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THE CONCEPTION OF KARMA AND REINCARNATION

IN HINDU RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

by

PAUL N. YEVTIC, B.Litt. (Oxon).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

ABH. BAYER. AKAD.	Abhandlungen der bayerischen Akademie.
A.g. Ph.	Deussen : Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie
AIT. BR.	Aitareya Brahmana
A.V.	Atharva-Veda
BRH. UP.	Brihad-Aranyaka Upanishad
B.S.	Brahma-Sutra
CHAND UP.	Chandogya Upanishad
E.R.E.	Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.
G.G.A.	Anzeigen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
H.T.Ph.	Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy
J.A.	Journal Asiatique
J.A.O.S.	Journal of the American Oriental Society
J.R.A.S.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
MHBH.	Mahabharata
N.G.G.W.	Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften
P.T.S.	Pali Text Society
R.V.	Rig-Veda
S.B. (Sat.Br.)	Satapatha Brahmana
S.B.E.	Sacred Books of the East
S.K.	Sutta-Nipata (Oxford)
TAITT. UP.	Taittiriya Upanishad
V.O.J.	Vienna Oriental Journal
V.P.	Vishnu Purana
Z.D.M.G.	Zeitschrift Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft.



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SYNOPSIS.

Hindu religious and philosophical activity is as complex as the European. The ideas underlying the karma notion are manifold and buried in ceremonial and sometimes obscure terminology. Nevertheless, several concepts appear to be forerunners of karma: ṛta (in the Rig-Veda), yajna and re-death in the Brahmanas; devayana and pitryana are corollaries of the foregoing concepts. Dharma is most probably of identical meaning with karma. Upanishadic thought already contains the karma doctrine but not elaborated. Buddhism definitely introduces karma as the ground-plan of its teaching, the latter idea being based on causation. It gives a definite and central place to Indian thought. In later writings of the Indians, karma is modified, due to the inrush of new ideas, but substantially it preserves its original meaning. From among the five chief commentators of the Brahmasutra, Sankara and Ramamija have made an attempt to give it a metaphysical background. The former succeeded in including karma in his system, but had to split knowledge into metaphysical and empirical. The latter was in some senses a complement to Sankara. The Surya-Gita deals with the problem of karma as an accepted fact. Nevertheless, trying to solve the relation between Brahma, Isvara and jiva on a logical ground, implies difficulties.

The possibility of conceiving the karma doctrine as an universal law of causation, as understood by the Hindus, in connection with the idea of heredity, environment, fate etc. Several aspects of understanding karma in its bearing on life - biological, psychological, ethical and metaphysical.

CHAPTER I.

In dealing with any particular system of religious and philosophic doctrine, one should bear in mind that all our actual thinking stands in close relationship with all previous development of the thought of all mankind. The primeval traditions and manifoldness of conception are the basis upon which our thought is founded, and is still creating new outlooks upon the world and striving after new ideals and criteria of truth. There is a great risk of sacrificing the real meaning of words in interpreting literally the scriptural texts of a religion. Much more so, if one takes only isolated facts and treats them separately, and not organically. This applies especially to Indian religion and philosophy, because the old Indian mind was directed upon a search after the ultimate reality of things - after truth, however elastic it may be. (1) To know the ultimate ground of the universe and man was the task of the Indian Sage. The eternal quest was: "Why, by what means, from what substance, has all this world originated?" and Bhagavati answers shortly: "I am alone this eternal all, and there is none other." (2) Truth does not mean a fixed standard of thinking, but a continual growth and change of human reasoning. Being of twofold aspect, static and dynamic, it assumes different appearances, so that it actually is never reached, in the human sense of the word.

(1) Tu Brh. Upanishad. It is said that there are twelve conceptions of Brahma, when Gārgya Balaki was questioned for a definition of Brahma as the ultimate ground of things. (2,1, 1 - 15) This is a leading idea which pervades all Vedantic thought, viz. that whatever is conceived by man at different stages of his evolution as Brahma, will be God to him. If he discerns what is permanent in the world he transcends human logic.

(2) Bhagavata Pārana. I, XV, 51 - 52.

There is no absolute truth about any particular system of doctrines. A certain idea may be true, if considered from a fixed standpoint, and if taken in relation to postulates which underlie it. However, human thinking is not only the product of sense-observation of the universal becoming, but also the result of the unconscious living, which at a certain stage reaches self-consciousness. As children, we perceive things in pictures and they represent a reality per se: when we are grown men, thought takes up those pictures and interprets them, so that at last they reach a fixed standard for the sake of human activity. The child-like state implies a necessary stage for the development of a perfecting human being and consequently it is necessary for the evolution of self-conscious man. The more we go back into the hoary past of humanity, the more we notice this manifestation of child-like reasoning, so that an enormous effort is required to discriminate the myth from reality, the truth from superstition. Myths and symbols constituted the only reality through which the experience of nations and races was manifested. Although concrete ideas of faith were expressed emblematically, ^{in India;} they exhibited, nevertheless, a symmetrical and philosophic whole, from Prajāpati down to the anthropomorphic goddess Kāla and various demons. How are we, then, to treat old Indian texts on religion, when the truth was not written but, according to Indian mythic writers and commentators, knowledge was derived through gruti, and holy rsis were oral intermediaries between gods and men? Written texts are of no help unless we rely upon intuition, which means the transcendence of empirical knowledge.

(1). The self-existent Prajāpati performed austerity (tapas). He considered: In austerity there is not infinity. Come let me sacrifice myself in created things, and create things in myself. (Sat. Brāh. XIII, 7, 1, 1.) Comp. Muṇḍ. Upaniṣad II, 14

Vivartan and Nivrttin would be fitting terms for Vedantic mode of thought to express the periodical evolution and involution (manvantara and pralaya) state of the universe, while for a Buddhist thinker the universe meant nivama, i.e. an eternal going-on process. Both cosmogonies have the same background. For many Christians of today the universe is a patch of architectural work which was done once for ever. But the recurring wheel of life always tends to correct our mistaken views on life, giving us a warning as to what is reality. Indian thought was always inclined to conceive the universe as an organic whole, stretching into infinity. In its metaphysics the phrase "beginning and end" but rarely occurs (^{except} ~~of~~ Buddhist anta), and then usually as a wording to be rejected. The universe is being created since eternity. So long as there is a cause, a desire, which produces the universe, so long the universe will exist. However much the Vedic texts may be in contradiction with the logical thinking of today, we should bear in mind that logic in our sense did not exist at that time, because the Indians followed the thoughts of gods, which were right of themselves in their particular function. Gods were represented by them as expressions of the superhuman, as more highly evolved beings, without it being actually realised that there was any essential difference between god and man. This idea of man becoming a god, and being a god, was slowly emerging since the earliest times, and gradually preparing the ground for its realisation in Christianity. One becomes god through the exercising of tapas, through the practising of karma (sacrifice), and we know that even Brahma practised tapas in creating. The final logical conclusion was that one becomes identical with what one does. (Comp. Tait.Up. 3, 1).⁽¹⁾ It was a matter of efficiency, realisation was

(1). "The Self-existent Brahma^{वृत्रापात्} performed austerity (tapas). He considered; in austerity there is not infinity. Come let me sacrifice myself in created things, and created things in myself." (Sat.Brah.XIII, 7,1,1.) Comp. Muir, Sanskrit texts, IV, 24.

the same. (1) Therefore the gods were absolute guides of human and cosmic development, and this should not be inquired into. And if someone was so inquisitive about the origin and ultimate end of the universe, he was privately initiated into the mysteries of life, the origin and meaning of the world. So when Artabhāga asked Yājñavalkya what becomes of the soul after death, the latter said: "We two only will know of this. This is not for us two in public (to talk of)." "They two went away and deliberated. What they said was karma. What they praised was karma." (Brh. Up. III, 2, 13). This passage shows clearly enough that for the Indian, there were two ways of obtaining knowledge of the mysteries of life: esoteric and exoteric. On one plane there was no need of entering into problems of existence, because certain truths were implicitly believed and never required a logical proof and discourse. It was enough to make clear to the people that there existed higher beings who guide human evolution, On the esoteric plane, those who were enough trained, could be acquainted with the gnosological problems of existence. For, according to Bankara, should one recognise the identity of one's own soul with Brahman, considering the manifested world as māyā; there was no need for developing doctrines of either Samsāra or karma or of any kind of future existence, because

(1) Tilak says in his "Arctic Home in the Vedas" - "Aitihā Sikas believed that many of the deities were real historical personages, who were apotheosised for their supernatural virtues or exploits. Other theologians divide the deities into karma-devatas, or those that have been raised to the divine rank by their own deeds, and Ajana-devatas, or those that were divine by birth, while Naituktas (etymologists) maintain that the Vedic deities represent certain cosmical and physical phenomena such as appearance of dawn..." etc. pp. 237-238. The word deva, coming from the root div, meaning to "sport" "desire to conquer", activity, praise, joy etc., hence manifoldness of conceptions of "deva". Native commentators usually give ten different meanings to "deva". (Comp SV. Dyanand Saraswati: Introduction to the comment. on the Vedas, p. 94 sy).

all these problems have value for this world of appearance, while for those who have overcome māyā, there was no need for any discussion. Vidyā (knowledge) was not delivered to the uninitiated. One had to pass through certain preliminary stages in order to get the true knowledge which made him free from bonds of matter and led him finally into union with Brahman. There were necessary Yoga practises which enabled him to come into a certain state of mind to receive the sacred knowledge. One must first become a neophyte and pass through psychological trials, that conducted him finally into the inner teaching and understanding of the Vedas. An inner experience was required which enabled a fit person to come to the knowledge which meant liberation. So it was with all religions which preceded Christianity, as well as in the primitive Christian church. Because to the Vedantic thinker all manifested universe was avidyā and only "through knowledge comes liberation" (jñānān mokṣah).

There was implied even in the RV a belief in the world-order which regulates the life of the whole universe and of mankind. Later on this develops into a general idea of cause and effect, of merit and demerit (dharma and adharma). As is his (man's) desire, such is his purpose; as is his purpose, such is the action he performs; what action (karma) he performs, that he procures for himself." (1) We do not find any explicit mention of the idea of transmigration or of karma in the sense of retribution in the hymns of RV. Some scholars have tried to trace Samsāra in some ancient portions of the RV., while others refute the same on philological grounds. But there is a wide distinction between the idea

(1). ^{sa} Yathākāmo bhavati tat kratuḥ bhavati yat kratuḥ bhavati tat karma kurute, yat karma kurute tad abhisampadyate. (Brh. 4, 4-5).

of transmigration, common to many ancient nations, and the idea of Samsāra, a recurring wheel of existence. (1) The word "karman" occurs in the sense of "work", "sacrificial act", sometimes personified as a god karman, which has originated with tapas - penance, religious austerities, -(another important concept) from the primeval waters. (2) The souls of the good were supposed to go into the heavens of Yama, where they enjoyed blissful life together with the fathers (pitarah). (3) The souls of the evil ones go into the deepest darkness. (4) But nowhere is there any explicit statement that the soul returns to earth again to live a new life either in human or another form. In the RV. Yama is nowhere represented, as in the later developments of Hindu religion, as having anything to do with the future punishment of the wicked. The most prominent references to a future life are found in books 9 and 10 of the Rig-Veda. In the earliest Vedic literature, for aforesaid reasons, there is no trace of the idea of karma implying that life does not begin at birth and end at death, and that it is a link in an infinite series of lives, each of which is conditioned and determined by the acts done in previous existence. Neither do we find any systematic exposition of the cause and effect (hetu) or even the general Indian conception of the nimitta - chain of causation. Nevertheless, there were

(1) Cf. Oldenberg. Noten zum Rigv. IV, 42, 1; VII, 33, 9; X, 14, 14.

(2) Atharva V. 11, 8, 6, 1. Hiranyagarbha (the golden egg or world-embryo) contained potentially all the gods and the whole world. (RV. X, 121). The waters have played an important part in all ancient cosmogonical systems, as representing the symbol of the all-powerful tranquil cosmic forces which operate continuously, those forces being inherent in them. One example is Taoism. But the idea of water was much more closely associated with religious rites, in bathing, sprinkling etc. In the Brahmanas, waters symbolically denoted dharma which is identified with satya (truth), yajña (sacrifice), śraddha etc. (Comp. Muir Sanskrit texts, IV, p.16 sq, esp. 26-28).

(3) RV. IX, 14, 10. Athā pitrint suvidatran upeti yamena ye sadhamādam madanti.

(4) RV. X. 152, 4. Yo asman abhidāsati, adharam gamayā tamah; Also Ath. V. IX, 2, 4.

in existence similar concepts which to a large extent expressed essentially the same idea. The Karma-concept as law of retribution was only a modification of the earliest thinking - a gradual transformation of the idea which existed since earliest times, and it is not accidental that the Karma (sacrifice) assumed the meaning of law of cause and effect. (Comp. S. Fevi, Conf. Musée Guimet, 1904 p. 102.) There were many concepts underlying the conception of karma, such as yajna (sacrifice), dharma, and especially ṛta - a universal world order in nature and ethical standards which developed out of observation of the regular movements of the heavenly bodies. As Oldenberg (1) says: "The idea of ṛta has come from the oldest times. It appears sometimes in RV. as a self-independent force, sometimes as an expression of divine will, carried out and protected by the gods: the first conception is a primordial one, while the second is based upon the natural necessity, to bring into harmony the idea of ṛta with the belief in the divine power over things." For in the Vedic times there existed implicit belief in the power of natural forces (often personified) as being ensouled. The uniformity of the movement of those forces might and must have suggested an immutable order of things. It is not improbable to imagine, as Max Muller suggested, that ṛta originally meant "the firmly established movement of the world, of the sun, of morning and evening, of day and night, how its manifestation was perceived in the path of the heavenly bodies.... and how that path (ṛta) on which the gods brought light out of darkness, became afterwards the path to be followed by man, partly in his sacrifices, partly in his general moral conduct." (2) So actually ṛta was a religious concept, the

1. Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmana-Texte (Göttingen 1919) p.124 and in Religion des Veda p'194 and foll.

2. Lectures on the origin and growth of religion (London 1880) p.244 foll.

antithesis of which was an-rta; and undoubtedly in the course of the evolution of the religious consciousness, both came to mean an interplay of the opposites: good and bad, true and false. We find traces of the meaning in the Upanishads as for instance Chandogya, where anṛta denotes a work connected with samsara, since those people who do not look for true desires "are carried astray by untruth" (anṛtena hi pratyūdāḥ) (VIII, 3, 2). Yajña (sacrifice) itself is much more than a simple human act, by which men showed to gods their veneration. Even gods perform the sacrifice, which means the order of the universe. (1) Rta in its ethical connection meant a moral law. It was an impersonal conception. With the passing of Varuna in the post-vedic period the content of rta was taken up into that of dharma "law" and karman "retribution" (2) Later on, or probably simultaneously, taking into consideration the unsettled chronology of the Hindu literature, we find in the Vishnu Purāna the third śakti of the universe is avidyā, which is known as karma. (3) There we find also mentioned the transmigration of souls as an elaborate system of belief. (4)

The idea of rta as an unwavering order that controls the gods and men, gradually assumed the meaning, in the

(1), A. Bergaigne: Religion Vedique (Paris 1878-88). "Plus généralement on peut dire que la notion du sacrifice celeste n'implique pas nécessairement l'intervention d'un personnage auquel il soit adressé. Ce sacrifice est avant tout le prototype indispensable du sacrifice terrestre" (I, 208) "The universal value of the sacrifices might suggest more than sacrificial work," because "The whole universe takes part in sacrifices," (tat sarvam yajñā ābhaktam). Sat. Brah 3, 6, 2, 26. Or in another place "Therefore a man, offering all oblations, all creatures in the sarvamedha (universal sacrifice) obtains superiority, self-effulgence and supreme dominion." (Sat. B. XIII, 7, 1, 1).

(2). Griswold: The Religion of the Rig Veda, p.133.

(3). Avidyā karma samjñānyā trtīyā śaktiriṣyate (V.P. VI. 7, 61).

(4). V.P. II, V, 36-~~38~~.

Brāhmanas, of moral order, which is not to be transgressed by men. The word asha in Avesta had the same significance. The followers of Ahura Mazda were in close connection with the Vedic Aryans not by blood only, but also in language and religion. (1) So the asha in its meaning may be identified with ṛta, as there are parallel passages in RV and Avesta which are sufficiently convincing to show that there was a common root of Zoroastrianism and Hinduism. (2) The conception of ṛta itself has many meanings in the RV., which does not diminish its value, if we bear in mind that in all ancient religions words were used symbolically for expressing the idea underlying them. As Ahura in Avesta was the name of the god of the Asha-world, in the same manner Varuṇa, in the Vedic period, assumed the function of the "guardian of the world order" (gopa rtasya). It appears that gods in turn assume this guidance of the world. (3) For in any religion we must clearly distinguish three elements, which constitute the essence of all, i.e. metaphysical (sometimes called esoteric), ethical and sacrificial or practical. If any of these three elements predominates, it means that the balance is disturbed.

(1) Max Müller's opinion is that there is an intimate connection between the mythology and the religion of Zoroastrianism and Vedic India, and that owing to a schism they separated. (Chips from a German Workshop, I, 83). Lately, this close connection has been discussed more fully in various works without a plausible conclusion. Cf.

(2) J. Darmesteter. Ormuzd Ahriman, (Paris 1877) pp.7 & foll. "Rta est l'expression. technique pour designer l'ordre universel. Le monde pour les Rshis vedique n'est point un chaos où règne le hasard. Dans la nature, dans la marche et la succession des phénomènes, il y a une loi, une habitude, une règle." (Vrata svadhā, dhāman (o.c. p.13). Also S.K. Hodivala: Indo-Aryan Religion (Bombay 1924) p.35. Cf. The word asa in C. Bartholomae. Altiranisches Wörterbuch

(3) Bargaigne. o.c. III, 256 ("The idea of law in the cult of Aditi").
 (4) W. H. D. Rieu. Journal of the Asiatic Society, 1894, p. 107. "The idea of law in the cult of Aditi".
 (5) J. R. A. S. (1894) p. 367 gives a description of the meaning of the "wheel of life" in Buddhism.
 (6) S. H. H. S. in Festgabe H. Jacobi, Bonn 1926, pp. 212 foll.

Sometimes gods are called in RV rtāvridh (holy-minded or "promoters of sacred order") as in zend asha-van: "May Pūsha, the promoter of sacred order, preserve us from calamity."

(1) Or again: "I praise you, guardians of the great law, Eternal Aditi, Mitra, Varuna...." (2) The gods are the "Lords of the Law" (rtasya pathyah), "dwellers in the home of order" (rtasva pastvasado) (3) Varuna's characteristic title is dhr-tavrata "Whose ordinances are fixed" (4) "Enthroned within his palace sits god Varuna, whose law is firm. All wise for universal sway" (5) Occasionally we find gods identified with rta, which is not at all surprising, as in Christian fathers we find also God identified with goodness, truth, etc. So Mitra and Varuna are mighty lords and they are supreme law. (6) "By your high law firm order is established there where they loose for travel sūrya's horses". (7) It is very characteristic that the sun is called the "wheel of rta", while in Buddhism there exists the same symbol for expressing the universal motion of samsara. (8) A definite attempt has lately been made to connect Varuna-Mitra with the rta concept. Especially suggestive is the contention that actually rta produced samsāra and karma, since rta is to be taken as referring to both macrocosmos and microcosmos. (9) The close connection of these two symbols must

(1) RV. VI, 75, 10. Pūshā nah pātu duritad rtāvridhah. - Pūshā is invoked as "charioteer of our rite" (rathīr rtasya no bhava") VI, 55. 1.

(2) Stusha u vo maha rtasya gopān aditim mitram varunam sujātān (RV. VI, 51, 3).

(3) RV. VI, 51, 9. Comp Deussen A.G.Ph. I, 14, pp.92 - 93.

(4) RV. I, 25, 8.

(5) RV. I, 25, 10. ni shasāda dhṛitā vrato varuṇah pastyāsṅvā samrājyā ya sukratuh.

(6) RV. V, 68 1. Mahi akshatran rtam vrhat; while both are none the less "guardians of the order" rtasya gopavadhi. (V.6311)

(7) rtena rtamapinitam dhruvam vām suryasya yatravimucantyasvan (V, 62, 1). In a hymn addressed to sūrya (RV. VII, 63). Samanam.

(8) (Chakram paryāvivṛtsan yad etaso vahati dhūrshu yuktaṅ (J.R.A.S. (1894) p.367 gives a description of the meaning of the "wheel of life" in Buddhism.

(9) B. Heimann in Festgabe H. Jachn. Bonn 1926, pp.212 foll.

be considered as a great help in interpreting the origins of Buddhism, which was not absolutely a protest against Brahmanism and anything but a revolt against law.

As said before, the term *rta* was applied to the activities not only of the Mitra and Varuna, but also of other Hindu deities. Agni becomes rtavan - keeping within the fixed order - (RV, III, 2, 13). There are numerous passages in RV. which refer to the conception of *rta* as a fixed order of things, which sometimes assumed an ethical character. For instance in RV. IX, 21, 1, and X, 37, 5 the good are those who follow the path of *rta*. Ordered conduct is called a true vrata (RV. 2, 27, 8) and yratāni are the ways of life of good men who follow the path of *rta*. In another place, later, Prajāpati becomes the first born of the *rta*.⁽¹⁾ In Sarvadarsana-samgraha *rta* is explained to mean the works done without desire of fruit ^{and} which have for aim the attainment of the Highest Brahman; whereas *anrta* denotes the works in connection with *samsāra* which brings little fruit and is opposed to the attainment of Brahman. (Samsārikālpaphalam karmānṛtam brahma-prāptivirodhi). (S.D.S. of Śāyana mādhava, Poona 1924 p.100 Comp. chā. 8, 3, 2). The idea of *rta* obviously survives all Vedic gods and preserves its identical meaning both in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads.

Very often in earlier religions the terms are formal and convertible, especially in Sanscrit, which uses often one term for expressing an idea, the meaning of which changes according to the evolution of the consciousness of the people. For instance, originally the expression "Brahman" did not mean "Universal Spirit" neither was it identified with ātma, but meant originally "holy word", "prayer", "magic formula" etc.⁽²⁾

(1) 6, 11, 2. Athar. V, 5, 24, 13. 12, 1, 61.

(2) Oldenberg in Nachrichten Kön. Gesel. der Wissenschaften Göttingen, 1916, p. 715 foll.

It often happens that a word belonging to the common language and used in vague and conflicting ways is taken over by science that it may correspond to some precise concept. Then scientists interested in different and more or less incompatible concepts claim exclusive rights over the same technical term. The term becomes for some time ambiguous, it answers to more concepts than one. Something of this kind has occurred in regard to the words "māyā", "brahman", "ṛta" and "karma".⁽¹⁾ After a long period of time these concepts assumed definite meanings: the concept ṛta was superseded by karma, a universal law of action, and hence the moral law, which rules supreme over all divine and human beings.⁽²⁾ The term Brahman evolved into an Universal Spirit, a cosmic principle,⁽³⁾ māyā, which meant originally "magical power" crystallized into the appearance of the manifested universe.⁽⁴⁾

The conception of punarjanma, samsāra and karma are already found in the Brāhmana literature, especially in the passages which speak about immortal life and penal retribution after death. The fact that only in the Brāhmanas are we met with hints of the ideas of samsāra and rebirth, and not in the Vedic period, has puzzled many scholars who expected systematical treatises on the above subjects, in order to grant that the idea of reincarnation and karma is of Aryan origin. ~~It~~ ^{is} ~~physically~~

(1) Griswold in his "Religion of the Rig-Veda", holds the opinion that there is a distinct suggestion of the conception of karma in the expression istapūrta (performance of charitable deeds or sacrifices). p.178. "Istapūrta is replaced by karma, the accumulated deeds of a given lifetime and the attendant evolution which these deeds have worked upon the spirit." Comp. Sankara's Comm. on Prasna up 1,9.

(2) Comp. Festgabe H. Jacobi (1926) pp.205-10.

(3) Taitt. Brah. 2,8,9,6.

(4) P.D. Shastri in his book "The Doctrine of Māyā" points out very clearly how one single Sanskrit word may assume different meanings in different texts. (ch I and foll.)

(5) Oldenberg, Religion des Veda. 562. Notes zum RV. IV, 22, 1; VII, 33, 9; X, 17, 17.

Today it is a well-known fact that the belief in transmigration of souls was common almost to all ancient peoples, but it is also true that nowhere is to be found such a systematic exposition of transmigration and the law of karma as in India. The reason why the Vedas do not mention it, we may reasonably assume, was that the Vedas were not composed for the philosophically minded thinker, but dealt chiefly with the present life of the human race, leaving aside speculations as to future existence. It is a well-known fact that actual experience precedes the understanding of it. As S. Levi points out "The Vedic priest does not leave the living man at the precise hour of death" in order to enable the different constituent parts of the human being to follow their right course, because "body" and "soul" according to the Indian mind were not units, but composite, and this "composite nature" of a human being is not peculiar to Buddhist thought, but also characteristic of Brahmanism. Some scholars suggested that the conception of saṃsāra and karma was absorbed by Vedic Aryans from other sources, Egyptian or Greek or Indigines. ⁽¹⁾ Prof. Keith recognises the difficulty in determining possible influences, if any, of Dravidian aborigines on Aryan religious and philosophical thought. ²⁾ The final conclusion arrived at is that there is enough probability to suggest that these doctrines were preserved as esoteric teaching and imparted only to dṛviḥja-s. Considered philosophically,

(1) Gough in "Philosophy of the Upanishads" (London 1903) is of opinion that transmigration was taken from indigenes in the course of their absorption of indigenous blood. (25). We might as well suppose that they originated amongst the Vedic Aryans independently, having a different order of ideas in the background. There are many instances in the folklore and religion of ancient peoples with similar beliefs and practises, of occurrences of this kind, but this fact only shows either that there is a common source of all beliefs of mankind, or that through some unknown reason they developed simultaneously.

(2) Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads, Cambridge 1925, (Harvard Orient. series) II, App.g. The opinion of G.W. Brown in "The sources of Indian Philosophy" ("Studies in honor of M. Bloomfield") p. 78 foll. ¹⁰⁰ "The doctrine of transmigration appears to be based on Dravidian animistic belief." has not sufficient foundation in facts.

the characteristic teaching of later Indian thought (that of the nothingness of individual existence and of the universe) has its root in the impermanence of human earthly life, and this doctrine has been a well-founded ground for the idea of rebirth and karma, which implied the transiency. One set of doctrines is easily transformed into another with the gradual emergence of the human consciousness, a principle which may be applied to many religious systems. The more so with the Indian mind, if we take into account the speculations of the Brahmanas who speak incidentally about the penal retribution after death.

Satapatha Brāhmana ⁽¹⁾ is full of passages which refer to another world, but does not say anything definitely of the duration of the dead in another world. If we admit only an indefinite future state which is foreign to the Indian mind, without taking into account transmigration and karma, we are only groping in the dark about many passages which occur in the Brahmanas. The view taken by S. Levi, that the doctrine of rebirth in the Brahmanas is presented preferably in the negative aspect, that what can be called re-death is very reasonable and it implies the same conception. ⁽²⁾ Oldenberg, without making any definite conclusion, admits that it required a long period of time in order that the doctrine of transmigration might be formulated, ⁽³⁾ and that it must have passed through many a stage. Possibly,

(1) S.B. I, 9, 3, 2 and foll. VI, 2, 2, 27 and X, 5, 2, 23. Prof. Weber in Z.D.M.G. vol IX, p. 239 gives an account of a legend which occurs in SatBr (XI 6, 1, 1, and foll.) concerning the future retribution. Bhrgu the son of Varuna went by his father's command to the four quarters of the world. There he saw a man being cut into pieces and eaten by other men. When questioned by Bhrgu they declared all, that they were revenging on their victims the treatment which they had received at the hands of the world (i.e. earth). Then, at the end of the seventh verse comes a significant phrase, "Then Varuna knew, he has indeed seen it." It is not difficult to perceive that this is not a simple story, but that it refers to the souls of men, although apparently it has nothing to do with transmigration.

