

## BEYOND THE USUAL SUSPECTS

### Literary Sources and the Historian of Emotions

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#### 1 INTRODUCTION

And you have never considered what manner of men are these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the execution of every new plan; while you are careful only to keep what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most urgent. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent, to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, and you are always at home. For they think to gain something by leaving their homes; but you, that any new enterprise may damage what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When they do not carry out an intention which they have formed, they think they have been robbed of their own property; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained a mere instalment of what is to come; but if they fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the void. For they alone have something almost as soon as they hope for it, for they lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the lifelong task, full of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves. None enjoy their good things less, because they are always seeking for more. To do their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth.<sup>1</sup>

- 1 Thucydides 1.70: οὐδ' ἐκλογίσασθαι πάποτε πρὸς οἴους ὑμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὅσον ὑμῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται. οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργα ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σφάζειν καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν καὶ ἔργω οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. αὐθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἶεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους· οἶονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἂν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ ἐπελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντές τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐξέρχονται καὶ νικώμενοι ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρώνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοήσαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγούνται, ἃ δ' ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτήσωνται,

In this passage (set in 431 BCE), Corinthian ambassadors to Sparta comment on the national characters of the Athenians and the Spartans, in a speech to the Spartan Assembly. Ancient texts that do not obviously portray deep, powerful sensations or displays of e.g. anger/shame/grief, which quickly bring about some great reaction and reversal of fortune (emotions and emotion scenarios that are prevalent, and have been widely studied, in epic and tragedy), have generally been overlooked by those studying the emotions of the Greeks. And yet, if we read this passage more closely, the characters of both Athenians and Spartans – juxtaposed as polar opposites – involve emotions. These are not, perhaps, sharp and short-lived (as are anger/shame/grief etc.), but longer-term emotions and perceptions of feelings determined by culture are equally important. Here Thucydides talks about the Athenians' hopeful character (the word 'hope' [*elpis*] appears three times in this short passage), contrasted with the Spartans' caution and distrust. The Athenians are 'revolutionary', 'bold', 'impetuous', thinking about 'gain' – words implying hope, confidence, and a lack of fear. The Spartans, on the other hand, are 'careful', 'distrustful', thinking about 'damage' – words implying caution, fear, and a lack of confidence.

We must not forget that this is a speech to an audience of Spartans, who would have reacted emotionally to what they were hearing – perhaps they would have felt shame or anger, and perhaps this would have affected their response? The speech, too, was given in a physical setting, i.e. at an assembly, where the speakers were probably situated on a *bēma* (speaker's platform), talking downwards to the Spartan listeners. What effect might this spatial arrangement have had on the listeners' emotions? Such a question is perhaps only answerable after considering many more examples of emotion arousal in deliberative contexts (that is, speeches to Assemblies, Councils etc.). Interestingly too, these words are put into the mouths of Corinthians, addressed to Spartans, in front of Athenians. Are they the Corinthians' genuine views; or spoken with ulterior motive: to rouse some of the emotions mentioned above in their Spartan audience? Or, perhaps more likely, are they Thucydides' own views – and if so do they reflect his pride as an Athenian, or his dismay at the impetuosity of his fellow-citizens; or should they merely be read as part of his narrative technique, his explanation for the causes of so much that follows? Again, these questions cannot be answered from studying just one passage, but careful reading of Thucydides' text will uncover many more.<sup>2</sup>

ὀλίγα πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες. ἦν δ' ἄρα του καὶ πείρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρεῖαν· μόνοι γὰρ ἔχουσί τε ὁμοίως καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχεῖαν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ποιῆσθαι ὧν ἂν γνῶσιν. καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξαι ξυμφορὰν τε οὐχ ἦσσαν ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἔαν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι (translation by Jowett 1963, 47f., slightly adapted).

2 Hornblower 1991, 114 notes parallels to a speech put into the mouth of the Athenian statesman Kleon (3.37–8) and an authorial assessment in Thucydides' own 'voice' (8.96), and

Unlike many of the other types of evidence so far discussed in this book (archaeological, epigraphic, papyrological), literary sources have been significantly studied with respect to the emotions, especially in the last twenty years.<sup>3</sup> However, there are methodological problems with relying solely on literary sources for the history of Greek emotions: nearly all Greek texts were written by educated men of high wealth and/or status; they were frequently written to be read only by other such men; and a large proportion were written, or received final form, in one city in a brief period – Classical (479–322 BCE) Athens. It is possibly for this reason that the majority of research done so far into Greek emotions has been philological and cultural (for instance the words and metaphors used for anger in Homer; how the expression of shame in the *Iliad* differs from that in tragedy), or philosophical (for instance Aristotle on the socio-psychology of emotions; the Stoics on control of the emotions). It has only rarely been historical: e.g. the ways real people interacted with each other in various *poleis* and other communities across the ancient Greek world at specific points in time; the way emotions change over long periods of time; the way emotions are shaped by social tensions and cultural developments.

Further, attention has generally focused on certain genres (epic, lyric poetry, tragedy, and philosophy) that only very indirectly reveal how emotions worked in real life, and to a much more limited extent on such genres as historiography, oratory, and biography that, under certain conditions, may be a better source of information for the part played by emotions in social, political, legal, religious, and cultural communication. Many other literary genres, especially outside the usual canonical authors, have received almost no attention at all – for instance, medical writings, technical treatises, didactic texts, fables, epigrams, satires and mimes, literary letters, anthologies, epitomes, commentaries, and fragmentary texts of all kinds. It will not be my purpose here to canter through as many such texts as possible, covering large amounts of ground skimpily. Rather I will use a handful of passages from a selection of genres to consider what sort of historical questions literary sources might answer, and what they might not.

concludes that the above passage must therefore also reflect Thucydides' own views; he describes it as 'as glowing a tribute as anything which Thucydides puts into the mouth of an Athenian speaker and is more effective coming from an enemy.'

- 3 Major monographs and collections in English include: Cairns 1993; Williams 1993; Nussbaum 1994; Konstan 1997; Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Harris 2001; Konstan 2001; Nussbaum 2001; Braund and Most 2003; Konstan and Rutter 2003; Sternberg 2005; Konstan 2006; Fitzgerald 2007; Graver 2007; Konstan 2010; Munteanu 2011a and 2011b; Sanders et al. forthcoming; Sanders forthcoming.

## 2 FICTION

I start, perhaps perversely, with a non real-life genre – the romantic novel – to see what can be gleaned even from such a text.<sup>4</sup> At the start of Chariton's *Chaireas and Kallirhoe*,<sup>5</sup> a number of aristocratic suitors are competing to marry Kallirhoe, the daughter of a Syracusan general. However Chariton tells us that 'Eros intended to make a match of his own devising'.<sup>6</sup> He continues:<sup>7</sup>

Eros likes to win and enjoys succeeding against the odds. He looked for his opportunity and found it as follows.

A public festival of Aphrodite took place, and almost all the women went to her temple. Kallirhoe had never been out in public before, but her father wanted her to do reverence to the goddess, and her mother took her. Just at that time Chaireas was walking home from the gymnasium; he was radiant as a star, the flush of exercise blooming on his bright countenance like gold on silver. Now, chance would have it that at the corner of a narrow street the two walked straight into each other; the god had contrived the meeting so that each should see the other. At once they were both smitten with love ... beauty had met nobility.

Chaireas, so stricken, could barely make his way home; he was like a hero mortally wounded in battle, too proud to fall but too weak to stand.

