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# Contractor Selection, Monitoring and Performance of Road Infrastructure Projects in Uganda

## Synergies between Policy and Law

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### ABSTRACT

The article highlights the powerful influence of contractor selection in improving road project performance in Uganda. It provides empirical evidence of the performance of road projects as a less studied phenomenon because in Uganda, most public works are delivered with longer delays, contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Use of poor-quality materials, poor scheduling, delayed procurement, and poor contractor selection causes cost and time overruns on roads. The study adopts a cross sectional design in terms of quantitative and qualitative approaches to collect data. A multivariate analysis and surveys were taken from 190 respondents. It was found that contractor monitoring has a significant positive effect on the completion of roads while contractor selection has a direct and indirect positive effect on performance of roads through the partial mediation of contractor selection. This suggests that contractor selection has an effect on the improvement of the level of road projects performance in Uganda. There is a need to improve the scrutiny of the contractor selection process in road agencies in Uganda. This will require a good review of the government policy on contractor selection aimed at making it more robust and efficient.

## INTRODUCTION

Although road agencies need to provide road infrastructure that is beneficial for road users, little is known about how the activities of the agencies influence the value creation of road infrastructure (Muzaale, Byaruhanga and Auriacombe 2018). From a service-dominant logic perspective, the influence of contractor selection and the monitoring on road infrastructure performance still remains complex given the increasing cases of irregularities in the award of contracts to companies that did not qualify, resulting in shoddy work, cost and time overruns in Uganda (Muzaale and Auriacombe 2018). In Africa, although use of roads dominates the transport sector, carrying 80 to 90% of the passenger and freight traffic in most countries; the condition of these roads requires regular maintenance by international standards (World Bank 2011). In order to respond to the road infrastructure challenges, the African countries instituted a wide range of policy reforms (World Bank 2011). Most countries embarked on the creation of independent sources of funding for road maintenance, based on road-user charges. However, as asserted by Banaitiene (2006), the reforms have not fully improved the performance of roads in Africa. According to the World Bank (2011), on average, about 43% of the main road networks are in a good condition, a further 31% are in a reasonable condition, and the remaining 27% are in a poor condition (Okello 2016).

According to the World Bank (2011), Africa has the lowest density of roads as compared to any other region of the world. Only 204km per 1 000km in Africa are paved, while in the developed world on average 944km per 1 000 km are paved (Bagaka and Kobia 2010). The spatial density of sub-Saharan Africa's roads is less than 30% of that of South Asia, where half of the roads are paved, and only 6% of that of North America, where two-thirds are paved (Barasa 2014).

In response to the low density of roads, the East African leaders have targeted road infrastructure as a priority for stimulating economic growth in the region. According to Ng'wanalika (2015), in the East African region, Kenya aims to develop a 1 700km northern corridor linking Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo to its port at Mombasa. On the other hand, Tanzania and Kenya also plan to invest in new port projects, at Bagamoyo and Lamu respectively (Byaruhanga, Muzaale and Auriacombe 2018). The East African Community (EAC) countries, in their 2015–2025 strategy, indicated there is need to invest between US\$68 billion to US\$100 billion to build roads, ports, railways, transmission lines and oil and gas infrastructure (Byaruhanga, Muzaale and Auriacombe 2018). The traditional roads authority regards the provision of road infrastructure and maintenance as a social responsibility. In this scenario there is in most cases little use of the asset value of the road infrastructure in the measurement of service delivery, and limited use of the business value attached (Horak and Van Wijk 2018). A total paradigm shift is needed when such services are contracted out such as when dealing with a roads agency.

