

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH KASHMIR

1885 - 1893

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the University of London

School of Oriental and African Studies

November, 1963

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ABSTRACT

This thesis primarily deals with British relations with the State of Jammu and Kashmir between 1885 and 1893. During that time the State was brought in line with the other Native States of British India by the imposition of a Political Resident, and a beginning was made for its modernisation by introducing a series of reforms.

The responsibility for introducing this change devolved upon Lord Dufferin, but the policy which led to it had been the result of mature deliberation by successive Governors-General since the creation of the State in 1846. Pratap Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, opposed the appointment of a British Resident, although he agreed to introduce reforms himself. But he was not an able ruler, and worse still, there were rival factions at his Court. Further complications set in owing to the interference of the Residents and their zeal for power. As a result, reform measures made little progress and factional conflicts were embittered. The anomaly of the situation reached its climax with Pratap Singh's resignation of power and his consequent supersession.

The task of governance then fell upon a State Council. Pratap, of course, soon appealed for his restoration, but Lansdowne decided to try the Council rather than the Maharaja. And, if eventually he agreed to restore Pratap partially, he went ahead vigorously with the scheme of reform. It involved, inter alia, the reorganisation of the Kashmir Army for imperial defence which also necessitated the re-establishment of

the Gilgit Agency. That measure was a means to consolidate British influence along the Kashmir frontiers by checking tribal incursions and foreign intruders like Afghanistan and Russia. The latter object could only be secured by having the Kashmir frontiers clearly defined. This was done by the Durand Agreement of 1893, which defined the Indo-Afghan frontiers and set a limit to Russian aggression.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Add. Mss.	Additional Manuscript
CIPD	Collections to India Political Despatches
Cons.	Consultation
ESLI	Enclosures to Secret Letters received from India
F.O.	Foreign Office
G.I.	Government of India
IFP/	India Foreign Proceedings
I.O.	India Office
IPFP	India Political and Foreign Proceedings
IPWP	India Public Works Proceedings
K.W.	Keep-withs
MINWF	Memorandum of Information regarding the North-West Frontier
NAI/FDP	Foreign Department Proceedings in the National Archives of India
P.A.R.	Punjab Administration Reports
PCD	Peshawar Confidential Diary
PFPP	Punjab Foreign Proceedings
PMC	Political and Miscellaneous Correspondence
PP	Parliamentary Papers
PRGS	Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society
PSDI	Political and Secret Despatches to India
PSDOC	Political and Secret Demi-Official Correspondence

PSHC	Political and Secret Home Correspondence
PSLEI	Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures from India
PSM	Political and Secret Memoranda
Sec.	Secret
SLEI	Secret Letters and Enclosures from India
SPLBI	Secret and Political Letters from Bengal and India
S.S.	Secretary of State for India
W.O.	War Office

INTRODUCTION

The period between 1885 and 1893 was one of transition in the history of Kashmir. Hitherto recognised as a quasi-independent State, Kashmir was reduced during this period to the position of the other Native States of India, and was completely brought within the Indian political system. This change was introduced in answer to a question that had been raised since practically the creation of the State in 1846: what was to be the position of Kashmir in relation to the British Empire in India?

The transformation began with the appointment in 1885 of a British Resident at the Court of the Kashmir Maharaja. It was completed in 1893 when an understanding was reached between Britain and Russia as to the demarcation of the Pamir boundaries. The concept of change was a composite one: political control was to be imposed upon the Kashmir Darbar in order to ensure the introduction of a scheme of reform, of which the State then stood in great need - especially as an integral part of the Indian Empire.

All this was demanded by a gradual deterioration of the Kashmir administration during the reign of Maharaja Ranbir Singh,¹ son and successor of Gulab Singh of the Lahore Darbar whom the British Government had made the ruler of the newly created State of Jammu and Kashmir in

¹Henvey's Report, 15 May 1880, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p. 27; Sufi, G.M.D. Kashir, pp. 796-802.

1846.² Consequently, a need was felt for a firmer control over the Maharaja's Government, especially in view of the rapid march of events upon the north-west frontier of India.³ Russia's advance towards that frontier had been well accelerated by the fall of Samarkand in 1868. From that time till the conquest of Merv in 1884 her advance had been continuous. Reports were even received of Russian activities upon the Pamirs.⁴ The situation was aggravated by Afghan intrigues in Swat, Bajaur and Dir, and it was rumoured that the Amir even intended to extend his influence up to Gilgit.⁵ All this made it imperative that Kashmir, an important frontier State, could not be left alone at the risk of the security of the Indian Empire.

Even so, it is interesting to note that the change in the Kashmir administration, though introduced in 1885 by Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy of India between 1884 and 1888, was not originally conceived by him. It was the result of mature consideration by successive Governors-General since practically the treaty of Amritsar.⁶ Nor was

²P.P., 1846, XXXI, (705), pp. 99-104; Panikkar, K.M. Gulab Singh or the Founding of the Kashmir State, pp. 111-15.

³G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p.27; P.P. 1890, LIV, C.6072, pp. 231-32.

⁴Encl. in F.O. to I.O., 1 Oct. 1883, PSHC/59, p.363.

⁵Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S., 1 Aug. 1884, PSLEI/41, p. 597; PCD, 19 Dec. 1884, PSLEI/43, p.75.

⁶Infra, Chap. I.

it deliberately intended to be introduced in 1885 which happened to be a very important year in the history of Indian defence. It was just a coincidence of history that the death of Ranbir Singh, which was the signal for the appointment of a British Resident in Kashmir, occurred in the same year as the Panjdeh crisis.⁷ That event was the prelude to a big change in the system of India's defence, and was directly responsible for the reorganisation of the Native States Armies. But once the change was initiated, it went on till it was completed in 1893. Between them Dufferin and his successor, Lord Lansdowne, shared the responsibility for completing that process of change which, it has been said, ushered in a new era for the State of Kashmir.⁸

If the local aspect of the Kashmir problem tended towards a solution with the establishment of complete political control over the administration of the State in 1889, the imperial aspect, namely, that of the defence of the Kashmir frontiers against a possible encroachment by Russia upon the northern frontiers of India, continued

⁷ Panjdeh was a territory upon the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. Her title to it was rather dubious. Nevertheless, its occupation by Russia on 30 March 1885 created tension and a war between England and Russia on the issue of its ownership very nearly came within the range of possibilities. Ghose, D.K. England and Afghanistan, Chap. VI. If the war was averted, the new Russian threat led to a reconsideration of the question of India's defence, and in consequence, the scheme of re-organisation of the Native States' Armies in India gradually came into being.

⁸ Sufi, G.M.D. Op.cit., p.815.

to be a matter for concern till the Durand Mission was sent to Kabul and Sir Mortimer, Lansdowne's Foreign Secretary, was able to come to a satisfactory agreement with Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, in regard to the north-west frontiers of India. That agreement has hitherto been regarded as important on the ground that it settled the frontier issues between Afghanistan and India.⁹ But Durand's work at Kabul was equally, if not more, important in that it provided the basis for the settlement of the northern frontiers with Russia. If, indeed, the Durand Agreement was the high watermark of Lansdowne's "forward frontier policy"¹⁰ it marked the climax of his Kashmir policy as well.¹¹

This theme has been elaborated into the texture of the present thesis which has been based upon nearly every type of available source material, both published and unpublished, including some demi-official papers from the Indian Archives at New Delhi which are not available in British Record Offices. Geographically, the thesis deals with the State of Jammu and Kashmir with its dependencies, and the numerous tribal states which lay to the south of the great mountain barrier formed by the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs and the Karakoram ranges - "all

⁹Harris, L. British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889-1901, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis of the University of London, 1960.

¹⁰Durand to Lansdowne, 10 Nov. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(j), p.450.

¹¹Infra, Chap. VII.

geologically one".¹² The area under discussion consisted of diverse tribal organisations, often at war with each other, and a source of trouble to the Kashmir Darbar. To the north-west of Gulab Singh's dependencies of Ladakh and Baltistan there lay, south of the Pamirs, a number of non-Pathan tribal territories stretching to the south-west as far as Dir, Swat and Bajaur which were generally known as Dardistan.¹³ The most northerly of them were the small states of Hunza and Nagar of which the former was strategically very important because it was traversed by a number of passes cutting across the mountain barrier of the north.¹⁴ No less important than Hunza was the State of Chitral to the west which included Yasin, and was accessible without difficulty from the side of the Oxus, and therefore held a very important position in the defence scheme of the northern frontiers of Kashmir.¹⁵ South-east of Chitral were the trans-Indus States of Gor, Chilas, Darel and Tangir. Of these Chilas was by far the biggest, and its inhabitants were perhaps the most fanatical of the Dard tribes.¹⁶ Strategically, it was of considerable

¹²Douglas, W.O. Beyond the High Himalayas, p.9.

¹³Durand, A.G. The Making of a Frontier, Chap. VII.

¹⁴Report on the Northern frontier of Kashmir by Algernon Durand, 5 May 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-60; Younghusband to Nisbet, 30 Dec. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11; Eckenstein, O. The Karakoram and Kashmir, p. 119.

¹⁵Memo. on Chitral by A.N.Wallaston, 8 Oct. 1878, PSM/A18; Younghusband's Report on the Hindu Kush Passes, Feb. 1894, PSM/A95.

¹⁶Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 917-24; vide also Bamzai, P.N.K. The History of Kashmir, p. 610.

importance, as it flanked the Kashmir route to Gilgit, the defensive nucleus of Dardistan, and also commanded a direct route to that place from British territory.

A word on the dependencies of the Kashmir State is also necessary to explain the scope of the present thesis. By 1819 both Jammu and Kashmir had been annexed by Ranjit Singh, the ruler of the Punjab, to his Kingdom. Next year, Ranjit handed over Jammu to Gulab Singh, a Dogra adventurer, for his faithful services to the Lahore Darbar.¹⁷ Kashmir proper was ruled by a succession of governors till 1841, when Gulab was called upon to suppress a rebellion in the Kashmir territory, and since then became virtually the master of the entire valley.¹⁸ In the following years began the expansion of the Kashmir territories to the north. By 1860 Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit fell to the Dogras. Three years later Yasin was occupied with great cruelty, but was soon lost to Chitral. Not long after, Ghazan Khan of Hunza offered his allegiance to the Darbar, though continuing to send a small tribute to the Chinese Emperor. During these years some of the Indus Valley tribes were also attacked by Kashmir troops, and Chilas and Darel were compelled to pay tribute.¹⁹ Several years later, in 1878, Chitral accepted the

¹⁷Panikkar, K.M. op.cit., pp. 27-29.

¹⁸Sufi, G.M.D. op.cit., pp. 725-51.

¹⁹Panikkar, K.M. op.cit., Chap V, pp. 141-48; Sufi, G.M.D. op.cit., p.495; Bamzai, P.N.K. op.cit., pp. 609-10, and 620-21; Infra, Chap. VI, p. 332.

suzerainty of the Kashmir Darbar.²⁰ Even so, the influence of the ruler of Kashmir over his dependencies was more nominal than real. The two most important tributaries, Chitral and Hunza, ruled independently for all practical purposes. Hunza even did not hesitate to trouble the Darbar whenever necessary. In fact, the northern frontiers of Kashmir were in a continuous state of flux, and whenever suitable opportunities presented themselves, the authority of the Darbar was set at defiance by its feudatories.²¹ In the fitness of things, therefore, the Kashmir policy of the Government of India included the task of consolidating British influence along the northern frontiers of the State, and that in the interests not merely of the Maharaja alone, but also of the Indian Empire.

²⁰ Aitchison, C.U. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. XI, p.427; Bamzai, P.N.K., op.cit., p.621.

²¹ Infra, Chaps. I, VI and VII.

Chapter I

THE KASHMIR RESIDENCY QUESTION

(1846 - 1884)

At the time of the First Sikh War the provinces which constituted the State of Kashmir had come, more or less, under the rulers of the Lahore State and one of its principal leaders, Raja Gulab Singh. The battle of Sobraon was followed by the British occupation of Lahore and the submission of the Sikhs to the British army. On the part of the Lahore Darbar, Gulab Singh was deputed to treat for peace, and the result was the first treaty of Lahore, signed on 9 March 1846.¹ By the twelfth article of this treaty provision was made for the creation of a State at Jammu which was also to include other territories in the hills. The new state was set up to act as a counterpoise to the Sikh State at Lahore, and the Company's Government decided to confer it on Gulab Singh by a separate treaty, which was concluded at Amritsar on 16 March 1846.²

By that treaty the British Indian Government transferred "for

¹P.P., 1846, XXXI, (705), pp. 99-102; Aitchison, C.U. Treaties, Engagements and Sanads etc., Vol.I, pp. 50-54.

²P.P., Ibid., pp. 104-05; Aitchison, C.U., Ibid., Vol.XII, pp. 21-22; Panikkar, K.M. Gulab Singh, or The Founding of the Kashmir State, pp. 111-15.

ever in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi". In consideration of this transfer of territory Maharaja Gulab Singh agreed to pay to the British Government a sum of seventyfive lakhs of rupees, fifty lakhs to be paid on ratification of the treaty, and twentyfive lakhs on, or before, 1 October 1846. (article 3) The Maharaja further agreed to "refer to the arbitration of the British Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring state", and "to abide by the decision of the British Government". (Article 5) By the sixth article of the treaty, the Maharaja engaged "for himself and heirs to join with his whole military force, the British troops, when employed in the Hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions".

Gulab Singh further engaged "never to take or retain in his service any British subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the consent of the British Government". (Article 7) The ninth article secured to the Maharaja the solemn pledge of the British Government to give its aid in protecting his territories from external enemies, while by the tenth or the last article he acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government and, in token of such supremacy agreed to present them annually with one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male and six

female), and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, a territory of about 80,000 square miles, was thus brought into being. Admittedly, the State was created in the interest of frontier defence³ - a policy which doubtless postulated that the State should be sufficiently strong for such a role, and that the British-Indian Government should have an adequate control over its affairs. But no such provision was included in the treaty of Amritsar, and this has led historians like K. M. Panikkar to emphasise the independent status of the Kashmir Maharaja. The argument to support this contention has been that "no control was exercised by the British Government in the administration (of the State), and no Resident was appointed".⁴ Whenever, in fact, the question of appointing a Resident in Kashmir was raised by the Indian Government, the Maharaja objected to it on the ground that his independent status was guaranteed by the first article of the treaty of Amritsar.

Such a claim, however, rested upon very doubtful assumptions. For one thing, whatever meaning may be attributed to the phrase "independent possession" in the first article of the treaty, Gulab Singh's independence was certainly qualified by the definite assertion of British supremacy in the last article. Besides, the ruler of

³ Bal, S. British Policy towards the Punjab 1844-49, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, London University, p.105. 1963,

⁴ Panikkar, K.M. op.cit., p.126.

Kashmir engaged himself to send to the British Government an annual gift which, however small, was nevertheless a symbol of "allegiance and subordination".⁵ At any rate, a literal interpretation of the treaty of Amritsar was never intended by its authors; at least Hardinge, the Governor-General of India, wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors three days after the treaty had been signed: "The Maharaja is declared by the Treaty independent of the Lahore State,⁶ and under the protection of the British Government".⁷

As a matter of fact, any literal interpretation of the treaty of Amritsar would have precluded Gulab Singh from acquiring territories in Gilgit, not to speak of those of Ladakh and Baltistan. The first article of the treaty had only guaranteed to the Maharaja territories to the east of the Indus, while the fourth article for-

⁵ Lee-Warner, W. The Native States of India, p. 322.

⁶ Italics mine.

⁷ SPLBI/XIII.

A fine example of the British attitude towards Kashmir and its Prince is afforded by Charles Viscount Hardinge. He writes: "On our way to Kashmir, we visited Ghulab Singh in his hill fortress of Jamu. Nothing could exceed the cordiality of the reception we met with, all being done of course with a special object. When we were summoned to Ghulab's presence, a diplomatic difficulty arose. (Capt.) Nicholson, so distinguished in after years, was our interpreter and master of the ceremonies, and he insisted on our taking off our boots before our introduction to the Raja. Being in full uniform, we held a consultation with Lord Elphinstone, and unanimously agreed that we would not make fools of ourselves, merely to please a man who owed everything to the British." Lord Hardinge, pp. 137-38.

bade him from extending his boundaries without the consent of the British Government. In fact, "the hill country was made over" to Gulab Singh "with all its duties and obligations"⁸, and it was stipulated that the Maharaja should act up to his engagements consistently with the maintenance of British paramountcy "over the Raja and the country"⁹.

But apart from these general stipulations, the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir was also discussed as a possible consequence of Gulab Singh's neglect or failure to carry out reforms. Scarcely was the ink on the treaty of Amritsar dry than direct interference into the affairs of the State had to be resorted to. Henry Lawrence¹⁰ heard complaints from the Jagirdars and other grantees that the Maharaja was resuming their ancient possessions.¹¹ Consequently,

⁸ Lawrence to Gulab Singh, 6 Nov. 1846, ESLI/108.

⁹ Hardinge to the Court of Directors, 4 March 1846, SPLBI/XIII.

¹⁰ After the conclusion of the Lahore treaty, Major (shortly afterwards Lieutenant Colonel) H. M. Lawrence remained at Lahore as Agent to the Governor-General in charge of the political relations of the British Government with the Darbar. This arrangement continued until the treaty of Bhairawal, executed in December 1846, when the Lahore Government, in return for the continued service of the British garrison, agreed to admit of more direct supervision during the minority of the Maharaja. Lt. Col. H.M. Lawrence was then made Resident as well as Agent to the Governor-General for the North-West Frontier, which continued to be the designation of the appointment until 6 March 1848 when it was altered to that of Resident at Lahore and Chief Commissioner of the Cis- and Trans-Sutlej States.

¹¹ Panikkar, K.M. op.cit., p.136.

Lt. R. G. Taylor,¹² Assistant to the British Resident at Lahore, was sent to Kashmir to enquire into the whole system of administration, and to draw up a programme of reform. This he did, and the Maharaja agreed to carry out the measures recommended. But Lawrence soon had occasion to doubt whether the Maharaja was earnest in his protestations, and capable of fulfilling his promises. He therefore suggested that it might be useful to depute a respectable native agent to Kashmir who could keep the Government informed "without being an incubus on the local authorities".¹³

Not that Gulab Singh was thoroughly averse to reforms.¹⁴ In fact, Lawrence himself was never convinced that the Maharaja was absolutely incorrigible. Even so, whenever he heard reports of misgovernment or oppression in Kashmir¹⁵, he impressed upon the Maha-

¹²Reynell George Taylor (1822-1886), General of the Indian army; fought in the first Sikh War, when he was wounded, 1845; worked at Lahore and in the Punjab under the Lawrences, 1847; captured the fort of Lukku in the second Sikh war, 1849; given the Star of India, 1866; General 1880.

¹³Lawrence to Currie, 12 Nov. 1846, ESLI/108. Partly quoted in Edwardes, H. B. & Merivale, H. Life of Henry Lawrence, II, pp. 77-80.

¹⁴Taylor reported that the Maharaja's acts were characterised generally by kindness and consideration for his subjects. Taylor to Lawrence, n.d. ESLI/113. Hardinge was satisfied that the Maharaja was exhibiting considerable anxiety to meet the wishes of the British Government, and deserved its commendation by the adoption of measures calculated to improve the country generally and ameliorate the condition of his subjects. PP, 1849, XLI, (1071), p.113. vide also, Lahore Political Diaries, III, p. 31.

¹⁵Vans Agnew, an assistant in the Lahore Residency, who paid a hurried visit to Kashmir, reported on 28 Nov. 1847 that the reforms planned by Mr. Taylor were not being carried out. ESLI/113. His report, however, was not considered impartial either by Lawrence or by Hardinge.

raja - irrespective of whether he believed in the reports or not - that the essential condition of his independence was his capacity to govern his subjects with justice and equanimity, and his ability to ameliorate their conditions; that if he should fail to fulfil the expectations of the British Government, "some other arrangement will be made for the protection of the hill people".¹⁶ The same sentiment was echoed by Henry Hardinge. "In no case will the British Government be the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his people" - was his parting address to Maharaja Gulab Singh, and this was followed by a solemn assertion that unless "the evil of which the British Government may have a just cause to complain be not corrected, a system of direct interference must be resorted to".¹⁷

All this was capped by a clear statement of British policy by Sir Henry Lawrence in one of his private letters to H. M. Elliot,¹⁸ who succeeded Frederick Currie as Secretary to the Government of India. This letter is unfortunately without date, but evidently, it was written about this period. After repeating his impression and

¹⁶ Lawrence to Gulab Singh, 29 Nov. 1847, ESLI/113.

¹⁷ Kharita to Gulab Singh, 7 January 1848, vide Hardinge's Minute, 1st January 1848, ESLI/113.

¹⁸ Sir Henry Miers Elliot (1808-53): Indian Civil Servant; previous to his appointment as Foreign Secretary, was Secretary to the Sudder Board of Revenue for the North-West Frontier Provinces. He negotiated the Sikh treaty of 1849.

his hopes that the reports of Vans Agnew¹⁹ were somewhat exaggerated, Sir Henry observed "that early next season one or two officers will go and thoroughly examine the valley, and on their report will depend whether the Maharaja is to be saddled with a permanent Resident or remain independent." This was the strongest argument he could use "short of saying we will take the country".²⁰ It was not without reason that both Hardinge and Lawrence warned the Maharaja in these unmistakable terms. By the right of victory in the Punjab War the territories of Kashmir had passed into the hands of the Indian Government. The country remained in their possession for a certain time, and was then entrusted to Maharaja Gulab Singh. But they apprehended that if afterwards it should appear that by that act of transfer they had made over a whole people to a harsh and oppressive ruler, both the Queen and the people of England would blame them for what would certainly be considered an act of folly.²¹

¹⁹Patric Alexander Vans Agnew (1822-1848): Assistant to the Resident at Lahore, 1848; despatched on administrative mission to Multan; was there murdered by natives (April), an outrage which led to the Second Sikh War and the annexation of the Punjab.

²⁰Quoted in a Memo. n.d., Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S. 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, pp. 81-85. A similar sentiment finds expressinn in an official letter from Lawrence to Elliot, dated 26 March 1847. ESLI/110. The Government of India approved of it. Elliot to Lawrence, 3 April 1847, Ibid.

²¹Taylor's Diary, 26 July 1847, Lahore Political Diaries, 1847-49, VI, p. 70.

The question of appointing a Resident in Kashmir was again raised in 1851. Owing to the natural attractions of Kashmir as a field of sport and holiday resort the number of British visitors to the Valley was largely increasing every year. The need was therefore felt for an officer to look after their interests. The suggestion came from Sir Henry Lawrence, and Lord Dalhousie, then the Governor-General of India, was eager to consider the appointment of a regular British agent.²² The Maharaja's objection to such an arrangement was well apprehended²³, and eventually an agreement was come to that a British officer would reside in the valley only during the summer months. Personally, Lord Dalhousie was unwilling to assent to the appointment of a civil officer every year, and agreed to the arrangement only as a temporary expedient.²⁴ The officer thus appointed was authorised to arbitrate in any dispute that might arise between the authorities of the country and the British visitors, and to take cognisance of any oppression or irregularities which could be charged against them.²⁵

During the next two decades the Residency question was kept

²² Dalhousie to Sir H. Lawrence, 8 July 1851, Dalhousie Papers/Section 6, No. 98.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Dalhousie to Sir H. Lawrence, 5 Jan. 1852, Ibid.

²⁵ IPFP/Range 200, Vol.X, Cons.82; Henry Lawrence to Dalhousie, Dec.20, 1851, Dalhousie Papers/Section 6, No.71.

alive not merely by the Anglo-Indian Press, but also by interested individuals as well as officials of the Punjab Government. The transfer - or sale, as it was often called - of Kashmir to Gulab Singh was considered a mistake²⁶, and there were men who even hoped that the public might be induced to look with favour upon the permanent acquisition of Kashmir.²⁷ It was argued that Kashmir was actually a part of the Punjab, and was a place of great importance to the security of the north-western frontier of India. Possessed of a European climate, it would serve at once as a fortress, a depot and a sanatorium, and with a good road through the Baramula Pass, "a British force in the highest state of health and appointment could, in a very few days, be marched thence to deploy along the banks of the Indus, or meet any invader in the plains of Afghanistan".²⁸

But political expediency was not the only consideration that weighed against the continued existence of Kashmir as an 'independent' state. Charges of oppression and tyranny - reminiscent of Lord Dalhousie's indictment that "the fertile and unhappy province of Cashmere we unwittingly handed over to a chief who has proved himself

²⁶The Friend of India wrote: "Next to the Cabul disasters this (the sale of Cashmere to Gulab Singh) is the greatest blot in our history." 31 Dec. 1863, p. 1482. Again on Nov. 24, 1864, p. 1323, it reminded that it was time that "the territory so foolishly given away should be resumed".

²⁷PRGS, 1859-60, IV, pp. 31-32.

²⁸Ibid.

a veritable tyrant".²⁹ — were brought against the Maharaja.³⁰

It was urged that a policy which was suited to the complete growth of the Empire - and not the prevailing attitude of non-interference with Native States - should be adopted, so that the Queen's supremacy which was unquestioned in fact could as well be recognised in form by the Kashmir prince.³¹

Another very common complaint³² against the Kashmir chief was his acquisition of Gilgit and Yasin in violation of the treaty of 1846. The first article of that treaty, as we have seen, had only granted him territories to the east of the Indus while the fourth article precluded him from acquiring new territories without the consent of the British authorities.³³ The cry was raised that such

²⁹Minute by Dalhousie, 28 February 1856, Dalhousie Papers/Section 6, No. 212; also Temple Collection/B.42.

³⁰The Friend of India, Nov. 24, 1864, p. 1322; Thorp, R., Kashmir Misgovernment, London 1870.

³¹The Friend of India, 23 Nov. 1865, p. 1367.

³²Ibid., 31 Dec. 1863, p. 1482; The Pioneer, May 9, 1870, p.3.

³³Supra pp.17-18. As already discussed, a literal interpretation of the treaty was hardly ever intended, and as such, this argument does not seem to conform to the reality of the situation. On the contrary, in 1848, Sir John Lawrence, then officiating as Resident and Agent to the Governor-General at Lahore, actually urged the Maharaja to strengthen the Gilgit garrison, and appoint an able commander there. Much later, in 1870, Gilgit was officially stated to have been included within the territories formally ceded to the Maharaja by the treaty of Amritsar, India to Punjab, 16 May 1870, Encl. 6 to Mayo to Argyll, 17 May 1870, SLEI/6, p. 379. Alder, J.G., British Policy on the Roof of the World, Unpublished Bristol thesis, 1959.

proceedings of the Maharaja should be stopped, and the feudatory duties, which the past indifference of the Government of India had allowed him to ignore, should now be exacted from him. Imperatively, the way to do that was to appoint "a Political Resident with full powers" at the Kashmir Darbar, and fix the Maharaja's boundaries at the Indus.³⁴

This line of argument, however, did not go altogether unchallenged, although it stimulated a hope that Sir John Lawrence, the Governor-General of India, would complete the service he had rendered in the establishment of a British Agency at Ladakh, by appointing a permanent Resident in Kashmir.³⁵ Criticising one Mr. Thorp's statement³⁶ in the Friend of India that he was ill-treated by the Kashmir Government the Englishman observed that nothing could exceed the kindness and hospitality the Maharaja extended to foreign visitors, and therefore "the nonsensical cry about oppression should cease".³⁷

Lord Lawrence, too, though considerably annoyed by adverse Press criticisms,³⁸ refused to give way. He had "no apprehensions" about

³⁴The Pioneer, May 9, 1870, p.3.

³⁵The Friend of India, Feb. 6, 1868, p. 152.

³⁶Ibid., p.155.

³⁷Feb. 12, 1868, p.2.

³⁸Lawrence to Wood, 21 October 1865, Wood Papers/Box 7B; also Macleod to Lawrence, 27 June 1868, John Lawrence Papers/45, No.38.

Russian advance in Central Asia,³⁹ and no wish to do anything that could alienate Ranbir Singh, Gulab's son and successor. So when, towards the close of 1867, Charles Aitchison⁴⁰ urged the Government of India to establish a direct control over the diplomatic intercourse of the Kashmir Maharaja,⁴¹ Lawrence argued that it would not be expedient, still less necessary, to insist on such a course. "A requisition of the kind," he observed, "would be distasteful to the Maharaja, and any attempt to enforce it would probably be nugatory."⁴² In fact, on representation from the Maharaja he even suggested the withdrawal of the British agent from Ladakh.⁴³ He gratefully remembered the loyal services of that feudatory throughout

³⁹ Lawrence to Becher, 14 April 1866, John Lawrence Papers/42, No. 20.

⁴⁰ Aitchison, Sir Charles Umpherston, 1832-96. Entered Indian Civil Service, 1855; Under-Secretary in Political Department, India, 1859-65; Commissioner of Lahore; Foreign Secretary, 1868-78; Chief Commissioner of British Burma, 1878-81; Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, 1882; member of the Governor-General's Council, 1887-88.

⁴¹ This was done when an envoy, accredited to the Maharaja of Kashmir by Muhammad Yakub Beg, the ruler of Yarkand, came to Jammu in December 1867. Aitchison argued that as the Maharaja was under the supremacy of the British Government, and as that Government was the arbitrator in all disputes of the Maharaja's with other states, and was responsible at the same time to protect him from foreign invasion, it should have a direct control over his diplomatic intercourse with other powers.

⁴² Encls. to Pol. letters No. 15 dated 28 January 1868, CIPD/96, No. 63; also Lawrence to Northbrook, 28 March 1873, Northbrook Papers/21/1, pp. 102-05.

⁴³ Lawrence to Northcote, 29 Oct. 1868, and 9 Nov. 1868, John Lawrence Papers/33, Nos. 75 and 78.

the Indian Mutiny and the subsequent occurrences on the north-west frontier, and was unwilling to lose the advantage of having between India and Central Asia at least one friendly state and one ruler, "thoroughly well disposed to British ascendancy and influence".⁴⁴

Lord Mayo, the next Governor-General, was in complete agreement with Lawrence that the Press criticisms of the Maharaja's activities around Gilgit were considerably exaggerated,⁴⁵ and no less embarrassing.⁴⁶ But, in spite of his faith in peace and non-interference, he failed to see how fixed rules of policy could be laid down in respect of countries like India where political events marched so fast. To him Lawrence's 'pedantry' was not commensurate with the policy of maintaining

"over our neighbours that moral influence which is inseparable from the true interests of the strongest power in Asia".⁴⁷

⁴⁴India to Punjab, 9 Nov. 1868, CIPD/110, No. 255.

The question of withdrawal was, however, not pressed by the Government of India owing to the serious opposition of the Punjab officials. Lt. Col. Cracroft, the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, even went to the length of suggesting the appointment of a permanent Resident in Kashmir as an alternative for the withdrawal of the British Agent. Cracroft's note dated 21 Nov. 1868. Ibid.

⁴⁵Secret No. 26 of 1870, G.I. to S.S., 17 May 1870, SLEI/6, pp. 433-35.

⁴⁶Mayo to Argyll, 16 May 1870, Mayo Papers/39, No. 126.

⁴⁷Mayo to Durand, 27 July 1870, Mayo Papers/40, No. 215.

Mayo indeed looked upon Kashmir "as a child"⁴⁸ of the British Government. He fully shared the opinion of the Punjab authorities,⁴⁹ given in 1867, that the duty of protecting the Kashmir State from external enemies required "a constant watchfulness over all (its) diplomatic proceedings".⁵⁰ He, therefore, impressed upon Ranbir Singh the wisdom of confining himself to the improvement of his own state, and asked him not to have anything to do with the affairs beyond his own frontier. At a private interview with the Maharaja at Sialkot in 1870, he made it clear that whatever might have been the policy of the Indian Government in the past, they were now determined to control his trans-frontier activities.⁵¹

All this was dictated by imperial considerations, but in respect of the internal administration of the country, Mayo was not prepared to do or suggest anything that would lower the Maharaja's dignity or weaken his authority.⁵² Even so, his successor, Lord Northbrook, asserted in later years that if Mayo had lived he would certainly have pressed a Resident Political Officer upon the ruler of Kashmir.⁵³ But

⁴⁸ Mayo to Argyll, 10 May 1870, Mayo Papers/39, No. 111.

⁴⁹ Mayo to Argyll, 16 May 1870, Ibid., No. 126.

⁵⁰ India to Punjab, 16 May, 1870, Encl. 6 in Mayo to Argyll, 17 May 1870, SLEI/6, p. 379.

⁵¹ Memo. by C. U. Aitchison, 15 May 1870, Argyll Papers/ Reel 312, p. 392.

⁵² Mayo to Argyll, 10 May 1870, Mayo Papers/39, No. 111.

⁵³ Tel. Viceroy to S.S., 13 Nov. 1873, SLEI/15, p. 1039.

there is nothing on record either in Northbrook's correspondence or in Mayo's official and private papers that would justify this assertion. On the contrary, Mayo was very sensitive to the Maharaja's susceptibilities, and did his best to "disabuse his suspicions" about British interference in his country.⁵⁴ In fact, Mayo believed that the ruler of Kashmir was the most loyal and devoted feudatory of the Indian Government,⁵⁵ and that if his personal confidence could be secured, "Cashmere will gradually be unfolded to the benefit principally of herself, but also of India".⁵⁶ The Viceroy was fully aware that the men who surrounded the Maharaja - a very good but weak man, in Mayo's opinion, - were always trying to persuade him that

"whenever we ask him to do anything in the interest of commerce, it is only a preparatory step to our taking possession of the country."⁵⁷

So he set himself to the task of counter-acting the mischievous counsel of the Maharaja's subordinates, seeking at the same time to estab-

⁵⁴ Mayo to Durand, 27 July 1870, Mayo Papers/40, No. 215.

⁵⁵ No. 26 of 1870, G.I. to S.S., 17 May 1870, SLEI/6, pp. 433-35. Durand too had full confidence in the Maharaja's loyalty. Durand to Mayo, 31 July 1870, Mayo Papers/52. For a brief note on Durand's official career, *infra*, Chap. II, p. 75.

⁵⁶ Mayo to Durand, 27 July 1870, Mayo Papers/40, No. 215.

⁵⁷ Mayo to Argyll, 10 May 1870, Mayo Papers/39, No. 111. This was particularly so at the time of the Forsyth Mission to Yarkand.

lish a strict control over his foreign relations.⁵⁸

It was actually Lord Northbrook who officially revived the Residency question during the period of his Viceroyalty in India. Early in February 1873, R. H. Davies, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, had sent the Viceroy a communication that smacked of Kashmiri intrigues with Russia.⁵⁹ Northbrook of course considered it unsatisfactory,⁶⁰ but the report nevertheless persuaded him to consider the question of appointing a permanent Resident in Kashmir. Before he moved in the matter, however, Northbrook elicited the opinion of Lord Lawrence upon the question.⁶¹ The latter advised him that the report of Kashmiri intrigues ought to be searched to its bottom, and should the Viceroy be satisfied that the Maharaja was guilty of intriguing against the Indian Government, then the best course would be to appoint a permanent Resident at his court.⁶² The Viceroy, though not disposed to exaggerate the importance of the reported intrigues of the Kashmir Maharaja, was yet aware of the larger issues involved in the Russian advance in Central Asia. In the spring of 1873 Khiva fell to the Czar, and this new Russian acquisition created

⁵⁸ Mayo to Durand, 19 June 1870, Ibid., No. 178; vide also, Mayo to Durand, 27 August 1870. Mayo Papers/40, No. 249.

⁵⁹ Davies to Northbrook, 6 Feb. 1873, Argyll Papers/ Reel 317.

⁶⁰ Northbrook to Rawlinson, 14 Feb. 1873, Northbrook Papers/21/2, pp. 23-24.

⁶¹ Northbrook to Lawrence, 21 Feb. 1873, Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁶² Lawrence to Northbrook, 28 March 1873, Ibid./21/1, pp. 102-05.

all sorts of rumours in British India. Besides, the closer relations which were likely to be established with Yarkand as a result of a recent commercial mission to the Atalik Ghazi, led the Viceroy to consider the advisability of a British Resident in Kashmir.⁶³

The result was that without even waiting for the sanction of the Home authorities, he informed the Government of the Punjab that a Resident, subordinate to the Lieutenant Governor, would hereafter conduct the political relations of the Government of India with the Kashmir Darbar. Davies was asked to communicate to the Maharaja that the change in the political arrangements was being contemplated

"entirely for reasons relating to the external relations of British India, and that the Viceroy has no intention of interfering more than heretofore in the internal affairs of Cashmere",⁶⁴

As was expected, Ranbir Singh very much disliked the proposal, and earnestly protested against it. Whether that alone would have stopped Northbrook from pressing a Resident upon the Maharaja is doubtful, but serious differences of opinion cropped up in the India Council. The Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, referred the question to the Political Committee where it was hotly debated. If

⁶³ India to Punjab, 12 Sept. 1873, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S. 15 Sept. 1873, SLEI/15, p. 1048.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Frere,⁶⁵ Perry,⁶⁶ and Rawlinson⁶⁷ supported the Viceroy's case, Montgomery,⁶⁸ Currie⁶⁹ and Clerk⁷⁰ strongly protested against it, and pointed out the impropriety and impolicy of the proposed measure. It was argued that the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir was never contemplated when the treaty of 1846 was concluded, and so, it could only be justified as a "penal measure" in consequence of the Maharaja's disloyalty to the British Government, or "as a political arrangement arising out of absolute necessity for the preservation of our posi-

⁶⁵ Sir Bartle Frere (1815-1884): Resident at Satara, 1846, and Commissioner upon its annexation, 1847; Chief Commissioner of Sind, 1850-54; appointed to the Viceroy's Council, 1859; Governor of Bombay, 1862-67; Returned to England as member of the India Council, 1867; later accompanied the Prince of Wales to India, 1875; was Governor of the Cape and first High Commissioner of South Africa, 1877; recalled 1880 from South Africa.

⁶⁶ Sir Thomas Erskine Perry (1806-1882): Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Bombay; retired 1852; M.P. Devonport, 1854-59; Member of the India Council, 1859-82.

⁶⁷ Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson (1810-1895): Famous Indian Official; won distinction for his services in Persia in the thirties, and the Afghan War of 1842; returned to England in 1855 and was an M.P. for some time; became member of the India Council in 1868; created baronet, 1891.

⁶⁸ Sir Robert Montgomery (1809-1887): Indian administrator, who was Chief Commissioner of Oudh, 1858, and Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, 1859-65; was member of the India Council, 1868.

⁶⁹ Sir Frederick Currie (1799-1875): Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, 1842-49; drew up the treaty with the Sikhs after Sobraon; member of the Supreme Council, 1849-53; Chairman of the East India Company, 1857; Vice-President of the India Council.

⁷⁰ Sir George Clerk (1800-1889): Indian Civilian; Governor of Bombay, 1846-48 and 1860-62; permanent Under-Secretary to India Board, 1856, and Secretary 1857; permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, 1858; Member of the India Council from 1863.
For the Minutes and Notes of these officials SLEI/15, p. 1039.

tion on that frontier,"⁷¹

Sir Frederick Currie even made a striking disclosure that at the time of the treaty of Amritsar a promise had been made to the Maharaja

"that as long as His Highness remained faithful to the conditions of the treaty and loyal to the British Government, no interference with his Government would be attempted....., and no Resident established at his capital!"⁷²

This was determined, as Currie asserted, by Lord Hardinge after full consideration of this point with him and Lord Lawrence, and Northbrook was urged to refer for his information to Lord Hardinge's letters to the Secret Committee of 19 February, and 19 March, 1846.⁷³

Argyll agreed with Currie that the appointment of a Resident was "virtually a penal measure", and expressed his doubts as to the wisdom of adopting such a course, except on the ground of treachery on the part of the Maharaja.⁷⁴

The refusal of the Home Government to sanction his plan naturally exasperated the Viceroy. He ransacked the files of the Foreign Department to find Hardinge's letters in question, but failed to trace

⁷¹Currie's Note, 31 Oct. 1873, SLEI/15, p. 1039.

⁷²Currie to Argyll, 27 Nov. 1873, Encl. in Argyll to Northbrook, 28 Nov. 1873, Northbrook Papers/9, pp. 103-05.

⁷³These letters are in SPLBI/XIII.

⁷⁴Argyll to Northbrook, 28 Nov. 1873, Northbrook Papers/9, pp.103-04.

in them any promise said to have been made to the Maharaja.⁷⁵ As a matter of fact, in none of these letters was there any reference to the supposed promise given to Ranbir Singh.⁷⁶ The second of them, of course, contained a reference to a Notification issued by Hardinge for general information giving a detailed account of the proceedings relative to the recognition of the independence of Maharaja Gulab Singh.⁷⁷ But there is not a single word in these recorded proceedings that testifies to the promise made by Currie on behalf of the Government of India. Northbrook, therefore, refused to take any official cognizance of Frederick Currie's statement which, in fact, had never been officially communicated to the Indian Government. He resented the manner in which his proposal had been but partially accepted,⁷⁸ and complained in a letter to Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India:

"Faith is to be kept under all circumstances, but is it to be assumed in future that the appointment of a Resident at Kashmir, which probably must come sooner or later, is to imply a belief on our part of disloyalty of the Maharaja?"⁷⁹

⁷⁵Northbrook to Salisbury, 27 March 1874, Northbrook Papers/11, pp.12-18.

⁷⁶Prof. H. H. Dodwell, Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, Cambridge, 1932, thinks that this promise might have been made. pp. 495-96.

⁷⁷Notes of Proceedings of meetings of 8 & 11 March 1846, ESLI/103.

⁷⁸Northbrook's telegram to the Home Government dated 13 Nov. 1873 for approval of his proposed measure for appointment of a Resident was telegraphically replied to by the Secretary of State for India sanctioning the Viceroy's proposal to retain Wynne at Kashmir only during the period of the Yarkand Mission, SLE1/15, p. 1039(a).

⁷⁹Northbrook to Salisbury, 27 March 1874, Northbrook Papers/11, pp.12-18.

The suspicions as to Kashmir intrigues with Russia had in the meantime completely broken down.⁸⁰ In his communication to Ranbir Singh, Northbrook therefore assumed a different attitude, and tried to impress upon him that the appointment of a Resident was an honour rather than a punishment.⁸¹ He urged Rawlinson to see to it that nothing was done by the Home Government against the right of appointing a permanent Resident at the court of the Kashmir Maharaja,⁸² because he was confident that the matter would be "raised again any day".⁸³ Salisbury wondered "how any business, let alone an empire, could be conducted "by the unsupported recollections of aged civilians as to the unauthorised pledges they gave in conversation a quarter of a century before".⁸⁴

The matter, however, was temporarily settled by a compromise offered by Ranbir Singh. He agreed to receive the officer on Special Duty at Srinagar for a period of eight months in a year, while the Joint Commissioner at Leh was permitted to stay at his station for all

⁸⁰ Northbrook to Rawlinson, 25 Dec. 1873, Northbrook Papers/21/2, pp. 168-69. Compare what Lytton wrote to Egerton on Dec. 2, 1879: "When I took over charge, Lord Northbrook informed me that, notwithstanding the many doubts previously thrown at various times upon it, he was personally satisfied as to the loyalty of the present Maharaja of Kashmir"/ Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1065-76.

⁸¹ Northbrook to Salisbury, 27 March 1874, Northbrook Papers/11, pp. 12-18.

⁸² Northbrook to Rawlinson, 25 Dec. 1873, Northbrook Papers/21/2, pp. 168-69.

⁸³ Northbrook to Salisbury, 27 March 1874, Northbrook Papers/11, pp. 12-18.

⁸⁴ Salisbury to Northbrook, 24 April, 1874, Ibid., pp. 12-15.

the twelve months.⁸⁵ This compromise was accepted, and the Residency Question was dropped for the time being.

Lord Lytton, Northbrook's successor to the Viceroyalty, came to India with a firm resolve to secure her North West Frontier against any possible external attack. The most potential enemy to be feared was Russia; besides her, there were also Afghanistan and China. In the context of India's frontier defence the importance of Kashmir was undoubted, and Lord Lytton was fully aware of it. "The remarkable depression or break," he wrote to Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India, "in the great mountain barrier of the Hindu Kush where it is crossed by the Iskoman and Baroghil passes, occurs just where a section of our frontier with Central Asia is held by a Native Indian State."⁸⁶

In fact, Lytton believed that the natural frontier beyond Kashmir was formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush. The wild country to the south of these ranges was in the possession of the petty chieftains of Chitral, Darel, Yasin, Hunza and other small dependencies. They were rather too volatile to remain for long under any political authority, and their vacillations kept the country in a continuous state of flux. Actually,

⁸⁵ Maharaja to Punjab Governor, 16 April 1874, PMC/5, pp. 1675-82; Northbrook to Salisbury, 27 March 1874, Northbrook Papers/11, pp. 12-18.

⁸⁶ G.I. to S.S., 28 Feb. 1879, PSLEI/21, pp. 859-63.

these chiefs were in the habit of tendering, more or less surreptitiously, their allegiance alternately to Kabul, Kashmir and China. But in Lytton's opinion the greater part of the country between Wakhan and the border of India proper was well within the reach of the effective influence of the Government of India, and no foreign influence within that sphere could be tolerated.⁸⁷ The recent acquisition "by the Chinese of the dominions of the late Amir of Kashgar", coupled with the possible existence of a secret understanding between Russia and China for territorial exchanges in Eastern Turkistan, had immensely added, Lytton thought, to the strategical importance of Kashmir.⁸⁸ Lytton was certain that sooner or later the Russians would be at Yarkand, and undoubtedly "Cashmere will then become a very important feudatory".⁸⁹

But a clear definition of his frontier policy was deferred by Lytton till, according to the instructions of Salisbury,⁹⁰ he had

⁸⁷G.I. to S.S., 28 Feb. 1879, PSLEI/21, pp. 859-63. It was this view to which the Government of India eventually came round during Dufferin's Viceroyalty. infra, Chap. VI, pp. 326-27.

⁸⁸G.I. to S.S. 28 Feb. 1879, as above.

⁸⁹Lytton to Northbrook, 10 April 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, p.75.

⁹⁰Salisbury to Lytton, 28 Feb. 1876, PP. 1878, Afghanistan No. 1 (I 907), pp. 156-59; Balfour, B. Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, pp. 88-93.

tried to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement with Shere Ali, the Afghan Amir. To him both Afghanistan and Kashmir were "indivisible parts of a single imperial question",⁹¹ that also involved an adequate control over the passes of the mountain barrier separating the Indian territories from the plateaus of Central Asia.⁹² The idea of a strong buffer in Afghanistan as an offset against the Russian advance in Central Asia was not new, and Lytton's first object was to secure in the Afghan Prince a strong and subordinate ally of the Indian Government who would ungrudgingly accept a British Resident at Kabul. Should that attempt fail, however, Kashmir was to be set up as a buffer,⁹³ and encouraged to extend her influence to Chitral and Yasin. The idea of the extension of Kashmir control to these territories was not, of course, Lytton's own. As he admitted, it was the parting advice to him by his predecessor⁹⁴ who, in his turn, had obtained it

⁹¹G.I. to S.S. 23 March 1877; PSLEI/13, pp. 235-47.

⁹²Lytton believed that unless the outer debouches of the passes were controlled, "our 'mountain-frontier', on which the 'Lawrentians' profess to place such reliance, is simply a fortress with no glacis - in other words, a military mouse-trap". At first he was inclined to apply this doctrine to the northern frontier, but came to believe afterwards that it would be enough to push up to the southern outlets of the passes in that direction. Lytton to Salisbury, 18 Sept. 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 460-67; Lytton to Cranbrook, 9 April 1878 and 3 August 1878, Ibid./518/3, pp. 233, 531; Balfour, B. Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, pp. 185-88 and pp. 249-60.

⁹³Lytton to Salisbury, 5 April 1877, Lytton Papers/518/2, pp. 248-49.

⁹⁴Lytton to Egerton, 2 Dec. 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1065-76.

from Biddulph.⁹⁵ But Lytton was reluctant to do anything before he had tried Shere Ali, and the Punjab authorities were accordingly asked not to dabble in the Chitral question.⁹⁶ In fact, Lytton was even prepared to consider the absorption of Chitral by Afghanistan on certain conditions, if only Shere Ali could be thoroughly secured on behalf of the Indian Government. If not, Chitral would be the trump card in his hand to be played against the Afghan chief.⁹⁷

Lytton's overtures to the Amir for a satisfactory settlement of the Afghan question did not meet with any immediate result, and this led him to reconsider his Kashmir policy. Fortunately for Lytton, the ruler of Chitral, being threatened by Shere Ali, had in the meantime offered his allegiance to the Maharaja,⁹⁸ and Lytton availed himself of this opportunity for a re-settlement of British

⁹⁵ John Biddulph, 19th Hussars, was A.D.C. to Lytton. He was twice sent on deputation to the Northern frontiers (Pamir Steppes, Wakhan, Chitral, Gilgit, Hunza etc.) to make certain explorations. He was also a member of the Yarkand Mission despatched by Northbrook. He advocated the extension of Kashmir's control over Chitral and Yasin. Later sent by Lytton as British Agent to Gilgit. Vide Enclosures to G.I. to S.S. 11 June 1877, PSLEI/14, pp. 537-698; PSM/A 18, Infra, p. 41.

⁹⁶ Political relations with the Kashmir Darbar had hitherto been controlled by the Punjab Government, but soon a change was initiated by Lytton, Infra, p. 42.

⁹⁷ Lytton to Salisbury, 2 May 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 129-31.

⁹⁸ Aman-ul-Mulk to Maharaja, n.d. PSLEI/14, pp. 643-44.

relations with Kashmir.⁹⁹ He was prepared to allow the Maharaja to take possession of Chitral and Yasin, as a part of a general arrangement involving the permanent appointment of a British Resident in Kashmir, and an agent at Gilgit.¹⁰⁰ Such an arrangement would secure to the Indian Government an effective control over the Iskoman and Baroghil passes and thus serve as a check upon Russian (or even Afghan) encroachment upon the northern frontier of India.¹⁰¹ With a firm control over Chitral and Yasin on the one hand, and a satisfactory re-settlement of British relations with Khelat on the other, Lord Lytton hoped to secure the two wings of the north-west frontier of India against any invading army.

The Viceroy's Council, however, was at first opposed to the idea of Kashmiri occupation of Chitral and Yasin, but with Salisbury's approval, Lytton found it no difficult task to persuade them to accept his scheme of frontier re-arrangement.¹⁰² It was discussed by him

⁹⁹Lytton to Salisbury, 2 May 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 129-31.

¹⁰⁰The idea of a British Agent at Gilgit was not new. As early as 1874, Douglas Forsyth, commercial envoy to Kashgar, had recommended such an appointment. Confidential Report dated 21 Sept. 1874, PSELI/4, p. 303.

¹⁰¹Lytton to Salisbury, 22 July 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 304-06; Lytton to Salisbury, 20 Aug. 1876, Ibid., pp. 406-07.

¹⁰²Lytton to Salisbury, 24 Oct. 1876, Ibid., p. 556-62.

with Ranbir Singh at Madhopore on 17 and 18 November 1876. The Maharaja was but too willing to extend his political influence over Chitral and Yasin, if necessary with British aid, but he "kicked long and strenuously" against the appointment of a British Agent at Gilgit. But Lytton made it a sine qua non of the proposed arrangement, and at one stage it seemed as if the negotiation would fall through. The matter, however, was settled when Lytton gave assurances to Ranbir Singh that the Gilgit Agent would not interfere in his domestic affairs, but would only be concerned with obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier. As a secondary clause of the agreement, the Maharaja undertook to construct a line of telegraph connecting Gilgit, Srinagar and Jammu with the British telegraph system.¹⁰³

With the establishment of the Gilgit Agency a provision was made to secure a vicarious control over the tribal chiefs beyond the Kashmir frontier,¹⁰⁴ but Lytton did not rest contented with

¹⁰³ Lytton to Salisbury, 24 Oct. 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 556-62; G.I. to S.S. June 11, 1877, PSLEI/14, pp. 537-41; Memorandum of Conversation at Madhopore together with Kharitas exchanged, Ibid., pp. 637-42; Lytton to Salisbury, 21 Nov. 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, p. 621; PP, 1895, LXXII, (C. 7864); Balfour, B., op.cit., pp. 184-88.

¹⁰⁴ Biddulph, the newly appointed British Officer on Special Duty at Gilgit, was instructed to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes beyond the border with a view to bringing them gradually under the influence and control of the Maharaja. Memo. on Chitral by A.N. Wollaston, 8 Oct. 1878, PSM/A 18, pt. I, p. 17; also Lytton to Lord Staplehurst, 9 April 1878. Lytton Papers/518/3, pp. 233-36.

that. He proceeded to establish a more direct contact with the Kashmir Darbar as, in his opinion, a special importance now attached to Kashmir - a state with which the relations of the Indian Government were imperial rather than local, and whose interests were identical with those of the Indian Empire.¹⁰⁵ He, therefore, informed both the Punjab Government and the Maharaja that henceforth the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir would directly correspond with the Government of India which would take into its own hands the direct conduct of all its political relations with Kashmir. On matters of local or provincial interest, the British agent was to correspond, as heretofore, directly with the Punjab Government. In lieu of this change, Lytton was prepared to accept an accredited Vakil of the Maharaja who would reside at the Viceregal Court for the special representation of the interests of the Kashmir Darbar.¹⁰⁶

At the same time Lytton prevailed upon Aman-ul-Mulk, the ruler of Chitral, to come to a definitive agreement with the Kashmir Darbar. Though at first inclined to accept the suzerainty of the Maha-

¹⁰⁵ Lytton to Henderson, 12 May 1877, Lytton Papers/518/2, pp. 362-63. Vide also, Lytton to the Queen, 10 January 1877, Balfour, B. Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, p. 121: Ranbir Singh is said to have observed, "...our interests are identical with those of the empire".

¹⁰⁶ Lytton to Henderson, 12 May 1877, Lytton Papers/518/2, pp. 362-63; India to Punjab, May 14, 1877, PFP/860, May 1877, p. 380; Lytton to Maharaja, May 4, 1877, Ibid., p. 381.

raja, Aman was reluctant to commit himself to any definite arrangement. Lytton, of course, invited Chitral agents to attend the Delhi Darbar in order to impress them with the splendour of the British raj and to explain to them the significance of the Madhopore arrangements.¹⁰⁷ But nothing came out of all his efforts till the Government of India took upon themselves the responsibility of defining the terms of the proposed arrangement between Chitral and Kashmir, and it was not till the end of 1878 that Aman committed himself to a treaty of alliance with the Maharaja by which he recognised the suzerainty of the latter in return for an annual subsidy of Rs. 12,000.¹⁰⁸

Matters thus stood for some time till the Kashmir famine inaugurated a new change. That catastrophe had affected nearly three-fifths of Kashmir's population,¹⁰⁹ and both the Anglo-Indian and the British Press largely attributed it to the misgovernment of the Kashmiri officials. In the name of humanity the annexation of the Happy

¹⁰⁷ Lytton to Beaconsfield, 3 Oct. 1876, Lytton Papers/518/1, pp. 515-18; G.I. to S.S. 11 June 1877, PSLEI/I4, p. 537, App. V, p.6.

¹⁰⁸ Aitchison, C.U., Treaties etc, vol. XI, p. 427.

¹⁰⁹ "It is impossible to state, with any accuracy, the number of deaths. The opinion of officers at Srinagar, who were commissioned to visit as much of the valley as possible, and to whom reports were submitted from outlying districts, seems to be that three-fifths of the population have emigrated or perished." P.A.R. 1878-79, pp. 2-3; also, Barton, W. The Princes of India, p. 122.

Valley was suggested by some, while others urged the British Government to intervene in order to afford the people some immediate relief.¹¹⁰ The official reaction to the incident was equally pronounced. Cranbrook was horrified at the reports of Kashmir atrocities and maladministration during the famine,¹¹¹ while both Henvey,¹¹² the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, and Lyall,¹¹³ Lytton's Foreign Secretary, urged immediate and effective intervention.¹¹⁴

Lytton was disposed to believe that the "sensational statements" in the newspapers were full of exaggeration, although he was aware that the administration of the state was not above reproach. But in his opinion the Kashmir question was much larger than the mere matter of interference in time of a famine, deserving "very careful consideration

¹¹⁰ The Civil and Military Gazette, 5 Sept. 1878, p.1; The Friend of India, 17 Sept. 1878, p. 831, 3 January 1879, p. 17; The Pioneer, 17 January 1879, pp.1 & 5; The Times, 25, 27 and 30 Aug. 1879, Sept. 4, 1879.

¹¹¹ Cranbrook to Lytton, 5 Oct. 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, No. 81.

¹¹² An Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department of the Government of India, he was appointed Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir during Lytton's Viceroyalty. Later became Commissioner of Hyderabad.

¹¹³ Lyall, Sir Alfred Comyn (1835-1911): Indian administrator and writer. Obtained nomination for Indian Civil Service in 1853, and came to India in 1856. He rose rapidly in the Indian Civil Service. Lord Northbrook appointed him Home Secretary in 1873; Lytton made him Foreign Secretary in 1878. In 1881 he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the North-West Provinces and Oudh. Retired from India in 1887 and on return to England was appointed member of the India Council. He was in India Office till 1902.

¹¹⁴ Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, Ibid., pp. 1065-76.

as a whole". Starting from this premise he proceeded to reconsider his Kashmir policy in the light not merely of the famine mismanagement, but also of the Afghan war and the recent reports of some treasonable correspondence by the Kashmir Maharaja with both Tashkend and Kabul.¹¹⁵

The question of Kashmiri intrigues was a dubious one, and formed a subject of prolonged investigation. Although no conclusive evidence was ever obtained, there was some proof to show that Russia was trying to intrigue with the Kashmir Darbar.¹¹⁶ General Roberts,¹¹⁷ who had marched to Kabul after the assassination of Louis Cavagnari,¹¹⁸ and to whom was entrusted the task of investigating the alleged treasonable correspondence of Ranbir Singh, failed to secure any evidence on the subject.¹¹⁹ Even the Macgregor Commission, whose depositions included enquiries about Kashmiri intrigues, could not bring anything to light suggestive of the Maharaja's treachery,¹²⁰

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Lytton to Cranbrook, Oct. 2, 1879, and Nov. 5, 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 845-46, pp. 979-86, Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1879, Ibid., pp. 1065-76.

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Lyall to Burne, 25 Feb. 1880, PSLEI/24, p. 1159A, S.S. to G.I., 6 Nov. 1879, PSDI/5, pp. 315-16.

117

Sir Frederick (afterwards Lord) Roberts, the famous General, hero of the Second Afghan War, and later Commander-in-Chief of India.

118

The British Resident at Kabul. Vide, Ghose, D.K., op.cit., Chap. III.

119

Roberts to Lytton, 18 Nov. 1879, Lytton Papers/519/12, No. 106; Lytton to Roberts, Dec. 12, 13, 14, 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1079-1100.

120

Depositions of Yahia Khan and Muhammad Sarwar Khan, PSLEI/24, pp. 708-10, and pp. 713-14.

But in Lytton's opinion,

"although the correspondence now in our hands contains no proof of actual treachery on his (the Maharaja's) part, it certainly does prove a very inadequate appreciation of the great confidence reposed in him, and an unfitness for the functions entrusted to him".¹²¹

For lack of adequate evidence which would have justified any overt action, Lytton proceeded to consider a revision of British relations with Kashmir on other grounds. "As regards our purely political relations", he observed, "such other grounds for the revision of them are, I think, amply furnished by the important change which has taken place in our relations with Afghanistan."¹²²

Actually, as Lytton explained, when "our present political arrangement was made with him (the Maharaja), Afghanistan was, to us, forbidden ground: Chitral and Yasin were inaccessible, and our relations with them could only be worked indirectly through Kashmir".¹²³ But the second Afghan war and the consequent disappearance of Shere Ali had completely changed the situation in Afghanistan. That country was indeed a tabula rasa and, as Lytton claimed, completely

¹²¹Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1065-1076.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Ibid.

"thrown open to us".¹²⁴ With this advantage, Lytton asserted, Chitral and Yasin could be worked directly, and much more conveniently, from Jalalabad.¹²⁵ Besides, the Madhopore arrangement had not worked satisfactorily, and Biddulph's task at Gilgit had become unpleasant owing to the inevitable difficulties of his situation.¹²⁶

Lytton therefore came to the conclusion that the Maharaja should now be relieved of all responsibilities, and deprived of all powers, in regard to Chitral and Yasin; that he should be simultaneously relieved of the small subsidy he paid to the Mir of Chitral, and of the unwelcome presence of a British Officer at Gilgit; that the agency for British relations with Chitral and Yasin should be transferred to Jalalabad; and that Ranbir Singh

¹²⁴ Lytton to Egerton, Dec. 2, 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1065-1076; Ghose, D.K., op.cit., p. 65.

¹²⁵ Ibid. In fact Lytton's idea was the virtual retention of Jalalabad under the control of the Government of India. This was a part of his scheme of disintegration of Afghanistan. Lytton to Roberts, 20 and 21 March 1880, Roberts Papers/Box File L7, R37/84.

¹²⁶ Biddulph, J. Memo on the present condition of affairs in Gilgit, March 1881, PSM/A 18. The difficulty of the situation was that Gilgit was an isolated post; the Kashmir Darbar was weak to render it sufficient assistance; the Government of India was somewhat reluctant to commit itself to perpetual material aid in times of difficulty; and on top of all that, the frontier tribes were troublesome neighbours to deal with - in fact, could hardly be dealt with without sufficient show of force. Infra, Chaps. VI & VII.

should be plainly told that henceforth he would neither be required, nor permitted, to meddle with the affairs of any state, great or small, beyond the frontier of Kashmir.¹²⁷

As regards the measures to be taken on the administrative side of the Kashmir question, Lyall had suggested that the Maharaja should be told that after all that had recently happened the British Government was compelled to demand from him, first, the construction of good roads from India into Kashmir, and, secondly, a reform of his present land settlement.¹²⁸ But Lytton did not agree with him, and proposed instead the establishment of a regular Resident in Kashmir, with certain recognised power of advice and control. His business would be to watch the proceedings of the Kashmir Darbar, and to suggest specific measures whenever they appeared to him really required.¹²⁹

In spite of Lytton's desire to place a Resident at the Kashmir Darbar he could not immediately act for fear of offending the other feudatory states of India.¹³⁰ By and large, however, as the

¹²⁷ Lytton to Egerton, 2 Dec. 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, pp. 1065-76.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Lytton to Cranbrook, 15 Nov. 1879, Lytton Papers/518/4, p. 979.

internal situation worsened on account of the protracted course of the famine and the Maharaja's illness, Lytton felt obliged to act. He decided to meet the Maharaja at Simla in order to impose upon him a programme of reforms and a permanent British Resident. Personally, Lytton was very firm in his decision; Ranbir Singh must accept his "advice" or go. As he wrote to Cranbrook:

"Shere Ali's case is a sufficient illustration of the certainty with which 'Don't care' brings Tommy to a bad end",¹³¹

Lytton however was spared the trouble of an obviously unpleasant task by the defeat of the Conservatives at home in the election of 1880. But that did not deter him from recording for his successor's guidance that the Kashmir problem was the most ticklish of those that would first demand his attention.¹³²

To Lord Ripon, Lytton's successor in India, the appointment of Biddulph at Gilgit was a "part of the forward policy",¹³³ that contained the danger of involvement in the paltry intrigues of the

¹³¹Dated 25 Feb. 1880, Lytton Papers/518/6, pp. 139-44.

¹³²Lytton to Ripon, 8 June 1880, Ibid., p. 365.

¹³³For a detailed discussion of Forward Policy along the North-West Frontier, Ghose, D.K. England and Afghanistan, Chap. I. Writing on Kashmir in April 1880, Ripon said: "... what designs Lytton may have harboured with regard to Kashmir, I cannot tell. It would not surprise me to find that schemes were in preparation by the late Government for the annexation of the moon"; Wolf, L. Life of Ripon, II, pp. 19-20.

small states beyond the Kashmir border, and at the same time exciting the suspicions of the Maharaja as well as the Afghan Amir.¹³⁴ Lyall did not approve of it,¹³⁵ while Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, agreed with the Viceroy that the arrangement ought to be brought to an end.¹³⁶ In fact, it was agreed on all hands that the experiment of placing a British officer in that out-of-the-way place merely to observe and report, without direct powers of dealing with the frontier chiefs, had not been advantageous to British policy.¹³⁷ Even Lytton admitted toward the lag end of his Indian career that the Gilgit arrangement had been "a complete failure".¹³⁸ Tribal intrigues and their mutual jealousies had made it clear that unless the Gilgit position was sufficiently strengthened nothing could be done from that

¹³⁴Ripon to Hartington, 27 July 1880, Ripon Papers/1.5. 290/5, Vol. I, p. 43.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Hartington to Ripon, 10 Dec. 1880, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS. 43,566, ff.13-17.

¹³⁷Note by Alfred Lyall, 13 June 1881, Ripon Papers/Add MSS.43,575. ff. 44.

¹³⁸Lytton to Roberts, 20 and 21 March 1880, Roberts Papers/Box File L7, R/37/84. That is why he wanted to transfer the Political Agency from Gilgit to Jalalabad, and retain the latter under India's control as part of his scheme of disintegration of Afghanistan, supra, p.47 , note 125.

isolated post to establish British influence along the Kashmir frontiers.¹³⁹ Biddulph actually demanded more powers and reinforcements to deal directly with the frontier tribes, but the Indian Foreign Office considered it difficult to render any "material assistance" to Biddulph "in regard to the protection and tranquillity of this remote frontier".¹⁴⁰ Ripon's doubts about the usefulness of the Agency were confirmed by the Yasinee attack on Gilgit in October 1880. This finally decided him to withdraw the Gilgit Agent from his distant post in 1881.¹⁴¹

Ripon, however, considered that the Government of India was still bound by the engagements made with Ranbir Singh at Madhopore, and agreed with Lyall that the Maharaja should be instructed to take no important step on the frontier without consulting Henvey, the British Officer in Kashmir.¹⁴² Further, as Lyall desired,¹⁴³ the Govern-

¹³⁹As already stated Biddulph had been sent to Gilgit with this end in view. Supra, p. 41, note 104.

¹⁴⁰Biddulph, Memo March 1881, PSM/A 18; India to Henvey, 29 June 1880, Encl. 23 in G.I. to S.S., 27 July 1880, PSLEI/26, p. 330; G.I. to S.S., 22 Dec. 1880, Ibid., pp. 2055-56. Biddulph, Report, 6 Dec. 1880, Ripon Papers/Add MSS. 43,575, ff.74, and letter to Henvey, 20 Dec. 1880, Ibid., ff. 76.

¹⁴¹G.I. to S.S., 15 July 1881, PSLEI/29, pp. 235-37.

¹⁴²Ripon on Lyall's note of 13 June 1881, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS. 43,575, ff. 44-45; also Encl. 12 and 13 to G.I. to S.S., 25 Sept. 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 1744-48.

¹⁴³Lyall's note, 13 June 1881, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS. 43,575, ff. 44.

ment of India reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if this should hereafter seem desirable.¹⁴⁴

To withdraw the Gilgit Agency might have been easy, but to devise an adequate alternative to Lytton's policy was a difficult task.¹⁴⁵ Ripon came to India at a time when the misgovernment of the Kashmir Darbar had become proverbial,¹⁴⁶ and reports of Kashmiri intrigues with Russia were rife.¹⁴⁷ Ripon might have refused to take any notice of the reports of the Maharaja's intrigues,¹⁴⁸ but he could not possibly shut his eyes to the chronic disorder in the Kashmir administration. Shortly after his arrival in India Ripon had urged on Ranbir Singh the urgent need for reform of the Kashmir administration,¹⁴⁹ and only a year later Henvey was asked to remind the Maharaja again.¹⁵⁰ Hartington agreed with Ripon that they had

¹⁴⁴G.I. to S.S., July 15, 1881, PSLEI/29, pp. 235-37.

¹⁴⁵Henvey had soon occasion to complain that the Maharaja was not acting up to his obligations to keep the Kashmir agent constantly informed of the affairs of the frontier. The Government of India was therefore obliged to instruct Henvey to remind the Kashmir ruler that he undertook at the time of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency to do so. Infra, Ch. VI, p.p. 303-04.

¹⁴⁶Henvey's Report, 15 May 1880, Encl. 2 to G.I. to S.S., dated 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p. 27; PP, 1890, LIV, C.6072, pp. 231-32: accounts of H.G. Ross dated 24 July 1881, 24 August 1881, 28 Sept. 1881, Nos. 54 (a), 119 (a), 174 (b), Ripon Papers, IS, 290/8, Vol. IV.

¹⁴⁷Lytton to Burne, 25 Feb. 1880, PSLEI/24, p. 1159A.

¹⁴⁸Ripon to Hartington, 20 April 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S.290/5, Vol. II, p.83.

¹⁴⁹Ripon to Maharaja, 13 July 1880, IFP/1922, Sept. 1882, Cons. 268, pp. 217-18.

¹⁵⁰Ripon to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S.290/5, Vol. II, 238-40; Lytton to Henvey, 26 Aug. 1881, IFP/1922, Cons. 277, p.220.

a very heavy "responsibility for improving this abominable government", and suggested the desirability of attempting "to mitigate its evils".¹⁵¹ He was particularly annoyed that the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir was precluded from enquiring too closely, or reporting, on the administration of Kashmir. He desired that a more decided course should be pursued, and Ripon agreed to do so "without overstepping the bounds of prudence". The Viceroy, however, warned the Secretary of State for India that any such measure might provoke the Kashmir chief to engage in intrigues "both in India and upon his northern frontier, in Afghanistan, and even beyond the Hindu Kush in Russian Turkistan."¹⁵²

Nevertheless, Ripon kept the need for administrative reform in Kashmir steadily in view. In fact, he had availed himself of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency to raise and strengthen the Kashmir Agent's status,¹⁵³ and before long, asked Colonel St. John¹⁵⁴ the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, to submit a report on the admini-

¹⁵¹Hartington to Ripon, 28 Sept. 1881, Ripon Papers/Add MSS. 43,567, ff. 79-82.

¹⁵²Ripon to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S.290/5, Vol. II, pp. 238-40.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴St. John, (Sir) Oliver (1837-91): Prior to his appointment as Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir St. John earned reputation as Chief Political Officer, attached to Kandahar Field Force and Political Agent for Southern Afghanistan. He was subsequently (April 1886) transferred to act as Gov.-General's Agent in Baluchistan in Sandeman's place.

stration of the State.

St. John reported ¹⁵⁵ that the country on which Nature had bestowed her gifts so lavishly was gradually dwindling in population and revenue. The public treasury was empty; speculation was rife at all levels; and the officials and workmen were suffering from arrears of pay. He considered that the oppression and maladministration of Kashmir justified British interference, though not, indeed, during the lifetime of Ranbir Singh. But with his demise, certain obligations and unwritten bonds would pass away, and then, St. John suggested, the new Maharaja ought to be brought down to the level of the other feudatories of the empire. The Officer on Special Duty should be replaced by a regular Resident, if necessary under some other name, with an assistant to remain all the year round in Kashmir. The British flag should be hoisted over the Residency, and measures symbolic of the paramount power ought to be imposed on the new chief. This should be followed by a stringent warning about the maladministration of Kashmir, "to be followed if necessary by more stringent measures".

One argument in St. John's report which appealed to Lord Ripon more than any other was the emphasis on the "moral obligation" of the British Government to the people of Kashmir whom they had handed over to the Dogra rule. As Ripon observed some time later, the great-

¹⁵⁵St. John to Ripon, 22 July 1883, Ripon Papers/Add MSS. 43,613, 74-83(b).

est responsibility of the Government of India was to reconcile their obligations towards the rulers of the Indian States with their responsibilities to the respective subjects. In his opinion, the duty of faithfully discharging that responsibility entitled the Indian Government even to over-ride the liberal provisions of some of their treaties.¹⁵⁶

Even so, for some time to come Ripon was hesitant as to the course that he should follow in order to mend the rotten state of affairs in Kashmir. To see for himself the condition of the country, he undertook a tour to Kashmir and was sorry to find that the political condition of the country was very unsatisfactory. Yet he believed, as did St. John, that in spite of the badness of the Kashmir administration nothing could be done during the life time of Ranbir Singh, although advantage could be taken of the accession of a new Prince to improve the situation.¹⁵⁷

A decision was, however, not long in coming. Early in 1884, St. John again reported that

"the administration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, always bad, even among Native States, has been steadily deteriorating since the commencement of the Maharaja's illness, and now appears to be not far from a point at

¹⁵⁶Ripon, Lord. The Native States of India, p.9.

¹⁵⁷Ripon to Halifax, 17 Nov. 1883, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/7, Vol. IV, pp. 180(a)-(b).

which the machine will come to a stand' still altogether."¹⁵⁸

The state of affairs, in St. John's opinion, was such as to make it fairly certain that the Maharaja's death, which in the advanced stage of his mortal disease,¹⁵⁹ could occur at any moment, was sure to be the signal for a general debacle, if not for serious outbreaks. Under these circumstances, it seemed advisable to St. John that a line of action should be determined in advance, so that no time might be lost in discussion after the Maharaja's death. From this premise, he proceeded to discuss the situation in Kashmir in all its bearings, and recommended three matters for Ripon's consideration: first, that the question of succession should be settled before the Maharaja's demise; secondly, that the new chief should be prevailed upon to introduce a scheme of reform; and thirdly, that the Officer on Special Duty should be recognised as Resident in Kashmir, entitled to stay in the country all the year round, and his position should be like that of the Residents in other Native States.

¹⁵⁸ Encl. to G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p. 27; PP, 1890, LIV, C. 6072, pp. 231-32. Berkeley, who acted for St. John for some time, thought otherwise: "so far as I have seen, things are not worse than in several native states in India..... Of course there are oppression and corruption. Where are they not, even in our own districts, but it strikes me that Henvey and St. John.... have exaggerated matters." Ripon to Kimberley, 9 May 1884, Ripon Papers/I.S.290/5, Vol. V, Encl. in No. 27, pp. 89-92.

