

**REFUGEES AS A CATALYZER OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY:
EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT**

by
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ABSTRACT

REFUGEES AS A CATALYZER OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT

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I developed a theory to understand the impact of refugee resettlement on the political attitudes of citizens living in host countries with authoritarian governments. While refugees may engender social discontent against existing institutions, their political implications need not necessarily be the rise of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes, as often occurs in Western countries. In authoritarian countries, anti-establishment feelings may generate social discontent against authoritarian institutions, leading to an increase in favorable sentiments toward democracy. Adopting difference-in-difference and instrumental variable approaches for causal inference, I test my theory in Jordan and show that the presence of Syrian refugees increases anti-establishment feelings in society and the likelihood of supporting democracy. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that even though academics and Western media pose migration as a serious threat to democracy, any analysis about the impact of migration on public opinion should be conditional on institutional contexts.

ÖZET

DEMOKRASİ DESTEK KATALATÖRÜ OLARAK MÜLTECİLER: DOĞAL BİR DENEYDEN DELİL

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Dünya Değerler Araştırması

Mültecilerin otoriter ülkelerde yaşayan vatandaşların politik düşünceleri üzerine etkisi hakkında bir teori geliştirdim. Mülteciler bir ülkedeki kurumlara karşı sosyal memnuniyetsiz yaratabilirken bunun politik etkisi, batıda olduğu gibi, otoriter yada demokrasi karşıtı düşüncelere yönelim olmayabilir. Otoriter ülkelerde, kurum karşıtı düşünceler otoriter kurumlara karşı bir memnuniyetsizlik yaratabilir ve bu demokrasiye yönelimi artırabilir. Farklar içinde farklar ve enstrümental değişken metotlarını kullanarak, geliştirdiğim teoriyi Ürdün üzerinde test ediyorum ve Suriyeli mültecilerin Ürdünlülerin kurumlara karşı olan duygularını artırdığını ve demokrasiye olan inançlarını artırdığını gösteriyorum. Bu çalışma, akademisyenlerin ve Batı medyasının mültecileri demokrasiye bir tehdit oluşturduğu önergmesine rağmen mülteciler üzerine yapılacak herhangi bir çalışmanın bir ülkedeki kurumlara koşullanması gerektiğini göstererek literatüre katkı sağlamaktadır.

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To My Family...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	x
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THEORY	4
3. BACKGROUND ON JORDAN	10
4. METHODOLOGY	13
4.1. Identification Strategy	13
4.2. Estimation Strategy	15
5. RESULTS	18
5.1. Descriptive Statistics	18
5.2. Estimation Results.....	19
5.3. Results with Control and Treatment Groups	23
5.4. Causal Mediation Analysis.....	26
5.5. Subgroup analyses	28
5.6. Robustness Checks.....	29
6. CONCLUSION	31
BIBLIOGRAPHY	33
APPENDIX A	38

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. Variables Operationalized	17
Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics	19
Table 5.2. Results	21
Table 5.3. Results	24
Table 5.4. Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances	27
Table 5.5. Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances	28
Table A.1. Results for Female Sample	40
Table A.2. Results for Male Sample	41
Table A.3. Regression Results for those ages 18-24	42
Table A.4. Regression Results for those ages 25-34	43
Table A.5. Regression Results for those ages 35-44	44
Table A.6. Regression Results for those ages 45-54	45
Table A.7. Regression Results for those ages 55-64	46
Table A.8. Regression Results for 65 and older	47
Table A.9. Regression Results for illiterate or literate with no diploma	48
Table A.10. Regression Results for primary school graduates	49
Table A.11. Regression Results for high school graduates	50
Table A.12. Regression Results for university graduates	51
Table A.13. Regression Results	52
Table A.14. Difference-in-Difference Results	53
Table A.15. Regression Results	54

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Proposed Causal Mechanism	5
Figure 4.1. Number of Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan	14
Figure 4.2. Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan	14
Figure 5.1. Parallel Trends	25

1. INTRODUCTION

Given that the world faces the highest number of refugees in history, it is important to ask: what are the political implications of refugee influxes for public opinion? Can refugees affect fundamental changes in public preferences of governance systems? Literature, as well as Western media, implicitly assumes that the rise of far-right and populist parties, authoritarian in nature (Mudde 2004), fuels anti-establishment and authoritarian feelings in host societies. Anti-refugee discourse widely adopted by populists creates an indirect link between refugees and authoritarian attitudes in Western societies. However, this inquiry begs a couple of follow-up questions: What are the main variables that determine the way that refugee influxes influence public opinion towards democracy? What are the intermediary mechanisms through which refugees promote certain types of governance? It is these questions that I aim to explore in this research.

The institutions within a political system and the way they interact with society writ large is a determining factor in whether new refugee populations will generate pro- authoritarian sentiments. While refugees may engender social discontent against existing institutions, their political implications need not necessarily be the rise of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. In authoritarian countries, anti-establishment feelings may generate social discontent against authoritarian institutions, leading people to consider other types of political governance such as democracy. I expect this outcome to be especially salient in countries where authoritarian institutions cannot bring economic prosperity to their constituencies.

I test this theory on an authoritarian country that has been struck with refugee exodus since its independence: Jordan. With its authoritarian ruling that limits democratic practices to a great extent, Jordan is a suitable case to test this theory. By combining the data taken from the World Values Survey Wave IV - VI and the Arab Barometer Wave II-V and adopting difference-in-difference and instrumental variable approaches, I establish a statistical causal relationship between the presence of Syrian settlements and Jordanians' anti-establishment feelings and support for democracy.

Also, I examine the extent to which economic mechanisms are influential in changing political attitudes towards democracy. Studies on the populist parties in the West have discussed various mechanisms associated with the anti-establishment feelings in society, ranging from economic mechanisms to cultural mechanisms and to political polarization (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). Considering the importance of economic well-being in the sustenance of authoritarian ruling (Teorell 2010; Pepinsky 2009), I believe economic motivations can provide comprehensible views about the formation of anti-establishment feelings in society living under authoritarian institutions even though there might be other context-dependent mechanisms, such as cultural or security-related mechanisms.

My analysis indicates that Syrians are associated with a significant loss of jobs for male Jordanians. Moreover, they have led Jordanians to be less likely to satisfy with national, as well as their households', economic conditions. These estimations demonstrate the perceptions of the economic strain put by Syrians. Moreover, my results indicate that Syrians are not the only ones blamed by Jordanians for the deterioration of Jordan's economy. Jordanians have also become dissatisfied with the economic management of their government. To be precise, they have become less likely to appreciate the government in running the economy, creating employment opportunities, and decreasing in equality in society as the presence of Syrians increases in a given governorate. As a result of the perceptions of economic deterioration and the blame put on the government, Jordanians have become less likely to cite confidence in political institutions, proxying the extent of institutional legitimacy.

There are two reasons why citizens under authoritarian institutions might want to support democracy as they are dissatisfied with their institutional system. First, they may believe that democracy can bring economic prosperity to their country (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Ceyhun 2017). However, such conceptualization of democracy might not be universal (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007). Second, the status quo recalcitrant to any reform attempt may lead citizens to desire a political system where they can voice their economic concerns freely and initiate necessary reforms. Even though I cannot test whether these reasons are valid, my results demonstrate that Syrians have led Jordanians to cite greater support for democracy.

This research has several contributions to the literature. Previous research on political preferences and refugee influxes focuses on either a) voting behavior (Vasilakis 2018; Altindag and Kaushal 2017); b) attitudes towards refugees (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Hangartner et al. 2019); or c) preferences over welfare policies

(Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport 2019). I improve this line of research and demonstrate that the impact of refugees on public opinion may operate on a much deeper level: it can change people's preferences over political regimes. Also, previous research provides only suggestive evidence about the possible mechanisms at play. This research establishes a causal mechanism between the presence of refugees and the change in public opinion and outline the steps in this process. Also, focusing on a country outside of the West, this research demonstrates the importance of institutions in determining the attitudinal outcomes of refugees. However, the most important contribution of this research to the literature is that migration does not necessarily constitute a threat to democratic sentiments in society, an opinion widely held by scholars and Western media.

I start with an overview of the literature discussing the impact of refugees on local economies and how refugees might lead to the anti-establishment feelings and greater support for democracy in society, followed by a brief background on Jordan. Presenting estimation strategies and results, I conclude with possible implications of this study and the room for further research.

2. THEORY

At the dawn of the second decade of the 21st century, democracy in the world have regressed on a rare occasion. Attacks on democratic ideals, such as toleration and equality, from political parties with authoritarian leanings, be it right-wing populist or anti-establishment parties, have led to a considerable amount of decrease in trust in institutions among Western societies. In this context, the widespread use of anti-migrant discourse adopted by these parties have appealed to the most vulnerable part of society: those who have been severely suffered from the market implications of globalization and neo-liberal policies. As a result, populist leaders have made various electoral successes throughout the West, ranging from charismatic populist leaders getting nomination from mainstream political parties, such as Donald Trump, to grassroots populist movements that secured considerable amount of seats in the legislative branches, such as the AfD in Germany.

The relationship between migration and the deconsolidation of democracy in the West, mainly driven by the success of populist parties, have led academics and Western media to devote a significant amount of time to understand the possible mechanisms through which migration hurts Western democracies Turner 2019; Galston 2018 and why people have leaned towards populist discourses and voted for populist parties (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014). However, we have limited knowledge about the political implications of migrants in authoritarian contexts. Given that authoritarian countries have distinct political characteristics in dealing with their citizens, it is imperative to examine political implications of migrants on public opinion in authoritarian countries.

