



1980 TAPOL STATEMENT

Following the successes achieved so far by the international campaign for the release of Indonesian political prisoners, in which TAPOL has played a decisive role, TAPOL wishes to reaffirm that it will continue to focus attention on the general problems of political imprisonment and human rights abuses in Indonesia.

Considering the many remaining problems confronting people victimised for alleged involvement in the October 1965 affair (G30S), TAPOL will campaign for:

- a decree of abolition and amnesty, abolishing the G30S as an event regarding which individuals or groups can be victimised, persecuted or sentenced and therefore granting amnesty to everyone so treated;
- the restoration of full civil rights for all released tapols;
- the immediate release of all tapols who have been tried or who are awaiting trial.

TAPOL will also campaign vigorously in support of workers, peasants, students and others whose political and legal rights are being abused, and it will oppose press censorship. It will do all it can to support the people of East Timor and West Irian who face both abuse of their individual rights as well as their rights as peoples to the exercise of the principle of self-determination.

The main obstacles to the restoration of human rights in Indonesia are KOPKAMTIB¹ and the anti-subversion laws. TAPOL will therefore campaign for the dissolution of KOPKAMTIB and the repeal of the anti-subversion laws.

In order to reflect TAPOL's broader focus, the name of the campaign will henceforth be as follows:

TAPOL: British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia.

Note

1 KOPKAMTIB is the acronym which denotes the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. It was 'temporarily' set up after the 1965 'coup', but still flourishes today.

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A prisoner from Buru is re-united with his family. Semarang, late 1979.



The writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a tapol for over 14 years, returned home in December 1979 to an emotional welcome from his family. During the first nine years in prison, he was not allowed, like all other tapols, to write. But in 1974, after widespread international concern at the restrictions imposed upon him, special permission was granted, allowing him to write. He completed eight manuscripts, seven historical novels and a play, during his remaining five years on Buru. All had to be surrendered to KOPKAMTIB which indicated at the time of his release that they would not permit publication because the texts were "too political".

WHERE IS TRUBUS SUDARSONO?—HE DISAPPEARED

Sri Sulistianuti, Trubus' daughter.



In the midst of the joy that always marks the tapol release ceremonies as long-separated families are re-united, many tragedies occur. Families who have been trying to trace their loved ones for years have attended releases in the hope of finding their relative, only to be disappointed.

One such case is the family of Trubus Sudarsono, a well-known sculptor and artist from Jogjakarta, Central Java. Several of his statues still adorn the streets of Jakarta.

His two daughters who attended the final release ceremony in Jakarta on 20 December said that their father had disappeared soon after the events in October 1965.* Some people claimed that he had been shot dead during the massacres, and later his wife was sent his watch and clothing but given no explanation about his fate.

"I do not believe my father is dead. I shall continue to believe he is alive till I get definite news about him", said one of his daughters, after watching the released prisoners leave (*Tempo*, 29 December, 1979). Her sister said: "I too want to know the whereabouts of my father. If he is still under arrest, where is he being held? If he is dead, where is his grave?"

The sisters explained that they had been searching for their father since 1970. It was only then, after things became relatively quiet, that they found the courage to start making enquiries. They had enquired about him at many prisons, and had written to Buru for news, only to be told that he was not there. As the releases began, they had attended many release ceremonies in all parts of Java. The ceremony on 20 December was probably their last hope, but again they were disappointed.

*From other sources, TAPOL has learnt that Trubus is known to have been in one the main Jakarta prisons

EX-TAPOL RECEIVES UNICEF AWARD

A writer named S. Hersri, a political prisoner for thirteen years without trial, including ten years at the labour camp on the island of Buru, has been granted an award by UNICEF for a study he wrote about the process of growing up for children of tapols held on the island. The award was well publicised in the Indonesian press, and Hersri who was released from Buru in December 1978 became the first ex-tapol to be interviewed on Indonesian television.

The study which is entitled: "Two Types Within a Single Fold: Aspects of Growing up in Buru", was published last October in **Prisma**, the leading Indonesian journal of the social sciences. It provides a very detailed account of the mode of living and production of the four thousand or so native Ina Kabuki people of Buru who inhabit tiny, scattered clusters of houses in the areas immediately contiguous with the labour camp where the political prisoners were held. These people still live by hunting and shifting cultivation and, until the camp was set up, had had no contact at all with a money economy.

The arrival of more than ten thousand political prisoners most of whom were from Java, who were immediately set to work to create what eventually became an advanced agricultural project, had a powerful impact on the lives of these native inhabitants. Hersri lists the enormously complex infrastructure built by tapol labour which included 150 kilometres of road, an extensive drainage system with at least fifty kilometres of primary canals, the clearance of 3,326 hectares of land for the cultivation of rice and other crops, the construction of many bridges, reservoirs, water locks, granneries, churches and mosques, as well as numerous storage sheds and workshops for activities related to the central agricultural pursuits of the tapols. The occupation of land which the native inhabitants had formerly used for shifting cultivation resulted in many changes in their habits, such as for instance their methods of collecting sago. The existence of the camp also brought them into sudden contact with money and led to a drastic upheaval in their material and spiritual values.

The social, economic and cultural problems faced by the 203 tapols who were joined by their wives and children and who settled in the special unit named Savana Jaya are the central focus of the study.¹ Economic pressures at the unit were very severe particularly during the first few years,

because of the lack of adequate land and disastrous crop failures in the first two years after the families arrived. The close proximity of large groups of male prisoners who had been isolated for so many years from normal social relationships created pressures which some of these impoverished families could not withstand, and some of the homes in Savana Jaya became virtual brothels. The children at Savana Jaya were fully exposed to everything that happened among their elders because of the close-knit community that developed in the unit which was also grievously lacking contact with, and stimulation from the outside. Schooling was inadequate; older children wishing to continue to upper middle school were not able to get the necessary permission from the authorities to go to Ambon where the nearest school is situated. Indeed, the families were just as much restricted in their movements as the imprisoned fathers. The writer observes that the children pursued totally different interests from those associated with childhood in their places of origin; they were drawn from a very early age into foraging for food, and other such activities, and in some cases had to fend for themselves when their parents became disabled. In one family where the father was paralysed, the oldest son had to leave school and take care of his sisters after their mother died in childbirth.

In addition to providing many moving insights into the problems faced by the communities that lived side by side within and around the Buru prison camp, Hersri has produced a remarkably comprehensive survey of the social and cultural life of the native inhabitants of the island. His study represents an important contribution to the ethnography of Indonesia, and is no small feat for a man who has spent so long in detention without access to any scientific material and deprived even of writing materials with which to record his extensive and detailed observations.


Note

- 1 In December 1979, just over half the Savana Jaya families returned to Java. Eighty-nine families decided to remain there. The reasons for their choice are not known, although it is known that the Army insisted that all the families would have to pay for their journey home themselves.

Branded!

Identity cards issued to ex-tapols bear the initials ET.

A military spokesman, speaking at the release ceremony for tapols in Semarang on 20 October 1980 actually implied that the special mark would "make things easier" for tapols after their release!



CITIZENSHIP: WEEDING OUT THE CHINESE

Amid fulsome praise from foreign journalists, notably in the Dutch press and the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, it has been reported that earlier this year President Suharto signed two citizenship regulations purporting to speed up naturalisation processes for approximately a million ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia who are still stateless or hold Chinese or Taiwanese citizenship. This followed an announcement in November last year by General Yoga Sugama, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff, that plans are being made for the repatriation of about a million Chinese who have not acquired Indonesian nationality, and that special camps are being set up as staging places for them (See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 37, January 1980).