¹⁵⁹ He had long been suffering from diabetes. Gradually, other complications set in which hastened the end.

In the main, Ripon agreed with the suggestions of St. John, and decided to take advantage of Ranbir Singh's death "to secure improved administration for the Kashmir State".¹⁶⁰ In this matter he had the full support of Lord Kimberley, the new Secretary of State for India, who agreed with him that, in introducing any changes, the Government of India should appear as little as possible, and ought to endeavour to have them proposed by the Darbar.¹⁶¹

With Kimberley's private approval Ripon proceeded officially to lay his case before the Secretary of State for India and his Council. In the meantime, in anticipation of the sanction of the Home authorities, he had sent instructions for St. John's guidance in case of an emergency arising in Kashmir. In his official despatch,¹⁶² sent home on April 7, 1884, Lord Ripon, after referring to the dreadful misgovernment of the Kashmir Darbar, disposed of the question of succession, as St. John had suggested. In this matter, he refused to be guided by any other consideration than that of the law of primogeniture, and bestowed the crown upon Pratap Singh, the eldest son of Maharaja Ranbir Singh.¹⁶³ Not only by his father, but even by most competent observers, Pratap

¹⁶⁰Ripon to Kimberley, 19 Feb. 1884, Ripon Papers/I.S.290/5, Vol. V, p.40.

¹⁶¹Kimberley to Ripon, 21 March 1884, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS 43,575, ff. 15-19.

¹⁶²G.I. to S.S. 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p. 27; P.P., 1890, LIV, C.6072, pp. 231-32.

¹⁶³Ibid.; also PSDI/10, pp. 27-32.

Singh was considered to be unfit to rule, and at one time Ranbir Singh had even contemplated setting aside his claims in favour of the youngest son, Amar Singh.¹⁶⁴ He even considered the partition of his kingdom among his three sons.¹⁶⁵ But nothing could be more injurious to the interests of the British Government than the dismemberment of the Kashmir State, and so, Lord Ripon, who had earlier declared the Lyttonian policy of disintegration of Afghanistan as absolutely impractical, refused to entertain for a moment such an idea.¹⁶⁶

As regards the Kashmir administration, Ripon asked the Secretary of State for his official sanction to the appointment of a Resident Political Officer, who would exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the Maharaja, without however any actual position in the Government of the State. The measure proposed was

"called for not merely by the need of assisting and supervising administrative reforms, but also by the increasing importance to the Government of India of

¹⁶⁴ G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p.27, and Encl. 1.

¹⁶⁵ Aitchison to Primrose, 11 Sept. 1883, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/8, Vol. VIII, pp. 105-06. Ranbir Singh in fact had four sons: (i) Pratap Singh, (ii) Ram Singh, (iii) Amar Singh and (iv) Lachman Singh. The last died when he was five. Sufi, G.M.D. Kashir, p.306.

¹⁶⁶ G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p.27.

watching events beyond the North-Western frontier of Kashmir. Any disturbances which continued mis-government might create in Kashmir would be acutely felt on the frontiers of Afghanistan; the connexion between Kashmir and its dependent chiefships would in all probability be severed; and grave political complications might easily ensue."¹⁶⁷

Ripon considered it necessary to provide for efficient political supervision, not only in the interests of the state of Kashmir, but in the interests as well of the empire of India.

The instructions for St. John's guidance, repeated in August, contained a scheme of reform which was to be gradually implemented after the accession of the new chief.¹⁶⁸ The measures proposed were: the introduction of a reasonably light assessment of land revenue, the construction of good roads; the cessation of state monopolies, the revision of existing taxes and dues, especially transit dues, and the numerous taxes upon trades and professions; the abolition of the system of farming the revenue wherever it was in force; the appointment of respectable officials, and their regular payment in coin; the establishment of a careful system of financial control; the removal of all restriction upon emigration; the reorganisation and regular payment of the army; and the improvement of the judicial administration. In order to afford the Maharaja all possible help in the introduction of such reform the Viceroy agreed to grant him a loan from Imperial revenues, and also to place at his disposal the

¹⁶⁷G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, p.27; P.P., 1890, LIV, C.6072, pp. 231-32.

¹⁶⁸G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1885, Encl. 1 PSLEI/45, p.1019.

services of any officers of the British Government specially qualified to assist the new administration in carrying out the contemplated measures.

With reference to the relations existing between Kashmir and the States upon her northern borders, no detailed instructions were issued to St. John. He was merely asked to keep a close attention over affairs beyond the Kashmir border and to advise Pratap Singh freely on all matters of frontier policy. In thus instructing the Political Resident, Ripon was aware that circumstances might occur to which the terms of his instructions might not be strictly applicable. In such a contingency, St. John was asked to use his own discretion;¹⁶⁹ and on top of all that, he was urged to keep it always in mind that his instructions were "strictly confidential",¹⁷⁰ and must on no account be divulged till the time should come for acting upon them.

¹⁶⁹This was necessary because any disturbances in the State, or on its frontiers, were likely to disturb the peace of the entire frontier region. The Amir of Afghanistan had recently complained that "most Indian rajās were corresponding with the Russian Government, and that the ruler of Kashmir had reached a secret understanding with them". Gopal, S. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, p. 212.

¹⁷⁰G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1885, Encl. 1 PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

Chapter II

THE NEW REGIME

(1885 - 87)

It was hardly a week after Ripon's retirement from India¹ that St. John drew the attention of the new Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, to the instructions he had received in the month of August.² He tried to impress upon Dufferin that the conditions in the State of Kashmir were "very unsatisfactory", so much so, that "interference by the Government of India may become imperative, at all events to a limited extent, before the opportunity by a change of ruler occurs".³ But Dufferin was unwilling to deviate from the line of action mapped out by his predecessor. He confirmed the instructions with which St. John was furnished by Ripon's government, and made it clear that no action should be taken on them before the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh.⁴

That event, however, was not long in coming. Ranbir Singh died on September 12, 1885.⁵ His death was mourned by his friends in India;

¹Ripon left India on 15 December 1884.

²Supra, Chap. I, pp 59-60.

³St. John to Dufferin, 23 December 1884, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, pp. 18-19.

⁴Dufferin to St. John, 29 Dec. 1884, Ibid., pp. 11-12.

⁵Encl. 4, 5 & 6 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019; Tel. from Viceroy, 12 Sept. 1885, PSEC/78, p. 865; Gazette of India Extraordinary, published in the Englishman, 22 Sept. 1885, p.6.

the Queen regretted the demise of an old chief;⁶ while the Government of India lost no time in communicating their message of condolence to Pratap Singh, and confirming him to the Chiefship of Jammu and Kashmir.⁷ Lord Randolph Churchill, the new Secretary of State for India, was however anxious to know whether the Viceroy intended to act on the proposals made by Ripon's Government.⁸ Personally, he was inclined to see ~~that~~ measures were taken preparing for the future annexation of the country. For "many reasons" it appeared to him that the Government of Kashmir "ought now to be in our hands".⁹ But that was not the view of the Government of India.

About this time, there was indeed a general feeling in many quarters that Kashmir - a model of misgovernment¹⁰ - required a thorough overhaul, and that the brightest opportunity had come to give effect to such a change.¹¹ As Pratap Singh seemed a weak and incompetent ruler, he was thought to need some able guidance from

⁶S.S. to G.I. 19 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p.88.

⁷Encls. 7 and 14 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct.1885, PSLEI/45, p.1019.

⁸S.S. to G.I. 16 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p. 87.

⁹Churchill to Dufferin, 16 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 183

¹⁰The Civil and Military Gazette, 16 Sept. 1885, p.1.

¹¹The Englishman, 23 Sept. 1885, p.5.

"a Political Resident of the first class".¹² But Lord Dufferin, though he was convinced that Pratap was "a cretin",¹³ hoped that a young chief would be glad "to signalise his accession to power by some endeavours to improve his administration".¹⁴ A Political Resident was of course to be appointed, but the change was to be effected "in as quiet and unostentatious a manner as possible".¹⁵ St. John was, therefore, asked to be very cautious in his dealings with the Maharaja. Reforms were not to be pressed upon him all at once, as an authoritative demand. On the contrary, the new Resident was instructed to persuade the Maharaja to suggest reform himself, and not to insist on "unpalatable measures" without reference to the Government of India. In short, St. John was asked to impress upon the new ruler, gently but firmly, that the administration of Kashmir "must be reformed", and that for the future the British Representative in his capital would have the same status and duties as Political Residents in other Native States.¹⁶

¹² Report of the Kashmir Correspondent, 13 Sept. 1885, The Englishman, 23 Sept. 1885, p. 5.

¹³ Dufferin to Cross, 24 June 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 47A.

¹⁴ Dufferin to Churchill, 21 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 221.

¹⁵ Dufferin to Churchill, 12 Oct. 1885, Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁶ India to Kashmir Resident, 17 Sept. 1885. Encl. 10 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019; G.I. to S.S. 17 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p. 85.

St. John took the earliest opportunity of communicating his instructions to the Kashmir Darbar. The message referring to the introduction of reforms was received without any mark of surprise, but the announcement of the immediate appointment of a Resident was an unexpected blow to the Maharaja and his Ministers. St. John was asked to use his personal influence to obtain a respite for the Maharaja before the appointment of a Resident, "in order that he might get the credit for reforms he had long made up his mind to introduce".¹⁷ Failing in that effort, Pratap Singh wrote to Lord Dufferin, begging him not to change the status of the Officer on Special Duty, so that his own position might not be compromised with his subjects. He did not deny that the existing state of affairs in Kashmir urgently required the immediate introduction of reforms. But he assured the Viceroy that he would spare no pains to justify his accession to power by making his country "a model of a well-governed state", in alliance with the Government of India.¹⁸ Pratap did not leave the matter there; simultaneously, he sent Diwan Gobind Sahai to lay his case personally before the Viceroy.¹⁹

As St. John reported,²⁰ the state of affairs in the Kashmir

¹⁷ St. John to Durand, 16 Sept. 1885, Encl. 14 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

¹⁸ Pratap Singh to Dufferin, 18 Sept. 1885, Encl. 17 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, Ibid.; Pratap Singh to Aitchison, 18 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, pp. 254(6)-55; Nicholson, A.P. Scraps of Paper, pp. 94-95.

¹⁹ Kashmir Resident to India, 18 Sept. 1885, Encl. 11 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, Ibid.

²⁰ St. John to Durand, 16 Sept. 1885, as in note 17.

Darbar was very favourable for the new Chief to introduce reforms in the country. At the time of Ranbir Singh, Wazir Punnu was the most powerful figure in the Kashmir Darbar.²¹ His name, in fact, was at once a by-word and a reproach among the people, and all the tyranny and oppression from which they suffered was invariably laid to his door,²² though not always with justice. Had he survived his old master, he would have been the leading spirit in the Councils of the new Chief, and the people, hopeless of improvement, would probably have made rebellious demonstrations, which, with an army eighteen months in arrears of pay, would not have been easy to suppress. But only six days before his master's death Punnu fell down dead in the Darbar. That was a stroke of good fortune for the opposite party at the Court, represented by Diwan Anant Ram and Babu Nilambar Mukherjee. It not only removed their most powerful adversary, and the man who had the greatest influence "with the present as with the late Maharaja", but it also kept the country quiet without much effort on their part.²³

Another fortunate circumstance for the new chief was the general prosperity of the country, as far as it could be prosperous after the devastations of the recent famine. The agricultural outturn had been

²¹St. John to Durand, 16 Sept. 1885, as in note 17; Berkeley to Durand, May 2, 1884, Encl. in No. 27, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. V, pp. 89-92.

²²Ibid.; The Civil and Military Gazette, 16 Sept. 1885, p.1.

²³Ibid.; Sufi, G.M.D. Kashir, p. 805.

pretty high in 1884 and the prospects of the crops then in the ground were good. Commerce was shown by the Punjab trade reports to be steadily improving,²⁴ and Pratap Singh had in Babu Nilambar and Diwan Anant Ram two very faithful and well-intentioned Ministers to whom he could look for advice and guidance.

But St. John foresaw a source of trouble in the influence possessed over the new Maharaja by his personal followers. They were "mostly men of the lowest class", and inclined "to help their friends to lucrative employment". St. John apprehended that it would not be long before they and the party of Nilambar and Anant Ram would come into conflict.²⁵

With the period of mourning over, Pratap Singh formally took his seat in the Darbar, and as Dufferin had expected, pledged himself to govern his country with justice and moderation. He warned his officials that no corruption or incompetence would be tolerated at any level. To commemorate his "auspicious accession",²⁶ he abolished certain imposts and customs which, as St. John observed, constituted "a valuable boon to the people".²⁷ Apart from that,

²⁴P.A.R., 1884-85, No. 168, p. 104.

²⁵St. John to Durand, 16 Sept. 1885, Encl. 14 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

²⁶Sub-Enclosure in Encl. 18 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, Ibid.

²⁷St. John to Durand, 27 Sept. 1885, Encl. 18 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885. Ibid.; Resident to India, 26 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/ Reel 528, p. 252.

money was advanced from the palace to pay the troops leaving them only five months in arrears. But St. John was not happy with what was done by the Maharaja. He believed that Pratap Singh had inherited a full share of his father's obstinacy and cunning, and although he would consent to certain surface reforms, on the cardinal points of freeing trade, improving communications, and making a proper land settlement, he would offer as much opposition as he dared.²⁸

In the meantime, Gobind Sahai had a private interview with Lord Dufferin at Simla. He tried to persuade the Viceroy to defer the appointment of a Resident till his master should have a fair trial to justify his accession to power. But Lord Dufferin pleaded his inability even to discuss the matter, as the decision, he said, had already been taken by the Home Government.²⁹ He, however, assured the Maharaja that the appointment of the Resident was not a penal measure, and should in no way be considered "derogatory to the dignity of the Kashmir State". He could not see how an arrangement, which had been accepted by all the great feudatories of the

²⁸ St. John to Durand, 27 Sept. 1885, Encl. 18 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885. PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

²⁹ Memorandum of 28 Sept. 1885 on the meeting between Dufferin and Gobind Sahai, Enclosure in Encl. 20 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

Queen, could lower the prestige of the ruler of Kashmir.³⁰ Even so, he asked the Diwan to impress it upon the Maharaja that the Resident had been instructed to abstain from unnecessary and improper interference in the internal affairs of Kashmir, and that, therefore, Pratap Singh should regard that officer "neither as a governing authority, nor as a pedagogue, but as a friend and adviser".³¹

In course of his conversation with the Diwan Lord Dufferin reverted to the causes of the Kashmir appointment, and his views in this respect were similar to Ripon's. He pointed out that the measure was necessitated by two considerations. The first was the disorganised state of the Maharaja's administration, which was due in a large measure to the protracted illness of his father. What was more important was that the course of events on the north-western frontier of India made it specially necessary that the appointment of the Resident in Kashmir should be established on a clear and recognised basis, as the Maharaja's territories occupied an important geographical position on that frontier.³²

³⁰ Dufferin to Maharaja, Oct. 5, 1885, Encl. 20 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019. The Home Government fully shared this view. Churchill believed that the measures taken would conduce to the material well-being of the State of Kashmir, and tend to the better security of Imperial interests. S.S. to G.I., 27 Nov. 1885, PSDI/11, pp. 62-67.

³¹ Memorandum in Encl. 20 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

³² Ibid.

Simultaneously, St. John was instructed to avail himself of a suitable opportunity of communicating to the Maharaja that for the future the retention of an agent by the Kashmir Darbar at the headquarters of the Government of India would not be necessary. The Maharaja was to be told that no such arrangement was required for the transaction of business with the other great feudatories of the Indian Government, and therefore, in all political relations with the Kashmir State in future the British Resident should be recognised as the accredited representative of the Government of India.³³

This, however, was not all. Apart from the instructions of Lord Ripon's Government, St. John was asked to gradually place certain other matters on a sound basis, such as the construction of a railway to Kashmir, and the improvement of Kashmir roads.³⁴ But the most important measure to which St. John's attention was drawn, and which required a very "careful treatment", was the location of a British force at some point or points within the Maharaja's territories. St. John was asked to explain to Pratap Singh that the British Government had placed cantonments in all the principal States of India, and that therefore the Maharaja need not entertain any

³³ Durand to St. John, Oct. 5, 1885, Encl. 21 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

³⁴ Durand to St. John, 19 Oct. 1885, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Dec. 1885, Cons. 243.

apprehensions on account of the proposed measure. It would be carried out in Kashmir, as it had been elsewhere, with the utmost consideration for the privileges and feelings of the ruler. But, since the British Government were bound by treaty obligations to protect Kashmir from foreign aggression, and were likewise committed to preserve the general interests of the Indian Empire, it was desirable that a British force should be stationed within the Maharaja's dominions.³⁵

St. John's attention was also drawn to another point of practical importance. It had been brought to Dufferin's notice that the subjects of the Maharaja were strongly discouraged from taking military service under the British Government, and that men who did enlist were imprisoned or otherwise ill-treated, when they visited their homes. Lord Dufferin, though personally reluctant to believe that such a condition of affairs could be possible, directed St. John to lose no time in impressing upon the Kashmir Darbar that in future similar complaints should altogether cease.³⁶

These measures were dictated by the war-scare of 1885. That year, on 30 March, a Russian advance upon Panjdeh, a territory of disputable ownership upon the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, very nearly precipitated a war between England and Russia. Gladstone, then

³⁵Durand to St. John, 19 Oct. 1885, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Dec. 1885, Cons. 243; also, Dufferin to Churchill, 12 October 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 235.

³⁶Ibid.

Prime Minister of England, asked for and readily obtained a vote of £11 million.³⁷ At that time the Native States came forward with striking enthusiasm and unanimity to place their resources at the disposal of the Indian Government.³⁸ The danger which then seemed imminent was happily averted, but it led to the revival of the proposal for a reorganisation of the Indian Army.³⁹ Suggestions were made for utilising the military resources of the Native States,⁴⁰ and Dufferin set himself to the task of adequately providing for the defence of the Indian Empire.⁴¹ A Defence Committee, with the Commander-in-Chief as President, sat to formulate a comprehensive scheme of Indian defence.⁴² The defective organisation of the Army in India was recognised, schemes were devised for increasing the strength of the Army, and recommendations were

³⁷For the Panjdeh Crisis in detail, Ghose, D.K. op.cit., Chap. VI; Lyall, A. The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, II, p. 88.

³⁸Tels. from Viceroy to S.S., 23 March 1885, and S.S. to Viceroy, 24 March 1885, PSHC/71, p. 749. Roberts, F. Forty one years in India, II, p. 397.

³⁹The idea of reorganising the Native States Armies was not new. It was considered by Lytton, but the proposal was found unsuitable, and hence dropped. Roberts, F., op.cit., II, pp. 426-27.

⁴⁰Note by Major D.W.K.Barr, 14 May 1885, PSM/D.174.

⁴¹Black, C.E.D. The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, p. 238.

⁴²No. 112 of 1885, Military Dept., G.I. to S.S. 10 July 1885, and enclosures, PSHC/81, pp. 967-80. Infra, Chap. VI.pP. 310-11.

made for the improvement of communications and the construction of defensive works at important strategical points.⁴³

Meanwhile, an important step had been taken in another direction. The appalling devastations of the recent famine in Kashmir, along with those in other Native States, had led during Ripon's Viceroyalty to the formulation of a Famine Code for adoption by these states. A copy of it was submitted by St. John to the Maharaja, and was readily approved.⁴⁴ But St. John was more interested in the completion of the Murree-Kashmir cart road, the construction of which had by then made some considerable progress. As Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir he had earlier emphasised its importance in no uncertain terms:

"Indeed if nothing else be done the road alone must make a vast change in Kashmir."⁴⁵

This was reiterated shortly after Pratap Singh's accession: in addition to being essential to the reforms which were then being "pressed" on the Darbar, the road would increase the cultivated area of the country and help settlement operations.

Ranbir Singh having meanwhile pleaded his inability to finance the project, St. John suggested three alternatives for the acceptance

⁴³Memo. of the Defence Committee, 2 June 1885, PSHC/81, pp. 975-80.

⁴⁴IFP/2586, June 1885, Cons. 101, 107-08, pp. 151, 161-64; IFP/2787 July 1886, Cons. 1-2.

⁴⁵St. John to Ripon, 22 July 1883, Ripon Papers /Add. MSS. 43613, ff. 74-83.

of the Government of India, any of which was to be "pressed" upon the Kashmir Darbar. The first was to take it over as it stood, finish it as an Imperial work, and return it to the Kashmir Government when completed, the cost being repaid with interest by regular instalments. The second method would be to leave the work nominally under the Darbar, vesting the control in the Resident, engineering assistance being lent by the Government of India, which would also make good temporarily any deficiency in the money supplied by the Kashmir Government to meet the cost. If, however, it should be considered inadvisable to insist upon either, it would only remain to urge the Darbar to furnish a fixed sum monthly, say Rs. 40,000 or so, to increase the engineering establishment so as to carry on work at two or more points instead of one, as was then being done, and refrain from interference in the work. Even then, it might

"be difficult to press this upon them in the face of their declaration of their inability; and perhaps the best course would be to say that the Government of India consider the work of such vital importance that they are prepared to take it over as an Imperial work to be paid for by the Kashmir Government hereafter. The Darbar will promise anything to avoid the Government of India taking over the road, and it may be possible to arrange for the second course suggested, or at least to secure guarantees that the money required to complete the road in a reasonable time is forthcoming."⁴⁶

⁴⁶IFP/2783, March 1886, Cons. 320, St. John to Durand, 16 Oct. 1885. No pressure was necessary to bring Pratap Singh round to St. John's views. He himself took up the matter with Dufferin at Calcutta. Infra, p. 85.

As regards the question of recruitment of troops in the territories of Kashmir, St. John lost no time in taking up the matter with the Maharaja. Earlier he had come to know from a Press announcement that new troops would be raised from the Dogras to augment the Bengal cavalry.⁴⁷ So he arranged an interview with Pratap Singh, in course of which he pointed out to the Maharaja that to place obstacles in the way of his subjects joining the British service was not in accordance with the traditional loyalty of his house to the British crown, and in marked contrast to the behaviour of Nepal and other states. At this, the Maharaja assured him that orders would be at once issued to give any assistance to recruiting parties for service in the Indian army, and St. John was able to communicate to the Commander-in-Chief that there would be no impediment to raising troops in the Maharaja's territories.⁴⁸

Pratap Singh was reluctant, however, to agree to the establishment of a British Cantonment in Kashmir territory.⁴⁹ When he came to know of it from the Resident, he felt considerably annoyed, and to settle all outstanding questions with the Indian Government, he

⁴⁷The Civil and Military Gazette, 22 Sept. 1885, p.3.

⁴⁸St. John to Durand, 27 October, 1885, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., Dec. 1885, Cons. 245.

⁴⁹Roberts to Dufferin, 1 Jan. 1886, Roberts Papers/R98/1, p.2.

hastened to Calcutta, accompanied by Babu Nilambar Mukherjee, to have a personal interview with Lord Dufferin. On his way, he saw Aitchison, the Governor of the Punjab, at Lahore. Pratap bitterly complained to him against the severance of Kashmir from its old connection with the Punjab Government,⁵⁰ and asked for its restoration. Aitchison was sympathetic, and though not inclined to

"interfere with the appointment of the Resident or Political Agent by the Government of India, nor with his powers as respects the Kashmir Government,"

he yet wrote to Dufferin urging him to reconsider if it was possible to meet the Maharaja's wishes.⁵¹ Dufferin referred the matter to his Foreign Secretary, Mortimer Durand,⁵² and presumably upon his advice, refused to take any action in the matter. Actually, Durand was opposed to a "restoration of the old order of things" which, in his opinion, afforded the Maharaja an opportunity to play off the Punjab Government against the Political Officer in Kashmir. He believed that any such measure would only retard the progress of the

⁵⁰This was initiated by Lytton (Supra, Chap. I, p. 42) and completed by Ripon in 1881 (Infra, p. 93)

⁵¹Aitchison to Dufferin, 30 Dec. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 460(a)-62.

⁵²Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer (1850-1924): Entered Indian Civil Service in 1870; appointed attache in the Foreign Office in 1874, was Political Secretary to Sir Frederick Roberts in Afghanistan in 1879-80; Under-Secretary, Indian Foreign Office, 1880; appointed Foreign Secretary in 1885; negotiated Durand boundary in 1893 with Afghanistan. Retired prematurely from Indian Civil Service in the spring of 1894 when he was appointed minister-plenipotentiary at Tehran.

reform measures:

"If Cashmere is not clearly shown now that he must keep his head straight, that country will be ten years hence in just as bad a state as it was a year ago."⁵³

The meeting between Dufferin and Pratap Singh took place in Calcutta in the middle of January 1886. In this meeting and the subsequent communications between the Viceroy and the Maharaja three subjects came up for consideration, namely,

first, the establishment of a British cantonment in Kashmir territory;

secondly, the discontinuance of the arrangement under which a Kashmir Vakil had been stationed at the headquarters of the Government of India; and

thirdly, the right of British traders to buy lands in Kashmir.⁵⁴

In spite of Pratap Singh's protests, the last two questions were easily disposed of. The circumstances, under which Lord Lytton had allowed a Kashmir Vakil to remain at the Viceregal Court,⁵⁵ having considerably changed in recent years, especially due to the appointment of a British Resident, Lord Dufferin maintained that he could not have any other channel of communication with the Maharaja than the Kashmir

⁵³Durand to Wallace, 6 Jan. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 22(c)-(d).

⁵⁴Memorandum of conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh, dated 15 January 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, July 1886, Cons. 426.

⁵⁵Lytton to Maharaja, 4 May, 1877, PFP/860, No. 18, p. 381.

Resident. With regard to the right of British traders to buy lands in Kashmir, Dufferin contended that,

"The whole of India, from the Himalayas to Cape Comerin, now formed a part of Her Majesty's Empire, and it was absurd to suppose that Her Majesty's European subjects could be subjected to disabilities of this kind in one of the feudatory states of the Empire!"⁵⁶

Pratap Singh argued that the existence in Kashmir of a large colony of resident Europeans who would not be subject to the jurisdiction of his law courts would be sure to involve the state in serious complications. But that argument was set aside by the Viceroy on the ground that it was "insufficient" to prevent European British subjects from enjoying in any part of the empire so common and necessary a right!"⁵⁷

On the question of the establishment of a British Cantonment, however, Pratap offered the most stubborn resistance. He was personally very much disinclined to see British troops stationed in his territory, and laboured under the apprehension that the measure would badly compromise his "independent status". He feared that the British officers who might be quartered in Kashmir would interfere with his officials and subjects, and the collisions that would consequently

⁵⁶Memorandum of conversation between Lord Dufferin and Pratap Singh, dated 15 January 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, July 1886, Cons. 426.

⁵⁷Dufferin to the Maharaja, 16 March, 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, July 1886, Cons. 427.

occur would result in British interference with the internal administration of the State. So he argued that the measure contemplated was contrary to the treaty of Amritsar,⁵⁸ and offered instead to raise an army of his own to be trained by British officers in his paid employment. In return for that, he demanded that the Indian Government should grant him a subsidy necessary for the maintenance of such a force. He pointed out that a similar subsidy was being paid to the Amir of Kabul for maintaining an army to check Russian advance towards India, and earnestly urged Lord Dufferin to adopt the same policy towards his state. He assured the Viceroy that, if left to himself, he would do all in his power to resist a Russian advance, and as an example of his loyalty referred to the large sum of money he had spent in the construction of the Murree-Kohala cart road.⁵⁹

But Lord Dufferin, though prepared to consider Pratap's representation, was determined that there should be no misapprehension in his mind about his position vis-à-vis the British Government. He admitted that it was quite likely that the development of communications, and other circumstances, might obviate the necessity of establishing a

⁵⁸Memorandum of conversation of 15 Jan. 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec.E. July 1886, Cons. 426.

⁵⁹Maharaja to Dufferin, 14 Jan. 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, July 1886, Cons. 423.

cantonment in Kashmir. But he made it quite clear that if in future the Government of India should decide in favour of such a cantonment, he would expect the Maharaja "as a loyal feudatory of the Queen Empress to accept the decision with readiness and goodwill".⁶⁰ He reminded Pratap Singh that,

"Kashmir is a Feudatory State, created by the British Government, and owning the supremacy of the British Government. It is evident that both under treaty provisions, and because Your Highness's State is a part of Her Majesty's empire, the British Government could call upon Your Highness at any time to place at their disposal the whole of your military resources for employment against an enemy acting from the north-west. You must not permit yourself to suppose that the British Government will ever consent to subsidise Your Highness's State, in order that a State force may be raised for the protection of the border."⁶¹

With this reservation, Dufferin dropped the cantonment question, and his decision in this respect seems to have been considerably influenced by the opinion of his Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Roberts. When the Viceroy had first proposed the measure to Roberts, the latter was in favour of it, and recommended sending a whole brigade to Kashmir.⁶² St. John preferred two battalions, but Durand advised caution, and suggested a small force to begin with.⁶³ Before Dufferin finally decided

⁶⁰ Dufferin to Maharaja, 16 March 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, July 1886, Cons. 427.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Roberts to Dufferin, 9 Dec. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, p. 407.

⁶³ Durand to Roberts, 31 Dec. 1885, Roberts Papers/Box File D.14, No.R26/2.

upon the question, Pratap Singh, on his way to Calcutta, had met Roberts who was then busy arranging a camp of exercise at Panipat.⁶⁴ The Maharaja's protest against the establishment of a British cantonment, coupled with the topographical knowledge of the northern frontiers, as far as it was then available, brought a change in Roberts' opinion. He thought that it was not possible for any large army to enter Kashmir from the north or north-west. He was, therefore, reluctant to recommend the immediate adoption of the proposed measure on military grounds, although he acknowledged that "there may be political reasons, of which he is unaware, which would outweigh them".⁶⁵

Before the mid-January meeting at Calcutta came to a close, Lord Dufferin was obliged to draw the attention of Pratap Singh to a rather disconcerting report of money being offered to Government officials for securing the withdrawal of the British Resident from Kashmir. When Gobind Sahai came to meet the Viceroy, he was alleged to have brought with him a large sum of money,⁶⁶ presumably to bribe British officials; while only two days before their meeting, Dufferin had learned that a sum of Rs. 25,000 had been

⁶⁴ Roberts, F. Forty one years in India, II, p. 401.

⁶⁵ Roberts to Dufferin, 1 Jan. 1886, Roberts Papers/R.98/1, p.2; Chamberlain to Durand, 3 Jan. 1886, Ibid., pp. 3-4. Infra., Chap VI, p. 312.

⁶⁶ Kashmir Resident to India, 18 Sept. 1885, Encl. 11 in G.I. to S.S. 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p. 1019.

sent to St. John from the Maharaja's treasury.⁶⁷ Both Pratap and Nilambar disclaimed any previous knowledge of this fact,⁶⁸ whereupon the subject was dropped. Nevertheless, Dufferin warned Pratap Singh not to do anything that might oblige the British Government to withdraw their support from him, and that he must be able, with their assistance, to set his house in order. The Government of India would be too willing to give him every opportunity of doing so, but if he should fail to take advantage of his opportunities, he would infallibly suffer.⁶⁹

This warning was the effect of a representation made by St. John in early January, 1886.⁷⁰ After reiterating his conviction that Pratap Singh was a weak and bad ruler, St. John went on to describe how in the first four months of the Maharaja's reign the condition of Kashmir had steadily deteriorated. The Maharaja's first act had been to dispense with the services of the Council, with the assistance of which his father transacted nearly all public business. Sheikh Wahab-ud-din, the only Muhammadan member, was promptly dismissed from the state service. Raja Moti Singh of

⁶⁷Memorandum of conversation etc. NAI/FDP/Sec.E, July 1886, Cons. 426.

⁶⁸As Plowden reported, Nilambar later admitted that the rumour of an attempt to bribe St. John was true, the money having been actually offered.

⁶⁹As in note 67.

⁷⁰Memo. of 8 January 1886. NAI/FDP, Sec. E. March 1889, Cons. 108; also, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp.855-918; PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 822-23.

Punch, the Maharaja's first cousin, and Pratap's two brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, were excluded from all participation in the affairs of the State. Diwan Anant Ram was merely the titular Prime Minister, all power really being in the hands of Gobind Sahai, his son Lakhpat Rai, his cousin Amar Nath, and a Kashmiri Pandit Muhanand Jee, whose corruption was so notorious and flagitious as to bring upon him the displeasure of the late Maharaja.

The most capable man in the whole state, and by far the most educated and liberal of all, except Babu Nilambar, was Diwan Lachman Dass, who was a personal favourite of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, but distasteful to his successor. As Governor of Kashmir he had done his best to improve the condition of the inhabitants of the Valley, and had been to a considerable extent successful. But Gobind Sahai, Amar Nath, and Babu Nilambar were all opposed to him and since the accession of Pratap Singh all efforts had been made to thwart him and induce him to resign.⁷¹

Coming to the backstairs influences, which were all powerful with the Maharaja, St. John named three men who were doing most of the mischief within the State. They were Miran Bakhsh, a Muhammadan of low origin, Seth Ramanand, a Jotishi or Astrologer, and a Hindu named Sawal Singh, generally known at the Court as the dewalia or

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Memo by St. John, dated 8th January 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, March 1889, Cons. 108; Report of the Kashmir Correspondent, 13 Sept. 1885, the Englishman, 23 Sept. 1885, p.5.

mad man. This man pretended to have spiritual communion with the ghost of a departed Raja, whose power over the Maharaja's destiny was unlimited. Most of Pratap Singh's actions were regulated in accordance with the dictates of this spirit, communicated through the dewalia. The Maharaja's dependence upon this mad man was looked upon with disgust by most people, and even the Maharani Bishen Devi⁷² complained very bitterly of Sawal Singh's conduct.⁷³

These facts, in St. John's opinion, established beyond doubt the Maharaja's "unfitness to rule", and precluded "all hope of any material progress under the present regime". It seemed clear to him that, instead of reform and improvement, the administration of the country would "continue to grow worse and worse", and that the money which would, under favourable circumstances, have sufficed for the rapid development of material progress would be lost to it. St. John was convinced that as long as Pratap Singh was allowed any real power, that power would be misused. Every encroachment upon his comparative independence would be fought with every possible weapon; no real reforms would be made, and such measures as might be "forced upon the Darbar would be grudgingly carried out and evaded in every possible way"; while the resources of the state would be "squandered on unworthy favourites".⁷⁴

⁷²Maharani of Pratap Singh.

⁷³Bishen Devi to Dufferin, Nov. 20, 1886, and Bishen Devi to Lt. Governor, Punjab, Nov. 25, 1886, PSDOC/3, First Series, p. 816; PFP/2923, Native States, Part B, Feb. 1887, Cons. 3-9, and Cons. 29-30.

⁷⁴St. John's Memo, of 8 January 1886. NAI/FDP, Sec. E, March, 1889, Cons. 108; PSDOC/3, First Series, p. 823.

But Pratap Singh, in fact, had not altogether neglected reforms. The day he had taken his seat in the Darbar he had issued a proclamation abolishing or mitigating certain imposts and customs.⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards, a tax called ravangi or pushmina, levied at the rate of 20 per cent on the price of pushmina (goat wool) goods, which went out of the town of Srinagar, was remitted altogether. At about the same time, the State monopolies on paper and lime were removed; bribe-taking was declared illegal and liable to severe punishment;⁷⁶ and, as St. John reported, "all burdens on the land in Kashmir", and certain taxes (abwabs) and cesses (siwas) were remitted in the Jammu territory.⁷⁷ The Maharaja, anxious as he was to encourage trade between his territory and British India, put an end to vexatious restrictions on frontier trade; and he could "doubtless claim credit" for initiating a salutary reform by abolishing the thana-patti or marriage tax on the Muhammadans.⁷⁸ But Pratap Singh's proclamations, St. John complained, had "not been obtained without the exertion of considerable pressure", although he admitted "that the oppression com-

⁷⁵ Supra, p. 66.

⁷⁶ Note by Cunningham, W.H., Dec. 12, 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 824-33.

⁷⁷ St. John to Durand, March, 10, 15 and 27, 1886, with enclosures, IFP/2783, June 1886, Cons. 42-46.

⁷⁸ Note by Cunningham, Dec. 12, 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 831 and 833; also, Bose, J.C., Cashmere and its Prince, pp. 13-20.

plained of during the late Maharaja's reign has now ceased to a great extent".⁷⁹

Meanwhile, St. John's representation for the completion of the cart road to Kashmir had made some considerable impression upon the Foreign Department. But Pratap Singh himself had taken up the question with Lord Dufferin at Calcutta and assured the Viceroy that he was vigorously pushing on the construction of the road to connect Kashmir with the Punjab.⁸⁰ Thereupon, the Lieutenant Governor sent one of his Executive Engineers, Hilton, to inspect and report upon the road. This he did, and his Report⁸¹ was sent to the Maharaja with a suggestion that, if necessary, the Government of India could lend him the services of a competent Engineer. That proposal Pratap Singh concurred, while he agreed to spend a sum of Rs. 30,000 per month for the construction of the road.⁸² Farrant, an Executive Engineer of the Punjab, was lent to the Maharaja for the construction of the Baramula section of the Murree-Kashmir road,⁸³ while the Kohala section remained, as before, under the superintendence of the Maharaja's Engineer, Atkinson.⁸⁴

⁷⁹St. John to Durand, March 10, 1886, IFP/2783, June, 1886, Cons. 42.

⁸⁰Cunningham to St. John, Feb. 11, 1886, IFP/2783, March 1886, Cons. 326.

⁸¹Ibid., Cons 324.

⁸²St. John to Durand, March 19, 1886, IFP/2784, July 1886, Cons. 169.

⁸³Ibid., Cons. 170-77.

⁸⁴Ibid., Cons. 169.

Such was the state of affairs when, due to an untoward incident, a change of Ministry took place in Kashmir. Owing to very hard work, Diwan Anant Ram, the Prime Minister, had lost his mental balance. He was replaced by Diwan Gobind Sahai, while Babu Nilambar Mukherjee was appointed Finance Minister. The two were made jointly responsible for the administration of the state.⁸⁵ As St. John reported, the administration, thus inaugurated, did not possess the confidence of the people or of the better class of officials, who wanted to see power transferred to the Maharaja's brothers in conjunction with Diwan Lachman Dass. In St. John's opinion, Gobind Sahai was notoriously corrupt, with no experience in administrative work, while Babu Nilambar was believed to be a mere theorist, anxious perhaps for reforms, but ignorant how to carry them out, whose influence over the Maharaja was "solely due to his ready invention of plausible pretexts for resisting the supremacy of the British Government and for evading compliance with its advice".⁸⁶ Neither was strong

⁸⁵ Maharaja to Viceroy, 3 March 1886, IFP/2783, June 1886, Cons. 91.

⁸⁶ St. John to Durand, 20 March, 1886, Ibid., Cons. 90. Durand, however, thought otherwise. During Pratap Singh's interview with Lord Dufferin at Calcutta Nilambar acted as the Maharaja's interpreter. As Durand observed: "Babu Nilambar interpreted well but with a constant tendency to omit or soften away anything that could be distasteful to the Maharaja, and to give more than proportionate weight to the Maharaja's friendly assurances. For example, he endeavoured to omit altogether His Excellency's warning as to the possibility of the Maharaja losing the support of the British Government..." NAI/FDP, Sec. E, July 1886, Cons. 426.

enough to check the influence exerted over the Maharaja by his favourites, and although Pratap had promised his Ministers that he would not interfere in the details of government, there was little chance of the promise being kept. The Resident was convinced that such reforms as could not be evaded would be carried out, and the condition of the people so far improved, "but for the radical reform in the financial administration of the country which is its most essential want", it would be useless to look to the new Ministry.⁸⁷

St. John's 'no confidence' for the Ministry of Gobind Sahai was reiterated shortly before he left the Kashmir Residency on promotion. He complained that neither Gobind Sahai, nor Nilambar, was competent to guide the destinies of the Kashmir State, and both were hostile to the Indian Government. The only man with some administrative ability was the governor of Kashmir, Diwan Lachman Dass who, unfortunately, was being passed over in every possible way.⁸⁸ Meanwhile, Robert Sandeman had been sanctioned nineteen months' furlough to England,⁸⁹ and St. John was appointed to officiate as Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan.⁹⁰ Plowden⁹¹ was ordered to take over

⁸⁷ St. John to Durand, 20 March, 1886, IFP/2783, June 1886, Cons. 90.

⁸⁸ NAI/FDP, Sec. E, June 1886, Cons. 7.

⁸⁹ IFP/2791, July 1886, Cons. 135. Sandeman is famous for his services on the North-West Frontier; negotiated Kheist treaty of 1876; was Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan from 1877 to 1892.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Cons. 150.

⁹¹ Plowden, T.J.C. Before being transferred to Kashmir to officiate as Resident in St. John's place, Plowden was Resident of the Second Class and Commissioner of Ajmgre. Subsequently he was transferred to Berar.

personally from St. John as there were "matters requiring personal explanation".⁹² The new Resident was to be tried, as St. John - Dufferin's first experiment - had not answered very well.⁹³

About the same time Pratap Singh was making preparations for his installation ceremony - an occasion which had been deferred till the hot weather in accordance with the calculations of the Maharaja's astrologers. He had invited both Dufferin and Aitchison to grace the occasion by their presence. About the middle of April, he sent Diwan Gobind Sahai to Aitchison to re-affirm the invitation, and "explain a few other matters".⁹⁴ The object of the mission was ostensibly to play off the Punjab Government against the Resident, and although not explained in so many words, it was clearly hinted at by the Diwan.⁹⁵

Sir Charles was in a dilemma. He had earlier accepted the invitation in anticipation that Dufferin would go and perform the installation ceremony.⁹⁶ But the situation was considerably "altered" when he came to know that the Viceroy would not.⁹⁷ Aitchison was un-

⁹² IFP/2791, July 1886, Cons. 148.

⁹³ Dufferin to Cross, 1 June 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 96; Dufferin to Cross, 24 Sept. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 112.

⁹⁴ Maharaja to Aitchison, 11 April 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, Encl. in No. 354, pp. 231-32.

⁹⁵ Aitchison to Wallace, 14 April 1886, Ibid., No. 354, p. 231.

⁹⁶ Dufferin to Duke of Connaught, 2 April 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 50-51.

⁹⁷ Aitchison to Wallace, 14 April 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, No. 354, p. 231. For the Maharaja's disappointment, IFP/2783, June 1886, Cons. 94-95. Dufferin however assured Pratap Singh that he would not leave India without accepting the Maharaja's invitation to visit Kashmir.

willing to go to Kashmir "in an undefined capacity", and if he were to perform the installation ceremony in the Viceroy's name, the position of the Resident might be misunderstood or weakened. Personally, he had no wish "to usurp the Resident's functions" or "to maintain old relations" with the Darbar, "which the Government of India wishes to see entirely severed".⁹⁸ So he requested Wallace⁹⁹ to send him a telegraphic 'yes' or 'no', so that he could decide accordingly.¹⁰⁰

Aitchison was not permitted to go to Kashmir,¹⁰¹ and Plowden was left alone on behalf of the British Government to grace the occasion of the Maharaja's installation, which took place in the morning of 10 May. In the course of his address Pratap Singh referred to the reforms he had introduced, and profusely thanked Aitchison - in spite of his absence - for the trouble he had been taking to help him with the services of officers required to carry out the administrative reforms.¹⁰² Evidently, Plowden did not like the Maha-

⁹⁸ Aitchison, though he never interfered with Kashmir administration, was nevertheless not happy over this severance. Aitchison to Dufferin, 28 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, pp. 254(a)-(b).

⁹⁹ Wallace, D.M., Dufferin's Private Secretary.

¹⁰⁰ Aitchison to Wallace, 14 April 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, No. 354, p. 231.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., No. 362, p. 237.

¹⁰² Report of the Kashmir Correspondent, The Pioneer, 12 May 1886, p.3.

raja's tendency to lean on the Punjab Government, and before long, began to assert himself in an unmistakable way. In fact, the question of reorganising the Kashmir State, as Plowden understood it, fell under two heads. The appointment of a Resident introduced a new political system, which envisaged a scheme of administrative reforms. St. John had hardly much time to bother about technicalities and decorum. During his brief tenure of office at the Kashmir Residency he was busy suggesting reforms and carrying out the instructions of the Indian Government. But Plowden was eager to have his status and powers adequately defined, while he resolved to implement the programme of reforms as drawn up by the Government of India. He took up both simultaneously, and the effect of his impulse was first felt in the matter of the appointment of a Judicial Officer in Kashmir.

Besides an officer to conduct survey and settlement operations, the Maharaja wished to have a good judicial official for his state, and requested Aitchison to select a man for him.¹⁰³ Sir Charles named two, and asked the Maharaja to choose.¹⁰⁴ But Plowden took exception at the Maharaja's tendency to by-pass him, and urged the Punjab Governor that "the matter should stand over" until he had an opportunity of speaking to Pratap Singh. He was glad that the Maharaja had "asked

¹⁰³D/O, Aitchison to Plowden, 12 May, 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 240.

¹⁰⁴D/O Aitchison to Plowden, 15 May, 1886. Ibid., Cons. 242.

for a Punjabi Officer and not for a Bengali", but before the appointment should be decided upon, he wanted to ascertain whether Pratap Singh had any definite scheme for judicial administration.¹⁰⁵ He accordingly wrote to Gobind Sahai for a detailed statement of what the Darbar wanted to do,¹⁰⁶ but had his rebuff when he was informed that the matter had been directly settled between the Punjab Government and the Darbar,¹⁰⁷ and that none of the officers named by Aitchison had been found qualified to fill the appointment.¹⁰⁸

Plowden was naturally exasperated, the more so because a Bengali, Babu Rishibar Mukherjee, a brother of Nilambar, had been appointed Chief Justice of the Sadr Adalat at Jammu. In fact, the appointment about this time of a number of Bengalis in the Maharaja's service, presumably at Nilambar's suggestion, excited the jealousy of the Punjabi Officials. The Liberal¹⁰⁹ gave a whole list of the Bengalis employed by the State, and Aitchison hastened to write to Wallace that Kashmir was "rapidly becoming the happy hunting ground of Bengali Babus".¹¹⁰ "The Babu Raj in Jammu", as Sir Charles described

¹⁰⁵Plowden to Aitchison, 20 May, 1886. NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 241.

¹⁰⁶Plowden to Gobind Sahai, 28 May 1886, Ibid. Cons. 244.

¹⁰⁷Gobind Sahai to Plowden, 7 June 1886, Ibid., Cons. 245.

¹⁰⁸Pratap Singh to Aitchison, 27 May 1886, Ibid., Cons. 246.

¹⁰⁹6 June 1886, Encl. in Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 464-65.

¹¹⁰Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Ibid.

it, was a matter of common talk among the natives of the Punjab, and Aitchison suspected that the Maharaja - a man with no force of character - was completely under the thumb of the Bengalis.¹¹¹ Matters came to a head when Babu Rishibar disobeyed an order from Amar Singh, when the latter "tried to invade the independence of the Judiciary".¹¹² The Prince complained to the Maharaja, but with no effect, so that he immediately withdrew all his support from the administration, and prepared for a show-down.¹¹³

This gave Plowden the opportunity of taking up the question of the appointment of British subjects in the Native States. In a demi-official letter to Durand he emphasised that the time had come to lay down certain general principles, which should govern the employment of British subjects by the Native States, especially Kashmir. He asserted that action should be taken on the seventh article of the Treaty of Amritsar, and the Resident empowered to instruct the Kashmir Darbar "that no British subjects can be taken or retained in the Maharaja's service except with the consent of the British Government". He even asked Durand to "issue such orders as may be necessary in respect to eliminating objectionable persons or

¹¹¹ Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 464-65.

¹¹² From the Kashmir Correspondent, The Pioneer, June 9, 1886, p.5. Rishibar was right in this matter. As Nisbet reported later, on January 29, 1890, one of the worst judicial abuses in Kashmir was the Executive pressure brought to bear upon it "to decide cases at the sacrifice of conscience and fairplay". PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 633-60.

¹¹³ Report of the Kashmir Correspondent, June 1, 1886, The Pioneer, June 9, 1886, p.5; also NAI/FDP, Sec.E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 238, Plowden to Durand, 14 June 1886.

placing a limit to their employ". In Plowden's opinion, the employment of Bengalis, unless they were Government servants, in the Native States was "highly objectionable", and he agreed with Aitchison that the introduction of the Bengali element into Kashmir - especially the high position that Nilambar occupied - was causing great dissatisfaction.¹¹⁴

This was followed by an official despatch to the Government of India in which he took up the question of the procedure that should govern the communications between the Kashmir Darbar and the Indian Government. He complained, and not without justice, that the direct correspondence that had recently passed between the Maharaja's Government and that of the Punjab was highly irregular, and was contrary to the orders of the Government of India, given in 1881, to the Punjab Government,¹¹⁵ and confirmed and expanded by the confidential instructions of August 1884, and subsequent communications. He suspected that the Kashmir Darbar had no scheme of judicial reform, and was merely "actuated by a belief that by creating a few nominal appointments, and obtaining the loan of British officers to fill them, it will have gone far to satisfy the requirements of the Government of India as to administrative reforms."¹¹⁶ But he hoped that no employ-

¹¹⁴ D/O Plowden to Durand, 14 June, 1886. NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 238.

¹¹⁵ Crawford, J., Cashmere Precise, p. 62, quoted in NAI/FDP, Sec. E. Oct. 1886, Cons. 239.

¹¹⁶ Kashmir Resident to the Secy., Foreign Dept., Govt. of India, 17 June, 1886, Ibid.

ment of any British subject would be sanctioned, except in furtherance of a substantial scheme of reform, and with a certain assurance that these officers would be allowed to carry out the duties for which they were lent. And inasmuch as the Government of India had declared it to be necessary that the administration of Pratap Singh must, for a time at least, be closely supervised, the Kashmir Darbar ought to make previous reference to the Resident in respect of all administrative changes they proposed to introduce.¹¹⁷

If Plowden met with a rebuff in the matter of the Judicial appointment, he sufficiently avenged it by securing the appointment of a British official to conduct revenue survey and settlement operations in Kashmir. This matter had been before the Indian Foreign Office for quite some time, but on account of the sudden transfer of Colonel St. John and the Maharaja's preoccupation with the installation ceremony no decision could be taken on the matter. Shortly before St. John left the Kashmir Residency, the Maharaja, with the Resident's approval, had approached Aitchison to find out a good Native Settlement Officer for Kashmir. The Punjab Governor "took a good deal of personal trouble to select a first-rate man",¹¹⁸ but before a decision

¹¹⁷ Kashmir Resident to The Secy., Foreign Dept., Govt. of India, 17 June, 1886. NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 239.

¹¹⁸ Aitchison to Wallace, 16 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, pp. 464-65. In fact, the Punjab Governor nominated two men, Fakir Syad Burhan-ud-din, and Munshi Ghulam Jasid Khan, both Extra-Assistant Commissioners, for the Maharaja's selection, and conveyed in his reply to the Maharaja certain suggestions with regard to the employment of the services of a number of trained Subordinates of the Settlement Department. PFP/2700, April 1886, Native States, Part B, Nos. 123-24.

could be reached Plowden intervened, and made his weight felt. He suggested that an English Settlement Officer should be appointed instead of a native, and to add strength to his representation to the Government of India, he sent them two petitions, signed by some seventeen or eighteen Muhammadans, all having interest in land, begging that an English Settlement Officer might be appointed.¹¹⁹ He also approached the Maharaja for the same purpose,¹²⁰ but Pratap Singh objected on the ground that an English officer would not obey his orders, and it would be difficult to get rid of him, if he were found unfit for his job. When, eventually, he agreed to accept Wingate,¹²¹ he attached certain conditions to his appointment, namely,

that the Settlement Officer should only be engaged in continuing revenue survey and settlement operations;

that his services were to be retained for a period not exceeding five years, but if considered necessary, that period might be extended;

that with regard to matters connected with his work he should act entirely under the instructions of the Maharaja's Government; and,

¹¹⁹ NAI/FDP, Sec. E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 281-83; Bose, J.C. Cashmere and its Prince, p.30.

¹²⁰ Plowden to Durand, 8 Aug. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

¹²¹ Wingate, A. Settlement Officer in Ajmere; appointed to officiate temporarily as a Resident of the Second Class, and as Resident in Mewar in April 1886; subsequently appointed Settlement Officer in Kashmir.

that in case of failure on his part to carry out those instructions, or for any other reasonable cause, his services might, at any time, be transferred to the Government of India, and the services of any other Officer borrowed to complete the settlement operations.¹²²

With the third and fourth conditions Plowden found it difficult to agree in their entirety, and had them modified according to his own light. The Settlement Officer, though subordinate to the Maharaja, and not to any officer of the Darbar, must, above all, be "subordinate in a general way to the Resident". The Maharaja's orders were to be sent to the said officer under signature of the Diwan or other chief official of the Darbar, a copy being, at the same time, furnished to the Resident. Finally, the Settlement Officer should address his reports and important letters to the Maharaja, and send a copy to the Resident, who would, if he thought proper, advise the Darbar upon them.¹²³

Plowden was perhaps going a little too fast to assert his own position. He thought he was giving effect to what he called Durand's policy,¹²⁴ but the latter warned him to be more cautious in his dealings

¹²²Pratap Singh to Plowden, 19 August, 1886, NAI/FDP/Sec.E. Oct. 1886, Cons. 289.

¹²³D/O Plowden to Durand, 21 August, 1886, Ibid., Cons. 291.

¹²⁴Plowden to Durand, 8 August, 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33, also supra, pp. 75-76.

with the Kashmir Darbar.¹²⁵ Actually, Durand's first concern was to bring the State of Kashmir into line with the other feudatory states of India - to establish the predominance of the Indian Government in such a manner that the Maharaja could have no illusion about his independence. He did not want the Government of the Punjab to have much to do with the Kashmir Prince.¹²⁶ In short, his object was to accomplish that long desired policy of establishing a more direct control over the Darbar.

Meantime the situation at the court of the Maharaja had very much deteriorated - so much so that a rumour got about that there would soon be a change in the Ministry.¹²⁷ Pratap Singh, acknowledgedly a weak man,¹²⁸ was opposed to both his brothers, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, especially to the latter as he was the nucleus of a Darbar clique. What was worse, the Maharaja was under the influence

¹²⁵ Plowden to Durand, 8 August 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

¹²⁶ Durand to Wallace, May 8, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, No. 547, p.462.

¹²⁷ Pioneer, 31 July, 1886, p.1.

¹²⁸ There was a consensus of opinion on this point. Not only did successive Viceroys and Kashmir Residents agree that Pratap Singh was very weak, and hence not likely to succeed as a ruler, his success depending upon his capacity to control diverse factions at the Court, but even Lady Dufferin, who had the occasion to see Pratap Singh once, formed a very unfavourable opinion of this prince. In fact, most observers who had the opportunity to see Pratap Singh from close quarters formed nearly the same opinion of him. For Lady Dufferin's opinion, Our Viceregal Life in India, Vol. I, p. 120.

of a number of his private servants - "Sawal Singh & Co.", as Plowden called them - who were at the bottom of much mischief. There was, indeed, an agreement of opinion among the high officials at the Court that these men were a positive hindrance to progress and should therefore be removed. Diwan Lachman Dass, who in British official opinion, as also that of many others,¹²⁹ was by far the ablest man in Kashmir, was a "persona ingratisissima" to the Maharaja. He was opposed to both Gobind Sahai and Nilambar, and looked upon them as his political rivals. As Plowden admitted, the ambition of Lachman Dass was to become the Prime Minister of the State of Kashmir.¹³⁰

The pivot of the Gobind Sahai Ministry was Babu Nilambar Mukherjee, whose influence with the Maharaja made the Diwan very jealous of him.¹³¹ Gobind Sahai, indeed, was taken very lightly by knowledgeable men; all official correspondence was done by Nilambar, as the Diwan did not know English; and on top of all that, the finances were in Nilambar's control. The relations between the two were further embittered on account of another very important reason.

¹²⁹ Report of the Kashmir Correspondent, 13 Sept. 1885, the Englishman, Sept. 23, 1885, also Pioneer, July 31, 1886, p.1.

¹³⁰ Plowden to Durand, August 8, 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33; also encl. 18 in G.I. to S.S. Oct. 19, 1885, PSLEI/45.

¹³¹ Plowden to Durand, August 8, 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33; also Civil and Military Gazette, 13 Oct. 1886, p6.

At the time Gobind Sahai came to Calcutta to meet Lord Dufferin, he had brought with him a very large sum of money, of which Rs. 65,000 were missing. Nilambar, as Finance Minister, asked for an account, but the Diwan failed to give any. This annoyed Nilambar as he apprehended that eventually he would be called upon to account for it. Admittedly, the Diwan was "a mere cypher", who was "detested by all parties alike, and shamelessly corrupt".¹³²

The growing coolness between Nilambar and Gobind Sahai was possibly the cause of a rumour about an impending change in the Kashmir administration, publicised by the Pioneer, but it was not known who among the two of the Maharaja's ministers would go. Nilambar's main support was the Maharaja himself, but here again the private servants stood between the two. Nilambar hated Sawal Singh and his partisans, and had for sometime been "trying conclusions" with them.¹³³ An open rupture between him and Sawal Singh was reported by the Pioneer of 31 July 1886. The story in full was certainly intricate, and the Pioneer Correspondent could only give an outline of it. Sirdar Rup Singh, a man of good family and the son of an old official of the State, was at the time of Pratap Singh's installation appointed Governor of Jammu. Besides being generally

¹³² Plowden to Durand, August 8, 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

¹³³ Ibid.

spoken of as a good officer, he was a man of sturdy independent character, and for this reason naturally came into conflict with Sawal Singh. He resisted some extortion of the latter, whereupon Sawal Singh went to the Maharaja declaring that he or Rup Singh must go. The matter had been simmering on for some time, but at last it ended in the dismissal of Rup Singh. Diwan Thakur Dass, an aged official, almost sightless and quite past work, who on account of his infirmities had been removed from the post when Rup Singh was appointed, was called back. But Ram Singh, who had been chosen to remain at Jammu during the summer, refused to work with Thakur Dass and demanded Rup Singh. So did Babu Nilambar who threatened to resign if Rup Singh should not be restored. How the conflict between Sawal and Nilambar ended the Pioneer could not say, but there was a hint in the Correspondent's telegram that the Finance Minister had been worsted and had resigned, and that Lachman Dass had been sent for in his stead.¹³⁴

That the account of the Pioneer Correspondent was not very far from the truth is borne out by Plowden's testimony.¹³⁵ Although Lachman Dass had not yet been sent for by the Maharaja, his ambition, as Plowden admitted, was certainly to become the Prime Minister. At

¹³⁴The Pioneer, 31 July 1886, p.1.

¹³⁵Plowden's report, 8 Aug. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

any rate, the state of affairs in the Kashmir Darbar was very much in disorder. As Plowden reported, Sawal Singh's opposition frightened Nilambar, and he hastened to effect a combination with Lachman Dass and the Maharaja's brothers in opposition to Sawal Singh and the other private servants of Pratap Singh's with whom Gobind Sahai had combined to bring about Nilambar's downfall. If, according to Plowden, the alliance of Nilambar with the Maharaja's brothers and Lachman Dass was "fortuitous", the house indeed, as Durand observed, was "divided against itself, and weak for resistance against necessary pressure."¹³⁶ Durand therefore wished that Plowden should move carefully now in order "to get things well in hand".¹³⁷ The Resident, of course, had already moved to carry out what he understood to be Durand's policy. He had several interviews with Nilambar, Gobind Sahai and Lachman Dass in order to ascertain more fully the situation at the Kashmir Darbar, and, as he said, to formulate a definite policy.¹³⁸

From Nilambar Plowden gathered that Pratap Singh had contracted large debts during his father's lifetime, and that the Maharaja's acceptance had been forged to the tune of lacs of rupees. Pratap

¹³⁶ Durand's note on Plowden's Report, 8 Aug. 1886, Dufferin Papers/ Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Plowden to Durand, August 15, 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., Oct. 1886, Cons. 287.

instructed Nilambar to settle these debts, and the latter agreed to do so if due consideration were shown in each instance. But his endeavours were defeated by Sawal Singh, who secured the Maharaja's consent to settle them for eight lacs, which amount was paid from the treasury. At this Nilambar tendered his resignation, which, however, the Maharaja refused to accept. On the contrary, he gave Nilambar a parwana conferring on him full powers in all administrative matters, with leave to dismiss and appoint as he pleased. Nilambar refused to accept this without making sure beforehand of British support. He asked Plowden straightway if he could reckon upon this, but the latter assumed a stiff attitude, and made him as uncomfortable as he could "by fixing personal responsibility upon him for everything" that was wrong in Kashmir. For instance, he blamed him for his conflict with the Maharaja's brothers, and his appointment of his brother, Rishibar, and other Bengalis. In short, Plowden tried "to induce him to stand by his resignation and leave the country".¹³⁹ Personally, the Resident had made up his mind about the future of the Kashmir state. Though still willing to allow the Darbar "to work out its own salvation", he had decided that,

"sooner or later, the Babu, Gobind Sahai, and the private servants must be got rid of. If I can get the Babu to depart, even on leave, of his own accord, it will be a great gain. He must never come back!"

¹³⁹Plowden to Durand, 8 Aug. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp.130-33.

In fact, it was a conviction with Plowden that all the opposition the Maharaja offered to the British Government was due to Nilambar Mukherjee, and if this man could be removed, the Diwan would not be able to last.¹⁴⁰

When Plowden met Gobind Sahai, the latter made his usual complaint that the loss of his power was due mainly to Nilambar's prominence, and as a remedy for the dual government, which his Ministry involved, he suggested three courses: first, the appointment of a single Diwan with real power; secondly, the constitution of a Council; and thirdly, the transaction of all business by the Maharaja himself. In Plowden's opinion, the last alternative could be dismissed, without any consideration, while his objection to the first was that there was none at the Darbar fit for the appointment. The second alternative was preferred by both Plowden and Gobind Sahai, though from different motives, and they agreed that a Council with a President at its head would be the best arrangement in Kashmir.¹⁴¹

But if Gobind Sahai hoped that he would be made the President of the proposed Council, Plowden had Lachman Dass and the Maharaja's brothers in view for any transfer of power which might be necessary in course of time. So, when Lachman Dass came to see him, and expressed

¹⁴⁰Plowden to Durand, 8 Aug. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, pp. 130-33.

¹⁴¹Plowden to Durand, August 15, 1886, NAI/FDP, Secret E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 287.

his anxiety to resign and retire to India, Plowden advised him "to stand fast" for some time, until presumably, matters were settled by the British Government. To the Resident it appeared that things were tending to the constitution of a Council, with Raja Amar Singh as President, and Ram Singh as Military Member. As for the other members, Plowden suggested that two, or at the most three, of them would do, but in any case the Resident must be an 'ex-officio' member for some time to come, and it would be necessary to tell the Maharaja without any reservation that he could "only reign", while "the Council must govern". He was prepared to allow things to simmer for another month or so, but after that the situation must be "cleared up". In the meantime, it was left to Durand to ascertain from Lord Dufferin whether such a Council was to be constituted or no.¹⁴²

About this time Nilambar Mukherjee had a scuffle with Gobind Sahai, whereupon he again tendered his resignation. Although the Maharaja accepted it this time, Plowden was not sure whether Nilambar would persist in his resignation, and even if he did, he would do so in expectation of his speedy recall. But the Resident was determined that this should never be, for he looked upon "his departure from Kashmir as an essential preliminary to the accomplish-

¹⁴²Plowden to Durand, August 15, 1886, NAI/FDP, Secret E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 287.

ment" of Durand's policy.¹⁴³ Nilambar, however, did not withdraw his resignation, nor did the Maharaja insist on it. It was officially announced in the month of September, and Nilambar left Kashmir in a few days along with a few other Bengali officials who also resigned with him.¹⁴⁴

The news of some impending change in the Kashmir administration which had been forecast from time to time by the Pioneer¹⁴⁵ evoked a protest from the Civil and Military Gazette,¹⁴⁶ which published, on the authority of the Maharaja, a statement that no such change was being contemplated, and that in spite of Nilambar's resignation, Gobind Sahai would continue to administer in his original capacity. But the Jammu Correspondent of the Pioneer was so sure of his informant that he immediately proceeded to contradict the statement of the Lahore Paper. He asserted that he had it from the best authority "that the question of the immediate change of the Prime Minister has been recently forced upon the serious attention of the Maharaja", and that the rumoured change in the administration would come into operation after the meeting at Lahore between the Maharaja and Lord Dufferin,¹⁴⁷ who was then touring the Native States.

¹⁴³ Plowden to Durand, August 15, 1886, NAI/FDP, Secret E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 287.

¹⁴⁴ The Pioneer, Sept. 22, 1886, p.1; the Englishman, Sept. 27, 1886, p.5. and Oct. 2, 1886, p.4; J.C. Bose, Cashmere and its Prince, p. 32.

¹⁴⁵ The latest being on Sept. 22, 1886.

¹⁴⁶ Oct. 13, 1886, p.1.

¹⁴⁷ The Pioneer, October 21, 1886, p.4.

That long-awaited meeting took place at Lahore on 4 November 1886.¹⁴⁸ After the usual exchange of formal enquiries Lord Dufferin went straight into the question of reorganisation of the Kashmir administration, raised by the resignation of Babu Nilambar Mukherjee. In Dufferin's opinion, Diwan Gobind Sahai was not "a fit and proper person to hold his present post", and hence he should at once be removed, and the administration entrusted to a Council composed of Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh, and Diwan Lachman Dass. Pratap Singh struggled hard to retain Gobind Sahai in the new administration, if not as anything else, at least as a general adviser. But the Maharaja's request was set aside by the Viceroy on the ground that a coalition of political rivals would only impair the efficiency of the administration, and would lead to unnecessary friction and unpleasantness. He impressed upon the Maharaja that it was necessary for him to "construct at once a stable administration in which both his own people and the Government of India could have confidence."¹⁴⁹ At length Dufferin succeeded in persuading Pratap Singh "to change the personnel of his Ministry",¹⁵⁰ and the Kashmir Prince went back pledged to send for Lachman Dass at once.

¹⁴⁸For the Lahore Darbar vide Dufferin Papers/Reel 524, p. 186.

¹⁴⁹Memorandum of interview on Nov. 4, 1886, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., Dec. 1886, Cons. 73.

¹⁵⁰Dufferin to Cross, 24 June, 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 47A.

But Pratap Singh did not mean to keep his promise as easily as he had given it. The constitution of a new Council had to be deferred for some time owing to the serious illness of Maharani Pathani.¹⁵¹ She died early in January 1887,¹⁵² and when the mourning ceremony was over, Plowden took up the matter with his usual zeal. But the Maharaja, contrary to his promise, was reluctant to appoint a Council, composed of his political adversaries, and fought for a day or two to postpone that unpleasant event. It was rumoured that he even conspired to put an end to Lachman Dass's life.¹⁵³ Whatever the truth in that rumour, it was not easy for him to escape from Plowden who prevailed upon him to send for Lachman Dass, and Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh. Pratap was reminded that if he should persist in his obstinacy, and wilfully bide his time, it might be necessary to consider the alternative arrangement suggested by Lord Dufferin at Lahore, namely, that Raja Moti Singh of PUNCH would be sent for, and the administration entrusted to him. This, as Plowden later observed,¹⁵⁴ "worked like magic", as Moti Singh was known to be hostile to the ruling family. Pratap Singh thereupon climbed down, ac-

¹⁵¹One of the wives of Pratap Singh.

¹⁵²PPF/2923, Native States, Part B, Jan. 1887, Cons. 45; Kashmir Resident to India, 7 Jan. 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 530, p.34.

¹⁵³Plowden to Cunningham, 21 January 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, March 1887, Cons. 46-48.

¹⁵⁴Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

cepted the agreed arrangement, and issued his parwana,¹⁵⁵ appointing Lachman Dass as the President of the new Council and the Prime Minister of the State.

Lachman Dass was empowered to conduct the administration in consultation with Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh, subject, of course, to the law of the State. He was given the authority to appoint or dismiss all servants of the State whose salaries did not exceed 300 Chilki rupees,¹⁵⁶ and also to decide all such issues, "which need not be reported" to the Maharaja.

On the evening of the same day as the Parwana was issued, a Khillat was sent to Lachman Dass's house. But, as Plowden observed, the normal practice was to present the Khillat in the Darbar, so that the Maharaja's act of sending it to the Diwan's house only demonstrated that he was not sincere in appointing the Lachman Dass Ministry.¹⁵⁷ Yet the Resident was disposed to believe that "the first step towards introducing a better condition of things" in the State of Kashmir had been taken, notwithstanding, of course, that it was still too premature to anticipate the ultimate result.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ NAI/FDP, Sec. E, March 1887, Cons. 46-48, D/O on p.4.

¹⁵⁶ Chilki rupee was equivalent to ten annas (British-Indian).

¹⁵⁷ NAI/FDP, Sec.E. March 1887, Cons. 46-48, D/O on p.4.

¹⁵⁸ Plowden to Cunningham, January 21, 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E. March 1887, 46-48, D/O on p.1.

Chapter III

THE LACHMAN DASS MINISTRY AND ITS AFTERMATH

(1887-8)

After taking charge of the Government, Diwan Lachman Dass and his colleagues began an examination of the actual condition of the State, both financial and otherwise. The finances particularly were in a bad state, and the Council therefore began to take stock of the State treasuries and attack useless expenditure. Substantial savings were quickly effected, sinecure offices were abolished, and their holders dismissed. The Dharm Arth or Charitable Fund created by the late ruler was examined and large defalcations, alleged to amount to 3¹/₂ lakhs of rupees, were discovered. Gobind Sahai had signalled his brief tenure of office by dismissing all the Wazir-i-Wazarats (Deputy Commissioners) in the province of Jammu, thus leaving the districts entirely at the mercy of Tahsildars, with no official check upon them. This measure was therefore reversed, and four Wazarats were reconstituted, and a Wazir-i-Wazarat appointed to each.¹

Soon, however, a case occurred which gave rise to a crisis. One of the primary tasks with which the new administration concerned

¹Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 August 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918; PP, 1890, LIV (C.6072) pp. 245-46.

itself was to demarcate the boundary between the legitimate public expenditure of the State and the private and personal disbursement of the Maharaja, and then to exclude his private servants from all interference in State affairs. Accordingly, they asked for the keys of the Toshakhana and Treasury and proposed to take stock of the contents. Pratap Singh agreed to this measure, but before operations could be commenced, Sheikh Miran Bakhsh, one of the chief private servants of the Maharaja and "a notorious rascal", intervened. When the Council issued orders to examine the State store of pashmina (wool), Miran Bakhsh seized the records and account books. On being called upon to explain, he declared with much arrogance of tone and manner that he had acted under the Maharaja's order. Thereupon, the Council went in a body to the Maharaja, remonstrated, and demanded the arrest of Miran Bakhsh. But Pratap Singh refused to entertain them, and in a fit of anger, declined all redress.²

This was more than the Council could tolerate. They resigned in a body, and went to report matters to the Resident. Plowden advised withdrawal of their resignation on condition of the Maharaja authorising Miran Bakhsh's arrest. Pratap temporised for some time, but eventually gave way, and Miran Bakhsh was promptly locked

²Plowden to Cunningham, 14 February 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, March 1887, Cons. 46-48, D/O No. 2.

up. An examination of the State store showed that pashmina (wool) to the value of 84,000 rupees had been removed by Miran Bakhsh. The case was thereupon made over to a Commission with Babu Rishibar Mukherjee at its head. Miran Bakhsh was found guilty and sent to seven years imprisonment. Even after the conviction, C. H. Spitta of the Lahore Bar was employed to lay the case before the Government of India, the funds being privately supplied by the Maharaja.³

About the same time an attempt was made to place some check upon the alleged extravagance of the Maharaja. Pratap Singh was addicted to opium, and it was suspected that when he was under its influence his private servants used to obtain his signature to bonds for large amounts. The Council brought Plowden one such document for Rs. 1,05,000, bearing interest at $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per month, which however had no creditor's name on it. When called upon to explain, the Maharaja tried to repudiate his signature and handwriting, but, as Plowden remarked, he eventually acknowledged his guilt, and "promised not to sign any more bills". He further agreed to issue an order to the effect that "no bills would be cashed at the public treasury which were not countersigned by the Council, and that his own unsupported signature would be valid only against

³Plowden to Cunningham, 14 February 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., March 1887, Cons. 46-48, D/O No. 2.; also Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 August 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

his private exchequer".⁴

As has already been mentioned, a cause of quarrel between Gobind Sahai and Nilambar Mukherjee was a demand by the latter as Finance Minister that the Diwan should account for a sum of 65,000 rupees paid to him during the Maharaja's visit to Calcutta in January, 1886.⁵ This matter was pending when the Lachman Dass Ministry took office. They pressed Gobind Sahai for an explanation whereupon he alleged that the Maharaja was aware of the expenditure, and so, the matter could be referred to him.⁶ Accordingly, a Darbar was convened by Pratap Singh which was attended by both Gobind Sahai and the members of the Council. The Maharaja acknowledged responsibility only for the expenditure of 5,000 rupees, and directed Gobind Sahai to account for the rest. Simultaneously, he authorised the Council to deal with the case.⁷

Shortly afterwards, Diwan Gobind Sahai, pleading his daughter's illness, left for Aminabad, his home town in the Gujranwala district of the Punjab. Here he received a notice from the Kashmir Council

⁴Plowden, to Cunningham, 14 February 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, March 1887, Cons. 46-48, D/O No. 2.

⁵Supra, Chapter II, p. 99.

⁶Gobind Sahai to the Council of State, 1 Feb. 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, June 1887, Cons. 173; Dufferin to Cross, 24 June 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, p. 158.

