves the titles, property and powers of the defeated Habe regime. Territorial jurisdiction thus remained

1. N.A.K./KANOPROF 5/1 - 960/2578, Mr. D.F.HI MacBride, op.cit.

2. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op.cit., p.45.

3. The chronology is based on D.M. Last, 'A Solution to the problems of dynastic chronology in 19th century Zaria and Kano', in J.H.S.N., III, 3, (1966), p.461-69.

4. H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p.67, 68.

5. Palmer, op.cit., p.127-28.

in the hands of the Jihad commanders who had conquered the particular areas or in that of their descendants. Because of their leading roles in the Jihad, these clan leaders automatically became the leading counsellors to the Emir and were thus designated Wakimai (sing. Wakimi) or state dignitaries with responsibility for administering certain districts or towns. It is further said that the Kano Fulani simply borrowed the Habe administrative system and adapted it to their own ~~hands~~ ^{needs}. However, this early arrangement could only have been ad-hoc for the duration of Suleiman's reign. For a story is narrated that Emir Suleiman remained poor throughout his tenure, that he continued labouring on his farm-estate throughout his life, and that on the occasion of one Muslim festival he lacked the money with which to procure a ram for sacrificial purposes.¹ This would suggest that Suleiman ruled simply and did not pester anybody. Obviously, his laissez-faire regime was such that the treasury was depleted. Suleiman's saintly outlook and simple life contrasted very sharply with the pomp and self-indulgence of the displaced Habe dynasty against which the Fulani raised their Jihad. Thus, weak though Suleiman may seem, he conformed to the ideal of an Islamic ruler, simple in his tastes and upholding a just social system. Hence the adoption, during his reign, of the principle of unanimity in the Emir's judicial and state councils on which sat the other clan leaders. Suleiman's rule was such that he annoyed nobody and the reign was thus marked by peace throughout the emirate. It was left to his successor, Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud (1819 - 46) to attempt to

1. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op.cit., p.50; cf. H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p. 68 - 69.

impose centralized rule so as to boost revenue and put the administration on a sound basis.

Ibrahim Dabo ascended the throne in 1819 apparently as a strongman determined to have his way. Johnston writes that during Suleiman's reign the rivalry between the Fulani clan leaders had made their rule in Kano very precarious.¹ This may have been a factor in Ibrahim Dabo's decision to re-organize the administration according to a hierarchic chain of authority. This would not only make possible an efficient administration but put an end to the political impasse within the ruling groups as manifested by the inter-clan rivalries. It would seem that the realization by all and sundry that Ibrahim Dabo intended to impose a heavy yoke on the emirate led to the outbreak of widespread revolts.² It is said that even one of Ibrahim Dabo's leading officials took an active part in inciting these revolts. This was the Galadima, Sani, whom Dabo had just promoted to fill the vacancy left by his accession to the throne.³

Faced by these revolts, in which one of his chief lieutenants was colluding, Ibrahim Dabo is said to have sought Caliph Muhammed Bello's permission for the establishment of an authoritarian regime at Kano in which the authority of the emir would be supreme. This permission was reportedly given, subject only to the condition

1. Johnston, op. cit., p.68, 69.

2. For details, see Palmer, op. cit., p. 128-129; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 53-54; cf. Johnston, op.cit., p.68.

3. Palmer, op.cit., p. 128, Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op.cit., p. 53. Galadima Sani was, incidentally, a younger brother of the late Emir Suleiman.

that appeals could be had to Sokoto.¹ Next, Ibrahim Dabo is said to have consulted one of the leading royal slaves inherited from the Habe regime. This slave official was the Dan Rimi,² Barka, who reportedly assured the emir that he would never be able to govern Kano unless he adopted such of the Habe administrative practices as did not openly conflict with Islamic tenets. Ibrahim Dabo thereby reshuffled the chief offices of state (inherited mainly from the Habe system) among the sons of the clan leaders who had been prominent in the jihād in Kano. Thus the title of Madaki went to the Yolawa clan, Makama to the Jobawa, Sarkin Bai to the Dambazawa, and Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta³ went to the Danejawa clan. Most of the remaining titles were conferred on Dabo's own relations and kinsmen. Ibrahim Dabo further co-opted ten of the leading slave functionaries into the emirate executive council (majalisan sarki).

The slave officials co-opted into the majalisan Sarki were Shamaki, Dan Rimi, Salama⁴, Kasheka, Turakin Soro, Kilishi⁵

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1. All my informants are agreed on this point; cf. Dokaji, op.cit., p.53.
 2. Literally means son of Rimi. In Habe times the Dan Rimi reportedly supervised all the kingdom's Lakimai. In Fulani Kano, the Dan Rimi and Shamaki were in charge of the emir's household establishment including repairs to the walls. Dan Rimi also acted as the intermediary between the emir and all those, including the Lakimai, who wanted an audience with the emir or to lodge a complaint.
 3. Literally 'the commander of the cavalry who bore the flag'. This was the most important title instituted by the Fulani which had no precedent in Habe times.
 4. His job was to lead the Lakimai into the presence of the emir. He also acted as co-ordinator when a war or raiding expedition was being planned. In addition, Salama was in charge of all gunners and bowmen.
 5. The duties of Kilishi entailed bed-making for the emir and listening to his wives' grievances.

Sarkin Hatsu, Sarkin Dogarai, Jakadan Garko,¹ and Galadiman Fanisau.²

In addition the Emir adopted the distinctive style of wearing the turban which has come to be associated with Kano royalty. In appearance the style looks like rabbit's ears, with two protrusions pointing skywards from the main body of the turban round the head of the wearer. Finally, Ibrahim Dabo reactivated the high throne hitherto used by the Habe rulers. And henceforth, with the leading royal slaves to enforce obedience, all the emirate officials were compelled to prostrate before the throne and sit on the floor in the ruler's audience chamber. As a result the emir abandoned the earlier practice of shaking hands with any of his subjects.³ Needless to say, these changes were un-Islamic despite their undoubted impact in the process of centralizing political authority in the hands of the emir.⁴

Ibrahim Dabo's measures entailed a reorganization of the Council of State or Tara ta Kano. Besides the Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta and Sarkin Bai which remained with the Yolawa, Jobawa, Danejawa and Dambazawa clans respectively, practically all the remaining five key titles were conferred on the emir's relations

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1. Jakada literally means an agent. In this case the official was in fact the chief of Garho town about 15 miles south-east of Kano.
 2. The chief of Fanisau town, about eight miles north of Kano. During the nineteenth century, Fanisau and Garko had the largest royal farm-estates sited near them. Fanisau and Garko were directly administered by the emir through these slave agents (jakadu).
 3. Accounts of Baba Jibir, Danagundi ward, Kano 5/1/1970; Sarkin Gwarmai; Sarkin Kofa, Kano.
 4. It may interest the reader to know that the Caliphs at Sokoto, overlords of Kano during the nineteenth century, did and still do shake hands with all and sundry.

or kinsmen. The distribution of the fiefs still reflected the haphazard conquests by the clans, but all the title holders became agents of the emir and officers of state (Hakimai). Similarly, most of the other titles were conferred on the emir's sons or his slaves.¹

Ibrahim Dabo crowned his reorganization by creating a number of titles and reviving one which had existed in Habe times. We have already noted that Suleiman (1806 - 19) created the office of Mai Unguwa Kutumbawa² and conferred it on a son of the last Habe King. So Ibrahim Dabo created the title of Mai Unguwa Mundubawa³ and conferred it on the descendents of his predecessor, Suleiman. He next instituted the office of Sarkin Fulani Ja'idanawa⁴ with headquarters at Ja'e and responsible for some groups of nomad Fulani. Similarly the office of Dokaje, (state official in charge of public pronouncements and decrees by the emir).⁵ Finally, Ibrahim Dabo is said to have revived the title of Dan Amar and conferred ^{it} on a junior branch of the late Emir Suleiman's family. Apparently this was done so as to create jealousy within the family and prevent them unifying to seek the throne in the future. By the time Ibrahim was through with these reforms and law and order restored in the emirate c. 1824, the country had acquired a new configuration.

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1. See chapter two for a breakdown of these by about 1882.
 2. Head of the Kutumbawa ward.
 3. Head of the ward of the Mundubawa (Modibbawa), namely relations of the late emir Suleiman.
 4. Chief of the Fulani of Ja'e town, about 25 miles north of Kano.
 5. Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, unpublished MSS; Adamu Wazirin Kofa, K/Naisa, Kano.

The general administrative pattern which emerged involved the ownership of almost every town and village by one or the other of the emir's Hakimai, with the local headman - dagaci - being in effect the agents of the Hakimai. The major exceptions were Rano, Dutse, and Birnin Kudu whose sarakuna were appointed by the emir and who were not under any Hakimi as such.¹ All these offices tended to be hereditary in certain families or descent lineages.

Finally, we need to ^{re}call that Emir Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud was appointed ruler of Kano subsequent to consultations between Caliph Muhammad Bello and the then leaders of the four clans which played a prominent part in the jihad.² Ibrahim's re-organization assigned to these four clans the titles of Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta and Sarkin Bai. The holders of these titles subsequently comprised the emirate Electoral Council with the responsibility of forwarding a nomination or nominations to Sokoto whenever the Kano throne became vacant. These titled Hakimai, together with the five other members of the Tara ta Kano - Galadima, Wambai, Dan Iya, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, and Ciroma - were the emir's chief advisers in Fulani Kano. All these titles could be conferred by the emir on a suitable male from the eligible lineage or family but none of them could be deposed without Sokoto's sanction.³ This limitation ensured a permanent tenure for the incumbents under normal circumstances.

1. Kano Provincial Office, Rano, Dutse, and Birnin Kudu District Note Books (histories).

2. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 52-53.

3. Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, interview, Bichi, 8/8/1970; Habibu b. Aliya Babba, interview, Kano, 12/6/1970.

The precedents established by Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud determined the context in which Kano Emirate was governed until the accession of Muhammed Bello in 1882. In the meantime, between Ibrahim Dabo's death in 1846 and the accession of Muhammed Bello, the ruling groups of Kano seem to have maintained a remarkable unity between themselves. Largely because of this amity, the reign of Ibrahim Dabo's eldest son and immediate successor, Usman b. Ibrahim (1846 - 55), was administratively uneventful. In fact Usman was either too self-indulgent or trusted his officials so much that he seems to have allowed them to govern on his behalf. Thus, when Barth was in Kano at mid-century, he observed

The authority of the governor (Emir) is not absolute, even without considering the appeal which lies to his liege lord in Sokoto or Wurno -- a sort of ministerial council is formed, to act in conjunction with the governor, which in important cases he cannot well avoid consulting. At the head of this council stands the ghaladima --- who very often exercises the highest influence, surpassing that of the governor himself.¹

This suggests that even though the Emir was in theory the almighty head of a theocratic authoritarian regime, his powers were limited. In fact the only major event worth recalling from Usman b. Ibrahim's reign was the occasion when Kano was dragged into a war at the behest of Sokoto. Due to the allegiance owed to the Caliph, Kano, in common with the other emirates, was called upon to provide levies to fight Sokoto's wars. Thus when Buhari Emir of Hadejia was in open

1. H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (London, 1890), vol. I, p. 310. It may interest the reader to know that Usman's Galadima was Abdullabi b. Ibrahim (emir 1855 - 82), a younger brother of the same mother.

revolt against Sokoto c.1848 - 55, Kano together with the eastern emirates provided troops so that he could be crushed. Buhari resisted very successfully and on several occasions he routed the Sokoto-led forces. It is reported that on one such occasion Buhari inflicted such a defeat on the Caliphate's levies that twenty Kano princes lost their lives, including three sons of Emir Usman.¹ When Barth passed again through the north-eastern territory of Kano in 1854 he saw the results of the devastation wrought by Buhari in the area. Barth saw many deserted and/or burnt towns and villages, and the few people he saw were very frightened.² In effect Kano had to pay for troubles in which it was involved only indirectly through its membership of the Sokoto Caliphate.

The reign of Abdullahi b. Ibrahim (1855 - 82) was the culmination of the development of Fulani government in Kano. Politically, the authority of the emir and the palace slaves (H. cucanawa) seems to have grown at the expense of the other interest groups. The reign was thus marked by a series of depositions of the State officials. The most spectacular was Abdullahi's deposition of his son and Galadiman Kano, Yusufu, in about 1870.

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1. Hajj Sa'id, History of Sokoto (trans. C.E.J. Whitting, Kano, 1949), p. 28; for details of the revolt of Buhari, see H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p. 181-183; D.M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, Alhaji Junaidu, Tarihin Fulani (Zaria, 1957), p. 36. For his seeming laxity in defending Kano emirate from the depredations of Buhari, Hajj Sa'id, a contemporary, dubbed Usman b. Ibrahim as a self-indulgent ruler who 'entrusted his business to untrustworthy men'.
 2. Barth, op.cit., p.313; see also Dutse District Note Book (history). The Kano Chronicle alludes to this prolonged conflict in one short sentence, see Palmer, op.cit., p.129-130.

Yusufu is said to have written to Sokoto urging the retirement of his father on grounds of senility.¹ As Abdullahi's reign coincided with that of four weak Caliphs in Sokoto, he was able to get away with almost anything. However, it is not unlikely that Sarki Abdullahi's seeming tyranny was partly a reaction against external threats to Kano's territory from the Caliphate's traditional enemies - the ⁱⁿNuigi, Maradi and Damagaram kingdoms. In 1855 and again in 1868, ⁱⁿNuigi was able to raid deep into Kano territory and inflict severe losses on the defenders.² During the 1870's Maradi under Dan Baskore and the kingdom of Damagaram were able to raid successfully to within a few miles of Kano city itself.³ So perhaps the ruler's frequent depositions of leading subordinates may have had something to do with their failures in the military sphere. In any case, the basic structure of government remained unchanged despite these upheavals.

Thus, we can conclude that the great increase in the size of the bureaucracy of Kano in the nineteenth century was largely a response to, and was largely made possible by, the rapid growth in its prosperity. On the establishment of Fulani rule, Katsina had been the most important commercial centre of Hausaland, and was consequently probably larger than Kano. By 1882 Kano had pre-empted Katsina as the greatest emporium of the Central Sudan and the

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1. Kano Provincial Office, Dawaki ta Kudu District Note Book (history); cf. Palmer, op.cit., p.131.
 2. Kano Provincial Office, Dutse District Note Book; Rano District Note Book (histories).
 3. See M.G. Smith, 'Maradi under Dan Baskore' in D. Forde and Kerberry eds. West African Kingdoms in the nineteenth century (London, 1967), p. 93-122.

city had grown in size and population accordingly. This growth had come about as a result of several factors. Perhaps the most important factor was the decline of Kano's chief commercial rival, Katsina, as the major southern terminal of the trans-Saharan caravans. Katsina, 85 miles to the north of Kano, had enjoyed a natural advantage over Kano prior to the Fulani Jihad . However, with the successful Jihad and conquest of the Hausa states, the Habe kingdoms in exile - Gobir and Maradi - posed a permanent threat to Katsina. As a result the Arab merchants and caravans transferred their base to Kano. Secondly, the welding of the Hausa States in the Sokoto Caliphate provided a larger and more secure market within which Kano acted as the main distribution, commercial and banking centre. Also, compared with any of the major emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, Kano had relatively secure borders. The hereditary enemies of the Caliphate might occasionally raid into Kano emirate but they never threatened its capital. Within this relative security the emirate did not need to divert too much energy and resources to defence, and the peasantry were able to concentrate on farming and manufactures, further increasing the emirate's prosperity. Finally, the availability of capital and credit enabled Kano traders to organize the costly caravans which traversed all parts of Hausaland, reaching destinations even beyond, more especially Gonja which was the source of the much valued kolanuts.

CHAPTER TWOKANO IN 1882: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY

By c. 1882 the evolutionary process of Kano's political and economic systems under Fulani rule can be said to have attained maturity. Precedents established since the jihad early in the century had become normally accepted practices. Politically the emirate was ruled by a confederation of clans, the majority of whom had played a prominent part in the Fulani conquest. Of all these clans, the Sullubawa had attained the status of primacy and the royal lineage founded by Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud had consolidated its position. Similarly, the other clans had come to be associated with certain offices of state the duties of which were largely administrative. However, the leading titled office-holders mostly resided at the capital, administering their fiefs through visiting or resident jakadu. Kano's internal situation was conditioned by its vassalage to Sokoto, a relationship which was of importance in determining succession to the throne and adjudication of certain sufficiently grave issues. The Amir-al-mumin supervised the affairs of Kano through his vizier, more especially in matters pertaining to boundary disputes between Kano and neighbouring emirates or the Kano ruler's arbitrary use of his powers against one of his subjects.

The Kano economy, was mainly agricultural. Almost all the people were farmers, with the exception of a few in the larger towns more especially metropolitan Kano. It therefore follows that there was extensive cultivation of the land, with individual farms being separated from one another by raised earthwork dykes or hedges,

mostly of cactus.¹

Kano-Sokoto relations

The bonds governing the relationship of vassalage and overlordship between Kano and Sokoto were based on ideals sanctioned by Muslim law and the traditions of the Sokoto Caliphate. In this wise, internally Kano was a theocracy. Externally, however, the emirate paid tribute to the Amir-al-mumin and also sent large gifts to other Sokoto officials, especially the vizier.² By the 1880's Kano, by virtue of its prosperity and commercial importance, had become the largest tribute-paying vassal of the Caliphate.³ Similarly, Kano was called upon to contribute levies to fight in Sokoto's wars.

Sokoto had ultimate discretion in determining the succession to the Kano throne. This discretion was however conditioned by a number of factors. One such factor is the Kano tradition which asserts that Sheikh Usman dan Fodio had deputised the four major non-royal Fulani clans of Kano to nominate whomever they chose as ruler of Kano. According to this tradition, therefore, the titled clan leaders would submit nominations to Sokoto which would in turn make the ultimate selection whenever more than one name was submitted.⁴

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1. For a description of Kano's landscape and cultivation, see W. Wallace, op.cit., pp. 213 - 214.
 2. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, pp.87-88.
 3. Paul Standinger, Im Herzen der Haussa Lander (Berlin, 1889); cited in Mrs. Moody, 'Standinger: An Early European traveller to Kano', in Kano Studies III, pp. 38-53.
 4. Dokaji, op.cit., p.49.

These titled clan leaders filled the state offices of Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta, and Sarkin Bai. The second factor which conditioned Sokoto's discretion in determining the Kano succession was the mono-dynastic situation in the emirate. Unlike Zazzau which had a tri-dynastic arrangement, the throne of Kano was restricted to the lineage of Ibrahim Dabo. As such Sokoto could not play one dynasty against the other and in that way be enabled to intervene too much in Kano's internal affairs. This would seem to have been true even though succession to the throne was always open, in theory at least, to all those whose fathers had been monarchs.¹ This restriction of Sokoto's room for manoeuvre may explain the fact that no ruler of Kano was ever deposed by the Sultan. Nevertheless Sokoto could and did play a decisive role in the succession to the throne, by utilizing its ultimate power of confirmation of a nomination. This power was clearly demonstrated in 1882 when Abdullahi b. Ibrahim (1855 - 82) died suddenly at Karofi in Katsina on his way to Sokoto. The Kano electors presented four candidates, one of whom died almost at that moment, and the second was too young, leaving only Abdullahi's full brother Muhammed Bello and ex-Galadima Yusufu (eldest son of Abdullahi) as the serious candidates.² The Caliph originally favoured Yusufu³ but the Vizier, who had a grudge against him, argued that he would be too strong and unruly and imposed

1. Cf. R. Cohen, The Kanuri of Bornu (New York, 1967), p.15.

2. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy, p.97.

3. Ibid.; S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), p.202.

a virtual veto.¹ A respected daughter of Usman dan Fodio, Miriam, then put forward Muhammed Bello as compromise candidate.² In the end Bello got the throne and Yusufu and his supporters acquiesced in the decision. These circumstances clearly demonstrate the power of Sokoto in the choice of the emir. We need note however that Bello would seem to have had prior claim to the throne in any case. In 1882 Muhammed Bello was an old man and his experience of public affairs extended backwards to the early 1850's. Yusufu on the other hand was relatively a young man (aged about 45 years) and his experience of public affairs dated from c. 1860. Since age and length of experience were major considerations for the succession, the choice of Bello was in the event eminently suitable.

The Kano political system

At the head of the emirate's hierarchical organization stood the ruler or emir of Kano. As Islam has never distinguished between the spiritual and temporal or religious domains, the ruler is supposedly guided in his actions by revealed law (shari'a) and the traditions of the classical caliphate as interpreted in Fulani-ruled Hausaland.³ It follows that the ruler had no properly legislative

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1. R.A. Adeleye, op.cit., p. 97; D.M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 170.
 2. Last, ibid., p. 170; Hogben and Kirk-Green, op. cit., p. 202.
 3. For discussion of the Islamic caliphate, see Al-Mawerdi (trans. E. Fagnan), Les Statuts Gouvernementaux (Algiers, 1915); T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate (London, 1959).

functions, for the shari'a is supposed to regulate in minute detail every aspect of private and public life. Hence there are laid down rules governing such diverse things as marriage, inheritance, trade, war and peace, taxation, etc., and the Muslim ruler is there to enforce these rules. In this context the king exercised absolute powers of rule. As Kano had no vassal states into whose succession or other affairs Sokoto might wish to intervene, the emir had complete control of appointments to the offices of state. His main limitation in this respect was the reservation of certain offices in particular clans or descent lineages. The ruler could not tamper with this arrangement without fear of inviting Sokoto's intervention. He could however appoint any suitable male from the eligible descent lineage to fill a particular vacancy.¹ The ruler's absolutism was therefore conditioned by the requirement to observe the constitutional conventions which governed political competition.²

There were four separate administrative and legal hierarchies all leading to the throne. The first of these was the hierarchy of free-born administrators. This was essentially a bureaucracy comprised of titled members of the ruling family, the clan leaders and a few clients or servants of the ruler. By far the largest number of this category of titled dignitaries was comprised of members of the ruling family, namely the brothers, cousins and nephews of the incumbent ruler.³ Besides these there were the titled clan leaders

1. Account of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, Alhaji Mai Zaure, Dorayi Babba; cf. Dokaji, op.cit., p.88-93.

2. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 107.

3. N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 2968/1907, A. Festing and H.R.Palmer, Assessment Summary Kano and Katsina; Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria (1902), p. 51.

whose offices entailed administrative responsibilities. These clan dignitaries, together with the titled scions of the ruling dynasty, were collectively known as masu sarauta or those holding official positions. Succession to their respective offices were usually hereditary and restricted to particular descent lineages. These descent lineages were related by marriage to the ruling family. For example, all the nineteenth century holders of the title of Madaki were married to a daughter of an incumbent emir or a recent ruler.¹ Similarly, all the ruling families were horizontally integrated due to the elitist and specialised administrative and military functions which bound them together and gave them a common interest.

Through the course of the nineteenth century, it seems that sons of the ruling family increasingly filled the offices of state which were formerly open to the servants or clients of the monarch. But since most of the fief-holding rights were vested in the titled clan leaders, whose ancestors had in the first instance won the respective areas for the Fulani during the jihad, the conferment of titles on sons of the ruling family tended increasingly to be honorific. As such it would seem that the majority of royal title-holders had in their charge only a village or two. About a third of the tax revenue of these villages accrued to these officials. Obviously, therefore, the assignment of these villages or towns to certain titled individuals was the normal equivalent of a state salary or pension.² It is significant that most of the fiefs of the royal

1. See Dawakin Tofa District Note Book (history and genealogy of fief-holders).

2. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578, D.F.H. MacBride, Assessment Report on Dawakin Kudu District 1937/38; N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 5785/1912, H.D. Foulkes, Kano Province Dan Buram Chiroma's District Assessment Report.

title-holders tended to be in the vicinity of metropolitan Kano. Most probably, as the nineteenth century progressed, the emirs of Kano tended to surrender their fief-holding rights in the environs of Kano to their sons and relations. In this way by about 1882 the emirs had no personal fiefs of their own. They therefore relied almost entirely on the percentages of revenue accruing to the state from each fief or town.

All the individuals who held official positions at the state level but below the throne were collectively called Hakimai (sing. Hakimi). As in any other bureaucracy, there was a well defined order of precedence. Each Hakimi had below him a hierarchy of subordinates corresponding on a lower scale, to that of the emir himself.¹ This multiplicity of titles at both state and subordinate levels made the administrative bureaucracy somewhat too large. An appreciation of this extensive bureaucracy in or about 1882 is best seen in the number of titled royal and clan dignitaries below the throne:²

<u>Precedence</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Clan</u>
1.	Galadima	Royal Sullubawa
2.	Madaki	Yolawa
3.	Wambai	Royal Sullubawa
4.	Makama	Jobawa
5.	Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta	Royal Sullubawa

1. Cf. M.G. Smith, 'The Hausa of Northern Nigeria' in J.L.Gibbs (ed.), The Peoples of Africa (London, 1964), p.132; see also M.G.Smith, Field Histories among the Hausa, J.A.H., vol.2, no.1, (1961),p.90.

2. The official order of precedence and other details are collated from unpublished genealogies in the possession of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, and 25 District Note Books deposited in the Provincial Office, Kano (1970) - see bibliographical section for list of these note books; cf. N.A.K/S.N.P. 7 - 5785/1912, op.cit., also N.A.K./KANOPROF - 2640/5992/S.I, Geneological Trees of Kano Ruling Family (1954); cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 350-351.

<u>Precedence</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Clan</u>
6.	Sarkin Bai	Dambazawa
7.	Dan Iya	Danejawa
8.	Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida	Royal Sullubawa
9.	Ciroma	" "
10.	Turaki	" "
11.	Tafida	" "
12.	Sarkin Shanu	Client or royal Sullubawa.
13.	Dan Buram	Royal Sullubawa
14.	Dan Isa	" "
15.	Dan Lawan	" "
16.	Barde	" "
17.	Dan Maje	" "
18.	Dan Makwayo	" "
19.	Dan Kadai	" "
20.	Barde Kerarriya	" "
21.	Dan Amar	Royal client

These royal, clan and client titled leaders were by no means the only free-born state officials. In addition to them there were the territorial and extra-territorial chieftains. Of these latter category of chiefs two were Kano-based. These were the masu unguwa or ward heads of Kutumbawa and Mundubawa, both title holders being highly esteemed hakimai with hereditary places on the ruler's judicial council.¹ Somewhat junior to these were the territorial and extra-territorial chiefs or manyar dagatai. All these manyar dagatai were

1. See Gezawa District Note Book; Dokaji, op. cit., p. 45; N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578, D.F.H. MacBridge, op.cit., see also Dawakin Kudu District Note Book.

usually called Ardo'en (sing. Ardo) in Fulfulde. The ardo'en or manyar dagatai were all based in major walled towns in the outlying districts of the emirate. Their rank order and official designations were as follows: Sarkin Jahun, Sarkin Bebeji, Sarkin Fulani Sankara, Sarkin Shanono, Sarkin Kunci, Sarkin Dambatta, Sarkin Rano, Sarkin Dutse, Sarkin Gaya, Sarkin Karaye, Sarkin Birnin Kudu, and Sarkin Fulani Ja'idanawa (based at Ja'e).¹ Some but not all of these ardo'en had extra-territorial rights over their settled or nomadic Fulani kinsmen, most notably the Sarkin Jahun over the Jahunawa Fulani in eastern and southern Kano, and the Sarkin Fulani Shanono whose nomadic kinsfolk were found mainly in the western districts of the emirate.² Similarly, the Sarkin Fulani Sankara had extra-territorial rights over his kinsfolk the Yarimawa Fulani dispersed largely in the northern and north-eastern districts of the emirate. Like the royal and other city-based clan leaders, these chieftains also had a hierarchy of titled subordinates. Also the ruling families from which these titled dignitaries hailed tended to assume the characteristics of clans named after the respective seats of the chiefs. Hence the Sarkin Rano was head of the Fulanin Rano, the Sarkin Shanono was head of the Fulanin Shanono, and the Sarkin Jahun was primate of the Jahunawa Fulani, etc. This development made the respective chiefly families very distinct and horizontally integrated

1. Account of Alhaji Mansur Yola; Alhaji Abubakar Sanus; (interview Bichi 9/8/1970); cf. Kano State jiya da yau (Zaria, 1968), p. 4-8, 14.

2. Jahun District Note Book (history); N.A.K/S.N.P. 7 - 1355/1911, Captain Uniacke, Rogo Sub-District Assessment Report; cf. N.A.K/S.N.P.7 - 4817/1912, Captain Foulkes, Jaidanawa Sub-District Assessment Report.

them into the Kano ruling group. Their integration in the administrative system was further cemented by marriage to the royal family or between the ruling families themselves. Thus by 1882 the Sarakuna of Dutse had become related to the Sullubawa dynasty through generations of inter-family marriage. A similar relationship also obtained between the Sarakuna of Rano and the royal family.¹

The third parallel rank order of titled state officials comprised of the slave functionaries. These were collectively known as the cucanawa and functionally they had the status of hakimai. Of the cucanawa titled functionaries at the emirate level, almost certainly eunachs had been eliminated by 1882 for the records show that titled cucanawa had brothers or sons holding subordinate offices under the incumbents, and in a number of cases sons filled the respective offices on the death of a slave official. The major slave hakimai as of 1882 and in the preceding decades of Fulani Kano were these ten title-holders:

Shamaki, Dan Rimi, Salama, Kasheka, Turakin Soro, Sarkin Hatsi, Kilishi, Sarkin Dogarai, Jakadan Garko, and Galadiman Fanisau.²

On his accession in 1894, Aliyu Babba added to this number by instituting the title of Shettima.³ Meanwhile, these cucanawa dignitaries had, like their free-born equivalents already cited, several titled subordinates. For example, it is said that the

1. See Dutse District Note Book; Rano District Note Book; Adamu Wamban Sankira, interview Kano 8/4/1970; see also N.A.K./KANOPROF - 1012/2724 vol.II, Rano District Notes (1938).

2. See Chapter I, p. 3246-47.

3. Information based on Alhaji Mai Sango, interview; cf. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 69 - 70.

Shamaki, who was the most important of the slave hakimai, had approximately 50 titled slave subordinates.¹ This slave official, we need recall, was the controller of the royal household - the Gidan Rumfa - and also in charge of the ruler's wives and concubines, horses, children and the food and clothing of the emir and his dependents. The complex nature of the Shamaki's office may thus explain the multiplicity of his titled subordinates. All the Shamaki's subordinates do not seem to have been concerned with the matters ostensibly under his jurisdiction. There was clearly a good deal of overlapping of functions and many ad hoc arrangements incorporated into the set-up.

It has proved impossible to compile a complete list of all the officials subordinate to the Shamaki. Yet some seventeen of these functionaries and their respective duties have been positively identified in the course of field-researches in Kano. According to the oral traditions collected by this writer, the titles and functions of the Shamaki's seventeen lieutenants were as follows (during the later nineteenth century):

<u>Title/office.</u>	<u>Function.</u>
1. <u>Madakin Shamaki</u>	Agent to the towns of Kahu and Hausawa. In charge of the ruler's purchases of horses. Rode on the right of the ruler when the latter was mounted.

1. Information based on Alhaji Mai Sango, and Shehu b. Adamu Sarkin Shanu (1970); also Adamu Wamban Sankira, interview Kano 8/4/1970.

<u>Title/office.</u>	<u>Function.</u>
2. <u>Ciroman Shamaki</u>	He presented subjects with grievances to the ruler. Doubled up as <u>jakada</u> ¹ of the towns of Kiyawa, Jangefe, Hugungumai, Malikawa-ta-Sarari and Malikawa-ta-Garu.
3. <u>Turakin Shamaki</u>	He was a courtier. Also the <u>jakada</u> of Dan Zabuwa.
4. <u>Sarkin Bargo</u>	He was the <u>jakada</u> of Bagwai town.
5. <u>Makaman Shamaki</u>	The <u>jakada</u> of Kabo. Also served as a courtier.
6. <u>Sarkin Rakuma</u>	He was agent to Gun-Dutse. Also he looked after the monarch's camels, especially those ridden by concubines.
7. <u>Garkuwa</u>	He was the <u>jakada</u> of Fagan on the Kano-Bauchi frontier.
8. <u>Barwa</u>	The <u>jakada</u> of the towns of Danguguwa, Chedi, Langen, Gabari, Lambu, Gahotoro, Sarauniya and Dandarama. Lived at a <u>ribat</u> .

1. The word literally means an agent.

9. Sarkin Zage In charge of spare horses whenever the emir rode into battle, or journeyed to another destination.
10. Sarkin Tambura He was in charge of the royal drums.
11. Lifidi He was the jakada of Damargu. Also in charge of the distribution of quilted horse-
armour and chain-mail.
12. Sarkin Ruwa He was the official in charge of the provision of water when the ruler was on an expedition or a long journey. Also ferry work.
13. Magajin Dan-Kana He lived in a ribat at the head of a cavalry contingent.
14. Babban Zagi This was the emir's aide-de-camp, usually riding directly in front of the ruler.
15. Ulban Dawaki He was the chief of intelligence and in charge of the scouts for this purpose. He usually had his seat at one of the fortress-towns.
16. Sarkin Takubba In charge of the royal Swords.
17. Ma ja Sirdi He was the functionary who saddled the emir's horse. He also looked after the horses specially reserved for the ruler.

But not only the Shamaki had titled subordinates among the slave hakimai. The Dan Rimi and the Salama, who were ranked next to the Shamaki, had also several titled subordinates. The Dan Rimi's major lieutenants are said to have been the Madakin Dan Rimi, the Makaman Dan Rimi, the Barden Dan Rimi, Dan Sarai and Yariman Dako. Their duties were parallel and complementary to those of the Shamaki's deputies. For example, the Dan Sarai, like several of the Shamaki's lieutenants, usually resided in one of the frontier fortified towns. Similarly, the third major slave dignitary, Salama, had about three key assistants. These are said to have been the Mabudi who presented complainants to the ruler and was in charge of the royal gates, the Barden Salama resided at a strategic ribat, while the Mai-tafari looked after a substantial number of the guns in the central armoury.

Even though the titled cucanawa were not appreciably more numerous than their free-born counterparts in the emirate administrative system, their importance cannot be over-emphasised. The slave hakimai and their chief assistants carried out menial tasks in the emir's household in addition to their administrative duties as jakadu and/or military leaders. Their functions placed them close to the ruler at the capital. Elsewhere they were in control of substantial military hardware and fighting men. As such, despite their social disadvantages, they were disproportionately represented in the political system. Hence the tradition that by 1893, if not yet in 1882, nothing politically or militarily significant could be decided in Kano without the concurrence of the key cucanawa.

The fourth highly placed administrative rank order was that comprising the judiciary. Since the basis of the state was Islamic, the emir was both temporal and spiritual leader of the whole

community. Thus, the first Fulani emir of Kano was both sarki and Imam of the central mosque.¹ The office of Imam was purely honorary and did not entail any administrative duties. Following the death of Suleiman in 1819, the function devolved to an official other than the Sarki. This official had a place on the supreme judicial body in the emirate - the emir's judicial council or court - and his legal advice carried a lot of weight by virtue of the juridical knowledge of the nineteenth century incumbents. But the office of Imam was not a Sarauta and the incumbent Imam derived his income solely from gifts from the emir and alms (H. Sadaka) from the faithful.² As such the impact of the Imamship was largely spiritual and indirect and had hardly any bearing on the political structure.

Of greater relevance to the political system was the judicial set-up. In this regard the ruler was the highest authority. The emir had a formally constituted judicial court, more popularly known as the emirate judicial council, which was the highest court of appeal in the polity. From this court there could be no appeal to another judicial body, not even to Sokoto.³ However the functions of the emir's judicial council tended to be political.

1. Dokaji, op.cit., p. 49-51; J.N. Paden, The Influence of religious elites on community culture and political integration in Kano, Nigeria (unpublished Harvard Ph. D., 1968), p. 438.

2. Information based on interviews with Dr. Kabiru Galadanci, Mallam Tijani Abubakar, Alhaji Mustapha Galadanci, and Alhaji Mai Sudan. Also Alhaji Nasira Nakabara (1970). It should be noted that there was at least one mosque with its own Imam in every ward (H. unguwa) of Kano city, besides the Central Mosque for Friday prayers.

3. Account of Alkali Aminu; Alhaji Barau Kofan Na-isa; and Mallam Ado Tudun Wada; cf. N.A.K. 1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Report 1907, p.11.

in nature. For example, it is believed that matters relating to disputes over the boundaries of farms, estates, fiefs and towns were exclusively reserved to the emirs court. The same rule applied to ownership and grants of land.¹ Customarily however, village and town chiefs informally settled the less intractable disputes pertaining to land matters.

The only other formally constituted judicial body in the emirate was the court of the Alkali or judge of Kano, the court-house and the Alkali both city-based. This court dealt with the majority of criminal and civil cases and could impose capital punishment.² The Alkali was assisted in his work by a team of assessors who were usually learned jurists in their own right and more often aspirants to the judgeship. The procedure of the Alkali's court was quite simple. In civil matters a person having a grievance against another would go to the court and lodge his complaint with official orderlies and messengers. If there was no queue, the complainant is presented before the Alkali and the grievance is outlined formally. A dogari (member of the emir's bodyguard who was also a policeman, jakada and messenger) would be directed to summon the respondent. Swearing on the Koran was usually sufficient to prove the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In case of a fine being imposed, the court charged ushira (a fee usually amounting to one-tenth of the amount involved) and the successful plaintiff took the rest, this amount being regarded

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1. See C.W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure, Kano Province (Kaduna, 1949), p. 4-5, 6-7; cf. C.K. Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (London, 1957), p.167.
 2. N.A.K/SNP - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op. cit., p.11; for a comparative hierarchy of religious and judicial officials in Fulani Zazzau c. 1865, see M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 352.

as damages. In criminal offences, the accused was more often arrested by a dogari and brought before the court in chains. If the accused would not swear on the Koran as proof of his or her innocence, the person was adjudged guilty and swift justice was inflicted - a thief, for example, forfeited an arm.¹ In judgements which involved the penalty of imprisonment, the guilty party would be sent to one of two prisons in the capital. A free-born criminal was sent to the main prison adjacent to the emir's palace. This was the central prison under the charge of Sankurmi or chief gaoler. But when a slave was found guilty and sentenced to penal servitude, the convict was entrusted to the charge of Sarkin Yara. This official, besides being chief of the un-married slaves, was also in charge of the slave prison which was located in a wing of the Ma'ajin Watari's residence.²

The Alkali and his assistants obtained their remuneration by keeping a proportion of the fees accruing to the court as a result of fines, awards of damages and apportionment of inheritance. In addition the Alkali, being a hakimi, is said to have had a small fief based on the town of Wangara about 40 miles east of Kano.³ Also, as a learned mallam, the Alkali received gifts from the emir and other officials.

Somewhat on the periphery of the regular judicial system was the office of Limamin Kasausawa. This scholar official usually

1. Based on information of Mallam Tijani Abubaka, Alhaji Mai Sango, Alkali Bappa, and Mallam Ali Nakabara. Reportedly, the amputated limb was dipped in boiling oil to prevent rotting - cf. Dokaji, op. cit., p.83.
2. Cf. Dokaji, op. cit., p.82.
3. See map and list of fief-holders, enclosure to Annual Report Northern Nigeria, 1904.

accompanied military expeditions, serving as battle-field Imam and travelling judge at the same time.¹ Similarly, another official who served as an occasional judge was Sarkin Shanu. We need to recall that whenever the emir was absent from the capital, this official deputised for him by assuming control of all the functions of the government. This role also empowered the Sarkin Shanu to act as judge in place of the ruler and he could impose sentences including capital punishment. In fact the Sarkin Shanu exercised all the prerogatives of the absent ruler. Finally, an important point needs to be singled out with regards to the administration of justice in the emirate. This is the crucial point that in Kano, as in all other Muhammedan countries, the pure religious law or shari'a was modified by the prevailing customs and the discretionary powers of the ruler or the judges.²

Fief-holding and state revenue

The general pattern of the organization of the emirate involved the ownership of almost every town and village by one or the other of the emir's officers of state - the hakimai. The local headmen or dagatai were as such stewards and they were directly responsible to their respective hakimai. The emirate, it should be reiterated, was a conquest state in common with the other units of the Sokoto Caliphate. The unco-ordinated nature of the Fulani

1. Cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda (1906), p. 169; M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 212.

2. Cf. C.K. Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (London, 1957), p. 163.

conquest of Kano is reflected in the scattered fiefs¹ over which a particular hakimi exercised administrative control. Generally speaking, the four clans which played a prominent part in the Kano jihad were for that reason dominant in the political structure. These clans - the Sullubawa, the Yolawa, the Dambazawa, and the Jobawa - filled the major state offices open to freemen and their titled leaders (including the royal family) had a multiplicity of fiefs. These latter could be located anywhere in the emirate, depending on which clan conquered what area.

By 1882, the royal family had its major fiefs, administered notably by the Galadima, Wambai, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, Barde, and Ciroma, in the north, north-east, east and south of the emirate.² However, we need to point out that the royal family never directly administered the fiefs under the jurisdiction of its titled scions. They instead relied on servants and jakadu for the administration of their fiefs.

A somewhat different situation obtained regarding the fiefs of the other clan leaders. In the jihad, a section of the Sullubawa Fulani led by M. Jammo Babba conquered the western and south-western districts of Kano.³ Similarly, a kinsman of M. Jammo, Jibir, led the jihad forces which conquered Tudun Wada about 75 miles south-east. By 1882, the descendents of these two men filled the office of

1. For the approximate distribution of the nineteenth century fiefs, see map 2.
2. See Ringim District Note Book; Kura District Note Book; Zakirai District Note Book.
3. Karaye District Note Book; Gwarzo District Note Book; cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 1020/2757, Gwarzo District Notes (1921-55).

Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta and the fiefs of this official were to be found largely in the areas conquered by his ancestors. Similarly, the first Fulani Sarkin Bai led the jihad in the region extending from the gates of Kano north-westwards to the frontier of Kazaure.¹ His descent lineage, with title of Sarkin Bai, had its fiefs concentrated in the region cited above. Like the others, the titled leader of the Jobawa clan in 1882, the Makama, had his fiefs centred on Wudil (27 miles east of Kano) and Sumaila about 48 miles south-east of the capital.² The only other group which had significant fief-holding rights comprised of the slave hakimai. In this regard, by 1882 the most extensive fief was that of Dan Rimi whose holdings were based on Gwaram some 118 miles south-east of Kano.³ The other key slave hakimai, Shamaki and Salama had their fiefs in the environs of the capital.

Whereas the royal family relied almost completely on servants and slave jakadu for the administration of the fiefs vested in its titled members, the clan leaders had several kinsmen holding official positions in their fiefs as the sarakuna of major towns and dagatai of the villages. But like the royal fief-holders, the clan hakimai also had their city-based jakadu commuting to and fro between the capital and their masters' respective jurisdictions. It was through the jakadu that the hakimai, all of whom lived in Kano, conveyed their orders to the rural chiefs. These jakadu similarly supervised the chiefs and looked after the interests of

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1. See. Dambatta District Note Book.
 2. Wudil and Sumaila District Note Book.
 3. Gwaram District Note Book (n.d.).

their masters through spying or ensuring that the correct proportion of tax revenue was passed on to the capital.

Kano emirate derived its revenue from a variety of taxes some of which were based on Islamic tenets and others assessed on specialised crafts and crops. The first of these taxes was the zakhat which was tithe on harvested grain and cattle and usually paid in kind.¹ The zakhat on cattle was more popularly known as iangali. The second major source of revenue was essentially the kharaj (H. haraji) which was a land rent payable by non-Muslims conquered by a Muslim community.² Kano emirate, in common with the other Fulani-ruled polities except the Sokoto homelands,³ was regarded as kharaj land and no distinction was made between Muslims and non-Muslims for the purposes of this tax. In Kano, the kharaj was usually known as kurdin kasa or kurdin gona and was originally according to the size and value of the holding. In fact, however, by c. 1882 this tax was imposed at a flat rate; reportedly farms of average size yielded about six pence or 1,300 cowries per acre.⁴ As it were, the usual practice was for the kharaj or kurdin kasa to be levied as a poll tax on household heads, most probably as an expedient to avoid a tedious enumeration of all the farm-steads.

1. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578, D.F.H. MacBridge, op.cit., part 3; cf. C.K. Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria and the Camerouns (London, 1957), p. 165.

2. Cf. C.K. Meek, ibid., p. 166; 166 fn.

3. See C.W. Rowling, Report on Land and Tenure, Zaria Province, p. 77 (cited in C.K. Meek, ibid., p. 165).

4. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 1065/1908, F. Cargill, Assessment Summary Kano and Katsina; see also N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 2968/1907, A. Festing and H.R. Palmer Assessment summary Kano and Katsina.

The third major tax comprised of the levy on cash or economic crops, known in Kano as the kurdin Shuka. This special tax was reportedly the equivalent of a tithe on crops which were more easily assessed on the ground than after harvesting.¹ The kurdin Shuka was by c.1882 divisible into three broad categories. The first sub-division was the assessment on fields of cassava, sugar-cane, etc., which then amounted to about one shilling or 2,500 cowries per acre. Next there was the tax on groundnuts, sweet potatoes, etc., assessed approximately at ten pence or 2,000 cowries a patch and occasionally at one penny a ridge. Then there was the special tax on shade-crops, for example pepper, cocoa yam, etc., which was assessed at five pence or 1,000 cowries a field regardless of size.

The fourth and last major source of regular state revenue was the dye-pit tax or kurdin karofi. This special tax was assessed at five pence or 1,000 cowries per pit and was for all practical purposes the only industrial tax in existence in the emirate.

In addition to all these taxes sanctioned by the Shari'a or Kano traditions, the state augmented its revenue as a result of successful slave raids into pagan enclaves. Kano's most obvious target was the semi-Islamized kingdom of Ningi to the south-east, though in fact by the 1880's the Ningawa were on the offensive and raiding Kano territory with impunity. However, while C.H. Robinson

1. This paragraph and the next are based on information supplied by Sarkin Bagwai, Inuwa Galadiman Fage, Malam Musa Tudun Wada, and Adamu Wamban Sankira; cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578, op.cit., part 3; also N.A.K./S.N.P.- 472/1909, Major A. Festing, Kano Province Report 1908. For comparative taxes in Fulani Zaria, see M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 353; also E.J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Zaria Province (London, 1920), p. 16.

was in Kano c. December 1894 to March 1895, about one thousand captives were brought into Kano on a single occasion as a result of a single raid.¹ The war captives, who were usually enslaved, were invaluable for two reasons. Slaves were used in Kano, as elsewhere in the Central Sudan, as currency where any large amount was involved. Also, they were used as carriers which in effect meant that this medium of exchange could transport themselves as well.² This contrasted very sharply with the cowrie currency which was the primary medium of exchange in Hausaland. Great quantities of cowrie had to be raised for relatively simple purchases and the cowrie was so heavy and bulky, a camel-load being comprised of about 100,000 cowries. This made the latter a very inconvenient currency not easily transferable from one destination to another.

Finally, we need to note the procedure of collecting the regular taxes in the emirate. Firstly, the assessment and collection of the tithe known as jangali was organized according to the nomadic Fulani 'tribes' rather than villages. The nomad Fulani owned most of the cattle in the emirate and subsequently the burden of jangali fell largely on them. The head of each so-called tribe (for example the Fulani of Shanono, Rano, Sankaranawa, Jahunawa, Bebedawa, etc.) was responsible for the jangali of all his kinsfolk wherever they might be.³ As already alluded to, the functions associated with

1. C.H. Robinson, Hausaland (London, 1896), p. 130.

2. See C.H. Robinson, 'The Hausa Territories', in Geographical Journal, No. 3, vol.8 (1896), p. 208; cf. L.H.W. Nott, 'The Upper Niger and Sudan', in Church Missionary Intelligencer, 47, (1896), p.208.

3. Cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF - 960/2578, part 4.

this taxation gave to quite a number of Fulani ardo'en extra-territorial rights throughout the emirate. But for the assessment and collection of the other regular taxes already cited, the procedure was largely based on villages or towns which were also normally separate fiefs belonging to individual hakimai. For the assessment of these taxes, the hakimi sent down his jakada accompanied by the jakada of the emir or his official representative. These worked in concert with the dagaci and minor village heads and each watched his master's interests. In case of appeal against assessment, the ruler would look to his slave jakada for a report on the circumstances. The actual collection was subsequently effected by the dagaci and his subordinates. Reportedly the proceeds were divided into three equal parts, of which one was retained by the dagaci for himself and his helpers. Of the balance, normally conveyed to the capital by the hakimi's jakada, a half went to the emir and the other half accrued to the hakimi as his income.¹ This process, repeated all over the emirate, provided the main revenue of the state and its leading functionaries. It should be pointed out that there was no distinction between the personal income of the ruler and that of the state.

Military organization

In the period being surveyed, the people of Kano were notorious for their lack of enthusiasm for any form of warfare, more especially if there was the prospect of stiff opposition. Since the talakawa or all those not holding any official position were in general exempt

1. Ibid.

from conscription for military service, this generalization could only have applied to the ruling families, their clients and slave retainers. The most graphic description of the reluctant disposition of the Kanawa towards warfare in the later nineteenth century has been given by Robinson. This traveller was in Kano in 1895 when on 19th February the emir of Kano Aliyu finally led his troops towards the Katsina frontier in an attempt to eliminate the threat posed by the exiled Muhammed Tukur (1893 - 95). Of the Kano troops accompanying the emir out of the city, Robinson claims that:

It would be hard to imagine a more unwarlike set of men than his warriors are. Dressed in every colour of the rainbow, they are apparently subject to no discipline of any kind. I followed in the wake of the army for some distance, about three hours afterwards, amidst a miscellaneous crowd of men, women, horses and donkeys. Judging by the rate at which they were going and their general gait, each man seemed possessed with an inordinate desire not to deprive those who had preceded him of the honour of bearing the brunt of the fight. 1.

But perhaps we should not take Robinson's biased portrait of the Kano army too seriously. Undoubtedly he presumes that an army should be correctly uniformed and marching in step as in modern Europe. For all its seeming lack of organization, the Kano army must have resembled the Fulani levies which waged the successful jihad early in the century.

In spite of current traditions to the effect that Aliyu Babba was a warrior-chief², a quality which should have inspired a greater

1. C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 210; cf. W. Wallace, *op.cit.*, p.215.

2. Many stories are extant regarding Aliyu's bravery and warlike qualities. For examples of these see C.G.B. Gidley, *op. cit.*, p. 37 - 45; Dokaji, *op. cit.*, p. 68 - 69, 99; Kano State jiya da yau, p. 9 - 16.

zeal for warlike adventure, the military capacity of Kano about 1882 seems to have been rather weak. For Aliyu's two immediate predecessors, Muhammed Bello (1882 - 93) and his son Tukur are not known to have been interested in military matters. It is however arguable that because of its central position which gave it relatively secure borders, Kano had no need to cultivate warlike traits or maintain an efficient and powerful military machine. Against this must be set the apparent helplessness of the emirate and the increasingly deep penetration of Maradi and Ningi raiders from c. 1879 onwards. Most certainly in comparison with its southern neighbour, Zaria¹, Kano's military machine seems to have been quite weak.

During the nineteenth century, Kano's military organization was largely devoted to a strategy of constructing defensive fortresses especially on the borders from where an attack could be expected. From about 1808 onwards, strategic considerations or the response to a number of crises compelled the rulers of Kano to found new fortress-towns in addition to those inherited from Habe times. The most important towns founded by the nineteenth century rulers of Kano were Babura (seventy six miles north of Kano), Dambatta about thirty seven miles north-west of the capital, Gezawa (nineteen miles to the north), Gwarzo some forty-six miles in the west, Gwaram 118 miles in the extreme south-east bordering on Ningi, and Tudun Wada about seventy-five miles south of the metropolis.² The circumstances

1. See M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 96 - 100.

2. See Babura District Note Book; Dambatta District Note Book; Gezawa District Note Book; Gwarzo District Note Book; Gwaram District Note Book; and Tudun Wada District Note Book.

in which some of these towns were founded illuminates the pattern of Kano's response to military problems. Dambatta town, for example, was founded C. 1824 - 25 following the refusal of Dan Tunku to recognize the authority of the new Kano ruler in 1819. According to the oral traditions, Dan Tunku was leader of the senior branch of the Yarimawa Fulani confederation and he had obtained a flag from Dan Fodio, subsequently contributing to the successful Fulani onslaught against the Habe kingdom of Daura. At the conclusion of the jihad he had acquiesced in the primacy of the pious emir Suleiman of Kano. When the latter died in 1819, however, he refused to recognize the authority of his successor, the authoritarian emir Ibrahim Dabo b. Mahmud. Fighting broke out between Dan Tunku and the Kano ruler. In the end Usman Dan Fodio is said to have intervened, parts of northern Kano were ceded to the former and the area became the emirate of Kazaure.¹ The ruler of Kano then constructed the fortress-town of Dambatta primarily as a defensive outpost against Kazaure incursions. By the 1880's however, in view of common threats from Maradi and Damagaram, Kano and Kazaure had cause to act in concert and Dambatta thus became a major strategic centre in the defence of the emirate against these hostile kingdoms. Similarly, the walled town of Babura was founded in the 1860's in an area which had hitherto been a no-man's-land between Kano and Damagaram. By 1882 the town was not only Kano's chief outpost against Damagaram raids but its sarki was the co-ordinator of Kano's resistance to such raids from the north with the title of Sarkin Gabas

1. Dambatta District Note Book; see also K.P.O., Kazaure Emirate Note Book.

or king of the east.¹ On the other hand the town of Gwaram was founded C. 1827 by a certain Mallam Lawan of whom one tradition would have us believe that his father would have been the first Fulani emir of Bauchi had he lived. According to this tradition, Mallam Lawan's father Isyaku was the leader of the early nineteenth century jihad in Bauchi but he died prematurely and the emirship passed to Yakubu. Mallam Lawan then left Bauchi with his followers and was given permission to settle in south-east Kano. Hence the foundation of Gwaram which by 1882 had developed into perhaps the major Kano outpost against Ningi.² These three case studies of the origins and changing roles of some Kano fortress-towns would suffice as illustrations of an aspect of the emirate's military organization. It should be remembered moreover that a great many of these fortress-towns were located astride the main trade routes linking Kano with other emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate and the world beyond. It is therefore not unlikely that these towns also provided the escorts and necessary protection for caravans and other travellers.

If fairly widespread reports are to be believed, whenever the emir of Kano went to war the sarkin dogarai and his largely slave contingent provided the advance party, acting as scouts and leading the initial thrusts into enemy-held territory. Following immediately in the footsteps of this contingent was the contingent commanded by the Madaki or commander-in-chief of the Kano army. Apparently the Madaki's contingent was comprised partly of light and partly of heavy cavalry. This second group usually drove the attack home after

1. Account of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, interview 9/8/1970; cf. Kano State jiya da yau, p. 14.

2. Gwaram District Note Book (n.d.).

the advance party of sarkin dogarai had ascertained the points of weakest resistance. In the event of the advance party under the sarkin dogarai and the supporting cavalry under Madaki being repulsed, they fell back in the direction of the third army group (H. runduna). This army group was reportedly the headquarters squadron, the focal point of which was the emir himself. The emir is said to have been surrounded on all sides by the quilt-armoured and chain-mail cavalry together with the gunmen and bowmen. These main-line troops went to the aid of the advance parties which had been thrown back by the enemy. In addition, it is reported that behind the emir's runduna there was the reserve group comprising of spare horses and footmen as well as the cooks, praise-singers and non-fighting retainers. Finally, covering the rear was the contingent detailed to safeguard the direction in which the whole army could retreat should the need arise.¹ These five divisions of the Kano military formations were somewhat similar to the Zazzau organization,² even though Kano seems to lack the multiplicity of units and chains of command which made up the total Zazzau army.

1. Account collated from Dokaji, op. cit., p. 84; Kano State jiya da yau, p. 5. None of my informants was able to give a similar outline of the Kano formations.

2. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 97.

The Society and the Economy

During the period under survey, as for the whole pre-colonial epoch, the household was the basic social and economic unit. The household was not (then as now) the same thing as a family. By household is meant one house or compound at the head of which stands a recognised master, the husband of the wife or wives in that compound and father of all the children in the house who have not opted for independence. The household is thus a corporate body for economic and social functions. On the other hand, a family normally contains several households, with or without a formal head. Members of the same family and their respective households may be in the same village or town ward or spread over a wider area. This in turn precluded the organization of a family into an economic unit as the latter pursuit was based on domestic cottage industries. In this regard, members of a household worked together under the supervision of the household-head who was responsible for the welfare of his dependents.

Territorially, the organization of Kano emirate c. 1882 corresponded to what obtained in nineteenth century Zazzau, Hadejia, Katagum and Gombe emirates.¹ At the administrative, social and commercial apex stood the emirate capital, Birnin Kano. In common with the other major towns of Hausaland, the city was strongly fortified. The walls surrounding the birni encompassed the built-up sections as well as vacant cultivable lands which came in handy whenever the metropolitan area was under siege or the threat of being run-over by the enemies of the State. Among the notable features of

1. See M.G. Smith, 'The Hausa of Northern Nigeria' in J.L. Gibbs, ed. Peoples of Africa (London, 1964), p. 129-32; 'Hausa Inheritance and Succession', in J.D.M. Derrett ed. Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria (London, 1965), p. 233-34; and The Economy of the Hausa Communities of Zaria (London, 1955), p. 4-5; V. Low, The Border States, p. 15-18.

the emirate capital can be included such familiar institutions like the central Friday Mosque and the main city market, in Kano known as Kasuwan Kurmi. On a smaller scale, these institutions were duplicated elsewhere in the emirate, notably in the country seats of important territorial chiefs or market-towns.

Kano city, by virtue of its political and social importance (for example it was the ^{level}headquarters of the Tijaniyya ^{order} sect) was also the commercial centre of the emirate as it was for the Sokoto Caliphate at large. Indeed, as already alluded to, traders and immigrants came to Kano bringing with them new techniques and influences which helped to change the character of the metropolis. The immigrants were integrated in the social system of the city, but in the process a new culture developed based largely on occupational rather than ethnic origins. The greatest influx of immigrants occurred between the establishment of Fulani government and the end of the reign of emir Abdullah b. Ibrahim in 1882.¹ Kano's prosperity was to a great extent based on the native industries it contained and the import-export trade which was centred there in consequence of the existence of these industries. To a greater or lesser extent, all the towns and villages in the emirate had one form of craft industry or another.

The large domestic industry which made Kano famous was the cloth weaving and dyeing industry. The size and importance of this cotton-based industry has been summarised by Dr. Barth who visited Kano in 1851 and again in 1854 and by Mr. C.H. Robinson who was in

1. Cf. N.N. Paden, 'Urban pluralism, integration, and adaptation of communal identity in Kano, Nigeria' in R. Cohen and J. Middleton eds. From Tribe to Nation in Africa (Scranton, 1970), p. 255. For details of the ethnic origins and occupational specialities of nineteenth century immigrants, see A. Fika and Zubairu Mahmud, unpublished MSS., Abdullahi Bayero College, Kano (1968).

Kano during the 1890's.¹ As nothing occurred as to radically alter the pattern or size of the cloth industry in 1882, it is arguable to suggest that what these two travellers saw was of general application throughout the nineteenth century. Thus cloths were woven from locally grown cotton and these were in turn dyed in various patterns, notably in Kano city, Garko and Dawakin Kudu. According to Robinson, Kano clothed more than half the population of the Central Sudan and that any traveller had no difficulty in purchasing Kano-made cloths at towns as widely separated from one another as Alexandria, Tripoli, Tunis or Lagos.² Reportedly almost every household was involved in the clothing industry directly or indirectly, the women spinning the cotton into thread while the men of the household undertook the weaving. By the middle of the nineteenth century and almost certainly by c.1882, when Kano was unchallenged as the pre-eminent centre of the clothing industry in the Central Sudan, its manufactures consisted of the tobe or riga - the gown worn by men, the turkedi which was a special dark-blue loose dress worn by women, the zani or plain women's dress, and the bakin rawani or black turban preferred by men, especially the Saharan Tuaregs who annually imported Bilma and mangul salt and potash into Kano in order that they could obtain black Kano turbans and cloths as well as trade articles like grain, shoes, etc. At mid-century, Dr. Barth estimates the total value of Kano's clothing manufactures at about 300 million cowries and it is plausible to suggest that by 1882 the annual value was on the upward trend.

1. See H. Barth, Travels (1890), vol.I, p. 300 - 309; C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 113 - 114; see also A.L. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 59 - 61; H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p.162.

2. C.H. Robinson, ibid., p. 113.

Next to the cloth weaving and dyeing industry, Kano was famous for its leather manufactures. Of these, sandals were by far the most important. At the time of Dr. Barth's visit to Kano as in the 1890's these sandals were made from tanned goat-skins and exported far and wide in the Sudan. Similarly, great quantities found their way to markets in North Africa where they were known as belgh'a and in the middle of the nineteenth century the total value of leather-goods exported from the emirate was estimated at 15 million cowries.¹ In addition to the cotton-based industry and the leather manufactures, Kano was a notable centre for the manufacture of agricultural and other implements. Kano smiths were thus skilled craftsmen and they produced articles from silver, copper, as well as iron.

Besides its industries which provided the main basis of its commerce, Kano was the major distribution centre for imports into Hausaland. As correctly observed by all nineteenth century travellers to Hausaland and more recent studies,² from Kano a web of trade routes spread out in all directions. To the north a caravan trail led to

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1. Cf. Barth, Travels, vol.I, p. 306; Robinson, Hausland, p. 114; A.L. Mabogunje, op.cit., p. 60.
 2. Cf. H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p. 161. The nineteenth century European travellers to Kano were Clapperton in 1824 and 1826; Lander in 1826 and 1827; Barth who was in the city in February 1851 and October 1854; Baikie in 1862; Paul Staudinger and Hartert in November 1885; William Wallace and Teed who traversed the emirate en route to Sokoto in 1894; C.H. Robinson who stayed at Kano in 1894 - 95, and the Frenchman Monteil in 1891. In addition two Italians, A.M. Massari and Matteucci travelled from Kuka in Bornu to Kano and then to Zaria in 1880 - 81. Similarly, the American Dr. van Flint and the Italian Marquis de Buoufanti claim to have visited Bornu, Kano and Sokoto in 1881 - 83 and they wrote the alleged accounts of their respective journeys.

Agades and then onwards, by several branches, to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Another route ran from Kano eastwards via Gumel, Hadejia and Katagum to Bornu, Wadai, Darfur and Egypt. The third major trade route ran from Kano south-eastwards through Dal to Bauchi and Adamawa, the latter being the main nineteenth century source of slaves and ivory. Yet another trade route ran southwards through Zaria to Bida on the Niger, with a branch running onwards through Ilorin to Yorubaland and the southern coast. Then there was the route running south-westwards through Jega on the Niger to Gonja and Kumasi in the Gold Coast. A branch of this last route ran through Sokoto to Say, Gao and Timbuktu on the middle Niger.¹ The convergence of all these routes on Kano enhanced its importance in the commerce of the region and contributed in no small measure to the expansion of its craft industries during the nineteenth century.

1. See map 3; for details of trade articles imported into Kano during the last decades of the nineteenth century, see chapter 6.

CHAPTER 3KANO : THE CIVIL WAR AND THE BRITISH CONQUEST, 1882 - 1903

The period from 1882 - 1903 can be said to have been largely a time of troubles for Kano emirate. The long reign of Abdullah b. Ibrahim (1855 - 82) which enabled his partizans and children to monopolise most of the key offices of state, and then the accession of his younger brother Muhammed Bello (1882 - 93) and the latter's internal policies, together with his subservience to Sokoto, had the effect of creating deep divisions and tensions within the Kano ruling groups. It would have required a miracle to avert an explosion, but the intransigence and partiality of the then Sultan of Sokoto when Muhammed Bello died in 1893 made the Kano civil war (1893 - 95) inevitable. When this bitter and bloody civil war was finally resolved on the battlefield, Kano regained a measure of internal stability, but its external problems became more pressing. By then, the traditional enemies of the Sokoto Caliphate - more especially the kingdoms of Maradi, Ningi, and Damagaram - could raid with impunity deep into Kano territory, thereby causing more damage and dislocation than they had ever done before.

As if the civil war and the raids of the traditional enemies of the Fulani were not enough, even more ominous threats began to loom on the horizon. In 1896 - 97 Rabeh, newly established in Bornu, seemed as if he would invade the Sokoto Caliphate from the east. This threat of an invasion created panic in the Caliphate, more especially in Kano which would have been an obvious objective in the event of such an aggression. Then from 1897 onwards, the

British and the French, age-old rival European powers, actively promoted their mutually conflicting designs on parts or all of the Sokoto Caliphate. Politically, their rivalry culminated in the British conquest of Kano in 1903, the destruction of the Sokoto Caliphate and the imposition of British colonial rule over what came to be known as Northern Nigeria. These upheavals had profound repercussions for the economy of Kano as for that of neighbouring polities. In fact European penetration and conquest had the effect of bringing nearer the end of the once flourishing trans-Saharan trade, in which Kano had been the principal nineteenth century southern terminus.

The origins and course of the Kano civil war 1882 - 95

When the emir Abdullahi b. Ibrahim died in 1882, his younger brother by the same mother, Muhammed Bello, was elected to succeed him. He was eminently qualified by the established criteria for this office, the traditional procedures were correctly followed, and the approval of the Amir-al-muminin secured. His only possible rival for the succession was the ex-Galadima Yusufu, the son of Abdullahi, and whatever his ambitions may already have been, he now acquiesced in his uncle's preferment without open opposition. The tensions within the ruling lineage which were to erupt into civil war in 1893 had not yet built up to the point of explosion. Clearly then we must look to the policies of the new reign for the immediate causes of that outbreak.

Muhammed Bello was an old man when he came to the throne. He had also had long experience of public affairs, having held the office of Turaki since the last years of Usman b. Ibrahim's reign

(1846 - 55).¹ Apparently, also, his impatience at the longevity of his immediate predecessor, Abdullahi, had been cause of friction between the two.² It would also seem that during Abdullahi's long reign, Muhammed Bello had been overshadowed by the former's partisans and children who dominated the administration, relegating Muhammed Bello into the background and allowing him to lead an impoverished life.³ These factors, together with dynastic considerations, would seem to have influenced Muhammed Bello's policies as ruler of Kano. For despite his acknowledged piety and generosity, he deliberately embarked on a course designed to upset the modus vivendi which had been at the root of the emirate's political stability and prosperity. Thus instead of the usual practice of retaining the Galadima as chief administrative assistant to the ruler, Muhammed Bello inaugurated his reign by conferring, apparently informally, the title of Waziri on his friend Sarkin Fada⁴ Dangyatuma and then placing in the hands of the latter the management of Kano's public affairs.⁵ This was unusual, for it was not customary to elevate somebody to the highest position below the throne merely on the basis of personal friendship. But this was only the beginning as a lot more was still to come. In fact Muhammed Bello then followed this up by instituting a policy of deposing as many state and other officials as was possible. Such depositions affected a broad spectrum of office-holders, both free-born and slaves.

1. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 59.

2. Ibid.

3. Palmer, op. cit., p. 131.

4. Chief of the courtiers.

5. Palmer, op. cit., p. 132; see also Dokaji, op. cit., p. 60.

Muhammed Bello's measures merit recounting as they determined Kano's internal and external relations for decades to come. Among those who suffered most from the ruler's policies were his nephews and nieces, the sons and daughters of the late emir Abdullahi (1855 - 82). It is said that as far as possible Muhammed Bello deprived almost all his nephews of their fiefs - the towns and villages which paid their tributes and taxes through these princes. In addition one of them, the Ciroma Musa, was deprived of his title.¹ Still yet another, the Dan Lawan Ayuba, was turned out of office and was soon to die as a result of this turn of fortune and the more important one of having only recently been considered for the throne and then dropped.² In the end, it is said that only two of Muhammed Bello's nephews were able to retain their titles. These were the Wambai Shehu and the Dan Buram Mamman Mai-Lafiya. However, it would seem that these two were deprived of the privileges and paraphernalia attached to their offices and in fact they were not deposed mainly because of admonitions from Sokoto. Apparently, the princes out of favour accepted their misfortunes stoically, except for one who had strong connections at Sokoto. This was Aliyu Babba (emir 1894 - 1903). He is said to have written to the Caliphate authorities protesting at being deprived of his town-fief, Garun Babba. The Caliph, or most probably his Vizier, intervened and Aliyu was left in possession of his fief.³

1. Palmer, ibid., p. 132; Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu (Zaria, 1933), vol. II, p. 65.

2. Cf. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 59; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria (London, 1971), p. 97.

3. See D. M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 201. Aliyu Babba's mother was a daughter of the Caliph Aliyu Babba Mai Cinaka (1842 - 59). In fact Aliyu was named after the Caliph.

As for his nieces, Muhammed Bello is said to have compelled many of their husbands to divorce them. Three of these princesses were married respectively to the Sarakuna of the towns of Rano, Dutse, and Kura. The emir is said to have sent messages to these chiefs, requesting that they should either divorce their wives or relinquish their offices. As it were, all these chiefs divorced the wives in question rather than risk the wrath of the ruler. Nevertheless, the chieftains were soon after deprived of their positions, thereby getting the worst of both worlds.¹ Two different chiefs, however, refused to comply with Muhammed Bello's wishes. One of these was the Sarkin Jahun, Modibbo, who refused either to divorce his wife Rabi or to abdicate from his position. Modibbo thus staged an undeclared rebellion: he refused to travel to the emirate capital even when summoned by the emir himself. However, since Modibbo's chieftaincy entailed, among its many duties, the protection of Kano emirate's north-eastern border in the direction of Hadejia, the ruler found it inexpedient to provoke a crisis and the use of force was thus avoided. Muhammed Bello's actions in this regard were contrary to usual practice and the law. In any case Modibbo's headquarters, Jahun, was well fortified and the chief had within it over 1000 horsemen loyal to himself. The other chief who refused to comply with Muhammed Bello's ultimatum was the Madakin Makama² Hamza.

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1. Adamu Wamban Sankira, Kano, interview, 8/4/1970; Alhaji Mai Sango, Kano, interview, 6/4/1970; see also Kano Provincial Office, Rano District Note Book, Dutse District Note Book, and Kura District Note Book.
 2. Principal lieutenant to the Makaman Kano. Hamza was appointed Makama on the victorious entry of the Yusufawa into Kano in 1894 but he died within less than a year; see Kano Provincial Office, Wudil and Sumaila District Note Book.

Hamza was married to one of the ruler's nieces, Daje, who had already given birth to a promising son, Dahiru (Makama Kano 1907 - 17).¹ Rather than divorce Daje, the Madakin Makama surrendered his title and retired to his personal estate at the town of Gano.

Muhammed Bello's motive for these actions would seem to have been the desire to bring home to his nephews and nieces that they could no longer take the security of their positions for granted. This would also serve as a warning to all others in the country. In any case the ruler's conduct towards the sons and daughters of Abdullahi was particularly painful because Muhammed Bello had the same mother with Abdullahi. Also, Abdullahi while emir had retained Muhammed Bello as Turaki, thereby keeping him in line for the succession. Furthermore, even when Abdullahi was alive, legally it was Muhammed Bello, as his closest younger brother, who was the Liwali (guardian) of his daughters and this was the more reason why from an ethical or political viewpoint his causing them to be divorced was bound to cause bitterness and reinforce the feeling that he wanted to ease them out of power and economic well being completely. Moreover, in view of the dependence of all the ruling groups as well as successful entrepreneurs to rely on slave labour for food production and cottage industries with which to obtain native and imported luxuries, loss of office meant that the numerous sons of Abdullahi were faced with eventual destitution. Meanwhile, as there was nothing that could be done, the ruler's divorced nieces went to live at the house of their senior brother ex-Galadima Yusufu.²

1. Ibid.

2. M. U. Adamu, 'Some Notes on the influence of North African Traders in Kano', Kano Studies, I, 4 (1968), p. 45.

The presence of these ladies at the capital was thus a permanent slight to Yusufu and his numerous brothers.