(2) S. Levi Conference Musee guimet. 1904, p. 91.

(3) Oldenberg: Die Lehre der Upanishaden: Von voller Ausgestaltung ist die Seelenwanderungsdoktrin doch auch jetzt noch weit entfernt. Wandlungen die so tief zu den Fundamenten des Glaubens hinab reichen & deren Konsequenzen sich allseitig so weit erstrecken, konnten ja nicht innerhalb kurzer Zeiträume zu ihrem letzten Ziel gelangen etc. (p. 105).

it may have absorbed foreign elements of similar doctrines, as it often happens with many religious and moral conceptions. The fact that the older texts speak very rarely about the future life of the soul, does not mean that the "doctrine of transmigration is not Aryan and not Brahmanic, as De la Vallee Poussin, quoting Barth's "Religion of India", is trying to prove, and that doctrine of rebirth does not agree with Brahmanic Ontology. (1) But the fact remains ^{that} in all primitive systems of doctrines there were not classifications in either philosophy or religion such as we conceive them today. Religion and philosophy and mythology were mixed together. Religion was science and science implied religion. When later on Mr. Poussin adds that "The doctrine of transmigration has its root in reincarnation, in gandharva, without which the system cannot be conceived" (2) this only corroborates the above statement, that although many ideas are not to be found in older texts, we can and must logically deduce them from similar ideas by internal evidence if we are to understand the spirit of a religion or philosophy. The very fact that Buddha accepted

(1) Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens. (p.286 and foll). "In order to conciliate the ātman with the belief in transmigration one must have either changed profoundly this dogma by multiplying the ātman-s (sāmkhya-system) or one must presuppose that ātman is becoming continually individualised, clothing itself in multiple organisms, who think, act and enjoy." This may be true, but this is not inconsistent with the Brahmanic ontology, as we shall see in Sankara, who demonstrated the necessity for rebirth as a fact of empirical experience, without having destroyed the metaphysical Being-aspect of Brahma. The idea of rebirth, taken for itself, could not be understood without its correlative notion of an Atman.

(2) The same. p.289.

(3) Histoire des Idées Theosophique dans l'Inde. I (Paris 1906) p'96. and further, "Dans la maniere dont les anciennes Upanishads se sont représenté le processus de reviviscences, il a eu trop d'hesitations, de divergences, d'ébauches, suivies de dessin plus complètement poussés, pour que cette élaboration ne soit pas tout entière le fait des penseurs brahmaniques eux-mêmes. (p.97).

in principle the Hindu idea of transmigration and samsara implies that those ideas must have been current in Brahmanic circles (perhaps not fully understood and elaborated), although we have only scattered evidence and implications in the oldest Upanishads. The myth of Naciketas in Katha Up. represents, very likely, the last remnant of Brahmanic allegory and regarding future life and the causal connection between this and future lives. (1) The consciousness of the ancient peoples was limited almost to perception in pictures, and the group-soul was the guide of many primitive tribes and peoples. Thoughts were not names or abstract things, but living "beings" with whom most individuals had individual connection and hence "initiation" was considered an indispensable means for obtaining knowledge.

Apart from the Brahmanic conception of the sacrifice - natural desire on the part of man to establish a link between himself and gods, "There is nothing in the very principle of transmigration which cannot be explained by the natural evolution of the ideas, which are specifically Hindu and Brahmanic," says P. Oltramare.

(1) In this respect it is worth while mentioning the attempt of Oldenberg to connect the Naciketas experiences in the Yama-world with Buddha's temptation of Mārā (Buddha, 58 foll.)

Chapter II.

Samsāra and Karma in older Upanishads.

That the idea of samsāra and karma was ingrained in the Indian mind was never doubted by any Hindu, whether today or several thousands of years ago. It was implicitly believed. As M. Müller points out: "The idea of the soul ever coming to an end is so strange to the Indian mind that there seemed to be no necessity for anything like proofs of immortality, so common to European philosophers. Knowing what is meant by "to be" the idea that "to be" could ever become "not to be" seems to have been impossible to the mind of the Hindus. If by "to be" is meant samsāra or the world, however long it may last, then Hindu philosophers would never look upon it as real. "It never was, never is, and never will be." (1) This idea of the transiency of things is definitely settled in the Buddhist mind. "No beginning is known of the samsāra of the beings streaming and flowing to and fro, being covered by ignorance and fettered by thirst (tanha)". (2)

In the Rig-Veda we do not find any textual mention of samsara and karma, (3) but later, in one of the earliest

(1) Six systems of Indian philosophy (L.1919) p.109.

(2) Samyutta nikaya, II, 178 & foll.

(3) P. Oltramare in L'histoire des Idees Theosophiques" (Paris 1909), I, 97-98, suggest that other considerations can be adduced to show that the idea of transmigration is vaguely hinted at in the Vedas. For instance, it was believed that the sacrifice carries the offerer to heaven and then back to earth until he dies, and that life descended from the sky as rain to produce fruits and nourish and generate life in turn.

Brahmanas there is an allusion to it: "And they who so know this, or they who do this ceremony, come to life again when they have died, and coming to life they come to immortal life. But they who do not know this, or do not do this holy work, come to life again when they die, and they become the food of him (Death) time after time." (1) And again: "...and when he becomes initiated, he makes for it (his self) that world beforehand and he is born into the world made by him, hence they say, man is born into the world made (by him)." (2) These passages clearly show that in the Satapatha Brah. the doctrine of metempsychosis makes a definite appearance. The problem is put forward already in Sat. Brah (X,1,4,14), " tad āhuh kim tad agnan kriyate yena yajamānah punarmṛtyum apajayati. "The second death" is often mentioned in the older texts of the Veda, and is often identified with pitṛyāna. Although it does not distinctly imply transmigration, it is a

(1). Te ya evam etad viduh ya vai tat karma kurvate mṛtvā punah sambhavanti te sambhavanta evāmṛtatvam abhi sambhavanti atha — ya evam na vidur ye vai tat karma na kurvate mṛtvā punah sambhavanti te etasyaivānnaṃ punah punarbhavanti. (Sat. Brāh. X, 4,3,10.)
In Taitt Br. 3,11,8,6: "He who builds up or knows the Śaciketa's fire, he escapes renewed death" (apa punar mṛtyum jayati).
 In another place: "The man is born into the world which he himself has made." (S.B. VI. 22,2)

(2) Yad dikṣite bhavati tam kṛtām lokam abhijāyate, tasmādānām kṛtam lokampuruṣo abhijāyatas iti (S.B. VI,2,27) Deussen thinks that this verse is to be understood in the sense of "again becoming" and "second death" in another world but connects it with transmigration. (En. der H. p.295) adding that "It was only necessary however to transfer that renewed death from an imaginary future world into the present, in order to arrive at the doctrine of transmigration." For S. Levi, the expression "repeated death" (punar-mṛtyu) in the Brahmanas should not be associated with the idea of transmigration, but taken in the sense of "second death". However, he does not give sufficient proofs that this passage is to be understood in that sense. (Doctrine du sacrifice (Paris 1898) p.95-96.)

entire, while its opposite - death, is only due to the

clear suggestion that Brahmanic thinkers have insisted upon and valued the moral nature of an action, which gradually assumed the idea of an equalising justice - karma. Philosophical and religious interpretations of Death emerge here and there in Sat. Brah. (I, 5, 1, 4; XI, 4, 3, 20; XI, 5, 6, 9; X, 6, 1, 14) Similarly in the Egyptian idea of retribution, the scales are used to measure the good and evil works (XI, 2, 7, 33).

In the earliest Upanishads the conception of metempsychosis and karma has more or less definite place and the whole trend of the Upanishads goes to suggest that the karma-concept was not merely incidental, or was added later, but that it made part of Vedāntic eschatology. In fact, in the Upanishads we find more definite statements of the destiny of the human soul after death in place of the vague and ambiguous concept of punishment and recompense as expressed in the RV and Brāhmanas. "The contributions which the Upanishad thinkers made, was in effect to combine these ideas, by transferring the retribution from an unknown and future sphere to the known and visible present, and by asserting the precise equivalence of the recompense after death to the deeds, good or evil of the earthly life."

(E.R.E. A.S.Geden: Upanisads in XII, 547). That man's life is often compared with that of a plant we find ^{much} ~~as~~ ^{earlier} ~~as~~ than Sankara's time. The very fact that the Buddhist conception of life in the earliest preserved records contains the idea of karma and transmigration, as it were, ready for the mass of believers outside, proves that karma must have been known in all its details by Brahmins who constituted the largest number of the Buddha's first pupils. Life itself, or that essence which constitutes life, is something which endures, while its opposite - death, is only due to the

wrong attitude of the finite ego towards the eternal, (1)
 and is described in the Brahmanas as mriyucāpman the enemy
 of Prajāpati. "Verily, indeed, when life has left it, this
 body dies. The life, or living soul, does not die." (2)
 And "Brahma is life." (prāṇa). (3)

For the Indian mind, generation is not the birth of
 the soul for the first time, but is only a passing phase,
 a coming into the world of effects. Birth is only a
 necessary medium through which the soul has to pass in
 order to reap the fruits of its previous karma. (4) In
Aitt.Up. three different kinds of birth of man's ātma are
 mentioned: as an embryo; physical birth into the world
 of effects; and the third birth, which in our sense is
 death. (5) The activities of man's prāṇa are not limited to
 the earth atmosphere but are connected with the whole
 universe, with sun, moon and stars. "All those who
 depart from this world, to the moon verily they all go.
 During the earlier half, it thrives on their prāṇa; with
 the latter half, it causes them to be reproduced." (6)

(1) "He (who knows this) wards off death, death obtains him
 not, death becomes his own Self." (atman) (Brh.1,2,7.)

(2) Chand up. 6,11,3. Jivapetaṃ vava kiledaṃ mriyate
 na jivo mriyate iti.

(3) Same, 4,10,5.

(4) Comm. Sāṃkhya-sūtra. III, 62.

(5) I,4, 1 - 5.

(6) Kaush Up. 1,2.

THE DEVAYANA (the way of the gods), (1)

The origin of the "five-fire doctrine" is contained

There is a tendency in the Upanishads to explain philosophically and mystically the meaning of Vedic ritual and ceremonies. The Agnihotra sacrifice becomes a continual cosmic process, which should be performed with knowledge of its universal bearing. The mystical Agnihotra sacrifice is made to the Universal soul. "If one offers the Agnihotra sacrifice knowing it thus (i.e. that the cosmic process is a continual Agnihotra), his offering is made in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves." (1) "The second death" cannot be escaped by offerings. (2) Sacrificial form becomes ineffective against rebirth. (3) Instead of formal sacrifice there comes "thinking sacrifice" (ishtapūrtam jñānayaajna), i.e. knowledge as the truest means of liberation.

The idea of transmigration is found first of all in those parts of the Upanishads called pāncagni vidya (five-fire doctrine). The old Brahmanic conception of the twofold way for human souls after death still holds good in the earliest Upanishads: the devayana (the way of the gods)

(1) Chand. Up. 5, 24, 2. Atha ya etad evam vidvan agnihotram juhoti tasya sarveshu lokeshu sarveshu bhuteshu sarveshvātmasu kutam bhavati. Similarly in Sat. Brah. XIII, 7, 1, 1.

(2) Bra. 1, 5, 2.

(3) "Unsafe boats are these sacrificial forms" (yajnarupa) (Mund. 1, 2, 7).

(4) J. Royal Asiatic Soc. London (1) 1925 which contains an exhaustive analytical study of the fire conception in the Indo-Iranian Religions.

(5) Chand. 5, 3, 1, foll.

and pitryana (the way of the fathers). (1)

The origin of the "Five-fire doctrine" is contained in the Chandogya Upanishad, in the form of instruction of Svetaketu by Uddalaka concerning the clue to all knowledge. This may be taken as the ground-plan upon which the Upanishadic doctrine of transmigration and karma is built. Incidentally, it may be observed that fire was one of the most significant elements of the Vedic Aryans. Prajapati "who produced Agni from his mouth" has very much to do with the production of living beings and gods. He is the primeval originator of mankind and cosmos, acting through Agni. The cosmic fire is identical with heart's fire, since it influences Willing, Thinking and Wisdom. Primarily, it meant the world-principle which penetrates the whole world. (2) Svetaketu is asked five questions:

- (1) Do you know unto what creatures go forth hence?
- (2) Do you know how they return again?
- (3) Do you know the parting of the two ways, one leading to the gods, and one leading to the fathers?
- (4) Do you know how yonder world is not filled up?
- (5) Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have a human voice? (3)

(1) The devayana way is for those "who know this and those who worship in a forest with the thought that faith (sraddha) is austerity." After having been purified, they are led finally to Brahma (Chand 5,10,1). "But those who reverence in the village a belief in sacrifice, merit and almsgiving" pass finally into the world of the fathers, thence they go into space, from space into moon, and become the food of the gods. "After having remained in it as long as there is a residue (of their good works) then by that course by which they came, they return again just as they came into space etc." Then after having passed alternatively into wind, smoke, mist, cloud and rain "they are born here as rice and barley, as herbs and trees, as sesame plants and beans." (Chand 5,10, 3-8). The latter idea of transmigration is not distinctly Vedic, because it is common almost to all peoples of antiquity. This belief that disembodied souls at death are resolved into different elements and that those elements are absorbed by planetary spheres is very similarly held by Hermes Trismegistus, (Lit. I 24-26a) W.Scott. Hermetica (1924) Vol I. p.127-129.

(2) J. Hertel Die Aritsche Feuerlehre (I) 1925 which contains an exhaustive analytical study of the Fire conception in the Indo-Iranian Religions.

(3) Chand. 5, 3, I. foll.

As Svetaketu could not answer any of these questions, neither could his father, they go both to Uddalaka, who instructs them into the secret doctrine of the pancagnividya.

Yonder world is the first sacrificial fire. In this fire the gods offer faith (sraddha). From this oblation arises King Soma.

The second sacrificial fire is parjanya, i.e. the rain-cloud. In this fire the gods offer King Soma. From this oblation arises rain.

The third sacrificial fire, which consists from the year (time) space, night and the quarters of heaven, is the earth. In this fire the gods offer rain and thence arises food.

The fourth sacrificial fire, which consists of speech, breath, tongue, eyes, ear, is man. In this fire the gods offer food and thence arises semen.

The fifth sacrificial fire is woman, which consists of the sexual organs and functions of the female. From this arises foetus. (1) There is no doubt that this mystical "five-fire doctrine" refers to sex as the universal creative principle in the universe, which is the cause of the manifestation of the phenomenal world. (2) It is interesting to

(1) Chand. Up. 5, 4 - 9 and Brh. 6, 2, 9-15. Deussen adds here by way of comparison, the parallel texts of the "five-fire doctrine" contained in Chand. Brh. Up. and Sat. Brah. (14, 9, 1, 12 - 16), which constitute, according to him the most important and fullest text of the theory of transmigration which we possess from Vedic texts. In his opinion the original doctrine is contained in S.Br. (Sechzig Upanishads des Veda, Leipzig 1921 III p.137-38.).

(2) The knowledge of Atman denotes indirectly the knowledge of the five-fire. (Sankara on Br. Sit. III, 1, 7). Consequently this would lead us straight into Brahmanic ontology had it not been for the metaphysical exposition of the text. Comp. also III, 1 1.

mention here, how old myths, beliefs and practices can be understood much better if interpreted in the light of modern investigations of folklore, especially psycho-analysis. Thus, the interpretation which Prof. C. Jung gives of the five-fire doctrine is very suggestive and throws much light upon the original beliefs and religious practices of mankind although this method does not always account for the deepest essences of human life. (See Psychology of the Unconscious ch. p.) We have an implicit suggestion of samsara at the end of XI, Khanda, "Having been born, he lives as long as it is his span of life. When deceased, they carry him to the appointed place, to the Fire, whence he came and whence he arose."⁽¹⁾ Of course, it is a very old idea, common to all ancient peoples, that life, or the essence which constitutes life, comes down from heaven in watery or fiery form, and after having fructified the earth, it passes from plants to animals, from animals into man. After their death men are taken to heaven by the funeral pyre and thereby nourish the vast reservoir of the universal life. The same idea is implied in Kathop, I, 6. "Like corn the mortal decays, and like corn is born again." But it is not necessary to lay undue stress on this fact, in order to prove that the doctrine of samsara could not spring from

(1) Chānd V, 9, 2. Sankara in his commentary interprets the words "as appointed" to refer to one's own action, done during life here.

(2) Chānd 5.2.16. "The soul's ascending foot of the mind should be understood, according to Sankara in a metaphysical sense. (See on Chānd V, 9, 2.)"

(3) Chānd 5.10.3; Chānd 5.2.16: "There is no one who is the cause of the world's decay, because there is here that is indestructible. (Sankara)." "

the Vedic Aryans. The coincidence of Indian samsāra with similar beliefs in transmigration held by other ancient peoples does not imply borrowing, but very possibly an independent growth, having for its background a different set of ideas.

Svetaketu, after having been instructed into the mysteries, the pañcāgni-vidyā, by King Pravāhana, is initiated into the "three-fold path" where the souls of the dead depart. First is devayāna (the way of the gods), saiyaloka of Śankara, where the souls of those "who know this" i.e. the philosophy of the Five-Fires, are conducted to the Sun and Brahma-world, and whence there is no return, i.e. the ceasing of the wheel of transmigration. The pitṛyāna (the way of the fathers) is the doom of the souls who have not liberated themselves by knowledge, but through sacrifices and other outward disciplines, such as charity, austerity etc. They go to the world of the fathers, and thence to the Moon, where they become food of the gods. "Rising up into the world, they circle round again and again." (1)

In addition to these two paths, there is a third place, reserved for those "who know not these two ways" and who are born continually as crawling and biting creatures, (kṣudrāṇi asakṛt āvartini bhūtani). (2) So those who do not possess either knowledge or works, do not participate in either of these two ways, but are incarnated in lowest animal forms. The "third place" refers very likely to hell, as it is evident from the commentary of Śankara on the Vedānta Sūtra and

(1) Bṛh. 6,2,16. "The soul's becoming food of the gods" should be understood, according to Śankara in a metaphysical sense. (Com. on Brahmasūtra, III,1,7).

(2) Chān. 5,10,8; Bṛh. 6,2,16: "Those who do not know these two paths become worms, insects and whatever there is here that is mischievous. (dandasukam)."

Upanishads. Dousson (1) finds incongruities in the exposition of the Brh. and Chānd.Up., which may easily be understood if we take into consideration that almost nowhere do we find a systematic exposition of the later Vedāntic doctrine, but chiefly have to rely for their understanding on the commentaries.

In the last-quoted passages of the Upanishads, we do not find a distinct moral idea underlying Śāṅkara's conception of saṃsāra; yet in another verse, conduct is the criterion which determines one's future; "Those who are of good conduct (raṃanīyacaranā) here, will enter a pleasant womb, either the womb of a Brahminee, or the womb of a kshatriyā, or the womb of a Vaiśya. And those who are of bad conduct here, will enter a stinking womb, either the womb of a dog, or the womb of a swine, or the womb of an outcast." (2) In the later Upanishads the means whereby the soul is released from the bondage of death does not depend merely on works, but on knowledge, for one "is born again here according to his deeds (yathākarma) and according to his knowledge (yathāvidyam)," in this or that condition etc. (3) Emancipation through knowledge, the goal of the Vedāntic thinkers, is clearly anticipated in the Chānd.Up: "Those who go hence without here having found Atman and those real desires, for them in all worlds there is no freedom. But those who go hence having found here the Atman and those real desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds." (4) In these passages, which refer to future

(1) System des Vedanta, 365 & 381; Sechzig Upanishads. p.157.

(2) Chānd: 5,10,7. This point is fully elaborated in the Mann Code.

(3) Kaṣh.Up. 1, 2.

(4) Chānd.Up. 8, 1, 6.

life and rebirth, we see the last connection with the traditional future retribution as expressed in the Vedas, which teach, according to Deussen, "a double retribution, once by reward and punishment, and again by rebirth upon earth."⁽¹⁾ Essentially, there is little difference between Vedic and Upanishadic belief in the destiny of the soul. Previously the Vedas had explicitly admitted, though in an anthropomorphic sense, the reward and punishment in the Yama-world, as well as enjoyment in the sukrtam loka, while the Upanishads implied the same belief in the retributive nature of a continued existence in this world, instead of in heaven and hell.⁽²⁾

More explicit is Yājñavalkya's section of the Bṛh. Up., which belongs to the genesis of the doctrine of transmigration, and which is quoted above. When asked by Ārtabhāga what becomes of a dead man when his organs and functions go to the constituent parts of the universe, he answered, "Take my hand. We two only shall know this (question). This is not (to be known by unfit person) in public. (na nāvetat sa jāna iti). Having gone out, they discussed it. What they said was karma. What they praised was karma. Verily by good action one becomes good, bad by bad action."⁽³⁾

In this passage karma is to be understood as cosmic law

(1) Philosophy of the Upanishads. (Eng. trans) p. 329. Deussen, in his Sechzig Up. des Veda, distinguishes eight stages in the evolution of the theory of transmigration, the "five-fire doctrine" being the combination of the Vedic belief in future life and Yajnavalkya's teaching. (p. 139-140). Though this classification may be interesting, it does not bring us much nearer to the original doctrine.

(2) Oldenberg: Religion des Veda. (1917 II) p. 531 foll. Comp. Lehre der Upanishaden: "überhaupt scheint man sich in den Upanishaden vielmehr mit dem Gedanken an kommende Daseinsformen, als mit den Wanderungen der Vergangenheit zu beschäftigen." (p. 108). Cf. R. E. Hume Thirteen Principal Upanishads. (1921) p. 55.

(3) Bṛh. Up. 3, 2, 13. It is interesting to note that Sankara in commenting this passage does not make it much clearer, as one would expect, but only repeats the same thing in other words. Action, according to Sankara, is material cause of man for assuming a body.

and not as a substratum of the personality, i.e. a transcendental power, which upon the dissolution of the psychic organism brings into being a new psychic complex. (1) Here we are introduced immediately, without the slightest preparation on the part of the speaker, to the central moral conception of vedantic doctrine: The idea of karma is attributed to the existing difference of character in different persons. In another passage, Yājñavalkya emphasises the dharmic law which regulates the destiny of the soul of a man. When a man's prāṇa goes out, "his knowledge and his work and his former experience (pūrvaprajña) accompany him." (2) After having exposed the essence of the soul (ātman) which is gradually released from the bonds of ignorance, Yājñavalkya continues: "According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, such does he become (yathākārī yathācārī tathā bhavati). The deer of good becomes good. The deer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action." (3) Here we are met with two important ideas underlying the karma conception: desire (kāma) and work (karman). It has been suggested that these passages refer only in a general manner to future existence and not to successively repeated existences after death, or to reincarnation as men etc; and further, that we must understand these verses either in a Buddhistic sense or take them as referring to blissful

(1) H. Jacobi: Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee beider Indern. (1923) p.9. On the other hand his view that karma is based on the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the apūrya, (a mysterious entity which attaches itself to the soul of man in sacrifice) is suggestive and may be correct although Keith considers it dubious. (Karma Mīmāṃsā p.73 ff). Comp. Sankara's Brahmasutra. (S.B.E. XXXVIII, pp.109-110).

(2) Brh. Up. 4, 4, 2. According to Roer's transl. pūrvaprajña is the knowledge of former life. (i.e. memory).

(3) Brh. 4, 4, 5. Similarly in Katha Up. 5, 7. The souls reincarnate into different beings "according to their deeds, according to their knowledge" i.e. according to the nature of their knowledge acquired in the former life, is the comment of Sankara.

life in the sense of the Brāhmanas; also, that Yājñavalkya teaches karma and liberation, but not transmigration. (1) The author's point of view cannot be considered valid, since there is enough evidence scattered in the Upanishads to show that in the Hindu mind the concepts of karma, reincarnation and saṃsāra are bound together, and never conceived separately, since the idea underlying them is moral retribution and very often one implies the others. (2)

We are gradually led, step by step, to the root-matter of the karma notion, which is especially accentuated in Buddhism: "As is his desire such is his resolve (kratuḥ); as is his resolve, such the action he performs; what action he performs, that he gets as result." (3) This passage is almost identical in essence with a similar passage to be found in Sat.Brāh. (4) "Brahman should be worshipped as truth (satyam). Verily, the man consists of purpose (kratumayo), and according to the completeness of his understanding when he departs this world, thus he becomes, after having passed away." Chānd Up. (5) uses the same words: "Verily, a person consists of purpose (kratumayo). According to the resolve which a person has in this world, such he becomes on departing hence." The man's essential nature is bound up

(1) Z.D.M.G. LXIV, p.333-35.

(2) Magnum: H.J.Ph. p.56-57. That the Brāhmanas in several passages implied these concepts has been shown before.

(3) Bṛh. 4, 4, 5.

(4) 10, 6, 3, 1.

(5) 3, 14, 1. Sankara says: "According as a man's will or determination is in this world, during his present life, so does he become when departing from this body." Although his comment refers to the determination one must have in order to meditate upon Brahman, the conception underlying it is the primeval desire, as being the root of the world, as elsewhere is clearly stated.

with his own action: "Where one's mind is attached, the inner self (lingam) goes thereto with action, being attached to it alone. Obtaining the end of his action, whatever he does in this world, he comes again from that world to this world of action (tasmāt lokāt punar iti asmai lokāya karmaṇa iti)."(1) Thus the man who is guided by desire, wanders from world to world. Later, the whole moral outlook on Indian thought is built upon the conception of desire, as the efficient cause in producing effects. The whole scheme of the karma doctrine is worked out on the ground that the original cause of any action whatever, is desire (kāma), which brings us very near to Schopenhauer's conception of will, as an essential and fundamental principle in ourselves and in the universe. The idea of "desire" being the primal root of the world-creation may be traced back as far as the R.Veda in the well-known hymn. (2) In the Sāṅkhya system desire constitutes the eternal driving force of existence and, as such, eternally rules the world. (3) This psycho-analytic method of finding out the primeval motives and cause of action (ādikarma) is not so much a characteristic of the early Brāhmanic literature, as it is of early Buddhist thinkers. (4)

Accordingly karma is only a link between one's personal desires and the effects which take place in due course of time. The quality of a man's desire is the leading thought which determines his future existence, whether the fruition

(1) Brh. Up. 4,4,6. This is the first mention of the word lingam in the Upanishads, in later writing elaborated as the linga-sarīra (causal body) which accompanies one's life through the whole cycle of samsāra.

(2) RV. I,129.4.

(3) Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 45. "By dispassion is absorption into prakṛti, through foul passion is samsāra," also in Sūtra, II,9.

(4) G.R. Davids. Buddhist Psychology. Ch. XI, esp p.257 foll.

of it comes in this life or in an indeterminate far-off future incarnation. Karma is, as it were, a metaphysical essence, always attached to one's personality, so long as his soul is governed by desires. As before stated, it is inconceivable to the Indian mind that generation on this earth is the birth of the soul for the first time. The present life is only a stage in the infinite series of lives through which the man's ātman has passed, whether it comes from the moon, where it has received the fruits of its works, as it is expressed in Kaush. Up. (1) or from any other planet. Man's life is compared by Śankara with the life of a plant, which springs up, develops and dies, but the seed of the plant survives in the new plant. So the seed of the works (desire) of a man remain and give rise to the next existence, according to his merit or demerit. (2) This analogy holds good in dealing with the metempsychosis of species, but in dealing with individual souls, we have to take into account the function of every individual within the evolution of a series of beings. Buddhism escaped this difficulty by denying individuality, whereas Śankara tried to avoid the same by dividing knowledge into metaphysical and empirical, absolute and relative. We should expect to find in the early Upanishads the systematic exposition of causation, which the karma conception implies. But it is only after many centuries that the terms which designate cause and

(1) I, 2. "All those who depart from this world, to the moon in truth they all go. During the earlier half it thrives on their prana, with the latter half it causes them to be reproduced. This in truth is the door of the heavenly world that is the moon. Whoever answers it, him it lets go further. But whoever answers it not, having become rain, it rains down here etc." i.e. This soul is reborn in different animals.

