

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE ARMY TO NATIONAL INTEGRATION
IN ISRAEL: THE CASE OF ~~THE~~ ORIENTAL JEWS

by

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1971

A thesis presented for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in Politics

in the University of London



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ABSTRACT

It is the purpose of this study to establish how the Army in Israel contributes to the National Integration of Jews who originated in the Middle East and in North Africa and who arrived in Israel en masse after the foundation of the State.

To assess this contribution, three steps are followed:

- 1) The establishment of a methodology as an analytical tool to determine what is meant in Israel by National Integration and the nature of the political formula.
- 2) The description of three main branches of the Army apparatus, together with their activities.
- 3) The activities of the Army are evaluated in terms of the political formula in order to determine the direction and success of its contribution to the process of National Integration.

The findings of this study show that no soldier is allowed to leave the Army without proficiency and literacy in the Hebrew language, elementary education and some form of vocational training. The IDF ensures

that the discharged soldier can earn his living and become a useful member of the society. Recruits are made aware not only of their rights in a democratic society, but also of their obligations towards that society. A strong identification with the land together with knowledge of the land and its history are imparted to all soldiers, both academically and empirically. On the other hand, the IDF's contribution in the areas of education and economic specialization have not been sufficient to integrate Orientals with Ashkenazim. The progress of National Integration has been hindered by the exclusion from the Army of "uneducated" women, the majority of whom are Oriental; by the Army's lack of contribution to ecological dispersion, and by its lack of receptivity to the Oriental's culture and beliefs.

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INTRODUCTION

Israel occupies an equivocal position in the comparative study of new nations. It has been difficult for the specialist in this field to place it either among the new developing countries of Asia and Africa or among the well-established modern nations of the West. In some respects, Israel belongs in the former category, and in others it is typical of the latter.

At the time of independence, new developing countries have generally found themselves populated by a socially and culturally traditional and economically backward native majority. As a result, their governments have been compelled to import the Western elements thought necessary for nation-building. This has not been the case in Israel. When Israel was granted independence, it had much in common with Western developed countries. It is estimated that in 1948, 89.6% of the Jewish population in Israel was of European or Western descent¹ and characterised by a high level of

education, Western values and norms, modern hygiene and technological know-how and modern institutions. These standards were threatened primarily as a result of the mass influx of immigrants from new developing countries, from the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia.

Therefore, instead of having to import Western elements in order to transform a traditional society, the new state received a large number of immigrants whose cultural experience and social standards were traditional and whose economic skills and educational level were much lower than those of the Jewish population already present. This disturbed the homogeneity which had characterised the Yishuv (Western) Jewish population and the state before this large wave of immigrants. To combat the growing problems presented by these new immigrants, all agencies of state, including the Army, were mobilised to integrate them in the new state.

This situation brought the IDF to occupy the same peculiar place among armies as Israel among nations. On the one hand, having developed from the Haganah (Jewish Defence Organization), the creation of the

Western Yishuv, the IDF emerged as an efficient and organised Army along the lines of the British and American Armies. Like the armies of these countries, the IDF has consistently remained an instrument of the state under civilian control. It has neither been an aspirant nor a contestant for political power. On the other hand, the need to integrate the new immigrants from developing countries obliged the IDF to undertake non-military tasks peculiar to the armies of new nations, such as the teaching of the three R's and socialization in the ideology of the state.

It is evident, particularly in a society which suffers from a shortage of manpower, that a well-trained, reasonably well-educated and integrated population is necessary both for the successful performance of the army and for the viability of the nation-state. As an Army, the IDF is primarily concerned with defending the country and waging war. To be successful in this, the IDF, like other armies, seeks to have a viable organisation in which soldiers are well integrated regardless of their origin or background. But if the experience, training and education given during army service also serves a national goal, such as integration,

then the military would also have contributed, however indirectly, to the integration of the society at large.

It is our purpose to determine whether the IDF does in fact contribute to integration, and if so, to what extent. In its specific aspects, this study will consist of three parts. First, it will require that we identify the composition of Israeli society. A comparative analysis of the social and cultural background of Oriental Jews on one hand and of Yishuv or Ashkenazi Jews on the other will show the differences and similarities between these two types of Jews as well as the kind of task facing the Army for this integration.² In the case of Oriental Jews, the analysis includes both parents and their offspring.³

The characteristics of Oriental immigrant society and Ashkenazi society are derived from (a) general social studies of both groups and their respective social and cultural origins, (b) published field research, (c) internal publications of the Hebrew University and the Educational Division of the Army.

Having established the framework of the society within which the Army operates, we will then examine integration in general theory and its relevance as a

policy goal in Israel. Integration in Israel will be defined in terms of a set of indices⁴ based on the cultural, social, political and economic values of the Ashkenazi, the "predominant social type" which is in power and concerned to integrate the immigrants.

The second part of our study will contain a description of the IDF's resources and "aspects of activities."⁶ The former consists of personnel and the overall educational organisation, whereas the latter refers to the different schools and specific programs which the IDF utilises for the purpose of integration.

The third part will contain a correlation of the IDF's activities and the indices of the "dominant social type." This will enable us to determine the attributes which the IDF intends to inculcate in the Oriental and to evaluate the extent to which it has succeeded in contributing to integration.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "Oriental." Wanting a more specific and abbreviated term, the word "Oriental" is used throughout to refer to Jews from the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia who

migrated to Israel between 1949 and 1954. To date, the incomplete and general research⁷ which has been done in this area shows that Oriental Jewish communities in their respective countries of origin differed from one another in their social and cultural backgrounds. Two types of forces were primarily responsible for these variations:

- 1) The centrifugal forces resulting from the penetration and influence of different colonial powers in these countries.
- 2) The centripetal forces exemplified by the social and cultural traits of each country which shaped the difference between the Jewish community in one country and that in another. For example, the social, economic, political and cultural factors which may have influenced the Jewish community in Morocco differ from those which affected the Jewish community in Libya.

Furthermore, as a minority group, each of the Jewish communities reflected a stratified social system and was to some extent self-contained. In other words, the community was divided according to social classes which in most cases consisted of wealthy merchants, profes-

sionals, skilled and unskilled labourers and the illiterate majority. The wealthy and the professional and religious leaders usually formed the elite group in these countries. With the exception of the religious leaders, it is this elite which by and large preferred in 1949 to stay behind or to migrate to Europe, Canada, Australia and the U.S.A. rather than to Israel. Those members of the elite who did migrate to Israel have faced no problem of integration, and have therefore been easily absorbed into the society. These Orientals are excluded from this study.

We will therefore be concerned with those Oriental Jews who, already in their country of origin, formed the lower social strata of the population, and who, when they arrived in Israel, became a problem of cultural, social and economic dimensions to the new state. Only to these Jews is the term Oriental applied throughout this study. Although the term is general and at times ambiguous, ample research has demonstrated that these Oriental Jews, regardless of their specific countries of origin, have retained a number of general characteristics in common.⁸

FOOTNOTES

¹Central Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1963, (Jerusalem: Statistical Bureau) No. 14, p.110. This population is referred to as part of the Yishuv or Ashkenazim.

²The word "type" is used here advisedly in the absence of a better term, since "community" is a collective term connoting large enclaves of people living separately and mutually exclusive to each other. This is not an accurate description of Israeli society.

³Sociologists in Israel, like Judith Shuval from the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Hayim J. Cohen, Dov Weintraub and Awraham Shuval, Chairman of the Psychology Department of Tel-Aviv University and former Consul to the Defence Ministry, caution us to view the characteristics of Oriental Jews who have arrived in Israel in the early fifties as flexible and changing since (a) Israeli society is still in the making, (b) the children of Oriental families have been exposed to Israeli institutions, such as schools, youth groups, trade unions, hospitals, etc., before their entry into the Army. But these sociologists and others, like Shimon Peres, Member of the Knesset, Matilda Gez, Member of the Knesset of Tunisian origin, and Hamon Rozen, Inspector General of Secondary Education in the IDF, admit that, although the characteristics of Oriental Jews have been undergoing change since their arrival in Israel, the children have nevertheless retained "a good part" of their parents' Oriental traits. There are several reasons for this: (1) Most children live at home with their parents where most of the customs and rituals are still perpetuated; (2) At the pre-Army age of eighteen, they have not yet interacted with the society at large; (3) Attendance at schools and youth groups is voluntary and therefore, socialization of these children does not strike deep roots and remains superficial. The Army, on the other hand, provides formal education and socialization, diversified social contacts, geographical mobility and away from home living over a long period of time. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954) p. 186.

⁴Abundant literature on Israel is available for the purpose of obtaining indices for integration. For specific works, see bibliography at the end of the study.

⁵See below. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1939) especially chapter IX.

⁶I am indebted to Davis B. Bobrow for the theoretical framework outlined in "Soldiers and the Nation-State," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March 1965) Vol. 358, pp. 65-70. Lucian Pye and Moshe Lissak have also utilized a similar approach in their case studies of the Burmese Army. See Lucian Pye, Military Development in New Countries (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1961) and Moshe Lissak, "Social Change, Mobilization and Exchange of Services between the Military Establishment and the Civilian Society: the Burmese Case," Economic Development and Cultural Change (October 1964) XIII, 1, part 1, pp. 1-19.

⁷Joseph B. Schechtman, On Wings of Eagles: The Plight, Exodus and Homecoming of Oriental Jews (New York: Thomas Yosseloff, 1961); Andre Chouraqui, Marche vers l'Occident: Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952); S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of New Immigrants; I. Ben-Zvi, The Exiled and the Redeemed (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1962) and various articles appearing in journals in Hebrew and English.

⁸Internal publications of the Hebrew University and articles from field research conducted by S. N. Eisenstadt, Judith Shuval, Dov Weintraub, Arik Cohen, Elihu Katz and Awraham Zloczower, and a publication of Moshe Lissak et al, 'Olim be-Yisrael (Immigrants in Israel) justify this notion. As the Ashkenazi community in Israel originated from a number of countries in Europe, so the Oriental community come from different countries on the North African coast and the Middle East. Yet these differences did not hinder sociologists from grouping these immigrants according to continent since they found that the similarities between countries in the same continent were much greater than the differences between them and those from other continents. Thus in

Israel all the Jews of European and American origin are referred to as Ashkenazi, and those who migrated from the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia are regarded as Orientals.

P A R T I

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

The Origins of Polarization

The Jews who inhabit Israel today have come from two different civilizations: the East and the West. Jews coming from the East, that is from the region of the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia, are generally referred to as Oriental Jews, while those from the West, that is from Europe and the Americas, are called Ashkenazi.

This division of the Jewish people into East and West originated when the Babylonians first conquered Palestine in 586 B.C.E. and deported most of the population to Babylonia. A minority of these Jews returned to Palestine when Cyrus conquered Babylonia in 538 B.C.E. but the majority remained in Babylonia, while others pushed northward to Greece, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean and Rome. By the time Palestine had been conquered for the second time in 70 A.D., a new Western branch of this hitherto Eastern people was found in Rome. There

were already considerable cultural differences between this small number of Jews in Rome and those who had lived in Babylonia for five centuries. Nevertheless, the Jews in Palestine held the spiritual and cultural hegemony until the third century when it passed to Babylonia.

With the growth of the Roman Empire, a further portion of the Jewish people was dispersed in England, France, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Rumania. Another wave of Jews just after 70 A.D. had gone northward to Asia Minor, the Black Sea and Russia, and spoke Slavic languages.¹ Evidently, the further Jews travelled from the Middle Eastern orbit, the greater became the cultural differences between them and the Jews of the East. Nevertheless, some contact was maintained between the two until the Arab conquest of Roman territories in the seventh century, which severed connections between the Jewish communities in this region and those in Europe and further accentuated the differentiation of the two.

Thus the expansion of the Roman Empire facilitated the dispersion of Jews in Central and Western Europe and the Arab expansion allowed the Eastern Jews to

remain in North Africa and to settle in newly conquered territories, including Spain. Wherever Arab rule reached, Jews followed. They went south to Ethiopia, Upper Egypt and Southern Arabia and East to Bokhara, Turkistan, Afghanistan, India and China.

Jews have been far from immune to the cultural environments in which they settled. In spite of a self-imposed isolation, non-Jewish cultural values have left a deep impression on them. This has been so much the case that wherever cultural development or decadence have occurred among non-Jews, the same phenomenon of development or decadence has been manifest among the Jews. Thus, by the eleventh century Arab cultural development reached its zenith and so did that of the Jews in the Arab Empire. Jewish cultural hegemony which had so far been retained by Babylonia, passed to the Spanish Jews, or Sepharadim² culminating in the Golden Age of Hebrew poetry, philosophy and religious literature there and in North Africa, Egypt, Baghdad and Persia. This period lasted until the fifteenth century.

Meanwhile Christian Europe was submerged in Scholasticism. Jewish intellectual effort centered

on scholastic exegism of the Bible, the Mishna and the Talmud, but nothing was produced comparable to the Golden Age of Spain. From the eleventh century, France and Germany emerged as Ashkenazi centers, but in 1306 the expulsion of Jews from France made Germany their only center, and it was not long before the persecution of Jews in Germany resulted in a further shift to the East. In the sixteenth century, thousands of Ashkenazi Jewish families settled in Poland, Lithuania and Russia. By the middle of the seventeenth century, new atrocities in the Ukraine produced a reverse migratory movement from East to West which continued for three hundred years.

The decline of Arab culture from the fifteenth and sixteenth century onward also marked the decline of Jewish cultural creativity in Muslim countries, although religious literature and Jewish religious law continued to emanate from these countries until the seventeenth century. From then, however, the center shifted to Europe where the rapidly expanding Jewish communities began to produce spiritual leaders of their own.

While the Jews in the East continued in their

decline during the eighteenth century, Jews in the West produced a number of vital movements, the impact of which is felt to the present day.³ The three most important of these were: Hasidism or the mystical love of God, Haskala or Jewish Enlightenment, and Hibbat Zion or love of Zion. The latter two are of particular relevance to this study.

The Haskala movement in Germany, Italy and Russia differed from the "Enlightenment" only in that it was applied particularly to Jewish thought and Jewish literature.⁴ It was an attempt to broaden the base of the Jewish intellectual tradition, to change the Hebrew language from a means of studying ancient religious writings into a living language and a medium for secular literary expression.⁵ It could be said, therefore, that its members were the first modernizers of the Hebrew language. They helped free the Jews from the spiritual ghetto in which they had been living by acquainting them with the intellectual and secular culture surrounding them, and thus promoted their emancipation.⁶ As Grayzel puts it: "The originators of the Haskala made a valiant effort towards the integration of Hebrew culture with the culture of Western Europe."⁷

The Hibbat Zion movement can be considered the

reaction of Jews at the end of the nineteenth century to their failure to achieve complete social and political equality in Europe.⁸ They might have been more readily accepted by the people among whom they lived had they been prepared to surrender their sense of national identity and their distinct character, for the nineteenth century was a period of intense nationalism all over Europe.⁹ Instead, the current of national feeling found fertile soil among the Jews who had for centuries been nursing as a sacred duty the ideal of a return to their native home in Israel; and so the Hibbat Zion movement grew, emphasizing the return to Zion, as a forerunner of the political Zionism founded by Theodore Herzl (1860-1904).¹⁰

During the period of Haskala, it was inevitable that many of the original cultural characteristics of the Jewish people should be lost.¹¹ Religion was generally the last remaining bond, but in the course of emancipation, this too was sometimes given up to make assimilation with the neighbouring Gentiles possible. Even where some communities partially retained their religion, they nevertheless approximated the non-Jewish majority groups among whom they lived in several other respects, such as culture and demography.

A similar process of assimilation took place among the Oriental Jews of the East whose association with the Arabs had extended over a much longer period of time.¹² Here, however, it was limited to language, dress and food and excluded religion.¹³ The reason for this partial, gradual and narrow assimilation lies in two interdependent factors.

The new European concept of nation-state found no counterpart in the countries of the Middle East. The European states alone required from the entire population regardless of origin undisputed loyalty and undivided allegiance to the state in return for equality and rights. Emancipation and equality required from the individual a change of identification and even assimilation at all levels. There were, therefore, a uniform set of requirements and pressures from the laws or state political forms of behaviour to which individuals were expected to conform. In the Ottoman Empire, there was no such pressure to assimilate and the individual, especially among minority groups, had much more freedom of allegiance. Jews, like any other minority in these countries, were only required to pay taxes which were a symbolic form of obligation to the local

authority for the privilege of living in the country.¹⁴

In place of nationalism, religion in the Middle East permeated all walks of life.¹⁵ Islam has been a way of life rather than solely a faith. Religious minorities under Muslim rule have generally enjoyed freedom of worship.¹⁶ Muslims were much more tolerant of other religious groups, like the Jews, than Christianity. There was no conscious missionary effort to convert the Jews to Islam and consequently, insofar as their religion was concerned, Jews and Muslims were able to coexist side by side.¹⁷

The role of religion in the West is profoundly different. In the West, religion has at best only a narrowly delimited field. Insofar as it has become institutional and ritualistic, it is somewhat out of touch with the cultural priorities and with the focal economic and technological complexes of Western civilization. Religion in the West has been gradually forced to relinquish its place in man's daily life to the ever-growing forces of economic expansion, technological advance and modernization and to man's concern with this world and with the improvement of his immediate environment.¹⁸ Morality and ethics have become divorced from religion and have been incorporated in civil and

and state law.

Since emancipation in Europe did not fulfil its promise, Western Jews sought to realize their complete emancipation by establishing a state of their own. Just as in Europe many religious ethical precepts were translated into secular law, so the Western Jews translated the "return to Zion" into a means of establishing a political entity rather than of perpetuating the ritual observances and daily traditions of Judaism. The state they created was based on Western ideas and ideals and relinquished the religious sphere to one ministry (The Ministry of Religious Affairs) within the government. The Western Jews had, therefore, translated the return to Zion of the Hibbat Zion movement into a political movement which could not have developed among the Oriental Jews who considered the return to Zion a way of preserving their religious traditions and customs and of ushering in the messianic age.¹⁹

In the East, the great majority of the people is overtly religious. The observance of traditional practices is an important and integral part of everyday life. It is the central force which motivates and

rules all aspects and phases of life. It is such an all-pervasive power that it has no field or delimited area of its own because the whole of life is permeated with it.²⁰ Cultural, social, political and economic forces are determined by religious precept. People cannot conceive of a moral law dissociated from religion for fear that it forfeit its claim to legitimacy. By the same token, customs which permeate everyday life cannot be divorced from religion in theory or in practice. Whatever man does during his lifetime, from birth to death, must conform to faith, tradition and custom. Religion, therefore, influences people's attitudes, thought and behaviour, whether in their own homes or in the society at large. Since the Muslim Weltanschauung is also rooted in religion, the Muslim culture exerted no pressure on the Jews in the East to abandon their traditional biblical interpretation of existence, which had clearly originated in the Middle East.

Unlike his brother from the East, the Jew in the West moulded his way of life according to the Western example which required the separation of Church and State. While he was responsible to the secular

authorities of the state in which he lived for his secular behaviour, he considered his involvement with Judaism optional--a matter of discretion. As a result, the domain of religion diminished in inverse proportion to the growth in assimilation, until the European Jew became a replica of his Western and non-Jewish counterpart.

Religion, therefore, led the way in the polarization of Western and Oriental Jews which penetrated the cultural, social, economic and ideological spheres. Notwithstanding local national variations, there are a number of basic characteristics which hold good for the culture of the entire Middle East, just as there are basic common characteristics in the West²¹ and these will be discussed below.

Western culture, as exemplified by its development during the last two centuries in Western Europe and in the U.S.A., is focused on two main and interconnected themes: technological development and mass benefits. Available, and not just to the privileged few but to the mass of the population are: mass education, universal suffrage, sanitation, hygiene, the mass media, and mass production of the visual and vocal arts.²² The

Industrial Revolution replaced human energy with technical energy. Since then technology has been used in all spheres of life and in every possible way. This unrelenting advance of technology had a multiplying effect on the economy as a whole, from basic consumer goods to the most sophisticated weapons.

While this revolutionary development was well under way in the West, man in the East was still dominated by a fatalistic attitude to life. The Shari'a taught its followers that Allah the Omnipotent ordains the course of history and particularly the course of every man's life, so that man can do nothing to change his fate. Naturally this Weltanschauung minimized man's efforts to change the present, with the result that the East continued to utilise the old and limited powers of animal and man. Technology, therefore, remained backward and underdeveloped.

This underdevelopment also characterizes the field of education. Education among the Jews in Eastern countries lacked any formal framework. In the main it was carried out "within the synagogue, by the synagogue and for the synagogue."²³ It was directed toward the attainment of traditional lore and learning, of diffuse

rather than specialised knowledge. Children were sent to traditional religious schools where they were taught prayers repetitiously and the rudiments of the three R's.²⁴ At the end of their studies, most of them spoke Arabic dialect and could read only some elementary (biblical) Hebrew. Girls were excluded from this school system altogether, and kept at home to learn practical arts and crafts or housework from their mothers and older female relatives. As a rule, children were taken out of school once their education could provide them with minimum earning power. The basic educational aim of the family was to mould the child into an obedient member of the family group who could integrate into the working of his immediate social environment. Higher education was confined to the minority elite who differed greatly from the mass of the population and could afford to send their children abroad.²⁵ Educational contact with other Jewish communities abroad was practically non-existent. The mass media too were underdeveloped until very recently,²⁶ which also indicates that the level of literacy was extremely low among the population at large.

By the twentieth century, education in the West

was provided on a mass scale and enforced by law. The system was designed to cover a wide span of subjects, from the humanities and social sciences to vocational training. It was, in addition, highly specialised in order to serve the economic, social and political needs of the society. In order to achieve this high degree of specialisation, the educational system had to be extended over a number of years, culminating in universities and other forms of higher education.

As a result of emancipation in the West, Western Jews were granted equal rights. Although they continued to send their children to religious Jewish schools, the emphasis shifted to secular education. They pursued the liberal arts, medicine, and science, and became part of the intelligentsia.²⁷ For them too it was an age of change of of intellectual revolt against their old, traditional system. Specialisation in education created division of labour and therefore new avenues of communication and organization, thus benefiting the society at large. New fields emerged and became accessible to the masses, both male and female. A new hierarchy in the factory system produced

managers, technicians, workers and salesmen. Labour unions, factory payroll systems and social welfare were developed.

In contrast with the progress in the West which allowed Jews to enter new and specialised fields of endeavour, the Jew in the East remained in the vague and undefined occupation he had inherited from his father and grandfather. The occupational structure remained primitive.²⁸ Self-employed Jews were mainly engaged in commerce on a small scale or in handicrafts, often on the traditional Middle Eastern level where no sharp distinction could be made between the two.²⁹ They also worked as cobblers, cloth-merchants and coppersmiths with little or no initiative for improvisation.³⁰ Although they had inherited one somewhat ambiguous trade, this did not preclude them from claiming the ability to do anything which happened to be in demand. Consequently, very few knew any one trade really well and everyone claimed knowledge of all trades.

Another significant area of contrast is the social pattern which characterises the East and the West. In the East, it is based on the extended family group where the patriarch or head of the family is the source of

authority and controls the purse.³¹ Age traditionally commands respect and deference and serves as an instrument of social cohesion. Since kinship is the basic principle of social organization, the extended family, which is the economic and social unit, is of primary importance. As the interests of the family must come first, the child has to learn to subordinate his wishes to those of his father and possibly those of his older brothers.³² The cohesion of the family is imperative because a divided family cannot hold its own in collective competition.³³ The males, therefore, usually gather together and work together, while the females in the household become jointly responsible for keeping house.³⁴ For the same reason, the aging patriarch transfers his leadership to his son who then becomes responsible for his aging parents. Male children alone are considered all-important as a source of wealth, pride and security for a man's old age. Consequently, the individual derives his confidence from the presence of numerous offspring.³⁵

In the West, the family consists of parents and two or three children who reside with them only until they are old enough to leave home. Schools provide

the children's preparation for adult tasks and parents educate them for independence from a very early age, unlike the child in the East who is expected simply to obey. Parents take pride in a child who can do things for himself, who can find his own way, and who is, therefore, in their opinion well prepared to take his place independently in a competitive society. In this respect, family cohesion is minimal. Cohesion is neither upheld in actuality nor expected in theory, for it is the individual and not the family who plays a role in society. Collective competition is reduced to individual competition. Achievement rather than age is respected. Women are given equal opportunity with men to prove their professional ability and achievement in the society at large. Women have equal authority in family affairs. Opportunities have become numerous and competition is no longer based uniquely on wealth or family prestige, but on merit and qualifications. The Jewish communities in the West have not remained immune to these revolutionary changes taking place about them. Their family structure has changed and they have increasingly copied the Western pattern,

But perhaps the experiences which characterise the Western Jew and is unique to him, are his emphasis

on individual achievement and his break with his limited ghetto environment, which gave him the opportunity to be involved with the movements and ideologies of his native country. This experience which found no counterpart among Eastern Jews has perhaps contributed the most important chapter to the Jewish history of the last two thousand years. This is the history of Political Zionism and its culmination in the establishment of the State of Israel.

The Consequences of Polarization

The first waves of Western Jewish immigrants to Palestine practiced the ideals of Political Zionism and thus became responsible for shaping the Yishuv³⁶ and laying the foundations of what later became the State of Israel.³⁷ Western Jews became the undisputed founders of the new state,³⁸ and its first leaders. Therefore, in order to understand the foundations of the State of Israel, it is necessary to examine the ideology, motivations, and social structure of these immigrants and of the society they evolved.

Until the 1930's, immigration to Palestine consisted mainly of Young Zionists. To them, Zionism

was an expression of rebellion against the idea that a Jewish way of life was compatible with a modern non-Jewish environment. The rebels, for the most part, had not successfully assimilated or were not inclined to assimilate. The observant families from which they came were also beginning to succub to the modern economic, social and educational forces which foster assimilation and economic progress. Although these young rebels had been given a secular education as well as a religious one, they found it difficult to identify with the pattern of life in the non-Jewish environment, and were dissatisfied with the direction taken by their communities. They felt that on the one hand the modern forces at work would undermine their cultural and spiritual heritage and that on the other they would never succeed in being totally assimilated, but remain an alien entity which the modern society could not absorb. They would, therefore, forfeit their identity as Jews without being able to adopt a new identity in the nation in which they lived.

Thus it is clear that their migratory movement was not prompted by lack of economic security or by political pressure. It was prompted instead by social

and cultural aspirations "whose essence was the establishment of a new type of Jewish community and society-- modern, mainly secular, territorially and economically independent, and at the same time wholly Jewish."³⁹ A set of goals was established which accomodated this ideology:

- 1) A return to land-farming to provide agricultural foundations on which an industrial structure could be erected.
- 2) A stress on social justice and security. In this instance the competitive aspect of modern economic activity was underplayed and subordinated to social solidarity and to the values of the community.⁴¹

The realization of these objectives was facilitated and accelerated by the fact that the institutional structure in Palestine had been newly established and was not yet crystallized. It was only through the interplay of various waves of immigrants, especially between the two world wars, that a structure emerged and not until the beginning of World War II that it could be said to be fully established. As it developed, this structure possessed a number of salient features:

- 1) The Aliyoth (waves of immigrants) were settled or absorbed with a minimum of ecological concentration.

The distribution of population was not based on the country of origin of a given wave of immigrants. It was instead based on the social movement to which a given settlement was affiliated. Thus, for example, the immigrants of the first Aliyah from Russia and Rumania who looked upon the settlement of the land as a primary condition for the renaissance of the Jewish people, were added to the agricultural settlements already in existence.

- 2) This dispersion of the population was found also in the economic sphere where a high degree of mobility prevailed. This was manifest in two ways:
 - a) An expansion of the economic sector contributed to a steady rise in the standard of living allowing new immigrants increasing occupational mobility.⁴²
 - b) A minimum concentration for any specific ethnic group in any key economic position.
- 3) The field of education was of crucial importance to the new immigrants. It was one of the strongest and most formalized agencies and though it elementary socialization and re-education was performed for immigrants and their children. The aim of the

Yishuv was to set up a modern Hebrew educational system, which was later developed into an extensive and differentiated one.

- 4) The family structure underwent major changes in Palestine. In contrast to traditional or semi-traditional Jewish family structure, the family became like a modern conjugal family with one or two children. Inter-marriage between different European groups promoted new types of family life peculiar to the new Yishuv. The facts of ecological and economic dispersion minimized the dysfunctional effects of inter-marriage among these Western immigrants.
- 5) Since the waves of immigrants arrived in the country with no predetermined role or structure, they had an unusually high predisposition to change.⁴³ Change occurred at all levels of social activities including:
- a) Finding a productive and accepted occupation.
 - b) New cultural traits, such as daily use of the Hebrew language.
 - c) Sending children to modern schools and youth groups and accepting the main social ideas transmitted there
 - d) A high degree of participation in the social system and orientation towards its values.

The Yishuv had no difficulty in establishing solidarity between the primary groups--family circle, friends and fellow-workers--and the institutional framework of the society--the political and social organizations. There were several reasons for this: The immigrants were a homogeneous group which shared the same ideals and was able to participate in the evolving institutions. This active participation in the institutional framework touched all spheres: it can be traced through the labour movement, the defence organizations, the youth movements, agriculture cooperatives and settlements. The struggle against the Mandate power and the Arabs further cemented their cohesion.

In addition to this general framework of the social structure, we must look at the specific principles and trends which this structure involved. The first and most important was the set of values developed by these waves of immigrants:

- 1) They established new collective ideals and a new national community, a sense of belonging to the Jewish people without the problems inherent in the immigrants' countries of origin.
- 2) They aimed at establishing a modern economic and

political structure in which religion played a secondary if not a tertiary role. Such a framework meant a high degree of specialisation and achievement which had to be tempered by a sense of obligation to and concern for the welfare of the community and its collective ideals.

In specific terms, the Yishuv attached special importance to:

- 1) Agricultural settlements which emphasized human equality and strong identification with the community and the land.
- 2) The highest standards of technical achievement.
- 3) The provision of social security schemes of a communal nature.
- 4) The establishment of associations of teachers, physicians, lawyers and other professionals. Here too the emphasis was not on the professionals' interest alone, but on the professions insofar as they served the ideals of the community and helped to develop the new culture.

In the political sphere, the Yishuv developed intensive activities whose aims were:

- 1) The maximization of immigration.

- 2) The expansion of Jewish settlement.
- 3) The maintenance and development of political, social, and cultural organizations.

Within the Yishuv, the elite was judged not by its wealth or economic power but by its achievement and realization of the ideology of the Yishuv. This allowed for a wide dispersal of political power and social prestige which contributed to the decentralization of its activities.

Side by side with these Western immigrants, another wave of immigration took place, this time a wave of Oriental Jews. In 1918, there were about 20,000 Orientals in Palestine.⁴⁴ From 1919 to 1948, they totalled 44,800 or about 10.4% of the Jewish population, in comparison to the 385,000 or 89.6% of Western Jews who migrated to Palestine during the same period. While the latter consisted of small groups, mainly young people motivated by the desire to establish a new and full Jewish cultural life, the Orientals migrated as extended families who formed a unified sociological block within the Yishuv, motivated by the messianic ingathering of the exiles and the desire to re-establish traditional Jewish life.⁴⁵ Their strong Jewish identity was, therefore, of a religious kind and not so much that of the Zionist movement

which was based on secular nationalism and which incorporated strong social orientations. The Orientals hoped to perpetuate their own cultural life and their traditional Jewish values, their occupations and their traditional social structure. Moreover, the Balfour Declaration and the promise of a "national home" revived their messianic aspiration and their eagerness to be restored to their land.

With lower, economic, social and educational standards and with a low disposition to change, these Orientals remained a minority which clustered in holy places like Jerusalem or Safed. They neither made a substantial contribution nor presented any serious problem to the Yishuv. Pre-State immigration from the East was insignificant and voluntary, idealistic and self-elected. Thus by the end of Mandatory period, the Western Europeans could claim undisputed leadership in founding the State.

Although the result of the holocaust in Europe provided a relatively large mass of immigration to Palestine, after World War II, the cultural and social composition of this immigration and its predisposition to change approximated that of the Yishuv.⁴⁶ This was not the case with the mass Oriental immigration which

took place during the formative years of the State, between 1948 and 1952.

The motives of this Oriental immigration to Israel were slightly different from those of its predecessor from the Ottoman Empire. This time the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the ensuing stalemate with its explosive potential in further conflicts, had far-reaching repercussions on most of the Jewish communities residing in the Arab countries.⁴⁸ They were economically strangled and politically persecuted as conspirators with Israel.⁴⁹ Most of the Jewish elite in these countries found refuge in the Western world, Europe and the Americas. On the other hand, the mass of the Jewish population which was largely at subsistence level, had the only opportunity to migrate to Israel which, at the same time, fulfilled its religious and traditional aspirations of living freely as Jews.⁵⁰ It is clear, therefore, that the 'push' toward Israel was based on a desire to attain economic and political security without suffering the hardship of building a new society or undergoing drastic change.

In the social sphere, Oriental Jews were characterised by the extended family and wide kinship

relations. The family remained the basic social and economic unit with the father wielding undisputed control and authority.⁵¹ This pattern however, underwent some changes and the father's position was undermined whenever the family had come in contact with Western culture. This process had taken place already in their country of origin, but it accelerated in Israel.⁵²

Together with this traditional social structure, the new Oriental immigrants arrived in Israel with hardly any education or skills, with a high degree of illiteracy, and therefore found themselves at an obvious disadvantage in the labour market.⁵³ More than half of them were employed in agriculture and in unskilled occupations during their first years in Israel, while only 9% were in the professional or clerical occupations. Women were largely illiterate since they were assigned to household work from an early age.⁵⁴ This trend was, to some extent, continued after their arrival in Israel.

In conclusion, the new Oriental immigrants were largely bound by "traditional value orientations-- particularism, ascription, diffuseness, and a strong collectivity orientation."⁵⁵ The desire to perpetuate

their religious, traditional and social patterns, led to the accentuation of the gap between them and the Western Jews of the Yishuv. The issue was further complicated since the organs of the Yishuv had already crystallized into national institutions and evolved structures which had their roots in the cultural heritage of the Western Jews.

The ensuing threat of division posed a real problem to the leadership of the new State which sought to solve it for its own interest, for the survival of the State and the nation, and for eventual economic development.⁵⁶ This was coupled with the moral obligation of the leadership towards the Jewish people as a whole, based on the right of every Jew to live in Israel. Furthermore, unity was considered essential to the survival of the nation especially in time of peril. The government, therefore, undertook to solve the problem through integration, a concept to which we shall now turn for examination of its significance in general theory and its relevance to Israeli society.

FOOTNOTES

¹Raphael Patai, Israel Between East and West (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1953); p. 15

²Originally the term "Sepharadi" Jews referred to the Jews of Spain's Golden Age. After the Inquisition, the Jews were forced to leave Spain and were scattered in Europe as well as North Africa and the Middle East. In Europe, their religious rituals differed sufficiently from the Ashkenazi Jews to keep them a recognizable separate entity. In North Africa and the Middle East, on the other hand, Sepharadi and Oriental Jews "mixed and interbred and influenced each other culturally." The extent of this integration of the two communities in the East, Oriental and Sepharadi, and the extent to which they became indistinguishable varies considerably.

³Patai, op.cit.

⁴Solomon Grayzel, A History of the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1965) p. 607

⁵Ibid., p. 609

⁶Fernando Henriquez, Israel - Some Problems of Social Integration (University of Sussex, 1965); unpublished paper.

⁷Grayzel, op.cit., p. 607

⁸Ben Halpern, The Idea of a Jewish State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); p. 15

⁹Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); p. 17

¹⁰Grayzel, op.cit., p. 665

¹¹Patai, op.cit., pp. 17-8

¹²S. D. Goitein, Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts through the Ages (New York: Schocken Books, 1967) chs. 2 and 3.

¹³Andre Chouraqui, op. cit., pp. 261-268.

¹⁴Alex Weingrod, Reluctant Pioneers: A Village Development in Israel (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 45. Jews held the status of dhimmi, protected peoples. This guaranteed life, property, and allocated control to Jewish authorities. They were barred, however, from citizenship.

¹⁵Chouraqui, op. cit., pp. 301-306.

¹⁶Goitein, op. cit., pp. 82-86.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁸Patai, op. cit., p. 266. Patai claims that "in the Western world, especially since the emancipation, the development of Jewish religiosity took a very different form. The cultural imperative of assimilation made for a progressive restriction of religious life, until the hold of religion became considerably loosened. Christianity has become relegated to a corner of existence and detached from the central interests and pursuits of life. The same process was manifest among an increasing majority of Western Jews."

¹⁹Judith T. Shuval, Immigrants on the Threshold (New York: Atherton Press, 1963) p. 185. "Jewish communities in the non-European countries of origin were characterised by traditional religious culture that had few elements of secularism."

²⁰Patai, op. cit., p. 39.

²¹Schechtman, op. cit., p. 341.

²²Patai, op. cit., p. 29.

²³Carl Frankenstein, Between Past and Future (Jerusalem: The Henrietta Szold Foundation for Child and Youth Welfare, 1953) p. 116. Also Chouraqui, op. cit., p. 29.

²⁴Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants, p. 99.

²⁵Ibid., p. 93; Also Weingrod, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁶Chouraqi, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

²⁷Shuval, op. cit., p. 179.

²⁸S. N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A case study of the Process of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change (October 1964) XIII, p. 271.

²⁹Henriquez, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁰Weingrod, op. cit., p. 56.

³¹S. N. Eisenstadt, Essays on Sociological Aspects of Political and Economic Development (The Hague: Mouton, 1961) pp. 63-64.

³²Raphael Patai, Golden River to Golden Road (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960) p. 75.

³³Eisenstadt, Essays on Sociological Aspects, pp. 63-64.

³⁴Weingrod, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁵Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants, p. 94.

³⁶This term refers to the Jews from Europe who settled in Palestine since early 1900's.

³⁷Henriquez, op. cit., pp. 13-14. This is an important and significant fact for Israel today since it is still dominated by the descendants of these immigrants and by later waves of Western immigrants.

³⁸Shuval, op. cit., p. 138.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 138-139.

⁴⁰Judah Matras, Social Change in Israel (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 1965) p. 202.