It was in the wake of these events which alienated a large segment of the royal lineage that Muhammed Bello then proceeded arbitrarily to impose other policies inimical to the continuation of a consensus within the ruling groups. Among those who suffered was an influential section of the 'ulama (religious scholars). Some of these men, because of their special talents, have^d had a warm relationship with the late emir Abdullahi. The new ruler, however, regarded them as personal enemies and branded them as Abdullahi's supporters. One of these mallamai, the then Galadima, Ibrahim, was deprived of his office and exiled to Funkuyi in Zaria emirate to the south.¹ Ibrahim, a trusted free-born client of emir Abdullahi had been promoted from Magatakarda (chief scribe) to Galadima about 1877 when Yusufu was disgraced by the former.² As obviously he had served Abdullahi loyally for so many years, it was perhaps inevitable that he should be displaced from the position of chief lieutenant to the new ruler.

The next victim of Muhammed Bello's wrath was the Alkali (judge) of Kano, Sule, who was also turned out of office and disgraced. Alkali Sule belonged to the Genawa clan, which had a long tradition of scholarship and faithful service to the throne. This, however, did not seem to have stood him in good stead. In addition, the new ruler decided on the expulsion from Kano of a mallam then reputed to be the most learned Koranic scholar in the

1. H. R. Palmer, op. cit., p. 132; also Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 65.

2. Kano Provincial Office, Dawakin Kudu District Note Book.

emirate. This man was a certain Bornuese called Mallam Kyari and he is said to have been exiled to Funkuyi in Zaria, like the recently deposed Galadima Ibrahim.¹ Along with these exiles, as was to be expected, went their families, supporters and students. Before going into this involuntary exile, however, these distinguished scholars are said to have publicly prophesied in front of the emir that he would end his reign peacefully but his son (referring to newly appointed Galadima Tukur) would not even have his grave in Kano territory. In short, the disaffected mallam foresaw troubled times ahead, more especially if the ruler persisted with his short-sighted and divisive policies.

These warnings, however, do not seem to have impressed Muhammed Bello at all. For he went ^{on} to alienate almost all the fief-holding hakimai in the emirate. Formerly, during the reigns of his Fulani predecessors from early in the century, the ruler used to delegate the collection of his share of the tax revenue to between three and at most five jakadu per hakimi, no matter the number of fiefs under the jurisdiction of the latter. Thus, a fief-holder in charge of, for example, twenty scattered fiefs would be supervised by a maximum of five royal jakadu. These latter were held in awe by the hakimai, for besides their duties as royal tax collectors, they spied and reported to their master about the administration, loyalty and efficiency of the fief-holder.² Therefore the fewer the number of royal jakadu the better it was for the hakimi to do what he

1. This paragraph is based on M. Jijani Abubakar, interview, Kano 19/5/1970; M. Mai Sudan, interview, Kano, 18/2/1970; and M. Na-Malle. Also Wambau Saukira Adamu, interview, 8/4/1970.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1904, p. 32; N.A.K./SNP/1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Annual Report, 1907, para. 25.

willed and at the same time maintain a favourable image in the eyes of the emir. Muhammed Bello upset this arrangement by assigning a royal jakada to each of the more than 400 fiefs in the emirate.¹ Apparently, the institution of this new system of royal supervision occurred in the period 1886 - 90. The effect of the measure was the relative impoverishment of the fief-holders, for the royal jakadu were ever present to ensure that the actual proportion of revenue due to the emir was made good. A reduction of their actual income and the curtailment of their freedom made the hakimai restive. However, as the ruler was acting within his constitutional rights, there could be no complaint to Muhammed Bello or to Sokoto. In any case, for political and dynastic reasons, Muhammed Bello seems to have been an exponent of close and respectful relations with Sokoto.

If Muhammed Bello's nephews and nieces, the 'ulama and hakimai did not fare well because of the ruler's measures, the talakawa who formed the bulk of the population had to bear even heavier burdens. It is said that the emir not only insisted on the prompt payment of all taxes at the appropriate times but also doubled the flat rate assessment of Kuridin Kasa. Reportedly, the new rate of 4,000 cowries was charged per farm instead of, as heretofore, the Kuridin Kasa being a poll tax levied on household heads, the household being a family unit.² Apparently, the only exception was the principality of Rano (thirty seven miles south of Kano) where the new rate continued to be levied as a poll tax on family units. Thus apart from Rano, elsewhere in the emirate the basis of taxation was changed and in many cases the taxpayer had to meet a tax bill up

1. Alhaji Mai Sango, interview, Kano; M. Ali Nakabara, Kano. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1904, p.

2. N.A.K./SNP/3635/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Report for half year ending 30/6/1909, dated 14/7/1909, para. 54.

to three times what he had been accustomed to paying in the past.¹ It is likely that Muhammed Bello doubled the rate of taxation to stop the government getting poorer. For the bulk of the revenue accruing to the state was in the form of cowries and by 1890 the cowrie in Hausaland is said to have possessed only about one quarter of its value in c. 1855.² Such a steep devaluation of the cowrie in relation to gold, silver, and what else it could buy must surely have been a major factor in the calculations of the emir. Furthermore, Muhammed Bello sent unusually large presents and tributes to Sokoto. It has been suggested that perhaps the increased tributes were meant to compensate for the discontinuation of personal attendance by the eastern emirs at the annual autumn campaigns of the Sultans against pagan enclaves near Sokoto.³ For the ruler of Kano this was another reason to raise a larger internal revenue. We must also not overlook the possibility that Sokoto, feeling the pinch of the inflation then prevailing, might be asking for larger tributes to soften the impact of the devaluation of the cowrie. These latter factors may explain what a twentieth century chronicler has noted, that the tributes Muhammed Bello sent to Sokoto were so great that it was impossible to compute the value.⁴ Also Paul Staudinger who visited Kano in late 1885, observes that the largest tribute to the Caliph came from the 'ever submissive' ruler of Kano, even though the latter was also

1. Ibid., para. 54.

2. M. Johnson, 'The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa', in J.A.H., XI, 3, (1970), p. 343; see also M. Hiskett, 'Materials Relating to the cowry currency of the Western Sudan', in B.O.A.S., XXIX, 1966.

3. D. M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 124.

4. Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir (c. 1906 - 08), f. 7.

the most powerful of all Sokoto's vassals.¹ Still yet a later European traveller to Kano, C.H. Robinson, estimates that the average annual tribute to Sokoto by Muhammed Bello amounted to a hundred horses, fifteen thousand tobes of various patterns, ten thousand turbans and several miscellaneous articles.²

It is thus obvious that Muhammed Bello's policy was one of strict submission to Sokoto.³ And most certainly what was happening was that Bello was doing all he could to curry favour at Sokoto because he knew he was unpopular at home. This policy of currying favour at Sokoto seems to have been very unpopular in Kano. When coupled with the ruler's other measures including his adoption of a policy of aggrandizement for himself and children, we can appreciate why large segments of the society were alienated. And this despite the internal peace and effective government which Bello was able to maintain. For example, during Muhammed Bello's reign, raids by the Ningawa into Kano territory were effectively resisted and Kano was able to mount successful counter measures.⁴ Bello also rebuilt the town of Tudun Wada (seventy five miles south of Kano) which had been destroyed by the Ningawa during the reign of Abdullahi.⁵ Muhammed Bello's successful containment of the Ningawa contrasted

1. Paul Staudinger, Im Herzen der Haussa Lander, (Berlin, 1889), cited by Mrs. J. E. Moody in 'Paul Staudinger: an early European traveller to Kano', Kano Studies, 3, (1967), p. 49.

2. C. H. Robinson, Hausaland (London, 1896), p. 105.

3. D. M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 124, R. A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, (London, 1971), p. 82.

4. Kano Provincial Office, Gwaram District Note Book.

5. Kano Provincial Office, Tudun Wada District Note Book.

sharply with the failure of the contemporary emir of Zaria, Sambo (1881 - 90) to mount any effective resistance against them.¹

Yet another aspect of Muhammed Bello's policy was his determination to keep in check the palace slaves (H. cucanawa). We need recall that the ruler's centralizing measures have greatly enhanced their position in relation to that of others involved in the emirate administration. Indeed, it is said that the slaves had already grown excessively powerful during the reign of Abdullahi.² Muhammed Bello's policies had the effect of further increasing their powers but he seems to have been at the same time determined to maintain constitutional subordination to the throne. Consequently, he directed all the leading cucanawa to divorce their free-born wives and retain as wives only women of slave descent like themselves.³ The cucanawa were resentful of this royal decree, for marrying free-born women had the effect of boosting their social status and making them almost indistinguishable from the non-slave dignitaries in the emirate. Apparently some of the important cucanawa tried to resist the ruler's directives, but Muhammed Bello acted firmly. One of the titled cucanawa, Salama Barka, is said to have been so outspoken that he was deprived of his title. It is also narrated that two other slave dignitaries, the Jakadan Garko ⁿDayakumatu and the Lifidi Yiga-Allah, were so incensed by the emir's directive that when ^{on} one occasion they accompanied him on a visit to Sokoto, they complained to the

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1. See M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p.185-87; D.M.Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p.172; cf. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 111.
 2. Palmer, op. cit., p. 131; cf. S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, p. 202.
 3. Alhaji Mai Sango, interview, Kano 4/4/1970; Mallam Ali Nakabara, interview Kano; Yahaya Sarkin Gwarmai, interview 18/2/1970; Dorayi Babba, interview, Dorayi 1972.

Sultan at the treatment the cucanawa were receiving at the hands of Muhammed Bello. Even though the Sultan did not take up the matter, the emir came to know about it and decided to make an example of the two culprits. Yiga-Allah committed suicide to avoid what could only have been a horrible end. The second man, Dankumatu, was beheaded and mutilated on the return of the emir to Kano. Muhammed Bello's unpredictable and arbitrary use of his royal prerogatives in this respect may look cruel but it was probably in line with the policies of contemporary Muslim rulers aiming at greater political centralization, namely increased reliance on slave officials so long as the latter were dependent on the ruler.¹ In this way the increased powers of the slave bureaucracy would tend to enhance the political aims of the state.

Just as for political reasons Muhammed Bello found it necessary to deal severely with his slave officials, he also turned out of office several sarakuna of the outlying towns. In this regard, it is reported that Suleiman, a son of a late sarkin Gwaram, usurped the chieftaincy in c. 1887 but popular pressure from below persuaded the emir to turn him out of office.² One year later in about 1888 the emir dismissed another sarkin Gwaram, Ado, for alleged insubordination. At about the same time the emir dismissed the sarkin Tudun Wada, Halilu Tsigi, for alleged oppression and extortion.³ Further in c. 1891 Muhammed Bello is reported to have dismissed and disgraced

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1. Cf. A.G.B. and H.J. Fisher, Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa (London, 1970), p. 137, 140 -
 2. Kano Provincial Office, Gwaram District Note Book; cf. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p. 82; D. M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 181.
 3. Kano Provincial Office, Tudun Wada District Note Book.

the Sarkin Kiru for embezzlement of the tax revenue paid by the market-gardeners under his jurisdiction.³ Similarly, the emir deposed the chief of Waire and expelled him from the emirate. This chief was also Sarkin Yaki of Kano and the most successful commander in resisting Maradi raids into the emirate during the 1880's. Because of his achievements, the Sultan persuaded the emir of Katsina to appoint the exiled Kano chief as Sarkin Ruma in Katsina.¹

Muhammed Bello's argument was that the chief, Danwaire, had become overmighty but clearly Sokoto saw the uses of a man who had proved successful against one of the traditional enemies of the Caliphate.

In view of Muhammed Bello's piety and generosity, qualities which seem to contradict his subsequent actions against his relatives and his officials, we need to view his policies in perspective.

As his predecessor Abdullahi (1855 - 82) had had a long reign, it seems that on Bello's accession practically all the offices of state were monopolised by Abdullahi's partisans and clients. If therefore Bello did not act in the way he did to create places for his own nominees, he stood in danger of remaining a prisoner in the hands of his enemies or at least officials on whose loyalty he could not rely. Thus his actions were dictated by political reasons rather than his dislike of the individual officials. However, overall the policies of the emir alienated several powerful interest groups in Kano. Their alienation and Sokoto's imposition of Muhammed Bello's son, Muhammed Tukur, as ruler over Kano following the former's death in 1893 soon plunged the emirate into civil war.

1. Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 59 - 60.

When Muhammed Bello died on 25th November, 1893,¹ the Vizier of Sokoto, Muhammed Bukhari, was at Kano apparently on his way eastwards to Katagum and Misau emirates.² Bukhari records what happened subsequent to his arrival in Kano:

When I desired to leave (Kano, after about a week's stay) I went to Emir of Kano to take leave of him but I found him in a condition which made it impossible owing to the seriousness of his illness. I returned to my lodging to await his recovery. After a day God took his life (God determined that he should die of his illness). I thus sent my messenger to the Amir-al-mumin so that he might know that the Emir of Kano had died. When my messenger reached him he sent him back to me, instructing me to install Tukur over Kano. I carried out his decision and so installed Tukur, as ruler of Kano, in my lodging. 3.

Muhammed Tukur had been Galadima of Kano since soon after the accession of his father in 1882. In that capacity he had led the Kano contingent during Sokoto's abortive expedition against Argungu c. 1892 and by his zeal had won the esteem of the then Sultan, Abdurrahman (1891 - 1902).⁴ One Kano source implies that because of the Kano contingent's zeal in that disastrous encounter, a brother of Tukur, Ciroma Abubakar, got killed.⁵ It is even said that the bravery of Muhammed Tukur saved the Sultan's life and that the latter was so impressed that he promised Tukur the emirship of Kano

1. NAK/NIGPROF 31/42 - Usman dan Fodio, Umdat al-ubbad, (cited in Last, 'A Solution to the Dynastic Chronology of Nineteenth Century Zaria and Kano', in J.H.S.N. III, 3, 1966, p. 468).
2. Bukhari, Kitab fi-ma jara baini wa-bain Amir Hadejia wa Yusuf (the Tukur Revolt, trans. R.A. Adeleye in possession of J.E. Lavers), f.1; Alhaji Junaidu, Tarihin Fulani (Zaria, 1957), p. 62; cf. V.N. Low, op. cit., p. 309.
3. Bukhari, op. cit., f.1.
4. F. Edgar, Littafi Na tatsuniyoyi na Hausa, vol. II, (Belfast, 1912), p. 337-40.
5. Labarun Hausawa da Makwabtansu, II, (Zaria, 1933), 65-66.

in the event of his father's demise.¹ Such an undertaking by the Sultan was, per se, unconstitutional and in the circumstances of the time extremely undiplomatic and unstatesmanlike. Sultan Abdurrahman's instruction to Vizier Bukhari to appoint Tukur as ruler over Kano was unconstitutional because the custom was for the Kano electors to submit a list of the suitable candidates to Sokoto whenever the eligible princes exceed one as in 1893. From among these the Sultan would then select the most suitable man after consultations with the Vizier² and probably other Sokoto officials. In fact this routine had been followed in 1819 on the death of the first Fulani ruler of Kano and more recently in 1882 when Muhammed Bello had been chosen as emir instead of ex-Galadima Yusufu.

Similarly, the Sultan's rash decision was undiplomatic because the time coincided with increased threats to the Sokoto Caliphate from its traditional and new enemies. The Kebbawa of Argungu were still unsubdued, the Kingdoms of Damagaram and Maradi on the northern borders were becoming ever more daring in their forays into the Caliphate, Rabeh was contemplating an advance into the eastern marches of the Caliphate, and the Royal Niger Company was flexing its muscles to assert its undefined political rights in the south.³

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1. Ibid., see also S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, op. cit., p. 203; H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p. 222; Dokaji, op.cit., p.61.
 2. According to J. Thomson, who travelled to Sokoto in the 1880's, the Vizier was so important that the Sultan could decide nothing without his approval, see J. Thomson, "Up the Niger to the Central Sudan", in Good Words, 27 (1886), p. 327.
 3. Cf. H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p. 223; cf. J.H. Fremantle, 'History of the region comprising the Katagum Division of Kano Province', in J.A.S., X - XI F.O./Royal Niger Territories Conf. 223, Royal Niger Company to Foreign Office, 21/8/1898.

These factors would seem to call for caution on the part of the Sultan because, faced by external threats, the Caliphate could ill-afford an internal disruption. In any case justice demanded that the succession in Kano be carefully weighed. For of the two leading princes eligible for the throne, Yusufu's claims would seem to have been the stronger. In 1893 Yusufu is said to have been 56 years old and certainly older than Muhammed Tukur by at least ten years. Further Yusufu had held public office since 1860 when he became Ciroma of Kano; from 1870 to 1877 he was Galadima, an office which made him second in precedence to his father Abdullahi who was then emir.¹ Muhammed Tukur, on the other hand, was not yet forty years old in 1893 and his experience in public affairs dated only from soon after the accession of his father in 1882.² Since age and experience in public office would seem to have been crucial in determining eligibility for the emirship, it was obviously foolish of the Sultan to have ignored the points, more especially as these very factors had helped Abdurrahman himself in his bid for the most exalted position in the Caliphate.³ In addition to his other qualifications, Yusufu is also reputed to have been the most charismatic and popular scion ever of the Fulani ruling lineage of Kano.⁴ Therefore for Sultan Abdurrahman to ignore all the danger signals is almost unbelievable. This point is even more obvious when we take into account the fact that in 1893

1. Kano Provincial Office, Dawakin Kudu District Note Book, note on the Galadimomi (pl.) of Kano; also W.F. Gowers, Gazetter of Kano Province (London, 1921), p. 13.

2. Information from Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview, Kano 10/6/1970.

3. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 127, cf. F. Edgar, Littafi na Tatsuniyoyi na Hausa, I, p. 212-213, II, p. 341-2; II, p.360-1; II, p. 366-7; H.A.S. Johnston, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

4. Dokaji, *op. cit.*, p. 63, 76; M.U. Adamu, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Yusufu had something like 50 brothers, two of them titled hakimai, who are said to have been not only married adults but in addition were practised horsemen and therefore qualified warrior-leaders.¹ In fact it has been observed that Yusufu's brothers and their supporters were determined to make Yusufu ruler over Kano at any cost and that their attitude made a civil war more than a probability if his claims were passed over.² In view of these well-known factors, it must be inferred that Bukhari warned Sultan Abdurrahman of the danger of civil war erupting in Kano in the event of Tukur being installed as emir.

But whatever his own personal misgivings, Bukhari had no room for manouvre once he had received the Sultan's specific instructions to install Tukur as ruler of Kano. As it was at least twelve days' journey on horseback in either direction between Kano and Sokoto, Bukhari could not have received the Sultan's instruction before late December, 1893. Reportedly the Sultan's letter containing the instructions reached Bukhari on a Thursday, probably the 28th December, 1893. By this account,³ which asserts that Tukur was installed on the next day following the receipt of Abdurrahman's message, the investiture took place on Friday 29th December, 1893 (20 Juma da II, 1311 A.H.). Aware of the gravity of the situation and the unpopularity of Tukur's selection, Bukhari was forced to install the latter surreptitiously and present a fait accompli.⁴

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1. Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview, Kano, 10/6/1970; Wazirin Kofa Adamu, interview, Kano, 2/6/1970.
 2. H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p. 222; Dokaji, op. cit., p. 62; Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 66.
 3. Account based on interviews with Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, Baba Jibir, Ali Nakabara, and Ahonadu Tasawa.
 4. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135; R.A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 97-98; H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p. 222.

Since Sultan Abdurrahman's unilateral selection of Tukur had made irrelevant a meeting of the Kano electors,¹ the Vizier decided to consult only the Madaki Ibrahim Malam, who was the most senior among the electors in terms of precedence, age and experience.² When the Madaki reached Bukhari's lodgings, the letter containing Abdurrahman's instructions was read by the Vizier and Ibrahim was then asked whether or not the other electors should be consulted. Ibrahim saw no point in convening a meeting of the electors as the issue had already been decided by the Caliph himself.

The Madaki therefore advised Bukhari to summon Muhammadu Tukur together with the most influential slave hakimai, namely Shamaki Sa'ad, Dan Rimi Yahaya and Salama Barde.³ Before all four were convoked before the Vizier at his lodgings, Ibrahim Malam revealed to Bukhari how best to go about investing Tukur with the emirship, more especially if Tukur's investiture was to stand any chance of being voluntarily acquiesced in. Ibrahim particularly emphasised the necessity of enrolling the co-operation of these slave officials since they collectively managed and controlled the emir's household (Fada), the armouries and horses directly under the control of the ruler, and the fortress towns (H. ribadi) scattered throughout the

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1. The Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta, and Sarkin Bai.
 2. By 1893 Ibrahim Malam, a grandson of Ibrahim Dabo (emir 1819 - 46), had been Madaki for some seventeen years. In the ensuing conflict he sided with emir Tukur; he was captured by the Yusufawa during their final siege and capture of Kano c. September, 1894, and was then deprived of his title but his life was spared at the request of his brother Kwairanga who succeeded to the title - see Dawakin Tofa District Note Book; cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135.
 3. Information based on interviews with Adamu Wamban Sankira, Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, Baba Jibir, and Alhaji Mai Zaure (Wakilin Rafuka). See, also, Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 66; Dokaji, op.cit., p.62.

emirate but especially along the borders. In short by virtue of the military and economic assets which these slave hakimai controlled through their official lieutenants, by 1893 it had become virtually impossible to effect any important measure without their concurrence. This was a new state of affairs attributable to the centralizing policies of Muhammed Bello, more especially his taxation re-organization which enhanced the power and influence of the cucanawa. This appears to have been the situation despite Muhammed Bello's insistence on constitutional subordination to the throne by all functionaries be they slave or free-born.

Following Madaki Ibrahim Malam's advice, Vizier Bukhari acted as follows: when Galadima Muhammadu Tukur and the three most important slave hakimai were gathered before him, he addressed himself to the royal slaves. Pointing at Tukur, he told the latter that he (Tukur) was their new master. And it is said that there was no hesitation or argument as it was unthinkable for these slave dignitaries to question the judgement or instruction of the Amir-al-mumin and his Vizier.¹ In the circumstances Bukhari formally turbaned Tukur and invested him with the symbols of preferment - a sword and a knife. The slave officials then performed the bay'a (homage) and Muhammed Tukur formally became the sixth Fulani emir of Kano. The investiture took place at the Vizier's official residence in Kano (Sabon gida) in the presence of only the officials named and probably their retainers.²

1. Ibid.

2. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 62; Bukhari, op. cit. A number of traditions claim that Tukur was invested at the Kano Central Mosque but this is unlikely in view of what Bukhari himself has written.

Subsequent to these private rituals, the slave hakimai set about making the 'glad' tidings known within Kano city. In as short a time as was possible, the royal praise-singers were summoned and the royal drums (H. tambura) were sounded to usher in the new reign. Here, we need recall that it is inconceivable that a new reign could begin in fact without the special royal drums being sounded.¹ Once these formalities commenced, Tukur was mounted on his horse and escorted to the royal palace. Simultaneously, it is recalled, the then leading woman praise-singer of royalty (H. Zabiya), burst into a typically provocative song in praise of the late emir Muhammed Bello and his son and successor Muhammed Tukur. This zabiya, a certain Yar Kankana, is said to have alluded to the 'victory' of the few over the many. By this she meant that the four living sons² of late emir Muhammed Bello had vanquished the numerous sons of Abdullahi b. Ibrahim (1855 - 82).³ Yar Kankana levelled many insults at the latter, adding that they should therefore feel ashamed of themselves. To make matters worse reportedly it was via such public, though indirect, insults that ex-Galadima Yusufu, his brothers and their supporters came to learn of the surreptitious investiture of Tukur⁴

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1. Account of Alhaji Inuwa dan Indo, Baba Jibir, and Musa Sarkin Kofan Kabuga. Cf. N.A.K./Kadcaptory 2 - Edgar, Labarin Kano, p. (cited in Adeleye, Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p.98).
 2. These were the newly installed emir Muhammed Tukur and his brothers Turaki Zakari, Ciroma Umaru, and Sarkin Shanu Datti - see Dokaji, op. cit., p.61. The fifth of these brothers, Ciroma Abubakar, had been killed in the abortive Sokoto expedition against Argungu c. 1892.
 3. Dokaji (op. cit., p. 58) lists 28 sons of Abdullahi as having held important public offices but in fact some of the names, with variations, are duplicated and the same individuals did hold different offices at different times. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 134, fn.

as ruler of Kano. Moreover as there was no formal convocation of the electoral council, their sense of aggrievement and outrage knew no bounds. Many of Yusufu's brothers and followers instinctively assumed that Vizier Bukhari had personally favoured the rival section of the royal lineage. There was serious consideration of an attack on Bukhari's lodgings, but this idea was dropped as it would not have undone the damage.¹ In any case, as Yusufu's faction must have known, the role of praise-singers such as Yar Kankana in poisoning the relations between otherwise peaceful rivals for public office is proverbial in Hausaland and precipitate reaction on account of their utterances would have been undignified. So a different strategy had to be adopted.

When news of Muhammed Tukur's investiture as ruler over Kano began to spread throughout the metropolis, ex-Galadima Yusufu and his faction had to decide on an immediate course of action. Only two alternatives lay before them, either to acquiesce in the unconstitutional preferment of Tukur, or to leave the city en masse, which would be tantamount to rebellion and make a civil war inevitable. But pending a decision one way or the other on that fateful day, two of Yusufu's brothers who had managed to retain their titles, though divested of most of their customary privileges, did perform the bay'a to the new ruler.² One of these, Dan Buram Mamman Mailafiya, returned immediately to his house to await developments. The other, Wambai Shehu, went to Vizier Bukhari's lodgings as soon as he had performed the bay'a to Tukur. There, Shehu is reported to have told Bukhari that in view of what had just occurred, namely the irregular

1. Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview Kano 12/6/1970.

2. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 66.

enthronement of Tukur, he no longer intended to continue as Wambai. After all, he added, it was through the good offices of the Amir-al-mumin and the Vizier that he had been able to retain his title during the previous reign and by elevating Tukur to the throne Sokoto was throwing him and his brothers to the wolves. Thereupon Shehu renounced his title and then left for Yusufu's house, where on arrival he found almost all the other adult sons of Abdullahi gathered.¹ According to Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji (op.cit. p.62) Yusufu had in the meantime performed the bay'a to Tukur but this seems unlikely: Tukur's investiture was held in secrecy and Yusufu as a disrobed title-holder did not usually attend at court.

Once all the brothers of Yusufu and their leading henchmen were gathered, reportedly a very animated discussion took place and conflicting arguments were advanced by the princes. Yusufu himself, as leader of the faction, acted as umpire and did not try to swing the ultimate decision one way or the other. One authority would have us believe that Yusufu as a good Muslim was reluctant to side with the extremist view, urging an immediate exodus out of Kano, and that only the intervention of Yusufu's mother finally sealed the decision in favour of the exodus which plunged the emirate into civil war.² This is very doubtful, more especially if we recall the chequered history of successions in Muslim polities since the seventh century and the fact that Yusufu's Islamic faith and his fealty to his father did not prevent him from trying to enroll Sokoto's aid to compel the

1. Account of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, interview Bichi 9/8/1970; Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview Kano 12/6/1970.

2. NAK/Kadcaptory 2, F. Edgar, Labarin Kano (cited in R.A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy ---, p.98).

latter to abdicate C. 1877.¹ Most probably Yusufu's initial reluctance to endorse an extreme course which could only lead to civil war can be explained by the knowledge that four of his sisters were married to the new emir Tukur and his three younger brothers. Similarly at least two sisters of Tukur were married to Yusufu's younger brothers.² As such the complex relationships within the ruling lineage were bound to give cause for reflection. In the end, however, the threat of material destitution inherent by the threatened exclusion of their descent lineage from the emirship prevailed over any other consideration. Hence the decision to stage a mass exodus from the metropolis on the very day that Tukur's appointment was made public.³

As soon as the decision was taken to seek refuge outside Kano, ostensibly to escape extermination at the hands of Muhammed Tukur,⁴ a message went round the city calling upon all those who supported Yusufu's cause to pack their belongings and make for the southern city-gate of Dan Agundi preparatory for a mass exodus.⁵

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1. Kano Provincial Office, Dawakin Kudu District Note Book, note on the Galadimomi (pl.) of Kano; see also D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p.170.
 2. Accounts of Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, 12/6/1970; Ibrahim b. Muhammadu Lele, 10/1/1970.
 3. All my informants are emphatic that Yusufu and his faction left Kano on the day Tukur was turbanned. For contemporary and later allusions to this exodus, see F.O. 83/134, Goldie to Foreign Office, 20th April, 1894; Bukhari, op. cit. William Wallace, who was in Kano for a month in April-May, 1894, says nothing about the timing of the exodus in his very brief allusion to the civil war then raging - see his 'Notes on a Journey through the Sokoto empire and Borgu in 1894', in Geographical Journal, III, 8 (1896), p. 211. Similarly, C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 82 - 83, throws no light on the timing. See also Dokaji, op. cit., p. 62; Johnston, op. cit., p. 223.
 4. Dokaji, ibid., p. 62.
 5. Ibid.

Apparently, the new ruler Muhammed Tukur was so busy receiving the allegiance of other people that he was oblivious of what was afoot. Also, it is not unlikely that with Vizier Bukhari in the city, Tukur had to desist from any rash counter-measures. Therefore, while the drumming, singing and other festivities were taking place at the emir's residence, the Yusufawa (supporters of Yusufu) set about the preparations for quitting the city. Wives and children, clients (barori) and slaves, horses and weapons of all kinds were hurriedly readied for the journey. Thereafter the Yusufawa headed for the exit gate with Yusufu at the head of the gathering.

Yusufu's withdrawal from Kano city on the very day of his rival's installation was tantamount to his openly claiming the throne and was an act of rebellion in itself. For all practical purposes the civil war had commenced. It did not immediately occur to the Vizier Bukhari, apparently, that the dynastic succession was so fundamental to the Yusufawa that it was not negotiable, any more than it would have been for emir Tukur and his supporters. For Bukhari, in all honesty, thought he could persuade Yusufu and his faction to return to the city and accept Tukur as the legitimate ruler. As he recalls:

I sent to him (Yusufu) to return and my messenger met him at Gugil (Gogel) and he brought his reply to me. I also sent back my reply to him, my messenger coming upon him at Lajawa. I therefore sent to the Amir-al-mumin that he might know about the flight of Yusufu. 1

By the time the Vizier realised the gravity of the situation, it was too late to settle the issue by peaceful means. Whether or not Yusufu was so ambitious that he was prepared to plunge the emirate into a destructive civil war soon became irrelevant to the issues at stake. By withdrawing from the capital with his relations and

1. Bukhari, op. cit.

followers, Yusufu was not only challenging the legitimacy of Tukur's accession but also indirectly disputing Sokoto's moral authority to impose a ruler over Kano regardless of the wishes of the people or the interested groups. At stake was a long established tradition in Kano-Sokoto relations if not in fact a principle. This tradition, we need recall, empowered the electoral council of Kano, comprised of the titled heads of the four clans which helped in the conquest of the emirate, to nominate a candidate or candidates for the throne in the event of a vacancy. Up until 1893 Sokoto had respected this tradition. Sultan Abdurrahman's violation of this tradition was thus unfair to Yusufu personally and offended many people. On the other hand Sokoto could not retract without loss of face.

The installation of Tukur as emir posed a dilemma to many inhabitants of the emirate, more especially those with official positions at emirate or subordinate levels. The legality of their positions derived from the superior legitimacy of the Sokoto Caliphate.¹ This factor seems to explain the allegiance given to Tukur by all those who occupied important official positions in the emirate.² However in practically all cases a brother, cousin or nephew followed Yusufu and his brothers. This division in the loyalty of all office-holding families was undoubtedly a very wise precaution for which there are many historical parallels: whichever side emerged victorious, the offices and privileges of the respective families were bound to go to a member of the family in question and in that way that family would retain its position in the traditional hierarchy. The succession thus split the ruling families throughout

1. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 232-33; M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 73 - 77.

2. The Kano emirate District Note Books confirm this point, for the genealogies in them reveal a complete turn-over of title-holders as a result of the civil war. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135; Johnston, op.cit., p.223; see also NAK/SNP/6415/1909 - C.L. Temple, Kano Province Annual Report, Judicial Supplement, para.44.

the emirate.

Meanwhile on leaving Kano, the Yusufawa spent a night at Gogel (about seventeen miles south of Kano), then they travelled in a south-easterly direction via Lajawa and Hamdallahi arriving at Takai (47 miles south-east of Kano) on the fourth day.¹ There Yusufu established his main war camp and temporary capital. Reportedly, the then sarkin Takai Umaru dan Maisaje voluntarily surrendered to Yusufu more than sixty horses under his personal control, while those in Takai who were not prepared to take up the cause of Yusufu withdrew from the town led by the town's Imam.² It is significant that Yusufu selected Takai as his headquarters. His father Abdullahi (emir 1855 - 82) had established a major ribadi there for intercepting Ningi incursions into Kano; also Abdullahi had a major private estate in the vicinity of the town.³ Yusufu also did already have special associations with Takai. When he was first Ciroma and later Galadima of Kano in the period 1860 - 77 he had spent most of his time there organizing counter-raids against the Ningawa and co-ordinating Kano's resistance to Ningi raids.⁴ In short Yusufu made his reputation as a distinguished public figure while based in the town. This suggests that his assets in the form of slaves and farm-estates were sited in and around Takai, and it is likely that many who were loyal to him personally lived in the area to the east and south-

1. Cf. Junaidu, op.cit., p.62; Labarun HausawaII, p. 66; W.F.Gowers, op.cit., p.13.

2. Account of Adamu Wazirin Kofa.

3. See Palmer, op. cit., p. 130; Baikie, 'Notes on a journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Haussa', in J.R.G.S., 37, p.97.

4. Dawakin Kudu District Note Book (note on the Galadimomi of Kano).

east of the emirate capital. It was thus natural that Yusufu should seek to organize his rebellion from an area where he had a strong nucleus of supporters and private assets.

Yusufu also arrived at Takai with a large following of supporters and substantial quantities of military hardware. He is said to have already made provisions of fire-arms, bows and arrows, swords and an elite corps of Nupe gunners.¹ Yusufu also brought with him a band of expert and brave horsemen led by such daring warriors as Ardo Sule Dano. With such backing and powerful support, Yusufu was proclaimed 'emir' and he set about conferring the emirate's traditional sarautu on his adherents. Shehu (who had a few days earlier renounced his title of Wambai), as the most senior prince next to Yusufu, was appointed 'Galadima'. Another prince, Mamman Na-Kande was made 'Wambai', while Aliyu Babba (emir 1894 - 1903) was appointed 'Vizier' and chief scribe by virtue of his learning. Similarly Muhammed Abbas (emir 1903 - 19) was conferred the title of 'Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida' and Shehu Usman (emir 1919 - 26) was designated 'Dan Makwayo'. This pattern was followed in respect of all the titles existing in the emirate, with leading supporters from other than the royal family getting those titles which traditionally belonged to their lineages.² This redistribution of titles undoubtedly strengthened the resolve of Yusufu's supporters to carry on the struggle to the bitter end.

1. Information based on accounts of Dagin Wak, and Habibu b. Aliyu Babba. Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir (f.7) claims that Yusufu attracted much support to his cause by bribing people with horses and slaves.

2. Account based on unpublished notes and genealogies in the possession of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi.

With the routine of conferring official positions out of the way, the dissidents embarked on a successful policy which ultimately assured the success of their faction. After an unsuccessful attempt to take Kano city, Yusufu for a while contented himself with reducing such of the towns and villages to the east and south-east of Kano as were still unwilling to recognise his authority.¹ The strategy followed was one of sending un-armed couriers to town and village chiefs calling on them to submit peacefully while at the same time an armed party was in hiding in the vicinity. In the event of a negative response, the armed band would fall upon the unprepared defenders and capture the town or village on account of the element of surprise. These shock tactics were apparently very effective in intimidating many towns and several submitted to Yusufu as a result.² According to C.H. Robinson, obviously exaggerating, in this fashion Yusufu's warriors raided some 200 towns and villages which had previously given their allegiance to Tukur and then sold all the inhabitants into slavery.³ At any rate the strategy of the dissidents brought more and more of the outlying districts under their control.

Another strategy adopted by the Yusufawa entailed enrolling the aid of the North African trading community resident in Kano. Their aid was effectively used to procure fire-arms and horses - the most advanced fighting mediums in nineteenth century Hausaland. The role played by the North African factor in the civil war has been summarised:

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1. W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 13-14; Dokaji, op.cit., p. 62.
 2. Dokaji, ibid.
 3. C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 83.

...the Arabs in Kano were in sympathy with the rebels and knowing that they were ill-equipped they (secretly) sent them swords and other arms from their store-houses. Al-Haj Abande asked the Arab community to help him finance the rebels in memory of their patron (Abdullahi 1855-82), to repay good with good. In addition to the money and arms, Bornu (Asben) horses and food were collected. 1.

The North African merchants by virtue of their financial resources and international commercial contacts were instrumental in importing horses into Kano as well as a large proportion of the fire-arms. With the financial contribution of these merchants and recommendations to their contacts in Zinder, Yusufu designated Muhammed Abbas (emir 1903-19) to be in charge of purchases of these items. Aliyu Babba (emir 1894-1903) was the intermediary between the Arab merchants and Yusufu's headquarters at Takai. Similarly Shehu Usman (emir 1919-26) was entrusted with the task of negotiating an alliance with the kingdom of Ningi. In return for Ningi's military support, their ruler was promised a proportion of the war booty.² It seems that for a while at least, Yusufu had the diplomatic support of Ningi and Damagaram-Zinder. In fact at one stage Damagaram is reported to have invaded Kano from the north to divide the attention of Tukur.³ But the most valuable ally the Yusufawa obtained was the kingdom of Gumel, a warlike polity traditionally tributary to Bornu. It is said that the pretender Yusufu and the then Sarkin Gumel, Habu, were maternal cousins, their respective mothers being the children of an early nineteenth century chief of Sankara in north-eastern Kano emirate.⁴ This relationship,

1. M. U. Adamu, op.cit., p.45-46.

2. Alhaji Mai Zaure, Alhaji (Siyaku Nasarki, group interview Kano 21/4/1970. Also Wakin Makiyaya da Dam. Cf. M. U. Adamu, op.cit., p.46.

3. Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir, f.9.

4. Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview Kano 12/6/1970. Cf. Dokaji, op.cit., p. 62.

together with the prospect of sharing in the spoils, made Yusufu's request for military aid very attractive to Gumel's ruler.¹ As it were Gumel's aid proved very useful to the Yusufawa.

While Yusufu was busy consolidating his authority in the eastern and southern districts of the emirate and organizing his diplomatic and military alliances, emir Muhammed Tukur countered with what can only be termed timid measures in the long run.

A supporter of Tukur and early twentieth century chronicler has aptly described the main steps taken by Sokoto's nominee:

People were sent by Muhammed Tukur to defend Kano against Yusufu. Most of the southern districts followed Yusufu, and the emir sent Dan Sarai to Yarkibiya to defend it ... He directed the sarki of Dambatta to Garko for the same purpose. To Gano he sent his brother Ciroma Umaru. To Kogin Turaki he sent the chief of Zakiriya. The emir remained in the city, thinking out a way he could destroy the evil of Yusufu and his brothers. --- He was much perturbed because his village heads were annoyed with him, and refused to send him any help. They were, to wit, even attempting to make people desert him, and encouraging people to follow Yusufu. 2

This chronicler states in no uncertain terms that Tukur did not leave the capital and take to the battlefield himself. Similarly there is no doubt that Tukur had no grassroots support since even his own inherited minor chieftains, dagatai, were apparently encouraging everybody to desert his cause. The latter factor probably explains the emir's failure or refusal to leave the emirate capital for fear that everything would then be lost. With hardly any support outside

1. Cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 223-4; also Hadejia Divisional Office, Gumel Emirate Note Book.
2. Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir, f.9. See translation of extracts in J.N. Paden, The Influence of religious elites on community culture and political integration in Kano, Nigeria (unpublished Harvard Ph. D. thesis, 1968), p. 824-27.

the capital, Muhammed Tukur directed his attention to maintaining his authority in Kano city itself. An appointed though desperate ruler that he was, he seems to have therefore confined his zeal to wreaking vengeance on all those on whose loyalty he could not rely. Tukur's brutal strategy in this regard has been described by William Wallace who was in Kano from 21st April to 20th May, 1894, at the height of the conflict:

Every few days batches of prisoners were butchered in the market-place with the customary indignities to the dead, parts of the bodies being utilized as medicines and for poisoning arrows, and the remains left to the dogs and vultures. Numbers of women were strangled simply because they belonged to the rebel party without the town. 1

In fact some sources would have us believe that all prisoners taken by Muhammed Tukur's supporters were executed as pagans on the order of the Amir-al-mumin and the emir.² On one single occasion Tukur is said to have ordered the execution of hundreds of suspected supporters of Yusufu.³ Tukur apparently selected his victims at random since all those who held no official positions and were not clients or slaves of titled dignitaries, as well as women, were never called upon to fight. As such among those executed as pagans must be included a great many who were innocent victims due to their associations out of reach. Such wanton destruction of lives obviously contributed in no small measure to Tukur's lack of support everywhere in the emirate. Hence C.H. Robinson, who visited and stayed in

1. W. Wallace, op. cit., p. 211.

2. Junaidu, op. cit., p. 65; Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 67; D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135ff; R.A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy, passim; Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir, f.12.

3. Information based on interviews with Baba Jibin and Alhaji Mai Sango. E.J. Arnett, History of Sokoto (attached to ed. Infakul Maisur, 1928), p. 34, gives a figure of 400 captives on that occasion.

Kano between December 1894 and March 1895, attributes Muhammed Tukur's ultimate defeat to his great cruelty and misgovernment which created the greatest possible dissatisfaction among the people.¹ Lest it be supposed, however, that the Yusufawa were paragons of virtue and tolerance, we need to emphasise that they were equally brutal to those they regarded as their opponents. In a nutshell both sides resorted to extreme measures and the devastation caused by the civil war was indeed great and resulted in a shortage of food and the cessation of almost all trade.² Not surprisingly the war has been described as a disaster³ and all the ruling families of the emirate had casualties in killed and wounded or those who were turned out of their official positions.

With the civil war raging in Kano Sultan Abdurrahman had to take what action he could in support of his nominee Tukur. Letters were sent to the neighbouring emirs in an attempt to isolate Yusufu. One such letter, from Vizier Bukhari to emir Usman of Zaria, forbade the latter to have any communication whatever with Yusufu.⁴ Similarly Bukhari wrote to the emir of Hadejia, north-east of Kano, asking him to dissuade or prevent Yusufu from his acts of oppression and injustice.⁵ The emir of Hadejia, Muhammadu (c.1885 - 1906)

1. C. H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 82 - 83.

2. W. Wallace, op. cit., p. 211, 214; W.F. Gowers, op. cit., p.14; S.J. Hogben, The Muhammedan emirates of Nigeria, (London, 1930), p. 78; H.A.S. Johnston, op. cit., p.222-27.

3. O. Temple (ed.C.L. Temple), Notes on the tribes, provinces, emirates and states of the northern provinces of Nigeria (Lagos, 1922), p.468.

4. Translation of the letter is in D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p.198.

5. N.A.K./SOKPROF - Box 25/2, letter no. 13, and N.A.K./G.O.K./Kadcap - Box 25, letter no. 25.

appears to have been very sympathetic to Yusufu. Apparently in an attempt to dissuade Muhammadu from giving armed support to Yusufu, Bukhari himself travelled to Hadejia where a meeting took place between him, Muhammadu and Yusufu. At that meeting the emir of Hadejia is reported to have requested the Vizier to install Yusufu as ruler over Kano but Bukhari refused, saying that he had been ordered by the Amir-al-mumin to instal Tukur and this he had done. The meeting was inconclusive and in the end emir Muhammadu agreed to have one of his messengers go with the Vizier's to the Sultan.¹ Subsequent to that meeting the emir of Hadejia seems to have adopted a policy of neutrality as he did not wish to risk a breach with Sokoto. It is also reported that Muhammadu settled for a policy of neutrality because of Yusufu's alliance with Gumel which had been at war with Hadejia more or less continuously throughout the nineteenth century.² But while withdrawing his seemingly enthusiastic support for Yusufu's cause, the Hadejia ruler did not co-operate with the Vizier in any scheme to crush the Yusufawa rebellion. Sokoto had no standing army to enforce the Sultan's decision and relied on the emirs in such matters. And since Abdurrahman's appointment of Tukur was based on personal preference and was therefore of doubtful justice, the war was fought to its logical conclusion, with none of the emirates neighbouring Kano showing any sympathy to the Sultan's intention to keep Tukur as ruler over Kano.³

1. Bukhari, op. cit., f. 4-5; Junaidu, op.cit., p. 62-67; cf. V.Low, The Border States, p. 309-311.

2. Cf. Johnston, op.cit., p.223-4; Dutse District Note Book.

3. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 134; V.Low, The Border States, p. 310.

Yusufu, on parting from the Vizier and emir Muhammadu of Hadejia, apparently had a meeting with the sarkin Gumel on the Kano-Gumel marches. Reportedly they agreed that the next onslaught on Kano would be a joint venture in which the Yusufawa and Gumel, contingents would participate. Soon after, moreover, a joint Gumel-Yusufawa contingent captured the town of Dabi (fifty miles north-north-east of Kano). After that victory, Yusufu marched towards Takai, from where final preparations for the capture of Kano would be made and word sent to sarkin Gumel to join the Yusufawa before Kano. On the way to Takai Yusufu and his followers had to pass near Gaya (forty miles east of Kano) which was then the most important town next to Kano city.¹ On reaching the vicinity of the town, Yusufu sent a message to sarkin Gaya, Ibrahim Dabo, calling on him to submit. Ibrahim reportedly not only refused to accept the call but heaped abuse at Yusufu's messenger and made preparations to resist the entry of the Yusufawa into the town. Subsequent to that rebuff Yusufu's followers, aided by a Gumel contingent led by a later sarkin Gumel, Ahmadu, besieged Gaya and after very severe fighting managed to gain entry into the fortified town. On entering Gaya, the Yusufawa and their Gumel allies burnt down many houses. Similarly a large number of adult males were summarily executed, more especially those who were suspected of offering the most resistance in the recent fighting. Further it is reported that the Gumalawa (people of Gumel) enslaved many women and children to the great dismay of the Yusufawa. Meanwhile Sarkin Gaya Ibrahim Dabo and all those who managed to escape from the town fled in confusion towards Kano. The capture of Gaya was the turning point in the civil

1. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1904, p. 32.

war. After its capture most of the emirate's outlying districts and major fortress-towns tended to fall in line behind the dissidents. In effect a majority of the emirate's 170 walled towns¹ withdrew their support from Tukur and instead submitted to Yusufu and his faction. From this time onwards the victory of the Yusufawa was more or less assured.

By the time Gaya was captured and the tide turned decisively in favour of the dissidents, however, Yusufu himself was critically ill.² It is reported that he was suffering from piles (H. basir) and that he did not play an active part in the siege of the town. Reportedly one day after the capture of the town, the war loot was shared and the Gumel contingent led by Ahmadu (emir 1894-1915) returned to their country to await the signal for the final onslaught on Kano city. Yusufu on the other hand made for Garko (15 miles south-east of Kano) en route for Takai his temporary headquarters. At Garko, however, Yusufu died. His death is said to have been on Sunday 2nd Safar 1312 A.H. or 5th August, 1894.³ The death of Yusufu gave rise to a crisis for his followers: a leader had to be chosen in the shortest possible time and such a man must be able to inspire the faction to carry on the struggle, otherwise the tide of war may turn in favour of the other side.

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1. Lugard, ibid. According to Dokeji (op.cit. p. 63) the fall of Gaya demoralised Tukur's supporters.
 2. Cf. Dokaji, op.cit., p. 63.
 3. The Islamic and Christian dates have been correlated by using Cattenoz, Tables de Concordance des eres chretiennes et Hegirienne (Casablanca, 1952); cf. D.M. Last, J.H.S.N., III, 3 (1966), p.468. My source for this information is 'the memoirs of Aliyu Babba (emir 1894-1903) as retold by his son and confidant Habibu' - see bibliographical section for a note on this. See also Junaidu, op.cit., p. 66f.

A number of authorities have stated or implied that on his death-bed Yusufu enjoined his followers to accept Aliyu Babba (1894 - 1903) as his successor because of the latter's maternal relationship with the Sokoto ruling family.¹ According to this version, since Aliyu was a great-grandson of Sultan Muhammed Bello (1817 - 37), his taking over the leadership of the Yusufawa would make it easier for Sokoto to forgive the dissidents in the event of their imminent victory. Such a plausible interpretation, however, neglects at least two important factors. In 1894 the Yusufawa could not have been unaware of the fact that Sokoto simply did not have the military capacity to enforce its will on Kano, more especially as all the emirs were aware of the injustice of Sultan Abdurrahman's stand. Secondly, even if Yusufu had been an emir de jure, it was not customary for a ruler in the Muslim polities to nominate his successor. After all the majority of the Yusufawa had been fighting against just such an imposition from above, without regard to precedent and the wishes of the powerful interest groups. So a different explanation has to be sought for the emergence of Aliyu Babba as leader of the faction and eventual ruler of all Kano.

When Yusufu died at Garko on 5th August, 1894, the leading royal slaves (H. cucanawa) who had supported the faction first informed Aliyu of the occurrence.² Aliyu, as 'vizier' and 'magatakarda', had been closest to Yusufu among the sons of Abdullahi. When informed of Yusufu's death, Aliyu is said to have taken immediate charge of the former's household. Apparently,

1. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 135-36; H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p. 224; Alhaji Abubakar Dokaji, op. cit., p. 63; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p.

2. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 63.

while some of the courtiers dug a grave, two mallamai were designated to perform the burial prayer (H. jana'iza) for Yusufu. The mallamai in question are reported to have been Dabo son of Galadiman Karaye (later made sarkin Karaye) and Isma'ila who was later appointed Chief Imam of Kano by Aliyu. With the body of Yusufu quietly buried, Aliyu then set in motion the machinery for selecting a new leader for the faction. In accordance with normal emirate practice, the leading representatives of the non-royal clans were summoned. From the Yolawa clan Aliyu called Kwairanga and Jodi, respectively brother and son of a mid-nineteenth century Madaki of Kano. From among the Jobawa there came ex-Madakin Makama Hamza. From the Dambazawa clan Aliyu summoned Abdussalami, son of an earlier Galadiman Sarkin Bai. No representative, however, seems to have been summoned from amongst the Daneji clan, most probably because none was recognized as their 'leader'. But with four dignitaries already assembled, the numerical requirement was satisfied.

In the presence of the leading cucanawa and other warriors, backbone of the fighting capacity of the Yusufawa, Aliyu asked the four dignitaries to nominate a new 'emir'. Abdussalami, being the oldest of the four, spoke first and said there could be nobody but Aliyu Babba himself. The three others reportedly and unanimously agreed with this judgement. Aliyu thereafter seated himself on the improvised throne, hitherto used by Yusufu. The assembled chiefs and warriors are then said to have performed the bay'a to the new leader.¹

1. This paragraph and the next are based largely on the 'memoirs of Aliyu Babba as retold by his son Habibu'. Complementary details were also provided by Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi, Alhaji Mai Zaure, Alhaji Mai Sango, Musa Tudun Wada, Mallam Na'adinga, and Bako Namulki.

Once Yusufu's mantle had been conferred formally on him, Aliyu Babba lost no time in taking the requisite steps to consolidate his 'accession'. The leading cucanawa and their armed retainers were despatched to take the precautionary measure of closing the four gates of Garko and prevent anybody from leaving or entering the town. Reportedly Aliyu Babba gave instructions that anyone trying to contravene these measures was to be beheaded, even if the person involved was Aliyu's full brother Mamudu (galadima of Kano 1894 - 1903, and magajin gari 1922 - 24). With these security measures well in hand, Aliyu then sent for his brothers. As each arrived, he beheld the overwhelming display of force surrounding Yusufu's residence. On entering the audience chamber they found Aliyu seated on the 'throne' and they were curtly informed that Yusufu was dead and Aliyu had succeeded him. There was no alternative but to perform the bay'a and accept the fait accompli. This procedure suggests that Aliyu Babba rose to power on the basis of the overwhelming support he had among the cucanawa and the armed retainers.¹ Another dimension which should not be neglected was the fact that Aliyu, by virtue of his paternal and maternal lineages, naturally inspired obedience much more than any of his brothers could. And this despite Aliyu being then only 36 years of age² and his accession meant that the claims of several elder brothers were ignored. For example Muhammadu Abbas (emir 1903 - 19) and Shehu Usman (emir 1919 - 26) are said to have been older than Aliyu, but they lacked his charismatic

1. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 63.

2. W. F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 14. It is unlikely that Aliyu was up to 36 years old in 1894. Another source suggests that he could not have been over 30 at the time - see Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria, 1902, p.

qualities most probably because their respective mothers were non-Fulani concubines from the Fagam and Warji tribes of the eastern borderlands. At any rate Aliyu's 'election' dealt another blow to the normally accepted procedure of crowning a ruler, in the same way that the Sultan's imposition of Tukur had done.

Reportedly it took thirty-eight days between the 'accession' of Aliyu and his victorious entry into the emirate capital. This version would suggest that the entry of Aliyu into Kano and the flight of Tukur took place on Wednesday 12th September, 1894 (12 rabia I, 1312).¹ We need recall that in the successful siege of Kano a contingent from Gumel played a prominent role,² and the ruler of Gumel was subsequently rewarded with large gifts from Aliyu. The larges\$ is said to have included 200 slaves and an equal number of cattle as well as 100 bundles of cloth. Soon after the ruler of Gumel returned to his country, but Gumel more and more gravitated into Kano's sphere of influence.

On escaping from Kano with a number of followers, Tukur fled north-westwards via Bichi and finally took refuge at Kamri in Katsina emirate. Many of his supporters and their dependents who managed to straggle into the neighbourhood encamped in several nearby towns, notably Tafashiya, Karofin Yashi and Kafin Dangi. Aliyu Babba, instead of pursuing Tukur and eliminating any threat he might pose from his sanctuary, devoted himself to reorganizing and revitalizing

1. Habibu b. Aliyu Babba; cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 136 fn.; Muhammadu Amimu, Faid al-Qadir, f. 16 (cited in Last, J.H.S.N., III, 3, 1966, p. 469).

2. According to Dokaji (op. cit., p. 64) the Ningi kingdom also had a contingent in the besieging army. This is likely as Ningi seems to have obtained a number of the captives, see Kano State Jiya da yau, (Zaria, 1969), p. 38.

the internal administration of his newly won kingdom.¹ It is not unlikely that Aliyu's indifference towards the potential threat posed by Tukur² in exile meant that it was common knowledge that the cause of the latter was already lost once he had been expelled from Kano.² Henceforth he could be a nuisance but certainly no threat to the consolidation of Aliyu's authority in Kano emirate. Somehow it was only at this stage that the Amir-al-mumin decided to take action designed to restore Tukur to power. In pursuit of this hopeless aim Sokoto apparently tried, unsuccessfully, to enrol the armed support of the Caliphate's eastern emirs.³ Further, on Sultan Abdurrahman's orders, Vizier Bukhari travelled to Katsina to organize an expedition to restore Tukur to his throne. Sarkin Katsina sent a force in the direction of Kano, but it was routed by Aliyu, and soon after^{hand} the emir of Katsina returned to his capital to organize its defence against a threatened invasion by the Maradi kingdom.⁴ The situation thereby degenerated into a stalemate. No tangible armed support was forthcoming to restore Tukur's fortunes and he remained at Tafashiya. The Vizier Bukhari, reportedly forbidden to return to Sokoto until Tukur was restored in Kano, encamped at Kafin Dangi in Katsina territory and generally maintained contact with all parties. It is said that Bukhari, obviously in desperation, sent a letter to Aliyu Babba urging him to engineer the capture or death of Tukur so that everyone would be rid of an

1. Dokaji, ibid., p. 65.

2. Cf. D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 136.

3. Ibid.

4. Junaidu, op. cit., p. 67 - 68; cf. Johnston, op.cit., p.225.

intractable situation.¹ Similarly the Sarkin Gumel is said to have volunteered to attack Tukur's camp at Tafashiya, if Aliyu felt unable to do so due to the blood relationship between himself and the fugitive. Aliyu discouraged his ally from his planned action, apparently because it was feared that the Gumalawa would use the occasion to enslave many of the Kano fugitives (who were Muslims). Aliyu, however, had his hands full with the internal affairs of Kano and contented himself with occasional punitive raids against the Tukurawa encampments in Katsina territory. Such Kano raids resulted in the burning of Katsina towns such as Kamri, Karofin Yashi and several villages. Then in March, 1895 Aliyu finally led a force against Tukur's encampment. At a hard-fought battle near Tafashiya, Tukur was mortally wounded and captured. On the way to Kano he died of his wounds and the lack of food and water (it was the month of Ramadan) at the village of Gurin in Kano territory. The date of Tukur's death is given as 16th March, 1895 (19 Ramadan 1312 A.H.)² Thus ended the fighting phase of the civil war.

With Muhammed Tukur dead and Aliyu firmly in the saddle at Kano, many of the leading supporters of Tukur found their way to Sokoto so that Sultan Abdurrahman would do something about their destitution. Many of these had held official positions under Tukur before his expulsion from Kano and during his exile. Most prominent amongst these men were Makama Ilyasu, Sarkin Bai Muhammadu Bashari (Alhaji), Shamaki Sa'idu, Dan Rimi Yahaya, Sarkin Yaki Malam,

1. Information given in confidence by a member of the Kano ruling family (1970).
2. Muhammed Aminu, Faid al-Qadir, f.21; C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, pp.216-217 (cited in Last, J.H.S.N., III, 3, p.469).

Sarkin Gaya Ibrahim Dabo, Dan Makwayo Musdafa, Ciroma Muhammadu Lele (son of Tukur), and Turaki Zakari and Sarkin Shanu Ibrahim Datti (brothers of Tukur).¹ These men, of course, had forfeited their titles as a result of the defeat of their faction. As it would be an embarrassment to allow the settlement of these fugitives at Sokoto, Sultan Abdurrahman was compelled to arrange their return to Kano with an escort. So a deputation was detailed to accompany these men and their followers to Kano. This escort carried a message from the Amir-al-mumin to Aliyu Babba to the effect that all the fugitives should be given back their houses as far as possible and that their relations (who had sided with the victorious faction) should provide for them. Aliyu Babba, delighted by the Amir-al-mumin's action which implied recognition of his authority over Kano, was quite happy to comply with these requests.² Hence the supporters of Tukur were re-settled and provision made for their welfare. This episode was the final footnote of the Kano civil war and Aliyu Babba resumed his position of vassalage to the Amir-al-mumin. It made sense for Aliyu to return to the fold, for he could not expect to derive any advantage by seceding from the Caliphate. The latter step could lose him support from hitherto sympathetic neighbours, and membership of the Caliphate provided Kano with a vast trading hinterland which was at the basis of the prosperity of Aliyu and his subjects. Moreover the civil war had already severely damaged the Kano economy and disrupted its commercial links, and any action that might lead to a resumption of conflict had to be avoided.³

1. Information based on Habibu b. Aliyu Babba and an unpublished manuscript in the possession of Alhaji Abubakar Samusi; cf. Dokaji, op.cit., p. 67.

2. Cf. Dokaji, ibid., p. 67.

3. Cf. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 137.

However it is said that in consequence of the dispute with Sokoto, Aliyu Babba reduced the annual tribute to the Amir-al-mumin, but it should be recalled that the damage to Kano's economy and the excessive generosity of Muhammed Bello probably left Aliyu with no alternative.¹ Above all else the emirate was in need of a period of peace so that economic prosperity could return. In the event, internal peace and stability were restored but, unfortunately, Kano's troubles in terms of international relations were far from over.

International complications and the British conquest 1895 - 1903.

The disruption caused by the recent civil war exposed Kano to the raids of its enemies and the infringement of its territory by Hadejia. One of the long standing enemies was the kingdom of Maradi north of Katsina just beyond the borders of the Caliphate. This polity never missed an opportunity of raiding into and causing destruction in the Caliphate, especially in the Sokoto homelands, Katsina and Kano.² The internecine war within the Kano ruling families was therefore a golden opportunity for Maradi to raid into the emirate with impunity. Thus when in 1894 Wallace was near the town of Rogo in the west of the emirate, the mere rumour that a Maradi raid was imminent led to a general stampede of people from the outlying hamlets into the town. Wallace also observed that large tracts of territory in the Kano - Sokoto marches were completely uninhabited due to the terror inspired by Maradi.³ Real or threatened

1. J. A. Burdon, Notes on Tribute in Sokoto Province (7 March, 1904).

2. W. Wallace, 'Notes on a journey through the Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1894', Geographical Journal, III, 8, (1896), p. 215.

3. Ibid., p. 215.

raids by Maradi into Kano territory and elsewhere continued throughout the 1890's.¹ Similarly, Hadejia emirate, bordering Kano in the north-east, took advantage of Kano's vulnerability to seize a number of districts on the Kano-Hadejia marches. The origins of the conflict between Hadejia and Kano lay in the recently concluded civil war. We need recall that the emir of Hadejia Muhammadu was sympathetic to the cause of the Yusufawa. We have also seen how Muhammadu arranged a meeting between himself, Vizier Bukhari and Yusufu in an attempt to find a solution to the Kano accession dispute. It is reported that prior to that conference the emir of Hadejia and Yusufu had had another meeting at which the latter promised Muhammadu the fertile eastern Kano districts of Miga, Kwanda and Majiya in exchange for active support against Tukur. Muhammadu of Hadejia apparently accepted this offer and, despite his subsequent neutrality during the civil war, he claimed possession of these districts when Aliyu Babba came to power and was able to effect their occupation. The emir of Hadejia is said to have argued that he had provided diplomatic support to the Yusufawa, a service which validated his claims. Aliyu of Kano rejected the validity of Muhammadu's claims and from 1895 - 1901 the two rulers were at loggerheads. Several punitive raids were launched by both sides, but the crisis never attained the proportions of a major war.² For both emirates there was no advantage to be gained from full-scale hostilities.

1. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 195, D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, p. 137; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p.

2. J. H. Fremantle, op.cit., p. 62 - 63; W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 23; cf. V. Low, The Border States, p. 311-312; Glenny, History of Miga; see also Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 69 - 70.

Kano could ill-afford to have its trade routes to Bornu disrupted too much. Similarly, Hadejia was partly dependent on the trade passing along these routes. Nevertheless it was not until 1906, when Muhammadu of Hadejia was killed by the British, that Kano formally regained these lost territories.¹

But the greatest threat to Kano in the 1890's came from the kingdom of Damagaram. The immediate causes of the Damagaram-Kano wars in this period were both economic and political. Kano, weakened by the recent civil war, offered an attractive raiding ground to Damagaram forces. However, in view of the recent amity between the Yusufawa and Damagaram, it does not seem that the latter deliberately sought to attack Kano. The accession of Ahmadu to the throne of Gumel in 1896 unfortunately strained Kano - Damagaram relations. Ahmadu was the Gumel prince who had led his country's contingents in support of the Yusufawa during the Kano civil war. Quite probably Ahmadu's accession implied that Gumel would be drawn further into Kano's orbit, whereas up till then Gumel had been tributary to Damagaram which was in turn a vassal of Bornu. Apparently Damagaram sought to reiterate its overlordship over Gumel by reminding Ahmadu of the fact, but the Damagaram letter conveying its intentions was inadvertently read to Ahmadu in the presence of a messenger from Aliyu of Kano.² The emir of Kano reportedly retorted with an angry letter to Sarkin Damagaram. But even before the incident of the Gumel letter, Kano already had grievances against Damagaram. For the ruler of Damagaram not only gave refuge to former

1. Cf. Jahun District Note Book, p.1.

2. C.G.B. Gidley, 'Mantanfas - a study in oral tradition' in African Language Studies, VI (1965), p. 34; cf. Kano State jiya da yau, (Zaria, 1969), p.3; Dokaji, op.cit., p. 68.

Sarkin Shanun Kano Ibrahim Datti, but was seemingly favourably disposed towards his pretensions to the Kano throne. Ibrahim Datti, we need recall, was in the party of Kano exiles returned to Kano at Sokoto's behest at the conclusion of the civil war. Reportedly he had left Kano within a few months and sought refuge at Zinder, capital of Damagaram. There, Ibrahim seems to have canvassed for aid for his plans of regaining the Kano throne by his brother had recently lost.¹ The issue of Ibrahim's presence in Damagaram and the rancour caused by the Gumel letter more or less set Kano and Damagaram on a collision course. To the ruler of Damagaram the situation appeared particularly auspicious, for his strength had recently been reinforced by fugitives from the Bornu army which had been routed by Rabeh at the end of 1893.² Damagaram thus felt emboldened to raid into Kano.

The first Damagaram invasion of Kano occurred in 1896. Ahmadu Sarkin Damagaram led his troops south-westwards by-passing Sankara and Dabi until he reached Gezawa only nineteen miles north of Kano. He besieged and sacked this latter town and then advanced as far south as Fage, a settlement just outside the city walls. This deep penetration into Kano territory, however, over-extended the Damagaram forces. The Kano defenders took advantage of the situation and attacked at the weakest point. When the Damagarawa tried to re-group, one section ran into an ^mabush and the Kano fighters

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1. Account of Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview 12/6/1970; cf. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 68. Another former official, ex-Sarkin Bai Muhammadu Brashari, sought refuge at Kazaure where he lived and eventually died (n.d.) - Dambatta District Note Book.
 2. Y. Urvoy, Histoire de L'Empire de Bornou (Paris, 1947), p. 127 (cited in Johnston, op. cit., p. 226); E. Gentil, La Chute de l'Empire de Rabeh (Paris, 1922).

inflicted great execution on it. In the end the Damagarawa were routed, their earlier successes were reversed and they had to retreat homewards in great disorder.¹ The ruler of Damagaram was however determined to revenge this defeat.

After a period of recuperation, Damagaram took to the offensive once more in 1898. This time Ahmadu struck at Kano from the north-west in the vicinity of Dambatta (37 miles north-west of Kano) and Dawakin Tofa south of Dambatta. Emir Aliyu of Kano intercepted the invaders and a fierce battle was fought near Damargu. The Damagarawa reportedly had cannon and many more effective fire-arms. The volleys from these weapons created a stampede in the ranks of the Kano cavalry. The force from Damagaram exploited the confusion in the ranks of the Kano defenders and as a result the Kanawa were defeated with heavy slaughter. Several Kano dignitaries fell in this battle, notably the Barden Salama, Dan Rimi, Salama, Turakin Shamaki, Jakadan Garko, Jakadan Dal, and Makaman Shamaki.² Aliyu managed to escape only by disguising himself as a Tuareg. According to the Dawakin Tofa District Note Book, 'the water round the battlefield was so polluted that it could not be drunk for three months afterwards.' Subsequent to this rout the Damagaram invaders then made their way towards Kano city where Aliyu and his troops had retired. En route the Damagarawa are said to have collected much booty, especially cattle, and they burnt the villages of Dawanau and Tattarawa. A siege of Kano then ensued in which the Damagarawa are said to have

1. C.G.B. Gidley, op.cit., p. 34 - 35; Dokaji, op. cit., p. 68 - 69; Kano State jiya da yau, p. 1 - 11; cf. Johnston, op.cit., p.226.

2. Account based on Kano State jiya da yau, p. 8 - 16; Kano Provincial Office, Dawakin Tofa District Note Book; cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 226 - 227; C.G.B. Gidley, op. cit., p. 35 - 37.

had 4,000 horses.¹ However not long after the Damagaram forces raised their siege and retired to their country carrying along with them much booty.

It seems likely that the Damagarawa raised their siege of Kano in view of events threatening them nearer home. A few months earlier the Cazamajou expedition had entered Damagaram and, after a misunderstanding, there had occurred a fierce clash in which Damagaram lost 460 lives before annihilating the members of the French mission.² By the end of 1898, not only was the French Foureau-Lamy mission approaching Zinder (capital of Damagaram) but there were persistent rumours that a French force comprising 500 men had left Say on the Niger and was en route to Damagaram to avenge the extermination of the Cazamajou expedition.³ Similarly Rabeh, having consolidated his conquest of the Bornu homelands, was demanding the submission of Ahmadu of Damagaram and threatening drastic military action if this was not forthcoming.⁴ Ahmadu therefore had overriding reasons for returning home to plan how best to respond to these threats from so many quarters. Indeed the evidence suggests that by the end of 1898 Rabeh was threatening not only Damagaram but the eastern emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. According to Adamu Jakada, the messenger of the Royal Niger Company to Sokoto, at about the same

1. P.R.O./C.O.446/4/4938, Col. Willcocks to Secretary of State C.O., 26/1/1899. According to this letter, the second Damagaram attack on Kano occurred early in December, 1898.

2. P.R.O. - C.O. 446/3/21371, Lugard minute, 27/10/1898.

3. P.R.O. - C.O. 446/4/4938, Willcocks to C.O., 26/1/1899.

4. P.R.O. - F.O. 2/118, Goldie to Salisbury, 11/4/1899; Intelligence Report, Egypt, No. 39, June, 1895.

time a large body of Rabeh's horsemen were advancing towards Kano. This body of troops was sent ostensibly to keep the trade routes open, but their advance had created a commotion in the eastern marches. The authorities at Kano were so alarmed that the mere mention of Rabeh's name was an offence carrying the death penalty.¹ Fortunately for both Damagaram and Kano, Rabeh's attention was diverted to the east by the activities of the French under Emil Gentil along the river Shari.² Less fortunately for Damagaram, however, the French converged on the kingdom and Ahmadu and many of his fighters fell in battle against them during September, 1899.³ Henceforth Damagaram was subdued by the French and the loss of its independence meant it was no longer a threat to Kano.

French activity on the northern borders of the Caliphate was cause for apprehension in Kano and elsewhere. But in the event it was the British, advancing from the south, who eventually penetrated to the heart of Hausaland destroying the Sokoto Caliphate and imposing their colonial overrule over its dependencies including Kano. Direct European occupation came late to this region. The imperial advance into tropical Africa began in the late 1870's. Throughout the 1880's and 1890's the powers of Western Europe were engaged in an increasingly competitive 'scramble' for territory all over the continent. By 1896 the process of 'partition' was nearing completion, but at that date the effective British presence in the area which later

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1. P.R.O. - C.O. 446/1/1608, Lugard to Chamberlain, 24/8/1898, enclosing extracts of Adamu Jakada's report to the Royal Niger Company.
 2. Cf. P.R.O. - 446/1/12014, Lugard to Chamberlain, 21/5/1898; cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 229; H.F. Backwell, The Occupation of Hausland (Lagos, 1927), letters No. 93, 94, 95, 97.
 3. E. Gentil, La Chute de l'Empire de Rabeh (Paris, 1902), p. 170-172.

came to be known as Northern Nigeria was still confined to a number of tiny enclaves on the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers.¹

The Royal Niger Company (chartered in 1886) had trading stations in places in the Niger - Benue region as well as a claim (acknowledged internationally since 1885 but not by the indigenous peoples) to the Sokoto Caliphate. During 1889, 1890, and 1893 the frontiers of the Royal Niger Company's territories had been fixed by Agreements between Britain on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other. The Company's claim to the Sokoto Caliphate was based on treaties signed with both the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu in 1885, 1890, and 1894. These treaties allegedly conferred on the Royal Niger Company sweeping sovereign powers, including rights to land and the mineral resources of the Caliphate. Neither Sokoto nor Gwandu recognised these claims however and apparently the former regarded the annual subsidy stipulated by these treaties as tribute.² The Fulani vassal states along the lower Niger, Ilorin and Nupe (Bida),³ did not recognise these claims of the Company either and, for that matter, neither did the non-Muslim polities in the Niger - Benue basin.

1. For summaries of the scramble and partition of Africa, see R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961); J.D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963).

2. D.M. Last, The Sokoto Caliphate, p. 139; Johnston, op.cit., p. 229; for a list of the Niger Company treaties with native States, see C.O. 446/6/36288, dated 12/12/1899.

3. In 1891 Goldie, Governor of the Royal Niger Company, had visited Bida in an effort to reach an understanding with the emir, more especially about putting an end to the slave trade and slave-raiding.