(2) Śankara on Brahmasūtra. 2, 1, 34.

III

The Early Buddhist Standpoint of Karma

"No god of heaven or Brahma world
 Both cause the endless round of birth.
 Constituent parts alone roll on
 From causes and from material sprung."

(Visuddhi Magga, 19. by Warren 279).

Even some of the oldest passages of the Upanishads show together with primitive beliefs and Vedic rites traces of a very advanced maturity of thought. Although they never seem to have represented a system in India in the European sense of the word, or to have treated strictly logically connected subjects, they have given birth to or formed an indispensable source of group-teaching for many systems and controversies in different systems of Hindu philosophy. They in truth represented a "vast ocean of knowledge" from the very fact of their complex nature and the various topics discussed in them. The fact that we now possess a limited number of those Upanishads or oral discourses on man's destiny and duties does not imply that originally they must have comprised a much larger body of doctrines since they were attached to Āraṇyakas. The wide scope of the subjects discussed or touched upon, does not lessen their comprehensiveness and depth, since their primary purpose was to initiate the duly prepared adhikari (vānaprasthas) for an independent religious and philosophical activity. That all important Indian philosophers knew and used the Upanishads for their study is obvious, not to mention many commentators from Gaṇiapāda, Śankara and Rāmānuja onwards. They are not distinguished from other primitive ritual

and philosophic texts so much by systematic treatment as by their suggestions. (1) If the problem "whether time, or nature, or necessity, or chance, or elements, or the purusa should be considered as the cause" was put in the Brh. Up. ^{and elsewhere} the great thinkers of India have answered them each in his own peculiar manner. The Upanishads laid down for all subsequent times the metaphysical principles upon which the Universe was based, i.e. that Ātman, in itself unknowable, is the subject of cognition and the only reality. The empirical knowledge developed later with a gradual evolution of philosophic and religious thinking in proportion to the individual understanding. It is a well-known fact that "systematic treatises were written in Sūtra-form, which did not elaborate the subject in detail, but only served to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted." (2) It may be objected that the Universality of Upanishadic influence for which many Indian writers contend, does not apply to Buddhism, since we have no direct literary evidence that the Upanishadic thinkers knew the reputed founders of the six systems, excepting Madarayana and Jaimini. Nevertheless there is enough suggestion in the fact that the Buddhist Canon mentions several Upanishads, but the absence of definite chronology prevents us from drawing certain conclusions.

The point where Buddhism parted from the Upanishadic trend of thought was in fully rejecting the reality of a permanent

(1) Comp. Dasgupta. H.T.Ph. 106-107.

(2) Dasgupta. H.T.Ph. p.62.

(3) *Notes on Upanishads, pp. 247, and elsewhere in Buddhist Sūtras where the subject of past, present and future is discussed.*

ego, as a self-contained entity. Buddhism found out through
 clever psychological analysis only phenomenal reality, mani-
 fested in the experiences of a complex personality, which
 constituted the only cause of suffering. Buddha himself was
 not a philosophic thinker in the usual sense, but a founder
 of a religion, whose aim was to free mankind from ignorance
 and suffering. (1) His chief purpose was to destroy sacrificial
 forms and the anthropomorphic conception of an Atman or God,
 which caused many speculations as to the nature of such a
 Being, and to draw attention to the actual experience of the
 moment (hence the title of his philosophy - Ksanikatvavyāpta -
 i.e. everything is new at every given moment). (2). Nevertheless,
 he was careful to avoid in dialectical discussions with his
 pupils the contested points which would mean the complete
 breaking-off from the former system. As always happens,
 whenever one aspect of reality is emphasised, it is done at
 the expense of the complete survey of truth, and hence there
 are many missing links and gaps in the ontological basis of
 Buddhism. Buddha considered all phenomenal existence from
 the standpoint of dynamic Becoming-aspect, whereas static
 Being - the aspect which implies continuity of becoming, was
 insufficiently stressed owing to his primary aim, viz. to
 destroy the Brahmanical Ātma doctrine. Most scholars agree
 that Buddhism was primarily a method by which liberation is
 achieved, and not a philosophy. This statement of fact does
 not elucidate many controversial points as to the gnostic
 value of primitive Buddhism. To judge only from the scanty

(1) Digha Nikaya passim; Of Compendium of Philosophy in many passages
 (2) Points of Controversy. p. 242 and elsewhere in Buddhist Suttas where the subject of past, present and future is discussed.

information of the earliest texts, which display so much ambiguity, is as hazardous as to think that Vedantic thought is contained in the Upanishads. The original meaning of the Buddhist central conception is untranslatable in European languages, much more so the ideas expressed in the Upanishads, which dealt rather with symbols and allegories of the Vedas, than with the logical sequence of words and categories. The absence of an argument sufficient to satisfy the curiosity of the pupil was supplemented with the answer - neti, neti, just as Buddha, when questioned about the becoming and the existence of the "I" kept silence or answered it by means of psychological analysis. Upanishadic thinkers knew the vital problems of existence and how to put them, leaving to individual questioners to realise the nature of the question. A correct answer depends very much on the nature and the way a question is put. It is conveniently pointed out by an orientalist that in Brahmanism magic and philosophy were closely associated, which to a large extent aids in the interpretation of the right meaning of their thought. Magic meant in past times, nothing but the acquisition of necessary forces for the realisation of a certain truth or belief.

There are some suggestive hints in the oldest Upanishads⁽¹⁾ (Brn. 3,2,13 and Ait. Ar. 2,1,3) tending to show that Buddha's principal doctrine, the non-existence of a self-identical and permanent self, was not lacking in them. Apart from this vague hint, here and there we can see this fact more clearly from internal evidence in different passages of the Upanishads, where the composite personality is said to dissolve at death into its primary elements and each of these goes back into its own

(1) Deussen: Sechzig Upanishads 435, Ans 1, and 494; Comp. Oldenberg: Lehre der Upanishaden (1905) 100, n.1.

appropriate prototypic Urgrund. The very fact that Buddhism split into several important sects, such as Mahayana and Hinayana proves clearly the necessity which the later adherents of Buddha felt for completing Buddha's negative attitude withgnoseological justification. Primitive Buddhism did not inquire into the morphology of being and cosmos, but occupied itself with the moral laws which determine human experience. In denying a permanent value to individuality in any sense (and consequently destroying the ground principles - mind and consciousness), it made impossible any inquiry into the metaphysical questions of being and purpose. To see "everywhere confinences, conjunctures of conditions and tendencies from which at a given locus something individual came to pass"⁽¹⁾ did not sound always convincing to the Buddha's pupils. Here and there a doubt arises: "If nothing in body or mind has or is self (atta) what soul is there to be affected by deeds which no soul has done?" After having rebuked the inquirer for such a heretical question, he answers "Ye, bhikkhus, have been trained by me in causation respecting various states under various conditions." If it be granted that mind is impermanent and consequently liable to suffering and change, is it proper to say of that which is liable to suffering and change "this is mine", "I am this", "This is the soul of me?"⁽²⁾ The same theme is developed over and over again, that the self is not to be found in any of the aggregates or in their combination; and when Buddha is asked who has feeling or sensation, he points out that he does not assert that any one feels, but that there is feeling. Even Buddha's

(1) R. Davids. Buddhist psychology, p.9.
 (2) Majjhima Nikaya, III, 19. (transl. by Mrs. R. Davids).
 (3) ... Buddhist psychology in India and Ceylon ... p.5.

aggregate does not claim permanency, since it includes many previous births and present changes. (1) This very problem, whether the Tathagata persists or not, produced the theory of Dharmakaya Buddha and Tathagātagarbhā as being the eternal embodiment of the Law of Karma, a kind of metaphysical soul which pervades the whole universe and all beings, without being itself involved into it. (2) He is invested with the functions of a god just as Kṛṣṇa in Bhagavad Gītā. The concept of Dharmakaya would correspond fitly with the Hindu conception of Brahman and antaryāmin. Just as in the evolution of the Christian doctrine the relation between the person of Jesus and Christhood has given rise to many sects and divisions, so the relation between Gotama and Buddha had to be subjected to the scrutiny of later Buddhistic thinkers, who wanted clearer understanding of the Buddha's personality, apart from its metaphysical aspect. (3) The answer that Buddha neither persists nor is annihilated might have satisfied the curious bhikkhu, overwhelmed and dazzled by his Master's personality; but in due course of time, when various Buddhist Councils were held, the ontological problems came to the surface, and the appearance of many sects testifies to the acuteness of the problem. The very silence of Buddha on some controversial points, such as whether there is a permanent Conscious Self, or whether Gotama exists or not, left enough room for future discussions. If

(1) Passages emphasising this leit-motive of early Buddhism may be found in many places.

(2) H. T. Suzuki. Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism (London 1907) ch. IX, esp. p. 227 foll. where different interpretations and qualities ascribed to Dharmakaya Buddha are given. P. Oltramar La Théosophie Bouddhique (Paris 1925) pp. 318-319.

(3) Comp. B. Keith. Buddhist philosophy in India and Ceylon (1923) p. 3.

one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, whether a Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, whether there was no permanent self and all dhammas were changing, it is logical to think of them as mere void, as śūnyavādin thought.

Buddha adopted the fact of transmigration without accepting a transmigrating self (the technical phrase being: "Apart from conditioning cause there is no coming to pass of consciousness.") and his dialectic in all cases for such a doctrine consisted in refuting inductively, one by one, the aggregates which made up a "person". (1) Most ingenious efforts have been made by some scholars to justify Buddha's attitude, without having answered why Buddha thought in such a manner. Mrs. Rhys Davids, who has brilliantly analysed the Buddhist psychological attitude of mind, suggests the following answer: "In the same way as we accept the transmission of mental qualities from parents to offspring without understanding it, Buddhists are equally unenlightened as to the nature and medium of the rebirth-force, but for them its logic is irrefutable." (2) G. Rosenberg (3) tries also to avoid the difficulty

concerning controversial points

(1) On Silence of Buddha see Digha N. I, 187; III, 136 (P.T.S.) esp. R.G. Franks in Z.P.N.E. "Buddhalenre im Digha Nikaya" vol 69. p. 456 sq: Sam. Nik. (Book of Kindred Sayings II, 151.) "Because this - i.e. whether Tathagata exists or not after death - does not pertain to our good, it belongs not to the first principles of the divine life... it does not lead to Nibbana." In III, 77-78 we read: "Is it possible, brethren, that some senseless person, sunk in ignorance and led astray by craving, may think to go beyond the Master's teaching?" asks Buddha, and then follows the usual argument. In Majj. Nik. (transl. by Bhikkhu Silacara, 1924 p. 226 foll.) a certain monk Sati is rebuked for teaching the persistence of consciousness in the samsara-state.

(2) Buddhist Psychology, p. 26.

3) Die Probleme des Buddhistischen Philosophie (1924)

which is purely ontological apart from its gnostic meaning by saying: "Each life is only a part-epoch in the endless process of becoming of the given Dharmastream..." No transmigration is going on, but an endless transformation of the dharma complexes, a new formation of the element substratum just as in a kaleidoscope (216). If Pali literature has no specialised term for memory,⁽¹⁾ the accumulated previous experience, whether conscious or unconscious, past or present, but only self-state (attābhāva), and still recognises the fact of transmigration, we have no legitimate basis to conclude that we could ever pierce the logic of the Buddhistic mind. This simply means that we cannot understand these two concepts without paying due regard to the internal evidence or to commentators, who must have felt this lacuna. If Buddha taught only what is useful to religious life, i.e. Four Noble Truths, it is curious to notice that this utility could be based only on the doctrine of momentariness. The doctrine of causation, which is held to be the ground-plan of his teaching, is very illuminating in some points, so we must go back to it to find a more satisfactory answer.⁽²⁾

All cosmic phenomena are sankhāra (complexes), cause and effect simultaneously. Every living being is passing on this earth owing to some individual specific energy (Ūkcraft), inborn in it. This is Karma, which constitutes the sum-total

(1) Buddhist Psychology. p.237. There is no reason whatever on psychological grounds why we should not translate pali sati (ansk. sarti) with our word "memory".

(2) Majj.N. I,426. L. de la Vallée Poussin: Nirvāna p.39-71; E.Oltmanns: Theosophie Buddhistique. p.159 fol.

of all activities in its relation to the outside world. This energy is manifested in aggregates of subjective experiences, denoted by the term khandas, which are only phases of experiencing. Reality is a becoming. That entity which we call "I", being at the same time potential and actual agans is a mere mode of being of karma (here understood as causal energy), since in every moment of being it represents a new value. So all beings are an-atta (not-self). Implication of a permanent self from this standpoint is senseless. (1) The "I process" is dependent on consciousness (viññāna), but this "I" assumes in every moment a new karmical value in relation to which, and for which only it exists. As P. Dahlke says: "Bewusstsein ist der Grenzwert, in dem in jeder Daseinsmoment Form der Energie und diese selber zusammenfallen und damit das was dem Ichprozess nicht nur die begreifliche, sondern auch die wirkliche Kontinuität gibt." (2) In the well-known "Fire Sermon" the whole world-existence is said to typify a huge burning furnace and every being burns according to his inborn energy. (3) There is no transigrating self in the Vedantic sense of the word, no "onlooker", but "I" in every moment is identified with act itself, speech, thought. What determines biological birth in the Samsara-state, is not father and mother, but the works

(1) Mahāvagga, 1,6.

(2) P. Dahlke, Buddhismus als Weltanschauung. II. p.52-53.

(3) Mahāvagga, I, 21. by Warren. Buddhism in Translation; Harvard Oriental series, p.351 foll. More emphatically stated in Mahāvagga I, 6 (Warren 146-50). Comp. P. Dahlke, o.c. p.51. Different view of the simile used by Buddha in R. Davids Stud. Psych. 225, n.2.

done in a previous existence, and a new product born is not the heir of father and mother, but he is heir of acts and is called "jassavoni" i.e. having karma for matrix as the cause of rebirth. (1) An "I" is in every moment of existence a final member of a beginningless series of "I sayers". Nirvana consequently consists in removal of those characteristic marks of an "I". Samsāra means a "wandering together" of necessary causes and effects, "fructification of individual energies"; as P. Bahke says: there is no continuity in "I" but it is karma which imports continuity to "I". Consequently consciousness itself (vināna) (2) or awareness is devoid of a substantial unity and may be taken as karma energy itself under special circumstances, since it is identified with mind (manas) and intelligence (citta) all three representing a sphere of cognition. (3) In Buddha's words it is only one of twelve dependent conditions of existence. So 'Becoming' was the central concept, composed of successive static points which are multiple, different in quality, discontinuous in themselves. The process of cognition is based on consciousness, but itself appears in co-ordination (sārūpya) with its objective elements, the agent denoting simply the cause. Just as the light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames, similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. (4) Such a

(1) Milindapanha, 65. Dhammasangani, 66.

(2) B. Bahke. Budd. Psych., 53 foll.

(3) O. Rosenberg. Die Probleme des Buddhistischen Philosophie (Heidelberg 1924) 2 pts. ch. XIII, p. 177 foll.

(4) Abhidharma-Kosa, ch. II. Comp. Siderbalaky, Soul theory, pp. 937-8.

system, which denies the existence of a permanent self, splits everything into a plurality of separate elements, and admits of no real interaction between them, such a system could not permanently stand the test of the logical mind of the later Buddhists; hence it was largely modified in some sectarian developments of the original Buddha's teaching. (1)

The primitive Buddhist mind permitted continuity on a psychological ground which is related to experience such as may be intuitively realised, but not ontological continuity pertaining to reality, apart from and independent of experience. If a primitive Buddhist thinker had recognised an ontological continuity, that would necessarily have destroyed the doctrine of an-attā. The result of this conception is that all stages of the samsara are causally dependent from each other and conditioned by each other.

When we know the cause of a certain condition, thereby we have found the means for its cessation and when the cause for an action is eliminated, thereby its effect is eliminated. Hence in twelve niānas is the only causal law, and the position may be summed up in Buddha's words: "The well-taught Aryan disciple gives his mind thoroughly and systematically to the causal law (patisaṃsamppāda), i.e. this being that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that ceases; from the ceasing of this, that ceases." conditioned by ignorance activities (come to be) conditioned by activities, consciousness, and so on." (2)

(1) Schopenhauer: Erkenntnislehre nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhisten, *passim*
 (2) Book of the Kindred Sayings. (P.T.S.) II. Transl. by Mrs R. Davids. (p.45) also p.66 and elsewhere; Points of Controversy p.186 *fol.*

The fact of rebirth is due to viññāna and taṇhā; consciousness and desire. (1) Karma is only a condition, a vehicle through which group-elements operate. It is based upon the doctrine of dependent origination and it seems to imply a double aspect. At one time it is consciousness, name and form raising a karma from ignorance; at another time it is birth by means of desire, here karma as existence is equivalent to karma as cause consequence. (2) Rebirth did not mean transmigration for the early Buddhist, since that would imply a permanent entity, but only a passing-on of a series within certain conditions. "It is only elements of being possessing a dependence that arrive at a new existence; none transmigrated from the last existence nor are they in the new existence without causes contained in the old.... there is no entity, no living principle; no elements of being transmigrated from the last existence into the present one; nor, on the other hand do they appear in the present existence without causes in that one." (3) Thus, causation is karma. Samsara is beginningless. Suffering and death are inseparable from existence. The past is suffering and the present represents suffering and the far-off future has terrible suffering in store for him who has not obtained Nirvana. For Buddha speaks to his disciples a stereotyped phrase: "Incalculable is the beginning, brethren of this samsara. The earliest point (pubba-koti) is not revealed of the running on, the faring on of beings cloaked in ignorance, tied to craving." (4) The Buddhist idea of the mechanism of transmigration differs very little from

(1) Ananda-Vagga (Ang. Nik. I, 216 foll.)
 (2) Vimuddhi-Nigga. ch. XVII (in Warren: Buddhism. 194 foll).
 (3) Vimuddhi Nigga. ch. XVII (Warren. p. 238). The explanation of the law of causation in connection with birth is contained also in Mahanidana Sutta (Digha Nik. II, 55 foll). Comp Z.R.M.C. 52, 688 foll.
 (4) Sam. Nik. II, 179. Transl. in Book of Kindred Sayings, II, 118-19.

the old Brahmanic idea. The conception in the womb is ascribed either to gandharva, a subtle entity which roams about and desires to become reincarnated in human and animal bodies, or to hirana.⁽¹⁾ We find already in the RV. the same conception of gandharva-beings who serve as intermediaries in the incarnation of living beings.⁽²⁾ According to de la Vallée Poussin, Buddhism ignores the Aryan concepts of Brahmanism on the mechanism of reincarnation, which is right to the extent that one system excludes the possibility of a re-incarnating jīva, but both presuppose a compositum of elements out of which a living being is born. The resemblance between the two concepts is much greater, if we compare Kh. Up. 4,4,5 (made of "this", made of "that") and similar passages which speak about the release of the soul, with Buddhist Majjhima Nik. II, 137, and especially 1,73 where an ascetic says "A being is built up of the four elements. When he dies the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth; the fluid to the water; the heat to the fire; the windy to the air; and his faculties pass into space."⁽³⁾ The difference between the two conceptions is that Buddhism did not permit of any kind of subtle or gross envelope which should go from one existence into another, but conceived that with each birth elements

(1) "Where consciousness is firmly placed and fruitful, there is descent of name and form. Where there is descent of name and form there is growth of activities. Where there is growth of activities there in the future is renewed becoming and rebirth etc. (Sam. Nik. translat. II, 71; Comp. II, 9.

(2) Deussen, A.G.Fn. I, I, 253. Bibliography of the Buddhist conception of the transmigrating cause indicated in Poussin's Hirvana. p. 28 N, 1, 2.

(3) Dialogues of Buddha. (S. A. B.) (transl. by T. W. R. Davids II, 73). The discussion of the subject in question. Poussin's Hirvana, pp. 27-32. Comp. Dialogues, vol. III, 66 foll.

were formed in a new way, but on the basis of causes started in a former existence. In Yimudhi Sutta we read that when one arrives at the gate of death, all elements are loosened and wrenched apart and only consciousness continues to exist in virtue of the previous karma which through a reflexive power enters a new mode of life. (1) In so far as consciousness still subsists and desire and ignorance have not been abandoned, desire inclines consciousness to the sense-world (since consciousness and karma are dependent upon each other). So long as a single moment of consciousness exists, we may speak of passing away and only being reborn into physical existence is called rebirth. We should be on guard against falling into heresy by assuming that consciousness from a former existence is not extinguished with death; consciousness of a new existence is formed from causes contained in the old existence which are karmic predispositions. (2) In fact, there is here neither absolute sameness nor an absolute diversity, but only the appearance of groups (kkhandas) constitutes rebirth. The process of birth consists in working out the five groups of grasping (panupadanakkhandha), i.e. in the becoming of these five groups, having corporeal organism as their basis. Grasping itself is dependent upon tanha (desire for anything within the world), the latter depending on attachment. The causal connection between a former death and a new birth is determined by the main thought which a living being has in the moment of death, if the tendency of will is

(1) HEITZER. o.c. p.238.

(2) The same p.239 foll. Copm. Milindapanna pp. 256-57.

present at all even in latent condition. (1)

Apart from dharma (dhamma) which represents for the Buddhist mind the law of the order of the universe or the norm (as in Brahmanic conception), the most important doctrine of Buddha is karma. The meaning of the former term has been analysed and explained in a most satisfactory manner by Geiger. (2) It is a different case with karma, since its use as presented in canonical and later Buddhist books is much larger than in Hinduism. On the whole we may classify the application and meaning of the Buddhist karma (kamma) under four main headings. 1. It is used first in the sense of active deed or action in general. 2. Acting with special reference to both deed and doer which includes its systematic development in subjective and objective action and interaction of act and agent: phala and vipāka (fruit and maturing). 3. The effect of that action which persists after the action has been performed and hence an universal law of cause and consequence. (3) 4. Viewed as an abstraction it becomes efficient cause or energy whereby beings are brought into existence. (4)

Considering the manifold and very elastic use of the concept "kamma" in early Buddhistic scriptures, it is difficult to give an exhaustive presentation of it within a small compass. This fixation of meaning is still more difficult owing to the use of synonymous terms for one and the same concept. Nevertheless, a clear distinction may be made between the conception of karma as

(1) Warren, Buddhism in Translations and in many Buddhist Suttas

(2) Pali Dhamma in Abhand der Bayer Akad. XXX, 1. (Munster 1921)

(3) Sankhāra in this sense may be taken as synonymous with karma since both karma and sankhāra come from the root 'kar'.
R. O. Francke, D. Sc. translated in Quellen der Religionsgeschichte 1913. p. 310.

(4) Comp Pali-English Dict. (Ed. by R. Davids & W. Stede, 1922) under word "kamma".

sacrifice in the Brahmanas, where it meant a magical potency capable of governing not only men, but the highest gods and the similar role which the very same term assumed in Buddhism. That Buddha had to clear from his Brahmanical pupils many misconceptions and wrong ideas as to the cosmical activities is evidenced in many suttas. A greater task lay with the Buddha - to lessen the Ātmanistic doctrine which presupposed an individual agent which persisted throughout eternity. Instead of letting one's own mind brood over origin and creation, Buddha cut deliberation short by putting before the mind of his pupils one fact of everyday occurrence - suffering and the removal of the cause of suffering. In spite of the newness of the doctrine, the minds of his adherents were already prepared and we have several hints in the Upanishads, which point out or are tending towards Buddha's conception. The cosmical effect of the duly performed sacrifice was rooted deeply in Brahmanical writers who were, perhaps, unconsciously, speaking of the cosmical sacrifice. No doubt, karma as chain of causation was raised by Buddha to a kind of hypostasised divinity. The Indian mind was always inclined to comprehend eternity as a continuous motion, and Oldenberg's surmise that there exists a similarity of the trend of thought, Brahmanic and Buddhistic, is not completely without foundation. (1) Both regard work and release as two things excluding each other, and both aim at liberation from the world, no matter how different the views they might hold as to the metaphysical postulates of existence.

The Buddhists, by resolving living beings into a number of elements called dhammas, which possess no permanent existence,

(1) Buddha, 6, pp. 55-56. Another striking similarity between the two systems is pointed out by an Orientalist, who connects Kara with Krtyu (pall maccu) in Katha Up. Kindisch in his book Buddha's Geburt (pp. 120-121) takes this possible interpretation without arriving at a positive result.

destroyed individuality as a conscious factor which is the sum-total of these elements. However, one should not think that in this manner every responsibility for an action was undermined. There was always a way of escape, uniquely based upon the intuitive belief that something is permanent. But this difficulty of the relation between experiencing subject and experience was felt strongly by later Buddhists, who had to solve it in a twofold way. The first attempt consisted in reconciling the doctrine of a permanent self or "eater of the fruits of action with operating karma and this was the task of Pudgalavādin (individualists). Pudgala was considered to be an entity, a thing-in-itself (dravya), but inexpressible in its relation to skandhas. It is neither permanent nor impermanent. ⁽¹⁾ The second solution was offered in an attempt to look at desire as cause of rebirth, considering self (attā) as a series (samūtāna, santati) or a biological individuality. ⁽²⁾ From the second standpoint the self (soul) has no substantial existence whatsoever, but it is rather a medium which manifests various qualities, because it is composed of a series of sensations, which knows itself by itself insofar as it is a series. The second is the oldest view and in a way excludes transmigration, since there is no living being and the term "vital principle" is used only metaphorically by Buddha and his disciples. ⁽³⁾ Nevertheless, says M. Poussin, "this series of Buddhists, this non-permanent and multiple 'I' is a living plant. It is enriched every moment of its duration by previous acts not yet atoned for, it contains potentially

(1). A. B. Keith. Buddhist Philosophy, p.175; Poussin, Nirvana 34 fol.

(2) Keith. o.c. 167,174. Abhidharmakosa II, 185.

(3) Poussin Nirvana, 40; also Buddhism. Cf. Poussin: Buddhisme. (1925) p. 54 fol.

numberless future lives. Death does not interrupt it; death is only a crisis in its history.... it marks only the moment where it must begin, in new conditions, the retribution of a new set of actions." The Universe is a product of aggregates: all living beings give birth to the varieties of the physical universe, and hence every sentient being is closely connected with the universal life. Men, being only temporary combinations of the five skandhas are mere names for duration in which similar forms continue. Through a particular action individuals receive mind and body corresponding to the operative causes. Internal causes are dependent upon external conditions. Good and bad actions yield fruits, not at the moment when they are done, but at some future time (vipakaphala). Our present life is the reflection of past actions. In this manner past experience is actually possessed while future experience is virtually in the present moment. (1) The theory of the apparent anomaly of paṭicca-saṃpāda (i.e. becoming preceeding birth) can be understood only if we take into account the twofold division of bhava: kāmasabhava as appertaining to the past, whereas upapatti-bhava as existence on its active side, shaping the present and future, while both are resolved into creative presence. (2) How does karma operate in a conscious agent, if conceived in the sense of cause-consequence? Buddha answers: "I say bhikkhus, that volition (cetana) is karma; when we have willed, then we make karma by

(1) This problem of the relation of past, present and future was one of the important subjects of controversy "These past things of which the effect is matured exist, those past things of which the effect is matured do not." (Kathavattim I, 7-8 transl. as Points of Controversy (P.T.S.) pp.95 foll.