This passage is formulaic (a *topos*), and has precedents dating back several centuries. Here, for instance, is a similar passage from the third-century BCE poet Theokritos:

And when I was come already midway on the road, where Lykon's is, I saw Delphis and Eudamippos walking together. More golden than helichryse were their beards, and their breasts brighter far than thou, O Moon, for they had lately left the manly labour of the wrestling-school. ... I saw, and madness seized me, and my hapless heart was aflame. My

- 4 Other examples of non real-life, or fictional, Greek genres include epic (e.g. Homer), tragedy, and comedy.
- 5 The romantic novel flourished in Greek (and Roman) culture in the first few centuries CE; Chariton's *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* is one of the earliest surviving, dating from the mid-first century (Reardon 1989, 5).
- 6 Chariton, *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* 1.1.3.1–2: ὁ δὲ Ἔρως ζευγος ἴδιον ἠθέλησε συμπλέξαι (translated by Reardon 1989, 22).
- 7 Chariton, *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* 1.1.4.1–7.4: φιλόνομος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ Ἔρως καὶ χαίρει τοῖς παραδόξοις κατορθώμασιν· ἐζήτησε δὲ τοιόνδε τὸν καιρόν. Ἀφροδίτης ἑορτὴ δημοτελής, καὶ πᾶσαι σχεδὸν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸν νεών. τέως δὲ μὴ προϊούσαν τὴν Καλλιρόην προήγαγεν ἡ μήτηρ, Ἔρωτος κελεύσαντος προσκυνῆσαι τὴν θεόν. τότε δὲ Χαιρέας ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων ἐβάδιζεν οἴκαδε στίλβων ὥσπερ ἀστήρ· ἐπήνθει γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῷ λαμπρῷ τοῦ προσώπου τὸ ἐρύθημα τῆς παλαιστρας ὥσπερ ἀργύρω χρυσός. ἐκ τύχης οὖν περὶ τινὰ καμπὴν στενωτέραν συναντῶντες περιέπεσον ἀλλήλοισ, τοῦ θεοῦ πολιτευσαμένου τήνδε τὴν συνοδίαν ἵνα ἑκάτερος τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὀφθῆ. ταχέως οὖν πάθος ἐρωτικὸν ἀντέδωκαν ἀλλήλοισ ... τοῦ κάλλους τῆ εὐγενεία συνελθόντος. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαιρέας οἴκαδε μετὰ τοῦ τραύματος μόλις ἀπῆει καὶ ὥσπερ τις ἀριστεὺς ἐν πολέμῳ τραθεὶς καιρίαν καὶ καταπεσεῖν μὲν αἰδούμενος, στήναι δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος (translated by Reardon 1989, 22).

looks faded away. No eyes had I thereafter for that show, nor know how I came home again, but some parching fever shook me, and ten days and ten nights I lay upon my bed.<sup>8</sup>

We should not interpret such passages as being necessarily reflective of real-life scenarios, but rather literary narrative devices: a stock ‘love at first sight’ scenario.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the formulaic nature of the *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* passage, however, it nevertheless suggests several profitable lines of enquiry to the historian of emotions. For instance, cult: Eros is the divine son of Aphrodite, but he is also a deification of an emotion (*erôs* = sexual desire). This particular deity is well known across the Greek world, at least as far back as the eighth-/seventh-century BCE epic poet Hesiod.<sup>10</sup> However, other deified emotions are more bounded in time and place – for instance the cult of Nemesis in Rhamnous and elsewhere,<sup>11</sup> or that of Phobos (Fear) at Sparta.<sup>12</sup> One historical question is why certain emotions were deified at certain places, and/or in certain periods – a question that might be answered by a literary author, by commentaries on the text, or perhaps by inscriptions of decrees instituting cults or establishing temples. For instance, regarding the cult of Phobos at Sparta, the first/second-century CE biographer Plutarch tells us that the Spartans<sup>13</sup>

pay honours to Fear, not as they do to the powers which they try to avert because they think them baleful, but because they believe that fear is the chief support of their civil polity. ... And the men of old, in my opinion, did not regard bravery as a lack of fear, but as fear of

8 Theokritos, *Idylls* 2.76–86: ἤδη δ' εὔσα μέσαν κατ' ἀμαξιτόν, ἧ τὰ Λύκωνος, | εἶδον Δέλφιν ὁμοῦ τε καὶ Εὐδάμιππον ἰόντας: | τοῖς δ' ἦς ξανθοτέρα μὲν ἐλιχρύσοιο γενειάς, | στήθεα δὲ στίλβοντα πολὺ πλέον ἢ τύ, Σελάνα, | ὡς ἀπὸ γυμνασίου καλὸν πόνον ἄρτι λιπόντων | .... χάς ἴδον, ὡς ἐμάνην, ὡς μοι πυρὶ θυμὸς ἰάφθη | δειλαίας, τὸ δὲ κάλλος ἐτάκετο. οὐκέτι πομπᾶς | τήνας ἐφρασάμαν, οὐδ' ὡς πάλιν οἴκαδ' ἀπῆνθον | ἔγνων, ἀλλὰ μέ τις καπυρὰ νόσος ἐξεσάλαξεν, | κείμεν δ' ἐν κλιντῆρι δέκ' ἅματα καὶ δέκα νύκτας (translated by Gow 1950, 21–23).

9 On formulaic passages in the Greek novel, and their relationship to similar passages in earlier Greek narrative or in oriental novels, see Anderson 1984, 25–42.

10 Hesiod, *Theogony* 120 – though associated iconography changes over time. See Most forthcoming; Stafford forthcoming.

11 On Nemesis cults, see Hornum 1993, 6–14. On Rhamnous in particular, see Fortea López 1994, 24–30; Parker 1996, 154; 2005, 406f. I have not provided a one-word translation for Nemesis, as there is no equivalent label in English; *nemesis* is a righteous indignation that leads humans to censure and gods to punish wrathfully; the god Nemesis is often translated Retribution, but this does not capture the emotional connotations of the Greek word.

12 The latter is referred to at Plutarch, *Life of Kleomenes* 9.1.

13 Plutarch, *Life of Kleomenes* 9.1–3: τιμῶσι δὲ τὸν Φόβον οὐχ ὡς περ οὖς ἀποτρέπονται δαίμονας ἡγούμενοι βλαβερόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πολιτείαν μάλιστα συνέχεσθαι φόβῳ νομίζοντες. ... καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐκ ἀφοβίαν, ἀλλὰ φόβον ψόγου καὶ δέος ἀδοξίας οἱ παλαιοὶ νομίζουσιν. οἱ γὰρ δειλότατοι πρὸς τοὺς νόμους θαρραλεώτατοι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους εἰσί, καὶ τὸ παθεῖν ἥκιστα δεδίασιν οἱ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι τὸ κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι (translated by Perrin 1921, 67). This passage is consistent with the Spartan ‘mirage’, which Cartledge 2002, 45 describes as: ‘the distorted image of what both Spartans and non-Spartans for various and often mutually inconsistent reasons wanted Sparta to be, to stand for and to have accomplished.’

reproach and dread of disgrace. For the men who feel most dread of the laws have most courage in facing their enemies; and those shun death least who most fear ill fame.

The connection between emotions and public/private space is another fruitful line of enquiry. Here, Kallirhoe's chastity and modesty are suggested by her only being outdoors to attend a religious festival and chaperoned by her mother;<sup>14</sup> Chaireas' wholesomeness is suggested by his exercise in the gymnasium. Such an encounter would therefore be plausible. In a real-life situation (just as depicted here) they would not be allowed to express their emotions, by action, speech, or any other sort of flirtation: it would damage Kallirhoe's reputation to be seen conversing with a young man in the street, and give the lie to Chaireas' supposed nobility of character were he to press it upon her. Even fiction can demonstrate how place (e.g. assembly, courtroom, religious processions, festivals, within the home, at another's house, in the street, in the agora, at war etc.) has a profound influence both on the sensation and expression of emotions, and the social acceptability of such expression. The characters' age, social class, and gender are important too: Greeks might expect young people to fall instantly in love, and their emotions to be violently felt and incontinently expressed;<sup>15</sup> only a wealthy youth would have the leisure to attend the gymnasium;<sup>16</sup> and Chaireas is notably bowled over by a girl, while most Classical Athenian literature might lead us to expect erotic feeling and competition for a beautiful boy or a courtesan.<sup>17</sup> Age, social class, gender, place: all matters that must intimately concern the historian of emotions, as any other.