Infrastructure is critical to economic growth and competitiveness in Uganda; however, the current inadequate infrastructure is impeding the expected growth. Evidence from surveys suggests that infrastructure constraints were responsible for as much as 58% of the productivity handicap faced by Ugandan firms as indicated in the World Bank AICD Report (2012). Despite the said government efforts, there is slow implementation of road projects coupled with an inability to implement road projects within the contracted time and cost as key performance gaps (OAG 2016). The government has acknowledged the slow progress, which is attributed to challenges in the contract award process and the quality of the selected road contractors. This assertion was further confirmed by the Ugandan minister responsible for works as cited by a local newspaper (*The Daily Monitor* 2015) where it was asserted that 80% of the road contractors are incompetent and they do shoddy work. To date in Uganda, performance of road infrastructure projects in terms of durability, timeliness and cost management is still difficult (Mulumba 2016). Although some studies and efforts have been made towards understanding project performance (Oluka and Basheka 2014), the underlying factors affecting road infrastructure performance such as timeliness, cost overruns and durability of roads in Uganda remain hazy. In spite of the call by the government of Uganda to handle government projects in a business-like manner, the procurement system continues to be clogged with numerous complaints, causing delays in implementation and where infrastructure contracts are signed, poor quality of works and cost overruns are evident. Little has been done to establish the causes of numerous complaints and continuous delays, shoddy works and escalation of costs in the implementation of road infrastructure projects to design appropriate mitigating strategies. However, contractor selection and monitoring is a glaring concern under contract management in the road construction industry creating a knowledge gap that prompted this study. This article aims:

- To establish the relationship between contractor selection and performance of road infrastructure projects in Uganda.
- To establish the relationship between contractor monitoring and performance of road infrastructure projects in Uganda.
- To examine the mediating effect of contractor selection on the relationship between contractor monitoring and performance of road infrastructure projects in Uganda.

## **CONCEPTUALISATION AND CONTEXTUALISATION**

On contractor selection, Lingard, Hughes and Chinyio (1998) indicate that decisions are usually made following pre-selection activities of competition or negotiation. Lingard, Hughes and Chinyio (1998) further present that under a competitive

contractor selection process, the client puts the works to tender and interested contractors respond by submitting bids. Bidding is pursued either through open or selective tendering. Open tendering allows all interested parties the opportunity to bid for the works. In the selective tendering process, contractors are subject to pre-qualification (Bagaka and Kobia 2010). Firms are short-listed on the basis of this pre-qualification and only a limited number are then invited to bid. Contractor selection involves the evaluation and selection of contractors leading to the award of construction contracts which is a crucial part of the road construction process (Arrows 2010).


According to Arrows (2010), repeatedly awarding contracts to a single contractor must be precluded; an impartial method must be used for selecting contractors who are to receive bid solicitations. Chetty and Eriksson (2002) posit that the selection of a contractor for a project is a critical decision for the developer because they often rely on the contractor to manage the process of transforming a feasible concept into a functioning project. Although some owners have the expertise, resources and desire to lead the development effort on their own, choosing the right contractor can greatly improve the likelihood of project success. Contractor selection in this study refers to procurement methods and evaluation criteria.

Contractor monitoring is a management aspect that involves active tracking and control of the relationship between the supplier and the contracting authority. Contractor monitoring involves those activities performed by an employer/client after a contract has been awarded to determine the performance of the contractor in meeting the terms and conditions of the contract. It encompasses all dealings between the employer and the contractor from the time the contract is awarded until the work has been completed.

The dependent variable is the performance of road infrastructure projects. Clarke (2014) observed that performance is the accomplishment of a given task measured against predetermined known standards of accuracy, completeness, cost and speed. In a contract, performance is deemed to be the fulfilment of an obligation in a manner that releases the performer from all liabilities under the contract. Cheung *et al.* (2004) posited that performance is about how well something can be done. To measure project performance, a number of performance indicators such as time, cost and quality were considered. In support, Otim and Alinaitwe (2013) noted that, to establish the performance factors, project success has been widely considered by many scholars as an indicator of good performance. Chan and Chan (2004) argue that project success can be categorised into the objective measures of time, cost, safety and environmental considerations and subjective measures of quality, functionality and satisfaction of project participants.