(2) Compendium of Philosophy. Transl. by S.Z.Aung (P.T.S.) pp.262-63. The diagram "wheel of life" being very useful; Kathavattim (transl.) pp.101 foll.

deed, word or thought." (1) The same definition is given in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakosa*: *cetana tatkrtam ca tat.* (2) . The determining factors of the operative karma are said to be *lobha* (greed), *doma* (anger or ill-will) and *moha* (bewilderment). (3) In the *Patisambhinnapa* formula, *Sankhara* are considered to be the aggregates of mental states which under the law of karma bring about the inception of the *patisambhivinnana* ("la pensee renaissante") or first stirring of mental life in a newly born individual, since they are antecedent to the birth or "coming into being". (4) The man brings with him (in accordance with the causal law) the predispositions (variously called in different texts) for existence, which inevitably drive him from one life into another so long as his karma has not been exhausted. A man at any moment of his life is precisely all that he is conscious of. The phase of his self-consciousness, the totality of that of which he is conscious is always changing and is consequently different at death from what it was at birth. An often quoted simile illustrates this "coming into being". If we take lamp to signify body and flames to signify changing self-consciousness, we shall still have an idea of the continuity in the series "One comes into being, another passes away, and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous." (5) Karma, as a

(1) Ang. Nik. III, 415 = Kathavatthi VIII, 9 (transl p.221); Comp. Sullabiddessa, 235 and elsewhere

(2) Cetana (volition) leaves traces (*vasanas*), a kind of consciousness lay in wait for an opportunity to reappear again in a new existence; A.KIV, 1 (translated by M. Poussin).

(3) Ang. Nik. IV, 96. Visuddhi Magga 116. Comp Madhyamika Sutra XVIII, 125.

(4) Majj. N. I, 433. (transl.). It is gandharva (pali gandhabba) which at the time of conception of a child enters the womb (Majj. N.I, 265). The gandharva-concept is essentially Brahmanic, but in Buddhism it is not an intermediary being, as a ghost, which participates in producing an embryo. (Poussin, J.A. 1902 pp.295-99. Oldenberg, Religion des Veda 253, n.1.)

(5) The questions of King Milinda (S.B.E. XXXV) pp. 63-65.

cosmical law rules supreme, both gods and men, and there is no means of escaping its consequences. Twenty-five kinds of karma are the origin of physical phenomena. (1)

In Suttanipata, one of the oldest writings, we are told:

"For one's deeds are not lost, they will surely come back to you, their master will meet with them; the fool who commits sin will feel the pain in himself in the other world. (2)

But in its earliest stage the conflict of nairātava and karmabhāva has not been solved at the same time as stated, as M. Poussin observes. (J.A. 1902, p. 303).

One is not a Brahmana by birth, but one who has liberated himself from the trammels of the phenomenal life, the one "who knows his former states of existence (pubbenivasam), who sees both heaven and hell and has reached the destruction of births" (S.H. v. 647). Just as for Sankhya, purusa, and for Śankara, ātman, were considered to be self-established (svarūpatah), so for Buddha the law of causation (karma) needed no proof whatever, since that was an immediate fact of human experience. In this manner Buddhism is illuminative in a negative sense, that the thought with its innate categories does not begin by an act received and imposed upon the "I", but that the latter is enclosed and comprised into that creative energy in the spontaneity of becoming. Life, considered from

(1) Compendium, p. 161 *fol.*

(2) Translation S.H.E. vol. I, p. 123 - Pali text.

Na hi nassati kassaci kamma etī na tam labhat' eva suvānī
gukkhāna mando paraloke attāni passati kibbisakārī (S.H. v. 666).

the standpoint of activity is suffering due to karma and the world is the playground where karmical effects are experienced. (1)

According to Abhidhammattha-Sangaha (transl. as "compendium of Philosophy") there are four classes of functional ^{or harmful} karma, each class being divided into four groups (See pp.

144-147). From the aspect of phala there are four kinds of action: (a) that which is dark with dark result (kanha-vipakam); (b) that which is bright with bright result (sukka-vipakam); (c) that which is mixed with mixed result (kanha-sukka-vipakam) and (d) with neither kind of result and which conduces to the destruction of karma, which refers to the fourfold Path-knowledge. (2)

The general division of the ^{origination} ~~functioning~~ of karma is threefold: kāyika, yācika and mānasika (karma affecting body, speech and mind). (3) The root of all three is

volition. Mental karma is the root-motive of all three. The man who has attained the state of arhatship is free from all karmas. An arhat may suffer the effects of an action done by him in some previous life, nevertheless, in spite of the remnants of his past karmas, ^{but} he is ^{regarded as} released owing to the cessation of his desire.

To the twofold effect of karma, good and bad, viewed

(1) Comp. Mrs. R. Davids. Buddhist Psychological Ethics. "Buddhists found the word sukham good enough to cover the whole ground of desirability from satisfaction in connection with sense up to the ineffable content of Nirvana..... His ethical system was so emphatically a study of the consequence of karma and vipaka (effects of karma), of seeing in every phenomenon a reaping of some previous sowing, that the notion of the good became for him inevitably bound up with result." (Intro. p.XCIII).

(2) Dialogues of Buddha; pt.III (1921) p.221. Comp Ang.Nik IV, 230 (P.T.S.)

(3) See Upali Sutta of Majj. Nik. (transl. by Neumann: Die Reden Gotamo Buddha's).

from the standpoint of phala, Buddhism added a third, viz. the indeterminate or fruitless states of consciousness (Dhammā svyākata), which means the absence of result, i.e. of pleasant and painful result. Besides dhammā which make up either good or bad karma, there is a third class of dhammā which make no karmical effect at all and are called indeterminate. Of these last some are simply results of good or bad dhammā, and some are not so, but are states of mind and expressions of mind entailing no moral result on the agent. Some again, while making no karma are of neither of these two species, but are dhammā which might be called either unmoral (rupam) or else super-moral (unconditioned element or Nirvana). These are held to constitute a third and fourth species of the third class of dhammā called indeterminate. (1) The indeterminate states are summed up in the Dhamma-Sangani (Buddh. Psychol. Ethics) § 983: The results of good and bad states taking effect in the world of sense, form or the formless, or in the life that is Unincluded, the Skandhas of feeling, perception, synergies and consciousness, inoperative states, moreover which are neither good nor bad, nor the last, all formed unconditioned element. (2) Buddha, in introducing the third category or indeterminate karma, drew a distinction between motive of acts arising from sensual desire and an ethically neutral state of bare cognition, as well as the desire after an ideal (Nirvana, Para-Nirvana etc). The cessation of desire or craving is a synonym for attaining Nirvana, the extinction of ill and its causes. In Kathavattu the absoluteness of the

(1) Buddhist Psychological Ethics. § 1366.

(2) Comp. § 431 foll. (for vipaka); § 566 foll. (for kiriya). and Buddh. Psych. Ethics. p.145 n.1 & 2.

law of karma is emphatically stated in many a passage and even transcendental attributes, as well as physical, are said to be due to karma. That the early Buddhist notions of karma, for instance such that a sound is due to karma, were modified, is to be explained by the impact of divergent beliefs, which survived in one form or another; this is obvious in many passages and would require a special treatise.

The Jain conception of karma, as being a kind of subtle matter or substance, makes its appearance here and there. But the fundamental conception of Buddhism is that karma acts as an universal cause and a mere vehicle or instrument through which life (consisting of aggregates of subtle or gross elements) is manifested. The Buddhist's idea of the moral law reigning in the universe - Dhamma - consisted in fact, in perception of the eternal truth of suffering, due to pleasure-pain principles, and of the Path whereby it may be overcome. This moral order was not conceived as a force imposed from outside, but "more like an infinite web that living creatures themselves are weaving."⁽¹⁾ In this manner, man and things are mere names for duration in which similar forms continue, the present life being the reflection of past actions. Karma is not heredity in the western sense but there are points of similarity. Between karma and rebirth, consciousness is one condition of cause and effect; between sensation and desire is a connection of effect and cause; and between existence and birth a connection of cause and effect. Consequently the wheel of existence has three connections of cause and effect and of cause and a predecessor.

(1) Dialogues of the Buddha. Transl. by T.W.R. Davids, pt. III, 187. *un problème de l'ontologie bouddhique t. I, (1915) p. 111*

IV

Considered philosophically, Buddha avoided two extremes to be found in some of the systems of Indian thought, namely, the doctrine of the Absolute Being and the negation of Being. He preached the "Middle Way" or the doctrine of "becoming by way of cause." ^{Similarly,} In the Hegelian system the apparent contradiction of being and non-being is resolved into a becoming. A being becomes, is determined, defined. But a determined or finiting being goes into the infinite; the finite is infinite, since nothing prevents our thought from ascribing its limits. This new contradiction is solved in the idea of individuality which is the unity of the finite and the infinite. Buddha admitted the first, i.e. becoming, but denied the latter, i.e. individuality. Buddha saw only that the world arises and disappears without acknowledging a conscious subject who is aware of that process. The Buddhist doctrine, although via negativa, in the truest sense is positive. Our "matter-moulded forms" of thought are the really negative things. The mind, in thinking of any particular thing, gives itself to that thing and so belongs to it. In utterly ceasing to belong to itself it ceases to have any self-consciousness and goes into Nirvana, no matter how we might conceive this final state. However, it was the task of his later followers to elaborate his teaching philosophically and to give it a philosophical basis. (1)

(1) comp. Ultramarra. in Museon; ~~et~~ Un problème de l'ontologie bouddhique t. I, 1 (1915) p. 11 and fol.

texts of the Amuṣitā (ch. XIXIV).⁽¹⁾ where the sages ask Brahmā: "We observe the various forms of piety to be, as it were, contradictory. Some say piety remains after the body is destroyed; some say that it is not so (i.e. Lokayatas or Cārvākas). Some say everything is doubtful (satyavādins); and others that there is no doubt (Tairthikas). Some say the permanent principle is impermanent (Tārikikas) and others that it exists (i.e. permanent, as Mīmāṃsākas); and others that it exists and does not exist (Vedāntins). Some say it is of one form or twofold, and others that it is mixed. (Referring to the theory of Parināma or evolution, according to Arjuna Misra). Some Brahmans, who know Brahman and perceive the truth, believe that it is one; others that it is distinct; and others again that it is manifold. Some say both time and space exist and others that it is not so. Some have matted hair and skins. Some are clean-shaven and without covering. (This refers undoubtedly to the followers of Buddha and Jains respectively). "Some people are for bathing; some for omission of bathing. Some are for taking food; others are intent on fasting. Some people extol actions, and others tranquility." Whatever the date of the present Mbh. may be, we get an insight from the above passage, that the epic has not an "encyclopaedical character" in the Western sense of the word, as Dahlmann affirms, but neither can we accept fully as final the opinion of L. Hopkins⁽²⁾ that Mbh. presents a loose incoherent mass of individual teaching, in which there are traceable six systems - Vedism, Ātmanism or Brahmaism, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Bhāgavata and Vedānta proper.⁽³⁾ Deussen sees in Mbh.

(1) S.B.E. VII, 375

(2) The Great Epic of India. (1902) p.90 foll.

(3) :: :: :: :: :: :: :: p.85.

a distortion of the primitive idealism of the older Upanishads and is inclined to believe that gītā and Mokṣadharmā are a transitional period of the "classical sāmkhya." Some scholars have attempted to prove that Mbh. represents a "mixed philosophy", whereas O. Strauss takes the rather moderate and acceptable view that the epic thinkers were not original minds, but popular exponents of the ideas which were current in their time, and consequently we cannot expect from them a systematic exposition of the different systems. (1) Oldenberg does not agree with R. Garbe's view that an influence was exercised on the Brahmanism of the Mbh. by the ideas of the Sāmkhya system in the period between the older and younger Upanishads. He considers the latter on philosophical grounds as a "developed product of Brahmanism." (2) Dahlmann regards Mbh. not as a heroic epic into which have been put at various times vast masses of didactic and unepic material. He holds that the epic in its earliest period was essentially a book of law (Dharmasāstra) and discipline, which the epic tale illustrates. He is bitterly opposed to the purely analytical methods and conclusions of some scholars, who see in it a heterogeneous mass of contradictory views, ^{and} ~~but~~ points out that these analytical methods are inadequate and purposeless, which deal exclusively with the considerations of the separate parts and lose sight of the

(1) O. Strauss. Indische Philosophie, München (1925) p.127

(2) Die Lehre der Upanishaden (1915) p.352-53. "Mir scheint Brahmanismus und Sāmkhya nicht Zweierlei, sondern das Sāmkhya ein wichtigstes, in gradliniger Konsequenz entwickeltes Produkt eben des Brahmanismus." Comp R. Garbe: Sāmkhya-philosophie (1917 II) says that the epic sources "die der Zeit auch unseren systematischen Sāmkhya-Schriften vorangehen inhaltlich jünger sind als jene." (p.56).

general character of the Epic. (1) The tendency of many scholars is rather to occupy themselves in finding out how several sections of the Mbh. differ from each other, without paying due consideration to the common character of thought. Because the fact, for instance, that authority (pramāṇa) is insisted upon in one place as the only valid authority, and in another place is rejected by the same authors or speakers, it does not necessarily, as Hopkins thinks, imply contradictions. (2) It would be as logical to think that one and the same subject-matter is considered and discussed from different standpoints, as is always the case with many great writings of ancient times. That at one place the Brahman says that he cannot efficiently accomplish the creation of the world without the Vedas (XII, 347, 32) and at another place (XIII, 208, 3) the god Brahman is said to be self-existent, eternal etc. does not imply contradiction and heterogeneity, but functional activity of the Supreme Being at different periods of time, viewed from different angles by ancient sages. The Gods themselves are made to come at last to the conception of their functional diversity even in Harivansa (K. 10. 662) "yo vai Viṣṇuḥ sa vai Rudro yo Rudraḥ sa Pitāmahaḥ; eka mūrtis trayo devā Rudra-Viṣṇu-Pitāmahaḥ." (3)

In spite of many controversies as to the date, make-up, and authorship of the Mbh. a large number of scholars agree on one point, that the Epic represents a transitional period of

(1) Genesis des Mbh. (1899) p.5 esp. p.12 foll; also in Sankhya philosophie (1902) p.VII fol. Winternitz in Gesch. Ind. Litt. (I, 264 fol) calls it "a whole literature" which presents a "magazine of bard-poetry," consisting of mythological legends of the Brahmanas as well as of Brahmanical philosophy, ethics and code.

(2) The Great Epic. p.90.

(3) Comp. Dussen: A.S. Ed. (1920 III) I, 3. p.30 foll: Mbh. XII, 34, 118 foll.

Hindu thought and practice, when Soma-chants, Vedic hymns and sacrificial performances were considered to be inadequate and unable "to preserve a fool from evil actions," and when "holy chants do not save from evil," as Sanatsujata speaks in 43 adh. of the Sanat. Dharma. Karma (works) and retribution takes a very important role throughout the Epic, as chief factor in fixation of one's destiny. (1) The Vedic moral of sacrifices is replaced by the simple formula: "yathā karma tābhā lābhah." Man is not considered any more to be subject to the changing mood of the gods, but his freedom as humanised divine being is emphasised and he can do what he likes. (XII, 290, 21; XIII, 1, 74) Śubha creates śubha, aśubha creates aśubha (XII, 192, 19). The Karma-theory takes a double aspect, as O. Strauss (2) points out: either to consider karma from the standpoint of phala, or to consider from the phala the operations of karma. In other words the cause and effect which underlie the karma theory, are convertible, as it is held by the Sankara school of Vedānta. But in order to make fitter the karma theory for practical life, the former

(1) Z.D.M.G. LXII, 666. A very bitter discussion has arisen between several scholars, (Oldenburg and Dahlmann on one side and Winternitz and Garbe on the other) as to the foundation of the oldest parts of the Mbh, especially Bhagavad Gītā. The contention of one, that Mbh. was based on Sāṅkhya-yoga principles was denied by others. But it seems most probable from the general character of the epic and other Indian literary products, that Sāṅkhya-yoga were not considered in their original forms as two different systems but two different paths for approaching the same reality. The very root Sāṅkhya (sam - khya) meant "numbering" and hence "reasoning", "reflection" so they have denoted ^{two} paths of empirical knowledge and inner illumination severally. (See Īyat. Up. VI, 13: comp. Dahlmann: Sam. phil. p. 38 fol.) Mbh. XII, 316, 2 - 4.

(2) Ethische Probleme aus dem Mbh. (p. 209-10) "Es besteht nämlich die Möglichkeit, von dem karmen aus vorwärts auf das phala zu blicken, oder umgekehrt von der Frucht rückwärts auf das Werk zurück zu schliessen."

loses its metaphysical rigidity, and especially in Bh. Gita, that a work, which is bad in itself may not be considered as such on account of its motive. So we find in the opening chapters of the Gītā the Lord Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to fight. (1) Both in the Upanishads and Gītā the emphasis is laid not so much on the value of a single act per se, but it is regarded that in the performance of an action, what is affected is not Puruṣa-Ātman, but man's outward appearance. (2) There are two aspects of wisdom - pravṛtti and nivṛtti, the path of works and the path of renunciation. In the simultaneous performance of both, liberation is attained.

Bhagavad Gītā.

Vary different and conflicting opinions have been expressed as to the general character of the Bhagavad Gītā and its connection with the religious and philosophical thought of India. (3) The profound influence exercised by it is due chiefly, not to the fact that it has arisen within a certain religious body, but rather to the universality of its message. It was not, in the present stage, the "text-book" of a particular religious sect, as R. Garbe contends, but an expression of the common forces of Hindu thought, when several philosophical and religious schools were fighting for supremacy. The fact that it contains many apparently conflicting tendencies

(1) In another place (XII, 36, 14) the bad works (asubhānām) if done with reference to the divine, may bring good fruits. (Strassmann Ethische Probleme, p. 211, n.1.).

(2) In Bh. Gītā II, 7. Arjuna asks what is right, i.e. absolutely good, and the Lord emphatically answers "Never did I exist, nor thou, nor these rulers of men; and no one of us will ever hereafter cease to exist." Later on (II, 20) He says that the Self is indestructible and immortal, when the body is killed.

(3) Cf. article "Bhagavad Gītā" by R. Garbe in E. R. E.

of thought does not justify us in assuming a deliberate borrowing, interpolations and later additions, but rather that the minds of its composers were moving in the same directions and towards the same conclusions along different paths. (1) That it had preserved its universal character for almost all Hindus, is proof enough that it was rather meant as an unifying spiritual force, and not as a systematic philosophic treatise. Hence, it is easy to understand its manifold variety of thought. Its greatness lies in its very manifold content, which combines Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and Yoga teaching into one harmonious whole. The Vedānta as understood by Śaṅkara, represents the stage of Hindu thought where perception and knowledge presupposed an intuitive vision, rather than sense-perception, and is metaphysical. This holds good as long as human beings are satisfied more with inner perception, which reveals the mystery of the Supreme Being. When the human mind emerged out of abysmal unconsciousness and began to inquire into the morphology of being-ness, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga system developed. Thus the Vedānta deals with pure being (to ontos on), Sāṅkhya with categories and forms of Being, whereas Yoga is an attempt to realise the Supreme Soul by means of inner development. In reading the Bhagavad Gītā one has the impression more of a gospel than a "collection" of different elements of thought,

(1) It is a very hypothetical and unwarranted hypothesis of R. Garha, expressed in his own translation, that the Vedantic element in it is a later addition. Similarly Hinternitz, who agrees with Garha against Hopkins and Oldenberg, that the Gita is neither a blending of the monism of the Vedānta with theistic bhakti religion, but that originally it was much shorter and that many passages represent later additions. (Gesch. Ind. Litt. I, 373 foll. III, 625). The criticism of the "vedantisierte" or "Brahmanical Überfärbung" of the original Bh. Gītā. See Oldenberg on H.G.G.W. (1919) p. 321 foll. Comp. Dr. Barnett: Introd. to his transl. p.

even in its present shape. (1)

The keynote of the religion of the Gītā is not non-activity, but the right activity according to the injunctions of scriptures (Dharma) having as its opposite adharma. (2)

Thus, dharma and adharma are therefore connected with karma, of which they are a species. (3) Dharma includes the whole sphere of religious moral and social functions and on its philosophical aspect means recognition of the various systems of religion and philosophy, as well as different means offered by those systems for the attainment of liberation. In this sense, it is coextensive with humanity itself, and may fitly be compared with Tao in Chinese philosophy or Aceton in Plato's philosophy. Therefore Dharma is explained by Krishna in Santi-parvan to be his own beloved first-born mental son. It does not mean syncretism, but that all different systems of thought and all religions have their proper value corresponding to the understanding of their adherents. It is the actual consciousness of Supreme Being, resident in man's inmost nature, which has led him to formulate some kind of conception of God, soul, evil, happiness etc. Some kind of dharma is assumed in all

(1) The fact that the Gita, according to some scholars may have been originally a text-book of the Bhagavata religion, does not affect its universal character. Most ingenious efforts have been made on the part of some scholars to find out "original Bh. Gita", especially R. Garbe in his translation of it. (p. 21 fol. and in E.R.E. II, 536-37). He contends that Sankhya-Yoga constitutes almost entirely the fundamentals of the Gita. Comp. Radha-Krishnan: Ind. Philosophy. p. 527 fol. and 530 fol.

(2) IV. 18. "He who can see non-action in action, and also see action in non-action, he is wise among men, he is yukta, he is performer of all action" is interpreted by Sankara to mean nivrtti and pravrtti aspect of karma, which makes up a balance.

(3) The substance of this Brahmanic concept is held by all Hindus. Dharma (rt. dhri. to uphold, maintain) however, as a technical term, has its own peculiar meanings in Buddhism (see Rayn David: Buddhism ch. II). In Jainism dharma means principle of motion, whereas its opposite adharma is a principle of rest.

the fundamentals of every religion. From the metaphysical standpoint, Hindu dharma in man implies that man is what he is, is as perfect a being as ever he can be (hence the great logion - "I am Brahma"), but he has not realised what he is in his human experience.

The second great moral axiom of the Gita is doing the right thing without being attached to the fruit of action (karmaphalāsangam). "Thy concern is merely with action, never with results" (II, 47; also III, 19; IV, 20; VI, 1.) "Always perform the action which should be done without attachment; for doing the action without attachment man reaches the Supreme." (). Dharma must be the ground motive of all action, since God Himself is in all beings "the desire unopposed to dharma" (dharmaaviruddho kamo'smi, VII, 11). "Better one's own dharma, though defective, than another's dharma well performed." (III, 35 XVIII, 47). If one does his duty according to his nature (svabhavanियatan karma) he does not incur sin. As against Arjuna's despondency, Krishna is presented as typical karma-yogi, (III, 22 and IV, 9), born in every age as an avatara for the firm establishment of dharma, i.e. whenever the human values are endangered by the overwhelming forces of evil. (IV, 8). This Krishna quells the scruple of Arjuna over the murdering of his enemies by the Upanishadic utterance "If the slayer think to slay; if the slain think himself slain, both these understand not. This one slays not, nor is slain." (Katha, 2, 19). Karma (action) is universal (18. 16; VIII, 5) and is fitly associated with sacrifice. In the consciousness of the Hindus it was symbolic for the world-process. Isvara limits Himself, in order that the universe may be made manifest, a thought which pervades even RV. and

the Upanishads. The origin of all beings is due to sacrifice (VIII, 3), and as Dr. Barnett points out, (1) "The works may be regarded as a sacrifice, since sacrifice is a most important focus of Indian religious thought." All karmas proceed from the five-fold afflictions, just as in Patanjala-Sāṅkhya, namely avidyā (ignorance), asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dveṣa (antipathy), and abhinivṛsa (self-love), (18. 13 - 15) and all five may be regarded as five special stages of growth of avidyā. The impulse to action, and the quality of an act is threefold - sattvic, rajasic and tamasic. Consequently, threefold is the fruit of action. The fruit of good works is sattvic and pure, while the fruit of rajas is pain; the fruit of tamas is ignorance. (14, 16). Life after death is governed by the gunas. (V. 14-17). The quality of an action is qualified by the intellect (buddhi) which is also threefold (18, 30 - 32). Even Gods are subject to gunas, and duties of the castes are ordained according to their respective nature (svabhāvaja). (2) "Niyataṁ karma, which is free from attachment and is done without love or hatred, by one not desirous of the fruit, is sattvic." (18, 9, 23). The opposite of it is rajasic. Tamasic action is defined to proceed from delusion (moha), since it is done regardless of consequences, loss, injury etc. (18, 25). In the jñāna-yoga chapter of the Gita, action is said to be threefold - good action (karma); bad action

(1) Mag. Gītā. Intr. p.69.

(2) O. STRAUSS in Z. D. M. G. LXII, 670, considers that the svabhāvaja is a technical term and cannot be translated as "his nature." The suggestion is very plausible because very often in the Gītā and elsewhere in Mbh. svabhāvaja does not mean at all "his nature", it takes on the meaning of prākarma, the result of actions in a former birth. For instance in 17, 2, "trivichā bhavati śradhā dehināṁ sa svabhāvaja." svabhāvaja is sometimes contrasted with the transcendental Brahma, i.e. it expresses the particular character of the empirical world: svabhāvo' dhyātmanamcyate (VIII, 3).

(vikarma) and inaction (akarma) (IV, 16-17). Prakṛti sometimes used in the sense of svabhāva, whence all action originates, typifies our likes and dislikes, is that element whence the gunas originate. Only when a man rises to dispassion and acts without attachment is he free from the future bondages of karma. "The Lord is not the cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions amongst men or of the connexion of action and fruit. But it is nature (svabhāva) that acts." (V, 14).⁽¹⁾

Similarly to the Upanishadic and yoga-philosophy, the Brahman is conceived as an ūrdhvanāla avākāśha aśvattha (a tree with its roots upwards and branches below, - the aśvattha-tree symbolising here saṁsāra,⁽²⁾ which should be cut with the "strong sword of dispassion", namely, knowledge as understood by Sankara because the release from sin is at the same time a release from ignorance. (IV, 1 - 4). Dispassion (vairagya) means indifference to the fruits of action and he who is above the pair of opposites, equanimous in success and failure, although acting, is not bound, and he reaches the eternal goal (padam avyayan).⁽³⁾ (IV, 22; V, 3; IV, 5).

(1) The svabhāva is interpreted by Sankara as avidyālakṣaṇā-prakṛti, and is connected by him with VII, 14, where it is said "this divine illusion of mine, made up of gunas, is hard to surmount." The lack of precision of the term svabhāva in different places, which sometimes means prakṛti (as in XII, 22, 16) and sometimes inner disposition of man, is indicated by Strauss: Einische Probleme p. 245 n. 2. In Svet. Up. (1, 2), in conjecturing concerning the first cause svabhāva is mentioned as one of the elements. We see also from Gandapāda on Sāṅkhya Kārikā (V. 61) that svabhāva played important parts in early Indian conceptions.

(2) A similar conception of the world as an eternal fig-tree growing out of Brahma in Kaṭha. 6, 1.

(3) The supreme goal of the mukti is variously named aiśvarya (perfection) in XII, 10; para siddhi (supreme perfection) 14, 1; parāṅgati (supreme goal) in 16, 23; 6, 45; 8, 13; 9, 32; padam anāmayam (blissful seat) 2, 5; sarvatham padam avyayan (the eternal indestructible abode).