- ⁴¹Weingrod, op.cit. pp. 17-26
- ⁴²Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants, p. 51
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 59
- ⁴⁴E. A. Alport, "The Integration of Oriental Jews in Israel", The World Today (Vol. 23, No. 4, April 1967) p. 154
- ⁴⁵Abraham Shumsky, The Clash of Cultures in Israel: A Problem of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955) p. 64
- ⁴⁶Moshe Sicron, Immigration to Israel, 1948-53, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1957) p. 6
- ⁴⁷S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967) pp. 200-1
- ⁴⁸Chouraqui, op.cit. p.236
- ⁴⁹Moshe Sicron, op.cit., p. 44
- ⁵⁰Alex Weingrod, Israel: Group Relations in a new Society (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965) p. 12
- ⁵¹Eisenstadt, "Sociological Aspects of the Economic Adaptation of Oriental Immigrants in Israel: A Case Study of the Process of Modernization", pp. 272-3
- ⁵²Schechtman, op.cit., p. 350
- ⁵³Matras, op.cit. p. 74
- ⁵⁴Patai, Israel Between East and West, p. 135
- ⁵⁵Eisenstadt, Essays on Sociological Aspects of Political and Economic Development, pp.63-8
- ⁵⁶ha-Aretz, "The Orientals" April 15, 1952. "The bringing together of too many people from underdeveloped countries may constitute a threat to the existence of the Israeli State... Unity of origin is not sufficient for creating NATIONAL unity, when one part of the country is

socially and culturally underdeveloped... The Zionist movement is faced with an unforeseen task: bringing Western culture to Oriental Jewry."

CHAPTER TWO

NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Integration is a general term which conveys the notion of an interwoven, coordinated and balanced set of forces which enables any particular unit to function properly. As a conceptual framework for analysis of societies, however, the above definition is limited in scope and content. It is, therefore, imperative to conceive of integration as a multi-layered concept with a range of prefixes which may be derived from and/or find their manifestation in the many variegated societies today. Hence the concepts of identity integration, value integration, social integration, and national integration, to cite but a few.

Israel has escaped many of the problems and uncertainties of identity integration common among new nations.¹ This would appear surprising initially in view of the fact that identity integration is considered the problem of multi-ethnic states.² The question faced by these new states is how to avoid conflict on

on the horizontal level between long standing ties of blood (tribal), race (ethnic), language, locality, religion or tradition, and how to create on the vertical level an allegiance to a new and less familiar legal order, the new state. Identity integration is a problem faced, for instance, by Nigeria, where tribal, ethnic and linguistic differences on the horizontal level and the lack of vertical integration in the Army were responsible for the bloody coups of 1966 and 1967.³

Israel has not been faced with a serious problem of vertical integration. It is a peculiarity of the Jewish people that in spite of their diverse origins and the difference of national languages, they have maintained throughout their dispersion a bond which kept their Jewish identity alive and which was the very reason which brought them back to their old homeland. In the case of the Jews of Western origin, the raison d'etre of the first waves of immigrants from Europe was the establishment of collective ideals to which all individual and kinship interests were subordinate. The climax of these collective ideals and hopes was their culmination in the establishment of a

state in which the whole populace found pride and of which they were eager to be a part. The Oriental Jews who came to Israel after the creation of the State were already predisposed towards a Jewish state in Israel by the centuries old yearning for the return of the exiles to Zion. In a sense, therefore, one might say that for each in their different ways, vertical identity integration with Israel pre-existed the return or the establishment of the state.

It is a peculiarity of the Yishuv population that identification with a state which was at the time little more than a dream should have superseded immediate economic "pay-offs." Hence the pioneering spirit and idealism which made this dream a reality. This peculiarity is shared by the Oriental community, who have foregone social, political and economic "pay-offs" for a number of years, but have nevertheless shown their vertical identity with the state by the low rate of their emigration, by the paucity of their social protests, and by their loyal defence of Israel in the course of three wars. This reflects not only a "manifest belief system" on the part of both Ashkenazi and Orientals, but also a "pattern of behaviour"

consistent with vertical identity integration.⁴

Although there is a problem of horizontal identity integration in Israel, it does not take the form of conflicts of "language, locality, blood, race or religion" which are the criteria of the theory of horizontal identity integration which appears to have been based on the experience of tribal African states. The problem of horizontal integration in Israel began when the Jews of North Africa and the Middle East migrated en masse to Israel, thus disturbing the cultural and social homogeneity of the already established Western community. This created a crisis both for Western and Oriental Jews. The Western Jews were overwhelmed by the numbers of new arrivals and their peculiarities and found it hard to identify with them. When the latter, equally overwhelmed by the contacts with the Western Jews, sought to identify with them, they found themselves unable to do so since they were separated by cultural and social differences. The problem between Western and Oriental Jews then, from their first encounter, was based on their different cultural, and social, experiences. Their differences were the product of different socialization rather

than of inherent, innate differences of blood, religion or even language.

The theory of identity integration would, therefore, appear to be suited to the problems of tribal societies rather than to those of Israel. In Israel vertical integration, as we have seen, has not presented serious problems, while the aspect of horizontal integration outlined in this theory goes far beyond the social and cultural differences which exist between Oriental and Western Jews.

Mechanisms for the resolution of conflict are necessary in states undergoing rapid social change. This issue is particularly crucial in new states where modernization is taking place, when conflicts multiply rapidly and procedures to resolve them are not easily found in time to avert serious crises in the political system.

These conflicts take various forms.⁵ They exist at the economic level between diametrically opposed interests; new occupational roles conflict with the old, well-established ones; the machine replaces the hands of the labourer; the ploughing of the land by tractor replaces the old slow plow; the doctor, a

graduate of a modern university, may be opposed by the traditional healer; there may be grave hostilities between traditional landlords and the government as a result of the latter's policies of land reform and legislation.

Conflicts may exist at the political level where different groups have clashing ideologies. Traditional elements may persist and resist the new forces of change and reform. Hostilities may exist between one tribe and another and between one religious group and another in a state whose policies have major consequences on their political, social and economic lives.⁶ It is not unusual to find a conflict of ideology among the elite whose members strive for a framework which they consider the best way of re-establishing order in a world of rapid change.

The resolution of these conflicts has been called value integration. A society is considered to have reached the state of value integration once it has developed the apparatus--laws and institutions--which function for the resolution of conflict. This does not mean that the conflict has necessarily been resolved, but merely that the apparatus for their resolution

exists to effectively contain the conflict.

Israel has succeeded in creating institutions such as political parties, the Histadrut or the Federation of Labour, the Army, agencies which have contributed most to directing change and to the mitigation of conflict. These institutions were evolved long before the creation of the state. In those times the conflicts in occupational roles between one wave of European immigrants and another were readily resolved because of their ideological commitments to Zionism and their high predisposition to change. Traditional or Oriental elements were still a weak and isolated minority unable to generate any significant degree of conflict within the Yishuv. The social, economic and ideological commitment grew with time to encompass the whole population. This did not mean that the Yishuv did not experience conflict. On the contrary, there were bitter conflicts, mainly on the ideological level, such as that of the Revisionists, the Irgun, the Haganah and the Stern Gang, which threatened division and the creation of splinter groups within the population.⁷ They were, however, regulated by mechanisms and institutions typical of the Yishuv structure and of Israel

later. These institutions had been sufficiently developed to cope with the new conflicts resulting from the mass immigration of Orientals from traditional societies. These were minimized by the common enemy outside and the strong ties of identity with the land of Israel.

Value integration has been achieved in Israel by the mere fact that institutions exist whose purpose and function is to contain and mitigate conflict. But value integration, the existence and functions of institutions, can be regarded only as a precondition for the resolution, or in the case of Israel for the minimization, of conflict which could among other things stem from the social and cultural differences of new immigrants in a country like Israel. However the successful and actual resolution of conflict is itself rooted not so much in the existence of agencies of state to mitigate or minimize conflict, as in the achievement of National Integration.

The issue of National Integration has been defined as "the political relationship between a modernizing elite and a traditional mass."⁸ This

definition is based on the theory of elite-mass gap expounded by Gaetano Mosca.

According to Mosca's theory, the polity or national community is made of two inter-related components: the "social type" and the "political formula." For Mosca, the "social type" is the dominant social group whose ties and relationship is maintained through:

a community of language, of religion, of interests, and the recurring relationships that result from geographical situation....A life that is lived for centuries in common with identical or similar moral and intellectual habits, similar passions, and memories often becomes the chief element⁹ in the development of conscious social type.

Mosca's ruling class is, therefore, homogeneous, since it has a common language and culture, common ideology and geographical origin, as well as ethnic affinity. The political formula, on the other hand, is defined as:

the legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests.¹⁰
 ...It must be based upon the special beliefs and the strongest sentiments of the social groups in which it is current or at least upon the beliefs and sentiments of the particular portion of the group which holds political pre-eminence.¹¹ (My underlining)

It is clear, therefore, that the political formula reflects the cultural, social, economic and political

beliefs of the dominant social group or elite which holds political power in the society.

Having defined these two components of the polity, it is important to stress that "while political formula and social type are related in all systems, each combination of the two has unique qualities."¹²

Mankind is divided into social groups each of which is set apart from other groups by beliefs, sentiments, habits and interests that are peculiar to it. Each of them presumes absolute superiority over other groups. The individuals who belong to one such group are held together by a consciousness of common brotherhood and held apart from other groups by passions and tendencies that are more or less antagonistic and mutually repellent.¹³

The point which is made here is that there may be more than one social type within a polity, which may or may not express their solidarity and interest in the political formula, i.e. the moral and legal basis of the dominant social group. In other words, although the dominant social group determines the political formula, the political formula so determined may not be espoused by other social types within the polity.

The polarization or multiplicity of social types emerges:

when rapid flows of ideas agitate the higher classes or the more active intellectual centers, which are generally located in large cities, the lower classes and the outlying districts of a state are more likely to be left behind, and differing social types tend to form inside the society.¹⁴

Mosca suggests that only by making the political formula "accessible" to all social types, by ensuring that "the complex of beliefs and moral and philosophical principles that underlie the formula" sink deeply enough into "the consciousness of the more populous and less well educated strata of the society," and by minimizing the differences between the "customs, culture and habits of the ruling class and those of the governed classes" can the polarization of elite and mass be averted.¹⁵ This represents an absorption of all social types into the political formula of the dominant social type.

But Mosca warns us that once certain human needs are satisfied, tension is likely to develop between these social types:

When the elementary needs of life are to an extent satisfied, what mostly contributes to creating and maintaining friction and ill-feeling between the various classes is... membership in two different environments... No law, no hereditary privilege, forbids them to enter that world. It is roped off

from them by a silken thread of the subtlest fiber--a difference in education, in manners, in social habits. Only with difficulty is that thread ever broken.¹⁶

Shils, on the other hand, outlines a different strategy for closing the gap:

The burden for the transformation rests upon the elite; its chances for success rests on its capacity for self-restraint and its effectiveness in legitimizing itself through modernizing achievement, through a due respect for the claims of traditional beliefs...¹⁷

Binder finds Shils' solutions partially disappointing, since Shils does not give sufficient weight to the "claims of traditional beliefs."

Traditional beliefs are to be adapted, but not the prevailing concepts of modernity.¹⁸

Binder rejects this and goes further than Shils to provide a solution to the elite-mass gap. He maintains first that all human resources in new states cannot be mobilized unless goals "are made meaningful to those now beyond the gap, in terms of their own beliefs and experiences." Secondly, he maintains that "the adaptation of beliefs will have to work two ways," and hastens to add that "the remainder of the problem turns on which elements of which traditions within a single polity will preserve and which elements will

be subverted or threatened."¹⁹

In conclusion, then, successful National Integration should combine two postulates:

- 1) The elite should be responsible for the transformation, education and socialization of the masses; and in doing so, it should make its goals both "accessible" and "meaningful" to them "in terms of their own beliefs and expectations." This is the absorptive function of the elite.
- 2) There should be mutual and reciprocal "adaptations of belief" between elite and mass. This entails a predisposition to change on the part of the elite in order to achieve a "behavioural and ideological synthesis"²⁰ which reflects the values of both elite and mass. In other words, the elite must also accept some of the beliefs and traditions of the mass. This process, which we have called the elite's receptivity disposition, precludes the total and unconditional imposition of the elite's political formula on the mass or a situation where the mass alone is expected to change.

Mosca's elite-mass gap theory reflects the situation in Israel.²¹ The "dominant social type"

was and continues to be, for the most part, the European-American Jew and his descendants. He was the author of the Zionist political ideology and the architect of the state.²² He brought with him the vast heritage of culture and technology of Europe together with the knowledge to use it. Today, as before, since the inception of the Zionist movement, the vast majority of policy makers in government, the Histadrut or Federation of Labour, the Jewish Agency, in finance or in politics, have been immigrants of Central and Eastern European origin. The same is true of the members of the different party central committees.²³ Consequently, most Israeli institutions today have been moulded by groups who have been predominantly European in origin and who have a cultural and social affinity.²⁴

The picture which emerges is one of a founding population with a high degree of homogeneity which "lived for centuries in common with similar moral and intellectual habits, passions and memories," and which, in establishing the State of Israel, moulded a state in their own image and in accordance with their "political formula." Had they not opened the

doors of the state to every Jew in the world, and had they not promoted immigration by every possible means in order to increase the meagre population of the new state, the gap would never have arisen or developed. National interest dictated a continuous flow of immigration from whatever quarter in order to defend and thus ensure the retention of the state they had so much desired. This immigration, however, was indiscriminate both in size and quality and in affinity to the "dominant social type."²⁶ Jews from the Middle East, North Africa and parts of Asia, prompted by the messianic call to return to their homeland on the one hand and by the political and economic conditions in their countries of origin on the other, flocked to Israel en masse.²⁷ Like their European counterparts, they brought with them their own cultural and social heritage, that of the Middle East, North Africa and Asia.²⁸ The encounter of the two cultures, the already established European and the newly arrived Middle Eastern Arab-Jewish culture, resulted in a clash which caused a gap between the two and the emergence of the European as the undisputed "dominant social type" in Israel.

As the dominant social type or elite, the European Jews in Israel determined the "political formula." The political formula of the dominant social type in Israel can be grouped in six categories:

1) Education: Modern, Differentiated and Vocational

- a) Literacy: Hebrew Language.
- b) Elementary Education/Secondary Education.
- c) Value Appreciation of Education: Motivation and Aspiration.

2) Economic Specialization

- a) Specialization in a vocation, trade or occupation with proficiency.
- b) Importance of the time factor in relation to work.
- c) Male and Female equality in Labour Force Participation.

3) Socialization in Zionist Ideology: the Inculcation of a National-Secular Identification.

- a) The State.
- b) The Land: Patriotism.
- c) Solidarity.
- d) Secularism.

4) Family Structure

- a) Primary family social structure.
- b) Intermarriage among different ethnic groups.²⁹

- 5) Social and Cultural Mores
 - a) Hygiene.
 - b) Food and Clothing.
 - c) Cultural Interests.
- 6) Minimum Ecological Concentration.

We have, therefore, seen that there are two main social types in Israel and have described the political formula of the predominant social type, that of the Western Ashkenazi Jew. It will be our endeavour to examine the manner in which the IDF contributes to closing the gap between these two social types. In view of the theory of National Integration outlined above, if the IDF contributes significantly to all these indices of the political formula, we will be obliged to conclude that it is endeavouring to absorb the Oriental masses into the political formula by making it "accessible" to them. If, on the other hand, the IDF shows receptivity disposition in some of these indices, we will be able to conclude that the IDF is concerned not with imposing the political formula on the Oriental, but with allowing him to contribute to shaping a political formula which reflects the National Integration of the State.

FOOTNOTES

¹S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, p. 389.

²Claude E. Welch, Jr. (ed.), Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Political Change (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967) p. 168.

³Panther-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War (London: The Athlone Press, 1970) chapter 1.

⁴John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) p. 5.

⁵Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March 1965) Vol. 358, p. 59.

⁶Norman N. Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," in Irving Leonard Markovitz, African Politics and Society: Basic Issues of Government and Development, (New York: The Free Press, 1970) pp. 118-133.

⁷Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion (New York: Praeger, 1969) Chapters I, II, III.

⁸Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," American Political Science Review (September, 1964) LVIII, 3, pp. 622-631.

⁹Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 72.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 70.

¹¹Ibid., p. 72.

¹²Binder, op. cit., p. 624.

¹³Mosca, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 106-107.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁷Binder, op. cit., p. 630.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Yitzhaq-Moshe Immanuel, The Gap: The Absorption Approaches and Suggestions for the Solution of the "Ethnic Integration" in the State of Israel (Heb.) (Holon, Israel: 'Ami Press, 1968) p. 19. Although the work lacks analysis, it contains an interesting collection of ideas, articles and letters on the subject from people in all walks of life.

²²Shumski, The Clash of Cultures in Israel, pp. 18-20. Since most of the Jews in the Middle East and North Africa were forbidden to participate in the political and social life of the country in which they lived, they were unable to interpret their feelings towards Palestine in those terms. Their eagerness to return was based on a romantic and melancholic feeling for the past.

²³Walter P. Zenner, "Sepharadic Communal Organizations in Israel," The Middle East Journal (Spring, 1967) XXI, 2, pp. 173-187.

²⁴Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, p. 201, and E. A. Alport, "The Integration of Oriental Jews into Israel," The World Today (April 1967) XXIII, 4, pp. 146-153.

²⁵Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 72.

²⁶Sicron, Immigration to Israel, p. 6. The mass immigration of Orientals brought an entire spectrum of persons: sick and healthy, rich and poor, those with large families, uneducated and unskilled. It created

at once an enormous heterogeneity in a society which had formerly been selective and homogeneous.

²⁷Hayyim Cohen, Twentieth Century Aliyah from Asia and Africa (Jerusalem: The Institute of Contemporary Jewry/Sprinzak Division, The Hebrew University, 1968).

²⁸These immigrants were not grounded in ideology and utopian socialism which drew many of the European immigrants to Palestine. Therefore, they had little or no understanding of the ideas of colonizing the land and establishing a new modern culture.

²⁹This may not be a characteristic of Israeli society, but it is an index of National Integration.

P A R T II

THE IDF'S RESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER THREE

THE ORGANIZATION UNDER THE CHIEF EDUCATION OFFICER

The Historical Setting

The emergence of the Israel Defence Forces in 1948 was an evolutionary process which had its beginnings in the early months of 1907 with ha-Shomer. It was slow and by no means free of strife.

The first Aliyah relied on Arabs for farming and for their defence against marauders and neighbouring Arab tribes.¹ Theft and looting were nevertheless daily occurrences, the Arab watchmen themselves often cooperating with the intruders.² The first Aliyah lacked confidence in the power of a Jewish force to defend them and feared that should they dismiss the Arab watchmen, these might join the marauders. The second Aliyah, on the other hand, which consisted mainly of Russian immigrants, aspired to transfer both labour and protection into Jewish hands. It was their contention that any future for the Jewish settlement

in Palestine depended on exclusively Jewish labour and Jewish defence.³ In 1907, they therefore established a secret organization which they called Bar-Ghiora to train Jews in the use of arms for the purpose of self-defence.⁴ In 1909, the members of Bar-Ghiora established a broader organization for the same purpose calling it ha-Shomer,⁵ but it was recognized and accepted by the Yishuv only with some difficulty. ha-Shomer's exclusiveness aroused the resentment of the Labour Movement whose members found it virtually impossible to enter the ranks of the defence organization. The Jewish settlers accused the members of ha-Shomer who were needed for guard duty only at night, of being lazy and unproductive in the daytime. The allocation of defence to one person and work to another produced resentment in the Yishuv, particularly since ha-Shomer claimed leadership of the community. This was thought to promote militarism among an exclusive number of individuals who might then dominate the society at large.⁶ Yet ha-Shomer was the first organization to succeed in convincing the early Yishuv that Jews could not only work the land themselves but also defend it themselves.

With a sharp increase in attacks on Jewish settlements during and immediately after World War I, with the new political developments in the country and the emergence of a legal Jewish Battalion, the leaders of the Labour Movement and those of ha-Shomer came to recognize the need for a compromise. They decided that ha-Shomer should be dissolved, that its members as a group should form the basis of a Defence Movement, and that this new defence organization should be part of the Labour political movement.⁷ Thus, on the fifteenth of June, 1920, the Haganah took over the defence of the Yishuv from ha-Shomer.

The years between the end of World War I and the anti-Jewish riots in Palestine during the early years of the Mandate were a transitional period during which both ha-Shomer and the Haganah were partially active. Ha-Shomer was in the process of disbanding and the Haganah was beginning to organize.

During this interim period, the Jewish Battalion fought with Britain against the Turks and then returned to Palestine. It was legally recognized by the Mandate power in Palestine until the anti-Jewish riots of 1921. Its contribution to the evolution of the Yishuv's

defence was its combination of Jewish defence with labour for the first time. Although only the major Jewish settlements were involved, their members would work the soil during the day and stand guard at night. The Battalion was, therefore, neither exclusive nor aloof from the growing Yishuv. Moreover, the members of the Battalion experienced for the first time the problems of living communally, in a Jewish culture and a military framework, with immigrants from different countries.⁸ Limited cultural activities were organized for the first time--clubs for lectures and concerts, tours of the country, and the circulation of pamphlets.

The gradually emerging Haganah differed from the Battalion and ha-Shomer in three fundamental respects:⁹

- 1) Its establishment was based on a distrust of the Mandate power and on the general public aspiration of the Yishuv for complete independence.
- 2) Its constitution, which began to crystallize as early as 1924, stipulated that any Jew or Jewess was eligible for membership of the Haganah from the age of seventeen.
- 3) Ideologically, the function of the Haganah was not to lead the Yishuv, but to accompany its development

and to defend it in time of need. It felt that the defence organization should be controlled by the people and by their elected institutions and that a few should not be allowed to decide when and where to use the instruments of defence.

The ideology of the Haganah was well expressed by Brenner in 1919:¹⁰

There is no contradiction between civilian work and the work of the army--both will have to be combined. But he who wishes to develop in our children the concept of militarism or to make of it a cult, perceives the negative side of our vision and is in opposition to labour. It is not with swords that one builds the wilderness.

In another reference, Israel Shohat and Eliyahu Golomb stated that:¹¹

Our aspiration has always been that night-watching should not be a profession on its own, but rather that work and watching should be combined. We work during the day and watch during the night, where it is needed.

Before 1929, the Haganah was most active in agricultural settlements. Here, where defence was essential, settlement members were automatically also members of the Haganah. The anti-Jewish riots of 1929 made the importance of self-defence obvious also to Jews who lived in towns, and the Haganah began to

to include volunteers from all sections of the population. Among these were a minority of Oriental immigrants whose fluency in Arabic and ease in establishing relations with Arabs made them particularly valuable.¹²

During the period of peace, when tension was low, attempts were made to improve and correct training in the organization. As early as 1923, courses had been organized for trainees¹³ but by 1932 they were permanent and offered annually. The material in these courses was based on the experience of senior Haganah members and was given to all branches in the country.¹⁴ From time to time Haganah Headquarters also arranged assemblies where the general staff convened to listen to lectures on politics and on general subjects.¹⁵ Among the permanent lecturers in the Haganah at this time was Ya'akov Dori, who later became the first Chief of Staff of the IDF (1948-1950).

The Haganah also sought to establish cultural activities, the most important of which were lectures about heroism in Israel. 'Al ha-Mishmar, a newsletter intended to unify the Jewish watch, began to appear

every few months. It fed on memories of the riots and of the Jewish defence forces in the Ukraine, the experiences of which allegedly played an important part in shaping the morale and strength of the Haganah in the twenties. The newsletter brought to the rank and file translations from military literature relevant to the tactics of the new organization.

After the riots of 1936, the defence of the Yishuv required that the Haganah establish more efficient coordination between its members and between the agricultural settlements and the urban and rural areas. For this purpose, the Haganah issued a new publication Ma'arakhot, the first edition of which appeared in September 1939, and which is still in existence today.¹⁶ The material collected and edited by the Chief of Staff of the underground Haganah and by Mr. Moshe Sharett, later Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency. Ma'arakhot was an illegal publication intended particularly for the Jewish soldiers who were serving in the British Army. The Central Library provided a corner where this publication and other pertinent information could be distributed to Jewish soldiers and policemen. From time to time, stencilled news-

letters were sent to communities where they were read aloud to the people. They were called Ma'arakhot Be'al-Peh, or oral campaigns. The Haganah was also responsible for an illegal radio station for which the Haganah education officer supplied some of the material. At the same time, meetings were arranged with the editors of newspapers to teach them how to drop hints to the public in their presentation of material without allowing the Mandate power to suspect their underground activities.

During this period, the Haganah was called upon to deal with newly arrived immigrants from Eastern Europe, only some of whom had had Zionist backgrounds and none of whom had any knowledge of the country or its language. The Haganah, therefore, had to provide them with "basic information" which consisted of:

- 1) Information about the country and the environment.
- 2) Information about the Arabs. They were taught to restrain themselves under provocation and to respect what was holy to the Arabs.
- 3) Geography: Tours were arranged all over the country and particular attention was given to explanations about the evolution of each region and about past

wars. Their purpose was to establish an identification with the land, and thus to help to integrate newcomers in their new land and in its national history.¹⁸

- 4) Hebrew language tuition: Classes were conducted in the evenings, and since the Haganah was an underground organization, courses were arranged in small groups and classes were limited in number. In spite of this, 11,500 men attended the course in a three year period.¹⁹

Although the predominant concept in the teaching at the time was "the fight for freedom," indiscriminate antagonism against the British or the Arabs was discouraged. Instead Haganah members were taught the notion of Tohar ha-Nesheq or sanctity of the weapon, which signified that the weapon must not be abused by irresponsible or indiscriminate use.²⁰ However, the Haganah did reportedly have trouble restraining some of the Oriental Jews who were allegedly more emotional than the others. In fact, it has been suggested that Oriental youth was generally more attracted to the Irgun Tzvai Leumi or National Military Organization which had a more "fanatic and chauvinistic ideology...

a relative lack of social and educational activities" and which offered "an outlet for their resentment, not only against the British and Arabs, but also against the governing Ashkenazi institutions."²¹

In the Haganah the education services were organized according to territorial subdivisions. The officers in charge were entrusted with the task of producing "good soldiers," which was taken to mean soldiers who understood that the Haganah was neither expansionist nor aggressive, but that it aimed at securing freedom for the Jewish people in Palestine. Officers in the Haganah were to set an example for their men and to be first in the front line when leading them. Their military training lasted three or four weeks, a practice still retained for N.C.O.s in the IDF. The Haganah insisted on flexibility and independent initiative on the part of its officers, especially when these were cut off from their seniors and had to act on their own responsibility.²² This is still required by the IDF today.

During this period, most of the Haganah's educational material was supplied by Jewish officers who fought with the British. Since it consisted of material

on drill and weapons but did not include tactics, it was of limited value. The Haganah, therefore, undertook to develop military tactics suited to the terrain. To this end, military books were gathered from "British, American, Russian and even German sources."²³ A new two-month course was then given to officers, who thereafter met annually for another week's training. Each Haganah officer had his own collection of material and it was from this assortment that the Haganah later evolved a number of books devised to meet its special needs. However, both methods of developing Army literature are retained by the IDF--each officer receives during his week's training, in addition to Army books, a folder containing pamphlets translated from originals by leading scholars on the subject of the course.

Towards the end of 1947, almost thirty years after its establishment, the Haganah emerged as a well-structured organization which consisted of:²⁴

- 1) The permanent nucleus, the Headquarters, numbering 400 men.
- 2) The Jewish Police in the Yishuv, who were members of the Haganah even under the British Mandate.

- 3) The Palmah, which was the striking force of the Haganah and which included an embryonic air force and navy.
- 4) Armoured units, part-time soldiers responsible only for their immediate area.
- 5) The Defence Guard, whose activity was limited to their own homes and settlements.
- 6) The Gadna or Youth Groups, the young people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen who were drafted by the Haganah and who served in case of emergency in communications, first aid, etc.
- 7) The agricultural settlements which served as bases for Haganah and whose members were ready for combat.

In a sense, on the eve of Israel's independence, the Haganah was an "army in transition" in a "state in transition." The declaration of the New State of Israel on May 15, 1948, marked the end of a chapter of Haganah history, the end of the Haganah as an illegal underground organization. The conversion of the Haganah into the Israel Defence Forces took place two weeks later because of the war. Towards the end of May 1948, the Haganah completed its functions after having paved the way for the IDF for thirty years. The

IDF is, therefore, a continuation of the Haganah. Ha-Shomer had injected life into the concept of Jewish self-defence, the members of the Jewish Battalion established the framework which became the backbone of the Haganah and this later provided the IDF with a frame of reference and a ready-made structure.

On May 28, 1948, with military order number one, the Israeli National Army was established.²³ On June 28 the Army took the oath of allegiance to the State, but it was not until November 1, 1948, when the Palmah was finally dissolved that the Army became a single and uniform national Israeli Army.²⁶ When the Arab states invaded the new State of Israel, every resource of manpower was mobilized by three measures: the control of manpower ordinance, an order prohibiting the foundation or maintenance of any other command force, and the establishment of an auxiliary Women's Force.

The Present Structure

According to Israeli law, both men and women may be drafted into the Army from the age of eighteen, with the exception of two groups:

- 1) The physically handicapped.
- 2) "Cases which combine lack of education, low intelligence standard and lack of knowledge of Hebrew in such a severe degree that enlistment in the Army becomes impossible without educational preparation and where there is no possibility of the soldier being integrated in military service so that his enlistment would only make difficulties for the Army and cause suffering to himself. A low formal education standard or inadequate knowledge of Hebrew is in itself no reason for disqualifying a youngster for IDF service."²⁷

The duration of Army service is three years for men between the ages of eighteen and twenty six and only two to two and a half years for men between the ages of twenty seven and twenty nine. Unmarried girls with the exception of religious girls who may ask for exemption serve for two years. After discharge from this compulsory military service, men and unmarried girls serve in the Reserve Army for thirty days each year consecutively and one day a month or three consecutive days every three months until the age of forty

nine for men and thirty four for women. Officers are called upon for seven days additional service a year.²⁸

The Army has the declared and closely observed policy of avoiding any postponement of compulsory military service as far as this is possible. Those who wish to continue their academic studies are permitted in principle to do so after and not before military service. In exceptional cases, however, this rule may be waived. It must be borne in mind that the option to join an academic reserve and to continue studying at the University before military service depends on a military decision and does not rest with the individual. In spite of these restrictions and of the length of military service, the military appeals to many youngsters as a period of transition and a "much hoped for change."²⁹ In fact, many youngsters try to enlist before they are eighteen.

The IDF relies on the conscription of soldiers to provide itself with a continuous flow of command cadre, to train soldiers for reserve and to provide the country with border guards. The regular Army of

senior command and expert positions consists only of a small nucleus of professional soldiers. There are two reasons for this, one ideological and the other financial. The ideological reason is in the tradition of non-militarism which prevailed in the Yishuv before the establishment of the State of Israel. The military neither considers itself a group distinct from the society at large, nor as standing apart from that society by virtue of its monopoly of the instruments of force. The draftees serve willingly because Israel was founded on the tenet that every citizen should have the duty and the right to share in defending and building his country. This is the only way that the country's viability can be maintained. As soon as the soldier has finished his "share" of training, patrolling borders and preparation for the eventualities of war, therefore, he returns to his civilian life as before. The financial impediment is that a professional soldier costs the country ten times as much as a conscripted serviceman. It is for this budgetary reason that the Army assigns conscripts to every possible appointment. They fill all junior command positions

at the level of the squad and the platoon and a wide range of staff and technical duties in the lower echelons.

Since the training of junior commanders takes little more than a year, there is a regular turn-over of corporals, sergeants and second lieutenants annually. In this way, each year tens of thousands of people have the opportunity for personal advancement and promotion in rank and status. As a fighting body, therefore, the IDF soldiers, platoon and squad leaders are not above the age of twenty, and company commanders are usually no older than twenty one or twenty two.³⁰

The structure of the IDF is, therefore, as follows:

- 1) A regular and professional nucleus of men.
- 2) The bulk of the Army which consists of men recruited annually.
- 3) The reserves.

The military command is in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff who is the only officer who may hold the rank of Major General. The General Staff has four branches:

- 1) General Staff
- 2) Manpower
- 3) Logistics

4) Intelligence

These branches are headed by men who have a rank equivalent to Brigadier General. The country is divided into three area commands: North, Centre and South. The commanding officers of these areas also hold the rank of Brigadier General. There are ten Corps in the IDF: the Armoured Corps, the Signal Corps, the Engineer's Corps, the Parachute Corps, the Supply Corps, the Infantry, the Ordnance Corps, the Medical Corps, the Air Force and the Navy.

The educational apparatus of the IDF is divided into three branches:

- 1) The Branch of Schooling.
- 2) The Branch of Information and Instruction.
- 3) The Branch of Recreation and Entertainment.

The IDF also maintains two central organs of communication: the journal Ba-Mahane (In Camp) and a radio station. The Branch of Schooling deals with the formal education of the whole Army, whereas the Branch of Information and Instruction is in charge of officer training.

The Branch of Schooling

The history of the Branch of Schooling in the IDF can be divided into four periods. During the first period, from 1948 to 1956, the major problem was that of teaching newcomers Hebrew. Language as a means of communication is the basic instrument for a viable organization and therefore became a crucial issue when new immigrants were drafted upon arrival. Language problems result in a dilution of command, and it was a military order during the War of 1948 that Hebrew had to be taught even during the fighting.

During the second period, from 1956 to 1962, Hebrew alone was taught, but the emphasis shifted from spoken to written Hebrew. There were no opportunities to provide a general education, and the IDF claims that this was not even necessary. Thus, in 1961 alone, more than 2,000 soldiers had no elementary education certificate upon discharge.

The third period, between 1962 and 1966, marks a change and an expansion in the kind of education provided by the IDF. There are a number of reasons for this, the two most important of which are:

- 1) There were still some Oriental parents who preferred

to send their children to work than to allow them to finish elementary school, since they were needed to help support their families. In some instances, it has been reported that the Government took severe action against those who refused to comply with the "compulsory elementary education law". Its lack of success can be attributed to the fact that elementary education in Israel, which according to the law is provided "free", costs money, because "local authorities are empowered to charge mandatory fees for certain added services provided to school children."³¹

2) In 1962, the country began to undergo an economic depression. The problem of unemployment was getting acute, and those who had no elementary education were most affected. It was then that a law was passed stipulating that no soldier be discharged from the Army without having completed a course of elementary education. With the aid of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Army designed a curriculum for three months of intensive courses and examinations to show that each soldier had completed the eight grades of schooling. By 1968, no soldiers were discharged without elementary education, and they were better equipped for civilian life.

Both elementary education and the study of Hebrew are compulsory for both soldiers and officers. These studies are, therefore, pursued not during the soldier's free time but as part of his daily duties. They are completed in three stages.³² In the initial training period, the new recruit completes between sixty and one hundred and twenty concentrated or staggered hours of Hebrew study. The teaching is done in training camps by groups of girl-teachers who are moved from one military base to another as required. The second stage unfolds in the Command Schools. For three or four weeks, soldiers are taken out of their service units in order to be able to devote all their time to an advanced course of Hebrew. Finally, soldiers who lack elementary education are sent towards the end of the military service to the Central Day School at Camp Marcus to study for three months and to obtain the Elementary Education Certificate.

The last period dates from 1966 to the present. The national economic depression of 1965 affected everyone, but once again, unskilled labour and those on the lowest economic levels were affected most of all.

Among these were recipients of elementary school education. At the same time, a marked improvement in the national education system made the civilian labour market more competitive. While the IDF encountered fewer conscripts who had not completed their elementary education before entering the Army or who lacked adequate knowledge of Hebrew,³³ the depression and the improvement in the civilian education system created employment difficulties for young men discharged from the Army. The IDF was, therefore, once more called upon to improve the qualifications of deprived soldiers to enable them to compete with others on the civilian labour market.³⁴ Beginning in 1966, the IDF offered conscripts a number of courses in post-elementary education, up to the tenth grade, similar to those which were already available to the Regular Army. In addition evening classes and classes by correspondence leading to half-matriculation and full-matriculation certificates were provided on a voluntary basis.³⁵ The certificates obtained on completion of these courses are recognized by the State and make their holders eligible for all kinds of

advanced vocational courses or for jobs in a higher income bracket.

Under the same branch, the IDF also maintains an array of vocational schools. Since it is in continuous need of skilled professionals, the IDF looks for ways to prepare technicians both before conscription and during Army service.³⁶

Other instruments of education are the weekly journal Ba-Mahane (In Camp) and the Army broadcasting station. The latter in particular serves not only the standing Army but also keeps the Reserves informed of the latest developments within the Army. The Air Force, Navy, Nahal (Pioneer Fighting Youth) and Gadna (Youth Battalions) issue their own publications in addition to the weekly special for religious soldiers.³⁷ The monthly publication Ma'arakhot keeps officers informed of technical and military matters and writings of military interest.

The Branch of Information and Instruction

As its title suggests, this branch consists of two departments: the department of Instruction which provides leadership training for commanders, and the

department of Information which is responsible for the soldiers' psychological welfare and morale.³⁸

The Department of Instruction.

The Army attributes the greatest importance to the educational activities of this department. These activities are part of daily life in the Army and include regimentation, the range of punishments and rewards, symbols and ceremonies which have a positive effect on the soldiers' morale, care of individual problems and the personal example set by the commander. These are the activities which are responsible for the atmosphere which prevails in the Army and the educational seal which it leaves on its soldiers.

According to the IDF, there is only one man, the commander, who can create the atmosphere in his unit, who is capable of establishing the necessary relationships with his soldiers and of developing in them the desired motivation. The Branch of Information and Instruction emphasizes the importance of friendly and open communication between commanders and their men, and encourages commanders to act as examples and as advisors. Experience has shown that the commander is

the man who can best persuade his men, even though he may not be the best man on any given subject. The admiration of soldiers for their commander is believed to be higher than for professional teachers, and unit commanders are therefore considered the best teachers. However, since not every commander is able to speak as well as a teacher, the Army also provides him with courses on the theory of public speaking.³⁹

Unlike in other armies, platoon and squad commanders in the IDF belong to the conscript Army. They are usually young, have little experience and spend a relatively short period of time at their posts. These circumstances increase the importance of the theoretical training in leadership which they receive as part of their intensive preparation for their position. This theoretical training is primarily concerned with leadership, modern public administration, human relationships, and the treatment of the soldier as an individual and of the unit as a group. The material taught is based on relevant chapters of sociology, psychology, and management and their application to the military.

Potential commanders are taught in their units for three to five months. Subjects range from "What

is Israel?" to the nature of the Army's obligations to soldiers.⁴⁰ At the end of this period, an examination is given. Those who pass it are promoted to NCOs and sent for a week to the Education Officer's special school for intensive training. NCO trainees up to the rank of second-lieutenant are sent to the Military Institute, while senior commanders are trained in the Military Education College.