Another aspect we might consider is the cause of Chaireas' and Kallirhoe's emotion: in this case, catching sight of each other.<sup>18</sup> Greeks of different periods were interested in a variety of competing causes for emotions. Aristotle famously suggests that anger can be understood psychologically as 'the appetite for returning pain for pain', or physiologically as 'a boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart'.<sup>19</sup> Competing socio-, psycho-, and physiological

14 Attendance at, and indeed participation in, religious festivals was the one major role women played in the public life of most Greek cities – at least in the Classical period when the novel is set, though not, perhaps, at the time it was written (see below).

15 Consider Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.12 1389a3–6: οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι τῇ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης ('the young are prone to desires and inclined to do whatever they desire. Of the desires of the body they are most inclined to pursue that relating to sex and they are powerless against this'); 2.13 1389b13–15: οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη ('people who are older and more or less past their prime have characters that are for the most part the opposite of these'; translated by Kennedy 2007, 149–151).

16 Fisher 1998 challenges this, at least for Classical Athens, with its unusually democratic socio-political organisation.

17 See Davidson 1997, 73–136.

18 See Cairns 2011, on the role vision plays in arousing *erōs*.

19 Aristotle, *De anima* 1.1 403a30–32: οἷον ὀργὴ τί ἐστιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπῆσεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ (translated by Smith 1984, 643).

explanations for the causes of the emotions can be found in the writings of philosophers and medical writers of all periods, but also (as we see above) in the most innocuous of literary text. Ideas went in and out of fashion in ancient thought as in modern, and what Greeks believed in different periods and localities is a profitable line of enquiry for the historian of emotions. Such ideas are almost exclusively expounded in literary sources.

Many psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense to speak of an emotional episode or scenario, than an emotion *per se*.<sup>20</sup> Emotional episodes begin with ‘antecedent conditions’, which have been well defined as ‘the elements physically or objectively present in a situation, along with the perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals of them’;<sup>21</sup> these arouse psychological and physiological feelings (frequently confused by laypersons with the ‘emotion’ itself); attempts to regulate or cope with the emotion may follow; then verbal expressions and/or physical actions resulting from the emotion; and eventually resolution.<sup>22</sup> In this analysis, Chaireas and Kallirhoe catching sight of each other in the way, place, and moment that they do, can be seen as the antecedent condition of their *erōs* episode. Continuing the life-cycle of this episode, we would hope to come to the symptoms of the emotion,<sup>23</sup> the metaphors, similes, and other imagery used to describe it, and its resulting actions. Here Chariton is rather restrained. Plato is less so in describing Hippothales’ *erōs* for the boy Lysis – his symptoms and actions include blushing, talking incessantly about Lysis, composing poems and prose to him, singing about him, hiding from his beloved, and being in an agony of confusion that he might be discovered.<sup>24</sup> Even fuller ‘symptomatology’ are found for some emotions.<sup>25</sup>

20 E.g. Parrott 1991, 4: ‘... an emotional episode is the story of an emotional event, and it seems a natural unit of analysis for understanding human emotions.’

21 Sharpsteen 1991, 37.

22 See also Elster 1999, 244–283 and Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 49–78, whose analyses differ in some details.

23 Some medical writers attempt to diagnose and cure emotions, for instance the second-century CE physician and philosopher Galen in *On the Diagnosis and Care of the Passions of the Soul* – see Harris 2001, 385–387. Plutarch, *Life of Demetrios* 38.2–7 and Heliodoros, *Aithiopika* 4.7 provide literary dramatisations of this process, in both cases for *erōs*.

24 Plato, *Lysis* 204c2–d8: Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. ὁ οὖν Κτήσιππος, Ἀστεῖόν γε, ἧ δ’ ὄς, ὅτι ἐρυθρίαξ, ὃ Ἰππόθαλες, καὶ ὀκνεῖς εἰπεῖν Σωκράτει τούνομα· ἐὰν δ’ οὗτος καὶ σμικρὸν χρόνον συνδιατρίψῃ σοι, παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος. ἡμῶν γοῦν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος· ἂν μὲν δὴ καὶ ὑποπίῃ, εὐμαρία ἡμῖν ἐστὶν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγρομένοις Λύσιδος οἶσθαι τούνομα ἀκούειν. καὶ ἂ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινὰ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὅ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ἄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῆ θαυμασία, ἣν ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθρίαξ. 207b4–6: καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἰπποθάλης, ἐπειδὴ πλείους ἑώρα ἐφισταμένους, τούτους ἐπηλυγισάμενος προσέστη ἦ μὴ ᾤετο κατόχεσθαι τὸν Λύσιν ... 210e5–7: κατιδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀγωνιώντα καὶ τεθορυβημένον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγομένων, ἀνεμνήσθη ὅτι καὶ προσεστὼς λανθάνειν τὸν Λύσιν ἐβούλετο.

25 See e.g. Cairns 2003, 24f. on anger in the *Iliad*. See also pp. 81–85 in this volume.

Chaireas eventually marries Kallirhoe, but one envious rival tells Chaireas that his wife is being unfaithful to him. Chaireas believes this:<sup>26</sup>

For a long time he lay dumb, unable to speak or raise his eyes from the ground. When he managed to find his voice – a small voice, not like his normal one. ... [He follows the rival, sees a man admitted to his house, and:] Chaireas could restrain himself no longer and rushed in to catch the lover red-handed and kill him. [However, on seeing Kallirhoe:] He could not find his voice to revile her; overcome by his anger, he kicked her as she ran to him. Now his foot found its mark in the girl's diaphragm and stopped her breath.

Again this passage is formulaic – we can compare the late second-century CE satirist Lucian's *Dialogues of the Courtesans*:<sup>27</sup>

Demophantos was my admirer in those days. ... But one day when he called, I was 'not at home'; I had Kallides the painter with me (he had given me ten drachmas). Well, at the time Demophantos said some very rude things, and walked off. However, the days went by, and I never sent to him; and at last (finding that Kallides had been with me again) even Demophantos began to catch fire, and to get into a passion about it; so one day he stood outside, and waited till he found the door open: my dear, I don't know what he didn't do! cried, beat me, vowed he would murder me, tore my clothes dreadfully!

In the Chariton passage we again see many psychological and physiological symptoms, and resulting actions, but of what emotion? The rival tells us earlier that his intention was to 'set Jealousy (*zēlotypia*) in arms against [Chaireas]',<sup>28</sup> and Chariton in his own voice suggests Chaireas could have pleaded jealousy in his defence.<sup>29</sup> This Greek word *zēlotypia* highlights a further concern of historians of emotions: the lexical and psychological overlap between ancient Greek and our own emotion words, in terms both of what they signify (the scenarios in which they occur, and the verbal expressions and physical actions they lead to), and also their change in meaning over time. *Zēlotypia* (or rather the adjective *zēlotypos*) first occurs in surviving literature in Aristophanes' comedy *Ploutos* (*Wealth*, dated 388 BCE), and David Konstan has argued not only that it did not at that stage mean sexual jealousy, but also that sexual jealousy as we understand it may

26 Chariton, *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* 1.4.7.1–3: Ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν οὖν ἀχανῆς ἔκειτο, μήτε τὸ στόμα μήτε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐπᾶραι δυνάμενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ φωνὴν οὐχ ὁμοίαν μὲν ὀλίγην δὲ συνελέξατο; 10.3–4: Χαιρέας οὐκέτι κατέσχευεν ἀλλὰ εἰσέδραμεν ἐπ' αὐτοφῶρω τὸν μοιχὸν ἀναιρήσαν; 12.1–4: ὁ δὲ φωνὴν μὲν οὐκ ἔσχευεν ὥστε λοιδορήσασθαι, κρατούμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ἐλάκτισε προσιούσαν. εὐστόχως οὖν ὁ ποὺς κατὰ τοῦ διαφράγματος ἐνεχθεὶς ἐπέσχε τῆς παιδὸς τὴν ἀναπνοήν (translated by Reardon 1989, 26f.).