During January - February, 1897, with the French threatening to intrude into its so-called Northern Territories from Dahomey, the Royal Niger Company was compelled to wage war on Ilorin and Bida so as to establish a more definite political presence.¹ The Company was successful in both wars. But after the withdrawal of the Company's troops, their nominee as ruler of Bida was driven out by Abubakar whom they had earlier deposed. Elsewhere on the Niger and Benue the Company's foothold remained precarious. In 1897 - 98 the British Government raised the West African Frontier Force, largely to bolster the strength of the Royal Niger Company and safeguard its sphere of influence on the Niger, especially in Borgu.² The French threat, however, did not cease, despite that country's ratification of the Anglo-French Niger Convention of June, 1898.³ A little earlier, in order to better counter the French intrigues and silence domestic criticism of Royal Niger Company policies, the British Government had in April, 1899, decided to take over the territories 'administered' by the chartered company.⁴ The British Government, like the Royal Niger Company, regarded the whole region as a potentially rich market which must remain under British influence or protection, implicitly to the exclusion of other European powers. Hence the decision to transfer the Royal Niger Company's territories to the control of the Colonial Office. According to this arrangement, the Company's territories north and

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1. For details, see J.E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the making of Nigeria (London, 1960), pp. 243 - 63.
 2. See S.C. Ukpabi, The W.A.F.F., An Instrument of Imperial Policy 1897 - 1914 (MA. thesis, Birmingham, 1964).
 3. For the convention, see Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, XXI (London, 1909), pp. ~~374~~ ~~92~~. 785 - 792
 4. M. Perham, Lugard, II (London, 1960), p.11.

south of the Benue - Niger confluence were to come under two separate administrations : to the south was to be the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (in addition to the pre-existing Colony and Protectorate of Lagos), while the region north of the Benue -Niger confluence was to be known as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.¹ This latter protectorate comprised the greater part of the Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu. The peoples of the region were completely unaware of this arrangement which purported to affect their lives.

Then in July, 1899, the formal revocation of the Royal Niger Company's charter was approved by the British Parliament. The Company forfeited its right to use the term 'royal' and was duly given compensation of £865,000 for its expenses on account of administration, developing territory, land and mineral rights, and for ships, buildings, etc., which passed to the government.² Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard was appointed High Commissioner and charged to take over the administration of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The ritual of handing over the administration to Lugard took place at Lokoja on 1st January, 1900. That same year a take-over proclamation was publicised and a government notice was issued dividing the Protectorate into three civil provinces: the Middle Niger comprising Ilorin, and Nupe and its dependencies; Benue comprising territory south of the Benue river bounded on the west by the Nupe territories, the emirates of Muri and Bauchi, and of Adamawa or those parts falling within the Protectorate; and Kano Province comprising the remainder of the Protectorate with

1. Hertslet, op. cit., p. 250 - 257.

2. Hertslet, ibid., p. 249 - 250; cf. Perham, Lugard, II, p.11.

the exception of Borgu and Bornu. Borgu, and Bornu in the extreme north-east were to be treated as Military Provinces.¹ This was however a very tentative arrangement which was rapidly superseded in fact. In any case it is one thing to proclaim a new regime and quite another to make the writ of such a regime run in its purported area of jurisdiction. Robert Heussler has put in perspective the significance of the rituals of that day in January, 1900:

Yet as the Union Jack went up over the Niger Company Station at Lokoja, British knowledge of the North as a whole was still minute. 'Protectorate' at this point represented intention and determination rather than fact. Even as such, it would make more of an impression in London, Paris, and Berlin than in Sokoto, Bornu, Kano, and the other northern emirates. 2

Indeed, practical British administration on the ground was very limited. Such as it was, Lugard's writ ran only in the vicinity of the West African Frontier Force concentrations, mainly the depots at Lokoja and Jebba on the Niger and Ibi on the middle Benue. Even along the Niger and Benue, very few areas were open to the new administration. Despite this grim reality, Lugard was very optimistic, more especially in regard to the prospects of trade. At the end of January, 1900, he wrote to the Colonial Office reporting that he had already sent survey parties northwards to ascertain whether there was a suitable site for an administrative headquarters in the neighbourhood. In the event of a suitable site being found, the High Commissioner hoped that the shift of the administrative centre towards the northern hinterland would go far in 'rendering the trade routes from Kano and the Sahara safe for small traders and thus open upto commerce the enormous possibilities of the Hausa states'.

1. P.R.O. - C.O. 446/8/30464, Lugard to Chamberlain, 3/11/1899, enclosing draft proclamation envisaging division of provinces and a map; Perham, Lugard, II, p. 38.

2. R. Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 19.

With this development the administration could look forward to greatly increased revenue, apparently from tolls on caravans.¹ In this regard Lugard planned to emulate the former Royal Niger Company which had relied on duties on exports and imports for its revenue from the northern territories. However, Lugard's survey parties met with hostility and had to fight innumerable skirmishes with the several tribes through whose territories they traversed. In addition very soon the High Commissioner was reporting clashes with the Munchi (Tiv) along the Benue, through whose country the British were attempting to construct a telegraph line. For their failure to welcome the work-force or see the potential benefit of the telegraph, the Tiv were branded as 'lawless pagans' by Lugard.² Meanwhile Lugard's plans to pacify recalcitrant tribes had to be shelved because he had to send a large contingent of the W.A.F.F. to fight in Ashanti. While the troops were away, the new administration very quickly fell out with the emirates of Bida (strategically placed between Lokoja and Jebba) and Kontagora north of Jebba. The emirs of these states were not only defiant but persisted in slave raiding almost to the environs of Jebba:

Within the last few days news has reached me that Kontagora (the so-called King of the Sudan) is raiding the whole country north of Jebba, and I hear that he has declared his intention of devastating the villages close up to our headquarters ...Meanwhile, Bida has just obliterated 8 villages on the other bank of the Kaduna (river). 3

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1. C.O. 446/9/7970, Lugard to Secretary of State, Jebba, 30/1/1900; also C.O. 446/9/7974, Lugard to Chamberlain, 30/1/1900.
 2. C.O. 446/10/25250, Lugard to Chamberlain, 30/7/1900. For a detailed account of early British-Tiv relations see D.C. Dorward, A Political and Social History of the Tiv People of Northern Nigeria 1900-1939 (Ph. D. thesis, London 1971), p. 138 - 178.
 3. C.O. 446/10/26964, Lugard to Chamberlain, Jebba, 21/7/1900.

Lugard therefore requested the immediate approval of his anti-slavery proclamation, though with the bulk of the W.A.F.F. away in Ashanti, he was fully aware that such a proclamation would for some time remain merely a pious resolution. The emirs of Bida and Kontagora continued their slave raids and the destruction of towns and villages disposed to befriend the new administration. The High Commissioner was vexed but powerless:

Despite the utmost provocation ... and the challenge offered by the destruction of villages, which Kontagora announced that he had attacked because they were friendly to the White man, while he tells his ignorant followers that the British are a species of fish which cannot leave the banks of the Niger and would die inland, I have foreborne to take any reprisals pending the return of the troops from Ashanti. 1.

The High Commissioner was however confident that the return of his troops from Ashanti would be sufficient to compel the emirs to adopt a more friendly attitude. Until then the administration had to be content if it could provide adequate protection to the proposed Niger Company trading station at Wushishi about forty miles inland and to Bishop Tugwell's missionaries who had recently been thrown out of Kano and were then encamped south of Zaria. To bedevil Lugard's problems, the French were very active in the north-west near Sokoto, levying taxes in 'Bengu, Kengakoi, and the towns lying to the East and South of the Dalul Mauri, and therefore beyond doubt in British territory, and ... when these taxes remained unpaid, native levies armed with French rifles were sent to harass the towns.' In addition Lugard alleged that the French were coercing Hausa traders travelling to and from Gonja to pass through Gaya (on the middle Niger) in their sphere of influence, instead of through Illo

1. C.O. 446/10/28704, Lugard to Chamberlain, 8/8/1900; cited in Perham, Lugard II, p. 27.

which was in British Borgu.¹ Far away in distant Bornu, Lugard complained bitterly that the French had entirely set at nought the boundaries of the British sphere, especially due to the report that they had installed a King at Kuka, Bornu's capital.² Bornu and the Sokoto region were still completely untouched by British political influence but the urge to thwart the French loomed so large in Lugard's vision that he was prepared to take France to task for penetrating into their territories. The French, when approached by either London or the High Commissioner, retorted that the areas they were pacifying were well outside the British Sphere; alternatively they argued that since the British had failed to bring law and order to their so-called sphere, the French had no alternative but to launch punitive actions against lawless elements on the British side of the borders.³

British punitive raids against the smaller tribes along the Benue continued well into the twentieth century, but Lugard was able to conquer and pacify the larger northern Muslim emirates much more rapidly. In November, 1900, the High Commissioner telegraphed London urging the immediate return to Northern Nigeria from Ashanti of at least two W.A.F.F. companies as the hostility of the chiefs near Jebba was increasing; he also put in a request for two

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1. C.O. 446/11/35311, Lugard to Secretary of State Chamberlain, Jebba, 24/9/1900.
 2. C.O. 446/11/33711, Lugard to Chamberlain.
 3. For an account of Anglo-French recriminations, see A.O. Anjorin, The British Occupation and Development of Northern Nigeria (unpublished University of London thesis, 1965); cf. C.O. 446/11/811, Lugard to Chamberlain, Jebba, 22/11/1900.

more 75 mm. guns.¹ A little later he reported the death of the Hon. D. Carnegie, killed by poisoned arrows in Bassa province. Soon afterwards Lugard was reporting increased hostility towards all Europeans in the far northern emirates, consequent upon Bishop Tugwell's abortive attempt to set up a missionary centre at Kano.² The High Commissioner was enraged with the Tugwell party's precipitate venture to Kano, but this did not prevent him citing their expulsion as a reason for strengthening the military capacity of the administration. In fact the two unchanging themes in Lugard's policy at this time were his fixed hostility towards the French and his tendency to bring together unrelated incidents to support whatever policy he was adopting or advocating.³ These facts were known to the officials of the Colonial Office and made them very sceptical of Lugard's many proposals.

The West African Frontier Force contingents returned to Northern Nigeria from Ashanti towards the end of December, 1900. Lugard was now quick to initiate a forward policy⁴ and by the spring of 1902 the British had established a more definite political presence at Yola on the Benue, in Bida and Kontagora along the Niger, and in

1. C.O. 446/11/37197, Lugard to Secretary of State, 14/11/1900.

2. C.O. 446/11/2469, Lugard to CO, Jebba, 9/12/1900; C.O. 446/11/2656, Lugard to Secretary of State, 12/12/1900.

3. For a typical example, see C.O.446/8/30397, Memorandum on the Development of Northern Nigeria, Confidential, Lugard to C.O., 2/11/1899; also C.O. 446/10/28694, Lugard to Chamberlain, 1/8/1900.

4. For details of Lugard's conquests and the incorporation into the Protectorate of several polities before the final confrontation with Kano and Sokoto in early 1903, see Perham, Lugard II (London, 1960); D.J.M. Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains (London, 1964); H.A.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London, 1967); R.A. Adeleye; Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria (London, 1971); see also A.O. Anjorin, The British Occupation and the Development of Northern Nigeria 1898 - 1914 (unpublished University of London thesis, 1966).

Zaria further north. Similarly in the north-east Bauchi and Bornu had been conquered or brought under control without a fight. The area brought under the new regime comprised about two-thirds the area of the Protectorate, though we should not forget that in almost all cases only the large fortress-towns or capital cities had been pacified. There remained to be conquered or overawed only the far northern emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, notably Sokoto itself and Kano. Already by December, 1901, Lugard was writing optimistically thus:

I hope before another year is past to be in direct touch with the great Emporium of Kano and to have the trade route thence to the Niger clear of brigands so that the whole of the trade may come straight to the Niger. 1

Besides trade prospects, the High Commissioner had several reasons for wanting an early resolution of the ambiguous relations of the British administration and the northern emirates. Lugard was genuinely committed to putting a stop to slave raids and inter-tribal warfare, reports of which were daily reaching him. Similarly, he was personally hostile to France and was therefore alarmed by reports of French activities in the vicinity of Sokoto and Kano. Reports on the intrigues and misdeeds of the French were gathered by Lugard himself in Northern Nigeria and many more were passed on to him by the Colonial Office - these emanated from the British consuls at Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as from the British embassies in Paris and Berlin. Worse still, many French Colonial Society members in the Chamber of Deputies were agitating for a re-adjustment of the Anglo-French frontier in the north, notably the section running from Sokoto to Zinder, in favour of France. In a sense therefore Lugard had to pre-empt the French designs on parts of the British Protectorate.

1. C.O. 446/17/494, Lugard to C.O., 30/12/1901.

But in the end it was the hostility of the northern emirates, particularly Sokoto and Kano, towards the Lugard administration which finally drove the latter to arms.

Since assuming the High Commissionership of the Protectorate in 1900, Lugard had been unsuccessfully trying to persuade Sokoto to surrender its sovereign powers peacefully. To all Lugard's many diplomatic moves Sokoto's response had been either negative or there had been no answer at all.¹ Then in May 1902 Lugard received a letter from the Caliph which declared that nothing but a state of war could exist between the Caliphate and the Administration.² The receipt of this letter convinced the High Commissioner of the inevitability of a military clash with Sokoto. Undoubtedly Lugard's overtures to Sokoto were destined to be still-born since the former's objectives and those of the Muslim Caliphate were incompatible. Lugard's piecemeal conquest or non-violent take-over in turn of Ilorin, Bida, Kontagora, Zaria and Bauchi not only impinged on the sovereignty of the Caliph but inspired fear throughout the region.³

Meanwhile throughout 1902 the High Commissioner continued to receive reports of Kano's warlike preparations to oppose the British. First, Walter Miller reported that the Amir-al-mumin and the emirs of Kano and Katsina had accused the emir of Zaria of the crime of following the Europeans and allowing the buying of horses

1. For a summary of Lugard-Sokoto relations, see R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 252-259.
2. Lugard, Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria, 1902, p. 159; text of the letter is cited in R.A. Adeleye, ibid., p. 343.
3. Cf. R.A. Adeleye, ibid., p. 258.

and victuals for the white men's use in his domain.¹ Then it was reported that Kano city and the major towns in that emirate had had their walls rebuilt or repaired and that large quantities of arms had been imported into Kano from North Africa.² Similarly it became known to the Lugard Administration that the ruler of Kano had announced that if any European ventured to the metropolis he would be killed.³ Furthermore Lugard claims to have received 'a well-authenticated report' that in October 1902 Aliyu Babba of Kano had set out to attack the British garrison at Zaria and only desisted on receiving the news of Amir-al-mumin Abdurrahman's death.⁴ To the High Commissioner all these reports suggested an open challenge to the British position and strengthened his resolve to settle with the emirates by force.

The attitude of Sokoto, Kano, and other emirates to the coming of the British can be deduced from reading the theories of the Islamic concept of international relations. These States had foreign policies based on well-known Islamic concepts of shaw'iyah - the attitude to be taken towards non-Islamic governments.⁵ Basically, Islamic jurisprudence divides the world into two opposing camps,

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1. N.A.K./KASCAPTORY/G.O.K./1/1/13, Miller to Lugard, 6/2/1902 (cited in Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 261). It should be borne in mind that Miller was implacably hostile to the Muslim emirates.
 2. Ibid., Miller to Lugard, 4/3/1902.
 3. N.A.K./KADCAPTORY/G.O.K./1/ /1/21, Lugard to Abadie, 29/4/1902; cf. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 262.
 4. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1902, p. 76; cf. Adeleye, ibid., p. 263.
 5. For an exposition of the rules governing such attitudes, see M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 1965).

the Dar-el-Islam versus the Dar-el-Hab - the abode of peace as against the abode of war or non-Islamic lands. This clear-cut distinction is comparable to the medieval concept of Christendom. The rules governing Islamic international relations greatly affected the attitude of the emirs of the Caliphate. It is obligatory to adhere to these principles and departure from them exposed the law-breaker to the danger of going to hell. Thus an appreciation of the attitude of Aliyu Babba and the Kano ruling groups is only possible in the light of their knowledge of Islamic obligations. Knowing that they had nothing to match against the British 75 mm. and Maxim guns, Aliyu had embarked on consultations with Sokoto as to whether or not the faithful should go on a hijra¹ to avoid European rule.² Aliyu candidly suggested that all the Muslims should flee the country as the Europeans seemed bent on overwhelming the Caliphate. Hence the frantic fortification of Kano towns during 1902 would seem to have been a stop-gap measure pending a final decision.

The High Commissioner however viewed the defensive measures being taken by Aliyu as unprovoked hostility. It remained only to have a pretext for launching an attack on Kano. So when in October 1902 the Magaji³ of Keffi Dan Yamusa murdered Captain Moloney (Resident of Nasarawa Province) and fled to Kano, Lugard had got his justification.⁴ In his despatch accompanying the estimates for

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1. To flee, with the intention of re-grouping and staging a comeback; cf. M. Khadduri, op.cit., p. 65-66.
 2. See H.F. Backwell, The Occupation of Northern Nigeria (Lagos, 1927), letter no. 125.
 3. The resident jakada or agent of the emir of Zaria at Keffi; cf. Johnston, op.cit., p.244.
 4. C.O. 446/25/46481 (a) and (b), Lugard to Secretary of State, 11/10/1902; cf. D.J.M. Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains (London, 1964), p. 63 - 68; R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 264 - 267.

the financial year 1903 - 04, Lugard made it very clear that through the course of that year he intended to bring under British control the provinces of metropolitan Sokoto, Katsina and Kano.¹ The High Commissioner was careful not to explain how he intended to achieve this objective. Then on 12th December, 1902, Lugard telegraphed the Colonial Office informing the officials of an impending military expedition against Kano. His reasons for this projected aggression were, as usual, not exactly related to one another:

...Information received that Kano preparations completed for provoking war, demonstration in favour of murderer of Moloney. Safety of garrison at Zaria, prestige of British Government, possibility of delimitation of frontier depend on energetic action. Paramount chiefs in this country await result and if action deferred they would attribute to fear of them. 2

The subsequent correspondence between Lugard and the Colonial Office has become the subject of controversy.³ Suffice it to say here that the Colonial Office, alarmed by criticism from men like Sir Charles Dilke in Parliament and the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, tried to urge caution on Lugard and suggested that he pursued a policy of 'diplomatic administration' rather than military confrontation with the major Muslim emirates. The High Commissioner, on the other hand, resorted to various subterfuges to keep his plans secret until the point of no return had been reached and passed. The Colonial Office, of course, resented what they termed Lugard's 'favourite

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1. C.O. 446/25/52540, Lugard to C.O., enclosing estimates for 1903 - 04, 21/11/1902.
 2. C.O. 446/26/51465, Lugard, telegram to C.O., 12/12/1902; cf. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy ..., p. 269.
 3. See, for example, D.J.M. Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains, p. 69-78; Perham, Lugard II, p. 93ff; Johnston, op.cit., p. 274 - 286.

policy of keeping silence until the coup has been made' but they nevertheless defended his actions in Parliament and outside it.¹

Lugard, of course, would have everybody believe that the Fulani empire was decadent and on the verge of collapse; he also disseminated propaganda to the effect that the Fulani rulers were tyrants and their subjects ready to revolt.

Meanwhile frantic telegrams were sent from London to Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Lagos, and Southern Nigeria, requesting troop reinforcements for Northern Nigeria or for reserves to be kept at the ready in case they should be needed. General Kemball, Inspector-General of the W.A.F.F., was instructed to rush from Lagos to Northern Nigeria to assume command of the Kano expedition. Lugard was not consulted when all these steps were taken and he resented these actions on the part of the London-based officials.

The Kano Expeditionary Force, under Colonel Morland, set out for Kano from Zaria on 29th January, 1903. It was composed of 26 officers, 13 non-commissioned officers, 2 doctors, 800 African rank and file, four 75 mm. guns and five Maxim guns.² The force met with resistance at the walled fortress-town of Bebeji (50 miles south of Kano) just inside the Kano frontier but after the field guns had been brought into action, the invaders forced their way into the town. In this encounter, some thirty of the defenders were killed including Sarkin Bebeji Jibir.³ Lugard implies that

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1. The despatches relating to the Kano-Sokoto expedition have been published as Cd. 1433, Northern Nigeria, Correspondence Relating to Kano, 1904; also C.O. 879/80/718/, Northern Nigeria, Expedition to Kano (further correspondence), 5/2/1903 - 12/10/1903, 100 pp.
 2. C.O. 446/30/10525, Lugard to C.O., confidential, 6/2/1903; cf. Johnston, op.cit., p. 247.
 3. C.O. 446/30/10526, Lugard, confidential, to Secretary of State, dated Camp Kasaji, 8/2/1903.

Bebeji might have surrendered peacefully but for emir Aliyu's threat of 'death to anyone who should open the gates'.¹ Reportedly, the corpses of Sarkin Bebeji and seven of his lieutenants were burnt to ashes by the invaders probably with parafin. Apparently news of this dreadful example (in the eyes of Muslims) and the invincibility of the British field guns travelled very fast in the country. Subsequent to the battle at Bebeji, the British force encountered no more resistance until it reached the gates of Kano city.

When the British expeditionary force penetrated into Kano territory, the emir Aliyu Babba was away at Sokoto with about 2,000 Kano horsemen.² However, before his departure for Sokoto, Aliyu was aware of the impending British-led invasion.³ When leaving for Sokoto, therefore, Aliyu had assigned the defence of the emirate to several dignitaries supported by cavalry. The disposition of the defending forces is said to have been as follows: the Salama and Jakadan Garko were placed in overall charge of the emirate's defences. The latter chief had his base at the ribadi town of Sakaratsa about 25 miles south of Kano. The Salama, together with the Sarkin Shanu who was in charge of the emirate in the absence of the emir, was at the capital. The Sarakuna of Ringim and Kunci were encamped

1. Ibid.

2. Cf. Dokaji, op. cit., p. 70. According to Lugard, Aliyu left for Sokoto on 2nd January, 1903 - see C.O. 446/30/10526, Lugard to C.O., 8/2/1903.

3. Cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 245; Labarun Hausawa, vol. 2, p.70.

a few miles east of the emirate capital, in case the British invasion should come from that direction. Similarly, Sarkin Gaya was encamped at the fortress-town of Sumaila 48 miles south-east of Kano. All this suggests that news of the projected British invasion had reached Kano well in advance and that arrangements were made to resist the invasion.

When news of the apparent ease with which the British had breached the walls of Bebeji, the burning of the corpses of its Sarki and his lieutenants, and the invincibility of the British field-guns spread in the Kano countryside, the Jakadan Garko abandoned his defensive fortress at Sakaratsa and retreated to the metropolitan city. This abandonment of the emirate's major bulwark against the expected British invasion from the south and retreat to the city greatly demoralized all those entrusted with the defence of the emirate.¹ The demoralization is said to have become total when the Salama Jatau and Sarkin Shanu Mamman Dan Gwari fell out over the decision as to how best to share out the weapons and ammunition in the central armoury. Reportedly the rivalry between these officials as to the respective superiority or otherwise of their slave origins even made this friction worse.² ~~Thus by the time the British~~

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1. Account based on Habibu b. Aliyu Babba, interview, 12/6/1970; Alhaji Mai Zaure, interview 29/4/1970; Dagajin Wak; Wamban Sankira Adamu, interview, Kano 8/4/1970; Baba Jibir; Ibrahim Lele Kano; see also Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains, p. 91 - 104; Perham, Lugard II, p. 108 - 123; cf. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy ..., p. 270.
 2. Salama Jatan is said to have hailed from the pagan Warji tribe east of Kano, while Sarkin Shanu Mamman Dan Gwari came from the Gwari tribe south of Zaria.

Thus by the time the British expeditionary force reached the gates of Kano city at dawn on 3rd February 1903, the two officials who carried the most weight in the metropolis were not united as to the best way to repel the invasion.

Despite the disunity amongst the officials responsible for defending Kano against the British, there was quite a stubborn resistance when the invaders launched their attack against the fortress-city later that day. When the W.A.F.F. finally breached the wall of the city by using the field guns and scaling ladders, about 800 horsemen and 5,000 foot charged towards them inside the walls. The defenders had many rifles but their firing was ill-directed and therefore largely ineffective. In any case these weapons were no match for the Maxim and 75 mm. guns. Very soon many of the defenders were mowed down, and many more retreated in confusion. Detachments of the W.A.F.F. were deployed in the surrounding countryside to cut off the retreat of the survivors and several more of the flying horsemen were gunned down. According to Colonel Morland who led the expedition, some 300 of the defenders were killed.¹ This figure of the Kano dead seems to be an understatement as many stories are extant that the British slaughtered at least 1,000 warriors. The victors then made their quarters in the emir's palace, the residents of which had already fled. The palace encompassed an area of some 50 acres surrounded by a high wall and Morland quartered his troops there apparently so as to prevent

1. For an account of the capture of Kano, see C.O. 446/30/10526, Lugard, confidential, to Secretary of State (8/2/1903), enclosing Col. Marland's report on the battle; also C.O. 446/31/20296, Lugard (confidential), to Secretary of State, 2nd May, 1903.

the latter from looting the city. He can thus write of Kano that 'no town taken by assault has ever been less looted and injured'.¹ A few days after the capture of Kano, General Kemball reached the city and assumed command of the expeditionary force. Lugard himself arrived on 20th February and took over the overall political direction of the new situation.

Subsequent to the conquest of Kano, the W.A.F.F. marched on Sokoto which they in turn captured on March 15th after a fierce battle.² As in Kano, the resistance of the defenders was quite stubborn and, besides bows and arrows, they employed well directed rifle volleys against the invaders. But all to no avail and the W.A.F.F. did great execution that day, reportedly killing some 100 of the defenders.³ This figure of the casualtyth on the opposing side seems again to be a deliberate case of suppressing or minimizing the numbers. For the battle for Sokoto took place in the open plain outside the town and the Caliph's fighters were completely exposed to the Maxim and shrapnel guns of the W.A.F.F. Sokoto town was completely deserted for days after the battle. Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu (1902 - 03) fled and nothing was heard of his whereabouts for some time. Lugard, forced-marching behind his troops, arrived at Sokoto on 22nd March and proceeded to effect a settlement with the rump of the Sokoto leadership.

1. Ibid.

2. C.O. 446/30/11722, Lugard, telegram (confidential), to Mr. Chamberlain, 19th March, 1903, (despatched from Sokoto); C.O. 446/31/18363, Lugard (confidential), letter to Secretary of State, dateline Sokoto, 22/3/1903, enclosure of General Kemball's report on the capture of Sokoto.

3. C.O. 446/31/18363, ibid., General Kemball's report; cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 251 - 252; Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p. 279 - 87, see also D.J.M. Muffet, Concerning Brave Captains (London, 1964), p. 129 - 134.

Meanwhile the final episode of the military conquest of Kano had been completed a few weeks earlier. Aliyu Babba and his party were on their way back to Kano when news of the capture of the city reached them. Aliyu, accompanied by four wives, and four horsemen, deserted his troops at Birnin Goga during the night of 24th February. The desertion of Aliyu, who was most outspoken in his opposition to the British, and the knowledge that Kano had already fallen to the latter completely demoralised the Kano army.¹ When this desertion was discovered on the following day, the Kanawa broke up into several parties, some heading back to Sokoto and others headed for Kano. The biggest party, led by the Vizier of Kano Ahmadu and the Wambai Abbas, left Birnin Goga and travelled in a southerly direction before turning eastwards in the direction of Kano. Unfortunately this party, which appeared not to have intended to resist the British, ran into a detachment of W.A.F.F. troops under Lieutenant Wright on 26th February 1903. The scene was the village of Lawaiya near Kotorkoshi in the Kano-Sokoto marches. It would seem that as a result of a misunderstanding, the Kanawa charged against the W.A.F.F. contingent which in response opened up with a Maxim gun. Vizier Ahmadu and several Kano dignitaries were mown down and the concourse scattered in the surrounding countryside.² The Wambai, Muhammadu Abbas, collected the rump of this party and made his way cautiously

1. See Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p. 276-277; cf. D.J.M. Muffet, Concerning Brave Captains, p. 101-104; Labarun Hausawa, vol. 2, p. 70.

2. C.O. 446/30/15493, Lugard (confidential), to Secretary of State, Kano 7/3/1903; Perham, Lugard II, p. 115 - 117; D.J.M. Muffet, Concerning Brave Captains, p. 119-126; Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p. 277-279.

towards Kano. In a sense therefore, even before the capture of Sokoto on 15th March, 1903, Kano had already been crushed militarily.

An event which deserves a separate treatment was the fortune of Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu following the rout of the Sokoto forces. While the rump of the Sokoto leadership was negotiating a settlement with the conquerors, Attahiru and some followers vanished into the countryside. After the settlement at Sokoto and the installation of a new Sultan, Lugard travelled by way of Katsina to Kano where he installed Muhammadu Abbas as ruler. Then, with almost indecent haste, Lugard travelled southwards to Zungeru and from there he departed for England on leave, apparently having assured himself that no trouble could be expected. The ex-Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu and Aliyu Babba of Kano,¹ together with all those who followed them (including the elusive Magajin Keffi), were branded as the 'irreconcilables', or the 'war party' who had terrorised their followers into resisting the British advance.² Furthermore, the British alleged that everywhere they went they were either welcomed or that resistance was feeble and half-hearted. Such an assessment of the situation suggests that the British, in particular Lugard, would have us believe that the Hausa peasantry (who formed the majority of the population of the Muslim emirates) had been suffering under the yoke of Fulani rule and were glad to be liberated from that bondage. As such the ruling groups of the Sokoto Caliphate, more especially those who fought to retain their independence,

1. Aliyu was captured and exiled at Lokoja where he died in 1926.

2. It was convenient, one supposes, for the British administration to suppress or only allude in passing to the Sultan's obvious desire to reach a peaceful settlement with Lugard - see C.O. 446/31/18363, Sultan Attahiru's letter to Col. Morland (n.d.), cited in Johnston, op. cit., p. 250; cf. Annual Report Northern Nigeria, 1902, Appendix I.

were dismissed casually as tyrants or wicked aliens lording it over the peace-loving Hausa peasantry (talakawa). Hence the allegations that following the British conquest of Kano and other strongholds, life almost immediately returned to normal as if nothing momentous had happened.

Such a simplistic interpretation of the attitude of the talakawa is belied by the actual response of the people during what is popularly termed as the exodus to the East by ex-Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu. Lugard had no sooner departed for England, than his deputy Wallace began sending in reports of developments completely contradicting Lugard's confident assessment of the situation in the Muslim emirates. In a telegram of 18th May, 1903, he informed London of the re-appearance of ex-Sultan Attahiru at the head of a large gathering heading eastwards through southern Kano and northern Zaria.¹ In the ex-Sultan's party were the Magajin Keffi and ex-emir of Bida Abubakar. Wallace tried to play down the significance of the movement by arguing that only the malcontents had joined the ex-Sultan. When this large concourse entered the south-western districts of Kano towards the end of April on its eastward march, Sarkin Karaye (the most important chief in the region) and most of the minor chiefs joined the movement. Similarly, at least half the population of every town and village packed their movable belongings and followed the ex-Sultan.² As the gathering passed through the southern and south-eastern districts of Kano emirate, many more people abandoned whatever they were doing to join Attahiru's movement.

1. C.O. 446/31/18516, Wallace, telegram to Mr. Chamberlain, 18/5/1903.

2. C.O. 446/31/23002, Wallace to Mr. Chamberlain, 20/5/1903, enclosure of Resident Cargill's report of 24/4/1903.

The Residents of Zaria and Bauchi were alerted and detachments of the Mounted Infantry were sent to head-off the exodus. From Kano, Captain Sword was detailed to endeavour to scatter the ex-Sultan's following and prevent the population of the outlying districts from following the fugitive Attahiru. Towards the end of May, Wallace was quite alarmed, and arguing that to prevent the movement becoming formidable and the population joining en masse, it was imperative that the ex-Sultan and his leading adherents be pursued and given no rest until they were either captured or driven beyond the frontier of the Protectorate.¹ Meanwhile as Attahiru and his gathering passed through south-eastern Kano emirate, Captain Sword's detachment pursued relentlessly endeavouring to entrap the party in an ambush. The movement, however, proved elusive. Everywhere the people who had remained behind either deliberately misled Sword as to the whereabouts of the ex-Sultan or pretended total ignorance.² In the event Captain Sword managed to come up only with the rear of the ex-Sultan's gathering. This rear and the stragglers were attacked, and horses, cattle and other property were captured. Wherever Attahiru passed the chiefs and most of the people followed him. Swordly therefore found largely deserted towns and villages, with the roads full of people heading eastwards. These were forcibly driven back.³ Captain Sword, as well as detachments from the provinces neighbouring continued the pursuit of the ex-Sultan. Many

1. C.O. 446/31/23994, Wallace to Chamberlain, 27/5/1903.

2. Ibid., enclosure of Cargill report of 3/5/1903; cf. A.O. Anjorin, op. cit., p. 94.

3. For the full detail of Captain Sword's pursuit of the ex-Sultan through Kano emirate, see C.O. 446/31/5967, 14 pp.

Kano dignitaries, however, found their way to Burmi where the gathering made its final stand. In the battle of Burmi on 27th July, 1903, many Kano chiefs fell together with the ex-Sultan. Of the so-called irreconcilables, seven hundred were killed. The Kano dignitaries who fell in that battle were Alkali Isma'ila, Madaki Kwairanga, Ciroma Musa, and the Dan Maje.¹ One other Kano dignitary, SarkinKaraye Abdulkadir, survived the battle and succeeded in fleeing to Mecca.² Similarly, many of the diehards, notably Ahmadu of Misau, ex-emir Abubakar of Bida and the notorious Magaji of Keffi, not only survived the battle but made good their escape to the eastern Sudan and beyond.³

The attempted exodus on the part of at least half the population of the Kano districts through which Attahiru passed proves that the people did not welcome the arrival of the British as such. Some people probably tried to join the ex-Sultan's movement out of genuine religious conviction and detestation of life under Christian rule. For the majority of the talakawa, however, it may be that they were just confused and uncertain as a result of the military defeat of the Fulani forces. Since the Kano talakawa were not called upon to fight in wars, their attempted flight was probably motivated by a desire to avoid the scene of conflict. For those who stayed behind, it can be suggested that they were dazed and did not know what to do. In any case the situation was hopeless, as the British were entrenched in the east in Bornu and Bauchi and the French were in control to

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1. C.O. 446/32/31322, Wallace (telegram) to Chamberlain, 18th August, 1903; cf. Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains, p. 201.
 2. Karaye District Note Book (history).
 3. Cf. Johnston, op. cit., p. 256 fn; Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria, p. 311.

the north.¹ As such the people had to return to their homes and live as best they could in the changed circumstances. The British then proceeded to reorganize the political and social scenes in the way they thought the best and most practical.

1. For a discussion of the problem of what was canonically the orthodox step to take in a situation in which Muslims had no other choice but to have intercourse with unbelievers and even accept their rule, see R.A. Adeleye, 'The dilemma of the Wazir: the place of the Risalat Al-Wazir 'Ila Ahl Al-'Ilm Wa'l-Tadabbur in the History of the Conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate' in J.H.S.N. vol. 4, no. 2, (1968), p. 285 - 311; cf; M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 1965).

CHAPTER 4Kano 1903-10: The Establishment and Consolidation of British Overrule

Subsequent to the military subjugation of Kano and Sokoto and the involuntary submission of Katsina and Katagum, the British proceeded to organize Provinces by grouping together a number of emirates under the charge of a Resident. Kano Province as constituted as a result of this re-organization comprised of the emirates of Kano, Katsina, Katagum, Kazaure, Daura, Gumel, Hadejia, Misau, Jama'are, and Dambam (which was abolished in 1915 for implication in the Karekare rising). The total area of this Province was just over 30,000 square miles and up until 1926, when several emirates were transferred to other provinces, it was the largest province in the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Because of its size, the Province was designated a 'double-province' and for administrative purposes it was divided into three Divisions, each encompassing a number of emirates. Kano emirate formed a Division by itself by virtue of its wealth and population (variously estimated at from one to two million). The headquarters of this Division was based at Kano as was also that of the Province. The second Division was Katsina and it comprised of Katsina, Daura and Kazaure emirates, with headquarters at Katsina. The third Division was Katagum and in it were the rest of the emirates. Theoretically, at least an Assistant Resident was to be based in each Division but in fact throughout 1903 only the Provincial Resident, Dr. F. Cargill, and his assistant, Captain H.C.B. Phillips, were available as political officers to supervise the whole province. During 1904 H.R. Palmer was posted as Assistant Resident in charge of Katsina

Division and J.M. Fremantle was placed in charge of Katagum Division. Up until 1910, the maximum complement of political officers was six and at no time were all six present on duty in the province - at any one time at least two were absent on leave or due to sickness. It should be borne in mind that in this early period the formal post of Resident in charge Kano emirate existed, obviously emphasising the importance of the emirate, though in practice the Provincial Resident also usually filled that post.

As obviously the British were aware that their presence was resented, garrisons were established at Kano, Katsina and Katagum. At Kano, too, the British stationed a contingent of the Mounted Infantry. Similarly, detachments of the colonial police were stationed at all three towns. All these military and police units were officered by Europeans who were in fact more numerous than the civil officials.

In Kano emirate whilst the emir Muhammadu Abbas (1903 - 19) was the creature of the British at one level, in order to maintain his position and prerogatives, he was forced to resort to passive resistance, duplicity, etc., so as to safeguard what he thought were his interests. This led to the so-called Cargill reforms of 1908 which, if they had been supported by the Protectorate Government, would have meant so extreme a change in the pattern and structure of the whole Kano Native Administration as to make the old emirate system barely recognizable. Fearing possible overt reaction to the Cargill reforms, C.L. Temple was sent in to replace Cargill as Resident of Kano Province and undo the damage. Temple's solution to the problems created by Cargill was to lead to the basic administrative structure of Kano N.A. as it came to be known up until the 'abdication' of emir Sir Muhammadu Sanusi in 1963. The period 1903 - 10 also shows that the British were prepared, despite the subsequent fetish they made of Indirect Rule, to interfere

directly in administrative situations which seemed to individual officers very unworkable. The period is also interesting in that it shows how far an African chief under British rule was able to resist changes and reforms that he did not consider in his interests. And in fact despite Resident Cargill's apparent victory, once Temple arrived Abbas was able to get most of what he wanted, though at a price.

Whatever the individual inclination of the British officials, they were all united over the issue of raising a revenue through taxation of the country. This central issue is fundamental for an understanding of colonial measures which decisively pushed Kano and the other emirates towards bureaucratization. The attitude of the Kano ruling groups and the talakawa was thus partly a response to these deliberate colonial measures.

Establishment and Consolidation of Colonial Overrule I

With the military conquest and occupation of Kano in 1903 and the overthrow of Sokoto's relatively distant suzerainty, the British colonial regime established 'a suzerainty of a more powerful, intimate, and exacting kind than that of Sokoto'.¹ The consolidation of colonial overrule was spread over a period of some two decades and, indeed, its exactitude and intimacy took time to stabilize. The eventual outcome was that the essentially theocratic pattern of Kano's traditional authority and administration was secularized and humanized in certain fundamental respects, even though the British, in as far as was compatible with their ideas, supported the religious infrastructure which was at the base of social organization.² In time the secularization of authority and administration affected very profoundly three main areas of public and private life, ie. law, education, and taxation.³ In the process, the colonial policy of indirect rule reformed the worst instances of injustice, while in some other respects it probably made things worse, e.g. by making the Emir sole native authority in the heydays of native-British cooperation.⁴ The resulting administrative pattern has recently been termed 'Anglo-African Government' and praised for its seeming efficiency.⁵ Central to the indirect rule system was the position of the traditional rulers - in the particular case of Kano

1. M. Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria*, (London, 1937), p. 87.

2. J.N. Paden, *The Influence of Religious Elites on Community Culture and Political Integration in Kano, Nigeria* (Harvard Ph.D., 1968), p. 64.

3. J.N. Paden, *ibid.*, p. 64.

4. J.N. Paden, *ibid.*, p. 64.

5. See, for example, R. Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria*, (London, 1968), esp. chapters 3, 5.

the Emir and his subordinate officials. As noted in a study of Sierra Leone, these traditional leaders could be expected to support that political and administrative arrangement which both maximized their sources of power in the changed circumstances of an alien overrule, and at the same time maintained as much as possible of their traditional authority.¹ Many difficulties attended the evolution of a workable and stable relationship between the traditional sources of authority in Kano and the alien, British overlords. The British-appointed Emir, Muhammadu Abbas (1903 - 1919), was of crucial significance in the process of inter-action.

When Colonel Morland captured Kano City on 3rd February, 1903,² he immediately posted High Commissioner Lugard's take-over proclamation at vantage points throughout the city, e.g. the market place; Morland also ordered the immediate closure of Kano's slave market. General Kemball, Inspector General of the West African Frontier Force, arrived at Kano on 13th February to take overall command of the British forces. Meanwhile, the occupying ~~alines~~ ^{aliens} found themselves faced with a difficult situation. They found no recognised and effective authority within the city. This situation arose from the heavy fighting which preceded the British entry. As usual in the absence of the Emir, the government had been entrusted to a slave official Mamman dan Gwari, the Sarkin Shanu and this man had lost his life in a desperate attempt to save the arsenal at the palace from falling into British hands.³ Lugard himself arrived at Kano on

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1. Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: A study of the modernization process in Sierra Leone, (Harvard, 1966), p.65.
 2. C.O.446/30/5973, Lugard telegram to Secretary of State, dated 8/2/1903; C.O.446/30/10526, Lugard (confidential) to S. of S., dateline Camp Kaseji 8/2/1908, enclosing Colonel Morland's report on the battle for and capture of Kano City.
 3. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 70.

20th February, to personally take charge of the new situation.¹

Earlier, in a despatch dated 3rd February and which Lugard had received on the 8th February while en route for Zaria and Kano, Morland had also intimated that 'none of the leading Fulanis are left in the town as far as I can gather but as it is 15 miles round it is impossible to speak with certainty at present'.²

On arrival in the city, Lugard was at first optimistic enough to report to the Colonial Office in London that Kano was 'perfectly quiet' and that the enormous market was in full swing as though nothing had happened, with caravans leaving for various destinations daily.³ However, within a few days Lugard's enthusiasm and confidence were dampened somewhat as he echoed Morland's earlier pessimism due to the failure of any recognizable leadership coming forward to effect a settlement with the conquerors. On 24th February, after days of fruitless search for persons of authority and status within Kano City and its neighbourhood, Lugard had to confess to the Colonial Secretary that

No settlement is possible at Kano until Aliyu's gathering has been dispersed since he has taken with him (in many cases apparently by force) every single member of the reigning dynasty as well as every official of importance in the city, and the chiefs and principal men of every surrounding town and village. 4

Any political settlement, therefore, had to await the British defeat of Kano's army returning from Sokoto under the command of Emir Aliyu Babba himself (1894 - 1903). It transpired that Aliyu deserted his

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1. C.O. 446/30/13710, Lugard (confidential) to Secretary of State, dated 21/2/1903, from the Emir's Palace, Kano.
 2. C.O. 446/30/10526, op. cit., Morland's report.
 3. C.O. 446/30/13710, op. cit., p. 552.
 4. C.O. 446/30/13735, Lugard (confidential) to Secretary of State, dated Kano, 24/2/1903.

troops on 24th February and two days later, in a bloody skirmish near Kotorkoshi, one of Aliyu's brothers and Wazirin Kano, Ahmadu, as well as several other notables, were killed by a British patrol under Lt. Wright.¹ Apparently, the High Commissioner's letter to the Waziri did not arrive in time to avert the fatal encounter, and neither was Lt. Wright aware that Lugard was attempting to negotiate with the Kano leaders.² With the death of Waziri Ahmadu, the Kano army broke up into small groups under different commanders. One such group, under the Galadina Mamudu and the Alkalin Kano Ismaila, returned to Sokoto.³ With this group went the Magajin Keffi Dan Yamusa, the man whose blood the British were after and whose warm welcome at Kano by Emir Aliyu Babba had been the immediate pretext for launching the attack on Kano. The rest of the Kano army scattered in the Kano-Sokoto marches, some groups heading for Kano while others made for various destinations in Kano Emirate. Following this dispersal, Lugard sent instructions to the British military patrols to the west of the capital city ordering that groups heading for Kano should not be attacked, in particular he said he was negotiating with the Wambai, Muhammadu Abbas (Emir 1903 - 1919). The group led by Abbas hence travelled cautiously towards Gwarzo, a town about 38 miles west of the city. From that vicinity Abbas sent a messenger with a letter to Lugard, intimating that he wished to return to Kano.⁴ Lugard sent back a favourable reply, and this was accompanied by his 'best political agent', Kyari, and several well-known but non-

1. C.O. 446/30/15493, Lugard (confidential) to Secretary of State, Kano, 7/3/1903, p. 668.

2. C.O. 446/30/15493, *ibid.*, p. 668.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 33.

4. C.O. 446/30/15493, *op. cit.*, p. 669.

indigenous persons from the city, assuring Abbas and his following of their safety. This written assurance and accompanying deputation was necessary, in view of the fact that the returnees 'were thoroughly scared and suspected treachery'¹. Lugard, too, was anxious to enrol their co-operation because, regrettably, since the occupation of Kano over a month earlier, the uneasy 'quiet and good order' of the city had been achieved solely by 'the exertions of the one man of any influence who was found in Kano - an old official who had been for forty-one years head of the market'² and, indeed, a very lowly cog in the traditional hierarchy. Wambai Abbas and his party, together with Lugard's deputation, then travelled to the vicinity of Kano city, arriving there on 6th March, 1903.³ A meeting between Lugard and Abbas took place, and the latter was permitted to bring in his followers on the following day (7th March) in the morning, provided they agreed to surrender their fire-arms, bows and arrows; they could, however, retain their swords, spears, and chain armour - these the British did not consider to be lethal weapons.⁴ In the morning of 7th March therefore, Abbas and his followers re-entered Kano city through the Kansakali gate, designated for the purpose by the conquerors. The returnees were estimated as at least 10,000 people of whom some 800 to 4000 were horsemen.⁵

The return of Abbas and his party greatly relieved the High Commissioner and that same day he sent off a telegram to London informing the Colonial Secretary:

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1. C.O. 446/30/15493, *ibid.*, p. 669.
 2. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 31.
 3. Lugard, C.O. 446/30/15493, *op.cit.*, p. 669.
 4. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 669.
 5. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 669.

- Have much pleasure in informing you that enemy's forces lately under the ex-Emir have surrendered to us and come home to Kano this day - - -. A great many more expected shortly; others returning direct to towns. All fire-arms have been taken away from them. 1

Soon after re-entering Kano, Abbas and six other notables were summoned by Lugard for an audience at which the High Commissioner carefully explained the conditions of British overrule. Lugard assured the assembled chiefs that he held no grudge against them for the recent fighting and he announced that neither their religion nor their customs and laws would be interfered with, so long as these did not conflict with the laws of the Protectorate. He, however, left no doubt as to the absolute sovereignty of the British over the country, adding that henceforth all appointments, from the Emir downwards, were subject to the High Commissioner's approval; and slave-raiding was to cease as also was the possession of fire-arms (except flint-locks). More assurances were given that the authority of the Emir and his court would be upheld, so long as there was no oppression or extortion. Lugard concluded with remarks that the British would impose such taxes as they saw fit to pay for the administration of the country and that Sokoto's Sultan would continue to be regarded as the Amir-al-Muminin but no more tributes in slaves were to be sent to Sokoto.² Lugard's speech, apparently so reassured the Kano leaders that he could report optimistically to London:

These statements were received with the liveliest satisfaction, and I am most sincerely glad to be able to report to you that, so far as I can at present judge, the prospect promises well.³

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1. C.O. 446/30/11593, Lugard (telegram) to Sec. of State, Kano, 7th March, 1903.
 2. Texts of Lugard's address are found in Annual Report, 1902, p.36, and C.O.446/30/15493, Lugard (confidential) to Secretary of State, Kano, 7/3/1903, p. 669 - 670.
 3. C.O. 446/30/15493, *ibid.*, p. 670.

Lugard had every reason to be immensely satisfied with the latest developments. The promising prospect which he was able to report to London contrasted, at least, very sharply with the power vacuum and surreptitious lawlessness which had afflicted Kano City since the British occupation early in February. For not only did the British have to rely on the slim influence of the market head (Sarkin Kasuwa) as already noticed, but at a much more disturbing level they had had to put up with another problem. Eventually, Lugard glossed over this matter with these words:

-- after the fall of Kano the representative of the elder branch of Dan Tukur, a man named Abdul Takkur, had arrived from Zinder where he had taken refuge on Alieu's succession. His claims were strong, but he had no following, and I found after a time that he was quite unfit for the position (of Emir), being eccentric and of weak intellect. The riff-raff of the town gathered round him, and I found that they had been looting the houses of the Chiefs of the rival party in their absence. I therefore turned him out. 1

Lugard's reference was to ex-Chiroma Lele,² eldest son of the late Emir Tukur (who was driven out of Kano in 1894 and eventually killed in March, 1895). This man, who thus had claims to the Kano throne, had travelled from Katsina Emirate^{3a}, to Zaria on hearing that the British were collecting troops there preparatory to the invasion of Kano. Lele had apparently paid homage to Colonel Morland at Zaria, told him his version of the Kano civil war and begged that the British should install him on his father's throne. It would seem that Colonel

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 34.

2. Lele, incidentally, was related to Aliyu Babba (1894-1903) and Muhammadu Abbas (1903-1919) not only through his father who was their cousin but also through his mother Safiya who was their elder sister.

3a. After the defeat of the Tukurawa during the civil war, Sokoto gave them a safe conduct to return and live at Kano and be provided for by their victorious relations. Lele and several others won't accept offer and took refuge first at Zinder and later in Katsina emirate.

Morland and Captain Abadie (Resident of Zaria) did not disabuse Lele of his high hopes and he travelled to Kano in the wings of the British expeditionary force. When the city fell, Lele and his retinue entered in the wake of the victorious conquerors. Since Morland put up his temporary headquarters at the royal palace, Lele took up residence at the house of the slave official, Salama Jatau (killed at the Koforkoshi battle on 26th February, 1903). Lele's Tukurawa supporters then started returning from Katsina territory where they had taken refuge since 1895, as it seemed their leader was about to be installed Emir over Kano by the British. Lele meanwhile started behaving as if he was already Emir of Kano, and his supporters became busy taking over the houses and property of the absent Kano leaders, their dynastic enemies. It was this irresponsible conduct which gave rise to the unsatisfactory situation that the High Commissioner found on his arrival at Kano. After consultations with the resident Arab merchants of Kano, Lugard realised that Lele had little support. Not surprisingly, therefore, the High Commissioner was only too glad that Wambai Abbas and other recognized emirate officials had finally returned to Kano to take over the running of day-to-day administration. As Lugard was set on appeasing the recognized traditional authorities, it made sense to pass-over the pretensions of Lele. Lugard accordingly told Lele either to accept Abbas's authority or return to wherever he had travelled from to pay homage to the British at Zaria. Lele refused to accept Abbas's authority and was therefore expelled from Kano city late on 7th March, 1903.¹

Lugard, by his policy of preference for Muhammadu Abbas, was more or less finally settling the dynastic issue of Kano in favour

1. The account of the Lele episode is based on the authority of Habibu b. Aliyu Babba and Wazirin Kofa Adamu. See also Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 72, for a brief allusion to the episode.

of the faction that was victorious in the civil war. This partiality was in spite of the fact that some of the rival faction showed every sign of accepting British tutelage right from the very beginning. However, this apart, the British were determined to emphasize the fact of Abbas's dependence on them. Instead of immediately installing him Emir over Kano, Lugard decided that Abbas should serve a period of probation - this despite the lack of a credible rival, and Lugard's own assertions that he was the 'most intelligent and humane' and the 'unanimous choice of all parties' for the Emirship.¹ During the probation period, Abbas was appointed Regent in charge of the emirate but he was not to occupy the royal palace until formally installed in due course - when Lugard returned from Sokoto. The prospective Emir accepted these limitations, plus the added task of building barracks/ for the British troops a few miles east of the city, as well as a house in the city itself for the newly appointed Resident. The somewhat incongruous order for a house in the city for the Resident (an alien and Christian) was justified by the spurious claim that 'the people regard it as a sign of suzerainty that the British representative should have a house in the city itself and fly the flag there'.² Be that as it may, the demand for a house for the Resident and barracks for the troops was the earliest of such burdens to be imposed on Kano's people through their traditional rulers. Lugard salved his conscience by regarding the imposition as a very light war indemnity.³ And, pending his return from Sokoto, the High

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 34.

2. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 36.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 36.

Commissioner allowed Abbas to confirm in their titles all those officials who had returned to Kano, but all other vacancies were not to be filled until the installation of the Emir. Abbas, literally the choice and creature of the British, complied with all these conditions.

Lugard trekked off behind his army that was then marching on Sokoto. There was a strong likelihood that Sokoto would fight the British. This possibility may explain the provisional nature of the arrangement the High Commissioner made at Kano. It transpired that Sokoto did resist the British and was overwhelmed, Lugard arriving just in time to effect a settlement. From Sokoto, the High Commissioner then travelled back to Kano via Katsina. He arrived at Kano on 2nd April, 1903, and on the following day he formally installed Muhammadu Abbas as eighth Fulani Emir of Kano and a principal Chief under the colonial regime.¹ The installation, according to Lugard, was watched by thousands of people, and brought to an end the two months' interregnum during which Kano had no formal ruler. Lugard left behind a garrison at Kano as well as a Resident, Dr. F. Cargill, and an assistant, Captain H.C.B. Phillips. The new Emir was to turn to the Resident if he was ever unable to enforce his legitimate orders - because it was made clear that in the British masters alone was to be vested the power of policing the country.² Thus was inaugurated the beginnings of a working relationship between the colonial regime and the Kano ruling groups. While the Resident and his assistant settled down to study the indigenous system, Emir Abbas, too became busy refilling the offices and titles where vacancies

1. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 44; C.O. 446/31/19832, Lugard (confidential to S. of State) dated 25/4/1903; W.F. Gowers, *Gazetteer of Kano Province* (London 1921, p. 15).

2. Lugard, *Annual Report*, 1902, p. 35.

had been created by the circumstances of the recent conflict with the British. First of all, those officials and friends who backed him and canvassed on his behalf in the process of nomination for the throne had to be rewarded. The better known men who had staunchly supported Abbas since the disastrous Kano-British encounter near Kotorkoshi were the following: Dan Iya Ibrahim, Ma'ajin Watari Adamu, Mai Unguwar Kutumbawa Audu, and Sarkin Fadan Waziri Suleiman (nicknamed Sarki). Ibrahim was confirmed in his important title, Ma'ajin Watari was made the official in charge of Kano city, and Suleiman Sarki was elevated to the position of Waziri to fill the vacancy created by the death of Ahmadu at Kotorkoshi.¹ With regards to the four most important titles outside the royal family, the new ruler had some rather embarrassing problems. The most important of these title holders, the Madaki Muhammadu Kwairanga, had refused to have anything to do with Abbas's intended surrender to the British and had taken to the bush after Kotorkoshi and was ultimately to fall at the battle of Burmi on 28th July, 1903. Of the other key non-royal title holders, the Makama Umaru dan Maisaje and the Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta Malam Jammo seem to have accompanied Abbas when he surrendered to Lugard. Presumably they were also among the notables whom Lugard consulted. Both were confirmed in their titles, with full jurisdiction over their traditional fiefs.² The last important non-royal title holder, Sarkin Bai Abdussalami, headed eastwards for Bima Hill near Burmi after the Kotorkoshi rout. However, in the general confusion following the capture of Sokoto by the British, a message from Abbas managed to persuade him to return to Kano, where he was

1. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 72.

2. See Wudil (and Sumaila) District Note Book, and Gwarzo District Note Book, esp. the chronologies and historical sections.

confirmed in his position.¹ Following his formal installation in April, 1903, the Emir conferred the title of Madaki on Husseini, a brother of the fugitive Kwairanga and like him a relation to the Emir.²

With regards to the titles normally held by members of the royal family, the new Emir had a great deal of freedom to fill the vacancies with men of his choice, for several important titles had become vacant. As already noted, following the desertion of Emir Aliyu Babba and the disaster of Kotorkoshi, Aliyu's younger brother of the same mother, Galadima Mamudu, had gone to Sokoto instead of Kano. In Mamudu's company were Aliyu's two titled sons, Turaki Manya Bello Dubgau and Chiroma Mujeli. All three, if it needs reiterating, had strong claims to the throne. It is said that Abbas was therefore almost delighted at their forfeiture of titles and positions in the ensuing political settlement whereby they were grouped with the 'irreconcilables'. The Galadimaship went to Umaru, one of the numerous brothers of the new Emir; yet another brother, Salihi, was made Turaki Manya. Abbas's eldest son, Abdullahi Bayero (Emir 1926 - 53) was made Ciroma of Kano.³ However, the full details of the redistribution of titles properly belong to the phase when Kano rulers had to reorganize in order to come to terms with administrative innovations inspired by the new alien overlords.

It is evident that the tortuous route via which Abbas came to the throne and the circumstances of the time were most extraordinary

1. cf. Dambatta District Note Book (section on history).
2. Dawakin Tofa District Note Book, history and chronology. Kwairanya and Husseini had the same mother, Kumboto, eldest daughter of the Emir Ibrahim Dabo (1819 - 45).
3. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 72; Kano State jiya da yau (Zaria, 1968), p. 20.

to say the least. The manner of his accession to power had no precedent in Kano practice. There was no formal convocation of the Electoral Council comprising the Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta, and Sarkin Bai to nominate a candidate, much less examine his credentials. Furthermore, besides the British, whose views were ultimately decisive, another alien group had a significant role for the first time. This was the resident Arab community, namely the Ghadames merchants whom Lugard consulted. The leader of the Arab community was one Alhaji Abande, the richest merchant in Kano.¹ Generally speaking, Abbas's section of the royal family had close relations with Alhaji Abande and the Arab community, and Abbas in particular seemed to have impressed the Arabs in his role as arms purchaser during the civil war. It thus transpired that one of Abande's clients, Auta, was part of Lugard's deputation which persuaded Abbas to surrender to the British in the first instance. Subsequent to that episode, it appears that Lugard was greatly influenced by the Arab merchants' favourable impressions of Abbas. Hence the High Commissioner's preference for him. Contrary to usual practice, the views of two alien groups, British and Arab, finally determined who should rule the Emirate. Instead of the Sultan of Sokoto, we had Lugard confirming the 'nomination' of Abbas for the throne. Since the whole country had been deprived of its most lethal weapons, the new Emir was ultimately dependent on British arms. The ruling groups of Kano seem to have acquiesced in the British imposed settlement for several reasons. The most important factor was the irregularity in the accession processes for the past several years:

1. cf. Muhammadu Uba Adamu, 'Some Notes on the influence of North African Traders in Kano', in *Kano Studies*, vol. I, No.4, (1968), p.44.

the imposition, by Sokoto, of Tukur over Kano, followed by the internecine civil war and then the 'coup d'état' by Aliyu Babba (1894 - 1903) were events of the same kind. Ultimately, they introduced elements of instability in the succession not only to the emirship but in all other titles in the emirate. The elevation of Abbas to the throne was in this sense merely a continuation of the irregular pattern. The Emir, of course, had a strong claim to the throne in his own right and, in any case, all the then title holders had reached their positions as a result of their faction's victory in the civil war or preference by Aliyu Babba since then. Furthermore, the prospects were promising to the ruling groups, especially due to the assurances by Lugard that their religion, customs, and authority would be upheld.

Yet, in spite of the seemingly identical interests of the two ruling groups, British and Fulani, it was to be several years before Kano's traditional rulers finally adjusted to their new roles under the colonial regime. British intentions in the political sphere are best described by Lugard himself; they did not envisage

two sets of Rulers - the British and the Native - working either separately or in co-operation, but a single Government in which the Native Chiefs have clearly defined duties and an acknowledged status, equally with the British officials. 1

Lugard in particular had no illusions about the potential difficulties. He therefore made it clear to his subordinates that the inauguration of pax Britannica was the opportune time to introduce any essential and important changes, as any delay could give rise to future difficulties.² Specifically, he desired the decentralization

1. Lugard, Political Memoranda, 1906, p. 191, (cited in M. Perham, Lugard II, p. 144).

2. Lugard, Memo. on the taxation of natives (Cd. 3309, 1907), p.5.

of executive authority, which had hitherto been concentrated in the hands of the Emirs and their royal slaves.¹ It was consequently not surprising, as one observer of the Lugardian system has noted, that the difficulties encountered during the formative years of Indirect Rule had a lot to do with the adjustment of relations between the British and the Emirs themselves.² In the Kano Emirate, these difficulties were at first submerged in the general euphoria of the seeming cooperation between Muhammadu Abbas and his subordinate officials on the one hand, and the British Residents on the other. In fact in the very early Annual Reports, there would seem to have been a deliberate conspiracy between Lugard and the first Kano Resident, Dr. F. Cargill (1903 - 08) to mask the difficulties encountered. The Kano Emir's loyalty and complete cooperation were taken for granted by the new overlords, especially in view of his seeming cooperation in subverting the hijra of Sultan Attahiru Ahmadu and his followers in mid-1903. The British branded Attahiru and his followers as the 'irreconcilables'. The movement of these people caused much commotion during the months of May and June in the southern and eastern parts of Kano emirate. Reportedly, Abbas warned his subjects of the dire consequences if any should join the exodus to the east. He was also said to have deployed mounted patrols along the eastern borders of the emirate to discourage any Kano people who might be inclined to migrate eastwards. Furthermore, Resident Cargill ascribed the dissociation of the Emirs of Hadeji'a and Katagum from Attahiru's movement to the good offices of the Emir of Kano, who seemed to have supported the Government in the most

1. Lugard, *ibid.*, p.6.

2. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, (London, 1938), p. 422.

loyal manner.¹ By the time Attahiru's movement was crushed at Burmi on 27th July, 1903, the British were convinced that in the Emir of Kano they had a more than willing protege. It did not then occur to either Lugard or Cargill that it was in the vital interests of Abbas to cooperate with the colonial regime in crushing the movement, as otherwise the doubtful legitimacy of his accession would be shown for what it was, namely that he was backed by foreign 'infidels'. As it was Lugard almost became a complete admirer of Abbas. Cargill's enthusiasm was somewhat less, but he ~~to~~^{toyed} the generally approving line up to about 1907. In the meantime, the High Commissioner's enthusiasm and approval for Emir Abbas were undisguised: in jubilant terms he reported that the Emir not only actively aided in subverting Attahiru's hijra, but also refused ~~there~~^{thereafter} to send the customary annual tribute to Sokoto, arguing that it was to the British that such tribute was due.² Furthermore, the High Commissioner added, Muhammadu Abbas

has always exerted himself to make his chiefs accept the situation created by our occupation in the proper spirit. He is imbued with no arrogant notions or false pride. 'The country is yours', he is fond of saying, 'you have put me to shepherd it'.³

Lugard assured his readers that both ~~himself~~^{he} and Resident Cargill had 'very complete confidence' in the Emir.⁴ By 1904 Lugard was reporting in general terms the good qualities of the Fulani rulers of Northern Nigeria, qualities which enabled administration to be

1. C.O. 446/31/24916, enclosure I, Cargill to Ag. High Commissioner W. Wallace, (dated 15th May, 1903); also cf. C.O.446/31/26250, Gollan to Secretary of State, Zungeru, 9th June, 1903.

2. Lugard, Annual Reports, 1903, p. 4.

3. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 4.

4. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 8.

carried on effectively and efficiently with a smaller number of British officials than would otherwise have been possible; Lugard had by then also noted the progress of the Fulani rulers in 'methods of civilized rule'.¹ Focussing attention on Kano, Lugard reported the 'friendly' visit of the Emir Abbas to himself at Zungeru in March, 1904.² The reasons for the visit were ascribed to

rumours in W.A.F.F. circles that the Emir was projecting an attack on them, and Kano people also thinking that W.A.F.F. projected an attack on Kano. Enemies of the Emir and the British were apparently behind the rumours. The Emir's visit to Zungeru and safe return effectively silenced the suspicions and mutual mistrust and proved his loyalty beyond doubt, thereby dashing the designs of his enemies. 3

A seemingly very satisfactory solution to a temporary misunderstanding. Emir Abbas for his part took the opportunity, on his return from Zungeru, to depose the Wazirin Kano, Suleiman Sarki, and the Alkalin Kano.⁴ Suleiman Sarki was succeeded as Waziri by the emir's eldest son, Abdullahi Bayero (Emir 1926 - 53), who in his turn was succeeded in the title of Ciroma by a younger brother, Abdulkadir. The key position of Alkali was conferred on Gidado, a close personal friend to the Emir. At about the same time the Ma'aji (treasurer), Usman, was also dismissed and disgraced. In this way Abbas disposed of officials who were proving difficult, even though in the first instance they had got their positions due to the Emir elevating them instead of other candidates.⁵ Resident Cargill and his subordinates were made to believe that these officials had been purged for

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p. 5.

2. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 33.

3. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 4-5.

4. Cf. Labarun Hausawa, II, p.72.

5. Labarun Hausawa, II, p. 72.

'misappropriating revenue' and the British officials were therefore gladdened by the Emir's 'great assistance in their conviction'.¹ Little did the British suspect that the purges were occasioned by conflicts of personality, the Emir's fears that some of his officials were surreptitiously casting doubts on his character and piety and the danger that such aspersions might reach the ears of the British and cause them to disapprove of him.² It was only later that the British were to learn of these circumstances.

In the short term, the Europeans were satisfied with the official conduct of their appointee. The years 1905 and 1906 were relatively happy ones from the British point of view. During the former year, the High Commissioner was satisfied that Emir Abbas had 'maintained the character he had established for loyalty, integrity and hard work'.³ In the latter year, also, the mood was the same, even though progress had not been as rapid as was expected and there had been 'a certain amount of discontent'.⁴ This passing allusion to discontent was a veiled reference to the fact that things had not been going on very well between the Kano ruler and his British 'advisers'. That the inherent conflict in the ideas of the two sides had not manifested itself earlier had been due largely to the influence of Lugard himself; for he regarded Muhammadu Abbas as a 'personal friend'.⁵ Furthermore, Lugard had been firmly convinced that Kano and Sokoto were the two 'best ruled of the emirates'.⁶ Also, it was generally assumed that

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p.33.

2. Many stories are extant regarding Abbas's less than exemplary habits and relative lack of piety and learning.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905 - 06, p. 26.

4. W. Wallace, Annual Report, 1906 - 7, p. 9.

5. Lugard, letter to Lady Lugard, 4/1/1905 (cited in Perham, Lugard II, p. 201).

6. Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p. 16.

not much in the way of enlightenment could be expected from the then generation of Fulani rulers. In any case the Residents and their assistants were shackled by Lugard's injunctions that they should support the authority of the Emirs, restrain from open interference in day-to-day affairs, and influence the rulers by persuasion only, lest their prestige and esteem in the eyes of their subjects be impaired.¹ During the High Commissionership of Lugard, such injunctions had the effect of making the colonial administrators generally wary of acting decisively in too many matters. In Kano, Dr. Cargill and Captain H.C.B. Phillips confined their vigour mainly to upholding the Emir's authority, namely his prerogatives in administrative, customary, and judicial matters, especially where his titled officials were involved. Abbas was allowed to depose his officials almost whenever he felt like doing so. And, whenever the 'peasantry showed a desire to throw off the yoke', the colonial regime dealt with such untoward behaviour with prompt military measures.² For example, subsequent to the conquest of Kano in 1903, the British found that the talakawa in the western districts of the emirate were 'sullen and turbulent' and towards the end of that year the conquerors were obliged to send a military patrol into the area so as to enforce payment of taxation and crush a 'rising of the talakawa against their headmen'. In the following years, the new overlords were compelled to repeat the same process practically every year.³

The illusion of amity and voluntary cooperation between ruler and ruled was too good to be true. By Proclamation No. 4 of June, 1904, the colonial regime decreed its right to 'a certain proportion

1. Lugard, Political Memoranda, 1906, p. ; cf. Perham, Lugard II, p.152-53.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, 1903, p. 4.

3. SNP/1538/1908, Dr. F. Cargill, p.10; see p.214ff for a detailed discussion of the talakawa attitude to the new, colonial situation.

of the tributes or taxes paid by the peasantry' on the produce of their land (and livestock).¹ This proclamation was superseded by the Native Revenue Proclamation (No. 2) of April, 1906, which codified and legalized the various customary taxes, apportioned (once more) 50 per cent of all tax returns to the Government, and limited the amounts which could be levied.² During the tax years 1904/05 and 1905/06, however, the Government could not fully realise its share of the taxes from Kano emirate; in fact the regime could claim only a quarter instead of half the proceeds.³ The official reason given was that 'it was found impossible without a cheap means of transport to realise even what was received, and upwards of £5,000 worth of cowries were carried forward unrealised at the close of the financial year 1905/6'.⁴ Due to the shortage of British-introduced silver currency, it had so far been possible only to claim the bulk of the British share of taxes in bags of cowries, which were then disposed of by public auction.⁵ These periodic auctions released on to the market vast quantities of cowries, no doubt causing a further inflation of the cowrie currency, with its accompanying fluctuations in the rate of exchange. Such problems were repeatedly bemoaned by the colonial Residents. However, they were no more than the continuation of a pattern familiar since the last decades of the nineteenth century. The unrealised bags of cowries accrued to the Emir and his officials, thereby adding to

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1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p.10; Memo.on Taxation(cd.3309,1907),p.4.
 2. Lugard, cd.3309, *ibid.*,p.4,5; cf. Perham, Lugard II, p.165; Mary Bull, Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria 1906-11, in *Essays in Imperial Government* (ed. K.Robinson & F. Madden), p.64-65.
 3. N.A.K./SNP/1538/1908, F.Cargill,Kano Province Report 1907, p.41; Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-6, p.46.
 4. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-6, p.46.
 5. N.A.K./SNP/1538/1908, F.Cargill, *op.cit.*, p.42.

their income.¹ Besides the exchange difficulties, the colonial regime was faced with problems of graver proportions in the taxation sphere.

Numerous administrative problems were posed to the British regime if taxation was to be properly assessed, its incidence equitably distributed, and the returns properly collected without extortion or embezzlement. Central to a resolution of these related issues was the transparent necessity for a recognized tax collector or collectors who could be held responsible for the amounts due from all corners of the Kano Emirate. Attempts to resolve the matter brought into the open the ambivalence and contradictions in colonial policies and in the event created what amounted to a crisis of sorts. How, for example, could the British support the authority of the Emir and at the same time introduce changes to facilitate easy administration and tax collection? How, indeed, were the desired changes to be effected, since they would inevitably entail a certain degree of decentralizing emirate central authority by the disbandment of what the British termed 'the palace clique', namely the royal slaves who surrounded the Emir, and many of whom were the tax collectors? Emir Abbas and his officials were, like their predecessors, accustomed to the existing system whereby practically all state titled notables lived at the capital, leaving such tedious chores as the assessment and collection of taxes to their underlings.² From the colonial regime's viewpoint, apart from administrative convenience and dislike for the institution of slavery, it was essential to raise a tangible revenue so as to reduce dependence on the annual grant-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury. Accordingly, during 1904 and the early

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905 - 6, p. 46.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, 1902, p. 21-22; Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p. 13.

months of 1905, Resident Cargill had the arduous task of visiting every town and hamlet within ^K Kano Emirate with a view to ascertaining (a) what its taxes consisted of, and (b) to whom they were paid.¹ During the course of the extensive tour, Cargill visited more than 1,100 towns and villages.² In all these places the Resident diligently pursued his enquiries after explaining the purpose to assemblies of town and village heads and the peasantry. He especially emphasised that his enquiries were designed to do away with the jakada system.³ By about early 1905 the Resident had acquired a clearer picture of the distribution of the scattered fiefs all over the emirate. He had also come to the conclusion that the Fulani fief-holders could be usefully engaged as the agents for collecting the various taxes instead of the jakadu. Cargill was in fact so confident of his ability to work with the Fulani chieftains that he described them thus:

As a class they are men of refinement and understanding, and existing abuses can hardly be laid to their charge, as their offices have hitherto been merely nominal, and their functions usurped by the big slaves. 4

The first stage towards progress was seen as the redistributing of existing fiefs between the titled emirate officials, excluding as far as possible those of them who were of slave descent or status. Thus, whereas up to this time an official's fief could be anywhere in the emirate, the Resident proceeded to create a new administrative

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905-6, p. 23.

2. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 23.