The Department of Information

According to the IDF, information has become such an important factor that without it a modern army could not operate.⁴¹ The IDF attributes this to two interdependent factors. The Army today demands much more of its soldiers than armies have ever done before. It demands that they think, that they be stable, that they act with initiative in unexpected circumstances, that they have the stamina to withstand psychological warfare. On the other hand, a soldier today can be critical or sceptical and unwilling to obey order when he does not understand his mission. Hence the essential nature of the role played by information in the administration of any organization, particularly

in the Army where demands on the individual are extreme and total and where material rewards are lacking.

By the term "information," the IDF intends not only the distribution of facts and figures, but the creation of conditions necessary for the soldier's identification with the aims and goals of his unit, his army and his country. The commander works with the Branch of Information and Instruction to develop in him the basic characteristics of a "good" soldier, to explain and clarify the goals of his endeavours, to cultivate in him pride in the IDF, in his unit and in his Corps, to strengthen his love for his country, and to increase his knowledge of the nation.

The Army considers the supply of information to recruits of particular importance, because it is during the first months of military service, when the change from civilian to military life is still fresh, that the recruit asks questions for which he expects adequate answers. The IDF believes that this period is also crucial because during this stage of his military service the soldier's attitudes to the military establishment and to his commanders are determined.

A negative attitude or unconvincing information at this juncture can undermine his confidence in the Army for the rest of his military service.

Until recently, "Information" programs were imparted in lecture form by the commander of each company for a total of between twenty five and thirty five hours. The IDF realized, however, that there were a number of shortcomings to this approach.⁴² Lectures delivered during the training period were found ineffective and unattractive to soldiers when they were under physical strain and suffering from tiredness. It was further realized that Information lectures are most meaningful and beneficial when they deal with situations with which the audience is familiar. When lectures describe a situation not yet known to the audience, a gap is created between the lecture material and the audience's imagination. Lastly, it was found that commanders could not themselves lecture more than twice a week, and would rely on junior commanders to substitute for them, and that this imperilled the quality and standards of delivery.

For these reasons, and others, the Branch of Information and Instruction has undertaken the three

year project of establishing a film collection on all subjects which can be utilized by commanders in their lectures. The IDF has three types of film:

- 1) Short films about IDF Corps, like the Air Force, the Armoured Corps, or the Parachute Corps, produced by this branch and shown to the civilian public.
- 2) Commercial films utilized for IDF purposes.
- 3) Original "information" films produced by the IDF which explain the purpose of training, the basis of Israeli defence, secrecy in the Army, field security, discipline, etc.

In addition to lectures and films, information directed to soldiers of all ranks often takes the form of conversations once every fortnight or once a month between the commander and his men. Commanders are compelled by military order to have such conversations. These are many and varied. They deal with specific subjects which are of current interest to the unit and with general subjects intended to establish a relationship between the soldiers and problems of Israeli security or to develop their knowledge about good citizenship. World Jewish communities, the occ-

upied territories, confrontations with the natives in these territories, their problems of industry, economy and agriculture, are among the specific subjects which have been discussed. Modern scientific development, astronomy, nuclear physics and medicine are among the general subjects. Subjects are varied according to need. These conversations have the advantage of giving soldiers the opportunity to raise any question or problem which interests them. According to the IDF, their value does not depend on their subject.⁴³ A conversation can be successful only if the subject bears relevance to the reality in which the soldier finds himself and if the material is so presented as to seem to him well thought out and to have an aim. To help unit commanders in this task, the Branch of Information and Instruction, periodically supplies them with Information booklets on subjects proposed by the Army's education service. Commanders may ask the Education Officer for a number of lectures to be given to his men, either specifying the name of the lecturer or leaving the choice to the Education Officer. He is also free to invite guest speakers both for soldiers and for commanders. If a group of soldiers

expresses interest in a subject, lectures or discussions on that subject are arranged for the group or for a number of units. The Information Office, which provides the material on the subject matter remains in continuous contact with the units.

Soldiers are also taken on tours to familiarise them with the land and with the sites of previous wars, and visit cultural centres such as museums, historical sites and developing areas. Journals like Ma'arakhot Ba-Mahane, Sqira Hodsheet are supplied to all units. Information is given to commanders through lectures given by specialists at Higher Institutes of Learning or at the Army's Institute and College. Commanders also receive the Sqira Hodsheet (Monthly Review), which deals with events in Israel, the Middle East and the World.

In addition, the Branch publishes a pamphlet which outlines the soldiers' rights and duties and which gives him a general ideal of military organization, symbols.

The Branch of Recreation and Entertainment.

This Branch is in charge of all the IDF's artistic and cultural activities.⁴⁴ It seeks to encourage soldiers to use their free time culturally and endeavours

to create comraderie among the soldiers by promoting military entertainment and recreational services for soldiers in the camp.

Each unit has its own Club Room, which serves as a centre for its social and cultural activities. The Club is a meeting place, where soldiers go to read newspapers, listen to the radio or play games, and where social gathering and lectures are given and quizzes held. Once a year a painting competition is judged by a professional committee which awards prizes in the form of material for painting or sculpture to encourage soldiers to continue their work.⁴⁵ An annual chess competition is held among the commands, and recently the IDF chess champion became the chess champion of Israel.

The Branch has four military ensembles, which belong to the Armoured Corps, the Nahal, the Northern Command and the Central Command, each comprising fourteen musicians.⁴⁶ Each ensemble has its own traditions and their members are both talented and professional. Composers are found in the ranks of the reserves, among whom are professors of music, and new young musicians are given the opportunity

to work closely with them.⁴⁷

The expenses of each ensemble in the IDF are paid by income from public appearances. Apart from their reputed excellence, they are noted for their contribution in developing an original Israeli style of music. In addition to these ensembles, the Branch also maintains a number of smaller music groups which belong to the Navy, the Gadna, the Southern Command, and to some of the Air Force bases and choirs in each unit, which perform once a week or once a fortnight.⁴⁸

Each year, the IDF advertises for musicians and composers in newspapers and on its radio station, and invites secondary school graduates for auditions. The Army also gives organized groups of sixteen years of age and students at the Music Academy, the opportunity to present themselves for audition.⁴⁹ A large number of musicians and composers have reportedly developed their talents in this way and built their professional career during military service.

Each unit in the IDF has its own budget for recreation and entertainment, which must cover such expenses as hiring artists and procuring films.⁵⁰ The latter are particularly important, since they are the

form of entertainment which is most easily obtained and thus each unit receives eight films a month. Soldiers who are on leave are entitled to see films in town at considerably reduced prices.⁵¹ The theatre is primarily in the hands of the reserves since theatre companies generally go into the reserves as a group, but soldiers are also entitled to see plays in civilian theatres, either at reduced rates or gratis.

Recreational activities in the IDF are "greatly assisted by the Soldier's Welfare Committee, a voluntary public organization whose work is co-ordinated with and partly financed by the Manpower Branch of General Headquarters. The Committee has opened clubs, low cost restaurants, recreational and educational centres in Army camps."⁵² The Committee runs a Central Soldier's Welfare building in Tel-Aviv, where exhibitions, national or international quizzes and competitions, opening nights of Army ensembles and orchestras are held. Here, twice a week, a revue appears called "The Ark of Noah."

The Women's Corps

The history of women fighting side by side with men ante-dates the establishment of the State and can

be traced back to the days of ha-Shomer.⁵³ However, less than fifty percent of the unmarried women who reach the age of eighteen actually enlist in the IDF. Military service law allows two exemptions for women:

- 1) Married women - girls married before the age of eighteen - are not drafted and girls who marry during military service are discharged immediately upon marriage.
- 2) Religious reasons: girls of traditional and religious families, a category into which most Oriental immigrants belong, "regard military service as an intolerable departure from their sacred values. Accordingly, the law permits exemption from the military on the strength of a girl's statement that enlistment is contrary to the religious principles of her family."⁵⁴

There is some flexibility about discharging women from military service. Girls are exempt for health handicaps which would be insufficient to make men exempt. "The same applies to welfare difficulties, the level of education and other personal reasons."⁵⁵ Other special allowances are made for women soldiers. No fewer than fifteen girls are permitted to serve in any unit. According to the IDF, "all night duties are

performed in pairs, reasonable quarters with separate conveniences are provided. Women soldiers can be tried and punished only by their own female Officers."⁵⁶

According to the Chief Education Officer, the IDF believes that the presence of girls has a restraining effect on the language and behaviour of male soldiers. Moreover, since the women in the IDF have relatively high educational standards, and therefore occupy corresponding positions within the Army, they become "a positive factor in forming the social and moral atmosphere in the units."⁵⁷

Women in the IDF are utilized to perform functions which do not require great physical effort and release men for combat duties. The IDF drafts women with a comparatively high educational level. According to the IDF's Chief Education Officer, a girl with a low level of education would be "most unhappy" in the Army. She would feel "more educational deprivation" and experience feelings of inferiority.⁵⁸

On the basis of aptitude and psychological tests, girls are posted to occupations in the Army, such as, clerks, radio operators, telephonists and teachers. In infantry battalions and other combat units and at

Brigade and HQ level, they have office assignments, act as education sergeants, welfare NCOs and nurses. Many women soldiers are trained as teachers. They are to be found in all branches of the service and are responsible for almost all the Hebrew instruction courses and a good part of the Basic or Elementary Education course in the IDF.⁵⁹

All girls who graduate from Teachers' Colleges enlist in the IDF on completion of their studies. Some serve in teaching assignments within the Army in soldier schools. Others are given short periods of basic training and sent to the Ministry of Education and Culture for two years. They are assigned to civilian primary schools in border settlements where there is difficulty in finding salaried teachers. Their army service of two years consists of teaching immigrant children, and they are paid according to the rate of civilian teachers. The Army continues to maintain contact with them, deals with their officers, and exercises a disciplinary and supervisory role, but their functional activities as teachers are entrusted to the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Since the Ministry of Education and Culture needs

more teachers than the IDF can supply from this qualified group for the teaching of both adults and children on border settlements, the IDF provides girls who have not completed Teachers' College training, but have only graduated from secondary school. These girls are given short extension courses by the Ministry of Education and Culture, and are sent to border settlements for two years.⁶⁰ At the end of the first year, a report of their work is sent to the Ministry. If it is favourable, they are given a trial licence and continue for another year at the end of which time they receive a teacher's diploma. Half of these teachers remain in their places for the whole tour of duty or even longer.⁶¹

Consequently, women soldiers are found teaching children in elementary schools or adults in evening classes, or working as youth club organizers. In many places, they bear the main load of responsibility for education and cultural affairs, and become the principal agents in the acculturation and education of new immigrants. In total, some 1,300 women soldiers have been trained and have since "become part of the state educational system."⁶²

Gadna and Nahal

The Gadna, which is the Hebrew equivalent for Youth Battalions, has a history which also ante-dates the War of Independence.⁶³ During the period of the Mandate, the Gadna trained signalers for the Haganah and was instrumental in halting the advance of the Jordanian Legion in Jerusalem. Following the War of Independence, the Gadna distinguished itself by building roads and helping, new immigrants and border settlements. During the Sinai War in 1956, the Gadna members were fortifying border villages against Arab infiltrators.

The Gadna is under the joint supervision of the IDF, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Education and Culture. It operates in 120 secondary schools, 35 technical schools, and 21 agricultural schools. Its membership is 35,000 youngsters between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, of which 10,000 a year attend a ten-day period of study sessions, camping activities and training.⁶⁴

While at secondary school, the Gadna offers its members extra-curricular activities, such as sports

and manual crafts, and courses in aviation, seamanship and signals.⁶⁵ During vacation periods, the Gadna operates field camps for its youngsters and exposes them to rigorous military training and activities.

Youngsters who are interested in agricultural training within the framework of the Kibbutzim in Israel, join the Army in organized groups called gar'inim or nuclei, within the Nahal.⁶⁶ Nahal is an abbreviation which means Pioneer Fighting Youth, and a volunteer Corps within the IDF.⁶⁷ Although it started as a battalion of the Gadna, it branched out after the War of Independence to combine military service with agricultural work and the pioneering life on border settlements, a cornerstone in the development of Israel.⁶⁸

The history of the Nahal can be traced back to the War of Independence when suitable tasks had to be found for thousands of seventeen year old youngsters. These were too young to be sent to the battle fields but desperately needed in the reserve force. Eliyahu Shomroni, then a young leader from Kibbutz Afilim, drafted a plan whereby recruits would combine military

and agricultural training which ensures the preservation of the traditional nucleus of youth movements in Army camps and Kibbutzim. Shomroni's plan was accepted and his program was incorporated in the Defence Service Law, approved in the Knesset in 1948.⁶⁹ In its original form, the law prescribed a year of agricultural training on a settlement following basic military training.

In 1950, this law was amended to satisfy the requirements of a modern defence system and from then on the Nahal became a small volunteer Corps for those who desire to serve on a Kibbutz or border settlement. Young people established their own nucleus a year before they are eligible for Army service and remain together until discharge. For them, military service consists of intensive military training for a few months before they are sent for agricultural training. Advanced courses in agriculture are offered to those members who so desire. At the end of this training, they join a border settlement or establish a new one. Members of the group who decide against an agricultural life, may return to regular military duties alone.

The Placement Office

The Placement Office is run by the Ministry of Defence in co-operation with the Ministry of Labour and local authorities, such as municipalities and Trade Unions.⁷⁰ Its purpose is to help discharged soldiers to return as quickly as possible to jobs in civilian life and to direct them according to the needs of the national economy. It helps discharged soldiers to learn a vocation, to finish their education and to find jobs, and living quarters. The Placement Office also provides them with an employment service and administers loans and scholarships. Special attention is given by the Office to the needs of special groups of soldiers like orphans, soldiers from broken homes, minority groups and the inhabitants of development areas.⁷¹

One of the most important activities of the Placement Office is to provide soldiers three or four months before their discharge with information about openings in education, in vocational training and in the labour market.⁷² This is done by explaining their rights and the government aid to which they are entitled, by providing them with a sheet called

la-Mishtahrer (to the Discharged Soldier) which contains information about the possibilities of vocational training, the Ministry of Labour Training Centres, and government and private agencies. Bulletins are posted on Army bulletin boards giving information not published above.

Information is also delivered orally. The Army Broadcasting Service broadcasts interviews between soldiers and representatives of the various agencies to encourage soldiers to seek further information. In the units, there are study days arranged with the co-operation of IDF commanders on subjects like choosing an occupation, the opportunities at different economic levels, salaries and social conditions. Tours are conducted in the vocational training centres, factories and educational institutions. There are also lectures in the units after which counsellors interview interested soldiers and advise them about the available vocational courses. Soldiers who are not interviewed in their units are invited to the Placement Office for counsel and direction. The Placement Office organizes information meetings, twice a year, with the Welfare Officers in the units.

The Placement Office receives from the IDF the names of the soldiers about to be discharged together with details about their military rank, their academic qualifications, and their leadership potential.⁷³

The Placement Office administers scholarships and loans for discharged soldiers. It is empowered to grant financial aid and loans for the purchase of clothing, for the payment of rent and for medical insurance, for maintenance during the first few days after discharge, and for the purchase of implements or tools needed for work not to exceed the amount of IL.120, in financial aid and IL.300 in loans.⁷⁴ Other loans and scholarships are given to discharged soldiers to help them to complete vocational courses which they may have begun. The families of these soldiers may receive a maximum of IL.50 per month for a period not to exceed six months while they are studying. The Placement Office is also authorized to provide loans for down-payments on lodgings, for rent and for the rehabilitation of regular Army soldiers.⁷⁵

These services are open to soldiers for one year from the date of their discharge.

FOOTNOTES

¹Ben-Zion Dinor (ed.), History of the Haganah (Heb.) (Tel-Aviv: Hotzaat Ma'arakhot, 1964), Vol. I, No. 1, chapter 10.

²Ibid., pp. 78-80

³Ibid., p. 298

⁴Ibid., pp. 206-210

⁵Ibid., p. 213

⁶Ibid., II, 1, p. 51. See also H. P. Walters (pseud.) Haganah: The Story of Jewish Self-Defence in Palestine (London: Newman Wolsey, 1946).

⁷Dinor, op.cit., I, 2, p. 670

⁸Ibid., p. 447. Limited cultural activities were organized for the first time. Clubs for lectures and concerts and tours of the country and the circulation of pamphlets.

⁹Dinor, op.cit., II, 1, p. 620. Also Samuel Rolbant, The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army, pp. 17-28.

¹⁰Dinor, op.cit., II, 1, p. 614

¹¹Ibid., II, 3, p. 1264

¹²Interview with Col. Gershon Rivlin, Editor in Chief of Ma'arakhot, May 30, 1968.

¹³Dinor, op.cit., II, 1, p. 278

¹⁴Ibid., I, 2, p. 518

¹⁵Ibid., p. 524

¹⁶Interview with Col. Rivlin.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Dinor, op.cit., II, 1, pp. 269-70.

¹⁹Interview with Captain Itamar Rozen, March 4, 1968.

²⁰Interview with Col. Rivlin.

²¹Shumski, The Clash of Cultures in Israel, pp. 86-88.

²²Harry Sacher, Israel: The Establishment of a State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1952) p. 218.

²³Ibid., pp. 216-217.

²⁴IDF/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Information and Instruction, the Haganah (Heb.) (Tel-Aviv: Hotzaat Muzeon ha-Haganah, Beit Eliyahu Golomb, Feb. 1968) pp. 145-147.

²⁵Sacher, op. cit., p. 270.

²⁶Ben Halpern, "The Role of the Military in Israel," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967) pp. 339-340. For detailed historical description of the struggle between dissident groups and the Central Command of the Haganah, see John and David Kimche, Both Sides of the Hill (London: secker and Warburg, 1960) pp. 55-68.

²⁷M. Bar-On, Education Processes in the Israel Defence Forces (Tel-Aviv: Israel Press, 1966) pp. 22-23.

²⁸Shaul Ramati, The Israel Defence Forces (Jerusalem: Israel Digest, 1964) p. 9.

²⁹Bar-On, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁰Ibid., p. 35.

³¹These include "medical and dental treatment, insurance against accidents, psychological and vocational counselling, out of school activities, materials for handicrafts, etc. Parents in low income brackets may obtain partial or total exemption from this change." Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools and Progress in Israel (London: Pergamon Press, 1967) p. 159.

³²GHQ Publication, Chief Education Officer, Education in the IDF (Heb.) p. 4.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Bar-On, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁵Interview with Captain Rozen.

³⁶Interview with Col. M. Erez, Head of Recruiting Center for the IDF, June 12, 1968.

³⁷Interview with Y. Doar, Head of Nahal Recruiting Center, April 18, 1968.

³⁸GHQ/ Publication Chief Education Officer, op. cit., p. 13.

³⁹Interview with Lt. Col. N. Raz, Deputy Chief of Branch of Information and Instruction, March 17, 1968.

⁴⁰GHQ Publication/Chief Education Officer, op. cit., p. 14.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 13.

⁴²Ibid., p. 31.

⁴³Interview with Lt. Col. Raz, March 25, 1968.

⁴⁴Interview with Col. S. Biber, Head of the Branch of Recreation and Entertainment, March 27, 1968.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶GHQ Publication/Chief Education Officer, op. cit., p. 28.

⁴⁷Interview with Col. Biber.

⁴⁸GHQ Publication/Chief Education Officer, op. cit., p. 28.

⁴⁹Interview with Col. Biber.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ramati, The Israel Defence Forces, p. 29.

⁵³Archives of the Labour Movement, The Collection of ha-Shomer (Heb.) (Tel-Aviv: Archive and Museum of the Labour Movement, 1947) pp. 75-84, 146-162, 418-442, 531-565.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ramati, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁷Interview with M. Bar-On, Former Chief Education Officer, January 31, 1968.

⁵⁸Bar-On, op. cit., p. 22.

⁵⁹Interview with Captain Rozen.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ramati, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶³For a detailed study of the Gadna, see Joseph W. Eaton, Influencing the Youth Culture: A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel (California: Sage Publications, 1970).

⁶⁴Dorothy Willner, "Near Eastern Society: Israel," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967) p. 113.

⁶⁵Gidon Levitas, Nahal: Israel's Pioneer Fighting Youth (Jerusalem: Haomanim Press, 1967) p.19.

⁶⁶Interview with Y. Doar.

⁶⁷Levitas, op. cit., p. 7.

⁶⁸Eaton, op. cit., chapter 8.

⁶⁹Levitas, op. cit., p. 16.

⁷⁰Interview with S. Serry, Director of the Placement Office, April 24, 1968.

⁷¹Placement Office Information Folder, Feb. 1968.

⁷²Interview with Sam Abutbull, Assistant to the Director of the Placement Office, April 24, 1968.

⁷³Placement Office Folder, Feb. 1968.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

ASPECTS OF IDF'S ACTIVITIES

In the last chapter, we traced the evolution of the educational and non-military programs in the IDF and described their present structure. In this chapter, we shall examine the functional aspects of this structure, dealing with the educational programs of the IDF, their operational methods and the personnel responsible for their implementation. In other words, we shall attempt to answer the questions: what, how and by whom.

Professional Aid: Methods and Personnel

Like most armies, the IDF relies on the guidance and advice of civilian expertise, such as that of psychologists and social workers, for the preparation of aptitude tests and the scientific data necessary to determine the ability of potential recruits before conscription. The six IDF recruiting centers were

established with the cooperation of civilian psychologists. However, for budgetary reasons, Army officers were thereafter trained to administer the tests established by the professionals,¹ although a military psychologist, serving in the Reserves, acts as their supervisor.

In the U.S. Army, which does not like Israel have universal conscription, aptitude tests serve as a method of selection among potential recruits. In Nigeria, criteria are different, since recruitment is carefully designed to maintain a balanced representation of the three major ethnic groups. In the case of officers, it is based on a quota system rather than on open competition according to educational qualifications.² Those who join the Army or graduate from military academies are generally "sons of minor officials, small farmers and petty traders,"³ who come from rural areas to find employment. In China too, local authorities must fill a fixed quota prescribed by the State. Their system of preliminary scrutiny is designed to give them "their pick of the nation's youth" in a search for those whose ideological

commitment is most promising.⁴

In Israel, with very few exceptions, every male citizen who reaches the age of eighteen is recruited and must be found a "job" in the Army. Recruits are, therefore, tested in three areas--general education, general intelligence and Hebrew--and interviewed by the recruiting officer who asks their "life history."⁵ Recruits are also examined for motivation, initiative, independence and pride. Colonel Gan El, Head of one of the Recruiting Centers, admits that this latter test is not altogether scientific, but that he has discovered that the test findings correlate well with economic and social factors.⁶ The scale used for testing is between 41 and 56, and Orientals usually score about 46/47.

After six months' basic training, further tests are administered, and those who score a grade above 47 are promoted to Corporal and may advance in the ranks. At one point it was suggested that the basic training period be shortened for those who net higher scores on their induction tests. The IDF rejected this proposal, arguing that basic training is the only opportunity for educated, secondary school graduates to meet Oriental

youth as equals in the ranks,⁷ since 70-80% of those who receive low grades (43-46) were found to be Orientals. If the classification of recruits were to be based only on the score of the first tests, clearly an immediate separation of educated and uneducated would result. The GHQ, therefore, decided in favour of keeping the basic training period at six months, at the risk of wasting the time of those who score high.

It has also been IDF policy to avoid establishing separate units for recruits with low socio-economic backgrounds, and that units should consist of soldiers of all origins. This policy has only been adopted by the U.S. Army recently. In fact, the Vietnam war has been the first war fought by an integrated American Army. Until the Korean war, Negroes fought in separate units regardless of their education or ability.⁸ The efficiency of Negroes fighting in separate units during the Second World War proved to be much hampered by their segregation. In China too, at first units were mobilized according to their provincial or regional origin and kept together during military service.⁹

In Nigeria, on the other hand, the introduction of a quota system for the three regions, North, South and Middle Belt, suggests that the Army has avoided the establishment of separate units for different ethnic groups and an over-representation of one region at the expense of another.¹⁰

In Israel, recruits who score below the minimum average of 43 and have low I.Q. test results have usually completed less than four years of schooling.¹¹ It is estimated that 80-90% of this group are Orientals, many of them slum youth or Oriental immigrants who arrived in Israel three to five years before military service.

A similar but more difficult group, approximately 350 a year, comes under the Army classification of "special recruitment." These recruits generally refuse to serve in the Armed Forces. They come from complicated socio-economic backgrounds, families with numerous brothers and sisters and disinterested parents, and lack motivation as well as means of support.¹² Members of this group are recruited twice a year and undergo the following training.¹³ They are sent for four months of basic training in Nahal as a special company which

is assigned the best commander available and a full-time psychologist, who assists him. Group members receive regular basic training with very little study of Hebrew or of the land. At the end of this period, they are sent to the Central Military School at Camp Marcus for three months of study. Upon completion of this program of study, they return to a Nahal base for a further two weeks to complete training before they are sent to a Kibbutz or border settlement, where they are trained in agriculture for one year. Here group members are expected to take courses in agriculture and to continue their study of Hebrew. At the end of one year on Kibbutz, they are given advanced military training for five months and are then expected to return to their agricultural settlements. Those who do so are no longer considered soldiers in uniform although they continue to be responsible to the Regional Command. However, if it fails to persuade this group to return to agricultural settlements, the IDF cannot be considered very successful in this program. It also appears that, for budgetary reasons among others, not all the youth who qualify for this program have been allowed to serve.¹⁴ Nevertheless,

this program is unique to Israel. Neither the American, nor the Chinese, nor the Iranian armies, have as yet instituted such a program for delinquent or petty criminal youth. On the contrary. In most of these armies, marginal groups are not allowed to serve.

For recruits who have not completed elementary education in civilian life, the IDF attaches great importance to the Basic Studies program at the Central Military School at Camp Marcus. In order to maximize the success and benefits of this program,¹⁵ the IDF takes two facts into consideration: first that elementary education is primarily designed for children, whereas the recruits involved in the program are of adult age; secondly, that they are handicapped by their lack of study habits and, in the case of Orientals, perhaps even by an incapacity for abstract thought. These factors necessitate the use of methods different from those employed in civilian elementary schools. The IDF's three-month elementary course is designed to impart the minimum number of necessary facts while emphasizing the totality and comprehension

of the educational process involved. The IDF's method of teaching history will serve as an illustration.¹⁶ The curriculum emphasizes the social, cultural, and economic aspects of history, and deals only superficially with names, battles and dates. For instance, Greece is taught in terms of the difference between Sparta and Athens, with concentration on democracy and its relevance to the present.¹⁷ In teaching the Middle Ages, the course dwells only on Christianity, Islam and Feudalism. In the words of the Head of Camp Marcus, "we teach the historical process in its entirety, but we dwell only on decisive and weighty facts, the influence of which bears an everlasting importance to the progress of humanity."¹⁸

Teaching in class takes the form of discussion rather than lectures alone. Teachers are told to raise provocative questions which will draw the soldiers' attention and interest and lead them to participate actively in discussion. The IDF believes that this method enables soldiers to develop "general understanding, insight, as well as comprehension of the historical processes now at work."¹⁹

In addition to these more conventional teaching methods, the IDF has been experimenting with audio-visual machines and with the utilization of films. These have, according to the IDF proved helpful in overcoming the students' difficulties with abstract thought.

Whereas civilian elementary education in Israel consists of eight years of schooling, recruits can obtain an elementary school Certificate in the IDF after only a three month course. This is possible first because recruits who have not finished elementary education before entering the Army have usually had four to seven years of elementary schooling, and second because the class schedule is demanding. There are nine hours of classes a day.²⁰ Classes are divided into ten groups and classified in accordance with grades scored at the time of enrollment. Each class has two permanent teachers, one for the humanities, and one for the sciences. Most of the teachers at Camp Marcus are girl soldiers studying at the IDF Teachers' Colleges.²¹ Since they are not experienced teachers, they are under

constant surveillance and guidance.

The role of the IDF in the sphere of teacher training is of some importance both to its organization and to the civilian population. After the establishment of the State and the mass immigration of Oriental Jews, the education system suffered from an acute shortage of qualified teachers. It fell to the lot of the IDF to alleviate the situation and to train girl-soldiers in its Teachers' Colleges. The IDF opened two Teachers' Colleges, which differ from others in the country by offering evening classes instead of day classes. In their administrative and organizational aspects, these colleges are under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Moreover, approximately 550 girls a year are also granted deferment of military service to enable them to attend civilian Teachers' Colleges. Upon successful completion of their courses, the IDF selects the graduates it requires.

Once graduate teachers have completed their basic military training, there are two possibilities

open to them: they may be sent to teach in immigrant settlements where civilian teachers are unavailable "for the rest of their compulsory service."²²

Here they are professionally responsible to the Ministry of Education and Culture, and administratively responsible to "one of the teachers' units at the different commands, under the authority of the Staff Officer in charge of women."³³ They may be given, alternatively, the opportunity to teach Hebrew language and elementary education at Camp Marcus. However, on occasion, when the shortage of teachers has been sufficiently acute, the IDF has been compelled to give secondary school graduates a month's crash course after basic training before sending them to teach in immigrant settlements.²⁴

The IDF also draws teachers from the civilian market. Depending on the IDF's needs and budget, civilian teachers are hired to teach specialized courses of Physics, Mathematics or Chemistry. It is, however, more convenient for the IDF to utilize the teaching services of the Reserves during their annual tour of duty.

Teachers nevertheless remain a problem in the IDF. Most of the teaching in the Army is done by girl soldiers who serve for twenty months, of which at least two are spent in basic training and preparatory courses. Every six months there is a change of personnel and about 30% of girl teachers leave to get married before they have fulfilled their tour of duty.²⁵ Moreover Teachers' Colleges have failed to provide their graduates with adequate training in adult education. This is due to the teacher shortage resulting from the expanding Israeli educational system and to the priority given to the education of children and youth under military age on the other hand.²⁶ Although courses in the psychology of adult education are offered to student teachers, the differences between teaching children and teaching adults are not clearly demonstrated.²⁷

These problems of teacher shortages and their consequences for the curriculum of the IDF do not arise, for example, in the U.S. Armed Forces, where there is no issue of either budget or manpower. Unlike the IDF, many U.S. military bases hire their

own civilian instructors and counsellors separately to "meet specific educational need." They may teach subjects as diverse as "reading, typing, foreign languages and various high school and college courses."²⁸ The U.S. Army has also developed an Examination Staff which consists of civilian experts working "under the direction of the USAFI Advisory Committee."²⁹ The U.S. Armed Forces have a massive College Level Examination Program (CLEP) which determines the level of education of the individual and his placement in the proper grade.³⁰ Furthermore, the U.S. Military maintains Education Centers for any installation which has a 750 troop strength. In 1957, there were a hundred of these centers in the U.S., and two hundred abroad, "employing 275 civilian educational advisors and over 1600 civilian and military teachers."³¹ These centers consist of "administrative, clerical and counselling offices, classroom instruction, registration and testing activities, language reading and science laboratories, and shops for technical and vocational instruction."³² In addition, the U.S. Army maintains an institution

which offers a wide range of correspondence courses from elementary to post-graduate work.

In both China and Iran, on the other hand, teachers are in short supply and their training must, necessarily, be inadequate. This problem, which is common to new developing countries, is shared by Israel and the IDF which have been unable to produce the number of well-trained teachers required by the population.³³ The problem is more acute, however, in Iran and China which have a large, basically illiterate population.³⁴ In China, teachers are trained by the General Political Department. Three thousand teachers have recently been trained and these are assigned to night schools to teach the Officer Corps.³⁵ The Soldiers' Club also serves as a center where young conscripts are taught both battle experience and "revolutionary zeal."³⁶ In Iran, the military trains its own teachers for four months before sending them to villages as instructors. They are usually high school graduates who are drafted twice a year to serve in the Education Corps. Their training consists of a program of "pedagogy, hygiene, rural development, rural legislation,

utilization of leisure, use of audio-visual equipment, and vocational occupation."³⁷ They are then sent to a rural area to teach for fourteen months.

Like the U.S. Armed Forces, the IDF also runs a training program for nurses. Here, as in other instances in the IDF, the program was established in response to the needs of civilian society. In 1949, when an "acute shortage of qualified nurses" became a threat to the country, the IDF founded an Army Nursing School to alleviate some of the pressure.³⁸ The course of study, like that of any other nursing program, is three years. Those who enroll are given free tuition in return for an additional year's service at the rank of Lieutenant. In this way, the program serves a dual purpose, training nurses for the civilian sector who serve in Army hospitals during their period of training at a minimal salary. Since its foundation, the school has graduated about one thousand nurses.

In addition, the IDF maintains for its own benefit "a limited number of academic professionals... who are intended for professional jobs once they join the service."³⁹ At the age of eighteen, when

they enlist, they are given interim courses of recruit training. Upon successful completion of this course, they begin their studies as "soldiers on special leave." During their period of study, they remain largely under military discipline. During the summer months, they are assigned to regular military camps to pass squad and officer courses and to benefit from the "educational values" of the military setting.⁴⁰ In spite of these periods spent at Army camps, the IDF does not "always regard" the academic reserve as a "success." It claims that their "emotional identification" and values are not the same as an officer who rose in the ranks. Accordingly, "their comparative maturity proved a liability rather than an asset."⁴¹

The Branch of Schooling: The System of IDF Schools

The IDF runs three broad types of educational program for its servicemen:⁴²

- 1) The Central Military School at Camp Marcus in Haifa, housing the so-called Basic Studies or Elementary Education.

- 2) The array of secondary, teaching and language schools. These include five schools for the teaching of the Hebrew language, five centers for secondary education, two centers for foreign language tuition and two Teacher's Training Colleges.
- 3) The Military Education College in Jerusalem and the Institute for Educational Training located in Petaḥ-Tiqvah, both of which give short courses on specific current issues or on subjects intended to broaden the commanders' general outlook. The former caters to officers, the latter to NCOs.

Whereas the Branch of Schooling is responsible for the first and second type of educational program, the third is under the jurisdiction of the Branch of Information and Instruction.

These educational programs of the IDF are not unique to Israel. Israel's case is, however, special in that some kind of educational program was in existence in the Haganah before the State was established. After the declaration of independence and the subsequent mass influx of Orientals, the IDF

lost no time in institutionalizing the pre-existent programs of the Haganah and in adding new programs in accordance with the country's minimum needs.

Although most armies today, both those of developed and developing countries, provide some sort of educational service for their recruits, not all of them see themselves in the role of educators. A case in point is the American Army. Until the Second World War, education in the Armed Forces was mainly, if not completely, designed for the maintenance of the military as an agency of violence. It was only on April 1, 1942, that the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI) began to operate at Madison, Wisconsin, for the purpose of offering educational opportunities first to enlisted men in the Army, later to the Navy, then to camps and Coast Guards, and still later to Commissioned Officers.⁴³ USAFI now operates throughout the world with branches in Alaska, Hawaii, Germany, Japan and the Canal Zone.⁴⁴ It provides more than two hundred elementary, high school, college and post-doctoral courses, in addition to technical subjects.⁴⁵ To administer such a massive range of courses at the local level, the

Army utilizes 296 educational centers. In addition to the USAFI services, the U.S. Armed Forces have agreements with "almost fifty colleges and universities to provide some six thousand correspondence courses to servicemen" which are available to them at reduced prices.⁴⁶ If a serviceman is in need of an occupational specialty, he can apply to any of the 26 military schools which are operated by the Army.⁴⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that USAFI has been called the 'world's largest institution for civilian adult education.'⁴⁸

Nothing comparable to the U.S. Army's, or even to the IDF's array of education programs is available in the Chinese Army, the PLA.⁴⁹ Here education takes the form of political indoctrination and propaganda⁵⁰ in order "to secure the loyalty of the individual rank-and-file soldier, and in particular the younger element of the PLA."⁵¹ Education such as technical training for the management of weapons and logistics are given only to a core of professional cadre, and this too in addition to their "political education." With the exception of literacy, political work "is regarded as a totality

which embraced all aspects of the Army's everyday life, of its cultural, educational and sparetime activities."⁵² If we insist on looking for what the Communist Chinese call educational theory, we find that "it is no more than the extension and application of certain aspects of dialectical materialism, beginning with Marx, through Lenin and Stalin and ending with Mao."⁵³

The problem of establishing schools to cope with the educational deficiencies of recruits has not yet been solved by Nigeria. With the exception of a military secondary school which is primarily designed for officer recruits, the Nigerian Army has concentrated on the eradication of illiteracy among recruits.⁵⁴ It is interesting to note, however, that a literate soldier in Nigeria is considered one who can "read simple words in English."⁵⁵ The Army has recently provided education "equivalent to the third and fourth grade in secondary schools" for those who volunteer and are selected.⁵⁶ It is not clear at this stage whether this form of education has been firmly institutionalized. The

other educational opportunities are open to officers in Military Academies abroad.

Jordan is yet another case where, until 1950, no Training Centre had been established⁵⁷ and where, until 1951, no Military Academy had been opened.⁵⁸ Boys at the age of ten are now recruited by the Legion from Bedouin and "other tribal groups" to spend seven years in the Training Centre before induction into the Legion. The Training Centre consists of a School for Boys and a Training Wing which together provide some form of education and basic training.⁵⁹ Technical or vocational schools as such are not available in the Legion, but only "a small base workshop," which serves the needs of technical services in the Legion.⁶⁰ Nor are there any special education requirements such as a secondary school certificate or a college degree for admittance to the Military Academy,⁶¹ and applicants very rarely possess either. One should note, in conclusion, that when the Legion instituted its internal education system and literacy training, it was primarily intended to create a homogeneous organization where uniformity in education and outlook

would prevent "a clash of values" between segments of the population.⁶² Here too, although not to the same extent as in the Chinese Army, education in the Legion took the form of socialization in the service of king, country and the social order.

In Iran, the army is also zealously engaged in building an infrastructure of educational centres in order to train recruits who, like in Israel, are sent to rural areas to teach the illiterate or uneducated rural population.⁶³ There are about twenty of these centres which give intensive training for four months before sending their graduates to the rural areas. The educational system in the Iranian Army comprises primarily schools for illiterates and training in vocations and trades which can be used later in civilian life.⁶⁴ High school or Academic training is conspicuously absent since the majority of the Army, with the exception of the Officer Corps, consists of youth from deprived and low socio-economic background.⁶⁵ It is worth noting here that in its vocational and trade schools as well as in its literacy program, the Iranian Army comes closest to the IDF in its endeavours.

Camp Marcus

The beginnings of elementary education in the IDF were rather modest. Until the outbreak of the War of Independence, courses were offered to youth leaders in Bet Rutenberg. During the War, this building was converted into an army camp, and its name was changed to Camp Marcus after Colonel David Marcus, an American who had volunteered to fight on the side of the Israelis in 1948. Marcus was killed near Jerusalem by one of his sentries when he failed to respond to a warning shouted at him in Hebrew, which he did not understand. After this, Camp Marcus was made a centre where new immigrants and soldiers were taught Hebrew.