27 Lucian, *Dialogi meretricii* 8.300.10–25: ἦρα μου Δημόφαντος. ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλθόντα ποτὲ ἀπέκλεισα — Καλλίδης γὰρ ὁ γραφεὺς ἔνδον ἦν δέκα δραχμᾶς πεπομφῶς — τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπῆλθέ μοι λοιδορησάμενος· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὰ μὲν διήλθον ἡμέραι, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ προσέπεμπον, ὁ Καλλίδης δὲ ἔνδον ἦν, ὑποθερμαινόμενος ἤδη τότε ὁ Δημόφαντος καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναφλέγεται ἐς τὸ πρῶγμα καὶ ἐπιστάς ποτε ἀνεωγμένην τηρήσας τὴν θύραν ἔκλαεν, ἔτυπεν, ἠπέιλει φονεύσειν, περιερρήγγυε τὴν ἐσθῆτα, ἅπαντα ἐποίει (translated by Fowler and Fowler 1905, 63).

28 Chariton, *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* 1.2.5.4: ἐφοπιῶ γὰρ αὐτῷ Ζηλοτυπίαν (translated by Reardon 1989, 24). On Chaireas' jealousy, see Jones 2012, chapter 1.

29 Chariton, *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* 1.5.4.6–7: οὐδὲν εἰπὼν τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπολογία δικάϊων, οὐ τὴν διαβολήν, οὐ τὴν ζηλοτυπίαν (translated by Reardon 1989, 28).



not even have existed prior to the first century BCE.<sup>30</sup> While I have demonstrated elsewhere that this latter assertion is invalid,<sup>31</sup> it is certainly the case that in the Classical period the word *zēlotypia* implies possessive jealousy or envy/greed, in either a sexual context or metaphor, rather than sexual jealousy as in Chariton.<sup>32</sup>

Drawing together several strands already referred to, these two Chariton passages suggest one final issue: to what extent do fictional genres reflect the emotions of real-life historical Greeks, rather than being merely literary *topoi*? And inasmuch as they do, do they reflect the emotions of the time in which they are written, or the time at which they are set?<sup>33</sup> These are tough questions, and most scholarship on ancient emotions in Greek literature does not address them – fairly, as they are not questions philologists or philosophers frequently set out to answer. However, for historians these questions cannot be ducked. Comparisons must be found in other, contemporary genres – for instance fifth-century tragedy with Thucydides or Old Comedy (more tentatively with fifth-/fourth-century oratory); alternatively in authors of the period in which it is set – for Chariton, perhaps Thucydides or Xenophon. Non-literary media can also be extremely helpful: love stories and rivalries, sexual jealousies, and actions causing harm abound in letters found on papyri, for instance; curse tablets may be helpful too, as may epigrams.<sup>34</sup>

### 3 ‘HISTORICAL’ GENRES: ORATORY, BIOGRAPHY, HISTORIOGRAPHY

Amongst literary genres, oratory is unique in that it both reflects real life, and addresses a mass audience, thus providing excellent evidence for the values of a community. Tragedy and comedy (and arguably epic) address mass audiences, but are fictional genres. Historiography and biography purport to record real-life events, but are written for an unrepresentative audience (educated males of superior class/wealth). Of literary genres that purport to record real life, oratory must uniquely be credible to an audience of broad social and educational background (though still entirely of citizen males). It is for this reason that I have chosen to concentrate on oratory in my case study later in this volume (pp. 355–383).

30 Konstan 2006, 219–243.

31 Sanders forthcoming, chapter 8.

32 Possessive jealousy: Aristophanes, *Ploutos* 1016; Plato, *Symposium* 213d2; Aeschines 1.58.4; Menander, *Perikeiromene* 987. Envy/greed: Aeschines 3.81.7; Aeschines 3.211.10; Isocrates 15.245.3. NB envy in a sexual context is the feeling I have for someone who has a beautiful girlfriend; sexual jealousy is my feeling at his dating Jane Smith, with whom I myself am in love (and believe previously reciprocated). See Salovey and Rodin 1986 on this distinction between what they label ‘social-comparison jealousy’ and ‘romantic jealousy’.

33 E.g. the first-century CE *Chaireas and Kallirhoe* uses *zēlotypia* anachronistically for its fourth-century BCE setting (see above).

34 For epigrams evoking physical intimacy between husband and wife, see p. 103 in this volume; for a curse tablet showing jealousy, see pp. 85f.

Let us consider a passage of Lysias' speech *Against Simon*, in which he portrays a defendant's character:<sup>35</sup>

I am particularly upset, members of the Council, at being forced to speak about matters like this in front of you. I put up with mistreatment, because I was ashamed at the prospect of many people knowing all about me. ... But if I can show I am not guilty of any of the charges that Simon has stated on oath, even though it is obvious that I have behaved rather foolishly towards the young man, given my age, I shall ask you to think no worse of me. You know that desire affects everybody and that the most honorable and restrained man is the one who can bear his troubles most discreetly.

As with the Chariton passages in the previous section, we can note once again the influence of age, social class, and gender on emotions. Unlike Chaireas, the speaker in *Against Simon* is a mature man, and (as he himself admits) *erôs* is considered somewhat unusual at his time of life.<sup>36</sup> The object of his passion is a teenage boy, possibly a slave,<sup>37</sup> while he himself is wealthy enough to afford a speech-writer (and a prostitute as companion, if that is what the young man is), and to leave the city at will – i.e. he is of the leisured classes. Yet he must persuade a jury, which will mostly be made up of poorer citizens, for whom indulging in love affairs with young male prostitutes will be an alien experience. Age, gender, and social class will have an effect not just on the speaker's emotions, but also on how he can best portray those emotions.

Orators use emotions as a persuasion strategy in two principal ways. First, through narrative. The speaker can describe his own emotions, in a way that is designed to demonstrate his innocence or show his good character – here, his *erôs*, shame at inappropriate sexual desire, and upset at being forced to make it public (all of which may be faked). Alternatively, he can accuse his opponent of being motivated by baser emotions – as in the following passage from the same speech, where the speaker portrays his opponent as driven by jealousy:<sup>38</sup>

35 Lysias 3.3–4: μάλιστα δ' ἀγανακτῶ, ὦ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυρόμενος, εἰ μέλλοιεν πολλοὶ μοι συνείσεσθαι, ἠνεσχόμην ἀδικούμενος. ... ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀποδείξω ὡς οὐκ ἔνοχος εἶμι οἷς Σίμων διωμόσατο, ἄλλως δὲ ὑμῖν φαίνωμαι παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον διατεθείς, αἰτοῦμαι ὑμᾶς μηδὲν με χεῖρω νομίζεω, εἰδόμενος ὅτι ἐπιθυμήσαι μὲν ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις ἔνεστιν, οὗτος δὲ βέλτιστος ἂν εἴη καὶ σωφρονέστατος, ὅστις κοσμιώτατα τὰς συμφορὰς φέρειν δύναται (translated by Todd 2000, 44f.). Lysias lived in Athens as a resident alien in the late fifth/early fourth centuries BCE, and wrote speeches (almost entirely) for delivery by others in trials.

36 The speaker seems embarrassed: he says he did not want to appear rather foolish, pursuing an erotic relationship with a young lad at his time of life (3.4: ἄλλως δὲ ὑμῖν φαίνωμαι παρὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν ἐμαντοῦ ἀνοητότερον πρὸς τὸ μειράκιον διατιθείς) – cf. note 15 above. Todd 2007, 278 notes that the speaker 'appears to be unmarried at an age when this was evidently unusual'. The fourth/third-century BCE comic playwright Menander portrays a mature man similarly ashamed of a relationship with a courtesan at *Samia* 23, 27 – see Lape 2004, 139f.

