

# A HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA



Marie-Janine Calic

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*Central European Studies*

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Marie-Janine Calic

Translated by Dona Geyer

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# Introduction

Why did Yugoslavia fall apart? Was its violent demise inevitable? Did its population simply fall victim to the lure of nationalism? How did this multinational state manage to survive for so long? And where do we situate the short life of Yugoslavia in the long history of the twentieth century? This book tells the story of why and under which conditions Yugoslavia was created, what held the multinational state together for more than seventy years, and why it finally broke apart in violence. It is a tale of confidence and doubt, of progress and decline, of extremes and excesses, of utopia and demise.

No other European country was as colorful, multifaceted, or complex as Yugoslavia. Its turbulent history made it a byword for Balkan confusion and animosity; it stood for the backward, barbaric, and abhorrent contrast to the supposedly so civilized European continent. At the end of the nineteenth century, to cross the Danube by steamboat from the Austrian city of Semlin (Zemun) to Belgrade or travel by the Hungarian state railway over the great iron Sava Bridge to reach the train station of Bosanski Brod was to enter an exotic world that appeared both mysterious and fabulous but also at times appalling and threatening.<sup>1</sup> Shrouded in such mystery and foreignness, “the Balkans” were consistently written out of the European context, as unfortunately still happens occasionally even today. However, a closer look soon dispels this shroud of mystery, because the region is tightly intertwined in the timeline of Europe’s history in both good and bad ways. Although popular images and stereotypes of a backward and violence-ridden “European other” have since been debunked as a “convenient prejudice,” the idea of the region’s structural backwardness persists, without the least empirical evidence.<sup>2</sup>

In contrast, this book addresses Yugoslav history from the perspective of the major social, economic, and intellectual changes that affected all of Europe at the turn of the twentieth century and marked its transition to modern industrialized mass society. The “great acceleration” first reached Western societies but soon expanded out toward the European periphery.<sup>3</sup> The emphasis here will not be primarily on structures of the *longue durée* and the unique developments in Balkan history, but on the overarching dynamics of

change, on interrelations and interaction, and on common European features and parallels during the “long twentieth century.”<sup>4</sup>

In Southeast Europe, the economy, social relations, cultural expression, mentalities, and daily life were undergoing fundamental transformation in the decades around 1900. The region also faced unanticipated challenges from the scientific-technological and economic progress of the West. Growing international competition and aggressive imperialism made it imperative to overcome backwardness as a matter of survival, in a very literal sense. It was against this background that the South Slavic idea took shape: the project of a common political future for culturally related peoples unified in a single state. After all, the liberation from foreign rule and the founding of an independent and sovereign Yugoslavia appeared to be the premise for securing a self-determined future in Europe.

Twice, in 1918 and 1945, Yugoslavia became a reality, each time with a thoroughly different political system: first as a centralized, constitutional, and parliamentary monarchy, then as a one-party socialist federation. Both models faced four fundamental long-term problems: the unresolved national question that challenged the identity and cohesion of the state; the underdevelopment and poverty in a predominantly peasant society; and the dependence on foreign political and economic powers. These three problems exacerbated the fourth, namely the enormous historical, cultural, and socioeconomic disparities between the various components of multiethnic Yugoslavia, which repeatedly raised anew issues concerning political legitimacy and a suitable constitutional order.

One of the main questions addressed here is how, under these circumstances, development and progress were conceived at various times and what means were employed to pursue them. An increasing number of the elite believed that they were living in an age in which tradition, customs, patriarchy, and long-existing community relations were vanishing—and should vanish—to make way for the advantages and merits of modernity, specifically of a world of expanding technology. However, competing political forces and intellectuals embraced very different answers to the coercions, aspirations, and challenges of a dramatically changing world. Who were the agents driving social change, and how did they envision the future? What alternatives to Western modernity were discussed?

The approach adopted in this book distances itself from popular explanations of the Yugoslav problem that emphasize ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions, or incompatible and even “clashing” civilizations. Instead of notorious Balkan intractability and ancient hatreds, the argument presented here stresses the politicization of differences in twentieth-century modern mass society. Peoples, nations, and cultures are not transhistorical entities; they

are subject to historical realities and change, and so are conflicts. A central question thus focuses on why, how, and under what conditions ethnic identity and diversity were turned into a matter of contention and by whom. Important are the interests, views, and motives of the major actors, the socioeconomic developments, and, last but not least, the cultural-historical dimensions of collective experiences, memories, and interpretations of history.

Very few scholars have yet attempted to provide a comprehensive history of Yugoslavia covering the entire twentieth century.<sup>5</sup> The pickings are particularly thin in the literature of the Yugoslav successor states.<sup>6</sup> Even before the wars of the 1990s, it was a tricky business to seek a common denominator among the various regional and national perspectives. Federalism, also in the realm of academia, granted each people its own way of dealing with its past, its own national images and narratives of its history. As a result, no master narrative ever evolved that was supported by all: too different, too politically laden were the interpretations and depictions. Quarrels over interpretation cut short the multivolume *History of the Yugoslav Peoples* at the year 1800. Likewise, the *History of the Yugoslav Communist Party/League of Communists* disappeared into oblivion. Nor did the historical contributions to the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* fare any better. Since the country's inception there has never been a standard narrative about Yugoslavia's origins, historical development, and problems. So far, everyone attempting the task has ended up in the crossfire of criticism.<sup>7</sup>

In stark contrast to the scarcity of general comprehensive works is the overabundance of books and articles dealing with the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. For the most part, they interpret Yugoslavia's history from the perspective of its bloody demise, analyze its congenital defects, and characterize the creation of the South Slavic state as artificial in order to underscore the inevitability of its failure. Yet Yugoslavia cannot be explained only by the way it began or the way it ended. The state existed for a good seventy years, which raises the question about what held its peoples together for so long and what eventually divided them, a question that has not become obsolete since Yugoslavia fell apart. This book attempts to avoid deterministic explanations and to grasp the history of Yugoslavia as an essentially open-ended process from different thematic approaches.

Many recent studies no longer deal with Yugoslavia but concentrate entirely on its successor states. The existence of Slovenia, Croatia, or Kosovo today is interpreted retrospectively and the past is read teleologically, as if distant history was a harbinger of modern statehood. Interactions with neighbors are often presented only in the form of conflicts and wars. In the process, the Yugoslav period is reduced to a very short—albeit not completely insignificant—episode in a centuries-long national history. By contrast, the objective

of this book is to encapsulate various local and national historical perspectives and place them in relation to one another, which then relativizes many an alleged regional particularity. However, in order to maintain a balance between diversity and unity, the various republics and peoples can only be treated in an illustrative manner. In many instances, Eastern Bosnia serves as the microhistorical example, for it is the proverbial heart of Yugoslavia over which many sides have fought in the course of the twentieth century.

This book is conceived as a topically comprehensive but compact approach to a complex, almost boundless, subject whose potential for study is far from exhausted. It is based in part on my own research but primarily on a broad scope of secondary literature. Publications on specific topics and time periods are numerous, but syntheses remain few and far between, and there are many areas in which little or no research has been done. This is particularly true with regard to the post-1945 period.

Every general overview needs a perspective and a focal point that decide how to select topics and questions. No narrative, therefore, can do without condensing and generalizing. Certain subjects that are the standard narrative of Yugoslavia's political history were kept short so as to better examine the deeper underlying socioeconomic and cultural dynamics and the daily life of common people in addition to the events and major actors. The chronological narrative alternates with cross-sectional analyses, which offers a deeper look into society and culture at a given period of time. A lack of space in the endnotes prevented the extensive citation of each important work that influenced this book. To facilitate readability, reference is often made to "Yugoslavs," namely to citizens with no mention of their ethnic affiliation. Nationality was specified only when the way people identified themselves was relevant to explain certain contexts.

Terminology, in this context, is a real minefield. Should one speak of nations, nationalities, or ethnic groups? Did peoples speak different languages or just varieties or dialects of one common language? Notions of all these terms have changed over time, as will be discussed here, and they have been and still are a matter of political disputes.

Interpretations of the Yugoslav past are even more emotionally laden, and discussions are often conducted not with factual but with moral arguments. Opposing interpretations of history provide explosive material for political confrontation. Those who do not clearly choose one side or another quickly open themselves up to unpleasant polemics. Grounded in the fundamental principles of good academic practice, this account attempts to weigh the various perspectives against one another, even if the limited space does not permit the extensive treatment of all theories and controversies. In the spirit

of Alexis de Tocqueville, I hope to have written this book without prejudice but not without passion.

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## Abbreviations

<b>AVNOJ</b>	Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije)
<b>BITEF</b>	Belgrade International Theater Festival (Beogradski Internacionalni Teatarski Festival)
<b>BSC</b>	Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian
<b>CSCE</b>	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>CPY</b>	Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije)
<b>DEMOS</b>	Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratska opozicija Slovenije)
<b>DFJ</b>	Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija)
<b>FNRJ</b>	Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija)
<b>FYROM</b>	The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
<b>HDZ</b>	Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica)
<b>HDZ-BiH</b>	Croatian Democratic Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina
<b>ICTY</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>JMO</b>	Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija)
<b>JNA</b>	Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija)
<b>LDK</b>	Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës)
<b>MASPOK</b>	Masovni pokret (Mass Movement)
<b>NDH</b>	Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska)



<b><i>NIN</i></b>	<i>Nedeljne Informativne Novine</i> (Informative weekly magazine)
<b>OIC</b>	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
<b>OKW</b>	German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)
<b>OOUR</b>	Basic Organization of Associated Labor (Osnovna organizacija udruženog rada)
<b>ORJUNA</b>	Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija Jugoslavenskih nacionalista)
<b>OZNA</b>	Department for the People's Protection (Odsjek za zaštitu naroda)
<b>SANU</b>	Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti)
<b>SDA</b>	Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije)
<b>SDS</b>	Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka)
<b>SLS</b>	Slovene People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka)
<b>SFRJ</b>	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija)
<b>SHS</b>	Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca)
<b>SIV</b>	Federal Executive Council (Savezno izvršno vijeće)
<b>SOUR</b>	Complex Organization of Associated Labor (Složena organizacija udruženog rada)
<b>TO BiH</b>	Territorial Defence Force of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (Teritorijalna odbrana Bosne i Hercegovine)
<b>UÇK</b>	Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
<b>UDB</b>	State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti)
<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
<b>UNPROFOR</b>	United Nations Protection Force
<b>VMRO</b>	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija)
<b>VMRO-DPMNE</b>	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija—Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo)

# Chronology

## **About 1800–1918 South Slavic Movement and the founding of Yugoslavia**

- 1804–1813** First Serb Uprising against the Ottoman Empire
- 1809–1813** Founding of the “Illyrian Provinces” along the north and east coasts of the Adriatic Sea by Napoleon Bonaparte; harmonization of administration and standardization of the “Slavonic language”
- 1814** Creation of the Kingdom of Illyria as successor state to Illyrian Provinces after the territory’s repossession by Austria-Hungary; existence until 1849
- 1815–1817** Second Serb Uprising
- 1830** Founding of the Illyrian Movement by Ljudevit Gaj (promoting the idea of South Slavic cultural unity); autonomy of the Principality of Serbia
- 1835** *Novine Horvatzke* (Croatian news) and *Danicza* (Morning star), publications advancing the cause of the Illyrian Movement
- 1844** *Načertanije* (The plan) by Serbian statesman Ilija Garašanin propagating the idea of expanding Serbia’s borders and influence
- 1848/1849** Hungarian Revolution against the rule of the Austrian Habsburg monarchy
- 1849** Founding of Croatia-Slavonia as a crown land within the Habsburg monarchy; appointment of Baron Josip Jelačić as governor (Ban)
- 1850** Vienna (Literary) Agreement on a standardized Serbo-Croatian language based on the Štokavian dialect
- 1860** *Jugoslovjenstvo*, a manifesto by the Croat historian Franjo Rački on Yugoslavism
- 1866** Founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in Zagreb by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Franjo Rački
- 1868** Croatian-Hungarian Settlement (Nagodba) between Hungary and the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia

- 1875–1878** Great Eastern Crisis; Russo-Turkish War
- 1878** Congress of Berlin; occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary; independence of Serbia and Montenegro; Kosovo and Macedonia remain in the Ottoman Empire; Slovenian and Croatian territories remain part of the Habsburg Monarchy (Slovenia, Dalmatia, Istria under Austrian rule; Croatia and Vojvodina under Hungarian); emergence of the Albanian national movement (League of Prizren)
- 1881** Abolishment of the Military Frontier
- 1882** Principality of Serbia becomes the Kingdom of Serbia
- 1889** Five hundredth anniversary of the historic Battle of Kosovo (28 June)
- 1892** Birth of Josip Broz in Kumrovec (Croatia)
- 1893** Founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
- 1903** Murder of Serbian king Aleksandar Obrenović; election of Peter I. Karadjordjević as his successor; Ilinden Uprising of Macedonians against the Ottoman Empire; “People’s Movement” and mass protests against the Hungarian governor in Croatia
- 1905** Resolution of Fiume calling for Croatian self-rule and general civil rights and liberties; Serb–Croat party coalition in Croatia; “New Course” in Serb–Croat cooperation
- 1906–1911** Austro-Hungarian customs war against Serbia (“Pig War”)
- 1908** Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary; Bosnian annexation crisis; partition of Sandžak between Serbia and Montenegro; founding of the Serb National Defense (Narodna odbrana)
- 1909** First pan-Yugoslav conference of South Slavic socialists
- 1911** Founding of the Black Hand
- 1912** Founding of the Balkan League by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro to liberate “European Turkey”; First Balkan War (against the Ottoman Empire); founding of Albania
- 1913** Demise of the Balkan League due to conflicts over the partition of Macedonia; Second Balkan War (between the former allies); Treaty of Bucharest; annexation of Kosovo by Serbia and the partition of Macedonia between Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria
- 1914** Assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip; Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia; July Crisis and the outbreak of the First World War; Austrian invasion into Serbia

- 1915** Retreat of the Serbian government and army through Albania to Corfu (“Albanian Golgotha”); occupation of Serbia and Macedonia by the Central Powers; founding of the Yugoslav Committee in London, headed by Ante Trumbić
- 1917** Corfu Declaration; agreement between the Croat-led Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian government on the founding of a South Slavic kingdom under the Karadjordjević dynasty
- 1918** Allied breakthrough on the Salonica Front; surrender of Austria-Hungary; founding of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs; secession of South Slavs from the Habsburg monarchy and resolution to unify with Serbia
- 1918–1941 The First Yugoslavia**
- 1918** Proclamation creating the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS) by King Peter I. Karadjordjević
- 1919–1920** Paris Peace Treaties; international recognition of the Kingdom of SHS and the demarcation of its borders; founding of the Free State of Fiume by Gabriele d’Annunzio
- 1920** Popular referendum in Carinthia; creation of the Little Entente with Czechoslovakia and Romania as part of the French security system; introduction of universal male suffrage; elections to the constitutional assembly; founding and outlawing of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
- 1921** Passage of the centralist Vidovdan Constitution despite Croat boycott; intensification of the Serb–Croat constitutional conflict
- 1924** Third Party Congress of the CPY with a focus on the national question (recognition of different Yugoslav peoples/nations)
- 1925** Treaty of Nettuno on the demarcation of Italy’s borders
- 1928** Assassination in the Skupština (National Assembly) of the Croatian Peasant Party politician Stjepan Radić; government crisis
- 1929** Suspension of the constitution by King Alexander Karadjordjević; declaration of a royal dictatorship; renaming of the SHS state to “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”; administrative reorganization into banovine; founding of the Croat Ustasha movement
- 1930** Intensification of the Great Depression’s impact on Yugoslavia
- 1931** Constitutional octroi and the introduction of a sham democratic system
- 1934** Assassination of King Alexander I in Marseille; regency of Paul Karadjordjević

- 1935** Election of the semiauthoritarian Milan Stojadinović as prime minister; abatement of Great Depression; state intervention in the economy; rapprochement with Germany and Italy
- 1936** Liquidation of farmers' debts
- 1937** Failure of the Concordat with the Vatican
- 1939** Tito's official appointment to the position of CPY General Secretary; Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum) to create the autonomous Banovina of Croatia
- 1941–1945 The Second World War**
- 1941** Entry of Yugoslavia into the Tripartite Pact; military coup in Belgrade; German attack on Yugoslavia (Operation Retribution); surrender of Yugoslav army; flight into exile of the king and his government; dissolution of Yugoslavia; founding of the Independent State of Croatia (under Ante Pavelić); German military government in Serbia (Milan Nedić's regime); annexation of various areas by Italy, Germany, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria; formation of a nationalist Serb resistance movement under Draža Mihailović (Chetniks) and the Yugoslav communist partisan movement under Josip Broz (Tito); "general insurrection"; the founding and fall of the partisan republic of Užice; extreme acts of "retribution" by occupational forces; massive "ethnic cleansing"; start of the extermination of Jews and Roma
- 1942** Battle of Sutjeska; first meeting of the Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia Antifascist Council (AVNOJ) in Bihac
- 1943** Launching of Operation White and Operation Black by German military to combat partisans; Battle of Neretva; Italy's surrender; second meeting of the Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce; announcement of creation of a federal and socialist Yugoslavia; Allied recognition of Tito; partisan military victories
- 1944** March of the People's Liberation Army into Belgrade; Vis Agreement between Tito and the royal exile government on the re-establishment of Yugoslavia; formation of a common interim government; measures expropriating the ethnic German population
- 1945** Unconditional surrender of Germany; Bleiburg massacre; creation of the People's Front; abolition of the monarchy

**1945–1991 The Second Yugoslavia**

- 1945** Proclamation of the creation of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ); elections to the constitutional assembly; Trieste crisis; land reform and state purchasing program for agricultural produce
- 1946** Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ); partition into six equal constituent republics; war criminal trials; nationalization of large landholdings, banks, and means of production
- 1947** Paris Peace Conference; recognition of Yugoslavia's borders (annexation of Istria without Trieste)
- 1948** Break with Stalin; expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform; political purges
- 1949** Expulsion from the founding of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
- 1950** Introduction of self-management system; Cazin peasant uprising; Yugoslavia's stance of neutrality between the power blocs in the East–West conflict
- 1952** Renaming of Communist Party of Yugoslavia as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- 1953** Constitutional reform incorporating the self-management system
- 1954** Expulsion of Milovan Djilas from the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia; normalization of relations with the Soviet Union; Novi Sad agreement on a written Serbo-Croatian language in two variants
- 1955** Declaration in Moscow by Khrushchev and Tito on the right of every country to pursue socialism its own way; Bandung Conference and the beginnings of the Nonaligned Movement
- 1957** Severance of diplomatic relations by West Germany in line with the Hallstein Doctrine
- 1961** First conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade
- 1963** Passage of a new constitution transforming the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY); formation of the Praxis group
- 1964** Eighth Party Congress of the League of Communists; introduction of market-economy reforms and the federalization of the constitution
- 1966** Removal of Aleksandar Ranković as the head of the secret police

- 1967** “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language”
- 1968** Student revolts; Albanian uprising in Kosovo and West Macedonia; recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth constituent people; introduction of national security doctrine of “All-People’s Defense”
- 1970** *Islamic Declaration* by Alija Izetbegović
- 1971** Croatian Spring; ousting from power of party leadership in Zagreb; constitutional amendment expanding the federalization of Yugoslavia; Brezhnev’s visit to Belgrade
- 1972** Ousting from power of party leadership in Belgrade; political purge within the party
- 1974** Passage of a new constitution; granting of greater authority and power to the republics and autonomous provinces; confirmation of Tito as president for life
- 1976** Law on Associated Labor to expand self-management
- 1977** CSCE meeting in Belgrade
- 1980** Tito’s death; collective presidency: growing economic problems and national tensions
- 1981** Kosovo uprising; imposition of martial law; political trials
- 1987** Rise of Slobodan Milošević to the top of party leadership in Serbia; party infighting with Serbian president Ivan Stambolić; memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; nationalistic meetings and mobilization efforts; Bosnian Agrokomerc affair
- 1989** Election of Slobodan Milošević as Serbia’s president; revocation of autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; 600th anniversary celebration of the Battle of Kosovo; economic crisis; growing conflict over reform within Yugoslavia; institutional paralysis and legislative backlog
- 1990** Disbanding of the League of Communists; introduction of the multiparty system; failure of reforms proposed by Ante Marković; Franjo Tuđman’s assumption of power as Croatia’s president; declarations of sovereignty by the parliaments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo; Slovenian referendum on independence; Serb-Montenegrin veto of the Croat Stipe Mesić as the president of Yugoslavia; declaration of autonomy by Croatian Serbs
- 1991–2018** **Collapse of Yugoslavia and Successor States**
- 1991** Violent incidents in the regions of Croatia inhabited by Serbs; declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and

- Macedonia; deployment of the Yugoslav People's Army; outbreak of war in Slovenia and Croatia; German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; declaration creating the Republic of Serb Krajina; resolution on independence passed by Bosnian diet despite Serb veto.
- 1992** Ceasefire and the stationing of UNPROFOR in Croatia; founding of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by Serbia and Montenegro; founding of the Serb Republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina; independence referendum and international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; outbreak of war; massive "ethnic cleansing" actions
- 1993** "War within the war" between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina; creation of UN safe areas; establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
- 1994** Shelling of the Markale market in Sarajevo; begin of NATO air strikes against Serb positions; founding of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croats and Muslims
- 1995** Croatian military operations Flash and Storm to retake Krajina; Srebrenica massacre; Dayton Peace Accord
- 1996** Founding of the Kosovo Liberation Army
- 1998** Armed conflict between Albanian guerilla fighters and Serb security forces in Kosovo; mass exodus and expulsion
- 1999** Failure of the Rambouillet negotiations for a self-governed Kosovo; NATO strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo; UN Resolution 1244 setting up an interim administration mission in Kosovo; start of the process to determine the status of Kosovo
- 2000** Defeat of Slobodan Milošević by the democratic opposition in Serbia; start of the EU Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkan states
- 2001** Armed revolt by Albanian extremists in South Serbia and Macedonia; Ohrid Framework Agreement on equal rights for Albanians
- 2003** Transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro
- 2004** Accession of Slovenia to the European Union
- 2006** Referendum on independence and international recognition of Montenegro
- 2008** Unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo
- 2013** Accession of Croatia to the European Union
- 2018** European Commission's new Western Balkan Strategy





# PART I

## THE SOUTH SLAVIC MOVEMENT AND THE FOUNDING OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE (1878 TO 1918)



# 1.

## The South Slavic Countries around 1900: The Dawn of a New Century

At the turn of the century, optimism prevailed throughout the entire South Slavic region. Even in very remote corners like the provincial Bosnian town of Višegrad, wrote the town's chronicler Ivo Andrić, "events too quickened their pace. . . . Exciting news was no longer something rare and unusual but an everyday food and a real need. The whole of life seemed to be hastening somewhere, suddenly speeded up, as a freshet quickens its pace before it breaks into rapids, rushes over steep rocks and becomes a cascade."<sup>1</sup> However, at this point only a few people were aware that they were living in an era of millenarian changes and that intellectual innovation and political impetus were also emerging from profound social upheavals. In any case, the young Bosnian revolutionary Vladimir Gaćinović hoped that the old feudal system, the major clans, and the patriarchal mindset of his home would soon belong to the past and that new ideas and a strong push to create a nation state would emerge.<sup>2</sup> Since large areas of the countryside still remained mired in dire poverty and old traditions, the idea of integrating all South Slavs into a single state appeared to be no more than a pipe dream in the eyes of many people. At the time it was not evident, let alone certain, that one day their so very dissimilar regions would indeed merge into a single body politic. It quickly becomes clear just how complicated the starting point truly was when we retrospectively comb the historical regions of Yugoslavia in fast motion.

### *The Historical Regions*

At the turn of the century, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were living in two empires—the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman—and in two independent nation states—Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, our fictional trip through the South Slavic countries around 1900 begins in the Austrian crown lands of Carniola, Styria, Carinthia, Gorizia, Istria, and then moves to Trieste, the home to approximately 1.32 million Slovenes, who would become the smallest

population located the farthest west in what would later be the multinational state of Yugoslavia. In Trieste they made up about three-fourths of the population and lived in confluence with Germans, Italians, Croats, and other peoples. They were the only group among the South Slavs never to have suffered longer phases of military threat, wartime destruction, or even depopulation. Their agriculture was varied and productive, and the standard of living and level of education were higher here than in the neighboring regions. The architecture reflected nearly 500 years of Habsburg rule and still today seems quintessentially Austrian. The areas in which Slovenes lived were still split into different administrative jurisdictions, but even in the past there had never been a state entity named Slovenia.<sup>3</sup>

Further west and south, the Slovenian regions passed seamlessly into the settlement areas of the approximately 2.9 million Croats, who were also part of Austria-Hungary.<sup>4</sup> The Croats exemplified internal fragmentation to an even greater degree than the Slovenes. They were dispersed throughout no less than seven separate political-territorial units within the Habsburg monarchy, each with very different socioeconomic structures, ethnic mixes, and cultural influences. Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed autonomy within the Hungarian half of the empire. Istria and Dalmatia, however, were under direct Austrian rule, whereas the port city of Fiume (Rijeka), as a *corpus separatum*, was governed by Hungary. Croats also lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in southern Hungary. Until the outbreak of the First World War, not a single railway connection existed between Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>5</sup>

Highly diverse cultural influences intermingled in Croatian regions. In the cities of northern and eastern Croatia, such as Zagreb, Varaždin, and Osijek, the Austrian and southern German influences are still evident today in the baroque style of aristocratic residences and the old town centers and in the interiors of city palaces and patrician homes. Along the coast, in Dalmatia and Istria, the architecture in cities like Pula, Split, and Dubrovnik points to ancient origins as well as to the centuries-long and very close ties to the cultures and histories of Venice, Florence, and Rome.<sup>6</sup>

Since 1881, Croatia-Slavonia also had included the former Military Frontier (*krajina*), a province under special military administration that existed for 400 years. This area extended along the Sava and Danube rivers before reaching the Adriatic coast farther south in western Bosnia. In order to shield its empire militarily from the “Turkish peril,” Vienna had settled Serb refugees and others as free soldier-peasants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and created an administrative district with its own social order. These “frontiersmen” formed military regiments to defend the monarchy.<sup>7</sup> The Habsburgs had also attracted non-Slavic colonists to the area, including German-speaking Danube Swabians.

Beyond the Military Frontier lay Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1878 Congress of Berlin had placed it under Austro-Hungarian military occupation, while formally leaving it under the administration of the Ottomans, who had ruled there since the fifteenth century. In 1908, the Austrian emperor annexed it in a surprise move, thereby also incorporating into the empire the autochthonous Muslim population. Around 1900, the South Slavic population totaled about 1.6 million, of which 43 percent were Orthodox Christian, 35 percent Muslim, 21 percent Roman Catholic, and the rest a combination of Jews, Vlachs, Turks, Roma, and other minorities.

The first thing to stand out in this newly annexed territory was the architectural mastery of the Turkish builders. Sarajevo dazzled visitors with the magnificence of the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque, one of the largest and most artistic religious buildings left by Islam on European soil. Also world famous was the bold sweep of the stone bridge over the Drina in Višegrad, which, according to its inscription, could be found “nowhere else in the world.”<sup>8</sup> Built in the fifteenth century on orders of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Paša Sokolović, a child of the region, this remnant of East–West interlock was immortalized by Ivo Andrić in his Nobel Prize–winning novel.<sup>9</sup> And then there is the Drina River itself. Originally the Turks and Austrians declared it to be the dividing line between their empires; later, in the twentieth century, it became a highly contested site of memory. Was the picturesque river the supportive backbone of Serb settlement beyond the political borders of Serbia or was it the insurmountable watershed between Catholic and Orthodox civilizations? For their part, the communists later summarily declared the Drina to be a symbol of Yugoslav unity.

Under Austro-Hungarian rule, all of Bosnia-Herzegovina was exposed to central European architectural influences. Sarajevo received a modern city center with representational administrative buildings, a theater, and a central post office right next to the Turkish old town with its bazaar—the *Baščaršija*—numerous mosques, hammams, Koran schools, dervish monasteries, and caravansaries.<sup>10</sup> In the late nineteenth century, the traveler Heinrich Renner wrote: “looks more Turkish here than in Sofia and Philippopolis; the regional costume still prevails; turban and fez are preferred,” despite the already “prevalent” European clothing.<sup>11</sup>

Travel was very strenuous at the time. The trip by coach, caravan, or horse from Sarajevo to Mostar, located about 84 miles away, lasted three grueling days. To venture into more remote regions, a person either used one of the hazardous horse trails or walked.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, from eastern Bosnia it took a difficult climb through the mountains to reach Montenegro, which had been independent since 1878. For centuries, the seclusion of the Karst had conserved the traditional clan order. The overwhelming majority of the

Montenegrin population were Orthodox Slavs, but a few thousand Turkish, Albanian, and Slavic Muslims also lived there. This tiny country with its population of about 200,000 always captured the imagination of foreign visitors, in particular, as a symbol for the irrepressible will of a small mountain people to be free; as the homeland of banditry, blood feuds, and barbarism; and not least as the stage for comical political conditions. Except for a small idyllic strip of coastline, the living conditions here were merciless. The country had almost no infrastructure, what cattle-raising and meager farming there was yielded little, and indescribable poverty prevailed. Deep in the interior, explained the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, a close collaborator of Tito, this land was “extremely barren and crippling quiet,” a place where “all things living and all things created by the human hand” vanished. “There is no oak, no white or copper beach, just dry, brittle, barely green grass. . . . Everything is stone.”<sup>13</sup>

Crossing the jagged mountains on the arduous zigzag of a Turkish road, the traveler reached the southernmost point of what would later be Yugoslav territory, namely the harbor of Bar, and a few miles farther inland, Lake Skadar, through which the Albanian border would run one day. Along this narrow coastline, the Mediterranean-Venetian flair returned. For centuries this area served as the most important and often the only link to western Europe.

Beyond Lake Skadar stretched those regions of the future Yugoslavia that belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1912/1913 and were considered particularly backward and poor. The administrative district (*vilayet*) of Kosovo, created in 1879 with the capital city of Üsküb (Skopje), included a greater part of today’s Kosovo and Macedonia, over which Greece, Bulgaria, and the new nation state of Serbia have fought. More than 1.6 million inhabitants created a unique ethnic and religious mixture. The population was fairly evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and was split into numerous language groups.

At the time, special status was given to the primarily Muslim-inhabited administrative district Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which separated Serbia from Montenegro. In 1878, the Congress of Berlin conceded to the Austrian emperor the right to occupy the strategically important area. In 1913, it was divided up between Montenegro and Serbia.

The Principality of Serbia gained de facto semi-independence from the Ottoman Empire as a result of two uprisings (1804–1813 and 1815–1817). Autonomy was legally granted in 1830, and independence was internationally recognized in 1878. In 1900, 2.5 million people lived here, of whom nine-tenths were Serbs and the rest Vlachs, Roma, and other diverse groups.<sup>14</sup> Another two million or so Serbs lived in the Habsburg monarchy. In the north, at the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers, stood the originally oriental-Balkan capital city of Belgrade, which for most of its long history had

served as a strategically significant border town, military post, administrative city, and trade center. After the Ottomans left, it was completely reconstructed in the Western style typical of Vienna and Pest. From here it was just a small jump to the southern Hungarian province of Vojvodina, from which the Serb national movement had emerged during the Enlightenment. As a result of the Austro-Hungarian colonization, the population of 1.3 million then consisted of Magyars (32 percent), Serbs (29 percent), Germans (23 percent), and numerous other nationalities such as Croats, Romanians, and Ruthenians.<sup>15</sup>

### *Peoples, Nations, Identities*

At the turn of the century, around twelve million people lived in the historic regions of the future Yugoslavia. The majority were South Slavs of Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim faiths, and the rest created a conglomerate of various other ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, including Turks, Albanians, Germans, Magyars, Jews, Roma, Vlachs, and others.

Local intellectuals and writers, like so many other Europeans of the nineteenth century, believed that communities needed to be organized as “nations” to secure political participation, cultural rights, and social justice. Nationhood was mainly understood as a cultural and linguistic category out of which the proponents of nationalism thought to create an organic whole. Yet, in most regions, the composition of the population was confusing, to put it mildly. Over the course of decades, an elaborate history of migratory movements from various places, religious conversions, and different kinds of cultural hybridization had thoroughly and repeatedly jumbled and reset the pieces of the ethnic mosaic. For this reason, contacts, cultural transfers, and cultural interweaving on various levels always played a major role.

Around 1900, the idea of a “Yugoslav” nation was as obscure as was a well-defined notion of what it meant to call oneself “Slovene,” “Croat,” or “Serb.” For peasants, their local communities, language, culture, and religion were the references important to their world. Granted, the process of modern nation building had indeed begun during the first third of the nineteenth century, and new and abstract forms of national awareness were emerging from the identities previously shaped by religion, cultural heritage, and regional affiliation. However, at this point none of the future Yugoslav peoples had yet formed an integrated community. The emergence of the modern nation involved protracted, often contradictory processes with a thoroughly open-ended result. The idea of a transhistorical existence of peoples, objectified by language, culture, or origin, is still popular today. Yet it is an idea that is totally inapplicable historically.

Stated simply, the majority of people living at the turn of the century in the areas that would later be Yugoslavia were South Slavs, linked by their language and cultural kinship. According to today’s categories, these were



Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians. According to the identification categories back then, these labels still oscillated between ethnic, national, religious, and regional connotations, which would contribute significantly to the problem of a future Yugoslavia, as will be shown here.

Despite the extreme disparities among the political territories and cultural histories, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim South Slavs all felt intuitively related. The reason was that they could communicate freely with one another. Most Croats and all Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians speak the same dialect, known as Štokavian (after the interrogative pronoun *što* for “what”).<sup>16</sup> The nineteenth-century language reformers selected this dialect in 1850 in the Vienna (Literary) Agreement to serve as the basis of a standardized Serbo-Croatian language.<sup>17</sup> The idioms of the Slovenes and the Macedonians were distinctly different and would later develop into their own literary languages. Since the early nineteenth century, intellectuals and societal elites thought that it would be possible to create (or rather revive) a united South Slavic nation based on a shared descent, language, and culture. They believed that South Slavs were a primordial and transhistorical people who had suffered the unfortunate fate of having been unnaturally torn apart. Their subsequent fragmentation into Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was considered superficial, which meant that it was possible and imperative that the South Slavic people reemerge as a single “Yugoslav” nation despite their present cultural and political differences.

The protagonists of the South Slavic idea were aided in their effort by a degree of conceptual vagueness: in this context, the vocabulary of local languages contained just the word *narod*, a word that made no semantic distinction between “people” and “nation.” Herein lay a creatively exploitable but also dangerous ambivalence. At the same time, the language lacked a term for that common idiom referred to then as “Slavic,” “Croatian,” “Serbian,” “Bosnian,” or simply “*naški*” (our language). There was no conceptual equivalent to a label like “German” or “French” that would have vaulted local and regional variations, nor was there a common collective term for the advocates of South Slavic unity and thus no “positive predisposition” for South Slavic (Yugoslav) nation building.<sup>18</sup>

In all of the regions mentioned here, forms of linguistically and culturally determined awareness that could be called protonational existed already in the late nineteenth century.<sup>19</sup> People identified themselves with certain groups that distinguished them from other communities by way of various factors like culture and language, sometimes also religion, social milieu, and regional origin. In each case, the respective environment determined which of these criteria stood at the forefront of such self-identification, as the following example of Croatia illustrates.

If a person traveling through Croatian regions at the turn of the century had asked peasants about their national affiliation, this individual would have been given a variety of answers.<sup>20</sup> People were already identifying themselves as “Croats,” but sometimes the label was used to mean ethnicity and other times to mean regional affiliation. At the same time, people identified themselves—depending on where they lived—as “Slavonian” or “Dalmatian” or “Istrian.” “The work of unifying the Croats has not yet been completed,” complained the Croat scholar Julije Benešić in 1911. “The lads from Sylvania are still ashamed to call themselves Croats publicly.”<sup>21</sup>

People intuitively considered the Slavic language to be an important identity marker as long as they lived among Germans, Hungarians, or Italians and a clear language barrier existed. Only then did people identify themselves primarily as “Slav” or “Croat.” In multireligious milieus in which the language was homogenous, such as in Bosnia or Slovenia, faith became the main identity marker. Since a Croat could communicate in the same dialect as Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians, the language criterion alone was not enough to define who a Croat was. A Croat peasant saw himself primarily as “Catholic,” “Christian,” or as a “Latin.”<sup>22</sup> However, the Croatian national identity and Catholicism were not yet identical; after all, Germans, Austrians, Italians, and Magyars were also Catholic. Not until much later, in the 1920s, would the activities of the Catholic clergy and the Peasants’ Party complete the integration of the Croatian nation under the recitals of Catholicism.

Unlike Catholicism, the Orthodox Christian Church was already a strong factor in creating the national identification and integration of the Serbs. There was a historical reason for this. During the Ottoman period, the religious communities were organized as quasi-legal entities with certain autonomous rights. These so-called millets had great administrative powers. The Orthodox Church could appoint church dignitaries and manage the property of the churches, monasteries, and charity institutions. Family and inheritance law as well as tax collection was also put in their hands. For an interim, the Turks granted the Serbian Orthodox Church sovereignty (autocephaly) to be exerted by the patriarch in Peć in Kosovo. The Serbian church thus became the sole guardian of the extinct medieval tradition of state. Serbian kings were worshiped as saints; hagiographic texts were evocative of the golden age and its demise; bishops acted as both spiritual and political leaders. Therefore, “Orthodox” was equivalent to “Serbian” both semantically and in meaning even before the nationalist period. Toward the end of the 1880s, the Serb geographer Vladimir Karić noted that, for the Serb, “it is very important to call himself ‘Christian,’ or more precisely, ‘Orthodox,’ and he even goes as far as not to distinguish between the faith and his nationality, so that he calls it the ‘Serbian faith’ and consequently wants to call every person a ‘Serb,’ regardless the ethnicity, if this person is Orthodox.”<sup>23</sup> Because of their Orthodox

religion, many Montenegrins understood themselves to be Serbs at the time. After all, both peoples had sprouted from the same ethnic soil of the medieval Serbian state, and these common origins and the shared religion are what exacerbated the split between them, the impact of which is felt still today, particularly in the hesitancy to affirm the existence of the Montenegrin nation. The merger of “Orthodox” and “Serbian” remained intact in many regions until the 1930s. Only later in the twentieth century did the religious meaning disappear, and “Serbian,” like “Montenegrin,” was recoded to fit into separate national categories.

Unique in European history has been the identity building of Bosnian Muslims.<sup>24</sup> These people are the descendants of those Slavs of Orthodox, Catholic, and other faiths who converted—usually voluntarily—to Islam when the Ottomans conquered the territory. The motives for converting were manifold and may well have resulted from a mixture of fear and incentive. Non-Muslims were confronted with fewer chances to advance, a greater tax burden, and legal discrimination in matters such as property ownership. Conversion to Islam occurred especially in places where the Christian churches had not yet firmly established themselves or competed fiercely among themselves for power and influence. Upon conversion to Islam, old folk customs were simply recast into new molds. Occasionally entire families split into a Muslim and a Christian branch, which served as a type of reinsurance to protect themselves should power shift again into other hands.<sup>25</sup> Outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavs in Serbia, Sandžak, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia also converted to Islam.

Islam was the decisive criterion separating Muslims from the others in Bosnia. It formed social identity, defined norms and values, and prescribed religious and cultural practices.<sup>26</sup> At the turn of the century, the collective identity of the Bosnian Muslims was still primarily influenced by religion. They fought for religious and cultural autonomy, not national and political sovereignty. Only a minority argued for the secularization of the Muslim community in the modern era, meaning the separation of religion and civil society. However, a nonreligious, national consciousness did not consolidate until well into the twentieth century.

In Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, all of which still belonged to the Ottoman Empire, the confusion was the greatest, and national identity building had advanced the least. In the proverbial Macedonian fruit bowl (in French, *macédoine*) lived both Slavic- and Greek-speaking Christians, Turkish- and Albanian-speaking Muslims, Jews, Vlachs, and Roma. How large each of the communities actually was became the subject of heated ethnographic and political controversies.<sup>27</sup>

According to traditional Islamic order, religion took precedence over ethnic distinctions. Therefore, Slavs and Greeks living in the Orthodox millet found it

especially important to identify themselves as “Christian” vis-à-vis the ruling Turks. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century during a conflict within the Bulgarian church did the overarching Christian Orthodox community divide along linguistic lines into Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb sectors. It would still take several decades before people understood this new differentiation, let alone internalize it. Slavic-speaking peasants of Macedonia were quite indifferent to their ethnic background until, with the emergence of the “Macedonian question,” they became the object of competing territorial claims and of ethnographic classifications from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.<sup>28</sup> At the time only a hint of a future Slavic-Macedonian national identity could be discerned.

However, for the moment, it was common in Macedonia—as in many culturally heterogeneous border regions like Vojvodina or Istria—for individuals to be opportunistic in stating their identity. In Skopska Crna Gora, peasants once admitted that sometimes they were Serbs, sometimes Bulgarians, depending how the question was worded.<sup>29</sup> This led the Swedish professor Rudolf Kjellén to view the population like a type of “flour from which you can bake any cake that you want, once the nationality has finally been decided.”<sup>30</sup>

As was true all over Europe, “imagining the nation” was essentially staged by intellectuals, scientists, politicians, and church authorities. On the microlevel, it just seemed to be some abstract entity. The coexistence with people of other faiths was a daily, socially structured, and usually conflict-free experience for many. Everyone always knew who belonged to which group, because this was communicated outwardly in names, clothing, religious practices, and social barriers such as the marriage ban between Christians and Muslims.

Likewise, mutual respect and good neighborly relations were part of village life. Birth, marriage, death, as well as house building and harvesting provided occasions for public ritual and festivities through which people underscored their communality and mutual dependence. People supported each other beyond regional borders through neighborly help in harvesting and building (*moba* and *pozajmica*) and gathered in the evening to socialize and work, an activity known as *sjelo*.

As in many rural regions in Europe, traditional popular piety dominated over canonical stipulations in the population at large. This also offered many opportunities for the faiths to mingle. Although people observed the official holidays of their respective faith, often these were merely the Christian or Muslim adaptations of original customs. In Serbia, the clergy had learned to accept that people went to church more to meet each other than to attend the religious service. Priests tolerated the “freer interaction” that believers had with God and Church, including cults worshipping ancestors and house saints.<sup>31</sup> As late as the 1930s, a study on the Belgrade suburb of Rakovica found that not one household there possessed a Bible or a New Testament, although everyone

believed in God: “We could not find these books anywhere or even a single person who would have known something about them. . . . All that everyone knows is that there are church books from which the Pope reads prayers.”<sup>32</sup>

Folk traditions built many bridges between the religious communities. A person seeking spiritual guidance or praying for a rapid recovery of health might visit the priest in the morning and, just to be on the safe side, the Islamic instructor (*hodža*) in the afternoon. Even today, August 2 is the day on which the Orthodox Christians celebrate Saint Elias, the *Ilindan*, and the Muslims the *Alidun*, a fact that has found its way into the expression “*Do podne Ilija, od podne Alija*” (mornings Elias, afternoons Ali).<sup>33</sup>

Around 1900, the nation-building process was fully underway throughout the entire region, with a bit of time lag in certain places. However, the proto-national communities (later the Serbs, Croats, Muslims, etc.) had not yet fully constituted themselves as modern nations. Originally, this was not a specifically South Slavic phenomenon. In France, Germany, and Italy, simple peasants also had to be transformed first into members of a nation.<sup>34</sup> However, unlike these parts of Europe, centuries of foreign rule in the Balkans had enabled room for ambivalence to emerge, in which avenues for identification through language, religion, and political history overlapped. Among other factors, there was no clear understanding of what constituted a nation, be it a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the tradition of statehood (as in France). On the one hand, the idea of a *Kulturnation*—as it was posited by Johann Gottfried Herder and conveyed in the region—might have pointed to the integration of South Slavs into one single nation. On the other hand, the heritage left by the Ottoman era included the phenomenon of the *Konfessionsnation*, the confessional nation, which used religious affiliation as the basis for differentiating among populations who shared a common language. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims spoke (and still speak) similar dialects, but they increasingly saw themselves as belonging to different peoples because of their faith. As important as the common cultural roots, shared language, and regional cohabitation were, the disparate historical-political traditions, especially those rooted in the different religious worldviews, created fissures too deep to allow the idea of a general Yugoslav identity to gain any ground without having to resort to instrumentalization “from above.” Not until the creation in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes did a strong agency for socialization develop that actively advanced Yugoslav nation building.

### *Demographic Development and Family Structures*

In the final thirty years of the nineteenth century, all South Slavic countries experienced far-reaching social and economic change. Population growth, agrarian and industrial development, and the transition to a monetary and market-based economy shook up the traditional social order of village life. The

economic dynamic that developed in the center and west of the European continent was no small contributing factor, one that appeared in the Balkans in the form of imperialism. Industrial goods needed new markets and accumulated capital needed new opportunities for investment. Railway construction, transregional markets, and the advancement of the monetary economy changed earlier forms of economic and communal life, which in turn brought new experiences, mentalities, and types of awareness. Unlike western Europe, the outlines of a modern industrial society, however, were only vaguely recognizable.

New dynamics were also developing from within society. Between 1880 and 1910 the population grew rapidly as the mortality rate sank. The highest demographic growth took place in Serbia (71.3 percent) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (63.9 percent), followed by Croatia and Slovenia (38.6 percent), Dalmatia (35.7 percent), and Vojvodina (33.6 percent). The slowest population to grow was that of Slovenia (9.4 percent).<sup>35</sup> Not until the period between the two world wars did the demographic discrepancy among the regions diminish. Along with Russia and Hungary, southeastern Europe experienced the highest birthrate in Europe.<sup>36</sup> One of the reasons for the great demographic growth lay in the extended rural family, the *zadruga* (household commune). The extended family constituted—except in Slovenia—the core of traditional social order in the countryside of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania.<sup>37</sup> Sons and grandsons remained in their parental homes, while daughters married into other *zadrugas*. Unlike in western Europe, where it was necessary first to own land or have a craft before setting up a household, which meant that many people married late or not at all, the socioeconomic net of the enlarged South Slavic family could always easily integrate additional family members. People married young and had many children. In eastern and southeastern Europe, the social order lacked an effective regulatory mechanism like that which safeguarded western Europe from extreme population growth.

Also unlike western Europe, it was not until this period that the traditional union of productive and reproductive functions within the family, of home and workplace, began to break apart. The *zadruga* represented a community of property, life, work and authority. Private property did not exist, not even money. The head of the household was the father, who derived his role as master from his natural authority. He represented the family in public, managed family and economic business, and had the last word in all important matters. Women held a subordinate place within the family and had practically no rights. In this patriarchal society, strict rules of conduct dictated daily life and limited every individual's personal freedom. In places where the state had never gained a foothold, like Montenegro and Kosovo, a strong archaic code of honor prevailed, one that included blood feuds.

Yet even in the regions of its historical origin, the *zadruga* began to fall away in a staggered fashion and at different rates of speed. Factors like the

growing size of the family, the gradual expansion of the market economy, new types of employment in industry and trade, and the dissipation of the patriarchal order played a role. More and more households were splitting, usually when they reached a critical point of twenty to forty members.<sup>38</sup> This occurred earlier and faster in the east and the south. However, around 1890, about a fifth of the population in Croatia and Serbia still lived in an extended family.

### *Social and Economic Change*

Around the turn of the century, about 85 percent of the population in Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina worked in agriculture, and only about 10 percent earned their living in industry, handcraft, and trade; the rest worked in independent professions. Only Slovenia differed in this respect. Here about two-thirds of the population still worked in the agrarian sector, while 11 percent were employed in mining and industry.<sup>39</sup>

The South Slavic region was divided into a number of distinct systems of agricultural law. The manorial system had been ended in 1848/1849 in Austria-Hungary, so that peasants were the owners of the land they farmed. This led to a differentiated structure of ownership and social life with several large modern agricultural enterprises, a wealthy farming middle class, but also increasing rural poverty. This lay the foundation for an—albeit modest—industrial development. The feudal system in Serbia was also abolished after the uprisings that occurred from 1815 to 1833. The principle prevailed here, too, that those who worked the land should own it. In the remaining regions, various forms of feudal dependency still existed. In Istria and Dalmatia the systems of colonate (*težaština*) and socage (*kmetije*) survived, which obliged farmers to turn over a portion of their harvest, anywhere from one-fifth to a half. These systems existed in many different variations. It is estimated that in 1925 as many as 100,000 peasant families were still working as coloni on land they didn't own.<sup>40</sup> Feudal relations in agriculture also remained intact in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the *čiftlik* system. More than half of the families, the majority being Orthodox and Catholic socagers, the *kmets*, were personally unfree, although they did have the right to buy their freedom. They were heavily burdened with the obligation to turn over a portion (usually a third) of their harvest. In early 1914, a total of 93,336 *kmet* families were still working a third of all arable soil.<sup>41</sup> Similar primeval dependencies also prevailed in Macedonia and Kosovo.

Where agrarian reforms were undertaken, the efforts were half-hearted and contradictory. Legislators in Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, and Montenegro tried to prevent the impoverishment of the peasants by upholding the principle of indivisible collective property and lifelong family solidarity. In Serbia, *zadrugas* were only permitted to be divided in exceptional cases, and by 1889 in Croatia this was only permitted if the resulting amount of property

allotted each party did not fall short of a legally stipulated minimum. Efforts to protect the homesteads (*okućje*) followed similar ideas. In order to protect peasants against excessive indebtedness and forced liquidation, a minimum of 8.5 acres including dwellings, draft animals, and inventory were required to be mortgage-free and exempt from liquidation. These protective measures hindered the mobilization of land and labor, the spread of market-based economic relations, and thus the segmentation of property and societal structures in rural areas.<sup>42</sup>

For these reasons, the potential surplus population in agriculture seriously encumbered society throughout the entire Balkan region at the turn of the century. As the large families split up, landholdings became more and more fragmented. Land was divided up into small, unproductive parcels; herds of livestock and machinery were torn apart; all too often an entire house was dismantled, beam for beam. At least a third of the peasants in the Yugoslav region worked less than five acres of land, another third only up to twelve acres. Landholdings of any considerable size were only found in central Croatia and in Vojvodina; they were practically nonexistent in Serbia, Dalmatia, and Carinthia.<sup>43</sup>

The result was indebtedness and poverty. Anyone with less than twelve acres to farm could just barely survive; those who owned less than five acres were in dire straits. In the period between 1910 and 1912, two-thirds of the farmers in Serbia could not earn the existential minimum. More than half of them did not own a yoke of oxen; a third had neither a plow nor even a bed.<sup>44</sup> Poverty was also indescribable in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the similarity of these circumstances in which they lived and of the crises they had experienced that would later contribute considerably to the political merger of the South Slavic peoples.

Agrarian productivity was low, and many households persevered on subsistence farming. Still, step by step, the market economy was making inroads into rural regions, first in southern Hungary, Syrmia, and Slavonia, later in Serbia, and finally in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. However, this left farming households at the mercy of cyclical fluctuations in the economy. The majority of them lacked the capital and the knowledge to intensify their agricultural production. Land use and cultivation techniques remained primitive with little diversification of produce; artificial fertilizers and modern farm machinery were unknown, as were root crops and industrial crops, and little changed in this regard until the interwar period.

The increase in agrarian productivity continued to lag far behind the dynamic growth in population. Instead of intensifying yields, peasants tended to increase arable farmland. They turned woods and meadows into grain fields, reduced livestock farming in favor of crop farming, and shifted their own eating habits from a meat-based diet to a vegetarian one. Despite these



efforts, food provision remained precarious. In 28 percent of the Serb farming households, the food shortages appeared each year by the end of October; in another 46 percent, the deficit appeared in January and February, all of which had serious consequences for the nutrition and state of health of the rural population.<sup>45</sup> About a hundred years after much of Europe had been cursed with rural overpopulation, the South Slavic countries first found themselves smitten with it, at a point when the curse had long been broken elsewhere.

As in many European societies, people sought a way out of their predicament by migrating in search of work. In doing so, they perpetuated traditional forms of periodic migratory labor known as *pečalba*. On the eve of the First World War, nearly 150,000 men from Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia made their way each year into the neighboring regions to hire themselves out as migratory artisans, wage laborers, or small businessmen. Istria and Dalmatia were also classic emigration regions.

Later than everywhere else in Europe, transcontinental labor migration did not take place to a significant degree until the 1880s. Then, between 1899 and 1913, more than a half million South Slavs left for the New World, four-fifths of whom were from the Habsburg monarchy.<sup>46</sup> Due to cyclical economic fluctuations, countries overseas limited immigration starting at the turn of the century, which meant that emigration provided far less relief to the taxed job market than had been the case in earlier decades in places like Germany or Scandinavia. The majority of the structurally underemployed jobseekers remained in their own country.

The low level of agricultural productivity also hampered development in trade and industry. Agricultural exports did not generate profits that could have been invested in industry, nor did a greater domestic demand for finished goods emerge in rural areas. People were simply too poor to be able to afford things that they did not produce themselves. Therefore, industrialization in the South Slavic countries began later, progressed slower, and developed in other branches than it did in the rest of Europe. Whereas the latecomers, Sweden and Denmark, did manage to initiate viable industrialization in the nineteenth century, and Italy, Hungary, and Russia created at least regional industrial centers, the Balkan countries—as well as Spain and Portugal—did not experience any substantial industrial growth.<sup>47</sup> Nor would there be any major impetus in industrialization until the 1930s; in fact, the rapid switch to advanced industrialization did not occur until 1945.

This was caused by a bundle of factors: the backward transportation infrastructure that hampered the development of transregional markets, the chronic lack of capital, the low level of education and training, and—last but not least—the powerful competition from developed regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Starting at the turn of the century, the number of factories

and employed workers increased and levels of production grew annually by more than 10 percent, albeit from a very low starting point. Unfortunately, at the same time, the discrepancy to the rest of Europe also grew.<sup>48</sup> In Croatia-Slavonia, the number of industrial workers rose from 9,832 to 23,604 in the years between 1890 and 1910. In Serbia, this number had only risen to 16,095 by 1910, despite the efforts made by the government in its industrial policy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, more than 65,000 industrial workers were employed in 1912/1913 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian development policy.<sup>49</sup>

Since proto-industries had been weak in southeastern Europe during the early modern period, industry developed out of artisan crafts more than out of manufacturing. It was not textile manufacturing (as in England) or the coal, iron, and steel industry (as in Germany) that stood at the forefront in the beginning, but agriculture (mills and breweries) and forestry (timber and wood processing). In 1910, food production generated 55 percent of the revenue of all factory production in Serbia, while the textile industry only generated 8 percent. In Croatia, the leading branch of industry was timber, and industry would not start to diversify significantly until 1910.<sup>50</sup> Due to the lower level of technological requirements in this sector, the demand for machinery did not intensify as a spin-off effect. At first, heavy industry only played a subordinate role, except in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Austro-Hungarian colonial regime had ignited a major thrust in industrialization.<sup>51</sup>

### *Life in the City*

Until the interwar period, urbanization developed moderately and was greatly influenced by agriculture. Railroad construction, mining, and factories drew people from the countryside, and cities grew and changed the way they looked. However, some qualification is necessary here with regard to the use of the term “city.” On average, a city only had a few thousand inhabitants. In the thirty years prior to the First World War, the urban population increased threefold. Still, Belgrade only had 68,481 inhabitants in 1900; Zagreb 57,690; Sarajevo 38,035 (1895); and Ljubljana 46,000 (1910). The number of migrants to the cities was enormous, and yet in 1910 only 13.2 percent of the Serb population lived in cities. In Croatia the figure was just 8.5 percent. Only Russia and Finland had lower figures.<sup>52</sup>

The migration from the countryside also changed the look and structure of the (sub)urban areas. The more newcomers arrived, the greater the village way of life infiltrated daily city life. The mass of urbanites lived under appalling conditions in small, ground-level farm buildings, not in tenement blocks and rear buildings as in western Europe. Living space was excessively expensive, overcrowded, poorly ventilated, squalid, and without any sanitary facilities. In 1906, an inquiry survey reported among other things “that a close causal

connection existed between life in such dwellings and the three greatest enemies of public health—tuberculosis, alcoholism, and venereal disease.<sup>53</sup> Only a small, wealthy elite could afford to live in comfortable townhouses.

The cityscape was not dominated by fuming smokestacks and proletarian hardship, but by the shabby dwellings of former rural inhabitants and small business dealers as well as the growing army of job-seeking day laborers.<sup>54</sup> Every other city dweller in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade still worked in agriculture. In the suburbs, many farmed plots of land and kept poultry, pigs, or a cow. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of southeastern European urbanization before the Second World War is that many cities were actually nothing more than gigantic villages. The only places that underwent a “European” urban metamorphosis were Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and a few mid-sized cities.

In Serbia a great effort was made starting in the 1870s to remove all traces of the Ottoman past so that, as the city planner Emilijan Josimović expressed it, the “capital does not retain the form that barbarism gave it.”<sup>55</sup> Belgrade’s reconstruction was modeled on Vienna and its grand circular boulevard, the *Ringstrasse*. The only structures that were left as reminders of the 350 years of Turkish rule were the citadel, two mosques, and a fountain with Arabic inscriptions.<sup>56</sup> Almost simultaneously with western European metropolises, Belgrade was outfitted in the 1890s with electrical lighting and streetcars, and after 1900 with canalization and a water supply system.<sup>57</sup> Irrespective of the modest conditions from which the reconstruction was starting, the city planners were driven by the desire to simply skip over the laborious catch-up process and to hitch up an “airplane motor to the oxen cart,” as an observer put it.<sup>58</sup> Belgrade became a paradigm of modernity, a shop window displaying a culture that was more or less imitating the West.

About 1900, daily life and habits in the cities changed at a breathtaking pace, evident first in the spread of traditional costumes (*građanski kostim*). In Belgrade, hats and felt caps replaced the traditional fez. Instead of gathering together in the evening, as was widely done in the villages, the elegant reception day *žur* (*jour de réception*) became fashionable among the Belgrade upper class.<sup>59</sup> Also in other cities of the South Slavic region, the upper echelons of society began to adopt European forms of socializing and lifestyles, such as salons, leisure activity, and interior design.<sup>60</sup> Bourgeois attitudes toward romantic love and marriage ideals also began to take hold.

However, there were also interactions between the distant worlds of the townhouse and the farmhouse. Lifestyle, fashion, and etiquette gradually made inroads into everyday peasant life. “Where a wooden cup had once been enough, one now finds a glass; the petroleum lamp replaces kindling wood,” a foreign traveler observed in 1897. “European farm wagons with iron

fittings are replacing the old prehistorical vehicle with the creaking wooden wheels.”<sup>61</sup> Whereas the respective local folk costumes were still being worn in the countryside up to the end of the nineteenth century, the men and women in the cities were already wearing West European clothing. Changes in customs spread from the cities outward. People began to address each other with the formal form of “you” instead of the more commonly used familiar form and to greet each other with the words “*dobar dan*” (good day)—known as the “German form” of greeting.<sup>62</sup>

### *Progress and Uncertainty*

The desire for national emancipation was generated not least by the awareness of how backward things were. Members of the elite considered liberation from foreign rule to be the prerequisite for a better future and an emancipatory strategy to further development that would finally enable the people of the region to participate in European civilization as members of equal standing. Yet the harbingers of the new European era, like technical progress, bourgeois culture, and liberal social morality, descended upon agrarian society in south-eastern Europe so suddenly that the changes severely shook the long-standing mainstays of identity and uprooted traditional values and societal relations. In particular, the countries formerly under Ottoman rule experienced a profound break with the traditions of their Muslim heritage, which had shaped daily life and society for four hundred years. Radical societal change subdued people’s optimism about progress and caused anxious uncertainty about the future. The key question was how their own social-cultural identity was to be reconciled with the new challenges facing them.

Since the Enlightenment, the intellectual elite of southeastern Europe had cultivated the idea of societal progress, which they associated with words like “reason” and “science” and equated with “Europeanization.”<sup>63</sup> During the nineteenth century, the enthusiasts of this intellectual interaction with Europe were young students attending higher schools of learning and universities in Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, and Austria. Over the course of the next few decades, a Europe-oriented intelligentsia emerged from their ranks, comprised of people familiar with the ideas of liberalism, socialism, and Russian populism.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, Muslim educated classes were adopting Islamic ideologies and movements from the Arab world, Asia, and Russia.<sup>65</sup> Islamic scholars also studied European philosophy intensely, especially rationalism. In view of the decline of the once powerful Ottoman Empire, they asked, how were the administrative, economic, military, and judiciary achievements of the West to be explained?<sup>66</sup>

The younger generations thirsted after answers to the big questions of this new era. How could the curse of backwardness be overcome and the

intellectual and technical level of “Europe” achieved? Which means were best to fight the prevailing patriarchal mentality and to create a sense of national identity among the rural population? How could the interests of the great powers be confronted and a body politic organized?

The educated classes of southeastern Europe took all the major intellectual and political movements of Europe (or of the Islamic world) with a grain of salt. However, this does not corroborate a popular stereotypical assumption that the absence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment caused the Balkans to harbor long-standing, specifically anti-Western attitudes hostile to modernization.<sup>67</sup> The decisive factor was not the fundamental differences between the civilizations of the Latin West and the Orthodox or Islamic East, but the fact that the reception of major ideas took place under thoroughly different societal circumstances. At the turn of the century, more than four-fifths of the population made their living from agriculture. Anyone seeking to gain widespread resonance for their ideas at a time when developments were only beginning to politicize the mass public still had to take into consideration the attitudes, values, and interests of the peasantry.

Up to that point, it had not been possible to develop an industrial society modeled on the West, even though there were clear indications that the political system, public life, national cultures, lifestyles, and value orientations in the cities were undergoing a gradual process of embourgeoisement.<sup>68</sup> Conditions for this had been particularly favorable in Slovenia, Croatia, and Slavonia. In the nineteenth century, a small bourgeoisie had developed from the ranks of the traditional urban classes, wealthy farmers, the nobility, artisans, merchants, government bureaucrats, and military officers. What the newly emerging business circles increasingly yearned to see was the industrial production associated with smoke billowing from ever more factory chimneys. Their vocabulary was augmented by new words like “producers,” “competition,” “business cycles,” “capitalism,” and “working class.”<sup>69</sup> The situation was quite different in the peasant societies formerly under Ottoman rule, because the majority of the urban Muslims had emigrated at the time when the Ottoman influence was being eradicated in these regions. The creation of a bourgeoisie here, as in Serbia, had to start literally from scratch. However, in less than three generations, a new social elite had developed that consisted of people from poor rural circumstances who had risen to higher posts in government service or established themselves in independent professions.

In all of the South Slavic countries, improved educational opportunities in rural communities and greater regional mobility among the well-schooled and university-educated youth proved to be a powerful motor for an intellectual and national awakening. Back in the 1860s and 1870s, the first generation educated abroad had brought the ideas of liberalism to Serbia, which was also

reflected in the political system established in 1881. Both the ruling Progress Party and the Liberals favored the idea of imitating the Western path to development as quickly as possible, in order to abolish the “limitations of outdated patriarchal Serbia.”<sup>70</sup> But only a small elite were convinced of the feasibility to simply impose the European model of progress on their own country through a type of “revolution from above.” Serbia lacked the underlying support of the bourgeois classes, who could have anchored the Western type of modernization more firmly into local society. Besides the royal family, a total of six millionaires lived in Belgrade in 1900; in Zurich alone there were 500.<sup>71</sup>

It was not the economic sphere but the political one that provided the realm in which to develop all things new. Every party in Serbia took up the cause of political freedom, yet no party had worked out a clear economic reform program. This demonstrates a nearly unbridgeable gulf between political modernity and economic backwardness. The Serb newspaper *Dnevni List* (Daily Newspaper) illustrated it in the following way: “Nowhere else in the world can one see the miraculous and absurd situation that modern ideas of political and social progress are advocated in the parliament by village cash-loan givers, former municipal cops, and illiterate bench-sitters and chicken sellers.”<sup>72</sup>

This entire debate over catch-up development and Europeanization occurred against the backdrop of an intensifying competition between the major powers in the era of imperialism. Granted, the Balkans had been the object of hegemonic power projection for centuries.

However, advanced industrialization and economic global expansion created hegemony of a new sort at the end of the nineteenth century. Increasingly the aim was to secure new markets and capital-intensive investments. Trade policy, lending policy, and railway construction created new economic dependencies that the new Balkan states found hard if not impossible to avoid at first. After the Congress of Berlin, Serbia had been forced to sign disadvantageous trade contracts with Austria-Hungary and soon fell deeply into debt. Between 1880 and 1914, its liabilities grew from 16.5 million to 903.8 million French francs.<sup>73</sup> For this reason, the debate on Europeanization was always accompanied by a fear of foreign dependence, as is illustrated in the controversy of railroad construction.

At the beginning of the 1880s, Serbia and Montenegro were the only countries in Europe without a railway system. In parliament there was stiff resistance to the railroad construction stipulated by the Congress of Berlin. Was Serbian society even ready for the technological revolution, asked the members of parliament? Didn't the imposed modernization intently create new dependencies on foreign lenders? Serbia would “suffer the same fate as the Indians following the discovery of America,” it was said. Think of

Columbus, who “brought European culture to America, but with it also the chains of slavery.”<sup>74</sup>

Broadly speaking, the elites in Serbia and Montenegro split into two main groups that roughly equated the distinction between “Liberals” and “Conservatives” in Europe or between “Westerners” and “Slavophiles” in Russia: namely, a European-modern and a Slavic-traditional group.<sup>75</sup> While the liberal, state-oriented “Westerners” pushed for the separation of church and state and for institutional, legal, and constitutional reform, the conservative, community-oriented “traditionalists” tended to cultivate the autochthon roots of a meta-historical, natural, and organically perceived national identity. Although both movements envisioned a better future, the former greatly emphasized institutional change, while the latter stressed a distinct *élan vital* of the Slavs.<sup>76</sup>

Parallel to this and in a process observable throughout the entire Islamic world, the Muslim intelligentsia also developed two wings, a European-laicist and an Islamic-religious one.<sup>77</sup> Members of the former group had been educated in secular schools and at European universities, opposed traditional, religious erudition, and favored a secular, politically determined concept of nation. However, the majority of the intelligentsia still adhered to the Islamic type of Bosnian Muslim collective identity. Muslims had been catapulted into a new world by the Austro-Hungarian project to impose European civilization. The former political legitimacy of Islam, as it had been universally understood, had been forced to give way to a heteronomous and secular state legitimacy imported from the West, one that fundamentally rocked its social and cultural core. The challenge before them was to harmonize all that was new with that which was tried and tested, to conjoin the universal aim of modernization with the preservation of cultural-religious identity. But how?

During these years, the popularity of the reformist movement of Salafism, which reinterpreted ancient writings in pursuit of what the reformers considered true Islam, helped introduce two different strategies of adaptation. One strategy postulated the compatibility of Islam with Western rationalism and recommended the “modernization of Islam.” It was argued that faith and science had not been contradictory even in earlier eras. In his work *Islam and Culture*, published in 1894, Osman Nuri Hadžić, for example, proposed a rational-enlightened model for the future.<sup>78</sup> The other, at first less popular strategy emphasized the universality and values of the religion and pushed for an “Islamization of modernity.” Pan-Islamism was also part of this tradition of thought, an idea that found a voice in the magazine *Behar* (Blossom) starting early in the twentieth century.<sup>79</sup>

All this discourse on modernity, progress, and the future appears closely connected to that on cultural identity, collective values, and national assertion

and dignity. As was the case throughout Europe, the new challenges prompted strong counterreactions. Anxiety about the future and antimodern reflexes were cloaked in egalitarian debate; rural traditions, local self-administration, and the extended family were adjured, in order to fight off the subversive trend of the new era. Wasn't the contrived finery of the capital, Belgrade, which so flagrantly contradicted the poverty-ridden world of the masses, no more than a subversive attack against Serbia's socially just, agrarian society? Why should the capital city lead the outside world to believe in its progress and high culture when in reality the countryside was plagued with poverty?<sup>80</sup>

It was against this backdrop around the turn of the century that the fundamental dichotomy between urban and rural emerged, a dichotomy between modern, Western-influenced urbanity, on the one hand, and village life with its traditional social culture, on the other. The city represented the condensation of all hopes and fears with regard to modernity; it was the metaphor both for progress and decline, the promise for a better future and the signal to return to the old social and moral order. What is more, the urban-rural dichotomy also symbolized the social dividing line between "rulers" and "people," between the "city-coat wearers" (*kaputaši*) and those wearing peasant costume.

As was typical for all of Europe, this confrontation between the familiar and the foreign, between the supposed security provided by patriarchal values and the attractions and adventures of urban progressivity served as a blueprint for numerous literary works.<sup>81</sup> "Progress" was often perceived as culturally foreign and thus radicalized fears of a loss of identity and a decline of morals—fears articulated in Serbian literature by Laza Kostić, Đura Jakšić, or Stevan Sremac and in Bosnian literature by Safet Beg Bašagić and Edhem Mulabdić.<sup>82</sup> Urban and rural became symbolic representations for the contrary forces of change and persistence and for the contradictory fears of a return to atavism and barbarism, for some people, and of the irretrievable loss of the tried and true, for others. An entire legion of ethnographers, village researchers, and historians set out to trace the true roots of Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian culture and to reconstruct the pastoral world of peasantry as a counterweight to the raw industrial present. Often modernity meant foreignness, even alienation, "something that should be eliminated," as a member of the Serbian parliament expressed it.<sup>83</sup>

Both the Liberals and the Radicals in Serbia tried to dissipate the tensions between traditional social structures and patriarchal values, on the one side, and the needs of modern constitutionality, economic management, and governance, on the other. As legislators, they thus repeatedly relied on established common law when reforming agrarian, family, and trade and commercial law in order to retain tested and trusted social institutions of village life and thus avoid the upheaval of capitalism.<sup>84</sup> This was consistent with the thinking of



the socialist Svetozar Marković, one of Serbia's most important intellectuals in the nineteenth century. Influenced by Russian revolutionaries, he advocated an agrarian socialism that was based on the societal order of the village and emphasized the self-administration (*samouprava*) of the traditional extended family (*zadruga*) and the community (*opština*). He considered collective ownership and collective production to be the more humane alternative to the exploitative capitalistic state.<sup>85</sup> The following generation of politicians also thought technology and science should be advanced, but—according to Nikola Pašić, the leader of the Radical Party—they both were to be used in the “Slavic-Serbian spirit.”<sup>86</sup> This was also very similar to the position of the founders of the Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party.

The majority of Muslim intellectuals decided to favor a pragmatic strategy that adopted a select number of European standards, just as Turkish and Egyptian authors had. Bosnian spiritual leaders found citations in classic writings to justify to their fellow countrymen why they should enter military service in the hated Christian army. Compromise was recommended in other questions as well, such as in the matter of integrating the sharia into the Habsburg legal and justice system.<sup>87</sup> The predominant paradigm was therefore not to fetishize the past or the religion, let alone some nebulous anti-Westernism, but to attempt to reconcile the imported ideas, values, and structures with the dominant societal conditions.

By the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century, the glorified view of the Balkans as an exotic and romantic region was no longer able to bear up against societal realities. Just as everywhere else in Europe, the emerging industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, and other fundamental processes of modernity had already shaken traditional agrarian society to the core, even though industrialized, urbanized society with its characteristic ways of life, aesthetics, and scientific-technological momentum would not fully develop until decades later. The socioeconomic upheavals in Europe's southeast region became noticeable later than in western Europe and occurred slower, less dynamically, and in other directions. Compared with England, France, and Germany they appeared modest; even Russia and Italy were far more advanced. Still, measured against what had existed before, the change was indeed spectacular not only because it created younger, mobile, and educated generations who carried forth the spirit of change, but also because it intensified tensions between social experiences and political realities and thus brought about nationalism. In this sense, an irreversible transformation process was forging ahead that not only thoroughly changed socioeconomic realities but also pushed the national question high up on the political agenda.

## 2.

# The National Question across the Balkans (1875 to 1903)

### *The Great Eastern Crisis, 1875 to 1878*

In the summer of 1875, Christian peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had become infuriated by unbearable tax burdens, forced labor, and the excessive use of force against them, revolted against the feudal Ottoman rule, an uprising that was attentively and anxiously watched by the Great Powers of Europe. During his wanderings through both provinces, the Oxford archaeologist Arthur Evans was shocked by the inhumane conditions he witnessed: “The Christian ‘*kmet*,’ or tiller of the soil, is worse off than many a serf in our darkest ages, and lies as completely at the mercy of the Mahometan owner of the soil as if he were a slave.” In order to enforce socage tenure and collect levies, torture was used: “In the heat of summer men are stripped naked, and tied to a tree smeared over with honey or other sweet-stuff, and left to the tender mercies of the insect world. For winter extortion it is found convenient to bind people to stakes and leave them bare-footed to be frost-bitten.”<sup>1</sup>

Ottoman rule over the Balkans had begun to crumble at the end of the eighteenth century, a process of decline that was intermittently accelerated in the nineteenth century by major Eastern crises, in which the Great Powers rivaled for hegemony in “European Turkey.” This had been preceded by the Greek War of Independence (1821 to 1832) and the Crimean War (1853 to 1856).<sup>2</sup> At the time of the Great Eastern Crisis, only Greece was a sovereign state, while the Principality of Serbia was autonomous. The greater part of the Balkans remained under Ottoman rule, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today’s Slovenia and Croatia were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The various national movements in the Balkans profited from the increasing decline of the Sublime Porte. In June 1876, Serbia and Montenegro entered the war to support their Bosnian compatriots in the fight against the Ottomans. Serbia intended to annex Bosnia, and Montenegro was to take over Herzegovina, but both countries soon found themselves in trouble militarily.

Russian pan-Slavic committees sent volunteers as reinforcements, thereby prompting Austria-Hungary and Great Britain to react. These revolts meant that the Eastern Question, resulting from the heralded collapse of Ottoman rule, had entered a new phase. Once again, the strategically and economically interesting Balkans were to become “the center of particularly difficult and above all course-setting crises of the European system.”<sup>3</sup>

As the power of the Ottoman Empire waned, Austria-Hungary and Russia became the main rivals for its territories on the Balkan Peninsula. The Russian czar was driven by strategic interests, above all by the opportunity to gain control of the Turkish Straits, but also by economic motives. In addition, he was motivated by a sense of pan-Slavic solidarity with the Orthodox Christians. For the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph, the chance to carve out a piece of Ottoman territory for his empire was more a question of restoring his personal honor, following the humiliating defeats in Italy (1859) and against Prussia (1866). Bosnia-Herzegovina was to be occupied not only to better protect the naval port in Dalmatia but also to facilitate advances farther south from there. The chief objective was to prevent the succession of the South Slavs in the wake of the successful independence movement of the Italians, who, led by Piedmont, had established the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.

At the time, both Austria-Hungary and Russia were still interested in supporting Ottoman power in the Balkans to a certain degree in order to keep national movements among the Balkan peoples in check.<sup>4</sup> At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, which resolved the Great Eastern Crisis, Serbia and Montenegro were recognized as independent states and were somewhat enlarged territorially. However, the historic region of southern Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia still remained part of the Ottoman Empire, and the demands of the new Albanian national movement to create an autonomous administrative region (*vilayet*) within the Ottoman Empire fell on deaf ears.<sup>5</sup>

Austria-Hungary secured the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak. A secret protocol also assigned Serbia to the Habsburg sphere of influence while the eastern Balkan region including Bulgaria was left to Russia. Serbia was then forced to sign disadvantageous trade agreements and not only had to approve a railway connection to Hungary but also had to accept a strong Austro-Hungarian say on the control of the Danube, which was declared neutral territory below the Iron Gates. Although Serbia had been given full sovereignty, it had not achieved the important war aim of liberating Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia and thus incorporating them into its national territory. This meant that more than half of all Serbs still lived outside the motherland. Furthermore, Austrian troops stationed in Sandžak blocked any chance of unification with Montenegro and thus the desired access to the sea.<sup>6</sup>

The problems arising from the occupation and later annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would significantly impact the rest of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy agenda. The erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the independence of Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and later Bulgaria intensified competition with Russia for hegemony over the region. At the same time, it was becoming clear that South Slavic nationalism would become a question of survival for the monarchy.<sup>7</sup>

### *The "South Slavic Question" in the Habsburg Monarchy*

A closer look at Viennese politics starting in the mid-nineteenth century, which the Austrian prime minister Count Eduard Taaffe once accurately described as "muddling along," reveals that there is no justification for nostalgia of any kind regarding the Habsburg era. The ideal, supposedly harmonious world of the multiethnic "Kakania" (Robert Musil), posed as an alternative to war-torn and violence-ridden Yugoslavia, did not correspond at all with reality. Granted, the metaphor of the *Völkerkerker* (dungeon of peoples) appears exaggerated.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, the albeit halting socioeconomic transformation process in the nineteenth century had produced all over the empire an educated and economic elite in the various nationalities, who were now demanding autonomy and democratic rights with ever-growing urgency. When faced with these demands, however, the Habsburg monarchy never once seriously considered granting political representation, economic participation, or linguistic and cultural autonomy.<sup>9</sup> Rocked by its first major existential crisis caused by the revolution of 1848, the monarchy had concentrated since then solely on ensuring its very survival.<sup>10</sup> For this reason, Emperor Franz Joseph was doomed to fail in his attempt to instill loyalty for the monarchical empire as a whole and against ethnic nationalisms. Austria-Hungary did not collapse because it "lost a decisive war" in 1918 or was the victim of Serbian agitation,<sup>11</sup> but because it never resolved the growing internal conflict between political and social dynamics of change and its poor ability to reform itself.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the South Slavic question became increasingly relevant. Like the Italians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Romanians, the South Slavs had been demanding more political rights for decades. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established the dual monarchy and thereby satisfied the long-sought Magyar desire for self-government. However, no other nationality was granted substantial political, economic, and cultural autonomy, let alone self-rule. Budapest, in whose half of the empire the Croatian lands lay, treated the Slavs no differently than they had been formerly treated by the Austrians. In the Croatian-Hungarian Settlement of 1868 (*nagodba*), it granted the "Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia" autonomy within Hungary, including its own bureaucracy, judicial system,

and cultural sovereignty, but no independent government. Even though this compromise promised the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia and Slavonia, which had been a central demand of the national movement since 1848, this was never realized.

The Croats were particularly annoyed by the Hungarian nationality law stipulating that Hungarian was not only the national language but also the language to be used in teaching. Moreover, under the absolutist regime of the Hungarian Ban Károly Khuen-Héderváry (1883 to 1903), the Croatian opposition was subjected to political repression. Croats and Serbs were pitted against one another through crude divide-and-conquer politics. Fifty-five percent of the country's tax revenue had to be turned over to the Hungarian authorities. Press and election laws discriminated against non-Magyar nationalities.<sup>12</sup> Except for a small class of Croatian "Magyarons" loyal to the state, the Croats viewed the established system as corrupt and fraudulent and deeply despised it.<sup>13</sup>

The idea of the South Slavic peoples as a single Yugoslav nation developed concurrently with Croat political frustration and growing self-awareness. Its origins can be traced back to the 1830s and 1840s among proponents of the Illyrian movement. The idea adopted the arguments of early sixteenth-century Croat humanists who derived the origins of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes from an antique people, the Illyrians. Influenced by the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder and Romanticism but caught in the pinch of Hungarian, German, and Italian hegemonic impulses, Croat intellectuals and aristocrats propagated the vision of all South Slavs as a single nation, since they spoke the same language.