At first, soldiers were divided into groups according to their countries of origin for a course lasting ten days to two weeks. Hebrew was taught by translation from their native languages.⁶⁶ They were only given two hours of Hebrew a day and the minimal vocabulary they would require on the battle-front. The remaining six hours consisted of information and instruction imparted to them in their native languages in order to insure a minimum of misunderstanding.

Unlike Israel, the U.S. Armed Forces have been reluctant to induct non-English speaking minorities even in a major war like World War II. They did, however, establish a ten percent quota for English speaking illiterates.⁶⁷ In China, on the other hand, during the early stages of the Communist takeover, the PLA resolved the language problem by drafting complete units from one region to preserve their cultural and linguistic homogeneity. The Nigerians sought to solve the problem of illiteracy in the Army by teaching draftees English as a lingua franca in order to avoid problems with the ethnic groups in the country.⁶⁸

In Israel, following the War of Independence, the above curriculum was reversed to include only two hours of tuition in their native languages and six hours in Hebrew. Newcomers were then given the rudiments of nationalism, the sense of belonging to a people, to the soil and to the culture in which they now found themselves. This attempt to give them a common identity and the feeling of being Israelis was enhanced by cultural and social gatherings and by publishing pamphlets about the Jewish communities

of the various countries. These were primarily distributed to Army commanders and to the officers of the IDF. These pamphlets, which were later discontinued, served as an instrument of integration for both commanders of European origin and newcomers from the Middle East and North Africa.⁶⁹

In the two years between 1948 and 1950, 4,830 soldiers were taught Hebrew.⁷⁰ But the mass immigration from North Africa and some Eastern European countries between 1949 and 1952, brought in its wake many new problems including an increase in illiteracy. The IDF's first step towards resolving these problems was a course of education for officers, the aim of which was to familiarize them with the social, economic and cultural conditions of the new immigrant communities and the problems they posed for the IDF. Camp Marcus was then designated by the IDF as the center where soldiers should learn to read and write. This was followed by a campaign to eliminate illiteracy.⁷¹ In 1953, under a military order, the Chief Education Officer of the IDF began to prepare books for adult education. These were mainly on the history of the Jewish people and their place among other

nations, although instruction in other subjects was given throughout military service. One of the most important of these was the "Study of the Land," which translated loosely, combined geography with the history of the Jewish people in the land of Israel. A pamphlet was compiled for each region in Israel describing its history and the role it played in Jewish battles and heroism. Immigrant servicemen were taken on field trips to important historical sites with maps and notebooks, to discuss and identify the spots on which the new "defenders of Israel" now stood. In this way, the IDF tried to create a living relationship between the new immigrants and the old land, which had been known to them heretofore only in history books.

It is interesting to note that neither the U.S. (which is also a country of immigrants) nor the Chinese, nor most of the armies of new developing countries, try to establish this link between the soil and the serviceman. Perhaps China comes closest to Israel through her political indoctrination, but not by visiting sites in the land.

Until 1962, recruits in Israel were sent to Camp Marcus to learn Hebrew. Tens of thousands of soldiers received their language training there.⁷² But since 1962, the Hebrew Language training course has been transferred from Camp Marcus to the Command Schools, to make room for an equally, if not more important, course of elementary education. Area Commands now have Hebrew schools attached to them where thirty to fifty students attend three week courses throughout the year.

Hebrew is taught on three broad levels according to the recruits' ability: those who are generally illiterate, those who are illiterate in Hebrew alone, and those who are at different stages of proficiency in the language. The GHQ Order specifies the following number of hours for each level:⁷³

1. Illiterates	30 hours
2. Illiterates in Hebrew only	10 hours
3. Stage A (a grade of 2 out of 10)	60 hours
Stage B (a grade of 4 out of 10)	60 hours
Stage C (a grade of 6 out of 10)	<u>60 hours</u>
Total:	220 hours

Soldiers in the first two categories who are at a training base are exempt from military training until they acquire minimum proficiency in Hebrew. When they have done so, they are placed in Stage A and their names are reported to the Headquarters of the Branch of Schooling. These soldiers are given Stages B and C at the regional Command Schools where they are permitted to complete their Hebrew training at their own pace. Average enrollment in each class is forty soldiers.⁷⁴ Commanders of all units are required by the IDF to send individual soldiers to these courses and are instructed that if a soldier proves unable to absorb the prescribed curriculum in the time allotted, he should be given a second chance.

When Hebrew teaching was transferred to the Command Schools, Camp Marcus was transformed into a Central Military Day School to which soldiers who are elementary school drop-outs are sent. Initially, the aim of the IDF's elementary education was to elevate the functional level of the Army, but later the program evolved "to a stage where the object is the education of the trainees themselves, and ulti-

mately of Israeli society at large."⁷⁵ This new program of elementary education is outlined in GHQ Order No. 37,0102:⁷⁶

- 1) Any soldier who has not finished his elementary education must complete this course during his national service, pass his final examinations, and receive his graduation certificate.
- 2) A soldier who has finished elementary education abroad must attend a course to complete the Israeli portion of his education.
- 3) The elementary education course aims at raising the cultural level of the soldier, at deepening his attachment to national values, and at laying the foundations for future training and further education.
- 4) Soldiers whose Hebrew has been graded between 0 and 5 by the IDF must study Hebrew before enrolling in the elementary education course.

This course of elementary education was initially given at the beginning of the recruit's military service so that the Army could benefit from his skills. However, the conditioning and motivation

necessary for study were found to be much stronger among soldiers who were about to be discharged. The IDF, therefore, postponed the elementary education program to the last three months of the soldier's service.⁷⁷ Here the IDF differs from the U.S. Armed Forces where active duty is prolonged in accordance with the time taken off for study.⁷⁸ The U.S. Armed Forces claims that only in this way can it receive "a fair return on its investment."⁷⁹

Parallel to this program of elementary education designed primarily for conscripts, another elementary education program of two months duration is provided for the IDF's regular staff.⁸⁰ This is aimed at NCOs who were in the regular army before the elementary education program was made compulsory. Their numbers have, however, been decreasing annually.

The elementary education program takes a number of facts into consideration: that there is a time limit of three months for conscripts and two months for officers, that elementary school material intended for children must be upgraded to the needs of adults and that conscripts have no study habits and often

lack the ability to think abstractly. These conscripts are required to take placement tests in comprehension, arithmetic and other subjects upon their arrival at Camp Marcus and are placed in one of ten classes according to their scores.

The elementary education program consists of the following subjects:⁸¹ Bible, Study of the Land, History of Israel, Renaissance and Independence in the history of the Jews in Palestine until 1948, Arithmetic, Geography, World History, Civics.

This program, which consists of five hundred hours of classes and seventy five hours of extra-curricular activities--field trips, lectures and conversations with commanders, sport and so forth--is carried out in boarding school conditions in order that soldiers should have a minimum of interference with their studies.⁸² In the evenings, the student-soldier is supervised in doing his homework and is expected to read a newspaper with his teacher.

It is clear from this that elementary education in the IDF serves goals additional to those of civilian elementary education. The fact that sol-

diers who complete their elementary education abroad must complete the "Israeli portion" of their education at Camp Marcus indicates that this program in the IDF is not only designed to provide the means for further education or for training in a trade or vocation but also, and equally important, for the socialization and absorption of the new immigrant into Israeli society.

A comparable program was introduced into the U.S. Armed Forces in 1966 when "Project 100,000" was initiated "to salvage poverty-scarred youth"⁸³ who are deficient in education but who can nonetheless "be made into fully acceptable soldiers by providing them with effective training activities."⁸⁴ When this program proved insufficient, a support program was instituted called "the USAFI Core-GED". It is a self-teaching program, which helps the trainee "to attain either eighth grade or high school equivalency."⁸⁵ In both programs, however, socialization and absorption play a minor role. Instead the emphasis is on providing the trainee with a simple and conventional course of elementary or high school education.

This is not the case in China, where education in the PLA is "politically and ideologically oriented."⁸⁶

In Mao's words:

The People's Liberation Army should be a great school. In this great school, our Army men should learn politics, military affairs and culture....They can also do mass work and take part in the socialist education movement in the factories and villages....⁸⁷

In 1963, courses taught in the PLA were shortened because the Party felt "that more time for indoctrination and extra-academic activities was needed."⁸⁸ This would indicate that education in the PLA consists primarily of socialization into Chinese Communism, Maoism and the Party. Communism as an ideology and culture has not yet filtered down to all elements of the society, which, after all came into contact with Communism only twenty two years ago. The PLA is, therefore, utilized to train and socialize promising young men so that they in turn can socialize others in the society.

The Secondary Schools

Secondary School education in the IDF was originally

designed to "raise the standards of the regular staff who lacked the advantage of a full high school education."⁸⁹ It was a partial secondary school program offered on a voluntary basis and financed by the IDF which employed soldiers or civilians serving on reserve duty as teachers. This program was specifically designed for those who were unable to complete their elementary education because of the interruption in their studies occasioned by their service to the nation during World War II, the War of Independence and the reconstruction years.

Since then, military rules regarding qualifications and rank have changed. No recruit can now rise in the ranks and become an NCO without having completed elementary education.⁹⁰ Nor can an NCO become an officer without completing ten years of formal education, and no cadet may be accepted by the Officer's School without half-matriculation.

In 1954, the first Army evening classes for secondary education were opened in the urban centers and in the four large air force bases. Students were required "to attend classes twice a week after

work hours, being given time off before each of the examinations."⁹¹ In this way, they could obtain secondary education by sitting first for the half-matriculation and later for the full-matriculation examination.

The increase of secondary school education in the country and the establishment of stricter requirements for promotion in the ranks, led the IDF to open a Central Day secondary school for regular staff in 1965. Here preparation for half-matriculation and full-matriculation is condensed into three and a half months and a year respectively, at the end of which time students sit for the civilian matriculation examinations set by the Ministry of Education and Culture.⁹²

Classes run for twelve hours a day, with the exception of Friday afternoon and Saturday. Afternoons and evenings are reserved for formal classes and the mornings for private tutoring. Classes usually consist of small study groups of five or six NCOs. Those who are enrolled in the full-matriculation program are given "a year's leave though they

remain within the military setting." The program, including room and board at the dormitories of the school is financed by the IDF in return for a commitment by the students to serve for a number of additional years.

Of the students who attended the Central Day secondary school, "95% received their Bagrut (full matriculation) certificate, as opposed to only 35% of those who attended the alternative evening class program."⁹³ This seemingly high rate of success has been explained by the officers' motivation and the growing competition for promotion. With the transformation of the IDF into a more modern Army, the officers feel deficient in education without a Matriculation Certificate. At the same time, although promotion to the Officer Corps is given from within the ranks, new NCOs are equipped with more years of education than their counterparts of ten or fifteen years ago. Secondary school education for officers is increasingly becoming a requirement for a better position in the ranks, and not, as has been argued merely a prestige or status symbol.⁹⁴

In 1965, secondary school education up to half-matriculation was extended to conscripts. Unlike elementary education, however, this secondary school program is voluntary and only for students who agree to serve four extra months in the IDF. Classes were made available in the Central Military School at Camp Marcus, where thousands of soldiers attend elementary education courses, in order "to capitalize on the motivation and interest that have already been aroused in them to induce them to continue with the high school program."⁹⁵

There are four sessions each year which correspond to the four times a year when soldiers are discharged after compulsory military service. Before discharge, meetings are arranged at military bases to inform soldiers of their opportunity to attend secondary school. Among other things, they are told that half or full matriculation is necessary for students who want to broaden their general education or to compete in the labour market for jobs.⁹⁶

There are two possibilities open to them: they may enter either the academically oriented (pre-academic) or the vocationally oriented (pre-vocational)

secondary school.⁹⁷ The academically oriented secondary school leads to the half-matriculation examination, the certificate which represents ten years of schooling. Only very few students continue to sit for full-matriculation examinations. The program consists of forty four to forty seven hours of classes a week with twelve to fourteen students in each class.⁹⁷ During the course, students are required to take two or three internal examinations per subject. These include Composition, Bible, Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics, Physics, English, and Civics.

The IDF's figures show a steady rise in enrollment from year to year with a greater measure of success in achievement. From July 1965 to July 1966, there were three experimental sessions during which the program's shortcomings were corrected. By the third session, the classification of students achievement was as follows:⁹⁹

<u>Subject</u>	<u>% of group passing</u>
Bible	100%
Composition	80%
Mathematics	50%

The IDF's follow-up study on the students in this session found that a large number of students who had failed any subject took it again and passed, while those who received a passing grade on all subjects continued to register for the full-matriculation course. By the fourth session, July to November 1966, of the fourteen students registered in the course, the following showed a passing grade:¹⁰⁰

<u>Subject</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>
Composition	14
Bible	13
Biology	13
Civics	11
English	10
Chemistry	10
Arithmetic	8
Physics	8

However, the greatest number of students is enrolled in the pre-vocational secondary school. In the fourth session alone, out of forty students, only fourteen were enrolled in pre-academic secondary school.¹⁰¹ Similarly, during the sixth session, twenty three were registered in the pre-academic

secondary school course, while fifty one registered for the pre-vocational.

The aim of the pre-vocational course is to provide students with a general education and with training in technical subjects in order to prepare them for vocational and trade schools. Many of these now require more than eight years of schooling.¹⁰² Upon completion of the pre-vocational secondary school course, students sit for an examination given by the Department of Vocational Training in the Ministry of Education and Culture. Those who pass it are given a certificate showing that they are graduates of the equivalent of two years of pre-vocational school. A Counselling Committee then directs them, if they so desire, to vocational schools for advanced training where they will be accepted without difficulty and without being subject to further tests. Should they accept this option, new and more lucrative occupations such as technical and construction drawing, general and commercial electricity, air conditioning and reffridgeration would be open to them on completion of their studies

in these schools.¹⁰³ Otherwise, they can proceed directly to the labour market.

Three government agencies are involved in the support of this program:¹⁰⁴ the Ministry of Education and Culture provides an annual grant of IL.150,000;¹⁰⁵ the Placement Office in the Ministry of Defence administers these funds and provides financial aid to soldiers who are in need. Soldiers are given their military salary as usual during the course in addition to a family allowance if they received one throughout military service. The Placement Office also extends its services to the guidance and counsel of soldiers after completion of their courses. The IDF provides the residence halls and the teachers. During the course of study, soldiers are expected to wear military uniform and receive their food and lodgings at the school.¹⁰⁶ Only on Saturdays are the students given leave.

It is worth noting here that the cost of the same course in civilian society is approximately IL.800 and takes considerably longer than in the IDF.

Secondary School by Correspondence.

In 1965, a program was instituted by the IDF to provide secondary education by correspondence for regular staff members and men on compulsory military service who are remote from urban centers and educational facilities.¹⁰⁷ Subjects for half and full matriculation can be studied in succession depending on the pace of the student. It has been calculated on the basis of an average speed of five lessons a week, that a course in the humanities can be completed in four months, whereas English and Mathematics can take from ten to twelve months.¹⁰⁸

The Branch of Schooling finances secondary school by correspondence only for the members of the regular Army, while men on compulsory military service, through a special arrangement between the IDF and the Israeli Institute of Schools by Correspondence, receive a twenty percent discount.¹⁰⁹ Payment here is used by the IDF as a means of discouraging the individual from dropping the course, since he is under no supervision and under no other pressure to complete it. The IDF believes that

payment forces the student to do his homework, especially when it is automatically deducted from his pay. The cost of a course of study is between IL.80 and IL.100, which is considered financially impractical for the IDF if too many students choose to drop out midway. The regular staff is also under obligation. Although they do not pay for secondary school education, they must complete their course of study in order to receive promotion. In spite of these restrictions, there were a thousand students enrolled in correspondence courses in 1968.

In the U.S. Armed Forces, secondary school training is given either through a local Army Center or through the USAFI by correspondence. Unlike Israel, high school education in the U.S. is free and in this respect it is as accessible in the Armed Forces as in the society at large. Enlisted personnel are, however, required to "have a minimum of active duty service remaining after completion of a course,"¹¹⁰ which varies according to the length of the particular course.

In Nigeria, the provision of first class secondary education is considered a "formidable task" and one which is beyond the army's capacity.¹¹¹ Indeed in a country which has a population of fifty five million with a largely illiterate adult population and "large numbers of young people" who lack "a modest modicum of education,"¹¹² it may not be feasible to undertake the task even for an army of 10,000 men. However, the Nigerian Army did found a secondary school with sixty places a year.¹¹³ Boys at the age of fourteen were drafted by selection and quota. If they were illiterate, they were given 'an intensive course of education' after basic training¹¹⁴ and might then proceed, again after selection, to Army secondary school training.¹¹⁵

Jordan follows a slightly modified pattern. Until 1956, the Legion preferred to provide its own brand of education instead of drafting secondary school graduates from the civilian population. To this end, the Legion established a Boys' School, where Bedouin boys aged ten to seventeen are trained before induction into the Legion.¹¹⁶ Like the IDF the Legion does not select its recruits on the basis

of their educational level.¹¹⁷

China is another case where, although the re-education of the entire population is at stake, education in the PLA is confined to elementary and technical training.¹¹⁸ Formal secondary education is almost entirely lacking. Since the establishment of the conscription system in 1953/54, the PLA has been in the unusual position of being able to "pick and choose" the best of those who register for the Army.¹¹⁹ Moreover, those completing their secondary education or University training, who are the "cream" of the nation's youth, are exempt from army service until they have completed their education. It would therefore seem that the PLA prefers these students to finish their formal secondary education in civilian secondary schools before enlisting so that the PLA can benefit from their general or professional education. The PLA's only educational responsibility towards them is their political education. Since the PLA is increasingly becoming the training ground for the political elite in China, this appears an efficient way of achieving this goal.

University Preparatory Program

The IDF is involved in two University Preparatory programs for conscripts and one for the regular staff:

The first program is designed to help candidates who are interested in pursuing academic studies in the Institutes of Higher Learning. These institutes offer this type of student a summer course of intensive preparation for the competitive entrance examinations. The IDF assists them in two ways: by paying half their tuition for the program if their secondary school work was done by correspondence and by having the courses taught in the Army by qualified teachers in the academic reserve.¹²⁰

The second program differs from the first in that it is designed primarily for Orientals with matriculation certificates who have not obtained the minimum grade required for the competitive University examinations. The University entrance examinations are based on the performance of first rate secondary schools, whereas many of the Orientals come from development and rural areas where the quality

of secondary schools is below the national average. These students also come from low socio-economic groups, often having parents who either lack education altogether or who have not completed elementary school.

In cooperation with the Institutes of Higher Learning, the IDF selects ninety such students annually for this special eight to nine month program which prepares them for the university entrance examinations and increases their chances of graduation. To be eligible, students must be first or second generation immigrants from the Middle East or North Africa and secondary school certificate holders, with a minimum grade average of 6-7.5 or graduates from four-year vocational schools. No student is admitted who has been a disciplinary problem.

Several agencies cooperate in the program: the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Sepharadi Philanthropists finance it. Instructors are provided by the Institutes of Higher Learning. The IDF provides complete board and lodging at military barracks, and assigns the students a comman-

ding officer who is a University graduate and who can act as tutor in case of need. Although students wear uniform, receive pay and are entitled to the same benefits as other soldiers, they have no military duties.

The Preparatory course for admittance to the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) emphasizes Mathematics and Physics.¹²¹ In addition to thirty hours of class work a week, students are expected to do extensive homework and to participate in many cultural extra-curricular activities. The preparatory course for admittance to the universities, given in Jerusalem, has two basic curriculae, one oriented towards science and medicine, the other towards the humanities and social sciences. In both, students are divided into small groups according to their respective needs.

Students who successfully complete the preparatory program and who are admitted to the Institutes of Higher Learning are eligible for the following financial aid:¹²²

- 1) Loans or stipends.
- 2) A scholarship from the Mitrani Fund administered

- by the Ministry of Education and Culture.
- 3) Community scholarships. For example, from the Iraqi community or the United Immigrants from Egypt.
 - 4) A scholarship from the Ministry of Education and Culture with the stipulation that candidates agree to teach for a number of years after their studies have been completed.
 - 5) A scholarship from the IDF in return for service in the regular Army.

The third University Preparatory Program is designed by the IDF to help regular officers who are eager to continue their studies at Institutes of Higher Learning. The IDF has recognized that it is in its own interest to satisfy the aspirations of these officers in order "a) to prevent officers from leaving the Army...to pursue their studies, b) to raise the standards of professional officers both in specific areas (engineering, chemistry, Oriental studies) and in the field of general education, c) to equip officers before their retirement with a civilian career."¹²³

The following groups are eligible for this program in the IDF:

- 1) Officers under the age of thirty who can be of service to the IDF. These are given full paid leave providing they agree to serve a certain number of years in the Army for every year spent at a University.
- 2) Senior Officers who intend to study a specific subject.
- 3) Senior Officers "from Lieutenant-General upwards (and in some cases also Colonels close to retirement)." The IDF undertakes payment for their studies providing these are "intended to set them up in a civilian career."¹²⁴

In addition, some soldiers and officers during their compulsory military service are exempt from regular duties for a few hours each week to enable them to attend University courses. The IDF pays part of their tuition.

Neither Nigeria nor Jordan has a University Program in the Armed Forces. Junior officers in Nigeria have completed secondary school and some have a University education.¹²⁵ In Jordan, the Legion not only refuses to provide University education within its educational framework, but also

does not grant "direct commissions" to University graduates with the exception of Medical School graduates. According to Professor P. J. Vatikiotis, this derives from a fear of sedition, since the authorities argue that the "educated" among the Arabs are also those who are most politically alienated and most available for recruitment by conspiratorial and seditious forces.

Although the military in China and Iran do not provide University education, they are eager to enlist University graduates for nation-building. In the PLA, University students are entitled to a commission in the Reserves, and given military training at their place of study.¹²⁷ In Iran, University graduates are used to supervise the secondary school graduates who are sent to villages to teach literacy and elementary education.¹²⁸ More important, however, is the recruitment of physicians and University graduates for the Health Corps' "mobile teams" which operate in rural and remote areas of Iran.¹²⁹

By far the largest and most extensive program of University education, surpassing all these armies, including the IDF, is to be found in the U.S. Armed

Forces. Opportunities for university education here are numerous and diverse. Universities and colleges are encouraged to offer courses to servicemen at military bases. Servicemen who cannot attend, are encouraged to go to universities in the proximity of their military installations. More than three hundred and fifty colleges and universities in this program cooperate with the Armed Forces.¹³⁰ A number of universities also conduct "classroom courses" for servicemen stationed overseas. This last program alone involves four to five hundred faculty members and an annual enrollment of over twenty thousand students.¹³¹ Servicemen who cannot for some reason attend these classes, can still enroll in USAFI for a university program by correspondence. The fees for these courses are nominal.

Vocational Training

Armies require skilled technicians to man and care for their vast arsenal of equipment and weapons and may, therefore be regarded as the largest vocational and technical schools in their countries.

As such, it is to be expected that many young men who serve in the military will be given some form of technical or vocational training during Army service.

This is certainly true of the U.S. Armed Forces where courses range from a week to a month or more, depending upon the occupational specialty. However, applicants are not admitted to the courses of their choice if they fail the second aptitude test required after they enter the service, or if the quota for the course of their choice is closed.¹³² The method of selection employed clearly favours the military by channelling manpower to suit its needs rather than the interests of the individual servicemen. The course work is intensive, and there are usually seven hours of classes a day. Upon completion of a course, "students are sent to installations for on-the-job training."¹³³ Given the size of the U.S. Armed Forces, the military runs one of the largest, if not the largest, network of technical schools in the country, and hundreds of thousands of servicemen have received training in skills ranging from carpentry to missile operation.¹³⁴

In a less modern and technologically under-developed country like China, vocational schools are rather scarce in the Army, although the PLA has been known to help the civilian sector in building industries, hospitals and housing.¹³⁵ The same may be said of Nigeria and Jordan,¹³⁶ where Army vocational training or "workshops" are only kept for the fulfilment of army needs. The case is different in Iran, where civilian vocational schools are rare, but where they abound in the army.¹³⁷

In the IDF, vocational training falls into three categories:¹³⁸

- 1) Short training courses given during army service to soldiers who have no knowlege of any trade.
- 2) "Adaptation" courses for the conversion of civilian vocational training for army use.
- 3) The Army's own pre-military, vocational schools.

Soldiers who belong to the first category and who have no knowlege of any trade are sent to a technical school for courses of two to four months' duration. Hundreds of courses are listed in a sizeable catalogue each with its own entrance requirements, aims, duration and description.¹³⁹

An examination is given at the end of every two-week section of a course and a student is permitted to continue to the next two-week section only if this examination is passed. Otherwise, he is required to repeat the section he failed. The IDF's goal here is to save time and money, but it also claims that this method is better suited to students who lack study habits and the power of concentration.

Such courses are designed to prepare soldiers for the Army's less complex technical tasks. However a modern army with complex equipment also requires more highly skilled personnel. To train such personnel would, according to the IDF's estimations, require a twelve to eighteen month training period before apprenticeship could even begin. By this time, the period of conscription would be almost at an end and the IDF would have received no return for its investment. To avoid this, the IDF selects conscripts who have already been trained in civilian vocational schools before enlistment or apprenticed in civilian society. Civilian vocational schools usually work closely with the IDF and their graduates need only short courses to adapt

their training to the IDF's needs. In a way, the IDF exercises control on the curriculae of these schools, however indirectly, since it could at any time declare the graduates of these civilian schools unfit and build its own vocational schools. This system of cooperation enables the IDF to save both time and money and provides the schools with a large market for their recruits.

The IDF's own pre-military vocational training designed to serve the Air Force, Navy, Ordnance and Engineering Corps, falls into the third category.¹⁴⁰ Male secondary school students at least sixteen years old are eligible for this course. Those who successfully pass the military's psycho-technical tests are admitted to the IDF's Residential Military Technical School where they study technical and vocational subjects.

The IDF also admits Orientals with less than nine years of schooling to this program, although these are first placed in special dormitories attached to civilian secondary schools to enable them to complete their nine years of secondary school education. Here the IDF cooperates with the Municipality of Haifa.

In return, the IDF expects the Oriental youth to serve an additional three years after compulsory military service. There are three hundred students in this program each year and priority is given to the people of Haifa.

Thus both the IDF and the soldiers benefit from the Army's vocational programs. The IDF uses the vocational services of the soldiers during military service, and soldiers are equipped with a skill or vocation which can be converted for civilian purposes.

Opportunities for General Education: Languages

The IDF runs two centers for servicemen who are interested in taking courses in languages or other subjects.¹⁴¹ A similar, but more extensive program by correspondence exists in the U.S. Armed Forces where it is available to all servicemen and where two language schools have recently been opened to offer courses in twenty eight languages.¹⁴²

Courses in the IDF are four months long, meeting two evenings a week for ninety minute sessions.¹⁴³

Both conventional teaching methods and audio-visual equipment are utilized. The IDF pays full tuition for its regular staff and only part of the tuition for conscripts. Since this program was instituted two thousand soldiers have been enrolled.

Soldiers remote from these centers may apply for a teacher on any subject, providing the request is signed by eight members of the regular Army or fifteen of the conscript Army. There are dozens of these "clubs" scattered in IDF units all over the country.¹⁴⁴ Similar arrangements exist in the U.S. Armed Forces and in the PLA.

Special Courses for the Regular Staff

The IDF has a special budget for extra educational services for members of the regular Army who fall into one of the following categories:

- a) Officers in the IDF who are assigned posts abroad as Military Attaches.
- b) Officers who need tutoring in one subject in order to obtain the full matriculation certificate.
- c) Officers who are assigned a special mission where special training is required.

Teaching is usually performed by a tutor and is, therefore, costly.

The IDF also offers its regular Army the two-fold scheme recently adopted in connection with University courses: Officers who wish to attend University courses are permitted to do so on their own time at a 75% reduction of tuition, and a number of officers who intend to pursue or complete their studies at a university to do so full time while on the Army's payroll.

Whereas in the IDF only the regular army staff is eligible for this program, in the U.S. Armed Forces, all servicemen may register for correspondence courses in higher education, including Ph.D level courses, through USAFI. Servicemen abroad may attend courses at local universities by special arrangement with USAFI. The fee is \$5 for the first course, but no payment is necessary for subsequent courses.

Another educational service unique to the IDF is the training of scouts and guides. Although the IDF trains a number of soldiers as scouts each year¹⁴⁶ it also offers all soldiers Study of the Land courses which deal with the geography, topography and archeo-

logy of the land of Israel. Such courses are available also to the regular Army and to study circles in the units upon request. Those who are qualified serve as scouts and guides for the IDF and usually accompany military units on field trips, manoeuvres or military campaigns.

Recently, guides have become one of the best payed professions in the civilian sector.

Branch of Information and Instruction

The responsibilities of this branch in the IDF extend beyond training the Officer Corps in their conventional, narrow and specialized military profession. It is also responsible for their education and socialization into Israeli society. This socialization falls primarily into the following categories: ¹⁴⁷

- 1) The rights and obligations of Israeli citizens
- 2) Identification with World Jewry.
- 3) The implications of a modern, technological and industrialized society.

The content of this socialization is clearly of minimum importance to the officer as a military man, but it is pertinent to the officer as a citizen and later as a civilian. The IDF is constantly reminding its officers in this way that, as citizens, they are not a group distinct from society, but share the same beliefs, ideas and goals as the rest of the nation. Looking at it in another way, this education is essentially an attempt to strengthen the "internalization of elite norms"¹⁴⁸ in citizens who are serving temporarily in a military setting. In this way it can act as a safeguard against a rift in civil-military relations, since the officer does not consider himself separate from society but an intrinsic part of it. He merely joins the Army, serves and withdraws. The possibility of a military take-over in Israel has been discounted on the grounds that Israel is a democratic country. Another explanation may, however, be found in this kind of training.

It would be an oversimplification to explain military take-overs in new countries in terms of inadequate officer training programs. Nevertheless a closer examination of the Nigerian Coups in 1966

and 1967 show that this was in part the case. In Nigeria, clashes of primordial tribal sentiment are carried into army service, with the result that the Army has become identified with "accelerating disunity and disintegration."¹⁴⁹ This has in part been attributed to the education and training of the Officer Corps in Nigeria, which has been primarily professional and "under-politicized."¹⁵⁰ The education of the overwhelming majority of these officers consisted of the Ordinary Level General Certificate of Education or the West African School Certificate of Education. A few officers attend Sandhurst in England, where their training can hardly be said to reflect Nigerian realities. The rank and file too were found "under-politicized and therefore insensitive to the political implications of their activities."¹⁵¹ In other words, officers and soldiers in Nigeria have not been "subjected to a process of socialization which would have made them conscious of the nature of citizenship and its rights, the meaning of individual protection and the boundaries of authority."¹⁵² Neither formal education nor communal life in a military setting were found sufficient as a means of

achieving integration within the army or between the army and society.¹⁵³

In China, "Political Departments" exist at all levels of the PLA, from GHQ down to the level of the unit, enabling the CCP to control the PLA and to ensure that the rank and file preserve a relationship of obligation to the society at large. Whenever PLA officers have gone "astray" and have been charged by the CCP with "excessive professionalism," "Warlordism," or "economic extravagance," the Political Department has been called upon to correct these "bourgeois" tendencies.¹⁵³ The closest the PLA has come to direct political involvement was the Cultural Revolution, and even then the PLA emerged as "loyal to the Maoist leadership and basically united where national interests are concerned."¹⁵⁴

The Military Training Institute for Commanders

Any officer in the IDF is entitled to take courses in the Institute. The length of courses varies between three to six months according to the subject involved.¹⁵⁵ All courses are, however

given on two levels: the first for NCOs and the intermediate level for Junior Officers. Although the material is basically the same for both, the approach is different. NCOs receive a less theoretical, more pragmatic approach to subjects than Junior Officers.

The curriculum consists of five subjects:¹⁵⁶

- 1) Social and psychological theories of leadership.
- 2) Theory and practice in the military.
- 3) Types of leadership in times of tension and fear.
- 4) History of the heritage of command and leadership in the IDF.
- 5) "Know thine enemy" - the image and reality of the commander in Arab armies.

There is a total of forty six lecture hours for both regular and intensive groups. The IDF supplies the necessary reading material in the form of pamphlets which are, for the most part, translations of outstanding works in their field.* Theoretical subjects are taught by University graduates and specialists. The IDF attempts to convey to

*See Appendix A.

commanders the notion that leadership should be based on democratic concepts, on persuasion and influence rather than coercion. This, the IDF claims, is a legacy from Jewish defence before the establishment of the State. Accordingly, the IDF considers a good commander one who satisfies the following requirements:

- 1) He acts like a commander, i.e. commands.
- 2) He promotes and maintains good relations with his men.
- 3) He respects them.
- 4) He shows understanding and concern for them.
- 5) He befriends them.

Although the commanders are only twenty to twenty two years old, they are expected to understand adolescence and its problems and to know how to cope with them. Although the difficulty of this task is partially diminished by the military setting in which commanders perform where solidarity is strong and members of each platoon or unit are of the same age, there is a further complication--the social and cultural diversity of its members.

Nevertheless, in the last twenty three years, there has been no known case of tension between soldiers and their commanders sufficiently serious to create a breach in commander-soldier relations. In fact, the opposite has been the case, and soldiers take pride in their commanders.

This cannot be said of the Nigerian or U.S. Armed Forces. In Nigeria, ethnic and regional differences have been reflected in the army's "cleavages between ranks and generations in the officer corps," and between the officer corps and the general ranks.¹⁵⁷ During the coup of July 1966, Northern officers did not spare their Ibo colleagues, an incident which represented "the most traumatic instance of the collapse of military solidarity," which had occurred in Independent Africa up to that time.¹⁵⁸ In another instance, in September 1966, officers of the fourth and fifth division succeeded only with "considerable difficulty" in restraining their men from "joining" or "leading a mob on a rampage." These events in Nigeria suggest the conclusion that "the process of political socialization, in the vertical sense of military acceptance

of its own subordinate status, has proved to be exceedingly inadequate."¹⁵⁹

In the U.S. Armed Forces, the officer-soldier relationship has, until very recently, been impersonal and distant in nature, bordering on alienation. This situation has been complicated even further by the "dangerously increasing" racial tensions which characterise the Military Corps stationed not only in the U.S. but also in "Germany, England, Italy, Spain, Vietnam and Thailand."¹⁶⁰ These tensions have often erupted into violent conflict, resulting in murder on both sides. It has been recognized that situations of this kind would not arise if commanders were properly trained in matters of leadership and human relationships. The latest in the list of failures of command leadership is the alarming increase of drug addicts in the U.S. Armed Forces. This reflects on the one hand the commanders' lack of awareness of the activities of his unit, and on the other, the feeling of loneliness, frustration and distance experienced by the enlisted man vis-a-vis his superiors. It has been estimated that ten percent of servicemen in Vietnam are drug addicts.

This is not the case in the Chinese army, which surpasses the U.S., the Nigerian and to some extent the IDF in its training of commanders. In the pre-Communist era, commanders resorted to force, like whippings, to make soldiers perform their duties. Now the Political Department in the PLA is constantly reminding PLA commanders and officers that they must use only "political education" in dealing with their men.¹⁶¹ Since not only soldiers but also people throughout the country must learn from the PLA, commanders must be examples of "correctness and honesty" for soldiers and masses to emulate. In order to foster equality within the PLA regardless of rank, military insignia for officers have been discarded. To enhance an even closer relationship between officers and men, the PLA made senior officers participate in military training and drills, "sweep away snow, fetch firewood together with their subordinates and help the work in the kitchen."¹⁶² The PLA has also been made to participate in "production, in economy campaigns and the institution of reforms...to improve officer-men and army-people unity."¹⁶³ This does

not mean that officers have always lived up to these expectations. However, when they did not, they were purged or made to correct their behaviour.¹⁶⁴ The emphasis on "correct" leadership is considered so important in the PLA because the CCP regards the army as "the best training ground in the country," for the political leadership of the party.

The Military Education College

The purpose of the Military College is to develop in officers sensitivity to their men and aptitude in their work.¹⁶⁵ They are taught the psycho-sociological aspects of military organization, their importance in times of war or peace, and their relevance to the IDF. Officers are also taught to abandon simplistic, stereotyped notions about men and to be aware of the complexity of human behaviour and interaction. This training has particular relevance for officers in the IDF who are expected to handle ethnic problems.

Courses in the College cover a wide range of subjects, from the contemporary problems which beset

the nation to specific problems of particular interest to the army. The curriculum which is changed annually is fixed a year in advance in accordance with suggestions from unit commanders and after in advance in accordance with suggestions from unit commanders and after approval by the Head of the College.¹⁶⁶

These three to four week courses are followed by an examination. Promotions are granted when the course of study, which usually consists of four subjects, has been successfully completed. The teaching is done by University professors or civil servants.

The Branch of Recreation and Entertainment.

The IDF, like the PLA, regards recreation and entertainment as a form of education. It is for this reason that this branch is part of the Office of the Chief Education Officer's organization, which receives the cooperation of the Soldiers' Welfare Committee.

The goal of the Branch is to create a cultural background in the IDF, to elevate the soldiers' cultural level, to satisfy his cultural needs and to transmit, through the medium of the arts, both national and cultural values.¹⁶⁷ The IDF believes that entertainment fosters unity of spirit. Men who live together and fight together also sing together and have an opportunity to interact under relaxed circumstances. The IDF also hopes to create in soldiers satisfaction and identity with military life. "military discipline and military work create emotional tensions in the soldiers which must be released by laughter, social gatherings in military units, evenings at the camp-fire, self-expression in the arts, theatrical performances and concerts which visit units from time to time."¹⁶⁸

In this field, the PLA comes closest to the IDF both in philosophy and in diversity of programs. The content of these programs in the PLA, however, is heavily laden with political education and ideology. For the PLA, entertainment is an expression of "spiritual life."

All military men should learn to sing the eleven songs prescribed by the General Political Department...We should organize entertainment programs in the company and encourage soldiers together to give performances. All army units must be...full of energy, and the spirit of revolutionary optimism.¹⁶⁹

Other armies, like the Jordanian Legion or the Nigerian Army, are lacking in this area.

The Ministry of Education and Culture

Like the U.S. Armed Forces, the IDF maintains close ties and close cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Culture. This ministry is involved in numerous activities including supervision of IDF secondary schools, administration of State examinations to IDF personnel and the exchange of teachers and nurses. This type of relationship between the IDF and the civilian agency attests to the fact that IDF education is part of the civilian education system and is, therefore, intended to prepare and train soldiers for their return to civilian life.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Interview with Col. Mordekhai 'Eiran, Psychologist, Head of the Research Center for Psychological Testing, June 30, 1968.

² Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 162.

³ Ibid., p. 82.

⁴ John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University Press) p. 151.

⁵ Interview with Col. 'Eiran.

⁶ Interview with Col. Hayim Gan-El, June 7, 1968. See also Yehuda Amir, "The Effectiveness of the Kibbutz-Born Soldier in the Israeli Defence Forces," Human Relations (October 1970) XXII, 4, pp. 333-344. These tests are given to all recruits and this preliminary study shows that the Kibbutz-born recruits score the highest grades.

⁷ Interview with Col. Gan-El.

⁸ Charles C. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in today's military (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970) p. 31. See also L. Howard Bennett, Command Leadership: Avoiding Racial Conflict and Maintaining Harmony, Unity and Strength in the Armed Forces (U.S. Department of Defence, Jan. 8, 1970) p. 1. And David G. Mandelbaum, Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952) p. 102.

⁹ Gittings, op. cit., chapter 4.

¹⁰ Claude E. Welch Jr., Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of military Intervention and Political Change (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) p. 41.

¹¹ Interview with Col. Gan-El, June 9, 1968.

¹²M. Bar-On, Education Processes in the Israel Defence Forces, pp. 40-44. See also Hugh Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces (New York: Praeger, 1967) pp. 119-124.

¹³Moshe Lissak, The Israel Defence Forces as an Agent of Socialization and Education: A Research in Role-Expansion in a Democratic Society (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, September 1970) Unpublished paper submitted to the Social Science Conference on the Perceived Role of the Military in France, p: 31.

¹⁴For an example of this, see Reuven Abergil, "Israeli Panther," New York Times, May 24, 1971.

¹⁵Interview with Lt. Col. Yitzhaq Ziv, Director of Camp Marcus, IDF Central Military Day School, March 21, 1968. Also see Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict: The Non-Military Use of the Military (Harrisberg, Penn: Stackpole Books, 1967) pp. 128-131.

¹⁶A. Oppenheimer, Elementary Education in the IDF (Heb.) (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1968) pp. 48-50. Lt. Col. Ziv, Unpublished Lecture, p. 1.

¹⁷Curriculae Guidelines, "General History" course, IDF.

¹⁸Ziv, Unpublished Lecture, p. 6.

¹⁹Ibid. Also Oppenheimer, op. cit., pp. 25-31

²⁰Ibid., p. 11.

²¹Lissak, op. cit., p. 26.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Miriam Mechner, "Bridging the Gap: The Chief Education Officer's Contribution," (IDF, Undated) p. 9.

²⁶Ibid., p. 7.

²⁷Ibid., p. 8.

²⁸Nathan Brodsky, "The Armed Forces," in Smith, Aker and Kidd (ed.) Handbook of Adult Education (New York: MacMillan, 1970) p. 287.

²⁹Cornelius Turner (ed.), A Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1969) p. 387. "This Committee primarily composed of civilian educators was established with the cooperation and support of the American Council on Education, the National Association Secondary School Principals and the Regional Accreditation Association."

³⁰Ibid., p. 391.

³¹Harold F. Clark and Harold S. Sloan, Classrooms in the Military: An Account of Education in the Armed Forces of the United States (New York: Bureau of Publications Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964) p. 65.

³²Irving G. Katenbrink Jr., "Military Service and Occupational Mobility," in Roger W. Little (ed.), Selective Service and American Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) pp. 169-170.

³³Chaim Adler, "The Israeli School as a Selective Institution," in Eisenstadt, Bar-Yosef and Adler (eds.), Integration and Development in Israel (New York: Praeger, 1970) pp. 287-299.

³⁴For this issue in Iran, see Hamon, Le Role Extra-Militaire de l'Armee dans le Tiers Monde (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) p. 203. On Nigeria, see Hanning, op. cit., pp. 151-152.

³⁵Gittings, op. cit., p. 168.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 248-249.

³⁷Bernard Vernier, *Armee et politique au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: Payot, 1966) p. 44.

³⁸Lissak, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³⁹Bar-On, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

⁴²Mechner, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Glick, *op. cit.*, p. 131; Amos Perlmutter, *Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion* (New York: Praeger, 1969) p. 72.

⁴³Katenbrink, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵Smith, Aker and Kidd, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 287-288; and Katenbrink, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁴⁷Moskos, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁴⁹Gittings, *op. cit.*, chapters 4, 7, 8, 9, 10; J. Chester Cheng (ed.), *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (The Bulletins)* (Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966) pp. 71-87, 501-507, 575-579.

⁵⁰C. T. Hu, "Communist Education: Theory and Practice," in Roderick MacFarquhar, *China under Mao: Politics takes Command* (Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966) p. 248.

⁵¹Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁵²*Ibid.*, pp. 105, 249-256.

⁵³Hu, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

⁵⁴William F. Gutteridge, "Education of Military Leadership in Emergent States," in James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968) p. 459.

⁵⁵Hanning, op. cit., p. 151.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921=1957 (London: Frank Cass, 1967) p. 83.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 24.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 83.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 89.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 24.

⁶²Ibid., p. 27; Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957) p. 263.

⁶³Vernier, op. cit., p. 44.

⁶⁴Hamon, op. cit., p. 203.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 204.

⁶⁶Interview with Col. A. Ze'ev, Former Chief Education Officer (1948-1963) and Director of the Soldiers' Welfare Committee, May 30, 1968. Col. Ze'ev was the first Education Officer of the IDF, and was responsible for this arrangement and also for the progress of the IDF's educational structure largely as it exists today.

⁶⁷Ginzberg and Bray, op. cit., pp. 66,68.

⁶⁸Hanning, op. cit., p. 151.

⁶⁹The IDF Education Officer at the time emphasized in one of his pamphlets: "There is no such thing as early or late in the history of the Jewish

people." The concept that "only the capital of the Jewish people has moved from place to place" showed their unity throughout the world, and that all should be considered equal in their contributions to the building of the new state. It is important to note that this notion has been reflected in the integration of the IDF but has not necessarily been shared by the society at large.

⁷⁰Ba-Mahane, July 20, 1950, pp. 7-8.

⁷¹Mechner, op. cit., p. 11.

⁷²Lissak, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷³GHQ/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, Permanent Instructions for the Teaching of Basic Studies (Heb.) pp. 2-6.

⁷⁴Interview with Captain Rozen, Head of the Hebrew Division, February 9, 1968.

⁷⁵Lissak, op. cit., p. 13.

⁷⁶Mechner, op. cit., p. 4.

⁷⁷Lissak, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷⁸U.S. Formal School Catalogue, Section 1, p. 7.

⁷⁹Katenbrink, op. cit., p. 167.

⁸⁰Lissak, op. cit., p. 16.

⁸¹Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 23.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Moskos, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

⁸⁴Brodsky, op. cit., p. 288.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 289.

⁸⁶Cheng, op. cit., pp. 72-87.

⁸⁷as quoted in The Editor, "Who's who in Peking? Leadership and Organization in the Chinese Party, Government and Army," Current Scene (August 8, 1966) IV, 15, p. 7.

⁸⁸Maurice Kelly, "The Making of a Proletarian Intellectual: Higher Education and 'cultural Revolution' in China," Current Scene (October 21, 1966) IV, 19, p. 7.

⁸⁹Lissak, op. cit., p. 17.

⁹⁰Interview with Captain Rozen, February 15, 1968.

⁹¹Lissak, op. cit., p. 17.

⁹²Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, The Opportunities for Education in the IDF (Heb.) p. 2.

⁹³Lissak, op. cit., p. 18.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 19.

⁹⁶GHQ/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, Post-primary Education for ex-servicemen of the IDF (Heb.) p. 2. The pamphlet contains this passage: "We know that many people of your age in your situation are afraid to return to the school desk. Sometimes this fear emanates from the fact that studies appeared very difficult to you when you were young or that you did not manage very well in your classes. From our experience with thousands of soldiers like you, we can tell you that this fear of yours is unfounded. The system used for study in your schools and the teaching methods will make you progress and will train you to achieve what the school has set for you."

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 5-6

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²The Defence Ministry/The Placement Office/
GHQ/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling,
Post-elementary Education for the Discharged from
the IDF Counsel to the Graduates of Elementary
Education, p. 1. (Heb.)

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁰⁵Lissak, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁰⁶The Defence Ministry/The Placement Office/
GHQ/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling,
op. cit., p. 3; Hanning, op. cit., p. 128.

¹⁰⁷Lissak, op. cit., p. 19; Chief Education
Officer/Branch of Schooling, The Opportunities for
Education in the IDF (Heb.) p. 3.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰U.S. Army Formal School Catalogue. The
requirements are as follows:

Length of the course (in weeks)	Service time remaining (in months)
9 or less	9
10-11	10
12	11
13	12
14-15	13
16	14
17	15
18-19	16
20	17

21	18
22-23	19
24	20
25	21
26-27	22
28	23
29 or more	24

111 William F. Gutteridge, "Education of Military Leadership in Emergent States," in James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968) pp. 459-60.

112 L. J. Lewis, Society, Schools and Progress in Nigeria (London: Pergamon Press, 1965) p. 5.

113 Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 459.

114 Hanning, op. cit., p. 151.

115 Ibid.

116 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 27, 83.

117 Ibid., p. 27.

118 Gittings, op. cit., p. 151.

119 For details on this educational program, see footnote 5 in Gittings, op. cit., pp. 179-180. As Immanuel C. Y. Hsu points out in his article: "The Reorganization of Higher Education in Communist China, 1949-1961," in Roderick MacFarquhar, op. cit., p. 299: "Knowledge, in order to be pursued in China, must be relevant to national construction and consistent with Communist ideology." See also Ellis Joffe, "The Conflict Between Old and New in the Chinese Army," in MacFarquhar, op. cit., chapter 3 and Rene Goldman, "The Rectification Campaign at Peking University, May-June 1957," pp. 255-269.

120 Lissak, op. cit., p. 20.

121 The curriculum is as follows:

Mathematics: 4 hours lectures, 4 hours homework.
 Physics : 4 hours lectures, 4 hours homework.
 (4 extra-tutorial hours in these subjects are available.)

Chemistry : 3 hours lectures.
 Hebrew : 4 hours lectures.
 English : 4 hours lectures.
 History : 3 hours lectures.
 Geography : 2 hours lectures.

Arye Perlberg and Yael Rom, A Compensatory Program on the Higher Education Level--An Israeli Case Study (Paper presented to the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, 1968) p. 9.

122 M. Eilat, A Preparatory University Course for Ex-Servicemen (Heb.) (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, February 1968) pp. 9-11.

123 Lissak, op. cit., p. 22.

124 Ibid.

125 First, op. cit., p. 164; Panter-Brick, op. cit., p. 65.

126 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 26.

127 Gittings, op. cit., p. 150.

128 Hanning, op. cit., p. 114.

129 Ibid., p. 116.

130 Clark and Sloan, op. cit., p. 66.

131 Ibid., pp. 66-67.

132 Ibid., pp. 31-40.

133 Ibid., p. 30.

134 Ibid., pp. 32-33.

135 Cheng, op. cit., pp. 175-179. For an example ample description of the army's activities in this sphere can be found in Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese

Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: East African Research Center, Harvard University, 1965) p. 85.

136 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 89; Glubb, op. cit., p. 259.

137 Hamon, op. cit., p. 203.

138 Bar-On, op. cit., p. 54.

139 An example of this type of course:

Name of Course: Cook and Assistant Cook

Aim of Course : The training of cooks and assistant cooks by imparting to them knowledge of how to prepare and cook food in military kitchens.

Qualifications

- 1 :
- 2 : No Previous Training Required
- 3 :
- 4 :
- 5 : No Previous Training Required for NCOs
- 6 : Medical History: 52-97
- 7: Schooling: 1 (4 years elementary)
- 8 : Hebrew 3 (Grade 6)
- 9 : Length of time in service after course: eighteen months.
- 10 : Other qualifications: Medical approval for candidates contact with food-stuff according to Order No. 33.0217

Footnotes: 1) Candidates found inadequate for independent cooks should be put to work as assistant cooks.

2) Kosher cooks must be made assistants to Kosher cooks only.

Length of course: 16 weeks.

Corps : All

Eligibility : Soldiers, Regular Soldiers, NCOs

Military Catalogue of the IDF, p. 96.

140 Bar-On, op. cit., p. 55.

- 141 Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, op. cit., p. 4.
- 142 Clark and Sloan, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
- 143 Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, op. cit., p. 4.
- 144 GHQ Publication/Chief Education Officer, Education in the IDF (Heb.) p. 8.
- 145 Chief Education Officer/Branch of Schooling, Educational Opportunities in the IDF, (Heb.) p. 5.
- 146 GHQ Publication/Chief Education Officer, The Educational Apparatus of the IDF (Heb.) p. 5.
- 147 Lissak, op. cit., p. 23.
- 148 H. Bienen (ed.), The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968) p. 95.
- 149 First, op. cit., p. 434.
- 150 John D. Chick and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Nigerian Army and African Images of the Military," (Paper presented at the VIIth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, held at Varna, Bulgaria, 14-19 September, 1970) p. 11; Hanning, op. cit., p. 151.
- 151 Chick and Mazrui, op. cit., p. 11.
- 152 Ibid., p. 11.
- 153 Gittings, op. cit., chapters 7, 11; Allis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps
- 154 Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Intervention," Current Scene (December 7, 1970) VIII, 18, p. 25.

155 Interview with Major Yefet Ben-Amotz, Director of the Educational Training Institute for Commanders, March 18, 1968.

156 GHQ/Chief Education Officer/Branch of Information and Instruction, A Sample of Education Programs for NCOs and Junior Officers' Courses (Heb.)

157 Panter-Brick, Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War (London: The Athlone Press, 1970) p. 72.

158 Chick and Mazrui, op. cit., p. 10.

159 Ibid., p. 14.

160 Bennett, op. cit., p. 2.

161 Gittings, op. cit., pp. 108-109; Joffe, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

162 Gittings, op. cit., pp. 159-160; For further details see pp. 188-201 and Cheng, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

163 Gittings, op. cit., pp. 159-160.

164 Ellis Joffe, "The Conflict between Old and New in the Chinese Army."

165 The Military Educational College, Educational Training Course for Officers: Aims and Orientations (Heb.)

166 Interview with Major A. Shalev, Director of the Military Education College, Jerusalem, February, 12, 1968.

167 Interview with Col. Biber, March 27, 1968.

168 S. Ramati, op. cit., p. 29.

169 Cheng, op. cit., p. 38; Gittings, op. cit., p. 146.

P A R T III

THE IDF AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

CHAPTER FIVE

THE IDF'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE INDICES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION

In the last two chapters, we have described both the resources and activities which are used for the education and socialization of the Army. What remains to be done in this chapter is to correlate the educational and socializing activities of the IDF with the indices of the Israeli political formula in order to determine the attributes which the IDF intends to inculcate in the Oriental, the success with which the IDF contributes to each index, and the extent to which this contribution approximates the concept of National Integration.

It is important to recall here that our examination of this concept in a previous chapter showed that no society can be regarded as nationally integrating unless it fulfills two basic tasks: first, an absorptive function, a responsibility

which falls primarily on the elite to transform, educate and socialize the masses, not through an unconditional imposition of its political formula, but, and here is the second task, through a mutual and reciprocal "adaptation of beliefs" between the elite and the mass, which we have called receptivity disposition.

I. EDUCATION: MODERN, DIFFERENTIATED AND VOCATIONAL

a) Literacy: Hebrew Language

Not all armies provide literacy courses for servicemen. As late as 1941, the U.S. Armed Forces refused to induct anyone who "does not have the capacity of reading and writing English language as commonly prescribed for the fourth grade in grammar school,"¹ in the belief that such instruction falls within the realm of civilian society and was not its responsibility. But, by 1942, under public pressure,² the Army was forced to change its position on illiterates and to accept for induction into the Armed Services "each day illiterates up to a maximum of

ten percent of its quota."³ It was not, however, until 1943, a few months before Pearl Harbour, that the Secretary of War announced the establishment of special training units at various centers to teach individuals who for one reason or another "lacked the ability to understand or speak the English language."⁴ Although the adjustment of these illiterates to military life and to the program as a whole proved successful, the U.S. Military remained convinced that these and other poorly educated men were an unnecessary expense and that their induction should be resisted. During the Korean War, the rejection of a considerable number of such recruits brought an outcry for major adjustments in the U.S. Forces attitude towards them. With projects "Third of the Nation" under Kennedy and "Project 100,000" under Johnson, was well under way in establishing programs and facilities to cope with this problem.

In China, as early as the Long March, Mao insisted on imparting to his men the rudiments of the three R's. It has been reported that on the March,

the men had a paper attached to their backs from which those behind them would learn a number of Chinese characters each day. In 1949, however, 80% of the PLA, which consisted of young people of peasant origin, had little or no education.⁵

During the Korean War when the question of modernizing the PLA arose and became increasingly pressing, "campaigns against illiteracy were launched among PLA units throughout China"⁶ in order to raise the educational level of the rank and file of the Army. This was interpreted to mean the acquisition of elementary Mathematics and calligraphy and of about two thousand Chinese characters in the short period of fifteen days. By 1953, two years after the program was instituted, it was claimed that the rank and file of the PLA had attained primary school standards and were able to read texts and take notes. This method, coupled with a broad cultural program was reportedly so successful that it not only contributed to the elimination of illiteracy but "brought about a complete change of attitude towards education" in the rank and file of the PLA.⁷ This may be regarded as an exaggeration,

especially in light of reports of soldiers captured during the Korean War indicating that thirty percent were "almost illiterate"--able to read road signs, essential characters and numbers.⁸ But this does not change the fact that efforts were made to fight illiteracy in the PLA, and that when its method was found effective, it was energetically extended to the civilian population.

Due to its insignificant size in comparison to the total population, the Nigerian Army leaves no impact on the society at large by its education of recruits. Although it is selective in recruitment, a number of illiterates are accepted every year as part of the quota for the North, which is known for low educational standards.⁹ Between 1962 and 1964, for instance, of 340 recruits, 70 were reported to be "totally illiterate" and 270 "semi-illiterate."¹⁰ Such soldiers are subjected to an intensive course of study during their first six months of service to enable them to read and write and follow simple orders in English. In Iran, where 80% of the population is illiterate, the campaign against illiteracy is conducted not within the Army, but by the

Army for the benefit of the civilian population. Secondary school graduates are recruited twice a year, given a four month period of training, and sent to spend the remainder of their military service in one of fifty thousand villages teaching illiterates language and the rudiments of hygiene and farming.¹²

The Jordanian Army is perhaps closest to the IDF in the intensity of its attempts to combat illiteracy. If we can assume that nomadic and semi-nomadic tribesmen are illiterate, the Jordanian Army has accomplished an unparalleled task in the direction of integration. In a definitive study on the Jordanian Army, Professor P. J. Vatikiotis has shown how "from an occasional raider of other tribes or of settled agricultural communities for pillage and plunder, the tribesman has been transformed in the Legion into an expert professional in the organized and disciplined use of force for the purposes determined and ordered by a central government."¹³ Thus, "the Army has transformed nomadic and semi-nomadic tribesmen into disciplined soldiers and officers responsive to rational command and

capable of sustained organized life."¹⁴

In Israel, the illiteracy rate in 1948 was less than 7% among the Jewish population aged fourteen and over, a figure which compares favourably with Western countries.¹⁵ With the mass influx of Oriental Jews, however, it doubled in ten years, reaching as much as 15% in 1954 and 17% in 1959.¹⁶ This may be considered a tolerable increase since the Jewish population in Israel more than doubled over the same period. The figures above which refer to the whole Jewish population would have been much higher were it not for the agencies of state, like the schools and the Army, especially the latter which made Hebrew compulsory during the first six months of military service. A breakdown into ethnic groups of the figures for 1961 shows that among Oriental Jews, 31% of those aged fourteen and above were illiterate in comparison to 3% of their Ashkenazi counterparts.¹⁷ Mothers, girls and old people form a high percentage of the figure for Orientals.

During the mass influx of Orientals, when the IDF was called upon to share in the burden of teaching them, five thousand soldiers a year learned

Hebrew in the army.¹⁸ At that time, the IDF was satisfied that its recruits should be able to speak and read the most elementary Hebrew necessary for military training and the comprehension of military orders. After 1962, since an increasing number of Oriental recruits had been born in the country and exposed to an average of four years of schooling, the emphasis in teaching in the IDF shifted from speaking to writing.¹⁹ These standards have been upgraded and this is reflected in the change of curriculum. Lessons no longer cover basic grammar or simple short stories, but include simplified pieces of literature followed by class discussion and the submission by students of written works of composition and vocabulary.²⁰

The number of students enrolled in this course each year has not increased, although it has not fallen considerably either. In 1968, the number of soldiers who needed some Hebrew language training was estimated at four thousand, although a good proportion of them were in advanced classes.²¹

In this program of Hebrew, the IDF has been designated to function as a net for those who, for

one reason or another, have dropped out of school or proved deficient in Hebrew. Since Hebrew training is a GHQ Military Order, no recruit is able to leave the Army without such training. This has, of course, contributed effectively to the lowering of the illiteracy rate among youth who are male and over the age of twenty one.

However, the IDF's contribution to the elimination of illiteracy lacks the comprehensiveness which is essential for its success. We refer to a compulsory recruitment policy which is enforced for Ashkenazi girls, but not for Oriental girls. The IDF has claimed that it had to respect the traditional beliefs of Oriental parents who objected to the drafting of girls when they first arrived in Israel. Yet polygamy and child-marriage were outlawed in the early fifties, and the considerable increase of prostitution and delinquency among Oriental girls surely provide legitimate grounds for drafting them into the Army. But, like the U.S. Armed Forces with reference to illiterate servicemen, the IDF claims that to draft illiterate or uneducated girls would be to take people who are of little use to the

the Army and to inflate the already high defence budget. Nevertheless, by neglecting to draft Oriental girls, the IDF has been ineffective in eliminating illiteracy and therefore only partially successful in its absorptive function.

b) Elementary Education/Secondary Education

Compulsory elementary education and voluntary secondary education as they exist in the IDF are virtually absent in the armies of developing countries like Nigeria, Iran, China, and to some extent Jordan. The closest program of this kind is to be found in the U.S. Armed Forces.

What the elementary school certificate is for the IDF, the high school certificate is for the U.S. Armed Forces. The IDF prefers all its recruits to be equipped at least with elementary school education before military service, and the U.S. Army expects its draftees to have completed high school before enlisting.²² This difference in expectation is due in part to the level of affluence of their

respective countries. In Israel, elementary education is compulsory and "free," whereas in the U.S. compulsory and free education is extended to high school. In spite of this, the Armed Forces in both countries induct a number of recruits each year who have not completed elementary and high school education respectively.²³

In 1965, 82% of the enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces were high school graduates before entering the service.²⁴ However, due to a disparity in high school curriculae in the country at large, these "graduates" were found "functionally" illiterate in the aptitude tests taken during enlistment week. In the past, the U.S. Army has been reluctant to accept these recruits, but since 1963, with Kennedy's "Third of the Nation" program, aptitude test score requirements have been lowered to accept such deficient draftees and to provide them with high school equivalency certificates during army service. This program, however, still excluded those with low socio-economic status who had not completed elementary school, a large number of whom were Negroes. With the growth of this section of

society, which represented 22% of the total population, and a large number of whom were excluded from army service because of their educational deficiencies, the U.S. Army was called upon "to correct the structural failures--socio-educational and socio-economic" which confronted American society.²⁵ They were charged with the responsibility of preparing this youth "for the larger society and civilian market place."²⁶ These are essentially the aims incorporated in "Project 100,000" which was inaugurated by Secretary of Defence MacNamara in 1966.

Although in absolute terms, 100,000 a year may be regarded as a large number, in an army like that of the U.S. which has three to four million men, it must in actual fact be regarded as relative. In comparison, the IDF is engaged in a much more exacting task, since the disadvantaged sector of Israeli society constitutes more than 50% of the total population and since all males of this group are drafted at the age of eighteen. Nor are educational deficiencies a criterion for rejection.

The role of the IDF in providing elementary

education for the deprived masses cannot be underestimated. Of the 90% of all draftees in 1962 who had not completed elementary education, 85% were Oriental Jews and 7% Israelis of Oriental origin.²⁷ Orientals are, therefore, provided in the IDF with a minimum standard of education which the majority of their Ashkenazi counterparts has already obtained before joining the Army. For the IDF, the program of elementary education has no direct or immediate benefit, since it is offered at the conclusion of the recruit's period of service. Its aim is to raise the educational level of the citizen and future reservist. Each year about 1500 soldiers complete their elementary education course and receive the equivalent certificate.²⁸ It is estimated that between 1961 and 1966, thousands of soldiers of Oriental origin attended the elementary education course in the IDF and obtained the Elementary School Certificate upon discharge.²⁹

Clearly, this program in the IDF complements the civilian school system from which each year a number of youth, the majority of whom are Oriental, are allowed to drop out before they have completed

the basic eight years of schooling. What the IDF program attempts to do is to break the existing vicious cycle of correlation between the Oriental's low educational achievement and his socio-economic status in the society. This is done not only by providing the Oriental upon discharge with an Elementary Education Certificate which is essential for his entry into the labour market, but also through the content of the education he receives. The elementary education course in the IDF is designed to impart to the Oriental soldier the "pioneering spirit" of Israeli society, its culture, its history, and the functions of its political and economic institutions. As we shall see below, subtly but explicitly, the IDF curriculum of elementary education shows the Oriental the norms of behaviour acceptable to Israeli society. There is hardly any indication in the IDF's elementary school textbooks of anything to make the Oriental feel that the Yishuv or the predominant type in Israeli society has learned or wishes to learn from his culture and beliefs. The IDF's function in elementary education is, therefore, only absorptive.

As was stated earlier, the place occupied by elementary education in the IDF is comparable to that occupied by high school education in the U.S. Armed Forces. By the same token, one might argue that the importance of secondary school education in the IDF corresponds to that of college education in the U.S. Armed Forces. This is borne out by the fact that in 1965, 72.3% of all officers in the U.S. Military had college degrees and 82% of enlisted men had high school diplomas, whereas only 1.3% of these had college degrees.³⁰ This is primarily due to the draft deferment system of college students which contributed in the sixties to an increase in the number of high school graduates drafted and to a decrease of college graduates.³¹ In other words, a college degree has virtually become a requirement for officers in the U.S. Armed Forces.

In Israel, due to the large size of the deprived sector of the population, the society's comparatively lower educational requirements and its less accessible college education, IDF personnel do not compare favourably with personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces in terms of college and high school diplomas. But,

soon after the establishment of the State, NCOs in the IDF were given free half-matriculation courses and later courses for full-matriculation equivalency.

When elementary education alone recently proved insufficient to upgrade deprived or Oriental soldiers in the labour market, the IDF also extended the half-matriculation program to members of the conscript Army. Here conscripts theoretically have a choice between two programs. They can enroll in the pre-academic or in the pre-vocational half-matriculation program, if their interest lies primarily in improving their position in their place of employment. Students are "directed" to one of these programs according to their intellectual ability, aspirations and plans for the future, although in the past enrollment has proved considerably higher for the pre-vocational than for the pre-academic half-matriculation course.³²

There have been nine sessions since the inception of the program and in each, approximately two thirds of the students have been Oriental. For example, the enrollment for the fifth session, from

October 1966 to February 1967 comprised twelve Israeli born students, five of whom were of Oriental parentage, sixteen Ashkenazis (six Poles, three Rumanians, two Germans, one Greek, one British, one Austrian, and one Czechoslovakian) and forty four Oriental Jews (ten Moroccans, eight Persians, six Yemenites, five Iraqis, three Libyans, two Tunisians, one Turk, one Syrian and one Egyptian.)³³

The program has proved successful judging from the rate of drop outs, an average of 10% for both programs each session. Graduates of the pre-vocational program have usually returned to their previous employment with a higher position and at a higher salary, or applied to the Placement Office of the Ministry of Defence for a new job.

The program is, however, deficient in its goal for National Integration, because the numbers enrolled are insignificant. Unlike elementary education, these pre-academic and pre-vocational secondary school courses are voluntary and can be attended only by remaining in the Army an additional four months. This may create problems for some Orientals, whose discharge from the IDF at the end of three years of

may be a necessity, since they may have to help their families financially. Even if this problem is overcome and even if their desire to pursue their studies is strong, they may still not be accepted for the program. Enrollment is limited not only by the number of applicants and the score on the entrance examination, but also by the budget allocation, the number of qualified teachers and the facilities made available by a decline in elementary school education. Since priority is still given to elementary education, each session has only a limited number of places. A case in point is the sixth session, from May to November 1967, for which only 85 out of 180 applicants were accepted.³⁴

But secondary education can also be obtained in the IDF through evening classes or by correspondence. This program is designed to accommodate soldiers who are unable to participate in one of the above secondary school programs. Members of the regular Army receive this education free on condition they obtain a passing grade, but if they fail or drop out, the IDF expects payment for the balance of the course.³⁵ The same opportunities

are available to conscripts during military service, but they are expected to pay 80% of the tuition fee by instalment. Figures for the year 1969, show that there were only 300 soldiers from the regular Army in this program and 1,000 from the conscript Army.

50% of the students attending the equivalent of half-matriculation and 20% of those attending the equivalent of full-matriculation were Orientals.³⁶ A parallel situation exists in civilian evening secondary schools. Figures for the academic year 1965/66 show that 10.4 Oriental and 8.2 Ashkenazi per thousand enrolled in these schools. For Israeli youth, of Oriental parentage, the figures is 19.3, more than double the figure 7.2 of Israeli youth of European parentage.³⁷

The fact that the number of Orientals registered in these classes where enrollment is not restricted is so large, in spite of the cost to the Oriental, the long duration of the program and lack of close individual supervision, indicates both eagerness and persistence on the part of the Oriental in endeavouring to obtain secondary school education. The IDF will not disclose how many Orientals actually

complete half or full matriculation in IDF evening classes or by correspondence courses, but it is not unreasonable to assume that a great many more begin than are able to graduate--particularly in view of the fact that among officers, who are known to be highly motivated, only 35% of those who attended evening classes obtained full matriculation in comparison to 95% of those who attended the Central Day School.

Clearly, opportunities for pre-academic and pre-vocational education exist in the IDF, but they fall short of their absorptive function in National Integration. For a country like Israel, where education is an index for upward economic and social mobility, the IDF programs are no more available to Orientals than their counterparts in Israeli society. The intake of the program, about 200 Orientals a year, and the stringent requirements for enrollment, puts the Oriental face to face with difficulties in obtaining secondary education similar to those he faced as a civilian. The wide disparity in the attendance rate of secondary school education (especially academic secondary school) between

Oriental and Ashkenazi in civilian society is responsible for a gap which grows wider and wider as the educational ladder is climbed, and which stays with the Oriental throughout his life. Figures for 1965/66 show that of 1,000 youngsters in Israel, only 89.6 Orientals attended academic secondary school as compared to 273.4 Ashkenazi and only 153.9 Israelis of Oriental parentage as opposed to 384.9 Israelis of European parentage. This shows that three times as many Ashkenazi youth as Oriental youth attend secondary school.³⁸ The ratio is smaller--1:2.5--between native Israelis of Oriental and those of Western parentage. When these figures are broken down according to the number of years of study, the disparity between Oriental and Ashkenazi becomes even more accentuated, as can be seen from the figures for 1961.³⁹

MALE POPULATION 14 YEARS AND OVER

Grades	Jews born in		Israeli born, parents from	
	Europe America	Asia Africa	Europe America	Asia Africa
9-10	62,915	32,135	17,100	4,480
11-12	60,815	20,920	25,080	2,855
13+	51,435	9,940	10,935	990

Despite the above figures, slow progress has been made if one considers that between 1956/7 and 1965/6, academic secondary school attendance among Orientals has tripled, from 32.6 to 89.6 per thousand. This indicates once again that even greater progress can be achieved providing the government will undertake drastic measures to increase facilities, and to provide funds or free secondary education for Oriental youth. This can be done by abandoning the "egalitarian" system of secondary school education which operates in Israel today, and instituting instead, a policy of discrimination in favour of the Oriental, at least for a few years until the gap has been reduced to "acceptable" and viable proportions. Only in this way can the aims of an egalitarian policy be achieved, and a socially, politically and economically homogeneous society be created in Israel. If it is considered prohibitive or impractical at this stage of Israel's development to apply such a program across the board to all Oriental youth, the IDF could be entrusted with the task of giving them secondary education, in the same way as it has given them elementary education.

After all, the IDF represents the last opportunity for Orientals to bridge the educational gap which separates them from Ashkenazis. It would merely be a matter of enlarging present facilities and of obtaining the support of the Ministry of Education and Culture, for the IDF to implement such a program and to justify its claim of being a pioneering Army and the avant-guarde of its society. Such a program would not make the Orientals superior in educational achievement, but merely adequately equipped to compete on an equal basis with their Ashkenazi counterparts. One should not, however, lose sight of the fact that these demands can be made on the IDF only for a few years, and that one cannot expect it to continue permanently correcting the failures of government agencies like the school system, whose responsibility it is, properly speaking, to educate Israeli-born offspring of Oriental parentage.

Meanwhile, the IDF seems to be moving in the direction outlined above. In a brief first page article appearing in the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv, as recently as July 5, 1971, it was

reported that "youth will no longer be prevented from completing secondary school education for economic and social reasons. After discharge from the IDF, a youth can, by means of an appropriate fund, complete his education, and if he graduates with the proper grades (my underlining), ... the gates of the university will be open to him."

This fund which has been established by the American Friends of the Hebrew University, and which amounts to IL.35 million, "will serve to finance those discharged servicemen who graduated from secondary schools but who could not be accepted in the university for economic reasons." The program as outlined in the paper does not differentiate between Oriental and Ashkenazi youth, and it is too early to assess at this stage which will benefit most from it, especially in terms of university entrance. Perhaps this program will complement another already existing program in the IDF. It might, for instance, be linked to the University Preparatory Program established by the IDF in 1963 in co-operation with the Hebrew University, the Tekhnion (Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa), the Ministry of Education and

Culture, and several Sepharadi philanthropists, for Oriental and Sepharadi soldiers or Israeli-born soldiers of Oriental and Sepharadi parentage.⁴⁰

This course is offered to Oriental conscripts who hold matriculation certificates but come from rural development areas where secondary school standards are below the national average.⁴¹

Graduates from these schools have a lower academic level than the average, and consequently either have less chance of obtaining a passing grade in the competitive national examinations for university entrance or a high rate of failure and drop-out during the first year of university education.⁴²

The difficulties of these secondary school graduates show in the most candid way the failures of the civilian school system, and the way in which the IDF is called upon to correct them.

In the five years since the program was established, 396 candidates were accepted for the Preparatory Course, 346 of whom satisfactorily completed the course and 316 of whom were admitted to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the Technion in Haifa. The follow-up report indicates

that "50% of the first graduating class at the Hebrew University scored grade B or better in all subjects and have already started their graduate studies."⁴³

At the Tekhnion, 25% of these students were found in "the upper half of their classes although they were not superior students at their secondary schools."⁴⁴

This program, however, suffers from several shortcomings.⁴⁵ First, it was discovered that information about the course does not reach all potential candidates. This information is usually conveyed formally by letter, a method which provides no opportunity for soldiers to discuss their questions and personal problems. Secondly, since the soldiers for whom the program is intended come from low socioeconomic backgrounds, serious economic problems often arise. Potential candidates are often responsible for the support of their families and therefore either do not enroll or drop out in the middle of the course as a result of conflict between their duty to their parents and their obligations towards the program. This problem arises because the scholarships which have so far been available to those on this program, often demand commitments long after

the completion of their studies. Since university education is costly, they are reluctant to apply for more than one scholarship for fear of being committed to re-payments for too long, and therefore unable to support their parents when the need arises. Finally, only an average of 10% of all applicants enroll in this program. In spite of all the effort and funds expended on these candidates, those who successfully pass their entrance examination are given a free choice to accept or reject a place at the university. In view of the fact that the aims of the program are (1) to improve the chances of the student not only of getting a place at the university but also of graduating, (2) "to develop highly educated leadership and an intellectual elite of Oriental origin...and improve the life of many others,"⁴⁶ the free choice given to these graduates at such a late date is very surprising.

c) Value Appreciation of Education: Motivation and Aspiration.

It has been argued that an individual's past experiences, his activities, his life record of achievement, his past relationship with family and community, all "reflect to some extent elements of that individual's motivational system."⁴⁷ It has also been argued that "perceived achievement, recognition and responsibility" are features which are constantly present in his attitude to his work. In another reference on work motivation, it was found that an individual's behaviour is determined by the "interaction" between the goal in mind, (value orientation), and "the perceived probability of achieving" it. The real outcome of this behaviour will in turn serve as "feedback for the modifications" of the conditions of the previous interaction. It is also known that backward societies persist in their backwardness because they lack the motivation and aspiration to improve the status and the situation in which they find themselves.

These references have particular significance in a military setting where motivation plays a major

role in transforming the civilian into a responsible and efficient soldier.⁴⁸ This transformation is usually accomplished during basic training. In some armies, like the U.S. Armed Forces, where the intake of draftees from deprived backgrounds has been increased, a number of programs have been established to "keep up" servicemen's motivation throughout army service, not only for discharging military responsibilities but also as preparation for civilian society. "Project 100,000" was aimed at breaking the vicious circle of low motivation, low education and achievement and low employment opportunities, which have been the source of discrimination against the deprived and the Negro in American society.⁴⁹

When he enters the service and especially Project 100,000, the Negro or the deprived White finds himself in a highly structured, highly disciplined institution which enables him "to improve his work habits and instill pride, self-confidence and a desire to succeed."⁵⁰ In the Army the Negro finds

a uniform, an insignia, and a unit. He finds heterogeneous training classes and the awareness that he is a 'somebody' who could learn a job... . And if he was one of those whom civil society had hurt by its painful and

persistent prejudices against him, he knew that , in the main, he could advance within the military without worrying about his race or previous social, economic and educational level.⁵¹

A preliminary follow-up study of servicemen in this Project, shows only a 4% drop-out rate, which is considered much lower than the rate in civilian society. This would indicate that once they are in a program which recognizes their plight and seriously attempts to correct it, they "remain highly motivated and committed" to their work and education.⁵²

In China, it has always been the PLA's responsibility to create such motivation in order to mobilize and socialize recruits for service in the Army, but more important, for their subsequent role as citizens in a revolutionary Communist society.⁵³

The IDF is, like any other army, a bureaucratic organization with a hierarchical structure for upward and downward mobility. As such, it operates on the principle of achievement rather than ascription, as the Public Investigation Committee on the Riots of Wadi Salib in 1959 confirmed.⁵⁴ The IDF offers equal opportunity for mobility to all soldiers,

regardless of their social or economic background. The only criterion for mobility is, therefore, the individual's capability, based on his qualifications and previous achievement. For the Oriental, this situation is contrary to what he experienced in Israeli society at large, where social and economic deprivation frustrated his efforts to achieve his goals. His behaviour upon entering the Army is, therefore, "modified" by the gap between his value orientation and his perceived probability of achievement. In other words, his motivation at this time reflects his past experiences, activities, life record of achievement and past relationship with his family and country which have shaken whatever motivation or aspiration he may have had as an immigrant in a new country. He is told, however, by friends and others, that the situation in the IDF is different from that in the society at large. It is for this reason that Orientals who drop out of school mark time until they are drafted in the IDF. For such Orientals, the IDF becomes the only testing ground for their aspirations and capabilities, where they can prove to themselves whether they are failures or whether the society has failed them.