Thus the Gītā's teaching is not concerned with inaction, but with the combination of action with non-attachment to the fruits and that implies a true attitude of the soul towards the world at large. The moral anxiety ceases for the man of unselfish action, who has transcended karmaphala. "He whose nature is free from egoistic motives (nāhankṛte bhāve) whose mind is unsullied, though he kills this whole world, does not kill, he is not bound." (18, 17; Comp. II, 19 and Katha Uo. 2, 19). This moral attitude, however, presupposes a sattvic intellect, which knows action and non-action, what ought to be done and what ought not to be done (18, 30). Pravṛtti-conception (karma-sārga) is the cause of bondage, whereas nivṛtti refers to the path of śannyāsa and is the cause of liberation, (śankara). Inasmuch as the desire is the root-cause of the Universe, by the cessation of desire man is released therefrom, since those who are not renouncers (akarmīns) "attain the state of going and returning" (IX, 20 - 21), and are subject to transmigration. The former are called avyuktāḥ, the latter being yuktāḥ (V. 12). Those who have purified themselves by different ceremonial and sacrificial karmas obtain in truth heavenly pleasures, even Indraloka, but as soon as their puṇya is exhausted, they enter anew the world of mortals. The ultimate goal of the Gita is not only the avoidance of an "evil birth" in the next life, but all rebirth whatsoever (munarūtpatti). Devotion to Kṛṣṇa, the performance of works for His sake only, determines the worshipper's spiritual evolution. (IX, 23, 26; 18, 55). The relation between man and God is nowhere precisely expressed, but it is implied here and there, that men are only instruments (nimittasātram), through whom God works, the latter symbolising

the "world-destroying time." (XI, 32 - 33). The view that the individual is a self-adjusting moral mechanism, with all its metaphysical incongruities, as found in Buddhism, is completely absent in the Gita. The fact that a considerable part of the cītā emphasises bhakti, has been over-estimated by some scholars. It is not "faith" in our conception of the word, but an attitude of mind which leads to intense realisation of the Absolute in knowledge. It is bliss, the mystic experiences at God's vision, as in Eckehardt. All three paths - jñāna, karma and bhakti, are discussed in the Gita and each of them is recognised to lead to the same goal, since they cannot essentially be separated from each other, viewed from a metaphysical standpoint. The Karma-path is declared inadequate as in Manavadharmasāstra (XII, 89 - 92), since it aims at the attainment of happiness in this world and its continuance in the next. The nivṛtti aspect of karma is pointed out as the para vidhi, because selfish action procures happiness only to a limited extent and is rather a hindrance in the attainment of mukti. In the Gita, Karma is ^{occasionally} looked on rather as God's foreknowledge than as a rigid law, which rules the world, because the grace of God (prasāda) may modify its effect. As Hopkins says: "Fortunately for man's peace of mind, his theology may be illogical without upsetting his religion and in India old and new beliefs seem to have met in a blend, which however incongruous, was accepted as the faith of the fathers, and hence was considered good enough for the sons." (1) The Gita itself is not concerned much with the concepts, which may have contributed to the full elaboration of the karma-theory, such as vidhi, bhāga, gata, and gāya, the last concept being elsewhere in

(1) J.R.A.S. (1906). p.583.

Mahā and Māra (VII, 205)⁽¹⁾ used as a synonym for past karma. The grace of God (18, 56, 58) a wide-spread feeling in Christianity as being mere unmerited divine love, has no reference whatever to this passage in the Gita. It means primarily a disposition, which enlightens the intellect by reinforcing the resident and autonomous powers of human nature. Hence, God's grace, combined with bhakti on the part of the devotee, does not annul the fundamental teaching of the Gita concerning karma, as Hopkins asserts,⁽²⁾ since grace implies the opportunity offered to the human being in the present moment, of which man is the master and may choose, without abrogating the theory of karma in its completeness.⁽³⁾

B. Mokṣadharmā.

Unlike the Bhagavad Gītā, Mokṣadharmā and other philosophical parts of the Mahā. represent less systematic expositions of the karma theory and are very much coloured by occasional reference to fate (bhāga, dāiva) "divine power" dīpta "decreed" svabhāva, which has an implication of the karma doctrine and similar concepts. — The responsibility is alternately fixed on the Lord, man, puruṣa, Kala and finally karma is recognised as the only agent which shapes

(1) Sarvaṁ karmadaṁ āyattam vidhane dāivamānuṣe tayor dāivam cintyan tu mānuṣe vidyate kriyā. Comp. Yana-parvan 32, 15 - 16, where everything is ascribed to past karma.

(2) J.R.A.S. (1906). p.585

(3) The word prasāda occurs also in later Upanishads, such as Katha 2, 20 and Svet. 3, 20. Hume thinks that the doctrine of prasāda is opposed to the general Upanishadic doctrine of salvation through knowledge. But it is difficult to decide how far this "salvation by grace" by the vishnuites holds good in the Epic, since prasāda has a double use in the Gita and elsewhere in the Upanishads - "peace" or "tranquility" as in 2, 64-65; 18, 37 (Thirteen Principal Upanishads p.59 n.1., and 350 n.1.) comp. Mokṣadharmā (adhy 216, 15); and Santi-parvan V.1500. Hopkins, The Great Epic, p.188. Deussen: Sechzig Up. p.274 n.1.

one's life. One story, related in Agusāsana-Pāṭha (XIII, 1) illustrates that stage of the karma-notion when it received final shape. A snake, having killed a child, had to be punished. The snake throws responsibility on Mṛtyu (God of death), the latter on Kāla and he on Karman (work), which was committed in a previous life by the child and his mother. The Kāla speaks: (V.70-71) "Neither Mṛtyu, nor this serpent nor I am guilty of the death of any creature. For we are not the originating cause, but the work which he has committed.... no one else is the cause of his death; he was killed by his own karma." A similar idea, i.e. that every calamity is the direct result of some evil action in a former life, is told in the Rāmāyana of vālmīki, where the lamentations of Rama's mother for her child being driven into exile are ascribed to some antenatal crime committed by her. In another place (Mokṣadharmā, adh.224) the autonomous power of karma is expressly denied and everything is ascribed to the agency of Kāla and everything is ruled by him: "It is not our karma, Sakra, and it is not they karma....It is Kāla that takes away all, that gives all, through Kāla is all determined." (2) As in much ancient literature, Time is often personified and often spoken of as producing things or causing events by its action, when the meaning is merely that the things come into being or the events take place in the course of time. Time as a succession of moments was always connected with movements of heavenly bodies and it was not difficult for the primitive mind to attribute supernatural powers to them and connect them with the life of human beings. In Upan. the absolute depend-

(1) Griffith, The Rāmāyana of vālmīki in English verse. II, LIII. Cf. Maṅgavata Purāna, 12, 6, 25.

(2) Comp. III, 139, 49. Kālena kriyate kāryam tathaiva vividhān kriyān kālenaiva pravartante kaḥ kaścetya parādhyati and v.52. Nāhaṁ pramāṇam naiva tvam anyonyam karaṇam sūbhe kāle nityam upādatte sukham dukham ca dehinaṁ.

ance upon Kāla is affirmed in order to set forth the hopelessness of all human activity and thereby make realisation possible in its metaphysical aspect of the non-agentship of the Purusa-Ātman, perhaps in accordance with the idea expressed elsewhere in the Gita and the Upanishads, that in the killing of a man, only his exterior form is affected, while Purusa-Ātman remains a mere onlooker. Therefore, the Spirit is called Ksetra-jñā, and although connected with sattva, it does not act, but stands as a mere spectator, since activity belongs to lower qualities of the empirical self. (1)

Another peculiarity of the Mokṣadharmā is that it successfully combines the karma doctrine with the notion of heaven and hell. The old Vedic belief in punishment in hell and reward in heaven runs parallel with the absolute karma notion. The pitryāna and devayāna path emerges here and there in a less precise form than in the Brāhmanas. It is perhaps the last attempt on the part of the compilers of the Mbh. to assimilate the old beliefs with the new ideas, greatly derived from Buddhism, which have largely transformed Indian conceptions of the causes of action and their retributions. The attempt to mingle many different and contradictory standpoints into a systematic doctrine is evident from many passages, such as "Some men assert that the cause of an action is a man's karma, some say fate, and others the nature" (svabhāva), (3)

(1) Mokṣadharmā, 194, 38, foll.

(2) Thus in XII, 297, 18 foll. it is said that the elemental soul (bhūtātman) is not immediately reborn after death, but roams about as a cloud, and after it has found a point of support comes to a new existence, but always corresponding to its karma in a former life. In XII, 329, 30 the devayāna is the path to the Supreme Soul, whereas pitryāna is identified with hell.

(3) Mokṣadharmā, adh. 259, 255, 19.

The Earth, Heaven and Hell, are described as places where retribution takes place. Metempsychosis plays an important part in the gradual liberation of the human soul. One may rise above gods or fall down to the animal kingdom. "By means of pure actions one attains the state of the devas; by means of actions that are good and bad one attains the human state, whereas by acts that are purely wicked one falls down among the lower animals" (329, 25). Or, in other words, birth among animals is compared with tamas quality, rajas with the human state, and sattva with the state of the gods. (XII, 308). Therefore, having once attained the state of humanity with great difficulty, one should be careful not to fall again into the animal stage. (Sopānabhūtam svargasya mānuṣyam prāpya durlabham, tathā ātmānaṃ samādadyādbrūhasyate na punar yathā. XII, 321, 79).⁽¹⁾ Hell (nirayam) is not considered as a final state from whence there is no return, but rather as a stage in the cycle of saṃsāra.⁽²⁾ Dharma is extolled, the performance of which leads one to heavenly felicity. The social differences are ascribed to the inequality of fruits (phalavaiśamyaṃ) in the same manner as in the Bhagavad Gītā XII, 336, 41). A fool ascribes his unhappiness to the gods and does not recognise ātmānaṃ karmadehāni, for there is nothing in the world which was not previously deserved (loke nāsti akṛtam purā, XII, 294, 17)⁽³⁾

(1) Comp. Anuśītā, XIV, 17, 36 foll.

(2) XII, 309, 41-72 (B) nirayāccāpi mānuṣyam kālenaśyānyaham punah. mānuṣyatvācca devatvam devatvāt pauruṣaṃ punah mānuṣyatvācca nirayam paryāyenopagaçhati.

(3) Comp. XII, 298, 30. No one receives here either pleasure or suffering, if he has not deserved it (nākrtvā labhate kaçcit kiñcit atra priyāpriyam).

And in the next verse, it is stated that the Creator has fore-ordained to all beings what they should enjoy, guided by their own works. But this strictness of the moral law is occasionally modified, as it was observed by Hopkins (Y.R.A.S. 1906, p. 589), perhaps in order to make due allowance for human freedom and for the sake of the performance of one's own dharma. Here and there, we meet with an uncertainty as to the absolute mechanical operation of karma. An action performed does not always bring the corresponding result. (1) An act, which is bad in itself considered from the human criterion of morality, on account of its motive, may not be considered as such. Such are the works connected with gods, life etc. They even bring good fruits. (2) Contrary to the Upanishads, which are almost unanimous in holding that the soul will not obtain release from rebirth either by sacrifice or penance, but by knowledge alone, Mokṣacharya inculcates the idea that the self-inflicted suffering or repentance (prāvaścitta) atones for sins, even if sins are committed against one's own relatives. The exception is made also in the case of unintentional sin (abuddhipūrvam) and anichamānah karmadam (XII, 291, 16 and 33, 37). One important idea creeps continually into the text., i.e. that this world is the realm of the experiencing of karma, and is the central conception underlying the whole karma doctrine.

(1) Anusāsana-parvan, VI, 28. Kṛtam cāpi akṛtam kiñcit kṛte karmani sīdyati sukṛtam duṣkṛtam karma ṅg yathārtham prapadyate.

(2) XII, 36, 14. Dāivam ca qāivasanyuktam prāṇas ca prāṇadas ca na — Apekṣāpūrvakaraṇād asubhanam subham phala
(To this Strauss, Ethische probleme..., 211, n.1.)

Although Buddhism as an organised creed might have been unfavourably received by orthodox Brahmins, the ideas which it promulgated were living, and therefore it formed one of the sources from which Epic beliefs as to the origin and values of human life were drawn. (1) In many passages the Buddhistic conception that the soul or self is not a permanent metaphysical entity, but a composite of many elements (technical Buddh. term being "bundle of formations"), is expressed. The striving to attain beyond pleasure-pain principles and the attribution of all suffering to existence, is to be found in many a verse, and in the whole adhyayas. (For instance XII 174 and 300). Trsna or will-to-live is pointed out as cause of existence. Ahimsa (harmlessness) is preached, but often in a different sense to that of the Buddhists. (2) The idea of Nirvana, used by Buddhists mostly in the sense of "annihilation", occurs in the sense of union with Brahma (XII, 177, 50). The characteristic teaching of Sāṃkhya and Buddhistic cosmology and psychology is the foundation of Mokṣadharmā. However, one should not infer from this fact that these coincidences are due to wilful borrowing on either side, but that they indicate rather, the use of common sources, as Deussen points out. (3) The very title "Mokṣadharmā", and especially its content, imply that it was not meant to be a systematic presentation of a particular doctrine or school of thought, but to expound different views on mokṣa, which were current at that time.

(1) R.R.E. VIII, 772, a.b.
 (2) Hopkins. Great Epic, 378-80 and 378, n.3.
 (3) A.G.Ph. II, 19. R.Garbe. Sāṃkhya Philosophie (1917) p.55.

(2) XII, 201. Comp. Z. Ind. Stud. Untersuchungen zur Mokṣadharmā (T.A.S.E. 1923, p.35 ff.).

The general conclusion based on former considerations of man's origin and destiny is that Brahman writers, compiling Mbh, were anxious to assimilate divergent views with their own concerning human and universal evolution. This may account for the contradictory views held side by side and which by a unique broadmindedness were permissible at that time. The Upanishads themselves are of such a heterogeneous nature in their content, that almost any interpretation could be given by an able commentator. Therefore, one should not be surprised to find in Moksadharma that in one place buddhi denotes the transmigrating essence, (1) and in another place manas, i.e. the mental mechanism of sense-cognition which is the cause of bondage and emancipation, (2) without having stated a precise co-relation between the two.

Liberation in its negative aspect is admitted throughout Moksadharma to mean the release of the soul principle from suffering which existence implied to the Hindu mind in one or the other form. The positive content depends naturally on the individual speaker and the practical aim he had in view. Sometimes the final goal is Purusa in the Sāṃkhya sense, in another place the release means the union of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul, which is either Isvara or non-dual Brahma. Whether emancipation be from the body during life (jīvanamukti) or from all subsequent bodies at final death, did not matter much. The positive consciousness

(1) Thus in XII, 206, 5. "As the earth apparently drenched with one particular kind of liquid supplies to each different kind of herb or plant that grows on it the sort of juice it requires for itself, in the same manner understanding (buddhi) whose course is witnessed by the soul, is obliged to follow the path marked out by the act of previous life."


(2) XII, 201. *passim* Comp. E. Frauwallner: Untersuchungen Zum Moksadharma (T.A.O.S. 1925, p. 55 ff.).

realised in the early Brahmanic conception is discernment of the identity of Brahma, Ātman and individual soul, the latter being the part of the One. No matter how bondage is conceived, the mukti is the final aspiration of the adhikari.

On the whole, one may say that bhūtātman is taken to represent the traveller in the chariot, i.e. the individual transmigrating soul, which clothed into different qualities owing to attachment, goes from one life into the other. It is difficult to trace in the epic a precise enumeration of elements forming part of the bhutatman, such as we find in Buddhism or Sankhya philosophy. (Comp. Maitri Up. 3, 1-3). The migrating element is often termed linga (a subtle body) and retasārira (seed body). The linga seems to have been borrowed and adopted from the Svet.Upanishad (1, 13), where it denotes the same thing. (1) But the eschatology of the Epic is far from presenting a complete whole. The doctrine of transmigration and the absolute karmic law is mitigated and interfered with by the idea of human action and free-will. (2) Final release is obtained either by knowledge or by the practice of Yoga. The Nirvana is the final aim, which means not an extinction but rather a state of supreme bliss. There appears, however, the Sankhya view that the goal is to be attained by the realisation of the distinction between self as spirit and prakrti.

(1) In Sāmkhya Kārikā. Aphor 39-40, the suksmatanmatrani (subtle elements) constituting the suksmasarira is the same as linga-sarira, or panpermia in gnostic systems designating both the primeval procreating cosmic principle and a mass of individual seeds. Cf. R. Garbe: Sāmkhya Philosophie 2, p. 327 *fol.* who gives a classical interpretation of the linga.

(2) O. Strauss. Ethische Probleme, *passim*.



Sankara's Conception of the World,

Reincarnation and Karma.

Sankara and all Vedantic systems of thinking follow the deductive method of reasoning, and the inductive method is only resorted to in order to explain and corroborate statements which Vedantic postulates imply. Everything is derived from the universals, while particulars are only relative, being the reflection of one immutable reality, which is Brahman, Ātman, Parabrahma etc. There are three types of reality - paramārthika (absolute), vyavahārika (empirical) and prātibhāsika (illusory). Māyā is the material cause (upādānakarana) of the world. In that sense māyā is the whole world as a sum-total of pleasure, pain, delusion etc. (1) The world evolves out of māyā (māyāparināma) and in this sense is almost identical with prakṛti of Sāṅkhya. The world originates out of Brahman, not by a process of evolution (parināma) as in some dualistic systems, but by vivarta (self-alienation) and consequently the Absolute (Brahman) acting through māyā produces subtle matter (ākāśa) which in its turn differentiates into still grosser elements, finishing with prthivī (earth element). (2) From the metaphysical standpoint (paravidyā) there is no creation, no dissolution, none in

(1) S. on Svetasv. Up. I, 10. Sukhadukhamohaṭmakasesa - Prapançarupamāya.

(2) Sankarabhāṣya, 2, III, 7. For pañcī-karana. Comp Vedāntasāra, v. 123 f. also V. Seal. The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus (1915) p. 875 f.

(3) Vedāntasūtra, II, 3, 7.

bondage, no pupilage, none desirous of liberation, none liberated. (1) Everything may be answered with neti, neti.

Only from the point of view of empirical knowledge

(apāravidyā) which is real so long as the individual soul

(jiva) has not realised its true nature to be identical with the Supreme (Brahman). All that forms the subject

or experience is pure illusion, due to the false super-

imposition (adhyāsa) on the part of the subject. All

differences are due to name (nāma) and form (rūpa), which

is avidyā. (2) There exists only one single Reality,

which is Ātman, Brahman, while all attributes ascribed to

It in the process of three times (i.e. past, present and

future), are due to adhyāsa, parināma, vivarta; they are

produced by the power of māyā. Ātman, in Sankara's view,

is pre-existent to all manifestations without being involved

in it. "Ātman is self-established." The fundamental

principle of Sankara's system constitutes self-intuition

[asmātpratīyaya or anampratīyaya] "The Self (Ātman), being

the abode of the energy that acts through means of right

knowledge is itself established previously to that energy.

And to refute such a self-evident entity is impossible. (3)

"Brahman, which is Being, cannot spring up from a mere being,

since relation of cause and effect cannot exist without a

superiority (on the part of the cause). Nor again, can

Brahman spring from that which is something particular, since

this would be contrary to experience: for we observe that

particular forms of existence are produced from what is

(1) Gandapāda's Kārikās, II, 32. Comp. Ś's introduction to and Tait. Up. XII where Ś. emphatically states that knowledge of Self and karma notion cannot co-exist, since the former does away with all distinctions of subject and object.

(2) Vedāntasūtra, II, 1, 14.

(3) Vedāntasūtra, II, 3, 7.

general, as for instance, jars from clay, but that which is general is not produced from particulars. In the same way, Brahman cannot arise from that which is not (asat), for that which is not, is without a self.* (1) Consequently, Brahman is not an effect. Should somebody raise the objection that in that case the effect before its production was non-existent (asat) and that consequently Being-ness (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production, Sankara answers by a very subtle dialectic: "By non-existence of the effect previous to its production is not meant absolute non-existence, but only a different quality of state, viz. the state wherein name and form are unevolved, which state is different from the state wherein name and form are evolved. With reference to the latter state, the effect is called, previous to its production, non-existent, although then it also existed as identical with the cause.... And as those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary language called 'existent', the term 'non-existent' is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to their differentiation." (2) In vedantic conception, the effectuating mode of being, in the passage from potentiality to actualisation, (implied in the empirical knowledge), when it is itself accomplished, is only a step in the evolutionary series, which adds a specific stimulus and renders determinate that which was previously indeterminate. The sum-total of all energy remains always the same.³⁾ The mind of Sankara was opposed to the idea of absolute becoming, which resolved apparent contradiction which exists between being and non-being and is

(1) Vedantasutra, II, 3, 9. Comp Sankara on Chand.Up. VI, 2, 2.

(2) Brahmasutra. II, 1, 17.

3) Cf. ^{O. Strauss} Vom Kausalitätsproblem in der Indische Philosophie
(Acta Orientalia, 1922 pp. 116-119)

centred in human individuality. However, the first concept, that of a continual becoming was elaborated in Buddhism, which conceived everything in terms of change. Sankara perceived that individuality meant limitation and it was ~~described~~ ^{reserved} for European philosophers to develop the concept of the self-conscious ego. The force of maya creates the multiplicity and differences; consequently, it is a force which we must take into account in dealing with the phenomenal world. Perhaps this null-value of māyā was the only point d'appui of human knowledge. Māyā itself is the creation of avidyā due to our perception in time (past, present and future) and consequently innate (naisargika) in our perceptive faculties, but how avidya produces the veil of maya is unaccountable (anirvacaniya). (1) Evidently this escape from the gnoseological problems would not be valid, had it not been for the clever psychological analysis based on different states of consciousness which Sankara puts forward.

Gandapāda, who has "by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered what lay in the heart of veda" and who was the teacher of Sankara, was undoubtedly a great psychologist and contributed much towards the elaboration of Vedantic idealism. Gandapada, who lived after the time of great Buddhist teachers, very likely might have absorbed some Buddhist doctrines, as Dasgupta (2) surmises, but there is hardly any proof that Gandapāda has "borrowed" from Mādhyamika and Vijñānavāda doctrines as the above writer suggests, although we have in the Kārikās direct references to Buddhism. (3) The verses 23 - 28 of the fourth

(1) A good exposition of Sankara's view on maya and avidya is to be found in P.D. Shastri's "The Doctrine of Māyā" p.96 foll.

(2) Hist. Ind. Ph. p.423 foll; also p.429.

(3) For instance IV, 42. IV, 98 & 99. On the possible influence of Buddhistic thought on Gandapada Kārikā. Comp. M. Walleser: Der äitere Vedānta. (1900) p.18 foll.

chapter contain rather a refutation of the doctrine of the Vijñānavāda, as is clear from Sankara's commentary on the Kārikas, and from the context with previous exposition. This does not mean that Gandapāda has not been acquainted with the teaching of Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghosa and Vasubandhu. It is very difficult to say where and in how far one system of Indian thought was coloured by the other, owing to the scanty sources of information about the personalities of the founders of different schools.

Gandapāda starts, in accordance with the advaita view, with a threefold classification of the self in its psychological aspect - waking state (jāgrati), dreaming state (tejasa) and the state of deep sleep (susupti), called prāiṇa which is pervaded by pure consciousness. The fourth state (turiyāvasthā) is identical with Ātman or Brahman. All duality is due to maya, and the One is ultimately real (paramārthataḥ). The manifested world is compared to a dream (svapna) and just as in a dream we imagine that the things perceived have a real existence, which on awakening we realise to be false, so the jīva on attaining the highest state of consciousness realises one's own true nature, which is Ātman.⁽¹⁾ So the whole objective experience is likened to experience in dreams, while in the state of saṁādhi the individual becomes merged into Brahman.⁽²⁾ In order to illustrate the state of the jīva under the power of maya, the familiar simile of the rope imagined in darkness to be a snake is frequently used. Unity in diversity is recognised,

(1) Gandapāda Kārikās. II, 31. III, 7.

(2) Gandapāda Kārikās IV, 33-37; Comp IV, 61: "As in dream the mind acts as if dual through the power of māya, so in the waking state also it acts in the same manner through the same cause."

but the latter ascribed to the power of māyā which is inseparable from the ever-luminous (ātman).⁽¹⁾ The Ātman, being likened to ākāśa, is the totality of all jīvas put together, while the latter have no independence and self-existence of their own, similar to the numerous ghatakāśa in comparison with mahākāśa. The absolute advaita conceives itself to be many through the power of māyā, but there is no many, nor are things different or non-different.⁽²⁾ Even birth itself is due to illusion, because "that which is, appears to pass into birth only through illusion, and not of itself; he who maintains the reality of this birth, must maintain also that the born is born again." (III, 27. Comp. III, 48, "no jīva is born"). The world-appearance (prapañca) is simply a phenomenon of the mind, for it is never experienced apart from the mind when mind is naught (i.e. in the state of saṁādhi) (III, 31, 35). True knowledge is compared with the saṁādhi state of consciousness, when mind is at rest, as there is nothing to be cognised.

In the fourth chapter, Gandapāda emphasises the identity of cause and effect. "Those who regard the cause (karana) as the effect in a potential form (kārya) admit the transformation of the cause into effect," (IV, II) consequently the cause itself cannot be considered as unproduced (aja). How can it be eternal and yet changing? If it is said that the effect is inseparable from the cause, then effect ought to be unproduced as the cause, or vice versa; if we assume

(1) Gandapāda Kārikās II, 19 34; Comp II, 12.

(2) III, 10.

that the cause is inseparable from the effect, then the cause is not permanent. Nor can we say that effect is cause of the cause, because that would imply a beginning and this would lead us to the regressus ad infinitum of cause and effect (hetu and phala). The cause being produced, the effect will not be definite; and an indefinite cause cannot produce any effect. (1) Therefore the reply must be in the theory of non-evolution (IV, 19) and consequently non-existence of causality. (IV, 78). This dialectic recognises that certain collocations invariably and unconditionally preceded certain effects, but this cannot explain how the previous set of phenomena could be regarded as producing the succeeding set. Even if we admit the chain of causation to be invariably present at an antecedent point of time, the effect immediately springs up into being, but this experience is only valid for the perception in time, which implies the succession of moments but not from the standpoint of the advaita which in its transcendental dialectic considers past, present and future moments as being due to māyā, avidyā, ajnana. Following this dialectic and applying it to individual soul, selfs, the suffering of misery, action, results etc. is only due to the false idea of individuality. All experience (prajñapti) is dependent on reason, for otherwise both (the world and knowing subject) would vanish, and there would be no suffering (saṃkleśa). All causation, which implies productions in present, past and future, a beginning and an end, applied by the human mind to various manifestations, is like an illusory elephant (māyāhasti). It exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. Causation is put forth by the wise only for

(1). IV. 11 - 17.

those who, being afraid of the absolute cessation of causality, cling to belief in the reality of things (IV, 42). There is an appearance of production, but the one knowledge (viñāna) is the unborn, unmoved non-reality (avastutva). All appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though substantially they do not possess them. (1) So long as one thinks of cause and effect, one has to suffer the wheel of existence (samsāra), but when that notion ceases one is liberated from the illusion. All things are regarded as existent relatively (samvrti), but there is nothing permanent. Since nothing whatever is produced, there cannot be any destruction. Whether things exist or do not exist, whether they are existent and not-existent, or neither existent nor non-existent, - these are thoughts meant for fools. Such is the final answer of Gandapada to all those who are deluded by the phenomenal, entangled in conditions of birth and death, fear, anger etc. Consequently the effect pre-exists in the cause, although non-developed, since all production is only the development of the latent possibilities contained in the agent. The cause must exist actually in the very moment of the production of the effect, otherwise it could not be produced. At the same time, this production (or manifestation of the latent qualities) does not affect the cause in any way, because that effect does not form part of the nature of the cause, which remains all the time identical with itself. So, the causal relation implies, according to the Vedānta, simultaneity of happening rather than succession. The same applies logically to individuals. All modifications of an individual soul (jīva) are co-existent in a transcendent

(1) Comp. Sankara in his introduction to Brahmasūtra.

time, as well as in ordinary time, which is a succession of innumerable moments, which determine each other according to a certain logical causation, since time represents a special modality of succession. (Cf. Sir John Woodroffe: The World as Power and Causality (1923) p.36f.

