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TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN LONDON

Economy, Society
Culture and Change

by
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ABSTRACT

This is a study of Turkish Cypriot settlers in London and it arises from fieldwork carried out in London and in northern Turkish Cyprus. Most Turkish Cypriot migrants to Britain have been resident here for around 20 years; many of their children were born in this country and there is every indication that they are making Britain their permanent home. The Turkish Cypriot population here must therefore be seen as a settled ethnic minority, and not as temporary migrant workers.

Unlike studies of the race relations type which tend to focus on the various problems minority populations experience in Britain - for example, in the sphere of education, in obtaining housing and securing jobs - this study focusses on the economic, social and cultural organization of Turkish Cypriots here and the changes which are occurring and have occurred in these spheres. As the majority migrated for economic reasons, the work context receives initial consideration. It is suggested that economic interests are important determinants affecting decisions made in other areas of social life. In subsequent chapters, family roles and relationships are discussed, and the role and status of Turkish Cypriot women in Britain are examined. Ritual and celebratory occasions are given extensive consideration and, finally, Turkish Cypriot relations with other minority populations - especially Greek Cypriots - are described and analysed. In each case, the focus is London, but continual reference is made to the form taken by these activities and institutions in Cyprus.

It is suggested throughout that Turkish Cypriots are not just passively fitting in to a dominant and discriminatory majority society, but that they are very positively maintaining, reorganising and even abandoning aspects of their traditional culture where it is practically convenient or economically advantageous to do so. The continuing adherence to certain norms which appear to have no particular relevance in the London context also has to be explained. In particular, the ritualisation of kinship ties and the maintenance of ethnic identity must, it is suggested, be understood in terms of a concept of 'alternative ideologies'.

Since this is the first anthropological study to focus on Turkish Cypriot settlers in London, it is hoped that it will also provide a basis for future research.

CONTENTS

Preface 5

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 10

Turkish Cypriots in London: An historical and sociological summary 10
Research Methods and Limitations 31
The limitations of data collected in London and Cyprus . 37
Anthropological Studies of Migrant and Minority Groups . . 41
The approach from race relations 41
The approach from ethnicity 42
Studies of migrants, immigrants and minorities . . . 52

CHAPTER II: THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT: PATRONAGE AND RECIPROCITY . 57

Immigrant Involvement with the Clothing Industry . . . 60
The Clothing Industry and Cypriot Work Norms 63
The fragmented structure of the industry 64
The flexibility of operation in the industry . . . 66
Patronage and Reciprocity in a Cypriot Clothing Factory. . 69
The manufacturer and factory owners 74
The factory owners and the work force 75
Relationships between employees 79
Patronage and Reciprocity in the Domestic Environment . . 82

CHAPTER III: KINSHIP AND FAMILY LIFE 90

Residential and Kinship Norms in Turkish Cypriot Culture . 92
The patrilocal residence ideal 92
The agnatic principle 100
Environmental Constraints on Family and Kin Relations . . 107
Relationships within the Family: The significance of age and sex 112

CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT WOMEN IN LONDON 118

Women in Cyprus 118
Women in London 123
Namus 131
Şeref 136
The Significance of Namus for Turkish Cypriots in London today 139

CHAPTER V: RITUAL OCCASIONS 151

Defining the Term and the Problem 151
Ritual Occasions for Turkish Cypriots in London and Cyprus . 155
Islamic and national Turkish holidays 155
Individual life-crisis rituals 160
Six month day 161
Prayer days 163
Circumcision 167
Occasions creating affinal ties 170
Proposal: the visit of the dunurcu 171
Engagement 179
Registration 181
Wedding party 185
Return to Ritual 196
Turkish Cypriots in London: A Secular Society? . . . 200

CHAPTER VI: INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: POLITICAL ADAPTATION IN LONDON AND CYPRUS 206

Interethnic Relations: Cypriot and Mainland Turks . . 212
Interethnic Relations: Turkish Cypriots in London . . 218
Ethnicity and Change 221
In Summary: The 'Second Generation' 223

APPENDICES

A. Households Selected for Intensive Study: Additional Notes 229
B. Demographic Breakdown of Households Selected for Intensive Study 234
C. Cypriots in Employment 240
D. Case Study of Migration and Settlement: Ayse, 1957-77 . 241
E. The Evil Eye 245

MAPS

1. Group A Households - Haringey 1976 246
2. Greater London: Main Areas of Cypriot Settlement . . 247
3. Cyprus: Households visited regularly in June and July 1975 and October 1977 248

BIBLIOGRAPHY 249

PREFACE

There is very little information available, either in published or unpublished form, on the Cypriot population in Britain today. It was this that initially prompted me to consider fieldwork among Turkish Cypriots in this country, rather than among Turks in mainland Turkey which had been an earlier intention. The most comprehensive study made on Cypriots in Britain to date is that by Robin Oakley (1972), whose detailed statistical analysis of Cypriot migration and settlement has provided me with invaluable background information. Since I conducted no surveys myself, I have had to rely on the statistical data obtained by others, and Oakley's study has been by far the most useful in this respect. This is despite the fact that his sources have not usually allowed him to distinguish between Greek and Turkish Cypriot, and that the statistics he presents cover only the period 1945-1966 - 1966 being the date of the last census at the time he was writing. It has been possible to update his figures when necessary by referring to the 1971 census.

Apart from Oakley's work, there are short articles on Cypriots by George (1966) and by George and Millerson (1966-7). References are also made to Cypriots by a number of writers whose concern has been also with other ethnic minorities in this country, such as Butterworth and Kinnebrugh (1970) and Ankrah-Dove (1973). However, so far as I know, there are only two social scientists apart from Oakley who have focussed specifically on Cypriots in London: Ferit Berk (1972) and Pamela Constantinides (1977). Berk's concern is with Turkish Cypriots and his study, like Oakley's, is primarily based on statistical sources. Its purpose, according to the author, is to provide a detailed picture of Turkish Cypriots in Haringey as a background for those concerned with social policy and community work affecting that population. His figures, based on his own survey of 86 households in Haringey, in fact give very little information additional to that provided by Oakley, even though the latter is not concerned specifically with Turks. Berk concentrates mainly on areas of contact between migrant and majority population: educational aspirations and ability in school, preferred types of employment, areas of settlement and choice of housing. He also looks at the differences discernible between the original migrants and the second generation - those born or at least brought up here - in terms of their educational level, occupations, age on marriage, and so on.

The only study of Cypriots in London to employ the standard anthropological techniques of participant-observation has been that of Constantinides. She completed her field research on London's Greek Cypriot population in 1975. It is to be hoped that her study and this one will 'overlap' in terms of the themes explored and that, taken together, they will provide a basis in terms of which future research on the London Cypriot population might be carried out, and the principal theoretical issues further explored. The issues with which each chapter in this study is concerned will now be briefly summarised.

Chapter I provides introductory and background information, surveying the history of the Turkish Cypriots, the causes and form of their emigration, the nature of their settlement in London, the kinds of ties maintained between London and Cyprus, and the general social structure of the Turkish Cypriot population in London. It also gives an account of my research methods and their limitations, and an evaluation of recent anthropological work relevant to migrant and minority communities.

In Chapter II Cypriot occupational preferences are discussed. The connection between Cypriots and the clothing industry is considered, and the norms and expectations which characterise the all-Cypriot work milieu are described and analysed with reference to one particular clothing factory. It is argued that the norms and moral obligations which obtain between employer and employee in such places of work are in fact typical of intra-Cypriot relationships outside this sphere; examples are given of their operation between any two parties where one can provide a service of which the other has need. In this chapter are introduced two themes which are taken up later in the study: the role and status of Turkish Cypriot women in Britain (which is considered in Chapter IV), and Turkish-Greek Cypriot relations (considered in Chapter VI).

The subject of Chapter III is kinship and family life. The demographic and economic circumstances which have influenced Turkish Cypriot kin relations in Britain are delineated, and the effect this has had on kinship relations here, are discussed. It is noted that kinship norms and ideals, which are common to Turks on the mainland, should not be presumed to hold for Cypriots. An attempt is made to explain a seeming preference for uxorilocality in London.

In Chapter IV the concern with kinship continues, but is made more specific. Given that women have moved into the 'public' sphere by becoming wage-earners and by contributing significantly to the family budget, I ask whether attitudes held by and about them have also changed. To answer this question, an understanding of the concept of namus (female chastity) is deemed essential, and its significance in London and Cyprus today is considered.

Chapter V focusses on Turkish Cypriot ritual occasions. Following Leach, importance is attached to the communicative aspect of ritual, rather than to whether they are 'secular' or 'religious'. Life-crisis rituals and other ritual celebrations are described and analysed, particular attention being paid to the institution of marriage, and the difference in its form, content and significance in London and Cyprus.

The focus of the final chapter is Turkish Cypriot relations with other ethnic populations in London and Cyprus. Ethnicity, it is argued, is a relative phenomenon - a fact demonstrated by a consideration of the relations which Turkish Cypriots have with Greek Cypriots and with Turkish mainlanders, in London and Cyprus respectively. It is suggested that shared cultural traditions and common economic aspirations serve as a basis for economic co-operation and social interaction - both of which obtain, on an individual level at least, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London today. A consideration of the issues unique to the young 'second' generation of Turkish Cypriots - those born or at least educated in this country - is left until the final pages of the thesis.

* * *

The research on which this study was based was made possible by grants from the Social Science Research Council (1974-76) and by an award from the Governing Body of the School of Oriental and African Studies (1976-77). I am also grateful to the Central Research Fund, University of London, for photographic equipment and for a grant to cover expenses (1975-76). My interest in the Middle East was originally inspired by David Brooks; for that interest and his continuing inspiration I am most grateful. Thanks are also due to Dr Robin Oakley for the use of his statistical data on the Cypriot population in Britain and to Dr Margaret

Bainbridge for her excellent Turkish course and her continuing interest in my research. I would also like to mention all those I have come to know in the Department of Social Anthropology, SOAS, both teaching staff and fellow students. Particular thanks are due to Dr James Watson and, of course, to Dr Richard Tapper for his patience, encouragement and thoughful supervision. His criticism of earlier drafts has been invaluable. I am also very grateful to Edward Condon for his assistance, advice and company during fieldwork, and for his typing of the final draft.

Finally, and very sincerely, I would like to express my gratitude to all those Turkish Cypriots who have welcomed me into their homes and their lives. I cannot hope to repay the hospitality shown by so many families in both London and Cyprus, let alone mention them all by name, but can only acknowledge that their generosity, spirit and sense of humour made fieldwork a very enjoyable and memorable experience.

Note on spelling and pronunciation

Turkish terms are used in the nominative case when there is no exact or convenient equivalent in English. Apart from the spelling of Istanbul, when the familiar English form is used (in Turkish the capital I has a dot), Turkish spelling is maintained throughout the text for all Turkish words. This is for consistency, as some but not all Turkish characters can be rendered into English by the addition or substitution of certain letters. The following Turkish characters are used:

- ç pronounced ch as in church
- c pronounced as the j in jar
- ğ lengthens a preceding vowel
- ı is akin to the pronunciation of the u in radium
- ö is pronounced as in the German word König
- ş is similar to the sh in shall
- ü is as the German u in Führer or the French u in tu

The first time a Turkish word is used it is underlined; thereafter it is not distinguished in any way. This is to avoid the constant underlining of a word like namus (honour through sexual chastity), which is used many times in one chapter, or bayram (national or religious Turkish holiday), which is used less frequently but throughout the text.

Note on abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text, and particularly in the kinship chart on p.103.

F	father
M	mother
S	son
D	daughter
H	husband
W	wife
B	brother
Z	sister
o	older
y	younger
Sb	sibling
Ch	children

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. Turkish Cypriots in London: An historical and sociological summary[1]

The purpose of this brief historical survey will be to present the reader with information which bears directly on issues which are discussed in the chapters that follow. For example, it is necessary to know something about the economic and political conditions on Cyprus to appreciate fully the significance of the 'push' factors involved in the individual's decision to migrate. It is useful, too, to be aware of the historical relationship between Greek and Turk when considering their relationship as separate ethnic populations in London today.

The Ottomans conquered Cyprus in 1571, wresting the island from its previous rulers, the Latin Christian Venetians. The indigenous Greek-speaking Christians apparently welcomed the invaders at first as they had been severely repressed by the Venetians, and the Ottoman government set about restoring their Orthodox Archbishops as political spokesmen and putting an end to peasant serfdom. (Loizos 1972:299) Ottoman soldiers were given land in Cyprus, and Turks from what is now mainland Turkey continued to cross over and settle in Cyprus throughout the seventeenth century.

Conflict between Greek-speaking Christians and Turkish-speaking Muslims in the period 1571-1878 was intermittent and outbreaks of violence were often inspired, as today, by external events. At other times, however, Muslim and Christian combined in rebellion against the harsh measures dealt out by the Ottoman Governor and the Orthodox Church authorities who co-operated with them to exact taxes. Revolts in 1765 and 1833 saw Christian and Muslim united against the state. (Loizos 1972:300-304)

In 1878 the British government was granted a leasehold of

[1] For a more detailed discussion of some of the points made in this brief summary see Patrick (1976) and Loizos (1972). A comprehensive history of Cyprus is given by Hill (1952). See also Alastos (1955), Purcell (1969), Newman (1956) and Maier (1968).

Cyprus by the Ottoman Sultan. Cyprus was to provide a military and naval base for Britain near a zone of Turkish-Russian confrontation; since it was also located near Suez and the Tigris-Euphrates valley, it could be used to protect the routes to India. However, after the occupation of Egypt in 1882, it was decided that the strategic importance of Cyprus had been overestimated and, with the reasons for its acquisition much diminished, it became, according to Patrick, "a backwater of the British Empire". (1976:5) Even so, in 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus as a colony.

Since the Greek war of independence (1821-1829), the leaders of the Christian Orthodox Church had made regular requests for the political union of Cyprus and Greece (enosis). Opposition to this from Turkish-speaking Muslims was as regularly voiced. The British took little notice of these requests until an outbreak of violence in 1931 by enosis agitators. This caused the British to repress the movement and so force it underground.

The British policy of divide-and-rule on Cyprus had an important long-term effect: it improved the political and economic position of the Greek-speaking majority to the detriment of the Turkish-speaking minority. The latter, who formed about 20% of the island's population throughout the British period, were no longer rulers but among the ruled. In fact, the tables were turned more completely than this because the British favoured the Greek Cypriot population on three counts: they were fellow Christians, they had a shared Hellenic tradition and, besides this, Britain was keen to speed up the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish and Greek populations each had their own educational systems, religious institutions and marriage laws. The same system of taxation was now applied to both peoples though a greater share of this money was then dealt out to Greek schools by the British. These became "factories for producing Greek nationalists" according to Loizos. (1972:300) There is no doubt that the system of education during the period of British rule fostered both Greek and Turkish patriotism and worked against the development of a common Cypriot identity. That the latter was in the process of developing before the British period is strongly argued by Pollis

who states that "... there was nothing inherent in the nature of intergroup relations between Orthodox Christian and Muslim during the Ottoman Empire to have fore-ordained (sic) or predetermined the emergence of separate Greek and Turkish nationalities". (1973:587) She points to extensive evidence of intermarriage between Muslim and Christian and to the existence of a Cypriot dialect with Greek roots which was spoken by both peoples. According to Pollis, religion, not nationalism, was the basis of social differentiation on Cyprus before 1878, but the British policy of divide-and-rule helped to generate nationalist sentiment. "The emergence of two nationalities ... was greatly facilitated by British policies which utilized the social system that prevailed prior to British rule, but redefined and reinterpreted it in such a fashion that the emergence of separate Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island seems to have been inevitable." (1973:599) She does admit, however, that the designation'Greek' rather than 'Orthodox Christian' was in use by the end of the 1820s - after the Greek war of independence but before the British period altogether. Pollis' claims may be exaggerated but there is no doubt that the British contributed to the political and economic separation of the two communities. With the British favouring Greek schools and institutions financially an economic discrepancy between the two populations became apparent - a discrepancy which is still much in evidence today, both in Cyprus and in London.

The economic insecurity felt by the Turks during this period was exacerbated by continuing Greek demands for enosis. In 1955 fruitless attempts to petition the British government were replaced when an organization - EOKA - began actively fighting for independence from Britain, and, more importantly, for the union of Cyprus and Greece. British attempts to stamp out EOKA only made the Greek population more politically conscious and united. It could be argued that the British sowed the seeds of partition at this point as they actually recruited Turks as auxilliary policemen to fight EOKA, and encouraged Turkey to oppose the movement. This meant in fact that the Turkish population became more voluble in its demands for taksim (the partition of Cyprus into Turkish and Greek states). Because the Turkish Cypriots sided with the British in their confrontations with EOKA they became secondary targets for attack. Large-scale rioting in 1958 was followed by the evacuation of ethnic minorities - most of them Turkish - from mixed villages.

It was then that Britain threatened to withdraw her troops into their bases unless Greece, Turkey and the two communities on the island came to a compromise about the status of Cyprus. As such a withdrawal would almost certainly have precipitated a civil war, the two sides agreed to talk, though it was Britain who drew up the constitutional structure of the new independent Republic of Cyprus. Though the constitution was to last only three years both sides approved it at the time (1960). The Turks accepted it because their rights were entrenched in the constitution, enosis was prohibited and Turkey had the right of intervention to maintain these provisions. The Greeks accepted it because their refusal would have meant the partition of the island into Turkish and Greek states, and the possibility of the whole island ever becoming part of Greece would be gone forever. Thus their acceptance did not mean that the eventual goal of enosis had been abandoned.

Patrick summarizes why the constitution proved unworkable and how its breakdown was the basis of intercommunal conflict from 1963-1971. (1976:20-24) In short, the Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with the constitution, the Greeks were not and continued to press for enosis. Their main grievance was the 30% representation of the Turkish community in the House of Representatives and in every grade of the Civil Service and the police. Since the Turkish Cypriot community constituted only about 18% of the population at this time, it was felt that it was on the basis of this ratio that jobs should be apportioned. Communal taxation was another area of contention. Makarios put forward proposals to revise the constitution in 1963 in terms which would make it more acceptable to the Greeks. These terms were rejected outright by the Turkish Cypriots. Fighting began in December of the same year. Over the next four months there was much bloodshed and atrocities were committed by both sides. The Turks withdrew into armed enclaves, Greek Cypriots controlled the rest of the island except for the British and United Nations bases. From 1964 onwards, an uneasy peace was maintained between the two peoples, the island remaining divided into Greek- and Turkish-controlled areas.

There is one important point regarding Greek-Turkish relationships which is perhaps not made apparent in the above paragraphs. It might be recalled that even during the period of Ottoman rule,

there was not a simple division between the Christian Orthodox and the Muslim populations. Greek and Turkish peasants were, at times, united in their opposition to the state authorities - the 'state' being seen as both the Ottoman governors and the leaders of the Greek Orthodox Church. Indeed, there have always been friendships between Greeks and Turks as individuals, even at times when the politicians and armed forces representing them have been at war. Peter Loizos worked in a village where 1,430 Greeks lived with 70 Turks. (Loizos 1975) The Turks remained in the village with their Greek neighbours even during the years of fiercest fighting in 1963-4 and 1967. Despite the 1974 war and the consequent partition of the island, I found, on returning to Cyprus in October 1977, that there were still a handful of Greeks in the Karpaz peninsula in northern Turkish Cyprus. They had remained in their homes and now continue to live alongside their Turkish Cypriot neighbours as before, even though they are quite cut off from the Greek Cypriot majority in the south. As in London, when it comes to the practicalities of life - earning money, cooking, bringing up children - there is very little to distinguish or divide Greek and Turk. Historically, as today, neither religion nor language have proved insurmountable barriers to the development of social relationships between individuals. This is important to remember when considering interethnic relations in London today.

Events in Cyprus from 1963 onwards have less bearing on a discussion of Cypriots in Britain today because the vast majority of would-be migrants were already in this country by that date. The sporadic fighting, the vehement propaganda-making, and the constant, and for the most part unsuccessful, bargaining that went on between the two sides between 1964 and 1974 did not directly affect most of those who are now settled here. Most had already left before the fierce fighting of 1963-4 when approximately 25,000 Turks had to abandon their homes in 72 mixed villages and 24 all-Turkish ones. (Patrick 1976:75) Nor did the London-based Cypriots witness the atrocities and fighting in 1967 which all but precipitated an invasion by Turkey. From 1963 onwards, economic blockades were imposed by the Greeks on the Turkish enclaves and this policy further widened the gap between the prospering Greek community and the increasingly impoverished Turkish minority. Oakley has estimated annual migration figures for the period 1945-1966 and I reproduce

his table below. As is evident, the peak years for Cypriot migration to Britain were 1960 and 1961; the incentives to migrate after this date were either less significant as 'push' factors or there were not the equivalent 'pull' factors from Britain which existed at the turn of the decade. Incidentally, the only other time there was a mass exodus from Cyprus was immediately after the 1974 war when 12,000 Cypriots - the vast majority Greek - were given leave to enter the United Kingdom as visitors for less than 12 months.[1] How many of this number have since been allowed to stay or have had their stay extended, I do not know; there was considerable Home Office pressure on those who could be 'reasonably expected' to return to do so.

Both economic uncertainty and feelings of political insecurity might be expected to have influenced the decision to migrate. In fact, the vast majority of Cypriots interviewed by George and Millerson (1966-67:278), Oakley (1972:122,144) and Berk (1972:8) said they migrated for economic rather than political reasons. However, it should now be clear that political events and economic conditions are closely linked in Cyprus. Thus, intercommunal violence may have caused families to evacuate their homes and leave their land initially, though it was the quest for an alternative means of livelihood that prompted them to move to Britain. Though various factors were clearly at work, according to

Cypriot Emigration from Cyprus to Britain 1945-66

Year	Total	Year	Total	Year	Total
1945	743	1952	1413	1959	5033
1946	1100	1953	1850	1960	12936
1947	1139	1954	3100	1961	12131
1948	753	1955	4446	1962	4952
1949	1259	1956	3448	1963	2168
1950	1145	1957	3944	1964	3784
1951	1669	1958	3896	1965	1977
				1966	1861

Estimate made by Oakley on consideration of the following sources: Demographic Report (annual official publication of the Republic of Cyprus); Issue of affidavits (up to 1959); British Home Office statistics.

[1] Home Office Immigration Statistics 1974, cmnd 6064

George and Millerson (1966-7:279), the major factor influencing emigration from Cyprus was unfulfilled economic aspirations. Independence did not bring prosperity. Indeed, when the British withdrew they took the well-paid jobs on the sovereign bases with them. The small amount of economic development Britain had brought to Cyprus was mostly a result of military building programmes. Cyprus, a backwater for 70 years, had again become of strategic importance at the start of the Palestine war. But the building of military installations had only provided short-term employment for a minority. The majority of Cypriots remained peasants - 64% of the island's population lived in 600 villages in 1960 (Patrick 1976:8) - and the British had not transformed the economy to the extent that it could continue to support the growing population. By 1960, according to Oakley, population growth had outstripped the country's capacity to produce jobs and the required standard of living. (Oakley 1972:130)

But although the political, economic and demographic situation in Cyprus had provided the necessary 'push' factors for emigration, the 'pull' from Britain determined both when this occurred and the numbers involved. The system of affidavits, whereby a potential settler had to have a guarantor in England who could find or provide a job, accomodation and financial assistance, was lifted in 1954. After this the number of Cypriots migrating rose substantially. Unlike Cyprus, where there was large-scale unemployment, in Britain there was full employment, and the Cypriot businesses set up by early migrants during and after the war had flourished. It was probably the labour situation in Britain which was mainly responsible for the sudden increase in migration in 1960-61 as well as for its decline after 1963. By this latter date, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act had been introduced, though this was probably less of an influence than the decline of economic opportunities here. As Constantinides remarks in discussing Greek Cypriot migration to Britain, "The never-had-it-so-good years were over, and if Britain was no longer eager to welcome foreign labour, neither were those seeking economic betterment so eager to come." (1977:272)

Today (1977) there are probably about 140,000 Cypriots in Britain, of whom about 35,000 are Turkish. These figures are extremely approximate. The 1971 Census puts the number of Cyprus-born

people resident in Britain at 72,665. However, this figure includes the small number of Armenian Cypriots while omitting those born in this country to Cypriot-born parents. Moreover, it does not distinguish between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Oakley estimates that the ratio of Greek to Turkish emigrants from Cyprus between 1955 and 1966 was 5:1, though he notes that Turks had a greater propensity to come to Britain than Greeks: 96% of Turks who migrated from Cyprus came to Britain, whereas only 83% of Greeks came - the most popular alternative destination for both populations being Australia. (Oakley 1972:32-47) The main Turkish Cypriot association in London puts the number of Turkish Cypriots resident here at 40,000. This figure may be slightly exaggerated. Indeed, the figure of 35,000 suggested above for Britain's Turkish Cypriot population is based on - or rather, is an attempt to reconcile - this 'official' Turkish estimate with the number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots who, according to Oakley's calculations, emigrated from Cyprus between 1955 and 1966. If there are approximately 35,000 Turkish Cypriots here now, and if the total Cypriot population in Britain is in the region of 140,000, then the ratio of Greeks to Turks in this country is 4:1. Given the absence of Census data which distinguishes the two populations, this is probably as reliable an estimate as it is possible to make, though it must remain, rather inevitably, a 'compromise' figure.

Neither of the above figures take into account the effects of the 1974 war, though this is not likely to have altered greatly the number of Turkish Cypriots resident here. The vast majority of Cypriot 'refugees' were Greek and, despite an announcement by the above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot association that 10,000 Turkish Cypriots were returning to live in Cyprus after the war (Sunday Telegraph, 5.10.1975), this is likely to have been an attempt to impress the British public that Turkish Cypriots here had enough confidence in the political stability and economic recovery of Turkish Cyprus to go back. I personally met very few Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus who had come from London and were planning to live there permanently.

Kin and village connections played an important role in the migration process. Oakley notes that whole families were usually involved, the husband migrating first with a view to finding a job and accommodation, before sending for his wife and children. Berk

found that the vast majority of the original migrants in his survey of 86 households were under 30 when they left Cyprus (Berk 1972:28) and this is confirmed by Oakley. (1972:66) Thus, the basic unit of migration was the young adult male, married or unmarried, though support was often obtained from a wider circle of kin - anyone, in fact, who was well placed to help the newcomer as regards accomoda-tion and employment. Although in subsequent years, some of the older people migrated to Britain in order to join children already settled here, the London Cypriot population has remained a relatively youthful one. The majority of those who now constitute the 'great grandparent' generation are still in Cyprus and their absence from London might be expected to have some bearing on kinship relations here. To this I return in Chapter III.

In terms of socio-economic status, those who have come to London represent a cross-section of the Cypriot Turkish population, though Oakley notes that the original migrants tended to be service and white-collar workers rather than farmers. (1972:79) It seems that now everyone from government officials to the poorest of vil-lagers has relations in London. Approximately one in six Cypriots is now in Britain. (Oakley 1970:99)

Most emigration from Cyprus to Britain has been specifically to London. Indeed, there are very few Turks outside Greater London and most of these live in the Home Counties, though there are small settlements in some other towns, notably Birmingham and Manchester. Census figures have not distinguished between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but by considering other sources Oakley estimates that by 1966 the Turkish Cypriot population of Greater London was fairly evenly distributed north and south of the river, to the east of the main areas of Greek settlement, Camden and Islington. (1972:261ff) The 1971 Census indicates that settlement since 1966 has progressed further north of these two areas. The borough of Haringey has now become the largest centre of Cypriot settlement with a Cypriot popu-lation of 11,860 in 1971, followed by Islington (7,300). (Kohler 1974:10) Indeed, it was largely in Haringey that the fieldwork for this study was carried out. (See Map 2, p.247)

But despite this northward expansion, the Turkish population

remains relatively scattered, a fact which has important implications for group organisation and communication and for kinship. In some boroughs, especially those in South London with very few Greek Cypriots, five or six Turkish households may live close together but be cut off from the main areas of Cypriot settlement north of the river and other Turkish enclaves in the south. However, even in Haringey, where there is a considerable Turkish population, it is unusual to find more than three Turkish families in one street. Moreover, there is no residential or business district, nor even a cultural or social centre in the form of a hall or central meeting place. One North London street (in Newington Green) boasts a Turkish coffee shop, a Victorian terraced house converted into a mosque specifically for Turks, and two shops selling Turkish pop records, paperbacks and newspapers imported from Turkey. Several windows advertise forthcoming Turkish films which are shown at two North London cinemas at weekends. But there is no equivalent to the area around Gerrard Street in the West End, the focus of Britain's Chinese community, nor is there even a concentration of residents and Turkish-owned shops and businesses such as exists for Greek Cypriots in Camden. The fact that there is no centralizing institution or meeting place for Turkish Cypriots in London should be born in mind when the role of the various organizations which purport to provide a cultural focus for Turkish Cypriots in this country is considered.

In some rural-urban migration studies (Suzuki 1966; Little 1970) the continuity of village ties in the town is discussed. Special attention is paid to the mutual aid associations set up by rural migrants in the town for the benefit of their co-villagers. There are no comparable associations for Turks in London, though it seems that there were in the early days of migration when an individual was not assured of finding some of his kin already resident here. Now, however, there is no preference for marriages between members of families who originally migrated from the same village in Cyprus, nor do non-kin based ties seemed to have been maintained long after the move to London. Rather, certain kin relationships have been strengthened and completely new relationships formed between individuals who now relate, not on the basis of where they once lived in Cyprus, but on the basis of their present status. Thus, a Turkish Cypriot family will quickly come to know and depend on other

Turkish families when it moves into a neighbourhood and the most relevant kin become those who live nearest and who visit most frequently.

Family life too persists in both London and Cyprus without any assistance from relatives abroad. In London, young Turkish people of both sexes agree that it is preferable to marry someone who has been brought up in Britain, as there is a better chance of mutual understanding. This is not to say that marriages are never arranged between London and Cyprus. Indeed, a family will sometimes send a son or daughter to relatives in Cyprus if there is some difficulty in finding him or her a spouse here. The mother country thus acts as a safety valve and is especially useful when there are problems of marriageability. In the case of a daughter, this may mean that her reputation has suffered. A son may have difficulty if he is not especially good looking, in which case the fact that he lives in London might be enough to ensure him success in the Cypriot marriage stakes. Similarly, young girls in Cyprus will not refuse an invitation to stay with relatives in London if they are unmarried, in order to 'have a look around'. For the most part though, marriages are arranged in the country of residence.

The self-sustaining nature of the family in Cyprus and London is connected with the financial independence of the two populations. Since in London it is the nuclear family and not the unattached working male which constitutes the normal, or at least desirable, residential unit, wages are spent and capital is invested for the benefit of the immediate family. Money is not remitted for the benefit of more distant relatives. The justification of this practical attitude is that anyone can migrate if he wants to, and that therefore, if one's relatives have chosen to stay in Cyprus and are not now rich, they have only themselves to blame. Indeed, every adult individual has probably weighed up the pros and cons of migrating at some point. No doubt, too, those resident here have considered returning at some period in the intervening years. However, as was mentioned above, it now seems likely that, despite considerable contact between Turks in London and Cyprus, the majority of those who have migrated will not return permanently to Cyprus. Many long-term settlers actually admit that they do not mind if they

never return to Cyprus to live. Similarly, there are numerous reasons why the second generation may not want to 'return', or may find it difficult to do so. To them Cyprus is a foreign country which they might have visited only once or twice. Those who return normally do so to retire or to invest their savings in a small business once the children have married and become independent. Moreover, despite the comings and goings of individuals for holidays and business, the vast majority of Turks in Cyprus will almost certainly never emigrate. As Oakley noted, the rate of migration has been declining since 1962, and one would expect the events of 1974 and the stricter enforcement since 1967 of the 1962 British Immigration Acts to stem any further movement.

It is important to make clear the level of Turkish Cypriot society with which this thesis will be concerned. Although the dichotomy between townsman and villager is much less obvious in Cyprus than it is in Turkey, there does exist an urban educated elite in Cyprus, some of whom have migrated to London. Constantinides recognizes the stratified nature of Greek Cypriot society in Britain and delineates three categories of people based on the extent of their education, their social status and their reasons for being here. (1977:277-8) Thus she distinguishes:

a. Officials of the Cypriot High Commission and other banking, trade and tourist officials.

b. Academics and professionals, together with those working in welfare departments in boroughs with large Cypriot populations.

c. The 'ordinary' immigrant who has come to seek a 'better life'. Most of these people are from the villages and have very little formal education.

I would reduce these categories to two in the case of Turkish Cypriots, merging categories a and b, since the number involved in either category is so very small. Thus, there is an urban educated group of professional people and those in official 'representative' capacities; then there is the ordinary immigrant who has come simply to acquire a better standard of living for himself and his family. Of course, underlying this dichotomy there is in reality a continuum. As Constantinides notes for Greek Cypriots, some of the ordinary migrants from the villages, who had very little education and no capital when they arrived, have done extraordinarily well in business and as a

result have come to associate socially with the educated professional group as well as with middle-class English people - with whom of course the latter elite has greater contact than the ordinary working-class immigrant. But this is the exception rather than the rule and it is, I believe, justifiable to talk of a small nucleus of professional people, students in Higher Education, and those involved in export, welfare and management, whose social and economic backgrounds are similar and who tend to know each other either personally or through hearsay. These people are able to keep in touch with each other here through their participation in various associations, the leaders and organizers of which have been drawn from their ranks. They are also in close contact with a similar social group in Cyprus, a group which includes high-ranking government employees and Denktaş himself. This group, and the ethnic associations organized by them, will be discussed now because they will not be given much attention in the rest of the thesis.

This middle-class group would receive more attention if it had a more direct influence on those it purports to represent, or if it constituted a greater percentage of the London Turkish Cypriot population. I am talking here of only a few hundred people, perhaps only 20 of whom are in recognised - though often self-assumed - 'representative' capacities. The fact that they run associations and organize activities which are not participated in by the majority is itself a matter for discussion. The main reason for not concentrating on this group, however, is that it would be impossible, were I to do so, to generalize about Turkish Cypriots in Britain, so great are the differences between this group and the majority of working-class people. To begin with, their familiarity with things English - often gained as a result of an education at English schools in Cyprus and, later, of working directly with or for the British after Independence - means that they are potentially able to manipulate two cultural systems. They are conscious that two distinct systems exist, one English and one Cypriot Turkish, and that there children are in danger of growing up with a greater knowledge of the former, partly because of their own familiarity with it and acceptance of it. Most 'ordinary' Turks in Britain do not have enough contact with, or knowledge of, the 'English way' to feel anything but vaguely threatened by it. This middle-class group, on the other hand, aspires for its

children to be successful by English standards, while worrying at the same time that they will lose all sense of their Turkish heritage, of Turkish history, culture, language and religion in the process. I would suggest that such considerations help explain why this urban elite has tended to set up Turkish associations here which state explicitly that their aim is to promote Turkish culture. Participation by the wives and children in the activities organized by this same group can be seen as an attempt to retain a consciousness and an appreciation of their cultural identity as Turks. The ordinary Turkish Cypriot in Britain does not participate in these activities because he does not see them as necessary. He does not intellectualize his Turkish identity in this way. It is not a 'culture', set apart, to be brought out and demonstrated on Turkish holidays - it is 'life'. An interesting thing is happening: this middle-class group is continuing to celebrate national festivals and is retaining some very traditional folk practices (music, dancing, and so on) which the ordinary Turkish Cypriot has long since ceased to practise or celebrate. This is not to suggest that the working-class majority of Turkish Cypriots in this country are simply losing their cultural heritage because they are not intellectualizing it. Parents continue to socialize their children in the ways that they know, and for the older generation of parents this means Turkish Cypriot ways. But certainly the working-class families of my acquaintance were not attempting to positively instruct their children about things Turkish. Most of the children spoke Turkish until they went to school, but this was because it was their parents' first language - only a very few Turkish parents made arrangements for their children to attend Turkish language classes, few mothers made a concerted effort to teach their daughters how to cook Turkish food, or interested any of their children in Turkish folklore or customs. This contrasted with the efforts of the middle-class group for whom the various associations - and particularly the Cemiyet and the Women's organization discussed below - were functioning as 'culture' maintaining institutions.

This is really by the way. But it does partly explain why the middle-class group organizes ethnic activities and participates in them and why the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots do not. There are, however, other reasons of perhaps greater significance. For example, let us consider what other functions ethnic associations have

for populations which are not represented in the government of the country in which they reside. Of great importance is the fact that they provide a milieu for leadership, a political arena. Turkish Cyprus has no Embassy or High Commission in Britain. The de facto ambassador, or, as I shall refer to him, the Representative for Turkish Cyprus in London, does have offices and a small staff, but there is no hierarchy or scope for other would-be leaders and diplomats within this sphere. The main Turkish Cypriot association, the Cemiyet (literally 'the Association') operates quite independently from him; it has its own premises, leadership and status hierarchy, even though its members take the same political stand - the de facto ambassador represents the Turkish Cypriot Administration in Cyprus and the Cemiyet actively supports that Administration.

But if organizations here function as platforms for the politically ambitious - whether ideologically right or left wing - disagreements within and conflicts between these organizations partly account for their failure to attract the interest or participation of the majority. Informants would often justify their ignorance of, or scorn for, events organized by one or other association in terms of their belief that the people concerned were 'only in it for themselves', they 'didn't care about ordinary people' and, in any case, they were not to be trusted because 'they took people's money and used it for themselves'.[1] This mistrust and uncertainty also sprang from a complete ignorance about what associations existed, who ran them and the sort of activities they organized. This was not surprising as there was no co-ordination of events or of policy between the different associations, and there existed no effective means of communicating forthcoming events to the ordinary Turk. Publicizing them in an association newspaper meant that they only came to the attention of its regular readers - the same middle-class group. During the fieldwork period, non-aligned individuals did attempt to bring the different parties together under the umbrella of the official Representative, but to no avail. The latter explicitly stated

[1] Berk reports on the meeting held to discuss the embezzlement of Cemiyet funds in October 1971. No satisfactory explanations were forthcoming. Even my informants, who had no dealings with the Cemiyet, came to hear about this. Although they did not know if the 'rumour' was true or false, it increased their distrust of the Cemiyet's aims and activities. (Berk 1972:127ff)

that his main concern was to get international recognition and acceptance for the Turkish position on Cyprus; only when that was achieved would he have time to attend to the squabbles taking place in Britain between, as it were, members of his own constituency.

So far I have discussed the class difference which exists in Turkish Cypriot society in Britain, and I have mentioned the tendency of the small, educated middle-class group to be involved with 'ethnic' associations. I stated that connections with others of equivalent social standing were maintained partly as a result of relationships of competition, conflict and, of course, co-operation at this level. I suggested that ethnic associations, whether their raison d'etre be ostensibly cultural, religious or political, must be seen as constituting a field in which political dramas could be acted out, each association constituting a sphere for the politically ambitious, with opportunities for leadership and decision-making. Insofar as some of the associations have direct links with political parties in Cyprus, they represent an extension of Cypriot politics here. I have made one or two suggestions as to why the ordinary Turkish Cypriot in this country is not only ignorant of, but also uninterested in, the existence of these associations. To gain some greater insight into this problem, I want to look in slightly more detail at the aims and activities of some of the principal Turkish Cypriot associations in London.

The Cemiyet, set up in 1952, is the most well-established. In its weekly paper it claims to be 'the voice of Turkish Cypriots in Britain', though it represents the Turkish Cypriot population here only insofar as it receives foreign visitors on their behalf. Its weekly publication (in English and Turkish) also represents the views of those who take the official government line on political issues, including the Cyprus problem itself and the question of settlement. Apart from the Turkish lessons held at six London schools two evenings a week, the Cemiyet puts on specific events to commemorate Turkish national and religious holidays. It holds four dinner-dances a year and also celebrates other occasions. For example, I attended an afternoon of folk dancing to mark Children's Day (Coçuk bayramı) and another of poetry reading, musical recitals, theatre and speech-making to celebrate Turkish Mother's Day (Anneler Hatırası günü). The former was attended by about 400 people, the latter by about 60. The dinner-dances are more generally known and one does not have to

be a member of the Association to go to them. (The celebration of Turkish holidays - bayrams - is discussed more fully in Chapter V.)

At the time of fieldwork, the Women's branch of the Cemiyet was keen to increase the number of activities organized, and to attract younger people, but there were differences of opinion as to how this should be done. They faced a basic dilemma: how to encourage young people to participate in their events without putting them off by making the occasion too traditionally Turkish. Was an English-type discoteque on Youth and Sport day (another national holiday in Turkey) the answer? Since their purpose was in part to encourage the young to retain an appreciation of their Turkish heritage, this suggestion seemed a contradiction in terms. Yet it was conceived in response to what was felt to be the disenchantment of young London Turks towards their parents' cultural mores and attitudes. Differences about this and other matters - for example, the extent to which the Cemiyet should be functioning as a charitable foundation - eventually split the Women's branch, and one faction moved away to different premises. At the time of writing (1977) it had established itself as a completely separate organization concerning itself with social and charitable, rather than political, issues, and calling itself the Turkish Women's Philanthropic Association of England.[1] This splitting rendered the Women's branch of the Cemiyet much less effective, and during the fieldwork period rivalries between members of the two groups took up much of their time.

Thus, through personal disagreements between individual organizers and the elitist attitudes of the leaders themselves, the main Turkish Cypriot association in London, despite its potential for providing a cultural focus for Turks, failed to interest the majority of ordinary working-class people in its affairs. Though claiming a membership of 1000, those participating in its organized events probably numbered no more than 400-500, that is, 1.4% of the Turkish Cypriot population in London.

The second best known Turkish Cypriot association in London is probably the Turkish Cypriot Islamic Association.[2] This is run

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[1] Yardım Sever Kadınlar Cemiyeti

[2] Kıbrıs Türk Musulman Cemiyeti

by a small group of people in Newington Green, North London, where there is a terraced house converted into a small mosque. This is the smaller of the two Turkish mosques in London - the other, a converted Jewish synagogue in Hackney, is run by mainland Turks, though it is frequented by Cypriots on the two major religious bayrams (Kurban and Şeker bayram). The mosque in Newington Green has room for only 30 or 40 to pray. Even so, it is full only on Friday, the Muslim day of prayer, though prayers are held there every evening. This is indicative of a more general phenomenon: only a tiny minority of Turkish Cypriots in London make any concession to formal religion, whether by attending a mosque or by making namaz (prayers) in their homes. The Turkish Islamic organization argues that this is partly because people have no large Turkish mosque near where they live. Indeed, at the time of fieldwork, the leading members of the organization were planning to convert a larger building or church in Haringey into a mosque with the aid of money promised by another Muslim country. But there were problems in choosing an accessible site and in coming to an agreement with the leaders of other Turkish Cypriot organizations, who wanted the money to be used for a more all-purpose community centre. The organizers of the Turkish Islamic Association and the Cemiyet knew each other well, though their relationship was such that the possibility of their co-ordinating their policies and pooling their resources in an effort to provide a unified organizational structure seemed remote - at least in 1975-6 when these enquiries were made. The promise of financial aid from abroad to the Turkish Cypriot Islamic organization led the Cemiyet to make the claim that it was the real spokesman for Turkish Cypriots in Britain and, as such, it also represented them as Muslims. Thus, it was implied, it should have a determining voice in how funds promised to Turkish Cypriots in London should be used.

According to the Dictionary of Ethnic Minority Organizations in the U.K. (1976), there exist, apart from the three organizations mentioned above, a Turkish Arts Society and a Turkish Drama Group. The latter was certainly in operation in 1976, though the former had ceased to function the previous year after a dispute between its organizers. The drama group comprised a small but dedicated group of amateur actors, many of whom were students. One production being rehearsed at the time told the story of a Turkish Cypriot family which had settled in London. The difficulties they faced in finding

jobs, making new friends and getting along with each other in Britain were highlighted and, in the play, resolved. It was a theme with which many ordinary people could have identified, had they been informed it was taking place and had the opportunity of seeing it. But the actors also faced practical problems: they had nowhere permanent to hold their rehearsals, and at the time were sharing a hall with a Greek Cypriot theatre group. This was not proving a satisfactory arrangement and an alternative venue was being sought. The principal organizer of the drama group was well known by the leaders of the aforementioned associations and was sometimes asked by the Women's branch of the Cemiyet to perform short skits on London life at their functions. But the lack of a meeting-place, the shortage of funds, the scant publicity given to productions, and the very small number of people actually involved in the acting meant that the future of this group was uncertain.

Finally, there are several left-wing student organizations involving Turkish Cypriots in London. Some of these are not specifically Cypriot but are run by mainland Turkish students - for example, the Union of Turkish Progressives (a small but well organized branch of International Socialists) and the Federation of Turkish Students. The Cypriot Democratic Society, on the other hand, is a left-wing group specific to Cypriots. It was unified until it split after the 1974 Cyprus war into a Marxist-Leninist faction, opposing the Turkish military presence on Cyprus and favouring a unified state, and a more nationalistic faction favouring the partition of Cyprus into separate Turkish and Greek states. As with all the organizations mentioned above, when one is formed or splits into two, each group starts its own newspaper - a symbol of its existence and a medium for propagating its political viewpoint. If the Cemiyet and the other politicized associations were frequently at odds with each other, they were nonetheless united in their opposition to all the left-wing political groups. They were particularly against the proposals for a united Cyprus put forward by the pro-Soviet faction of the Cypriot Turkish Democratic society, seeing them as tantamount to treachery. Indeed, during the fieldwork period, members of this group said they were having to meet in secret for fear of recriminations from Cyprus, or rather, from representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Administration in London. Their political influence was thus,

they felt, being forcibly restricted.

So there are two main reasons why Turkish Cypriot associations continue to be monopolised by, and to cater for, the small circle of urban, educated London Turks. First, although the organisers explicitly state that their aim is to provide a cultural focus for Turks in London, they do not really try to reach the masses, while the leaders of some of the left-wing associations maintain that they are prevented from doing so. Too much time is spent, in both cases, on intra- and inter-associational disputes, and these have prevented the formation of a single decision-making body and have negated the occasional efforts made to co-ordinate policy or, at the very least, to procure a building to be used as a centre by and for everyone. Secondly, those ordinary Turks who have come into contact with one or more of the associations (usually with the Cemiyet through its dinner-dances or because they have sent their children to the Turkish classes it organises) have actually chosen not to participate more fully in their activities. This, so informants say, is because the associations have nothing more to offer them socially, because their members are elitist and because their leaders are not to be trusted. What they do not say, but what I have been led to surmise, is that identification with a Cypriot Turkish political pressure group (which all the above-mentioned associations are) is somewhat irrelevant for them. Take, for example, the Cemiyet's weekly magazine. Rather than, say, discussing the difficulties encountered by Turkish Cypriots here and offering them advice, or giving news of events and activities which might be of interest to the younger people or to Turkish mothers, its news is all from Cyprus. Most of it is unsubtle propaganda aimed at justifying the Turkish position there, and damning the Greeks. Every week references are made to the atrocities committed by Greeks in the past and to the fact that it is only now, with partition, that the Turkish population can feel safe. The point is that, since Turkish Cypriots in Britain are economically independent and have invested their capital here, the livelihood of most is no longer directly affected by events in Cyprus. In his everyday working routine - which invariably involves his co-operating with and consequently his befriending of Greek Cypriots - the intricacies of Cypriot politics are of no great concern to him, at least in peace time. Continuing in public the war with those who happen now to be his neighbours and work-mates is not to his advantage, whatever his private political

leanings might be. Thus, the political message of the right-wing groups, with which the majority of the London Turkish population might nonetheless sympathise in times of political unrest or war in Cyprus, is simply not sufficiently relevant under normal circumstances to warrant their active identification in terms of it.

In the chapters that follow, then, I confine my discussion almost wholly to the ordinary working-class Turkish Cypriots in London. Of course, reference will be made when relevant to the small elite group of middle-class Cypriots, and to their participation in the activities organised by the associations I have described. One outcome of the fact that most people are ignorant of the existence of associations which purport to represent them on a group level, is that they have very little objective awareness of a larger, and potentially cohesive, Turkish Cypriot community. For the majority, interaction with other Turks is frequent but fairly limited in its scope. Apart from weddings, visits to the Turkish cinema, and other extraordinary activities, the individual's day-to-day relations with other Turks are restricted to his kin, his Turkish neighbours and his work-mates. From these people every service can usually be obtained, be it a case of finding a job, a husband or someone to mend the roof. They constitute the individual's social universe, in the context of which his behaviour as a Turk is judged and his attitudes to non-Turks are formed. It is with this universe that I became familiar during fieldwork, and it is to this that I now turn.

2. Research Methods and Limitations

The fieldwork on which this thesis is based was carried out in London and Cyprus mainly between October 1975 and October 1976. However, information from London informants is still being collected at the time of writing, while a return visit to Cyprus was made in October 1977. During the year of fieldwork proper, 10 months were spent working with the Turkish population in London, most time being spent in the Haringey area of North London; two months (June and July 1976) were spent in northern Turkish Cyprus.[1]

The main problem in doing fieldwork among a geographically scattered population was to delimit a group large enough for those included to represent a cross-section of the population (in terms of age, wealth, occupation, length of time resident here), but small enough to allow for frequent visiting and for close relationships to be built up with a nucleus of main informants. To this end, it was decided to concentrate on four different areas of investigation, devoting an equivalent amount of time researching each. This, it was felt, would correct any bias in my otherwise arbitrary sample, as the different spheres would inevitably bring me into contact with Turkish Cypriots of different ages, socio-economic backgrounds, political affiliations, and with both men and women. Thus I planned to research into:

a. Households and family life: by delineating a neighbourhood or kinship group and establishing close ties with those within it.

b. Work and business activities: by accompanying the informants met in a. to their places of work.

c. Turkish Cypriot organizations and associations, cultural and politcal: by visiting them and talking to organisers and members.

d. The younger generation currently being educated in Britain: by visiting the schools with the greatest number of Turkish Cypriot children, and talking to children, their parents and teachers.

I did not conceive that any of these spheres would be mutually exclusive, but assumed that each would lead into the other; that relationships I came to establish with informants in their homes would lead me

[1] I had visited Cyprus before the 1974 war and had also spent a total of six months in Turkey before fieldwork began. At the onset of fieldwork, I had a working knowledge of the Turkish language.

to further contacts in factories and schools, and vice versa.

What went by the board when fieldwork began was not the schema outlined above but the plan to spend an equivalent amount of time researching each sphere. In fact, about 80% of my research time was spent in Turkish Cypriot households. Visits were made to work-places, associations and schools, but to supplement data obtained from informants in their homes. I concentrated on the Turkish Cypriot family and household for a number of reasons. The hospitality shown me by the families I came to know well, and their incorporation of me as a 'daughter' or 'sister', meant that visiting families in their homes was a pleasurable and ever-informative experience. The fact that I did not live permanently with any one family, but kept my own base elsewhere in London, made it possible to fraternise with many more families than would have been possible had I been adopted by a particular one. The pressure to absorb me as a recruit in inter-family arguments was still strong, however. By staying in one house for one or more days, or by making, as I was more inclined to do, extended calls two or three times a week on 10-14 households, I came to know a considerable number of people, as much of my time was spent visiting the relatives or neighbours of the family with whom I was staying. The range of contacts established in this way, and the very close relationships I developed with a few families, meant that information could be gathered on the basis of both what informants said they did, and what, through observation over an extended period, it was apparent they were actually doing.