⁷NAI/FDP, Sec.E. June 1887, Cons. 174-78; Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

asking him to account for the missing sum. When the Diwan denied all knowledge of it, a case of criminal misappropriation was instituted against him. He was ordered to appear before the Council to stand trial, but Gobind Sahai, on the advice of his legal adviser, C. H. Spitta, refused to do so. He explained that the President of the Council, Diwan Lachman Dass, was a bitter enemy of his, and so, no impartial investigation into his case could be expected from the Council. He agreed, however, to submit himself to an enquiry by an independent commission or tribunal, if it should be conducted within British territory.⁸

Thereupon the case was investigated by the Council in Gobind Sahai's absence. The depositions⁹ of the witnesses who were examined by the Council proved beyond doubt that the alleged sum had really been paid to Gobind Sahai in two instalments at Calcutta and Benares, and that no account had ever been produced of how the money was spent. Gobind Sahai was therefore declared guilty of misappropriation of State money, and the Council decided that he should be fined to the amount of 40,000 rupees which, together with the sum misappropriated by him, ought to be realised from his property in the State. It was further decreed that for the future he would be pro-

⁸Gobind Sahai to Wallace, 8 June 1887, PSDOC/2, First Series, pp. 254(a)-(d); Plowden to Durand, 29 April 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E., June 1887, Cons. 171.

⁹Ibid., Cons. 179-92.

hibited from holding any appointment in Kashmir. The proceedings of the Council were submitted to the Maharaja for his approval, which was readily obtained.¹⁰

At about this time there was again a small crisis in the affairs of the Darbar. Early in March 1887, Plowden had occasion to visit Jammu, when he ascertained that the relations between the Maharaja and the Council were not cordial. Lachman Dass reported to him a complaint which had been made against Sawal Singh, the Maharaja's chief private servant, and requested the Resident to advise him on the matter. Plowden did so, but the Holi began the next day, and no steps could be taken until the end of the festival. But the fact that the Council was going to act against Sawal Singh got abroad. Before the Holi was over Lachman Dass reported that a party, headed by Sawal Singh, had been formed against the Council, and that the Maharaja had been instigated to write a letter of complaint both to the Resident and the Viceroy.¹¹ The very next day Plowden received a letter from the Maharaja complaining that the Council had been acting like a Council of Regency, and treating him like a minor; that although he would "like very much to have a Council", he was not satisfied with the present one.¹²

¹⁰ Order of the State Council of 16 March 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., June 1887, Cons. 179-92; Plowden to Durand, 29 April 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., June 1887, Cons. 171.

¹¹ Plowden to Cunningham, 18 March 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., April 1887. Cons. 510-12, K.W.2.

¹² Maharaja to Plowden, 11 March. 1887, Encl. in the above letter, Ibid.

After the termination of the Holi, Plowden asked the Maharaja to arrange for a public Darbar in which he intended to deliver a Kharita¹³ from the Viceroy, received meanwhile from the Indian Foreign Office, sanctioning the Maharaja's appointment of the Kashmir Council.¹⁴ In this Darbar Plowden succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between the Maharaja and his Council. Lachman Dass and his colleagues disclaimed all intention of superseding or ignoring the Maharaja's authority. Thereupon Pratap Singh asked Plowden to draw up a set of rules for the guidance of his advisers. But this the Resident declined to do, and advised the Maharaja to draw it up in consultation with the members of the Council, and then to submit it to him for his examination and advice.¹⁵ At the same time, Plowden seriously exhorted the Diwan and his colleagues to do their utmost to keep on friendly terms with the Maharaja, and impressed upon them the expediency of mutual conciliation.¹⁶

This produced a salutary effect. Matters went well for some time, and neither the Maharaja nor the Council felt any misgivings

¹³Dated, 28 February 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., March 1887, Cons. 48.

¹⁴Plowden to Foreign Secy., G.I., 17 March 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, April 1887, Cons. 510.

¹⁵Plowden to Cunningham, 18 March 1887, Ibid., Cons. 510-12, K.W.2.

¹⁶It was rumoured at Jammu at the time that the Council, with a view to having the Maharaja completely in their power, had persuaded him to go to one of the temples, and there take a solemn oath that he would never in future oppose any of their measures. The Civil and Military Gazette, 6 April 1887, p.1.

about the other. In the middle of April - with the summer fast approaching - the Maharaja, accompanied by his brothers, Diwan Lachman Dass and other officials, left Jammu, and travelling via Punch arrived at Srinagar in early May.¹⁷ Immediately after his arrival Plowden raised a question which had hitherto been undecided. The Maharaja had never yet visited the Resident according to established usage in all Native States. Plowden therefore expressed an intention that the Maharaja should return his visits with the customary official ceremonies. No difficulties were raised by Pratap Singh who soon returned a formal visit of the Resident's, and a matter of procedure was thus easily settled.¹⁸

The Council commenced work at Srinagar without delay. Of the two important matters that were taken up, one was known as the "Bakidar"¹⁹ question." Large balances were entered in the public accounts as due to the State from officials of every rank, from merchants, shawl weavers, shopkeepers and cultivators, amounting in the aggregate to about three crores of rupees for Jammu and Kashmir. The peculiar indebtedness of the whole community to the State, even though a great

¹⁷The Civil and Military Gazette, 6 April 1887, p.1; May 7, 1887, p.3; May 12, 1887, p.3; Plowden's Report etc. PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918

¹⁸Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

¹⁹"Bakidar" means debtor.

portion of it was merely nominal, was characteristic of the extraordinary system of administration prevalent in Pratap's dominion.²⁰ Plowden advised the Council to take up genuine cases against men of substance really able to pay, and to investigate them fairly and openly. At the request of the Council, he agreed, though reluctantly, to examine any objection which the Bakidars might raise against the proceedings of the Council against them. The intention of the Council to deal with the Bakidars was made known and at once rendered them unpopular. A principal Bakidar was a certain Mian Lal Din, who was associated with many discreditable affairs. Hitherto he had worked with the Council, but the Council's declared intention to deal with the Bakidar question made him hostile. He associated himself with other Muslims, and led an opposition against the Council in Srinagar. Owing to this agitation, the Council made no progress in settling the Bakidari cases in Kashmir. They were afraid to face the odium to which any general proceedings would inevitably give rise, nor had they any official competent and honest enough to deal with so difficult a matter.²¹ At the end of the summer season Iachman Dass asked Plowden to obtain from the Government of India a temporary loan of the services of Captain Ramsay, the

²⁰ Henvey's Report, May 15, 1880, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1884, PSLEI/40, P. 27. Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888 PSLEI/54, p. 855.

²¹ Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

British Joint Commissioner at Leh, to investigate the Bakidari cases of Jammu during the winter.²² In Plowden's opinion, the choice of Ramsay was "an excellent one",²³ and he lost no time in securing the permission of the Government of India to Ramsay's employment.²⁴

More important than the Bakidar question was that of financial reform. For years past the finances of Jammu and Kashmir had been in a state of confusion, and the necessity of reducing chaos to order, and of placing the income and expenditure of the country upon a sound footing was very pressing. Plowden took an early opportunity of drawing the attention of the Council to the question, whereupon they prepared a draft budget of Kashmir and sent it to the Resident for examination and advice. Within a month the draft budget of the province of Jammu was drawn up, and was likewise sent to the British Resident. Of these two budgets, that for Kashmir was tolerable, but it was evident that very little care was given to the preparation of the draft budget for Jammu. As Plowden observed, an expenditure of upwards of 24 lakhs of rupees was not shown at all, proving beyond doubt that the matter "had not been resolutely faced".

²²Lachman Dass to Plowden, 5 Oct. 1887, IFP/3041, Nov. 1887, Cons. 5.

²³Plowden to Government of India, 17th Oct. 1887, Ibid., Cons. 4.

²⁴G.I. to the Kashmir Resident, 27 October 1887, Ibid., Cons. 6, Per. Dept.

Subsequently, Diwan Lachman Dass promised a revised budget, but that was never submitted to the Resident.²⁵

The estimated gross receipts of the two provinces of Kashmir and Jammu together with the outlying districts did not exceed 55 lakhs of rupees in British currency, but the actual collections fell considerably short of this amount. Out of the total revenue, 22 lakhs of rupees were spent on the army and connected services, leaving only 33 lakhs for all other purposes. Out of this balance, again, the Maharaja's Civil List alone absorbed $8\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs, while the departmental expenses were not always properly accounted for.²⁶ Evidently, the situation was far from satisfactory, so that Plowden hastened to lay down his suggestions for the consideration of the Maharaja and his advisers. The result of his examination was recorded in two notes on the Kashmir and Jammu budgets which were sent to the Council without delay.²⁷

Plowden admitted that the financial condition of the Kashmir State was really "open to far more searching criticism" than his memoranda afforded. He therefore advised the Council to be more cautious

²⁵The two budgets are in Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Sub-enclosures in Plowden's Report dated 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid.

in estimating the expenditure under different heads than they had hitherto been. As, owing to the important position of Kashmir as a frontier state, its military expenditure did not admit of any large reduction, Plowden asserted that the means to augment the revenue and effect an economy must be sought elsewhere.²⁸ He suggested that, among others, the departmental expenditure should be subjected to a proper "system of check and control"; the Maharaja's revenue should be augmented by bringing waste lands under cultivation with the help of an improved system of irrigation; detailed estimates should be made for expected receipts and expenditure of every description; the salaries of the State officials, which were usually higher than in other native states, should be reasonably cut; and even the Maharaja's Civil List ought to be reduced. In his opinion, the State should by all means aim at having a surplus, rather than a deficit, because,

"Owing to particular conditions of the province of Kashmir, His Highness' Government is liable to be called upon to meet unforeseen expenditure for frontier defence and for famine.... Therefore, the estimates should be so framed as to leave a reasonable surplus, which I should fix at not less than four lacs or more than five lacs per annum."²⁹

But all this meant a task of "great labour and responsibility", and required, in his opinion, a special officer. It was impossible, he

²⁸Sub-enclosure 2 in Plowden's Report dated 5th March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

²⁹Sub-encl. 1 to Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid.

said, "for the Hakim-i-Alas³⁰ of Jammu and Kashmir or for the Council to undertake the preparation of the Budget as part of their ordinary work, in addition to their other duties". So he recommended that the Maharaja should create an appointment of Accountant-General for Jammu and Kashmir, and "obtain from the British Government the services of a competent native officer for the post".³¹ In fact, Plowden did not deny that the Council had not succeeded "in evolving order out of the existing confusion, and in obtaining adequate control over the finances". The truth, he said, was that "the task was far beyond the administrative capacity of the Council".³²

At the same time, under the guidance of the Resident, the Council had taken other measures to improve the condition of the State.³³ As Plowden had desired, Wingate took up his appointment as Settlement Officer on January 15, 1887.³⁴ After only a month he was asked to undertake the settlement of the Jammu districts in addition to Kashmir. Before Wingate's arrival, during a series of years, some portion of the valley of Kashmir had been measured. But the work had

³⁰Governors.

³¹Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54.

³²Ibid.

³³Civil and Military Gazette, 14 April 1887, Editorial entitled "Kashmir and its new Minister", p.2.

³⁴NAI/FDP, Sec.E, Oct. 1886, Cons. 291.

not been done in any systematic manner, so that the previous measurement had to be rejected, and a new system adopted. With the assistance of Lala Narsing Das and four other officers, lent by the Punjab Government, Wingate began his work at Jammu in April 1887, and completed within a year the preliminaries of the settlement work of both Kashmir and Jammu. The whole undertaking cost a total sum of Rs. 35,048.³⁵

Next, an application was made to the Resident to assist the Council in investing 25 lakhs of rupees in Government securities. An attempt was made to place this amount in the Government loan of 1887, but unfortunately the Bank entrusted with the business submitted the tender too late. The investment was thereupon made by degrees as supply bills in Bombay and Calcutta became available. By March 1888, nine lakhs were invested, and another six lakhs were made available for further investment.³⁶

Meanwhile, a cognate question, that relating to the visitors to Kashmir, had been disposed of to Plowden's satisfaction. St. John had been asked by the Government of India in 1885 to get the rules for the foreign visitors to Kashmir revised by the Darbar. The question remained unsettled during his tenure of office, but was taken up by

³⁵ Preliminary Report by Wingate, 1 Aug. 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 26 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 923-72, (PSLEI/57); PFP/2923, Native States B, April 1887, Cons. 160 & 126-27.

³⁶ Plowden's Report 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855; Ardagh to Maitland, 25 Feb. 1890, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 623-25; Bose, J.C., Cashmere & its Prince, p.69.

the Government of India early in 1887. At Plowden's suggestions, all visitors to Kashmir - European, Americans and Australians - were placed under the direct supervision of the Resident, and the Darbar formally admitted that such visitors could reside in the country all the year round. The Resident was given complete authority to remove any person from the Maharaja's territories if he should be found guilty of violating any of the rules set forth for his guidance.³⁷

A preliminary survey for a railway into Kashmir was also completed at the expense of the Darbar. From the first Plowden had been urging the Maharaja and his Council to stiffen the administration by obtaining the loan of competent officers from the British Government. The ground had been prepared for such an appointment when the services of Colonel (afterwards Major-General) R. de Bourbel of the Royal Engineers were transferred in May 1886 for employment in connection with the construction of a railway to Kashmir.³⁸ For a whole year Bourbel was engaged in surveying for a Kashmir Railway.³⁹ Shortly before his retirement from British service, Plow-

³⁷ IFP/3036, August 1887, Cons. 72-73; IFP/3275, Feb. 1888, Cons. 21-25.

³⁸ Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 25 Oct. 1886, PSLEI/48, p. 765; IFP/2791, Nov. 1886, p.19.

³⁹ IFP/3036, Aug. 1887, Cons. 156-60; De Bourbel's General Report, IFP/3738, Feb. 1890, Cons. 307-308.

den secured his employment by the Darbar as Chief Engineer in charge of the Public Works Department. As Plowden observed,

"The object which the Darbar has in view in engaging Col. de Bourbel is to enable that officer to supervise the existing expenditure, to prepare a scheme of important public works to be gradually accomplished in a series of years, and to organise a Public Works Department with an adequate system of check and control!"⁴⁰

Personally, he hoped that the fact that, in addition to the Revenue Settlement, the Darbar was now willing "to intrust an important spending department to an English Officer", would be considered by the Government of India a satisfactory proof that the Maharaja's Government was "really in earnest in its endeavours to set its house in order".⁴¹

Simultaneously, the provision of funds for the Kashmir cart-road was placed on a satisfactory basis. The budget allotment for this road was Rs. 30,000 (British Currency) per month, and the Maharaja made no difficulties in regularly supplying this promised sum. As a result, there was a marked progress in the work of construction, and in April 1887, the road was opened for wheeled traffic as far as Garhi. As Plowden claimed, during the two years ending in April 1888, the work done on this road "more than equalled the work of the pre-

⁴⁰ Plowden to Government of India, 26 March 1887, IFP/3036, August 1887, Cons. 156.

⁴¹ Ibid.

vious five years". At a total cost of about seven lakhs a length of 35 miles between Kohala and Garhi was completed, 16 miles from Garhi onwards was partially constructed, and an additional length of 26 miles from Baramula towards Uri was cut to formation.⁴²

While the cart-road was making good progress, the Darbar had taken another important step in improving the communications between Kashmir and India. In August 1887, Lachman Dass made a proposal for the construction of a railway line from Sialkot to Jammu.⁴³ The measure, now proposed, had been sanctioned by the Government of India early in 1885, but soon a difficulty arose over the question of financing the project. No satisfactory arrangement could be arrived at by the Indian Government with Ranbir Singh, with the result that the whole scheme had to be kept in cold storage for the time being.⁴⁴ When the question was revived, however, a different proposal was made by the Darbar. The railway line was to be called the Jammu and Kashmir State Railway, and was to be constructed by the Darbar through its Chief Engineer, Col. de Bourbel. The necessary capital would be provided by the State, but the Government of

⁴²Bourbel's Report, July, 1888, IFP/3501, Feb. 1889, Cons. 69.

⁴³Lachman Dass to Plowden, 4 Aug. 1887, IFP/3278, March 1888, Cons. 586 A. The railway was to begin from the terminus of the Sialkot branch of the North Western Railway.

⁴⁴G.I. to S.S. 14 Feb. 1888, Ibid., Cons. 591.

India would pay interest at the rate of 4⁰/_o on the capital expenditure on the British section of the line.⁴⁵ The terms were convenient for the Indian Government, and the railway was considered "desirable on political and commercial grounds".⁴⁶ After the preliminary discussions were over an agreement was concluded with the Kashmir Darbar on 4 July, 1888. The agreement was initially made for five years, and in addition to the conditions, mentioned above, the following were some of the provisions included in it:

1. The section of the line in Jammu territory should be leased to, and worked by, the North Western Railway for a period of five years from the date of opening to traffic on condition that they would pay to the Darbar one per cent per annum on the capital expenditure on the Jammu section. The surplus net earnings on this section, in excess of that payment of one per cent during the period of five years, should be divided equally between the Kashmir Darbar and the North Western Railway.
2. Subject to the payment of four per cent interest the portion of the line in British territory should remain the absolute property of the Government of India, and the earnings of it

⁴⁵Lachman Dass to Plowden, 4 Aug. 1887, IFP/3278, March 1888, Cons. 586A.

⁴⁶G.I. to S.S., 14 Feb. 1888, Ibid., Cons. 591.

should belong solely to that Government. Further, the Government of India reserved to itself the right at any time, after six months' notice, to repay the Darbar the capital expenditure advanced by it in respect of this section of the line, whereupon the payment of interest should cease.

3. After the expiry of the said period of five years, a fresh arrangement should be made for working the line upon terms to be agreed upon between the Darbar and the Government of India.⁴⁷

The Medical Departments of Kashmir were for long in need of able supervision, but financial difficulties of the State had hitherto stood in the way. In October, 1887, the Maharaja however ventured to make a suggestion which proved to be a great help to the State without imposing upon it much financial obligation. The Resident was requested to lend the services of Surgeon-Major Deane of the British Residency for supervising the Medical Departments in his spare time on a monthly allowance of Rs. 250. The matter was quickly settled, and Deane was appointed to superintend the Medical Departments of the Kashmir State.⁴⁸ During his year of office he did some really good work. Although all the evils from which the Kashmir and Jammu hospitals had hitherto suffered could not be removed - in fact, it was impossible to

⁴⁷IFP/3280, August 1888, Cons. 94.

⁴⁸IFP/3275, January 1888, Cons. 42-44.

remove them in course of only one year - Major Deane, as Plowden observed, "made a good beginning" in the right direction.⁴⁹ He systematised the medical expenditure of the State, and was thereby enabled both to augment the number of medical institutions and to extend the sphere of usefulness of those already existing. This was done without any additional outlay in the case of Jammu, and in Kashmir with a budget grant reduced by Rs. 10,000 (chilki). He took measures to substitute qualified for non-qualified hospital assistants in charge of minor dispensaries, and to supply them with necessary instruments and a stock of suitable drugs. Finally, he drew up and set going a scheme for educating a certain number of boys in the Lahore Medical School for the purpose of rendering them fit to take charge of dispensaries in their own country. He drew up special rules for their appointment, pay, and promotion, and had no doubt of the success of his scheme, provided the Darbar should take a little care to implement it.⁵⁰

In the meantime, Diwan Gobind Sahai had gone far enough in his effort to reverse the verdict of the Kashmir Council against him. In June he had written to Lord Lytton, complaining against the proceedings of the Council.⁵¹ Perhaps he did so in expectation that Lord

⁴⁹Plowden to G.I. 12 Nov. 1888, IFP/3501, January 1889, Cons. 116.

⁵⁰Report of Surgeon-Major Deane, 14 Oct. 1888, Ibid., Cons. 117.

⁵¹Lytton to Dufferin, 10 July 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 526, p.200(b).

Lytton would take up his case in England and secure his reinstatement. However, this was followed by an appeal to the Viceroy for a re-hearing of his case. He complained that the charge of embezzlement against him had been built up at the machinations of Diwan Lachman Dass, who had a long-standing enmity with him "in connection with the division of their family estate". Besides, the Council had exceeded its functions by arrogating to itself judicial powers which, he said, were beyond its legitimate jurisdiction, and therefore the verdict given by it was evidently ultra vires. So he submitted for Lord Dufferin's consideration a petition in the following alternative form, and fervently urged the Viceroy to intervene on his behalf, and save him from this persecution, prompted by personal enmity:

either, the appropriate papers be called for, and such order passed thereon as might be deemed just;

or, a safe conduct be given to him to prefer an appeal to the Maharaja who might be directed to decide the case without any dictation from any quarter.⁵²

Commenting upon the Diwan's Memorial, Plowden argued that there was hardly any substance in his complaint against Lachman Dass, since the Council was not composed of its President alone, but also included

⁵² Memorial of Gobind Sahai, dated 22 August, 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E., Dec. 1887, Cons. 63.

the Maharaja's two brothers, on whose impartiality the Diwan had not ventured to cast any imputation. Besides, the proceedings of the Council had been conducted "in a formal and regular way", with due authority from the Maharaja. He therefore failed to understand how was it possible to contend that the Council had exceeded its powers by holding an enquiry which the orders of the Maharaja had authorised them to hold, or to impugn a decision as ultra vires, which had been passed not by the Council, but by the head of the State himself. Even so, Plowden heartily admitted that the Diwan's appeal to the Viceroy in Council, urging them to call for the relevant papers on his case, should be acceded to, because, in his opinion, an intervention to redress a wrong in a Native State was "not only a prerogative of, but also an obligation upon, the paramount power".⁵³ But the Government of India refused to interfere on Gobind's behalf, and after proper enquiry, regretted their inability "to accede to either of the alternative requests", preferred in the Diwan's Memorial.⁵⁴ Not only that, Gobind Sahai's name, as Plowden had desired,⁵⁵ was struck off the Viceregal Levée List, and the Punjab Government was duly informed that in future the Diwan would

⁵³Plowden to Durand, 2 Sept. 1887, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, Dec. 1887, Cons. 67.

⁵⁴Cunningham to Gobind Sahai, 14 Oct. 1887, Ibid., Cons. 73.

⁵⁵Plowden to Durand, 2 Sept. 1887, Ibid., Cons. 67.

not be admitted to interviews with the Governor-General.⁵⁶

As a matter of fact, Lord Dufferin had come to form a very poor impression of Gobind Sahai, both as a man and an administrator, and he had even a shrewd suspicion that the money embezzled by the Diwan, might have been sent to Dalip Singh to entle him to regain his hold over the Punjab.⁵⁷ Actually, about this time rumours were afloat that the Kashmir State was intriguing with both Dalip Singh and Russia against the Indian Government.⁵⁸ There were men who even believed that Dalip Singh would settle in Kashmir.⁵⁹ In fact, since the close of 1885, his movements had been very closely watched by the Punjab Government.⁶⁰ Dalip went to Russia early in 1887, and began to intrigue with the Czar in the vain hope of securing Russian aid to invade India.⁶¹ Lord Cross was very anxious to know the truth or otherwise of the Maharaja's complicity with Dalip Singh. He actually

⁵⁶ Crawford to Plowden, 14 March 1888, NAI/FDP, Sec. E. March 1888, Cons. 226; PFP/3163, Native States, Part B, April 1888, Cons. 27.

⁵⁷ Dufferin to Cross, 24 June 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, p.158.

⁵⁸ Maitland to Mackenzie Wallace, 18 March 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 526, Encl. in No. 64, pp. 75-76; Dufferin to Northbrook, 10 January 1886, Ibid./Reel 525, p.9; Tel. from Viceroy, 21 June 1888, PSHC/102, p.883.

⁵⁹ Summary of correspondence in the case of Dalip Singh by Col. P.D. Henderson, 13 June 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1505-09.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Dufferin to Roberts, 12 Feb. 1887, Roberts Papers/Box File D/2, No. R27/68; Dalip Singh to Lala Jhindaram, 1 May 1887, Encl. in No. 788, Dufferin Papers/Reel 531, pp. 611-12. Lala Jhindaram was a pleader of Multan.

felt very much concerned about the "disloyal proceedings" of the Punjab Prince about whom all sorts of rumours were then in the air. The Lahore Press even reported that mendicants were going about in the Punjab, foretelling the restoration of the Khalsa power. In consequence, Cross asked Dufferin to impress upon Aitchison the necessity of strict vigilance in the Punjab,⁶² and Roberts was urged to keep his eyes upon the Sikh section of the Indian army.⁶³ Henderon,⁶⁴ Durand⁶⁵ and Aitchison⁶⁶ did not believe that the Maha-

⁶²S.S. to Viceroy, 1 Feb. 1887, Cross Papers/33, Feb. 1887, No.6.

⁶³Cross to Dufferin, 2 June 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, pp. 50-51; Tel. from Viceroy, 1 June 1887, PSHC/95, p.727; Dufferin to Roberts, 12 Feb. 1887, Roberts Papers/Box File D2, No. R.27-68.

Roberts asked every Commanding Officer to enquire about the feeling of the Punjab troops with regard to Dalip Singh. He also enquired of his old Sikh acquaintances, and was told by them that the appearance of Dalip Singh in the Punjab "would probably cause a certain amount of excitement, and perhaps also in the Sikh regiments; but they did not think it would be serious, certainly not so long as we were in strength and successful in the front!", Roberts to Durand, 9 June 1887, Roberts Papers/100/5, p. 219; Roberts to Wallace, 10 Sept. 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 532, pp. 228(b)-(d).

⁶⁴Summary of Correspondence regarding Dalip Singh, 13 June 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1505-09; Note by Henderson, 1 July 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 663-67; Dufferin to Cross, 22 July 1887, Cross Papers/23, Encl. 2 in No. 51. Henderson was the head of the Thuggee and Dacoity Department, Infra, p. 141, note 101.

⁶⁵Durand to Wallace, 14 January 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 13-14. For a brief note on Durand, supra, Chap. II, p. 75 , note 52.

⁶⁶Dufferin to Cross, 22 Feb. 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, pp. 20-24. For a brief note on Aitchison, supra, Chap. I, p. 26 , note 40.

raja of Kashmir had anything to do with Dalip Singh, but Dufferin preferred to reserve his opinion, and in the absence of any documentary evidence, he passed it off as "one of those circumstances which must always remain a matter of conjecture".⁶⁷

In fact, the Government of India had never discounted the possibility of a Russian invasion of India, or even an attempt by Dalip Singh, with Russia's aid, to reconquer the Punjab.⁶⁸ Early in 1887, Durand had drawn the attention of the Government of India to the close proximity of the Russians to the Indian frontier, and suggested the advisability of some kind of preparedness to meet any contingency that might occur. He was particularly in favour of organising the armies of the Native States so that they could be utilised as a valuable reserve in time of war.⁶⁹ Personally, Lord Dufferin was not inclined to accept such a proposal; yet, the matter could not be long delayed.⁷⁰

Shortly afterwards, Durand again urged upon the attention of the Indian Government the danger of a Russian invasion, and suggested the desirability of reorganising the armies of the Native States. He pointed out that in the last ten years Russia had come very close

⁶⁷ Tel. from Viceroy, 1 June 1887, PSHC/95, p. 727; also Cross Papers/33, No. 1 of June 1887; Dufferin to Cross, 24 June 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, p. 158.

⁶⁸ Dufferin to Roberts, 19 July 1887, Roberts Papers/Box File D2, R27/96; Durand to Roberts, 27 May 1887, Ibid.,/Box File D¹/4, R 26/3.

⁶⁹ Memo by H. M. Durand, 21 Jan. 1887, PSM/D80; Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 172.

⁷⁰ Dufferin to Cross, 22 Feb. 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, pp. 20-21; Dufferin to Roberts, 12 March 1887, Roberts papers Box File D2, R27/71.

to the Indian frontiers, and in that context, it seemed not improbable to him that before long the British Government might be forced to undertake military operations against her on an unprecedented scale, the cost of which would tax the Indian exchequer to the utmost. Unhappily, the depreciation of the rupee⁷¹ had occurred simultaneously with the Russian advance, and had exerted a deplorable pressure upon the Indian finances. Under these circumstances it seemed to him desirable to reconsider very fully every possible means of strengthening the Indian Empire without increasing its financial burdens, and there were, he thought,

"many special reasons for taking up again the question of the Native Armies".⁷²

Durand believed that this would especially prove to be

"a political advantage just now when Dalip Singh is appealing to the sympathies of his countrymen".⁷³

He therefore proposed that a separate beginning should be immediately made with the armies of the Punjab States, and Kashmir should be called upon to supply a Dogra contingent.⁷⁴ He further advised that

⁷¹The reference is to the Silver Crisis of the Eighteen eighties that affected the World economy as a whole.

⁷²Durand's Note on the organisation of the Native States Armies, 7 Aug. 1887, Roberts Papers/Box File D1/4, R26/6; Memo. on the present position in C. Asia, 21 May 1887, Cross Papers/22, Encl. in No. 43, PSM/C.104.

⁷³Durand's Note on the Native States armies, 7 Aug. 1887, Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid.; also Durand's Memo of 21 May 1887 PSM/C104.

Major Melliss of the Bombay Staff Corps should be appointed on special duty for a couple of months to secure all possible information about the Native States in general, and to submit a scheme for dealing with their military resources.⁷⁵

Roberts agreed with Durand that to prepare for resisting a Russian invasion of India the Native States like Kashmir might be called upon to lend their assistance.⁷⁶ A Mobilisation Committee was thereupon set up with Roberts, Chesney⁷⁷ and a few others, and Lord Dufferin agreed with their general deliberations that any

"further advance of Russia could not fail to create a situation of great political and financial embarrassment in India and should be opposed at all hazards".⁷⁸

Durand's proposal for raising some Dogra troops was separately considered. Dufferin's Government was at first hesitant to sanction the formation of a Dogra regiment. But Roberts urged upon them the desirability of such a contingent on political grounds.⁷⁹ The matter assumed considerable importance when Dufferin asked for the permission of the Home Government to confer an Honorary Colonelship upon the Kash-

⁷⁵ Durand's Note on the Native States armies, 7 Aug. 1887, as in note 72.

⁷⁶ Roberts' note on Military Preparation, 23 May 1887, Roberts Papers/96/1, pp. 175-77; Roberts to Durand, 2 June 1887, Ibid./100/5, pp. 213-14. Sykes, P. op.cit., pp. 172-73.

⁷⁷ Sir George Chesney, General in the Indian Army; Secretary to the Military Department of the Government of India, 1880-86; Member of the Governor-General's Council, 1886-91; M.P. for Oxford, 1892.

⁷⁸ Dufferin to Cross, 24 Sept. 1887, Cross Papers/23, No. 60; Black C.E.D. op.cit., pp. 279-80.

⁷⁹ Roberts to Chesney, 19 April 1887, Roberts Papers/100/5, p.189.

mir Maharaja for that purpose. To such a proposal Lord Cross raised "no objection on political grounds", but he apprehended that it might form "an inconvenient precedent in respect to other chiefs".

"Is it worth doing merely to help recruiting in one Corps?"

he asked, but subsequently left the matter to the Viceroy for a final decision.⁸⁰ Eventually, Dufferin decided in favour of a Dogra Contingent, and the Maharaja was appointed an Honorary Colonel of his new regiment, the 37th Dogras.⁸¹

About this time, an offer came from the Nizam of a sum of 20 lacs of rupees as a contribution towards the defence of the Indian frontier.⁸² Dalip Singh might have been pained by the Nizam's offer,⁸³ but its announcement led other chiefs to follow the example set by Hyderabad, and some of them came forward with similar offers.⁸⁴ The Maharaja of Kashmir offered a sum of one million rupees in addition

⁸⁰ S.S. to Viceroy, 4 Aug. 1887, PSHC/96, p. 1389, also, Cross Papers/33, No. 11 of Aug. 1887; PFP/2924, Aug. 1887, Genl. B., Cons. 58-62.

⁸¹ IFP/3276, July 1888, Cons. 26-27, p.31; also, IFP/3501, February 1889, Cons. 238-45, pp. 139-45.

⁸² Viceroy to S.S. 4 Oct. 1887, PSHC/98, p. 295, PSHC/97, p.831.

⁸³ Dalip Singh to Nizam, 30 Oct. 1887, Encl. in No. 565, Dufferin Papers/ Reel 532, pp. 433-34.

⁸⁴ Dufferin to Cross, 24 January 1888, Encl. in No. 24, Cross Papers/24; Viceroy to S.S. 27 Oct. 1887, Cross Papers/33, No. 26; Viceroy to S.S. 27 Nov. 1887, No. 38 of Nov. 1887, Ibid.; PSHC/98, p.299 and p. 1313.

to all the troops and war materials of the State.⁸⁵ Those who remained silent did so only because they had freely placed their resources at the disposal of the Indian Government two years earlier.⁸⁶ Lord Dufferin still questioned the prudence of accepting these offers,⁸⁷ the more so, because Indian opinion, as expressed in the Indian Press was generally opposed to the arrangement. At least, he said, the "Government should have the appearance of acting with deliberation, rather than of any over eagerness".⁸⁸ But his colleagues supported Durand's idea of taking some definite measure for utilising the Native Armies. Most of them, of course, disfavoured the proposed money payment by the Native States, but there was a general agreement among them as to the utility of reorganising the Native Armies with a view to employing them in case of a war with Russia.⁸⁹ The rights and obligations of the Paramount Power in relation to the Native States were put very tersely by Aitchison:

"The duty of subordinate cooperation in the defence of the Empire is one which flows necessarily from the re-

⁸⁵ Encl. to G.I. to S.S. 17 April 1888, PSLEI/53, p. 297; Dufferin to Cross, 26 Jan. 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 82.

⁸⁶ Supra, Chap. II, p. 71.

⁸⁷ Viceroy to S.S. 4 Oct. 1887, PSHC/98, p. 295.

⁸⁸ Viceroy to S.S. 29 Oct. 1887, Cross Papers/33, Oct. 1887, No. 31.

⁸⁹ Notes by the Members of the Viceroy's Council, Encl. in No. 24, Cross Papers/24; Dufferin to Cross, 3 Aug, 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 105.

lations of supremacy which we have established over the Native States of India and the obligation we are under to protect the Native States as part of the Empire. The duty of subordinate cooperation is sometimes expressly provided for in our treaties with the Native States, which require the chiefs to furnish troops on requisition according to their means, to place their resources at the disposal of the British Government, and sometimes even to serve with their armies in person. But whether the treaties contain express provisions on the subject or not, the duty is a general one flowing from the relations which have been in fact established!"⁹⁰

Dufferin, however, believed that the collateral question which his colleagues had incidentally raised as to converting the proposed money payment into a contribution of troops was one that must be gone into more fully.⁹¹ He therefore instructed Major Melliss, as Durand had desired, to visit the Native States to ascertain whether the offers of the Indian Princes could be fruitfully utilised for the purposes of defence. Melliss was asked to study the actual condition and probable future capabilities of the Native States' Armies.⁹² Personally, Dufferin still had "very grave doubts" about the advisability of the proposed measure, "and, even if adopted, its practical accomplishment".⁹³ The delay in deciding upon the matter gave rise

⁹⁰Note by Aitchison, 16 January, 1888, Encl. in No. 77, Dufferin to Cross, 24 January, 1888, Cross Papers/24.

⁹¹Dufferin to Cross, 24 January, 1888, Ibid.

⁹²Ibid., also, G.I. to S.S. 17 April, 1888, PSLEI/53, p.295; G.I. to S.S. 13 March, 1889, p. 347, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i).

⁹³Dufferin to Cross, 3 Aug. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 105.

to questions in the British Parliament,⁹⁴ and Cross asked for a categorical answer from the Viceroy as to his intentions.⁹⁵ In India a similar anxiety was felt by Roberts when Dufferin's intention to retire from the Viceroyalty toward the end of 1888 became known.⁹⁶ The General wanted the matter settled before the new Viceroy assumed office; otherwise it would be further delayed.⁹⁷ But Dufferin was opposed to any hasty decision, and preferred to wait till Melliss had gone round the Native States, including Kashmir, and submitted his report for the Viceroy's consideration.⁹⁸

In the meantime, signs of discord had become manifest in the affairs of the Kashmir Darbar. The entente cordiale between the Maharaja's brothers and Diwan Lachman Dass had ceased to exist. Raja Amar Singh, in particular, became hostile to the Diwan, and aspired to become the Prime Minister himself. The Maharaja sided with his brothers, evidently to get rid of Diwan Lachman Dass whom he had never wanted as his Prime Minister. The net result of this internecine conflict was

⁹⁴Hansard, Third Series, Vol. 323, 19 March 1888, Col. 1616.

⁹⁵Tel. from S.S. 19 March 1888, PSEC/100, p. 1025.

⁹⁶Dufferin wanted to retire on family grounds at the end of his fourth year in India. Dufferin to Cross, 6 Feb. 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 79. Announcement of his resignation appeared in the newspapers on 9 Feb. 1888. The next day Dufferin announced it to the members of the Legislative Council. Wallace, D.M.(ed.) Dufferin's Speeches in India, pp. 188-90; Black, C.E.D. op.cit., p.322.

⁹⁷Roberts to Durand, 17 March 1888, Roberts Papers/100/5, p.377.

⁹⁸G.I. to S.S. 17 April 1888, PSLEI/53, p.295; Dufferin to Cross, 2 April 1888, Cross Papers/24, No.87.

that the Darbar became "a scene of indolence and intrigues". Rumours, not without foundation, were rife of neglect of State business and of scenes of debauchery. The Maharaja still continued to be under the influence of his worthless parasites. Measures of reform, which were proposed and adopted, were rarely carried out in the proper manner.⁹⁹ Worst of all, the burden of expenditure entailed upon the State exchequer on account of the reforming zeal of the Resident and the Council, had made the State completely bankrupt, so much so that in the beginning of March 1888, Amar Singh disclosed it to Plowden "that at the moment the total sum in the public treasuries was only Rs. 800".¹⁰⁰

Even Plowden admitted that the Lachman Dass Ministry was now a spent force. In his opinion, therefore, it was now time "for the Government of India to reconsider the entire situation". The question, he emphasised, was what form of Government should now be constituted, and whether the policy of 1884 of allowing the Maharaja a free hand should still be continued. Personally, he tried to answer this question by suggesting three alternatives for the consideration of the Government of India. He asserted that a drastic reduction of the Maharaja's authority was an essential preliminary to any form of government that might be considered suitable for the Kashmir State. Pratap Singh might reign,

⁹⁹Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855; Lachman Dass to Plowden, 18 March, 1888, sub-encl. in Encl. 2 to G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid., the Pioneer, 26 January, 1888, p.6.

¹⁰⁰Plowden to Durand, 23 March, 1888, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

but must not govern: that was the demand made by him, and starting from this premise he proceeded to discuss his alternative plans for the reconstitution of the Kashmir Government.¹⁰¹ And, one of these, he believed, the Government of India would be obliged to choose in view of the failure of the Lachman Dass Ministry.¹⁰²

The first plan was to appoint Raja Amar Singh as the Prime Minister. This idea had gained credence in many quarters, especially due to the recent rapprochement between the Maharaja and his brother.¹⁰³ But Plowden was avowedly opposed to it. He had great doubts whether the young prince could be safely employed without prejudice to the interests of the Indian Government, and he asserted that the recent reconciliation between the Maharaja and Amar Singh was not genuine, being solely motivated by their common desire to overthrow Lachman Dass.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Col. P.D.Henderson, Head of the Thugee and Dacoity Department, however, thought that the grounds assigned by Plowden for setting aside Pratap Singh were rather inadequate. He believed that there was very little against the Maharaja that was definite except that he was weak, superstitious, liable to be influenced by inferiors, and generally not favourable to reforms. Pratap Singh, he observed, was in a difficult position right from the beginning, for which his father, Ranbir Singh, was largely responsible, and stated that with sympathetic guidance he would make a fair ruler. Note by Cunningham, 21 Dec. 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 811-51.

¹⁰² Plowden's Report, 5 March 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855; also PSDI/14, p. 55(d).

¹⁰³ The Pioneer, 11 Feb. 1888, p.6; the Civil and Military Gazette, 26 March, 1888, p.3.

¹⁰⁴ Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

The next plan was to bring in a Prime Minister from elsewhere, but the selection, in Plowden's opinion, would need particular care. No Indian official could administer the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir unless he was not only of exceptionally strong character, but also exceptionally honest, and in any case he would require besides the full support of the Indian Government. If, Plowden urged, the Government of India should decide to bring in an Indian Minister from outside, precautionary measures ought to be adopted with the young Rajas:

"I should order each of them to take up his residence in his own jagir and so occupy the same position as Raja Moti Singh of Poonch. It is not right that these young men should be given large jagirs which they never visit. It ought to be a condition of the grant that they reside on their property and be personally responsible for its administration".¹⁰⁵

Plowden's third plan was to continue the existing Council, making the Resident its temporary head and strengthening it by the addition of two selected Natives. He believed that an administration so constituted would probably be strong enough to introduce all needful reforms and to set the country in order. Three years would suffice to set things straight, and the Resident might then withdraw from the headship of the Council, and an administration be established on ordinary Native lines.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

Plowden's recommendations did not, however, end there. He was sure that whatever plan might be adopted by the Government of India, there was "one measure which must under any circumstances be prescribed". That was, first, the immediate removal of the band of incompetent, corrupt and mischievous men who were at the bottom of most of the intrigues in the State; and secondly, the appointment of an adequate number of trained Native Officials on reasonable salaries who could be trusted to carry out the orders given to them. "Until," he said, "the entire Kashmir establishment has been recast, and honest and competent servants substituted for the fraudulent and incapable men now employed, no reform can be carried out, nor can any mere alteration of the form of Government be of any use." ¹⁰⁷

After discussing the possible means for reconstituting the Kashmir Government, Plowden endeavoured to anticipate an objection which, he foresaw, was likely to be raised - that of interference in the affairs of a Native State. Notwithstanding, he argued, that the British Government was pledged not to interfere with the internal affairs of a Native State, a clear case of unavoidable interference had then occurred in Kashmir. First, because misgovernment producing evil consequences to the people had existed for many years, and though a

¹⁰⁷ Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

wide margin of time and opportunity had been allowed, there seemed no hope whatever that the State, unaided, would be able to settle its own affairs. Secondly, the condition of Kashmir affected countries on its northern border beyond its limits, and thus became an injurious and disturbing element in the scheme of frontier defence. He came to the conclusion that a strict adherence to the principle of non-interference would merely prolong "the local disorder and mal-administration" in Kashmir, and therefore to check its mischievous course, decided and effectual interference had become a necessity.¹⁰⁸

That Lachman Dass had failed to fulfil the obligations of his high office was generally recognised,¹⁰⁹ and in an open Darbar, summoned on March 19, 1888, Pratap Singh declared his intention to dismiss the Diwan from his office of Prime Minister and President of the State Council. The decision was communicated both to the Resident and the Diwan on the same day, and the causes assigned were the Minister's failure to discharge his duties satisfactorily. The specific charges against the Diwan were, first, his negligence in not completing the Jammu budget, and secondly, his failure to control the expenditure of the State, which had exceeded income, leaving the Civil

¹⁰⁸ Plowden's Report, 5 March, 1888, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

¹⁰⁹ The Pioneer, 26 January 1888, p.6, 11 Feb. 1888, p.6, March 21, 1888, p.1, March 22, 1888, p.1. The Civil and Military Gazette, 26 March, 1888, p.3.

and Military establishments in arrears of pay.¹¹⁰ Ram Singh did not approve of the measure,¹¹¹ while Lachman Dass appealed to the Resident to save him from his discomfiture.¹¹² The Maharaja at first entrusted the duties of the President to the joint charge of his brothers, Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh, but subsequently, perhaps on account of the disapproval with which Ram Singh appeared to have viewed the whole business, the state seal was made over to Raja Amar Singh alone.¹¹³

Following Lachman Dass's appeal to him, Plowden took up his case with the Government of India. On the same day as the Darbar had been held Pratap Singh had sent a communication to the Viceroy stating his reasons for the removal of the Diwan, much in the same terms as he had done to the Resident.¹¹⁴ But Plowden tried to answer the first charge of the Maharaja by shifting the responsibility for the Jammu budget to the entire Council, and the second by attributing

¹¹⁰ Maharaja to Resident, 19 March, 1888, Lachman Dass to Resident, 19 March 1888, Ram Singh to Resident, 21 March, 1888, sub-encls. in Encl. 2 to G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855. Maharaja's Parwana of 19.3.1888 to Lachman Dass, Encl. 4 in Ibid. The Civil and Military Gazette, 23 March, 1888, p.4.

¹¹¹ Ram Singh to Resident, 21 March, 1888, as above in PSLEI/54.

¹¹² Lachman Dass to Resident, 19.3.1888, as above in PSLEI/54.

¹¹³ Plowden to India, 20 March, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, p.278; Plowden to Durand, 23 March, 1888, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855; Maharaja to Resident, 19 March, 1888, Sub-encl. in Encl. 2 in Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Pratap Singh to Dufferin, 19 March, 1888, sub-encl. in Encl. 2 to G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid.

the bankruptcy of the State to its military expenditure,¹¹⁵ and to the personal expenditure of the Maharaja and his two brothers. Further, he tried to impress upon the Foreign Department that the dismissal of Lachman Dass was due not to the causes alleged by the Maharaja, but to that perpetual intrigue at the Darbar which was the bane of the Kashmir State. He urged the Government of India to consider two points before allowing Pratap Singh to effect a change in the Ministry. First, whether the reasons assigned by the Maharaja for the dismissal of the Diwan were adequate and just, and secondly, whether having regard to the circumstances under which the administration of Jammu and Kashmir was entrusted to a Council on the recommendation of the Viceroy, the Maharaja's proceedings, if just in themselves, had been consistent with the respect due to the paramount power.¹¹⁶

That Plowden would be annoyed at the sudden dismissal of Lachman Dass is understandable, but Durand, too, considered the Maharaja's action without previous consultation with the Indian Government to be absolutely improper.¹¹⁷ The Anglo-Indian Press felt a sympathy for

¹¹⁵ Earlier Plowden had assumed that the military expenditure of the State did not admit of any reduction, Supra, p. 120.

¹¹⁶ Plowden to Durand, 23 March 1888, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S. of 18 August, 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

¹¹⁷ Durand to Plowden, 22 March 1888, sub-encl. in Encl. 3 to G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid.

the fallen Minister and sought to cover up his personal failings by suggesting that he was practically helpless being under the absolute control of the Resident.¹¹⁸ A Correspondent from Kashmir even asserted that the failure of the late Ministry was not due to the personal failings of Lachman Dass, but due to the interference of the "ignorant charlatan who professes to tell the futurity in the stars"; that, indeed, the "mock astrologers" at the court had been too many for the Diwan.¹¹⁹ On the whole, however, the Press opinion had gone against Plowden, and much of the failure of the Lachman Dass Ministry was ascribed to him. He was charged with having interfered too much in the affairs of the State, "both small and great"; he was accused of having exercised his authority in an undue measure. The Pioneer even went to the length of suggesting that if Lachman Dass were to be removed from his office on account of his failure, the Resident ought to be removed as well.¹²⁰ Partisans of the Diwan, however, fondly hoped, as perhaps did Plowden himself, that the Viceroy would intervene on behalf of Lachman Dass, and ask the Maharaja to state "openly and fairly what he has to urge against his

¹¹⁸The Pioneer, March 21, 1888, p.1.

¹¹⁹The Civil and Military Gazette, 26 March, 1888, p.7.

¹²⁰Ibid., p.3, the Pioneer, March 21, 1888, p.1, and March 22, 1888, p.1.

Minister..... The final result of all this will be the retirement of the Maharaja from business, which will have to be carried on by a Council of Regency."¹²¹ To such expectations Dufferin's speech at the Town Hall, Calcutta, on March 23, acted as a fine rejoinder. His deprecation of any desire to interfere unduly with the methods and concerns of Native States was so hearty and explicit "as to suggest the idea that the Viceroy had in his mind the absurd rumours recently spread in connection with Kashmir."¹²²

This became apparent shortly afterwards. Dufferin had earlier accepted an invitation from the Maharaja to visit Kashmir in the spring. But he was obliged to give up his trip,¹²³ and this is how he described his reaction to Lord Cross:

"For some reasons I was glad, for others sorry. I was sorry not so much on account of missing a sight of that wondrous valley, as because I am not satisfied with the condition of public affairs in the State. We have tried Agent after Agent there, and none of them has done well. The fact is our politicals are a very poor lot. They are either lazy or stupid, or vulgar-minded bullies, or disreputable or amiable gentlemen, devoid of any real grasp or energy."¹²⁴

¹²¹The Pioneer, March 23, 1888, p.1.

¹²²Ibid., 26 March, 1888, p.1.

¹²³Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, Nos. 424 and 438, pp. 350 and 353; Dufferin to Roberts, 9 April, 1888, Roberts Papers/Box File D3 No. R27/159.

¹²⁴Dufferin to Cross, 16 April, 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 89. Compare what Roberts said of the Resident: "Plowden has not been a success in Kashmir." Roberts to Lyall, 22 June 1888, Roberts Papers/100/2, p.92.

The failure of the Plowden-cum-Lachman Dass regime¹²⁵ should not, however, be exaggerated. It may appear at the first sight that the Ministry of Lachman Dass foundered upon the rock of finance. Notwithstanding that some very valuable reforms had been initiated by them, pursuant to the instructions of the Government of India,¹²⁶ both Plowden and Lachman Dass, in their zeal for reform, had indeed calculated without the financial capacity of the State. They tried their hand at many things at a time with the result that the State exchequer was gradually exhausted till it became virtually empty. This afforded the Maharaja, who was never happy over the appointment of Lachman Dass, a very convenient pretext to overthrow the Diwan.

That, however, was only the facade. The fact is that the situation at the Kashmir Darbar was such that no Minister, unless he had the support of the majority factions at the Court, could hope to administer the State with any very definite success. Of the existing factions at the Darbar, three were really powerful. One of these looked to the Resident for support; another gathered round the Maharaja; while the third looked to Amar Singh for his favour. So long as Lachman Dass could count upon the cooperation of Amar Singh and his group, he could manage the affairs of the State. But when that prince

¹²⁵ J.C. Bose says it was a 'phenomenal failure'. Cashmere & its Prince, p.33.

¹²⁶ In spite of his disapproval of Plowden's proceedings Dufferin admitted that considerable reforms had been introduced. Dufferin to Queen, 24 May 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 516, No. 78.

fell out, and joined hands with the Maharaja, the fate of the Lachman Dass Ministry was practically sealed. Its failure was hereafter a mere question of time, and even if the treasury had not been emptied, any other similar pretext might well have brought about its end.

Presumably, Plowden was not aware of Lord Dufferin's personal opinion of him; nor was he at all deterred by the Press criticisms of his high-handedness in Kashmir. His representation to the Government of India in favour of Lachman Dass was soon followed up by further accusations against the Maharaja. Toward the end of March he sent to the Foreign Department a copy of a paper, complaining of the Maharaja and signed by the two young Rajas, Ram Singh and Amar Singh, and by three Kashmir officials, Diwan Lachman Dass, Wazir Shib Saran, and the notorious Mian Lal Din. This paper, as Plowden said, had been given him while Lachman Dass was in office, but he had deliberately withheld it at the time since Pratap Singh had promised to work in collaboration with Lachman Dass and his colleagues, and the earlier disagreement between the Maharaja and his Council had been smoothed over.¹²⁷

This paper, supported by further evidence alleged to be in Pratap Singh's hand-writing, reiterated some of the standing grievances against the Maharaja, namely, that he was recklessly extravagant and

¹²⁷Plowden to Durand, 28 March, 1888, Encl. 3 and sub-enclosures in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

surrounded by disreputable and fraudulent persons. It also detailed a few more which, if true, placed the Maharaja in a very unfavourable light. The gravest among these charges were that the Maharaja had been intriguing to kill both his brothers and Diwan Lachman Dass; that he had always treated the ladies of his household with harshness and cruelty; that he was very ill-disposed both to Dufferin and Plowden; and that, above all, he was inclined to intrigue with Russia against the British Government.¹²⁸

Pratap Singh, however, had made up his mind to thoroughly recast his own Government, and with that end in view, he again sent for Babu Nilambar Mukherjee from Calcutta. But Plowden was determined not to allow Nilambar to re-enter the Kashmir territories, and as soon as he learnt of the Maharaja's intention, he telegraphed to the Babu asking him not to come to Kashmir without the sanction of the Government of India. Plowden believed that Nilambar's re-engagement without the previous consent of the Indian Government would be contrary to the treaty of Amritsar. Accordingly, he asked Durand to send a cable to the Government of the Punjab to stop Nilambar at Sialkot, and to send at the same time a strong warning to Pratap Singh.¹²⁹

Durand agreed with Plowden that the Maharaja's action in re-employing Nilambar Mukherjee was contrary to treaty stipulations, and

¹²⁸ Plowden to Durand, 28 March, 1888, Encl. 3 and sub.-enclosures in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

¹²⁹ Resident to India, 30 March 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, No. 398, p. 304.

therefore wrong. All the same, he apprehended that the refusal to admit him to the Maharaja's territories would be criticised in Bengal. So, instead of stopping Nilambar at Sialkot, he decided that the Resident should tell the Maharaja, in the Viceroy's name, that in view of the serious condition of affairs in the State Pratap must not make any arrangement for employing Nilambar or^{any} other British subject, until the Viceroy had had an opportunity of considering the Maharaja's proposals for the future conduct of the Kashmir administration.¹³⁰

Flowden was informed accordingly,¹³¹ but before he moved in the matter, Pratap Singh had drawn up a scheme for reorganising his administration and sent it to Lord Dufferin for his consideration. The new scheme proposed the appointment of a Council, a consultative one, composed of a President, a Vice-President, three Members, and a Secretary. The Maharaja chose himself to be the President of the new Council. The right of appointing the Vice-President, Members, and the Secretary was reserved by Pratap Singh, while the power to remove and substitute them was vested in the majority in the Council. Raja Amar Singh was appointed Vice-President, who was also to be the Prime Minister with executive power. Ram Singh and Nilambar Mukherjee were appointed as

¹³⁰ Durand to Wallace, 31 March, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, No. 398, p. 304.

¹³¹ Durand to Flowden, 1 April 1888, sub-encl. in Enclosure 2 in G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

Members, with Diwan Janki Prasad as Member and Secretary. Amar Singh was entrusted with the Judicial and Foreign Departments ; the charge of military administration was assigned to Ram Singh; Babu Nilambar Mukherjee was given the charge of the Revenue Department; while Diwan Janki Prasad was charged with 'Miscellaneous' functions.

The business of the Council was defined as follows. The Council should sit three days in a week except on authorised holidays. Any extra-ordinary meeting should be held on the requisition of the Prime Minister. It should be the duty of the Council to legislate and hear and pass opinion on all subjects that might be brought forward by the members. The Council should, on meeting, frame rules for its guidance, which might be removed or modified only by it. All matters should be decided on a majority of votes. Besides the matters which might be brought forward in the Council by the Members, the Prime Minister might refer to the Council, for opinion, all important questions affecting the administration in all its branches. The respective opinions of the several members should be recorded and signed.¹³²

On the Maharaja's kharita proposing the new Council Plowden wrote a long commentary to the Foreign Department, criticising the Maharaja's scheme of reorganisation point by point. As regards Pratap

¹³² Maharaja's kharita, of 13 April, 1888, sub.-encl. in Encl. to G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

Singh, he reiterated his firm conviction that the Maharaja was wholly unfit to be entrusted with any power whatever, and asserted

"that his deposition in favour of the infant son of his brother Raja Ram Singh is the best thing that could happen to the State. But if it suits the policy of the Government of India to retain his Highness as nominal Chief, it is essential that he should be debarred from all interference in the administration and be subjected to a controlling agency possessing the full confidence of the paramount power. The plan of placing the Maharaja at the head of the Council cannot be sustained." ¹³³

Reverting to the Constitution of the Council, Plowden argued that it was evident from the terms of Article 5 that the persons who had framed the new scheme were aware of the Maharaja's mental impotence. For although by Article 3 the first appointment of the Vice-President, Members, and Secretary was vested in the Maharaja, the subsequent removal of anyone of these, and the substitution of another in his place, was determined by a majority of votes. But while this provision was primarily intended to divert the power of constituting a Government from the Maharaja to the Council, it would also operate as a direct incentive to intrigue, and render the conduct of administrative business impossible. Besides, care had been taken by the 6th Article to deprive the Council of any real power by defining its functions as merely consultative. Although it could legislate and pass opinions on all matters

¹³³Plowden to Durand, 24 April, 1888, Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

brought before it, the executive power rested with the Vice-President and Prime Minister, and therefore the main struggle would be to secure this office.¹³⁴

Plowden drew the attention of the Government of India to the fact that one post in the Council had been deliberately left vacant by the Maharaja. He believed that this was reserved for Raja Moti Singh of Punch who had recently ingratiated himself with the Maharaja for the purpose. Among those appointed, Diwan Janki Prasad, in Plowden's opinion, was a nonentity, Ram Singh a cypher, and Amar Singh shifty, untrustworthy and still too young "for any certain opinion to be formed about him". At any rate, Plowden concluded, Amar Singh was quite unfit to be the Prime Minister of the Kashmir State, and if the Government of India should still agree to his appointment in that capacity, they would do well to associate with him an experienced and trustworthy Secretary or colleague, selected by them. He thought, however, that the best course would be to ask the Maharaja's brothers to retire to their respective jagirs, since as long as they remained in Jammu or Srinagar they were sure to become a focus of intrigue and a standing obstacle to the introduction of a stable administration.¹³⁵

As regards Babu Nilambar Mukherjee, Plowden observed that though not "pecuniarily" dishonest, he was responsible for the introduction

¹³⁴Plowden to Durand, 24 April, 1888, Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

¹³⁵Ibid.

of the Bengali element in the Maharaja's administration and all the opposition that was offered by the Maharaja to the British Government was the result of his "pernicious advice and influence". Plowden asserted that the Government of India could safely take it that Nilambar knew nothing of revenue or financial matters, and therefore on their part

"it would be most unwise from every point of view to permit him to re-enter the service of this state"

In Plowden's opinion, there was only one remedy for the existing conditions in the State of Kashmir, and that was "for the Government of India to interfere, decidedly and effectually".¹³⁶

If Plowden was anxious that the Indian Government should interfere in the affairs of Kashmir, Durand apprehended "a possible onslaught" from the Punjab Government.¹³⁷ Recently, he had received a complaint from Plowden about Nisbet's¹³⁸ meddlesomeness in Kashmir affairs.¹³⁹ Although he did not personally believe that Nisbet would intrigue against Plowden,¹⁴⁰ Durand was aware of Aitchison's

¹³⁶ Plowden to Durand, 24 April, 1888, Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p. 855.

¹³⁷ Durand to Wallace, 8 May 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, No. 547, p.462.

¹³⁸ Nisbet was then Commissioner of Rawalpindi, Infra, p. 169.

¹³⁹ Plowden to Durand, 5 May 1888, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, May 1888, Cons. 286. One Karamchand reported to Plowden from Rawalpindi that Nisbet, then Commissioner at that place, was receiving representatives of the Maharaja's, suggesting that he sympathised with the Darbar against Plowden. Ibid., Cons. 287.

¹⁴⁰ Durand to Plowden, 11 May 1888, Ibid., Cons. 288.

view that the Government of the Punjab alone could "manage Cashmere", and that the rest were "all wrong".¹⁴¹ This, of course, Durand could hardly ever admit,¹⁴² and in spite of his confidence in Nisbet, the Maharaja continued to send his representatives to Rawalpindi, while not long after, Nisbet himself expressed his desire to Wallace to replace Plowden as Resident in Kashmir.¹⁴³

In the meantime, Plowden had communicated to the Maharaja that no step should be taken to appoint Babu Nilambar Mukherjee till the Government of India should have examined the scheme of reorganisation of the Kashmir administration. But the Maharaja claimed that according to article VII of the Persian version of the treaty of Amritsar, which alone was signed by his grandfather, Maharaja Gulab Singh, he was entitled to appoint any British subject without the consent of the Indian Government. He argued that a person was only bound by a document to which he was a party, and since his grandfather had never signed the English version of the treaty of Amritsar, he as Gulab's successor, was not bound by its stipulations. Pratap knew, however,

¹⁴¹Durand to Wallace, 8 May 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, p. 462. Durand of course acknowledged that the Kashmir people would always try to play off the Government of the Punjab against the Kashmir Resident.

¹⁴²To Wallace he wrote: "But remember, the Punjab Government 'managed' Cashmere by treating him as an Independent Sovereign.... He was always received with most extravagant honours. He would stand no sort of interference in the State, and kicked out all Englishment for four or five months in the year, and so on. We have brought the State into line, and made the Darbar realise that it is not an independent power."

¹⁴³Nisbet to Wallace, 3 July 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, pp. 4-5.

that the matter was a complicated one, and therefore he left it to the Government of India for final decision.¹⁴⁴

The Maharaja's arguments evoked a very smart rejoinder from Plowden which was submitted to Durand for the consideration of Lord Dufferin's Government. In this Plowden pointed out the fallacy, even the danger, in Pratap Singh's contention. He argued that if the State of Kashmir was bound only by the Persian version of the treaty, by the same reasoning the British Government was obliged only to respect its English text, in accordance with which the Government of India had hitherto recognised the Maharaja's existence as a ruling chief. In other words, the repudiation by Pratap Singh of the English text of the treaty would at once mean, from the British point of view, the forfeiture of his right to continue as the ruler of Kashmir. The question of Nilambar's appointment thus became a complicated one, and no immediate decision could therefore be given on it.¹⁴⁵

Side by side, the Darbar asked for five native officers from British India for employment in the State, all of whom must be Punjabis and must know English and Persian. As we have observed, Plowden had earlier suggested the appointment of two Accountants General for Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequently, at the suggestion of Major Bailey,

¹⁴⁴ Maharaja to Plowden, 24 April and 8 May, 1888, NAI/FDP, Sec. E. March 1889, Cons. 157 and 160.

¹⁴⁵ Plowden to Durand, 12 May 1888, Ibid. Cons. 159.

the Inspector General of Forests in British India, he advised the Darbar to requisition the services of a competent Forest Officer for inspecting some of the principal forests in Kashmir. He also pointed out that as the Darbar estimated the revenue to be obtained from the State forests under proper management at twelve lakhs of rupees per annum, there was manifest risk in entrusting the administration of so lucrative a department to officers of native origin on moderate salaries. But on account of the existing financial difficulties of the State the Maharaja was reluctant to appoint any British official on a high salary, and insisted upon the appointment of Natives. On the question of the employment of Accountants General, however, he readily agreed, but as one of the posts he was inclined to offer to Pandit Pyare Lal of Lahore, he only asked for the services of one Account^{ant}/General. Besides this, four more officers were asked for: two for appointment as Military Accountants and two others as Conservators of Forests.¹⁴⁶

However much Plowden tried to resettle the affairs of the Darbar, Lord Dufferin was never very happy about the way he did so. In a letter to the Queen he expressed almost the same feeling as he had to Lord Cross only five weeks before. Notwithstanding that "some very considerable reforms have been carried through in Cashmere", he

¹⁴⁶ Plowden to Government of India, 16 June, 1888, IFP/3501, March 1889, Cons. 403.

observed, referring to the services of both St. John and Plowden:

"The fact is the political service in India is anything but well-furnished, and the worst of it is that owing to its peculiar constitution, if a member of it falls short of what the Government has a right to expect, the only remedy is to remove him from one post to another, for as he is a member of the covenanted service, he cannot be got rid of unless he is guilty of marked misconduct."¹⁴⁷

And only a week after this he informed Cross of his decision to remove Plowden. He recognised Plowden's ability as a man, but considered that "he has been too zubberdust, in other words, too high-handed in his dealings with the Maharaja". Dufferin complained that Plowden had "identified himself beyond what was desirable with the direct administration of the State", and so decided to transfer him to Berar where a vacancy had been created by the accidental death of Leslie Saunders. Plowden was to be replaced at Kashmir by Colonel Trevor, who was then Commissioner at Ajmere.¹⁴⁸

At this turn of events Colonel Nisbet plunged headlong into the vortex of Kashmir politics. To Wallace he expressed a wish for the Kashmir appointment, and professed a great deal of interest for the welfare of the State. He claimed that he had had more to do with the State of Kashmir than any other officer of the Punjab, and even frankly acknowledged that the Maharaja and his brothers had often ap-

¹⁴⁷Dufferin to the Queen, 24 May, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 516, No. 98.

¹⁴⁸Dufferin to Cross, 1 June, 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 96.

plied to him for coming to their assistance. Nisbet was, of course, aware that his "rather severe personal rule" had made him unpopular with the Native Press. Even so, he hoped that he "might be able to exercise a useful personal influence in the direction of affairs" in Kashmir.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the Maharaja had again applied to Plowden asking that Babu Nilambar Mukherjee might be allowed to take service under the Darbar. The appointment, he said, was to be made as a provisional arrangement and without prejudice to his treaty rights.¹⁵⁰ By the phrase "provisional arrangement" the Maharaja meant, as Plowden rightly remarked, not to employ Nilambar only for a time. He hoped that eventually the Government of India would agree to his keeping Nilambar permanently.¹⁵¹ Plowden had already sent the previous correspondence of the Maharaja on this subject for consideration of the Government of India. The matter was taken up by Lord Dufferin's Government along with the Maharaja's scheme for the reconstitution of the Kashmir Council, and their decision was communicated to Pratap Singh towards the end of July.

They declined to permit the employment of Babu Nilambar Mukherjee

¹⁴⁹ Nisbet to Wallace, July 3, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, No. 5, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵⁰ Maharaja to Resident, 22 June, 1888, sub.-encl. in Encl. 8 to G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

¹⁵¹ Plowden to Durand, 27 June, 1888, Encl. 8 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug., ^{1888,} Ibid.

as Member of the Council in charge of the Revenue administration.¹⁵² Plowden was informed that if the Maharaja should raise the question of employing him in any other capacity, he was to be told that the Government of India did not "consider it desirable that the Babu should return to Kashmir".¹⁵³ As regards the question whether the Maharaja was at liberty to employ Native British subjects without the consent of the Indian Government, Plowden was asked to tell him that the interpretation of the treaty of 1846 with regard to this point was no longer open to discussion. The Government of India was willing to give the Maharaja every possible assistance in regard to such appointments, "but they must maintain their right to be consulted" before any British subjects were appointed by the Darbar.¹⁵⁴

If Dufferin refused to sanction the appointment of Nilambar Mukherjee, he accepted the scheme of Pratap Singh's in its major aspects. Of course, the Government of India did not overlook the fact that the Maharaja's scheme was open to many objections, and that, partly on account of Pratap Singh's personal character, and partly for other reasons, it was not unlikely to prove a failure. Yet, they set aside for the time being the alternative proposals of Plowden's,

¹⁵² Viceroy's Kharita to the Maharaja, of 25 July, 1888, sub.encl. in Encl. 9 to G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

¹⁵³ Government of India to Resident, Kashmir, 25 July, 1888, Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

and decided to afford the Maharaja a further opportunity of showing whether he was capable of discharging the duties of a responsible ruler. But they agreed at the same time that if after a fair trial it should become evident that the Maharaja was wholly incapable of conducting the administration of his State, the proposals submitted by the Resident would be reconsidered.¹⁵⁵

In particular, Dufferin impressed upon the Maharaja the supreme need for a careful investigation into the condition of his finances, and also for reorganising the executive and judicial services of the State. To secure that end, the Maharaja was asked to employ competent officials with practical experience of administration for all the three branches, and the Viceroy assured him of all possible help in securing the services of such men from the Punjab or elsewhere.¹⁵⁶

If Dufferin thus gave the Maharaja a fair trial to justify his rule, no one at the India Office entertained any illusion about the new administration. Cross was not at all hopeful about its success, though he recognised that the time was not ripe for "any radical change". Evidently, the official attitude was to try Pratap Singh

¹⁵⁵ Government of India to Resident, Kashmir, 25 July, 1888, Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S. 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918.

¹⁵⁶ Viceroy's Kharita, 25 July, 1888, sub-enclosure in Encl. 9 to G.I. to S.S. 18 August 1888, Ibid.

to the last, so that if it should

"become necessary hereafter to remove the Maharaja as incapable of ruling his State, it will not be possible to charge the Indian Government with acting in an arbitrary manner or without having given the Maharaja every chance of showing that he possessed the will and capacity to govern his Kingdom wisely and to the benefit of those subject to his rule."¹⁵⁷

On receipt of his instructions Plowden proceeded to Jammu and delivered the Viceroy's Kharita to Pratap Singh at a private interview with him. A few days later he had another opportunity of discussing the Kharita with the Maharaja and Amar Singh. On this occasion he urged upon the Maharaja's attention the Viceroy's desire that the finances as well as the judicial and executive services of the State should be immediately reorganised. But Plowden suspected that the Maharaja could not adequately appreciate the necessity of balancing the income and expenditure of the State, and was possessed by the idea that, as the land revenue formed the principal source of income, nothing much could be done till the new settlement was concluded.¹⁵⁸

The Viceroy's Kharita seemed to have inspired the Maharaja to action. He made certain modifications in respect of the composition

¹⁵⁷ S.S. to G.I., 12 Oct. 1888, and accompanying minute, n.d. PSDI/14, pp. 55(a)-60.

¹⁵⁸ Plowden to Durand, 21 Sept. 1888, NAI/FDP, Secret E, March 1889, Cons. 177.

of his Council. The number of its Members was raised to seven to keep it, as the Maharaja explained, "uneven for the majority of votes". He appointed Diwan Amar Nath as a Member who was placed in charge of the Nizamat Department. He asked Lord Dufferin for the services of two experienced Indian officials for the Judicial and Revenue Departments. The Maharaja desired that these officials should be from the Punjab and not from other provinces, and their appointment was to be initially for five years on a salary ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 rupees per month.¹⁵⁹

Meanwhile, an incident had occurred on the north-west frontier which afforded the Maharaja an opportunity of exhibiting his fidelity to the British Government. For some years past the tribes of the Black Mountain had frequently harried the subjects of the Punjab Government all along the border, and to chastise them reprisals and blockades had to be instituted. Matters came to a head when on 18 June 1888, a party of British troops was attacked by the tribes, and two English officers and four Gurkha soldiers were killed. Thereupon, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab urged upon the Indian Government the immediate necessity of sending a military expedition to the Black Mountain to teach the tribes a severe lesson.¹⁶⁰ Lord Dufferin was

¹⁵⁹ Maharaja to Dufferin, 16 Sept. 1888, NAI/DFP, Secret E, March 1889, Cons 178.

¹⁶⁰ G.I. to S.S., 24 Sept. 1888, and enclosures, especially 25 and 29, P.P., 1888, LXXVII, C.5561, pp. 1-184.

opposed to an immediate movement of British troops, and desired that if an expedition was at all to be undertaken, it should be postponed till the next summer.¹⁶¹ He was not sure whether the proceedings of Major Battye, who had led the party of British troops to the border to examine the water supply, was above reproach.¹⁶² But against the unanimous opinion of the Punjab officials and all the members of his own Council, he could not long defer the despatch of an expedition to the Black Mountain.¹⁶³ Early in September, he cabled for the Secretary of State's consent to send the expedition.¹⁶⁴ Cross was "quite content to leave the matter" in Dufferin's hands,¹⁶⁵ and a force was asked to assemble in the beginning of October under the command of General McQueen.¹⁶⁶

When the Maharaja came to know of the proposed expedition, he offered 1,000 troops to cooperate with the British force.¹⁶⁷ The offer was accepted by the Viceroy with due appreciation, and the

¹⁶¹Dufferin to Rawlinson, 16 Sept. 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 527, p. 583.

¹⁶²Dufferin to Cross, 22 June 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 99; PFP/3164, Sept. 1888, Cons. 1-19.

¹⁶³Dufferin to Lansdowne, 17 Sept. 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 527, pp. 585-86.

¹⁶⁴Tel. from Viceroy, 3 Sept. 1888, PSHC/104, p. 1269.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶P.P., 1888, LXXVII, C.5561, pp. 1-184; PSLEI/55, pp. 209-12, 1161-1211; Lyall, A., op.cit. II, pp. 186-87.

¹⁶⁷IFP/3274, Nov. 1888, Cons. 79, p.43.

Kashmir troops left Jammu on October 1 for Abbotabad.¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile Raja Ram Singh had become anxious to take part in the Black Mountain Expedition. Plowden supported his proposal in the hope that it would stimulate the new scheme for utilising the Native States' Armies, and also produce a "good political effect".¹⁷⁰ But for family reasons the Maharaja did not consider it advisable that Ram Singh should join the expedition, and instead offered his own services. But Plowden considered that the Maharaja could not be spared from his own territory at that moment.¹⁷¹ Dufferin agreed with him, and asked Pratap Singh to nominate some one else.¹⁷² At this, General Indar Singh was appointed to command the Kashmir troops, and Lala Ram Kishen to accompany them as Political Officer.¹⁷³

In spite of some basic defects in the organisation of the Kashmir army which were left to the Resident's discretion to be brought to the Maharaja's notice, some very good and useful work was done by the Kashmir contingent during the campaign. In every way the officers and men of the Contingent behaved well, and with their assistance the

¹⁶⁹IFP/3274, Nov. 1883, Cons. 81, p.43; Ibid., Cons. 109, p.49.

¹⁷⁰Ibid., Cons. 87, p.44.

¹⁷¹Ibid., Cons. 96, p.46.

¹⁷²Ibid., Cons. 99, pp. 46-47.