In his commentary on Chand.Up. (VI, 1,4), starting from the standpoint that "It is Being alone which names and is named," Sankara maintained that just as in the ordinary world when a single lump of clay, the material cause of the jar etc. is known, all other modifications of clay become known by it. Because the effect is non-different from the cause..... all modification is only a name (nāma-dhēya) based on mere words and there is no such reality as modification. In truth it is only alay. (1)

Sankara's central conception of karya-karanabheda (the non-difference of cause and effect) is in a way a logical outcome of the Vedantic dogma of the essential identity of Brahman and the phenomenal world. 'Subject', "pure spiritual self," and 'object' (vishaya) noumenal and phenomenal, are not used in a purely logical sense, but 'subject' means to him absolute reality, while 'object' represents almost an appearance. They are absolutely different (atyanta-vivikta) and exclude each other, but they are innate, or rather joined together in human individuality, the latter being only a negative expression of the former universal principle. It is very curious that the Samkhya system expressed the same thing in other words. "As the total energy remains the same while the world is constantly evolving, cause and effect are only more or less evolved forms

(1) If we accept in Sankara's sense that there is "no reality such as modification," it would imply the destruction of the time-sense and that is one of the contributions which Sankara has definitely attributed to supreme Brahma. The time proceeds from ākāśa and Brahma is beyond space and time. Time implied phenomenal world-maya, and consequently it was non-existent from the standpoint of highest realities. Therefore, it is clear why manifestations of cause and effect were nāmadhēyam.

of the same ultimate energy. The sum of effects exists in the sum of causes in potential form. The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings on the manifestation of the latent powers of the gunas, but without creation of anything new."⁽¹⁾ The absolute monism of Sankara and the dualism of Sankhya seem rather complementary to each other, not antagonistic. The first conception is static, while the second allows more dynamism and is brought to a head in the Buddhistic conception of causation, which admitted only one aspect of reality-becoming. Viewed from this (Sankara's) angle, individual and all manifestations are non-being, and this non-being cannot be the cause of anything. "Entity does not spring up from non-entity.... If we admit that entity issues from non-entity (as the Buddha doctrine presupposes), lazy, inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since non-existence is a thing to be had without much trouble. Corn would grow for the labourer even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay.... And nobody would have to exert himself in the least and either for giving to the heavenly world or for obtaining final liberation."⁽²⁾ Besides, this would contradict our consciousness (upalabdhi) "From this fact of our always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously, it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct (as the dualists

(1) Dasgupta H.J. Ph. p.254 & 257. Comp. Shtcherbatsky: Erkenntnistheorie und Logik nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhisten. München 1924. p.40 & foll.

(2) Sank. comm. on Brahmasūtra, II, 2, 27.

suppose) as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason we maintain that there are no outward things." (1)

How does Sankara account for the phenomenal world with its multiplicity of individual souls and numberless differences, in spite of the fact that all this world is due to the power of māyā? Whence come and how act saṃsāra and karma, which prevent individual souls from realising their identity with Atman, which is Brahman? Admitting that the soul is in its metaphysical aspect identical with Brahman, "eternal, pure, wise and free," how to explain the empirical (vyavāhāra) state, the connection of the soul with upādhis, its limiting adjuncts? He solves the problem by saying that the action and suffering of men is due to adṛṣṭa, karma. Just as the growth of the plant depends on rain, which causes the seeds to spring up, so the works of the previous existence automatically and by necessity produce different states of existence in individual souls. Śāstras, in insisting on different karma, which is the fruit of desire or has for consequence saṃsāra, were meant only to counteract the effects of sins committed in previous births, in order that those who are striving after liberation may realise their wish, since karma is a means to the acquisition of knowledge. (2) Works are the product of nimitta (causation) or śakti, which are inherent in the character of every individual and they produce through nescience the action and suffering (kartṛtram and bhoktṛyam). This does not imply that God himself is involved in saṃsāra, since that would involve duality, a contradiction with the

(1) Ś. comm. on Brahmasūtra, II, 2, 28.

(2) Sankara on Tait. Up. Śikṣā Vallī, XII.

metaphysical identity of Brahman and jiva: "Apart from the qualities of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the samsara state; for the latter, owing to which the self appears as an agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts (upādhis), being wrongly superimposed upon the Self." (1) As long as this connexion of the soul with the buddhi exists, i.e. so long as the samsara state is not brought to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the connexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease and it results in transmigratory existence (II, 3, 30). Then quoting Brhad. and Chand. Upanishads he goes on to say: "In reality, there is no individual soul, but it exists only in so far as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting adjunct;" the soul is essentially intelligence (knowing subject, viññanam), but owing to the power of avidyā, the whole theory of knowledge is imaginary. (2) The soul (embodied self) is an agent only because of the upadhis (II, 3, 33 and II, 3, 40) and therefore its actions are not absolutely free, because it depends on differences of space, time and efficient causes (desa-kāla nimitta). They produce pleasant and unpleasant actions. (II, 3, 37). "The state of activity to which the soul is subject, is not essential to its existence, for should this be a fact (that being an agent belongs to the soul's nature), it could never free itself from it, anymore than fire can divest itself from heat. And as long as man has not freed himself from activity, the attainment of his highest aim is not possible, because

(1) Brahmasutra bhasya. II, 3, 29.

(2) Sankhya on Brahmasutra, II, 3, 36; Comp. Bhagavad Gita adhyaya.

activity is essentially suffering (kartrtvasya dukkharūpat 2,3,40). Finally, the state of being an agent of the Self is due to its upadhis (upādhi-dharma adhyāsenā). Brahman Himself is not like the embodied self, subject to the fruition of karma - to think so, would be the figment of false knowledge (mithyājñāna kalpita), since there is difference of nature. Should we assume that, on the ground of the mutual proximity with jīva, Brahman himself is involved in the saṃsāra state and subject to the fruition of karma together with individual souls, it would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire when something in space is on fire. We should bear in mind in considering the relationship between the individual soul and Brahman, their essentially different functions. (1,1,8).

According to Sankara, the saṃsāra is beginningless, eternal (I,3,30; II 2,28; II, 3,42) and the God acts as a mere occasional cause (nimittam), in producing apparently unequal results to individual souls. Although the agentship of the soul is dependent from God, nevertheless it is the soul which acts only, while the God makes it act (kārayati) (II, 3, 42). The multiplicity of selves, with their individual desires, thoughts and actions, are only the reflection of the highest Brahman, like the reflection of the sun in the water; in another case, should we concede the reality to the multiple individual souls (purasas) as the Sankhya system presupposes, the logical results would be confusion of actions and fruits of action (II, 3, 50). But as advaita presupposes only one highest reality, all else being the result of avidyā, which itself produces saṃsara in its manifold aspects, in the same way as the sun reflects its rays on many objects, without itself being affected by it. So in Sankara's view, there

is no confusion of actions and results of actions from the advaita point of view.

Considered psychologically, an individual soul consists of five sheaths or kosa, connected together, and through which Atman is manifested. The highest is Anandamaya-kosa "vehicle consisting of bliss", which is superior to any conditional existence and which characterises higher forms of beings including Isvara. In this vehicle the formless only exists. Only with reference to the cosmic manifestation it constitutes the causal frame (karana-sarira) by means of which the form is manifested in the lower vehicles. (1) The second vehicle is vijnanamaya-kosa (the sheath consisting of intelligence, caused by understanding beings associated with the organs of perception). It consists of buddhi, being joined with the perceptive faculties which proceed from five tanmatras constituting the five senses of the personality. The third, manomaya-kosa, which includes manas and ahamkara or mental consciousness and whose function is reasoning. The fourth is pranamaya-kosa consisting of the vital element (prana) *enshrining* the soul and includes five vayus, which are modalities of prana. These three (vijnanamaya, manomaya and pranamaya) constitute sukshma-sarira or linga-sarira and are permanent principles of the individual soul. sthula-sarira is the fifth and is called annamaya-kosa (alimentary frame) since it is made of elements of food and dissolves at death. (2) Death is only a transition into a new state of existence, individuality is not annihilated but transformed. It is not atman which passes from one state into

(1) This designation anandamaya may be attributed only to Isvara, and by transference and Paramatma and Brahman, (Brahmasutras 1,1, 12-19).

(2) This subject of the constitution of a jiva is dealt in Sankara's commentary on Taitt.Up. "Brahmananda Valli and Hirgu Valli."

another in successive planes of existence, but elements which make up individuality. From the metaphysical standpoint there is simultaneity of all states of existence and succession is only applied to the essence of a determined state. At death the vital airs assemble together, as described in the Upanishads, and follow each their own course of journeying to higher or lower spheres. The being who follows the deva-vāna way, having left the corporeal form, is conducted to arcis (light), then to the kingdom of fire (tējas) where reigns Agni or Vaisvanara, from there to the devatas, who are the distributors of day (waxing and waning moon respectively); from there it passes into the kingdom of Vāyu. The soul then passes into the sphere of the Moon (Chandra or Soma). The soul does not remain there, as is the case with those who follow the pitravana way, but ascends into the region of lightning (Vidyut) beyond which there is Varuna - connected with waters. The remaining part of the soul's journey is effected through an intermediary region (antarikṣa) which is the kingdom of Indra and which is occupied by ākāśa, here representing the state of primordial equilibrium. The last stage in the gradual liberation and the purification of the soul is represented by Prajāpati and Brahman. (1) Just as there are seven higher spheres to which the souls ascend in their gradual liberation, in the same manner there are seven hells, as described in the Puranas, which are the doom of the evil ones. These spheres of the Sun and the Moon do not refer to the Sun and Moon as planets but to the universal principles which these planets represent in the physical world. The lokas (Lat. locus) represent rather the different states through which the soul principle has to pass in order to accomplish gradual or relative liberation

(1) Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śankara. IV, 3, 1-7; Comp. Chand. Up. IV, 15, 5-6 and V, 10, 1-2; Kaṇsh. Up. I, 3; Bṛhad. Up. V, 10, 1 and VI, 2, 15. According to Puranas, there are seven planes or worlds: bhūr, bhūvar, svar or svarga, Mahar or Prajapati Loka, Jana-loka, Tapas loka, and Satya or Brahma Loka.

(apeksiki mukti). The soul when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the subtle parts of the elements, which are the seeds of the new body (III, 1, 1). This is sukṣma sarira. The knowledge of Brahma implies immediate release and gives to a person freedom to reincarnate at his own will, (III, 3, 32). Sankara admits both transmigration of souls into lower animals, and reincarnation in its general aspect, the former being due to sinful deeds which wipe out consciousness of any previous life as a human being. (1) It is only by means of paravidvā jñāna that absolute liberation (paramukti) is achieved. In his commentary on the Bh. Gita he is trying to refute the samucchaya vāda, according to which doctrine both knowledge and works are necessary for liberation, even for those who have attained the highest knowledge. (2) He makes a difference between a released man who is jīvanmukta and videhamukta, the latter implying complete release. (Comp. Sūrya gītā). The karmic effects cannot be exhausted in the course of a single life. The works whose maturing is effected, build up the present state of existence; others wait for opportunity, place, time and operative causes in order to be effected. The causes for a new embodied existence are not absent even in the case of one who has been performing good deeds, since there is always a remainder of works, due to unextinguished desire, which potentially exists and at a given moment, under co-ordinated causal influences, will inevitably produce the

(1) Comm. on Chand. Up. V, 10, 5 and elsewhere.

(2) This point of whether one who knows Brahma is exempted from the ordinary performance of duties or not, is discussed fully in the Sūrya Gītā, which in many respects differs little from Sankara and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

former life prior to the attainment of knowledge, the fruition of which may need another body in order to be exhausted. (Sankara on Chand. VI, 14, 2).

actuality. (1) Consequently only an ativavarnaśrami i.e. one who has transcended castes and asramas and who has passed beyond individuality may obtain final release. Final release results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal of the preceding member. The release and the absolute knowledge of Brahma are inseparable, it is only terms which differ. If knowledge is a means of liberation, and liberation the end, then they are inseparable, knowledge bearing fruit by itself. Release is a fruit in so far only as it is cessation of all bondage and does not imply the accession of something new (IV, 4, 2-4). For it is stated in another passage that the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas, and all beings manifest themselves in each new creation bearing the same names and forms as in the preceding. The higher knowledge arises simultaneously with moksa and consists in the entire absorption of the individual soul into Brahman. We cannot speak of "the unity with Brahman" where there is absolute identity. It is only a becoming of the soul of what it has always been. Psychologically considered, release consists in freeing oneself from the three states - the state of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. Final release is essentially a disembodied state; a man going to final release reaches the Ān. It is the state of videha-mukti, obtained immediately at death. Kāma-mukti, or gradual liberation, is achieved by the yogi in this life and is called jīvan-mukti, consisting of the acquisition of the consciousness "I am Brahma." He who realises this, goes beyond name and

(1) Sankara on Brahmasūtra IV, 3, 14, S.B.E. XXXVIII, pp 397-400. The knowledge of the Pure Being does not necessarily imply the final liberation since there may be certain actions done in a former life prior to the attainment of knowledge, the fruition of which may need another body in order to be exhausted. (Sankara on Chanā. VI, 14, 2).

form and is united with the primordial principle of the universe. This is the "fourth state" of the Gandapāda, in which one, although living enclosed in a body, is master of the body and uses it as an instrument in life. (1) This is the Nirvana of the Buddhists.

Sankara enumerates three characteristics of a Yogi who has attained the knowledge of Brahma, which are:- bālva (childlikeness), which involves embryonical potentiality, a reverting to the primary stage of existence. The second characteristic is pāṇḍitva (knowledge) which is the quality of a guru or Master; and mauna, which is state of a muni, in which the realisation of the Absolute is complete. (2) . Elsewhere this state is called kaivalya (isolation) which is equivalent to mokṣa.

The existence of the world is due to the soul's connection with works (karma), and freeing oneself from works means a return to the absolute state of Brahman. In so far as individual souls can claim any reality, they date from all eternity and not from the day of their birth on earth. Metempsychosis in the ultimate principle is nothing but differentiation into action, agent and result, according to Sankara (Comm. on Chand. VII, 24, 1). The shaking off of both good and evil works takes place at the moment of the souls departure from the body (B.S. III, 3, 27-28) and not after having departed from the body and having entered on the path of the gods. It is karma (works) which constitutes the efficient cause for the origination of a new body, since

(1) This point is fully discussed in the Surya Gita, ch.IV. Comp. Atma-Bodha of Shankara (Memor ed. of the works of Sri Sankaracharya Srirangam. Vol.15, pp.55 foll.

(2) Sankara on Br. Sū. III,4, 47-50; Comp R.Guenon. L'homme et son devenir selon le Vedanta. (1925) p.240. foll.

there is always a remainder of works which drives one into new existence. The karma is due to upādhis which prevents one from the realisation of one's true nature. The soul, devoid of true knowledge, having taken its abode in the subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body. On the other hand, the soul of him who knows passes into the vein revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release. (Br. Sutra, IV, 2,7). The Moon is the place where the complete requital of works takes place. The Sun is spoken of as being the place which is reached by man going to final release. Sun and Moon are not referred to as physical heavenly bodies, but rather as states which participate in the evolution of the living being. They are designated as the eyes of Vaisvanara and are related to the chief nerve-currents, Ida, Pingala and Sushumna. The treatment of this subject, however, belongs rather to yoga although a complete understanding of the process or mechanism of the human being is incomplete without giving reference to this system. (1)

(1) comp. Chand.Up. VIII, 6, 2-5.

The Meaning of Śaṅkara and Rama in
the System of Rāmānjanā.

The **Rāmānjanā**. Rāmānjanā is based largely on the
Brahmānā or Māṅsakānā religious system which was the
forerunner of theistic Vaiśṇavism. The Māṅsakānā
religion had as its basis the Māṅsakānā-Śāstra and
Viśṇu-Purāṇa, as well as the Māṅsakānā Āgama, as it
is evident from the frequent reference of Rāmānjanā to
these writings which were accepted as authoritative in
his time. (1) He also refers often to a class of
ascetics, Śākyas, who formed one branch of the Viśṇavite
tradition, in Southern India. Māṅsakānā belonged to that
religious period of India when a bitter struggle was
going on between Brahmins and Jainas on the one side,
and Viśṇavism and Śākyism on the other. This is clear
from his frequent references and allusions to these sects.
It is quite clear that his intention was to overthrow all
systems which were antagonistic to Viśṇavism, as Vedāntism
and historical records picture etc.

The metaphysical background of Rāmānjanā's system is
constituted by three eternal principles - absolute God

(1) S. S. Rāmānjanā, Vaiśṇavism, Śākyism etc. (1913) p. 30 fol.
and p. 39 fol. Also S. S. Rāmānjanā in E. S. S. I, p. 572-74;
Māṅsakānā: The Religion of India, p. 305 fol; S. Rāmānjanā,
art. "Māṅsakānā" in E. S. S. II, 544 fol.

The Meaning of Samsara and Karma in
the system of Ramanuja.

The system of Ramanuja is based largely on the Bhāgavata or Pāncarātra religious system which was the forerunner of theistic Vaisnavism. The Bhāgavata religion had as its basis the Bhagavad-Gītā and Vishnu-Purāna, as well as the Pāncarātra Āgama, as it is evident from the frequent reference of Ramanuja to those writings which were accepted as authoritative in his time. (1) He also refers often to a class of teachers, ācāryas, who formed one branch of the Vishnuite tradition, in Southern India. Ramanuja belonged to that religious period of India when a bitter struggle was going on between Buddhism and Jainism on the one side, and Vishnuism and Saivism on the other. This is clear from his frequent reference and attempts to refute them. It is quite clear that his intention was to overthrow all systems which were antagonistic to Vaisnavism, as tradition and historical records picture him.

The metaphysical background of Ramanuja's system is constituted by three eternal principles - absolute God

(1) R.G.Bhandarkar: Vaisnavism, Saivism etc. (1913) p.38 fol. and p.50 fol. Also A.B.Keith in E.R.E. X, p.572-74; Hopkins: The Religions of India, p.388 fol; G.Grierson, art, "bhakti-mārga" in E.R.E. II, 544 fol.

(Īshvara), individual souls (cit) and inorganic world or matter (acit). The last two are related to the first as attributes to a substance. The body of God is made of cit and acit and they are the essential constituents of His being, or better, they are the modes (prakāra) of Him. He is not consciousness or intelligence, as Sankara would express it, but intelligence is His attribute. He does not remain eternally identical to Himself, but for the sake of the world-existence He takes on different forms of vāsudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, which divide themselves into three. Through being the knowing subject or inner controller (antaryāmin) of the individual souls, He is in permanent intimate bond with them. Here lies the chief gnoseological difference between Sankara's and Rāmānija's conception. Whereas for Sankara, who distinguishes higher and lower knowledge, the empirical perception is due to adhyāsa, māyā (nirguṇa Brahma being eternally apart from it and self-sufficient).⁽¹⁾ Rāmānija tries to make clear that we cannot actually prove absolute and unqualified Brahman in Sankara's sense. According to him, the intelligence or consciousness and the things perceived cannot be separated in the process of perception, owing to simultaneity of awareness of the things. Thus, for instance, when "I" perceives an object, that act is not only a subjective relative fact, but an objective reality also; and without accepting this, we should at last be in doubt of the criteria of truth.⁽²⁾ The simile of dreams etc. used by Sankara in order to prove the

(1) For Sankara distinguishes between Nirguṇa-Brahma, which is cause (karana) and Saguṇa Brahma, which is effect (karya). The first is also called Para-Brahma while the second is Apāra Brahma.

(2) For the real and unreal cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is unreal, that the world is real" etc. (S. B. V. p. ———).

illusionistic theory of perception, does not hold good, since all states of consciousness are true viewed from their own plane of perception. The reflected image of a thing is as real as the thing itself. Dreams are real even in the absence of reality of the object corresponding to them, since what determines the basis of our cognition is merely the manifestation of a certain thing to our consciousness in some manner or other. (1) The destiny of the soul is determined by its knowledge in both systems, but the nature of that knowledge, as it is seen, differs entirely. By "knowledge" Sankara means an intuitive perception or gnosis, which by itself may bring release, whereas by Rāmānuja it is regarded as sum-total of sense perceptions which is the means for the attainment of liberation. As pointed out earlier, the Brahman of Sankara represents the non-qualified homogenous One, which can be defined as pure Being in the Hegelian sense of the word, all plurality being a mere illusion; the Brahman, or Father Īvara, of Rāmānuja is endowed with different qualities, such as magnificence, power, self-luminosity etc. (2) With the first, the transcendental Brahman becomes saguna Brahman only through its association with the unreal principle of maya, which casts a kind of veil upon the individual consciousness; with the second, Brahman is conceived in a theistic sense as a personal god, the all powerful and omniscient ruler of the world with whom he is closely bound through its qualities, but never losing its true

(1) Sri Bhāshya of Rāmānujā^{ārya}, translated by Rangāchārya. (Madras 1899) p.XVIII.

(2) R.G.Bhandarkar. o.c. p.53. Comp. Artha-pancaka "The Five Truths" in J.R.A.S. (1910) p.571.

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nature. Brahman is not git (consciousness, as Sankara thinks), because git cannot exist without a reference to some material object. Git is not git. There is no transcendental knowledge apart from sense perception and consequently Ramaraja uses synonymously the expressions anubhūti (experience), jñāna (knowledge), avagati (comprehension), samvid (consciousness). The monistic doctrine of the Vedanta left no room for the exercise of love, bhakti, in the empirical world. (1) The individuality of the soul is as real as the transcendental Being of God through its association with git. The souls are many and "they exist in their own essential nature." Brahman is Purugottama as expressed in the Bhagavad Gītā (*passim*); the individual souls are persons (purusas) but their power is limited as long as they are subject to samsāra. Apurusārthas is the term which Ramaraja ascribes to individual souls which compels them to suffer on account of their karma. (2) They have essentially the capacity of thinking and action. They are bound through birth with body, through which acts the thinking subject and they retain their individuality even when they reach the highest stage, i.e. the Brahmaloka. They are subordinate to God and are dependent upon him for their existence and their action. Being connected with avidya and karma, they are drawn into matter (prakṛti, acit). Souls are classified as ever free (nitya) such as those of angelic spiritual beings, or blessed souls who dwell in constant communion with Brahman; released (mukta), bound

(1) Comp. R.C. Bhandarkar o.c. p.51 foll.

(2) Cf. V.A. Sukhtankar: Teaching of Vedanta according to Ramaraja (V.O.V. XXII, 141).

(badha), Kevalas or the Isolate, who desire to escape from the fires of samsāra and mānksus, who are desirous of liberation.

Concerning the third ground-principle of the world, acit, and its manifestation, Rāmānuja follows the sāmkhya cosmology, or has been largely influenced by it. Acit, or prakṛti is eternal and everything in this universe is the result of the mingling of cit and acit and constitutes the body of the Lord. "But having the World for its body does not cause Brahman any suffering since a priori Brahman is free from Karman, ^{the latter being} ~~which is~~ identified with avidyā. Brahman remains in the world," as it were, without a form. (1)

The origination, preservation and destruction of the world are due to the will of God (prapatti), who acts as material and efficient cause. (2) But He may be called as well the material cause, in as much as acit forms His body. The existence of the soul is conditioned by the eternal karma. (3) The souls take possession of different bodies according to their karma, and their destiny depends on karma. In order to corroborate his views Rāmānuja often quotes Purānas, especially Vishnu Purana, where it is stated that the third world energy is karma or nescience. "The energy of the Vishnu is the highest, that which is called embodied soul (ksetrajna) is inferior. There is another, third energy called karma or nescience (avidyā), actuated by which the omnipresent energy of the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly existence. Obscured by

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- (1) V.O.Ā. XXII, 151 fol.
 - (2) " XXII, 197.
 - (3) S.B.E. XLVIII, 88 fol.

nescience the energy of the embodied soul is characterised in the different beings by different degrees of perfection. (1) This is exactly Ramamuja's view, but also that of Samkhya. If we replace the energy of karma by rajo-guna, whose inherent function is activity, motion, git by sattva guna, and acit by tamo guna, we have more or less a complete Sāṅkhya ontology, not to speak of identical correspondences with regard to the evolution of the fundamental principles from purusa-prakṛti. (2)

Isvara, identified with viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva, is omnipotent ruler of the world and dispenser of justice, since he "wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting, so as fully to please Him, engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly virtuous action..... while, on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on actions altogether displeasing to Him, He engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord." (Brahmasūtra, II, 3, 41). (3) The individual souls are not the cause of creation of the world, in spite of their previous karma, the Lord is alone the cause of the world (Comm. on Br.Sutra, I, 2,1). (4) The souls, being the modes of the Supreme Self, whose true nature is obscured by avidyā, are one with Him only in so far as they are its effects (II, 1, 23; I, 4, 20). Although individual souls

(1) Y. P. VI, 7, 61-63.

(2) Y. O. J. XXII, 304 foll.

(3) For Śaṅkara Īsvara is the principle of the evolved world. He is the immediate determination of the paramātma. In later elaborations of this concept Isa becomes Trimūrti, as he manifests Himself under threefold aspect: Brahma, Viṣṇu, Śiva.

(4) All references in parentheses are from S.B.E. translation of the B.S. with the comm. of Ram.

are free in their wish to act or not, nevertheless their activity proceeds from Him (II, 3, 40). But this activity is promoted by the inward ruling self (antaryām) in so far as the former shows any will to act (prayatna). The second only helps the former and grants permission (II, 3, 41). All experience is the fruit of action (karma) "From Brahma down to a blade of grass, all living beings that dwell within this world are in the power of samsara due to works, and hence no profit can be derived by the pious from making them the objects of their meditation." Consequently only Vishnu should be made the object of meditation.

Samsāra is not an illusion as Śankara regards it, (1) but a real fact consisting in name and form, which is necessarily due to the connexion with non-sentient matter, such connexion arising from good and evil works (I, 3, 2). The feeling of "I" (ahamārtha) or conscious subject, is a thinking subject and constitutes the essential nature of the Self, and it persists even after final release, is not merged into Brahman. "It shines forth in the state of final release as an "I" for it appears to itself." Ignorance, transmigration etc. cannot be applied to the Self on account of its connexion with the body, but to the ahamkartri (sense of self) which being the product of avidya and connected with the body enjoys the fruits springing from actions. The Self is that which is conscious of ahamkartri (I, 1, 4). Consequently karma, or fruits of action, is allotted by the Lord, and is not brought about automatically by the karma itself, as Jaimini asserts (III, 2, 39). The Isvara is an outward

(1) S.B.E. XLVIII, 90.

agent, who exercises the function of a superintendent in distribution of karma. The individual soul's being subject to karma is due to the connexion with a body, which implies imperfection and suffering; whereas the Supreme Soul "is subject to itself only, and the same connexion is the source of playful sport, which consists therein, that He in various ways guides and rules those things." (III, 2, 12).