Besides this, the information collected in schools, factories and associations was neither as easily obtainable nor as accurate or comprehensive as I imagined it would be. For example, the fact that most organizations lacked any significance for the ordinary Turk meant that their internal organization and policy were less relevant than if their leaders had functioned as decision-makers or as approved and acknowledged representatives of the London Cypriot Turkish population. The strong political biases of many of the associations also made a long-term examination of any one of them difficult. Concerned as I was with Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus, I was a potentially useful spokesman on Turkish affairs, an English person who could, for example, be possibly encouraged to explain and to justify the Turkish position on Cyprus, or on any other particular concern of a particular association

to the media. Although the individual organisers of different associations were helpful and informative at all times, I did not want myself cast in any other role but that of an impartial observer. For this reason, I restricted my visits to times when I had specific enquiries to make, or to occasions when special celebratory activities had been organised.

Most of the data gathered as a result of visiting work and business places are presented in Chapter II. The difficulty here was that of obtaining access to places of work where there were no Turkish Cypriot female employees. Indeed, the fact that it was impossible to fraternize equally with both men and women in general - but particularly in the work context - meant that my data are not as comprehensive as they could have been in this sphere.

In schools, too, I spent less time than anticipated. Having contacted the six schools in Haringey with the greatest number of Cypriot pupils, I was welcomed by the heads of four of them to interview the children and staff. This was with a view to understanding why so many of the younger generation, educated in Britain, still enter the same occupations as their parents. Was it because they were leaving school without the qualifications which would enable them to compete on equal terms with their English peers in the job market, or because there was pressure from parents to look for work only within a Cypriot milieu? On the whole, such enquiries in schools did not furnish me with the information I was seeking. Teachers did not distinguish between Turkish and Greek Cypriot children, and, although some useful contacts were made in this way (I got to know the families of two girls very well), this sort of information was more readily obtainable through participant-observation in homes. Indeed, the limited educational achievement of many of the young Turkish Cypriots with whom I came into contact was at least partly a result of their parents' lack of interest and the absence of a positive home ideology about edcation. Most parents did not encourage their children to stay on at school after the age of 16 if they did not want to do so. Getting a well-paid job was considered more important than education, if the latter was seemingly for its own sake. All this became apparent over time in the context of the home and, as a result, I soon brought my enquiries in schools to a close.

Since most of my research time was spent inside Turkish Cypriot households, it is important to specify the number of families involved, if only as a means of substantiating or qualifying the data presented and my interpretation of them. I mentioned above that most of my informants were 'working class', though this is not to suggest that the financial circumstances of the families concerned did not vary considerably. The length of time a family had been resident here, the entrepreneurial initiative of its individual members, the ratio of dependents to wage-earners in a household, good and bad luck - all these factors helped explain why some individuals were relatively wealthy factory owners while others had remained in the same sort of job as that found when they first arrived. The selection of a 'population' not wholly biased towards one end of the wealth continuum was achieved more by luck than by design. My initial contacts at the beginning of fieldwork were two families - a nuclear family of five and an extended one of 16 - and I began by visiting their kin and neighbours with them, building up my own contacts independently over time. After some months, three groups of families - or rather, households - emerged. My justification for defining a collection of households as a group, and for categorizing them A, B and C respectively, should become clear when the salient characteristics of each group are described.[1]

Group A was basically a neighbourhood group: five households (four nuclear families, one extended) which, when fieldwork began, were neighbours all within five minutes' walking distance of each other, in two adjoining streets in Haringey. Four of the households were Turkish Cypriot, and the extended family household was mainland Turkish. Only two of the families were related, the daughter of one having established a separate household on the same street as

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[1] It should be noted that the households specifically mentioned here form but a small fraction of the total number of households visited and families met during the fieldwork period. Rather, they became my primary contacts, and their individual members my chief informants. I was able to become acquainted with their respective networks of kin, neighbours and work-mates. Generalizations made in the course of this thesis are thus based on my familiarity with many more families than these 14 primary contacts. Indeed, the problem of fieldwork was how to limit, rather than increase, the number of families who expected me to call on them frequently - that is, several times each week.

her parents on the birth of her third child. The five households had been neighbours for between three and eight years, depending on when each had moved into the area. Two of the families 'remembered' each other from Cyprus, but their living close in England was coincidental. The women in this neighbourhood group were in and out of each others' houses all day, their children played together and their husbands went out together to drink or gamble at weekends. Of course, at different times the individuals concerned saw more or less of each other as they chose - with no kin connections, there was not the same moral obligation to restore relations in the event of an argument. However, it was acknowledged that they lived too close to each other to prolong disagreements unnecessarily, and there was no shortage of go-betweens when relations became strained between any two of the women. Although at weekends each family would visit and be visited by its respective kin and affines who also lived in the Haringey area, these people were not normally enlisted for their help or advice, or called on for their company on a daily basis. For most social and practical purposes, the neighbourhood group functioned as a self-sustaining entity. This is not to say that ties with non-local kin were being severed, but simply that they were less relevant in day-to-day affairs.

Group B might best be described as a dispersed kinship group. To facilitate describing the kin connections between the different families involved, I will designate one nuclear family household as a central ego. The people this family saw most often were the wife's six siblings (three married brothers, two married sisters and one unmarried sister) and the husband's sister (his only sibling in London). Individuals in this group had migrated to England at different times: the eldest brother of the sibling group had been in Britain for 20 years, the youngest brother for 11 years. With the death of both parents and some financial success, the older siblings moved out of the area in which they had originally settled, and bought houses in quieter residential districts; the eldest brother eventually moved to a large house in Hertfordshire. The unmarried sister stayed with her most recently married sister in the original parental home. At the time of fieldwork, the six households thus established had few Turkish neighbours and, despite the distances involved, they continued to see each other often. Certainly, the wife of the family designated as ego relied almost completely on visits by and to her siblings and

her husband's sister for company and news. There were few days when at least one of her siblings or their spouses did not call. It is important to note that both A and B are designated groups because they comprise individuals whose frequency and intimacy of contact is greater with each other than with anyone else.

Group C households are so categorized because they lack the close ties with other households which characterise the families in the above two groups. I regularly visited two nuclear family households who had neither close Turkish neighboure nor many close kin in this country. I include them here, and refer to them where relevant, in order to correct the impression, which might otherwise be given, that all Turkish Cypriot families in Britain are socially incorporated into tight-knit networks of kin, neighbours or both. Some families are quite isolated, both physically and socially. One of the families (household C2) had been living in London for five years and, although the husband worked with other Turkish Cypriots, his wife knew practically no-one. She machined at home and looked after their one child. During the fieldwork period, the husband's mother visited from Cyprus for medical treatment, and stayed for some months to keep her company. The wife's own parents, siblings and first cousins were all in Cyprus, as were most of her husband's immediate family. The other family in this group was a nuclear family household of seven. One of the wife's brothers was in England, as were two of her nephews. Apart from occasional visits from more distant kin, these were the only people who visited or were visited regularly. The parents in both these families longed to return to Cyprus, though their children's schooling made plans in this direction difficult. They were also the only families I met who sent regular remittances to the grandparents in Cyprus. In contrast, communication between the 12 households in groups A and B and their relatives in Cyprus was sporadic and limited for the most part to the occasional letter and a summer holiday visit every few years. With their immediate kin resident here, the latter had no particular reason to maintain close links with Cyprus, and none were planning to return to live there.

The purpose of this introductory statement of my household sample is to make it possible from now on to refer to specific families when necessary, in order to exemplify points made in the text. In Appendix A, I discuss other similarities between the families in each group, and other differences between the families from different

groups. A chart detailing the families involved, with more information about individual members, is given in Appendix B (p.234). A similar chart is given for the families visited in Cyprus in 1976 and 1977 (p.237). This group will be referred to as Group D. (See Map 3, p.248)

My base in Cyprus in June and July 1976 and in October 1977 was household D1, the household head being the eldest son of household A1. I also stayed with the parents of the wife of household C2. This was quite apart from the visits made to other households, and the contacts made at a more official level (these too being initiated in London). My aim in visiting northern Turkish Cyprus was twofold:

a. To follow up the relatives of those families with whom most time had been spent in Britain - contact with 12 of the 14 households listed was made in this way. In some cases, this entailed meeting some of my London informants in Cyprus, where they had returned for a holiday at the same time as my visit. The nature of the tie between London and Cyprus could thus be more positively examined, and the attitudes that Turks in Cyprus had towards their London-based kin elicited at first hand.

b. To reach a fuller understanding of the political and economic conditions on the island in the light of the July 1974 war and consequent partition, with a view to explaining why London Turks do not seem to be returning to live permanently in Cyprus. Information was also collected on interethnic relations in Cyprus - the attitudes of the Turkish Cypriot majority to Greek Cypriots and to the newly-arrived Turkish mainlanders. These data enabled interesting comparisons to be drawn with the situation obtaining in London, and illustrated the importance of local conditions in determining interethnic relations and attitudes. The findings of this part of my field research are discussed in Chapter VI.

The limitations of data collected in London and Cyprus

The main factor limiting the comprehensiveness of the material collected in both countries was its female emphasis; this I have already referred to. This was not an intentional emphasis, though I think it was to some extent inevitable. I was working in a society with a definite sexual division - especially as regards activities outside the home. I related to women in a kinship idiom, using the

kin terms of address when appropriate and when talking to older informants I knew well. Relations with older men, though more formal, were conducted on the same basis. With the younger men, however, and especially with those in London who had been brought up here, the essence of the relationship was rather different. To Turkish Cypriot women in their twenties and thirties I was another woman, but to men of my own age I was an English woman and therefore conversant with a system of norms and values which they, much more than their sisters, were familiar with and keen to talk about. However, accompanying them to their place of work, a pub, the bookmakers or a cafe was out of the question as far as their womenfolk were concerned. Within the household, men were family and so was I. Outside it, they were male and I was female.

Berk, whose study is referred to above, had the same problem but in reverse. Though Turkish himself, he mentions that he was never allowed into a Turkish Cypriot house if the husband was out and the wife alone. 80% of his information was obtained from men, 13% from women with their husbands present, and only 7% of his sample were women interviewed on their own. These latter were well educated women, who had been in Britain longer than the rest. (Berk 1972:35) The outcome of this bias in my own research is that I have relatively little information on the leisure activities of men, summed up by one wife as "cafes, gambling and womans". Indeed, the older household heads in groups A and C would return to their homes only to eat and sleep. A sexual division was much more marked here than for the families in group B, where the wives relied on their husbands for company in the evenings. The emphasis in the following chapters on family, kinship and neighbourhood relations is therefore not just a reflection of my own interests but a result of the amount of fieldwork time spent in Turkish Cypriot homes in the company of women.

As for field research in Cyprus, there was a limit to the amount of information which could be gleaned in the three months spent there. However, the fact that I brought messages or presents from relatives in England to most of the households listed meant that I was immediately accepted by most of them as a family friend, since they were eager for news and gossip about their London-based kin. How representative these sample families were of Turkish Cypriot families generally is debatable. Twelve of the fourteen had close kin in London

(siblings, parents or children) and this differentiated them from other families which were less closely connected with the migration process. However, as in London, there were considerable differences in socio-economic status: households 2 and 12, for example, were personal friends of Denktaş and had spacious, elegant town houses, whereas household 6 lived in a small, mud-brick house without running water, in the very oldest part of Nicosia. The main problem in Cyprus was in obtaining information about the past and in particular about family structure, residence patterns, marital norms and inter-ethnic relations of the Cyprus of 1958-1962 - the period when many of those now in Britain actually migrated. In the political and economic instability caused by the 1974 war, people were overwhelmingly concerned with their current situation in 1976, and memories were couched, perhaps inevitably, in emotive and evaluative rather than descriptive terms. I was aware that even my observations of the present did not necessarily reflect pre-1974 norms and circumstances. For example, on the basis of my observations in 1976, I could say that very few Turkish Cypriots practise their religion, at least in the formal sense of regularly attending a mosque, as none of the members of the households I visited did so. But such a statement must necessarily be qualified, given the conditions obtaining for many of the families concerned. Seven of the 14 households had moved as a result of the war; four had been evacuated from the south and three had moved to new homes in the north. These moves had entailed resettlement in previously all-Greek villages for some (households 8, 9, 10 and 14) and in Greek areas of towns for others (households 1, 2 and 4). Consequently, many had no local mosque which they could have visited even if they had been in the habit of doing so.

It was not immediately obvious, then, which institutions and activities had been affected by the war. Moreover, on my return visit in 1977, I realized that much of what I had noted the previous year no longer held. For example, because of the influx of Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south and the arrival of many Turkish mainland families on the island, neighbours in newly-settled, formerly Greek areas were often complete strangers to each other. Yet the mutual suspicion obtaining between households of strangers in 1976 was already less obvious 15 months later in 1977. The women in a Famagusta suburb where I stayed on both occasions had got to know each other better, and had become friends in the intervening period. The general Cypriot anta-

gonism to settlers from Turkey was dying down. Thus I had to be careful not to assume that what I had observed in Cyprus during my two short fieldwork trips was necessarily typical of pre-1974 Cyprus, and to be be aware also that what informants told me about the past was likely to be influenced in part by their recent experiences.

But the political situation notwithstanding, I do consider that my visits to Cyprus gave me an invaluable perspective. The significance of certain events in London became apparent only when seen in the context of equivalent events in Cyprus. I did not appreciate, for example, the significance of Turkish women working here, or of Turk and Greek working together, until I visited Cyprus and became aware of the discrepancy between the two countries in what was seen as normal practice. Thus, despite the fact that my fieldwork in Cyprus was of short duration and was undertaken in the aftermath of war, I felt better able to evaluate and analyse material collected in London as a result - at least to ask the right questions, if not to provide all the answers. It is to the questions specifically, and to the theoretical orientation of the study generally, that I now turn. The points at which my own perspective converges with or departs from those held by other anthropologists working with minority or 'ethnic' populations will be discussed at some length.

3. Anthropological Studies of Migrant and Minority Groups

The Approach from Race Relations

My fieldwork was largely carried out in London among Turkish Cypriots and, although a further three months were spent in the northern Turkish part of Cyprus, the object of this was to supplement information obtained in London rather than to make a separate study of Turks in Cyprus. Thus my research has been primarily a study of an immigrant group.

Other studies on migrant or immigrant populations are of several types. There is, on the one hand, a vast literature on 'race relations'. The approach from race relations is problem-oriented and, since it is assumed (in most cases justifiably) that foreign white immigrants do not experience discrimination to the same degree as British-born and -educated coloured immigrants, the main theme can be summarised as the problem of coloured immigration. Practical matters predominate in most of these studies, and solutions are sought in the various areas where the two groups come into contact (jobs, housing, education and so on). The terminology used is confusing. As immigration to this country increased, race relations theories developed and terms like 'absorption', 'assimilation', 'cultural pluralism' and 'integration' were severally used over time to describe popular conceptions of what were, government conceptions of what should be, and the theorists' conceptions of what could be - with regard to race contact situations. This emphasis on the nature of the relationship between an immigrant population and the 'host' society means that the internal structure and organization of the immigrant group has tended to be overlooked. Internal differentiation in terms of, say, class, caste, occupation, precise area of emigration, religion and education are irrelevant to the fundamental classification, which is of course based on 'racial' difference. And, as far as race relations studies are concerned, this invariably means colour.

Thus, not only are Cypriots too white to be considered under the race relations rubric, but the practical, policy-making emphasis

of the approach is, I find, both unchallenging theoretically and limiting in its usefulness for providing an analytical framework for ordering ethnographic data. Since most of my material relates to the internal dynamics of the London Turkish Cypriot population, and very little to the nature of Turkish-English relations, it is obviously an unsuitable approach for presenting the type of data I have collected.

The Approach from Ethnicity

Anthropologists working with migrant groups in Britain, whether these be short-term labour migrants or more settled 'immigrant' peoples, have been variously influenced by the growing number of studies whose authors define their subject as 'ethnicity', and their primary unit of study an 'ethnic group'. Despite the popularity of the term 'ethnicity' it has as yet no generally accepted definition, nor do those who use it agree about whether it should be used simply as a descriptive device, as an analytic concept, or both. Two rather different perspectives on ethnicity have evolved - I will refer to them as the 'political' and the 'cognitive' approaches respectively. I want to summarise their main concerns here, so that at least my own proposals regarding the usefulness of the concept can be seen against the background of what I consider to be the most significant contributions to current theory.

The political approach to ethnicity is best exemplified in the work of Abner Cohen (1969, 1971, 1974a, 1974b), though his general perspective is taken up in different ways by most contributors to the book he edits, Urban Ethnicity (1974a). As the title of the book suggests, the contributors are concerned with ethnicity in cities, and particularly African cities - seven of the eleven essays being based on African ethnography. The exponents of the political approach define ethnic groups as interest groups which, lacking any sort of formal bureaucratic structures, tend to make use of cultural symbols to organise themselves informally - organization being imperative for any group which aims to retain its control of a resource it corporately monopolizes, or an occupation it dominates. Thus some, and perhaps many aspects of the group's shared lifestyle (Cohen calls these aspects 'symbolic strategies') will be severally used by the group to ensure the following basic organizational functions: distinctiveness,

communication, an authority structure, a decision-making process, an ideology and a socialization process. All of these Cohen deems essential if ethnic distinctiveness and solidarity are to be positively maintained and, it follows, ethnic interests served.

In fact, Cohen is less concerned with ethnic groups per se than with the example provided by ethnicity of a more general phenomenon: the ability of many different types of interests groups to 'operate' without the conventional aids to formal organization. Thus, ethnic groups are considered in conjunction with economic elites, religious sects and caste groups (jati), all of which cannot, for various reasons, organise themselves formally in a Weberian sense, and which consequently employ different symbolic forms to serve the organizational functions mentioned above. Sometimes, Cohen notes, one symbolic form will do a number of jobs: for example, religion might provide both a channel for communication and a milieu for group leaders to emerge. Alternatively, several symbols might be employed in the articulation of just one organizational function: dress styles, a system of morality, the ritual in certain ceremonies - all may help towards ensuring continuing group distinctiveness. Thus, what is of interest to Cohen is the relationship between power relations and symbolic action (the theme of Two-Dimensional Man, 1974b). Indeed, Cohen explicitly states that he would like to use the word 'ethnicity' more generally - to describe the process whereby different types of power elites, and not just ethnic groups, manipulate symbolic patterns of behaviour to articulate their organization. (1974a:xxi) Cohen's concern, then, is less with ethnic identity (an attribute of individuals) than with the ethnic group, a political group by definition, because its members are struggling (whether violently or quite unobtrusively) to maintain control of a scarce commodity. To struggle effectively they must organise, and to organise they symbolise. The focus then becomes the form taken by these symbolic actions and the organizational functions they fulfil.

Cohen's very specific use of the term ethnicity does avoid some of the pitfalls into which others have fallen when attempting to define the term, and use the label 'ethnic group', more loosely. For example, Badr Dahya talks about Pakistani 'ethnicity' in Britain. (In Cohen ed. 1974a:77-118) In his article he makes a valid point about the danger of ignoring the motives of the people being studied

when attempting to describe and understand their behaviour. But as Verity Saifullah Khan notes, he confuses ethnicity with nationality. Pakistani ethnicity, she says, is a nonsense term because Pakistanis in Britain are internally differentiated according to their ethnic/ regional origin and class. Moreover, in their day-to-day activities "... they are not reminded of, or involved in a wider notion of the Pakistani population. They do not identify themselves with all other Pakistanis but with those from their particular region of origin who (except in this very general sense) cannot be called a community". (Saifullah Khan 1976:225) The fact that they share a common nationality and religion does not mean that they will be socially and culturally homogeneous. Considerable variations in attitudes and behaviour may - and in this case obviously do - exist.

But there are several drawbacks with Cohen's particular definition of ethnicity. It is extremely limiting in its applicability. It demands, for example, that the political climate be one of conflict or competition: by definition, the members of an ethnic group are struggling to maintain control of those resources they corporately monopolise. Although this allows one to explain why, over time, some ethnic groups maintain their distinctiveness while others lose it, the ethnographic context is too narrowly defined to allow for the consideration of peoples in transitional or marginal states. Within this category I would include most migrant and immigrant populations in this country where the majority have arrived since about 1950. If part of a population migrates from one country to another, they may not have developed corporate interests at the time of an anthropological study (and may in fact never do so), but they may still organise on a cultural basis to preserve their identity, if only because they have no good reason to adopt the culture of the majority population. However, a migrant population can presumably be considered an 'ethnic group' in a Cohenian sense, and be analysed within the theoretical framework he proposes, only if it can be assumed that corporate interests exclusive to the population being discussed are in the process of developing. This cannot be automatically assumed in the case of Turkish Cypriots.

If Turkish Cypriots are compared with the Hausa of Cohen's study, the differences immediately become apparent. Cohen states that most of the Hausa in Ibadan and other Yoruba towns in Nigeria

were indirectly or directly engaged in long distance trade between the savannah and the forest belt. Although on independence the Hausa lost those distinctive traits which traditionally set them apart from their Yoruba neighbours (formerly, they were politically autonomous, residentially separate and ritually distinct), they adopted a religious order of Islam - the Tijaniyya. This helped them retain the distinctiveness they were in danger of losing. The reorganization of Hausa religious life led to a political reorganization which allowed for the development of a communication system, a decision-making process, and so on. Thus the basic organizational functions referred to above continued to be provided for, though on a different basis. Religion, therefore, acted as a catalyst enabling the Hausa to continue as a politically corporate group with a monopoly on trade. New class cleavages after independence coincided with existing ethnic divisions, so that they continued to be a privileged socio-economic group as well. (Cohen 1969:183ff)

Not only are Turkish Cypriots in London occupationally differentiated and residentially dispersed, but class and ethnic group boundaries do not coincide. The educated, and for the most part politicized, elite has very little contact with the vast majority of working-class Turks here. Moreover, the political orientation of this elite and the economic orientation of the majority means that their interests are not always the same. Internal stratification exists within the ethnic group and this must be recognised.

Moreover, even if one were to argue that Turkish Cypriots in Britain have corporate economic interests (in the sense that they have attained a degree of economic security they want to maintain), and that these are advanced by ethnicity (an ethos of working through whom you know and trust, that is, each other), the economic niche they exploit is not exclusively theirs. It includes Greek Cypriots and others, and Greek Cypriots alone outnumber Turks in London by approximately four to one. Just as there appeared to be no internal divisions or conflicting loyalties within the Hausa or Creole populations, so too no outside group encroached on their economic niche, forcing them into relationships of co-operation rather than conflict. But the fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriots are employed in the same occupations in London, and agree on the norms which operate in the work context, means that it is in the interest of Turks generally, and those Greeks who work with them (or, as is frequently the case, employ them) to use

their common ground and shared understandings positively, and for their respective economic good. Thus political disagreements which exist between Greek and Turk tend not to be emphasised by the latter in London, and this significantly influences the types of symbolic strategy employed by Turks in the ethnic delineation process. In contrast, the economic niche of the Ibadan Hausa was occupied by them alone: interest group and ethnic group coincided. Indeed, the fact that they coincided, that cultural differences were being used to maintain a sense of group distinctiveness and thus the control of a material resource, is what, for Cohen at least, ethnicity is all about. But is it necessary or useful to define ethnicity as specifically as this?

David Parkin uses the term ethnicity in a rather more general sense. He has to. In his chapter in the above-mentioned volume (Cohen ed. 1974a:119-151) he outlines the differences between the Luo of Kampala and the Ibadan Hausa. The fit between class and tribe is less exact for the Luo and his essay is interesting partly because the situation he describes is so much more complex than that with which Cohen was dealing. The Luo, unlike the Hausa, are not a highly corporate group. They are not residentially separate, and there is considerable diversity in income, occupations and educational levels within the population. Thus, class and tribal divisions do not neatly coincide. However, despite this lack of homogeneity, Parkin is able to utilise the general theory of ethnicity evolved by Cohen because the Luo as a group are, like the Hausa, being threatened - in this case by the numerically superior Kikuyu - in the job and housing markets. Both of these commodities are critically scarce, according to Parkin. The maintenance of a corporate, if more diffused, sense of identity is therefore still vital if they are to compete effectively in these two spheres. Parkin goes on to argue that, for the Luo, kinship is a more effective basis for organization than religion. He explains how informal kin networks and formal lineage-based associations serve the same function for the Luo as the Tijaniyya order does for the Hausa. Both kinship associations and religious affiliation make it possible for the people concerned to express a corporate identity, and thus maintain their distinctiveness.

Perhaps Turkish Cypriots in London can be seen as simply one step further along the continuum of ethnic situations proposed by

Cohen. "At one end of the continuum we have highly corporate political groups such as the Hausa of Ibadan, whose considerable political autonomy is accompanied by a trading monopoly, preferred residential segregation, and religious and cultural exclusiveness. At the other end are ethnic groups, or rather categories, whose members recognise and interact among themselves by reference to their cultural affinity but who do not otherwise hold significant corporate interests in common." (Summarised by Parkin, in Cohen ed. 1974a:147) Clearly, the Turkish Cypriot population in London is further towards the 'category' end of the scale than are even the Luo, though like the latter they present an interesting in-between case. The main difference between the Luo and Turkish Cypriots in London is, of course, that the latter are not being obviously threatened in any particular sphere by tangible outsiders. Because they do not feel discriminated against or threatened as a group, individuals are not forced continually to identify their own interests with those of other Turkish Cypriots. It is this absence of 'struggle' that limits the applicablity of the approach to Turkish Cypriots in London.

Let us now turn to the cognitive approach to ethnicity. In recognising the limitations of the political approach, while acknowledging the logic of its principal tenets, Parkin demonstrates how it can be utilised so as to provide a framework for a cogent and interesting analysis. But the fact that Cohen, Parkin and the other contributors to Urban Ethnicity take competition to be an inherent property of ethnicity is, I would suggest, related to the fact that many have worked in urban Africa, with tribes undergoing intense struggles to retain their identity and exclusiveness. In a similar way, Fredrik Barth's fieldwork experience has influenced his definition of ethnicity and has also determined the problems he presents for investigation. I am not suggesting that the difference in fieldwork contexts alone accounts for this difference of approach, though it goes a long way towards explaining it.

In writing of the Pathans, Barth is concerned with a population whose territory extends from Turkestan to the Indus, from Baluchistan to the Pamirs. Despite their geographical dispersion, Pathans have been relatively undisturbed by changes in the political superstructures of the countries they inhabit, and their distinctiveness has not been obviously threatened. The questions Barth sees as

pertinent, given these conditions, are understandably different from those which concerned Cohen and others. What especially characterise Barth's approach, as it is presented in the Introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969a), are two implicit assumptions about ethnic identity. First, ethnic identity is considered as a category of ascriptive identity and, in a multi-ethnic situation, as the means by which individuals categorise others and so order their relationships with them. Thus, ethnic identity 'canalizes' social life by implicitly stating the norms governing interaction, both between individuals who identify themselves as members of the same ethnic group, and between those who identify themselves in terms of different groups. (1969a:15-17) Ethnicity for Barth, then, has this organizational function. Secondly, the ethnic group itself is seen to be demarcated by the fact that its individual members share certain distinctive norms, values and cultural forms. With the Pathans, however, Barth found that observable cultural differences (dress, language, house forms, rituals, and so on) could be misleading as indicators of ethnic group affiliation, and he therefore concluded that the only way to ascertain an individual's ethnic identity was to ask him what he considered himself to be. Thus, a Pathan was a Pathan if he identified himself as such and allowed his behaviour to be judged by Pathan standards. (Likewise, Moerman's difficulty in differentiating the Lue of Northern Thailand from their Yuan neighbours led him to favour this method of subjective identification. (1965))

Barth presents for consideration two observations about the nature of ethnicity. (1969:9-10) He notes that ethnic groups persist despite interaction with other groups and other cultures, and also that ethnic boundaries are maintained despite the fact that ethnic group membership is not constant. Pathans, he found, would change their ethnic identity when they could no longer emulate Pathan values, provided that an alternative identity - the adoption of which would mean their no longer being classed as a failure - was within reach. But rather than going on to discuss the first point - why and how ethnic group distinctiveness was being articulated and thereby maintained - Barth tends to concentrate on the second point and considers at length the means by which other neighbouring populations were able to incorporate 'drop-out' Pathans into their political and economic structure. In this way, the 'stuff' of Pathan distinctiveness was not diluted or changed by having to cope with those who failed the

standards required for ethnic inclusion. So, Barth's concern is not _why_ ethnic distinctiveness is articulated and _whether_ group identity is being maintained as a result, but _how_ the ethnic boundary is maintained despite a flow of personnel across it.

Barth's concept of boundaries is a potentially useful one. Indeed, one possible line of enquiry as regards Cyprus is how the essential characteristic of Turkish Cypriot distinctiveness is maintained despite close association with Greek Cypriots, Turkish mainlanders (in some instances) and, of course, the English. If one takes the term 'boundary' also to mean 'point of vulnerability' - and I think this is implicit in Barth's use of the term - then a special concern with those who have been born, or at least brought up, in Britain is called for. Of these, the women are particularly important. They are on the boundary and potentially peripheral, and it is the possibility of their marrying out of the group that is seen as most threatening to its distinctiveness and continuity.[1] These are areas of enquiry which I find interesting, but to focus on them specifically would be to restrict the study as a whole to a consideration of either interethnic relations or the adaptive response made by the young in Britain, and I aim to deal with a wider range of topics than these.

The real value of Barth's work on ethnicity, in my view, is its comprehensiveness. This he achieves because he had to consider the relationships that different Pathan groups had with their various neighbours. He was not dealing with a straightforward case of the Pathans vis ã vis one other population - indeed, there were four principal ethnic populations with whom Pathans interacted. Thus, Barth aims to demonstrate how different forms of Pathan organization represented various ways of consummating the identity under changing conditions. On the northern, southern, western and eastern borders of Pathan territory, Pathans adapted their social organization in response

[1] This is because, even when Turkish Cypriot men do marry 'out', they bring their wives 'in', and it is expected that their children will be brought up within a Turkish cultural context. The same cannot be expected if a woman marries a non-Turk, as her own family effectively hands over its responsibility for her at marriage. It is not presumed that she will have the right to determine the cultural bias of her children's upbringing, so both she and her children are seen as 'lost'.

to both the social and economic organization of their neighbours and to the ecological variations of the area. So, for example, Barth notes how Pathan local descent groups in the south were organised politically through lineage councils, and faced centrally organised Baluch tribes along a clearly defined territorial boundary. (Barth 1969b:123) In the west, Pathan pastoral and trading nomads penetrated into Hazara territory, often settling there as landowners. Different circumstances again obtained on the northern and eastern boundaries. In each case, the method by which border Pathans obtained a living and related to neighbouring peoples was an adaptation of their own social and economic organization to local conditions. Barth distinguished four types of ecologic interdependence; that is to say, four outcomes of interethnic contact:

a. If two groups occupy distinct niches in the natural environment, competition for scarce resources will be minimal and the articulation of the relationship probably confined to ceremonial and ritual spheres.

b. If two groups occupy separate territories, competition for resources along the border may ensue.

c. If two groups provide goods and services for each other, they may be closely interdependent. Barth goes on to say, "If they also compete and accommodate through differential monopolisation of the means of production, this entails a close political and economic articulation, with open responsibilities for other forms of interdependence as well". (1969a:20)

d. If two groups occupy the same niche, there will be at least partial competition; either one will displace the other over time, or complementarity and interdependence will develop.

Although he stresses that it is a gross simplification to reduce interethnic relations to such straightforward types, Barth shows, in merely drawing up the typology, that he recognises the diversity of relationships which can obtain between any two ethnic groups in contact. Taken, literally, Cohen and other exponents of the political approach confine their discussion of ethnicity to those groups at the conflict end of the continuum, and omit any consideration of groups whose relationships are based on co-operation, or are articulated only in certain spheres - in ritual activities, for example. It is interesting that my own fieldwork situation corresponds more closely to that of Cohen, Parkin, Dahya, Grillo and others, insofar as it is a study of a minority group in an urban environment, yet it

is Barth's typology which allows for the Turkish Cypriot case to be incorporated. Indeed, the third type of ecological adaptation referred to above approximates closely to the Turkish Cypriot situation. In Chapters II and VI I attempt to demonstrate this.

One of Barth's principal concerns was to discover and explain how Pathans maintained their distinctiveness as an ethnic group, despite the differences in social organization and interethnic relations which obtained in different regions of Pathan territory. He delineates what might be called a Pathan ethos, his idea being that, however differently border Pathans had adapted to the exigencies of their environment, there still existed certain marks of Pathanness, a Pathan self-image, which made them recognisable to themselves and to outsiders. I do not want to elaborate on this here as his argument is clearly stated in the above-mentioned book, but this self-image was realised in the Pathan case in three central domains of activity: hospitality, councils, and the seclusion of women. (Barth ed. 1969:119-123) I think it could be argued that Turkish Cypriots in London also have a self-image, an idea of what it means to be Turkish Cypriot - that, whatever changes are occurring as a result of, and in response to, social and economic circumstances here, the essence of their identity as Turkish Cypriots can be, and is being, maintained. For example, in later chapters it will be seen that, despite a lack of overt religiosity, to be a Turkish Cypriot is to be a Muslim. Circumcision, the physical mark of a Muslim male, is compulsory for all Turkish boys, in London as in Cyprus. It is a prerequisite for marriage. Similarly, despite the apparent freedom allowed unmarried daughters in England and the impossibility of distinguishing them from their English counterparts by their appearance, the chastity of women - symbolized by virginity on marriage - remains of the utmost importance. The honour of the whole family is at stake. Islam, female chastity, family honour - these, together with a deep, though for various reasons not always verbalized, attachment to Cyprus (and now, specifically Turkish Cyprus), are part of what it means to be a Turkish Cypriot in this country. They make up the Turkish Cypriot 'identity' or 'self-image'.

I am particularly interested in how this identity is changing and, indeed, has changed since the early days of migration to this country. Cohen and Barth also addressed themselves to this question,

though less explicitly. Cohen, for example, describes how the Hausa actually embraced a new religious order and reorganised themselves in terms of it after independence. Barth does not mention it directly, but the fact that his border-region Pathans were in close contact with other ethnic groups, and even settled among them, leads me to think that they may have adapted their lifestyle to that of their neighbours more than he implies. I am sure that, although the seclusion of women was a distinguishing mark of Pathanness, women were not subject to exactly the same rules of conduct throughout Pathan territory.

Although some of the questions which it seems pertinent to ask in an immigrant situation are going to be also raised by those working in newly independent African states or in Central Asia, there are likely to be areas of investigation specific to the immigrant context. It is for this reason that I will now turn to look at some of the work done in Britain on immigrant groups, and define my own stand and perspective in terms of this.

Studies of Migrants, Immigrants and Minorities in Britain

Anthropologists working with immigrant groups in Britain, whether these be short-term labour migrants or long-term settlers, have tended to focus either on the effects of migration on the original home society or on the adaptation being made by the migrant population in Britain. The environment in which the researcher has spent most of his time usually determines where his emphasis lies. Thus Philpott, in his work with West Indians from Montserrat, concentrates on the political, economic and social effects of migration on Montserratian society. (1973) A similar emphasis is made by Watson in his work with the Chinese of rural Hong Kong. (1975) Both Khan and Ballard, however, concentrate on how different traditional institutions have changed in being transported to Britain. Thus, for example, Khan discusses how the system of purdah operates for Mirpuri Indian women in Bradford (1976), and Ballard how the structure of the Sikh joint family operates in England. (1973)

The above-mentioned authors are also contributors to the book Between Two Cultures: Migrants and Minorities in Britain. (J.L. Watson ed. 1977) The studies in this volume are characterised by the fact that the authors have conducted fieldwork at both ends of the migration

chain, in both the country of origin and Britain. Such migration studies go further than their race relations predecessors insofar as they consider the actor's perception of his situation and the effects of living in Britain on family structure, the traditional role of women, and so on. The usefulness of this sort of information is gradually being recognised by those professionally or personally involved with different migrant and immigrant populations. The fact that anthropological studies undertaken in Britain can be both of practical relevance to those directly involved with minority populations, and of general interest to a wider public, is an encouraging sign. However, it is perhaps inevitable that this interest should in turn influence the topics chosen for exploration by anthropologists. Information on say, family life and the continuing tie with the country of origin is potentially useful because it can sometimes help explain the educational achievement of children from different ethnic backgrounds, parents' attitudes to their childrens schooling, and so on. These themes are taken up by most of the contributors to the abovementioned book, as they are by McGrath (1976), Bagley (1976), Akram (1974), Thompson (1974) and others. Areas of study which are of less general relevance to the 'market' tend to be given less attention by these and other authors. Here I would include changes in the form and significance of indigenous ritual and religious occasions,[1] internal organization and politics, and interethnic relations where these involve relations with other ethnic minorities in Britain, and not just the 'host' society. It is these areas in which I am particularly interested and will devote some time to discussing. That is to say, my concern will also be with the internal changes taking place within Turkish Cypriot 'society', even if these have no direct effect on the majority population.

A further aim of this thesis is to counter the popular notion that there exists a continuum of outcomes of minority-majority relationships, with 'assimilation' at one end and 'maintenance of traditional culture' at the other. Not that writers on immigrant populations assume that any one group falls at one or other end, but rather that each achieves a sort of synthesis or compromise so that, at any one point in time, the social organization, norms and values of the group can be seen as an adaptation of their traditional culture to

[1] Jackson (1976) is an exception here.

the dominant British one. Even if the idea of a synthesis is useful for conceptualizing and explaining the form that certain institutions have come to take here for some populations, it is an inaccurate assumption to make for Turkish Cypriots. It implies that there is a more or less equal familiarity with British society as there is with the indigenous culture. Catherine and Roger Ballard maintain that young Sikhs in Britain are "... thoroughly conversant with British cultural norms and capable of presenting themselves as British whenever necessary". (Watson ed. 1977:46) I would hesitate to make this statement for any section of the Turkish Cypriot population in Britain, even for those young men born and brought up here. As for the older Turks, and especially the women, there is generally very little contact with English people. Some who have lived in the country for 15 or 18 years still know only a few words of English. The point is that, because of this lack of familiarity with, and knowledge of, the English and English cultural norms, it is not helpful to think in terms of a continuum with assimilation at one end, identity-maintenance at the other, and Turkish Cypriots as somewhere in between. The majority of Turkish Cypriots in this country do not, as yet, have recourse to both cultural systems, and they should not therefore be represented as bridging the gap between them.

This is not to say that Turkish Cypriots are not 'adapting', though it is important to be aware of the exact connotations of the term 'adaptation' as used in this thesis. Adaptation is one of the central themes of Plog, Jolly and Bates' comprehensive introduction to the subject of anthropology.(1976) They define adaptation as "the response of organisms to changes in their environment" (589) and talk about how societies adapt their language, culture, social organization and religion to their environment. This concern with social adaptation follows on from their earlier discussion of skeletal and genetic adaptation which characterises human and animal evolution. In both cases, adaptation is used to imply a positive rather than a passive response. The idea is that plants, animals and humans adapt themselves to their physical environment the better to secure those resources necessary for survival. Man also adapts himself to his social environment and adjusts to the presence and activities of neighbouring peoples. (1976:317ff) To exemplify this, the authors cite the three peoples studied by Barth in the Swat province of Pakistan. (1969b) The Kohistanis, Pathans and Gujars all live in the same

area, but each has chosen a different set of techniques and resources as its adaptive strategy. Each group occupies a different ecological niche, but there is some trade and the establishment of patron-client-type relationships between them. It is a clear example of three interacting peoples 'adapting', in the sense of efficiently exploiting their physical environment and each other (their social environment). It is this notion of a positive ecological response that will be a focus in the following chapters. In talking of the adaptive response made by Turkish Cypriots in London, then, I am not referring to a simple synthesis, the result of contact between migrant and majority culture, with compromises inevitably made by the former. I want, rather, to convey the idea of a minority population adapting its social institutions, work norms and religious practices to a London seen as a total environment (physical and social) which can potentially be exploited for ends defined by the minority population itself.

The actual form that such adaptations take varies. Sometimes adapting might involve the abandonment of a traditional activity; sometimes it will involve its reorganization and investment with new meaning; while at other times, there will be an attempt to recreate the past as remembered. Always, the term will have the sense of a positive manipulation by the 'adapting' group of those external circumstances which directly impinge on its activities - and especially, in the case of Cypriots, its economic activities. Because this is what I would argue Turkish Cypriots in this country are doing - very positively using those traditional practices and continuing to adhere to those traditional norms which work for them, while just as positively reorganizing those which do not. Theirs is a common-sense strategy of action, not just a passive accomodation to a majority society and culture.

The theme of 'alternative ideologies' will also be a recurrent one throughout this thesis. This is a theme which has cropped up in a number of anthropological works - for example, in Leach's analysis of Highland Burma (1954); in the literature on Great and Little Traditions; and recently in Salzman's discussion of 'complementary opposition' (1978). Salzman refers to Peters' (1967) analysis of the Cyrenaican Bedouin lineage system, in which Peters shows how the lineage model of complementary opposition, which the Bedouin themselves

subscribe to, and which is similar to that elaborated by Evans Prit-Chard for the Nuer (1940), is in fact of limited use in describing or explaining actual social behaviour. Salzman asks why, then, do the Bedouin maintain such a model, if they do not act in terms of it? He is also interested in the more general question of the disjunction between behaviour and ideas. He proposes that the model is kept by the Bedouin as a "social structure in reserve". By this he means a sort of emergency model, one which, given a radical change in circumstances, would provide an alternative framework and basis for action. (1978:63) Thus, although competition for resources with neighbouring and geneologically close groups was the norm among the Bedouin, if there came a time when the territorial commitment was removed from consideration, then a geneological model for social organization would become necessary. Salzman gives actual historical examples of this having occurred.

The relevance to Turkish Cypriots in Britain of this theme of alternative ideologies will become clearer in the chapters dealing respectively with Turkish Cypriot kinship and ethnicity. The theme - and particularly Salzman's elaboration of it - is introduced here so that it can be referred to, without elaborate introduction, in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER II: THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT: PATRONAGE AND RECIPROCITY

The surveys carried out by Oakley (1972) and Berk (1972) show that the majority of Cypriots migrated primarily for economic reasons.[1] My own investigations indicated that people had also remained here for economic reasons, having come to accept as normal a standard of living which could not be attained in Cyprus, even if employment could be found which paid an equivalent wage to that earned here. After the 1974 war in Cyprus, and the consequent partition of the island into Greek- and Turkish-controlled areas, Turkish Cypriots did not rush back to rebuild businesses left by Greeks as they were encouraged to do by the Turkish Cypriot Administration. The economic security attained here had to be weighed against the possibly lucrative - but nonetheless uncertain - political and economic situation in Cyprus. The result was that all but a very few Turkish Cypriots in Britain decided to stay. It is not surprising that the financial opportunities which exist in Britain are emphasised by Turks when they return to visit their relatives in Cyprus. The Mercedes car driven from London, the presents bought for relatives, smart fashionable clothes, and a refusal to return to live on the island, are all ways of proving to their relatives - and perhaps also to themselves - that the decision to remain in Britain is an economically rational one.[2]

So Cypriots migrated to Britain with the intention of finding work, making money and thereby improving their standard of living. The way in which this has been done is the theme of this chapter. I shall suggest that the Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-staffed factory or firm can be seen as a microcosm of the Cypriot 'world'. Its operation is based on the same principles as those obtaining outside it, and the

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[1] 77% according to Oakley's calculations (1972:141); 73% according to Berk's survey (1972:8).

[2] Those who settled in Britain have, however involuntarily and with regret, divided their families and separated themselves from many of their kin including, in some cases, their parents. However much their choice is accepted as economically rational by those who remain in Cyprus, grandparents still miss their grandchildren and parents yearn to have all their children around them. In response to the sense of guilt close kin in Cyprus often manage to impart to relatives visiting from London, the latter emphasise - and often greatly exaggerate - the financial prosperity they have achieved in Britain, in order to justify their remaining there.

relationships encountered in a factory are comparable to those found, say, between members of one or several households in a neighbourhood group. Other spheres of life which do not immediately seem to be related to the work context - attitudes to women, family and household organisation, interethnic relations - can only be really understood when the Cypriot work ethos has been described and explained. A money-earning orientation to life has, I would argue, affected traditional attitudes and has introduced new criteria for judging actions as right or wrong, honourable or dishonourable. In some cases, behaviour which would once have been judged as deviant in Cyprus is now seen as legitimate and normal. In other cases, formerly innocent actions have taken on new meanings, and are sanctioned accordingly. The economic situation in Britain should therefore be seen as a given constant; one which every newly arrived immigrant was able, and is still able, to manipulate, but one which in turn influences him and the norms, values and traditional culture with which he migrated.

Cypriot men in Britain are represented in all the main employment sectors, though they have remained concentrated in certain spheres. (Appendix C) They are particularly inclined towards work in the service industries - catering, hairdressing, shoe-mending, minicabbing; the retail trades - grocery, greengrocery; and the clothing industry, as tailors and as small factory owners and workers. Some of these occupations are traditional ones; for example, many Cypriots already had experience of tailoring and dressmaking when they arrived in Britain. Other types of employment, such as catering and retail shop-keeping, are not held to be traditional Cypriot occupations, however. The preponderance of Cypriots engaged in these jobs was the result of their readiness to fill existing employment niches when they arrived in Britain. What all these occupations have in common is the chance they afford the individual entrepreneur to set up his own business. To be one's own boss is a widespread Cypriot desire. Oakley noted that in 1970 20% of all Cypriot men were self-employed, twice the national average. (1970:101) However, in the light of my own investigations, I would add that although both Greek and Turkish Cypriots aspire to be self-employed, proportionately more Greeks than Turks actually manage to become so.

Although Cypriot men are now engaged in a wide range of

occupations, Cypriot women have tended to remain in one specific niche - the clothing industry or 'rag trade'. In this chapter, the operation of one particular Cypriot clothing factory will be discussed. This concern with the rag trade is a result both of the female bias of my data and of my belief that a specific enquiry of this sort can better exemplify the Cypriot work ethos than could a more general survey, which took different industries and several work places into account. As was mentioned in Chapter I, investigations were mainly confined to those occupations where both men and women were involved, and where an introduction could be made through women. This inevitably limited the scope of the enquiry, as approximately 50% of working Cypriot women are employed in the clothing industry, though only 10% of Cypriot men are.[1] However, there were other considerations which made this concentration worthwhile. Cypriots occupy a specific niche within the industry, being employed in the small factories which make up women's fashion garments for large-scale manufacturers. Insofar as the factory is the basic work milieu for Cypriots, it provides a good social 'arena' for investigation. The fact that most of the workers in a Cypriot factory are Cypriot - both Greek and Turk - means that customs which could be observed in other male and ethnically mixed work contexts were more obvious in the all-Cypriot milieu. In these places everyone was familiar with the same economic norms, methods of pay, and so on. It is these work practices that I will examine, asking, more generally, how Cypriots are using their traditional work ethos to their advantage in Britain.

Most of this chapter concerns the way in which Cypriots organise their business ventures, though the theme is extended in the final pages to a consideration of how the norms which operate in the work context can be found just as well outside it - determining relations among housewives, or between housewives and traders, in the domestic environment, for example. It is suggested that, when several Cypriots work together, they do so not in terms of norms recognised by the English majority, but according to certain specifically Cypriot norms. These, I argue, are peculiarly suited to the give-and-take nature of the rag trade. This chapter also adumbrates certain themes to be explored later in the thesis. Thus, though it may not seem relevant to note at this point that, say, Turkish Cypriots will eat with Greek

[1] According to 1971 Census data (See Appendix C). These figures apply of course only to Cyprus-born people now resident here.

Cypriots more readily than with Turkish mainlanders in the factories, such references to the nature of contact between these people are intentional - a detailed consideration of interethnic relations being the subject of Chapter VI.

Immigrant Involvement with the Clothing Industry[1]

Cypriots are not the only immigrant group associated with the clothing industry, nor have they been involved with it for the greatest length of time. The first immigrants to enter the trade were the Jews, who came as refugees from Eastern Europe around 1900. The latter were consequently very well established in the industry when the first Cypriots migrated to Britain after World War II. Later waves of migrants have entered the industry for many of the same reasons as the Jews and Cypriots. The Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, East African Asian and West Indian populations are now also associated with it. (Shah 1975:21)

There are several reasons why the clothing industry has attracted immigrant labour, though some of these apply to the catering and other service industries as well. Inner London, and particularly the East End, is London's so-called 'zone of transition' - the area where immigrant populations first tend to settle and, due to chain migration, become concentrated. They move out over time to more residential districts and so make room for newer arrivals. According to Oakley, Soho was the area where the first Cypriot migrants settled, though, as was noted in the Introduction, Haringey is now the borough with the greatest numbers. Unlike many industries, which have been forced out of London altogether in order to expand, the clothing industry has been able to remain close to its labour market, and Cypriot-owned clothing factories can now be found in all areas with a resident Cypriot population. This is because that section of the clothing industry which involves Cypriots (the making of women's outwear garments - skirts, dresses, blouses, suits) has not had to move out of London, there being nothing to be gained in the fashion trade by increasing the size of the basic production unit. Whatever the size of the enterprise, the basic equipment is still the sewing machine, and the core worker the machinist. Thus, many of the 11-12,000 clothing firms in the United Kingdom

[1] Much of this section is based on two useful articles - Shah 1975 and Maw 1974.

today remain situated in inner London.

Another reason why immigrants generally and Cypriots in particular have entered the rag trade is that it has been vacated over time by the English, and particularly by English women. This is important, as women form 85% of the work force in the industry. (Shah 1975:11) It is partly due to the higher aspirations of working English girls: the prospect of a secretarial job, in a clean office, with set wages, hours and holiday times, is more attractive than the piece-rate system of pay and the long hours associated with machining in a factory. It is also due to the bad public image of the trade - many believe that the factories are 'sweat shops', with appalling working conditions, low pay and long hours. This impression is corroborated on occasion by sensational press reports in the popular dailies. The Jews were the first scapegoats and were actually blamed for introducing sordid conditions, though, as Shah points out (1975:8), social historians now agree that the Jewish arrival was coincidental with, and not responsible for, the worsening of 'sweating'. But the scapegoat role has been transferred to the successive waves of immigrants who have arrived in Britain since the early Jewish migration, and who have also found employment in the trade. According to Shah, it is now the Indo-Pakistani owners who are the scapegoats. (1975:8) So a bad public image has helped to discourage English girls from becoming machinists, and this accounts in part for the labour shortage in the industry as a whole.

Thus, both 'push' and 'pull' factors account for immigrant involvement in the trade. The English have rejected the industry, and there have been pressures on immigrant populations to fill the niche thus vacated. Since 1962, work permits have not been issued to unskilled or semi-skilled workers from abroad (except for a small quota for the hotel and catering industry), and in 1973 the raising of the school-leaving age to 16 meant that many of the 22,000 workers the industry normally takes straight from school were unavailable. Because of competition from countries with vast labour resources - India, for example - the clothing industry in this country is under pressure to use a cheap labour source, and the major such source is immigrants. This is not to suggest that immigrant populations have been encouraged to enter the industry by the home population just because the working conditions, pay and image of the trade no longer appeal to themselves.

Nonetheless, there has been no objection to their engaging in this 'low quality' employment, whereas there are barriers preventing them from working in other occupations. But it must be emphasised that the different expectations of Cypriots and other migrant populations, as regards pay and conditions, mean that, far from being simply 'inferior' work, there are several advantages in being employed in the rag trade.

As mentioned above, it is one job where individuals with little capital but access to labour can start up a business. All that is needed initially is a few machinists prepared to do the work and a manufacturer ready to supply material. The only equipment necessary - provided the manufacturer does the cutting - is the sewing machine. Moreover, for Cypriots today, as for the early Jewish settlers, starting a business is socially prestigious in terms of native cultural values. The fact that the acquisition of a small factory in Hackney or Dalston is still an attainable goal means that Cypriots are drawn into the industry for both the material rewards and the prestige that hard work can bring.