The Illyrians called for an imaginary national "rebirth" (*risorgimento*, *preporod*) through linguistic unity. Ljudevit Gaj, a leading scholar, wanted to create a common "Illyrian" written and literary language and to disseminate it by way of cultural activities. Reading societies, newspapers, and publishing houses were founded, and literature was used to advance "our dear native tongue." Gaj and his fellow activists decided deliberately to use the Štokavian dialect as the guide for standardizing the written language because many Croats shared this dialect with the Serbs.

It was clear to the pioneers of the Croatian national movement that they needed allies in order to ensure the success of their project for national self-rule against the resistance of Austrian centralism and Magyar cultural hegemony. Compared with the deep language gap that divided the South Slavs and the dominant nationalities (Germans, Magyars, Italians), the cultural and dialectal differences between Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, and Montenegrins appeared marginal. In the course of language reforms in the 1850s, this dialect was chosen as the basis for both Croatian and Serbian literary standards. Until

the late twentieth century, Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian) figured as the backbone of Yugoslav unity and identity

The Illyrianist idea represented the early stage of Croat national awakening. But it simultaneously addressed the issue of a common culture and identity of all South Slavs under the neutral name of an ancient people.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, this idea also found supporters among the Slovenes in Carinthia and Styria—here as a defense strategy against Germanization—and among Croatian Serbs. The historical importance of Illyrianism lies in the fact that it created the basis of both the modern Croatian culture and a bourgeois political movement that fundamentally questioned the legitimacy of the Habsburg monarchy. At the same time it planted the seed for Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian cooperation and the idea of forming a unified South Slavic (that is, Yugoslav) state.

In the 1860s, South Slavic nationalism (or Yugoslavism) developed out of Illyrianism to become the core idea adopted by a large part of the Croat intelligentsia, because the belief in a single Yugoslav nation simultaneously legitimized the creation of either an independent nation state (Greater Croatia) or a unified Yugoslav state. However, both options presupposed either the dismemberment of the Habsburg monarchy or a “trialist” recomposition of Austria-Hungary, as well as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The chief political protagonist of the Yugoslavists was Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the bishop of Djakovo since 1849, who demanded the formation and autonomy of the “Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia” within—and eventually also outside—the Habsburg monarchy.

According to the manifesto *Jugoslovjenstvo*, written in 1860 by the then well-reputed historian Franjo Rački, Croats, Serbs and possibly Slovenes, despite their historical particularities and different religions, were understood as “branches” of a single primordial nation, united by common descent and shared history.<sup>15</sup> The Yugoslavists also believed in pre-schismatic religious unity, although they realized that church and religion were the two factors that chiefly conferred national identity, established differences, and—whether intended or not—thwarted a Croat-Serb symbiosis. They used the Cyril-Methodius idea to encourage rapprochement between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. They referred to the ninth-century Slavic apostles who had made it their mission to spread a supposedly authentic Slavic-Christian culture throughout Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Bulgaria two centuries before the Great Schism of 1054. A vestige of this East-West ecclesial symbiosis is, for example, the Glagolitic alphabet (*glagolica*), which was developed from the Greek alphabet and was still being used along the Croatian coast up to the nineteenth century. However, the return to pre-schismatic religious unity as propagated by Strossmayer and Rački had

already failed in the nineteenth century when it ran up against the historic realities of stronger, more institutionalized church hierarchies.

The enlightened elite who put their faith in progress, namely the liberal bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and Catholic clergy, believed in the obliteration of historical, cultural, and religious differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. For them, the unification of South Slavs seemed to be the only realistic strategy to ensure the survival of the Croat nation in light of Austro-Hungarian supremacy. The idea of a primordial Yugoslav nation, although varied and controversial, greatly influenced the political discourse in the South Slavic lands in the decades preceding the First World War.

Among the Slovenian national movement, Yugoslavism also became popular across the entire political spectrum during the period of the dual monarchy. It appeared to be the only political idea that could bring about the realization of a United Slovenia, as had been propagated since 1848.<sup>16</sup> In 1870, Croat, Serb, and Slovene representatives met in Ljubljana to hold a South Slavic conference, in which they vowed to combine “all their strength” in order “to use it for unification in the literary, economic, and political fields.”<sup>17</sup>

Competing against the Yugoslav idea was an irredentist and hegemonic nationalism that emerged in the last third of the century in the form of “Croatianism” as propagated by the aspiring petite bourgeoisie. Unlike the Yugoslavists, Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik from the “Party of Rights,” founded in 1861, called for the creation of an exclusively Croatian nation state outside the “treacherous” Habsburg monarchy. They based their legal claims for a Croatian state on the *Pacta conventa* (agreed accords) of 1102, in which the Croat nobility had acknowledged the supremacy of the Hungarian king but allegedly had never surrendered the autonomy of Croatia. They considered the Yugoslav idea to be a tragic mistake and rejected the argument that the other South Slavic peoples had a national identity of their own. Instead they claimed that Serbs and Slovenes were basically also Croats.<sup>18</sup> Even if the importance of this ideology waned after the turn of the century, it contributed significantly to enhancing the awareness for Croatian nationalism and popularizing the idea of an independent Croatia.

Both of these national integration ideologies—the South Slavic and the pan-Croatian—invoked historic rights (of medieval Croatia) but at the same time natural law (language and culture) without ever clarifying in detail how these two elements concurred. Czech constitutionalists used similar arguments to call for the unification of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.<sup>19</sup> Time and again, both the integrative South Slavic model and the Croatian-exclusive model were debated as fundamental political alternatives throughout the entire twentieth century, and at various times in history one and then the other temporarily prevailed.

### *The Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina*

Both inside and outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Slavs were extremely bitter when Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 1878 following the Congress of Berlin. As the troops marched into the country, they met with unexpectedly fierce resistance. The dual monarchy mobilized around 250,000 soldiers and lost more than 5,000 men in order to bring the situation under control militarily. It took months to pacify the country.<sup>20</sup> The annexation of the two provinces invited more significant problems for the Austro-Hungarian dynasty. At the time, more than two million South Slavs lived in the Austrian part of the realm (7.8 percent of the total population) and another three million in Hungary (15 percent).<sup>21</sup> The annexation meant that the empire now included nearly two million more Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats, thus posing the question of why the greater percentage of South Slavs in the monarchy's entire population shouldn't be reflected in its political system. The specter loomed large not only of solidarity among Serbs and Croats but even of the founding a South Slavic state.

The efforts of Austria-Hungary to modernize the former Ottoman provinces were dictated by strategic, economic, and power interests; the emperor's aim was to integrate the occupied regions into the empire as extensively as possible.<sup>22</sup> The crux of the problem was the primacy of politics over all other developmental objectives: Vienna and Budapest identified Bosnia-Herzegovina as the key to containing the South Slavic nationalism that so threatened the existence of the dual monarchy. What needed to be prevented at all costs was the creation of a larger South Slavic state in the southern part of the monarchy, one that could become a focal point for Serbs and Croats within Austria-Hungary, a South Slavic "Piedmont." A unified Yugoslav state would have blocked both Vienna and Budapest from having access to economically and strategically vital Adriatic ports.

There were indeed reformers in Austria who wanted to federalize the monarchy and create a Slavic entity as a third and equal pillar alongside Austria and Hungary, in order to accommodate the demands of the Slavs. However, the conservatives feared that this would only encourage the nationalities to make ever more far-reaching demands. Among those opposing trialism was Emperor Franz Joseph's nephew and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand. He was an avowed anti-Liberal, an opponent of universal suffrage, a militant Catholic, and an unabashed anti-Semite.<sup>23</sup> Franz Ferdinand eventually had the entire idea of trialism struck from the program drawn up in preparation for his succession to the throne because, as was noted in internal instructions, "the Slavic part of the state will often side with Hungary, where certainly the interests of the Crown will never be found."<sup>24</sup> Then again, Hungary also



wanted to thwart any possible plans that would expand federalization, in the sense of establishing trialism.

Both the bureaucracy and the military saw themselves as being on a historical mission to bring the achievements of Western civilization to this part of the Balkans and to instill in Bosnians the feeling of belonging to a great and powerful nation. The region was to be developed in three phases. In the first phase, the emphasis was on advancing the economy and the general welfare, if for no other reason than to tap additional resources in administering the provinces. The educational system would not be expanded until the second phase, long before any thought would be given—in a third phase sometime in the distant future—to the idea of granting any rights of political participation whatsoever. Economic growth and “Europeanization” were to curb nationalism.<sup>25</sup>

Governor Benjamin Kállay, who ruled the country from 1882 to 1903, chose to implement a combination of measures meant to conserve much of the status quo while gradually modernizing the region. Because the Austro-Hungarian bureaucracy was fearful of alienating too greatly the almost exclusively Muslim class of gentry and landowners—the agas and beys—in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it left the archaic agrarian system nearly intact. Instead, it advanced transportation, industry, and urban development and thus fundamentally reshaped the old order to fit the Central European model. By 1907, the occupation government had built more than 1,250 miles of roads and 630 miles of railway lines. Forestry and the mining of coal, copper, chrome, and iron ore were intensified.<sup>26</sup>

In order to better acquaint the Muslims with the new order, the Habsburg bureaucracy decided to combine tradition and modernity. For this reason, the long-established religious and secular Ottoman schools and universities were not abolished, but at the same time new occupational training schools, teacher training colleges, and secondary education schools were established. In 1887, the governor opened a training institute for sharia judges, in which both Islamic and Austrian law were taught.<sup>27</sup> As a result, the Austro-Hungarian government succeeded in instigating certain socioeconomic transformation processes but did not win the hearts and minds of the population.<sup>28</sup> For all practical purposes, the local populace remained excluded from higher positions in bureaucracy and enterprise, and elementary schools were accessible only to a minority of 15 percent. The ethnically discriminatory agrarian system created a highly explosive situation right up to the First World War. In 1910, Muslims still accounted for 91.1 percent of all landowners, whereas only 6 percent were Orthodox Christians and 2.5 percent Catholic Christians. The flip side of the coin was that the tenant crop farmers (*kmets*) were 73.9 percent Orthodox, 21.5 percent Catholic, and only 4.6 percent Muslim.<sup>29</sup>

In an effort to neutralize the increasing nationalistic agitation coming from Serbia and—to a lesser degree—from Croatia, Kállay worked to push the historical individuality of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the limelight and to rope in nascent nationalism with the help of *bošnjaštvo* (Bosniakhood), an artificial construct depicted as a political nation with medieval historical roots.<sup>30</sup> Except for a small minority of Muslims, the people found this idea foreign; too deep were the ingrained divisions between the religions and identities.<sup>31</sup> The developmental policies of the Habsburg provincial government also stalled. The lack of agrarian reform and consumer-goods industries brought about little improvement in people's standard of living and hindered self-sustained economic growth. At the same time, the tax burden multiplied because the provinces had to cover the costs of the occupation themselves. All this fed the fires of social frustration. In 1906, a general strike took place on behalf of the nine-hour day; in 1910, there was a peasant revolt. For nationalists across the entire South Slavic region, it was clear that the conditions within Bosnia-Herzegovina were untenable and cried out for radical change.<sup>32</sup>

#### *The Serb "Piedmont"*

In Serbia and Montenegro, nationalism developed under completely different conditions than it did under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Serbia had attained autonomy in 1830 and independence in 1878. Here, nation- and state-building processes ran parallel, and the country had several decades to create and develop modern institutions and strong national self-confidence. Throughout the entire nineteenth century, especially after 1878, the state served as an energetic and resourceful agency for nation building.

Another structural difference was that, at the time, Serbia was to a large extent ethnically homogeneous. Unlike in Croatia, people in Serbia did not experience competitive coexistence in multiethnic regions on a daily basis, which is why the cooperation with other South Slavs was not seen as immediately pressing. Still, nearly two million Serbs lived outside the young state, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, southern Hungary (Vojvodina), the former Military Frontier (*krajina*), and Dalmatia. Many of them perceived independent Serbia as their national-political focal point, their springboard for the ultimate independence of all Serbs—in other words, their "Piedmont." But there were also cases in which the situation was more ambivalent, such as that of Montenegro and Macedonia. Belgrade considered Montenegro a (second) Serbian state, as did many Montenegrins themselves. Only a few saw themselves as members of a separate people. Furthermore, Serbian national politics viewed the Macedonians either as a mixture of Serbs and Bulgarians or simply as "South Serbs."

Against this backdrop, the leitmotiv of national-political thinking and action in Serbia was the liberation of its fellow countrymen and the annexation of what was believed to be Serbian lands. This had already been expressed quite clearly in *Načertanije* (The plan), written in 1844 by the statesman Ilija Garašanin, a work considered to be the earliest and an important statement on the “Serb question.” His thoughts strongly influenced Serbian national policy until 1914.<sup>33</sup>

Garašanin was himself greatly influenced by the Polish national movement, whose homeland was divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The Poles were in a situation very similar to that of the South Slavs, which is why they recommended to the Serb national movement that they create a unified South Slavic state in order to counter the predominance of the hegemonic powers.<sup>34</sup> From this Garašanin derived the fundamental principle of Serbia’s foreign policy: “That it does not limit itself to its current borders but strives to unify all Serb people surrounding it.”<sup>35</sup> Like other European national movements, Garašanin invoked historical medieval law. He designated Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, northern Albania, and Vojvodina as Serbian lands, thereby influencing the mental map of a future (Greater) Serbia.<sup>36</sup> As a result, Serb nationalism tended to be highly self-confident and to lean toward irredentism and expansionism, even if delusions of conquest to bring about a Greater Serbia cannot be inevitably derived from this.

During the decades after 1878, Serbia developed its state and parliamentary system, further refined its national culture, standard language, and literature, and thus generally consolidated its national identity. Baron Benjamin von Kállay, at the time the Austro-Hungarian consul in Belgrade, warned as early as 1873 of the widely held opinion “that Serbia is called upon to play the role of Piedmont among the Slavs of Turkey.” The Balkan state did indeed want to model itself after the Italian province as the nucleus in the process of crystallizing a transregional movement of national Serb consolidation. These political ambitions were “so strongly rooted” in public opinion, Kállay noted, “that the Serbs can no longer understand that the Slavs of the different Turkish frontiers should seek aid and protection from any state except Serbia.”<sup>37</sup> When the news of the Bosnian uprising of 1875 reached Belgrade, there were demonstrations, and Serbia’s Prince Milan would have risked a revolution had he not decided to intervene eventually on behalf of his fellow Serbs.<sup>38</sup>

The Serbs evaluated the outcome of the Great Eastern Crisis as a national tragedy, for it meant only a partial success for Serbian national politics. All sides, regardless of political affiliation, now put a solution of the national question prominently in their party programs. Opinion did not differ over the aim, only over strategy.<sup>39</sup> In 1894, the Radical Party under Nikola Pašić,

which dominated politics during the 1890s, stated in its national program: “Serbia simply cannot abandon the interests of Serbdom. From the Serbian standpoint, there is no difference between the Serbian State interests and the interests of other Serbs. The question of Serbdom is ‘to be or not to be’ of the Serbian State. . . . Cut off from other Serbian lands, Serbia by itself means nothing and has no reason to exist at all.”<sup>40</sup> In order to achieve his goal of “one nation—one state,” Pašić sought an alliance with Russia and a compromise with Bulgaria on Macedonia. The Radicals were open to, if still skeptical of, the South Slavic idea because Serbs and Croats differed in their religion and their historical-political traditions, which for them raised the question whether “we are the same people or not.” Therefore, the Radicals considered the union of all South Slavs as a possible and, under certain circumstances, a logical result of Serb unification, but not as an alternative to it. From their point of view, Yugoslavism did, however, possess the potential to place Serbian plans for fusion onto a broader platform.<sup>41</sup>

What at first was not attainable politically was shifted to the cultural realm. The intellectual elite in the various regions where Serbs lived created a cross-border cultural sphere through media, literature, travel, and youth meetings. In 1886, the new Kingdom of Serbia founded the Serbian Academy as the center for this activity.<sup>42</sup>

Like all new European nations, the South Slavs sought to legitimize their national existence with recourse to historic traditions and to strengthen social and emotional cohesion by attributing historic meaning to it in order to give the nation the appearance of a natural community, as opposed to a politically created one. During the Romantic era, the linguistic reformer Vuk Karadžić was second to none in helping shape the Serb national ideology by his collection of folk epics and folk songs.

During the course of the century, the Kosovo cycle, which celebrated in song the famous Battle of Kosovo that took place on Vidovdan (St.Vitus Day), 28 June 1389, became the bedrock on which the identity-establishing national myth was founded.<sup>43</sup> It tells the story of the fateful fight between the Serbian prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the assailing Sultan Murat I, a confrontation that allegedly led to the fall of the medieval Serbian empire. Lazar was killed in battle and later canonized. In the national consciousness, 1389 is remembered as a cataclysmic reference point, comparable to the Hundred Years’ War between England and France.

Throughout the centuries, the legend of the Battle of Kosovo evolved in hagiographic texts and epic poems to become a monumental story, albeit one in which the actual course of historical events was often downplayed or altered, such as the fact that the Serbian state did not completely disappear in 1389.<sup>44</sup> Still, it had all the components of a great national myth. Lazar’s

son-in-law Vuk Branković appears in the role of a typical traitor who becomes a collaborator with the Ottomans and thereby helps bring about the fall of the Serbs. The nation's rescuer in the tale is the fabulous Miloš Obilić, who murders the sultan and thus causes the Ottoman army to retreat. The basic motives portrayed here—discord and disloyalty, on the one hand, and courage, freedom, and justice, on the other—provided an elementary sense of meaning and purpose. With the help of biblical figurations of memory such as heroism, sacrifice, and betrayal, the Kosovo myth provided the ideological mortar to hold together an increasingly polarized Serbian society, one that found itself searching for a new self-image after the break with the oriental heritage of the Ottoman era.<sup>45</sup>

In the nineteenth century, national-minded elites transformed the originally religious Kosovo myth into a secular legend to be used for political purposes, particularly for the mobilization of resistance against both Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule. This historical narrative, based on a system of symbols, merged the past, present, and future into one; “nation,” “history,” and “freedom” constituted a whole. Thus, Kosovo represented not only Serbian identity but also the Serbian foreign policy program. Likewise, the messages of the Kosovo myth lent themselves to pictorial aggrandizement in historicizing art forms, in painting and novels. In 1889, the 500th anniversary of the battle was celebrated as a highly symbolic, major national event.<sup>46</sup> In all of Europe during the nineteenth century, emblematic meaning was attributed to the major battles of the past for the purpose of constructing national identity.<sup>47</sup>

Sagas and legends about the Battle of Kosovo were not just incorporated into Serb national mythology, they provided a rich source from which to create a common Yugoslav national culture. It was helpful that several of the historic epics were equally popular among Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, such as those about the heroic and universally revered Serbian prince Marko (Kraljević Marko) from the fourteenth century, the icon of justice in the fight against the Turks. Further inspiration was provided by contemporary national poetry, especially the immensely popular, monumental work *The Mountain Wreath* by Montenegrin prince-bishop Peter II Petrović Njegoš from 1846, who praised the sixteenth century. This epic poem and play represented one of the most important works of the time.

Similar importance was also given to the epic poem *The Death of Smail-aga Čengić* written by the Croat poet, literary scholar, and politician Ivan Mažuranić. This epic poem depicts the struggle against the Ottomans and codifies the messages of freedom, betrayal, heroism, sacrifice, and martyrdom.

The celebratory mood surrounding the 1889 commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo thus reverberated euphorically among both Croats and Serbs living under Habsburg rule. The Zagreb city government even discussed the

proposal of hosting its own celebration.<sup>48</sup> The ancient folk epics and their modern adaptations created a universe of signs, metaphors, and myths, out of which any liberation ideology could derive meaning. They created cohesion, legitimated authority and rule, shaped norms and values, and offered concrete guidelines for action.

Yet the reception of national ideology occurred less smoothly than might be expected, because Yugoslavism simultaneously served two different, if not always clearly distinguishable concepts of identity: the Croatian and the South Slavic. Serbian intellectuals feared that their own culture would be undermined and influenced by a Croatian national ideology cloaked in Yugoslavism. Contrary to the South Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbs already enjoyed their own established cultural institutions, such as the cultural-scientific institute *Matica srpska*, founded in 1826. At first, Serb intellectuals wrote with verve against the idea of South Slavic unity imported from Croatia and polemicized against the term “Illyrian.” Following the Prussian victory of 1866, politicians from Croatia and Serbia contacted one another in order to deliberate how the South Slavs could be liberated from Ottoman rule and how the Yugoslav “tribes” could be later unified into a federated state. The situation changed following the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. The fact that almost all Croats now lived in the Habsburg monarchy turned the issue of Ottoman rule into an exclusively Serb problem and thus underscored, at least for the time being, the feasibility of pursuing two separate national strategies.

Perhaps the very disparate national ideologies and objectives caused more disagreement between peoples than the religious and language differences did. Croats and Slovenes were more willing to compromise with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy than the Serbs were with the Ottoman Empire. After all, the Habsburgs had established their power by way of contractual relations (in the *Pacta conventa*), and not only through military subjugation. Catholicism also helped build a bridge between the rulers and those ruled, unlike Islam, which erected high religious, political, and social barriers against the Christian populations. Therefore, Slovenes and Croats first gave greater consideration to the possibility of federally restructuring the existing Habsburg order than to its overthrow. The Croatian concept of a Catholic-universalistic state, conceived as possessing constitutional continuity and territorial constancy throughout history, contrasted with the Serbian version of rather expansionist-oriented cultural nationalism, one that originated from an independent Serbia and its Serbian-Orthodox state church and which strove to fulfill its historic mission: namely, the unification of the South Slavic countries by the Kingdom of Serbia.

### 3.

## Radicalization (1903 to 1912)

### *The South Slavic “Powder Keg”*

In 1903, the entire region experienced dramatic domestic developments. In Serbia, army conspirators led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, known as Apis (“Holy Bull”), murdered the autocratic king Aleksandar Obrenović and his wife. His successor was Peter I Karadjordjević, who enacted the constitution, guaranteed freedom of the press, and thereby heralded a phase that would later be remembered as the “golden era” of Serbian democracy.<sup>1</sup> Following the dynasty change, Belgrade took a self-confident course toward ridding itself of the economic and political hegemony established in 1878 by Austria-Hungary and approached Russia instead.

When negotiations with Austria-Hungary failed in 1906 over a trade agreement that proved unfavorable for Serbia, the dual monarchy closed its borders to Serbian goods. The trade war (“Pig War”) forced the Serbian government to reorient its foreign trade. Within a short period of time, it succeeded in liberating itself from its dependency on Vienna.<sup>2</sup> Austro-Hungarian observers watched with concern as Serbia began, with Russia’s help, to become actively involved in the neighboring regions inhabited by South Slavs. Chief of General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, a representative of the “hawk” faction in Vienna, recommended an aggressive offensive strategy: Bosnia-Herzegovina should be annexed and Serbia militarily defeated.<sup>3</sup>

Severe political turbulence developed also in the southern Balkans in 1903 over the “Macedonian Question,” the problematic issue plaguing the area since 1878 about how to divide up the strategically and economically important historical region, including the port of Thessaloniki, between Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. In 1893, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was formed, a secret organization planning an insurrection against the Ottomans under the motto “Macedonia for the Macedonians.” On 2 August 1903, St. Elias Day, the rebels struck and “liberated” an area in the Republic of Kruševo. Although Ottoman troops quickly put down the revolt, the “Macedonian Question” thereby became internationalized. The

journalist Leon Trotsky noted perceptively that “before igniting the doomsday machine,” the conspirators had given “very felicitous thought about the type of echo this [would] have in the ‘relevant’ European press.”<sup>4</sup> The unrest alarmed Austria and Russia because they feared the power vacuum being created by the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The Mürzsteg Agreement suggested administrative, judicial, and security reforms, supervised by foreign representatives—an early international peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, one doomed to failure from the start.<sup>5</sup> In light of the violent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, when the Great Powers competed openly for its former European possessions, perceptions developed that were strongly colored by imperialist interests. Clichés and stereotypes about the Orient, such as references to it as the “powder keg,” were also attributed to “the Balkans,” making the region appear overwhelmingly anarchic, violent, and backward and thereby compelling the Great Powers to intervene in order to reinstate order and civilize its inhabitants.

Meanwhile, the dualism of the Habsburg monarchy itself was headed for a new crisis. Vienna and Budapest were constantly quarreling over finances and shared institutions. In 1903, the Hungarian opposition demanded greater independence from Austria and its own army. The Croats exploited the moment to claim their own right to financial autonomy, which the Hungarian government denied with highly insulting arguments. Mass protests broke out in 1903, which spread rapidly from Zagreb throughout all of Croatia and lasted an entire year. Thousands demanded civil liberties, the end of both economic exploitation and cultural Magyarization. Weeks of demonstrations finally brought to an end the twenty-year rule of the acting governor, Ban Khuen-Héderváry. His successor made no concessions to the protesters, but the new “people’s movement” had electrified the country and elevated the “South Slavic Question” to a topic of permanent public debate in the monarchy.<sup>6</sup>

An irrefutable realization was dawning on many groups in the Croat elite: not only did Austro-Hungarian dualism fundamentally violate the Croatian right to self-rule, but Croatian petitions put before the emperor were not being heard. A delegation from Dalmatia and Istria arrived at court, seeking to draw attention to the deplorable situation of their fellow countrymen; it was simply turned away. This marked a fundamental change of attitude. The highly praised, special loyalty of the Croats to the monarchy, still quite evident in 1848, now disappeared.<sup>7</sup>

Against this backdrop, the seed of what would later lead to the founding of the Yugoslav state began to germinate in Dalmatia at the beginning of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of the renowned politicians Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, the Croatian Party of Rights in Dalmatia switched to a “new course.” In their minds, it was now clear that the Habsburg monarchy



could not be reformed and that the Croats and Serbs could only effectively resist the German “push eastward” if they worked together. For this reason, they should found a common state.<sup>8</sup> Inspired by the writing of the Czech philosopher and later president Tomáš Masaryk, they saw their future as lying in the “liberation and unification of our peoples . . . from Tyrol to Macedonia.”<sup>9</sup> Supporters of the “new course” were politicians, lawyers, bankers, and entrepreneurs, who also recognized the South Slavic cooperation as a springboard to better counter German-Austrian and Hungarian economic competition. Students were also enthusiastic about the project of unifying the South Slavs.

On 3 October 1905, Croat members of parliament in Rijeka (Fiume) drew up a precedent-setting resolution in which they condemned the “inacceptable parliamentary and administrative conditions” in the monarchy and demanded constitutional rights and liberties, as well as the unification of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, they agreed to cooperate with the Hungarian opposition.

Shortly afterward, on 14 November 1905, Croat and Serb parties agreed to a close cooperation and a shared political program, which included the somewhat paradoxical statement that “Croats and Serbs are one people, each equal in relation to one another.”<sup>11</sup> A month later in Zagreb, they sealed a broad coalition alliance that won the majority of votes in the 1906 and 1908 elections to the diet.

Vienna and Budapest watched the developments in Croatia with growing concern and subsequently, in March 1909, tried fifty-three members of the Serbo-Croat coalition on charges of high treason. When the prosecution presented documents in court that were provably forged, the Habsburg monarchy lost its last shred of moral credibility in Croatia.<sup>12</sup>

### *Public Opinion and the Spread of Nationalism*

Starting in the early years of the twentieth century, nationalism spread to include ever more segments of the population until it became a mass phenomenon. There were two reasons for this. First, the creation of a new, politically and nationally conscious public was made possible by the vertical and horizontal mobilization of society, the emergence of new middle classes, and improved means of communication and educational opportunities. The proliferation of press, clubs, organizations, and even bold political actions like demonstrations and strikes underscored patriotic demands all the more. Further, the serious political, social, and moral crisis in which the Habsburg monarchy found itself kindled discontent that could seep down to the lower classes.

Second, clashing interests were being interpreted ever more explicitly as national conflicts, no longer social or political ones. Socioeconomic processes of change undermined existing ethnic hierarchies, and international tensions

such as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905 fueled pan-Slavic sentiments. Proof of how closely industrialization, urbanization, and “Slavication” were intertwined is evident in political life on the Croatian coast, where masses of jobseekers from the countryside migrated to what had been until then the German- and Italian-dominated cities of Slovenia, Istria, and Dalmatia. Once settled, they demanded more rights for political input on the communal level. As the Slovene and Croat parties began to win city council elections early in the century—be it in Ljubljana, Trieste, or Split—public life became “nationalized.” One indication of this was that Italian or German street names were replaced with Slovene and Croat ones.<sup>13</sup>

A new spirit reigned throughout the entire South Slavic region at the turn of the century. The spirit of optimism was reflected in newspaper names like “New Century,” “New Age,” “New World,” and “Change.” Others were called “Democracy,” “Public Life,” and “Republic,” or—with a nod to the patriotic agenda—also “Fight,” “Victory,” and “Defense.” With the spread of the printed press throughout rural regions, the new means of mass communication and thus the nationalist idea reached more and more people. In 1912, several hundred print publications appeared in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, respectively; some of these had remarkably large circulations. The Belgrade *Narodne novine* (National newspaper) printed about 32,000 copies every day, and even the Slovene *Domoljub* (Patriot) reached 30,000.<sup>14</sup> The Bosnian Muslims also experienced, somewhat belatedly, their national “rebirth.” Intellectuals emphasized the cultural individuality of a Slavic Islam, and founded magazines like *Behar* (Blossom) and the cultural institution *Gajret* (Zeal).

It became increasingly popular to meet in one of the many bustling cafés to read through the newspapers and discuss politics. As Andrić describes life in Višegrad in the first years of the new century: “Till then the townspeople had concerned themselves exclusively with what was near to them and well known, with their gains, their pastimes and, in the main, only with questions of their family and their homes, their town or their religious community, but always directly and within definite limits. . . . Now, however, more and more frequently in conversation questions arose which lay farther away. Outside this narrow circle. . . . When reading speeches and articles, protests and memoranda issued by party or religious organizations, each one of them had the feeling that he was casting off chains, that his horizon was widening, his thoughts freed and his forces linked with those of men more distant and with other forces never thought of until then.”<sup>15</sup>

Those who—like the majority of the peasant population—could not read were reached by way of a printed calendar or a small image of some historical icon with great nationalistic symbolism, like that of King Tomislav in Croatia or Saint Sava in Serbia. In the theater and in literature and art, new

heroes appeared on the cultural stage who represented the nation's pursuit of freedom, such as the early modern Croat peasant leader Matija Gubec or the protagonists in the Serb Battle of Kosovo. The public discovered national flags, symbols, holidays, food dishes, and everything that contributed and encouraged a sense of community.

A good indicator of the ongoing societal mobilization was the rapid proliferation of civil society organizations, parties and social societies, charities, reading groups, choirs, gymnastic clubs, and associations for professional groups, youths, or women. Modeled on the German example, gymnastic clubs were founded to associate physical fitness with an awakening of national consciousness. By way of Czechia, the patriotic athletic club of the Sokol (hawk) movement was introduced into the region, which promoted the idea of pan-Slavic unity. The expansive organizational structure and propaganda network of the Sokol movement helped turn it into the backbone of Yugoslavism in the South Slavic countries before the First World War.

Even the many branches of the volunteer firefighters developed a previously unknown feeling of community. For their part, choirs and singing societies that cultivated the folksong tradition contributed to the popularization and dissemination of the national idea, such as the associations Kolo and Merkur in Croatia or Gusle in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>16</sup> If we are to understand civil society as the space of social self-organization between the state, the economy, and the private sphere, in which societies and clubs, social movements, and media created on their own a sphere of public discussion and pursued these interests, then the origins for these were also to be found in the South Slavic countries.

In the ethnically mixed regions, the public organized itself primarily along ethnic and religious lines. People attended the cultural societies, joined the associations, read the press, and even frequented the coffeehouses linked to their particular ethnic and religious community, which in turn gave rise to parallel and mutually exclusive communities of communication and special advocacy groups. For example, between 1906 and 1908, separate parties for Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were founded in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Athletic clubs, cooperatives, savings banks, and reading societies were also stratified. Except for the socialists and the youth movement, very few political organizations existed that spanned all ethnic or religious groups.

Political agitation by parties also contributed to the gradual politization of rural society and to the spread of national consciousness in the countryside. The opportunities to express one's own interests through elections in the political decision-making process were unequally distributed in the region. Following the May 1903 overthrow, Serbia broadened the voting franchise to include at least 70 percent of the adult male peasantry. In contrast, the

Habsburg monarchy continued to enforce a stricter census, so that only 3.5 percent of the (adult male) Croats and about 5 percent of the (adult male) Slovenes enjoyed the right to participate in the democratic process.<sup>17</sup> Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was allowed to have a diet of its own in 1910, this body only had a consultative function and not a legislative one. Moreover, it was subject to the veto power of Austro-Hungarian institutions.<sup>18</sup> From Slovenia to Serbia, nationality politics were almost the sole topic of debate in places where diets or parliaments existed; rarely were economic or social matters discussed. With each new foreign policy crisis, be it the Serbian–Austrian “Pig War” or the crisis of Bosnian annexation, nationalistic tunnel vision became increasingly prevalent.<sup>19</sup>

Starting in the 1880s, political Catholicism in Slovenia appeared as an encompassing movement to raise national consciousness. With a tight network of social, economic, and educational activities, the Catholic Church significantly helped “awaken” Slovene peasants, workers, and small bourgeoisie. In 1905, the Slovenian People’s Party was formed. It became the strongest and most significant democratic mass party existing, even after the First World War.

In Serbia it was the Radical Party, founded in 1882, that politicized the countryside for the first time with social egalitarian and emotionally charged nationalist rhetoric. Unlike the Liberal and Progressive parties of the bourgeois elites, the Radicals idealized Serbian village traditions and donned traditional folk costumes, quite literally, to mobilize the rural vote. By articulating peasant interests (e.g., in broadening local self-administration) and aversions (e.g., against the modern tax-collecting state), they provided not only a political but also an emotional safe harbor for a peasantry threatened by the storm of social decline.<sup>20</sup> Only a year after it appeared on the scene, the party had 60,000 official members and just as many unofficial ones, quickly to be followed by many more.<sup>21</sup> In 1903, the party won 88 percent of the parliamentary seats—a solid basis for a thorough reorientation of Serbia after the dynastic change.

In 1904, the brothers Stjepan and Antun Radić founded the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party, which would become the strongest political force in Croatia after the First World War. They also understood the culture of the rural population (*puk*) to be the most promising potential for the future, an antithesis to the ruling urban class.<sup>22</sup> In place of a half-hearted industrialization of Croatia, the motor of progress was to be well-developed agriculture, improved by agrarian technology, expertise, and cooperatives.<sup>23</sup> The Peasant Party railed against the growing tax burden, usury, and sinking market prices and declared that only a sovereign state could solve such pressing problems. They mobilized more and more supporters by circulating calendars and their magazine *Dom* (Home), staging election rallies and literacy campaigns, founding cooperatives, and providing credit. The decisive factor was that they transformed the

problems of rural society into issues of national importance and thus won over broader segments of the population for the goal of creating an independent Croatian or Yugoslav state. This was one reason why they were able to play a key role in the national integration of the Croats.

In comparison, the workers' movement—essentially imported from Germany—remained weak for lack of a social basis. German, Austrian, and Hungarian artisan journeymen who were underway in the region, or local apprentices who had come into contact with socialist ideas while working abroad, acted as transmission belts for socialist ideas in what was still primarily an agriculturally dominated world. In 1872, the first workers' associations were founded in Croatia, followed by the emergence of the trade union movement in 1890. In 1894, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia was founded, which merged two years later with their Slovenian comrades into the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. Starting in 1902, they also cooperated with Serbian socialists.<sup>24</sup>

As elsewhere in Europe, the South Slavic socialists believed that the national question merely represented a side contradiction of capitalism, which would disappear once capitalism gave way to communism. Linguistic, cultural, and historic differences between the Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats were considered anachronistic or irrelevant. At the first pan-Yugoslav conference of the socialists, held in 1901 in Ljubljana, the existence of a South Slavic nation was declared. However, there was no consensus over the political consequences of such a declaration. Should a federal state be created within Austria-Hungary, or a larger Balkan federation, or a Yugoslav federal state? The party split over this issue. Those favoring an independent Yugoslavia, the founding of which required the destruction of the monarchy, found themselves in conflict with their Austrian comrades, who argued the case favoring a democratic, federal reform of Austria-Hungary. For the time being, the Austro-Marxists were in the majority.<sup>25</sup>

In the 1890s, a progressive, revolutionary youth movement emerged in the Balkans, as it did in many European countries. It rebelled against things time-honored, sought new concepts and models, and thereby linked criticism of civilization with nationalist ideals of freedom. Supporters of the Progressive Youth, the Young Croats, and the Young Bosnians were politically active pupils from secondary schools. Most came from peasant families and believed in revolutionary ideals, heroism, and sacrifice. They did not have a coherent ideological concept but had recourse to populist, anarchic, and socialist ideas.

Anticlericalism and social-revolutionary impetus blurred the religious and historical differences that originally defined ethnic identities among the South Slavic peoples. Therefore, most were committed Yugoslavists and

believed that Serbs and Croats formed “a nation with two names,” as could be read in the Croatian almanac *Narodna misao* (National idea).<sup>26</sup> Consequently, nationalism was “the idea of unifying Serbs and Croats,” as one of the Sarajevo assassins later testified in court.<sup>27</sup> These youths impatiently awaited the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy and dreamed of founding a democratic South Slavic state. A new generation emerged from the youth movement that no longer merely supported Yugoslavism as an ideological standpoint, but in fact lived it. Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims conspired underground and formed a tightly knit community of shared experience. Several people who would eventually become very well-known names in Yugoslavia were politically socialized in this way, including the later Nobel laureate for literature, Ivo Andrić.<sup>28</sup> In 1913, the organizations from the various regions in the monarchy consolidated into one.

### *The 1908 Annexation Crisis*

When Emperor Franz Joseph announced, on 6 October 1908, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary had occupied since 1878, a serious crisis loomed once again. The occasion prompting this development was the revolution of the Young Turks, who introduced a constitution and a parliament in the Ottoman Empire. Vienna feared that now the Christian peoples in the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were formally still under Ottoman rule, would convene a constitutional congress and demand their independence. In August, Serb and Muslim politicians had already submitted a memorandum to the government and demanded a constitution.

The coup-like annexation contributed significantly to fanning the fires of nationalism among the South Slavs and radicalizing them. Whereas the Ottoman Empire accepted a compensation of 2.5 million pounds, the Serbs reacted angrily to the annexation. The king’s government saw that Serbia’s chances to fulfil its historic mission of liberation were dwindling, so it started an aggressive press campaign and mobilized the army. Public reaction exploded into anger in Belgrade, and enraged mobs burned Habsburg flags on the streets. Prominent citizens and intellectuals formed the organization *Narodna odbrana* (People’s Defense) to strengthen Serb resistance to the annexation. They modeled their efforts on the *Difesa nazionale* of the Italian resistance fighter Garibaldi. Within a short period of time, 223 chapters were set up and tens of thousands of people had been mobilized. At least 5,000 volunteers joined the ranks of the paramilitary “death squads.”<sup>29</sup>

Austria-Hungary mobilized several army units, threatened war, and presented Belgrade with an ultimatum on 19 March. The Serbian government had to declare that it would “abandon the stance of protest and resistance that

it had taken regarding the annexation since the previous October . . . and live in friendly and neighborly relations.”<sup>30</sup> Starting in 1909, the Narodna obbrana discontinued its militant rhetoric and limited its activities from that point on to cultural ones.

The annexation crisis prompted Serbia to improve relations with Montenegro, whose head of state Nikola (who had himself crowned king in 1910) had established close ties to Italy, Russia, and Serbia through clever marriages. Suddenly the tiny state, immortalized in Franz Lehár’s operetta *The Merry Widow*, became a factor in international politics that was hard to overlook. For one thing, its drive for expansion into the Albanian region of settlement posed a potential threat for Vienna’s Balkan policy. For another, a political alliance with Serbia would give Belgrade the access to the Adriatic it had sought for so long. At first the Montenegrin political elite were divided over rapprochement with Serbia. While supporters of the “People’s Movement” considered the Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and approved the fusion of the “two Serbian states,” the monarch and government insisted on the existence of separate historical and political identities—a conflict that would flare up time and again during the twentieth century.

The use of force had indeed enabled Austria-Hungary to consolidate its territorial gains from 1878, but this accomplishment came at the high price of angering the South Slavs, of strengthening the Yugoslav idea, and of intensifying the growing rivalry with Russia. Serbia was humiliated; Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs living under the Habsburg rule were embittered. The annexation crisis reestablished the “South Slavic question” as a major foreign policy issue for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, what was new this time was that the matter was organically linked to the political reorientation of the entire region, thereby making it a very real “European question.”

In the meantime, a real obsession with war took hold of large sectors of Serbian society. As the *ultima ratio* of the annexation crisis, nationalist passions were to be stilled by the liberation of the European part of the Ottoman Empire, namely Kosovo. Gymnastic, singing, and charitable associations, as well as professional organizations, youth groups, and women’s leagues declared support for the war of liberation so fervently yearned for. Commemorations of and references to the Battle of Kosovo were popularized in calendars, almanacs, theater plays, poems, and songs. Even the simplest of peasants was imbued with the belief in a national mission and hungered for the day of revenge, noted a historian at the time, Slobodan Jovanović.<sup>31</sup>

One of the most decisive intellectual developments was the breakthrough in garnering support for Yugoslavism, meaning the idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were all part of one people. In Serbia, the earlier skepticism of a national merger of Croats and Serbs into a single nation gave way to a new

pragmatism. In 1910, Nikola Pašić convinced his fellow supporters in the Radical Party that it was “necessary to abandon the two-people theory. . . . The one-people theory, which corresponds to scientific findings and the actual situation, has all of the merits of a national unification idea and certainly does not prevent the components of this people from cultivating and further developing their respective particularities and historic memories.”<sup>32</sup>

In artistic and intellectual circles, support grew for the concept of a South Slavic unity of culture, language, and politics and for the founding of an all-Yugoslav nation in which each “tribe” was to make its own unique contribution. It seemed logical that the avant-garde for this movement was made up of intellectuals, artists, and the youth movement, including leading scholars and writers like the geographer Jovan Cvijić, the writer Jovan Skerlić, and the historian Stojan Novaković in Serbia; the sculptor Ivan Meštrović, the dramatist Ivo Vojnović, and the writer Antun Gustav Matoš in Croatia; the ethnologist Niko Županić and the literary scholar Ivan Cankar in Slovenia; as well as the writer Ivo Andrić in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Authors, journalists, and painters established close ties in order to advance the cultural unification.<sup>33</sup> In 1909, the Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb, together with their partners in Serbia and Slovenia, initiated a project to produce a “Yugoslav Encyclopedia,” which was not published due to the outbreak of the First World War. “We are the generation of the great national synthesis . . . from Drniš to Niš,” that is, the South Slavic region in its entirety, summed up the Croat writer Tin Ujević in 1912.<sup>34</sup>

In literature, sculpture, and painting, intellectuals and artists discovered they could transpose the heroes and motifs of the Serb national epic to the genre of modern art and thereby use them as a cipher for a Yugoslav national ethos. In 1910 at the Viennese Secession Building, the Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović exhibited the model of a “Vidovdan temple” with a number of large caryatids representing figures from the epic Kosovo cycle in order to honor the Yugoslav idea.<sup>35</sup> Architecture and sculpture were an ideal-type representation of the cultural imagination of primordial Yugoslavism, which was based on the idea of South Slavs as a single nation united by common origin and historical experience. At the same time, such artistic expression served as a catalyst in expressing discontent with the manner in which the national question was being handled in Austria-Hungary.<sup>36</sup> Meštrović’s decision to exhibit this model at the International Exhibition of Art in Rome in 1911 at the Serbian pavilion and not at the Austro-Hungarian one was a political statement that caused international furor. Years before the decisive moment arrived during the First World War to establish a state of Yugoslavia, the artistic and literary avant-garde of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia had formed a consensus on its cultural foundations.<sup>37</sup>



*Revolutionaries, Anarchists, Conspirators*

Following the annexation crisis, South Slavs across the Balkans increasingly embraced the ideas of Clausewitz and Hegel, posited a century before, that national unification could only be achieved through a war of liberation. The Serb scholar Jovan Cvijić demanded as an ultimatum “that the Serb problem [had to be] resolved with force.” In Croatia, youth at demonstrations cried out “*nulla redemptio sine sanguine*” (there is no salvation without bloodshed). People wanted to take control of their own affairs. They cultivated a stronger sense of self-confidence and the “belief in oneself, the reliance on one’s own strengths,” as the Serbian writer, critic, and committed Yugoslavist Jovan Skerlić wrote.<sup>38</sup>

From the seedbed of the youth movement grew anarchistic and social revolutionary groups that resorted to various means of violence. In 1912, the Nationalist Youth was formed in Croatia. This group wanted to achieve the unification of Serbs and Croats with insurrectionist methods. In June of that year, a Croat student attempted to murder the hated Austro-Hungarian governor in Croatia, Slavko Cuvaj, who had dissolved the diet and forbidden political gatherings in an effort to prevent a government coalition he did not favor from assuming power. As a result, demonstrations and street fighting with the police and the army occurred in many cities, and the Croat student body went on strike.<sup>39</sup> In April 1912, the constitution was suspended, and Cuvaj was named royal commissioner, all of which led to a further radicalization and transregional solidarity among students.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the pressure also grew to use violence to revolt against the foreign regime. In the heated atmosphere of the annexation crisis, more and more teachers and pupils turned to national revolutionary ideologies. According to the disciplinary rules of May 1908 for the middle school, pupils were forbidden to order political publications, to stroll down the street with girls, and to ride bikes.<sup>40</sup> Since the authorities did not allow student organizations of any kind, secret societies formed similar to the Russian Narodniks, a social revolutionary, populist, and Slavophile movement.

The supporters of the Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna) were Yugoslav nationalists striving for the political union of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Slovenes. They wanted to shake off foreign rule, overcome the backwardness of their home, emancipate women, and create a thoroughly “new man,” a morally superior type of person. All this was to be achieved through revolutionary action. Literature played an extraordinary role. Nearly all tried their hand at being a literary critic or an author, or translated Kierkegaard, Strindberg, Ibsen, Wilde, or Poe. “If the Serb revolutionary wants to win, then he has to be both artist and conspirator,” summed up Vladimir Gaćinović.<sup>41</sup>

The records of one pupil's trial in 1914 in the central Bosnian town of Tuzla reveal the sources of inspiration for young Bosnians. Tuzla was a small town that must have been considered a provincial backwater even by the standards of the time. However, the youth embracing nationalism were very familiar with Europe's intellectual canon. For example, Mladen Stojanović, a pupil preparing for his secondary school graduation exams, had read Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Bakunin, Nietzsche, Jaurès, Le Bon, Ibsen, and Marinetti just to that end. Others were influenced by Mazzini's Risorgimento and the movement Young Italy (Giovine Italia), the rationalism and anticlericalism of Tomáš Masaryk, and the writings of the Russian revolutionaries and anarchists, especially those of Chernyshevsky and Bakunin. Folk mythology, particularly the Kosovo myth and the epics by Prince-Bishop Petrović Njegoš, had deeply impressed them.<sup>42</sup> They saw their commitment to a better future as homage to modernity: a "modern person," wrote their chief theoretician Dimitrije Mitrinović, "is one who sympathizes with the unrest of our times, who tries to find a solution to the misery. . . . Modern is the person who, in our epoch of democracy and liberalism, feels the full absurdity of an anachronistic system in our country, who senses the lack of justice for our poor masses and fights for bread and freedom for a naked and starved people."<sup>43</sup>

In order to advance their revolutionary cause, the Young Bosnians established contact in Serbia with the nationalistic secret society Unification or Death. In 1911, Serbian officers had founded this underground organization, also known as the Black Hand, out of their bitterness over the compliance of the Belgrade government toward Austria-Hungary. In this case, too, there were many instances in which these organizations were intertwined with European models, such as the Italian *carbonari* or the Freemasons. Similar rituals and symbols (skull and crossbones, dagger, bomb, poison) illustrate this. Their "constitution" borrowed wording from the Russian *Catechism of a Revolutionary*. The Black Hand, which the regicide Colonel Dimitrijević-Apis also joined, supported anarchic-revolutionary activities abroad in order to unify all Serbs into a single state. Although both groups took up the cause of national liberation and later worked together in some areas, there were fundamental differences between Young Bosnia and Unification or Death. For one, the former sought to establish a South Slavic state, the latter a pan-Serbian or Serb-dominated Yugoslav one. For another, the former was made up of atheistic and republican-minded young people, while members of the latter embraced authoritarian, militaristic, and clerical worldviews.<sup>44</sup>

By the eve of the First World War, the basic constellations and dilemmas involving the various national questions had crystallized and would preoccupy the entire South Slavic region for the duration of the twentieth

century: the dispersion of the Serbs in various states; the unfulfilled right to self-determination for Croats and Slovenes; the unresolved questions of both Macedonia and Bosnia, complicated by the competing territorial claims of neighboring states; the ambivalence of the Montenegrins regarding Serb and Montenegrin national identity; and last but not least, the future Serbian-Albanian conflict over Kosovo. At the start of the century, it was all but clear how these mutually influencing and sometimes competing “national questions” could be solved. Which national ideology should be pursued, an ethnically exclusive one or a South Slavic integrative one? What political framework should be established to guarantee the coexistence of all the peoples of the Balkans?

Even though the Yugoslav idea was never supported by all relevant forces within society, it found more and more resonance in the population starting at the turn of the century. In addition to cultural and linguistic similarities, the large number of ethnically mixed settlements, shared folk traditions and ideals, and irrefutably practical political reasons spoke in favor of a common South Slavic state. Meanwhile, Yugoslavism was both open and inclusive and offered a great deal of interpretative leeway. Alternately it could guide Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian identity and nation building, serve as a synthetic multicultural South Slavic national ideology, or function as a transethnic, political framework. Furthermore, Yugoslavism was anchored neither in one religion or political ideology, nor was it territorially determined. It is possible that it was precisely this vagueness that made it so highly attractive. In an age of ever-radicalizing nationalism, Yugoslavism created space for highly different ideological concepts, political objectives, and societal designs and, more importantly, provided a backdrop against which to project every type of hope, illusion, and aspiration.

## 4.

# The Three Balkan Wars (1912/1913 to 1914/1918)

### *The Balkan Wars 1912/1913*

Following the dynastic change in Serbia in 1903, tensions with Austria-Hungary began to rise slowly, not the least because of Russia's growing influence in the Balkans. Emperor Franz Joseph was convinced that he could still curb Belgrade's foreign policy ambitions even if it was no longer possible to control them. But the situation reached a turning point in 1912.

In March of that year, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, orchestrated by Russia, formed the Balkan League, a system of bilateral, mutual assistance treaties that aimed to deprive the sultan of his remaining European possessions. From Vienna's point of view, the patronage of the Russian czar toward these Christian states expanded his sphere of influence to a dangerous degree. Serbia turned itself into the gravitational center of South Slavic national movements by demanding outright the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Since Russia was also searching for allies in Galicia, Bohemia, and Bukovina, Austria-Hungary felt itself surrounded by hostile forces.

On 8 October 1912, Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Ten days later, the other members of the Balkan League joined it. Their troops moved quickly to the southern Balkan region in the direction of Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>1</sup> That winter the Montenegrin army reached Shkodër, and the Serbs advanced down the Albanian coast to Durrës. However, Serbia's grab for Kosovo and Macedonia was not only criticized by Bulgaria and Greece, which also harbored territorial claims to this region, it was also condemned, especially by the Albanian national movement. Founded in 1878, the League for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation, commonly known as the League of Prizren, had demanded autonomy within the Ottoman Empire for years without success and had even assumed power in Kosovo for a short

spell in 1881. In 1911, unrest erupted there, and in the spring of 1912, a revolt. Now the creation of an Albanian nation state was even being discussed.

The Balkan armies committed unfathomable atrocities against the civilian population as they conquered the Ottoman areas. They expelled, persecuted, and sometimes even annihilated unwanted minorities to usurp territory to which there were no legitimate claims. Such “ethnic cleansing,” a euphemistic term for mass atrocities, had occurred since the beginning of the nineteenth century during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of modern nation-state building. Since the Serb uprisings in the early nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of people had been uprooted, and violent policies of homogenization continued thereafter when ethnic homogeneity became the mantra of a strong and effective nation-state in Europe. In a nationalist age, the makeup of a population served to justify one group’s territorial claims over those of another.<sup>2</sup> Leon Trotsky reported how “the Serbs in Old Serbia . . . are engaged quite simply in systematic extermination of the Muslim population” so as to correct the ethnographical statistics to their favor.<sup>3</sup> The armed forces of the other countries also undertook “ethnic cleansing” in order to destroy any resistance. “Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred . . . with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians,” documented an independent commission of inquiry.<sup>4</sup> Throughout the twentieth century, such acts of violence would reoccur whenever conquests brought regime change or empires and states fell apart, particularly during the Second World War and the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s.

The Great Powers worked feverishly to come up with a containment strategy. However, by December 1912 it had become clear that the status quo could not be reinstated in the Balkans. Instead, a dangerous crisis developed in Austro–Russian relations. Ultimately, Vienna succeeded in blocking Serbia from gaining any access to the Adriatic and, for this purpose, recognized the independence of the new state of Albania, declared by the Albanian National Congress in November 1912 in Vlorë. On the basis of these developments, the warring sides signed the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913, through which the sultan lost most of his European possessions.<sup>5</sup>

Serbia refused to accept the situation and demanded parts of Macedonia as compensation for the loss of territorial claims in Albania, thereby destroying the Balkan League. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece on 29 June 1913, was defeated, and had to accept painful territorial losses in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913.<sup>6</sup> Albania was given the status of a sovereign principality under the control of the Great Powers and their governor, German Prince Wilhelm zu Wied. Still, about 50 percent of the Albanian population lived outside the boundaries of this new state.

In light of Serbia's successful expansion in the Balkan wars, encouraged by Russia, the view of the "hawk" faction at the Viennese court persevered: now Serbia was said to pose an existential threat to the dual monarchy that could only be eliminated by force.<sup>7</sup> From this point on, the Serbian danger, supposedly initiated by Russia, became the leitmotif of Austro-Hungarian politics in the Balkans. For Serbia, however, the wars had established it as a regional hegemonic power, which thus immensely boosted its national self-confidence. Its territory had expanded by 81 percent with the annexation of Vardar-Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sandžak, its population by nearly 50 percent to about 4.3 million. Belgrade had achieved a grandiose military triumph and reconquered the historic and emotionally significant "Old Serbia" with Kosovo and parts of Macedonia, where once the heart of the medieval Serbian empire lay. However, the victory had come at a high price. In both wars the country lost 14,000 combatants in battle. An additional 22,000 soldiers died from injuries and disease, and 54,000 were wounded. The costs equaled a sum three times greater than the national budget.<sup>8</sup> Serbia was exhausted, financially drained, and confronted with new domestic problems caused by a half million new Albanian and Turkish citizens. Authorities settled about 12,000 Serb families in the new territories, and thousands of Muslims fled. The Serbs ruthlessly combated the active resistance put up by Albanian rebels, the Kachaks, starting in 1913. In addition, guerrilla warfare with the Macedonian irregular troops of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization started in 1914. War and uprising left the population destitute.<sup>9</sup>

Among the Serbs and Croats still living under Habsburg rule, the Balkan wars had an enormous mobilizing impact. "Not only in Serbia itself, but also in the Austro-Hungarian regions inhabited by South Slavs did people believe that the collapse of Austria-Hungary was imminent and that Yugoslavia could be created only from Belgrade with the help of the Serbian army and its allies," concluded Alexander Hoyos, then the chef de cabinet at the Austrian Foreign Ministry.<sup>10</sup> In March 1913, a confidential report submitted to the emperor and his government stated: "The South Slavic idea, meaning the idea of the Serbo-Croatian fraternization . . . has now reached the highest leadership and . . . is not only the solution for all segments of the population in political matters, but also in cultural and economic ones as well. This is true not only for Croatia and Slavonia, but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly for Dalmatia, where a revolutionary, antimonarchical spirit has promptly gained ground."<sup>11</sup>

Serbia's national agitation and its drive for expansion endangered both the domestic stability and the foreign security of Austria-Hungary. In April 1913, negotiations commenced between the Serbian and Montenegrin governments on unification, which would have given Belgrade its long-sought access to the sea.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Serbia took possession of Macedonia and hence acquired

parts of the Oriental Railway in 1912/1913. Since the Habsburgs owned 51 percent of the railway, they suffered highly aggravating financial losses. However, what troubled them the most was Russia's political patronage in the region, because this affected the power and alliances of the Habsburg Empire and curtailed its military discretion in handling defiant Balkan states. For Austria-Hungary, relations with Serbia were increasingly becoming a question of survival, and each success enjoyed by Serbia further reinforced this view.

The Balkan wars accelerated the militarization of Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. It was becoming increasingly clear that a military offensive was being taken into consideration as part of its strategy to prevent the further expansion of Serbia's influence in the region. Vienna issued ultimatums both in the spring and fall of 1913 that forced Montenegrin and Serbian troops to retreat from Albanian territory, which then reconfirmed the Austrians' view that force was the only language Belgrade understood.<sup>13</sup> When control over the annexed provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina threatened to slip from its grasp in the summer of 1914, Vienna resorted to the means of "surgical intervention against the pathogenic agent" Serbia.<sup>14</sup> What was at stake seemed to be nothing less than the domestic stability of Austria-Hungary, if not the survival of the monarchy itself. In a memorandum dated 24 June 1914, the Foreign Ministry, encouraged by Germany, urged the emperor to take an aggressive foreign policy course. This memorandum shows that, even before Austria-Hungary faced the crisis that would unfold in July, the leadership had decided to use the aggressive strategy worked out back in 1906 by General Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf.<sup>15</sup>

Vienna's policy was developed in the context of pressing considerations and concerns involving the Balkans and foreign alliances, the foremost of these being its troubled relations with Romania, a rivalry with Italy over Albania, the danger that the Balkan League would be revived to counter Austria-Hungary, a possible unification of Serbia and Montenegro, and the growing influence of Russia in the region. Several factors paved the way for a "great war": the division of Europe into two hostile blocs; the arms race and imperial expansion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; growing social and domestic conflicts; and finally, aggressive war plans, inaccurate military speculations, and diplomatic mismanagement. War would offer the chance to neutralize Serbia. All that was needed was the appropriate opportunity to spark a conflict,<sup>16</sup> and that occurred on 28 June 1914 with the assassination of Austrian crown prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

### *Assassination and the July Crisis*

Shortly after 1:00 p.m. on 28 July 1914, the Serbian prime minister, Nikola Pašić, was eating lunch at the Café Evropa in Niš when a gendarme handed him a simple telegram containing Austria-Hungary's declaration of war.

Tensions had been great and preparations for war had intensified in the weeks since the 19-year-old Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip had shot the Austrian crown prince, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in Sarajevo. That spring, members of the Young Bosnia movement had felt deeply provoked by the announcement that the royal couple would visit the occupied provinces to observe military maneuver exercises precisely on the anniversary of the symbolic and emotionally charged Battle of Kosovo. On the morning of 28 June, seven young conspirators armed with bombs and weapons positioned themselves along the Appel Quay. It was due to pure coincidence and especially the bungling security measures of the police that this amateurish tyrannicide was successful.<sup>17</sup>

The assassins and their instigators were seized shortly afterward and later tried along with about 180 other sympathizers. Princip and his codefendants repeatedly asserted that they had planned the assassination all by themselves and had only been handed the weapons in Serbia. Yet apparently they had very different political and private motives. Princip confessed that he had been determined since 1912 to carry out an assassination of some person of high standing who represented power in Austria. "I am not a criminal, because I just eliminated an evildoer," he claimed on 12 October 1914. He and his accomplices further stated that Franz Ferdinand was an "enemy of the South Slavs," that the archduke was responsible for the state of emergency and all trials of high treason, and that poor people were becoming even poorer with every passing day. They all sought to free Bosnia from the Habsburg monarchy and unify all South Slavs into a single state, so that Yugoslavs would live together as one nation.<sup>18</sup>

The Austrian prosecutors refused to accept that the anti-Slavic politics of Austria-Hungary had motivated these members of the Young Bosnians to carry out the assassination. They attempted to prove that the Serbian government had planned and assisted the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg monarchy because the crown prince allegedly wanted to reform the empire in a way that would have taken the wind out of the sails of Serb nationalism.<sup>19</sup> But nowhere in their testimonies do the assassins ever say that they murdered Franz Ferdinand because of his (actually nonexistent) plans to establish trialism. To date no evidence has been found to prove either that the assassination was the work of the Serbian government or that Russia was the real force behind Serbia's politics.<sup>20</sup> On the contrary, two weeks before the assassination, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić had pushed to halt the illegal smuggling of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to scrutinize the activities of the Black Hand.<sup>21</sup>

On 28 October 1914, the Austrian court sentenced the three main perpetrators to twenty years in a maximum security prison camp located in the Bohemian city of Theresienstadt. Their punishment was to be intensified by



a day of fasting each month and by confinement in a bare-bones, completely dark cell every 28 June. All three died in prison as a result of the inhuman conditions there.

The Serbian government in Belgrade attempted to de-escalate the situation since it had long been concerned that Vienna was looking for a pretext to attack.<sup>22</sup> It expressed its deep regrets and condolences and assured Vienna that Serbia would immediately investigate the circumstances of the assassination. At the same time, it stated unequivocally that the Serbian government had nothing to do with the murder.<sup>23</sup> The Russian envoy Strandtmann reported on 23 July 1914 from Belgrade that an aggravation of Austrian-Serbian relations “was viewed in Belgrade as being not only unwanted, but also as dangerous for the survival of the kingdom itself.”<sup>24</sup>

Diplomats at Vienna’s Foreign Ministry on Ballhausplatz were indeed pondering “what demands could be made that would be thoroughly impossible for Serbia to accept.”<sup>25</sup> On 7 July, the Ministerrat für Gemeinsame Angelegenheiten (Council of Ministers for Common Affairs) urged the stipulation of unfulfillable conditions, “so that a radical solution in the direction of military intervention could be initiated.” Twelve days later, it decided to prune Serbia to a rump state dependent economically on Austria-Hungary by partitioning as much of Serbian territory as possible with Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.<sup>26</sup> Even though it is accurate to say that the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne on 28 June 1914 was but the trigger that discharged the full force of mounting international competition between the major powers, and that Emperor Franz Joseph would never have risked the attack on Serbia without the support and public encouragement of Germany, the conflict between Austria and Serbia that had been building since 1908 possessed its own explosive logic.<sup>27</sup>

On 23 July around 6:00 p.m., the Austrian envoy Baron Giesl delivered an alarming note in Belgrade. In it, Vienna accused the Serbian government of complicity in the assassination and issued a ten-point ultimatum in which it demanded that the propaganda aimed against Austria-Hungary be condemned and all irredentist activities be prosecuted. In addition, it demanded that Serbia “agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy.”<sup>28</sup> Serbia was to answer within forty-eight hours.

In these forty-eight hours, Nikola Pašić composed—with the help of his minister of domestic affairs, Stojan Protić—a truly masterful answer that commanded quiet respect even in Vienna. He delivered the note personally to the Austrian ambassador shortly before the clock struck 6:00 p.m.<sup>29</sup> The note was conciliatory, nearly apologetic, in all points except one: “As far as the cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and

R. [Imperial and Royal] Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure.”<sup>30</sup> The Serbian legal system did not permit any foreign intervention in domestic affairs, it was argued. The very same day, Vienna broke off its diplomatic relations with Serbia, and on 28 July, the Austro-Hungarian emperor declared war on Serbia. It was the culmination of a looming crisis long in the making.

### *War, Retreat, and Occupation*

The Austrians harbored the illusion that the war would be short and therefore sent an underfinanced, poorly equipped, and rather unmotivated army into battle against Serbia. As a precautionary measure, martial law was declared already on 25 July in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, pro-Yugoslav newspapers were banned, and opposition leaders and “Serbian spies” were arrested, deported, or executed on a massive scale. Vienna made preparations to repress the predictable wave of solidarity with Serbia.<sup>31</sup>

On 11 August, General Oskar Potiorek crossed the Drina from Bosnia-Herzegovina with three armies and headed into Serbia. Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes living under Habsburg rule were forced to fight; in some units they made up as much as 40 percent of the troops. One of them was the 21-year-old locksmith Josip Broz, later known as Tito.<sup>32</sup> The area of eastern Bosnia and the Drina valley was one in which much of the fighting took place. It was from here that the Austrians advanced toward Serbia. Serb volunteers led by Kosta Todorović took the provincial city of Srebrenica on 18 September 1914 but were driven from there shortly afterward by the Austrians, who killed the commander and, together with Croat-Muslim legionnaires, committed hideous atrocities against the civilian population. In Serbian historical memory, Todorović became a hero and is still commemorated today. His story serves as an early parable in the national discourse on sacrifice.<sup>33</sup>

The Austrians soon found themselves in difficulty because of poor strategic planning, logistic problems, and the highly motivated Serbian army under the command of the elderly Serbian general chief of staff Radomir Putnik. Although the Balkan wars had exhausted the Serbs, militarily they were well trained and psychologically hardened for war. On the plateau of the mountain Cer, where the Drina and Kolubara rivers converge, they pulverized Potiorek’s soldiers. Nearly 274,000 Austrian troops were killed in the first year of the war. By the end of 1914, the Austro-Hungarian troops were trapped in the Balkans, the war virtually lost. The Serbs commemorate the important battle with the patriotic song “March on the Drina,” which praises their soldiers’ bravery and love of liberty.

The brutality and totality of the war in the Balkans was characteristic of the conflict from its very beginning in the summer of 1914 and not just the

result of the escalating dynamics of violence. The Austrians were convinced that the Serbs would conduct a bloody guerrilla war with the help of irregular fighters, the *komitadži*. Invoking “*Kriegsnotwehrrecht*,” the wartime right to self-defense, the Habsburg troops committed horrific devastation and mass atrocities that stood in clear violation to valid international laws of war and appalled foreign observers.<sup>34</sup> A “*Direktion für das Verhalten gegenüber der Bevölkerung in Serbien*” (directorate for the behavior toward the population in Serbia) ordered: “The war leads us into an enemy country that is inhabited by a population filled with fanatical hatred toward us. Any form of humanity or tenderheartedness shown to such a people is not only misplaced but actually baneful, because such deference, which in wartime is otherwise possible now and then, would in this case seriously endanger the security of our own troops.” The Austro-Hungarian armies took civilians as hostages; killed thousands of men, women, and children “in reprisal” for partisan attacks; burned down villages; and plundered as much as they could carry. This was the case not only in Serbia but also on the other side of the Drina in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “‘Our troops,’ one soldier serving with the Honved reported, ‘have struck out terribly in all directions, like the Swedes in the Thirty Years War. Nothing, or almost nothing, is intact. In every house individuals are to be seen searching for things that are still usable.’”<sup>35</sup>

Rudolf Archibald Reiss, Professor for Criminalistics and Forensics in Lausanne, traveled to the Serbian front in 1914 and documented the horror for the rest of the world. Innumerable cities and villages were described as consisting only of ruins, such as Šabac: “Go into any house . . . everything is empty and plundered. Everything that could not be carried away was kaput, broken or in some way made unusable.”<sup>36</sup> Wherever the Austrians moved in, men were viciously slaughtered, women raped, entire settlements destroyed beyond recognition. On 30 July they arrived in the village of Prnjavor and assembled all the local men. Any man on whom they found a conscription order or even just a bullet was immediately shot. The 60-year-old Jovan Maletić, who witnessed the butchery along with forty hostages, described what he had seen:

By the time the Swabians [a commonly used name for Austrians] brought by the 109 inhabitants from Prnjavor, the soldiers had already dug the grave. They tied them together with rope and wrapped the entire group with barbed wire. Then the soldiers positioned themselves on the railway embankment about 15 meters [50 ft] away from the victims and fired off a round. The entire group tumbled into the grave, and other soldiers shoveled dirt over them without checking if all were dead or if there were still wounded among them. Certainly there were many who had not been fatally wounded, at least a few, but the others had pulled them all down into the grave. They were buried alive!

“Anyone who has seen all that I have seen,” wrote Reiss, a native of Freiburg, “will never be able to forgive.”<sup>37</sup>

Serbia had successfully contended its victory at an enormous loss of human lives and property. The hardship suffered by the country at the outbreak of the war defied description. Soldiers and refugees in the hundreds of thousands and war prisoners in the tens of thousands needed to be provided for. But the economy had come practically to a standstill. In the first war year alone, 163,557 of the 250,000 soldiers and another 69,000 civilians died. Nearly 600,000 refugees were on the move. In early 1915, a typhus epidemic broke out. International aid workers counted 400,000 sick and 100,000 dead. The catastrophe was not contained until five months later.<sup>38</sup>

In the meantime, Austria-Hungary was preparing a counteroffensive. This time the Central Powers were better prepared and had pulled Bulgaria to their side. In October 1915, ten German divisions crossed the Danube from the north, while the Bulgarians invaded from the east. In order to save his army from annihilation, General Putnik ordered a retreat on 26 November 1915, over the mountains to the Albanian coast. The High Command, the elderly King Peter, and numerous members of the government, members of parliament, and intellectuals joined them. It was announced that Serbia would not surrender at any price, despite the superiority of the enemy forces. The men, women, and children left behind were armed.

The formerly proud Serbian army degenerated into a demoralized and internally dissolving force. Many soldiers simply went home. Only those who did not take to their heels started the long trek to the coast. Marching over hazardous paths, the starving, freezing, and deathly exhausted men fought their way through snow and ice at temperatures falling to  $-4^{\circ}\text{F}/-20^{\circ}\text{C}$ . “Slowly we crawl up the bare cliffs on the slopes of the Čakor. Step for step on the downtrodden snow we move forward,” wrote Josip Jeras in his diary. “On the sides of the path, exhausted refugees, trapped in the snow, their heads lowered. White snowflakes dance around them, and the mountain winds whistle the funeral dirge. The heads of fallen horses and oxen jut out of the snow.”<sup>39</sup> Caravans of civilian refugees followed the troops: “There were no houses by the way, no refuge of any kind. . . . If anyone became exhausted, what could be done? . . . The other members of the family were powerless. It was a case of the rest of the family pushing ahead or of all perishing together,” reported British rear admiral Ernest Troubridge, who accompanied the wretched trek.<sup>40</sup> The horrible, grueling march is often referred to as the Albanian Golgotha. It took the lives of about 150,000 and left another 77,000 missing. Only 140,000 people made it to the Adriatic coast; from there the starved and ragged survivors were shipped to Corfu and Thessaloniki by the Triple Entente.<sup>41</sup> By the spring of 1916, Serbian troops were once again fighting on the frontlines, this time on foreign soil near Thessaloniki.

The victors—Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Bulgaria—were convinced that Serbia had to disappear from the map as a political entity. However, there were differences of opinion on how to go about this. Should the entire country be annexed or should Serbia be extremely reduced to no more than an economically dependent rump state? At first they divided the country among themselves and set up a harsh occupational regime in the fall of 1915.

The objectives and practices of the occupation amounted to no more than the ruthless denationalization and plundering of the occupied regions, meant to ensure that the state of Serbia would vanish for good. The Austrians set up the Military Governorate of Serbia and introduced a rigid economic system of exploitation. In addition, political organizations and societies were forbidden, and schools were brought under their control.<sup>42</sup> In March 1916, General Conrad ordered that all resistance be destroyed with ruthless severity, that the country be squeezed dry, and that no mercy be shown for the hardship this caused to the general population. Harvest yields and produced goods had to be turned over to authorities; food was rationed. Officials interned 16,500 men fit to bear arms until November 1916.<sup>43</sup> That winter, starvation killed more than 8,000 Serbs, according to Red Cross reports, while figures from the Habsburg High Command reported that 170,000 cattle, 190,000 sheep, and 50,000 pigs had been requisitioned and exported to Austria-Hungary by mid-May 1917.<sup>44</sup>

In late September 1916, the Serbian High Command flew in the guerrilla leader Kosta Milovanović Pećanac from Thessaloniki to organize resistance in Serbia. In February 1917, a force of 4,000 armed men and women managed to liberate an area in the Morava valley, but then the uprising was put down. The Austro-Hungarian military reported 20,000 dead and the escape of 2,600 into the forests.<sup>45</sup>

Starting in November 1915, the Bulgarians established themselves in the eastern part of the country, where they had an old score to settle with Serbia. In 1912/1913, Serbia had ruthlessly “Serbianized” territories annexed from Bulgaria. The churches and schools of the Bulgarian Exarchate had been closed, Bulgarian newspapers banned, Greek and Bulgarian names translated into Serbian ones. When power changed hands at the end of October 1915, the situation reversed itself, and the Bulgarian military government in eastern Serbia, Macedonia, and parts of Kosovo began an unrelenting process of Bulgarianization, occupation, and economical exploitation.

Particularly hard hit were the Serbs. All former soldiers between the ages of 18 and 50, as well as teachers, doctors, journalists, civil servants, and other officials were interned, shot, or transported to Bulgaria as prisoners of war. Another 46,000 or so were deported there as forced laborers. Serb names, alphabet, and language were forbidden; books and maps were banned from the public.<sup>46</sup> However, the occupiers did not treat the Muslims significantly better.

Whereas Austria-Hungary conducted the war against Serbia out of its existential interests, Germany was pursuing primarily economic aims. Berlin took charge of exploiting the mines, controlling the railway in the Morava valley, and organizing a swath of territory behind the lines (*Etappenzone*) used to provision its troops on the Salonica Front. Germany incorporated Serbia into its planning of the war economy, since the Germans were experiencing acute deficits in raw material and food as a result of the British trade blockade. To handle the exploitation of occupied Serbia, the *Deutsch-orientalische Gesellschaft* (German Oriental Society) was created, based on the model of other German organizations working elsewhere to secure the supply of raw materials needed for the war. This exploitation drove Serbia so deeply into destitution that even Austrian representatives in Berlin filed complaints.<sup>47</sup> Likewise in Bulgaria, the Germans had forced Sofia to let the War Raw Materials Department of the German Empire manage the mining of iron ore, so necessary for steel production.

The Salonica Front ran across all of Macedonia. It was a broad band of destruction, 80 to 95 miles long, that was repeatedly ploughed up by the artillery on both sides. By mid-1916, the fighting had reached such a stalemate that a crisis in provisioning the civilian population and the military reached catastrophic proportions. More and more of the Central Powers' soldiers, including many Bulgarians, refused to take orders, deserted, or defected to the other side.

Two years later, on 15 September 1918, the Serbian army launched a major offensive that finally broke through the front lines. Accompanied by its allies, it marched in the direction of the Danube and liberated Belgrade on 1 November. From the outbreak of the Balkan wars in 1912 to the armistice in 1918, Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo had suffered almost unceasingly from extreme violence, hunger, and disease. These experiences brought about deep-seated material, societal, political, and sociocultural transformations.

Of all the countries involved in the First World War, Serbia had suffered the greatest loss of life with 1.2 million war dead by the end of the conflict. Fifty-three percent of the male population between 18 and 55 had been killed, and 264,000 were invalids. Almost all livestock had been either destroyed or requisitioned.<sup>48</sup> For the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs, the experience of war had proven to be a decisive one. Part of the Isonzo Front ran across Slovenian soil, which resulted in tens of thousands of Slovenes being exiled or deported to Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Nearly 300,000 Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and Slovenes had lost their lives as frontline soldiers fighting on behalf of foreign powers.<sup>49</sup>

Millions of people had gone through life-threatening experiences, been forced to flee their homelands, and lost relatives and property. This unraveled

the old social order. As long as the men, at one point more than 700,000 of them, were off fighting, traditional gender roles had to be redefined. During the war years, women took the place of men as the head of households, performed extremely hard labor for months at a time for the occupation forces, fought in the resistance, and lived a more liberal sexual morality.<sup>50</sup>

In exile on Corfu, where political life continued, the 26-year-old Serbian prince regent used the emergency situation to deal with the secret organization Black Hand, which was allegedly hatching plans for an overthrow in its aim to create a Greater Serbia or Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. In 1917, ten officers were tried for high treason in Thessaloniki, and their leader, Apis, was executed along with two co-conspirators. This ended the rivalry that had existed since 1903 between military and civilian institutions of power and enabled the Serbian state to further consolidate itself.<sup>51</sup>

The trail of destruction and destitution left by the war, the years of trauma, and the massive loss of human life left the entire South Slavic region with a pressing need to justify and attribute meaning to the sacrifice rendered. The prospect of national resurrection and greatness fulfilled this need in Serbian public opinion. Historians, politicians, and intellectuals knew how to incorporate the experiences into the public culture of remembrance. They heroized, sacralized, and mythologized the history of the war by stylizing the Serbs as a nation of martyrs and victims in the monuments they erected and the veteran cult they created. To cultivate this war culture as a common framework of reference and orientation meant to create of a new understanding of national community and political legitimacy, one in which the war ascended to become the founding myth of the new Yugoslav state.

### *Yugoslav Unification and the Founding of the State*

The First World War fundamentally radicalized the contrasting national ideas and opposing political ideologies about Yugoslavia's domestic order that existed among the elite. Throughout the entire twentieth century, conflicts emerging from these contrasts would remain a dominant, recurring theme and would repeatedly flare up in critical moments of change, such as in the Second World War and in the 1990s. The South Slavic elite had entered the war with very different and in part irreconcilable expectations, objectives, and concepts of order. Were the Yugoslavs already a single people (with different names) or did such a unified people first have to be created? Should the future state be a federalist or a centralist one?

Serbia saw itself as having been blamelessly drawn into a struggle to survive, from which it had to emerge strengthened and territorially enlarged in order to permanently dispense with Great Power influence. To achieve this, the Yugoslav idea, although originally foreign to Serb national thinking,

was now adopted and turned into a specific war aim. In a circular note dated 4 September 1914, the Serbian government announced the plan to create a “strong southwestern Slavic state to be joined by all Croats and all Serbs and all Slovenes.”<sup>52</sup> Peace would be compromised should a political order emerge that created small, rival entities. Thus, Serb nationalism amalgamated with the ideas of South Slavic unification.

The idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were one people with different names became increasingly prominent. Politicians, diplomats, and scholars began to construct a theoretical and representational framework for the Yugoslav nation. Among these were Aleksandar Belić, a linguist, and the geographer Jovan Cvijić. Under the pseudonym “Dinaricus,” Cvijić published what he argued was anthropological proof of the common ethnic origin shared by South Slavs.<sup>53</sup> By the end of September 1914, both the borders and the structure of the future state were taking on distinct contours. In October, the Serbian government was certain that Yugoslavia should be structured as a centralist state, yet one that also guaranteed the “national particularities of each tribe,” with equal treatment given to religions and alphabets and with consideration given to Croatian state symbols that documented its historic individuality.<sup>54</sup>

The struggle to establish a Yugoslav state had to be fought not only on the battlefield, but also on diplomatic fronts. In November 1914, exiled politicians from Serbia and Croatia agreed to create the Yugoslav Committee for the purpose of lobbying the Allies and winning public support for their undertaking. In May 1915, this committee assumed its work in London under the chairmanship of the Croat Ante Trumbić. It advocated a decidedly unitary “Southern Slav Programme” that declared Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to be “one and the same people, known under three different names.”<sup>55</sup> This was important if the Slavs wanted to claim together the right to self-determination that U.S. president Woodrow Wilson had advocated early in 1918 as a principle on which the postwar order was to be built. Despite this effort, the various views did butt up against one another. Whereas the Croats announced the future state to be the creation of peoples of equal standing, the Serbs saw it more as the reward for their extremely hard-fought war of liberation. Yet it was agreed to negotiate constitutional details later.