Both by Śankara and Rāmānuja apūrva or adrsta (being the super-sensuous magical principle which has potency to bring about the results of some action in a distant period of time or in another world) is refuted on the ground that the fruit of any action comes from the Lord, as a result of deeds done in previous lives, who acts as causal agent in reference to all actions, good or bad. ⁽¹⁾ In Buddhism, we find that samskāra, piled up character of works, is an objective force which makes for rebirth, independently of the will of any god, as being more satisfactory and logical, which the commentators of the Vedānta tried to avoid by interposing an outward force. When Manu declares "na hi karma kṣiyate" (the action is not destroyed) it does not presuppose an outward Īvara, but may be considered in the Buddhistic sense. Mbh is full of passages which imply that the doctrine of karma has been largely modified by Buddhism, where it meant rather a law of causation, not requiring the sanction of an external will, divine or human. In Manu's code the effects of karma are mathematically fixed, especially with regard to its operations in performance of sacrificial acts, but nowhere are to be

(1) S.B.E. 38, III, 2, 41; 48, III, 2, 40. The fact is that only body is ruled by the soul in the form of unseen principle, comprising good and evil karma and has for its end the requital of those works, the Lord being free from the unseen principle. (48, II, 2, 38).

found the statements of the relationship between individual action and its supervision by God. That is the later interpretation into which even the absolutist Sankara did not want to fall. "The confusion of results" is quite logical. If we accept one pure Being guiding human evolution on the one hand, and on the other hand, individuals acting or working out the results of their previous existences. There is no dilemma in accepting Sankara's subtle escape by putting forth a metaphysical Being, a Hirguna Brahman, being the totality of all existence on a higher plane, and empirical or practical conception of the necessity of a mass of individual souls who are whirling in the world of phenomena, so long as they remain in the space-time state of existence. Thus, Ramanuja's conception of karma is equivalent to the old Vedic belief in sin and punishment, which is equivalent to the dista (what is divinely appointed). The fundamental teaching of the karma doctrine is finally modified in the Bhagavad Gita, where a new factor is added - "grace" (prasada), which combined with the pious attitude of the worshipper, surpasses all effects of pre-natal sin. Ramanuja readily accepts "grace", which is a necessary corollary for final liberation and is a logical outcome of Ramanuja's system, since those who by practising bhakti attract, so to say, corresponding divine force, which enables them to attain the state of jivanmukti, which is even in this life, according to Sankara. (1) For

(1) On the contrary, for Ramanuja, the release in this life is impossible. The released souls retain the sense of individuality because if a man were to realise that the effect of such activity (desire and works) would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about release." (S.B.E. 48, p.70).

him the emancipation from the bonds of karma is not an actual addition to the sum of human possessions and enjoyments, a new fact breaking forth where nothing had been before, but the removal of a barrier and the entering into a permanent and inalienable truth, by being conscious of the unreality of appearance. Liberation of Ramanuja means freedom of the soul from its connexion with works and what depends thereon, i.e. body and the rest, when "intelligence, bliss, and other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by karma, expand and thus manifest themselves when the bondage due to karman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light." As in the Bhagavad Gita, the individual soul does not lead a separate existence from all eternity, but it has become severed as a part from the Divine Soul. (1) (IV, 4, 2-3). So the soul in its complete emancipation does not cease to be conscious of itself as separate from the Highest Self.

According to Rāmanuja, Karma is the root of avidyā and vice versa, (I, 2, 1; I, 2, 12), which remains attached to the individual soul as long as it is connected with the body, because the imperfection and suffering of individual beings are inherent in their connection with a body. The Supreme Soul is regarded by him as possessed "of all blessed qualities", i.e. as beyond pleasure-pain principles which chiefly account for samsara and karma. To the objection that the Supreme Soul, in having connexion with matter is itself in a way sullied by it, because of their very opposition, Rāmanuja answers: Not so, even non-sentient beings are not intrinsically bad, but the nature of the works of those beings binds them to the law of karma,

(1) Comp. Bh. Gita, XV, 7; XVI, 18; XVII, 6.

owing to the will of the Supreme Soul. Thus, in trying to refute the absolute monism of Sankara and duality of Sankhya, he had to invent a tertium quid, which participates in the evolution of the world as omnipotent ruler and controller. Essentially, there is little difference in the idea of karma and samsāra between Rāmānuja and Sankara. As the individual soul's bondage is determined by karma and is therefore a concrete reality, it cannot be removed by any abstract knowledge. Divine worship and divine grace can alone cause release of the soul. To know God is to seek liberation, according to Rāmānuja. It is through faith, bhakti and devotion (prapatti) that final release is achieved.

VII

The Problem of Karma and Release, Videhamukta
and Jīvanmukta in Sūrya-Gītā. (1)

The Sūrya Gītā is one of many later works of Indian literature where the problems of Īshvara, jīva and world creation are discussed in classical form. As it stands, it is an attempt to demonstrate the necessity of karma, in the form of an imaginary conversation between Brahma (Absolute Spirit) and Dakshināmūrti. Brahma, no more dominated by cause and effect, is still puzzled by the problem of the relation between the infinite and the finite and the operations of the law of karma. (2) Dakshināmūrti repeats to Brahma the Sūrya Gītā, the purport of which is to show the working of cause and effect in the manifested world. Although an original work in itself, it contains influences of Buddhistic thought as well as of Saivism or Saiva-Siddhanta, in the midst of which it must have sprung up. To which school it actually belongs it is difficult to say since the latter system does not comprise a particular system but a stream of thought which includes several schools within Saivism. (3) The central figure is Śiva who appears as Satguru and is identified with antaryāmin, the

(1) The text used for this chapter is contained in Gītāsaṅgraha pp. 302-336, published by Ashtekar & Co. Poona, 1915.

(2) For we are told, that "even when one does not fear death or rebirth, there remains something to be known about operations of karma (karmabhageṣu).

(3) H.W. Schomerus. Der Saiva Siddhanta (Leipzig, 1912) P. 6

subject and object of knowledge. ⁽¹⁾ Whereas in the Upanishads Brahman is antaryāmin, here we find that Śiva has taken his place. The peculiarity of Hindu thought has always been to express the same root ideas under different names. The originality of this work consists not so much in presentations of new stand-points as in emphasis on the value of mental vision as a means of attaining liberation.

The central problem of the first chapter is put in the form of a question: "How can one having no karma have the capacity to create karma? And as we know that if Brahma were to perform karma by any cause whatever, the samsara would be applicable to him, therefore the Sun is asked for an explanation of the primordial karma (Ādikarma) i.e. the first cause of the universe. More or less in agreement with the teaching of the Śaiva siddhanta, Para-brahman is represented as the ultimate and final cause of the universe, who although acting is not involved in Samsāra. — So we read: "Previous to the coming into being of the universe, individual soul and Īvara, there existed Para-Brahma (elsewhere termed Parasiva) alone, one without a second, eternal, devoid of attributes, without karma." As a result of the association of Parabrahma with consciousness (cit) and latent energy (Śakti), there arose two śaktis - māyā and avidyā. For although Brahma is without duality, he is reflected in these two, who represent duality, i.e. jīva and Īvara. Brahma has potentiality for good and evil and for the creation of the universe, and consequently he became indirectly associated with karma. The manifestation of the Paramatman, which arose by His own power, is called primordial karma, which creates bondage for Himself

(1) Schomerus o.c. p.85 ff (and 280 fol. Comp Sir John Woodroffe, Shakti and Shakta² Ch. IV.

and is subtle. Thereby he did not lose his attributeless state nor did he become imprisoned in samsara. (1) The individual soul having good and bad karma is absolutely involved in samsara, but the Īsa who has the karma of creation (sr̥ṣṭyadikarmavan) is only phenomenally imprisoned in samsara (v.19). Parabrahma, who is the cause of both jiva and Īsa, is not at all involved. He is beyond the reach of speech and thought (v.20). Mahādhiyas, rejecting both jīva and Īsa, who are associated with karma, reach to the Parabrahma by means of samadhi. These noble men (narottamaḥ) whether vidhehāmukta or jīvamukta, being beyond karma and akarma will reach this formless Brahma. Though bound in samsara by their karma, they are released by disinterested action (akarmaṇa); it is men with karma (i.e. who act), and not akarmin (who do not act), who are beyond imprisonment and liberation. (v.20-23). (2) Both imprisonment and release of the individual soul are due to karma, therefore karma should be avoided and karma should be accepted, i.e. some works should be done that the effects may follow, some works should be omitted that no effects may follow. When one abandons works, one ceases to be in the state of jīva; when works are applied, the state of Brahma is attained quickly (the meaning of this verse is that one should distinguish between right action which does not have as consequence bondage and that karma which involves one in samsara). In the following verse the same is more

(1) I, 13-18. Prāgūtpatterakarmaikamakartṛ ca nirindriyam nirviśesam param brahmaivāsinnātrāsti samsayah tathā'pi tasya cīcchaktisamyutādvēna hetuna pratīcchāyātṁike sakti māyāvidye bahūvatuh advitīyamapi brahma tayor yat pratibimbītan tena dvaividhyamāsādyā jīva īsvara ityapi puṇyapāpādikartṛtṛyam jagatṣṛṣṭyadikartṛtan abhajaḥ sandriyatam ca sakarmatvam viśesatah.

(2) I, 21-23 Karmavantaḥ parityajya jīveṣau ye mahādhiyaḥ akarmavat param brahma prayāntyaatra samādhibhiḥ te vidhehāmukta vā jīvamukta narottamaḥ karmakarmobhayātītāstadbrahmārūpamāpnyuh karmāṇā samsṛtau badhā mucyante te hyakarmaṇa bandhamoksobhayābītaḥ karmīṇo napyakarminah.

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clearly stated that karma which is born of ignorance and which is impure (asuddham) brings sorrow to mankind; but that karma which is pure (suddham) and proceeds from knowledge brings happiness in its train. The wise man (puruṣottama) who cuts asunder the bonds of the karma of ignorance by the sharp knife of the karma of knowledge, is released. Karma is the cause of all worldly intercourse (v. 23-29).

The next question which puzzled Aruna, i.e. why living beings are entangled in samsāra and whereby are they released from it, is answered by the Sun (Aditya), the eternal witness of karma. An act that is prescribed (as good) or prohibited (as bad) by all śāstras, if its motive is an outcome of desire etc., alike becomes a cause of samsāra. Even in the animal kingdom there is no exception to the law of samsāra, since all animals follow their previous karma. In this world, through the influence of evil deeds, although formerly men, they became degraded and are born as animals. When the evil karma becomes exhausted by suffering they reach the human state, and if they violate the moral law, they are reborn as animals. Thus, over and over again, whirled through repeated births and deaths, they wander about like a piece of wood upon the waves of the ocean (v. 30-40).

Arjuna, struck by the apparent contradiction, asks next: By what cause can they whose evil karma has been exhausted, who once have reached the human state, be reborn as animals? (Lit. dogs). Besides, in the case of those individual souls who have purified themselves by righteous deeds, knowledge and yoga, it is illogical to suppose that individual, not released (v. 41-45). The sun answers: "Even though the evil karma of the embodied souls (dehinu) should

have become exhausted through suffering, if they again perform evil deeds, it will bring about a degraded birth (durgati). The evil seeds of the base birth of the embodied souls, as a result of desire, will cause again a low birth, although they may have previous merits. The merits of men who are sakama cannot cause purification of their minds. Whence then can there possibly be the knowledge of yoga, jñāna-yoga, etc. for those whose minds are impure and whence can be deliverance from samsara for those who are devoid of yoga-wisdom? While there exist higher and lower births owing to desire (kāma) the effectiveness of the Mokṣasāstra depends upon arising of desirelessness (naiśkāmya). When one arrives at disgust (for the world) through the enjoyment of pleasure and pain, he attains desirelessness accompanied with discernment of his own self (svaviveka). Then, after a certain number of births, he obtains jñānayoga; through efforts in listening and the like, liberation is the established state in his soul (v.45-53).

In the next verses the problem of the relation of the individual soul and Parātman is discussed. "How can one possessing karma obtain paratman, who is the surveyor of all karma, himself remote from all karma?" The Sun answers "When former meritorious and sinful acts are through suffering destroyed, the Supreme Spirit (Paramatman) himself becomes revealed. All fruits of karma are reaped by individual souls, which are the actors, and not by Parātman, which is the mere witness, undefiled, unstained." Some people who have an imperfect knowledge of the Vedānta have doubt how jīvas, who are (metaphysically) not different from Tat (supreme spirit), can be influenced by karma. From the

metaphysical standpoint (paramartha dasayam) individual souls are non-different from the Supreme Soul; but from the empirical standpoint (vyavanāradasayam) this is impossible. Even the jīvanmukta, who has risen to the sphere of absolute truth, is rightly regarded as affected by the law of karma, and it is seen to apply to him when in that state. But how can it be said that the ignorant, who regard only the empirical world, are identical with Tat, and that they are not undergoing suffering (i.e. that they are not subject to karma)? Some people think that the performance of karma by the wise man will not produce its effects, just as an action of a dream. This is wrong; for in a dream the wrong-doer is not independent, but in a waking state the action of a living being is independent. In other words, the dreamer is powerless to choose his acts, whereas the man who is awake has freedom and consequently incurs the consequences of his acts. As for animals the waking state is only a cause of the fruits of enjoyment (bhogaikakaram), so for men the state of dreaming is only a cause of the enjoyment of fruits of karma (phala-bhogaikakaram). But the waking state for men, whether they are young or very old, is wholly unlike the waking state of an animal, much more so is this the case with those who know their own souls. In the waking state man's karma operates for the purpose of future bhoga but the effects of karma can be worked out in sleep and waking (phalam tu karmanah svapne jagratyapi ca yujyate). The distinction should be made between karma and bhoga (cause and effect) since there are people who mistake one for the other. (1)

cf. v. 65-66. bhāvibhogārtakam jāgratyeva nrnām bhavet
phalam tu karmanah svapne jagratyapi ca yujyate

- (1) Karmadyadhyasya bhogam ye bhoge 'dhyāsyātha karma ca karmatadbhogayorbhedam ajñātvāmuryathepsitam

(v.53-66). The following verses (67-82) deal with the gradual liberation which is obtained by following ordinary duties, and complete liberation which is achieved by an intense self-realisation that ^{iiva} he is non-different from the Paratman. The Ativarnasrami, i.e. who has transcended the naimittika and nitya karmas, reaches the highest goal in the course of many lives, but he obtains final liberation, even in the course of a single life, who has obtained true knowledge (samyagjñāna).

The second chapter of the Sūrya Gītā deals with different stages of karma and some minor points which are connected with the performance of the different prescribed rules in Śrutis and Smrtis, the performance or non-performance of which may influence human destiny. In the beginning it is said that ^{inf} human life, being the product of the law of karma, has passed ^{nam} formerly through five successive stages of development and has been guided by Tantras, Purānas, Smrti, Śruti and the Upanishads, the last should be considered as the highest exposition of truth, and alone leading to liberation. (1) Tantras are considered as the lowest, since they deal with material acts and symbols. Purānas contain allegories of mythical persons; Smrtis contain acts based upon tradition; Śrutis contain acts which are based upon revelation and intuition, whereas the subject matter of the Upanishads brings freedom (v.1-10). However highly developed a man may be, he must not neglect the performance of the ordinary duties of life, if he desires to obtain freedom, because they are steps which lead one towards liberation.

v.8.
 (1) Śrautānyapi ca yastyaktvā sadaupanisadāni vai karoti śraddhayā karmānyayan mokṣi tu pañcamah

The chief obstacle to freedom is desire and selfish action, in the absence of which even ordinary men obtain freedom, immediately or gradually. He who has risen to the fifth stage of development by knowledge, meditation and work, is free from sorrow and delusion and is always ^{radiant} ~~shining~~. Both knowledge and worship are necessary; without knowledge there cannot be worship (upāsana) and without worship there cannot be any knowledge. Thus, liberation is brought about by knowledge, worship and works combined. The man who rejects any one of these three conditions will not obtain immortality (parāṃṣtam) (v.10-22). The man who craves for worldly enjoyments (bhogādhikārī) and is desirous of mukti, will certainly fail to attain it. When doing caste-duties, if one who is ignorant should be in any doubt concerning those acts, he should follow the practice of his ancestors. Should a learned man have any doubts on sastra let him follow his own intellect and he should not consult an ignorant father. If a man does works, in opposition to the customs of his forefathers he is a fool and contracts sin. The following of the customs of ancestors applies only to works and not to the intellectual predilection for a system of thought. The omission of naimittika karma i.e. special occasional rites and kārya karma (acts having for object the attainment of personal selfish aims), is not considered as sin and does not produce any evil effects, either in this world or in the next. The performance of nitya-karma (i.e. daily rites) does not bring any merit, but the non-performance of it degrades one from the higher conditions of life. Nevertheless, the mere omission of nitya karma does not become a cause, but if this is due

to previous karma (prākkarma), then that act was the cause of an effect created in a previous life which is sin. (1) Thus, it becomes a new cause of future sorrow and pain. If a man neglects to perform karmas either through ignorance or knowingly without lustration (prayascitti), he will obtain again a low birth. The man who knowingly rejects nitya-karma and does not follow any ~~śikṣā~~, and remains unrepentant, goes to the ~~Raurava~~ [hell]. Jīvanmukta is not liable to fall because of omissions in his nitya karma (v.22-46).

The next verses deal with the division of acts into pure and impure (śuddha and asuddha). By impure acts individuals are bound, by pure acts mokṣa is achieved. Impure acts are likewise twofold: meritorious (puṇya) and evil (pāpa). The pure man is not subject to these two. Pure karma has for its object the envisagement of the eternal pure free Soul, it brings the perception of truth bound by cause and effect. By purifying actions (visuddhain karmabhiḥ) the senses gradually become pure; when the senses are purified the mind becomes pure of itself. The mind, once purified, the individual soul becomes pure and in this manner becomes one with Brahma who is absolute bliss and without part. Pure acts are either external regular acts such as bathing, or internal such as meditation. Those who are devoted to pure actions, are liberated from mortal conditions and become independent. The wise man who has mounted to the fifth stage should continually exercise himself in it, and never trust to his senses for they, under the influence of some previous

(1) v.38-39. Na syādakaraṇam heturabhāvātmatayā tataḥ nityākaraṇahetuḥ prākkarma cet pratyavāyakrt akṛtau pratyavāyasya śravanam vyarthameva tat pūrvakarmaphalādanyaphalasyānavadhāraṇāt.

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unconscious impression (pūrvavāsanā) may fall into impure acts; therefore he should keep them from impure acts and busy them with pure ones. Though the mind and senses may be purified by pure acts, a mind with evil tendencies may act impurely. Having obtained a clear mind (prasanna-manas), one should not rest satisfied with the feeling of happiness thence ensuing because satisfaction in the attainment of ^asmall pleasure is itself a cause of misery, because just as the worldly man indulges in sensual enjoyments without ever being satisfied, so the wise man is continually active in pure works. When senses, manas and vital breaths have been stilled as in deep sleep, then the aspirant will transcend both pure and impure thoughts and acts and will obtain supreme satisfaction. The manas is not merged until the senses are quite stilled; until the vital breaths are stilled, so long should pure acts be done. External and internal purity being mutually helpful are never separated by the wise until death, for the swan with a sound wing rises up in the sky, but the falcon with an unsound wing, though in the sky, falls down from it. So the twofold purity is essential for release. Internal pure acts are of two kinds - samprajñāta samādhi (concentration with knowledge of objects) and asamprajñāta samādhi (in which mind is without any object) (v.46-71). The last verses are a recapitulation of the previous exposition.

The subject matter of the third chapter is the so-called antaryāmi (inner Controller), which is here identified with Siva, "Conqueror of death, giver of all and witness of all karmas." The content of this chapter has undoubtedly been taken or inspired by Brihad-Āranyaka Up., III adh. seventh Brāhmaṇa, where Yājñavalkya explains

to Aruni the subjective and objective aspects of the antaryami, the immortal pantheistic soul of all universe. In this Gitā it is personified, and according to the general rule of Indian philosophical writers, antaryami is described as saguna and nirguna. The trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, occupies a prominent place, the last having always the highest function. Paramātman is the cause of Śiva, the latter being the cause of Viṣṇu who in his turn is the cause of Brahmā. (Brahmā viṣṇuḥ Śivo Brahmā hyuttarottarahetavaḥ). Only wise men know this and not those men who are in illusion. (v.27-29). The tendency of the writer seems to be to show that these three gods are not only transcendent beings, but also that they are associated with three modes of energy and activity in nature. At the same time, while to each of them different functions are ascribed, Śiva is continually referred to as inner controller.⁽¹⁾ Their first inequality consists in guṇas, since Brahmā is concerned with rajas, Viṣṇu with tamas and Śiva (here called Rudra) with sattva (v.31 - 32). In human activities they are connected with karma, worship (upāsana) and knowledge, severally (v.41). Each of them is surveyor of a particular aspect of karma - sāmyakarma, naimittika-karma and nityakarma. The same correspondences are applied to worship and knowledge, Śiva always representing the purest and the subtlest form of human and universal life.

The following chapter, the fourth, treats the respective functions of Brahma (Absolute), Īśa (Creator) and the individual soul and their mutual relationship. The creation of the world is conceived in the traditional Vedāntic sense

(1) v. 31: sarva jñatvādidharmānām katham sāmyam trimūrtiṣu trayānām ca guṇānām hi vaiṣamyam sarvasamātam.

to be a mere play or sport of the Creator (lilarupa). But the creation of the material world is not ex nihilo, but is due to a definite proportional combination of the five primordial elements - ākāsa (ether), vāyu (air), tejas (light), apas (water) and pṛthivī (earth). This is called pañcāhikarānakarma. When the moment of creation or rather unloosening comes they enter into a definite combination, a particle of each (akasa) plus one quarter of the other half consisting of each of the four, according to the following formula:-

E.g. Earth = $\frac{\text{Earth}}{2} \frac{\text{Ether}}{8} \frac{\text{Air}}{8} \frac{\text{Fire}}{8} \frac{\text{Water}}{8}$

and so on for each other tattva. ^{cf.} Vedāntasāra of Śaṅkara v. 123-125). This concept of the fivefoldness of all things is a very ancient division, and can be traced back to the Upanishads, where we are told: "The sacrifice is fivefold. The sacrificial animal is fivefold. A person is fivefold. This whole world, whatever there is, is fivefold." (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. 1,4,17). ⁽¹⁾ Of course, it is questionable whether this passage is not a later addition, because elsewhere, in the older Upanishads and Brahmasūtra, only a threefold division is to be found. ⁽²⁾ Nevertheless, if we try to disentangle in the Upanishads the mythological from the philosophical elements, very likely the same fivefoldness of things could be found. Moreover it should be observed that technical terms designating primeval world-substances are to be found in Sāṅkhya-kārikā, corresponding to those used by the early Greek philosophers, from the

(1) In later literature this five-fold division is applied to the soul, which is supposed to be composed of five vehicles corresponding to five tattvas: Annamayakōśa (earthly vehicle), Prāṇamayakōśa (the vehicle of prāṇa), Manomayakōśa (sensorial vehicle), Vijñānamayakōśa (the vehicle of cognition) and Anandamayakōśa (the vehicle of bliss).

(2) comp. Deussen: Philosophie der Upanishads³, 171 fol.

Elasticity onwards.

Next, the Surya Gita proceeds to describe the fourfold birth to which all living creatures are subject, i.e. jīvajā (birth in the womb, as men and mammals); āṇḍajā (birth from the egg, birds, reptiles, fishes and insects) and ^{udbhijā} udbhijā which comprises two classes of beings: (a) lower animals which are born chiefly in the waters, and (b) plants, which are born chiefly by germination in the earth. (1) Having created the universe he himself entered into it. The creation of the universe is the result of prārabdhakarma, that is to say of causes created in previous cycles of existence. The Lord (Īśa) is only the highest of all individuals (adhikārī); he was previously in the state of jīva, and he became Lord only through knowledge, worship and works. The god who was placed in charge over a previous kalpa, rejected his own māyā and reached the highest state, after his commenced karma had been exhausted (v.1-6). Since the Creator (Īśa) is involved in activity through three-fold karma (creation, preservation and dissolution of the universe), he is subject to the law of karma (tasya karmitvam Īśasyāpyupapadyate). Since it is understood that he is equal to the jīvanmuktas, (those who are free but still retain a physical body), hence it necessarily follows that he is a performer of commencing karma. He is brahmevid, but not Brahma himself, because he is subject to works, such as the creation etc., and because of his māyā. While the act of creating the individual soul is an act of Brahma, he can never be said to be a performer of previous karma for karma implies previous non-existence and Brahma is an

(1) See Brahmasūtra, III, 1, 20-21; Cf. Chānd Up. VI.5.1 and Aitareya Up. V.3.

existence (bhāva) and so commenced karma can attach only to one affected by previous karma. ⁽¹⁾ (v.6-12). If he (Īśa) is bound by the works of creation and thus influenced by māyā, is the term "Controller of māyā" (vaśyamāyatva) inapplicable to him? No, for on the conclusion of his function, his absolute state (kaivalyam) is not obstructed, hence the familiar term "Controller of māyā" is correct. But so long as the universe is in the state of continuance, it may be said of him that he is possessed by māyā (māyin) in the sense in which a lover (kāmin) is possessed by love, not in the sense in which a rich man (dhanin) is possessor of riches, because of his subordination to karma. ⁽²⁾ For to such a Creator (māyīnah), the act of creation is like a waking state, the act of maintenance is like a dreaming state, but the act of dissolution is like a state of deep sleep. Some say he is also an individual soul (jīva) because he possesses three states, three modes of action and three bodies. This is wrong, for though formerly he was an individual soul because of his knowledge of Brahma and Soul and because of his omniscience, he is different from jīva. Īśvara has not three karmas, for he is equal to the the jivantsukta, he is bound only by his commenced karma (not creating new karma), and he holds a special cosmic function. On the conclusion of his function as Īśa, he will become Brahma; how can there be an error in this meaning established in Vedānta? (v.12-20).

Brahma is declared to be one, without karma, by Bruti and Smṛti; but the statement that Īśa has karma is metaphorical (aupachārikī). Even if Īśa has karma, he is able

(1) ^{v.12} Karmanah prāgnāvaadvādbhāvatvādbrāhmano vibhoh pūrvakarmavato hi syātkarma prārabhasamjñitam

(2) ^{v.15} Sthitau tu tasya māyitvam kāmītvādivadisīyate

(2) ^{v.15} Sthitau tu tasya māyitvam kāmītvādivadisīyate na dhanītvādivatkarmapāravasyāmirantaram.

to get rid of it, since he is not subject to accumulated and future karma and is omniscient. Distinction should be made between Īsa and Brahma, the former having karma (sakarma), the other being free from karma etc. He who claims for Īsvara freedom from karma is a dualist and he will never obtain freedom from the chain of saṃsāra. Since the conception denoted by the word "Tat" is to be set aside, to him cannot be ascribed either eternity or freedom from karma. As one cannot perform acts without a body with which the Soul is identified, therefore Īsa must be a soul inhabiting a body similarly conceived as itself the soul. (1) This ascription of Īsa to his own body is not real in a higher sense but is called phenomenal, as it assumes the functions of creator etc. There can never be a true ascription of body to Īsa, because he had not body before, and because he has no body after dissolution. At the time of pralaya, though inactive like one who sleeps, he possesses the germ of adhyāsa (ascription of phenomenal body) in him, etc, by which he becomes again active in creation. During the night of Brahma, 4000 yugas in length, Īsa as well as jīva, sleeps with this germ. Viṣṇu's night is said to be 100 times longer than Brahmā's, and Śiva's 100 times longer than Viṣṇu's night. (20-32).

How can it be said that the creators, who are circumscribed by time like individual souls, are without body and not subject to the karma law? As the trio of souls, by imagining the individual trio of bodies to be its own, becomes fettered in a real cycle of births and karma, so the trio of bodies becomes fettered in a phenomenal

(1) v. 26-27.