¹⁷³Ibid., Cons. 110, p.49.

tribes of the Black Mountain were easily suppressed.¹⁷⁴ As McQueen reported, a full Akazai deputation came in and unconditionally accepted all his terms.¹⁷⁵ The Hassanzais followed suit, and the purpose of the expedition was, by and large, fully realised. When the question of future relations with the tribes came up for consideration, Durand advised the annexation of their territories. But both Dufferin and Lyall were opposed to it.¹⁷⁶ Even so, although the country was not theoretically annexed, arrangements were made for driving roads through it to the Indus and along that river. The suggestion that roads be built had come from Roberts and was approved by both Lyall and Dufferin. The tribes were compelled to keep the roads open, and by this provision, as Dufferin remarked,

"Our control over the locality will be as complete as if it formed a portion of British territory."¹⁷⁷

Dufferin's approval of the Maharaja's scheme of reorganisation was a decided check upon Plowden's initiative. That however did not prevent him from recording a note of dissent against the appointment of Diwan Amar Nath. This young member of the Diwan family was a brother of Anant Ram. He was appointed Secretary of the Council under

¹⁷⁴IFP/3500, April 1889, Cons. 34, 37 & 38; Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S. 27 March, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 49(b) to 491(f).

¹⁷⁵Tel. from Viceroy, 20 October, 1888, PSHC/105, p.623, PSLEI/55, p.213.

¹⁷⁶Dufferin to Grant Duff, 22 October, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 527, p. 642.

¹⁷⁷Roberts to Lyall, 7 Oct. 1888, Roberts Papers/100/6, p. 559; Dufferin to Cross, 4 Nov. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 117; Lyall, A. Life of Dufferin, II, p. 196.

Diwan Lachman Dass's administration, but having quarrelled with the other members, he remained in office for a very brief period. He was dismissed from the service of the State, and since then had held no appointment under the Darbar. Plowden did not entertain a very favourable opinion of the young Diwan. He did not approve of his appointment by the Maharaja, and even complained that, since the Diwan was a British subject, Pratap Singh ought to have sought the permission of the Government of India before employing him. Even so, in view of his recent instructions from the Foreign Department not to unnecessarily meddle in the affairs of the Maharaja, Plowden refrained from asking them to withhold their sanction in respect of Amar Nath's appointment.¹⁷⁸ He merely suggested that it could "be withdrawn hereafter if (the Diwan's) proceedings should render this course advisable".¹⁷⁹

This was the last of Plowden's recommendations to the Government of India as Resident of Kashmir. Thereafter his days at the Residency were numbered, since Dufferin had decided to replace him by Colonel Parry Nisbet, the Commissioner of Rawal Pindi.¹⁸⁰ Durand, of course,

¹⁷⁸G.I. to Kashmir Resident, 25 July, 1888, Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S., 18 Aug. 1888, PSLEI/54, p.855.

¹⁷⁹Plowden to Durand, 21 Sept. 1888, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, March 1889, Cons. 177.

¹⁸⁰Dufferin to Cross, 24 Sept. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 112.

was opposed to Nisbet's appointment, and that for two reasons mainly. In the first place, he complained to Wallace that the Kashmir Darbar had always tried to play off the P_unjab Government against the Resident, and Nisbet's appointment would merely encourage them to believe that they were in future to be restored to the charge of the Punjab officials if not the Punjab Government. Secondly, he pointed out that it was quite a mistake to suppose that the State was in a worse position than it was before:

"On the whole, things have greatly improved since the old Chief's death. The Darbar is inefficient, like almost all Native Darbars, but it is now manageable, which it was not before, and progress has been made in many ways".¹⁸¹

Whether Durand liked it or no, the Viceroy was favourably impressed by Nisbet's abilities as an administrator. He thought that Nisbet was the right type of man to guide the Maharaja, if the latter was to be kept in power:

"...unless we are able to place by his side as Resident an officer whom he likes and trusts, and who will in some measure supply him with the strength and courage which he lacks, the result of leaving H.H. in possession of full administrative powers may be precisely what we wish to avoid".¹⁸²

Dufferin even wrote to Cross with the idea of temporarily raising

¹⁸¹Durand to Wallace, 5 Sept. 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, pp. 174-75.

¹⁸²G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, PSDOC/2, First Series, pp. 1131-32.

the salary of the Kashmir Resident which was then 2,000 rupees a month, and 750 rupees short of that which Nisbet was drawing as Commissioner of Rawalpindi.¹⁸³ Officially, of course, Dufferin asked Nisbet to accept the post at its lower salary, and formally apologized for introducing "these pounds, shillings and pence considerations."¹⁸⁴ Nisbet "demurred very strongly at first, but subsequently gave way".¹⁸⁵

With Nisbet's appointment began a new chapter of Kashmir history, and Lord Dufferin hoped

"that our new man in Cashmere will put everything to rights in that most important corner of the world!",¹⁸⁶

But his expectation was not fulfilled, and Pratap Singh had to be temporarily set aside to keep things straight in Kashmir.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³G.I. to S.S. 15 Oct. 1888, PSDOC/2, First Series, pp. 1131-32.
Dufferin to Cross, 24 Sept. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 112.

¹⁸⁴Dufferin to Nisbet, 1 Oct. 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 534, No. 229.

¹⁸⁵Dufferin to Cross, 4 Nov. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 117; Viceroy to S.S., 5 Nov. 1888, Cross Papers/34, No. 11 of Nov. 1888.

¹⁸⁶Dufferin to Cross, 3 Dec. 1888, Cross Papers/25, No. 121.

¹⁸⁷Infra, Chap. IV.

Chapter IV

SUPERSESION OF PRATAP SINGH

(1889 - 90)

In November 1888, Plowden was transferred to Berar as Commissioner of the Hyderabad Assigned Districts.¹ On the 13th of the same month Colonel Parry Nisbet assumed the charge of the Kashmir Residency.² The new Resident was given "a hearty reception" by Pratap Singh, and after the first ceremonies were over, Nisbet arranged a few private interviews with the Maharaja and Amar Singh in order to acquaint himself with the affairs of the State. His first impression of Pratap Singh was favourable, as he wrote to Dufferin:

"The Maharaja is not the least wanting in intelligence, far from it, being very shrewd in all his remarks, and he can reason and argue with much force and good sense."³

In his earlier meetings with the Maharaja, Nisbet took up the military question. Pratap Singh had agreed on the occasion of Melliss's visit to Kashmir in August 1888, to thoroughly equip and train a force of 2,500 for the purpose of Imperial defence.⁴ That offer

¹Notification by the G.I., 12 Nov. 1888, IFP/3508, Feb. 1889, Cons. 3.

²Memo. 13 Nov. 1888, Ibid., Cons. 5.

³Nisbet to Dufferin, 8 December, 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 534, No. 656.

⁴Maharaja to Durand, 1 Sept. 1888, Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 13 March 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 403; Supra, Chap. III, pp. ~~140-41~~. 138-39.

was now renewed with equal enthusiasm, and the Maharaja even asked for the services of eight Drill Inspectors from the British army to commence work on that portion of his forces which he had consented to make thoroughly efficient.⁵

Nisbet settled down to his work with "every hope of doing all" that was wished of him. The Maharaja and his brothers were very cordial, and eager for reforms.⁶ Pratap Singh's first request was for a pure water-supply for Jammu, whereupon Nisbet called a Committee of Engineers which adopted a suitable project for that purpose.⁷ With the help of Major Melliss and Algernon Durand the training of the Kashmir troops was set on foot, and Nisbet hoped that Major Drummond⁸ and Captain Hogge⁹ would make the best use of the Kashmir army. The new Resident was, however, very much dissatisfied with the Public Works Department under General de Bourbel.

⁵ Nisbet to Dufferin, 8 Dec. 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 534, pp. 472-73; Nisbet to Dufferin, 11 Dec. 1888, Ibid., p. 482.

⁶ Nisbet to Durand, 12 January 1889, NAI/FDP, External B, April 1889, Cons. 27/33, K.W.2.

⁷ Ibid.; Report on the Lansdowne Water Works by J.S. Attfield, 28 Sept. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

⁸ Major F.H.R. Drummond, Inspector of Cavalry, Punjab States, was sent by Lansdowne to reorganise the Kashmir cavalry. This fell under the scheme of reorganising the troops of the Native States.

⁹ Captain J.W. Hogge, Inspector of Infantry, Punjab States, was likewise sent for the reorganisation of the Kashmir Infantry.

He complained to Durand that Bourbel was very slow, expensive and pompous, and that the railway to Jammu and the cart-road from Srinagar to Kohala had made very slow progress, and that too at a very heavy expenditure. The same sloth and extravagance, he further alleged, possessed the Maharaja's Engineer, Atkinson, with the result that the Jhelum Valley road had made no progress whatever. Nisbet however took up both the matters, and prepared himself to cleanse the Public Works Department.¹⁰

The Maharaja had meanwhile expressed a strong wish to meet the Viceroy, which seemed to Nisbet a very desirable proposal deserving of every encouragement:

"I am satisfied that he only wants drawing out of his shell and being brought out of the background into which he has fallen of late to be both useful and compliant."¹¹

That apart, such an interview would, he believed, "amazingly" assist in the settlement of frontier questions and other matters. He wrote to Durand to enquire if the Viceroy could have time to arrange a meeting with the Maharaja, and suggested that if that course should not be feasible, he himself could come down to Calcutta with Raja Amar Singh. Nisbet was in earnest in his effort to establish an intimate relation between the Darbar and the Government of India, and even

¹⁰ Nisbet to Durand, 12 January 1889, NAI/FDP, External B, April 1889, Cons. 27/33, K.W.2.

¹¹ Ibid.

asked Durand to come up to Kashmir with his wife, assuring him that such a trip would help in the settlement of various matters which otherwise "would have a year's correspondence".¹²

No meeting could be arranged between the Viceroy and the Maharaja as Lord Lansdowne was then busy with people from two other Native States - Hyderabad and Jaipur. That also kept Durand busy, so that Nisbet was asked to come to Calcutta with Prince Amar Singh if he should consider that desirable.¹³ Just when telegraphic communications between Sialkot and Calcutta were thus crossing each other, an incident occurred which radically changed the entire course of future events in Kashmir. On 25 February 1889, a batch of 34 letters,¹⁴ written in the Dogri character and alleged to be in the Maharaja's own handwriting, fell in the hands of Nisbet. Some of them disclosed the Maharaja's intrigues with Russia and Dalip Singh;¹⁵ others brought to light several offers of large sums of money to certain individuals for removing by death or otherwise such men as Plowden, the erstwhile Resident, the two brothers of the Maharaja,

¹² Nisbet to Durand, 21 Feb. 1889, NAI/FDP, External B, April 1889, Cons. 27/33, K.W.3.

¹³ NAI/FDP, Extl. B. April 1889, Cons. 27-30.

¹⁴ Sub-encl. in Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), pp. 535-37 (PSLEI/56).

¹⁵ At about this time Dalip Singh had issued a proclamation to the Princes and people of India, intended, it was supposed, to create another mutiny. PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 33-36.

and one of his Maharanis.¹⁶

Personally, Nisbet had no doubt about the authenticity of these letters which was vouchsafed for by Raja Amar Singh. Immediately as they fell in his hands Nisbet came to the conclusion that though the Maharaja had his "lucid intervals of good sense and propriety", he was "utterly incapable of being left in charge of his own affairs"; that, indeed, there was no other course open "save his removal from the State". He, therefore, urged the Foreign Department to permit him to come to Calcutta at once to talk the matter fully over with Durand, so that the future policy of the Government of India towards the Kashmir State could be definitely settled.¹⁷

Durand received the Resident's communication with mixed feelings. He appreciated that the matter was one which could not be thoroughly ignored. But at the same time he was aware that Amar Singh "always wanted to oust the Maharaja of Kashmir". He evidently doubted the authenticity of the treasonable correspondence; at any rate, it was a nuisance, and he felt that

"if we had to remove the Maharaja, we should have to wash a great deal of dirty linen in public".¹⁸

¹⁶ Nisbet to Durand, 27 Feb. 1889, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), pp. 519-20(PSLEI/56); Sufi, G.M.D., op.cit., p. 808; Nicholson, A.P., op.cit., pp. 102-03.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Durand to Wallace, 3 March 1889, p.190, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a).

When the matter was submitted to Lord Lansdowne he instructed that Nisbet should first hold a full enquiry into the matter and then come to Simla to present his case.¹⁹ But the Resident was in no mood to wait for any further investigation, and urged Durand to take his word for it that the letters discovered were undoubtedly genuine. He of course admitted that the matter was brought to light by the two brothers of the Maharaja, but notwithstanding their intrigues against their ruler, the letters, he argued, certainly established the absolute incapacity of Pratap Singh, who should therefore be deprived of all powers. Instead the administration should be entrusted to a Council, composed of the Maharaja's brothers and other members, approved by the Government of India.²⁰

Nisbet then hastened to Jammu and had two interviews with Pratap Singh on 7 and 8 March. In both these meetings the Maharaja was reported to have urged upon the Resident his desire to retire from public life, entrusting the administration to a Council which should include the Resident himself. Nisbet knew this was not feasible, and proposed instead the inclusion of an English member. This measure, he believed, would ensure freedom from intrigue,

¹⁹ India to Resident, 4 March 1889, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 520. (PSLEI/56).

²⁰ Resident to India, 5 March 1889, Encl. 3 in Ibid., pp. 520-21.

and continuity of the Kashmir administration.²¹ Shortly after Nisbet's second interview with the Maharaja, Amar Singh brought the Resident an edict of renunciation from Pratap Singh in which the latter declared his intention to retire from public life for a period of five years, and authorised a Council of five members to conduct the administration of the State during that period. Of these five members, two were his brothers, Rajas Ram Singh and Amar Singh; a third was an English member selected by the Government of India; and the two others were Pandits Suraj Kaul and Bhag Ram. The Maharaja pledged himself not to interfere with the administration during this period of five years, but retained for himself the right to draw a monthly allowance for his privy purse, and to make all the usual expenses relating to marriages and other family customs. Above all, he retained the privilege of nominating one of his brothers as President of the Council. It was further provided that the Council would have no power to alter the existing treaties without the previous consent of the Maharaja, or to assign jagirs or immovable property of the State.²²

In Nisbet's opinion, the resignation of the Maharaja afforded an acceptable way out of "a very acute difficulty" created by the

²¹ Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 16 March 1889, Encl. 8 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 520 (PSLEI/56); also, Roberts Papers/Box File N¹/3, No. R50/2.

²² Maharaja's *Irshad* dated 8 March 1889, Sub-encl. in Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 3rd April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 521-23 (PSLEI/56).

discovery of his "treasonable" correspondence.²³ Of course, he was not inclined to exaggerate the importance of the letters, and regarded them "as the foolish and mischievous invention of a weak and ill-balanced mind". Nisbet believed that Pratap Singh was a man of no strength of character or intellect, and that when under the influence of opium, he could be induced to commit acts of folly, such as he had done. He further affirmed that as a man the Maharaja was "not entirely bad, but rather an object of compassion and leniency." His fault was that he was placed in a position for which he was disqualified by natural character, education and intellect. All the same, it was dangerous to leave the affairs of the State in his hands, because an incapable and foolish ruler like him could, by his acts, plunge the Government of India at any moment into unforeseen difficulties. So the time had come when the Government of India could hardly ignore the imperative necessity of directly interfering into the affairs of Kashmir. With this assumption, Nisbet proceeded, just as Plowden had done, to suggest the remedies which would relieve the State of its present deplorable condition of utter mismanagement.²⁴

Nisbet's first remedy was the appointment of a British Official

²³Nisbet to Durand, 13 March 1889, Encl. 7 in G.I. to S.S. 3rd April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 521-23 (PSLEI/56).

²⁴Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 16 March 1889, Encl. 8 in Ibid.

as a member of the State Council. He argued that past experiences had shown that the old officers of the State, except Suraj Kaul and Bhag Ram, could no longer be trusted in any responsible capacity for the improvement of the administrative machinery. For their incapacity and intrigues they had forfeited not merely the Maharaja's confidence, but also that of the Indian Government. Nor was there any scope for re-importing Bengali elements from Calcutta who, though clever, were yet unsuited to the task of Government, and were "loathed by the people at large". That explained, he pointed out, the "extreme anxiety" of the Maharaja and his brothers for an English Official of high character and position on the State Council and such subordinate officials, a few of them European, as were trained in the English system of government. Personally, Nisbet was certain that in the miserable condition of affairs in the State which was the direct outcome of the intrigues of the official cliques, no purely native administration could hope to work long, or stand united. That being the case, the presence of an English Officer on the State Council was a primary necessity, as he alone could act as an unassailable barrier against intrigue and corruption, and thus hope to

"secure decency and continuity of administration in every Department which more than anything else is required to restore peace, justice, and good order in this distressed country." ²⁵

²⁵Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 16 March 1889, Encl. 8 in G.I. to S.S. 3rd April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 521-23 (PSLEI/56).

The alternative proposal was to appoint the Resident also Superintendent of the State. Nisbet, of course, claimed that he himself would prefer the first alternative, but whatever the measure adopted, he emphasised that it must be complete in itself, and not a half measure. Personally, he was satisfied that only a rigorous action on the part of the Government of India could provide for the proper administration and future security of the Kashmir State.²⁶

Meanwhile, Nisbet had been asked to come to Calcutta for a discussion with the Foreign Department.²⁷ He had made an unnecessary fuss over the discovery of the Maharaja's letters. The news leaked out and obtained a wide circulation.²⁸ Questions were asked in the House of Commons,²⁹ and both Lansdowne and Durand were annoyed on that account. The Viceroy felt that Nisbet had made "a needless commotion about the letters".³⁰ Durand thought that no officer "who had seen anything of the Native States would have attached so much importance to them as Colonel Nisbet has done". In fact, he believed

²⁶ Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 16 March 1889, Encl. 8 in G.I. to S.S. 3rd April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 521-23 (PSLEI/56).

²⁷ India to Resident, 8 March 1889, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 521 (PSLEI/56).

²⁸ Wallace to Knight, Editor, The Statesman, March 11, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), p. 123; The Pioneer, 11 March 1889, p.1.

²⁹ Hansard, Third Series, Vol. 333, March 14, 1889, Col. 1635.

³⁰ Lansdowne to Roberts, 30 March, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 153-54.

that the appointment of Nisbet as the Resident in Kashmir had been a "dangerous experiment". For the Viceroy's consideration, therefore, Durand wrote:

"His (Nisbet's) sense of right and wrong is often too acute, and his energy explosive. Colonel Nisbet should, I think, be restrained."³¹

However, he agreed with the Resident that the letters, if genuine, were very discreditable to the Maharaja, and afforded good evidence of his unfitness to rule. But he disapproved of Nisbet's suggestion of an English member on the Kashmir Council. That measure would have "the appearance of annexing Kashmir", and a disastrous effect upon the confidence and loyalty of the other Native States. So the Government of India should take steps similar to those recently taken in Gwalior, maintaining the existing Council under the Presidency of Raja Amar Singh, with the reservation that they must consult the Resident on all matters of importance, and must follow his advice whenever offered.³²

As to the exact grounds upon which the action of the Government of India should be based, Durand was rather hesitant. He, however, advised the Viceroy that it would be better not to base it upon the Maharaja's letters exclusively, nor even on his voluntary resignation,³³

³¹Durand's note dated 16 March 1889, on Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, dated 16 March 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, April 1889, Cons. 80-98, KW.1. Evidently, Nisbet personally brought his report to Calcutta.

³²Ibid.

³³In the same note Durand expressed his apprehension that by the Native Press the Maharaja's resignation would be criticised as having been extorted from him.

but to take cognisance of both and say that in order to relieve the State of the existing misgovernment, the Maharaja should, for a time at least, hand over his powers to the State Council.³⁴

Lansdowne, like Durand, attached little importance to the Maharaja's letters, but believed, all the same, that their discovery betrayed his incapacity to govern his State.³⁵ He, however, was anxious to avoid creating the impression that he intended to annex Kashmir. He recognised that the affairs of the State were very much in confusion, from which there was no possibility of any immediate relief under the "incorrigible" Maharaja, and therefore, the "episode of the letters" should be made the occasion for a radical change in the State, though not its main justification. But the whole change should be made as quietly and unostentatiously as possible, so that it might not appear as though the Maharaja was being publicly degraded.³⁶ As regards Pratap Singh's proposals for the future administration of the country, he agreed with Durand that it would be inadvisable to allow an English Officer to serve upon the new Council, and whatever the measures taken they should

³⁴ Durand's note dated 16 March 1889, on Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, dated 16 March 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, April 1889, Cons. 80-98, K.W.1.

³⁵ Lansdowne to Cross, 20 March 1889, Cross Papers/26.No.16; also Viceroy to S.S. 13.3.1889, PSHC/107, p. 993; Barton, W., The Princes of India, p. 123.

³⁶ Lansdowne to Roberts, 30 March 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 153-54, Roberts Papers/Box File L1, R34/18.

be adopted on grounds of protracted misgovernment in the State.³⁷

Nisbet was accordingly advised to communicate to the Maharaja that for a time at least he would be expected to refrain from all interference in the administration. He would retain his rank and dignity as Chief of the State, but full powers of government would be vested in a Council composed of the Maharaja's brothers and three or four officials selected by the Government of India. It was considered undesirable to include an Englishman among the members of the new Council, and Raja Amar Singh was nominated its new President. Besides retaining his rank and dignity the Maharaja would receive from the revenues of the State an annual sum sufficient to maintain his household in due comfort, and to defray any expenditure which might rightly devolve upon him. But he would have no power of alienating the State revenues, and the money placed at his disposal for private expenses, though adequate, must not be extravagantly large. As for the Council, it would have full powers of administration, but these powers were to be exercised only under the guidance of the Resident. They would take no important step without consulting the Resident, and should follow his advice whenever it might be offered.³⁸

³⁷Lansdowne to Cross, 20 March, 1889, Cross Papers/26, No.16.

³⁸India to Resident, 26 March, 1889 and 1 April, 1889, Encls. 10 and 14 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), pp. 539-40.

In communicating the decision of the Government of India, Nisbet was asked to be careful to avoid basing that decision exclusively upon the Maharaja's resignation or upon the discovery of his seditious letters. But the Government of India was by no means prepared to make the settlement a matter of compact with the Maharaja, and to accept all the conditions laid down in his edict of resignation. Nisbet was therefore asked to tell the Maharaja that the decision of the Government of India was based upon a full consideration of all the circumstances, the letters as well as the Maharaja's abdication being considered among other things, but only as portions of a difficult and complicated case, which it had been necessary to settle on broader grounds of general policy.³⁹

The Resident was further asked to work out fresh proposals upon the lines indicated to him - such as the definition of the future position of the Maharaja and his annual allowance, the framing of a new Constitution for the Council, and the requirements of the State in the matter of subordinate officials. In making these proposals, however, he was asked to bear in mind that the Government of India had "no desire to turn Kashmir into the semblance of a British district, or to place all administrative posts in the hands of Punjabi foreigners". Nisbet was particularly requested to introduce

³⁹

India to Resident, 26 March 1889 and 1 April 1889, Encls. 10 and 14 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 539-40.

the new arrangements as quietly as possible, with no ceremonial or performance that could be construed as the public degradation of the Kashmir ruler. The change should attract no more attention than necessary, and, above all, it should never be given the appearance of a punitive measure against a great Native Chief for his disloyalty to the Crown.⁴⁰

To Amar Singh's appointment as the President of the State Council, as laid down in the instructions of the Government of India, Nisbet could not heartily agree. He was still doubtful about the capacity and industry of that young prince, and on political grounds recommended that the question of appointing a permanent President could be kept open for some time. He pointed out that if Ram Singh should be passed over in favour of his younger brother, he would never attend the Council meetings. On the other hand, if he were appointed the permanent President of the Council, he would, being a man of curious disposition, create all sorts of difficulties. So the best course for the time being would be to announce that "the senior member present at the commencement of the sitting will preside". Nisbet thought that the two brothers ought merely be allowed to retain their "present designations", Ram Singh as Commander-in-Chief, and Amar Singh as Prime Minister; and when

⁴⁰ India to Resident, 26 March 1889 and 1 April 1889, Encls. 10 and 14 in G.I. to S.S. 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), pp. 539-40; Nicholson, A.P., op.cit., p. 105.

they and the other members should sit together in Council, they would fall into their natural places, each with an equal vote.⁴¹

As regards the native members of the Council, Nisbet approved of the Maharaja's appointment of Pandits Suraj Kaul and Bhag Ram. But he wished immediately to have a third member owing to the heavy pressure of work that was likely to be brought to bear upon the Council. His choice fell upon a Muhammadan gentleman, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Mohi-uddin Khan, Extra-Assistant Commissioner of the Mian Walli Subdivision of the Bannu district in the Punjab.⁴²

On the question of the Council meetings, Nisbet was not in favour of "very frequent" ones: once or twice a week, he thought, would be enough. He expressed his preparedness to work in collaboration with all the departments of the State Government, making each member of the Council bring his particular work to him, if necessary daily. Thus he hoped to settle himself every administrative problem, and ensure the regular progress of the work of the State Council. Though uncertain of Ram Singh's attitude, Nisbet was eager to keep the ruling family together, and on his personal behalf assured Durand that he would certainly work quietly and with circumspection as the Government of India wanted him to do. He emphasised at the same time

⁴¹ Resident to India, 27 March 1889, Encl. 12 in G.I. to S.S., 3rd April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), p. 540 (PSLEI/56); Nisbet to Durand, 29 March 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, May 1889, Cons. 556.

⁴² Resident to India, 27 March 1889, Ibid.; Nisbet to Durand, 30 April 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, May 1889, Cons. 566.

that

"the trumpet should give no uncertain sound, and with my knowledge of native character, if the policy is strong and vigorous, it is well they should understand it is so by a sufficiently brave outward show, which impresses them rather than very quiet working which they easily mistake for timidity."⁴³

The Government of India agreed to Nisbet's proposal about the Presidentship of the Council, but they did not wish him to take a direct and open share in the administration. Lansdowne's idea was to maintain a responsible native government under the general control and guidance of the Resident, and not to have departmental officers coming to him daily as their official superior. Nisbet was advised accordingly, and asked not to get all his officials from the Punjab. Durand, in particular, favoured a "mixture" of diverse elements, rather than "a Punjabi ring", in the Kashmir administration.⁴⁴

The decision of the Government of India about the administrative change in Kashmir was communicated to the Maharaja in the middle of April. A private Durbar was held for that purpose which was attended by the Resident, the Maharaja, his brothers, Pandits Suraj Kaul and Bhag Ram, Diwan Janki Prashad, an old official of the State, and Sirdar

⁴³Nisbet to Durand, D/O dated 29 March 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E., May 1889, Cons. 556.

⁴⁴NAI/FDP, Sec. E., May 1889, Cons. 558-59.

Rup Singh, Governor of Kashmir. The Maharaja received it calmly, and after the conclusion of the meeting told Nisbet that he would "think it over" and soon give an answer. The Resident was thereupon obliged to remind him that what had been communicated was an order of the Government of India, and no reply to it was wanted. On 18 April 1889, the first meeting of the Council was held.⁴⁵

Lord Cross, the Secretary of State for India, fully approved of the proceedings of Lansdowne's Government,⁴⁶ but the supersession of Pratap Singh gave rise to bitter criticisms in other quarters. By some of the Anglo-Indian Papers it was of course justified by the long course of maladministration in Kashmir and the "notorious" incapacity of the Maharaja to direct the affairs of the State.⁴⁷ But the Indian Press vehemently criticised the action of Lansdowne's Government. The British Resident was abused in unmeasured terms for what was denounced as his treacherous conduct,⁴⁸ and the Government of India was suspected of annexationist designs.⁴⁹ For sometime there

⁴⁵Nisbet to Durand, 19 April 1889, Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 26 July 1889, Lansdowne MSS/IB(i), p. 915 (PSLEI/57).

⁴⁶S.S. to G.I. 24 May 1889, PSDI/15, pp.87-94.

⁴⁷The Pioneer, 29 April 1889, p.1; The Civil and Military Gazette, 24 April 1889, p.4, 6 June 1889, p.3.

⁴⁸Translation of an article from the Akbari-i-Am, 28 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, July 1889, Cons. 163.

⁴⁹The Indian Mirror, May 1, 1889, The People's Journal, 3 Aug. 1889, as published in The Kashmir Conspiracy or The truth of the Maharaja's Case, pp. 20-22; The Hindoo Patriot, 26 Aug. 1889, p. 399; Lansdowne to Cross, 19 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 121-25; Lansdowne to Cross, 2 Aug. 1889, Ibid., pp. 128-31; also Cross Papers/27, No. 36.

was such an upsurge of native feelings that Lansdowne seemed to be somewhat shaky. He even considered the publication of an official statement to contradict what Ardagh⁵⁰ called the "misrepresentations" of the Indian Press.⁵¹ Although this was not done, official secrets "leaked through the waste paper basket", and found their way to the Indian Press.⁵² These papers, however, refused to believe that the Maharaja had voluntarily resigned, and continued to shower abuses upon the Indian Government.⁵³

About this time, Sir Lepel Griffin⁵⁴ made a suggestion that the Government of India should colonise Kashmir with British settlers.⁵⁵ That intensified the criticisms made by the Indian Press,

⁵⁰Private Secretary of Lord Lansdowne.

⁵¹Lansdowne to Cross, 19 July 1889, Cross Papers/27, No. 34; Cross to Lansdowne, 12 July 1889, and 19 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 57/60; Ardagh to Durand, 26 April 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E., May 1889, Cons. 553-67, K.W.2.

⁵²Ardagh to Godley, 21 Aug. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(a), p.90; NAI/FDP, Sec.E., Aug. 1889, Cons. 162-203, K.W.4, Foreign Office D/Os dated 27 May and 1 June 1889. For instance, Nisbet's letter to Amar Singh, dated 17 April 1889, reviewing the new arrangement in Kashmir was published in the Amrita Bazar Patrika, 23 May 1889, p.5.

⁵³The Indian Mirror, 21 and 23 April 1889; The Hindoo Patriot, May 6, 1889; the Bengalee, 15 June 1889; The Kashmir Conspiracy or The Truth of the Maharaja's Case: Articles from the People's Journal.

⁵⁴Then a Civil Annuitant. The famous Punjab Administrator, reputed for his services in Afghanistan.

⁵⁵Lansdowne to Cross, 19 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 121-25, Cross Papers/27, No. 34; The Indian Mirror, 11 July 1889, Bose, J.C., Cashmere & its Prince, p.81.

and before long Charles Bradlaugh⁵⁶ drew the attention of the House of Commons to that matter. In fact, although an important section of the British Press remained silent over the matter,⁵⁷ a demand was made in the Lower House as early as the middle of April for the presentation of official papers to its members.⁵⁸ Not long afterwards, this demand was reiterated by Bradlaugh when he drew the attention of the House of Commons to what he considered to be the forced resignation of the Maharaja. He demanded that an enquiry into the matter should be made by a Select Committee of the House, or in some other suitable manner, and that the Maharaja should be given a fair opportunity to defend his case.⁵⁹ Even in India some Englishmen protested against the "hasty" decision of the Government of India to set aside Pratap Singh.⁶⁰

⁵⁶Freethought advocate and Politician; M.P. for Northampton.

⁵⁷The Times, for instance, gave only an obscure corner of its columns on 2 May 1889, p. 5 to the announcement of the new arrangement in Kashmir.

⁵⁸Hansard, Third Series, Vol. 335, 15 April 1889, Col. 485. This was done by W.S. Caine, Member for Barrow-in-Furness.

⁵⁹Ibid., Vol. 337, 20 June 1889, Cols. 299-302.

⁶⁰The Civil and Military Gazette, 15 June 1889, p.6.

In this sensitive state of feelings the Maharaja submitted his representation to Lord Lansdowne for a reconsideration of the decision of the Government of India. In the month of April, when Roberts was on a visit to Kashmir to inspect the army of that State, the Maharaja had appealed to Sir Frederick to urge the Viceroy to reinstate him.⁶¹ This appeal was renewed in a lengthy letter to Lord Lansdowne, dated May 14, 1889, which was sent through Pandit Gopinath, the Editor of the Akbar-i-Am. The Maharaja complained that he had been "extremely misrepresented" to the Government of India by his enemies, chiefly his youngest brother, Raja Amar Singh, who had long been intriguing to compass his destruction. Pratap repudiated the seditious letters attributed to him: as "most daring forgeries", and accused Colonel Nisbet of obtaining his letter of resignation by "a great and many-sided pressure". He appealed to the Viceroy to give him a "fair trial" with complete independence of action, so that he could prove in three to five years' time that he was capable of reorganising his own State to the benefit of the paramount power.⁶² This letter was sent to the Foreign Department accompanied by another, which was addressed by Pratap Singh to Sir Mortimer Durand. In that letter the Maharaja entreated Sir Mortimer to exercise his personal influence upon the Viceroy so that he might

⁶¹ Roberts to Maharaja, 21 June 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File 100/6.

⁶² Maharaja to Lansdowne, 14 May 1889, Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 26 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 915; Gopinath to Ardagh, 27 June 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

be saved from his miserable plight.⁶³

While Gopinath was engaged in pleading the Maharaja's case with the Foreign Secretary, a libellous attack was made by the Akbar-i-Am on Colonel Nisbet, accusing him of gross treachery against the Maharaja. It was alleged that the Resident came to Kashmir pretending to be a friend of the Maharaja's, but immediately upon his arrival in the State, he began to intrigue with Raja Amar Singh with a view to removing the Maharaja, and making himself the de facto ruler of the State.⁶⁴ An issue of this paper was sent by the Resident to Sir Mortimer Durand.⁶⁵ Earlier, Nisbet had communicated to the Foreign Secretary that he had it from reliable sources that Gopinath had been sent to Simla by the Maharaja with large funds to agitate. He even urged that the Maharaja's representative, if found, should be given "a strong hint" to leave immediately.⁶⁶

This had its desired effect. In framing his reply to the Maharaja Durand practically anticipated Lord Lansdowne by impressing upon Pratap Singh that he must get rid of all the undesirable men who surrounded him, such as Gopinath, whose sole motive was to further their own interests at the expense of his. He advised the Maharaja to accept

⁶³Maharaja to Durand, 28 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E., August 1889, Cons. 168.

⁶⁴Article in the issue of 28 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E. July 1889, Cons. 163.

⁶⁵Nisbet to Durand, 3 June 1889, Ibid., Cons. 162.

⁶⁶Resident to India, 24 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Secret E, August 1889, Cons. 163.

the decision of the Government of India in good grace, and not to oppose their "wishes and orders". That was the surest way, he assured Pratap Singh, of regaining his power and position, lost through his own mistaken policy.⁶⁷

Meanwhile, Pratap Singh had announced his intention to retire to Jammu for some time, ostensibly to perform certain ceremonies connected with his father's death, but really to avoid having anything to do with the new administration. His original plan was to leave for Jammu sometime in the middle of August, but he suddenly changed his mind, and soon after Roberts' visit to Kashmir was over, he announced that he would immediately go to Jammu. As Nisbet put it:

"his object now in doing so is to avoid me, and to sit in a cave of Adullam at Jammu with many ill-advised and mischievous persons who do not accept the new arrangements".

Nisbet alleged that he was told by some that the Maharaja's intention was to consult and employ lawyers from Lahore or elsewhere to make out a petition of grievance for presentation to the Indian Government, or to the Secretary of State for India in London.⁶⁸ In the light of after events, Nisbet's information does not seem to have been altogether baseless. That, at any rate, Pratap Singh intended to avoid

⁶⁷Durand to Maharaja, 11 June, 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, August 1889, Cons. 173.

⁶⁸Nisbet to Durand, 17 May 1889, Ibid., Cons. 162.

the new Administration is more than certain. He thought he was considered a cipher at Srinagar, and should therefore "set himself apart from" the new state of things.⁶⁹

In Nisbet's opinion, the Maharaja's departure before the date originally fixed by him, might result in serious mischief in the absence of any control over him at Jammu. Personally, therefore, he thought that the Maharaja's future movements and places of residence should hereafter be subjected to the Resident's approval; or alternatively, some Political Agent should be in permanent attendance on him.⁷⁰ But Lansdowne was not disposed "to insist authoritatively" upon the Maharaja's remaining at Srinagar, or to send a political officer with him to Jammu. So Nisbet was asked to exercise his personal influence to prevent the Maharaja from changing his plans, and even to warn him that if he should be found to be working against the orders of the Government of India, it would not do him any good in the future.⁷¹

To persuade the Maharaja to stay on in Srinagar Nisbet had an interview with him towards the end of May. When Pratap Singh complained that under the new arrangements he had no part to play in State

⁶⁹ Maharaja to Nisbet, 26 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, August 1889, Cons. 167; also the Civil and Military Gazette, 15 June 1889, p.6; Bose, J.C. op. cit., p.42.

⁷⁰ Nisbet to Durand, 17 May 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, August 1889, Cons. 162.

⁷¹ Durand to Nisbet, 25 May 1889, Ibid., Cons. 165.

affairs, Nisbet was obliged to remind him that he had been relieved of the duties of State at his own request. Pratap admitted the truth of that contention, pointing out, however, that the terms of his edict of resignation had been altered to his complete exclusion from participation in the affairs of the State, and that therefore it did not matter whether he lived at Srinagar or Jammu. He expressed his firm resolve to leave Srinagar immediately, regardless of the wishes of the Resident, or of the Government of India. Meantime, it had become known that Raja Ram Singh would also accompany his elder brother to Jammu, whereupon Nisbet also tried to persuade him to stay on to assist the administration. But the Raja excused himself on the plea of illness in his family. On June 1, 1889, Pratap Singh left for Jammu accompanied by his brother.⁷²

The sudden departure of the Maharaja and Ram Singh brought about a crisis in the affairs of the State.⁷³ Nisbet was especially annoyed with Ram Singh, as his absence would seriously affect the work of the Council, especially the reorganisation of the Kashmir army. In a lengthy representation to the Government of India he strongly complained against the mischievous conduct of Ram Singh, stressing in particular his incompetence to manage the armed forces of the State.

⁷²Nisbet to Durand, 2 June 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec. E, August 1889, Cons. 169-70.

⁷³Durand to Ardagh, 19 June 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

He represented that Ram Singh had been drawing large sums of money, entirely disproportionate to the revenues of the State, which he had spent not to train or equip the troops, but mostly on himself and his officers,

"whose attachment he has gained by an almost culpable generosity to them while leaving the rank and file ill-fed, ill-dressed and ill-disciplined, and with eighteen months' arrears of pay due to many of them".⁷⁴

He emphasised that if the Kashmir State was to be properly administered, the work of the State Council must not be rendered impossible by the caprice of Raja Ram Singh or anybody else, and that the misconduct of that prince must therefore be immediately checked and seriously corrected. As a punishment for his present misbehaviour Nisbet recommended the immediate removal of Ram Singh to his family estate, and his absolute exclusion from participation in the management of the State.⁷⁵ Shortly afterwards he complained again that the sort of dual government set up by the Maharaja and Ram Singh at Jammu was causing very serious distraction to the people at large. They did not know to whom they should look for guidance, and who had the real countenance of the Government of India.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Nisbet to Durand, 2 June 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec. E., August 1889, Cons. 170.

⁷⁵Ibid.; Nisbet to Roberts, 9 June 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File N¹/3, No. R.50/4.

⁷⁶Resident to India, 18 June 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, Aug. 1889, Cons. 176; Nisbet to Roberts, 20 June 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File N¹/3, R50/5.

Ram Singh's obstructionist attitude was very much distasteful to Lord Lansdowne, and he decided that if that Prince should fail to mend his ways, he ought to be deprived of his control over the Kashmir Army.⁷⁷ As regards Pratap Singh, the Viceroy was anxious to leave him under no misapprehension in respect of the intentions of the Government of India. He was even prepared, if necessary, to receive the Maharaja at Simla, and "to tell him face to face that he must accept the inevitable".⁷⁸ While Lansdowne was anxious to do nothing that could be regarded as pointing to the annexation of the country, he was determined to "keep the Maharajah in leading strings for some time at all events".⁷⁹ All this was reiterated in Lansdowne's official reply to Pratap Singh on 28 June 1889. After recapitulating the circumstances in which Pratap Singh was given a last trial by Lord Dufferin's Government, and that too under the guidance of a new Resident who was a man of the Maharaja's liking, Lansdowne observed:

"The reports from the new Resident of the manner in which your Highness had administered the State had been not less unfavourable than those submitted, from time to time, by Mr. Plowden. Notwithstanding the ample re-

⁷⁷Lansdowne to Cross, 21 June 1889, Cross Papers/26, No. 30.

⁷⁸Lansdowne to Nisbet, 24 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 275-76.

⁷⁹Lansdowne to the Duke of Connaught, 25 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), p.279.

sources of your State, your treasury was empty; corruption and disorder prevailed in every department and every office; your Highness was still surrounded by low and unworthy favourites, and the continued misgovernment of your State was becoming, every day, a more serious source of anxiety."⁸⁰

Besides, the supersession of the Maharaja, Lansdowne continued, was decided upon by the Government of India at the Maharaja's own request - in terms of his own edict of resignation, by which he had pledged himself not to interfere in the administration for five years. It was idle to contend that the edict of resignation was written by the Maharaja under pressure from Colonel Nisbet, and that the Resident, Raja Amar Singh and other officials of the State, who were all men of Pratap Singh's own choice, had turned overnight from friends into foes. However, he assured the Maharaja that the measure taken was a temporary one, and if he, by his manners and dignity, could justify that he had not altogether lost the qualities of a wise ruler, he could yet hope to regain in course of time a larger share in the control of the public affairs of the State. The Viceroy also availed himself of the opportunity to warn Raja Ram Singh that the Government of India could not look with indifference to his attitude of non-cooperation in regard to the affairs of the Kashmir State. The Prince was reminded of his important position in the State Council, and warned in unmistakable terms that if he should fail to return soon to Srinagar and resume his

⁸⁰Lansdowne to Maharaja, 28 June 1889, Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 26 July 1889, PSLEI/57, p. 1021.

duties, it would be "necessary to make some arrangement for the transfer of those duties to other hands".⁸¹

To this communication Pratap Singh replied on 14 July 1889. He tried again to defend his conduct by attributing all his past failures to the intrigues of Raja Amar Singh - to his misrepresentations both to the Resident and to the Government of India. He repudiated his letter of resignation as a forced document, obtained from him by Colonel Nisbet at Amar Singh's instigation. He denied that his private servants had ever had anything to do with the administration of the State, and expressed a hope that he would soon be restored to power with all his independence of action. As regards Ram Singh he told the Viceroy that his presence at Jammu was really necessitated by illness in the family, which he hoped would shortly be cured. Finally, he pointed out that the Chaubursee ceremony,⁸² for which they had all come to Jammu was near at hand, and that it also demanded the presence of Raja Amar Singh at that place.⁸³

Meanwhile, Nisbet, on his own authority, had asked Ram Singh to come to Srinagar to participate in the discussions of the

⁸¹Lansdowne to Maharaja, 28 June, 1889, Encl. in G.I. to S.S. 26 July, 1889, PSLEI/57, p. 1021.

⁸²The religious ceremony connected with Ranbir Singh's death, and due to be held at the end of the fourth year and the beginning of the fifth.

⁸³Pratap Singh to Lansdowne, 14 July 1889, Sub-encl. in Encl. 2A in No. 41, Lansdowne to Cross, 6 Sept. 1889, Cross Papers/27; PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 843-45.

State Council, especially in those bearing upon the question of army reorganisation. He asked him to fix a date for resuming his duties,⁸⁴ but Ram Singh regretted his inability to do so, excusing himself again on ground of sickness in his family.⁸⁵ Nisbet thought that the Raja was adamant. In consequence, he represented to the Foreign Department that they should consider Amar Singh for the permanent Presidentship of the Council. Ram Singh, he argued, had failed, by his mischievous conduct, to justify his appointment to that office, whereas Amar Singh had rendered every assistance in carrying out the wishes of the Government of India.⁸⁶ Lansdowne approved of Nisbet's proposal, but he was more concerned about Ram Singh's alienation, and was even willing to consider his replacement by Pratap Singh in the command of the Kashmir army.⁸⁷ This, however, was not necessary, as Ram Singh soon quarrelled with the Maharaja and parted.⁸⁸ He came back to Srinagar, professed regret at his past conduct, and expressed his intention to work in cooperation with the Resident and the Council.⁸⁹

⁸⁴Tel. from Resident to Ram Singh, n.d. Encl. in Nisbet to Durand, 25 June 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, August 1889, Cons. 185.

⁸⁵Ram Singh to Resident, n.d. Encl. in Ibid.

⁸⁶Nisbet to India, 22 July 1889, Ibid., Cons. 193.

⁸⁷India to Resident, 29 July 1889, Ibid. Cons. 197; India to Resident, 1 August, 1889, Ibid. Cons. 199; also, Ibid., Cons. 201.

⁸⁸Lansdowne to Cross, 2 August 1889, Cross Papers/27, No.36.

⁸⁹Resident to India, 13 August 1889, NAI/FDP, Sec.E, August 1889, Cons. 202.

The agitation by the Indian Press against the Government of India had meanwhile continued unceasingly. Sir Lepel Griffin's proposal for the colonisation of Kashmir was commented upon in this connection,⁹⁰ and it was predicted that Kashmir would be declared British territory before the expiration of Lord Lansdowne's term of office.⁹¹ It was reported by the Thuggee and Dacoity Department that Pratap Singh's partisans, Pundits Surajbal and Mahanand Jee were actively intriguing with Gopinath to get the Maharaja's case forwarded to the Indian Political Agency in London, whose mouthpiece was Bradlaugh.⁹² Official papers continued to find their way to the Indian Press, and when Lansdowne's despatch to the Home Government, reviewing the circumstances of Pratap Singh's supersession, was published by the Amrita Bazar Patrika on 15 August 1889,⁹³ Ardagh suspected that it had leaked through the machinations of Bradlaugh and Digby.⁹⁴

At the end of July, William Digby of the Indian Political Agency had addressed a letter to the Members of the House of Commons,

⁹⁰Lansdowne to Cross, 2 Aug. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 128-31; Cross Papers/27, No. 36.

⁹¹The Hindoo Patriot, 26 August 1889, p. 399.

⁹²Extract from Secret Report of Thuggee and Dacoity Department, of 7 Aug. 1889, Encl. 2 in Lansdowne to Cross, 16 Aug. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), No. 46.

⁹³pp. 3-4.

⁹⁴Ardagh to Godley, 21 Aug. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(a), No. 76, p. 90; Henderson to Bradford, 16 Sept. 1889, PSDOC/3, pp. 163-65.

criticising the action of the Government of India in Kashmir. Digby regarded the appointment of the British Resident as a virtual amendment of the treaty of Amritsar, and tried to prove, with the help of certain papers obtained from a private source, that pressure was brought to bear upon the Maharaja to secure his letter of resignation. It was very unfortunate that Pratap Singh, a kind and good ruler who had always been "animated by a staunch loyalty to the British dominance", should have been so unjustly vilified as he had been by the Kashmir Resident and Lord Lansdowne. No misgovernment, Digby complained, had been proved against the Maharaja; according to his information none did really exist. As a remedy for the unhappy state of affairs in Kashmir, he suggested that the House of Commons should call for the immediate production of all the relevant papers, and if it should be found that the Maharaja's grievances against the Indian Government were well-founded, a Select Committee of the House, or a Royal Commission, ought to be appointed to investigate into the manner in which the Maharaja was set aside.⁹⁵

A Secret Committee Minute on Digby's letter called it an "utterly wrong" statement,⁹⁶ The Evening News described it as "a mixture of cant, exaggeration, ignorance and partisanship of the most exaggerated character".⁹⁷ Even so, trouble in the British Parliament over the

⁹⁵The letter is dated 31 July 1889, PSEC/109, p. 100(a).

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Extract given in the Civil and Military Gazette, 4 September 1889, p.6.

Kashmir issue was apprehended both at Simla and in London. Some time earlier Reuter had published a telegram suggesting a possible motion by Bradlaugh in the House of Commons.⁹⁸ The idea prevailed, and Cross had to comfort Lansdowne by assuring his support against

"any outcry that may be raised, or that has been raised, about Kashmir".⁹⁹

Before long, a question was asked in the House of Lords by Herschell if there was any truth in the rumour about the Government of India's intention to annex Kashmir. Cross repudiated the idea of annexation, but gave a hint that when the condition of the State should be improved, the Maharaja would be free to resume control over it.¹⁰⁰

Lansdowne was happy at the repudiation of the idea of supposed annexation, but did not appreciate the latter part of the Secretary of State's statement.¹⁰¹ The Maharaja's resumption of control of the State, he pointed out,

"will depend a good deal upon his own personal conduct, as well as upon the general situation at the moment!",¹⁰²

Undaunted by Press criticisms of his letter to Members of the

⁹⁸Cross to Lansdowne, 19 July, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 59-60.

⁹⁹Cross to Lansdowne, 15 Aug. 1889, Ibid., pp. 67-68.

¹⁰⁰Hansard, Third Series, House of Lords, 27 Aug. 1889, Vol. 340, Col. 573.

¹⁰¹Lansdowne to Cross, 23 September 1889, No. 43, Cross Papers/27, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 159-61.

¹⁰²Ibid.

British Parliament, Digby wrote another to the Editor of The Times, which was published in the issue of 7 September 1889.¹⁰³ In this letter he reiterated his previous views about Pratap Singh as a ruler, and followed this up by a long statement of the reforms which that Prince had claimed to have introduced after his accession to the throne. He criticised the Government of India for setting aside the Maharaja on the strength of a letter of resignation which, he maintained, was forcibly obtained from him. Even that letter, he further alleged, had not been strictly adhered to by the Government of India. For instance, the Maharaja agreed to the formation of a new Council only on condition that he himself was to preside over it. The Kashmir case, Digby concluded, was one of the many instances of gross injustice done by the Indian Foreign Office; and it was time that the Viceroy of India had taken some measure to reinstate the Maharaja to his place of power and dignity.

While the Maharaja's case was being pleaded by the Press and interested individuals, Lansdowne proceeded to answer Pratap Singh's communication of 14 July 1889. In this letter, dated 3 September 1889,¹⁰⁴ Lansdowne pointed out to the Maharaja that he had failed to afford sufficient reason that would justify a reversal of the decision of the Government of India in regard to the Kashmir State. The Maharaja's

¹⁰³ Entitled Lord Lansdowne and the Maharaja of Kashmir, p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Encl. 2A in No. 41, Lansdowne to Cross, 6 Sept. 1889, Cross Papers/27; PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 847-48.

letter contained little beyond a series of accusations against his brother, Raja Amar Singh, which was in contradistinction to the confidence that the Maharaja himself had latterly placed in the Raja, whom he designated for the high office of Prime Minister of the State. The Viceroy refused to accept the allegation of Pratap Singh that his letter of resignation was obtained from him by undue pressure, and after recapitulating the circumstances in which Pratap Singh made his voluntary resignation, Lord Lansdowne observed that his interference in the Kashmir State had been prompted not by a desire to reap any advantage for the British Government, but because he had sufficient evidence to believe that unless a more vigorous attempt than the Maharaja was capable of, was made by the Government of India, there was no hope of resuscitating the Kashmir State or ameliorating the conditions of its people. In conclusion, Lansdowne firmly advised the Maharaja to bear with all dignity the loss of power that he had sustained, and above all, to refrain from any useless attempt to oppose the measures that the Government of India had determined to take, and in which he, as Viceroy, intended to persevere.

Lansdowne's Government might have taken a determined stand on the Kashmir issue, but the Indian Press kept up the agitation against it. The Indian Mirror published a long list of reform projects undertaken by the Government of India at the expense of the Darbar, and concluded that the Kashmir State had thereby been made completely

bankrupt.¹⁰⁵ A Minute on Gilgit defence by Sir Mortimer Durand, dated 6 May 1888, was fabricated in an article in the Amrita Bazar Patrika, and the writer concluded that "His Highness was deposed not because he resigned or oppressed his people, but because Gilgit was wanted for strategical purposes by the British Government."¹⁰⁶ Earlier the Russian Press had criticised the Government of India for its annexationist designs, and contended that the British seizure of Kashmir constituted a serious threat to the Russian interests in Central Asia.¹⁰⁷

Against these provocations it became difficult for Lansdowne to keep quiet. Durand was asked to consult the Legislative Department to find out whether any penal measure could be taken against the Indian Mirror.¹⁰⁸ Ardagh drew the attention of the Foreign Department to Digby's letter in The Times of 7 September and asked them to have an answer ready.¹⁰⁹ Lansdowne himself invited Scoble,¹¹⁰ to luncheon to discuss whether anything could be done against the

¹⁰⁵ September 28, 1889.

¹⁰⁶

Issue of 3 October 1889, p.6; Encl. in No. 46, Lansdowne to Cross, 14 October, 1889, Cross Papers/27; Encl. 2 in No. 47, Lansdowne to Cross, 21 Oct. 1889, Ibid.

¹⁰⁷

Russian apprehensions about Kashmir: Translation of an article in the Novoye Vremya, vide the Pioneer, October 2, 1889, p.6. The Civil and Military Gazette, 31 Aug. 1889, p.2.

¹⁰⁸

Ardagh to Durand, 5 Oct. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 208.

¹⁰⁹

Ardagh to Barnes, Oct. 7, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), p.194.

¹¹⁰

Legal Member of Lansdowne's Council.

Amrita Bazar Patrika.¹¹¹ Although no punitive measures could be immediately taken against that paper, Scoble soon introduced the Official Secrets Bill in the Legislative Council. In the course of his speech on this Bill, Lansdowne gave a public contradiction to the Patrika's statements.¹¹² The Viceroy was further delighted when Dufferin backed up his policy in Kashmir in a speech at a banquet of the London Chamber of Commerce.¹¹³ He congratulated his predecessor for this timely reference to Kashmir and thought that it would strengthen his hands both at home and abroad.¹¹⁴

Meanwhile, Pratap Singh had again appealed to Lord Lansdowne to reinstate him in his "former position" in view of the impending visit to India of Prince Albert Victor. At least on this ground, if not on any other, he begged to be restored to power, so that he

"may be spared the deep pain and the indelible humiliation of coming under His Royal Highness's notice in my present miserable and unbearable position",¹¹⁵

¹¹¹Lansdowne to Scoble, 14 Oct. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 109.

¹¹²Encl. 2 in No. 47, Lansdowne to Cross, 21 Oct. 1889, Cross Papers/27, Lansdowne to Nisbet, 21 Oct. 1889, No. 241, pp. 219-20. The speech was delivered on Oct. 17, 1889.

¹¹³Dufferin to Lansdowne, 6 Nov. 1889, No. 108(a) Lansdowne Papers/VIII(a), p. 127. The banquet was held at Hotel Metropole on 30 Oct. 1889, the Pioneer, 21 Nov. 1889. For the speech, Ibid.

¹¹⁴Lansdowne to Dufferin, 30 Nov. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(a), pp. 115-16.

¹¹⁵Maharaja to Lansdowne, n.d. Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), p. 309.

This was followed, in the month of October, by a further representation by the Maharaja which was written in reply to Lansdowne's communication of 3 September.¹¹⁶ After reviewing the long list of reforms that he claimed to have introduced on his accession to the throne, Pratap Singh tried to meet the charges of the Government of India as detailed in Lansdowne's letter of 28 June 1889. As to the unfavourable reports which were received by Lord Dufferin during the last year of his administration, Pratap regretted that they had been entertained by the Government of India without any reference to him. He emphatically reasserted that the seditious letters attributed to him were all forgeries, and that his letter of resignation, commonly regarded as a voluntary act, was signed by him under severe pressure.

Reverting to Lord Lansdowne's assertion that it was difficult for him to believe that Nisbet, Amar Singh, Suraj Kaul, Bhag Ram and other officials of the State had all conspired against their ruler, Pratap failed to answer it squarely, and simply suggested that they all belonged to the same clique. But he emphasised that it would not be true to say that he had had a fair trial when Lord Dufferin accepted his scheme of reorganisation. Under Plowden, he complained, he was never a free agent, while Nisbet's sudden change of attitude

¹¹⁶ Maharaja to Lansdowne, 18 Oct. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11, (Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 304, pp. 328-36).

was so perplexing that he himself had never been able to account for it.¹¹⁷

Before the time came for Lansdowne to reply to Pratap's communication, an arrangement was made for a meeting between the Viceroy and the Kashmir Council at Lahore in November. Nisbet was particularly anxious that Lansdowne should meet the members of the new Council, "and give them a little good advice".¹¹⁸ Of course, Lansdowne also summoned Nisbet to Lahore "to talk over the Kashmir position",¹¹⁹ and asked him to frame a reply to the recent communication of the Maharaja. To Pratap's appeal for restoration on ground of Prince Albert's visit, however, Lansdowne had sent his reply by this time. The visit of the Royal Prince would be an informal one, and Lansdowne said there would be no opportunity for him to visit Kashmir. Besides, the new arrangement for the administration of the Kashmir State had been in operation for so short a time that any consideration of its re-arrangement was then out of the question.¹²⁰

Pursuant to the Viceroy's instructions Nisbet wrote a Memorandum at Lahore on the Maharaja's October communication to the Viceroy. In the main, it was an answer to Pratap Singh's claim that he had introduced considerable reforms in the State on his accession to

¹¹⁷Maharaja to Lansdowne, 18 Oct. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11 (Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 304, pp. 328-36).

¹¹⁸Lansdowne to Cross, 29 Nov. 1889, No. 63, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a); Nisbet to Lansdowne, 19 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹¹⁹Lansdowne to Cross, 8 Nov. 1889, Cross Papers/27, No. 49.

¹²⁰Lansdowne to Maharaja, 21 October, 1889, No. 244, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), p.224.

power. The other matters referred to by the Maharaja, were left out by the Resident, because he believed they could be answered without any difficulty. Nisbet pointed out that the credit for these reforms, on which the Maharaja had prided himself so eloquently, did not solely belong to him. Many of them had been planned, and some introduced, by the late Maharaja - Pratap Singh having only recorded his approval of his father's measures on the occasion of his installation. Even then, the reforms had been introduced without any corresponding measure for replenishing the financial loss incurred upon the removal of various taxes and cesses. Nisbet alleged that this had proved to be a grave financial blunder, with the result that the officials of the State, especially the army, had been perpetually in arrears of pay. He further complained that the disorderly condition of the Kashmir finances had been increased by the Maharaja's extravagances. Shortly after his¹ accession to the throne the Maharaja withdrew a sum of 34 lakhs from the Riasi reserve treasury, of which 8 lakhs were spent on installation ceremonies; 8 lakhs in part payment for debts incurred by the Maharaja when he was heir apparent; 4 lakhs on a journey to Calcutta; 3 lakhs for an intended pilgrimage which was never undertaken; and the rest in similar ways.¹²¹

¹²¹Nisbet's Memorandum written in answer to Pratap Singh's communication of October, 1889, dated Lahore, January 2, 1890. Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

Lansdowne's discussion with Nisbet at Lahore, followed by the Resident's Memorandum in answer to Pratap's letter, confirmed the Viceroy in his conviction that there was no point in reconsidering the question of the Maharaja's restoration at that moment. Although he drafted an answer to the October communication of Pratap Singh, on a second thought he decided not to send it.¹²² He was satisfied that the intervention of the Paramount Power in Kashmir was "absolutely necessary". Besides, the new administration of the State had been on trial for a very short time, so that there could be no question of immediately reconsidering the decision of the Government of India in regard to it.¹²³

However, if Lansdowne closed his official correspondence with the Maharaja, he made a clear statement of his Kashmir policy at Lahore. He apprehended an attack in the British Parliament for his interference in the Kashmir State. Nisbet was therefore asked to prepare a Report which could be used by the Home Government in justification of British intervention in that State.¹²⁴ To the members of the Kashmir Council he explained that the Government of India had no ulterior designs upon the State, that indeed their in-

¹²²Lansdowne to Nisbet, 10 January, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), pp. 15-16.

¹²³Draft of Lansdowne's reply to Pratap's letter of 18 October, 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11; also Lansdowne to the Queen, August 16, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 16-17.

¹²⁴Lansdowne to Nisbet, 3 November, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 232-235.

tention was to interfere as little as possible in its internal affairs. The temporary resignation of the Maharaja, the Viceroy asserted, was accepted in the belief that it was "absolutely necessary" to take this step in order to remedy long-standing abuses. He urged the Council to strive very hard to restore the Kashmir finances; and when they complained of the reckless waste of State resources by the Maharaja and the Military Department, Ram Singh was warned to mend his ways, and Nisbet was asked to keep an eye on the Maharaja's extravagance.¹²⁵

Although, as Nisbet claimed, the tone of the Vernacular Press comparatively changed after Lansdowne's meeting with the Kashmir Council at Lahore,¹²⁶ a pamphlet entitled 'Cashmere and its Prince' was published at this time by one Jogendra Chandra Bose. This gentleman was one of the Bengali officers, who were appointed by the Maharaja at the recommendation of Babu Nilambar Mukherjee. He was in the service of the Kashmir State for about four months, and his pamphlet, though a partisan document, was written "temperately".¹²⁷ Babu Jogendra Chandra wrote it in defence of the Maharaja, whom he

¹²⁵Lansdowne to Cross, 29 November 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), pp. 188-91; Lansdowne to Queen, 3 December 1889, Lansdowne Papers/X(a), pp. 19-22; Lansdowne to Roberts, 30 November 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File LI, R34/58.

¹²⁶Nisbet to Ardagh, 8 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 405-07.

¹²⁷Cunningham's Review, 21 Dec. 1889. PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 811-51.

described as a well-meaning, orthodox ruler. He made an attempt to meet the charges of the Government of India against the Kashmir Prince, criticised the high-handed administration of both Plowden and Nisbet, and pleaded for the Maharaja's reinstatement to his former position and power.

To a certain section of the Indian Press the publication of this pamphlet afforded a fresh lever for renewing their agitation.¹²⁸ Lansdowne was a little perturbed, and drew Nisbet's attention to it, especially to Chapter VII, in which an allegation was made of Nisbet's extravagance as director of the new arrangements in Kashmir. The Resident was asked to be very careful, so that his conduct might not be open to attack on this ground. As Lansdowne remarked,

"our principal object should be to restore equilibrium in the State finances, and we shall be certainly taken to task if it can be shown that the temporary withdrawal of the Maharaja has resulted in large expenditure, particularly if any part of that expenditure has been incurred upon objects the utility of which can be questioned".¹²⁹

As a measure of defence against any possible onslaught, Nisbet was urged to write out his Report on Kashmir, of which he had been earlier informed.¹³⁰ Lansdowne emphasised that the Report should give a sketch

¹²⁸ The People's Journal, 7 Dec. 1889 as quoted in The Kashmir Conspiracy, pp. 71-75.

¹²⁹ Lansdowne to Nisbet, 31 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 357. (Ardagh Papers/11).

¹³⁰ Supra, p. 212.

of the financial condition of the State, whereas its general object should be

"to bring into strong relief the undoubted difficulties with which the Council has had to contend, owing to chronic mal-administration, and the fact that it has, upon the whole, made a very fair beginning, considering the short time during which it has been at work".¹³¹

By this time, according to the previous instructions of the Viceroy,¹³² the Foreign Department had prepared a review of the statements on Kashmir affairs made in Digby's letter in The Times of 7 September 1889.¹³³ Written by Cunningham,¹³⁴ this review, on reliable authority,¹³⁵ described Digby as a salaried agent of the Indian National Congress. Cunningham suspected that Digby had "almost certainly derived his information" from Babu Jogendra Chandra Bose, the author of Cashmere and its Prince ; if he did not, the unanimity of thought and expression on the part of both the authors was "marvellous". As for Pratap Singh's character, Cunningham observed that the accounts given by both Digby and Bose were "somewhat rose-coloured". He quoted from various official notes and reports to

¹³¹Lansdowne to Nisbet, 31 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 357. (Ardagh Papers/Box 11).

¹³²Supra, p. 207.

¹³³Dated 21 December, 1889. PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 811-51.

¹³⁴Cunningham, W.J., Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department of the Govt. of India.

¹³⁵A. O. Hume's letter in the Pioneer of 21 December, 1889, p.6.

disprove their characterisation of the Maharaja, and gave in support of his own contention the unanswerable argument of Ranbir Singh's desire to pass over his eldest son in favour of Amar Singh.¹³⁶

Of Digby's accusations against the Government of India, Cunningham took up each by turn, and sought to establish that his letter was a partisan document. He ably answered the two or three most telling points in Digby's criticisms in which the latter tried to establish that the Maharaja was deposed on the basis of a letter of resignation which was obtained from him by severe pressure, and was then altered to suit the needs of the Government of India. With the help of the triangular correspondence between Pratap Singh, Nisbet and the Indian Government, Cunningham argued that it was difficult to believe that the Maharaja's edict of resignation was obtained from him by undue pressure from the Resident. Besides, there was not a word in that edict which retained for the Maharaja his right to preside over the State Council. As for the Maharaja's stipulation that he was to abstain from interference in the management of the State for five years, Cunningham pointed out that although this was not literally adhered to by the Government of India, its spirit was

¹³⁶ Cunningham's Review, 21 Dec. 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 811-51. Among the Maharaja's sympathisers, Roberts, though admitting that Pratap was a weak and unreliable man, held Ranbir Singh responsible for his shortcomings. He alleged that Ranbir Singh wanted to make his youngest son the heir, neglected Pratap's education, and did not bring him up properly with the result that Pratap fell under the influence of evil companions. Roberts to Duke of Cambridge, 28 April 1889, Roberts Papers/100/2.

not altogether absent in their decision about the Maharaja: Pratap Singh had been informed without any ambiguity that his suspension from power was only a temporary measure.¹³⁷

In compliance with the Viceroy's instructions, Nisbet drew up his report on Kashmir toward the end of January 1890.¹³⁸ He added an appendix¹³⁹ to it which was written in answer to J.C. Bose's charges of extravagance against the Government of India and their Kashmir Agent. In Chapter VII of his pamphlet,¹⁴⁰ Bose referred to several items of expenditure which, he alleged, were forced upon the Kashmir Maharaja by the Indian Government. This was responsible, he asserted, for the exhaustion of the Kashmir exchequer, and as such, there was very little substance in Lord Lansdowne's indictment against Pratap Singh that in spite of ample resources of the State, the Maharaja's treasury was empty. Some of Bose's allegations, as Nisbet claimed, were false; a few others were too insignificant to be seriously considered. Nisbet of course tried to contradict all of them, but it would suffice for us to deal with only the major charges

¹³⁷ Cunningham Review, 21 Dec. 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 811-51.

¹³⁸ Dated 29 January, 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 January, 1891. Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78 (PSLEI/62).

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 473-74.

¹⁴⁰ Cashmere and its Prince, pp. 69-72.

in Bose's pamphlet and the Resident's answer to them.

Bose accused the Government of India of burdening the Kashmir State with a recurring expenditure of six lakhs of rupees a year on the Jhelum Valley Cart Road, and a lump sum of 13 lakhs for the Jammu-Sialkot Railway. To these he added three more lakhs spent for the Jammu Water Works, and another sum of 25 lakhs of rupees, which, he alleged, was taken as a loan by the British Government from the Kashmir State. Besides, a donation of Rs. 50,000 was taken for Lady Dufferin's Fund, and another of Rs. 25,000 for the Aitchison College at Lahore. Added to that was a lakh of rupees spent during Roberts' visit to Kashmir, and a further amount of Rs. 50,000 spent on the Maharaja of Kapurthala on the occasion of his visit to Kashmir.¹⁴¹

With regard to the construction of the Jhelum Valley Cart Road and the Jammu-Sialkot Railway, Nisbet argued that both these works were begun and estimated for under the late and the present Maharaja, long before he came to Kashmir, and therefore, the duty of carrying on these projects devolved upon him as a matter of course. The estimates in neither case had been exceeded, and both the undertakings were of a most highly beneficial character to the State. Secondly, the Jammu Water Works, which Bose himself admitted "will be beneficial" to the State, were undertaken only at the earnest request of the Maharaja, and they had cost about half the amount he previously expressed his wish to

¹⁴¹Cashmere and its Prince, pp. 69-72.

sanction. Further, Nisbet flatly denied that the Government of India had ever taken a loan of Rs. 25 lakhs, or any other, from the Kashmir Darbar. As for the donations to Lady Dufferin's fund and the Aitchison College, Nisbet asserted that the Maharaja himself made those contributions without any external pressure. Other princes in India, equal to and below the rank of the Kashmir Maharaja, had already made donations to both these objects equally munificent. Naturally, the Maharaja might not have wished to stand aloof or appear less generous than his compeers. Finally, the invitations to the Commander-in-Chief of India and the Raja of Kapurthala were extended by the Maharaja himself, and the expenditure on these personages was undertaken by him voluntarily. It was well known, Nisbet argued, that such hospitality was the genius of the Native Princes of India, and Kashmir had a reputation in such respects which it ought to be well able to afford, and Nisbet hoped it would never lose. Neither a lakh of rupees, nor anything like that sum, was spent on the Commander-in-Chief's visit. Again, the visit of the Raja of Kapurthala with a large retinue, although extending over three months, did not cost Rs. 50,000. Of course, a much larger sum had been estimated for his visit to the State, as the Raja's father had been entertained by the late Maharaja on a few days' visit at a cost of over a lakh of rupees.¹⁴²

¹⁴²Appendix to Nisbet's Report dated 29 January 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 January 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 473-74. (PSLEI/62).

Lansdowne was "very glad" that Nisbet had been "able to contradict so unequivocally the misrepresentations" in Bose's pamphlet.¹⁴³ Even then, he considered that the Resident's Report, as a whole, was not a "complete and trustworthy" document.¹⁴⁴ As Ardagh remarked, Nisbet's statement that the Government of India had never taken a loan from the Kashmir Darbar, though true in substance, was "rather too point blank a denial". At Plowden's suggestion, a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs had indeed been invested by the Darbar in India Government Paper.¹⁴⁵ Lansdowne believed that the report in any case would not serve as an adequate explanation of the recent transactions in Kashmir. The Maharaja's case would soon come before the House of Commons, and the Indian Government would be called upon to defend its action.

In the meantime, native agitation against the Government of India had assumed quite a different form. Some of the Proprietors and Editors of the Indian Press combined in their effort to send the Maharaja's case to the British Parliament.¹⁴⁶ Notable among them were Babu Molilal Ghosh of the Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, and Pandit Gopinath and Babu Jogendra Chandra Bose, respectively, of the Akbar-i-Am, and the Tribune of Lahore. Pandit Mahanand Jee, a dismissed official of the Kash-

¹⁴³Lansdowne to Nisbet, 5 Feb. 1890, Encl. in No. 62, Cross Papers/28.

¹⁴⁴Lansdowne to Cross, 4 Feb. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 13-15, Cross Papers/28, No. 61.

¹⁴⁵Ardagh to Maitland, 25 Feb. 1890, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 623-25.

¹⁴⁶PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 721-807.

mir State, acted on behalf of the Maharaja. They took the opportunity of Bradlaugh's visit to India toward the end of 1889 to urge him to take up the Maharaja's case in the House of Commons. In fact it was Motilal who, during the fifth session of the Indian National Congress at Bombay, persuaded Bradlaugh to agree to stand by the Maharaja.¹⁴⁷ Bradlaugh was reported to have made the suggestion that a printed petition on behalf of Pratap Singh should be sent to Digby for circulation among the Members of the House of Commons as well as the principal journals, asking for an enquiry into the Maharaja's case by a Select Committee or any other appropriate body.¹⁴⁸ Between them these newspapermen raised some money, which was perhaps augmented by contributions from Pratap Singh and was sent to Digby, "so that", as Motilal put it, "his interest in H.H.'s case may not flag".¹⁴⁹

The activities of these men, though surreptitious, could not be kept concealed from the Government of India. Reports about them were sent from time to time by the Foreign Department to the India Office, till toward the middle of February Gorst became convinced

¹⁴⁷ Motilal to Gopinath, 7 Jan. 1890, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 769-771; Dutt, P. Memoirs of Moti Lal Ghose, pp. 68-71.

¹⁴⁸ Motilal to Gopinath, 7 Jan. 1890, Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Motilal to Gopinath, 10 Jan. 1890, Ibid., p. 773; Cunningham to Neel, 21 Jan. 1890, Ibid., pp. 767-68.

that

"we should prepare ourselves to defend the action of the Government of India in Cashmere, as Bradlaugh is sure to bring the matter forward".¹⁵⁰

He was right. It was not long before Bradlaugh actually moved for papers on Kashmir in the House of Commons. Cross agreed to present them, and informed Lansdowne.¹⁵¹ The Viceroy, at first, was very much worried. The Resident's reports did not present the Maharaja's brothers in a favourable light. He even feared that the publication of all the documents might well "render the restoration of the Maharaja virtually impossible".¹⁵²

Lansdowne, however, "exercised his mind a good deal over the question", and soon suggested the line of defence that the India Office should adopt. First, the misgovernment of the State was a matter of notoriety, to which one Resident after another had called the attention of the Government of India. Secondly, the conduct of the Maharaja had never been satisfactory, and there was a complete consensus of opinion about it. Thirdly, Pratap Singh was allowed to succeed only upon condition that the administration of the State should be substantially improved. No such improvement took place, and in 1888 Lord Dufferin's Government seriously considered the propriety of de-

¹⁵⁰ Gorst to Cross, 12 Feb. 1890, PSDOC/3, First Series, p.763.

¹⁵¹ Cross to Lansdowne, 26 Feb. 1890, No. 47, Cross Papers/36.

¹⁵² Lansdowne to Cross, 25 Feb. 1890, Cross Papers/28, No. 64; also Cross Papers/35, No. 46.

posing the Maharaja, but decided to give him a further trial. Fourthly, early in 1839 the Maharaja spontaneously offered to withdraw for a time from active participation in the affairs of the State. The fact that this offer was made by him was not disputed, and was admitted even by the writer of the pamphlet, Cashmere and its Prince. Under these circumstances, the Government of India had to determine whether, considering all the antecedent circumstances, the Maharaja's offer should be accepted or not. It was not their duty to concern themselves with the motives which prompted the offer. The question which they had to decide was whether they were "justified in letting slip such an opportunity of putting an end to the state of chronic oppression and misgovernment".¹⁵³

Even so, Lansdowne still wished that the papers on Kashmir were not presented to Parliament at all. He was probably a little apprehensive of the result of the coming debate there. Adverse criticisms by the Indian Press perhaps added to his apprehension.¹⁵⁴ As a result, the question of the presentation of the Kashmir papers to Parliament became a subject of protracted correspondence between the India Office and the Government of India.¹⁵⁵ Durand, then on leave at home,

¹⁵³Lansdowne to Cross, 4 March, 1890, Cross Papers/28, No. 65.