The existing literature has contended that the economic well-being of the populace is crucial to the sustaining authoritarian rule (Teorell 2010; Pepinsky 2009). The Middle East, in that context, is no exception: social contracts in the region are dependent on the extensive use of unproductive rents - money coming from oil revenues, foreign assistance or remittances – to placate society and buy their acquiescence to restrictions on political rights. The Arab Uprisings, which shook the foundations of authoritarian ruling in the region, was in large part spurred by economic grievances

in Middle Eastern societies as authoritarian institutions failed to deliver on previous promises of economic security (Campante and Chor 2012). Thus, the importance of economic issues in authoritarian countries constitutes a reasonable account as to how anti-establishment feelings can be generated in society. In authoritarian contexts, these sentiments may manifest as support for democratic systems for the reasons I explain below.

Figure 2.1 presents the causal mechanism I propose to study between the arrival of refugees and the support for democracy among citizens. It should be noted that even though other mechanisms, such as security-related or cultural mechanisms, may be influential in the extent that people nurture anti-establishment feelings against authoritarian institutions and support for democracy as a result, I focus on the impact of refugees on host' labor market outcomes due to the centrality of economic issues in almost every authoritarian country. More specifically, given that security-related or cultural mechanisms are highly context-dependent, economic motivations can provide solid and generalizable explanations as to how the presence of refugees may induce greater support for democracy in authoritarian countries.




Figure 2.1 Proposed Causal Mechanism

The possible impacts of refugees on local economies have been well established in literature on labor economics (Card 1990; Maystadt et al. 2019). However, academic studies mostly using migration shocks as natural experiments yield mixed results. While some studies find small or no negative effect of refugees on local economies (Card 1990; Friedberg 2001; Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019), others find much larger negative effects of refugees (Glitz 2012; Aydemir and Kirdar 2017; Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2016). These mixed results are also present in research analyzing the impact of Syrian refugees on labor market outcomes (Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019; Ceritoglu et al. 2017; Fakhri and Ibrahim 2016; Tumen 2016). However, one commonality can be found in these studies: Syrians not having access to formal labor market are mostly competing with citizens in the informal sector, which harbors the most vulnerable strata of society (Del Carpio and Wagner 2015; Tumen 2016).

The impact of refugees on objective economic indicators, such as employment and wage levels, may not be conducive to analyses of whether social discontent is generated. Instead, subjective indicators, such as the assessments of individual and national economies, may be associated with the formation of social discontent. Indeed, research has demonstrated that subjective assessments or relative deprivation among voters can explain why citizens vote for populist parties, being anti-establishment in nature (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018).

Evidence from Uganda has demonstrated that while refugees do not harm the labor market outcomes of the host society, subjective assessments about the impact of refugees on local economies are highly negative (Kreibaum 2016). For instance, even though people may not lose their jobs, the labor supply shock due to the presence of refugees may create a pressure for lower wages, leading wages not to catch up with inflation rate which might also be exacerbated by the economic strain put by the refugees. At the end, despite the deterioration of economic situation of hosts, we might not be able to measure a significant job loss among hosts. Also, employment status is not associated with negative perceptions against refugees, but the disadvantageous households' economic situation is (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Ceyhun 2019). In other words, anti-refugee sentiments may not be concentrated on those who are objectively worse-off but those who believe that they are worse-off. Thus, I propose the following set of hypotheses taking both objective and subjective micro and macro indicators into account:

Hypothesis Ia: Refugee density should decrease the likelihood of being employed.

Hypothesis Ib: Refugee density should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.

Hypothesis Ic: Refugee density should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.

However, citizens discontented with the status quo need to direct blame for unfavorable conditions and mismanagement of the economy towards their government. Research has demonstrated that citizens have a strong tendency to hold their government responsible for the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Considering that refugees create a considerable strain on government's ability to run the economy and provide public goods (Maystadt et al. 2019; Francis 2015), it is imperative to analyze how the presence of refugees is associated with host societies' evaluations of their government's performance on managing the economy.

On the other hand, since the competition between refugees and hosts occurs predominantly within the informal sector, the economic situation of the most vulnerable

people, i.e. poor and uneducated, might be deteriorated, which may augur rising inequality. Research has shown that the rise of economic inequality contributes to the anti-establishment feelings among citizens and the rise of populist parties in Europe (Rodrik 2017). Similarly, people within authoritarian political arrangements might be likely to blame their government for the rise of inequality. Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis IIa: Refugee density should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on managing economy.

Hypothesis IIb: Refugee density should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.

Hypothesis IIc: Refugee density should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.

Corruption plays a key role in determining whether the perception of economic deterioration turns into anti-establishment feelings (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). Public perceptions of structural impediments within the economy and/or political institutions often forms the catalyst that galvanizes feelings of economic dissatisfaction into active calls for institutional changes.

Even though the relationship between refugees and corruption within state institutions may not seem obvious, refugees can contribute to the perception of corruption among host societies for various reasons. First, refugees generate lucrative businesses based on human trafficking, which in many cases develop corrupt relationships between criminals and government officials. Second, the cooperation between states and international organizations in assisting refugees may generate social discontent among poor citizens who feel marginalized. When international organizations are perceived as corrupt (Harb and Saab 2014), this may have a spillover effect on governmental institutions as well. Lastly, refugees may need to bribe officials to ensure their security. Research has shown that migrants may commit corrupt activities if they emigrate from a corrupt home country (Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin 2015). Given that refugees mostly flee corrupt countries, it is likely that they commit bribes and other malfunctions in host countries. Even though corrupt activities are not visible to host societies, it is likely that informal mechanisms or rumors eventually lead to an increase in the awareness of such activities. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis IIId: Refugee density should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.

It is intuitive to argue that people adopt critical stances against the government in

case they are dissatisfied with the economic management, even though the exact causal mechanisms could not be well established (Yang and Holzer 2006; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). However, whether criticism against the government over economic management leads to anti-establishment feelings in society is not obvious. Thus, it is imperative to examine whether anti-establishment feelings nurtured in society as a result of the blame put on the government.

Literature has adopted abstract methods and proxies to measure anti-establishment feelings in society. Measures of trust in institutions, in that context, are the most common ways to understand social grievances against institutions (Mishler and Rose 2001; Hutchison and Johnson 2011). Indeed, it has been documented that lower political trust induces greater likelihood of voting for anti-establishment parties (Geurkink et al. 2019). In authoritarian contexts in which people are more likely to believe their political participation as inconsequential, political distrust is likely to be a good proxy for anti-establishment feelings.

Moreover, the relationship between corruption and anti-establishment feelings has been well developed in the literature (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Kostadinova 2012; Mishler and Rose 2001; Seligson 2002). Those who believe that there is a widespread corruption in state institutions are more likely to nurture anti-establishment feelings. Also, the evidence from the West suggests that the perception of corruption is positively correlated with one's tendency to support populist parties (Ziller and Schübel 2015; Engler 2016). Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis III: Refugee density should decrease the confidence in political institutions.

What is the impact of nurturing anti-establishment feelings in an authoritarian context on the most preferable governance system? In the West, anti-establishment feelings have been characterized by a higher likelihood of voting for populist parties that are authoritarian in nature. Research has indicated that increasingly higher proportions of youth in the West are in favor of a strong leader unbound to elections (Foa and Mounk 2017). It may also be reasonable for citizens under authoritarian contexts to desire such a governance system, i. e. the persistence of their political systems, so that the restriction towards refugees can be implemented easily and efficiently.

However, I argue that it is not the case. Public lack of confidence in existing institutions due to the deterioration of their economic situations indicates that people may now identify the most preferable governance system as something different from the

status quo. Democracy, in that case, has become appealing to people because of two reasons. First, people may expect better living conditions from a democratic system. Evidence from the Middle East has suggested that people conceptualize democracy based on economic progress (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Ceyhun 2017). More specifically, a majority of the population believes that under a democratic system, the economy runs more efficiently, and employment opportunities increase dramatically. However, evidence from other regions has demonstrated that such understanding of democracy may not be universal (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007).

Second, people may increasingly believe that their voice is not heard by the existing institutions which fail to bring economic progress. A status quo recalcitrant to entertain any reform attempts may also lead people to adopt a pro-democratic stance and desire to have a political system in which they can freely express their opinions. Thus, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis IV: Refugee density should increase the support for democracy in the host society.

I test these hypotheses on an authoritarian country that has been struck with the refugee populations since its history: Jordan. The recent Syrian shock and the availability of public opinion data make Jordan a suitable case to discern the extent that refugees contributed to anti-establishment feelings in host society and the extent that these public sentiments are motivated by the perceptions of economy and lead to greater support for democracy.

3. BACKGROUND ON JORDAN

The land on which modern Jordan was established has always been a destination for mass migrations throughout the history. Despite the particularly Palestinian nature of immigration waves to Jordan in the past, people from different nationalities have started seeking refuge in Jordan recently. To conceptualize, Jordan has experienced six mass migration waves so far: a mass Circassian exodus after the Circassian War in 1878, three mass Palestinian exoduses during the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, and the first Gulf War in 1990, an Iraqi exodus during the Iraqi Civil War in 2001, and the Syrian exodus during the Syrian Civil War.