Writing in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (14 March 1980), David Jenkins describes the new regulations as a "policy about-face" and calls them "remarkably generous":

Under the new rulings, Jakarta is opening its doors and offering citizenship to virtually all Chinese residents who seek it. Regulations have been streamlined and simplified, and a strict three-month limit put on the time given to the bureaucracy to process any individual application.

But a close inspection of the regulations shows them to be far less generous than Jenkins implies.

Before examining the regulations in detail, it is necessary however to consider whether there has indeed been a "policy about-face". Historically, there has never been a truly consistent policy towards the Chinese *as a whole* and their position has always been undermined by political and economic uncertainty.

Scapegoats for generations

In the early colonial period, the Dutch used the Chinese to achieve their penetration of the Indies market. They became the middlemen, providing a useful buffer between Dutch exploiters and Indonesian exploited. At the same time, the Dutch were at pains to prevent them from becoming too influential in the export-oriented colonial economy. And the many Chinese who became labourers, peasants, small traders or small-holder producers of cash crops such as rubber remained poor, under-privileged and insecure.

Since independence, the Chinese have repeatedly been victims of policies aimed at strengthening "native" (*pribumi*) Indonesians. The most serious of these policies was the regulation introduced in 1960, known as PP10, which prohibited Chinese from engaging in trade in all places below sub-district level, i.e. in all villages where so many had been handling commercial activities for generations. This regulation, introduced by Sukarno under strong Army pressure, was rigorously implemented particularly after 1965 when the Army came to power. At the same time, under the New Order, some Chinese financiers have found a comfortable niche (not unlike the situation in colonial times) where profits are exchanged for patronage and brokerage from those in power.

Nonetheless, the position of even the wealthiest Chinese in this system remains insecure. Patronage crumbles when the patron loses power; when Jusuf Muda Dalam, Sukarno's minister for central banking affairs, fell, his favoured clients fell with him. Patronage creates complex rivalries, so it is hardly surprising that the Chinese population as a whole has repeatedly been used as a scapegoat. Students complaining of the corrupt practices of the generals and their allies also attacked big Chinese financial interests, but small Chinese traders were the most vulnerable and the generals did not hesitate to turn public wrath on them, transforming the complaints into manifestations of racialism.

Sometimes the attacks have taken an ideological form as when, shortly after 1965, Chinese traders and peasants in West Kalimantan were killed or rounded up into camps, or Chinese were driven from their homes in Aceh and deprived of their livelihoods, in the post-1965 hysteria against China for allegedly supporting Untung's attempted "coup": Again in 1968, the Chinese became victims of a showdown between two elite corps, the marines (KKO) and the para-commandos (RPKAD) in Jakarta's Chinese district of Glodok. In 1973-4, Chinese shopkeepers fared badly in what were ostensibly demonstrations against Japanese investments, but which were manipulated by differing interests within the military. One writer has described the scapegoat tactic as throwing "Chinese dust into the eyes"¹ of those who complain about the general effects of New Order economic strategy and corruption.

The 1980 Regulations

Far from being "remarkably generous", the regulations enacted by Suharto earlier this year are little more than window-dressing in the larger arena of realpolitik and trade considerations. Commentators generally agree that they are related to moves towards a restoration of diplomatic relations with China. A Chinese delegation will visit Indonesia shortly for the 25th anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference and diplomatic relations will probably be discussed then. Vice-President Adam Malik has hinted that direct trade ties may be re-established which, despite denials by Trade Minister Radius Prawira, would clearly be in Indonesia's interests since China now supplies 15-20% of its rice imports through Hong Kong and Singapore where traders reap huge benefits from this profitable transit trade.

Indonesia has always insisted that diplomatic relations cannot be resumed before the status of the one million or so non-Indonesian citizens has been regularised, for it contends that these people could be used as a fifth column by China. The main reasons why so many Chinese have failed so far to acquire Indonesian citizenship is the hugely exorbitant levies, legal and illegal, and the complex bureaucratic tangles resulting from the many documents and signatures required before an application can be submitted. Naturalisation can cost as much as three million rupiahs and depends greatly on the greed and cussedness of the particular

officials with whom the applicant has to deal. The new regulations have done nothing to remove these difficulties.

The first of the new regulations, **Presidential Instruction No. 2, 1980** concerns the issuance of nationality certificates to those who already consider themselves to be Indonesian citizens. August 17 this year has been set as the deadline for completion of this. David Jenkins states that about 100,000 people require such certificates. It remains to be seen whether this number of cases can be dealt with in the time set and then, what will happen to those who fail to obtain certificates by the deadline.

The second regulation, **Presidential Decision No. 13, 1980** has been introduced "to speed up the handling of applications for citizenship" which is necessary in order

to clarify and establish the status and legal guarantees for every inhabitant of Indonesia in the framework of ensuring national stability and strengthening national defence.

Thus, the link with security considerations has been firmly established.

The Decision lists no fewer than eleven documents required with an application: a birth certificate, an immigration certificate confirming residence in Indonesia, a certificate of notification, a good-conduct certificate from the police, a marriage certificate or in the case of non-married women proof of single status, a health certificate, proof that the naturalisation fee has been paid, proof that the applicant receives a regular income, proof that the applicant will hold no other nationality, proof that district court costs have been paid, and a passport photograph.

The documents almost all entail lengthy and costly bureaucratic wrangles. The naturalisation fee is particularly onerous. A regulation passed in 1968 set the amount at between Rp 30,000 and Rp 100,000, and stipulated that the amount should not exceed a month's income. But the wording is such as to be interpreted as meaning that the applicant must have a monthly income of at least Rp 30,000 which precludes a very large number of people. The new regulation stipulates that the applicant must have a regular income, but many Chinese will not be able to comply. Trading restrictions and the many harassments inflicted on the poorer ethnic Chinese have deprived them of jobs or regular livelihoods. This would affect the tens of thousands still living in refugee camps in North Sumatra and West Kalimantan, and many more besides. Possibly some ex-tapols of Chinese origin could also be facing this problem. According to some estimates, about one-half of the 850,000 ethnic Chinese who might be expected to apply for citizenship are prevented from doing so because of such income and financial requirements.

Security Checks

The regulation also stipulates that each application must be vetted by BAKIN, the state intelligence agency. In other words, a security check of every single applicant will be made. The chances of pressure, intimidation and corruption over this particular requirement are virtually limitless. Moreover no appeals procedure is provided in cases where

BAKIN rejects an application. Besides signing an oath of loyalty, applicants will also be tested in their fluency of Indonesian and knowledge of Indonesian history!

If the Indonesian authorities indeed wanted to be generous in their naturalisation policy and humanitarian towards Chinese who have lived in the country for generations, the most effective way would be to make provision for naturalisation free of charge. Only then would the major obstacles be removed for the hundreds of thousands who cannot afford the procedures as they now stand.

Note

- 1 Adil Rakindo, "Chinese Scapegoat Politics in Suharto's 'New Order'", pp. 125-139 in Malcolm Caldwell et al. *Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia*, Spokesman Books, 1975,

POLITICAL TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

"... Political terrorism is part of the 'anything goes' system so widespread in Indonesia, and is sometimes carried on on a mercenary basis (special operations). The methods include: having the houses of people disliked by the regime stoned; sending anonymous letters; intimidation with weapons or less direct means; organising hooligans and mafia-type groups to frighten people disliked by those in power; night-time operations to plant leaflets on people's doorsteps; sending transvestites in to cause chaos among demonstrators, and then arresting these transvestites, and demonstrators; hiring professional killers to commit murders with watertight alibis; hiring prostitutes to tail political notables; sending in apparent madmen or idiots to student meetings or any activity the regime distrusts; hiring 'masseur' to hang around the lobbies of political conferences; installing bugs in meeting-rooms; infiltrating informants into 'suspicious' meetings of Islamic scholars; making amonia bombs to be exploded during dramatic performances critical of the government; hiring people to pretend to be reporters taking pictures; ordering military men to pose as rickshaw-drivers, roadside food-vendors, etc. in the context of 'total intelligence operations'..."