A second advantage is that the skills necessary for machining, pressing or even cutting are relatively easily learnt, and can be taught simply by demonstration. Thus, a knowledge of English and the educational qualifications essential in other jobs are not necessary here. As noted above, tailoring and dress-making are traditional Cypriot occupations. Oakley notes that 80% of those who migrated and who were economically active in Cyprus worked as dress-makers, either on their own account, or for small manufacturing firms. (1971:85) A small proportion worked in workshops in the towns, and continue to be so employed in northern Turkish Cyprus today.

Thirdly, the rag trade has several advantages relevant to the employment of women. It provides them with the choice of working in the factory or as machinists in their own homes. It also allows them to vary their workload through the day and at different times of the year; in theory at least, they can choose how much work they want to do. Traditionally, Turkish women in Cyprus did not work for a wage unless it was earned in a family business or shop, and many speak of the opposition they encountered from their husbands and families to the idea of their getting a job when they first arrived. Now, the

financial expediency of women working has been recognised; though cultural factors still limit their occupational choices. This is true even for the second generation who have been educated here and who would prefer to be secretaries working for British firms or banks. Some families still put pressure on their daughters to become machinists. As Cypriot-run clothing factories tend to employ Cypriot workers, and as new recruits are usually engaged on the basis of personal recommendation, many of the workers at any one factory tend to be related to the others and/or to the factory owner. A Turkish Cypriot husband has no objection to his wife earning £40 a week if she is machining at home and looking after the children, or else in a factory alongside his mother and sister. It is because a woman can earn money in an environment where she is 'safe', in the company of relatives and other Turks, that the rag trade has attracted 50% of Cypriot working women.

Finally, it should be noted that, although an average wage is impossible to estimate because of the piece-work system of pay and the difficulty of estimating the hours worked by home machinists, the amount of money that <u>can</u> be earned is considerable. £40 a week clear is considered a good but average wage, while £70 or £80 is not unusual, and £130 not unknown - though this latter figure is likely to be the result of a sixteen-hour day and a seven-day week. But the point is that it is possible for a machinist to earn this sort of money given the availability of the work, the incentive and the stamina. The fact that rates of pay make it possible for a woman to earn as much as - and in some exceptional cases more than - her husband has important implications for her role in the family and for husband/wife relationships. I return to this theme in Chapter IV.

The Clothing Industry and Cypriot Work Norms

There are two inherent characteristics of the industry: the fragmentation of its structure and the flexibility of its operation. I shall argue that these two factors combine to make it the sort of work where traditional Cypriot work patterns, attitudes and values can be, and are, positively utilised; that the economic security Cypriots have attained here has partly come about as a result of their ability to make the system 'work' for them.

a) <u>The fragmented structure of the industry</u>. As mentioned above, the manufacturing side of the UK clothing industry consists of 11-12,000 firms. (Maw 1974:11) These range in size from large-scale production units like the Burton group to the small workshop in the East End. Most medium to large size firms contract out much of their production to firms in Britain or abroad. But even the English or Jewish manufacturer with a West End showroom will contract out all or some of the job of actually making up the garments to small factories, including those run by Cypriots in north London. The latter make up the garments and return them to the manufacturer to be distributed and sold. Thus there are three different levels of people involved in any one transaction.

The manufacturer is usually Jewish or English, not Cypriot. He first has his designer create a style from which a sample is made; he then has to find a market. The manufacturer buys the material and, if the work is to be done 'out', it is delivered to those firms who have agreed to make up the order. The number of firms among which a manufacturer divides his orders varies. There may be five, fifteen, even thirty, depending on the amount of work to be done, the size of the firms, and the urgency of getting the garments onto the market. The manufacturer works closely with a stock controller and an accountant; the latter actually visits the individual firms to ensure that the work is being done and books are being kept. When the order is completed, it is delivered back to the manufacturer or, on his request, straight to the shops.

The Cypriot factory owner or 'outworker' must first secure a contract from a manufacturer. He or she will employ a number or workers on his/her own or rented premises, to make up the garments. The three Cypriot factories I knew well each employed between 15 and 30 people in the factory, and up to 30 machinists who worked at home. Another Turkish Cypriot 'outworker' had no premises and was merely a middle man, getting all the work done by home machinists; in this case the specialised jobs were done by the manufacturer.

Whatever the variation, and whoever does the work, the following people are employed in a factory:

Cutters who grade the pattern sent by the manufacturer (that is, they make other sizes from the original), draw it out on paper and cut out the material with a band saw. This is the most skilled and the most highly paid manual job in the factory.

Straight machinists who sew up the main seams. This may be done in the factory or at home. The only equipment necessary is an ordinary sewing machine.

Special machinists who do the overlocking, button holes, hooks and eyes, and also sew on lace and embroidery. This requires a special machine.

Pressers who press the finished garments with heavy steam irons.

Finishers who sort the finished garments into sizes, check and price them ready for delivery.

Drivers who deliver garments to the manufacturer and also take work to, and collect it from, the home machinists.

Men or women are employed in these capacities according to the nature of the job. Thus, cutting is a man's job, as are pressing and driving. Machining is done by women, and both sexes work as finishers. All but the ordinary machinists are on a fixed wage, the amount depending on the sort of job they do and, in theory at least, on their individual skill. Thus, a cutter earns more than a presser, who in turn earns more than a finisher. Ordinary machinists are paid on a piece-work basis whether they work in the factory or at home. Those working at home are legally self-employed.

Thus, in its most simple form, the structure of the industry looks like this:



Note that the manufacturer may give machining straight to the homeworkers; that one outworking firm may sub-contract to another; and that homeworkers sometimes have two employers.

b) The flexibility of operation in the industry. Flexibility is built into the system because of the seasonality of work in the trade. There is very little demand around Christmas and, since the manufacturers cannot get a market for their products around this time, they cannot pass on the work to the factories. This means that factories sometimes have to lay off workers, though the Cypriot firms I visited all closed down for two or more weeks at this time, until work picked up. In the spring, however, all the summer styles are being rushed into the shops. Manufacturers have ready markets, and so they contract out a lot of work, and the factories need all the labour they can muster. The seasonality of the trade has certain consequences as it affects employment, wages, hours worked, and recruitment and redundancy. I will elaborate briefly on these.

Factory owners must get regular contracts to maintain their profits, to keep their workers employed and to stop them leaving when work is slack. So they must procure the full-time patronage of at least one manufacturer; this is often the difference between the success and failure of a small clothing factory. A factory owner will therefore attempt to improve the speed and efficiency of his workers, and will also try to personalise his relationship with the manufacturer and his stock controller. A factory owner must be able to increase or decrease the number of his employees at will; indeed, if he is not going to be alternately over- and under-staffed, this flexibility is essential. The ordinary machinists are dispensible here, especially those who work at home. They are legally self-employed, and so their employers have no responsibility towards them as regards light, heating, power, holiday or sickness pay, or the continuous provision of employment. So home machinists can be dispensed with as soon as there is not enough work to keep them employed. Aware of this, the women I knew tended to insure themselves against sudden unemployment by having two employers: one for whom they worked in the daytime, and the other for whom they did occasional or evening work. If one employer made them temporarily redundant, they would simply ask the other for more work. In other words, due to the seasonality of demand in the industry, neither factory manager, factory worker nor home machinist is assured of continuous employment. At every level, people attempt to protect themselves against lack of work by spreading the number of contacts on whom they can depend for an income.

As with the availability of employment itself, there is flexibility built into the system as regards wages and hours. As far as wages are concerned, piece-work machinists are again the ones to take the brunt of changes brought about by the seasonality of demand for orders. As regards hours worked, however, those on a fixed wage are also affected by this seasonality. A cutter, for example, may agree to work for £80 clear a week for a five-day week, eight hours a day. When there is a lot of work, however, he will be expected to work for longer, usually without overtime pay; he might be asked to work until 9pm each night and to come in on Saturdays and Sundays. Moreover, all workers are expected to take their holidays when work is slack, not when the factory is busy; those who do not work - whatever the reason - are not paid.

A factory owner will also recruit new workers and make workers redundant according to the availability of work and the consistency of contracts. A reason can usually be found to make employees leave: the factory owner will watch them working and sack them for talking too much, for not learning the work fast enough, or for doing it shoddily. At the same time, incentive must be given to those who work well to encourage them to stay; because of the demand for labour in the industry, someone with experience never encounters difficulty finding employment.

It might appear from the above paragraphs that all the power is in the hands of the factory owner and that, because machinists are the most dispensible, they are in the most vulnerable position. If indeed this were so, one might ask why Turkish and Greek clothing factory workers do not use trades union membership to lobby for their rights. (The relevant union here is NUTGW: the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers.) In fact, union representatives do visit the factories, but Cypriots either do not join them or, if they do, they do not appeal to them when dissatisfied. There has only been one strike at a Cypriot clothing factory of which I am aware: at the Saadat Factory, Hackney, in 1974. However, this was organised by the UTP (Union of Turkish Progressives) and was probably not a spontaneous strike by the majority of factory workers. One cannot therefore explain Turkish non-participation in trades unions by ignorance, nor by the fact that in this case we are talking mostly of women, whom one

might expect to be less inclined than their male counterparts to participate in such activities. Cypriot women, at least the younger ones, tend to be well aware of their rights in Britain and are not shy about getting what they want out of councils and other local 'English' authorities. Indeed, when union representatives came to the factory I am going to describe, everyone wanted to know what advantages attached to union membership but, on hearing what their relevant union had to offer, declined to join it.

Though all the above factors play a part, it is quite obvious why unions have not appealed to Cypriot factory workers: it goes against the nature of the relationship which is established between any Cypriot employer and any Cypriot employee, whether Greek or Turk, whatever the industry or job concerned. This relationship makes it both difficult and ultimately unprofitable for an employee to appeal to an outside body even if he/she sees him/herself as being unfairly treated or underpaid. I want to explain this relationship in the context of the factory I studied intensively. It will become clear that it is not a simple case of the employer having the upper hand; this varies according to the situation. Whatever their relative bargaining power at any one time, both employer and employee accept that their relationship is defined in the same terms - its basis being the moral obligation to lend and to repay, whatever the sort of debt involved. Of course, the same sense of moral obligation and mutual interdependence does not hold if the workplace is too large for the employer to be known personally by his employees, or if immediate superiors do not attempt to establish this type of relationship with those whose work they supervise. This can in turn affect the interest shown in trades union activities.

In order to correct the impression, which might otherwise be given, that Turkish Cypriots are not inclined towards trades union membership in other circumstances to these, my experience of Turkish Cypriots in an entirely different place of work might be worth recounting. During fieldwork, I was able to visit a relatively large factory in north London which manufactured light metal goods. There were about 800 employees, 50% of whom were classified as 'immigrant'. Although there were only 62 Cypriots, the majority Turkish, they were all concentrated in one department where they constituted 80% of the work force. All the supervisors in the department were English. Although they insisted that there were equal opportunities for promotion

for everyone, on the shop floor Cypriot employees said that not only were there no opportunities for job advancement but that channels for communication with middle or senior management were practically non-existent. In this factory, union participation was particularly strong among the Cypriot workforce. Through the union their demands could be communicated and their rights observed. One of the Turkish Cypriots was deputy convenor for the Transport and General Workers Union in the factory (the convenor was West Indian) and he acted as spokesman and representative for all the Cypriot employees. The management saw the Cypriots as being clannish and difficult to deal with; because they were also highly unionised, and 'controlled' one department numerically, they were a force to be reckoned with. As far as the Cypriots themselves were concerned, however, union participation was the only way to 'balance' the otherwise arbitrary (and potentially discriminatory) actions of the management, while granting them a sphere of influence within the union itself in the form of an 'ethnic voice'. In other words, an attempt was being made through union participation to exert some control over their own labour and over their 'employers' - however nebulous a group. This might be compared to the 'control' an employee in a small Cypriot factory ideally has over his employer as a result of the social relationship he has established with him. The point is that Cypriots in general are familiar with the trades union movement, and those in work situations which allow for little contact with, or control over, their employers would actively participate in union activities and use the unions as a medium through which to both state and advance their interests. Because quite different circumstances obtained in all-Cypriot work milieus, unionisation was on the whole seen as unnecessary.

Patronage and Reciprocity in a Cypriot Clothing Factory

I want now to consider how the norms of patronage and reciprocity operate in the work context. My particular concern is with a Cypriot-owned and -staffed clothing factory in north London, though parallels can be drawn between the situation described here and other Cypriot work contexts, as well as with relationships obtaining in the domestic environment. These will be discussed later.

Between January 1976 and February 1977 regular visits were made

to a Cypriot clothing factory in Kentish Town, north London. Kentish Town is not the centre of the clothing area in London, nor is it a particularly Turkish area. Indeed, one unusual feature about the factory was that the predominantly Turkish work-force had to travel from Stoke Newington and Dalston (areas east of Kentish Town); in some cases transport was arranged by the factory. By February 1977, negotiations for different premises in Dalston were under way, and the factory later moved to this area.

Working conditions in the factory were good. It was well lit, warm and spacious. The cutting table and ironing boards were in the same large room as the machinists; the factory owners had a separate office where accounts and paper work were done. The kitchen was fully equipped with a cooker, plates, cutlery, and a soft drinks machine. This meant that meals could be cooked on the premises at lunchtime, and some of the workers did bring prepared meals which they cooked there during the morning. Normal working hours were from 8.30am to 5.30pm, Monday to Friday, and 8.30am to 1pm on Saturday. There was a 45 minute lunch break and 15 minutes in the afternoon for tea.

The factory was run by Andrew, a Greek Cypriot man, and Ayşe, a Turkish Cypriot woman. (She was the wife of household B1 - See Appendix D for detailed case study.) Andrew was principally concerned with the accounts, the daily running of the factory being left to Ayşe. It was she who engineered the contracts, recruited labour, supervised the work force and saw to the upkeep of machinery. Altogether 21 people were employed in the factory full-time: 14 men and seven women. The work force included Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkish mainlanders and Ghanaians, though the ethnic composition of the factory changed almost completely in the course of the year. Before going on to discuss the relationships of the different levels of people involved, the reason for this change in personnel will be considered. Some of the differences which actually exist between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and Turkish mainlanders will be delineated here. (The differences which people themselves see as existing, and in terms of which they act, will be dealt with in Chapter VI.)

In January 1977, the following people were employed in the

factory:

1 master cutter	male	Greek Cypriot
1 assistant cutter	male	Greek Cypriot
3 special machinists	female	Greek Cypriot
9 ordinary machinists	female	4 Turkish Cypriot 2 Turkish mainland* 3 Ghanaian
3 pressers	male	2 Turkish Cypriot 1 Turkish mainland
3 finishers	2 female 1 male	Turkish Cypriot Turkish Cypriot
1 driver	male	Turkish Cypriot
21 employees	14 women 7 men	10 Turkish Cypriot 5 Greek Cypriot 3 Turkish mainland 3 Ghanaian

* One was a girl of 13 who worked during the holidays and after school.

There were also about 25 home machinists, though only 14 of these were employed all the year round. The others would be taken on when there was a lot of work to be done, but not at other times. Of the regular machinists, nine were Turkish Cypriot and five were Greek Cypriot. The two mainland Turkish women who machined in the factory also machined at home.

Had the above chart been constructed exactly one year earlier, it would have looked quite different. At that time there were three Greek Cypriots, three Turkish Cypriots and the rest (about 14) were from mainland Turkey. At one time all the work force had been from Turkey. There were several reasons for this change. To begin with, job changes are frequent in the clothing industry because of the seasonality of the work and the ease with which those who do not like the job or do not work well leave or are dismissed. Some people found Ayşe difficult to work for (they said she was bossy), and others left because their circumstances changed - they had children, moved house or simply wanted to machine at home for a while. Secondly, the workers in any one factory have not usually found their jobs independently. With the exception of two of the 1976 work force, everyone in the factory was related to someone else, and in most cases to two or three people. When one individual left, whatever the reason, his or her spouse, niece or cousin would also leave. This suited the factory

owners, who preferred to employ women with their husbands or mothers, as this decreased the possibility of sexual problems arising between unrelated men and women.

Mainly, however, the ethnic composition of the factory had changed because of the difficulty of finding Turkish mainland workers to replace those who left. Mainland Turks were the best proposition from a management point of view, being the hardest workers. Like the Turkish 'Gastarbeiters' (literally 'guest workers') in Germany (Paine 1974), most Turkish mainlanders come to Britain to earn money and remit what they can to their families in Turkey.[1] Like the migrant workers in Germany or the Chinese in this country studied by Watson (1975, 1977), their eventual goal is to return to their country of origin. Unless they are able to acquire British citizenship, either by marriage or by having their work permits extended every year for four years (in which case they are entitled to become citizens), they do return to Turkey. Indeed, the Greek Cypriot partner, Andrew, had gone to Istanbul in 1974 specifically to recruit Turkish workers; as an employer he had to be able to offer them a job and accomodation. Since the factory owned some adjacent buildings, he had these converted into flats: 11 bedsits, one communal kitchen and a bathroom. In January 1975, the 14 mainland Turkish workers were living in these flats and a few pounds a week were deducted from their wages as rent (£4 a week for a family of four). But the families concerned gradually left, in some cases because they were unable to get their work permits extended and had to return to Turkey, in others because they found they could earn more money elsewhere. For example, despite the savings made possible by their housing arrangement, one family left because they still could not support both themselves and their families in Turkey, and there was the possibility of their being able to do more overtime in a different factory. The couple in question had arrived in England in 1974 and since that time had brought their four children and their respective mothers over to live with them. The latter looked after their grandchildren and did some home machining, while the parents worked in the factory. After a ten-hour day in the factory, they would bring work home in the evenings and machine for another six hours

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[1] An exception are those who are here as students in Higher Education. There are about 1000 mainland Turkish students in Britain, according to an estimate made by the Anglo-Turkish Association.

until 2am. Not only was there not enough work for them to do this every evening, but the neighbours complained to the council about the noise of the machines, and the council got in touch with the factory. As a result, they were only allowed to take a certain amount of work home each night and were forbidden to machine after 11pm. This new condition meant that it was impossible for them to earn more than £150 a week between them, and £100 of this was immediately remitted to their families in Turkey. They left to find a house and factory where they could work for longer hours.

Cypriots are not migrant workers in this sense and appear to be settling permanently in this country. Their desire to earn money, which in management terms means they are prepared to work night and day, is tempered by other aims - the leisure time to lead a normal family life, for example. They cannot therefore be relied on to the same extent as the mainlanders to work long hours and not to take holidays. The mainland Turks are also more respectful to their employers, and cause no 'trouble'; for this reason also they are preferred to Cypriots, who complain more often and leave if they are not satisfied with their pay or working conditions. However, according to the Greek Cypriot partner in the factory, all the Turks were preferred as employees (as were West Indians and, in this case, the three Ghanaian women) to Greek Cypriots, who showed the least respect to their employers. This was explained in terms of the fact that the Turkish Cypriots had always been second class citizens in Cyprus, and had lower expectations as regards a standard of living. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, had been both more prosperous and numerically and politically dominant in Cyprus. They were consequently more demanding and volatile in Britain. Even though the factory owners had tried to replace the mainland workers with other Turkish mainlanders when they left, they found this impossible due to the difficulties of recruiting workers direct from Turkey. The present work force in the factory was reruited in the normal way - through personal contacts and recommendations.

The nature of relations between different groups of people in the factory, or rather, in the production process, will now be considered. There are three different levels of relationship involved:

between the manufacturer and the factory owners; between the factory owners and the work force; and between the workers themselves.

a) The manufacturer and factory owners

Because it was the Turkish Cypriot woman, Ayşe, and not her Greek Cypriot partner, Andrew, who effectively ran the firm, she will be considered the 'owner' from now on. Ayşe, as I mentioned above, had one main manufacturer who contracted out work to her - a Jewish man with a large showroom in the West End. She also occasionally did work for other manufacturers, though Mr Y. took precedence at all times. At one time, rumours that the latter's business was not doing well had caused her to increase the amount of work she took on from elsewhere, though there had never been any serious cause for alarm. Mr Y contracted out work to about 30 firms, and Ayşe was third in line for work, the first two being factories run by his own relatives. Ayse's factory's favoured position was due to its reputation for being well managed, efficient and quick. It was also due to Ayşe's care to establish personal relationships both with Mr Y himself and with his English stock controller. Initially, Mr Y was impressed with Ayşe because, apart from running the factory, she could also machine well, and he would ask her to make the samples for new styles. She occasionally called on him personally and acknowledged that retaining a personal relationship with him was of the utmost importance; it would be more difficult for him to let her down or fail in his moral obligation to give her work if he knew her well. Perhaps more important is the fact that she won the respect of the English stock controller, who was effectively Mr Y's right-hand man and his chief liaison with the various factories to which he contracted out work. It was he who visited the firms and thus knew how well they were being run and how good an investment the manufacturer's patronage of them was likely to be. Very often this individual is in the pay of both the manufacturer, for whom he works officially, and the individual outworking firms, who pay him for securing contracts for them. However, this was not the case here, as the stock controller refused to take any form of bribe. He patronised Ayse's firm because he respected her business-like manner, and she reciprocated by inviting him and his wife to all her family's weddings and engagement parties. As a result, the factory was assured

of contracts and this gave them a great advantage over other outworking firms who had no regular contractor.

Beneath the congeniality and the show of pleasantries, however, there was much hard bargaining. The amount which was paid for each dress, skirt or blouse was the result of negotiation between Mr Y and Ayşe. The sum was based on the complexity of the style, the type of material used and the number of garments to be made up. At different times of the year, each party had a different degree of bargaining power. In winter, demand was slacker, so the factory needed work and had to accept less money for each garment. In spring and summer when work picked up, they could demand more because they had the option of taking work from other manufacturers.

However, because relationships at this level were fairly formal, with little face-to-face contact, the ways in which patronage could affect the operation of the system were relatively limited. In this particular example, of course, we are dealing with a Jewish manufacturer, an English stock controller and a Cypriot factory owner. This inevitably meant more formality; all three parties were cautious. If the stock controller had been a Cypriot, he would probably have been on the factory's payroll - in which case patronage would have seemed more obvious. As it was, Ayşe had to cultivate her relationship with the stock controller rather differently and retain his favour by demonstrating her efficiency and reliability as a contractee. It is worth noting that the Englishmen refused to do business with Ayşe's Greek Cypriot partner, whom he did not like or trust.

b) The factory owners and the work force

Due to the operation of the trade, and to the fact that it involved a more or less all-Cypriot work context, there was more scope for patronage and reciprocity to develop within the factory itself. In one sense, Ayşe was dependent on the efficiency of her employees, since the standard of their work affected the factory's reputation. In theory, it was to her advantage to get rid of those who were not particularly experienced or hard working, while keeping with her those who were reliable and efficient. In practice it was more complex than

this. As stated above, indiscriminate sacking (however well disguised) was unwise if the individual concerned had relatives and friends working there also. In fact, if a man was, say, a particularly good cutter, Ayşe might be obliged to put up with his wife and daughter, whatever their work output, simply to retain his services.

Skill and efficiency in the factory were rewarded in several ways; the actual job an individual did was also important. A good cutter is more valuable to a factory than a good presser or machinist, because he can make or lose the factory more money than either of the latter. A cutter's job is to draw out the pattern in, say, four sizes and, with the material laid out 250 layers thick, to cut out the garments with a band saw. In this way, 1000 garments are cut out at once. A mistake in the cutting can therefore cost a firm hundreds, or even thousands, of pounds. However, if a cutter is particularly skillful, arranges the pattern carefully and makes no mistakes, it may be possible to make more garments out of the material provided by the manufacturer than the latter requires. (The manufacturer provides a little extra material in any case to allow for mistakes.) These extras (or 'cabbage' as it is called in the trade) are sold off to market stalls for cash - clear profit for the factory owners. This means of obtaining cash is important and will be referred to later. The point now is that a good cutter is more valuable than any other individual employee, and is rewarded accordingly.

In this particular factory, the cutter was earning £80-£90 a week (after tax); the pressers earned £50-£60 and the machinists around £40, though this varied. Non-monetary payments included the provision of accommodation and transport, the giving of gifts, loans, and so on. These favours, meted out on an individual basis, helped to inculcate a sense of moral obligation between giver and receiver to fulfil the mutual expectations that each had of the other. These obligations acted as a break on hasty or indiscriminate action by either party, thus taking some of the uncertainty out of the employer-employee relationship.

(This is not to suggest that a mutual sense of obligation is not established between employer and employee in any small firm, whatever the nationality of those involved. English employers may extend

favourable credit facilities to customers whose patronage they want to retain, and they may reward their employees in other ways than by paying them wages. If there is a difference in a Cypriot firm, then it is merely in the degree to which this occurs, and in the fact that it is a system which is seen as normal and legitimate by all Cypriots. For example, it is accepted as reasonable that an employer will give a job to a kinsman in preference to someone who is more skilled but not related to him. As will be shown later, the work context is only one sphere in which such patronage operates. Exactly the same principles underlie any transaction between Cypriots where one party offers a service which another requires.)

Accommodation: As mentioned above, the fact that Ayşe's factory owned some property, and that this had been converted into accomodation, meant that formerly it had been possible to employ Turkish mainlanders. This was financially advantageous for all concerned, as the women could work in the factory during the day and machine at home in the evenings and at weekends. For two years, it had also provided a fairly constant and stable work force; those concerned thought twice before giving up their jobs as it meant leaving their homes as well. At the time of fieldwork, only one mainland Turkish family remained living in factory accommodation; conditions were not good enough to induce Cypriot employees to live there.

Transport: When the driver left the factory each evening, he took two of the Turkish machinists home, and Ayşe's son (the finisher/driver) picked them and others up on the way to work in the morning. It was accepted that all the women who did not have male relatives working in the factory, and who would otherwise have to go home without an escort, would be given lifts. But this did not occur in either of the other two factories I visited, and the women involved here saw it as a personal favour. It was also a favour which benefitted Ayşe, as it meant that she more or less dictated their working hours.

Gifts and loans: It was also accepted that if long-standing employees needed a loan of, say, several hundred or even a thousand pounds, then either Ayşe or Andrew would lend them the money. (One home machinist of my acquaintance actually left her Turkish Cypriot

boss because he refused to give her a loan, while she felt he had no moral right to refuse. In consequence, her two sisters also stopped working for him.) Such a loan puts the worker in his employer's debt in the most literal sense and, if the latter wants to keep the individual employed, it is to his advantage to agree to such a request. Certain pressures can then be applied - to work longer hours without overtime pay, for example - when necessary. Gifts do not always involve cash, however. The driver in Ayşe's factory used to have an old car which was always breaking down on his way to work. Although he usually used the factory van to pick up and deliver material, his old car made his journey's to and from work hazardous. Andrew decided it would be worth his while to provide him with a firm car which could be for his own personal use for as long as he remained an employee. The driver will now think twice about leaving his job as it will mean relinquishing what is now his only form of transport.

Dresses and other garments made in the factory were given away free or sold for a nominal sum to employees and their relatives. Ayse would also employ the relatives of individuals already working at the factory as a favour. This too was generally to her advantage, the rationale being that the greater the sense of interrelatedness amongst employees, and the more family-like the situation, then the more they would be prepared to vary their time schedule or work routine when asked to do so. Indeed, this was what Ayşe was aiming for: a degree of informality between herself and those she employed so that hours, pay and holiday times could be kept flexible.

Wages: A final word about wages. These were the result of negotiation between the individual and the factory manager so that no two people doing the same job were getting the same wage. Experience, efficiency and whether or not the individual was the recipient of other favours, had to be taken into account. Home machinists, being legally self-employed, paid no tax or insurance stamps, and the way that pay was worked out for those in the factory meant that some tax at least was avoided. Ayşe's son, for example, earned £50 cash a week, whatever his work routine. Officially, however, he only earned £37 a week and tax and insurance contributions were deducted from this amount. The rest was made up in cash - cash which had been obtained from

'cabbage' sales. In 1976, one of the women who was working both at the factory and at home was earning over £100 a week, after tax. Here the difference in declared and actual earnings was more apparent. Her official income was £32 and she was taxed on this amount; the rest was made up by the factory.

It is quite obvious why Cypriots prefer to deal with their own; to them such methods of reckoning pay are standard practice. Wages in Ayşe's factory were by no means low, though this was partly helped by the system of pay. Individual wages were sometimes increased and sometimes decreased by the factory owners at their discretion; wages were therefore 'used' in the same way as other favours. So Ayşe had built up an informal patron-client relationship between herself and her workers, just as she had established herself as the client of her principal manufacturer. In the factory, she was careful not to set herself too much apart from her employees, who, after all, included her own sister, her son and, at one time, her husband. Thus she would machine herself when there was a lot of work to be done, and would eat with them at lunchtime. Employees as well as employers were invited to her family's weddings. She also personally visited her home machinists once a week and had her driver take work to them and pick it up every day. She considered the personalisation of these relationships particularly important; indeed, some other home machinists I knew were only called on by a driver once or twice a week, and they lacked any sense of commitment to get the work done on time. Ayşe's home machinists on the other hand were some of her most efficient workers.

c) Relationships between employees

Employees can be seen as relating to each other on the basis of three criteria: shared kinship, ethnic identity, and potentially 'social' relationships.

Apart from the three Ghanaian women, only two of the work force (and this includes the 14 key home machinists) were not related to anyone else by kinship - the Greek assistant cutter and one of the Turkish Cypriot women finishers. The Greek Cypriot cutter's wife, sister and brother's wife worked as special machinists; the Turkish Cypriot

driver's wife was a machinist, and one of the Turkish Cypriot pressers had his wife and mother-in-law working in the factory as machinists. The other Turkish Cypriot presser was related to eight of the 14 home machinists. Another home machinist was Ayşe's second cousin. The three Turkish mainlanders working at the factory were mother, father and daughter. The five Greek home machinists were also related. The three Ghanaian women were thought of by the Cypriots as one family, but were in fact only friends; the fact that they had all been employed together was not an accident, however. One had been recruited on a trial basis and when she turned out to be competent, Ayşe agreed to take on her two friends as well. This factory was not unusual in the extent to which its workers were joined by kin ties.

The Turkish mainland family alone kept slightly apart from the rest, and this was particularly noticeable at mealtimes. Unlike the Cypriots, who had a picnic-type lunch in the factory, the mainlanders had their main meal at lunchtime. This would be prepared the night before and cooked in the factory kitchen. During school holidays, the two children (aged seven and 13) would accompany their parents to the factory, where the 13 year old would work as a full-time machinist; the younger one occasionally helped by cutting lace into lengths. In Turkey, as in Cyprus, daughters help their mothers in the house from an early age (in contrast to the boys who are rarely called on to do anything) and working in the factory was simply seen as an extension of this domestic help outside the domestic environment. The family had no other kin in England and it was unthinkable that the children should return to an empty house, so during term time they went straight to the factory after school. Since this mainland family spoke only Turkish, their isolation was partly brought about by language differences. The younger Greeks and Turks would converse in English, as would the Ghanaian women. The older Cypriots spoke to each other in Greek - Greek being the second language of many of the original Turkish migrants. But there was more to it than this. The Greek and Turkish Cypriot employees had something to talk about, sharing in different ways both past and present experiences of life, in London and in Cyprus. Like the Ghanaians, but unlike the mainlanders, their aim was not to make as much money as possible before returning to their country of origin, but to both spend and invest it here. Though an outsider

would have found it difficult to distinguish Greek and Turkish Cypriot in the factory (no clue could be obtained from observing who ate with whom or talked to whom), the mainland Turks were conspicuous by their remaining apart from the rest, and also by their dress. They had none of the fashion consciousness of Cypriots or, perhaps more accurately, they did not choose to spend their wages on fashionable English clothes. The point is that Turkish and Greek Cypriots interacted socially in the factory to a greater extent than did the Turkish Cypriots with the mainland family. The same thing occurred at the other two Cypriot factories I visited which also employed Greek and Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks.

Employees may also develop social ties in the factory; that is to say, it is one of the few places where non-kin-based relationships may be initiated, friends made, and useful contacts formed. As the social milieu of most Turkish Cypriots, and especially Turkish Cypriot women, tends to be confined to close kin and neighbours, contacts made at work can be important. If there is no Turkish family in the neighbourhood and if kin visit irregularly, then the factory may play a significant part in an individual's social life. Information is disseminated there and practical help may be enlisted from work acquaintances. For many people in Ayşe's factory, the work place was an extension of their home environment, with some notable differences. For example, it was accepted that, in the factory, related and unrelated members of the opposite sex would work, eat, and gossip together, as would Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was rare, in contrast, to find unrelated members of the opposite sex talking with the same degree of intimacy within a home, and I met very few Greek Cypriots in a Turkish household during fieldwork. The factory, then, was in some ways a neutral place; there existed a degree of intimacy across the normal boundaries - between the sexes and between Greeks and Turks. The significance of Greek-Turkish contact and co-operation in an economic context will become relevant when inter-ethnic relations are discussed in Chapter VI.

Both changes and continuities are discernible in the work norms and practices of London's Cypriot Turks. The most significant development is undoubtedly that in London most women work for a wage, whereas in Cyprus they do not. Despite early opposition to the idea of women

working, it is now generally agreed that a woman who, through working, is able to contribute significantly to the household economy, is a good mother since she is helping to raise her family's standard of living, and provide for her children's future. This at least is the case if she also continues to fulfil her role as wife and mother competently. The extra income also allows the purchase of consumer durables and conspicuous spending on public occasions (especially weddings), both of which bring social recognition and prestige. Whether attitudes to women have changed as a result of their participation in, and greater familiarity with, the world of work, is the theme of Chapter IV. However, perhaps it is the continuities in Cypriot work norms which the discussion of the preceding pages highlights most definitely. In London, as in Cyprus, the emphasis in a work context is on the unwritten word rather than the formal contract, on acting in response to outstanding moral obligations rather than out of legal necessity, and on establishing an informal personal relationship with those with whom one is involved in any kind of business enterprise or economic transaction. However, it is important to stress that these are not norms which are confined to the work context - they obtain between any two parties where one is in the position to offer the other a service. The factory described above is not a case apart, divorced from the domestic environment; the relationships described are conducted on exactly the same principles as those which pertain in the home or on the street. It is my aim to exemplify this in the remaining pages of this chapter, and I begin by describing a series of transactions witnessed during fieldwork.

Patronage and Reciprocity in the Domestic Environment

The fact that a Turkish household is neither economically nor socially self-sufficient means that it has to relate to others, be they other Turkish Cypriot households or specific individuals who may or may not be Turkish or even Cypriot. Despite the occupational diversity of Turkish Cypriot men, there is no assurance that any one family will know, however indirectly, sources from which all their daily requirements can be obtained. At some point, a household must go 'outside' its range of immediate contacts. Besides, most families have dealings with banks, the local council, schools, doctors, the law, and so on. What is interesting here is the way that relationships of this sort are

established and the form they take. Even when dealing with non-kin and non-Cypriots, the type of relationship established with outsiders is similar to that established between kinsmen and fellow Cypriots, in terms of the mutuality of obligation it ideally involves.

Household A2 was established at the beginning of the field-work period, when the married daughter of household A1 moved out of her parents house, where she had lived since her marriage, and into council property further along the street. Since the couple had very little of their own furniture in the wife's parents' home, their own house had to be furnished from scratch. Given the importance attached to new furniture, and the social pretensions of the young wife, this venture promised to be both timely and expensive. Being in control of all matters relating to the household, she did not consult her husband in any of the negotiations that followed, preferring to tell him after the various purchases had been made, or when the down payments on hire purchase goods had been paid. Instead, she enlisted her mother's help and used her contacts. In the week preceding the move, she was in touch with the following people:

a. A Greek Cypriot who visited the house and brought catalogues illustrating living room suites. He had a long-standing relationship with household A1, having supplied all their major articles of furniture for the previous eight years. Since the women were unsure what to choose, he suggested they visit his showroom, and offered to send a car to pick them up the following afternoon. There was no suggestion at any point that they should go anywhere else to compare prices. A sale was eventually made and a special extended credit arrangement agreed upon. The same man called back after the move, "to see how they looked".

b. An Englishman came to the house with samples of curtains. It is perhaps worth noting that I met very few English people in Turkish houses.[1] This particular man apparently had many Cypriot customers; he was well aware of the service expected of him, and of the assurance of continued patronage which was his return. He had been supplying

[1] Others included (c) below and the same family's milkman. Even the latter had a reciprocal 'business' relationship with the family. He gave them free milk and eggs and they, in return, would make up various articles of clothing for himself and his family, mostly suits and trousers.

household A1 with curtains and other soft furnishings for six years, and on this occasion visited the house three times: once to bring samples and to advise on colour and price, a second time to take their order, and finally to deliver them.

c. Although the wall-papering and carpet-fitting were undertaken by the council, the men involved were welcomed to household A1 and the carpet-fitters agreed to do some work there 'on the side'; for this they received a cash payment.

d. The woman from the council who had been instrumental in the family's obtaining a house so conveniently close to household A1, was invited to dinner and was also invited to the düğün (wedding party) of a younger brother the following month. Two years later, household A2 was still in touch with her; this was not unrelated to the fact that they were thinking of moving again.

e. I was recruited to accompany the wife of household A2 to the electricity and gas boards - the rationale being that I was English, and could therefore more easily convince them of the urgency with which the various new appliances were required, given that the wife herself "did not know anyone there".

f. On enquiring about a telephone and learning that the installation would take up to six months, the wife of household A2 asked her local doctor for a letter requesting that she be given priority because she had a chronically sick child. (This was quite untrue.) Although her doctor, who was Pakistani, would undoubtedly have done this as a favour for her anyway, she gave him £1 as a token 'thankyou', and he wrote the required letter.

g. Renting a television from her mother's address proved problematic as the address was blacklisted by several television renting companies in the area for delayed payments on previous bills. An application was therefore made in the husband's name from the new address. However, the husband had recently been made redundant, and his former Greek Cypriot employer acknowledged this when approached by the television company for a reference. The family was outraged. They assumed the employer would automatically realise what was at stake, and confirm that the husband was still an employee and could therefore be trusted to meet the payments involved. Eventually they had to enlist the support of a friend in a different area, seek out a different rental company, and engineer more trustworthy referees.

One could continue to exemplify how the principles of patronage and reciprocity are built into relationships among Turkish Cypriots, and how they make them the basis of their relations with others. If kin or affines are not well placed to help them, they turn to neighbours and work mates until they establish, through a chain of personal contacts, someone who can provide the service they require. As soon as possible, 'middlemen' are cut out and rendered unnecessary, and a direct personal relationship is formed and consolidated through the establishment of a social tie. When tradesmen visit, they are treated in exactly the same way as visiting kin or neighbours, and will be offered tea (drunk in England with milk, sugar and cinnamon) or Turkish coffee. Families and children are discussed as well as the colour and cost of curtains, or whatever is being purchased. The time spent by the tradesmen on socialising is rewarded by the assurance of a market and the likelihood of continued patronage.

It is worth noting that, of the various people who provided a service on this occasion, only the English woman from the council was invited to dinner and to the forthcoming wedding. This was because she was a woman, and greater intimacy with her was therefore possible, but it was also because there was no other way in which she could be recompensed for her trouble. She could not be paid because she was a council employee, and this would have embarrassed her in any case. But the obligation to repay a favour is strong, and the sense that a favour is owing, equally so. Compensation in excess of what is owed can lead to the maintenance of a relationship because of the debt thus incurred, whereas if recompense is thought to be inadequate, bitterness and friction - which often lead to gossip and accusations about honour - tend to follow. But when the rules of exchange are well defined and agreed on by both parties - as is the case when a service or object is exchanged for a cash payment - such problems do not arise. The Greek factory owner who refused to render a 'service' to his former employee (g above) did so partly because he had nothing to lose by being uncooperative; he did not employ any of the man's relatives, and he was Greek, not Turkish, and so ensuing gossip about him could not be harmful to his business or his family.

It should be realised that, though I met few Englishmen in the

course of fieldwork, this was not because Turkish Cypriots avoid working with or for Englishmen on principle. Most English people are simply not prepared to organise their business ventures in a way that allows for the needs and expectations of Cypriots to be taken into account. As far as Turkish Cypriots are concerned, there is little that is chauvinistic or nationalistic here; it is just economic good sense.

This is not to suggest that Turkish Cypriots prefer to work with and through other Turkish Cypriots simply because it is to their economic advantage to do so. Sometimes it is just because it is easier to enlist the help of a countryman. For example, when there arose a legal or medical problem of a personal nature or involving a specifically Turkish custom, the Turkish Cypriots of my acquaintance would seek out a Turkish doctor or solicitor.[1] Thus, they would contact a Turkish doctor for advice on any matter relating to a girl's virginity. A family might want to check the virginity of a future daughter-in-law (if there was some reason to suspect it), or a husband might ask a doctor to ascertain why there had been no blood on the wedding night. (The loss of blood is still seen as the only absolute proof of virginity.) The rationale for calling a Turkish doctor on these occasions is obvious: he would understand the issues involved and the reasons for his being contacted. In fact, of course, a Pakistani doctor would also be familiar with such a situation but, although this was probably realised by many Cypriots, they preferred to seek the advice of someone Turkish in these instances. A Turkish Cypriot solicitor was contacted for similar reasons: when help with problems of a legal nature was needed and where these were complicated by Turkish cultural norms or practices. The 24 year old daughter of household A1 contacted a Turkish Cypriot solicitor when she wanted her marriage annulled. Her mainland Turkish husband had deserted her three months after they had been legally married. (It was clear that he had only married her to gain British citizenship and thus the right to stay in Britain.) Because of the Turkish Cypriot custom of postponing the

[1] As far as I was aware, there were only two Turkish Cypriot doctors and two solicitors in London at the time of fieldwork. There was one Turkish Cypriot employed as a Community Relations Officer by the Home Office, to whom problems of a social and legal nature were also referred.

consummation of a marriage until after the wedding party, the couple were still not really married as far as her family, kin and Turkish neighbours were concerned. Conjugal rights had been legally conferred on her husband, but they had not been transferred to him in practice. Besides, he had forfeited these rights by leaving her. She was therefore in an ambiguous position: legally married but sexually unprotected. Her family saw it as imperative that the marriage be annulled quickly and another husband found for her as soon as possible. Had the girl visited an English solicitor, this seemingly complicated marital system would have had to be explained. As it was, the Turkish Cypriot solicitor was well conversant with the situation and had apparently dealt with many similar cases. He also anticipated the fact that as a homeworking machinist she would not be paying tax or a national insurance contribution, and would therefore have problems if she were to apply for legal aid - it would be asked why she was not on social security, since she was apparently not working. He advised her on these matters and promised to charge her a reduced fee in any case, because she was Turkish. This familiarity with Turkish marital norms, and an appreciation of the problems involved with her working status, meant that potentially embarrassing explanations on the girl's part were avoided.

In this chapter I have concentrated mainly on the Cypriot work ethos, and have explained in some detail the structure and operation of one particular Cypriot-owned factory. Mention was then made of how the norms of patronage and reciprocity also operate outside the factory - how they determine the nature of the relationship between trader and housewife, doctor and patient, solicitor and client, when all are Cypriot, or at least conversant with Cypriot norms. As Oakley notes (following Desai 1963), Cypriots have both an 'external' and an 'internal' economy. (Oakley 1970:101) The 'external' economy is part of the larger, national economy. Thus, workers in the clothing, catering and service industries produce for the general public, and not just for other Cypriots. As a corollary of this, the 'internal' economy provides Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Britain with a wide range of Cypriot-run businesses and services. Some of these I have referred to above, and they include grocers and greengrocers, butchers, bakers, travel agents, lawyers, estate agents, builders, electricians, and a

host of other trades from which everyday needs and provisions can be obtained. But just as Cypriot employers and tradesmen cater for the wider public and are not solely dependent on the patronage of an ethnic clientele, so too Cypriots in general are not dependent on other Cypriots for work or for any other service. Many Turkish Cypriots have non-Turkish and non-Cypriot employers; if a Turkish child contracts measles, his mother does not rush to one of the two Turkish Cypriot doctors in north London, but visits her nearest surgery; and so on. If Cypriots work with and through other Cypriots, it is because they choose to do so; they see it as advantageous or more pleasant. Cypriots in London are not economically self-sufficient as a population, and it would be impossible for Turkish Cypriots even to attempt to be so. There are simply not enough of them in varied enough occupations to provide all the services required by the whole London Turkish population.

What has afforded the Cypriot population in Britain a "moderate degree of affluence" (Oakley 1970:101) has been their readiness to fill existing occupational niches on arrival, and to their participation since then in the wider economy as consumers and producers while building up their own internal economy. Because of the nature of this internal economy - I refer here to the preponderance of enterprises concerned with providing everyday services and necessities - a high degree of psychological self-sufficiency has been achieved. Indeed, if one is going to talk in terms of Cypriot self-sufficiency in London, then it should be emphasised that it is a psychological state perhaps more than an economic actuality. Cypriots, both men and women, old and young, are always having to deal with non-Cypriots, whether through necessity, convenience or choice; it is just that their most important, recurrent, and therefore <u>noticed</u> transactions are with other Cypriots.

This chapter raises a number of issues that will be taken up later in the thesis. The subject of Turkish-Greek relations in London has been introduced. The fact that Turkish Cypriots do not remit money to their relatives in Cyprus has been mentioned, and raises the question: On what and by whom is money spent? Wage earning might be expected to have significant implications for the role and status of women in London and for the marital relationship generally. Until very

recently, wage earning in Cyprus was confined to a small, well educated group who worked as teachers, secretaries and such like. The majority of women did not work for a wage and, were a village woman to have done so, it would have indicated poverty rather than a good education. As we have seen, it is quite normal for women who originally migrated from villages in Cyprus to work in London; indeed, they are expected and encouraged to do so.

Before moving on to consider these issues in depth, however, I want to discuss the Turkish Cypriot family and kinship system. The purpose is not simply to describe its structure, but to ask how - if at all - it has changed by being transported to London. The following chapter will also provide an opportunity for commenting on traditional anthropological conceptions of the Turkish family and kinship system, and the extent to which any of the existing literature on Turks and Turkey is useful for understanding Turkish Cypriot family life in London.

The fact that both sexes work together in London, and that Greek and Turk employ each other because it is profitable, is an example of the adaptation they are effecting; this I mentioned in the last chapter. I used the word 'adaptation', it might be recalled, in a very definite sense. I argued that migrant populations, or at least Turkish Cypriots, have not effected a synthesis, a half-way compromise between their traditional culture and that of the English majority, but that they have very positively changed, maintained or reorganised their traditional institutions and activities where doing so has furthered their interests in this country. In most cases, this adaptation is being effected without reference to the way the British do things. If Turkish Cypriot work practices sometimes come close to those of their British counterparts - for instance, as regards work norms, perks, trades union activities, and so on - this should not be construed as 'borrowing' but as a process of independent adaptation.

CHAPTER III: KINSHIP AND FAMILY LIFE

In previous chapters, reference was made to factors which seemed likely to have some bearing on kinship relations in London. Their significance will now be discussed. We have already encountered four of the five factors summarised below; the fifth is my own addition and, though not mentioned so far, might also be expected to have influenced Turkish Cypriot kin relations in this country.

a. One in six Cypriots is in Britain. This means that each individual has proportionately fewer kin here than in Cyprus, even though his or her immediate family may have migrated.

b. The dispersed nature of Turkish Cypriot settlement in London makes it difficult to visit kin who do not live close and to establish kin-like relations with neighbours.

c. Because of the amount of time spent working in Britain, less time is given over to socialising - especially by women.

d. The oldest generation of kin, the 'mobilizers', and sources of genealogical/cultural information, are absent in London, as it tended to be the younger generation which migrated. This means that the range of kin in London, which any one individual is likely to meet regularly, or to hear first-hand information about, is limited to first (and sometimes second) cousins.

e. The welfare state supports not only the few old people who migrated but also the unemployed, the unfortunate, and so on. In London, therefore, there is less need for, or pressure on, young couples with children to have an elderly or economically unproductive relative living with them.

Factors a, b and d are a result of migration and settlement patterns in Britain, that is to say, of the demographic situation. Factor c is due to both demographic and economic circumstances, and factor e to economic conditions. Thus, they are all constraints of a physical, practical kind. One might refer to them as 'environmental constraints' insofar as, though a result of individual decision-making, the individuals concerned had no way of knowing at the time that thousands of others were making similar decisions, and that eventually these would have long-term consequences for Turkish Cypriot communal life in Britain. So, for example, the fact that it was the young people who decided to migrate, and that there was no attempt to encourage their parents to join them later, was the result of a practical decision made by many; the possible consequences of the numerical underrepresentation of the

most senior generation in Britain years later could not have been foreseen at the time.

Before discussing each of the above factors in more detail, with a view to evaluating their significance for kinship in London, it is worth considering whether there are any other 'constraints' which might also be expected to influence kin relations and, connected with this, the residence patterns of Turkish Cypriots here. The above environmental constraints are external insofar as they appear to be imposed from the outside, but there should also logically be internal constraints in the form of an ideology - an indigenous idea of what the norm is as regards, say, household structure or marriage preferences, which the original migrants arrived with as part of their 'cultural baggage'.

Anthropological discussions of kinship structure and interpersonal relations in the Middle East often make reference to two widespread ideals, sometimes actually citing them as forms of explanation for their own data. They are:

a. That the patrilineal extended family is the ideal form of household structure.

b. That th ere exists a strong agnatic principle which is the basis of all matters relating to kinship: marriage preferences, actual inheritance customs, interpersonal relations (male-female, husband-wife, and so on), social structure (where this refers to the formation of kin-based groups above the level of the household), and so on.

This is not to say that all individual authors have found that the people they have studied have necessarily exhibited those features which would follow if these ideals were put into practice. There are obviously many exceptions to both these normative 'ideals', and they are remarked upon by anthropologists when they occur.[1]

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[1] Magnarella, for example, found that in Susurluk, an ethnically mixed town in N.W. Anatolia, first cousin marriage was prohibited by some sections of the population (Manavs, Balkan Turks, Circassians and Georgians), patrilateral and parallel cousin marriage being especially bad because it entailed the joining of people from the same seed (tohum) and the same blood (kan). Among the Yuruk Turkmen and Chepni in the area, however, first cousin marriage, and especially that with the FBD, was preferred. (Magnarella 1974:90)

It is important for our understanding of Turkish Cypriots in London, however, to know whether the above two ideals have influenced kinship and residence patterns here, and this means ascertaining whether they represent norms in Cyprus, at least to the extent that they do in many parts of rural Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. If, for example, the extended family household is the norm in Cyprus, then the preponderance of the nuclear family household here needs to be explained. Furthermore, we need to examine the effect which such a drastic change as this might be expected to have on kinship relations. If, conversely, extended family households have never been the norm in Cyprus, then one wants to know what the norm there is and how this is likely to have influenced residence patterns here. The same holds for the agnatic principle.

The extent to which there is a patrilocal extended family household ideal for Turks in Cyprus will be considered first, the aim being to ascertain whether such an ideology has acted as a constraint - in much the same way as the 'environmental' factors cited above are constraints - on settlement patterns and household structure in Britain.

Residential and Kinship Norms in Turkish Cypriot Culture

The Patrilocal Residence Ideal

According to Paul Stirling, whose account of two villages in central Anatolia is still the most comprehensive ethnographic study of rural Turkey, the household ideally contains "... a man, his wife or wives, his married sons with their wives and children, and his unmarried sons and daughters". (1965:36) Stirling saw the domestic cycle as having several well-marked stages. In the beginning, the nuclear family would be established with the birth of children. As they grew up, they would contribute through their labour to the household economy and all their needs would be provided for in return. On marriage, daughters would leave the natal home to live in the house of their husband's parents, while married sons would remain in their natal household and bring their wives in to live with them. But only with the birth of their children would the final and, according to Stirling, the 'ideal' form of the joint household be achieved. With the death of the household head, the sons would separate into conjugal or nuclear family units, which would then become economically independent

and the cycle would begin again for each of them.