¹⁵⁴Lansdowne to Cross, 26 May, 1890, Cross Papers/28, No. 77.

¹⁵⁵PSHC/115, pp. 1-18.

was of course certain that nothing would come out of this "paid agitation in England".¹⁵⁶ But Lansdowne urged Cross to show the papers privately to Bradlaugh, and explain to him that their presentation would injure his client's cause.¹⁵⁷ Cross indeed showed the papers to Bradlaugh before they were presented to Parliament,¹⁵⁸ but the latter was determined to bring the matter forward, unless the Government of India willingly gave the Maharaja an opportunity to defend himself.¹⁵⁹

On 3 July 1890, Bradlaugh moved the adjournment in the House of Commons on the question of Pratap Singh's supersession. He complained that the Maharaja had been condemned unheard in spite of his appeal to the Government of India for a fair trial. That unfortunate prince, he said, had been denied what even the meanest person in England would have been conceded as a matter of course. In fairness, therefore, his case should be investigated by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, or a similar body. Bradlaugh presented the Maharaja's case in the same manner as Digby and Bose had done before him. He repudiated the idea of chronic misgovernment in Kashmir, treated the alleged treasonable correspondence of the Maharaja as a mere sham,

¹⁵⁶Durand to Lansdowne, 14 May, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), No. 36.

¹⁵⁷Viceroy to S.S., 19 June, 1890, PSHC/115, p.761; No. 9, Cross Papers/36.

¹⁵⁸S.S. to Viceroy, 26 June, 1890, PSHC/115, p. 757; Lansdowne Papers/IX(a), p.151.

¹⁵⁹From the London Correspondent of the Bengalee, 19 July, 1890, p.343.

and condemned the Government of India for the alleged bankruptcy of the State.¹⁶⁰

In answer to Bradlaugh's criticisms, Sir John Gorst, the Under Secretary of State for India, quoted from the official papers to show that there was chronic misgovernment in what was once the Happy Valley, resulting in acute poverty and the gradual depopulation of the State. He amused the House by taunting Bradlaugh, a Radical, for taking up the cause of an Oriental Prince under whose despotic rule, he alleged, the scourge of forced labour had been imposed upon the people with utmost severity. Gorst announced to the House that Pratap Singh's supersession was decided not exclusively on the basis of grave personal charges against the Maharaja, nor solely upon the continued maladministration in the State. It was based on an aggregate of incidents, one following upon another, culminating in the Maharaja's voluntary resignation of power.¹⁶¹ Sir Richard Temple¹⁶² made a very telling point when he dwelt upon the complete disinterestedness of the Government of India in the recent transactions in Kashmir. "All that happens",

¹⁶⁰Hansard, Third Series, Vol. 346, 3 July, 1890, Cols. 699-712.

¹⁶¹Ibid., Cols. 713-22.

¹⁶²Famous Punjab Administrator. Governor of Bombay, 1878. Then M.P. for Evesham, Worcestershire.

he said,

"is the transfer of power from one brother to another, while the Government of India remains exactly in the same position as she was before, and is in no wise benefited." ¹⁶³

After debate the motion was put to the vote, and was defeated by an overwhelming majority.¹⁶⁴ Reaction at Bradlaugh's defeat, both official and non-official, was very clearly pronounced. Cross was glad that he would have to hear no more of the Kashmir case.¹⁶⁵ The Times was silent about it,¹⁶⁶ but in political circles in London there was a feeling that Bradlaugh was paid for his agitation on behalf of the Maharaja, and should not have brought the matter before the House of Commons.¹⁶⁷ In India, however, the reaction was a mixed one. Lansdowne was certainly very much delighted, for if Bradlaugh had obtained much support in the House, "the effect in this country would have been most mischievous".¹⁶⁸ He was happy that the agitation in favour of the Maharaja would now lose the "little strength it still possessed".¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³Hansard, Third Series, Vol. 346, 3 July, 1890, Cols. 726-29; also Temple Papers/N286.

¹⁶⁴The motion was defeated by 226 votes to 88. Hansard, Ibid., Col. 631; also Lansdowne Papers/XI(a), S.S. to Viceroy, 4 July 1890, p. 153; Cross Papers/36, July 1890, No. 1.

¹⁶⁵Cross to Lansdowne, 4 July, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 56-57.

¹⁶⁶The Times only published extracts from the Kashmir debate in the issue of July 4, 1890, p.7, but otherwise remained silent.

¹⁶⁷From the London Correspondent, The Bengalee, Aug. 16, 1890, p.391.

¹⁶⁸Lansdowne to Connemara, 8 July, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp.9-11.

¹⁶⁹Lansdowne to Cross, 7 July 1890, Cross Papers/28, No. 83.

A certain section of the Anglo-Indian Press congratulated Gorst for his reply to Bradlaugh: it was considered "good in matter and manner alike".¹⁷⁰ But there were others who were not only dissatisfied with the decision of the House of Commons, but were even disposed to believe that it was not the final verdict of the British nation.¹⁷¹ Perhaps their source of inspiration was William Digby who made a final, though futile, attempt to secure a re-hearing of the Maharaja's case by addressing a lengthy letter to Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth, M.P., in July 1890.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰The Pioneer, July 22, 1890, p.1.

¹⁷¹The Friend of India, 9 Aug. 1890, p.1; the Bengalee, 2 Aug. 1890, p. 364.

¹⁷²Digby, W., Condemned Unheard: The Government of India and H.H. the Maharaja of Kashmir, July 1890, London.

Chapter V

THE COUNCIL AT WORK AND THE PARTIAL

RESTORATION OF PRATAP SINGH

(1889 - 1893)

When the Government of India took the decision to set aside Pratap Singh, and place the affairs of Kashmir in the hands of the State Council under the immediate supervision of the Resident, his attention was particularly directed to the following points:

first, the definition of the future position of the Maharaja, the amount of his actual allowance, the expenses which it was intended to cover, the extent of his power over his own household, and generally the conditions to which he should conform;

secondly, the proposed constitution of the Council, the duties falling upon each of its members, and the method of transacting business;

thirdly, the requirements of the State in the matter of subordinate officials, and the steps to be taken for reorganising the administrative services; and,

finally, the financial position of the State on which the Resident was asked to submit a report.¹

¹India to Resident, 1 April 1889, Encl. 14 in G.I. to S.S., 3 April 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(1), pp. 540-542 (PSLEI/56).

With these instructions, Nisbet entered upon his new task, and the State Council held its first meeting on 18 April 1889. From that date, too, the new Constitution of the Council came into operation. In accordance with Pratap Singh's wishes, preferred in September 1888, four of the Council members were appointed to take charge of the new administration. Raja Amar Singh was given the charge of the Foreign Department, Ram Singh of the Army, Pandit Suraj Kaul of the Revenue Department, and Pandit Bhag Ram of the Judicial.² Soon afterwards, a fifth member, Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Khan, was appointed at Nisbet's recommendation,³ and he was entrusted with the General Department. According to the Constitution of the Council, the members held independent charge of their respective departments, subject to the general control of the Resident. He was the final referee in all matters, and could veto any Resolution passed by the Council, or suspend action thereon pending further explanation. Although Amar Singh, as Prime Minister, was the executive head of the administration, the Presidentship of the Council was kept open for some time at Nisbet's suggestion. That, as we have seen, was done to ensure Ram Singh's attendance ^{at} of the Council meetings,⁴ which were

²Nisbet to Durand, D/O dated 30 April, 1889, NAI/FDP, Secret E, May 1889, Cons. 566.

³Supra, Chapter IV, p.187.

⁴Ibid., pp.186-87.

normally held once a week. In emergent cases, however, special meetings could be convened by the President of the State Council.⁵

On assuming charge of the administration, the Council had to face considerable difficulties. In spite of his abdication, the Maharaja still continued to be quite a power within the State, capable of obstructing the passage of reforms.⁶ He was further strengthened when Ram Singh joined him. From the very inception of the Council Ram Singh set his face against it. He attended only few of its meetings, and though invariably voted to the chair, he scarcely showed any interest in the proceedings of the Council.⁷ Matters came to a head when he left for Jammu with the Maharaja, and helped him to set up there a sort of dual Government.⁸ Besides, the new administration had inherited from its predecessor a legacy of heavy arrears due to the troops and the Civil and Public Works Departments of the State. The treasury was practically empty, and fears were entertained that it would be impossible to administer the State efficiently without providing adequate funds for the current expenditure.⁹ In short, faced with bankruptcy and the opposi-

⁵Quarterly Report of the Proceedings of the State Council from 18 April to 31 July 1889, PSLEI/59, p.595.

⁶Lansdowne to Cross, 31 October 1891, Lansdowne Papers/D(c), pp. 128-31.

⁷Quarterly Report of Proceedings of the Council, 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p. 595.

⁸Supra, Chapter IV, pp.194-97.

⁹Quarterly Report of the Proceedings of the Council, 18 April-31 July 1889, PSLEI/59, p. 595.

tion of two senior members of the ruling family, the new administration found itself in a difficult situation.

Nisbet's first instructions were to deal with the Maharaja and keep him within the limits of his altered situation. But in that direction the Resident could not go very far. Pratap Singh was reluctant to submit quietly to the decision of the Government of India, and continued to appeal to Lord Lansdowne for his reinstatement. In the face of the Maharaja's representations Nisbet considered it inexpedient to reduce his Civil List or check his extravagance. He even feared that if the Council should endeavour to be too strict with him in this respect, Pratap Singh might leave the country altogether, and create a scandal.¹⁰ The result was that the Maharaja's personal expenditure for 1889-90 exceeded the estimated sum of $11\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees, which in itself was out of all proportion to the revenues of the State. The Council was loth to insist upon the curtailment of the Maharaja's privy purse, on the ground that, unless the concurrence of the Maharaja was obtained, such reduction would not affect him so much as the Ranis, the members of his household and the palace dependents. The Council feared that such action on their part would have the result of engendering an amount of dissatisfaction, not commensurate with the saving effected.¹¹

¹⁰Note of conversation between Nisbet and Lansdowne at Lahore, November 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹¹Resident to India, 29 January 1890, and 12 March 1890, Encls. 4 and 8 to G.I. to S.S., 21 January 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

If the Council failed to cope with the Maharaja and his extravagance, they achieved considerable progress in other directions. Nisbet believed that the military question was all important, the more so because it was linked up with that of organising the Native States' Armies for imperial defence. Although, as we have seen, Lord Dufferin had been hesitant at first to accept the offers of the Native States,¹² he eventually agreed with his colleagues that some measure to utilise the native forces was necessary. His decision was considerably influenced by the report of Major Melliss, who travelled through many of the Native States, and suggested that a reconstruction of their armies would be in the best interests of imperial defence.¹³ In November 1888, Dufferin made a public declaration of his policy at Patiala: the money offers of the Native States could not be accepted, but a portion of their armies would be trained and equipped, so that they could be utilised in time of war.¹⁴

This was reiterated in Dufferin's official despatch to Cross toward the end of November. In carrying out the scheme, the Viceroy decided to adopt the principle that the armies of the Native States should remain entirely in the hands of their chiefs, and be composed

¹² Supra, Chapter III, pp.137-39.

¹³ Encls. 1 and 2 in G.I. to S.S., 13 March 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 347-420.

¹⁴ Encl. 4 in Ibid. Dufferin's Patiala speech of 17 Nov. 1888 was published in the Pioneer on 19 Nov. Encl. in No. 119, Cross Papers/25; Durand, A.G., op.cit., p.116.

of natives of the State concerned. No contingent officered by Englishmen would be formed; the British officers who would be lent to the Native States would merely serve as advisers and inspectors, not as Commandants and Regimental Officers.¹⁵ Roberts was delighted at the Viceroy's decision, and proposed to visit the Kashmir State to inspect its army.¹⁶ Pending Cross's approval, only preliminaries were taken in hand by the Government of India, Melliss was entrusted with the general superintendence of the project, while in Kashmir Nisbet took up, as his first duty, the question of reorganising the State Army. The Kashmir troops were indeed in a disorganised state. It was a huge rabble, and ate up two-fifths of the State's revenues.¹⁷ In addition to that the Maharaja had undertaken to train and equip a contingent of 2,500 for imperial defence.¹⁸ Evidently, the entire question was a big one, and to start with, the Maharaja asked for some officers and drill instructors from India to train his troops.¹⁹ Lansdowne sent Major Drummond²⁰ and Captain Hogge²¹ for the supervision respectively of

¹⁵G.I. to S.S., 24 November, 1888, PSLEI/55, p. 1013.

¹⁶Roberts to Dufferin, 22 November 1888, Roberts Papers/R 98/1, pp. 93-94.

¹⁷Supra, Ch. III, p.119.

¹⁸Supra, Ch. IV, p.172.

¹⁹Lansdowne to Cross, 24 December 1888, Cross Papers/26, No.3.

²⁰Major, F.H.R. Drummond, Inspector of Cavalry, Punjab States.

²¹Captain J.W.Hogge, Inspector of Infantry, Punjab States.

the Maharaja's Cavalry and infantry. Finally, in the month of April, came Sir Frederick Roberts, but by then Pratap Singh had been set aside, and the Kashmir administration entrusted to the State Council.

When the new administration entered upon its duties the condition of the State troops was nearly as bad as ever. The total number was still maintained at about 22,000²² and as the expenditure on the army was more than the State could bear, the troops were perpetually in arrears of pay.²³ As Hogge reported, the troops and officers, though on the whole a fair lot, had not the right type of training. They were ill-fed and poorly clothed, with the result that they never cared to maintain regularity in attendance.²⁴ Owing to heavy arrears the troops were very much discontented, and on that account,

"it has been impossible to attempt anything more than a slight training".²⁵

What was still worse, there was reason to believe that pay was drawn for many troops whose existence was only shown on paper, but which

²²The exact number was 22,398. Kashmir Administration Report 1889-90, Chapter III, PSDOC/3, First Series.

²³Ibid.; Quarterly Report of the Proceedings of the State Council 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p.595.

²⁴Hogge's Report of the progress made by the Kashmir Infantry from Feb. to Sept. 1889, n.d. Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

²⁵Drummond's Report on Kashmir Cavalry, 1 Oct. 1889, Ibid.

in reality did not exist. Men who had the opportunity of knowing the truth shared the belief that there were not more than ten or twelve thousand men in the ranks.²⁶

That such a state of affairs would be shocking to Roberts was only natural. He shuddered at the abnormal number of men and officers in the Kashmir army, and at once disapproved of the high expenditure that the State incurred upon it. He advised that the Council should immediately reduce the number of the troops, arrange to pay up the arrears of pay, disband the disabled with gratuity, increase the salaries of those who would be retained, and, above all, borrow British officers to train the army. Besides, Kashmir being a frontier State, and therefore different from the other Native States of India, Roberts recommended a few measures for the purposes of Imperial defence:

first, the completion of a road from *Hasan* *Abbotabad* via Abbotabad to Muzaffarabad, near which point it joined the Murree-Baramula road;

second, the construction of a railway line to Kashmir;

third, early construction of a road to Gilgit which he considered indispensable for placing the Kashmir defences on a proper footing; and

last, but not the least, the training of a force of 6,000 for defending the northern frontier of the Indian Empire.²⁷

²⁶ Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 29 January 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21.1.1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

²⁷ Notes by Roberts on the Kashmir Army, 11 May 1889, and 19 June 1889, Roberts Papers/96/1, pp. 363-67, 395-96.

"The Gilgit corner", he said, was "a very important one on the frontier line", and unless an adequate force could be made efficient enough for the defence of the Gilgit passes, "we shall be obliged to place some of our own troops there".²⁸

Lansdowne and Durand, however, did not agree with the Commander-in-Chief. Durand thought that Roberts' proposals would startle the India Office, while Lansdowne had no doubt whatever that they would "frighten the Secretary of State".²⁹ The scheme for reorganising the Native States' Armies had meantime been approved by Cross,³⁰ and Lansdowne feared that the adoption of all of Roberts' proposals would prejudice the prospects of its further development. In Durand's opinion, the Kashmir frontier was "probably the strongest" in the world, and he anticipated the Viceroy when he pointed out that Roberts' scheme was rather too large to be considered in its entirety. And, what was worse, it was likely to evoke bitter criticisms from the Indian public. Lansdowne was in complete agreement with his Foreign Secretary that there was no immediate need of departing from the policy already adopted by Dufferin's Government of raising a smaller force in Kashmir for Imperial

²⁸ Roberts to Duke of Cambridge, 14 May 1889, Roberts Papers/100/2, p.283.

²⁹ Roberts to William Lockhart, 7 June 1889, *Ibid.*, p. 307; Lansdowne to Duke of Connaught, 25 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 278-79.

³⁰ S.S. to G.I., 31 May 1889, PSDI/15, pp. 91-93; S.S. to Viceroy, 6 June 1889, *Ibid.* 7; Cross Papers/35.

defence. Both of them, however, concurred in Roberts' opinion that every endeavour should be made to pay the arrears due to the Kashmir army, and reduce its numbers, so that the State exchequer might be relieved of the burden which had hitherto been imposed upon it.³¹

The Kashmir Council, of course, realised the seriousness of army reform, and clearly saw what was immediately necessary. They decided to cut down the expenditure and reduce the number of the troops, without however impairing the strength of the force necessary for the safety of the state and of the Indian Empire.³² In the initial stage however they were considerably hampered by the obstructionist tendencies of Ram Singh.³³ The submission of the budget estimates was delayed; the accounts of the department were in a most unsatisfactory condition; and there was a complete absence of data as to the amount of unpaid arrears. Muster rolls were totally absent, so were bills; and in spite of repeated reminders, Ram Singh only delayed matters. In fact, till his return from Jammu, the military arrangements did, as Nisbet complained,

³¹Durand's note on C-in-C's proposals, 25 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 472-74; Lansdowne to Duke of Connaught, 25 June 1889, *Ibid.*, pp. 278-79; Lansdowne's Minute on Kashmir Army, 1 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 61-63; Roberts to Lockhart, 7 June 1889, Roberts Papers/100/2, p. 307.

³²Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chapter III, PSDOC/3, First Series.

³³Quarterly Report of the Council, 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p. 595.

"hang fire".³⁴ The Council of course resolved to go ahead with-
 out Ram Singh, and decided, as an initial measure, that the mili-
 tary expenditure should be limited to twelve lakhs of rupees a
 year.³⁵ It was easy to take a decision, but difficult to act upon
 it. Any reduction in the military expenditure involved a consider-
 able diminution in the strength of the army, and this required a
 careful handling to avoid the disaffection which would result from
 precipitate reductions. Besides, the Council found that it was use-
 less to frame any budget until the financial administration of the
 army was placed on a sound footing, and accurate information ob-
 tained as to the real strength of the forces, the way money granted
 was spent, and the amounts which the Darbar might be called upon to
 disburse on account of arrears of pay.³⁶

Even Ram Singh did not know much about all this. The fact is
 that due to his negligence the accounts were in such confusion that
 the Council felt it was impossible to unravel them without some assist-
 ance from the British Government. The suggestion for a British officer
 to assist the Council in this matter came from Nisbet,³⁷ and when he

³⁴Nisbet to Roberts, 17 July 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File N¹/3, R50/g.

³⁵At a special meeting held on Oct. 2, 1889, a resolution was passed appropriating a sum of Rs. 11,35,260. Quarterly Report of the Council, 1 Aug.-31 Oct. 1889, PSLEI/59, p. 597; Kashmir Administration Report, 1889-90, Chap. III, PSDOC/3, First Series.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Nisbet to Roberts, 16 Nov. 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File N¹/3, R50/9.

and the members of the Council met the Viceroy at Lahore in November 1889, they asked for a field officer to bring the whole army administration into order.³⁸ Lansdowne asked Roberts to nominate someone for this purpose,³⁹ and the Commander-in-Chief, at Nisbet's suggestion, recommended Lt. Col. Neville Chamberlain.⁴⁰ Nisbet wanted that the military officer should be placed under him, but Lansdowne decided that he must be lent direct to the Darbar as its Military Secretary, and not as Nisbet's subordinate.⁴¹ Chamberlain's salary, as Roberts recommended, was fixed at Rs. 1500 a month. He joined his new post on January 1, 1890,⁴² and an important step was thus taken in the direction of reform.

The reorganisation of the Kashmir finances was found to be no less difficult than that of its army. In 1887 Plowden had drawn the attention of the then Council to the deplorable condition of the State finances,⁴³ but hardly any attempt had since been made to place them

³⁸ Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), p. 411; Lansdowne to Roberts, 30 Nov. 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File L1 R34/58, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 249-50.

³⁹ Lansdowne to Roberts, 10 Dec. 1889, Roberts Papers/Box File L1, R34/59.

⁴⁰ Roberts to India, 12 Dec. 1889, Roberts Papers/100/6, p.933; Roberts to Lansdowne, 12 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 415-16. Chamberlain was Roberts' Private Secretary.

⁴¹ Lansdowne to Cross, 21 Jan. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 7-9, Cross Papers/28, No. 59; Encls. 2 and 3 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan.1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 412-15.

⁴² Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90; Chap. III, PSDOC/3, First Series.

⁴³ Plowden's Report, March 5, 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 18 August 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 855-918; P.P., 1890, LIV, (C.6072), pp. 245-46.

on a proper footing. There was no system of classifying income and outgoings, nor was there any to administer the finances upon the budget system. Although the practice of maintaining a general account of receipts and expenditure was in vogue, and at Plowden's initiative an attempt had been made at preparing budget estimates,⁴⁴ nothing tangible had been done beyond that stage. When the State Council entered upon their duties in April 1889, they found almost an empty treasury. The cash balance was insufficient to meet the daily expenses, and there was no possibility of defraying the necessary charges unless the exchequer was replenished from some source or other. Hitherto the practice had been to draw from the Riasi Reserve Treasury whenever the expenditure fell heavily upon the State finances.⁴⁵ But no one knew the condition of that or any other reserve treasury, as their accounts were kept for the Maharaja's inspection alone.⁴⁶ As against this deplorable condition of the State exchequer, the new administration was faced with large outstandings in the shape of heavy arrears due to the civil servants and the troops. There was, besides, the need for a large amount of money to meet the cost of public works already undertaken.⁴⁷ To crown all, there was

⁴⁴Supra, Chap. III, pp.118-19.

⁴⁵Quarterly Report of the Council, 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p.595.

⁴⁶Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

⁴⁷Quarterly Report of the Council, 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p.595.

the extravagant Civil List of the Maharaja's, fixed by himself at 11¹/₂ lakhs a year, and that too was gradually exceeded as the year rolled on.

In the face of these difficulties, the first task of the Council was to provide for some funds for immediate expenditure. The easiest source to obtain money was the Riasi Reserve Treasury, but the Council was reluctant to draw upon it indefinitely. They therefore decided to take some loan from it to be repaid as soon as the Council should "recover itself from their present embarrassments". Accordingly, in April 1889, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was withdrawn from the Riasi Reserve Treasury for current expenditure. At the same time strict orders were issued to the Provincial Governors to provide funds for future requirements by converting the existing stock of grains into cash at prevailing market rates. Again, in order to ensure the speedy conclusion of some of the public works, such as the Murree-Kohala cart road and the Jammu Water Works, a sum of 4 lakhs was withdrawn from the accumulated reserve investment of 25 lakhs held in trust by the Agra Bank.⁴⁸ Nisbet apprehended that these public works "threatened to come to a stand-still".⁴⁹ So

⁴⁸Quarterly Report of the Council, 18 April-31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, p.595.

⁴⁹Nisbet to Lansdowne, 12 July 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 37-38, Cross Papers/27, Encl. in No. 34.

he "made great exertions" to push them on, and was satisfied that, when completed, they would largely assist to develop the peace and prosperity of the country.⁵⁰

More definite steps were soon taken to improve the financial administration of the State. Under Nisbet's directions, the Finance Member of the Council framed a budget for the ordinary expenditure of 1889-90, based on the current income of the year. Due to lack of adequate information the budget estimates were not altogether faultless. On the whole, however, they were based on more accurate data than could have been hitherto obtained, and insofar as the current income and expenditure were concerned, they gave a trustworthy impression of the financial condition of the State.⁵¹ At Nisbet's advice the Council had temporarily employed a few Accounts Officers from India to check the existing accounts, and they provided the Council with the available data to draw up the estimates.⁵² Although Lansdowne was not happy with the financial condition of the State,⁵³ the actuals for 1889-90 did not materially differ from the estimates. There was, of course, a deficit of nearly

⁵⁰Nisbet to Ardagh, 15 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 429-30.

⁵¹Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 January, 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

⁵²Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

⁵³Roberts to Nisbet, 19 Feb. 1890, Roberts Papers/100/7, p.13.

a quarter of a lakh in the actuals of that year;⁵⁴ but that was more apparent than real, inasmuch as credit was not taken for the value of the stock of grain in the State warehouses. There were no doubt one or two points in the accounts which were not altogether clear, but Lansdowne hoped "that as the Council acquire experience, the accounts will be submitted in a more lucid form".⁵⁵

Side by side, the Council also framed the budget for the extraordinary expenditure for 1889-90. As the income of the State was just enough to meet the ordinary expenditure and left no surplus, money had to be provided from the Riasi Reserve Treasury to pay for the huge arrears due to the Civil and Military servants of the State, as well as to meet the expenses of the public works which were already in hand. Nisbet believed, and so did Lansdowne, that the expenditure on public works, though heavy in proportion to the resources of the State, was expedient:

"Considering the many benefits likely to accrue from them the Council were well-advised in pressing on the work as they did."⁵⁶

The one item in the Kashmir accounts to which the Viceroy took serious exception was the Maharaja's extravagance. Although Nisbet often complained of it,⁵⁷ neither he, nor the Council, ever took any

⁵⁴Resident to India, 3 June 1890, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 491-505.

⁵⁵G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Ibid., pp. 393-405.

⁵⁶Ibid., and encl. 4 in it.

⁵⁷Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

measure to check it. On the contrary, the Resident had tried to impress upon the Government of India that any attempt to severely deal with the Maharaja's privy purse would produce very adverse effects. But Lansdowne failed to understand why in spite of his deprivation of active powers, the Maharaja should be allowed to spend as much money as he liked.

"To deprive a sovereign of the right of carrying on the government of his own country, and to allow him at the same time uncontrolled powers of spending its revenues"

appeared to him "a grotesque anomaly."⁵⁸ To Cross he regretted that the Resident and the Council "did not take the bull by the horns at once in dealing with the Maharaja's extravagances".⁵⁹ But he lost no time in asking the Resident to be very firm on this account, and to persuade the Council to adopt two preliminary steps as a sine qua non for improving the finances of the State. First, the Council must take into their hands the absolute control of the Reserve Treasuries, which practically were still being administered for the Maharaja by his own men. Secondly, they must deal without delay with the question of fixing a reasonable allowance for the Maharaja.⁶⁰ The Government of India believed that if early steps

⁵⁸Lansdowne to Nisbet, 5 Feb. 1890, Encl. in No. 62, Cross Papers/28.

⁵⁹Lansdowne to Cross, 11 Feb. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 15-17.

⁶⁰India to Resident, 22 Feb. 1890, Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 479-84.

were taken to do these, it would not be difficult to reform the financial administration of a State, which had a reserve of seventy six lakhs of rupees, and an income capable of meeting the ordinary expenditure.⁶¹

Though hopeful about the Kashmir finances, Lansdowne was aware that the huge expenditure incurred upon the public works was

"a considerable drain upon the State resources and has consequently attracted adverse criticisms".⁶²

He however agreed with Nisbet that a heavy immediate outlay was in the end likely to prove more beneficial to the State than lighter payments accompanied by a slower rate of progress.⁶³ Taking a long view, and considering the progress that was made during the first year of the new administration, the decision of Nisbet to push on with the public works seems indeed to have been the right one. Before the Council had taken office, the Jhelum Valley Road had been opened to traffic for only 35 miles at an expenditure of 18 lakhs of rupees. But until the road was completed to Srinagar, or at least to Baramula, where the boat traffic of the Jhelum river met it, the road could not hope to yield the result that was intended by its

⁶¹G I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 393-405.

⁶²Ibid. For the criticisms, J.C. Bose, Cashmere and its Prince, pp. 69-70, Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 217-18.

⁶³Ibid.

projectors. The result was that a huge capital had been practically locked up yielding no interest or benefit to the State. But during the one year of the Council's administration the cart road was nearly completed making it possible for wheeled carriages to pass the entire way from Kohala to Baramula. The road was, indeed, of great importance as it was sure to foster trade between Kashmir and the Punjab, and thus help in the development of the State as a whole. What was more, with the introduction of wheeled traffic, and the more extended use of baggage animals, considerable relief could be afforded to the people in respect of the system of 'begar' or forced labour.⁶⁴ Again, during the same period, the Jammu-Sialkot Railway was completed, and the line was opened to traffic. The town of Jammu was provided with a Water Works, named after Lansdowne,⁶⁵ which supplied a population of 30,000 inhabitants with pure, wholesome drinking water. A similar project for Srinagar was also taken in hand, and was being rapidly pushed on. It was hoped that these measures would stop the decimation of the population of the State, which was often visited by Cholera and similar epidemics.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78; Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. XI, PSDOC/3, First Series.

⁶⁵ Report on the Lansdowne Water Works, by J.S. Attfield, 28 Sept. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

⁶⁶ Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78; Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Ch. XI, PSDOC/3, First Series.

Simultaneously, the Council under Nisbet's direction also undertook to construct a good military road between Srinagar and Gilgit. Toward the end of July 1889, the Resident urged the Government of India to forego the loan of 3¹/₂ lakhs of rupees due from the Darbar on account of the Jammu-Sialkot Railway, on condition that the Darbar would spend the money on a military road from Bundipura to Gilgit.⁶⁷ Lansdowne's Government readily approved of it, but suggested that the agreement of 1888⁶⁸ with the Darbar should be accordingly revised.⁶⁹ The Council accepted the suggestion whereupon the earlier agreement was supplemented by a new one,⁷⁰ and the stipulated sum was funded by the Darbar in due course.⁷¹ At the same time, the question of constructing a railway to connect the Punjab with Kashmir was considered by both the Council and the Government of India. This project had been under consideration since 1886. Four separate routes⁷² had been surveyed since that time, and de Bourbel

⁶⁷Resident to India, 30 July 1889, IFP/3506, Sept. 1889, Cons.96,p.157.

⁶⁸Supra, Chap. III, pp.126-27.

⁶⁹India to Resident, 30 Aug. 1889, IFP/3506, Sept.1889, Cons. 97,pp.157-58.

⁷⁰IFP/3965, Feb. 1891, Cons. 22, pp. 24-25.

⁷¹Resident to India, 21 July 1890, IFP/3743, Sept.1890, Cons. 26, p.167.

⁷²The four routes were:

- (i) The Banihal route from Jammu to Srinagar by the Chenab Valley, 175 miles.
 - (ii) The Punch route from Jhelum to Srinagar, by the Punch Valley, 181 miles.
 - (iii) The Panjar route from Rawalpindi to Srinagar by the Jhelum Valley, 210 miles.
 - (iv) The Abbotabad route from Kalake Sarai to Srinagar through Hazara and by the Upper Jhelum Valley, 210 Miles.
- de Bourbel's General Report, 16 Nov. 1889, IFP/3738, Feb.1890, Cons. 307-08, pp. 561-80.

submitted his General Report to the Kashmir Resident in November 1889.⁷³ Discussions with private entrepreneurs, who were eager to undertake the construction of the railway, proceeded on the basis of de Bourbel's report, but no agreement could be reached as to the route to be adopted, or the terms on which the line was to be constructed. Another survey of the possible lines was then decided upon, and Lansdowne desired that it should be taken up under the direction of the Public Works Department of the Government of India during the winter of 1890-91.⁷⁴

At the same time the Settlement operations made considerable progress under the superintendence of Walter Lawrence. When Wingate proceeded to England on furlough in April 1889, Lawrence, then Under-Secretary to the Government of India in the Revenue and Agricultural Department, was appointed as his successor.⁷⁵ When he took over, Lawrence was advised by his predecessor to devote himself chiefly to the work of assessment, which was the bane of the revenue arrangements in Kashmir.⁷⁶ Lawrence did so, and gradually went deeper into the problem of Settlement work. With Wingate's Report before

⁷³Cons. 306-08, de Bourbel's General Report, 16 Nov. 1889, IFP/3738, Feb. 1890, pp. 561-80.

⁷⁴I.P.W.P./3930, April 1891, Nos. 158-68, pp. 1495-99; I.P.W.P./3931, July 1891, Cons. 213-37, pp. 3289-3300; Elliott to Lansdowne, 26 March 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), p. 218, Lansdowne to Griffin, 29 March 1890, *Ibid.* pp. 166-67; G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 393-405.

⁷⁵IFP/3501, April 1889, Cons. 49-70A, pp. 33-43.

⁷⁶Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. V, PSDOC/3, First Series.

him, it was not difficult for Lawrence to detect the three most important evils which accounted for the deplorable condition of the cultivating classes in Kashmir. The first was their subjection to the uncontrolled tyranny of a numerous official class; the second was the system of 'begar' or forced labour; and the third, the indefinite character of the obligations imposed upon them.⁷⁷ He acknowledged, however, that a reduction of the number of the revenue officials could not but be a slow process, and to secure a higher moral standard among them must necessarily be a work of time. As regards the question of forced labour, he observed that in a country like Kashmir the system must be regarded as "a stern necessity",⁷⁸ so long as improved communications did not provide for a greater mobility between one place and another. Its sudden abolition at any rate would, as Nisbet put it, cause a great deal of confusion and difficulty both to the Government and the people.⁷⁹

The improvement of the position of the cultivator with regard to his title in, and liability for, his holding stood however upon a different footing altogether, and Lawrence achieved creditable progress in this respect. In two tahsils,⁸⁰ he proposed an assessment for a term

⁷⁷ Lawrence to Nisbet, 13 Nov. 1889, Appendix to Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 433-39.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Nisbet's Report on Kashmir, 29 Jan. 1890, with encls. Ibid.

⁸⁰ Lal and Pak tahsils.

of ten years, and when his proposals were submitted for the approval of the State Council they readily accorded it. The efficacy of the measure was at once seen in the result it produced. Its announcement made the people "alive to the reality and importance of Settlement operations", and a considerable number of cultivators who had been compelled in former times to desert their villages, returned to their homes. Both Lansdowne and Nisbet looked upon this as one of the most tangible proofs that the Settlement was inspiring confidence among the people.⁸¹

The Council also entrusted to Lawrence considerable powers in regard to revenue jurisdiction, without however giving undue prominence to the matter by any change in his official designation, or by formally investing him with new powers.⁸² As Lawrence admitted, they freely gave him "generous assistance" in his efforts to reform the revenue administration. They also gave him the charge of the State vineyards, gardens and orchards; and Lawrence made some progress in the direction of inducing the villagers to construct and repair irrigation works.⁸³ Lansdowne was satisfied that, once

⁸¹Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. V, PSDOC/3, First Series. Lawrence to Amar Singh, 14 Sept. 1889, with enclosure, Appendix to Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 445-73.

⁸²For instance, Lawrence was given full powers to receive and dispose of all applications for waste lands direct. Quart. Report 18 April-31 July 1889, PSLEI/59, p. 595.

⁸³Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. V, PSDOC/3, First Series.

the Council and the people of Kashmir began to understand that existing arrangements were not likely to be suddenly disturbed, and that the efforts which were being made in favour of the cultivating classes would not be abandoned, the necessary reforms would be effected with more speed and certainty than it had been hitherto possible.⁸⁴

With regard to the reorganisation of the administrative services, to which Nisbet's attention had been particularly drawn in April 1889, the reports received from the Resident showed that the number of officials in the State was greatly in excess of the offices in which they could be called upon to do any real work. It had been the custom of the Darbar to subsidise the official aristocracy, formed of the Pandit class, by means of nominating its members to sinecure offices, many of which were remunerative to the incumbents rather by reason of the opportunities they afforded for speculation or extortion than owing to the salary attached to them.⁸⁵ At the same time it was clear from Lawrence's observations that the Pandits could be expected to become fairly good public servants, if they were given proper guidance and adequate salaries.⁸⁶ In these

⁸⁴G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 393-405.

⁸⁵Encl. 4 with sub-encls. in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

⁸⁶Lawrence to Nisbet, 2 December, 1889, Appendix to Encl. 4 in Ibid. pp. 439-45.

circumstances the Government of India agreed with the Kashmir Resident that any measure to reduce the official class must be gradual. They however suggested that as a preliminary measure to working out any general scheme for disposing of sinecure offices the Council should get the exact data as to their number, and the compensation that would be necessary for reducing it. They hoped that by working cautiously on these lines, and carefully weighing the capacity of each office-holder, real or sinecure, the Council would "be able to effect a valuable reform without incurring needless unpou^pularity".⁸⁷

In the Judicial Department the progress reported was more satisfactory than it was in the administrative services. Serious attempts were made to check abuses in the administration of justice, particularly in that of criminal justice. At the time the Council took office judicial abuses were practised on a large scale by the officials of the State.⁸⁸ As Nisbet reported, punishments did not necessarily follow on the commission of crime.

"Officials who sat on the Judicial Bench exercised their powers often only to afflict the poor, the weak, and even the accidental offender, and not seldom to do injustice at the bidding of their superiors, or those who were rich and powerful, or to gratify their private malice."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ India to Resident, 22 Feb. 1890, Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 479-84.

⁸⁸ Note on the Administration of Justice by Bhag Ram, Judicial Member, Kashmir Council, 18 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

⁸⁹ Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

The administration of justice was usually a slow process; suits against influential people were kept pending, or even adjourned sine die.⁹⁰ There was no elaborate civil code; the only law in force was a simple Code of Civil Procedure. The administration of criminal justice was guided solely by a Penal Code, and was usually rendered impossible by the rapacity of the officers of the Department who considered themselves privileged enough to take the law into their own hands.⁹¹

The first and principal care of the Judicial Member, therefore, was to get rid of the anomalous position in which the Criminal Courts were placed, and reduce the administration to a methodical and well-organised system regulated by defined rules of law and procedure.⁹² Circular orders correcting judicial abuses and laying down rules for the future guidance of the Department were issued by the Council,⁹³ and it was hoped that the aims of the new administration would thus be better served in future. With regard to the administration of civil justice, the Council considered it inadvisable to adopt British Codes of law, as they felt that both the judges and the people were incapable of grasping any such elaborate system. They preferred to

⁹⁰Note by Bhag Ram, 18 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

⁹¹Note by Bhag Ram, 18 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11; Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chaps VI and VII, PSDOC/3, First Series.

⁹²Chap. VII, Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.; Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

impart the necessary training to the subordinate judges by the formulation of case law. That, they believed, exerted greater influence upon the judges than the codified laws, which were scarcely read by them. The Judicial Member of the Council therefore adopted the system of writing elaborate decisions in the cases which came before him in appeal or revision, pointing out defects in rudimentary procedure, explaining or propounding the law governing the case, and showing to the subordinate courts the way to deal with analogous cases in future.⁹⁴

Measures were simultaneously taken to place the police on a better footing, and to reform the jails. In the Police administration bribe-taking was very common, investigation into crimes was usually defective; and the officials as a class were uneducated and thoroughly corrupt. The jails likewise were in the utmost disorder, and hardly had the appearance of prisons. The prisoners indulged in all kinds of luxury with impunity, so that jails were more like pleasure houses than places for undergoing sentences.⁹⁵ As a first step to

⁹⁴Chap. VI, Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, PSDOC/3, First Series.

⁹⁵Note by Bhag Ram, 18 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11. Nisbet knew of a case where a man sentenced to a long term had several additions to his family. On enquiry he found that there was no great difficulty in a prisoner sleeping with his wife in the town and returning to jail in the morning. Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

remedy these evils the arrears of pay were paid off. Each police station was provided with proper registers, and the officers-in-charge were instructed in the way of keeping them as well as in their general duties. An adequate check on these officers was provided by sending special officials, trained on the Punjab system, to every police station from time to time.⁹⁶ The jails at Jammu and Srinagar were placed on an efficient system of management, insofar as conservancy and sanitation, food and clothing, discipline and employment of the prisoners were concerned.⁹⁷

Education, too, did not escape the attention of the Council, although want of adequate funds forbade them from undertaking reform on a large scale. New schools and boarding houses were established at Jammu and Srinagar, and a system of awarding scholarships to meritorious students was introduced. Village schools in principal places⁹⁸ were also established, but for lack of adequate resources, the Council could not introduce primary education which was postponed "till such time as funds [were] available for the expenditure on education".⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Nisbet's Report, 29 Jan. 1890, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S. 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 417-78.

⁹⁷ Ch. VIII, Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, PSDOC/3, First Series.

⁹⁸ Such as Akhnur and Nowshera in Jammu.

⁹⁹ Ch. IX, Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, PSDOC/3, First Series. The only exception was one primary school at Muzaffarabad in Kashmir which was established "on the pressing application of the people".

Chamberlain's appointment might have facilitated the task of reform in the Kashmir army, but it raised a technical question which took some time to be decided. As already mentioned, Nisbet had asked for Chamberlain and wanted to have him as his military assistant in the Residency. But Lansdowne was determined that Chamberlain should work with the Council direct, and not as an assistant to the Resident.¹⁰⁰ In this decision the Viceroy was considerably influenced by Durand. What actually happened was that since June 1889, Nisbet had been asking for "a couple of good Assistants"¹⁰¹ for the Kashmir Residency - a Military Officer to assist him in carrying out army reforms, and an Engineer Officer in place of de Bourbel to supervise the public works. From the very first, Nisbet had been annoyed with de Bourbel, and he now demanded that that officer should not be re-employed after the expiry of his engagement with the Darbar in January 1890.¹⁰² When told by the Foreign Department that his claims to a military assistant and an Engineer Officer were inadmissible,¹⁰³ Nisbet asserted that as Resident and Superintendent of the Kashmir State he was perfectly

¹⁰⁰ Supra, p.239.

¹⁰¹ Nisbet to Ardagh, 15 June 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), pp. 429-30.

¹⁰² Nisbet to Durand, 3 Oct. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹⁰³ Cornish to Nisbet, 26 Oct. 1889, Ibid.

entitled to such assistance.¹⁰⁴ This annoyed Durand. He failed to understand why Nisbet should style himself Superintendent of the Kashmir State, and remarked that his claims were "preposterous".¹⁰⁵ In a note written to Lansdowne he emphasised that Nisbet had thoroughly mistaken his position; that he was not the ruler, nor indeed the Superintendent of the State. His only business was to guide the Council in their work, and not certainly to do it for them.¹⁰⁶ As such, Nisbet was entitled only to one Political Assistant in the Residency;¹⁰⁷ the other Officers, if they were at all to be lent to the Council, should be placed directly under them. In fact, Durand had never wanted Nisbet in the Kashmir Residency, nor was he satisfied with his proceedings in that State.¹⁰⁸ The Resident's demands now exasperated him beyond measure. He again wrote for the Viceroy's consideration that unless controlled, Nisbet would be the cause of much trouble to the Government of India. He would merely justify the allegations of the anti-Government party "that our aim is the practical annexation of the State".¹⁰⁹ Lansdowne agreed with

¹⁰⁴Nisbet to Durand, 7 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹⁰⁵Durand's note on Nisbet's letter of 7 Nov. 1889, Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Durand to Lansdowne, 17 Nov. 1889, Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Durand's note on Nisbet's letter of 7 Nov. 1889, Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Supra, Ch. III, pp.169-70; Ch.IV. pp. 181-82.

¹⁰⁹Durand to Lansdowne, 17 Nov. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box. 11.

his Foreign Secretary and decided to place Chamberlain directly under the Council. He felt that Nisbet was interfering too much in the administration of Kashmir, and even complained to Roberts about it.¹¹⁰ Lansdowne was further exasperated when Nisbet demanded the removal of Bhag Ram on the ground that he was becoming all powerful in the Council, and even trying to split it:¹¹¹

"Nisbet is, I am afraid, too much inclined to meddle in details, and particularly in personal questions... Altogether I am afraid that Nisbet is wanting in tact, and I often wish I had a more judicious man in his place."¹¹²

If Nisbet was "very much put out"¹¹³ by Chamberlain's appointment, Melliss too was a little apprehensive lest this should lead to an encroachment upon his functions. Lansdowne guessed it, and had a Memorandum drafted defining Chamberlain's position.¹¹⁴ He made it clear that the Military Officer was lent directly to the Council to aid the Commander-in-Chief of the Kashmir Army. He was to form no part of the Residency Staff, nor was he to act as a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief. He would be Military Secretary

¹¹⁰ Roberts to Lansdowne, 12 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 415-16.

¹¹¹ Nisbet to Cunningham, 18 Dec. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹¹² Lansdowne to Cross, 21 Jan. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 7-9, Cross Papers/28, No. 59.

¹¹³ Chamberlain to Roberts, 5 January, 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹¹⁴ Melliss to Ardagh, 14 December, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 418(a)-(b); Lansdowne to Roberts, 18 Dec. 1889, Ibid., pp. 285-86.

to the Council and adviser to Ram Singh, but would hold no command of the Army. Lansdowne deliberately left no room for misapprehension as to Chamberlain's position vis-à-vis Ram Singh. Should that prince again prove obstructive, or unmindful of his duties, the Military Secretary was to work with the other members of the Council. Further, Chamberlain's appointment would not alter in any way the duties or responsibilities of those officers who, under the control of Major Melliss as Chief Inspecting Officer, were entrusted with the work of supervising the training and drilling of the troops which had been selected by the State for Imperial Service. Chamberlain's duties were connected with the general military administration, and had no special relation to the troops selected for Imperial Service, except insofar as they formed a part of the Kashmir Army. Lansdowne hoped that Chamberlain would heartily cooperate with Melliss and facilitate the execution of his recommendations in regard to the Imperial Service troops of the Kashmir State.¹¹⁵

By this Memorandum of Instructions the "first and most important duty" that was assigned to Chamberlain was to assist Ram Singh in removing the defects of the Kashmir Army, and to place the financial administration of the Military Department on a proper footing. The Council had asked for the services of a British Officer particularly to help them "in the delicate task of effecting the necessary reductions"

¹¹⁵Lansdowne to Roberts, 18 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(b), pp. 285-86; Memo, 14 Jan. 1890, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 413-15.

in the Army, and "of introducing a new and sound system of pay, control and audit".¹¹⁶ On his arrival at Jammu, Chamberlain found that the accounts of the Army were being actively overhauled, and "there was a nervous sort of desire to explain past accounts". But he considered that his business was not to probe too deeply into the "past scandals", but to improve the financial administration of the army in the future. This attitude at once secured him the good-will of the Commander-in-Chief and his associates, and they heartily settled down to their work.¹¹⁷ From the first, Chamberlain was very confident of himself, and felt sure that the Viceroy "won't be troubled with Kashmir military affairs again".¹¹⁸

To clear up old accounts, Chamberlain first tried to determine the exact amount of arrears due to the troops. On proper investigation, much of it turned out to be mere paper debts, and after two months of hard labour, the exact amount due to the army was found to stand at a sum of Rs. 3,01,794. Reduction of the number of troops was the next difficult problem that Chamberlain dealt with. The Council had already entered upon this task, and considerably reduced the numerical strength of the army by retrenching a large number of officers and men. On enquiry, Chamberlain found that a large proportion of these men had done

¹¹⁶ Memo, 14 Jan. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 413-15.

¹¹⁷ Chamberlain to Roberts, 21 Jan. 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11;
Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 11 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 4-8.

¹¹⁸ Chamberlain to Roberts, 9 Jan. 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

long and creditable service to the State, and it appeared to him very undesirable that such men should be simply paid off and asked to leave. At the same time, he was unwilling to see the State encumbered with a formidable pension list. He accordingly recommended that each man should be given the option of either remaining in the service on a very reduced scale of pay until a vacancy occurred which would permit of his being reinstated, or of retiring voluntarily on a moderate gratuity. A large number of the dismissed officials preferred the latter alternative, and Chamberlain believed that a majority of those who were still on the supernumerary list would eventually take the gratuity and go.¹¹⁹ The measure at once produced a salutary effect. No clamour was raised over such a huge reduction in so short a time, and the Kashmir Army was reduced from 22,398 to 9,965 by April 1890,¹²⁰ while the sanctioned strength in the budget estimates for 1890-91 was only 8,751.¹²¹

Chamberlain next assisted Ram Singh to prepare a Budget for 1890-91. The estimates showed an ordinary expenditure of a little over 11¹/₄ lakhs, and a separate sum of 83,741 for payment, on a reduced scale, of officers and men who were in excess of the sanctioned establishment.

¹¹⁹ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. III, PSDOC/3, First Series, Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 1 July, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 4-8.

¹²⁰ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. III, PSDOC3/, First Series.

¹²¹ Encl. in Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 1 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 4-8.

The accounts were so far regularised that it appeared that in future the Darbar would be able to maintain, at an estimated cost of Rs. 11,35,260, all its armies, which comprised the Gilgit frontier garrison necessitated by the establishment of the Gilgit Agency, the Imperial Service troops, and a force of regular army for the ordinary duties of the State, such as ceremonials.¹²² With regard to the question of "a new and sound system of pay, control and audit", Chamberlain found that the various pay forms proposed by Captain Hogge for the Imperial Service troops were simple and business-like. They were based on a simple system of accounts and required only a moderate amount of auditing. He therefore proposed their introduction throughout the army to have one uniform system in the State. The net result, as Chamberlain exclaimed, was that

"the State now knows exactly where the money goes,
and what it gets in return for it!"¹²³

Things went well so far, but difficulties arose over the question of reorganising the Imperial Service troops. Under the scheme for the resettlement of the Kashmir Army as a whole, which was approved by the Council and sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India, the troops of the State were classified into three distinct categories. Pratap Singh had agreed in 1888 to thoroughly train and equip a force

¹²² Kashmir Admn. Report, 1889-90, Chap. III, PSDOC/3, First Series, Encl. 14 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne MSS/III(iii), pp. 507-26.

¹²³ Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 1 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 4-8.

of 2,500 for Imperial defence. The Council approved of that, and in addition agreed, under the Gilgit arrangement, to station another force of 2,500 on that frontier. A third group consisted of the regular army required for the ordinary duties of the State, including the support of the British Officer at Leh. Lansdowne's idea, which however was not sufficiently explained at first, was that the troops for Imperial defence should be organised and trained under the supervision of Melliss and Hogge, who were to be directly under the Government of India. The Gilgit force, on the other hand, which was to be relieved every two years, should be controlled by the British Agent so long as it was in Gilgit, while the Council under Chamberlain's guidance would be responsible for the general administration of the entire army, especially the financial aspect of it. It was further provided that the troops for Imperial Service would be stationed at Jammu and supply the necessary reliefs to the Gilgit force.¹²⁴

Admittedly, the arrangement was a complicated one, and proved to be a severe strain upon the finances of the State.¹²⁵ The arrangement for Imperial defence corps required that its equipment and discipline should be such as to bring it up to the standard which was aimed at in the case of all native troops liable in the event of war

¹²⁴G.I. to S.S., 21 Jan. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 393-405; Lansdowne to Roberts, 14 Jan. 1890, Roberts Papers/Box File LI, No. 34/66; Lansdowne to Roberts, 4 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), pp. 172-73; Progress Report of Imperial Service troops June 1890-June 1891, by H. Melliss, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 29 August, 1891, PSLEI/63, p. 1280A.

¹²⁵Lansdowne to Roberts, 4 April, 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), pp. 172-73.

to be brigaded with British forces. As it was made interchangeable with the Gilgit garrison, it followed ipso facto that both these portions of the Kashmir Army must be equally trained, paid and equipped. This accounted for a two-fold strain upon the State exchequer, and practically doubled the expenditure, the Maharaja and the Council had voluntarily undertaken to incur upon the Imperial defence scheme. In actual practice, Chamberlain found it difficult to cope with the demands made by Melliss on account of the Imperial Service troops.¹²⁶ He complained to Roberts that things could never go right until some definite orders were issued regarding the relationship that should exist between the Imperial defence troops and the Gilgit force. Personally, he believed that the raison d'être of a Kashmir army could only be to guard its own frontiers. That the State was training a force of 2,500 to defend the Gilgit frontier was in itself a satisfactory contribution towards Imperial defence; the force of the same strength under Melliss' supervision was only an additional burden upon the State.¹²⁷ Roberts agreed with Chamberlain, and thought it was a case of "too many cooks". He suggested to the Viceroy that the Kashmir army should be for the defence of the State alone, and Melliss' supervision over the State ought to be dis-

¹²⁶ Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 1 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 4-8.

¹²⁷ Chamberlain to Roberts, 21 March 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

pensed with.¹²⁸ Lansdowne admitted that the calls upon the Kashmir Army were greater than he could reasonably ask it to bear, but he was hesitant to take any step

"which might suggest the idea that Chamberlain had, within a few months of his arrival, succeeded in ousting Melliss from Kashmir...."¹²⁹

Melliss, however, provided the Viceroy with an argument strong enough to decide him to maintain the status quo. He pointed out that Chamberlain's proposal "to have an efficient Kashmir army for Kashmir alone" struck at the fundamental principle on which the whole scheme for utilising the Native States' Armies was based, and if that State should be conceded such a privilege, the other Native States too would "ask for a like concession".¹³⁰ Roberts of course still maintained that the first concern of the Government of India in Kashmir was to provide for the defence of its frontiers, and if the troops of the Kashmir State could be trained for that purpose, the objects of the scheme for Imperial defence would be adequately realised.¹³¹ But Lansdowne looked at it from Melliss' viewpoint, and argued that if any part of the Kashmir Army was ever to

¹²⁸ Roberts to Lansdowne, 29 March 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), p. 230.

¹²⁹ Lansdowne to Roberts, 4 April, 1890, Ibid., pp. 172-73.

¹³⁰ Melliss' Note on Kashmir Army, 10 April 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹³¹ Roberts' Note on Melliss' note of April 1890 dated 8 May 1890, Ibid., also Roberts Papers/96/2, pp. 619-20.

be utilised for external service the State must have a force avowedly maintained for that purpose. From that premise he proceeded to clear up the misunderstandings which had arisen because the principles on which the Kashmir Army were to be reorganised "were not explained with sufficient distinctness" to Melliss and Chamberlain. The Imperial Service Corps and the Gilgit garrison, he said, were in reality not two distinct forces, but interchangeable parts of one and the same force: the portion liable for Imperial service being that which for the time being happened to be at Jammu. "In the event of war, the force liable for Imperial service at Jammu would be mobilised, its position having been previously assigned to it in our scheme of Imperial Defence..."¹³² Lansdowne thought that the main cause of the controversy was a want of elasticity in the application of the system conceived by the Government of India; and if the system was a little complicated, it was nevertheless sound in principle. To relieve the State of unnecessary expenditure in future he clearly stated his policy for the observation of the Officers concerned:

"If the demands of the Chief Inspecting Officer appear to be excessive, the fact should be made known to the Resident, who should be in a position of holding the balance, and who could intimate to us, if the matter was an important one, or to the Inspecting Officer-in-

¹³²Lansdowne's Note on Kashmir Army, 7 May 1890, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 175-77.

Chief in minor cases, that for particular reasons it was not desirable for him to insist too much."¹³³

Meanwhile, Pratap Singh had continued to appeal to Roberts for his restoration,¹³⁴ and availed himself of every opportunity to exhibit his fidelity to the Queen and her representative in India.¹³⁵ Roberts' official position precluded him from discussing the question of the Maharaja's restoration,¹³⁶ but what was surprising was that a change soon came over Nisbet's attitude towards Pratap Singh. Scarcely had he come to know of the defeat of Bradlaugh's motion in the House of Commons¹³⁷ than the Resident proposed to Lord Lansdowne that the Kashmir situation might be reconsidered, and the Maharaja appointed as the President of the Council in place of Amar Singh.¹³⁸ In fact, Nisbet had already sent Raja Amar Singh to Jammu to induce the Maharaja to come to Srinagar to resume his position as President of the Council.¹³⁹

This naturally annoyed the Viceroy, the more so because the Resident had acted without consulting the Foreign Department. Lans-

¹³³Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 14 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 24-26.

¹³⁴Roberts to Maharaja, 8 Feb. 1890, Roberts Papers/100/7, p.103.

¹³⁵The Maharaja to Viceroy, 19 Jan. 1890, 20. Jan. 1890, 24 May 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), pp. 40, 46 and 358.

¹³⁶Roberts to Maharaja, 8 Feb. 1890, Roberts Papers/100/7, p. 103.

¹³⁷Supra, Chap. IV, p.226.

¹³⁸Resident to Viceroy, 5 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), p.18.

¹³⁹Cunningham to Ardagh, 7 July 1890, Ibid., p.23.

downe asked Nisbet not to move further in the matter without instructions, and impressed upon him that no departure from the policy deliberately adopted in regard to the Maharaja could be allowed without greater deliberation. The Resident was told that the time was not opportune for a change of policy, that if it should be made at all, it ought not to follow immediately upon a discussion in the British Parliament.¹⁴⁰ Ardagh had to remind Nisbet that the Maharaja's appeal to the House of Commons was in itself a very severe censure upon his own conduct, and therefore the Resident must not hold out any expectation to that deposed prince which might embarrass the Government of India.¹⁴¹

To Lord Cross Lansdowne expressed his feelings more pointedly. He was extremely annoyed with Nisbet and had no desire to restore the Maharaja until he showed "some signs of being in earnest".¹⁴² About this time, Nisbet had an interview with Pratap Singh, and in the course of his conversation with him he made certain suggestions which could easily be construed as an assurance that the Maharaja would be restored to power if he should undertake to follow the advice of

¹⁴⁰Lansdowne to Nisbet, 8 July 1890, Ibid., pp. 11-12.

¹⁴¹Ardagh to Nisbet, 31 July 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹⁴²Lansdowne to Cross, 14 July 1890 and 8 Aug. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 78-80, and 88-91.

the British Resident in all matters.¹⁴³ Lansdowne was thoroughly disgusted at this. He was "much averse to anything like a transaction with the Maharaja" at that moment, and was happy that Nisbet, who had meanwhile applied for leave,¹⁴⁴ would shortly go on furlough. To Cross he complained that

"Nisbet has done a number of foolish things, and has quarrelled with half the people, with whom he has been concerned. Altogether he is a gentleman who rather keeps me on the tender-hooks."

In fact, Lansdowne could not "make out" why Nisbet was sent to Kashmir at all.¹⁴⁵

What accounted for the sudden change of Nisbet's attitude towards Pratap Singh is not on record. Perhaps at that time he was contemplating furlough, and wanted to do the Maharaja a good turn before he left Kashmir. Nisbet had made himself quite unpopular in Kashmir; indeed he had alienated, as Lansdowne remarked, "half the people" with whom he came in contact. There was talk of his dictatorial attitude in the management of Kashmir affairs. Even men like Chamberlain, Lawrence, de Bourbel and Algernon Durand talked of him in the same vein.¹⁴⁶ Their views were fully shared by the Viceroy

¹⁴³ Encl. in Lansdowne to Cross, 1 Sept. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 93-95; Cross Papers/29, No. 90.

¹⁴⁴ IFP/3969, Jan. 1891, Cons. 1-3, pp. 1-3; Nisbet to Lansdowne, 14 Aug. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 111-13.

¹⁴⁵ Lansdowne to Cross, 1 Sept. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 93-95, Cross Papers/29, No. 90.

¹⁴⁶ Chamberlain to Roberts, 5 Jan. 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 10, Lawrence to Ardagh, 11 July 1890, *Ibid.* Box 11; de Bourbel to Ardagh 18 May 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(c), pp. 340-42, Cunningham to Ardagh, 7 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), p. 23.

and his Foreign Department, and perhaps Nisbet was not unaware of that. He, at any rate, was no longer confident about his own position, and might even have felt that he would never come back to Kashmir again. Chamberlain's appointment under the Kashmir Council had considerably unnerved him; he had even apprehended that it was going to be the prelude to his removal from Kashmir.¹⁴⁷

Chamberlain of course never went out of his way to injure the Resident, but Nisbet's own official subordinate, Captain H. L. Ramsay, the British Joint-Commissioner at Ladakh, brought a series of charges against him. They would have certainly led to his removal from Kashmir if Nisbet himself had not taken leave and re-¹⁴⁸
tired from the scene. In fact, Lansdowne "was anxious to replace him by a better man"; and just when he "was endeavouring to do this quietly", Ramsay fell foul of Nisbet, and created a rather awkward situation for the Viceroy.¹⁴⁹

As the British Joint Commissioner of Ladakh, Captain Ramsay was required to forward from time to time, through the Resident of Kashmir, his diaries containing information in respect to the affairs of his charge. In July 1890 Ramsay sent to the Government of India his diary for the period from 21 to 30 June, which was accompanied

¹⁴⁷ Chamberlain to Roberts, 5 Jan. 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 10.

¹⁴⁸ Infra, p. 271.

¹⁴⁹ Lansdowne to Cross, 11 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 55-57, Cross Papers/32, No. 179A.

by a memorandum containing a series of attacks upon Colonel Nisbet.¹⁵⁰ Both the diary and ^{the} memorandum were written in an utterly insubordinate tone, and the allegations made with evident prejudice against Nisbet. Some of these were trivial in character, others either exaggerated or conjectural. Lansdowne was therefore obliged to support Nisbet, although he could not conceal from himself "that in some respects, the unfavourable opinion which Ramsay had formed of his own chief was one" which he himself shared.¹⁵¹ This created a difficult situation, but Lansdowne decided to get out of it by removing both Nisbet and Ramsay.¹⁵² However, he was spared the embarrassment of this unpleasant task by Nisbet's application for leave to go on furlough, while Ramsay agreed to retrace his steps and withdraw the charges.¹⁵³ Colonel W. F. Prideaux, Resident at Jaipur, was appointed to officiate during Nisbet's absence.¹⁵⁴ Lansdowne considered him to be a man of "tact and a conciliatory manner" who could be "trusted

¹⁵⁰ Encls. in G.I. to S.S., 2 Dec. 1891, PSLEI/64, pp. 1209-21.

¹⁵¹ Lansdowne to Cross, 11 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 55-57, Cross Papers/32, No. 179A.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Encls. 6 and 8 in G.I. to S.S., 2 Dec. 1891, PSLEI/64, pp. 1209-21.

¹⁵⁴ IFP/3969, Jan. 1891, Cons. 4, p. 3.

to keep out of scrapes and to obey orders".¹⁵⁵ The new Resident took up his duties in December, 1890.¹⁵⁶

For the Council, the new financial year, that began from April 1890 did not evidently augur very well. The Melliss-Chamberlain controversy was raging in full swing, and until the Viceroy gave his final decision upon the matter, the future of the Kashmir army was uncertain. Nisbet was in troubles over Ramsay's allegations, and the possibility of a change in the Kashmir Residency was soon added to a rumour about the Maharaja's returning to power. That unsettled men's minds, and raised new hopes in many hearts.¹⁵⁷ All this created a state of uncertainty which, coupled with some irregularity in the collection of revenues,¹⁵⁸ hampered the progress of reforms. Lawrence felt some difficulty in continuing the Settlement operations.¹⁵⁹ Publicworks, however, were pushed on as usual, and that elicited from Lawrence a rather caustic, though exaggerated, remark. The administration, he said, had been too ambitious, and necessary measures of reform had been sacrificed to high-sounding schemes of public works. In his opinion, it was "a

¹⁵⁵Lansdowne to Cross, 18 Oct. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 112-15, Cross Papers/29, No. 97.

¹⁵⁶IFP/3969, Jan. 1891, Cons. 7-8, p.4.

¹⁵⁷Lawrence to Ardagh, 15 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 44-47.

¹⁵⁸Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Ch. III, PSLEI/66, p.767.

¹⁵⁹Lawrence to Ardagh, 15 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 44-47.

case of lace ruffles without a shirt".¹⁶⁰

Not that the other reform measures came altogether to a stand-still. The initial difficulties were gradually got over, and with the lapse of time the state of uncertainty passed away. Nisbet was aware that change of residents had hitherto created much confusion in the State.¹⁶¹ He was therefore particularly anxious that there should be "no interruption in the progress of good work in Kashmir", and assured the Viceroy that his successor would be confronted with "no arrears".¹⁶² With Prideaux's arrival things began to assume their normal form, and before the official year was out creditable progress was recorded in some of the departments, though not all.

With Lansdowne's definition of the policy of the Government of India in regard to the Kashmir army the controversy between Melliss and Chamberlain was over. Thereafter these officers quietly carried out their respective functions, and some progress was made in 1890-91. Two infantry regiments were transferred in the course of the year to the Imperial Service Corps, and necessary reductions

¹⁶⁰ Lawrence to Ardagh, 11 July 1890, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

¹⁶¹ Nisbet to Lansdowne, 14 Aug. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 111-13.

¹⁶² Nisbet to Lansdowne, 13 Oct. 1890, Ibid., p. 252(c).

were made in the regular forces of the Darbar without arousing any discontent among the discharged officers and men.¹⁶³ This resulted in a considerable saving to the State, but even then, the financial capacity of the State was at such a low ebb that progress in training and equipping the corps was necessarily slow. In fact, as Melliss reported, the Kashmir troops in both these respects were still far behind the other Imperial Service regiments in India. If the financial weakness of the State retarded the progress in equipment, the backwardness of the army in training was partly "due to the tardiness with which suggestions and advice were accepted by the Darbar". Mostly, however, it was due to the custom of granting three months' leave to each corps before it proceeded to Gilgit for duty, with the result

"that inspecting officers had had only half battalions to deal with during the greater part of the last two drill seasons" ¹⁶⁴

In spite of Lawrence's complaint against the Council, they afforded all possible help to his department, and by the end of the year the Settlement operations, as Lawrence wrote, had made satisfactory progress. Nine tahsils, including 1,386 villages, were practically surveyed, leaving only six tahsils in the Kashmir province

¹⁶³ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Chap. I., PSLEI/66, p. 767.

¹⁶⁴ Progress Report of Imperial Service troops by Melliss, June 1890-June 1891, PSLEI/63, p. 1280A.

for future measurement. Lawrence established three patwari¹⁶⁵ schools, a measure which, Prideaux hoped, would yield excellent results.¹⁶⁶ The reparation of old irrigation channels was undertaken to step up food production in the future, and this was unquestionably a step in the right direction.¹⁶⁷

One drawback in the system of administration by the Council had been their reliance upon the efficacy of circulars and orders rather than upon an accurate conception of the work to be done, based upon a first-hand knowledge of the conditions of the country and the people to which their circulars and orders were to apply. The departments under the charge of the Judicial Member exhibited this tendency in a great measure without due appreciation of the fact that the circulars were hardly intelligible to the State officials of the older school. Bhaḡ Ram complained of the illiteracy and unfitness of the subordinate members of the Judicial staff, but did not indicate if any serious attempt had been made by him or the Council to grapple with the abuses. Besides, unreasonable delay in the disposal of important cases occasionally occurred, and even political considerations were sometimes permitted to interfere with the

¹⁶⁵ A patwari was a native assistant in the Settlement department whose duty was to help in the work of survey.

¹⁶⁶ Resident to India, 26 Nov. 1891, PSLEI/66, p. 757.

¹⁶⁷ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Chapter III, PSLEI/66, p. 767.

due discharge of the functions of the Judges.¹⁶⁸

An incident which considerably discredited the Judicial Department in the eyes of the Government of India was a serious outbreak in the Srinagar Jail on 4 August 1890. The riot had its genesis in the harsh treatment that the prisoners received at the hands of the Deputy Superintendent, Pandit Kashi Nath. The disturbance was made by a number of life prisoners who had latterly been transferred from the Jammu Jail. It assumed rather serious proportions when both the Superintendent and the Jailor were severely assaulted, and great exertions had to be made before it could be brought under control. After the tumult had subsided the offenders were removed, according to a Resolution of the Council, to Gujpat fort jail and kept under military guard.¹⁶⁹ The case was reported to the Government of India which expressed its displeasure at the state of things prevailing in the Srinagar Jail, and hoped that the Council would introduce reforms to improve its administration.¹⁷⁰ As a result, some attempt was made by the Council to place matters on a more satisfactory footing.¹⁷¹ The Judicial Member also made

¹⁶⁸ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Chapter IV, PSLEI/66, p. 767.

¹⁶⁹ Resident to India, 10 Sept. 1890, IFP/3740, Oct. 1890, Cons. 177 and its encls. (Cons. 178-79), pp. 237-40.

¹⁷⁰ India to Resident, 30 Sept. ^{1890,} Ibid., Cons. 180, p.240.

¹⁷¹ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Ch. IV, PSLEI/66, p. 767.

some efforts to improve the system of education which fell under his charge. As he reported, some progress was made in the shape of a few new schools.¹⁷² But Prideaux was cynical about what was done, and remarked that

"until a few typical schools have been examined by a Government Inspector it is impossible to say whether the improvement is apparent or real".¹⁷³

A piece of good work, however, which was done under the superintendence of the Judicial Member of the Council was the census of Kashmir and Jammu, undertaken for the first time in connection with the general census of the Indian Empire. In this work Bhag Ram was very ably assisted by Provincial Superintendents, Babu Rishibar Mukherjee and Pandit Jya Lal, the Chief Judges of Srinagar and Jammu respectively. Great credit was due to these officers for the excellent manner in which they performed their duties. Baines, the Census Commissioner, expressed his satisfaction at the quality of the work done by them, when he paid a visit to Jammu at the beginning of 1891. The total population of the State was found to be 2,527,710, of which 1,560,915 belonged to the Province of Jammu, and 9,66,795 to that of Kashmir.¹⁷⁴

In the Department of Public Works, the Jammu-Sialkot Railway,

¹⁷²Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Ch. IV, PSLEI/66, p.767.

¹⁷³Resident to India, 26 Nov. 1891, PSLEI/66, p. 757.

¹⁷⁴Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890/91, Chapter X, PSLEI/66, p. 767.

which had been opened for traffic just before the close of the last official year, proved to be a source of great convenience to the people of Jammu, and brought in a revenue slightly exceeding one per cent to the account of the 'Dharmarth' or State Charitable Fund, from which the funds for its construction were provided. The building of the Tawi Bridge made good progress, but owing to want of funds it was decided to erect a wire-rope bridge for foot and carriage-traffic, instead of the railway bridge which was originally contemplated. The abutments and piers were practically finished by the end of the year, with the exception of two wells in the pier nearest to the Jammu side of the river. The Jhelum Valley cart road was also opened for tonga traffic in the course of the year, and creditable progress was made in the construction of the Gilgit Road.¹⁷⁵ Before the end of 1890 about 40 miles of the road were very near completion. W. H. Johnson, the Executive Engineer for the road, made great exertions in surveying the whole distance to Gilgit, and submitted his proposals about the road and a bridge over the Indus at Bunji for consideration of the Council. The scheme was a comprehensive one, and after its adoption the completion of the road was a mere question of time.¹⁷⁶

In the Departments under the control of the General Member of

¹⁷⁵ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Chapter IX, PSLEI/66, p. 767.

¹⁷⁶ IFP/3962, April 1891, Cons. 1-10, pp. 1-13; IFP/4182, Feb. 1892, Cons. 33, pp. 16-18.

the Council, the Posts and Telegraphs showed an appreciable advance. The opening up of the Jhelum Valley Road to tonga traffic enabled the State to enter into an agreement with the British government, under which the latter undertook the conveyance of mails to Kashmir, and the vexatious levy of double postage on articles to and from British India was abolished. It was of course yet premature to judge the full effects of this measure, but it certainly marked a step forward in the direction of closer relations between the Kashmir State and the Indian Empire. In the organisation of the State Police, on the other hand, the improvements recorded in 1889-90 did not seem to have borne fruit. The enquiries, which were made into the causes of Sawal Singh's death in December 1890, revealed a highly discreditable state of things. Mohi-ud-din's attention was drawn to the matter and he undertook to remedy it.¹⁷⁷

Meantime, the Government of India had decided to send an expedition to the Black Mountain region which afforded the Maharaja an opportunity to exhibit his loyalty to the Indian Government. In March 1890, the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was invited to a proposal made by the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara that in order to reap the full benefit of the roads which were about to be made on the

¹⁷⁷ Sawal Singh was murdered on 18 December 1890 by some thirty men on Jammu-Aknur Road near Machlian village, about seven miles from Jammu. The case was investigated by the Head Superintendent of Police and tried by the Judicial Member of the Council, resulting in conviction of two out of fourteen persons sent up for trial. Complaints of torture and ill-treatment were made against the Police, which formed the subject of enquiry by a special commission appointed by the Council. Kashmir Admn. Report, 1890-91, Chap. XI, PSLEI/66, p. 767; Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), p.391, Resident to India, 19 December 1890.

Black Mountain, it should become a custom to preserve the peace of the border, to send a regiment at least once a year to march from Agror up to and along the crest of the mountain.¹⁷⁸ This proposal was subsequently supported by the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force and by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, and in August the Punjab Governor recommended that the march should take place in the following October.¹⁷⁹ The Government of India sanctioned this proposal and directed an expedition to be sent early in March 1891.¹⁸⁰ When this became known, Amar Singh, on behalf of the Kashmir Council, offered the services of the State forces in the ensuing expedition.¹⁸¹ Ram Singh sent a special message to Roberts for the same purpose, while the Maharaja surpassed both his brothers by offering to the Viceroy, in addition to his own services and that of his army, a sum of 10,000 rupees from his private funds.¹⁸² Chamberlain approved of the idea of employment of Kashmir troops in the coming expedition, while Prideaux thought that it would have "an excellent political

¹⁷⁸ India to Punjab, 27 March 1890, PFP/3620, April, 1890, Cons. 3.