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on a bicameral system. The King has the full veto power over the legislative branch, constituting considerable damage to popular will. Furthermore, the members of the Upper House appointed by the King overlook the implementation of the constitution. The Lower House, on the other hand, is formed by national elections. Electoral districts in Jordan have been tilted to favor Eastern part of country where Transjordanians, traditional supporters of regime, reside, which as a result hurt the representation of other mass groups in Jordan like Palestinians. Even though there is a considerable amount of competition in the elections and the lack of electoral fraud, King's influence on the formation of government and capability to veto any law passed by the parliament have resulted in electoral outcomes that further stabilize the regime (Lust-Okar 2006).

The 1948 Arab-Israeli war brought statehood to Israel but caused about 700,000 Palestinians to be expelled and forcibly displaced from their lands. Jordan was among a few countries that adopted integrative policies for the Palestinians. It not only provided full access to social provisions but also granted citizenship to the Palestinians from the West Bank. This was an exception since most of the host Arab countries didn't facilitate the acquisition of citizenship to them. Jordan's generous citizenship policy, however, only lasted until the second Palestinian exodus from Gaza after the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Thus, the ensuing influx of refugees was deprived of citizenship rights even though social provisions remained generous.

Jordan's first response to the Syrian influx was to open the border crossings with the consideration of short-term Syrian presence. However, as the Syrian civil war enters its eighth year, the political landscape indicates no potential for Syrians to return back to Syria. As of December 2018, Jordan hosts 671,350 Syrians, with 18 percent living in five refugee camps funded by UNHCR and other international organizations, and the rest spread into Jordan.

Jordan adopted a rather integrative approach to Syrians. Some associated this approach with Jordan's strategy to lure international aid (Davis et al. 2017). Syrians are eligible to receive aid and food vouchers if they are registered to the UNHCR and access education and healthcare services if they have a service card obtained from Ministry of Interior. However, those who are not registered by the UNHCR and not hold service card cannot receive aid and access to welfare services. Those who hold a service card can enroll their children to public schools and get healthcare from Ministry of Health facilities with no charge as insured Jordanians until 2014. In November 2014, Jordan abrogated the free access to healthcare for Syrians. Now, they are required to pay the same rate as uninsured Jordanians, but it is still better than foreigners who are required to pay an amount 35%-60% higher than that paid by uninsured Jordanians (Amnesty International 2016). Overall, it is found that Syrians tend to cite adequate access to education and healthcare services (REACH 2014; Ceyhun 2017).

As the number of Syrians seeking refuge in Jordan increases, the burden on the economy and the infrastructure, already deteriorating before the crisis, was exacerbated. Even though these economic and infrastructural problems are deeply linked to structural and natural factors, Syrians were blamed by the host society as the sole reason (Francis 2015). More specifically, public frustration against Syrians stem from a number of factors, such as overcrowded education and health facilities; the increased demand by Syrians for housing boosting the rent prices; Syrians' burden on the labor market and the infrastructure, especially on waste management and water supply.

In 2016, Jordan declared to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees. Even though there are concerns about the applicability of this new policy (Lenner and Turner 2019), close to 130,000 work permits have been issued by 2019 (Ministry of Labor 2019), which constitutes 30 percent of the working-age population of Syrians in Jordan according to the UNHCR estimates. After this law Syrians have become eligible to register in the formal sector and have started competing with Jordanians who are working at the formal level. On the other hand, even though it has been demonstrated that Syrian refugees compete with other non-Jordanian groups at the

informal sector (Malaeb and Wahba 2018), the subjective assessments of Jordanians may deviate from this reality.

Protests movements in Jordan have been mostly motivated by economic concerns (Al-Ajlouni and Hartnett 2019). Thousands took to the street to protest economic mismanagement of government after the Iraqi exodus. Indeed, the lack of economic prosperity was put at the center of the protests during the Arab Spring. Also, social discontent against Syrians contributed to the general public frustration against the government (Francis 2015) which failed to carry out the structural reforms it had promised during the Arab Uprisings (Yom 2013).

Macroeconomic indicators suggest that since the outset of the Syrian influx, Jordan's economy has deteriorated considerably. In 2018, youth unemployment peaked at 40 percent, and economic growth has slowed down. Even though Syrians were blamed as the scapegoats for the economic deterioration, Jordanians have also developed grievances against the government. 2018 protests were telling; Jordanians took to streets in thousands to protest IMF-backed tax reforms, which resulted in the dissolution of the Hani al-Mulki government. In short, the centrality of economic issues to Jordanian politics provides a suitable case in which above-established theory can be tested.

4. METHODOLOGY

To test this theory, I combined the data taken from World Value Survey Wave IV- VI and Arab Barometer II-V, nationally representative datasets that cover a time period between 2001-2018. More specifically, the merged data covers the following time periods for pre-Syrian shock (2011): 2001, 2007 and 2010, and the following time periods for post-Syrian shock: 2012, 2016, 2018. However, it should be noted that not all outcomes of interest are asked consistently throughout waves. As a result, for some variables, such as employment, it is possible to make analysis covering a longer period, but for some variables, such as government performances, it is not possible.

4.1 Identification Strategy

The identification of refugees is crucial since differential identifications can generate fundamentally different results. Even though there are several accounts about the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan (Krafft et al. 2019), I use the number of registered Syrians taken from the UNHCR for various reasons. First, only the UNHCR shares the number of Syrian refugees on an annual basis. Other resources, such as the Jordan census of 2015, present the number for only one year. Given that the public opinion data includes more than one time points after the refugee shock, UNHCR data is the most suitable data publicly available. Second, Jordan was criticized for inflating the number of refugees, which decreases the credibility of the data shared by the government of Jordan (Lenner 2016). Third, UNHCR shares the regional distribution of Syrians based on gender and age categories, which significantly improves the power of identification. However, I test the extent to which my results are compatible with different identification strategies as robustness checks.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the Syrian refugees in Jordan skyrocketed in 2013, and after 2014 the number of refugees have become steeper.




Figure 4.1 Number of Syrian Refugees Registered in Jordan

Considering that only 7 percent of female Syrians enter into the Jordanian labor market (Stave and Hillesund 2015), I take the number of male Syrians aged between 18-59, the most likely group that competes with Jordanians in the labor market. This is an important improvement for the existing research that assumes gender and age distributions similar across regions by utilizing the density of Syrian refugees without gender difference. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of the density of Syrian male refugees aged between 18-59.




Figure 4.2 Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan

4.2 Estimation Strategy

The main method to estimate the impact of Syrian refugees is the linear difference-in-difference. This method analyzes group-wise (here, region) and time-invariant differences between treated and control groups by using fixed-effects (Angrist and Pischke 2008). Its main assumption is the parallel trends between treated and control groups, that is, if the shock had not been realized, the trends within groups, as well as their difference, would have been preserved. Measuring the deviations from these different characteristics due to an exogenous shock, this method extract causality between Syrian refugees and outcomes of interest.

A concern may be related to latent characteristics that may influence the outcomes of interest. For instance, literature has discussed that citizens' values and expectations are crucial in explaining whether government performances lead to lower levels of political trust (van der Meer and Hakhverdian 2017). However, the research design proposed in here eliminates such concerns by assuming that these values are not time-variant at the regional level. Even though such settings can be constructed without control variables, I include standard demographic controls to decrease the statistical noise in the data. The proposed weighted regression analysis is;

$$D_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta MaleDens_{jt} + \gamma_j + \delta_t + \kappa_{kt} + X_{it} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

where i indexes individual, j indexes 12 governorates in Jordan, t indexes time period, and k indexes three big regions consisting of North, Center and South regions whose boundaries are determined by the range of mountains in Jordan. D_{ijt} represents the outcome of interest. $MaleDens_{jt}$ is the density of Syrian male refugees aged between 18-59. This specification operationalizes a continuous treatment intensity without differentiating between treatment and control groups. Having the same statistical philosophy, this method provides flexibility to the analysis. However, I also conducted the same analysis with treatment and control groups. γ_j is region- and δ_t is year-fixed effects. To loose the common trend assumption, I added 3-bigger region and year-fixed effects κ_{kt} . Such specification is similar to the one used by Stephens and Yang (2014). Standard demographic controls (X_{it}) include continuous age, four education levels, and gender. The education categories are illiterate or literate with no diploma, primary school graduates, high school and university graduates. Also, I use the weights provided by the World Values Survey and the Arab Barometer. This equation is a standard linear difference-in-difference setting.

I am mainly interested in β .

Since Syrians are not exogenously distributed across Jordan, my estimates may suffer from endogeneity bias. Thus, I operationalize an instrumental variable to predict Syrian density as follows;

$$IV_{jt} = \frac{MaleDens2004_j \times R_t}{Distance_j}$$

$MaleDens2004_j$ is the density of non-Jordanians, mostly Egyptians and Syrians, given in 2004 census. R_t is the total number of refugees in Jordan in year t . $Distance_j$ is the closest bird distance between governorate j and the Syrian border. Main assumption of this instrument is that Syrians fleeing from Syria are likely to move to the places where Syrians have already been present, while accounting for the cost of moving to farther places by having the closes bird distance between governorate j and the Syrian border as the denominator. This instrument has similarities with the instruments used by Altindag and Kaushal (2017) and Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019)¹.

Dependent variables are operationalized as follows. One question asked whether a respondent is employed with 1 representing that the respondent is employed and 0 otherwise. Respondents were also asked to evaluate their economic situation. Since the scaling of this question is different between World Values Survey and Arab Barometer, I created a binary measure with 1 indicating that a respondent evaluates his/her economic situation as being better than the standardized mean value of the 2001 sample. The main idea behind this rescaling is to understand the deviations from household economic situations in 2001. To measure respondents' evaluations of national economic situation, respondents were asked the following question: "How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country?", with 4 indicating respondents evaluate their national economic situations as very good and 1 as being very bad.