From: *Indonesia Dibawah Sepatu Lars* (Indonesia Under the Jackboot), Defence plea of Mr Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono, formerly caretaker chairman of Bandung Institute of Technology Students' Union, during his trial which ended late last year.

HERI AKHMADI ON STUDENT TRIALS AND NORMALISATION

(taken from *Kampus*, December 1979 as reprinted in *Berita dan Analisa*, December 1979)

Slightly abridged translation.

*The following is taken from an interview given to **Kampus**, the journal of the Students Council of the Bandung Institute of Technology, by the ex-chairman of the Council who was one of the defendants in the student trials. His criticism of the regime's philosophical justification for "campus normalisation" is of particular interest at a time when student actions to reject the policy are intensifying.*

Heri was sentenced to two years' imprisonment earlier this year.

Each of the student trials took place in similar circumstances—with a stifling atmosphere, tight security on visitors and other measures. Many of the student-defendants' rights were violated, including the right to submit statements on the basic aspects of the cases which were concerned with the appalling state of the national leadership and its consequences for society. This had been the theme of the student actions. So there were tight restrictions on explanations of the principles and objectives of the student movement. The trials were conducted as if the defendants were petty thieves. During questioning, the judges tried, with the help of the prosecutors, to extract confessions from the defendants by asking leading questions, to ensure that the sentences when passed would appear to be justified.

Besides seeking to establish the truth, the courts should also administer justice. This was not done. The defendants were interrupted as they spoke, they were not granted permission to call witnesses, and were not even allowed to explain the basic problems which had led to the trials being held. Newspapers were banned from reporting the trials.

The 1979 student trials can indeed be said to have conformed with the scenario prepared by those in power—using the trials as a way to punish their opponents and to intimidate society. It was possible to do this because the judiciary is heavily dependent on those in power for the livelihood of its personnel, even of the judges. It is not yet in a position to regulate and pay the people involved.

This is all in the hands of the government. It is now so bad that even the judges are required to join KORPRI (Civil Servants' Corps of the Republic of Indonesia) and to belong to GOLKAR¹.

In view of the restrictions, the defendants decided to put everything they had to say in the defence pleas, their thoughts, explanations and responses to the charges. It was as if they were exerting themselves to produce "monuments" because this was their only chance to explain things to the public: what the student movement had sought to achieve and what it would continue to do in pursuit of its aspirations.

But, alas, even the defence pleas could not escape censorship. My own plea, entitled **Smash the Yoke of Oppression of the Indonesian People** was banned from distribution, even when my trial was still in progress.

Nevertheless, all of us from the Bandung Institute of

Technology (ITB) had decided in consultation that we wanted to go before the courts and expose the brutalities committed by those in power, the arbitrary arrests, and the attempts made by the rulers to force their will on the students in 1978. And I think we have achieved this. Society now knows just how viciously the students were treated, just as common people are treated when for instance petty traders are forcibly removed from the streets.

By means of the trials and the defence pleas, we were able to disseminate everything we know about the irregularities practised by the national leadership and about the nature of their development policy. The authoritarian, dictatorial system created in the Suharto regime protects the avarice of the rulers, their relatives and cronies who are enriching themselves and living lives of luxury. We showed how officials conspire with Chinese businessmen to exploit the people, how they conspire with foreign investors to plunder Indonesia's natural resources, how socio-political forces have been paralysed to prevent them from interfering with the corrupt, illegal practices of those in power. The President—Suharto himself—is ultimately to blame for all this, for he not only fails to prevent such things from happening, but he even gives them his blessing and sets the example. A member of his family has been given the lucrative cloves monopoly which is earning him thousands of millions of rupiahs in profits and he also has forestry concessions and use-rights over plantation lands². Others in his family have shown the way in conspiring with Chinese businessmen and foreign investors. The Berkeley mafia³ is entrenched in Senopati Square⁴ where it has produced an ultra-conservative, anti-people's plan. The plan is liberal and capitalistic, using the free market as the chief mechanism in the economy. It only benefits businesses that have strong capital assets and advanced managerial techniques, that is to say, the Chinese businessmen and the foreign investors. Meanwhile, the people's economy goes from bad to worse with each passing day.

The Suharto regime has reached the point where it must use all means possible, including armed force, to stay in power and to safeguard the interests and the wealth of its cronies from the seething anger of the people which could explode at any moment and destroy them. The regime, stricken with fear and panic, will use all possible means, the

foulest and the most violent, to suppress poor and starving people who find themselves trapped by every single policy measure taken by those in power. The rulers have used violence and oppression in almost all parts of the country.

On Normalisation of the Campuses

The KNK and NKK⁵ are instruments with which those in power can suppress voices that threaten the Suharto regime and endanger the wealth of its cronies (corrupt officials, Chinese businessmen and foreign investors). In the eyes of those in power, normalisation of the campuses will mean that all posts on the campus will become part of the bureaucracy, whereas the student movement will be eliminated. And in order to confuse us, they speak about it as a *technostructural* society, which is none other than authoritarianism and bureaucracy.

There are two components in KNK: logic (*penalaran*)⁶ and technostructure. Logic as part of normalisation-style education is aimed at creating analytical beings who will some day hold leading positions in the technostructural society. But is logic alone enough? No, certainly not! Logic alone turns scientists into nothing more than computers who consume data, process it and produce analyses that conform to the formulae already imbibed. If academic life is based on logic alone, our universities will revert to the

era of rationalism which has already been abandoned. Rationalism means a tyranny of ideas, estranging the universities from real life. Rationalism produces lofty ideas and top-quality analysis that is quite inapplicable and irrelevant to the realities existing in society; analyses of this kind end up covered in dust in the archives. Progress in today's world of science is characterised by the employment of scientific method that is based on experimental investigation as well as logic; this involves the collection of data, the quantification of data and so on. Academic freedom is the key to such a method, in particular the freedom to collect data. This is what our academic institutions lack: data has dried up because investigations are seriously hampered by complicated formalities to get the necessary permits. And the mass media too can only print the dregs left by the censors. With tight restrictions on the collection of data, especially in the social sciences, academic life will become very shallow indeed if it is only allowed to practise logic as envisaged within the concept of campus normalisation.

That those in power intend to paralyse academic life as a force of dynamism in society and turn the universities into government departments responsible for churning out experts is abundantly clear from the function that has been designed for intellectuals in the technostructure. Intellec-

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STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST 'NORMALISATION'

Several hundred students, including representatives from 43 universities and colleges throughout the country, demonstrated at the Indonesian Parliament on 11 February in protest against the government's policy of 'campus normalisation' and called for the dismissal of the Minister of Education, Daoed Yusuf.

Student protest against this policy has been intensifying for a number of months. The policy would mean an end to democratic student councils and would prevent students from participating in any political activity.

The demonstration outside Parliament took place as Members were voting on a proposal by the two non-government parties, the PPP (Moslem) and the PDI (Nationalist and Christian), that Parliament should exercise its right of enquiry to question the government about "normalisation". MPs from the two parties were heavily outnumbered by members from the Army-backed GOLKAR party and the appointed members from the Armed Forces, and the motion was defeated. The defeat brings to an end a long campaign by students to press their grievances upon the government through legal and constitutional channels.

Some of the demonstrators had tried to visit President Suharto but were prevented from doing so by heavily armed riot troops. They also failed to meet members of the Supreme Advisory Council. All major buildings and intersections in the centre of Jakarta were tightly guarded during the day.