3. Cargill, cited in Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p. 18; for discussion of Jakada system, see p. 73-77

4. Cargill, letter to Lugard (n.d.), in Annual Report, 1904, p. 18.

unit, the gunduma, which the British termed a 'hamlet' - an area comprising of a fair-sized town or village with its surrounding satellite settlements and homesteads.¹ Thus, whereas a hamlet ordinarily means the small settlements round a larger village, the term was used in a different sense in this context. The term gunduma means simply to redistribute land, especially if this entails assigning one person's land to another. It had had no administrative meaning until then. We must therefore remember that both the terms 'hamlet' and gunduma are used in these special senses and that the colonial regime equated the two terms. Later still in the colonial era, the regime for a time used the term 'village group unit' as a substitute for hamlet and gunduma. At the head of each gunduma a formal village head was appointed and given some executive authority in tax collection and the maintenance of law and order. The gunduma heads were to be responsible to higher authority, which for the time being we will term fief-district Heads. With the boundaries of each gunduma more or less demarcated, the gundumoni(pl.) which fell in an area comprising an official's greatest concentration of pre-1903 fiefs were put under that official's charge - thus forming his new fief-district.² The function of these new fief-district Heads was to be tax collection primarily. Excluding Kano City, the rest of the emirate was divided into thirty-three consolidated fief-districts, making 34 divisions all told.³ Because the colonial overlords were

1. Because of this innovation, Dr. Cargill is remembered at Kano as Mai Gunduma, - the creator (or owner) of hamlets.

2. See map, enclosure to 1904 Annual Report.

3. NAK/SNP/472/1909, Major A. Festing, Kano Province Report 1908, p.2,4; W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province, (London, 1921), p.

adamant in their insistence on consolidating the Fulani fief system, Emir Abbas made sure that his family got as many as possible of these newly consolidated fief-districts. It should be emphasised that Abbas was totally opposed to the scheme but he had no choice, so he used the situation as best he could. These reforms were not achieved overnight and the re-arrangements dragged on until 1908, and even after that year additional difficulties came to light and had to be corrected. If the consolidation policy could not be prevented, the Sullubawa royal family could at least benefit from the new system. In any event Abbas managed to limit the departure from the old fief system by insisting that some of his most important slave officials were given fief-districts. A breakdown of the jurisdiction over the new divisions was as follows: sixteen went to titled scions of the royal Sullubawa family (mainly Abbas's own brothers); three were given to the charge of royal slaves - Dan Rimi, Salama, and Shamaki; three more were entrusted to men to whom Abbas owed political debts: the Maga,jin Malam Ma-Chedi, the Maajin Watari, and the Mai Unguwa Kutumbawa; of the rest the bulk went to the clan leaders customarily associated with administration and fief-holding. Of the rural potentates (F. Ardo'en; H. Manyan dagatai) only the Sarkin Rano and the Sarkin Fulani Ja'idanawa were lucky enough to be retained as fief-district chiefs in their own right.¹ This arrangement was, per se, a radical departure from Fulani practices. For in the traditional Fulani hierarchy, below the emirate titled officials at the capital came these rural ardo'en in their order of precedence: Sarkin Bebeji, Sarkin Jahun, Sarkin Fulani Sankara, Sarkin Shanono, Sarkin Kunci, Sarkin Dambatta,

1. See map, enclosure to Annual Report 1904, appended list of fief-district chiefs by title.

Sarkin Rano, Sarkin Dutse, Sarkin Gaya, Sarkin Karaye, and Sarkin Birnin Kudu. Sarkin Fulani Ja'idanawa was somewhat junior to all these. The fact that only the last named and Sarkin Rano were designated fief-district chiefs meant that the rest were reduced in status, most of them ending up as mere village heads in the colonial era, whereas in the pre-British era all of them had jurisdiction over relatively large slices of territory, and in addition many (for example Sarakunan Jahun, Shanono, and Sankara) had extra-territorial jurisdictions with regards to certain nomadic and even settled Fulani clans.

Kano city remained directly under the Emir's jurisdiction, though he delegated Ma'ajin Watari to be in administrative charge. This also is a radical change, because in Fulani practice Kano city had been administered by the ward heads (H. masu unguwa) who were in turn directly responsible to the Emir himself. The elevation of Ma'ajin Watari to the overall headship of the city interposed an intermediary between the ward heads and the ruler. This situation no doubt reduced the status of the ward heads. To explain their failure to persuade Abbas to disown his slave officials completely, the British decided to regard the compromise as a temporary concession to the Emir in view of his total opposition to the scheme of redistribution.¹ In any event, it was explained, this temporary concession was allowed 'in recognition of the loyalty and ability' of the Emir.² Furthermore, as far as the British were concerned, the Emir would himself be regarded as the 'district head' of the slave fief-districts - the implication being

1. Lugard, Annual Report, 1905 - 6, p. 24.

2. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 25.

that he was merely delegating his jurisdiction to servants.¹ In this way, it was hoped that no formal recognition was being given to the royal slaves while at the same time the reluctant cooperation of the Emir was being enrolled. It was deemed necessary to placate the Emir so that the new scheme would be acceptable to the ruling groups whether or not they were inclined to give support.

The promulgation of the 1906 Native Revenue Proclamation marked a decisive step in the policy of consolidating the administrative and taxation schemes of the colonial government. As already alluded to, this proclamation reiterated the regime's claim to 50% of all tax revenues, laid down limits to assessment and legalized the indigenous taxes. It also placed the British administrative officers in charge of supervisory work in connection with the collection of the taxes.² More specifically, the Europeans were expected to check the taxpayers' lists submitted by each village, town, and gunduma through the appropriate officials respectively. The desirability for this cannot be over-emphasised, as the assessments varied from place to place and the taxes were numerous. In Kano, as in the other Muslim emirates, the colonial regime had to contend with some nine different taxes, the most important being Kurdin Kasa, shuka, karofi, zakhat (these were taxes for the use of agricultural land), and jangali, a cattle tax for the use of pasture land the main burden of which fell on the nomadic Fulani who had vast herds.³ Through constant checks and revision, the Government hoped to limit the tax burden and eliminate abuses. Unfortunately, in 1906 as in

1. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 25.

2. Lugard, Memo. on taxation (c.d. 3309, 1907), p. 4-5.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, 1904, p. 12-13; NAK/SNP/3635/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Prov. Report half year 1909, para. 10; W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London, 1921), p. —; cf. H. Barth, *Travels*.

the preceding years, the British administration found it impossible to check thoroughly the tax lists and assessments due to shortage of staff and the alleged 'mistatements of the talakawa and village headmen themselves'.¹ Therefore, the desirable and intended amalgamation of the various taxes into a single General Tribute Tax (H. Haraji) had of necessity to be postponed indefinitely.²

Meanwhile, the British suspected that the tax lists and returns submitted to them by the emirate indigenous authorities represented only about 75% of the actual totals, and that the talakawa were victimized further by surreptitious and irregular levies.³ It should be noted that there were only two British administrators in the emirate, and it was impossible for them to check on everything even if they wanted to. Of this period's taxation, one colonial Resident (A. Festing) firmly believed that:

There was really no check. The (tax) books kept were useless for calculating purposes and so far as we were concerned were purely concocted in order to impose and bewilder us. 4

The traditional fiefdoms and the extra-territorial jurisdictions which determined to whom the land, produce and cattle taxes were paid were obviously confusing to the newcomers. It was partly to eliminate the confusions that Cargill instituted his gunduma and fief-district reforms. The British found that for tax purposes, the whole Kano Emirate was divided into consolidated groups of farms, instead of consolidated groups of habitations which would have made administration and supervision easier.⁵ And, since the most onerous and important taxes were paid for the use of land or the produce from the land,

1. NAK/SNP/1538/1908, F.Cargill, Kano Province Report 1907, p.43.

2. *ibid.*, p. 43.

3. *ibid.*, p.42.

4. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Province Report, 1908, p.7.

5. NAK/SNP/3635/1909, C.L. Temple para. 16.

it followed that a man might be living in a particular habitation (e.g. village) whereas he paid his produce and land taxes to the chief of a different locality, because his farm-land fell under the jurisdiction of the latter chief.¹ In fact this was what obtained, at least in some localities of the emirate. It was found, for example, that in the new fief-district of Kura to the South of Kano city, the town of Chiromawa had 309 households (i.e. compounds or families) of whom 179 owed taxes and therefore allegiance to Sarkin Chiromawa but 63, 30, 21 and 16 households owed taxes and allegiance to the Sarakuna of the towns of Kadama, Ringimawa, Garun Babba and Malam respectively.² In the last named town Malam, it was discovered that of the 458 households, 303 owed taxes and allegiance to the town's Sarki, while 104, 28, and 23 owed the same respectively to Sarkin Jobawa, Sarkin Ringimawa, and Sarkin Kamfawa.³ At the town of Ringimawa, 87 only out of a total of 143 households paid the land and produce taxes to the town's Sarki.⁴ This arrangement whereby jurisdictions overlapped applied in varying degrees to all the towns in the neighbourhood.⁵ The old system of taxation has persisted in spite of the reforms of Cargill - hence the complex tax payments still in practice. The British, in the event, estimated that nearly half the population of the emirate were affected by these overlapping jurisdictions which made the business of tax collection and supervision very complex and difficult.⁶ Not surprisingly,

1. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 16.

2. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 22.

3. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 23.

4. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 24.

5. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 25, 26, 27.

6. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*, para. 17.

they were perplexed, and therefore suspected that the tax lists and returns were understated by the emirate hierarchy. However, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that these complexities must have daunted even the traditional leaders themselves. But it must also be said that whereas the traditional emirate authorities were quite prepared to enrol, and in fact welcomed, British support in the enforcement and collection of the customary taxes, they were less than enthusiastic in helping the new overlords to streamline and rationalize these taxes.

Cargill's innovation of the gunduma and the creation of consolidated fief-districts were designed with the view, among other things, to rationalize the processes of taxation, simplify the administration and enable a proper supervision by the colonial administrative staff. In view of the lukewarm attitude of the emirate leaders to the reforms, the new masters gradually came to the viewpoint that the only way to progress was to send the fief-district heads to live in their territories permanently in due course. Meantime the fief-district chiefs continued to reside in the capital city as in the old days, though Resident Cargill made it clear that they were expected to collect the taxes themselves and the jakada system was to cease.¹ In the tax collecting season of 1905/06, however, it was found that the fief-district chiefs had done nothing personally to oversee collections themselves, instead they had left their underlings and slave jakadu to undertake all the chores. But nothing could be done immediately to put a stop to this undesirable delegation of executive duties. However, in the tax season of 1906 - 07, the British literally drove out all

1. NAK/SNP/472/1909, Arthur Festing, Kano Province Report, 1908, p. 2-3.

the fief-district chiefs to their territories and held them directly responsible for the Government's and Emir's share of the taxes - the Government's share to be handed over with all expedition to the Emir, who in turn was to hand it over to the colonial administrators.¹ Such apparent decisiveness on the part of the colonial administration was very unpopular with Emir Abbas, the fief-district chiefs, the customary jakadu, and allegedly even the talakawa themselves:

To the Emir it suggested the curtailing of his power in the land as well as his income. To the District Heads it meant their performing themselves what they had previously left to their underlings. To the underlings and household slaves (H. cucanawa) it meant that their power and *raison d'etre* was a thing of the past; whilst to the talakawa or agricultural class it was unpalatable because to such a class any new method of taxation or collection of taxes is naturally viewed with distrust. 2

Emir Abbas was especially dissatisfied with the latest arrangement. He imagined that some of his subordinate officials were about to be upgraded to independent status in their respective territories, for there was talk of establishing permanent headquarters for these officials away from Kano city. Also, the Emir was not unaware of the fact that some of these fief-districts were so large as to fulfill the territorial and population requirements of medium-sized polities. He was thus particularly suspicious of his brothers and relations who had been entrusted large fief-districts, namely the Galadima Umaru, the Turaki Manyu Salihi, the Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida Idrisu, and the Barde Abdu Na-Gwangwazo. That the Emir's suspicions were not groundless could be seen in the colonial representatives' view that some of these chiefs were 'really sub-Emirs' as their territories were very large.³ To the titled officials, too, the enforced duties

1. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p. 3.

2. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p. 3.

3. NAK/SNP/6415/1909, Kano Province Report 1909 (Judicial Supplement), para. 169.

of tax collection ^{were} ~~was~~ equally distasteful. To a man they considered it below their dignity to undertake the task, especially as their household retainers and slaves were available for just such duties. It must also be remembered that each titled official had below him a hierarchy of titled subordinates corresponding to the Emirate hierarchy.

In the end, Abbas bowed to the inevitable and persuaded his officials to accept the situation as otherwise a worse fate might be in store for all of them.¹ As for the household followers and jakadu, the new system was distasteful because it deprived them of their advantageous positions as intermediaries, spies and informers - a situation which enabled them to tyrannize the talakawa and exercise power without any responsibility.² Finally, the talakawa were suspicious of this novelty because, apart from their assumed conservatism, they feared they would suffer more from the visitations of these almighty, and in many cases royal, potentates from the capital city.

The British administration was, however, very satisfied with the results by the end of the 1906/7 tax season. First, it had become evident that so long as Emir Abbas could be prevailed upon to bow to the inevitable and see his position in the proper perspectives, there was no reason why his prestige should suffer in the eyes of his officials and subjects. Secondly, the regime had been enabled to gauge the capabilities of the fief-district chiefs.

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1. The writer was given a graphic account of the reactions of Galadima Umaru and the Emir's assurances and reasoning which persuaded the former to go out into the country.
 2. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Prov. Report, 1908, p. 7; Lugard, Annual Report, 1903, p. ; see also M.G. Smith, Govt. in Zazzau, (London, 1960), for discussion of the role and functions of the jakada.

Thirdly, without any increase in the incidence per taxpayer, the yield of the taxes had risen appreciably. Fourthly, it had become evident that, given determination on the part of the British regime, the indigenous officials could be turned into useful and effective agents of government.¹ In view of these positive results with regards to the 1906/07 tax collection season, it was decided to repeat the process in the next season, 1907/08. However, at about the same time there developed a new crisis involving the British administrators on the one hand and the Emir on the other. In October, 1907, Dr. Cargill, the First Class Resident in charge of the Kano Province (of which Kano Emirate was the most important polity) returned from more than a year's absence, arriving at Kano on the 16th. He was incensed by the hostility of Emir Abbas to the reforms in taxation and the attempts towards consolidating the fief-district policy. He therefore determined, whether the Emir approved or not, not only once again to send the fief-district chiefs to their territories to collect the taxes but also to make them live permanently at headquarters he had pre-selected for them away from the city.² In furtherance of this aim, Cargill instituted what then amounted to draconian measures, the main points being the abolition of the slave fief-districts, and re-grouping of the ten smaller fief-districts nearest to Kano city into a single, large 'Home District', and as well as the removal of the Waziri, Maa'ji, Alkali, and Imam from being in charge of fief-districts. Instead the latter titled officials were made city executives and principal advisers to the Emir.³

1. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Province Report, 1908, p. 3-4.

2. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p.6.

3. NAK/SNP/1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Annual Report, 1907, p. 45; AG. Resident Hamilton Browne, SNP/2949/1908, Report for Half year 1908, p. 1-2; A. Festing, SNP/472/1909, Kano Province Report, 1908, p. 4-5.

This many-sided measure involved a thorough reorganization of the whole structure of emirate administration and gave rise to acrimonious controversy. Of the three slaves who forfeited their fief-districts one, Dan Rimi Allah-bar-Sarki, was appointed the Waziri of Kano and chief adviser to Emir Abbas and general intermediary between the British and native wings of the administration.¹

The new Waziri was enslaved when young as a result of a raid on the Warji tribe of Ningi during the reign of Emir Abdullah b. Ibrahim (1855-82). By 1903 he had risen to the position of Sarkin Hatsi, and Abbas on his accession promoted him to the title of Dan Rimi and appointed him messenger to the British Resident, Dr. Cargill. In this latter capacity he seemed to have done an excellent job which greatly impressed the Resident. His reward was the unilateral promotion to the position of Waziri against the wishes, and without the concurrence, of Emir Abbas; and neither did Cargill await for approval from the colonial secretariat at Zungeru.² It should perhaps be emphasised here that the office of Waziri, though it had had a chequered career in Fulani Kano, was not customarily a slave office. Apparently, Cargill also cajoled the Emir into granting Allah-bar-Sarki his freedom from slave status just on the eve of the latter's elevation.³ Concurrently with the elevation of Allah-bar-Sarki, Dr. Cargill reduced the former Waziri (i.e. displaced) Abdullahi Bayero (Emir 1926-53) to the position of Ciroma and headman in charge of the newly formed 'Home District' with headquarters at Dawakin Kudu and from 1914 at Fanisau; Bayero's younger

1. NAK/SNP/2949/1908, Hamilton Browne, Half Year report 1908, p.2.

2. See especially NAK/SNP/6415/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Report 1909 (Judicial Supplement), para. 45.

3. NAK/SNP/2949/1908, Hamilton Browne, Kano Province Report Half year 1908, p. 2.

brother, Abdulkadir, who had been Ciroma until then, was sent back to school.¹ It would seem that Cargill was particularly upset by Abdullahi Bayero's over-bearing manner in dealings not only with other Fulani officials but also with the more junior British staff. Abbas was thus doubly displeased, for Abdullahi Bayero was his eldest and favourite son. His demotion was seen by the Emir as the first step in his own deposition from the throne and expulsion from Kano. The Emir's fears were further increased by the other changes accompanying these above.

When the British occupied Kano in 1903 and appointed Abbas Emir, they found only two courts for the administration of justice in the whole emirate - the Alkali's, and the Emir's, which was the final court of appeal.² Up to the end of 1907, they did not tamper with this judicial arrangement.³ In 1904 these two courts were graded Class A, with equal powers, but in the course of the coming years the Resident discovered that 'Abbas wanted to retain the power of the Emir's Court in his own hands as Aliyu (his predecessor) had done before him'; further, Abbas was accused of using his court 'simply as a means of paying off old scores and overruling the Alkali's awards'.⁴ Early in 1908 at the same time that the other measures were being enforced, Resident Cargill suspended the powers of the Emir's judicial court, leaving only the Alkali as the final

1. Hamilton Browne, *ibid.*, p. 1,2; NAK/SNP/6415/1909, para. 45.

2. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Province Report 1908, p.11.

3. NAK/SNP/1538/1908, F. Cargill, letter in reply to comments of Ag. Secretary Northern Nigeria in 1907 Kano Province Report, (n.d.).

4. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Province Report 1908, p. 11-12.

court of appeal in the local judicial arrangements.¹ The suspension of the emir's judicial council was not only unfair to Abbas but was to prove unacceptable to the Resident's superiors at Zungeru - for throughout the colonial period the British administration never pretended to practice the separation of church and state or judicial from executive powers. At the same time subordinate courts were established in the outlying districts and the Alkali of Kano was formally made their executive head.² As far as Abbas was concerned, this was one more indication of impending doom. As if all these were not enough, Resident Cargill moved a step further in his fief-district consolidation policy. In the second quarter of 1908 he dragged the emirate decisively away from the nineteenth century administrative organization. We have already alluded to the forfeiture of their fief-districts by the slave hakimai, and the cessation of the post of Waziri carrying with it jurisdiction over a fief-district. Also, we have noted that the Emir's eldest son and newly-appointed Ciroma was placed in charge of the 'Home District' which comprised the ten fief-districts nearest to the capital. The ex-Waziri's former fief-district was divided into the new, consolidated administrative districts of Dutse, Gaya, and Barden Kano with headquarters in Dutse, Gaya and Jahun respectively.³ To the west of Kano, Karaye district was carved out of the Sarki Dawaki Mai Tuta's extensive fief-district.⁴ Similar but minor adjustments were made in other parts of the emirate. The administrative shape

1. NAK/SNP/2949/1908, H. Browne Kano Province Report half year 1908, p. 2; A. Festing, *ibid.*, p. 12.

2. Hamilton Browne, *ibid.*, p.2.

3. See Gaya District Note Book, Jahun District Note Book & Dutse District Note Book.

4. cf. Karaye District Note Book; Gwarzo District Note Book.

which emerged was quite different from what obtained in the preceding years. In place of the former 34 fief-districts, there emerged 14 relatively large districts including the Home District but excluding Kano City which was entrusted to the charge of Maajin Watari Adamu.¹ As a corollary to these changes, the titled officials from the city were forced to go out and live in their territories permanently.² Care was taken to ensure that each new administrative district was of a sufficiently large size for taxation and other purposes.³ District capitals were selected, the choice being based on size of town and its history, and as far as possible each new entity was given its share of rich farmland and less useful farmland.⁴ Also, to each district headquarters an alkali was appointed to bolster the executive powers of the district head as well as ^{to} administer justice in most civil matters.⁵

In the context of the newly consolidated districts, Dr. Cargill took steps to appease the titled officials who had been unfavourably affected by his consolidation measures. Those of them whose fief-districts have been submerged in the Ciroma's large Home District were appointed Sub-District Heads. Similar sub-divisions and appointments were made in the outlying districts. Thus, the Emirate came to have 14 Districts and 56 sub-Districts.⁶ And, from this time

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1. For a detailed analysis of the administrative reorganization, see NAK/SNP/2949/1908, H. Browne, Kano Province Report half year 1908, p. 1-2; also C.L. Temple, Native Races and their Rulers (Capetown 1918).
 2. NAK/SNP/472/1909, A. Festing, Kano Province Report 1908, p.4.
 3. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p.4.
 4. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p.6.
 5. A. Festing, *ibid.*, p.
 6. NAK/SNP/134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, p.2, para. 6.

(1908) onwards, it would be proper to refer to Districts, Districts Heads, and Sub-District Heads - terms which have come to be closely associated with the administrative system of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria. The distinction from the fief-district system of 1904 - 07 should be obvious. Whereas the fief-district system with its absentee chiefs, etc. was akin to the traditional nineteenth century system, from 1908 onwards the territorial chieftains lived permanently in their holdings and their authority was bolstered by the appointment of District Alkalaj. Also, from 1908 onwards, as far as the British were concerned the jakada system had come to an end.¹ Undoubtedly, by these administrative and legal measures, Dr. Cargill and his assistants intended that the administration of Kano Emirate should be decentralised as far as possible away from the Emir's palace and judicial court. And, in furtherance of this aim, the Maaji (Native Treasurer) was removed from the charge of a tiny fief-district and assigned duties solely relating to the disbursement and accounting of the Emir's share of the taxes.² All these 1908 changes were to remain the basis of Kano emirate administration for many decades to come. The processes of consolidation, improvement and occasional re-adjustment were to continue, but the basic structure as outlined was not tampered with. An aspect of Cargill's energetic reforms was his premature attempt then to amalgamate the several taxes into a single tax, but this only succeeded in creating chaos at the grassroots level and Cargill had to be got rid of.

Before discussing further the continuing story of emirate and district administration, taxation, legal and other matters, it would be

1. SNP/2949/1908, H. Browne, Kano Province Report Half Year 1908, p.1.

2. H. Browne, *ibid.*, p.2.

worth our while to refer to a three-sided controversy which arose as a result of Dr. Cargill's 1908 measures. On perusal of the Cargill report on the changes, the then acting Secretary to the colonial Government of Northern Nigeria, Major Alder Burdon (a pro-Fulani official), specifically questioned the legality and wisdom of some of the Resident's measures. He particularly disapproved of the appointment of a man of slave descent to the position of Waziri of Kano:

The Office of Waziri is stated by all natives I know to be one of the "Royal" Offices of Kano. It has always been held by one of the highest dan Sarki (princes) the holder has been next to the Emir in importance, never has he been even a 'Talaka' (commoner) much less a slave. I cannot say whether this is true historically, but what does matter is the way the people regard the office. 1

Burdon went on further to assert that Cargill's action had caused 'consternation' and was one of the prime causes of unrest in Kano.² Burdon added that the Emir of Bida (Nupe) had informed him that the Emir of Kano had sent to Bida 'a very frightened message ... begging for his protection and for a place to live' when the day (imminent it seemed) finally came of his deposition and expulsion from Kano.³ The Acting Secretary's comments concluded by attributing all the troubles with the Emir of Kano to Dr. Cargill's 'direct method of rule' and failure to delegate authority.⁴ Burdon was, of course, an old Niger Company man, who had opposed military operations against Sokoto and Kano in 1903.⁵ Since then, he had become a great admirer of Fulani administrative talents and an advocate of caution

1. SNP/1538/1908, Ag. Secretary Burdon, comments on 1907 Report, dated 23/5/1908.

2. A. Burdon, *ibid.*

3. A. Burdon, *ibid.*

4. A. Burdon, *ibid.*

5. See D.J.M. Muffett, Concerning Brave Captains (London, 1964), *passim*.

in all dealings with them.¹

In an undated reply, Cargill vehemently denied that there had been any attempt on his part to introduce direct rule in Kano.² He maintained that on the contrary, he had always endeavoured to cooperate with the Emir whenever the latter acted loyally along the lines of Government policy.³ Cargill went on to explain that whenever he had found it necessary to work without Abbas's cooperation, it had been due to the Emir's 'covert opposition to the District Headman policy and the constant intrigues of the palace slaves to nullify it'.⁴ The Resident justified the appointment of Allah-bar-Sarki as Wazirin Kano in these words:

I wanted the Waziri to become an office-holder in Kano i.e. principal counsellor and I did not think that the Emir's son would exercise sufficient influence with his father. At the same time I was aware that the Emir would be jealous of any other member of his family being raised to that position; he would not however feel any jealousy of a trusted slave.⁵

Cargill, however, admitted that his action was rather arbitrary and not in accordance with Kano precedents. Nevertheless, the Resident reiterated that his hands were forced to take this, and other, measures by the Emir's hostility to administrative reforms, his determination to retain all judicial powers in his own hands even though he lacked legal training, and his affliction by an almost insane dynastic fear, a weakness which made Abbas suspect that any proposed change was designed to bring about his downfall and

1. See R. Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria* (London, 1968), p. 22, 59.

2. SNP/1538/1908, F. Cargill, Reply to points raised by Ag. Secretary (n.d.).

3. F. Cargill, *ibid.*

4. F. Cargill, *ibid.*

5. F. Cargill, *ibid.*

replacement on the throne by ex-Emir Aliyu Babba (1894-1903).¹ Thus unfolded the debate between Cargill and his assistants on the one hand, and the Acting Secretary to the Government on the other. It was not resolved until Mr. C.L. Temple, a firm but persuasive supporter of the Fulani ruling groups, was sent to take charge of Kano Province in January, 1909. Muhammadu Abbas did not cease his attempts to limit, if he could not prevent, a good deal of the changes desired by the colonial regime. And neither did he abandon his fear of imminent, though in the event imagined, deposition and probable replacement by ex-Emir Aliyu or somebody else.

Abbas was sensitive to change or criticism for various reasons. He was especially sensitive because to a great extent he lacked the virtues which distinguished his nineteenth century predecessors - bravery in battle and/or piety and scholarship. What is more, his immediate predecessor, Aliyu Babba, possessed all these desired qualities abundantly. Since Aliyu's exile to Lokoja in 1903, it was likely that a sort of nostalgic admiration had attached to his reign, in contrast with Abbas's. This nostalgia would appear to have infected some of Abbas's own officials, and to some extent even the British, for some of their writings indicate respect for defeated and deposed opponents who no longer posed any threat. Hence the incumbent ruler's pre-occupation and suspicions. Aliyu, too, did not do anything to help allay Abbas's fears, for example by dying. In fact he lived until 1926, out-lasting Abbas by nearly eight years. It seems that Abbas's fears and feeling of inadequacy led to his taking to at least one despairing habit. Cargill summed it thus:

An uneasy mind not dis^ffection best explains the Emir's attitude. I refer to his notoriously drunken habits and the scandal caused thereby ... 2

1. F. Cargill, *ibid.*; Aliyu Babba was exiled at Lokoja, and lived there until his death in 1926.

2. F. Cargill, *ibid.*

However, in fairness to Abbas, he could not have failed to hear of the projected inquiry into the possibility of supplanting the Fulani ruling dynasty of Kano with a Habe alternative. At the highest level of the colonial regime, the Acting Resident who was to take over from Cargill, Mr. W.P. Hewby, was asked to enquire into the possibility of just such a step.¹ The replacement of a Fulani dynasty by a Habe alternative had already been effected in 1907 in Daura, one of the smaller emirates of Kano Province.² Such an event so near Kano did not contribute to a reduction of Abbas's fears or his suspicions of British intentions.

Meanwhile Resident Cargill left Kano preparatory to retirement early in June, 1908.³ Mr. W.P. Hewby, who was sent as Cargill's acting replacement and with instructions to study the possibility of replacing the Fulani with a Habe or another dynasty at Kano, had a short-lived tenure lasting only from July 29th to 30th November, 1908.⁴ We need recall that between the Satiru Mahdist rising of early 1906 and about the end of 1908 the debate as to the efficacy or otherwise of retaining the Fulani as rulers in the Northern emirates had been revived. This was so because during that uprising, it was alleged that the Emirs of Gwandu, Katsina and Hadejia were implicated or at least they did not come to the aid of the British. Hence the former two were deposed and the latter fell in battle against the British not long after the Satiru revolt. In the event, however,

1. W. Wallace, minute to Governor, in SNP/1538, (dated 29/6/1908).

2. SNP/1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Report 1907, p.

3. W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London, 1921), p.49.

4. ibid., p. 49.

the debate about Fulani rule proved inconclusive, as only H.R. Palmer was able to discover a credible alternative Habe dynasty, in Daura, which fell within his jurisdiction - the Katsina Division of Kano Province.

As far as Kano emirate was concerned, the arrival of C.L. Temple early in January, 1909, as Resident of the Province and overseer of Kano emirate (January 8, 1909, to January 4, 1910), implied that the Fulani would be retained as rulers. Temple's appointment to the Kano Residency was a promotion, as since it was known that he was partial towards the Fulani, his promotion was indicative of the ascendancy of the indirect rule faction which he championed and personified.¹ On arrival at Kano, Temple immediately set to work to undo those aspects of Gargill's measures which were unpalatable to the Emir Abbas of Kano, retaining only those which were advantageous to the designs of the British regime. Temple paid especial attention to the organisation of the central Emirate executive. To achieve what he deemed a fair re-arrangement, Temple asserted that he was guided by the desire on the one hand that the Emir should deal fairly with his subordinate headmen and officials, and on the other that these subordinates should trust and loyally obey the Emir.² The first step was firmly to discourage any attempt or inclination on the part of the new district heads and other native officials to deal directly with the European staff behind the back of the Emir.³ To make sure that the changed mood of colonial overrule was clearly understood and perceptively to re-assure Emir Abbas, the

1. For the exposition of Temple's beliefs, see his Native Races and their Rulers (Capetown, 1918); see also M. Bull, 'Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria 1906-11', in Essays in Imperial Government, ed. Robinson & Madden, (London, 1963); R. Heussler, The British in Northern Nigeria (London, 1968), passim.

2. C.L. Temple, NAK/SNP/6415/1909, Kano Report (No.41), Judicial Supplement, para. 39.

3. *ibid.*, para. 39.

ex-slave Waziri of Kano (and protégé of former Resident Cargill) was in January, 1909, demoted to the position of Dan Rimi, the title he had held before Cargill elevated him to the Waziriship early in 1908. Among the reasons advanced by Temple for the demotion of Waziri Allah-bar-Sarki were allegations that the latter had become too carried away by the sudden acquisition of power, that he regarded himself as the 'appointee of the whiteman', and was behaving in an off-hand manner to the Emir and other members of the royal family.¹ With the Emir's concurrence, therefore, the title of Waziri was conferred on Gidado, hitherto the Alkalin Kano and a free-born royal client who was on a number of occasions described as 'the alter ego' of Emir Abbas.² Another client of the Emir, Ma'aji Auta, was designated the second confidential adviser to the ruler.³ The suspension of the powers of the Emir's Judicial Council was at the same time lifted, and the new Waziri was concurrently made the executive overseer of the central and new district judicial courts.⁴ Almost at a stroke, the Emir had got rid of a Waziri who was inclined to insubordination and enhanced his position through the installation as his principal advisers of two pliant and dependent protégés. By the end of 1909 Temple was so impressed by his shuffling around with titles and executive roles that he could report that the Emir had given up the habit of acting on the advice of irresponsible councillors such as head slaves and other members of the royal household.⁵ This extraordinary change on the part of Emir Abbas was

1. *ibid.*, para. 46.

2. *ibid.*, para. 48.

3. *ibid.*, para. 49.

4. *ibid.*, para 51.

5. *ibid.*, para. 50.

only possible because he could rely on Waziri Gidado to execute his wishes and keep the new rural Alkalai in line.

In succession to Waziri Gidado in the position of Alkalin Kano, the Emir appointed Magatakarda Abdulkadir, a man who lacked a visible independent means of livelihood and who was therefore likely to be a very grateful client of Abbas. The weakness inherent in Abdulkadir's impoverished condition was noted by Temple, but this did not prevent his appointment being sanctioned.¹ In the event, the effect of the 1909 appointments of Waziri and Alkali, and the inclusion of Ma'aji Auta (another client of Abbas) in the Emir's Judicial Council could not have failed to strengthen the hands of the Emir *vis-à-vis* the District Heads and other subordinates. Together with the Chief Imam, these three appointees were to be the principal aides and advisers to the Emir in administrative and judicial matters.

The administrative measures instituted by Resident Temple need to be seen in their correct perspective. As he saw it, the Residency of Cargill from 1903 to 1908 had been 'direct' in spirit if not in fact. He naturally deprecated this tendency and wanted to make sure it was not repeated again. Mr. Temple particularly blamed H.R. Palmer (Assistant Resident in charge Katsina Division) for being the evil genius behind the unsettling interpretations of overrule as practised by Cargill and his subordinates in the Kano Province as a whole.² In reporting to Sir Percy Girouard some two months after assuming the Residency of Kano, Temple accused Palmer of having become the victim of an obsession which took the form of invective against, and violent hatred of, the Fulani generally, and in particular the Emir of Kano. Temple ascribed Palmer's suspicions

1. *ibid.*, cf. M.G. Smith, *Government in Zazzau*, p. —

2. C.L. Temple, NAK/SNP/44/1909, Kano Province Preliminary Report, dated 17th March, 1909.

of the Fulani rulers to 'his having been too long in Katsina surrounded by black men', namely the Habe talakawa as distinct from the racially 'superior' Fulani.¹ Temple especially blamed Palmer for giving the wrong advice to Acting Resident Festing who, it has recently been suggested, thereby adjudged the Fulani rulers as 'hopelessly effete'.² The changes instituted by Temple in the Kano Emirate executive appointments were thus designed to undo the harmful effects evident in the more interventionist policies of the 'direct rulers'. At the same time, the question as to whether or not the Kano ruling dynasty should be supplanted, as already done between 1906 - 07 in Katsina and Daura under Palmer, by a Habe or another dynasty was dropped. By seemingly strengthening the formal powers of Emir Abbas, Temple was consciously emphasising the concept of ruling through the native ruler and along native lines.³ It would be correct, in short, to assert that Temple's Residency at Kano (January, 1909, to January 1910) finally resolved the direct versus indirect rule debate in Kano Province in favour of the latter creed.

After C.L. Temple's departure from Kano, many a Resident or District Officer would still be activist and reforming, but the context of their relationship with the Emir would never again be cause for acrimony or misunderstanding to the extent of calling for a thorough-going re-evaluation of colonial objectives. It perhaps calls for more emphasis that Temple's policies did not mean genuine non-interference with traditional institutions and methods. But he differed from the so-called direct rulers in that his approach

1. C.L. Temple, *ibid.*

2. See R. Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria* (London, 1968), p.37.

3. cf. M. Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

was firm but sympathetic, enabling him thereby to enrol the co-operation of Emir Abbas. In this way, he was able to persuade Abbas to accept the institution of a Native Treasury at Kano in January, 1909, as well as 'a civil list' or rather salary. The Native Treasury, as we know it, was Palmer's brain-child, and Temple was able not only to borrow it but to persuade Abbas to accept it as posing no threat to his interests.

British efforts in the early years concentrated upon raising a revenue. With this objective in mind, no amount was considered too small or insignificant by the regime. Lugard especially believed that such returns of revenue vindicated his ideas of sovereignty and in addition improved the prospects of the regime's ability to pay its way. Furthermore, Lugard believed that only by being intimately associated with the assessment and collection of taxes could the expatriate administrators know their charges sufficiently well.¹ Not surprisingly, even small returns of revenue were considered good per se and an improvement in the prevailing circumstances.

In the early days of the colonial assessment of taxation, the amounts paid by the peasantry were enormously under-estimated. But even had the correct estimate of taxation due to Government been made it would have been impossible for the regime to dispose of the grain, livestock and cowries in which the payments were made.² The relatively meagre revenue of the Government from Kano and other emirates was also partly due to another problem which the regime had had to contend with especially in those very early years: this had to do with the chronic shortage of British-introduced silver currency. Lugard, who was in a position to know, partly attributed

1. Lugard, Political Memoranda (1906), p.

2. W.F. Gowers, Gazetteer of Kano Province (London, 1921), p.51; cf. Lugard, Memo. on Taxation (cd. 3309, 1907), p.33; see also Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905-06, p.30.

the shortage of silver currency to

The tendency of local firms ^{is} to sell for cash instead of buying for cash, and to export specie out of the Protectorate for the payment of customs on the coast in the case of European firms, and for the purchase of imported cottons, etc. in the case of natives. 1

As a result of this tendency which the regime greatly deprecated, the bulk of British silver currency - introduced on to the market via payments of troops, native labour and/or purchases - was largely re-exported for trade purposes outside Northern Nigeria. This development made for a continuation of taxes being paid in kind, thereby accentuating the Government's problems in disposing of its bulky share of the taxes.

These difficulties, together with the lack of adequate transport and roads, compelled the Government to claim only a quarter, instead of the statutory half, of all tax returns from the Kano emirate.² In this respect Kano emirate was an exception. For elsewhere in the Protectorate emirates the Government claimed half the tax returns as early as 1903 - 04 except in the case of Sokoto where, as a concession to the Sultan, Government claimed only a quarter. Meanwhile in the Kano emirate it was not until the tax year of 1906 - 07 that the regime started claiming its statutory fifty per cent share of the taxation. In addition the Administration insisted that the Emir must hand over the regime's share in silver currency.³ With these twin measures, a more pronounced increase in Government revenue from the emirate could be expected henceforth. This was borne out by the fact that in 1906 - 07 the regime derived a revenue

1. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905 - 6, p. 63.

2. See elsewhere, but also F. Cargill, NAK/SNP/1538/1908, p. 41, 42; Gowers, Gazetteer, p. 51.

3. F. Cargill, *ibid.*, p. 42.

totalling £9170. 0. 0. from Kano emirate, an increase of 78 per cent over the previous year.¹ And in 1907 - 08 the Government's revenue from the emirate jumped to £14496.0.0., a figure which was 57 per cent over that of the 1907 - 07 tax year. From the British occupation in 1903 up to the end of the 1907 - 08 tax year, the amounts accruing to Government from Kano emirate were as follows:²

Year	Total Govt. Share land & cattle taxes	Increase/Decrease	% increase/ decrease
1903 - 04	£2027. 0. 0.	None	None
1904 - 05	£6418. 0. 0.	+ £4391. 0. 0.	+ 217
1905 - 06	£5161. 0. 0.	- £1257. 0. 0.	- 19
1906 - 07	£9170. 0. 0.	+ £4009. 0. 0.	+ 78.8
1907 - 08	£14496. 0. 0.	+ £5326. 0. 0.	+ 57

It can be assumed that the figures of Government revenue equalled a quarter or a half as the case might be of the total revenue from taxation as known to the regime during the period under discussion. Moreover, we can further assume that the actual total revenue from taxation was really greater than thought to an extent which we cannot hope to discover. In the years under discussion there were no social services financed from local revenues. The balance accruing to the Emir and his subordinates, three quarters or a half in any one year during this period, was regarded solely as personal emoluments by the Government and the native officials concerned. As far as the native officials were concerned, the disbursement of tax revenue remained as of old except for that portion which the new overlords had arrogated to themselves. Thus the traditional

1. F. Cargill, *ibid.*, p.41.

2. The figures have been collated from F. Cargill, *ibid.*, p.41 - 42.

authorities remained, as in the past, oblivious of the concept that taxation could be used for the provision of social services except in the narrow sense of law enforcement. The only difference, this time, was that even the protection of life and property of the talakawa was guaranteed, ultimately, not by the native rulers but by the colonial regime. In this sense then, the income of the Kano ruling groups can be presumed to have been augmented by the colonial umbrella - this guaranteed the rulers their revenues without the corresponding customary duties for the defence of the realm. This arrangement, whereby personal emoluments accounted for all or a disproportionately large part of local revenue, was to be perpetuated in Kano emirate and elsewhere in Northern Nigeria at large.¹

These precedents and difficulties apart, certain inferences can be drawn by early 1908. The point had been made of British sovereignty over the country in that tribute to Government was coming in and steadily increasing. The British administrators had learnt something about the society; this knowledge was to inspire major reforms which would radically alter the pattern and context of emirate administration. As far as the generality of the people were concerned, they had been disarmed as a precautionary measure by the new overlords, but the latter assumed the 'duty of protecting the weak, and of carrying out all measures of police coercion.'² It would seem that so as to facilitate this objective and provide the regime with some measure of security, the headquarters of the newly created Mounted Infantry Battalion had been sited at Kano towards the end of 1905.

1. For a critique of the system, see Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, esp. chapter .

2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905 - 06, p. 6.

Pattern of grassroots response to British overrule 1903 - 10.

Although in Kano emirate there was no organized military rebellion against the advent of the British on a scale comparable to the Satiru and Hadejia revolts of 1906, there was nothing either to indicate that the talakawa welcomed the newcomers. If anything, the evidence suggests that their reaction was hostile and occasionally violent. Such a reaction was inevitable in view of the social order the new masters set out to establish. Leaving aside the entirely different response of the ruling groups to the British advent, the Kano community at large, or at least a substantial section, viewed the arrival of these strange white men as heralding the imminent end of the world and its corollary - the cessation of all worldly obligations.

In Kano there seem to have been two quite different reactions. Quite apart from ex-Sultan Attahiru's exodus, which profoundly moved the inhabitants of Kano and other emirates, the peasantry seem to have endeavoured to overthrow their Fulani rulers subsequent to the latter's defeat in the military confrontations with the British. According to Dr. Cargill's early reports to Lugard, initially 'there was considerable lawlessness', and the Habe of Kano either drove out the Fulani sarakuna from their respective towns or shut the gates against those returning after the disastrous battle near Kotorkoshi. Furthermore, reportedly the slaves of the Fulani deserted them in large numbers. But worst of all from the British viewpoint, 'the peasantry showed a desire to throw off the yoke, and attacked the tax-collectors, and even Captain Phillips when he went to arrest the perpetrators of one of the outrages'.¹

1. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1903, p. 4.

Apparently some of the talakawa even took up the motto 'no more taxes, no more slaves, no laws and each to do as he pleases'. Such exuberant but extemporary and premature commitment to lawlessness called for military punitive expeditions. These were duly undertaken and any symptoms of rebellion against orderly government were crushed. Most of the British officials, and Lugard especially, in view of earlier assurances to the Colonial Secretary that wherever the newcomers went they were welcomed, ascribed these contradictory developments to 'a few malcontents, who proposed to obey neither the Fulani nor the British'.¹ It would seem that the most flagrant resistance to any form of government was manifested in the western districts of Kano bordering on Katsina and Sokoto emirates. There, indeed, the talakawa rose en masse against their Fulani headmen and blood was shed in the few months following the British conquest.² These events undoubtedly contradicted the claim that normalcy returned almost immediately subsequent to the British advent, or that the peasantry welcomed the newcomers wherever they went. Dr. Cargill, who had no such illusions, candidly communicated his reservations to the High Commissioner. He pointed out that the unrest in Kano subsequent to the British occupation could be ascribed to two main factors - the hatred of the Habe or Hausa talakawa towards their Fulani rulers and that of the Fulani peasantry (branded as fanatical Muslims) towards the British. The Habe talakawa, the majority of the population, particularly left no doubt that they desired neither Fulani nor British rule.³ Hence

1. Ibid., p.4. Palmer was one of the few amongst the British officials who was sceptical of the seeming loyalty of the Fulani and their subjects - see Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London, 1937), p.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Report 1907, p. 10; Lugard, op. cit., p.7.

3. F. Cargill, cited in Lugard, ibid., p. 8.

the British intervention to restore the Fulani Sarakuna to their towns and villages and the somewhat boastful assertion by them that 'the Fulani Chiefs of many or most of the cities owed their restoration to power entirely to the British.'¹ Since the conquerors had no manpower with which to administer the country, it was undoubtedly in their interests to restore the Fulani rulers if only to avert chaos, such as happened in Nupe during 1901 when the British for a time allowed the talakawa to take the law into their own hands. Despite the self-interest which motivated their intervention, the British chose not to mention that before their forceful entry into Kano, the talakawa had not shown any disposition^{si} to rise against Fulani rule.

Except for an alleged friendliness on the part of the Fulani dignitaries, Resident Cargill maintains that throughout 1903 the British remained strangers in a hostile country, primarily because the Kano talakawa appeared 'to look at all rule as oppression and all taxation as spoliation'. Even though he usually blamed the intrigues of the royal slaves or 'palace clique' for the widespread discontent with British overrule, Dr. Cargill was realistic enough to concede that occasional risings would continue to recur in Kano emirate due to what he terms the 'sullen and turbulent' nature of the populace.² Without any doubt, the bulk of the peasantry remained sulky under British rule, especially because they had been disappointed by the latter, whose arrival and conquest of the Fulani had at first been regarded as at least marking the end of the obligation to pay taxes.³ In their disappointment the talakawa assumed that the

1. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 3 - 4.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, *op.cit.*, p. 10; see also his reply to comments by Secretary Northern Provinces (n.d.), *ibid.*

3. Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria, 1904, p. 32.

British and the Fulani were birds of the same feather.

During 1904, due to the excesses of the W.A.F.F. troops (comprising mainly of de-tribalised Hausawa, Yoruba and Nupe people) and the awe they instilled in the populace, a group of unsuspecting soldiers acting as mail couriers was waylaid and two killed while traversing the western Kano countryside.¹ The depredations of government employers in fact made the British despair of recruiting even a few honest or efficient subordinates. We need recall that the High Commissioner had already been compelled to enact a proclamation against impersonation during 1900 and again in 1903. As he admitted, the offences of impersonation, extortion and bush soldiering in the name of the white man' were rife throughout the Protectorate, causing an incalculable amount of oppression and misery.² These offences were so well known that Lugard himself classified them separately - firstly independent but 'uniformed' scoundrels who travelled from place to place demanding slaves, sheep, cattle, food and other property; secondly discharged carriers who looted as they pleased in the towns through which they passed; and thirdly government employees (for example clerks and interpreters), soldiers and political agents (spies) who perpetrated offences similar to those enumerated whenever they had been sent on missions without a European supervisor.² In order that such occurrences could be minimized if not prevented completely, the colonial regime took steps to avoid sending soldiers and other subordinates on assignments without European supervision.³ Unfortunately though, such incidents continued to be associated with the activities of the regime's employers for many years to come.

1. Lugard, *ibid.*, p. 33.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1902, p. 72.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1904, p. 33.

In view of the open disaffection of the talakawa and what the British termed 'fanatical anti-European propaganda' being disseminated among the Muslim population at large, the Administration systematically disarmed the country as a measure of safety.¹ The people, more especially the ruling groups who had hitherto monopolised advanced weaponry, were left with practically no fire-arms except flint-locks. The Satiru rising of 1906, in particular confirmed the wisdom of this precautionary measure. With regards to Kano proper, the headquarters of the Mounted Infantry Battalion was established adjacent to the metropolis at the end of 1905 so as to facilitate enforcement of obedience to the law and the suppression of outrage. And not long after, during 1906 the British had to undertake punitive operations in the emirate on two occasions. On the first occasion a police constable² was murdered while trying to arrest a man for impersonating a government official and extorting from the rural talakawa. The other instance was when villagers killed the servant of a tax collector, allegedly when the servant tried to arrest a man in the act of theft. The villages involved were held responsible for the outrages and fined collectively - a punishment considered appropriate by the Administration because colonial officers in those early days generally believed that the peasantry of Kano, as elsewhere in the Protectorate, were inclined 'to take the law into their own hands and resort to blows on little provocation.'³

1. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905 - 06, p. 6.

2. The colonial police force was organised in 1900. Following the hand-over of the administration to Lugard by the Royal Niger Company in January, 1900, the para-military force known as the Royal Niger Constabulary was largely absorbed into the West African Frontier Force. Those who were found unfit for the W.A.A.F. were constituted into a police force. This force patrolled the government reservation areas and escorted the colonial officers on tour in the countryside.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905 - 06, p. 26.

The year 1907 coincided with the withdrawal of the colonial police force from service in the Muslim emirates of Northern Nigeria. This step was deliberately taken, principally so as to give teeth to the Enforcement of Native Authority proclamation of that year. Specifically, the withdrawal of the colonial police was designed to enable the native rulers to use their para-military gendarmes or dogarai for the maintenance of law and order.¹ In Kano Province, Resident Cargill was of the opinion that this withdrawal should cause no difficulty as the duties of the government police could be easily undertaken by the emir's dogarai and the district and village chiefs. In support of this contention, Cargill cited the example of H.R. Palmer (then a junior Resident in charge of Katsina Division of Kano Province) who was already averse to going on tour with the government police constables as his escort and deprecated their use for effecting arrests. Palmer in fact was advocating the deployment as native police of men in native dress (rather than uniforms) with no more than some distinctive badge and armed only with bludgeons instead of rifles. Palmer's argument was that 'the sight of a man in uniform armed with a rifle causes too much terror and alarm to villagers to admit of their differentiating between police and soldiers.'² The duties of the colonial police were subsequently confined to the military and civil cantonments at Kano as there was no African township or Sabon gari as yet in the emirate.³

1. Cf. M. Bull, 'Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria 1906 - 11' in Robinson and Madden (eds.), Essays in Imperial Government (Oxford, 1963), p.

2. See N.A.K./S.N.P. - 1538/1908, p. 61 - 62.

3. Girouard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1907 - 08, p. 30 - 31. The African foreigners' township or Sabon gari of Kano did not come into formal existence until 21st December, 1911, at almost the same time that the rail-head reached the city.

The emir's dogarai who replaced them elsewhere in the emirate were provided with distinctive uniforms in the indigenous style - a red turban and brightly patterned native gown, but they were not armed.

In Kano emirate, it was almost as if the withdrawal of the armed colonial police was a signal for renewed discontent and unrest. These disorders were most noticeable in the districts to the west of the metropolis. There, in April, 1907, fighting broke out between the largely Habe talakawa and Fulani herdsmen near Dan Zabuwa in the Madaki's fief-district. The local dagatai were unable to put a stop to the fighting which ensued. Major Arthur Festing, assistant to Dr. Cargill, accompanied by the Madaki and sixty Mounted Infantrymen commanded by Lt. Morgan-Owen, marched to the scene of the incident. News of the advancing force having preceded them (as usual in Hausaland), on arrival at Dan Zabuwa Festing found that the fighting had ceased. However, a number of suspects were arrested and jailed, and a number of dagatai from the surrounding countryside were deposed for failure to prevent the outbreak in the first instance.¹ The second incident occurred in May, 1907, when a military mail courier was reported to have been assaulted at Gwarzo forty six miles west of Kano. Once more Arthur Festing, the then acting Resident, marched to the scene of the outrage escorted by fifty soldiers with the intention of investigating the cause of the affair. He discovered that the assault had been caused by the soldier's unreasonable conduct over pricing meat in the market. A minor brawl had resulted during which the soldier had fired his rifle harmlessly and then had bolted, leaving behind his rifle and horse. Festing could not trace the soldier, who had presumably deserted, but the Sarkin Gwarzo was deposed, apparently because even such a minor incident could occur in his town. Similarly, the three butchers

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, p. 4, 10.

involved in the incident were flogged in the market-place and jailed for six months each.¹ Yet a third incident occurred during 1907 when, at Maruta in the extreme south-eastern corner of Kano emirate, a policeman who had been detailed to arrest a caravan for evading the payment of caravan tolls was severely beaten and his rifle seized. But not before the policeman had succeeded in stabbing one of his attackers to death with a bayonet. Arthur Festing, who tried the case in the Provincial Court, absolved the policeman of all blame but sentenced three of the surviving caravan men to various terms of imprisonment.²

Attacks on unwary government functionaries need to be seen in perspective. The incidents just enumerated were quite insignificant and there does not seem to have been a remarkable number of them. Rather it would seem that the force deployed by the British as a reaction to these incidents was excessive, as were the extreme punishments inflicted. However, account needs to be taken of the fact that in this period as for the next decade, the British were numerically very weak, the desertion rate from the West African Frontier Force was still alarming and the feeling of insecurity was very pronounced. Hence the tendency on the part of the British to over-react towards even relatively minor incidents, for there was no knowing what was an isolated outrage and what could develop into a major uprising. To compound the problems of the British, they were not absolutely certain of the loyalty or honesty of their employees - the soldiers, policemen, clerks, interpreters, and messengers who were supposed to warn them of any treasonable developments. Even in the event of the loyalty of the regime's employees being taken for granted, the latter were either

1. Ibid., p. 10.

2. Ibid., p. 11, 62.

foreigners from beyond the borders of the Protectorate or outcasts from the traditional societies of the country. As such, the personnel on whom the British relied most were out of touch with local public opinion. This made the intelligence services of the British very faulty and the colonial rulers very apprehensive.

The lack of public morality on the part of the early African colonial employees invited attacks on themselves. For example, during 1907 the amount of crime prevalent among government employees in Kano Province (of which Kano emirate was the most important polity) was so remarkable that the Resident devoted a whole section to it in his annual report. That year a government interpreter was jailed for six months for abuse of office, two artisans were fined for extortion, a soldier was jailed one year for receiving bribes, and several police constables were jailed to terms ranging from three months to two years for offences which included larceny, taking bribes and connivance in the escape of prisoners. Further it was known that some functionaries of the Administration were engaged in bush soldiering and slave-dealing.¹ The excesses of government servants (including the probable trigger-happy disposition of the armed soldiery and policemen) would thus seem to partly explain the periodic attacks on them, rather than any deliberate hostility towards the regime.

But to the British administrators based in Kano, attacks on colonial personnel were but symptoms of the unpopularity of their hegemony. Such was the apprehension of the overlords that Dr. Cargill cautioned his superiors at Zungeru against any sense of false security:

1. Ibid., p. 24 - 26 (judicial supplement).

The moral is that however peaceful things may look on the surface we must not deplete our garrisons unnecessarily. We must always be on the qui vive against local risings of the talakawa. 1

Indeed, these precautionary admonitions were not all. The British in addition recruited local 'political agents' or spies, quite independently of the native administrations on whom they officially relied. In Kano Province during 1907 there were three such agents on the pay-roll of the Government, as well as two Arabists and six civil couriers who probably doubled up as informers and ~~agent~~^s provocateurs.² The identity of one of these political agents is quite well known. This was Adamu Jakada, a Kano-born Habe who had had commercial relations with the Royal Niger Company, acting at times as their messenger to Sokoto and informant on the Caliphate generally. When the Company lost its charter in 1900, the Lugard Administration inherited his services as and when they were needed.³ By 1907 Adamu was a big merchant and doubled up as a part-time political informant to the British Administration in Kano. Apparently Adamu relied on his business clients for the information (and gossip) he relayed to his alien masters. Partly as a result of such information, the British more especially Palmer, talked disparagingly of emir Abbas of Kano.⁴ Adamu of course became very unpopular with the Kano ruler. According to H.R. Palmer,

1. Ibid., p. 11; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 44/1909, Palmer letter to A. Festing, 3/10/1907.

2. F. Cargill, loc. cit., p. 59.

3. For allusions to Adamu's chequered career, see R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804 - 1906, p.86, 244; cf. J.S. Hogendorn, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria (unpublished University of London thesis, 1966), p.149-150.

4. Cf. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906, p. 326.

Adamu, by acting as informant to the Administration, flouted the Kano ruler's policy of keeping the 'white man screened off from the affairs of Kano'. Worse still, Adamu had recruited two native mallamai for service with the British Administration as Arabists, thereby by-passing the Kano ruler and depriving him of the chance to plant his own spies-cum-mallamai with the British.¹ The emir of Kano countered by resorting to a deliberate attempt to ruin Adamu's business ventures. Since emir Abbas did not participate directly in business, he enrolled the aid of the Ma'ajin Kano, Siddiku, a man of North African descent who had connections with the business community. Adamu's prices were undercut and his retail agents encountered all sorts of difficulties largely engineered by the emir. Apparently there was even an unsuccessful attempt to get Adamu's business clients convicted of murder.² Emir Abbas's counter-measures were only to be expected, since the reports of Adamu and his like could not but exacerbate the already strained relations between the emir and the British Administration.

Besides Adamu Jakada, at least one of the Arabists was also engaged in political intelligence. The man was a certain Muhammadu Aminu, a staunch adherent of the Kano ruler's relatives and dynastic enemies, the Tukurawa, many of whom were then exiled in Katsina emirate which fell in Palmer's jurisdiction. Aminu was sent by Palmer on a confidential mission to Sokoto so that he could report on political developments at the Sultan's court. His report, like Adamu Jakada's on Kano, was disparaging. These reports leave one with the impression that the political agents usually dwelt on issues and gossip likely to

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 44/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Preliminary Report (19th March, 1909), enclosure of Palmer letter to A. Festing, 3/10/1907.

2. Ibid.

discredit the Fulani rulers. Palmer was however so impressed by Muhammadu Aminu that he advocated the latter's political objectives in regard to Kano emirate. Since a credible non-Fulani dynasty was not available to supplant the Kano ruling family as Palmer would have wished, he advocated ~~for~~ the reinstatement of a Tukurawa candidate on the Kano throne. Undoubtedly Palmer was influenced by Muhammadu Aminu's propaganda that the Tukurawa had been wrongly expelled from Kano, and that in any case Abbas's branch of the Sullubawa dynasty was unpopular with the inhabitants of the emirate. And Palmer, no doubt to the chagrin of the well-informed emir Abbas of Kano, even went to the extent of travelling to Kaudama (in Katsina emirate) for an audience with the exiled ex-Sarkin Shanu Ibrahim Datti, who had taken refuge there since the occupation of Zinder by the French in 1899.¹

The emir of Kano naturally viewed such actions by Palmer as very unfriendly towards himself. Temporarily therefore the interests of Abbas and his subjects converged in a common dislike, fear and hostility towards the British. On the other hand Palmer shrewdly observed that the Fulani rulers in the Protectorate stood by the Administration only in matters of revenue, otherwise they never abandoned for long the thought of regaining their independence should the opportunity occur.² In the event, however, matters never quite reached the proportions of an explosion.

During the first quarter of 1908, while Dr. Cargill was engrossed in his administrative reforms so much disliked by the emir of Kano,³ the latter's subjects also took advantage of the Resident's pre-

1. Cf., ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. See above, p. 196-201

occupation to display their hostility to the new taxation proposals in the process of implementation. Specifically, Cargill had decided to amalgamate (experimentally) all the various categories of taxes prevailing in the emirate's more densely populated districts.¹

Cargill's proposals appeared to the talakawa as a design to increase the incidence of taxation, and in many respects the peasantry and even some of the dagatai viewed the proposals as sacrilegious or at least an infidel levy. In April and May, 1908, when Cargill himself travelled to the western districts of the emirate to supervise the collection of his amalgamated taxes and ensure that the jakadu had nothing to do with the collection whatsoever, he found the countryside almost in open revolt.

At the town of Bagwai, the talakawa had refused to pay the amalgamated tax and were insisting on the removal of the dagaci for trying to carry out instructions to that effect. Similarly at Yanoki the populace had defaulted on their payments, ostensibly because of the presence in their town of a Bormuese called Da-Allah. It is not unlikely that the people regarded this stranger as a government informer. Furthermore around Dan Zabuwa and Dumbulum, the villagers refused to pay any tax and in addition they converged on the country seats of the dagatai armed with bows and arrows intending to drive out the local Sarakuna. The Resident telegraphed Governor Girouard informing him of these disorders and their causes. The Governor wired back instructing Dr. Cargill to abandon the amalgamated assessments and revert to the old well-understood collections. This was duly

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 1065/1908, F. Cargill, Assessment Summary Kano and Katsina.

carried out and a number of dagatai were deposed ostensibly for laxity in their duties and for extortion but most probably to appease the masses.¹ These minor uprisings necessitated despatching a patrol of the Mounted Infantry to the affected areas. The patrol remained in the countryside for several weeks, pacifying the districts and rounding up the suspected principal malcontents. As a further precaution, troop reinforcements were brought to Kano from Sokoto just in case the situation should deteriorate unexpectedly. As a result of these minor incidents and the accompanying military pacification, an estimated two thousand talakawa migrated from the emirate's western districts to the virgin lands in southern Katsina emirate. The Resident then maintained that this migration had been caused partly by the oppression of the talakawa by the Fulani dagatai but mainly by the exhaustion of the soil in western Kano.² However, in at least one recorded instance from this period, many Habe talakawa of Getso in Gwarzo district in this region are known to have migrated beyond the emirate's western borders because they were made to undertake forced labour while their Fulani equivalents were exempt.³ The practice of forced labour, like the institution of collective punishment, seems to have been quite diabolical in the eyes of the masses, even apart from their being abused by the local Sarakuna for personal gain.

The talakawa in question migrated mainly to the Rubu bush, hitherto a no-man's-land due to Maradi raids into the Sokoto Caliphate

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 2949/1908, Hamilton Browne, Kano Province Report Half year ending 30/6/1908, p. 4 - 5.

2. Ibid., p.6, 7; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 472/1909, p. 10 - 11.

3. Bello Dandago, 'History of Getso', in Gwarzo District Note Book (1952).

during the nineteenth century. Most probably, the migrants hoped to obtain a respite from close administration with its attendant conscription for forced labour and the white man's unwelcome embrace. Such a probability is strengthened by the fact that migration to the tracts of wild and less administered territories on Kano's borders was noticeable in all directions at about this time.¹ In addition to these symptoms of non-violent dissent, elsewhere in the emirate the telegraph line was wilfully cut on several occasions. It is not certain whether or not the culprits knew the significance of the telegraph in colonial communications but their action certainly disrupted the line. There is also the probability that the telegraph wire was found valuable for other purposes. Whatever the motives of the vandals, the British Administration countered by persuading the emir of Kano to hold the headmen of districts, towns and villages responsible for the telegraph line passing through their territories.² A number of the alleged offenders were punished, most probably by public flogging. All in all the military in Kano were called upon six times during 1908 to suppress outrage or hold the ring between factional brawls, and the

1. Cf. Girouard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1907 - 08, p. 37; D.M. Last, 'Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland 1800 - 1968' in Africa, vol. XL, No. 4 (1970), p. 352.

2. Girouard, op.cit., p. 39. It is significant that by a series of proclamations, the Administration bound 'every native authority and ... the native community subject to the jurisdiction of a native authority to prevent any offence or attempt to commit any offence in respect of a telegraph (line) established within the jurisdiction of such native authority'. Failure to prevent offences in this regard or to report such offences invited the imposition of a collective punishment (e.g. a fine) on all or a part of the community - see chapter 54 of Laws of Northern Nigeria (London, 1910); Telegraph Proclamation, No. 6, 1911; also Telegraph Ordinance No. 60 of 1916.

administration was further alarmed by the frequency with which the parcel post was robbed while in transit through the emirate. These relatively minor events caused such apprehension that the British took further precautionary measures: an emergency fortress was erected in Kano should in case the British find themselves besieged.¹ The erection of forts was not confined to Kano, for others were hurriedly erected at Katsina and Katagum within the Kano Province and elsewhere in the Protectorate. These measures further suggest that the British suffered from a feeling of insecurity.

1. Girouard, loc. cit., p. 39.

CHAPTER 5Kano 1910-26: Political and Administrative Developments.

During the period 1910 - 26 the territorial extent of Kano Province and Kano emirate remained as demarcated by the British Administration in 1903. Similarly, the colonial infrastructure was identical with that of the preceding period, with Kano emirate nominally under the direct supervision of a political officer having the rank of Resident, though in fact it was the Provincial Resident who usually filled that position as well. As always during the whole colonial period, there was a chronic shortage of British administrative officers. This shortage was further accentuated when in 1914 the clouds of war descended upon Europe. For many of the European administrators in the Protectorate were on secondment from the British army to the Administration and they were recalled to their regiments. Others who were not military men volunteered for service at the front. The 1914 - 18 war thereby denuded the Protectorate of very many able-bodied administrators.

Not long after the conclusion of hostilities, the aged Shehu Usman (1919 - 26) became emir of Kano. As he was also ailing, it became even more difficult for the Administration to institute desirable innovations for fear that his physical condition might get worse. Since Indirect Rule presumes an active ruler in order that administration could be dynamic, the incapacity of Shehu Usman produced a malaise in the administration of Kano emirate. The problem was made even worse by lack of continuity due to the Administration's practice of transferring officers from one post to another and from one Province to the other.

In this period as in the one preceding, the British suffered from a sense of insecurity and this made them imagine dark plots out of relatively insignificant incidents such as high-way robberies. It would seem that the British feeling of insecurity was the direct result of their numerical inferiority and the fact that law-enforcement was not significantly better than in the pre-colonial period. Despite all these obvious handicaps, it was during this period that the system of Indirect Rule became fully consolidated and the institutions associated with the system were developed and rationalized. The context in which these developments occurred was influenced somewhat by the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 by Lugard himself. Lugard's idea of the position of the Native Administrations differed from that held by the Northern officials. He attempted unsuccessfully to control N.A. finances but the Colonial Office and the Northern officials frustrated his centralizing plans.¹ When Clifford succeeded to the Governorship of Nigeria in 1919 following the departure of Lugard, he was to complain of the insularity of the Northern officials and their apparent pre-occupation with 'administration' rather than social and economic progress.² But all to no avail and the northern Native Administrations, including Kano emirate, developed at their own pace which was often incongruous with the designs of the central government at Lagos.

The British staff in Kano at any one time never exceeded about half a dozen and they were all based at Kano or other Divisional

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1. See Perham, Lugard II, p. 479 - 487; see also I.F. Nicholson, The Administration of Nigeria 1900 - 1960 (Oxford, 1969), p.217-241.
 2. For examples of Governor Clifford's Strictures, see his Address to the Nigerian Council, 29th December, 1920 (Lagos, 1920).

headquarters in the Province. They supervised the affairs of the emirate by touring, mainly during the dry and tax collecting season. Whenever a British official went on tour to the districts, he was accompanied by the emir's agent or wakili.

Emirate Administration

With Mr. C.L. Temple's resolution of the British-Abbas misunderstandings, the co-operation of the emirate authorities was enlisted for colonial designs. After 1909 a series of legislative measures were enacted which further clarified and strengthened the position of the emir in relation to his officials and subjects. In specifically administrative terms, the first major legislation after 1909 was the Land and Native Rights Proclamation (No. 9) of 1910. This enactment, even though it nationalised all land in Northern Nigeria and gave sweeping powers of control to the colonial regime, vested in the traditional rulers powers of land administration and allocation according to the existing native laws and customs. In Kano these powers were vested in the Native Authority or the emir assisted by his judicial council.¹ In 1916 a much more elaborate Native Authority Ordinance was enacted and it was designed to operate throughout Nigeria. This Ordinance (No. 14) of 1916 was very thorough in defining the powers and functions of the traditional rulers in the country - in Northern Nigeria these chiefs, namely the emirs, were confirmed in their positions as presidents of their respective judicial councils. These councils were once more designated as the highest legal institutions in the emirates, with full executive powers of law-

1. Cf. Cd. 5102, Report of the Northern Nigeria Lands Committee. The recommendations of this committee formed the substance of the 1910 proclamation.

enforcement. In short the emirs, as Native Authorities, were made custodians of public order in their respective domains with almost complete jurisdiction over 'natives' residing in their territories; they might, furthermore, appoint and/or depose subordinate chiefs and officials with the approval of the Provincial Residents. Each ruler was also empowered to appoint native police or dogarai to help him in carrying out his lawful orders. The British political officers were enjoined to give all support and aid to the ruler in the exercise of his legal prerogatives. Nothing, indeed, was to be done which might lower the prestige of the Native Authority in the eyes of his subjects.¹ This 1916 ordinance, unlike the 1907 proclamation which merely enabled 'recognised' chiefs to issue legal orders for the preservation of peace and good government in their areas of jurisdiction, has appropriately been judged as in effect making the Northern emirs 'the regulators of native law and custom'.² Despite its tyrannical implications and subsequent criticisms, the 1916 ordinance did remain the basis of local government legislation in Northern Nigeria until the 1960's - and this in spite of Governor Donal Cameron's supposedly liberalizing ordinance (No. 43) of 1933 and others subsequent to that.³

In the administrative, political and dynastic spheres, the rulers of Kano were further entrenched in their potentially despotic powers. The two emirs involved in these early years, Muhammadu Abbas (1903 - 19) and Shehu Usman (1919 - 26) used the British-backed local government laws for seemingly enlightened ends. In this, moreover, Abbas did not have to await the enactment of the 1916 ordinance.

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1. Lugard, Political Memoranda (London, 1918), memo. No. 9.
 2. M.J. Campbell, Law and Practice of Local Government in Northern Nigeria (London, 1963), p. 4; cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 205 - 206.
 3. M.J. Campbell, op.cit., p.5; G.O. Orewa, Local Government Finance in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1966), p. 8.

With Temple's welcome measures as a boost to his authority and the colonial Administration's concern for proper accounting of assessed taxes, it became relatively easy to 'catch' the District Heads in acts of embezzlement and other misdemeanours. The backing of the colonial regime was guaranteed in view of the emir's deliberate attempts to please the British after 1909, more especially on occasions like the Governor's visit to Kano or the occasion of Temple's appointment to the Acting Governorship of the Protectorate.¹ It was therefore in the nature of things that even before the enactment of Lugard's 1916 ordinance, the British administrative staff had been completely won over by Muhammadu Abbas's 'shrewd and practical common sense'. As a consequence, the emir's wishes were invariably upheld as regards to control, appointment and/or deposition of his subordinate officials.²

In the post-1909 era collaboration between the British and the Kano ruler was especially pronounced in matters pertaining to administration and appointments to offices of state like the District Headships. The British were pre-occupied by a desire to instill efficiency in the emirate administration. This drive for efficiency puzzled the native officials because they had hitherto been accustomed to conducting the public business in an informal and leisurely manner. Emir Abbas was however able to exploit the situation. Between 1910 and his death in 1919, Abbas was able to displace many of his officials for reasons ranging from insubordination to embezzlement and incompetence. In particular the axe seems to have fallen more especially on the

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 3835/1910, E.J. Arnett, Kano Province Report (No. 42) for half-year ending June, 1910 (dated 21.7.1910), para. 36-37; N.A.K./S.N.P. - 3546/1911, G. Malcolm, Kano Province Report (No. 44), for half-year ending June 1911, dated 31.7.1911, para. 44.
 2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 98P/1914, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report 1913, dated 9.3.1914, p. 6.

ruler's relations who had hopes for the succession. In 1910 the District Head of Dutse, Haladu b. Sule was dismissed for 'embezzlement'.¹ That same year, Abbas's nephew and District Head of Dawakin Kudu, Dan Iya Ibrahim, was also deposed for 'embezzlement'² and Dan Isa Mamman Mai Ruwa a half-brother of the emir and District Head Kumbotso, was displaced for the same offence.³ Similarly another half-brother of the emir and District Head Minjibir, Dan Buram Ibrahim Cigari was turned out of office for 'disloyalty'⁴ and the Sarkin Tudun Wada suffered the same fate for alleged 'slave dealing and child stealing'.⁵ This pattern of charges and the consequent loss of office by the accused became a regular feature of the Native Administration.