Independent of these internal differences, the members of the committee began their campaign of tireless and emphatic wooing for the favor of the Great Powers, which were at first anything but enthusiastic about an independent Yugoslav state. In London, the Croat Frano Supilo appeared as a “force of nature,” in the words of the former British prime minister Herbert Asquith, to convince the West of the South Slavic issue. Above all, they sought to thwart Italy’s claim to the coastal areas, which the Allies had offered it as the reward for entering the war.<sup>56</sup> Franko Potočnjak, who lobbied in the United States,



admitted: “We pay great attention to the question of how it can be proven to the world that Slovenes, Serbs and Croats are one people, in order to thus justify the demand for unification. The world knows us under so many names: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians, Dalmatians, etc., and each of these names means ‘people.’ And to tell the truth, we have not yet solved this problem even at home.”<sup>57</sup>

As for the structure of a future Yugoslav state, the question remained undecided. In 1917, three groups, each with a different agenda, stepped up to be heard. The first was the Serbian government in exile on Corfu, led by Nikola Pašić, which favored a Serb-dominated centralist state that Slovenes and Croats would merely join. The second was the Yugoslav Committee in London, which demanded a federal constitution based on the right to self-determination and thus equality among all three participating peoples. The third was the Yugoslav Club, an organization formed by Slovene, Croat, and Serb members of the Austrian parliament (Reichsrat) for the purpose of finding a solution within the framework of the Habsburg state. On 30 May 1917, the club called for the “unification of all countries of the monarchy” in which “Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs live . . . on the basis of the national principle and the Croatian constitution.” The May declaration electrified the South Slavs of the monarchy, sparked public rallies, and inspired signature petitions for the national program. However, the declaration soon outlived its political relevance, and even the club abandoned its loyalty to the Habsburg emperor early in 1918.

In the meantime, representatives of the Serbian government had banded together with the Yugoslav Committee as equal partners. On 20 July 1917, they issued the Corfu Declaration, signed by the Croat Ante Trumbić on behalf of the Committee, and Nikola Pašić for the Serbian government. The Corfu Declaration announced the founding of the State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, “also known by the name of Southern Slavs or Yugoslavs,” under the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty. While it was agreed that Yugoslavia would become a constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary monarchy, the question was left open whether the new state would be a centralized or federal one. In any event, it guaranteed universal male suffrage, territorial indivisibility, religious freedom, and full legal equality for the three national denominations, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as well as for the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim religions, and for the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets within the “united nation.”<sup>58</sup>

Austria-Hungary’s military defeats, the growing destitution, but also international developments like the revolution in Russia and the U.S. entry into the war created a widespread and transregional consensus above party lines in favor of the creation of Yugoslavia. Support was strong in Slovenia and

Croatia, where the plan was opposed only by parts of the Catholic clergy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Muslims expressed their reservations, and also in Macedonia and Montenegro there were doubts. However, the faster the war approached its end, the less often voices critical of the new state were to be heard.

Throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the press and cultural institutions were now propagating the “great aim” of creating a “unified people” comprised of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Little notice was taken of the helpless attempt by Austrian emperor Karl I to save the monarchy through a reform and by agreeing to a tripartite empire with a Croatian state. Instead, on 6 October 1918, seventy-three members of the Austrian parliament founded the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, with the aim of unifying their people living in Austria-Hungary and establishing a free, independent, and democratic state. They formed a provisional government on 17 October, which Belgrade preliminarily recognized as the official representation of the eight million South Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy.

By this point, Austria-Hungary’s military might was completely depleted. While the command headquarters of the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie reported over 20,000 desertions in 1917, this number had reached 100,000 by the summer of 1918. Not even drumhead court martials could deter deserters. As soon as trains started to roll in the direction of the front, soldiers in full gear were jumping from the cars and hiding in the woods. Several thousands of them banded together into the “Green Cadre.”<sup>59</sup> In September 1918, after Austro-Hungarian forces failed to hold the Salonica Front, the troops began to disband altogether.

With the collapse of its army, the days of the dual monarchy itself were numbered. Pressure from the streets in provincial capitals grew. Starting on 21 October 1918, the flag flying from houses in Zagreb was the South Slavic blue-white-red tricolor. Later demonstrators marched in the direction of the diet waving Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, and red flags. The crowds cheered Wilson and Masaryk, the Green Cadre, and Nikola Pašić. The Marseillaise could be heard blaring from the coffeehouses, as well as the Croatian and Serbian national hymns. The national euphoria in Zagreb and Ljubljana turned into a gigantic festival when, on Tuesday, 29 October, the Croatian diet met at 10:00 a.m. for an extraordinary session, in which it ruled to dissolve “all constitutional relations and bands between the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, on the one side, and the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire, on the other.” Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, including Rijeka, were proclaimed as the independent and sovereign nation state of “Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs covering the entire ethnographic region of this people.”<sup>60</sup> In Slovenia, the people’s assembly also voted to secede from the monarchy,

upon which Austro-Hungarian military and civilian institutions there abdicated their power. On 24 November 1918, the National Council announced the unification with Serbia. “Our Austrian-Hungarian reality rumbles around drunkenly under the throne of the Karadjordjević like an empty beer bottle in the trash,” wrote the Croat novelist Miroslav Krleža.<sup>61</sup>

For Montenegro, which had fought alongside Serbia in the war, the fundamental question revolved around the survival of its own institutions and dynasty. From his exile, King Nikola spoke out in favor of a federalist solution, but on 26 November he was deposed by the National Assembly and the unification with Serbia was declared. In Macedonia, the political class was also divided. One side supported the Corfu Declaration on the condition that they retain their own representation outside of Serbia, while the other side called for a unified, independent state. However, neither the architects of Yugoslavia nor the Great Powers ever considered granting the right to self-determination to the Macedonian people, who were dispersed throughout three different states.<sup>62</sup>

On 1 December 1918, Prince Regent Alexander Karadjordjević proclaimed amid great pomp and ceremony the founding of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS). This proclamation was met with armed resistance only in a few places in Croatia and Montenegro. The new state was recognized internationally at the Paris Peace Conference in May 1919. Prior to this, American observers had closely studied the situation in Croatia and Slavonia and had not discovered any noteworthy opposition there to unification. A secret plebiscite in Dalmatia even resulted in 96 percent approval for the founding of the new state.<sup>63</sup>

Yugoslavia was therefore not an artificial state created out of ignorance or just to serve the interests of the Great Powers.<sup>64</sup> Instead, support for the Yugoslav project had been emerging from a variety of sources for quite some time: from cultural similarities and shared experiences in the ethnically mixed areas, from thwarted and—at least since the turn of the century—enormously radicalized feelings of nationalism, from new types of socioeconomic challenges and consciousness, and, last but not least, from the anachronistic, arrogant, and reform-hostile rule of the Habsburg monarchy. The First World War catalyzed all the forces that had been pushing for self-determination since the end of the nineteenth century.

At the same time, the turbulent creation of this new state was neither inevitable nor unavoidable; certainly it would not have been launched without the radical political, social, and ideological changes caused by the First World War. Only the complete collapse of the Habsburg monarchy made obsolete all alternatives to solve the national question within the imperial framework of Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the fear of becoming a pawn in the hands of

competing Great Power politics had an integrative impact, particularly since Italy was claiming Istria and Dalmatia and, in the words of Frano Supilo, thus threatened to “gobble us up like macaroni.”<sup>65</sup> Due to Serbia’s spirit of resistance, its readiness to make sacrifices, and its perseverance, all of which made it triumphant over the broken monarchical empire in 1918, it would have been very hard to deny Serbia the realization of its ultimate war aim, namely, the founding of a South Slavic state. Across all regional, national, and ideological borders, the military, economic, and humanitarian catastrophe brought about a change in attitude among the broader populace, including the rural population. It was the long-suffered, painful experiences of social subordination and political marginalization, now condensed by the trauma of war, that exploded into boundless enthusiasm for a new start together at the historical turning point of 1918. For many, “Yugoslavia” became the code word for a better life in dignity, peace, freedom, and prosperity. Thus, the new state set out amid immense and euphoric hopes for the future.



## PART II

### THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA (1918 TO 1941)



## 5.

# The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (1918 to 1929)

### *The Paris Peace Conference and Its Consequences*

In January 1919, a delegation from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, better known as the Kingdom of SHS, arrived in Paris to seek recognition of its state at the international peace conference. It had to be accredited as a Serbian delegation because the Great Powers were still hesitant about this new state entity. Could it even survive? In February 1919, it was recognized as a sovereign state by the United States, and finally in June also by Great Britain and France.<sup>1</sup>

The international system negotiated in the five Parisian treaties established the right to self-determination as had been defined in January 1918 by President Wilson in his “Fourteen Points.” This right became a key criterion for the political order in both East-Central Europe and Southeast Europe. Every people was to be free to create a nation state of its own, provided that certain language and ethnographic criteria were met. Economic, historical, and strategic factors also played a role. With the peace agreements of 1919/1920, the Great Powers created a corridor stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans of nation states that had liberal democratic constitutions and welfare state systems. These were to act as a *cordon sanitaire* against revolutionary Bolshevik Russia, on the one side, and revisionist Germany, on the other.

Of all the states to appear on the political map of Europe in 1918, Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the most diverse and complicated. The titular nation of Slovenes and “Serbo-Croats,” which also included Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians, represented around 83 percent of the Yugoslav population of roughly 12.5 million. In addition, about twenty other ethnic minorities lived within its borders. With respect to its socioeconomic composition, Yugoslavia also resembled a patchwork rug. The new borders divided and rearranged economic regions that had evolved over time. The multiethnic state inherited seven different historic entities with varying monetary,



taxation, infrastructural, and legal systems, and great disparities in the level of development. In this latter aspect it was not alone. Other successor states also struggled with considerable regional disparities, particularly Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania.

Among the most sensitive issues handled at the Paris conferences were those that determined borders in multiethnic areas. For the Yugoslavs, the relationship with Italy posed a particular problem. During the war, the Triple Entente had signed secret treaties with its allies that in part contradicted a people's right to self-determination. In the 1915 Treaty of London, Rome had been promised, as compensation for entering the war, the regions of Trieste, Gorizia-Gradišća, Istria, and a large part of Dalmatia—all areas in which the majority of inhabitants were Slavs. In order to create a *fait accompli*, the Italians had quickly invaded the coastal areas in question in November 1918 and then doggedly defended their claim to them. Even though the United States repudiated the secret treaties as undemocratic, the Yugoslav foreign minister eventually had to concede to Italy's demands. Istria, Zadar, and several islands were ceded to Italy in the Rapallo Treaty of November 1920, while the Dalmatian coast went to the Kingdom of SHS. In Fiume (Rijeka), which had been invaded in September 1919 by the poet Gabriele d'Annunzio and his legionnaires, an independent free state was created but then revoked and awarded to Italy in 1924, much to the chagrin of the Croats. The Yugoslavs were at least partially successful in asserting their territorial claims at Austria's expense. They received the Maribor Basin, which was inhabited by Slovenes, but then had to give up claims to southern Carinthia following the popular referendum in 1920. Whereas Hungary had to turn over the Vojvodina, Bulgaria remained essentially untouched by Yugoslav claims to its territory. All in all, the border-setting agreements were only a partial success from the standpoint of the South Slavic state. Nearly half a million Slovenes and Croats found themselves living as minorities under either Italian or Austrian rule.<sup>2</sup>

For the first time, the new European order included the protection of minorities, as guaranteed by the League of Nations. In treaties, the victorious powers compelled the new states of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Greece to protect their minorities against discrimination and to ensure them religious freedom, the right to form organizations, and the right to elementary school instruction in their native tongue. Similar stipulations were imposed on other East European states through the peace treaties or in other legally binding declarations.<sup>3</sup> Yet it seemed to the East and Southeast Europeans that the peacemaking powers had applied a double standard here and excluded themselves from having to make the same guarantees to protect their minorities. How was one to understand the fact that Hungarians and Germans in Romania and Yugoslavia were entitled to minority rights, but Slovenes and Croats in Italy were not?

The redrawing of borders and the issues connected to the various nationalities fed the fires of revisionism in the vanquished countries, which attempted to leverage the existence of ethnic minorities to contest their territorial losses. Actively supported by Sofia and Tirana, Macedonian and Albanian rebels in the southern regions of the country fought for unification with Bulgaria and Albania, respectively. The Germans and Magyars in Vojvodina, numbering a half a million each, found it very hard to accept the painful change in their role from ruler to the ruled. Berlin and Budapest instrumentalized ethnic politics in order to dislodge the postwar political order with ever new accusations of repression. On France's initiative, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia created a system of bilateral treaties in 1920 and 1921, the Little Entente, in order to arm themselves against Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Austrian revisionism.<sup>4</sup>

Despite obvious structural weaknesses, the outcome of the five Parisian treaties cannot be simply dismissed a priori as artificial. It enabled most East and Southeast European peoples to be recognized for the first time as full-fledged members of the international community. A more convincing concept than that of self-determination was not on the table, even if the complexity of ethnic settlement in many regions appeared to make it thoroughly impossible to create a territorial order that would satisfy all sides. The British, French, and Americans, guided by the ideal of Western individualism and representative liberal order, sought to create citizenship nations in which ethnic particularism would sooner or later cease to play a role and special minority rights would become obsolete. What was left unsaid was that assimilation policy was considered an effective means to achieve this end.<sup>5</sup>

### *Unitarism and Centralism*

The Kingdom of SHS, the first Yugoslavia, understood itself as the nation state for a single South Slavic people, a state built on individual liberties and not on collective rights. However, this South Slavic state was not yet called Yugoslavia, because the Serbs refused to strike their name from that of the state.

At the heart of the Yugoslav problem in the interwar period was the conflict over the constitution of the new state, a battle between centralism and federalism, between the Serbian state tradition and the Croat national idea. Before 1914, each group had used Yugoslavism above all as a vehicle to achieve the liberation, national unification, and integration of their own people, for which the South Slavic state also created the political prerequisites. Both the Serb and the Croat national ideologies were grounded in the idea of historical rights and political legitimacy derived from powerful empires in the Middle Ages. From the viewpoint of Zagreb, the compromise between Croatian autonomy and Yugoslav unity lay in federalism; only a minority of

Croats were calling for independence at the time. National-thinking Serbs, on the other hand, dismissed federalism as a Habsburg anachronism. In their minds, a strong, integrated Yugoslavia had to be built—like other states in Europe—on a centralized structure and on Serbian state tradition.

Starting with the Yugoslav Committee and the Corfu Declaration, the founders of Yugoslavia struggled over the constitution and then postponed the final decision to some point after peace was achieved. Prior to the election of a constitutional assembly, controversy broke out in 1919/1920 between centralists and federalists. Loosely speaking, politicians from the former Habsburg monarchy advocated a federalist solution, while Serbs, most Montenegrins, and all those committed to unitarism regardless of nationality wanted a strong central state. Croats and Slovenes had been particularly perturbed when the king, in the official act declaring the establishment of the new state and its provisional constitution on 1 December 1918, had preordained its unitary and centralist structure.

The ensuing realization that federal options were no longer being seriously considered and that the constitutional process was headed in the direction of an autocratic royal decision embittered a significant part of Croatia's political class and undermined the credibility of the historic compromise reached by the elite during the world war. Based on a universal, equal, direct, and secret electoral franchise for men over the age of 21, a constitutional assembly was elected in the winter of 1920. At the time, women still did not have the right to vote in many countries, including France and Italy. Proportional representation produced a political standoff between advocates and opponents of federalism. In absolute terms, the centralists had a slim majority, because the Croatian Republican Peasant Party had decided to boycott the assembly. The vote on the constitution was held on the very symbolic St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan), 28 June 1921. Following turbulent debate and discussions, the representatives of the Serbian, Muslim, and Turkish parties cast 223 votes out of 419, a total of 53 percent, in favor of the draft constitution establishing a highly centralized state that reflected the motto of "one nation, one king, one state." The constitution also included strong elements of local and regional self-administration. The majority of the Slovenes, Croats, and communists boycotted the vote.<sup>6</sup> This electoral procedure contradicted the spirit of the agreements that had been concluded before the end of the war. In order to protect minorities from simply being outvoted, the founders of Yugoslavia had postulated in the Corfu Declaration that the principle of a "qualified majority" be adhered to, whatever that meant.<sup>7</sup> In the end, the so-called Vidovdan Constitution was declared ratified. Yet from the start, these origins left the new state with a dangerous deficit in legitimacy that its opponents would condemn time and again from then on.

In order to overcome internal divisions, the state propagated a unified, “tri-named” South Slavic nation. Unlike today, when the ethnic differences between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes are no longer doubted, at that time the overwhelming majority of the intellectuals and the political elite believed these only to be the “tribes” of a single people. European experience inspired such views: the differences in cultures, religions, dialects, temperaments, and mentalities between Slovenes and Serbs did not seem any greater than those between Venetians and Neapolitans or between Bavarians and Prussians. If Italy and Germany had succeeded in creating a unified nation state with a high culture valid across regions and accepted by the populace, why shouldn’t this also be possible in Yugoslavia?

The theory of the “tri-named people” described the relationship between Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs as being trinitarian, analogous to the biblical Trinity; certainly, it was thought, this would make things clear even to the uneducated classes. Notwithstanding what would later become political practice, the trinitarian idea implied at first that all three parts of the whole were of potentially equal standing; in fact, this was the original idea.<sup>8</sup> A coat of arms for Yugoslavia represented this unitarism by combining national symbols from each of the historic regions and by stipulating the official state language to be “Serbo-Croato-Slovenian.” To demonstrate how deeply rooted the dynasty was in all parts of the country, King Alexander named his three sons Peter, Tomislav, and Andrej, each after a Serbian, a Croatian, and a Slovenian medieval ruler, respectively. That it would not be easy to amalgamate the tribes into one Yugoslav nation was indeed obvious to the constitutional founders when they laid out plans in 1921 to promote a national consciousness in the spirit of national unity and religious tolerance.<sup>9</sup>

In reality, the situation was far more complicated than the new national ideology made it seem. Official statistics recorded only people’s native tongue and religious affiliation, not their nationality, which is why the composition of the population at the time is rather controversial. According to the calculations of the communists, who expressly opposed unitarism, about 39 percent of the population in 1924 were Serbs and Montenegrins, 24 percent Croats, 8.5 percent Slovenes, 6.3 percent Bosnian Muslims, and 5.3 percent Macedonians or Bulgarians. In addition to these major nationalities were innumerable smaller ethnic groups. No one group was large enough to claim an obvious or even absolute majority.<sup>10</sup>

Even though the architects of this first Yugoslavia did acknowledge some measure of distinctiveness about Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians, they did not accept them as “tribes” in their own right. No one represented their interests when the new state was constituted. Even the most ardent advocates of federalism from the Croatian Republican Peasant

Party at first only acknowledged Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, but considered Montenegrins, Muslims, and Macedonians to be “half-historical” entities whose affiliation to one of the three national peoples would have to be decided later.<sup>11</sup> The communists were the only ones who recognized different nations and nationalities at the time.

The further course of events shows that at this point it was probably already too late to merge the various identities into a common Yugoslav one. Although the existing collective identities were varied and in part shifting, it was far from easy to simply give up long-standing affiliations with a community in favor of something new. Too dense were the networks of social communication and too diverse the interests and political cultures of these communities that this new construction of a nation, imposed on them “from above,” could have been met with widespread enthusiasm and acceptance. Apart from that, however, the concept of the three tribes left sufficient room for some measure of multiculturalism.

The Slovenes in particular proved to be dedicated supporters of the Kingdom of SHS, because they were allowed for the first time to cultivate and develop their own language and culture.<sup>12</sup> Slovenian was finally recognized as an official state language; a university was founded in Ljubljana in 1919, followed by the Slovenian broadcasting system in 1928 and the Slovenian Academy for Arts and Sciences in 1938. Two of the state’s thirty-three administrative districts (*oblasti*) covered the exact territory in which Slovenians lived. What is more, the Kingdom of SHS offered them protection against the overreaching territorial demands of Italy, which was pushing for hegemony in the Adriatic region. The clerical Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), by far the strongest Slovenian voice in the entire interwar period, opted for federalist solutions only in the early years. Under the charismatic leadership of Anton Korošec, who later became the prime minister of Yugoslavia, the party mutated into a pillar of support for unitarism and centralism. Thus, it is a myth that the Slovenes always fought against being absorbed into Yugoslavia.<sup>13</sup>

The Bosnian Muslims also found a *modus vivendi* for coping with this new state, although they had been the people least committed to its founding. At this point no clear ethnic identity had yet evolved. Instead, people saw themselves primarily as part of a cultural and religious community. In 1920, the Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) explicitly pledged its support of Yugoslavism in its program.<sup>14</sup> The following year, it voted in favor of the constitution for a centralized state, once it had been assured that the autonomy of Muslim religious institutions would be guaranteed and that people would be compensated for the expropriation of their land in the course of agrarian reform. The ideology of a unified Yugoslavia shielded Muslim identity from the pressures of Serbian and Croatian assimilation and offered a niche in which to cultivate that specific historical and religious, prenatal group identity

that—in the minds of Bosnian Muslims—only lacked a tribal label. This developed within a frame of reference, backed by Islam, which at the time did not inevitably imply either theological, ideological, or even an ethnonational affirmation. The Muslim elite were divided into four camps: pro-Croat, pro-Serb, pro-Yugoslav, and pro-autonomy. No unified view of Muslim religious and ethnic identity yet existed. For the most part, the common folk remained unaffected by these political and intellectual debates.<sup>15</sup>

Far more problematic was the situation of the Macedonians, who already demonstrated a vivid awareness of their own clearly defined ethnic identity, despite the fact that they were not acknowledged as being a tribe and had obviously been instrumentalized for Bulgaria's revisionist aims. In the early 1920s, more than 1,600 armed rebels belonging to the extremely nationalist and pro-Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) carried out terrorist attacks against Serbian security forces and settlers. To counteract the irredenta, Yugoslav authorities started a ruthless policy of Serbianization. All things Bulgarian had to vanish from public life; the exarchal (Bulgarian) religious community was placed under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Thousands of political prisoners landed behind bars. Not until it was discovered that VMRO was planning a coup d'état in 1934 in Sofia did Bulgaria become willing to liquidate the underground organization and recognize the borders of Yugoslavia. The idea that Macedonians were a people in their own right, eligible for self-determination, and not merely an appendage of Bulgaria was a position embraced only by the leftists and communists in the mid-1920s and prompted them to call for a unified and independent Macedonia.<sup>16</sup>

Like the VMRO, armed Albanian rebels, the Kachaks, fought against annexation by Serbia in western Macedonia and in Kosovo. They were supported politically and militarily by the Kosovo Committee from Albania. In 1918/1919, the Serbian army harshly suppressed rebels and civilians alike, and some of the fighters surrendered when an amnesty was granted in 1921. Yet things did not really quiet down until Albania ceased to back the rebels in 1923/1924. Even then, the Yugoslav state considered the approximately 440,000 Albanians living within its borders as particularly unreliable citizens who needed to be assimilated. Entire libraries of pseudoscientific literature attempted to prove that the "Arnauts" were in fact Albanianized Serbs. Tens of thousands of Albanians and Turks emigrated.<sup>17</sup>

### *The "Croatian Question"*

The icon of opposition against Serbian centralism was Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party and the spokesman for the Croat faction set up in parliament in 1921. During the phase of the country's formation, he had railed against the unitary position of the Zagreb National Council, denounced the founding of the state as undemocratic, and boycotted

the constitutional assembly. His agitational stance was built on two pillars: the supposed illegitimacy of the Yugoslav state, as it had been founded, and the demand for a Croatian peasant republic, as he had already called for in November 1918. In May 1921, he submitted his own draft constitution in which Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were labeled as individual nations, each with its own claim to sovereignty. Once recognized as such, they would then found a federal state.<sup>18</sup>

The son of a peasant with a diploma from the Sorbonne and nostalgic for village life, Stjepan Radić was a man full of contradictions.<sup>19</sup> Before 1918 he had preached the cause of unifying Serbs and Croats and even spent years in prison for his politics. Then he mutated into an unrelenting advocate of exclusively Croat interests. He raged against communism, only to beg for support shortly thereafter in Soviet Moscow. Although deeply religious, he hated the clergy and the church and was in the habit of starting off his rallies by crying out: “Praised be Jesus and Mary—down with the priests!” Impulsive and charismatic, often demagogic, the gifted orator used his remarkable whispery voice to enthuse the peasant masses for the Croatian cause. He dangerously enraged the Serbian political establishment and was viewed with skepticism abroad.

Once universal male suffrage was introduced in 1920, the extraordinary attractiveness of socially utopian agrarian ideology began to manifest itself. That year the Croatian Republican Peasant Party received the third largest mandate in the Kingdom of SHS with about 230,000 votes. Three years later the party garnered nearly a half million. Large-scale information and election campaigns mobilized thousands of new voters using catchwords like “peasant democracy,” “justice,” “sovereignty,” and “people.” The utopia of a unified, organic, and solidaristic national community bundled together all the aspirations and tribulations that worried the crisis-plagued peasants. Josip Smodlaka, a politician and lawyer, reported the following on the 1923 election in Zagora: “They even carried the gravely ill on stretchers for several hours in order not to lose a single vote. One saw something that had never been seen before: in the most remote and scattered mountain villages, 90 percent or more of the voters took part in the elections. . . . Never had these people ever been so enthusiastic and so unified at an election . . . as they were in this election for Radić.”<sup>20</sup>

Radić’s political program focused, for one, on the social problems of village life and, for another, on the sovereignty of the Croat nation—topics that for him not only belonged together but were indivisibly linked. His argument was that only in a nationally unified, democratic peasant state would it be possible to ensure substantial participation by the third estate in state and society. Moreover, the vision of an egalitarian Croatian peasant republic made it easier for the rural population to identify with what they viewed as a bureaucratic

and exploitive state and its signum, urban embourgeoisement. It was only through the mass mobilization of the 1920s that Croatian national integration was achieved. Today Radić is revered as a pioneer for Croatian independence.

The national question, as expressed most stridently by the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, was driven by huge social, cultural, and economic disparities throughout the entire country. In 1921, the rural population made up 76 percent of the total population, but this figure varied from 63 percent in Slovenia to 86 percent in Montenegro. Every other person over the age of 12 could not read or write, but in Slovenia this figure was less than 9 percent, while in Croatia and Slavonia it reached 32.2 percent, in Serbia 65.4 percent, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia over 80 percent.<sup>21</sup>

Domestic politics were therefore inevitably overshadowed by tough, ongoing conflicts over the economy, monetary reform, and tax law, in which Croats and Slovenes felt they were being put at a structural disadvantage by Belgrade. The Croat economist Rudolf Bičanić complained that the former Austro-Hungarian region contributed more than 80 percent of the tax revenue while, at the same time, Serbia and Montenegro were awarded more than 70 percent of the investments made in infrastructure.<sup>22</sup>

Serbs and Croats each harbored their own tacit arrogance. The Croat bourgeoisie indulged itself in a feeling of cultural superiority based on its affiliation with what was considered to be the superior Western civilization, compared with the barbaric East. The Serb political class derived what it believed to be unassailable claims to supremacy from its strong state tradition and its military successes in the First World War. Angered by the renitence of the Croats, who made demands alleged to be harmful if not hostile to the state and repeatedly boycotted parliamentary sessions, Serbs began in the mid-1920s to consider the idea of ridding themselves of the Croats through territorial “amputation.” Wouldn’t a unified Greater Serbia be stronger in every way than the heterogeneous SHS state?<sup>23</sup> King Alexander feared a bloodbath. Even Stjepan Radić recognized the danger: “We have intermingled to a degree that forces us to come to an agreement. . . . Not even through a civil war could we ‘cleanse’ every region if we do not want to mutually exterminate and fully annihilate one another.”<sup>24</sup> Today his words sound like a grim prophecy.

The aspect that provoked the most acrimonious confrontations was the privileged position held by the Serbs in the government, military, bureaucracy, police, and many important societal areas. Of the 656 ministers who served the short-lived Yugoslav cabinets, 452 of them were Serbs, as opposed to only 137 Croats, 49 Slovenes, and 18 Bosnian Muslims.<sup>25</sup> In the army and government administration, things did not look much different. Political practice discredited the concept of Yugoslav multicultural unity and alienated significant groups of people from their state.



Domestically, the outcry expressed by the Peasant Party had a great impact because the party further incited the national question by also referring to historical and cultural commonalities and socioeconomic interests shared by all Croat people. With such explosive topics as the unfair distribution of the tax burden, failed agrarian reform, and the Serb dominance throughout the entire country, it also jarred other population groups to feel collectively disadvantaged.<sup>26</sup> “The Croatian question,” wrote *Nova Evropa* (New Europe) in 1936, represents “the symbol and synthesis of the fight against the overall unbearable situation (not only in a political and legal but also socioeconomic sense).”<sup>27</sup> By referring to gravamens of a very principled nature, namely constitutional order and justice, it posited the antithesis that the creation of the state was imperfect. Therein lay its legitimation and brisance.

### *The Structural Crisis of Parliamentarism*

Before the First World War the protagonists of Yugoslavia had agreed on a constitutional monarchy as a compromise between the democratic premises of the emerging bourgeois intelligentsia and the traditionalism of conservative elites. The new order respected both the values of a liberal democracy and the rule of law. It guaranteed political pluralism, if only to a limited degree and for a certain period. Over time laws and regulations were passed that banned communist ideas and activities, such as the so-called proclamation (*Obznana*) of 1920 and the Law for the Protection of the State of 1921.

Most political parties that participated in elections after 1918 could be classified as falling into the moderate bourgeois camp. With regard to their understanding of state and constitution, strange constellations resulted. The strongest party was the Democratic Party under the leadership of Svetozar Pribičević, a former Serb politician during the Habsburg rule who had campaigned before 1918 for Serbo-Croatian cooperation. The party propagated an integral Yugoslav nation and a strong centralized democratic state. Its main competitor was the Radical Party led by Nikola Pašić, the long-serving prime minister of Serbia. The party leaned more toward the conservative national camp. The Yugoslav Muslim Organization and the Slovenian People's Party also cultivated an ethnic veneer but were bourgeois and pro-Yugoslav. Only two political parties fundamentally opposed the system itself: the Croatian Republican Peasant Party, which was radical in its rejection of the monarchy, and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, founded in 1920 and dedicated to fighting for a democratic workers' and peasants' state based on the Soviet model.<sup>28</sup>

Similar to the situation in Germany and other countries, the election system of proportional representation was conducive to the fragmentation of the political landscape. In 1925, there were forty-five parties, nearly all of

which represented specific ethnic and regional interests. They were known primarily by their leaders and only secondarily by their respective political programs. Publicly they usually took uncompromising stances toward their opponents or reluctantly formed instable coalitions. Changing alliances between parties, known as “blocs,” were formed time and again for elections, which resulted in chronically short-lived cabinets: by 1929, Belgrade had seen twenty-four cabinets come and go; by 1941 the number had risen to thirty-nine. Parliamentarism did not run in a smooth and orderly fashion but seemed instead to create instability and dysfunctional political structures, which undermined its acceptance.

For King Alexander the structural weaknesses of parliamentarism were all but inopportune because they provided him with far more leeway to make autocratic decisions and develop informal power relations outside the democratic process. At the same time, the already precarious internal balance of power was also being undermined by the influential camarilla at court, the pro-dynastic secret army organization White Hand and a dense and clientelistic entangled web of interests. In particular, the close relationship between the army and the king would hinder efficient parliamentary control.<sup>29</sup>

Nor did the civil rights and liberties guaranteed in the constitution count for much in practice since people could be brought to trial because of their political ideas and activities. Belgrade brandished an attitude of superiority and used police force to suppress certain oppositional activities. Time and again, leading functionaries and politicians of the democratic parties landed in prison on charges of alleged traitorous behavior. The dominant political culture was still one in which dissidents were seen as enemies and compromise was considered a weakness. It took the elites in the bureaucracy, military, church, and political parties a long time to understand that they could not govern the country simply at their own discretion and according to their self-made rules.

The system encouraged the existence and activities of nationalistic, even paramilitary and violence-prone groups. These included the athletic movement Sokol and the right-wing paramilitary Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA) founded in Split, which worked to propagate the state ideology of a unitary state among the populace. Tens of thousands of veterans, both of the Austrian-Hungarian army and of the Serbian army, formed associations on the fault lines of the First World War. Old conflicts seemed to live on in their hearts and minds. Many could not be reconciled with the parliamentary system and would later, after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941, engage in ultranationalist organizations and resort to civil war.<sup>30</sup>

Much like the German free corps, organizations of Serb nationalist veterans acted as the extended arm of the state security forces and violently attacked communists, separatists, and state enemies of all sorts. The ultraconservative

Chetniks (from *četa*, meaning band) were former fighters of irregular units that had battled since the nineteenth century for the liberation of Macedonia and in the First World War for Serbia. Their ranks were recruited from the Serb peasantry. The Chetniks did not cultivate an elaborate national ideology or run a stringent organization; instead they broke up into various, sometimes competing groups. The smallest common denominator among them was their view of themselves as patriots. They all cultivated typical symbols and rituals and commemorated the myth that the nation originated out of the wartime experiences on the front. Above all, they understood themselves to be a protective force against Serbian enemies, whatever the political color.<sup>31</sup>

In the eyes of the regime, the main enemies of the system were the communists, who had become the third strongest faction in parliament after the first general election in November 1920 during the precarious socioeconomic postwar situation. In April 1919, the socialist and social democratic parties fused into the Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia, then in 1920 renamed themselves the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), in order to join the Communist International. Because it was very well organized and in many regions received help from the unions, the party succeeded in mobilizing about 200,000 voters from among the socially disenchanted and in winning 12.4 percent of the votes.

The CPY denounced the SHS state as a product of Western imperialism, in which the Serb bourgeoisie took every liberty to repress the South Slavic peoples and exploit the working class.<sup>32</sup> Obsessed with the "red peril," the government banned all communist activities in December 1920 and annulled the mandates of all communist deputies. Following the assassination of interior minister Milorad Drašković in mid-1921, the Law for the Protection of the State forced the CPY deep into illegality. Party members were arrested, tortured, or driven out of the country, and the press was repressed. The politburo fled into exile in Vienna, and party activities were transferred to the trade union movement or were organized underground. It is for this reason that the CPY played an insignificant role in domestic affairs during the 1920s. The size of its membership dwindled within three years to about 700 people. However, during this period communists set the main ideological course for the future takeover of power. The third party congress of the CPY in January 1924 addressed the national question for the first time by stating that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were three different peoples, just as the Bosnian Muslims, the Montenegrins, and the Macedonians each had their own individuality. The communists called for the right to self-determination for all peoples, including the Albanians in Kosovo. The founding of an independent republic for each nation was declared to be one of the aims of the revolutionary class conflict.<sup>33</sup>

To sum up, the much-asserted fundamental ethnic conflict between Serbs and Croats as a result of allegedly deep-rooted historical, cultural, and attitudinal differences does not adequately explain the Yugoslav problem in the interwar period.<sup>34</sup> On the contrary, tactical calculations, ideological and political differences, and concrete economic interests contributed just as greatly to the internal destabilization of multiethnic Yugoslavia as did the national question. When it was politically opportune, then alliances between Serbs, Croats, and others, or between government and opposition worked very well. For example, Stjepan Radić underwent a spectacular change after he and other leaders from his party were arrested in January 1925. The occasion for the arrest was his trip to Moscow and his joining the Red Peasant International (*Krest'intern*), which the government interpreted as a treasonous act. Still, the Croatian Peasant Party was allowed to participate in the 1925 elections in exchange for its formal recognition of the constitution and the Serbian dynasty and its removal of the word "Republican" from its name. Radić decided to collaborate with the Radical Party and entered the government of Nikola Pašić as education minister in November 1925. At the same time, he still advocated the federalist reform of the state and publicly attacked his Serb colleagues in the cabinet, which led him to resign soon afterward in April 1926.

In November 1927, Radić changed course yet again. The Croatian Peasant Party and the Yugoslav Democratic Party, an oppositional party that supported an integral Yugoslavia and was led by the Serb Svetozar Pribičević, joined forces in what was called the Democratic Peasant Coalition against Belgrade centralism. After that, the government and the joint opposition were in constant and very antagonistic conflict. Peasant leader Radić resorted to a no-holds-barred polemic when condemning what he considered to be a police state and tax exploitation. "Heads will roll," he once threw at the Serb radicals in one of the chaotic and aggressive sessions of parliament.

The streets also became enveloped in a climate of violence following the bloody police repression in May 1927 of demonstrations in Split, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Belgrade against the ratification of the Treaty of Nettuno with Italy.<sup>35</sup> The treaty had been signed in 1925, prompting a storm of outrage in parliament and from the public because, among other things, it regulated the rights of the Italian minority in the SHS state but not those of the Croat and Serb minorities in Italian Istria. It was attacked for abandoning Croat interests and for the concessions made to Italian fascism. Not until the summer of 1928 was the treaty ratified.

Since his ascension to power in 1922, Mussolini had indeed been working to alter the postwar order and gradually to expand his sphere of influence in southeastern Europe and in the Adriatic region. However, Yugoslavia, France's

protégé, stood in his way. In June 1927, he approved the shipment of arms and money to underground right-wing terrorist groups, on the condition that they fight against the South Slavic state, just as the Macedonian, Albanian, and Croat separatists were doing. Until the mid-1930s, Mussolini continued to support the idea of destroying Yugoslavia through subversive terrorist activity.<sup>36</sup>

In the early summer of 1928, parliamentarism in the Kingdom of SHS was on the verge of collapse. The domestic polemic, incited by the media, had become so virulent that parliament and the state apparatus were nearly paralyzed. The country found itself in a very serious national crisis, and the king feared that Radić would declare Croatia's independence in July. It was apparent that the parliamentary system had failed to produce a basic consensus on vital matters of domestic and foreign policy, which indicates that the national question was not the sole cause of the crisis.<sup>37</sup> The SHS state suffered from symptoms similar to those of other democracies in the interwar period: instable political systems, authoritarian mindsets and the inability to compromise, precarious economic conditions, and aggressive revisionism with respect to the issue of national borders.<sup>38</sup> However, one specifically Yugoslav problem was the chronic lack of legitimacy and a functional order in the centrally governed, multiethnic state, which propelled and radicalized exclusive nationalisms. The crises and corruption permeating everyday political life and the climate of structural violence undermined trust in the transformative power of democracy and international law and discounted high-flying hopes for a just future. It was not a historical antagonism between Serbs and Croats that paralyzed the state, but a political system whose numerous weaknesses were the spark that enflamed this antagonism in the first place and then continued to fuel it.<sup>39</sup>

## 6.

### The 1920s: Tradition and Change

“Extremes and contrasts are the most striking feature of Belgrade,” reported the journalist Lena Jovičić in the mid-1920s to her English readers. “You see opposing forces everywhere: in the streets, in the houses, in the lives of the people even. Side by side with the peasant in homespun clothes and sandaled feet walk smartly dressed people of the wealthier classes. The creaking ox-cart has the right of way alongside the luxurious limousine car. . . . Thus East meets West in a curious jumble, and in view of such extremes and contrasts you cannot but feel that there is a gap somewhere. The connecting link between the one and the other is missing, and so you constantly find that you suddenly drop into the gap.”<sup>1</sup> No better description could be given of the contradictions found in the first decade after the war between tradition and change, backwardness and progress. While the larger cities were enjoying the amenities of the “golden twenties” and getting caught up the faster pace, transborder interconnections, and new mass culture of the times, large segments of the rural population continued to plod along in long-established ways and oppressive poverty. Although the “Janus-faced nature of modernity” manifested itself in all European societies, in the first Yugoslavia the two sides contrasted particularly sharply.

#### *The Inflation Economy and the Postwar Economic Boom*

Between the years 1912 and 1918, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia had found themselves, for all practical purposes, permanently at war. About one million people had been killed in the Yugoslav lands during the First World War, a fourth of whom died in Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia lost more than 16 percent of its prewar population. In addition, hundreds of thousands were uprooted, crippled, or orphaned. The occupiers had plundered raw materials and livestock and destroyed infrastructure, factories, and mines. Once peace

had been achieved, the Yugoslav government demanded a stately sum of seven billion gold francs as reparations for the destruction done, the production and tax revenue lost, and for debt redemption—a sum that equaled about half of the total value of the Serbian economy before 1914.<sup>2</sup>

Like other European countries, the Yugoslav economy profited from the inflation economy that began in 1920. At first, things began to improve. As the country started to rebuild, demand and prices, as well as the public debt, increased. The reaction of the government was to print more and more money. By the end of 1923, the circulation of bank notes was eight times higher than it had been on the day of the currency reform in 1920. Monetary depreciation encouraged investment in tangibles and thus helped to spur investment. Thirty-one percent of all the factories that would be built in the interwar period and 40 percent of all the jobs that would be created appeared between 1918 and 1923.<sup>3</sup> However, this short boom went bust with the stabilization of the currency in 1925.

Soon afterward, the first signs of crisis in the agrarian sector became evident. Far more capacity had been created by the inflation economy than could be supported over the long run by the market economy in light of weak purchasing power. The economic upswing had only shortly camouflaged the more deep-seated problems of the agrarian society, and hopes for lasting recuperation faded fast.

Thus the premise to modernize society and to catch up to Western Europe soon ran up against its inherent economic limitations. Due to growing financial shortages, the young Yugoslav state was not able to master the curse of backwardness in a foreseeable future. Economic stagnation and the first signs of the major worldwide agrarian crisis considerably narrowed its policy options in the areas of taxation, investment, and development. Therefore, in addition to doubts about the political legitimacy of the new state came the fear that possibly it would not be in a position to fulfill the promises of progress and welfare it had made. This was one reason why visible cracks in the fragile political consensus began to show.

### *Population, Family, and Gender Relations*

Few European countries entered the new era under such unfavorable conditions as Yugoslavia did. The First World War had taken a toll on the population of about 1.9 million through death, fewer births, and migration—a severe setback for family, society, and the economy.<sup>4</sup> However, the size of the population began to increase greatly starting in 1918, so that it had reached 15.6 million by the end of the 1930s from originally 12 million. In 1931, the birthrate in Yugoslavia was 34.6 babies per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas in Italy this figure only reached 25.8 and in Germany only 16.8 per 1,000 inhabitants.<sup>5</sup> In the

patriarchal agrarian society, not only were children regarded as valuable labor, they also meant great personal fortune. This attitude did not change until the old social order broke down. Where the extended families fell apart, more people remained single, birth control was used, and there were more abortions.

The trends toward social change that had been evident in the nineteenth century now continued and accelerated. The extended family started to disappear at a more rapid pace, and the types of family began to diversify greatly. There were villages in which the traditional *zadruga* and its strict regime of social relations remained primarily intact, and others in which the households split apart, and finally places where core families dominated. Households with sixty to eighty members coexisted with smaller ones of four to six members.<sup>6</sup> The expansion of the monetary and market economy, the shortage of land, and also new attitudes and values undermined the subsistence-oriented economy by which peasant families survived. As the *zadruga* disappeared throughout Yugoslavia, so too did the paramount authority of the father and the traditional solidarity with the group. New social relations geared toward economic benefit and individualist values prevailed. Generational and gender conflicts within families became quite common. Yet a number of extended families continued to exist even after the Second World War.

The new era offered both sexes more freedom, but also greater insecurity. Women were not on an equal footing with men either in the work world or before the law. They were not allowed to vote, for example, or become a judge. Common law, church law, and civil law withheld from women full contractual capability and subjected them to the authority of their fathers, spouses, brothers, or sons. Even as late as 1931, every second woman was illiterate.<sup>7</sup> A concept of the “new woman” similar to those found in industrial countries had not yet found acceptance overall. Only in the bigger cities like Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade did the image of the “modern girl” spread. The features of their emancipation and physical attractiveness—cosmetics, cigarettes, and fashion—came from the world of consumerism that was now popularized through advertising and film.

Therefore, the traditional role model did begin to change even outside the big cities. In the South Slavic countries as elsewhere in worn-torn societies, women had taken over important functions at home, on the farm, and in the urban working world, through which they enhanced their social status. In the urban environment, they retained their positions after the war, attended schools and universities, and fought for more political rights. With women making up 20 percent of the faculties, the academic milieu became a biotope for equality in gender relations and for a more liberal sexual morality, so much so that the use of the term “student marriage” gained currency.<sup>8</sup> The emancipatory impetus manifested itself in external appearances: hairstyles, hemlines,



and marriages were becoming shorter, scoffed the comedian Branislav Nušić in jest.<sup>9</sup> In the rural areas, however, the patriarchal order remained intact for a while. The war's impact on demographics meant a shortage of marriageable men. In turn, this negatively affected the market value of young girls, who realized it was now imperative to have a dowry if they wanted to marry.

In no other aspect of life were the regional differences so great as in the relationship between men and women. In the villages of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, it was commonplace to treat women roughly and to humiliate them publicly. Such attitudes on female subordination to male authority and aggression were even reflected in commonplace expressions, such as that a man should "beat a woman and a horse every three days."<sup>10</sup> In places where the patriarchal authority was crumbling, females immediately gained greater respect. There were areas in Yugoslavia where women lived in near enslavement and other areas where women, even though very poor, were shown respect and affectionate appreciation by men, as was the tradition in these communities. In certain regions, economic considerations stipulated exclusively who one would marry, while in others, such as among Bosnian Muslims, romantic and soulful love (*sevdah*) also counted in picking a partner. In many places, including villages, people even entered into "trial marriages."<sup>11</sup>

Muslim men rarely had two or more wives, but the gender issue posed fundamental religious problems for the Islamic faithful. The writings of Bosnian scholar Dževad-beg Sulejmanpašić on the liberation of Muslim women prompted angry protest by traditionalists in 1918, and the publication was publicly burned in Sarajevo. At the end of the decade, modernizers founded the society "Reform" in order to work for the abolishment of the veil and the fez, which they saw as stigmatizing symbols of backwardness, while others revered them as an unchallengeable hallmark of their identity. In September 1928, a congress of Muslim intellectuals came up with a Solomonic solution: instead of insisting on banning the veil, people should press for school education for girls. It should be left to every woman to decide whether she wished to wear a veil or not. In Turkey, both the veil and the fez had been banned since 1922.<sup>12</sup>

Both in the cities and the villages, the decline of the traditional family structure meant greater sexual freedom for those married and single, for women and men. Even divorce occurred more frequently and was now a topic in the press and publications. However, the new liberality was tolerated to different degrees across the country since, as the Croatian social anthropologist Vera Stein Ehrlich noted, "in one area a glance under the veil of a woman might prove so fateful that . . . [it could cause] a blood feud between tribes, while in another even the birth of an illegitimate child would be followed only by cynical remarks of . . . a chorus of malicious village voices."<sup>13</sup>

*Housing, Nutrition, and Health in Rural Areas*

Even though living circumstances differed from region to region, between the city and the countryside, and even among the various ethnic and religious milieus, one overarching fact was true everywhere: the great majority of the population spent their lives scraping by in indescribable poverty and under the most ghastly hygienic conditions. The situation was the worst in the so-called passive regions, meaning the poor and backward areas of Lika and Dalmatia, Herzegovina, western Bosnia, eastern and southern Serbia, and Montenegro. The crop harvests were so meager here that people starved in the winter of even the good years. No thought could be given to investing in agriculture or improving one's house or farm in light of people's precarious income situation.

One of the most severe problems in the Karst regions was a shortage of water. People often traveled for hours just to fill a canister at the next available well. The consequences of the water shortage were untenable hygienic conditions: "Washing clothes or scrubbing floors is of course quite out of the question. People stay dirty and houses unscrubbed as long as there is no water. Dirt breeds sickness. But what can be done? There is no water."<sup>14</sup>

There were practically no baths to be found in villages and only rarely in the smaller cities.<sup>15</sup> In addition to the water shortage, a government inquiry discovered a widespread ignorance among the populace concerning "the most elementary premises of hygiene." The situation was the worst in the south, where the "cleanliness of one's body and clothing . . . is not given any thought." In fact, "there are women who last bathed just before their wedding." Therefore it should come as no surprise that there were many workers in the urban factory setting who also "are not at all familiar with cleanliness, washing themselves, sleeping in a bed, changing clothes regularly, who would rather lie on the floor or outside than in decent apartments."<sup>16</sup>

Because they suffered from such oppressive poverty, the first area where peasants saved was their own nourishment. Their produce was sold at the market as much as possible in order to have money at least for taxes and the purchase of petroleum and salt. Corn porridge and bread were the mainstays of many peasants' diets. "We are never full, we are always hungry," said 40-year-old Mujo from the Central Bosnian region of Bugojno to an ethnologist, who noted: "Nobody in the village is older than forty or fifty. Many people die in the spring when food is scarcest. The last time a physician visited them was 23 years ago. The people cure themselves with various herbs and incantations. Many women die in childbirth, which takes place without any help whatsoever, often in the stable."<sup>17</sup>

Preindustrial customs and traditions also hurt the general health of the population. Long periods of fasting of up to 194 days in a year alternated with phases of extreme overindulgence: "At the time when they are working the

fields . . . the peasants are the worst fed, eating usually bread or corn porridge with garlic, peppers, and vinegar. . . . In the winter months . . . [however] an alarmingly and unbelievably large amount is eaten. Nearly every dish is made with meat.”<sup>18</sup> Once again the health experts complained about the prevailing ignorance: “Our peasant women . . . cannot cook . . . and often have no knowledge about the most elementary rules of hygiene. Valuable parts of foodstuffs are wasted due to their ignorance.”<sup>19</sup>

Poverty, ignorance, and superstition were detrimental to the health of the general population. The mortality rate of mothers and infants was high; tuberculosis and alcoholism were widespread. Peasants distrusted doctors in order “not to agitate the illness.” They preferred to have a priest come by and quietly say a prayer, or, if that didn’t help, then to call the *hodža*—the Islamic instructor—or some herbwoman.<sup>20</sup>

In the 1920s and 1930s, living conditions gradually improved. In the poorer regions it was common that humans and livestock shared a single room. Only the wealthy built modern houses with floors and windows. More modern and more hygienic types of construction spread slowly. Stoves and beds began to furnish dwellings, but still conditions remained poor. In Croatia, three-fourths of the peasants in the 1930s still did not have their own bed, not even those better off. Instead, they slept on straw mats, sacks, or benches or on the bare floor. Everyone slept in the same room: men and women, old and young, married couples and singles. “Why have the peasants no beds of their own? . . . People have learned to live without beds; or, to be more exact, they have not yet learned to sleep in beds.”<sup>21</sup>

The low standard of living could not be attributed exclusively to poverty and ignorance. Often prosperous peasants did not live any better than their penniless neighbors. If someone had worked abroad, then “as soon as they return, local tradition overwhelms them so thoroughly that they are most reluctant to introduce any change for the better, even in small things, however intelligent they may be.”<sup>22</sup>

### *The Vicious Cycle of Poverty*

Throughout the country, the market economy was expanding and thereby further spreading the new social and income structures. Property collectively owned by the villages was divided up. Starting in 1925, the prices for agricultural produce fell as a consequence of a worldwide crisis in overproduction. Many families found themselves deep in debt and were forced to give up their property and work as wage laborers.<sup>23</sup>

Peasant families everywhere were caught in a vicious cycle of poverty because the increase in productivity did not keep in step with the demographic development. While the size of the population rose by 25 percent in the years

between 1920 and 1935, the amount of arable land increased by only 19 percent during the same period. About 250 acres had to yield enough to feed 52 people in Germany, 48 in France, 30 in England, and 114 in Yugoslavia. Measured against its productive farmland, the density of the country's agrarian population was the highest in all of Europe.<sup>24</sup> In the early 1930s, yields and labor productivity were 31 percent and 57 percent, respectively, below the European average.<sup>25</sup> The gap between population growth and economic growth continued to be wide.

These factors intensified a problem that was referred to at the time as "overpopulation" and today is described by social science with the more neutral label of "underemployment." In 1931, about 34 percent of Yugoslavia's peasants owned less than five acres of land, another 34 percent owned five to twelve acres, 29 percent worked mid-size farms of up to fifty acres, and only a small minority of 3 percent had more than fifty acres.<sup>26</sup> Compared with the European average of per capita production, over 61 percent of Yugoslavia's agrarian population could not cover their daily expenses by working in agriculture. Apart from the size of the farms, what they lacked was knowledge, technology, and attitudes necessary to be able to use manpower efficiently.<sup>27</sup> The agrarian reform announced by the king on 6 January 1919 produced little relief. It dismantled the large estates, compensated the owners, and abolished all peasant dependencies on their former landlords. The reform was meant to satisfy certain national interests in addition to social ones. In Vojvodina, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Slavic peasants and war veterans profited the most from the reform. Tens of thousands moved to the newly acquired lands as colonists. More than five million acres were awarded to a total of nearly half a million families.<sup>28</sup> In the postrevolutionary mood after the First World War, agrarian reform was politically unavoidable but economically not very successful. It strengthened the structure of small farm ownership and did little overall to increase agricultural productivity. In Kosovo and Macedonia, many colonists soon fled in fear of the recurring violent attacks by local rebels.<sup>29</sup>

Underemployment was evident in various ways. Since there was simply not enough to do on the many small farms that existed, people worked little and slowly, despite severe poverty. Researchers studying village life in the 1930s discovered a glaring lack of useful work indoors and outdoors, so that "among peasants, most of the year passes in idleness or with unproductive activities 'just to be doing something.'"<sup>30</sup> In one household of four adults located in the Serb community of Rakovica, they noted the following: "There were hardly any work days, 44.5 of 200, that is, a fifth. If we assume that household work and community work and trade also represent useful work, then it follows that, in 200 days, our household head only worked 75.7 [days] or a third of this time."<sup>31</sup> And this was certainly not the worst case.

Approximately two-thirds of the agrarian population depended on supplementary income from nonagricultural employment. By this time, there were actually more opportunities to earn money or wages. One could haul the (usually quite modest) surpluses with a donkey to the market or get hired as a side hand. "They will often travel a hundred kilometers or more . . . from Travnik to Jajce, from Bugojno to Split. . . . A peasant will go dozens of kilometers to sell the small quantity of maize or wool which his horse can carry."<sup>32</sup> Others walked for hours to earn a humiliatingly small but absolutely necessary extra income by working in a mine or factory.

Since an ever-growing number of peasant households supplemented their income with work away from their farm, a new type of dual agrarian-industrial family economy evolved and with it a new social class: the worker peasant. In 1931, more than 90 percent of the agrarian population owned land, which is why few of them were willing to give up agriculture altogether, even though they earned extra income in industry and mining.<sup>33</sup> The Yugoslav Social Ministry reported "that in Yugoslavia there is a constant stream of laborers coming and going from agriculture to industry and vice versa. What has developed from this is a new class of workers—we call them industrialized peasants—who are regularly employed in industry without having broken their ties to agriculture."<sup>34</sup> In 1929, more than half of the industrial workforce belonged to this agrarian-industrial hybrid.<sup>35</sup> Throughout the entire interwar period, the industrial labor force remained deeply rooted in agriculture. Even in the 1950s few were in a position to say whether they identified themselves socially as peasants or as workers.<sup>36</sup>

Many people attempted to flee poverty by emigrating, especially the younger and better trained from the western parts of the country. Between 1921 and 1939, approximately 200,000 men and women headed abroad.<sup>37</sup> However, emigration became increasingly difficult in the mid-1920s because the classic destinations, including the United States, issued rigid immigration quotas to protect their own labor market. For this reason, about 90,000 migrants headed instead to continental Europe. At the same time, more and more countries sent foreign workers home again because of the economic crisis. Therefore, emigration brought little noticeable relief to the job market.

### *Industrialization and Social Change*

Although the speed increased with which industrialization took place during the 1920s, Yugoslavia did not yet fully develop the typical characteristics of a modern society: the accelerated growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors, the dissemination of urban ways of life, and the self-propelling dynamics of science and technology. Even in 1931, only 11 percent of the population was employed in industry or artisan trades while 76 percent continued to live off

agriculture. From the days of the inflation economy until the year 1938, about 145,000 industrial jobs were created—far too few to absorb the swelling army of jobseekers. Not until 1948 did Yugoslavia reach the point at which the size of the agrarian population began to shrink in absolute terms, something that had occurred in England already in 1820, in Germany in 1850, and in Italy in 1920.<sup>38</sup> There are a number of primarily structural reasons why industrialization did not advance faster than it did. Yugoslavia possessed rich deposits of coal and iron ore; significant reserves in copper, gold, silver, lead, and zinc; as well as chrome, manganese, and bauxite. However, it lacked the prerequisites to mine, transport, and further process these. For one thing, there was not enough electrical power. In 1934, the average energy consumption in Belgrade was 90 kilowatts per hour (kwh) per person, while in Budapest the figure was 253 kwh and in Paris 367 kwh. The country had to export its raw materials for further processing, then turn around and reimport the resulting intermediate goods of iron and steel at high cost. Machines, tools, and technical plants were also imported at great expense to foreign currency reserves. Often buyers would purchase used or outdated equipment because it was cheaper. Yet such outdated technology, combined with a shortage of skilled labor, a lack of credit, a high tax burden, and inefficient management contributed to the fact that Yugoslavia produced fewer and inferior goods at a greater expense than in western and central European countries.

Since Yugoslav goods were not competitive abroad, they had to be consumed at home. But demand in domestic markets was weak. For many peasants, industrial goods were simply unaffordable. Because the prices for agricultural products had been dropping since 1925 at a much faster rate than those for industrial products, the purchasing power of farmers shrank continually. So it proved illusionary to think of backwardness as a privilege, namely that developing countries could “spur” industrialism and accelerated growth by importing advanced scientific and industrial techniques.<sup>39</sup>

Despite it all, industry did begin to grow. Between 1919 and 1938, a total of 2,193 factories were built. The majority were erected in the first five years after unification: in Slovenia 47 percent, in Croatia and Slavonia 37 percent, in Serbia 24 percent, and in Macedonia and Kosovo 14 percent. These statistics also offer evidence of the disparity in regional development.<sup>40</sup> The textile and food industries developed the best; they required little investment and needed low labor skills. At no point in the entire interwar period did Yugoslavia experience an industrial takeoff and structural change in industrial production from consumer to production goods.

What exactly was a factory? The commerce law of 1931 considered an industrial plant to be “any workshop or plant in which more than fifteen workers are employed, if motor power is used, or twenty-five workers, if no motor

power is used,” which is why large artisan shops were included in the statistics.<sup>41</sup> Many industrial businesses were actually primitive workshops operating on little capital and with few machines. The majority of these were built “out of poor materials and do not conform to the most basic requirements of statics, hygiene, and fire protection,” complained the Ministry for Building. Others grew out of agriculture: “Very often the more prosperous peasants will erect a building or use one of their farm buildings, begin production with several workers who break hemp with wooden tools. Then they purchase an old locomotive and a breaker, employ an ever-larger number of workers, and so emerges a factory step by step. Then comes machine after machine, the steam-driven apparatus is replaced with a motorized machine, an ever-greater part of the work becomes mechanized . . . and suddenly the industrial plant exists.”<sup>42</sup>

Outside industry, new opportunities for wage employment were opening up, such as in agriculture and forestry, publishing, crafts, and household service. In 1938, there were about 730,000 wage laborers, of whom only 240,000 were employed in industry and 54,000 in mining.<sup>43</sup> Until the end of the 1930s, this extreme heterogeneous Yugoslav workforce had not yet merged into a somewhat uniform proletarian class characterized by roughly similar interests, ways of life, customs, and values. A working class comparable to the industrialized West with its own organizations, forms of protest, and culture was just beginning to evolve.

At the start of the 1920s, every fifth person who was covered by national insurance was female. Ten years later it was every fourth. On average, women were younger, less qualified, and especially cheaper, which is why they pushed men out of the job market during periods of economic crisis. The same was true for children and youths, who found low-paid employment in factories, mines, workshops, cottage industries, and transport. In the mid-1920s, every tenth wage earner was under the age of 18. Although they were often officially taken on as apprentices, these minors were actually hired to do backbreaking work. It was common practice to work nights and Sundays and as many as sixteen hours a day.

As everywhere in Europe, the working class evolved out of migration and by acculturation to the new way of life dictated by the factory. Many jobseekers moved to the cities, where entire new neighborhoods sprang up in the 1920s. Between 1918 and 1941, Belgrade itself grew three times over from 110,000 to 350,000 inhabitants. “Overnight they hauled timber beams, pounded them into the ground, built a roof with cheap scrap wood, and covered it with old pieces of hole-punched tin pitchers, porcelain pots, billboards . . . instead of walls, wrapped [the dwelling] temporarily with tent canvases, [and then] carried in some battered oven.”<sup>44</sup> Due to the acute lack of housing everywhere, even these huts were soon hopelessly overcrowded. Despite the crowdedness of the premises, every second worker household rent out places to

sleep to people who could not afford their own bed, often to several at a time. The wretched colonies of huts sprawled rampantly around all larger cities, and every morning a procession would commence from these huts into the city: "Hundreds of newspaper sellers, hawkers, washerwomen . . . leave their filthy and gloomy dwellings while it is still dark. Handymen, workers of all trades, day laborers, and the unskilled, the numerous doormen at law offices. . . . This entire army of workers . . . move daily in an early morning wave in the city."<sup>45</sup>

Terrible living conditions prevailed in these miserable dwellings, where a mixture of the rural lower class, wandering petty traders, unskilled workers, and beggars were housed. In 1930, 48 percent of the working-class dwellings in Belgrade were damp, 69 percent had no sanitary facilities, and 87 percent were structurally unsafe. People lived with the smell of garbage and open sewers; children played amid trash and primitive outdoor toilets. Poverty and indescribable hygienic conditions greatly concerned city planners, but they lacked the financial means to extend the city's systems of water pipes, canalization, and street lighting.<sup>46</sup>

For quite a while, the urban newcomers ran their own clubs and societies and cultivated the traditional peasant lifestyle and customs. Only with a heavy heart did they part with these old habits and traditional peasant costumes. Gradually even the most sporadic factory work changed the way they lived and did business. Houses were not the only things to be modernized. Crop cultivation methods were intensified and more and more up-to-date equipment appeared. The hygiene, nourishment, and health of the population began to improve. Punctuality and discipline were accepted as virtues.

### *The Beginnings of the Social Welfare State*

Like everywhere else in Europe, the state felt compelled to eradicate the worst social evils, and these were many. The costs to build drinking-water and sewage pipes, construct housing, and regulate the growth of cities seemed astronomical, not to speak of the pending investment in education, medical care, and social insurance. Against this backdrop, one of the greatest achievements of this new state was the creation of a social welfare state. Prior to the First World War and under pressure from the labor movement, most European countries had already created the basis for insuring against illness, old-age poverty, and injury caused by workplace accidents. However, the South Slavic countries had only developed very rudimentary beginnings of public welfare and labor protection. Now, in this postwar era, the eight-hour day was introduced in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, child labor was forbidden, and a national social security system was developed. Between 1923 and 1939, the number of people covered by the social insurance scheme rose from 439,163 to 728,494 individuals.

The new social system was inadequate in many respects. As in most European countries, the Yugoslav social state limited itself at first to providing



health insurance strictly for industrial workers. The masses of those in need—rural laborers, servants, artisans, and domestic workers—were not covered. However, those who were insured received little more than symbolic medical and financial support. Other branches of social insurance like old-age, invalidity, and pensions for surviving dependents existed only on paper until the end of the 1930s.<sup>47</sup> Despite such limited coverage, public budgets were utterly overwhelmed. As early as the mid-1920s, the insurance providers were already operating in the red, long before the Great Depression caused them nearly to fold completely.

The second pillar of the modern welfare state was legislation on industrial safety. Yugoslavia adopted all of the relevant international conventions. Although the eight-hour workday had been law since 1919, in many regions people worked longer hours in unsuitable buildings and under unacceptable hygienic conditions, meaning no heat, light, fresh air, or sanitary facilities. Workshops operated without any safety precautions, were crammed with machinery, and were thoroughly overcrowded.

Why was the welfare state established belatedly in South Slavic countries, and why did it remain so deficient for so long? First, very few large industrial agglomerations existed, let alone a concentration of proletarian masses. So the social problem was not openly perceivable as such. Many people remained farmers and only worked in factories periodically or seasonally. The interests of this heterogeneous and fluctuating class were hard to organize and articulate through trade unions. For state welfare bureaucracies it was just as difficult to collect accurate statistics and to supervise this diffuse social class. Second, the low aggregate income of the population and the barely functioning taxation system limited the financial outlays that the national budget could afford. Third, the indigence existing in a predominantly rural environment was far less visible than in an industrial society. The village community and the extended family still provided for their elderly and sick. Therefore, at the time, proletarian poverty could hardly be distinguished from the needs of others, such as the rural lower classes. Fourth, outside of Slovenia and Croatia, the tradition of church and communal welfare agencies was very weak, leaving little on which the state could have built. Not until the late 1930s when strikes were on the rise did the pressure significantly increase to improve the situation of workers. The statistics for 1937 listed 238 strikes involving 53,000 workers.<sup>48</sup>

#### *International Exchange and the New Mass Culture*

Those to profit from Yugoslavia's entry into the international order after the First World War were educated urban dwellers. Cultural, scientific, and technological exchange rapidly developed and a number of innovations, cultural influences, and fashions swept across the country. Whereas those benefiting

from such transfer had been limited to a small circle of students, scientists, and politicians before the war, now more people were making contacts abroad. Cultural institutions and new networks of charitable, cultural, scientific, and bilateral friendship societies acted as the clearinghouses of exchange. The media—newspapers, radio, and the movies—opened up new worlds to a mass public. Modern role models changed taste preferences, lifestyles, fashions, consumption demand, and values.<sup>49</sup>

The elites had no doubts that Yugoslavia would be a part of European civilization, whereby they did not always look to the West. Intellectuals, scientists, writers, musicians, and other artists located “Europe” anywhere they found interesting trends worth emulating. In addition to Paris, London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg/Leningrad, influences on style also emanated from Prague, Budapest, and Bucharest.<sup>50</sup> This interaction is most obvious in modern urban architecture. Neobaroque, neorenaissance, neoclassical, and art nouveau buildings could be found next to those built in a historicizing Serbian national style, which was inspired by medieval Byzantine style. In the 1930s architecture was further influenced by classic modernism, Bauhaus, and the Garden City movement. For this reason, the Italian writer Alberto Moravia thought of Belgrade after the Second World War as a synthesis of several metropolises.<sup>51</sup>

Urban cultural life was also cosmopolitan with strong inclinations toward France, Great Britain, and Germany—in part the result of changing political alliances in the interwar period. American influences also had an impact. German and Austrian musicians, conductors, and directors often performed on the theater stages of Yugoslavia’s major cities, exhibitions of European art were shown, and foreign literature was translated and published. In turn, Yugoslav orchestras and artists performed abroad. The magazine *Nova Literatura* (New literature) impressively illustrates this multifaceted interconnectedness. Among those on its editorial staff of thirty-five were Albert Einstein, Maxim Gorky, George Grosz, Sergei Eisenstein, Hugo Kersten, and Upton Sinclair.<sup>52</sup>

Czechoslovakia was particularly attractive. The writings of the country’s highly revered founder, Masaryk, had inspired the pioneers and protagonists of Yugoslavia. Not only architects, musicians, and artists viewed the avant-garde in Prague as an important cultural compass, conservative and nationalist-oriented circles also greatly admired the Slavic “brother country.” In bourgeois circles, Russia was no longer looked upon as the center of pan-Slavic solidarity following the Bolshevik revolution. Travelers, students, and teachers now identified with an idealized “Slavic modernity,” in which emotionality and rationality appeared to have organically coalesced.<sup>53</sup>

In particular, the literary and artistic avant-garde understood itself as part of a European and worldwide cultural scene. Preceded by the aesthetics

of impressionism, symbolism, and art nouveau, classic modernism developed new experimental and eccentric styles such as expressionism, cubism, Dadaism, and surrealism.<sup>54</sup> As in other countries, the trauma of the war stimulated provocative art forms, which were offered a forum in magazines like *Mladina* (Youth), *Svetokret* (World-turn), *Plamen* (Flame), *Zenit*, and *Dada Jazz*. Writers developed societal utopias like The New Age (Dimitrije Mitrinović) or cosmopolitanism (Miroslav Krleža).<sup>55</sup>

Intellectuals sought to make an original contribution to European civilization that reflected their own identity, expressed in the form of popular, romantic, socially critical, and realistic literature.<sup>56</sup> However, this contribution was also made in the form of experimental, provocative, subversive, and anarchistic texts, manifestos, collages, and films. For example, the avant-garde Zenitism of Ljubomir Micić propagated the “Balkanization of Europe” in which the direction of the civilizing mission was reversed. Cultural progress was not to spread from West to East, but vice versa, from the Orient to the Occident. His utopian figure “Barbarogenius” embodied the Balkan “anti-Europe,” the opposite of that old and decadent continent that lacked an identity and had blanketed the world with unbounded force.<sup>57</sup>

While avant-garde art remained a noteworthy but elitist phenomenon, the broader public in the cities came into contact with modern Anglo-Saxon mass culture. The proliferation of newspapers and magazines alone from 1,245 to 1,939 contributed greatly to this. Radio was also coming into its own, even though only 4 percent of the population could be reached by radio during this decade. Still, between the years 1929 and 1938, the number of radio receivers rose from 19,270 to 86,060 as more and more people were able to afford one. Television did not exist until after the Second World War.<sup>58</sup>

Like everywhere else in Europe, cinema established itself as an essential medium of entertainment; here the public watched American, German, and domestic productions. As of 1939, Yugoslavia had imported about 500 American films.<sup>59</sup> Not only were popular adventure, crime, romance, and entertainment movies shown, but also artistic films by Ernst Lubitsch, Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau, Fritz Lang, Sergei Eisenstein, and Man Ray. Politics also made use of this new medium to disseminate information, election campaign rhetoric, and propaganda.<sup>60</sup>

Photos, posters, and advertisements contributed notably to the change in popular taste and dress. The styles from Vienna and Budapest, so widely worn before the war, now seemed old-fashioned. Smartly dressed women preferred the latest Paris collections, featuring short skirts and high heels, while elegant men wore English-style tweed suits and Anthony Eden hats. Special shops and department stores for ready-made clothing opened for business.<sup>61</sup>

American and British influences on popular mass culture had the most lasting impact. Major sporting events, especially soccer, handball, and boxing, aroused new passions and shaped social identities. Following a visit to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, a group of women students introduced the popular handball game *hazena* that they had discovered there. Soon it became the most popular women's sport in the entire country.<sup>62</sup>

Movies, jazz, nightclubs, variety shows, and bars changed the way people spent their leisure time. In addition to the polka and the waltz, people at parties now danced the Charleston, foxtrot, and tango. Comic series and films introduced Yugoslavs to Mickey Mouse, Felix the Cat, and Tim Taylor. Popular comics were adapted culturally to illustrate the life history of famous historical figures, such as Saint Sava or Tomáš Masaryk.<sup>63</sup>

Outside of the cities and larger towns, in which only a fifth of the population then lived, foreign cultural influences were slow to reach people. Few individuals had ever even left their home region, many could not read or write, and unlike in other Western countries, travel was something undertaken only by a very small educated class. At best, men became acquainted with other parts of the country through their military service. Modern mass tourism did not yet exist. Still, the first travel office, Putnik, opened in Belgrade in 1923.

Despite the increasing domestic and transnational contact and communication, the broad masses still considered the Western lifestyle an abstract entity. They remained faithful to their customs and religions, and the symbols, interpretive frames of reference, and values indelibly connected with them. These were the indisputable anchors of daily cultural life. The strength of these ties to community is demonstrated by the fact that in 1918 about 60 percent of all Yugoslavs dressed in their respective traditional costumes, the cult, color, and ornamentation of which indicated their regional origin, marital status, religion, and ethnic group.<sup>64</sup>

### *The Politicization of Religious Milieus*

Throughout the entire interwar period, religious affiliation played a major role in political, cultural, and social life. It constituted the most important milieu of people's lives and was at the same time the most distinctive criteria to demarcate between the various ethnic collectives. According to the 1921 census, 46.67 percent of the Yugoslavs were Orthodox (especially Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins), 39.29 percent were Catholic (Slovenes and Croats), 11.22 percent were Muslim (Bosniaks, Albanians, and Turks), 1.91 percent were Protestant, and 0.54 percent were Jewish.<sup>65</sup> No one religion clearly dominated.

The liberal Vidovdan constitution from 1921 guaranteed the separation between church and state, freedom of conscience, and equality among all recognized religious communities. Inherent to Yugoslavism were religious neutrality and anticlericalism, not only a result of the Enlightenment-inspired ideas from which it had grown but also a result of its progressive focus on the future and its dictate of tolerance as strategic factors to ensure the survival of the multiethnic state.

Despite the formal equality within the Kingdom of SHS, the Catholic and Orthodox churches once again found themselves in different roles. For the Serbian Orthodox Church, the aim of the national and canonical unification of all Serbs into one state had been fulfilled. The patriarchate created in 1920 combined the divergent Orthodox areas of jurisdiction into a single church hierarchy which was de facto subordinate to the state. Yet even though it was no longer the official state church, as it had been before the war, the Orthodox Church was still very closely linked to the monarchy.

Since Orthodox Yugoslavs made up the relative majority in the country, the Catholic Church feared for its position, not without reason. Catholicism was universal, not genuinely Slavic, and was subordinate hierarchically to the Vatican, which had spoken out in favor of an independent Slovenia and Croatia. For this reason, the church was under general suspicion in Serbia. Despite great reservations, the church had decided by and large in 1918 to be loyal to the new Yugoslav course. Unlike Archbishop of Sarajevo Josip Stadler, many did adopt a pro-Yugoslav stance, including the Zagreb archbishop, the Franciscans, and the ranks of political Catholicism.<sup>66</sup>

The secular Kingdom of SHS stipulated by law the legal position and self-administration of the four recognized religious communities of Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Islam, and Judaism. It prompted a storm of protest and resistance by church officials when it banned the misuse of clerical authority for political aims, established civil marriage, and assumed supervision of school education. Starting with the state's founding, a creeping politicization and radicalization of the religious communities became visible, which later, in the 1930s, led to a dangerous connection between the clergy and extremely nationalist parties and movements. Ivo Andrić described the precarious multi-religious coexistence of 1920:

Anyone who spends one night in Sarajevo sleepless on his bed, can hear the strange voices of the Sarajevo night. Heavy but steady strikes the clock on the Catholic Cathedral: it is 2 a.m. More than one minute will pass (exactly seventy-five seconds, I counted) and only then will the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church announce itself. It strikes its 2 a.m. A while after, with hoarse faraway voice the Sahat Tower near Beg's

Mosque declares itself. It strikes eleven times, the eleven ghostly Turkish hours, according to some strange alien part of the world. . . . And thus even during the night, when everybody is asleep, in this counting of the hours in the dead part of the night, the difference which divides these sleeping beings has been emphasized. . . . And this difference, sometimes openly and visibly, sometimes invisibly and basely, approaches hatred, often identifying with it.<sup>67</sup>

For historical reasons, religious community officials saw themselves as the natural, God-given trustees guarding the interests of “their” faithful, which is why it was customary to use churches and mosques for political events.<sup>68</sup> In the minds of the greater part of the population, no distinction was made between nationality and religion: the majority of Serbs were Orthodox, Croats Catholic, and the Bosnian Muslims were just that, Muslims: “Everything that has to do with religion also simultaneously has to do with nationality, and everything national is simultaneously religious,” stated one observer in 1920.<sup>69</sup>

Although premodern attitudes toward church and religion survived in many regions, new links between groups had been evolving since the turn of the century because of increasing social transformation and the development of a broader church infrastructure that included schools, societies, and publications. Religious communities functioned as both social and religious milieus, meaning that they were influenced not only by faith but also by shared socioeconomic interests, ethnic and cultural identities, values and attitudes, and the congruence of ethos and sentiment. It was in this framework that contacts were made and networks created, that guidance was sought and spiritual comfort found. The community thus created a truly tangible alternative to the distant, foreign, and sometimes hostilely viewed state. With the portent of increasing politicization, more and more of the faithful viewed religion as an obvious ethnic attribute with which they could identify and distinguish themselves from others; this also influenced the direction of national politics and, in part, ideological convictions.<sup>70</sup> The religious-social milieus cultivated their own symbols and rituals, holidays and commemorations, semantics and historical images that circumvented those of the state every day. This explains the persistent resistance to the Yugoslav national ideology and the phenomenal success of the ethnic-bloc parties as compared with supranational political movements.

The sociocultural practice of Yugoslavism was polyvalent and could evoke both a Yugoslav identity as well as exclusively national or regional traditions. Historical events, popular culture, and myths could be incorporated into either one of the constructions of identity. For example, the monumental sculpture erected in Split in 1929 of Bishop Gregory of Nin, the work of the

sculptor Meštrović, could have represented national Croat or all-Yugoslav history, depending on the perception of the observer. The churchman, who had defended the Slavic-Glagolitic liturgy in the tenth century against the pressure coming from Catholic Rome, could be commemorated as an early protagonist of Croatian independence as well as a symbol of South Slavic pre-schismatic unity. The depiction, interpretation, and perception of one's own history, even of that of the nation itself, could serve thoroughly different needs.<sup>71</sup>

When all ethnic organizations were banned in 1929, the political confrontations over questions of nationality shifted all the more clearly to the religious communities. Popes and priests were considered to be people of authority in the village community, especially when they could read and write. They were opinion makers for a public that was still greatly influenced by verbal communication and personal relations, even though modern mass media was reaching them. In 1932, the pro-Yugoslav politician Svetozar Pribičević complained: "Since 1918 . . . one has never heard from the mouth of the Patriarch something about questions of faith and church, about the relationship of man to God, about brotherly love, . . . only ever about questions of a national or political nature. . . . He emphasizes the double-headed eagle, the powerful king, the blood spilled on battlefields, the war sacrifices—in a word, everything that serves extreme nationalism."<sup>72</sup> The more the semantics of religion became imbued with political agendas, the more outright became the solidarity between religious leaders and politics.

The question of religion was posed in a somewhat different light for Muslims. Until 1878, the two main pillars of Bosnian identity had been mutually supportive: on the one side was the special administrative position of being an Ottoman province and on the other was the identification with a worldwide, religiously tolerant Islam. In the age of nationalism, however, matters involving territory, religion, and ethnicity became increasingly conflictual in regions inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. How should, how could Bosnian Muslim identity be defined? The Bosnian elite remained divided. Some spoke out in favor of "nationalizing" Muslims. If certain old customs were to be abandoned, like the veiling of women and the religious schools, this would help the community embrace "healthy reason and the zeitgeist," as one Bosnian scholar expressed it in a tract on Muslim progress.<sup>73</sup> Others propagated the laicistic, political *bošnjaštvo* (Bosniakhood) as proof of the historical individuality and ethnic identity of their people. Contrary to an older version from the Austro-Hungarian era, this concept was now reserved exclusively for Muslims, who were understood as a tribe of their own. Historical causes were said to be the only reason why this tribe was bestowed with a religious name instead of an ethnic one.