To measure the perception of the government performances in managing the economy, I used the questions asking respondents' appreciation of government in a) creating employment opportunities; b) managing the economy and c) narrowing gap between rich and poor. All questions are Likert-scale questions with 4 categories and higher values presenting greater appreciation of government performances cited by Jordanians. For the perception of corruption, I use the question asking whether

¹Altindag and Kaushal (2017) uses the distribution of Arabic speaking people in Turkey in 1965 to predict the Syrian density in Turkey, but the statistical association between their instrument and density variable disappears when the distance is controlled for (Aksu, Erzan, and Kirdar 2018). On the other hand, Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019) uses the density of non-Jordanians in 2004 to predict Syrian density in Jordan.

a respondent thinks there is corruption at state institutions, with 1 being that respondent believe the existence of corruption and 0 otherwise.

To measure political confidence in institutions, I created an additive index of trust in government, parliament, political parties and legal system. Such indexes are widely used for both within- and cross-country analyses (Chang and Chu 2006; Hutchison and Johnson 2011; Stoyan et al. 2016; Clausen, Kraay, and Nyiri 2011; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012), even though they may be problematic to make cross-country comparisons (Schneider 2017). To measure the level of support for democracy, respondents were asked to evaluate democratic systems. I recoded these variables in a way that higher values mean higher support for democracy. Table 4.1 shows the variables, the recoding procedure and the years when the variables were asked.

Table 4.1 Variables Operationalized

Name of the Variable	Recoding Procedure	Years Asked
Employment	1:Employed, 0:Otherwise	2001, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Eva. of National Economy	1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good	2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Eva. of Household Economy	1: Higher than the standardized mean value of the 2001 sample, 0: otherwise	2001, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Gov. Per. on Managing Economy	1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good	2010, 2016
Gov. Per. on Creating Employment	1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good	2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Gov. Per. on Decreasing Inequality	1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good	2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Perception of Corruption	1: Yes, 0: No	2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Confidence in Political Institutions	Higher values demonstrate higher trust	2007, 2010, 2012, 2016, 2018
Evaluation of Democracy	1:Very Bad - 4:Very Good	2001, 2007, 2010, 2012

5. RESULTS

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, I present the descriptive statistics of the variables operationalized. Table 5.1 shows that among control variables, the respondents surveyed after the arrival of Syrian refugees are older than the respondents surveyed before the arrival of Syrian refugees. Furthermore, there are significant mean-differences between the variables of interests before and after the influx of Syrian refugees in the sense of supporting the hypotheses established above.

The mean values of a) being employed; b) evaluating national economy better; c) evaluating household economy better; d) appreciating the government in managing economy; e) in creating employment; f) in decreasing inequality; and h) the confidence in political institutions was higher among the respondents surveyed before the influx of Syrian refugees. Also, perception of corruption is lower in this group. Notably, the mean values of support for democracy among the respondents after the influx of Syrian refugees is significantly lower. However, it is imperative to adopt more advanced statistical tools to understand the extent to which the changes in the mean values are associated with Syrians.

5.2 Estimation Results

Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics

	<i>Before Shock</i> ($T_0 < 2012$)		<i>After Shock</i> ($T_1 \geq 2012$)		Difference	T-Statistics
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	$T_0 - T_1$	
Education	2.81	0.88	2.79	0.84	0.02	(0.96)
Age	37.20	14.09	40.76	14.96	-3.56***	(-11.59)
Gender	1.51	0.50	1.50	0.50	0.01	(0.51)
Employment	0.37	0.48	0.30	0.46	0.07***	(6.81)
Eva. of National Economy	2.23	0.86	2.09	0.87	0.14***	(5.00)
Eva. of Household Economy	0.41	0.49	0.28	0.45	0.13***	(13.15)
Gov. Per. in Managing Economy	2.64	0.79	2.41	0.86	0.23***	(6.76)
Gov. Per. in Employment	2.25	0.83	1.82	0.87	0.43***	(16.01)
Gov. Per. in Decreasing Inequality	2.21	0.85	1.81	0.82	0.40***	(14.49)
Perception of Corruption	0.74	0.44	0.88	0.33	-0.14***	(-9.74)
Confidence in Political Institutions	12.59	2.84	10.21	2.63	2.39***	(31.22)
Support for Democracy	3.47	0.65	3.35	0.71	0.12***	(5.60)
Observations	3611		5695		9306	

Two-tailed tests. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.2 presents the difference-in-difference (Upper Panel) and instrumental variable results (Lower Panel). Considering the high levels of gender segregation in Jordanian labor market, I test Hypothesis Ia for males and females independently, a common approach in the literature (Aksu, Erzan, and Kırdar 2018; Aydemir and Kırdar 2017; Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019). First column under Hypothesis Ia shows the results for male respondents, and second column shows the female respondents. The other results have gender as a control variable.

Difference-in-difference results demonstrate that Syrian have decreased the likelihood of male Jordanians being employed, while there is no significant association between female Jordanians and Syrian density. This impact of Syrians on the labor market differs from previous research that has found no deterioration of Jordanians' labor market outcomes as a result the influx of Syrian refugees (Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba 2019). The differences between these results and those presented by Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019) can be related to various reasons. First, they use the number of Syrians taken from Jordan's 2015 census, whereas I use the numbers stated by the UNHCR. Second, they use density of Syrian refugees by assuming that gender and age distributions among regions are similar, but I use male Syrians of ages 18-59. Lastly, they conduct their analysis by using Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey. Even though a detailed analysis of the impact of Syrian refugees on Jordanian labor market outcomes is far beyond the scope of this research, Table 5.2 demonstrates that Syrians have decreased the employment levels of male Jordanians.

Also, the results indicate that the subjective assessments of economic conditions among Jordanians have deteriorated after the influx of Syrian refugees. More specif-

ically, Jordanians have become less likely to evaluate their household and national economic situations favorably. This impact of the refugees on the perceptions about the state of economy is also compatible with (Kreibaum 2016), demonstrating that the perceptions of host societies about the performance of national and household economies have been negatively influenced by the influx of refugees.

Table 5.2 Results

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>												
Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III		Hypothesis IV			
a	b	c	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.023* (0.010)	-0.026** (0.010)	-0.069* (0.031)	-0.069+ (0.035)	-0.108*** (0.030)	0.046*** (0.008)	-0.130*** (0.034)	0.212*** (0.046)				
Observations	4623	9233	6844	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955				
R ²	0.088	0.095	0.098	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.063				

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>												
Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III		Hypothesis IV			
a	b	c	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.069+ (0.040)	-0.088* (0.045)	-0.108** (0.035)	0.042*** (0.008)	-0.119*** (0.034)	0.160*** (0.039)				
Observations	4623	9233	6844	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955				
R ²	0.088	0.095	0.098	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.063				
F	93.083	92.591	31.017	30.529	30.687	30.787	107.144	72.579				

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-Statistics of first stage.

Furthermore, Syrian refugees are not the only one Jordanians put the blame on: Jordanians increasingly are dissatisfied with the government performance on running the economy. Table 5.2 demonstrates that the influx of Syrian refugees systematically decreased the likelihood of Jordanians appreciating their government in a) managing economy; b) creating employment opportunities; and c) decreasing inequality in society. Also, perception of corruption has deteriorated as a result of the influx of Syrians even though detecting the exact mechanism leading to this impact is far beyond the scope of this research. In short, these results support the first and second sets of hypotheses arguing that Syrians have negatively influenced the prospects of Jordanians in the labor market as well as their perception about national and household economies for which Jordanians also hold their government responsible.

Hypothesis III was testing whether the Syrian refugees decreased the confidence in political institutions, proxying the extent of anti-establishment feelings among Jordanians. Table 5.2 demonstrates that Syrian refugees decreased the extent of confidence in the institutions, suggesting that Syrian refugees have indeed contributed to the anti-establishment feelings of Jordanians.

As predicted, these anti-establishment feelings among Jordanians turn into greater levels of support for democracy. The last columns in the upper panel of Table 5.2 maintain that Syrian refugees increased the support for democracy among Jordanians. These results indicate that Syrian refugees contributed to the anti-establishment feelings among Jordanians by motivating economic mechanisms. In short, the results presented in Table 3 demonstrate that the political impact of Syrian refugees operates in a much deeper level: Syrian refugees can change how Jordanians want to be governed and increase the likelihood of Jordanians being supportive of democracy.

However, due to the fact that Syrian refugees are not exogenously distributed across the governorates, difference-in-difference results may suffer from endogeneity bias. Thus, I conducted the same analysis with an IV that predicts the density of Syrian refugees in a given governorate of Jordan. Lower panel of Table 5.2 shows the IV results. All results are compatible with the difference-in-difference estimations and show that there is indeed a causal relation between Syrian refugees and the way Jordanians nurture anti-establishment feelings and become more likely to support democracy. However, a caveat must be given: even though the estimation strategy relaxes the parallel trends assumptions across the governorates, parallel trends need to be examined to provide more credible results. In the next section, I test the hypotheses with treatment and control groups and show that the parallel trend assumption hold for the variables available in the past data.