Then in 1911, the recently appointed District Head Dutse Halilu b. Musa was dismissed for ineptitude'.⁶ During 1912 Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta Jammo, the D. H. of the combined territory of Karaye-Gwarzo with headquarters at Yelwa, was relieved of his position on grounds of mental instability.⁷ In the following year his replacement as Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta and District Head was sacked for 'ineptitude' and at the same time the large district was curved into the two separate districts of Karaye and Gwarzo. Sarkin Karaye, hitherto to a mere dagaci, was promoted to a district headship.⁸ It is significant that

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1. Dutse District Note Book.
 2. Dawakin Kudu District Note Book.
 3. Kumbotso District Note Book.
 4. Minjibir District Note Book.
 5. Tudun Wada District Note Book.
 6. Dutse District Note Book.
 7. Gwarzo District Note Book.
 8. Ibid., see also Karaye District Note Book.

the Sarakunan Karaye were Sullubawa kinsmen of the Kano royal family but with no claim to the throne. At the lower level below the district headships, 1913 witnessed the deposition of Sarkin Gwaram Abdulkadir for alleged concealment of murder.¹ During 1914 yet another half-brother of Abbas and a District Head, Turaki Manya Salihi, was turned out of office for 'embezzling tax revenue'.² Salihi, incidentally, was an elder brother to emir Abbas and had hopes for the succession before his deposition. By thus being turned out of office he was effectively excluded from consideration for the throne. Yet another official forfeited his position during 1914 - this was the District Head of Gezawa Mai Unguwa Mundubawa Zakari who was alleged to have embezzled tax revenue.³ Similarly in the course of 1915 a half-brother of the emir and District Head Birnin Kudu, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida Idrisu was disrobed ostensibly for negligence of duty and failure to collect the taxes due from his large and sparsely populated district.⁴

The frequency with which depositions of titled District Heads occurred and the standard reasons given for these call for comment. The context in which these chiefs are said to have abused their positions was a new development because in the pre-colonial era what now became 'embezzlement' or 'peculation' would have been regarded as the customary entitlement of these chiefs to recompense themselves for the work of tax-collection. It is therefore arguable that these officials did not quite appreciate their changed roles in the emirate administration whereby they were expected to adhere to new standards

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1. Gwaram District Note Book.
 2. Kura District Note Book.
 3. Gezawa District Note Book.
 4. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report (No.52) for half-year to June 1916 (2.8.1916), p. 33.

arbitrarily set by the colonial rulers. Instructions to this effect were not only vague but verbal, making it easy to relapse into old habits and practices. The British political officers were not unaware of these problems or the fact that the emir was taking advantage of the situation for his own ends, but they showed no inclination to intervene. It thus seems that the British were prepared to tolerate the emir's arbitrary use of his executive powers so long as this was done ostensibly to advance colonial objectives. British approval made the ruler an unrestrained despot, a situation very unlike the pre-colonial arrangements. Then, the emir could but rarely use his powers arbitrarily for fear of revolt or Sokoto's intervention.

At any rate the colonial context made possible the perpetuation of the situation whereby an official out of favour with the ruler often forfeited his official position. Thus in Kano emirate the depositions of subordinate officials continued. In 1916 the District Head Dutse Abdullahi b. Sule was dismissed for 'ineptitude' and 'incompetence'. In the following year Abdullahi's successor Dan Lawan Ahmadu Gurara was disgraced for 'embezzlement and insubordination'.¹ Furthermore during 1917 another of Abbas's numerous brothers and District Head Kumbotso, Dan Isa Huseini, was turned out of office for 'ineptitude'.² During 1918 the major casualty was the Ma'aji Auta who was deposed for 'embezzlement' of the money entrusted to his charge. Auta was succeeded as Ma'aji by Baballe, a baran Sarki or emir's servant.³ This suggests that Auta was deposed for reasons other than embezzlement,

1. Dutse District Note Book.

2. Kumbotso District Note Book.

3. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, Kano Province Report (No. 56) for 1918, p. 9.

most probably a zeal for proper accounting of the emirate's finances as desired by the Administration. His replacement Baballe being a dependent of Abbas, was more likely to be a stooge of the ruler. And just before his sudden death on 3rd April, 1919, emir Abbas turned out of office one of his nephews and D. H. Kura, Turaki Many Abubakar.¹ The vacant district headship and title were conferred in 1920 on Abubakar, a son of the new emir Shehu Usman.

By the time Muhammadu Abbas died at the age of fifty-six in 1919 he had, via depositions of his many brothers from titles and District Headships, significantly narrowed the field of potential candidates for the throne. In effect by then there were only two serious candidates for the succession: Abbas's eldest son, the Ciroma Abdullahi Bayero (emir 1926 - 53), and the Wambai, Shehu Usman (emir 1919 - 26) then aged about 67 years.² Pending the appointment of a substantive ruler, the Electoral Council comprising of the Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta, and Sarkin Bai selected the older man to act as Regent.³ Shehu Usman had been somewhat an embarrassment to the late emir as he was eleven years his senior. However he had managed to avoid forfeiture of his title and District Headship and by not being found lacking in zeal and efficiency as District Head-cum-tax collector, had impressed the British administrative staff. Ciroma Bayero (aged 38 years in 1919) on the other hand, had as early as 1909 been on occasions referred to as either 'young and inclined to be haughty'⁴ or as suffering from a 'swollen head and too haughty in his bearing to be really popular with the people'.⁵ Admittedly,

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, Kano Report (No.57) for half-year to June 1919 (28.8.1919), p. 2; Kura District Note Book.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op.cit., p. 2.

3. Ibid.

4. N.A.K./S.N.P.-3635/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Report (No.40) for half-year to June 1909 (14.7.1909), para. 84.

5. N.A.K./S.N.P.-6415/1909, Kano Report 1909 (Judicial Supplement), para. 164.

it had been confidentially written, he would one day no doubt make a good emir once cured of these defects.¹ When the Electoral Council failed to reach unanimity by choosing either Wambai Usman or Ciroma Bayero as emir, the then Acting Lieutenant-Governor of the Protectorate and only recently substantive Senior Resident of Kano, Mr. W.F. Gowers, finally preferred Shehu Usman as new ruler of Kano and the latter was duly confirmed in that position on 3rd May, 1919.²

The selection of Shehu Usman as ruler over Kano was an anomaly though procedurally correct. It was an anomaly because Usman was not only aged but ailing, and one would have expected the British to prefer the younger candidate as probably more open to modern influences. Usman had moreover not served his apprenticeship as a public official under the colonial regime: he had been Dan Makwayo and later Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida during the reign of Aliyu Babba (1894 -~~1908~~) and had been appointed Wambai by Abbas in 1903 following the British occupation.³ In short Usman could be regarded as one of the old-type Fulani 'raiders' of whom the British did not expect much in the way of enlightened rule. Usman's rival for the throne, Ciroma Bayero, on the other hand had first held public office during the colonial era: he was appointed Ciroma in 1903, 'promoted' to the Waziriship in 1904 but once more 'demoted' to the Ciromaship in 1908. Also, Bayero's ability was not in doubt, especially after there was created for him early in 1916 the self-contained Bichi District.⁴ It would thus seem

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 3635/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., para. 184.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op.cit., p.2; cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF 5/1 - 1651/6146, Emir of Kano 1926-51.

3. Account based on unpublished MSS. in the possession of Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi.

4. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report (No.51) for 1915, dated 9.2.1916, p. 28; cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF 4/5 - 140/1918, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report (No.53) for 1917, para. 59-60.

that the preference of Shehu Usman over Abdullahi Bayero was dictated by considerations other than ability or the potential for adjustment to British-inspired progressive ideas. The one reason which immediately comes to mind was the British desire to get as ruler a man who would be less independent-minded (as Bayero then seemed) and who could be cajoled easily into granting freedom to the remaining royal slaves and free himself, according to British wishes, of continued dependence on the slave officials of his household. But procedurally the Lieutenant Governor was acting within his constitutional rights by preferring Usman over Bayero because by the conquest of Kano and the overthrow of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 the British arrogated to themselves the power of enthroning the rulers of the Protectorate.

As it was, however, emir Usman (1919 - 26) continued his predecessor's policy of turning out of office as many subordinates as was possible. Within a year of his accession, Usman deposed the District Head and Sarkin Gaya, Mamman Kwallo, for what were termed 'various malpractices'.¹ In the same year the ruler dismissed from the headship of Ungogo District the Tafida Aliyu Babba, a grandson of the nineteenth century emir Usman b. Ibrahim (1845 - 55); the reason, by now standard, was given as 'embezzlement'.² The title and District Headship were conferred on Usman's own son, Muhammadu (later promoted to the position of Turaki).³ The year 1920 similarly witnessed the *deposition* of Dan Kadai Muhammadu Baba, District Head of Tudun Wada (created in 1916 out of extensive ^Rano) - to the standard indictment of 'embezzlement' was added to the new one of 'peculation'.⁴ Then in

1. Gaya District Note Book.

2. Ungogo District Note Book.

3. Ibid.

4. Tudun Wada District Note Book; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.-120P/1921, A.C.G. Hastings, Kano Province Report for Fifteen Months to 31st March, 1921, para.54.

1923 one of the emirate electors, Makama Muhammadu Dahiru Aminu was deprived of his title and turned out of his extensive district.

The indictment was embezzlement of tax revenue,¹ but it is more likely Aminu had been particularly vehement in opposing the candidature of Usman for the throne in 1919 thereby incurring the enmity of the ruler. Concurrent with Makama Aminu's deposition, his district was broken up into the two separate districts of Wudil and Sumaila.² The pattern and, indeed, the reasons for dismissing public officials were almost always the same in this as in the preceding reign. Moreover the same trends would seem to have persisted throughout the colonial period.

Administratively, then, a number of themes are discernible and common to the period up until 1926. Abbas would appear to have been largely influenced by a desire to exclude from the succession as many of his numerous half-brothers as was compatible with British approval and sense of fair-play. Unfortunately he could not dispose of everyone of them. And in the event he failed to assure the succession to his eldest and favourite son Abdullahi Bayero. Instead the British preferred the aged and ailing Shehu Usman despite their lip-service to the younger generation of Fulani nobles and superficial devotion to enlightenment and progress. Usman too would have liked to assure the throne to his children. But ill-health and death deprived him of such a hope: his eldest and ablest son Wambai Abdullahi Mai-Bindiga died in September, 1924 and this was such a terrible blow to the aged ruler that his delicate health further rapidly declined and subsequent to that date Usman ceased to take his 'full and proper share

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 635/1925, E.J. Arnett, Kano Province Report (No.63) for 1924, 2.4.1925, para. 24, p. 11.

2. Ibid., cf. Wadil and Sumaila District Note Book.

of the administrative burden'.¹ However, despite this lapse on the part of the emir, it can be said that by the time Usman died in 1926, the ruler had to a great extent deprived his hakimai of their traditional security of tenure. Only the ruler had direct access to the British administrative staff and these normally concurred with the former's political and administrative measures. This policy deliberately aided and abetted the concentration of power in the hands of the emir. Colonial legislation further gave legal sanction to this centralization of political authority.

The district organisation became, in a way which the British had never intended, one of the means by which the emirs usurped the potential independence of their titled officials. Because as District Heads all officials were primarily tax collectors, it was easy enough to incriminate and dismiss many of them for embezzlement, inefficiency, negligence of duty, and what not. Almost all their misdemeanours were connected with the collection and accounting of the taxes assessed for their respective districts. This was an entirely new situation for which the Emirs's subordinates were not prepared: for in the pre-1903 era, they had left the burden of tax collection to the Emirs' or their own jakadu. As a consequence, it was seldom that an official had been dismissed for misuse of public funds. Moreover, as if to make the position of the District Heads mor untenable, in 1915 the arrangement whereby the D.H.'s got percentages (15-20) of all the taxes they collected was abandoned in favour of fixed salaries. A table of these when first introduced will best illustrate the deprivations they had to put up with:²

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., para.27, p.12.

2. Based on N.A.K./S.N.P. - 170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report 1915, p. 24.

<u>D. H./Title</u>	<u>Relation to Emir</u>	<u>Traditional Rank/ Precedence</u>	<u>Salary</u>
<u>Galadima</u>	Brother	1	£200
<u>Wambai</u>	Brother	3	£240
<u>Madaki</u>	Clan Head	2	£1000
<u>Makama</u>	Clan Head	4	£800
<u>Sar. D. Mai Tuta</u>	Clan Head	5	£420
<u>Sar. Bai</u>	Clan Head	6	£260
<u>Sar. D. Ts. Gida</u>	Brother	8	£360
<u>Ciroma</u>	Son	9th	£1000
<u>Turaki Manya</u>	Nephew	10th	£550
<u>Barden Kano</u>	Nephew	11th	£160
<u>Sarkin Rano</u>	Ardo	12th	£300
<u>Sarkin Dutse</u>	"	-	£380
<u>Sarkin Gaya</u>	"	-	£250
<u>Sarkin Karaye</u>	"	-	£600

Whereas when the District Heads were deployed permanently in the countryside in 1908 the British bragged that they had even managed to assign to the most important among them the largest and farthest districts from the capital, the apportionment of salaries did not reflect their relative importance or precedence in the traditional hierarchy below the throne. The Galadima was particularly done in, for he was first in precedence and last but one in size of salary among the 14 full-fledged District Heads of 1915. No wonder, then, that the District Heads, whenever possible, continued to conceal part of jangali or zakhaf returns as well as borrow large sums from traders to make good tax deficiencies which could not be satisfactorily accounted for.¹ When caught, as pointed out already, the consequences were disastrous even when only small sums were involved: for example, the depositions of Sarkin Dawaki Tsahar Gida Idrisu and Sarkin Dutse Haladu

1. Ibid., p.26.

in 1915 - 16 were occasioned by their failure to account for a tax shortage amounting to £45 all told,¹ out of a total gross emirate general tax revenue of just under £80,000 for that tax year. Even where office was not lost due to administrative failures, as in the case of the Galadimomi in the period to 1926, the unequal apportionment of emoluments affected the standing of the titled officials in public esteem. A salary became automatically equated with a grade i.e. precedence in the emirate heirarchy.² It is thus probably from about 1915 that the idea has grown that the Ciroma of Kano is the heir-apparent to the throne, especially when Ciroma Abdullahi Bayero ascended to the throne in 1926.

In the meantime with the introduction of fixed salaries in 1915, the District Heads-cum-titled officials not only found it increasingly difficult to make ends meet but they had to contend with a challenge to their authority from below. From 1908 onwards each of the new districts was divided into some three to six sub-districts under the charge of the Sarakuna of the larger rural walled towns. Besides mental instability, which was seized upon by the Emir to justify the deposition of Sarkin Dawaki Mai-tuta Ahmadu Jammo in 1912 (cited above), the Resident justified the same to his superiors by arguing that Jammo 'again made a mess of things (tax collection) and got at loggerheads with his sub-District Heads'.³ The colonial administrators had earlier supported the Emir's deposition of his elder brother Turaki Manya Salihi in 1909 for the reasons that:

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report for Half-year ending June 1916, p. 33.
 2. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 170P/1916, op.cit., p. 24.
 3. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 6415/1909, op.cit., para. 167.

Turaki Manya Salihi..... made a complete hash of jangali collection for 1908/9. Two months after he had been ordered to collect the haraji for 1908/9, it was found he had not only taken no pains to collect but had even interfered with some of his sub-District Heads and prevented them collecting..... He was therefore deposed. 1

By 1915 when salaries were introduced for the fully-fledged District Heads, the sub-heads continued to receive percentages as before - as a result many received emoluments in excess of those received by their executive and social superiors. The administration, needless to add, did not make any savings financially, and it was even observed that due to the continuation of their large remuneration, some of the sub-district heads were 'bidding fair to usurp altogether the positions of the District Heads in some instances'.² This inherent conflict in the relations between District Heads and their subordinate chieftains inevitably worked to the advantage of the incumbent ruler of the emirate, and the conflict was not resolved until the final disappearance of the term 'sub-district heads' in the 1920's.

District and Village Administration 1910 - 26.

Whereas Dr. Cargill had to his credit the creation of districts in Kano emirate plus the deployment of their chiefs into the countryside, and Temple presided over the institution of the Native Treasury or beit-el-mal, it was left to their successors to rationalise and reorganize district and village administration. Cargill's sending out of the District Heads to reside permanently in the countryside was the most fundamental structural change brought about by colonial overrule. This change was effected partly to enable the emir to escape from being surrounded by an all-powerful, idle bureaucracy as well as to make

1. Ibid., para. 166.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 170P/1916, op.cit., p.24.

sure that administration was carried on through legitimate channels of authority instead of the jakadu (the bogey of the British Administration). In this wise, Temple's institution of the Native Treasury was one of the most positive steps taken in the direction of channelling the revenues of the emirate towards ends beneficial to the populace. For the district system and the Native Treasury to function efficiently, it was necessary that administration at the lower levels had to be rationalized in line with colonial ideas, especially those designed to humanize the system. As it was, however, neither Cargill nor Temple had much chance or opportunity of giving attention to the question.

The jakada system, which had been in vogue up to 1907, supposedly ceased with the 1908 deployment of District Heads to reside permanently away from the capital.¹ However, this formal cessation was no more than a pious declaration of intent. The elimination of jakadu from the administrative system of the emirate had yet to become reality. Such reality could only be possible if and when district and village administration had been rationalized, thereby giving the District and village chiefs adequate authority over their respective peoples. Unlike the Fulani emirate-states of Sokoto, Katsina and Katagum, where the hakimai (Hausa equivalent of district chiefs) had been accustomed to living in their territories,² the newly deployed District Heads of Kano emirate were unaccustomed to the idea of residing in their territories and administering their charges on the spot. Therefore, when the Kano District Heads were deployed in 1908, they at

1. See pp. 73-77, above.

2. See D.M. Last, Sokoto Caliphate, passim; Hastings, 'History of the Katagum Division of Kano Province' (JAS), vol. X XI; V. Low, The Border States; O. Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, States & Emirates, p. _____.

first lacked the physical infrastructure on which to base their authority. This was especially true of the most important, titled chiefs, who had hitherto resided exclusively at the capital. If these hakimai were to escape from the evils of the jakada system, they had to have responsible and acceptable subordinates. During 1908 and before then, the system of administration prevailing in the countryside was, to put it mildly, very chaotic.¹ We may recall that because of the jakada system and the disorderly location of fiefs, the resident town and village chiefs had had hardly any power over the peasantry whom they were supposed to administer. However, as the districts, newly consolidated, were large in size and many were densely populated, the colonial regime gave first priority to formalising the position of what were termed sub-district heads. Every district was sub-divided into smaller territorial jurisdictions and at the head of each subdivision was appointed a sub-district head.² In all the British created 56 sub-districts within the 13 districts of the emirate (excluding Kano city).³ The chiefs of these sub-districts were to be the immediate subordinates of the District Heads. In the Home District - encompassing the ten sub-districts within a radius of twenty miles from the capital - the District Head, Chiroma Abdullahi Bayero (emir 1926 - 53), was more or less a super overlord over the titled sub-district heads. Traditionally, these titled, sub-district heads had held fiefs in their own right and it was partly to mollify them that the term sub-district head had been adopted as an administrative terminology.⁴ For these traditional hakimai left no doubt of their

1. See p.57-68, above.

2. NAK/6415/1909, p.

3. NAK/ /1913, p.

4. NAK/6415/1909, p.

agrieved feelings at not being given their own full-fledged districts in the new scheme of things. In the event, however, the sub-district head system did not work well in any of the thirteen districts of the emirate. As early as 1909, the British found that Hamza, one of the sub-district heads under the Madeki, not only gave merely lukewarm allegiance to his immediate superior but was also reported as 'notoriously lacking in zeal and inclined to take things easily' - he was therefore deposed.¹ The same year, the sub-district heads of Madoki, Dambatta, Kura, Godiya, Kabbo, Garki and Majiya were deposed for 'various malpractices' and failure, or more correctly refusal, to collect taxes.² It should be noted that everything else apart, the efficiency of the District and sub-district heads was gauged by their abilities as tax collectors.³ The conflict of personality between the District and sub-district heads became so intense that in 1909 it was decided that the sub-heads should personally take the taxes they collected to the capital, instead of (as originally intended) handing over the monies to the District Heads.⁴ This arrangement could not but exacerbate further the already inflamed relations between the District Heads and their so-called immediate lieutenants - for there had emerged two contending sources of authority in the countryside. Many of the sub-district heads, in fact, bade fair to usurp the pre-eminent positions of their superiors, as noted by E.J. Arnett in 1912:

Some of these men, in charge of important walled towns with villages under them, were in the old days in a very independent position and they have not yet quite realised the changed state of affairs. 5

1. NAK/6415/1909, para. 179.

2. *ibid.*, para. 171 - 178.

3. *ibid.*, para. 80.

4. *ibid.*, para. 169.

5. NAK/1114/1912, para. 31.

If, as the British Administration intended, every official under the native administration had to 'work for his upkeep', then either the District or sub-district head had to go. For one would not work side by side with the other in the most important aspect of their duties - tax collection. Even in a matter dear to both sets of officials - maintenance of law and order - there could not be the desired degree of cooperation. In view of the situation, there was a lively debate within British circles as to the pros and cons of retaining one set of officials or the other. The problem was most acute in Kano emirate, in contrast to Katsina and Katagum - the other large emirate-states of the Province - where the District Heads had no competitors for power and influence in their respective territories. At the end of 1915 acting Resident Palmer finally came down in favour of retaining the Kano emirate District Heads even though, he observed, some of them were not competent tax collectors.¹ Of the reasons Palmer advanced for the retention of the District Heads was one argument that their inherited positions were important assets in the performance of their duties.² In this regard, Palmer considered the sub-district chiefs as normally followers and social inferiors of the District Heads. He thus laid it down that in future the aim should be to gradually reduce the districts to somewhat smaller sizes, and at the same time increase the number of sub-districts so that in the end their chiefs would become merely town or village group heads, with no illusions of grandeur.³ In short, the policy outlined by Palmer would result in a substantial increase in the number of districts within the emirate, but avoiding the

1. NAK/170P/1916, Palmer, p. 25.

2. *ibid.*, p. 25; Cf. Afigbo, 'Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria', J.H.S.N., vol.III, No. 2, 1965; D.C. Dorward, op.cit.

3. *ibid.*, p; 25, 29.

complications posed by the existence of the sub-district heads. Such an arrangement, Palmer maintained, would be a great success, especially as the percentages of taxation retained by sub-district heads as remuneration could be utilised as salary payments to the proposed town and village group heads.¹ At any rate, Palmer's proposals were adopted and as from 1916 their implementation was taken in hand.

The most obvious territory in which a trial of Palmer's proposals could be undertaken was the unwieldy Home District. There, the Chiroma Bayero had been theoretically in charge of the ten densely populated sub-districts nearest to the capital. His sub-district heads, however, almost always did as they pleased because traditionally they had been independent hakimai. As sub-district heads, moreover, they retained percentages of the taxes they collected as remuneration for their labours. And since practically all of them hailed from the ruling dynasty - greatly feared especially by the peasantry - they perpetrated no small measure of extortion in their public dealings. Neither their overlord Chiroma Bayero nor, apparently, the emir of the British staff, could do anything about this. The situation had become so depressing that Palmer himself was at a loss for a practical solution:

It is extremely difficult to inculcate the idea that Government is interested in method as opposed to the result of (tax) collection, and the Native mind considers that Government has no right to complain of a chief who renders to Caesar as much as Caesar can find out to be due, even though he incidentally makes a good deal for himself. 2

If these chiefs were therefore to be restrained, they had to be made directly responsible for all their actions, instead of the sham arrangement whereby they were supposedly responsible to the Chiroma. The Chiroma, Bayero, had in turn never been able to prove his capacity in view of the recalcitrance of his sub-heads, who considered themselves his peers. On the adoption of Palmer's proposals, therefore,

1. NAK/170P/1916, Palmer, *ibid.*, p.25.

2. NAK/170P/1916, Palmer, p. 26.

Bayero had a new district created for him early in 1916: there, his efficiency or otherwise could be gauged.¹ The creation of a new district for Bayero entailed reductions in the sizes of some districts north-west of the capital. At the same time, the ten sub-districts of the Home District regained their 'independence' and their chiefs became full-fledged District Heads.² Also, on the death of the District Head, Sarkin Rano, in March, 1916, the new district of Tudun Wada was carved out of Rano district and entrusted to the charge of Dan Kadai.³ At about the same time Karaye district was divided into two smaller units, resulting in a new district with headquarters at Gwarzo under the charge of Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta.⁴ These changes, together with the partial re-deployment of personnel, bequeathed Kano emirate with twenty four districts (in place of the former thirteen), excluding Kano city.

With twenty four administrative districts in existence, the task of gradually eliminating the remaining sub-district heads could be pursued in earnest. Since Dr. Cargill had, not long after the inauguration of British overrule, already demarcated the rough boundaries of 'natural' village group units or gundumomi (sing. gunduma), what remained was to carefully map out those units afresh. The next stage would be to pay the village group chiefs (H. dagatai) sufficient salary to secure them standing and respect enough to enable them to collect the taxes.⁵ Concurrent with the formalization of the

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1. Palmer, *ibid.*, p. 28; cf. O. Temple, *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, States*, p.
 2. The relevant district Note Books use almost identical words to describe the emancipation of the districts then.
 3. NAK/518P/1916, p.8; Tudun Wada District Note Book (historical section and chronology of district heads).
 4. NAK/170P/1916, p. 28; Gwarzo District Note Book; Karaye District Note Book.
 5. NAK/518P/1916, p. 4.

twenty-four districts of 1916, the status of sub-district head was abolished in thirteen of the districts, namely the more densely populated units under the charge of Barde Kerarriya, Dan Amar, Dan Buram, Dan Isa, Dan Iya, Dan Makwayo, Madaki, Mai Unguwa Mundubawa, Makama, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, Sarkin Fulani Jaidanawa, Sarkin Rano, and Tafida.¹ In all these districts, the former sub-district heads who had not been lucky to be promoted to a District Headship were reduced to the position of town or village group chieftains. In effect, they became merely minor chiefs or notables, in common with many who had hitherto been their subordinates. At the end of 1917, the number of such minor chieftaincies in Kano emirate had risen to three hundred and ninety five.² In addition, since these chieftaincies averaged thirty square miles in area with a population of 3500 people, there was ample room for further reducing their sizes as well as extending the system to cover the remaining eleven districts of the emirate-state. During 1918, some more of the remaining sub-districts heads were dispossessed; those affected were from the districts of Chiroma and Wambai.³ In fact, wherever possible, the village group unit or town headship was substituted for the sub-district chieftaincy and steps were taken to increase the number of these smaller units by reducing the sizes of those already in existence.⁴ The latter measure had to be pursued vigorously in order that the sub-district head would not re-emerge in a different guise. The newly emancipated dagatai

1. NAK/518P/1916, *ibid.*, p.9. The districts had yet to acquire more permanent boundaries in order that they could be referred to by the names of their headquarters towns.

2. NAK/179P/1918, enclosure Form 7.

3. NAK/93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, p. 5.

4. C.O. Migeod, *ibid.*, p. 6.

(sing. dagaci) or village group chiefs were encouraged towards a proper appreciation of the rights and duties of their position. As a result, by 1918 if not earlier, it would be true to say that

... the hopeless spectacle (once) common of a Village Head, a man in other respects of some local importance but with no hold or authority over the people living in his own village is now no longer seen. 1

As for the former sub-district chiefs, greatly reduced in stature due to the reorganizations already cited, as also of native courts,² the changes greatly affected their material well-being. For many of them, because the reduction in their stature also meant a steep fall in income, they were 'reduced to trekking instead of riding horses' in the performance of their less important duties.³

The difficulties of the former sub-district heads did not cause the administration to reconsider its policies. If anything, measures aimed at dispossessing the few remaining sub-district chiefs were pursued with greater vigour. So much so that by the turn of 1919 the mere existence of a few remaining sub-heads was regarded as an embarrassment.⁴ In furtherance of this policy, during 1920 the decision was taken in principle to sub-divide the districts of Wambai, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, and Makama.⁵ Fortunately for some of the surviving sub-district heads in these territories, by then the British Administration felt that wherever possible local chiefs of prestige should be promoted to new district headships in preference to the emir's relations or titled protégés from the metropolis.⁶ This shift

1. NAK/1114/1912, E.J. Arnett, para. 32.

2. See ~~p. below~~ ^{below, p.} 289-299

3. NAK/1114/1912, Arnett, para. 33.

4. NAK/93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, p. 5.

5. NAK/PCJ/432/20, confidential; also NAK/316P/1920.

6. NAK/316P/1920, p. 1.

in colonial thinking, however, did not affect all new district headships: for when the Wambai's district was broken into two smaller entities in 1921, the headship of one remained with the incumbent Wambai while the second went to a younger brother of emir Usman, Dan Maje Zakari.¹ In this instance, the desire to satisfy the old and almost incapacitated ruler overrode all other considerations. Resident E.J. Arnett, however, claimed that none of the local sub-heads was equal to the task.² But when Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida's district was broken into two during the same year, one of the local notables and hitherto a sub-district head, Sarkin Birnin Kudu, was promoted to the headship of one of the new districts with its headquarters at Birnin Kudu.³ The then Sarkin Dawaki, Isa, transferred his seat to Gwaram, headquarters of his reduced territory.⁴ The district headships in the emirate thereby rose to twenty six. The heads out of whose jurisdictions the two additional districts had been carved had their salaries slashed to reflect their diminished responsibilities. The Wambai had his pay reduced from £800 to £500 per annum, and the Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida from £480 to £360 per annum.⁵ The newly promoted District Heads, Dan Maje Zakari and Sarkin Birnin Kudu, were apportioned annual payments of £300 and £480 respectively.⁶

1. Ringim District Note Book (historical section). The districts in question were Dabi and Taura.

2. NAK/316P/1920, p. 1.

3. NAK/120P/1921, para. 19, p. 7; Birnin Kudu and Gwaram District Note Books. The Note Books wrongly give the date as 1922.

4. Ibid.

5. NAK/120P/1920, para. 20, p. 7.

6. ibid., para. 20, p. 7.

The next territorial adjustment in the emirate occurred towards the end of 1923. Then, the old district of Dutse, hitherto under the charge of Dan Lawan Umaru, was divided into two. Umaru transferred to a new district with headquarters at Kiyawa.¹ At the same time, one of the last surviving sub-district heads, Sarkin Dutse Suleiman, was promoted to the headship of the other district with headquarters at Dutse.² Almost concurrently, the Makama, Muhammadu Aminu, was deposed for embezzlement.³ Advantage was taken of this deposition to carve two districts out of the Makama's old jurisdiction. One of these new units, with headquarters at Wudil, went to a newly appointed Makama while the other, with headquarters at Sumaila, was placed under the charge of Dan Darman Isa,⁴ who was a cousin of the new Makama and had hitherto been a sub-district head. With these changes, which left the emirate with twenty eight districts, the term sub-district head ceased to exist in administrative usage.

Below the District Heads, of course, were the village group heads or dagatai. As already noted, the reduction in the sizes of the districts was coupled with the elimination of sub-district heads. As a replacement to the latter officials, village group heads were developed into minor but more effective local administrators. At least this was how the British optimistically viewed their own actions in this regard. Consequently, from 395 village units with formally recognised chiefs in 1918, the number had risen to 459 by the end of 1922.⁵ And, at the end of 1924, there was a total of

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1. NAK/635/1925, para. 25, p.11; Dutse District Note Book (history and chronology).
 2. Dutse District Note Book (history and chronology).
 3. Wudil (and Sumaila) District Note Book.
 4. *ibid.*; Sumaila District Note Book.
 5. NAK/635/1925, para. 29, p.14.

1,175 village group units, each with its minor administrative head.¹ By then, too, the village units were sufficiently small for purposes of tax collection by the individual chiefs personally - the average area of each was 13 square miles, with a population of some 1,632 of whom about 468 were tax-paying male adults.² The British had every reason to be pleased with the seeming achievement: in their view, the grassroots basis of indirect rule had finally become reality in an emirate where they considered that the emir's inbuilt supremacy made decentralization difficult.

It would be false, however, to conclude that the establishment of village group units with recognised chieftains between 1916 and 1926 was accomplished without the usual disappointments. Just as in the case of their superiors the District Heads, many village heads were caught in acts out of accord with British ideas. Indeed, considering the number of chiefs involved, these acts were numerous; predictably, many absconded or were dismissed, and their 'misdeeds' provoked succinct comments from colonial officers. During 1918 alone, a total of twenty three village heads were dismissed for embezzling tax revenue.³ Also, in 1919, the chief of Kabbo was deposed for, among other misdemeanours, harbouring a thief.⁴ In fact 1919 and 1920 were critical years in regard to village management as of other spheres of emirate administration. Early in the former year, the aged Shehu Usman (1919-26) succeeded to the emirship following the

1. *ibid.*, para. 29, p. 14.

2. *ibid.*, para. 29, p. 14.

3. NAK/93P/1919, p. 9.

4. NAK/318P/1919, p.4. The British suspected that harbouring thieves was then a common practice of rural notables, apparently in order that they could get a share of the proceeds.

death of Muhammadu Abbas (1903-19). Usman, according to the British, did not care to establish a firm grip on his officials, in spite of all encouragement by the colonial Resident. As a result, so the British version would make us believe, almost all the emirate officials, from the district to village level, became 'first and foremost intent on filling their pockets and those of their numerous and rapacious hangers-on'.¹ At one stage, allegedly, the emir himself fell under the spell of a slave official - Abdullahi - who for all practical purposes usurped the position of the Waziri as chief counsellor to the ruler. Fortunately, as Resident W.F. Gowers was considering 'drastic action' the slave, E.J. Arnett writes, 'recently solved the problem by dying'.² Indeed, the laxity of the emir was so obvious to the British that A.C.G. Hastings, who was acting Resident from October 1920 to March 1921 had to intervene more directly. This intervention was the background of the district adjustments of 1921 and 1923, though we must not forget the local dynastic considerations involved. Much more relevant here, many village heads lost their positions. For example, during 1922 a total of 152 village group heads defaulted on the payment of taxes from their respective areas; scores were deposed and imprisoned and not a few absconded from the emirate.³ In 1923, there were 86 defaulting village heads.⁴ In addition, in 1924 some nineteen village heads were found guilty of embezzlement - of these

1. NAK/316P/1920, p.1.

2. *ibid.*, p.2.

3. NAK/635/1925, para. 125, p.49. Absconding to Damagaram in French Niger was a favourite ploy with offending village heads. In one celebrated case, the absconding chief was caught at Maiduguri, 387 miles away, and the culprit was 'apparently on his way to the East'.

4. *ibid.*, para. 125, p.49.

thirteen were deposed and imprisoned and six absconded.¹ Furthermore, that same year four village heads were found guilty of pilfering jangali money - the full amount was recovered via confiscations of the chiefs' property; three of the culprits were deposed and the fourth was sentenced to corporal punishment and then allowed to resume his chiefly duties.² Finally, during the tax year 1925/26, tax embezzlement amounted to £334 representing the defalcations of twenty three village heads of whom thirteen were deposed and imprisoned.³ Despite these seeming wholesale depositions of village heads, the British staff at Kano were unanimous that emir Usman could have meted out more punishments and that many more cases of fraud went unpunished. Mr. E.J. Arnett, a man with long experience of the emirate, has summed up what appeared to have been the effect of emir Usman's lack of firmness:

The immediate effect of this ... is chiefly noticeable in the general air of slackness and entire absence of discipline amongst the native officials. I do not suggest that discipline has ever been their strong point but flagrant breaches of orders, if not actually ignored, are dealt with far too leniently. Even those who have been warned on previous occasions are treated as first offenders and 'action taken' generally consists of a recapitulation of the terrible punishments that will be meted out to them if they offend again. 4

Indeed, according to Arnett, an offender would get away with a solemn tuba (seeking forgiveness) 'but without any resolve to sin no more'. Nevertheless, despite such flaws, the British Administration had no more room for manouvre. The only ultimate remedy was a future generation of chiefs, whom it was hoped would be more dedicated

1. *ibid.*, para. 125, p. 49.

2. *ibid.*, para. 126, p. 49.

3. NAK/K.105 vol. III, p.

4. NAK/635/1925, para. 27, p. 12.

and selfless in the public business. Meanwhile, the village chiefs could not be dispensed with for fear of upsetting the delicate balance of the indirect system.

The Development of the Native Treasury and Colonial Tax Assessment

One of the major developments of the colonial period in Northern Nigeria was the institution of the Native Treasury system. In itself the treasury (A. Beit-el-mal; H. Baitulmali) was not an innovation as such, for both Heinrich Barth at mid-century and C.H. Robinson in the last decade of the nineteenth century when they stayed at Kano, had ^{seen} the Ma'aji or treasurer mediating between them and the then rulers of Kano.¹ Robinson was in fact so impressed by the then Ma'aji that he mistakenly assumed the man was the 'king's chief executive minister'.² Nevertheless the beit-el-mal was such a well established institution that apparently the ruler left to the Ma'aji the substantial payments for goods purchased from incoming traders and travellers.³ With the establishment of British overrule in 1903, the first few years were taken up with the problems of taxation and the reorganization of emirate administration. In those years though, the colonial administrators were also engaged in a serious debate as to whether or not the share of tax revenue accruing to the rulers and their officials should be regarded as public funds and therefore controlled by the Administration. It has been noted correctly that even in those early years when much energy was

1. H. Barth, Travels (1890), vol.I, p.289; C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, p. 108 - 110.

2. C.H. Robinson, ibid..

3. Ibid., p. 109.

devoted to taxation and administration, all the colonial political officers were agreed on the desirability of paying fixed salaries to the emirs and their officials, in place of the then current arrangement whereby the Government shared the proceeds of taxation on a fifty-fifty basis with the native administrators.¹ It is inappropriate to discuss the wider implications and twists of this debate here or the other aspects of colonial politics as more than 50 British officers were involved. In Kano and elsewhere in the Protectorate, the local officials were also numerous, their number for Kano being about sixty and the local politics was affected by too many factors which were non-European.

In remodelling the taxation system, the colonial regime had two primary objectives, namely to preserve the continuity of the system which had developed in the emirates before the imposition of British overrule, and to simplify taxation by merging the many taxes under a few heads.² Hand in hand with the implementation of these reforms, there emerged an awareness that with the expected consolidation and development of the Protectorate, the taxes which were accruing to the emirs and their officials would inevitably increase enormously but there was no guarantee that those sums would be 'expended on objects beneficial to the people'.³ Hence Girouard's plea to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a memorandum on

1. Lugard, Political Memoranda (1906); C.L. Temple, evidence to N.N. Lands Committee, Cd. 5103 (1910), para. 683, p.88 (cited in M. Bull, op.cit., p.67).
2. Cf. Cd. 5102, Report of the N.N. Lands Committee, which cites H.R. Palmer's evidence that in Katsina there were some 26 taxes by the time of the British occupation in 1903. It should be remembered that the codification and simplification of taxation absorbed the first two decades of colonial overrule.
3. Cd. 5102 (1910), para. 54, p. XVII.

Land Tenure and Revenue Assessment (dated 2/11/1907), for an 'early replacement by fixed emoluments of the proportion of native revenue (50%) told off to the payment of salaries to native administrators.'¹ However, the Northern Nigeria Lands Committee, which sat from June to July 1908 and of which two of the Northern Residents (C.L. Temple and Captain C.W. Orr) were members, felt unable categorically to recommend that fixed salaries for emirs and officials be adopted as policy. The farthest the committee would go was to suggest that where an emir's share of the revenue exceeded the income which was considered comensurate with his status, the balance should be devoted to works of public utility under the supervision of the Governor.² In suggesting this limited supervision of the emirs' revenue, the committee was influenced by fears that to place an emir on a fixed salary would very materially 'diminish his prerogatives' and 'place him in a comparatively inferior position in the eyes of his people.'³ Such a development, of course, would contradict the colonial policy of supporting the authority and prestige of the emirs and other recognised chiefs. Some points which should be reiterated were that no matter the incidental personal inclinations of individual officers, the British generally tended to be ideologically committed not to interfere in local financial and other matters and most of them seem to have had a superstitious devotion to the interests of any group which had been ruling. How, then, was the Native Treasury and subsequent control of local finances brought about after all? Mr. H.R. Palmer (later Sir Richmond), the British official

1. Cd. 5103 (1910), Girouard to the Earl of Crewe, 2/11/1907, p.53.

2. Cd. 5102 (1910), para. 54, p. xvii.

3. Ibid.

instrumental for instituting the first colonial treasury in Northern Nigeria, has confirmed that the latter was inaugurated at Katsina in 1908 and finally established in the following year.¹ Elsewhere too it has been on record that Katsina was the 'home and origin of the institution'.² Palmer, then Assistant Resident in charge ^{of} Katsina Division of Kano Province, is said to have 'persuaded the Emir to provide a budget for his share of the revenue, converting his retainers into salaried officials'.³ What neither Palmer nor another observer has pointed out were the circumstances which made the institution of the Native Treasury so easy and apparently popular to the then emir of Katsina. This ruler, Muhammadu Dikko (1906-44) came to the Katsina throne in unusual circumstances. In 1906 Palmer was still a long way from conversion to either 'correct' indirect rule policy or belief in the loyalty of the Fulani rulers to the Administration.⁴ Not long after the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903 and their occupation of Katsina without a fight, Palmer was appointed Assistant Resident in charge, Katsina. At the end of 1904 he had instigated the deposition of the then emir of Katsina, Abubakar (1887-1904), for allegedly 'every kind of misrule and continued opposition to Government'.⁵

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1. O. Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria ed. C.L. Temple, (Lagos, 1922), p.471; Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London 1937), p.71; cf. M. Bull, op.cit., p.67.
 2. N.A.K./S.N.P - 3835, E.J. Arnett, para. 75.
 3. M. Bull, op.cit., p.67.
 4. Cf. M. Bull, ibid., p.59-60; C.O.446/82, Girouard to Crewe, 17.2.1909.
 5. Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p. 25.

Abubakar was succeeded by Yaro (1904-06) but within less than two years he too had been deposed on the grounds that he had 'disappointed all expectations' and apparently Palmer's evidence that Yaro was 'disloyal, dishonest and incapable'.¹ With the deposition of Yaro, the emirship was removed from the dynasty founded by Umaru Dallaji (1806 - 35) at the time of the Fulani jihad a century earlier. Instead the position was conferred on Muhammadu Dikko, a Sullubawa Fulani but non-royal local official who had, so the story goes, 'risen by his own merits' to the noble title of Durbi and had come to the notice of Palmer when the latter 'was urgently trying to build a fort at Katsina after the Satiru rising of 1906'.² It is said that emir Yaro and the other Katsina nobles were lukewarm in giving support due to their failure to provide the required conscripted labourforce but Durbi Muhammadu Dikko had obliged and provided over a thousand able-bodied men and the construction of the fort had then been completed in record time. Palmer is said to have asked Dikko to name his reward and the latter had requested the emirship.³ Hence his elevation to the throne when Yaro was dethroned in 1906. It is therefore obvious that Muhammadu Dikko was Palmer's creature and totally dependent on British support for the maintenance of his authority and legitimacy as neither had a basis in the jihad legacy which had hitherto been the source and inspiration of the Katsina theocracy in spite of the recent imposition of colonial overrule. As could thus be expected, Dikko became an enthusiastic collaborator

1. Ibid., p. 25; see also W. Wallace, Annual Report Northern Nigeria 1906 - 07, p. 9.
2. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria (London, 1966), p. 175.
3. Ibid.

with the British regime. Another factor which must have persuaded the Katsina ruler to cooperate was Palmer's by then undisguised contempt for the Fulani rulers generally and his disposition to supplant them by representatives of the Habe dynasties which the Fulani had dispossessed in the nineteenth century. This was proved in the neighbouring small emirate of Daura (which fell within Palmer's jurisdiction) where on 20th August 1907 the Fulani ruler was turned out and Mallam Musa, a representative of Daura's dispossessed Habe dynasty and till then Sarkin Zango, installed as emir.¹ Apparently Palmer was able to get away with this unique dynastic overhaul due to the backing of the then Acting Resident in charge Kano Province, Major Arthur Festing.² The effect of this dynastic revolution in Daura was to act as a spur to the Katsina ruler to remain in the good books of such a potentially hostile Resident, friendly though he then was.

Such was the background to the earliest organization of the Native Treasury at Katsina in 1908. In the following year the institution was further stabilised at Katsina, and at Kano the emir was persuaded to accept 'a civil list' and a Native Treasury was constituted, with Governor Girouard's sanction, in January 1909.³ The emir of Kano Muhammadu Abbas accepted the beit-el-mal as the lesser of many possible evils, for it was only recently in 1908 that there was talk of supplanting the Kano Fulani dynasty if it were possible to bring forth an alternative Habe dynasty. At any rate Temple, who engineered

1. N.A.K./S.N.P - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p. 14.

2. Ibid., p.14.

3. N.A.K./S.N.P - 6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., para. 55; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P - 134P/1913, para. 24, p.7.

the project at Kano, had been also responsible for re-assuring the ruler and the restoration of his administrative and judicial prerogatives by re-constituting the Emir's Judicial Council as the highest court of appeal in Kano emirate at about the same time. This factor made it seem statesman-like of the Kano emir to accept the new innovation.

The most immediate consequence of the inauguration of the Native Treasury system was an intensification of the assessment and collection of taxation, hand in hand with the simplification and rationalization of the traditional taxes which the British had found. In the latter spheres of endeavour British influence had already resulted in the creation and consolidation of gundumomi and districts as we know them nowadays, as also in the deployment of District Heads to reside permanently in their newly consolidated jurisdictions. These changes had occupied the early colonial period up to 1909. There had then been neither the time nor an adequate number of British administrative officers to allow for attention to be given to the projected simplification and rationalization of the traditional taxes. In any case until locally recruited officials who could be held directly responsible for the collection of the taxes were deployed in the countryside, it would have made no sense to embark on any precipitate action. But with the institution of the Native Treasury in 1909, it became necessary that the full share of the emir (or Native Authority) from taxation should be paid up and fully accounted for. The colonial regime, but especially the emir, deemed it proper that the newly deployed District Heads were checked so as to render a correct account of all the monies they collected from the talakawa. The colonial regime could expect to net a greatly increased revenue in the event of improved accounting. The emir, for dynastic reasons, was hostile

towards many of these District Heads, and in any case he disliked their deployment away from the capital where they had been under his watchful eyes. Their deployment, of course, upset the traditional administrative set-up. For these reasons if for nothing else, the emir was bound to take an active interest in taxation and Native Treasury affairs in order that he could at least maintain his prerogatives regarding his subordinate officials. The zeal of the emir Muhammadu Abbas (1903 - 19) for the means to ensure this end was whetted by the colonial regime's deliberate self-effacement and a strict refusal to interfere in local affairs. Taxation then as in the past was collected in the name of the emir, and for all practical purposes the funds of the Native Treasury were to be entirely controlled by the emir and his judicial council and accounted for by the beit-el-mal staff, namely the Ma'aji and his official assistants. Legally the Resident was to confine himself to advising the emir.¹

Elsewhere allusion has already been made to the advantage taken by Muhammadu Abbas (1903 - 19) and Shehu Usman (1919 - 26) of the opportunity to dispossess many District Heads and other officials for misdemeanours and shortcomings in collecting and accounting for the taxes assessed for their respective districts. In spite of the reported embezzlements, speculation, and neglect of duty for which so many heads rolled, the total annual revenues of the Native Treasury and the colonial regime from emirate taxation continued to record an annual and steady increase.² One explanation for this upward trend in the revenue lay in the intensification of assessment as well as improvement of tax-collection methods. The first step in this

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op. cit., para. 56.

2. ~~See Appendix 2,~~ cf. N.A.K./KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568 vol. II, Kano Provincial Gazetteer 1933 - 54, enclosure of financial figures.

direction was taken with the institution of what were termed 'taki' and 'Resident assessment' between 1909 and 1910.¹ 'Taki' (lit. measurement by foot) was a rough sort of measurement of the areas of farms and dwellings for purposes of assessing an individual's income. The system was devised in order that the communal lump-sum assessments of towns, villages and dwellings could be dropped as inefficient. Assessment of taxation by the taki system became so popular with the colonial administrators, that they endeavoured to extend the method to cover all the emirate as the most 'accurate and nearest method of arriving at the incidence of an assessed income tax'.² The taki method of assessing individual in place of communal or lump-sum taxation was initially instituted in 1909 - 10 in Kano City and the twenty-two small hamlets in its immediate vicinity (H. hurumi).³ In that financial year all compounds in Kano City as well as all farms in the city and hurumi hamlets were measured and taxed in proportion to their sizes.⁴ In Kano City the compound rates were instituted at one penny per twenty square yards for natives and one penny per five square yards for non-natives, that is non-indigenous residents; city and hurami farms were assessed at one

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 114/1912, para. 61. For incidental details see N.A.K./S.N.P. 7 - 5570/1909, E.J. Arnett, Kano Province Assessment; N.A.K./S.N.P. 7 - 5463/1909, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Assessment Report.
 2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report for 1915, p.30; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P. 7 - 1354/1911, Kiru Sub-District Assessment Report; N.A.K./S.N.P. 7 - 1355/1911, Captain Uniacke, Rogo Sub-District Assessment Report.
 3. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 3835/1910, para. 49; N.A.K./S.N.P. - 114/1912, para. 61.
 4. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 3835/1910, paras. 41, 48, 49.

shilling eight pence or one shilling per acre-flat.¹ This somewhat complicated system was conceived by H.O. Lindsell and its purported object was to derive a reasonable income tax from the urban inhabitants. These rates replaced all other taxes formerly payable within the city and its environs.² Elsewhere in the emirate, except for the districts under Wambai, Barde, and Sar. D. Tsakar Gida, a Resident assessment was introduced pending an extension of the taki assessment; this amounted to counting the compounds in each locality and assessing each at a rate of one shilling six pence while farms were also assessed at one shilling per acre.³ In all the districts which were 'Resident assessed', all other land and produce taxes were abolished, except zakhat which continued to be paid as a separate tax.⁴ In the far-flung districts of Wambai, Barde and Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, only compounds were counted by the emir's officials and assessed at the rate of one shilling six pence per dwelling; farms were left alone for the time being but the customary taxes, including zakhat, were to be paid separately.⁵ Concurrent with these measures, all over the emirate two little known taxes, chappa⁶ and hurumi,⁷ were

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report for 1912, para. 9, p.3.
 2. Ibid.; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.-430P/1913, J. Withers Gill, Kano Quarterly Report March 1913, 20 pp.
 3. N.A.K./S.N.P.-134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., para. 10; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 2793/1912, Captain Uniacke, Makama's District Assessment; N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 2715/1911, Mr. Bell, Dutsi District Assessment. 1911-12.
 4. N.A.K./S.N.P.-134P/1913, op.cit., para.9.
 5. Ibid., para. 10.
 6. Chappa which literally means paying homage, would seem to have been an annual payment made by men associated with the administration to their immediate superiors. In other contexts it means payment on elevation to high office.
 7. The Hurumi tax would seem to have applied to the settlements in the vicinity of Kano City and the larger walled towns in the emirate. It was evidently a tax payable for the privilege of taking refuge behind the walls whenever the emirate was raided by its enemies.

abolished.¹

The changes in the basis of assessment and collection of taxation instituted in 1909 - 10 formed the basis of Kano emirate taxation in the period up to 1926. Primarily, these changes were designed (1) to shift taxation from a communal to a personal and individual assessment (2) to ensure that the incidence of taxation would correspond to a person's income, and (3) to simplify and amalgamate the various taxes into a single annual tax. In the forthcoming years, therefore, the taki and Resident assessments were extended and the different taxes were amalgamated gradually, starting from the capital city and its environs and radiating, with the passage of years, farther and farther towards the emirate's sparsely populated marches. The extension of the system, as is only to be expected, called for the creation of a cadre of local surveyors to undertake the measurement of the areas of farms and compounds all over the emirate. It would seem that in anticipation of this requirement, a section for technical and survey instruction had been instituted when Mr. Hans Vischer opened the first school at Kano in 1909. By early 1910 when the taki system came into full operation, Mr. Vischer had already trained 10 such mallamai (lit. educated men/teachers) and they were sent into the field to assist officials and measure farms and compounds as well as record the names of the owners in Roman script.² These semi-skilled surveyors came to be known as taki mallamai - their training gave them proficiency to measure farms by pacing and ability to write Hausa in the Roman script. In 1914 a full-fledged Survey Department was organized under Mr. Morphy and

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 134P/1913, op.cit., para. 8.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P.- 6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., para. 184 - 185.

by 1916 the number of taki mallamai had risen to 37 men and by then their training had been so advanced as to enable them to do simple surveying and map work, in addition to their tax assessment work.¹ And by 1926 the revenue assessment staff totalled forty men, mainly engaged in taki measurements.² However, by then this figure concealed the actual number of junior employees engaged in administering the assessment of taxation - for in 1918 a Central Revenue Office had been constituted and placed under the charge of the Wazirin Kano in the following year.³ These 40 revenue or taki mallamai, together with several other clerks, draughtsmen, accountants and apprentices were all under the Waziri's jurisdiction for purposes of tax administration. Also, in 1921 a Printing Department had been organised, supervised like the Survey Department by Mr. Morphy, and its work was closely involved with taxation as it was called upon to print receipts and ledger books for keeping records of all sorts.⁴

By 1912 the new system had been extended to cover most of the sub-districts in the close-settled zone covering a radius of some twenty miles around Kano City.⁵ The labour involved and the variety of information to which attention was paid can only be properly appreciated by a look at the figures below, detailing the progress

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Half-year Report to June 1916, p. 36.
 2. N.A.K./S.N.P.-K.105 vol.III, p.32.
 3. N.A.K./S.N.P.-318P/1919, C.O.Migeod, Kano Province Report (No.57) for Half-year to June 1919, p.5.
 4. N.A.K./S.N.P.-635/1925, E.J. Arnett, Kano Province Report for 1924, p.74.
 5. N.A.K./S.N.P.-134P/1913, op.cit., para.56; cf. N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 4817/1912, Captain Foulkes, Jaidanawa Sub-District Assessment Report; N.A.K./S.N.P.7 - 5785/1912, Captain Foulkes, Dan Buram Sub-District Assessment Report.

of taki survey work by the end of 1912.¹

Area of districts assessed	1850 sq.miles.
Area of cultivated land	710 sq.miles.
Percentage of cultivation	39%.
Number of individual holdings measured	170,000.
Average size of field	2.7 acres.
Population	492,000.
Average density per square mile	267.
Average number of persons per acre of cultivated land ...	1.08.

By the end of 1913 the whole of what was then termed the 'Home District', namely the 10 small but densely populated districts nearest to Kano over which the Chiroma, was 'overlord', as well as parts of the Madaki's district to the north-west of the city, had been taki surveyed and assessed and the information as outlined above had been greatly augmented.² As a result, in that financial year alone the revenue from taxation for the whole emirate was increased by about thirty thousand pounds (~~see table below~~).³ By early 1916, taki assessments and measurements have been further extended into the districts of Makama and Sarkin Gaya to the east of Kano and to those of the Sarkin Bai, Galadima and Wambai covering most of the northern areas of the emirate.⁴ The land revenue then recorded an increase of just under twenty eight thousand pounds (see table below). In fact each year as the taki system was extended to cover more and more

1. The table is based on N.A.K./S.N.P. - 134P/1913, para. 62.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 98P/1914, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report for 1913, p. 31 - 32.

3. Ibid., p.33.

4. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, op.cit., p.36.

districts, the revenues from land or income tax also continued to record increases year after year. Indeed, by 1918 the taki system had become such a prominent feature of the administration of taxation in the emirate that a Central Revenue Office was founded and placed under the charge of the Waziri (already cited above). By then too, the revenue from land tax (known by then as haraji) had topped a hundred thousand pounds for the first time; together with jangali, the revenue from taxation was just under a hundred and forty thousand pounds.¹

Early in 1919 the tax on compounds was abolished finally in the emirate but the taki assessments on farms was raised from a flat rate of one shilling to one shilling six pence per acre.² The latter measure ensured that the revenue did not decrease. Also, in January of 1919 a large scale taki revision survey of all the farms in the emirate was begun to bring the accumulated information as to acreage, location, etc., up to date as also to re-assign the increased incidence of taxation per farmer's holding.³ Subsequent to the abolition of compound tax in 1919, the taki assessments per farm were finally rationalised and increased in the 1921 tax season as follows:⁴

Farms in Kano City and within a radius of 5 miles ...	4/- per acre.
Farms in a belt from 5 to 10 miles radius	3/- per acre.
Farms in a belt from 10 to 15 miles radius	2/- per acre.
Remaining farms outside radius	1/6d per acre.

1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, Kano Province Report ^{for} 1918, enclosure Form 8.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P.-318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, Kano Report Half-year to June 1919, p.11.

3. Ibid., p. 12 - 13.

4. Figures based on N.A.K./S.N.P.-120P/1921, A.C.G. Hastings, op.cit., p.8.

The work of the taki mallamai, as sketched above, made them the main intermediaries between the farming, tax-paying peasantry on the one hand and the native and colonial administrations on the other. Their job not only entailed measurements but also tenancy of new farms and they were entrusted with responsibility for reporting the complaints of the peasantry to the administration.¹ Like the pre-British jakadu, they acquired a potential power to tyrannize the peasantry if they were so inclined. As it were, by 1924 the many-sided duties of the taki mallamai had led to abuses which even the administrative staff, adept at keeping in the background, could no longer pretend not to notice. In that year they were therefore withdrawn from their sem-permanent visitations to the countryside. Kano Resident E.J. Arnett, a man who ought to know in view of his long association with the Kano emirate, rationalised the withdrawal thus:

The Taki Mallams (were under) no adequate supervision or control and exposed to temptations which few natives could have resisted; these men had long been enriching themselves by corruption and intimidation at the expense of the Revenue. 2

They were henceforth to be attached to the Central Revenue Office at the capital and detailed for field work as and when the occasion arose.³

The problems of tax administration had turned full circle: the taki mallamai, creation of the colonial regime, had been an important factor in the steady annual increases in tax revenues - an achievement for which the regime was delighted and full of praise. However, the taki mallamai had proved just as prone to corruption, and intimidation of the peasantry as the mainly slave jakadu whom they had supplanted.

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.52.

2. Ibid., p. 52.

3. Ibid., p.52.

Because of these weaknesses they had to be withdrawn from the countryside. The curtailment of the corruption, and intimidation of the peasantry on the part of these mallamai in such a manner proves at least one lesson - that the colonial regime was the sole guarantee of redemption for the peasantry from the age-old, often harsh, despotism of the ruling groups, even at the lowest levels. This fact was true of the period of establishment and consolidation of colonial overrule (1903-26) as it was to be for many more years to come.

An aspect of twentieth century taxation which has not been alluded to so far was the project for an Industrial Tax. The taki mallamai, as informants and assistants, were closely associated with the project. Following representations by Mr. H.O. Lindsell in 1918, a project for just such a tax was approved by the colonial regime. The industrial tax was to have been imposed in 1919 on people who had no farms but derived an income from other sources.¹ In its conception the tax was to have been paid by all adults to whom it applied, all over the emirate. However, in 1919 the Emir Muhammadu Abbas died suddenly during the tax season. This mishap, together with the discovery that 'only 4 men out of 1,000 did not own farms' in Kano Emirate, necessitated the postponement of the scheme.² The project was again postponed in 1920. It was introduced, however, in 1921 but in a modified form, i.e. instead of being levied all over the emirate, the tax was to apply only to craftsmen within Kano city. The industrial tax was then termed kurdin masu sana'a (i.e. tax on craftsmen) and levied on every adult male not paying any tax as a farmer, the rate

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 179P/1918, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report for 1917, p. 19.

2. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op.cit., p.11, 12.

being fixed at 12/- per head.¹ Concurrent with the kurdin masu sana'a or industrial tax, another form of income tax was introduced in the city. This was the kurdin masu arziki (i.e. tax on wealthy people) which was imposed as a super tax on the wealthier residents, the rate per head fixed higher than that charged on craftsmen and the liability varying according to the income involved.² As in the case of the countryside farming community, taxation on compounds was abolished whenever either of these two taxes was imposed. In the years to come, the industrial and super taxes were improved, and during the tax year 1925/26 the former was uniformly levied on all craftsmen rather than on only those who were entirely non-farmers.³ In effect, the industrial as well as super taxes came to be levied on adults in addition to any tax they might be liable to pay as farmers. Also, by 1925/26 care was taken to ensure equity by meticulously dividing the people liable to pay these taxes into grades and sub-grades according to the nature of the business and the income that might be expected from its pursuit.⁴

The institution of the Kurdin masu sana'a and the Kurdin masu arziki, when taken together with the earlier and continuing taki assessments, would help to explain the steadily increasing revenues from the general tax (or haraji after 1919) which in essence amounted to an amalgamation of the traditional taxes into a single annual

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1. N.A.K./S.N.P.-316P/1920, E.J. Arnett, Kano Report for half-year to June, 1920, p.3; N.A.K./S.N.P.-120P/1921, A.C.G. Hastings, op.cit., p.9.
 2. A.C.G. Hastings, ibid., p.9.
 3. N.A.K./S.N.P.-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, Kano Province Report for 1925 (15.2.1926), p.13.
 4. Ibid., p.13; see also Kano City Assessment Report 1925/26, H.O. Lindsell.

income tax. Despite the steadily rising revenue from taxation, for the Kano talakawa these reforms did not mean that they had to pay more. For the majority of the people the incidence of taxation more or less remained about the same as in pre-reform days and the spread of a cash economy based on the groundnut industry enhanced the capacity of the peasantry to meet their tax obligations. The prosperity of Kano emirate in this period as throughout the colonial era is underlined by the fact that in any one year the revenue raised from taxation in Kano emirate was at least double that collected in Sokoto, the next richest emirate in the Protectorate.¹ It is therefore no wonder that Kano was very important in the administrative set-up of Northern Nigeria.

By the time that the era of consolidation of colonial overrule was complete, interaction between British and native administrations and personnel has brought about a remarkable transformation on the landscape of Kano emirate administration. The resulting system, variously termed indirect rule or Anglo-African government, possessed its own separate identity and dynamism. Its motive forces were neither of Britain nor quite of indigenous Hausa-Fulani culture - in fact an amalgam of both. From the first direct and violent confrontation of 1903, both sets of rulers had learnt to work together. Their aims, though not necessarily exclusive, were often in conflict. The bogey of the British Administration was the jakada system. Also, the British aimed at liberalizing emirate autocracy

1. N.A.K./KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568 vol.II, Kano Provincial Gazetteer 1933 - 54, p.13; cf. Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London, 1937), p.113. ~~For the Kano revenue from 1909 to 1926, see Appendix 2.~~

and utilizing at least part of native administration revenues in works beneficial to the silent populace. Hence the various experiments culminating in consolidated districts with resident chiefs, as also the gunduma and village group heads. The Native Treasury, ultimate symbol of a successful native administration, had come fully into its own by 1926. Related to its success were the taki mallamai and measurements, designed essentially to free the talakawa from extortion and the tyranny of the jakada. The Native Authority, namely the emir, often succeeded in frustrating British intentions or taking advantage of them for his dynastic and political designs. In the end, it would be true to say that by 1926 British policies had succeeded in freeing the emir from the control of an idle bureaucracy, slave or free-born. Equally remarkably, they had established on a firm footing the district heads, and somewhat less firmly the village authorities or dagatai.

Pattern of Revenue Expenditure to 1926.

Since one of the reasons for instituting the Native Treasury or beit-el-mal at Kano as elsewhere was to ensure that the revenues accruing to the native rulers were utilised for ends beneficial to their subjects, it will be appropriate to outline the pattern of Kano's revenue expenditure to 1926. We need recall that the ordering of N.A. finances was deliberately and directly linked to a reform of the administration in the direction of bureaucratisation. The most important and by far the largest item of expenditure was personal emoluments, namely the ruler's 'civil list' which was fixed at £400 a month in 1909, and the payment of salaries, in the first instance, to the members of the Emir's Judicial Council and the newly deployed district alkalai. Pending the allocation of fixed salaries to the

District Heads, they and their subordinate chiefs in the rural areas continued to draw a statutory 25% share of the taxes they collected from their respective territories, while 25% and 50% respectively accrued to the Native Treasury and the colonial regime.¹ Within a year of the institution of the beit-el-mal, ten of the mallamai trained by Mr. Hans Vischer were employed by the Emir (Native Authority) as taki mallamai and paid salaries from beit-el-mal funds.²

As from 1909, also, the emir started employing free or paid labour for construction work on various public undertakings such as a new court-house and a jail as well as repairs to Kano city gates.³

The wages for such paid labour were disbursed at the rate of six pence per day for skilled labour, and five hundred cowries, with food, for unskilled labour.⁴ The institution of payment for work done for the ruler was no less an innovation than the institution of fixed salaries for the Emir and his assistants. That the payment for labour by the ruler was a new and radical departure from traditional precedent was quite obvious to Resident Temple:

I would like to draw particular attention to this as I think it is the first time that labour which is strictly and literally free has been employed on any large scale by an Emir in this Protectorate. 5

In fact this innovation, together with personal emoluments and an annual grant of £1,000 to the Government-run schools at Kano, formed the main items of Native Treasury expenditure during the period under discussion.

1. N.A.K./S.N.P. - 6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., para. 187.

2. Ibid., para. 274.

3. NAK/6415/1909, para. 207.

4. Temple, ibid., para. 208.

5. Temple, ibid., para. 207.

With these objectives in view, the first rudimentary estimates of expenditure for 1910-11 ^{were} ~~was~~ submitted for the approval of the Governor. Out of a total revenue of just over £31,000, recurrent expenditure was to total £14,746 while extraordinary expenditure was to account for £5,276.¹ The Governor duly approved the estimates. The extent to which personal emoluments consumed most of the budget for ordinary recurrent expenditure can only be appreciated when we note that for that financial year (1910-11), salary payments by the beit-el-mal averaged £1032. 11. 8d per month, making a total of £12,391 for the year.² That same year, also, a disproportionately large portion of the money budgetted for extraordinary expenditure was spent on the construction of some thirty-three rest houses, at vantage points in Kano emirate, for the use of the colonial administrative staff. Even though expenditure on construction of rest houses would not recur again, personal emoluments would continue to feature prominently in the budgets of the Kano Native Treasury.

During 1911, with British encouragement, the Kano beit-el-mal adopted the British-introduced silver currency as the medium for accounting its funds. In disposing of its large stocks of cowries, the native treasury incurred a loss of more than £2,000 due to a further depreciation of the cowrie.³ However, the exercise made it feasible for the British Administration to check as well as keep an eye on native treasury finances in the years to come. Not long after, Lugard arrived to take charge of Northern and Southern Nigeria with a view to amalgamating them. And, during 1913, obviously at Lugard's

1. NAK/6415/1909, Temple, enclosure 4, p. 5.

2. NAK/3546/1911, para. 66.

3. Ibid., para. 45, 47.

behest, the Kano Native Treasury 'contributed' the sum of £6,000 as 'grant-in-aid to the Protectorate.'¹ A separate grant of £1500 was made to the Public Works Department.² These grants represented a significant slice of the N.A.'s total revenue of £36,681 during 1913. In 1914, the Native Treasury was persuaded, again, to make a contribution of £6542 to the Protectorate Government.³ These sums, we should not forget, did not include the £1000 per annum the Kano Native Authority had undertaken to donate as aid to the Government educational institutions sited in the emirate.

By 1914, with greater central control over assessment and collection of taxation resulting in greatly increased revenue, it was deemed time to institute fixed salaries for the district administrators. That year, therefore, a scheme for regular salaries for District Heads was prepared - implementation was to begin during the following year.⁴ The then emir, Abbas, played a key role in the allotment of the proposed salaries to the District Heads as in other aspects of beit-el-mal budget discussions with the Resident.⁵ When the salary scheme became operational in 1915, the ruler's influence was evident in the amounts assigned to the District Heads involved.⁶ The inauguration of fixed salaries for the district chiefs was significant from the point of view of the British Administration: it confirmed the acceptance by the traditional sources

1. NAK/494P/1914, A.C.G. Hastings, p.9.

2. Hastings, *ibid.*, p.9.

3. Hastings, *ibid.*, p.9.

4. NAK/98P/1914, Gowers, p.4.

5. W.F. Gowers, *ibid.*, p.7.

6. See above, p. 243

of authority of cash payments for work done in the public interest. The emir and his leading officials were on the verge of abandoning the traditional concept of self-reimbursement in the course of their public duties, the most onerous by 1915 being tax collection and the maintenance of law and order. With the admittance of the principle of fixed cash payments to the leading state functionaries, it was only a matter of time before every other functionary became a salaried official. Among the incentives with which the colonial regime sought to use the salary issue as a spur to zeal in law enforcement by the District Heads was the hint that the prevalence of crime in a district could unfavourably affect the amount a chief finally received as his salary.¹ In the event, however, this implied threat does not seem to have been a factor in the salary figures that finally emerged. The salary scales which came into operation in 1915 were determined almost solely by the whims of emir Abbas and the colonial administration's total refusal to interfere in local matters. Inevitably, District Heads who were out of favour with the ruler were assigned ridiculously meagre salaries. Richmond Palmer, then acting Resident, was sympathetic with their plight but nevertheless acquiesced in the obvious injustice:

... Sarkin Bai £260, Sarkin Gaya £250, Wambai £240, Galadima £200 and Barden Kano £160, cannot be supposed to be living on their salaries, and must be augmenting their incomes from other sources. The salaries are relatively small considering the population for which these chiefs are responsible. 2

It was almost as if the meagre salaries of these officials were designed to ensure that they either had to embezzle so as to meet their

1. NAK/494P/1914, A.C.G. Hastings, p.12.

2. NAK/170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, p.23.

private needs and social obligations or that they had to foresake the conspicuous consumption and pomp necessary for their public image. Palmer, as it were, correctly suspected that these chiefs would, in one way or the other, continue to resort to every financial expedient including illicit levies on the talakawa.¹ Indeed, the salaries as apportioned in 1915 represented a steep fall in the remuneration the district chiefs had been accustomed to receiving until then. Worse still, the sub-district heads subordinate to the District Heads retained higher emoluments, since they continued to receive 25% of the gross taxes which passed through their hands, thereby gaining more than their social and administrative superiors.² Not surprisingly, the tax returns of 1915 were unsatisfactory in those districts where the heads had been assigned particularly meagre salaries.³ The British Administration could apparently do nothing - Palmer resigned himself to bemoaning that it was unfair to pounce on these District Heads for alleged peculation and embezzlement, since their income had been reduced through no fault of theirs.⁴ The plight of the impoverished chiefs, however, acted as a spur to draw up plans whereby all those subordinate to them would become salaried in like manner. Accordingly, during 1916 data was collected on which was to be based the policy of gradually instituting fixed salaries for the subordinate district officials, namely the sub-district and village group heads.⁵ Wherever feasible, payment of salaries to these officials was to begin in 1917. However, in the

1. NAK/17OP/1916, op.cit., p.26.

2. NAK/17OP/1916, op.cit., p.24, 27.

3. Palmer, *ibid.*, p.27.

4. Palmer, *ibid.*, p.27.

5. Palmer, *ibid.*, p.29.

course of collecting the data on which to base these salaries, it soon became obvious that no equitable salaries could be apportioned unless the sub-district heads were eliminated from the scene. With an entitlement to 25% of the gross taxation, even an insignificant sub-district head tended to have a bigger income in comparison to a District Head whose salary had been arbitrarily fixed. Hence the adoption of a policy aimed at gradually abolishing the status - by reducing the sub-district heads to the lower status of paid town chiefs or salaried general assistants to the District Heads.¹ For this measure to be practicable, it was further decided to increase the number of districts in the emirate by reducing the sizes of the fourteen already in existence.² That way, it was hoped, the grievances of the District Heads would be removed and a single source of district authority would be consolidated: no longer would sub-district heads contend for power and influence with their superiors. In any case the British contended that the sub-district heads had lost their *raison d'etre* when it was discovered during inspection tours, that they were guilty of the same defects the whole district system was designed to eradicate - namely collecting taxes through wandering tax gatherers (jakadu) who had no permanent interest in the unit from which collection was made.³ This, needless to say, was a revival or rather continuation of the jakada system which the colonial regime detested so much, and which had supposedly ceased in 1908. In the end the administration did not have to wait until 1917 before instituting salaries for some of the sub-district heads. During 1916 it

1. NAK/170P/1916, Palmer, p.29.

2. Palmer, *ibid.*, p.29.

3. Palmer, *ibid.*, p.29.

became finally evident that the arrangement, whereby Chiroma Abdullahi Bayero (emir 1926 - 53) had been overlord of the Home District, was unworkable. When a new district, with headquarters at Bichi, was therefore created for him, the Home District's titled, sub-district heads (numbering ten) became fully-fledged District Heads on fixed salaries.¹ They were lucky, as the change enhanced their status. Also, at the end of 1916 the town and village heads of some thirteen districts became salaried officials: the districts involved were those of Barde Kerarriya, Dan Amar, Dan Buram, Dan Makwayo, Dan Isa, Dan Iya, Jaidanawa, Madaki, Mai Unguwa Mundubawa, Makama, Rano, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, and Tafida.² The heads of these districts, unlike their counterparts in the former Home Districts, were demoted. An interesting episode in connection with the institution of salaries for them was the way the British Administration took advantage of the occasion to introduce nickel coins into circulation - on one particular occasion the Native Treasury took onto its account £969 in nickel and the British gave instructions that the amount be passed on to the town and village chiefs as part-payment of their newly-fixed salaries.³

Overall, by the end of 1917 all the twenty five District Heads in the emirate were in receipt of fixed salaries,⁴ as also were 395 town and village group chieftains.⁵ The latter's payments were made

1. NAK/518P/1916, p.9, cf. Gezawa, Kumbotso, Ungogo and Minjibir District Note Books.

2. NAK/518P/1916, *ibid.*, p.9.

3. NAK/518P/1916, p.37.

4. This is explained by the exergence of 10 new districts in place of the former Home District, coupled with the creation of an entirely new district for Chiroma Bayero (emir 1926 - 53) and the sub-division of Dutse district.