Langston (2012) posits that performance is not just about efficiency but about achieving desired results. He identified performance indicators to measure the

**Figure 1: Conceptual framework**



Source: (Adapted from Gitau 2013)

success of construction projects which include client satisfaction, stakeholder engagement, service delivery, investment return, urban renewal, defect minimisation, trust, dispute avoidance, innovation, safety and standard (Langston 2012). He noted, however, that the most commonly cited indicators are time of completion, project cost and workmanship (quality). For purposes of this study, performance of road infrastructure projects is measured in terms of time, cost and quality.

Contractor selection is conceptualised as the process of choosing the most appropriate contractor to deliver a specified project to ensure achievement of the best value for money. According to Ibadov (2015), the key stage for every construction project is its implementation and this stage is connected with the selection of a contractor. Contractor monitoring is conceptualised as the level of implementation of monitoring components as developed by Hinton (2003) namely training, policies, plans, communication, payment, reports, records management, inspections and audits, appraisal and dispute management. Performance measures are the basic input to a variety of decision processes and activities in infrastructure management. These include charting progress towards achieving operational, sectoral, and policy objectives; assessing whether users are receiving services that they want at the level of quality that they are willing to pay for; and comparing competing or alternative service providers to determine the most efficient provision arrangement for infrastructure service. A framework is presented for defining consistent measures of infrastructure performance, particularly for roads and pavements. The framework identifies relevant indicators and the linkages between them. Because there are changes over time in information

needs and in the types of agencies using performance indicators as well as in their relationships to one another, a framework is needed to maintain consistency in the information bases used and to update the indicators to ensure relevance. Performance is measured at five major levels: (a) service quality and reliability from a user's point of view; (b) cost; (c) operational efficiency and productivity from a service provider's perspective; (d) time; (e) institutional performance indicators such as effectiveness (Bshaka, Sabiti, Muhumza 2011). Which particular performance indicators are of interest depends very strongly on the view of the party involved in the use of the indicators (Barasa 2013).

## **THEORETICAL REVIEW**

Many efforts have been made to develop the theoretical perspective for developing empirical understanding of the institutional theory. During recent years, this theory went through major advancements and gained popularity; however, we believe that it has several significant theoretical/methodological issues, which limit its applicability and effectiveness. The most important issues include static institutional explanations, and difficulty while calculating some institutional variables. In this study, we have addressed a major issue related to this theory in terms of its static nature, using the "institutionalisation" concept to explain institutional structures and to develop better institutional explanations. This study negates/refutes the claims of many researchers, who stated that the institutional theory is rich in concepts and has advanced to, "warrant more formal models and codification". The theory draws attention to how organisations' decision-making is influenced by the institutional, social and cultural factors as identified by Scott (2001), and in particular how rationalised activities are adopted by organisations. The theory emphasises the use of rules, laws and sanctions as enforcement mechanisms, with expedience as basis for compliance (Scott 2004). The theory explains good procedure as an effect of institutional decision-making (Scott 2004). The institutional theory helps in showing the relevance of structures, processes and systems and to establish whether contractor selection and monitoring has a significant effect on performance of road infrastructure projects. We suggest that identifying the determinants of changes in institutional structures, represents an important area for theoretical/empirical work.

Studies have already suggested that potential determinants of how specific structures are taken for granted and how strong incentives for maintaining the structure increase, instead of decreasing it. No major actors attempted to compel organisations to adopt a given structure, either through law or through withholding critical resources. For organisational scholars, addressing the general issue of applicability requires a consideration of how and when choices of action become socially defined; who acts to cause change and how to diffuse that change to other organisations.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The perspective of infrastructure provision, in the case of roads, includes indicators relating to the characteristics of the road system and network such as the size, value, and distribution of the network; it also represents the performance of the facility in meeting demand for availability and access to road transportation users (Sodongi and Amran 2011:45).