It becomes clear, therefore, why a youth in Israel, like a Jerusalem "Panther",⁵⁵ who is excluded from army service feels that he has been doubly condemned. The IDF ranks high among the prestigious organizations of the State, and the people who form part of it exhibit the symbols of belonging to the "in-group." Moreover, it is run according to "Ashkenazi standards" and therefore, any achievement, visible through promotions and ceremonies testifies to the Oriental's equality to his Ashkenazi counterpart and allows him to prove to himself where his "real" capabilities and deficiencies lie.

The Oriental's original impression that the IDF is a "fair" organization grows into a conviction during his three years in the Army. This is reflected in the motivation of Orientals, which is greater at the end of army service than at the beginning. One example will suffice to illustrate the point. In 1963 and 1964, the IDF conducted a number of experiments, the purpose of which was to assess the difference between giving new recruits their elementary education at the beginning of their service rather than at the end. This way, the IDF could have a fair return for its investment while

the soldier was in the service.⁵⁶ The findings showed that soldiers who were sent to school at the beginning of their military service presented serious disciplinary problems both inside and outside the classroom. In class, they lacked respect for their teacher and resented study. They had expected the Army to be a place where they would learn to fight not to study. Outside the classroom, they distinguished themselves for their delinquency. Some deserted, others dropped out of the service, and others still were jailed. In short, they displayed most of the characteristics of "failure in service." This contrasted sharply with soldiers who were given their elementary education at the end of their military service. These showed seriousness and diligence in learning, and interest in further education. According to the Office of the Chief Education Officer, these soldiers also displayed some symptoms of depression at the thought of leaving the service and made serious enquiries about the opportunities available to them to further their education.

It is evident from this experiment that a change in attitude takes place in the recruit

during the time he spends in the Army. In a cumulative series of encounters, beginning with his first promotion which enables him to show green recruits the ropes, both Ashkenazi and Oriental, to his discharge from the service after having usually taken part in a major battle, there is constant upward mobility which "provides aspiration, arouses hope which in turn arouses ambition and this again results in efforts and self-improvement."⁵⁷ Mobility, however, is not achieved only through physical prowess. Orientals who spend basic training in a mixed group of Ashkenazi and Orientals realize that some of their comrades are promoted, while they remain behind. They recognize that lack of promotion is due not to their ethnic or socio-economic background but to the limitations occasioned by their lack of education. This conviction makes them seek further education in secondary evening schools or by correspondence. By the time the opportunity presents itself, they become eager to take full advantage of it usually scoring among the higher grades in the national average of the Matriculation examinations.

This achievement and at time the rate at which

it is realized creates stronger motivation and higher expectations which are beyond the IDF's control once the recruit is discharged. In the words of a former Education Officer:

Our problem is not to raise their hopes too high in our efforts to provide and increase motivation for their studies.⁵⁸

However real these efforts may be, the result indicates a situation where Orientals begin to have higher expectations which cannot be fulfilled and where frustration consequently sets in. The major riots in Wadi Salib in 1959⁵⁹ and the "Panther" riots in Jerusalem in May 1971 are possible results.

The IDF can be considered to have fulfilled its absorptive function since the Oriental has been successfully brought out of his "fatalism" and given the motivation and aspiration to emulate the standards of his Ashkenazi counterpart. The IDF has succeeded in making the standards of the Ashkenazi palatable to the Oriental to the extent that he is eager to achieve them. This of course creates a dilemma for the IDF. If the motivation and aspiration of the Oriental to achieve the same standards as the Ashkenazi in the society persist, then he

may force the Ashkenazi community to pay heed to his demands and grievances by riots and demonstrations. Since the Oriental community is numerically larger than the Ashkenazi, the Ashkenazi elite may have to concede to the demands of the Orientals, as has already been done in the case of the Jerusalem Panthers in order to avoid disruption of the social order, and in the case of Israel, the collapse of the State.

II. ECONOMIC SPECIALIZATION

a) Specialization in a vocation, trade or occupation with proficiency

Armies require a large number of skilled technicians to operate equipment, from the most simple to the most sophisticated weapon systems. This need has given rise to a variagated set of vocational programs and schemes whose uniqueness or particularity depend as much on the different types of armies as on their goal in imparting this training to their conscripts. Thus army vocational programs fall into one of the following categories:⁶⁰

- 1) Vocations which are applicable to the civilian economy.
- 2) Vocations which are convertible to the civilian economy.
- 3) Vocations which are neither applicable nor convertible for civilian purposes but specifically designed for the Army.

Until recently, vocational programs in the U.S. Armed Forces fell into the second and third categories.⁶¹ The training of youth in military skills has in the past contributed "more generally to their total knowledge and capability...but has not found a direct and closely identifiable application in the civilian employment."⁶² There is evidence that only a limited number of military skills have in the past been directly used by conscripts in later civilian employment. Only in the field of electronics does the military remain the largest training center for servicemen who subsequently find little difficulty in applying the knowledge acquired in the military to the civilian economy. Otherwise, civilian-military convergence of skills "has been of little significance and in the main

proved to be largely illusory."⁶³

In the early sixties, with the Task Force called "One Third of the Nation," in 1966 with "Project 100,000" and later, in 1968 with Project Transition, the U.S. Armed Forces were made responsible for gearing military training to the civilian economy, at least for the groups in these programs. This made the U.S. Armed Forces a place where particularly Negro and deprived white servicemen could spend their time learning how to serve their country not only militarily but also as productive citizens upon discharge.⁶⁴

In China, vocational training as such is not provided by the PLA. Because of its mission to modernize the society at large, the PLA usually recruits students with secondary school education or students from technical schools who have specialized knowledge in technical fields. The PLA has, therefore, been known to "skim the technical and political cream of China's student and working population"⁶⁵ and to provide them with "political education and military techniques."⁶⁶ It is not clear, however, whether the PLA maintains any vocational schools

like those in the U.S. Army or the IDF.⁶⁷

Upon discharge, PLA servicemen are usually assigned to help in the modernization of industry and agriculture or co-opted by the Chinese Communist Party for political leadership. In both instances, discharged PLA servicemen are entrusted with the mission of reforming and re-educating the Chinese population rather than finding jobs themselves.

Vocational training is also virtually absent in the Nigerian Army. Although a vocational training center was organized, its enrollment is insignificant, about sixty trainees a year, and it suffers from a shortage of instructors.⁶⁷ This is not the case in Iran, where the Army has trained specialists who can easily apply their vocational skills to the civilian economy.⁶⁹ The Iranian Army and the U.S. Armed Forces come closest to the IDF's programs of vocational training.

The IDF is considered one the main agents which contribute to the development of the Israeli economy and to its modernization by increased specialization.⁷⁰ Since most army skills are performed by the conscript army and not by regular staff,

there is a considerable turn-over of skilled manpower in the IDF. Their training in a vocation, skill or trade ranges from the simplest, like driving, warehouse work and telephone operation, to the more complex, like airplane mechanics, electronics, acting journalism and radio announcing.⁷¹ They are trained in vocations which are applicable and convertible to the civilian economy and in vocations which are primarily for IDF use.

With the mass influx of Orientals soon after the establishment of the State, vocational training became one of the most important services the IDF could render to the Oriental immigrant. Often without modern skills or trades, the Oriental formed the largest unemployed sector of the population and threatened the Yishuv economy by requiring welfare payments for his support and survival. To avoid this situation from becoming permanent, the IDF was called upon to complement the civilian vocational school system in order to ensure that upon discharge the new immigrants were equipped with a skill which was marketable in the civilian economy.

The IDF accomplishes this with a number of

programs both before and during military service; at its own schools and by sending soldiers to civilian schools; through the Gadna youth groups and the Nahal agricultural military corps; and finally with the cooperation of the Ministries of Education and Culture, Labour and Defence.

The Army has found it necessary to train most of its own specialized technical personnel, which led to the establishment of its own pre-military schools. Although these accept only secondary school graduates, the IDF admits each year about three hundred Orientals holding nine or more years of schooling. Prior to their enrollment in the program, the IDF provides them with a residential secondary school education which allows them maximum concentration on their studies. In return, they are expected to sign up for three additional years of service.

The IDF also accepts an undisclosed number of Orientals in the technical boarding schools of the Armoured Corps and the Navy.⁷² In the former, elementary school graduates are trained for one year in mechanics, and in the latter they "specialize"

for two years in wireless operation, signalling, radar and navigation.

In the Gadna Youth Corps, the IDF and the school system cooperate to add to the para-military training a social and vocational function. However, since the Gadna Youth Corps operates only in civilian secondary schools, where Orientals are not well represented, it reaches only 60% of all Israeli youth. Moreover, Gadna leadership has generally come from "middle class and well established families,"⁷³ only one leader in five being of Oriental origin. The same disproportionate representation exists among adolescent youth leadership trainees, only 6% of whom have come from the disadvantaged fifty percent of Israel's population.⁷⁴

An IDF program which does provide an opportunity for Orientals to receive some form of vocational training, is the Nahal or agricultural military corps. Nahal is of particular importance since, unlike the Gadna, it takes disadvantaged youth, mostly Oriental, who would otherwise have been rejected by the Army.⁷⁵ The IDF gives prominence to the educational, social, agricultural and vocational

training in Nahal as opposed to military training and this benefits a majority of Orientals who, out of school and out of work, have thus been allocated through Nahal to the agricultural sector and helped to establish Kibbutzim and Moshavim. The achievement of Nahal is rather impressive. Available data shows that in the last twenty years, it has "set up 45 military agricultural strongholds of which 20 have... become permanent." In all, Nahal has contributed to the operation of about one hundred Kibbutzim.

Finally, the IDF runs a Placement Office for discharged soldiers in cooperation with the Ministries of Defence, Labour and Education. Like "Project Transition" in the U.S. Armed Forces, the IDF's Placement Office is intended to integrate soldiers in the economy by directing their attention to the demands of the market and by encouraging them to become productive citizens. The Placement Office warns against heading for an easy and short-range solution to the job problem, and counsels soldiers to embark on a full vocational program, which, in the long run, will not only benefit them but also the state.⁷⁷ The elaborate media utilized

by the Placement Office testify to its eagerness to reach every soldier before discharge. It seems that every possible attempt is made to ensure that no soldier should leave the Army without definite placement either in a job or in a vocational training course. Soldiers who already have plans after discharge are supplied with the same information to make them aware of the opportunities available.

It is clear that the IDF abounds in programs for vocational, agricultural and trade education and these programs are perhaps the largest in the IDF's total apparatus for education. Although no direct data or follow-up studies concerning the IDF's contribution of vocationally trained Orientals exist, it is possible to deduce from the structure and activities of the IDF that the concentration of Orientals is to be found in vocational education rather than in other programs. The reason for this can be recalled and summarized as follows:

- 1) Those Orientals who have had no elementary education before entering the Army complete their elementary education before discharge and are expected to enroll in a vocational or trade school.

2) Those Orientals who have had elementary education before Army service have a choice between pre-academic and pre-vocational secondary school courses. The latter lead directly to a vocation or trade. The former lead to completion of half-matriculation. There are no equally easy provisions for a soldier to complete secondary school and take full-matriculation if he has entered the Army only with elementary education. It is difficult for those who enter the Army with half-matriculation to obtain full-matriculation, and correspondingly much more difficult, if not impossible, for those who enter it with only elementary education.

It is obvious then, that most Orientals stop at half-matriculation which serves as a prerequisite for admittance into vocational schools. In other words, whether an Oriental has taken pre-vocational or pre-academic secondary school in the IDF, he is likely to "slide" into a vocational school of one sort or another, with this difference, that holders of half-matriculation are eligible for more advanced training than elementary school graduates. Graduates

of elementary school are, for example, eligible for plumbing and confection, or for twelve month courses in refrigeration and air-conditioning, eleven month courses in car mechanics and eight month courses in librarianship. But half-matriculation graduates may take twelve month courses to become assistants to electronic specialists, or radio laboratory workers, eleven month courses to become general electricians and eight month courses to become cosmeticians.⁷⁸

Full-matriculation courses open the door to even more advanced vocational training courses, such as two year courses for X-Ray and laboratory technicians, and three year courses for occupational therapy and certified nursing. Full-matriculation also makes enrollment at Higher Institutes of Learning a possibility. Compared to 55% Oriental enrollment in the four-month voluntary half-matriculation courses and 50% in the half-matriculation by correspondence courses, only 20% of the enrollment in full-matriculation courses is Oriental.⁷⁹ This fact, together with the high cost of attending Institutes of Higher Learning in Israel and the need

for the University Preparatory Course offered by the IDF to only ninety Oriental soldiers each year, to say nothing of family obligations, indicates that very few Orientals ever approach the portals of the Institutes of Higher Learning.⁸⁰

It is evident, therefore, that the majority of Orientals emerge from the IDF as graduates of elementary school and as holders of half-matriculation certificates and then take vocational training courses which put them in the "lower class" of the society. As a result, we can only expect to find a minority in the professions, the Universities, in technical work or in managerial or administrative positions.⁸¹ We must, therefore, conclude that the IDF integrates more Orientals in the lower occupational levels of Israeli society than in the higher ones.

This conclusion which emerges from the IDF is reinforced by data from a larger recent study of the educational and occupational mobility of Orientals in Israeli society.⁸² The study's findings indicate that there has been "a gradual but systematic abandonment of agriculture" among Orientals and

"an accelerated entrance into production work (construction, industry and trade)"⁸³ although they are still over-represented in agriculture and the services in proportion to their numbers in the total population. On the other hand, there has been a "flight" from agriculture on the part of Ashkenazi immigrants much more pronounced than that of Oriental immigrants, due to their "considerable penetration into the liberal professions and typical low white-collar jobs."⁸⁴ The Oriental, instead, has not only "doubled" his participation in the "construction, industry and trades" category, but also reached over-representation in proportion to his weight in the total population in comparison to the Israeli born citizens who showed under-representation and the Ashkenazi born citizens who showed a slight increase.⁸⁵ The tables on the following page show these changes.⁸⁶

Our conclusion is further supported by evidence from figures showing the occupational mobility and income of Orientals in comparison to those of Ashkenazis. It was found, for instance, that Oriental immigrants tend to enter occupations which

Distribution of European-American employed
Persons according to length of residence and
occupation (1954 - 1965) in percentages.

European-American New Immigrants					
Year	Agriculture	Construction, Industry and Trades	Liberal professions and Bureaucracy	Business	Services
1954	20.7	42.2	21.9	11.4	10.0
1958	12.7	33.9	24.8	10.7	13.2
1961	11.1	35.4	23.8	11.8	13.7
1963	9.5	32.6	31.4	8.8	13.5
1965	7.3	34.8	31.5	10.8	12.4
Asian-African-born New Immigrants					
1954	27.4	42.5	9.7	7.1	11.8
1958	26.9	38.6	11.4	5.9	15.3
1961	22.3	41.0	10.3	5.9	17.7
1963	20.8	42.5	11.1	5.6	16.4
1965	20.9	45.1	14.7	5.8	16.1

do not demand professional training,⁸⁷ whereas Ashkenazis demonstrate "a mobility of skipping and short-cuts," skipping middle range occupations and entering "directly into occupations of high prestige."⁸⁸

Although in absolute terms there was an improvement in the standard of living of the population as a whole, the gap in income between Oriental and Ashkenazi has in fact widened. It is estimated that in 1957-58, the lower fifty percent of the population received only 25.8% of the total income, while the upper fifty percent received 74.2%, three times more. For the years 1963-64, figures show 24.2% and 75.8% respectively.⁸⁹ In interpreting these figures, consideration should be given to the fact that Oriental families are nearly 60% larger than those of their Ashkenazi counterparts, and that the average income of an Oriental more than doubled from 1951 to 1954, and has continued to increase at a steady pace throughout the years. This growth may be attributed to the fact that the IDF's elementary school graduates of Oriental origin generally try to enter secondary schools or

or trade schools, and only as a last resort, go directly into the labour market.⁹⁰ As a result, the Ashkenazis hold "a significant monopoly" in income and are "practically absent at the lowest income categories" while they "densely populate the higher ones."⁹¹ Although the study finds "a moderate tendency" among Orientals "to penetrate occupations in which their numbers were formerly insignificant," the problem is far from being resolved:⁹²

From various points of view, this constellation constitutes an excellent breeding ground for the development of acute tensions, which can be expressed both on an individual and a collective basis.

It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the efforts of the IDF in giving the Oriental a vocation or trade re-establishes the Oriental/Ashkenazi dichotomy which exists in Israeli society as a whole. Instead of concentrating on providing the Oriental with academic secondary school to offset the growing gap between him and the Ashkenazi and to contribute thus to the more balanced representation of all groups in all sectors of the economy, the IDF largely

reinforces the trend which exists for the Oriental in the civilian sector. This is not to underestimate the IDF's contribution in upgrading the level of the Oriental before discharge, but, as has been found with several of the U.S. Army's projects, the IDF appears to upgrade these immigrants only by one level. This may be sufficient to make Orientals productive citizens, but is insufficient and inadequate to bridge the gap. In this index, therefore, the IDF has clearly succeeded in absorbing the immigrants but not sufficiently to accelerate the process of National Integration.

b) Importance of the time factor in relation to work

The influence of military service on recruits cannot be measured only in terms of education or vocational and specialized training. This "formal education" plays only a part in the military's overall impact on recruits. Equally important and far-reaching, is the "informal" education which the

recruit receives as a result of the military environment. By living and working in an organization like the Army, the recruit is being socialized to behave in accordance with the rules and norms of his new setting. As the socialization process takes deeper roots in the new recruit, his "previous social and personal background, his ascriptive traits" and acquired "disabilities" are de-emphasized or denied.⁹³ This process is common to all armies, but has been particularly significant for the rehabilitation of underprivileged and uneducated recruits in the American and Iranian Armies.⁹⁴

For Israel, Orientals with ascriptive traits and acquired disabilities, steeped in Middle Eastern traditions and lacking such modern concepts as work, organization, punctuality, efficiency and discipline, presented a major problem which required an intensive campaign of socialization by all agencies of state. The IDF proved most successful in this task because the essential features of its milieu and organization, as an Army, its regimentation and the length of service, allows for a more intensive and perhaps more forceful socialization of its members.

Young Orientals, for whom time, punctuality and efficiency have not been important factors in daily life, learn from their first few days in basic training that they are expected, like everyone else in the camp, to live and work according to a strict time schedule with punctuality and a maximum of discipline. Each assignment and each military manoeuvre, each function, social or otherwise, is calculated to begin and to end at certain times. The same is true of education and of class attendance. For instance, the programs of Hebrew and elementary education courses are calculated to devote a specified number of hours to each topic. Army vocational courses and secondary school courses are also taught in accordance with a strict schedule of two week periods, at the end of which an examination is administered with emphasis on a time limit, and students who fail are required to repeat the two-week schedule before proceeding further.

The importance of the time-factor and the need for punctuality are also imparted to recruits in their formal education to emphasize the relevance of these concepts outside the confines of Army life.

As will be seen from one of the texts used for elementary school education, the IDF shows that recruits should develop a sense of time and practise self-discipline because these traits are required not only in the Army but also in the society at large.

The story describes a situation in which Jacob visits a friend in hospital. Since he hurried all the way to the hospital, he expects to be able to go straight in to visit his friend:

"Where are you going?" asked the nurse on duty. "Wait a while in this waiting-room. The patients are receiving treatment now. It is impossible to go in."

There is regimentation here too, thought Jacob. Not quite like in camp, but still regimentation. There is a time for everything. There is a time to eat and a time to rest, a time for visits and a time for doctor's visits, a fixed time for operations and fixed times for treatment. The patient has to drink his medicine on time and have his dressing changed on time....

When he finally goes into his friend's room, he discusses his discovery with him:⁹⁵

"The regimentation here is tough," said Jacob. "As I was sitting waiting to come in, I saw that you have regimentation tougher even than in camp."

"Not so very bad," said David. "There is regimentation in every place. Isn't there regimentation in civilian life too? You get up at a fixed hour and you go to work, and at work there is regimentation

again. You return home and there is regimentation at home too, and the same is true in restaurants and on public transportation. There is regimentation everywhere. Even though it is a little inconvenient, without regimentation, life is impossible."

The nurse came into the room. She turned towards Jacob and said: "I'm very sorry but your time is up."

"Another few moments, Aliza," said David.

"Impossible," said the nurse. "Everybody begs for a few more moments, but it's impossible."

It is worth noting that unlike other lessons in the textbook, this story is told in two parts, Jacob's thoughts forming part of the first lesson and David's discussion of them forming the second. The same idea is repeated in both lessons.⁹⁶ Since they are part of a very tight schedule of lessons, each of which has a specific message to convey besides its overt linguistic purpose, it is interesting to observe that this subject was one of the few considered sufficiently important to merit two full sessions.

Discharged soldiers of Oriental origin admitted that a change had taken place in their outlook on self-discipline and punctuality and in other factors

which indicate responsibility and diligence in their work. This is to be expected when recruits spend three full years in the Army away from their homes and family settings. Moreover, after the initial period of three years, Israeli citizens are recalled at least once a year to the Reserves and undergo a refresher course. For the Oriental, this can serve as a corrective of traits previously inculcated during compulsory military service.

The IDF's absorptive function in this respect goes beyond its application to the Oriental's period of service in the Army by helping him to meet the demands of civilian society. It also contributes to changing the society's pejorative stereotype of Oriental laziness, laxity and irresponsibility. As a result of this kind of socialization in the IDF, Orientals were able to distinguish themselves by their performance in the Six-Day War and thereby regained their self-respect and the recognition of the society at large. Yigal Allon spoke for the Israeli establishment when he said that Orientals had proved themselves equal in bravery and in achievement to their Ashkenazi counterparts, and showed

that they could stand side by side with Ashkenazis and accomplish the same tasks. This is an implicit admission that the Ashkenazi establishment's reservations about Orientals are beginning to be dispelled.⁹⁷

c) Male and Female Equality in Labour Force Participation

The equality of male and female was one of the tenets of Zionist pioneering ideology long before the establishment of the State. Women worked side by side with men in the political, economic and military spheres and the history of the Yishuv and the Haganah are replete with the names of women who participated in reclaiming land, establishing communal settlements, and in helping with social services and military defence. Apart from the ideological justification for this, women's participation was no doubt necessary due to the shortage of manpower and the restrictions on immigration during the years of the Mandate. The pattern, however, persisted after the establishment of the State and was formalized in legislation which proclaimed the ir-

relevance of sexual attributes in economic, political and educational institutions.⁹⁸ Women with education were conscripted by the IDF to serve in administrative and secretarial capacities in order to release men for combat and other heavy duties.

This situation contrasts sharply with the role of women in the traditional milieu from which the Orientals originate. Prior to the series of revolutions which took place in the Middle East in the early fifties, women in Islamic culture were confined to domestic activities, like housekeeping and child-rearing. Women were segregated from men and considered "unqualified" to share in their husband's work and decision-making. Although traditional Judaism holds a similar view of women's role, the influence of Islamic culture was decisive in determining the attitude of Oriental men towards women. It is inevitable, therefore, that upon their arrival in Israel, Oriental men should have suffered a cultural shock and considered the behaviour of Israeli women inappropriate and despicable. Their attitude was not shared by Oriental women, who, like women in post-war Japan, saw in the position of

Israeli women a cause for pride and an opportunity for emancipation.

In civilian society, Oriental men were able to be evasive in recognizing the new situation, which they considered an attack on their manhood. Not until they were drafted into the Army and confronted with a girl-teacher in Hebrew and elementary education courses, were they compelled to adjust. Recognizing the difficulties inherent in this situation, the IDF is careful to give its girl-teachers a higher rank, calculated to minimize informality and friction and to impress the Oriental and inspire him with respect. The Chief Education Officer of the IDF believes that the presence of girls in the Army is responsible for a more polite atmosphere and for the maintenance of decorum in language and behaviour among soldiers. The military environment therefore provides the Oriental, incidentally to his formal education, with the conditions and opportunities for interaction with women as equals.

But the IDF recruits only "educated" girls, and the majority of these are of Ashkenazi origin. Since the IDF requires girls with a relatively good

level of education and allows exemption from army service for women on religious grounds, Oriental girls are hardly represented in the IDF in terms of their weight in the total female population. Unlike their male counterparts, the IDF considers girls with a low level of education more of a liability than an asset. By denying these girls the experience of the Army, the IDF is depriving them of the "last chance" that they might have to correct their educational deficiencies. In view of the fact that Oriental girls still lead sheltered lives and preserve the traditional customs indicated above, and in view of their literacy figures--56% of Oriental girls in comparison to 96% of Ashkenazi girls--the IDF is contributing to the perpetuation of the traditional conditions and the low level of education of Oriental women.⁹⁹ Even educated Oriental girls are allowed exemption from army service on the strength of their statement that army service is against their parents' beliefs. It should be noted, however, that this exemption is not extended to Oriental men with similar "principles" and with an equally low level of education.

Although in this index, the IDF fulfills its absorptive function for the Oriental male, it clearly fails to do so for Oriental women, with far-reaching implications for their position in the society at large in terms of equality in labour-force participation and also, as we shall see below, in terms of slowing down the pace of National Integration.

III. SOCIALIZATION IN ZIONIST IDEOLOGY: THE INCULCATION OF A NATIONAL-SECULAR IDENTIFICATION

Research on socialization has shown that, after the family, the most intensive and productive socialization of the individual in the political culture occurs at school. This of course assumes that children and their parents are born in the same culture and that schooling is made available and compulsory. Whenever these two conditions, birth and education in the culture, are fulfilled, the formal socialization process of the individual is considered complete. These conditions are normally found in Western and well-established nations, like Great Britain, France and the U.S.A., where political culture and national

character have long been established and, therefore, provide a relatively crystallized and homogeneous milieu. To maintain this homogeneity, these nations have restricted immigration from countries with which they have little in common by establishing annual quotas. At no time, therefore, has the need arisen in these Western nations, to extend the task of socializing these immigrants to agencies other than the school system or factory. Armies, especially those with a voluntary or selective service system, were seldom employed for the purpose of socializing new immigrants. For instance, in the U.S. Armed Forces, the specific indoctrination of any recruit, indigenous or immigrant, was found to be "indeed limited."¹⁰⁰ This, of course, did not exclude the possibility that the military has contributed to a change of attitude inservicemen, but did indicate that explicit, ideological socialization of servicemen was lacking.¹⁰¹

This is hardly the case in China or Iran, both of which have a sizeable backward indigenous population desperately in need of integration and socialization. In China, the PLA maintains a "political

department," the history of which can be traced as far back as 1928 when the Red Army was established.¹⁰² This Department, which is to be found at all levels of the Army from division down to unit level was designed "to promote political education, instill a national revolutionary spirit...solidify discipline and realise Sunyatsentism in the army."¹⁰³ In later years, the ideological work was not limited only to PLA recruits but was required to "be carried out on every single person."¹⁰⁴ Ideology and politics in China are seen as the key to economic production, national unity, and social justice.¹⁰⁵

As China is attempting to "communize" its vast population, so Iran, albeit in a much lower key, is aiming at the "iranization" of its tribes.¹⁰⁶ The Army in Iran is considered "a School of Nationalism" where young recruits, originating from remote villages or diverse tribes, are made aware of Iran's existence as one nation and of the State as the residence of power.¹⁰⁷ The Army in Iran is thus called upon to forge national unity from diverse ethnic, religious and social elements.

This kind of socialization is lacking in most

of the armies of underdeveloped countries. Few armies in Africa have been adequately socialized. The Nigerian Army's coup in 1966 is a flagrant example of the soldiers' lack of socialization or "underpoliticization," and the ensuing bloodshed only brought into the open the underlying ethnic and local loyalties of the soldiers in the Nigerian Army.¹⁰⁸

In Israel, more than half the population today consists of immigrants or sons of immigrants. Since there were no restrictions on immigration to the new State, immigrants arrived en masse and were accepted initially for settlement in the new State irrespective of their level of literacy and education, of their traditional culture and of their manifestation of underpoliticization. But unlike other countries, all agencies of state, including the Army, were mobilized to socialize these new immigrants and to stave off any threat which they might have posed to the political formula of the predominant social type in Israel.¹⁰⁹

a) The State

As we have seen above, the Oriental Jew before his immigration to Israel was allowed little participation in the political process of his host country. Since the Golden Age of Spain, Jews in the Middle East and North Africa have generally been excluded from political activity and accused of conspiring first with the Colonial Powers and later with Israel.

Living under these conditions for centuries, Oriental Jews were inhibited in their political behaviour and their relationship to government was characterised by distance, subjection and fear. This was due in part to their minority status, but can also be attributed to the political culture of traditional Muslim society, where government was authoritarian in character, and citizens were "subjects" of their ruler. The relationship between the two was anything but reciprocal. Subjects had obligations such as tax payments, fulfilling quotas for the ruler's mercenaries, and obeying laws decided and acted upon without the consensus

of the population. The ruler, by virtue of the legitimacy invested in him by the Muslim Shari'a or by means of military power, ruled without obligation, even to the extension of police protection. It was under these circumstances that Oriental Jews came to know the meaning of government. It came to represent an unknown quantity to which men are subject but which gives them no opportunity to redress grievances. This relationship in turn bred both contempt and concealed hostility, and a lack of cooperation.

When such Oriental Jews arrived in Israel, the IDF was confronted with the task of changing their attitudes in order to establish a positive and reciprocal relationship between them and the Israeli state. The IDF accomplishes this by teaching the Orientals to relate to the State in terms of rights and duties. Upon induction, each recruit receives a booklet outlining some of the State's obligations towards Jews and the soldiers' duties towards the Army and the nation. The latter are incorporated in their oath of allegiance, which also explains the soldier's new role:¹¹⁰

The IDF requires of its soldiers unlimited allegiance to the State of Israel. The soldier in the IDF recognizes the rights of the Jewish people to have their own state in the land of Israel and is ready to participate personally in the defence and in the security of the State, its sovereignty and its ability to fulfill its social and cultural missions. The soldier in the IDF loves his country and aspires to the integrations of the Jewish communities and the fraternity of the Jewish people.

In essence, soldiers are required to espouse the ideology of the Zionist movement. For the Oriental this means a transfer of allegiance from messianic aspirations to a secular state whose tenets are primarily those of democratic socialism. With this in mind, the IDF teaches Orientals and Eastern Europeans from totalitarian countries, modern democratic values and the character of democracy in Israel, not so much by academic or philosophical debates, as by daily life in the IDF setting.

As an outgrowth of a voluntary underground movement, the IDF lacks the "authoritarianism" which characterises military institutions.¹¹¹ Now, as before, it relies heavily on persuasion and consent to enhance motivation and obtain successful results.¹¹² According to the Chief Education Officer,

persuasion has always been "one of the most essential instruments of leadership." Commanders are therefore taught to rely less on orders and more on influence, to be less the boss and more the educator.

"Social norms and moral values become ammunition no less essential than shells or bullets...the personal example of the commander becomes the first command of combat leadership."¹¹³ Commanders are taught to treat their men democratically and to show respect for their individuality regardless of origin or status in the civilian community. They are taught that the safety and success of their unit or company may depend on their relationship to their men, since these are expected to operate efficiently in circumstances when detailed orders cannot be given.¹¹⁴ It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that soldiers should trust their commanders, and this relationship can only be created through persuasion. To enable commanders to discharge all their responsibilities in this sphere, the Branch of Information and Instruction provides them with intensive courses in Sociology, Political Science and above all in Social Psychology. Sometimes

failure to complete these courses successfully can cost a commander his promotion. Commanders are also required to keep their men informed as fairly and correctly as possible of border developments and Army activities. The Branch of Information and Instruction maintains an elaborate organization for this purpose, because the IDF believes that information and comprehension are vital means of obtaining cooperation.

The IDF's first aim in civic education is to teach Oriental soldiers that they have both rights and duties, and thus to erase the apathy which characterised their traditional outlook. At the induction camp, to avoid any possible misunderstanding and to emphasize the importance of the subject, the Sergeant-Major explains the soldiers' duties and their rights and the fact that the two are closely interconnected. He explains that their rights are not threatened by the arbitrary whims of any individual whatever his rank, and that a man's rights cannot be snatched from him, but that a man must stand by his rights and, if necessary be prepared to fight for them. Soldiers also learn that they cannot be sentenced in absentia

and that they have the right to appeal their sentence. They are informed of their right to various kinds of leave: ten days for marriage, eight days for births or deaths in their family, and four days of holiday for every three months of service, during which period they are entitled to their travelling expenses to and from the base and to the cost of their meals during their absence.¹¹⁵ Religious soldiers are entitled to receive separate Kosher meals prepared in accordance with the dietary laws. Finally, soldiers are told that the IDF law is upheld and that everyone is equal before it regardless of his origin or his place in the military hierarchy.

At the end of military service, after having lived according to these principles for three years, Orientals are further exposed to democratic concepts imparted to them in elementary education. The Government Education Regulation, Document No. 2, specifies that the democratic values evolved by the Zionist movement over the last sixty or seventy years are to be taught to the children of all immigrants.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, the IDF's elementary school provides a course in World History which deals with the following

subjects: (In brackets are the IDF's instructions to teachers about what to emphasize in each lesson.)¹¹⁷

1) Greece--The Polis, Athens and Sparta.

(Emphasize education, the type of government and the type of society by making comparisons)

2) Democracy in Athens at its peak.

(Lecture, reading and discussion in addition to writing for emphasis on the concept of democracy)

3) Society and Government in Rome.

(Take enough time to explain concepts of Republic and Senate)

4) Feudalism.

(Maximum time of two and a half hours is devoted to this)

5) The Renaissance and Humanism; the stand of Italy as a guardian of classical tradition and its ties with the East

(Emphasis on Renaissance and Humanism)

6) Reformation.

(Emphasis on general outlines of the difference between Reformation and Catholic doctrines)

7) British Parliamentary System.

(Teacher should require a written summary)

8) The French Revolution.

(Five hours are devoted to this in comparison to an average of one or one and a half hours and a maximum of two and a half hours on others. The teacher is required to lecture, discuss and demand a written examination on this subject.)

9) The Congress of Vienna and Liberalism.

(Emphasis on Liberalism)

10) The Industrial Revolution and Socialism.

11) Nationalism.

12) Imperialism.

13) Nazism and Fascism.

(Teacher lectures in order to be able to describe concepts)

It should be noted that one fifth of the course is devoted to the study of Democracy and of Political Institutions, and its aim is to help Orientals to conceptualize their experience in the Army and to place both Israel and the IDF in the context of international democratic movements.

By teaching them that they have rights and must stand by them and that rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, the IDF is clearly preparing Oriental soldiers for their future civilian life. By challenging their preconceptions about government, the IDF prepares them for responsible citizenship. The implications of this training have already been manifested by the riots of Wadi Salib in 1959 and intermittently throughout the last ten years. The Oriental has become more vocal, not for

political reasons as might be expected, but for economic and social equality. This may be the beginning of an Oriental awakening to their rights in Israeli society. The Oriental's growing awareness of his numerical superiority may in the future make him even more militant about the rights he is taught in the IDF he is entitled to demand and fight for. One wonders here if the IDF is aware of these possible consequences of its absorptive function. It does not appear to be, for if the IDF had also provided the Ashkenazis with the necessary training in receptivity disposition, by sensitizing them to the problems the Orientals encounter in Israeli society and by encouraging them to help and accept their Oriental counterparts, clearly the riots and the ensuing social and political cleavages would not have occurred.

b) The Land: Patriotism

The IDF's transformation of the Oriental's attitudes towards the State and his initiation into

the democratic process represents only one aspect of his socialization in Israeli citizenship. If it were confined to this area, the new relationship between the Oriental and the State would have existed and developed only in a vacuum.

Citizenship is a universal concept which differs from one country to another only in its specific characteristics which vary according to the particular laws and norms of each society. Even these are similar in countries with similar experiences, such as Western Democracies or totalitarian and communist nations. However, citizenship which is acquired by the observance of civil laws and the democratic process only provides an identification with the system or the state but does not necessarily establish an organic relationship between an individual and the land or its history.

For the Oriental, this is particularly significant since in his country of origin, he felt hardly any identification with the state, much less with the land. As long as he was permitted to live relatively near a Jewish community, the Oriental seldom cared in which country he lived. For him,

"country" was an irrelevant concept, since he generally had no relationship with the soil and his aspirations were primarily to return to the land of Israel.

The IDF believes that an historical and geographical knowledge of the land enhances the organic link between the Oriental and the soil and eradicates the Jewish Diaspora's trait of "nomadism" in order to generate instead allegiance to the nation-state rather than to ethnic and cultural groups. For these reasons, the Study of the Land and of the history of the Jewish people in the IDF is second in importance only to the study of the Hebrew language. It is the first subject taught after Hebrew at the beginning of elementary school education and serves as a basis for all the other subjects taught in elementary school. The Study of the Land is taught not only as geography and history, but also as politics, demography, geology, economics, security and meteorology.¹¹⁸

The course is intended to provide soldiers with a comprehensive knowledge of their land and of the heroes who sacrificed their lives and worked for the

good of the nation at great personal cost. These aims and ideals are conveyed in the form of stories about people and places which can be visited. An example of this is the story in one of the elementary school text books about Tel-Ḥai, where a well known hero of the Jewish Battalion fell for his country. David is taken on a field trip to Tel-Ḥai and he writes to his friend Jacob about his feelings:¹¹⁹

I have heard the story of Tel-Ḥai many times, but hearing it does not compare with seeing it. When you sit in the very same building where people fell, the fact comes alive for you....Don't forget; this did not happen in 1954 or in 1948. It happened in 1920, and we were making our first few steps in the land. The IDF was not yet in existence, we did not even have weapons. The Galilee was almost empty of Jewish settlements. Here and there a few solitary pioneers dug into the rocks to win bread from the land and here on Tel-Ḥai, thousands of Arabs attacked. How could so few withstand so many? Was it better to retreat and not to sacrifice dear lives? For Trumpeldor and his friends there was only one answer: No! This is a question of honour, an honour which is more precious than life. We will not live in our land by the favour of the Arabs, although we did not come here for war. We are an industrious people. Our hands are for work and for peace, but they are also ready to defend our children and our land, our sprouting crops and our livestock and all that we have created with the sweat of our brows.... We are staying here by right and not by favour, by the right of our ancestors to whom this land belonged, by the right of our father who never relinquished it and by the right of our work and our accomplishment, by

the right which is given to any nation to live in its land and to defend its survival. ...Death does not frighten the man for whom the land is his land, the people his people, the war his war.