In fact, in Stirling's two villages, this ideal three-generational type household was achieved only 24% and 23% of the time respectively. Stirling reconciles practice with ideal here by arguing that in any case the joint household is only likely to be achieved 50% of the time due to the time it takes for each household to reach this stage of the developmental cycle. Pre-joint or simple households which comprise only one married couple are consequently seen as being in the process of moving towards the preferred ideal of the three-generational joint family. Other authors writing about villages in Turkey interpret the discrepancy between the so-called ideal of the extended family household and the preponderance of the nuclear family household in practice as exemplifying a growing preference for the latter. (Erdentuğ 1959; Kiray 1964)

Whether or not Stirling is right to assume that the extended family household is the ideal form of family structure among Turks is quite irrelevant to any discussion of family structure among Turkish Cypriots, however. For the latter, the nuclear family household is the ideal and the statistical norm, in both Cyprus and London. Only those village families in Cyprus who own more land than they can work themselves are likely to have a married son or daughter living with them. The extended family household does seem to have been more common in the past, but nowadays small land holdings make it difficult for large rural families to gain their living entirely from the soil. Over time, more and more young men had to migrate to the cities and support their families with wage incomes. On marriage, they settled in the towns near to their work, and did not return to their natal homes. At the same time, there were various 'pull' factors, operating from the major towns, which further accelerated rural-urban migration and contributed to the break-up of the extended family household. The increase in governmental functions and economic development, during the British administration (1878-1960) and after the establishment of the Republic, resulted in the growth of urban centres and, in turn, urban populations. The governmental and economic activities centred in towns attracted the educated and the entrepreneur - as well as foreign investors, residents and tourists. (Area Handbook for Cyprus, 1970:89,90)

In my own sample of 14 Turkish households in Cyprus (Group D, Appendix B), it will be noted that 12 were nuclear in structure. Of the remaining two, one (household 3) had only recently become 'extended' - the eldest daughter was married during my stay and her husband moved into her natal home in order to help her father farm the land he owned. This was not an ideal arrangement as far as the young couple were concerned, and they saw it as temporary. The daughter had insisted that the actual structure of the house be reorganised, and her parents had consequently moved into the same room as their younger children, leaving their daughter and her husband their own bedroom, living room and kitchen. In fact, catering was done jointly, as were all the domestic chores, but concessions had been made which indicated that all agreed that the newly married couple ought to have their own home. The other extended household (household 5) had come about directly as a result of the war. The family had lost a son in the fighting and had been allocated, as a form of recompense, an especially large house when they moved from their village in the south to the rich citrus-growing area of Güzelyürt (better known by its Greek name, Omorfu) in the north. The family had also been allocated approximately 50 acres of farmland and three water pumps. In order to work this land efficiently, four previously nuclear families combined their labour, and came to live in the same house. Despite the economic potential of the land and the relative luxury of a large house, the three young married couples did not consider the arrangement ideal, and were already planning in 1976 to move out and find their own homes.



What is interesting about both the extended households mentioned above is that they have come about mainly as a result of uxorilocal residence. This was not considered at all unusual by those involved or by outsiders, and was seen as a practical adjustment to the economic circumstances which prevailed in both cases. Indeed, there seemed to be considerable flexibility in attitudes regarding living arrangements in Cyprus, a general readiness to adapt household structure to the situation in hand. I am not suggesting that there was a preference for uxorilocality, as my sample was far too small to justify any such conclusion. Indeed, the young couples who objected did so on the basis that they were losing some of their independence by moving in with their families and in-laws, and not because they were living with the wife's, rather than the husband's, parents.

Even in Turkey, however, the so-called norm of virilocality is not always backed up by the data. Erdentuğ, for example, notes that in the village in Eastern Turkey where she worked there was an increasing preference for uxorilocality. She explains this in terms of both economic conditions and the friction seen to characterise the mother/daughter-in-law relationship. (1956:32-33; 1959:19) Kiray interprets the high proportion of nuclear family households in her 1962 study of Ereğli as the result of the changing relationship between father and son, and the latter's desire for financial freedom and the control of his own spare time. (1964:115-7) I will not be explaining uxorilocality in London in these terms, but I make the point in order to stress that there is no recent tradition of virilocality in Cyprus, while in Turkey virilocal residence might not be as common as we have been led to suppose.

The domestic cycle of the Turkish household in Cyprus is consequently quite different to that outlined by Stirling above, and corresponds more closely to that described by Benedict. (1976:233-238) Both children leave the natal home on marriage - not on the occasion of the civil ceremony, however, but after public recognition of the marriage, which comes on the day of the wedding party. The period of time between these two events varies considerably; it may be just a few months or as much as one or two years. The time-lapse depends on the amount of time it takes for the groom to save up and buy a house, and for the bride to provide the furnishings for it - the

bedroom and kitchen being her special responsibility here. Thus, even the different stages of marriage are so spaced as to allow for the immediate establishment of the nuclear family household by the young couple on marriage. I cannot document just how recently the nuclear family household has come to be the ideal and statistical norm in both the towns and the rural areas of Cyprus. But what is important is that it has come about as a result of certain local conditions - economic, demographic and social. The type of residential unit established in London by Turkish Cypriots must be seen, similarly, as a response to these same influences.

In London, the nuclear family household is both the ideal and the most frequently found type of residential unit for Turkish Cypriots. As in Cyprus, however, extended family households are sometimes formed on a temporary basis, usually as a result of one of the children marrying and bringing his or her spouse in to live with them. This was the case with household A1: the wife of what is now household A2 had lived with her husband in her parent's house until the birth of their third child. Her younger brother (d) also moved into the house of his wife's parents on marriage, though this is not shown in the table as the marriage took place after the fieldwork period, (and his wife's family are not, in any case, included in my household sample). At about the same time, a younger sister (e) also married and her husband moved in to live with her in her parent's house. (They intended to start buying a house once they had saved enough to put down a substantial deposit.)

In these and other cases, the possibility of the couple moving in with the husband's parents for a short time was not even considered. It was generally agreed that any newly married couple should have their own house but, if this was not possible, then they should stay with the girl's parents. Indeed, the only cases of temporary virilocal residence I heard of were those where the bride's parents lived in Cyprus. Where a couple did remain in the girl's parent's home, they were usually given the largest room to use as a bedsitting room. They would have their own television and the means to make tea and coffee, so that they could at least entertain their own visitors and have some privacy and independence. In my experience, households which were extended in this way in London would eventually divide into nuclear family households at the point when practical difficulties

began to exacerbate inherent structural tensions, so that arguments became frequent - or more frequent. Despite the domestic rearrangement that occurred when a couple moved into a parental house, the couple would be afforded very little decision-making power, and an incoming husband was simply expected to fall in with the rules of the house and to keep out of the way as much as possible. The birth of children often precipitated an attempt to find alternative accommodation, a move which the couple often explained in terms of the need for more space. However, the importance attributed to male independence, and the belief that a couple ought to have its own house and a man be the head of his own household, must have influenced these decisions.

Thus in London, whenever neolocal residence on marriage proves impractical, uxorilocality is preferred to virilocality, unlike in Cyprus where, as mentioned, the occurrence of either is simply a result of external constraints. The preference in London is explained by informants in terms of the mother-daughter relationship - a mother and daughter always get on well, whereas a mother and daughter-in-law are more inclined to argue. In an uxorilocal household, the relationship between father and son-in-law is not seen as potentially problematic, as the two men usually work in different places and spend little time in the house in each other's company. It was noticeable that fathers initially distanced themselves from their co-resident sons-in-law, at least until they were sure of their suitability and their moral and financial responsibility. But it was the mother/daughter-in-law relationship which was seen as potentially explosive, since they had to share the same domestic environment and responsibility for the same man. The Turkish image of the mother-in-law as an interfering old busy-body was often cited as an explanation for the avoidance of virilocal residence.

Although this was undoubtedly important, and was how informants usually rationalised the fact that such uxorilocal residence was more common, I see it as only a part explanation and would suggest that uxorilocality in London, however infrequent and temporary, can be seen as an acknowledgement that marriage in Britain is less stable than in Cyprus. I have no statistics on the frequency of divorce, but in my sample of 14 households, one woman had been divorced (A3a) and another had had two marriages annulled (A1e). This was

quite apart from the number of broken engagements I knew of, or heard about, and the number of marriages which had broken down but not resulted in divorce for family reasons.

Informants acknowledged that part of the reason for marital instability in this country was the way in which spouses were chosen. Certainly, a Turkish Cypriot marriage in Britain is arranged in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. The couple and their respective parents might meet for the very first time when the boy visits the girl's house with his dünürcü (the relatives who accompany him to discuss the possibility of marriage). It is often on the strength of this one meeting that the decision to marry or not is made. Of course, in some cases the families marrying their children are already acquainted - perhaps because they are neighbours or distant kin - but more usually they will merely have a mutual acquaintance who is able to vouch for the reputation and character of both parties. When this is the case, decisions regarding future spouses are made on the basis of very little information, and a girl's parents rarely know enough about their future son-in-law at this juncture to be sure that the match is a good one, either financially or from the point of view of providing their daughter with an agreeable and responsible husband. Of course, the boy's parents are invariably in the same position and may know very little about their future daughter-in-law. The important difference is that, if the marriage is agreed upon and later breaks down - whether during the engagement period, after registration or after the wedding party proper - the boy will have less difficulty than the girl in finding another partner. This is especially the case if the wedding party has taken place and she is no longer a virgin.

If the couple lives with the girl's parents initially, the latter can at least acquaint their son-in-law with the expectations they have of him, and encourage him to live up to them. He is, in the meantime, incorporated into the family and is likely to develop close ties with its male members, especially his wife's unmarried brothers. His movements are restricted and there is little chance of his continuing his pre-marital male pursuits, especially where these involve other women. Given the anonymity of London, this is a constant cause of anxiety for married women. Indeed, I would suggest that what a bride's parents are basically afraid of is that

she will be deserted while still young, and then they will have to take her back to live with them and find her another husband. Uxorilocality is a way of extending the protection afforded a daughter before her marriage; it is more common than virilocality because a girl's parents are not willing to hand over responsibility for her to people they know relatively little about and are in no position to control. As soon as the husband has been 'tested' and is found to possess at least some of the characteristics which he was reported to have while the marriage was being arranged, the couple may well be encouraged, or may well themselves decide, to find separate accommodation.

Whether one could correlate the incidence of uxorilocality with the amount known by parents about their future son-in-law, I do not know. Other factors obviously influence whether it will be considered or not: the availability of suitable accommodation when they marry, their eventual plans, the amount of space in the girl's parent's house, and, of course, the husband's acquiescence in such a plan. This last factor is obviously a crucial one and it was probably not coincidental that, in all the cases of temporary uxorilocal residence of which I knew, either the husband's parents lived in Cyprus (and thus virilocality was out of the question) or his earnings were such that, in the event of his in-laws suggesting that he should reside with them, he could not reasonably afford to refuse. The families in the neighbourhood group (A) tended to see uxorilocality as an alternative - albeit a temporary one - to neolocal residence on marriage, whereas the families in the dispersed kinship group saw it as something exceptional. This was consistent with the greater emphasis put on individual initiative and independence by the families in this latter group.

When a couple moves into its own home, they endeavour to live near some of their close kin. Usually this means the wife's parents, as from their point of view this is the next best thing to actually having their daughter and her husband living with them. There also seems to be a preference for residing near those married siblings with whom both husband and wife get on well. Those renting council property were usually able to find accommodation within walking distance of other kin if they were prepared, and could afford, to wait for a house to become vacant in the area. (Household A2 is an example.) For those buying houses, however, such as the families in

group B, both the availability of suitable housing in an area and the desirability of the area itself determine to a great extent where they came to live, and thus, their nearness to other kin.

So it is clear that the traditional Middle Eastern ideal of virilocal residence has not influenced Turkish Cypriot residence patterns in London, simply because it was not the ideal nor the statistical norm in Cyprus when the original migrants left. (According to informants, it was more common in the villages in the 1950s and 1960s, but was not considered 'ideal' by the young people even at that time.) The preference for the nuclear family household in London must therefore be seen in the context of exactly the same preference in Cyprus. Exceptions to this - temporary uxorilocal residence, for example - can be explained in terms of certain social, economic and demographic conditions in London, which make this sort of residence desirable. The extent to which the agnatic principle acts as a constraint on social organization and kinship relations will now be considered.

The Agnatic Principle

There are no corporate kinship groups in London or Cyprus above the level of the household, which, as we have seen, is generally nuclear in structure. This lack of any larger property-holding unit is consistent with the almost equal emphasis put on uterine and agnatic kin. Certainly, there are no agnatic groupings in present-day Cyprus which would warrant the name 'lineage', even in the loose sense in which Stirling, and other writers on rural Turkey, use the term. (See, for example, Cuisenier 1964, 1969; Cohen 1965.)[1] With

[1] With reference to Turkish villagers, Cuisenier defines lineages in much the same way as Stirling, that is, as named agnatic groups who are residentially identifiable at the village level (1964:84) and whose members assist each other in the event of illness or other trouble (1966:223). Cohen delineates what he calls 'patrilineal associations' (hamulas) among the Arabs. (1965) Members of these live in the same quarter of a town or village and are linked by a complex network of cognatic and affinal relationships. Due to the practice of in-hamula marriage, men are intensely linked through sharing rights and obligations in relations to each others' daughters and sisters. Members share the responsibility to avenge wrongs inflicted by other hamulas, and they collectively compete for power with non-hamula members. The idiom of patrilineal descent, which defines Cuisenier's or Stirling's lineages and which binds Cohen's hamula members, if it exists for Turkish Cypriots, is not observable 'on the ground' as it is for the people mentioned here.

reference to Sakultutan, a village in Anatolia, Stirling uses the word 'lineage' to describe "... small groups of shallow depth, reckoning common agnatic descent from the grandfather or great-grandfather of the senior living generation". (1965:158) These groups were not corporate and, barring one exception, they owned nothing in common. They did not have common ritual symbols or recognised leaders, and were neither endogamous nor exogamous. In fact, they only existed to the extent that their members were bound to fulfil certain rights and duties to each other, and these most commonly occurred in the event of a crisis, or when there was the possibility of violence. The villagers, however, did recognise their existence, and each 'lineage' had its own name, based on the name or nickname of a founding ancestor. "In one sense," Stirling writes, "a lineage only exists at a time of hostility, and consists only of those agnates who support that group in quarrels." (1965:161) It is debatable whether Stirling's use of the term 'lineage' to describe such groups is appropriate, but for my own purposes it is also irrelevant, as Turkish Cypriots have no kin-based, named groups of any sort. Indeed, in Cyprus agnates cannot be distinguished by their settlement patterns, nor even by their sharing of a common patronym, since children customarily adopt their father's first name as their own 'surname'. The Turkish law of 1935, which compelled everyone in Turkey to adopt a surname of the normal European type, based on linguistically pure Turkish roots, was not binding in Cyprus, though familiarization with the West has encouraged a few urban families to follow the Turkish example. For most people, however, it is still customary for children to take their father's first name, and wives their husband's first name, as their surname, unless the name is particularly unusual and therefore considered unsuitable. Father and son consequently never have the same 'surname'. I am not suggesting that this absence of named, agnatically-based groups necessarily indicates that little importance is attached to the agnatic principle, but it was in fact the case that, in Cyprus and London, those who gave help in interfamily quarrels, or came to assist in domestic crises, were not necessarily agnates. The proximity of households, personal relationships, and relative needs were all factors which determined who gave help to whom in which situations.

In the same way, spouses are not purposely chosen from amongst those with whom there already exists a kin or affinal connection. Various factors influence the choice of spouse and, although it is

important - at least from the point of view of the parents of the couple - that a relationship of familiarity and trust should already exist between them, a neighbouring family may fulfil this condition as adequately as one related by kinship. In fact, unlike many other Muslims, Cypriot Turks do not consider it a 'good' thing to marry a close relative, and by 'close' is specifically meant a first and, to a lesser degree, a second cousin.[1]

The Turkish Cypriot avoidance of first cousin marriage can probably be attributed to their having lived alongside Orthodox Christian Greek Cypriots for four centuries. It seems likely that the latter could have influenced marriage preferences - whatever they were originally - just as they have influenced marriage customs (see Chapter V p.189). For the Greek Cypriots, marriage with the first or second cousin is expressly forbidden by the Church, though dispensation for second cousins to marry is granted in rare cases. In fact, Turkish Cypriots also occasionally marry their first cousins on both sides, but in my experience this practice is rare and disapproved of for supposed eugenic reasons. How recently this latter notion has been conceived I do not know, but even in the villages where I stayed informants emphatically stated that close cousin marriage could be damaging for any children born to the union, and was therefore best avoided. The actual form taken by marriage in both Cyprus and London, and the way that a spouse is chosen, are discussed at length in Chapter V.

The lack of any unilateral or unilineal emphasis in Turkish Cypriot kinship is reflected in the kinship terminology. Although Stirling cites the Turkish case as an instance of a negative relationship between terminology and kin relations, a few general principles stand out obviously, and these substantiate the points made above. As reference is made to Turkish kin terminology throughout this chapter

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[1] Actually, despite the abundance of literature on the preference for first cousin (and specifically FBD) marriage in the Middle East (for example, Barth 1954 and 1973, Patai 1965, Murphy and Kasdan 1959 and 1967, Aswad 1968 and 1972), its incidence and actual occurrence vary widely, at least in Turkey. It was mentioned above that, in the village of Magnarella's study, patrilateral parallel cousin marriages were prohibited by some peoples and endorsed by others. Even in the villages in which Stirling and Meeker worked, the actual incidence was not high - rates ranged up to about 5% (Stirling 1965:202-4; Meeker 1976b:395). See also Keyser 1974, Cuisenier 1964 and Bates 1973:56-86, who have also written about the problem with reference to Turkey.

and to specific terms in the following ones, Standard Turkish kinship and affinal terms of reference are listed below.

Standard Turkish Primary Kin Terms

baba	F
anne	M
dede	FF, MF
nene	FM, MM
dede/büyük dede	FFF, FMF, MFF, MMF
nene/büyük nene	FFM, FMM, MMM, MFM
amca (büyük amca)	FB (FFB, MFB)
dayı (büyük dayi)	MB (MMB, FMB)
hala (büyük hala)	FZ (FFZ, MFZ)
teyze (büyük teyze)	MZ (MMZ, FMZ)
ağabey (Cyprus=abi)	oB
abla (Cyprus=aba)	oZ
kardeş	ySb
oğul	S
kiz	D
torun	SS, SD, DS, DD
torunoğlu	SSS etc.
yeğen (Cyprus=no term)	SbCh
(Cyprus=yeğen, ST no term)	Cousin

Standard Turkish Affinal Kin Terms

koca	H
karı	W
yenge	FBW, MBW, BW
enişte	FZH, MZH, ZH
kayınbaba	WF, HF
kayınanne	WM, HM
kayın	WB, HB
baldız	WZ
görümce	HZ
bacanak	WZH (reciprocal with ego)
elti	HBW (.. .. ..)
gelin	SW, BSW, ZSW (lit. 'bride')
güvey	DH, BDH, ZDH
dünür	SW's family/DH's family
sütkardes	milk sibling[1]

(For key to abbreviations see p.9)

[1] Sütkardeş (milk sibling) is used to refer to someone suckled at the same breast; in the villages, a woman would suckle another's baby if the mother herself was ill or did not have enough milk. Islam forbids the marriage of milk siblings, the idea being, presumably, that such children have become like brother and sister to each other. (Koran 4:26-27) The custom is rapidly dying out in Cyprus and it does not occur in London, with the availability of milk substitutes. Those who had a sütkardes maintained that the relationship ideally involved feelings of special closeness.

The importance of close kin and close affines, and the relative lack of importance attributed to those outside this circle, is also reflected in Turkish kinship terminology. Only a small number of people can be referred to by a descriptive kinship term. Even the terms for grandparents (nene and dede) do not allow maternal and paternal sides to be differentiated. Many terms are classificatory, and either specify sex but not generation (enişte = husbands of female kin of own and above generations), or specify generation but not sex (torun = grandchildren, dünür = one's children's parents-in-law). There are no terms for more distant kin and, in order to specify, say, one's FBDH, one would have to adopt the same procedure as in English.

The only indication of an agnatic emphasis in Standard Turkish kin terminology is found in the use of the term 'gelin', which literally means 'bride'. 'Gelin' is used to refer to all women of the same or of a younger generation marrying into a family (thus, SW, BW and, on some occasions, W). It has the connotation 'our bride' and 'one who has come to be part of our (agnatic) family'. The equivalent male term, 'güvey' (son-in-law), is used much less frequently, and is never extended to mean sister's husband or husband, because, of course, it does not have the connotation 'our groom'. Women become part of their husband's families on marriage - at least conceptually, if not in terms of residence. Men do not become part of their wives' families, even in thought - despite the fact that they may occasionally live with or near them. This use of the terms 'gelin' and 'güvey' by Turkish Cypriots in London substantiates Stirling's contention that there is a negative relation between kinship terminology and kin relations. One might expect that, given the greater incidence of uxorilocality in London, there would be good reason for parents-in-law to cease referring to their son's wife as 'gelin', since it is more frequently the son who moves out of his natal household on marriage, and moves into his wife's natal home. (Alternatively, one might expect the term 'güvey' to be used by parents to refer to their co-resident sons-in-law.) I witnessed no change on either score, however; both 'gelin' and 'güvey' continued to be used in exactly the same way in London as they were in Cyprus.

Given the preponderance of the nuclear family household, the lack of both corporate agnatic groups and a preferential marriage system, one might ask which kin or affinal relationships are especially

significant for Turkish Cypriots. They themselves say that they recognise bilateral kin up to and including the third cousin. Indeed, after that they usually deny that any relationship exists at all, or say that the individual concerned is 'not really related'. But whether an individual is a third cousin or a completely unrelated acquaintance is, in London at least, usually irrelevant, since there are few rights conferred or obligations enjoined on those who have such a distant kinship tie. In London, as I have said, it is generally thought to be a 'good thing' to marry someone with whom there is already a kin or affinal connection (though not a close one), simply because such a person might be expected to share some of one's own sentiments and perspectives. Even if the individuals concerned have never met before, they are naturally felt to be closer and more familiar than complete outsiders. There is an unspoken but nonetheless observed rule in London that all known relatives are invited to family weddings (düğün) and circumcisions (sünnet), though of course, if the individuals concerned happen to be friends or neighbours as well, contact with them will be more frequent than this. It is the degree of familiarity obtaining in a relationship, and not simply the fact that it is or is not kin-based, which is important. Thus, a man would ask his second or third cousin for a loan only if he could not approach his own or his parents' siblings (or his employer), and if he also knew his cousin particularly well. The money would be lent on the basis of the mutual trust the two men had for each other, and not just on the basis of their kinship.

In both London and Cyprus, daily and weekly family visiting was confined to a small group of nuclear family members and their spouses. A couple would try to visit their grandparents, parents, married siblings and parents' siblings as often as possible. Their married children would visit them. In the event of any crisis, be it monetary, legal, social or marital, it would be these people who would be approached for help and advice. Of course, if distantly related families lived near each other in London, it was expected by others - and it usually happened - that they would join together and support each other in the event of a disagreement with non-relatives. Such a liaison was only inevitable, however, if the two households were close kin - if they included a brother and sister, for example, or parents and a married son or daughter.

It would seem then that neither the 'Turkish' norm of virilocal residence nor a strong agnatic ideology have acted as constraints on Turkish Cypriot residence patterns, social organisation and marriage choices in Britain. But although Turkish Cypriot kinship and residence norms have not been greatly modified by their London setting, the significance of kinship for individuals here is very different from that in Cyprus. In London, Turkish informants tended to be extremely vague about their kin and affines. For example, even though the wife of household A1 could tell me that she had 101 first cousins, she did not know all their names and could not remember meeting even one third of them. This was because over half of them lived in Cyprus and she had made only two visits there since her arrival in Britain 13 years beforehand. Her younger brother (f) had absolutely no idea how many cousins he had in England or Cyprus, and denied knowing even those who lived in London. He maintained he had only twice met one family of first cousins, who lived some miles away in Wembley, at the wedding parties of his two elder siblings. When relatives visited at weekends, the young men would invariably go out, and they would not accompany their parents and sisters when they visited kin or affines who were not near neighbours. For them, visiting relatives was boring and to be avoided, whereas for the girls it promised a trip out in the car or on the bus, and a change from routine. For this reason, girls tended to be better informants when it came to helping me establish the range of their family's kin connections. On the whole, however, obtaining information about kin or affines, from young or old, was extremely difficult. Most young people, at least the girls, could list all their own first cousins but were hesitant when it came to second cousins or, say, the first cousins of their siblings' spouses. The older people undoubtedly had more knowledge of the structure of their families, but they were not interested in talking about those they rarely saw. Of course there were exceptions: one might recall that the wife of household C2 had maintained close ties with Cyprus primarily because her parents were still alive and were dependent on her financially. She was consequently a good informant in this respect. For most people, however, the only people worth talking about were those whom they regularly met in London, and very close kin in Cyprus, especially parents, siblings, parents' siblings and their children - those in fact which residents here would have met and stayed with if they had visited Cyprus for a holiday.

The seeming lack of importance attached to kinship in London is reflected in the way people are addressed. In Cyprus, everyone familiar to the speaker, but senior to him or her, is addressed in a kinship idiom, a kin term being tacked onto the end of the first name. (Those who are younger or the same age are simply addressed by their first name with no kin term suffix.) A speaker will address a slightly older, unrelated girl as, say, 'Songül aba' - aba being the term for an older sister. If there is a greater discrepancy in age than this, then the term for mother's sister will be used, thus 'Songül teyze'. The equivalent terms for men are used in the same way. Although in London, primary kin terms of address are still used for all those who are actually related (thus, 'abi', 'yenge', 'enişte' and so on), these are usually dropped as suffixes for those who are not. In these cases, the first name is used on its own if the relationship is a familiar one, or, if it is more formal, the equivalent 'Mr' and 'Mrs' in English are used. In Turkish, this takes the form of the suffixes 'hanım' (lady) and 'bey' (gentleman); hence, 'Serap hanım' or 'Ahmet bey'. (The surname, that is, the father's or husband's first name, is traditionally never used as part of a term of reference or address by Turkish Cypriots.) In short, the familiar world is no longer addressed in a kinship idiom, as classificatory brothers, sisters, aunts and uncles.

So the significance of kinship appears to be changing for Turkish Cypriots in Britain. An individual's uncles, aunts and cousins do not have, nor do they attempt to have, any say in his or her daily activities, unless of course they happen to be close neighbours. How and why has this come about? At this point I want to return to the factors listed at the beginning of this chapter, factors which I referred to as 'environmental constraints' to distinguish them from the possible ideological constraints considered above. These environmental constraints on Turkish kinship will now be considered in more detail.

Environmental Constraints on Family and Kin Relations

It is clear that the vagueness about their kin shown by many people, and especially the young, is partly a result of the fact that Turkish Cypriots do not form a residential ghetto in London, and the distances separating many kin-related households militate against

frequent meetings between them. The young boy mentioned above was ignorant of the whereabouts of his kin, how many first cousins he had and who they were, partly because he saw them so infrequently. Over half of them were in Cyprus (these he had never seen) and the rest were now living in different parts of London. Only his married sister (household A2) lived within walking distance. Because he saw other kin infrequently, they had little relevance for his day-to-day pursuits.

However, it is not just because of the dispersed nature of Turkish Cypriot settlement in London that kin have less relevance here than they do in Cyprus. There is no doubt that the families of my acquaintance could have made more effort to visit their kin than they did. Nor do I think that this kinship 'indifference' can be attributed, at least at the conscious level, to the influence of the English kinship system. Turkish Cypriot perceptions of the 'English way' of interpersonal relations do not present it as a desirable alternative to their own. The English are seen as having very loose affective ties with their children, who in turn have no sense of responsibility for their parents. Sexual freedom is seen to characterise all pre-marital relationships. Extra-marital affairs are seen as common for both partners, the result being that marriages are intrinsically unstable. Though occasionally there may be undertones of envy as well as disapproval in these stereotypes, nonetheless most people have no desire to emulate the 'English way' - perhaps the only exception being some young unmarried men, to whom it seems to symbolise the ultimate freedom. In time, of course, it is likely that the English system will influence Turkish kinship, especially as more and more young people grow up exposed to, and understanding, English cultural norms. For the moment, however, I would suggest that there are other, less conscious, but more practical, reasons why Turkish Cypriots do not maintain close kin connections here.

Unlike the world of the Cypriot village or even suburb, the world of the London streets is a relatively impersonal one. Where several families live on the same street for several years, or where men work in the same factory or business for a long period, close ties inevitably develop between them. But, even though there is usually some overlapping, kinsmen, neighbours and work-mates are, for many Turks in London, three distinct categories of people. This was not

the case in Cyprus, where links tended to be multiplex and where, in any case, all work-mates and neighbours were Turkish Cypriot - thus there were simply more people to know in different contexts. Besides, proportionately less time is spent on socialising in this country. The men work longer hours, and many women, who did not work in Cyprus, do so in London. Thus, where women in Cyprus would be spending much of their day visiting others or being visited by neighbouring women, to drink coffee, prepare vegetables and talk about family affairs, those in London are working a full day in a factory or on their machines at home. The impression given is that work hours and residence patterns have together combined to make the Turkish Cypriot household in London more socially insular - relative, that is, to its village or suburb equivalent in Cyprus.

There is a further reason why Turkish Cypriots in London know less about their relatives and are less interested in their domestic and social affairs. Given that the vast majority were under 30 when they migrated, the 65-plus age group is underrepresented in Britain. Even the migrants of the early 1950s are now only between 50 and 60 years old. The lack of a 65-plus generation has, I would argue, had. an important effect on family life here. It means that the range of any one individual's kin connections is limited by the absence of an older generation, which would normally act as a social focus and a medium for communicating information to their descendents about each other. One is less likely to keep in touch with one's second cousin (let alone one's third) in the absence of the kin one has in common with him or her (that is, grandparents and their siblings). In Cyprus, visiting grandparents is likely to involve either meeting or hearing about one's grandparents' siblings and their respective families, as well as their own children and grandchildren. There is no such communal meeting-place or such an encompassing information-source in London simply because most of the senior living generation of Cypriots have remained in Cyprus.

Finally, the influence of the British welfare state on Turkish kinship should be mentioned. Because of the relatively small number of really old Turkish Cypriots in Britain, the question of filial responsibility does not arise for everyone. Married couples in this country do not usually have to provide for their parents

financially. The latter, if they are still relatively young and are resident here, will be working themselves. If they are past working age, they are more likely to be living in Cyprus, in which case they will be provided for and taken care of by family members there. (Very exceptionally, families do remit money to Cyprus - household C1 is an example.) But even for those few old people now resident here, and for the many who will retire in the next decade, their pensions and other forms of state aid will enable them to maintain their economic independence. Similarly, the existence of the National Health Service means that any illness of family members, and the cost of medical treatment, are no longer the responsibility of kin. Thus, in London, families are no longer responsible for those kin who, because of age or illness, are not earning. The state has assumed many of the roles which were once filled by kinsmen.

The points made so far in this chapter may be summarised thus: there have been few normative constraints on the Turkish Cypriot kinship system as it operates in London. That is to say, Turkish Cypriots migrated with a residence and a kinship ideology which could be accomodated in Britain without significant change or modification. What has changed is the significance for the individual of kin beyond the close family. This I have explained in terms of certain demographic and economic factors which have influenced the frequency and necessity of contact with kinsmen, and thus the relevance of kinship per se. What I do not want to do is convey the impression that kinsmen who are not closely related, and who do not live nearby, inevitably lose touch with each other - for this is not the case. The circle of kinsmen visited informally by any one family may be relatively small (and it will vary considerably according to the family); but that family is likely to see all its London-based relatives at the weddings of kinsmen and, if they are large-scale celebrations, at engagements and circumcision parties also. At these events, there is an opportunity to do little more than exchange essential news and gossip, and, by their attendance, implicitly to state their relationship to their hosts and thus to each other. The question this raises is that of the purpose of these sporadic and seemingly superficial gatherings. Why indeed did the families of my acquaintance never turn down an invitation to a wedding, even if the family hosting the occasion lived on the other side of London, were third cousins, and, since their arrival in

England, say 10 or 15 years ago, had only ever been seen at the weddings of other shared kin? Do families attend such occasions simply for the party and festivities? I would suggest that at least part of the reason weddings are large and well attended events in London is because the importance of maintaining contact with kinsmen whom one would otherwise never see is recognised. As has been mentioned, kin who are not immediate family or near neighbours are not 'important' on an everyday level. However, kinship continues to be importtant in a more general sense. Indeed, as was suggested in Chapter I with reference to Salzman's study (1978), kinship might be seen as an alternative ideology, an ever-present but for the most part quite unobtrusive system of rights, duties and moral obligations which exist between people, one's relationships with whom can be activated if need be. Ties with geneologically or spatially distant kin are maintained through wedding attendance and other kin gatherings, not out of everyday necessity but out of expediency; there is a realisation that one's present job, prospects, marriage or financial situation might be temporary, and that as an individual one is a Turkish Cypriot in a foreign country, whose language and customs are still not totally familiar. Thus, the wider the range of potential 'helpers' in times of sudden crisis, the better. If all else fails, one can turn to one's kinsmen, but only if ties have been maintained and the kinsmen concerned are aware of their obligations to offer assistance. To appreciate the significance of this, one only has to consider the transience of most extra-familial relationships in London. The work-mates and neighbours of an individual or family continue to be potential sources of help or advice only so long as they remain in the same job or neighbourhood. Kin on the other hand are always kin, and, however irrelevant on a day-to-day basis, they are the only permanent category of people on whom an individual can depend.

This is not to say that there is a strong ideology that a man is duty-bound to help a kinsman, although were a large sum of money to be loaned by a man to his wife's cousin's nephew, whom he did not know, community opinion would be as likely to label him foolhardy as generous. Nonetheless, distant kinship links are activated on many occasions, especially when there is mutual advantage to be gained by both sides. Marriages are invariably arranged with the help of kinsmen (usually women) and there are often several mediating individuals

or families, all connected in different ways to the two parties they are bringing together. Jobs, too, are sometimes found with the help of more distant kinsmen, if close kin and neighbours cannot help. Every change of house might involve a family being brought into close association with another family whom they used to see only at weddings, but whom they now have the chance to visit regularly. The knowledge that one can generally, if not automatically, rely on one's kin is born of what Fortes calls the rule of prescriptive altruism, or the 'axiom of amity'. By this he refers to those "... rules of conduct whose efficacy comes, in the last resort, from a general principle of kinship morality that is rooted in the familial domain and is assumed everywhere to be axiomatically binding". (Fortes 1969:231-2)

That weddings function as meeting places for distant kinsmen, and thus provide the context and the opportunity for this alternative system of social relationships to be maintained, is a theme which will be taken up again in future chapters. Nothing has so far been said in this chapter regarding relationships within the nuclear family. These will now be examined. Rather than adopt Stirling and Magnarella's method of outlining the one-to-one relationship between every possible kinship pair (mother-son, father-daughter, and so on) (Stirling 1965: 101ff; Magnarella 1974:99ff), I will attempt to organise the discussion in terms of two basic determining principles of family organisation: age and sex.

Relationships within the Family: The Significance of Age and Sex

In any all-Turkish Cypriot context, whether the household or the factory, respect is due to age per se. Because in the household the father is the recognised decision-maker, and the ultimate authority on all matters of any consequence, it is to him that respect is most obviously paid. Respect is symbolocally paid in a number of ways. For example, unmarried sons and daughters do not smoke in front of their father; indeed, daughters rarely ever do so even after they marry and have children of their own. This, it was explicitly stated, was out of 'respect' for their fathers. The respect due to age is also given symbolic expression in the festivities surrounding the two main religious holidays - Kurban and Şeker bayram. (These are discussed in Chapter V.) Visiting kin to 'kiss their hands' is the

central secular activity on both these occasions. The young visit their elder kin and affines and, in greeting them, kiss their hands and raise them to their foreheads. Children do this to all those of their parents' age and older while married sons and daughters, whatever their age, greet their parents, parents-in-law and parents' siblings in this way. It is seen as a humbling gesture and, if the recipient considers him or herself not far enough removed from the other in terms of age or family seniority to be so greeted, then there is embarrassment and a response implying "Don't be silly, humbling yourself before me".

Within the household, responsibilities are delegated on the basis of age - at least until puberty. In a large family, the older children are frequently put in charge of younger siblings, over whom they have authority. It was not at all unusual to find in group A households a young girl of eight meeting out punishment (in the form of smacks and verbal recriminations) to her six year old brother. She in turn would be cautioned by an older brother or sister, even in the presence of their parents. But after puberty this changes. Boys are assigned fewer tasks and given fewer responsibilities in the house, and begin to spend a greater amount of time outside, playing with their peers on the street. When they reach their teens, boys are inclined to become much more authoritative in their attitude to younger sisters, and attempt to assume a much more disciplinary and protective role. This is born, or is at least coincidental, with their realising that they are indeed <u>expected</u> to take some responsibility for their sisters and to help safeguard their sexual reputation (<u>namus</u>). As girls get older, they are expected to take on more substantial domestic responsibilities, and will help with the cleaning and laundry (but rarely with cooking or shopping) from the age of about 12. Indeed, as far as a mother is concerned, the worry of bringing up a daughter is offset by the fact that she can be relied upon to help her run the house and look after all the younger children, whereas a son cannot be expected to do any job which smacks of 'women's work'. Elder sisters would help with their younger siblings and in large families would come to be looked upon as alternative mothers, especially if, on marriage, they continued to live nearby. The youngest children of household A1, for example, looked on their eldest sister (the wife of household A2) as a second mother, and on her children as brothers and sisters. Despite the generation difference, there was no age gap - in

fact, the eldest son of household A2 was older than his youngest uncle in household A1 - so it was quite natural that the children of mother and daughter should play together, and that the two women's roles as sister/mother and mother/grandmother should be almost fused in the minds of their respective children.

The tendency for young women to take on domestic responsibilities inside the house, and for young men to spend more and more time outside it, means that women are more inclined than men to form relationships with those not necessarily close to them in age. This occurs both with other women within the household (mothers and sisters - the mother-daughter tie is especially close) and, if there are Turkish neighbours, with other women on the street. Men, on the other hand, tend to form relationships outside the home with their age peers. Indeed, fathers and sons appear to have a formal and rather distant relationship, perhaps because they spend so little time in each other's company. No restrictions are generally placed on an unmarried man's freedom to come and go as he likes and, as many husbands also spend most of their leisure time out of the house, even when fathers and sons do meet, they are not alone, being at home and thus in the company of their womenfolk. Mothers do not expect to be able successfully to exercise very much control over their unmarried sons, and the latter do not, for the most part, allow them to. Within the home, young men tend to be retiring; they rarely become involved in family or neighbourhood arguments, using these as an excuse to spend as much time as possible outside it. There is a striking contrast here with the relationship between mothers and daughters, older daughters in particular spending a great deal of time with their mothers in the house and, if they happen to work together, in the factory also.

Although in theory the reputation of a girl reflects on her brother as well as her father, it is the latter who is really conscious of his responsibility in this sphere. Relations between daughters and fathers seemed to be characterised by respect of a formal kind, which sometimes borders on fear on the daughter's part. A girl would argue with an older brother with whom she did not agree, but she would never argue with her father or answer him back. Depending on the husband-wife relationship and the amount of time spent by a man at home, he would see more or less of his daughters. In any case, news about their

exploits and activities generally came to him via his wife, in carefully censored form. As far as daughters were concerned, mothers were potential friends; fathers were not friends but were to be respected, obeyed and kept uninformed of anything which might invite their disapproval.

Finally, a brief word about brothers and sisters. A brother and sister are expected to be close but, because of the girl's relatively sheltered upbringing, siblings of the opposite sex tended to spend little time in each other's company during adolescence. The boys developed outside friendships and pursuits, and invariably came to see their sisters as home-bound, old-fashioned and 'too Turkish'. As mentioned previously, a boy is expected to have some responsibility for his sister's sexual conduct, and thus his family's honour and reputation. In fact, the boys of my acquaintance did go through a sort of bravado stage as regards their sisters. This coincided with adolescence and consisted of a readiness to spring to a sister's defence if she was having problems with other girls or boys at school, or to threaten her with physical punishment if she crossed the norms of propriety - defined, as these tended to be at the time, by himself. It was often the case that the closeness expected of the sibling bond did not in fact develop until after one or both were married. The idea that a brother had responsibility for, and was affected by, his sister's conduct, did not appear to be taken very seriously, and if real friendship developed in adulthood this was at least partly a result of favourable circumstances making the relationship possible: proximity of residence, children of the same age, the ability to get on with the other's spouse, and so on. As a general rule, sisters maintained a closer relationship throughout life than brothers and sisters, and were more likely to try to settle near each other on marriage.

If the brother-sister relationship defies generalisation, so too does that obtaining between husband and wife. Since the role and status of women is the subject of the next chapter, and since much is implicitly said about the marital relationship there, I will not attempt to describe this here. Very much depends on the age of the couple considered, the length of time they have been here, and their exposure to and consequent familiarity with British marital norms

The overall picture presented here is of mothers and daughters having a close relationship based on the home and a sharing of common acquaintances in the form of other female neighbours and kin. Conversely, unmarried sons, husbands and, where relevant, sons-in-law are shown as participating little in the women's world at home. Fathers are consulted for all major decisions regarding the family (marriages, for example), but not about more mundane domestic matters. A wife runs the home in her own way with the help of her elder daughters, and without any interference from either husband or sons. For the families in group A and others like them, this is, I think, an accurate picture, though it is less so for the families in group B. In the latter, the husband-wife relationship was much closer, husbands spent more time at home, and this in turn affected their relationships with their children. Daughters communicated more directly with their fathers, and fathers saw themselves as more central to the family, involving themselves in consequence with ordinary domestic matters - what colour to paint a room, what new item of furniture to buy, and so on. Fathers typical of this group (B) would also exert pressure on their unmarried sons to stay at home and to bring their friends into the house, thus making their own relationship with their sons more intimate, and family relationships generally more personal and less segregated on the basis of age and sex. The difference in family relationships established between the two types of families (which have been dichotomised in order to make the point more strongly, rather than because such an absolute division exists in reality) could be seen as essentially one of class, the families in group B having become more familiar with, and influenced by, English middle class norms.[1]

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[1] It would be difficult to talk about the normative relationships between individuals and kinsmen who are not nuclear family members. This is simply because different families saw different categories of kin more or less frequently and to describe the relationship normally (or even ideally) obtaining between, say, a boy and his mother's brother would be to generalise on what would probably be a very few instances of a boy and his mother's brother having an identifiable relationship. As in English culture, the relationship of a girl or boy to her or his aunt or uncle depends on how often they meet and how well they get on together. There is no normative ideal defining what the relationship between any two such individuals should be; no special importance is attached to paternal rather than maternal kinsmen, for example, though this of course is consistent with the bilateral nature of the kinship system.

In this very brief sketch, the more general theme of male-female relations has not been considered, nor indeed has any mention been made of relations between children (that is, the second generation of Turkish Cypriots in this country) and their parents (the original migrants). This is because the focus has been on kinship, and not on the more general theme of relations between the sexes and the generations. Male-female relations will be given more attention in the following chapter, although a consideration of the so-called young 'second generation' of Turkish settlers will not be made until the concluding chapter of the thesis. This is because it is only at this point that an attempt will be made to consider what lies in store for future generations of Turkish Cypriots in this country. Since this essentially concerns those who have been born and brought up here, a consideration of how far their ideas, moral standards, and status aspirations continue to mirror those of their parents will be left until then.

CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE AND STATUS OF TURKISH CYPRIOT WOMEN IN LONDON

In this chapter I consider the role and status of Turkish Cypriot women. In the first section, I give an account of norms and attitudes related to women's position in Cyprus, without which it would be impossible to assess how and why they have changed since migration to Britain; but, since I was able to spend only a short time in Cyprus myself, and since there has been no other anthropological study of Turks there, the account must be cursory and couched in general terms.

Women in Cyprus

The main point to note, as with kinship and the family, is that observations made by anthropologists working in Turkey should not be presumed to hold for Turks in Cyprus, and models formulated there should not be used to measure changes brought about in this country by Turkish Cypriots who have migrated. It will be seen, for example, that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots have long been more 'western' in these spheres than the Anatolian Turks.

This is revealed, though by way of a paradox, in examination of the legal position of women in Cyprus. This is defined by an essentially western and secular code of civil law which, based on the Swiss Family Code, gradually replaced the Shari'a (Muslim religious law) in a series of reforms beginning in 1945. This code had been introduced as early as 1926 in Turkey by Kemal Ataturk but it had not, of course, been binding on Turks in Cyprus. As J.N.D.Anderson notes, the Turkish Cypriot family law retains a religious character to a much greater extent than does family law in Turkey. (Anderson 1958) His explanation for this is worth mentioning because it throws light on the role played by Islam in the life of Turks in Cyprus. According to Anderson, the retention of Islamic principles in Turkish Cypriot family law

> "... does not appear to lie in any desire on the part of the Turkish Cypriots to adhere more closely to the dictates of Islamic orthodoxy than their compatriots across the water, but rather their determination to preserve the integrity of their community; and the profession of Islam, together with a very occasional bow to the Shari'a in their family law, seemed essential both to the raison d'etre of the community as such and to their claim to retain special courts". (1958:187)

Earlier in the same article Anderson writes:

> "There can be little doubt that this community is in fact considerably less strongly attached to Islamic orthodoxy and traditionalism than were (or are) the Anatolian peasantry, and that it was far better prepared to accept a Western Code of family law than was the Turkish population as a whole in 1926". (1958:169)

This is confirmed by my own experiences and observations in Turkey and Cyprus; as mentioned previously, none of the 64 members of the households I visited in Cyprus attended a mosque even on Fridays - the Muslim religious day - nor did they fast during Ramadan. (Prayers and fasting are two of the five 'pillars of faith', activities which are enjoined on all true Muslims.) Indeed, although President Denktaş is now stressing the fact that the Turkish population in Cyprus is united as Muslims under the banner of Islam, this reflects his desire to get the support (financial and political) of other Muslim countries. He is also keen to play down the antagonism between the newly-arrived mainland Turks and the Cypriot Turks which, in 1976 at least, was very much in evidence. Thus his assertions do not so much reflect the religiosity of Turkish Cypriots as illustrate the potential use of religion as a unifying force in a political situation.

So, although Mübeccel Kiray holds that the family laws promulgated in Turkey in 1926, which defined new and equal rights and status for Turkish women, are partly responsible for the changes which have come about since that date, I myself do not see that there is necessarily a correlation between law and practice here. (Kiray 1976:261-271) Rather, local conditions have gradually effected a change in women's economic roles and this, together with increasing access to urban centres and familiarity with western modes of thought, is bringing about a corresponding change in women's status. After 50 years, the status of women in Turkey as defined by local custom is beginning to 'catch up' with their position in law. The paradox, then, is that though laws were reformed considerably earlier in Turkey, practice there has taken longer to approximate to the law than in Cyprus.

Traditionally, very few women entered any type of paid employment in Cyprus. The exceptions here were the very poor and the relatively wealthy - those who had to work for a wage to support their families and those who, drawn from an urban educated minority, worked in the towns as teachers or secretaries. Today this is changing, as

more and more girls go on to secondary school and, in a very few cases, college. However, except for teacher training colleges and several post-secondary technical schools, there are no institutions of higher learning in Cyprus, and parents are more inclined to send their sons to Turkey or England to university or college than they are their daughters. Even so, sons completing their education outside the country tend to be those from wealthy urban families. None of the women in the villages I visited in 1976 worked for wages, but they were often occupied in agricultural tasks on their own land, especially during harvest time. In the towns, a few women worked in family-owned firms, in one of the many small dress-making shops, or as secretaries, but the vast majority spent their time at home, cleaning, cooking, looking after their children and constantly visiting neighbours.

Despite the fact that very few women were publicly employed or, indeed, to be found frequenting 'public' places such as the market or the coffee shops, the private-public dichotomy that anthropologists have used to conceptualise and explain the physical separation between men and women in the Middle East, is not as applicable to Cyprus as it is to Anatolian Turkey and elsewhere. The presence of the Greek Cypriot majority, and the exposure to English thought and ideals generally, through the British presence and more recently through tourism, has had its effect - especially in the towns. Even house styles in Cyprus reflect an outward, 'public' orientation. Apart from the mud brick buildings which can still be found in the oldest parts of towns and in some villages, the houses are brick built and open out onto a porch or balcony and then the street. Women sit and chat and prepare food outside on the porch in the summer, in full view of passers-by; they are not confined to an inside, walled courtyard as is usual in many parts of Anatolia.

Nor do women in Cyprus cover their faces. Indeed, a difference in dress is one of the ways that Cypriot and mainland Turks could be distinguished on the island, during my first fieldwork visit in 1976. The mainlanders, who have settled since the 1974 war, originate mainly from the villages of Central Anatolia and the Black Sea. During the summer of 1976, their traditional village clothing marked them out from the Cypriot Turks. The Turkish women wore _şalvar_ (long baggy pants,

elasticated at the ankle), bright floral blouses and a headscarf or loose veil. The Cypriot women have long put aside this traditional village wear in preference for more westernised styles, in both the towns and the rural areas.

Despite this outward, public orientation suggested by house form and dress, it is still true that the house is the woman's domain in Cyprus, and that men belong outside it. The young adult males of the families I stayed with returned in the evenings only to eat; they would leave almost immediately after to visit the coffee shops or other male friends at their places of work. In particularly westernised households (9, 10, 11, 12), however, the older men would stay at home with their wives in the evenings, or accompany them to visit relatives or friends.

Not only are male and female work roles quite separate, but men and women tend to spend their leisure time in the company of their own sex. Women in urban areas would visit their neighbours constantly during the day and evening to chat, drink Turkish coffee and, whenever a special dish was being made, to assist with its preparation. It was obviously they and not the men who developed and maintained a sense of community among neighbours; indeed, it was interesting to observe how a sense of community and trust was being re-established in the summer of 1976, by the women in areas which had been resettled by displaced Turkish families after the war. In 1975, after the official population exchange, accomodation had to be found for the 65,000 Turks who had migrated from the south, as well as for those in the north whose houses had been destroyed in the fighting. In some cases, whole villages had attempted to reconstitute themselves in the abandoned Greek villages in the north, with some success. The allocation of houses in the urban areas had been more random, however, and on one particular street where I stayed, in a suburb of Famagusta, none of the households were related or had known each other before settling there some months previously. Not knowing one's neighbours was cause for anxiety, and women who met at the corner <u>bakkal</u> (all-purpose grocery shop) would invite each other to visit, and would send their children along the street with plates of food for neighbouring households. Male neighbours played little part in the initial establishment of these relationships, though, when I returned the following year to find that their wives had become

friends, they too were getting to know each other.

But the separation discernible between men and women in Cyprus is not segregation. When the sexes do meet, there is free conversation between them, and men do not have a room separated from the female part of the house - though there are, from what I could gather, considerable differences between town and country here, the extent of sexual segregation depending on the agricultural regime and the methods of dividing labour.

In the towns, the wife of a nuclear family household does not have to turn to others for help in the preparation of food for herself and her family. She might grow some vegetables in her garden, but otherwise basic foodstuffs and other commodities are obtained from the shops or market. The men in any one neighbourhood are also unlikely to be involved in co-operative labour relationships; rather, they work for outside employers who, though they might be kin, pay them wages. As a result, there is no economic basis for exclusive associations of women; rather, social life tends to focus on home and family.