To many others, the next logical step to solving religious-regional conflict over identity then seemed to be a clear conviction to supranational communism, that is, the transference of the trend toward secularization into fundamental atheist attitudes. The only ones to unequivocally presume the existence of a distinct Bosniak national identity were the Marxist intellectuals associated with the Zagreb magazine *Putokaz* (Signpost) in the late 1930s.

Regardless of the direction each proposed reform took, they shared one common feature: all strove to strengthen the ethnic spirit and national character of Slavic Muslims and an appreciation for their homeland.



## 7.

# The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929 to 1941)

### *The Royal Dictatorship*

On the morning of 20 June 1928, Stjepan Radić appeared at the opening session of parliament. Although public confrontations in the preceding days had escalated to the point of murder threats, this consummate politician threw caution to the wind. One of the first people to speak that morning was Puniša Račić, a member of parliament for the Radical Party from Montenegro. Quite unexpectedly he found himself in a heated debate with the colleagues from the opposition. The president of the parliament was trying valiantly but unsuccessfully to restore order when Račić suddenly pulled out his pistol and shot in the direction of the Croatian Peasant Party faction. Two members of parliament died immediately; two others were wounded. Radić, who had been shot in the stomach, died in August of complications. The assassination marked the tragic culmination of the domestic crisis that had been fatefully escalating since 1927. It turned Radić into a martyr, welded together Croat national politics, and provided the Peasant Party with enormous political capital. However, Yugoslav democracy had shattered, and the king declared a state of emergency.

On 6 January 1929, King Alexander dissolved the parliament, abolished the constitution, and installed himself as a dictator in his effort to create Yugoslav unity. All ethnic or religious parties and organizations were banned and politicians from the opposition arrested. Ten months later, on 3 October, the country was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. A new administrative structure was introduced in which the country was divided into nine regions, similar to French *départements*, each of which was named after a river: Drava, Sava, Vrbas, Littoral, Drina, Zeta, Danube, Morava, and Vardar. In six of these nine administrative regions, known as banovine, the majority of the populace was Serb. The royal dictatorship aimed to unify the people and the state into one nation and thus finally create an integral Yugoslav identity.

The new system of government reflected the trend toward powerful executives and authoritarian regimes that had been threatening parliamentarianism since Mussolini's ascension to power in 1922. Of the twenty-eight European democracies existing after 1918, only eleven were still in existence in 1939.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the model of royal dictatorship that was established not only in Yugoslavia but also in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania differed qualitatively from that of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. First, Alexander's regime did not resort to a totalitarian ideology, a one-party state, although it also used mass mobilization. Second, the king's regime was supported by the older elites in the bureaucracy, church, and military and by traditional forms of legitimation, first and foremost the monarch's charisma. Third, it sought to achieve national unity by restoring conservative values and a patriarchal culture, not through revolutionary social change. All things tried and true were to be upheld, not toppled. It was a pitiful attempt to overcome the internal fissures that had been created by parliamentarianism and socioeconomic conflicts, especially by the lack of consensus over the constitution within the political class. However, instead of bestowing domestic peace and uniting the nation, the introduction of dictatorship ruptured the country all the more.<sup>2</sup>

During the royal dictatorship, the country's unity became its chief priority. King Alexander juxtaposed "tribalism" with Yugoslav "nationalism" in order to overcome internal divisions of different kinds. The regime used draconian royal decrees and the state's security apparatus to implement national and state unity by dictatorial means. Basic civil rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association were suspended.<sup>3</sup>

The regime also undertook a great effort to standardize school curriculums in order to establish integral Yugoslavism in the educational system. Similar efforts tried to infuse unity into the army and athletic clubs.<sup>4</sup> Using new ways to disseminate information through the press, propaganda, film, science, and culture, the regime sought to reinforce the idea of a Yugoslav nation. The Belgrade magazine *Pravda* (Truth) started an inquiry on "creating a Yugoslav mentality"; as late as 1939, the publication "Characterology of Yugoslavs" tried to make a case that culturally the various tribes were truly one people.<sup>5</sup> In order to encourage patriotism, radio stations in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana started in 1938 to broadcast programs called the "National Hour" about things to know from all parts of the country. These programs were modeled after the German example. One-sided nationalistic material, including Serb, was forbidden. Despite it all, representations of national unity in a multinational state remained ambivalent, and the country's internal diversity could never be made to disappear completely. This is illustrated by the monument dedicated to the unknown soldier, located atop Mount Avala near Belgrade. While Germania and Marianne serve as the sole allegory to represent their

respective countries of Germany and France, eight female figures depicted in various traditional folk costumes were necessary to symbolize multicultural Yugoslavia at this monument.<sup>6</sup>

It soon became clear that the king's dictatorial rule would not be able to solve the multifaceted problems of the country. On 3 September 1931, the monarch imposed a new pseudodemocratic constitution on the country, in which he gave himself the right to appoint as many as half of the representatives to one of the two chambers of parliament. That same year the Yugoslav Radical Peasants' Democracy was founded (known as of 1933 as the Yugoslav National Party). This was a hodgepodge of various parties and politicians close to the regime who organized themselves under the banner of integral Yugoslavism. Associations and organizations of ethnic, regional, and religious nature remained banned.

The king's attempt to win support for the Yugoslav Radical Peasants' Democracy from members of the banned political parties failed. Instead, republican forces lashed out with a counterattack. In November 1932, the Democratic Peasant Coalition, an oppositional coalition of Serbs and Croats, demanded the reintroduction of parliamentarism and a federal restructuring of the state. A massive wave of protest engulfed the country. Leading politicians from the opposition were arrested, including Svetozar Pribičević, a Serb from Croatia, the Croat Vladko Maček, the Muslim Mehmed Spaho, and the Slovene Anton Korošec. Amid this upheaval, it was only a matter of time before the dissimilar opponents of the regime agreed on a common platform. This did indeed occur in the elections of May 1935 and December 1938, when Serb, Slovene, Croat, and Muslim parties joined forces to present a joint list as the "unified opposition" against the government.

On 9 October 1934, the day that Alexander set sail for Marseille on an official visit to France, the king was fully aware that his imposed integration had failed. Yet his solution to the Serb-Croat problem that had been announced as forthcoming died with him on the streets of Marseille in the assassination attack that also killed his host, French foreign minister Louis Barthou. Since Alexander's son and heir to the throne was underage, Prince Regent Paul governed the country during the minority of King Peter II.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Great Depression*

As was happening all over Europe, Yugoslavia was impacted by the severe economic and social ruptures that cracked open when the Great Depression hit. The full force of the shockwaves did not reach Southeast Europe until mid-1930 and thus somewhat later than in the industrial nations. But when the depression reached Yugoslavia, the consequences were all the more disastrous. As a result of worldwide overproduction, grain prices on international markets

had already begun to fall in 1926. Now they dropped sharply, plunging first the agrarian sector into ruin and shortly thereafter the entire Yugoslav economy. Since the industrial nations used protectionism in an attempt to ward off cheap imports, Southeast Europe lost its most important markets. Within a few months, the foreign trade volume, wages and incomes, domestic demand, and industrial production had plummeted.

The Great Depression hit the agrarian countries of Southeast Europe harder and longer than it did the industrial nations, because it cumulatively intensified all of the structural problems that had continually plagued their economies. In 1932, the value of Yugoslavia's foreign trade, which was based primarily on corn, wheat, and other agricultural products, fell by about 70 percent from what it had been in 1929.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, the terms of trade worsened because prices for agricultural products sank faster than those for industrial goods, which threw the balance of payment severely out of whack. Yugoslavia had to sell its agricultural goods and raw materials cheaply but purchase finished goods at disproportionately expensive prices. When more and more European banks called back their loans in 1931, the National Bank was threatened with insolvency. Out of its concern for inflation, Yugoslavia had pursued a strict stability course and refrained from credit-financed investments, as had many other countries. First private demand and then public demand stagnated, which paralyzed the economy and caused unemployment to rise. Not until years later did the government shift to an anticyclical fiscal policy. The depression did not bottom out until 1934, much later than in West European countries. By the time the Second World War broke out, the standard of living had still not reached that of 1920.

The biggest losers of the Great Depression were the peasants. Not only did they sell fewer and fewer goods on the markets, but the prices for their produce also sank. Despite the government's intervention measures, poverty increased. Between 1925 and 1933, the income of an average peasant family dropped by two thirds. In 1934, wholesale agricultural products were only worth half of what they had been in 1926.<sup>9</sup> The price gap between agricultural and industrial goods widened alarmingly. "There are hundreds of farmers for whom a cigarette has become a luxury, and the purchase of a liter [of] gas to light up the house is no less than a veritable sensation."<sup>10</sup> The only way for farmers to save themselves was to take out loans and thus to put themselves deeply into debt.

The hidden unemployment in rural areas now emerged from the shadows to become quite visible. An increasing number of people pushed their way into the cities in search of a way to earn what they needed to survive. But industry and trade did not grow fast enough to absorb all of the migrants. Between 1930 and 1939, the number of registered jobseekers rose from 150,000 to 651,000. At the same time, short-term and seasonal work expanded. In order to lower

wage costs, it was becoming increasingly common for entrepreneurs to replace male workers with women and children, particularly girls. Between 1933 and 1935 the number of socially insured adults rose by 8.5 percent, while that of minors increased by 28 percent. For skilled workers and academics, it was nearly impossible to find a job.<sup>11</sup>

Many entrepreneurs cut wages. Between 1930 and 1935 the average daily wage fell by about 20 percent. The cutbacks were the largest in those branches of industry in which many unskilled workers and peasants worked. At the same time, there were significant regional differences. In Slovenia wages fell by 18 percent between 1930 and 1934, in Croatia by 25 percent, and in Serbia by 41 percent, so that the depression also enhanced the existing socioeconomic disparities between the regions. All in all, the incomes of those employed in Yugoslavia shrank during the crisis by more than 70 percent.<sup>12</sup>

The fledgling Yugoslav welfare state was completely overtaxed by the aggravated social situation. Since only a small percentage of the unemployed were entitled to benefits, the government helped by distributing food. Yet with every passing day the army of poor, sick, and hungry grew larger. Many remained dependent on charity facilities or had to find some other way to earn a bit more. The poverty took on untold proportions during the crisis years. The majority of jobseekers survived only under the most pitiful conditions. They lived in huts amid catastrophic hygienic conditions. Many did not even have a roof over their heads, shared a bed with others, and wandered homeless through the city.<sup>13</sup>

More and more people took to the road. Rumors of possible opportunities for work spread quickly by word of mouth. Jobseekers moved in packs from place to place and hung around in waiting rooms of labor offices and on the streets. This mobile labor force was absolutely bereft of means: "Unkempt, filthy, tattered, and barefoot, they aroused distrust with every step, and therefore it was very seldom that someone decided to hire them."<sup>14</sup> Belgrade had to cope not only with migrating masses from southern and eastern Serbia but also with the storm of destitute people arriving from Lika, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. Many became homeless: "They sleep in basements, attics, sheds in unfinished and half-deserted buildings. . . . Several sleep together in rooms that are not large enough for a single person," reported the social agencies and organizations as early as 1929.<sup>15</sup> As the crisis deepened, the number multiplied of those who had to resort to jobs that could barely keep them alive: "There is an entire army of a category of people who wander through the streets and cafes day and night and sell shoestrings, cigarettes, almonds, sugared fruit, razor blades, toys . . . postcards, and other snick-snack. They have to beg for twenty kilometers in order to earn five dinars (if even that)."<sup>16</sup> Others drifted into petty crime like smuggling, known as *šverc*, or prostitution.

In the 1930s, urban destitution on a massive scale was a daily experience for many people. Each day one saw “many children on the street, children living without a thought for tomorrow, children of whom no one can say what they live from or what they do, where they sleep or what they eat.”<sup>17</sup> “We questioned several of these unlucky little things. . . . The majority only had one passionate desire—to be able to eat once to their heart’s content.”<sup>18</sup>

The Great Depression radicalized internal tensions—be they of a social or ethnopolitical nature—intensified the lack of prospects, narrowed the leeway for political action, and endangered what was already a precarious compromise among elites. The experience of crisis day in, day out, led many to question the credibility of a political system that, in the face of such existential concerns, was proving incapable to cope with the crisis and thus tried to compensate for its inadequacies by becoming more authoritarian.

### *The Stojadinović Era (1935 to 1939)*

A new era began when the former finance minister Milan Stojadinović assumed the office of prime minister in June 1935. Together with the former opposition politicians of the Slovene People’s Party and the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, he founded the Yugoslav Radical Union. The new regime party was still committed to unitarism and centralism but demonstrated greater flexibility regarding the national question. It spoke out in favor of self-administration and equality among tribes and religions. The authoritarian system was relaxed to allow a limited degree of party pluralism.<sup>19</sup>

Unlike the conservative regime of King Alexander, which cultivated traditional, patriarchal values, symbols, and culture, the financial expert Stojadinović presented himself as a modernizer. He took advantage of the palpable upswing in the global economy of 1935 to introduce a New Economic Policy. As in the United States and other European countries, government subsidy programs were to jump-start the economy. The government created state agencies and monopolies and set up an investment program based on job creation measures to stimulate heavy industry and the arms industry. In order to stabilize the agrarian sector, farmers’ debts were liquidated, and prices were subsidized by a state monopoly on foreign trade.<sup>20</sup>

Stojadinović’s semiauthoritarian regime adapted symbolic practices, political rituals, and semantics from Italian fascism and German National Socialism without adopting their ideologies, political content, and methods of ruling. New means of mass communication, particularly radio, film, billboards, and flyers, were used to present the dynasty and the government in a positive light and to improve Yugoslavia’s image abroad. Traditional folk singers were hired to perform centuries-old epic songs on the *gusla*, an ancient single-string instrument. Instead of telling the tales of the age-old heroes of

Kosovo, their lyrics praised the good deeds of the current authoritarian head of state.<sup>21</sup>

Despite these efforts, the national ideology of Yugoslavism remained nothing more than a chimera of the politically established elite, a utopian promise for the future that never won the undivided approval of regional, political, church, and intellectual authorities, let alone the complete trust of the population at large. Societal and political realities had exposed the unified Yugoslav city on a hill to be no more than a Potemkin village, leaving even the most modest hopes for economic development dashed. The ongoing political and economic crisis created a climate of uncertainty in which people of all nationalities perceived themselves as the losers in a precarious state entity. Disappointed, many politically thinking people turned their backs on the Yugoslav model. In political rhetoric, in commemorative practices, and within clubs, societies, and other organizations, greater emphasis was placed once again on the historic heritage of one's own people. Writers and scholars acted as the guardians of their respective communities by describing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as the original and true subjects of history, as peoples who were far more than merely a part of Yugoslav history.

Against the backdrop of dictatorship and depression, it appeared quite plausible to many people to attribute the obscure, conflicting economic and political interests to the seemingly obvious historical, linguistic, and religious differences between them. Pressing social problems—such as the half-hearted implementation of agrarian reform, the frightening decline of prices and incomes coupled with an increasing tax burden, and last but not least, the antimodern sentiments of rural society toward urban life and the diffuse fears of being overridden—were easily recycled into allegedly essential differences and conflicts between Serbs and Croats.

### *Ideologies and Paths of Development*

In the period between the two world wars, all of Europe was affected by the rise of fascism and communism. The powerful dynamics of change that had been set in motion before the turn of the century and had culminated in the upheavals caused by the First World War now intensified the search for alternatives to the liberal-capitalist order and its painful failings. Both ideologies propagated radical if thoroughly different alternatives to the conservative, liberal, and social democratic models. While fascism claimed that the health of a people could be restored by its racial pureness, Bolshevism prophesized the elimination of class differences in a humane, egalitarian global order.<sup>22</sup>

In the countries of Southeast Europe, which were suffering more from the decline of agriculture than they were from the crises of the industrial society, neither of these radically critical ideologies and their all-encompassing

explanations found many followers. Fascism remained a rather peripheral phenomenon. The most popular alternative to the bourgeois-capitalist model proved to be the agrarian ideology—quite unlike the case in the more industrialized societies of Europe.

The agrarian movements, which were strong not only in Croatia but also in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania, strove to develop ways to counteract the crises of capitalism. Above all, they wanted to create a worthy and socially secure place in the modern world for the peasantry, which had been economically neglected and politically ignored by bourgeois governments. They were under the illusion that, in the long run, agriculture would prove to be the leading economic sector, despite industrialization and the market economy. With the help of a comprehensive campaign for spreading literacy, credit, and cooperatives, the agrarian population was to be made fit for the capitalist era, and villages were to be empowered to assume greater responsibility for themselves. While the rhetoric of these movements was backward-looking, the program, strategies, and instruments of the peasants' parties were well abreast with the times.

Even though the agrarian movement in Southeast European countries turned out to be the leading ideational, social, and political force in this period, its outreach to other parts of society was limited. Unlike communism and fascism, which attracted broad sectors of industrialized Europe in the twentieth century, the agrarian movement did not offer a comprehensive, universal explanation of the world, coupled with the intent to enforce certain norms and claim absolute power. Instead, it concentrated solely on the matters vital to peasants and was neither interested in nor able to address the social problems of the middle classes and of industrial workers. Its natural and exclusive milieu was rural society, specifically the small independent farmer. There were villages in Croatia in which Radić's people won over 90 percent of the vote, while failing to gain even 7 percent in bourgeois-proletarian Zagreb. Not until the late 1930s did the agrarian movement begin to propagate solutions to the national question beyond the framework of the agrarian social milieu.<sup>23</sup>

Ultimately, the agrarian movement lacked the cast-iron will to rule and the organizational prerequisites to make this happen. The Croatian Peasant's Party acted as a populist movement that used all the instruments offered by modern mass politics. However, it never undertook an intensive effort to create a stringent party organization with rigid hierarchies, extensive training, and strict discipline among its cadres. It rejected violence as a political means, sought compromises instead, and thereby took surprising sidesteps from time to time.<sup>24</sup>

Contrary to Italy and Germany, the ultra-right and fascist movements remained powerless. Only in Croatia did the extreme right make a name



for itself at all in the form of the separatist but politically irrelevant Party of Rights. Often referred to by the name of their earlier party leader Josip Frank, the “Frankians” fought Yugoslavism and referred to historic rights stemming from the Middle Ages in justifying the creation of an independent, ethnically homogenous Croatian nation state. After King Alexander banned nationalist Croat agitation in 1929, leading party members emigrated. Abroad they founded the fascist, separatist underground organization Ustasha (from *ustaša*, insurgents), whose spokesman became the lawyer Ante Pavelić. Support for their ideas came first and foremost from students, intellectuals, the self-employed, and former Austro-Hungarian military officers and veterans. The Ustasha ideology was militantly anti-Yugoslav, anti-Serb, antiliberal, and anticommunist. Its stated aim was to use armed, terrorist actions to establish an independent, ethnically homogenous Greater Croatian state, to which Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandžak, Montenegro, and part of Vojvodina were to belong. The movement was based on the leader principle, glorified violence, and operated paramilitary units. It propagated the overthrow of the old order and cultivated religious-like, mystic communal rituals. Its ideology, self-image, organization, and forms of representation were similar to those of Italian fascism, and it took its inspiration from the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), with which it cooperated closely.<sup>25</sup>

Although the extreme right found support among the urban petty bourgeoisie and in some Catholic areas, rural Croatia proved quite resilient to the violence-laden activity of the Ustasha movement. Only in Lika, Dalmatia, and Herzegovina did some of the impoverished peasantry sympathize with the subversive, ethnic-populist slogans and the agitation against Serbs and communists. In September 1932, an attempted uprising in Lika against the local authorities, which had been orchestrated by Italy, failed miserably. The king’s security forces crushed the insurgency, and many of those involved landed in prison. Its base of support remained limited, even though the Ustasha movement was able later to operate openly following an amnesty in 1937 brought about by the Axis powers and to expand its radius of activity to include Catholic high schools, academic organizations, and patriotic societies. Only a few Frankians, rightist supporters of the Croatian Peasant Party, and a part of the Catholic clergy ever joined their ranks, so that even in 1941 the movement only had 4,000 members.<sup>26</sup>

The picture was not much different in Serbia, where the counterpart to the Ustasha movement was formed in 1934/1935 as the Yugoslav National Movement Zbor. Its leader was Dimitrije Ljotić, a man with religious-clerical, anticommunist, and anti-Semitic leanings who admired National Socialist Germany. He combined race theory and blood-and-soil ideology with Orthodox mysticism and a romanticized Serb nationalism. No more than 5,000 to 6,000 students, teachers, low-level employees, and a handful of priests

constituted his base of support.<sup>27</sup> However, as in Croatia, there was a milieu of sympathizers, where radicalism and intolerance could potentially grow out of the deep-seated insecurity that existed. The pluralization of lifestyles and the advance of the modern state resulted sometimes in decidedly anti-Western stances. People were upset by the egoism, rationalism, materialism, and decadence that the new era also brought with it in Yugoslavia and that, in the minds of critics, was tolerated far too much by some of the elite.<sup>28</sup> In intellectual and church circles, visions of the future were nationally exclusive, ethnic, and religiously fundamentalist. For example, the writer Miloš Crnjanski moved away from his earlier cosmopolitan position and railed against liberalism and Marxism in his published contributions to newspapers. He put forth the case for corporatism and a “Jacobian nationalism” because “the new nation is not yet finished. Next to external enemies, a worm of emigrant cliques, strange ‘cultivated’ ideals, foreign capital . . . national snobs and separatists eats away at us.”<sup>29</sup> In other parts of the country, authors also complained about moral decline and the “decayed West,” and about godlessness and the gravediggers of the monarchy, namely the communists.

How do we explain the fact that a fascist mass movement never gained a foothold in Yugoslavia? Southeast Europe had certainly suffered the far-reaching consequences of various crises of modernization since the turn of the century: devastating world war experiences, an unfinished process of nation building, disruption in the operation of the political system, class conflicts, cultural pessimism, and criticism of civilization. What was missing were the relevant ideological and social milieus, the leadership cliques, and the followers on which the ultra-nationalist right thrived. Disoriented, status-threatened, or déclassé members of the middle classes, especially from the bourgeoisie, did not constitute the critical mass necessary for such movements, as they did in the highly industrialized countries. Revolutionary reactionaries simply did not have as many ways to penetrate the world of intact and steadfast religious, family, and social relations in which so many people still lived. Moreover, many citizens of Yugoslavia may not have felt that they were being personally spoken to by the rabble-rousing campaign of the ultra-nationalist right. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and Spain, the conservative and monarchist forces in Yugoslavia did not strike a compromise with the radical right on the power to rule. Without Hitler’s rise to power and his later intervention, these movements would have remained no more than a footnote in history.<sup>30</sup>

### *The Nascent Communist Movement*

Conservative and extreme rightist circles considered communism to be the most dangerous thing imported from the decadent West. King Alexander also certainly would have liked to destroy it, had he been able. Unlike fascism, communism had been able to take root in the South Slavic countries starting

in the nineteenth century, despite the fact that the working class to which it appealed was never large. However, the bourgeois-capitalist economic order and its periodic crises had pushed a large number of landless peasants and those with tiny plots (“dwarf farmers”) into destitution, and the Great Depression had further swelled the ranks of the distraught and disappointed. In the Orthodox regions of the country, Russia had traditionally been considered a major role model, an attitude that was reinforced by a belief in the blessings brought about by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. This explains why the communists won 12.5 percent of the vote in Yugoslavia’s first postwar election in 1920. In Bulgaria they won 20.4 percent and thus clearly more than in Poland (7.9 percent), for example. With 200,000 votes, the communists joined the constitutional assembly as the third largest delegation. In backward Macedonia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) garnered an astonishing 33 percent of the vote and in Montenegro even 36 percent.<sup>31</sup>

One of the factors contributing to the attractiveness of the illegal communist movement was its approach to the national question. Since 1924, the underground CPY had taken a strong stand on the issue by being the only ones to recognize Macedonians and Montenegrins as distinct peoples and by claiming that all peoples should have the right to self-determination and separation. Faced with the growing danger of fascist aggression years later, they shifted their position in 1935 to support the continued existence of Yugoslavia and spoke out in favor of a federal state, modeled on that of the Soviet Union, in which all nations and nationalities were of equal standing.<sup>32</sup> The German social democrat Hermann Wendel, whose South Slavic sister party had been pushed to the political sidelines by the communists, was disgusted: “The subsistence farmers of Montenegro and the goat herders of Macedonia—people who live in a completely medieval world of imagination, have never seen a factory smokestack, and have never voted for a parliament—have abruptly metamorphosed into such ‘class conscience’ enthusiasts for the ‘Soviet idea.’”<sup>33</sup> Actually, the communists were also surprisingly strong in Zagreb, Belgrade, and other big cities.

During the party’s years of illegality starting in 1921, the CPY had numerous sympathizers, especially among the 300,000-member-strong trade unions and in the youth movement. The communists had a solid base of support in Croatia, where Josip Broz was born in 1892 as the offspring of a Slovene-Croat marriage. In search of employment, Broz, a locksmith and trade unionist, had traveled to Zagreb, Pilsen, Munich, and Mannheim, among other places, before he was sent to the Serbian front during the First World War and then into a Russian prisoner of war camp.<sup>34</sup> As a communist, party functionary, and professional revolutionary, he was later imprisoned in Yugoslavia for nearly six years. In 1934, the CPY appointed Broz, who

now called himself Tito, to the Central Committee and sent him to the Soviet Union for training. Unlike many of his comrades, he survived the Stalinist Great Purge unharmed. Tito returned home in 1935 and became the party's secretary general in 1939.<sup>35</sup>

For talented young men from lower-income backgrounds like Josip Broz, the trade unions and the party provided the only available avenue to education and social advancement. Since political work offered them the chance not only to pursue class-specific interests but also to develop individual abilities and careers, many skilled laborers and artisans joined the party. The CPY used cultural organizations, reading societies, and athletic clubs to spread its ideas in rural areas. Communist ideas were further disseminated by two new social groups: the young generation of village teachers who had been trained in the cities and the young class of worker-peasants, who moved back and forth between the worlds of urban libertarian cosmopolitanism and rural traditionalism.<sup>36</sup>

In the 1930s, leftism was becoming increasingly attractive, not the least among intellectuals and the middle classes who rejected the antidemocratic, repressive Yugoslav regime. Marxism justified the necessity for a more just world in a quasi-scientific, theoretical way, and its vision of society offered an alternative to the stuffy patriarchal culture that was being rejected, particularly by the educated young. Concerned about the rise of militarism and fascism, they saw communism as the most outspoken and resolute opposition to Franco, Hitler, and Mussolini, from whom the political establishment did not seem to be sufficiently distancing itself. After the Comintern decided in 1935 on a new Popular Front policy that directed communist parties to form alliances from that point on with social democrats, liberals, and all other antifascists, the communists in Yugoslavia were more accepted as a patriotic force by a broader, no longer exclusively leftist-oriented public.<sup>37</sup> Increasingly the left gained a foothold in schools and at universities. For example, they thoroughly infiltrated the law faculty in Belgrade. The students became politicized over the existing police state, the deficit in democratic participation, widespread social plight, and old-fashioned morals. In growing numbers they began to organize underground.<sup>38</sup>

Later, during the Second World War, the communists would be in a good position to take power because the CPY had been restructured into a disciplined Leninist cadre party during the thirties. Tito heralded a generational change at the leadership level through which the party became not only younger but more modern, convincing, and forceful. Three men who belonged to Tito's innermost circle were the Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, the Serb Aleksandar Ranković, and the Slovene Edvard Kardelj; these men would later become the architects of the second Yugoslav state.

Such communists saw themselves as the political and social avant-garde and part of a worldwide movement that conferred its legitimacy and backing on them. They believed in a universally applicable, historical legitimacy and the development of a more humane society throughout the entire world in which revolutionary consciousness would triumph over ethnic aversions. They shared not only their ideological premises but also biographical experiences and convictions, such as years of underground political work, faith in a just future, and a steadfast will to change the way things were. Many had volunteered to fight in the Spanish Civil War. Reminiscent of the Young Bosnians before the First World War, Yugoslavism for the communists was not just a vision but a way of life. The party enforced a strict code of values and behavior emphasizing ideological loyalty, willing sacrifice, familial solidarity, Spartan discipline, and somber Puritanism. By the end of the decade, the party was tightly organized, authoritatively led, and peacefully focused on a pro-Yugoslav aim.<sup>39</sup>

#### *Radicalization, Religious Fundamentalism, and Political Violence*

In the late 1930s, the radicalization and militarization of the political spectrum that was evident throughout Europe could also be found in Yugoslavia. The authoritarian rule of the royal dictatorship, the rise of fascism and National Socialism, and growing external pressure encouraged extremism and accelerated ideological polarization. State repression intensified and many communists and ultranationalists were jailed, tortured, or disappeared.<sup>40</sup>

In turn, this strengthened an antidemocratic discourse that aimed at overcoming the internal fragmentation by creating a unified Yugoslav nation with authoritarian means. Political confrontations were carried out primarily on the streets and no longer in parliament or in the media.<sup>41</sup> Militant political actions increasingly impacted public life, irrespective of ideology or nationality. The incidents of students from both the left and the right violently attacking each other became more frequent. In October 1940, a shootout in Belgrade between the supporters of the anti-Semitic Zbor and the communists left five dead and 120 wounded.<sup>42</sup>

Every party had paramilitary units deployed to propagate and advance their cause. Yugoslav Action was a group founded in 1929 with close ties to the regime. It fought for a populist totalitarian Yugoslav ideology by staging mass marches, while the communists sent armed units of proletarian street fighters to disrupt the rallies of the fascists. Nationalist-minded Serbs joined the ultra-nationalistic Chetnik units, whose membership rose between 1935 and 1938 from 200,000 to over a half million.<sup>43</sup> Likewise, the Croatian Peasants' Party formed peasant and citizen militias allegedly as a defense

against Chetniks, communists, and the “Green Shirts” from the camp of Stojadinović supporters. In 1940, this force comprised 200,000 men, which Yugoslav authorities were not completely wrong to view as the nucleus of a later Croatian army.<sup>44</sup>

With the rise of nationalism, antidemocratic thinking, and religious intolerance, antagonism heightened not only among the political parties but also between the churches. One of the points of rivalrous contention was the education of children from mixed-religion marriages. The Concordat with the Vatican that resulted from long negotiations failed the ratification process in 1937 because the Serbian Orthodox Church opposed it. The Orthodox Church feared the Catholic missionary zeal of converting believers of other faiths, and so it threatened all members of parliament who ratified the Concordat with excommunication. In various cities violent demonstrations protested against the Concordat. Embittered, the Catholic Church subsequently adopted a confrontational stance toward the Yugoslav state. The fragile balance of religious coexistence broke apart.

Soon militancy manifested itself in the overall atmosphere, and also within the various religious communities. The lay organization Croatian Catholic Movement fought against liberalization and secularization, as did ultranationalist and profascist groups with names like “Eagle” and “Crusader.”<sup>45</sup> In Serbia this fervor was channeled into an extremist Orthodox trend that celebrated religious cults, the Kosovo myth, nationalism, and antimodernism in the guise of *svetosavlje* (the ideology of the Saint Sava). Influenced by the cultural theories of Russian Slavophilia and the reception of Oswald Spengler’s work, these ideas caught on among theologians, the peasant lay movement known as the Bogomoljci (literally, God-prayers), and on the far right end of the Serb elite, but never on a widespread basis.<sup>46</sup>

Radical militarism was also found among the Muslim population. The dissolution of their traditionally closed societal order in both their religious and secular worlds, the disappointment over the unfulfilled promises of progress, and especially a deep-seated identity crisis may have moved Bosnian intellectuals to retreat into the universal and ultimately justifying system of religious dogma and embrace the utopia of a pan-Islamic societal and world order. They concentrated their energies on the reform movements in the Arab world. Confronted by the alleged decline of human civilization in general and of Muslim culture in particular, the university-educated youth sought inspiration in the work of Islamic and Western authors who criticized civilization, like Oswald Spengler. They joined the pious societies Trezvenost (Sobriety) and Ihvan (Brotherhood) to revive Muslim customs and traditions like the study of the Koran and the observance of Ramadan. Modeled after the

Egyptian group Young Muslims, a handful of intellectuals founded a group of the same name in Sarajevo in 1941. It was the first militant organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina that propagated the “training and struggle” for a pan-Islamic state.<sup>47</sup>

### *A Reorientation in Foreign Policy*

The ongoing rivalry since the nineteenth century among the major powers for dominance in Southeast Europe intensified in the 1930s. The region proved to be both a good supplier of agrarian products and raw materials vital to industry and a good market for finished industrial goods. For Germany in particular, the region became important for its war industry after the Nazi regime announced its New Plan in 1934.<sup>48</sup>

Since assuming power, the National Socialists had worked determinedly to bind the countries of Southeast Europe to Germany through trade agreements. Intensive economic relations seemed an apt way to exert political influence and, where possible, to undermine French security interests. In March 1933, the undersecretary at the foreign ministry, von Bülow, underscored in a memorandum that Yugoslavia and Romania could “in this manner be significantly influenced regarding the direction of their foreign policy.”<sup>49</sup>

In the bilateral trade agreement of 1 May 1934, Germany contracted to purchase Yugoslav agrarian products at prices higher than those on the global market, which would take place in exchange for German export goods in a clearing process.<sup>50</sup> Unerringly, the Reich succeeded in becoming Yugoslavia’s most important trading partner. Whereas Germany received 14.1 percent of Yugoslav exports between 1931 and 1935, this figure had already risen to 25.44 percent in 1936 and even 45.9 percent by 1939.<sup>51</sup> Yugoslavia had made itself dangerously dependent on Germany economically and thus also politically.

The security system that France had put into place in 1918 in East and Southeast Europe began to erode when King Alexander and France’s foreign minister, Louis Barthou, were murdered in October 1934. French investigators uncovered close ties between the assassin and the Macedonian VMRO and the Croat Ustasha, which, in turn, could then be traced to Italy and Hungary. Belgrade later failed in its effort to get the League of Nations to condemn Italy unequivocally, in addition to Hungary, even though it had been proven that both countries tolerated the existence of Croat fascist training camps on their territory. However, no country was willing to publicly expose Mussolini, not even France.<sup>52</sup>

Faced with growing international tensions and the intervention practices of the Axis powers, Yugoslavia adopted neutrality as its strategy to survive. Prince Regent Paul, who governed the country during the years that Alexander’s heir, Peter, was a minor, attempted to keep his country out of

the looming international disputes by pursuing a policy of equidistance. This meant maintaining good neighborly relations in all directions without making any alliance commitments, which is why Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović established closer relations to Berlin and Rome. In 1937, Yugoslavia and Italy signed a friendship and nonaggression pact.

Hitler became more forceful in his dealings with Southeast Europe starting in 1938. In preparation for the war, he made Yugoslavia part of the “Greater German Economic Sphere—Southeast” and assigned it the task of supplying armament-relevant raw materials, like iron ore and copper, and food, for which the country received weapons and airplane technology in exchange.<sup>53</sup> In order to ensure that the supply of resources would not be seized by enemy countries, Germany pressed the countries of Southeast Europe to enter the Tripartite Pact. When Prince Regent Paul paid an official visit to Germany in the early summer of 1939, the German government started an unexpected charm offensive, underlaid with intimidating demonstrations of military might. This visit led the prince to draw the long overdue conclusion that, if Yugoslavia was to repel foreign threats, his nation had little choice but to negotiate solutions to its internal conflicts in order to forge the much stronger unity it needed.<sup>54</sup>

#### *The Serb-Croat Settlement (Sporazum)*

In February 1939, domestic and foreign policy motives prompted Prince Regent Paul to dismiss the powerful prime minister Milan Stojadinović, a man who advocated a strong centralized state and thus stood in the way of solving the “Croatian question.” In the December 1938 elections, the “United Opposition” under the leadership of the Croatian Peasants’ Party had won an impressive 45 percent of the vote, while the governing party only garnered 54 percent. So it had become quite apparent that Stojadinović’s politics were not sufficiently supported by the electorate.

Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (1935/1936), Germany’s annexation of Austria (1938), and the partitioning and eventual demise of Czechoslovakia (1938/1939) demonstrated dramatically that Great Britain and France would not defend their East European protégés against military aggression. It thus seemed essential that the small Balkan countries maintain good relations with the Axis as a defense against their own destruction. As the influence of London and Paris diminished in eastern Central Europe, so did the foreign backing of Yugoslavia and its centralist political system, which had been based on the model of the Western powers.<sup>55</sup> The founding of an independent Slovakia by Nazi Germany aroused the fear that, sooner or later, the rebellious Croats might also seek Hitler’s help to achieve their demands for autonomy. Moreover, Rome secretly continued to try to incite the Ustasha movement



and the Peasants' Party to an uprising that would bring about the demise of Yugoslavia and an intervention by Italy. Therefore, there was no choice but to give the leader of the Croatian Peasants' Party, Vladko Maček, a role in government.

On 26 August 1939, Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and Vladko Maček agreed on a settlement a few days before the outbreak of the Second World War. The *Sporazum* (Agreement) established for the first time an autonomous Croatian administrative district within Yugoslavia with Zagreb as its capital. This so-called Banovina of Croatia covered the greater part of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and was inhabited by over four million people, of whom nearly 20 percent were Serbs and 4 percent Muslims. Economic affairs, domestic matters, the educational system, and the judicial system were now in the hands of the Croatian self-administration, led by Ivan Šubašić as the new governor. The agreement went into effect on 26 August 1939 at the same time that the new "Government of National Agreement" was sworn into office. Cvetković remained prime minister, and Maček became his deputy.<sup>56</sup>

Although the agreement satisfied the Croats' most tenacious demand, it created new problems. Both the Ustasha and the communists criticized it for not going far enough. Once the Second World War started, the economic situation was further aggravated by rising inflation, tax increases, and a shortage of goods. Dissatisfaction with the situation grew in Croatia, for which the former opposition leaders were held responsible. Due to the outbreak of war, most stipulations of the *Sporazum* were not fulfilled.

The new autonomy granted to the Croats made many in Yugoslavia nervous and triggered a domino effect for comparable demands by other peoples. Serbs, Slovenes, and Bosnian Muslims each called for their own banovina. The Muslims were particularly bitter over the fact that Croats and Serbs had—seemingly bilaterally—divided up their country among themselves, and in doing so they had not only trampled the historical borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina but had also treated with contempt the regional identity of the populace. Religious and secular elites banded together to submit several resolutions demanding territorial autonomy. Particularly explosive in a political sense was the proposal put forth by the Serbian Culture Club led by the historian Slobodan Jovanović, one of the most important scholars in the interwar period. This proposal presented a plan to create a banovina of "Serb countries," which was to include Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In other words, the banovina would closely embody the historical concept of a Greater Serbia.<sup>57</sup> By the end of the decade, the ideology of unitarism and centralism was dead, and a great majority of Yugoslavs, including Serbs, now favored federalism.

### *Operation Retribution*

Whether the *Sporazum* would have been able to establish domestic peace on the long run will always remain an unanswered question. On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland, thus further darkening the political skies over Europe. Mussolini seized the opportunity to still his appetite for Yugoslav territory. Following the dismantling of Czechoslovakia back in March 1939, Hitler had given his partner a free hand in the Mediterranean realm. The next month, in early April, Italian troops marched into Albania. In August of that same year, Hitler urged Mussolini—so as to appease his Axis partner before the German aggression against Poland commenced—to “deliver the coup de grâce [to Yugoslavia] as soon as possible.” In January 1940, Pavelić promised to provoke a revolution and then to call on Italy for help. Under the code name E, Rome began to prepare a military intervention that would create a Croatian state by the grace of Mussolini.<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile, Hitler had changed his mind and wanted instead to maintain peace in the Balkans. Otherwise, the risk seemed too great that the British would engage them militarily in the Mediterranean or that Stalin might even be provoked to intervene. However, the Axis partners did agree that there would be no place for Yugoslavia in the “New Europe” they were planning.<sup>59</sup>

After Italian troops invaded Greece on 28 October 1940, the German leadership modified its strategy. To come to the aid of the militarily hard-pressed Mussolini, Germany intended to invade Greece in its Operation Marita. At the same time, Hitler sought to protect his southern flank during the impending attack on the Soviet Union, to drive the British out of the Aegean mainland permanently, and to secure the exploitation of Southeast Europe for the war industry, especially Romania’s oil fields. To do this, the German army—the Wehrmacht—required a deployment zone.<sup>60</sup>

Yugoslavia found itself in a quandary. To support Germany’s aggression against Greece would have meant war with Great Britain sooner or later, maybe even with the United States and the Soviet Union. This is why Belgrade denied the Axis permission to transport their troops through Yugoslavia. At the same time, the General Staff knew very well that its army would not be able to effectively counter any German attack. So, how was Yugoslavia to maintain the neutrality so vital to its survival?

Once the Wehrmacht started marching through Bulgaria in the direction of the Greek and Yugoslav borders, these considerations became obsolete. Against the backdrop of domestic turmoil, growing social dissatisfaction, and massive threats from Germany with serious political consequences, Prince Regent Paul followed the path taken by his neighbors Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, and joined the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact of 1940 on 25 March 1941.<sup>61</sup> Hitler assuaged Belgrade’s overriding concerns by assuring

the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and, at least at first, forwent asking Yugoslavia for military support in the impending campaign against Greece.<sup>62</sup>

That very evening, major demonstrations occurred in various cities. Encouraged but probably not incited by the British, Serb generals toppled the government on 27 March 1941 in a bloodless coup and placed King Peter II, who was still a minor, on the throne. Air Force general Dušan Simović became prime minister, and following some initial hesitation, the Croatian Peasants' Party leader Maček assumed a cabinet post. Simović was deeply committed to the *Sporazum*, and both men believed it would be possible to keep Yugoslavia as a whole out of the war if they acted quickly and offered Berlin a declaration of loyalty to the Tripartite Pact. The vast majority of the political class thought that even the worst of all possible Yugoslavias was a better alternative to no Yugoslavia at all. Thousands gathered on Belgrade's streets to celebrate the return to neutrality.

That same day, Hitler convened a secret meeting in Berlin. The Germans viewed the coup both as a rebuff and as a potential risk. They feared Britain would be able to convince the Yugoslavs to switch their alliance and then to permit the British to use their air bases for attacks against the German troops amassing in preparation for the attack against the Soviet Union. Hitler ordered that Yugoslavia be "considered an enemy and crushed as quickly as possible." As retribution, Belgrade was to be destroyed through a continual series of daytime and nighttime bombing raids by the German air force.<sup>63</sup> Besides the strategic military motives, Hitler was also being driven by ideological ones, namely his desire to reverse the outcome of the First World War and to eliminate Serbian influence once and for all.<sup>64</sup>

In the early morning hours of 6 April 1941, German aircraft began without warning to bomb the defenseless capital, which the government had declared earlier, to no avail, as an "open city." These attacks destroyed 9,000 houses and killed 3,000 people—more than in Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry taken together.<sup>65</sup> Eleven days after the completion of Operation Retribution, the Yugoslav army was forced to surrender. Thus, the first Yugoslav state met its demise through foreign aggression and not as a result of its own internal conflicts and contradictions.

## PART III

### THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1941 TO 1945)



## 8. Occupation, Collaboration, and Resistance

### *The New (Dis-)Order in the Balkans*

Yugoslavia ceased to exist on 17 April 1941, the day it surrendered. Hitler and Mussolini plucked the country apart, turning it into a mosaic of annexed, occupied, and quasi-independent territories. Germany annexed northern Slovenia and occupied Serbia and the Banat. Italy received southern Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Montenegro. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Independent State of Croatia was formed under the control of the two Axis powers. Kosovo and western Macedonia were given to Albania, which had been an Italian protectorate since 1939. While Bulgaria grabbed eastern Macedonia, Hungary pushed into the region between the Tisza, Danube, and Mur rivers. These developments prompted State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker to ask, in some consternation, about who was now going “to tend to this bag of fleas during the war.”<sup>1</sup>

The new order in Southeast Europe worked as a system of graded dependencies in which there were annexed areas (Slovenia), occupied countries (Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece), puppet states (Croatia and Slovakia), and allies (Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary). However, the various legal statuses of these countries were of little practical relevance. Aims, strategies, and politics were all very similar within the National Socialist “Greater Space” (Großraum), regardless whether a country was “independent” or “occupied.” In all of these countries, partners could be found who were willing to collaborate with the Axis powers in order to launch their own plans for the creation of homogeneous nation states.<sup>2</sup>

Germany and Italy had different motives for dividing up Yugoslavia. Hitler pursued political, military, and economic objectives in the Balkans. He sought to destroy the postwar order, secure transport lines and access to economic resources vital to the war effort, and thwart an Allied invasion. Shortly after occupying the Balkans, Himmler also incorporated them into his

megalomaniacal policies of resettlement and extermination. For its part, Italy considered Southeast Europe as its historically evolved sphere of influence and part of its natural living space (*spazio vitale*) stretching from the Adriatic to Africa and the Middle East. However, the equality between the two dictators was only a formal construct. Occupational practices later revealed permanent friction and serious conflicts of interest, in which Mussolini usually came out on the short end.<sup>3</sup>

### *The Independent State of Croatia*

The Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was created from the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the attempt failed to get the popular peasant leader Vladko Maček to take over the reins of government under German protection, the SS-Standartenführer Edmund Veessenmayer put the fascist Ustasha movement in power. By this time he had already arranged the annexation of Austria and the independence of Slovakia.<sup>4</sup> Ante Pavelić returned to Zagreb from his years-long exile to become *Poglavnik* (leader) with dictatorial authority. Croatia was organized as a leader state (*Führerstaat*) without any separation of powers, and the persecution of oppositional forces was legalized with the enactment of the Law for the Protection of the People and the State on 17 April 1941. The Ustasha government invoked the idea of a “people’s community” (*Volksgemeinschaft*), which it defined as “Aryan” like the German model. Also in April, Pavelić zealously enacted the anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws. The pillars of support for his reign of violence were the militias, army, secret police, special courts, and more than twenty concentration camps.<sup>5</sup>

Croatia’s long-sought sovereignty soon proved to be a chimera. Both Hitler and Mussolini treated the country as an occupied region and drew a demarcation line through its territory. Berlin used its immense diplomatic corps and the Plenipotentiary German General to exert great political influence on racial, economic, and military policy.<sup>6</sup> In the Roman Protocols, Pavelić also had to surrender a wide strip of Dalmatian coastline and the Bay of Kotor to Italy on 18 May 1941, thus turning the decades-old collective nightmare of the Croats into reality.

In the wake of the German-Italian occupation, the Ustasha movement saw a historically unique opportunity to implement its original agenda, the creation of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Croatia. For decades, it had been preaching for the resurrection of medieval Croatia covering its “entire ethnic and historic territory.” The 6.3 million population of the Independent State of Croatia was extremely heterogeneous. Only a bare majority of 3.3 million were Croats. The rest of the populace was made up of about two million Serbs, 700,000 Muslims, and 150,000 ethnic Germans and other minorities.<sup>7</sup> The Croat fascists now launched a systematic campaign against their

alleged archenemy, the Orthodox Christian population. Hundreds of thousands were disenfranchised, dispossessed, driven out, herded into internment camps, or murdered in vicious attacks. The centralist government of Greater Croatia also did not permit Muslims to hold any special status, even though a number of them sympathized with the Ustasha government. The government struck all references to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” from official language and declared the Muslims to be “Croats of Islamic Faith.” For this reason, the profascist Committee of National Rescue, based in Sarajevo, petitioned Hitler in November 1942 to bestow autonomy on Bosnia-Herzegovina under direct patronage of the Third Reich. Berlin turned down the request promptly.<sup>8</sup>

Support for the new regime remained sparse. Neither in domestic nor foreign policy did the government exercise full sovereignty. Approval came from the right wing of the Peasants’ Party, from parts of the Catholic Church, and from nationalist-thinking intellectuals and students, who celebrated the “resurrection” of Croatia and indulged in a missionary and chauvinist sense of purpose. Yet it only took a couple of months following the assumption of power before the already rather heterogeneous base of support for the Ustasha movement began to crack apart.<sup>9</sup> Very few people identified unconditionally with the ideology and aims of the Croatian leadership, and whoever cooperated with it often acted out of pure opportunism. It “appears to prove little that houses in the villages hang flags and that a relatively large number of people participate” in Sunday rallies, warned a German informant in mid-1941. He sensed that the prevailing “indifference of broad segments of the population” could change “into active resistance.”<sup>10</sup>

In mid-February 1942, the plenipotentiary German general in Agram, Edmund von Glaise Horstenau, reported: “Hatred against it [Ustasha] is hard to beat anymore. Representatives of the movement make themselves unpopular time and again through their arrogance, despotism, greediness, and corruption. Furthermore, misdeeds, theft, and murder continue unabated. No week goes by in which some ‘cleansing action’ is not carried out in which entire villages including women and children bite the dust.”<sup>11</sup> In early February 1943, German supreme commander of the southeast Alexander Löhr complained: “Government and bureaucracy have lost all support through mismanagement and the Ustasha course, not only among the Pravoslavs [the Serbs], but also among their own Croat population.”<sup>12</sup>

### *The German Occupation of Serbia*

What little remained of Serbia fell under German occupation rule, a confusing jumble of various civilian and military offices that switched and altered their competencies time and again.<sup>13</sup> Starting in June 1941, the highest authority in the occupied territories of Yugoslavia and Greece became the supreme army commander of Southeast Europe. Subordinate to him was the military



commander in Serbia (since September 1941, the plenipotentiary commanding general). This person, in turn, headed two staffs, one civilian and one military. As head of the civilian administration, SS-Group Leader Harald Turner supervised the Serbian collaboration government. The military command staff oversaw police, army, and security tasks. Operating independently of these were two task forces of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD) whose mission it was to combat “emigrants, saboteurs, and terrorists.” The general plenipotentiary for the economy, Hermann Göring’s direct representative, completed the institutional jumble. While he was, institutionally, not part of the Military Administration, he was to exploit Serbia’s resources for the German war machine. Foreign policy matters were handled, in turn, by the German Foreign Office through their own plenipotentiary. However, in August 1943, the powers of this office were transferred to the influential special plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, Hermann Neubacher.<sup>14</sup>

In order to facilitate the administration of Serbia more easily, the SS officer Veesenmayer installed the ultraconservative and nationalist general Milan Nedić as prime minister of a puppet “Government of National Salvation” in August 1941. He was supported by parts of the officer corps, the Chetniks under Kosta Pećanac, and the fascist Zbor movement led by Dimitrije Ljotić. Nedić’s chief task was to smash resistance with indigenous troops and thereby relieve the German military from this work. Because Hitler viewed Serbs as characterless, disloyal, and dangerous, all government functions vital to power pertaining to the military, police, economy, and finances remained in German hands. Thus, the status of the Serbian collaboration government differed from that of Pétain’s regime in France, which was at least allowed to represent a sovereign state that the Germans did not classify a priori as inferior. Nedić proved to be a willing implementer of German occupation policy. He “cleansed” the education system, established strict censorship, and set up trade corporations and a National Labor Service. He also commanded the Serbian State Guard and the Serbian Volunteer Corps, two military organizations set up to assist German troops.

Nedić viewed himself as a trustee of Serb interests, as a mediator between the foreign occupiers and his people, and he tried to alleviate the suffering of the Serbs while at the same time brutally combating communists. His ideology was a mixture of ultraconservatism and the chauvinism of the fascist Zbor movement, a strange conglomerate of heterogeneous, ideological elements creating an ethnic-racist, blood-and-soil cult and religious Orthodox messianism, coupled with a fixation on an age-old Serb patriarchal family structure and village community.<sup>15</sup> However, the Serb population did not prove very receptive to this train of thought. The nationalist-leaning middle class tended to remain loyal to the king and to favor the former and now exiled government, and the peasantry did not think much differently.

As was the case everywhere in Eastern Europe, the ethnic German minority played a key role in establishing the new order. For one, the approximately half a million Danube Swabians were expected to help further the “racial reordering” of the area. For another, they were to serve on the Eastern Front as “troops obligated to the Reich” and to fight in their own country against the partisans, no matter what the legal status of their home regions was. Even though Croatia was formally an independent state, the ethnic Germans there were given an autonomous legal status as “*Volksgruppe*” that ensured their total cooptation by the Reich.

Berlin treated the Banat Swabians in a similar fashion. This German minority in Serbia was given its own administrative region,<sup>16</sup> where society was organized according to the Nazi model and the district received directives directly from the Reich. Berlin expected the Banat Swabians to do their part in the agricultural “production battle” and to engage in “total war.” Starting in the spring of 1942, practically all men fit for military service were conscripted into the Waffen-SS on the basis of “the iron law of their folkdom (*Volkstum*).” In 1943/1944, about 50,000 ethnic Germans from Croatia, Serbia, and the Banat were serving, and another 18,500 came from the territories occupied by Hungary.<sup>17</sup>

In all other parts of the former territory of Yugoslavia, the New Order was built on sand. In the summer of 1941, the Italians in Montenegro failed in their attempt to declare a pseudo-independent satellite state. Instead, they set up a military government. Slovenia, which Hitler and Mussolini had divided up between themselves, was subjected to a systematically implemented policy of Germanization and Italianization, respectively. The Provincia di Lubiana was headed by an Italian high commissioner, who was assisted by a local consultative council that, however, lacked any form of authority in its own country. After Italy surrendered in 1943, the region fell to the German occupiers. With the help of General Leon Rupnik, who wanted to secure the Slovenes a place in “New Europe,” and with the blessing of Bishop Gregorij Rožman, a home guard (*domobranci*) was formed, an auxiliary of the Wehrmacht under German command. At the height of its power, this force was about 17,500 men strong.<sup>18</sup>

### *Reprisal Actions*

The plan to rule the country with little military deployment and with the help of local collaborators soon proved illusionary. All state institutions of government and authority had been destroyed, creating a power vacuum that was hard to control. While bourgeois groups, royalists, peasant-party supporters, social democrats, and communists were distraught and disillusioned, they were not without fight in them. In various parts of the country, oppositionists carried out attacks and acts of sabotage. The Germans decided to nip

this resistance in the bud by having SS-strike forces and Wehrmacht soldiers carry out hostage executions. On 28 April, Colonel-General von Weichs, the commander-in-chief of the Second Army, ordered that, in retribution for every German soldier harmed in an attack, one hundred civilians from all segments of society were to be shot “ruthlessly” and the corpses hung in public display. General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel instructed the High Command on 28 September 1941 to shoot one hundred people, “including known leaders of the community or their relatives,” for every German soldier killed and fifty people for every German soldier wounded.<sup>19</sup> The Wehrmacht took prisoners referred to as “*Sühnegefangene*” [retribution prisoners], usually communists, Jews, gypsies, criminals, and “hostages . . . who play a role in public life.” They had to pay with their lives for attacks against members of the Wehrmacht, ethnic Germans, and—as of November 1942—Serb collaborators.<sup>20</sup> For example, on a single November night in Belgrade, 149 professors, academy members, artists, doctors, and lawyers were arrested, including the intellectuals Aleksandar Belić, Tihomir Djordjević, Viktor Novak, and Vaša Čubrilović.<sup>21</sup> In particularly brutal acts of retribution, the German army shot 4,000 to 5,000 civilians in Kraljevo and more than 2,300 in Kragujevac in mid-October 1941.<sup>22</sup> German soldiers captured school pupils and teachers, workers and peasants, clerics and sextons, and any man they happened to come across. Later these people were executed in groups of thirty to fifty and dumped in mass graves. General Böhme’s “punitive actions” took the lives of more than 25,000 men and women just between October and December 1941.<sup>23</sup>

Like elsewhere in the Eastern European realm, the measures undertaken by the occupiers to smash the resistance were combined with those to annihilate the Jewish population. As early as 2 April 1941, the forces deployed by both the security police and the SD for “enemy combat” received the mission to crack down not only on “emigrants, saboteurs, terrorists, etc.” but explicitly on “communists and Jews.” Thus, the Balkan campaign exhibited the characteristics of a war of ideology from the very beginning and not only after Germany invaded the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup>

Due to a lack of personnel, there was no fundamental division of labor between the Wehrmacht and the special unit execution squads in the Balkans, as was practiced in Poland. Hitler expected that the army would be able to handle the partisan problem on its own. He judiciously assigned former Austrian career officers with relevant experience from the First World War to the Balkans.<sup>25</sup> The plenipotentiary German general in Agram, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, had formerly been a staff officer in the imperial Austrian army. The plenipotentiary commanding general in Serbia, Franz Böhme, and the majority of the enlisted troops came from Austria. Such continuity in personnel may perhaps explain why the occupation rule in the First and

Second World Wars are so very similar. Many a brutal “cleansing action” was carried out in regions where, according to Böhme, “in 1914, streams of German blood flowed from those beguiled by Serbs, men and women.”<sup>26</sup> The terror perpetrated against the Serbian civilian population in the First World War was significantly radicalized yet again by the National Socialists, who used it as means to the ends of their racial policy.

In their sphere of influence the Italians also resorted to brute force as a means to create an *ordine nuovo* in the Mediterranean region. Anti-Slavic sentiments and the colonial experience in Africa shaped the attitudes of the Italian officer corps toward the Balkan “subhumans.”<sup>27</sup> In the circular memo 3C from March 1942, General Mario Roatta instructed his army not to play the part of the “good Italian,” but to use the harshest reprisals to smash partisan resistance. Villages were bombed and burned to the ground, masses of hostages were interned and shot, tens of thousands of civilians were taken to the concentration camps of Gonars, Ponza, Colfiorito, and Renicci.<sup>28</sup> This reality thoroughly contradicted the decades-old, uncontested self-image of the “good Italian.”<sup>29</sup>

### *The Annihilation of Jews and Roma*

Military operations to combat the resistance were inseparable from the measures taken by the National Socialists to implement their monstrous plans for displacement, resettlement, and extermination beginning all over Europe in mid-July 1941.<sup>30</sup> Jews in Southeast Europe also lost their civil rights, jobs, and property. They were registered, badged, declared an “enemy within,” and targeted in police raids, hostage shootings, mass executions and—starting in October 1941 at the latest—systematic and complete annihilation.

In 1940, an estimated 72,000 Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews lived in Yugoslavia, primarily in the cities. Unlike the situation in most other Eastern European countries, the Jewish population here was highly assimilated, well integrated, and not stigmatized by social envy to the same degree as in Hungary and Romania. Although anti-Semitism did exist in Croatia and to a lesser extent in Serbia, it tended to be a peripheral social phenomenon. Mixed marriages were common. In the 1930s, propaganda financed by Nazi Germany had been seeping into the country well before the Yugoslav government finally succumbed to pressure from Berlin and passed anti-Jewish laws in 1940. First and foremost, these laws set quotas for Jews at higher schools and banned them from serving in the army. Thanks to what was still a comparatively liberal policy, thousands of German and Austrian Jews chose to flee to Yugoslavia in the 1930s.

The Jewish policy of the Ustasha government was also highly influenced by Nazi Germany. Like several of his colleagues, Ante Pavelić was married

to a woman with Jewish family roots. Not until the late 1930s was an explicit anti-Semitism documented in the party's program.<sup>31</sup> Berlin often doubted the assiduity of its Croat vassals, such as when they proposed to grant particularly well-deserved Jewish citizens the status of "honorary Aryans" despite the strict race laws.<sup>32</sup> Nonetheless, Pavelić followed the Nazi example and had Jews registered, badged, and dispossessed. On 26 June 1941, the *Poglavnik* came out in favor of the principle of collective guilt: "Since the Jews spread bogus news to unsettle the populace and disrupt and aggravate the provision of the population with their known speculative practices, they will therefore be considered collectively responsible and . . . deported to outdoor detention camps."<sup>33</sup> The Ustasha murdered more than 25,000 Jews in these camps, most of them in the notorious Department III B of the Jasenovac concentration camp. German agencies deported another 5,000 Jews to Auschwitz. Tens of thousands were shipped to German extermination camps from regions occupied by Bulgaria and Hungary.<sup>34</sup> The only place where Jews were a bit safer was in the Italian zone. Authorities there treated German pressure to deport in a dilatory manner, so that thousands could escape to Italy or save themselves in partisan-held territory. Whereas the royalist and conservative Italian army conducted an arrogant and aggressive civilizing mission in the lands it occupied, it did not carry out a race-based, ethnic extermination project.<sup>35</sup>

German involvement was more direct in occupied Serbia. As early as mid-April 1941, all Jews had to register with the police. The German High Command (OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) collectively branded them as enemies of the state within the context of "combatting banditry" and made it a priority to shoot them in "reprisal actions" (*Sühneaktionen*). By early December nearly all Jews and gypsies were detained in the Sajmište concentration camp near Belgrade, where the SS deployed a gas van starting in the spring of 1942 to murder the remaining survivors, of which 7,000 were women and children. Harald Turner, an SS-Gruppenführer and head of the German military administration in Serbia, proudly reported in August 1942: "Serbia is the only country in which the Jewish question and the Gypsy question have been solved."<sup>36</sup>

Of the approximately 72,000 Jews who originally lived in the entire Yugoslav region, about 55,000 to 60,000 fell victim to the genocide between 1941 and 1945, about 28,000 of whom died in German concentration camps. Thousands emigrated to Israel after the war.<sup>37</sup> As a result, the Jewish population in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s had been decimated to about 6,500.<sup>38</sup> Likewise, the roughly 80,000 Yugoslav Roma were also stigmatized, disenfranchised, and systematically murdered. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina they were almost completely wiped out and managed to survive in larger numbers only in Serbia and Montenegro.

### *The Serb Chetniks*

In the spring and summer of 1941, the nationalist Chetniks presented themselves as the chief protagonists of Serb resistance. The Chetniks formed armed guerrilla units in parts of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia under the command of Colonel Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović. As assistant to the chief of staff in the Yugoslav army and an expert on guerrilla warfare, Mihailović had refused to surrender when the German Wehrmacht invaded and instead marched to western Serbia with fifty to sixty men, where he set up his headquarters in Ravna Gora in mid-May.

It was Mihailović’s aim to ride the wave of Serb patriotism to the top of a restored monarchical postwar order. He therefore avoided open confrontation with the occupiers, which he considered to be militarily superior, and planned to wait for the anticipated Allied landing before starting an uprising. He invented military successes to report to London, while at the same time getting financial backing from the Serbian collaboration government and offering his services to the Germans and Italians. Fearing the communists above all else, the Yugoslav government in exile turned a deaf ear to rumors about any possible betrayal by their resistance hero. In January 1942, it named Mihailović to the post of war minister and commander-in-chief of the “Yugoslav Army in the Homeland.” As a recognized representative of the old system, he received military support from the British until mid-1943.

Mihailović’s Chetniks borrowed the famous name, emblems, and bearing of the historical partisan fighters from the First World War. They wore high fur caps on heads bearing long hair and unkempt beards and hung ammunition belts across their chests. Traditional symbols and codes evoked a sense of continuity that did not actually exist but triggered widespread recognition and favor among the rural population. Mihailović is thought to have recruited 3,000 to 4,000 men, if not more, by September 1941. Many were former officers, noncommissioned officers, gendarmes, and policemen. By 1943, his following is said to have grown to a number ranging from 30,000 (the German estimate) to 180,000 (Mihailović’s claim). However, from the start, the slightly chaotic force suffered from internal rivalries, discipline problems, and a lack of clear organizational structure and central command.<sup>39</sup>

The Chetniks differed from region to region, and their supporters were driven by various motives: patriotism, self-protection, nationalism, or chauvinism. In Croatia and western Bosnia, they formed primarily as resistance to the Ustasha atrocities. Otherwise, their social base consisted of the populations found in Serb villages and the Montenegrin mountains, where customs, popular religion, and patriarchal values were dominant. Any search for a cohesive ideological program is fruitless. This explains why some collaborated with the occupiers, while others conducted guerrilla warfare, and still others later

defected to the partisans.<sup>40</sup> A notable segment of the Serb bourgeoisie, the nationalist-oriented intelligentsia, and the Orthodox clergy also sympathized with the Chetniks, especially since those with more moderate political views found few alternatives to the communists.<sup>41</sup>

The popularity enjoyed by the Chetniks in Serbia and Montenegro in the rural areas can be attributed in no small measure to the protection they provided to the peasant population against Germans and Italians. For example, in consultation with the Italian occupation authorities in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and Sandžak, they were able to establish local self-administrative bodies. With tacit approval and sometimes open support on the part of Nedić's authorities, many communities in Serbia led a life of their own. The village Miokovce in the Šumadija region completely evaded the clutches of the state: "Now all state power has skipped over us," the head of the village told a journalist in early 1944. "Here we also have military, police, and court. . . . Now we make all our own laws. . . . Whoever does not listen, gets beaten. . . . Blows or a bullet to the head. . . . The village is . . . like a small state."<sup>42</sup> The inhabitants paid no taxes and ignored military conscription orders. Instead, they provided food to the Chetnik fighters in the surrounding mountains, who in exchange protected the villagers from unwanted visits by the Wehrmacht.

### *Tito and the People's Liberation War*

In the meantime, the communists working underground were making military preparations for armed resistance. On 4 July 1941, shortly after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Tito declared the launching of armed insurgency and created partisan units. Preparations had been underway already for months. Yugoslavia was to be liberated and some pressure taken off the Red Army by creating a new front for the Germans. In August 1941, he proclaimed the "liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and a fight against indigenous agents . . . who support the subjugation and terrorization of our people."<sup>43</sup> Although a change of political system was part of the plan from the very start, it sounded less adverse to refer to the struggle as a "people's war of liberation" instead of a "socialist revolution." Still, the iconography spoke volumes. As an emblem the partisans chose the five-pointed red star, and on Stalin's birthday, 21 December 1941, they formed the First Proletarian Brigade in the eastern Bosnian town of Rudo. With 1,200 soldiers, it was the first larger all-Yugoslav combat unit operating offensively and transregionally that understood itself as the military arm of the Communist Party.

The emergence of Tito's armed resistance presented the occupation forces with a serious challenger and the Chetniks with a dangerous rival. Although the partisans and the Chetniks had sometimes fought together against Ustasha and the Wehrmacht, a rift occurred in September 1941. The first military clash

in November 1941 escalated into civil war, an ideological battle to the death. Mihailović saw himself as the legitimate representative of the king and his government and strove to reinstate the old order under Serb leadership. In June 1941 a memorandum titled “Homogeneous Serbia” by political advisor Stevan Moljević outlined the large-scale, ethnic-based, forced displacement of Croats and Muslims on roughly 70 percent of Yugoslavia’s territory. His ideas about a Greater Serbia inspired a proposal by the Chetnik Central Committee that was presented to the government in exile in September 1941. For his part, Tito preached “brotherhood and unity” among all peoples and sought to bring about a socialist revolution and certainly his own rise to power.

Unlike the defensive military operations of the Chetniks, the partisans sought open offensive combat with the occupation forces. Next to their contrasting ideological and political objectives, this was another reason for the tension between them. The militarily trained party cadre, veterans from the Spanish Civil War, and former officers of the Yugoslav army assumed the command of the partisan fighters. Within a few months, they had built a tightly run armed force that quickly developed into a regular, centrally commanded people’s liberation army.

Before the war, the Communist Party had only been strong and well organized in several of the larger cities. In occupied Slovenia, they had already joined forces with Christian socialists, intellectuals, and segments of the Sokol organization to create a “Liberation Front” (*Osvobodilna fronta*) in April 1941. They became so powerful in Italian-occupied Ljubljana that they could establish a parallel state with illegal military hospitals, print shops, and so on, and practically governed the province from underground through a tightly meshed network that reached the highest levels of authority.<sup>44</sup> In the rural regions, however, the CPY was considerably weaker and had not cared too much about the peasants. For example, when the war started, they only had 830 members in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Four years later, 140,000 Bosnian partisans were fighting under Tito’s command.<sup>45</sup>

In addition to CPY members, youth organizations, trade unions, and an increasing number of noncommunists soon began to back the partisans. Besides a general sense of patriotism, the brutal persecution by the Ustasha and the rampant retribution measures by the Wehrmacht also drove more and more fighters underground. The unpredictability and omnipresence of the terror, the precarious supply situation, and the state of unending exhaustion and humiliation mobilized resistance, at first hesitantly and then at a rapidly accelerating pace. For the masses of simple rural dwellers, even the unpolitical ones, no conceivable way had been found to come to terms with the foreign rulers. Harald Turner, German military head of the administration in Serbia, noted as early as the fall of 1941: “These people, who in countless



cases witnessed themselves the bestial massacre of their relatives, had no more to lose . . . and thus consorted with the Communists in the forests and mountains.<sup>346</sup>

The motives and modes of insurgency varied; rarely were they ideological. There were organized forms of communist resistance in the cities, but also activities by irregular bands, militias, and village guards conducted strictly for self-protection. Often organized opposition developed out of social rebelliousness, proletarian protest, and small-town obstinacy. The uprising of Serb peasants in western Bosnia tended to resemble premodern agrarian revolts, in which the aim was to restore the old order, not to create a new one. In other places, insurgency flared up in urban working-class milieus, such as in the summer of 1941 when the workforce of the timber and cellulose factories in Drvar rebelled against layoffs and then declared the founding of the republic.<sup>47</sup> The Communist Party was successful because it managed to bundle these very different forms of protest and resistance under the motto of “people’s liberation” and to forge the heterogeneous milieus into a unified command structure. In the firmly established social structure of a village community, a single part-time worker might have been all it took to draw first his large family clan and then all of his neighbors into the resistance. Tito’s comrade and chronicler Vladimir Dedijer was surprised how many simple, politically unexperienced, and unskilled men joined them, especially from quite poverty-stricken regions. In the fall of 1941, the partisans had taken control of several areas located in Montenegro, in Croatian Lika, Banija, and Kordun, in Bosnian Krajina, in Herzegovina, and in western, southern, and eastern Serbia. In the first liberated territory the communists declared the establishment of the Republic of Užice in September. The short-lived mini-state in Western Serbia served as Tito’s headquarters.<sup>48</sup>

In light of the partisans’ military successes, Mihailović discovered that his strategy to wait out the war was causing him to fall more and more to the wayside. Not only was Tito challenging his title as the top resistance hero, but also his claim to be the future head of state. In November 1941, Mihailović ordered an attack on the partisan headquarters in Užice, an assault that ended in military disaster for the Chetniks.<sup>49</sup> Mihailović, who still refused to surrender to the Germans, now offered to be a partner to the Wehrmacht. This was the beginning of an ever intensifying involvement in various forms of cooperation and collaboration with the declared enemy. However, the commanding general, Franz Böhme, rejected Mihailović’s offer, telling him that “the German Wehrmacht will deal with the communists by itself quite soon and . . . cannot trust you as an ally.”<sup>50</sup>

The seed for the rift between Tito and Stalin was planted during these early years. In the fall of 1941, the Soviet dictator was desperately dependent on a second Allied front that would force the Germans to redirect more

divisions from the east. In order to calm Western suspicions that he was attempting to Sovietize Southeast Europe, he needed to dissuade the Yugoslav communists from their plans to establish a socialist political system. Instead of the arms Tito urgently requested, Stalin sent him a long telegram lecturing the Yugoslavs to stop preaching revolution and instead to forge a popular front alliance with the man backed by the British, Draža Mihailović. To Tito's extreme frustration, the radio station Free Yugoslavia from Moscow continually broadcast Chetnik propaganda from London.

At the end of November, the Wehrmacht undertook a major offensive against all the areas controlled by the resistance in Serbia, during which the Republic of Užice also fell. More than 1,400 partisans died; hundreds were taken prisoner and then murdered. Not long after that, the Germans stormed the Chetnik headquarters in Ravna Gora. They also leveled further draconian measures against civilians. Whoever gave partisans food or shelter or refused to betray partisan whereabouts was "considered an insurgent himself and shot."<sup>51</sup> Tito and his stalwart followers managed to head south and eventually to reach Sandžak. In the borderlands between Montenegro, eastern Bosnia, and southern Serbia, they could at first control some territory but were soon also driven away from there.

By early December 1941, the insurgency in Serbia and Montenegro had been put down for all practical purposes. Granted, by then the partisans had about 80,000 men and women in arms, but the superior might of half a million German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian occupation troops plus 120,000 soldiers from the Ustasha and Nedić regimes was crushing.<sup>52</sup> Having been driven out of Serbia, where the peasant population tended to favor the Chetniks over the partisans, and under constant fire from the militarily far superior Germans and Italians, the partisans were faced with despair and demise. There was no help to be found far and wide. Eight painfully long and demoralizing months had passed since the Germans had stormed Užice when Tito decided in late June 1942 to move his high command westward to the heartland of the Independent State of Croatia. Only here were the partisans able to control larger areas with the support of Serbs threatened by persecution. The crusade by the Ustasha drove more and more men and women to join the resistance, so that the uprising in the Bosnian region of Krajina, in Lika, and in Slavonia promised to spread further.

Four brigades set out in June 1942 on a seemingly never-ending and very risky march full of deprivation through the summits and valleys of the Bosnian mountains. For months, the ragged figures lived in the forests and slept on the hard ground with only a tornister pack shoved under their heads. Food and medicine were notoriously scarce and ammunition was in acute shortage, just as it was everywhere. "The worst was that there was no salt. We also suffered from scurvy, for there was no fruit or green vegetables in the mountains. We

could only eat young beech leaves, or press the juice out of the beech bark and drink it.”<sup>53</sup> Usually the partisans traveled with entire herds of sheep and goats that were slaughtered along the way. The herds were replenished by requisitions from peasants.

During the march through the ethnically heterogeneous areas in which the Ustasha, Chetniks, and occupational forces had raged and rampaged one after the other, more and more desperate people joined the people’s liberation army, first and foremost the persecuted Serbs. With the slogan “Brotherhood and Unity” (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*), Tito overcame the initial reservations of some of those Croats and Muslims who had originally felt drawn to the nationalist parties and had distrusted the communists. The latter, however, now promised to solve the national question at the expense of Serbian hegemony so that the emphasis of national and religious feelings became decisive for the mobilization of the rural population. The communists explained that they did not just want to liberate Yugoslavia as a state, but also each of its peoples. At the end of 1942, Tito published an article on the “National Question” in which he promised: “The struggle for the peoples’ liberation and the national question in Yugoslavia are inseparably linked to one another. . . . The term peoples’ liberation struggle would only be an empty phrase, even deceit, if it would not . . . also have its own national meaning for every people, if it would not only mean the liberation of Yugoslavia but at the same time also the liberation of the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Albanians, Muslims, etc.”<sup>54</sup> The peoples’ liberation struggle presented itself as a national emancipatory movement for everyone and every nation and nationality. Eventually a large segment of the non-Serb peasantry became convinced of this.<sup>55</sup>

In early November 1942, the partisans captured the western Bosnian town of Bihać, formerly a Ustasha bastion, after a hard fight. From this victory emerged a large contiguous territory in the heart of Independent State of Croatia in western Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Lika. Roughly two million people inhabited this territory, now known as the Bihać Republic. In this new republic, the first all-Yugoslav assembly was held on 26–27 November 1942, attended by delegates from the various parts of the country, specifically the Antifascist Council of the Peoples’ Liberation Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) with its national committees from Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tito still did not dare to declare the founding of a new government, but the cornerstone for a socialist Yugoslavia had been laid.

### *1943: The Turning Point*

In the fall of 1942, the military tide turned against Germany worldwide. In Africa, British and American troops were victorious, and the Western powers were preparing for the invasion of Sicily. All at once, the partisans in the Balkans played a key role as a potential partner for the Allies. In early 1943,

there was more and more evidence that the British would drop Mihailović. He had publicly declared that his main enemies were the partisans, Ustasha, and Muslims and that only the Italians were his pillar of support. A British military mission sent evidence back to London proving that the Chetniks were collaborating with the Axis and that partisan fighting power was “the most formidable.” Moreover, to switch sides would also help to establish a common line with the Soviets.<sup>56</sup>

Hitler undertook one more futile attempt to ward off his military defeat in the Balkans. He transferred the command of all Serbian and Croatian units to the supreme commander of the southeast and expanded the competencies of the SS in their campaign to “combat banditry.” Part of this project was to create national volunteer divisions in the occupied and allied lands to fight alongside the Waffen SS. In addition to the notorious “Prinz Eugen” Division of ethnic Germans, they formed the Muslim division *Handžar* (saber) in March 1943 and the Kosovo-Albanian *Skanderbeg* in March 1944.<sup>57</sup>

Hitler ordered his generals to be “brutal” in their operations and to discard all “European inhibitions.” German troops liquidated insurgents and anyone considered suspicious, plundered and torched villages, and depopulated entire tracts of the countryside in order “to drain the swamp.” Ahead of events, the Wehrmacht High Command had ensured its soldiers immunity for any criminal action “also against women and children.” With time, the German military leadership was reluctantly forced to admit that the arbitrary terror perpetrated against the civilian population tended to spark more resistance than to smother it.<sup>58</sup>

On 20 January 1943, the Wehrmacht launched “Operation White” to eradicate resistance once and for all. Unceasing air, tank, and artillery attacks were supposed to drive the partisans into the murderous clutches of the Italians and Chetniks and then thoroughly annihilate them. The German offensive, in which the Prinz Eugen Division took part, put Tito’s troops in an utterly hopeless situation. Thousands of wounded needed to be rescued from the enemy’s revenge. Despite ice and snow, more than 100,000 refugees set out on a march in which they found burned-down villages but no shelter. Tito sent a telegram to Moscow: “Am obliged once again to ask you if it is really quite impossible to send us some sort of assistance? Hundreds of thousands of refugees are menaced by death from starvation.”<sup>59</sup> But even twenty months into the war, not even a token of support was in sight.

Josip Broz, whom his fellow partisans endearingly called *stari* (in effect, “old man” or “father”), engendered even in his toughest political opponents a bit of awestruck admiration.<sup>60</sup> Over fifty years old, Tito possessed legendary leadership qualities and radiated self-confidence, determination, and natural authority. “He gave an impression of great strength held in reserve, the impression of a tiger ready to spring,” reported the British liaison officer Fitzroy

Maclean in 1943 from Tito's headquarters. "He was unusually ready to discuss any question on its merits and to take a decision there and then, without reference to a higher authority. He seemed perfectly sure of himself; he was a principal, not a subordinate."<sup>61</sup>

Maybe Tito lacked the talent to be a great field marshal, but he was able to inspire his troops time and again and to lead them into the offensive by way of dubious military maneuvers. Despite enormous losses during the German offensive of early 1943, the Proletarian Brigades broke through the enemy circumvallation, finally defeated the Chetniks allied with the Italians in the Battle of the Neretva, and saved thousands of wounded and masses of peasants seeking protection before advancing subsequently to Montenegro. In the following German-Italian offensive "Operation Black" in May, the partisans also suffered massive losses. As many as 7,500 fighters, nearly a third of their troops, and over 1,300 wounded and sick, were wiped out in the Battle of the Sutjeska. Yet once again the partisans succeeded in escaping the enemy's clutches and the ranks filled with new volunteers. Even local alliances between Germans, Italians, Ustasha, and Chetniks were no longer in a position to turn the tide.