This story contains the basic tenets of patriotism which are imparted to Israeli soldiers. It involves a justification of "right" to the land and the notion that it is honourable and praiseworthy to show determination and to make sacrifices in fighting for that right.

The purpose of the Study of the Land is to involve soldiers as much as possible with the land, its history, current problems and future prospects. Teachers of this course are specifically instructed to present the material in such a way as to show each soldier that the problems of the land not only touch him personally but that they should be considered his own.¹²⁰ This is a new concept for the Oriental who usually ignored the "local" problems of his country of origin.

This endeavour is not limited to classroom teaching. The IDF makes the Study of the Land come alive by requiring soldiers to acquaint themselves with the land not only academically but physically "through the belly."¹²¹ The country's small size

enables soldiers during military service to walk "over every corner of Israel, lie in ambush in every valley, sit for days on end in look-out posts and learn every bush and every clod of soil in the landscape."¹²² Each year, the IDF also organizes a four day march which is treated as a major activity and as the climax of this educational process.¹²³ The march is prefaced by a ten day series of nineteen lessons which include both lectures and films which deal primarily with the past history of the areas to be visited, the plans for future development and other items of interest such as vegetation and climate. During the march, commanders of each unit, working from fact-sheets provided by the Branch of Information and Instruction, lecture on the places en route during halts in the march. At the end of each day, legends are retold of the places visited during the day and songs which refer to the day's sights are taught by the camp fire.¹²⁴

The IDF believes that young people acquire identification with the land not only by lectures and field trips but also by identifying with a figure they can admire whose feelings towards the

land are known. Commanders are, therefore, encouraged to set an example in the hope that by emulating them, young people will acquire not only the characteristics of manhood, but also the ideological commitment of their commanders.¹²⁵

To this end, the IDF provides Junior and Senior Officers with special courses on the Jewish Heritage and lectures on Jewish culture and development, which usually deal with such subjects as the redemption and unity of the People of Israel or the place of Israel in Jewish History.¹²⁶

To shoulder the burden of Study of the Land courses, the IDF also trains special guides in the Jewish People's history of heroism. These guides are then scattered among the units to accompany them on field trips and in basic training. Their task is to explain the geography and history of the places in which soldiers find themselves. The IDF believes that the soldiers' acquaintance with the land is made as vivid as possible and in this way establishes in his mind a reservoir of memories which will help him to understand the problems which may arise in connection with the places he has visited. In

this way, the IDF has contributed enormously to making the land a common and living knowledge for all soldiers. By the publication of pamphlets, the IDF also extends such knowledge to the general public.¹²⁷

The Study of the Land pursued in the IDF is virtually non-existent in other armies. It may well be that countries like the U.S.A., China, Iran, Nigeria or Jordan have no need to acquaint either their immigrants or their citizens with the land because the concept of "return" to the land is inapplicable to them and because the number of immigrants in these countries is so small that they are not indispensable to the state's survival as they are in Israel.

In this respect, the Oriental poses very little problem for the IDF and for the nation in general. Since the sacredness of the Land of Israel and the loyalty due to it have always been deeply rooted concepts in Jewish culture, the average Oriental was highly predisposed towards patriotism. Evidence of this can be found in the dedication with which Oriental youth fought to "liberate" Israel during the years

of the Mandate and the War of Independence, when a high proportion of Orientals served in the extreme and chauvinistic military organization called the Irgun. More striking evidence of the patriotism among Orientals is to be found in their low rate of emigration from Israel compared to European or Israeli-born Jews. The table below indicates the percentage of emigration of the various groups since the establishment of the State:¹²⁸

Period	Asia/Africa	Born Europe/America	Israel
1948-51	24.6	65.6	9.7
1952-61	15.0	63.7	21.2
1962	18.3	51.7	30.4
1962-65	17.7	49.9	31.4

These figures show that approximately three times as many Israeli citizens who were born in Europe and America have emigrated from Israel since its establishment as Israelis born in Asia or Africa. The evidence of the Oriental soldier's strong attach-

ment to the land is further supported by interviews of an outgoing class of elementary education students at Camp Marcus in 1968.¹²⁹ When asked whether they would leave Israel for a better country, they replied that they were aware that a number of Orientals who had migrated to the U.S.A or Canada enjoyed a "better life" but they could never themselves think of emigrating. Israel was their land and they felt responsible for its defence and survival. The IDF's task, then, is less to instill these values in Orientals than to translate the pre-existing traditional material into more modern terms.

Until the foundation of the State of Israel, Jews were minority groups in the nations of the world, who had, for the most part, few obligations to the national goals of the countries they inhabited and whose interests were personal and Jewish. The task of the IDF was to teach such Jews that Israeli nationalism involves action rather than dreams, obligations rather than self-interest, and that self-sacrifice may be required of them.¹³⁰ In the words of Lord Acton, patriotism "is in political life what faith is in religion...in its real political character,

patriotism consists in the development of the instinct of self-preservation into a moral duty which may involve self-sacrifice."¹³¹

To achieve this objective, the IDF has used both Jewish history and the philosophy of the Enlightenment. In the study of the land courses, the IDF is at pains to emphasize the heroes of Israel, the location of their battles and their place in the history of the Jewish people. This history is shown to culminate in the establishment of the State of Israel and in the heroes who have fought and fallen for the modern state. In this way, soldiers are not only given detailed knowledge of their common historical roots, but also shown that they are the most recent link in the chain of history and self-sacrifice.

c) Solidarity

In Israel, the IDF provides a unique environment for the development of identification and solidarity among soldiers of different origins. The IDF has consistently upheld the policy of assembling in each squad soldiers from different communities

and different social strata of the population: Orientals and Ashkenazi, urban and rural inhabitants, and members of Kibbutz and Moshav. This, of course, not only benefits the Oriental but also provides a form of cultural exchange by creating a basis for communication between different elements of the population. By coming into close and prolonged contact they can develop common values, common norms and common memories.

Other than these informal opportunities for promoting solidarity between Oriental and Ashkenazi, the IDF provides Oriental soldiers in a course of Jewish history with a perspective on the historical role of the Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews and their relationship throughout the ages. The topics chosen by the IDF are instructive. They range from the Haskala movement to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, with barely any mention of the Oriental's contribution to Jewish history and to the establishment of the State of Israel.¹³² The only positive Oriental contribution which the IDF's text seems to acknowledge is that the Spanish Jews kept the Hebrew language alive during the twelfth century and were instrumental

in its development as a modern language. Otherwise the picture of history presented by the IDF can be observed from the following excerpts:

In the nineteenth century, the terms "the West" and "Europe" symbolized progress and enlightenment, whereas "the East" symbolized backwardness and ignorance. The Jews in the Middle East were more advanced than their neighbours, but they too were adversely affected by the low standards of the land in which they lived. In contrast to the large Jewish centers in Eastern Europe, the Middle Eastern Jews lived in smaller ghettos, in special districts near the cities and sometimes even near villages where the Arabs harmed and humiliated them. ...The scattering of the Oriental Jews over a wide expanse and the paucity of means of transportation and its consequences and also the differences in language and tradition among themselves, made it difficult to disseminate an organized movement for the return to Zion.¹³³

The Oriental Jews were poorer than the Jews of Eastern Europe, and it was impossible to raise any money among them in order to support their brothers who were settling in the land of Israel. The settlers who came from Eastern Europe in order to build the land were themselves a community apart called "the new Yishuv." ...They differed both from the Jewish community of Oriental origin and also from the "old Yishuv" whose origin was from Eastern Europe and who guarded the traditional customs which were pre-enlightenment piously and jealously, and suspected all newcomers of being heretics. In contrast to them, the new settlers were proud to be as they were, since they had come to support themselves by work and since there was no need for them to take "charity."¹³⁴

These passages clearly re-state the origins and underlying reasons for the elite-mass gap from the point of view of the veteran population. The IDF textbook accentuates the differences between the two communities in a manner which infers their polarization: The veteran population is almost by definition the elite, since it originated from the West and from Europe which "symbolized progress and enlightenment," and consisted of immigrants who cast off the yoke of tradition and rebuilt Palestine with their own labour and without needing to accept "charity." Instead of demonstrating these virtues, the Orientals were too poor even to support Israel in its time of difficulty, let alone to organize themselves to disseminate the ideas and ideals of the Zionist movement. The East clearly "symbolized backwardness and ignorance," and the Jews who lived there were at the mercy of the Arabs. This picture, the accuracy of which can be questioned, does not give the Oriental who is exposed to it any sense of pride in his past or any confidence in his role in Israel. In the Ashkenazi, it creates a feeling of superiority and complacency and perhaps even encourages

condescending towards his Oriental brother.¹³⁵

This "historical" approach is modified in another textbook to reflect the realities of the situation in Israel today:

The Jewish settlement consisted of a mosaic of communities representing communities from different nations, and in the early days, this situation was a blessing because it lightened the burden of integrating the immigrants. Each immigrant found himself among immigrants from his own country, similar to him in their customs and speech and aware of his needs....But on the other hand, the separateness among the communities weakened the Yishuv and deprived it of unity. Today we are at pains to ensure that the descendants of all the communities recognize that they all belong to one people and that they should integrate into one body speedily.¹³⁶

The continuing existence of this situation might no longer be an issue if Israeli society and the IDF itself acted with receptivity disposition towards the Orientals. As it is, the ideal situation to which the authors of the above textbook aspire is still far from reality. This is well illustrated in another lesson presented in the elementary school textbook.¹³⁷ Aliza, an Ashkenazi nurse, has invited David to her home:

"Am I to come to your house?" asks David.

"Why ever not?" says Aliza.

"We...how can I explain it to you," said David, "we are new in the country, and you--don't be angry with me, you..."

"Dear me, David, I thought you were clever. What does it matter to me how long you have been in the country!"

"There is nevertheless a difference between old settlers and new immigrants in the country," says David. "I have felt it more than once."

"Where did you feel this?" asks Aliza.

"I don't remember exactly where, but nevertheless, it is so," says David.

"Isn't a clever boy like you ashamed to tell such stories! What difference could exist here in Israel? Who is old here and who is new? You know what it is like? It's like people who want to go through a door. There are those who go through first and those who go through afterwards. Almost all the Yishuv in the country are new immigrants. Some were the first and some came later. What are sixty or seventy years in the life of a nation? We come from different countries, from Asia, Africa, etc....Who remembers all this? Who thinks about it? We are all Jews, not so? We are all partners in one undertaking, for one goal. We sometimes joke about "Rumanians" or "Germans" or "Morocans" or "Galicians" but who takes it seriously? No, my friend. I only know one difference between people--that between good and bad people. I like good people and I don't like bad people, that's all.

Although this passage deals with a real problem, it does not treat it realistically. David's painful consciousness of inferiority may be real enough, but Aliza's reply neither reflects the predominant Ashkenazi attitude nor represents a serious treatment

of the problem. The passage is particularly offensive in view of the fact that the majority of those who read it are Orientals who have probably met very few Alizas in Israel. In fact, Oriental respondents to interviews claim that their families originate from "Southern France" or from some other European country to avoid citing their true country of origin, which may be Morocco or Algeria.¹³⁸

It seems fair to conclude that whereas Oriental youth is unable to claim European origin, their exposure to the views of the veteran population causes them to aspire to that status sufficiently to deny and deprecate their identity and real origins.

Solidarity in the IDF, therefore, exists not so much out of the Ashkenazi's love for the Oriental or vice versa but as a result of the allegiance they share to their state and land, to their commanders and their units in the defence of their ideals. The Oriental's long-standing allegiance to the land, which stems from the religious training he had in his country of origin, is the source of much of this solidarity. It is this which has made him remain in Israel in spite of poverty and arduous years in

shanty houses and tents. But the IDF's obvious lack of receptivity disposition and the fact that it has neglected to re-educate the Ashkenazi in their attitudes towards Orientals has diminished the solidarity which might exist between Oriental and Ashkenazi. Their fragile solidarity has endured in battle conditions and during protracted war. Should peace come, the Oriental may yet demonstrate his lack of solidarity with the Ashkenazi veteran population.

d) Secularism

In Israel, the struggle between religion and secularism is one of the fundamental and constant issues in the internal politics of the country. This is manifest in the bargain and mutual concessions of the political parties in power. However, in real fact, the influence of religion in Israel goes beyond party politics.¹³⁹ The prevalence of a certain number of religious laws in the society at large has created a rhythm of life to which the population has become accustomed. For example,

the Sabbath and some religious holidays are generally observed; rabbinical law governs the personal status of Jewish inhabitants; the food industry and slaughter houses are under rabbinical supervision.

It was fear of the ultra-orthodox who threatened to impose the most rigid form of Judaism which led the Labour parties to profess a "certain atheism" during the pre-State Yishuv years and after the establishment of the State. Their objection to this aspect of orthodoxy should not be considered a total abandonment of Judaism. It was only meant to give "to the message of tradition a national and secular sense,"¹⁴⁰ but the message lives on as a symbol of the State. Israel is neither a medieval theocracy nor a secular state. The situation is more complex. In Judaism, the notions of religion, people and state are interwoven and it is impossible in Judaism to speak of the kind of cleavages between the spiritual and temporal which occur in Western democracies. In Israel, different people observe Judaism in different forms. Some, who might be called "religious," would like Israel to be a state where all the laws of Judaism are observed; some, who might be called

"traditional," continue to practise Judaism but not with the rigour of orthodoxy, and others, who are "liberal" practise little Judaism.¹⁴¹ The State, however, is clearly bent on giving Judaism national and secular relevance other than as a divine revelation of undisputable laws.

The IDF, as an agency of state, contributes in this direction. In IDF schools, the Bible is presented as a social, economic and political history of the Jews, and viewed as a piece of literature open to interpretation and criticism, rather than as divine revelation. An example of this attitude can be found in the written directions given to teachers of the Bible in the IDF. A section of the "Preface to the Stories of the Creation" contains the following guidelines:

The story of the Garden of Eden is aethiological. Aethiology is the accepted method of understanding folklore and was introduced into literary research by German researchers who dealt with the Songs of Homer, Greek legend and ancient German folksongs.... This story was created in order to answer burning problems which every man asks himself. The answers are not scientific; they are popular answers, childish and also full of charm and lyricism. The ancients preferred answers of this type to dry, cold and scientific answers.¹⁴²

Similar stories to those of the Creation of the World, of Heaven and Hell, the Garden of Eden, and the Flood, are to be found in almost all cultures. There are resemblances between them. Of special interest to us are the stories which came from Babylon and Egypt. These stories of the Creation have had a great influence on the Book of Genesis. This influence can be traced in every passage. This is not surprising. The patriarchs resided in Babylon and Egypt. The Hebrew language resembles the Babylonian language. The Babylonians and Egyptians ruled the land in different periods and therefore had contact with and influence on the Hebrews.¹⁴³

The authors of these stories: The group of Creation stories is not written by one man. There are contradictions between one chapter and another and especially between chapter one (the creation of the world) and chapter two (Garden of Eden story). Furthermore, sometimes in the very same chapter, the influence of some of the authors is to be found.¹⁴⁴

The author who wrote chapter one did not particularly excel in a rich imagination. The story in front of us is monotonous, boring, lacks realism and repeats the same words and the same formulae again and again.¹⁴⁵

The stories found in this part are naive. They are cast over with the charm of childhood. The humanness of God stands out. God talks, consults, argues, creates, searches for man...becomes angry, etc. This is a very human god who is close to man but not shut up in his heavens.¹⁴⁶

God opens the deeds of Creation with the creation of light in the same way that a man who enters a dark room and wants to do his work finds that the beginning of wisdom is to light it.¹⁴⁷

For religious and traditional Jews, these passages would be unacceptable, if not blasphemous because they consider the Bible holy revelation the validity of which is not open to question, and because no authorship is admitted other than God's revelation to Moses on Mount Sinai. Hence literary criticism of the Bible and references to "authors" are inadmissible. Furthermore, God in the Bible is traditionally seen as humane and not human, and any human characteristics ascribed to God in Biblical episodes are considered purely allegorical.

The attitude to the Bible transmitted by IDF teachers is, therefore, a rude awakening for Orientals who were reared to be religiously observant, although not always well informed about the deeper meanings of religious practices. The IDF's treatment of the Bible first comes as a shock, and later creates laxity in religious observance. There is evidence to support this view in a study of the religious observance of Orientals during army service, which indicated that only 2.2% of those interviewed considered themselves religious whereas as many as 31.1% regarded themselves as liberal.¹⁴⁸

This was attributed to the fact that "military service constitutes a rupture with the family environment," and that while in the Army, Oriental youth find themselves under obligation to fulfill tasks even on the Sabbath. Thus they learn "slowly to perform certain tasks which do not conform to the observance of religious law."¹⁴⁹

This is especially true of the evolutionary change in the Oriental's observance of the Sabbath. When he observed the Sabbath in his country of origin, the Oriental may have felt at a disadvantage since he closed his business while his non-Jewish competitors remained open. In Israel, however, where Saturday is officially a day of rest, one would expect it to be generally observed. Yet part of the Israeli population considers Sabbath observance a "constraint imposed by the religious parties," and the abandonment of Sabbath observed as a day of rest and religious practice has been found, astonishingly enough, not only among Oriental youth, but also among their parents.¹⁵⁰

The IDF's contribution to this change among

Oriental youth can be seen from the textbook which describes a typical Sabbath day in the Army. The teacher is given a number of questions to put to the class, but the IDF also provides the answers, as can be seen from the following excerpt:¹⁵¹

Question: How does a man get up every morning for work and how does he get up on the Sabbath?

Answer: Every day he gets up in a hurry, washes, shaves, cleans his shoes with a brush and shoe polish, cleans his teeth with a toothbrush or just rinses his mouth, runs to the table to have a bite to eat and hurries to his work. Not so on the Sabbath. We get up very slowly at a late hour, we wash slowly, shave slowly, we have time to look closely in the mirror and to look at our faces. If we wish, we can take a very long shower, wash ourselves with soap at length, and afterwards come out and comb and do everything in a relaxed fashion.

It is interesting to note that there is no mention here of synagogue attendance and that whereas synagogue services are conducted early in the morning, soldiers are shown that it is pleasant to get up late. Furthermore, since the answer prescribes shaving which is forbidden on the Sabbath in traditional Judaism, it would almost seem that the IDF discourages soldiers from observing traditional Sabbath practices. Briefly, the difference which

emerges between wek-days and the Sabbath in the above passage does not depend on religious observance. Instead, the Sabbath is portrayed as a day which fulfills a private and social function--the passage continues: "We get dressed nicely and receive visitors," and the answer given to the question: "Is the Sabbath specially a holiday for the individual or for the public?" is "For the individual."¹⁵²

On the other hand, the IDF claims that soldiers in the Army are permitted to observe religious practices in any way they desire. There is a synagogue in every camp and soldiers are allowed one hour each day for the three services and one hour and three quarters on Saturday for the longer Sabbath service. However, if observance of religious law is easily practised in the IDF, one wonders why the ultra-orthodox, mostly Ashkenazi Yeshiva students are exempt from army service.

The IDF chaplains also provide the soldiers with a prayer-book which allegedly incorporates the different systems of prayers and rituals common to the Oriental and Ashkenazi communities--"one unique prayer-book for all." Content analysis of this

prayer-book, however, shows that it incorporates most of the Ashkenazi version of religious services and prayers and very little of that to which the Oriental has been accustomed.¹⁵³ This may account in part for the drop in synagogue attendance among Orientals since the Ashkenazi order of prayer and Ashkenazi tunes can elicit in them no sense of continuity with their past and little emotional response. There is, moreover, no chaplain of Oriental origin in the IDF.

With regard to the dietary laws, the whole Army eats meat which has been prepared in accordance with the dietary laws of Judaism, since the slaughter of animals is under rabbinical surveillance in Israel. Although IDF kitchens observe the religious law forbidding the consumption of meat and dairy products in the same meal, they do not keep separate dishes for meat and milk products as the dietary laws prescribe. Only upon request, can such dishes be obtained by the soldier.¹⁵⁴

In its attitude to religious matters, the IDF once again represents a microcosm of Israeli society. Although soldiers are allowed freedom of

choice in religious matters, the IDF clearly emphasizes and encourages secular comprehension of the Bible and a more secular approach to religious law.

Religious and traditional elements in the IDF are represented neither by the majority of Ashkenazi, who are non-observant Jews, nor by the minority of ultra-orthodox Ashkenazi, who are exempt from army service, but by Oriental Jews, the majority of whom are religious. Orientals in the IDF are, therefore faced with a dilemma in religious matters. Although the same dilemma exists in the society at large, there the necessity to change was hardly felt since Orientals were in their own environment and generally lived in the same house as their parents. In the IDF, Orientals are, on the one hand, given the freedom to continue their religious practices, and on the other exposed to an atheological approach to the Bible and its laws. Moreover, the values of their peer-group, which are non-religious, become more important in their new setting than their family's beliefs and they consequently feel an intangible pressure to change.

The discrepancy between practice and teaching in the IDF is bound to create a conflict within the Oriental which will be extended to his relationship with his traditional parents. He has become aware that although Israeli society gives the individual freedom of choice in religious matters, just as the IDF does, the majority of Ashkenazi, the "dominant social type," are liberal rather than traditional or religious. Acceptance by his peers in the IDF may have to be achieved at the cost of shedding his traditionalism. On the other hand, a departure from traditional practices may undermine both his family and his place in it. The choice the Oriental makes in this matter may, therefore, have far-reaching implications.

Since it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the consequences in detail, we will limit ourselves to some general observations. In the IDF, the Oriental has theoretically two choices: he may persist in his religious practices or abandon them. From the data indicated above, it would seem that in the past, he has tended to abandon them.

This new attitude can have two consequences for his relationship with his family upon discharge from the Army: His parents may tolerate laxity in religious observance, or they may reject his new ideas, in which case conflict would ensure. The former is the more probable, because age, stay in Israel and environment have also been found to produce a change in attitude towards religion among adults.¹⁵⁵ It must be remembered that the Oriental Jew was not so steeped in religious observance in his country of origin as the Ashkenazi. His religious observance was not, like that of Ashkenazi Jews, based on the Talmudic and legal aspects of Judaism, but was mixed with local Arab-Berber customs which became inextricably bound up with Judaism and gave it a distinct character in the East. Consequently, Orientals are attached to their own customs and traditions, even when these have become "reduced to inherited traditions of past centuries of whose significance they are ignorant."¹⁵⁶ Serving in the IDF has made young Orientals aware of the superstitions and foreign influences which form part of their traditional Judaism, and therefore,

more critical of their rabbinate which was unable to rid itself of these elements, accusing it "of not having helped the Jewish masses to westernize without losing at the same time the sense of religious values."¹⁵⁷

Thus, the attitude of the Oriental towards religious practice is changing, although not in the direction of that of the Ashkenazi. In other words, the Oriental has neither accepted the Ashkenazi system of religious practice and ritual, nor has he become liberal. Instead, the Oriental has just begun to realize the extent to which the local customs acquired by his ancestors in his country of origin have influenced their religious practices, and to sift the two in an endeavour to evolve his own form of Judaism, just as in the past his Ashkenazi counterparts evolved theirs.

IV. FAMILY STRUCTURE

The characteristic structure and evolution of the Oriental family can be attributed to two factors which differentiate it from the Western family unit:

Oriental traditional Judaism, which through observance and religious ceremonies, made the family the center of religious and social life; and the influence of Islam and local customs which made the Oriental Jewish family resemble the local population in patterns of relationship and way of life. The symbiosis between religion and local customs, together with the social functions which devolved upon family members in these stratified Muslim societies, have therefore influenced the structure of the Oriental family so that it came to possess most of the social characteristics of families in tribal societies: the importance and veneration accorded to the father as the head of the family; the almost effaced role of the woman; the parent-child relationship; the role of sons, especially the first born son who at an early age is introduced to his responsibilities as his father's heir, and the absorption of the bride into her husband's family. These and other customs were transplanted by the average Oriental family to Israel. Here the Orientals' encounter with Western Israeli society

resulted at first in shock and later in dysfunctional effects due to the conflict arising between urbanization and the traditional family structure.

a) Primary Family Social Structure

Since Oriental girls are exempt from serving in the IDF on religious grounds, only Oriental young men are exposed to the socialization and educational processes of the IDF and undergo some change by leaving the family milieu and spending three years in a Western and modern social organization.

Males in Oriental families are taught from childhood to obey and honour their parents and the other adult male members of their extended families. Their role is characterised by such traits as obedience and subordination to their fathers during his life, and in time they adopt the same role of "self-assertive authoritarianism" for their own relationship with their children.¹⁵⁸ The personality type thus created is one of "tradition-abiding conservatism" manifest in the tendency to follow

established patterns of thought and action, together with "an ingrained veneration of old age which is regarded as synonymous with wisdom, experience and influence; a capacity of self-effacement and group-identification and a habit of thinking in terms of 'we' rather than 'I'."¹⁵⁹ The relationship between father and son in these families has thus been authoritarian rather than based on the equality characteristic of relationships in Western families.

By simply taking the Oriental out of his milieu, the IDF plants the seeds which disrupt this pattern of father-son relationships. The military setting and daily activity encourage the Oriental to base respect and deference on knowledge rather than age. Only in this way can the IDF forge a relationship between him and his commander who is generally only two to four years his senior. Besides, through educational courses, like those on citizenship and Zionist ideology, the Oriental is introduced to the democratic process and to an understanding of his place as a citizen in a democratic society. For those Orientals who attend Hebrew language courses at the beginning of army service, there is

tuition which deals directly with the question of parent-child relationships. A number of these lessons deal with different aspects of this subject. One of these tells of a visit which David, an Oriental youth, makes to Aliza, an Ashkenazi girl, in her home. He arrives before dinner and, to his embarrassment, Aliza insists that he joins the family for dinner. (It would be most unusual for an Oriental girl to extend such an invitation to a boy on the spur of the moment, particularly in front of her parents.) David accepts, and in the following extract, he comments on the relationship between Aliza and her parents:

Aliza and her parents are friends, good friends. She tells them what is on her mind and is happy to hear their opinion. She does not always agree with their opinion. She has her own opinion. They argue a little but even after the argument, the relationship remains one of respect and love.

"And what are you planning to do David, during your free days?" asked the father of Aliza.

"I will go home for a few days rest," said David, "to be with my family and perhaps to do a bit of sightseeing. Until now I have not been able to see much of the land. I came to this country and started to work straight away. I wanted to lighten my parents' burden at the beginning until I reached the age for the army and was drafted..."

"Perhaps I will also go sightseeing for a few days to the South, this is an opportunity. I will show David the land..."¹⁶⁰

The salient features of the story are the equality, harmony and love between Aliza and her parents. David finds, much to his amazement, that Aliza is entitled to her own opinions and that she can argue with her parents without ensuing ill-feeling. The father in the story is not portrayed as a privileged patriarch but as a good friend in whom one would wish to confide. David finds that there is hardly any difference in the freedom allowed Aliza and that of her brothers. It is Aliza who invites David to join the family for dinner and to go sightseeing with her, and this latter invitation in particular, indicates that she has no obligation towards her family which keeps her at home.

More important than the values in this story are the IDF's instructions for teachers who are required to base the ensuing discussion on the following questions:

- 1) What is the relationship between parents and children when the children are young?
- 2) What is the relationship between parents and children when the children grow up and become adolescent?

- 3) Do parents and children agree on everything?
- 4) On what do they disagree? What do parents want? What do children want?
- 5) To what extent are children permitted to demand a change in the way of life of their parents?
- 6) To what extent are parents allowed to interfere in the lives of their children?
- 7) What must parents and children do to attain a correct relationship?
- 8) What is the form of this correct relationship?

These questions which are given to the teacher indicate not only the direction in which the soldier-teacher is expected to lead the class but also that the lesson is intended to teach Orientals what constitutes a "correct" relationship.

This kind of education, even though it is an outgrowth of the concept of equality, has far-reaching implications. The Oriental soldier may aspire to create in his home a relationship similar to that which he has learned from Aliza's family. However, since his parents have not been exposed to the same lesson, there is the likelihood that a chasm will develop between the father who wants to cling to his authority and the son who demands more freedom. In the early years of immigration, this new situation

had dysfunctional effects. But as all uprooted and immigrant parents from traditional backgrounds become incapable of fending for themselves when they are transplanted into a Western society and culture, their children come to be relied upon increasingly for economic support and guidance in the new society.

The IDF's socialization of young Orientals has transformed them into individuals with a point of view and way of life different from that of their parents, although a certain respect for their families persists.¹⁶¹

Some youth would still want to leave the head of the family the illusion of exercising authority: they listen but do only what they think is best for them, all to avoid discussions and in order not to shock him.¹⁶²

Their parents, generally unable to fight the growing prestige of their young who know their way in the new society, slowly get into the habit of discussing important family decisions with their children.¹⁶³

This was shown in a recent study in response to the question: "Would your parents discuss with you important decisions?"

	Often	Sometimes	Never
Pupils:	39.9%	46.4%	10.8%
Young Workers	40.5%	37.6%	13.3%

More important, there is the tendency among the young to avoid argument and to try "to explain or convince their parents:"¹⁶⁴

If a discussion between you and your parents takes place, would you follow their advice?

	Generally follow parents advice	Maintain point of view	Try to convince parents
Pupils	41.3%	7.6%	51.1%
Workers	32.8%	19.7%	47.5%

The transformations in the relationship between parent and child have contributed in part to a decline in the extended family among Orientals and to the emergence of a nuclear family comparable to that of the Ashkenazi. The gross rate of reproduction among Orientals has dropped from 2.56 in 1959 to 2.17 in 1966, which means from roughly five or six children to four or five children per family.¹⁶⁵ There is also a decrease in the number of children desired per family:¹⁶⁶

Number of Children Desired

	2 - 4	5 and more
Pupils	71.5%	4.2%
Young Workers	65.2%	3.6%
Students	69.6%	19.5%

These figures clearly show a change in the attitude of Oriental youth to their parents, to their family structure and size. Although not all these changes can be attributed to the IDF, the Army clearly has a lasting impact on the Oriental by exposing him through education and through peer-group influence to a different kind of family structure and pattern of relationships during the three years which he spends in the non-traditional military setting. The IDF therefore contributes to fulfilling its absorptive function, but by challenging his family traditions, by transforming the Oriental, and by breaking his family's structural base, the IDF ignores the receptivity disposition necessary for National Integration. This means that "no Oriental Jewish cultural contribution can be recorded in this area of modern Israeli life."¹⁶⁷

b) Intermarriage among different ethnic groups

Inter-group marriage has rightly been called "one of the most important criteria when measuring the extent and quality of the integration of natives

of different countries in primary groups."¹⁶⁸

Intermarriage indicates the extent to which ethnic groups have accepted each other, have shown receptivity disposition and have been able to adapt their customs and beliefs to one another. Consequently, a multi-ethnic society with a low proportion of intermarriages remains a largely segregated society.

In 1962, only 15% of all marriages in Israel were contracted between members of different ethnic groups, and this figure represents an increase of only 6% in a ten-year period.¹⁶⁹ In interpreting these statistics, it was found that among intermarriages, those between Oriental females and Ashkenazi males were twice as frequent as those between Oriental males and Ashkenazi females and that, of all the combinations between Oriental and Ashkenazi immigrants and Israelis of Oriental and Ashkenazi origin, Oriental males and Ashkenazi females had the highest "rejection index."¹⁷⁰

This is surprising in view of the fact that the IDF plays a similar role in Israel to college in the U.S.A., in drawing young people away from their homes at the crucial age of eighteen for a three year

period during which time they establish new contacts, share common experiences and develop friendships likely to culminate in marriage. Since Oriental girls are generally exempt from army service, it is not to be expected that the IDF can have much effect on their rate of intermarriage. Yet the figures for intermarriage between Ashkenazi grooms and Oriental brides have been highest, fluctuating from 13.40% in 1955, to 18.44% in 1963 and 15.45%, the most recent figure, in 1965.¹⁷¹ Considering the fact that Ashkenazi girls and Oriental men have an opportunity in the IDF to interact for three years, their rate of intermarriage should be considerably higher.

Education is certainly an important factor in promoting or preventing intermarriage. Since the IDF selects girls according to their level of education and their usefulness to the ARmy, they generally hold a higher rank than the average Oriental soldier. This undoubtedly presents an obstacle to intermarriage. The fact that such intermarriages often occur when the Oriental male has distinguished himself, for example in the field of entertainment, testifies to the importance of parity in achievement and education.

The IDF's success in inculcating in Oriental males value appreciation of education has also influenced their attitude to marriage.¹⁷² In a recent survey, of the five criteria proposed to Orientals as a basis for choice of marriage partner-- appearance, education, situation, social origin, and country of origin--education received the highest score from all those interviewed.¹⁷³ The survey also shows that Oriental males place considerable importance on the "respectability" and "social standing" of their marriage partners and that they are no longer interested in the traditional advantages of receiving a dowry.¹⁷⁴

This change in attitude towards education and social status is clearly a change in the direction of the values of the Ashkenazi community, and suggests that Oriental males are predisposed, and perhaps even eager, to marry Ashkenazis who fulfill these aspirations. This is borne out by a survey which found that Oriental males attached "much less importance"¹⁷⁵ to their spouses' country of origin than to education and social origin; that they were well aware of the problems resulting from "mixed" marriages and

yet that many Orientals wanted to marry outside their ethnic community. Their insistence that they would not take parental opposition to intermarriage into consideration represents a drastic change from their traditional customs, where an Oriental youth could not oppose his parents and had little choice in whom he married.

This change in attitude on the part of the Oriental males has not been matched by a comparable socialization of the Ashkenazi female's attitude towards the Oriental male in the IDF, yet the results of the above study would suggest that opposition to intermarriage must come largely from her. While an improvement in level of education among Oriental males would certainly be an important contribution to intermarriage, the IDF should also socialize Ashkenazi females to change their stereotyped attitude and image of the changing Oriental.

At present, however, the Oriental males are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, Oriental females, because of their exemption from army service, have not changed to the same degree as Oriental males; on the other, Ashkenazi females have not yet recognized

the Oriental male's changing standards. This situation has resulted in a decrease in the "attraction index" between the Oriental male and Oriental female and a persistent "rejection index" between Oriental male and Ashkenazi female. In a sense, the IDF has created this situation by raising the Oriental male's aspirations, by educating him but not in sufficient measure, and by exposing him in the IDF only to Ashkenazi females.

If the army has not contributed to intermarriage among Oriental males and Ashkenazi females, it has contributed even less to intermarriage between Oriental females and Ashkenazi males. The IDF needs to re-educate Ashkenazi females, elevate further the standard of Oriental males, and draw Oriental females into the Army, both to give them the education they lack and to enable them to meet Ashkenazi males, before the IDF will even begin to fulfill this index.

Incidentally, the inclusion of Oriental females in the Army would play a large part in improving the integration of Israeli society in every respect. Uneducated mothers only perpetuate low economic and

social standards and Israel is not so blessed with manpower that it can afford to ignore a large sector of its population.

V. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL MORES

The mass immigration of Orientals soon after the establishment of the State consisted primarily of those who had already been on the lowest socio-economic level in their countries of origin. These immigrants had usually lived in urban slums or primitive rural areas and their social and cultural patterns followed those of the society immediately surrounding them. They exhibited a deficiency in practising modern hygiene which was due in part to their lack of modern facilities, such as baths and toilets, and had little interest in cultural activities such as modern music or sport. Local foods and local clothing had the greatest influence on their pattern of life. In their countries of origin, Oriental Jews ate the same type of food as the local population and dressed in such a way that they were almost indistinguishable from the natives. It is

fair to state however, that not all Orientals have undergone the same degree of acculturation in their countries of origin. The colonization of these countries by the French, the British or the Italians contributed to a rise in the standards of hygiene, and to a shift in cultural tastes from Arabic to Western among some of them. Even so their habits of food and dress remained basically the same as that of the native population.

Prior to their immigration to Israel rumours and eye-witness reports led them to believe that Israel suffered from a scarcity of food and clothing. As a result, they carried with them a considerable supply of Middle Eastern spices and surplus clothing of the sort used in their countries of origin. Since the latter, and perhaps to some extent the former are visible cultural traits, they contributed to distinguish them as separate groups when they arrived in Israel.

a) Hygiene

In the IDF the practice of hygiene is taught to soldiers less as a formal subject than as proper

and desirable behaviour in Army life befitting Army discipline, to which each recruit is expected to adapt in due time. Like any other army, soldiers in the IDF are expected to maintain a tidy appearance, a certain standard of cleanliness, and to develop certain habits. These are clearly outlined in a "Guide to the Soldier:"¹⁷⁶

Cleanliness and order are habits beneficial for every man everywhere, but their importance is even greater in the Army:

- 1) to ensure that the many men concentrated in military bases do not catch contagious diseases.
- 2) to preserve the Army's ability to function.
- 3) to show a nice outward appearance which will be attractive to every soldier in every unit.
- 4) to give every soldier the good and pleasant feeling which cleanliness and order bring to those who really insist on them.

You are, therefore, required to watch over the cleanliness of your body and of your living quarters. Wash your hands before every meal and after you have been to the toilet. Wash every day. Change your underwear and your socks often enough and be concerned to clean your living quarters. Take all the vaccines including the smallpox vaccination, as you are required to do by your commanders. Insist on a pleasant and tidy appearance and on the order of your personal belongings as you are commanded to do. You must shave every morning and have a short haircut.

The practice of cleanliness and the habits of hygiene may be considered common to most armies, but specific directions like "Wash your hands before every meal and after you have been to the toilet" are conspicuous details included bluntly by the IDF because of the composition of the Army, a good proportion of which consists of recruits from underdeveloped countries where hygiene practices are lacking, who would not take all such habits for granted.