In the villages, women are more directly involved with the production process - fruit and olive picking, tobacco leaf picking and drying, cheesemaking and so on. Such activities are more likely to engage women from different households in co-operative labour. In the village in which I stayed (Map 3, Household 5), the making of helim (white goats cheese, a speciality of Cyprus) brought the women and consequently the children from different households together. In one case, two sisters from neighbouring villages, and one of their neices from a nearby town, assisted with the preparation and then divided the finished cheeses between them, setting some aside as presents for other kin in Cyprus and for relatives in London also. Men too were more likely to perform co-operative tasks in the villages, and to call on neighbouring kin to assist in a special task on a reciprocal basis. So there is considerably more economic and social separation of the sexes in the villages than in the towns for this reason.

But even in the villages, there was no sign that women, through their associations with each other and their separation from the men, were establishing an autonomous sub-society such as that described by

Nancy Tapper for the Shahsevan of Azerbaijan. (1968, 1978) In the above example, the women who took part in the cheesemaking were all kinswomen, and were not unrelated neighbours. They came together as an action set (Mayer 1966) for a specific purpose and as a result of the mutually beneficial nature of the activity (helim keeps for many months in salted water, and is expensive to buy); they did not exist as an autonomous unit at any other time, and there was certainly no evidence of sub-society organisation with female leaders and a status hierarchy, as was the case among the Shahsevan. In another study, of the town of Edremit in Western Turkey, women achieved independence through the separation of male-female work roles and spheres of activity. According to Fallers,

> "... in Edremit women have an institutional structure and a sense of solidarity of their own, parallel to those of men, which gives them a substantial field for self assertion and a psychological independence of men - an independence underscored by the performance of those women who break into the public sphere". (1976:260)

But even this degree of independence and separation was greater than that which I could observe on Cyprus - and, besides, quite irrelevant to an understanding of the position of Turkish women in London.

Women in London

In settling in Britain, Turkish Cypriots have made a number of ecological adaptations which have affected their economic pursuits, social and ritual practices, leisure time activities and so on. These adaptations, or more precisely the form they have come to take, represent the outcome of decisions initially made by individuals, but which over time have become normal practice for the majority. For example, Turkish Cypriots have successfully adapted to the economic situation here, and they manipulate it to their advantage. Most families now have a higher standard of living than that which they would have achieved had they remained in their villages in Cyprus. Yet this economic adaptation has itself had repercussions which have been felt outside the economic sphere. For example, I would argue that economic success could not have been achieved to the extent that it has, had not a positive value been placed on womens' wage earning. Consequently, the importance of earning money gradually took priority over traditional Cypriot attitudes, which defined the woman's place as in the home.

This, of course, is not to suggest that women in Cyprus do not work outside the home. It has already been mentioned that village women work in the fields, while in the towns some are employed in small workshops as machinists and dressmakers. Until recently, however, such work has not entailed working for an independent outside body, since it has tended to be in small family firms employing female relatives and acquaintances. The exceptions here are those women, drawn from the small urban educated minority, who work in the towns as teachers or secretaries.

But in London, as we have seen, all women are expected to work unless they are old or have young children to look after. Such is the pressure on young women to work (machining is still seen by many as the 'safest' and potentially the most profitable occupation) that one young woman of my acquaintance actually went back to Cyprus after many months of quarrelling with her mother-in-law about whether she should work or not.

> After five years of machining, the woman (the wife of household D1) wanted a rest and a chance to see more of her two young children. Her mother-in-law (the wife of household A1) argued that, since she herself was looking after the children, it was her daughter-in-law's duty as a wife and mother to work and secure a better standard of living for her family. The girl had no support from her affines, but her husband was sympathetic and the couple left for Cyprus one day unexpectedly. This, incidentally, is one of the cases of virilocal residence spoken of in Chapter III (p.96). When the couple married they lived with the boy's family as an economy measure - the girl's parents and all her siblings being in Cyprus at that time. The quarrel which precipitated their moving back to Cyprus lent credence to the view that, quite apart from uxorilocality being preferable from the bride's family's point of view, a girl and her mother-in-law never get on well together for long.

A complete breakdown in relations followed; four years have passed and relationships are still strained. The family in England dismiss their son and his wife as 'lazy' - a label commonly applied by London Turks to their relatives in Cyprus. It is more to the point that the acquisition of material goods has assumed such importance for those Turks living here that voluntarily to forfeit the opportunity of earning the money necessary to acquire them is seen as both unnatural and, to some extent, morally reprehensible.

The fact that Turkish Cypriot women in London now work, and that their working - or rather, their ability to earn money - is highly

valued, has meant that their structural role in the household has radically altered. For what reasons, and in exactly what way, will be explained presently. The question I want to ask in this chapter is whether this change in role reflects a basic change in attitudes towards women. Has the fact that women now jointly control household economics, and can exert influence - if not actual control - in the way money is spent and/or invested, affected their status? Are traditional attitudes to them changing, now that they have moved into the 'public' sphere? Have women themselves capitalised on their new-found economic power? Thus, the basic question becomes: How has a woman's changing role in this country affected her status? What, in fact, is the relationship between roles and status? Do changes in the one necessarily entail changes in the other?

In attempting to answer these questions, we should also ideally consider how far differences in attitudes and activities reflect differences in economic and social strata, or in age, or time of migration to Britain. The difficulty here is that there is no simple class or generation difference among Turkish Cypriots in London - a continuum obviously exists in both cases. Participant observation within the homes I visited made me aware that, although generalisations about the role and status of women in London would on the whole be justified, some differences in attitude existed between families such as those in groups A and C, on the one hand, and those in group B on the other. Where these differences were particularly noticeable, they will be mentioned. As far as age is concerned, I will be talking principally of the adult Turkish population, those who had already completed their education before migrating to Britain. Some tentative remarks will be made in the final paragraphs about those who have been born, or at least brought up, here and who are now married, independent of their parents, and having to make their own decisions. The extent to which their attitudes continue to mirror those of their parents, as regards the role and status of women, will be discussed.

This chapter concerns women, and only by implication their menfolk. In respect of women and the family, there are few notable differences in men's roles between London and Cyprus. In both countries the man is the principal wage-earner, and his good name and reputation depend largely on his ability to provide for his family financially.

The nuclear family household is the predominant type of residential unit in Britain and the husband/father, as the head of this unit, is also its moral representative. He is responsible for its good name, for both its namus (honour through sexual chastity) and its şeref (honour through action). I think it is vital to understand the meaning and significance of these concepts if one is to reach an understanding of attitudes to, and beliefs about, Turkish women; an attempt will be made to explain them presently. For now it is enough to state that it is the father, brothers and husband of a woman who are ultimately affected by any sexually indiscreet act she might commit, and this is as true in London as it is in Cyprus.

But if the role of Turkish men has changed little in this country, their womenfolk have taken on many additional tasks while not relinquishing those traditionally assigned to them. They have retained their role as mothers and housekeepers, but in many cases their working for a wage is considered an equally important activity. In fact, the two roles, domestic and productive, are connected in terms of the status which accrues to those who are 'good' at both. As stated above, to be a good mother is to be a wage earner, for only if the family income is boosted by her pay can they hope to attain those material comforts seen to be essential to the good life. In fact, the connection between being a good mother and a working one is, in practical terms, a tenuous one. Although women are inclined to machine at home if they have preschool age children, the work-load of a young mother who does all the shopping, cooking and cleaning in the house, while bringing up a family and working more or less full-time, is considerable. Men, both husbands and sons, do not generally help in the house or with the children, and invariably expect a meal to be ready when they return home - whether their wives are working or not. But even those who machine at home and who can, in theory, work what hours they want to, are often compelled to work long hours simply to satisfy an employer with whom they have a long-standing association. Because of their two roles, the women I visited were able to spend little time just being with their children; indeed, they would encourage them to help and depend on each other and to amuse themselves.

Of course, not all Turkish Cypriot women in Britain work, and those who do not tend to fall into two categories. There are those

whose financial situation is such that it is quite unnecessary for the wife to work in order to pay the bills. If she also lacks the necessary skills to get a job considered suitable, given the family's social position, she - or at least her husband - would normally prefer her not to work at all. However, even for the husband of household B3, who was not only the owner of a relatively large factory but had recently moved into a large house in Hertfordshire, it would not have been thought unusual or shameful for his wife to work, had she been able to find an appropriate job. She could not possibly have worked as a machinist, as this would have been considered too menial a form of employment for the wife of a factory owner. Family approval would have been forthcoming, however, had she become a secretary or teacher. In fact, she preferred not to work at all, and there was no pressure on her to do so. Her husband's sister (household B2) experienced great opposition from her family when she announced, after the birth of her first child, that she wanted to work again and was considering home machining. (She had previously worked as a secretary in a Greek accountancy firm.) Her husband, a cutter in his sister's factory (household B7), would not hear of it; nor would the rest of her family. Machining was considered beneath her and, since she had no relatives living close by who could look after the baby while she found a suitable 'outside' job, her plans to work came to nothing.

Apart from these women, whose husbands' financial circumstances were such that their working was either unnecessary or, for some social reason, not approved of, there are those whose domestic responsibilities make wage-earning impossible. The wife of household A1 did not work during the fieldwork period and had not done so for many years. At 55, she was the oldest woman of the neighbourhood group, and nine of her ten children lived in Britain. At the beginning of the fieldwork period, eight of the children lived with her, the eldest daughter being the wife of household A2. Before fieldwork began, however, households 1 and 2 had formed an extended family household along with the tenth son and his wife and children - who, as mentioned above (p. 124), had subsequently moved back to Cyprus. At one time, then, the household had comprised an extended family of three married couples and unmarried children, 20 members in all. During this extended family period, the wife of household 1 had acted as the overall housekeeper, delegating responsibilities for cooking and cleaning where possible, but shopping for the household

herself, and effectively bringing up both her own children and her five grandchildren while their parents worked. Although the eldest daughter's family is now a separate household in the same street, the interdependence of mother and daughter households is marked. Though financially independent of each other, in every other respect they act as if they were one extended household - their children eating in whichever house they happen to be at mealtimes. The wife of household 1 remains the overall co-ordinator for the two families, and does not have time to work for a wage. But she exerts considerable pressure on others to do so, particularly her daughters, all of whom (albeit reluctantly) began working as machinists as soon as they left school. The pressure is for financial and, ultimately, for social reasons. The household bills and the savings necessary for forthcoming marriages - the scale and elaborateness of which provide a status guide for other families - mean that every penny is counted.

Turkish Cypriot women in London, then, have two consecutive roles - as housekeepers/mothers/wives and as wage earners. Even in their capacity as housekeepers, however, they have taken on tasks which, in Cyprus, are performed by men. Traditionally, women do not shop in Cyprus except at the local bakkal on their street. All the major items, of which meat is the most important, are bought by men in the market place, though in the towns at least this is gradually changing. In Britain, however, women do all the shopping, either at a supermarket or, more usually, at the nearest Turkish- or Greek-owned store.

Most of the women I knew were also responsible for paying all the household bills and for budgeting for them; this included the mortgage if there was one. Husbands would give their wives most of their wages each week, keeping the rest themselves for pocket money. When, for example, in household A2 the husband's weekly take-home pay was £45, he would give his wife £38 on average - although there was a ritualistic argument every Friday, since the latter said she could not possibly bring up her four children on this amount, supplemented though it was by her own earnings. Working sons and daughters give their parents a contribution to the housekeeping, spending the rest themselves on clothes (the girls) and their cars or other entertainments (the boys). If a wedding is imminent, the money usually spent on such items is saved. The head of the family, then, provides a steady income;

so too do any dependent sons and daughters, whose contribution is constant, whatever its amount. Food, clothing and major household bills (electicity, gas, telephone, rates and rent or mortgage) have to be paid for out of this communal household fund, which of course includes the wife's own earnings. However, it is invariably the wife who decides how the extra should be spent; indeed, if she is a home machinist, it is also she who determines how much 'extra' cash there will be, since she can vary her workload, at least in theory, according to the exigencies of the moment. Thus, the wife of household A2 worked long hours in weeks when a quarterly bill had to be paid or a deposit put down on a new hire purchase, and shorter hours in other weeks. Consequently, her pay over the year varied; she earned between £20-£35 most weeks, though her lowest take-home pay was £12 and her highest £90.

The households in group B managed their finances more efficiently than this. There was much more of a premium put on saving, and incomes were such that this was possible. All of this group, apart from the youngest brother (household B6), were buying their own houses. Apart from household B1, where the wife earned more than her husband, the husband's income alone was sufficient to cover household expenditure.

Insofar as Turkish Cypriot women are wage-earners, contributing to, and in many cases controlling, the household budget, they participate in the male public world in a very real sense. They work and shop outside the home and both of these activities are not only approved of by the community in general (I use this term to mean other Turkish Cypriots in London), but it is expected that women should do them. Let us now return to the question raised at the beginning of the chapter: How has this participation in formerly male pursuits and activities affected the status of women and attitudes about them? Are the women conscious of what Western feminists would see as the potentiality of their wage-earning role? Do Turkish Cypriot men see their women differently now that they work and contribute significantly to household expenditure?

Some anthropological studies of the position of women in society have utilised the nature-culture dichotomy in explaining and clarifying the status of women vis-à-vis that of men. The discussions that these terms have evoked have led to the drawing up of a conceptual framework

in terms of which data collected in different societies can be presented, and the significance of cultural variations considered. The idea that nature is to women as culture is to men is argued by Sherry Ortner. (1974:67-88) Her thesis is concisely summarised by Rosaldo as follows:

> "Insofar as men are defined in terms of their achievement in socially elaborated institutions, they are participants, par excellence, in the man-made systems of human experience. On a moral level, theirs is the world of 'culture'. Women, on the other hand, lead lives that appear to be irrelevant to the formal articulation of social order. Their status is derived from their stage in a life cycle, from their biological functions, and, in particular, from their sexual or biological ties to particular men. What is more, women are more involved than men in the 'grubby' and dangerous stuff of social existence, giving birth and mourning death, feeding, cooking, disposing of faeces, and the like. Accordingly, in cultural systems we find a recurrent opposition: between man, who in the last analysis stands for 'culture', and woman, who (defined through symbols that stress her biological and sexual functions) stands for 'nature', and often for disorder." (Rosaldo 1974:31)

The assumption made in the nature-culture argument is that the participation of men in the world of culture, and their association with it, makes for community recognition vis-à-vis women. This idea has been articulated in various ways by other writers involved with representing and understanding the position or 'problem' of women in society. Some have utilised the same terms but more metaphorically, drawing also a less rigid distinction between the two worlds. Edwin Ardener, for example, does not posit a simple women=nature, men=culture dichotomy involving mutually exclusive categories. Rather, he conceives of male and female models of society which do not fit exactly but overlap. Women cross the 'bounds' of society drawn by men, and overlap into the non-social, the 'wild' or 'nature'. (1975:23) He uses these terms metaphorically, unlike Ortner who talks of women representing or standing for natural things (giving birth, mourning death, and so on). It is this metaphorical usage of the terms nature/culture that enables Ardener to refute (convincingly in my view) the biological determinism of which Mathieu (1973) accuses him. (1975:24ff) In whatever way the superiority of men to women is portrayed or conceptualised by anthropologists, however, (and it is differing ideas about how to express and understand this distinction that are the crux of the disagreements mentioned), women can logically only increase their status by participating in the men's world and by becoming accepted

by them as part of it. In terms of Turkish Cypriot women in London, this means being able to move in the 'public' world, being free to earn money and control its disposal. Given the external trappings of increased status afforded Turkish Cypriot women in Britain - their wage-earning role in particular - I will be asking to what extent they are actually coming to perceive themselves, and to be perceived by men, as their status equals - as participators in the world of 'culture'.

An understanding of the concept namus (sexual honour) is essential if this question is to be answered. An attempt will first be made to translate both this term and şeref (honour through action). Examples of these two concepts 'in action' will then be given and their significance for Cypriot Turks in London today discussed more generally.

Namus

One could say that namus refers to a general moral code, a point made by Meeker in his discussion of namus and şeref amongst the Black Sea Turks and the Levantine Arabs. (1976a) However, the term namus tends to be used much more specifically than this by Cypriot Turks, and refers particularly to the sexual shame - and potential shamelessness - of women.

When a girl or woman is seen to behave in a manner which is considered fitting to her age and sex, she is said to be namuslu - with shame or sexual chastity. So namus refers to the state of a person, usually a woman - though the term is sometimes applied to men and can be used to describe the state of larger collectivities also. Its use implies a common standard, an implicit agreement by the members of a community that certain actions are morally reprehensible and indicate that a person is namussuz (literally, without namus), while other actions are morally commendable and indicate that the doer is namuslu. Turks use other terms to describe specific aspects of namus, but less frequently: thus, irz (used to refer to virginity when taken by rape), edep (good mannered; the cultured way to behave), iffet (chastity, honesty), saf (innocent, naive-hearted), temiz (clean). When attempting to articulate their understanding of the term namus to me, however, they usually had recourse to examples. These varied

according to whether the speaker was a young London Turk, an elderly Cypriot villager, someone from Istanbul, and so on. There was a consensus of opinion on one fact: a Turkish girl anywhere who was found to have lost her virginity before marriage would be called namussuz. This was the example par excellence of how a girl could lose shame. It was also generally implied that a Turkish girl, whether married or not, would come to be described as namuslu (with shame) if, over time, she was seen to avoid those situations and activities which would earn her the reputation of being namussuz. Thus, in London, a Turkish Cypriot girl is namuslu if she is never found talking to unrelated boys on the street; if, apart from family outings, she does not spend time out of the house at weekends and in the evenings; if her friends are known to be namuslu; if she is seen to behave modestly at all public gatherings; and so on.

Several things may be noted in the light of the above. First, namus is relative to time, place and class. One could hypothesise that in the future even the loss of virginity before marriage will not be viewed as shameless for a small, educated group. The existence of the concept merely indicates the existence of a community standard, but it does not define it. Note, moreover, that 'community' does not necessarily refer to a geographically defined entity, though it may. In the cities in Turkey, Istanbul and Ankara for example, there are differences of opinion between young and old as to what constitutes the namussuz act. What is namussuz for the older generation is, quite obviously, no longer necessarily so for young college and university students. In the villages, of course, where there is less familiarity with western systems of morality, and where it is impossible for one section of the population to experiment with different standards anyway, a common static standard might still be expected to apply.

Secondly, namus has nothing to do with the moral conscience of the individual; rather it implies the public observance of action and its consequent evaluation in terms of the community standard referred to above. Loss of virginity prior to marriage is not in itself wrong or günah (sin), and it leads to the loss of namus if, and only if, it becomes known. So the namus label is applied only when an indiscreet act is known, or is believed, to have occurred, or when a woman is seen to act in a way that suggests that something could have

happened. For example, one woman of my acquaintance in Cyprus had a grocery store where she took it in turns with her husband to serve. She was in the habit of talking to the soldiers who went there to buy beer, and it was said that she occasionally had a drink with them. After a time, rumours began to circulate among her neighbours that she was a prostitute, and the other women, disinclined to associate with one who was namussuz, began to withdraw their patronage. Whether she did actually entertain the soldiers in this way became quite irrelevant; what was important was that she had allowed speculation about her namus to build up. Thus, namus relates not necessarily to what _is_ but to what is seen or thought to be. It is honour in the sense of name or reputation.

Thirdly, although namus is usually used to describe a woman's moral state, all my informants agreed that men could be namuslu or namussuz, just as women could be _şerefli_ or _şerefsiz_ - labels usually reserved for men. But namus is rarely used in relation to men and, when it is, it refers either to their moral uprightness generally or to their honour as it resides in their wives and unmarried daughters; it never refers to their own sexual conduct. A man is namussuz if he steals or is dishonest in his business dealings. If he abandons his wife and children and goes off with the wife of his best friend he is also namussuz, but not because he has had an extramarital affair. What is important is that he has acted in a way which ill befits his age, his status and his responsibilities, by leaving his wife and children and by putting his friend into an impossibly compromising situation, where to vindicate his own honour he must take action against his wife and himself. It is the immorality of his action which makes him namussuz, not his sexually indiscreet act.

A man is also namussuz if the chastity of his wife or unmarried daughters is questioned by others, and if he does not respond accordingly. Here namus is used to imply moral strength or, in this case, weakness. Thus, the husband of the woman who was thought to be giving the soldiers a good time was also called namussuz, but for a quite different reason: he failed to do anything which could be interpreted by the neighbours as a serious attempt to reprimand his wife and to ensure that there could be no justification for further rumours. Although his wife mysteriously disappeared for a short time

and some said he had sent her back to her mother, her absence meant that her daughters had to help in the shop. Far from being praised for taking appropriate action against his wife, therefore, he was found guilty of exposing his daughters to the very moral dangers to which his wife had, it was believed, succumbed. The opinion of the neighbours was expressed thus: "Well, what can you expect from women if their men cannot control them?" He too was namussuz in the sense of being morally spineless and as weak as a woman.

So a man can be both namuslu and namussuz but in a different sense from a woman, as a man's sexual conduct has little relevance for others. It is his own responsibility; no-one controls it, and his sexual behaviour reflects on his family only if his action also contravenes a general code of morality and honesty. As one Turkish Cypriot girl remarked, when asked whether men could be namussuz in the same way as women, "All men are namussuz". In fact, it was an irrelevant question for her because a man's sexual behaviour does not directly implicate his family; rather, he is responsible for the sexuality of his womenfolk.

Finally, it is clear from the above examples that, while namus can be lost through one indiscreet act, to earn the reputation of being namuslu a woman must be seen to be in the habit of avoiding potentially dangerous situations which would put her namus at risk. It is a case of continually avoiding doing what is wrong rather than positively doing what is right. But I would not entirely agree with Meeker (1976a:260) when he states that all that has to be said about namus is whether a person has it or not. I would at least maintain that in practice the namus label is not applied as categorically as this. Meeker's argument implies that all women are divided into two camps: the fallen and the not-yet-fallen (since even the most namuslu woman is potentially capable of losing her namus through one rash indiscretion). There is a once and for all assumption about Meeker's understanding of namus, and one is reminded of the proverb told Antoun in the Lebanese village of Kufr al-ma:

> "The woman is born clean (thus the least spot soils her).
> She is like the mirror. The slightest breath clouds it.
> She is like glass; once it is broken it cannot be repaired."
> (1968:679)

This is applicable to Cypriot Turks, as I suspect it is to Antoun's Arab villagers, on the level of ideology. Such sayings tend to state norms rather than reflect actual practice. Certainly in the case of Cypriot Turks, the dichotomy between the fallen and the not-yet-fallen woman, which is made explicit in the above quotation, is also present in the hypothetical examples given to me by informants when attempting to elucidate the meaning of namus. When commenting on the everyday actions of known individuals, however, behaviour is evaluated in terms of the stereotype which already exists about the person in question. A girl with a previously unblemished reputation who did something described as namussuz, is not immediately branded a namussuz girl. A bad reputation takes time to acquire, as does a good one. It is only on an ideological level that act and individual are not separated; in theory, only a namussuz girl commits namussuz acts.

In everyday life, then, namus is not a once and for all statement on a woman's sexual chastity. Indeed, there are often differences of opinion about the namus of others. This is not unrelated to the fact that, in any disagreement between, say, two neighbouring families, namus often enters the argument as a factor justifying the breakdown of relations between them. Indeed, rivalries and disagreements between women invariably invoke namus accusations, whatever the original reason for the dispute. Not that the namussuz label is necessarily accepted by other neighbours on such occasions, though it sometimes is if the rumours can be substantiated, and if others already have their suspicions about the woman in question.

The final point, then, is that one must be aware that, although namus implies a common standard against which the relative shame of women within a community might be measured, the fact that it can also be used for slander, makes it an excellent weapon in disputes. To accuse a woman of being namussuz, and to have this accepted by others, is the most effective way of damaging the reputation and standing, not just of the woman concerned, but of her whole family. Since the consequences of becoming known as namussuz can be extremely serious, the threat of becoming so labelled acts as a powerful sanction against bad behaviour. And despite the fact that accusations regarding the namus of others can rarely be substantiated, and are no more than rumours

spread with the intention of denigrating the opposition, still they exemplify the sort of behaviour to which the namuslu and namussuz labels are applied. The 'community standard' as it relates to women in any two places can then be compared. Before going on to describe what sort of behaviour is evaluated in namus terms by Turkish Cypriots in London today, however, an attempt will be made to translate the related concept of şeref.

Şeref

Namus, as I have said, implies the acceptance by a community of a standard against which the behaviour of individuals can be measured and either approved or condemned. Şeref, however, implies an awareness of 'greatness' and 'nobility' in a national and an Islamic sense; an awareness of history, of great men and great events. An action which is described as şerefli (honourable) is acknowledged as being significant in the same way as the heroic exploits of a great leader in war, or the victory of an army, were significant in the past. This relationship between ordinary men and national or religious seref is well articulated by Meeker, who renders the concept 'sharaf' thus:

> "When a villager undertakes military service, when he finds himself called to serve in a war or some border incident, when he goes on the hadj, or even when he prays in a mosque, his own acts and person acquire an aspect of sharaf more modest than the sharaf of a celebrated army general, a popular prime minister, or a learned mufti, but sharaf none the less. In the background of the ordinary villager's sharaf, one can again perceive a recognition of a historical community. For the villager performs his military obligations as a Turk, and he performs his religious duties as a Muslim. Indeed for most Turkish villagers the examples of military service and religious duties are almost indistinguishable in their significance, just as the two historical communities, the Turkish nation (ulus) and the Muslim community (millet) of Turkey, are almost indistinguishable for him." (1976a:245)

Unlike namus, şeref involves positive and significant action; like namus, it must be publically recognised. Not surprisingly, it is a term which is rarely used to describe the exploits of women. Women do not act significantly in the sense referred to above; theirs is not the public world of action and, as I will demonstrate presently, positive action by women in this public world does not necessarily make them şerefli - especially if this achievement necessitates

contravening or flouting the rules governing the attainment of namus. Rather it is the men, the trustees and inheritors of the National and Islamic past, who are potentially capable of becoming şerefli through their honourable acts. Meeker goes on to describe clan şeref and in so doing clarifies the meaning of the concept. "The sharaf of a clan" he states, "is a totality of significance derived from acts accomplished by its ascendents." (1976a:246) He cites as examples both pious and courageous acts which would become part of clan şeref (that is, clan honour in the sense of reputation), were they known to have been performed. Being known for heroism in local wars, for performing the hadj, for building mosques - all such actions would have come to stand for a kind of uniqueness representing the clan. Those actions of men nowadays which relate to, and themselves epitomise, the honour and reputation of the clan, which substantiate and thus reinforce the legitimacy of its şeref, are themselves honourable (şerefli) actions.

What I would like to be able to explain here is why the word şeref is rarely used by Turkish Cypriots in London. When asked to give examples of actions which, were they to be performed, would earn the reputation of being şerefli, informants had to resort to hypothetical examples. They did not relate to themselves in everday practical terms but to situations where great courage was demanded or great piety shown. Thus, heroism in wartime and almsgiving on a substantial scale were common themes. The principle common to all was that the honourable action involved putting allegiance to country, clan, village or family before self. If women ever spoke of the şerefli adam (honourable man) it was usually in the sense of an ideal type, a man who was sincere, morally upright, trustworthy and respected by others. Conversely, the şerefsiz adam was one who put his own interests before those of the greater whole, be it country or family. Thus it implied both selfishness and cowardice, though again individuals were never singled out as examples. In contrast, very many specific examples could be given of women who were namuslu or namussuz. An imaginary or historical universe had to be created to exemplify the meaning of şeref, whereas to explain what it was to be namuslu and namussuz, the informant only had to point to the behaviour of Turkish women in the neighbourhood, where examples were readily found.

Pitt-Rivers attempts to explain why namus-like honour is emphasised in some contexts and şeref-like honour in others. (1964) He argues that people who have power assert their precedence and thereby claim honour (şeref or its equivalent). They are able to flout the norms of virtue (namus or its equivalent) simply because there is no-one to take them to task for it. Virtue, he states, is the honour of those with no power; they express their egalitarianism in the idiom of sexual morality. With this there is no need for the unique and dynamic act which is the mark of şeref-like honour. "The concept of honour presents itself in a different contextual framework to the individual according to his place in the social structure and the differing value attached to it can be explained by this." (1964:61) But, as Meeker points out, şeref does not imply power, nor is it reducible to it. My own view is that şeref-like honour presupposes the existence of a community - be it a nation, state, religious sect, clan, or whatever - which embodies the self-identity of the individual and in terms of which his actions assume significance. What relevance does this have to Turkish Cypriots in London?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Turkish Cypriots do not form corporate groups of any kind in Cyprus or London, and the agnatic principle, insofar as it exists, is weakly articulated. In London, marriage is seen as being potentially unstable, hence the tendency for daughters to reside with, or at least near, their own parents on marriage. With the Turkish Cypriot population so dispersed in London, there is no 'community' sanction to ensure that a girl is financially provided for and morally protected by her husband, such as would be the case in a Cypriot village. Thus in London, the Turkish Cypriot man does not owe allegiance either to clan or village, for neither exists for him here. Neither does he act purely as a Turk in his everyday life. His Turkishness is not always relevant to his actions and his behaviour is not necessarily evaluated in terms of traditional şeref-like honour. Here he has no country to fight for, he does not do military service, nor does any great sense of religious affiliation make his Islamic past of especial relevance. Most Turkish Cypriots in London never visit a mosque, let alone make the hadj; nor is almsgiving to the poor as significant here as it is in Turkey. Such an act of piety would not have the same relevance in London, given the

lack of an Islamic 'community'. Thus I would suggest that it is not because Turkish Cypriots in Britain are 'powerless' that şeref is less relevant here than elsewhere, but because the individual here does not feel himself to be part of an historical and religious tradition in terms of which şeref-like actions are significant and meaningful.

Namus-like honour, on the other hand, is of greater relevance in London and is more frequently applied, even to men. Perhaps this is because the successful exploitation of ethnic ties in the business sphere, and the very numerous opportunities which exist for double-dealing here - given that trust is the basis for many transactions - means that a reputation for honesty is not only valuable for the individual himself but significant for others who are, or who come to be, associated with him economically. I would suggest that an individual's 'virtue' is more relevant where he is on his own, and his reputation is derived from public assessment of his behaviour over time, than in a situation where his behaviour is evaluated in the context of the şeref of his clan or his country.

But to return to the main theme: the importance of namus in London today, and the fact that the concept is very frequently used in its positive or negative form to describe the moral state of a woman. We need to be aware of how namus as an idea is relevant to action and how attitudes about women find their everyday practical expression in the methods used to 'control' them.

The Significance of Namus for Turkish Cypriots in London Today

To the observer it might seem initially that there are relatively few restrictions placed on Turkish Cypriot women in London today. They are indistinguishable from other Londoners in their dress, and those Turks one does meet wearing some form of head covering or şalvar have, in my experience, invariably come from mainland Turkey, not Cyprus. Women work and shop outside the home, and the young people attend English schools to which they travel each day unaccompanied. Women do not, as previously mentioned, go out by themselves, except to work, shop or visit neighbours in the vicinity, but two or three women from the same or neighbouring households may make joint

expeditions to the cinema (Turkish or English), to visit relations in another area, or simply to go and have a meal in a restaurant or Wimpy Bar. (The latter have many male Turkish staff, and partly because of this they are favorite eating places.) Within the house, there is no sexual segregation and, as in Cyprus, men do not separate themselves from the women in a room when talking or eating. I found no noticeable difference in the treatment of sons and daughters within the home, at least until puberty, at which time domestic jobs and responsibilities did indeed begin to be allocated to the girls rather than to the boys. But the point is that, because Turkish women in Britain are not hidden behind a veil or closed doors, it is not immediately apparent that namus is a significant concept, as it is not physically obvious. To explain the importance of namus in Britain, then, one must first point to those times and occasions when it obviously does act as the principle in terms of which people think and organise their activities.

Perhaps the time when a girl's namus is most obviously at stake is immediately prior to marriage. For a woman, virginity is important because it is the ultimate vindication of her family's honour; it validates the success of their control over her. Conversely, the loss of virginity before marriage implicates her family as it suggests their failure to control, and the implications of this are far reaching. What sort of family is it where a father cannot control his daughters? If one daughter is considered to have disgraced herself, the marriage of her sisters is jeopardised and the reputation of the whole family is called into question. Brothers are also implicated because of the responsibility they are held to have for their sisters. Thus, a girl's virginity at marriage is of paramount importance, for the honour of her whole family is at stake. If she is known to have lost her virginity, even if this is the result of her having been married once already, the chances of her marrying (again, or at all) are much reduced. It is not surprising, then, that her freedom is curtailed from puberty onwards, that young girls are sometimes asked to have virginity checks by their future in-laws and that, in exceptional cases, a repair operation can be performed, so restoring a girl's virginity before her wedding night. As the two latter occurences are relatively rare, I will not consider them at length here, but will mention them briefly later.

The fact that women themselves are made acutely aware of their sexuality, and of the need to behave modestly from puberty onwards, is of much greater importance given its generality. An attempt will therefore be made to describe the controls on women which seek to ensure their chastity. The ways in which namus can most easily be lost, and the social consequences of this loss, will also be discussed. It should become evident why a namuslu reputation is so important for Turkish Cypriot women in Britain and for their families.

Although Turkish Cypriot women here are not set apart from men in any physical sense, free conversation and socialising between the sexes is confined to, and only allowed in, certain 'environments'. Within the house, men and women of all ages, whether they are kin or neighbours, converse freely, and this was also the case in the Cypriot-run factories I visited. At weddings and engagement parties a great deal of flirtation goes on between men and women and, although such behaviour would be quite inappropriate in any other situation, it is usually excused on these occasions. Future marriages, it is recognised, have to have their roots somewhere. As for schools, older parents of my acquaintance sometimes expressed a preference for sending their daughters to an all-girls school because there, it was hoped, they "wouldn't teach them sex things". However, in the two cases which most immediately come to mind (the daughters of households A1 and C1) the parents were overruled in the end by their daughters, who insisted they would be unhappy if separated from their friends.

What all these 'environments' have in common is an element of supervision. In the home and at work an unmarried girl is almost always in the presence of close kin or affines - members of the nuclear family, parents' siblings or siblings' spouses. Weddings, of course, are kin gatherings par excellence. Parents might bemoan the laxity of discipline in English schools, but as long as their daughters do not delay their return home after school in the evenings, they are not inclined to worry. But anywhere betwixt and between these safe, supervised areas, there is cause for concern, and unwritten rules come into play. Rules, however implicit, are only effective if they can be enforced. Because behaviour has to become known before it becomes socially significant - in the sense of being namuslu or otherwise - the

most effective sanction is the very real possibility of being found out. Once an act has been discovered, an extraordinarily effective communication system comes into operation, and public evaluation of the 'crime' gets passed from neighbour to kin to friend with news of the act itself. At least this is the case in Cyprus.

In London, the effectiveness of this communication system varies according to the density of Turkish settlement in an area, and the extent to which people are in daily contact with one another. Thus, the localised neighbourhood group (A) were more able to impose a rigid code of morality on their womenfolk simply because any indiscretion on the part of one of them was likely to be seen by a neighbour, and broadcast. The 17 year old daughter of household A1 was always complaining about her Turkish Cypriot neighbours, even though she was on good terms with them, because she knew that anything she did would 'get back' to her parents. One day while shopping, she stopped to talk to an English boy who was in her class at school. She was reprimanded later in the day by her father for doing so. The conversation had been witnessed by the wife of household 4, who had then mentioned it to the girl's mother - not, she maintained, out of spite, but out of concern for the reputation of the girl herself. Similarly, the wife of household A2, who was an attractive 27 year old and who was known to be unhappy with her husband, would not open the door to unrelated men when she was alone in the house. This was both because of the reprimand she knew she would receive from her mother who lived further down the street - in the form of "What are other people going to think?" - and the inevitable gossip about her by those who were thinking. The unrelated households on the street (A3 and 4) always posed a threat of this sort. However, because relations between women in this group were normally good, and because they depended on each other for company and help in their everyday pursuits, namus was a topic reserved for times of disagreement between the families. Observations of indiscreet behaviour were stored up for such occasions. In one such episode, they were so effectively employed that relations between households 1/2 and 4 were seriously breached; indeed, at the time of writing (two years later), they have not been fully restored. As this argument centred around the namus of a girl about to be married, it is relevant here and is therefore worth describing in full.

When the parents of household A1 began to consider the possible choices of marriage partner for the eldest son, Ahmet, aged 20, they thought first of Sonay, who was 18 and the eldest daughter of household 4. At that time members of the two households were unrelated but close friends; the men would spend time together at the weekends, the two younger daughters of each family were always together and their mothers spent a lot of time visiting each other during the day. Despite this familiarity, a meeting was arranged to discuss the possibility of marriage, and Ahmet and his parents duly visited Sonay and her family one evening in the capacity of dünürcü. This meeting was in fact only a formality as the couple had previously informed their respective parents that they wanted to be married, though it is worth noting that they had only ever spoken at family gatherings and when Ahmet visited Sonay's house to see her brother. The engagement party was set for three weeks hence and duly took place; about 150 guests were invited. At this point there was no indication that the marriage would never in fact take place.

Within five months, however, not only had the match been called off, but the two families were no longer even on speaking terms, and Sonay's chances of finding a husband in the future were much reduced. Ahmet's family, recalling the event at a later date, put the blame on Sonay and her family, saying that they could not allow him to marry a girl who was so namussuz. The following factors inevitably contributed to the breakdown in relations between the two families, though it is clear that few of them relate to Sonay's behaviour.

First, the wife of household 2, who was Ahmet's married sister, did not like his proposed bride and opposed the match from the beginning. She said that she wore too much make-up and that she smoked - the implication being that, if she did these things, what else might she be in the habit of doing? So Sonay's sister-in-law to be, her potential görümce,[1] was opposed to her and raised the subject of her namus to justify her opposition. The fact that she was overruled by her parents and by Ahmet's own initial enthusiasm for the match made her resentful, as she was used to having some considerable influence in family affairs.

Secondly, in terms of the expectations of Ahmet's family, Sonay's parents did not live up to either their financial or their social obligations at the engagement party. In London nowadays, it is usual to come to an agreement about how best to split the cost of the wedding expenses; but Sonay's family had not even offered to share the cost of the party, and the brunt of the expenses consequently fell on Ahmet's family. Nor, it was felt, did Sonay's mother make an effort at the

[1] Görümces (HZ) are thought to be interfering by nature and have a similar status, in popular thought, to the mother-in-law. As a Turkish woman might say to a friend who is always asking her advice: "Görümcelik yapmayim sana?" (Do you want me to be a sister-in-law to you? Do you want me to be always interfering?)

party to welcome anyone but her own friends and kin. These things were less important at the time than they were later.

Thirdly, after four months of getting to know Sonay, mostly in the company of kin, Ahmet himself decided that he simply did not like her enough to marry her, and he told his family this. By this time, however, his father had booked a hall for the wedding feast (düğün) and, feeling that he had already invested time and money in his son's marriage, refused to let him break it off. The rest of Ahmet's family, apart from his elder sister, sympathised with Sonay when they heard about his intentions; Sonay, they felt, had simply not done anything to deserve being deserted at this stage. Without his father's approval, it was impossible for Ahmet to send his ring back. (Sending back the rings formally exchanged at an engagement is a public declaration that the relationship is terminated.)

At this point however, Sonay, much piqued by Ahmet's behaviour, did two things which made it possible for his family to condemn her and abandon their commitments on the basis of suspecting her reputation. First of all, she boasted to Ahmet's younger sister that she did not mind if Ahmet did break off their engagement because she could find another boy within a week. Her second mistake, according to Ahmet's family, was that she "went to see an old boyfriend". In fact, she met, probably quite by chance, a boy who had previously come to see her as a suitor, at a neighbour's house. The facts were irrelevant; the question of her namus had been raised and quite soon it was being suggested that she had had previous boyfriends and that her make-up was evidence of her desire to attract men. In any case, her family were 'tight' with their money, and this boded ill for future relations with them. Sonay's family retaliated in the same fashion as best they could. The relationship between the two households, already severely strained, was abruptly terminated when Sonay sent her ring back to Ahmet, thus taking the initiative and formally ending the relationship herself.

Their pride upset, Ahmet's family immediately set about finding him another wife, and within two months they succeeded and he was again engaged. This girl, they let it be known, was "much better than Sonay"; she was temiz (clean), and her family moreover were generous and could be trusted. Comparisons were drawn for weeks, all unfavourable to Sonay. Each new insult was relayed to Sonay's family via household 3 and returned. It is difficult to convey the seriousness of this disagreement - the exaggerated stories exchanged and created, the number of others, both kin and neighbouring families outside this tightly nucleated group, brought into the argument. Quarrels between other families ensued as a result of their taking different stands, and the namus of other women, having nothing whatsoever to do with the original quarrel, was held up for public scrutiny. Over many months, these secondary arguments died down and peaceful relations were again restored, though Sonay's and Ahmet's families have not started visiting each other again. There are signs that relations will be restored, however, as words are now exchanged on the street

between the women, and household 3 is continuing to act in a sort of middleman capacity.

This story demonstrates why a girl's reputation for being namuslu is so important: the consequences of her being seen as otherwise are extremely serious. For, despite her threat, Sonay has not been able to find another husband. This is in fact partly through choice: she has turned down a number of suitors simply because she did not find them at all attractive. It is important from the point of view of her family's own sense of self-respect that she makes a better marriage than she would have done had she married Ahmet. 'Better' can be defined in a number of ways here, but of particular importance to Sonay is the fact that Ahmet was very good looking. Physical appearance is important in Turkish matches, especially in Britain where little may be known about a potential spouse, unless he or she is a near neighbour or distant kin. Consequently, both boy and girl let the other's appearance influence them a great deal. Partly for this reason - that is, the scarcity of good looking suitors - Sonay had not been able to find a suitable husband.

But there is also the fact in this case that Sonay had been engaged, and potential suitors are naturally suspicious. Indeed, in theory at least, there is simply no need for a good looking young man who is a Turkish Cypriot, a British citizen, and who has a job with reasonable prospects, to marry a girl who has been engaged before. Sonay is now one point down in the marriageability stakes. This has less to do with the fact that insinuations were made about her namus at the time of her last engagement, than that she had been engaged before and could have lost her virginity during this time. Indeed, it is possible that, when a match is finally agreed on, her in-laws will suggest that she be medically examined before the wedding so that her virginity be not in doubt.

The importance of virginity for Turkish Cypriots on marriage can be further attested by the consequences of an absence of blood on the wedding night. Everyone I asked believed that loss of virginity, in the sense of having intercourse for the first time, was accompanied by a loss of blood. This, of course, is medically incorrect, as the hymen can always be broken beforehand by some other

means, or may be virtually absent. However, one of the two Turkish Cypriot doctors practising in the Haringey area of north London said that he was not infrequently telephoned on Sunday mornings by new and worried husbands, demanding that he come and examine their wives. Fortunately, he said, such anxieties were almost always unfounded, and after an examination he was able to confirm that the woman concerned had no previous sexual experience. This often saved the marriage. The traditional way of dealing with a wife who was found not to be a virgin on marriage was to divorce her immediately. This was exactly what many young Turkish men told me they would do, were they to be faced with the same situation today. However, I have never heard of an actual occurence of divorce for this reason in Britain, and am inclined to think that in any case almost all Turkish Cypriot girls today are virgins when they marry. As for the tamir operation, which technically repairs the hymen after it has been ruptured by intercourse and thus 'restores' virginity, the doctor I interviewed said that he had been asked to perform it rarely and that he had, in all cases, refused. The operation, if performed, means that there will be some loss of blood on the wedding night, 'proof' that the girl is a virgin. It is apparently more common among the upper classes of Istanbul and Ankara, where western-educated girls return to Turkey, or at least to the dictates of Turkish morality, when they marry. Probably the tamir operation is not done at all among Turkish Cypriots in Britain, so there is no easy way out for a girl who loses her virginity before marriage, a consideration which might further deter her from doing so.

So much for the importance of chastity on marriage and the often tentative relationship between actual behaviour and reputation. The above paragraphs have, I hope, illustrated the sort of social context where namus tends to be especially relevant, as well as exemplifying the sort of behaviour which is inclined to be discussed with reference to it. Most of the examples have been of actions which have earned the actor the reputation of being namussuz rather than namuslu. Given that both labels are subject to the vagaries of public interpretation, this is hardly surprising. Not doing anything worthy of public recrimination is simply not as newsworthy as blatant immodesty.

So far an attempt has been made to demonstrate why the reputation of an unmarried girl is important - because the ultimate test of her own namus, and thus her family's success in exercising control over her, will come when she marries. When a girl marries, speculation about her namus tends to die down; since most young Turkish couples do not wait long before starting a family, a young wife is soon tied to the home looking after a baby. And, as the Turks say, "A woman with a baby is like a mouse with a pumpkin tied to its tail". ("Çocuklu bir kadın kuyruğuna balkabağı baglanmış bir fare gidibir.") Neither can go anywhere quickly or unobtrusively. For a woman, this means that her circumstances are themselves are a control over her, and the possibility of her losing shame is much reduced. At least, this is the case for most women. However, there are those who, through a combination of such factors as personality, social or marital status, or economic position, flout those behavioural norms associated with their age and status.

I want briefly to consider two such examples here because I think both exemplify the idea of the namussuz kadın (the shameless woman) rather than just the namussuz iş (the shameless work or deed). These are women whose very lifestyles are beyond the pale, and whose marital and sexual roles are anomalous because they choose for them to be so. What is interesting is that these women are not outcastes; they are gossiped about by those who know them and by those who do not, but this does not leave them friendless. In fact, in both cases there is an element of awe in the attitudes of others. It is as if, through epitomising namussuz behaviour, they have nothing more to lose; thus they are no longer affected by gossip. This being so, they are in a position of strength, but it is not a strength to which most women aspire. Though jealous of the 'freedom' of these women, to attain it they would have to give up the security of life as it is.

The first of these women is not a member of one of the sample households, but was a friend of the wife of household A2; the second is the wife of household B1.

Emine's husband died when they had been married seven years, leaving her at 24 with a six year old daughter. It was difficult to determine the status of a young widow in

Cyprus or London, but it would seem that Emine had two options when her husband died. Either she could return to her parent's house and live with them as she had before she married, hoping to find another husband as soon as possible; or she could stay in her own home and bring up her daughter by herself. Older women who had already had several children and were not contemplating re-marriage were more likely to do the latter, according to informants. Emine chose the former, though there were some unusual features about the house she returned to. Some years previously, her parents had divorced and both had re-married, her own father moving just out of London when he did so. Emine thus went to her mother's house and to her stepfather, who, much younger than his wife, never attempted to exercise control over her daughter. She could have lived quietly with them, relinquishing even that independence she had acquired while married. However, at the time of fieldwork, when she was 29, she was making no concession to the expected norm. She worked as a hairdresser, which partly accounted for her multicoloured streaked hair. She drove a car and, since she could leave her daughter with her mother, came and went as she pleased. She was well known as an accomplished belly-dancer and would act in this capacity at all weddings where her father was not present. She made no secret of her boyfriends and during the course of my fieldwork went out with an Englishman, a Persian, a Greek and several Turkish men. In the summer she went to a fashionable Turkish coastal resort where, as she put it, "No-one will know me". This was an attempt to escape the gossip which inevitably surrounded her in England. Even her language was considered namussuz, and her dirty joke repertoire was impressive. Nor were her jokes reserved for women's company, and she would act in a similar way in the company of men her father's age, to whom great respect would normally be shown. Others were challenged into accepting or rejecting her: the wife of household C1 would not let her daughter visit the daughter of household A1 - with whom she was at school - in case Emine was visiting; conversely, households A1 and A2 had known her for 15 years and, despite their own conservatism and capacity for gossiping about others, accepted her and would even defend her reputation in public. Her chances of marriage to a Turkish Cypriot are now extremely small, but in any case she has no pretensions in this direction. She explicitly states that she prefers foreign men: another blasphemy.

Ayşe is beyond the pale in a different way. (See Appendix D for an account of how she reached her present social and economic position.) Whereas Emine flouted the norms associated with her widowed status and chose to remain 'outside' control, Ayşe, through her success in the male public world of achievement, went 'beyond' control. In fact, her husband's attempt to assert his authority over her in the factory she managed - and where he worked as a driver - had led her to get her Greek Cypriot partner to sack him. She simply could not stand the strain of his working for her as an employee and at the same time attempting to exercise his authoritative role as her husband. In sacking him, she made her priorities explicit: business came before family. Indeed, she spent little time at home and, though she did the shopping, she left the other domestic

chores (washing, cooking and cleaning) to her son's English girlfriend who, in anticipation of their forthcoming marriage, was living with them. Her financial success allowed her to give her family a good standard of living, but the fact that she was an attractive 39 year old, drove a Triumph Stag, and ran a business with a Greek Cypriot man was evidence of her namussuz state. For example, it was firmly believed by those who came into contact with her at work, or who had merely heard about her, that she was having an affair with her Greek Cypriot partner, and that it was the knowledge of this that "had driven her husband to drink". Her two sons tended to side with their father in intrafamily quarrels, but all her own kin firmly supported her. As was noted in the Introduction (p.129), all the families in group B had been relatively successful in their business ventures in London, and Ayşe's success was approved of in the family partly because she was a woman. Since her own household was not part of a tightly knit neighbourhood group, gossip about Ayşe was largely unheard by her and totally unheeded. But along with the gossip she also commanded respect, perhaps because she had attained the economic goal to which all Turkish Cypriot women in fact aspire. Through working, she had been able to acquire all those material comforts associated with financial success: cars, a large house with central heating, the latest labour-saving kitchen devices, and so on. As with Emine, there was awe as well as denunciation for her seemingly shameless lifestyle.

Both women had an obvious social function. In disregarding the traditional values associated with their respective female roles, they epitomised the namussuz kadın (shameless woman) and, though their very extremeness was in itself cause for awe - if not actual respect - it was not the sort of awe that most women would wish for themselves. They saw in Emine and Ayşe the sexual freedom and financial prosperity which would never become realities for themselves and which they could only dream about. Yet dreams is what most Turkish women - not to mention their husbands - would have them remain.

In summing up, let me return to the theme of adaptation. It was stated earlier that a man's role in London is not radically different from his role in Cyprus. But a woman's role has changed: in London, she too is now a financial contributor to the household budget and, in many cases, a significant one. However, despite a woman's economic potential, it is clear from what has been said so far that attitudes to women have not changed to a very great extent. This is not to say that they will never do so, but just that, so far, the children of migrant parents have not been free of their parents' traditional

mores long enough to have been greatly influenced by the supposedly egalitarian and permissive ideology of Britain. But is this surprising? I do not think so. The idea of female equality is, even in England, a relatively recent one and its practical expression is still confined to the middle (leisured) classes. Apart from the small number of well educated, 'middle class' Cypriots and those here temporarily as students, Turkish Cypriot settlers have joined the ranks of the British working class. Even those who have been financially successful here, (the families in group B, for example), are still culturally working class. Ayşe's siblings applauded her business sense but even they would lament the fact that her success had to be achieved outside the framework of her marriage. Her two sons felt this particularly strongly and said they thought their mother was 'too ambitious'. While defending her honour outside the home, they nonetheless felt that she should be a wife and mother first, and only after that a businesswoman.

No attempt has been made here to provide examples of namus-type behaviour in Cyprus, but had I done so very few differences would have been discernible. Indeed, a woman who stops and talks to a stranger on the street is more at risk of losing her namus in Cyprus than she is in London, simply because the anonymity of London does provide a screen for those who want to make it work for them in this way. But it is difficult to ascertain how many do. Certainly, rumours about extra-marital affairs are unreliable, as in any argument between neighbours exaggeration about the sexual activities of others is common. There again, namus is not about actions in themselves, but about giving others grounds for suspicion. This being so, it acts as an equally effective norm-maintaining mechanism in London as it does in Cyprus.