37 Carey 1989, 87 believes that he is; Todd 2000, 43 believes that he is not.

38 Lysias 3.5–8: Ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐπεθυμήσαμεν, ὦ βουλή, Θεοδότου, Πλαταϊκοῦ μειρακίου. ... πυθόμενος γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μειράκιον ἦν παρ' ἐμοί, ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τὴν ἐμὴν νύκτωρ

We were both attracted, members of the Council, to Theodotos, a young man from Plataia. ... He found out that the young man was staying with me, and came to my house drunk one night. He knocked down the doors and made his way into the women's rooms, where my sister and my nieces were – women who have been brought up so respectably that they are ashamed to be seen even by relatives. Simon, however, reached such a level of arrogance that he refused to leave, until the men who were present, together with those who had accompanied him, realized that by entering the rooms of young orphaned girls he was behaving unacceptably, and threw him out by force. Far from apologizing for this outrageous conduct, he found out where I was having dinner and did something that was extraordinary and (unless you know his criminal insanity) unbelievable. He called me out of the house, and as soon as I came out, he immediately tried to hit me. I defended myself, so he moved off and threw stones at me.

The second use of emotions in oratory is to arouse the audience's emotions: their sympathy or pity (as in the first passage above), friendship, gratitude, or other kindly emotions for the speaker; or their anger or indignation (as in the second passage), hatred, envy, resentment, or other hostile emotions for the opponent.<sup>39</sup> This emotion arousal can be achieved in a variety of ways. One possibility is explicitly, through exhortation – there are hundreds of explicit calls for an audience's emotional response in Classical Athenian oratory, for instance (from the end of the same speech).<sup>40</sup>

So I rightly deserve pity from you and from others, not only if I should suffer the fate that Simon intends but simply because I have been compelled by these events to undergo such a trial.

Alternatively orators can arouse an audience's emotions covertly, by playing on their values – in the first two passages above, the audience's sympathy/pity is roused for the speaker for the travails he has suffered and his embarrassment, and their indignation/anger against the opponent by his violence against the speaker and outrageous behaviour towards the female relatives (see pp. 357–359 on covert arousal of emotions). A final way an audience's emotions can be aroused is through theatrical effects – that is, delivery. Here, for instance, is an account of a

μεθύων, ἐκκόψας τὰς θύρας εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν, ἔνδον οὐσῶν τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν, αἱ οὕτω κοσμίως βεβιώκασιν ὥστε καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ὀρώμεναι αἰσχύνεσθαι. οὗτος τοίνυν εἰς τοῦτο ἦλθεν ὕβρεως ὥστ' οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν ἀπελθεῖν, πρὶν αὐτὸν ἡγούμενοι δεινὰ ποιεῖν οἱ παραγενόμενοι καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντες, ἐπὶ παῖδας κόρας καὶ ὀρφανὰς εἰσιόντα, ἐξήλασαν βίᾳ. καὶ τοσοῦτου ἐδέησεν αὐτῷ μεταμελῆσαι τῶν ὕβρισμένων, ὥστε ἐξευρῶν οὐ ἐδειπνοῦμεν ἀτοπώτατον πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀπιστότατον ἐποίησεν, εἰ μὴ τις εἰδείη τὴν τοῦτου μανίαν. ἐκκαλέσας γάρ με ἔνδοθεν, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα ἐξῆλθον, εὐθύς με τύπτειν ἐπεχείρησεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτὸν ἡμυνάμην, ἐκστὰς ἔβαλλέ με λίθοις (translated by Todd 2000, 45). For other examples of such detailed, vivid descriptions (*enargeia*), see other studies in this volume: pp. 63 and 76–79 (petitions in papyri), 102f. (funerary epigrams), and 188f. (healing miracles of Epidaurus).

39 Arousal of the audience's emotions is particularly recommended by Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2 1356a14–20 and 2.1–11 1378a19–1388b30, and [Aristotle], *Rhetoric to Alexander* 34 1439b15–1440b4.

40 Lysias 3.48: ὥστε δικαίως ἂν ὑφ' ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλεηθείην, οὐ μόνον εἴ τι πάθοιμι ὧν Σίμων βούλεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἠναγκάσθην ἐκ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰς τοιούτους ἀγῶνας καταστῆναι (translated by Todd 2000, 52).

speech to the Assembly in the Sicilian city of Engyion in the late third century BCE, described by Plutarch.<sup>41</sup>

Nikias, right in the midst of some advice that he was giving to the people, suddenly threw himself upon the ground, and after a little while, amid the silence and consternation which naturally prevailed, lifted his head, turned it about, and spoke in a low and trembling voice, little by little raising and sharpening its tones. And when he saw the whole audience struck dumb with horror, he tore off his mantle, rent his tunic, and leaping up half naked, ran towards the exit from the theatre, crying out that he was pursued by the Mothers [goddesses]. No man venturing to lay hands upon him or even to come in his way, out of superstitious fear, but all avoiding him, he ran out to the gate of the city, freely using all the cries and gestures that would become a man possessed and crazed.

This passage leads me to another historical genre, biography, and a different type of text. Plutarch informs us in his *Life of Agis* about the reasons for, and effects of, a fourth-/third-century BCE law change in Sparta:<sup>42</sup>

But when a certain powerful man came to be ephor who was headstrong and of a violent temper, Epitadeus by name, he had a quarrel with his son, and introduced a law permitting a man during his lifetime to give his estate and allotment to any one he wished, or in his will and testament so to leave it. This man, then, satisfied a private grudge of his own in introducing the law; but his fellow citizens welcomed the law out of greed, made it valid, and so destroyed the most excellent of institutions. For the men of power and influence at once began to acquire estates without scruple, ejecting the rightful heirs from their inheritances; and speedily the wealth of the state streamed into the hands of a few men, and poverty became the general rule, bringing in its train lack of leisure for noble pursuits and occupations unworthy of freemen, along with envy and hatred towards the men of property.

In this passage we see emotions (explicitly grudging, greed, envy, and hatred; implicitly anger) interacting with property ownership, laws to promote equalisation (or otherwise) of property, the relationship between rich and poor, and the

41 Plutarch, *Life of Marcellus* 20.5–6: ὁ δὲ Νικίας μεταξύ τι λέγων καὶ συμβουλευῶν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἐξαίφνης ἀφῆκεν εἰς τὴν γῆν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ μικρὸν διαλιπὼν, οἷον εἰκὸς ἡσυχίας σὺν ἐκπλήξει γενομένης, τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπάρας καὶ περινεγκῶν ὑποτρόμφῳ φωνῇ καὶ βαρείᾳ, κατὰ μικρὸν συντείνων καὶ παροξύνων τὸν ἦχον, ὡς ἑώρα φρίκη καὶ σιωπὴ κατεχόμενον τὸ θέατρον, ἀπορρίψας τὸ ἱμάτιον καὶ περιρρηξάμενος τὸν χιτωνίσκον, ἡμίγυμνος ἀναπηδήσας ἔθεε πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον τοῦ θεάτρου, βοῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Μαιτέρων ἐλαύνεσθαι, καὶ μηδενὸς τολμῶντος ἄψασθαι μηδ' ἀπαντῆσαι διὰ δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτρεπομένων, ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας ἐξέδραμεν, οὔτε κινήσεως πρεπούσης δαιμονῶντι καὶ παραφρονοῦντι φεισάμενος (translated by Perrin 1917, 491). See Chaniotis 1997, 234f. and forthcoming. Plutarch relies on earlier sources – here the first-century BCE historian Poseidonios (*FgrH* 87 F 43).