With each military victory, Tito's stature grew. All power became concentrated in him. He was the head of the CPY, commander-in-chief of the army, and chairman of the government-like AVNOJ. Many people projected their hopes on him, and partisans were finding more and more backing in Croatia. "Hardly a village, hardly a wooded area, hardly a train trip that they [the Wehrmacht] do not become the victim of some larger or smaller measure of treacherous attack," noted General Glaise von Horstenau in his diary.<sup>62</sup> The German general Rudolf Lütters had to admit in July 1943: "The view that the German Wehrmacht serves in a friendly country [Croatia] is long obsolete. The majority of the population support the insurgents."<sup>63</sup>

Italy's surrender in September 1943 brought the final military breakthrough. Large arsenals of weapons and munition fell into partisan hands. The insurgency had now engulfed Dalmatia and Montenegro, and victory was in sight. In 1943, the People's Liberation Army numbered over 300,000 men and women, and the ranks kept swelling. At the start of the war Germany had only had 30,000 soldiers in the Balkans; by 1943/1944 the force had grown to include 18 divisions with 250,000 men in place to control the growing resistance.<sup>64</sup>

From 29 to 30 November 1943, Tito convened the second meeting of the AVNOJ in the central Bosnian town of Jajce. The 142 delegates from all parts of the country declared the body to be the country's highest legislative and executive authority. The only delegates who could not make it were those from Macedonia; combat activity had blocked their trip to Bosnia. The council

decided to restructure Yugoslavia as a socialist federal state of constituent peoples and republics with equal rights. The parts of Slovenia and Croatia that had been lost in 1918 were to be handed back to the new Yugoslavia. The council forbade King Peter II to return and announced that war crimes would be prosecuted. Tito was awarded the honorary title of marshal. The Allies had signaled beforehand that they would officially recognize the partisans as allies. At the time, on 30 November to be exact, they too were meeting at a summit in Tehran. They were also of the opinion that Yugoslavia should be revived as a state, although the question of the eventual political order and the western border to Italy were left open for a while.

In May 1944, as the Allies prepared for the landing in Normandy, the Wehrmacht started its seventh and last offensive, known as "*Rösselsprung*" (a chess term for a knight's move), this time with the objective being to capture Tito himself, dead or alive. At the very last minute, the partisan leader was able to escape the paratrooper attack on his hideout in a Bosnian cave. The British brought him and his staff to safety on the Adriatic island of Vis. From here he laid the tracks for his later takeover of power.

## 9.

# The 1940s: Total War

If we are to understand why the partisans became so strong and the communists could later assume power, then it is imperative to view developments against the backdrop of the total war that Yugoslavia experienced. Inherent in this conflict were dimensions of an exploitative, racial, and civil war, a war that caused human tragedies and societal upheavals to an unimagined degree. Occupation, exploitation, terror against civilians, “ethnic cleansing,” persecution, and mass annihilation caused people to experience existential threat on a daily basis, which in turn rocked the foundations of institutions, social class, identity, roles, and hierarchies. All established values and moral categories were toppled. In this way the war became a laboratory for social utopias and an accelerator for a new revolutionary order. It bundled all those forces of social change that had been forging ahead since the turn of the century, if nothing else than by grinding away at the rotten fundament of the old political system.

### *Economic and Social Tremors*

Back on 16 April 1941, Hitler ordered that the “economic prerogatives” and export quotas in Yugoslavia and Greece were to be secured for the Reich. He forced his allies to hand over resources that were vital to the German war effort. The Bulgarians had to relinquish ore and chrome mines, the Hungarians oilfields. Even Italy was bullied into delivering bauxite from Dalmatia, iron ore from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lead and zinc from Kosovo.<sup>1</sup> In order to exploit the occupied countries, German authorities resorted to every means imaginable. Reich Finance Minister Schwerin von Krosigk explained that the objective was to “extract the maximum of economic advantage from these countries.”<sup>2</sup> Between June 1941 and July 1944, Croatia and Serbia were forced to deliver industrial goods to Germany valued at 328.4 million and 91.2 million reichsmarks, respectively.<sup>3</sup>

The plenipotentiary for economic affairs in Serbia, Franz Neuhausen, organized the entire economy to coordinate with the German four-year plan. Infrastructure, mining, and plants relevant for armament were placed under

his supervision. Gold and securities from the vault of the Serbian national bank disappeared into the German treasury. In Croatia, Berlin used bilateral government committees and treaties to secure a monopoly on exploiting mineral deposits like antimony, copper, lead, zinc, bauxite, and iron ore. Labor was also exported: 200,000 workers from Croatia and 200,000 from Serbia were deported to the Reich, sometimes voluntarily, usually under force.<sup>4</sup>

Tens of thousands were also forced to work in factories and mines in their home countries. At the end of 1941, the Nedić government introduced compulsory labor duty for every person between the ages of 17 and 45. The authorities resorted to drastic measures in order to compile the workforce needed for mining and other war-relevant activities. In 1943, this workforce numbered 40,000 and included compulsory laborers, refugees, political prisoners, and prisoners of war. In the mines and prison camps, “naked and barefoot people in rags” worked to the point of exhaustion, constantly undernourished and tormented by guards.<sup>5</sup>

Parallel to this, agriculture was also being aligned to the needs of the Reich. Newly created economic offices issued “target quotas” and strict rules on levying feed and industrial crops, sunflowers and seed, vegetables and grain. To the frustration of the authorities, peasants were very creative in finding ways to use, hide, or sell their produce on the black market. They did so because anyone who did indeed turn over the demanded quota soon found themselves starving. Should the quota be filled, this left only 57 kilograms of wheat per year to each Serb, while the normal bread consumption demanded four times as much on average.<sup>6</sup> Only in the Banat, the region controlled by ethnic Germans, were the occupational authorities more successful in the “battle for production.” In the first three years of the war, this region sent 900,000 tons of wheat, corn, sunflower seeds, and other produce, as well as 305,000 pigs to the Reich.<sup>7</sup>

To top it off, the occupied lands were also required to finance the Wehrmacht and the occupation administration. For this purpose, Serbia spent well over 1.5 billion reichsmarks and Croatia more than a billion. In both countries this resulted in a horrendous devaluation of their currency.<sup>8</sup> In Croatia, prices climbed until 1944 from 2,500 to 3,000 percent over the prewar level. On the black market, the figure was more than 9,000 percent. In Serbia, the costs of living rose by more than 2,700 percent between mid-1941 and the end of 1943. At the same time, real wages sank by more than half. This explains why Yugoslavs had lost about four-fifths of their income by the end of the war.<sup>9</sup>

The devastating impact of the war economy brought the social pyramid crashing to the ground. Galloping inflation caused a gigantic destruction of business values and leveled class and status differences. While peasants were freed of their debts overnight, the middle classes became poor because the



value of their wages, pensions, and savings melted away. The former advantage of urban life over rural life now turned into a disadvantage. To secure food, city dwellers had to swap or sell everything they owned. Gold and jewelry, furniture and clothing now changed hands for a song.

In the poorer regions, namely in Dalmatia, Lika, and Herzegovina, starvation occurred in the very first war winter of 1941. Likewise, in the Serbian province “the population [was] . . . especially preoccupied with the concern to secure food, which is almost all gone. What the occupier has failed to plunder and ship to Germany is hidden by unscrupulous retailers or sold only at astronomical prices.”<sup>10</sup>

Despite it all, cultural life in Zagreb and Belgrade continued. Theater productions, exhibitions, literature readings, variety shows, concerts, and sport events were all subject to strict censure, as were radio broadcasts and printed press publications. Movie theaters primarily featured German films like *Baron Münchhausen*, and from the printing presses came Nazi propaganda publications and works by authors sympathetic to the cause, like the Swedish geographer Sven Hedin.<sup>11</sup> All in all, the situation was desolate. “No one ever leaves the house. We don’t light the oven, and there is no electricity during the day. . . . Meals are bad, there is no meat. . . . No one knows from what direction they will be hit next. One lives from one day to the next.”<sup>12</sup> In the provincial areas, daily life was even grimmer. For example, in Užice “bleakness and tension prevailed: the shops were empty, the market deserted; only the tailor shops and bakeries that worked for the army were very busy. The streets and the small parks were neglected, the shop windows dirty. All that was to be seen was misery and decay. In the streets, only a few people . . . shabbily dressed.”<sup>13</sup>

Those who had not been conscripted into the army or had not gone underground to fight in the resistance either sat at home or hung out at the village pub. But soon even that was no longer permitted. In early March 1942, the Serbian minister for domestic affairs prohibited youth from spending their time by taking the traditional stroll, sauntering down streets and through squares, even going to pubs.<sup>14</sup>

Resignation and despair, apathy and fatalism spread particularly in places where there was constant fighting. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, people lived practically in a permanent state of psychological duress. When the partisans invaded eastern Bosnia in early 1942, they were met by eerie creatures: “Their faces expressed dull and inhuman indifference . . . all were dressed in rags and old stuff, their faces were yellow and haggard.”<sup>15</sup>

In spite of harsh sanctions, the exploitative strategy was only successful to a degree. For one thing, the authorities no longer had access to an ever-increasing number of “liberated areas.” In 1943, they managed only to

secure barely a fourth of the harvest in Croatia.<sup>16</sup> For another, industry did not produce the amount they expected. By dismembering Yugoslavia, the authorities also fragmented a functioning economic space and its division of labor, created small economic entities, and severed transregional chains of procurement and production. Given the starvation, shortages of manpower and fuel, and the constant attacks by the partisans, economic performance fell off sharply. In many sectors, Serbian production had already sunk by half by 1942; in Croatia, 80 percent of industrial capacity was out of service in 1944.<sup>17</sup>

### *“Ethnic Cleansing”*

As this first Yugoslavia perished, so too did the ideology of an integrated South Slavic state. In its place arose separate ethnic and sometimes even racist concepts of identity that resorted to the idea of the cultural nation—a community linked by origin, history, language, and religion. In all parts of the country, nationalists implemented ruthless policies of assimilation, resettlement, and in some cases annihilation in order to remove those population groups they deemed undesirable. Since the early nineteenth century and certainly after the two Balkan Wars in 1912/1913, ethnically heterogeneous regions were “cleansed” of minority populations when empires broke apart or institutions failed, as was now occurring in occupied Yugoslavia. Creating ethnically exclusive nation states also aimed at destroying potential opponents—a typical motive also in later “ethnic cleansing.” Millions of people now discovered that their fate was dependent solely on the purely accidental ascription of the “right” or the “wrong” nationality.

The Croat Ustasha government was driven by a complex *mélange* of anti-Serb sentiments and fascist ideology, old cravings for revenge and new enemy images, coupled with specific military, economic, and political interests.<sup>18</sup> Their overriding obsession was to drive the Serbs out of the regions northwest of the Drina and Sava rivers, those regions that the Turks had conquered in the fifteenth century. Only as a result of missionary work and religious conversion as well as the colonization policy of the Habsburgs in the eighteenth century had Serb settlements of any importance emerged in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. The objective of the Croat fascists was to restore the original ethnic state as they presumed it had existed in the period prior to the Ottoman conquest.

The Ustasha regime did not have a strong following, charismatic leadership, or any other form of legitimacy to govern. Against this background, their radical anti-Serb sentiment became their “*raison d’être* and *ceterum censeo*,” as one of their protagonists, Slavko Kvaternik, wrote.<sup>19</sup> There were three reasons for this. First, the strong Serb presence contradicted their utopia of a homogeneous Greater Croatian nation state. Second, revenge needed to be

taken for the years of Serb hegemony, which was to be prevented from ever occurring again. Third, the elimination of the “eternal enemy” helped the Croat fascists justify their own rule and implement it locally. In a speech he gave on 2 May 1941, Minister Milovan Žanić declared: “This must be the land of the Croats, and no one else. No means exists that we, the Ustasha, will not use to make this land truly Croatian and to cleanse it of Serbs, who have long threatened us for centuries.”<sup>20</sup>

In order to homogenize the Greater Croatian state, the authorities implemented ruthless policies of assimilation, displacement, and annihilation. They banned Serb organizations and the Cyrillic alphabet and “cleaned up” the Croatian language. Immediately after assuming power, they started mass expulsions. The first to be deported were the Serb colonists, who had received land in the course of the agrarian reform in 1919 that they now had to give up without any compensation. They were forced to leave for Serbia. The next ordered to leave were politically active individuals and clergy. Police woke up these people in the middle of the night, took away their house keys and valuables, and put them on a train headed for Serbia. Out of fear of reprisals, thousands of people then fled the country by foot and empty-handed, without cash or provisions. By the end of September 1941, nearly 120,000 Serbs had left the country, and a year later the number had risen to 200,000.<sup>21</sup>

Besides discrimination and segregation, Serbs were the victim also of physical annihilation. The larger massacres of Serbs since April 1941 are documented as having taken place in Bosnian Krajina, in Bihać, Cazin, Bosanska Krupa, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Ključ, then also in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example in Zvornik, Višegrad, Bijeljina, Sarajevo, Foča, and Goražde. It was quite obvious that the aim was to create homogeneous Croat areas in the regions bordering Serbia and Montenegro.<sup>22</sup> From up to 330,000 Serbs killed in the four years of the war, 217,000 fell victim to the systematic persecution during killing sprees in villages, cities, and throughout the countryside, as well as in prisons and camps.<sup>23</sup>

The events of 1941 in western and central Bosnia illustrate the way in which the spiral of violence and counterviolence began. Following the Ustasha movement’s seizure of power, measures to disenfranchise and persecute Serbs were implemented in rapid succession: on 17 April, a ban of the Cyrillic alphabet; 23 April, the expulsion of all those born in Serbia and Montenegro; 25 April, the annulment of mixed marriages; 4 May, hostage taking and the first killing sprees, plundering, and terror. The fear of further attacks prompted Serbs to organize local militias. On 7 May near Sanski Most, a group of about 1,000 peasants armed with hayforks and shovels drove off a troop of Croatian and German soldiers. In reprisal, the Wehrmacht advanced with heavy artillery, shelled the nest of resistance to smithereens, and shot numerous hostages.

On 27 May, Serbs and Jews were prohibited from using public transportation and baths. On 5 June came the order to gather all those fit for work in camps, and on 10 and 11 June the order to deport entire families on a massive scale to Serbia. The growing resistance at the local level, inspired by Tito's beacon of hope regarding the people's liberation, is what finally broke the dam: on 23 July, all remaining Serbs were required to be registered, and thousands were brutally murdered with axes, knives, clubs, and other archaic methods of killing.<sup>24</sup>

Under Ustasha rule, the extreme right—similar to what occurred in Spain—entered an unholy alliance with Catholicism. Serbs and Croats spoke the same dialects, so that religion was the only remaining objective marker of distinction and paramount ethnic identification. Therefore, the representatives of the Orthodox Church, meaning the bishops, metropolitans, monks, and priests, were subject to particular fury. The Ustasha forces had hundreds of churches deliberately destroyed, monasteries plundered and sacked to their foundations, and church property expropriated. The Serbian Orthodox religion was renamed “Greek Eastern.” Approximately 250,000 Orthodox were forced to convert to Catholicism. In order to cut the spiritual, emotional, and nationalist ties to Serbia, the Croatian government established a new, state-supervised Croatian Orthodox Church in April 1942; however, with little success.

Even today, the role of the Catholic Church and its leader, Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, is highly controversial. Nationalist-oriented clergy sympathized or even cooperated with the Ustasha regime, because they lauded the Croat nation and fought the communists. Stepinac was probably not a committed fascist, but he was certainly also not a decisive opponent of the new regime. In honor of the Independent State of Croatia, he had a *Te Deum* read in all churches in early May 1941 and had himself appointed to the post of head military vicar in Croatia. The state was the fulfilment of a “centuries-old and ardently desired dream”; it was “no longer the tongue . . . but the blood” that was speaking, he announced in a circular memorandum in April 1941.<sup>25</sup> The Vatican, which was informed about what was happening in Croatia, withheld its criticism.<sup>26</sup> The Catholic press praised the Ustasha, and far more than a few clerics welcomed and supported the policy of forced conversion to Catholicism. One of them was Frater Vlado Bilobr from Metković, who said in a sermon: “Everyone must convert to the Catholic faith because no other religion has a justified existence and no one will remain alive who has not accepted the Catholic faith.”<sup>27</sup>

Just as the Ustasha regime propagated an ethnically “pure” Greater Croatia, the Serb Chetniks boasted about Greater Serbia. Draža Mihailović relied on Stevan Moljević's memorandum of June 1941 titled “Homogeneous Serbia,” which he claimed included northern Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Dalmatia, and large sections of Croatia. Had this absurd plan been implemented, more than four million people would have been resettled and expelled.<sup>28</sup> With the political program they presented in September 1941, the Chetniks announced preparations in the “Serb countries” to ensure “that only the Serb population remains in them.” To do this it would be necessary “to have an eye particularly on the rapid and radical cleansing of the cities . . . [and] to develop a plan to cleanse and deport the rural population.” Moreover, it was also time “to solve the question of the Muslims as much as possible in this phase.”<sup>29</sup> Mihailović was even clearer about what he meant on 20 December 1941: he issued the directive “to cleanse [the national territory] of all national minorities and anational elements.” Muslims and Croats were also to be removed from Sandžak, Bosnia, and Croatia (up to the Karlovac-Knin-Šibenik line).<sup>30</sup>

“Ethnic cleansing” was also undertaken by the Germans, Italians, Hungarians, Albanians, and Bulgarians for the purpose of better incorporating annexed territory. The most extensive plans were drawn up by Hitler, who intended to transform all of Europe along racial lines. In a speech given in the Reichstag on 6 October 1939, he had announced the “ethnic consolidation” (*völkische Flurbereinigung*) of East and Southeast Europe; as the Reich commissar responsible for “German Nationhood,” Heinrich Himmler had designed a comprehensive European “master settlement plan” (*Gesamtsiedlungsplanung*). The Balkan countries were also to provide several pieces to the overall mosaic of the “Greater Germanic Reich” that was to be created by systematically murdering Jews and gypsies, “Germanizing” annexed territory, and resettling millions of ethnic Germans.

Much like the Poles living under the General Government in the German zone of occupation, the Slovenes in the annexed regions of Lower Styria, southern Carinthia, and Upper Carniola were viewed “basically as enemies of the state.”<sup>31</sup> The entire population was racially profiled and “Germanized.” More than 220,000 Slovenes, primarily representatives of the clergy, intelligentsia, and economic elite, were to be “deported” and their property confiscated. Slovene organizations, press, and schools were forbidden. As early as 1941, authorities deported about 40,000 men and women to Croatia and Serbia, and another 33,000 were taken to camps as part of the campaign to “re-Germanize” the area. Ethnic Germans were then “appointed” to their farms. Within the framework of the “master settlement plan” for all of Europe designed in May and June of 1942, the SS sent another 43,000 ethnic Germans from Bosnia, Sylvania, and Slavonia into the Reich, put them through the official “sluicing” procedure (*Durchschleusung*), and later resettled them in Poland and Galicia.<sup>32</sup>

In Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria—those areas that Italy had acquired in 1920—a strict policy of assimilation had existed already before the war.

Mussolini considered the Slavic population to be an “inferior, barbaric race” that should be cast out of the region.<sup>33</sup> Slovene and Croat personal names and city names were Italianized, while libraries, press publications, and societies were closed. It was forbidden to speak “Slavic” on the street. In the 1920s and 1930s, fascist authorities had already developed plans for the “ethnic cleansing” (*bonifica nazionale*) of the border regions. They now put these plans into practice “with great rigor,” in part by organizing mass deportations. Authorities interned 30,000 men, women, and children under inhumane conditions in concentration camps, such as those in Gonars and on the island of Rab. Ownership of their homes and landholdings was then transferred to the families of Italian soldiers.<sup>34</sup> In occupied Dalmatia and in Montenegro, the Italian army played a rather ambivalent role in that, on the one hand, it furthered the *Italianità*, while on the other, it offered protection at the same time to thousands of Serbs escaping Ustasha units running amok and in some cases even took military steps to put the Croat militias in their place.<sup>35</sup>

The southern regions of the former Yugoslavia also witnessed “ethnic cleansing.” In Italian-controlled Kosovo and in western Macedonia, Albanians drove out the indigenous Serbs and Montenegrins, burned down their houses, and destroyed historically important churches and monasteries. After King Vittorio Emanuele decreed the annexation of these areas to Albania, of which he had also been king since 1939, a policy of Albanization and colonization was methodically carried out.<sup>36</sup> For its part, eastern Macedonia was subject to a radical policy of Bulgarianization. More than 110,000 Serbs were forced to leave the country, and their property was confiscated. Bulgarian authorities closed schools and libraries, and destroyed cultural facilities, archives, cemeteries, and churches. Everything Serbian and Macedonian had to disappear, be it names, language, or national symbols; repression and despotism prevailed.<sup>37</sup>

### *Mass Atrocities and the Dynamics of Violence*

Hostage shootings and reprisals, “ethnic cleansing,” and mass killings threatened a large segment of society. Everyone could feel the omnipresent violence, and the longer the war continued, the more brutal, deadening, and barbaric everything became. Against this background, traditional religious cohabitation, cosmopolitan culture, and civic consciousness were deeply challenged. This was evident in multiethnic Sarajevo and many other places.<sup>38</sup>

Fear, insecurity, onslaught, and killings created feelings of revenge and paranoia that prompted ordinary people to participate in collective violence. Sometimes economic and interpersonal conflicts or simple greed drove some neighbors to attack each other along ethnic lines. Contingent events and

specific instances of violence could thus crystalize and transform senses of collective identity that would result in ethnic conflict.<sup>39</sup>

Most people experienced the war as a rolling barrage that descended upon them unexpectedly and with great force. In many regions, nationalist sentiments may well have existed before the war, and in several others, like eastern Herzegovina, even open conflict. However, a fundamentally anti-Serb, anti-Croat, or anti-Muslim consensus did not exist. Neither regionally specific cultural traditions nor the nebulous category of self-perpetuating mass violence can explain the atrocities. As in every society, South Slavic popular culture did include traditions glorifying war and violence as expressed in gory folk epics, the cult of knives, or patriarchal imprinting. Yet, it is no more than popular legend that Serbs, Croats, and Muslims always hated each other and that the “Balkan ghosts” were only waiting for a signal to perpetrate genocide.<sup>40</sup>

“Ethnic cleansing” and mass atrocities did not occur spontaneously; they were ordered. In Serb-inhabited communities, the Croatian government installed loyal authorities who could be counted on to implement the homogenization program. For example, in May 1941, the Franciscan priest Velimir Šimić appeared in Knin to inform the appalled commander of the Italian troops of the new political line: “Kill all the Serbs in the shortest possible time.”<sup>41</sup> As the new prefect, Ante Nikolić arrived in the company of Ustasha commander Juraj (Juco) Rukavina, one of the leaders of the failed uprising in Lika in 1932. Their mission was to form an ideologically indoctrinated, terror-trained militia and to carry out “acts of revenge.”<sup>42</sup> Among other things, Ustasha troops were infamous for loading their victims in trucks and transporting them into the mountains, beating them with axes and wooden hammers, stabbing them with knives and daggers, or throwing them down canyons alive.<sup>43</sup>

Later, once the civil war was raging in full, special forces, militias, and paramilitary units also played a key role in atrocities. When a village was to be taken, troops schooled in terror were first sent in. Massacres helped intimidate the unwanted and potentially resistant population groups and sent them fleeing elsewhere. This is what happened not only when the new Ustasha ruler “cleansed” Herzegovina in the spring of 1941, but also when the Serb Chetniks overran eastern Bosnia in early 1942.<sup>44</sup> There were always people who joined the rampages, be it out of opportunism, social pressure, jealousy, or greed. Witnesses reported time and again seeing peasants from the neighborhood stuffing their pockets during the plundering. A similar scenario occurred yet again in the 1990s. Targeted pogroms are the most effective means to throw a multiethnic society, regardless of how well it may function, out of kilter.

By the summer of 1941 at the latest, revenge was also playing a role. In eastern Bosnia, where Croat and Muslim Ustasha militias had murdered

hundreds of Serb families and burned down their homes that summer, Serb Chetniks launched a counterattack in the following winter. The reaction to the Greater Croatian racial craze took an open “anti-Turkish” turn. Thousands of Muslims in Foča, Goražde, Vlasenica, Srebrenica, and many other places became the victims of massacres. Men, women, and children fled to the cities in an attempt to save themselves from the terror. By the end of 1943, more than 230,000 people had abandoned their homes. “The tragedies taking place among these masses are not something any person can immediately describe,” reported a member of the SS.<sup>45</sup> Refugees were vegetating away by the hundreds in warehouses, sheds, stalls, and basements, without food or light.

The Chetniks were certainly no less barbaric than the Ustasha regime. People were treated ruthlessly. Men had their throats cut or were stabbed or impaled. Derviš Bačević was a man from Foča who, against all odds, escaped massacre. In early February 1942, he reported how a group of Chetniks, whom he knew by name, tied him up in his home and then led him and other men to a railroad bridge. “One of the Chetnik thieves got down on his knees and held a large knife in his left hand. Every victim had to place himself under the knife. . . . Every slaughtered victim was searched, robbed . . . and then kicked into the Drina.”<sup>46</sup> Hundreds of bodies, some of them chained together, floated down the rivers as testimony to the terror. The permanent threat of violence became an effective resource of power because it acted as both deterrent and intimidation. Whoever stabbed people with a knife, dagger, or stiletto handled their victims no better than animals, which magnified the humiliation and horror felt by the civilian population. The scenes these hangmen staged resembled human sacrifice and invoked sacral symbolic acts.<sup>47</sup>

In ethnically homogeneous Serbia and Montenegro, the wrath of the fanatic Chetniks focused on the political enemy. They drew up death lists so that their trained killers from the “Black Troika” could wipe out entire families. The commander of the Majeвица Corps, for example, ordered the ruthless elimination of all those who sympathized with the communists. “Everything that has to be killed—kill it, that has to be set afire—set afire, that has to be plundered to the benefit of the Chetniks—plunder.”<sup>48</sup> Nor were they any less cruel toward dissenters or traitors from their own ranks. Any person who broke the rules was liquidated immediately. Even Mihailović’s rival, Kosta Pećanac, became the victim of a clandestine murder.<sup>49</sup>

A report from eastern Bosnia, written by the commander in charge on 13 February 1943, for Draža Mihailović proved the systematic implementation of the “cleansing.” “All Muslim villages . . . were completely burned down, so that not a single house remained intact. All property was destroyed. . . . During the operation, we proceeded to completely annihilate the Muslim population regardless of sex and age. Victims . . . among the Muslims were about 1,200



fighters and up to 8,000 other victims: women, elderly, and children.<sup>50</sup> Entire stretches of the countryside were depopulated in this manner. The picturesque valley of Sutjeska was also eerily empty when the partisans arrived: “Charred chimneys towered over grass-covered ruins. Nowhere a living soul. Here and there lay a broken barrel, a battered pot, or an old cup . . . not a living soul, not a single person, with whom one could talk.”<sup>51</sup>

As in many other situations of persecution, it is surprising the degree to which potential victims repressed and denied what was going on and sat quietly in their houses awaiting their fate. Those who survived reported that they had placed their faith in law and order, that later they had hoped—in fact, firmly believed—that aggression toward them could be diverted through conformism, even religious conversion and name changes. This was a dangerous mistake. Suddenly all certainty of an orderly coexistence vanished. Countless people were left defenseless against the unpredictability of terror and tyranny.

The insecurity grew because power changed hands time and again, leaving no one safe from revenge. In June 1942, the military maps of the Bosnian Krajina region, to cite one example, showed a confusing mosaic of competing rule. Half of the territory was occupied by the partisans, interspersed with German-, Italian-, and Croat-held areas. Another four regions were controlled by rival Chetnik leaders.<sup>52</sup> During the four and a half years of war, the small Montenegrin town of Kolašin experienced nineteen changes of power, the east Bosnian town of Foča, twenty-seven. It was here that the partisans discovered in 1942 the owner of a small shop who “kept several flags under his counter: a German flag, an Italian flag, and a Yugoslav flag with a star. Whenever he heard fighting going on around the town at night, he would listen intently and then pull out the appropriate flag.”<sup>53</sup> The poor man was eventually shot by the Italians for being a communist.

As in every civil war, some who participated in the nationalistic murder sprees and revenge orgies were fanatic nationalists and sadists who acted out of a pure passion for torment and killing. Others seized the opportunity to take personal revenge on a neighbor or settle a long-standing communal conflict. However, moderate Croats and Muslims rejected the Ustasha atrocities, if for no other reason than the very justified fear of revenge.<sup>54</sup> In a protest petition dated 2 December 1941, seventy Muslim notables from Bijeljina presented their view that the violence against Orthodox believers contradicted the prevailing concepts of morality, well-tested rules on coexistence, and the healthy tradition of religious tolerance.<sup>55</sup> Authorities also received complaints from Prijedor, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo. Many sources tell how Croats, Serbs, and Muslims helped each other to safety when terror threatened.<sup>56</sup> The fact that hundreds of thousands joined Tito’s supranational people’s liberation movement during the course of the war is indeed the best proof that within the population neither blind hate nor the desire for systematic annihilation dominated.

*Tradition and Transformation*

Since the beginning of the war, the communists worked determinedly to bring about a system change. The popular liberation struggle was the vehicle and the basis for legitimizing a socialist revolution that would transform Yugoslavia into an egalitarian, free workers' and peasants' state and would guarantee the CPY absolute rule. The heart of the new order was the so-called People's Committees, which temporarily assumed the role of state bodies in place of the earlier bureaucracy. In the "liberated areas" they issued regulations, organized supplies, and expropriated landholdings and possessions to distribute among the local peasantry. The communists thus resorted to a simple means by which to gain the support of the land-hungry peasantry and at the same time create irreversible facts with regard to the later social and political systems.<sup>57</sup>

The People's Committees also took control of all other facets of public life. People's courts made short shrift of alleged traitors, spies, and saboteurs. Dissenters, deserters, and collaborators were ruthlessly liquidated after they had been sentenced in mass trials.<sup>58</sup> However, at the same time the partisans opened theaters and ballet companies, printed newspapers, and started up postal delivery and telephone connections. In Foča they even helped put on partisan Olympic Games.<sup>59</sup>

In February 1942, Edvard Kardelj drew up a complex set of rules, known as the "Regulations of Foča," for these temporary administrative bodies. That summer it was eventually decided to establish the Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia as an overarching political body, a quasi-government, to coordinate the work of the local committees. In November 1942, the first meeting of this council took place, and a year later the AVNOJ was established in Jajce as the highest executive body. It was also decided that Yugoslavia would be reestablished as a socialist federal state.

The communists filled all important positions with their supporters, usually peasants, which is why the takeover of power marked not only a new start politically, but also initiated an immense social mobilization. By the end of 1943, approximately 12,000 people's committees existed at the local level with over 120,000 elected members. The new bodies used very simple means to do their work, because very few of the new functionaries could read and write. These provisional institutions were therefore the genesis of a loyal, Yugoslav-oriented political class that would become an important pillar of support for the new system in the immediate postwar decades.<sup>60</sup>

Yet even then, opinions differed throughout the country on what was the correct policy. For example, the "Liberation Front of the Slovene Nation" installed a Central Economic Commission, regulated the bank lending system in 1943/1944, reformed taxes and pricing practices, and issued a new currency. The economic and financial system established there became the model for all of the other partisan areas and later for Yugoslavia as a whole.

However, it later became apparent that the modern Slovenian model was very difficult to implement in the poorer regions. The area around the eastern Bosnian city of Foča was plagued by starvation, refugee plight, and a shortage of land, which prompted those in charge to resort to a rigid steering policy. In other words, the seed of what would later become a perpetual conflict over the direction of economic policy between the developed north and the underdeveloped south began to take root during the war.<sup>61</sup>

Contrary to all other parties, the communists explicitly campaigned for women's issues and granted women active and passive electoral suffrage for the first time in the fall of 1942. Although the party leadership had initially seen the role of women primarily in the procurement and maintenance of weapons and medication, sabotage, propaganda, and messenger duties, by 1942 women were allowed to be combat medics, doctors, and soldiers in the army. Military service gave about 100,000 women fighters social recognition and more rights.<sup>62</sup>

The body most important for the creation of a new order was the People's Liberation Army, the "revolutionary educator for the masses," as Tito's fellow collaborator Moša Pijade expressed it.<sup>63</sup> No institution of socialist Yugoslavia epitomized the ideal of "brotherhood and unity" in such a pure form as did this multinational volunteer army. During the entire course of the People's Liberation Struggle, the force was made up of 53 percent Serbs, 18.6 percent Croats, 9.2 percent Slovenes, 5.5 percent Montenegrins, 3.5 percent Bosnian Muslims, 2.7 percent Macedonians, and the remaining compilation of Albanians, Hungarians, "Yugoslavs," and other ethnic groups.<sup>64</sup> After Belgrade was taken in the fall of 1944, the partisans began to mobilize all men between the ages of 17 and 50 for the People's Liberation Army, adding another 250,000 soldiers by the end of the war. All enemy soldiers were encouraged to desert to the partisan side and were granted amnesty as long as they had not committed any war crimes. By May 1945, the army had 800,000 men and women in arms.<sup>65</sup>

The army served not only as the armed force of the party, but also as the earliest and most important instrument in socializing the populace of the future socialist state. During their military service, soldiers learned how to read and write. They were instructed in Marxist political economy and socialist-patriotic values. In addition to the ideological indoctrination, shared events, experiences, and emotions shaped new identities. Military rituals such as flag presentations and brigade baptisms created a unique popular and revolutionary partisan culture. Elements of folklore were incorporated, such as the peasant circle dance *kolo*, popular throughout the South Slavic region. Partisans read the poems written by great national writers, sang battle songs, and printed calendars that listed the new holidays created during the war. After

the war, the song “Comrade Tito, we swear to you, from your path we will never depart!” referred to the time of the partisan struggle.<sup>66</sup>

Yugoslavia was the second country in Europe, after the Soviet Union, in which communism came to power of its own accord. In both countries, it would never have been possible without the war. However, this was not due to strategic mistakes made by the German high command of the militarily far superior Wehrmacht, to the partisans’ better knowledge of the lay of the land, to the Croats’ incompetence and loss of reputation, or to the failure of the allied Italians.<sup>67</sup> It was the illegitimacy of the occupation itself that mobilized a major part of the population. Economic plight, the rule of terror, and the omnifarious and omnipresent experience with violence destroyed in a very short period of time nearly everything that had once constituted traditional society, leaving the political, social, economic, and psychological foundations of the old order in irrevocable ruins. The war accelerated basic social changes and created approaches with which to bridge the old rifts between the urban and rural populations. Unlike the old parties, the communists were well organized politically and militarily and, most importantly, they were not compromised by their absence, as were the king and his government in exile. In this situation, the partisans promised the battered nation a magical vision of the future in that they combined in their ideology the three existential questions that had plagued the South Slavic countries for so long: resolution of the social problems of the peasants and workers, triumph over exploitation and foreign rule, and last but not least, reconciliation through “brotherhood and unity.” By the end of the war, this had led to the emergence of a truly revolutionary situation, one made possible by the total collapse of the old system and its irretrievable loss of repute, shaped by the radical upheaval of social relations, and facilitated by an international constellation pushing for change.

### *Burdensome Legacy*

The attritional power of the war as an important prerequisite for the communist takeover is illustrated in the compilation of the damage it caused. According to official statistics provided by the Yugoslav reparations commission, more than 1.7 million people died between 1941 and 1945, which equals 11 percent of the Yugoslav population at the time. This figure is certainly greatly exaggerated. Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian scientists later calculated independently that there were about a million war dead, of whom 500,000 were Serbs, 200,000 Croats, and up to 100,000 Muslims. Today it is no longer possible for anyone to reliably estimate how many of the dead were killed in fighting, in camps, in mass executions, or by starvation, disease, and the lack of medical provisions. The experts also agree that Yugoslavia indirectly lost another million people through the lack of births, emigration,

abduction, resettlement, and dislocation. All in all, Yugoslavia lost around two million inhabitants because of the Second World War.<sup>68</sup> In addition to the dead, statistics documented about 400,000 prisoners, interned persons, and forced laborers; 530,000 people deported and displaced; and 320,000 forced recruitments. According to the figures, every fourth Yugoslav must have personally experienced the inhuman consequences of the war.<sup>69</sup>

The victory of the People's Liberation Army came at an extremely high toll. About 305,000 fighters lost their lives and 425,000 were wounded. The Communist Party also paid a high price: of its original 12,000 members, about 9,000 were lost. Nor were the communists the only ones to suffer heavy losses. Their political opponents and many simple soldiers from the government's forces also died. About 350,000 fought on that side, and many members of the Croat Ustasha, the Serb Chetniks, and the Slovenian Home Guard did not survive the war.<sup>70</sup>

Those who did survive had a heavy burden to shoulder. The deaths of relatives, comrades, and neighbors and their own experiences with hunger and suffering deeply scarred their biographies and memories. The roots of many of Yugoslavia's later problems lie in this period, because the experience of violence further reified and significantly radicalized competing ideological alternatives. Although the war came to an end, the ideological passions and feelings of revenge did not. The number of murdered, tortured, and expelled became a political issue. In the concentration camp at Jasenovac, the epitome of the fascist rule of terror, 700,000 people are said to have been killed according to official depictions. However, within Croat exile circles, people spoke of 30,000 killed; within Serb circles, up to 1.1 million. Since the communists did not later permit any impartial research into the matter, events became framed in rival cultures of memory. For one side, Jasenovac became a site for collective repression and forgetting; for the other, a ghostly location to commemorate an inflated national myth of sacrifice. Probably a total of about 200,000 people died in all of the Croatian concentration camps.<sup>71</sup>

## PART IV

### SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA (1945 TO 1980)



## 10.

# The Consolidation of Communist Rule (1943 to 1948)

### *Liberation*

On 20 October 1944, at 6 a.m., the First Proletarian Brigade reported per telephone: “Kalemegdan is liberated. . . . The proletarians have taken the fortress by storm. The Germans fought over every stone, every bridge, every tunnel, every brick. As if for their Berlin.”<sup>1</sup> In this battle for Belgrade, 15,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and 3,000 partisans lost their lives.

Commanding General Peko Dapčević was shaken by the result: “It looked horrible. . . . Everything was covered with the bodies of German soldiers and officers, amid destroyed equipment that was smoldering away with blistering heat. . . . The smell was revolting! . . . Near Boleč lay a whole mountain of corpses—a gigantic heap of corpses. Nearby yet another. And that’s what you saw everywhere you looked.”<sup>2</sup> Yet soon life reawakened in the devastated city: people crawled out of their dwellings and celebrated that the war was finally over. Shortly afterward, Tito addressed the people from the former royal palace as their head of state. There was no question in his mind that the enormous sacrifice of the Second World War would inevitably have to lead to the development of socialism and the one-party rule of the CPY in Yugoslavia. He admired the Soviet Union, venerated Stalin, and firmly believed in the superiority of communism. Yet three hurdles blocked the path to this objective: the aggressor had to be decisively defeated, the political rivals neutralized, and recognition for the new regime obtained from the Allies.

Following the conquest of Belgrade, the Wehrmacht and its allies began their retreat. The Croat Ustasha, the Croatian Home Guard, and the Slovene Home Guard were disbanding. Ante Pavelić and Milan Nedić fled across the border. Mihailović’s Chetniks also retreated. Fiercely fought offensives finally secured victory for the People’s Liberation Army. By the end of 1944, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo were liberated; on 6 April 1945, the partisans entered Sarajevo, and on 8 May of that year they marched into Zagreb.



Yugoslavia was able to end its occupation on 15 May 1945, without any significant help from the Allies.

The communists had prepared well in every regard for the moment in which they took power. Back in May 1944, Tito had created the Department for the People's Protection (OZNA, Odsjek za zaštitu naroda) under Aleksandar Ranković. This secret police, from which the State Security Administration (UDB) later evolved, compiled card files with the names of collaborators and war criminals. In Slovenia alone the number reached 17,000. They also created commissions to prosecute war crimes that were punishable by death. So-called courts of honor were set up to try those who had aided and abetted the occupational forces. Those found guilty were punished with disfranchisement, expropriation, or forced labor. By the end of the war, the partisans had condemned thousands in this way to imprisonment, forced labor, or death.<sup>3</sup>

Tito ordered the quick and complete destruction of all "bandits." As the partisans advanced, it was therefore common to "cleanse" the conquered areas of those who had supported the occupational regime and enemy troops. On its own initiative, the OZNA executed whoever they could catch. An American liaison officer reported in the fall of 1944 from Dubrovnik: "The inhabitants were living in a state of mortal terror. . . . The Partisan attitude was that anybody who stayed in town during the occupation and didn't work in the Partisan underground was ipso facto a collaborator. The dreaded secret police was going to work and people were being taken from their homes to the old castle and shot every day."<sup>4</sup>

In March 1945, an estimated 170,000 Croat Ustasha fighters and members of the Croatian Home Guard, 36,000 Serb and Montenegrin Chetniks, 18,000 Slovene Home Guard troops, and 7,000 of Nedić's Serb soldiers had not yet surrendered.<sup>5</sup> Tens of thousands of these fighters tried to flee to Austria to save themselves. In May 1945, an approximately 38-mile-long trail of 25,000 (British estimate) to 200,000 (Croatian statistic) soldiers and civilians moved toward the border, where their vanguard came up against British troops at Bleiburg and Viktring. Since Germany had surrendered on 7 May, the Allies felt that all ex-Yugoslav collaborators should be turned over to the partisans. Therefore, they were not permitted to advance into British-occupied territory. Anyone who did make it across was turned over by the British. The partisans issued an ultimatum for surrender to the forces stopped at the border, but the Ustasha commander let it elapse. So the People's Liberation Army attacked. Just how many fighters and refugees then fled into the woods, were taken prisoner, died in rearguard battles, were executed or massacred can no longer be reliably reconstructed. Croat emigrants spoke later of hundreds of thousands of victims. Probably partisans executed up to 70,000 people through court martial. Another 60,000 died in the final battles.<sup>6</sup>

During this phase the communists systematically and extensively liquidated their military and political opponents—the “quislings”—out of conviction, embitterment, and revenge.<sup>7</sup> “We are receiving terrible news,” reported a witness. “In Crnogrob there are mass graves. Trucks are bringing men with bound hands and feet every evening from the prison in Škofja Loka and no one ever returns. Every evening one hears shots from Crnogrob. . . . Officially and publicly no one knows anything about it. . . . At the same time, the OZNA goes about its own dirty business under the cover of night.”<sup>8</sup> In early July 1945, Tito gave the strict order to free all imprisoned “quislings” over the age of 35 who had not committed an atrocity. However, this order was not implemented at first. Not until the end of 1945 did he definitely put an end to the rampage by expounding emphatically that “no one is afraid of capital punishment any longer!”<sup>9</sup>

Targeted “cleansing” actions were also carried out in the liberated areas once annexed by Italy. Immediately following Italy’s surrender in 1943, anywhere from 500 to 700 representatives of the fascist regime were executed. The partisans had the corpses of the murdered Italians dumped in the deep karst sinkholes of the region, where, as Jules Verne once wrote, “of that which is thrown in, certainly nothing ever comes out again.”<sup>10</sup> In the spring of 1945, the bodies of hundreds, if not thousands of murdered victims followed. Named after the Istrian limestone sinkholes in which the murdered were thrown, these atrocities became known as *foibe*.<sup>11</sup>

The terror at the end of the war eliminated the remaining military resistance on the ground, but it did not eradicate resistance in the heads of many. Instead, the violence provided grounds on which to fundamentally question the legitimacy of the new system, a system that apparently liquidated its enemies brutally and forced possible opposition to accept an unwanted state under the threat of force. In Slovenia and Croatia, the rift running through the society was particularly deep, where the re-establishment of Yugoslavia itself, regardless of its political system, found anything but consensual approval. Since the communist state neither acknowledged nor uncovered the injustice done in its name, commemoration of the atrocities near Bleiburg and the *foibe* became historical and political time bombs.<sup>12</sup>

### *Creating a People’s Democracy*

From the standpoint of the Western powers, it was all but certain in the fall of 1944 that Yugoslavia would drift into the communist camp. Above all, they viewed the alliance with Tito as a pragmatic solution because their chief priority was to bring about Germany’s unconditional surrender. Churchill hoped that once Germany had been defeated in Yugoslavia, the monarchical regime would be restored or a bourgeois multiparty democracy would emerge.

However, King Peter and his government were in a weak position due to the rapid surrender of the Yugoslav army back in April 1941 and his hasty flight into exile. The reputation of this government was badly tarnished, especially since the partisans had just proven that military resistance would have indeed been worth the fight. Although the monarch headed a government representing all parties, ideas for a postwar order were amorphous. The first Yugoslavia had never been able to truly consolidate itself as a state, and now recognized institutions no longer existed. Several of the king's cabinets had crumbled over internal quarrels between Serb and Croat national politics, and the government was also being condemned for its support of war criminals. In other words, it was rather unclear what this government actually stood for—except anticommunism.<sup>13</sup>

At Churchill's behest, Ivan Šubašić, the former head of the Banovina of Croatia, became the leader of the exile regime in June 1944. The British and the Americans hoped that the bourgeois camp would thereby finally consolidate itself and be able to prevent a communist government at the last moment. Tito understood that international recognition of his power could only occur if he acknowledged his main legitimate rival, the royal government in exile. So he succumbed to Churchill's urging to reach an agreement with Šubašić, which was signed on 16 June 1944 on the Adriatic island of Vis and expressed their mutual recognition and agreement on a procedure for moving forward. The decision about Yugoslavia's future political system was to be postponed until after the war. The revolutionary leader was making a strictly tactical move when he publicly emphasized that he was primarily concerned with the liberation of his homeland and not the introduction of socialism. Back at home, he formed the Unified Popular Liberation Front (known as the Popular Front starting in August 1945), a broad alliance of communists, social democrats, monarchists, peasant-party members, and the bourgeoisie.

Tito's primary aim was to neutralize his political competitors by affiliating them with him. His rivals hoped for a coalition of equal partners, but even then Tito considered such a coalition thoroughly absurd. In the end his strategy proved successful, not the least because the anticommunist opposition was hamstrung. The standing of the old parties had eroded during the war, and their leaders, like Vladko Maček, had long left the country. The government-in-exile did not return to Yugoslavia until late March 1945, so that not a single well-organized political force existed to counteract Tito's influence, nor were there any credible alternatives to Tito's federal-state solution for Yugoslavia. Many outstanding personalities, intellectuals, artists, and writers from all parts of the country began to publicly announce their support for the new state, which gave it the veneer of deeper legitimacy.<sup>14</sup>

Tito proved to be a clever foreign policy strategist in that he played the conflicting interests between Churchill and Stalin against one another in order

to limit the West's influence on the postwar order. He duped the British when he secretly boarded a Soviet military plane on 21 September 1944 in Vis and flew to Moscow to convince Stalin to send Red Army units to help liberate Belgrade. In doing so he foiled the impending British invasion of Yugoslavia, which would have been the only thing able to prevent the communist takeover. Stalin granted Tito this favor but then pursued his own *realpolitik* when he reached an agreement with Churchill in October of that same year at the Moscow Conference on dividing up Europe into spheres of influence. Romania was to be controlled to 90 percent and Bulgaria to 75 percent by the Soviets, while Greece would be to 90 percent under British control. The two major powers planned to equally divide control of both Yugoslavia and Hungary. Faced with this international constellation, Tito had no choice but to reach an agreement with Ivan Šubašić, the representative of the Yugoslav king, on 1 November 1944, in Belgrade to create an interim coalition government. This was constituted under Tito's leadership on 7 March 1945. Šubašić became foreign minister, and eleven of the twenty-one ministers in this government were also not communists. Shortly afterward the Allies formally recognized the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ).<sup>15</sup>

Ideologically, the communists hunkered down and waited. They declared Yugoslavia to be a people's democracy in which they were willing to share power with other political forces. Pro forma, 118 bourgeois representatives from the former *Skupština*, the prewar National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, were allowed to be seated in the interim parliament next to members of the AVNOJ, the People's Liberation Council formed during the war. The new leadership avoided using terms like "class struggle" or "dictatorship of the proletariat." Instead they avowed their support for antifascism, "brotherhood and unity," and even general humanistic values. Yugoslavia now had a hybrid political system in which elements of liberal parliamentarianism were combined with the one-party state that had been established during the war. However, with the passage in the summer of 1945 of a law on crimes against the people and the state, civil rights were limited, as were the freedoms of association, assembly, and the press. Despite the impending elections, communists already held key offices in all bodies. In reality, this phase of the people's democracy bridged the transition from the country's former bourgeois-capitalist system to its future socialist one.

Also at the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy sat seasoned fighters from the People's Liberation Army, who had the regime alone to thank for the positions they held. At the beginning of the 1950s, two-thirds of the leading personnel came from the working and peasant classes. Every second low-level civil servant and employee had little or no schooling.<sup>16</sup> What this meant is exemplified in a decree from the Ministry for Forestry, which apparently felt it necessary in October 1945 to inform its civil servants of a few basic rules of

behavior, specifically that leftover food, paper, and cigarettes were not to be simply thrown out the windows, that spitting was not allowed in the hallways or stairwells, and that there was a purpose for and a proper way to use toilets.<sup>17</sup>

The elections for the constituent assembly took place in November 1945, in a climate of considerable instability; they could not be called either free or fair. Approximately 200,000 people were prevented from voting because they had cooperated with the occupational regimes. Furthermore, there was a separate ballot box reserved only for those voters casting ballots against the People's Front.<sup>18</sup> One British diplomat reported that the trend toward establishing a dictatorship was growing not because the population at large was convinced of communism as a form of government, but because the wartime and postwar experiences had made the people more receptive to a regime that promised order and security, even at the price of losing personal liberties and political decisions.<sup>19</sup> Winning over 90 percent of the votes, the communist-dominated People's Front list received a comfortable majority in the constituent assembly. When the bourgeois ministers pulled out of the coalition under protest in the late summer, they were in effect committing political suicide. On 29 November 1945, the parliament declared Yugoslavia to be a republic and banned King Peter from returning to the country.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the transformation to a one-party state occurred here far earlier than in the eastern states of Central Europe.

Tito prohibited all discussion, pro and contra, on the introduction of a multiparty system, even though it had also been occurring in his own party. In accordance with the classic Bolshevik view, he placed monolithic ideology and the one-party system combined with social justice over political pluralism. He was convinced that a democracy based on the Western model would only lead to the restoration of the old order, to ethnopolitical polarization, and to the collapse of the state. "If these [democratic] parties wish to have the people behind them, then they have to conduct strictly local politics for each of the respective peoples, and that would prevent the creation of a unified state. . . . If such [a party] would form in Slovenia for the Slovene nation, another in Montenegro, a third in Serbia, then in Macedonia and Croatia, this would lead to the fragmentation of the state, which would immediately fall apart."<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the egoistical party bickering would block developmental policy based on industrial progress and social justice. Therefore, in 1946, the constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) institutionalized the system of "people's rule" (*narodna vlast*) with hundreds of elected people's committees in cities and rural communities. The communists advocated direct democracy and instructed communities to enable "the direct involvement of the citizens in administering state business," to abolish all privileges, and particularly to eliminate all forms of national and religious

hate.<sup>22</sup> This definitely precluded a revival of the democratic multiparty system. Leading oppositional politicians were tried in court and their supporters threatened. All political power was concentrated in the Politburo of the CPY under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, who was simultaneously the head of the Yugoslav government.

As in other countries, the main war criminals were to be tried in court. However, Ante Pavelić escaped to Argentina, and General Nedić committed suicide in 1946 in pretrial detention following his extradition.<sup>23</sup> Leading representatives of the collaboration regime in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia were charged, in a sense as surrogates for the old regime. Draža Mihailović, who had disappeared, was betrayed by one of his commanders, lured into a trap, and arrested in March 1946. He was executed on 17 July 1946 and buried in an anonymous grave.<sup>24</sup>

Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac also had to answer to the court in the fall of 1946. The communists wanted not only to hold him accountable for his dubious role during the Second World War but also to use him to set an example against the Catholic Church, around which the nationalist opposition in Croatia was grouping at the time. In the fall of 1945, the bishops had issued a pastoral letter opposing the communists. The court convicted Stepinac of collaboration and the cover-up of war crimes and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment, which he served as house arrest. In addition to the tens of thousands of political oppositionists and supporters of the old regime who had fled, hundreds of Catholic clerics now went into exile out of fear of repression.

Tito himself repeatedly argued that it was better not to wallow in the wounds of the past but to build a positive, commonly shared perspective for the future instead. Once the war criminals were convicted, he offered a type of armistice to his opponents. "We extend our hand to all the misled," he said in 1946. "We extend our hand to them over the innumerable graves, over these ruins, we forgive them! But we demand that they become loyal citizens of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia."<sup>25</sup> From this point forward, the communists preached the need to forgive and forget. In reality, however, very little was forgiven and nothing forgotten.

### *Nationalities and Neighbors*

From a Croat point of view, one of Tito's most notable achievements was the liberation of Istria and Dalmatia from Italian rule, which thus finally brought about the unification of all Croats. In September 1943, after Italy had collapsed, Slovene and Croat partisans declared "once and for all . . . that Istria is and remains Croatian territory." Referring to President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the right to self-determination, they declared reunification with the motherland.<sup>26</sup>

Tito was aware that he would not be able to clinch the annexation of Istria through diplomatic channels with the Allies. Therefore, shortly before the end of the war, he had his troops quickly move into the claimed territory and march to Trieste, which had been a point of contention between Italians and Slavs since 1870 and now lay directly on the border between the spheres of influence that the great powers had so painstakingly negotiated in Yalta in February 1945.

The Trieste crisis marked the first major dispute in the emerging East–West conflict.<sup>27</sup> The Western powers thought that Italy should be rewarded for its 1943 defection to their side, which is why they wanted the People’s Liberation Army to leave the region. Demonstrations of military strength in which Stalin eventually took the side of the British and Americans ended in June 1945 with a compromise. Yugoslav troops pulled out of Trieste while the surrounding territory was divided into Allied and Yugoslav zones of occupation. The Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947 turned Trieste and northern Istria into a neutral “Free Territory” under the protection of the United Nations. Zone A (Trieste city) was administered by a British-American military government, while Zone B (surrounding territory) was placed under Yugoslav military control. This provisional solution lasted until 1954, when the Free Territory was dissolved. The contested territories were divided between Italy and Yugoslavia.<sup>28</sup>

The integration of Istria and Dalmatia into the Yugoslav state greatly concerned the Italians living there. The former rulers now became the ruled. Although they were not systematically driven off, as many as 200,000 Italian refugees left the area in several waves until the peace treaty with Italy was signed in 1947. Those who remained were given the status of a national minority with all the appertaining rights, including school instruction in Italian.<sup>29</sup>

Besides the Italians, many ethnic Germans also left the country, the majority of them before the end of the war and on order of evacuation issued by the Coordination Center for Ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) of the German Reich in the late summer of 1944. This sent hundreds of thousands of them out of the country. From the original population of half a million ethnic Germans, only about 200,000 remained by the end of the war.<sup>30</sup> Many of these people became the victims of partisan retribution.

Because of their close collaboration with the occupational forces and especially because of the killing sprees perpetrated by the SS division “Prince Eugen” against partisans and civilians, the ethnic Germans were seen collectively as war criminals. When the partisans marched into the region where ethnic Germans lived, many of them were therefore mistreated, interned in camps, or executed as war criminals. The Soviets, who crossed the Danube in October 1944, deported around 30,000 German war prisoners and forced

laborers to Russia. Not until the end of 1949 did they release these deported people from the camps.<sup>31</sup>

On 21 November 1944, the provisional Yugoslav government of the AVNOJ decided to confiscate “all property belonging to persons of German ethnicity, except those Germans who fought in the ranks of the national liberation army and in partisan units” as well as the property “of war criminals and their accomplices regardless of nationality.” Apparently the Yugoslav government had no specific plans to deport the Germans collectively; at least this was not an issue addressed during the Potsdam negotiations. A later attempt to have “the entire German minority” transferred to Germany was rejected by the Allies. The Yugoslav foreign ministry then concluded that deportation “will not be able to be solved in a legal manner in the foreseeable future.”<sup>32</sup>

The Germans who did not leave Yugoslavia were put into camps, such as in Rudolfsgnad (Kničanin), Gakowa (Gakovo), and Kruschiwl (Kruševlje), and subjected to forced labor. Tens of thousands of them died as a result of deliberate abuse and the conditions there. When the camps were disbanded in 1948, the survivors were shipped off to Hungary and Austria. Roughly 62,000 Yugoslav Germans immigrated to West Germany in the 1950s as part of the effort to reunite families.<sup>33</sup> Hitler’s rule thus brutally ended the centuries-long presence of the Danube Swabians in the region.<sup>34</sup>

There were also open national questions in the southern regions of the country. The communists handled the old feud with Bulgaria and Greece over the “Macedonian question” by declaring the Macedonians in 1937 to be a people of equal standing and promising them in Jajce in 1943 that they would have their own republic. In other words, the communists conducted targeted nation building “from the top down,” in order to shape Macedonian national identity. Soon a standardized Macedonian language and orthography were established (on the basis of the dialect spoken in the Prilep-Veles region). Grammar books, dictionaries, and belletristic works were published. In the Bled treaty, Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian head of state, recognized the independence of the Macedonians in 1947. The province was meant as a bridge between the two friendly states.

The situation in Kosovo proved to be trickier. There the Kosovar communists had declared at the Bujan Conference at the turn of 1943/1944 that Kosovo had “always wished . . . to be unified with Albania.” Early in 1945, an uprising was put down of nationalists known as Ballists (after the name of the organization founded in 1942, Balli kombëtar) who advocated a Greater Albania. During the war they had collaborated with the German military government, which discredited them with the Western powers. Because the communists in Kosovo were never strong and many Albanians favored a Greater Albanian state, Tito was forced to toe a more conciliatory line.



Retrospectively, he sanctioned the deportation of the Serb colonists, which helped significantly to appease the Kosovars. Tito decided to make Kosovo and Metohija an autonomous region of the Republic of Serbia, as a sort of compromise between Serbian claims over the territory and Albanian desires for independence. For a while he even played with the idea of uniting the southern province with Albania, should the country join a confederation of Balkan states.

### *State and Nations in Socialism*

On the basis of decisions by the AVNOJ in 1943 and modeled after the Soviet example, the constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the two-chamber parliament it created were established in January 1946. The constitution recognized five coequal constituent nations of the new multinational state, namely the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Not until the 1960s did the Bosnian Muslims advance to become the sixth such nation. Before that they had to declare themselves as being either ethnically undefined, Muslim Serb, or Muslim Croat. The negative experiences of the interwar period prompted the communists to expressly reject the idea of merging all these coequal peoples into a supranational Yugoslav nation. At the same time, it appeared to Tito to be just as important to thwart the dominance of the most populous people, namely the Serbs.

Article I of the constitution defined Yugoslavia as "a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state."<sup>35</sup> Moša Pijade, a member of the Central Committee, coined the pedantic interpretation that the right of secession had been exhausted once and for all by the decision to reestablish Yugoslavia in 1943, since the partisan war represented a type of implicit referendum in favor of the new state.

Each of these peoples received their own state, something that was important to the communists. From then on, Yugoslavia comprised six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Within Serbia, two autonomous regions existed, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The situation was somewhat different only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there was no clear ethnic majority. In November 1943, the Bosnian communists had decided that this republic was "neither Serb, nor Muslim, nor Croat, but Serb, Muslim, and Croat all at once." All three groups were said to be equal. For one, this stance recognized the individuality of the Muslims; for another, it expressly emphasized the multiethnic character of the republic.<sup>36</sup>

Nor were the other republics ethnically homogeneous. For example, the Croats only made up 78 percent of that republic's population, the Macedonians just 66 percent of theirs. As long as Yugoslavia remained intact politically, this was but a small problem. People were not faced with the decision of identifying

themselves either as the member of a certain ethnicity or as the inhabitant of one of the republics, because in Yugoslavia the two proved without any problem to be mutually compatible. In fact, federalism institutionalized multiple identities and loyalties: every person was the citizen of a republic and at the same time a Yugoslav citizen. Since all titular nations enjoyed the same rights across the entire territory of Yugoslavia, this put the importance of each republic's borders into a different perspective. Tito hoped that this would connect people with one another instead of dividing them.

The alpha and omega of the Yugoslav system and its highest patriotic values were "brotherhood and unity"—solidarity among different yet related and coexisting peoples. Tito's campaign slogan reflected the tradition of nineteenth-century pan-Slavic solidarity. The national anthem of Yugoslavia, "Hej, Sloveni" (Hey, Slavs), chosen in 1945, was an adaptation of the anthem of the pan-Slavic movement adopted at the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848. The concept of a federative democracy was also rooted in the nineteenth century in the thinking of the Serb socialists Svetozar Marković and Dimitrije Tucović, who in turn had been influenced by the Austro-Marxists.

Both the Enlightenment and Marxism taught that the social organization of humanity progressed through a series of transformations from tribes and clans to peoples, then nations, and finally to supranational formations. Therefore, from the communist standpoint, national identities did not have to be repressed since they represented a historically necessary stage on the path to socialism. In addition to peoples (*narodi*), ethnic minorities also thus enjoyed the right to be treated equally, to further their own distinct cultural development, and to use their language freely. Magyars, Albanians, and eight other groups were officially recognized as nationalities (*narodnosti*). Although they were also represented in the political bodies, they had a different status than the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. The right to self-determination was argued to have already been fulfilled for the Kosovars through the existence of Albania and for the Magyars through Hungary. Therefore, they were not given their own republics and the right to secession. Minorities without national homelands, such as the Roma, Jews, and the Vlachs, were considered to be ethnic groups. They also enjoyed special protective rights. The optimistic expectation was that ethnic differences would disappear of their own accord as socialism progressed.

Socialism served as the main unifying force and the most important ideological adhesive in a state made up of various peoples. Patriotic education and a pan-Yugoslav consciousness were to thwart strife and succession and thus prevent civil war and fratricide from breaking out anew. However, Yugoslavia's nationality policy remained a harrowing balancing act. On the one side, it provided room for national, religious, and cultural activities; on the other, it attempted to rigorously combat all forms of intolerance and chauvinism.

Cultural organizations, clubs and foundations, publishing houses, and religious societies were banned if they exhibited an exclusive ethnic preference. Three examples of such organizations were the Muslim Preporod (Rebirth), the Croat Napredak (Progress), and the Serb Prosvjeta (Education). Instead, society was to organize itself along multiethnic and citizenship lines, starting in the youth brigades, the Communist Party, the Antifascist Women's Front, and the People's Army. Yet it did not prove easy at first to diminish nationalism. Prejudices and the trauma of the war ran deep. Time and again passions rose to the surface, such as when a soccer game in Split in the early 1950s evolved into anti-Serb rioting. In Herzegovina, peasants demanded ethnically separate schools, and teachers refused to teach anything other than their "own" national history.<sup>37</sup> Time and again, Tito had to implore his fellow countrymen to "keep brotherhood and unity as the apple of your eye."<sup>38</sup>

The majority of intellectuals initially engaged in the new state project. Important cultural and scientific institutions adopted the adjective "Yugoslav" in their names. The writer Miroslav Krleža founded the Institute of Lexicography and began the compilation of a Yugoslav encyclopedia in the early 1950s. Furthermore, all across the country publishing houses, movie theaters, and a writers association were formed.<sup>39</sup> Building on the agreement reached back in the nineteenth century, linguists and writers worked out a shared standard language in December 1954 in Novi Sad. They concluded that Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins spoke the same language in two variants, Ekavian and Ijekavian. Officially the language was called "Serbo-Croatian" or "Croato-Serbian." Both ways of spelling, pronunciation, and alphabets, the Latin and the Cyrillic, were to be treated equally.

Universities and academies began to tackle the task of creating a common dictionary. Emblematic for the Yugoslav understanding of culture after 1945 was Ivo Andrić's novel *The Bridge on the Drina*, which he had written during the interwar period. Andrić was not a communist, but his chronic of a Bosnian microcosm of different religions and civilizations masterly historicizes the *longue durée* of coexistence and conflict as the central experience shaping identity among Yugoslavs. In 1961, Andrić was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

### *"No Rest While We're Rebuilding!"*

Tito's communist system represented the most ambitious and encompassing attempt up to that point to combat the excesses of capitalism through industrial progress and social justice and thereby to actually bring about modernity in Yugoslavia in the first place. It propagated the idea of a better world in which alienation and class conflict would be overcome in a modern societal order exhibiting great solidarity. In its pursuit of this ideal, the regime used

dictatorial means to accelerate the pace of modernization in the years immediately following the war.

As a result of their analysis of bourgeois economy and society, the communists undertook a massive project to promote progress that they developed as an antithesis to capitalist market economy. The core of the ideology consisted of the socialist theory of growth and labor. It aimed to achieve three major objectives: first, to generate employment and wealth without creating any of the negative side effects in society that capitalism had been producing since the nineteenth century. Second, the vicious circle of economic and political dependence on foreign powers was to be broken. Third, socialist society was to be better, happier, more just, and more humane. In order to achieve this, the political system resorted to classic Soviet means: substantial abolishment of private property, long-term economic planning and management by the state, and the dissemination of socialist attitudes, values, norms, and practices.

By the time the war ended, Yugoslavia faced immense demographic and material losses. More than a million people had died in the war; another 3.5 million had no roof over their heads. The country lay in ruins; 289,000 farms had been totally destroyed.<sup>40</sup> Because the Wehrmacht had practiced a scorched-earth policy in which it systematically destroyed facilities, plants, businesses, and infrastructure as it retreated, one-third of Yugoslavia's industry was damaged in 1945. Not one mine remained intact, and most of the roads, railway tracks, and bridges lay in ruins.<sup>41</sup> This intensified exponentially the old problem of Balkan backwardness. By the end of the war, only 43.8 percent of the peasant households in all of Yugoslavia had an iron plow; another 18.2 only had a wooden one. The rest did not even own the most rudimentary agricultural machines. Large sections of the country did not have canalization or running water.<sup>42</sup>

Under the motto "No rest while we're rebuilding!" (*Nema odmora dok traje obnova!*), Yugoslavia undertook the great task of cleaning up and repairing. Until 1953, the country received \$553.8 million in aid from various sources. Over \$419 million came from the UN program for reconstruction and development alone, the highest amount awarded to any European recipient. Most of this aid was used to purchase food, clothing, and medicine.<sup>43</sup>

However, what had a greater impact than this money on Yugoslavia's immediate postwar reconstruction was the people's optimism and initial élan. Hundreds of work brigades labored diligently. Youth helped with the harvest and reforestation, collected firewood, repaired roads and bridges, and built soccer stadiums, schools, and dwellings. Reconstruction was not just one great toil; for the youth, at least, it was also a huge party and the first important Yugoslav ritual of integration. "They were constantly celebrating. . . . They played instruments and danced as though they'd not been hard at work,"

noted one amazed observer.<sup>44</sup> A total of 1.3 million young men and women worked more than 60 million voluntary and involuntary hours. Between 1945 and 1952, they built eleven railway lines, fourteen industrial plants, and the highway between Zagreb and Belgrade—the *autoput*—which was named “brotherhood and unity.”<sup>45</sup>

Back in November 1944, the AVNOJ had confiscated over 80 percent of all private property in key economic sectors. Now, in November 1946, industry, banking, and the wholesale trade were officially nationalized. What remained in private hands were peasant farms, artisan workshops, and dwellings.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, the expropriation of land holdings was sanctioned retroactively. The land reform and colonization law passed in August 1945 legalized the confiscation, limited peasant farms to a size between roughly 62 to 86 acres, and distributed land to small farmers and the landless poor. Those affected by the expropriation of about 39.5 million acres were, for one, banks, companies, churches, and monasteries, and for another, large landowners and ethnic Germans. The state gave nearly half of this expropriated land to about 300,000 veterans and landless poor. The rest was allocated to state-run enterprises and cooperatives. A second major reform followed in 1953 in which individual ownership was restricted to twenty-five acres for peasants and to 7.5 acres for people who farmed on the side. This reform put another 692,000 acres in the state’s hands.<sup>47</sup>

Much like in the Soviet Union, the cornerstone of this new order was rapid industrialization advanced by the state. The secondary sector of the economy was to absorb the surplus labor from rural areas, satisfy the demand for consumer goods, and initiate self-sustaining economic growth. It was to be the lever with which to pry Yugoslavia loose from its backward social structure.<sup>48</sup> In mid-1949, the state launched a campaign to mobilize the peasantry. Loyal party agitators spread out across the countryside, called meetings, and attempted to convince the village youth of the amenities of industrial work. Often the militia helped with recruitment: men were threatened at gunpoint, and women and children were locked up in dark cellars. One way or another, the campaign soon proved successful. Between 1945 and 1953, 1.5 million people left their villages and moved permanently to the cities. Another 800,000 became part-time industrial laborers and commuters.<sup>49</sup>

Hand in hand with industrialization, the state sought to promote the socialist transformation of village life. Backwardness was to be combated, loans and modern agricultural technology provided, the level of education raised, and productivity increased. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, over 90 percent of the land was privately owned and change was to take place at a slower and especially at a voluntary pace.<sup>50</sup>

In order to combat food shortages and to finance industrialization, a centralized purchasing system for agricultural products (*otkup*) was created in

which farmers were to sell surplus production to state agencies at low fixed prices, yet there was nothing voluntary about the system. Farmers felt burdened with an unacceptable hardship because, on the one hand, they had to sell their produce at disproportionately cheap prices but, on the other, could only buy industrial goods at high market prices. Numerous peasants circumvented the party dictate by withholding part of their harvest and selling it on the black market. Since the threat of arrest and severe sentences did not discourage this practice, the authorities were forced to issue an amnesty in the summer of 1946. The *otkup* turned out to be one of the largest flops in postwar history because the amount of produce delivered sank, the black market flourished, and the frustration of the authorities and the population at large grew.<sup>51</sup>

### *Pragmatism, Propaganda, and Socialist Values*

These years of reconstruction and development were marked by exuberant enthusiasm and optimism. The rationalism of the Enlightenment, technological progress, and the ideology of socialism combined to generate the idea that humans could not only dominate nature but that entire societies could be thoroughly reformatted through rational criteria and aesthetic norms. State planning, scientific research, and expertise were to drive social transformation, as would the dissemination of modern values and norms. A major objective was to bring forth a new sort of person, one fitting the needs and requirements of industrial society. Health, education, prosperity, and social security were considered high aims worth working for and which required virtues such as a strong work ethic, discipline, punctuality, precision, and efficiency. These were core ideas of European industrial modernity stemming from intellectuals and social reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; they were not at all typical elements of communist ideology. In the early years, rhetoric consisted mainly of appeals to work more and harder.<sup>52</sup>

Although they harbored a strong belief in the power of the state to shape society, Yugoslavs remained fairly pragmatic. Contrary to the Soviet Union, the backward peasantry was not to be terrorized into entering this new age but rather persuaded of both short-term political and long-term transformative goals. Yet, communists had to take into account a variety of local cultures, value systems, and behavioral habits, and they were well aware that not all features of the Soviet example suited Yugoslavia's conditions. Therefore, time-tested social practices were usually tolerated. At least at the top, the leadership relied on models and persuasion to advance their aims, but at the local level party functionaries still often resorted to coercion and the use of force. Education and socialist training were to help emancipate the people and to overcome all forms of idealism, mysticism, and religiosity. The new system thus rested on the supportive pillars of agitation and propaganda (agit-prop). The people's consciousness was to be pulled from the moorings of their

traditional-patriarchal or conservative-bourgeois life worlds; their hearts and minds were to be won for the social revolution.<sup>53</sup>

Never before had the state invested so much in public education as it did after 1945. The highest priority was to combat illiteracy in the villages, to teach new health standards and practices, to enforce compulsory school attendance everywhere, and to set up public adult education centers, libraries, and cultural organizations. There are moving photographs of bright-eyed older men and women crowded onto the wooden benches of the village school in anticipation of learning to spell their first words. People were to be taught about health, hygiene, and women's emancipation. Hundreds of new clubs for women, youth, sports, culture, leisure activities, and education suddenly sprouted up everywhere in the initial postwar years. They printed wall newspapers, flyers, calendars, and books and organized lectures, training courses, and events of every sort. Even theater and cinema were now to be accessible to the broad masses.

In addition to the sociocultural norms of the industrial age, the communists propagated specific socialist values: the Marxist ideology, humanism, open-mindedness, solidarity, equality between the sexes, and the "correct" way to live with regard to family life and morality. High priority was also given to other patriotic virtues such as loyalty to one's homeland, love of liberty, fighting spirit, heroism, and naturally "brotherhood and unity." The highest maxim of agitprop was to convey optimism and the joy of life as the country marched forward into a better and more just future.<sup>54</sup>

The regime showed less tolerance when it came to handling the religious communities. They were a thorn in the governments' side for three reasons: first, all religion was considered the source of popular ignorance, nationalism, and chauvinism. Second, the clergy were suspected of being the uncompromising opponents of the communist order. Third, religiously based national identities hampered people from developing a feeling for a supranational Yugoslav state. For these reasons, the religious communities were given certain freedom to operate but remained under the close observation of the state.

Article 25 of the constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and the separation of church and state. Individual religious belief was tolerated but only as a private matter. The abuse of religion for political purposes and the incitement of ethnic hatred were unlawful. In their first few years in power, the communists took a hard line against the churches. Clergy were harassed, press censored, church property nationalized, congregational offerings to the church prohibited. Religious festivities such as Christmas, Easter, St. George, Passover, and Bayram remained holidays, but community activities were deliberately scheduled on these days, like school festivals, excursions, sports events, and volunteer work. While Jack Frost, St. Nicholas, and Santa Claus

were still allowed to thrive, the state was stricter about Islamic customs. It abolished the Sharia, closed religious foundations and schools, and banned the veiling of women, just as Turkey already had. Many communists were excluded from the party because they attended religious services at churches or mosques.<sup>55</sup>

At first the religious communities were not willing to surrender their influence on schools, family policy, and moral values to the secular state without a fight. They raised a storm over civil marriage and religious instruction on a voluntary basis. The Vatican took a particularly aggressive stance by issuing a decree in 1949 that threatened excommunication to anyone who joined the Communist Party. When the pope took things a step further in 1952 and announced the appointment to cardinal of Archbishop Stepinac, who was a convicted war criminal and under house arrest, Belgrade broke off diplomatic relations with the Holy See.

The communists turned the old order on its head in ways other than secularization. Like the Soviet model, their dictatorship of development relied on technological progress, social justice, and rationality in everyday life. Subsequently, the combination of a faith in progress, planning euphoria, and forced modernization catapulted the Yugoslavs into a thoroughly new era. Epochal sociocultural innovations got underway, as was evident in people's working lives, in relations between the sexes, in regional and social mobility, and with regard to attitudes and values. Yet, while existing culture could be influenced to a very significant degree, it seemed impossible to transform it completely. Anyway, the price for change was the forced relinquishment of all political pluralism: one-party rule halted bourgeois-liberal traditions and prevented all possible alternative systems for many decades.

Many people wanted to believe in the advantages of this new system. The birth of the people's liberation movement that Tito fathered sustained itself through the heroism it demonstrated during the war and ultimately established itself throughout Yugoslavia without Soviet intervention. Therefore, the regime possessed an original legitimacy of its own, even if this was tarnished by the persecution of political enemies and tens of thousands of repudiated victims during the takeover of power. "Brotherhood and unity" built bridges in a country deeply torn by civil war, and without the energetic policy of industrialization that the communists enacted, many a region would have been left crawling at a snail's pace toward European-level development. Still, the constitution was written in an attempt to reconcile diverging interests between distinct nations; individual civil rights did not count *de facto*. Direct democracy and socialist Yugoslavism soon proved to be a chimera.



## 11.

# Tito's Socialism (1948 to 1964)

### *The Break with Stalin*

The optimism of the early years came to an abrupt halt when a serious international crisis evolved in 1948. Yugoslavia had been well on its way to becoming an independent center of communist power in Southeast Europe. Neither Churchill nor Stalin was happy about this.

The unabashedly self-confident President Tito worked single-mindedly to establish a Balkan federation that, besides Yugoslavia, would include Bulgaria, Albania, and possibly even Greece. When the Greek civil war broke out again in 1946, Yugoslavia openly supported the communists. This infuriated the British, who considered the Mediterranean region to be their very own sphere of influence and a strategic bridge to the economically vital Near East. Stalin had accepted this British position when the demarcation of East–West spheres of interest had been negotiated. For him, the Balkan countries were not worth the risk of sparking a confrontation with the Western powers.<sup>1</sup>

Moscow was far more annoyed by Tito's proactive course toward Bulgaria and Albania. In mid-1947, at a point when Stalin was clamping down on his East European allies, Tito signed a series of treaties with Bulgarian prime minister Georgi Dimitrov in Bled that included a mutual assistance pact and a customs union. He also signed a friendship treaty with Enver Hoxha in Albania. At the end of 1947, just as Belgrade was preparing to send two army divisions to Albania in order to preempt the alleged aggression of Greek "monarcho-fascists," Stalin's patience finally snapped.<sup>2</sup>

In harsh language, the Soviet dictator demanded that his Balkan comrades fall into line and ordered Georgi Dimitrov and the chief Yugoslav ideologue Edvard Kardelj to report to the Kremlin in February 1948. He forced the Yugoslavs to sign an agreement in which all further foreign policy moves would first be approved by Moscow. Because Tito still continued unapologetically to work toward a union with Albania, the Soviets pulled their military advisers from Yugoslavia in March. The tone of a series of "critical letters" heated up communication in April 1948. Stalin wrote that the CPY placed too

much emphasis on the originality of its experiences and politics, neglected collectivization, and hindered the work of Soviet representatives. In a threatening tone he demanded a gesture of submission from Tito.<sup>3</sup>

In the meantime, even greater frustration had built up on the Yugoslav side toward the Soviet Union because of the help promised by the Soviets but never received during the Second World War, the lack of Soviet support in the Trieste question, attempts at espionage by Soviet advisers and diplomats, and the attempt to establish a monopoly on the raw materials market through Yugoslav-Soviet enterprises. Tito is said to have been seriously surprised and deeply upset over Moscow's harsh reaction. Yet he had already fulminated publicly at the end of May 1945 in Ljubljana that Yugoslavia did not want "to become the pawn of any policy having to do with spheres of interest . . . [and] to be dependent on anyone any longer." Moscow subsequently sent a protest note: "We view the speech by Comrade Tito as an aggressive act against the Soviet Union."<sup>4</sup> Now Tito upped the ante: "No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love his own country less."<sup>5</sup> In order to take the wind out of the Soviet dictator's sails, the Yugoslav leadership decided in April 1948 to hastily collectivize agriculture. But Stalin was seething and decided to involve the Cominform, the organization of communist parties. On 28 June 1948, the historically renowned St. Vitus Day, the CPY was expelled from the Cominform in absentia on suspicion of capitalism. A major media campaign was launched in the East European countries, calling for the removal of Tito as Yugoslav head of state and leader of the CPY. No one dared to declare solidarity with Belgrade. Even Albania and Bulgaria shrank back.