Helicopter Crash

As the students were returning to the University of Indonesia campus in Jakarta, a police helicopter hovered so low over their convoy of trucks that the students below had to duck to avoid the powerful gusts of wind and heat. The helicopter went out of control and crashed within feet of the trucks, only narrowly avoiding what could have been a very serious accident in terms of human life.

The demonstration came as the climax to a series of actions and demonstrations in Jakarta, Bandung and other cities. On one occasion, students were prevented from burning an effigy of the Education Minister, and on another occasion, in Ujung Pandang, the Minister was compelled to leave the university campus secretly and could not attend a luncheon held in his honour because of the large number of students demonstrating at major points throughout the campus.

The students who gathered in Jakarta to attend the demonstration before Parliament on 11 February adopted a Student Proclamation reaffirming their determination to preserve democratic student council constitutions, and to resist all attempts to restrict their freedoms. They also adopted a series of demands, calling for the dismissal of the Education Minister, Daoed Yusuf, and urging the government to eliminate all forms of the misuse of power and to take measures to resolve the widespread social unrest in Indonesia.

WHAT'S GOING ON

*... where plants, insects
have become "pests".*

The small population, rugged terrain and remote location of the island of Kalimantan have ensured that many of its secrets have been kept from the outside world. Yet a number of disquieting reports have indicated that the grab for rapid profits by timber companies and their Indonesian brokers and the government's obsession with "security" have resulted in a pogrom, ethnocide or the deliberate destruction of a culture, forced resettlements, and widespread use of forced labour. At the same time Kalimantan itself has become threatened by the environmental devastation which has rendered many of the world's former great forest areas unfit for human or animal habitation. The Philippines example of over-exploitation of forest areas is comparable and sobering, and directly relevant, because once the plunder of the Philippines forests was complete, the timber companies spread their relentless trail of destruction into Kalimantan.

Kalimantan has become an exceptionally important source of revenue to the Indonesian government. Indonesia is now the world's leading exporter of tropical hardwood logs; from April 1978 to April 1979 earnings were approximately \$1 billion in timber exports. Since 1978 the price of Kalimantan meranti samarinda logs has almost doubled so that at least another year of windfall profits may be

... pogrom, ethnocide ... forced resettlements, widespread use of forced labour, ... environmental devastation ...

expected. Despite early temporary set-backs related to fluctuating market prices, the expansion of the Indonesian logging industry has been phenomenal. In 1966 the log output was 2.6 million cubic metres, while in 1979-80 it is targeted at 30 million cubic metres of which 18.5 million cubic metres are marked as log exports. Earnings are expected to be worth at least \$1.6 billion, accounting for 13% of total exports and 50% of non-oil export earnings. The main customers are Japan, Taiwan and South Korea who together take nearly 90% of the log exports. Kalimantan timber provides the major part of these earnings.

The breathless admiration which characterises many reports of the Kalimantan timber industry cannot conceal the far-reaching negative implications for several groups of people on the island. In different ways, but for the same reasons, Chinese settlers, the Dyak population and political prisoners have all become victims of a rapacious and ruthless exploitation of the forests which has pushed them from their agricultural lands and endangered the future of all who have to live on the island after the companies and their Indonesian allies have moved on. Finally the benefits to the Indonesian economy as a whole are at best short-term and limited, and the Indonesian brokers, the Jakarta generals and local officials have proved unable to protect Indonesia's longterm interests against the wiles of experienced multi-nationals, and for the most part have been content merely to take the profits while the going is good.

Wilful Destruction: Dubious Benefits

The exceptional rapacity of the exploitation of Kalimantan's timber may be judged by the amazing degree to which production targets have been exceeded:

TABLE 1¹

	Target Output (million cubic metres)	Actual Output (million cubic metres)
1969-70	1.2	4.6
1973-74	5.1	21.5

In 1971, 70% of all exported timber came from East Kalimantan alone. Generally Indonesian companies have taken large concessions in Kalimantan, but lacking the capital to exploit them, have invited foreign companies to provide the capital.

The style of operation of the foreign companies is well-illustrated by the US giant company, Weyerhaeuser. For over a decade Weyerhaeuser extracted large profits from its Philippines holdings, and when the last stands of timber were exhausted, Weyerhaeuser obtained, through its first wholly-owned Indonesian subsidiary, P.T. Weyerhaeuser Indonesia, a concession of 250,000 hectares in December 1969. In June 1971 Weyerhaeuser acquired a 65% interest in P.T. International Timber Corporation Indonesia (ICTI). In this venture Weyerhaeuser's partner is P.T. Indonesian Regional Development Agency, a subsidiary of P.T. Tri Usaha Bhakti, which is a private Department of Defence-controlled holding company. In this particular transaction 73 of Indonesia's top leaders were reportedly granted the concession by President Suharto himself in a bid to ensure their loyalty. In return for their 35% of the profits, and an initial pay-off by Weyerhaeuser of \$3.5 million, the generals merely had to provide the licence for the concession. Initially Weyerhaeuser took out two insurance policies, mainly against political instability, for ICTI, but by late 1977, so confident was Weyerhaeuser in the security of the area, that the policies were cancelled.

The lure of rapid returns and the generous terms of Suharto's 1967 investment law caused a large inflow of applications from foreign companies. Dazzled at first by the opportunities for participating in the great rip-off, Indonesian officials welcomed the companies unreservedly, but the honeymoon was soon to pall. By late 1968 applications from Philippines companies were theoretically to be rejected, as with the exhaustion of the Philippines timber industry, it was rightly felt that Philippines investors were simply acting as brokers for Indonesian timber on the world market. Many infringements of regulations were noted and as early as 1969 a forestry seminar at the University of

IN KALIMANTAN?

ts, animals and people

Gajah Mada expressed concern at the fact that unregulated felling had caused a dangerous spread of *alang-alang* grass, the scourge resulting from indiscriminate destruction of ground cover, and which has devastated large areas of formerly productive land in Southeast Asia.

Eventually those who had most to gain from the timber industry realised that the pace and voracity of the logging operations threatened their own interests. Timber was being exported at its lowest unprocessed value when many more profits could be made for Indonesian brokers if the timber were processed inside Indonesia. The foreign investors were indeed investing very little capital in comparison with their returns. Accordingly, in the pursuit of value added gains the Indonesian authorities now demanded that concessionaries must set up processing plants within three years of commencing felling, and that 60% of the logs must be processed within ten years. However the government has been unable to enforce these demands as the penalty clauses involve time-consuming legal processes and in fact the crux of the matter has been aptly summed up in the **Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies** by K. G. Koehler² who says,

The arbitration procedures laid down in the contracts, furthermore, tend to be so time consuming that it is not likely that any disputes could be quickly settled. Under these circumstances, the crucial problem seems to be the criteria which determine the short-range behaviour of foreign investors in East Kalimantan. (Our emphasis—ed.)

Meanwhile Indonesia's imports of processed wood products have been rising steadily to a record value of \$122 million in 1978. 60% of Indonesia's paper supplies are imported, including its entire newsprint needs.

Environmental Costs

Timber companies operating in Kalimantan have been able to violate selective cutting agreements and then abandon their concessions once all the virgin forest has been cut down. Some, like Weyerhaeuser have opted to switch to monoculture plantation crops on the cut areas of their concessions. They have introduced fast-growing pines and eucalypts, thus destroying any chance of regeneration of the natural forest. This policy has serious implications for a natural habitat like that of Kalimantan.