5.3 Results with Control and Treatment Groups

As mentioned earlier, Difference-in-Difference estimates can also be analyzed through control and treatment groups. Even though Syrian densities across the governorates are close to each other, Mafraq, the governorate bordering to Syria, has exceptionally higher Syrian refugee density with 10 percent, followed by 3 percent in Amman in 2016. The other regions follows Amman within 1-3 percent range. Furthermore, the order having the highest Syrian density for Mafraq has not changed in time. Thus, Mafraq can be chosen as a treatment region.

To estimate the impact of Syrian refugees, the following equation is utilized;

$$D_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta Post_{it} \times Treatment_{ij} + \gamma_j + \delta_t + \kappa_{kt} + X_{it} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where i indexes individual, and j indexes 12 governorates in Jordan. D_{ij} represents the outcome of interest. $Post_{it}$ is the dichotomous indicator taking the value 1 for the time period after the Syrian influx and 0 otherwise, and $Treatment_{ij}$ is taking the value 1 for the governorate Mafraq and 0 otherwise. γ_j is region- and δ_t is year-fixed effects. Similar to the above estimation, to relax parallel trend assumption, I added 3-bigger region and year-fixed effects κ_{ij} . Again, individual-control variables (X_{it}) include age, four education levels, and gender variables. I am mainly interested in β .

Table 5.3 Results

	<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>												
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III				Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d	a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	-0.102* (0.039)	-0.045 (0.059)	-0.130*** (0.037)	-0.448*** (0.078)	-0.263+ (0.141)	-0.432*** (0.114)	0.191*** (0.032)	-0.554*** (0.125)				0.339*** (0.061)	
Observations	4623	4655	9233	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555				4955	
R ²	0.088	0.130	0.096	0.065	0.133	0.102	0.048	0.177				0.061	

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IIId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 5.3 shows the results with treatment status. The results are compatible with Table 5.2, demonstrating that Syrian refugees have negatively influenced Jordanians' labor market outcomes and perceptions about economy, leading Jordanians to have become less likely to cite confidence in state institutions. The anti-establishment attitudes have generated greater support for democracy among Jordanians.

Even though my estimation controls for differential trends to some extent by adding the interaction of bigger-region and year effects, it is still imperative to analyze the trends between control and treatment regions. However, only four out of nine indicators go back in time, enabling to visualize the trends between treatment and control groups. These four variables are employment, evaluation of household economic situations, confidence in political institutions, and support for democracy. For the other variables, the date goes back to 2010 when the Arab Barometer Wave II was conducted, not permitting to check if the parallel trend assumptions hold. Thus, for the other variables my results claim causality under the assumption that including bigger region and year interaction controls for differential trends between treated and control groups.




Figure 5.1 Parallel Trends

Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the trends for the variables that we can track by using past data. Even though the trends for evaluation of household economies and support for democracy do not move in parallel, this movement would not hurt the

sign of my estimations. More specifically, if the Syrian shock had not been realized, the expected coefficient for the evaluation of household economies would have been positive due to the upward trend in the treatment group. Thus, the estimated negative coefficient might be an underestimated value offset by the upward trend in the treatment group to some extent. This suggests that the impact of Syrians is likely to be more severe on the evaluations of Jordanians about their household economic situation than what the Table 4 indicates.

Similarly, the downward trend of support for democracy in the treatment group suggest that if the Syrian shock has not been realized the coefficient of the support for democracy would have been negative. Thus, the estimated positive value in Hypothesis IV might be an underestimated value offset by the downward trend in the treatment group to some extent. More specifically, the impact of Syrians on Jordanians' support for democracy might be stronger than what the Table 5.3 suggests. I provide mathematical proofs for these claims in the Appendix.

In short, Figure 5.1 indicates that for these five variables for which the parallel trend analysis can be made, the coefficients, if not representing the true value, have correct signs, thus increasing the credence over the proposed causal mechanism.

5.4 Causal Mediation Analysis

To what extent is the relationship between Syrian refugees and support for democracy mediated by the proposed mechanism? Or more generally do we observe a statistical relationship as stated in Figure 1? In this section, I analyzed the extent to which results are mediated by the proposed mechanism.¹ However, one caveat needs to be given: since political trust in institutions are not asked in 2012, the only post-treatment year for the support of democracy variable, I can not analyze the extent to which the relationship between Syrian refugees and support for democracy is mediated by the anti-establishment feelings of Jordanians.

¹This method basically tries to understand the extent to which the coefficient of an independent variable of interest is changing when adding the mediator as another control. Causal Mediation Analysis help understand the relationship between three types of effects: Total effect, natural indirect effect and controlled direct effect. Total effect can be described as the effect of an independent variable when the mediator is not added, and natural indirect effect represents the effect explained by the mediator. Controlled direct effect is the remaining effect of the independent variable not explained by the mediator.

Table 5.4 Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances

Government Performance on Managing Economy			
	Employment	Eva. of Nat. Econ.	Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect	-.1271882	-.0781292	-.1213719
Natural Indirect Effect	-.0000683	-.0199988	-.0038215
Total Effect	-.1272566	-.098128	-.1251933
Perc. Explained	0.00	0.20	0.03

Government Performance on Decreasing Inequality			
	Employment	Eva. of Nat. Econ.	Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect	-.0612819	-.0411579	-.0667284
Natural Indirect Effect	-.0007603	-.0179582	-.0030193
Total Effect	-.0620422	-.0591161	-.0697478
Perc. Explained	0.01	0.30	0.04

Government Performance on Decreasing Inequality			
	Employment	Eva. of Nat. Econ.	Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect	-.0861197	-.0663283	-.117367
Natural Indirect Effect	-.0004223	-.0167214	-.0024005
Total Effect	-.086542	-.0830497	-.1197675
Perc. Explained	0.00	0.20	0.02

Government Performance on Managing Economy			
	Employment	Eva. of Nat. Econ.	Eva. of Hous. Econ.
Controlled Direct Effect	.0361111	.0432605	.0431632
Natural Indirect Effect	.0000715	.0042955	.0000469
Total Effect	.0360396	.0475561	.0432101
Perc. Explained	0.00	0.09	0.00

Notes: Natural indirect effect demonstrates the effect of Syrian refugees mediated by the outcome of interest. Difference-in-Difference is applied without instrumenting the density variable.

Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 demonstrate the results for causal mediation analysis. As shown in Table 5.4, Jordanians are likely to evaluate their government performance on managing economy, creating employment, and decreasing inequality based on their evaluation of national economy. By contrast, the link between Syrian refugees and government performances is mediated by evaluation of household economic situation to some extent and not mediated by employment.

On the other hand, Table 5.5 demonstrates that Syrian refugees have led to anti-

establishment feelings in society, mediated by Jordanians' evaluation of government performances and perception of corruption at state institutions. Notably, satisfaction with government performance on managing economy and decreasing inequality can explain the link between Syrian refugees and anti-establishment feelings with 62 percent of and 69 percent of the total effect explained by these variables, respectively. Overall, causal mediation analysis provides suggestive evidence for the proposed mechanism given in Figure 2.1.

Table 5.5 Causal Mediation Analysis: Government Performances

	Anti-Establishment Feelings			
	Gov. Per. on Man. Economy	Gov. Per. on Creat. Employment	Gov. Per. on Decr. Inequality	Corruption
Controlled Direct Effect	-.1045388	-.0851873	-.0377496	-.1564344
Natural Indirect Effect	-.1703881	-.0599969	-.0843623	-.0283917
Total Effect	-.2749269	-.1451842	-.1221119	-.1848261
Perc. Explained	0.62	0.41	0.69	0.15

Notes: Natural indirect effect demonstrates the effect of Syrian refugees mediated by the outcome of interest. Difference-in-Difference is applied without instrumenting the density variable.

5.5 Subgroup analyses

Considering that Syrian refugees mostly compete with male Jordanians in the labor market, there may exist differences between males and females about the extent to which the proposed mechanism is valid. Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix shows the results for female and male samples. Even though the intermediary mechanisms, i.e. the extent of the perception about economic situation and the blame put on the Jordanian government are similar across gender groups, the coefficient of support for democracy decreases to some extent for the female respondents. By comparison, the questions measuring support for democracy are statistically significant among male respondents, suggesting that the proposed mechanism is stronger among the male Jordanians, who are the ones competing with Syrians in the labor market.

Table A3 to Table A8 in Appendix demonstrates the results with different age categories. Notably, even though all age categories with the exception of those older than 65 years old have become more likely to support democracy, the economic con-

siderations of Jordanians are concentrated on those ages 24 to 54, which corresponds to the proportion of Jordanian most likely to be active in the labor market. For the other age groups, that is, those with ages 18-24 and older than 55 years old, other intermediary mechanisms may be effective, such as cultural or social.

Notably, the deterioration of employment prospects among those Jordanians who are illiterate or literate with no diploma has not triggered the proposed mechanism as demonstrated in Table A9. This result suggests that objective assessments may not be sufficient to lead anti-establishment feelings and support for democracy. Table A10 to Table A12 demonstrate that the other education groups have become more likely to support democracy, but the proposed mechanism seems to be strongest among those with primary education and high school diploma. Given that Syrians in Jordan are mostly uneducated (Stave and Hillesund 2015), these education groups are more likely to compete with unskilled Syrians in the labor market. In short, the examination of subgroups indicates that the impact of Syrian settlements is strongest among those groups most likely to compete with Syrians in the labor market, providing a further evidence for the proposed causal mechanism.