CHAPTER V: RITUAL OCCASIONS

In this chapter, the ritual occasions celebrated by Turkish Cypriots in London will be discussed. The first task is to define 'ritual' - a concept which is itself the subject of a substantial body of anthropological literature. The various Turkish Cypriot activities and occasions which fall within the definitional field so outlined are then described in some detail. Two particular aspects of ritual are kept in mind throughout the main part of the text:

a. The extent to which the form and content of Turkish Cypriot ritual occasions have changed since their introduction to Britain.

b. Their communicative aspects: what rituals can tell us about the society in question, its social structure, family relations, norms, values, and the individual's conception of his place within it.

This focus on the communicative aspect of ritual is inspired primarily by Leach (1976), whose argument is considered in more detail in the final pages, where the rituals that have been described are looked at in toto and aspects or qualities common to all or some of them are outlined and analysed.

Defining the Term and the Problem

A reference to mystical powers is, for most writers, an essential component of ritual. Thus, Turner defines it as "formal behaviour for occasions not given over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in mystical beings or powers". (1967:19) Writing in 1957, Monica Wilson distinguishes between 'ceremonial', which she sees as secular, and 'ritual', which she sees as necessarily pertaining to the religious. (1957:9) Gluckman also favours this distinction and uses the word 'ceremony' as a general term to describe both the 'ceremonious' (that is, secular ceremony) and a 'ritual' (that is, a religious ceremony). (1962) Goody, however, opts for a broad category of 'ritual' in which is contained both religious and non-religious rituals, though he adds that "... it is often useful to distinguish between them". (1961:22) What all these writers are assuming or, in the case of Goody, at least acknowledging, is that it may be necessary for analytical purposes to separate into two categories those ceremonies or "occasions not given over to technological routine" which pertain to the religious

and those which do not. Presumably the rationale behind this is that the two cannot be analytically equated; that 'religious' ritual is intrinsically different from non-religious ritual and the same framework will not suffice for both.

The editors of the recent volume Secular Ritual (Moore and Myerhoff 1976) specifically state in their introduction that their focus is "... the meaning of ceremony and formality in any modern context except the exclusively religious". (1976:20, emphasis mine) They and most of the other contributors to the volume - who, incidentally, include both Turner and Goody - again separate religious from secular ritual in order to concentrate on the latter. Specific secular ceremonies are then analysed in much the same way as if they were religious ceremonies. The main difference between the two, according to the editors, is that religious rituals (that is, those which contain a reference to a god or mystical powers) are related to a comprehensive ideology, a religious world-view which explains and states universals: how the world began, man's place within it, how the powers that be can be moved to aid the individual, and so on. Religious rituals are "... a declaration about religion and a demonstration of its operation. ... The interrelation between religious ritual and religion is explicit, worked out, stated and conscious". (Moore and Myerhoff 1976:10,11) On the other hand, the implied explanatory range of any secular ritual is limited.

> "Religions have something to say about life and death, the beginning and end of time, and the source of all things. Ceremonies, religious or secular, may be occupied with relatively shallow periods of time, and with the experience of special and particular segments of the population and with their immediate concerns. They may be quite situationally specific in their explicit emphasis. When religious rituals are situationally specific (the funeral of a particular person, the marriage of two individuals) by implication they link these specific occasions to all deaths and all marriages and the nature of life, and eventually to the religious doctrine itself. When secular rituals are situationally specific, they may also link the immediate with a larger reality, but they do not, even in a vague way, invariably attach to a total explanation." (1976:12)

Now in general terms I would agree with this. An explicitly religious ritual such as a Christian baptism refers to the 'universals' of which Moore and Myerhoff speak, whereas a school speech day does not.

In baptism, a child is cleansed from his natural state of sin to be reborn into a new society, membership of which gives each individual rights, duties and rules to live by, as well as the promise of reward and punishment in the hereafter. Its reference point is other-worldly, and its rationale the belief in a kingdom of 'heaven'. Not so with a speech day, ostensibly and in fact a secular ceremony. Certainly, a speech day does not explicitly offer or refer to a 'total explanation' of anything, let alone the nature of life. However, apart from this, there are similarities between the two events in terms of what they communicate. At some point in the speech-making, values which other members of the school share (the importance of honest achievement, the pursuit of knowledge, community cooperation) will be invoked, and their relevance to the occasion emphasised. Not 'universals' perhaps, but certainly expressive of cultural mores. The structuring of family relations is made evident at a baptism by the presence of those who attend, and by the fact that one or more of them are asked to act as god-parents to the child. A school speech day, similarly, dramatises the structure of school 'society' by assigning, through dress, location and prizes, different roles and ranks to the participants.

I do not want to exaggerate the similarities between the two occasions, because many obvious differences exist. The question it leads me to ask, however, is whether it is necessary to distinguish ceremonies which are ostensibly religious from those which are not, given my aim in this chapter - which is to analyse ritual primarily as a form of communication. Is there any reason, given these specific interests, why religious and secular rituals cannot be analysed within the same analytical framework?

Consider for a moment Barth's analysis of the spring migration of the Basseri nomads of Iran. He describes it as "the central rite of nomadic society". (1964:153) What he is hypothesising here is that the Basseri migration can legitimately be seen as a ritual insofar as it is capable of symbolically representing Basseri society - its structure and, in particular, the separation and aggregation of social groups at different times of the year - in the same way that a straightforward religious ritual might in another society. I say 'another' society here because, as far as I can see, Barth only came to consider the

migration as a type of ritual behaviour because he found that the Basseri not only had few religious rituals, but that those which they did possess did "... not seem closely connected or interrelated in a wider system of meanings; they give the impression of occurring without reference to each other or to important features of the social structure..." (1961:135)

Not deterred by Douglas' castigation of Barth's hypothesis and her insistence that he simply accept the fact that some tribal societies - like many Western ones - are secular, Richard Tapper spells out the ritual character of the migration of another Iranian nomadic society, the Shahsevan. Conceptually, neither Barth nor Tapper are asking very much. Following Leach (1976), they are simply defining ritual in terms of its communicative aspects - that is, what it can tell us about the society in terms of its norms, values and social structure - rather than in terms of its reference to religion or its being essentially non-technical routine. A ritual can be technically useful while at the same time expressing fundamental truths about the nature of society. What Tapper is saying, then, is that if you want to fathom a society's symbolic system and what it is communicating, it is no use just looking for 'religious' ritual and symbols; 'secular' rituals also communicate, particularly about social structure. So, Barth sees the Basseri migration as the central rite, while Tapper finds the Shahsevan migration to be incomprehensible without seeing it as part of the whole ritual (religious and secular) system.

The second reason why I would deny that there is a fundamental difference between religious and secular rituals is that 'religious' and 'secular' are not necessarily exclusive categories of ritual. At least with Turkish Cypriots, and I would presume with other peoples also, the line between the two is not always obvious. Some of the rituals with which I shall be concerned are obviously secular in their manifest function, though they may employ religious symbols in the form of charms or 'protective' phrases almost as insurance. Others are religious in stated purpose (a circumcision), yet the content of the ritual, the form it takes and the symbols employed are 'secular'. Certainly there were many occasions when informants wanted to explain

something in terms of its religious significance but were unable to do so either because they had forgotten it, or because they did not know if it had one. In short, I found that elements of the religious were to be found in many secular rituals, and vice versa.

Because I think it is neither analytically necessary nor always possible to separate the religious from the non-religious ritual, I make no attempt to distinguish the two in the discussion which follows. I will describe ceremonial forms which are obviously secular but I include those whose purpose, outcome or symbolic content involves the invocation of a god or spirits at some point.

Ritual Occasions for Turkish Cypriots in London and Cyprus

Like Moore and Myerhoff, I am concerned here with collective ceremonial occasions, events which, in Turner's phraseology, are "... not given over to technological routine", and which bring varying numbers of people together to celebrate or commemorate a special event in a culturally prescribed way. For Turkish Cypriots in London, such occasions can be divided into:

1. Islamic religious or Turkish national holidays. (Christian and British holidays will also be mentioned here.)
2. Individual life crisis rituals (*mevlût*, *altı aylık*, *sünnet*).
3. Occasions creating affinal links (*nişan*, *nikâh*, *düğün*).

I want to discuss both the numbers and the relationships of people brought together on these occasions, and the form the actual ceremonies take in London and Cyprus respectively. The emphasis in the description will be on the way in which the various ceremonies and/or celebrations have been adapted to suit the lifestyle and needs of the London Turkish population.

1. Islamic and National Turkish Holidays (Bayrams)

Bayrams fall into two categories: those which are religious, are based on the Muslim (lunar) calendar and which consequently change their date every year; and those which were instituted by Ataturk (the founder of the Turkish Republic) to commemorate a battle or special day in Turkish history.

a) Religious bayrams:

Şeker bayram. This means 'sugar holiday' and is a three-day feast to mark the end of Ramazan - the Muslim month of fasting.

Kurban bayram. This is the Muslim feast of sacrifice and is held to commemorate Abraham's sacrifice to God of a ram in place of his son Ismail (Isaac in the Jewish and Christian tradition).

b) Non-religious bayrams:

Yılbası — New Year — January 1

Çocuk bayram — Children's Day — April 23

Bahar bayram — Spring holiday (May Day) — May 1

Gençlik ve Spor bayram — Youth and Sport Day — May 19
(to commemorate the arrival of Mustafa Kemal in Samsun from Istanbul in 1919. This marked the beginning of the Ataturk revolution.)

Hurriyet ve Anayası bayram — Freedom and Constitution Day — May 27
(to commemorate the Turkish liberation of Izmir at the end of the war of Independence against Greece, 1923)

Zafer bayram — Victory Day — August 30
(to commemorate the last victorious battle fought against Greece in 1922)

Cumhuriyet bayram — Republic Day — October 29
(the beginning of 'Ataturk week' in schools - to commemorate the founding of the Turkish Republic by Ataturk in 1924)

In Turkey and Cyprus, newspapers and the television keep people informed of these religious and national days; thus everyone is aware of the occasion that each is held to commemorate. The media also publicise the national and local activities organised on these days - the military parades, sporting events and so on. In London, there is none of this activity and, as few Turkish Cypriots of my acquaintance ever read a Turkish newspaper, most of these days pass by uncelebrated, if not unnoticed.

But the two religious bayrams, Şeker and Kurban, are still celebrated by Turkish Cypriots here, even though their religious significance tends to be overlooked. Şeker bayram comes at the end of Ramazan, the Muslim month of fasting. If the fast is kept, nothing must pass the lips between sunrise and sunset for the whole month. Şeker bayram lasts three days and celebrates the end of this fasting period. Although no-one I knew in London kept the fast, everyone celebrated after it. Kurban bayram is the more important of the two feasts for Muslims. In Turkey, every family who can afford it sacrifices a sheep and gives meat to the poor. Ideally the same is true in Cyprus, though in both countries it is only the richer families who can afford to celebrate this occasion in the traditional way nowadays. On the first day of both feasts in Turkey, men go to the mosque to pray, after which visits are paid to the most senior member of each family, and their hands are ceremoniously kissed - a mark of respect. Gifts are exchanged on both occasions, children being the main recipients, and everyone who can afford it wears new clothes. In cities and villages, fun fairs and other forms of entertainment are organised for the holiday makers.

In London, this pattern is followed to a great extent, though there are some variations. There is no local mosque to act as a centre for the bayram gifts of meat and money, which can then be distributed to the mosque's registered poor, as in Turkey. Only the older men visit a mosque to make the traditional bayram prayers, though, if anyone else were ever to visit a mosque, it would be on such days. It is not the religious element of bayrams which brings people together in London, however, but the opportunity these occasions provide for a family celebration. Kurban bayram especially is tantamount in its significance as a family occasion to the English Christmas. On both bayrams, visiting and being visited is the order of the day. As mentioned in Chapter III, it tends to be the older people who stay at home and the young who visit, as in Cyprus, a special effort being made to visit close kin and affines who live too far away to make visiting at weekends possible. Special foods are prepared and offered to the guests: <u>pilavünü</u> (savoury bread made of semolina with sultanas, mint and hard grated goats cheese), <u>çeyrek</u> (special bread covered with sesame seeds),

and baklava (layers of flaky pastry and nuts, soaked in syrup). In London, Turkish Cypriots usually take the day off work for Kurban bayram, and children stay home from school if the day falls during term time.

In contrast to the above, non-religious bayrams are not made the occasion of any special celebration by most Turkish Cypriots here, New Year's Day being the one exception. Only those who are involved with one of the associations mentioned in Chapter I are likely to make a special occasion of Children's Day, Victory Day or, in the case of the left-wing political organisations, May Day (International Labour Day).

This leads one to ask why Şeker and Kurban bayram are the only two holidays which continue to be celebrated in the traditional manner by the London Turkish population. This seems initially surprising, given the religious basis of the two bayrams and the relative lack of concern shown by Turks here towards things Islamic. However, what is significant is the fact that they are the only two bayrams which focus specifically on the very institution which is the core of social life in London - the family. Family ties are traditionally strong and, as has been noted, they remain so in London, even though settlement patterns and the long hours worked by most adults mean that close kin cannot be visited frequently unless they live nearby. Visiting kin and giving are the essence of Kurban and Şeker bayram. Note that on Kurban bayram in particular a sacrifice is made to God, meat is given to the poor, respect is paid to older kin, and children are given money and presents. Guests are given specially prepared bayram foods. The main part of both bayrams takes place in the family home, and the emphasis throughout is on social relationships - both within the nuclear family and outside it, thereby including other kin and affines, neighbours and friends.

The non-religious bayrams celebrate events in Turkey's past, and even in Cyprus these days are either spent at home watching special broadcasts, or in the nearest town watching processions and parades. There is no particular emphasis on visiting kin and no built-in ritual

of giving. The focus is the Turkish nation, and the centre of activity the nearest town where marches and parades are held. In fact, one's attention is directed even further afield than this: to Ankara, the capital of Turkey, where the most elaborate celebrations take place. On the holidays commemorating a military victory, it is the military parades in Ankara which are broadcast throughout the day on Turkish Cypriot radio and television.

It is hardly surprising then that these national days of celebration have not been incorporated into the communal life of Turkish Cypriots in London. Not only is there no association capable of organising a large-scale event in which many thousands of Turkish Cypriots could participate, but such days are not of any functional significance for Turks in London. They do not bring people together in their homes but are essentially public events to celebrate a national Turkish past. The two religious bayrams, however, provide an excuse for visiting kin who are not regularly seen but with whom people do not want to lose touch. Thus, religion is merely the medium or background for what are in fact important social events.

One final word about the Turkish incorporation of the main English bayram: Christmas. Turkish Cypriots in Britain do celebrate Christmas, though the extent to which it is made a really important occasion depends on the family and on the corresponding importance they attach to the Turkish bayrams. Families in groups A and C did all the traditional things associated with the Turkish bayrams, and a corresponding lack of preparation went into Christmas. Families in the dispersed kinship group B, however, who considered themselves more English, said they found it more convenient to celebrate Christmas, though they did not completely ignore the Turkish bayrams. They visited kin and friends in the evenings on Kurban and Şeker bayram, but they did not take the day off work or prepare all the customary bayram foods.

For all Turkish Cypriots here there are several practical reasons for celebrating Christmas. Whereas time has to be taken off work or school if the Turkish holidays are going to be spent in the

traditional way, at Christmas a holiday is actually provided for the occasion. The awareness of Christmas created by the media has had an effect, especially on young children. At school, they are taught the story of the nativity, and more practical things too: for example, how to make Christmas cards and even presents for their parents. Not surprisingly, Turkish children come to expect presents themselves at Christmas. Thus, even the families in groups A and C who had given their children presents on Kurban bayram (which fell in December, 1975-1977), felt obliged to do the same at Christmas simply because of their children's excitement and expectations.

For all the families with whom I worked, however, New Year was considered the more important occasion. Whereas Christmas tends to be spent quietly at home watching television, with perhaps a visit made to parents or neighbouring kin, on New Year's Day an effort is made to visit kin who live further away and who, in the normal course of events, are seen infrequently. Large family gatherings are the norm and, as at Kurban and Şeker bayram, special bayram foods are prepared for the guests. Traditionally, turkey is eaten on New Year's Day - though some of the families of my acquaintance had moved this New Year feast to Christmas. Indeed, the extent to which Christmas is being celebrated in a typically British manner is, I think, changing as the children of the original migrants, who have been wholly brought up here and who have always known Christmas since childhood, are themselves becoming parents and thus the organisers of their own families' celebrations.

2. Individual Life-Crisis Rituals (apart from marriage ceremonies)

Over time, then, there has emerged an apparent consensus among Turkish Cypriots to continue observance of some bayrams while virtually ignoring others, depending both on the ideological relevance of the actual event and on the organisational form it takes in London. Much the same thing happens for what I have called individual life-crisis rituals. As in other cultures, among Turkish Cypriots the knowledge of how life-crisis rituals should be conducted is preserved and passed on by the older generations. As was mentioned in Chapter IV, apart from the few old people who have joined their married sons and daughters

in England, the oldest generation of London Turks are now only in their fifties, having migrated in their twenties or thirties, fifteen or twenty years ago. This means that those most qualified to pass on information about ritual performance and the symbolic significance of certain actions, are not here to do so. When specialist religious knowledge is required, the help of elderly relatives or, in their absence, complete strangers is enlisted by Cypriots here. The practical consequence of this is that the ritual observances associated with certain occasions vary according to who is called upon to perform the role of ritual specialist. Thus, the traditional culture is not being transmitted consistently.

Most of the detailed account to be presented in this section was obtainable only from older informants. The younger people - those now in their teens and twenties - made no pretensions about their inability to explain the significance of certain events, whereas their parents, the middle aged group spoken of above, usually attempted an explanation, feeling it was something they should have known. The result, as far as my research was concerned, was a collection of personal theories which all varied slightly and sometimes considerably. Besides, even the few really old people I asked in London (C2d is an example), though able to recall the traditional form a ritual activity took in Cyprus, admitted that in different parts of the country custom varied, and in some cases variations even occurred between neighbouring villages. Thus, I decided, what was important was what was actually happening in London at the time of fieldwork. If important differences existed between events in London and present-day Cyprus, they would have to be explained. But it would not always be possible or necessarily useful to reconstruct 'traditional' ideal forms as they existed in Cyprus in the past. Here, then, I have merely tried to account for the differences now discernible in the form and function of ritual occasions in present-day London and Cyprus.

a. Six Month Day (Altı Aylık)

The ceremony of altı aylık itself is simple. On the night preceding the day on which the baby is six months old, a henna paste is

placed in the palms of one (sometimes both) hands and on the ends of the fingers. They are then bandaged so that by morning the palms and fingers are stained red.[1] In the afternoon, kin and neighbours gather in the house, and the mother of the child prepares food and tea for them all. Thus, the occasion is simply a gathering of mothers and their children to mark the fact that the baby of the host household has reached its six month day. This event would doubtless have been more significant when mortality was high, and perhaps it is because the risks are so much reduced today that young mothers say they see no point in doing it. There are obviously other reasons too. In Cyprus, women who are not working on a farm or involved with a seasonal activity (such as fruit-picking) spend a good part of each day visiting each other, preparing food together, and watching over their children. Children are more central to a woman's life in this environment than in England, where the objective of many women is to leave their children with parents or in-laws and go out to work. In London, then, the ceremony has come to be seen as time consuming, expensive and, since most women work in the afternoons, inconvenient. Young wives who have their own independent households consequently tend not to be persuaded to celebrate the occasion if they see no particular reason for doing so.

Alti aylik, then, is performed less and less frequently by young parents in London today. For example, when the youngest daughter of household A2 was six months, the parents were in two minds whether to hold a special six month party or not. They decided against it in the end, and justified their decision by saying that it was an old-fashioned custom that no-one bothered with in London nowadays. One or two of the older Turkish women on the street took the decision as a personal affront, however, and said that the wife had not held a party because she did not want to invite them. The fact that it raised comment at all, and that others were awaiting the party to the extent that they knew its date, showed that the ceremony, if becoming less

[1] Informants stated that henna was used purely for decoration on the six month day. (Henna is also used to stain the bride's hands before a wedding. Its significance in this context is rather different and will be discussed when the wedding party is described.)

frequently performed by the young here, is still considered normal practice by the old. Indeed, when the wife of household A2 had been living with her mother, she had celebrated altı aylık for the first three of her children as a matter of course.

b. Prayer days when the Mevlût or Koran is read

The Mevlût is a religious poem commemorating the birth of Mohammed. The most famous mevlût was written by Suleyman Çelebi and it is read in Turkish homes in Turkey, Cyprus and London on the fortieth day after death. The mevlût, or a passage from the Koran, is also read as a thanksgiving to God for the fulfilment of something desired or wished for. Thus, household B2 had the Koran read on the birth of their first child. The wife had to have two operations before she became pregnant and, before the second, she vowed to have the mevlût or the Koran read in her home if the operation was successful and she was subsequently able to have a baby.

When someone dies, neighbours and kin will gather in the home of the deceased to hear the Koran read on (ideally) the night of death and on the third, seventh and fifty-second days after that. On the fortieth day the mevlût is read; it is the most important of all these remembrance ceremonies and the one which brings the most people together. A family might not have the Koran read in their home on the third or seventh day, but they will always have the mevlût read on the fortieth.

In Cyprus, the fortieth day mevlût can be held either in the mosque or in the home; in either case, it will be read by a hoca (religious teacher). The thanksgiving mevlût or Koran prayers are always read at home. The mevlût is written in the Arabic script of Ottoman Turkish, and I did not meet any Turkish Cypriot in London who could read either this or the Koran (which is never translated from the original Arabic when read on religious occasions). Nor did the families of my acquaintance know of any practicing religious teachers, and so they had to find a mainland Turk to conduct the mevlût ceremony. Mainland Turks, being usually more religious, are more likely to have

to read both the mevlût and the Koran in childhood than are Cypriots. In the absence of a mainland Turkish family in the neighbourhood, enquiries would be made among relatives and work associates; in the case of the Koran prayers read for the birth of the child in household B2, an old Algerian lady was eventually asked to come and read for them. As for the families in group A, a relative of the mainland Turkish family (A4) came to read the mevlût for all the families in this neighbourhood group.

Usually, though not inevitably, the reading of the mevlût or the Koran is attended by only fairly close kinswomen, neighbours and close female friends of the hosting household. If men are present in the house at the time, they can stay, though they are usually asked to sit in a separate room. Like the six month party, such occasions are home-based and thus they essentially concern women. In London, the reader is also usually female and she comes accompanied by some of her own kin. A mevlût is held in the evenings and, while it is being read, the visiting women sit with their heads bowed, wearing special prayer scarves. Afterwards, the reader and all the visitors are given helva (a sweet substance made from sesame seeds and honey) or lokma (small doughnut-like deserts covered in syrup). I was unable to discover the significance of either of these two sweets; most people denied that they had any significance at all, though the mother of the head of household C2 told me that when those who have attended prayers in someone's memory eat, the person who has died eats also. Helva is eaten because it makes the dead person's mouth 'sweet'. The reader, though officially giving her time to read the mevlût as sevap (charitable good deed) is recompensed in cash. The amount is left to the household hosting the occasion; it was around £10 in 1976-77.

As mentioned above, although the mevlût is read on the fortieth day after a death, the Koran is read on other days. These are also occasions bringing kin and neighbours together; very close kin will attend all the prayer readings, but neighbours and those less closely related will try to come to the mevlût and, failing this, to the fifty-second day prayers. Between 15 and 40 people attended the mevlûts/prayer readings at which I was present. All these occasions are held for

the soul of the deceased, "to make it rest easily". It is believed that the soul leaves the body at the moment of death. The fiftysecond day prayers are also said for the physical body, however. In London, burial takes place as soon after death as possible, ideally while the body is still warm. At the one graveyard in north London where many Muslims are buried, there are Muslim religious teachers and other (Pakistani) specialists who wash the body according to custom, and wrap it in the white shrouds used for burial. The Koran is read at the graveside by the religious teacher and, traditionally, no coffin is used as it is believed that nothing should obstruct the joining of earth and body; sticks are put beneath the body and over it, then the soil. On the fiftysecond day after death, it is believed that all the flesh has fallen from the bones except for the nose; on this day the nose falls off. On this night, as well as the readings from the Koran, a special prayer is said in modern Turkish; it is known as the burün duasi (nose prayer). In fact, it makes no mention of the nose at all, but prays instead for the soul of the deceased. However, informants in London, Turkey and Cyprus said that the nose prayer was read to ease the pain felt by the body as the nose fell off. Although admitting that the idea was ridiculous, a Turkish religious teacher I spoke to in Turkey confirmed this explanation, even though he could throw no light on the origin of the belief, nor suggest why it should take place on the fiftysecond day. Needless to say, none of my informants in London under the age of twenty had ever heard of the prayer, though they were aware that it was customary for the Koran to be read on the fiftysecond day.

This ignorance of religious custom, and the consequent reliance on outsiders to fulfil the role of religious specialists, leads to considerable variations in the form of these events. For example, the old Algerian lady who was asked by household B2 to read the Koran after the birth of their first child, surprised all the Turks present by scattering small blue, black and white beads through the house. She also placed a blue mark (made from the substance used to bleach clothes) in the corner of every room at the height which the parents of the child said they wanted their daughter to grow to. The blue marks, like the beads, were meant to represent eyes, and were to ward off the 'evil eye'

while the child was growing.[1] Thus, the various remembrance and thanksgiving ceremonies in London now, though fixed to a great extent by the reading of the Koran or mevlût, do vary somewhat in form according to who conducts the ceremony. Their religious and social functions remain the same, however.

Ostensibly they are occasions which either celebrate the occurrence of a longed-for event by giving thanks to God or, in the case of a remembrance day, pray for the soul of the deceased. On a social level, kin, friends and neighbours of the host household gather on the basis of three criteria which they share: they are usually all women; they are either kin, affines, neighbours or close friends of the host household; and they are Muslim. Despite their ignorance of the finer points of Islamic ritual, their non-observance of Ramazan and of the rule forbidding pork, Turkish Cypriots in London continue to express this aspect of their identity on these occasions. Whereas on Şeker and Kurban bayram the religious basis of the gathering may be overlooked altogether (as it is by many Christians at Christmas), the religious element here is very obvious. The atmosphere is solemn, portentous, religious, even though - or perhaps because - the Koran readings cannot be understood by those present, and the Turkish of the mevlût, though intelligible to them, is unfamiliar. Indeed, it could be said that for most Turkish Cypriots in London, and definitely for those with whom I became most closely acquainted, only on those occasions on which the Koran or mevlût were read would it have been clear to an outsider that these people were Muslim. Men, as was noted above, are not involved. The only religiously-based gathering in which men also participate is circumcision, which is discussed below.

There is no doubt that the form the mevlût takes here has changed, as Turkish Cypriots have had to rely on mainland Turks from different regions, and even on Muslims from other countries, to conduct the ceremony. But as far as I was able to ascertain (in the absence of statistical data), occasions for mevlût or Koran reading, unlike the six-month day, are as frequent in London as in Cyprus. Though

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[1] The significance of the 'evil eye' is discussed in Appendix E.

attaining the age of six months is not cause for a social occasion nowadays, easing the passage to the next world of one who has died continues to be seen as essential.[1] Like Şeker and Kurban bayram, then, these gatherings are perpetuated as social events and have definite social functions. For example, on those occasions when prayers or the mevlût are read following a death - in London, usually just the seventh, fortieth and/or fiftysecond day - kin, neighbours and friends gather to pray for the deceased and, in doing so, renew their ties with each other. Sometimes the mevlût becomes an annual occurrence: household A1 held a mevlût every year for the brother of the household head (a). His widow and her children lived in Manchester (she had married again) and they travelled down each year and stayed for a week with household A1. This gave them the opportunity to visit all their kin and affines in London.

c. Circumcision (Sünnet)

Circumcision is regarded by Turkish Cypriots as essential for all males. It is the physical mark of a Muslim male. Turks are Muslims, thus a boy who is not circumcised cannot, by definition, be a Muslim; nor in consequence can he be a real Turk. However little attention Turkish Cypriots in London appear to pay to the rites of formal Islam[2] or

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[1] I have said nothing about the afterlife because ideas about it are so vaguely articulated by informants. Heaven and hell (cennet and cehenen) are familiar concepts, but are not seen in real enough terms by Turkish Cypriots here to influence their everyday behaviour. The notion of gûnah (sin) is used little by Turkish Cypriots here and was mentioned only in specifically 'religious' contexts when it referred to the sin of a Muslim against God. In Islam gûnah is complemented by things which are not sin but only forbidden - eating pork and drinking alcohol are examples. Sevap means 'charitable good deed performed without expectation of reward', though I only mention it here in order to add that, like gûnah, it is a term little used by informants except when talking of the good deeds which used to be done on bayrams: killing a sheep and distributing the meat to the poor, for example. Outside the religious sphere, other words are used to describe good and bad behaviour. Namus and şeref have already been mentioned. Another very frequently used word is ayıp. This carries no connotation of religious sin at all but denotes shamelessness, not in a sexual sense but in the sense of ignorance, of not knowing the proper way to behave. Thus, whenever children embarrass adults they are 'ayıp'.

[2] Here I refer specifically to the five 'pillars of faith', adherence to which characterises the true believer: profession of the faith, keeping the five daily prayer times, fasting in Ramazan, almsgiving, making the hadj. (See Magnarella 1974:169-175)

or even to folk traditions and beliefs, their self-identity as Muslims continues to be closely bound up with their self-identity as Turks. It would seem that Turkish Cypriots in London have arrived at a compromise: a lack of any overt religiosity in everyday life, yet a continuing adherence to the basic qualifications for ascription to Islam. So, boys are circumcised without exception and a traditional Muslim burial is given to all.

I have purposely left a discussion of the circumcision (sünnet) ceremony until now because, traditionally, the actual celebration closely resembled a marriage feast; thus, it seems only logical to consider them consecutively. The similarities are much less obvious in London than it appears they were in Cyprus a generation ago, but there are still parallels and informants themselves compared the two occasions in terms of their significance in the life cycle of men and women respectively.

What actually happens at a circumcision (I use this word to refer to all the activities associated with the occasion) varies between London and Cyprus, as it does between Cyprus and Turkey, and within Turkey itself. In Cyprus I was unfortunate enough to miss the circumcision season on both fieldwork trips, leaving the island too early in 1976 and arriving too late in 1977. Whereas weddings are traditionally held in early and mid-summer, circumcisions are usually left until September. By this time, the hottest weather is over and the boys' convalescence is made more comfortable. Informants said that usually several boys between the ages of four and ten - perhaps the children of kin or neighbours - would be circumcised together. Dressed in white, they would wear red sashes across their chests bearing the word Maşallah to protect them against the evil eye.

They would be mounted on horses and would parade around the town or village followed by their friends, parents and relatives. Musicians playing the davul (a large drum), the zurna (double reed instrument, usually played with the davul) and the saz (lute-shaped stringed instrument) would accompany them. The actual operation would be performed in one of the boys' homes by a sünnetci (circumciser) and the

party held two or three days later in one of the households.

In London, there is no procession of any sort and the operation is always performed in a hospital. This is partly because there are no practicing circumcisers in London and partly because the hospital operation is, in any case, preferred for health reasons - a view that is now also gaining ground in Cyprus. In London, the party which follows the operation is held in the house or in a hall; like the wedding party (düğün), it depends on how grand an occasion the parents of the child want to make it.

Parallels between the circumcision and the wedding party - in terms of both form and intrinsic ideology - have been noted by several writers. Margaret Bainbridge has noted (personal communication) that traditionally in Turkey there were similarities both in the form of the circumcision and wedding parties and in the ritual symbols used on both occasions. For instance, just as the boy to be circumcised would parade around the village on horseback beforehand, so the bride-to-be would ride to the village or house of her spouse - as, indeed, she still does in many parts of Anatolia. Symbols associated with the procession - red ribbons, fruits and ears of wheat, tied to a branch and carried by the rider - evoke images which apply to both the circumcision and the married state. The red ribbons symbolise the blood of both circumcision and virginity, the fruit and grains the fertility which would hopefully accrue to both in their new status. Richard Tapper also compares the form and ideological content of the two events, among the Shahsevan of Azerbaijan. (1977) For Turkish Cypriots in London today, circumcision is still a prerequisite for marriage; only once a boy is circumcised is he 'fit' to marry and hence have children; only once a girl is married is she 'fit' to have sex and thence children. On marriage, the virginity of a man is not an issue, for reasons already mentioned in Chapter IV. Symbolically though, he is a virgin in the sense of being untouched, 'whole' and incomplete as a man in his uncircumcised state. Similarly, a woman, though technically 'whole' while a virgin, is also incomplete as a woman and unable in that state to fulfil her role as a mother. All such overt symbolism has been lost in London,

as it has in Cyprus, but the underlying ideas remain. Indeed, informants themselves correlated the two events, two fathers making the point that the circumcision of their sons was for them like the marriage of their daughters - it made them MEN and WOMEN respectively.

Compared to most weddings, circumcision parties are relatively small, with between 40 and 200 guests. Only kin, close neighbours and friends are invited and, invariably, all are Turks. The party usually takes place a few days after the hospital operation, when the boys have had time to recover and can join in the festivities. Circumcision parties are not used to repay debts or maintain useful social relationships. At a circumcision, people gather specifically to celebrate a Turkish Muslim rite and a young boy's entry into manhood. A cold buffet and drinks are served to all the guests and, if the event is held in a hall, a Turkish band is hired and everyone dances. There is no focal point in the party unless it be a general period of time when money is given to the newly circumcised boys. A boy might be given £40 or £50, which his parents will keep for him. The similarities between this and the wedding party will become clear in the following pages.

3. Occasions creating affinal ties

There are four stages in a Turkish marriage:

a) Proposal - the visit of the dünürcü (potential in-laws)
b) Engagement party - nişan
c) Official registration of the marriage - nikâh
d) Wedding party - düğün

In the pages that follow, I want to do more than simply describe the actual form taken by these ceremonies in London and Cyprus. Perhaps this will involve digressing from the main theme of 'ritual', but I think such a digression is justifiable. For example, the significance of behaviour at the initial meeting between two families considering the marriage of their children cannot be ascertained purely from a description of the meeting itself; the basis on which choices are made is in no way evident from the proceedings, nor was it ever explicitly stated by informants themselves. Nonetheless, it became obvious to

me that a definite point-scoring system of marriageability existed, which made it possible to explain a family's acceptance or rejection of a proposal. A consideration of the factors affecting marriage choices will therefore be included here; apart from anything else, they exemplify the attributes which are seen to characterise the ideal wife and the ideal husband, from the point of view of the boy's family and the girl's, respectively.

a. Proposal - The Visit of the Dünürcü

When the daughter of a household completes her education, whether she is 16 or older, the question of her marriage arises, as indeed it does for a boy once he is settled in a steady job and reaches the age of 20-24. Parents begin to think of suitable partners for their children, families whom, ideally, they already know, like and trust. First they turn to those connected by kinship or affinity. First cousins, as mentioned earlier are thought too closely related, so they are not considered. The sons and daughters of neighbours in Britain are a possible choice, though there is no attempt to locate old friends and neighbours Cyprus; it is the here-and-now relationships which matter. But even relatively close kin are not likely to know each other well unless they live close and have had the opportunity of meeting regularly. More distantly related families, brought together by a mutual kinsman, affine or aquaintance, are less likely even to have met. Thus, in household A1, the eldest son's wife's paternal first cousin introduced his maternal first cousin to his cousin's cousin's husband's sister.[1] This was a relatively straightforward connection; often the relationship was much more distant than this. Sometimes the kinship or affinal link between two families would only be made explicit and actually worked out when it was realised that there was a possibility of their children marrying.

Traditionally, the boy to be married was not included in the visit to the girl's house; nowadays he does come, accompanied by one or more of the members of his family, usually his father and mother if they are in England. If they are not, then a close male relative, ideally his amca (FB), who can act with his parents' interests in mind,

[1] This connection is represented in diagram form overleaf.

HOUSEHOLD A1

HOUSEHOLD D2

X Y Z

HOUSEHOLD A2

HOUSEHOLD D1

Note: X (A1e in my sample) was introduced to Z by Y. The couple got engaged but did not marry; the girl broke off the engagement the day before the registration. After several months of uncertainty on her part, and what was seen by her family as the boy's lack of interest in their daughter, her parents accepted her last minute but very final refusal to marry. Her married sister (A2b) supported her decision, having been unhappily married herself for 12 years. Had the boy and his family lived nearer or been more closely related, more pressure would probably have been brought to bear on the girl to accept the marriage, whatever her personal feelings about her future husband.

will accompany him. Sometimes the girl and her family visit the boy, but this is not usual; the home is a woman's place, and it is the boy who must do the visiting. The meeting itself is extremely formal unless the two families know each other already. If the families are well acquainted, the boy and girl concerned may know whether they want the marriage to take place or not; if it is fairly certain that everyone concerned agrees that it should, then the couple might be asked to make their wishes known at the meeting. When this happens, all the rules are relaxed and the event turns into a small party; the men start drinking together and playing tavla (backgammon), the women begin to arrange the engagement party. Usually, however, decisions have not been made before this meeting.

When two families do not know each other well, as is often the case in London, the visit of the dünürcü is quite different to that described above. It is characterised by polite and restrained conversation and behaviour. The visitors are sat down in the front room (the misafir odası - guest room) and given tea and cakes, prepared by the girl herself. After this everyone makes formal, rather guarded conversation. Though both the girl and boy are present, they rarely say very much. Their parents do the talking and topic's include their respective children's job prospects, their personal accomplishments, their likes and dislikes, and so on. The content of the discussion is in fact irrelevant. Ideally, of course, both families want to substantiate the information already obtained from other sources (hearsay, mutual acquaintances) about their future son or daughter-in-law and his or her parents. The boy's family want to find out something about the girl's reputation, whether she is known to be namuslu, as well as her capabilities as a housewife and her ability to earn money. The girl's family likewise want to know about the boy's financial prospects, including details about his job as well as his character and social habits. A good wage is worthless if there is a possibility that he will squander it all on gambling or drinking. Questions which would provide this sort of information cannot easily be asked directly, however, which means that very few substantial facts about the boy and girl and their respective families are revealed at this initial meeting. The boy's present job might be discussed at some length, and his plans

and financial prospects for the future outlined; but questions which relate to more abstract, personal attributes - honesty, generosity, the girl's moral reputation - are avoided. This is not the sort of information which can best be furnished by the respective parents of the couple in any case. Reports from mutual acquaintances have to be sought later, and to some extent these must be relied upon.

Certainly, very little relevant or reliable information is conveyed through conversation. What is being exchanged and managed is impressions - that is, bodily and visual, as well as verbal, messages. The two sides are both putting on a performance, sizing each other up in terms of how things are said, and general deportment. For the couple themselves, paricularly, mutual evaluation is along physical lines, and they leave the concern with matters of character and prospects to their parents. Is he tall enough, strongly built without being fat, good looking, well-dressed? These are all pertinent questions for the girl. The boy is concerned with much the same things: the girl's figure, her attractiveness and dress sense. Given that they usually get no chance to get to know each other or even talk privately at this first meeting, this seeming obsession with personal appearance is understandable.

The couple do not have to make their decision at the time of the visit. Usually, both sides agree to wait for a few days, when the boy's parents get in touch with the girl's and they let each other know the decision. If either side replies in the negative, the matter rests there. The sort of excuse given for a negative decision depends on the closeness of the tie, and the potential damage a refusal might do to the relationship between the two families. If the two families were not previously acquainted, then a refusal does not have to be justified in very specific terms. If they are reasonably close kin, however, (say, third cousins), a more elaborate and sympathetic excuse is necessary. "She wants to wait a few more years", "He has decided he wants to get settled in a permanent job before marrying", is the sort of excuse given, even though the actual reason may be that the parents of the girl or boy have encouraged them to refuse on the basis

of the stories they have heard in the meantime about their potential son or daughter-in-law. There appeared to be no shame attached to a refusal by the girl - it was almost seen as her prerogative. For the boy to refuse when the girl and her family were ready to accept the proposed marriage, however, was more damaging for the girl. For this reason, most girls and their families kept their decisions to themselves until they heard, either directly or through hearsay, the boy's intended reply.

When an affirmative reply is given by both families, it is usual for the girl's family to invite the boy and his immediate family - including his brothers and sisters - to dinner. The girl cooks this meal herself to demonstrate her cooking expertise and, thus, it is implied, her ability to be a competent wife. On this occasion, the engagement party is arranged. This usually takes place within two or three weeks of the agreement to marry.

The question I find most interesting here is this: On what basis are decisions actually made, given the often incomplete picture that each side is able to gain of the other? Though never explicitly stated by informants, it became clear to me that an individual could be rated for his or her marriageability, and that a sort of point-scoring system existed. This might be represented thus:

	The marriageable girl		The marriageable boy
1.	A Turkish Cypriot	1.	A Turkish Cypriot
2.	Physically and mentally sound	2.	Physically and mentally sound
3.	Namuslu reputation (so that virginity not in doubt)	3.	Reputation for generosity, kind-heartedness (virginity not an issue)
4.	Not engaged or married before (therefore a virgin)	4.	Not engaged or married before (therefore no evidence he will prove an unreliable husband)
5.	Attractive to look at	5.	Handsome, tall
6.	Around 20 years old	6.	Under 30
7.	Educated at least to 16	7.	Educated at least to 16
8.	Wage-earning now	8.	Good job prospects, good wage now
9.	Non-smoker	9.	Not frequent gambler or heavy drinker
10.	British passport holder	10.	British passport holder

I have not attempted to put the above criteria into any sort of order of preference because some aspects are more important as attributes of one sex than they are of the other. It is, for example, more important for a girl to have a namuslu reputation than a good job; whereas a boy's sexual chastity is not an issue, but his wage-earning capabilities are of primary importance. There is also the fact that what was of paramount significance for one family was not always quite as important for another. Differences were particularly noticeable between the families in groups A and B here. Moreover, in each case, any one factor has to be considered in the context of other marriageable or non-marriageable attributes, in order to ascertain why certain decisions are made. Take, for example, the question of age. As a general rule, girls are married by the time they are 24; if they are not, people want to know why. However, the importance of age as a determining factor in marriage varies according to the significance any one family attaches to it, and also to the other positive attributes that the individual under consideration is seen to possess. The wife of household B4 did not marry until she was 25. This was partly because, after one broken engagement, she wanted to be sure she did not make a mistake a second time. Both her parents had died and she had inherited their house; consequently she was in a favourable economic position as a house-owner, and she was also extremely attractive. The fact that she had stayed at home and looked after her parents in their old age meant that she had a reputation for being generous and also namuslu. Her five siblings did not put any pressure on her to marry, knowing that, when she decided to do so, she would find a husband at once - which she did. This liberality of attitude was in any case in keeping with the mores of her sibling group; the economic success each had achieved in Britain, and their relative familiarity with English middle-class norms, meant that they could see the advantages of not rushing into marriage at the earliest possible moment. The fact that the girl in question eventually married a Turkish Cypriot who had just graduated from Istanbul University bore out the wisdom of their convictions. Through waiting, she had been able to make a 'good' marriage from a social and from an economic point of view, and this pleased the older men in her family. The fact that she gave birth to a son within the year gratified her older female relatives; as far as they were

concerned she had, though belatedly, assumed her proper role as a wife and mother.

Compare this with the eldest daughter (c) of household A1. She was ~~also~~ unmarried at 25 (the time of writing), though this was not through choice. She had had between 10 and 15 meetings with different dünürcü over the years, and had in fact been registered (nikâh) twice; both of these marriages had been annulled. Despite the fact that neither marriage had been consummated (there had been no wedding party in either case), her virginity could not be taken for granted by those who did not know her. Although a broken engagement or the annulment of a registered marriage is no sure indication of the loss of virginity, it is cause for suspicion. It leads others to ask why the relationship had been broken off. Perhaps something was found out about the girl at the time which was not afterwards disclosed. This was one reason why she was having difficulty finding another husband. It was plain to potential suitors that, since the girl's parents were eager to find her a husband and since she had not remained unmarried through choice, others had also found reason not to accept her as a wife. She was not physically attractive and - added to all this - she was 25 years old. As she gets older, it will be more and more difficult for her to find a husband.

Apart from illustrating the varying significance of any one 'marriageable attribute', the above example can also be used to illustrate how a couple are sometimes matched on the basis of their shared lack of positive marriageable qualities. With reference to the girl mentioned above (A1c), one might ask how she had actually come to be registered twice. The answer can be found if one considers the relative marriageability of her husbands, neither of whom ranked highly in these stakes. Of particular importance is the fact that neither were British citizens, and they had good reasons for wanting to marry one - it would give them the right to remain in Britain. But the girl could not afford to be choosy (especially the second time), as she had not been approved by any of the other dünürcü who had visited, and her parents had consequently persuaded her to agree in each case to the marriages. With each husband, they hoped that his intentions were

genuine and that he was not marrying her simply to acquire citizenship. But as soon as the formal registration (nikâh) had taken place, both men had left her, and her own fears were confirmed. The men concerned had no need to wait even until the wedding party, at which point the couple would have become man and wife in the eyes of custom and would have been living together. A marriage certificate was all that they needed. None of this, of course, could have been predicted when the boys first visited with their dünürcü, although on the second occasion the possibility that the boy wanted to acquire citizenship - though he denied it as any sort of motive - was seriously considered by the girl's parents. However, their desire to get their daughter re-married as soon as possible outweighed any objections they might have had to their future son-in-law's possible motives, and they decided to take the risk.

So the form that the visit of the dünürcü takes in no way conveys the issues which are implicitly at stake, or suggests the range of outcomes which might ensue from any decisions taken on the basis of this first meeting. Given the uncertainty surrounding marriage in London, it is not surprising that a family looks first to the sons and daughters of close kin, affines and neighbours, later considering those with whom they share a mutual kinship or other connection, and only finally agreeing to meet families about whom they know nothing directly at all. Informants assured me that, in Cyprus, it was most unlikely for one family which was not directly acquainted with another to visit them as dünürcü, and that in most cases a great deal was known by each side about the other, even before the initial meeting. Generally, in Cyprus, the two families are connected by multiple links - as kin, neighbours, work-mates, the men frequenting the coffee shops, and so on - and do not need to rely on an external source of information regarding the suitability of the other partner. The dispersed nature of Turkish Cypriot settlement in Britain and the work pattern of most Turkish Cypriots here - which leaves little time for socialising - means that the familiarity which comes from living in a close-knit community is lacking. This, as mentioned here and in Chapter III, has had very definite consequences for kin and affinal relations and for marital stability in London.

One final point. The amount of pressure to marry put on girls or boys by their parents is directly related to their own feelings about the partnership and the chances of their son or daughter making a better marriage in the future. In theory, if a girl is pretty and only 17, she can turn down a dozen suitors without parental or kin interference; if she is ugly and 25, she might be firmly persuaded to accept any match, whatever her feelings about her potential spouse. A boy has rather more time to make up his mind for, unlike his sister, his namus is not at stake. Indeed, the longer he leaves it the better his financial position is likely to be when he does settle down. Once the hunt for a wife has begun, however, he is in exactly the same position as his sister, and subject to the same constraints and influences from his family.

b. Engagement (Nişan)

Whereas a girl may have several visits from dünürcü, and a boy may visit several girls with a view to marriage, if all goes smoothly there is only one nişan (engagement party), one nikâh (registration) and one düğün (wedding party). The form taken by these three events in London varies somewhat from that in Cyprus. Where these variations are particularly noticeable and of obvious significance, they will be described and explained.

The engagement takes place as soon as possible after there has been an agreement to marry; preparations for the party usually take two or three weeks. The purpose of the nişan in both countries is to declare formally the engagement of the couple, and the central part of the ceremony is the exchange of rings. These are placed on the third finger of the boy's and girl's right hands by a third party - usually a close male member of one or other family, though ideally someone who is well known by both sides. The man chosen makes a short speech congratulating the couple, and acts as a sort of master or ceremonies for the duration of the ring ceremony; but he does not assume any special long-term relationship with the couple as a result of acting in this capacity at their engagement. He is perhaps the equivalent of the 'best man' at an English wedding. Sometimes a red ribbon

joins the two rings, and whoever puts the rings on cuts the ribbon, which then remains attached to the rings until the end of the party. These rings are transferred to the left hand on marriage. After the ring ceremony, the guests come up to congratulate the couple and are given badem şekeri (sugared almonds) wrapped in a cloth. In London, macaroons placed inside a paper napkin tend to be given instead; this is simply for convenience, due to the greater numbers invited to engagement parties here.

In London, the scale and venue of the occasion vary, and the cost is usually shared, though it is felt to be primarily the bride's family's responsibility. If the family is wealthy, 200-400 people might be invited to a formal sit-down meal in a hotel. If the family is less well off, or if they simply choose to have a small party (perhaps because it is not a first engagement for one or both of them), 40 or 50 close relatives and friends might gather for a cold buffet in the bride's (occasionally the groom's) house.

In Cyprus, an engagement party tends to be much smaller, less of an alcoholic extravaganza, and it is the groom's financial responsibility. Alcohol other than beer is not served and, except for nuts, food is rarely provided. For most of the invited guests, the party ends when the rings have been put on, the couple congratulated, and the bags of sugared almonds handed out by the 'bridesmaids'. The immediate families might then go out to dinner together, but the event does not turn into, nor indeed is it intended to be, a big party for everyone.

One final difference: in Cyprus, neither presents nor cash are given to the couple at their engagement, though the bride is likely to be given takı (attachable things): gold pendants, bracelets, and rings, by her fiancé and by both families. In Cyprus, presents for the house are given at nikâh (registration). In London, however, the couple receive these presents at their engagement - sometimes money, sometimes household items. As will be shown later, the occasions on which presents are given in both countries correspond to the lavishness of the event and to the amount which the guests themselves get out of

it - in terms of a meal, drinks, the opportunity to dance and enjoy themselves, and so on. More is made of an engagement in London for two reasons. First, nikâh (registration) is not thought of as a separate event from the düğün (wedding party) in London, whereas it is a totally separate and very important occasion in Cyprus. Consequently, almost as a form of compensation, more importance is attached to the engagement in London. Secondly, people in London are making more money and can therefore afford to be more extravagant; moreover, both engagement and wedding parties are used by most families as occasions for making an explicit statement about their financial status. I return to this later in the chapter, once the wedding party itself has been described.

c. Registration (Nikâh)

The English wedding ceremony is composed of two distinct events which usually take place on the same day. The legal registration of marriage at a registry office or in church is generally followed immediately by a reception party in a hall or hotel, or at the bride's house. This reception is a celebration of the marriage; it is not thought of as intrinsically part of it. When the guests arrive at the reception the couple are, as far as all are concerned, already married. For this reason, the reception can be dispensed with if need be; the couple are not less 'married' for not holding a party to celebrate the event.

The Turkish wedding makes two quite separate occasions of these events. The registration (nikâh) is held first and this is followed - weeks, months or even years later - by the reception or wedding party (düğün). The civil registration of marriage in Turkey only became compulsory in 1926, when the Swiss Civil Code replaced the Shari'a (Islamic law) as the basis of all laws relating to the family and the status of women. (See Chapter IV, p.118) Civil marriage was just one of a number of laws instituted by Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, in his policy of dividing church from state. It was a case of attempting to create a new mentality through legislation, rather than legislating in response to changing attitudes, and the practice of registering marriage caught on only slowly. According to Timur,

(1957:34-35), less than half the marriages in Turkey in 1950 were civilly registered, and the Turkish government had to pass laws in 1933, 1945, 1950 and 1956 to legitimise the children of hitherto unregistered marriages. A disjunction continued to persist, then, between statutory law and practice, particularly in the rural areas.[1]

In Cyprus, the separation between civil and religious law did not take place until 1945, with the Wills and Succession Law. (J.N.D. Anderson 1958:162-3) Thus, civil marriage has been compulsory in Cyprus only since 1945, though here too law and practice did not immediately fall into line. The comparative recency of civil marriage in Cyprus partly accounts for people's continuing attitudes towards it. Although the traditional form of the wedding (düğün) has now greatly changed, it is this customary and traditional public occasion which continues to constitute a 'real' marriage for most people. Thus, today, a newly married couple do not consummate their marriage until after the wedding and they continue to live with their respective parents until that time. In London, young Turkish Cypriot girls continue to describe their husbands as their fiancés if they are 'only' registered, and begin referring to them as their husbands only after the wedding party proper.