Kalimantan covers an area of 208,000 square miles, divided into four administrative areas, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. Of the 6 million inhabitants 2.5 million are Moslem Malays, over half a million are Chinese and the remainder are the autochthonous people, the Dyaks. The diversity of the jungle itself is immense with its many varieties of trees, flowering plants, animals and insects. Simulating the diver-

sity of the jungle, the Dyaks practice *swidden* (or "slash-and-burn") agriculture, a delicately balanced but successful system in which root-crops, legumes, grains, vines and fruits may all be grown in the same area of cultivation. Forest cover is essential for the maintenance of the system in providing humus or a cover of nutrient material in the form of rotting vegetation, and a natural umbrella which protects the soil from being leached by excessive exposure to tropical rains. As long as this system operates a sufficiently long period of rotation or long fallow and short cultivation periods, with a low population density (around 45/square km.), the system is stable.

The seizure of vast tracks of forest has limited the areas of land available to the *swidden* cultivators, or in many cases has forced them to move to less fertile areas where the *swidden* system becomes unviable. The obvious devastation of Kalimantan cannot be denied and it has suited the government to blame the Dyaks for it, claiming that the *swidden* system is primitive and destructive. Damage attributed to *swidden* agriculture is hard to believe when Kalimantan is so large and once so well forested with a very low population density. On the other hand the requirements of the timber companies, the denuding of the landscape and the substitution of monocultural crops, have created "pests" of Kalimantan's plant, insect, animal and human populations. This fact has determined the fates of the Dyaks, the Chinese and the prisoner/transmigrants of Kalimantan.

The Dyaks: Ethnocide

Today the Dyaks and their culture are under severe attack as the government makes a concerted attempt to "civilise" them. Taking the government line of attack, David Jenkins of the **Far Eastern Economic Review** (30 June 1978), writes that over the past 100 years the Dyaks have "moved like locusts across a once-green landscape, practising a primitive slash-and-burn agriculture that has upset a finely-balanced eco-system". Yet in his finely argued discussion of *swidden* agriculture in his famous study, **Agricultural Involution**, Clifford Geertz presents *swidden* agriculture as being very much in harmony with the natural environment. But David Jenkins argues that ecologically the Dyaks are "at the end of the road". Can it really be that Geertz was wrong and that less than 3 million *swidden* cultivators were too many for the vast timbered areas of Kalimantan? Or was it the fault of the government and the timber concessionaries who pushed the Dyak cultivators into unviable areas?

Part of the answer is in fact provided by David Jenkins himself. He observes that the Dyaks have found that certain areas of West Kalimantan have been designated as resettlement areas for Javanese transmigrants. In 1978-9 it was announced that almost 5,000 people would be moved into areas not far from the Kalimantan border with Sarawak. The government has in fact been somewhat defensive about the policy. The Javanese head of the provincial transmigration office is quoted by Jenkins as saying that the programme can only be beneficial to the Dyaks, who "will learn from the Javanese". He added that the Dyaks can

learn to cultivate rice in the lowland areas, confirming that they are to be moved from traditional areas of cultivation. He claimed too that the land taken over for the project was "not used" by the Dyaks. This completely ignores the long fallow periods which are allowed for the regeneration of the jungle in the swidden system. And if the land were not under fallow/regeneration, it is notoriously difficult for the untutored and the scornful to distinguish between the natural forest and areas actually under swidden cultivation, so well-tuned is the swidden eco-system to its wider environment.

Several justifications have been used for the seizure of Dyak land. Part of the "civilising mission" has focussed on the Dyak longhouses, the heart of Dyak culture and community. The longhouses are impressive structures of up to 400 yards long and may contain up to 100 apartments, and they are the physical manifestation of a strong sense of community and of security in that community. Members of the government who have not seen fit to consult anthropologists any more than ecologists, have defined this embodiment of community as "communism" and therefore the longhouses must be destroyed. Just as extreme and ill-informed is the government view that the practice of housing so many people under one roof encourages promiscuity, loose morals and sexual orgies. David Jenkins quotes one well-informed observer as saying that the government is not exactly consistent in its claims about the Dyaks,

In places where there has been a security threat (e.g. the border areas—ed.) they say the longhouses are based on the communist way of life . . . In places where there are no communists they say they are worried about the danger of fire and disease. It is perfectly clear that they just want to get rid of them.³

The destruction of Dyak culture or ethnocide is proceeding apace and no matter what the reasons given, the true reasons are very much murkier. There are now very few longhouses left in Kalimantan as they have been pulled down. There are several reports of government agents burning down longhouses, and shots have been fired into longhouses on more than one occasion. For all the stated concern about the alleged destruction caused by the Dyak way of life, there has not been a single instance where the government has attempted well-informed and well-intentioned agricultural work among the Dyaks. The only extension has been the steady encroachment of the timber companies and to a lesser extent of the transmigration settlements.

One of the foremost concerns of foreign investors is with the security of their investment, and it is obvious that Jakarta generals and provincial officials have not allowed security considerations to stand in the way of short-term gains any more than ecological considerations have. In the early days of the New Order, coinciding with the beginning of the timber boom, West Kalimantan, especially the area bordering with Sarawak, was regarded as a serious security risk and it became essential for the government to clear out the pro-Sukarno guerrillas who had been operating in the

Confrontation with Malaysia, as well as PKI survivors who also operated within the area. The government were able to use the Dyaks to solve this pressing security problem which involved the Chinese population of Kalimantan.

Dealing with the Chinese: Pogrom and Forced Resettlement

From the mid-18th century onwards many Hakka and Teochin Chinese migrated to West Kalimantan, initially attracted by work in the gold-fields. Their descendants remained as settlers, mainly engaged in small-scale cash crop farming and some wet rice agriculture. Many lived in the interior in harmony with the Dyak population. In late 1967 however, the government successfully incited the Dyaks to massacre the Chinese after its own attempts to round them up had failed. This strategy of "Peoples' War" has been described by an Indonesian officer,

We convinced the Dyaks that the Communists were their enemies. We mobilised some of them into a Civil Defence Corps and armed them with Lee Enfield rifles. They killed many guerrillas . . . We have only two battalions of our own to guard the border (about 1,300 kilometres). Do you think we could have driven out the guerrillas without Dyak help?⁴

Three thousand Chinese were killed in this exercise and some 50,000 fled to the coastal towns as refugees. Taking advantage of this the government then decreed that the resettlement camps for the Chinese refugees would be away from the coast and from the Sarawak border—in the interests of security. Many have been employed in clearing forest, and adding to the army's gains, 150 ex-servicemen through an army housing scheme, have been given land "abandoned" by the Chinese in the kabupaten of Pontianak⁵. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the Dyaks too should have their turn of falling foul of the government's "security" requirements.

The enforced confinement of a large number of Chinese . . . has simplified matters . . .

The enforced confinement of a large number of Chinese in Kalimantan has simplified matters on subsequent sensitive occasions. For example, during the 1971 elections, the military commander of West Kalimantan ordered the Chinese not to travel, and also ordered his troops to shoot any "trouble-makers" on sight⁶. A recent report in *Angkatan Bersenjata* (7 May 1979) has added a little to the limited press coverage of the resettlement of Chinese in Kalimantan, mainly from the border districts. Now "special" districts have been prepared for them, and they will not be allowed to leave. Their numbers will be swollen by settlers from other districts, but it has not been specified whether these will be former tapols or not. The government then claims that it is not trying to isolate the Chinese, but is helping them to integrate with other transmigrants. It is perhaps telling that these areas have not been designated by the provincial transmigration authority, but by none other

than the provincial representative of KOPKAMTIB, indicating that security considerations are paramount. It is also perhaps significant that this policy was discussed by the governor of West Kalimantan, Soejiman at the release ceremony for G30S detainees in Kalimantan on 27 April 1979.

Prisoners/Transmigrants: A Captive Labour Force?