5.6 Robustness Checks

Identification strategy is crucial in discerning the impact of Syrians on public opinion. Indeed, different identification strategies may result in completely different results. To analyze the extent to which my results are robust to different identification strategies, I rerun the regressions by adopting different strategies. First, I did the same analysis with the Syrian density including all age and gender categories, taken from the UNHCR. Table A13 demonstrates that the results are compatible with my results. It should be noted that for the instrumental variable results I use the density of non-Jordanians in 2004 Census including all age and gender categories, a logical correction.

Second, I use the data taken from the Jordan 2015 census, which was used by Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba (2019). Since this specification gives the distribution of Syrians for only 2015, I first run the regressions by only including the respective years, that is, the years that is closest to 2015. Since support for democracy is not asked in 2016, I take the numbers for 2012. Table A14 demonstrates that the results with

this identification are compatible with my results.

Also, I did the same analysis by including all years. This specification adds one more assumption to the assumptions of similar gender and age distributions across governorates: the distribution of Syrians across the governorates are similar across all years. Even though this is a strong assumption, I believe it can hold considering that Syrians have always been more populated in the bordering regions and the capital. Table A14 shows that the results are compatible with my results.

Lastly, if the regions hit by refugees happen to be places mostly influenced by the democratic discourse created during the Arab Uprisings, my estimates might have captured the impact of Arab Uprisings rather than that of refugee settlements. Even though this confounding cannot be directly tested, I tried to capture the impact of the Arab Uprisings by re-estimating my coefficients with a control that measures the mean value of self-cited interest in politics at the regional level.² The main assumption in this specification is that the regions with higher levels of interest in politics are more likely to be influenced by the democratic discourse created during the Arab Uprisings. Thus, adding this control eliminates the impact of Arab Uprisings to some extent. Table A15 demonstrates that adding this control does not significantly change my estimations.

²The results do not significantly change when I add self-cited interest in politics at the individual level.

6. CONCLUSION

The massive migration in the West may have led to the rise of populist parties and leaders. The populist discourse fueling intolerance and authoritarian attitudes into the Western societies have led academics and Western media to mistakenly suppose an indirect link between Syrian refugees and authoritarian attitudes in society. The core aim of this research is to caution that any claim about the threat of migration to democratic sentiments in society needs to be conditional on democratic institutions. More specifically, under authoritarian contexts migration may become a catalyst to galvanize democratic sentiments.

In this thesis, I develop a theory that maintains that the presence of refugees might be associated with anti-establishment values among host societies living authoritarian institutions as it often occurs in Western contexts. However, I demonstrate that the anti-establishment feelings have led hosts to become more supportive of democracy and less supportive of authoritarian leaders. Considering the importance of economic well-being in the sustenance of authoritarian ruling, I propose a chain of reaction between refugees and anti-establishment feelings, motivated by economic mechanisms.

I test this theory on an authoritarian country that is struck by the massive influx of Syrian refugees: Jordan. Using the Syrian refugee shock as a natural experiment, I establish a causal mechanism between the presence of Syrians and various outcomes of interest raised by the theory developed in this article. My estimates demonstrated that Syrian refugees have led Jordanians to become more skeptical towards national and their households' economic well-being. Moreover, male Jordanians appear to suffer from Syrians in the labor market: they became less likely to be employed. Also, my results indicate that Jordanians have become more likely to criticize the government in running the economy and providing economic prosperity. As a result, Jordanians have become less likely to cite trust in governmental institutions, demonstrating the increase in anti-establishment feelings in society.

I propose two reasons why people under authoritarian institutions may become

more likely to support democracy when they are dissatisfied with the existing institutions. First, people may conceptualize democracy based on economic terms. Indeed, research on the Middle East demonstrates that citizens associate democracy with economic prosperity (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012; Ceyhun 2017). Second, the tendency of authoritarian institutions not to initiate reforms may have led people to desire a governance system in which they can voice their demands for reform. Even though the exact psychological mechanism in becoming more supportive of democracy once being disassociated with the authoritarian institutions should be further explored in future research, I find that Jordanians have become more likely to support a democratic governance as a result of the presence of Syrians.

To what extent the result of this thesis can be generalized into other contexts? Given that the sustenance of authoritarian ruling depends on economic well-being, I believe the results of this research can be extended to other contexts as well. Even though economic mechanisms provide a solid and generalizable account as to the creation of pro-democratic sentiments, domestic variables need to be considered. For instance, people need to be fed enough to start thinking about their most preferred governance system once they perceive that refugees influence the economy badly. In an authoritarian country in which people live at the edge of starvation line, it would be mistaken to assume that this theory holds. Thus, further research needs to examine other authoritarian contexts hit by refugee inflows, such as Uganda.

This thesis significantly contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the impact of Syrian refugees on public opinion may operate in a much deeper level: the refugees may initiate a chain of reaction resulting in hosts becoming more likely to support democracy. Methodologically, it adopts causal methods from labor economics literature that can be further practiced by political scientists. Also, this research demonstrates the importance of institutions in determining the impact of the refugees on political attributes by studying a non-Western and authoritarian context.

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APPENDIX A

Mathematical Proofs

In this section, I will show that the violation of parallel trend assumptions for evaluation of national economies and support for democracy do not hurt the sign of the causal impact given in Table 4.

The estimated negative value for evaluation of national economies in Table 4 is an overestimated value.

Proof. Under the conditional independence assumption and without refugee shock, the outcome variable (here, the evaluation of household economies) evolves according to two different time trends, that is, for the treatment group we have;

$$\mathbf{E}[Y_{0igt}|i, g, t] = \gamma_g + \lambda_{t^A}$$

where i represents individual controls, g group controls and t time controls. γ_g is the time-invariant group characteristics and λ_{t^A} is the time effect. Note that t^A represents the time before the shock. For the control group, denote;

$$\mathbf{E}[Y'_{0igt}|i, g, t] = \gamma'_g + \lambda'_{t^A}$$

Note that outcome variables with scripts represent the control groups. Note that after the shock, we have;

$$\mathbf{E}[Y_{1igt}|i, g, t] = \gamma_g + \lambda_{t^B} + \theta$$

where θ represents the causal impact of Syrians on outcome variable of interest and t^B represents the time after the shock. For the control group, we have;

$$\mathbf{E}[Y'_{1igt}|i, g, t] = \gamma'_g + \lambda'_{tB}$$

Notice that since the slope of trend for the evaluation of national economic situation is larger for the treatment group, we have $\lambda_{tB} - \lambda_{tA} > \lambda'_{tB} - \lambda'_{tA}$. The regression device operationalized linearly approximates the following calculation;

$$\Delta - \Delta' = (\lambda_{tB} - \lambda_{tA}) + \theta - (\lambda'_{tB} - \lambda'_{tA}) \approx \beta < 0$$

where Δ represents the change of outcome variable before and after the refugee shock, that is, $\mathbf{E}[Y_{1igt}|i, g, t] - \mathbf{E}[Y_{0igt}|i, g, t]$, and β is the coefficient of the evaluation of household economies given in Table 4. Since $\lambda_{tB} - \lambda_{tA} > \lambda'_{tB} - \lambda'_{tA}$ and $\beta < 0$, we have $\theta < 0$ and $\theta < \beta < 0$. This suggests that the causal impact of Syrian refugees on the evaluation of household economies (θ) is negative and more severe than what Table 4 suggests (β). \square

The estimated positive value for support for democracy in Table 4 is an underestimated value.

Proof. This claim also holds true since $\Delta - \Delta' \approx \beta > 0$ and $\lambda_{tB} - \lambda_{tA} < \lambda'_{tB} - \lambda'_{tA}$, we have $\theta > 0$, and $\theta > \beta > 0$. \square

Results with Gender Categories

Table A.1 Results for Female Sample

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d
Syrian Density	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.025+ (0.014)	-0.124*** (0.028)	-0.191*** (0.026)	-0.077 (0.046)	-0.095* (0.036)	0.056*** (0.010)	-0.069 (0.043)	0.133* (0.057)
Observations	4655	4633	3414	1156	3215	3182	3068	2682	2422
R^2	0.130	0.103	0.106	0.096	0.159	0.123	0.062	0.177	0.063

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d
Syrian Density	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.128*** (0.037)	-0.146*** (0.032)	-0.118+ (0.068)	-0.086* (0.043)	0.069*** (0.011)	-0.040 (0.042)	0.080 (0.054)
Observations	4655	4633	3414	1156	3215	3182	3068	2682	2422
R^2	0.130	0.103	0.106	0.096	0.158	0.123	0.062	0.177	0.062
F	90.418	91.394	31.466	52.686	30.231	30.925	32.068	103.456	87.038

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d
Post X Treatment	-0.045 (0.059)	-0.117+ (0.060)	-0.638*** (0.054)	-0.707*** (0.098)	-0.135 (0.181)	-0.371** (0.134)	0.269*** (0.036)	-0.255 (0.177)	0.159+ (0.093)
Observations	4655	4633	3414	1156	3215	3182	3068	2682	2422
R^2	0.130	0.103	0.107	0.093	0.158	0.123	0.062	0.177	0.061

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under H1a shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.2 Results for Male Sample

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.023*	-0.027**	-0.010	-0.064**	-0.060	-0.117***	0.036**	-0.178***	0.288***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.019)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.058)
Observations	4623	4600	3430	1167	3239	3220	3160	2873	2533
R^2	0.088	0.096	0.104	0.047	0.117	0.084	0.047	0.185	0.079

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.031*	-0.026*	0.000	-0.041+	-0.052	-0.124***	0.012	-0.180***	0.246***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.042)	(0.053)
Observations	4623	4600	3430	1167	3239	3220	3160	2873	2533
R^2	0.088	0.096	0.104	0.047	0.117	0.084	0.046	0.185	0.079
F	93.083	93.468	30.569	52.652	30.781	30.367	29.480	111.109	61.637