5. NAK/179P/1918, enclosure Form 7.

through the emir or the District Heads. The placement of so many minor chiefs on fixed remunerations was an achievement of sorts, if in fact the exercise could bring about the final disappearance of the tendency to rely on underlings. Unfortunately, as the sub-district heads gave place to town and village chiefs, the new smaller units were found to be too large: despite the proliferation of town and village group chieftaincies (395) by the end of 1917, the average size of each was still 30 square miles, with a population of some 3500 - predictably the minor chieftains, like the sub-district heads before them, became equally dependent on jakadu in the performance of their public duties.¹ Nevertheless, the policy of consolidating viable, though smaller, town and village group units was retained as was also the salary scheme for their chiefs. However, every opportunity was taken to improve and rationalise the system.

The Native Administration did not show consistency or much initiative in financial matters except in regards to salary payments in place of the customary system of self-reimbursement. Lugard's return was largely behind this docility. Put briefly, the former High Commissioner returned as governor of Northern and Southern Nigeria 1912 - 13 and Governor-General of amalgamated Nigeria 1914-18. Lugard, architect of the indirect rule system in the Northern Protectorate, wanted to control more directly the finances of the native treasuries. The controversy and differences caused by his attempts have been adequately dealt with.² In the end, the Governor-General's intention of absorbing the funds of the emirates into the

1. *ibid.*, p. 3 - 4.

2. See M. Perham, Lugard II, p. 480-85; Nicholson, The Administration of Nigeria 1900 - 1960.

Nigerian budget was thwarted by the Colonial Office and the Northern Nigeria colonial staff, in particular C.L. Temple. Meanwhile, the native administrations had to tread delicately. While Lugard was arguing his case with the Colonial Office, he did in effect succeed in imposing stricter control and supervision on native administration estimates.¹ Lugard, with an eye for detail, was all in favour of fixed emoluments for native officials as that would leave a larger revenue to accrue to the native treasuries and the British Administration. Consequently it was not surprising that during Lugard's Governor-Generalship the Kano beit-el-mal confined its expenditure mainly to the pursuit of apportioning statutory remuneration to its officials. In all other spheres, the Kano Residents observed a certain apathy with regards to British suggestions that money be expended on ends other than personal emoluments or purely administrative objectives.² Such matters, for example the provision of medical centres or expert sanitary and agricultural advisers, had hitherto been private affairs, and the local officials could not appreciate their becoming state undertakings. And even after the departure of Lugard in 1918, the Kano beit-el-mal continued to give priority to the payment of salaries almost to the exclusion of everything else. Thus in 1919 a beginning was made in the payment of salaries to newly appointed clerks to the District Heads.³ These clerks had been trained at the British-run schools at Kano and they were appointed full-time scribes and administrative assistants to the district chiefs. Their special training and professionalism made the institution of

1. NAK/491P/1918, p.9.

2. NAK/491P/1918, p.9.

3. NAK/316P/1920, p.10.

their offices quite a significant innovation in the emirate's administrative structure. By the end of March, 1921, all the District Heads had been assigned clerks on fixed salaries.¹ The salaries of the latter varied according to the size and importance of the districts but generally the sums involved were small, ranging from about £24 to £84 per annum. The salaries of these clerks or mallaman hakimai were so meagre that the British administrative staff could not possibly expect them to desist from illegal exactions from the talakawa:

I do not suppose for a moment that this (institution of salaries) will render the District Heads' underlings incorruptible but it will at any rate give them less excuse for being corrupt. 2

By and large though, the substitution of salaries, in place of percentages of tax collected, for all emirate officials meant that a lot more revenue accrued to the native and colonial administrations. Since however the Native Administration was apathetic in all other aspects of the disbursement of its revenue, the beit-el-mal began to accumulate large reserves of funds. At the end of 1924 the Kano Native Treasury had to its credit the following balances:³

Cash in hand	£ 54,663. 0. 0.
Cash with local banks	£175,000. 0. 0.
Investment Crown Agents	£ 59,817. 0. 0.
Total balance/reserves	£289,480. 0. 0.

These reserve funds, together with its annual revenue, made Kano the richest Native Administration in Northern Nigeria.

1. NAK/120P/1921.

2. NAK/SNP-316P/1920, op.cit., p.10.

3. Figures are based on NAK/SNP-635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.52.

Nevertheless, the Native Administration had not been totally idle. Funds from the Native Treasury were expended on a number of projects, namely public buildings, transport, medical and sanitary undertakings. A typical example of approved estimates from this period (in this instance January - June 1919) would best illustrate the expenditure on these undertakings:¹

Head	Description	Amount		
9	Works Recurrent - Repairs markets	£ 59.	15.	7.
9	" " - Upkeep ox-carts	27.	5.	9.
9	" " - Repairs markets	14.	17.	4.
9	" " - Upkeep ox-carts	15.	5.	2.
10	Capital Works/N.A. Offices - Survey School	£121.	18.	10.
10	" " - Workshop	68.	13.	4.
10	" " - N.A. Offices Survey School	37.	9.	9.
10	" " - Workshop	52.	5.	4.
10	" " - Upkeep carts	29.	7.	8.
13	Medical/Sanitary - 10 labourers @ 15/- p.d.	45.	0.	0.
Total		£471.	18.	9.

Expenditure on these projects practically encompassed the whole field of Native Administration public undertakings. The half-yearly estimates sited here ^{were} ~~was~~ typical of the period and the sums then accounted for really chicken-feed. This half-yearly expenditure on public undertakings was not up to a quarter of the sums then being expended as salaries to emirate officials in any one month. The ratio

1. The figures are based on NAK/SNP - 318P/1919, C.O. Migeod, Kano Province Report for Half-year ending June 1919, enclosure of Kano N.A. estimates.

remained practically unchanged until the late 1920's when the British Administration goaded Kano emirate into undertaking large capital-intensive projects like the construction of a well-equipped hospital, a waterworks and an electrification programme. Meanwhile it would be fair to assert that relatively meagre sums were allocated to works of public utility. This fact partly explains the large reserve funds which the Native Treasury was able to accumulate in the years to 1926. While the British Administration was quite prepared to push through the salary schemes, it did not display the same degree of interest in other activities, with the possible exception of road construction which was however effected largely through forced labour.

Social Developments.

As in the political sphere, the imposition of British overrule had profound repercussions for the judicial arrangements in Kano emirate and the Northern Provinces generally. These changes were correlated to changes in Hausa society generally. Because judicial and political authority in the Muslim emirates were inseparable, the judicial system had to adapt to the new situation. On the British conquest of Kano in 1903, the judicial position of Limamin Kasausawa, or battle-field judge-arbitrator, automatically ceased to exist since the conquerors deprived the emirate of its sovereign powers to wage war. However, from 1903 up until 1908, the British did not temper with the two other legal institutions in the emirate. These were the Kano-based Emirate Judicial Council and the court of the Alkalin Kano.¹ The emir's judicial council, we need recall, was a court of appeal from the Alkali's court as in Zaria.² The emir himself presided

1. NAK/SNP - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.31.

2. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p.95.

and passed judgement in the judicial council. The council administered the same law as the Alkali's court and both conformed to the Maliki code as interpreted in the Sokoto Caliphate. A major aspect of the Muslim code is the concept of sworn testimony which made oaths in themselves carry weight irrespective of the swearer's proven knowledge of the fact at issue. Also, a defendant or accused could not have the aid of or be represented by counsel as in British law. Furthermore according to the Muslim shari'a certain common offences were more severely punished than in British law, these being theft, adultery and impersonation. At the time of the British conquest, the emir's judicial council and the Alkali's court had concurrent jurisdiction, but certain types of cases tended more or less to be confined to one or the other. For example civil cases and minor crimes went to the Alkali's court while land cases and serious criminal or political charges were taken before the emir.¹

By the Native Court proclamations of 1904 and 1906, the emir's judicial council and the Alkalin Kano's court were conferred grade 'A' status and confirmed in the possession of full civil and criminal powers over natives including the power to inflict capital punishment with the concurrence of the Resident.² Also from 1904 the two courts in the emirate were subjected to oversight by the Resident who could quash sentences or transfer cases to his own court - the Provincial Court over which he presided. Meanwhile in the two local courts the prevailing customs and traditions continued as the basis of legal decisions, but the British prohibited punishments which entailed

1. C.W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure, Kano Province (London, 1949), p.4; Lugard, Political Memoranda 1906, p.67; T.O. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System (London, 1963), p.121.

2. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1906, p. 61, 66.

mutilation, torture or grievous bodily harm.¹ It should also be borne in mind that from the moment of the British occupation of Kano, its pre-existing courts lost their exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction within Kano territory, and appeals to Sokoto ceased since the British recognised the religious but not the political leadership of the Sultan.² Hence from the advent of the British any crime committed by a European and cases involving the African employees of the Administration came under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court and ultimately the British Supreme Court.

This arrangement whereby there were two parallel judicial systems in the emirate functioned uninterruptedly until early 1908. This pattern was, of course, duplicated elsewhere in the Muslim polities of the Protectorate. Even in those early years, the existence of British courts and the exclusion of certain persons (e.g. African police constables, soldiers and clerks) from the jurisdiction of the emirate's courts obviously impinged on the sovereignty of the latter. The British Resident of Kano who had the right and duty to supervise the actions of these native courts did not however interfere with either court as far as day-to-day activities were concerned. Meanwhile Dr. Cargill frequently reported to his superiors at Zungeru that the emir of Kano's judicial council was doing a marvellous job, especially with regards to resolving land and taxation disputes to the satisfaction of the contestants and the British political staff. Land and taxation issues were partly administered according to Muslim law but mainly according to Kano customs and precedents.³ The British Administration was especially

1. Lugard, ibid., p.67.

2. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1906, p.92.

3. C.K. Meek, Land Law and Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (London, 1957), p. 167-69

pleased at the way the emir's judicial council went about administering land law in a way which seemed fair. In particular it appealed to the British sense of sympathy to the underdog whenever any village heads or dagatai were severely punished for wrongly appropriating the farms of helpless commoners.¹

Then in the first quarter of 1908, concurrent with his political measures so detested by the emir of Kano, Dr. Cargill also instituted drastic reforms in the judicial system of the emirate. It should be reiterated that the judicial council over which Abbas presided was both a law court and the highest executive body in the emirate. The executive powers of enforcement vested in the emir and his judicial council could sometimes be more important than their judicial function as a court of appeal.² As such the emir would obviously endeavour to maintain the supremacy of the judicial council. But when in 1908 the Resident forced the hakimai to depart from Kano and reside permanently at the headquarters of their recently consolidated districts, at the same time he suspended the powers of the emir's judicial council to function as a trial or appeal court and delegated the latter function to the Alkalin Kano. Dr. Cargill was very naive, for he claimed that his suspension of the powers of the judicial council was motivated by a well-intentioned desire to restrict its functions to 'cases of a purely administrative and political nature'. By this criteria, all cases requiring 'legal knowledge' were to be dealt with by the Alkali's court, where the latter's judicial training would ensure the proper weighing of evidence

1. NAK/SNP - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.30.

2. Cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1918, p. 298 - 308; Political Memoranda 1906, p. 270.

and avoid any miscarriage of justice. With his judicial burden thus lightened, the emir could then give uninterrupted and closer scrutiny to the details of native administration than was hitherto possible.¹ Dr. Cargill's action was distasteful to the emir and unacceptable to his superiors at Zungeru. For the emir, the erosion of certain aspects of his executive authority was already causing friction between him and the Resident and this unilateral action was viewed as one more unfriendly move. To William Wallace, then Acting Lieutenant-Governor and Alder Burdon who was then Secretary to the Protectorate government, Cargill's action amounted to insubordination. For the 1904 and 1906 ordinances make provision for the suspension or removal of a judicial council or its president but the power to enforce such an extreme measure was vested in the Governor or the senior officer in charge of the government in the absence of the former. To a large extent therefore the Kano Resident was exercising his administrative discretion which was allowed for during an emergency, but his move certainly went beyond the actions of other Residents elsewhere in the Muslim emirates. Cargill's actions in this as in other regards were viewed as undesirable and capable of undoing the grudging cooperation which was developing between the Fulani rulers and the colonial administration. Further the Resident's arguments that he wanted to separate executive from judicial powers was contrary to the regime's policy of boosting the stature of the pre-existing rulers.

Dr. Cargill left Kano prior to enforced retirement soon after. Since it was colonial policy to enlist the support of the Fulani rulers, the very first measure effected by C.L. Temple when he arrived at Kano

1. NAK/SNP - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op. cit., p.31.

to take charge of the Province in January 1909 was to see to the restoration of the powers of the emir's judicial council by warrant of the Governor.¹ With the restoration of his judicial and executive powers, emir Abbas became more cooperative. Dr. Cargill's arbitrary attempt to separate these functions was thus short lived.

Of more permanence for the administration of justice in the emirate, however, was Dr. Cargill's establishment of courts with resident Alkalai outside Kano city for the first time. An alkali was posted to the headquarters of each of the newly consolidated districts.² In this regard the Resident was acting on his own discretionary initiative, but in fact putting into force the provisions of the 1904 and 1906 Native Court Proclamations which were of general application throughout the Protectorate. These enactments empowered the Residents to establish native courts or tribunals if they thought there was a need for such bodies in one or more localities in their jurisdiction. In Kano emirate during the Resident's enforcement of political and judicial reforms, alkalai were posted to the district headquarters-towns of Birnin Kudu, Dawakin Tofa, Dabi, Dutse, Fogolawa, Gaya, Jahun, Kura, Rano, Wudil and Yelwa. These new district courts were accorded grade B status as per a clause of the 1906 Native Courts proclamation. Accordingly, they could deal with

1. NAK/3635/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Report for Half-year to June 1909, para. 150; NAK/SNP - 44/1909, C.L. Temple, Kano Province Preliminary Report, March 1909.

2. The procedure was that the Resident instructed the emir to nominate who should be appointed alkalai. Normally the emir's nominees were confirmed by the Resident, though everything was done to make it appear that the emir himself made the ultimate appointments.

petty civil and criminal cases but they were debarred from tackling serious criminal charges especially those entailing capital punishment.¹ Appeals lay from these courts to the Alkalin Kano's court and from 1909 from the latter to the emir's judicial council.

In 1908 Dr. Cargill made the district alkalai and the Alkalin Kano (later Senior or Chief Alkali) responsible to Waziri Allah-bar-Sarki, a former royal slave elevated to the viziership of Kano despite the emir's objections.² On the arrival of Temple in 1909, Allah-bar-Sarki was removed from his position in a reshuffle deliberately designed to appease the emir. Then on the recommendation of the emir Muhammadu Gidado was made Wazirin Kano. For Gidado this was a promotion from the Sarauta of Alkalin Kano which he had held since 1904. It is interesting to note that Gidado was an intimate friend to the emir Abbas and Temple himself observed that the new Waziri was Abbas's alter ego. It is very likely that this factor was crucial in the elevation of Gidado to the viziership and the continuation of his executive headship of the Kano judiciary henceforth, in fact until Gidado's death in 1939. For it seems that elsewhere in the larger Muslim emirates, the Senior or Chief Alkalai were made the executive heads of the judiciary rather than the Wazirai.³

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1. NAK/SNP - 2949/1908, Captain W. H. Browne, Kano Province Report for half-year ending June 1908, para. 45.
 2. The Waziri's supervisory role was administrative, in that he was supposed to ensure that the judges were adhering to the Maliki code and new legislation enacted by the British. As it was then no mean task to reconcile certain aspects of Muslim and colonial laws, the Waziri was of course open to potential colonial disapproval most of the time.
 3. Cf. M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, p. 214, 216 - 222.

In any case the man appointed Alkalin Kano in succession to Gidado in 1909 could not aspire to the mantle of executive headship of the judiciary since he was economically dependent on the ruler. This man was Ibrahim who had hitherto been the emir's Magatakarda or chief scribe. And Temple shrewdly observes that despite his undoubted learning Ibrahim lacked an independent source of income to supplement his salary and enhance his independence. As such the new Alkalin Kano was inclined to be subservient to the emir, more especially as he was of lowly descent.¹ In fact as far as Temple was concerned, Ibrahim's total dependence on his official salary and his talaka origins made him racially inferior and lacking of the regal qualities associated with the Fulani ruling groups. What Temple fails to say is that Ibrahim was in effect a creature of the emir Abbas.

With the new Waziri an intimate friend and the senior judge virtually a dependent, Muhammadu Abbas's fears were allayed. Moreover to make these two officials literally beholden to himself, they were co-opted as members of the emir's judicial council.² As reconstituted in 1909, this council comprised of the emir as president, together with the Waziri, Ma'aji, Imam of Kano, Alkalin Kano, and the mallamai Faruka, Ahmadu (a half-brother of the Waziri) and Ahmadu Bazazzagi. The non-titled members were in fact no more than general assistants and assessors. This arrangement ensured that the council was dominated by Abbas's supporters and this made

1. NAK/SNP - 3635/1909, C. L. Temple, op. cit., para. 99.

2. Ibid., para. 151.

him the council in fact if not in law.¹ Thus with the overall headship of the subordinate judiciary vested in his friend the Waziri, emir Abbas was not averse to the latter's supervisory role in regard to the district alkalai. Accordingly these had to seek the permission of Waziri Gidado or Alkali Ibrahim whenever they wanted to try cases in such politically sensitive areas as land ownership or the estates of deceased persons.² The final say in such matters remained vested in the emir himself then as in the pre-colonial period. In this way the emirate central authorities managed to curtail successfully the freedom of the district judges and the British political officers could boast that their policies were enhancing the status of the emir.

The changes wrought in the judicial organization and the deployment of the district alkalai begun in 1908 greatly enlarged the Kano legal bureaucracy. By the end of 1912 there were twenty-seven judgeships in the emirate: the emir's judicial council and the Chief Alkali's which were native courts of appeal, a grade 'C' court in the city to lessen the chief Alkali's burdens, fourteen district judgeships, and twenty market-courts.³ The market-courts had been instituted in 1910 to adjudicate in disputes arising as a result of commercial transactions.⁴ These courts were sited in the prominent

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1. It should be recalled that the Imamship of Kano was not a Sarauta or noble title and the title of Ma'aji was filled by a political client of the ruler.
 2. NAK/SNP - 6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., para. 245, 250.
 3. NAK/SNP - 134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report 1912, para. 26 - 28, p. 7.
 4. NAK/SNP - 6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit.; NAK/SNP - 3835/1910, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., para. 109; NAK/SNP - 134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op. cit., para. 27.

market-towns which the British found on their arrival. As it happened however by 1914 new patterns of road development and the colonial flow of trade based on these roads had diverted the bulk of commercial transactions away from the pre-existing markets. With the decline of these market-towns as important trade centres, there was a corresponding decline in the volume of commercial litigation taken before the market alkalai. Hence the decision in 1914 to abolish all the market-courts except for the one based at Kano city's Kasuwan Kurmi or main market.¹ However when these market-courts were abolished the redundant alkalai did not have to wait for long before they were re-engaged in ~~even~~ enhanced positions. This came about in 1916 when another administrative reorganization beque²th^{to} the Kano emirate ~~with~~ yet more districts, with a corresponding increase in the number of district judgeships. The displaced market alkalai, whose powers had been minor and largely confined to petty suits, were gradually absorbed into the system as more and more district court-houses were established. The new job opportunities resulting from a progressive increase in the number of administrative districts led once more to the emirate having twenty-seven judicial courts not long after 1926.² It should be borne in mind that all the changes which occurred in the Kano judiciary were happening concurrently with similar changes throughout Northern Nigeria.

There was a love-hate relationship between the British Administration and the enlarged Kano judiciary. In terms reminiscent of Lugard in his early Annual Reports on Northern Nigeria, Sir William Gowers has placed this relationship in historical perspective:

1. NAK/SNP - 494P/1914, A.C.G. Hastings, Kano Report for half-year to June 1914, p. 6.

2. NAK/SNP - 25673A, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1935, p. 45.

I have no doubt that these courts administer justice more satisfactorily than could any system of European Magistrates, whose ignorance of the Native Customs, language and habits of thought would nullify any advantage gained by the elimination of possible corruption. I do not think that the Native Courts are corrupt, as a rule, but admitting that they were, to set up Courts presided over by European Magistrate in their stead would be to transfer the corruption from the judge to the interpreters and Court officials. 1

With the expansion of the Kano judiciary, the British political staff progressively disengaged from other than supervisory roles in the judicial processes involving natives of the emirate or of Northern Nigeria who were deemed subject to the Islamic or customary laws prevailing in the emirate. This deliberate policy more or less applied throughout the Protectorate. The British argued, probably correctly, that the suppression of crime and the redress of grievances could best be undertaken by the indigenous ruling groups. It would be even better from the colonial viewpoint if the native executives and courts could prevent the occurrence of crime and unnecessary litigation, and the Administration usually regarded its disengagement as designed to bolster the pre-existing authority of chiefs and even family heads. Apparently, therefore, the colonial umbrella was expected to perpetuate the existing political and social order.² That this social and political system was hierarchic and authoritarian did not seem to matter as long as law and order were maintained.³

1. NAK/SNP - 134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., para 51, p. 16 - 17; cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1906, p. 67, para. 13.

2. NAK/SNP - 518/1916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Province Report for half-year to June 1916, p. 16.

3. For a critique of the native judiciary and the political system in colonial Northern Nigeria, see W. Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer (London, 1936); see also W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: A Critique of British Administration (London, 1936).

But in fairness to the British administrators, we ought to remember that this authoritarian system was more or less indigenous to Haus^lland especially those areas which fell within the defunct Sokoto Caliphate.

In common with the other Northern Nigerian native judges or tribunals, the Kano judiciary did not exactly live up to colonial expectations. The problem of adaptation to enacted but almost unassimilable European tenets was certainly not unique to Kano emirate. The most outstanding issue over which the local judiciary was found lacking was the administration of colonial anti-slavery legislation. In Kano as elsewhere in the Protectorate the British found on their arrival a society in which slavery in all its forms and other milder forms of servitude existed on a large scale. Not only was the administration based on a feudal-type bureaucracy in which slavery was inherent, but the political and economic organization of the emirate also depended to a great extent on slave labour. Indeed the suppression of slavery was among the reasons given by Lugard for advancing on Kano and Sokoto during 1903. Subsequent to the British conquest and the realization that slavery could not be abolished overnight, the colonial regime tolerated the institution of domestic slavery and its abolition became a long drawn-out process.

Between 1900 and 1907 five anti-slavery proclamations were enacted¹ and anyone born in the Protectorate after 1st April 1901 could not be legally enslaved. The British Administration

1. For the text of the first of these proclamations, see C.O. 446/10/26964, Lugard to C.O., 21/7/1900. The anti-slavery legislation was subsequently amended and further elaborated, culminating in the Slavery Ordinance (No. 35) of 1916.

in fact claimed that the legal status of master and slave had ceased to exist in the Protectorate since a Royal Niger Company proclamation to that effect in 1897. At the same time, however, Lugard and his successors contrived to maintain the existing social order based on domestic slavery, if only to prevent social and economic chaos. Indeed subsequent to the rout of the Sokoto Fulani many of the latter's slaves tried to regain their freedom by attaching themselves to the British following. Lugard more or less sent them back into servitude and 'did not enquire too curiously what became of them.'¹ In view of the existing social situation, Lugard argued convincingly that it was enough to assert the freedom of all new-born children so that 'twenty years hence no youth or girl would be a legally held slave, and fifty years hence the race of slaves would be practically extinct.'² In other words domestic slavery was recognised even though the legal status of slavery was abolished. It was a paradox that the British abolished slavery de jure while in fact they continued to administer laws which recognised the system of domestic servitude. The British political officers hoped that the existing numerous slave or serf farm-estates would break-up as more and more slaves claimed their freedom under the law through self-redemption or manumission on the part of their owners. However from the British occupation until almost the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, progress in this regard was very slow and only a trickle of domestic slaves throughout the Protectorate claimed their freedom. The newcomers were dismayed that the latter were not taking advantage of the options open to them to assert their freedom before the courts.

1. Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria 1902, p.41 - 42.

2. C.O. 446/10/26964, Lugard to C.O., 21/7/1900.

In Kano emirate, cases relating to the emancipation of slaves which had hitherto been dealt with by the British Provincial Court now became the province of the local courts. The alkalai were called upon to administer the colonial laws providing for the emancipation of domestic slaves. The major legislation dating from 1901 forbade all dealing in slaves. Thus slaves could no longer be sold; masters ^{could} ~~can~~ no longer replace lost slaves by purchase and therefore became motivated to treat them better. Secondly, the 1901 and subsequent amendments abolished the legal status of slavery by making slaves responsible before the courts for their own actions and the alkalai were supposed not to distinguish between concubines and free-born women in divorce cases.¹ The native courts were also to keep records of the liberation of domestic slaves. For the judges the emancipation of slaves was problematic, as slavery was sanctioned by Muslim law. *? gross error*

The colonial laws calling for the liberation of slaves was thus *highly evolved Islamic law in calling for their liberation* contrary to their jurisprudence. In the event moreover the enslaved did not at first show any enthusiasm to be emancipated. Their lack of enthusiasm for freedom can only be explained in the context of the privileges enjoyed by the average domestic or farm-slave (H. bawan gida and bawan gona). This category of slaves, by far the most numerous, enjoyed certain legal and customary rights. These slaves were born in the households and they could not be sold. In addition they could acquire property, till the land for themselves for part of the farming season and were more or less members of the families of their masters.² In Kano emirate there was another fairly

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1. See Lugard, Political Memoranda 1913 - 18 (London, 1970), p.107-108, 221. For the place of slavery in Islam, see R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge, 1969).
 2. See M.G. Smith, 'The Hausa System of Social Status', in Africa, XXIX, No. 3 (July, 1959); cf. V. Low, The Border States, (UCLA thesis, 1967), p. 58 - 61.

large group of domestic slaves, the cucanawa, slaves born of free mothers who were generally the camp followers, retainers and administrative assistants to the ruling groups.¹ The association of these slaves with the ruling groups gave them privileges denied to the average free-born talaka. In particular their owners were responsible for all their actions and general well-being. As such these slaves were not worse off than medieval serfs and it would appear that the seeming disabilities entailed by their servitude were preferable to the life of a talaka who lacked a patron. Not surprisingly, serfdom or domestic slavery had hardly any social stigma and there was even a certain pride in having that status.

By 1913, ten years after the imposition of British overrule over Kano and despite colonial anti-slavery legislation, Sir William Gowers² was to write:

The term which we translate 'slave' has no degrading associations for the Hausa and there are still of course very many household and farm 'slaves' who prefer to remain with their old masters and among their old associations rather than to enter the ranks of casual labour or to set up as independent agriculturists or traders. 3

This reluctance on the part of domestic slaves to regain their freedom was the more remarkable since there was now nothing to stop them just walking-out on their masters and going off to earn wages on colonial railworks or portering which would have deprived their masters even of compensation. In addition, the kidnapping and sale of unwary children persisted sub-rosa, as also did surreptitious transactions involving transfers of long-standing slaves in the

1. Cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1906, p. 295, 309.

2. Gowers was then Resident Kano Province.

3. NAK/SNP-134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., para. 53.

event of poor harvests.¹ These actions were illegal under colonial laws, but the British lacked the means to enforce prohibition without the co-operation of the ruling groups. For the society at large these transactions had to be secret in view of the severe penalties decreed for contravening their prohibition.

Because of these complications, the liberation of slaves through the Kano emirate native courts did not begin in earnest until after 1910. It is significant that this period also marked the inauguration of tax assessments based on individuals or farm holdings and the discouragement of absentee landlordism. We need recall that the most important source of state revenue then as in the pre-colonial era was kurdin kasa which was a poll-tax levied on household heads. By a series of enactments culminating in the Native Revenue Ordinance of 1916, the British made every male adult (or rather those aged sixteen and over) liable to pay tax. Obviously this meant an increase of taxable adults and therefore greatly increased revenue. Further the British hoped that the system of assessing individuals rather than household-heads would lead to a break-up of the slave or serf farm-estates. In the pre-existing system these farm-estates did not pay kurdin kasa since their products belonged to the estate owner or titled official. Neither category of men paid the tax, instead they gave presents to the ruler. A sizable proportion of the emirate's production thus went untaxed. By holding the individual cultivator liable to pay tax on the land he tilled or by virtue of being over sixteen years of age, the British were deliberately destroying the right of the rich estate-owner or noble to the profits from the labour of his serfs. In effect the colonial regime was saying that owner-

1. Cf. NAK/SNP - 1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p. 38; NAK/SNP - 3635/1909, C.L. Temple, op. cit., para. 166.

ship of land was valid only if the claimant personally tilled the land or paid for the labour. These developments were of general application throughout the Protectorate.

In Kano emirate these developments were enhanced by the coming of the railway in 1912, the intensification of colonial road construction and the growth of an export orientated cash economy based on groundnut cultivation.¹ The convergence of these administrative, social and economic factors was primarily responsible for the emancipation of more and more domestic and farm slaves before the native courts from 1913 onwards. Thus between 1912 and 1917 just under six thousand domestic slaves were granted freedom before the courts in Kano emirate.² And by the end of 1927 the grand total of slaves freed before the courts had risen to eleven thousand six hundred.³ After that date the number of slaves liberated before the emirate courts dwindled, a single domestic slave being emancipated in 1933.

The greatest number of domestic slaves regained their freedom via manumission on the part of their owners, self-redemption or the payment of ransom by relatives or intending husbands in the case of female slaves. In administering the colonial laws which provided for the liberation of domestic slaves many Kano alkalai fell foul

1. See chapter six.

2. NAK/KANOPROF 4/5 - 140/1918, W. F. Gowers, Kano Province Report (No. 53), enclosure Form 16. See also NAK/SNP - 518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, op. cit., p.17.

3. NAK/SNP - 6892, C.W. Alexander, Kano Province Report 1927, enclosure Form 16, p. 44; cf. NAK/SNP - 93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op.cit., p.42; NAK/SNP - 635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op. cit., p.42.

of the Administration.¹ The most dramatic case occurred in 1921 when the Alkalin Kano Muhammadu Aminu was dismissed from office, subsequently tried in the Resident's Provincial Court and sentenced to three years imprisonment.² Aminu's crime was that he had permitted a girl born in and brought to Kano from Ngaundere in the Cameroons to be treated as a slave for the purposes of ransom although she was too young to be other than free-born by the strict letter of the British law. In any event this girl or woman was free because she had been brought into the Northern Provinces since April 1st 1901. In the same year, the Alkalin Gwarzo was jailed for three years for a similar offence. When the file on these cases reached the then Attorney-General of Nigeria, Donald Kingdom, he observed that the alkalai had extenuating circumstances and recommended that Hastings's sentences should be quashed.³ H. R. Palmer, then acting Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, vehemently defended Hastings⁴ and apparently refused to quash the sentences, for there is nothing to show that the imprisoned judges were freed as advised by the Attorney-General.

Notwithstanding these complications, by the later 1920's the bulk

1. For details, see NAK/SNP - 3635/1909, op.cit., para. 145; NAK/SNP - 98P/1914, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., p. 22, 27; NAK/SNP - 410P/1917, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., p.18.
2. NAK/SNP - 120P/1921, A.C.G. Hastings, Kano Report 1/1/1920 to 31/3/1921, p. 24-25; cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1913-18, p. 217-8.
3. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1 - 2608/5945, Fictitious Ransom of Slave Girls, minute by Mr. Donald Kingdom, dated 26/5/1921.
4. Ibid., Palmer minute, 16/7/1921.

of the domestic slaves in Kano emirate had been liberated. Those liberated before the courts were numerous. But it is likely that probably an equal number were granted their freedom privately by their masters without resort to the courts, especially since fees were charged for the court's services of registration.

Law enforcement and British feeling of insecurity

In the period up until about 1919 the British suffered from a feeling of insecurity. This made them very sensitive to any action on the part of the talakawa which could be construed as anti-European or rebellious towards the ruling groups. Hence the problems of law and order pre-occupied the Administration in Kano emirate and undoubtedly throughout Northern Nigeria.

Due to the progressive extension in Kano emirate of the taki measurements by which tax was assessed according to farm acreages, there was a corresponding increase in the lodgement of appeals against such assessments. By early 1913, such appeals were causing an excessive back-log in tax collections all over the emirate.¹ Even such legal expedients alarmed the political officers as they feared that they could lead to a break-down of authority. Under the familiar customary taxes, the taxpayer had been able to estimate for himself what was due from him. It seems that the talakawa lodged appeals against taki measurements because they felt the latter was increasing their tax liabilities.

The outbreak of war in 1914 and the resulting depletion in the strength of the British administrative officers and garrisons heralded

1. NAK/SNP - 430P/1913, J.W. Gill, op.cit., p. 1-2.

a period of unrest in Northern Nigeria.¹ In Kano this took the form of violent crimes, increased thefts and the robbing of caravans on the highways. During June - July 1915 seven Arab caravans were plundered within Kano emirate, and the main routes to the north and east from the emirate became unsafe except for convoys escorted by armed patrols.² These developments could not have failed to reflect badly on the Administration since the British were disposed to boast of their ability to maintain the safety of the highways and caravans, especially foreign caravans, normally expected protection from the political authorities. The British were therefore embarrassed, especially in view of their declared aim of encouraging long-distance trade. The Kano political officers resorted to blaming the district, town and village chiefs for their failure to suppress such outrages. Some of the latter were even alleged to have connived at these robberies, ostensibly because they were dissatisfied with their newly fixed small salaries and closer assessment of taxation, and the establishment of rural judicial courts which further limited their potential incomes from maladministration.³ However, since the British and emirate administrations relied on the chiefs for the maintenance of law and order, nothing could be done except as and when a chief had been caught red-handed in an act of connivance with the criminal classes.

One policy by which the British sought to minimize the consequences of their reduced military strength in the Muslim emirates during the

1. See A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria (London, 1968), p. 97 - 98.

2. NAK/SNP - 170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, op. cit., p.1.

3. Ibid., p.2.

1914-18 war was to refrain 'from any interference with the Muhammedan religion and even from anything which might be construed by or interpreted to the ignorant as such interference'. The British were expectedly nervous because the Sultan of Turkey - potentially the political leader of the Muslim world - was an ally of the 'Central Powers'. In Kano emirate the care taken to cultivate the goodwill of the Muslims was apparently very successful. By early 1918 the Kano Resident could report to his superiors that there was no sign of enemy propaganda or 'fanatical preaching' by any of the itinerant marabouts who gravitated to the city.¹ Despite this optimism, by then the need for closer surveillance had necessitated increasing the number of native political agents or spies from three to six men.²

What worried the British most was the problem of internal security and the safety of the roads. Indeed by 1918 the roads in Kano emirate were by no means free of brigands. In 1918, the armed robbery of a mail-courier only a few miles from Kano, led to a widespread check by the emir's dogarai to enforce his prohibition, normally a dead letter, against the carrying of bows and arrows save for the protection of caravans.³ The Administration would have us believe that it was impossible to control traffic on the roads because too many 'foreigners' were being attracted to Kano city by the

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1. NAK/SNP - 491P/1918, W.F. Gowers, op. cit., p.2. For an analysis of the British pre-occupation with Muslim propagandists, see G.J.F. Tomlinson and G.J. Lethem, History of Islamic Political Propaganda in Nigeria (London, 1927).
 2. NAK/SNP - 93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op. cit., p. 36.
 3. NAK/SNP - 93P/1919, ibid., p.19.

availability there of goods in the European and Levantine canteens. By 'foreigners' the British of Kano meant other Northern Nigerians from beyond the borders of the emirate.

The end of the 1914-18 war was accompanied in Kano with the strengthening of the law enforcement agencies, notably the dogarai force and the rural judiciary. These measures were backed up with an annual 'campaign' against highway robbers, thieves and other law-breakers, a strategy which was strenuously pursued both in Kano city and the rural areas.¹ Perhaps because of these drastic measures, no more cases were reported of attacks on soldiers, policemen, mail couriers, or the telegraph lines which traversed the emirate. In this regard, it may be significant to recall a particular series of colonial enactments. This dealt with the subject of collective punishment. By a series of proclamations culminating in an ordinance of 1915, the British needed only to show that a crime had been committed in a district or area to impose a collective fine on the community or tribe. The accused community had to prove that they had taken every reasonable step to thwart the commission of an offence if they were to escape the collective punishment. Whenever a collective fine had been imposed, the victims had to pay up within twenty-one days or their movable and even immovable property could be seized and sold off to compensate the injured party or the government. And there could be no appeal from an order made under that legislation.² Not

1. NAK/K.105 vol. III, p.12.

2. For details, see Collective Punishment Ordinance (No.20), of 1915, especially sections 2,3,5,7. This ordinance was the culmination of earlier proclamations and ordinances (i.e. Collective Punishment Proclamation 1911 and Collective Punishment Ordinance 1912).

surprisingly, offences that could be construed as recalcitrance towards the colonial regime declined with the passage of years. Not that everybody, however, became a law-abiding citizen. For the inhabitants of Kano emirate, where life had been for long relatively settled and resort could not be had to inaccessible forest or mountain range, it became safer to desist from overt hostility to the existing order. Because of the risks involved, offences against the social order began to take forms unmistakably dictated by economic considerations. For example, the blacksmiths of Kano city and the towns and villages adjacent to the railway gave cause for alarm to the British and emirate administrations. They resorted to stealing railway lines and scrap: during 1921 there were three thousand six hundred and thirty six such instances, in 1922 the figure was one thousand and thirty reported, and in 1923 and 1924 the reported thefts amounted to one thousand and thirteen, and two thousand one hundred and eighty respectively. The Administration, almost in despair, countered with stealthy and sudden patrols, round-ups and raids on suspected blacksmiths' quarters, but all to no avail. In the end, the then Resident Kano could only recommend what seemed to him the last possible alternative - extensive sale of scrap iron by the railway authorities to local dealers.¹ The cause of these thefts was the obvious temptation the stuff presented. The lines and scrap were the property of an alien administration and Northern Muslims probably believed they were justified to plunder property belonging to a foreign government. In any event stealing from a government is universally considered less obnoxious than from a private individual. The unguarded railings were thus temptingly available as a source of raw material easy to steal

1. See NAK/635/1925, p. 34 (judicial supplement).

at night and the Hausa peasantry were of course not economically sophisticated enough to know that the railway might be of general benefit to the Protectorate and the community at large.

In conclusion it would be fair to say of the period to 1926 that law enforcement or the prevention of outrages was not significantly better than in the pre-colonial period. Despite British fears, the response of the people to colonial overrule did not take the form of concerted armed rebellion. In Kano as elsewhere in the Muslim emirates, the rulers got almost all that they wanted and life went on largely undisturbed. The British did manage to change certain aspects of the social and political system, but the strength of old traditions prevented many changes or innovations desired by the Administration. A good many of the problems encountered by ruler and ruled in adapting to a working relationship are largely explained by the different cultural backgrounds of the British and the Africans. But since the social structure of the Northern Nigerians was basically hierarchic and authoritarian, it was easier to adapt to colonial overrule, more especially in regard to administrative matters.

CHAPTER 6.KANO c. 1890-1926: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

This period coincided with the intensification of Anglo-French rivalry and competition for political and commercial hegemony over the Central Sudan. As the vanguard of these rival imperial powers converged on the Sokoto Caliphate during the last years of the nineteenth century, both powers not only endeavoured to gain exclusive political advantage but also attempted to prevent trade going to the other's so-called sphere of influence. There were designs on both sides on Kano's reputedly large trade. Politically the designs of the European powers culminated in the capture of Kano by the British early in 1903, the destruction of the Sokoto Caliphate and the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Similarly, the French established their political authority over the region lying north of the boundaries of the new British Protectorate. The imposition of British and French authority over the whole region profoundly affected all branches of human activity, more especially the trade and economic pursuits of the peoples.

It is generally believed that during the closing years of the last century, French wars against the tribes of the Sahara as well as inter-tribal wars between the tribes themselves made the trans-Saharan trade routes unsafe and that this in turn largely explains the death of the latter trade.¹ However, such an interpretation can only partly explain the death of the trans-Saharan trade, especially in regard to Kano which was the emporium of the Central Sudan. For there is evidence

1. See H. Vischer, Across the Sahara to Bornu (London, 1910), p.65.

to suggest that the commercial relations of Kano and the southern coast became more significant than the trans-Saharan trade from at least 1890, several years before European imperialism intervened. This point is best illustrated by comparing the prices of goods imported into Kano from Europe and the Middle East in the last decade of the nineteenth century.¹

ARTICLE	UNIT	Prices at Kano ,000 cowries	
		1890	1901
1. Bouthir/probably white cottons	piece	5	5
2. White cotton (broad)	"	30	25
3. Unbleached cotton (<u>malti</u>)	"	15	14
4. Printed handkerchiefs	single	7.50	4
5. Muslin (<u>zubeta</u>) narrow	piece	1	1
6. Popular cloth (<u>ajami</u>)	"	10	10
7. Muslin broad-piece (<u>mobrut</u>)	"	10	7
8. Ordinary fez cap	single	60	50
9. Silk cloak (<u>Djebba</u>)	"	40-50	40-50
10. Cotton thread	bundle	250	100
11. Silk thread	"	5-6	3
12. Plain sugar	loaf	8-10	6

These figures leave no doubt that an increasing abundance of imported goods had resulted in reduced prices at Kano market. Indeed

1. Figures based on Captain Gaden, Residence Zinder, (Paris, 1904), p.786. Gaden was the French Resident at Zinder from 1901-02.

Captain Gaden maintains that towards the end of the nineteenth century, these popular trade goods hitherto monopolised by the Arab merchants of Kano could be purchased from English merchants on the Niger and Benue. Furthermore, he adds that the cost of transporting goods from the south to Kano and Zinder was much cheaper in comparison with the cost of transporting goods across the Sahara.¹ Indeed, Gaden observes that the trans-Saharan trade was in decline throughout the 1890's. He estimates that in 1890 the value of the imports from Tripoli to the Central Sudan amounted to 8½ million francs. The value of these imports subsequently declined to 6.7 million francs in 1895, 3.5 million in 1897 and only 1.2 million francs in 1901. Similarly, the value of exports from the Central Sudan to Tripoli declined to a mere 1,230,000 francs by 1901, comprising largely of ostrich feathers, hides, and ivory.² Needless to say, there was a corresponding decrease in the number of caravans involved in the trans-Saharan trade and the loads carried in either direction.

This development was not appreciated by the British Administration as it progressively extended its authority over Northern Nigeria from 1900 onwards. By the time that Kano and the rest of the Sokoto Caliphate fell to British arms in 1903, Lugard was apprehensive that Kano's commercial and industrial pre-eminence would wither away:

I foresee with great regret the decline of Kano as a commercial centre when European goods supersede her manufactures, and the exports of other provinces are diverted by more direct routes to the factories of British merchants, instead of passing through the hands of her middlemen.³

As it was, however, Lugard's pessimism was unfounded. Meanwhile, the

1. Gaden, ibid., p.788-90.

2. Ibid., p.786; see also Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1902, p.61.

3. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1904, p.88.

Lugard Administration proceeded to impose tolls on caravans to and from Kano, in addition to discriminatory customs duties on goods imported into Northern Nigeria from North Africa.¹ Despite his Administration's discriminatory commercial regulations, Lugard purported to be keen for the continuation of trans-Saharan trade. In a letter written to the British Consul-General in Tripoli, Mr. T.S. Jago, the High Commissioner, endeavoured to dispel the fears of North African merchants and assure them that the tolls being charged were light in comparison with the improved security prevailing in Northern Nigeria as a result of the British occupation.² Consul Jago lost no time in making known Lugard's assurances, in addition to propagating that enormous profits awaited any North African merchant who took advantage of trading via Manchester or Liverpool to Lagos and the hinterland. In effect the British encouraged the Tripoli-based merchants to abandon the trans-Saharan route with all its hazards. Alternatively, the British entered into negotiations with the tribes of the desert in order that the trans-Saharan routes could be kept safe for caravans to and from Northern Nigeria.³ Attempts were made to bring the influence of the

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1. According to the Customs Tariff Proclamation 1902, a duty of 15% was levied on ivory exports from Northern Nigeria to North Africa. Later amendments between 1903 to 1906, imposed a duty on salt from the north which was double that levied on salt imports from the southern coast. Similarly, duty was levied on potash which was entirely imported from beyond the northern borders of the Protectorate.
 2. For the correspondence relating to this episode, see NAK/SNP7/5 - 152/510/1904, Trade between Tripoli and Northern Nigeria and Transport Facilities, Lugard to Jago, 27/1/1904; Jago to Lugard, 8/3/1904; see also Mr. W.P. Hewby (Tripoli) to Lugard, 20/11/1903; cf. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1903, p.13; see also Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p.76.
 3. See NAK/SNP7/8-1601/1818/1907, Caravan Traffic between Ghat and Zinder and Air, Consul Justin Alvarez (Tripoli) to Sir Edward Grey, 14/4/1907; also Alvarez to Sir Edward Grey, 4/5/1907.

Turks, overlords of Tripolitania and the Fezzan, to bear on these negotiations pertaining to the safety of the overland routes.

Unfortunately for British efforts, the trans-Saharan trade was already doomed. The desert Tuaregs increasingly attacked and plundered the caravans travelling to and from Kano. Similarly the French, firmly established between the Mediterranean coast and Northern Nigeria, were by 1909 putting all sorts of difficulties in the way of trans-Saharan caravans. On one particular occasion during 1909, a caravan bound for Kano and consisting of 200 camels escorted by 20 Turkish soldiers as well as a band of Kel-Owi and Ghanat Tuaregs, was attacked by a French patrol at Wadi Sanjelen, a place just south of Ghat. Several well-known Tripoli merchants, notably Muhammed Nassuf, Said Gnaba, El-Ghazla and Hadi Bushaghour, were arrested by the French. When messengers were sent from Ghat to investigate, they were also arrested and allegedly severely flogged. As a result of this episode, all the Ghadames and Tripoli merchants intending to set out for Kano postponed their departure for fear of meeting a similar fate at the hands of the French.¹ In a petition to Consul Justin Alvarez, a group of Tripoli merchants appealed to the British Government to take 'such necessary steps or action, as to ensure the free passage and safety of an important caravan route to a British possession (Northern Nigeria) so as to protect not only our greatly prejudiced interests, but also those of British trade in general and of British traders engaged in this particular trade'.² When forwarding a copy of the Tripoli merchants' petition to Governor Sir Percy Girouard in

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1. NAK/SNP 7/10 - 2762/1787/1909, Caravan from Tripoli to the Sudan, Petition by Leading Merchants of Tripoli to Consul Justin Alvarez, for onward transmission to Zungeru and London, Tripoli, (n.d. but c. 23/3/1909).
 2. Ibid., for Lugard's Machiavellianism in relation to the trans-Saharan trade at the time, see Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p.78.

Northern Nigeria, Justin Alvarez enumerated the Tripoli-based British, Italian, Ottoman and Arab firms whose interests suffered as a result of the unprovoked aggression by the French. According to Alvarez, all the firms had commercial agents in London and Manchester, and they were largely engaged in the caravan traffic with Kano as more or less importers of British merchandise into Northern Nigeria by the route across French territory.¹ In effect Alvarez wanted the British and Northern Nigeria governments to make representations to the French in order that the caravan traffic in either direction between North Africa and Kano could be resumed. But this was not to be. Then in 1911 the Italians occupied Libya, including Tripoli, and thereafter the trans-Saharan trade ceased to be of any importance.

Meanwhile Kano's long distance trade with its natural hinterland in sub-Saharan Africa continued to prosper. During the early years of British overrule and for long afterwards, Kano's large domestic cloths and leather industries continued to serve the needs of distant areas, especially since European firms did not seriously start to encroach on its market until the arrival of the railway in 1912. Up until then, the pattern of Kano's trade remained basically what it had been before the arrival of the British. In the background of these developments was the relative security of the roads provided by colonial overrule. Kano merchants took advantage of this relative improvement and thousands of Kano people became itinerant traders in far-flung areas including Southern Nigeria

1. NAK/SNP 7/10-2762/1787/1909, op.cit., Justin Alvarez to Sir Percy Girouard, Tripoli, 10/4/1909. The Tripoli firms having offices or agents in London and Manchester were J. Arbib and Sons (British), Raphael Hassan (Italian), Meburah Hassan (Italian), and Hidi P. Nahum (Italian). The Ottoman or Arab firms engaged in the North-Africa to Kano trade but without offices in Britain were Sumany Arbib, Seyd Ali Zaghwan, Faqui Hussein, Mahomet Bn.Menjel, Hajj Abdallah Cusa, Mahomet Ahmed El-Hamaly El-Kafy, Sheikh Mahomet Selaf Arnauty, Mahomet Nassuf Ben Khalil, Rejeb El-Khoja, and Usta Ahmed Ben Umer

and even beyond.¹ Also, we need to recall that the British Administration of Northern Nigeria deliberately kept out the European concession-hunter and directed its efforts to preserving the initiative of the natives in their economic pursuits.

Subsequent to the imposition of British overrule, there was a significant increase in the volume of internal trade and a corresponding fall in prices. The people of Kano, to whom industrial and commercial pursuits are age-old habits, greatly benefited by taking advantage of these developments.² In like manner the British Administration also benefited from the general increase in trade. For example, despite the unpopularity of the colonial tolls on long-distance caravans and the elaborate steps taken by most merchants to avoid payment by resorting to little-used routes not patrolled by the British, government revenue from caravan tolls in Northern Nigeria increased from £21,027 in 1903-04 to £34,459 during 1904-05.³ Similarly, an increase in the volume of salt imported into the Protectorate is reflected by the rise in revenue from customs on salt imports. Hence the import duty on salt rose from £4,766 in 1903-04 to £7,916 in 1904-05, which suggests that the volume of salt imported almost doubled.⁴ The bulk of the imported salt and other merchandise went to Kano which acted as the main distribution centre.

1. For a discussion of the activities of Hausa traders in Cameroons early this century, see H.R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons (London, 1938), pp. 232, 233-34, 256.
2. cf. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1904, p.32.
3. Lugard, Annual Report Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p.74.
4. Lugard, ibid., pp.87-88. The import duty on salt was then charged at 1/- and 2/- per cwt of the commodity imported from Lagos and North Africa respectively. Needless to say, this arrangement discriminated in favour of imports from Europe and against the trans-Saharan traders.

It is best to illustrate Kano's continued prosperity during the period 1903-11 by outlining the pattern of its long-distance trade before the colonial economy proper was grafted onto it. In the general atmosphere of improved security on the roads despite the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of British law-enforcement, the increase in the volume of internal trade tended to damage the old-time Madugqi (sing. madugu) who used to move about in large caravans for security purposes before the British arrival. Hitherto such large caravans had had practically a monopoly of trade, made large profits and could therefore well afford any tolls demanded by the rulers through whose territories they traversed.¹ The new security on the roads reportedly boosted the small time traders, who farmed during the rainy season, and sold their surplus produce to buy their stock-in-trade after harvesting. Such small part-time traders were then able to travel in small parties of two's or three's during the dry season. Since they were usually contented with small profits, the fall in prices then prevailing as a result of increased imports did not unduly affect them.² If anything, the small part-time itinerant traders seem to have prospered.

Besides something like two to three thousand Kanawa whose full-time occupation was trade, the people who carried on the trade to and from Kano during this period (as in the pre-colonial era) were Kanuris from Bornu, Mangawa from the western shores of Lake Chad, and Asbenawa and Adarawa from beyond the Protectorate's northern border. Also, there were Yoruba from Lagos and Ilorin, Hausawa from Sokoto, Bauchi, Zaria and Katsina. In addition there were the Tripoli and Ghadames merchants who

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1. Cf. Sir Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria (London, 1911), pp.86, 145; cf. NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, Kano Province Report 1907, p.75.
 2. See Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1902, pp.67-69; W.Wallace, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1906-07, pp.68-69.

numbered at least two hundred in Kano by 1907. Finally, there were by then a few Lebano-Syrians engaged in retailing European merchandise.¹ European participation in the Kano trade during this period was confined to the London and Kano Trading Company which opened an office at Kano in February 1905 and then embarked on an abortive scheme for establishing a ranch and an ostrich farm.²

It is not possible to compute the volume of goods involved in the trade. Neither is it feasible to assess the total number of people who engaged in the long-distance trade. However, when Hans Vischer was en route from Tripoli across the Sahara to Bornu in 1906, he saw three large caravans destined for Northern Nigeria. Between them these caravans comprised of 11,000 camels, each heavily laden with commodities.³ As Kano was invariably the entrepot and chief distribution centre, trade was undoubtedly booming.

The Kanuri of Bornu brought to Kano stone potash, cattle, feathers and ivory.⁴ They exchanged these for Kano cloths and gowns (mainly black or white) and Arab goods. The Mangawa brought with them mangul

1. The first two Lebano-Syrian traders arrived in Kano during 1903, see Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1903, pp. 12-13. The descendants of one of them, Mr. Ferris George, still maintain a prosperous business at the metropolis. See also NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, Kano Report 1907, p.84.
2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, pp. 78,80; NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.85.
3. W.Wallace, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1906-7, pp.69-70; cf. Hans Vischer, Across the Sahara (London, 1910), pp.268,299. By about 1907, these caravans transported mainly salt and potash to Kano market.
4. This trade was largely outside the control of the colonial regime in Northern Nigeria. As far as possible the traders avoided the British control posts and toll stations, thereby not only avoiding payment of caravan tolls but also making it impossible for the Administration to compile accurate trade statistics. In view of this, and the costly but impotent machinery supposedly engaged in collecting caravan dues and gathering commercial intelligence, William Wallace abolished the caravan tolls while he was acting High Commissioner in 1907.

salt and red potash, which they exchanged for black Kano cloths and gowns. Both the Kanuri and the Mangawa used bullock transport.¹ On the other hand the Asbenawa from Asben in the Sahara imported into Kano the so-called Asben salt, white potash, camels and horses. These they exchanged for black gowns and cloths, grain (millet and guinea corn) and leather goods. The camel was and still is their main beast of burden. Furthermore, the Asbenawa supplied hired transport for the Arab merchants between Kano and Ghat, even though we should bear in mind that the trans-Saharan trade was waning in this period.

The Adarawa Tuaregs imported camels, oxen, donkeys, sheep and goats, and ostrich feathers. All these were exchanged at Kano market for black cloths. French territory was the main source of the livestock slaughtered (then as now) in Kano and other Northern Nigerian markets. And during the period under discussion, we find that the Adarawa had begun conveying some of their trade livestock direct from Adar via Illo on the Niger to as far south as Lagos on the coast. At Lagos they reportedly exchanged their livestock for kolanuts, and then returned north via Zaria to Kano. There, they sold the Kolanuts and used the proceeds to purchase more black Kano cloths with which they then returned to their country. This new trade pattern involving the Adarawa was undoubtedly more profitable as they were able to by-pass Kano's middlemen. Also, this development was made possible by the relative security of the roads to the coast resulting from British overrule: so long as these desert Tuaregs kept to the main trade routes patrolled by the British, they had no need to fear attack from marauders or hostile tribes.

1. This and the following four paragraphs are based on an extensive trade report compiled by Dr. F. Cargill early in 1908, see NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., Economic Supplement, pp.75-85.

The new security on the north-south trade routes brought about by the British presence also enabled Yoruba from the south to venture as far north as Kano.¹ These Yoruba brought to Kano English goods, kolanuts, Yoruba cloths (popularly known as bunu and jalwami). They took back with them potash and livestock. Potash was valued by the Yoruba as an adjunct to their yam diet and equally invaluable to other African peoples for its medicinal and other uses.

Up until 1911, the pattern of Kano's trade was basically what it had been in the nineteenth century. In the early years of British overrule, this trade could be divided into three broad categories: the trade to and from Gonja, the trade to and from Sokoto, Bauchi, Adamawa, etc., (Hausaland trade), and the trade to Lokoja and Lagos. The Kano-based Gonja traders or Agalawa were a hereditary group who engaged largely in the kola trade.² In this period, as undoubtedly in the pre-colonial era, they purchased from Kano potash, black cloths, and Arab goods (chiefly warwar or magenta coloured thread) which they then took to the Gold Coast Northern territory and Kumasi. Along the road they reportedly sold some of their potash and used the proceeds to buy cattle, which they took on with them. From Gonja they brought back to Kano mainly kolanuts. It is probable that even as early as 1903-11, colonial rule led to a further growth in the kola trade. However, it should be noted that during the same period the kola trade became less

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1. However, it should be noted that Kano had had a sizeable colony of Yoruba settlers dating from the seventeenth century, notably in Iyagi and Yakasai wards of the city.
 2. For the origins of the Agalawa and development of the kolanut trade during the nineteenth century, see P. Lovejoy, 'Long distance trade and Islam: the case of the nineteenth century Hausa kola trade', J.H.S.N., V, No.4 (1971), pp.537-47; also J.R. Goody and T.M. Mustapha, 'The caravan trade from Kano to Salaga,' J.H.S.N., III (1967).

profitable owing to a fall in the price of kolanuts resulting from greatly increased supplies. Another factor was the imposts which the kola traders had had to pay at the various British, French, and German entry and exit control posts. These imposts reportedly amounted to about £1 per donkey load per trip. All these factors, plus the fact that the kola trade was (and still is) a very risky business, meant that not many people made a fortune because of the further growth in the trade.

The articles exchanged in the trade to and from Kano early in the colonial period, as already outlined, comprised largely of horses, cattle, feathers, hides and skins, cloths, and re-exports of kolanuts. In addition, the salt and potash imports to Kano and their distribution to other areas occupied an important place. These trade articles were largely indigenous to the Central Sudan and sub-Saharan Africa. Kano acted as the main clearing-house, as it had a large trading community to organize the re-export trade. The emirate had a large domestic cloth and weaving industry and the opening of more markets and greater trade enabled these industries to expand during the early twentieth century. The availability in Kano of Arab and other imported goods and luxuries further attracted more trade to the metropolis.

A striking example of the expansion of the Kano trading hinterland was the development of the Kano to Lokoja and Lagos trade during this period. Kano's exports or re-exports to these destinations comprised of hides and skins, potash, cattle, sheep and goats, and Hausa gowns. Imports from these places composed of kolanuts, English cloths, salt, beads, sugar, foreign dyes, mirrors, matches, pins, needles and even a small quantity of cigarettes. It would suffice here to draw attention to the beginnings in this period of the north-south Nigerian trade, in hides and skins, livestock and kolanuts, which were to become very

important during the 1920's and 1930's. Meanwhile, according to Dr. Cargill very little profit was made from the trade, especially in regard to hides and skins, whose prices fluctuated rather too often.¹ Similarly, potash was unprofitable as it was a bulky cheap commodity. In an effort to enhance their margin of profitability, wealthy traders from Kano and elsewhere preferred to take cash to Lagos with which to purchase trade goods. This tendency to export the newly introduced British silver currency was very unpopular with the Administration which was then trying to encourage the circulation of currency in the Protectorate.² The Niger Company was a major culprit in this regard and it was repeatedly condemned for this practice, which not only retarded the rapid expansion of a money-based economy but gave a new lease of life to the prevailing system of exchange by barter. As a consequence, the majority of people in the Protectorate continued to pay their taxes in cowries. So as to dispose of the large amounts of cowries, at places like Kano and Zaria the Administration had to resort to purchasing exportable commodities like cotton, hides and skins which were in turn auctioned to the European companies.³

But while no fundamental changes occurred in the pattern of Kano's industrial and commercial activities in the early twentieth century, an economic revolution was already taking place in the Protectorate. Kano and the rest of Hausaland had a pretty sophisticated

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1. NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, *op.cit.*, p.77; see also Lugard, Annual Report 1905-06, pp. 77-78.
 2. NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, *op.cit.*, p.77; cf. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, pp. 72-73.
 3. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1905-06, p.73.

trading and commercial network including an elaborate exchange system. This made the introduction of British currency and cash payments for labour and purchases less of a novelty and delayed the economic revolution wrought by colonialism. Meanwhile the Administration did all it could to encourage the development of an export-orientated economy. As however the European companies were expected to be the main instruments for bringing this about, every encouragement was given to them to penetrate into the interior. Being the oldest established firm in the Protectorate, the Niger Company was naturally expected to give a lead. But up until 1913, the Company confined itself to the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers, except for a solitary trading post at Nafada on the Gongola river.¹ Hence the colonial Administration often deplored the refusal of the Niger Company to show initiative by establishing branches at Kano and other northern centres. As it was, probably the Company was not sure of security so far inland. Moreover, since the Company's arbitrarily high prices and profits were already threatened as a result of the penetration southwards of Kano and other African traders, it is not unlikely that the former saw no prospect of quick profits in the far interior.

Meanwhile, the exploitation of the Protectorate's raw material resources had already begun. Until the arrival of the railway at Kano in 1912 and the subsequent development of the groundnut industry, the chief export products of the Protectorate were forest products. Of these, the most important were rubber and shea butter.² Other products

1. Sir Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria, p.212.

2. Sir Charles Orr, ibid., p.212; for the annual volume of these products exported from 1904-08, see Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1908, p. W.2-17.

which featured among the Protectorate's exports in the early period were beniseed, bees-wax and timber.¹ However, as far as Kano emirate was concerned, these products were insignificant. The emirate was densely populated and any manpower not engaged in local trade was usefully engaged in food production.² As a result no extra labour could be diverted to activities other than trade and food production. According to Sir Charles Orr, however, the newly inaugurated tin mines on the Jos Plateau attracted many Kanawa between 1906-11 due to the daily 'good wages' amounting to six pence.³ Undoubtedly the people of Kano, then as now, were appreciative of chances for making good money but the numbers attracted to the tin-mining industry must have been marginal.

One product which featured prominently in the early phase of British overrule was cotton. This crop has been cultivated in Hausaland for centuries and all the nineteenth century European travellers have vividly described the resulting large industry and trade based on cotton, more especially in regard to Kano whose dyed cloths could be found in most markets in West and North Africa. Not surprisingly, by the turn of the twentieth century, the British textile industry was looking to Northern Nigeria to become its main source of raw cotton in view of difficulties in the Americas. Therefore between 1900-13

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1. Sir Charles Orr, op.cit., for details of the export orientated trade, refer to the early Annual Reports and Blue Books for the period 1900-1913.
 2. See Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1910, p. Y.I.
 3. Sir Charles Orr, op.cit., pp.210-211; see also W. Wallace, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1906-07, p.61, cf. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria (London 1968), p.121.

both the European merchants and political officers in Northern Nigeria laid emphasis on the development of cotton production all over the country. To both it was cotton, more than any other agricultural product, that made Northern Nigeria a valuable commercial proposition before the growth of the groundnut trade.¹ Because of this the Government of Northern Nigeria rendered every assistance to the British Cotton Growing Association and from 1900 onwards consignments of American and other cotton seeds were forwarded to Residents to distribute amongst the cultivators. As Sir Charles Orr has observed, cotton was confidently expected to become the great staple of Northern Nigeria as soon as cheap and ready communication could be established with the coast.² More in anticipation of future developments rather than the then current quantity of cotton exports merited, some twenty nine cotton ginneries were established by the B.C.G.A. in the period to 1912. And since the European firms and the British Administration gave undue priority to the cotton industry, it would be proper to tabulate the total quantity exported between 1904 and 1912.³

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1. Sir Charles Orr, ibid., pp.208-09; A.O. Anjorin, op cit., pp.204-05; see also J.S. Hogendorn, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria (unpublished Univ. of London thesis, 1966) pp. 191, 197-98.
 2. Sir Charles Orr, op cit., p.209; Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, pp.65-67.
 3. Figures based on Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1912, p. Y.5.

A. Total Seed-Cotton Purchased by B.C.G.A.

Year	Quantity
1904	NIL
1905-06	NIL
1907	364 tons
1908	13 "
1909	321 "
1910	74 "
1911	185 "
1912	1,913 "

B. Purchases by other Merchants in tons of seed cotton.

Year	Quantity
1904	156 tons
1905-06	362 "
1907	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ "
1908	15 "
1909	54 "
1910	37 "
1911	44 "
1912	Not available

C. Total Cotton ginned and baled in 400 lbs.bales of lint.

Year	Quantity re. 400 lbs. units.
1904	NIL
1905-06	NIL
1907	563
1908	254
1909	573
1910	132 (exported via Lokoja).
1911	230
1912	2,643

Needless to say, Kano did not contribute much to the cotton export trade. Moreover, up until 1913 and for most of the colonial period to 1940, Kano cotton buyers successfully competed against the B.C.G.A. by offering higher prices, notably in Zaria Province where Kano dealers in our period offered at least two pence per pound weight of cotton as against the B.C.G.A.'s maximum price of one penny per pound weight.¹ Of course the British Cotton Growing Association and firms such as John Holt of Liverpool deluded themselves by propagating that the cotton export trade was flourishing and developing at a rapid pace.² Contrary to what they would have us believe, however, the cotton exported out of Northern Nigeria would seem to have been only a tiny proportion of the domestic production. In the meantime black dyed and glazed cloths, reputedly peculiar to Kano, enjoyed increased popularity all over the Protectorate, and at Gonja in the Gold Coast and the Southern territories of Nigeria, especially Lagos. As might therefore be expected, black Kano cloths (glazed by beating in a mixture of wet and dry indigo) had a large demand, especially by the desert tribes in the North, who wore nothing else and whose continued annual journeys to Kano bringing salt and potash were in order that they could buy black Kano cloths.³ Up until 1913 and besides Kano city, the main production centres of cloths in Kano emirate were the towns of Kura (22 miles south of the metropolis), Garko (15 miles to the south-east), and Dawaki-ta-Kuda which is 15 miles

1. NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.83.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p.66.

3. NAK/SNP-354/1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.83; cf. MAK/SNP-361/3546/1911, G. Malcolm, Kano Province for half-year to June, 1911, para. 79.

south of Kano.¹ At any rate the continued boom in the Kano clothing industry meant that cotton exports from Kano to England remained insignificant and in addition the B.C.G.A. had had to face competition from Kano cotton dealers in major cotton areas like Zaria and Sokoto provinces.

In the end Kano emirate was not properly integrated into the colonial economic system until the arrival of the railway in 1912. Before then, however, a beginning had been made through the introduction in 1905 of ox-carts for transport purposes. With the inauguration of a pioneer road linking Kano and the administrative headquarters at Zungeru in 1904, the Administration had invited the Kano business community to use the south-bound ox-carts which were usually empty after conveying government stores and supplies to Kano. By 1905 not only was the recently established London and Kano Trading Company utilizing the so-called parcels post to export ostrich feathers, but the same service was being used by the large Arab merchant community of Kano for exactly the same purpose.² In addition, as from 1905 the Arab merchants of Kano began using the parcels post for importing into Kano several trade commodities. These developments suggest that from early on in this century, the trading community of Kano realised that the trans-Saharan trade connection was more or less doomed. However, whereas the Arab merchants were able to use the parcels post, the Hausa traders of Kano remained aloof largely because the charges for the service

1. Ibid. It is impossible to compute the numbers of the people and the volume involved in the trade, largely because the British had no accurate idea of these two factors and my field informants are imprecise in regard to such issues.

2. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1905-06, p.80.

were too high. Hence then as in the pre-colonial era, the donkey continued as the Hausa merchants' main beast of burden. It is relevant to point out that using the donkey for transporting trade articles was a very slow method of conducting business because, for example, donkeys took about 40 days on the road between Kano and Lagos on the coast.

The actual building of the Baro-Kano railway had important social and political implications. We need to recall that during the 1890's, Mr. C.H. Robinson, the British traveller who visited Kano, had advanced several reasons in support of the cause of building a railway from the southern coast to Kano.¹ Then in 1898 the Niger Committee had incorporated amongst its recommendations a proposal for the construction of a railway linking Kano with the Niger river.² But Lugard was the greatest and most persistent exponent of the project for building a railway to Kano.³ As it was, many reasons were advanced by Lugard and others in support of a railway policy and Kano city was invariably suggested as the natural terminus for such a project. As finally articulated by Lugard and others, the advantages for having a railway linking Kano and the Niger were summarised as follows. First, it was argued that such a railway would simplify the defence of the British position in Northern Nigeria and bring about

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1. C.H. Robinson, Hausaland, pp.131, 134-40; see also C.H. Robinson, 'The Hausa Territories', in Geographical Journal, No.3, vol.VIII (September, 1896), pp.205-207.
 2. See C.O./446/3/17887, Report of the Niger Committee, 9/8/1898.
 3. For some of Lugard's arguments, see C.O. 446/8/22111, Lugard to Chamberlain, 8/9/1899; C.O.446/8/30397, 'Memorandum on the Development of Northern Nigeria', Lugard to Chamberlain (confidential), 2/11/1900; C.O. 446/22/14549, Lugard to Secretary of State (confidential), 1/3/1902.

economy in maintaining the colonial garrisons. Secondly, it would lead to the abolition of the system of transport by human portage, thereby freeing a large number of the able-bodied for productive pursuits. Thirdly, it was argued that British capital would not flow into the Protectorate until such time that investors could be assured of protection in the hinterland, and a railway would be proof that the Administration could organize a rescue operation should the need arise. Then it was argued that a railway would serve imperial interests by enabling the British Cotton Growing Association to export cotton cheaply and rapidly. Finally, the argument was advanced that

'until better transport is arranged and the iron horse takes the place of the human carrier, Northern Nigeria cannot possibly realise the hopes and wishes of those who are assured of the great future before it'.¹

In August 1907 the British Parliament sanctioned the construction of the Baro-Kano railway and in January 1908 work commenced on the project.² Capital for the project was raised on the credit of the government of Southern Nigeria and the work on the line proceeded at a rapid pace. Earthwork to Kano was completed by June 1910 and the line itself reached the city at the end of March 1911.³ The distance covered was 356 miles and the total cost was £1,270,000 or roughly £3,500 per mile. The railway was formally opened to commercial traffic on 1st April, 1912.⁴ The construction of the railway had profound

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1. William Wallace, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1906-07, p.6; C.O. 446/63/23355, Sir Percy Girouard to C.O., 30/5/1907.
 2. For details of the construction of the Baro-Kano railway, see A.O. Anjorin, op.cit., pp.137-203, and 'The Politics of the Baro to Kano Railway', paper presented at the conference of the Historical Society of Nigeria, December 1970; see also Sir Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria, pp.183-190, Sir H. Bell, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1910-11, pp.29-30, 39-41.
 3. NAK/SNP-361/3546/1911, G. Malcolm, op.cit., para.87.
 4. NAK/SNP-363/134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., para.31; C.L. Temple, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1911, pp.33, 34.

social implications for Northern Nigeria. Muslims and non-Muslims from all over the Protectorate were recruited for work on the project. The British procured the labour required by ordering the native rulers to provide a specified number of able-bodied men to work for a prescribed time at a designated site along the line. Obviously, such labour was conscripted under compulsion. However that may have been, the employment of Muslims and non-Muslims on the railway brought the peoples together for the first time without fear of attack or enslavement and this probably reduced the tension which had hitherto characterised the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. As it was, the reduced tension became obvious soon after: at the durbar held for Lugard at Kano on 1st and 2nd January, 1913, all the important chiefs of Northern Nigeria were present. That occasion was the first time that all the rulers had been gathered on friendly terms and the then emir of Kano aptly summarised the new situation by pointing out that for the majority of his guests the only shelter they had hitherto enjoyed in common was the shade of night.¹

The construction of the railway also helped the social objectives of the British Administration by increasing the circulation of the colonial currency throughout the Protectorate. The conscript or other labour engaged on the rail works received cash wages and this development dealt a blow to the prevailing system of exchange by barter. As a result British currency circulated more widely and probably became less suspect in the eyes of the people.