The break with the Soviet Union was a severe shock for Yugoslav communists and soon caused a long-lasting war psychosis. With a single blow they had lost Stalin as their ideological mentor and now had to face the possibility that the powerful Soviet leader might even be preparing military interventions against them. Tito found himself isolated in the communist world. Furthermore, grave economic consequences threatened. Early in 1949, the Soviet Union and its East European allies excluded Yugoslavia from the founding of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and set up a hermetically tight trade blockade. Inflexible planning, political isolation following the expulsion from the Cominform, and an extreme drought caused the multiethnic state to suffer a serious economic and psychological crisis in 1950. Production and consumption shrank, so that many goods were only available on voucher. In 1952, Yugoslavs consumed only two-thirds as much as they had before the war.<sup>6</sup>

With time, the conflict with Stalin proved to be a political blessing for the regime. Not only did Yugoslavia avoid the Sovietization and homogenization

experienced by the Eastern bloc, but the party was also able to overcome the internal divisions that it had suffered since the interwar period by conducting fundamental debates but also undergoing brutal political purges. In the end, it emerged from the conflict stronger than before. In July 1948, Tito had himself reelected by an overwhelming majority as head of the CPY at the fifth party congress. The People's Front was disbanded, thereby discarding the last pretense that pluralism might be possible. Among the people, Tito's defiant demeanor ensured him much goodwill for many years. "I don't like him," explained a librarian from a small town near Zagreb in the early 1970s, "but I guess we all respect him for having stood up to the Russians and having kept us out of their clutches."<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime, the West fully misinterpreted the breach between Tito and Stalin. The Americans believed there was an ideological fissure running through the Soviet bloc that would allow them to drive deeper the wedge implanted by the Yugoslavs. President Truman offered general military and economic assistance, to "keep Tito afloat."<sup>8</sup> However, the ex-revolutionary was not about to renounce communism. He was primarily concerned with power politics, not ideological questions. Washington's strategy did offer Belgrade distinct advantages for orienting its trade relations more toward the West and thereby liberating Yugoslavia from Soviet economic dependence. It took years before the U.S. administration understood that the Yugoslavs did not intend to concede to American claims to power, let alone encourage other Eastern bloc countries to imitate their rebelliousness against the Soviets. Tito relentlessly refused to make political concessions, with one decisive exception: in August 1949, he cut off support for the communists fighting in the Greek civil war and in return received an urgently needed loan worth millions from the British. The uprising in the neighboring country collapsed soon afterward.<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, communists loyal to Moscow, the Cominform sympathizers (*ibeovci*), were ostracized. Two leading party members, the Serb Sreten Žujović and the Croat Andrija Hebrang, were tried before a court and thousands of rank-and-file members were expelled. About 5,000 Stalin supporters emigrated for political reasons. Over 55,600 were on record as Cominformists between 1948 and 1955, meaning every tenth party member.<sup>10</sup> Approximately 16,000 sympathizers, agents, and "suspicious" individuals were convicted and interned in the prison on the infamous island of Goli Otok and in the camp Sveti Grgur nearby for the purpose of undergoing "reeducation" through hard labor under a blistering sun. If the Soviet supporters were not isolated, noted Edvard Kardelj rather laconically, Stalin "would transform all of Yugoslavia into a terrible camp."<sup>11</sup> The prisoners, including some of the first partisans to fight with Tito, were severely mistreated. For example, every prisoner to arrive on the island had to undergo the cruel ritual of running the gauntlet. Then they

were subjected to hours of interrogation. It is possible that as many as 3,000 torture victims may have died on Goli Otok.<sup>12</sup> The situation did not improve until the writer Dobrica Ćosić reported on the untenable conditions and the maltreatment in the summer of 1953. At the end of the 1950s, the doors of the camp were closed for good.

### *Self-Management and Socialist Patriotism*

The 1948 break with the Soviet Union deprived the Yugoslav leadership of what had been up to that point its ideological and political basis of legitimacy. The task now was to develop an alternative that radically departed from and rejected Stalin's totalitarianism, without fundamentally questioning the socialist revolution as such in Yugoslavia. Party theoreticians found a handy phrase in the concept of the "withering state," which Friedrich Engels had coined and Lenin had further developed. In order to achieve justice and freedom, the people had to directly control the means of production: "The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. . . . The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away."<sup>13</sup>

In his 1949 article "On People's Democracy," chief ideologue Edvard Kardelj presented a fundamental criticism of Soviet statism, in which he argued that the party and state threatened to melt into one, to take on a life of its own, and to elevate itself over society. Together with Milovan Djilas, Boris Kidrič, Moša Pijade, and Vladimir Bakarić, he drafted in 1950 the "Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises" with the following key elements: debureaucratization through workers' councils; decentralization of management, politics, and culture; and democratization of all aspects of life. The basic idea of the "three D's," as these elements were known, was to involve as large a section of the population as possible in economic and social procedures and thereby anchor the foundation of the system's legitimacy all the more deeply.<sup>14</sup> In more than 6,000 plants the labor force then elected councils to decide all business matters.

In the years that followed, self-management was further expanded. Step by step it was left to be more freely shaped by supply and demand. Even young Karl Marx had once called for the "association of free producers." So why shouldn't certain rules of the market economy not also be valid in socialism? The Yugoslavs thought that the state was only allowed to coordinate the economy but without any universal power of central planning. In 1952, the "new economic system" introduced the principle of business risks and certain rules of competition. The strict target quotas characteristic of the first five-year plan were replaced with a more general framework of orientation, the social development plan for Yugoslavia.

At the high point of its reform activity, the CPY changed its name at the sixth party congress in November 1952, to League of Communists of Yugoslavia so as to communicate outwardly its democratic inclinations and multinational character more clearly. The aim was to initiate, advocate, and win support for reform, not merely impose it from above. It was the role of the party to educate and guide the masses, but as a sort of political and intellectual avant-garde and no longer as a hermetical cadre. "The working masses," said Kidrič in an influential speech, had to "have their say directly and daily and not only by way of the vanguard of their political parties."<sup>15</sup>

However, for all practical purposes, the monopoly of the Communist Party remained unchallenged. Its legitimacy was still derived from the people's liberation struggle. At the same time, it was the strongest guarantor of Tito's personal power. Unlike Stalin, Tito repeatedly reassured himself of its support. He was able to settle factional strife through his personal authority and thereby constantly expand his power base. Throughout his entire lifetime, Tito was convinced of the leading role of the party, "which made me the person I am today." He thought of the party as the avant-garde of the working class, the guarantor of state unity, and a reliable base from which to rule. In his opinion, democratic rights had to take second place behind the axiom of social justice. He emphatically rejected the term "Titoism" that was widely used in the West "because we have not added anything new to the science of Marxism-Leninism. We have just succeeded in applying this science the most correctly. Because there is nothing new, there is also no [separate ideological] direction."<sup>16</sup>

Nevertheless, the reform of the political system was linked to the gradual departure from the monolithic, Bolshevik-type, one-party state. Unlike in the Eastern bloc, a degree of pluralism was tolerated, at first in literature and the fine arts, but then also in political theory. At least different interpretations of Marxism were now permitted.<sup>17</sup>

The constitution enacted in January 1953 institutionalized the reforms and created the Federal Executive Council (Savezno izvršno vijeće, SIV) as the Yugoslav government. Tito was the head of government, the commander in chief of the army, and the head of state. Leadership positions in the ministries were filled by state secretaries, all of whom were longtime communist comrades of Tito, men like Ranković, Kardelj, Djilas, Pijade, and Vukmanović-Tempo.<sup>18</sup> The backbone of Tito's rule was the People's Army, the entity that had made Tito's rise to power possible militarily and that had been the earliest and most typical embodiment of "brotherhood and unity." Members of the army enjoyed numerous privileges, ranging from good wages to educational opportunities and government housing. The party carefully selected and closely controlled those entering the officer corps. For this reason, the military remained especially loyal to the state to the very end.

The Yugoslav system was meant explicitly as the ideological alternative to the Soviet Union, as a real-existing disclaimer of state socialism, so to speak. Its entire legitimacy and internal cohesion was derived from being more democratic than the USSR and from its ability to withstand the superpower's political pressure. In its party program of 1958, the seventh party congress resolutely opposed "bureaucratism and statism" and its personification: Stalin. "The aims of socialism are the same, but they are brought about—for a variety of different objective and subjective reasons—by the peoples in different ways and with different means."<sup>19</sup> As long as the Soviet Union existed, Belgrade feared an invasion, especially in light of the periodic border incidents with Hungary and Romania. This monumental threat acted as a major cohesive factor in Yugoslavia, but one that would become a problem in the long run, specifically at the point when this threatening scenario fell apart.

The idea of a renewed state identity in the form of "Yugoslav socialist patriotism" was also linked to this reformed system. "We are not talking about creating a new 'Yugoslav nation' . . . but . . . affirming common interests on the basis of socialist relations. Such Yugoslavism [*jugoslovenstvo*] does not inhibit the free development of languages and cultures; on the contrary, it requires these."<sup>20</sup> It was argued that the element unifying the peoples was not the state or an integral understanding of nation, but "membership in the Yugoslav self-managing socialist community." However, for many people this was a rather abstract argument. A poll of 3,000 party members taken in 1967 revealed the perseverance of "old thinking." Asked what bound the people of Yugoslavia together, only every other person gave the ideologically correct answer of "self-management." A third named the—tabooed as too bourgeois—criteria of common origin and language; the rest expressed no opinion.<sup>21</sup>

One person to raise doubts about the earnestness of democratic communism was Milovan Djilas, the head of the department for agitation and propaganda and a confidant of Tito.<sup>22</sup> Following Stalin's death in 1953 and the subsequent rapprochement with the Soviet Union, he feared Yugoslavia would relapse into state socialism. He grumbled about the influence of Aleksandar Ranković, his strongest rival as Tito's successor, and accused him of statism. At the end of 1953, he published a series of articles in the party newspaper *Borba* (Struggle) in which he radically took to task "bureaucratism" and the communist monopoly over politics. In the book *Anatomy of a Moral*, a compilation of essays, he attacked the national elite for the privileges they granted themselves and for their unethical behavior. Thousands of functionaries interpreted this as an appalling provocation. At a special plenum in January 1954, the leadership convicted Djilas of "revisionism" and expelled him from the Central Committee. Shortly after that he left the party on his own initiative. An interview in the *New York Times*, in which he demanded multiparty

democracy, landed him in prison for the first time. While serving his sentence, he wrote the bestseller *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, a vigorous reckoning with communism, which he denounced as a form of totalitarianism.<sup>23</sup> The book was translated into more than forty languages and established Djilas's reputation as the most prominent dissident of the communist world. By the time he was finally pardoned in 1966, he had spent about nine years in prison. Curiously, he left few marks on the critical literary field in Yugoslavia, perhaps because of his own Stalinist past. The only person to speak up on his behalf was a young university professor, Mihajlo Mihajlov. He wrote an open letter to Tito in which he condemned the regime and announced the formation of a new party. The president's reaction was harsh. A court subsequently convicted the young critic to four years imprisonment.<sup>24</sup>

Purges within the party did occur during Tito's rule, but never with the same totality and brutality as they did under Stalin. In Moscow during the 1930s, the Croat communist had experienced the Stalinist Great Terror in person, and he was well aware of the high moral and political price that the Soviet system had paid for it.<sup>25</sup> Following the purge of the 1948 crisis, Yugoslavia allowed itself to deal with political critics in a relatively liberal fashion, at least as long as they did not fundamentally question socialism and "brotherhood and unity." The power apparatus preferred to use a combination of repression and cooptation, of carrot and stick. On the one hand, Article 133 of the criminal law code outlawed "enemy propaganda" and "verbal delicts." Other offenses were "counterrevolution," "terrorism," and "conspiracy." This meant that intellectuals were permanently threatened with occupational or publication bans or—in serious cases—prison sentences. On the other hand, the regime permitted contacts and trips abroad, did not operate a state censorship agency, and usually granted its defiers a second chance. The prominent Serb literary critic Borislav Mihajlović-Mihiz had to leave his work brigade in 1946 as an enemy of the state, only later to become the chief critic of the weekly magazine *NIN*. The young Croat poet Goran Babić, who was accused of nationalism on the basis of his poem "Croatia burns," later became the publisher of the magazine *Oko* (Eye). However, three journalists who had published his poem at the time on the front page of *Hrvatski tjednik* (Croatian weekly) were sent to prison.<sup>26</sup>

### *Economic Miracle*

Two years after the end of the war, the economy was back on its feet, by and large. Only now did long-term strategies of development make any sense. The first Five-Year Plan (1947–1952) targeted a fourfold increase in industrial production. Priority was to be given to the investment in machine manufacturing, shipyards, and electrical industries, and to the increased production of energy, iron, steel, and coal. Enormous resources were poured into the armament industry in the country's interior, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina

and Serbia. Yugoslavia strove for autarky in military defense and later even became a significant exporter of military equipment.

The highest objective of long-term economic planning was to level the regional disparities of development, because "the principle of brotherhood and unity . . . categorically demands elimination of this unevenness," stated Boris Kidrič, the architect of the five-year plan.<sup>27</sup> In 1947, the wealthiest region (Slovenia) produced about three times more than the poorest region (Kosovo) per capita. The small southern province barely reached 50 percent of the Yugoslav average, while Macedonia reached 70 percent and Bosnia-Herzegovina 86 percent. Croatia and Serbia represented roughly 100 percent, and only Slovenia lay far ahead of all others with 163 percent.<sup>28</sup>

Like other Europeans, Yugoslavs in the 1950s delighted in the experience of an economic miracle made possible by an enormous increase in productivity, the shift of resources from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and the optimistic and ever-expanding global boom. Between 1947 and 1949, a third of the national income was invested in industry and the number of workers and employees in the secondary sector had increased fourfold to nearly two million.<sup>29</sup> Sarajevo and Belgrade had grown by about 18 percent by 1953, Skopje by more than 36 percent, and the new industrial centers like the Bosnian city of Zenica by 56 percent.<sup>30</sup> Between 1953 and 1960, industrial production increased yearly by an impressive 13.83 percent, which meant Yugoslavia held the world record, ahead of even Japan. During the 1960s, the rate was still high at 8.2 percent.<sup>31</sup> Gradually, all of this also increased personal wealth. Incomes rose by 5.9 percent between 1953 and 1959. After the years of deprivation during the initial phase of reconstruction and development, priority was now given to improving consumption.<sup>32</sup> The multiethnic state was on the threshold of becoming an industrial society, which brought the country great international recognition. Many developing countries and international organizations extended invitations to Yugoslav economic experts in the hope of coaxing out of them the recipe for overcoming backwardness. As early as in the mid-1950s, a new transnational economic discussion was taking place between socialist Yugoslavia, developing countries, and the capitalist West, which resulted in fresh thinking about both competitive markets and central planning.<sup>33</sup>

In the course of this development, it was questioned whether the high rate of economic growth was perhaps being financed only by external loans and reconstruction aid and not at all by self-sustaining economic expansion. Between 1950 and 1953, Yugoslavia did indeed receive \$553.8 million in international financial assistance, of which \$267 million were in loans. However, the bulk of the foreign funds went toward financing the importation of food, which was in short supply due to a disastrous drought and the failure of collectivization. Belgrade only invested \$158 million from these funds into financing industry, mining, and infrastructure, a figure that represented about 3 percent



of all investment. The larger share of Yugoslavia's capital was created by its own economy, namely through indirect transfer payments from the agrarian sector to the industrial sector. Never before had the state invested so much in industry, electrification, and infrastructure.<sup>34</sup>

The Yugoslav project of creating a socialism in which democracy, pluralism, and the market economy were reconciled with the values of an egalitarian, autonomous society fascinated intellectuals and political activists throughout the world. The Yugoslavs wanted to overcome "alienation," to distribute the surplus value among its workers, to introduce the principles of grassroots democracy, and to openly argue and settle conflicts of interest. Social democrats, Eurocommunists, and independent leftists placed great hope in Yugoslavia's unique path to socialism.

Indeed, a degree of leeway in the economic sphere did develop in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the complex system of decentralized institutions, bodies, and assemblies. The regime, for example, even tolerated strikes. Between 1958 and 1969, official statistics reported that nearly 80,000 employees participated in more than 1,900 labor conflicts. Probably in reality this figure was significantly larger. In Pula, Jesenice, and Rijeka, labor conflicts turned into violent clashes with security forces in 1968 and 1969.<sup>35</sup>

Not until the 1960s did it become evident that serious structural inequalities lingered in the shadows, hidden by the brightness of the Yugoslav economic miracle: the constrictions placed on farming by low prices for agricultural products and raw materials fixed by the state, the social decline of the peasantry due to its drop in income, a growing dependence on foreign loans despite all efforts to prevent this, and the structural disadvantages of the poorer, raw-material-producing regions of Yugoslavia, which thus led to growing regional disparities. However, the labor force recognized at first only the numerous material advantages of workers' self-management, not its immanent weaknesses. Among other aspects, many social tasks were assumed by the plants. They provided housing and vacation dwellings, distributed fresh fruit and vegetables, and organized child care. Only the economists slowly began to realize that the system not only advanced prosperity, but also mismanagement, bureaucratization, corruption, and bad investments, which in the end undermined the cohesiveness of Yugoslavia's economic space.

### *The Cazin Peasant Uprising*

Although the partisans had attempted during the war to win the peasants' hearts and minds for communism, it was this rural setting in which socialist modernization ran up against its own limitations. The rural population remained essentially conservative in their values, bound to tradition, and resistant to what they viewed as the impertinencies of the new era. A person who

had grown up in a village loved the farm and fields and worked at his or her own individual pace. As in other communist countries, socialist transformation was meant to change established institutions, socioeconomic relations, and everyday habits. Socialism shook the foundations of the peasant identity and way of life that had evolved over centuries. This unnerved and scared them.

The conflict came to a head when, in reaction to the accusations leveled by the Cominform, the Yugoslav leadership decided to introduce the collectivization of agriculture as modeled on the Soviet Union's policy. The plan, announced in July 1948, depended on the expansion of the collective farms system to bring about the socialist transformation and cultural improvement of village life. In 1947, roughly 200,000 farmers were organized in farming cooperatives (*zadruga*). By 1950, the figure had increased to 2.5 million, which contradicted the claims made during the war that the land should belong to those who worked it.<sup>36</sup>

As the chief ideologist for the regime, Edvard Kardelj understood that one could not force headstrong peasants to accept the socialist means of production from one day to the next. On his recommendation, the CPY pledged to encourage voluntary participation and to offer various transition options. What was to be avoided at all costs was a war against the peasantry similar to the annihilating one Stalin had conducted against the wealthy farmers (*kulaks*) in the 1930s. Instead, the peasants were to be gradually introduced to socialism. Nevertheless, the information campaign for collectivization nearly turned into a disaster in 1949. The rural party cadre had little use for the elaborate line of argumentation offered by their leadership. Instead they behaved with the high-handedness of local royalty, commonly using threats and repression to force peasants into the collectives. Peasants responded in a variety of ways to communist agricultural policies, ranging from support to active resistance. The number of participating farmers multiplied, but so too did peasant discontent. All across the country, peasants were becoming increasingly unruly, and a few did not shy away from publicly threatening local party functionaries or throwing rocks at the police.<sup>37</sup>

The discontent erupted into an uprising in the Croatian-Bosnian border region between the towns of Cazin, Velika Kladuša, and Slunj. On St. George Day, 6 May 1950, more than 700 Muslim and Serb peasants, including former partisans and party members, rebelled in an effort to finally tear away the oppressive "yoke" they felt around their necks. Armed with shotguns, hayforks, and shovels, the rebels intended to take the provincial town of Cazin to assert their withdrawal from the collective and their exemption from the *otkup*, the centralized purchasing system for agricultural products. The impoverished, poorly educated, and naïve rebels barely managed to occupy a police station in the neighboring village before the police and military arrived. The security

forces blocked off the entire region. Hundreds of people were arrested, and later the leaders of the uprising were sentenced to death. The authorities thought they were fighting a reactionary plot to overthrow the government. Instead, it was the oppressive conditions of rural life and the high-handed actions of the apparatchiks that fired up the peasants to resist and transformed their discontent into open hostility against a state that viewed its rural population merely as an anachronistic relict of an era long past. It took a while before the CPY understood that the unrest among the peasantry was not truly caused by the misbehavior of a few individual party functionaries but by the party's own politics.<sup>38</sup> Because the open militancy in the rural areas threatened to seriously damage the credibility of socialist Yugoslavia, the CPY radically changed its agrarian policy in March 1953. Unproductive cooperatives were disbanded, and the land was returned to the peasants to be farmed privately. The *otkup* had already been abolished the year before. In the future, the state invested more in the agrarian sector, so that productivity began to increase once again and the population became more content.

#### *Foreign Policy Balancing Act*

The unusual historical constellation that evolved in the early phase of the Cold War offered Tito new foreign policy options. When the big powers began to divide Europe into their respective spheres of influence in 1943, they defined Yugoslavia as a sphere they shared. Because East and West now wished to gain Yugoslavia's favor for strategic reasons, the regime found itself in a very advantageous position. It could gratefully accept assistance from all sides without having to do something in return. His people would prefer to go naked than make concessions in exchange for aid, Tito retorted angrily to the Americans when they protested in February 1950 against Yugoslavia's recognition of North Vietnam.<sup>39</sup> As part of their "wedge strategy," the Americans were still willing to transfer more than \$1.5 billion into Belgrade's coffers between 1948 and 1960; some estimates put the figure as high as \$2.4 billion.<sup>40</sup> NATO also made blatant advances toward Belgrade within the context of the West's containment policy, in which the aim was to encircle the Soviet bloc politically and militarily with a ring of allied countries.

The death of Stalin in 1953, however, offered a chance to mend Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This was very important to Tito for ideological and political reasons. The only thing that could guarantee Yugoslavia's independence against Western influence was a strategy of equidistance to both blocs. The first Soviet-Yugoslav economic agreement was concluded in 1954, before Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade the following year to establish contact. He was interested first and foremost in preventing Yugoslavia from drifting into the Western camp. A year after his visit, he received Tito with a pompous

ceremony in Moscow. They issued a joint statement stating that each country had the right to travel its own path to socialism without external intervention. In other words, the bottom line of this visit was that the small state of Yugoslavia had been able to assert itself against the giant USSR.

The de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav model encouraged the Eastern European satellites to push for political liberalization. When the uprising broke out in Hungary in the fall of 1956 and Moscow intervened militarily, Tito found himself in an awkward position. To stay the threat of a Soviet invasion into Yugoslavia, Tito called the rebellion's suppression a necessary evil to save socialism, even though he had already publicly denounced the move earlier. However, Moscow did not intend to breach the agreement it had made with the Western powers on the respective European spheres of influence by intervening in Yugoslavia and thus possibly risking a war between the blocs. Therefore, Tito was also able to steer his independent course successfully, not least because he did so in the wake of the American nuclear threat.<sup>41</sup>

At first, Washington also seemed willing to accept the status quo as long as Yugoslavia did not drift into the Eastern bloc. The Americans continued to send money and military aid, until Tito halted this at the beginning of the 1960s. Relations soured because Belgrade supported the Arabs in the Near East conflict, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, to the Soviets' advantage. Although Tito acted arbitrarily and unpredictably, all sides found Yugoslavia's neutrality to be more advantageous than disadvantageous.

The improved relations to Moscow prompted Belgrade to recognize East Germany formally in October 1957. As a consequence, the Federal Republic of Germany broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia as required by the Hallstein Doctrine, established in 1955, which threatened such action against any state that carried out this "hostile act" of recognizing the GDR. Yugoslavia was the first and (except Cuba) the only country against which the sanctions were then applied. Still, Tito succeeded in maintaining economic and cultural contacts to the Federal Republic until Willy Brandt rescinded the isolation in 1968 during the course of his new *Ostpolitik*. Besides, over the years, the doctrine had not been able to stop the flow of either Yugoslav guest workers to West Germany or West German tourists to the Adriatic coast.<sup>42</sup>

Tito's most important and prestigious project was the politics of non-alignment, through which he internationalized the Yugoslav approach and also made other options of development possible.<sup>43</sup> Following a meeting with Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who first launched the basic concept of "active neutrality," Tito became one of the most active advocates of this new policy. In this era of decolonialization, many allies could be found among the Asian and African countries that Tito frequently visited in the mid-1950s. In

1955, the Bandung Conference brought together twenty-nine states from the so-called Third World to speak out in favor of the politics of active peaceful coexistence and the surmounting of political blocs. The following year, Tito invited his Egyptian and Indian counterparts, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Jawaharlal Nehru, to the Brijuni Islands; later, in 1960, a much larger group including these three men would meet in New York. "Egypt is trying to become another Yugoslavia," a high-ranking Egyptian diplomat explained to the Yugoslav foreign minister. "Our situation is somewhat similar. While you are working to preserve your independence, we are trying to win ours." Nasser, like other political leaders from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, viewed Tito as an outstanding role model because the struggle against colonial rule was also part of Yugoslav history, as the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs had freed themselves from imperial rule in an earlier era. Furthermore, Tito showed them "how to get help from both sides without joining."<sup>44</sup> In September 1961, under the shadow of the Berlin Crisis, twenty-five heads of state and government met in Belgrade and decided to formally establish the "Nonaligned Movement." They pledged to maintain strict military neutrality and peaceful coexistence and to support national liberation movements.<sup>45</sup>

Tito traveled indefatigably around the world and often on a cadet boat called *Galeb* (The Seagull). From 1944 until 1980, he made 169 official visits to 92 countries, spending almost 1,000 days abroad. In addition, he hosted 175 heads of the state, 110 prime ministers, as well as hundreds of ministers and heads of political movements.<sup>46</sup> From the 1950s onward, he became an untiring ambassador of "active peaceful coexistence" and a mediator between the blocs.<sup>47</sup> During the darkest moments of the Cold War, namely the Berlin Crisis and the Cuba Crisis, Tito preached tirelessly on behalf of solving conflicts peacefully. He lambasted the division of the world into political blocs as the fundamental evil of the international system. While Cold War tensions repeatedly flared, the nonaligned nations addressed topics pertinent to the future: disarmament, the abolishment of nuclear weapons, decolonialization, and a more just New International Economic Order. This movement was never politically neutral because it took a clear stand against Western imperialism and strongly supported the reform of the global economic system, among other things. A child of the nonaligned movement is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), founded in 1964. In 1970, on the initiative of Yugoslavia, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the principles of international law concerning "peaceful coexistence."<sup>48</sup>

During the 1960s and 1970s, Tito acted as an unflagging ambassador for the movement and as its greatest hope. As such, he gained allies worldwide

for his independent course and internationally enhanced Yugoslavia's image and his own reputation. At the same time, he opened up new markets for his country outside of Europe. Exports in the weapons, shipyard, and construction industries to Third World countries brought \$1.5 billion into the country annually. Thousands of young people from developing countries arrived each year to study in Yugoslavia.<sup>49</sup>

Even though the extremely heterogeneous nonaligned movement remained internally divided and was only able eventually to produce little more than a bare skeleton of a rhetorical program, it created vibrant and strong symbolism. Tito's clever maneuvering between East and West brought great international prestige to his country and a foreign policy identity of its own, one that became an essential pillar supporting the Yugoslav understanding of state. Furthermore, the "third path" contributed to internal peace. The politics of equidistance reconciled conflicting foreign policy orientations within Yugoslavia, since the northern republics tended historically to lean toward the West, while the Orthodox eastern republics tended to look toward Russia. And the friendship with the Islamic world made Muslims inside Yugoslavia feel safer. The politics of nonalignment were extremely popular among Yugoslavs because it enhanced the country's reputation, an aspect that played no small role in compensating for some of the frustration caused by the drawbacks of the socialist system. So, in many respects, nonalignment acted as an important stabilizing factor in this multiethnic state.

#### *Yugoslav Identity, Tito Cult, and the Partisan Myth*

Like every nation, socialist Yugoslavia created its own founding myth and rituals after 1945. An important component in this process was to take recourse to popular culture and literature. Historical figures and folklore evoked emotion and provided meaning in that they reconstructed the present in socialist Yugoslavia from the cultural values of the past.

Traditions were simply adapted to fit ideological specifications, which did indeed help win the sympathy of the masses and better come to terms psychologically with the far-reaching changes brought about by the new order. Among other things, the communists staged a modern propaganda event in 1947 to celebrate the centennial of the publication of the monumental epic *The Mountain Wreath*, written by the Montenegrin national poet Njegoš, which had so greatly moved the South Slavic patriots in the nineteenth century. Throughout the country, new editions were published; the work was translated into Slovenian and, for the first time, into Macedonian. It vividly showcased the virtues of the people's liberation struggle like self-sacrifice, heroism, and patriotism. At the same time, the statue of Ban Josip Jelačić, who fought on

the side of Austria against the 1848 Revolution, was removed from Zagreb's central square in 1947.<sup>50</sup>

The central figure with which socialist Yugoslavia identified was Josip Broz Tito, and the regime used all the tricks of the trade to nurture a personality cult with demonstrations, parades, speeches, and flag-waving, cheering crowds. Enthusiastic supporters yelled "We belong to Tito! Tito belongs to us!" or sang in unison "Comrade Tito, we swear to you that we will not deviate from your path." His image was that of an undefeatable commander with statesmanlike qualities. He appeared courageous, clever, generous, humorous, just, and infallible. Streets, squares, factories, and cities like Titovo Užice and Titograd were named after him. He had been awarded the Order of People's Hero three times since the war, and his portrait hung in public buildings, banks, shops, restaurants, and many private homes.<sup>51</sup>

Tito was the personification of the new Yugoslavia, its father figure, and its god. Many people projected their very personal desires, hopes, and fantasies onto their idol, whom they venerated, honored, and passionately adored. They sent baskets full of greeting cards and presents when Yugoslavia celebrated Tito's official birthday as "Youth Day" with a nationwide relay race. Starting in 1953, young pioneers ran each year on 25 May from north to south in order to present Marshal Tito with a message of good tidings.<sup>52</sup> Besides New Year's, the other holidays celebrated were International Women's Day, May Day, Fighters' Day, and the celebrations for the founding of the republics and the Yugoslav federation.

Much like Stalin, Tito orchestrated contact to the masses in order to feign a sort of inherent legitimacy, but he never did it to mobilize support on the streets against critics in the party. He feared the inherent dynamics that could develop from ecstatic mass demonstrations. Whenever he felt control was slipping from his hands, he conjured the specter of the Soviet threat in order to produce unity. All important decision-making processes were to take place within the protected confines of the party and not in public.<sup>53</sup>

Josip Broz Tito was the main character in the founding myth of Yugoslavia and in its most important community-building narrative, the multinational partisan struggle. This was a story of David against Goliath, of the bloody existential fight between heroes and traitors, between good and evil. The enemy forces were coded politically, not ethnically, so that people from all nationalities could find themselves fighting on the right side. This myth featured all of the crucial elements needed to be successful: the explanation of the national origins (the Second World War), the founding father (Tito), the motif of martyrdom (fight for liberation), and the highly dramatic component of the miraculous rescue from the most dire of straits (e.g., the Battle at Neretva). The messages transported in this myth about national history were key political

ones: the credo of “brotherhood and unity,” the legitimacy of communist one-party rule, and the justification for the distance to the Soviet Union.

A diverse topography of symbolic commemorative locations illustrated and represented this story of national origin: the battlefields on the Sutjeska and Neretva rivers; Jajce, the birthplace of the republic; the hills of Šumarice near Kragujevac, where the Germans carried out a bloodbath during the Second World War; the Croatian camp Jasenovac. Every city commemorated its heroes and victims with memorials and chronicles. One such monument stands in Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, where the Croat Ustasha regime initiated a massacre in 1943 against the civilian Serb population. Streets and squares, factories and department stores, movie theaters and soccer clubs were named *Partizan*. The state celebrated 4 July as “Fighters’ Day” and 22 December as “Army Day,” honored those who were among the very first to fight (*prvoborci*) as folk heroes, and provided veterans with government pensions, housing, and other social privileges.<sup>54</sup>

The partisan plot served extraordinarily well as popular mass culture and inspired innumerable novels, pieces of music, western movies, and comics. The most popular and most widely found genre was the partisan movie. More than 200 films were produced, and some became box office hits, like *Battle on the Neretva* or *Walter Defends Sarajevo*. Several of these were international co-productions, which is how Richard Burton and Curt Jurgens came to appear on the screen in dramatic poses against the backdrop of rustic and romantic landscapes. Besides their value as entertainment, these films also sent subliminal messages: heroic fates, tumultuous battles, and war romances illustrated patriotic virtues in general and transethnic solidarity in particular. They shaped images of history, a feeling of community, shared knowledge and values. Viewed in this context, it is clear that partisan films also served as important instruments in nation building.



## 12.

# The 1960s: Transition to an Industrial Society

At no other time in its history did Yugoslavia change as much as it did in the twenty years following 1945. The socialist transformation completed the far-reaching industrial reshaping of social conditions that had started before the Second World War. It left no area untouched. Everything changed: social and occupational structures, urban environment and architecture, family structures and gender roles, attitudes, norms, and customs. The 1960s marked a phase of transition in which the society could no longer be characterized as a rural-traditional one, but at the same time it had not yet fully become urban-industrial. At this point, tradition and modernity neither ran parallel nor directly conflicted with each other. Instead, they mutually penetrated each other. All aspects of life that were age-old, well established, and customary no longer found socially relevant niches in which to flourish. The economic miracle, greater intellectual liberties, and international exchange sparked an impressive heyday in art, culture, and consumption and opened up unprecedented opportunities in the lives of a large segment of the population, which is why this period was later known as the “golden years.” Critical self-reflection and the desire for change and advancement grew from being an elite phenomenon to a mass one—perhaps the decisive characteristic of this decade.

### *An Industrial Society, Finally!*

The absolute size of the rural population in Yugoslavia did not begin to drop until 1948, decades later than in most European countries. Once it started to decline, it decreased at the annual rate of 1 to 2 percent on average. The former upper-middle classes and the large landowners vanished, while peasants and the landless became industrial workers and service providers. The share of those working in the agrarian sector fell from 75 to 57 percent in the years between 1945 and 1965. Twenty-one percent were employed in the industrial sector, 22 percent in the tertiary sector.<sup>1</sup> Compared with 1947, industrial production in 1965 had risen more than sixfold and now made up over a third of

the country's gross national product.<sup>2</sup> The number of men and women working in industry and mining totaled 1.375 million (rising to 2.625 million by 1986).<sup>3</sup> Still, the socialist modernization of the country had not been able to sweep aside all relics of traditional agrarian society. Every third industrial worker did not work on a conveyor belt or at a machine but produced goods by hand.<sup>4</sup>

The expansion of industry and mining ensured a continued influx into this class of peasant-workers, which had been forming even before the war. In many regions, such as Kranj, Zenica, Leskovac, and Trepča, thousands of peasants never fully abandoned farming. Instead they commuted daily or seasonally between farm and factory for years, often covering great distances on foot. "Throughout the entire country many men and women make their way each workday from the village to the factories and mines. Entire processions of people are underway who arrive by foot, cart, bus or train."<sup>5</sup> Many factories sent buses to pick up the so-called *polutani*—the name given to this "hybrid" type of worker—from collection points. The worker from the village "usually does not pay much heed to his appearance: he is dirty, dusty, and unshaven, and most of his clothing is locally produced and made out of wool, cotton, or hemp." He carried his snack in a wrapped bundle to the factory, just as he had before the war. He owned no workwear.<sup>6</sup>

Even in Slovenia and Croatia, large extended families could still be found who worked together, now under industrial conditions. A peasant-worker from the area around Samobor near Zagreb talked about his nineteen-person *zadruga*, which owned five acres of land: "If we would split up, we would all certainly be worse off. . . . I would only get a couple of patches of land and no more. And how could the house be divided up? This way we manage to live somehow, thanks to the work in the factory. We all pay into the family coffer, according to how much a person earns, and don't worry about each and every penny."<sup>7</sup>

Those who moved close to the factories were quick to adopt the industrial lifestyle. This was particularly true for women, who were usually looked upon disapprovingly in the patriarchal village community if they worked as wage laborers. Once they started working in factories, they switched their peasant *opanci* for sandals, went to the movies, and took liberties previously unheard of. At home they were first viewed unfavorably, but only until their families learned to appreciate the advantages of female wage income.<sup>8</sup>

### *Life in the Village*

The structural change brought about by industrialization eased but did not satisfactorily solve one of the most pressing problems of this society in transition: agrarian underemployment. Because of inefficient methods of production, the Yugoslav peasant in 1960 still only worked 140 days a year on average. The different levels of productivity caused this figure to vary regionally: in

Slovenia it was 160 days, but in Kosovo it was only 108. Every third agrarian laborer was redundant, statistically speaking. For this reason, farmers remained poor. Their income was only about half as much as the average incomes of the wage-earning population as a whole.<sup>9</sup>

Despite and even because of agrarian reform, land ownership remained primarily in the hands of peasants. This had a negative effect on agricultural yields. In 1960, the average farmstead consisted of about ten acres, leaving most peasants dependent on earning extra income outside of farming, just like before the war. As it was, nearly 40 percent of the farmers earned their living entirely or in part outside of their own farms.

In most rural regions, tending the fields was still bone-breaking work. Farm machinery made headway into peasants' lives only at a slow pace. In the 1960s, there were about 3,000 privately owned tractors in all of Yugoslavia. Men and women sowed, plowed, and harvested their crops by hand or tilled the soil with an antiquated span of oxen or horses. It was not until the next decade that a significant boom in mechanization occurred in agriculture. In 1971, statistics reported more than 52,000 tractors in the country, a number that rose to more than 200,000 by 1975. Only then were the majority of Yugoslav farmers using modern technology.<sup>10</sup>

The new era not only accelerated the use of technology and the intensification of agriculture, it also gave the rural population access to education and mass media and increased their physical mobility by way of public transportation. Schools, cooperatives, sports clubs, cultural institutions, administration, and health services arrived in the villages, which caused them to lose their former sociocultural and economic self-sufficiency.

In places where industry provided jobs, people changed the ways in which they built and furnished their dwellings, and lived their daily lives. Ovens, beds, and other types of furniture were purchased, as were bicycles and alarm clocks so as to ensure the timely arrival at work each day. Suddenly, people had to work not only more than before, but on a regular basis and within clear hierarchies. Hygiene and health were more highly valued. New demands for individual qualifications and achievement became the vital categories for functionally defined social relations, but the formerly existential solidarity found in family networks was not eliminated completely. For example, every fifth migrant found his new workplace in the city with the help of a family member, and in the realm of public services nothing ever got done without the magically effective relations on a personal basis known as *veze*.<sup>11</sup>

All of this drew the village, the most robust bastion of traditional ways of life and social interaction, into the vortex of the dynamic processes of transformation. This became glaringly evident in social structure. The massive migration to the cities caused the village to experience feminization and

senilization, meaning that women and the elderly remained in the village, while the youth fled. The previous unification of production, reproduction, and lifeworld embodied by farming families dissipated, as did the traditional division of labor between the sexes.

One of the most far-reaching upheavals during these years of transformation was that even people in the most remote locations began to see their lives in a more critical light. Hard living conditions and backwardness were no longer accepted as fate. People talked at school, in the media, and with acquaintances about having a better future, one that the majority of the population now claimed for themselves as a matter of course. Patriarchal attitudes, values, and social relations eroded, the first of these being the strong emotional tie to one's own land, the socially paramount importance of family relationships, the unwillingness to consider any form of innovation or risk, and the preindustrial attitude toward work with its lack of emphasis on efficiency, discipline, and profit.

In Orašac, a small village in the Serb region of Šumadija, ethnologists were surprised to find the inhabitants suddenly talking so much about education, technological progress, and civilizing developments, as well as their own individual advancement and occupational success.<sup>12</sup> In other places, too, the younger generation expressed no desire to follow in their fathers' footsteps as farmers. Life in the village was thought to be too miserable, backward, boring, and depressing, whereas the city enticed them with its higher standard of life and greater freedoms. With the exception of a few elderly inhabitants, men and women strove to break the chains of tradition. Every second farmer declared that he would very gladly sell his land; most hoped that their daughters and sons would attend middle school and later work in an occupation not related to agriculture—preferably as a medical doctor, business manager, or engineer.<sup>13</sup>

### *Urbanization and Socialist Urban Culture*

In no other European country did the cities grow faster after the Second World War than in Yugoslavia. Between 1945 and 1970, roughly 5.5 million people left the villages, half of them during the 1960s.<sup>14</sup> Underemployment, poverty, the lack of educational and occupational opportunities, and the rigid social corset of rural life drove masses of jobseekers to the urban centers, causing the urban population to double. In Belgrade, whose population size surpassed the one million mark in 1969, two out of three inhabitants had migrated there from the countryside.<sup>15</sup> Yet it should not be forgotten that this process started from a very low level of urbanization. Like Albania, Portugal, and Malta, Yugoslavia was one of the least urbanized countries in Europe. In 1960, less than 20 percent of the population lived in places with more than 20,000 inhabitants.<sup>16</sup>

In the minds of many, not just of communists, industrialization and urbanization were the cornerstones to building a modern society. The socialist city was not only the embodiment of the progressive socialist society, it also served as a showcase for Yugoslavia's modernity. This introduced a new influential field after 1945: socialist city-planning modeled in a style of architectural modernity. One of the first projects was to build large-scale neighborhoods of functionally monotone apartment blocks in spacious environments surrounded with large swaths of green space in order to provide the urban masses with hygienic and affordable dwellings. Monumental Stalinist buildings, long and expansive thoroughfares, and futuristic skyscrapers signaled cosmopolitan attitudes and an urbane lifestyle. This monumentality and generosity in the use of public space was thought to herald a new, progressive order. Architectural symbols of modernity and statehood sprang up in all regional centers: hospitals, universities, libraries, hotels, broadcasting stations, and sports arenas. Socialist urban development created a thoroughly new environment for public life.

The symbol of this new Yugoslavia was its metropolis, Belgrade. Across the Sava River in the former Habsburg town of Zemun, the urbanists planned a model socialist city, a type of Yugoslav Washington, D.C. Artistically designed representational buildings, functionally Le Corbusier-style high-rises, broad boulevards, and open green spaces were to make New Belgrade (Novi Beograd) the political and administrative center and the poster city of a progressive and cosmopolitan Yugoslavia. Prestigious building projects sprang up in the 1960s, including the parliament building, the Ušće Tower as the headquarters of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the Hotel Jugoslavija.<sup>17</sup>

Visitors landing at the capital's newly built airport in the late 1960s were amazed by its modern, even futuristic ambience. "Belgrade is a lively, frivolous, noisy, jam-packed city compared with the one I remember from twenty years ago," noted a correspondent from the *Washington Post*. The larger-than-life images of Marx, Engels, and even Tito had disappeared. In their place, gigantic and colorful billboards lined the city's new thruway with ads for Coca-Cola, Pan Am, Siemens, and Volkswagen. In the city center, the dingy Balkan provinciality of earlier years had given way to a Western European look. Belgraders were fashionably attired; women were seen with bleached blonde hair and a great deal of makeup. A vibrant hustle and bustle prevailed in the streets, squares, and numerous cafés.<sup>18</sup>

To walk down one of the broad boulevards from the center of the city to its outermost neighborhoods was to discover the growth rings marking the historical layers of the city's history. Starting at Marx-Engels Square, designed in 1956, past imposing parliament and university buildings built during the

nineteenth-century *Gründerzeit* era, one would find artifacts of earlier times. Along the mighty boulevards huddled pathetic little stores selling cloth, metal goods, and dishware next to the dingy workshops of shoemakers, silversmiths, and candle makers. At the periphery of the city, the density of buildings diminished, giving it a rural appearance. Cows and chickens wandered along the unpaved streets, occasionally startled by the rattling of wooden horse-drawn carts.<sup>19</sup> Since there was not yet enough work for everyone, people eked out a living by turning to the age-old occupations of traveling panhandler, peddler, wandering musician, scissors grinder, rag picker, shoe shiner, lottery ticket seller, corn cob roaster, and casual laborer for cash-in-hand work.<sup>20</sup>

Despite intensive construction activity, all of Yugoslavia was faced with a deplorable housing shortage well into the 1970s. This explains the major architectural sins of the immediate postwar years: the colorless, thoroughly bare-boned and cheap mass construction that gave so many cities their shabby gray, “real socialist” appearance. As early as 1950, Yugoslav architects were officially abandoning the “socialist realism” style and striving, especially in the 1960s, to create more individual and aesthetically ambitious buildings—with mixed results. At the same time, the historic neighborhoods of the city centers, such as the Ottoman *baščaršija*, the bazaar in Sarajevo, were reconstructed true to the originals.

Nevertheless, in 1961, the average number of people sharing a room was 1.6; in Belgrade there were 2.5 people to a room. In addition, there were innumerable and statistically unrecorded subtenants. In 1965, there was a shortage of at least 50,000 housing units in the capital alone. Many dwellings were occupied by several families, which is why many people made makeshift homes for themselves in shops, basements, laundry rooms, and even elevator shafts. In the outer districts, the migrants began to construct huts, barracks, and cottages. Sooner or later, communities were forced to give in to the rank architectural growth because they could no longer tear it down fast enough. “In the last seven or eight years, 20,000 to 30,000 people have come to Belgrade each year,” explained Mayor Branko Pešić in 1965. “That equals an entire small town. . . . And all of these people find shelter somewhere, hole up someplace. Some get an apartment, but that is the smallest percentage of them. A great number however are forced . . . to house in basements, in unhygienic apartments and barracks. And whoever has not yet seen this should definitely once examine what this looks like. . . . Something like this doesn’t even exist in Africa.”<sup>21</sup>

Long-time city residents viewed the onslaught of so many rural people with skepticism. They found it almost embarrassing when the newcomers celebrated their village festivals in the middle of the city and clasped hands for a round dance (*kolo*) to the music of accordions, basses, fiddles, clarinets, and

trumpets.<sup>22</sup> There was endless joking about the problems of the backwoods villagers in adapting to contemporary city life. Generations of Yugoslavs laughed over the bumbling of “Haso and Mujo,” distant Yugoslav relatives of Laurel and Hardy, whose simplicity left them all too often defeated by the modern world. “‘Hey, Haso, what date do we have today’—‘No idea, Mujo!’—‘But you have a newspaper tucked under your arm!’—Haso: ‘That’s no help, it’s from yesterday!’”

### *Media, Mobilization, Migration*

By this time, Yugoslavs had become well interconnected through means of mass communication, even though the reach of print and electronic media differed greatly from region to region. In the early 1960s, only about three million inhabitants living in remote locations still had no access to printed press.

Radio had been spreading rapidly throughout the country since the late 1950s. While an average of 70 inhabitants shared a radio in 1947, this number had dropped to only seven by 1965. Likewise, circulation of print media grew exponentially.<sup>23</sup> Domestic publishing houses introduced over 13,000 new book titles to the market each year, just under 2,000 different newspapers and magazines, and 1,150 periodicals. In the early 1970s, there were nine television stations and 190 radio stations.<sup>24</sup>

Deficits in the technological infrastructure meant that television was still not widely available. Only every other person lived within the transmission reach of a television station in the early 1960s. Once again, the decade would witness a breakthrough in this respect: whereas about 30,000 television sets existed in all of Yugoslavia in 1960, that number had grown to over 440,000 by 1964.<sup>25</sup> On average there had been one television for every 618 people in 1960, yet this ratio had dropped to one for every 6.2 Yugoslavs by 1976.<sup>26</sup> In addition to broadcasting news, information, and cultural events, television programs also featured quiz shows, satire, and entertainment series.

Since the mid-1960s, Yugoslavs were allowed to watch foreign television broadcasts unimpeded, preferably programs from Italy and Austria. The new media habits also changed leisure time activities in the villages. People were now gathering at their neighbors’ homes in the evenings to watch television, while traditional social activities, such as the evening get-together of *sijelo*, faded out of existence.

Yugoslavia was the only socialist country to expressly forbid any advance censorship in 1960. Violations of the press laws could only be prosecuted following the appearance of a publication, and even this occurred fairly seldom, whether out of tolerance or overwork on the part of the public prosecutors. Far more widespread was preemptive self-censorship. In principle, the respective republic could confiscate a publication thought to be subversive, meaning

antisocialist or nationalistic. However, the publication could continue to be sold in all other parts of the country until it was also forbidden there. This protracted and bureaucratic process created some leeway in the media landscape that enabled the Yugoslav press to become colorful, multifaceted, and relatively outspoken.<sup>27</sup> It was also possible to buy foreign press publications like the *New York Times* or the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* at the newspaper stands.

Besides this more extensive access to information, the outstanding privilege that Yugoslavs had over other East Europeans was the unimpeded communication with the West and the East made possible by the freedom to travel. Starting in the early 1960s, nearly everyone was allowed to travel to the West without a visa. Each year, over 300,000 Yugoslavs took advantage of this opportunity, many as vacationers.<sup>28</sup>

Close ties to the West were created by way of the hundreds of thousands of guest workers who left the country starting in the 1960s during the phase of market-economy reform. Since the right to work was part of the canon of basic rights in socialism, the official language regime described migrants as “workers temporarily employed abroad.”<sup>29</sup> However, many of them settled abroad permanently, and their children grew up identifying with their new homeland. In 1971, nearly 775,000 migrants (3.8 percent of the total population) lived outside Yugoslavia, a large share of them in West Germany. Every third Yugoslav came from Croatia, every fifth from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later the Yugoslav government realized what a loss of human capital this migration represented and tried to entice people to return. In fact, several hundred thousand Yugoslavs did answer the government’s call in the 1970s when jobs in their host countries again became scarce due to the global recession.<sup>30</sup>

Guest workers were lured by higher wages to the host countries, which enabled them to enjoy a higher standard of living and send part of what they earned back home. The industrious and frugal Yugoslavs dreamed of expensive status symbols like cars, electrical appliances, and agricultural machinery. In places where neighbors were working abroad, one could often observe a domino effect. In the race for higher social prestige, no one wanted to be left behind, and so more and more people emigrated. The transfer of guest worker incomes back home changed hierarchies of respect in the village. It was no longer the wealthy peasant or the village schoolteacher who stood on the top rungs of the social ladder, but families with members working abroad. Many of them donated to the community and financed public buildings, fountains, and streets.<sup>31</sup> However, in general, relatively little money flowed into areas of production; instead it was spent, quite obviously, on housing and private consumption. The appearance of once destitute rural areas completely changed



as massive, flamboyantly decorated, and often thoroughly tasteless houses sprung up, with German cars parked in the garages.<sup>32</sup>

Far from their home, Yugoslavs abroad experienced the growing need to cultivate community among themselves, a need best met at the workplace, in clubs, and in pubs.<sup>33</sup> The Yugoslavs in the “diaspora” thus developed their own culture, tastes, and political orientations. The Yugoslav state tried to maintain contact with its citizens abroad by way of a complicated bureaucratic structure. It brokered jobs, supported guest worker clubs and organizations, and financed language instruction in the schools. Because the connections of guest workers to their homeland remained strong, a dense network of interrelations and transfers developed, and the overwhelming majority of workers actually did intend to return some day. As a rule, the emigrants also maintained close personal ties and family contacts in their homeland. They transferred money, visited regularly, and at some point fulfilled a life dream by building their own home.<sup>34</sup>

### *Tourism and Transformation*

Yugoslavs and other Europeans became acquainted with one another not only at the workplace but more and more often during vacations. Each year, the new, highly subsidized tourist trade attracted millions of foreign vacationers to Yugoslav beaches. The tourist resort business did not start in Yugoslavia until the 1950s, which is much later than in Spain and Italy. In 1966, the government recognized tourism to be a motor for development and social change and therefore designated it as a priority for investment. Tourism became a recognized discipline for research and study within economics. In 1967, the year declared by the United Nations as International Tourist Year, Belgrade unilaterally abolished visa requirements for all states worldwide.<sup>35</sup>

Yugoslavia’s attractions were its 745 miles of beautiful coastline, more than 1,000 islands, its Venetian heritage and Italian flair. It was not hard to reach the country, the people were friendly, and the campgrounds, accommodations, and boarding were inexpensive. For Germans, the added attraction was that German was spoken nearly everywhere. In 1965, over three million foreign guests vacationed on the Adriatic; by 1970, the figure had risen to 4.75 million and by the end of the 1980s to about ten million. Nearly every third tourist came from West Germany, many by car.<sup>36</sup> Initial ideological reservations soon gave way to pure pragmatism: “The sea doesn’t care what political system rules on its coast,” said one of the first tourists from Austria. “We go to be at the sea and not to communism.”<sup>37</sup>

Huge hotel resorts and private bed and breakfasts also hosted tourists from the Eastern bloc countries, particularly from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These tourists came not only to enjoy the scenery but also to take advantage

of the better shopping opportunities and sources of information. Although the quality standard was often low and the service somehow typically socialist, the Yugoslav tourist industry generally tried to serve foreigners well, an effort that was rewarded with return visits by their guests. In this way, Yugoslavia gained the reputation during this decade of being a friendly, inexpensive, and cosmopolitan tourist country.

Above all, the Yugoslav system sought to ensure that its people profited from the leisure and vacation opportunities of their own country.<sup>38</sup> On the coastline and in the mountains, publicly financed lodges and guesthouses for workers and schoolchildren popped up everywhere. Thanks to subsidies, vacation spots received annually more than 6.6 million domestic guests for their annual vacation (*godišnji odmor*), one of the most important social achievements of workers' self-management. The hiking, swimming, and grilling peasants and workers were considered pioneers of the leisure industry and the most exalted representatives of the new era.

At the end of the 1960s, the government was earning about \$275 million—10 percent of all foreign currency—through tourism. The industry developed into the strongest branch in foreign trade and simultaneously benefited numerous other economic sectors. The construction, hotel, and souvenir businesses and every possible service industry profited, and other sectors such as the food industry also geared their business toward providing for foreign guests vacationing on the Adriatic, where the climate made agriculture difficult anyway. Tourism had an especially welcoming effect on education and employment, which in turn enhanced greater domestic demand.<sup>39</sup>

Consequently, tourism acted as a catalyst for immense social change. Hotel building and management, road construction, private bed and breakfasts, shops, restaurants, and cafés generated above-average increases in income, especially in what had previously been the poorest regions of Yugoslavia: Istria, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic islands. Whereas these areas had experienced waves of migration abroad caused by a lack of jobs before 1960, the trend suddenly reversed itself. Cities like Split began to grow significantly, more people were finding employment, the job structure changed, and the entrepreneurial middle class became larger. In the main centers of tourism, 10 percent—in some places 30 percent—of the total labor force worked in the tourism industry, while at the same time, agriculture and fishing died out.<sup>40</sup> So “we saw the houses get bigger, the trees grow, and the dusty country road become asphalted over the course of a summer. Now even my small village Svib wanted to belong ‘to the world.’ . . . The road was to connect us again, the first travelers with foreign license plates arrived. . . . The church and the chapel of Saint Anthony were the places that were asked about most often in connection with Makarska Rivijera. ‘Yes, yes, straight ahead,’ the locals

would say, and it always sounded as if they were delighted anew, as if experiencing a type of awakening by the description itself.”<sup>41</sup>

### *Yugoslav Double Identity*

In the 1960s, socialist modernization, work and education, the freedom to travel and access to information, consumption and culture were the pillars supporting a sense of community and self-confidence pertaining to Yugoslavia as a whole, through which the social barriers between the nations and nationalities melted away. This is not to say that ethnic identities and otherness were no longer present in everyday life. They certainly were, such as in the preference of a partner or in dealings with a neighbor. Especially in rural communities, less often in the city, ethnic-religious identities continued to affect social relations, thus perpetuating social distance between different groups. Yet at the same time, the relations between the peoples had never been as amicable as they were then. In 1964, one poll reported that 73 percent of those questioned found relations to others as good, another 8 percent found them satisfactory. Only 5.3 percent expressed a negative opinion, and the rest were undecided.<sup>42</sup> In 1969, an empirical study showed that most people actually perceived themselves as having two identities and two loyalties: as citizens of the Yugoslav state and as members of their respective nation or nationality.<sup>43</sup> As a rule, such dualism appeared thoroughly unproblematic.

In addition to this, some men and women were beginning to identify themselves only by their Yugoslav citizenship and no longer by their ethnic origin. These “Yugoslavs” represented 1.7 percent of the population in 1961, whereby the question arose whether these people actually represented a new nation in the ethnic sense, something the communists denied vehemently. They did not want to expose themselves to the politically sensitive accusation of creating an artificial nation, similar to the one of the interwar period. A poll taken among the readers of a weekly magazine in 1969 revealed who “Yugoslavs” were. They came from mixed marriages and listed their upbringing, their political convictions, or even both as the motive for their perception of themselves. The question of whether a person could only be a citizen of the state of Yugoslavia or also a member of a newly created community of “Yugoslavs” was one that very few of them had ever considered. Their share of the population would continue to grow, up to 5.4 percent in the 1980s.<sup>44</sup>

As was the case all over Europe, the trend toward secularization accelerated after 1945. Religious outlooks and practices receded into the background. While 12.6 percent claimed not to be religious in 1953, the figure had already risen to 51 percent by 1968.<sup>45</sup> The youth in particular distanced themselves from the belief in God and had little use for church institutions and rituals. Yet all were free to worship as they wanted. Throughout Yugoslavia there

were over 14,000 active churches, monasteries, mosques, and synagogues in the 1960s.<sup>46</sup>

The regime had become so stable by the beginning of the 1960s that it no longer considered the churches a priori as enemies of the state. The state placed a great deal of emphasis on treating religious communities relatively liberally, because it was thought that repression would only evoke fundamental counterreactions. However, nationalism and any political ambition harbored by religious communities were not to be tolerated.<sup>47</sup> In this new atmosphere of liberality, Cardinal Stepinac was allowed to be buried in the Zagreb cathedral in 1960 with full honors. In 1966, Yugoslav diplomats and representatives from the Holy See signed a protocol granting the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia the right to operate freely and placed its churches under the supervision of the Vatican. Full diplomatic relations were then established between Belgrade and the Vatican in 1970.<sup>48</sup>

Despite growing social mobilization and modernization and contrary to all socialist attempts at socialization, rural society maintained its ethno-cultural stratifications and communal relations, as expressed in customs, clothing, language, house construction, eating habits, folk songs, and folk dances. While 60 percent accepted members of other ethnic groups without reservation as neighbors, colleagues, and friends, only 20 percent expressed strong alienation. At the same time, 88.5 percent of marriages were between members of the same people, while ethnically heterogeneous marriages remained the exception, particularly in villages. In addition to class and level of education, the factors of language, religion, cultural tradition, and family structures were those affecting people's willingness to accept a multicultural living community, and this acceptance was more prevalent the greater the similarity was among people. Those who intermingled the most were Croats and Serbs living in Slavonia; those who intermingled the least were Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Religious affiliation created high barriers: marriages between Christians and Muslims rarely occurred, even within the same ethnic community. It would have been more likely for a Muslim Albanian to have married a Bosnian Muslim than an Albanian of Orthodox faith.<sup>49</sup>

Outside of the cities, it was still quite easy to identify people's ethnicity from their appearance. Men in the western Bosnian villages all dressed similarly but wore characteristic hats: the Muslims wore the red-brown fez or beret, the Croats a black visored cap, and the Serbs the typical partisan side cap. Dialect also demarcated people. For example, the Christians did not pronounce the letter "h" and said only "odža," instead of "hodža." Each people had its own greeting. Serbs and Croats wished each other a good day with the Slavic "dobar dan" (good day), while the Muslims greeted each other in Turkish with "merhaba" (hello), They would say "inshallah" and the Christians "ako

*bog da*” for “God willing.”<sup>50</sup> Each person understood and respected the established cultural distinctions. Certainly a Croat could have donned a beret or a Muslim could have tied a red sash around his waist instead of a green one. But they didn’t.

### *Population, Family, and Gender Relations*

No other identifiable group profited from so many changes brought about by socialist Yugoslavia than did women. The 1946 constitution guaranteed for the first time the full legal, economic, and societal equality of the sexes. Girls had to attend eight years of school, as did boys. Women could finally inherit and own private property, vote, and hold political office. Marriage and the family were placed under state protection, and the regime initiated a campaign to popularize female employment and fight against sex discrimination.<sup>51</sup>

Great progress was made in education. Whereas two-thirds of all women could neither read nor write on the eve of the Second World War, that figure was now only 25 percent.<sup>52</sup> Women also began to catch up in higher education and employment statistics: a third of the student body and the labor force were now female.<sup>53</sup>

Compared to standards at the time in many countries, the Yugoslavs maintained a very liberal family policy. Already in the 1950s, the regime granted equal legal rights to legitimate and illegitimate children. Furthermore, it allowed people to keep their original family names after they married and introduced a liberal divorce law. Abortions on demand were permitted (in clinics) for a limited period at the start of a pregnancy. The Institute for Family Planning, established in 1961 in Ljubljana, started an information campaign and took the government at its word concerning birth control. In 1969, parliament passed a resolution on birth control and liberalized abortion law. Men and women were free to choose either for or against having a child without any governmental interference. In other words, every newborn was to be a desired child. In 1974, planned parenthood became a constitutionally guaranteed human right.<sup>54</sup>

At the start of the 1960s, 18.5 million people lived in Yugoslavia. Birth control led to a dramatic decline in natality, as it did throughout Europe. Life expectancy and the average marriage age increased, families became smaller, and there were more divorced couples and single parents. Between 1948 and 1981, the rate of population growth was cut by half from 14.7 to 7.4 percent, whereby the rate only began to drop steeply in the 1960s. At the same time, life expectancy rose from 51 years (1948) to 70 years (1981).<sup>55</sup>

Sociocultural and economic factors continued to influence the different demographic patterns. Slovenia roughly resembled Western Europe with a low birthrate, higher life expectancy, and a strong involvement of the middle-aged

and older generations in the social pyramid. The opposite example was Kosovo, which had a record population growth and a very young age structure.<sup>56</sup>

With great verve, the state combated what it considered to be archaic relics in the Muslim culture: veiled women, polygamy, and the “sale” of girls and women, for whom a bride-price was paid. Women activists canvassed the countryside, attempting to convince other women of the advantages of gender equality and to educate the broader public. At village assemblies and in factories, many women became caught up in the revolutionary élan of the postwar years and tore away their veils in a show of defiance. In 1950, veiling was legally forbidden, and by the 1960s it was finally very normal for a woman to show her face openly in public. A young Muslim woman recollected: “Things used to be very different. Girls were not free. . . . Today a girl . . . can choose whom she wants to be with and where she wants to go. She can go to *sijelo* [evening gatherings] or *teferica* [picnic] with her friends. . . . When I cut off my braids and got a permanent wave there was a lot of disapproval and gossip. I was one of the first girls in the village to stop wearing *dimija* [harem pants] and put on a dress. . . . And today almost every girl . . . has modern clothes in addition to her *dimija*.”<sup>57</sup> Antidiscrimination measures and the expansion of training and employment opportunities for women created the necessary framework for more self-determination and caused a slow but profound change of attitude regarding gender relations—among both women and men.

The socialist transformation of village life also brought about decisive changes that greatly diminished the importance of a major aspect: the prevailing, male-dominated connotation of land ownership. The agricultural cooperatives calculated work in daily wages, making individual female contributions both evident and measurable for the first time. Because more and more men were landing jobs in factories, women took over the full responsibility for the farm. More than two-thirds of the entire rural labor force were female in the 1960s.

Female employment had been continually increasing since 1945 in other sectors as well at a rate of 7.3 percent and thus faster than in any other European country. In 1964, about 29 percent of all those employed were women. In Slovenia, 42 percent of the women were employed; in Kosovo, 18 percent. For the first time, they could land positions that had been seen typically as men’s work, be it as ambassador, pilot, university dean, engineer, or bus driver. However, as was happening all over Europe, women still ran up against the glass ceilings of a still quite male-dominated society. Working women continued to be eyed disapprovingly by many. The higher one climbed up the social ladder, the lower the percentage of women became. Although the productivity of women was notably higher than that of men, they earned 10 to 40 percent less. In 1968, sociologists ascertained that a clear majority still

preferred to have a son rather than a daughter, because males were thought to have greater social recognition and better chances in life. Men also dominated the Communist Party, where only 5 percent of the seats on the Central Committee were occupied by women.<sup>58</sup>

Men were not the only ones who had difficulties accepting their female colleagues as equals. Women also hesitated because it was hard for them to abandon what had been for centuries their chief responsibility: the family. Working mothers paid for their double burden with extra-long workdays, lack of sleep, chronic fatigue, and nonexistent leisure time. Women read newspapers less often, remained less well informed, and did not serve as often on political committees and self-management bodies,<sup>59</sup> because they still had to do nearly all family and household chores. Only every seventh man helped clean house or cook.<sup>60</sup> At the same time, change was within reach in private life, even in the villages. Gender roles were no longer chiseled in stone. Absolute male authority in marital life ceased to exist as it had before the war, and marriage began to become more and more of a partnership.<sup>61</sup>

Westernization and commercialization contributed to the 1950s' socialist ideal of femininity with new postulates of attractiveness. Women were no longer just workers, peasants, partisans, and mothers, but sexual beings meant to please men. The rigid puritanism of the immediate postwar period was followed by more permissive and open attitudes toward the body and nakedness and the commercialization of these in erotic magazines, pinup titles, and juicy gossip in the yellow press. Yugoslavia also experienced a sexual revolution of its own in the 1960s. Whereas at the end of the 1950s the police had still cracked down on immoral behavior in public, now this seemed ridiculous. The Yugoslav sexologist Aleksandar Kostić gave curious teenagers scientifically coated advice. In 1965, on Student Day in Belgrad, there was even a public striptease.<sup>62</sup>

*Educational Revolution, New Elites,  
and the "Socialist Bourgeoisie"*

Socialist modernization caused a gradual replacement and transformation of elites, whose younger generation had little or no biographical connections to the partisan era. Another factor changing the social structure was the educational revolution. Whereas only every second person could read and write at war's end, by 1961 the illiteracy rate had fallen below 20 percent.<sup>63</sup> An ever-increasing percentage of children aged 7 to 14 completed the compulsory eight years of schooling: in 1953, 71 percent; by 1981, 97 percent. In the same time span, the number of pupils doubled, which meant immense costs for the state. Still, it successfully invested in teacher training, a fact that substantially improved the teacher–pupil ratio. In 1945, there was one teacher

for every fifty-nine pupils; in 1975, the ratio had improved to one for every twenty-two pupils.<sup>64</sup>

Although there were only three universities and two institutions of higher learning in all of Yugoslavia in 1945, three decades later there were 158. The new state had more students per capita than any other European country, with the exception of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1945, it increased its university-trained population tenfold to about 500,000 people by 1960 and to 650,000 people by 1970. At the same time, social mobility increased. Many of those in the new technological class originated from peasant, worker, or craftsman families.<sup>65</sup>

Industrialization and modernization also increased the specialization and professionalization of occupations and thus produced a new and influential class: managers and experts. Because growing complexity needed special expertise, key positions could no longer be filled solely based on ideological aptitude. The influence of the party in recruiting elites declined, which particularly affected the middle and lower levels of administration and management.<sup>66</sup>

Since the Yugoslav system produced a proliferation of bureaucracy that was hard to control, administrative personnel grew. In 1960, more than 410,000 positions existed for office employees, finance authorities, managers, and other civil servants. Decentralization strengthened the administration of the republics and communities and bloated this class even further. In 1970, a total of 530,000 civil servants worked at the lower and middle levels of public service.<sup>67</sup>

Just how greatly the elite changed in the first two decades after the war is illustrated by the social composition of the Communist Party. Of the original 12,000 party members, only 3,000 survived the war, which meant that most of the 140,000 communists joined only at the end of the war or thereafter. Every second member after the war had a peasant background, every third belonged to the working class, and every tenth was a white-collar worker. Twenty years later, in 1966, the composition looked completely different. White-collar workers were the largest contingent, representing 39 percent of the party membership, while the number of peasants had shrunk to 7 percent.<sup>68</sup> It was in this decade that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia mutated into a middle-class party.<sup>69</sup>

During the economic miracle years, a new societal class evolved: the socialist bourgeoisie. In addition to educated elites, technological elites, and party functionaries, this new class included self-employed individuals, such as craftsmen, restaurant owners, construction and transportation entrepreneurs, and small retailers. Those who were not included in the statistics were people who lined their own pockets with profits earned in the "gray economy."<sup>70</sup>



This socialist bourgeoisie deliberately disassociated itself from the masses by way of occupational position, income, attitudes, and lifestyles.<sup>71</sup> It associated progress more with the Western-bourgeois ideal of prosperity and wealth than with socialist virtues. Status symbols like expensive brand-name products, car ownership, and the inevitable weekend cottage—the *vikendica*—were the trappings of membership in a privileged class, one that became the subject of sociological research.<sup>72</sup> “We go to Trieste about twice a year to buy clothes and cosmetics,” explained a contemporary. “Italian clothing is really not of a better quality than ours, but we want something others don’t have, even if it costs us a lot of money.”<sup>73</sup>

### *Economic Miracle, Leisure, and Consumption*

Yugoslavs definitely had more money in their pockets in the 1960s than ever before. Between 1950 and 1965, real income grew by about 80 percent, and the wealth gap to the Western industrial nations narrowed. Whereas the national income per capita in West Germany, Great Britain, and France in 1955 was still four to five times greater than in Yugoslavia, ten years later the gap had shrunk to being only three times greater. By the end of the 1970s, it had closed even further.<sup>74</sup> This was incredibly significant both practically and psychologically, for it meant that Yugoslavs no long lived in Europe’s poorhouse.

As early as the mid-1950s, the communists shifted the priorities of their economic planning. The highest priority was no longer given to investing in production goods, but to wealth and consumption, which were considered indicators of social progress.<sup>75</sup> Contrary to the competition-driven greed of capitalism, they wanted to develop a democratic culture of consumption that would provide the population with modest, useful, and beautiful things. In the following decade a hybrid form of consumer society developed that embraced elements of both socialist and capitalist systems. Numerous foreign products were imported or produced under license, including Pepsi Cola and the sweet Italian chocolate-and-hazelnut spread Eurokrem. In the canon of typical Yugoslav products that became export hits were washing machines from Gorenje and especially the fabulous condiment Vegeta, popular throughout the entire realm of real-existing socialism.<sup>76</sup>

The history of consumption in the 1960s reveals a lot about the needs, desires, preferences, and prestige in Yugoslav society. Growing wealth, more leisure time, and closer international ties created needs and influenced attitudes in favor of a higher quality of life. Industrialization, urbanization, and the educational revolution also helped differentiate ways of life, manners, styles, and desirable objects of consumption. For example, the introduction of the forty-two-hour workweek in 1965 encouraged the development of a leisure industry, about which a person could learn in the magazine *Vikend*

(Weekend), among others.<sup>77</sup> Consumerism created new identities that were predominantly defined by lifestyle, attitudes, values, feelings, and behavior linking it symbolically to the more advanced capitalist societies.

Fashion was the first area in which the economic miracle became evident. Yugoslavia's opening up to the West pushed out the prudish and dully uniform socialist dress code that had dominated since 1945, when years of shortage encouraged clothing to be "uniform, practical, and modest." Companies such as Kluz and Beko now produced affordable clothing that could be purchased in large department stores, and everyone could afford factory-made wear. Whereas the number of traditional leather sandals sold in 1958 (six million) was almost as high as the number of industrially produced shoes sold (seven million), ten years later only a small minority still wore the typical *opanci*. Urban wardrobes also began to be popular in rural areas, and if a woman did wear traditional dress, then she was most likely doing so as a concession to convenience rather than to tradition.<sup>78</sup>

Urban women kept themselves up-to-date on the latest fashions by reading magazines like *Praktična žena* (Practical woman) or *Bazar*.<sup>79</sup> The "New Look" by Dior even made it onto one of the covers in 1950. The student movement fought against the last taboos while sporting Beatle haircuts, miniskirts, and blue jeans.<sup>80</sup> Pero Jurić, a delegate from Bijelovar, once sought to mollify his comrades who were concerned about the decline of socialist etiquette. He bellowed out a reminder to his dumbfounded fellow delegates that Karl Marx's rallying cry was "Workers of the world, unite!" not "Workers of the world, shave!"<sup>81</sup>

Like everywhere else in Europe, the automobile became the most prominent symbol of the economic miracle. In the late 1950s, the manufacturer *Zastava* in Kragujevac began producing a small car, the Fiat 600, which the Yugoslavs affectionately called *fičo*. Entire families with bags and baggage crammed into this indestructible vehicle with 29 horsepower. After celebrating its acquisition, the car owner would proudly present it to the neighborhood and lovingly care for it for many years. The *fičo*, wrote the publicist Igor Mandić in his book *Mitologija svakidašnjeg života* (Mythology of daily life), was the mirror reflecting Yugoslav society, "the manifestation of the dreams of an entire nation," a "worldview," and "a psychological state."<sup>82</sup> Indeed, by holding the steering wheel of a *fičo* in one's hands, a person could literally feel progress. In 1968, about 8 percent of all households owned a car.<sup>83</sup>

As in the West, advertisement and marketing agencies awakened unimagined desires for consumption. The magazine *Savremena tehnologija* (Contemporary technology) informed its readers about the latest electric stoves, mixers, sewing machines, telephones, electric toothbrushes, shavers, televisions, and hi-fi equipment. Between 1962 and 1973, the number of

households equipped with an electric stove in Croatia increased from 19.1 percent to 62.7 percent and those with a refrigerator from 13.4 percent to 58.6 percent. In 1962, only 7.2 percent owned a television, but only eleven years later, in 1973, this figure was up to 55.8 percent. By the end of the 1980s, these useful appliances could be found in nearly every household.<sup>84</sup>

The freedom to travel and the availability of foreign currency tempted Yugoslavs with a new and nearly ritualistic cultural phenomenon: the shopping tour. Year after year, more and more shoppers set out in their search for fashionable shoes, sweaters, suits, home textiles, and Vespa scooters. As a result, the number of Yugoslavs just crossing the border into Trieste increased tenfold between 1960 and 1969.<sup>85</sup> The new consumer culture meant more pleasure and prestige and a measurable increase in the level of contentment. Since (nearly) all Yugoslavs participated in the economic miracle, the new mass consumption had a politically pacifying and socially integrating effect. It was possible to be a part of the modern European lifestyle and to disassociate oneself from the poorer Eastern bloc countries. At the time, everyone still believed that life could only keep getting better.

### *Cultural Openness*

In the 1960s, Yugoslavia was a culturally open and friendly country. Artists, writers, and philosophers had been enjoying considerable artistic freedom ever since Miroslav Krleža had given a sensational speech, "On Cultural Freedom," at the third congress of the Yugoslav Writers' Union in 1952, in which he criticized Stalin's negation of artistic freedom. In addition, the state invested heavily in the cultural sector. Roughly eight million people visited the 371 state museums annually, and about 4.3 million attended the theater.<sup>86</sup>

Just as Stalinism was being questioned and criticized, so too was socialist realism in the arts, with its monumental, sometimes monstrous allegories of work, socialism, and progress. In 1950, the National Museum in Belgrade put on an exhibition featuring work by Van Gogh, Picasso, and other abstract artists who had been decried as decadent until then. Western influences could be found in film, theater, painting, and sculpture. Local and international aesthetic traditions mingled. In contemporary Yugoslav art, socialist realism and Western modernity existed side by side or intermingled, as the abstract sculptures of a Dušan Džamonija or the strikingly expressionistic large-scale work of Edo Murtić showed.<sup>87</sup> In 1965, the Museum of Contemporary Art (Muzej savremene umetnosti) opened in Belgrade, modeled after the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The Belgrade International Theater Festival (BITEF) brought the most innovative international performances to the capital city every year. Since the regime was open to various avant-garde trends, lively art scenes developed in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Artists worked

on experimental, shocking, even destructive multimedia representations of modernity. Outside the country, they were called Neo-Dada, Fluxus, Junk Art, Arte Povera, and conceptual art.

Influences from the West also shaped popular music. One of the most popular Yugoslav singers at the time was Ivo Robić, whose hit “*Morgen*” (Tomorrow), written by the German songwriter Peter Moesser, sold millions in 1959. As “Mister Morgen,” Robić also pursued a successful international career as a recording artist. Pop icons like Djordje Marjanović attracted large audiences because they sang translations of catchy tunes by people like Gilbert Bécaud (“Nathalie”) or Chubby Checker (“Let’s Twist Again”). Others, like Karlo Metikoš, made rock ‘n’ roll socially acceptable in concert halls across the country.

Yugoslav youth were enthusiastic about the music of the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, the Beach Boys, and Jimi Hendrix. Despite the potentially subversive quality of rock music with its critical texts and provocative poses, the state decided against repression. Soon an independent Yugoslav scene emerged, one that imitated Western models somewhat but increasingly developed its own style: YU rock.<sup>88</sup>

During the 1960s, the most popular form of entertainment was cinema. Theaters showed Soviet, American, French, Italian, and British movies, and the United States subsidized the import of Hollywood productions. In addition, considerable sums of state funds financed not only partisan epics but all sorts of mainstream entertainment movies and auteur films.<sup>89</sup> Often Western companies co-produced movies. In Split, Zagreb, and Belgrade, an internationally renowned avant-garde in filmmaking developed. It brought forth artists like Dušan Vukotić from Zagreb, the first non-American to win an Oscar for his animated movie *Surogat* in 1962. He credited the famous Zagreb animation school for his success. In 1969, Želimir Žilnik, soon the most famous exponent of the “Black Wave,” won the Golden Bear in Berlin for his film *Early Works*.<sup>90</sup>

During the 1960s, the majority of Yugoslavs finally arrived in the modern age. The rhythms, habits, and social practices of everyday life and generally the ways people lived demonstrated that the country had crossed the threshold from an agrarian society to an industrial one. This industrial society removed the yoke of traditional norms and legal restrictions and instilled a lively spirit of optimism everywhere. While the political system strove to enhance its legitimacy through more wealth, leisure, and consumption, socialist ideology became ever less important in people’s daily lives. Ideals like community, solidarity, and socialist asceticism faded into the shadows cast by bright ideas of competition and commodity fetishism. People’s plans for life became more individualized and values and habits were increasingly relativized, as was made evident by the more relaxed sexual morality and the advancement of

hedonism and a culture of fun. All this undermined the authority of a political system that propagated, on the one hand, seemingly outdated social ideas about morality and, on the other, a utopian model of society. Because Tito opened the country to the Western world, he made the steady transfer of goods, knowledge, and values possible by way of labor migration and tourism, for example. He even tolerated the fact that some of his fellow citizens became guest workers abroad and thus subjected themselves to the laws of capitalist wage labor. In Yugoslavia, the social, psychological, and mental differences with the West never hardened into antipathies as they did in the Eastern bloc countries. On the contrary, behind the ideological façade, Yugoslav society was becoming more and more like Western Europe, and sooner or later this would inevitably influence political thought, just as it had already affected art and philosophy.

# 13.

## Reforms and Rivalries (1964 to 1968)

In many respects, the 1960s were exceptional years. Political liberalization, prosperity, and an active foreign policy shaped this “golden era,” during which Yugoslavia definitely put the aftermath of the war behind it. A measure of pluralism in literature, the arts, and political philosophy also appeared. However, the idyllic picture of “brotherhood and unity” began to show its first cracks. Forced modernization produced friction and frustration both within and between republics that centralism and a planned economy were no longer able to offset. This triggered an intensive and frank public debate about the very foundations of the political system, the nature of democracy, the future of socialism, and the merits of a multiparty system. For the first time, conflicts of interest and ideological debates were conducted openly.