In *Tapol Bulletin* No 34. (1979), fears were expressed that the government has been using a variety of means to force former tapols to "voluntarily" opt to remain as "transmigrants" in Kalimantan. Some of the resettlement camps, at least Amborawang and Pararapak, appear to be situated inside the forestry concessions of Inhutan and Barito Baru respectively, raising the possibility that these "settlers" are used as forced labour or to supply food and other services to the forestry camps and towns. Amborawang has been regarded by military authorities as the "beach-head" of development for East Kalimantan and a recent *Tempo* report (26 January 1980) reveals that there are now 127 families living in the Amborawang camp, but "only 96 families (42 of which are headed by former Armed Forces personnel) are living in houses". The rest are forced to live in barracks despite a promise by Admiral Sudomo at the end of 1977 that within two years 500 houses would be built and no one would have to live in barracks. Influenced by this promise some tapols agreed to go to Amborawang only to find that the promised housing did not materialise.

We are not allowed to go home, yet there are no facilities here.

Tapol labour has certainly been used to build the houses which have been constructed so far. A former tapol, Kusdi, explained in the *Tempo* report that he had built several houses but had not yet been paid. He also indicated that former tapols are being held against their wills in the camp and stated that he wished to return to his family in the Pari district,

But the Laksusda⁷ has asked us to remain here. We are not allowed to go home, yet there are no facilities here.

Conditions in the camp are extremely difficult. Tools promised by the government have not materialised, the soil is poor and the tapols are forced to seek work as labourers outside the camp in order to subsist.

Families in the Jilatan settlement in South Kalimantan are also experiencing hardship, but curiously they are very reticent about their obvious hardship. This might be explained by the fact that the "settlers" are former tapols and their families, and they are under the supervision of the local military command, or "under regional guidance" as KOPKAMTIB puts it. Yet the prisoners are theoretically released and subject to the same conditions as other transmigrants. Because of the transport difficulties and remoteness of Kalimantan, there is ample reason to fear that such reports represent only a fraction of widespread abuses.

Obviously it is in the interests of the government to populate the "secure" areas of Kalimantan, as it has always been difficult to supply the labour and service requirements of the concessionaries. At first it was necessary to import labourers from the Philippines and Malaysia. It is also necessary that the labour force is subdued and easy to control so that there can be no redress against the notoriously exploitative working conditions in the concession areas. The dispossessed Dyaks and Chinese and the captive tapols (many of whom are Dyaks and Chinese) can supply this need. The immediate implications about the fates of these people are distressing enough, but the long-term effects of a reckless and rapacious plunder of the forests for those who remain long after the investors and their brokers depart, promise to be equally dire.

Notes

- 1 These figures are taken from Ingrid Palmer 1978, *The Indonesian Economy Since 1965*, London, Frank Cass, p. 120.
- 2 K. G. Koehler, 1972, "Wood Processing in East Kalimantan: A Case Study of Industrialisation and Foreign Investment in Indonesia", pp. 93-130, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, VIII:3; November, p. 125.
- 3 Quoted by David Jenkins, "The Dyaks: Goodbye to All That", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 June 1978, p. 23.
- 4 Quoted by Brian May 1978, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 120.
- 5 Marian W. Ward and R. Gerard Ward, 1974, "An Economic Survey of West Kalimantan", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, X:3, November, p. 28.
- 6 Brian May, op. cit. 5 above, p. 266.
- 7 Laksusda is the acronym which designates regional executive officers of KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order).

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BOOK REVIEW

Annual Report on Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia 1979, (ed.) T. Mulya Lubis and Fauzi Abdullah. Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Jakarta, 1979.

The Legal Aid Institute has taken a valuable step forward with the publication of this, the first, of their annual reports on human rights in Indonesia. A legal aid institute could, if it wished, confine itself to the provision of legal counsel free of charge to those who cannot afford it. In Indonesia it has interpreted its brief much more broadly and is becoming the major forum for criticising abuses and pressing for changes in the law that would improve the rights of Indonesian citizens.

This Annual Report also makes it clear that the Institute does not confine its understanding of human rights to political and legal rights but extends it to include social, economic and cultural rights as well. It therefore includes chapters on a variety of topics: education, health, income, basic needs, employment opportunities, press freedom, participation in state affairs and the right to justice. But it acknowledges that its access to information about abuses is very limited indeed:

If all would speak up, if all the information in the villages could be gathered, it would perhaps struck us dumbfounded (sic). We have to honestly admit that we don't know much about what happened in remote corners of our country.

Indonesia's two provisional constitutions of 1949 and 1950 were far better on human rights than the 1945 Constitution, the one restored by President Sukarno in 1959 under pressure from the Army which was by then increasingly interfering in political affairs. In tracing the post-1965 New Order claims to restore the rule of law, which had been severely battered under Sukarno by the abandonment of the *trias politica* principle, the Report suggests that "the New Order truly utilized the law as a legitimate means of power. If the law is non-existent, then it was immediately drawn up". From the examples that follow this extraordinary statement, one can only assume that it is intended as an ironic comment on how laws have been used to perpetuate unlawful and unconstitutional institutions such as KOPKAMTIB, and to abrogate constitutionally-affirmed rights by means of the "simplification" of party political life.

On some of the most crucial aspects of the way in which military rule was established in 1965, the Report is inconsistent in its adherence to human rights principles. When describing the immediate post-1965 period, it asserts that "we really found an atmosphere of political freedom, freedom to express opinion and freedom to associate". Yet this was a period when dozens of organisations with a combined membership of many millions were banned, when hundreds of thousands were killed for their alleged political affiliations, and hundreds of thousands more thrown into prison, and when numerous newspapers were prohibited. But in a later chapter, the Report redeems itself by

referring to the problem of the G30S/PKI political prisoners as the

gravest violation against human rights ever done by the Indonesian people against its fellow nationals. The killing of thousands of people throughout the country in the weeks following the murder of seven Generals, mass arrest of men and women, detentions and protracted unfair treatment, dubious process of law and the widely known and publicised heavy sentences.

The simplest explanation for this contradictory presentation of a single period is that the several chapters in the Report were written by different people, as indeed the editors say in their introduction. But more fundamentally, the ambiguity arises because the "PKI-spectre" has been so deeply established in Indonesia that even outspoken human rights advocates have ignored or skirted round this "gravest violation" of all, either because of the risks involved or because some of them still believe that PKI members or sympathisers got all they deserved, human rights or no. But the author of the chapter from which the latter quotation is taken is Mr Yap Thiam Hien, a man who has been unfailingly consistent in his adherence to human principles.

The chapters on social, economic and cultural rights provide a great deal of useful information: figures on the high illiteracy rate among school-age children (41.3% in 1971, 40.3% in 1977), on the very low expenditure on health services (0.3% of GNP in 1979), and on the lack of basic hygienic facilities (safe water is available to only 6.1% of village dwellers). An important point too is made about the danger of human rights abuse in the implementation of the family planning programme which is being pushed at a time when child mortality is still very high, so that it could still be in the interest of parents to have more children than national population figures would seem to justify. The Report also contains a useful section on land problems and points out that 80% of the 1,200 complaints made by delegations who went to Parliament in 1979 were connected with land disputes.

All in all, the Report provides a useful and fairly comprehensive picture of life in Indonesia today and is valuable reading for anyone wishing to understand why there is so much social and political unrest in the country. It is very helpful indeed to have the document available in English though it must be said that the translation is not always very satisfactory and sometimes positively impedes an understanding of the text.

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LAND DISPUTES

JENGGAWAH PEASANTS ON TRIAL

Seven peasants involved in the widely-reported land dispute with a state-owned tobacco plantation in Jenggawah, District of Jember, East Java last July, were suddenly summoned to court on 4th December to face a number of charges. (For a summary of this dispute, see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 36, October 1979, p. 7).