Otim and Alinaitwe (2013) reiterated that to establish the performance factors, project success has been widely considered by many scholars as an indicator of good performance. Chan and Chan (2004) observed that project success can be categorised into the objective measures of time, cost, safety and environmental considerations and subjective measures of quality, functionality and satisfaction of project participants. However, Otim and Alinaitwe (2013) submit that in terms of enhancing effectiveness, road infrastructure projects in rural areas are on the lower scale compared to rural infrastructure projects in urban areas. Therefore, in bridging the gap, this may require the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) to revise its policies in order to enhance sector innovativeness and performance.

Langston (2012) posited that performance is not just about efficiency but effectiveness. He identified performance indicators to measure the success of construction projects which include client satisfaction, stakeholder engagement, service delivery, investment return, urban renewal, defect minimisation, trust, dispute avoidance, innovation, safety and standard. Okello (2016) argues that road construction projects are still associated with sub-standard work, loss of government funds and untimely completion of projects. The most commonly cited indicators are time of completion, project cost and workmanship (quality). Sebanatika (2013) further asserts that funds were set aside for monitoring and supervision in the budget for road projects but roads were found to be of poor quality compared to those works where there were no funds set aside. The funds were not necessarily put to use, especially where works are undertaken by government. This study will close this gap by borrowing from the ideas of Okello (2016) who asserts that the most commonly cited indicators are time of completion, project cost and workmanship (quality).

Mulumba (2016) further explains that the choice of the right contractor strongly affects successful completion of construction works. This supports the earlier argument by Banaitien and Banaitis (2006) that contractor selection is one of the main decisions made by the clients and in order to ensure that the project can be completed successfully, the client must select the most appropriate contractor. Indeed, it is critical for the client's goals to manage the project schedule of cost, time and quality and general construction management (Puri and Tiwari 2014).

Puri and Tiwari (2014) further posit that selection of contractors is often conducted during tendering which gives a client a choice in awarding a contract



to a company which proposes the lowest price and short construction cycles. In recent years, most entities make use of such a method. On the other hand, the research results show that the cheapest tenderers often have problems with completing the project (Okello 2016). Accepting the lowest price is the basic cause of the project completion problems because very often lowering the price means lowering the quality. These practices, however, are characterised by major weaknesses, because achieving lower costs does not necessarily give the best value. On the other hand, studies by Okello (2016) indicate that contractor selection is mainly by alternative procurement methods (APM) in which ownership (of decision-making) and responsibility for design and operation is passed to the contractor with the state adopting a regulatory role (Barasa 2013).

Muzaale and Auriacombe (2018) noted that the criteria determined for the evaluation of bids is a critical stage in the process of selecting a contractor from a number of bidding contractors that have submitted bids for a specified project (Nguyen 2015). Procurement and bid evaluation methods are critical steps in contractor selection, which involves the use of different procurement and evaluation methods (Singh & Tiong 2005). Similarly, the institutional theory is applicable given the organisational set-up. The multicriteria theory in this context brings out the fact that different competencies and capabilities are considered during evaluation of bids to arrive at an ideal contractor.

Hatash and Skitmore (1998) described a systematic multicriteria decision analysis as a contractor selection method based on utility. The study focused on what causes contractors to fail in project implementation but did not address what would lead to a weak contractor being selected. Sodangi and Amra (2011) investigated a selected sample of 150 construction professionals operating in Malaysia to identify the actual criteria used by clients for the selection of contractors from the current practice in Malaysia. The results showed that track performance, financial capacity and technical capacity were the most important criteria and considered crucial for the selection of contractors in Malaysia. The study focused on the criteria and not the entire process of contractor selection and possible challenges but it was silent on performance which was the problem subject to investigation in this study.