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>									
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	-0.102*	-0.140***	-0.274***	-0.185**	-0.380**	-0.488***	0.110**	-0.791***	0.526***
	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.116)	(0.097)	(0.033)	(0.135)	(0.094)
Observations	4623	4600	3430	1167	3239	3220	3160	2873	2533
R^2	0.088	0.096	0.105	0.046	0.118	0.084	0.046	0.185	0.076

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under IIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IID is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Results with Age Categories

Table A.3 Regression Results for those ages 18-24

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.026 (0.025)	0.039*** (0.010)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.019 (0.042)	-0.064* (0.028)	-0.077 (0.048)	-0.014 (0.029)	0.003 (0.019)	-0.040 (0.085)	0.245** (0.078)
Observations	920	713	1624	1082	351	1030	1026	985	892	1002
R^2	0.192	0.086	0.122	0.161	0.074	0.157	0.119	0.065	0.227	0.101

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.063+ (0.034)	0.054*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.023)	0.002 (0.047)	-0.031 (0.039)	-0.138*** (0.034)	-0.029 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.028)	-0.049 (0.093)	0.276** (0.089)
Observations	920	713	1624	1082	351	1030	1026	985	892	1002
R^2	0.191	0.085	0.122	0.160	0.074	0.157	0.119	0.064	0.227	0.101
F	149.103	56.706	93.359	30.360	37.951	27.718	29.135	29.245	89.735	98.389

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	-0.060 (0.095)	0.134** (0.049)	-0.123 (0.082)	-0.096 (0.109)	-0.316*** (0.071)	-0.537*** (0.108)	-0.027 (0.079)	0.049 (0.048)	0.162 (0.402)	0.430** (0.156)
Observations	920	713	1624	1082	351	1030	1026	985	892	1002
R^2	0.191	0.084	0.123	0.161	0.074	0.158	0.119	0.065	0.227	0.099

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IIId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.4 Regression Results for those ages 25-34

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.053+ (0.027)	-0.041 (0.025)	-0.027 (0.030)	-0.079* (0.030)	-0.341*** (0.046)	-0.073+ (0.039)	-0.168*** (0.036)	0.055*** (0.012)	-0.245*** (0.056)	0.163* (0.070)
Observations	1045	1264	2295	1599	587	1493	1479	1447	1297	1370
R^2	0.114	0.198	0.088	0.127	0.098	0.187	0.130	0.074	0.205	0.056

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.048+ (0.027)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.109** (0.034)	-0.290*** (0.045)	-0.062 (0.043)	-0.183*** (0.046)	0.062*** (0.015)	-0.221*** (0.062)	0.101 (0.069)
Observations	1045	1264	2295	1599	587	1493	1479	1447	1297	1370
R^2	0.113	0.198	0.088	0.127	0.097	0.187	0.130	0.074	0.205	0.055
F	113.716	108.980	114.277	36.583	41.614	35.898	38.053	36.580	132.078	42.743

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Post X Treatment	-0.234** (0.085)	-0.225+ (0.116)	-0.139 (0.125)	-0.488*** (0.043)	-1.222*** (0.163)	-0.243 (0.150)	-0.601*** (0.167)	0.205** (0.060)	-1.151*** (0.196)	0.188+ (0.106)
Observations	1045	1264	2295	1599	587	1493	1479	1447	1297	1370
R^2	0.114	0.199	0.088	0.128	0.089	0.187	0.128	0.073	0.205	0.054

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under H1a shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.5 Regression Results for those ages 35-44

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.016 (0.022)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.024** (0.009)	-0.130*** (0.026)	-0.038+ (0.019)	-0.115+ (0.063)	-0.148** (0.044)	0.096*** (0.012)	-0.050 (0.088)	0.247*** (0.036)
Observations	963	1258	2213	1680	582	1588	1577	1533	1345	1230
R^2	0.114	0.148	0.141	0.075	0.083	0.138	0.108	0.063	0.177	0.064

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.027 (0.029)	0.024 (0.018)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.138*** (0.033)	-0.076*** (0.019)	-0.111 (0.075)	-0.149** (0.057)	0.075*** (0.015)	-0.089 (0.097)	0.180*** (0.042)
Observations	963	1258	2213	1680	582	1588	1577	1533	1345	1230
R^2	0.114	0.148	0.141	0.075	0.082	0.138	0.108	0.062	0.177	0.063
F	57.559	151.248	94.628	30.315	61.255	31.277	30.527	29.520	129.180	84.061

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Post X Treatment	-0.234** (0.085)	-0.225+ (0.116)	-0.139 (0.125)	-0.488*** (0.043)	-1.222*** (0.163)	-0.243 (0.150)	-0.601*** (0.167)	0.205** (0.060)	-1.151*** (0.196)	0.188+ (0.106)
Observations	1045	1264	2295	1599	587	1493	1479	1447	1297	1370
R^2	0.114	0.199	0.088	0.128	0.089	0.187	0.128	0.073	0.205	0.054

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.6 Regression Results for those ages 45-54

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.009 (0.041)	-0.028+ (0.015)	-0.050+ (0.026)	-0.062* (0.030)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.162** (0.049)	-0.175** (0.053)	-0.059*** (0.013)	-0.128* (0.058)	0.232*** (0.065)
Observations	724	801	1519	1240	426	1161	1157	1136	972	715
R ²	0.131	0.166	0.113	0.123	0.105	0.174	0.123	0.082	0.152	0.110

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	0.021 (0.046)	-0.031+ (0.018)	-0.069* (0.028)	-0.025 (0.044)	-0.030 (0.024)	-0.236** (0.085)	-0.147* (0.075)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.050 (0.063)	0.128 (0.093)
Observations	724	801	1519	1240	426	1161	1157	1136	972	715
R ²	0.131	0.166	0.113	0.123	0.105	0.173	0.123	0.081	0.152	0.108
F	165.412	69.005	85.563	27.116	90.354	26.217	26.650	28.072	87.068	69.598

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Post X Treatment	-0.102 (0.165)	-0.043 (0.067)	-0.175 (0.125)	-0.351*** (0.084)	-0.078 (0.074)	-0.557** (0.195)	-0.876*** (0.169)	-0.234*** (0.049)	-0.284 (0.194)	0.473*** (0.121)
Observations	724	801	1519	1240	426	1161	1157	1136	972	715
R ²	0.132	0.165	0.112	0.123	0.105	0.172	0.124	0.081	0.152	0.108

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.7 Regression Results for those ages 55-64

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.060 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.063 (0.090)	0.060 (0.085)	0.136+ (0.069)	0.098 (0.086)	0.061* (0.028)	-0.273* (0.127)	0.398** (0.131)
Observations	500	428	923	734	226	702	694	673	618	395
R^2	0.180	0.099	0.180	0.123	0.154	0.167	0.198	0.095	0.283	0.132

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.098+ (0.050)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.054* (0.026)	0.084 (0.157)	0.179 (0.129)	0.141+ (0.073)	0.225** (0.076)	0.068+ (0.038)	-0.262+ (0.147)	0.356** (0.124)
Observations	500	428	923	734	226	702	694	673	618	395
R^2	0.180	0.099	0.180	0.120	0.152	0.167	0.196	0.095	0.283	0.132
F	68.092	76.119	83.043	37.848	47.570	38.157	30.915	35.804	153.825	40.341

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	-0.542** (0.158)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.158 (0.097)	-0.781** (0.226)	0.515 (0.312)	0.523 (0.343)	0.845* (0.318)	0.308* (0.118)	-1.171* (0.550)	0.566** (0.192)
Observations	500	428	923	734	226	702	694	673	618	395
R^2	0.187	0.099	0.181	0.127	0.156	0.166	0.201	0.096	0.282	0.126

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IID is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.8 Regression Results for 65 and older

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.022 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.016 (0.036)	0.050 (0.150)	-0.154 (0.390)	0.094 (0.147)	0.130 (0.138)	0.075 (0.058)	-0.006 (0.147)	-0.028 (0.148)
Observations	471	191	659	509	151	480	469	454	431	243
R^2	0.130	0.084	0.106	0.131	0.174	0.135	0.135	0.129	0.197	0.215

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.030 (0.044)	0.055 (0.157)	-0.842* (0.359)	0.096 (0.172)	0.148 (0.139)	0.016 (0.040)	0.524 (0.466)	0.010 (0.198)
Observations	471	191	659	509	151	480	469	454	431	243
R^2	0.130	0.082	0.106	0.131	0.168	0.135	0.135	0.128	0.193	0.215
F	38.222	46.339	56.420	312.760	33.599	268.066	379.323	242.162	14.190	91.589

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	0.071 (0.091)	0.042 (0.029)	0.032 (0.142)	0.079 (0.235)	0.075 (0.078)	0.147 (0.266)	-0.183 (0.239)	0.031 (0.038)	-0.118 (0.234)	-0.308 (0.244)
Observations	471	191	659	509	151	480	469	454	431	243
R^2	0.130	0.085	0.106	0.131	0.174	0.135	0.134	0.127	0.197	0.216

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under IIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Results with Education Categories