Anadhyastātmanbhāvena na dehenaiva kāścana
 vyāpriyeta tatasca syāddenīso'dhyāsa^{saṃ}myutah a)
 svadehe'pīśvarasyāstī nādhyāsaḥ pāramārthikāḥ
 prātibhāsikamāsritya srasṭṛtvādi nigadyate.

a) according to the correction of Dr. Barnett.

cycle of births and karma. It is said that Īśa is reflected in māyā consisting mainly of pure sattva, but how can it be possible for him to be without limiting adjuncts (upādhi)? If he is so limited, how can he be eternal; if he is not eternal (anitya) he cannot be without karma. Those who are deluded ascribe the character of Īśa the Creator, to Brahma, but ātmayogis, free from delusion, disprove the ascription. Just as a man who in the darkness mistakes a pillar for the thief, so the man deluded by nescience mistakes Īśvara for Parabrahma. Īśvara is not real in the sight of him who is a seeker for liberation (mumukṣurṣṭyā); therefore the theory of vivartavāda is well applied to him. Even from the point of view of parināma, there is proof that Īśa is non-eternal, and therefore it will follow that the individual soul that hearkens will devote itself to the [doctrine] of second-less Brahma (advaitabrahmanisthatvam). There are three theories, each held by qualified persons (adhikārin): a high adhikārī is he who is taught to see in Īśa a vivarta (i.e. that he is unreal); higher is one who sees in jīva evolution (parināmitvam), since release is achieved by way of evolution, as the grub develops into a bee. If jīva attains to the state of Īśvara, gradual liberation is achieved; then attainment of the state of Brahma is declared to be for the purpose of immediate liberation. It is immaterial whether Īśa is fourth, fifth, or sixth; Brahma transcends all. Some people say Brahma abides in Īśa and Īśa in Brahma and hence they are one (ekatvam); this should not be considered. It is said that Īśvara is in Brahma, but never the reverse, for it is impossible for the paramātmān

which is unlimited to stay in the limited. The Supreme Puruṣottama, who is only a portion of Brahma, is superior to Īśa, much more so is Absolute Brahma superior to him. The cause of the phenomenal world is Īśvara, Brahma is the cause of individual souls, in that case how is it possible to identify Brahma and Īśa in the empirical sphere? (v. 32-50).

The next verses try to justify the Creator as independent, although he is involved in a phenomenal universe. The question is put: If Īśvara is active (karmitā), he must have merit and demerit, consequently he will have pleasure and pain and thus he will be a jīva. This is denied on the ground that Īśa is active in good and evil only for the welfare of the world, and he is not affected by pleasure and pain because he has knowledge of Self (ātmajñānavattā). Killing ^{of} an unborn child and similar sins committed by Viṣṇu did not bring any real misery to him; one cannot condemn him for sin committed by him for the benefit of the world, nor is he for that reason a jīva. The objection is raised: if Viṣṇu is the author of the Vedas etc. he should act according to their prescriptions, otherwise he violates his own laws. If we establish that he is not the primary maker of Śāstras, the mention of a secondary maker is not futile. This however is false. If jīva is a primary actor, then Īśa will be the secondary actor, but if the śāstra is a work then Mahesā is their primary maker. This does not disprove the statement that the Unqualified [Brahma] is the origin of the Śāstra: the Śāstra has originated from the Unqualified (Brahma), but has been manifested from a qualified Being. The qualified Īśa is metaphorically spoken of as originator of the śāstra, or it may be granted that he is the seed (bījātā) of both

Veda and Vedānta. But on that account there is no similarity between Brahma and Īśa as regards agency, for there is an obvious difference between one who makes and one who makes a maker. (1) (v.50+60).

Another objection: if a person is proved to be active, it follows that he must be involved in karma, hence there is no doubt that Brahma and Īśa are involved in karma. But this is false for Īśa's relation to karma is that of a lover to the love that possesses him, but Brahma's relation to it is that of the rich man to the riches that he possesses. Mahesā is dependent, Unqualified Brahma independent. Both Brahma and Īśa are related to each other as cause and effect, the one being the ground and the other what is contained therein. But if you accept Brahma as karmin how can he be called Unqualified? This objection does not hold good for there is no reference to "qualities" of māyā. The designation "qualified" can be applied to Brahma in the sense that he is invisible etc, that he has qualities of knowledge, that he consists of bliss etc. As it is said that Īśa is the maker of the universe, and jīva the maker of samsara, so parabrahma is the maker of jīva and Īśa. There is no other maker than Brahma, because of the non-existence of previous karma etc., for Brahma is declared to be one, without beginning and end, without karma and non-agent.

If it is agreed that Brahma is not a doer in any period of time (past, present and future), then jīva and Īśa could not form the Universe and samsāra. For a manifest formation requires some maker and therefore as Brahma is a maker of works (karmakartṛtva), it is reasonable to conclude that he is a karmin (involved in karma). If

(1) IV, 60: na caitenāsti karmitvasānyam brahmesayostayoh kartusca krtakartusca bhedo'sti spasta eva hi.

however Brahma is karmin, what are we to say of the knower of Brahma (brahmavedin)? Therefore it is not possible to establish that a man who has become one with Brahma will be free of karma. He who has become Brahma must be such as Brahma himself has been decided to be, ^{and this is quite logical.} Some formless Reality other than Brahma may be unaffected by karma in the three modes of time, not a subject of action, and not involved in time. (1) But this (ultimate subject) which is beyond all times is not to be known or expressed since there can be on this point no valid conclusion, no valid proof and no right reason. But Brahma, Īsa and jīva, who are said to be subjects of action (kartṛtvasaṅgata), are involved in Karma through knowledge (vidyā), māyā and ignorance (avidyā) respectively. Of these three karmins, Brahma, being the highest is declared in śruti and smṛti to be without karma, and this is proper. So, realising that the Highest Being is Karmin, the wise will not abstain from actions which are prescribed in śruti and smṛti.

The last chapter proceeds with the definition and attributes of the "greatest karmin" (karmisreṣṭa), i.e. those men who are released while in the body, having transcended all human limitations. The greatest karmin is he who does not regard either his body or senses as his own; whose pranas, manas etc. have become tranquil and reached the state of Avyakta; from whom are absent actions such as those of a child, a lunatic or a demon, whose attitude is like that of a boa constrictor; who has no sense of an ego or of objects (of an ego), and no

(1) kālātraye'pyakarmitvamakartṛtvamakālātā
kasya chidbrahmano'nyasya nīrūpasyāsti vasturāh.

sense of duality. The idea "Once I was bound, now I am free" never occurs to him since he has become eternally free in essence (nityamuktasvarūpaḥ). The greatest karmin is the videhamukta who is called the best of knowers of Brahma, whose mental organs and vital breaths are lost in the formless (Aprakṛta); whose activities derived from the three kinds of impressions (vāsanātraya-jāni) have all been stilled; who having destroyed impure actions with pure actions becomes wholly one with Karmic Brahma (sakarmabrahmanatro'bhut); who, highest among jñānins, has reached the seventh stage and who is unique among devotees; who is untouched by emotion whether he be afflicted by all or worshipped by them; who is beyond pleasure and pain; who is worshipped by all men, by gods and demons, by Brahma, Viṣṇu and Śiva. Rejecting all karmas and living only in his own Soul, how can he be called karmin? The fact of his residing only in his own Soul is the fruit of his karmas, therefore he will enjoy the fruits of his karma (saphalakar-maisa bhavet). What is known through knowledge or obtained by worship, that surely he attains through karma, therefore he is a karmin. But how can the videhamukta (released in bodiless state), (who is so called) because he has no memory of his body although the body still exists, be said to be karmin? The answer is that although he has lost consciousness of the body, he stays in the body which is the effect of karma (karmadene), hence he is an embodied self from the standpoint of other people, consequently he is karmin. It should not be supposed that since he is limited by his body he is therefore not full (of universal consciousness); on the contrary he is full of it, like a jar full of water

sunk into a pond. Even if freed from commenced karma and from all worldly experience, still while in the body he must abide still as a karmin in the body, which is produced by karma and is an instrument of suffering karma. Though the body is our instrument, it is not proved that suffering must be acquired, for since he is unconscious of his body, he is as if he were without body. He who has gained ambrosia by the three junctures (sandhi) of the Soul, namely waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, is free from all fissures (sandhi), is ever worshipped by makers of union (sandhin). He who is to be worshipped ever by all *karmins* [karmibhis] and all akarmins is called the greatest karmin and the greatest akarmin. If a yogin is indifferent towards all things, and has his pleasure in his own soul, what profits it him whether thousands of acts of worship are paid to him or not? Having left aside all personal interest and right of ownership in the body and other like evolutes, by constant states of devotion he becomes radiant, purely composed of soul. Those who are bewildered by the objects of their senses are influenced by evil karma; he who is free from them, he is called sukarmin and bodyless. He who is free from all quality and has rejected all threefoldness, (of karma etc) devoid of all states (of consciousness), he is called bodyless (videna). The man in whom all worldly and vedic karma has been destroyed, from whom [i.e. from whose old self] not a single atom (survives), is called bodiless. His senses never wander about, but remain like a picture painted on the wall. As he sees always non-dual atman, eternal, quality-less, immortal, how can there appear to him evolutes other

than Self? As he does not see anything other than soul, untrue, dual, and variously qualified, how can he fail to find in himself the essence of eternal bliss? When the Ātmayogin's essence has become consciousness and bliss, without beginning, middle or end, and his intelligence steady, how can he be constrained by the body? Rejecting all karmas by means of karmas, standing in Brahma by means of Brahma, obtaining constant happiness through karma, he is resplendent. The man who has neither keenness nor dullness of buddhi, who has passed beyond buddhi, he is awake (prabuddha) and very glorious. For, just as salt is dissolved in water, so the thought-organ is dissolved in pure consciousness, so that through constant devotion of the Self he becomes one (non-dual). Pain comes from having a thought-organ (samanastva); whence should it come to one without a thought organ? For he who has a thought-organ (samanasko) conceives imaginations which cause misery. The misery born of prārabdha karma is said to apply to the jīvanmukta; but how can it apply to a bodyless being devoid of three karmas? The man who thinks "karma should be done" or "karma should not be done", or that ecstatic concentration (samādhi) should or should not be performed, has not reached the state which is called videhamukti. Or, if a man thinks "I was bound before, now I am liberated from bondage" he has not attained the state of videhamukti.

"Previously I was released, in the interval was an illusion like bondage, if a man etc. "All unreality has come to be in me like a son to a barren woman", if he thinks etc.

"The darkness belonging to ignorance is destroyed by the radiance of the Self" if etc. If he thinks, even in dreams, "I am without sense of egoity in my bodily senses

controlled, calm, desireless, fearless, unattached, steady in his own soul, and who, abandoning Maya-karma, finds

etc." he is not videhamukta. The state of bodilessness belongs to him whose thought organ is lost in the Formless (see above); how can it belong to one who thinks of anything whatsoever that is other than Soul. The thought-organ is destroyed altogether when its exercise is abandoned, then remains to him only that state in which his essence is void of thought-organ. They who talk about "attainment of freedom from action," conceiving that the liberation of soul in bodilessness is effected by exercise of the thought-organ (manana), are fools who cannot be satisfied, they delight in hearing tales of the Upanishads, but do not realise (their sense).

In the next verses the necessity of realisation of the Self (svāmbhūti) is further emphasised and those who practice different karmas without understanding and realisation (svāmbhūti), are ridiculed by various comparisons. Even those who practice meditation of Yogic postures without self-realisation are compared to herons on the river bank seeking to deceive the fish. Thus, whatever a man does without self-realisation is as useless as cultivation on a barren land. Any action, however inferior, if practised for the sake of self-realisation is to be considered great, since it destroys ignorance. If a man is attached to kamyakarma prescribed by śruti, smṛti and purānas, he is to be avoided by men of refinement. Such a man imagines that his soul is properly devoted (svaniṣṭhām svasya manyate) as if a blind man should consider himself skilful in assaying precious stones and he puts himself under an unworthy teacher to gain worldly benefits. But the wise man, who in order to gain liberation approaches a self-controlled, calm, desireless teacher delighting solely in his own soul, and who, abandoning kama-kamas, frees

himself from lusts by his desire of liberation, obtains liberation thereby (v. 48-60).

The content of the sūrya Gītā is centred in Parabrahma, elsewhere denoted as Siva antaryāmin, who with a view to creating the world enters into association with consciousness (cit) and latent energy (śakti). The two fundamental principles - māyā and avidyā - are the instrumental cause of the universe. Brahma, although without duality, is reflected (pratibimbhita) in Īśvara (Creator) and jīva. He has only a latent capacity for creating. Brahma and Īśvara stand in relation to each other as cause and effect. Thereby he is indirectly connected with karma. Primordial karma (Ādikarma) is said to be the cause of the manifestation of the universe in its dynamic or manvantaric stage. Generally speaking, the existence of the cosmos is conceived in the sense of apokatastasis, or recurring of an identical state of things. The Hindu Trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva is conceived to correspond to various functions in the world and to the psychological centres of a man's being. All three correspond to threefold activity - sattva, rajas and tamas; - and threefold karma - kāmya, naimittika, and nitya karma; these correspondences apply to all spheres of activity. On the metaphysical ground there is no difference whatever between these three, but from the point of view of emanation, they preponderate each in their turn at different stages of the world's evolution. Śiva-Rudra, in this subjective aspect denoted as antaryāmin, emerges as supreme, to whom all gods are in a sense subject. Antaryāmin itself is of twofold aspect - saguna and nirguna.

(2) The peculiar Hindu conception, i.e. that all classes of beings have evolved owing to their previous meritorious karma, appears in many passages. Even Brahma, or the

Creator, who is the leader of present kalpa, is denoted more as a kind of Over-soul and not as a real embodied soul. He has passed through all lower stages of evolution on the expiry of which he will reach the state of non-dual Brahma. Therefore, he has not yet reached the absolute state (kevala avastha), because he is involved in samsara together with individual souls and by means of them is working out his own freedom. The Absolute (Parabrahma) is not subject to karma. ^{As} he has not yet grasped the origin of the law of karma, Dakṣiṇāmūrti, ⁽¹⁾ repeats Sūrya Gītā

Samsāra is eternal and is due to desire and all living beings are involved in samsāra, because the whole universe is governed by the immutable law of cause and effect, or karma. Parabrahma is beyond karma of any kind, whereas Ivara or the Creator is bound by the karma of creation. The creator is denoted as sad-cit-ananda and is related to the organic and inorganic worlds by means of his twofold saktis - māyā and avidyā. Individual souls, although in their metaphysical aspect they are equal to Paramatman, are bound by threefold karma - prārabdhā, samcita and āgama karma, and only through higher ecstatic consciousness (samādhi) can they perceive their true being and free themselves from the continual stream of becoming. Māyā-sakti is causa materialis of the universe which fetters all beings and keeps them under its sway. The jñānayogin is the man who has transcended all three karmas, pure, impure and neutral, and he is called jīvanmukta. Soteriology is expressed in two types of release, jīvanmukta

one of the Avatars of Śiva

- (1) The name Dakṣiṇāmūrti is very likely taken from the Upanishad of the same name, belonging to Yajurveda and constituting one of the 108 collections of the Upanishads. The word "Dakṣa" (the son of Aditi) appears to denote a kind of spiritual energy and is mentioned in the RV, and Nirukta. (Comp. Muir Sanskrit texts, I, pp. 25-27).

and videhamukta, i.e. liberation while in the body and liberation in a bodiless state. The complete freedom from the chain of Samsara is reserved to the videhamukta.

Knowledge is obtained from five sources, appropriate to the five stages of the evolution of individual souls - Tantras, Puranas, Smritis, Srutis and Upanishads, the last being the highest and is meant for highly evolved souls.

systems of Indian religions and philosophies thought. The most important is KARMA. The law of causation: KARMA causes KARMA, the chain of re-embodiment of living beings. The continual wheel of existence caused by KARMA (SAMSARA) the painful character of life and hence of death (MORTALITY), liberation from suffering by means of the destruction of KARMA, the ways and means differing in various systems according to different schools and forming basic principles of all systems.

In Rigvedic hymns the idea of either SAMSARA or KARMA is rarely to be found. Instead, we have another concept, that of YAMA, as an inviolable order of things which rules supreme over both gods and men and often takes the form of a moral concept. It would be too daring to assert that the idea of YAMA evolved into KARMA, but with some probability of arriving at a result we might say that YAMA was one of the important concepts underlying or corresponding to the idea of KARMA in the post-Vedic period. It is more plausible to think that KARMA, in its aspect of cosmic, technical law, evolved out of both YAMA and YAGNA, the latter being used as spell for removal of sin and which implied a technical force which could perpetuate man's life and free him from all evils.

(1) It should be born in mind that there are four distinct stages of liberation (MUKTI), particularly elaborated in Yoga philosophy: MUKTI (the being in the same sphere or world with any particular deity); MUKTI (freedom or conformity with the deity); MUKTI (intimate union or absorption into divine essence); and MUKTI (proximity to the deity). Comp. MUKTI in "Mind", Jan 1915: "Vedic School" esp. Mukti Unpublished. Ann. I, v. 16-25.

Chapter VIII

Recapitulation and General Considerations.

There are several fundamental ideas common to all systems of Indian religious and philosophic thought. The most important is karma, the law of causation; next comes samsara, the chain of re-embodiment of living beings, the continual wheel of existence caused by karma; duḥkha, the painful character of life and mokṣa or mukti (pali vimutti), liberation from suffering by means of the destruction of karma, the means used thereto differing in various systems according to postulates laid down and forming basic principles of the system.

In Rigvedic hymns the idea of either samsara or karma is rarely to be found. Instead, we have another concept, that of ṛta, as an immutable order of things which rules supreme over both gods and men and often takes the form of a moral concept. It would be too daring to assert that the idea of ṛta evolved into karma, but with more probability of arriving at a result we might say that ṛta was one of the important concepts underlying or corresponding to the idea of karma in the post-vedic period. It is more plausible to think that karma, in its aspect of absolute cosmical law, evolved out of both ṛta and yajña, the latter being used as spell for removal of sin and which implied a cosmical force which could perpetuate man's life and free him from all evils.

(1) It should be born in mind that there are four distinct states of liberation (mukti), particularly elaborated in Yoga philosophy: sālokya (the being in the same sphere or world with any particular deity); sārūpya (resemblance or conformity with the deity); sāyujya (intimate union or absorption into divine essence; and samīpya (proximity to the deity). Comp P. Narasimha in "Mind". Jan 1915: "Vedantic Good" esp. Mukti Upanishad. Adh. I, v.18-23.

Moreover, the semantic development of the word "karma" from Vedic times down to the Upanishads is very significant for the evolution of its meaning. It is only in the Brahmanas that the idea of samsara is vaguely hinted at and implied in many passages, as it has been shown in chapter I. The idea of transmigration (not samsara) is closely associated with that of the psychostasia, or weighing of souls and their deeds, this is obvious in Brahmanas. Naturally this latter idea is to be found in many ancient eschatologies and might have been borrowed from the ancient Egyptians. Apart from this, the "repeated death" (punar mrtyu) or re-death conveyed more to the Brahmanical priest than death in another world. The transition from the idea of a "repeated death" to that of a series of lives was not remote. We see even in the oldest Upanishads how, quite suddenly, new meanings are ascribed to the word karma. The blending of sacrifice and karma - causation- with its cosmical meaning of a law of cause and effect was gradually emerging. The sacrifice becomes gradually secondary and only the mystical or gnostic conception of sacrifice is emphasised. The man who does sacrifice "unto all worlds, unto all beings" reaches Brahma. A well defined dogma of karma and samsara is lacking in the oldest Upanishads but a tendency is manifested for a new re-statement of the earlier Brahmanic conceptions and remodelling of the ancient ideas contained in the Vedas and Brahmanas. (1) It was not difficult for an Upanishadic

(1) It is a very characteristic opinion of M. Müller, who endeavours to repudiate the general opinion of Sanscrit scholars, that the Vedanta is based upon hymns and Brahmanas. He says: "Scholars have imputed to Vedanta philosophy childishness, imagining that they could establish the highest truths which are within the reach of the human mind on such authorities as the hymns, the Brahmanas, and even some of the Upanishads as we possess them." (six Systems, 1919, p.151).

thinker to come from the doctrine of the soul's eternal duration in the future to the idea that that which is without beginning is also endless. The fact of apokatastasis or recurrence of an identical state of things was suggested by the idea of ῥτα, and its application to the ethical side of life was not distant. Samsara was not a causal concept. It meant not a succession of states and degrees of existence, but the whole imaginable past present and future existence. As it has been pointed out elsewhere, it is difficult to draw up a precise genealogical scheme of doctrinal and literary development in India, because the strata of thought from the prose treatises of the Brahmanas perpetually overlaps, so that it is impossible to suggest any definite limits.⁽¹⁾ On the archaic elements of the early texts, later doctrines are imposed, so that a long period of time was required before the teaching presented was reduced to self-consistency. Moreover, the secrecy of the teaching, combined with oral transmission of the texts, make our task still more difficult to determine what is borrowed and what has sprung up within Brahmanical circles.⁽²⁾ The secrecy with which the original Hindu teaching was invested, was not peculiar to this system, but also to many ancient gnostic-philosophical schools - Greek, Egyptian, Jewish etc., who imparted their teaching only to individual disciples and transmitted them down from father to son. The problem of authorship is also very

(1) Comp. A. S. Geden: E.R.E. XII, 541 fol. Comp Max Muller, o.c. p.117 fol.

(2) M. S. Levi has lately attempted to prove the pre-Dravidian influence on Vedic civilisation and religion, basing his evidence on the existence of pairs, triads and ethnic names, having in mind that "India has been considered too much from the Indo-European standpoint" (J.A. CCIII (1) pp. 1-56). Comp Keith: Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas, II, p.632-33.

complex, the names recorded are the heads of several schools and often are traced in their genealogical tables of descent to Prajapati. The much discussed name of Patanjali is one instance of this difficulty.

This slight digression was necessary in order to show, that in considering the evolution of a certain doctrine or idea, one should not pay attention only to chronological principles but more to the ideas as such which evolve often independent of any chronology. Hindu logic and psychology is different in many ways from Western conceptions of it. For the Hindu mind, the analogies from nature that serve to illustrate a proposition are accepted with the force of an argument. Very often a single preposition might change the whole meaning of a sentence, and unless we can intuitively feel it, the comprehension remains imperfect. (1)

There seem to be two distinct sources for the idea of transmigration and karma in early Hinduism: (1) the early religious ideas of the Brahmanas, certain ceremonies, especially those connected with sacrifice and speculations about future life, such as the myth of Bhrgu and that of Naciketas in Katha Up. The caste system might have fostered the same ideas as is evidenced by the Manu's code. (2) The philosophical principles, which were gradually formulated in the schools and from the statement of which the doctrine followed as corollary. We have ample evidence that the early thinkers of India made a distinction between the visible effects (dr̥ṣṭaphala) and the invisible effects adr̥ṣṭaphala of a moral action, such as they conceived

(1) Prof. Whitney in Amer. Journal of Philology-Vol VII, p.15.

the rituals to be. It has been shown earlier that ritualistic actions were supposed to have a double effect, one physical and visible, and the other moral and invisible. A good action produced dharma, a bad action, whether materially or formally, adharma.⁽¹⁾ Considered philosophically, the effects of acts of any kind were regarded by the early thinkers in India as an objective force which persisted eternally in the cosmic ether and made up a cosmic memory (in Buddhism called samskaras).⁽²⁾ They remained latent so long as maturing conditions were not present, that they might take physical form. Hence the idea of re-birth of the individual and of all living beings. The causal agent was considered to be either the desire of an individual being, or an impersonal principle, being self-caused and internal constraint of the deeds of the individuals.

The distinct contribution of Buddhism to the karma conception was that it eliminated from the karma concept all the sacrificial elements associated with it by the Brahmanical writers. Moreover, it laid down the law of causation, phala and vipāka, and thereby gave to it a distinctly moral basis. Karma was dharma (dhamma) with a new element, viz. that excluded the possibility of a permanent experiencing subject. Buddha laid stress upon the fact that a 'person' is definitely and ultimately a complex, whose *raison d'être* of existence in the phenomenal world was due uniquely to craving. The logical

(1) Professor Keith says in his "Religion and Philosophy of the Veda": "Dharmā denotes that which supports and that which is supported; it applies like ṛta to all aspects of the world, to the sequence of events in nature, to the sacrifice and to man's life." I, 249.

(2) It is interesting to note as a matter of comparison, that in European philosophy, Bergson has arrived at practically the same conclusions, viz. that there is a certain cosmic memory in the universe impressed on cosmical ether. (His book "Matière et la Mémoire").

outcome of such a doctrine was that man does not belong to himself but to the whole and cannot be imagined apart from the whole. This fact was more emphatically stated by inclusion of a third class of karmical concept, i.e. indeterminate or neutral karma, which enabled one to attain to the state of an Arhat and lastly arrive at Nirvana. The last conclusion was that all world-activity is due to karma and that apart from it there is no existence as such. The same notion was implied later on in the Bhagavad-Gita and Mhñ, with occasional modifications due to the appearance of new ideas tending to lessen the mechanical causality as understood by early Buddhism. If we take as granted, that ideas, previous to their actual manifestation, exist, so to say, in the air ready to enter into human minds, we cannot speak much of borrowing by later thinkers. Each one conceived in his own fashion, but the development of an idea belonged to a unity of thinkers and teachers whose purpose was to deliver mankind from suffering. Some have minutely analysed human powers of thinking, others have drawn definite, practical conclusions bearing upon life, whereas the task of atmayogins consisted more in the realisation of that Unknown, of which all collectively are speaking.

The fact that fate, destiny and necessity, grace etc. (viddhi, bhāga, diṣṭa, dāiva, prasāda) are introduced into the Mahabharata shows simply that this was a logical elaboration of the same underlying idea, that of karma, which required a certain limitation of the general concept in applying it to different spheres of human activity. The leading idea of karma was that of pain, and the chief task

of the Hindu religious and philosophical schools consisted in an earnest attempt to find out the cause of it, whereby pain itself could be removed. In this there consists a distinct contribution by Hinduism and Buddhism to humanity.

It would be of great value for human interchange of ideas, to view the western conceptions of fate, destiny and sin from the Hindu standpoint, and would be a great impulse for common good; for we can view the karma conception from several other standpoints, which have either not been treated in the present essay or have been lightly alluded to. In its biological aspect, we could possibly trace some identical root ideas in our heredity concept. Nevertheless, karma is wider in its scope than heredity since it implies not only the predetermining influence of individual and social evolution, but a causal law which in some sense may be taken to have pre-existed evolution itself. To ascribe the variegated existence of heredity and environment which work as mere blind forces is perhaps identical to destiny, but the explanation of innate pre-existing powers cannot be understood without taking into account the new being which asserts itself completely as a new factor. Its psychological aspect would be in finding out what are these "innate ideas" which modern psychology has not yet been able to solve. Do they appear solely in virtue of inheritance, and what is meant by character, so generally misunderstood? How also to explain some spontaneous and untaught moral reactions of children, which are somehow preformed in their constitution. In its ethical aspect, we are confronted with innumerable problems dealing with predestination, freedom of will, and determinism. The relatively fixed external world of action does not preclude

a certain limited freedom. The relatively fixed constitution of things does not exclude a limited freedom of choice. But to what extent we are free beings, that still remains a controversial and unsolved problem of human life. Lastly, in its metaphysical aspect we often put problems in a wrong way, that is, instead of looking to ourselves, to our own self, to find an answer and satisfaction regarding existence, we are advised and taught to look into some distant and indeterminate God, who assumes at times national characteristics. Whether we conceive God in a pantheistic, deistic or monistic way, is less important than doing things in a right way. An over emphasis is laid upon the learning of words instead of understanding ideas. Hence our terminology has become dried up and reduced in all spheres to a mere naming of things without entering into the significance of things. This was only incidentally remarked upon in order to give a true colouring to the previous exposition which was more historical in character. As for the ancient Indian thinker, differing from us today, he was always conscious of his divine heritage, as expressed by his Orphic contemporary: "A child of Earth and starry Heaven am I, but of Heaven is my race."

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