42 Plutarch, *Life of Agis* 5.2–3: ἐφορεύσας δὲ τις ἀνὴρ δυνατός, αὐθάδης δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸς τὸν τρόπον, Ἐπιτάδευς ὄνομα, πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῷ γενομένης διαφορᾶς, ῥήτραν ἔγραψεν ἐξεῖναι τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κληρὸν ᾧ τις ἐθέλοι καὶ ζῶντα δοῦναι καὶ καταλιπεῖν διατιθέμενον. οὗτος μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ τινα θυμὸν ἀποπιμπλάς ἴδιον εἰσήνεγκε τὸν νόμον· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πλεονεξίας ἕνεκα δεξάμενοι καὶ κυρώσαντες, ἀπόλεσαν τὴν ἀρίστην κατάστασιν. ἐκτῶντο γὰρ ἀφειδῶς ἤδη παρωθῶντες οἱ δυνατοὶ τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐκ τῶν διαδοχῶν, καὶ ταχὺ τῆς εὐπορίας εἰς ὀλίγους συρρυσίσης, πενία τὴν πόλιν κατέσχευε, ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἀσχολίαν ἐπιφέρουσα μετὰ φθόνου καὶ δυσμενείας πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας (translated by Perrin 1921, 13–15).

stability or otherwise of the polity – the socio-political effects of this law, according to Plutarch, creating the conditions for revolution. Such issues are staples of Greek historiography, as well as other political writings.<sup>43</sup> Aristotle, for instance, tells us that

those who have secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.<sup>44</sup>

Likewise, Thucydides, following a description of horrific civil strife in the *polis* of Kerkyra:<sup>45</sup>

Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils. To this must be added the violent fanaticism which came into play once the struggle had broken out. ... As for those citizens who held moderate views, they were destroyed by both the extreme parties, either for not taking part in the struggle or in envy at the possibility that they might survive.

The extent to which Greek historians, biographers, orators, philosophers etc. ascribed such issues (and others) to emotional motivations, is clearly a major subject for investigation.<sup>46</sup> We might also consider to what extent emotions are postulated, as in the *Agis* passage above, as a rationale for something whose true origins are lost in the mists of time.

A second area for study suggested by this passage is the connections Greeks believed there were between emotions – for instance, how one emotion leads to another, and under what circumstances. In the passage above, private anger and grudging mingles with generalised greed, leading to widespread envy and hatred. Aristotle suggests a different sort of connection, when he opines that those (jurors) feeling indignation or envy will be incapable of feeling pity.<sup>47</sup> The fourth-century BCE historian/moralist Xenophon unites both these issues (emotions in

43 E.g. see Ehrenberg 1938, 52–61 on *pothos* (yearning/longing/desire) as a frequent explanation of Alexander the Great's actions in ancient historiography. Until recently, modern historians are considerably less willing to attribute political decisions to emotions. See pp. 12–14 in this volume.

44 Aristotle, *Politics* 5.4 1304a34–38: ὡς οἱ δυνάμεως αἴτιοι γινόμενοι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ πλῆθος ὁποιοῦν, στάσιν κινουῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων (translated by Jowett 1984, 2071).

45 Thucydides 3.82.8: πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν· ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον. ... τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ζυνηγωνίζοντο ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο (translated by Warner 1954, 243f.). Hornblower 1991, 485 comments that: 'These motives – love of power, greed, ambition – were all of the greatest importance for Th.', and provides comparative passages elsewhere in the *History*.

46 E.g. see Harrison 2003 on envy as a cause in the *Histories* of the fifth-century BCE historian Herodotus. We might also compare inscriptions mentioning *phthonos* (envy), of which there are many.

47 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.9 1387a3–5: διὸ καλυπτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ, διαφέρει δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἅπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

their socio-political setting, and the relationships between emotions) in his description of how friendship changes one's emotions and actions.<sup>48</sup>

By nature human beings have certain tendencies towards friendliness. They need one another, they feel pity, they benefit from cooperation and, realizing this, they are grateful to one another. They also have hostile tendencies. When they have the same opinions about what things are beautiful and pleasant, they fight for their possession, and, falling out, take sides. Rivalry and passion also make for hostility; the desire to overreach is a cause of ill-feeling, and envy arouses hatred. Nevertheless, friendliness finds a way through all these obstacles and unites men who are truly good. Their moral goodness makes them prefer to enjoy moderate possessions and avoid tribulation rather than gain absolute power by means of war, and enables them, when hungry and thirsty, to share their food and drink without a pang, and to control their pleasure in the sexual attraction of beauty in such a way as not to cause improper annoyance to anyone. It enables them not only to suppress greedy instincts and be content with a lawful share of wealth, but even to assist one another. It enables them to settle arguments not only without annoyance, but even to their mutual advantage, and to keep their tempers from rising to a degree that they will later regret. It rids them completely of envy, since they give their own goods into the possession of their friends, and regard their friends' property as their own.

Returning to the Plutarch *Life of Agis* passage above, another issue that will be familiar to historians is what we might refer to as commentator bias: how far can authors who are rich, educated, and (frequently, though not here) Athenian, be believed when they opine on the emotional motivations of those who are poor, uneducated, and/or non-Athenian – or even non-Greek? To what extent are 'Greek' emotions themselves Athenian cultural constructs? For instance, discussion of *phthonos* (envy/possessive jealousy) in so many Classical (479–322 BCE) sources – which are overwhelmingly Atheno-centric – is so intimately bound up with class and wealth issues in democratic Athens that it raises legitimate questions as to how appropriate any understanding drawn from them will be to non-Athenian contexts.<sup>49</sup>

48 Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.6.21.2–23.7: φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικὰ· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος· ἀλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυομένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλοὺς τε κάγαθούς, διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν αἰροῦνται μὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ μέτρια κεκτηῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ πολέμου πάντων κυριεῦειν, καὶ δύνανται πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καὶ τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων ἀφροδισίοις ἡδόμενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν οὐδὲ μὴ προσήκει· δύνανται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προῖέναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες (translated by Tredennick and Waterfield 1990, 123).

49 To take one example, we might wonder at its relationship to an envious (*phthoneros*) god causing someone's death, a cause which has been frequently attested in funerary inscriptions – for examples see Vérilhac 1978, 100f. no. 66, 257 no. 180; Lattimore 1942, 148f., also 147 for *baskania* and 153f. for *invidia* ('envious glance' in, respectively, Greek and Latin) doing likewise.

Finally, one more issue familiar from historiography can be raised here: that of reporting. Plutarch bases much of his *Life of Agis* on the writings of historians of the Hellenistic period (322–31 BCE), and an exaggerated emotionality was supposedly one of the hallmarks of writing in this period. The second-century BCE historian Polybios criticises the third-century BCE historian Phylarchos for this tendency:<sup>50</sup>

Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours during the night, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchos' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it.

Plutarch, like any commentator separated by time from the events he describes, can only be as good as his own sources – and undated, unreferenced anecdotes about private emotional motivations must be treated with caution.<sup>51</sup> Like other historians, the historian of emotions must test sources for plausibility, and for their wider applicability.

#### 4 BEYOND THE USUAL SUSPECTS: OTHER HISTORICAL SOURCES

At this point it is perhaps appropriate, then, to turn to a fragment of a text by Phylarchos himself, preserved in Athenaios' *Deipnosophistai*:<sup>52</sup>

Phylarchos says that the Athenian settlers in Lemnos were flatterers. For the Athenians in Lemnos – showing gratitude to the descendants of Seleukos and Antiochos, because Seleukos not only delivered them when they were severely oppressed by Lysimachos, but also restored both their cities to them – not only erected temples to Seleukos, but also to his son Antiochos;

50 Polybios 2.59.2: τηρῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἰδίωμα φωνάς τινὰς πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουμένου προσπιπτούσας τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν ἐκπληττομένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν, τοὺς δ' ἀπιστοῦντας, τοὺς δ' ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις προστρέχειν πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν φησίν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω· δεδήλωται γὰρ ἀρκούντως (translated by Paton, Walbank, and Habicht 2010, 425). Cf. Polybios 2.56.7–8. On so-called 'tragic historiography' see Walbank 1960; for further bibliography on Polybios' criticism of tragic historiography, see Chaniotis 1997, 221 note 14; Schepens 2004; van der Stockt 2004; Marincola 2010.