With only two days' notification of the trial, the defendants' lawyers could not be present. Despite protests from the peasants that the charges should not be read out till the lawyers were present, the first hearing proceeded as planned. The defendants' demand that the next hearing should be postponed for a month was also turned down, and the hearing was fixed for only one week hence, giving virtually no opportunity to the lawyers to prepare their case.

The peasants are being charged under the 1963 anti-subversion law and several articles of the Criminal Code. They are accused of holding three meetings without permission, of organising the peasants who are involved in the dispute, of continuing to protest against the arrest of two peasants involved in the dispute. They are also charged with responsibility for the damage caused to two tobacco warehouses which were burnt down during the course of the dispute.

Four of the defendants, who are not being held in custody during the trial, travelled to Jakarta after the first hearing to submit a formal complaint to Parliament and to demand proper legal protection. They stressed that the peasants involved had been willing to accept the decision announced by the Governor of East Java which guaranteed that the size of land-holdings re-distributed to the peasants would not be limited to 0.3 hectares per family as the plantation had originally determined, but would allow families to obtain larger plots in accordance with the size of their family. After this decision has been published, nothing further happened, and the plantation appeared to have abandoned its plans to re-distribute the land. The peasants therefore went on cultivating the land as formerly. But suddenly, plantation officials appeared again, accusing them of working on land to which they were not entitled, and insisting once again that the originally proposed plan of re-distribution of only 0.3 hectares would be fully implemented. Simultaneously with this, court proceedings were commenced.

Why, the peasant-defendants asked the leaders of Parliament, was the Governor's decision now being completely ignored? And why was it that they, who had agreed to accept the Governor's decision, were now being charged in court whereas no action was being taken against the plantation officials who were ignoring this decision?

ARRESTS IN NORTH SUMATRA

* Eleven peasants were arrested in mid-January in the village of Paya Mabar, Deli Serdang District, North Sumatra after resisting attempts to force them off the land they till. The land in dispute had been grabbed from them in 1967 by members of the armed forces. A total of 46 peasants have been trying to re-possess the land.

The arrests followed two incidents during which peasants who were working on the land were set upon and beaten up by gangs of men. In the first incident, police who accompanied the attackers stood by as the peasants were assaulted. In the second incident, six peasants under attack tried to defend themselves, but they were quickly outnumbered, and so tried to escape from their assailants. Soon afterwards the police appeared and arrested the six men, and then went to the homes of other peasants involved in the dispute and arrested them too. **Kompas** which reported this incident (25 January 1980) stated that the Police Chief of North Sumatra refused to answer any questions about these arrests.

* A group of peasants in the village of Ujung Rambe, Bangun Purba District, North Sumatra were arrested in January after attempting to defend their rights to land they have been tilling since 1962. Soon after the arrests, forty women who were wives of the arrested men, some carrying babies, travelled to the District Chief's office to protest about the arrests. They declared that they did not feel safe in the village and wanted to remain there for protection until their husbands were released and allowed to return home. They had all brought mats and bundles of clothes with them and staged a sitdown strike on the premises. Eventually they were persuaded to go home without any settlement of their complaint (**Kompas**, 17 January, 1980).

ACEH TAPOLS

There are about 126 political prisoners in Aceh, the most northerly province of Sumatra, says an Indonesian lawyer who has written to human rights activists in the Netherlands asking for support to help free these prisoners. A few are currently being tried, and some others have already been tried and sentenced, but the majority, who were arrested in 1977 and 1978, are being held without trial.

The prisoners are accused of involvement in the Movement for an Independent Aceh. They include some prominent figures in society.

The lawyer also points out that many others were held for shorter periods of time, also without trial. In some cases, local leaders who had been detained were only released, he says, after promising to vote for GOLKAR, the military-backed party, at the elections held in July 1977. The conditions in which the prisoners are held are quite appalling, he says; food is very inadequate and there have been many cases of maltreatment.

Aceh is a strongly Islamic region, and the PPP (the Moslem party) did well there at the 1977 elections.

GARUDA PILOTS DISMISSED

At the end of January, the state-owned Garuda Airways was brought to a complete standstill by a walk-out of pilots in protest against the dismissal of four of their colleagues over a pay claim made last year. Over 130 pilots walked out and participated in a demonstration to Parliament demanding immediate re-instatement and a settlement of their pay dispute.

The Army security command, KOPKAMTIB, intervened when chaos struck the main airports throughout the country, and set up a "crisis centre". Whilst cynically asserting that no pilots would be dismissed over the issue, KOPKAMTIB Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sudomo, announced that all pilots employed by Garuda would be required to re-register for work and to give a written undertaking that they would not engage in strike action or in any way disrupt flights.

KOPKAMTIB has repeatedly intervened in the dispute, claiming that "national security" and "economic development" are being put at risk. A lawyer, Mr Albert Hasibuan has pointed out (*Kompas*, 2 February 1980) that by accusing pilots of disturbing national development, Sudomo could now charge them with violating the anti-subversion laws of 1959 and 1963. "Don't play around with such charges", he warned, "for the penalties involved are extremely severe and include the death sentence".

The conflict has been brewing since November last year when the pay claim was first submitted to the Garuda

management. KORPRI, the association to which all state employees must belong, was brought in to find a solution, but since the managing-director of Garuda is also chairman of the KORPRI Garuda branch, it is not surprising that KORPRI's intervention proved fruitless. In fact all those who represented the pilots' side in the negotiation team that was set up on the orders of KOPKAMTIB to work out a settlement have now been dismissed. They are among the four men dismissed in January and another five persons dismissed last December.

The pilots who went to Parliament with their complaints were clearly afraid of possible repercussions from their demonstration. Many had even brought suitcases with them and announced their intention to remain in the Parliament building until the dispute had been solved; some also said that they expected to be arrested. As discussions were going on, the pilots refused to leave the building until some progress had been made and until assurances had been given that no arrests would be made after they had left the building. The chairman and deputy chairmen of Parliament, all of whom became very much involved and, according to some newspapers, quite agitated over the pilots' sit-down action, eventually secured an assurance from the Jakarta military command that no arrests would be made, and it was only after this that the pilots agreed to disband and go home.

A PETTY DESPOT'S 'RECONSTRUCTION' IN MEDAN

As the result of an understandable mistake, a respected Medan journalist, Yus Rivai Harahap, has been made to spend several days in jail, and suffer public humiliation and physical distress at the hands of a despotic police officer.

On 7 December 1979, Yus hired a red Yamaha motor-bike and parked it outside the Kisaran District Office where he went inside to settle some business. When he came out someone had parked a similar motor-bike right next to the one he had hired, and Yus had difficulty identifying the one he had used. On finding that his key fitted one of them, he rode away without realising that he had the wrong one. Meanwhile the owner of the motor-bike, Ali Amran, emerged from the District Office and saw at once that a mistake had been made, and so took Yus' hired machine to the police station. Later when Yus returned the motor-bike he was riding to Corporal Pakpahan, the owner, Pakpahan said he had returned the wrong motor-bike. However, Pakpahan quickly found his motor-bike at the police station and he and Ali Amran realising the mistake, exchanged the bikes without further ado.

However Captain Bambang Susetyo of the police was not happy to let it rest at that, and decided to make a public spectacle of Yus. After he had spent four days in prison and had been refused permission to see his wife, Bambang had him manacled and made him walk five kilo-

metres around Medan in the hot midday sun with bare feet on baking asphalt, encouraging a large audience, including journalists, to witness Yus' discomfort. The walk was supposed to enable the reconstruction of the so-called crime and the police made Yus visit all his stops of 7 December. Several journalists were upset by this treatment and asked Bambang why he did not conduct the 'reconstruction' by car, but Bambang claimed that there was no petrol. The journalists then offered to supply petrol, but were told angrily by Bambang that "it was not their business".