¹⁷⁹ Punjab to India, 1 Aug. 1890, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S. 14 Jan. 1891, PSLEI/62, p.126.

¹⁸⁰ G.I. to S.S., 14 Jan. 1891, and Encl. 8, Viceroy to S.S., 5 Jan. 1891, Ibid., p. 125 and p. 153.

¹⁸¹ Amar Singh to Resident, 28 Jan. 1891, IFP/3962, Feb. 1891, Cons. 37, p.28.

¹⁸² Roberts to Ram Singh, 29 Jan. 1891, Roberts Papers/100/7, pp.101-02; Pratap Singh to Viceroy, 28 Jan. 1891, IFP/3962, Feb. 1891, Cons. 40, p.29.

effect".¹⁸³ But the Government of India did not consider it worth while to use the Kashmir troops on this occasion, and politely turned down the offer.¹⁸⁴

Even so, Pratap Singh continued to appeal to the Viceroy for his restoration to power,¹⁸⁵ and even approached Ardagh, Lansdowne's Private Secretary, to help him in his efforts.¹⁸⁶ In April 1891, he expressed a wish to Prideaux for an interview with the Viceroy at Simla or any other convenient place. The Resident saw no "obstacles of a political nature to the proposed interview"; he rather thought that "a few words of friendly advice from His Excellency's lips would have a very beneficial effect" upon the Maharaja.¹⁸⁷ Lansdowne was not disinclined to accede to Pratap's request, but he was doubtful as to the time "which would be most proper" for such a meeting. For certain reasons he was disposed to believe that it would be desirable to postpone the meeting till the next autumn. First, he thought that one of the Maharaja's objects would be to persuade him that the time had come when he might be restored wholly, or in part,

¹⁸³ Chamberlain to Resident, 28 Jan. 1891, IFP/3962, Cons. 38, pp. 28-29; Resident to India, 29 Jan. 1891, Ibid., Cons. 36, pp. 27-28.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., Cons. 35 and 41, p. 27 and p.30.

¹⁸⁵ Maharaja to Lansdowne, 3 Feb. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(e), pp. 114-15.

¹⁸⁶ Pratap Singh to Ardagh, 2 Feb. 1891, Ardagh Papers/Box 2.

¹⁸⁷ Prideaux to Ardagh, 27 April 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(e), pp.381-82.

to the powers of which he had been deprived two years ago. But in Lansdowne's opinion any consideration of the Maharaja's reinstatement ought to be preceded by a proper appraisal of the progress of reforms, because the object of the Government of India in accepting Pratap's abdication and placing the affairs of the State in the hands of a Council was to afford an opportunity for removing the abuses with which the Maharaja was not strong enough to deal. Prideaux was therefore asked to state his views in regard to the position of the reform measures with which the Council was then dealing, especially the financial condition of the State.¹⁸⁸

Apart from that there were two other matters which concerned the Maharaja more directly. One was the "mischievous" influence of the Maharaja's private servants on him; and the other his personal expenditure, which was out of all proportion to the income of the State. Lansdowne authorised Prideaux to mention these points to the Maharaja and impress upon him the necessity of abiding by the Viceroy's wishes, not only by mere promises or assurances, but by some measure of accomplishment. Lansdowne expressed his willingness to meet the Maharaja during his autumn tour, provided in the meantime Pratap should address himself seriously to carrying out his instructions.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸Lansdowne to Prideaux, 12 May 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(e), pp. 230-32.

¹⁸⁹Ibid.

Before the date for Lansdowne's visit to Kashmir was fixed, an important measure was taken to improve the financial administration of the State. As the Viceroy had apprehended, the Kashmir finances were not in proper condition, and that necessitated the deputation of an experienced English officer to enquire into the defects of the administration and suggest remedial measures. The Officer chosen was R. Logan, the Accountant General of Bombay, who arrived at Srinagar on 24 August 1891. He made a careful investigation into the general condition of the State, so far as it was affected by financial and revenue considerations, and formulated a series of proposals for adoption by the Council.¹⁹⁰ Pratap Singh had meanwhile become rather impatient to meet the Viceroy, and extended him frequent invitations to come to Kashmir.¹⁹¹ He felt assured when he learnt from the Pioneer of 5 September that the programme of the Viceroy's autumnal tour included Kashmir,¹⁹² and hoped that the Viceroy's visit would "bring redress to (his) wrongs".¹⁹³ Lansdowne decided to visit Kashmir in October,¹⁹⁴ but he was unwilling to commit himself to the Maharaja's

¹⁹⁰ Logan's Report on Kashmir, 25 November, 1891, Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 9 December 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1049-1132.

¹⁹¹ Maharaja to Lansdowne, 2 August 1891 and 15 August 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 57 and p. 86.

¹⁹² The Pioneer, 5 September 1891, p.1; Maharaja to Lansdowne, 10 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p.161.

¹⁹³ Maharaja to Prideaux, 13 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p.161.

¹⁹⁴ Lansdowne to Maharaja 14 Sept. 1891, Ibid., p.92.

restoration before he should have the opportunity to study the situation on the spot. Prideaux was accordingly advised to impress upon Pratap Singh that the Viceroy's impending visit did in no way bind the Indian Government to his restoration, which would exclusively depend upon his capacity to assure the continued good government of the State.¹⁹⁵ Personally, however, the Viceroy had made up his mind: even if the Maharaja were to be reinstated, he could never be given "a free hand" because

"he might use it in order to undo all that has been achieved up to the present time".¹⁹⁶

Upon his arrival in Kashmir on 23 October Lansdowne found "everything in order".¹⁹⁷ To acquaint himself with the situation in the State, he had several interviews with Prideaux, Chamberlain, Logan, and Pratap Singh and his brothers. At the State banquet given in his honour the Viceroy avoided committing himself prematurely with regard to the future government of the State.¹⁹⁸ But Prideaux suggested that the Maharaja could safely be restored to some portion of his former powers provided he unreservedly assented to the financial proposals of Logan, and promised to be guided by the Resident in all import-

¹⁹⁵ Lansdowne to Prideaux, 2 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), pp. 74-75.

¹⁹⁶ Lansdowne to Cross, 30 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 114-16, Cross Papers/31, No. 147A.

¹⁹⁷ Lansdowne to Cross, 25 Oct. 1891, Ibid., pp. 126-27, Cross Papers/31, No. 151.

¹⁹⁸ Encl. in Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, No. 52, Cross Papers/31.

ant matters. For Amar Singh's services during the interim period, the Resident advised that some recognition might be bestowed upon him in lieu of the loss of power that he would sustain in case of a change in the Kashmir administration.¹⁹⁹

Lansdowne's enquiries left him in no doubt that he ought to restore to the Maharaja "the greater part of his lost dignity without seriously imperilling the work of the Council,"²⁰⁰ He felt that

"whether the Maharaja ever meant to abdicate or not, we certainly 'jumped down his throat' very sharply, and the opportunity of setting the affairs of the State to rights was no doubt too good a one to be lost."²⁰¹

In fact, he was more "favourably impressed" by the Maharaja than he had expected, and had no doubt that Pratap, in spite of his weakness and extravagance, was "perfectly loyal" to the British Government. To Cross he wrote:

"I doubted at the time whether the letters which were attributed to him in 1889 were genuine, and what I have since heard strengthens my impression that they were either signed by him in ignorance of their contents, or were deliberate forgeries."²⁰²

Moreover, Lansdowne was struck by the fact that in spite of his abdication the Maharaja was "still a power in the State, and able, to

¹⁹⁹ Prideaux to Lansdowne, 26 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), pp. 248-53.

²⁰⁰ Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, No. 152, Cross Papers/31.

²⁰¹ Lansdowne to Hutchins (Sir P., Member, Viceroy's Council), 9 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), pp. 176-77.

²⁰² Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, Cross Papers/31, No.152.

some extent, to thwart the action of the Council." On the whole, he came to the conclusion that the time had come when a change should be made in the Kashmir administration, and he was glad to find that Prideaux was of the same opinion.²⁰³

The Viceroy, however, had already made up his mind that Pratap Singh must not be reinstated with full powers. He must agree to a reduction of his Civil List, and undertake not to disturb the reform measures, already adopted by the Council. With these intentions he invited Pratap Singh to an interview, and after discussion laid down the conditions of his reinstatement in the following manner:

that Pratap Singh would become the President of the State Council, with Amar Singh as Vice-President;

that the constitution of the Council would otherwise remain unchanged;

that all measures of reform approved by the Council would be accepted by the Maharaja, and the latter would make no effort to change them without the consent of the Government of India;

that all future differences of opinion between the Maharaja and the Council should be referred to the British Resident;

²⁰³Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, Cross Papers/31, No. 152.

that the administration would be guided in all matters by the British Resident; and

that the Maharaja's personal expenditure should be reduced to six lakhs of rupees a year.²⁰⁴

Pratap Singh accepted all other conditions without reserve, but appealed to the Viceroy to raise his Civil List by another 50,000 rupees a year. This request was acceded to, and Pratap Singh was formally restored to his lost dignity.²⁰⁵

The Kashmir Council accepted the new arrangement, and agreed to carry out all the recommendations of Logan for the improvement of the financial administration of the State which, inter alia, were:

the introduction of a proper system of audit and control, at first to be managed by a European Officer lent to the State;

the substitution of the payment of revenue in cash for payment in kind; and

the abolition of the worst abuses connected with the forced labour or 'begar' system.

Lansdowne warned the Council against the encouragement of intrigues in the future, and promised them all help in implementing the projected reforms.²⁰⁶ Amar Singh's loss of power, as Prideaux had sug-

²⁰⁴Lansdowne to Pratap Singh, 6 Nov. 1891, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 9 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1045-47; Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), pp. 162-65, (PSLEI/64).

²⁰⁵Encls. 3 and 4 in G.I. to S.S. 9 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1047-48; Viceroy to S.S. 7 Nov. 1891, PSHC/126, p. 495; Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 187.

²⁰⁶Logan's Report, 25 Nov. 1891, Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 9 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1049-1132.

gested, was amply compensated by the conferment of a Knighthood; shortly afterwards, the Maharaja was made a G.C.S.I.²⁰⁷

The resettlement of the Kashmir affairs afforded "the greatest satisfaction to all concerned and the people generally".²⁰⁸ Lansdowne was glad that he had been able to set things right in Kashmir.²⁰⁹ Roberts, as Pratap's sympathiser, was highly pleased at his restoration, and thought that the Maharaja's defects were due to his father's negligence.²¹⁰ Cross rightly hoped that Lansdowne's arrangement would work well,²¹¹ while Prideaux reported that everybody in the State was happy. Matters were progressing much more harmoniously than Prideaux had ventured to anticipate. The members of the Council were working together cordially, and there was "not the slightest friction between them and the Maharaja". Prideaux believed that the Maharaja's Presidency of the Council suited "their ideas of the fitness of things better than that of Raja Amar Singh,"²¹²

The result was seen in what Prideaux called a "marked improvement" in the internal administration of the State.²¹³ Under Chamberlain's

²⁰⁷ Encl. in Lansdowne to Cross, 20 April 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 43-48; The Pioneer, 10 Nov. 1891, p.1.

²⁰⁸ The Statesman and Friend of India, 14 Nov. 1891, p.4.

²⁰⁹ Viceroy to S.S., 7 Nov. 1891, PSHC/126, p.495.

²¹⁰ Roberts to Lansdowne, 15 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p.294.

²¹¹ Cross to Lansdowne, 19 & 26 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 86-87; S.S. to G.I. 8 Jan. 1892, PSDI/18, pp. 3-6.

²¹² Lansdowne to Cross, 9 March 1892, No. 170A, Cross Papers/32; also, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 26-28.

²¹³ Resident to India, 16 Oct. 1892, PSLEI/68, p.7.

guidance the training of the Kashmir Army continued satisfactorily, and the result was shown in the Hunza-Nagar campaign,²¹⁴ in which the Kashmir troops showed themselves not unworthy to fight shoulder to shoulder with their comrades in the British service. In January 1892 the Kashmir Imperial Service troops were brought up to their full strength by the incorporation of a sixth regiment of infantry.²¹⁵ According to Logan's recommendation, the Forest Department was re-organised under the supervision of J. C. McDonnell, Deputy Conservator of the Forests in the Punjab, whose services were lent to the Council.²¹⁶ In the Revenue Department a commencement was made towards effecting the reforms, recommended by Logan, by the appointment of a European Auditor-General,²¹⁷ while the Settlement operations, under Lawrence's supervision, made considerable progress. Four more tahsils were surveyed, and assessments were announced and distributed in three.²¹⁸ The result, as Prideaux observed, was that the peasantry, "in losing their liability to arbitrary and capricious exactions", were fast becoming "a prosperous and contented community".²¹⁹

²¹⁴Infra, Chap VII, p.369.

²¹⁵Kashmir Admn. Report, 1891-92, Chap. I, PSLEI/68, p.11.

²¹⁶India to Resident, 11 Aug. 1891, IFP/3964, August 1891, Cons. 100, p.82.

²¹⁷Kashmir Admn. Report, 1891-92, Chap. IV, PSLEI/68, p.11.

²¹⁸Ibid.

²¹⁹Resident to India, 16 Oct. 1892, PSLEI/68, p.7.

The Judicial Department, too, worked with ability. Prideaux was particularly satisfied with the working of the Chief Court of Srinagar which was presided over by Nilambar's brother, Rishibar Mookherjee.²²⁰ The administration of the Police was more satisfactory than in the preceding year, while the Jails were administered with credit by Doctors A. Mitra and Jagan Nath, the Officers respectively in charge of the Srinagar and Jammu Jails.²²¹ No original works of importance were carried out by the Public Works Department during 1891-92, but imperial considerations necessitated attention being paid to the Gilgit Road. With a view to the more speedy completion of that work, a contract for its execution within two years was entered into with Messrs. Spedding & Co., and considerable progress was recorded by the end of 1891. The bridge of the river Tawi was completed as a suspension bridge early in 1892, but the Indus bridge at Bunji could not be completed owing mainly to the delay in the receipt of the material from England.²²² On the whole, the work done by the Maharaja and the Council, though slow, was satisfactory. With an apathetic and indifferent people their task was a difficult one, and it was

²²⁰ Resident to India, 16 Oct. 1892, PSLEI/68, p.7.

²²¹ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1891-92, Chaps. V, VI, VII & XI, PSLEI/68, p.11.

²²² Ibid., Chap. X.

to their credit, as Prideaux observed, that they were able to advance in the path of reform.²²³

Side by side, the Council also took an interest in the mountain railway to Kashmir which, as already mentioned, was for long in view of the Indian Government.²²⁴ At their initiative surveys for the railway were made throughout 1891, but no decision could be reached as to the route to be adopted.²²⁵ Private entrepreneurs of course still continued to show their interest in the project,²²⁶ and strategists like Roberts considered it "very necessary" on military grounds,²²⁷ but to Lansdowne the prospects did not appear to be very hopeful.²²⁸ One of the Capitalist groups demanded a guaranteed interest of $3\frac{1}{2}$ or 4 per cent over the invested capital, and that too in sterling; but Lansdowne was prepared only to guarantee 2^o/o in silver.²²⁹ Another group proposed a contribution by the Kashmir Darbar of all the labour required for the con-

²²³Resident to India, 16 Oct. 1892, PSLEI/68, p.7.

²²⁴Supra, pp. 247-48.

²²⁵IPWP/3931, July 1891, No. 253, pp. 3322-23; Lansdowne to Public Works Secretary, 8 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 174; Lansdowne to Brackenbury, 10 Nov. 1891, Ibid., pp. 180-181.

²²⁶IFP/3964, August 1891, Cons. 73, pp. 65-66; IFP/4393, Feb. 1893, Cons. 21, pp. 71-72; IFP/4399, Oct. 1893, Cons. 8-24, pp. 27-57.

²²⁷Note by Roberts, 4 August 1890, Roberts Papers/96/2, pp. 687-88.

²²⁸Lansdowne to Brackenbury, 10 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), pp. 180-81.

²²⁹IPWP/3930, April 1891, Cons. 158-68, pp. 1495-99; IFP/3964, August 1891, Cons. 73-74, pp. 65-67.

struction of the railway, but Lansdowne did not consider that feasible.²³⁰ Actually, the negotiations for a mountain railway led nowhere, and the matter was consequently dropped.²³¹

Meanwhile, on 2 April 1892, the General Member of the Council, Ghulam Mohiuddin, died. At Prideaux's suggestion, his place on the Council was left vacant for some time,²³² and Bhag Ram was entrusted with the General Department, which was soon renamed the 'Home Department'.²³³ Even so, the improvement in the internal administration of the State, as the Resident reported, was "fairly maintained" during 1892-93. The administration was for a time somewhat disorganised owing to outbreak of fire and cholera in Srinagar but the Maharaja and the Members of the Council made "creditable endeavours"²³⁴ to fight the calamities. Before long substantial progress was recorded in almost all the departments of the State. Prideaux, however, did not remain long at the Residency to report on the success of the new administration. He proceeded on furlough in November 1892, and his place was filled by D.W.K.Barr, the Resident of Gwalior.²³⁵ About this time certain other changes in the personnel

²³⁰ IFP/4184, May 1892, Cons. 1-24, pp. 1-21. Lansdowne refused to consider the proposal presumably because the finances of the State did not allow at the time any investment by the Darbar in the shape of paid labour, whereas forced labour would have been contrary to the principle of reforms adopted by the Kashmir Council.

²³¹ IPWP/3931, July 1891, No. 253, pp. 3322-23, IFP/4398, Feb. 1893, Cons. 36, p.88; IFP/4399, Oct. 1893, Cons. 8-24, pp. 27-57.

²³² G.I. to S.S., 7 June 1892, PSLEI/66, p.755.

²³³ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1892-93, Chap.III, PSLEI/72, p.271.

²³⁴ Resident to India, 28 Oct. 1893, Ibid., p. 263.

²³⁵ IFP/4403, March 1893, Cons. 8-9, p.3.

of the Kashmir administration also took place. In October, General de Bourbel had to retire from the service of the State, and he was replaced by Charles Tickell, Under Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, in the Public Works Department.²³⁶ Still more important was the appointment of Muhammad Hyat Khan, a Divisional Judge of the Punjab to fill up the vacancy in the State Council created by Mohiuddin's death.²³⁷

All this went hand in hand with the progress of the reform measures, which was considered satisfactory by the new Resident. In the Military Department, the improvements in the administration and condition of the State forces were well-maintained. The efficiency of the Kashmir Imperial Service troops was again brought prominently to notice by the gallant behaviour of the 2nd Kashmir Rifles in the fighting at Chilas in March 1893.²³⁸ Efforts were made to complete the equipment of the Imperial Service Troops; but the Military Department was somewhat hampered by the want of funds, and progress was therefore necessarily slow.²³⁹ The working of the

²³⁶ IFP/4184, June 1892, Cons. 70-92, pp. 63-87; IFP/4185, Oct. 1892, Cons. 34-42, pp. 61-62; Kashmir Admn. Report, 1892-93, Chap. VI, PSLEI/72, p. 271.

²³⁷ G.I. to S.S. 5 April 1893, PSLEI/70, p.3.

²³⁸ Infra, Chap. VII, p. 394.

²³⁹ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1892-93, Chap. I, PSLEI/72, p.271.

Judicial Department continued to be satisfactory,²⁴⁰ and the Home Department was well-supervised, especially its Medical Branch. They did some excellent work during the cholera epidemic at Srinagar in the summer of 1892, and that won them the approbation of the Government of India.²⁴¹ Serious efforts were made by the Educational Department to extend primary education which yielded good results. Hitherto education had been popular only amongst the Hindus, but by 1893 large numbers of Muslim as well as Rajput students began to attend the State schools.²⁴²

The Settlement Department, in particular, performed a commendable task - thanks to Lawrence and his able assistant, Narsing Dass. According to the annual report of the State Council, four more tahsils were properly assessed, and even the reclamation of waste lands was taken in hand.²⁴³ Lawrence also took some effective steps to revive

²⁴⁰ Kashmir Admn. Report, 1892-93, Chap. XVIII, PSLEI/72, p. 271.

²⁴¹ Ibid., Chap. III.

²⁴² Ibid., Chap. V. Muslims being the majority in the State, and the Rajputs the predominant class, it was felt that they should be better educated, and encouraged to be so, as they were required to take part in the administration of the State. The initiative in this respect was taken by the Council.

²⁴³ Ibid., Chap. IV. Lawrence reported that waste lands were allotted to individuals, say 100 acres to each, and new settlers were thus encouraged to settle down on new lands. But to what extent this measure proved successful is not clear from the annual report of the Council. Bamzai writes that by 1893 the land settlement was completed by Lawrence, op.cit., p. 634.

the industry of sericulture,²⁴⁴ and as Burr reported, they showed "fairly satisfactory results".²⁴⁵

According to Prideaux's recommendations, the Public Works Department was reorganised during the year.²⁴⁶ The Gilgit and Jhelum Valley roads were made independent charges - the former road under Captain J. E. Cappar of the Royal Engineers whose services were lent to the Council by the Government of India,²⁴⁷ and the latter under Baines. The maintenance of the existing public works, and the preparation of plans and estimates for the future kept the department fully engaged throughout the official year, and no important original works were therefore begun or constructed.²⁴⁸

Admittedly, this progress was made possible by the exertions of the Maharaja and his Council. On the whole, they maintained cordial relations, and diligently discharged their duties to the State and its people. The new Resident bore testimony to their efforts which met with considerable success:

²⁴⁴Kashmir Admn. Report, 1892-93, Chap XV, PSLEI/72, p. 271.

²⁴⁵Resident to India, 28 Oct. 1893, Ibid., p. 263. Villagers seemed more willing to take to this industry than to any other except of course that of paddy cultivation.

²⁴⁶IFP/4184, June 1892, Cons. 70-92, pp. 63-87.

²⁴⁷IFP/4182, Oct. 1892, Cons. 28-62, pp. 15-28.

²⁴⁸Kashmir Administration Report, 1892-93, Chap. VI. PSLEI/72, p.271.

"The meetings of the Council have been held regularly and with praiseworthy punctuality. The relations between the Maharaja and the Members of the Council have been good, and the Maharaja, as President of the Council, has set a good example by devoting himself very earnestly to the duties of his important office; and while the administration has been fairly conducted in all its branches, the State Council have exercised a strong and, on the whole, judicious control over the government of the State."²⁴⁹

Before Lansdowne's retirement from the Viceregal office, Pratap Singh once again appealed for his complete restoration to what he called "the plenary powers that appertain to my rank and station."²⁵⁰ He claimed full credit for the reforms and improvement that were introduced in the administration of the State, and urged the Viceroy to "rescue" him from the indignity of partial restoration. But Lansdowne, though recognising Pratap Singh's share in carrying out reforms in the State, was yet unwilling to admit that all improvement was due alone to the Maharaja's efforts. In fact, he was still not convinced that the Maharaja was free from the influence of his evil advisers, and apprehended that a compliance with Pratap's request "would merely effect a transfer of power from the hands of responsible and experienced officers into those of worthless subordinates". Even so, he assured Pratap Singh that his

²⁴⁹ Resident to India, 28 Oct. 1893, PSLEI/72, p. 263. For the progress made, vide also, Bamzai, P.N.K. op.cit., pp. 633-37, Sufi, G.M.D., op.cit., pp. 811-15.

²⁵⁰ Pratap Singh to Lansdowne, 25 August 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(j), pp. 173-75.

successor to the Viceroyalty, and the Government of India, would continue to support him in any measures that might be best adapted for the good of his State and for the maintenance of his position and dignity.²⁵¹

²⁵¹Lansdowne to Pratap Singh, 30 Sept. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(j), pp. 177-78(a).

Chapter VI

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GILGIT AGENCY

(1881 - 1889)

As we have already seen, the Gilgit Agency had been withdrawn by Lord Ripon in 1881 because, in his opinion, Biddulph, the Political Agent at Gilgit, had failed through the inevitable difficulties of his situation to secure any influence over the neighbouring chiefships, or trustworthy information about affairs on the northern frontier of Kashmir. But the withdrawal was by no means considered final, and the Government of India reserved full discretion to send back an officer to Gilgit if that should be considered necessary. The Maharaja was further informed that his relations with the states on the northern frontier could not but be a matter of permanent concern to the Indian Government, and that therefore he would be expected to supply early and accurate information on the course of events throughout that region. Ripon availed himself of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agent to raise and strengthen the status of the Officer on Special Duty in Kashmir, and the Maharaja was asked to consult him on all matters affecting the relations of his state with any one of the adjoining chiefships.¹

¹Supra, Chapter I, pp.47-53.

Although Hartington approved of Ripon's measure,² there was a strong feeling at the India Office that the Amir of Afghanistan was disposed to bring some of the states and tribes on the Kashmir frontier under his influence - an attitude which could not be long ignored by the Government of India.³ For that reason the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agent was considered inexpedient; as Burne, the Secretary of the Political and Secret Department, remarked, it meant the removal of "a sentry from a vulnerable point of the Indian frontier".⁴ This sentiment found expression in Hartington's official despatch that sanctioned the measure adopted by Ripon's Government:

"..... it cannot be overlooked that the effect of the withdrawal of the agent may possibly be practically to close a valuable channel of information as to the course of events in the countries between Kashmir and Russian Turkestan, at a moment when such information is likely to be of particular interest, as well as to diminish in some degree your knowledge of the intrigues to which that part of the frontier is specially exposed In the event of the Maharaja failing to keep you informed of what is passing on his borders....., it might be necessary to reconsider the expediency of deputing an officer to Gilgit, at all events during the summer months."⁵

²Hartington to Ripon, 10 Dec. 1880, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS 43566 ff. 13-17; S.S. to G.I., 16 Sept. 1881, PSDI/7, pp. 339-44.

³I.O. Minute, Dec. 1881, PSDI/7, pp. 437-40, PSHC/48, pp. 747(a)-(b); also S.S. to G.I., 30 Dec. 1881, PSDI/7, pp. 473-77. In fact, in May 1881 Abdur Rahman had made overtures to Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, for a closer understanding between his state and the latter's. PFP/1625, July 1881, No. 51, pp. 946-47.

⁴PSDI/7, pp. 331-37.

⁵Ibid., pp. 339-44.

Evidently, the concluding part of the India Office despatch was based upon the suggestion of Ripon's Government to send back an officer to Gilgit in case of necessity. Curiously, this was not Ripon's private sentiment. In a demi-official letter to Hartington he demurred against the above passage in the India Office despatch, and hoped that the Secretary of State would never ask him to take recourse to such a measure:

"I am convinced that to send any one back there would be a mistake; the whole idea is a pure piece of Lyttonian policy."⁶

In fact, the policy that was underlined in the official despatch of the Government of India, sent home for the approval of the Secretary of State, was largely influenced by Lyall, Ripon's Foreign Secretary. No doubt, he approved of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agent, but recorded at the same time for the Viceroy's consideration that the measure was merely a temporary expedient, and its continuance would only depend upon the Maharaja's capacity to preserve the influence of the Indian Government in the regions beyond his northern frontiers.⁷

Not that Ripon was not aware of the limitations of his own policy. He was very much alive to the Afghan pretensions to suzer-

⁶Ripon to Hartington, 6 Oct. 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. II, p. 233.

⁷Note by Alfred Lyall, 13 June 1881, Ripon Papers/Add.MSS. 43575, ff. 44.

ainty over territories to the north-west of Kashmir. He was equally susceptible to the continuous advance of Russia in Central Asia to which Hartington had drawn his attention in August 1881.⁸ He himself doubted the ability of the Kashmir Darbar to control the remote and unruly tribes on their northern frontier,⁹ and frankly admitted that all his "admonitions" about the Kashmir State had not borne much fruit.¹⁰ Although, Abdur Rahman disavowed all his aggressive intentions on Chitral in July 1881,¹¹ some months later he reasserted his claims to suzerainty over Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral.¹² Ripon, of course, did not believe that the Amir, in view of his pre-occupations at home, would be of much trouble to Aman or the Maharaja.¹³ All the same, he warned Abdur Rahman that the British Government was bound by treaty obligations to recognise Kashmir's suzerainty over Chitral, and that therefore his

⁸Hartington to Ripon, 31 August 1881, Ripon Papers/Add.MSS. 43567, ff.61-66.

⁹G.I. to S.S., 25 August 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 949-52.

¹⁰Ripon to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. II, pp. 238-40.

¹¹Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 25 Aug. 1882, PSLEI/33, p. 966.

¹²Encl. 25, Ibid.

¹³Ripon to Hartington, 10 April 1882, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. III, pp. 84-87; K.W.s of March 1882, Add. MSS/43,576, ff. 235-37.

violation of Aman's territories would be considered by them an unfriendly act.¹⁴

Even so, Ripon was reluctant to follow a more active policy in relation to the tribes on the Kashmir border, such as was advocated by Colonel Waterfield, the Commissioner of Peshawar. Waterfield suggested the inclusion of the entire tribal belt to the east of Afghanistan within the sphere of British influence by declaring them independent of Kabul, and guaranteeing their independence.¹⁵ At about this time there was indeed a distinct feeling in the Indian Foreign Office that a uniform and active policy should be formulated with regard to the entire tribal belt along the north-west frontier.¹⁶ Ripon was prepared to recognise the independence of these tribes including those of Swat, Bajaur and Chitral, but he was very much averse to guaranteeing that independence.¹⁷ He apprehended that any direct interference with the tribes on the Kashmir frontier would arouse the suspicion of the Maharaja and encourage him to intrigue against the Indian Government.¹⁸ Rightly or wrongly,

¹⁴Note by Viceroy, 15 April 1882, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/8, Vol. V, p. 128; Ripon to Northbrook, 24 April 1882, *Ibid.*, 290/7, Vol. III, pp. 56-59; Ripon to Northbrook, 15 June 1882, *Ibid.*, No. 83, pp. 87-88; Encl. 30 in G.I. to S.S. 25 Aug. 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 983-84; Gopal, S. Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, p. 38.

¹⁵Encl. 41 in G.I. to S.S., 4 Aug. 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 562-68; Ripon to Hartington, 21 Aug. 1880, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. I, pp. 83-84.

¹⁶K.W. No. 1, Aug. 1882, Ripon Papers/Add. MSS. 43576, ff. 534-36.

¹⁷Ripon to Hartington, 21 Aug. 1881, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. II, pp. 83-84.

¹⁸Ripon to Hartington, 22 Oct. 1881, *Ibid.*, pp. 238-40.

Ripon felt that his policy of controlling the tribes on the north-west frontier of Kashmir through the Maharaja was "the only practicable policy" left open to his Government, and he hoped that eventually that policy would prove successful.¹⁹

Ripon's hopes, however, were not realised. The inability of the Maharaja to maintain his influence over the states on the Kashmir frontier was clearly demonstrated during the Hunza and Nagar disturbances of 1882.²⁰ Henvey, the Officer on Special Duty at the Kashmir Darbar, complained of the Maharaja's lack of frankness to keep him informed of the course of events beyond the northern frontier.²¹ The Darbar had agreed to do so at the time of the withdrawal of the Gilgit Agency, so that Henvey was instructed to remind the Maharaja of his obligations to "maintain constant watchfulness over events on the frontier", and to convey "the fullest and earliest information regarding all such matters".²² The right of information was claimed according to the conditions of the treaty of Amritsar, 1846,²³ and the Kashmir ruler was further

¹⁹G.I. to S.S., 25 August 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 949-52.

²⁰G.I. to S.S., 25 Sept. 1882, and enclosures, Ibid., pp. 1723-48.

²¹Henvey to Grant, 16 May 1882, Encl. 7 in Ibid., p. 1736.

²²Grant to Henvey, 11 July 1882, Encl. 11 in Ibid., pp. 1743-44.

²³According to the treaty (art. IX) the British Indian Government had undertaken to protect the state from foreign aggression, and was entitled to such information.

reminded that he had undertaken in 1881 to take no step in regard to his external relations without reference to the Officer on Special Duty.²⁴

In spite of Ripon's warnings to Abdur Rahman, that prince had not given up his claims to Chitral, and even tried to establish his suzerainty over the neighbouring chiefships of Bajaur, Swat and Dir.²⁵ But the British Government had never recognised the pretensions of the Afghan Amir to these territories, and although Abdur Rahman denied all aggressive intentions on his part,²⁶ there was a strong feeling at the India Office that Ripon's Government should be urged to warn the Afghan ruler again in a very clear language.²⁷ Kimberley did so,²⁸ and in compliance with his instructions, Ripon warned the Amir once more that Bajaur, Swat and Dir, like Chitral, were regarded by the Government of India "as being beyond the proper limits of Afghan influence".²⁹ But this did not seem to have produced any effect upon Abdur Rahman. Reports received in the last

²⁴Encl. 12 and 13 in G.I. to S.S., 25 Sept. 1882, PSLEI/33, pp. 1744-48.

²⁵PCD, 1 July 1883, 17 July 1883, and 1 August 1883, PSLEI/37, p.311, 649, and 1007; Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 8 Jan. 1884, PCD, 31 Jan. 1884, MINWF, January 1884, PSLEI/39, pp. 127-28, p. 1198 and pp. 765-68.

²⁶MINWF, Jan. 1884, PSLEI/39, pp. 765-68; Kabul Agent to India, 18 Dec. 1883, Ibid., p. 333.

²⁷I.O. Minute, Oct. 1883, PSHC/59, pp. 599-600.

²⁸Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 18 Oct. 1883, Ibid. p. 601, S.S. to G.I., 16 Nov. 1883, PSDI/9, pp. 121-24.

²⁹G.I. to S.S., 8 Jan. 1884, PSLEI/39, p. 123, and encl. 18 in Ibid., p. 160.

year of Ripon's Viceroyalty were full of Afghan intrigues in these states.³⁰ Rumours were even rife that the Amir intended to annex Swat and Bajaur, and extend his influence right up to Gilgit.³¹ Aman-ul-Mulk was very apprehensive of the Amir's proceedings, and asked more than once for British protection against him, as well as for the deputation of a British Agent to Chitral.³²

Even more important than the Afghan intrigues was the steady advance of Russia in Central Asia that urged upon the consideration of Ripon's Government the question of defence of the northern frontier. The continuous drive of the Russian armies towards the Oxus and the northern frontier of Afghanistan had for long been a source of anxiety to British statesmen. The pressure was not relaxed in the early eighties. Russian engineers surveyed the region between Sarakhs and the Herat frontier,³³ and Russian agents visited Merv.³⁴ It was reported from St. Petersburg that there was a project to connect the Caspian with the

³⁰MINWF, March 1884, PSLEI/40, p. 91; also, Ibid., pp. 379, 971 and 985; Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S., 1 Aug. 1884, PSLEI/41, p. 601.

³¹PCD, 19 Dec. 1884, PSLEI/43, p. 75; Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S., 1 August, 1884, PSLEI/41, p. 597.

³²G.I. to S.S., 29 Aug. 1884, and Encls. 6 and 12, PSLEI/41, pp. 1083-90; PCD, 10 Nov. 1884, PSLEI/42, p. 859.

³³Tel. Thompson to Ripon, 30 Oct. 1882, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/8, Vol. VI, No. 331, p. 259.

³⁴Tel. Thompson to Ripon, 27 Nov. 1882, Ibid., No. 354, p. 285.

Russian possessions on the Upper Oxus by a light railway.³⁵ Before long Russian travellers visited even the Alichur and the Great Pamirs.³⁶ In the face of the increasing activities of Russia both the Home and the Indian Governments began to consider measures to check her. A Russian advance to Merv was expected and to forestall this, Hartington suggested its occupation by Persia.³⁷ But both Ripon and his Council were opposed to such an idea. Ripon thought "that it must have issued from the same mint as that which produced Salisbury's famous plan for giving Herat to Persia".³⁸ He saw no harm in Russian occupation of Merv, and proposed a treaty with that power binding her not to interfere in Afghanistan.³⁹ The matter was discussed in the British Cabinet and rejected; in fact, the authorities at Whitehall failed to arrive at a definite policy on Central

³⁵ Encl. in Kennedy to Granville, 12 Sept. 1883, PSHC/59, p. 363.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 688.

³⁷ Hartington to Ripon, 3 March 1882, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. III, pp. 26-27.

³⁸ Ripon to Hartington, 3 Feb. 1882, Ibid., p. 27, 17 Feb. 1882, Ibid., pp. 34-35, 24 Feb. 1882, Ibid., pp. 43-46. For the scheme of handing over Herat to Persia, Ghose, D.K. op.cit., Chap. III.

³⁹ Memo. of Ripon, 2 Sept. 1881, Encl. with letter to Hartington of the same date, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. II, No. 43, pp. 196-97; Ripon to Hartington, 3 Nov. 1881, Ibid. No. 57, pp. 248-52; Ripon to Hartington, 20 June 1882, Ripon Papers/I.S. 290/5, Vol. III, pp. 143-48; Wolf, L. Life of Lord Ripon, II, p. 61. The Indian Foreign Office was in complete agreement with the Viceroy in respect of a treaty with Russia. So was Lyall. Durand, H.M. Life of Sir Alfred Lyall, p. 289.

Asia. The result was that the Russian advance continued unabated, and in February 1884 Merv fell to the Czar. This suddenly awakened all concerned to the necessity of active preparations. Ripon even considered measures that would be necessary in case of a war. Eventually, however, an agreement was reached with Russia for the delimitation of the Afghan frontier, and the tension subsided for the time being.⁴⁰

If Ripon failed to cope with the intrigues of Abdur Rahman and obtain a treaty with Russia, he took a definite measure as part of his scheme of imperial defence. That, as already mentioned, was his decision to appoint a permanent British Resident in Kashmir. Of course, the measure was dictated as much by imperial considerations as by internal maladministration in the state.⁴¹ Yet, indeed, "the increasing importance to the Government of India of watching events beyond the North-Western frontier of Kashmir" forced the liberal Viceroy to suggest a measure which, when adopted, caused greater indignation to the Kashmir ruler than that produced by Lytton's Agency at Gilgit.⁴²

Towards Afghanistan Dufferin followed the same policy as Ripon had done.⁴³ He agreed with Aitchison and Lyall that the Amir's preten-

⁴⁰Gopal, S. op.cit., pp. 35-38; Ghose, D.K. op.cit., p. 141.

⁴¹Supra, Chap. I, pp. 58-59.

⁴²Supra, Chap. II, pp. 64, 67-68.

⁴³Dufferin to Northbrook, 25 January 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 18-19.

sions to suzerainty over territories like Swat and Bajaur must be withstood.⁴⁴ Although Kimberley, the Secretary of State for India, shared Dufferin's views in this respect, he enquired of the Viceroy at the time of the Rawalpindi Conference whether the territories in question could be given to Abdur Rahman as a gift, provided he agreed to meet the wishes of the British Government in regard to the general settlement of the Afghan frontier.⁴⁵ Dufferin was willing to consider this,⁴⁶ but Aitchison, the Punjab Governor, was strongly opposed to it. He considered that no territory that outflanked Peshawar could be left in the Amir's possession, lest the security of the entire valley be endangered.⁴⁷ Fortunately, the question was not raised by the Amir at Rawalpindi, and the matter was consequently dropped without any discussion.⁴⁸ But Abdur Rahman tried to exploit his meeting with the Viceroy both on his way back home and afterwards. He wrote and talked as if Dufferin had given him a blank cheque in Swat and Bajaur.⁴⁹ This annoyed the

⁴⁴Dufferin to Kimberley, 23 December 1884. Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, pp. 3-6.

⁴⁵Kimberley to Dufferin, 6 March 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 32.

⁴⁶Dufferin to Kimberley, 30 March 1886, Ibid., p.89.

⁴⁷Ibid.; Aitchison to Dufferin, 4 Jan. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, pp. 37-41.

⁴⁸For the account of the Rawalpindi Conference, Dufferin to Kimberley, 5 April 1885, Ibid., pp. 90-96.

⁴⁹MINWF, June 1885, PSLEI/44, p. 1112; PCD, 16 June 1885, Ibid. , pp. 1070-71.

tribes, and by the middle of 1885 the Chiefs of these states along with that of Dir offered their allegiance to the Indian Government, and appealed for its protection against Abdur Rahman.⁵⁰ Dufferin, true to Ripon's policy,⁵¹ recognised their independence, but refused to guarantee it except by way of a mild warning to the Amir.⁵²

If the Afghan intrigues on the Kashmir frontiers continued to be a source of trouble to the Indian Government, the steady expansion of Russian Power in Central Asia soon led to a serious reconsideration of the question of imperial defence. With the so-called Panjdeh crisis in March 1885 the agreement between England and Russia, which Ripon had obtained for a settlement of the Afghan boundary, almost reached breaking point. A war seemed imminent between the two European powers. Dufferin was not prepared to ignore the "Russian challenge", and "ordered all preparations to be conducted as quietly as possible".⁵³ Donald Stewart⁵⁴ was asked to be ready

⁵⁰ MINWF, May 1885, *Ibid.*, p. 659; MINWF, June 1885, *Ibid.*, p. 1112; PFP/2473, July 1885, Cons. 17 and enclosures, pp. 213-14.

⁵¹ Dufferin to Ripon, 2 July 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 138-42.

⁵² Dufferin to Churchill, 28 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, pp. 224-25. In June 1885, the new British Agent at Kabul was asked to warn the Amir that Afghan intrigues on the Kashmir frontier would not be tolerated.

⁵³ Dufferin to Kimberley, 6 April 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 99.

⁵⁴ The Commander-in-Chief of India.

"to take the chief command" in any emergency.⁵⁵ Fortunately, the war was averted, as the Panjdeh issue was submitted to arbitration. But the preparations for war were pushed forward by the Indian Government.⁵⁶ In fact, a feeling gradually gained ground that the settlement with Russia over the Panjdeh issue was just a truce which merely afforded a "breathing time" to both the powers.⁵⁷ This was also Kimberley's view. To Dufferin he wrote:

".....whatever smooth things Russian diplomatists may say, ... we must look to our own defence, and not trust to any assurances or paper securities against designs which are now scarcely, if at all, disguised. Russia is above all things military, and the military party in Russia mean mischief."⁵⁸

Dufferin agreed with him,⁵⁹ and appointed a Committee⁶⁰ in order to

⁵⁵Dufferin to Kimberley, 6 April 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, pp.101-02.

⁵⁶Dufferin to Churchill, 12 Oct. 1885, Ibid., p. 235.

⁵⁷Ibid.; also, Napier of Magdala to Dufferin, 1 Oct. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 112-13; from W.H.White, Asst. Director of the Central Department of the Admiralty, Encl. in 16(a), Ibid., pp.14(a)-(b).

⁵⁸Kimberley to Dufferin, 6 March 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p.32.

⁵⁹Dufferin to Kimberley, 30 March 1885, Ibid., p.89.

⁶⁰The Defence Committee consisted of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart (and after Stewart's retirement in November 1885, Sir Frederick Roberts), Sir George Chesney, the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council, Sir Charles Macgregor, Quarter Master General, Major-General Edwin Collen, the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, and Major (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel) W.G.Nicholson, R.E., as Secretary. Roberts writes that it also consisted of the heads of Departments with the Government of India and at Army Head Quarters. Forty-one Years in India, Vol. II, p. 424.

determine upon "a complete and thorough plan" for the defence of the north-west frontier. Simultaneously, he sent Colonel Lockhart⁶¹ on an expedition via Gilgit and Chitral to explore the passes of the Hindu Kush, and another mission to Chinese Turkestan under Ney Elias⁶² for a similar purpose.⁶³

The Defence Committee recommended, inter alia, that precautions should be taken to meet, or forestall, an isolated attack upon Kashmir. With that end in view, they strongly pressed that the road already in course of construction between Rawalpindi and Srinagar should be completed as a good cart road without delay, and that it should be extended from Srinagar to Gilgit and Chitral as a cart road as far as practicable, and onward as a good mule road.⁶⁴ Dufferin shared the view of his military experts that the road was necessary, and recommended the measure to the Home Government.⁶⁵ About the same time the Viceroy also considered the desirability of establishing a British cantonment in Kashmir. On that point he consulted Roberts, who had meantime succeeded Stewart

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⁶¹Deputy Quarter Master General in the Intelligence Branch at headquarters in India, 1880-85. Commander-in-Chief in India in 1898.

⁶²Explorer, author and diplomatist. Commissioned by the Government of India for various journeys in Asia for exploration. He was a F.R.G.S. Retired from service in 1896.

⁶³Dufferin to Kimberley, 29 May 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p.139; Durand, A.G. The Making of a Frontier, p.4.

⁶⁴Memo. of the Defence Committee, 2 June 1885, PSHC/81, pp. 975-80.

⁶⁵G.I. to S.S., 10 July 1885, Ibid, pp. 967-74.

as the Commander-in-Chief in India. Roberts at first welcomed the idea, but on second thoughts expressed his doubts about the wisdom and necessity of the proposal "from a purely military point of view". He thought that unless further exploration showed that the Kashmir frontier was easily assailable from the north, it would be advisable, especially in view of the opposition of the Kashmir Darbar,⁶⁶ not to station British troops in the valley. He of course admitted that he was not aware of the necessity of such a measure on political grounds, "which would outweigh" all other considerations.⁶⁷ Similar doubts were expressed about the value of the Punjab-Kashmir road beyond Srinagar when the recommendations of the Defence Committee were examined by a joint War and India Office Committee in London.⁶⁸ The net result was that in October 1885, the

⁶⁶Supra, Chap. II, pp. 77-80.

⁶⁷Chamberlain to Durand, 3 Jan. 1886, Roberts Papers/R98/1, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁸W.O. 32/263/40233; also, Greaves, R. Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-92, p. 38. The Committee met under the direction of Lord Randolph Churchill, the Secretary of State for India. It was composed of: President: Lt. General Sir A. Alison, Adjutant General to the Forces; Members: Lt. General Sir C.H. Brownlow, Asst. Mili. Secy. (for Indian affairs), Major General A.B. Johnson, Mili. Secy., Council of India, Col. E.F. Chapman, Royal Bengal Artillery, A.D.C. (to the Queen); Secretary: Capt. G.W. Addison, Royal Engineers. The Committee concurred in the completion of the road between Rawalpindi and Srinagar, but from a purely military point of view, it seemed to them of doubtful advantage to continue the road beyond Srinagar.

Secretary of State for India enquired of the Viceroy whether it was on military or political grounds that he recommended the proposal.⁶⁹

To be able to suggest a definite course of action Dufferin submitted the report of the Defence Committee for the opinion of his new Commander-in-Chief, and Charles Macgregor,⁷⁰ the Quarter-Master-General in India. Roberts agreed with the recommendation of the Defence Committee that adequate precautions ought to be taken to meet or forestall an attack upon Kashmir. For that purpose he suggested that "we should have political control over the country round Chitral and Gilgit in order to secure the approaches to the former by the Dora Pass, and to the latter through Wakhan".⁷¹ Both Macgregor and he recognised the importance of the Rawalpindi-Kashmir road, and urged its early completion. Roberts approved of the road being pushed towards Chitral; Macgregor suggested that it should at least be continued to Gilgit. Evidently, both of them stressed the strategic importance of both Gilgit and Chitral in any scheme of Indian defence, and in so doing Roberts certainly deviated from his early opinion on the subject. Macgregor even urged that the passes

⁶⁹S.S. to G.I., 15 Oct. 1885, PSHC/81, pp. 961-64.

⁷⁰Major-General Sir Charles Macgregor, the famous soldier who served in the Second Afghan War and was in charge of the Enquiry Commission set up after the assassination of Louis Cavagnari. Supra, Chap I, p.45.

⁷¹Note by Roberts, 22 June 1886, Roberts Papers/96/1, pp. 89-101.

of the Hindu Kush into Chitral should be prepared for defence by field works.⁷² Strengthened again by the views of his military advisers, Dufferin urged upon the Home Government the necessity of completing the Kashmir road up to Chitral on military grounds:

"In view of the strategical importance of Gilgit, and to a lesser degree of Chitral, we consider that the original proposals should be adhered to, and carried out with as little delay as possible."⁷³

Upon this representation, the Secretary of State for India sanctioned the road, but only up to Gilgit for the time being.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, Colonel Lockhart, accompanied by Colonel Woodthorpe of the Survey of India, Captain Barrow, the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Surgeon G.M.Giles of the Indian Medical Department, and an escort of 21 men,⁷⁵ had travelled north of the Kashmir frontiers, and explored the passes of the Hindu Kush. Lockhart's instructions were, first, to obtain full information regarding Chitral and the neighbouring districts, including of course the routes and passes leading through and from it. Secondly, he was asked to

⁷²Note by Macgregor, 23 May 1885, PSM/A117.

⁷³G.I. to S.S., 4.10.86, PFP/2923, April 1887, Frontier A, Cons. 1.

⁷⁴S.S. to G.I., 27 Jan. 1887, Ibid., Cons. 2.

⁷⁵Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 28 August 1885, PSLEI/45, pp. 404-05.

penetrate into Kafiristan, and explore it thoroughly, with the object of gaining the goodwill of the inhabitants of that country, and securing all possible information regarding the passes leading from Kafiristan across the Hindu Kush.⁷⁶ In the summer of 1885 the Mission travelled via Gilgit and Chitral up to the Dora Pass, and tried "to penetrate and explore Kafiristan". But the Kafirs obstructed their passage so that the party was obliged to return to Gilgit via Chitral.⁷⁷ In April 1886, the party visited Hunza and the Kilik Pass and travelled up to the Tagdumbash and Little Pamirs. They explored the northern approach to the Baroghil, and then made another attempt to penetrate into Kafiristan. The Amir had earlier given permission to the party to travel through his territories in Badakshan, but subsequently withdrew it, in spite of Dufferin's request to the contrary, with the result that the Mission was stopped at Kila Panja by its governor.⁷⁸ This gave rise to rumours of the detention of Lockhart's party at Badakshan, and questions were even asked in the House of Commons.⁷⁹ As the rumours

⁷⁶Cunningham to Lockhart, 6 June 1885, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 28 August 1885, PSLEI/45, pp. 403-04; Black, C.E.D. op.cit., p. 243.

⁷⁷Viceroy to S.S., 22 May 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p. 199; MINWF, Nov. 1885, PSLEI/45, pp. 1487-92.

⁷⁸Viceroy to S.S., 19 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p.212; Encl.15 in G.I. to S.S. 30 June 1886, PSLEI/47, pp. 1015-29; MINWF, May 1886, Ibid., p. 332; Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p.180.

⁷⁹Hansard, Third Series, CCCVII, 21 June 1886, Cols. 59-60; also, Tel. from S.S. to Viceroy, 18 June 1886, PSHC/87, p. 499, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p.188.

spread the Russians became suspicious of the Mission, and anxious enquiries were made at the British embassy at St. Petersburg regarding its objects.⁸⁰ In the face of Russia's annoyance and the Amir's refusal to allow the Mission a passage through his territories, the Secretary of State for India asked Dufferin to consider the advisability of withdrawing the expedition.⁸¹ Meanwhile, at Roberts' suggestion, it had been decided to appoint Lockhart to act as Quarter Master General in place of General Chapman, who went on sick leave.⁸² On July 19, Lockhart returned to Gilgit via the Dora Pass and Chitral, and then left for Simla. His party under Colonel Woodthorpe was joined by Ney Elias at Zebak, and followed him back to India.⁸³

Lockhart demonstrated that the Baroghil Pass, which had hitherto been considered to be "the easiest avenue to Gilgit", did not really lead to that place or anywhere else "by any practicable route for pack animals". The easiest route to Chitral from the side of Badakshan was the Dora Pass which was about 14,800 feet high. Even then the difficulties of the routes south of the passes were such that

⁸⁰S.S. to G.I. 21 May 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p. 183, Morier to Rosebery, 20 June 1886, and 10 July 1886, PSHC/87, pp. 423 and 1209.

⁸¹S.S. to G.I., 26 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p.190.

⁸²Roberts to Dufferin, 12 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, p.454; also, Encl. 11 in G.I. to S.S., 30 July 1886, PSLEI/47, p.1025; Viceroy to S.S., 19 June 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p. 212.

⁸³MINWF, July 1886, PSLEI/47, pp. 1125-32, Viceroy to S.S., 26 July 1886, PSHC/87, p.1293.

Lockhart came to the conclusion

"that without unlimited time and unlimited labour resources the feat of crossing an army over the section of the Hindu Kush visited by myself was an impossibility".

He of course admitted that small bands of troops could come across the mountain barriers during two brief periods in spring and autumn, but he thought that this would not seriously threaten the security of the northern frontiers. In his opinion, the danger was not really one of invasion, but of mischief, which was likely to be caused by the appearance of lightly armed troops coming across the Hindu Kush. It was to encounter this mischief that Lockhart suggested the establishment of a British Agency at Gilgit, and hoped that with an Agent of "the proper stamp" there would be no danger in that quarter.⁸⁴

For Chitral he recommended the appointment of a native agent to ensure the continued loyalty of the Mehtar.⁸⁵ For the defence of that place he suggested the construction of a military road from Peshawar through Dir and Chitral to the Dora Pass, and the enlistment of a mobile scout force for blocking the passes in an emergency.⁸⁶ This force was to be supported by an artillery battery from the Punjab and nineteen British officers. The defence of Gilgit, on the other hand, should be assumed by the Government of India and no Kash-

⁸⁴Lockhart's note on the Hindu Kush Passes, 9 March 1888, PSM/A79.

⁸⁵Lockhart and Woodthorpe, Gilgit Mission, p. 276 and p. 348, cited by Alder, J.G. British Policy on the Roof of the World, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bristol 1959.

⁸⁶Ibid., p.109.

mir troops ought to be employed there.⁸⁷

If Lockhart stressed the importance of Gilgit as the defensive nucleus of Dardistan and suggested that the ruler of Chitral should be controlled by the British Agent, Elias had no faith either in Aman-ul-Mulk's loyalty to the British, or in his capacity to check the Russians:

"It is obvious, from a political point of view, that any measure for obtaining a grip on Chitral and the approach from Badakshan, must be undertaken from the Punjab and not from Gilgit."⁸⁸

Dufferin's Government, however, took no notice of Elias' opinion, and Lockhart's scheme was rejected on financial grounds.⁸⁹

In spite of Dufferin's warning to Abdur Rahman, the Amir had meanwhile continued to intrigue with the tribal chiefships on the Kashmir frontier. Reports of his intention to annex Bajaur, Swat, Dir and the Shinwari country were frequently received at Peshawar.⁹⁰ Although the Amir was apprehensive that the Russians were in league with Ishak Khan, his governor at Turkistan, and even talked of a quadruple alliance between Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, and England to fight Russia, his activities all along the Kashmir and Chitral

⁸⁷ Lockhart and Woodthorpe, op.cit., pp. 275-80.

⁸⁸ Elias, N. Report of a Mission, p. 102; Alder, J.G. op.cit.

⁸⁹ G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), p. 547; Durand, A.G. op.cit., p.119.

⁹⁰ MINWF, June 1886, PSLEI/47, p.844; PCD, 12 Oct. 1886, PSLEI/48, pp.823-31; MINWF, March 1887, PSLEI/49, pp. 1275-96.

were never relaxed.⁹¹ In August 1886, it was reported that the Amir was taking measures to annex to Kunar some of the passes held by independent tribes with a view to facilitating an advance upon Kafiristan, Chitral and Bajaur.⁹² In short, the Afghan menace continued to grow, and this so ~~far~~ frightened the independent Chiefships that Aman-ul-Mulk pressed hard for a treaty with the British Government, and was anxious to receive a resident British Officer at Chitral.⁹³ The rulers of Dir and Jandol were unnerved by the Amir's proclaimed intentions against Swat and Bajaur, and made friendly overtures to the British Government for protection against him.⁹⁴ Dufferin was still unwilling to extend the liability of his Government in regard to the frontier Chiefships. But a reconsideration of the tribal policy of the Government of India could not be long postponed owing to more serious developments in other quarters.

While the Indian authorities were engaged in considering the problem of defence against Russia's aggression, reports were received of her intrigues along the Kashmir frontier.⁹⁵ There was even a strong opinion in Peshawar that the Russians were contemplating an

⁹¹PCD, 23 July 1886, PSLEI/47, pp. 1185-97; Newsletter from the British Agent at Kabul, 3 August 1886, Ibid., pp. 1427-34; MINWF, October 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 985-93; MINWF, July 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1637-40.

⁹²PCD, 26 August 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 73-80; PCD, 14 April 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 249-52.

⁹³MINWF, June 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1229-45.

⁹⁴Ibid., also PFP/2700, June 1886, Frontier B, Cons. 7-11.

⁹⁵A.O.Hume to Dufferin, 16 June 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, pp. 324-25; MINWF, May 1885, PSLEI/44, p.660; PCD, 8 May 1885, Ibid., p.585.

advance by the Baroghil pass to occupy Yasin, and that the rulers of Chitral and Yarkand had concluded an alliance with Russia.⁹⁶ All this might not have been true, but there indeed was a possibility of war between England and Russia in the middle of 1885. A deadlock was reached in the negotiations for the Afghan frontier, and there was a marked preparedness on both sides for an outbreak of hostilities.⁹⁷ The war clouds, of course, soon receded,⁹⁸ but the Russian intrigues in Central Asia continued unceasingly.⁹⁹ Kimberley,¹⁰⁰ and after him Cross,¹⁰¹ was anxious on this account, and drew Dufferin's attention to Russia's misdemeanour. But, personally, the Viceroy did not believe that the Russians at the moment were engaged in intrigues against the Indian Government. He thought Russia's hands were too full with Bulgarian affairs to allow her to

⁹⁶PCD, 31 May 1885, PSLEI/44, p. 864.

⁹⁷Ghose, D.K. op.cit., pp. 203-04. Compare what Durand wrote to Roberts (14.6.85): "We have fallen upon troublous times, and have at present very bad cards to play. Whenever Russia chooses to trouble us she can do so." Roberts Papers/Box File DI, No. R26/1.

⁹⁸Ghose, D.K. op.cit., pp. 204-05.

⁹⁹PCD, 5 Sept. 1885, PSLEI/45, p.754.

¹⁰⁰Dufferin to Cross, 16 Nov. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p. 228; Kimberley to Dufferin, 9 July 1886, Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁰¹Cross to Dufferin, 6 Oct. 1886, Ibid., p. 105.

make a war in Central Asia.¹⁰²

Even so, Dufferin agreed with Cross that China would always be "a powerful factor" in any dispute with Russia,¹⁰³ and even seriously considered a Chinese alliance against her.¹⁰⁴ In fact, when the Panjdeh crisis seriously threatened the peace in Central Asia, and the relations between England and Russia considerably deteriorated, China showed an inclination to come closer to England. She was annoyed on account of Kashgar and Korea, the security of which seemed threatened by Russian proceedings in those regions. The Governor of Singapore was approached by the Chinese for an alliance with England against Russia,¹⁰⁵ and but for the Burmese embroglio Dufferin would have perhaps considered the proposal at that stage. However, with the Burmese question seemingly settled in 1886, he thought that

"the time has come for the Government of India seriously to consider the best means of improving its relations with China, and of paving the way for obtaining her cooperation in the event of a war with Russia!"¹⁰⁶

¹⁰²Dufferin to Churchill, 5 January 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, pp. 2-3; Dufferin to Cross, 16 November 1886, Ibid., p. 228. For the Bulgarian affairs, Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for mastery in Europe, Chap. XIV.

¹⁰³Cross to Dufferin, 3 Sept. 1886, Ibid., p.90.

¹⁰⁴Dufferin's Memo. 18 Sept. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, p.102.

¹⁰⁵Governor, Singapore, to Viceroy, 12 April 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 528, p.207. For Chinese anxieties over Korea, Boulger, D.C. The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney, pp. 417 and 444.

¹⁰⁶Dufferin's Memorandum, 18 Sept. 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 529, p. 102.

The idea of course did not materialise on account of the subsequent development of the Burmo-Chinese boundary question,¹⁰⁷ but in 1886 a common sentiment was certainly shared by both the Home and the Indian authorities that Chinese friendship should be cultivated as an offset against Muscovite expansion in Asia.¹⁰⁸

In spite of Dufferin's optimism about Russia, reports of her warlike activities continued to pour in from time to time. Knowledgeable men apprehended a probable massing of Russian troops in Central Asia.¹⁰⁹ Russian surveyors were found in Shignan accompanied by armed escorts.¹¹⁰ Reports were received that the Czar was making preparations for the navigation of the Oxus.¹¹¹ The trans-Caspian Railway was making rapid progress, and it was feared that on

¹⁰⁷ After the annexation of Burma in 1885 a convention was signed between the English and the Chinese on 24 July 1886 providing for the delimitation of the Burmo-Chinese boundary. But an amicable settlement was delayed by two factors: first, the question of a decennial mission, and secondly, local disputes based upon the question of ownership of the tribal regions upon the Burmese border. Practically, it was not till the end of Lord Lansdowne's Viceroyalty that a satisfactory agreement could be arrived at. Vide F.O.17/1064 and 1065, F.O. 97/554, F.O.17/1150-52 and 1175-77; also, Jeyes, S.H. The Earl of Rosebery, p.87.

¹⁰⁸ F.O./1062 generally; Durand's Memo. on C. Asia, 21 May 1887, Cross Papers/22, Encl. in No. 43; Lamb, A. Britain and Chinese Central Asia, pp. 173-75.

¹⁰⁹ S.S. to G.I., 7 Nov. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 519, p.108.

¹¹⁰ PCD, 13 February 1886, PSLEI/46, pp. 1545-52.

¹¹¹ Letter from a Correspondent in St. Petersburg, April 1886, PSDOC/1, First Series, pp.1121-23.

its completion Russian forces would be massed in Central Asia "with a view to threatening India".¹¹² Waterfield, the Peshawar Commissioner, even suspected that a Russian emissary was working in Bajaur and Chitral in the interest of the Czar.¹¹³ Not long afterwards, three Russian officers, disguised as merchants, were reported to have visited Kashmir and taken notes of the different routes to that state.¹¹⁴ What was worse, reports were received from Peshawar and other frontier districts that Russia had sent two spies to India - one to Bombay and another to Calcutta - for the purpose of collecting information and fomenting trouble against the British Government.¹¹⁵ The situation was still more complicated when Dalip Singh entered the vortex of Russian politics.¹¹⁶ Although Dufferin still believed that Russia could hardly afford a war with England in Central Asia - and mainly in view of her pre-occupations in Europe¹¹⁷ - he could not but agree with the Secretary

¹¹²PCD, 12 Oct. 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 823-31; PCD, 18 Oct. 1886, Ibid., pp. 873-80; MINWF, Oct. 1886, Ibid., pp. 895-98; St. John to Durand 10 Nov. 1886, Ibid., pp. 1157-58; MINWF, March 1887, PSLEI/49, pp. 1275-96. The fear was justified sooner than it was expected. In May 1887 5000 Russian troops and 2000 Cossacks were placed in and around Charjoi, PSHC/96, pp. 715-17; Lansdell, H. Through Central Asia, pp. 633-34; Dobson, G. Russia's Railway Advance, p. 413.

¹¹³PCD, 13 Nov. 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 1261-68.

¹¹⁴MINWF, January 1887, PSLEI/49, pp. 371-81.

¹¹⁵PCD, 12 Oct. 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 823-31, MINWF, Oct. 1886, Ibid., pp. 985-93.

¹¹⁶Supra, Chapter III, pp. 131-34.

¹¹⁷Dufferin to Cross, 3 June 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 44.

of State for India that the policy of his government "must be steady and unceasing preparation to put ourselves in a complete state of defence".¹¹⁸ As he wrote to Cross,

"Under any circumstances, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that in the north-west we are dealing with an excitable and credulous population and that if the Russians were to come with Dhulip Singh in their right hand, the rumour of such a circumstance would undoubtedly have an inconvenient effect."¹¹⁹

In any case, "the establishment of such a Power as Russia in strength and security in close proximity to an Empire so peculiarly constituted as is the Empire of England in India, cannot fail to be productive of very momentous, if not disastrous, consequences, especially when so uncertain and unknown a quantity as Afghanistan and the adjacent border tribes form an essential element of the problem....."¹²⁰

When the Viceroy was thus exercised in his mind, and consulting his Commander-in-Chief as to the best mode of defence of the Indian Empire,¹²¹ Mortimer Durand, his Foreign Secretary, proceeded to lay down his personal opinion on the question.¹²² He observed that

¹¹⁸ Kimberley to Dufferin, 9 July 1886, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p.70.

¹¹⁹ Dufferin to Cross, 22 Feb. 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 29.

¹²⁰ Dufferin to Cross, 3 June 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 44.

¹²¹ Dufferin to Cross, 1 May 1887, Ibid., No. 39.

¹²² Memo. by Durand, 21 May 1887, Encl. in No. 43, Ibid.; also PSM/C.104, PSHC/94, pp. 1295-1324.

the establishment of Russian posts within striking distance of the Indian Empire necessitated a thorough reconsideration of "our future course of policy". He felt that the Government of India should work out their future plan of action with the countries lying between the British frontier and the Russian, so that the defence of the Indian Empire could be assured without any help from an external power. The question of safeguarding the northern frontier received his particular attention, because he believed that if the Government of India were in serious difficulties with Russia, Kashmir would be "more or less shaky and inclined to hedge".¹²³ He recommended the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency under one or more English officers, assisted by a good corps of Dogras raised from Kashmir, and some additional levies raised from small Muhammadan chiefships of the neighbourhood. From Gilgit efforts should be made to cultivate the friendship of the tribes on the Kashmir frontier, and a direct road to Chitral via Dir ought to be opened to facilitate communication between British territories and the Kashmir frontier.

Both Roberts and Chesney, the military member of Dufferin's Council, concurred in Durand's proposals for the defence of the northern frontier, and heartily welcomed the idea of Native Princes contributing from their resources to the general defence of the Indian Empire. Roberts agreed with Lockhart that although a large army

¹²³Durand to Wallace, 14 January 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 525, pp. 13-14.

might not be able to reach India by the Gilgit-Chitral route, the appearance of small bodies of Russian troops in the midst of the frontier chiefships under the Hindu Kush would produce a disquieting effect throughout India.¹²⁴ Chesney emphasised that "under no circumstances can the advance of Russia beyond the Hindu Kush be permitted".¹²⁵ Roberts, in particular, was in complete agreement with all of Durand's recommendations, and even considered the road to Chitral through Dir to be the "most important" factor in frontier defence.¹²⁶

The authorities at Whitehall, too, were favourably impressed by Durand's Memorandum. The re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency was, of course, not immediately considered, but Cross seriously urged Dufferin to consider the desirability of establishing "closer relations with the tribes on the frontier from Chitral to Baluchistan in view to bringing them under control and utilising them for defence in the event of any hostile attack from that side".¹²⁷ The Viceroy certainly was aware of the importance of the tribal problem,¹²⁸ and agreed with the Secretary of State

¹²⁴ Roberts' notes on Durand's Memo. dated 13 June 1887 and 14 June 1887, Roberts Papers/96/1, pp. 181-89, and p.191.

¹²⁵ Chesney's Memo. dated 5 July 1887, Cross Papers/23, Encl. 2 in No. 58.

¹²⁶ Roberts' note dated 13 June 1887, Roberts Papers/96/1, pp. 181-89.

¹²⁷ S.S. to G.I. 21 July 1887, PSDI/13, pp. 55-59.

¹²⁸ Supra., pp. 309 & 324.

for India that the relations with these independent tribes ought to be placed on a more satisfactory footing.¹²⁹ The Punjab Government was accordingly informed,¹³⁰ and thus a decided step was taken in the direction of Lytton's objectives.¹³¹

It was not long before events upon the northern frontier forced the Government of India to a much more decided course of action. Abdur Rahman proved, indeed, to be a very hard nut to crack. In spite of his promises and in spite of sharp reminders from the Government of India, he freely indulged in intrigues with the tribal chiefs on the Kashmir frontier. He was very persistent in his claims upon Swat and Bajaur,¹³² and even tried to conclude a matrimonial alliance with the Mehtar of Chitral. Aman, of course, straightway refused, but only incurred his displeasure.¹³³ As a measure of retribution the Amir closed the Badakshan passes against travellers through and from Chitral, with the result that the Mehtar suffered a

¹²⁹ Dufferin to Cross, 18 August 1887, Cross Papers/23, No. 55; Black, C.E.D. op.cit., p.241.

¹³⁰ India to Punjab, 17 Aug. 1887, Davies, C.C. The Problem of the North-west Frontier, p.71.

¹³¹ Supra, Chap. I, pp. 36-37.

¹³² MINWF, July 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1637-44; PCD, 19 July 1887, Ibid., pp. 1655-65; PCDs and MINWFs of Sept.-Dec. 1887, PSLEI/51; PCD, 21 Jan. 1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 469-76; MINWF, April 1888, PSLEI/53, pp. 541-55; PCD, 14 May 1888, Ibid., pp. 923-28.

¹³³ MINWF, Sept. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 665-74; PCD, 6 Oct. 1887, Ibid., pp. 801-10, PCD, 21 Jan. 1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 469-76.

loss of about 12,000 rupees a year on account of transit duties.¹³⁴ This was followed by the imposition of a heavy tax on timber floated down the Kunar river from Chitral towards Peshawar.¹³⁵ Aman withstood all this, but became very apprehensive when the Amir was reported to have undertaken the construction of a road in the direction of Asmar and Kafiristan.¹³⁶ In fact, the tribal chiefships on the Kashmir frontier were all very nervous on account of the Amir's movements, and sought the protection of the Indian Government against him.¹³⁷ Finally, when Abdur Rahman moved to Jalalabad early in 1888, and was reported to be meditating an attack upon Bajaur, even the Punjab Government could not ignore it, and urged the Government of India to take the matter up with the Amir.¹³⁸

Dufferin was still prepared to wink at the Afghan intrigues,¹³⁹ but the rapid extension of Russia's power in Central Asia, and her bellicose tendencies, soon urged him to action. With the settlement of the Afghan boundary question in July 1887, Russia had begun to

¹³⁴PCD, 6 Oct. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 801-10.

¹³⁵MINWF, April 1888, PSLEI/53, pp. 541-55.

¹³⁶PCD, 14 May 1888, *Ibid.*, pp. 923-28.

¹³⁷PCD, 29 July 1887, PSLEI/50, pp. 1875-79; PCD, 21 January 1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 469-76.

¹³⁸IFP/3273, March 1888, Cons. 44, p. 41; MINWF, April 1888, PSLEI/53, pp. 541-55.

¹³⁹IFP/3273, March 1888, Cons. 55, p. 51.

strengthen further her position in Central Asia.¹⁴⁰ A War Office memorandum bore evidence of great Russian activities in the direction of Badakshan.¹⁴¹ Reports were received of concentration of Russian troops at different places between Garmab on the Persian border and the River Oxus.¹⁴² The Central Asian Railway of the Czar was making spectacular progress in the direction of Samarkand and Bokhara, and new roads were being pushed on to connect the different Russian stations in Central Asia.¹⁴³ War, of course, was not feared in 1887 - neither in India nor at Whitehall¹⁴⁴ - and in 1888 the Russian Minister at Tehran even suggested to the British Ambassador an agreement between Britain, Germany and Russia guaranteeing India in return for British help in settling the Bulgarian difficulties of Russia.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the rapid military preparations

¹⁴⁰Dufferin to Cross, 19 May 1887, Dufferin Papers/Reel 518, pp. 101-06.

¹⁴¹Dated August 22, 1887, PSHC/96, p. 1339.

¹⁴²Reports were received of military preparations and massing of Russian troops at Garmab, Askabad, Charjui, Kerki, Samarkand, Tashkend, Sarakhs, Merv, Yolatan and Panjdeh. PCD, 14 Sept. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 543-49; MINWF, Jan. 1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 589-95; Minister, Tehran to Viceroy 16 June 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, p.566.

¹⁴³PCD, 14 Sept. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 543-49; MINWF, Feb. 1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 763-72; MINWF, May 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 101-10. Dobson, G. Russia's Railway Advance, pp. 413-14; Curzon, G.N. Russia in Central Asia, pp. 44-45.

¹⁴⁴Dufferin to Cross, 3 June 1887, Cross Papers/22, No. 44; Memo. by Brackenbury, War Office 7 Aug. 1887, PSHC/96, pp. 1479-1525; Lansdell, H. Through Central Asia, pp. 640-41.

¹⁴⁵Minister, Tehran, to Viceroy, 6 June 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, p.18. For Russia's Bulgarian difficulties, Taylor, A.J.P. Op.cit., Chap. XIV. For the suggested Anglo-Russian agreement, Langer, W. European Alliances and Alignments, pp. 468-69.

of the Czar were a disquieting element that could not be long overlooked. Kimberley had time and again drawn the attention of Dufferin's Government to this aspect of Russian proceedings in Central Asia.¹⁴⁶ Lord Dufferin, who was fast becoming a convert to the Forward Policy, began certainly to feel the need for a more active policy on the Kashmir frontier when Russian activities spread beyond the Hindu Kush and seemed to threaten the security of the Indian Empire.

Already in 1887 some Russian travellers were reported to have visited Hunza.¹⁴⁷ In the train of this new Russian advance came Captain Gromchevsky whose mission was evidently to explore the possibilities of Russian penetration across the Hindu Kush. There was a certain gap between the eastern boundary of Afghanistan at Wakhan and the westernmost tip of the Chinese Empire at Aktash, through which small Russian forces could easily penetrate further south, and disturb the peace of the Hindu Kush regions. In fact, this tract was considered by Russia as a sort of 'no-man's land',¹⁴⁸ so that Gromchevsky's visit to Hunza in the summer of 1888, and his movements along the Pamirs, drove the point home that an adequate

¹⁴⁶ Supra, p.310; Kimberley to Dufferin, 9 July 1887, Dufferin Papers/ Reel 517, p.70; Dufferin to Cross, 16 Nov. 1886, Ibid., p.228.

¹⁴⁷ PCD, 14 Sept. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 543-49; MINWF, Sept. 1887, Ibid., pp. 665-74.