### *Socialist Market Economy*

Following the boom of the founding years, industrial growth slowed down in 1960 and dropped from 15 percent to 4 percent in the first half of 1962.<sup>1</sup> For that reason, the national parliament decided in March 1961 to remove the remaining state supervision in plants and to give companies the right to manage their profits themselves. The theoreticians of workers’ self-management believed that it lay in the natural interest of the workers to increase productivity. However, workers preferred to spend the surplus on private consumption and not to invest it in the company, which then skewed the economic balance between production and consumption. Whereas private income increased by about 23 percent in 1961, industrial production rose only by 3.4 percent. From this point forward, Yugoslavia was living beyond its means. Trade balance deficits and inflation increased; economic growth shrunk.<sup>2</sup>

Against this backdrop, discussions ensued over the distribution of means among the republics, reform of the banking sector, foreign exchange control,

and market liberalization, from which two extreme positions crystallized. Slovenes and Croats wanted to strengthen the republics at the expense of the national federation and to increase competition between republics. The catchword of the wealthier republics was “optimization”—the state should invest according to criteria of profitability and not opportunities to pursue development policy. The opposing position was advocated by Serbian centralists, who insisted that the state take on a greater role in managing an efficient macroeconomic policy and advancing the development of the poorer republics. The party theoretician Edvard Kardelj struggled to come up with a clever solution that would hold at bay the two antagonistic camps endangering the stability of Yugoslavia. On the one side, “localism” (meaning nationalism and separatism) threatened to tear apart the state from within. On the other, the unitarism and statism of the central authorities tended to encourage hegemony of the larger nationalities over the smaller ones. Both represented dangerous forms of nationalism. Kardelj, a Slovene, viewed Serbian efforts to dominate as the greater challenge to Yugoslavia’s stability. He was truly convinced that self-managing socialism would render the national question obsolete sooner or later. But until that time came, Yugoslavia should continue to exist as a federation of sovereign states without any claim to linguistic or cultural assimilation.<sup>3</sup>

Things came to a dramatic head at a meeting of the party leadership in March 1962, when representatives from Slovenia and Croatia demanded that the state become more of a federation. Tito must have already realized that this would subject the existence of the multiethnic state to renegotiation. In a rousing speech at a mass rally in Split in May 1962, he ranted against the egoism, localism, and nationalism of his party comrades. Tito was perfectly clear on the point that he would not allow anyone to destroy the fundamental values of “brotherhood and unity” for which so much blood had been spilled in the war.

In light of all this, the League of Communists decided to introduce two fundamental reforms at its eighth party congress in December 1964. First, it turned away from socialist Yugoslavism for good in favor of greater federalization within both the party and the state. Second, it decided to further liberalize the economy. Thus began a precedent-setting transformation of the political and economic systems. In 1965, the communists removed state controls on production, prices, and wages and ended state investments and subsidies. From now on, the Yugoslav system was to function according to the laws of capitalism. Smaller independent businesses with up to five employees were allowed. All enterprises would be more competitive and thus make the Yugoslav national economy overall more resilient.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, Yugoslavia was to become more democratic. Citizens were allowed to express their will in the factories, community councils, and all types of organizations, but not in political parties. “We are not about to permit a multiparty system into this country,” explained Prime Minister Mika Špiljak to a journalist. “But we want to have democracy. At the factory level every criticism is possible.”<sup>5</sup> Innumerable new bodies of self-management sprang up. At the same time, a generational change among functionaries was taking place in the party. Because the former partisans stayed entrenched in their posts, reelection was forbidden, thus forcing more than 1,000 old warriors to give up their seats. The men and women who took their places knew the war only from stories, harbored more liberal attitudes, and emulated Western lifestyles. So, during the 1960s, the young socialist middle class reached mid-level positions of political power.<sup>6</sup>

However, the grand hopes attached to the “socialist market economy” were not fulfilled. The balance of payments slid into a deficit, investment shriveled up, prices and the cost of living skyrocketed, so that inflation reached 28 percent in 1966. Between 1964 and 1968, industrial production grew only by 18 percent, as opposed to 54 percent in the preceding four years, and agriculture fell even further behind.<sup>7</sup>

Recession and reforms made one disturbing phenomenon quite visible: unemployment. Between 1964 and 1968, the number of jobseekers rose by 47 percent to 312,000, including an increasing number of well-qualified people. As early as 1962, Yugoslav leaders were already working on a strategy to counter unemployment, namely “temporary employment abroad.” Yugoslavia signed treaties on the matter with France, Austria, Sweden, West Germany, and other countries. Willy Brandt, who was then West Germany’s foreign minister, recognized this as an important instrument in the strategy of “change through rapprochement,” when he concluded the West German–Yugoslav Guest Worker Agreement in 1968. In this year the number of Yugoslavs in West Germany rose to 300,000 and in the following five years to clearly more than 500,000. On the whole, 1.1 million Yugoslavs lived abroad as guest workers.<sup>8</sup> The communists hazarded the consequences that Yugoslav citizens were subjecting themselves to the capitalist dictate of wages—to their own and the state’s advantage. So the regime made a virtue out of a necessity. Migration was said to insure Yugoslavia’s participation in international exchange processes and to support the socioeconomic development of the country. The state considered itself responsible for the well-being of its citizens and insisted that they return later to their homeland, a stance that the host countries welcomed because they balked at permanent immigration and feared communist infiltration.<sup>9</sup>



*Regional Disparities*

The 1960s confirmed that the leveling of regional disparities was not only an economic priority but above all a political one. As economic problems became more severe, the chronic problem of the welfare gap among the republics intensified.<sup>10</sup> Despite—or precisely due to—the economic miracle, the gap between rich and poor became greater. Although Slovenia and Croatia contributed 6–10 percent of their gross social product to the national government for the purpose of subsidizing development in the structurally weaker regions, their economies and thus their developmental advantage grew the fastest. In 1965, the poorer republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo only achieved 64.4 percent of the Yugoslav per capita income, as opposed to more than 71.3 percent a decade earlier. Topping the wealth list were the Slovenes with an index value of 177.3 percent (Yugoslavia = 100). Croatia achieved 120.7 percent and Serbia 94.9 percent. At the bottom of the list were Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo with 69.1 percent and 38.6 percent, respectively.<sup>11</sup>

There were various reasons why rich and poor were drifting apart. First, the industry-friendly pricing policy kept the market value of raw materials and agricultural goods artificially low, although these were the main economic products of the stragglers. The industries of Slovenia and Croatia profited from the inner-Yugoslav terms of trade, leaving the less developed regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo at a structural disadvantage. Second, the more politically powerful republics strove to direct investment primarily to their own regions. Self-management made it possible to invest also in unprofitable enterprises instead of in those where the resources would produce the greatest profit.<sup>12</sup>

By this point, both the rich and poor republics were constantly leveling accusations at each other. The former accused the latter of parasitism and mismanagement, and the latter the former of neglect and exploitation. The Croatian party leader Vladimir Barkarić noted in 1964: “Each party now reports to the federation with a calculation of how much it lost in the latest period, and thus the question arises: Who actually profited at all in Yugoslavia if we were all ‘exploited’?”<sup>13</sup> In the summer of 1969, a scandal arose when the national regime submitted two credit applications to the World Bank without including Ljubljana’s request for funds to finance a larger infrastructural project for road building. The public was then rocked by the vehement protest that subsequently occurred in Slovenia, particularly by its ugly nationalist undertones suggesting alleged discrimination. The project had actually been included in a future application that was still being planned and not yet ready for submission. Two years later, the Slovenes did indeed get the credit they

sought, but after the “road affair” relations remained touchy for a while between the federation and the republic.<sup>14</sup>

In the following five-year plan for the period of 1966 to 1970, the national government decided to make greater strides toward economic quality by closing the wealth gap to at most 10 percent by 1970. The most important instrument to be used in this endeavor was the federal development fund created in 1965 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, where exactly a third of the Yugoslav population lived. From that point on, all businesses had to pay a solidarity contribution to this fund of about 1.85 percent of the gross national product. Additional state subsidies for the structurally disadvantaged regions were used to raise the living standard by improving people’s education and health, for example.<sup>15</sup>

### *Decentralization and Liberalization*

At the urging of Kardelj and important proponents in the party, Tito decided to take the wind out of the sails of centrifugal tendencies in the country through decentralization and federalization. The prerequisite for such a move was to repress political resistance within the ranks of the leadership. In 1966, he took steps to deal with the most prominent opponent of constitutional reform and Kardelj’s chief rival for the position of crown prince: Aleksandar Ranković, head of the secret police agency. Not only did Ranković advocate a prostatist line, he was known above all for his advocacy of discriminating against Albanians, Muslims, and Turks in Kosovo. As vice president he had made sure that Serbs predominated in the administration even in those republics where they were in the minority, and he was responsible for much of the state repression from the 1950s on. Even his Serbian party colleagues increasingly viewed him as a burden. To the satisfaction of communists in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo, Ranković was personally accused by Tito in a bugging affair and removed from office; his supporters were also subsequently dismissed from the secret service.

Following Ranković’s fall from power, Kardelj pressed forward with the federalization that had been laid out in the constitution of 1963. It gave the republics more rights and transformed the Federal People’s Republic into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).<sup>16</sup> Further changes came after 1966. For example, in 1968 Kosovo and Vojvodina were each given the status of autonomous province in the federation with rights similar to those of a republic. They were even allowed to fly the Albanian and Hungarian flags there, respectively.<sup>17</sup> The political leadership took great pains to ensure that all institutions were filled according to the principle of ethnic representation. Since upward social mobility was effectively affixed to nationality, the

Yugoslav system reproduced the ethnic stratification and competition that it actually aspired to transcend with a supranational state of Yugoslav citizens.

Through these reforms, the state altered the concept of itself fundamentally. In 1963, the constitution still stated that the Yugoslav federal state was built on the free will of its nations and their right to self-determination and that it consisted of six republics. Now the language used was that the Yugoslav state was based on agreements and cooperation *between* the republics. The peoples exerted their sovereign rights in and through their respective republics—which were almost independent states. Consequently, the federal government was left with only a few core competencies like defense, foreign policy, and cohesion policy. All federal institutions required equal representation, and the veto right of each republic guaranteed consensual decisions. In order to counter the creeping dissolution of central authority, Tito suggested a collective presidency, in which all entities would be represented equally: the republics with three representatives each, the autonomous provinces with two. This new presidency was to succeed Tito, who assumed lifelong chairmanship of it, as the highest governmental entity.

The Communist Party also gave up its supranational structure. The statute passed in 1969 strengthened the republics insofar as the regional parties became independent organizations, and each one met before the Yugoslav federal party convened. In the place of the Central Committee, a new collective body was set up that consisted of 14 members that equally represented all of the federal states. The chair of this body rotated every two months and decisions were made based on the consensus principle. Each member had to state his or her personal affiliation to a nationality and a republic, even Tito (Croat). The functions of state and party were separated, and it was no longer possible for one person to hold several offices, as it had been for the former war generation.

### *Praxis Philosophy and the “Black Wave”*

The more liberal climate of this reform period encouraged artists and intellectuals to explore new ways to examine Yugoslav reality. Much like the politicians, Marxist philosophers sought a new direction following the historic conflict with the Soviet Union. They found it in the early writings of Karl Marx and thereby blazed a trail for pluralism in political thinking, one that no longer limited itself to the interpretation of Marxism.<sup>18</sup>

The Praxis group, founded in 1962, represented an undogmatic, creative Marxism, comparable roughly to critical theory originating in West Germany. Important proponents included Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrga, Predrag Vranicki, Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, Svetozar Stojanović, Veljko Rus, and Žarko Puhovski. At their summer school on the island of Korčula, which Western intellectuals also liked to attend, sociologist, philosophers,

and political scientists discussed topics such as “progress and culture,” “purpose and perspectives of socialism,” “power and humanity,” or “freedom and unity.”<sup>19</sup> The journal *Praxis* was established in 1964, and members of the advisory board included Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Bloch, Leszek Kołakowski, Henri Lefebvre, Georg Lukács, and Herbert Marcuse. In 1963, Erich Fromm confided “that, as a socialist and Marxist, it was a great experience for me to meet the Yugoslav philosophers, . . . who were so fruitful in developing Marxist humanism.”<sup>20</sup>

By adopting the term “praxis,” the intellectuals distanced themselves from the determinism of dialectical materialism and emphasized free human action instead. This offered a lever with which Yugoslav reality could be examined more critically. By reflecting on “alienation,” “emancipation,” and “humanity,” the members of the Praxis group bluntly exposed that the system of self-management had not enabled more self-determination at all but had only produced a camouflaged form of hierarchical and bureaucratic power structures, an oligarchy of party functionaries, and thus another type of alienation. Quite publicly they published their reform proposals for more freedom in socialism, the introduction of the multiparty system, and the necessity of democratizing the communist federation. Important inspiration came from the New Left in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States, from critical theory and the existential philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Theodor Adorno, and Max Horkheimer. This was accompanied by criticism of Stalinism leveled by Leo Trotsky, Victor Serge, and Isaac Deutscher.<sup>21</sup>

In literature, theater, and filmmaking, a subversive genre known as the “Black Wave” appeared that frankly depicted the dark side of socialism. In 1968, Slobodan Selenić published the novel *Memoari Pere Bogalja* (Memoirs of Pera the Cripple), in which he portrayed the communist party elite as decadent and permissive nouveau riche and pilloried the political persecutions after 1948. For this work he received a prestigious Belgrade literary award. In his play *When Pumpkins Blossomed* (*Kad su cvetale tikve*), Dragoslav Mihailović described his imprisonment on the island Goli Otok. However, the play was not allowed to be performed because of the parallels Mihailović drew in it between the partisans and the National Socialists.

Nowhere was the dark side of socialism described so vividly as in film. In his film *Early Works*, Želimir Žilnik depicted the failure of the ideals of socialism including sexual liberation, when applied to Yugoslav reality. His female protagonist Yugoslava was an allegory for the entire state. Communists and conservatives alike were enraged by the “anarcho-liberal” plot,<sup>22</sup> but in 1969 the filmmaker was awarded the Golden Bear in Berlin for this work. In 1971, the cineaste Dušan Makavejev won a prize in Cannes for *W.R.: Mysteries*

of the *Organism* (*W.R.—Misterije organizma*) about communist politics and sexuality and the work of Wilhelm Reich. The film was banned in Yugoslavia shortly thereafter on the grounds that it mocked the People's Army. Despite such reactions, filmmakers were usually not banned from working in their profession as they were in the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup>

Theater also played a prominent role in the self-reflective interpretation of societal conditions. The Zagreb theaters Teatar & TD, Atelje 212, and the Belgrade international theater festival BITEF made names for themselves as places of political and pedagogical provocation and consciousness-building. They abandoned not only petrified structures of thought and behavior but also traditional aesthetic rituals and argued instead in favor of overcoming societal constraints. On experimental stages and at festivals, both international and local productions were performed, including Samuel Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* and Peter Handke's *Offending the Audience*. Literary magazines like *Krugovi* (Circles), *Književne novine* (Journal for literature), and *Polet* (Enthusiasm) provided a forum for critical writers such as Bora Ćosić and Danilo Kiš. Ćosić, for example, satirized socialist development in his novel *My Family's Role in the World Revolution*, for which he received a literary prize in 1970.<sup>24</sup>

By establishing a critical discourse on society, championing individualistic works, creating alternative subcultures and networks, and advocating certain social practices, the Praxis philosophy and the cultural avant-garde sowed the seeds for a large-scale critical deliberation of contemporary socialism.

### *The Student Revolts of 1968*

In many countries across Europe, the student movement of 1968 challenged established thinking and fossilized structures—so, too, in Yugoslavia, where a politicized younger generation sought to improve the world. Despite their transnational forms of expression, the ideas of '68 were also overlaid everywhere with country-specific motives.

On the occasion of a pop concert held on the evening of 2 June 1968 in Novi Beograd, fighting broke out between youth and the police. This prompted thousands to demonstrate the next day and occupy university buildings, which they proclaimed as the “Red University Karl Marx.” One day later, protests were also taking place in Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Sarajevo. Numerous important intellectuals and artists expressed their solidarity with the angered youth.

Even though these revolts resembled the student protests in other national capitals, in Yugoslavia they expressed domestic grievances first and foremost. The demonstrators criticized the party oligarchy and “localism,” and demanded democratic rights, social justice, and the improvement of conditions at the universities. They chanted “Down with the Red bourgeoisie!” and then

“We don’t want capitalism!” This revealed with unmistakable clarity that a striking credibility gap existed in the system of self-managing socialism, and it was quite obvious that the protests directly addressed the reforms that began in 1965. The social underpinning for the unrest was undoubtedly the education revolution, since it had doubled the number of students within a period of only eight years and had led to untenable conditions at the universities. Capacities were limited and scholarships scarce. Moreover, young men and women were greatly worried about their future because of growing unemployment. More keenly than in the West, Yugoslav youth were confronted with the dissonance between the dogma of progress and the sad reality of an overtaxed educational system.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, the young students had also been politicized by the Vietnam War, the hardships of the “Third World,” and all forms of restrictions to be found in the Yugoslav system. Undogmatic Marxism, praxis and existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, and cultural criticism formed the theoretical basis for revolt and directed attention to potentially subversive topics like democratization, participation, and transparency. As was the case all over Europe, youth hungered for new ways to live, self-determination, openness, self-reflection, and self-fulfillment.<sup>26</sup>

Tito proved to have the right political instinct when he addressed the strikers in a radio and television speech on 9 June 1968. He acknowledged that the unrest was a result of the regime’s neglect of youth, a failing that urgently needed to be corrected. He conceded that the students’ demands were justified. By doing so, he managed that very day to bring about a peaceful end to what had been the most serious political crisis until then.<sup>27</sup> This shows that the demonstrators were indeed primarily protesting against social disadvantages and were less concerned with expressing a fundamental criticism of society.<sup>28</sup>

Still, the student movement marked a turn in the political development of Yugoslavia. For the very first time, the country had experienced open protest on a broad scale and by the younger generation no less. It was this generation with whom socialism had so strongly sought to curry favor because the young were allegedly the most important bearers of progress. It was clear to all that a system that alienated the next generation had no future. The revolt pointed with blatant candor to the system’s deficits of credibility and legitimacy, and the ’68 movement was important in another respect: the student movement was interpreted as a clarion call by politically thinking people of all stripes. It had proven that pressure from the street could achieve more than all the discussions ever held in the Central Committee. The mobilization of the masses thus became an important factor in the coming political confrontations, such as in the “Croatian Spring” of 1971.

At first the regime did not consider undertaking any far-reaching democratic reforms. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968

to end the “Prague Spring” proved convenient to Tito. Once again, the danger of a Soviet invasion was underscored by events elsewhere in the East, at least from the Yugoslav standpoint. After Khrushchev fell from power in October 1964, bilateral economic relations between the two countries were further developed. With regard to the Near East conflict and the Vietnam War, Tito and Brezhnev also repeatedly discovered that they held similar views. However, the far-reaching market economy reforms that Yugoslavia introduced in 1965 created new ideological rifts because they required a measure of political liberalization. Tito sympathized with Alexander Dubček’s demands for more democratization in Czechoslovakia and even intervened with Moscow on his behalf. When Soviet troops marched into Prague in August 1968, the Yugoslav government issued a strong protest. Moscow’s immediate and severe condemnation of Tito prompted fears that this time Yugoslavia could indeed become the next victim of military aggression.

Had the Soviets invaded, the Yugoslav army could have done little to combat it. Thus, in the fall of 1968, preparations began for reforming the country’s national security doctrine. A law was passed in 1969 that spelled out the “all-peoples defense.” It took recourse to partisan warfare insofar as it attempted to include as much of the population as possible in the defense of the country. In accordance with decentralization, the armed forces were made up of two components: the national regular army of 250,000 soldiers plus 500,000 reservists, and the territorial defense of the republics, which could mobilize 900,000 men. A third component was the civil defense. In the case of a defense emergency, every individual who was 16 years or older had to help in evacuation, medical provision, and other tasks. Men were required to take part in military exercises on a regular basis, and even schoolchildren learned the basics of handling arms.<sup>29</sup>

Foreign observers at the time recognized the serious risk to domestic security that decentralization posed. Throughout the countryside and in the mountains, nearly every man owned a gun or carbine, and millions of ammunition rounds were sold to private citizens annually. Each community had a committee responsible for training and armament. Sizable weapon arsenals were stored across the country. Thanks to the dual military structure, the republics practically maintained their own armies—in fact, who was to guarantee that they wouldn’t someday turn against each other? In a very literal sense, the new security doctrine was inherently quite explosive and contributed in large measure to the creeping militarization of Yugoslav society.

## 14.

# The New Nationalism

### (1967 to 1971)

While Yugoslavs continued to enjoy the “golden years,” doubt intensified within leadership circles about the hitherto fairly unquestioned faith in progress that had dominated since the immediate postwar era. It was all too clear that the self-management system suffered from structural problems that were being camouflaged by apparent prosperity, if only rather poorly. The rate of economic growth was sinking; increasing regional disparities and rising unemployment put pressure on the political system to act in the second half of the 1960s. Furthermore, the dynamics of modernization had produced new social constellations. Competition within the market economy aggravated national sensitivities and intensified ethnopolitical rivalries. Politicians and intellectuals in all of the republics were expressing their concerns that the leveling politics of “brotherhood and unity” threatened their own republic’s interests. Nationalist rhetoric resurfaced that was thought to be long gone, accompanied by new problems pushed to the forefront by the economic downturn.

#### *Modernization and the National Question*

Despite all the efforts made by the communists, nationalism had never completely vanished from Yugoslavia. During the Second World War, nearly 350,000 men had not fought with the partisans, but against them as members of the collaboration troops. Many of them were later sentenced to prison terms or even liquidated. These men, together with their family members, represented a sizeable number of people who were perhaps able to live with the new regime but never fully identified with it or even opposed it in their hearts.<sup>1</sup> The lines were blurred between forbidden nationalism and an encouraged patriotic love of one’s homeland. The patriotic nineteenth-century art song “Our Beautiful Homeland” (*Lijepa naša*) had been usurped by the Ustasha regime as their hymn. For this reason, certain versions of the song were banned after the war. Many Croats loved the melody, to which more or less politically



offensive texts could be sung. In order to avoid suspicion by their neighbors, people simply closed their windows at family celebrations when they sang. Clearly ambiguous were the old national symbols like the Croatian tricolor and the white-and-red chessboard crest, which the communists had adapted by adding a red star. When the older version of the flag appeared occasionally at private parties, sports events, and in church, the practice then fell into the tolerated gray zone of celebrating folklore. However, anyone who attached a political message to this was seen as violating “brotherhood and unity” and was punished.<sup>2</sup>

The regime also tolerated social niches in which national leanings (even in an undesirable form) could be expressed within certain limitations. This was also true for the churches, in which hardline critics of the regime were even able to rise to the position of bishop. The anti-Western, lay preacher movement of the Bogomoljci also remained intact.<sup>3</sup>

Although schools, universities, and research institutes had been purged of collaborators after 1945, they remained bastions of the old bourgeoisie, particularly the academies of science. Most professors and academy members retained their positions following the regime change. As long as they acted loyally, they were permitted to pursue their research interests with relatively few restrictions. Older traditions and schools of thought were maintained, particularly in the fields of philosophy, literary studies, and history, and these disciplines became conclaves for cultivating national identity. During the 1960s, blatantly nationalistic discourses crept in. One contemporary at the time suspected that at the academies, “a generation of historians were being trained, who were worse [more nationalistic] than their teachers.”<sup>4</sup>

Intellectuals were the first to break the taboo of “brotherhood and unity” in the 1960s. The Slovene literary critic Dušan Pirjevec conducted a bitter controversy in 1961/1962 with the Serb writer Dobrica Ćosić over the relationship of internationalism, Yugoslavism, and the rights of nations and nationalities. Shouldn’t the peoples of Yugoslavia exert their sovereignty first and foremost in and through the republics (Pirjevec), or didn’t a “vampire-like nationalism” lurk behind this demand (Ćosić)? Such cultural controversies constituted the intellectual discourse accompanying the political debate over constitutional reform.<sup>5</sup>

Velimir Terzić, a Serb historian and director of the Military History Institute in Belgrade, sparked a debate involving Franjo Tuđman over Croatia’s guilt in the fall of the first Yugoslavia. Tuđman had fought in the Second World War on the side of the partisans and made a military career for himself afterward. In 1961, he was appointed director and later became president of the Institute for the History of the Workers’ Movement of Croatia in Zagreb. Tuđman felt provoked by Terzić and sought to prove that the Croats were the

chief victim of Greater Serbian efforts to establish hegemony in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, he considered it his most important mission to lower the official numbers on Serb victims of Ustasha crimes. He maintained that, in fascist Croatia, the total number of all those killed in camps and deported amounted to little more than 59,000 people of all nationalities, not just Serbs.<sup>6</sup> He suspected that the intent behind the official statistic listing 700,000 murdered prisoners in the Jasenovac concentration camp alone was to stigmatize the Croat people collectively. As a matter of fact, there were 83,000 to 90,000 people killed in Jasenovac, so that the data originally given do indeed appear exaggerated. Still, Tudjman's actions reeked of revisionism and denial.<sup>7</sup>

The rapid modernization of Yugoslav society also produced a thoroughly new dynamic in ethnic relations. Wholly contrary to its original intent, the socialist politics of development acted as a catalyst for national consciousness-raising. Granted, industrialization, urban culture, higher education, regional mobility, and modern mass communication did indeed further the spread of ethnic tolerance, cosmopolitan attitudes, and supranational identities, as had been predicted by both Western theories of modernization and by Marxism. However, simultaneously these same processes created new competitiveness between peoples, particularly when institutions and power were being distributed according to the "national key," namely criteria of ethnic proportionality.<sup>8</sup>

The communists propagated rationality and efficiency in daily socialist life, so that ethnicity and religion appeared only to be archaic relics of a dark past. Because this jarred old certainties, social networks, and constructions of identity, some people felt they had to react in defense of national culture. Within certain media, clubs, and educational facilities linguistic and cultural cohesion was cultivated, whereby a feeling of alienation toward Yugoslavia as a multinational state also then took hold.

In addition, the government's forceful policy of modernization and development accelerated social differentiation within society. Education, mobility, and high expectations of growing income and a better life helped intensify different kinds of conflict of interest, such as those between rich and poor republics and between majority and minority populations. Among the Bosnian Muslims and the Macedonians, as well as among Kosovo Albanians, a large class of people emerged for the first time who were geared to advancement and made a career in the party, bureaucracy, enterprises, and educational institutions. Before 1945, there had been but a very small bourgeois and intellectual class in these societies that would have been able to propagate the national idea.<sup>9</sup>

Demographic changes also played a role. In light of the varying rates of population growth among the peoples of Yugoslavia, the ethnic composition

shifted. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the share of Muslims in the population rose from 31.3 to 39.5 percent between 1953 and 1981.<sup>10</sup> In Kosovo, the Albanian share rose from 67 to 74 percent between 1961 and 1971, a fact that caused Serbs there to fear that they would eventually be crowded out.<sup>11</sup> The situation was also aggravated by the increase in competition for an ever-dwindling number of jobs.

For all these reasons, socialist modernization and its emerging crisis in the 1960s raised fundamental questions concerning ethnic coexistence and the distribution of political power and prosperity. The party watched these developments with growing concern and produced hundreds of pages of secret reports on the deteriorating national relations. Not only was the competition between peoples for advancement, status, power, and resources becoming more clearly visible, but emerging economic problems also caused insecurity and irrational fears of the future. Social and economic interests were being discussed more and more in categories of ethnic differences, clothed in typical discourses on discrimination, and reminted into ethnopolitical demands. The dogma that socialism had solved the national question to the satisfaction of all could no longer be maintained. In 1964, Tito concluded: "If we do not want to be confronted with serious problems further down the road, then we have to keep our eyes open when examining the problems in ethnic relations that still exist."<sup>12</sup> From this point forward, there was no more talk of the healing impact of socialism. What was emphasized instead was the right of each group to freely develop its own cultural identity and economic evolution. The ranking in the tandem of "brotherhood and unity" was switched. No longer was the greater emphasis placed on commonalities (unity) but diversity (brotherhood), and that, in turn, required a change in direction in constitutional politics.

### *Recognition of Bosnian Muslims*

An important step in rebalancing ethnopolitical relations was the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as the sixth constituent people (or "nation") of Yugoslavia. This concluded a process that had been underway for decades, meaning the transformation of this traditional religious community into a modern nation. By this time, to be Muslim meant especially to follow certain cultural practices and harbor certain forms of ethnic consciousness; it was less a profession of faith.

Although the communists had actually acknowledged the individuality of the Bosnian Muslims during the people's liberation struggle, this specific group was not given the status of a nation after 1945. Instead, they were classified in 1948 according to the categories "undetermined nationality" or "Muslim Serb" or "Muslim Croat," a state of affairs that was deemed unsatisfactory. The rubric "Muslim (ethnic affiliation)" slipped into the national

census taken in 1961, before the Bosnian Communist Party decided in 1965 to upgrade Muslims officially to the sixth constituent people of Yugoslavia.<sup>13</sup> In 1971, the national census included for the first time the category “Muslim in an ethnic sense.” Muslim with a capital “M” referred to national affiliation, as opposed to a lowercase “m” when just religious affiliation was meant. This represented an enormous success for Bosniak national politics, which had been pushing for greater influence for years. The only reason why the sixth official nation in Yugoslavia went by a name with a religious connotation was that its members themselves used no other name. “Bosnian” referred to regional origins that included other nationalities. Not until 1993 was the historical term “Bosniak” officially reintroduced as the name given exclusively to the people of Bosnian Muslims and—contrary to the nineteenth century—no longer to a specific citizenship regardless of ethnic origin.<sup>14</sup> “In Europe, if you do not have a national name, you cannot have a state,” explained a politician.<sup>15</sup>

The Muslim nation was not an artificial product devised by the communists, as opponents to the reform argued. Likewise, it is clear that the valuation of Muslims to a nation did indeed serve a strategic interest in neutralizing the growing ambitions of Croatia and Serbia by strengthening Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer. The “heart of Yugoslavia” played a key role for the internal stability of the multiethnic state. In 1971, about four million people lived there, of whom 39.6 percent were Muslims, 37.2 percent Serbs, and 20.6 percent Croats. At the time, both Zagreb and Belgrade had begun to exert more influence in the republic.<sup>16</sup> In reaction to these hegemonic tendencies and the threat of being usurped as Islamicized Croats or Serbs, the new Muslim elites strove for full recognition and a greater say, not only in their home republic but also in Yugoslavia as a whole. Apart from this, they were still citizens of a republic that had fallen far behind the national level of development, and more lobbying was needed to correct this situation.

However, the wish to be recognized as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples did not emerge primarily out of a perceived need to defend oneself; instead it reflected a widespread, deeply felt, and distinct ethnic consciousness. Back in the interwar period, there had been no consensus about the existence of a Bosnian Muslim nation among the elites, not to speak of the populace in general. In the meantime, this had changed, thanks in no small measure to the secular state and its strategy for socialist modernization. Just as the Serb national identity shed its ties to Christian Orthodoxy back in the nineteenth century, the identity of Bosnian Muslims increasingly emancipated itself from Islam after 1945.

Muslim identity was no longer identical with religious affiliation but still remained connected to it in different ways. This identity was constituted within a sociocultural sphere and lifestyle influenced by Islam into which one was

born and in which one was socialized via the family. It included old traditions and belief systems, religious practices and daily customs, and even symbols and values, all of which shaped community consciousness, regardless if a person was religious or not. Fewer and fewer people were religious, and all were socialized in secular institutions. Still, it was not possible to completely define away the Ottoman cultural heritage for these people. The old customs, songs, special food dishes, and visits to the mosque had important sociocultural functions, even if Allah had little to do with it all. Even communists often gave their children Muslim names and tolerated old customs like circumcision, which was outlawed.<sup>17</sup> To the horror of the public health agencies, for example, they shied away from prohibiting outdated burial rituals, in which the dead were laid out in front of the mosque in the heart of the city. Religious practices were associated with national identity, which was permitted to be freely articulated. Apart from this, efforts were made to strengthen the nonreligious characteristics of Muslim national identity by concentrating more intensively on objective criteria of demarcation, such as language, literature, and history. Magazines like *Odjek* (Echo), *Život* (Life), and *Pregled* (Review) reflected various dimensions of Bosnian Muslim identity with the aim of shaping and standardizing it further.

The political and constitutional upgrade gave Muslims more influence in the various bodies of the republic and the federal government, more visibility in the public realm, and a significant increase in national self-confidence. The share of Muslims in the Bosnian Central Committee rose from 19 to 33 percent between 1965 and 1974.<sup>18</sup> While only 15.8 percent of the assemblymen in the republic's parliament were Muslim in 1969, by 1974 the figure had risen to 33.4 percent.<sup>19</sup> However, a greater voice in the leadership cadres also encouraged more targeted interest-driven politics, from which systemic problems arose. Were the Muslims to be treated as one of the three equal nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or did they deserve a privileged status because Serbs and Croats each already had their own republics? How could the Muslim identity be protected from assimilation in a multicultural milieu? In 1971, the intellectual Salim Ćerić called for a Muslim cultural institute (*Matica*) and a flag and anthem of their own. The Communist Party rejected this immediately with the argument that this would lead to national segmentation, polarization, and finally civil war.<sup>20</sup> While the tectonics of power strengthened the new Muslim nation, the "national key" felt threatening and prompted a fear of future discrimination among the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>21</sup>

Contrary to the Bosnian Muslims, the Macedonians were recognized as a nation with their own republic even before the war ended. The Communist Party was conducting deliberate nation building "from above" in order to protect this numerically small people from Serb, Bulgarian, and Greek efforts to assimilate them. Soon afterward, a standard Macedonian language and

orthography was established that differed from the Bulgarian, with its own grammar books, dictionaries, and literature. As the other republics had done, Macedonia set up institutes dedicated to the study of its own history. Schools and media helped popularize the new idea of identity, which rapidly took root because it was being planted in a terrain where the people already cultivated a collective awareness of themselves. Therefore, it did not take long before the formation of a Macedonian nation was completed. After the separation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church from its historic archbishopric of Skopje-Ohrid in 1958, it took until 1967 and a period of tough negotiations before the Serbian Orthodox Church finally recognized the Macedonian metropolitan. Macedonia now had its own national church.<sup>22</sup>

### *Islam and Pan-Islamism*

In addition to the nearly 1.5 million Bosnian Muslims, other Islamic groups lived in Yugoslavia. In Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo lived a total of a quarter million so-called ethnic (meaning Slavic) Muslims. There were also another 1.4 million Albanians, Turks, and Roma who adhered to Islam.<sup>23</sup> Yugoslav Muslims enjoyed particular state protection for political reasons: they represented an important link to the Islamic countries within the nonaligned movement.

Therefore, the state tolerated and even supported the Islamic religious community and other activities connected to the faith. In Sarajevo, the renowned Oriental Institute and a chair for Oriental Studies at the university were established to study the Ottoman heritage. Between 1955 and 1972, the number of mosques doubled, and special magazines appeared like *Preporod* (Renaissance) and *Islamska misao* (Islamic thought). In Bosnia-Herzegovina alone there were 1,092 mosques, 569 prayer houses (*mesdžid*), and another 394 smaller shrines. Around 1,000 more were to be found in Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>24</sup>

Unlike the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox churches, the religious leader of the Muslims, the *Reis-ul-ulema*, was unconditionally pro-Yugoslav in his views, not least because of gratitude for the public support given to his own culture. In 1969, the Islamic Religious Community dropped the adjective “religious” from its name—an important signal that it saw itself not only as a representative of spiritual matters but also of ethnopolitical interests.<sup>25</sup>

However, the liberal atmosphere of the 1960s also encouraged followers of a politicized Islam to resume their activities. Under various pseudonyms, Islamists began to publish their views. In certain circles, such as among the students of the theological madrasa (*Gazi Husrev-beg medrese*) and of the Islamic Theological Faculty, such politicized ideas about religion fell on fertile soil. Led by the young imam Hasan Čengić, a loyal circle of *tabački mesdžid*

formed. It condemned discotheques and ethnically mixed marriages and called for the veiling of women and the prohibition of alcohol. Similar to the 1930s, the demands for an Islamization of society were linked to a comprehensive political and ideological reform project.<sup>26</sup>

This form of Islamism advocated the unification of religion and social order; it rejected the separation of Islam, the state, and society. Therefore, its followers were also against anything that limited the religious community to strictly religious functions. They attacked both the self-contented conservative theologians and imams, whom they claimed were unable to solve the current problems, and the nonreligious modernists of the new Muslim generation of politicians.<sup>27</sup>

In 1970, the year in which Tito's political ally and friend, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, died and the Ayatollah Khomeini published his book *Islamic Government*, Alija Izetbegović, the future president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wrote his *Islamic Declaration*. As a member of the secret anticommunist organization Young Muslims, he had been sentenced to imprisonment in 1946 with several of his fellow fighters, because the group called for the unification of the Muslim world under one single Islamic state and demanded of its members an "iron will" and "surliness and fanaticism" for the psychological, political, and military struggle. Izetbegović, who was born in 1925, sat in prison until 1949 and afterward retreated into a private life of practicing law. Several of his fellow travelers, however, went into exile.<sup>28</sup>

The *Islamic Declaration* reiterated earlier demands calling for an "Islamic order and way of life" and a pan-Islamic state stretching "from Morocco to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia." The distant aim was to develop an Islamic order, although what this would be was never exactly defined. The key demand was the "Islamization of [secularized] Muslims" as based on the Pakistan model. It was argued that religious and political awakening went hand in hand, that Western culture and its concepts of societal order were to be rejected, and therefore public life and media should be controlled. Once again, this point was not to propagate crude antimodernism, but to safeguard identity: "Hence, the question is not whether we will or will not accept science and technology . . . but rather whether we will do this creatively or mechanically, with dignity or with inferiority. The question is thus whether in this inevitable development we will get lost, or whether we will preserve our individuality, our culture and our values." The struggle for an Islamic order would be carried forward by a select elite with clear ideological visions and moral criteria. Unlike many movements outside of Europe, the *Declaration* explicitly called for the creation of a pan-Islamic state, not a federation. Muslims should merge into a single community, in which Islam was the ideology and pan-Islamism

the politics. "OUR GOAL: Islamization of Moslems. OUR MOTTO: Believe and Fight."<sup>29</sup>

The upswing of political Islam was linked to global developments. Everywhere in the Islamic world, and therefore also in Bosnia-Herzegovina, modernization had brought forth an urban class of intellectuals who oriented themselves on foreign Muslim brotherhoods and relevant authors like the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb or the Pakistani Muhammad Iqbal. Unlike in Egypt, Pakistan, and Malaysia, Islamism in Yugoslavia only addressed a minority of the population. Bosnia-Herzegovina lacked both a pious bourgeoisie and an impoverished urban lower class among whom Islamism resonated so strongly in the Arab world. For this reason, Islamism was at first nothing more than intellectual wishful thinking.<sup>30</sup>

### *Unrest in Kosovo*

All of the newly emerging problems intersected in Kosovo. In the 1960s, more than two-thirds of the roughly 1.3 million inhabitants were Albanians. The rate of population growth reached 27.6 percent annually, about three times as much as in the whole of Yugoslavia. Every second person was under the age of 20. This dynamic birth development caused many Serbs to fear that they would be completely pushed out of Kosovo in a few years' time. They considered this region to be the "cradle of the Serb nation," because Kosovo had been the heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom and the setting of the myth-laden Battle of Kosovo, and the most important Orthodox cultural landmarks were located there. At the same time, Kosovo also held important national significance for the Albanians, whose majority status prompted them to insist on having a greater say in politics. In 1878, the League of Prizren, the modern-age Albanian national movement, had been formed here.

The predominantly Orthodox Serbs and the overwhelmingly Muslim Albanians essentially remained strangers to one another, even during the era of "brotherhood and unity." No two peoples mistrusted each other as deeply as these two; rarely did marriages between members of these communities occur.<sup>31</sup> Until Aleksandar Ranković fell from power, Albanians were greatly underrepresented in leadership positions within the party, the administration, the police, and the military. The Serb establishment thought of Albanians as chronically disloyal and separatist and arrogantly looked down on them. Kosovo did indeed suffer from a structural deficit of educated classes. It took a while for Albanians to gradually catch up. The Yugoslav state invested a great deal in the development of their province. Whereas only a third of all Albanian children attended school prior to the Second World War, by the mid-1960s, the figure had risen by 85 percent. The number of students also multiplied.



Kosovo suffered from serious socioeconomic problems that painfully came to light with the challenges of the 1960s. The national income per capita was only 38 percent of that of Yugoslavia, and economic growth lagged far behind the annual influx of jobseekers. All other indicators also pointed to glaring underdevelopment: in 1968 there were 60 percent fewer medical doctors, 70 percent fewer radios and television sets, and 75 percent fewer private automobiles per 1,000 inhabitants than in Yugoslavia as a whole.<sup>32</sup>

Liberalization opened the door in Kosovo for the far-reaching Albanization of the province. Šiptari, until then the official yet pejorative label for their people, was replaced with what they called themselves, namely Albanian. Enver Hoxha, the Albanian head of state, sent schoolbooks and more than 200 teachers to Kosovo to accelerate instruction in their native language. Close collaboration on national policy developed in other areas. In March 1968, Kosovo adopted the Tosk version of the written language that had been developed in its neighboring state. New interpretations of history were embraced, especially on the autochthonous and Illyric origins of Albanians and the cult of the national hero Skanderbeg. All of this underscored the cross-border unity of the Albanian people that even the government sanctioned. New newspapers and magazines appeared and hundreds of books were published in Albanian. Radio and television spread rapidly. Even the Albanian flag was permitted to be flown in front of official buildings in Kosovo. In other words, Tito's attempt to construct a distinct Kosovar national identity had failed.<sup>33</sup>

For nationalist-oriented Albanians in Kosovo, the concessions made since 1966 did not go far enough. Their country still did not have the status of a republic, which would have included the right to secession. Growing tensions over this finally erupted into violent riots in October and November 1968 in Kosovo and western Macedonia. Demonstrators demanded a republic and a constitution; some went as far as to call for the unification of all regions settled by Albanians into one nation state. Students celebrated Albania's head of state, Enver Hoxha. Tito did not want to concede to demands for a republic because he feared the direction such separatist sentiments might take. The uprising was crushed.

In the 1960s, an elite evolved that was being socialized to adopt an aggressively nationalist stance. These people were found at the university, the Albanological Institute, and the Academy of Sciences, where they eloquently presented their political demands at home and abroad. In 1969, the first Albanian university was opened in Prishtina and quickly became the center for nationalist activities. Within a short span of time, an upwardly mobile and autochthonous class of intellectuals emerged who advanced to key positions and emphatically demanded a fairer distribution of opportunities, even at the national level. Thanks to quotas and positive discrimination, this generation

made its way in the 1970s into important jobs and key positions in bureaucracy, the party, and the economy.<sup>34</sup> An atmosphere of euphoria and triumph prevailed, which they increasingly rubbed in the face of local Serbs. Since the Serb language had been degraded to an elective subject in the schools, the two ethnic communities of Kosovo found that they literally no longer shared a common language. Thus, the consequent Albanization of Kosovo also caused deep-seated alienation and polarization between members of the two peoples.<sup>35</sup>

In Serbia the new course of greater federal and national rights was not met with absolute approval. In May 1968, the writer Dobrica Ćosić addressed the party in a passionate speech, using harsh words to uncover decentralization as a masquerade for nationalist machinations and to warn that the systematic discrimination of Serbs and Montenegrins could evoke a reaction of Greater Serbian irredentism. This speech by one of Yugoslavia's most prominent and respected intellectuals hit like a bombshell. The party quickly condemned Ćosić's stance. Two months later, he resigned his membership in the party and then took over the Serbian Literary Society. The chief focus of this circle of intellectuals was to defend the historic, national, and cultural unity of the Serb people with greater determination in the future.<sup>36</sup>

Meanwhile, the communist leadership was convinced that the situation in Kosovo could only be stabilized by giving the Albanians even more rights. Petar Stambolić, one of the most prominent Serb communists, called critics to task: "How can anyone today maintain that it is in the interests of the Serb people that . . . other peoples are not treated equally with us? I truly do not know how someone could be threatened by the nationalities. . . . It is in our own interest to decide in favor of [the rights of] Kosovo and Metohija."<sup>37</sup> Tito decided that Kosovo should not be granted the status of a republic. Instead, it remained a province, although it was allowed to exercise all the rights of a republic except the right to secession. It was simultaneously a federal component of Serbia *and* a constituent entity of Yugoslavia, and as long as Tito was alive, nothing would change.

### *Linguistic Nationalism*

The insidious process of alienation and politicizing ethnic identity can be followed best in the area of culture. In the 1960s, the language question advanced prominently to the fore and served as a type of seismograph for the national sensitivities in the multiethnic state.

The question of whether Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians can be said to speak the same or different languages is one that dates back to the nineteenth century. It is actually not a linguistic problem but a political one, because three-fourths of Yugoslavs—the population speaking

Serbo-Croatian—communicate in language variations that differ from one another to a degree not much greater than the English spoken in Great Britain, the United States, and Australia. In 1954, the cultural institutions had agreed in Novi Sad that the language referred to as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian was to be understood as one language with two variants, one western and one eastern. Intellectuals in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina now questioned this. In Slovenia, there was an awakening of linguistic purism, and a semiofficial language tribunal was formed to guard the “purity” and the equal standing of the Slovenian language. The cultural ambitions in Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia were closely and mutually interrelated, radicalized each other through ever more far-reaching demands, and eventually drew the remaining republics into the vortex of their struggles. However, what was decisive for the evolving controversy was not the communicative function of language, but its role as a marker of identity. Language disputes symbolized a deeper need for national recognition, appreciation, and distinction, and this was not least a reaction to the injury that socialism had inflicted on the national pride of its peoples.<sup>38</sup>

The catalyst for a deepening alienation among the republics was the “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Literary Language” of March 1967. More than 140 intellectuals from eighteen cultural organizations in Croatia severely criticized what they saw as trends toward Serbification. They were explicit in their rejection of the compromise of Novi Sad and demanded instead that Croatian be recognized as one of four independent literary languages in the constitution, next to Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. The fact that linguistic characteristics could also be found specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro interested the Croat experts little.

In reaction to the Croatian declaration, Serbian writers composed that same month a document signed by forty-two fellow writers entitled “A Proposal to Ponder,” in which they supported the idea that the Croatian and Serbian languages be officially separated. It was argued that Serbs and Croats should have the right to develop their national languages and culture independently from one another. Starting in 1969, the Belgrade literary magazine *Književne novine* was no longer published using the Latin alphabet, but the Cyrillic one—over the protest of at least twelve Belgrade intellectuals.<sup>39</sup>

Croat communists were very concerned about such nationalist demands. Many renowned scientists and organizations had signed the language declaration, and just as many had voiced their opposition to it. Rallies to save “brotherhood and unity” were held in many institutions and businesses.<sup>40</sup> The communists decided to halt nationalistic machinations and expelled nine signers of the declaration from the party. In addition, they forced Franjo Tudjman, one of the key protagonists of Croat nationalism, into retirement as the director of the Historical Institute in Zagreb. Yet, in line with Yugoslav tradition, he

was allowed to continue researching and publishing his work. At the same time in Belgrade, the communist leadership also cracked down on Serb nationalist intellectuals.

Nevertheless, the Croats ended their participation in the common dictionary in 1970 and declared the Novi Sad agreement to be obsolete. The language question had now become a political affair. The long-standing Zagreb cultural society *Matica hrvatska* and its Belgrade counterpart *Matica srpska* embroiled themselves in an endless and unpleasant dispute. Essentially this was a proxy conflict between Croatia and Serbia that was emblematic for the domestic struggle over identity and alterity, over distinction and openness, over self-assertion and hegemony—and the desire for more autonomy by some of the republics.<sup>41</sup>

In 1971, Muslim linguists in Bosnia-Herzegovina started an initiative to document the particularities of the regional “forms of literary expression,” meaning a Bosnian Muslim language. Even before the Second World War, Bosnian Muslim intellectuals were divided over this question. The magazine *Gajret* had appeared then in the Ekavian (Serbian) variant of the Serbo-Croatian language and in the Cyrillic alphabet, while in other places Muslim authors published in the Ijekavian (Croatian) variant and in Latin alphabet. If the Muslims formed a separate people, argued those more nationally conscious intellectuals, then didn’t they also have the right to a distinct standardized Muslim language and literature? The three most famous Bosnian writers, Meša Selimović, Mak Dizdar, and Skender Kulenović, became the victims of a disconcerting cultural war over their affiliation with Serb, Croat, or Bosnian Muslim literature. Suddenly people wanted to sort out and divide up everything that had constituted a unified entity for centuries. Selimović, who did not want to subordinate himself to the new cultural dictate, no longer felt welcome and moved to Belgrade.

During the 1970s, a “cultural rebirth among Muslims” (Mustafa Imamović) took place in many areas, supported by the work of philosophers, literary scholars, and historians, including Alija Iseković, Atif Purivatra, and Muhamed Filipović. The historian Mustafa Imamović advocated the inclusion of “Muslim history and literature” in the curricula of the schools and universities in his republic, which the communists interpreted as an attack on the multiethnic nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to calm the waters, a compromise was reached and the subject “history of the nations and nationalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina” was introduced in the history department at Sarajevo’s university. However, emphasis was being placed ever more rarely on the historical unity of cultures in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ever more often on the ethnic individuality of its peoples.<sup>42</sup> When the demand for a Muslim cultural organization was expressed in 1971 in order to check “intellectual

colonization,” the communists sensed the coming of a reactionary relapse into the nationalism of the interwar period. Their antidote was simple: they made the point that each of the three peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to kindly live out their cultural identity within the framework of the shared, supranational institutions.<sup>43</sup> The three bodies responsible for language policy decided that both variants and alphabets were of equal standing and that the down-to-earth, everyday vocabulary was to be particularly esteemed.<sup>44</sup>

Even at the time this sounded like whistling in the dark, because nationally conscious intellectuals and often religious communities were competing for visibility and influence. As a republic in which four religions were practiced, Bosnia-Herzegovina became the place where rivalries were played out in disputes such as those over the construction of churches and mosques. The century-old contestations of “whose Bosnia” reemerged with the rise of nationalist discourse and disputes.<sup>45</sup> Each side solicited donations specifically from the generous guest-worker “diaspora” in order to outdo the other in building their respective places of worship, as the party publication *Borba* reported with some concern in 1972.<sup>46</sup>

### *The “Croatian Spring”*

Resentments threatened to flare up again in early April 1971 when the Croatian Central Committee raised serious accusations against “unitarian-centralistic forces” in the League of Communists. The Zagreb leadership had already decided in early 1970 to pursue a course that would make it more independent of Belgrade, even though the Croatian party was itself deeply divided over the issue. Tito called together the heads of party and state in order, as he said, to tackle unsolved problems. Essentially what was discussed was further constitutional reform. The Croats demanded autonomy in financial affairs and a fundamental restructuring of the currency and foreign-trade system. Serbia criticized the rights of the autonomous provinces. For their part, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia expressed their concern particularly over the critical state of inner-Yugoslav relations. Each side felt discriminated in its own way.<sup>47</sup>

Starting in the spring of 1971, the mass movement MASPOK spearheaded what it intended as a very public debate over constitutional reform in Croatia. A choir of voices called for more independence for their republic, including the top party leaders led by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, the cultural organization Matica hrvatska and its weekly magazine *Hrvatski tjednik* (Croatian weekly), student representatives, and the media. Some wanted Croatia to have its own army and foreign policy, even redraw the borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats complained about a loss of culture and political status, discrimination, and economic exploitation—in other words, very typical grievances that

had already marked the national discourse in the first Yugoslavia.<sup>48</sup> However, it would be too simple to explain the “Croatian Spring” as having evolved solely from a new nationalism; in reality, it was born out of a broad spectrum of political orientations and motivations.<sup>49</sup>

The first issue on the agenda was the language question, accompanied by the complaint that the nation was bleeding to death because 224,000 men and women had left the country to work elsewhere in Europe.<sup>50</sup> Franjo Tuđman announced in Krapina that assimilation “under the banner of socialism” threatened the Croats since it placed into question “the very existence of the Croat people.”<sup>51</sup> The *Hrvatski tjednik* heated up the debate further by claiming that the Yugoslav government was conducting a “genocidal type of denationalization.”<sup>52</sup>

Additional topics were discrimination and outside infiltration. Already in 1970, party leader Savka Dabčević-Kučar expressed her “major concern that Croatia is becoming more the home of Serbs and other nationalities than the home of Croats themselves.”<sup>53</sup> Therefore, the constitution needed to be changed in a way that defined the republic in the future as a “sovereign nation state of the Croat nation” (and no longer as a republic of peoples with equal standing). Moreover, Croats were said to be underrepresented among the police, officer corps, and higher administrative positions, a claim that was often made but was very hard to substantiate, because only in the case of the People’s Army and the news agency Tanjug does reliable evidence exist proving that Serbs and Montenegrins were overrepresented.<sup>54</sup> Likewise the prominent theme of betrayal surfaced, as it did in all discourses on threat, as the economist Marko Veselica explained: “The main enemy of the Croat people is its own Croatian bureaucracy, which had to be non-national in order to cooperate with the centralistic forces of Greater Serbia.”<sup>55</sup>

Other core demands were focused on the topic of economic exploitation. Using all forms of media, Marko Veselica propagated the idea that Yugoslavia prospered at Croatia’s expense because the federation exploited his homeland and Serb dominance created colonial dependence. For this reason he demanded a radical revision of the currency system, an autonomous management of taxation and banking, and fewer contributions to the structural fund. In this line of argument, the fact was simply swept under the rug that Croatia profited from the common Yugoslav market and even developed faster than others.<sup>56</sup>

It was at this point that calls were first heard for more sovereignty, sometimes even for the republic’s independence. The purpose was to “complete the mental and territorial integrity” and “statehood.”<sup>57</sup> If Yugoslavia wanted to survive, then only one path remained: to transform it into “a community of truly sovereign and thoroughly equal peoples.”<sup>58</sup> Thus, the “Croatian question” became the overall dominant obsession during the summer and autumn

of 1971, complained the British ambassador, and the centralists in Belgrade were being blamed for every little thing that went astray in Croatia, even the previous year's poor potato harvest.<sup>59</sup>

In early July, Tito summoned the Croatian leadership: "I am very angry. . . . Croatia is the key problem in our country when it comes to the frenzy of nationalism. It exists in all of the republics, but is now the worst in yours. . . . I expect from you . . . decisive action [against nationalism]. Anyone who cannot decide to do this, for whatever reason, should resign their position," he ranted.<sup>60</sup> The crisis came to a head when Zagreb students under the leadership of Dražen Budiša occupied the university in November 1971 and called for a general strike. At the demonstrations, thousands of people yelled "Long live the independent state of Croatia!"

A highly enraged Tito ordered the Croatian leadership to Karadjordjevo in December 1971, where he made it absolutely clear that valid demands would indeed be discussed but that he would not tolerate any mobilization of nationalism to extort from him acceptance of these demands. He decided to strip the party leadership in Zagreb and Belgrade of power. The first people to be forced to resign were Savka Dabčević-Kučar and two other Croatian functionaries. The Croatian party expelled 741 members, 511 lost their positions, and 189 people were arrested. The "Zagreb Eleven," primarily members of the cultural institution *Matica hrvatska*, were tried in court, including Franjo Tuđman, who was charged with propagating Croatian independence, working to establish an illegal counterrevolutionary organization, and cooperating with fascist exile groups.

The second round of expulsions was directed against the liberal economic leadership in Belgrade, headed by Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović, because they had criticized the dominant role played by the Communist Party. They also backed calls for a greater degree of federalization in Yugoslavia as demanded by Croatia, which they believed would strengthen Serbia by benefiting it economically. Their motto was "a modern Serbia"—by which they meant a strong state free from all Yugoslav ballast. The liberals in Belgrade were also forced to resign following Tito's intervention.<sup>61</sup> Last but not least, the "liberalistic" head of Slovenia's government, Stane Kavčič, was forced to resign in 1972. Kavčič had been a protagonist for more Slovenian autonomy and a spokesperson in the previously mentioned "road affair." Similar events occurred within the parties in Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where people alleged to be nationalists were expelled from the party ranks.<sup>62</sup>

All this left the ideology of Yugoslavism quite tarnished by the early 1970s. Not only was it suspected of disregarding the national interests of its peoples at the expense of an abstract supranational community or of cloaking

Serb hegemonic ambitions, but it was also being criticized in national-oriented circles in Serbia. The communist leadership made painstaking efforts to avert any suspicion of this type. Everyone should and had to identify themselves with a nation, nationality, or ethnic group, and whoever refused to do this appeared shamefacedly in the 1971 national census in the very last category of “Yugoslav,” placed in quotation marks. More sovereignty was now transferred to the constituent entities, which revealed a new problem: the incongruence of ethnic and political boundaries. Only in Slovenia did they overlap for the most part. Otherwise pluralism hampered the simple equation of “nation = republic.” If people were to be given more latitude to express their national identity, then this also had to be true in the republics where they constituted a minority. This, in turn, programmed ethnic segregation within a multicultural society. Moreover, radical souls even questioned the territorial order. Mihailo Djurić, a philosophy professor and member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, was an adamant opponent of confederalization and criticized at a public event in March 1971 that the borders of socialist Serbia were “neither national nor historical.” If the reform process made it necessary to create one’s own nation state, then the fate of fellow countrymen in neighboring republics had to play a role as well, he argued.<sup>63</sup> Djurić was sentenced to prison but was later permitted to return to the university.



# 15.

## After the Boom Years (1971 to 1980)

In the 1970s, Yugoslavia entered an economic recession, as did all of Europe. The oil crisis triggered radical socioeconomic structural change throughout the Western world. Economic slumps and the competitive pressure from low-wage countries brought not only the old European industrial system to its knees but also the societal model that had so definitively shaped the continent's economy since the nineteenth century. Entire industrial sectors collapsed. Factory work, the leading harbinger of economic hope during the industrial era, gave way to the service sector. While the West lost its basic trust in perpetual, unhampered industrial growth, Yugoslavia's economy fell onto hard times. After the boom years, the socialist system faced its gravest problems of credibility.<sup>1</sup>

### *Turbulence in the Global Economy*

Triggered by the 1973 oil crisis and the collapse of the international currency system, the global economy experienced serious turbulence that severely rocked traditional industrial sectors, such as mining and heavy industry, which were the foundation of the Yugoslav "economic miracle" and the *raison d'être* of the socialist system. While in the West the "third industrial revolution" heralded the transition to the information and service society, global structural change and the worldwide economic crisis put the planned economies of Eastern Europe under unrelenting pressure. In Yugoslavia, massive production losses and sales problems reduced the financial feasibility of importing consumer goods. Amplified by bad planning, mismanagement, lack of investment, and technological gaps, the terms of trade worsened for Yugoslavia: imports became more expensive and the trade deficit grew. In the face of surging unemployment, it became increasingly difficult to fund the growing welfare expenditures.<sup>2</sup> Also, consumerism had created expectations of continued economic growth that, as now became clear, could not be satisfied indefinitely.

The downfall of the culture of plenty and pleasure resulted in the deep disappointment and disillusionment of many. Hence, support for the system began to slip away.<sup>3</sup> But no alternatives were immediately accessible to the relatively underdeveloped socialist country of Yugoslavia with its outmoded economic structure. Therefore, the demise of industrialism brought about an irreversible loss of legitimacy for the socialist regime.

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslavs attempted to compensate their loss of income with foreign loans. Since no one wanted take responsibility for the economic slump, republics and provinces borrowed more and more money from abroad. Paradoxically, Yugoslavia experienced its all-time greatest surge of investment in this decade. Hundreds of new streets, hotels, sports arenas, and libraries sprang up, which caused the public to believe in the existence of a prosperity that did not at all correspond with the country's economic performance. In this way, the republics led the state into a fatal debt trap. Between 1973 and 1981, the total sum of liabilities rose from \$4.6 billion to \$21 billion. In addition, between 1975 and 1981, the interest rates tripled, from 5.8 percent to 16.8 percent. Since the republics doggedly refused to cut back on expenditures, all the central government could do was to print ever more money.<sup>4</sup> The Eastern bloc countries also attempted to stem the crisis with increasing foreign loans. As a result, the level of debt in the Eastern bloc states grew from \$6 to \$110 billion between 1970 and 1990.<sup>5</sup>

At the impressive rate of 8 percent, economic growth still remained high, while investments and mass consumption continued to expand and real incomes climbed to their highest levels. Between 1965 and 1975, beef consumption rose from 6.2 to 14.7 kilograms per capita, while that of fish rose from 1.5 to 3 kilograms. Energy consumption increased more than threefold.<sup>6</sup> The warning signs of a serious crisis, such as increases in the trade deficit, inflation, the cost of living, and unemployment, were consistently ignored.<sup>7</sup>

The crisis intensified the tendencies toward societal disintegration inherent in the system, which had been allowing the republics and provinces to drift farther and farther apart since the 1970s. Whereas the state in Western industrial countries was taking on a greater role in governance, in Yugoslavia more economic responsibility was being shifted to the regions in the wake of decentralization, thus eroding the Yugoslav market and its infrastructure. From 1970 to 1980, the exchange of goods between the constituent republics dropped from 27.7 percent to 21.1 percent, and four-fifths of production either remained in the place of origin or was shipped abroad. Railways, postal service, and foreign trade were divided *de facto* into eight subsystems that interacted less and less with one another.<sup>8</sup> Wages and incomes also increasingly diverged at a dramatic pace. The market mechanisms strengthened the competitive disadvantages of the less developed regions. By the mid-1970s,

the Slovene population was already seven times richer than the Kosovars. Despite the good intentions at the start, the government's redistribution and structural policies were now facing a credibility crisis that endangered not only economic but also social and political cohesion.<sup>9</sup>

In the end, Yugoslavia, like all socialist states, was not sufficiently adaptable to master the global challenges of the secular transformation, namely, to understand the structural change evolving from the shift to an information and communication society or at least to tap into new technological niches. The consequences were drops in economic growth, unemployment, government debt, and hyperinflation—and a glaring loss of political legitimacy.<sup>10</sup>

### *Bonapartist Reactions*

As the inner-Yugoslav disputes over politics and the economic problems increased, Tito focused on cultivating international relations, as if to distract from the state of internal affairs. At the beginning of the 1970s, Yugoslavia's international status was stronger than ever before. The government signed additional agreements with the United States that ensured economic aid, exports, and investments, which complemented its bilateral trade relations with West European countries. Even the tense relations with Moscow since 1968 eased again, and in 1971 Leonid Brezhnev visited Belgrade. Tito sought neutral allies in advancing his proposal for a European security conference meant to lead to the recognition of the territorial status quo (meaning two German states) and eventually to the dissolution of the two political blocs dividing the continent. He was all too happy to assume the role of an impartial mediator between East and West in the early phase of *détente*. At the 1972 consultation meeting in Helsinki in preparation for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Yugoslavia distinguished itself by making an innovative proposal to advance confidence-building measures between opposing militaries that set standards for the subsequent negotiation process. Tito excelled in his role as the European peacemaker and was even suggested as a possible nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Once the Helsinki Final Act was passed in 1975, he invited the conference participants to Belgrade for a follow-up meeting in 1977. At this point Yugoslavia also developed friendly relations with China.<sup>11</sup>

The demeanor of the Yugoslav leader on the international stage stood in strange contrast to his behavior at home. Following the shock of the "Croatian Spring," Tito decided to grasp the reins of power tighter in his own hands and to allocate greater importance to centralism once again. A law passed in 1973 stripped the media of some of its freedoms, and leading editors and cultural functionaries lost their jobs to people trusted to follow the regime's policies. "The means of disseminating information, the press, radio, television, must

be in our hands and not in the hands of those who work against our unity,” declared Tito. “We were too hell-bent on democracy.”<sup>12</sup> In 1975 a restrictive law was enacted that penalized hostile and counterrevolutionary activities, and by the mid-1970s roughly 4,000 political prisoners were behind bars in Yugoslavia. Only Albania and the Soviet Union imprisoned more people proportional to the size of the population.<sup>13</sup> The regime resorted to political intimidation, monitored and locked up tens of thousands of people it found suspicious, while Marshal Tito continued to insist that “our revolution is not eating its children.”<sup>14</sup> As it turned out, Tito’s system punished critics and nationalists but then adopted their main demands as its own. For example, the long-frowned-upon song “Our Beautiful Homeland” ascended to become the Croatian national anthem by way of a constitutional amendment in 1972.

In Serbia, artists and philosophers found themselves subjected to growing pressure from the regime. A series of “Black Wave” films were banned, as were books from Praxis philosophers, social critics, and writers like Dobrica Ćosić. Even the famous Korčula Summer School and the magazines *Praxis* and *Filozofija* were shut down. Professors from the University of Belgrade, such as Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, and Dragoljub Mićunović, were suspended in 1975. Whereas most criticism of the system had been articulated within public institutions and structures up to that point, it was now voiced in the more open realm of civil society, as was occurring everywhere throughout Eastern Europe.

The “Basket 3” of the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 by the CSCE member countries, including Yugoslavia, guaranteed freedom of speech, which served as an irrefutable basis for the cause of the civil rights movement. In petitions and open letters, the Yugoslav opposition protested against the occupational bans leveled against university faculty members. Following the example set in Poland and Czechoslovakia, so-called “flying universities” emerged in 1976. Critical intellectuals organized lectures and discussions in private dwellings and printed oppositional magazines like *Časovnik* (Clock) and *Javnost* (The public). Yet dissidence remained a rather peripheral phenomenon in Yugoslavia. Rock music illustrates how great the overall approval of the system was for most of the population. Djordje Balašević, a singer very popular throughout all of Yugoslavia, had a hit in 1978 titled “You Can Count on Us” (*Računajte na nas*). Speaking for his generation, Balašević swore his unconditional allegiance to Tito and his state. “In Yugoslavia’s relatively happy, consumerist, hedonist, megalomaniac ecstasy,” complained Dobrica Ćosić, “the public word was powerless.”<sup>15</sup>

The regime attempted to compensate for the lack of democratic liberties by further expanding self-management. The 1976 Law on Associated Labor helped advance decentralization. Free market competition was replaced with

the so-called negotiated economy. The self-managing councils in the factories, plants, and firms were to decide themselves about production levels and profits. New “Basic Organizations of Associated Labor” (OOUR) were established as the hub of the societal order. They were meant to help workers exercise more input, quite in keeping with Marxian “free producers.” Several OOURs banded together into “Complex Organizations” (SOUR). In addition, there emerged a complicated political system of delegates who, proceeding from the self-managing bodies, elected the district and provincial assemblies, which in turn elected the parliaments of the republics. In 1982, approximately 71,000 delegations existed with a total of about 767,000 members.<sup>16</sup>

In practice, the reform did not lead to the foretold withering away of the state but to an even greater proliferation of bureaucracy. By the end of the 1970s, 1.5 million new regulations had been adopted. The bureaucracy grew eight to eleven times the size of bureaucracies in countries of comparable size.<sup>17</sup> This resulted in further systemic disintegration and institutional confusion because a polycratic tangle of various self-management bodies evolved in nearly all institutions. For example, the Yugoslav postal and telephone company broke up into 291 basic organizations and the air traffic control authority into fifty-two. Countrywide, a total of 94,415 grassroots democratic entities of this type were operating in 1980.<sup>18</sup>

In the end, the idea proved illusory that the negotiated economy, self-management, and the frequent rotation of delegates could actually breathe more democratic life into the one-party state. The Yugoslav system represented merely a higher form of institutionalized ineffectiveness that placed political opportunism ahead of economic rationality, canceled the rules of a market economy and entrepreneurial professionalism, bloated the size of the bureaucracy, and invited irresponsibility, wastefulness, and abuse of office.

#### *The Constitution of 1974*

Another area that seemed to offer compensation for the democratic deficit was in the politics dealing with nations and nationalities. The reform process begun in 1967 in favor of greater decentralization culminated in the 1974 constitution. A few core competencies remained centralized at the national level, such as the implementation and enforcement of federal law, the regulation of the economic order, and the defense of the country. Several confederative elements were added, such as the equal representation of the republics and their veto rights in federal bodies, and the collective head of state in the form of the nine-member presidency. Thus, Yugoslavia transformed itself into a “federation with several confederative characteristics.”<sup>19</sup> The decentralization advocated by Kardelj had little to do with democratization, since state power was just transferred away from the federal level to the republics, without having created any real control mechanisms.

Politically speaking, the greatest foreseeable point of contention in the constitutional reform was the status of Kosovo, for neither the Albanians nor the Serbs were satisfied with the way this issue had been settled. Prishtina resented that it had been denied the status of a republic. Although, for all practical purposes, being a republic would not have added significantly to the autonomy Kosovo already enjoyed, the decision left Albanians feeling degraded, both constitutionally and politically. What seemed too little to them was far too much to the Serbs. Belgrade was frustrated that Serbia was the only republic with a federal structure, like a miniature Yugoslavia. Its autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo could vote on all key matters in Serbian politics, but they could forbid Belgrade from intervening to any degree in their affairs. For example, the provinces prevented the creation of a uniform economic development plan, the passage of a common defense law, and a centralized collection of statistical data in Serbia. In 1977, the Kosovars were enraged when it was discovered that the Serb leadership had listed the various problems in a "blue book." An altercation was in the making until the wing of the party loyal to Tito intervened to rein in the adversaries. Tito decided simply to sweep the matter under the rug for the time being.<sup>20</sup>

The constitution of 1974 subjected politics at the national level to a complicated negotiation process between the republics. Nearly every issue became automatically laden with national fervor. Federalism and proportional ethnic representation institutionalized competition and conflicts between peoples and republics, not between political and ideological ideas. This reinforced the trend toward affirming national affiliation over Yugoslav citizenship. In practice, the principle of equal representation in parliament meant that a delegate from Montenegro represented about 20,000 citizens, while one from Serbia represented 200,000 people. Because the communists had given priority to the management of diversity, meaning the equal standing of nations and nationalities, they had neglected the main postulates of liberty and democracy. Tito's Yugoslavia rested per definition on the consensus of its peoples and republics, meaning on collective, not individual, rights. With time, the elites of the republics showed an ever-stronger tendency to compensate the glaring democratic deficit with a "real-existing nationalism."<sup>21</sup>

These same mechanisms to secure power were reproduced on a smaller scale in the republics themselves, with a striking lack of political participation and transparency. Once they were bestowed with more federal rights, the republics and provinces possessed all of the insignias of statehood. This did not lead to democratic competition but to national polarization. Political careers were pursued nearly exclusively in the institutions and party organizations of each of the republics, where things were not run any more democratically than they were at the national level. Instead, the system encouraged ethnic pillarization. With the exception of the military, there were practically no

channels for advancement in an integral Yugoslav context and no institutions with a nationwide base of legitimacy. Opaque networks developed among regional party leaders, bureaucracies, and major business firms. The communist “politocracy” created a polycentric system that was nearly unsurpassable in its inefficiency and lack of transparency.<sup>22</sup>

Science and culture illustrate the distance that had developed among the republics by the 1970s. Part of the doctrine of “brotherhood and unity” was to allow each people to cultivate its own culture of memory through such means as scientific research, school books, monuments, and publishing. This meant that the principle of federalism also dictated the political uses of history: each republic authored its own national narrative and created its own historical images, and no republic was allowed to interfere in the affairs of any other.<sup>23</sup> For this reason, the republics were free to devise school curricula on their own. This led to a situation in which pupils were taught little about Yugoslavia in their schools, but all the more about the history, literature, and geography of their nation and republic. In Macedonia, for example, middle school pupils spent twenty-one class hours learning about Macedonian literature and only five hours about the literature of the rest of the country. A person attending school in the 1970s learned very little about the other republics and peoples of Yugoslavia—an important step down the road to institutionalized alienation.<sup>24</sup>

### *Tito's Charismatic Leadership*

Although the 1974 constitution placed governmental power in the hands of a collective executive body, Tito's epochal and almost unchallenged personal authority still remained indispensable for the system. The constitution had made him president for life, thus putting him in a unique position in the hierarchy of power. The rotation principle that had been applied to leading positions in government thwarted all attempts of prospective successors to inherit the political throne of the aged autocrat during his lifetime. As the republics drifted farther and farther apart and all of the governance functions of the centralized state vanished in the vortex of the highly chaotic political system, Tito's own power grew boundlessly.

Despite his eighty years, the Yugoslav head of state radiated amazing vitality and phenomenal self-confidence. He ingeniously mastered the art of symbolic communication that mattered so much to the man and woman on the street. A foreign observer once accurately described Tito's political style as that of a communist king. His stockpile of honors, titles, and symbols of power included seventeen palaces, villas, and hunting lodges, a fleet of state-owned automobiles, yachts, and particularly the “Blue Train” in which he traveled all across the country. For the most part, Tito governed from the seclusion of his private quarters, surrounded by only a few advisers. Critics may have grumbled about his vanity, hedonism, and monarchial demeanor, but it did not

seem very advisable to express such objections openly in light of his immense popularity. "It's far better to have a *bon vivant* type of dictator like Tito than an ascetic type like Stalin," noted a historian. "Our man enjoys the good life and understands that we want to live better as well."<sup>25</sup> An elderly lady from Sarajevo said: "Honestly, the people have never had it so good. He lets them live and enjoy life."<sup>26</sup>

Tito appeared in public sometimes as the beloved father of the nation, sometimes as the mentor of the common folk in their struggle with the bureaucracy. Every year he received thousands of letters: "Dear Comrade Tito: We . . . employees of Zvezda supermarket no. 8 in Kisać, love you and respect you so much we cannot describe." The villagers of Uzdolje, Knin, Croatia wrote: "May God bless you and care for you for the benefit of all of us, our dear comrade Tito."<sup>27</sup> Dobrica Ćosić, who scorned Tito as the "greatest enemy in this century of my [Serb] people," noted in his diary his disappointment over the fact that the country's youth in particular were so incredibly fond of the president. "I am almost completely alone with my anti-Titoist feelings. . . . I feel so lonely, completely isolated."<sup>28</sup>

From Tito's popularity radiated the nimbus of greater democratic consent. He was able to silence special national interests when he pointed out the threat to the common good. One example was the conflict, mentioned above, between Serbs and Kosovars over their respective criticism of the constitution of 1974. At Tito's request, they simply swept their differences under the rug. Tito glossed over the fact that this was not a solution to the problem by presenting himself as the fair-minded mediator of conflicting interests. He was always exceedingly careful to maintain ethnic symmetries when he intervened, so that his verdicts would not spawn any nationalist myths of victimization. When, in 1971/1972, he dismissed first the Croatian and then the Serbian leadership from office, he did this without any public humiliation. Above all else, his personal image was not to be damaged by his actions.<sup>29</sup>

Everyone knew that many decisions would have ended differently in the 1970s without Tito, even long before the Five-Year Plan for 1976 to 1980 was passed by the respective governing body solely because Tito commanded it to happen. Yet looking at the situation the other way around, the autocratic system of unbridled authority continued to function without a hitch. As the Croatian politician Savka Dabčević-Kučar remembered: "Even when a resolution was finally more or less ready to be voted upon following arduous deliberations in the elected bodies of representation and then Tito suddenly appeared with a fully new and contrasting proposal, his was adopted without objection."<sup>30</sup>

Anyone looking closely at the situation, however, could see how much things were already stirred up behind the scenes. Many were feeling restless. Leaders of the republics wanted even more power. The postwar generation



found it intolerable that anything could justify permanently excluding people with different opinions from political participation. Serbs and Albanians in particular, who rejected the constitution, waited impatiently for the moment when the last guarantor of the status quo stepped down, because the system would remain superficially intact only as long as Tito used his uncontested authority to ensure a fairly tolerable balance of interests.

In retrospect, the 1970s proved to be the profound turning point in which the tracks were laid for the collapse of the system in 1989/1990. The end of industrial modernity worldwide undermined the pillars supporting Yugoslavia's postwar economic boom. The transition to a postindustrial society nullified the central paradigms of socialism: industrial progress and social justice. The system offered solutions to problems that no longer existed—its ideology had literally outlived itself in the poorly developed countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, *détente* brought about a new international context. As outside pressure diminished, political-ideological solidarity dwindled and even the cohesion of the nonaligned bloc dissipated. All in all, the later loss of legitimacy for Tito's societal model was now predestined, even if this was not yet fully evident. Progress was proving to be no longer plannable; the credo of socialism was turning into an illusion. With courage born of despair and a great deal of ignorance, the Yugoslav system stuck doggedly to its now unrealistic promise of prosperity. It financed an overextended public sector on credit, refused to undergo fundamental reform, and thus acted as the guarantor of outdated industrial structures.

PART V

AFTER TITO  
(1980 TO 1991)



## 16.

# The Crisis of Socialist Modernity (1980 to 1989)

On the afternoon of 4 May 1980, in Split, the soccer game between two national league teams, the Croat Hajduk Split and the Serb Red Star (Crvena Zvezda) Belgrade, was interrupted early in the second half for an important announcement. The crowd learned from the stadium loudspeakers that Josip Broz Tito had died in Ljubljana after a long illness, shortly before his eighty-eighth birthday.

Yugoslavia froze in its tracks. The country was fully unprepared for his death; many were deeply distraught. “I remember this day very well,” recalled the journalist Gordana. “People were running in all directions. . . . Some were crying. . . . It seemed to me that it was as if they had to go and look after their firm or office because the father was dead.”<sup>1</sup> What was going to happen now that Tito was no longer there?

Tens of thousands gathered to say farewell when the famous Blue Train transported the coffin to Belgrade. The square in front of the central train station in Zagreb was “so packed with people that you could literally feel the breath of the people behind you on your neck. . . . Shock, sadness, and weariness about the unknown future were on people’s faces.”<sup>2</sup> Spontaneously the crowd sung a traditional, moving, and melancholic tune, a ballad from Tito’s homeland Zagarje that was well loved throughout Croatia: “*Fala!*”—Thank you!