In both Cyprus and London, then - as indeed in other Islamic countries - registration (nikâh) is seen as only a formal preliminary to 'real' marriage. Very little changes for the couple after registration. While they are engaged, a couple meet regularly, usually in each other's homes, though at weekends they may go out alone, to a film or a restaurant. Most of their time together is spent in the company of one or other of their families, however; this gives their respective parents plenty of time to acquaint themselves with their future son/daughter-in-law. After registration, this pattern continues: they meet regularly but continue to live separately, and almost as great a watch is kept on a girl's activities during this period as when she is engaged.

In Cyprus, there might be as much as a year between engagement

[1] See articles by Timur and others in the same volume (1957) for a discussion on the reception of the Swiss Family Law in Turkey.

and registration, and another year between registration and the wedding party. During this time, the couple work and save as, traditionally at least, the boy must buy a house and the girl provide furnishings for it from her çeyiz (trousseau). They cannot expect to be able to accumulate basic household items afterwards - not only are wages much lower in Cyprus, but only the men in a family are likely to be working. The registration, then, tends to mark a half-way stage between engagement and marriage proper, and it is celebrated as such. In form, it resembles a small wedding party and is quite different from the same event in London. Usually, the actual registration takes place at the Municipal Buildings, though some very religious families still hold it in a mosque with a religious teacher officiating. In this case, it is called hoca nikâh. In either case, after the necessary formalities have been completed, a party is held at a hired hall or at one of the homes, and kin, affines and neighbours are invited. The bride wears a wedding dress with a veil and head-dress, but in a colour other than white, usually blue or pink. Presumably this is because the new bride is not about to lose her virginity, and thus her purity does not need to be symbolically stated through her wearing white. In both countries, a white wedding dress (European style) is reserved for the wedding party.

The groom and his family pay for the registration party in Cyprus, just as they pay for the parties held at the engagement and the wedding. In terms of numbers invited, the registration party is smaller than the wedding will be, with perhaps 50-150 guests; food and drink, including alcohol, are provided for the guests. If the party is held in a hall, there is a band and everyone dances. The couple are given presents for the house and money, the latter being pinned to the bride's dress and the groom's suit. As this custom is repeated at the wedding party, I will delay a consideration of its significance until then.

In London, it is simply not possible, nor is it even necessary, for a boy to save up and buy a house before marriage. Council housing is usually available, even if this means staying with in-laws initially. Moreover, given the opportunity in England for buying household goods, including furniture, on hire purchase, there are not the same incentives

for delaying the wedding party for more than a few weeks or months. Thus, the delay between registration and wedding depends on the availability of accommodation and the time it takes for both families to save up for the inevitably - or almost inevitably - elaborate party. It is because the one follows the other relatively quickly in London that little is made of registration. Indeed, all that happens is that the bride and groom go to the registry office, where the official formalities are completed. The bride wears a simple dress or suit. The couple are usually accompanied by 10-15 of their immediate family, often just their parents and adult siblings. Afterwards, they might go out for a meal or prepare something at home. Photographs are taken, but that is all; no presents are given and there is no party. The cost is negligible and no set rules apply as to who should bear it. A couple simply 'get registered' and carry on as before. The 'real' marriage usually follows in a few weeks, sometimes the following weekend, if preparations have been made in time.

Although I have no statistics on the frequency of broken engagements, such occurrences are not unusual in London. Consider, for example, the last four weddings I attended. (These took place in 1977-8, after the fieldwork period proper.) Three of the eight partners involved had been engaged once before they met the spouse they were then marrying. Given that couples often have very little opportunity to get to know each other at all before they become engaged, and given also the general atmosphere in Britain which emphasises the importance of individual choice and personal compatibility, this is not surprising. Besides this, there is the fact that the parents of the couple only begin to get to know each other, and their future son/ daughter-in-law, once the couple have become engaged. No family has ever, in my experience, actually initiated the breaking off of an engagement; this would be tantamount to admitting that they had been wrong in the first place. However, if one or other partner is obviously against the marriage, either because he finds that he cannot get on with his future spouse, or because he has found out things about her (or she about him) that were previously unknown - the girl has had 'boyfriends', the boy gambles - then parents will not force their son or daughter into the marriage, and will sometimes openly support their decision to return the engagement ring and thus formally

break the contract. Bad feelings will almost certainly ensue between the two families for a while, especially if they are kin or neighbours. Even if it is known that the couple did not have the chance to become sexually intimate during their engagement, the girl's chances of finding a husband in the future will be impaired. This was the case with the daughter of household A4 referred to in Chapter IV (p.143).

After the couple have become registered, breaking off the relationship is more complicated as the marriage must be legally annulled. In London, the wedding party follows registration almost immediately, so it is unusual for a couple to separate at this point. This occurred in my experience only when Turkish Cypriot girls married Turks whose main purpose in marrying was to acquire British citizenship. Although two such cases have already been mentioned in this chapter, I heard of very few others.

d. Wedding Party (Düğün)

Conceptually, the wedding party is not just the celebration of marriage for Turkish Cypriots - it is marriage. A couple might be legally married after registration, but until the party they are not thought of as man and wife. The party functions as a public recognition ceremony; only through this recognition is the union morally and socially legitimised. The consummation of the marriage follows on the same night and ideally the couple move into their own house immediately.

The wedding party is also the final statement about a now complete relationship and, after it, kin, family and friends will usually exert great pressure on a couple to remain together, whatever the domestic unhappiness this might involve. Love is not believed by the older generation to be an essential prerequisite for marriage, and its absence is certainly not seen as sufficient grounds for divorce. However, given the greater expectations of those Turkish Cypriots who are marrying in London now, one might expect that the number of divorces will increase. The fact that a divorced woman with children can claim financial assistance from the state means that divorce is also now an economic possibility. But there is no obvious trend in this direction yet.

The wedding party, then, should be seen as the initiation of a once-and-for-all relationship. For a woman it is the rite of passage par excellence. She becomes a wife and, as such, responsibility for her sexual chastity (namus) passes from her father and agnatic kin to her husband and his family. She becomes a woman; on the night of the party, her virginity is both proved and lost. She becomes independent - to some degree at least - insofar as she establishes a nuclear family unit with her husband, and is no longer under the constant scrutiny of her parents and in-laws, as she has been throughout the engagement and 'registered' periods.

The difference between a wedding party in London and one in Cyprus is mostly one of scale and consequent expense, though the flexibility which characterises other days of ritual celebration in London is evident here too. No two wedding parties, mevlûts, circumcisions or engagement parties are exactly the same. Innovations are occurring in all these events and one might argue that this is necessary if the ritual is going to continue to be meaningful in London. Many of the changes can be understood as commonsense adaptations to the constraints imposed by the environment here. They also reflect the changed priorities of London Turks. These I will attempt to highlight in the discussion which follows.

Basically, a düğün is a party to which are invited all known kin, affines, neighbours, work friends, and other close or useful acquaintances. In London, no other regular celebration draws so many Turkish Cypriots together in one place at one time. Wedding parties tend to be much larger and grander affairs in London than in Cyprus. In London, the numbers of people attending the seven at which I was present during fieldwork ranged from 150-1000, with 600-700 being the average. Only in unusual circumstances are there likely to be as few as 150 guests, however. In this case, it was a marriage between a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot, about which the Greek family were not informed. (This wedding is described in more detail in the following chapter.) Usually, the wedding party is a large and extremely expensive event, its scale being determined by the personal preferences of the couple and their parents, their combined financial resources, and the number of kin on both sides who are resident in Britain and who

must therefore be invited.

Invitations to a wedding are delivered by hand whenever possible. The parents of the bride and groom take the opportunity to visit and talk to those relatives they rarely see before the wedding, as they usually have little time for such socialising on the day itself. Like other celebratory occasions mentioned, those invited can be categorised according to whether they are linked as kin and/or affines, close neighbours or Turkish work associates. Here these same categories apply, but they are extended. At a wedding, there are two groups of kin and affines to be invited, (say, 500 people including children), two groups of neighbours (say, 10-60 people), and the work acquaintances of both the bride and groom and of their respective parents. The latter are much more numerous at a wedding party than at other occasions (a circumcision or engagement, for example). This is because a wedding provides those hosting the occasion (here I include for the moment both the couple themselves and their respective parents) with the opportunity of 'socialising' relationships whose basis is, or was initially, economic. In Chapter II, I mentioned how in the clothing industry a factory owner will personalise his or her relationship both with the manufacturer for whom he works, and with his own employees. Whether in the clothing industry or not, a Turkish Cypriot employer will invite all (or at least some) of his employees to the wedding party of his son or daughter; they, similarly, will invite him to their family weddings. In associating with the host's family, those invited are inevitably drawn into closer contact with their hosts. It is also the one occasion when individuals normally differentiated by status and income in the work context can meet, drink and talk in a purely social context. Thus it helps to bind the economic relationship between employer and employee with a social tie, and thereby to increase that sense of moral obligation and responsibility that each ideally has towards the other in the work context.

Another category consists of the guests with whom the couple, or their parents, have an economic relationship which entails the one providing a service for the other. Such relationships may be intermittent because the service itself might not be required often; or, as with the case of the woman from the council who found household A2 a house, it may not involve monetary exchange, and thus an invitation to

a düğün can be seen as a form of repayment. For example, parents might invite their son's or daughter's favourite teacher, the owners of the grocery shop they have patronised for ten years (more likely to be Greek than Turkish), or the wife's hairdresser. There are usually several non-Turkish Cypriots at the wedding: Greek Cypriot employers, West Indian co-machinists, a son's English friends from college, and so on. The fact that they are non-Muslims and non-Turks is quite irrelevant at a wedding party; unlike a circumcision or the celebration of a bayram, there is nothing at all religious about the event. Besides, the more who attend, the greater the status accorded the parents of the couple, and the more money the couple themselves are likely to receive in presents.

There are no set rules defining who pays for what at a London wedding. Given that both the boy and the girl are likely to have been saving seriously for at least a year, they are able to contribute - and indeed are expected to do so. Their respective parents do not necessarily make equal contributions, however. At the most recent wedding I attended (the daughter (e) of household A1), the bride's family bore the brunt of the expense. This was because the groom's family and kin all lived in Cyprus, he himself having come over to Britain as a student two years earlier. His parents were villagers and they simply had not got the capital to make a substantial contribution to the wedding, though his father did come over for the occasion. (Incidentally, his paternal uncle had been instrumental in arranging the marriage for him; he was connected with the girl's father in a business context.) Besides this, the majority of the guests invited were relatives and friends of the bride; thus it was only reasonable that they should contribute more.

The couple usually keep the money given in presents; some of it may be used to buy the furniture and fittings for their new house or flat. Sometimes it is put into a bank or building society account with a view to buying a house in the future; occasionally, a proportion of it is paid back to their parents to reimburse them for the amount they have spent on the wedding party, but this is rare. The couple themselves are often penniless after their düğün, so ideally they keep the money; in this way, they are able to start married life with some

capital. The amount of money involved is considerable and in London often amounts to over £1000.

This contemporary Turkish Cypriot custom of giving money to the bride and groom and presenting it in exactly the same way as the Greek Cypriots - by pinning it onto the bride's dress and the groom's suit during the wedding party - might well have its roots in Greek Cypriot culture, though it is a practice also found in some parts of mainland Turkey, (among the Çerkez (Circassians) for example).

So far the emphasis has been on the wedding party in London - the numbers invited, their relationship to their hosts, and the way in which financial responsibility for the party itself and for the couple's new house is shared out. The only differences which exist between a wedding in London and one in Cyprus in these spheres are mostly those of relative size and flexibility. In Cyprus, the party tends to be a smaller affair (100-300), with fewer non-kin invited. Guests give proportionately much less money to the bride and groom, though more emphasis is put on a girl's ceyiz (wedding trousseau) and on the boy's obtaining a house and buying the major household items. The girl is particularly responsible for the kitchen, bedroom and bathroom - in other words, the rooms where she will be spending a good deal of time. These furnishings for the house include the bed, linen, carpets, curtains, plates and cutlery, cooking utensils and cleaning aids, night clothes for her and her husband, decorative ornaments, and so on. Major and relatively luxury items, such as the fridge, a radio or television, are the boy's responsibility. Although this rigid division of responsibility does not occur in London for the practical reasons mentioned - the availability of council accommodation, the ease with which household goods may be acquired on H.P., and so on - it is still the norm in rural Cyprus.

I will now consider what actually happens in London and Cyprus on the day itself. It should be mentioned first of all that, in both countries, pre-düğün activities do not amount to very much nowadays, though traditionally they would take a week. The one pre-düğün event that is still occasionally held, even in London, is kina gecesi (henna night). This takes place on the night preceding the day of the wedding

party. Some of the bride's female kin are likely to be staying at her house, in anticipation of the festivities the following day, and her closest neighbours often take the opportunity of visiting her on this final evening. The girl's mother or aunt applies a henna paste to her right palm, which is bandaged and left overnight so that it is stained red by the morning. All those present also give her money for luck. Formerly, there would be more of an event made of the custom than this (the women would dance together), but now this is all that happens in London. A clue to the significance of henna when used on this occasion is given when one considers that the hand of a girl who is not a virgin is never hennaed. The connection between the blood of virginity (which will be lost the following night) and the red stain left by the henna, was recognised by the women themselves, or at least by the older ones who were familiar with the custom. It is interesting to note the change in significance of the same symbol here, as henna has no apparent connection with virginal blood when used on bayrams or on altı aylık. At least informants were adamant that, on these occasions, it is used only for decoration and luck. All that can be surmised from this is that it is - or traditionally was - a kind of luck with religious overtones. Henna is green in its natural state and green is the colour of Islam. Thus, there may be the implication that such luck is God-given. (Indeed, it is seen on these occasions as a sort of protective device, comparable to the maşallah-inscribed coins and the blue 'eye' beads.)

The düğün itself is a party. In London, this takes place in a hired hall and it begins at 5.30 or 6pm. As they arrive, the guests are seated in family groups, those invited by the bride on one side, and those by the groom on the other. Bottles of whisky are placed at intervals on each table, and there is beer and cola. The whisky is never in short supply, and extra bottles are always being handed out. Drinks are not served, individuals help themselves. The main meal is preceded by the meze - a Turkish style hors d'oeuvre consisting of humus, olives, salad, nuts and bread. About 6.30, when a considerable number of people have arrived, dinner is served. This usually consists of cold chicken and salad, sometimes augmented by köfte (Turkish meat balls). It is simple and not particularly Turkish, and usually supplied by an English catering company.

About an hour later, the bride is telephoned and asked to come to the hall. She has been getting ready since the morning and an elder married sister or aunt will have stayed with her until now, helping her to put on her make-up and to get dressed. She wears a white English-style wedding dress and a veil. She and her husband arrive at the hall together and make a ceremonial entry. The lights are turned off and the couple proceed up the hall, accompanied by about 12 bridesmaids and pageboys, all of whom carry candles. Two men, specially brought in for the occasion, play the davul and the zurna, as at circumcisions. The procession goes three times round the dance floor; the bride and groom sit down at a separate table; and the band begins to play in earnest. This procession does not occur in mainland Turkey, and even in Cyprus it occurs only at village weddings; but it is typical of weddings in London. As far as I can see, it has been adopted from the candlelit procession led by a Greek bride and groom on entering church, where they circle the alter three times before sitting down.

The band is always Turkish and its repertoire, though punctuated by English popular songs, is mostly traditional Turkish wedding music. If anyone could be said to act as the master of ceremonies, it is the singer of the group. He is the only individual to address the whole party in the course of the evening - and even then, it is only to comfort the bride and to encourage people to dance, and to announce the time when money will be pinned on. Despite this lack of an overall co-ordinator, there is an accepted sequence of events which gives some structure to the proceedings after the bride and groom have arrived. The immediate family of the couple dance, usually - and where possible - with their affinal partner of the same sex, beginning with the two fathers-in-law. Then mothers-in-law dance, then sisters-in-law, and so on. In this way, the close kin of both sides come together with their equivalent opposite, and make public their relationship both to the bride and groom and to each other. Dancing here is traditionally Turkish: arms outstretched, fingers clicking, movement from the hips and with the stomach, the upper part of the body remaining relatively still.

This joining together of the two sides is also the time when money is collected for the band. The two men hired to play the davul

and zurna are paid separately, but money for the band is collected on the dance floor. Individuals (mostly the nuclear family of the bride and groom) come and stuff money into the pockets, collars and sleeves of the dancers - a £1 on each. At the end of each dance, the money is collected and presented to the band, and another couple go on the floor. Finally, after about an hour, the bridal couple themselves dance. After this, everyone is encouraged to join in, the rest of the guests having spent their time up to now eating, drinking, and going to different tables to talk to those kin who live too far away for them to see in normal circumstances. Children, both boys and girls, charge about the hall quite independently. At about 10pm, the couple themselves stand up and the adult guests form a queue and, one by one, pin money on the dress of the bride and the suit of the groom. No-one gives less than £5 and many give £10 or more. They congratulate the couple, and are offered a cigarette and, as at the engagement, a bag of sugared almonds or a macaroon. This is in lieu of a piece of the cake which, though many-tiered, could not be cut so as to ensure that all the guests received a piece. (The cake is kept by the couple and offered to those who visit them in their new home after the wedding.) Once the money has been pinned on, the guests begin to go home. The newly-married couple stand at the door to say goodnight to those who leave.

Although this is the end of the düğün for the guests, it is not the end for the couple themselves, as the marriage must now be consummated. It is no longer usual for the bride to have to show the wedding sheet to her parents and in-laws as evidence of her virginity, but even in London this custom may be followed if the couple are spending the first night with their parents/in-laws. It is still believed that the loss of virginity is accompanied by a loss of blood and, as mentioned in Chapter IV (p.145), if there is no blood a husband may seek a doctor's advice in order to find out whether or not his wife was a virgin. Traditionally, divorce was automatic in the absence of blood and, even today, the threat of an immediate divorce, and the shame a girl would bring on herself and her family if she were ever discovered to have engaged in pre-marital sex, are enough to make her refrain from doing so. If Britain's relatively permissive society

has effected any adaptive response on the part of Turkish Cypriots as regards the sexuality of their womenfolk, it has been to increase the emphasis on the importance of a girl's virginity prior to marriage and her sexual chastity at all times.

Before proceeding, the following point should be reiterated. I could quote many exceptions to the norms of the registration and wedding parties presented here. For example, although the registration is generally a far grander and more significant occasion in Cyprus than in London, this is not always the case. I stressed in Chapter I that I was concerned primarily with working-class Turks in England and with the 'ordinary' people in Cyprus. In this way, I hoped to avoid the continual qualification that would be necessary to account for the practices of middle-class and urban Turks. I merely restate this now because it is especially true of marriage customs. Thus, among a small group of urban, professional Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, registration and wedding party are often held on the same day, as is common in England. This group would also deny that marriages are in any way arranged by dünürcü, and would assert that, at most, they encourage their children to meet and socialise with the children of their friends. One could give many examples. My object in mentioning such differences at all is merely to remind the reader that, even though my discussion of engagement and wedding parties has been both brief and very generalised, differences exist not just between London and Cyprus, but also between different sections of the Turkish Cypriot population within these countries.

The main differences between a wedding party in London and one in Cyprus can now be summarised. If one leaves aside organizational differences such as the time of day it starts (in Cyprus they begin in mid-afternoon since public transport is unavailable late in the evening), then there are three spheres in which obvious differences are discernible.

(i) Economic extravagance

The overriding impression of a London wedding party is its scale and extravagance - the numbers invited, the large meal, the bottles of whisky on the tables, the very public method of paying the band, the pinning of money onto the clothes of the bride and groom. This is,

of course, a relative extravagance. In Cyprus, more or less the same things happen, but on a much reduced scale. At the village wedding I attended in 1976, there were fewer guests (approximately 150), as only those kin who lived within easy travelling distance attended. Apart from immediate neighbours, there were very few non-kinsmen present. A hall was hired and a band played so that people could pin money on the bride and groom, but food and drink were not provided for everyone. After the public viewing in the hall, most of the guests left and only the bride and groom's closest relatives were invited back to the bride's house to eat and drink. There was no whisky, only beer.

The reason for this difference is obvious: Turks in Cyprus simply do not have the capital to put on the sort of display which has come to be normal practice here. In Cyprus, a wedding party is simply an occasion when kin gather to celebrate a marriage. In London, it is more than this - it is an exercise in conspicuous consumption and a claim to status. This claim is an acknowledged one; weddings are continual topics of conversation and a good wedding is not only talked about for long afterwards, and compared with others, but it is attended by all those whom the hosting families want to impress, including, of course, each other. Thus, in London, a wedding party is a statement both to oneself and to the outside world of "what we can afford" and, therefore, "how far we have come". A man can buy a house in the country and fill it with expensive furniture, but the number of people who will see it is limited. A wedding, on the other hand, is 'seen' by practically everyone he knows, and is therefore an effective way of demonstrating his economic status. Of course, the lavishness of the affair is never explained in quite these terms by the parents of the couple. They are "just doing the best they can" for their son or daughter. (Although some of the younger second generation would complain about how expensive weddings were, and how foolish it was of their parents to spend so much on them, they were less frequently heard to complain when their turn to be married came.)

(ii) Sexual division

Despite the importance attached to a woman's sexual chastity in London, there does not exist any rigid division of the sexes, either

at work or in the home. This is reflected at a wedding party. Dancing with a partner of the same sex is quite normal in London, but it is not the norm. After the exhibition dances between newly established affines of the same sex, men and women dance together, whether with their respective spouses or not. Indeed, weddings are the one time when men and women can openly 'flirt' and - usually - get away with it. The rules are somewhat relaxed, especially for the unmarried who always go in hope of meeting their ideal partner, and therefore making a 'love marriage'. This familiarity is not observable in Cyprus, at least in the rural areas. The only couple to dance together at the village wedding I attended were the bride and bridegroom; they were also the only couple to eat together. Apart from them, the women and children ate first and separately; only when the tables had been cleared and the women had moved did the men sit down. This sexual division is, of course, a reflection of the greater separation between the sexes in Cyprus in all spheres of life.

(iii) Flexibility - a characteristic of London ceremonies

As mentioned above, there are no rules in London defining who should pay for what part of the party, what the bride's çeyiz should consist of, or how, if at all, the groom should go about obtaining a house. Everything is done by negotiation after a consideration of how much each family can reasonably afford, or borrow. A couple who have been living in England for 15 years, and who have done reasonably well here, will be able to contribute a great deal more than a family resident here only two years, or living in Cyprus. (In the case of such a discrepancy, the family footing the bill does not hesitate to make public the fact that it is doing so.) In Cyprus, however, it is still expected that the boy's family pay for all the parties (nişan, nikâh and düğün), that he should obtain a house and that the girl should furnish it, whatever their respective fortunes. Because in Cyprus a couple cannot so easily accumulate houshold goods as they go along, the rules relating to their financial responsibilities before marriage are consequently spelt out more exactly than in England.

Return to Ritual

Before attempting further analysis of the ritual occasions described above, it might be useful to list them once more.

National and religious days:	Muslim feast of sacrifice (Kurban bayram) Celebration at end of Ramazan (Şeker bayram) New Year Christmas
Individual life-crisis rituals:	Six month day (Altı aylık) Days commemorating a death or special event, when the mevlût or Koran is read Circumcision (Sünnet)
Rituals creating affines:	Engagement (Nişan) Registration (Nikâh) Wedding party (Düğün)

Weddings, as mentioned previously, are also life-crisis rituals; the above categorisation is arbitrary and I will not attempt to organise my analysis in terms of it.

I begin with a consideration of Leach's approach to ritual as expounded in his book, Culture and Communication. (1976) Leach does not dwell on the merits of different definitions of the term but refers, where relevant, to 'religious' ritual (p.85) or describes the ritual in question in terms of its ostensive purpose. Thus, there are 'puberty rites', 'weddings', 'funerals', 'healing rituals', and so on. (p.34) Leach sees all rituals, whether they have a religious reference or not, as being used for two things: to act as boundary markers in social time, (that is, to mark status changes in the life cycle of individuals and/or groups), and to communicate information. "We engage in rituals in order to transmit collective messages to ourselves." (p.45) It is this communicative aspect of ritual that I am particularly interested in, and in the paragraphs that follow I shall consider what the ritual occasions described above communicate about the organization of Turkish Cypriot society in London, Turkish values and norms, and the individual's sense of identity in this country. At the end of the chapter, I shall briefly discuss the possible reasons for the general lack of ritual among Turkish Cypriots here, and the lack of religious rituals in particular.

Rather than re-examine and analyse in turn each of the ritual occasions mentioned, I will look at the different sorts of information which, in various ways and to a greater or lesser extent, are communicated by all of them.

1. First, all the ritual occasions mentioned above are public declarations of significant events and cultural identities. They are all held to celebrate phases in one of three cycles: the Muslim lunar year (Kurban and Şeker bayram), the European (Christian) solar year (Christmas, New Year), and the individual's life (six month day, circumcision, marriage, death). Thus, they are markers in social time, the individual life-cycle events occurring without reference to annual cycles, and the two bayrams changing their (solar) dates every year in accordance with the Muslim calendar. The individual is reminded, through his participation in these events, that he is part of these three systems, distinct in ritual, though not in life. However little overt religious symbolism or activity there may be on a bayram, the fact that the great religious bayrams continue to be celebrated in England, and for the most part in a traditional manner (the making of special foods, wearing new clothes, the idea that men should be visiting the mosque) defines Turkish Cypriots here as Muslims, albeit lapsed ones. The increasing tendency to celebrate Christmas, New Year (also a traditional Turkish bayram), and of course to take a holiday on the other English bank holidays and Sundays, defines them in their role as British citizens living in Britain. With the exception of weddings, all the individual life-crisis rituals are Turkish in their form, even though the practice itself (circumcision, for example) may be Islamic in origin. Weddings might be better described as 'Cypriot' in form. In terms of identities and affiliations which are being ritually expressed, the individual is declaring himself as Muslim, British resident, Turk and Cypriot in the celebration of these events.

2. Secondly, in celebrating these ritual occasions, the individual's social universe is defined and momentarily illuminated. All the occasions discussed above involve gatherings of people whose numbers differ according to the event, but whose composition always overlaps. A family hosting the above occasions would meet all its acquaintances in the

course of them. The purpose of each ritual defines its form and it is this form which, to some extent, determines who is invited. Thus, non-Muslims are not invited to circumcisions, men are not invited to a six month day, no-one but the close kin and friends of someone who has died will be informed of the time of the mevlût, and so on. But all 'significant' individuals in the hosting families' networks are invited to a wedding party. This is the one time when there are no barriers placed on who comes, by reason of religion, ethnic identity, or the relative closeness of a kin connection. Interestingly, the wedding party is also cosmopolitan in form. It lacks any religious symbolism, yet includes symbols adapted from its Western, Christian equivalent - the white wedding dress, bridesmaids and pageboys, the wedding cake. The event also has common Cypriot features - the candlelit procession, the pinning on of money. And, like its symbolism, those invited are of heterogenous origin - there are inevitably some Greek Cypriots, West Indians, and at least the occasional English family present. It is as if the ritual itself is expressing the fact that Turkish Cypriots cannot afford to be an isolated minority in London. They must incorporate others and be incorporated by them economically, and because an instrumental relationship is ideally combined with a social tie, non-Turks are incorporated on a social level also.

The shifting composition of those attending the occasions put on by any one family highlights the fact that there is no one principle ordering and organising society. There is no one central basis for their coming together, neither ethnicity, agnatic nor bilateral descent, nor affinity. The relative closeness of one family to another is very important; so, too, at weddings is the patron-client-type relationship, established in the spheres of work and/or business. The structure of Turkish Cypriot society in Britain, at this level at least, can perhaps best be seen as a collection of nuclear families, each family relating to others in an unbounded network which changes its composition through time - as affines and potentially useful acquaintances are added, and neighbours who move out of the area, or who have ceased to provide a service, drop out. The individual is placed first within his nuclear family household, and then in an ever-widening network of kin and acquaintances whose relative significance for him is expressed in the frequency with which he meets them in everyday life and at the

ritual occasions they attend along with himself.

3. The individual is made aware of his basic identity as a Turk in a number of ways. I mentioned above that the life-crisis rituals (with the exception of weddings) were explicitly Turkish in their symbolism. Weddings are important here, not because of their symbolism and form, which is not particularly Turkish, but because they are the occasions attended the most often by the greatest number of people. Although there may be non-Turks present, the ratio of Turkish Cypriot to non-Turkish Cypriot is still likely to be in the region of 30:1 (this is a very approximate figure, based on five weddings I attended where both bride and groom were Turkish Cypriot). In the summer, a family might attend a wedding or an engagement party every two or three weeks; although they are held throughout the year, the winter months are generally quieter. No other event regularly draws so many Turkish people together. There are the very occasional crowd-drawing occasions such as the visit of a famous Turkish singer or, even more rarely, of a Turkish politician. (Ecevit, the then Turkish Prime Minister, visited Callaghan, then Foreign Affairs Minister, after the Greek coup in 1974, and spoke to many thousands of Turks at Alexandra Palace.) But apart from these occasions, only wedding celebrations and the Turkish cinema draw large numbers of Turks together at one time.[1] Attending an engagement or wedding party imparts a sense of belonging to a larger whole, a sense which is otherwise lacking due both to the dearth of events organised specifically for Turks, and to the absence of any organization which Turkish Cypriots see as representing them.

4. Finally, and very generally, these ritual occasions are essential to the continuation of social life as it is. Bayrams, circumcisions, mevlûts, weddings, all allow kin living in different parts of London, and indeed England, to meet and renew their ties with one another, and exchange news and gossip. For the young, they are times when the

[1] In a sense, going to the Turkish cinema is a sort of ritualised activity for Turkish Cypriots in London and one which involves the young men, who opt out of many other family-centred activities in order to spend time with their peers. I will not attempt to argue that periodic visits to the Turkish cinema constitute real 'rituals', however, as this would, I feel, be extending the definition of the term unnecessarily far. There is a difference between occasions such as weddings, where the main activity is interaction among the guests, and events such as cinema visits and concerts, where the audience is composed of individuals or small groups who only share an interest in the performance, there being only minimal structured interaction amongst themselves.

routine of life is broken and on some occasions - at wedding celebrations, for example - the rules governing relations between the sexes are slightly relaxed. Those intent on marriage can look for a partner, their parents meanwhile discussing with other parents the suitability of so-and-so's son or daughter. Thus, Turk generally marries Turk. Stories and gossip about others are exchanged, reputations - including financial reputations - are established and broadcast; a concensus of what is morally right and wrong, and an understanding of what constitutes success and failure in life, are maintained to a considerable degree. Those who attend and participate are themselves declaring that the purpose and form of the ritual are relevant and functional. Some of the details of the rituals themselves (hennaing the hands, for example) may not be practised so frequently in London because of the associations such customs have come to have here;[1] but the rituals themselves continue to be performed. They merely become, like the people themselves, 'adapted' to circumstances and attitudes prevailing in the country they have made their home.

Turkish Cypriots in London: A Secular Society?

Not only are Turkish Cypriot ceremonies lacking in ritual elaboration and symbolic complexity, but the actors rarely have any satisfactory explanation for the symbolic elements that do exist. Note that there was no 'folk' explanation for the eating of helva after a mevlût, the making of special foods on bayrams, or the sugared almonds given to guests at a wedding. Individual explanations came in the form of on-the-spot rationalisations, unless the informant was very old, in which case it would appear that she (or he) was drawing on what she at least believed to be an accepted body of theory. That Turkish Cypriots here cannot explain the symbolic content of such activities is partly related to the fact that few of the ritual specialists - that is, the oldest generation - have migrated and settled in Britain. Thus, those who are the most able to explain, however idiosyncratically, the few symbolic acts whose meaning is not explicit are not here to pass this information on to the young. Not that symbols automatically ceased to be used when they can no longer be explained - a symbol whose function is implicit may 'last' much longer than one whose function is explicit and

[1] Henna is seen as rather old fashioned by younger people when used as a skin decoration, although it is still used by young women to dye and condition their hair.

obvious. The latter will be more susceptible to changes in the external environment; if an association is known to exist between the reality a symbol expresses and the symbol itself, then changes in the former will affect the latter, which is then likely to be 'updated'. Not so with symbols whose significance is not explicit or obvious; they are not likely to change overnight, because the connection between them and reality is implicit and invariably complex, there being no one-to-one relation between the symbol and the one, or several, things symbolised. Besides, a symbolic form, be it an act, a verbal expression or a material thing, through being mystified and having multiplex associations may act as a powerful force on action and thought, legitimising, and thus maintaining, to some extent at least, 'life' as it is. (Having said this, I should also add that, if, say, the food customs referred to above do express fundamentals about the society, then I, the analyst, have had no more success at giving them a plausible explanation than informants themselves.) The inability of informants to interpret their actions or the significance of certain materials (food, henna) should not therefore surprise us.

What I think it is rather more important to explain, however, is the lack of social structure expressed in the ritual occasions discussed. Why is there apparently little more to any of these occasions than a party? Apart from marriage, which by definition creates affinal relationships, there are no special relationships created between participants in the other rituals. A Turkish Cypriot boy has no circumcision patron (kivre), unlike some mainland Turkish boys who do have just such a patron; children have no godparents. The few special roles that are assumed, exist for the duration of the ritual only; a senior man puts the rings on the fingers of the boy and girl at a nişan, but he has no special relationship with them as a result of this. Even at a wedding, there are no special roles assigned; no-one features prominently as an organiser except, ironically, the band leader, who is about the only person who has nothing more than a financial interest in being there, insofar as he is simply being paid to provide entertainment. In short, the rituals that do exist call for few specialist roles, and invariably bring together an amorphous collection of people who are related to each other and to their hosts in a number of different ways. In other words, the rituals which have been described above do not communicate social structure. Following Bloch (1977) I am not equating social

structure with society here; as he says, if one did, it would be nonsense to talk about one society having more or less. In noting that among the Hazda (African hunters and gatherers studied by Woodburn) there is a lack of social structure communicated by ritual, Bloch is perceiving social structure as existing on two levels. There is that which is made apparent in ritual:

> "For example, <u>rites de passage</u> are the rare occasions when it is possible actually to hear people giving lists of rights and duties, and even quite literally to see roles being put on individuals as in the case of ceremonial clothing or bodily mutilation. Similarly, descent groups gathered for ancestor worship presided over by elders acting as priests, can actually be photographed, and what is more, it is extremely probable that at some time in the proceedings it will actually be said that they 'go on for ever' and are 'one body'." (Bloch 1977:286)

For Bloch, then, social structure exists in ritual. It also exists on the ground, where one finds,

> "... such groupings as agricultural cooperative groups, local groups such as Nuer villages and cattle camps, social relations, such as those of patron and client as described by Hobart, landlord and share-croppers in India, (which) have no place in the classification system expressed in ritual;..." (Bloch 1977:286-87)

Social structure in the first sense is thus a sort of "invisible system created by ritual" (1977:287) and, of this, both the Hazda and Turkish Cypriots in London have little. Bloch cites the Balinese as an example of the opposite, a people whose abundance of groups, sub-groups and specialised roles is communicated in their many ritual activities. On considering what he admits to be limited evidence, he makes a correlation between the amount of social structure-type communication a society has and the degree of instituted - and institutionalised - hierarchy it has. He does not elaborate this because it is peripheral to his main theme, which is the distinction between the social structure of ritual and the on-the-ground organization observable in everyday life. Nonetheless, it is an interesting idea with which to end, since it fits the Turkish Cypriot case exactly. There is no instituted hierarchy among Turkish Cypriots, there is neither a formal nor an informal system of age grading, nor is there any instituttionalised hierarchy in the sense of individuals invested with political, or even moral, authority over others. This is not to say that there is no social structure in Bloch's everyday sense. I have tried to show both in this chapter

and in the preceding one that the individual is firmly rooted within the context of the nuclear family household, and thereafter in a wider, primarily kin-based 'ethnic' community, whose existence and relevance is manifested at a number of extraordinary occasions (engagements, weddings, the Turkish cinema). It is rather that Turkish Cypriots in London lack a formal ideology of social structure which, in other societies, assigns rights, duties and responsibilities to individual members, and which delineates social groups within a ritual context. What is interesting is that there is both a lack of social structure in ritual and a lack of any instituted or institutionalised hierarchy among the Turkish Cypriot population in Britain. Weight is therefore given to Bloch's well-argued thesis that a correlation exists between social structure in ritual and hierarchy, and my own question about the lack of ritual elaboration among Turkish Cypriots can at least be tentatively answered.

* * *

One final point might be made here. It is relevant both to this chapter and to the preceding one, as it concerns the part that women play in the ritual practices described. It will have been observed that the occasions celebrating birth and death (the mevlût, Koran readings and the six month ceremonies for babies) are usually performed by women. If men do attend (in the case of a mevlut for a close relative, for example), they may be present but will be separated from the women, usually remaining in a next door room and listening to the chanting through the open door. Of the life-crisis rituals, only circumcision and marriage concern both men and women as organisers and participators. How might this best be explained?

I will first turn to Edwin Ardener's conception of women as a 'muted group'. (1975a,b) Ardener uses the term 'muted' to describe groups whose own model of society is at variance with, and therefore its expression inhibited by, that held by the dominant group within the system. He suggests that women characteristically form such a group, and are inclined to be inarticulate when expressing themselves through the language of the dominant group. Indeed, because of the absence of a suitable code through which to express their view of the world (including their place within it), Ardener suggests that they

might lack the facility to raise to conscious level their unconscious thoughts. This being so, they might find a different medium for expression - through symbolism in art, myth and ritual. This is how Ardener accounts for the preponderance of women in ritual, as performers and participators. He substantiates his hypothesis by recounting a myth held by the Bakweri people of Cameroon, West Africa. (1975a)

While not denying that the concept of the muted group may be potentially useful, and could be used both to describe and to analyse women and other 'dominated' sections of a population[1] I am not certain that it is applicable in the Turkish Cypriot case. It was my aim in Chapter IV to point out that the dominant male model of Turkish Cypriot society, which defines the woman's place as the home (or home-like environment), still prevails for Turkish Cypriots in London. So, too, assessment of a woman's social status is still based more on her fulfilment of her domestic role as wife and mother, and on her reputation for sexual chastity, than on her earning power or astuteness in business. Women, I believe, continue to share this model of themselves to a great extent. Indeed, they are their own worst enemies - it is the gossip of other women that is the strongest sanction against bad, 'permissive' behaviour; men very rarely have to interfere to reprimand or punish an erring daughter or wife. Were women, since their arrival in Britain, to have evolved a model of their place in society which was at variance with the men's model of them, then we would at least be justified in looking for an alternative women's model expressed in ritual or symbolism.

Discussing spirit possession cults in Somalia and other parts of Africa, Lewis argues that women use spirit possession to express their subordinate position vis-à-vis men, to insinuate their interests and to achieve ends which they cannot obtain directly. (1971:75ff) This would seem to be a good example of women expressing their model of society through the medium of ritual. There are no parallels to be found here with Turkish Cypriot women in London, however. This is perhaps related to the fact that they voice their complaints most volubly when they have them, and they exercise a considerable amount of decision-

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[1] In the same volume (S.Ardener (ed) 1975), Judith Okely discusses Gypsies as a muted group in relation to majority British society.

making power in the household. Indeed, for most domestic matters, they are the principal decision-makers, all the more so in London because of the sense of security generated by their being wage-earners and (if all else fails) living in a welfare state. It is possible that Turkish Cypriot women are not muted 'enough' to qualify for inclusion in Ardener's muted group model. Certainly, it would be difficult to find a 'woman's model' being expressed in the rituals they are mostly concerned with.

I would suggest that one might more fruitfully return to the 'women are to nature as men are to culture' argument (Chapter IV, p.129) to answer my original question: Why are men excluded from, and women the principal organisers of, rituals at the beginning and end of life, but not those which fall in between (circumcision and marriage)?

The nature-culture argument is useful here because it can explain the division of men's and women's ritual responsibilities. The difference between birth and death ceremonies and those which celebrate circumcision and marriage is that the latter concern changes in the life status of already 'socialised' individuals, who are merely passing from one social status to another. The fact that they take place at all, and the manner in which they are celebrated, is culturally determined; parents choose to circumcise/marry their children, and both occasions are therefore part of their culture, which is also of their creation. But man does not choose to be born or - usually - to die. These events do not take place in cultural time; rather they mark the beginning and the end of cultural time and of the individual's 'social' existence. Thus, women, associated as they are with nature and natural states, take care of those ceremonies which celebrate the beginning and end of life; whereas both sexes - and specifically the men - are involved with circumcision and marriage, as these ceremonies merely transport the individual from one culturally determined life status to another.

CHAPTER VI: INTERETHNIC RELATIONS: POLITICAL ADAPTATION IN LONDON AND CYPRUS

In this chapter, a different type of adaptation will be examined: that which is taking place in the sphere of ethnic relations. Referring to Salzman's theory that the lineage model acts for some societies as "a social structure in reserve" (1978:63), I mentioned in Chapter I that Turkish Cypriot ethnicity in London can also be seen as an ideology - one which can be utilised at any given moment, but which can also be forgotten if circumstances dictate that an advantage lies in such a strategy. This hypothesis was not substantiated by data in Chapter I and, although various references have been made to the way in which ethnicity is played down in certain circumstances - at work, for example - I want to look more specifically now at how and in what sort of situations, and towards what ends, the ethnic ideology is manipulated. Thus, the relations that Turkish Cypriots have with other ethnic groups, and especially with Greek Cypriots, will be considered in some detail.

Comparing interethnic relations in London and Cyprus is particularly interesting; since the 1974 war in Cyprus, relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus have been quite different from those between the same two groups in London. Each population has adapted to the conditions in the external environment, and this has affected their relationship with each other. It is this difference that I will attempt to describe and account for in this chapter.

As has already been stated, the peak years of Cypriot migration to Britain for both Turks and Greeks were 1960 and 1961. Oakley estimates that in these two years just over 25,000 Cypriots migrated to the United Kingdom. (1972:28) However, by 1962, numbers had already dropped to pre-1960 levels (4,000 p.a. maximum), and they continued to decline steadily through the 1960s. Even by 1963, then, when intercommunal fighting broke out in Cyprus, the majority of would-be emigrants were already settled in Britain. Thus, the vast majority of Turks now resident here did not personally experience the hostility and conflict which characterised the period between 1963 and 1974 in Cyprus, either

because they had migrated to Britain before that date, or because they were subsequently born, or at least brought up, in Britain. Cyprus 1963 also saw the beginning of a physical separation between the two communities: the Turks moved into enclaves in order to better protect themselves and more adequately obstruct Greek desires for enosis (union with Greece). This separation, together with the economic restrictions placed on Turks between 1963 and 1967, increased feelings of insecurity and allowed resentment to build.

But the emigrant of the 1950s and early 1960s experienced none of this first hand. He had not migrated from a Turkish enclave, but from a village which may have been ethnically mixed; in any case, as a member of a minority population, he would normally speak Greek as a second language. It was this state of affairs which allowed and encouraged the first Turkish migrants to Britain to turn to Greeks, some of whom were well established in business by that time, for employment and for essential services when there were no Turks available. At the time, then, this initial interdependence of the two communities might be seen as the result of a tendency for early settlers to build on pre-existing patterns of relationships in an otherwise alien environment. But why, one might ask, has it continued to the present? For, despite the sensitisation of group feelings at times of particular crisis in Cyprus - during the fighting of 1967 and the war of 1974, for example - Turks have maintained firm work and business relations with Greeks in London.

It may help clarify the problem if we consider the present situation in Cyprus. By this I mean the situation obtaining on the island when the first fieldwork visit was made, June-August 1976. Since the July 1974 war and particularly since the adoption, in September 1975, of the agreement for an official population exchange, relations between Greeks and Turks on an individual level have been almost non-existent. In a few villages, a handful of Greeks have remained in their homes and live alongside the Turks, though cut off from their kin and the Greek Cypriot majority, their numbers are decreasing as they too move south. There are, therefore, very few Turks in present day Cyprus who have any direct contact with Greeks, and it could be argued that relations are no longer based on ethnic criteria at all, since they are conducted through the formal, bureaucratic structures

of de facto statehood. Of primary importance, however, is the fact that there has been a war, and this has resulted in an almost complete termination of personal relations between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus.

But it appears that the fluctuating nature of Greek-Turkish relations on Cyprus since 1963 has not had any profound consequences for interethnic relations in Britain. Here, as I mentioned in Chapter II, Turks have maintained work and business ties with Greeks for several practical reasons. To begin with, there are still not enough Turks in sufficiently varied occupations for them to be ethnically self-reliant, and Greeks continue to be chosen as work mates and business partners. This is partly because the type of relationship established by the early settlers has continued to be economically viable for both groups. It would have been detrimental to their combined interests if, for example, the recent war and consequent partition of the island had caused them to terminate relations in London.

This is not to suggest, however, that Greeks and Turks are interdependent at the group level. Greeks have to turn to Turks much less often than Turks do to Greeks. There are approximately four times as many Greeks in London as Turks. Not only do their greater numbers make them more self-sufficient occupationally, but also the fact that a higher percentage of Greeks own their own businesses means that they are more likely to be employers of Turks, and not their employees. Moreover, the extent of interdependence, and the form this takes, will vary according to a number of other factors: for example, the percentage of Greeks to Turks in a neighbourhood; the number of years they have lived as neighbours in Britain; the situation in Cyprus at the time - all these will influence the nature of Turkish-Greek relations in London.

Nonetheless, interdependence, even if often unequal, does exist between Turks and Greeks as Cypriots and is based in part on shared roles in the work context, which makes discrimination on ethnic grounds untenable. I have described in Chapter II how the patron-client-type relationships which are built up between employer and employee develop

develop independently of ethnic status. As I mentioned then, were a factory owner employing both Greeks and Turks to begin openly to discriminate against certain workers on the basis of their respective ethnic identities, he could jeopardise his business. Not only would others of the same ethnic identity leave, but his reputation as an employer, and his economic viability as a contractor, would suffer. The same arrangement exists in a number of other occupations, where one group depends on the other for its patronage, or for providing an essential service. Thus, one finds a Greek wholesale greengrocer visiting a Turkish family in the evenings and selling on credit; and another Greek calling on Sunday afternoon with carpet catalogues. It is this flexibility in hours and the lack of distinction made on ethnic grounds that ensures these small entrepreneurs a faithful clientele, Greek and Turk.

On a business level, then, and especially in areas inhabited by Greeks and Turks, it would be economically inexpedient for both parties if Turks did not patronise Greek businesses as customers or employees. I would argue that the implicit recognition of this has stopped the various political crises in Cyprus from causing serious conflict between individuals in Britain. (Here we must confine ourselves to individuals; for conflict does exist on the group level as represented by political organisations.) Cultural differences which could have been used to activate political divisions have not been appealed to, at least not by Turks. Instead, cultural familiarity has allowed and encouraged the continuation of interethnic ties. Thus, Turks maintain that they shop at the nearest Greek corner store because they eat the same food as Greeks, though in fact most vegetables could just as easily be bought from a West Indian shop, while the staples could be purchased more cheaply at an English supermarket. This element of choice, positively exercised by Turks <u>for</u> continued contact, is also partly responsible for the tendency of both groups to remain concentrated in the same types of employment. Shared experience of tailoring and dressmaking in Cyprus encouraged the early settlers to move into the clothing industry in Britain, a niche they have continued to exploit successfully. A preference for self-employment has also encouraged Turk and Greek to move into the service industries - catering in particular, but also wholesaling, retailing, hairdressing, shoemaking, minicabbing - and

these occupations have the additional advantage of catering for, and in turn being patronised by, the entire Cypriot population.

However, it is not merely a question of playing down differences so that the basic task of earning a living can continue without interruption. Rather, it is a case of drawing a line which allows for contact and co-operation in one sphere, while tabooing contact in another; and thus maintaining ethnic distinctiveness without evoking xenophobic sentiments. For, given the constant interaction of individuals, friendships inevitably develop across the ethnic boundary at school, at work, and between neighbours. In most cases, these remain 'public', confined to the classroom, factory or street. It is rare indeed to find Greek Cypriots visiting Turkish Cypriots in their homes on a purely social basis, even if the families concerned have been acquainted for years. But occasionally, often due to unusual circumstances, relationships do go further than this and it is then that the lines delineating respective ethnic boundaries are drawn with renewed vigour. Not that social condemnation necessarily serves as a corrective to the individuals concerned, but like other forms of punishment, it acts as an example to would-be transgressors.

The effectiveness of such sanctions is attested by the fact that, in 18 months of research, I learned of only three marriages between a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot, though I know of several cases where English girls have been successfully incorporated into a Turkish Cypriot family by marrying a son. One of the Turkish-Greek marriages is particularly interesting as it occurred recently (in September 1976 - the other two both took place over 15 years ago), and the bizarre nature of this event illustrated its uniqueness. The couple, a Turkish girl[1] and a Greek boy, were both in their early twenties. They had both come to London as children and had known each other for eight years prior to marriage. Although both families knew about the friendship, only the girl's parents were informed of the wedding, as it was feared that the groom's family might attempt to disrupt the proceedings if they were to be told. Indeed, when they heard that the wedding had taken place, all relations with their son and his wife were severed.

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[1] The sister of an old school friend of the wife of household A2.

Due partly to the expected communal and familial opposition, the marriage ceremony itself was not held according to either Greek or Turkish tradition, but took place in an English church, neutral ground and the only place where the respective ethnic identities of the couple would not be an issue. Nonetheless, only the bride's kin attended the reception, though several of the groom's Greek friends were present. Apart from these Turks and Greeks, the guests included English, Irish, Scottish, Pakistani and West Indian friends; while the bride's kin included her Armenian and English in-laws. A Greek band played Greek, Turkish, English, and even Spanish songs, though English was the *lingua franca*, at least for all the young people present.

To explain how and why the marriage occurred is beyond the scope of this chapter. My aim is merely to stress that it was an occasion for which there were no rules prescribing the form it should take, and that includes the ethnic identity of the guests invited, simply because there were no precedents. It was only due to the independent nature of the girl herself, and her own family's understanding, that the marriage was even conceivable in the first place. Most relationships of this kind are never allowed to get so far, and the problem of marriage to any non-Turk, let alone to a Greek, never arises.

There is no doubt that interethnic association in the wider social environment means that boundaries have to be rigidly drawn at the familial level. The individual Englishwoman can be incorporated into the family as a Turk as long as she is prepared to accept, and to some extent adopt, Turkish ways; but the incorporation of a Greek girl into a Turkish family, or vice versa - with all the opposition this would meet from the girl's family (whether she were Turkish or Greek) - is seen as neither socially possible nor ethnically desirable.

Ethnicity, as the above example indicates, is a relative and a dynamic phenomenon. That is to say, the nature of the relationship between any two ethnic groups can, over time and in different environments, alter gradually or even be changed suddenly and consciously by the people themselves. Cultural differences which exist, or are perceived to exist, may be played down, emphasised, even created, depending on the nature of the relationship that each is trying to establish

with the other. Of course, it may happen that a relationship which is ideal for one group is not at all ideal for the other. This is a point to which I will return. For now, it should merely be noted that the Greeks with whom I am personally acquainted in London tend to be those with Turkish neighbours, work mates or business associates, and may for this reason be unrepresentative of the majority who come into contact with Turks less often. Nonetheless, by comparing the nature of Turkish-Greek relations in London and Cyprus, the dynamic aspect of ethnicity, overlooked in many ethnic studies, can be illustrated.