¹⁴⁸ G.I. to S.S., 27 Dec. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 1377-79; Seaver, G. Francis Younghusband, pp. 136-37.

defensive measure for the protection of the northern frontier was a necessity that admitted of no indefinite postponement.¹⁴⁹

It was indeed the question of Kashmiri control over the chieftains of Hunza and Nagar that immediately led to the re-establishment of the British Agency at Gilgit. These two Dard States, lying on the Kashmir frontier, were strategically very important, commanding, as they did, the various passes of the Hindu Kush. They were only second to Chitral in their influence on the question of defence of the northern frontier, and were much less subservient to the Kashmir Maharaja than Aman-ul-Mulk.¹⁵⁰ Of these two States, Hunza, though smaller in population than Nagar, was of far greater importance on account of its geographical position.

¹⁴⁹G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, and Encl. (Durand's Report on Northern Frontiers, 5 Dec. 1888) Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-610. For Gromchevsky's visit to the Pamirs and Hunza, as reported by Captain Younghusband, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 210-15, also Younghusband's letter to Nisbet, 30 Dec. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11. Gromchevsky is said to have told Safdar Ali, the Mir of Hunza, that the Czar intended establishing a military post at Baltit with three hundred rifles, two guns, and a Russian officer to train the people of Hunza in the latest development of warfare, Mons. B. High Road to Hunza, p. 94. A. Durand, the British Agent at Gilgit, suspected that some agreement was come to between Gromchevsky and Safdar Ali. Younghusband seemed to have thought that arms were promised by Russia to the Chief of Hunza. Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, sub.encl. in Encl. 1 to G.I. to S.S., 28 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), p.304; Knight, E.F. Where Three Empires Meet, p.333; Lansdell, H. Chinese Central Asia, p.18. Gromchevsky even tried to enter Kashmir, but was refused admission. Encl. in F.O. to I.O., 21 Oct. 1891, PSHC/123, pp.575-81.

¹⁵⁰Durand's Report on the northern frontiers of Kashmir, 5 May 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-60; Eckenstein, O. The Karakoram and Kashmir, p. 119; for a description of Hunza and Nagar and their strategic importance, Durand, A.G. op.cit., pp. 138-40.

From it Chinese Turkistan could be reached without much difficulty; and immediately to its north, across the Kilik Pass, lay the gap between Afghanistan and China, through which Russian forces could march to Hunza, and via Gilgit to Kashmir. Safdar Ali, the ruler of Hunza, who had murdered his father, Ghazan Khan, in 1886, and had succeeded him, was fully aware of the strategic importance of his state. Though, on his accession to the throne he had rendered allegiance to the Kashmir Maharaja, Safdar Ali acknowledged at the same time the suzerainty of the Chinese, as his father had done before him.¹⁵¹ Of course, the recognition of Chinese suzerainty by the Chief of Hunza hardly ever exceeded a nominal tribute of 1¹/₂ ounces^{of} gold dust in return for two pieces of satin,¹⁵² in 1886 Ney Elias found in Yarkand that the Chinese regarded Hunza as a border district of Sinkiang, and even talked of ultimately incorporating it within their province.¹⁵³ The same year Ghazan Khan told Lockhart that he considered himself a subject of the Chinese Emperor.¹⁵⁴ Yet,

¹⁵¹ MINWF, Oct. 1886, PSLEI/48, pp. 985-93; MINWF, June 1887, PSLEI/49, pp. 371-81; G.I. to S.S., 30 June 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 289-90, MINWF, June 1888, Ibid., pp. 405-16.

¹⁵² The announcement of this tribute by Hunza was from time to time announced in the Peking Gazette. MINWF, Jan. 1887, PSLEI/49, pp. 371-81; Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, PSLEI/55, pp. 673-75.

¹⁵³ Report of a Mission, pp. 14-15; Alder, J.G. op.cit.

¹⁵⁴ Lockhart and Woodthorpe, Gilgit Mission, p. 392; cited by Alder, op.cit.

as long as the rulers of Hunza did not press this attitude to unpleasant extremes, the Government of India did not take much notice of their dual allegiance to Kashmir and China.

Matters, however, took a serious turn early in 1888. On 20 January, the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar, with a force of 2000 men ejected the Kashmir troops from their posts at Chaprot and Chalt, and threatened Nomal, a fort of about 15 miles by road from Gilgit.¹⁵⁵ The Kashmir outpost of Chaprot was situated on the Hunza river, 28 miles by road to the north of Gilgit, and had been occupied by the Maharaja's troops since 1876. Strategically, it was very important for defence of Kashmir. It covered Gilgit from the north and checked Hunza and Nagar, which lay about 20 miles away to the north-east. This fort had long been a source of discord between the Hunza and Nagar chiefs, and it was at the request of the latter that the Maharaja of Kashmir had taken it over, and since maintained it.¹⁵⁶ The causes of this sudden outbreak were not very clear at the time. As Plowden, the Kashmir Resident, subsequently gathered, the disturbances were brought about by the proceedings of Bakshi Mulraj, the Governor of Gilgit, who was charged with several acts of annoyance

¹⁵⁵G.I. to S.S., 30 June 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 289-90; MINWF, Feb.1888, PSLEI/52, pp. 763-72.

¹⁵⁶G.I. to S.S., 30 June 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 289-90.

towards the Nagar people, and with having kept back a portion of the subsidy paid by the Kashmir Darbar to Hunza. Both states had thus a common grudge against the Governor of Gilgit, and to discredit him they combined to attack the frontier outposts.¹⁵⁷

Reinforcements were immediately sent from Gilgit to meet the beseigers at Nomal, and met with initial success.¹⁵⁸ The tribesmen fell back upon Chaprot and put up a determined show of retaining it. For the recovery of the frontier posts, a special Commission, backed by sufficient troops, was sent from Srinagar with instructions to obtain possession of Chalt and Chaprot by peaceable means, if possible, by force, if necessary.¹⁵⁹ The difficulty of the situation was that in the event of a large force being required for a considerable period of time to retake the posts, it was likely to suffer from want of supplies, whereas a small force was sure to be

¹⁵⁷ Plowden to India, 12 Sept. 1888 and 21 Sept. 1888, Encls. 7 and 8 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, PSLEI/55, pp. 677-78, MINWF, September 1888, Ibid., pp. 593-605.

¹⁵⁸ G.I. to S.S., 30 June ^{1888,} PSLEI/54, pp. 289-90, MINWF, March 1888, PSLEI/53, pp. 283-91; Kashmir Resident to India, 24 March 1888, Dufferin Papers/Reel 533, p. 295.

¹⁵⁹ G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, and enclosures 1, 4 and 5, PSLEI/55, pp. 667-79.

repulsed by the tribesmen.¹⁶⁰ Negotiations were therefore preferred to violent means, notwithstanding that the entire proceedings of the Kashmir Darbar merely showed the unsatisfactory state of affairs at Gilgit. Eventually, of course, Chalt and Chaprot were re-occupied by Kashmir troops, but Plowden suspected that "this result has been brought about by bribery, and there is no guarantee... that similar disturbances will not recur on the first opportunity".¹⁶¹

Meanwhile, the Chinese Government had preferred a complaint to Walsham, the British Ambassador at Peking, against an alleged attack by a British-Indian tribe upon Kanjut (Hunza) with a view to seizing the district of Chaprot.¹⁶² Evidently, the Peking Government was misinformed of the recent invasion by Hunza and Nagar upon Kashmir territories, but what really bothered Dufferin was the Chinese claim to suzerainty over Hunza which was made by the Tsungli Yamen in no uncertain terms.¹⁶³ The Viceroy was not disposed to recognise the Chinese or any other rights in Hunza:

"It is imperative that in this quarter we should keep the Chinese and every other power to the north of the barrier formed by the Himalayas and Hindu Kush, and though it may be inexpedient at

¹⁶⁰ MINWF, April 1888, PSLEI/53, pp. 541-55. As a matter of fact, the Kashmir force at Chalt, which was necessarily small, was dependent for its supplies mainly upon the Hunza and Nagar States. If these States combined they could at any time make the fort untenable. Support could not be easily sent up, for the road from Gilgit to Chalt was very difficult, lying in parts along the face of precipices which were crossed by the help of ladders and frail wooden galleries. The force, indeed, was allowed to remain on sufferance, and more than once it was threatened with expulsion.

¹⁶¹ Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, PSLEI/55, p.677.

¹⁶² Tel. from Viceroy, 18 June 1888, Cross Papers/34, No.18; PSHC/102, p.881.

¹⁶³ Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Oct. 1888, PSLEI/55, pp. 673-75.

this moment to enter into any discussion with the Chinese Government upon the question, we must in practice maintain our right to deal with Hunza direct, notwithstanding its nominal suzerainty to China."¹⁶⁴

Both Cross¹⁶⁵ and Salisbury,¹⁶⁶ the British Foreign Secretary, approved of the view of the situation taken by the Indian Government. Walsham was asked to explain the situation created by the Hunza attack upon Chaprot, emphasising that the ruler of Hunza had long been a feudatory of the Kashmir Maharaja, receiving a yearly pension and paying tribute. He was of course directed not to enter into any elaborate discussion with the Yamen upon the question, and accordingly Walsham simply asserted in a personal interview that it "would be impossible... for the Indian Government to allow the petty border chieftain to create disturbances on Indian soil with impunity, and in reliance on his pretension to be a tributary state of the Chinese Empire".¹⁶⁷

Dufferin, however, did not rest contented merely with the assertion of the Maharaja's rights over Hunza. While the negotiations were being actively carried on by the Kashmir representatives

¹⁶⁴G.I. to S.S., 30 June 1888, PSLEI/54, pp. 289-90.

¹⁶⁵I.O. to F.O., 25 Aug. 1888, PSHC/103, pp. 1485-87; also PSDI/14, S.S. to G.I., 21 Sept. 1888, pp. 53-54.

¹⁶⁶F.O. to I.O., 10 Sept. 1888, PSHC/104, pp. 375-78, Encls. 1 and 2 to the I.O. letter of 21 Sept. 1888, PSDI/14, pp. 55-56.

¹⁶⁷Walsham to Yamen, 21 June 1888, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S. 15 October 1888, PSLEI/55, pp. 674-75; also PSHC/129, p. 1381.

with Hunza and Nagar during the summer months of 1886, he decided to depute an officer to the Gilgit frontier with a view to ascertaining the military position there. Captain Algernon Durand¹⁶⁸ of the Quarter-Master-General's Department was selected for that purpose and was required to examine the situation at Gilgit with reference to the recent tribal disturbances and to future possible complications with Russia. He was asked to work out a scheme for rendering Gilgit secure without the aid of British troops, and for dominating from Gilgit through Kashmir forces the country up to the Hindu Kush.¹⁶⁹ On his return Durand complained that the military position at Gilgit was as unsatisfactory as it was possible to imagine. He especially drew the attention of the Government of India to Gromchevsky's visit to Hunza in the autumn of 1888, and to that gap between the Afghan and the Chinese frontiers, often called "Gromchevsky's wedge",¹⁷⁰ through which Russia could push

¹⁶⁸ Originally of Central India Horse; brother of Mortimer Durand; later Military Secretary of Lord Elgin.

¹⁶⁹ MINWF, August 1888, PSLEI/55, pp. 129-42; Report on the Present Military Position in Gilgit by A. Durand, 5 Dec. 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-610 (PSLEI/57); Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, pp. 181-82; Durand, A.G. op.cit., pp. 3-4.

¹⁷⁰ G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63. When Younghusband met Captain Gromchevsky on the Pamirs, the latter showed him a map on which there was a broad red line enclosing a strip of country running down from the Russian frontier and including the eastern portion of Wakhan and the Taghdumbash Pamir. Younghusband to Nisbet, 24 Oct. 1889, PSDOC/3, First Series, pp. 205-08.

down to Hunza at any time, and make her influence felt along the Kashmir frontier. As a remedy, he recommended a scheme of defence based upon a British Agency at Gilgit and a direct road to Chitral from the Peshawar frontier through Dir.¹⁷¹

Meanwhile, the state of affairs in Kashmir had considerably changed, providing for the adoption of a comprehensive scheme of frontier defence. The plan for the reorganisation of the Native States' Armies had been approved by Dufferin,¹⁷² and the Maharaja had agreed to raise and equip a force of 2500 men for India's defence.¹⁷³ Dufferin, of course, did not stay in India to give effect either to his scheme of imperial defence, or to Durand's recommendations for a Gilgit Agency. He left them for his successor to carry out, and by the time Lord Lansdowne could give his serious attention to Durand's proposals, further changes had taken place in the State of Kashmir. The training of the State army had been set well on foot,¹⁷⁴ and the Maharaja's supersession in April 1889¹⁷⁵ had

¹⁷¹Durand's Report, 5 Dec. 1888, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-610.

¹⁷²Supra, Chapter V, p. 232.

¹⁷³Supra, Chap. IV, p. 172.

¹⁷⁴Supra, Chap. IV, p. 173 & Chap. V, pp. 233-34.

¹⁷⁵Supra, Chap. IV, pp. 188-89.

brought the administration of the State "under proper control" of the Indian Government. So, Lansdowne hoped that

"An English agent in Gilgit would not now have serious reason to complain of obstructiveness on the part of the Darbar officials, or of inefficient arrangements for his protection."¹⁷⁶

Lansdowne agreed with his predecessor that no foreign power should be allowed to establish its influence in the region to the north of Kashmir. The attempt of the Russians to penetrate to the south of the Hindu Kush and of the Afghans and the Chinese "to tamper with some of the small chiefships in this quarter" convinced him of the necessity of establishing closer relations with these tribal chieftains, and he fully agreed with Algernon Durand that the way to do that was to establish a British Agency at Gilgit consisting of four officers, and a brigade of Kashmir troops. He accepted with modifications Durand's proposal for subsidising^{si} the rulers of these small states in return for their allegiance to the Indian Government, and approved of his suggestion for the road from Peshawar to Chitral. In writing to the Home Government for their sanction of his plan of defence of the northern frontier, Lansdowne expressed the hope that, if adopted, it would have

"the Upper Hindu Kush well watched, and the countries to the south of it closed against interference from

¹⁷⁶G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-51, PSLEI/57, pp. 27-31.

China and Russia and Afghanistan, and we shall get some useful information from the districts beyond. We shall be protected against any coup de main from the northward and we may eventually succeed in establishing our influence in Kafiristan also."¹⁷⁷

And, in anticipation of Cross's approval he sent Captain Durand back to Kashmir to await there the final instructions of the Government of India.¹⁷⁸

While the proposals of Lansdowne's Government were under the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, the Kashmir Darbar expressed a wish to bear the entire cost of the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. But the Viceroy was unwilling to allow the Darbar to bear the whole cost, and decided that the expenditure on account of the British Agent and his office establishment, the increased subsidies to the chiefs of Chitral, Hunza, Nagar, Punyal, and some other items should be borne by the Government of India. The Kashmir Darbar accepted the arrangement, and when the approval of the Secretary of State was obtained,¹⁷⁹ Captain Durand, who was already in Kashmir, was directed to proceed to Gilgit to work out his defence scheme.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-51, PSLEI/57, pp. 27-31; Durand, A.G. The Making of a Frontier, pp. 119-20.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

¹⁷⁹The Viceroy's recommendations were considered "sound and well-founded" by the Secretary of State for India. Lansdowne Papers/IB(ix), pp. 35-36.

¹⁸⁰G.I. to S.S. 3 Dec. 1889, and enclosures, 1, 2, 4 and 6, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 1159-70; Kashmir Administration Report, Quarterly, 18 April to 31 July, 1889, PSLEI/59, f. 595.

Durand was asked to pay a visit to Hunza and Nagar in order to counteract the Chinese and Russian attempts to establish an influence in those parts. He was to explain to the Chiefs of those States the wishes of the Government of India and to offer them increased subsidies of 2000 rupees each per annum, contingent upon the cessation of their raiding of the neighbouring regions, and the grant of free access to their countries by British officers. On the conclusion of his visit to Hunza and Nagar, Durand was to visit Chitral and set on foot the new arrangements there.¹⁸¹

Captain Durand reached Gilgit on 27 July 1889, accompanied by Lieutenant Manners-Smith and Doctor Robertson,¹⁸² both officers of the Agency. He was well received by the local officials, and was soon able to start for Nagar. Raja Jafar Khan was very cordial with the British Agent, and readily accepted the stipulations laid down by the Government of India in return for the increased subsidy. At Hunza, however, Durand met with some difficulties. Safdar Ali, of course, accepted the stipulations of the Government of India in return for his subsidy, although he maintained that owing to his having a jagir in Yarkand, he would still have to communicate with China. But when he ascertained that he would be treated on equal terms with

¹⁸¹Encl.6 in G.I. to S.S., 3 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 1169-70; Durand, A. op.cit., p. 121.

¹⁸²Surgeon-Major G.S. Robertson who later led the Chitral Mission. Infra, Chap. VII, pp.398-99

his neighbour, the Chief of Nagar, whom he considered to be a ruler of less importance, the Hunza Chief changed his attitude and demanded an allowance of 500 rupees per annum for his son.¹⁸³ For a time, even the security of the British Mission seemed threatened. Durand's tact however saved the situation, and at his recommendation the Government of India eventually agreed to pay an allowance of 500 rupees to Safdar Ali's son, subject of course to the good behaviour of that chief.¹⁸⁴

From Hunza the British Agent and his party made a successful visit to Chitral. Aman-ul-Mulk readily agreed to the conditions of the Government of India contingent upon the receipt of his increased subsidy. He promised all help in opening up the Peshawar-Chitral road, the improvements of the main paths in his country to tracks passable by laden mules, and the fortification of certain selected positions to be afterwards pointed out to him. As against all that, he was granted a subsidy of 6000 rupees per annum and a gift of rifles.¹⁸⁵

Durand thus carried out the instructions of the Government of India with complete success. On his own initiative he took yet another measure to accomplish his immediate object. To mark the re-

¹⁸³ Encl. 9 and sub-encls. in G.I. to S.S., 3 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 1170-79.

¹⁸⁴ Encl. 10 in *Ibid.*, pp. 1179-80; Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09.

¹⁸⁵ Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 3 Dec. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 1169-70; Gilgit Agency Report 1889, Encl. 10 in G.I. to S.S., 20 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09.

establishment of the British Agency, he invited the neighbouring chiefs to Gilgit, all of whom either came in person or sent suitable representatives. A Durbar was held, at which the permanent re-establishment of the Agency was formally announced, and the Chiefs were informed that their subsidies would in future be regularly paid every year. They were warned at the same time that the payment of subsidies would be contingent upon the faithful execution by them of the agreements they had undertaken to fulfil.¹⁸⁶ Durand's work was highly commented upon by the Secretary of State for India, and Cross hoped that this "will secure the exclusion of any foreign influence in these territories adverse to Imperial interests."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 20 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09; MINWF, Jan. 1890, PSLEI/59, pp. 437-38; Durand, A.G. op.cit., p. 227.

¹⁸⁷ S.S. to G.I., 10 Jan. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ix), p.81; PSDI/16, pp. 5-7.

Chapter VII

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH INFLUENCE ALONG

THE KASHMIR FRONTIERS

(1889 - 93)

The re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency was not an end in itself; it was a means to an end. Admittedly, the objects of the Agency were to watch and control the country lying to the south of the Hindu Kush, and to prevent any coup de main by a small body of troops descending by the Baroghil or the Hunza group of passes. Lansdowne acknowledged that it would not be possible to operate from Gilgit to repel an advance from the direction of Badakshan by the Dora route upon the western frontier of Chitral. That was why both he and Durand suggested the construction of a road from Peshawar through Dir to Chitral, so that a force could be moved up the Peshawar Valley in the event of any Russian attack upon the Mehtar's territories.¹

Evidently, the policy thus laid down postulated a certain control over the southern ends of the above passes, and inevitably, upon the entire tribal region to the south of the Hindu Kush. This was all the more necessary in view of the vulnerability of the mountain ranges to the north of Kashmir. Neither the so-called "no-man's land" that separated the Afghan frontiers from

1. G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1889, and enclosure, Lansdowne Papers/IB(i), pp. 547-610; (PSLEI/57) Supra, Chapter VI, p.339.

the Chinese,² nor the Baroghil and the Hunza passes were the only vulnerable points through which a small Russian army could swoop down upon the southern slopes of the mountain barrier of the north. Captain Younghusband,³ who had been sent on deputation to the northern frontiers of Kashmir in the summer of 1889, discovered a few more practicable routes leading directly into the valley of the Hunza river. He pointed out that it was not difficult for a small Russian force, driving with them flocks of sheep to subsist on, to invade the territories of Hunza through these passes.⁴ In his report on the progress of the Gilgit Agency of 1889, Lieutenant Colonel Durand also drew the attention of the Government of India to the possibility of a Russian force penetrating southward through these outlets. Both he and Younghusband agreed that in order to forestall such an attack, the Government of India should assume the practical sovereignty of the entire tribal region upto the Hindu Kush. But that would not be possible so long as the absolute loyalty of the ruler of Hunza could not be assured. But that chief was so thoroughly possessed by a false notion of his own importance that it would be impossible to bring him under control unless

2. Supra, Chapter VI, p. 330.

3. Of the First Royal Dragoon Guards, Afterwards Sir Francis Younghusband. While in service he led many explorations in Asia. Was Political Officer at Hunza, 1892. Later, in 1906, became Kashmir Resident.

4. Younghusband to Nisbet, 30 Dec. 1889, Ardagh Papers/Box 11.

he could be taught that the armed strength of the British Government was far greater than the subsidies he was receiving from them.⁵ In thus advocating the establishment of British supremacy along the Kashmir frontiers both Durand and Younghusband were merely echoing the sentiments of Sir Frederick Roberts who had been pleading since 1885 "that the Hindu Kush must eventually be our frontier."⁶ Lansdowne's opinion was in complete accord with Roberts', and he believed with his Commander-in-Chief that the tribes along the Indian frontiers should be assimilated "as rapidly as possible", and must never be allowed to "pass on to the wrong side of the account."⁷ It was indeed a conviction with the Viceroy that the mountain barrier to the north of Kashmir should be "the limit of our political jurisdiction."⁸

In fact, Durand had set himself to this task immediately after his arrival at Gilgit. Measures were taken to strengthen the forts at Gilgit and improve the transport system between that place and Srinagar in order that supplies for the troops

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5. Ibid.; Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, by Algernon Durand, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 28 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09, (PSLEI/59).
 6. Roberts to Lansdowne, 12 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VII(d), pp. 38-39.
 7. Lansdowne to Roberts, 17 Feb. 1889, Lansdowne Papers/VII(a), p. 82.
 8. G.I. to S.S., 14 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 557-60; also Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 11 March 1891, Ibid./IB(iii), pp. 697-98. (PSLEI/62)

might be easily obtained.⁹ The Gilgit-Srinagar road was gradually pushed up, and the question of improving the local communications was exhaustively examined.¹⁰ Although Durand did not seem to have been very happy with what was done in the first year of the Agency,¹¹ by October 1889 the Government of India congratulated itself on the "very favourable results" that were claimed to have "attended the active policy" at Gilgit. A year later, Lansdowne wrote to the Home Government :

"..... since the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, much has been done to strengthen British influence and control among the petty states lying between Kashmir and the Hindu Kush."¹²

In reality, however, the situation along the Kashmir frontier was not that rosy. Early in 1890, news was received from the Gilgit Agent pointing to "the existence of a feeling of uneasiness amongst the neighbouring tribes." The establishment of the Agency was looked upon as the first step towards the annexation of the entire tribal region.¹³ Rumours of an intention to build a road to Chalt and strengthen its fort gradually got about, and it was whispered that Hunza and Nagar had entered

9. IFP/3962, Jan. 1891, Cons. 157-62, p. 183; Durand, A.G. The Making of a Frontier, p. 227.

10. IFP/4182, Feb. 1892, Cons. 33, pp. 16-18.

11. Durand, A.G. op. cit., p. 228.

12. G.I. to S.S., 7 Oct. 1890, and encl. 1 in it, PSLEI/61, pp. 455-58.

13. MINWF, Feb. 1890, PSLEI/59, pp. 829-30; MINWF, Aug. 1890, PSLEI/61, pp. 52-53.

into a defensive alliance with a determination to resist all attempts at constructing the road to Chalt or strengthen the fortress there.¹⁴

For Durand the hostile attitude of Hunza which persisted throughout 1890¹⁵ was not anything new. He had come back from his first visit to Hunza fully convinced that Safdar Ali was too vain and arrogant to be controlled by the mere payment of an annual subsidy, and that the only way to keep him straight was to impress upon him the superior strength of the British arms.¹⁶ What actually perturbed Durand was the absence of peace along the Kashmir frontiers. The political situation there was disturbed by conflicting alliances among the states within the circle of the British Agent's supervision.¹⁷ The rising Chief of Jandol, Umra Khan, was constantly at war with his

14. Ibid.; MINWF, March 1890, Ibid., p. 1063; MINWF, April 1890, PSLEI/60, p. 15.

15. MINWF, June and July 1890, PSLEI/60, p. 824 and pp. 1218-19.

16. Supra, p. 342, and Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, Lensdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09.

17. The States within the Gilgit Agent's circle of supervision were : Chitral and Yasin, Hunza and Nagar to the north; the petty state of Punyal, adjoining Gilgit on the west; and the republican states of Gor, Chilas, Darel and Tangir, all on the Indus. For the conflicts among the States, MINWF, November 1890, PSLEI/61, pp. 948-49, and note 18 below.

neighbouring chiefships.¹⁸ The Mehtar of Chitral was at logger-heads with him, and encouraged the Bajauri Chiefs to oppose Umra's aggressive activities. He even wished the British Government to interfere with the Jandol Chief, and put a restraint upon his bellicose tendencies.¹⁹

Confusion was worse confounded by the interference of the Amir of Afghanistan in the politics of the northern frontiers. As already mentioned, Abdur Rahman had never given up his pretensions to suzerainty over Bajaur, and though warned from time to time, he had carried on his intrigues with impunity, and laboured most persistently to bring the Chiefs of Bajaur under his influence.²⁰ In 1890-91, however, he did not meet with much success in that direction. Chitral and Jandol were both his deadly enemies, and declined repeatedly to respond to his overtures.²¹ Even so, early in 1890 the Government

18. MINWF, Feb. 1890, PSLEI/59, p. 829; PCD, 15 Jan. 1890, Ibid., p. 154; PCD, 10 Nov. 1890, PSLEI/61, pp. 848-50; PCD, 14 Feb. 1891, PSLEI/62, pp. 702-03; MINWF, Feb. 1891, Ibid., pp. 764-65; PCD, 21 March 1891, Ibid., p. 1010; MINWF, July 1891, PSLEI/63, p. 1120.

19. PCD, 15 Jan. 1890, PSLEI/59, p. 154; MINWF, Feb. 1890, Ibid., p. 829; PCD, 10 Nov. 1890, PSLEI/61, pp. 848-50.

20. Supra, Chap. VI; G.I. to S.S., 16 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 283-306. This despatch gives a historical summary of the Amir's activities in Bajaur.

21. Note 20 above, also, MINWF, Feb. 1891, PSLEI/62, pp. 764-65; PCD, 14 Feb. 1891, Ibid., pp. 702-03.

of India warned Abdur Rahman not to meddle with the affairs of Bajaur.²² Next year the warning was repeated,²³ and Lansdowne's Government wished to see Umra Khan as the champion of Bajauri independence against the Amir's pretensions.²⁴ In fact, to facilitate the construction of the Peshawar-Chitral road, the Government of India had been considering a defensive alliance with the Jandol Chief since 1889.²⁵ Umra's excessive demands,²⁶ coupled with Lansdowne's reluctance to take an active part in Bajauri politics led however to the failure of the negotiations. Actually, Lansdowne was not willing to do anything that could alienate the Amir irremediably. He was aware that the active tribal policy of his government had annoyed the Amir, and undoubtedly, as he said, "any signs of marked activity in the direction of Swat and Bajaur would greatly irritate him."²⁷

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22. MINWF, May 1890, PSLEI/60, p. 432.
23. Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 6 May 1891, PSLEI/63, p. 11.
24. G.I. to S.S., 16 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 283-306; (PSLEI/67).
25. Gilgit Agency Report, 1889, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 28 April 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 302-09.
26. Ibid.; also Encl. 16 in G.I. to S.S., 24 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 564, (PSLEI/66).
27. Lansdowne to Roberts, 18 Dec. 1890, Roberts Papers/Box File Li, R34/126; also vide Lansdowne's Memo. on Amir's proposed visit to India, 10 June 1891, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 321-24.

So long, indeed, as the balance of power upon the northern frontiers was preserved by the triangular conflict between Chitral, Jandol and the Amir of Afghanistan, the Government of India had very little to worry about. Durand therefore took to pacific measures to strengthen his position at Gilgit. He sent his agents to the frontier states to assure them that the British Government had no intention to interfere in their domestic affairs so long as they remained true to their engagements. This was reiterated when the representatives of the subsidised states came in December 1890 to receive their annual payments.²⁸ Meanwhile, Durand had made arrangements for regular supplies for the Gilgit troops; a road between Gilgit and Nomal was taken in hand; and the Kashmiri "rabble in the Gilgit command" were relieved by the First Kashmir Infantry, trained for Imperial Service.²⁹ By October 1890, 40 miles of the Srinagar-Gilgit road was constructed.³⁰ About the same time the survey for a bridge over

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28. MINWF, Feb. and March 1890, PSLEI/59, pp. 829-30 and 1062-63; MINWF, Feb. 1891, PSLEI/62, p. 765; Neve, A. Thirty Years in Kashmir, p. 157.
29. Durand, A.G. op. cit. pp. 230-34; MINWF, Nov. 1890, PSLEI/61, pp. 948-49; Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 183.
30. IFP/3962, April 1891, Cons. 1-10, pp. 1-13, see above Chap. V, pp. 247 & 278.

the Indus at Bunji was completed,³¹ and before long, Durand called attention to the immediate necessity of completing the road to Chalt and strengthening the fortress there.³² All this, he said, was necessary to keep the Gilgit Agency in a state of preparedness for any offensive against Hunza and Nagar whose hostile intentions continued to be a source of anxiety to the British Agent.³³

While Durand was thus busy strengthening the Gilgit Agency, Lord Lansdowne suggested that China should be encouraged to occupy that strip of "no-man's land" to the north of Hunza which lay between her frontiers and the Afghan. He attached "the greatest importance to filling up this vacant space," because Russian encroachment at this point would be "extremely inconvenient" to the Indian Government. Lansdowne's idea was to build up a solid wall of Afghan, British and Chinese territory that would act as a barrier against a Russian advance.³⁴

31. Ibid.

32. Durand to Kashmir Resident, 2 March 1891, IFP/3962, July 1891, Cons. 37, pp. 28-30. Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 184.

33. Ibid., MINWF, Feb. 1891, PSLEI/62, p. 765; MINWF, May 1891, PSLEI/63, p. 498.

34. G.I. to S.S., 14 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 557-60 (PSLEI/60, pp. 967-70), Lansdowne to Cross, 14 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IX(b), pp. 78-80; Lansdowne to Walsham (British Ambassador at Peking), 17 July 1890, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(b), pp. 49-50.

The idea; of course, was not his own. After the conclusion of the Russo-Afghan boundary agreement of July 1887, the Amir had approached the Government of India for a demarcation of his frontiers upto the Pamirs.³⁵ At the time, however, there were practical difficulties for laying down a well defined frontier in this direction. By the Agreement of 1873 between England and Russia, which had tentatively defined the northern frontier of Afghanistan, the Amir's territories to the north-east terminated at Victoria or Wood's Lake.³⁶ From that point to the Chinese frontier at Aktash there was a stretch of undefined territory - a sort of "no-man's land" - which, Dufferin feared, would no doubt be claimed by Russia, if any proposal should be made by the British Government for the demarcation of Afghan territories in the direction of the Pamirs. He was therefore eager to encourage Afghan occupation of this undefined territory, so that at the time of actual demarcation the Amir's rights could be established on the basis of possession.³⁷ But both Cross and Salisbury were opposed to such an idea for fear of fresh complications with Russia, and the proposal was consequently

35. Amir to Dy. Commissioner, Peshawar, 5 Aug. 1887, PSLEI/51, p. 351.

36. P.P., 1873, LXXV, C. 699, pp. 695-710; Ghose D.K. England and Afghanistan, pp. 167-68.

37. G.I. to S.S., 27 Dec. 1887, PSLEI/51, pp. 1377-79.

dropped.³⁸ When Lansdowne revived it in 1890 the idea of an Anglo-Chinese alliance as a bulwark against Russia had gained official recognition.³⁹ So, there would not perhaps have been any difficulty in giving effect to Lansdowne's proposal if it were known how far the Chinese claims upon the Pamirs actually extended. The British Foreign Office considered any discussion on the subject "useless and dangerous" unless a definite line of frontier could be determined beforehand as a basis of discussion with China.⁴⁰ As a necessary preliminary to the Indian proposal, therefore, Younghusband was sent to make a survey of the northern frontiers with a view to determining the actual extent of Chinese influence, and to encourage them to occupy territories claimed by them.⁴¹

At Gilgit Durand was so anxious to complete the road to Nomal that he even urged the Government of India to bear its expenses, if the Kashmir Darbar should find it difficult to provide funds. In his opinion, the road was necessary not only

38. S.S. to G.I., 2 March 1888, PSDI/14, pp. 5-6; also, PSHC/99, pp. 1243-47.

39. *Supra*, Chap. VI, p. 324; Brackenbury to Bradford, 17 May 1889, PSDOC/2, First Series, p. 225(a).

40. Note by T.H. Sanderson, 10 Sept. 1890, F.O. 65/1394.

41. G.I. to S.S., 14 July 1890, and Encl. 1, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 557-61, (PSLEI/60, pp. 967-71); Younghusband, F.E. The Heart of a Continent, p. 291.

to keep Hunza in check, but also for any offensive action against a Russian force advancing towards Gilgit.⁴² Events soon justified his apprehensions. On 25 May 1891, Durand received the news that UZR Khan, son of the Raja of Nagar, had murdered his brothers Gauri Tham Khan and Ding Malik, and was planning to seize the Kashmir posts at Chalt and Chaprot. Two days later, when he heard that a Nagar official was on his way to occupy Chalt and Chaprot, Durand made a rapid march to Chalt with a small Kashmiri force, and occupied it. Finding their position untenable the Nagar forces dispersed without firing a shot. Soon, however, letters were received from Safdar Ali of Hunza announcing that he had always been subject to China, and if attacked by Durand he would fight till Chinese help arrived. This intention was disavowed shortly afterwards, and both Hunza and Nagar promised not to make any attack on Chalt or Chaprot. Durand refused to trust these assurances, and after making arrangements for holding the frontier outposts with a sufficient garrison of Kashmir troops, he returned to Gilgit.⁴³

42. Durand to Kashmir Resident, 2 March 1891, IFP/3962, July 1891, Cons. 37, pp. 28-30.

43. G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891 and Encl. 1 in it, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 985-94 (PSLEI/64, pp. 899-904); G.I. to SS., 6 Jan. 1892, Ibid./IB(v), pp. 3745 (IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 127, pp. 42-48; PSLEI/65) Kashmir Resident to India, 1 June 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(e), pp. 462-63, Durand A.G. op. cit., pp. 227-43; Knight, E.F. Where Three Empires Meet, p. 335.

But Durand was convinced that all that had been won was only a breathing space. He had no illusion about the promises made by the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar, and soon reported that it was believed on all sides that an attack on Chalt would be attempted during the winter.⁴⁴ So he applied to India for more British officers for the Agency,⁴⁵ and three lieutenants were soon sent up to Gilgit.⁴⁶ At the same time the Kashmir Resident was urged by the Government of India to "press de Bourbel about the Indus bridge and more important parts of the Gilgit road",⁴⁷ in order that there might not be any difficulties of communication between Gilgit and Srinagar in time of a crisis. Besides, the probability of disturbances breaking out again, and the obvious need for coming to a definite conclusion in regard to the manner in which the Hunza and Nagar States should be treated in future, led the Government of India to summon Durand to Simla in order to discuss the situation upon the northern frontier.⁴⁸

44. G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 985-986. (PSLEI/64, pp. 899-900).

45. Encl. 3 in Ibid., pp. 907-10.

46. Lieutenants, C.V.F. Townshend of Central India Horse, C.A. Molony of Royal Artillery, and J.M. Stewart, 5th Gurkhas. IFP/3962, Dec. 1891, Cons. 28-33, pp. 47-48.

47. India to Resident, 27 June 1891, Ibid. Cons. 33, p. 48.

48. G.I. to S.S., 6 January 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 37-45 (IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 127, pp. 42-48); Durand, A.G. op cit., p. 245.

Durand recommended that the first thing to be done to preserve British influence along the northern frontiers was to bring Hunza and Nagar under complete control. To do so, it was necessary, in his opinion, to build a proper fort at Chalt and to improve the road to that place from Gilgit. These measures, though certain to evoke protests from the Chiefs of these two states, must be carried out, and the Chiefs plainly told that while the Government of India had no intention to interfere in their internal affairs, they were determined to exercise a complete control over them, and to reserve to themselves the right to make roads into their country, and to place officers there, if that should appear desirable. At the least sign of opposition from these states, a force should be marched into their territories, and all opposition broken down. Of the two rulers, Durand was inclined to treat the Nagar Chief leniently, though not his son, Uzr Khan, whom he wanted to remove into exile. In Durand's opinion, Safdar Ali, the ruler of Hunza was more dangerous and faithless, and he demanded his immediate removal and substitution by a son of five or six years, backed by a Regency.⁴⁹ To strengthen the Gilgit Agency Durand recommended the increase

49. Durand's Memoranda, 4 and 14 Sept. 1891, Encls. 6 and 7 in G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1001-04, 1007-10 (PSLEI/64, pp. 921-24, 927-30).

of the Agency Guard by 200 Gurkhas, more guns, a telegraph line from Srinagar to Gilgit, and fourteen more officers for the Agency staff. This was considered necessary to train the Kashmir troops of the Agency so that they might be able to hold their own against any Russian advance.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, a new aspect had been given to the question of defence of the northern frontier by the arrival on the Pamirs of certain parties of Russians whose avowed object was to annex the Great, Little, and Alichur Pamirs.⁵¹ Their activities, as Younghusband reported, were very brisk,⁵² and officers from the Gilgit Agency were sent up to watch the Russian proceedings.⁵³ Matters came to a head when on 13 August 1891, Younghusband was expelled from Bozai Gumbaz on the Little Pamirs by a Russian Colonel, Yanoff.⁵⁴ Whether Bozai Gumbaz was within Afghan

50. Durand's Memo. of 4 Sept. 1891, Ibid.

51. Encls. 11 and 15 in G.I. to S.S., 8 Sept. 1891, Ibid., pp. 312 and 14 (PSLEI/63, pp. 1307&1372), India to British Ambassador, Peking. Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 65. For a discussion of the Pamir question, see Alder, J.G. British Policy on the Roof of the World, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Bristol, 1959.

52. Encls. 3 and 4 in G.I. to S.S., 8 Sept. 1891, Ibid., pp. 306-09.

53. Encl. 3 in Ibid., p. 306.

54. Encl. 25 in Ibid., pp. 325-26; Tel. from Viceroy, 3 Sept. 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 539-41; Younghusband, F.E. The Heart of a Continent, pp. 330-32; Seaver, G. Francis Younghusband, pp. 143-45; Curzon, G.N. The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus, p. 40.

territory, or in the debatable lands outside it, is another matter. It certainly was not in Russian possession, and the forcible expulsion of an accredited British officer was therefore considered by Lansdowne "a piece of great effrontery".⁵⁵ The authorities at the India Office were fully sympathetic to the Viceroy. Although it was apprehended

"that Younghusband's action would stir up the Russians to make some counter movement of their own",

it was never imagined that "it would take such an outrageously and lawless form".⁵⁶

Indeed, the Russian activities on the Pamirs created an awkward, if not dangerous, situation for the Indian Government. Especially their move to Bozai Gumbaz, if followed by annexation of that territory as Lansdowne apprehended, would bring the "Russians to the crest of the Hindoo Koosh passes".⁵⁷ The inconvenience of a Russian wedge, driven between Afghanistan

55. Lansdowne to Cross, 8 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 105-07; Indian Officer, Russia's March towards India, p. 261.
56. Bayley to Lansdowne, 17 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(c), p. 134; I.O. Memo., PSHC/124, p. 537. Russian officers on the spot told Younghusband that he was the cause of their appearance on the Pamirs. Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 98.
57. Tel. from Viceroy, 7 Sept. 1891, PSHC/125, p. 215.

and China, and touching the passes which lay to the north of Hunza and Nagar, was obvious. Lansdowne was afraid that these two states, restless and insubordinate of late, might be stirred to action by the recent Russian encroachment upon Bozai Gumbaz.⁵⁸ With this view of the Viceroy's Cross fully agreed. "I mistrust the Russians everywhere", he said, "and we cannot for a moment allow Hunza or Nagar to be disturbed".⁵⁹

Immediate measures were therefore taken to check further Russian encroachment south of the Hindu Kush, and to strengthen the Gilgit Agency. Manners-Smith, then acting for Durand at Gilgit, was asked not to allow the Russians to advance to Chitral or Hunza, nor to permit them to descend the Iskoman, Yasin or Chalt Valley.⁶⁰ Hunza and Chitral were warned that no foreign armed parties were to be allowed to cross the passes into their territory.⁶¹ To strengthen the Gilgit Agency

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58. Lansdowne to Cross, 8 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 105-07.
59. Cross to Lansdowne, 10 Oct. 1891, Ibid., pp. 70-72.
60. Resident to India, 24 August 1891, Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S., 8 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), p. 309 (PSLEI/63, p. 1367); I.O. to F.O., 31 August 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 73-74.
61. Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S., 16 December 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), p. 1183 (PSLEI/64, p. 1483); Manners-Smith to India, 18 Aug. 1891, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 8 Sept. 1891, Ibid., p. 306 (PSLEI/63, p. 1375); I.O. to F.O., 31 Aug. 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 773-74.

Durand's suggestion⁶² of an increase in the British Agent's guard by 200 Gurkhas was seriously considered. Roberts thought it was "most moderate",⁶³ and before long Lansdowne, with Cross's approval,⁶⁴ sent the required men to Gilgit along with two guns.⁶⁵ Lansdowne even hinted to Cross that it would be soon necessary to fortify Chalt to keep Hunza and Nagar under complete control.⁶⁶ As an answer to the Russian move upon the Pamirs, Roberts even wanted to visit Gilgit.⁶⁷ But Lansdowne did not like the idea lest it should give rise to misapprehension among the Russians. At any rate, he was unwilling to pay so great a compliment to Yanoff and his "bluffing announcements".⁶⁸ The Commander-in-Chief of India, he said, was "too high a card to trump the Russian Colonel with".⁶⁹ Even so, complaints

62. *Supra*, p. 358

63. Roberts to Durand, 9 Sept. 1891, Roberts Papers/100/7, p. 191.

64. S.S. to Viceroy, 14 Sept. 1891, PSHC/125, p. 217 (Lansdowne Papers/XI(b), p. 110)

65. Tel. from Viceroy, 11 Sept. 1891, *Ibid.*, p. 215; G.I. to S.S., 6 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 37-45; Knight, E.F. *op. cit.*, p. 336.

66. Lansdowne to Cross, 15 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 108-12.

67. Roberts to Lansdowne, 1 Sept. 1891, *Ibid.*/VII(f), p. 137.

68. Lansdowne to Roberts, 1 Sept. 1891, *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69; Lansdowne to Cross, 15 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 108-12.

69. Lansdowne to Brackenbury (Military Member of the Viceroy's Council), 1 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 69.

against Russian movements on the Pamirs were lodged at St. Petersburg , and Salisbury hoped that "proper reparation" would be offered by the Russian Government for the treatment to which Younghusband had been subjected.⁷⁰

As a further check upon Russian encroachment, Walsham, the British Ambassador at Peking, was instructed to impress upon the Chinese Government the importance of effectively occupying all that she claimed on the Pamirs. Lest, however, it should encourage her to claim a right upon the territories of Hunza, it was made clear at the same time that Hunza was within the British sphere of influence.⁷¹ A division of the disputed territory on the Pamirs between Afghanistan and China was even proposed by the British Foreign Office to the Chinese Legation in London.⁷² The Tsungli Yamen at Peking seemed to have reacted favourably at first to British proposals. The Chinese Governor at Kashgar was instructed to tell the Russians that their encroachment upon the Pamirs would not be tolerated,⁷³ and

70. Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 11 Sept. 1891, Ibid./XI(b), p. 108; (PSEC/125, p. 217) Younghusband, F.E. op. cit., p. 332
71. Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 31 Aug. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/XI(b), p. 103 (PSEC/124, p. 531); F.O. to Sieh Tajen (Chinese Minister in London), 31 August 1891, PSEC/124, pp. 443-45.
72. Sanderson to Halliday Macartney, 15 Aug. 1891, F.O. 65/1415.
73. George Macartney (On special duty at Kashgar) to India, 1 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 53.

Chinese officers visited the Alichur, Taghdumbash and the Great Pamirs to watch the Russian proceedings.⁷⁴ But with the lapse of time the early enthusiasm of the Yamen gradually cooled down, till by the middle of the next year it was bluntly declared that China had no wish to occupy any territory in the debatable land; and as

"England had no intention of advancing beyond the Hindu Kush, the only alternative seemed to be occupation by Russia."⁷⁵

But a rallying ground for Russia on the slopes of the Hindu Kush or the Pamirs that would enable her to make a forward move south of the mountain ranges was exactly what the Government of India was inclined to prevent. Accordingly, when Whitehall had begun to think in terms of a Pamir delimitation,⁷⁶ Lansdowne's Government proceeded to strengthen and control the states within the circle of the Gilgit Agency. In January 1891 the Mehtar of Chitral had applied to the Viceroy for an increase in his subsidy, so that he might be able to maintain a standing force of 2000 musketeers to be employed in guarding the passes leading into his country.⁷⁷ But neither Durand nor Prideaux

74. George Macartney to Mortimer Durand, 5 Dec. 1891, Ibid., pp. 217-18.

75. F.O. to Walsham, F.O. No. 73, 12 May 1892, F.O. 65/1437.

76. Memo. by Edmund Neel, 10 Sept. 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 933-35; S.S. to Viceroy, 12 Nov. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/XI(b), p.132.

77. Aman to Viceroy, 3 Jan. 1891, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 14 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 657-59 (PSLEI/64, pp. 243-45).

supported the Mehtar's application. Both of them suggested instead that it would suffice to present Aman-ul-Mulk with one hundred snider carbines, and that four Muslim non-commissioned officers should be deputed to instruct the men already carrying sniders in the Mehtar's service.⁷⁸ But the increasing activities of the Russians on the Pamirs led the Government of India to respond favourably to Aman's application. The suggestions for granting the Mehtar one hundred snider carbines and sending four Muslim officers to train his troops were of course approved. But in addition, the subsidy of the ruler of Chitral was raised from 6,000 to 12,000 rupees a year; and an annual gift of 1,500 rupees was sanctioned for each of his sons, Afzal and Nizam, and another of 1,000 for the youngest son Shah-i-Mulk. These allowances were granted on condition that the Mehtar would be guided by British advice on all matters, and accept a permanent British Resident officer in his country.⁷⁹

As regards Hunza and Nagar, Lansdowne fully agreed with Durand that it was necessary for the safety of the northern frontiers to bring these two states under complete control. Unless that was done, the ruler of Hunza, Lansdowne apprehended, might let a Russian force into his territories, within a few marches

78. Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 14 Oct. 1891, Ibid., pp. 660-62, (PSLEI/64, pp. 246-48).

79. India to Resident, 1 Oct. 1891, Encl. 8 in Ibid., pp. 663-64 (PSLEI/64, pp. 249-50).

of Gilgit. In Lansdowne's opinion, the reasons that led Dufferin's Government to refuse to recognise Chinese rights in Hunza⁸⁰ applied with double force in the case of Russia, and that power, he felt sure, must be kept off by all means from the territories of Safdar Ali.⁸¹ Both Cross and Salisbury approved of it,⁸² and the Viceroy instructed Durand to move troops to Chalt at the end of October 1891, in order to improve the road between that place and Gilgit, and to build a small fort at Chalt. At the same time, the Gilgit Agency was further strengthened by the increase of its staff,⁸³ and Durand was asked to address letters⁸⁴ to the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar, clearly impressing upon them that for the safety of Kashmir and its dependencies the British Government should have free access to their territories whenever it was required. Moreover, the Government of India reserved to themselves the right to build military roads through their territories as far as necessary

80. *Supra*, Chap. VI, pp. 335-36.

81. G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 985-86 (PSLEI/64, pp. 899-900); G.I. to S.S., 6 Jan. 1892, *Ibid.*/IB(v), pp. 37-45 (PSLEI/65, pp. 39-49, I.F.P./4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 127, pp. 42-48)

82. S.S. to G.I., 21 Sept. 1888 and encls. PSDI/14, pp. 53-56; Cross to Lansdowne, 1 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), pp. 70-72; Cross to Lansdowne, 15 Oct. 1891. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-77.

83. IFP/3962, Dec. 1891, Cons. 53 and 55, pp. 52-53.

84. Dated 29 Nov. 1891, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 253 (IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 51, pp. 23-24).

to secure the command of the Hindu Kush passes. Durand was asked to inform the Rajas that if they should refuse to comply with these demands, troops from Gilgit would march into their countries, put down all opposition by force, and construct the roads in spite of the opposition offered.⁸⁵

Personally, Lansdowne might have hoped that Hunza would submit without fight,⁸⁶ but in his official communications he never made a secret of it that Durand's instructions were "likely to lead to forcible resistance on the part of the Raja and eventually to his removal".⁸⁷ The Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, though recognising the necessity of bringing Hunza under control, thought that the removal of the Raja of Hunza was likely to produce serious complications with China. He apprehended that if Hunza be occupied, China would probably raise some claims and difficulties that might provoke her to aid the Russians in the Pamirs. Though Salisbury did not want to restrain the Government of India from taking any measures considered necessary for bringing Hunza under control, he yet urged the Viceroy to consider whether the object could be secured without

85. G.I. to S.S., 6 Jan 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 37-45 (PSLEI/65, pp. 39-49, IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 127, pp. 42-48). Sykes, P. op. cit., p. 184; Knight, E.F. op. cit., p. 336.

86. Lansdowne to Cross, 15 Sept. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IX(c), p. 108.

87. G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891 and Encls. 6 and 8, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 985-1010 (PSLEI/64, pp. 899-930); I.O. to F.O., 27 Nov. 1891, PSHC/126, pp. 107-110.

removing Safdar Ali or provoking any rupture with China on that account.⁸⁸ But Lansdowne was determined to teach Hunza a lesson if Safdar Ali should refuse to comply with the demands of the Gilgit Agent, and he felt sure that the Government of India would merely get into trouble if they should consult the Chinese Government "before inflicting a salutary punishment upon the two states".⁸⁹ In fact, both Cross and Lansdowne believed with Prideaux, the Kashmir Resident, that China

"has never exercised any effective control over Kunjut (Hunza) and it is clear that the alleged suzerainty is of a purely nominal character and carries no obligations with it." ⁹⁰

Durand was therefore asked to go ahead with his scheme of defence of the northern frontiers. Owing to difficulties of supply, work upon the Chalt road could not be begun until after the middle of November, but by then Durand had come to know that Hunza and Nagar troops had assembled near Chalt and threatened its security.⁹¹ Towards the end of November Durand reached Chalt

88. S.S. to Viceroy, 9 Dec. 1891, PSHC/126, p. 1195.

89. Lansdowne to Cross, 19 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 6-9 (Cross Papers/32, No. 163A).

90. Encl. 11 in G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), pp. 1013-14 (PSLEI/64).

91. Gilgit Diary, 21 Nov. 1891, IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 29, p. 18. For a running summary of the events, G.I. to S.S., 6 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 37-45.

and sent his ultimatum as proposed.⁹² But he received a defiant and abusive reply from Safdar Ali,⁹³ whereupon an advance was made on 2 December.⁹⁴ After some fighting Nilt was taken, but Durand himself was severely wounded. Pushing on rapidly the British forces occupied Nagar on 21 December, and Hunza the next day,⁹⁵ The Raja of Nagar made full submission, but his son, UZR Khan,⁹⁶ and

92. Kashmir Resident to India, 5 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 345; IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 15, p. 15. From a diplomatic point of view this ultimatum, as Stewart Bayley, the Political Secretary at the India Office, rightly pointed out, left much to be desired. It did not touch upon the previous breaches of agreement by Hunza, nor on the unprovoked hostilities which were attempted in the previous May. It dealt only with the rights conferred on the Indian Government by previous agreement. These rights which were granted in return for a fixed subsidy did not include either the right to make roads or to march troops through the territories of the two Chiefs. Bayley observed: "If we did not intend to punish them for previous aggressions or breach of agreement, we ought surely in demanding new concessions to have offered new terms in the shape of an increased subsidy." Note dated 25 Jan. 1892, PSM/A 83.
93. Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB (v), pp. 255-57 (PSLEI/65).
94. Kashmir Resident to India, 8 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 351 (IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 49, p. 23).
95. Kashmir Resident to India, 10 Dec. 1891, Ibid., p. 355.
96. Kashmir Resident to India, Ibid., p. 396.

Safdar Ali of Hunza fled to the mountains.⁹⁷ The defeat of the tribal Chiefs was complete - thanks to the Kashmir State troops of the Imperial Service Corps, who for the first time since the inauguration of the Imperial defence scheme, showed themselves capable of fighting side by side with the Indian troops.⁹⁸

Pending the orders of the Government of India as to the disposal of the defeated states Lieutenant Townshend was appointed Military Governor of Hunza.⁹⁹

As the news of the British occupation of Hunza reached the Chinese authorities they became anxious about the future arrangements there.¹⁰⁰ Even earlier, when they came to know of the intention of the Government of India to build a fort at Chalt, anxious enquiries were made by the Tsungli Yamen; and George Macartney, then on Special Duty at Kashgar, apprehended

97. IFP/4182, Jan. 1892, Cons. 105, p. 35. For the Hunza-Nagar Expedition, see Durand, A.G. op. cit. Chap. X, Knight, E.F. op. cit. Chaps. XXIV-XXVIII; Neve, A. op. cit. Chap. XV. Before long, Safdar Ali escaped to Chinese Turkistan. Sykes, P. op. cit. p. 185.
98. G.I. to S.S., 6 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 37-45; Viceroy to Maharaja, 1 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(g), p. 4.
99. Kashmir Resident to India, 30 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/VII(f), p. 400.
100. George Macartney to Mortimer Durand, 31 Jan. 1892, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 27 April 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 357-58; also, Encls. 12 and 13 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Ibid., pp. 267-73.

trouble with China on account of Hunza.¹⁰¹ Later the Taotai¹⁰² of Kashgar intimated to Durand that he was sending a Chinese Envoy to Gilgit to discuss the future of Hunza.¹⁰³ Durand suggested, and the Government of India agreed with him, that the Chinese representative might be allowed a passage and to make any representation, with which the Taotai might have charged him; but on no account should he be permitted to deal directly with the Rajas of Hunza and Nagar.¹⁰⁴ The Taotai, however, was assured of the friendly sentiments of the British Government for the Chinese, and was told that the British interference in Hunza, which was within the sphere of influence of the Government of India, in no way marked any departure from their traditional policy of friendship with the Chinese Empire.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile, Cross too had become equally anxious to know what arrangements the Viceroy had in mind for the resettlement of Hunza and Nagar.¹⁰⁶ In the absence of a legitimate adult from

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101. Macartney to India, 24 Oct. 1891. Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Ibid., pp. 249-50.
102. Governor in Civil and Military charge.
103. Kashmir Resident to India, 13 March 1892, Encl. 9 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 265.
104. Encls. 10 and 11 in Ibid., p. 265; sub. encl. in Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 16 March 1892, Ibid., pp. 231-32.
105. India to Taotai, 17 March 1892, Encl. 15 in G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1892, Ibid., p. 277.
106. Cross to Lansdowne, 8 Jan. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 1-3.

the ruling family as Safdar Ali's successor Durand suggested that until the complete restoration of order and stability at Hunza, a military force should be retained there, and a Political Officer deputed to supervise the general administration of the country. Otherwise, the administration would remain under Wazir Humayun, half brother and a rival of Safdar Ali's, as Governor of the state, who would work in subordination to the Political Officer. The subsidies hitherto paid to both the states should in the altered circumstances be altogether stopped, and the State of Nagar ought to be restored, as a matter of clemency, to Jafar Khan who indeed took no leading part in the recent fighting, and was under the complete tutelage of his son, UZR Khan.¹⁰⁷

Lansdowne was in complete agreement with the views of the Gilgit Agent, and soon issued instructions to implement the measures recommended. It was further provided that the cost of the administration of the two countries would be met from the revenues of the state, and if they should prove inadequate for the making of roads or the execution of similar works necessary for imperial purposes, the Government of India would be willing to spend on those accounts the sums hitherto enjoyed by the rulers of Hunza

107. Durand to Kashmir Resident, 20 Jan. 1892, sub-encl. in Encl. 1 to G.I. to S.S., 16 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 231-33. UZR Khan was deported to Kashmir, Durand, A.G. op. cit., p. 265; also, Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S., 31 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 592.

and Nagar as subsidies.¹⁰⁸ The arrangement made was "looked upon as merely a temporary expedient", and Lansdowne hoped that before long it would be possible to find a suitable candidate from the reigning family to succeed Safdar Ali, who must never be allowed to return to Hunza as its ruler.¹⁰⁹

It was not long before a new ruler for the State of Hunza was found in the person of Muhammad Nazim Khan, a legitimate son of the former Raja Ghazan Khan who was murdered by Safdar Ali. In a duly attested will of his father's, recently discovered at Hunza, Nazim was recognised as heir to the Chiefship. Although he was a man of ordinary intellect and capacity, his appointment, as Captain Stewart, the Political Officer at Gilgit, ascertained, was likely to be popular. Both Prideaux and Durand agreed with Stewart, and Lansdowne accepted their recommendation in favour of Nazim Khan.¹¹⁰ But meanwhile the question of interposition of the Chinese authorities in the matter of the Hunza settlement had become a subject of discussion in London. Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, was very anxious to avoid any complications with China, because on imperial considerations he "especially"

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108. Cross to Lansdowne, 9 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 26-28. (Cross Papers/32, No. 170A); G.I. to S.S., 16 March 1892, and Encl. 2, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 225-26, 239-40.
109. G.I. to S.S., 16 March 1892, Ibid. The measures recommended by Lansdowne in this despatch were approved by Cross in S.S. to G.I., 29 April 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ix), p. 437 (PSDI/18, pp. 187-89).
110. G.I. to S.S., 31 May 1892, and Encl. 9, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 577-78, pp. 601-04 (PSLEI/66).

wanted to be on good terms with that country.¹¹¹ The Chinese Legation in London made the most of this weakness,¹¹² and prevailed upon Salisbury to secure his consent to Chinese participation in Hunza affairs when a new man was to be set up.¹¹³ Lansdowne's Government was not very willing to concede on this point,¹¹⁴ but they agreed when two explicit reservations were obtained by the Foreign Secretary : first that the Chinese representative was only to be there as witness and by express invitation from the Viceroy; and secondly, that Chinese participation on this occasion would not be considered a precedent for a similar claim on future occasions.¹¹⁵ The formal installation of Nazim as Raja of Hunza had to be deferred till the

111. Cross to Lansdowne, 10 March 1892, and Encl. 9, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 15-17. In Salisbury's opinion, it was a matter of great importance to have the friendship and goodwill of China, and he considered it worthwhile to purchase that friendship and goodwill even at the expense of slight inconvenience. F.O. to I.O., 5 March 1892, PSHC/128, pp. 651-56; F.O. 65/1436.
112. Correspondence between F.O. and I.O., Aug. 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 181-201.
113. Cross to Lansdowne, 18 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 17-18.
114. This greatly irritated Salisbury, and he even complained that the Viceroy was subordinating imperial to local interest and treating China as though she were "some weak and petty frontier state". F.O. to I.O., 7 March 1892, PSHC/128, pp. 671-82. Lansdowne of course never admitted of these charges. Lansdowne to Cross, 3 Feb. 1892. Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), p. 16.
115. Ibid., Cross to Lansdowne, 1 April, 1892, Ibid., pp. 21-22; India to Resident, 12 May 1892, Encl. 17 in G.I. to S.S., 31 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 625-26.

middle of September 1892. When the ceremony was performed, China was represented by Brevet Brigadier-General Chang Hung Chow, but only as an "honoured spectator" and not as an active participant.¹¹⁶

In spite of the Government of India's warning to the Amir in 1891¹¹⁷ he did not relax his activities upon the Bajaur frontiers. The negotiations of the Indian authorities with Umra Khan¹¹⁸ provoked the Amir's jealousy and he continued to support the opponents of the Chief of Jandol.¹¹⁹ Toward the end of 1891 a deliberate move was taken by the Amir's Commander-in-Chief, Ghulam Haidar Khan, in the direction of Bajaur.¹²⁰ Finally, at the beginning of 1892, having secured as his allies the Khans of Nawagai and Dir, both of whom were at enmity with Umra Khan, Ghulam Haidar seemed to have resolved to advance into Bajaur. Toward the end of January, Lansdowne was therefore obliged to warn the Amir that the Government of India could never permit

116. Encls. 1 and 5 in G.I. to S.S., 6 September 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 523-25 (PSLEI/67); Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 7 Dec. 1892, Ibid., pp. 1161-64 (PSLEI/68).

117. Supra, pp. 349-50.

118. Supra, p. 350.

119. G.I. to S.S., 16 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers, Ibid., pp. 283-306.

120. Encls. 1-3 in G.I. to S.S., 24 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 549-51 (PSLEI/66).

his interference in the affairs of Bajaur.¹²¹ The Amir replied that the Bajaur question was to remain in abeyance till he met the Viceroy or received a British Mission to discuss it. At the same time he declared that "Asmar as a matter of urgency should be occupied, because it was the frontier of the country and was included in the limits of Kunar."¹²² Meanwhile, the Khan of Asmar, whose daughter was betrothed to the Amir's son, Habibulla Khan, had died, leaving an infant son to succeed him. At this juncture, Asmar was suddenly occupied by Umra Khan who placed his nominee, Jan Khan, a brother of the late Khan of Asmar, upon the throne. This enraged the Amir, and consequently, Ghulam Haidar marched to Asmar and occupied the country, whence he threatened Jandol and the rest of Bajaur.¹²³ The Amir was therefore warned again not to invade Bajaur, and told that the Government of India could not recognise his rights to Asmar. In fact, he was even asked to vacate the Khan's territories, but Abdur Rahman pointedly refused to give up Asmar, and reiterated his determination to chastise

121. Viceroy's Kharita to the Amir, 29 Jan. 1892, Encl. 7 in Ibid.
122. Amir to Viceroy, 25 Feb. 1892, Encl. 9 in Ibid.; G.I. to S.S., 16 August 1892, Ibid./IB(vi), pp. 283-306. The question of Asmar belonging to Bajaur was rather dubious. Gazetteers said it was a part of Bajaur, but the Punjab Frontier Officers asserted that it was not. Encl. 14 in G.I. to S.S., 24 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 559.
123. G.I. to S.S., 16 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 283-306, Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 24 May 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), p. 549.

Umra Khan, if the latter should try to create trouble in Asmar, or even in Nawagai.¹²⁴

The authorities on Indian affairs in London and Simla agreed that the Amir's occupation of Asmar had indeed created a risky situation for Lansdowne's Government.¹²⁵ It had brought him to within forty miles of Aman-ul-Mulk's capital whence he could threaten the link between Peshawar and Chitral.¹²⁶ At any rate, it was bound to engender a sense of general uneasiness, if not really "very serious troubles" among the tribes.¹²⁷ The Viceroy was therefore inclined to turn the Amir out of Asmar, but his Council "was a good deal divided upon the point".¹²⁸ Roberts of course agreed with the Viceroy that the Amir should be asked to vacate Asmar,¹²⁹ but the opposition of the Council decided Lansdowne to content himself with a warning that any further breach of the peace in the Bajaur region, if attributable to the Amir's aggression, would force the Government of India to

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124. Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 9 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 257-58. Encls. 2-3 in G.I. to S.S., 13 Sept. 1892, Ibid., pp. 779-81.
125. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 8 Sept. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), p. 57; Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 Oct. 1892, Ibid., p. 128; Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 Nov. 1892, Ibid., p. 142.
126. Roberts to Duke of Cambridge, 11 May 1892, Roberts Papers/100/3, p. 279.
127. G.I. to S.S., 16 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 283-306.
128. Lansdowne to Cross, 28 June 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), p. 76.
129. Notes dated 7 and 25 July 1892, Roberts Papers/96/2, p. 1183, and p. 1189.

ask him to vacate the territory.¹³⁰ Even so, he could not still admit the Amir's claim to Asmar,¹³¹ and only deferred the issue till the time came for "a general squaring of accounts with him."¹³² Evidently, Lansdowne's prime interest was to preserve the peace of the northern frontiers, and both Chitral and Jandol were warned to refrain from hostile activities against the Amir.¹³³

The misunderstanding with Abdur Rahman about Asmar was one of several points that led Lansdowne to write to the Home Government for their sanction to a British Mission to Kabul for a settlement of frontier questions. Roberts was to be the head of the Mission, and its object was to lay down the frontier between Afghanistan and India in such a manner that British control over the independent tribes on the north-west frontier from Baluchistan to Chitral could be well-secured.¹³⁴ The proposal of course was not the first of its kind. Abdur Rahman himself was

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130. G.I. to S.S., 16 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 283-306.
131. Lansdowne's Memo. on the relations with the Amir, 11 July 1892, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 486-92.
132. Lansdowne to Ardagh, 6 June 1892, Ardagh Papers/Box File 2.
133. Encls. 3 and 4 in G.I. to S.S., 9 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 259-60.
134. G.I. to S.S., 16 August 1892, and Encl. Ibid., pp. 283-306, and pp. 311-12.

eager to receive such a mission. In the course of the last two years he had twice asked for it so as to have the outstanding frontier issues between the two countries properly settled.¹³⁵ Even then, owing to his pre-occupations with the Hazara rebellion - and no less for his personal dislike of Roberts, the hero of the Second Afghan War,¹³⁶ - Abdur Rahman expressed his inability to receive the British Mission, and postponed its despatch.¹³⁷ Lansdowne was eager to press for an early reception of the mission,¹³⁸ but Kimberley advised caution.¹³⁹ As a result, the Amir was allowed to retain his troops at Asmar pending a settlement

135. Amir to Viceroy, 3 Sept. 1890, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 31 Dec. 1890, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ii), pp. 1045-46; Amir to Viceroy, 8 Feb. 1891, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 18 March 1891, Ibid./IB(iii), pp. 721-23.
136. Khan, Sultan M. (Ed.) Autobiography of Abdur Rahman, Vol.II, pp. 155-56. Compare what Lansdowne wrote to Kimberley, 12 Oct. 1892 : "You need, I think, have no fear as to the manner in which Roberts will conduct the negotiations. There is a sort of idea - I think one or two of my colleagues in Council are possessed with it - that he is burning to pick a quarrel with the Amir, and to annex a part of Afghanistan before he vacates his present appointment. No suspicion could be more absurd." Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 120-24.
137. Amir to Viceroy, 3 August 1892, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 13 Sept. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 799-802.
138. G.I. to S.S., 13 Sept. 1892, Ibid., pp. 793-94.
139. Ibid.; Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 23 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers/XI(c), p. 940.

of all the frontier questions which, the Viceroy hoped, would be effected at no distant date.¹⁴⁰

If the Afghan occupation of Asmar led directly to the question of demarcation of the Indo-Afghan frontiers, it was the Amir's activities on the Pamirs that raised the question of their delimitation. In fact, throughout 1891-92 Abdur Rahman had been busy securing his hold over his eastern frontiers, and acquiring as much territory as possible, so that at the time of delimitation, he could claim all that was in his effective possession.¹⁴¹ He was playing the same game as the Russians were to the north of Hindu Kush and the British to the south of it. It was indeed this triangular contest for territorial possessions and spheres of influence in which lay the logic of both the Durand and Pamir delimitations.

Somatash, a small place on the Alichur Pamir, was abandoned by the Chinese to the Afghans in 1885. Ney Elias found it in the possession of the Afghans,¹⁴² but early in 1891,

140. Viceroy to Amir, 29 August 1892, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 13 Sept. 1892, *Ibid.*, pp. 802-04.

141. Sykes, P. *op. cit.*, p. 202.

142. Report of a Mission, p. 28; Younghusband to India, 23 Nov. 1890, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S. 11 March 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iii), pp. 703-09 [PSDOC/3 (First series) pp. 257-63].

Younghusband, pursuant perhaps to his instructions to encourage Chinese occupation of the debatable land in the Pamirs, had secured the withdrawal of the Afghan force from Somatash. This created an embarrassing situation, as the Amir forthwith complained against Younghusband's action, with the result that the Government of India was obliged to disown it.¹⁴³ Towards the end of 1891 an Afghan force returned to Somatash, and in the face of Yanoff's threat,¹⁴⁴ both the Chinese and the Afghans worked in co-operation for sometime. But this unnatural alliance was soon dissolved when the Afghans in early 1892 forced the Chinese to withdraw, and occupied Somatash. This evoked a protest from the Chinese, and the Government of India again found itself in an awkward position.¹⁴⁵

The situation seemed to deteriorate because, soon afterwards, the Amir advanced a claim to Bozai Gumbaz.¹⁴⁶ Since

143. Encls. 3 and 5 in Ibid., pp. 703-13.

144. Supra, pp. 359-62.

145. Salisbury to Walsham, 16 June 1892, F.O. 65/1438, F.O. to I.O., 27 June 1892, PSHC/131, pp. 381-82; also, G.I. to S.S., 14 Dec. 1892, 22 March 1893, 15 August 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), (vii) and (viii), pp. 1193-1212, 491-514, 273-90.

146. Resident to India, 27 June 1892, Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 19 July 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 21-23.

Younghusband's expulsion from that territory¹⁴⁷ the Government of India had been unable to determine whether Bozai actually belonged to Afghanistan or the so-called no-man's land beyond the Afghan frontiers. When the complaint against Yanoff was initially made at St. Petersburg, it was claimed that Bozai Gumbaz was in Afghan Wakhan.¹⁴⁸ But only a few days later it was affirmed that Bozai lay beyond Afghan territories.¹⁴⁹ The vacillation of the Indian Government not only irritated the Foreign Office in London;¹⁵⁰ it exasperated the Amir as well, and his sullen wrath found expression when he was afterwards turned out of Somatash by the Russians.¹⁵¹ The misunderstanding about the ownership of Bozai Gumbaz coupled with the Amir's activities at Somatash necessitated a clear understanding about the extent of Afghan territories on the Pamirs, and Salisbury was quick to point it out to the India Office.¹⁵² Lansdowne, of course, was aware of

147. Supra, p. 358.

148. Tels. from Viceroy, 3 and 7 Sept. 1891, PSHC/124, p. 539, and PSHC/125, p. 215.

149. I.O. to F.O., 21 Sept. 1891, PSHC/124, p. 1105, Tel. from Viceroy, 20 Sept. 1891, Ibid., p. 1107.

150. F.O. to I.O., 31 Dec. 1891, PSHC/126, pp. 1117-41.

151. Encl. 21 in G.I. to S.S., 21 Sept. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 830-33 (PSLEI/67), Infra, pp. 387-88.

152. F.O. to I.O., 31 Dec. 1891, PSHC/126, pp. 1117-41.

it,¹⁵³ but his difficulties were that it was not easy to reconcile the interests of China and Afghanistan on the Pamirs in order to keep the Russians out. As already mentioned, after the policy of encouraging the Amir to extend his territories in the direction of the Pamirs was discarded by the Home authorities in 1888, Lansdowne pursued a new line - that of setting up a Chinese Wall against the Russians.¹⁵⁴ But the Chinese soon proved to be "a broken reed to lean upon",¹⁵⁵ and the existing gap between their territories and the Afghan remained as usual a stern reality. It was not the policy of Lansdowne's Government, nor of the Home authorities, to acquire any land upon the Pamirs, and Russia made the most of this anomalous situation. Indeed, the only solution seemed to be the delimitation of the disputed territories.

Even if the ownership of Bozai Gumbaz was uncertain, the English Foreign Office had been busy pressing St. Petersburg^h for an apology for Yanoff's conduct in expelling Younghusband.¹⁵⁶

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153. Encl. 19 in G.I. to S.S., 16 Dec. 1891, Lansdowne Papers/IB(iv), p. 1225 (PSLEI/64).
154. Supra, pp. 352-53.
155. Tel. from Walsham to F.O., 29 Jan. 1892, PSHC/127, pp. 1023-25; Kimberley to Lansdowne, 8 Sept. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 57-58; Supra, p. 363.
156. Correspondence between I.O. and F.O., Sept. 1891, PSHC/124, pp. 933-65; also, Seaver, G. Francis Younghusband, pp. 145-46.

The Russian Government was "very obstinate at first", but subsequently offered a "full apology".¹⁵⁷ Both Cross and Lansdowne were exceedingly happy "with the Russian amende", and congratulated Morier, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, for admirably handling the whole question.¹⁵⁸ But before long a fresh Russian move on the Pamirs was made. Even as early as January 1892, reports were received of a possible Russian advance on the Pamirs in the next spring.¹⁵⁹ This was confirmed early in March when George Macartney informed that preparations were apace in Russian Turkistan.¹⁶⁰ Within two weeks 300 Russians were on the Pamirs,¹⁶¹ and on 22 June Yanoff drove the Afghans out of Somatash.¹⁶²

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157. Cross to Lansdowne, 4 Feb. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), p. 7; The Times, 26 Feb. 1892; Lansdell, H. Chinese Central Asia, p. 73.
158. Cross to Lansdowne, 25 March 1892, Ibid., pp. 19-20, Lansdowne to Cross, 2 March 1892, Ibid., p. 25.
159. Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 27 April 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(v), pp. 367-68.
160. Encl. 6 in Ibid., pp. 375-76.
161. Kashmir Resident to India, 25 April 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(g), pp. 268-69.
162. G.I. to S.S., 21 Sept. 1892, and enclosures, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 823-34; Resident to India, 2 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), p. 86; Tel. from Viceroy, 23 Aug. 1892, PSHC/132, pp. 157-59; Curzon, G.N. op. cit., p. 46; Indian Officer, op. cit., pp. 265-66.