Table A.9 Regression Results for illiterate or literate with no diploma

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d	
Syrian Density	-0.088 (0.055)	0.001 (0.004)	0.012 (0.019)	0.090 (0.102)	0.008 (0.034)	-0.192* (0.093)	-0.010 (0.228)	0.081 (0.094)	-0.045 (0.078)	0.020 (0.086)
Observations	168	375	537	328	99	270	267	253	249	275
R^2	0.473	0.060	0.161	0.139	0.174	0.195	0.195	0.146	0.231	0.130

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d	
Syrian Density	-0.136** (0.047)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.039 (0.116)	0.004 (0.032)	-0.328** (0.108)	0.069 (0.263)	0.252* (0.101)	-0.054 (0.081)	0.020 (0.100)
Observations	168	375	537	328	99	270	267	253	249	275
R^2	0.471	0.059	0.161	0.138	0.174	0.193	0.194	0.130	0.231	0.130
F	122.523	98.682	111.930	58.015	2984.404	55.574	54.411	51.007	154.788	612.948

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c			d	
Post X Treatment	-0.349 (0.214)	0.039* (0.015)	0.033 (0.065)	0.268+ (0.158)	0.062 (0.133)	-0.198 (0.214)	-0.513+ (0.286)	-0.289+ (0.160)	-0.392 (0.292)	-0.066 (0.154)
Observations	168	375	537	328	99	270	267	253	249	275
R^2	0.473	0.061	0.161	0.138	0.175	0.192	0.197	0.146	0.231	0.130

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under IIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IIId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.10 Regression Results for primary school graduates

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.033+	0.025**	-0.026*	-0.064+	0.008	-0.007	-0.112**	0.051**	-0.083	0.203**
	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Observations	1497	1409	2895	2159	627	1942	1923	1845	1587	1396
R^2	0.141	0.016	0.071	0.103	0.075	0.125	0.103	0.055	0.203	0.055

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.030+	0.028**	-0.021+	-0.028	0.067	-0.041	-0.120**	0.026	-0.110	0.194**
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.069)	(0.063)
Observations	1497	1409	2895	2159	627	1942	1923	1845	1587	1396
R^2	0.141	0.016	0.071	0.103	0.074	0.125	0.103	0.055	0.203	0.055
F	93.696	98.483	99.004	34.193	50.308	33.796	32.497	33.494	181.536	99.080

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	-0.142*	0.068*	-0.100*	-0.334**	0.057	-0.043	-0.483*	0.132+	-0.472	0.370**
	(0.069)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.099)	(0.092)	(0.164)	(0.186)	(0.066)	(0.294)	(0.133)
Observations	1497	1409	2895	2159	627	1942	1923	1845	1587	1396
R^2	0.141	0.014	0.071	0.103	0.075	0.125	0.102	0.054	0.203	0.053

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under IIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IIId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.11 Regression Results for high school graduates

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.050** (0.017)	-0.040* (0.018)	-0.038* (0.018)	-0.130*** (0.022)	-0.182*** (0.023)	-0.142*** (0.036)	-0.128*** (0.033)	0.052** (0.018)	-0.237*** (0.060)	0.205** (0.067)
Observations	1859	1841	3684	2823	1059	2748	2735	2664	2265	2179
R ²	0.064	0.059	0.072	0.094	0.053	0.135	0.095	0.053	0.185	0.068

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.080** (0.025)	-0.042* (0.020)	-0.034 (0.022)	-0.143*** (0.031)	-0.167*** (0.029)	-0.152** (0.049)	-0.133** (0.042)	0.046* (0.023)	-0.152** (0.056)	0.141* (0.058)
Observations	1859	1841	3684	2823	1059	2748	2735	2664	2265	2179
R ²	0.063	0.059	0.072	0.094	0.053	0.135	0.095	0.053	0.185	0.068
F	90.527	75.920	87.528	26.969	42.162	25.730	27.351	27.869	94.335	55.165

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I			Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV		
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Post X Treatment	-0.134* (0.061)	-0.211* (0.083)	-0.201** (0.071)	-0.527*** (0.085)	-0.663*** (0.088)	-0.492** (0.165)	-0.372** (0.111)	0.293*** (0.036)	-0.751*** (0.141)	0.279** (0.100)
Observations	1859	1841	3684	2823	1059	2748	2735	2664	2265	2179
R ²	0.063	0.060	0.073	0.093	0.051	0.133	0.093	0.054	0.184	0.066

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Table A.12 Regression Results for university graduates

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b		c	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	0.027 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.021)	-0.033 (0.055)	-0.236*** (0.033)	-0.027 (0.035)	-0.088* (0.035)	0.024** (0.009)	0.012 (0.076)	0.293*** (0.066)
Observations	1099	1030	2117	1534	538	1494	1477	1466	1454	1105
R^2	0.093	0.118	0.084	0.117	0.082	0.143	0.093	0.041	0.128	0.120

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b		c	a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	0.046+ (0.025)	-0.009 (0.038)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.065 (0.059)	-0.185*** (0.029)	-0.016 (0.040)	-0.073+ (0.043)	0.029* (0.013)	-0.053 (0.076)	0.210+ (0.119)
Observations	1099	1030	2117	1534	538	1494	1477	1466	1454	1105
R^2	0.093	0.118	0.084	0.116	0.081	0.143	0.093	0.041	0.127	0.119
F	64.597	56.093	62.084	52.038	57.968	51.221	52.707	43.304	52.106	16.446

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b		c	a	b	c	d		
Post X Treatment	0.039 (0.077)	-0.055 (0.152)	-0.078 (0.097)	-0.437* (0.189)	-0.828*** (0.085)	-0.177 (0.117)	-0.473*** (0.108)	0.107*** (0.030)	-0.148 (0.308)	0.629*** (0.074)
Observations	1099	1030	2117	1534	538	1494	1477	1466	1454	1105
R^2	0.092	0.118	0.084	0.118	0.078	0.143	0.094	0.041	0.128	0.119

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Identification with Syrian density without gender and age distinctions

Table A.13 Regression Results

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.015+ (0.007)	-0.020** (0.006)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.007)
N	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.089	0.130	0.095	0.098	0.065	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.062

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.015+ (0.008)	-0.019*** (0.005)	-0.019+ (0.010)	-0.023** (0.007)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.025*** (0.007)	0.031*** (0.008)
Observations	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.088	0.130	0.095	0.098	0.065	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.062
F	73.647	72.024	73.533	22.656	40.032	22.053	22.182	22.313	91.888	65.382

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IIId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.

Results with the data of 2015 Census

Table A.14 Difference-in-Difference Results

<i>Respective Years Included</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.004** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)
N	2525	2561	5061	2669	2323	2333	2322	2218	3294	4955
R ²	0.096	0.154	0.103	0.032	0.067	0.083	0.071	0.034	0.126	0.063

<i>All Years Included</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II			Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV	
	a	b	c		a	b	c	d		
Syrian Density	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.010** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.012** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.002)
N	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.089	0.130	0.095	0.099	0.067	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.063

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is 'Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed.'

First column under H1a shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is 'RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation.'

Hypothesis Ic is 'RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance.'

Hypothesis IIa is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIb is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment.'

Hypothesis IIc is 'RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality.'

Hypothesis IIId is 'RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society.'

Hypothesis III is 'RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society.'

Hypothesis IV is 'RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society.'

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions.

Possible Confounding

Table A.15 Regression Results

<i>Difference-in-Difference Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.023* (0.010)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.066* (0.031)	-0.144*** (0.022)	-0.063+ (0.032)	-0.109*** (0.029)	0.045*** (0.007)	-0.130*** (0.036)	0.215*** (0.042)
N	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.088	0.130	0.096	0.098	0.067	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.064

<i>Instrumental Variable Results</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Syrian Density	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.023* (0.011)	-0.067+ (0.039)	-0.097* (0.039)	-0.084+ (0.047)	-0.109** (0.037)	0.041*** (0.008)	-0.119*** (0.036)	0.160*** (0.037)
Observations	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.088	0.130	0.095	0.098	0.066	0.133	0.103	0.048	0.177	0.064
F	91.229	88.857	90.844	36.199	37.644	35.189	35.330	35.614	107.228	74.758

<i>Results with Treatment Status</i>										
	Hypothesis I				Hypothesis II				Hypothesis III	Hypothesis IV
	a	b	c	a	b	c	d			
Post X Treatment	-0.099* (0.042)	-0.042 (0.056)	-0.128*** (0.035)	-0.459*** (0.069)	-0.454*** (0.085)	-0.226+ (0.125)	-0.442*** (0.102)	0.182*** (0.032)	-0.559*** (0.137)	0.363*** (0.060)
N	4623	4655	9233	6844	2323	6454	6402	6228	5555	4955
R ²	0.089	0.131	0.096	0.099	0.065	0.133	0.102	0.048	0.177	0.062

Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered in governorate and time levels, given in parantheses.

Hypothesis Ia is "Refugee density (RD) should decrease the likelihood of being employed."

First column under HIIa shows the result for male respondents and second column shows the results for female respondents.

Hypothesis Ib is "RD should increase the dissatisfaction with the household financial situation."

Hypothesis Ic is "RD should increase the likelihood of negative perceptions of national economy performance."

Hypothesis IIa is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIb is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on creating employment."

Hypothesis IIc is "RD should increase host societies' dissatisfaction with government performance on decreasing inequality."

Hypothesis IIId is "RD should increase the perception of corruption in the host society."

Hypothesis III is "RD should decrease the confidence in political institutions in the host society."

Hypothesis IV is "RD should increase the support for democracy in the host society."

Region and Year Fixed Effect are included in all regressions. F-Statistics represents the F-statistics of first stage.