In regard to Kano emirate, however, the most striking impact of the railway was its role in bringing about the growth of the groundnut

1. NAK/SNP-363/134P/1913, W.F. Gowers, op.cit., para.33.

trade. Subsequent to 1912, groundnut became the main export cash crop of the emirate and Northern Nigeria at large. John Paden asserts that ^{the} groundnut was introduced to Kano during the 1914-18 war.¹ But Paden is wrong about the facts. Groundnuts were known in nineteenth century Kano and when Sir William Wallace passed through the emirate in 1894 on his way to Sokoto, he saw several fields under the crop.² Furthermore, groundnuts occur as a very minor Nigerian export even in 1900. Subsequently the quantity exported out of the country had increased slowly and in 1912 some 1,917 tons were exported from Northern Nigeria.³ The arrival of the railway, as it was, led to a rapid growth in the groundnut trade.

Lugard has described the groundnut as a crop easy to cultivate and ^{said} that it is a soil-enriching plant, in contrast with cotton whose cultivation involves much more work and greater risks from the weather, parasites, etc.⁴ As there was land pressure in Kano and since ^{the} groundnut itself is edible, it is possible that its cultivation boomed in comparison with cotton largely because by cultivating groundnuts the Kanawa were not diverting too much land and labour from food production. As when the railway reached Kano in 1912, there came in its wake representatives of European commercial houses, notably the Niger Company, Tin Areas of Nigeria, The Lagos Stores, and the French Company. Apparently

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1. J.N. Paden, The Influence of Religious Elites on Political Culture and Community Integration in Kano, Nigeria (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard, 1968), p.110; cf. Paden, 'Urban Pluralism, Integration, and Adaptation of Communal Identity in Kano Nigeria', in R. Cohen and J. Middleton, eds. From Tribe to Nation in Africa, p.266.
 2. W.Wallace, Geographical Journal, No.3, vol.8, (1896), op.cit., p.214. In fact groundnuts were subject to a special tax in Kano emirate, see NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-960/2578.D.F.H.MacBride, op.cit.,
 3. Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1912, p.Y.3.
 4. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria (London, 1969), pp.112-113.

some of these businessmen, in particular the agents of the Lagos Stores, immediately began spreading the news that high prices would be offered for any groundnuts sold to the firms.¹ The opening of the railway in April 1912, two months before the beginning of the rains, gave enough time during which the information about the good market for groundnuts could become known to farmers and steps taken to increase acreage. This factor would seem to explain the sudden leap in the quantity of groundnuts offered for sale to the European firms during the railway's first year of operation. Whereas in 1912 the groundnut exported out of Northern Nigeria was just under two thousand tons, in 1912-13 the quantity reached 19,000 tons, of which 10,000 tons came from Kano.² Given the high prices that the firms were prepared to pay for groundnuts, there had been a great increase in its cultivation with every farmer trying to benefit from the anticipated good profits.

Because the newly inaugurated railway did not anticipate an enormous demand for rail transportation or due to the fact that organisationally the system was still in its infancy, during the dry season of 1912-13 the logistic problems of transporting to the coast the groundnuts purchased by the European firms overwhelmed the railway authorities at Kano.³ Whatever the reason, it could hardly be anticipated that during the first full season of the line being open to commercial traffic, a trade in groundnuts alone would have sprung up so as to strain the resources of the railway authorities.

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1. NAK/SNP-362/114/1912, E.J. Arnett, Kano Province Report 1912, para.92.
 2. NAK/SNP-369/170/2916, H.R. Palmer, Kano Report 1915, p.4; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria, p.106; cf. J.S.Hogendorin, The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1966), p.220; see also Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1913, p.33.
 3. Captain H.O. Mance, article in African Mail, 14/3/1913, p.237 (cited in Hogendorin, op.cit., pp.175,185-86, 188); NAK/SNP-366/494P/1014, A.C.G. Hastings, Kano Report for half-year ending 30/6/1914, p.25.

Subsequent to the groundnut season of 1912-13, the quantity of the crop exported annually doubled almost every other year until about 1923. After that date the quantity exported from Kano and the country at large increased rather slowly.¹ As it was, of total groundnut exports from Nigeria during the period up until 1926, Kano provided about 80%. During the same period, the average purchase price of groundnuts at Kano city ranged from £6.10.0. per ton in 1913-14 to £11.19.0. during 1926-27. However, in the 1914-18 war and for a few years afterwards, greatly inflated prices were offered for the crop due to an expansion in the demand for oil in Europe. Thus the price per ton at Kano rose from an average of £6.0.0. in 1914 to some £13.0.0. in 1918-19 and to an all time (for the period 1913-40) high of £18.15.0. per ton during 1920-21, a few years after the conclusion of hostilities. Significantly, the great increase in the local price of groundnuts had an impact in increasing the production of the crop. The other factor in the expansion of groundnut cultivation pertains to the issue of land-ownership and usage.

After the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the British took some while before tackling the matter of land-ownership and usage. However, subsequent to the report of the Northern Nigeria Lands Committee of 1908, the Administration embodied the recommendations of that committee in the Lands and Native Rights Proclamation of 1910. By that ordinance, all the land in the Protectorate, whether occupied or unoccupied, was nationalised. The Governor was empowered to administer the land for the benefit of the indigenous peoples, subject only to the condition that native law and custom should be taken into account. This legislation left the prevailing system of land tenure and usage practically

1. For example, in 1915-16 the tonnage exported from Nigeria amounted to 50,000 of which Kano provided 38,000 tons, during 1924-25 the total amounted to 132,000 of which 111,526 tons came from Kano and in 1926-27 the tonnage was 90,000 and 50,963 tons were railed from Kano - see Annual Report, Nigeria 1916, p.8; Annual Report, Nigeria 1917, p.6; Annual Report, Nigeria 1928, p.13; also NAK/SNP-372/179P/1918, W.F.Gowers, Kano Province Annual Report 197, p.23; NAK/SNP-380/K.105 vol.I, Kano Province Annual Report, 1925, p.38; NAK/SNP-381/K.105 vol.III, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.34.

unchanged. Had the British acted otherwise, they could have brought about a lot of dislocation in the economic system which to a large extent depended on slave labour.

In Kano and elsewhere in the Protectorate, the prevailing system of land tenure, which the British found and perpetuated, gave the inhabitants the right to use the land for productive and other purposes. But land itself was not normally susceptible to sale and there was therefore no conception of freehold or personal ownership of land as such.¹ In pre-British days there was a general rule that only the freeborn could inherit land. By abolishing the legal status of slavery, the British gave every freed slave the rights of citizenship, including the right to till and inherit land. This was a long-term plan designed to avoid chaos in the social system. Meanwhile in Kano emirate, the Administration tried to induce owners to free their slaves. Then from 1909 onwards, the British embarked on a serious reorganisation of the taxation system in Kano emirate. Essentially this took the form of taxation on acreage rather than the customary levies on income or crops. In place of these levies there was at first introduced a uniform tax on compounds. Then in 1911 taxation per acreage of farms supplanted the compound taxes.² This simplified system, coupled with the high prices of groundnuts, probably eliminated disincentives to expanding the production of the crop.³

1. C.W. Rowling, Report on Land Tenure, Kano Province (Kaduna, 1949), p.4; C.K. Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons (London, 1957), pp.113-117; cf. H.A. Oluwasanmi, Agriculture and Nigerian Economic Development, pp.26-27.

2. The reorganisation of the basis of taxation was spread over several years, see C.K. Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration, in Nigeria and the Cameroons, pp.167-169.

3. Cf. J.S. Hogendorn, op.cit., pp.89, 96.

As the majority of domestic slaves in the emirate were freed between 1911 and 1926, it is likely that they played a large role in the expansion of groundnut cultivation, especially in view of the high prices it could fetch and the British insistence that all taxes should be paid in the colonial currency.

The growth of groundnut cultivation and trade had several implications. First, the boom in the trade dealt a severe blow to the British Cotton Growing Association's hopes of developing a viable trade in the cotton grown in the emirate.¹ Local cotton dealers undercut the Association by offering higher prices. The B.C.G.A. repeatedly complained against this practice which placed them at a disadvantage, in spite of their distributing free cotton seeds to the farmers.

The arrival of the railway in 1912 and the development of the groundnut trade gave an impetus to the establishment of British commercial undertakings in Kano. By 1915, there were 15 European trading firms at the metropolis. In addition, there were by then 4 Syrian, 3 African non-indigenous and 35 Arab concerns actively engaged in the import-export trade.² These developments attracted large numbers of Southern Nigerians to the city. They were largely mission educated traders attracted to Kano by the prospects of profit. The Southerners became middlemen, sometimes acting on credit for the European firms. These middlemen not only exploited the rivalry between the European firms but used their knowledge of market conditions to exploit the cultivators.³ To protect the interests of the

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1. During this period, it was estimated that an average of 3,500 to 5,000 tons of cotton were produced in Kano emirate annually. However, the emirate's domestic weaving industry continued to flourish and the local tonnage could not meet its demand. As such, Kano cotton dealers competed with some success against the B.C.G.A.'s agents in other emirates.
 2. NAK/SNP-369/170/1916, H.R. Palmer, op.cit., p.1.
 3. See H.H.M. Kirk-Green, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria, pp.118,160, cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.101.

peasantry the Government intervened by restricting the activities of these middlemen to the environs of Kano city.

The influx of Southern Nigerians and other foreigners had important social and political implications. As they were often Christians, they had to be administered separately from the native citizens under the authority of the emir, otherwise these foreigners would have to conform to the Islamic way of life and legal administration. In order that these newcomers could be contained, the layout of the Sabon Gari or native quarter of the Township was begun in 1911-12. Then during 1915 the Township was constituted into an administrative enclave under the jurisdiction of a British Station Magistrate, who administered his area in accordance with British law.¹ Meanwhile, early in 1914 a township market had been established on the outskirts of the Sabon Gari. Increasingly the trade of Kano began to be concentrated in this market, to the detriment of the city market within the walls. This development is largely explained by the availability of credit in the commercial area outside the city. The Bank of British West Africa had established a branch at Kano in 1914, but the indigenous Muslim population had no trust in banks throughout our period.² So the new settlers got all the credit and began the process of dominating the trade in produce. However, up until about 1918, the Hausa middlemen were able to compete successfully, but subsequently they were largely squeezed out. As a result, the farmers and the Hausa middlemen did not profit much from the expansion of trade brought about by the railway and improved roads.³ Instead, the large profits increasingly

1. NAK/SNP-370/518P/1916, H.R. Palmer, op.cit., p.1.

2. Cf. B.E. Sharwood-Smith, Kano Survey (Zaria, 1950), p.37.

3. By 1926, over 1,000 miles of roads have been constructed linking Kano city with the rural areas of the emirate. Similarly, by then the emirate had been linked with other parts of Nigeria by a road network.

accrued to the Lebano-Syrians and Southern settlers.¹ As a result the Kano Sabon Gari and township swelled in size. Thus by 1927 these privileged enclaves contained 4,894 Southern settlers, 76 Lebano-Syrians and over 120 European businessmen.² Politically they were outside the jurisdiction of the emirate authorities and economically they were increasingly dominating the commercial sector of the colonial economy.

1. See M. Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule (London, 1968), pp.275, 286-87, 454; Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.101; cf. A. McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London, 1926), p.104.

2. NAK/SNP-382/K.6892, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., enclosure re: Township.

CHAPTER 7

KANO 1926-40: POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE

DEVELOPMENTS.

While the preceding period of British overrule had been marked by experimentation, innovations and a good deal of misunderstanding in the search for a working relationship between the British and native officials, the period 1926-40 can in comparison be termed a golden age characterised by different pre-occupations. The year 1926 was an important watershed for both Kano emirate and Kano Province. Politically both the Kano ruling groups and the talakawa had more or less reconciled themselves to colonial overrule. Indicative of this, was the fact that at the end of that year the post of Resident Kano emirate was abolished and Kano was brought in line with the other emirates by having from that time onwards, a District Officer as supervisor and overseer of N.A. affairs.¹ At the same time Kano Province was affected by the general reorganisation involving changes in Provisional boundaries.

-- In commenting on the Kano Province report for 1924, Governor Clifford had minuted that in view of changing conditions, it appeared that the province was too large.² Undoubtedly, the Governor was right for as constituted in 1903 Kano Province had an area of over 30,000 square miles with an estimated population in 1925 of $3\frac{1}{2}$ million. Till then also the Province contained nine emirates grouped in four administrative Divisions

1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, p.2.

2. NAK/SNP-635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., Clifford minute (n.d.)

of which Kano formed one on its own. Subsequent to Clifford's observation, proposals and counter-proposals passed to and fro between Kano, Kaduna and Lagos as well as the capitals of neighbouring emirates and Provinces. As a result, it was decided to reorganise not only Kano Province but the other provinces as well. This decision was effected in 1926 when Kano Province was considerably reduced in size: Katsina emirate was transferred to Zaria Province and Katagum Division (comprising the emirates of Jama'are, Katagum and Misau) was transferred to Bauchi Province.¹ Of the remaining emirates, Kano emirate continued as before as an administrative Division, while Daura, Gumel, Hadejia and Kazaure were re-grouped in a new Northern Division with the District Officer based at Hadejia. This provincial reorganisation, together with the cessation of the post of Resident Kano emirate, meant that henceforth the Provisional^{ncial} Resident could, and in fact, did, to a greater extent than before, oversee the affairs of Kano emirate personally. Perhaps to further emphasize the new era from about 1926, the Kano emirate districts began to be known officially after the names of their headquarters' towns, in contrast to the preceding period when each district was named according to the title of its District Head. The recall during this latter period of some of the most important titled District Heads to assume duty as departmental councillors at the capital had had a lot to do with this.

While internally Kano emirate administration was characterised by further bureaucratization and greatly augmented responsibilities, the number of supervisory staff on the British side also increased appreciably. Hence

1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, op.cit., p.1.

Kano emirate was divided into four touring areas, each containing a number of districts. Each touring area was entrusted to an Assistant District Officer who was normally based at Kano but spent a good deal of his time touring his area.¹ Similarly in the 1920's and 1930's, it became possible to deploy European political officers to oversee specialised activities of the N.A., notably finance and the judiciary. Hence the emergence of such designations as A.D.O. Finance and A.D.O. Judicial, etc. In theory the Native Administration had autonomy in certain fields, but never did it have unfettered discretion, since the A.D.O.'s, District Officer Kano or the Resident could intervene. Also this was the era of secondment of European professionals for service in the N.A. technical and specialised departments such as agriculture, public works, hospitals and waterworks. It should moreover be borne in mind that these developments occurred within the context of greatly reduced British pre-occupation with security, and a deliberate policy of making the emirates the main agencies for development in the Protectorate.

In Kano, the new era also marks the beginning of a fundamental change in the character of emirate government, from being a traditional Fulani theocracy to becoming a local government authority in a modern state. There was a widening expectation of what local government should provide for the public and people, at least in Kano city, began to appreciate the services provided by the Native and British administrations. Notable in this regard were such services and amenities like hospitals, schools,

1. These touring areas were designated the Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Western Touring Areas. They had no formal headquarters but almost at each district capital there was a Rest House which the A.D.O.'s used as accommodation and occasional offices while in the respective districts.

electricity and pipe-borne water.

While the emirate was adjusting itself to collaborating with the British, a further development resulting from the latter's presence was threatening the political authority of the emir. Since the foundation of the Sabon Gari or Township in 1912, this 'foreign' enclave has grown into a sizeable town with over 7,000 inhabitants under the direct administration of a British Station Magistrate. The Sabon Gari was however only one of several extra-territorial jurisdictions endangering the emirate, for there were within the emirate institutions like the British garrison, courts and police which were all reducing the sovereignty and autonomy of the emirate. In regard to the Sabon Gari, the British realised the danger it posed to the emir's authority and sought to avert this threat by gradually introducing a policy of integrating the enclave into the emirate administration. Hence the institution in 1931 of a Mixed Court which administered traditional and British laws and was made responsible to the Waziri of Kano. Then in 1940 the Sabon Gari was placed under the emir's authority as a constituent unit of the Native Administration.¹ Up till then the Sabon Gari had been a privileged enclave containing non-Kano citizens over whom the emir's writ did not run. The existence of the Sabon Gari and its exclusion from the authority of the emir until 1940 symbolised an underlying contradiction of Indirect Rule which on the one hand attempted to preserve the emirate on a traditional basis while on the other trying to integrate the emirate into the broader Nigerian scene and modern developments and institutions.

1. NAK/SNP 17-33147, J.R. Patterson, Kano Province Report 1940 (21/1/1941); see also NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1880/4627, Transfer of Native Reservation to Kano N.A. (1940-41).

Meanwhile, it is plausible to say of Kano emirate that the new age had been inaugurated even before the accession of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-53) in 1926. This was brought about by the relative passivity of Bayero's predecessor Shehu Usman (1919-26). Usman, aged about 67 years when he ascended the Kano throne, was apparently neither interested in nor capable of overseeing the details of day-to-day affairs in the emirate. In any case he suffered from chronic ill-health which made matters even worse. When moreover his eldest and favourite son Wambai Abdullahi Mai-Bindiga died in September 1924, the aged ruler ceased to exercise all but a minimum of his prerogatives. It cannot be over-emphasised that the failure of Usman to take his full share of the administrative burden gave rise to a major problem, for successful Indirect Rule on the emirate model presupposes an active and effective ruler or Native Authority. For Kano emirate the problem posed by Usman's inactivity was simple enough: when the district organisation was enforced by Dr. Cargill in 1908, all the traditional close advisers to the emir, with the notable exception of the Waziri,¹ were sent away from the capital to reside permanently in their districts. While Muhammadu Abbas (1903-19) was at the helm, things ran smoothly enough. Now, with the emir Usman unable to perform the supervisory role expected of him, a vacuum became only too apparent at the centre. Something decisive had to be done to rectify this situation.

The British political officers at Kano were wary of taking things into their own hands. For already in 1924 Governor Clifford had complained that Kano's British staff, while bemoaning a chronic shortage

1. The office of Waziri was relatively new, dating from the accession of Aliyu Babba in 1894.

of staff, were in fact to an increasing but unnecessary degree doing the Kano Native Administration's work for it.¹ This comment had the effect of discouraging the political officers from further intervention into local affairs. It is also interesting in view of Clifford's supposedly cool attitude to the Lugardian system prevailing in the emirates.² The Kano problem of inadequate supervision for the numerous branches of Native Administration activities had to be solved within the context of the emirate's indigenous authorities despite emir Usman's obvious incapacity. Waziri Gidado, himself ageing, could not be entrusted with all the supervisory duties which the emir had left unattended. To make matters even worse, the infirmity of the ruler had given rise to a distasteful revival of a familiar colonial bogey: the royal entourage, largely men of slave descent, had again to a great extent become 'the avenues of approach to the emir of the District Heads, the native administration officials, and of the people generally.'³ An early solution thus became an urgent necessity.

Mr. H.O. Lindsell, then Resident in charge Kano emirate, therefore embarked on a reorganisation of the administration in July 1925. Madaki Mamudu, hitherto a D.H. with his seat at Dawakin Tofa, was brought back to the capital and placed in charge of district administration.⁴ Another District Head, Sarkin Bai Abdulkadir, was brought back from Dambatta

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1. NAK/SNP-635/1925, Sir H.Clifford, comments on Kano Province Report 1924 (undated).
 2. Cf. I.F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960 (Oxford, 1960), pp.217-221; D.C. Dorward, op.cit., pp.194-95; see also NAK-461/DB9/1, Minutes by Sir H.Clifford to Lt.Governor Northern Provinces, Issued for the information and guidance of Political Officers (Kaduna, 1930).
 3. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., p.3.
 4. Ibid., pp.3-4; cf. Dawakin Tofa District Note Book.

and put in charge of Kano city administration and the technical departments and specialised institutions.¹ The Waziri Gidado, as before, retained his control of judicial and legal matters and personnel. The two vacancies in district headships were filled as follows:

the Madaki's cousin, Ibrahim Cigari, took charge of Dawakin Tofa with the title of Sarkin Shanu, and the Sarkin Bai's district was put under the charge of his own kinsman Muhammadu Dikko, with the title of Dokaji.² At the capital, the installation of Sarkin Bai as administrator as well as councillor in charge of the central departments coincided with the deposition of Magajin Gari Mamudu who had till then been the equivalent of metropolitan District Head.³ These changes entailed the decentralisation of the Native Authority's powers and, in effect, emir Usman delegated a good deal of responsibility to his subordinates. Usman seemingly accepted the re-organisation. At any rate by late 1925, he was too weak to attend to public and official business or leave the environs of his palace.⁴ Moreover in order that the substance of these reforms might not be undermined by intrigues on the part of the royal entourage, many of the latter were exiled to Gogel about 17 miles south of Kano in January 1926,

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1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., p.4; cf. Dambatta District Note Book (history and genealogy).
 2. See Dambatta District Note Book and Dawakin Tofa District Note Book (historical sections). Traditionally the title of Dokaji was filled by the man who made public the emir's proclamations.
 3. Magajin Gari literally means 'chief of the town'. It is interesting to recall that Mamudu was Galadima of Kano during the reign of Aliyu Babba (1894-1903). He lost his position subsequent to the British occupation and the deposition of his full-brother from the throne. But Mamudu staged a come-back in 1924 with his appointment to the position of Magajin Gari on the death of the first holder of the title, which was first instituted at Kano in 1922.
 4. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W.Alexander, op.cit., p.4.

and the exiles were forbidden to return to the capital for any reason whatever.¹

Concurrent with the administrative measures of July 1925, a new native police force was organised in Kano city. The new force was christened Yan Gadi (lit. watchmen) and its job was to help the Native Administration in the task of law enforcement, the prevention of crime and the maintenance of law and order in the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of the capital.² A Sarkin Yan Gadi was appointed to head the force; below him were his deputy, five non-commissioned officers and 144 rank and file constables, making a grand total of 151 men. About two-thirds of the personnel were recruited from the ranks of the emir's dogarai, the rest from among retired colonial soldiers and policemen with good discharge testimonials.³ These uniformed men, like other city-based institutions, came under the portfolio of Sarkin Bai, Kano's traditional gendarmes or dogarai, hitherto engaged in policing the city and Fagge⁴ were reduced from a strength of 275 to 100 men - comprised of 70 horsemen and 30 foot - and charged with liaison between the emir and his District Heads; they were also to work as couriers and aides in the districts.⁵ For the first time, the emir had been persuaded to delegate to subordinate officials a part of the law enforcement work at

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1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Annual Report 1926, pp.2-3, 4. Alhaji Mai Sango (1970), a son of the most powerful amongst those exiled (the then Dan Rimi), maintains that even the descendents of the victims were not allowed to return to Kano city until 1954.
 2. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., para.55, p.17; cf. A Description of the Provinces of Northern Nigeria (Kaduna, 1950), pp.7-11.
 3. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., para.56, p.18; cf. Hermon-Hodge, Gazetteer of Ilorin Province (London, 1929), p.210. The tendency to recruit ex-soldiers and retired colonial policemen into the N.A. police was widespread throughout the Protectorate.
 4. A native settlement, originally a caravanserai, adjacent to the walled city which was under the jurisdiction of the emir as distinct from the Sabon gari which was a separate entity under an A.D.O. with the official title of Station Magistrate.
 5. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., para.56, p.18.

the capital, and his personal police force was restricted to functions confined largely to the countryside. Emir Usman is said to have disliked these changes, despite the formality of everything being done in his name as Native Authority. At any rate the retention of some of the dogarai was seen by the then Lieutenant-Governor of the Protectorate as a way of enrolling the goodwill of the ruler: the argument was that in the absence of a pension scheme for redundant local officials and the end of the slave bureaucracy, maintaining a residual dogarai contingent was a satisfactory arrangement by which the emir could 'give deserving henchmen a means of livelihood'.¹ The smaller dogarai force was of course to be paid out of Native Administration funds.

As it was, by the early months of 1926 emir Usman's health deteriorated rapidly, making it impossible for him to render these reforms ineffective even if he wanted to. Meanwhile the work of the Kano Native Administration did not suffer unduly, since a newly constituted regency council comprising the Waziri, Madaki, and Sarkin Bai continued to discharge its duties creditably. The incapacity of the emir contributed in no small measure to the successful functioning of the council, more especially in regard to departmental responsibilities. By the time emir Usman died on 23rd April 1926, the administrative re-deployment and the new police force were firmly established.² His successor, in effect, would be faced with a fait accompli.

Emir Usman's death and the electoral process necessary for the nomination of a successor temporarily overshadowed all other activities in the emirate. For even before the demise of the late ruler, his prolonged

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1. NAK/SNP-12004 vol.II, minute by H.R.Palmer, Lt. Governor Northern Nigeria, re: Correspondence and Despatches relating to Kano Province Annual Report 1929, p.87; cf. NAK-4409/C.43, Slaves as Office Holders, Elimination of (1928).
 2. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.3.

incapacity had given rise to uncertainty and intrigue within the ruling families. Some of the District Heads, however slender their hope for the succession, were displaying a tendency of lingering at the capital until Resident H.O. Lindsell told them firmly that their duties lay in their districts.¹ Two days after the death of emir Usman, Lindsell summoned the traditional electoral council - Madaki, Makama, Sarkin Bai and Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta. In addition to these the Waziri (a title dating only from 1894) was co-opted for the occasion, largely because of his legal expertise and long association with central emirate policies.² On 29th April 1926, six days after the death of Usman, the electoral council formally informed the Resident of their unanimous choice for the emirship. The man they had chosen was Ciroma Abdullahi Bayero, eldest son of the late emir Muhammadu Abbas (1903-19). Bayero, it may be recalled, had narrowly missed the emirship in 1919 when Usman had been preferred by the then Acting Lieutenant-Governor of the Protectorate. Bayero had excelled in his duties as District Head, duties which by 1926 entailed not only efficiency in tax collection but also uprightness and the ability to implement colonial projects, like road construction and rural improvement measures. For all practical purposes the Ciroma had no serious contestant, as the only other candidate was Tafida Muhammadu, son of the recently deceased emir Usman and in 1926 barely twenty years old. Thus the nomination of Abdullahi Bayero suited the

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1. Ibid., para. 10, p.4; cf. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-3775/8455, Deceased Chiefs, Traditional Election of Successors (1954).
 2. NAK/SNP-K.105, op.cit., para.12, p.5; see also NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1651/4164, Emir of Kano (1926-51), letter from Kano Electors to Governor of Nigeria, 29/4/1926.

British political officers at Kano, practically all of whom were unanimous in their praise of his qualities. Resident Lindsell was only too glad to recommend the confirmation of Bayero's nomination to the Governor of Nigeria. He left no doubt that the latter's confirmation would satisfy the wishes of Kano's ruling circles and populace and also fit in with colonial objectives.

As it was, however, Lindsell was yet to extract concessions from the emir-elect. When he summoned Abdullahi Bayero to inform him that his name was being forwarded for the Governor's approval, Lindsell used the occasion to obtain certain definite promises from the former. The Resident emphasised that as far as the British were concerned, the Fulani system of ruling through royal slaves was a thing of the past and was on no account to be revived directly or indirectly. In addition, the emir-elect had to give an undertaking to respect the recently established system of 'departmental' councillors having defined responsibilities.¹ In short the new ruler was made to realise that the activities of the Native Administration had expanded so much that he had to endorse the principle of delegating some of his executive prerogatives to subordinates. The British administration displayed a new determination to rule out the concentration of power in the hands of the emir, more especially as such centralization of political power was likely to be abused by the ruler's entourage. Confronted by these demands, Abdullahi Bayero gave an unqualified promise to abide by the Resident's conditions.² This episode undoubtedly suggests a new-found confidence on the part of the colonial regime since till then they had

1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., para.15, 16, pp. 6-7.

2. Ibid., para.16, p.7; cf. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1651/4164, op.cit., H.R. Palmer, Lt.Governor Northern Nigeria, telegram to Resident Kano, 26/4/1926.

been more interested in enrolling the co-operation of the Northern emirs in law-enforcement rather than reforming the emirate central administrations.

Abdullahi Bayero was subsequently confirmed in office on 15th May 1926 and when not long after the then Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Richmond Palmer, paid a visit to Kano, the new emir took advantage of the occasion to ingratiate himself with the British Administration. To prove to the latter than he intended to rule according to their wishes, he ostentatiously proclaimed his intention of dispensing with the services of the remaining palace slaves and eunuchs. He also proclaimed the manumission of all royal slaves wherever they might be in the emirate.¹ However, to soften the blow and reduce dissatisfaction on the part of the emancipated slaves, the colonial regime consented to the emir's proposal to award pensions and gratuities to the latter from Native Treasury funds.

The next major political act by the new ruler was the appointment of his eldest son Muhammadu Sanusi (emir 1953-63) to the Ciromaship and the district headship left vacant by his own accession.² There was nothing unusual about this as all Bayero's predecessors had been in the habit of elevating their sons to high office. Nevertheless the accession of Abdullahi Bayero marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Kano emirate under British overrule, more especially because he formally endorsed the British desire of ending the role of slaves in the royal household and the administration of the emirate at large. Together with his acceptance of the principle of delegating executive responsibilities to his councillors, a new phase of British-Native

1. NAK/SNP-K.105 vol.III, op.cit., para.18, p.7.

2. Ibid., para. 21, p.8.

Administration co-operation was about to begin, which was strikingly different from the preceding period. The British political officers in Kano were quick to point out the significance of the occasion. Furthermore, because the colonial Administration no longer expected difficulties in their relations with the new emir, the prestigious post of Resident Kano emirate ceased to exist as from November 1926, soon after Bayero's accession.¹ Henceforth the British officer in charge of the emirate was to be a District Officer, as had already been the practice elsewhere in Kano Province and the Protectorate generally.

On 14th February 1927, the Governor of Nigeria formally installed the emir Abdullahi Bayero, amidst much pomp and festivity.² The year 1927 was also the first in which the recent administrative changes in the emirate were seen at work. There was cautious optimism in regard to the 'departmental' responsibilities of the councillors or the local equivalents of ministers, as observed by Senior Resident C.W. Alexander.

It is not easy for them (the councillors) to step into the shoes of powerful slaves whose self-confidence and greed were encouraged by temporary favour and whose attitude to their master (the emir) had to be schooled by a ready subservience. But there is now assurance that the slave regime has entirely ceased to exist.³

In the light of the prevailing goodwill between the British and Native administrations however, the British were not unduly worried by this faltering start on the part of the councillors. In the event the emir utilised the mood of optimism to improve the dynastic position of his

1. Ibid., p.2.

2. NAK/SNP-K.6892, C.W. Alexander, Kano Annual Report, para.7, p.3. For text of the Governor's speech which was delivered in Hausa, see NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1651/4164, op.cit., Hausa version and English translation of H.E.'s speech.

3. NAK/SNP-K.6892, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., para. 9, p. 4.

family and lineage during 1927. When the District Head of Fogolawa and Galadiman Kano died in June that year, the emir conferred the title and district headship on his own younger brother Abdulkadir, who had hitherto been Dan Iya and D.H. of Dawakin Kudu. Abdulkadir's former title and district headship went to the ruler's second son Muhammadu Aminu.¹ Thus, within a year of his accession emir Abdullahi Bayero had managed to install three of his immediate relations in important titles and district headships - his brother as Galadima, his eldest son as Ciroma and his second son as Dan Iya. Indeed, even though the Senior Resident Mr. C.W. Alexander claims that he had impressed upon the new emir that the first qualification for an emirate title and district headship was experience and ability, apparently in these instances he had had to concede the undoubted advantage of being related to the ruler. Moreover towards the end of 1927, Alexander further backed the emir when the latter deposed the Turaki and District Head of Ungogo Muhammadu (a son of Bayero's predecessor on the throne). Muhammadu was charged and alleged guilty of insubordination and failure to control his district.² The title and district headship went to another of the new emir's brothers Muhammadu Iruwa (emir 1963).³

During 1928, there was a significant re-deployment of Kano Native Administration personnel. Two factors accounted for this. The then District Officer in charge Kano emirate and a man who had a reputation for radicalism,⁴ had noticed that Sarkin Bai Abdulkadir, the councillor

1. C.W. Alexander, ibid., para. 13, 14, p.6.

2. C.W. Alexander, ibid., para.16, p.7.

3. Ibid., cf. Ungogo District Note Book (history).

4. The D.O. in question was Mr. J.H. Carrow.

for Kano city and city-based institutions, was not measuring up to the progressive standard expected of him. Abdulkadir, it should be remembered, was old and very much a survivor from a passing age. Furthermore, the emir who wanted to promote one of his brothers to Abdulkadir's prestigious position, argued that he wanted to put in charge of the city and the central departments a young and vigorous man who could take in his stride the changing times. Such a common ground between District Officer and emir needed only the slightest nod from the then Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Richmond Palmer, to set in motion the desired reorganisation. Sarkin Bai Abdulkadir was sent back to reside in his old district with headquarters at Dambatta. The Galadima Abdulkadir, younger brother to the emir, was recalled from his district of Fogolawa to assume charge of the metropolis and the city-based departments.¹ However the return of Sarkin Bai to Dambatta gave rise to a minor problem. The Dokaji Muhammadu Dikko, who had been in charge of Dambatta District since 1925, had to be found a new job. The easiest solution would have been to appoint Dokaji as D.H. of Fogolawa, a post just vacated by the Galadima. In the event however, Fogolawa District ceased to exist. Its former territory was reconstituted into two new districts, Babura and Garki.² Dokaji Muhammadu Dikko, a kinsman of the aged Sarkin Bai, was made District Head of Babura, and the emir conferred the headship of Garki district on a cousin, Barde Kerarriya Abubakar. The number of districts in the emirate, however, remained twenty-nine as before because one of the smaller districts, Zakirai, was absorbed into an enlarged Gabasawa district.

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1. For details of these changes, see NAK/SNP-9043 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, Kano Province Annual Report 1928, paras. 13,14,15, pp. 9-10.
 2. NAK/SNP-9043 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit.; cf. Babura District Note Book.

Elsewhere in the emirate, personnel changes affected the districts of Gabasawa, Gwaram and Ungogo due to the death of a District Head, the promotion of another, and the demolition of a third D.H.¹ The net result of these changes was that the emir did further strengthen the dynastic position of his family at the emirate capital without necessarily weakening it at the district level. The mutual collaboration between emir and D.O. in effecting these changes illustrates an aspect of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, namely that an emir, even an unjust emir, could get away with almost anything provided that he was in the good books of the British political officers.² Such collaboration of course tended to concentrate even more power in the hands of the emir.

By 1930, fiscal administration and management loomed so large in the affairs of the Kano Native Administration that the emir, with prodding from the Provincial Resident, Mr. H.O. Lindsell, made the Ma'aji or Native Treasurer the financial member of the Emirate Council. Then in 1932 there was another administrative reorganization. Kano city attained the status of a fully fledged district under the charge of the Galadima, who, however, retained his numerous responsibilities in regard to the specialised departments. To lighten the administrative burdens of the Galadima, the metropolis was then sub-divided into four administrative areas each under a Wakili or official deputy appointed by the emir.³ The institution of the Wakilai (pl.) was an innovation which superimposed a

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1. Cf. Gabasawa, Gwaram, and Ungogo District Note Books (histories and genealogies of District Heads).
 2. For critiques of this tendency, see W. Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer (London, 1936); W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: Critique of British Administration (London, 1936).
 3. NAK/SNP-18956 vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Annual Report 1932, para.6, p.2.

set of intermediaries between the emirate authorities and the ward-heads. Concurrent with the changes in the administrative set-up in the city, three of the smallest districts in the emirate were merged into others, thereby reducing the number of districts to twenty-seven instead of the former twenty nine.¹ As might be expected, the small districts which were abolished had had their District Heads convicted of the now familiar crimes of embezzlement or negligence of duty.

The year 1932 also saw the inauguration of a deliberate policy designed to improve and develop the rural areas of Kano emirate. Rural development projects in fact became a feature of the 1930's due to a large extent to the urgings of Governor Sir Donald Cameron who wanted to see progress extended to the countryside. These rural projects in Kano emirate took the form of road construction in and around the district capitals, the rebuilding of markets and the improvement of the general layout of towns, well-digging, public latrines, new court-houses, and the enforcement of colonial sanitary regulations. The district capitals which first benefitted from these rural improvement schemes were Bichi, Gaya, Gwarzo and Wudil.² The Native Administration and the British political officers at Kano rushed through these schemes largely in response to the strictures of Cameron. The latter criticised the status quo whereby practically all development projects and N.A. expenditure were concentrated upon the capitals of the Northern emirates. At Kano the emir, prompted by the D.O., executed these projects through the District Heads.

1. Ibid., para. 9, p.3; cf. Kiru, Kumbotso, and Minjibir District Note Books.

2. NAK/SNP-18956 vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., para.12, p.4.

And even though officially forced or 'political' labour had ceased since 1918,¹ it was employed on a large scale at this time.² People were conscripted to work on these projects by executive orders emanating from the emir. The District Heads directed these operations. It is not unlikely that many people were victimised and not a few of the officials took advantage ^{for} ~~of~~ enriching themselves. For large Native Treasury funds were voted towards paying the conscripted workers but the British suspected that the money was diverted into private coffers.³

In the execution of these rural development projects, the beneficiaries were not consulted and in fact some of the schemes were enforced despite the lack of enthusiasm by the talakawa. The Chief Secretary of Nigeria drew attention to this flaw in what were otherwise desirable objectives. To Lagos, it appeared that nothing was being done to popularise these projects and neither were the British administrative staff paying enough attention to their supervisory role in the implementation of development projects, thereby exposing the talakawa to the tyranny of the chiefs. Kano Province's acting Resident, Mr. F.M. Noad, retorted with a vehement defence of the emirate system and the political officers in Kano emirate. Noad pointed out that contrary to what Lagos imagined, the D.O. Kano emirate was in constant touch with the Native Administration. Furthermore,

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1. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria (London, 1968), p.121.
 2. NAK/4419/C.83, Forced Labour Kano Province (1931-34).
 3. Ibid.

argued the Resident, only the emir and his small circle of advisers appreciated the value of many colonial development projects. Therefore to by-pass these in an attempt to involve the populace in decision-making would not only be contrary to Indirect Rule as practised in the Northern emirates but would also lose the Administration the co-operation of the rulers. In any case, in view of the general lack of initiative on the part of the District and village chiefs and the conservatism of the populace, the British officers could not but confine their involvement to persuading the emir to enforce these schemes through executive orders. In view of these considerations, there was a case for the arbitrary execution of these schemes and the enforcement of sanitary and other regulations. Noad concluded by asserting that he was sure the populace would in future appreciate the value of these schemes imposed from above.¹ Lagos does not seem to have re-opened this subject subsequent to Noad's angry retort.

Further rural improvement projects were undertaken during the 1930's. In the course of 1933, development and improvement projects were extended to the district headquarters towns of Dambatta, Dutse, Gwaram, Minjibir and Ringim. In an apparent attempt to make the District Heads and the dagatai see their positions in a wider perspective, steps were taken to explain to them that they should not be 'entirely obsessed with tax collection'. As it was, the British touring officers summoned meetings in the countryside at which they endeavoured to persuade the dagatai to represent the needs of the talakawa in the absence of a medium via which public opinion could be gauged.² This system of consultation

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1. NAK/SNP-18956 vol.II, F.M. Noad, Correspondence and Despatches relating to Kano Province Report 1932, undated letter to Chief Secretary, Lagos.
 2. NAK/SNP-21326 vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, Kano Province Annual Report 1933, p.4; see also NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-

in fact was extended right down to the village level where the chieftains were encouraged to surround themselves with village elders who were in turn supposed to represent the desires of the populace.

The background to the developments of the 1930's needs some explanation. In 1929 the British Parliament had passed the first Colonial Development Act which set aside a small sum of money towards developing the empire. Similarly in Nigeria, the government deliberately decided to make Native Administrations the main agencies of development and progress in their respective areas. In order that the larger N.A.'s could have more funds with which to implement British-conceived projects, the government allowed the N.A.'s to retain 70% of the revenue from taxation as from 1928. Following the world-wide economic depression, however, the Government once more laid claim to 50% of local revenue, but in 1934 the proportion going to the Government was fixed at 40%.¹ The larger Native Treasuries had appreciably greater annual revenues with which to finance what the Administration thought necessary.

With increased financial resources, the Native Administrations obviously needed expert advice in order to implement certain projects. By the early 1930's, such expertise was available in the form of European officers belonging to Lagos-based Central Departments dealing with such matters as agriculture, produce inspection, veterinary, sanitation, engineering works and transportation. These specialised Departments had been inaugurated at the time of the 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria and by the late 1920's their experts and their respective efforts were manifest

1. Cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London, 1937), p. ; NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-952/2568, vol.II, Gazetteer of Kano Province 1933-54, p. . See also NAK/KANOPROF 5/1- 913/2487, Taxes Assigned to Native Administrations 1926-37.

in the capitals of the Northern emirates.¹ In a sense therefore, the developments of the 1930's reflected the way in which the expertise of these Departments was spreading into the rural areas. In Kano emirate by the end of 1933, the Resident Mr. H.O.Lindsell was sufficiently impressed by the progress made:

The extension of departmental activities to the Districts is having its inevitable excellent effects. Improved markets, court buildings...cattle inoculation, inspection of hides and skins, sleeping sickness surveys, anti-tsetse clearing...are all matters which tend to broaden the outlook of the District Head and widen his interest beyond the narrow conception of duties limited to an efficient tax collection and the modicum of energy necessary to keep out of serious trouble.²

In order to facilitate the development of areas other than the emirate capital, the Kano political officers toyed with the idea of boosting the status of the dagatai during the early 1930's, in order that they might be delegated meaningful executive powers. A memorandum drafted by Mr.J.R. Patterson claims that for such a policy to be really successful, it would be necessary to have as dagatai men who had long historical or strong sentimental claims to the position in their respective communities; the point being that such men would be automatically obeyed and respected by the peasantry.³ Like earlier British officials who had supervised the affairs of Kano and other Northern emirates, these officials of the 1930's were equally inclined to believe in the superior qualities of old ruling families even at the lowest level of society. Unfortunately the proposal to boost the prestige of the Kano dagatai as a means of aiding colonial objectives

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1. For background to the development of the central or specialised departments, see A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria (London, 1968), pp.73-81, 163-167.
 2. NAK/SNP-21326 vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., pp.32-33.
 3. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-753/2087, Village Administration (General) 1934-35, memo by J.R. Patterson, 17/3/1934; see also ibid., memo by H.O. Lindsell, 19/3/1934.

was still-born, since earlier British policies had concentrated too much power on the emirate capital and by the 1930's the average dagaci was accustomed to receiving rather than giving orders.

However by 1934, the British staff at Kano were confident that the emirate, like others in the Protectorate, was quite ready and capable of taking modern developments and new ideas in its stride. Of course it was a good thing that the institutions of the Native Administration had had time to become stabilised. Of special pleasure to the British was the fact that except for the railways and the post office, all other development projects in Kano emirate were being undertaken under the aegis of the Native Administration and financed from beit-el-mal funds.¹ Further it was encouraging to note that informed^a village consultative meetings, inaugurated two years earlier, were increasingly more outspoken as to the rural improvements which they considered desirable in their respective areas. It is not unlikely that the then prevailing slump in the prices of groundnuts, the main cash crop, had had a lot to do with this unexpected desire for N.A. financed development schemes. This new popularity of rural developments arose from the fact that the conscripted labour employed on these schemes were paid cash wages which supplemented the cultivators' reduced income from export crops.

These developments soon led to the further bureaucratization of village administration. In 1936 all Kano dagatai, together with specially trained and professional clerks recently assigned to these village chiefs, were put on fixed salaries. Ostensibly this measure was pushed through in recognition of the success of the dagatai as minor agents of the emirate administration, though in fact the British were more concerned

1. NAK/SNP-25673, H.O.Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1935, p.13; cf. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-754/2091, Allocations to Incur Expenditure, Kano Emirate 1934-35.

with the effect of the salary scheme in making the chiefs adhere to colonial codes of public conduct in the way that their social superiors had had to conform in the earlier phase of Indirect Rule.¹ There is no doubt that to the British, the salary scheme for the dagatai and village scribes was seen as marking the graduation of these officials to a recognised permanent status at the bottom of the colonial administrative hierarchy. Since 1916, when the business of establishing the authority of village heads in accordance with colonial objectives was taken in hand, the dagatai had advanced a long way.

However despite the seeming consolidation and enhanced position of the dagatai, the British administrative staff at Kano had no illusions about improvement in the immediate future. The situation is well summed up in a report by Resident Patterson in 1937:

...except in the case of villages which are old and important... the personnel of village administration is poor and few of them appear to have any ambition to be more than the peg on which the peasantry from the one side will hang their ills and the district chiefs from the other side some of their difficulties.²

Indeed much as the colonial overlords would have liked to decentralize authority, the Kano village chiefs were not prepared for this. Any disposition towards untried ideas and reform rarely permeated beyond the emir and his advisory council. Moreover the Kano dagatai of the 1930's, and to a lesser extent even the District Heads who had been schooled in the colonial era, had generally a low standard of integrity according to the British. For almost at the end of our period, in 1939, eighty-four

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1. NAK/SNP-27810 (No.1862), H.O. Lindsell, Kano Annual Report 1936 (14/1/1937), p.22.
 2. NAK/SNP-399/29652, J.R. Patterson, Kano Province Report 1937, para.47, p.22.

dagatai were found guilty of embezzling tax revenue. Of these, thirteen absconded and the rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.¹ The British would have us believe that the main cause of embezzlement then was kurdin Falle - the practice by village heads of accepting in advance money from taxpayers having ready cash. Reportedly these sums were frittered away but the dagaci hoped to make up for them from his cash crops or further advances made during the groundnut and tax collecting season. Whatever the reason, district and village administration remained intractable. This was especially marked with regard to taxation and its efficient collection to which the colonial regime devoted much of its energy. The confusion relating to this has again been summed up by Resident Patterson in 1940, the very end of our period:

To instill ^{into} persons of the mentality of Village Headmen and the average District Headman the meaning of and necessity for a rapid and accurate collection of tax is no mean task. To such people disorderliness of thought and action is not a crime, it is hardly a fault, it is a habit of mind...Village Headmen are quite likely to become befogged and to forget that the main object of tax collection is to get in the money.²

As far as the British political officers were concerned, the efficiency of District and village administration left much to be desired.³ But towards the end of the period the Kano Native Administration was taking on greater responsibilities in regard to fiscal management and development activities. It should be borne in mind that neither fiscal affairs nor the provision of services and amenities had been a major aspect of Kano government in pre-colonial times.

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1. NAK/SNP-403/32098, J.R.Patterson, Kano Report 1939 (dated 18/1/1940), pp. 19-20.
 2. NAK/SNP- 403/32098, J.R.Patterson, ibid., pp.4-5.
 3. NAK/SNP 17-33147, J.R.Patterson, Kano Province Report 1940 (dated 21/1/1941) p.6. For analysis of British apprehension in regard to German propaganda during the 1939-45 war, see NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1835/4494, War Propaganda Circulars 1939-45.

An important characteristic of this period was the emergence of the Kano Native Administration as an agency for educational development. According to Sir Charles Orr, the educational requirement thought necessary in the early phase of British overrule fell under three heads. First, priority was to be given to intelligent natives of the mallamai class who would be taught Roman characters for writing Hausa, colloquial English, and finally reading and writing English, arithmetic and geography, so that they might qualify for clerkships in Government and Native Administration offices and gradually replace the native clerks who had hitherto been drawn from other West African colonies having Western schools. Secondly, there was need for some sort of special training for the ruling class likely to become chiefs or emirs. Thirdly, it was thought desirable to provide general elementary schools for children on a secular basis, with industrial teaching in addition.¹

With these objectives in view, the first colonial educational experiments in the Northern emirates were begun at Kano in the course of 1909. Early in that year, a beginning was made with the inauguration of a school for the sons of native chiefs in the Protectorate. All Kano dignitaries, including the emir, were persuaded to send their children. Then in August 1909, Mr. Hans Vischer, the first Director of Education in Northern Nigeria, took charge of the school on the instructions of Governor Sir Percy Girouard.² Besides the school for the sons of chiefs, Hans Vischer almost immediately organised another school for Mallami,

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1. Sir Charles Orr, The Making of Northern Nigeria (London, 1911), p.266; cf. D.W. Bitteringer, An Educational Experiment in Northern Nigeria in its Cultural Setting (Elgin, Illinois, 1941), p.214.
 2. NAK/SNP-6415/1909, C.L. Temple, op.cit., paras. 269, 270, 271. The first teachers in the School for the Sons of Chiefs were Mr. McFoy and Mr. Ali Davies, both of whom were natives of Sierra Leone.

the men destined for clerical jobs in Government and other offices. He also set about organizing an industrial school. To aid British educational objectives, the emir of Kano was persuaded to make an annual grant of £1,000 to these new institutions from the funds of the recently constituted Native Treasury.¹ And by the end of 1910, ten of the mallamai trained by Mr. Vischer were already employed by the emir of Kano and engaged on tax assessment using taki measurements. In the course of the following years, these schools were expanded and their curriculae rationalized to fit in harmoniously with the existing political and social systems.² In due course, the Kano schools attained lofty designations - Kano Emirate Provincial School, the Industrial School, and the Survey School. It should be borne in mind that whereas subsequently the Provincial School came to serve the emirates of Kano Province, the Industrial and Survey Schools catered for all the Northern Provinces. Kano emirate, then as now the richest of the emirates, bore the major burden of the financial contribution from the Native Administrations. Up until 1927, this contribution from Kano N.A. amounted to £1,000 per annum, which was largely disbursed as salaries for the African staff.

Meanwhile, the Church Missionary Society had abortively applied for permission to establish a Christian missionary centre, a dispensary and a school at Kano. But in Kano as in the other Muslim emirates, the British political staff were quick to turn down the proposals of the

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1. C.L. Temple, ibid., para.273; see also O.Temple, Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (ed. C.L. Temple, Lagos, 1922), p.470; Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1910, p. U.2; Blue Book, Northern Nigeria 1911, pp.U.1 - U.2.
 2. For an analysis and favourable assessment of the expansion of Western education in Kano and other emirates up until the 1920's, see Sonia Graham, Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria with reference to the work of Hans Vischer (1900-39) (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1955), p. ; see also S.Graham, Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria (Ibadan, 1966).

C.M.S. and other Christian missionary bodies. In regard to Kano, a Resident has summarised the reasons for rejecting the proposals for extending missionary activities into the emirate:

...if the Mission (C.M.S.) be permitted to establish itself in the City of Kano or in any other town in the Province, I fear there is only one possible view of such permission in the eyes of the Chiefs and people of the country... that Government has broken its solemn promises publicly and repeatedly made that it will not interfere with their religious beliefs.¹

As it was, Christian missions were forbidden to extend their work into Kano emirate until 1929 when Dr. Walter Miller was permitted to establish a C.M.S. centre on a plot on the edge of the Sabon Gari of Kano.²

The effect of this deliberate policy of excluding the Christian missionaries was that Western education in the Northern emirates expanded at a slow pace dictated by the colonial Administration and this in turn accounted for the relative lack of many schools in Northern Nigeria.³

However that may have been, British-sponsored education was in fact cautiously pushed by the Administration and reluctantly received by the people. Within the context of their limited objectives of training youths who would occupy useful positions in the Native Administrations, the British purported to be training the Northern Muslims on 'national lines' which, while not interfering with their religious beliefs or their best traditions, would help the Northerners to hold their own in the

1. NAK/SNP-1114/1912, E.J. Arnett, Ag. Resident, Kano Province Report 1911, para. 180.

2. W. Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer (London, 1936), pp.216-219; cf. NAK/SNP-18956 vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., para.34, p.9.

3. Cf. ^{W.J.} Kenneth Post, 'Modern Education and Politics in Nigeria' in Hans N. Weiler, ed., Education and Politics in Nigeria (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1964), p.143.

struggle for existence in the modern world. Hence in the early years of the development of Western education, the British were pre-occupied with providing special training for the younger generation of the ruling families in the hope that they would have become progressive and enlightened by the time they attained high office or chieftaincies. At Kano, and in newer schools elsewhere in the Protectorate, active courses in civics and ~~e~~Etiquette were introduced and senior British political officers called upon to instruct the pupils.¹ Similarly, in order that the Western schools would be less suspect in the eyes of the Muslim rulers and their subjects, religion occupied a prominent place in the curriculum of the Kano Schools and the Arabic language, revered by the Northern Muslims for its sacred associations and for its importance in the working of Muslim law, was also studied.² Everything was therefore done to consult the emir on matters affecting the Kano schools and the ruler, like his contemporaries in the other emirates, undertook to keep the schools filled with pupils.

The limited nature of British educational objectives and their policy of enrolling the co-operation of the rulers, however, did not make Western education popular at Kano. The problem here as elsewhere in the Islamic world, was that Northern Nigeria had a scholarship and literary tradition of its own. This resulted in inevitable problems when the British tried to 'modernize' the society by grafting on to the Islamic traditions an educational system within more or less Christian context. While in non-

1. S. Graham, op.cit., (1955), p.113.

2. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1922), p.118; D.W. Bittinger, op.cit., pp.214-215, 223-232; see also NAK/SNP-6415/1909, C.L.Temple, op.cit., para.273; C.L.Temple, Native Races and Their Rulers (Capetown, 1918), p. ; cf. NAK/SNP-170P/1916, H.R. Palmer, op.cit., pp.38-43.

Muslim colonies like Southern Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Buganda, etc., British rule and colonial developments were seen as something to be taken advantage of and therefore welcomed, in Northern Nigeria British rule was viewed as something to be put up with. Indeed, at Kano and the other Northern emirates, while the British wishfully desired that some day attendance at the Provisional School would be a sine qua non or at any rate a cause for priority in consideration for preferment among the ruling families, they had had to contend with an ingrained prejudice or barely concealed hostility towards Western education up until 1940. In fact the idea that attendance at British-sponsored schools was likely to prove actually a disqualification for office in Kano emirate lingered well into the 1930's.¹ A Kano Resident has written that as far as he could assess, colonial educational institutions and policies were little welcomed or understood.² The unpopularity of Western schools was equally pronounced in the other emirates. Mr. Hermon-Hodge has summarised the situation in Ilorin in the 1920's

...education was still unpopular, and even the Emir and leading men showed little interest in it. Complaints were frequent that schoolboys were molested and jeered at in the town. More than one attempt was made to burn down the (school) compound. Needless to say, education was no more popular with the pupils. Absentees were the rule rather than the exception; boys were continually running away....³

The problems of making Western education less suspect in the eyes of the people were further complicated by a chronic shortage of staff and frequent transfers. These latter shortcomings were of course a permanent feature of British overrule in Northern Nigeria.

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1. NAK/SNP-372/179P/1918, W.F. Gowers, Kano Province Report 1917, Educational Supplement;
 2. NAK/SNP-381/K.105 vol.III, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., pp.28-29.
 3. The Hon. B. Hermon-Hodge, Gazetteer of Ilorin Province (London, 1929), p. 255.

In Kano emirate the accession of Abdullahi Bayero in 1926 was seen by the British as marking the beginning of a progressive age in all spheres. Bayero seemed forward-looking and less intolerant of new ideas. The British political officers at Kano were therefore quick to draw up plans for the construction of two elementary schools in the emirate. These new schools, hopefully, were to provide pupils for proposed secondary level classes at the Provincial School.¹ Up to 1926, Kano Native Administration's 'contribution' to the three schools at the emirate capital had been £1,000 per annum, which was an insignificant charge on the Native Treasury funds. The rest of the maintenance costs of these schools as well as the salaries of the European staff had been met from contributions from other emirates and the British Administration. But the new elementary schools were now to be constructed and wholly maintained by the Native Administration. As it was, in fact three elementary schools were constructed in the emirate in the course of 1927 - one in the metropolis near Dalla Hill, the second at Dambatta, and the third at Gaya.² Between 1927 and 1939, the number of schools in the emirate was increased until in the latter year there were seventeen schools, most of which were elementary vernacular schools sited at District Headquarters towns.

Meanwhile, in the course of 1927 plans were also drawn to provide new and better buildings for the Kano Provincial School which was to be renamed Middle School. Then also, it became possible for the first time for the Kano Superintendent of Education, Gerald Power, to write an optimistic assessment of the educational scene:

1. NAK/SNP-381/K.105 vol.III, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.29.

2. NAK/SNP-382/K.6892, C.W. Alexander, Kano Province Report 1927, Education Supplement, p.33.

I think one can safely say that the antipathy and hostility of the past is almost dead now but I think it would be (too) optimistic to say that we have reached the stage of active support.¹

We have now reached the stage when the Kano Native Administration becomes the chief agent for training the new generation of local administrators. The main British objective, now as in the preceding years, was to train a select group of people in order that they could write Hausa and English in Roman script which the British could read, and in this way be enabled to check the Native Treasury accounts and taxpayers lists compiled by the native bureaucracy. In order that the younger officials and technicians might be better trained, the British Administration persuaded the Native Administration to finance the construction of a Craft School at a cost of £10,000 and a new Primary School costing £14,000 in the course of 1929. The sums involved accounted for a substantial percentage of expenditure for that year.² Both schools were sited at the emirate capital.

The year 1930 was an important landmark in the development of Western education in Kano emirate, as elsewhere in the Northern Provinces. Early during the year, the then Director of Education, Mr. Hussey, had travelled all the way from Lagos to Kano to explain the new, more comprehensive educational policy the Government had in mind for the emirates. Subsequent to that mission, the year witnessed the inauguration of the new scheme. The recently constructed Craft and Primary schools were absorbed into a new Middle School having a 'modernized and comprehensive curriculum.'³ Furthermore, it was planned to expand the size and scope

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1. NAK/SNP-382/K.6892, C.W. Alexander, *ibid.*, p.35, quoting Mr. Gerald Power's Report of Kano Education Department.
 2. NAK/SNP-385/12004 vol.I, J.H. Carrow, Kano Report 1929, Education Supplement, p.21.
 3. *Ibid.*, p.32; see also NAK/SNP-387/14686, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, Kano Report 1930, Education Supplement, pp.35-36.

of the existing elementary schools. In the new scheme of education, both modern and traditional instruction were to co-exist side by side, the latter to take the form of enlightened and less dogmatic Koranic mallamai.¹ Reportedly, the new system appealed to the traditional leaders not only in Kano emirate but elsewhere in the Province.

These changes were accompanied by the establishment of a regular salaried bureaucracy for the administration of education in Kano Province as a whole. As might be expected, the administrative offices and personnel were based at Kano, where the bulk of the educational institutions were. The new educational bureaucracy comprised of an inspectorate and a curriculum development and co-ordination section. Then the new Middle School, at the top of the educational pyramid, was formally opened on 24th March 1930 with a student intake of sixty-eight pupils. Of these, forty-two came from Kano emirate, eleven each from Daura and Hadejia, three from Kazaure, and one from Gumel emirate. The school was jointly owned by the emirates in the province, but Kano bore the major financial burden which amounted to £30,000 for the construction alone.² This represents something like a quarter of the Native Administration's revenue for 1929-30 but did not cause financial embarrassment as the N.A. had by then accumulated enormous reserve funds.

But 1930 was also conspicuous for yet another educational development in Kano emirate. In August that year a Girls' Training Centre was opened

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1. For analysis and discussion of colonial educational policy in the 1930's, see NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1239/3464, Educational Policy in the Northern Provinces 1926-52.
 2. NAK/SNP-387/14686, vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., pp.35-36; see also M. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria (London, 1937) p.96.

in the metropolis, wholly constructed and maintained by the Native Administration.¹ By 1932, learning at the girls' school had progressed sufficiently to enable the sending of four of the older girls to be trained as nurses at the new Native Administration Hospital.² Also, during the course of 1932 a Sanitary School (more popularly known as School of Health), the funds for which were provided by the Colonial Development Fund, was started on a site inside Kano city walls.³ Similarly, a judicial training class was inaugurated at the Shahuci elementary school inside the city. The institution of this class was an important innovation specifically designed to train legal scribes and court accessors. No facility for training such future alkalai had hitherto existed anywhere in Hausaland. And by the end of 1932, the first batch of 12 pupils had graduated from the class and taken up junior judicial appointments with the Kano Native Administration. In 1935 the judicial class at Shahuci was upgraded into a fully-fledged Law School, with three instructors recruited from Khartoum in the Eastern Sudan.⁴ Potential alkalai were sent to receive training at the school from all the Northern emirates.

Meanwhile, the first 18 pupils from the 'comprehensive' Middle School had also graduated at the end of 1932. Some took up appointments with the Native Administration while a few were sent to be trained as Teachers at the

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1. Perham, ibid., pp.96-97; D.W. Bittinger, op.cit., p.215. The girls school began with an enrolment of 15 girls, drawn from the households of the emir, Chief Alkali, Galadima, Madaki and Waziri of Kano. The curriculum consisted mainly of handiwork, but a start was made to instruct the older girls (their ages ranged from four to eleven years) to read and write the Roman script - see NAK/SNP-387/14686, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., pp.38-39.
 2. NAK/SNP-392/18956, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1932, Education Supplement, pp. 9,39; see also Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.97.
 3. NAK/SNP-392/18956, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.8, Perham, ibid., p.85.
 4. NAK/SNP-395/25673A, H.O.Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1935, p.10.

Teacher Training Centre at Katsina.¹ In 1932, also, a new elementary school was opened at yet another District headquarters. Furthermore, more classrooms were constructed at existing elementary schools and those at Bichi, Gaya, and Ringim became co-educational with the admission of a few girls. At the city girls' school, the source of pupils was diversified in 1933. Hitherto, all the pupils had come from the households of important nobility. The latter do not seem to have seen the benefit to be derived from girls' education and had only agreed to send girls from their households more or less at British insistence. The British therefore sought for an alternative promising source of pupils for the girls school. So in 1933, eleven girls from the households of yan doka (Native Administration police) and prison warders were admitted in to the girls' school.² This is interesting as exemplifying a deliberate British attempt to broaden the base of enrolment into the girls school - for the yan doka and prison warders were more or less the lowest ranking of the Anglo-Fulani clientage. The yan doka and prison warders were of course recruited largely from the ranks of ex-slaves and discharged colonial police and soldiers and reportedly their daughters were keen students at the school. There was nothing unusual in this, for wherever Western education was making its first inroads, nearly always the first people to accept such education and the ministrations of Christian missionaries were invariably ex-slaves, refugees, adventurers or people without status in the traditional societies. In the Kano society which was pretty prejudiced against Western education, it was not surprising

1. NAK/SNP-392/18956, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.35.

2. NAK/SNP-393/21326, vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1933, Education Supplement, p. 65.

that only the lowly types like yan doka and prison warders seemed willing to send their daughters to school voluntarily.

Not everything was rosy in the development of British education in Kano during the 1930's. The overall situation at the Kano Middle School has been summarised at the end of 1935:

...in spite of the many advantages enjoyed by the Kano Middle School - a tradition of many years' standing, ample financial resources, good buildings, and numerically strong European Staff - the standard of work is low and the necessary local teaching staff is not available...The competitive urge in the school is lacking because boys know that, provided they reach Upper Middle IV, they are certain of employment.¹

Obviously the highest educational institution in the emirate was not measuring up to the standards the British desired. However, we should bear in mind that the educational system was training enough pupils to man the Native Administration's expanding bureaucracy. With employment assured, the students were contented to plod on to the end of their Middle School courses but hardly any strove for excellence which might lead to further training at the higher institution at Katsina. Attendance at all the schools was confined to the children of the ruling groups and their followers. Right up to 1940, the talakawa of Kano were unwilling to send their children to school. According to Resident Patterson, the talakawa persistently believed that the educational institutions, like so much else associated with the colonial regime, were for the ruling groups and therefore of no concern to the peasantry.² Apparently in an attempt to make Western education popular with the talakawa, the British had abolished all school fees (for tuition and lodging) since 1927 but all to no avail.

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1. NAK/SNP-395/25673A, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1935, p.41 (quoting the then Kano Superintendent of Education).
 2. NAK/SNP-399/25652, Part I (No.2569). J.R. Patterson, Kano Province Report 1937, dated 14/1/1938, p.34.

Quite obviously, Western education made no impact on Kano society at large. And this was despite the fact that the traditional Muslim education offered little in the way of understanding or ability to read and write standard Arabic.¹ Colonial education was basically elitist and the instruction was no more than a sort of preparation of the select few for lording it over the peasantry. The shortcomings of the educational system unfavourably affected the efficiency of the Native Administration clerical and other staff, who had received their training in the schools. Similarly by 1940, only about one-third of the forty-four native staff teaching in Kano emirate schools had had any training for their jobs.² The point to be made, however, is that the development of educational institutions resulted in more people being on the N.A. payroll and education for a select few was accounting for some 4% of Native Treasury expenditure.

But while the British made the Native Administration spend large sums on education, during the 1930's we find that N.A. funds were being used by the British on other than local purposes. This was especially so in regard to public health and the provision of water, medical and electricity amenities. In this regard, we need recall that British pre-occupation with the problems of public health, especially sanitation, pre-dates the first educational experiment at Kano in 1909. However, just as the establishment of educational institutions at Kano was the earliest of such ventures in the Hausa-Fulani emirates, so also was the British establishment of a dispensary at Kano the first step in the matter of medical facilities. The first colonial dispensaries for natives were

1. Cf. D.W.Bittinger, op.cit., p.205; see also C.K.Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, II, (London, 1925), p.254.

2. NAK/SNP 17-33147, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.17.

instituted at Kano, Katsina and Hadejia during 1906. But for nearly two decades subsequently, the colonial dispensary at Kano had no apparent success. Reportedly only the emir sent his children and his immediate followers and other dependents to the Kano dispensary, while his subjects remained 'suspicious of modern medical science.'¹ In effect the dispensary was very unpopular. There was no doctor in regular attendance. The dispensary was also limited in facilities and the early nurses were Christians from Southern Nigeria and therefore disliked by the people. Furthermore, these so-called nurses had had no formal training and had learnt their profession through being medical orderlies to European medical practitioners. Also, in matters relating to re-setting broken limbs and bones, it seems that the bone-setters of Northern Nigeria were more skilled than their counterparts elsewhere in West Africa and it is not unlikely that the traditional medical practitioners might have been better than the early dispensers. In short, the unpopularity of the Kano dispensary could be explained by the lack of tangible benefits which could be obtained from it. Of course there was another dispensary at Kano dating from the 1903 occupation. This was sited in the British cantonment at Bompai and had a permanent European doctor who supposedly catered for all the inhabitants of the emirate.² But the British policy of segregation, the distance between the city and the native dispensary (about five miles), and its being adjacent to the civil and military cantonment, may help explain its unpopularity with the populace.

1. Cf. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1906-07, p.10; NAK/SNP-1538/1908, F. Cargill, op.cit., p.67.

2. Cf. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1913-18 (London, 1970), p.18.

Despite such disadvantages, as early as 1908 the government native dispensary was providing useful vaccinations against smallpox to a number of people from within and without the walled city. As a curative centre, however, the native dispensary remained practically unused by the inhabitants.¹ The failure of Kano citizens to utilize the curative services of the dispensary was cause for concern to the British Resident. Inevitably, its development was retarded. And in the course of the next few years, the political officers did not report much progress in the activities of the native dispensary. Instead, the British seem to have concerned themselves more with the problems of public health and sanitation and vaccination undertakings.

The physical lay-out of Kano old town which the British found was a confusion of closely-packed houses and narrow streets or paths. From the sanitation viewpoint there was neither an organized drainage or public rubbish disposal system. The disposal of waste, especially human waste, was by private arrangements. No particular area was publicly designated as a cemetery and in many instances wells and pit-latrines were almost adjacent to one another. The lack of drainage and the fact that the city had numerous borrow pits meant that often the town was partially flooded during the rainy season. This in turn resulted in the contamination of drinking water and the menace of mosquitoes. Hence as far as the inhabitants were concerned, the sweeping and drainage of the town was probably of more importance healthwise than the actual provision of medical facilities. Despite this somewhat bleak situation, it would seem that Kano city was nevertheless in a better position in comparison with the other large towns in the Protectorate.

1. G.R. Mathews, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1908, p.23.

The town of Kano itself is probably the least insanitary large town in the Protectorate. It will be long ere its numerous borrow pits - many of them ponds - the work of centuries, are filled in.¹

The removal or at least reduction of the causes of Kano's unhealthiness therefore became an administrative matter. As early as 1910, the British had persuaded the emir to issue a proclamation, enjoining his metropolitan subjects to observe certain simple laws in regard to sanitation.² In addition, there were British-inspired anti-mosquito campaigns and the draining of several pools.

As subsequently elaborated, the sanitation campaigns of the colonial period took many forms. Deliberate campaigns were undertaken for placing refuse heaps in selected spots away from wells. Also, bye-laws were promulgated for the introduction of incinerators and pit-latrines in public places like markets. Similarly, selected sites were designated as cemeteries and latrines had to be separated from drinking water by at least 100 yards. In the city and its environs, no tall grass or bush, for example guinea corn, was to be allowed. These laws were of general application in Kano emirate and the Protectorate at large and penalties were imposed for non-observance.³ Similarly steps were taken to eradicate the tsetse fly which was the carrier of sleeping sickness and cattle diseases. Also, by an ordinance of 1916, the Native Authorities were called upon to establish leper settlements and control the movement

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1. C.L. Temple, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1911, p.18; cf. Robinson, Hausaland, pp.107, 125-26; H. Barth, Travels, II (1890), p.502.
 2. Sir H.Bell, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria 1910-11, pp.24, 25.
 3. For details, see Lugard, Political Memoranda 1913-18, pp. 33, 34, 35.

of vagrants. The rulers and chiefs were held responsible for enforcing the sanitary regulations. It is likely that these sanitary laws were used by the chiefs to enrich themselves by fining so-called defaulters. And of course the rules were by themselves a nuisance to the average citizen.

As yet, the Kano Native Administration had no medical institution of its own, despite the relative diversification of its activities since the institution of the Native Treasury in 1909. The British Administration was not inclined to push too far or too fast. It does seem that in the end the hands of the Administration were forced by circumstances. During the last quarter of 1918, an influenza epidemic swept across the Northern Provinces. In Kano emirate alone, the epidemic resulted in an exorbitant mortality of 38,287 people. The metropolis, with its congested housing, labyrinthine streets and inadequate drainage, accounted for a large proportion of this disastrous mortality.¹ Proposals for opening a dispensary within the city were once more revived. But, because of frequent changes of British staff, the death of an emir and the accession of another, it was not until 1921 that the dispensary could be commissioned. This dispensary, under the supervision of European medical officer assisted by a native apprentice or medical orderly, was strategically sited at a central point in the city. Despite this advantage and the memory of the calamitous 1918 epidemic, Kano's inhabitants remained, as before, adamantly suspicious of the new institution in their midst. A few years later, in 1924, Resident E.J. Arnett was constrained to admit that the dispensary's work was 'unfortunately still hampered by the fear and suspicion with which the mass of natives regard the European medical profession', and as might be

1. NAK/SNP-374/93P/1919, C.O. Migeod, op.cit., p.4; Sir B.E. Sharwood-Smith, in Kano Survey (Zaria, 1950), gives the inflated figure of 60,000 mortality.

expected, the dispensary was still little used and showed 'no signs of becoming any more popular than the one (proposed) which was abandoned a few years ago.'¹ Not even two epidemics during 1924 - smallpox and relapsing fever², which resulted in an estimated 200,000 mortality - were sufficient inducements to the inhabitants of Kano city to change their ways and use the dispensary.³ Unlike the city inhabitants, the settlers in the Sabon Gari, namely Southern artisans, clerks and traders, were taking the fullest advantage of the treatment available at the Fagge dispensary just outside the walls. So much so that a new and more spacious accommodation had to be constructed during the year.⁴ In view of the contrasting attitudes of the indigenous and new inhabitants of the urban area, it is possible to postulate an explanation of the attitude of the emir's subjects: the Muslim city populace still believed in their traditional and familiar herbs and witchcraft, or in providence in the last resort.