Sinar Indonesia Baru the newspaper for which Yus works took a very critical position on the affair, and said that Bambang's action was one of revenge as *Sinar Indonesia Baru* had often criticised the police for torturing prisoners and about the widespread gambling in Kisaran. Many other organisations protested including the Indonesian Journalists' Association legal office in Medan, and seven youth organisations. The head of the North Sumatra Police District, Brigadier General Montolalu, has said that Bambang's actions were imprudent and that action would be taken. Bambang is one of a few who may not have got away with despotic and arbitrary practices . . . But then, he is not a general. . .

Source: *Tempo* 22 December 1979.

TOURISTS: ANOTHER INVASION OF THE ASMAT

An advertisement placed in the Dutch monthly, *Arts en Auto* invites a group of fourteen Dutch people to participate in a safari to the Asmat area of West Irian so that they can wonder at the "primitive" practices of the Asmat people. The leader of this cynical expedition is a Dutch woman, Oedine Wittewaall, a former resident of sixteen years in West Irian. The cost of her expertise will be Dfl. 14,000 (about £3,500).

The spectacle-seekers will not be disappointed for the Indonesian military has provided them with much to see which may be recorded as "primitive". The thousands of West Papuans who have been forced out of towns have to practice a precarious subsistence agriculture in the bush and the jungle, in the least fertile areas which have been left after the transmigration programme. The hardship is compounded by the fact that the military authorities will not allow the West Papuan villagers to leave the immediate village area in districts which are regarded as insecure. This means that shifting cultivation cannot be practised effectively and nutritional levels must drop. No doubt the comparison between such a primitive and poor way of life will provide a comfortable contrast for Oedine's intrepid companions, and they will return home with their slides, colourful stories and an enhanced appreciation of Dutch affluence.

BRUTALITY ON BIAK

Baldus Mofu Dies in Prison

The West Papuan nationalist Baldus Mofu is reported to have died on 7 December 1979 as a result of ill-treatment received in Biak prison. He was arrested along with several others in July 1979 after making a speech on West Papua's National Day on July 1st which commemorates the Declaration of Independence made by the Free Papua Movement leader, Seth Rumkorem, on 1 July 1971. It is estimated that there are some 300 political prisoners on Biak island alone. They are held in dreadful conditions and are subject to torture.

Source: *West Papuan Observer* 4:2 and 4:4

Massacre on Biak

A group of twelve men, women and children who had obtained permission to gather sago outside of their village in north Biak, were ruthlessly shot down last year by an Indonesian army patrol which was looking for Free Papua Movement (OPM) units. It appears that the patrol later checked and discovered that the villagers did have a valid

MASSIVE FORCED RE-SETTLEMENT IN EAST TIMOR

In its drive to force East Timorese people out of the mountain regions, the base for the protracted resistance to Indonesia's invasion launched in December 1975, the Indonesian government has adopted a starvation policy. Saturation bombing combined with search-and-destroy missions and widespread defoliation has severely disrupted the traditional agricultural pursuits of the country's mountain people. Villagers forced to be constantly on the move have been unable to plant or harvest their crops. The resultant grave food shortages and lack of medicines and clothing forced more than half the total population to come down into the lowland areas, the only parts of the country which the invading troops have been able to control physically.

At least 300,000 people, well over one-half the total surviving population of East Timor, have now been herded into "resettlement villages". The strategic role of this "resettlement" programme has been clearly described by Henry Kamm, in the *New York Times* (28 January 1980) who visited East Timor for one week. He writes:

The Jakarta Government has prepared a resettlement program under which people are to be installed in larger groups than was the Timorese tradition. Villages are to be situated along the roads, where the inhabitants will be accessible to public services such as education and health. A specialist in Timorese agriculture said that the plan had been drawn largely for strategic reasons, placing the population where the Indonesian Army can control it. Strongly anti-Communist, he approves of the political objective of keeping the people out of the reach of Fretilin remnants.

However, he said, Timor has never been more than barely able to feed its population. The people have produced their food by living in small groups and exploiting all the arable valleys of the rugged interior. The resettlement project, the specialist said, will make East Timor permanently dependent on food imports.

permit, but by then it was too late as they were all dead. Their bodies were left to be discovered some time later by another villager who was on his way to do some gardening. The informant of *West Papuan Observer* was reluctant to identify the village in north Biak where the massacre occurred because of fear of reprisals.

Biak is now the centre of renewed OPM activity, but it has always been an area of strong anti-colonial resistance. It has been reported that at the end of 1979 north and east Biak were subjected to heavy bombing attacks by Indonesia, probably indicating that attempts by patrols to end OPM activity had been unsuccessful.

Source: *West Papuan Observer*, 4:3 and 4:4

PRESS FREEDOM: ALI MURTOPO ELUCIDATES

When in early December last year, KOPKAMTIB Commander, Admiral Sudomo warned newspapers in Indonesia against printing opinions and told them they should stick to facts, Vice-President Adam Malik, himself a newsman in the old days, could not let pass an opportunity of reminding Sudomo that opinions were also facts, and therefore worthy of being reported, although to be on the safe side, he added that newspapers should be cautious about publishing opinions that could "harm the national interest".

Continued from page 7

tuals will be nothing more than thought machines. As Kenneth Galbraith has said, technostucture which already exists in the advanced countries is simply a means for giant corporations to wield control over society.

Rationalism and bureaucratism based on the technostucture idea take the shape of models and formulae which must all conform to the wishes of those in power. The universities must conform to the will of those in power, the students must conform to the will of those in power. This is what an authoritarian, dictatorial system of government means. So, KNK and NKK are the political means to undermine social and cultural life in order to justify the authoritarian regime in power in this country.

The campaign being waged by ITB students to resist the enforcement of normalisation has now reached the point of no return. It is a struggle which is aimed not only at defending the students' council and other democratic students' organisations; it also pursues the broader objective of freeing academic life from the clutches of the dictators who want to control everything in Indonesia. It is not only the implementation of normalisation that is bad, but also the concept on which it is based. Thus the personification of normalisation is not Daud Jusuf,⁷ but the regime itself.

Notes

- 1 GOLKAR is the party of the army, and KORPRI is the Civil Servants' Corps which all government employees are required to join. KORPRI is one of the GOLKAR organisations.
- 2 This is a reference to the President's brother, Probosutejo, who owns the company P.T. Mercu Buana which is built on an official monopoly of clove exports.
- 3 The Berkeley mafia refers to the techocrats in charge of Indonesia's economy. They are so called as most were trained at Berkeley, California.
- 4 Senopati Square is the address of the State Planning Office.
- 5 KNK—*Konsep Normalisasi Kampus*; NKK—*Normalisasi Keluarga Kampus* (Normalisation of the Campus Family).
- 6 *Penalaran* means something reasonable or sensible, but the best word to use here would seem to be logic.
- 7 Daud Jusuf is the Minister for Education who launched the normalisation policy and who is mainly responsible for its implementation in the universities.

But, for a full clarification of what newspapers are allowed to print and what they are not allowed to print, who better than the man actually in charge, the Minister of Information, General Ali Murtopo? We are indebted to Kompas (6 December 1980) for reporting his final judgement on this important question, as follows:

Some opinions expressed by individuals have not been tested for their validity. These can be classified, he said, as opinions about opinions. He acknowledged that, for newspapers, these were facts, but taking into account the present conditions of Indonesian society and the educative role performed by the press, the reporting of such opinions cannot be considered as being educative. By reporting such opinions, newspapers would be publishing information that only blurs the issues . . . The way to judge whether an opinion about an opinion should be reported in the press is to decide whether it has moral value, whether it is in the national interest and whether it is worthy of being reported.

'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are 'criminals'.

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