51 On Plutarch's sources and reliability, see Pelling 2000, 44–60.

52 The *Deipnosophistai* is an invaluable late second-/early third-century CE compendium of excerpts from earlier literary and historical sources, organised by subject; it takes the form of a report of a dinner-party discussion between a large number of educated men. Phylarchos *FgrH* 81F29 (at Athenaios, *Deipnosophistai* 6.66.254f–255a): κόλακας δ' εἶναί φησι Φύλαρχος καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λήμνῳ κατοικοῦντας Ἀθηναίων. ... χάριν γὰρ ἀποδιδόντας τοῖς Σελεύκου καὶ Ἀντιόχου ἀπογόνους, ἐπεὶ αὐτοὺς ὁ Σέλευκος πικρῶς ἐπιστατομένους ὑπὸ Λυσιμάχου οὐ μόνον ἐξείλετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς πόλεις αὐτοῖς ἀπέδωκεν ἀμφοτέρας, οἱ Λημόθεν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ μόνον ναοὺς κατεσκεύασαν τοῦ Σελεύκου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Ἀντιόχου· καὶ τὸν ἐπιχεόμενον κύαθον ἐν ταῖς συνουσίαις Σελεύκου σωτήρος καλοῦσι (translated by Yonge 1854, 400, slightly modified). For a similar decree instituting cult worship of Seleukos and Antiochos in the *polis* of Aigai, see Riel and Malay 2009.

and at their feasts, the cup which they use for libations they call ‘the cup of Seleukos the Saviour’.

It had long been customary to express gratitude to a foreign benefactor by the granting of honours.<sup>53</sup> Since Alexander (336–323 BCE) in particular – although there are earlier precedents – this expression of gratitude began to include the local establishment of cults, in which the benefactor was worshipped as a divinity.<sup>54</sup> The fullest extent of their development was not immediate, however, and this excerpt of Phylarchos provides evidence for an inflation in cultic honours.<sup>55</sup> The Athenians surpass customary gratitude in a number of ways (hence why Phylarchos terms this flattery): by establishing a cult to the king’s son as well as to the king himself; by binding future generations to continue to express gratitude; by erecting temples;<sup>56</sup> and by pouring libations at banquets – this act of worship in private homes assimilating both kings to the level of gods.<sup>57</sup> Since canonical literary evidence for this period is extremely limited (chiefly Polybios and Plutarch, both working from earlier sources), much of the literary evidence available for the development of such cults will only be found in fragmentary texts.

This particular fragment was preserved in an anthology (see note 52 above), and such anthologies are useful, if rarely used, historical sources. Another type of source rarely used is educative literature. One tract, addressed by the fourth-century BCE educator Isocrates to the young ruler Demonikos, contains the following instruction on the moral virtues of shame:<sup>58</sup>

- 53 Among literary texts, Demosthenes 20 and 23 evidence a lively discussion on the topic in fourth-century BCE Athens. See Austin 2006, 320f. no. 175 for an example of an inscription (dated in the 240s BCE) in which Seleukos II of Syria acknowledges the gratitude of the city of Miletos for his and his ancestors’ benefactions.
- 54 Habicht 1970 is the seminal work on these so-called ‘ruler cults’ established by *poleis* in the Hellenistic period (323–31 BCE). For recent discussions of ruler cults, including their historical development, see Chaniotis 2003; Buraselis and Aneziri 2004; Chaniotis 2007 (on gratitude and memory in the ruler cult); Chankowski 2010. The cults in the cities should be distinguished from the cults that were established centrally by the major dynasties – see van Nuffelen 2004 on the royal cult of the Seleucid kings of Syria; Melaerts 1998 on the dynastic Ptolemaic cult in Egypt.
- 55 On this specific cult, see Habicht 1970, 89f.
- 56 Chaniotis 2003, 438f. notes that this is a rare example of an entire temple being erected to a ruler, an altar in a sacred precinct normally sufficing.
- 57 On private worship of Hellenistic monarchs, see Aneziri 2005; for Ptolemaic monarchs, see Pfeiffer 2008.
- 58 Isocrates 1.15.4–5: Ἄ ποιεῖν αἰσχρὸν, ταῦτα νόμιζε μηδὲ λέγειν εἶναι καλόν. 1.15.7–16.2: Ἦγοῦ μάλιστα σεαυτῷ πρέπειν κόσμον αἰσχύνην, δικαιοσύνην, σωφροσύνην· τοῦτοις γὰρ ἅπασιν δοκεῖ κρατεῖσθαι τὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἦθος. Μηδέποτε μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιήσας ἔλπιδε λήσειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους λάθης, σεαυτῷ συνειδήσεις. 1.21.2–4: Ὅν κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἰσχρὸν, τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἄσκει πάντων, κέρδους, ὀργῆς, ἡδονῆς, λύπης. 1.21.10–11: αἰσχρὸν ὑπολάβης τῶν μὲν οἰκετῶν ἄρχειν, ταῖς δ’ ἡδοναῖς δουλεῦειν. 1.24.4–7: Βραδέως μὲν φίλος γίνου, γενόμενος δὲ πειρῷ διαμένειν. Ὅμοίως γὰρ αἰσχρὸν μηδένα φίλον ἔχειν καὶ πολλοὺς ἐταίρους μεταλλάττειν. 1.26.1–3: Ὅμοίως



Believe that what is shameful to do is not good even to mention.

Think that a sense of shame and justice and soundness of mind are an especially fitting regimen, for all agree that the character of the young should be controlled by these things. Never expect to do something shameful and get away with it; for although you may escape the notice of others, you will be conscious of it yourself.

Strengthen your soul against all those things by which it is shameful for it to be overcome, such as profit, anger, pleasure, and pain.

It is shameful to rule servants and yet to be a slave to pleasures...

Be slow to take on a friendship, but once you have, try to maintain it, for it is equally shameful to have no friends and to be continually changing companions.

Regard it a similar disgrace to be outdone by your enemies in doing harm and to be beaten by your friends in doing good.

This passage shows the thoughts of a conservative, Athenian philosopher/educator on the appropriate uses of a healthy capacity for shame (*aidôs/aischynê*), especially in training the young. It demonstrates that this particular individual was well aware of the educative value of the emotion.<sup>59</sup> His comments, however, also reflect ‘traditional’ thought – many ideas that appear in later educative tracts were attributed to earlier moralists such as the ‘Seven Sages’ of the Archaic period (seventh/sixth centuries BCE) or can be traced back to the poems the sixth-/fifth-century BCE conservative aristocrat Theognis purportedly wrote to his young beloved Kyrnos – historical sources that are often ignored. Consider, for example the following verses:<sup>60</sup>

You will lay by no greater treasure for your sons than a sense of shame, Kyrnos, which follows good men.

Kyrnos, feel shame before [i.e. respect] and fear the gods – for this prevents a man from doing harm or speaking impiously.

Such thoughts can be traced forwards in time too, and we might expect similar comments to appear in such works as Plutarch’s *Moralia*, Stobaeus’ *Anthology*,<sup>61</sup> or the *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* (Corpus of Greek Proverbs). Such texts have never yet been consistently studied in connection with the history of emotions, but they will both trace patterns of thought that persist over a thousand years of Greek moralising, and help highlight similarities and differences between different geographical locations. For instance Plutarch records one anecdote in which a character says:

αἰσχρὸν εἶναι νόμιζε τῶν ἐχθρῶν νικᾶσθαι ταῖς κακοποιαῖς καὶ τῶν φίλων ἠττᾶσθαι ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις (translated by Mirhady 2000, 22–25).

59 Kristjánsson 2007, 99–112 argues that for Aristotle emulation was the primary educative emotion; for a contrary view see Sanders 2008, 272–274, where I argue that Aristotle sees education in virtue as involving all the emotions.

60 Theognis 409f.: Οὐδένα θησαυρὸν παισὶν καταθήσει ἀμείνω αἰδοῦς, ἢτ’ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι, Κύρν’, ἔπεται; 1179f.: Κύρνε, θεοῦς αἰδοῦ καὶ δείδιθι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἄνδρα εἴργει μήθ’ ἔρδειν μήτε λέγειν ἄσεβῆ (my translation).

61 Of which, for instance, 3.31–32 in particular deals with *aidôs*. The *Anthology* was probably compiled in the fifth century CE.

In Sparta ..., wealth, softness, and adorning oneself are held in no honour, while a sense of shame, good conduct, and persuasion of the leaders are prioritised.<sup>62</sup>

This is both excellent historical evidence for Spartan thought about shame,<sup>63</sup> and an indication that they too believed it could/should be taught: consider what it is grouped with.