## **EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PERFORMANCE OF ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN UGANDA**

The findings from interviews and documentary reviews, give the status of contractor selection and how it influences the performance of road transport projects. According to Mulumba (2016), the road construction industry is full of projects that were completed with significant time and cost overruns. According to Faridi

(2006) delays have an adverse impact on project success in terms of time, cost, quality and safety. The effects of road construction delays are not confined to the construction industry only, but influence the overall economy of a country. The study found that delay in payment of the contractor in completing works was experienced during the construction of Mukono-Katosi and Kisoga-Nyenga (74.2km and Kigumba-Masindi-Hoima-Kabwoya Roads. As Okello (2016) noted, contractual delay is a manifestation of failure by contractual parties involved to perform their obligations under the contract. Such obligations may include timely payment of workers for accomplished construction works as well as timely mobilisation of necessary equipment or machinery and manpower, among others.

Some road projects were characterised by overruns in cost; the issue of cost overruns is critical and needs to be addressed. Ssebanakita (2012) noted that cost overruns need to be identified and avoided so as to maximise benefits and returns from infrastructure construction projects. Costs arising due to such delays often manifest themselves in terms of accumulated interest on loans, high cost of maintaining management staff, as well as continuous escalation in wages and material prices.

Findings revealed that lack of access to finance, both during pre-construction which disqualifies emerging contractors from meeting guarantee and performance bond requirements; and during construction, which leads to cash flow problems; incomplete work and even liquidation are financial constraints facing emerging contractors. The payment predicament of the construction industry cannot be easily explained (Mulumba 2016). All parties including the owners, consultants, contractors, sub-contractors, suppliers and even public sector employers have an important role and must act in concert to take ownership of the problems and challenges.

Study findings revealed causes of cost overruns for contractors are: delay in certification, paymaster's poor financial management, local culture, paymaster's failure to implement good governance in business, underpayment of certified amounts by the paymaster, the use of payment for paid-when-paid clauses in contracts, disagreement on the valuation of work done. Study findings revealed the paymaster's wrongful withholding of payment, shortage of current year project budget, poor communication among parties involved, delay in submitting contractor's payment claim, conflict among parties involved, poor understanding of the contract. Furthermore, it was observed that there are cost overruns for the completed work due to bureaucracy in government departments. As Mulumba (2016) noted, payment to contractors or lack of it is a common cause of disputes in the construction industry.

Major road project works are delayed because sub-contractors are also affected by cost overruns. Sub-contractors are often paid late by the main contractors because of pay-when-paid and pay-if-paid clauses included in most contract forms. The consequences of the sub-contractors being paid late are grave. In such

situations, some sub-contractors tend to increase their quotations, which in turn increases total project cost, an undesirable condition for owners. Amoako (2011) noted that it should be possible to improve sub-contractor payment practice if developers pay main contractors on time, and in turn main contractors pay their sub-contractors right after completion of sub-contract work.

Various parameters directly and indirectly contribute to the highway's quality performance. The contributing factors are design, specifications, environment, and construction-related factors, while the indirect factors are managerial-related factors. Enshassi, Najjar, and Kumaraswamy (2017) noted that quality of construction projects is significantly affected by the characteristics of site layout, experience of site staff, consistency of design documents, the financial power of the contractor, and availability of construction materials.

The analysis of the results of the study showed that errors or omissions in construction work are found to be the highest ranking followed by inexperienced or newly qualified consultants, political focus on reduced project costs, quality or time, unsettled or lack of project planning, and errors or inconsistencies in project documents.

It was also found that gaps in road project performance could also have arisen due to a difference in expectations that leads to increase in construction costs and delays. Findings from the interviews further indicated that there was much political influence which compromised the quality of roads from identification of contractors, awarding of tenders, and the construction process. This not only increased the costs of road construction but also the quality was compromised on roads; for example, the Mpigi-Kinoni road. As Mulumba (2016) noted, political influence during selection negatively affects the performance of the road construction projects in terms of quality and costs.