Evidence of the Army's emphasis on hygiene is to be found in Army camps and barracks in the form of notices and posters. Instead of notices like: "Show your I.D. card," "Ties are required," "No bathing suits are admitted in the dining hall," which are found in American Army camps, the IDF has the following notices:

Do NOT spit or litter. Consider this as your home.

or in the bathroom:

Flush the water when you leave so that it will be clean for the person coming after you.

This kind of behaviour is emphasized in the Hebrew language textbook used by soldiers during basic training

and the first lesson deals with hygiene and describes some of the hygiene practices which the IDF requires of its recruits:

Soldiers clean their clothes and their quarters in such a way as to be ready on time. One polishes his shoes, another cleans his room and makes his bed. There is soap and water available everywhere. The time is short and there is a lot to do...In the shower-room, there is a lot of happy noise....Boys are standing under the shower and singing at the top of their voices...Boys are standing in front of the mirrors shaving. Some of them cut themselves while shaving. As usual they curse their razors. Other soldiers hear this and laugh.

"There's no need to curse the razor; the razor isn't guilty. You have to learn to shave, that's all."

...The time for inspection has come. The soldiers stand in rows, clean, tidy and shaved.¹⁷⁷

Clearly the IDF plays a role in socializing the recruits in the practice of hygiene. The absence of further data on the subject, however, prevents us from evaluating the long term impact of such socialization on the Oriental recruits.

b) Food and Clothing

Although there is no evidence to suggest that the Army attempts to change the Oriental's style of

eating and dress, it is evident that during army service, Orientals are exposed to a uniform which is Western in style and to food which does not resemble their own. Data from the society at large shows that whereas traditional Oriental clothing has almost completely disappeared in Israel, eating habits are changing at a much slower rate. As Donath's study shows, for example, a large number of Orientals still refuse to eat "Ashkenazi" factory made bread and bake their own. Other traditional dishes still seem to prevail in the Oriental's cuisine.

The absorptive function of the IDF in socializing the recruit in habits of eating Western food appears to be limited in great part only to the time the recruit spends in the IDF. Not so in clothing. Orientals seem to respond favourably to Western apparel, specially the young who dress well and regard this as a status symbol.

c) Cultural Interests

The responsibility of the IDF's Branch of Recreation and Entertainment is, as we have seen above,

to provide soldiers with as many opportunities as possible to develop cultural interests at all levels. The Branch sponsors a wide range of activities with the intention of creating in each military base an atmosphere conducive to cultural recreation. Each camp has its own club room, which is a center for social and cultural activities. Here social gatherings are held, lectures are given, study and drama circles meet, chess competitions and Bible quizzes are organized and exhibitions of painting are shown. The purpose of these activities, according to the Head of the Branch is "to give the soldiers a push to take up hobbies and an understanding of how to spend one's leisure time culturally."¹⁷⁸

The "Guide to the Soldier" manual gives the new recruit the following information:¹⁷⁹

Leisure time in the Army is given to you for rest, hobbies, reading, making friends and to take care of all the details for which there is not the opportunity during official duty. Although you are permitted to do what you wish with your free time, it is appropriate that you fill it with cultural content as befits a cultured person. To this end there are at your disposal:

- 1) the Canteen, the Club for games, the Writing and Reading room, which contain newspapers.

- 2) Recreation and Information programs posted on the bulletin board.
- 3) Cinema performances.
- 4) The Library.

In addition you can read books that you have with you or books that you borrow from the unit library, write letters, etc. Worthless forms of recreation like card games, intoxicating drugs, getting drunk from alcohol, etc. are absolutely prohibited.

In case the IDF's recreational preferences are not clear enough from this, soldiers rapidly discover that they have to belong to one leisure circle which meets twice a week. They can choose the one they prefer. They are also ordered to attend certain theatre performances as well as concerts.¹⁸⁰ This is intended to give them experience in this kind of activity and is often their first such experience. They are also taken to universities and museums. After such sessions, there are discussions and explanations of a cultural nature on issues connected with the subject of the visit. Each cultural outing is loaded with cultural significance and intended to impart values other than the mere appreciation of a particular cultural activity.

At Camp Marcus, every Friday morning, students

and teachers gather for a special "cultural hour." Ten or fifteen minutes are spent listening to classical music; this is followed by a review of the week's events, and by readings on subjects of general interest, such as love, friendship, human destiny, and the hour is rounded off by singing a special Saturday song.

The Army attempts to develop in students the habit of reading a newspaper daily. After students have done their daily homework, therefore, time is dedicated to reading a newspaper and to tutorial debates and discussion of the material read. The teachers of the Hebrew language course at the beginning of army service are directed to ask the following questions and to draw the following answers from their students:¹⁸¹

- 1) Why is it important to read a newspaper?
- 2) Is it worth reading a newspaper?
- 3) What is the most important news in a newspaper?
- 4) Would you like to repeat what is the most important news?
- 5) What is the most important section in the newspaper?
- 6) Why is the political news the most important?
(Because it influences the life of every man.
How?)

7) Should only what happens in this country interest us?

(We should be interested in what happens all over the world. What happens in Russia also has an effect on this country.)

8) How does what happens abroad influence us?

9) What is the other news in the newspaper?

10) Of what interest is it to us to know of new factories that have been built and of new villages that have been established?

11) What other types of news do we know?

(Sports news, tournaments, weather reports)

There are a total of thirty one questions in this vein.

Soldiers are also encouraged to play sports and to appreciate their value, both for physical well-being and as an attitude of mind. Again, during the Hebrew language course, the teacher is instructed to lead the discussion in the direction indicated by the following questions:¹⁸²

1) What is the sport which you play?

2) And you?

3) What kind of sport do you like best and why?

4) Do you belong to any team?

5) What sport do you like better--sports played by a team or sports played alone?

- 6) Why do you like to play?
- 7) Are games important? What is their importance?
(Games develop different muscles in our body legs, arms, even breathing)
- 8) What else do sports develop?
(Determination, the will to win, correct behaviour under tension--you must emphasize every characteristic.)
- 9) Are there people who do not hit others on the sports field but who still do not have a sporting attitude?
(New nervous players who shout at the referee or at team-mates)
- 18) What is a sporting audience?
(An audience which behaves well even when its favourite team is losing or when the game is turning to the advantage of the other team-- Examples)
- 19) If so, what are the different qualities that sports develop in us?
(Sports develop in us not only a healthy body, not just courage, the will to win and determination, but also the characteristics of a sporting person and of a nice boy, one who behaves well under all circumstances. Therefore, not every body who wears sports clothes is sporting.)

The field in which Orientals excel most, like Negroes in the U.S. Armed Forces, is music. IDF ensembles usually include a number of Orientals and Oriental tunes are part of the Army's repertoire. For example, Joe Amar, a Moroccan born Israeli, is a well known singer popular in the Army. Oriental

soldiers are also popular in humorous sketches, for instance in sketches where Oriental soldiers appear very naive, but turn out to be more astute than their sergeant-majors. The audience sympathizes with the Oriental soldier and appreciates his shrewdness. This form of humour is considered by the IDF as a positive creation of Israeli culture, unlike sketches of Eastern European Jewish life which are not appreciated by Israeli youth because they are regarded as primarily the product of the ghetto. Perhaps the Oriental has contributed to Israeli culture in the field of entertainment more than in any other. Hebrew translations of some Arabic songs and Oriental tunes applied to Hebrew songs have become increasingly acceptable to young Israelis, although they are still accepted very reluctantly by the old-time Ashkenazi. Perhaps in this field more than any other in the society, and above all in the IDF, receptivity disposition exists between the Ashkenazi and Oriental communities. The Oriental is encouraged to contribute his tunes which are incorporated into the new emerges Israeli folklore and music, but the IDF is also introducing the Oriental to Western Classical

music. There appears to be mutual appreciation and tolerance between the two communities in this area. It should be pointed out, however, that this tolerance is not extended to Arabic music as such-- Orientals listening to Arabic music or talking Arabic continue to create breaches between the two communities.

VI. MINIMUM ECOLOGICAL CONCENTRATION

Like intermarriage, minimum ecological concentration or ecological dispersion of ethnic immigrant groups among the local population in a given country is regarded as an "equally legitimate indicator" of integration. Putting it another way, the creation of ethnically homogeneous enclaves in a society is "not conducive to contacts in primary frameworks or even in secondary ones" and hampers the process of integration.¹⁸³

There is no doubt that in their countries of origin Oriental Jews constituted a homogeneous and closed enclave almost separate from the rest of the society, due to their traditional family patterns and to their status as a religious minority. These

conditions were partly responsible for their easy availability for immigration to Israel. The arrival of such communities in Israel, en masse and with extended families threatened to re-establish the same ecological conditions in Israel as existed in their countries of origin. It fell to the civilian absorption agencies to disperse the new immigrants in urban and rural areas for their geographical and occupational integration. These agencies ignored the desire of the new immigrants to settle where they already had some family.¹⁸⁴ Only a few Orientals who possessed financial means escaped the "allocation" process of these agencies and were able to choose their own place of residence.

By 1961, the attempts of these agencies to disperse the majority of the Orientals had resulted in a very interesting picture. The percentage of Israelis of European origin living in old cities was 60-80% and in the newer cities 43%, but only 32% in the new urban settlements. In other words, in proportion to their weight in the total population, Orientals are largely under-represented in the old cities, but over-represented in the newer towns and

new urban settlements.¹⁸⁵ By the mid sixties, it became even clearer that "the old-timers are concentrated in the older and more established cities of Israel and also in the central areas of the country; the new cities and the new urban settlements are mainly populated by Asian-African immigrants."¹⁸⁶ This "partial segregation" should not be ascribed primarily to the wish of Orientals to congregate near families as Lissak argues, but is more likely to be a result of conditions such as the high price of apartments in Ashkenazi populated urban areas, which prevents families of meagre means from making their home in these areas, and even to the occasional unwillingness of Ashkenazis to allow their homogeneity to be disturbed. Indeed Donath's study supports this view since she finds that only 1.3% of Orientals interviewed desire to live in the same area as their families and that some Oriental women have even expressed the desire not to live near their in-laws.¹⁸⁷

There is no evidence to show that the IDF is correcting this "partial segregation". In fact, one might argue, that the IDF is doing the exact opposite. Soldiers who originate from developing

areas are encouraged by the Placement Office to return to their homes after discharge. These soldiers are given easy-term loans to enable them to establish small businesses in these areas, and sometimes even loans for downpayments on flats or houses, and may use the services of the Placement Office for one year instead of the usual six months.¹⁸⁸ The terms are even better for the soldiers who "respond to the challenge" of development areas for the first time, but the number of soldiers who have done so is very small - about two hundred a year. It should be remembered that since development areas are predominantly Oriental, soldiers who originate in development areas and who are encouraged to return to them, are also predominantly Oriental, and that the soldiers encouraged to move to these areas, who may or may not be Ashkenazi, do not constitute a sizeable enough number to change the facts of "partial segregation." The IDF then, is not arresting this pattern, but through the Placement Office, is helping to perpetuate it, and neither its absorptive function nor its receptivity disposition are fulfilled.

FOOTNOTES

¹E. Ginzberg and D. Bray, The Uneducated (Columbia University Press, 1958); p. 64

²Ibid., pp. 203-4. This pressure consisted of public and congressional criticism.

³Ibid., p. 66

⁴Ibid., p. 67

⁵John Gittings, op.cit., p. 145

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Roy A. Gallant, "Why Red Troops Surrender in Korea," The Reporter, August 15, 1952

⁹Hugh Hanning, Op.cit., p. 151

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Bernard Vernier, op.cit., p. 43

¹²Ibid., p. 44

¹³P. J. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 5

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Aharon F. Kleinberger, Society, Schools and Progress in Israel (London: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1969); p. 44

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 82

¹⁸Moshe Lissak, The Israel Defence Forces as an Agent Of Socialization and Education: A Research in Role-Expansion in a Democratic Society, p. 15

¹⁹ Interview with School Inspector of IDF, Captain Rozen, March 4, 1968.

²⁰ GHQ/Chief Education Officer/The Branch of Schooling, Education in the IDF, (Heb.) pp. 8, 11, 13

²¹ Moshe Lissak, op.cit., p. 15

²² Irving G. Katenbrink, Jr., op.cit., p. 169

²³ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man, p. 42

²⁴ Harold Wood, The Military Specialist, p. 102

²⁵ Moskos, op.cit., p. 172

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ M. Bar-On, Education Processes in the Israel Defence Forces, p. 39

²⁸ Moshe Lissak, op.cit., p. 14

²⁹ Y. Tadmor, op.cit., p. 39

³⁰ Moskos, op.cit., p. 42

³¹ Nathan Brodsky, "The Armed Forces," in Smith, Aker and Kidd, Handbook of Adult Education, p. 285

³² GHQ/Chief Education Officer/The Branch of Schooling, Post-primary Education for Soldiers to be Discharged: A summarized Report, No.2, 1968, (Heb.) p. 3

³³ Ibid. p. 6

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Interview with Captain Rozen, February 22, 1968

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Aharon F. Kleinberger, op.cit., p. 288

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹Central Bureau of Statistics, No. 42, Jerusalem 1969, p. 168

⁴⁰Aryeh Perlberg and Yael Rom, Resume: A compensatory Educational Program on the Higher Education Level for a Culturally Deprived Group in Israel: An Interim Report (June 29, 1968), p. 20

⁴¹Kleinberger, op.cit., chapters 4 and 7

⁴²Perlberg and Rom, op.cit., p. 5

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 12-22

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 19

⁴⁷Paul D. Nelson, "Personnel Performance Prediction," in Roger W. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions (California: Sage Publications, 1971); p. 102

⁴⁸Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, chapter 3.

⁴⁹Edward Bernard Glick, Soldiers, Scholars and Society: The Social Impact of the American Military (California: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1971); p. 50

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 49

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Katenbrink, op.cit., p. 188

⁵³Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," in Roger W. Little (ed.) Handbook of Military Institutions, chapter 9

⁵⁴One of the people who served on this Committee was Professor S.N. Eisenstadt, Dept. of Sociology at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

⁵⁵Le Monde, 20 May 1971

⁵⁶M. Bar-On, op.cit., pp. 59-62

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 29

⁵⁸Miriam Mechner, Bridging the Gap: The Chief Education Officer's Contribution, p. 14

⁵⁹Wadi Salib is a slum district in the Western old city of Haifa, which had a dense population of Oriental immigrants who lived in overcrowded conditions and lacked jobs or vocations which could enable them to be productive in the Labour Market. Their difficult living conditions, their lack of financial means, their despair that anything would be changed and the ease with which other new immigrants were being settled in immigrant housing and villages, their feelings of inferiority and resentment against the prejudice and lack of understanding of the Jewish Agency, led to the Riots of Wadi Salib on July 9, 1959. Discharged IDF soldiers participated in the riots, which were accompanied by violence and looting and were the first of several similar outbreaks which occurred in other Oriental slum district all over Israel. The Investigating Committee later set up to look into this situation urged a rapid integration of these people into Israeli Society. See Y. H. Immanuel, The Gap (Heb.) (Israel: 'Ami Publishers, 1968) pp. 115-6

⁶⁰Moshe Lissak, op.cit., p. 11

⁶¹John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957) pp. 52-3. Also Harold Wool, "The Armed Services as a Training Institution" in E. Ginzberg (ed.) The Nation's Children (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1960) Vol. II, pp.178-9

⁶²Harold Wool, "The Armed Services as a Training Institution", p. 185

⁶³Moskos, op.cit., p. 54. Also see Katenbrink, op.cit., pp. 166-8, and Kurt Lang, "The U.S. Military" in Morris Janowitz, The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1964) p. 59

- ⁶⁴Harold Wool, The Military Specialist, p. 180-2
- ⁶⁵Gittings, op.cit., p. 80
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 151
- ⁶⁷C. T. Hu, "Communist Education: Theory and Practice," in Roderick MacFarquar, China under Mao! Politics take Command, p. 250
- ⁶⁸Hanning, op.cit., p. 149
- ⁶⁹Leo Hamon, op.cit., p. 203
- ⁷⁰M. Bar-On, op.cit., pp. 52-3 and Lissak, op.cit. pp. 11-12
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- ⁷²Lissak, op.cit., p. 10
- ⁷³Joseph W. Eaton, Influencing the Youth Culture: A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel (California: Sage Publications, 1970) p. 168
- ⁷⁴Ibid., p. 169
- ⁷⁵Lissak, op.cit., p. 34
- ⁷⁶Ibid., p. 33
- ⁷⁷The Placement Office/Manpower Division/Ministry of Defence, To the Discharged Soldier No.34/(4) (Heb.) Also GHQ/Chief Education Officer, Post-Primary Education for IDF's Discharged Soldiers, 1967, pp. 1-4
- ⁷⁸The Placement Office, Towards A Secure Future: A Guide to the Soldier about to be Discharged. (Heb.)
- ⁷⁹Interview with Cap. Rozen, February 22, 1968
- ⁸⁰Perlberg and Rom, op.cit., p. 9

⁸¹Judah Matras, Social Change in Israel, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965) p. 153

⁸²Lissak, Social Mobility in Israeli Society (Jerusalem: Israeli University Press, 1969)

⁸³Ibid., p. 9

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 13-21

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 10-11

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 26

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 29

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 39

⁹¹Ibid., p. 43

⁹²Ibid., p. 46

⁹³Morris Janowitz, "Basic Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces," in Roger W. Little (ed.) Handbook of Military Institutions, p. 170

⁹⁴Hamon, op.cit., p. 204

⁹⁵Shlomo Keresh, Beginning B, (Heb.) (GHQ/ The Branch of Schooling, 1955), pp. 48-50

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 48-64

⁹⁷See also Raphael Patai, Israel Between East and West, second edition, 1970, pp. 371-2

⁹⁸S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Position of Women in Israel" in Eisenstadt, Bar-Yosef, and Adler (eds.) Integration and Development in Israel (New York: Praeger 1970) chapter 27

⁹⁹Kleinberger, op.cit., p. 315

¹⁰⁰Morris Janowitz, "Basic Education and Youth Socialization in the Armed Forces," in Little, op.cit. p. 199

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 200

¹⁰²Gittings, op.cit., p. 99

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 101

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 253

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 256-62

¹⁰⁶Hamon, op.cit., p. 192

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 203

¹⁰⁸John D. Chick and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Nigerian Army and African Images of the Military," pp. 15-24

¹⁰⁹Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants, chapter 6.

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¹¹¹Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel, chapter 1.

¹¹²Ibid., pp. 35-45

¹¹³M. Bar-On, op.cit., p. 20

¹¹⁴This egalitarian relationship is extended even to the conditions under which both conscripts and Officers live. There are hardly any differences between the two; sometimes in field units, NCOs and COs may have even harder accommodations than the enlisted men. M. Bar-On, The Process of Integration in the IDF (Heb.) (GHQ/Chief Education Officer, The Branch of Information and Instruction), p. 6

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- 126 The Military Institute, General Explanations: Permanent Instructions and Guidance, undated and un-paged, (Heb.)
- 127 About two million copies of these have been printed and made available to the public.
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- 129 See Questionnaire in Appendix B. Bensimon-Donath interviews and study support these findings, see Bensimon-Donath, op.cit., p. 476

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137 Shlomo Keresh, Beginning B. (Heb.) pp. 78-9

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141 Ibid., p. 417

142 Betzal-el Bar-Kochba, Instruction Sheets: The Bible, (Heb.)(GHQ/Chief Education Officer/The Branch of Schooling) March 1966; p. 162

143 Ibid., p. 155

144 Ibid.

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150 Ibid., p. 424

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CHAPTER SIX

NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN ISRAEL

The last chapter has shown that, in terms of the political formula, the IDF has not contributed sufficiently to National Integration. In order to achieve National Integration according to this formula, an effective and adequate contribution is necessary in each of the indices indicated above. In other words, the IDF should have been able to absorb the Oriental into each of these indices. This it has manifestly failed to do.

We have demonstrated that the IDF's most successful contribution in absorption is to be found in the fields of education, economic specialization and in the socialization of the Oriental in Zionist ideology.

In terms of education, the IDF has succeeded in enforcing a minimum standard of literacy and education by offering Hebrew courses and by making elementary education compulsory. In economic specia-

cialization, the IDF has ensured that Orientals are given a vocation which will enable them to be self-supporting in civilian society. It has, moreover, through the Placement Office, taken great pains to ensure that before discharge, soldiers are placed in a job or in a vocational training course. In connection with the State and the Land, the IDF has succeeded in teaching Orientals that they have both rights and obligations vis-a-vis the State and in developing in them a sense of belonging to the Land by transforming their religious messianism into an effective patriotism. In so doing, the IDF has given Orientals a durable link with both the State of Israel and the Land. Absorption of Orientals in these three fields enables them to function as self-supporting citizens in Israeli society. Orientals have been given the minimum skills and knowledge required to earn a living, to communicate in the language of the State and to deal with State agencies.

Impressive as this may be, it does not constitute a closing of the gap between Ashkenazi and Oriental, and therefore represents an inadequacy in

the IDF's absorptive function. In the first place, most Oriental women do not share in these advantages since they are exempt from military service. Secondly, by giving the Orientals compulsory elementary education, the IDF merely provides them with the minimum educational standard, a standard which has already been attained by the majority of Ashkenazi before entering army service. Therefore, the Oriental, even after completing his elementary education, still remains at a disadvantage in competing with his Ashkenazi counterpart, who, for the most part, has completed at least some secondary education before entering the Army.

The IDF attempted to correct this situation by providing a four-month half-matriculation course for the conscript Army, but the number of places available in this course are limited by inadequate funding, by rigorous entrance examinations and by the lack of qualified teachers. Only about two hundred Orientals a year are in fact accepted in this course, the majority of these embark on pre-vocational secondary school courses. These limitations do not appear to hinder a great number

of Orientals from trying to obtain half-matriculation by correspondence or in evening classes, where there is no limit on the number of places available.

Although there are no figures to indicate how many actually graduate, the duration of these courses and their attendant difficulties would suggest that only the most dedicated succeed in obtaining the desired qualification. It is worth remembering that even if they overcome these difficulties, they have still only obtained the equivalent of two years of secondary school which, in most cases, represents preparation for a vocational qualification. Needless to say, there is no full time course for conscripts in the IDF which leads to full matriculation. However, there is a new program, funded by the American Friends of the Hebrew University, which purports to make secondary education easier to obtain for the underprivileged. It is impossible to know at this stage how successful this new program will be and how many Orientals will benefit from it.

Vocational training in Israel is closely linked to educational level, since each vocational program has its own educational entrance requirement--either elementary education, or half-matriculation or full-

matriculation. As we have seen, the more advanced vocations have correspondingly higher educational entrance requirements. The Oriental who has succeeded in obtaining only an elementary school or half-matriculation certificate will, therefore, be limited in his choice of vocational occupations and will, for the most part, be obliged to fill the lower occupational places in the society. The inadequacies of the IDF's educational programs, therefore, have a direct effect on the position of Orientals in the society where education is an important index for upward social and economic mobility. Clearly then, the IDF contributes more to the Oriental's over-representation in the "construction, industry and trade" category than to his entrance into the "liberal professions, bureaucracy and business," which remain for the most part in the hands of Ashkenazis. The Oriental is thus to be found in the lower 50% of the population which receives only about 25% of the total national income.

The IDF, however, maintains a program which helps Orientals who have matriculated before serving in the Army to enter the high occupational strata.

The University Preparatory Program, which incidentally is funded by Sepharadim, does prepare Orientals for the competitive University Entrance Examinations and increases their chances of graduating. Once again, this program is inadequate because of the number of students which it accepts each year-- only ninety students, or 10% of all applicants.

It is only fair to conclude that the IDF's efforts in the fields of vocational training and education re-establish and perpetuate the Oriental/Ashkenazi dichotomy which exists in Israeli society, and that more education needs to be given to the Oriental if the gap is to be diminished.

The question which arises here is whether the IDF as an Army should be expected to make the efforts necessary to improve the education of Orientals to the point where they can meet Ashkenazis as equals. However, inadequate the training of Orientals by the IDF may be in this respect, we must in fairness to the IDF remember, that it succeeds in giving almost all Orientals a vocation or trade which they can use in civilian life and which helps them to be independent, useful and self-supporting citizens. In so

doing, the IDF is fulfilling a role which no other Army in a developing country with a comparable underprivileged mass has either attempted or achieved, as we saw above in reference to Iran, Nigeria and even China. It is also true, however, that given the already established educational organization and the three year conscription period, the IDF could without too much difficulty do a great deal more than it is doing at present.

The fact that so much more needs to be done reflects on the civilian school system, which still appears to be allowing students to drop out of elementary school and which provides no economic help to enable poor Orientals to complete secondary school. Figures quoted by Fein show that the highest attendance rate is registered by the Israeli born offspring of Western parents of whom 70% are involved in some form of post-primary education, followed by 55% of all third generation Israelis, 49% of all Western immigrants, 38% of all Israeli-born offspring of Oriental parents, and the lowest on the scale, 26% of Oriental immigrants. The enrollment of children in academically oriented

secondary schools is 67% among the Europeans and little more than a third among Orientals. Moreover, a recent study has shown that a uniform, nation-wide curriculum is lacking, and consequently that the academic standard of a given grade varies according to geographical location. The fact that well-qualified teachers are distributed unevenly across the country further adds to the discrepancy between the standards of schools in different areas. Most well-qualified teachers are to be found in urban areas and less or none at all in developing districts which are inhabited predominantly by Oriental immigrants. The school system, which in the last analysis is responsible for education therefore needs urgent self-examination and reform.

In the meantime, however, the IDF could prevent a generation of young Orientals who have already been failed by the schools system from being obliged to perpetuate the gap. What is proposed, therefore, is an intensive effort, but an interim effort, by the IDF to ensure that a greater number of this generation of Orientals be given sufficient education to enable them to compete with Ashkenazis as

equals. Such discrimination in favour of Orientals is essential not only to arrest the gap produced in part by the failures of the school system, but also to accelerate the pace of National Integration,

Although armies can successfully fulfill educational roles, in a healthy polity they should not be allowed to usurp the role of any other civilian agency of state. The IDF's educational role should, therefore, only be regarded as an interim measure and the government should make every effort to ensure that the Israeli school system speedily fulfill its social function.

The IDF's success in creating in the Oriental a sense of solidarity with the State and the Land is counterbalanced by its failure to create a parallel solidarity between him and the Ashkenazi which can endure beyond military service. Solidarity within the Army is maintained because of the imminent danger of war and death, the pressure of the Army setting, and the need for all members of a unit to work together. After Army service, Orientals and Ashkenazi continue to share their identification with the Land

and with the symbols of the State, their preparedness to defend it at all costs, and their memories of the Army experience. However, the lack of ecological dispersion, the low rate of intermarriage, and the growing complaints of the Oriental community, suggest that there is little interaction between Oriental and Ashkenazi in civilian life.

The IDF's failure to contribute to the maintenance of solidarity between the communities beyond Army service is due in part to its failure to contribute successfully to intermarriage and to ecological dispersion. Moreover, its treatment of the social gap between Oriental and Ashkenazi in its education courses is at best inadequate, at worst offensive. Instead of emphasizing the polarization of the communities, the "backwardness" of the East and the "enlightenment" of the West, the IDF might teach the Oriental about the Ashkenazi and vice versa in such a way as actively to promote understanding. In this respect what is most lacking is a course directed specifically to the Ashkenazi on the history, culture, customs and beliefs of Orientals and on their contribution to World Jewry and to Palestine

or Israel. What is essential here is that the tone in which the material is presented be changed to emphasize the positive cultural contributions that the Oriental can make to the State if permitted, and to foster an appreciation of the Oriental's wealth of tradition and culture.

There is no evidence anywhere in the Army's educational courses that this is done. On the contrary, as we have seen above, whenever the IDF's textbooks describe a cultural or social pattern it invariably reflects those of the predominant social type. For instance, when a family situation is described, it is not the Oriental patriarchal family structure but the Ashkenazi egalitarian nuclear family which is used as an example of a "correct" family relationship. When the Sabbath day is described, it is not the traditional day devoted to prayer and religious observance which is familiar to the Oriental but the Ashkenazi's day of leisure and entertainment which is used as the model. Moreover, the prayer book available in the IDF follows the Ashkenazi version of the liturgy without the inclusion of the Oriental's wealth of liturgical traditions.

The IDF has also contributed to a change in family patterns among Orientals. As we have shown above, young Orientals largely possess a point of view and way of life different from that of their parents. A decline is evident in the extended family and young Orientals express a desire for fewer children. Such a rapid transformation of family patterns in less than one generation is likely to result in some dysfunctional effects in the short run, particularly in view of the fact that Oriental women are for the most part neither socialized nor educated by the Army like Oriental men.

The IDF has also caused the Oriental to change some of his patterns in religious matters, The aethiological teaching of the Bible has created a certain laxity in religious observance, at least during Army service. Only 2.2% of Orientals interviewed considered themselves religious in the Army and 31.1% regarded themselves as liberal. Although the IDF allows soldiers to observe religious practices, such as prayer and the dietary laws, it clearly encourages a secular comprehension of the Bible and a more secular approach to religious laws. This

discrepancy between practice and teaching would lead to a conflict in the Oriental which will extend to his relationship with his family whose patterns have been based on a traditional Jewish way of life. We cannot estimate exactly how many religious practices have endured within the Oriental home, but we can note that it is rather unpopular to make an open display of religious observance, particularly among the young. At best, as we have shown, the reassessment of religious values begun in the IDF may have led the Oriental to realize that his Judaism is a mixture of local customs and Jewish traditions.

We have seen, therefore, that the IDF does attempt to contribute to the indices of family mores and secularism and that it does so with a measure of success. This is to endeavour to absorb the Oriental not only into the public sphere of the political formula but to influence and possibly change his private patterns of life. In other words, the IDF does not limit itself to giving him an education, a vocation or trade, and an affinity with his country, which are sufficient to make him

a good citizen, but also endeavours to change his personal behaviour towards his family and his attitude to his faith.

This raises a serious question as to the freedom agencies of state, particularly armies, should be allowed in a democratic society. The power of an army to influence the minds of men should not be underestimated. The attempt of armies, like the PLA and the IDF, to influence men during army service to a particular attitude towards the state is already the thin end of the wedge. It may be argued that in developing countries the inculcation of the sense of nationhood and citizenship is necessary for a viable state. However, the utilization of army service to influence or transform the inter-relationship of members within the family and the family's traditional pattern of beliefs should surely be beyond the concern of armies. This should be an area where the IDF preserves neutrality, either by impartially describing the different cultural, social and religious patterns which have been current in the various Jewish communities, or by leaving

well alone, and not contributing to these indices at all. In either case, the IDF would be demonstrating receptivity disposition, i.e. allowing for mutual and reciprocal "adaptations of belief" between Oriental and Ashkenazi, by not imposing these aspects of the political formula on the Orientals.

The demonstration of such receptivity disposition is in the interest of the IDF if it wishes to achieve successful National Integration rather than partial absorption of the Oriental masses. For successful National Integration, it is necessary not only that the Oriental be absorbed in the economic, educational and ideological spheres, but that he be accepted as an equal in the social and cultural life of the country. Such acceptance can only be achieved if each cultural group is receptive to the peculiarities and characteristics of the other, especially in view of the fact that it is unrealistic to imagine that such characteristics can be eradicated by absorption in one generation. The low rate of intermarriage and the low ecological dispersion in Israeli society are not only symptoms of the society's lack of receptivity, but also, by

perpetuating segregation, actively militate against National Integration. The fact that the IDF contributes less to these indices than to the others is also highly significant.

Indeed the growth of unrest among the Orientals in Israel today can be attributed to inadequate absorption on the one hand and lack of receptivity on the other. The Oriental has been absorbed sufficiently to have aspirations, encouraged by the IDF but frustrated by the society, to improve his social standing and earning power. The Oriental who, as we have shown, is aware of the importance and value of education, finds himself living in an area where schools are below the standards of the national average. The IDF has taught him to observe a certain standard of hygiene, but he often leaves the Army to live in sub-standard and crowded housing. Although he has made some effort to learn a trade or vocation and to acquire some education, he may find that this does not provide him with sufficient income to live as he has learned the Ashkenazis do. After discharge, the Oriental continues to aspire for solidarity with the Ashkenazi, an aspiration

manifest, for example, in the reluctance to claim an Oriental origin. It would, therefore, seem that while the IDF enables the Oriental to function in Israeli society, and perhaps enables him to raise his standard of living, it also leaves him with a number of unresolved contradictions both in his values and beliefs and in the discrepancies between his aspirations and the realities of Israeli society. It is not surprising, therefore, that there should be increasing dissatisfaction and unrest among Orientals.

Officials of the Israeli government deny the existence of a written or unwritten policy of discrimination against Orientals in Israel. Yet a closer look at the composition of the government itself clearly indicates a highly disproportionate representation of more than half the population at all levels from the top organs of state like the cabinet to the most insignificant department of an Israeli consulate in a remote corner of the globe. Moreover, the Israeli government's active and persistent campaigns for immigration from Russia, America and parts of Europe where Ashkenazi Jewry

predominates, show again the Israeli government's partiality in this matter. France, Latin America, and even parts of the U.S.A. have sizeable Oriental and Sepharadi communities containing the elite of Oriental Jewry. Yet the Israeli government has shown little interest, and made less effort, to solicit immigration from these communities as it does annually in the world centers of Ashkenazi Jewry. If, as some Israeli officials claim, Oriental Jewry in Israel has not yet been able to produce an elite stratum capable of sharing in government with the Ashkenazis, then the Oriental and Sepharadi elite outside Israel, if properly mobilized, could serve in this capacity. It could act as a "middle-level elite" between the Ashkenazi and Oriental communities to promote cultural understanding and social justice in Israel.

The choice before Israeli leadership is a crucial one: it can either persist in its present course making only minor concessions in the hope that the abatement of the war will not be utilized by the Orientals to redress their long standing grievances; or, and this would be the wiser course,

it can improve its absorptive function in the economic and educational spheres and begin to practice receptivity disposition both in its attitude to the Oriental and by an active socialization of the Ashkenazi community, and in this way embark on a path more calculated to lead to National Integration.

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE PRESCRIBED READING FOR COMMANDERS AT THE MILITARY TRAINING INSTITUTE AND OFFICERS AT THE MILITARY EDUCATIONAL COLLEGE

The pamphlets prescribed to Commanders and Officers are either condensed versions of an important work translated into Hebrew, or selections. The prescribed reading is subject to change each year according to the needs of the time. Some of these are:

BROWNE C.G. and COHEN T.S. (eds.), The Study of Leadership

1. I. Nickerbocker, "Leadership: A conception and some implications."
2. A. W. Gauldner, "Situations and Groups: The Situational Critique."

HILGARD, Introduction to Psychology

1. The Perception of Objects and Events.
2. The Nature of Learning.
3. Motivation
4. Emotion.
5. Conflict and Adjustment.

KRECH, CRUTCHFIELD and BALLACHEY, The Individual in Society

1. The Characteristics of Conformist Behaviour.

MACCABY, E., NEWCOMB T. and HARTLEY E., (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology.

1. Ferenc Merei, "Group Leadership and Institutionalization."
2. Robert F. Bales, "Task Roles and Social Roles in Problem Solving Groups."
3. S. E. Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgements."

THIBAUT J. and KELLY H. H., The Social Psychology of Groups

1. Conformism towards Group Norms.

CARTWRIGHT and ZANDERS, Group Dynamics.

1. The Group, its characteristics, functions and influence. Chapters on Social Psychology.

MERTON, Robert K., Bureaucratic Structure and Personality (condensed)

JANOWITZ, Morris, Sociology and the Military Establishment (condensed)

JOHNSON, John J., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.

1. Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization."

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE TO SOLDIERS

This questionnaire was used in a sample of forty five Oriental and Ashkenazi soldiers at Camp Marcus, including new immigrants and members of the veteran population. The soldiers were studied at elementary school and therefore, at the end of their military service. The findings have been incorporated in the research.

- 1) What do you like most about army life?
- 2) What do you like least about army life?
- 3) Do you feel that army life has changed you in any way?
- 4) How do you get along with other recruits/officers of Ashkenazi origin?
- 5) When you were in the army, did you feel that civilians treated you nicely?
- 6) Do you think that your attitude towards religion



- in any way through the Army?
- 7) Do you keep in touch with Army friends of Ashkenazi origin?
 - 8) How many Ashkenazi friends did you have before entering the Army? Many, few, none.
 - 9) How many Ashkenazi friends do you have after leaving the Army? Many, few, none.
 - 10) Do you like your Ashkenazi friends?
 - 11) Do you belong to any sport, music clubs in the Army? If not, why?
 - 12) How much did you learn about Israel in the Army?
A lot, not much, half of it I knew already, a little, nothing.
 - 13) Education: Primary school:
Elementary school:
Four/Two years secondary school:
Technical school:
Agricultural school:
 - 14) How many children would you like to have?
 - 15) Would you bring them up the way your father and mother brought you up?
 - 16) What do you feel about your wife working?
 - 17) In general, would you prefer to live in a house in which all families came from your country of origin?


- 18) If you could choose between an ethnically mixed house and a house in which all the families came from your own country of origin, which one would you choose?
- 19) Do you like living with your parents? If not, why?
- 20) Do you like your parents' friends?
- 21) Do you think that conditions of living with Ashkenazis will improve in time?
- 22) In case of need, do you think your neighbours would help you?
- 23) Would you prefer to live in another country?
- 24) Do you think the government is going to help stop discrimination?


The above questionnaire was adapted from:

COLEMAN, James S. The Adolescent Society. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961.

BETTLEHEIM, Bruno and JANOWITZ, Morris. Social Change and Prejudice. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963.







*Regional Education Officers are chosen and nominated by the Chief Education Officer of the IDF.

The Branch Of
SCHOOLING

Army Central
School for
Education at
Camp Marcus

Officer in
charge of
Libraries and
Press

Geography &
Study
of the Land

General Staff
Guide Team

Command Guides
and Guides in
Units

Secondary
Education
Section

Evening Second.
in cities and
large bases.

Matric. classes
for Officers
(concent. studies)

Teachers' Semin.
for soldiers in
Tel-Aviv

Languages and
Related
Studies sec.

Evening Study
Centers in
large cities

Study Groups
in
Units

Individual
Studies

Elementary
Education
Section

General Staff
Supervisory team

General Staff
Teachers' Pool

Area Command
Schools

Hebrew Teaching
in Bases and
Units

The Branch of
INFORMATION & INSTRUCTION

Section for
Oral
Information

Section for
Written
Information


Section for
Audio-visual
Information


Section for
Research & for
Educational Train.
of Commanders.

Military
College

Military
Institute

The Branch Of
RECREATION & ENTERTAINMENT





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V. INTERVIEWS

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