Interethnic Relations: Cypriot and Mainland Turks

Interestingly, the Cyprus of 1976 presents us with another example, complementary in form, of this ethnic dynamism. Here the cultural differences between Cypriot Turk and mainland Turk, non-existent to the uninitiated observer, are emphasised and exaggerated by Turkish Cypriots in order to justify their exclusive claim to certain resources which seem to be both scarce and, at present, unjustly distributed. A comparison of Cypriot/mainland Turkish relations in London, though difficult to assess because of their unobtrusive character, nonetheless confirms the importance of local environmental conditions in determining the nature of ethnic relations.

After the intervention of mainland Turkish forces on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority in July 1974, and the establishment of the boundary which now divides Turkish and Greek Cyprus, there followed a period of population movement. In ones and twos, and often with considerable difficulty, those Turks previously resident in the south, about 65,000 in all, moved to the security of the Turkish-held north, and the 200,000 or so Greeks who were living north of the new border moved to the south. This migration was eventually completed, at least for the majority, in September 1975 when the official population exchange took place. But whereas Turkish Cypriots had previously constituted less than 20% of the population, they now controlled 40% of the land. It was therefore imperative for the Turks to increase the population so that, apart from any political objectives, there would be enough labour, both skilled and unskilled, to set the economy on its feet. To this end, Turkish Cypriots who had migrated to London, Turkey,

Australia, and even Canada were formally invited to return to settle, and were given certain economic incentives to do so (including rent-free accommodation for two years and the assurance of a job). Although the Turkish population of Cyprus is now 160,000 - an increase of 40,000 on the pre-1974 figure - it is difficult to determine what percentage of this number is made up by those who returned. Certainly, the exodus from Britain was not very large and, although the British press (Sunday Telegraph, 5 October 1975) reported that, by October 1975, 4,000 Turks had already left Britain for Cyprus and that another 6,000 were expected to follow, it is impossible to know how many of the first group have since returned, and how many of the second ever really left. Such figures were not, to my knowledge, based on any actual statistical survey made by Turkish Cypriot officials, and the number quoted probably included many holiday makers. Turkish Cypriots in Britain successfully exploit an economic niche that gives them considerable security - security which could not easily be assured in Cyprus, then or now, despite the economic inducements and the promise of opportunities to rebuild businesses left by Greeks.

The vast majority of these migrants are likely to have come from the Turkish mainland. Officially classed as 'returnees', they may nevertheless have migrated from Cyprus many generations ago and, in historical perspective, their return represents one more phase in an exchange of populations between Turkey and Cyprus which has been going on since the first influx of Turks to the island after the Ottoman conquest of the island in 1571. In consequence, they are no longer distinguishable as Cypriots by their accent or dress. A Cypriot can usually tell a mainlander by his 'clean' pronunciation - which is much admired - whatever part of Turkey he is from. In 1976, mainlanders on Cyprus were also conspicuous by their dress: traditional village wear, which the Cypriots have now put aside in preference for more westernised styles. The women wore brightly coloured floral dresses over şalvar (long baggy pants), and a headscarf; the men can also usually be identified as mainlanders, if only by their old fashioned suits and cloth caps which replaced the fez in Turkey when the latter was banned by Ataturk in 1925.

But, for the ordinary Turkish Cypriot, neither historical

processes nor official terminology justified differentiating between this group of mainland 'returnees' and those who had come ostensibly as a work force and who were officially termed 'seasonal migrant workers'. Just as the so-called returnees do not look or sound like Cypriots, the migrant workers are not seen as being seasonal and their stay, so far as local Cypriots are concerned, is permanent. And this opinion is what matters. It is the actor's interpretation of a situation which determines attitudes and influences behaviour.

Whatever the official justification for their presence in Cyprus, the point to emphasise is that, in 1976 at least, mainland Turks were particularly noticeable, whereas other returnees were not. Thus, when the London Turk returns to Cyprus, or even visits for a holiday, he is immediately absorbed into the society at the level of kinship. He returns to his relatives as brother, son or cousin. Sometimes, young men on holiday continue to relate to each other on the basis of their 'London-ness' and can be found congregating on certain beaches; otherwise, London Turks in Cyprus never come together to form a group of any kind. Similarly, they do not differ in appearance from Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. Even though they try to look like rich tourists, this is merely part of the London image and is one way of *showing* their relatives that they are making the right decision by remaining in England. Not so with the mainlanders. Unabsorbed into Cypriot society on a kinship basis after the war, they were allocated houses in specific areas of a town, or even whole villages. This meant that they were marked out merely in terms of their settlement patterns, so that certain streets and villages became known by Turkish Cypriots as being *Türkiyeli* (mainland Turkish). The fact that practically all these people were villagers from central Anatolia and the Black Sea region, uneducated and poor, also differentiates them from Cypriots and provides the latter with grounds for prejudice and discrimination.

An irony exists here. On the one hand, the Turkish Cypriot would tell of the bravery and hardiness of the Turkish soldiers who intervened on his behalf in 1974, whose success was due to their tough training in Turkey, living in the mountains, "eating frogs and snakes". On the other hand, he made it quite clear that this was not the sort of person he wanted living next door. The mainlander is respected for

his fighting ability, but not for his cultural ingenuity ("they saw the legs off tables"), commonsense ("after two years they still ride their bicycles on the right"), or Western ways ("they wear şalvar"). This dichotomy is all pervasive. The civilised/Western category he used for himself was constantly contrasted to the uncivilised/Oriental category that is the lot of the Türkiyeli. Even the religiosity of the mainlander was used in the process of ethnic delineation ("they build mosques before schools"). This classification was strictly relative, and Turkish Cypriots do not think of all mainlanders as being uncivilised or overreligious. It is also reciprocated in this particular context, as the mainlanders thought the Cypriots were sinfully irreligious and not 'pure' Turks at all, having been exposed to the corrupting influence of the Greeks and the West generally. But the fact remains that, in 1976, there still exist these cultural differences between mainland and Cypriot Turks on Cyprus, and these were exaggerated and extended by Cypriots beyond the sphere of reality into the realm of myth.

The reasons for this are fairly obvious. They relate to perceived inequalities and ironies caused by the war, and to the indiscriminate way that rewards and punishments seemed to have been handed out. Thus, the mainlander was, for the most part, thought of as an economic parasite; as having come, not with the intent to work, but to cash in on the economic potential of post-war Cyprus. Since most things of value, from businesses to the most productive land and classier houses, tended to be in Greek hands prior to 1974, this economic potential is considerable. Those Turkish Cypriots from the south who have benefitted economically, perhaps by being allocated a larger house or more land than they originally owned, have had to pay for it in other ways. They have left their villages, their homes, often their neighbours and friends, and for the older people especially, no amount of additional land is recompense for the loss of these. The mainlander, on the other hand, was not seen as having lost or suffered in any way at all. Even though there was some loss of life among the mainland soldiers during initial phase of the war, the fact that mainlanders received benefits for which many of the Turkish Cypriots themselves were not eligible (subsidies on certain foods, for example) made them an object of

considerable resentment.[1]

I would also suggest that immediately after the war mainland Turks in Cyprus filled for the Turkish Cypriots an important cultural role, hitherto played by the Greeks: namely, that of scapegoat. As scapegoats, both mainlander and Greek, by representing the outside-in-opposition, facilitated the maintenance of ethnic distinctiveness. The fact that Turkish Cypriots and mainlanders are not naturally separated by language or religion meant that the cultural differences which did exist had to be greatly exaggerated for them to serve as efficient boundary-maintaining mechanisms. Conversely, Turkish Cypriots did not have to invent differences with Greek Cypriots to explain or justify their antagonism to them, as differences had always existed. But it was ironic to hear the occasional remark which indicated that the speaker was actually identifying himself first as a Cypriot and only secondly as a Turk. As one man said after considering the relative merits of his ethnic neighbours, past and present: "At least the Greeks were human beings..."

But the significance of this much emphasised cultural disparity, used in the ethnic demarcation process by Turkish Cypriots against their mainland neighbours, can only be grasped when the relationship between the two groups is considered in another environment. In fact, and perhaps unfortunately for our purposes, there are relatively few mainland Turks in London. There are a thousand or so Turkish students, most of whom have come straight from Turkey to complete their education. They have little prior experience of Britain. Some of them help swell the ranks of the various political organizations referred to earlier. But the ordinary Turkish Cypriot does not come into contact with such students. Neither is there contact with the 300 or so government and administrative personnel who staff the Turkish Embassy and Consulate, and the Anglo-Turkish Association. Rather, it is the working population, concentrated in the same type of employment (especially catering) and

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[1] This resentment was much less in evidence when I returned to Cyprus in October 1977, and the mainlanders were likewise much less visible. They were discarding their veils and şalvar, and moving out of the areas in which they had originally been settled whenever there was a chance of finding a better house elsewhere. I return to this development in the concluding pages of the chapter.

living in the same areas, which typifies the Türkiyeli for the Turkish Cypriot in London. This category of mainlanders, which numbers over 4,000, not including dependents, (Turkish Consulate General statistics), is merely a tiny proportion of the 850,000 Turkish mainlanders who are working in Europe at the present time. (Paine 1974:122) This means that a Cypriot family in Britain is likely to have only occasional contact with a very few mainlanders. This is not to imply that frequency of contact between two groups is necessary for the formation of ethnic attitudes. Once an ethnic stereotype has been established, it takes very little for the underlying attitudes to become self-sustaining, and they can be reinforced merely by the infrequent interaction of individuals. Incidents which are interpreted as typifying group characteristics - as defined by the stereotype - are easily relayed to the group by selective gossip.

In London, however, ethnic stereotypes are not employed very often. That is to say, although Cypriot Turks will in conversation distinguish a mainlander terminologically (by referring to him or her as a Türkiyeli), this need not have derogatory overtones - though it may, depending on the context. Thus, in normal circumstances, visiting will occur and occasional marriages will be arranged between Cypriots and mainlanders. It is only if things go wrong that ethnic differences are used to justify a breakdown in relations. To give an example: the daughter of household A1 has already been mentioned as having been registered (that is, legally married) twice to men whose only motive in marrying turned out to have been to enable them to stay in Britain. In both cases, the marriages were annulled before the wedding feasts, which would have socially legitimised the unions. The first of these marriages was to a mainland Turkish boy, the second to a Cypriot. The girl's parents explained the breakdown of the second marriage in terms of the couple's mutual incompatibility and the boy's bad character - he had only married her for his own interests and had deceived them. But although this is exactly what had happened the first time also, the breakdown of this marriage was attributed to the fact that the girl's husband had been a mainland Turk and, insofar as he showed himself to be untrustworthy and deceitful, he was typical of all mainlanders. Indeed, in retrospect, the girl's family explained the breakdown of the marriage in terms of the different values and standards they "had always thought"

obtained between islander and mainlander. The lesson they apparently learnt from this was that mainlanders should never be trusted, rather than that the motives of anyone who wanted to get married in a hurry, and who was not a British citizen, were highly suspect.

Thus, ethnic identity is made relevant by the actors themselves in situations of conflict or disagreement. The reason why an ethnic stereotype is not used at other times and on a group level is, I suggest, because Turkish Cypriots do not see the existence of mainland Turks in Britain as a threat to their own interests as individuals. Economically, they are not regarded as competitors; ideologically, they are of the same mould and are seen as, if anything, more traditional and certainly more religious. However, these characteristics are not reinterpreted as they are in Cyprus to mean 'backward' and 'uncivilised'; there is no reason to delineate the ethnic boundary with such fervour. Besides, the religiosity of the mainlanders is positively utilised by Turkish Cypriots in London when it comes to finding someone to read the mevlût or the Koran. A Turkish Cypriot family - or at least its female members - may come to know a mainland Turkish family quite well over time due to their reliance on them for this service.

I have so far discussed the relations between Turkish Cypriots and two other ethnic populations, Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks, in London and Cyprus. The larger issue has been the separate development undergone by a migrant population and its home society, and the adaptive response of both to their respective environments. Up to this point, however, only those ethnic relationships that Turks in London and Cyprus have in common have been considered. But in order to appreciate fully the complexity of the interethnic situation in London, this comparative aspect must now be set aside so that the relations of Turkish Cypriots with other groups can be briefly considered.

Interethnic Relations: Turkish Cypriots in London

Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus have had little sustained contact with minority populations other than Greeks and, of late, Turkish mainlanders, though it might be argued that over a century of contact with

the British has helped develop the 'superior culture' complex which currently plays an important part in the delineation of Cypriot-mainlander boundaries. On the whole, however, contact with people of other nationalities is minimal and has not taken place on a group level. Apart from the British on sovereign bases and the contingent of Ancient Brits (the self-defined colony of 200 or so Britons who still live in the north), the only minority population of which I am aware is a small group of Pakistanis who have settled since the 1974 war, and who now live and work among the Turks unobtrusively.

There is certainly nothing here to compare with the ethnic mosaic facing the Turkish Cypriot in London. For although Greek Cypriots and, to a much lesser extent, mainland Turks are the paramount reference groups, the mere fact that the majority of the society is neither Greek nor Turkish means that everyday contact with others is inevitable. However, because most Turks in Britain live in London, and the majority of these in boroughs with a considerable immigrant population (Haringey, Islington, Lewisham and Southwark, for example), it is not a simple matter of interacting with the English majority. Indeed, attitudes toward the English seem to be rather vague and ambivalent. On occasions they are seen to epitomise everything that is 'modern' and therefore commendable; at other times, this same modernity becomes reinterpreted as immorality, which of course is not commendable and must be guarded against. Neither of these two reactions persists as a result of knowing English people personally, however. Even those friendships that develop at school and which are not hindered by a language barrier (as relations between an Englishman and an older Turkish migrant would be), are not usually continued when the individuals concerned leave school and start working. In the case of girls, this is because of the pressures that operate to draw them back into the all-Turkish milieu once they become marriageable. As mentioned above, boys have more freedom to continue associating with their non-Turkish friends, as their activities in this pre-marital period are not circumscribed by their parents or kin. But after marriage, they too are usually drawn back into the ethnic environment, to which their wives by this time are already accustomed.

Yet, despite this uncertainty about who the English are and what

they represent, Turks have adopted many English racist attitudes toward members of other groups, particularly West Indians and Africans. Pakistanis incite less prejudice, partly because their settlement patterns do not coincide with those of Cypriots and they are therefore less visible, partly because they are Muslim, and partly because they are perceived as being 'less black'. That this prejudice has evolved in Britain is almost beyond doubt. It is unlikely that the original migrants would have had contact with black people before they came to England as there are very few black Muslims in either Turkey or Cyprus; moreover, the phraseology used to express these attitudes is the same as that used by the English themselves. Significantly, racial attitudes were often expressed in my presence, as if to say, "We're like you (English and white), not like them (foreign and black)". But this sort of ethnic stereotype used by Turks in London is of a very different order to that which is used for Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks. It is not that Turkish Cypriots see West Indians or Africans (between whom in any case they do not distinguish) as threatening to their own individual interests. They do not occupy the same economic niches and they are not even seen as constituting a moral threat, as are the English on other occasions. Rather, it is that in certain situations, notably when working with or simply getting to know English people, it is expedient for Turks to identify with the English majority, and the colour difference is the most obvious criterion for creating a common outgroup. Most Turks are also aware of the associations that the term 'immigrant' has for the English. This follows from their reading of the British press, which is mostly confined to the popular dailies - just those which are apt to sensationalise stories concerning immigrants and the Englishman's attitude to them.

It is therefore not surprising that the Turkish family, surrounded as it is by non-Turkish neighbours, does not like to think it is being classed as 'immigrant'. And again, the most obvious means of getting into the non-immigrant category is to stress that they are white. All the associations that 'black' has for the English working class are then advanced to justify this prejudice and support the ideological and cultural 'Englishness' that they ascribe to themselves. What is interesting here is not so much that group stereotypes are invoked for outsiders who have no particular relevance to Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic

group. Rather it is that Turkish Cypriots themselves have adopted those stereotypes already in use by the English majority and, in doing so, differentiate themselves from other minority groups - a status which, for that moment in time, they cease to ascribe to themselves.

Ethnicity and Change

In the above paragraphs, the ethnic relations of Turkish Cypriots in London have been compared to those of the Turkish Cypriot population in Cyprus. Even though Turks in Cyprus still tend to think of their relatives in London as mere sojourners who are working abroad for a while, and despite the fact that family disputes are still maintained between individuals in the two countries, it is true that many basic institutions of Turkish Cypriot life - including the nature of their ethnic attitudes - have been transformed by, or rather adapted to, circumstances here. It is also important to realise that ethnic attitudes, like other social institutions, have undergone changes in Cyprus since the original migrants left. It is often implicitly assumed that the home society remains static, and that it is the migrant population which, on its return, introduces new ideas and so influences the otherwise unchanging country of origin. But with Turkish Cypriots, there have been changes in both London and Cyprus, so that both populations have adapted, and for the most part differently. As has been demonstrated, in terms of ethnic relations this adaptation has taken some paradoxical turns.

Ethnicity is not, as noted earlier, a static phenomenon. This was brought home to me when I returned to Cyprus for a month in October 1977. The antagonism observable 13 months previously between Cypriot Turks and mainlanders was much less evident. This was partly due to the greater feeling of security in the Turkish north - the awareness that, after all, war would not be immediately resumed and that their homes and land were safe, at least for the time being. It was also due to the women who were acting as unifying forces, re-establishing ties on a neighbourhood level, ties which were disrupted or broken due to family mirrations during the war. Immediately after the war, the allocation of food and basic essentials to the newly-settled mainland families had caused contention in that very sphere of activity which, in normal circumstances brings women together: the domestic sphere. But by 1977,

such inequalities were all but ironed out and women had begun to depend on each other again as neighbours - what ever their country of origin. They were drawn together in being cut off from their former neighbours and kin, and by a shared uncertainty about the future. Thus, contacts were initiated and relationships built up between women - their menfolk meeting only later, sometimes (by October 1977) cementing, on the male side, a relationship between two families which had initially been founded by the womenfolk drinking coffee together and swapping plates of food. Those Turkish mainlanders who found the country unfavourable, who were not committed enough to actually establishing a means of livelihood there, had left by 1977 and returned to Turkey. Those who had stayed were not necessarily finding Cyprus to be a land of jobs or easy money; but, since they were staying and putting up with conditions, adapting to the Cypriot way of life and showing themselves ready to intermarry and make Cyprus their own, hostility between them and the indigenous population was dying down, and will presumably continue to do so.

As for the London side, predictions about the future are more difficult to make, both because the pattern of interethnic relations and interdependence is more complex here, and because the situation is more stable, making changes difficult to delineate until they have occurred. All that can be said on the basis of developments so far is that individuals are continuing to act rationally in terms of their own perspectives; they are making compromises which, while not overstepping the norms of social distance, are allowing them to attain their own personal economic goals. Meanwhile, a generation is growing up which knows the beaches of Cyprus better than its politics and, in many cases, does not care very much about either. The future rests with these people and their children.

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In Summary: The 'Second Generation'

The oldest members of this British-born or, at least, British-educated generation are now in their late teens and early twenties, soon to become parents themselves. In this study, I have not attempted to separate out this so-called 'second generation' and talk of them as a case apart. This is for two reasons. First, because the distinction between 'first' and 'second' generation immigrants is entirely arbitrary; no such division of course exists, and it is difficult to decide upon a socially significant basis for such a division, were it to be made. Country of birth? Country where the individual received most of his/her education? Such a division, whatever its basis, is useful only when referring to very general differences between groups, where these can be seen to be the result of the amount of time spent in this country and/or age on arrival.

The second reason for not treating the second generation as a case apart is simply that they are young, and their behaviour and attitudes as adolescents are not necessarily a good guide to how they will behave and think as adults - and, more significantly, as parents. In many cultures, adolescence is a time of rebellion against the mores and authority of the preceding generation. For example, I do not think it would be justified to assume that, say, the disaffection felt by some young Turks with their parents' life style and values today necessarily indicates a disaffection with their Turkish Cypriot heritage and identity per se, and a preference for the 'English way'. This is not to suggest, however, that people born in this country have not been greatly affected by their environment, physical and social. In the final pages of this thesis, I would like to make some tentative remarks about the young - tentative for the reasons given above, but also because it will mean my generalising from the comparatively small number of young people I came to know well during fieldwork who were born or educated here but who are now young adults with some degree of independence from their parents.

As was mentioned in Chapter III, compared to their sisters, boys are afforded considerable independence and freedom before marriage. They are expected to do their growing up outside the house and are rarely called on to say what they have been doing or where they have been. In this

pre-marital period, it is expected that boys will gain some sexual experience and it is assumed, usually correctly, that this will be with non-Turkish girls. Boys are not encouraged to publicise such exploits, however, and do not do so lest they acquire a reputation amongst their female kin and neighbours for being morally irresponsible, and thereby jeopardise their chances of marriage to a 'good' Turkish Cypriot girl. The lack of restrictions on a boy's movements and activities before marriage, and the fact that he can choose the nationality of his friends, means that he becomes much more familiar with the life style of his English peers than either his parents or his sisters. Indeed, the contrast between young men's familiarity with things English (football, music, what is going on in London, and so on) and their sister's interest in, or awareness of, such equivalent events and pursuits is striking. Certainly, a girl's experiences prior to marriage are of a very different order to those of her male counterpart. She may go shopping with girlfriends on Saturday afternoons, but any evening excursion, say, to the cinema or, more usually, to visit kin, is monitored insofar as she is usually encouraged to take a younger sister with her, or to go with older kin or neighbours. There is a word in Turkish which is often used to mean 'young man' - <u>delikanlı</u>. Literally translated, this means 'mad blooded'. Not surprisingly, there is no equivalent term for a young woman.

At the onset of fieldwork in 1975, I met two girls (A1f and C1d) who were then still schoolgirls, but who are now (1978) married. One (A1f) has a baby. Between 1975 and 1978, I witnessed how both of them, more or less independently, passed through three stages which one might describe as stages of rebellion, frustration and re-acceptance of things Turkish. Aware of the relative freedom of their English school friends, both girls initially rebelled against their parents and the Turkish 'system' they saw restricting them. They swore they would never marry someone they did not love, and would refuse to be visited by görücü. However, attempts to circumvent parental restrictions on their going out in the evening brought, when discovered, severe reprimands from parents and older siblings, and the warning that they would never find a husband if their immoral behaviour continued. This gave way to a sense of frustration and despair - a realisation that, despite their English education, to live like their English peers would necessitate their leaving home and

rejecting their families altogether. This neither girl could, or even would, contemplate. Faced with this stark alternative, marriage came to be seen as the only legitimate form of escape. Gradually, both girls came round to the idea that, if their parents could come up with a good looking fiancé, this at least would give them the opportunity to go out alone and have some independence. Rebellion gave way to excitement as negotiations for their marriage got under way. Their aspirations to be secretaries were forgotten as they made friends with other girls machining with them in the factory. Gradually, they began to re-examine and eventually to accept the 'Turkish way' and this led, ironically, to a rejection of the English equivalent. In fact, some time later, both girls were castigating their former English school friends for their 'immoral' associations with boys and, from at one time wanting to emulate their life style, came to condemn it. Their accusations were all the more vehement, one felt, for their having attempted to identify with, and live out, a system of norms and values their English peers appeared to personify, but which they themselves had had to reject. The point is that these two girls, and others like them, became reabsorbed into the Turkish world on marriage, despite a period of rebellion while teenagers.

The fact that young Turkish girls with very definite ideas of their own at 15, come round at 17 to accepting an engineered marriage, is not the paradox it initially seems. On marriage, women usually move into separate accommodation with their husbands, and thus escape the scrutiny of parents and in-laws. If they get on well with their husbands, they may go out together a great deal, and as wage-earners they have a substantial say - if not always the determining voice - in how money is spent in the home. What is perhaps more difficult to explain is why young Turkish men - who have ostensibly nothing to escape <u>from</u> - also tend to accept a more or less arranged marriage, and all that this entails. Not that this acceptance is universal. Two young men in the 14 households studied (B1c and B6a) did marry English girls, and such out-marriage by men is not uncommon. Nonetheless, such liaisons, which invariably start before marriage, tend to be strongly opposed by the boys' families and, in the case of the two mentioned above, were only approved of once it had become clear that the girls themselves were happy to 'become Turkish' and did not appear to have strong ties with their English kin. In one case (that of B1c) the English bride-to-be lived with her Turkish parents-in-law for two years before she married their son, and

the young couple continued to reside in the parental household until the birth of their first child. But the majority of young men of my acquaintance did eventually agree to marry a Turkish girl, and their marriages were arranged in the traditional manner. Once married, though continuing to see their non-Turkish peers occasionally, they became more involved with their kin and affines through their wives' close association with them. Whether or not this trend will continue for long I cannot say, though it seems likely that over time more and more young men will marry 'out', and eventually more young women will do so too.

Education is important here. While young Turkish Cypriots (girls and boys) leave school without the educational qualifications which would enable them to compete for jobs in the English job market, they will continue to be re-absorbed into Cypriot culture through the virtual necessity of working with fellow-Cypriots. Once friendships with non-Cypriots initiated at school are continued into adulthood through their working together, however, one might expect there to be less of a 'return' to the 'Turkish way', and more reluctance to give in to the pressure exerted by parents to accept a traditional Turkish marriage. A positive home attitude to education is a prerequisite to any such development. This, as mentioned above, was not in evidence in any of the 14 key households I studied, though it is undoubtedly a concern among a section of young Turkish parents in London today. The future does indeed rest with these people and their children.

* * *

This study has been concerned with London's Turkish Cypriot population or, more accurately, with a very small proportion of it. Since this is the first anthropological study to focus on Turkish Cypriots resident here, the aim has been to present comprehensive ethnographic information about various aspects of Turkish Cypriot life in Britain - in particular, the Cypriot work context and internal work ethos, women and family life, ritual occasions, and interethnic relations. Reference has been made to Cyprus whenever possible, since it is acknowledged that the significance of changes in London cannot be fully appreciated, or even recognised, without some knowledge of equivalent forms in Cyprus.

It has been suggested that two processes are occurring. First, the considerable economic security that Turkish Cypriots have attained here is due to a very positive process of 'adaptation' to the environment. 'Adaptation' is not meant to imply a passive fitting-in to another economic and cultural system here, but rather a positive manipulation of certain economic opportunities which presented themselves at the time of migration and - to a very much lesser degree - continue to do so. There has been a readiness to use traditional ties and cultural mores where these could be put to positive economic use, but also a readiness to reorganise dramatically traditional Turkish Cypriot norms when to do so would be economically advantageous. The paramount example of the latter is the importance attached to women working in London. Where there has been no economic incentive to induce changes, however, it is quite evident that fewer have occurred. Indeed, I have argued that there has actually been an encapsulation of traditional moral values in some areas and that, as a result, the discrepancy between a woman's role, for example, and her status in London now is much greater than it is in Cyprus. This is because a woman's role in London has altered, but it is also because attitudes to her have not changed to correspond to this new wage-earning role. The anonymity of London has encouraged this encapsulation.

Secondly, the continuing use by Turkish Cypriots here of what were interpreted as 'social structures in reserve' has been referred to in the text. The economic co-operation and cordiality which characterises Turkish relations with Greek Cypriots in their shared places of work and on the street was mentioned, but it was noted that such sociability rarely extends to the home. It was also noted that, due partly to the dispersed nature of Turkish Cypriot settlement in London, daily or weekly contact is maintained only with close kin who also live nearby, and who can visit and be visited regularly. Yet practically everyone with whom a kinship link is known to exist is invited to a wedding party, even though the family hosting the occasion may live on the other side of London, and may never see them except at weddings. In attempting to explain both these apparent ironies, the notion of 'alternative ideologies' or 'structures in reserve' was advanced. It was argued that, despite the sharing of a work ethos between Turk and Greek, there was a realisation among Turks that the historical antagonism between their two peoples may one day flare up again in Cyprus. Given the possibilities of such an occurrence, the establishment of close social relationships with Greeks in this country

is avoided as a potential embarrassment or even danger. The 1974 war served only to emphasise the rationality of such caution.

Likewise at weddings, people renew and thereby maintain contact with kin they otherwise rarely see. I suggested that this was because, apart from Turkish Cypriot neighbours, kinsmen remain not just the primary but the only reference group for the older Turkish Cypriots in this country. It is to such people that the individual can turn if all his or her immediate contacts prove unable to help with the task in hand. They are a potential network in the sense that they can be mobilised to help if the situation urgently requires it. However, in order to assure that the individuals concerned retain the necessary sense of moral obligation to their kinsmen, contact with them must be maintained and their common interests emphasised. Thus, there are very many people an individual sees only at weddings (and, occasionally, on bayrams and at engagement parties), unless and until some previously unforeseen circumstance brings them into closer relations with them. Like ethnicity, the maintenance of such kinship relations acts as a sort of insurance policy, an alternative ideology for use in the future.

Both Turkish Cypriot ethnicity and the importance placed on maintaining distant kinship ties may not continue for long in their present form, as those born and brought up in this country become psychologically and socially more self-sufficient than their parents. It would be interesting indeed to follow up this study in a decade from now. At that time it might be possible to make more definite remarks about the future of the 'second generation', and of the complex and changing relationship over time between the migrant, his society and his culture. It is to be hoped that the information and analysis presented here may provide a basis on which such a study may be carried out.

APPENDIX A: HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED FOR INTENSIVE STUDY: ADDITIONAL NOTES

The differences which did exist between the families in groups A, B, C and D will be elaborated on here. Since group C families do not form a 'group', even in the loose sense in which I am using the word, and since there are in any case only two families involved here, the emphasis will be on the families in groups A, B and D.

The families in the neighbourhood group (A) were living in an area of relatively dense Cypriot, and more generally immigrant, settlement. This was partly through choice but it was also because they had not acquired the capital which would have allowed them to consider moving further from the centre to the more attractive surburban areas. Apart from the one extended family household of mainland Turks (whom I include as part of the neighbourhood group even though they are not Cypriots), every household was well equipped with basic essentials including a television, radio and record player, though none had a washing machine at the time of fieldwork, only two had a telephone and one a car. Their tendency to buy new furniture and household goods on hire purchase meant that in all cases there was considerable pressure on all who had left school to start working for a wage immediately so that the regular household payments could be met. When one item was paid off, payments on the next were started immediately. The financial contribution of wives and working children was absolutely essential to their respective household budgets and the two non-working mothers did not work only because they had large families and therefore full-time domestic responsibilities. Although the impression given by some of these families was that there was a financial crisis just around the corner, this was largely because of the need to meet weekly and monthly payments which had been voluntarily incurred. Infact none of the households could be described as poor, and they continued to buy the traditional and costly Cypriot foods from the Greek Cypriot shop on the corner of the street.

The mainland Turkish family was less financially secure. Indeed, during the fieldwork period it was involved in two separate court cases as a result of non-payment of various debts. Although seven of the 13 members of the household were wage-earners, their obligation to remit money to their relatives in Turkey, and their plan to return there meant

that they were much less inclined to invest their capital in durable goods in this country. In consequence their standard of living was considerably lower than that of all the Cypriot households.

Expenditure on food and household goods was high for all the families in this neighbourhood group due to the size of their families. Two of the four Cypriot households had four or more dependent children. The household heads of this group were somewhat older than those of the dispersed kinship group (B), the former being in their forties and fifties, tha latter in their thirties. But the families from both groups had spent approximately the same amount of time in this country and there was no evidence to suggest that the families in group B had arrived with much, if any, more capital than the families just described.

One final point is worth noting. Given that all the wage-earners in this neighbourhood group were employed by Cypriots in predominantly Cypriot staffed places of work, the household heads and their wives (all but one of whom had completed their education before migrating to Britain) had had no need, nor indeed any opportunity, to master more than the rudiments of English. Of course their children who had been wholly, or at least partly, educated here, could speak the language quite adequately but even then, not with the same command as an English child. On the whole the children were growing up with the ability to express themselves in both languages but without a good grammatical command of either. However, this seemed to cause their parents little concern. They knew they could always find them jobs in Cypriot-run businesses on the basis of their own contacts.

To turn now to the families in the dispersed kinship group (B). These had few Turkish neighbours simply because their favourable financial circumstances had enabled them to move out of the main Cypriot areas to quieter residential districts. The occupations of the male household heads of this group are given in Appendix B. Of the women, only the unmarried sister and two of the seven wives worked; the latter had no kin living nearby and therefore stayed at home to look after their children. Neither of their husbands would

allow them to home-machine. The two wives who did work were both partners in their respective clothing factories.

Except for the youngest brother (B6a) all the household heads were owner-occupiers of their houses. These were well furnished with very many more luxury items than were to be found in the houses of the neighbourhood group and every household had at least one car - household 1 had three. Their general standard of living was partly a result of their having decided to limit the size of their families; although five of the seven families were probably not complete (the wives said they were tentatively planning to have another child), all agreed that two children was quite enough. This was in marked contrast to the attitudes held by the mothers in the neighbourhood group who, apart from the divorced wife, had 10, 6, 4 and 3 children respectively. (These are not all included in the charts in Appendix B because some had married and moved away before fieldwork began.)

Exactly how one family in this kinship group (household B1) had started with no capital but had become factory owners is described in Appendix D. For the moment the financial success attained by all these families will have to be taken as given. It should also be noted that, almost as a prerequisite of their occupational status, both men and women in this group had learnt to speak good English. This had been essential given their business interests, but their ability to speak the language fluently had also facilitated their fraternizing with English people, reading the English papers and dealing directly and with confidence with all extra-domestic matters: banks, the health service, the educational system and so on. One of the household heads (B6a) had married an English girl as, somewhat later, did the eldest son of household B1.

The factory owning families in this group were particularly conscious of their superior economic and social status and their relative familiarity with things English compared to those they employed, say as piece-work machinists. Though there was no ostensive identification with the English middle class, they did disassociate themselves from Turkish Cypriots who were their economic inferiors. The sort of job their children were doing (or, in most cases, would do) became important; they felt it would reflect their own social

status. Thus the factory-owning wife of household 1 did not like her eldest son mini-cabbing in case he picked up one of her employees; she did not want anyone to know her son was not employed in a more skilled and highly paid occupation. A good education - too late in the latter case as the son had already left school without qualifications - had nonetheless become important for the younger wives and it was a frequent topic of conversation when they were together.

A brief word about group C families. Both the families in this group were similar to those in the neighbourhood group (A) in terms of their economic circumstances. One family (household C1) had been in England since 1960 and was buying a house, the top part of which was let out to tenants. During the fieldwork period the eldest daughter left school and became a home machinist though her brother (C1c) was taking 'A' levels. Household C2 had only been in England for five years and they had one child. Most of their savings went towards the trip they made every other year to see their respective families in Cyprus. As mentioned previously, both these families maintained close ties with their families in Cyprus and remitted money to them regularly. This in part accounted for the fact that they had relatively little to spend on themselves.

Finally, mention should be made of the families visited regularly in Cyprus. The economic circumstances of these households varied considerably and they are categorized together only by virtue of the fact that their members reside permanently in Cyprus. The connections between these families and those in the London sample are noted in Appendix B; their approximate place of residence is marked on map 3 (p. 248). As for the degree of relatedness between the families themselves: households 1, 2, 3 and 5 are connected by kinship and households 2 and 4 are neighbours. ~~Households 6 and 7 are both kin and near neighbours.~~ Households 6 and 7 are both kin and neighbours, the eldest daughter of the head of household 6 being the wife of household 7. Households 8, 9, 10 and 11 are also related by kinship and households 12 and 13 are family friends of household 11. Only household 14 is quite unconnected to any of the above households or to any of those in the London sample. It should be noted that I either knew well, or regularly met at weddings and other functions,

all those specified in the table as 'close kin in London' though this is not obvious as most of them are not included in the London household sample.

APPENDIX B: DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN OF HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED FOR INTENSIVE STUDY

GROUP A: NEIGHBOURHOOD GROUP

Household 1

	Age	Occupation
a. Husband	52	partner in minicab firm
b. wife	50	housewife (not wage-earning)
c. daughter	23	home machinist
d. son	20	presser in clothing factory
e. daughter	17	at school, later machinist
f. son	16	at school, later hairdresser
g. daughter	12	at school
h. son	10	at school
i. son	8	at school
j. son	6	at school

Household 2

	Age	Occupation
a. husband	40	tailor in men's clothing factory
b. wife	26	home machinist
c. son	10	at school
d. daughter	8	at school
e. daughter	6	at school
f. daughter	2	at school

Household 3

	Age	Occupation
a. wife	36	home machinist
b. son	18	at school, later presser

Household 4

	Age	Occupation
a. husband	40	cook in catering firm
b. wife	40	home machinist
c. daughter	18	machinist in factory
d. son	16	at school, later restaurant worker
e. daughter	14	at school

Household 5

	Age	Occupation
a. husband	44	presser in clothing factory
b. wife	40	housewife (not wage-earning)
c. son	21	presser in clothing factory
d. daughter	19	machinist in factory
e. daughter	16	machinist in factory
f. daughter	11	at school
g. husband's brother's wife	38	machinist in factory
h. g's sister's daughter	20	machinist in factory
i. husband's mother	60+	housewife (not wage-earning)
j. son's wife	25	home machinist
k, l, m. a's grandchildren	3, 1, 6	(parents of these children were in Turkey)

GROUP B: DISPERSED KINSHIP GROUP

	Age	Occupation
Household 1		
a. husband	40	driver in factory owned by House-
b. wife*	37	clothing factory partner (hold 7
c. son	18	finisher/driver in b's factory
d. son's girlfriend, later wife	19	secretary
e. son	16	at school
Household 2		
a. husband+	29	cutter in sister's factory (House-
b. wife*	27	housewife, formerly hold 7)
c. daughter	under 1	a secretary
Household 3		
a. husband*	40	factory owner
b. wife	26	housewife (not wage-earning)
c. son	3	
Household 4		
a. husband	27	Istanbul University graduate, now
b. wife*	25	housewife trainee accountant
c. son	under 1	
d. wife's unmarried sister	38	finisher in sister's factory (Household 1)
Household 5		
a. husband*	28	cutter in Greek-owned factory
b. wife	23	housewife (not wage-earning)
c. son	3	
Household 6		
a. husband*	20	driver in Cypriot-run minicab firm
b. wife	19	housewife (not wage-earning)
c. son	under 1	
Household 7		
a. husband	42	factory owner
b. wife+	37	joint partner with husband
c. daughter	19	secretary
d. son	14	at school

* siblings
\+ siblings

GROUP C: 'INDIVIDUAL' HOUSEHOLDS

	Age	Occupation
Household 1		
a. husband	42	bread factory worker (on shifts)
b. wife	37	home machinist
c. son	19	at school (doing A levels)
d. daughter	17	at school, later machinist
e. son	15	at school
f. son	9	
g. daughter	7	
Household 2		
a. husband	41	presser in clothing factory
b. wife	27	housewife, former machinist
c. daughter	under 1	
d. husband's mother	65	temporary visitor

GROUP D: FAMILIES IN CYPRUS

	Age	Occupation	Close kin in London
Household 1			
a. husband	28	motor mechanic	mother, father, all 9 siblings (household A1)
b. wife*	26		2 sisters
c. son	4		
d. son	3		
Household 2			
a. husband	62	semi-retired, works at docks	brother; married daughter & grandchildren
b. wife+	54		
c. son*	22	customs officer	
d. son*	18	doing military service	
Household 3			
a. husband	40	farmer	
b. wife+	40	assisted with harvesting, etc.	married sister & family
c. daughter	19	assisted with harvesting, etc.	
d. c's husband	26	worked land with a.	
e. son	14	at school	
f. son	12	at school	
g. daughter	7		
h. daughter	6		
Household 4			
a. husband	51	owned grocery shop	married brother
b. wife	45	helped in shop	married brother and sister (this family were themselves returnees from London in 1973, after 18 years)
c. son	18	doing military service	
Household 5			
a. husband	51	shop owner/citrus farmer	none close
b. wife	45		
c. son	28	managed shop/helped on farm	
d. son	26	helped on farm	
e. daughter	19	at home	
f. daughter	17	at home	
g. wife's father	67	retired	
h. wife's mother	63		
i. c's wife+	23		
j. c's daughter	2		
k. c's daughter	1		
l. d's wife	25		
m. d's son	4		
n. d's daughter	2		

* siblings
\+ siblings

Note: With few exceptions (which are duly noted) all the women in this group were housewives (not wage-earning).

Group D (cont.)

	Age	Occupation	Close kin in London
Household 6			
a. husband	55	messenger in government office	married daughter & granddaughter (household C2)
b. wife	47		
c. daughter	23	secretary	
d. daughter	18		
Household 7			
a. husband	29	draughtsman	
b. wife	25		married sister (household C2)
c. son	3		
Household 8			
a. husband	68		unmarried son
b. wife	59		married son & 2
c. son	33	works father's farm	grandchildren
Household 9			
a. husband	28	farmer	2 brothers (themselves 1975 returnees after 2 years in London, but considering re-emigrating due to lack of jobs)
b. wife	24		
c. son	4		
Household 10			
a. husband	39	1975 returnee from Canada; looking for job in hotel industry	2 brothers
b. wife	35		
Household 11			
a. husband	38	educational administrator	
b. wife	37	teacher	2 brothers
c. son	13		
d. son	10		
Household 12			
a. husband	42	high-ranking government official	brother
b. wife	39		
c. daughter	16		
d. son	12		
Household 13			
a. husband	40	owned photographic shop	son (at London University)
b. wife	40	helped in shop	2 sisters
c. daughter	17	helped in shop	

Group D (cont.)

Household 14	Age	Occupation	Close kin in London
a. husband	40	wood carver, shop owner	married daughter and grandchild; son at college in London
b. wife	40		
c. son	18	military service	
d. daughter	15		
e. daughter	13		

APPENDIX C: CYPRIOTS IN EMPLOYMENT

Table I: Number of Cyprus-born people employed in the clothing industry in 1971

	Males	Females
All occupations	2693	1136
Clothing workers	257 (10%)	509 (48%)

Source: Draft Table 1239. 10% Sample, 1971 Census.

Table II: Cyprus-born men by industry, 1971

Base: Males over 15 in employment = 2,490

Industry	%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	0
Mining and Quarrying	0
Construction	5
Manufacturing Industries (Coal and Petrol products, Chemicals, Metal Engineering)	9
Other Manufacturing Industries (Building, Timber, Paper Materials)	4
Food, Drink, Tobacco	5
Textiles, Leather and Clothing Industries	18
Transport and Communication	5
Distributive Trades	12
Professional and Scientific Services, and Public Administration	6
Miscellaneous Services (Restaurants, Cafes, Snack Bars 21%)	36
	100

Source: Draft Table 1240. 10% Sample, 1971 Census.

APPENDIX D: CASE STUDY OF MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT: AYŞE, 1957-77.

Ayşe came over from Cyprus in 1957 when she was 18. Her husband had a stomach ulcer and he came to Britain specifically for an operation. Although all her seven siblings are now living in Britain, none of her immediate family were here at that time, and it was with her husband's brother that they stayed initially. It is worth noting that although a marriage had been arranged for her in Cyprus when she was 16, she had eloped with the man who became her husband; he was also her first cousin. Although Turkish Cypriots do not normally marry either their first or second cousins, their relationship had eventually been accepted by both families and in hindsight is described as a 'love marriage'. The elopement perhaps says something about her strength of character as a young girl.

Because of the 1957-8 troubles in Cyprus, Ayşe and her husband decided to stay in England for a short time and he got a job. He would not allow Ayşe to work initially, but she convinced him that it would be financially advantageous and that it was quite normal for Turkish Cypriot women to work in England. Her argument was strengthened by the fact that she was already familiar with machining, having had a job in a small family-run dress shop before she left Cyprus; this experience could now be put to good use. By this time she had two sons: one of 18 months, the other newly born. She left the two of them with the women downstairs during the day while she went to work in a nearby factory.[1]

The child-minding arrangement did not prove to be a success in Ayşe's case; the children were noisy and their English neighbours continually complained. Eventually, Ayşe took them back to Cyprus and her mother brought them up for the next two years. This left her free to work unbothered by children. Already, then, she was not fulfilling her traditional female role; she had chosen to work for a wage rather than look after her children and it soon became apparent that she had also

[1] Leaving one's children with unrelated neighbours on an informal child-minding basis is not common today; it only occurs if the mother concerned must go out to work and has no female relatives either living close or in the same house who can look after her children. Usually, however, such women opt to machine at home.

decided to limit the size of her family and have no more children.

Ayşe first got a job in a Jewish-run firm where her cousin worked. There were several other Turkish workers there and they showed her what to do; she could not speak English at this stage, though she knew Greek quite well, having been brought up in a mixed village. Having learnt the basics of machining, and feeling more confident and self-assured, she left to go to another factory. This was Jewish-owned but staffed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots; with her proficiency in Greek, she acted in the capacity of translator and, within a month, was made a forelady. (A forelady is the head of a bench of machinists; it is a position which only exists in larger factories, where the machinists are divided into 'benches'.) After a few months, she left this job too, and started work at a smaller Greek-owned factory. Here she was made manageress of all the machinists and she stayed in this position for the next ten years, until 1970.

During this period, both she and her husband (who was also employed in the clothing industry as a driver) saved. After two years as a manageress, they still did not have enough capital to put down a deposit on a house, and Ayşe therefore decided to do some home machining. This was opposed by her husband; he felt that, as a manageress and the most highly paid woman worker in the factory, she should not lower herself to do home machining - considered by all who have risen above it to be the lowest status job in the factory. But she assured him that only her boss would know she was machining, and he consented; after six months of working in the evenings and at weekends, she had saved £1,000.

It is unlikely that she would have gone any further than this, however, had it not been for the intervention of Andrew, the Greek Cypriot with whom she now runs the firm. He came over to England in 1952 and, after completing his studies, became an accountant. During the ten years in which Ayşe worked as a manageress, he was individually employed by about 20 Cypriot firms, working as an accountant for them. Four of these firms he visited every week on a permanent basis, the others just to do their books once or twice a year. One of the firms he visited regularly was that where Ayşe was manageress, and when he decided to go into business himself it was to her that he broached the idea of a partnership. She had the practical and technical knowledge that he lacked;

she knew Turkish, Greek and, by this time, English also. He knew the trade from an accountancy point of view and he had the capital necessary to start a business. At the time of fieldwork they had been in business together for six years, though the partnership had not been without its problems. Foremost among these was the fact that Ayse had only 10% of the shares of the firm, Andrew and his two brothers holding the remaining 90% between them. When the manufacturer's English stock controller found out about this, he advised Ayşe to leave the firm and open her own factory, assuring her of the manufacturer's continuing patronage. However, her husband opposed the move, arguing that they would have to mortgage their house to raise the necessary capital. Ayşe consequently had to abandon the idea. It was enough to stir her Greek Cypriot partner into action, however. He knew that most of the work force would follow Ayşe to her new factory if she were to move. When the factory moved to its new premises in 1977, Ayşe was made a 50% shareholder.

Several factors account for Ayşe's success. These factors also explain why the vast majority of Turkish Cypriot women do not follow her example. I only met one other woman in an equivalent position to Ayşe: the wife of household B7 (Ayşe' sister's husband's sister) who also jointly ran a clothing factory. Ayşe's success was more remarkable than that of the latter, however, since she had not had the moral or financial support of her husband in her business venture. Ayşe's husband had in fact worked for her as a driver for some time, though their frequent arguments over the running of the factory had caused her to ask her Greek partner to sack him.

Ayşe worked hard, was ambitious, and was willing from the start to put her work before her children and her family. She cultivated her relationship with those above her - both with the Jewish manufacturer and his English stock controller. She was generous to those who worked well for her while dismissing those who did not, when it was feasible to do so. At the same time, her reputation suffered. Although there is no discrimination against women in the trade itself, there is a certain cultural ambiguity in the status of a working Turkish woman outside the immediate work context. This is discussed at length in Chapter IV. Basically, a woman contributes to the household economy by working. The fact that she has a job is therefore highly regarded, but only if it does not interfere with the commitments she has as a result of her primary

role, which is as a wife, mother and housekeeper. If her work starts to take precedence over her domestic responsibilities and becomes a career, then it is negatively sanctioned and her reputation suffers accordingly. Indeed, for a woman to become a public figure in this way and to expose herself to the scrutiny of others is to invite their speculations about her moral and sexual chastity. As I attempt to show in Chapter IV (p.148ff), the price she had to pay for her achievement in the male world was high, too high to encourage most Turkish women to follow her example and embark on similar courses of action.

APPENDIX E: THE EVIL EYE

The idea of the evil eye is very real to Turkish Cypriots, as indeed it is to most Muslims in the Middle East. Any individual who is the centre of attention for whatever reason - because he is hosting an occasion, wearing new clothes, or the central figure in a ceremony - is especially susceptible to the evil eye. That individuals should be thought to be exposed to dangerous forces when in marginal, liminal or other extraordinary states, is something with which anthropologists are familiar. Parallels can be found in most societies. In the case of the evil eye, one might ask the source from which such misfortune is presumed to come. Informants in London would say that people could look on others with 'bad eyes' and bring them bad luck without even being aware that they were doing it. Thus, they identified the source of misfortune as human, not other-worldly. But because it was also believed that the evil eye could be given unconsciously, it was never possible to hold any specific individual responsible for some unfortunate occurrence.

It is generally thought that those in marginal states are more susceptible than others to the evil eye because of the jealousy they are likely to induce in others as a result of their being set apart and momentarily exalted. In fact, if anyone even so much as paid a compliment to someone else, say, on his appearance or on her new baby, the compliment would be followed immediately by the exclamation "Maşallah!" This means literally "How wondrous is God!", but what informants held to be implicit in the word was "I am complimenting you, but it is not out of envy; I do not mean harm to come as a result". 'Maşallah' was seen by Cypriots as a sort of insurance policy, then; it was almost as if the speaker were saying, "If anything goes wrong for you now, it is not a result of my 'bad eyes'".

Blue, white and black 'eye' beads and gold coins inscribed with 'Maşallah' are worn as charms in London, as they are throughout the Islamic Middle East, especially by those in vulnerable positions or states - babies, boys about to be circumcised, girls about to be married, and travellers in cars and buses (when presumably they are seen as a protection against the hazards presented by bad roads and bad drivers, as well as the potentially 'bad eyes' of strangers).

MAP I



GROUP A HOUSEHOLDS HARINGEY 1976

(NOT TO SCALE:- THE DISTANCE BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS 2 AND 4 IS APPROXIMATELY 300yds. FOR DETAILS OF HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION SEE PAGE 234)

GREATER LONDON: MAIN AREAS OF CYPRIOT SETTLEMENT

MAIN AREAS OF SETTLEMENT (SOURCES: OAKLEY 1972; KOHLER 1974)

AREA FIELDWORK MAINLY CARRIED OUT

(ALL BOROUGHS COVERED BY SHADING HAD AT LEAST 1000 CYPRUS BORN RESIDENTS IN 1971.)


MAP 3
CYPRUS: HOUSEHOLDS VISITED REGULARLY IN JUNE AND JULY 1975
AND OCTOBER 1977
N
W
E
S
GIRNE (KYRENIA)
KARPAZ
GÜZELYÜRT (MORPHOU)
LEFKOŞA (NICOSIA)
MAĞOSA (FAMAGUSTA)
LÂRNAKA (LARNACA)
BAF (PAPHOS)
LIMASOL (LIMASSOL)
TURKISH CONTROLLED
GREEK CONTROLLED
SINCE JULY 1974
GROUP D HOUSEHOLDS - FOR DETAILS SEE P. 237.
MAIN TOWNS
SCALE:
0
MILES
20

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