## **Contractor selection**

Okello (2016) emphasised that a participatory approach will be the best for Uganda and this has been implemented through the contractor selection process that emphasises transparency. For many road projects, the existing contractor selection criteria are not appropriate for complex roads projects. The respondents had mixed responses about the worthiness of the contractors selected for various road projects; however, the majority of the procurement professionals condemned the act by contractors who submit falsified documents, claiming to have adequate expertise and equipment at the preliminary stages. They noted that this in itself is affecting the performance of road projects in Uganda.

As to whether contractor selection procedures allow unnecessary interference through complaints which cause delays; an UNRA official noted that the "interference by oversight agencies delays the completion of the selection process,

this is common when bidders seek administrative review and PPDA as an oversight agency overturns the award". He noted that in all cases where the Public Procurement and Disposal Authority (PPDA) has ordered a repeat of the process the cost outcome is always higher than the earlier submitted costs.

There are also many loopholes in the process of contractor selection. According to the PPDA Annual Performance Report (2016), the authority handled a total of 38 applications for administrative reviews, some of which were on major road projects. The administrative reviews handled were due to bidders' dissatisfaction with the evaluation process and quality of bidding documents, both of which affect the contractor selection process. The authority recommended re-evaluating the bids to ensure fairness and transparency.

The selection procedure for many road projects had many unnecessary approval stages. As Mulumba (2016) noted, the contractor selection process in public procurement has various stages of approval manned by the various committees such as the evaluation committee, contracts committee, user department and the accounting officer. All these approval stages had a bearing on the length of the contract process of road projects. A UNRA Report (2016) reiterated that many of the procurement processes for various key roads infrastructure projects have taken longer than required to go through the procurement process.

A senior engineer of planning at UNRA when interviewed on the causes of delays in the selection process noted that the: "evaluation process takes too long because evaluators concentrate on technical issues which ideally would be handles at negotiation with the selected contractor". He further observed that the way due diligence is handled at UNRA is ineffective and staff take too long on travels verifying projects even where the government has a mission that could handle these matters.

The analysis of contractor competency revealed that 64% of the respondents indicated that the selection criteria did not provide for methods to analyse contractor competency for some roads; for example, the Mukono-Katosi-Nyenga Road, while 11% disagreed and 25% remained undecided. This attribute of contractor selection had a mean score of 3.76. Furthermore, study findings revealed that the selection criteria do not require certified evidence from bidders to demonstrate their capacity to execute works. Failure by the evaluation teams to obtain certified evidence results in selection of incompetent contractors who end up taking longer than the contractual time.

## **Contractor monitoring, selection and performance of road projects**

The study examined the relationship between contractor monitoring, contractor selection and performance of road projects and the results indeed reveal that the

relationship between contractor monitoring, selection and performance of road projects is positive and significant ( $\beta=.480$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). This finding provides support for the argument that there is a significant relationship between contractor monitoring, selection and performance of road projects. This assertion is in line with previous studies which state that contractor monitoring and selection capability is related to the improvement of road performance.

### **Contractor monitoring, selection and oversight role of PPDA**

The findings have revealed that there is a strong positive and significant relationship between contractor monitoring, contractor selection and the oversight role of PPDA ( $\beta=.765$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). This is in line with Okello (2016) who determined that changes in contractor monitoring are positively associated with changes in the oversight role of PPDA, implying that when UNRA improves on its contractor monitoring and selection this might lead to certain performance improvements on road projects.

### **Oversight role of PPDA and performance of road projects**

The findings revealed that there is a strong positive and significant relationship between the oversight role of PPDA and performance of road projects ( $\beta=.428$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). The message here is that UNRA's performance on road projects depends on the level of its commitment to the advice given by PPDA. This is in line with Okello (2016) who states that to attain and sustain performance of road projects the status requires a good oversight role by the institutions concerned.