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1. NAK/SNP-379/635/1925, E.J. Arnett, op.cit., pp. 6, 76.
 2. The standard of personal cleanliness must have been very low, for relapsing fever is usually borne by lice or tick.
 3. NAK/SNP-379/635/1925, Arnett, op.cit., pp.4-5; NAK/SNP-380/K.105 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., pp.28, 29.
 4. NAK/SNP-379/635/1925, Arnett, op.cit., p.68. A dispensary in this context means a one or two-roomed treatment centre. There was usually an untrained nurse or two, bandages and disinfectants for dressing wounds and medicine for curing headache, etc. A European doctor called at the dispensary perhaps once a week to examine serious cases of illness. A citizen requiring hospitalisation could not be helped at the dispensary as there was no provision for admitting patients. Similarly, a person could not have a tooth pulled out or limbs set. Also, there was no special service for expectant women or young infants.

Mr. C.W. Alexander's tenure of the Residency of Kano Province from November 1925, to March 1929, was a significant landmark in the history of Kano under British rule. Politically, the period coincided with the accession of Abdullahi Bayero (1926-53), a man who had served his apprenticeship as a public official during the early colonial era. Bayero's accession inaugurated a period remarkable for the proliferation of development projects under the aegis of the Native Administration, developments which made the N.A. the main modernizing agency in its area of jurisdiction. Nowhere was this more manifest than in the provision of medical, water and electricity facilities - undertakings which, due to the huge sums involved, have since made the Kano N.A. somewhat unique amongst the Northern emirates.

The changed mood of the period was soon in evidence. Despite the unmistakable unpopularity of European medical practices, a new dispensary (built of permanent material) was constructed in 1927 on the central site inside the city walls. Fresh plans were further drawn up for a new hospital on the same site. According to Resident C.W. Alexander, the emir of Kano readily agreed that the city hospital, when completed, would serve all purposes and 'be available for use by all natives, whether native population of the emirate, Government employees, or alien natives from outside the emirate.'¹ This was a case of the British making the Native Administration agree to provide a costly service to the Christian and 'foreign' inhabitants of the Sabon Gari who were outside the emir's political and judicial authority and whose tax was paid directly to the colonial regime, with no share going to the N.A.

For Kano city proper, seat of the Native Administration, the construction of the hospital was the most conspicuous symbol of the new age.

1. NAK/SNP-382/K.6892, C.W. Alexander, op.cit., pp. 23, 24.

Needless to say, the whole cost of the construction was borne by the Native Treasury. Initially, £30,000 was voted for the buildings, construction of which commenced towards the end of 1928. By 1930 the first blocks were operational and the hospital was functioning under the charge of Dr. Fox, on secondment to the N.A.¹ A maternity clinic was opened at the hospital and in April 1930, a centre for the training of attendants for proposed rural dispensaries was inaugurated. The opening of a maternity clinic provided, for the first time, a service for expectant mothers and new-born infants. Also, the institution of a training scheme for nurses for proposed rural dispensaries was undertaken at the insistence of Lagos that it was time the rural peasantry, whose taxation provided the bulk of N.A. revenue, should have something in the way of development and basic amenities. Up until 1930, there had been no medical service or facilities outside Kano city.

In April 1932 four rural dispensaries were inaugurated at the District Headquarters towns of Bichi, Dambatta, Ringim and Gaya.² Meanwhile, at Kano city hospital the available services were gaining in popularity, more especially the maternity clinic under Miss Storrier, a British nurse.³ Similarly, the inhabitants of the ancient city were reported to be frequenting the native dispensary at Fagge outside the walls.

Hand in hand with the development of medical facilities, symbolised by the city hospital and the four new rural dispensaries, more attention

1. NAK/SNP-3851/12004 vol.I, J.H. Carrow, op.cit., p.29; NAK/SNP-387/14686 vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.32; cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.97.

2. NAK/SNP-391/18956, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.7.

3. Ibid., p.7.

began to be paid to the question of sanitation. We need to recall that a Native Administration Sanitary Inspectorate had been inaugurated in 1914 with the amalgamation of Nigeria and by 1930 that inspectorate had a staff of fourteen men in the city and seven in the Sabon Gari.¹ The Sanitary Inspectorate, rather small for an urban area containing some 82,000 residents, endeavoured to instill into the residents and often enforce the first principles of cleanliness and rubbish disposal, more especially in the ancient city where such ideas were novel. Attempts were made to ensure that colonial regulations in regard to sanitation were observed but the task was seemingly impossible in view of the small size of the inspectorate. Yet by 1933 considerable progress had been made. Of course sometimes the enforcement of sanitary rules were made the occasion for arbitrary extortion, especially since observance of sanitary laws often entailed the use of selective forced labour and unnecessary waste of time as far as the average man was concerned.²

Then in 1933 the Kano Native Administration commenced a programme of constructing public latrines around the main city market or Kasuwan Kurmi and along the streets of the Sabon Gari.³ And by the end of 1935 the N.A. Sanitary Inspectorate had acquired the services of two European Superintendents to deal with sanitation problems both in the metropolis and the districts of the emirate. These Superintendents were on secondment from the Government. Maintenance of the city hospital and other medical and health services, including the European medical officer's salary, was by then costing the N.A. almost £17,000 per annum or roughly eight per cent

1. NAK/SNP-387/14686, vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.33.

2. NAK/SNP-393/21326 vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.61.

3. Ibid., p.63. Hitherto, Kano had had no public latrines despite colonial regulations providing for them.

of its total annual revenue.¹

That the city hospital had very much become a part of day-to-day life could be discerned from the construction in 1935-36 of a special ward for women in-patients.² In addition, in the course of 1936, the Sanitary and Medical Departments of the Native Administration were able to administer over 18,000 vaccinations in Kano city alone, another 5,600 in the enlarged township (Fagge, Sabon Gari and the recently founded Tudun Wada), and almost 250,000 in the outlying districts of the emirate.³ The success and popularity of the city hospital were so evident that the Fagge native dispensary, euphemistically termed a hospital and hitherto maintained by the colonial administration, was down-graded and henceforth became just another dispensary under the auspices of the Native Administration. In its place the Administration started a new infectious diseases hospital on a site a few hundred yards away.

As the medical institutions gained in popularity, there were extensions to the existing facilities. The cost was of course borne by the Native Administration. For example, in 1937 a special ward was constructed at the city hospital to cater for in-patients from the Kano ruling families. Those who qualified for admission in the new special ward had to be members of the royal Sullubawa family or the hereditary descent

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1. NAK/SNP-395/25673A, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.8. In terms of personnel, a contemporary study has pointed out that by then the junior male and female African Staff at the city hospital alone numbered sixty - see Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.97.
 2. NAK/SNP-395/25673A, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.10.
 3. NAK/SNP-397/27810, Part I, H.O. Lindsell, Kano Province Report (No.1862 of 14/1/1937), p.48.

lineages associated with high office and emirate administration. The point to remember, however, is that the institution of a special hospital ward for the Kano ruling groups illustrates the British deference to Hausaland rulers to a degree not found elsewhere in Africa. In effect the traditional rulers of Northern Nigeria were given a distinctly higher status than most colonial subjects.

By the late 1930's, it can be said that the Native Administration's medical institutions were experiencing a boom, especially if such a term may be used to describe the way in which the populace were availing themselves of these amenities.¹ Most probably, there had then dawned a belated realisation of the curative and preventive powers of Western medicine, especially as the indigenous peoples came more and more in contact with the 'alien' settlers in the Sabon Gari. At least in regard to certain ailments, the regular inhabitants of Kano emirate were increasingly abandoning many of their traditional herbs and superstitions and turning to European medicine.

Whereas the late 1920's and the 1930's witnessed the expansion of medical facilities in Kano emirate as well as an increasing appreciation of Western medicine by the Kanawa, even more remarkable developments were taking place during the same period. These developments, namely the provision of pipe-borne water and electricity for Kano city and its environs, were especially conspicuous for their novelty. The notion of medicine, albeit often dominated by superstitious beliefs, was at least familiar to the Kanawa. Pipe-borne water supply and electricity, together with the sciences making them feasible, were completely beyond the grasp of

1. By 1938 the city hospital had 285 bed spaces, ninety of these being in the female section. That year, furthermore, total attendances at the city hospital numbered 160,000, while attendance at the then rural dispensaries (eleven in all) attained the impressive total of 136,000; see NAK/SNP-401/30847, Part I (No.3095 of 12/9/1939), E.K. Featherstone, Kano Province Report 1938, pp. 7-8, 50, 53.

local imagination in Hausa-Fulani society.

Undoubtedly, without the availability of large reserve funds in the Native Treasury, the provision of tap water and electricity could not have been conceived in the circumstances of the period. The physical infrastructures for these facilities were then, as now, very expensive. We need to recall that in the origins of the Native Treasury lay the decisions which gave rise to the steady and continuous accumulation of reserve funds by the Kano and other Native Administrations. When, from 1909 onwards, the institution of the Native Treasury in the emirates became official policy of the Protectorate Government, the functions these treasuries were expected to fulfil were clearly stated. No doubt it was expedient to pay generously the people responsible for collecting the revenue in the first instance - these were the emirs, their councillors, native police, official messengers, etc. The British then envisaged that the remaining funds of the Native Treasuries would be expended on works of public utility: roads, public buildings (markets, gaols, court-houses, offices, etc.), sanitation, payment of native judges or alkalai, education, well-sinking, and the sustenance of those who, according to Muslim or other tenets, should receive State aid. Also, the British stated, a proportion of Native Treasury funds should be saved 'towards establishing a reserve fund, in case at any time, owing to the failure of crops, it should be necessary to remit a portion of the taxes.'¹ In the event, however, it was never found necessary to remit any taxes in Kano emirate during the colonial period. During 1914, though, a few thousand pounds were expended from the Kano reserves to help out during a great famine. After that date no other demand was made on the reserve funds. Not surprisingly, the Kano Native Treasury reserves increased

1. Sir Hesketh Bell, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1910-11, p.33.

steadily year after year until at the end of 1924 these stood at nearly £300,000. These savings would come in handy for the pipe-borne water and electricity schemes.

The first concrete suggestions for a pipe-borne water scheme for Kano city were advanced in 1924. That year, various gravitational and pumping tests were carried out in the vicinity of the town. The water supply scheme, adopted in principle by the colonial Administration, was to cost an estimated £280,000 and in conjunction with the scheme a town planning project for the ancient city was envisaged, namely to widen the streets in congested areas where the pipes would be laid.¹ The British Administration, from whom the idea originated and who should normally have borne the cost of such a gigantic project, could not bear the financial burden due to its other commitments. But approaching the Kano N.A. was then of no use due to the increasing incapacity of emir Usman and the ensuring laxity in emirate administration. The scheme was therefore shelved temporarily. With the accession of a new ruler over Kano in 1926, the water scheme was revived and kept under continuous consideration. The project had by then been enlarged to include an electricity generating plant. Total initial cost of the two combined schemes was estimated at £304,000.² Subsequently the Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Richmond Palmer, authorised the Kano N.A. to proceed with the projects in August 1929. By then the N.A.'s reserve funds stood at £349,015 and these sums were considered adequate to meet

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1. NAK/SNP-379/635/1925, E.J. Arnett, *op.cit.*, pp.69,71; cf. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-1048/2827, Kano Waterworks, General Correspondence, pp. 1-5.
 2. NAK/SNP-383/9043 vol.I, C.W. Alexander, Kano Annual Report 1928, pp.25-26.

the costs of machinery and equipment from England.¹

Even before the formal authorisation for the projects, the Government had already begun preliminary work on the site, on the Challawa River some seven miles south of Kano, during December 1928. The waterworks and electric power plant were to be adjacent to one another. Work on both projects progressed rapidly. By December 1929, a one and a half million gallon water-tank on a hill inside Kano city was nearing completion. Similarly, the power generating plant was almost ready. Labour was procured and day-to-day expenses met by the Government Public Works Department, which acted as sub-contractor for the projects, and the Kano N.A. reimbursed the Government its expenses quarterly.² By 1930, even though the projects were not yet formally completed, pipe-borne water was being supplied to Kano city, the British cantonment, and Sabon Gari at the rate of 80,000 gallons daily. Also, Kano city, Fagge, and the European and city hospitals were by then electrified.³ In the end the water and electric power schemes cost £309,000 of which the Government's contribution was the £20,000 it expended on preliminary site-work.⁴ The completed schemes were formally commissioned with an impressive ceremony in February 1931.

The Kano Native Administration undertook to supply not only the water and electricity needs of the City's 82,000 inhabitants but also that of the Government reservation and the satellite settlements (old and new) adjacent to Kano and including the Sabon Gari. The ordinary populace

1. NAK/SNP-K.7151, Kano Water and Electricity Scheme, S.N.P. to Resident Kano, No.10224, vol. 4/39, dated 28/8/1929.
2. NAK/SNP-385/12004 vol.I, J.H. Carrow, op.cit., pp.23, 25-26.
3. NAK/SNP-387/14686, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., pp.2, 27, 32.
4. Cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.96.

of Kano benefitted from these developments only through electric street lighting and stand-pipes in the streets and at the city market. A British cadre of administrative and technical managers was procured for the undertakings, which were run as a single establishment under a General Manager. These European experts were on secondment to the N.A. and were made directly responsible to the latter.¹ In one particular year, these Britons cost the Native Treasury over £11,000.² To help defray the costs of maintenance, water was sold per gallon to users and electricity was charged at a flat rate per bulb in the household of consumers. However, the sale of water per gallon was abandoned during 1932 (except for the Sabon Gari) in favour of a quarterly flat rate of six pence per adult male and three pence per adult female in the walled city and adjacent Muslim settlements.³ Inevitably, a new Native Administration sub-department had to be established to deal with the collections and accounting of these sums. For the average Kano citizen, the provision of water made life easier and electricity made the nights safer due to street lighting. However, it also seems that in our period most of the consumption of water and electricity was confined either to the British cantonment or the alien settlement of Sabon Gari. As such, it is obvious that very considerable N.A. funds had been spent on amenities which largely benefitted non-Kano citizens.

Meanwhile in the indigenous quarters of the metropolis, a special clerk had had to be engaged as propagandist and charged with the task

1. NAK/SNP-385/12004, vol.I, J.H. Carrow, op.cit., p.26.

2. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.96.

3. NAK/SNP-391/18956, vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., pp.11-12.

of popularising the efficacy of pipe-borne water and of electricity, as an illuminant. Even though this clerk does not seem to have converted many of the city's inhabitants, by the end of 1933 he was reporting that his efforts were at least making the amenities 'more widely known and creating discussion'.¹ The British and Native Administrations were thus hopeful that the propaganda would bear fruit in the near future. It would however be fair to say that just as it took some while for Western education and medicine to become acceptable to the populace, similarly for several years pipe-borne water and electricity were shunned. Moreover, as far as the latter amenities were concerned, to have piped water and electric light installed amounted virtually to having a new house, at a cost prohibitive to the average citizen.

Despite the initial lukewarm reception of the water and electricity provisions by the inhabitants of Kano city, these facilities gradually became more acceptable. By 1935 both schemes were generating so much business that their control and management were transferred to the Government Public Works Department. The Kano N.A., however, continued (as before) to pay the salaries of both European and African staff.² In order that these amenities could become even more tempting to prospective consumers in the city, the flat rate charge for electricity was drastically cut. This was a factor in the steadily increasing consumption of piped water and electricity, as the respective figures illustrate:³

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1. NAK/SNP-393/21326, vol.I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.57.
 2. NAK/SNP-395/25673A, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., p.10.
 3. NAK/SNP-397/27810, Part I, H.O.Lindsell, op.cit., pp.59-60. After 1936, the Kano Reports speak of steady and increasing utilization of both amenities by the urban inhabitants at large. However, no precise figures seem to be available for the years 1937-40.

Water Consumption (gallons)		Electricity: metered consumers.
1931	39,500,000	402
1932	86,548,000	402
1933	122,920,000	816
1934	134,954,000	Not available
1935	134,948,760	948
1936	137,021,038	1,048

The coming of pipe-borne water and electricity to Kano had very useful side-effects. In order that pipes could be laid and electric poles erected in more or less straight lines, wide streets had had to be driven through the congested houses and meandering path-ways of the ancient habitat. Without such a good justification, it had hitherto not been possible to construct wide streets or implement a drainage scheme for the city. However, with the new schemes in hand, surveyors were sent to work measuring the appropriate spaces for the streets. People affected were ordered to move by the emir, though reportedly compensation was paid in all cases where a house had to be pulled down. By 1939 the street-widening project had advanced: by then some 26 miles of motorable macadamized roads had been constructed in Kano city.¹

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the developments of the late 1920's and the 1930's. Because of the large sums involved, the N.A. was taking on greater responsibilities in fiscal affairs and management. This and the manpower required in order that these undertaking might function, added greatly to the N.A. pay-roll. Hence the expenditure on education, hospitals and dispensaries, teachers, nurses, surveyors, etc.


1. NAK/SNP-403/32098, Part I, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.67.

shows the diversification of Native Administration activities and underlines the point that Kano government in 1940 was no longer the same kind of animal the British found on their arrival. The limited nature of the services provided by the N.A. should also be stressed. For the only community which really benefitted from medical, water and electricity services was Kano city itself and the Township inhabitants. By 1940, there were eleven dispensaries and seventeen elementary schools in the rural districts but at least 90% of the Kanawa had no access to Western education, medicine and other amenities being provided by the N.A. By then some 40% of N.A. funds was being expended on employees working in these and other undertakings and the bulk of the rest was being spent on services which should have been borne by the British Administration.¹ At the end of our period, with the Second World War in its second year and new or nationalist ideas being voiced in the British colonial possessions, the Administration of Northern Nigeria resigned itself to the maintenance of the status quo. In Kano, the British were not unduly pessimistic. However, they were convinced that the end of the war was bound to bring about changes. The forms that these changes might take could not be predicted and neither could the British prepare either the local rulers or the populace to face them. In the circumstances, argued Resident Patterson, the best that could be done was 'to teach the leaders of the people to appreciate new forces and to meet them with courage and understanding'.²

1. Cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.121; Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State (Cambridge, 1966), p.32; Lord Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa (Confidential report, 1940-42), p.162.

2. NAK/SNP 17-33147, J.R. Patterson, Kano Province Report 1940, p.10.

COLONIAL PATTERN OF AUTHORITY 1930'S.



CHAPTER 8KANO 1926-40: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS.

This period is remarkable as marking the final phasing out of the pre-colonial economic system in Kano emirate. Kano became, more than ever before, fully integrated in an economic regime which was dependent on the production of export cash crops and other raw materials. The colonial communications network which made this possible was further elaborated and improved by means of bridging rivers and improving road surfaces. Hence it became practical to motor from Lagos on the coast via Jebba and Kano or Jos, to Maiduguri and Lake Chad in the extreme north-east of Nigeria. In this regard, it is worthwhile to recall that the railway was extended from Kano to Nguru to the north-east and from Zaria north-westwards to Kaura Namoda between 1927 and 1930. This period saw the disappearance of the old-time caravan leaders or Madugai as far as long distance trade was concerned, for increasingly the lorry replaced the donkey as the means of transport over long distances. However, it should be borne in mind that in spite of the intensification of the new economic regime, one notable Kano industry continued to flourish. This was the Kano weaving and clothing industry. In 1933, it was estimated that 50,000 people in Kano emirate were largely dependent on the cloth dyeing industry alone.¹ Indeed, in spite of its establishment of a ginnery at Challawa (ten miles south of Kano) in 1925 and its continuation of the policy of distributing cotton seed free to farmers, the British Cotton Growing Association had no success in its attempts to

1. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1 - 952/2568 vol.II, Kano Provincial Gazetteer 1933-34, p.66.

purchase cotton in the emirate.¹ In the event, the local weavers purchased the large amount of cotton grown in the emirate up to the end of our period in 1940 and within the same period the celebrated varieties of cloth associated with Kano were greatly valued over and above the imported European and Japanese cloths.² This was exemplified by the fact that the Saharan Tuaregs still came, as they had done for centuries, to buy Kano's dyed cloths.

Notwithstanding the continued prosperity of its somewhat anachronistic large domestic weaving and dyeing industries, Kano nevertheless became the most important trading centre in colonial Northern Nigeria. The emirate remained dominant in the groundnut trade, even though its share of the production marginally declined in comparison with the earlier period. The significant thing about the period 1926-40 pertains to the dependence of the Kano peasant on income from groundnuts which enabled him to pay his tax, buy imported clothing and household utensils and even indulge his fancy in imported luxuries.³ This development came about

1. After several years during which all the cotton produced in the emirate was diverted to the domestic clothing industry, in 1939 the B.C.G.A. finally managed to purchase 145,000 lbs. or 100 bales of cotton in Kano emirate. However, by then there was a slump in groundnut prices and it is not unlikely that this explains the offer of some cotton to the B.C.G.A. In the end the company was compelled to shut down its Challawa ginnery in 1947 since it was operating at too great a loss; for discussion of Kano's cotton trade, see NAK/SNP-403/32098, J.R. Patterson, Kano Report 1939, p.22.
2. See NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-952/2568, op.cit., p.66; NAK/SNP-402/30847, Part I, E.K. Featherstone, op.cit., p.5. The most popular amongst the imported textiles were the cheap bafts.
3. See NAK/SNP-402/30847, Part I, ibid., p.2.

even though the groundnut market was speculative, prices fluctuated and the cultivator was exploited by the middlemen and the European firms. It is best to demonstrate this point by outlining the figures of Kano's groundnut production in relation to total Nigerian exports.¹

Year	Total exports (tons)	Quantity railed from Kano (tons)	Average Kano prices (per ton)
1926-27	90,000	36,936	£11. 19. 0.
1927-28	86,000	Not available	£12. 18. 0.
1928-29	135,000	88,422	£11. 0. 0.
1929-30	147,000	112,032	£ 8. 18. 0.
1930-31	154,000	Not available	£ 4. 17. 0.
1931-32	165,000	158,818	£ 6. 16. 0.
1932-33	197,000	150,000	£ 5. 14. 0.
1933-34	235,000	Not available	£ 2. 13. 0.
1934-35	199,000	Approx. $\frac{2}{3}$	£ 6. 19. 0.
1935-36	177,000	" "	£ 7. 16. 0.
1936-37	350,000	300,000	£ 7. 17. 6.
1937-38	107,000	170,000	£ 2. 12. 6.

These figures merit some comments. Undoubtedly the prices offered for groundnuts fluctuated from year to year, more especially in view of the economic depression which unfavourably affected the prices of raw materials all over the world during the 1930's. The fluctuations in prices had some interesting repercussions. The situation made the produce market very

1. The figures of Nigeria's groundnut exports are collated from Colonial Report, Annual, Nigeria 1928, p.13; Colonial Report, Annual, Nigeria 1932, p.32; Colonial Report, Annual, Nigeria 1935, p.38; Colonial Report, Annual, Nigeria 1937, p.54; Nigeria Handbook 1936, p.45; the figures of Kano's production and average purchase prices per ton are collated from the Provincial Reports and Annual Reports, Nigeria; cf. J.S. Hogendorn, op.cit., p.239.

changeable and gave rise to intense competition among buyers. This in turn nullified the attempts by British-owned firms to organize a cartel or 'pool' in order to regulate prices, and the groundnut cultivators exploited the manoeuvring amongst the firms so as to obtain higher prices.¹ The Administration did not intervene to regulate the market and the presence in Kano of Lebanese, Syrian, Italian and even German (re-established at Kano in 1935) firms ensured that they could never agree on a fixed price to be offered to the peasantry.² Whenever prices were relatively low, there was gloom in business circles as the farmers had no surplus money with which to buy imported European merchandise. But whenever prices were good, there was a corresponding boom in buying imported goods and all firms made impressive profits. In addition, good groundnut prices led to an increase in civil litigation brought before the Native Courts, as surplus money enabled the peasantry to seek redress for real or imagined grievances.³ It follows that there was a corresponding decrease in litigation as well as increased prosecutions of tax defaulters whenever the groundnut prices slumped. These developments suggest that by the 1930's, the people of Kano had come to depend largely on the groundnut trade for their surplus wealth.

The established position of the groundnut trade in the life of Kano as well as the general development of a cash economy attracted even more

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1. See NAK/SNP-395/25673, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.7.
 2. However, in 1935 the Government instituted a system of produce inspection in regard to groundnuts destined for export, because buyers in England were complaining that Nigerian groundnuts were mixed with things like stones, leaves, etc. - see NAK/SNP-397/27810, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.2.
 3. See NAK/SNP-403/32098, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.32; see also Hogendorn, op.cit., pp.240-41.

foreigners to the city. Most of these new settlers came from the Southern Provinces and, encouraged by the seeming ease with which their compatriots had made fortunes, they too sought to make good in the shortest possible time. Thus by 1939 the Sabon Gari had attained a population of 10,323, over 9,600 of whom were Southern Nigerians, the rest being Lebano-Syrians and North African Arabs.¹ As in the preceding era, they dominated the intermediate sector of the colonial economy by acting as middlemen, clerks and agents to the European firms. But quite a number of these adventurers were ruined. Subsequent to the relative improvement in the groundnut market during the produce season of 1936-37, when demand for lorry transportation had exceeded supply, literally thousands of these Southerners (singly or in concert) bought hundreds of lorries on hire purchase from the European companies in anticipation of potential profit during the following season. But the 1937-38 groundnut season was disappointing. Groundnut production was poor and there was a steep fall in prices. These lorry owners encountered immediate difficulties in their hire purchase repayments and they resorted to expediences like using the lorries as buses at cheap rates. However, before the season was out, most of the lorry owners had defaulted in their instalmental repayments and the firms had seized the lorries.² Any personal financial resources invested in these lorries were forfeited and the Sabon Gari became crowded with disappointed gold seekers, whose presence considerable alarmed the British Administration.

1. See NAK/SNP-403/32098, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.I.

2. NAK/SNP-406/29652, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.31.

While the marketing of groundnut increasingly came under the domination of aliens who were in effect outside the jurisdiction of the emirate authorities, the Hausa trading community was able to create opportunities for itself by participation in new Nigerian cattle and kola trade. Similarly, Hausa traders, thousands of whom came from Kano, took advantage of the colonial situation and new markets to become itinerant retailers of trade articles all over West Africa.¹ In almost all their business undertakings, Hausa conventional trade methods were still used and modern institutions like banks, cheques, etc., were avoided.² But in regard to long-distance trade the railways and lorries were substituted for the donkey and human portorage. The new methods of transportation had a great impact on the kola and cattle trades especially. However, it should be borne in mind that even by 1914, before railways and motor transport had become normal in the organization of business, the cattle and kola trade between Kano and the Nigerian coast had become important. Colonial railways and roads gave added impetus to these commercial ventures. Thus, kolanuts railed to Kano rose steadily, from about 400 tons in 1913 to 15,000 tons in 1941, one year after the end of our period.³ Kola was the most important commodity in the trade between Kano and Southern Nigeria. Vast quantities of the nuts were, of course, re-exported from Kano to other markets in Northern Nigeria and French Niger to the north.

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1. According to the Census of Nigeria 1931, the number of Kanawa then residing outside Kano emirate but within Nigerian territory totalled 137,000, see N.J.Brook, Census of Nigeria 1931, vol.II, (London, 1933), p.30.
 2. For analysis, especially in regard to organization of Hausa kola and cattle trade in recent years, see Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa (Berkeley, 1969).
 3. See B.E. Sherwood-Smith, Kano Survey, p.36.

The next most important item in the trade between Kano and the south involved livestock, namely cattle, sheep and goats. In our period, large numbers of these animals were transported to southern markets by rail, road and to a lesser extent on foot. During the 1920's and the 1930's the numbers railed from Kano to Lagos in some years were as follows.¹

YEAR	CATTLE	SHEEP, GOATS AND RAMS
1924	13,017	7,026
1925	13,813	7,276
1926	13,930	7,052
1927	14,541	11,330
1932	15,000	Not available
1933	18,001	3,914
1934	16,874	7,800
1935	17,774	9,179
1936	23,598	11,894
1937	29,522	14,822
1938	28,194	17,265
1939	33,316	16,435

The Kano-Lagos trade in livestock maintained a steady rate of expansion and the animals involved comprised by far the larger proportion of the trade in livestock between Northern Nigeria and the Southern Provinces. The Kano business community dominated this trade.

1. Figures based on Kano Annual Reports covering the period, especially NAK/SNP-381/K.105, vol.I, op.cit., p.39; NAK/SNP-394/21326 vol.I, p.19, NAK/SNP-397/27810, Part I, p.28; NAK/SNP-400/29652A, p.30; NAK/SNP-403/32098, Part I, p.57.

This in turn helped to perpetuate their dominant role in the south-north kola trade in the twentieth as in the nineteenth century. As it was, many Kano entrepreneurs first became successful businessmen as a result of participation in these commercial ventures rather than in the groundnut trade which was dominated by the European firms, Syrians, Lebanese and to a lesser extent Southern Nigerians. Their success in this regard is largely explained by the fact that the kola and livestock trades catered to the demand for the two commodities amongst African peoples in Nigeria and even beyond. Thus when a large trade in cattle, sheep and goats developed between Kano and the Gold Coast from 1936 onwards, Kano merchants were able to dominate that trade too.¹ The demand for Nigerian livestock in the Gold Coast began in 1936 due to a temporary French ~~ex~~^{pro}hibition of the exportation of cattle from their Niger and Upper Volta territories. However, following the lifting of that ban, Kano cattle dealers were able to compete successfully against other dealers from the French territories, notably at Kumasi. Subsequently, the livestock trade to the Gold Coast became a significant feature of Kano's long-distance trade.

Related to the trade in livestock but quite separate in terms of organization was the trade in hides and skins. Like the groundnut trade, this latter trade's marketing was largely dominated by European business houses, the Lebanese and the Syrian businessmen. The role of Kano and other northern traders was confined to acting as middlemen for the bigger merchants. This is not surprising as the hides and skins trade was export-oriented during the 1920's and 1930's. However, as the growth of the trade was largely dependent on the consumption of meat in Kano and elsewhere,

1. NAK/SNP - 27810, vol. I, H. O. Lindsell, Kano Province Report 1936, p. 27

its beneficial effect cannot be underestimated. As more and more money was earned by the people as a result of groundnut cultivation, wages from colonial or other projects or business undertakings, the ability of the average man to afford meat became more pronounced. Thus whereas in 1927 some 20,581 cattle and 60,218 sheep and goats were slaughtered for human consumption at the markets in Kano city and environs,¹ during 1936 the figure rose to 118,709 cattle and 524,050 sheep and goats for the metropolis and the emirate at large.² If the consumption of meat may be cited as indicative of a rise in the living standard of the people, then undoubtedly the people of Kano emirate can be said to have become more affluent by 1936. The increase in the number of animals slaughtered for food boosted the export trade in hides and skins. Furthermore, because the Northern headquarters of practically all the major companies were based at Kano,³ the hides and skins from other provinces were brought to Kano and then railed from there to Lagos en route for overseas.

It is not possible to outline the total tonnage railed from Kano to Lagos due to the omissions of the Kano Annual Reports during the period.⁴ However, even though the prices offered for hides and skins

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1. Returns from the district markets are not available for that year.
 2. For a breakdown of the totals for the city and district markets, see NAK/SNP-382/K.6892 vol.I, op.cit., p.42; NAK/SNP-397/27810 Part I, op.cit., p.66.
 3. It was not until the coming of self-government and independence in 1959-60 before the Northern Nigeria Government, successor to the colonial administration, more or less compelled the European firms to transfer their regional headquarters to Kaduna.
 4. Only the figures for some three years are given in regard to the tonnage railed from Kano to Lagos. For some details of Nigerian exports of hides and skins (in lbs) during the period, see Colonial Reports, Annual, Nigeria 1927, p.17; Colonial Reports, Nigeria, 1928, p.20; Colonial Reports, Annual, Nigeria 1931, p.36; cf. Nigeria Handbook 1936, p.44.

were low (varying from $1/0\frac{1}{2}d$ to $2/3d$ for all kinds) the market was steady in comparison to the fluctuations of the groundnut trade. It is worth recalling that in order to protect the interest of foreign buyers, the Government instituted stringent measures in 1933 for regulating the quality of the hides and skins destined for the export market. From then onwards, their quality steadily improved and Nigerian hides and skins became very popular in overseas markets. Then in 1936 the hides and skins trade gained a further advantage overseas consequent upon the cessation of competition from Ethiopian exports due to the conquest of the latter country by the Italians.¹ Kano, by virtue of its importance as a rail depot and headquarters of the import-export companies, dominated this export trade as it did almost all the others except cotton and tin-mining.

Nowadays there is an important trade in dried fish and also dried meat (H. banda) from the Northern to the Southern Provinces of Nigeria. Though an exact dating for this development is not possible, it is arguable to suggest that the trade was well-developed by the end of our period in 1940. From present trends, it would also seem that the Southern Nigerians settled at Kano and elsewhere in the north were responsible for developing that trade.

The developments in regard to long-distance and export trades brought Kano firmly within the colonial economic system. Resident J.R. Patterson has again summarised the changed circumstances of the emirate in 1937:

The Kano trader is (now) a familiar figure throughout the West Coast of Africa. He is symbolic of the importance of Kano's trade activities though he typifies the old rather than the present methods. Unconsciously and almost without any special effort Kano has re-orientated her trade outlook and from being the southern focus of camel-borne trade across the western Sahara she has become the centre of the large Nigerian trade in groundnuts.....²

1. NAK/SNP-395/25673 A, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., p.37.

2. NAK/SNP-399/29652, Part I, J.R. Patterson, op.cit., p.2.

One of the most important features of the colonial era was the great increase in means of communication. Road construction was the main pre-occupation in this regard. Beginning from about 1908 when the British started to connect new district headquarters with Kano city, as well as with one another, motorable roads were constructed as a matter of policy. Labour on these constructed networks was largely conscripted and by 1939 the mileage of motorable roads in Kano emirate totalled 1,549 miles.¹ By then also the Kano N.A. had become responsible for the construction and maintenance of all roads within its territory.² The principal roads for which Kano N.A. was responsible were as follows:³

ROAD	TYPE
Kano - Katsina	All season
Kano - Kazaure - Daura - Zinder	" "
Kano - Wudil - Azare - Bornu	" " (to Wudil).
Kano - Wudil - Sumaila - Bauchi	" " (to Sumaila).
Kano - Wudil - Gwaram	" " (to Wudil).
Kano-Zaria via Karaye	Dry season.
Kano - Sokoto via Gwarzo	" "
Kano - Jos via Tudun Wada	" "
Kano - Hadejia - Nguru	" "
Kano - Babura - Magariya	" "
Kano - Gumel via Gezawa	" "

Needless to say, similar road developments were taking place all over the Protectorate. Road construction, together with extensions to the railway

1. NAK/SNP-403/32098, Part I, J.R. Patterson, *op.cit.*, pp.67-68.
2. cf. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, p.426, Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, pp.98-99
3. Based on NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-952/2568 vol.II, Kano Provincial Gazetteer 1933-54.

in the late 1920's, gave an impetus to the spread of groundnut cultivation and trade at large. This latter development played a large part in the consolidation of the colonial cash economy. Similarly, the colonial pattern of feeder roads largely determined which towns stagnated, declined or grew as population and trade centres. Thus in Kano emirate towns which were by-passed by the colonial road network generally declined into insignificance. In contrast, the district headquarters towns, through all of which a feeder road passed, grew in size and as centres of economic activity.¹ An interesting point in the development of roads is that it exposed Kano's rural areas to seasonal invasion by Lebanese and Southern Nigerian produce buyers. By penetrating into the countryside, these traders largely succeeded in nullifying the attempts of the European firms to organize produce-buying cartels. Reportedly the Lebanese and Southern traders also exploited the unwary producers. In an attempt to protect the Kano peasantry and no doubt the interests of the large European companies, the Administration intervened in 1933 by restricting the number of trading stations in the emirate (other than along the railway) to sixteen.² It is however unlikely that the Administration succeeded in that policy.

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1. For an illustration, see N.J. Brooke, Census of Nigeria 1931, vol.II (London, 1933), p.60, table 4 re: population of Kano emirate towns.
 2. NAK/SNP-339/18956, vol.I, H.O. Lindsell, op.cit., pp.17-18.

CHAPTER 9CONCLUSION.

I have attempted to outline the major developments in the political and economic history of Kano emirate during the period 1882 to 1940. The most fundamental influences on the emirate during our period were the establishment of British colonial rule and the development of an export-orientated economy resulting from colonialism. The era of British overrule was preceded by the Kano civil war of 1894-95 which brought about elements of instability in the administrative system of the emirate. The resolution of the civil war was followed by complications in international relations culminating in the British conquest in February, 1903.

The British conquest was a shattering experience in the lives of the Kanawa as for all the peoples of Northern Nigeria. It is imperative to emphasise the relative ease with which the British defeated or overawed the Hausa States. By 1903 virtually all areas neighbouring these states had already been occupied by Europeans and news of the defeat of Rabeh, Massina, etc., were well-known in Hausaland. To bring this point home, Ahmadu of Segou had taken refuge in the Sokoto Caliphate after having been successively defeated by the French.¹ It must therefore have seemed to the people of Hausaland that the Europeans were determined to occupy all Africa and there was nothing that could be done about it, more especially in view of the maxim and shrapnel guns against which Hausaland had no effective defence. In view of such a hopeless situation, it is not unlikely that the fighting and ruling classes of Kano and elsewhere

1. Cf. R.A. Adeleye, Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906, pp.169-170; H.A.S. Johnston, op.cit., p.230.

resisted the British largely to satisfy their honour and conscience before submitting to Christian rule. For the generality of less committed people, such as conscripted fighters, the demoralization would have been even more due to the certain knowledge of impending defeat at the hands of Europeans. Nevertheless Kano put up a stubborn resistance before submitting to British rule.

The traumatic experience of military defeat was subsequently followed by the consolidation of colonial overrule, which occupied the best part of two decades. Whereas in those early years the British rulers felt insecure and their ineffectiveness in law-enforcement was self-evident, they were still able to modify many of Kano's traditional institutions to their liking and even introduce innovations which subsequently became associated with the administrative expedience known as Indirect Rule and the Native Authority system in Northern Nigeria. As correctly observed by a critic of the colonial administration of Northern Nigeria, Kano emirate was the spiritual home of the Indirect Rule system.¹ Kano achieved this position by virtue of the size of its territory, and the high density of its population and their relative wealth which enabled for many colonial projects to be first experimented upon in the emirate. Essentially, the Indirect Rule system was an administrative device which sought to perpetuate British authority by utilizing the traditional powers of the native rulers. As the architect of the system in Northern Nigeria writes, the 'policy of the Government was that these Chiefs should govern their people, not as independent but as dependent Rulers. The orders of Government are not conveyed to the people through them, but emanate from them in accordance, where necessary, with instructions received through the Resident. While they themselves are controlled by Government in matters of policy and of

1. W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: A critique of British Colonial Administration (London, 1936), p.123; see also Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.81; Lord Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa (confidential report, 1940-42), p.162.

importance, their people are controlled in accordance with that policy by themselves'.¹ In the event, the expedient of ruling through the traditional rulers made wide use of the traditional powers of the native rulers, regulated the scope and extent of these powers and defined the area of jurisdiction possessed by the rulers, while ostensibly not admitting the dualism inherent in British and native practices - the former basically Christian and the other inspired by Muslim and/or traditional cultural influences. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that the system of Indirect Rule did not treat the Muslim rulers of Northern Nigeria, euphemistically designated Native Authorities, merely as agents or mouthpiece of the British Administration. In effect the British deigned to integrate the native institutions into the official colonial system, which was racist and paternalistic. At Kano, probably more than anywhere else, British designs were enhanced by the fact that the local citizens showed much the same detachment towards state matters and security as they did early in the nineteenth century when the Fulani launched their jihād against the Habe kingdoms.² In essence Indirect Rule was conceived by Lord Lugard and his successors in Northern Nigeria as a means of grafting the so-called higher civilization of the Christian Europeans upon the pre-existing traditional Muslim political and social system and effecting the improvement of native conditions through the direct activity of the colonial government or the adaptation of Kano and other indigenous institutions along lines approved by the British rulers. Since the

1. A.H.M. Kirk-Green, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria : A Documentary Record (London, 1968), p.70; see also Lord Hailey, An African Survey (London, 1938), p.419.

2. Cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.84.

British dictated the terms and pace of 'modernization', it would be misleading to imagine that Indirect Rule at any one time implied total abstinence from intervention in local matters.

Subsequent to the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the attention of the British was directed primarily to the establishment of law and order, and the provision of those requirements, such as a means of communication, which would enable the population to satisfy its more basic and elementary material needs.¹ It is thus plausible to suggest that the development of Indirect Rule in the Nigerian emirates involved changes in the practice rather than in the structure of political organization of entities like Kano, Sokoto and Katsina.² Because of this, the problems which the colonialists encountered had had a lot to do with the adjustment of Anglo-African relations. At Kano and no doubt in the majority of the emirates, friction was an exception and this can be explained by the fact that the British and native rulers were largely dependent on one another for the perpetuation of their authority. With slight variations the system of Indirect Rule was subsequently exported and applied in such widely separated entities like the Aden Protectorate, Buganda, Sierra Leone, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Tanganyika (now Tanzania), and even in the eastern provinces of Nigeria where the communities were amorphous and lacking a traditional system of hierarchic authority which was considered necessary for the success of the system.³ Everywhere the British endeavoured to use

1. Cf. Lord Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p.3; and An African Survey, pp.417-422.

2. Ibid., p.222; cf. Lugard, Annual Report, Northern Nigeria, 1913, p.24.

3. Cf. M. Kilson, op.cit., p.24.

the native rulers as agencies of local rule. In many instances, however, British policy either moulded traditional institutions into forms hitherto unknown to local usage or goaded the native authorities into taking on functions which were equally foreign to former practices.

Undoubtedly the most important institution resulting from Indirect administration is the Native Treasury, otherwise known as the beit-el-mal in Northern Nigeria. Whereas a treasury had been in existence at Kano for centuries, before the modifications of 1909 and the constitution of the colonial Native Treasury there had never been any distinction between the personal and public/official revenue of the rulers of Kano. By instituting the Native Treasury and arrogating to themselves powers of ultimate financial control, the colonial Administration transformed the Kano ruling groups into paid officials instead of traditional despots. The history of revenue management in colonial Kano emirate is therefore not one of an alien institution imposed from without, but of the systematization, simplification and development of an institution which was already in existence at the time of the British occupation. Fundamentally, the colonial Native Treasury system made Kano's treasurer (ma'aji) responsible for the receipt and disbursement of the official revenue of the emirate.¹ Subsequent to its earliest beginnings at Katsina and Kano, the Native Treasury was extended to other parts of Northern Nigeria until by 1936 there were sixty-three such institutions in the Protectorate.² And in the long run the existence of a Native Treasury became the proof that a Native

1. Cf. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, p.96.

2. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, p. 426.

Authority had attained the status of a regular established local administration in the colonial context.¹ At Kano the consolidation of the Native Treasury enabled the N.A. to undertake many costly projects by the 1930's. For example, towards the end of our period in the financial year 1936-37, the Kano N.A. had an estimated revenue of £206,720, of which £173,600 was expected from its share (60%) of the tax collected in the emirate, and the remainder came from various fees and dues, such as court fines, licences, ushira, etc. That same year, the ordinary expenditure was estimated at £199,367 - administrative and judicial establishments accounting for £70,675 (inclusive of the emir's salary of £6,000 p.a. and his establishment allowance amounting to £2,500), police and prisons were assigned £19,089, public works and staff £61,416, education had £6,785, survey £6,488, medical and sanitary establishments £15,922, agriculture and forestry £9,111, and capital works had a budget of £6,020.² By then, too, the proliferation of N.A. undertakings requiring regular financing had attained staggering proportions. Hence Galadima Abdulkadir, the councillor in charge of the 'Central Departments', was responsible for overseeing the prisons and police establishments, sanitation and public buildings, metropolitan and district markets, survey and printing establishments, medical and veterinary departments, electricity and waterworks as well as the administration of Kano city.³ The British Administration inspired all these undertakings, but this was only possible because of the financial resources of the Native Treasury.

1. Ibid., pp. 422, 428.

2. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-634/1890, Kano Native Treasury Revenue and Expenditure 1936-37; cf. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, p.426.

3. NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-952/2568 vol.II, Kano Provincial Gazetteer 1933-54, p.32.

The administrative landscape of Kano emirate was transformed during the colonial period. Instead of the traditionally scattered fiefs, the British created the District organization in which the territory under each hakimi was consolidated and the hakimai were held personally responsible for law and order and the collection of taxation in their respective jurisdictions. This development made possible the gradual eliminating of slave functionaries from the emirate's administrative set-up. Furthermore, in order that the task of supervising N.A. affairs might be facilitated, Western-type schools were started. These schools provided special training for future local administrators, clerks, tax assessors, etc. Towards the end of our period there was instituted a special school for the training of local judges. Such functions had not hitherto been a feature of the activities of Kano government, and its taking them on during the colonial era was largely directed towards administrative objectives.

At Kano and the other Northern emirates, the provision of social amenities, notably schools, dispensaries, pipe-borne water and electricity, benefitted only a tiny proportion of the population at the capital and the district headquarters towns. At the metropolis, moreover, the very costly electricity and waterworks largely served the new settler groups in the Sabon Gari and the British cantonment. Similarly, the way in which the economic development of colonial times took place was of benefit mainly to these new groups. The profits of the enormous groundnut trade went to non-Northern traders, especially the Lebanese, Syrians and Southern Nigerians. Hence the average Kano and other Northern producers of cash crops, etc., gained little from the north-south economic activity and their standard of living was not appreciably improved due to those economic activities.

Indirect Rule, with its laissez faire economics and emphasis on

administrative matters, has many critics as well as defenders. One persistent criticism is that by protecting the existing political and social systems, the colonial regime retarded the pace of progress and turned the rulers into despots.¹ Another viewpoint claims that had Lugard been allowed his way, then the Northern emirates would have developed along more progressive lines.² Yet another criticism is that Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria meant that the emirates were not administered for the benefit of the mass of the people but for the benefit of the 'obsolete' Muslim chiefs and their large polygamous families and friends.³ But perhaps the most notorious criticism of Indirect Rule is the viewpoint which deplores the segregation of Southern Nigerians in the Sabon Gari, whereas if they had been allowed to mix with the Muslims their influence would have been beneficial.⁴ This last argument neglects the well-known fact that most of the Southerners who flooded into Kano and other places in the Northern Protectorate were undesirable people who were fraudulent in their dealings with their hosts.⁵ In any case to allow these Southerners to live under the jurisdiction of the emirate authorities would have required their conforming to Islamic laws

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1. See W. Miller, Reflections of a Pioneer (London, 1936); Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Confidential Memorandum on the Future Political Development of Nigeria (Lagos, 1939), 13 pp.; I.F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, pp.239-241.
 2. M.Bull, op.cit., E.A. Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria (London, 1966), pp.147-152; Perham, M, Lugard II, p. 480-85
 3. See Captain J.F.J. Fitzpatrick, 'Nigeria's Curse - The Native Administration' in National Review, No.502 (December, 1924), p.618, also W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial Administration (London, 1936), pp. 122, 213-222.
 4. E.A. Ayandele, op.cit., pp.147, 148, 151; G.O. Olusanya, 'The Sabon-Gari System in Northern States of Nigeria', in Nigeria Magazine, No.94 (September, 1967), pp. 243-47.
 5. Cf. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria, p.118, D.W. Bittinger, op.cit., p.204, W.R. Crocker, op.cit., pp.97, 124-25, 126, 208-212.

which were alien to them. Moreover, up to the 1920's the British in Northern Nigeria were apprehensive of Mahdism as an extreme anti-European creed which might result in risings should the Administration abandon caution in its dealings with the indigenous peoples.

Hence the policy of enrolling the support of the ruling classes. This policy had its advantages from the viewpoint of the Northern Residents. It was a form of colonialism on the cheap, especially in view of the chronic shortage of British political and other staff.¹ Making use of the local rulers as agents of administration made possible the arrangement whereby in 1926 the British had one political officer for every 100,000 people in Northern Nigeria.² In the end it is amazing that the British achieved so much in changing the character of emirate government. Certainly at Kano and no doubt in the other emirates, something new was being attempted, despite the obvious lack of enthusiasm for change on the part of the people. That not much more was achieved can be explained by the strength of old traditions, rather than a deliberate policy to prevent progress.

1. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, pp.1449-1454;

2. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New York, 1928), vol.I, pp.983-84; Lord Hailey, ibid., pp.236-41; cf. M. Kilson, op.cit., p.24.

APPENDIX I : The Kano District Note Books - an example.

HISTORY OF UNGOGO DISTRICT

Because of its close proximity of Kano City, the area that now forms Ungogo District has been heavily populated for generations. The two towns of Ungogo and Panisau were already in existence in Hausa times and were both fortified.

In 1808, when the Fulanis seized power and drove out the last Hausa Emir, there were no upheavals in this area. Panisau, which had always formed part of the Emir's own domain, passed to the new Fulani Emir Sulemanu. In Ungogo and the smaller villages, the Fulanis wrested authority from the Hausas but imitated the traditional hierarchy of government with the Overlord (Hakimi) at court, the Headman (Dagaci) in the village and the Confidential Messenger (Jekada) constantly moving between the two.

In 1819, when the Emir Ibrahim Dabo succeeded to the title, he conferred upon Sarkin Bai Muhammadu Dabo (who had been at feud with the late Emir Sulemanu) a fief stretching from Ungogo to Kunci. This gift immediately led to trouble between the Kano Fulani and Dan Tunku (the founder of the Kazaure Family) who had received a flag from Shehu and laid dubious claim to this part of the country. Fighting soon broke out and Dan Tunku gained some early successes, surprising a force from Ungogo and inflicting considerable casualties and even besieging Sarkin Bai in the town. Later however, weight told and Dan Tunku was pushed back to the north where he established the Emirate of Kazaure as it is today. This left the Dambazawa Family in possession of their fief and they lost no time consolidating it by founding the town of Dambatta as its capital and fortress. For the rest of the Fulani era, Ungogo remained part of this fief.

The Civil War of 1893-94 did not affect Ungogo except in so far as it led to the replacement of its overlord, Sarkin Bai Muhammadu Bashari, who had remained loyal to the Emir Tunku, by Sarkin Bai Abdu Salame who had sided with the Pretender Aliyu.

In 1898 Sarkin Damagaram of Zinder invaded the Emirate with a powerful force and defeated the Kano army near Tattarawa in Dawakin Tofa District. When news of this reverse was received the people of Ungogo deserted the town and fled to the city for safety. The Zinder army passed through the district and camped at Panisau but did not attack the town.

1903-1908

Soon afterwards the British captured Kano and installed Abbas as Emir. Subsequently a move was made towards establishing a coherent territorial organisation in place of the old patchwork of fiefs. At first a home district was created corresponding to the present Districts of Ungogo and Kumbotso. This was entrusted to the MA'AJI SADI who, as he was also Native Treasurer, had to make his headquarters in the City. He was a servitor of the Emir and of North African (Agatawa) origin. He did not survive long.

1908-1916

In about 1908, the district organisation took shape and Ungogo emerged as a distinct unit separated from Kumbotso and having its own headquarters. At about the same time the Ma'aji Sadi was disgraced and banished. The headship of the District was thereupon given to the TAFI-DA MUHAMMAN, a grandson of the 3rd Emir Usuman. He ruled until his death in 1916 but for the last two years of his life was reduced to subordinate status.

1914-1916

This reduction was not confined to Ungogo or the Tafida but arose out of the experiment of 1914 whereby the CIROMA ABDULLAHI, the Emir Abbas's eldest son and later Emir himself, became overlord of the ten home districts. Kunya, Kuru, Minjibir, Gezawa, Gabanawa, Zakirai, Tsakuwa, Dawaki, Kumbotso and Ungogo were all reduced to sub-districts and placed

under the general supervision of the Ciroma who made his headquarters at Panisau. In 1916, after only two years, this experiment was abandoned and Ungogo again became an independent district.

1916-1920 On the death of the Tafida Muhamman, his son ALIYU (Babba) succeeded to the post and title. Four years later he was dismissed for embezzlement.

1920-1926 The Emir Usuman, then gave the district to his son MUHAMMADU, first with the title of Tafida and later as Turaki. Immediately after his father's death, he too was dismissed for embezzlement.

1926-1931 The next District Head was the Turaki (later Galadima) MUHAMMADU INUWA, a younger brother of the new Emir Abullahi. He ruled for five years and was then promoted to Minjibir.

1931-1932 He was followed in Ungogo by DAN MAKWAYO ISA, a son of the Emir Abdullahi. Within a year he was transferred to Garki District and succeeded by one of the last of the Emir Abdu's many sons, DAN ISA U MORU.

1932-1940 When U moru died in 1940 he was followed by his son MUHAMMADU. During his time, in the early part of the World War, work began on the present Airport and, as it expanded, more and more land was gradually taken up. The dispossessed farmers were collected together in the new settlements of Kwaciri and Jaba, north-east and north-west of the airfields. Most of them found work as labourers on the construction of the runways or entered trades such as wood-cutting for the City and Sabon Gari markets. Nevertheless land-hunger was aggravated and the economic dependence of the District on the City became more marked than ever before, especially as wealthy men from the City continued to acquire large farms in the District.

1944-49 In 1944, Dan Isa Muhammadu was promoted to Babura and was succeeded in Ungogo by DAN LAWAN IBRAHIM who, in turn, was promoted to Jahun.

1949-54 The next District Head was the DOKAJI ABUBAKR. As a member of the well-known Zarawa Clan, he was the first District Head since the original Ma'aji Sadi who had not belonged to the ruling family. In 1954, the

Dokaji, who had previously become the Council Member in charge of Medical and Health, moved to Kano in order to devote all his time to this work.

1954-

In Ungogo he was followed by the MAKAMA MUHAMMADU DAHIRU, head of the famous Jobawa Clan, who was demoted from Wudil for reasons which have been recorded in his personal files.

LIST OF DISTRICT HEADS OF
UNGOGO

Name	Family	Date	Fate
1. Ma'aji Sadi	Agatawa	1903-08	Disgraced
2. Tafida Muhamman	Sullubawa	1908-16	Died
3. Tafida Aliyu	"	1916-20	Dismissed
4. Tafida (later Turaki) Muhammadu	"	1920-26	Dismissed
5. Turaki Muh. Inuwa	"	1926-31	Promoted to Minjibir
6. Dan Makwayo Isa	"	1931-32	Promoted to Garki
7. Dan Isa Umoru	"	1932-40	Died
8. Dan Isa Muhammadu	"	1940-44	Promoted to Babura
9. Dan Lawan Ibrahim	"	1944-49	Promoted to Jahun
10. Dokaji Abubakr	Zawawa	1949-54	Became full- time Coun- cillor
11. Makama Muh.Dahiru	Jobawa	1954-	Demoted from Wudil.

Besides the historical sketches as illustrated here, the District Note Books contain valuable social and economic information on the 1950's and 1960's.

APPENDIX II.


Throughout the colonial period, besides a chronic shortage of political officers, there was a lack of continuity in the tenure of the acting and substantive Residents in Kano Province. These officials were also directly responsible for supervising the affairs of our emirate. [The information is based on Kano Province Gazetteer 1933-54, appendix B (NAK/KANOPROF 5/1-952/2568 vol.II)]. It should further be noted that a similar lack of continuity applied to the careers of junior officials serving under the Residents.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>
Dr. F. Cargill, CMG, Appointed Resident ..	February 27, 1903
Hon. A. Bailey (Acting)	January 8, 1904
Dr. F. Cargill	December 11, 1904
Capt. H.C.B. Phillips, DSO (Acting)	March 24, 1906
Capt. W. Hamilton Browne, DSO (Acting) ...	September 24, 1906
Major A.H. Festing, CMG, DSO (Acting)	October 24, 1906
Dr. F. Cargill, CMG	October 16, 1907
W.P. Hewby, CMG, Appointed Resident	July 29, 1908
Major A.H. Festing (Acting)	December 1, 1908
C.L. Temple, CMG, Appointed Resident	January 8, 1909
E.J. Arnett (Acting)	January 4, 1910
H.R. Palmer (Acting)	November 24, 1910
G. Malcolm (Acting)	June 1, 1911.
E.J. Arnett (Acting)	August 21, 1911
W.F. Gowers, Appointed Resident	January 1, 1912
J. Withers Gill (Acting)	August 23, 1912
G.J.F. Tomlinson (Acting)	October 19, 1912
W.F. Gowers	November 24, 1912
J. Withers Gill (Acting)	March 28, 1913
W.F. Gowers	November 5, 1913
G.S. Browne (Acting)	June 30, 1914
A.C.G. Hastings (Acting)	August, 1914
W.F. Gowers	November 15, 1914
A.C.G. Hastings (Acting)	February 8, 1915
G. Anderson (Acting)	February 27, 1915
H.R. Palmer (Acting)	July 12, 1915
W.F. Gowers	October 13, 1916
C. Migeod (Acting)	November 18, 1918


<u>Name</u>	<u>Date of Appointment</u>
F. Beckles Gall (Acting)	August 23, 1918
W.F. Gowers	January 1, 1920
E.J. Arnett, Appointed Resident	August 18, 1920
A.C. Hastings (Acting)	May 15, 1921
C. Wightwick (Acting)	May 21, 1921
E.J. Arnett	February 6, 1922
C. Wightwick (Acting)	January 10, 1923
E.J. Arnett	June 27, 1924
C. Wightwick (Acting)	May 2, 1925
H.O. Lindsell (Acting)	November 3, 1925
C.W. Alexander, Appointed Resident	November 23, 1925
Commander J.H. Carrow, DSC, RN., (Acting).	October 18, 1926
H.O. Lindsell (Acting)	November 1, 1926
N.J. Brooke (Acting)	June 24, 1927
H.O. Lindsell (Acting)	July 2, 1927
C.W. Alexander	December 24, 1927
Comm. J.H. Carrow (Acting)	March 31, 1928
C.W. Alexander, CMG	October 1, 1928
H.O. Lindsell, Appointed Resident	March 1, 1929
Comm. J.H. Carrow, (Acting)	November 4, 1929
H.O. Lindsell	May 10, 1930
F.M. Noad (Acting)	June 22, 1931
Comm. J.H. Carrow (Acting)	September 5, 1931
H.O. Lindsell	November 23, 1931
F.M. Noad (Acting)	May 11, 1931
H.O. Lindsell	November 5, 1931
J.R. Patterson	May 2, 1935
H.O. Lindsell	December, 1935.

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MAP I. KANO AND ITS NEIGHBOURS c. 1850



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KEY.


- A - Alkali
- B - Barde
- C - Cirama
- DI - Dan Iya
- DR - Dan Rimi
- MD - Madaki
- MK - Makama


- R - Rano
- SB - Sarkin Bai
- SG - Sarkin Gabas
- SH - Shawaiki
- SL - Salama
- TK - TURAKI
- TR - TURAKIN ROMO
- SDMT - SARKIN DUKAKI
- MAI TUTA

//// - Territory annexed by Hausa c. 1895

MAP 3.
NINETEENTH CENTURY TRADE ROUTES TO AND FROM KANO.
[BY HONORABLE H. A. S. HUNSTON, 1967].

NINETEENTH CENTURY TRADE ROUTES TO AND FROM KANO.





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355	2949/1908	Half-yearly Report Kano Province 30/6/1908, Captain Hamilton Browne, 33 pp.
356	472/1909	Annual Report Kano Province 1908, A. Festing, 62 pp.
357	3635/1909	Half-yearly Report Kano, 30/6/1909, C.L. Temple, 76 pp.
358	6415/1909	Annual Report Kano Province 1909, C.L. Temple
359	3835/1910	Half-yearly Report Kano Province 30/6/1910, E.J. Arnett, 74 pp.
361	3546/1911	Half-yearly Report Kano Province for period ending 30/6/1911, G. Malcolm, 72 pp.
362	1114/1912	Kano Province Report 1911, E.J. Arnett, 163 pp.
363	134P/1913	Kano Province Report 1912, W.F. Gowers, 35 pp.
364	430P/1913	Kano Province Report for March quarter 1913, J. Withers Gill, 20 pp.
365	98P/1914	Kano Province Report 1913, W.F. Gowers, 23 pp.
366	494P/1914	Kano Province Report for half-year ending 30/6/1914, A.C.G. Hastings, 34 pp.
367	139P/1915	Kano Report 1914, A.C.G. Hastings, 35pp.
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369	170P/1916	Kano Report 1915, H.R. Palmer, 64 pp.
370	518P/1916	Kano Province Report half year ending 30/6/1916, H.R. Palmer, 24 pp.
371	410P/1917	Kano Province for first half of 1917, W.F. Gowers.
372	179P/1918	Kano Province Report 1917, W.F. Gowers, 31 pp.
373	491P/1918	Kano Province Report for first half of 1918, W.F. Gowers, 13 pp.
374	93P/1919	Kano Prov. Report 1918, C.O. Migeod, 42 pp.
375	318P/1919	Kano Prov. Report first half 1919, C.O. Migeod, 31 pp.
376	316P/1920	Kano Report first half 1920, E.J. Arnett, 20 pp.

<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Agency Mark</u>	<u>Subject and Description</u>
377	120P/1921	Kano Province Report for 15 months ending 31/3/1921, A.C.G. Hastings, 59 pp.
378	548/1922	Kano Province Report 1921, E.J. Arnett, 49 pp.
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-	K.8236	Monograph on Walled City of Kano 1928, Major A. Logan.
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387	14686 vol.I	Kano Province Report 1930, H.O. Lindsell, 80 pp.
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400	29652A	Kano Province Report 1937, correspondence re.
401	30847, I-IV	Kano Province Report 1938, E.K. Featherstone, 79 pp.
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570	1737	Trade Relations with French Territory (1936).
634	1890	Kano Native Treasury Revenue for 1936-37.
678	1981 vd.II	Cattle Diseases Control Measures 1933-54.
753	2087	Village Administration, 1934-35.
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780	2131	Muslim Missionaries 1937-47.
790	2163	Kano Emirate Population, 1927-55.
794	2168	Jangali Collection Kano Emirate 1937.
842	2261 vol.II	General Tax 1938-39.
853	2320	Cattle Entering Nigeria - Proposed import duty on, 1937-8.
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1039	2808	Conference of Kano emirate Alkalai.
1043	2820	Infakul Maisur, translation by E.J. Arnett and H.R. Palmer, 1920-48.
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<u>Acc. No.</u>	<u>Agency Mark</u>	<u>Description.</u>
4409	C.43	Slaves as Office Holders - elimination of, 1928.
4419	C.83	Forced Labour 1931-34.
4424	N.D.C.103	Groundnuts 1933-34.
4437	C.145	Nigeria, memo. on future political development, Sir B. Bourdillon, 1939.
4443	C.154	Political Intelligence 1940-42.

D. Materials Deposited at the Provincial Office, Kano - K.P.O.

- (i) Touring Diaries Kano Emirate 1920's and 1930's (25 volumes).
- (ii) Two files on emirs of Kano and on the appointment and deposition of village heads.
- (iii) District Note Books
 - (a) Babura District Note Book.
 - (b) Birnim Kudu " " "
 - (c) Dambatta " " "
 - (d) Dawakin Kudu District Note Book.
 - (e) " Tofa " " "
 - (f) Dutse " " "
 - (g) Gabasawa " " "
 - (h) Garki " " " (1941 onwards)
 - (i) Gaya " " "
 - (j) Gezawa " " "
 - (k) Gwaram " " "
 - (l) Gwarzo " " "
 - (m) Jahun " " "
 - (n) Karaye " " "
 - (o) Kiru " " "
 - (p) Kumbotso " " "
 - (q) Kura " " "
 - (r) Minjibir " " "
 - (s) Rano " " "
 - (t) Ringim " " "
 - (u) Sumaila " " " (1930 onwards)
 - (v) Tudun Wada " " "
 - (w) Ungogo " " "
 - (x) Wudil (and Sumaila) District Note Book.
 - (y) Kazaure Emirate Note Book.

Note: - The ~~Provisional~~^{ncial} Organization has been abolished since the creation of Kano State in 1967. The materials listed above can now be found in the Local Government Division of the Military Governor's Office, Kano.

2. Public Record Office, London.

(a) Colonial Office Records, C.O.

- C.O. 446 This series (115 volumes) contains the most comprehensive documentation on the establishment and development of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, notably the original despatches to and from the Protectorate Government and the Colonial Office 1897-1913. The series also contains material on the activities of the West African Frontier Force from December 1897 onwards, as well as correspondence between the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, the Crown Agents, the Imperial Treasury and the Manchester and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce. Also, in them can be found political and commercial intelligence reports from the Director of Military Intelligence (War Office), the British embassies in Paris and Berlin and the British consuls at Tripoli, Murzuk and Benghazi. The un-edited versions of the Annual Reports on Northern Nigeria are also contained in the series.
- C.O. 583 (228 vols.) Correspondence to and from Nigeria 1914-1940. Contains background documentation pertaining to colonial policies in amalgamated Nigeria.
- C.O. 587 This series (2 volumes) contains the Proclamations of the Northern Nigeria Government in the period 1900-13.
- C.O. 879 Confidential information covering such diverse topics as the early activities of the Royal Niger Company, Anglo-French rivalry and military build-up in West Africa, proposals for railway and road construction and development, international boundaries and treaties, etc., c.1875-1920.

(b) Foreign Office Records, F.O.

- F.O. 2/118 This volume covering the period 1893-96 contains material relating to British policy towards Rabeh and on his activities in Bornu. An account by one Sharif Hassam is invaluable and throws light on the political and commercial scene of the Sokoto Caliphate in the late nineteenth century.

3. Rhodes House Library, Oxford University.

- S.60-63 Lugard Papers - background information on events and developments in Northern Nigeria at the end of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century.

S.64 Lugard Papers - contains information on Lugard's secret preparations for launching an attack on Kano, namely R. Poppam-Lobb's letters to his mother between 1902-1904; also memorandum by Lugard himself.

S.65 Correspondence between Lugard and his wife with various people; also contains the High Commissioner's notes on Kano c.1903.

4. Jos Museum, Nigeria.

Palmer Papers:

(a) Catalogue 116 - correspondence to and from H.R. Palmer; also notes drafted by him - especially Notes on the Maguzawa of Kano Province.

(b) Faid al-Qadir, written for Palmer by Muhammadu Aminu c.1906-07 - deals with the Kano civil war and its history subsequently until the British occupation.

5. Unpublished Theses.

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Hogendorn, J.S. 'The Origins of the Groundnut Trade in Northern Nigeria', (London, 1965).

Low, V.N. 'The Border States: A Political History of three North-East Nigerian Emirates', (U.C.L.A., 1967).

Paden, J.N. 'The Influence of Religious Elites on Political Integration and Community Culture in Kano, Nigeria', (Harvard, 1968).

6. Oral Interviews.

In the course of my field researches in Nigeria during 1969-70, I was able to interview several people in Kano city and environs and a few more in the rural districts. As Kano has been internally a centralized state up until 1968, it has been possible to gather information pertaining to its political system within the city. The following individuals, cited in the study with regards to the pre-colonial era, provided invaluable information verbally or in writing.

- Adamu Wamban Sankira - aged about 82 years. Descended from royal slaves and considered the authority on Kano slave titles and functions. Presently the deputy to the chief of the royal praise-singers.
- Ado-Tudun Wada - age 60. Born at Garko, 15 miles south of Kano. Moved to Kano c.1930 when the new settlement of Tudun Wada was founded. Typifies the Hausa fortune seeker through trading activity.
- Ahmadu Tasawa - age 55 years. Born in Niger Republic of Tuareg parents but now lives in the Habe quarters of Kano. Family still participates in trade using camels for carriage.
- Alhaji Abubakar Sanusi - 47 years of age. Member of the Sullubawa royal family and son of Sir Muhammadu Sanusi, emir 1953-63. Has been a district head since 1954, presently Wambai of Kano and District Head Bichi. Has in his possession the only complete collection of title holders in Fulani Kano from the jihad up until 1970; also notes on Kano traditions and customs as well as translations in Hausa of the writings of some of the jihad leaders. The Kano N.A. (now Local Government Authority) directed me to him for information on Fulani government and I was his guest for a week in August 1970, discussing various aspects of administration.
- Alhaji Abubakar A. Mai Zaure - my guide and travelling companion to rural districts. Grandson of Abbas (emir 1903-19) and well informed about the ruler's pre-colonial farm estates. Educated at the Shahuci Judicial School and was once a taki mallam. Presently an emir's agent with the title of Wakilin Rafuka or overseer of Native Authority anti-tsetse fly measures. It was through his good offices that I was able to procure motor transport to the districts, together with accommodation and hospitality at N.A. rest houses.
- Alhaji Aliyu Maisango - aged 72 years (1970), Descendant of a nineteenth century Dan Rimi and therefore of slave status. An authority on slave offices and functions pertaining to the royal household. Interviewed over three days in April, 1970.
- Alhaji Mustapha - the Imam of Galadanci ward of Kano city. Aged about 60 years. Member of the Genawa scholar family. Provided information on judicial matters and allowed me access to court record books of the Chief Alkali's court. Also two files on judgements pertaining to land by the Emir's Judicial Council dating from 1922. Presently holds one of the judgeships of Kano city.

- Alhaji Salihi Bayero - age 40 years. Administrative Secretary of Kano N.A. At one time private secretary to Sir Muhammadu Sanusi (emir 1953-63). In charge of the N.A.'s secret documents. Provided information which throws light on the District Note Books.
- Alhaji Uba Adamu - age about 40 years. Grandson of Aliyu Babba (emir 1894-1903). Useful informant in matters pertaining to the activities of North African merchants in late nineteenth century Kano; also Fulani practices and folk-lore.
- Baba Jibir - age about 102 years (1970). Already a junior executioner when the British occupied Kano in 1903. Subsequently became a dogari and then an unofficial messenger. His account typifies the role of slave functionaries in Kano administration and illustrates why and how the British eliminated these functionaries.
- Dagacin Wak - age unknown but over 90 years. Has been a village head for over 40 years. Useful informant on village administration and succession.
- Dorayi Babba - age c.80 years. Descended from slaves. Presently the man in charge of the ruler's farm-estate at Dorayi near Kano. Still regards himself a ba-cucane or royal slave.
- Habibu b. Aliyu Babba (emir 1894-1903). Aged 72 years in 1970. Was a young prince when the British conquered Kano in 1903. Fled to Gaya with members of the royal household. Subsequently lived at Lokoja with Aliyu until the latter's death in 1926. Then he returned to Kano where he briefly occupied the office of a District Head. My most useful informant with regards to the Kano civil war, his account being based on the verbal memoirs of Aliyu Babba. Has in his possession several Arabic manuscripts, some written by Aliyu himself. He is unofficially regarded as the historian of the royal Sullubawa family. My interviews with him was spread over five working days in 1970 and I had had occasion to return to him to check or confirm certain points since then.
- Muhammadu Musa - age c.65 years, lives at Tudun Wada outside the city walls. Was a colonial policeman and then a government messenger. Useful information on the workings of the colonial system of authority as seen by a junior African functionary.
- Mika'ilu Wakilin Sarkin Kasuwan Goro - approx. 45 years old. Provided information on Hausa kola trade from the 1930's onwards, when the railway replaced the donkey as a means of transporting the commodity. He notes particularly the risks of the trade whereby the big merchant's capital is usually tied up as unsecured credit to retailers and the delicate nature of kolanut itself.

Shehu b. Adamu Sarkin Shanu - 50 years old. Very knowledgeable on the relationships, especially through marriage, between Kano ruling families.

Tijani Abubakar - Kano city, aged c.45 years. An amateur historian and one of my main sources on the nineteenth century judicial organization of Kano and the status of Kano's Imams.

Suleiman, Wakilin Rijiya da Dam - age c. 50 years. Useful informant on Abbas's branch of the royal family.

Wazirin Kofa Adamu (died 1972) - in his late 80's in 1970. Born at Gaya in the later 19th century into the family of a chief of that town. As a result of the civil war, his family lost its official position and he himself was reduced to penury. Forthright account of the greed and ambition at work during the civil war of 1894-95.

Yahaya Sarkin Gwarmai - age 64 years, village head of Gwarmai town. Provided information on the principles governing the accession to high office by members of the ruling families.

This list is only representative. The Kano N.A. kindly provided me with transportation to and from the district headquarters towns, where many people helped in verifying the diverse information contained in the District Note Books. It is intended to deposit the transcriptions of all my interviews at the Department of History, Abdullahi Bayero College, Kano.

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Bello, Muhammed, Infakul Maisur (the text used is the translation by E.J. Arnett and H.R. Palmer 1920-28, in NAK/KANOPROF 5/1.)

8. Published Sources.

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(ii) Parliamentary Papers.

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