Finally, I wish to discuss briefly one more type of source that has never been systematically studied in connection with emotions, and that is the so-called *scholia*.<sup>64</sup> This is a vast field, and here I shall select merely a handful of passages which cast further light on an emotion I considered earlier: *zêlotypia*. In the *Odyssey*, the nymph Kalypso responds to Zeus' reported order to let Odysseus (her lover, but also her prisoner) go free.<sup>65</sup>

You are cruel, gods, *zêlêmones* beyond all others, who resent (*agaasthe*) goddesses sleeping beside men publicly, if one of us makes him her dear husband.

This adjective *zêlêmones* is habitually translated 'jealous', which at first glance would seem to make sense; but on closer examination it becomes clear this is not the emotion Kalypso is referring to: she says that it is not merely sleeping with a man that is the problem, it is making him her husband. The verb *agaasthe*, which I have translated 'resent', is related to *agan*, which means 'very much' or 'excessively'; accordingly the verb can be translated in a good sense 'to admire', or in a bad sense 'to be envious / bear a grudge against'. It is characteristically used in Homer to mean 'begrudging' or 'resentment',<sup>66</sup> and this explains the prior use of *zêlêmones*: male gods (Kalypso says) believe female gods go too far, and accordingly they feel some sort of censoring emotion for them. The *scholia* make the following comments:<sup>67</sup>

(H.P.Q.) *zêlêmones*, jealous (*zêlotypoi*); baneful (*dêlêmones*), harmful.  
(V.) Baneful (*dêlêmones*) is written.

62 Plutarch, *Apophthegmata Lakonika* 228c9–11: ἐν Σπάρτῃ ..., ἐν ἧ̃ πλοῦτος μὲν καὶ τρυφή καὶ καλλωπισμὸς ἀτιμάζονται, αἰδῶς δὲ καὶ εὐκοσμία καὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων πειθῶ πρεσβεύονται (my translation).

63 Or at least for the Spartan 'mirage' – see note 13 above.

64 The *scholia* started as explanatory comments written in the margins of manuscripts of major Greek authors. They eventually became more formalised from the third century BCE, as scholars working in the great library of Alexandria collected these comments and added to them (though the process continued for centuries after the destruction of the library in 48 BCE). Some scholiasts wrote entire commentaries themselves on individual works, but for the most part the *scholia* are anonymous and undated. For a guide to using *scholia*, see Dickey 2007. For more advanced analysis, see Nünlist 2009.

65 Homer, *Odyssey* 5.118–120: σκέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλήμονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων, | οἷ̃ τε θεαῖσ' ἀγάασθε παρ' ἀνδράσιν εὐνάζεσθαι | ἀμφαδίην, ἣν τίς τε φίλον ποιήσεται' ἀκοίτην (my translation).

66 Walcot 1978, 25f.

67 *Scholia* to Homer, *Odyssey* 5.118: (H.P.Q.) ζηλήμονες, ζηλότυποι· ἢ δηλήμονες, βλαπτικοί. (V.) γράφεται δηλήμονες – given in Dindorf 1855, 254 (my translation).

The scholiasts make the same mistake as modern translators in assuming, wrongly, that *zêlêmones* is a synonym for *zêlotypoi*,<sup>68</sup> and that both have the meaning *zêlotypoi* has in the later period, i.e. ‘jealous’. The scholiasts do at least realise that ‘jealous’ is the wrong word in this context, that what is meant implies some sort of resentment, some desire to punish, but this leads them to the mistaken conclusion that *zêlêmones* must be the wrong word. They would not have been led down that path had they realised that *zêlotypos* had changed its own meaning over the centuries since the Classical period (as discussed above), and that *zêlêmones* need not mean the same as *zêlotypoi* in any case.

Turning finally to *zêlotypia* itself, in a comment on *Iliad* 11.58 (‘Aeneas, who was honoured as a god by the Trojan people’), the scholiast writes:<sup>69</sup>

This addition is not gratuitous, but displays the rankings of men; for this man was second after Hector; and because of this there was some jealousy (*zêlotypia*) between them; so they say anyway, for he was always angry with godlike Priam [the Trojan king], because he did not honour him at all despite him being noble among men.

*Zêlotypia* is translated ‘jealousy’ here, but (just as in the Classical period) this is not sexual jealousy: rather it shows the jealousy of rivals.<sup>70</sup> *Zêlotypia* frequently appears to be similar to *phthonos* (envy/possessive jealousy); the two are paired in a sexual context by Plato,<sup>71</sup> but a Homeric scholiast pairs them in a non-sexual one: commenting on Nestor’s attempt to persuade Agamemnon to accept good counsel without grudging the person giving it, he says that Nestor ‘knows that many good deeds are destroyed though envy and anger and unjust jealousies’ (my translation).<sup>72</sup>

Once again the context is not sexual but, this time, deliberative. Such *scholia*, though undated, have told us much about this elusive and controversial emotion, and in particular put paid to the notion that it always represents sexual jealousy.

68 Both words derive from *zêlos*, which itself means ‘emulative rivalry’ and generally has no relation to sexual jealousy.

69 *Scholia* to Homer, *Iliad* 11.58: οὐ μάτην ἢ προσθήκη, ἀλλ’ ἐμφαίνει τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἀνδρῶν· μετὰ γὰρ Ἑκτορα οὗτος δεύτερος· διὸ καὶ ζηλοτυπία ἦν τις αὐτοῖς· φησὶ γοῦν· αἰεὶ γὰρ Πριάμῳ ἐπεμήνιε δίῳ, οὐνεκ’ ἄρ’ ἐσθλὸν ἔόντα μετ’ ἀνδράσιν οὐ τι τίεσκεν – given in Erbse 1974, 135 (my translation).

70 This is close in meaning to the etymological root *zêlos* – see note 68 above.

71 At Plato, *Symposium* 213d2 – though the emotion referred to is again not sexual jealousy, as displayed in *Chaireas and Kallirhoe*, but rather possessive jealousy: Alcibiades knows of Socrates’ penchant for disbursing wisdom to attractive young men, and (since Socrates refused to take advantage of Alcibiades’ sexual advances) it must be this that Alcibiades wants all to himself.

72 *Scholia* to Homer, *Iliad* 9.102: οἶδε γὰρ φθόνῳ καὶ θυμῷ καὶ ζηλοτυπίας ἀδίκους πολλὰς πράξεις ἀγαθὰς ἀνηρημένας – given in Erbse 1971, 419 (my translation).

## 5 CONCLUSION

My aim in this chapter has not been primarily exegetic, but rather explorative: to broaden horizons, rather than to derive any new knowledge – though some new findings have emerged. The heterogeneous collection of passages discussed should, it is hoped, have given the reader some idea of the huge range of ancient Greek literary sources that are available to the historian of emotions, and the types of questions that such sources can, and cannot, answer.

Literary sources have unique benefits not generally applicable to other types of source: we generally know something about the personality of their authors; many texts can be reasonably precisely dated; their intended readership (or audience) is generally known, as is the intention of the author in writing the text. Additionally, literary texts are generally far longer than other types of text, and accordingly provide a much wider narrative context.

However, literary sources also have certain problems as sources for emotions: they are almost exclusively written by, and frequently intended to be read only by, men of higher education and wealth/status; and a disproportionately large number come from one city in a relatively brief period (Classical Athens). The historian must necessarily be concerned, therefore, with the extent to which such texts are representative of the wider society, or indeed other *poleis* and non-*polis* areas, and other periods. Further, many literary texts belong to genres which are partly or wholly fictional, and the historian must be wary that scenes portrayed may not be wholly reflective of real life, but rather literary *topoi*, or that details of a scene are unintentionally anachronistic.

While literary sources do, therefore, raise methodological issues that must be recognised and resolved, they are far from unique in doing so, and are nevertheless an immensely rich source for the historian of emotions. Accordingly they fully deserve their place alongside the other types of evidence discussed in this volume.

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