### **Oversight role of PPDA mediates the relationship between contractor monitoring, selection and performance of road projects**

The oversight role of PPDA appears to be a strong mediator in the relationship between contractor selection, monitoring and performance of road projects. Through the oversight role, contractor monitoring and selection influences performance of road projects in Uganda. This is in line with Basheka, Sabiti and Muhumuza (2011) who contend that performance is built through the oversight role of the concerned institutions. Hence, the oversight role of PPDA is critical in building adaptive capacity which is significant in enhancing performance. The findings of this study have demonstrated similar phenomena as observed by Luthia (2009), except that in this case the findings revealed (unlike in the study by Luthia (2009) that established full mediation of organisational performance

on the relationship between contractor monitoring and performance), that contractor selection and monitoring do not have a direct influence on the performance of road projects except through the oversight role of PPDA. Hence, the oversight role of PPDA is a powerful mediator in the relationship between contractor selection, monitoring and performance of road infrastructure projects in Uganda.

## **Discussion of findings**

Contractor selection appears to be a strong mediator in relationships between contractor monitoring and the performance of road projects in Uganda. This is in line with studies such as Byaruhanga and Muzaale (2018) who contend that performance of road projects is through good contractor selection. It can therefore be argued that good contractor selection is critical in building a good road network system performance in Uganda. Contractor selection is based on procedure; for example, the firms that are eventually awarded contracts by the contracts committee should be in line with the evaluation committee recommendations. Section 29 (C) of the PPDA Act of 2003 mandates the powers to award contracts in accordance with applicable procurement or disposal procedures to the Contracts Committee. Selecting a contractor is one of the major decisions which influences the progress and success of any construction project (Banaitien and Banaitis 2006).

Mulumba (2016) noted political influence negatively affects the performance of the road construction projects in terms of quality and costs. On appropriateness of selection criteria, contractor selection criteria were not appropriate for complex roads projects. Contractor selection procedures allowed unnecessary interference through complaints which caused delays on some roads. On analysis of contractor competency, the selection criterion does not provide for methods to analyse contractor competency. The selection criterion does not require certified evidence from bidders to demonstrate their capacity to execute works. Contract selection has become a priority for public entities like UNRA. In a developing country like Uganda, having an effective contractor selection system is still a major challenge to many public entities (Oluka 2013). Contractor selection is one area that needs careful attention from all stakeholders in public entities because it has a huge influence on service delivery, and this is one way of accounting to the tax payers (Barasa 2013). Okello (2016) contends that the PPDA must play a central role in providing training, technical guidance and ensuring compliance to all set rules. Sabiti, Basheka and Muhumza (2011) noted that proper contractor selection influences procurement performance. Some contractors selected lack the appropriate experience and this is clearly seen from the works accomplished. Some roads have been a particular nightmare

for motorists considering that some contractors selected reluctantly execute the tasks, ending up doing shoddy work.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The implications for the existing theory can be formulated in two ways (1) whether or not the findings support the views of the existing theory (i.e. support or contradict), and (2) whether or not the findings have filled the theoretical gaps to contribute or not contribute. The study has contributed to the conceptualisation of performance and provides evidence that performance can be described as measurement of what UNRA has achieved in terms of contractor monitoring and selection. Performance is the outcome of a clear vision, aligned objectives and focused and sustained efforts. A performance management process should tie together and reinforce these elements. The components of performance can be taken to be an outcome of many attributes of performance which were hard to pin down in the extant literature (see Okello 2016; Barasa 2013; Oluka 2012; Basheka 2013; Basheka, Sabiti, Muhumuza 2011).

It is recommended that UNRA should place more emphasis on continuous improvement of the selection processes since it significantly influences road projects' performance. UNRA should also address causes of delays in contractor selection by adopting innovative methods such as *Fit-for-Purpose* and *Competitive Dialogue* techniques to ensure value for money. The PPDA as a regulator, should focus on a proactive approach in supporting the road agency in making the contractor selection process more efficient.

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