This was a repetition of Bozai Gumbaz, but the effect it produced was far greater.¹⁶³ Delimitation of course had been talked of after Younghusband's expulsion from Bozai, but beyond that there was no more enthusiasm, nor even at Whitehall. Cross was "much astonished that no question has been asked upon the subject in either House of Parliament",¹⁶⁴ and after the first impulse had subsided, the British Foreign Office was positively lukewarm.¹⁶⁵ All that was really insisted on was a formal apology, and when that was obtained, the authorities at Whitehall and Simla looked contented. But after the Russian occupation of Somatash not only was delimitation considered to be the basic minimum,¹⁶⁶ but an independent Commission by England in the event of Russia disagreeing to delimitation was also discussed.¹⁶⁷

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163. British newspapers teemed with news-articles on the Pamir incident. See for instance, The Times, Sept. 1892. This also finds support in Kimberley to Lansdowne, 13 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 69-72.
164. Cross to Lansdowne, 25 March 1892, Ibid., pp. 19-20.
165. F.O. to I.O., 31 Dec. 1892, PSHC/126, pp. 1117-41.
166. Within almost a week, Stewart Bayley, Political Secretary at the I.O., urged that the F.O. should take up the question of delimitation with the Russian Government at St. Petersburg without delay. Note dated 1 July 1892. PSM/A87.
167. Viceroy to S.S., 9 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 88-89; Kimberley to Lansdowne, 1 Sept. 1892, and 8 Sept. 1892, Ibid., pp. 56-58, Tel. 4, Rosebery to Morier, 19.1.93, PSHC/135, p. 725.

The idea, however, was not pushed to an extreme owing to the obvious difficulties of the Pamir situation. The fact is, that the entire question of division of territories in this region was so inextricably mixed up with the Agreement of 1873¹⁶⁸ that any hasty decision was likely to lead to serious complications. That agreement neither justified the Amir's acquisition of the trans-Oxus provinces of Roshan and Shignan, nor did it support his pretensions to territories on the Pamirs to the east of Wood's Lake. Besides, the idea of a Chinese Wall, as already discussed, had completely broken down, and ~~the~~ British policy was not to acquire territories on the Pamirs.¹⁶⁹ Was then the entire region outside the limits of the agreement of 1873 to be surrendered to Russia as China had suggested,¹⁷⁰ and Russian territories allowed to be coterminous with the limits of the Indian Empire to the north? This certainly was a question which could not be easily answered. At any rate, it was contrary to the traditional British policy in Central Asia. Diplomacy, therefore, became the handmaid of British policy in keeping Russia out of the Pamirs. Lansdowne suggested that the British Foreign Office should secure Yanoff's withdrawal by diplomatic pressure

168. Supra, p. 353.

169. Supra, p. 382.

170. Supra, p. 363.

at St. Petersburg, and arrange for joint delimitation.¹⁷¹

On 5 September 1892, Kimberley passed the Viceroy's suggestion on to Rosebery, the new Foreign Secretary.¹⁷² The very next day the latter instructed Morier to press for delimitation.¹⁷³

The Russo-Afghan collision at Somatash stirred the Government of India to action. Roberts suggested sending a British Officer to the Pamirs to watch the proceedings of the Russians, but Lansdowne opposed the idea, and preferred to wait till the results of the Pamir negotiations should be known.¹⁷⁴ Even so, he acknowledged that the recent action of the Russians in the Pamirs rendered the further strengthening of the Gilgit Agency absolutely essential.¹⁷⁵ Not that Lansdowne seriously believed in the possibility of a Russian invasion from this quarter.¹⁷⁶ In this respect, he fully shared the opinion of his Commander-in-Chief that any large scale attempt by the Russians to descend upon the southern slopes of the mountain barrier was likely to prove

171. Tel. from Viceroy, 1 Sept. 1892, PSHC/132, pp. 415-17.

172. I.O. to F.O., 5 Sept. 1892, Ibid., pp. 413-14.

173. Rosebery to Morier, 6 Sept. 1892, Ibid., pp. 1541-43.

174. Lansdowne to Cross, 9 Aug. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 88-89.

175. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 5 Oct. 1892, and 26 Oct. 1892, Ibid., pp. 116-20, 128-30; G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 897-903.

176. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 Nov. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 139-43.

futile.¹⁷⁷ But both were in complete agreement that small and lightly equipped bodies of troops under officers of the Yanoff type could easily set at unrest the tribes upon the northern frontiers.¹⁷⁸ The only remedy, as Roberts had suggested, was to extend and consolidate British influence upon the neighbouring Chiefships, and Lansdowne agreed that the way to do that was to strengthen further the British Agency at Gilgit. As Lansdowne observed, the Gilgit outpost of the Indian Empire ought to be "a centre of British influence" upon the northern frontiers of Kashmir.¹⁷⁹

The Viceroy's conviction was strengthened by a recent declaration by the Amir of his intention to withdraw from eastern Wakhan, a territory to which he could legitimately lay his claims according to the Agreement of 1873. Dissatisfied with the Pamir policy of the Indian Government,¹⁸⁰ the Amir announced his decision in July 1892, shortly after the discomfiture of his

177. Ibid., Note by Roberts on Gilgit, 2 May 1892, Roberts Papers/96/2, pp. 1113-15.

178. Ibid.

179. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 Nov. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 139-43.

180. Supra, p. 381.

troops at Somatash.¹⁸¹ Lansdowne immediately saw the danger of his proposed move. It would at once widen the gap between the Afghan and the Chinese frontiers upon the Pamirs which it had been the object of the Indian Government to seal against a Russian encroachment since the time of Dufferin's administration.¹⁸² Thereby the Russians would be better able "to establish themselves at the foot of the Hindu Kush", and disturb the peace of the tribal regions, situated to the south of it.¹⁸³

Nearer home, it was the hostile attitude of the Chilas State towards the Gilgit Agency that decided the Government of India to reinforce it. Practically since the establishment of the British Agency in 1889 the Chilas had maintained a persistent attitude of hostility towards it. At the end of 1891 they openly assumed an attitude of defiance, threatened to murder the news-writer of the Kashmir Darbar, and actually expelled him from their country.¹⁸⁴ Nothing could be done then as Durand was busy with

181. Lansdowne to Cross, 26 July and 9 August 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 82-84 and pp. 88-89; Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 12 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 883-92.

182. *Supra*, p. 353.

183. G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 897-903.

184. Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, *Ibid.*, pp. 917-24; also Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Feb. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), pp. 383-84, (PSLEI/69).

the Hunza affairs. But soon after the termination of the Hunza campaign Durand suggested that the time had come to remove the Chilasi menace, enforce a British official on them, and secure if necessary a right to construct a road through their territory.¹⁸⁵ But Brackenbury, the Military Member in Lansdowne's Council, was opposed to any such move,¹⁸⁶ and eventually, upon Prideaux's advice, it was decided not to take any immediate action. The Resident advised

"that instead of being dealt with as an isolated question, the policy to be adopted with the Indus Valley tribes should be treated as forming part of the general policy to be followed in regard to the north-western and northern frontiers of India."¹⁸⁷

Even so, both Prideaux and Durand recommended that the Gilgit Agency should be further strengthened to control the tribes and states along the northern frontier of Kashmir.¹⁸⁸ Their views were fully shared by Roberts,¹⁸⁹ and Lansdowne was not slow to

185. Gilgit Agent to Kashmir Resident, 19/21 March 1892, sub-encl. in Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892. Ibid.
186. Brackenbury to Lansdowne, 21 March 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(g), p. 185.
187. Kashmir Resident to India, 13 April 1892, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp.917-19.
188. Encl. 6 in Ibid., pp. 929-33.
189. Note dated 14 April 1892, Roberts Papers/96/2, pp. 1101-03.

come to the conclusion that it would at least be necessary to increase the Gilgit staff by 2 Political Officers - one for Hunza and Nagar, and another for Chitral - and 4 Military Officers. No increase in the number of troops was demanded, as the Kashmir Imperial garrison for the defence of Gilgit was considered adequate. But in Lansdowne's opinion, they were still "rather poor stuff" to be left to themselves, and required to be guided by British officers.¹⁹⁰ As for the Political Officers, Lansdowne explained that

"the near approach of the Russians renders it necessary for us to keep Political Officers in both Chitral and Hunza, to obtain early information and to counteract Russian activity."¹⁹¹

Two members of Lansdowne's Council, Barbour and Crosthwaite, dissented from the measures recommended by the majority. They argued that the measures were likely to involve the Government in heavy expenditure and "serious difficulties", the nature of which, of course, was not explained. They did not believe that the Russian danger was really so serious as it was thought to be, and even then, the only way to counteract it was for the Home

190. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 124-27.
191. G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 897-903.

Government to come to a speedy settlement with Russia as regarded the Pamir boundaries.¹⁹² Lansdowne, however, was resolved to go ahead with his scheme of defence. With the support of the majority of his Council, his Commander-in-Chief, the Kashmir officials, and, most of all, his Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand,¹⁹³ the Viceroy ordered the officers to proceed to Gilgit in anticipation of the sanction of the Secretary of State for India.¹⁹⁴

As Lansdowne anticipated, his recommendations were received at the India Office with mixed feelings. There was an undercurrent of sympathy with "the general attitude of the protesting members." Even then it was difficult to deny "that

192. Minute of dissent appended to Government of India's letter of 19 Oct. 1892, Ibid., pp. 905-12.
193. Durand to Lansdowne, 18 Sept. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), pp. 218-19; also, vide, Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p.182. There was a feeling in certain quarters that it was Sir Mortimer Durand who was inspiring Lansdowne to pursue a forward policy on the northern frontiers. Brackenbury warned the Viceroy : "I have again heard it said, that Sir Mortimer Durand will never rest till he has brought about the conquest of the whole territory of the tribes lying on both banks of the Indus from Peshawar to Gilgit," Brackenbury to Lansdowne, 3 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(i), p. 278(b).
194. G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 897-903.

on the general question of increasing the Agent's staff the Government of India have made out a good case."¹⁹⁵ Kimberley was "reluctantly obliged to admit that we cannot safely leave such points as Chitral, Hunza and Nagar, and the Indus Valley tribes open to" the Russians.¹⁹⁶ Sanction to Lansdowne's proposals was, therefore, ultimately given. But since Kimberley apprehended the annexation of territories upon the northern frontiers,¹⁹⁷ the Viceroy was urged to see to it that his officers did not unnecessarily interfere in the affairs of the tribes to the north of Kashmir, and that they were restrained from "the tendency to multiply political relations and responsibilities" in that region.¹⁹⁸

Events soon justified Kimberley's apprehensions. In October 1892 the headmen of the small state of Gor came to

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195. Lansdowne to Godley (permanant Under Secretary of State for India), 12 Nov. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(d), pp. 100-02. Bayley's Minute on the Reorganisation of the Gilgit Agency, 17 Nov. 1892, PSM/A88 (PSDI/18, pp. 339-53).
196. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 24 Nov. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX (d), pp. 83-84.
197. Ibid.
198. S.S. to G.I., 2 Dec. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(ix), pp. 503-06. In the original I.O. draft Lansdowne's measures without the previous consent of the Secretary of State were even criticised as "embarrassing and irregular". PSDI/18, pp. 355-62.

Gilgit, and asked that they might be visited by a British Officer. Their object was to cultivate closer relations with the Gilgit authorities, and to come to some arrangement by which they might be protected from the marauding proclivities of the neighbouring Chilasis. Both Durand and Robertson considered the invitation "too good an opportunity" to establish closer relations with the tribes.¹⁹⁹ Prideaux regarded it as "very important",²⁰⁰ and Lansdowne's sanction for a mission to Gor was easily obtained.²⁰¹ Accordingly, on 11 November, Surgeon-Major Robertson started for Gor with a small escort. It was arranged that some of the Gor elders should go in advance and inform the Chilasis of the peaceful nature of Robertson's visit. That the Goris did not, and Robertson's movements aroused the suspicion of the Chilasi tribes. It soon transpired that the tribes meant to attack the British party. This put Robertson in a difficult position, but he considered retreat to be dangerous. So he pushed on and took the small Chilasi village of Thalpen. On 30 November, having meanwhile been reinforced, he took Chilas after a heavy fight. A garrison of 300 Kashmir Imperial Service troops was left at

199. Encl. 1 with sub-encl. in G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 69-73 (PSLEI/70).

200. Ibid.

201. Encl. 4 in G.I. to S.S., 15 Feb. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), p. 385.

Chilas under Major Daniell, and the construction of a mule road from Gilgit was taken in hand. Durand considered it necessary to maintain the position, partly for the security of Gilgit, and partly because withdrawal might precipitate a tribal uprising.²⁰²

The Government of India at first consented only to a temporary occupation till peace was completely restored. But events soon forced them to change their decision. Perhaps the increasing activities of the British garrison at Chilas let the tribes suspect that the occupation would be a permanent one. Whatever it was, early in March 1893 a body of over 1200 tribesmen attacked the fort at Chilas. The attack was repulsed, but Daniell lost his life in the fight. The troops in Chilas were then strongly reinforced, and the mule road from Gilgit was completed.²⁰³ Meanwhile, both Barr, the Kashmir Resident, and Durand had strongly recommended that Chilas, like Hunza and Nagar, should be brought under the absolute control of the Gilgit

202. G.I. to S.S., 15 Feb. 1893 and enclosures thereto. Ibid., pp. 375-400, Durand, A.G. op. cit., pp. 273-82, Bruce, C.G. Twenty Years in the Himalaya, pp. 195-209.

203. G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63; Extract in P.P. 1895, LXXII, (C.7864), pp. 498-500; Gilgit Agent to India, 7 March 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(i), p. 184(a); Bayley's Memo. on Gilgit Agency, Chilas and Chitral, n.d. PSM/A92, Durand, A.G. op. cit., pp. 284-89; Bruce, C.G. op. cit., pp. 210-11; Neve, A. Thirty Years in Kashmir, p. 129.

Agency by keeping troops in that country, and reserving at the same time the right of the British Government to construct roads through the territory of Chilas.²⁰⁴

By this time the situation at Chitral had also taken a sudden turn, so that in the light of the altered situation the policy of the Government of India regarding the northern frontiers had to be reconsidered. In the same month as the Gor elders paid a visit to Gilgit, Aman-ul-Mulk, the Mehtar of Chitral, died. At the time of his death, his nominee to the throne, Nizam, was at Yasin, and Afzal, who was at Chitral, seized power. Nizam was not capable of holding his own, and fled to Gilgit. Immediately after establishing himself in power Afzal tendered his allegiance to the Indian Government, and invited them to send a British officer to Chitral.²⁰⁵ Lansdowne recognised Afzal as the defacto Mehtar, and hoped to find in him a trustworthy ally who would help to strengthen the Gilgit Agency.²⁰⁶

204. Encl. 1 with sub-encl. in G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 69-73.

205. Encl. 22 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), p. 951, Younghusband, F.B. The Heart of a Continent, p. 349.

206. G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892. Ibid., pp. 937-38.

The expectation, however, did not last very long. Upto the beginning of November 1892, it seemed that affairs were settling down, and the Government of India were considering the desirability of sending a mission to Chitral as wished by the new Mehtar.²⁰⁷ The only source of anxiety was Umra Khan, the Jandol Chief, who took advantage of the prevailing confusion and occupied Nasrat at the southern end of the Chitral valley. An attempt to bring about an amicable settlement between Umra Khan and the Chitral ruler would have been one of the first aims of the proposed mission.²⁰⁸ But, about the middle of November, the situation at Chitral suddenly took a bad turn. Sher Afzal, a brother of Aman-ul-Mulk, who had been a refugee in Badakshan for many years, descended upon Chitral and killed Afzal-ul-Mulk. When Nizam heard of this change in the state of affairs, he informed the British Agent at Gilgit that he was marching against Sher Afzal, and that if he should succeed in his attempt to secure the throne he would agree to British officers being stationed in Chitral and to the establishment of a telegraph line.

207. Encls. 2-7 in G.I. to S.S., 28 Dec. 1892, Ibid., pp. 1287-89; Kashmir Resident to India, 5 Nov. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), pp. 326-27.

208. G.I. to S.S., 28 Dec. 1892, and encls. 13 and 16 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 1275-77, and pp. 948-51. Vide also, Newman, H. Umra Khan and the Chitral Campaign of 1895, Chap. II.

Nizam's professions of loyalty to the British Government induced Durand to allow him to go to Chitral.²⁰⁹

Simultaneously, Durand sent 250 rifles, two guns and a hundred levies to Gupis, opposite the mouth of the Yasin valley and just beyond the Gilgit district, in order to strengthen his own position in the event of its becoming necessary to treat with Sher Afzal.²¹⁰ Durand took this decision without any sanction from the Government of India. He believed that an immediate action alone could avert a serious crisis if that should occur. Lansdowne agreed that Durand was right.²¹¹ Sher Afzal's success might indeed have established Afghan influence in Chitral, and any loss of control over that country, especially at a time when the Russians were advancing upon the Pamirs, would have been a mistaken policy.²¹² Be that as it may, Nizam met with complete success on crossing over to Chitral. The force that was sent against him by Sher Afzal went over to Nizam, and the former

209. G.I. to S.S., 28 Dec. 1892, and Encls. 1 and 13, Ibid., pp. 1287-97. Younghusband, F.E. op. cit., p. 350.

210. Ibid. Encls. 13 and 18, pp. 1297 and 1305.

211. Ibid. Encl. 63, pp. 1337-38; Lansdowne to Durand, 15 Dec. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), pp. 244-45.

212. Ibid. Encls. 9-12, pp. 1295-96. Durand actually thought so, Encl. in Encl. 6 in G.I. to S.S., 4 Jan. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), pp. 13-15 .

fled to the Afghan Commander-in-Chief at Asmar.²¹³

Lansdowne was pleased with the turn of events, and sanctioned the British mission to Chitral, especially because Nizam again earnestly requested a British Officer to visit him.²¹⁴ Accordingly, Robertson, accompanied by Younghusband and Bruce,²¹⁵ and with an escort of 50 Sikhs under Lieutenant Gordon,²¹⁶ left for Chitral where the party arrived on 25 January 1893. Nizam was profuse in his expressions of loyalty, but not long after his arrival Robertson reported that the situation at Chitral was very unsatisfactory. Nizam was disliked by his people; Sher Afzal's return was eagerly expected by many; Umra Khan was threatening the southern frontiers of the country; and worst of all, the Amir was intriguing with Umra, and as Robertson

213. Encls. 30, 37, 45 and 66 in G.I. to S.S., 28 Dec. 1892, Ibid., pp. 1317-18, 1322, 1324, 1342-43; Tel. Peshawar Commissioner to India, 20 Dec. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), p. 422; Durand to Roberts, 27 Nov. 1892, Roberts Papers/Box File D $\frac{1}{3}$, R 25/6.
214. India to Resident, 15 Dec. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/VII(h), p. 245; Encls. 57 and 60 in G.I. to S.S., 28 Dec. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vi), pp. 1333-34; Viceroy to S.S., 7 Jan. 1893, PSHC/135, p. 121; also G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63.
215. Lieutenant C.G. Bruce of the 5th Gurkhas.
216. Lieutenant J.L.R. Gordon of the 15th Bengal Infantry on service at Gilgit.

reported, every mosque and bazar were ringing with war.²¹⁷ Lansdowne was not disposed to retain the Chitral Mission any more than as a temporary expedient. Robertson's deputation was to recognise Nizam as de facto ruler of the country, and then to leave him to look after his own affairs. He accordingly instructed the Gilgit Agent to withdraw the mission,²¹⁸ and fortunately, before Robertson left Chitral toward the close of May, the situation there had somewhat improved. Even so, the whole mission could not be withdrawn, and Robertson had to leave behind Younghusband and Lieutenant Gordon with the whole of his escort.²¹⁹ In the meantime, Robertson had submitted his proposals for the future arrangement in Chitral as a state under the supervision of the Gilgit Agent. They included inter alia the retention of a British Officer in Chitral, and further reinforcement

217. G.I. to S.S., 4 Jan. 1893 and encls., Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), pp. 1-16; G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Encl. to Encl. 2, Ibid./IB(viii), pp. 75-96; Foreign Dept. to Viceroy (camp), 20 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/vii(1), pp. 344-45. Younghusband, F.E. op. cit., pp. 350-52.
218. G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Ibid.; Viceroy to S.S., 23 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 81; Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), p. 61.
219. Robertson's Report, 6/17 June 1893, Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 29 Aug. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 639-43; G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893; Ibid., Seaver, G. Francis Younghusband, p. 156.

for the Agency at Gilgit.²²⁰

Thus the question of future arrangements in Chilas and Chitral came up for the consideration of the Government of India at one and the same time. Obviously, the question was how best the British influence in these states could be maintained in the face of the Russian advance upon the Pamirs. Lansdowne was inclined to support the recommendations of his Kashmir officials, but Brackenbury, Barbour and Pritchard, members of the Viceroy's Council, were opposed to a policy of interference in these states.²²¹ The question was discussed in the Council at the beginning of June 1893, and it was decided by the majority that a British officer with an escort of Kashmir troops should be stationed in Chitral; that Chilas was not to be evacuated; and that a road should be opened up the Khagan valley (Hazara) for

220. Robertson to Burr, 18 March 1893, sub. encl. in Encl. 2 in G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Ibid., pp. 75-96. For a description of Robertson's mission to Chitral, vide Robertson, G.S. Chitral, Chap. VI.
221. Brackenbury to Lansdowne, 3 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(i), pp. 278(a-b), Note dated 21 April 1893, enclosed in his letter to Lansdowne of the same date, Ibid., pp. 347-48(b); Durand to Ardagh, 28 March 1893, Ibid., pp. 264-65; Minute of dissent by Barbour and Pritchard, 8 July 1893, Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 103-04.

the purpose of easy access to Chilas.²²²

The dissenting members deprecated the idea of interference in Chilas because they believed that the policy might lead to a general coalition of tribes upon the northern frontiers against the Gilgit Agency,²²³ and Brackenbury warned the Viceroy "that in this direction Your Excellency is entering upon a dangerous and very costly policy".²²⁴ As regards Chitral, Brackenbury argued that if Russia was not allowed to extend her influence south of the parallel of Lake Victoria, there was no need to retain a British Agent at Chitral which might well provoke a coalition of the tribes against the British Agency. Besides, if Russia was allowed to dispossess the Amir of ~~from~~ Roshan and Shignan, as was likely to be the case, the best course would be to let the Amir have Chitral as compensation,

222. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 6 June 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 78-82; G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63. According to Younghusband's suggestion Lansdowne proposed that the British Agent at Chitral should take up his headquarters at Mastuj which was within easy access of the forces of the Gilgit Agency.
223. Minute of dissent by Barbour and Pritchard, 8 July 1893, Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S., 11 July, 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 103-04.
224. Brackenbury to Lansdowne, 3 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(1), p. 278(a).

because that would give him a direct interest in retaining his hold over the narrow strip of Wakhan.²²⁵

Although Barbour and Pritchard did not support Brackenbury's proposal for ceding Chitral to the Amir, they thought that the country could yet be better defended against a Russian attack with the assistance of the Afghan ruler, and by making use of the route through Jalalabad and the Kunar Valley. To secure that end they suggested "a cordial understanding with the Amir" rather than an effort to control the tribes upon the northern frontier from the direction of the Gilgit.²²⁶

Lansdowne rejected all these arguments. He did not believe that the retention of Kashmir troops in Chilas, if compensated by a moderate subsidy, and an assurance that the Government of India had no desire to annex the country, would lead to any trouble. On the contrary, it would impress the Chilasis, who had hitherto been thoroughly ill-disposed towards their suzerain, that "we are strong enough to hold our own", and capable of

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225. Summarised in G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63. Detailed in Lansdowne's Note on Chitral, 6 May 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 598-612.
226. Minute of dissent, Encl. 5 in G.I. to S.S. 11 July 1893, Ibid., pp. 103-04.

maintaining the peace of the country.²²⁷ Indeed, the importance of Chilas for the safety of the Gilgit Agency was clear enough, and Lansdowne believed with Robertson that Chilas was the "sheet anchor" of British policy upon the northern frontiers.²²⁸ As for Chitral, he argued that it would be sheer "madness to encourage the Afghan occupation" of the country.²²⁹ Since at least Lytton's time Chitral had been under the suzerainty of the Kashmir Darbar, and the British Government had agreed to uphold the arrangement of 1878 entered into by the Maharaja and the Mehtar of Chitral. Lansdowne did not deny that there was risk in maintaining British officers in remote places like Chitral, but his policy, he said, could not be condemned so long as it was not given a fair trial. Nor was he persuaded that the loss of Roshan and Shignan would alienate the Amir more than he already was. Abdur Rahman, he said, had been accustomed to the idea that he might not be allowed to retain those provinces; and besides,

227. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 6 June 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 78-82; Lansdowne to Brackenbury, 8 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(i), pp. 163-64, G.I. to S.S., 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63.

228. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 Sept. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 136-39.

229. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 May 1893, Ibid., pp. 62-66.

there was no certainty that the Amir would be reconciled even if given Chitral for Roshan and Shignan. Lansdowne believed that if he continued to recognise de facto Mehtars, as he did in Nizam's case, a strong man was eventually bound to arise in Chitral through the process of the survival of the fittest.²³⁰ Even then, he argued, Chitral could hardly hope to stand alone :

"it must be under the influence of Russia or of the Amir, or under ours. We do not mean it to be under Russian influence, and we do not believe that it would be safe, or just, to hand it over to the Amir. We must, therefore, look after it ourselves",

and in that case, he could not do less than he had proposed to do.²³¹ In fact, Lansdowne thoroughly mistrusted the Amir, and believed that the cession of Chitral would merely afford him an opportunity for using it as a focus of intrigues upon the northern frontiers. Lansdowne fully shared Durand's view that for the preservation of British influence upon Chitral it must "remain a portion of the Gilgit Agency".²³²

230. Lansdowne's Note on Chitral Affairs, 6 May 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XIII, pp. 598-612.

231. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 11 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 97-99.

232. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 May 1893, Ibid., pp. 62-66; Durand to Ardagh, 28 March 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VII(i), pp. 264-65.

All this was reiterated in the despatch of the Government of India, dated 11 July 1893,²³³ which asked for the Secretary of State's sanction to their proposed measures in Chilas and Chitral, and those for increasing the strength of the Gilgit Agency.²³⁴ Kimberley "had no doubt about Chilas and the Khagan Road", but Chitral was "a much more perplexing matter".²³⁵ Both he and Bayley agreed that it could not be handed over to the Amir, and that it was necessary to keep it as "a portion of the Gilgit Agency, i.e. under British influence".²³⁶ Kimberley admitted that Lansdowne's proposal was the best if permanent retention of Chitral were intended. But no measure that was likely to increase the liabilities of the British Government commended itself to the Secretary of State for India unless it was proved that there was "absolutely no tolerable alternative".²³⁷

233. Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 53-63.

234. The addition proposed was a Bengal Infantry Regiment, Ibid.; also PSM/A92.

235. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 18 August 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 65-68; Kimberley's Note dated 12 August 1893, PSDI/19, p. 12.

236. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 2 June 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 41-43; Bayley's note on Gilgit Agency, Chilas and Chitral, n.d. PSM/A92; S.S. to G.I., 1 Sept. 1893. PSDI/19, pp. 141-46.

237. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 18 August 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 65-68.

Besides, he was not willing to decide upon any permanent measures so long as the results of the Durand Mission to Kabul or the Pamir boundary negotiations were not known. Approval was therefore given to Lansdowne's proposals for Chilas, Chitral and Gilgit only as temporary measures which were to continue till at least the contemplated settlements with Afghanistan and Russia did not come to a satisfactory conclusion.²³⁸

Meanwhile, Morier had approached the Russian Government at St. Petersburg for a discussion of the Pamir question and its future delimitation. The proposal was favourably received, but for some time no basis for a discussion could be agreed upon.²³⁹ Rosebery felt some anxiety on that account, and both he and Kimberley suspected that Russia would send a filibustering expedition to the Pamirs as soon as the weather should permit. Indeed, Kimberley apprehended that Russia meant to postpone any delimitation as long as she had not established herself on the line she was determined to occupy.²⁴⁰

238. Ibid.; S.S. to G.I., 1 Sept. 1893, PSDI/19, pp. 141-46; Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 17 August 1893, PSHC/142, pp. 603-04.

239. Tels. to and from Morier, 19 January 1893 and 21 January 1893 followed by communications from Morier dated 21 Jan. 1893 and 7 Feb. 1893, PSHC/135, pp. 725-27, 967-88, 1203; also Kimberley to Lansdowne, 26 Jan. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 7-8.

240. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 19 Jan. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX (e), pp. 5-7; tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 23 March 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 43.

These fears were soon justified by Russia's claim for a frontier upon the Pamirs. On 13 April 1893, Staal, the Russian Ambassador in London, demanded the evacuation of the trans-Oxus provinces of Roshan and Shignan by the Amir in return for the abandonment of Darwaz by Bokhara. This was in conformity with the letter of the agreement of 1873, but on the Pamirs the Russian claim went beyond it by their claim to the line of the Wakhan Darya as far east as the longitude of Lake Victoria.²⁴¹

Lansdowne was prepared to relinquish Roshan and Shignan to Russia, even at the risk of alienating the Amir,²⁴² but he was determined not to allow Russia a line of frontier which would afford her a happy hunting ground upon the slopes of the Hindu Kush. But the new demand made by Staal would mean exactly what Lansdowne wished to avoid, and so, when urged by Kimberley to state the "minimum of frontier" that would satisfy the Indian Government,²⁴³ he proposed the line of Oxus to Wood's Lake, and

241. Tel. S.S. to Viceroy, 19 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 55; Rosebery to Morier, 13 April 1893, PSHC/138, pp. 231-38; also F.O. 65/1463.

242. Lansdowne of course never seriously believed that the loss of Roshan and Shignan would alienate Abdur Rahman. He thought that the Amir was quite accustomed to the idea that he might have to forego the trans-Oxus provinces. *Supra*, p. 403.

243. S.S. to Viceroy, 23 March 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 43.

thence a line drawn due east to the Chinese frontier.²⁴⁴ Both Rosebery and Kimberley were in complete agreement with the Viceroy as to the necessity of keeping Russia at a safe distance from the Indian frontiers.²⁴⁵

Even so, diplomatic considerations demanded that Rosebery should ask for more than he was willing to accept. Accordingly, in reply to Staal's claims of 13 April, Rosebery demanded status quo on the Upper Oxus west of Lake Victoria, and a line to the Chinese frontier east of it. He argued that the 1873 agreement had tentatively defined the boundaries of Afghanistan, but had by no means assigned the territories beyond Afghan limits to anybody else. They should therefore be treated as no-man's land, the division of which between the contesting parties ought to be fair and just.²⁴⁶ Even while thus arguing, Rosebery was prepared to step down if Russia should insist upon the Afghan evacuation of Roshan and Shignan. That is why he had urged Kimberley to enquire about the Viceroy's "minimum of frontier",

244. Viceroy to S.S., 27 March 1893, Ibid., p. 67.

245. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 26 Oct. 1892, Lansdowne Papers/IX(d), pp. 128-30; Kimberley to Lansdowne, 13 Oct. 1892, Ibid., pp. 69-72; Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 April 1892, Ibid., pp. 139-43.

246. S.S. to Viceroy, 19 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 55. Viceroy to S.S., 30 June 1893, Ibid., p. 140; Memo. to Staal, 24 April 1893, F.O. 65/1463. On 24 April 1893, Rosebery also addressed a letter to Staal. This letter is in PSHC/138, pp. 1495-96.

and this was reiterated toward the end of April.²⁴⁷ Although Lansdowne suggested that the British Foreign Office should begin by standing out for the retention of Roshan and Shignan, they could eventually fall back on Wood's Lake line as a compromise.²⁴⁸ This was precisely the stand taken by Rosebery in negotiating with the Russian Government. As was anticipated, Staal objected to the counter-claims of the British Foreign Office, and to keep the negotiations open, Rosebery was obliged to admit that the retention of Roshan and Shignan for the Amir would not be insisted on. On his part, Staal acknowledged that everything beyond the 1873 line was not necessarily Russian.²⁴⁹

While the prospects of the Pamir negotiations thus seemed hopeful, Lansdowne, under Brackenbury's influence,²⁵⁰ suddenly made a volte face, and stood out for the retention of Roshan and Shignan for Abdur Rahman. He was uncertain about the Amir's

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247. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 21 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 30-31.
248. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 17 May 1893, *Ibid.*, p. 71.
249. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 2 June 1893, *Ibid.*, pp. 41-43, 17 June 1893, *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48; Rosebery to Howard, 19 May 1893, F.O. 65/1464.
250. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 3 May 1893, *Ibid.*, p. 67, G.I. to S.S., 17 May 1893, and encl. (Brackenbury's Minute dated 30 April 1893) Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), pp. 697-704.

attitude, and thought that he would be accused of bad faith. He also apprehended that Abdur Rahman might ultimately upset all calculations. Surprisingly, the Viceroy was even prepared to break off negotiations with Russia, and to gain time, he advised Whitehall to prolong the negotiations in order that Russia might not send another expedition to the Pamirs.²⁵¹ He was of course aware that everything would "depend upon the European outlook at the moment", and abrupt termination of the discussions would be no solution.²⁵²

But a rupture with Russia on the question of Roshan and Shignan was the last thing that the authorities in London were prepared to allow. Rosebery and Kimberley agreed that the British nation would not support a war with Russia on this account.²⁵³ More important than that, the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance against Great Britain was what the London authorities

251. Tels. to S.S., 30 June 1893, 4 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), pp. 140 and 143; Tels. A & B, Viceroy to S.S., 10 July 1893, Ibid., p. 150. Letter to Kimberley, 4 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 95-97.

252. Letter to Kimberley, 4 July 1893, Ibid.

253. There was a joint I.O. and F.O. meeting at the Foreign Office on 13 July 1893. Rosebery, Kimberley, Roberts, Bayley and Sir P. Currie were present in the meeting. The decision was to continue the negotiations. Minute on the meeting in F.O. 65/1487. For Rosebery's attitude as regards England's involvement in a European war, Crewe, Marquess of, Lord Rosebery, II, pp. 425-27.

"considered the most formidable of all possible combinations against us".²⁵⁴ Kimberley therefore persuaded Lansdowne to accept the surrender of Roshan and Shignan as a compromise, and reminded the Viceroy that this was the suggestion he made before the negotiations began.²⁵⁵ He of course promised to retain the strip of Wakhan, north of the Panja, for the Amir, and suggested that concessions could also be made to him elsewhere on the frontier for the loss of Roshan and Shignan.²⁵⁶

If the Government of India could be persuaded to accept a compromise on the basis of the Afghan evacuation of Roshan and

254. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 27 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 59-60, 7 July 1893, Ibid., pp. 52-53. British relation with France had considerably deteriorated over the Siamese question, and both the F.O. and the I.O. were considerably annoyed on this account. The coincidence of the Siamese and the Pamir crises in 1893 made the British Government suspect that France and Russia would combine in the event of any of the two powers going to war with Great Britain. This fear indeed was not unfounded. Vide Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. 344. For the Siamese crisis, vide F.O. 17/1178, F.O. 69/150. For Rosebery's annoyance, Crewe Marquess of, op. cit. II, 425-27.
255. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 25 May 1893 and 14 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), p. 40 and p. 54.
256. Tel. from S.S., 13 July 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), pp. 105-06; Kimberley to Lansdowne, 14 July 1893, Ibid./IX(e), p. 54. Lansdowne accepted Kimberley's recommendation for giving up Roshan and Shignan, but on Ardagh's suggestion pleaded for the retention of the Wakhan strip, north of the Panja river. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 18 July 1893, Ibid., pp. 105-08. Ardagh's note dated 9 July 1893, Ardagh Papers/Box 12, p. 89.

Shignan, the attitude of the Russian Government considerably changed about the middle of 1893. The Military party was in the ascendant at St. Petersburg, and persuaded the Czar to demand a line on the Pamirs that would include Bozai Gumbaz within Russian limits.²⁵⁷ Both Rosebery and Kimberley considered this "inadmissible", and asked for Lansdowne's opinion.²⁵⁸ The Viceroy thought that the recent Russian encroachment was "outrageous", and accordingly suggested that her insistence on Bozai Gumbaz must be met with a "distinct announcement that a perseverance in these demands involves a rupture of diplomatic relations, and possibly a declaration of war".²⁵⁹ He, of course, believed that Russia would never venture a war with England on such an issue, and agreed with Brackenbury that her policy was one of bluff and bluster:²⁶⁰

"I confess that I should have thought that, if we had stood firm, Russia would probably have to come to terms sooner than provoke a rupture!"²⁶¹

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257. Tel. to Viceroy, 23 Aug. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), p. 131. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 25 Aug. 1893, Ibid./IX(e), pp. 71-73, 13 Sept. 1893, Ibid., p. 79. Lansdowne to Kimberley, Ibid., pp. 128-30.
258. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 21 Sept. 1893, Ibid., pp. 82-84; Rosebery to Staal, 19 Sept. 1893, PSHC/143, pp. 549-50.
259. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 18 Oct. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 155-58; G.I. to S.S., 25 Oct. 1893, Ibid./IB(viii), pp. 1071-75.
260. Brackenbury's Minute, 30 April 1893, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 17 May 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(vii), pp. 701-04.
261. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 1 Aug. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 113-17.

Whether this was so or not was never put to the test. But on the question of Bozai Gumbaz Russia was certainly not prepared to "provoke a rupture". Indeed Staal had admitted that the recent claim by Russia to Bozai Gumbaz was not the "last word" in the Pamir negotiations.²⁶² As Rosebery had rightly presumed, Russia was inclined to agree to a line east of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier if Britain should persuade the Amir to evacuate Roshan and Shignan.²⁶³ So, Kimberley urged the Viceroy to send a mission to Kabul in order to explain to the Amir "the course of negotiations with the Russian Government regarding the frontier on the Upper Oxus and in the direction of the Pamirs!". He indeed hoped that the success of the Kabul Mission would lead to a solution of the Pamir question.²⁶⁴

A mission to the Amir for a settlement of the Indo-Afghan frontier had been intermittently considered during the previous years of Lansdowne's Viceroyalty.²⁶⁵ But it had been hardly ever imagined that so much would depend upon this one mission that

262. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 25 Aug. 1893, Ibid., pp. 71-73.

263. Kimberley to Lansdowne, 17 June 1893, Ibid., pp. 47-48; Rosebery to Staal, 19 Sept. 1893, PSHC/143, pp. 549-50.

264. Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 27 Sept. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 848-49; Kimberley to Lansdowne, 10 Nov. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), p. 94.

265. Supra, pp. 377-79.

would have to settle the frontier problems between India and Afghanistan as well as between Russia and India upon the Pamirs. Although in May 1892 Lansdowne had casually referred to the Amir the need for discussing the frontier on the Upper Oxus,²⁶⁶ it was not mentioned at all to Pyne,²⁶⁷ or the Amir in 1893.²⁶⁸ Indeed, hitherto the emphasis, even in respect of the northern frontiers, was upon Chitral, Bajaur and Asmar, i.e. the tribal regions between Kashmir and Afghanistan. But the Russian threat upon the Pamirs changed the entire complexion of the Afghan Boundary Mission, and Durand was instructed to take up the question of Roshan and Shignan first, and then the Indo-Afghan frontier from Chitral downwards, only if the Amir should raise it.²⁶⁹ From the British point of view, indeed, Durand was sent to Kabul to settle the most vital problem of the northern frontiers

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266. Viceroy to Amir, 28 May 1892, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 7 June 1892, PSLEI/66, p. 855.
267. Amir's Chief Engineer since 1885, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Salter Pyne, who was sent to negotiate with the Government of India in 1893. Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, p. 200.
268. Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 29 Aug. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB (viii), pp. 621-23.
269. India to Durand, 14 Sept. 1893, Encl. 3 in G.I. to S.S., 27 Sept. 1893, Ibid., pp. 848-49; also Durand's Report on Kabul Mission dated 20 Dec. 1893, Encl. in G.I. to S.S., 3 Jan. 1894, Ibid., pp. 1413-36. Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand., pp. 210-11.

- that of arresting Russian advance towards the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush, so that Kashmir with its dependencies, and other tribal regions within the British sphere of influence could be safe from a really potential^{and}/external enemy.

It appears on the face of it that Durand was entrusted with a rather arduous job. In reality, however, it turned out to be very different, in so far as the northern frontier was concerned. That was because of the difference in attitudes at Simla and Kabul. If the Government of India was more interested in the settlement of the Pamir question, Abdur Rahman expressed greater interest in the Indo-Afghan frontier. He made no unnecessary fuss over Roshan and Shignan.²⁷⁰ Perhaps the demand of Captain Vannovsky, a Russian officer, for a passage through Roshan persuaded the Amir to believe that he could not keep those provinces without encountering Russian opposition.²⁷¹ In the case of the Wakhan strip, however, he showed his reluctance to keep it, and if eventually he agreed to retain it under his suzerainty, he categorically refused to fortify it.²⁷² But he easily gave up his pretensions to suzerainty over the frontier

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270. Durand's Report, 20 Dec. 1893, Ibid., Sykes, P. op. cit., p. 212; Durand, H.M. The Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, p. 15.
271. Encls. 1, 2 and 3 in G.I. to S.S., 4 Oct. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IB(viii), pp. 859 and 867; also Durand's Report, 20 Dec. 1893, Ibid., pp. 1413-36.
272. Sykes, P. Sir Mortimer Durand, pp. 212-13. Khan, S.M.(ed.) The Life of Abdur Rahman, Vol. II, p. 161.

tribes from Chitral to the Persian border, and was allowed in return to keep Asmar within his territories. So far as the northern frontier was concerned, Durand thus secured all that was necessary for the safety of Kashmir and its dependencies.²⁷³

With the Amir agreeing to give up Roshan and Shignan a settlement about the Pamir appeared to be within sight. But the negotiations were in abeyance for some time owing mainly to the illness of Morier²⁷⁴ and Giers, the Russian Foreign Secretary. By December 1893, however, Russia accepted the compromise offered by the British Foreign Office. In return for Roshan and Shignan she agreed to accept a line east of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier running along the neighbouring mountain crests and corresponding roughly to the latitude of Lake Victoria, leaving Bozai Gumbaz to the British sphere of influence.²⁷⁵ Kimberley at once detected in it a basis for a settlement,²⁷⁶ and Lansdowne could not but consider it a "very promising" one.²⁷⁷ It indeed proved to be so, and in the following fifteen months

273. Durand's Report, 20 Dec. 1893, as in note 264; also P.P. 1896, LX, C.8037, pp. 382-83.

274. Morier died shortly afterwards on 16 Nov. 1893.

275. S.S. to Viceroy, 20 Dec. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/XI(d), pp. 192-93; also, vide Rosebery to Staal, 22 Jan. 1894, F.O. 65/1484.

276. Ibid., also Kimberley to Lansdowne, 15 Dec. 1893, and 21 Dec. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 102-04.

277. Lansdowne to Kimberley, 27 Dec. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), pp. 192-93.

the details of the final agreement of March 1895²⁷⁸ were worked out without much difficulty.

278. Infra, p. 438, Appendix II; Anon. The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery, pp. 59-60.

Chapter VIII

EPILOGUE

When Lord Lansdowne laid down his Viceregal office, a final agreement for the Pamir boundary was yet to be reached, and no decision had been finally taken upon the Chitral question. Yet indeed in all essential details the Kashmir policy of the Government of India had taken a concrete shape. Complete control over the internal administration of the State had been established, and Kashmir was reduced to the position of the other Native States of India. Lansdowne had refused to reinstate Pratap Singh to full powers, as in his opinion, the Maharaja was still unfit to shoulder the responsibility for governing his state to the complete satisfaction of the Indian Government. Lansdowne's policy was not to relax British control over the Kashmir administration, until the changes, which had been introduced in 1885 and clearly outlined by the end of his own administration, should show some definite prospect of permanence. He therefore left the question of the Maharaja's restoration for his successors to tackle, and as it turned out, both the Indian and the Home authorities took the same view of the Kashmir question as Lansdowne did. Pratap Singh, of course, continued to exert himself for more powers in the administration, and even proposed to Lord Elgin, Lansdowne's successor in the Viceroyalty, to dissolve the State Council, and have a Minister of his own choice to

assist him in the administration.¹ But both Elgin and Fowler, the new Secretary of State for India, were unwilling to take any measure that might frustrate the scheme of reform, introduced during the last few years. In fact, they agreed between themselves that there should be no immediate departure from Lansdowne's arrangement as regards the internal administration of Kashmir.²

Lord Curzon, too, took the same view of the case when Pratap Singh appealed to him in April 1902 for his restoration to full powers.³ He thought, as Elgin did before him,⁴ that the Maharaja was yet too weak and foolish to be completely trusted with the entire responsibility of the Kashmir administration. Though at first not personally disinclined to consider the Maharaja's case, he was not willing to depart from the policy laid down by Lord Lansdowne. He agreed with Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, that adequate guarantees ought to be obtained from Pratap Singh before any change should be made in his status. He therefore preferred to wait

¹Elgin to Fowler, 23 Oct. 1894, Elgin Papers/12, pp. 97-100.

²Ibid.; Elgin to Fowler, 20 Nov. 1894, Ibid., pp. 114-16; Fowler to Elgin, 23 Nov. 1894, Ibid., pp. 62-64.

³Memo. of interview between Curzon and Pratap Singh, 25 April 1902, Curzon Papers/256.

⁴Elgin to Fowler, 23 Oct. 1894, Elgin Papers/12, pp. 97-100.

till he should receive a favourable report from Colvin, the then Resident at Kashmir.⁵ Colvin, however, was not favourably impressed by Pratap, and so, Curzon was inclined to defer the question of the Maharaja's restoration "for a long time, if not for ever."⁶ But his hands were forced when, during his absence from India,⁷ Lord Ampt-hill, the acting Viceroy, paid a visit to Kashmir, and, as Curzon later alleged, practically committed the Government of India to Pratap's restoration. Of course, he did so on the conditions which the Maharaja himself had made at a private interview with Curzon at Peshawar in April 1902.⁸ On that occasion Pratap had agreed to keep Amar Singh as the Prime Minister, and to accept the British Resident as the arbiter in case of any difference between himself and his brother. He promised to run the administration on the advice of the Resident, and to make no change in its form or standard.⁹ Curzon was reluctantly obliged to give effect to Ampthill's promise,¹⁰

⁵Curzon to Hamilton, 30 April 1902, Curzon Papers/161, pp. 117-24, Hamilton to Curzon, 21 May 1902, Ibid., pp. 164-70, Curzon to Hamilton, 26 Oct. 1902, Ibid., pp. 387-94.

⁶Curzon to Hamilton, 12 Aug. 1903, Curzon Papers/162, p.285.

⁷Lord Curzon went on leave to England on 30 April 1904, and resumed his office as Viceroy on 13 December. Ronaldshay, the Earl of. The Life of Lord Curzon, Vol. II, pp. 340 and 361.

⁸Curzon to Brodrick, 14 Dec. 1904, Curzon Papers/164, pp. 1-5.

⁹Memo. of Interview between Curzon and the Maharaja, 25 April 1902, Curzon Papers/256.

¹⁰Curzon to Brodrick, 14 December 1904 and 15 June 1905, Curzon Papers/164, pp. 1-5, 135-36.

but made it a point to retain in substance the kind of arrangement that Lansdowne had made. Indeed, it had been a conviction with him that

"we shall have to take guarantees for the continuance of the present form and standards of administration in Kashmir, which are practically British".¹¹

As for the Pamir question, it practically hinged upon the arrangement about Roshan and Shignan, and as Kimberley had hoped,¹² the agreement reached in December 1893 proved indeed the basis of the final settlement of March 1895. The line east of Lake Victoria, having been accepted by Russia, the British Foreign Office proceeded cordially with the negotiations. In January 1894, Rosebery formally accepted the compromise agreed upon in the previous month,¹³ but matters assumed a gloomy aspect when Russia tried to make a further bargain as regards the line east of Lake Victoria. By the December agreement of 1893 Russia had accepted a line which was to run from the east end of the lake along the neighbouring mountain crests till it reached the Chinese frontier, leaving Bozai Gumbaz within the British sphere of influence. This was reaffirmed by Rosebery in January 1894, but in the month of April, Staal, the Russian Ambassador

¹¹Curzon to Hamilton, 30 April 1902, Curzon Papers/161, pp. 117-24.

¹²Supra, Chap. VII, p. 413 & 416.

¹³Rosebery to Staal, 22 January 1894, FO 65/1484.

in London, proposed a new line which, leaving Bozai Gumbaz to the British sphere of influence, did not conform to the natural configuration of the country, and included a large portion of the Little Pamir within the Russian sphere.¹⁴ But Kimberley, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, considered it "wholly inadmissible".¹⁵ Fowler was thoroughly "disappointed" with the Russian demeanour, and insisted that the line east of Lake Victoria must follow the natural configuration of the country.¹⁶ Fortunately, Russia made no fuss about her new proposal. In July, Staal finally accepted the line as claimed by the British Foreign Office,¹⁷ and this practically remained unchanged in the final agreement of March 1895.¹⁸

By 1895, too, the final decision as to Chitral was taken. Kimberley, as we have seen, had deferred it till the result of the Pamir boundary negotiations should become known. He was not certain whether the military retention of Chitral would be necessary after the conclusion of the settlement with Russia about the northern frontiers.¹⁹ But Lord Lansdowne, though not quite sure of the nec-

¹⁴F.O. to Howard, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 5 April 1894, F.O.65/1485.

¹⁵Ibid.; also Kimberley to Staal, 28 April 1894, Ibid.

¹⁶I.O. to F.O., 25 April 1894, Ibid.

¹⁷Kimberley to Howard, 11 July 1894, F.O. 65/1487.

¹⁸Appendix II.

¹⁹Supra, Chap. VII, pp.405-06.

essity of permanently retaining Chitral,²⁰ was fully alive to its strategic importance. While strengthening Gilgit, he had never overlooked the necessity of keeping Chitral under the absolute control of the Indian Government.²¹ When, eventually, he decided to retain it, the situation upon the northern frontiers had considerably changed justifying his decision and that of the majority of his Council. So long as Hunza remained the trouble spot, Gilgit indeed was the defensive nucleus of the Kashmir frontiers. Of the two groups of passes leading directly into the Kashmir valley - the Dora and the Hunza groups - it was more important to have control over the latter, and these passes could be best defended from Gilgit. But with the complete subjugation of Hunza and Nagar, and their pacification by 1893,²² the centre of political gravity upon the northern frontiers had shifted from Gilgit to Chitral.²³ The question of retaining or abandoning that country, therefore, became the moot point during Elgin's Viceroyalty. Elgin was in favour of retaining it, and even the Pamir agreement, he argued, did "not affect

²⁰Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 April 1893, Lansdowne Papers/IX(e), p. 55; Lansdowne to Kimberley, 12 and 20 Sept. 1893, Ibid., pp. 136-43.

²¹That is why he advocated the construction of a road from Peshawar to Chitral. Supra, Chap. VII p. 344.

²²MINWF, July 1893, PSLEI/71, p. 293.

²³Prideaux to Ardagh, 7 Sept. 1893, Lansdowne Papers/VIII(e), pp. 120-21.

the necessity of holding Chitral, except in so far as it may be said to increase it, because it has brought the Russians nearer to the passes".²⁴ Whatever the differences of opinion over the question of the retention of Chitral both in India and England,²⁵ the decision to retain it was certainly an absolute justification of Lansdowne's policy. If that policy was finally accomplished in 1895, it had been clearly outlined two years earlier. Indeed, in the history of the northern frontiers the events of these two years serve as an epilogue to our narrative.

²⁴Elgin to Fowler, 24 April 1895, Elgin Papers/13, p.67.

²⁵Harris, L. British Policy on the North West Frontier of India, 1889-1901, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis of the University of London, 1960.

CONCLUSIONS

The major aim of the present thesis has been to analyse how the State of Jammu and Kashmir was integrated with the rest of the Indian Empire during the Viceroyalties of Dufferin and Lansdowne without actually annexing the State. The change in Kashmir's status was dictated mainly by political considerations. But it also envisaged a scheme of economic, social, administrative and military reforms which aimed at the transformation of Kashmir from what has been called a medieval into a modern State.¹

The responsibility for introducing that change devolved upon Lord Dufferin, but the policy that led to it was not his own. That policy had been discussed - even debated - since the creation of the Kashmir State in 1846, and was eventually decided upon in the last year of Ripon's Viceroyalty. The task before Dufferin was not easy, but he faced it boldly in spite of adverse criticisms in the Anglo-Indian Press. When, pursuant to Ripon's instructions, he appointed a Political Resident in the Kashmir State, and brought it in line with the other Native States of India, the measure was criticised as being a prelude to the ultimate annexation of the State.² Lord Randolph Churchill indeed desired it to be so,³ whereas subsequently, the

¹Sufi, G.M.D., op.cit., p.815.

²Letter to the Editor, by A.W.H., 27 Sept.1885, The Statesman and Friend of India (Weekly), 3 Oct. 1885, pp. 1-2.

³Churchill to Dufferin, 16 Sept. 1885, Dufferin Papers/Reel 517, p.183.

imposition of a British Resident upon the Kashmir Darbar was even considered a violation of the treaty of Amritsar which was interpreted as having granted the State in independent possession to Gulab Singh.⁴

But the State of Kashmir was never really annexed to the Indian Empire,⁵ nor could the appointment of a Political Resident be strictly construed as a violation of the treaty of Amritsar. What was done was in the interests of good government and imperial defence - prerogatives which were hard to deny legitimately to the Paramount Power.⁶ In fact, judged in the context of the 1846 treaty, and the discussions and events that followed it, British interference in Kashmir in 1885 seemed to have been a logical consequence of the growth of the Indian Empire. A State created in the British interest, and maintained for the safety of the Indian Empire, could hardly be conceived of as belonging outside the Indian political system.⁷

⁴Panikkar, K.M. op.cit., p.126.

⁵During the period under review, annexation had actually ceased to be the policy of the British Indian Government. Dodwell, H. (ed.), Cambridge History of India, Vol. VI, p. 501; Majumdar, R.C., Raichandhuri, H.C. and Datta, K.K. An Advanced History of India, pp.841-43.

⁶Lee-Warner, W. An elementary treatise on political relations with Native States, Lee-Warner Papers; Majumdar, R.C., Raichandhuri, H.C., Datta, K.K. op.cit., pp. 844-46; Dodwell, H. A Sketch of the History of India, Chap.VII.

⁷Admittedly, the State was made over to Gulab Singh in the hope that he would resist any attempt by a "Muhammadan power to establish an independent State on this side of the Indus," and also act as a "counterpoise against the power of a Sikh prince." G.G. to Secret Committee, 19 March 1846, SPLBI/XIII.

Even then, the intended change could not be easily introduced. Of its two component parts, namely, the appointment of a Resident and the introduction of a series of reforms,⁸ Pratap Singh was reluctant to accept the first, although he partly agreed to the second. His reluctance to accept a Resident was certainly ignored, but it became difficult to introduce the reforms in the face of Pratap's incapacity as a ruler. His unfitness became all the more glaring in the context of sharp factional conflicts at the Kashmir Darbar.⁹ The situation deteriorated still further owing to the unnecessary interference of the British Residents. In fact, in the face of the misgovernment of the Kashmir Darbar and the continuous advance of Russia towards the Indian borders, the need of the hour was a stable government in Kashmir. The essential prerequisites for such a government were a strong ruler, capable of controlling diverse factions at the Court, and a Resident who would look to the genuine interests of the State as well as of the Indian Government, rather than his personal influence and power.

Unfortunately, the State of Kashmir lacked both. The result was that in the next few years events marched almost in kaleidoscopic rotation. Factional conflict reigned supreme at the Darbar. Pratap Singh,

⁸G.I. to S.S., 7 April 1885, PSLEI/40, p.27 (P.P., 1890, LIV, C.6072, pp. 231-32); Encl. 1 in G.I. to S.S., 19 Oct. 1885, PSLEI/45, p.1019.

⁹Supra, Chaps. II and III.

instead of attempting to control the rival groups, set one against the other. He was jealous of the influence of the Political Residents, and tried even to play off the Punjab authorities against the Government of India.¹⁰ In their effort to exercise their personal influence over the Kashmir administration, the Residents backed the Court faction, opposed to Pratap Singh. The result was that the search for a stable administration led nowhere. One Ministry came after another. Residents came and went in quick succession. Reforms were tried but made slow progress. In short, matters did not move in the right direction. In the middle of this disorder, Dufferin tried to be fair to Pratap Singh. When the Maharaja removed the Lachman Dass Ministry toward the end of Dufferin's Viceroyalty, and Plowden, the British Resident, complained against Pratap's highhandedness, the Viceroy removed the Resident, and gave the Maharaja a fair and final chance to justify his position as the head of the State.

Whether Dufferin himself was hopeful about Pratap as a ruler is doubtful, but he was disgusted with Plowden's highhandedness.¹¹ At Whitehall, too, no one had any illusion about Pratap's chances of success. But Cross admitted that the time was not ripe for "any radical change" in the Kashmir administration. Pratap Singh was given a

¹⁰Supra, Chaps. II and III.

¹¹Dufferin to Cross, 1 June 1888, Cross Papers/24, No. 96.

final chance to justify his rule, so that if it should become necessary thereafter to remove him, the Government of India might not be assailed for having acted in an arbitrary manner.¹²

The search for a Kashmir policy was complicated by affairs upon the northern frontiers of the State. Opinions were agreed that it should be determined in the light of India's defence requirements to counteract any foreign encroachment upon the northern borders. To that end Kashmir's hold over its dependencies, hitherto rather weak, should be strengthened. Of the tribal States along the Kashmir frontiers, Hunza in particular proved to be a troublesome neighbour. Its leanings towards the Chinese Empire, and hostile attitude towards the Kashmir Darbar, led to a reconsideration of Dufferin's frontier policy, and though essentially a believer in Ripon's policy of non-interference with the tribal States, Dufferin was obliged to advocate an active policy along the northern frontiers. In fact, he himself sent Algernon Durand to study the situation upon the northern borders of Kashmir and suggest some measure for their defence against any external attack. Durand recommended the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency which had been set up by Lytton in 1878 and withdrawn by his successor three years later.¹³

¹²S.S. to G.I., 12 Oct. 1888, and accompanying Minute, PSDI/14, pp. 55(a)-60.

¹³Supra, Chaps. I and VI.

The result was that the Kashmir question, as it was posed to Lord Lansdowne when he succeeded Dufferin in the Indian Viceroyalty, boiled down to two major points: first, how long could Pratap Singh be tried in order to set up a stable administration in Kashmir, without which no policy whatever could be safely adopted for the reorganisation of that State; and secondly, whether the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency, which Durand had recommended, would be an adequate beginning to ensure the safety of the northern frontiers. Whether the treasonable correspondence attributed to Pratap Singh was genuine^{or} no - in fact, Lansdowne later admitted that it might even have been a case of deliberate forgery¹⁴ - in the Viceroy's opinion its discovery at least showed the unsatisfactory condition of affairs at the Kashmir Darbar. And when Pratap resigned in favour of a Council, his unfitness and perhaps also his unwillingness to shoulder the responsibility of governing the State became manifest. How far Nisbet was personally responsible for Pratap's resignation is difficult to judge. Lansdowne, however, was never very happy with the Resident, and his decision to set aside the Maharaja was taken not on Nisbet's recommendations exclusively, but upon an aggregate of events culminating in the Maharaja's renunciation of power.¹⁵ At any rate, in a temporary acceptance of that

¹⁴Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, Cross Papers/31, No. 152.

¹⁵Lansdowne to Cross, 4 March 1890, Cross Papers/28, No. 65.

resignation Lansdowne saw an effective means of setting things right in Kashmir.

He therefore decided to set up a Council to run the administration of Kashmir under the direct supervision of the British Resident. Side by side, for the defence of the State and of the Indian Empire, he re-established the Gilgit Agency in 1889. The instruments were designed to have at once an adequate control over the internal administration and frontier relations of the Kashmir State. Evidently, the idea was not all Lansdowne's. In setting aside Pratap Singh, and adopting an active policy along the Kashmir frontiers he merely did what presumably Dufferin would have done in his position. As a matter of fact, Dufferin himself admitted that the supersession of Pratap Singh was "but the natural consequence of what happened during the course of my own Viceroyalty."¹⁶ The re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency was likewise a measure which followed from a course of action that Dufferin himself had undertaken.¹⁷ Indeed, Lansdowne's Kashmir policy was in perfect continuity with that of his predecessor. During eight years of their administration the British policy in Kashmir saw both its application and climax. The framework of that policy had indeed been well accomplished; what remained for its consummation was merely a question of time.

¹⁶Dufferin's speech at a banquet of the London Chamber of Commerce on 30 Oct. 1889, The Pioneer, 21 Nov. 1889, p.5.

¹⁷Supra, Chap. VI.

After Pratap's supersession the task before the Kashmir Council was to speed up the reform measures. The object was to modernise the Kashmir State, and link it up with the rest of the Indian Empire. In the interest of imperial defence the reform of the Kashmir army was given priority. Since the Russo-Afghan collision at Panjdeh in March 1885 the question of Indian defence had received the active consideration of the Indian Government. A proposal was made and examined for reorganising the armies of the Native States, and before Lord Dufferin had retired from India the scheme for that reorganisation had been well set on foot.¹⁸ The defence measures taken in Kashmir were a part of that scheme, and although initially these measures proved to be a strain upon the Kashmir finances, they eventually turned out to be a solid gain for the State.

Side by side, other measures of reform were also taken in hand. The finances of the State were reorganised, and a check was imposed upon the extravagances of the Maharaja. A special officer was appointed for the Land Settlement of the State, and officers from British India were lent to develop and reorganise the Administrative Services. The census of Jammu and Kashmir was undertaken for the first time in connection with the general census of the Indian Empire. An attempt was made to check corruption in the Judiciary; the Posts and Telegraphs showed considerable progress; educational institutions were set up

¹⁸G.I. to S.S., 24 Nov. 1888, PSLEI/55, p.1013.

for the advancement of the common people; the Medical Department was placed upon a satisfactory footing; and even a mountain railway - in addition to a line between Jammu and Sialkot - was considered for facilitating communications between Kashmir and the Punjab. The scheme for a mountain railway did not of course materialise, and in certain cases the progress of reforms was slow owing to the lack of adequate resources. But on the whole some improvement was made in the conditions of the State, and communications between India and Kashmir were considerably improved.¹⁹ In any case, the plan for the future development of the State was clearly laid down, and the only hurdle still to be combated was its financial weakness.²⁰

In this task of reorganisation Pratap Singh did not participate at first. He complained to Lansdowne that his resignation had been obtained from him by undue pressure, and begged for permission to withdraw it. In fact, an effort was made by the Indian Press on behalf of Pratap Singh to secure his reinstatement. Appeals were even made for his restoration to the House of Commons by William Digby of the Indian Political Agency in London, and by Charles Bradlaugh, a British M.P.²¹ But in political circles in London Digby and Bradlaugh could not obtain much support. Their agitation in favour of

¹⁹Supra, Chap. V.

²⁰Elgin to Fowler, 23 Oct. and 12 Nov. 1894, Elgin Papers/12, pp.97-100, 112-14.

²¹Supra, Chap. IV.

the Kashmir Maharaja was even rejected as paid propaganda.²²

It was only after the defeat of Bradlaugh's motion that Pratap came back to his senses, and began to cooperate with the new Council. Lansdowne, too, detected during his visit to Kashmir in 1891 that the Maharaja, though deposed, was nevertheless quite a power within the State.²³ Even so, Pratap was considered incapable of undertaking the full responsibility for the administration of his State, and Lansdowne responded to his frequent appeals for reinstatement only by partially restoring him toward the close of 1891.

However, with the establishment of complete control over the affairs of the Darbar, the Kashmir problem was by no means entirely solved. The frontiers of the State were still a matter for concern. There was considerable uneasiness among the frontier tribes at the re-establishment of the Gilgit Agency. They apprehended that the British outpost was the prelude to the annexation of their territories.²⁴ Hunza, as usual, was the main spot of trouble, and rumours of tribal combinations against the Gilgit Agency were rife.²⁵ This offered an opportunity to the Afghan Amir to fish in troubled waters. And, while China still persevered in her pretensions to suzerainty over Hunza, Russia was not slow to take advantage of the situation upon the northern frontiers. Ever since the Anglo-Russian Agreement of July

²²From the London Correspondent, the Bengalee, 16 August 1890, p.391.

²³Lansdowne to Cross, 31 Oct. 1891, Cross Papers/31, No.152.

²⁴MINWF, Feb. 1890, PSLEI/59, pp. 829-30.

²⁵MINWF, March 1890, Ibid., p. 1063.

1887 as regards the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, she had been busy strengthening her position in Central Asia. Reports and rumours of her activities poured regularly into the Indian Foreign Office, but matters assumed a serious outlook when in August 1891 a Russian Colonel turned out a British Officer, reconnoitring the Pamirs.²⁶ Something clearly had to be done to establish British influence along the Kashmir frontiers, and to come to a definite understanding with Afghanistan, Russia and China as to their respective claims upon the feudatories of the Kashmir Maharaja and the other tribal regions upon the northern frontiers. On this point the authorities at Whitehall and Simla were in complete agreement. In the early period of his administration Lansdowne was more concerned with a definite understanding with the Amir about the Indo-Afghan frontiers. A Mission to Kabul was considered intermittently from 1890 onwards. But matters took a turn with the increasing activities of the Russians upon the Pamirs, and their insistence on the Afghan evacuation of the territories of Roshan and Shignan which the Amir had occupied in violation of the Agreement of 1873 relating to the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. The Pamir question was therefore given priority when Mortimer Durand was sent to Kabul for an understanding with the Amir. That certainly hinged upon a settlement as to Roshan and Shignan without which Russia

²⁶Supra, Chap. VII, p. 358.

was determined not to agree to a Pamir line from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier, as Britain had demanded it. Fortunately, the Amir readily agreed to give up Roshan and Shignan in return for concessions upon the Indo-Afghan frontier, whereupon Russia sought no major concession as to the line east of Lake Victoria.²⁷ Thereafter the Pamir settlement was quite within sight, and with it a solution of the Kashmir question.²⁸

Later events testified to the success of Lansdowne's policy. That success of course was mostly his own, although he owed it to a certain extent to his official superiors at Whitehall. At least on one occasion he badly vacillated with regard to the Amir's rights upon Roshan and Shignan, and even talked of war with Russia. But Whitehall advised caution, and Lansdowne had the wisdom to appreciate the exigencies of the situation. After all, as Lytton had rightly pointed out, both Afghanistan and Kashmir were "indivisible parts of a single imperial question",²⁹ a decision on which could only be taken by the joint efforts of the India and Foreign Offices in London.

²⁷Supra, Chap. VII.

²⁸Supra, Chap. VIII.

²⁹G.I. to S.S., 23 March 1887, PSLEI/13, pp. 235-47.

APPENDIX I.

RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE OF LAHORE,

MARCH 9, 1846.

(P.P., 1846, XXXI, C.705, pp. 265-68)

- ART. 3. The Maharajah (of Lahore) cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights, in the Dooab, or country, hill and plain, situate between the Rivers Beas and Sutlej.
- ART. 4. The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article 3, payment of one and a-half crores of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security, satisfactory to the British Government, for its eventual payment; the Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the Hill Countries, which are situate between the Rivers Beas and Indus, including the Provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.
- ART. 12. In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Golab Sing, of Jummoo, to the Lahore State, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognise the independent sovereignty of Rajah Golab Sing, in such territories and districts in the Hills, as may be made over to the said Rajah Golab Sing by separate agreement between himself and the British Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Rajah's possession since the time of the late Maharajah Kurruk Sing; and the British Government, in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Golab Sing, also agrees to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British Government.
- ART. 13. In the event of any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore State and Rajah Golab Sing, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British Government; and by its decision the Maharajah engages to abide.

APPENDIX II.

RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
 GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND RUSSIA WITH
 REGARD TO THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE OF THE TWO
 COUNTRIES IN THE REGION OF THE PAMIRS

London, March 11, 1895.

(P.P., 1895, CIX, C.7643, pp. 160-62)

The Earl of Kimberley to M. de Staal.

Foreign Office, March 11, 1895.

Your Excellency,

As a result of the negotiations which have taken place between our two Governments in regard to the spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia in the country to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul), the following points have been agreed upon between us :-

1. The spheres of influence of Great Britain and Russia to the east of Lake Victoria (Zor Koul) shall be divided by a line which, starting from a point on that lake near to its eastern extremity, shall follow the crests of the mountain range running somewhat to the south of the latitude of the lake as far as the Bendersk and Orta-Bel Passes.
2. From thence the line shall run along the same range while it remains to the south of the latitude of the said lake. On reaching that latitude it shall descend a spur of the range towards Kizil Rabat on the Aksu River, if that locality is found not to be north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, and from thence it shall be prolonged in an easterly direction so as to meet the Chinese frontier.
3. If it should be found that Kizil Rabat is situated to the north of the latitude of Lake Victoria, the line of demarcation shall be drawn to the nearest convenient point on the Aksu River south of that latitude, and from thence prolonged as aforesaid.
4. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from

exercising any political influence or control, the former to the north, the latter to the south, of the above line of demarcation.

Sd/- Kimberley.

N.B. In his reply of the same date M. de Staal approved of the above agreement.

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Box 10. Papers relating to India, 1888-94.

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Box 12. Notes (Confidential) for the Governor-General, 1888-93.

- (2) Argyll Papers: Correspondence of the 8th Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India, 1868-74. On Microfilm at the India Office Library.

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The National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Considerable use has been made in the preparation of this thesis of the Secret E series of the Foreign Department Proceedings in the National Archives of India, New Delhi - papers which were not sent to the Home Government from India. In fact, this series proved indispensable in building up the history of Kashmir during our period. That is because a considerable gap has been created by a dearth of papers, both official and private, on the period of Dufferin's Viceroyalty. Only two official despatches were sent home by Dufferin's Government during the entire period of his Indian administration - one in October 1885 and the other in August 1888. These despatches leave a considerable gap between these two dates, and the history of the intervening period cannot be built up even with the help of the private papers of the period.

The Indian States Papers at the India Office Library.

Papers on the Indian States which were sent by the Government of India and were received in the Political and Secret Department of the India Office between 1880 and 1902, were separated from the original volumes of documents of that department (such as Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures from India, Political and Secret Home Correspondence etc.) and were not available to research students till 1960. There are still various practical difficulties in obtaining these papers, but the author of the present thesis was able, with the assistance of the Officers of the India Office Library, to get hold of all the relevant papers on Kashmir, and presumably, for the first time since they were opened to readers. The India Office Library has decided to gradually put back these papers to their respective places in the original volumes, and as such, in respect of these papers, reference has been made in the footnotes to the original volumes.

Other Political and/or Secret Department papers consulted at the India Office Library are :-

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1885-95, Vols. 69-162. Mainly correspondence between the I.O. and F.O. relative to Indian affairs. Necessarily, letters, notes and telegrams from the Government of India form the enclosures to such letters. Notes from the F.O. are also there. Important F.O. papers, though not enclosed in this series can be easily traced with the help of cross references to such papers in this series.
- (9) Political and Secret Demi-official Correspondence:
First Series : Vols. 1-7.
These volumes contain d/o letters received in the Political and Secret Department with Minutes, Memoranda, Drafts and copies of letters sent.
Second Series : Vols. 1-4.
These volumes contain copies of d/o. letters sent out by the Political and Secret Department and copies of Minutes and Memoranda.

- (10) Political and Secret Memoranda. A series of memoranda concerning Afghanistan, North-west and Northern frontiers (A Series); Central Asia (B Series); and Native States (D Series).
- (11) Political Letters to India, 1846-58, Vols. 11-23.
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- (13) Political and Secret Despatches to India, 1875-95, Vols. 1-21. This series contains minutes and notes written at the India Office on letters received from the Government of India, and trace the preparation of despatches to India in their different stages including the final drafts which were ultimately sent.
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India Foreign Proceedings.

Of this series all the volumes of the following categories for the period between 1885-96 have been consulted.
(a) Political, (b) General, (c) Frontier, (d) External and (e) Internal.

India Public Works Proceedings.

Only select volumes, as referred to in footnotes, have been consulted with the help of cross references obtained from the India Foreign Proceedings.

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Some material from the B series has also been used. This has been possible where somewhat detailed summaries of the consultations are given.

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1849	41	{ C.1071 C.1075	Punjab: Papers relating to the Second Sikh War, 1847-49.
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1881	98	C.2844	Correspondence, 1879-81 re: Russia's military operations.
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1884	87	C.3930	Central Asia: Correspondence, in continuation of C.3032.
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		(117)	Expenditure incurred on Military Expeditions to Gilgit, Chilas, Hunza, 1890-91 and 1892-93.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Command No.</u>	<u>Description</u>
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1895	109	C.7643	Pamirs: Agreement between Russia and Great Britain.
1896	60	C.8037	Chitral Correspondence.
1900	58	(13)	Wars on or beyond the borders of British India since 1849.

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
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KASHMIR AND ITS ADJOINING COUNTRIES

Scale in miles (approx)



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Scale in miles (approx)

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Darkot P.

Mustaj YNS

Chitral R.

HINDU KUSH RANGE

TRANS-ALAI

ALICHUR PAMIR

GREAT PAMIR

LITTLE PAMIR

Wakhan R.

Bozai Gumbaz

Baroghil

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