Meanwhile, preparations were underway in Belgrade for the official state funeral. The attendance broke all existing records: 209 delegations from 128 countries, including four kings, six princes, 31 presidents, 22 prime ministers, and 47 foreign ministers, paid their respects to the Yugoslav president. Never before had the multiethnic state received so much international recognition and attention.<sup>3</sup>

*Crisis*

After Tito's death, things got bad quickly. Before the year was out, the socialist state of Yugoslavia had already slid into the most serious economic, political, and social-psychological crisis of its existence. In the wake of the second oil crisis and the global recession that followed it, production and productivity began to fall in 1979. All of Europe struggled with economic problems, but nowhere were the problems as devastating as in the socialist countries. Like the entire Eastern bloc, Yugoslavia's prosperity had been supported by the massive expansion of heavy industry in the early decades of the postwar era. The chase to catch up industrially had made growth and modernization possible, but it had also produced structures that had become outdated in the capitalistic global economy. At this point, the degree of flexibility was the decisive factor in mastering new challenges, such as a switch to highly specialized sectors like electronics or telecommunications.<sup>4</sup> Yugoslavia's production was underfinanced and technically outdated. The bureaucratically cumbersome and privileged-based "negotiated economy" did not prove adaptable to the new global environment. Take the example of Zastava, once a very successful car manufacturer that had produced the legendary *fićo*. The story of its attempt to introduce the small car Yugo 45 to the American market speaks volumes—quality, service, and marketing were simply not competitive. In 1989 only eighteen cars were sold in the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Because demand for Yugoslav products shrank, the country's foreign trade balance slipped into the red. Like Poland and Hungary, Yugoslavia was also forced to parry the blow of decreasing revenue and foreign credit with a strict austerity course. Less expenditure caused investment, income, demand, and turnover to plummet. In 1983, Yugoslavia experienced negative growth.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, inflation rose at an annual rate of 45 percent, even 100 percent starting in 1985. That same year, people's real income was only worth half of what it had been in 1980, so that the standard of living fell significantly.<sup>7</sup> Social problems followed on the heels of the economic ones. "The inflation . . . doesn't care a whit about the official prognoses," wrote *Borba* at the end of 1985. "The majority have emptied their pockets, milked their household savings dry, put themselves on a diet . . . banned trips to the movies."<sup>8</sup>

The exorbitant reliance on credit in earlier years now took its toll. The state had taken on 85 percent of its liabilities between 1976 and 1981 and thereby amassed debts amounting to \$21 billion. The huge jump in interest rates on the international finance markets drained the country's foreign currency reserves. In 1982 alone, the government had to come up with \$1.8 billion just to service its debts.<sup>9</sup> Budget deficits grew larger and larger, making it impossible to hide the fact that the borrowed funds had been squandered on major political projects, often with no consideration of efficiency. Gigantic

sums had simply vanished in the system: in 1988, only eight of the \$19 billion in loans could be linked to a specific borrower.<sup>10</sup>

As the economy shrank, the ranks of the unemployed swelled and exceeded the million-person mark in 1984. The younger generation was hit particularly hard. Over 60 percent of jobseekers were under the age of 24, and 74 percent of them were female.<sup>11</sup> Since the 1970s, it had become difficult to work abroad as a guest worker, so people from the poorer regions of the country now migrated to the more developed ones, especially to Slovenia and central Serbia. As incomes dropped, social unrest and strikes escalated. In January 1983, supply shortages sparked violent looting in Titograd and led, in 1987, to a widely publicized labor conflict in the Croatian town of Labin. A year later, in 1988, around four million people participated in nationwide mass public protests; even physicians, teachers, and journalists went on strike.<sup>12</sup>

Faced with this dramatic economic situation, the republics developed fundamentally different ideas about the types of reform needed. Implementing more restrictive monetary, finance, and foreign trade policies, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded if it were to approve more loans to the country, meant handing back greater control to the central government over the expenditures and revenue of the republics and establishing a more unified and centralized economic policy. During the phase of decentralization in the 1970s, the governments and banks of the republics and provinces had amassed considerable competencies that now thwarted attempts at macro-economic stabilization. The wealthier republics feared that federal regulation would be to their disadvantage; they argued instead that it was not the fragmentation of the domestic market that was responsible for the economic crisis but a misguided investment policy, the waste of funds through aid and subsidies to the poorer republics, and the exorbitance of these same republics. Not only did they want to pay less into the federal development fund, they now wanted even more authority in order to protect their industries from the pressure of competition. In 1985 alone, they blocked the passage of three laws designed to regulate exports.<sup>13</sup>

The economic crisis also intensified the conflicts over redistribution between the wealthier and the poorer republics. Because Slovenia and Croatia refused to contribute about 10 percent of their investment revenue to the development fund, the flow of capital and investments to the receiver republics diminished, which widened the gap even further between rich and poor. At 222.9 points, the index value of Slovenia in 1989 ranked far ahead of the Yugoslav average (= 100), followed by Croatia with 128.4 points. At the other end of the scale, Bosnia-Herzegovina garnered only 66.3 and Kosovo just 26.1 points, meaning that the Slovenians were nearly nine times richer than

the Albanians.<sup>14</sup> Another crass difference existed even within Serbia. Since the Second World War, the level of prosperity had not improved in any other Yugoslav entity as greatly as it had in Vojvodina (about 29 percent) and had not worsened as drastically as in Kosovo (about 19 percent).<sup>15</sup>

Following Yugoslavia's successful phase of catching up with the West in the initial decades of the postwar period, the economic crisis in the 1980s pushed the country back down to a level below that of 1970.<sup>16</sup> In 1984, the annual per-capita income in Yugoslavia was \$1,850. Poland and Hungary had similar averages, while the Soviet Union recorded an average of \$4,300 and East Germany of \$5,400.<sup>17</sup> This was a hard blow to the Yugoslavs, both materially and psychologically.

While official statements at first assured people that the country was only undergoing a temporary setback in economic growth, by early 1983 even party functionaries were no longer mincing their words: the crisis was frightening, threatening, and bottomless. Party chairman Mitja Ribičič warned about "Polish conditions," and Jure Bilić, a member of the presidency, declared that many principles and programs of this united Yugoslavia were based "on illusions and sometimes even on fantasy."<sup>18</sup> It took quite a while until authorities finally admitted the full extent of the depression and, in 1983, launched a program aimed at stabilizing the economy. For experts the program offered too little and came far too late.

#### *After Tito: Tito!*

Many people in Yugoslavia believed that Tito's greatest mistake—besides dying—was that he had not groomed a designated political heir. However, there is little evidence that another charismatic leader would have been able to perpetuate Tito's model of governance. Yugoslav society had since become far too diversified and divided. Many sides were pushing for more pluralism and a system in which competing opinions and interests could be openly articulated and settled: intellectuals, bourgeois middle classes, civil society groups, and the media constituted the critical public that demanded more freedom of opinion, democracy, and civil rights. Journalists working at more than 3,000 newspapers and magazines and more than 200 radio and television broadcasting companies made it clear that they no longer wanted to simply parrot party positions. In 1982 and 1983 there were still several cases of censorship, and the editors of *Danas* and *Politika* were forced to resign their posts.<sup>19</sup> Yet the difference was that the number of publicly critical voices had become very large, so large, in fact, that in 1983 the ideology commission of Croatia's Communist Party abandoned its efforts to document comprehensively in its White Book the flood of articles, podium discussions, dramas, poems, novels, films, and critiques that denigrated the achievements of the revolution, socialist values, and even Tito himself.<sup>20</sup> The political leadership

in the republics also did not see the purpose of encouraging the emergence of a strong new integrative figure on the national level. The weaker the central government was, the more leeway the federal entities enjoyed to pursue their own interests.

The regime clung to the hope, against all odds, that Tito's integrative influence would continue after his death. Undeterred, the traditional relay race was held on his birthday, posters and T-shirts were printed, and huge, highly visible slogans were posted across the Yugoslav landscape. But the motto of "After Tito: Tito" sounded more like whistling in the dark than a defiant and determined assertion. It would take a wave of political trials and a new media law to lock the ideological coordinates once again.

In 1981, a group of Croat "nationalists" stood trial, including Franjo Tuđman. Tuđman was sentenced to two years imprisonment for propagating abroad that the Croat people were being discriminated and exploited. Among other things, he had told an émigré newspaper in 1977 that the number of victims who died in the Jasenovac concentration camp had been greatly exaggerated "for the sole purpose of creating some kind of collective and eternal guilt of the Croat people."<sup>21</sup> In Kosovo, Adem Demaqi, editor of *Rilindja* and a cofounder of the Revolutionary Movement for a United Albania, was charged along with other Albanian activists, including the prominent communist Azem Vllasi.<sup>22</sup> In Sarajevo, a trial was held in 1983 of Alija Izetbegović and twelve others on the charge of Islamism. They were accused of spreading propaganda in favor of a pan-Islamic state and of maintaining contact with the Iranian ayatollah's regime. The court found that the demands for the introduction of the sharia, the veiling of women, and the ban on mixed marriages represented attacks on the principle of "brotherhood and unity." The accused were sentenced to years of imprisonment.<sup>23</sup>

What actually sparked the fight for more democratic rights was an operation by Belgrade police. In 1984, they stormed a private dwelling in which the Flying University had gathered to hear a lecture by the dissident Milovan Djilas. Six of the professors attending were arrested and brought to trial. However, the sharp-tongued defendants succeeded in transforming the trial into a tribunal against the repression of freedom of speech and to sway public opinion against the regime.<sup>24</sup> In a very similar way, the public was also mobilized by the conviction of Vojislav Šešelj, Bosnian-Serb sociologist, to eight years in prison for his article "What Is to Be Done?" In this article, he called for the restructuring of Yugoslavia into only four republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. In his opinion, there was no justification for the existence of the autonomous provinces and the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.<sup>25</sup>

Although most of these sentences were significantly mitigated later, the political trials electrified the public and ignited a widespread mobilization



of the (at first primarily Serbian) intelligentsia for more democratic rights. A group led by Dobrica Ćosić formed the Committee for the Defense of Freedom of Thought and Expression in 1984, which drew up a “Proposal for the Establishment of Rule of Law” two years later. This proposal called for free elections, a free press, an independent judiciary, and the abolition of the one-party system. The committee also wrote a petition demanding the release of the Bosnian “Islamists.”<sup>26</sup>

So, as it turned out, the political trials did not even come close to having the impact desired by authorities. Instead of intimidating dissidents and indoctrinating the public, they only underscored the legitimacy of demanding more civil rights. Nationalistic émigré associations located in the United States, Canada, Argentina, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland intensified their propaganda activities. Examples were the Croatian National Committee (Hrvatski narodni odbor), the terrorist group Otpor (Resistance), and the émigré magazine associated with it, *Nova Hrvatska* (New Croatia). Macedonian, Albanian, Slovenian, and Montenegrin separatists were also active.<sup>27</sup> By conducting these political trials, the regime inadvertently upgraded the status of these nationalists and other radical souls, turning them into champions for freedom of opinion and democracy. Politically, these groups profited considerably from this at the end of the decade.

The economic crisis was also accompanied by a serious political crisis of legitimacy. It even threatened the heart of Titoism, namely, socialist self-management. This very characteristic element of Yugoslav socialism had originally been introduced by Edvard Kardelj, who died in 1979, a year before Tito. The early success of socialism had been built on the postulate of industrial progress and social justice. However, the global crisis of industrialism and the transition to postindustrial society robbed socialism of its legitimacy and ideals. With unapologetic ruthlessness, scientists, entrepreneurs, journalists, and critical intellectuals began to deconstruct this key political myth. The crisis was addressed in the media and at countless public events held at universities, student associations, and institutes, where party functionaries, managers, and prominent political figures came under fire for their incompetence and extravagance. The problems of nepotism, profiteering, and corruption were also highlighted.<sup>28</sup> It now came to light that the system had brought about a “total bureaucratization of a socialist society” and produced new forms of alienation instead of leading to the withering away of the state.<sup>29</sup> Researchers proved that workers’ self-management was no more democratic than state socialism or capitalism: employees turned out to be quite poorly informed; very few were familiar with terms like inflation, budget, amortization, and profitability; and only a minority had even a rudimentary knowledge about their own firms.<sup>30</sup> Real power lay in the hands of a self-aggrandizing

political caste of functionaries, factory directors, managers, and experts, who used the workers' collective only as a quasi-democratic guise for technocratic decision making. Eighty-six percent of all decisions in a firm were based on proposals put forth by its management.<sup>31</sup>

It was thought that economic decline was not the cause but the result of a far greater crisis in the social and political system.<sup>32</sup> The League of Communists was accused of being the core of the problem since its eight provincial organizations had not been able to define and implement common policy in years. In 1983, the national parliament only passed eight of twenty-five important laws, while decisions on the rest were postponed for an indefinite period due to a lack of consensus. Federal decrees, where they existed, were simply ignored by the republics and provinces.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the party had long given more priority to the interests of civil servants, managers, and professionals—who, with time, had come to comprise a high percentage of its membership—over the interests of workers and peasants. The League of Communists insisted on exerting its influence in state institutions and societal organizations as a sort of centralized counterweight to the republics. The circle of those who occupied key political functions was relatively small, but these people thus had even more influence and remained at their posts all the longer. The party had established oligarchic power structures, which enabled decisions to be made in informal ways instead of going through official institutional processes. The state and the party were closely, far too closely, intertwined, which is why many believed it would be impossible to undertake structural reform.<sup>34</sup> Against this backdrop emerged a very serious problem of credibility: in 1986, surveys showed that 88 percent of young Slovenes and 70 percent of young Croats did not wish to become members of the Communist Party. In Serbia the figure was 40 percent.<sup>35</sup>

In this charged atmosphere, an intense and amazingly frank public debate ensued about domestic reforms. It centered on three controversial questions: whether to have communist one-party rule or pluralist democracy, more or less centralism in the constitution, and a liberal market economy or socialist self-management. Wasn't it evident, as the Zagreb professor Jovan Mirić stated in *Borba* in 1984, that the excessive federalization of the 1974 constitution was responsible for the fragmentation of the domestic market, for a grid-locked system, and for reform coming to a standstill? Or was the opposite true, that perhaps the demands from Belgrade for an even greater centralized authority were the actual cause of all problems? In October 1984, Serbia presented proposals for reform that were to strengthen the federal government and curtail the veto rights of the autonomous provinces. Leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Croatia, and Slovenia were incensed. The Slovenian central committee made it known immediately that any attempt to change the status quo

of the constitution would represent a serious threat to Yugoslav unity. This killed any further debate on long overdue reform.<sup>36</sup>

*“Kosova Republika!”*

One year after Tito’s death, violent demonstrations took place in all of Kosovo’s larger cities. For Albanians, it seemed as if the time had finally come to fulfill their desire for full equality. Political frustrations and the lack of occupational prospects conjoined to feed the fires of discontent that first ignited at the University of Prishtina and soon spread across the entire province. Rallying around the slogan of *“Kosova Republika!”* demonstrators demanded the founding of an independent republic for all Albanians living in Yugoslavia, meaning those of Kosovo, West Macedonia, and Southern Serbia—not excluding the possibility of a later unification with Albania, as one of their leaders at the time, Bardhyl Mahmuti, explained. The radical-nationalist diaspora incited unrest to a dangerous degree, with the support of Enver Hoxha’s secret police.<sup>37</sup> The cause was widely supported because the constitution of 1974 had guaranteed the province extensive autonomy and representation in all institutions, including the federal presidency, but had not raised its status to that of a republic of equal standing. Even more disconcerting was that the Serb leadership was contemplating at the time whether to abolish Kosovo’s existing autonomous rights.<sup>38</sup>

Nine people died in the unrest, more than 200 were injured, and the Serb patriarchate in Peć went up in flames. The party leadership condemned the irredentist-nationalist uprisings because they supported the idea of founding a Greater Albanian state. Following the unrest, the League of Communists and Kosovo’s educational system were purged, and martial law was imposed for a while. More than 1,600 men and women stood trial, 585 of whom were convicted. The League of Communists expelled over 1,000 members, many of whom then emigrated.<sup>39</sup>

The uprising revealed the deeper dimensions of a problem that neither communism nor federalism could have solved. In the forty years since the end of the Second World War, no region had made such great strides in its development as Kosovo and still remained so far behind all others. The federal government had invested billions in the impoverished province—far too much from the standpoint of the donors, far too little from the standpoint of the recipients. In any case, Kosovo had undergone a dynamic development since 1945. The share of the farming population fell from 80 percent to 36 percent, and the situation in the education and health systems improved substantially. Nevertheless, the province continued to fall further behind. In 1947, the level of prosperity in Kosovo equaled 52 percent of the Yugoslav average; in 1980 it only reached 28 percent.<sup>40</sup> Social indicators also revealed discrepancies. The

illiteracy rate of people over the age of 10 was less than 1 percent in Slovenia but more than 17 percent in Kosovo.<sup>41</sup> Kosovo became the code word for the failure of Yugoslavia's policy of cohesion.

Another contributing factor for the backwardness stemmed from the high rate of demographic growth among Albanians, which lay at 2.5 percent annually (compared to the Yugoslav average of 0.7 percent). On average, every Albanian woman bore seven children, causing Kosovo's population to double in twenty years. Thousands of people did not have adequate employment, and the unemployment rate was more than three times as high as it was in Yugoslavia as a whole.<sup>42</sup>

Shocked by the riots, the Yugoslav government came up with a new plan to invest another \$2.5 billion into the development of the southern province by 1985. Actually, the Kosovars had no reason to complain. In the 1970s more than 30 percent of the financial resources from the Yugoslav development fund flowed into their province; in the 1980s this figure was up to 42 percent. However, the relative backwardness and the immense problems caused by economic cycles intensified the feeling among Albanians that they were being treated unjustly and placed at a disadvantage.<sup>43</sup>

While the Kosovars believed that the status of a republic would finally free them from what they thought of as colonization and would increase their prosperity, local Serbs complained of discrimination and assaults. By then, Albanians constituted a clear majority of the population in the southern province. Between 1948 and 1991 their share rose from 68 percent to 81 percent, whereas that of the Serbs fell from 14 percent to 10 percent.<sup>44</sup> A third of the Serbs and Montenegrins left the region after the Second World War, a total of about 131,000 people. A real thrust in migration followed the 1981 unrest. Many non-Albanians saw no future for themselves in the province, and a "run for your lives" atmosphere grew. "You take your child to school, and she comes back saying that the teacher left Kosovo forever during the night. You go to the doctor and his cleaning woman tells you that the doctor moved to Serbia yesterday," explained one Serb woman. "Do you know what it means when all around you is collapsing?"<sup>45</sup> Every fourth Serb migrant cited economic motives for fleeing, while all the others feared insecurity, discrimination, or even physical assaults.<sup>46</sup>

Real problems, vague and diffuse fears, and other emotional factors inflamed national passions and phobias on both sides in what were almost perfect mirror images of each other. Even though it is true that the province represented a rather abstract entity to most Serbs, many others still felt a strong emotional tie to their "Serb Jerusalem," the place that was home not only to the Orthodox patriarchate in Peć but also to the most important Serb churches and monasteries. Because of the myth-enshrined Battle of Kosovo, this region

was and is a type of national shrine and “a question of the spiritual, cultural, and historical identity of the Serb people,” as was stated in an appeal issued by twenty-one priests in April 1982.<sup>47</sup>

In the early 1980s, Serbs began to see Kosovo as a metaphor for everything going wrong in the country, given the all-encompassing crisis facing them. In 1985, Dimitrije Bogdanović, a historian of Serbian medieval literature, published a work titled *The Book on Kosovo*, with which he provoked an emotional controversy by arguing that the Albanians had been intentionally ousting the Serb population out of Kosovo since 1912/1913. Although the Serbian Communist Party condemned the book as destructive and nationalistic, emotions got heated.

Kosovo became a public obsession through the case of Djordje Martinović, a farmer from Gnjilane, who showed up at a hospital severely injured on 1 May 1985. The brutally primitive and sexual mistreatment of this victim, which was drastically embellished with each retelling, became a metaphor for Serb suffering in Kosovo. One event then followed another. In September, Kosovo-Serb politicians submitted a petition with 60,000 signatures supporting the abolishment of the province’s autonomy and the removal of Albanian symbols of nationalism, such as flags and national coats of arms, from public life. In January 1986, 200 Belgrade intellectuals, artists, writers, church representatives, academy members, and professors sent a petition to politicians and the media demanding that the rule of law be reestablished in Kosovo. Suddenly consensus prevailed across all political camps, including several people who would be critics of Serb nationalism in the 1990s. The earlier struggle for freedom of speech and civil rights now took on a clear nationalist tinge. Kosovo came to symbolize the collective discrimination, humiliation, and victimization of Serbs by the Yugoslav state in general and by the Albanians in particular.<sup>48</sup>

*“No one may beat you!”*

While Serbia’s political class was inching its way to the conviction that nothing could be expected out of Kosovo except trouble, the 44-year-old Belgrade party functionary Slobodan Milošević discovered that this was the topic that could further his own political career. During a trip to the southern province in April 1987, outraged Serbs told him that they had been beaten by police during a demonstration. His response—“No one may beat you!”—became the rallying cry with which Milošević promoted himself from then on as the man to rescue the nation from the supposedly indifferent leadership of the older party establishment. Milošević, who had been the former director of Beogradska Banka, one of Yugoslavia’s largest banks, now enjoyed a meteoric political career. In 1987 he became party chairman, in 1989 the president of Serbia.

Milošević presented himself as someone on whom both nationalists and communists alike could pin their hopes. He cultivated Serb national interests, opposed changes to the political system, and rejected multiparty democracy, while at the same time proposing liberal economic reforms. In his opinion, the key to overcoming the crisis lay in a unified, integrated, and liberalized Yugoslav market that would replace the autarkically operating mini-economies of each republic, a system in which each one could paralyze all the others. Therefore, he propagated the recentralization of Yugoslavia, starting with the abolition of the autonomous provinces within Serbia. With the help of mass demonstrations, he launched an “antibureaucratic revolution” against the caste of functionaries, the *foteljaši*, by which he was able to put his own coterie into place.<sup>49</sup> In a surprising coup in October 1988, he stripped power away from the leadership of Vojvodina and installed those who supported his political line. What drove him was actually not nationalism as such, but his cold-blooded instinct for power. Many Serbs were enthusiastic about this dynamic politician, who not only offered practical solutions to problems but also soothed the battered Serb soul. Blessed with considerable political talent, Milošević was above all the typical product of a system on the verge of collapse, a system that propelled a technocratic mover and shaker with the right instincts for the zeitgeist to the top. The consequences of his rise to power were so momentous because he mobilized and radicalized nationalistic moods, projected longings for a strong leader onto himself, and thereby neutralized democratic alternatives. More importantly, with his proposals for restructuring the federation, Milošević bulldozed Serb interests over those of all others and gave the debate about the constitution a new quality, which other parts of the country perceived as threatening.<sup>50</sup>

The matter that overrode all else for the Serbs was that theirs was the only republic that was not completely sovereign since, for all practical purposes, it was a tripartite entity. The constitution of 1974 enabled the autonomous provinces within Serbia to block Serbian policies with their veto, but Belgrade was not allowed to interfere in their internal affairs. The Serbian leadership complained that their colleagues in Prishtina hindered almost every decision. Therefore, Belgrade was extremely interested in changing the legal framework and in centralizing all of Yugoslavia to a greater degree.

Among intellectuals, discontent was brewing. In September 1986, the widely read newspaper *Večernje novosti* (Evening news) published excerpts from a secret “memorandum” written by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU). Among its authors were such renowned intellectuals as the writer Antonije Isaković, the historian Vasilije Krestić, the economist Kosta Mihajlović, and the philosopher Mihajlo Marković. Dobrica Ćosić had only indirectly “inspired” the text. The memorandum caused a storm of indignation

within Serbia's Communist Party and the broader Yugoslav public. In dramatic words, it conjured up long-familiar nationalistic scenarios of various threats to Serbia and propagated its main paradigm, the self-stylization of Serbs as a victimized nation.

One thread of argument running through the fifty-page memorandum was that the crisis at hand put Serbia and the Serbs in a precarious situation. It plausibly described the economic setbacks, political disadvantages, and cultural humiliation resulting from a thirty-year history of exploitation and discrimination. In Kosovo, the Serb nation had been experiencing "open and total warfare" since 1981 and "physical, political, legal, [and] cultural genocide." Two new ideas were introduced: first, the Serbs in Croatia had been exposed to a clever and very effective policy of assimilation, which was hollowing out the unity of the nation. Second, a Slovenian-Croatian conspiracy for power, personified by the Croat Tito and the Slovene Kardelj, was responsible for all of this. In conclusion, the text called for the "full national and cultural integrity of the Serb people, regardless which republic or province they live in." This implied that national—Serb—unity had to be restored.<sup>51</sup>

While Serbian president Ivan Stambolić called for personnel changes as a consequence of this obituary for Yugoslavia and the media leveled a barrage of accusations against the academy, the authors protested the "illegal removal and publication" of an unfinished and unauthorized text that was obviously addressed to the Serbian government.<sup>52</sup> Contrary to what was reported later, the memorandum did not contain any specific plans for "ethnic cleansing," let alone a finished and implementable war plan. The importance of this document lies in the dramatic depiction of the disadvantages and threats and the lament over the betrayal, conspiracy, and losses that Serbs had suffered, presented in emotionally stirring imagery. In a concise presentation, the text included all of the emotive, provocative, and controversial issues that the new Serb nationalism drew upon. To no small degree, the discourse mirrored the mood of nationalist intellectuals, who were sinking ever deeper into self-pity. The theories on victimization and conspiracy, presented always in the collective singular ("the Serb people"), showed the willful and intentional loss of any sort of capacity for empathy. They were implicitly antidemocratic and explicitly anti-Yugoslav.

A similar Slovenian document was published just a few months later in January 1987 as a special issue of the opposition literary journal *Nova revija* (New magazine). The tenor of the publication was also directed against the Yugoslav state using similar nationalistic stylistic devices. It presented what it called "Contributions to the Slovenian National Program" drafted two years earlier, in 1985. Unlike the Serbian memorandum, this publication was expressly addressed to the public. It argued that the Slovene people

were threatened with extinction, its language was being repressed, its economy exploited. The republic was being handicapped, overrun by immigrants, and militarily “castrated.”<sup>53</sup> One of the contributing authors maintained that Yugoslavia was pushing Slovenia toward “national catastrophe” and “national erosion.” If the nation did not forcefully defend itself, then it was doomed.<sup>54</sup>

At this point, neither the leadership in Ljubljana nor the leadership in Belgrade adopted the standpoints of these nationalist intellectuals. Slobodan Milošević even started an “ideological offensive” against SANU and the Serbian writers’ guild.<sup>55</sup> However, by then the seeds for national solidarity movements had been sown.

### *From Alienation to Disintegration*

Throughout the 1980s, the republics continued to drift further apart at an ever-accelerating pace. They cut themselves almost completely off from one another, politically, culturally, and economically. In doing so, people’s lives and perceptions became estranged from one another, and their understanding of the realities and experiences of other peoples dwindled. Topics like identity, sovereignty, and national interests increasingly dominated public discourse.

There was a great outcry in 1983 when the central government proposed a compulsory core curriculum for the schools in all republics. The purpose had been to create a common base of knowledge and to facilitate the transfer from one school system to another should a pupil move to a different republic. The Slovenes found it thoroughly unacceptable that half of the lessons in the disciplines of language and literature be dedicated to Yugoslav topics and the other half to topics dealing strictly with their national culture. Writers in particular were quite outspoken against what they saw as an insubordinate interference in Slovenian cultural sovereignty.<sup>56</sup> In the mid-1980s, when concerned historians commissioned a review of history books used throughout Yugoslavia, a surprising fact came to light: the curriculums of the six republics and two autonomous provinces shared no more than a minimum of common learning content. Topping the list of the nineteenth-century historical figures mentioned most often in all the curriculums was one man: Napoleon Bonaparte.<sup>57</sup>

Politically, the relations between the republics had become quite beleaguered. A notorious example for the rocky basis of trust was the 1987 affair involving the food company Agrokomerc from the western Bosnian town of Velika Kladuša. The company’s director, Fikret Abdić, had accumulated a huge amount of capital by issuing promissory notes without coverage. He invested this capital in the firm and the local infrastructure and thus created an impressive political powerbase for himself in the region. In the end, the banks were left with unpaid debt equaling hundreds of millions of dollars, and the scandal forced leading Bosnian politicians to resign. *Pars pro toto*, the



scandal revealed the self-aggrandizement, self-indulgence, irresponsibility, and corruption of the leadership in the republics and exposed the entangled interests of politics and business. Many suspected that the Agrokomerc affair only represented the tip of the iceberg.

Against this backdrop, Slovenian leaders were no longer willing to make concessions to the welfare of Yugoslavia as a whole. Economic necessities and political divisions all spoke in favor of discarding the political ballast of Yugoslavia. This republic of two million represented 8 percent of the population, but financed over 25 percent of the national budget and about 18 percent of the development fund. Leaders demanded more sovereignty, including more rights for the territorial defense of Slovenia at the expense of the Yugoslav People's Army. The youth magazine *Mladina* started a campaign for military conscientious objectors and the right to do one's military service in the republic's own forces instead—a stab in the back for “brotherhood and unity.” When three journalists were arrested in June 1988 for their critical reporting on the federal army and the betrayal of state secrets, a massive wave of solidarity arose. In Slovenia, where traditions of democracy and civic activism were rather strong, a pluralistic civil society landscape had developed in the 1980s that consisted of intellectuals, peace movement activists, women's groups, human rights advocates, and youth magazines, among others. These people now mobilized support. Over one thousand activist organizations, churches, newspapers, schools, and factories signed a letter of protest on behalf of the accused.<sup>58</sup> Countless rallies aroused the public, and concerns about the Yugoslav state grew. In 1988, 59.5 percent of the population criticized the economic relations with Yugoslavia as being too close, and 72.6 percent felt federal politics had neglected Slovenian interests.<sup>59</sup>

As the political leadership in each republic grew more hostile toward the leaders of the other republics, popular solidarity with the nationalist cause gained momentum. The polarization between Slovenia and Serbia continued to widen, because both Milan Kučan and Slobodan Milošević used mass demonstrations as political stages. Over the course of 1988, intellectuals, the media, and civil society groups in both republics came out in support of the reform programs of their respective governments, which in Ljubljana was aimed at attaining a fuller degree of self-determination and democracy and in Belgrade at attaining more centralization and state control.

The fronts between the republics became increasingly entrenched. “It was clear to me there was absolutely no chance for Slovenia without serious reform,” Milan Kučan later explained, turning a blind eye to nationalist trends within intellectual circles and civil society, in particular the verbal attacks on the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). The JNA leadership, on the other hand,

were convinced they would have to draw the line and defend the unity of the country.<sup>60</sup>

Economic plight and the political incapacity to act perforated any willingness among the elite to compromise, accelerated the demise of legitimacy, enhanced the sense of meaninglessness, and intensified the loss of trust, all of which, in turn, undermined the central government's power to solve problems and produced reform gridlock. The pursuance of self-interest politics deprived the state of what little accountability it still had. The more complex and encompassing the crisis became, the more intransigently the adversaries behaved and the more improbable any strategies were to resolve it. Far more symptomatic for the situation was that all types of conflict were reinterpreted as genuine ethnopolitical antagonisms.

## 17.

# The 1980s: Anomie

From the mid-1980s onward, confidence in the functionality of the Yugoslav state vanished at an accelerated pace. The crisis filled people with uncertainty, destroyed their faith in the capacity of institutions to manage the crisis, wrecked the relations between the republics, and eventually branded even colleagues and neighbors as traitors and enemies. Social and political changes were perceived as omens of looming downfall and destruction. Trepidation about the future unsettled and paralyzed people; their faith in the established rules of ethnic coexistence dissipated.

### *Social Inequality*

In the 1980s, Yugoslavia had become an industrial society. The percentage of the population working in agriculture was only 29 percent in 1981, while the industrial and service sectors had grown to levels of 35 and 36 percent, respectively.<sup>1</sup> Every second person lived in the city, the acute housing shortage had been mastered, and even the supply of electricity and running water worked. Statistically, every tenth Yugoslav owned an automobile and a telephone; every fifth, a television. In 1979, Yugoslavs went abroad 22 million times. People had become accustomed to prosperity, international exchange, and vacation trips.<sup>2</sup>

Seemingly all at once, the crisis revealed the dark aspects of rapid socialist modernization. In 1980, half a million students were matriculated at universities, a figure that represented one young graduate for every 50 inhabitants (as opposed to 1:1,000 in the interwar period).<sup>3</sup> Since the economy not only failed to expand as quickly as the educational system but had even shrunk, a growing surplus of well-trained graduates flooded the job market, and young people thus had a hard time finding employment. In 1984, every second job-seeker was professionally qualified and every third was under the age of 30.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the system produced a large number of half-educated and semi-literate people: in 1981, 44 percent of the Yugoslav population had no

school diploma (as opposed to 80 percent in 1945). Every tenth Yugoslav still could not read or write.<sup>5</sup>

Among those who were hit particularly hard by the crisis were the millions of people who had been uprooted socially and emotionally by industrialization and rural exodus. In 1981, 41 percent of the population no longer lived in the place they had been born, and many of them made up the reservoir of a “nonagrarian, nonurbanized” class that now populated the peripheries of the cities.<sup>6</sup> These people had become city dwellers only in a statistical sense, but not in their attitudes and lifestyles. For them, the job prospects also looked dim. This created fertile soil for simple explanations and radical ideas.

In the three decades of its existence, self-management had not produced less social inequality but more—a situation that was only made worse by the economic crisis.<sup>7</sup> Income distribution in Yugoslavia corresponded with that of Western Europe in the 1980s. The 20 percent poorest households earned 6.6 percent of the national income (in France, 5.3 percent; in Great Britain, 7.3 percent). The middle classes, which made up 60 percent of the population, earned 54.7 percent, and the richest 20 percent earned over 38.7 percent—all very similar to the ratios of distribution found in capitalist countries on the continent. Blue-collar and white-collar workers no longer identified with their jobs any more than they did in France. Dissatisfaction and the degree of “alienation” was equally great everywhere.<sup>8</sup> The economic crisis facilitated this differentiation in income, because the slump did not affect all sectors and all of the employed equally. The 10 percent of the population at the wealthiest end of the income scale now owned more than the 40 percent at the lower end. These were proportions similar to those in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries.<sup>9</sup> However, the growing inequality raised questions about the credibility of the system in general and about the privileges enjoyed by the elites in particular.

The economic crisis and monetary devaluation hit a society in which status, prestige, personal satisfaction, and social identity were already being measured primarily by material wealth. The inflation rate not only eroded incomes, savings, and funds set aside for old age, it also posed a serious threat to the plans people had for their lives.<sup>10</sup> As everywhere in Europe, individualism and materialism were becoming more prevalent—and such attitudes often slipped quickly into cynicism when times got hard.<sup>11</sup>

The crisis radicalized existing dissonances: for one, between the aspirations for advancement harbored by the younger generation and the limited possibilities available to them in an economy that had long been stagnating; for another, between the status quo enjoyed by the older generation and the increasingly real threat of losing social and economic status. Social conflicts

between rich and poor, urban and rural, and particularly the nationalities became all the more evident in the context of such gloomy prospects for the future. The pressure of inflation also made it clear that socialism could not fulfill what it had promised: to provide employment, affordable housing, food, health facilities, and education.<sup>12</sup>

### *Experiencing Crisis and the Loss of Values*

Suddenly, the word “crisis” was on everyone’s tongue. It reduced the complex experiences of an entire decade to a single word, a code word for insecurity, trials and tribulations, and an uncertain future.<sup>13</sup> Against this backdrop arose a new type of scientific expertise: “crisology.” While the symptoms of the country’s impending destruction were being debated in the newspapers, economists and political scientists were investigating its origins and consequences, and pollsters were tracking down the moods and opinions of the populace.<sup>14</sup> All of this had great analytical value but very little prediction power and—more importantly—no practical impact on how to overcome the problems. If anything remained unexplained, it was that the crisis, in all its manifestations, had been astutely identified but no effective antidote had been discovered. The unpredictability of the future and a loss of orientation undermined the popular understanding of society and security, authority and identity, meaning and morality. Growing fears threw doubt on the values, institutions, and functionality of the political system as a whole. In 1985, it was reported that 31 percent of the population was plagued with concerns and anxieties, 19 percent had mixed feeling with regard to the future, and 10 percent had given into resignation and apathy and wanted to see a “strong hand” intervene.<sup>15</sup>

The youth in particular found themselves in a desolate situation. They either exhibited an especially aggressive and pessimistic attitude or, at the other extreme, succumbed to helplessness, indifference, and apathy. As one youth summarized, “you are young, but unemployed; educated, but feel superfluous; full of ideas, but can’t make any of them happen; just waiting around instead of having hope.”<sup>16</sup> Three-fourths of this generation developed a fundamentally anomie attitude: “Often I think that everything our parents worked for is being destroyed before our eyes,” said one. “Today everything is so uncertain; anything, really anything could happen,” said another.<sup>17</sup> These were indicators of a deep-seated identity crisis and a massive loss of purpose and orientation. They point to a mood that cried out for emotional release, for scapegoats, and for the eradication of the supposed cause of this entire malady.

People’s trust in the existing order was rapidly dwindling. In particular, the younger generation sought to question and rethink Yugoslav socialism and the very notion of Yugoslavism. A surge of debate erupted over the inability and irresponsibility of the political class and over the nepotism, highhandedness,

and corruption of the bureaucracy and technocracy. By the end of the 1980s, self-management, once the pride of the nation, had degenerated into an insult. Fundamental social values—those key virtues in the socialist codex of heroism like equality, solidarity, and self-sacrifice—crumbled.<sup>18</sup>

Imaginative metaphors attempted to put into words that which seemed unexpected and inexplicable. This crisis vocabulary depicted inflation as a quasi-alien force by evoking the idea of divine punishment (“hell of inflation”) or of a fatal illness (“cancerous tumor”) or of an unstoppable natural catastrophe (“biblical flood”). Such metaphors for inflation depicted people as the plaything of higher powers, tossed about with no control over their own fate.<sup>19</sup>

The crisis was increasingly perceived as the epochal threshold, as a time of upheaval pushing toward radical change. More and more people felt a diffuse wish for transcendence in a social world that was not necessarily rationally understandable.

### *The Revival of Religion*

As the bedrock of socialist ideological certainties crumbled, so too did the base for a rational world view and secular belief in progress. The emptiness was filled more often than not with religious interpretations—a typical human response when social order and patterns of identity suddenly collapse. The rediscovery of religion replaced former notions of socialization with communitization and reactivated faith as a constitutive element of identity formation. At the same time, each of the religious communities worked actively to glorify its own nation as being sacred.

In 1974, sociologists noted a gradual increase in religiousness, which by the mid-1980s had increased exponentially among the younger generation. In 1967, a third had called themselves religious; in 1987 it was already more than half. This figured neared those of Northern Ireland, Denmark, France, Great Britain, and West Germany. The personal search for meaning in life had since led every second individual back to church, if more for the purpose of cultivating national and cultural traditions than for reasons of faith. The values, orientation, and identities of religion filled the void that developed during the crisis.<sup>20</sup>

The clergy seized the opportunity to exploit the ever greater yearning for community, purpose, and transcendence and to regain at least part of their lost power to interpret and explain societal issues. After Belgrade reinstated full diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1970, the Catholic Church intensified its activities. For example, it held official commemorative days for Cardinal Stepinac, who was celebrated as a faithful servant to the pope, a bastion against the infidels, and a martyr for the rights of Croats. In 1960, the cardinal, who had been convicted as a war criminal, was buried with full

honors in the Zagreb cathedral.<sup>21</sup> In 1971, the Catholic Church declared the town of Marija Bistrica a place of pilgrimage, for this is where the apotheosis of the nation, a “Black Madonna” similar to the one in Poland, was enshrined. An international congress consecrated the holy shrine as “Our Lady Queen of Croatia.” In honor of thirteen centuries of Croatian Christianity, the Catholic Church held a novena, in this case a nine-year cycle of jubilee celebrations known as the Great Novena between 1975 and 1984. It was the stated attempt to tackle the “phenomena of secularization, urbanization, industrialization, and atheism” by reawakening historical and religious awareness.<sup>22</sup>

Not only did the Catholic Church explicitly direct its crusade against the social consequences of modernization, it also worked to reinstitutionalize the place of religion in national politics and to reassociate church and nation. The Marian cult was particularly effective for intensifying the close connection between the Catholic Church and the Croat nation. It also openly declared an affiliation with the Western-Catholic Occident and a disassociation with the Orthodox East. In 1984, more than a half million believers traveled from all over Yugoslavia to attend the National Eucharistic Congress at the shrine in Marija Bistrica—a gigantic spectacle that called for unification of the nation under the auspices of the church.<sup>23</sup>

However, the yearning for religious fulfillment could not be contained by existing institutions and dogma. In 1981, a group of children in the impoverished village of Medjugorje in profoundly Catholic Herzegovina were reported to have seen apparitions of the Virgin Mary. Although the bishop of Mostar critically noted that “this is all merely mass delusion, euphoria, and a spectacle for tourists,” the provincial town became a powerful symbol of Croat national consciousness and grew into an important pilgrimage site within a short period of time.<sup>24</sup> Suddenly 400 hotels, eighteen currency exchange shops, and five duty-free shops popped up out of nowhere to accommodate the ten million believers who visited annually.<sup>25</sup>

Tourism and anticommunism struck up a lucrative relationship. It was not by accident that the Madonna appeared close to the anniversary of the apparitions of 1917 in the Portuguese village of Fatima, an event that at the time mobilized millions of people all across Europe against Bolshevism. Likewise, the Madonna cult in Croatia possessed not only religious and cultural connotations, but also ideological-political ones in that it sacralized the Croat nation. It also recalled the ill-fated alliance between the Catholic Church, Franciscans, and the Ustasha regime. During the Second World War, horrific atrocities against Serbs had taken place in the vicinity, for which sixty-seven Franciscan monks were sentenced to death after the war. At least seventeen mass graves were known to exist. The Orthodox Church decided this was a welcome opportunity to honor the Serb victims of Croat fascism with a

commemorative ceremony. In 1991 it erected a memorial chapel dedicated to the “New Serbian Martyrs.”<sup>26</sup>

The Orthodox Church also endeavored to attract more believers back to church, which prompted it to draw more public attention since the late 1960s. For example, in May 1968, the patriarch put on a spectacular procession through the center of Belgrade with relics of the Serbian czar Stefan Dušan. A year later the church celebrated the 750th anniversary of its independence, and in 1975, the 800th anniversary of the birthday of Saint Sava, its founder. Enormous effort was expended to celebrate Vidovdan, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. The overarching theme was always the self-assertion of the Serb nation—and its unification. Such activity caused the communist leadership to become concerned about the possible revival of Greater Serbian ideas. As early as 1972, the Central Committee reported that a vision of Greater Serbia was indeed being idealized, that Serbs in Croatia were being instrumentalized, and that the Ustasha’s crimes were being exploited for propaganda.<sup>27</sup>

A new theological faculty was founded in 1984 in Belgrade, and a year later construction started in the middle of the city on the monumental cathedral of Saint Sava. When completed, the gigantic edifice would seat 12,000 believers and thus surpass the capacity of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul. Hundreds of thousands heeded the church’s call to participate in anniversary celebrations of major national events, whether the breakthrough on the Salonica Front in the First World War, the founding of the monastery Studenica in the Middle Ages, or the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. In June 1989, the remains of Saint Great Martyr Prince Lazar were transferred to the Ravanica monastery in an elaborate celebration on the occasion of the 600-year anniversary of the battle that cost him his life. In 1990 and 1991, the Orthodox Church organized a series of commemorations of the outbreak of the Second World War and the persecution of the Serbs.

For Islamic theologians and politicians, the end of the 1980s also offered welcome opportunities to establish closer ties between religion and national identity. In the day-to-day life of a Bosnian Muslim, a sense of identity had not been determined primarily by religion for quite a while; and for many, not at all. In 1990, only 37 percent of the Bosnian Muslims considered themselves religious, compared with 60 percent of the Slovenes and 53 percent of the Croats. Over 60 percent of them never visited a mosque.<sup>28</sup> However, nationalism provided an effective means by which to transform secular identity back into religious affirmation. Between 1969 and 1980, about 800 new mosques were built. In 1976, around 40,000 copies of the Koran and 50,000 copies of the brochure *How to Become Muslim* were distributed. In the following year, an Islamic theological faculty was set up in Sarajevo, where the next generation of religious teachers, both men and women, studied. Because of Yugoslavia’s



good relations to other nonaligned countries, many students were awarded scholarships to study in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or even Sudan.<sup>29</sup>

Generous donations from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya made it possible to build what would become Europe's third-largest mosque in 1987 in Zagreb, one nearly as impressive as those in London and Rome. An increasing number of imams adopted radical stances, and more clerics called for the return to Muslim traditions in order to revive religious laws, rituals, and customs, such as the fasting month of Ramadan, study of the Koran, pilgrimage, and the veiling of women. A key component of re-Islamization was the adherence to rules of behavior that set the Islamic community apart from others: the strict ban on mixed marriages and the consumption of alcohol, the education of children in the faith, and the use of Muslim names. Such religious customs also mobilized political forces. The journal *Muslimanski glas* (Muslim voice) maintained that "an important message for all who fight for truth, justice, and freedom" could be found in the Battle of Badr, an improbable military victory described in the Koran, which the Prophet Muhammad is said to have won with Allah's help in the year 624. Ramadan was the month of jihad and the defense of the faithful, wrote the magazine of the Ulema association. The "message" to the Islamic faithful was quite similar to that of the Kosovo myth, for it extolled important heroic values: faith in God, self-sacrifice, unity, and discipline.<sup>30</sup> In 1990 and at great effort and expense, the Islamic community commemorated the Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sixteenth century. Ajvatovica was dedicated as a holy pilgrimage site, and 100,000 faithful attended the celebrations remembering the arrival of Islam. For the first time, one could see green flags with Arabic inscriptions and thoroughly veiled women. Not only the Serbs and Croats, but also the Muslims now had a holy place in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was meant to represent the enduring character of their nation.<sup>31</sup>

In the late 1980s, all sides applied the semantics of religious symbolism quite successfully to mobilize support from their respective ethnic community for nationalist aims. While the economic-political crisis and its various contingencies undermined the established Yugoslav order, the resurgence of religious faith provided an alternative way to interpret time and history, to depict a complex and confusing reality simply, and to create a distant horizon of transcendence toward the greater ethnic community. The Madonna cult, the Kosovo myth, and the Battle of Badr sacralized each respective nation, suggested a privileged place nearer to God, and cultivated a deeply felt emotional connection to others of the same ethnicity that transgressed political borders and legal distinctions. In this way, the national theology of each group exalted itself to the point of becoming an absolutely binding normative value, which

required from every individual an unconditional willingness to sacrifice in order for it to survive.<sup>32</sup>

### *Politics of Memory*

Yugoslavia became obsessed with history. Historical topics flourished in academic research, popular publications, and memoirs. In the 1980s, the legitimacy of the League of Communists dwindled at the same rate that controversy proliferated over fundamental questions focused on the country's view of itself. Who are we in Europe? How did we become what we are? A contributing factor to this phenomenon was that many people who had lived through the Second World War a good forty years earlier were now reaching an age at which they felt the need to relate to posterity their own accounts and interpretations of events. The liberal atmosphere in the media also made it possible to address openly topics found in exile literature that had been previously taboo.

Two large and prominent projects reached an impasse already in the early 1970s because of outbursts of national antagonism: the *History of the Communist Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia* and the multivolume publication *History of the Yugoslav Peoples*. Croat, Bosnian, and Serb historians became so mired in controversy over the nineteenth-century nationalist movements that the monumental historical overview ended with the year 1800. The revision of the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* that had begun in 1975 also resulted in a half-hearted compromise: it was to appear in six different languages and a condensed English edition. The fact that the precarious consensus in historiography finally collapsed altogether in the mid-1980s reveals how serious the situation had become, not only in its ideological, economic, and regulatory dimensions, but also in the deepest regions of the collective subconscious.

The controversy over the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* had been simmering since the 1970s and finally boiled over into strong polemics at the end of the 1980s when the first volume of the revised edition was published. Particularly controversial were the contributions on the origins of the Albanians and the Montenegrins, the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the sections on language and literature in general. The project was discontinued in 1991.

The search for new identities, authorities, and political causes revived nationalistic constructions of history and stereotypes of ethnic differences. The main topic of revision was Tito and the events of the Second World War.<sup>33</sup> With the publication in 1980/1981 of a relatively moderate criticism of Tito in his book *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* (New contributions on the biography of Josip Broz Tito), Vladimir Dedijer opened the floodgates for the demystification of the great leader. Others subsequently dragged out into the

open the dark sides of Tito's character, the personality cult, and piquant details from his private life until the former hero of the revolution had been reduced to no more than a power-hungry, vain, egotistic, and politically confused old man.<sup>34</sup> The deconstruction of Tito served a twofold purpose. It made it possible to delegitimize both socialism as a political system and Yugoslavia as a multinational state. If Josip Broz had actually been just a decadent autocrat, then "brotherhood and unity" was only an illusion. After 1989/1990, Tito's public presence was also removed. Streets, squares, and cities were renamed, and his mausoleum was temporarily closed.

The Second World War also underwent reinterpretation. As early as 1983, Branko Petranović blurred the good-and-evil dichotomy between partisans and Chetniks in *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941–1945* (Revolution and counterrevolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945).<sup>35</sup> His colleague Veselin Djuretić carried the revisionist iconoclasm too far in his 1985 publication *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* (The allies and the Yugoslav war drama) when he rehabilitated the Chetniks and General Nedić as saviors of the Serb nation and claimed that the Western powers shared the blame for the communist takeover of power.<sup>36</sup> The Communist Party reacted by issuing toothless threats of sanctions against the apologia of the Chetniks but was not in a position to save even a sliver of consensus on the interpretation of war and revolution as its authority slipped rapidly away.

Even the circumstances leading to the communist takeover of power were critically reexamined when Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški denounced the Stalinist practices used between 1944 and 1948 and the destruction of the bourgeois multiparty system.<sup>37</sup> The regime was hit by an immense wave of criticism from all sides in culture, art, and science. Novels, dramas, poems, songs, and films focused on topics that questioned what until then had been the rarely contested legitimacy of the system. The poet Gojko Djogo was arrested in 1981 and later convicted because his book of poetry *Vunena vremena* (Woolen times) included metaphoric allusions to the tyrannical and ignorant regime of Tito. The banning of this book shook the cultural scene because it was the first time that the regime had come down so hard on a writer.<sup>38</sup> Emblematic of the awakening criticism by intellectuals was the genre of Goli otok literature, work that dealt with the persecution of Cominform sympathizers after 1948 on the infamous prison island of Goli otok. In 1982, Antonije Isaković's novel *Tren 2* was published; in 1985, Emir Kusturica caused a great deal of controversy with his film *When Father Was Away on Business*. That same year Slobodan Selenić published his socially critical novel *Father and Forefathers*.

The paradigm shift to nationalism manifested itself quite drastically in the debate on the victims of the Second World War, a topic that had raised

tempers for a long time and was also being exploited with relish in political publications. Few topics were as emotionally laden as the number of people who had been murdered, tortured, and displaced, and no other topic could be better used to celebrate the national myth of victimization that each national group thrived on. This debate discussed the ethnopolitical dimensions of the civil war and undermined the dogma of “brotherhood and unity” so fundamental to the Yugoslav order.

At the heart of the controversy was the concentration camp Jasenovac, one of the most prominent places in Yugoslavia’s collective memory and the signum for the politics of anti-Serb annihilation. Plausible sources calculate that about 83,000 people died in Jasenovac and another 120,000 in the other Croatian concentration camps.<sup>39</sup> However, Serb and Croat historians outdid each other in their attempts to decrease or increase the estimated number of victims. In an article published in 1986 titled “On the Genesis of Genocide on Serbs in the NDH” [Independent State of Croatia], Vasilije Krestić developed the theory that genocidal intent was a constitutive component, both historically and religiously, of the Croatian idea of nationhood, while Radomir Bulatović spoke in 1990 of a record number of 1.1 million victims. Franjo Tuđman, who had been challenging the official party statistics since the 1960s, repeated his well-known argument in an apologetic piece written in 1989 titled “Fallacies of Historical Realities.” In it he argued that no more than 60,000 people died in the Independent State of Croatia. He also maintained that the dimensions of the Holocaust were greatly exaggerated. Citing dubious witnesses, he attempted to prove that the camp in Jasenovac had been run by Jews, who were the ones actually responsible for selection and liquidation. These were the people who were truly guilty of persecuting the Serbs, he argued with reference to another source of information: “A Jew is a Jew . . . egoism, cleverness, unreliability, greed, treachery, and acting as an informant” were in his mind their most important characteristics. Tuđman did not limit his remarks to the past but spoke out on current affairs, noting that after the war, Nazi fascism became “Judeo-Nazism” because Israel was conducting a “true Holocaust” against the Palestinians.<sup>40</sup> A year after making those remarks, he warned that it should not be forgotten “that the NDH . . . was also the expression of the historical drive of the Croat people for an independent state.”<sup>41</sup>

Finally the time had arrived to create a myth of victimization for the Croat nation, something exile organizations had been cultivating for a long time. “Bleiburg,” the place where partisans had executed up to 70,000 collaborators at the end of the war, now became the metaphor of the anticommunist Croat resistance. The right-wing nationalist emigrant Ante Beljo blazed ahead on this path with his publication *YU-Genocide*. A flood of other studies, many

written by emigrants, spoke of up to a half million dead in order to show that the Croats had become the victims of a Serbo-communist “Holocaust” and had been forced into the “Yugoslav dungeon of peoples” only by armed force.<sup>42</sup> Although the discourse on crimes committed by the partisans was long overdue, the Bleiburg discourse that took place was apologetic. Terms like “holocaust,” “death march,” “exodus,” and “genocide” transformed the Ustasas into patriots and martyrs and the Serbs into archenemies—certainly not people to share a country with. In “Fallacies,” Tudjman also supported the claim of victimization. In 1997, the Croatian government even held a religious mass to honor those who died at Bleiburg.<sup>43</sup>

The academic field of history was not the only battlefield in the struggle to construct and deconstruct national icons. At least as influential were historical novels, films, and political publications that provided a public hungry for history with great tales of the past. Unlike scholarly work, fiction enjoys the unbeatable advantage that it can simply invent a master narrative—irrespective of actual historical events. Literarily sophisticated and emotionally stirring, the monumental three-volume *A Time of Death* and *A Time of Evil* by Dobrica Ćosić or *Knife* by Vuk Drašković transplanted the narrative of the Serbs’ suffering, embodied by the protagonists, to the historical settings of the First World War or the Ottoman Empire. About the same time, Mića Popović produced his Serbian Scenes Paintings that would come to represent the iconography of a new Serbian self-image. These and many other literary and artistic works conveyed the message that ultimate salvation lay in a revival of Serbian national consciousness.<sup>44</sup>

It was clear by the end of the 1980s that the communist regime’s attempt to filter out the civil war and nationalistically driven persecution from memory had failed, because the generation who had lived through it still had vivid memories, and their recollections of the most recent past and their own personal experiences were passed down through the collective memories of their family. The failure to deal with traumatic experiences in the past seriously hampered efforts to move beyond them. In fact, it benefited the nationalists’ efforts to mobilize public support for their cause. Their rhetoric appealed to repressed feelings of powerlessness, mourning, bitterness, and anger in people who had lost relatives during the war or had heard the stories of atrocity, and such feelings provided the perfect justification for taking preemptive measures of self-defense.

Yet it would be wrong to argue that the identity crisis of the 1980s simply revived the old conflicts. The experience of war is not a given with invariable influence; it changes in the process of remembering and with the language used retrospectively to describe it. The Yugoslav example shows how ideas about the past and the creation of historical consciousness are continuously

being filtered and reshaped into something new by existing social conditions.<sup>45</sup> In political confrontations it was rarely important what people and their forefathers had actually experienced. What counted was that interpretations of the past produced new perspectives of the present, which gave people a new orientation and generated ostensible legitimacy. The conflicts of the 1980s were not predestined to occur because of the bloody history of the Second World War, but because certain images of the past triggered fears that then affected and influenced people's thinking, feelings, and actions. To a degree they were instrumentalized deliberately by politics.

### *Political Communication and Populism*

By the mid-1980s, the old concept of a state-controlled public realm had become obsolete. Pluralism in the media and the lively cultural scene, featuring events and discussions in the larger cities, involved broader sectors of the population, so that debates on reform and alternatives to the system were no longer limited to smaller circles of intellectuals and dissidents. Whoever sought to speak to the ordinary urbanite or rural inhabitant needed to adopt a new language style and a new form of communication.

Spectacular political actions like mass marches and meetings drew hundreds of thousands into the streets. Those who could not attend watched broadcasts of the events for hours on television, which had meanwhile become the country's most important and favorite medium. Euphoric masses waved Croatian, Albanian, or Serbian flags, cheered the speakers, and chanted aggressive populist slogans. Slobodan Milošević was the first to mobilize the masses with such events, starting in 1987. During his "antibureaucratic revolution," so-called "truth rallies" were held even in the deepest backwaters of the land. Thousands of demonstrators held banners high that read "Only Unity will save the Serbs!" or "Czar Lazar, so unlucky you were, if only Sloba had been at your side awhile!" or "Mother Serbia, save us from the Autonomists!" or "Down with the Bureaucrats!"<sup>46</sup> In such settings, people came together as an ethnic collective, and the political messages drew on historical and folkloric slogans because economic deprivation, vulnerability, and fear of loss drove people to seek what they felt was familiar, ageless, and constant. Milošević successfully gave the distraught nation new hope after a decade of doubt and uncertainty and revived buried feelings of pride and unity.

At the heart of Serbia's political message in the late 1980s was the Kosovo myth, the source of the sacred allegories as applied to the Serb nation. It was the hinge between the spiritual, national, and political awakening and provided the historical underpinning for the widespread belief, common to many religions, that theirs was a chosen people. According to legend, Prince Lazar took his vows on the evening before the fateful battle and thereby prepared

himself for the “Kingdom of Heaven” for eternity. The religiously laden myth supported the Serbs in that it bestowed legitimacy on their cause that far surpassed all political arguments and justifications. In this decade, the Serbs were often referred to as a “heavenly people,” and this image became a pivotal figure in their discourse. The fateful battle between their heroes and traitors served exceedingly well as a metaphor for the times at hand. The narrative of the eternal battle for freedom and self-determination communicated a hope for salvation, encouraged Serbs to reassert their own identity, and helped mobilize and emotionalize the masses. Moreover, the religious overtones distinguished the Serbs from the Albanians, their rivals for what was seen as the embattled holy land Kosovo.

In 1989, Slobodan Milošević cleverly played up the Kosovo myth when he addressed the Serb people in a highly publicized speech celebrating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. He spoke of the past, but he meant the present and vowed that Serbia would return to its former greatness. Back then, like today, he said, “tragic disunity” was the cause of the malady to befall Serbia. At the same time, he also pointed to the future: new battles were ahead that would demand determination, bravery, and self-sacrifice. Milošević condemned the older generation of communists for their concessions to the Yugoslav state and led the crowd in cheers for freedom, justice, and brotherhood. The use of rhetoric imbued with cultural symbolism helped generate a common sense of identity, establish moral commitment, and suggest superiority over the stereotyped enemies of the people. “Kosovo” was the perfect metaphor to cloak political messages in universal and transhistorical validity and to link the present and the past by placing them side by side in a quasi-timeless context.<sup>47</sup>

Subsequent political movements and parties that formed starting in the late 1980s used similar communication strategies. For example, Slobodan Milošević was celebrated in Serbia as Tito’s heir, while in Croatia those campaigning for Tudjman praised him as the figurative descendent of the seventeenth-century conspirators and freedom fighters Petar and Nikola Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan.<sup>48</sup> Banks and firms also used folk epics in their advertising. The Chetniks emerged in the 1980s as the modern version of the Serb resistance movement from the Second World War. An entire commemorative industry produced magazines, pennants, emblems, postcards, CDs, and other memorabilia linked to the long-tabooed guerrilla fighters. They now became the protagonists in pop and rock music, in cartoons, and in other forums of youth culture. Other heroes reemerged from the nationalist pantheon: Prince Lazar and Miloš Obilić as the martyrs of the Battle of Kosovo, the Madonna of Medjugorje and Saint Sava, the Serb revolutionary Karadjordje and the Croatian Ban Josip Jelačić. Folkloric accessories, crests,

flags, iconic images of the saints, and insignias became important props of this commercialized mass culture.

Popular folk music set the emotional tone for the euphoria over all things ethnic. In the age of modern mass communication, it experienced renewed recognition and a political transformation. In the past, partisans and Chetniks had once fought bitterly to appropriate folksongs to their cause. These nationalistic versions were banned after 1945, but now enjoyed a revival.<sup>49</sup> The traditional folksingers—the gusle players—did their best at singing political ballads with contemporary references in the pedestrian zone of Belgrade. For centuries, such bards had traveled throughout the countryside with a simple type of single-string violin that they held vertically between their knees while singing about historical times and events in a lamenting, monotone voice. The old songs were the key to the microcosm of longings, fears, and fantasies that kept the oral traditions and tales alive from generation to generation.

The so-called “newly composed music” was a contemporary genre that became an important instrument in political communication. It adapted elements of folk music, supplemented with components of pop music and political messages. Cassette tapes were found everywhere with songs like “The Twentieth-Century Man,” which celebrated the birth of Slobodan Milošević as the birth of a new era.<sup>50</sup>

Not everyone was captivated by customs, epics, and myths. All over Yugoslavia, a new political generation, a cohort that had been socialized in the 1960s and 1970s, aimed at rethinking Yugoslav socialist federalism without necessarily negotiating its dissolution. Their main concern was bringing about greater freedoms and a new sense of civic identity and Europeaness rather than promoting a nationalist agenda.<sup>51</sup> Thus the constant exposure to the same stylized historical figures had an adverse effect on some, like the school pupil who found the required reading of the Montenegrin national epos *The Mountain Wreath* to be “ludicrous, exaggerated, rural, macho,” and simply “repulsive.”<sup>52</sup> However, for many others, such folklore developed an incredibly emotional and motivational power filled with new meaning. Like religion and history, it merged ideas about the past, present, and future; intensified deep and binding feelings of community; and created reservoirs of powerful, politically relevant trust.<sup>53</sup>

### *Multicultural Symbiosis and Ethnic Distancing*

Nationalist propaganda obscured the less spectacular realities of Yugoslav life. Most people lived with a twofold identity, being Croat, Serb, Macedonian, and so on, on one side and Yugoslav on the other. In a survey taken of 6,200 young adults in 1985, the majority said that they considered themselves to be Yugoslav citizens first and members of one of the constituent nations only



second. This opinion was held to a particularly large degree by Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs (76 to 80 percent) and less so by Croats (61 percent) and Slovenes (49 percent).<sup>54</sup> At the end of the 1980s, the large majority of those polled were still of the opinion that every community did not necessarily have to establish a nation state of its own.<sup>55</sup>

The Yugoslav census also revealed another interesting phenomenon: the massive increase of “Yugoslavs.” Between 1961 and 1981, the percentage of those who no longer claimed to belong to any nation or nationality but considered themselves only to be citizens of Yugoslavia increased from 1.7 percent to 5.4 percent, representing more than 1.2 million people. Because the number of “Yugoslavs” clearly increased faster than that of mixed marriages, it could be concluded that a gradual change was occurring in the attitude of the more mobile, better educated, and occupationally skilled younger generation.<sup>56</sup> Only Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians emphasized their ethnicity for reasons linked to language differences.<sup>57</sup> Because the political system did not provide for the representation of “Yugoslavs” and the central state was doing nothing in the way of active nation building, a full-scale discussion began on questions like: were Yugoslavs experiencing a stronger sense of community as political citizens or was this a new type of ethnicity? Was there only one form of (socialist) patriotism or could the love of country consist of two components (loyalty to the state and to the respective ethnic community)?<sup>58</sup>

Compared to the 1960s, however, the relations between the nationalities had worsened measurably. In 1985, most people described the ethnic relations in their neighborhood, republic, and in all of Yugoslavia as acceptable or good. The further people got from their own horizon of experience, the more negative their assessments tended to become. Ten percent attested to a poor interethnic atmosphere in their hometown, but 22 percent felt the same with regard to their own republic, and 31 percent thought so with a view toward the country as a whole. Most of those polled attributed ethnic tensions to nationalist propaganda, political egoism, regional disparities, and economic problems, not to religious, ethnic, and cultural differences.<sup>59</sup>

The social distance between nations and nationalities also widened at the end of the 1980s. The percentage of ethnically mixed marriages had not increased significantly since 1960 and averaged at 12 percent, even in ethnically diverse Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than half of those questioned expressed a moderate to very strong objection to marriage outside their ethnic community. Yet, even here the picture appears more complex because of the differentiations people made. Researchers found that the greatest aversions were to marriages between Macedonians and Albanians and between Serbs and Albanians. Relationships between Croats and Serbs caused the least aversions,

whereby among women, the less educated, and the very religious, many people tended to prefer complete ethnic seclusion.<sup>60</sup>

The spheres of socialization in which each individual moved varied, which helps explain why ethnic affiliation began to take precedence over state citizenship in the late 1980s. Although everyone was subjected to institutions extolling patriotic loyalty to the Yugoslav state, such as the schools, the military, and the workplace, the primary milieu of socialization was that of the usually ethnically homogeneous family. For example, in the villages of central Bosnia where Croats and Muslims lived side by side, neighbors still helped each other build houses and harvest crops; they met to drink coffee, chat, and watch television together just as they had in earlier times. Hospitality and a sense of village community shaped a social-moral code that each ethnic community considered to be part of their own innermost culture. Still, most people continued to believe that a marriage partner from another nationality would disrupt family life.<sup>61</sup> When institutions and values, and even the state itself, broke down at the end of the 1980s, nothing was left to counterbalance the trend toward ethnic segregation.

A person who argued that ethnic affiliation was gradually becoming insignificant in Yugoslavia was therefore just as correct as the person who argued that religion and ethnic affiliation were still paramount categories of identity. Especially in the large cities, a person's origin, nationality, and religion were of little interest in the 1980s, but the picture was quite different in the rural parts of the country, where the influence of family background, relatives, and ethnicity had never waned. This phenomenon of a simultaneous occurrence of very different if not contradictory perceptions explains why people's views and interpretations of the world around them differed so drastically and almost developed into ideological trench warfare in the 1990s. "Yugoslavia was a multicultural biotope," claimed one side. "No, it was a constant powder keg of primordial conflicts," countered the other. Actually, in the day-to-day realities of life, both occurred simultaneously: coexistence *and* conflict.

### *Fin de siècle*

Because social change had progressed at such a rapid pace and had simply overridden antimodern sentiments after 1945, society became all the more disconcerted when the dynamics of progress floundered and then came to a sudden halt. What had previously been applauded was now rejected and criticized. Similar to what was happening in the West, philosophers, writers, and artists became exasperated with an ever more complex and globalized world in all its negatives guises. Riding a wave of postmodern criticism of the existing order, intellectuals renounced key fundamental certainties of the

industrial age, such as modernity, progress, and the future. At the same time, earlier utopias like Marxism were thoroughly bankrupt, and ultraliberalism and market radicalism seemed to have exhausted their credibility because the shock therapy they prescribed had thrown the Yugoslav economy into an abyss of recession. No alternative societal models were in sight. Therefore, what happened first was the total deconstruction of all known dogmas. The protagonists of postmodernity fled into a rather noncommittal analysis of discourse, symbols, and culture, in which they offered no ideas of their own for explaining the past or shaping the future. The zeitgeist was plagued with a lack of orientation and an intellectual caste that had surrendered in the face of diffuse feelings and fantasies—all of which created the ideal conditions from which a new politics of identity could emerge.

The ideological vacuum and the identity crisis among intellectuals took on many manifestations. Only a very small part of society, one located in the more developed regions of the country, turned to the new social movements organized in environmental, peace, antinuclear, and women's groups. The majority drifted into seemingly nonpolitical types of group awareness, into consumerism, or into a generally apocalyptic mood. Hedonism and commodity fetishism shaped the lifestyle of the *dizelaši* (named after the fashion label Diesel), who believed in nothing except extravagant behavior. One critical contemporary commented: "The guys who belong to this, let's say, 'movement,' wear streetwear from the clothing brands Diesel and Nike, usually track pants, and—very important—they always stick their shirt into their pants. They are bald and look like bodybuilders. And it is very popular to run around packing heat. . . . The women fulfill the other half of the heterosexual code: sexiness, short skirts, bare midriff."<sup>62</sup> This all had very little to do with the traditional virtues of the Kosovo myth, but very much to do with the role models presented at the time in Rambo movies and commercial television broadcasts like MTV.

The music of the younger generation also expressed a change of values and a questioning of norms, as can be seen in the multitude of rock bands that existed as the vehicles of an increasingly aggressive protest culture. In 1982, there were about 3,000 rock bands in the entire country, but by 1987, the number had already increased to more than 5,000. The cult groups of the 1980s were Laibach (Ljubljana), Riblja čorba (Fish Soup) from Belgrade, Leb i sol (Bread and Salt) from Skopje, and Bijelo dugme (White Button) from Sarajevo, whose lead guitarist, Goran Bregović, gave the group's music a signature sound by combining Balkan folklore with Western rock elements.<sup>63</sup> In addition there were other types of music, such as punk, rap, techno, and heavy metal.

Instead of expressing social and generational criticism as had been done earlier, the bands of the 1980s like Šizike (The Lunatics), Električni orgazam (Electric Orgasm), Videosex, and 4R (The Fourth Reich) paid homage to an apocalyptic culture. Contemporary music was nihilistic, iconoclastic, Nazi-like, and pornographic in its texts, performance, gestures, habits, and symbols. The Slovene group Laibach startled with its Nazi punk, decorated the stage with swastikas, and sang the praises of Adolf Hitler. “We want a great totalitarian leader,” said one musician. “God is a totalitarian being. Totalitarianism, for us, is a positive phenomenon.”<sup>64</sup> Heavy criticism of societal values was coupled with aggressive fin de siècle moods. The group Satan Panonski sang in English: “Auto-destruction is eruption; it will destroy all my enemies, my victory is toxicant peace.”<sup>65</sup>

Soccer clubs had always cultivated a strong feeling of allegiance. In the mid-1980s, the stadiums first gave effusive fans a place to work off their frustrations in public. Hardly a game took place in which the public did not hold up posters featuring politicians and saints, wave flags, sing Chetnik songs, or give the fascist Ustasha salute. Hooliganism and violent incidents became increasingly frequent. Starting in 1989, the press was full of warnings about excessive chauvinism. In May 1990, violent rioting took place in connection with a Serbian–Croatian game. From then on, the aggression that had originally been focused on a competitive sport took on a dynamic of its own, and the soccer stadium became an arena for fights between nationalities.<sup>66</sup> One of the most well-known warlords was the president of the fan club for the Belgrade soccer club Red Star Belgrade, Željko Ražnjatović. In October 1990, he founded the Serb Volunteer Guard, also known as Arkan’s Tiger, and linked the milieu with a particularly vulgar version of newly composed music, *turbofolk*. In 1995, he staged a lavishly gaudy wedding event with his bride, the pop icon Ceca. Within his and other soccer clubs, a particular milieu of violence had emerged already by the late 1980s. Since daily life for many young men was fully devoid of meaningful activity, this void was filled with a latent chauvinistic and aggressive counterculture, with excessive drinking, video games, and violent pornography. It produced a hollow, sadistic atmosphere that later transformed into open bellicosity. Many of the members of these fan clubs would later join one of the numerous paramilitary units. Soccer teams represented the ethnic nation, and the fans were the soldiers. Not long after that, the worst atrocities of the war were perpetrated by these people.

## 18.

# Disintegration and the Collapse of the State (1989 to 1991)

### *1989: The Beginning of the End*

As communist regimes collapsed one after another throughout Eastern Europe, centrifugal forces in the multinational state of Yugoslavia grew stronger and the crisis there reached an unprecedented, dramatic climax. Political deadlocks prevented any hope of an orderly transfer to multiparty democracy and a market economy. The adversaries Slovenia and Serbia entrenched themselves ever deeper in what were, in principle, incompatible standpoints. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav political system did not have a procedure with which to solve such a conflict. Both sides remained unrelenting. They were willing to violate the system's established checks and balances and thus completely undermine the legitimacy of time-proven institutions like the constitutional court. From this point on, all that counted were the particular interests of each republic—the common good of Yugoslavia as a whole no longer mattered.

In one last major effort to turn things around at the end of 1988, the federal parliament introduced privatization and abolished the system of socialist property rights and self-management. However, it lost the battle against inflation, which was galloping at a rate of 2,700 percent, because the republics refused to reduce their expenditures substantially. On the advice of the International Monetary Fund, Prime Minister Ante Marković implemented a shock therapy in December modeled after Poland's example: he froze wages, stopped subsidies, and introduced the strict monitoring of expenditures. Although he succeeded in stabilizing the currency within a few months, many ailing government-owned enterprises still could not survive the liberal market competition. In mid-1990, the rates of growth and production both plummeted, and in December every other job was endangered by the new radically neo-liberal course.<sup>1</sup>

Growing tension in Kosovo pushed the Serbian parliament in March 1989 to rescind the province's autonomy for all practical purposes. In doing so,

Belgrade improved its ability to enforce its authority over the entire republic, but at the same time it squandered any remaining trust in the federal state. In light of the impending change of Kosovo's status, various associations of Slovene intellectuals called for a major rally in Ljubljana to demonstrate solidarity with the Kosovars. Demonstrators wore stickers with a Star of David and the words "Kosovo, my homeland." The parallels drawn to the Holocaust through this action angered the Serbian public, and within twenty-four hours a million people had gathered in front of the federal parliament building in Belgrade. They chanted "Slovenia lies!" and "Slovenia is a traitor!" The crowd directed all its hate against the Albanians and their Slovenian sponsors.<sup>2</sup>

Slobodan Milošević, who had become the president of Serbia in May 1989, continued to work single-mindedly toward the destruction of Yugoslav federalism à la Kardelj. In doing so, he whipped up other peoples' fears of Serb hegemonic politics and gave the rebellious regions a concrete reason to reject thoroughly any cooperation with Belgrade. The Kosovars boycotted Serbian institutions, and Ljubljana warned that the republic's party could declare independence if Belgrade failed to desist in its efforts to maintain its majority position.

In July 1989, Milošević presented a comprehensive proposal for constitutional reform in Yugoslavia in which the principle of consensus at the federal level would be replaced with qualified majority decision making. Milan Kučan countered by calling for an "asymmetrical federation." Each republic would separately negotiate its relations with the federation, whereby some would forfeit more sovereignty and others less to the central government.<sup>3</sup> Because this proposal could not get the backing it needed, the Slovenian parliament amended the Slovenian constitution in September 1989 by adding the right to self-determination and secession. "First of all we are Slovenes and only then Communists," elaborated Milan Kučan at an urgently called Central Committee meeting in Belgrade where he felt he was being threatened with JNA military intervention.<sup>4</sup> Both the collective executive leadership at the federal level and the federal constitutional court immediately declared the constitutional changes null and void—to no avail. In November there was a scandal when the Slovenian police decided to forbid demonstrators from Serbia from entering Slovenia. In response, Belgrade broke all bilateral trade relations with Slovenia; in turn, Ljubljana refused to make its contribution to the federal development fund.<sup>5</sup>

By the time the League of Communists met in January 1990 for its fourteenth extraordinary congress, the relations between the republics were already thoroughly poisoned. Slovenia's delegates could not find sufficient support for their renewed demands for more autonomy and subsequently walked out of the congress in disgust. The Croats then refused to continue any debate on reform.

The congress was adjourned, and soon after that Tito's party, the guarantor of "brotherhood and unity" in the multinational state, broke apart.

Meanwhile, the communist systems in the entire Eastern bloc were also falling apart. Soon after his ascension to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the introduction of glasnost and perestroika and thus paved the way for democratic elections and change throughout all of Eastern Europe. Since Moscow finally allowed its long-time allies to choose whatever form of government they wanted in 1989, thus withdrawing its latent threat to intervene, all resistance against the transformation to a democratic market economy soon dissipated. Communism left Europe, and the Cold War ended. With the restructuring of the international order, the crucial foreign policy pillars of the Yugoslav model crumbled: socialism, nonalignment, and self-management became superfluous once the Cold War came to an end. Tito's strongest trump card had been outplayed: the Soviet military threat no longer existed.

Gradually it began to dawn on the West that something was brewing in Yugoslavia. Europe seemed to be growing together, which meant that Yugoslavia was losing its superb strategic importance for the United States and Western Europe as a buffer to the Eastern bloc. Consequently, it also meant that the country was losing its privileged access to cheap credit. In the foreign ministries of Western countries, other events had priority, such as the ramifications of German reunification, the Iraq War, the putsch in Moscow, and the Maastricht Treaty. The United States now relegated Yugoslavia to the status of a European problem. But no one in Europe found the time and interest to work out a strategy for overcoming the crisis of the collapsing multinational state.

### *Multiparty Democracy*

As was happening all over Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia's political leadership decided to hold elections in the course of 1990. Instead of being the first step in the transition to a stable democracy, however, the democratic transformation worked like a fire accelerant, setting ablaze issues of ethnicity and disintegration.<sup>6</sup> The emerging spectrum of parties was organized along the lines of ethnic identity, not political programs. The socialist system had operated according to the principle of collective power sharing and "national key," so that the logic behind having quotas had long been put into practice. Many people believed that only their own national party would represent them well in difficult times. This allowed the new ethnopolitical elites to mobilize populist support easily for their program, without having to make concessions to democratic procedure. Mass rallies suggested plebiscitary approval and camouflaged the fact that an authoritarian style of leadership and the political control of the media continued to be commonplace. The knee-jerk support for

ethnic solidarity explains how Slobodan Milošević was able to further consolidate his power position, but also why nonreligious people from Bosnia tended to support an Islamic-leaning party. In the spring of 1990, only 26 percent of the Slovenes, 48 percent of the Croats, 49 percent of the Albanians, 68 percent of the Macedonians, 71 percent of the Serbs, 80 percent of the Montenegrins, and 84 percent of the Muslims identified with the Yugoslav state.<sup>7</sup> Nine out of ten Yugoslavs considered the relations between the various peoples and republics to be bad or even very bad.<sup>8</sup>

Across the entire country, nationalist-oriented parties were formed. For those who supported a Yugoslav stance, the only parties committed to the cause were the Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia led by Ante Marković and the League of Communists. In Slovenia and Croatia, the parties that prevailed in the elections of April 1990 were those that championed independence. In Slovenia the multiparty alliance DEMOS led by Jože Pučnik won a clear majority of 55 percent of the vote. The result was not so clear in Croatia, where the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) under Franjo Tuđman won 42.2 percent while the League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Reform (SKH-SDP) received 37.3 percent. The plurality voting system turned this slight lead into a crushing majority of 58 percent of the seats in the three chambers of parliament and a majority of 67.5 percent in the most powerful of these, the lower house. Stipe Mesić became prime minister and Franjo Tuđman president.<sup>9</sup> In Macedonia the nationalist forces also prevailed in the form of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). In Serbia and Montenegro, however, the socialists remained in power. In December 1990, Slobodan Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia won 194 of the 250 parliament seats up for election. In Montenegro the League of Communists won 83 of 125 mandates and its leader, Momir Bulatović, the presidency. The most difficult situation was that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where three ethnically affiliated parties dominated the elections in November and December 1990: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije*, SDA) with 87 seats, the Serbian Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka*, SDS) with 71, and the Croatian HDZ-BiH with 44 mandates. True to the Yugoslav political tradition of power sharing, they created a government coalition.<sup>10</sup>

In all of the republics, the new parties called for solidarity of their respective nation. Franjo Tuđman's pledge to deliver Croatian statehood relied on mobilizing not only the masses in Croatia, but also the political émigrés whom he had invited to the HDZ congress held in Zagreb in February 1990. He also counted on the backing of the Herzegovina lobby, a strong pillar of his support within his party, when he demanded the right to self-determination "of the entire Croat people within its natural and historical borders."<sup>11</sup> The



campaign slogans of the HDZ promised that Croatia would “be defended at the Drina” and that “Herzegovina is Croatia.”<sup>12</sup> Later about 400,000 Bosnian Croats received Croatian citizenship, including the right to vote.

Transnational networks were probably decisive in these elections. The HDZ depended highly on “emigrant Croatia” (*iseljena Hrvatska*), especially as Tujman had been systematically building his party since 1987 with the financial help of exile groups in the United States and Canada, including that of rightwing extremists who distributed maps of Croatia showing the borders of 1941.<sup>13</sup> Tujman co-opted the “diaspora,” assuming that its members were victims of a divided people that needed to be reunited. Using the catchword “reconciliation” (*pomirenje*), he encouraged all Croat exiles and guest workers to return to their homeland in the spring of 1990.<sup>14</sup>

In Bosnia, Alija Izetbegović also campaigned with his party, SDA, for Muslim unity, for the unification of “our people” who lived along “the long belt of land from Novi Pazar to Cazin, interspersed with Serbs and Croats.”<sup>15</sup> More precisely he strove to mobilize the Slavic Muslims in Sandžak, the region of the homeland “occupied” by Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore he demanded that this region be given a special autonomous status. At campaign rallies the crowds cheered and chanted “Sandžak is ours!” and “Sandžak is Bosnian!”<sup>16</sup>

The SDA used religious rituals to appeal to the nationalist feelings of a largely secularized Muslim population. Campaign events started with religious forms of greeting, and the party’s green flag featured the crescent. In 1991, Izetbegović proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina enter the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).<sup>17</sup> At the same time, the SDA attracted traditionalist, laicist-liberal, religiously conservative, and Islamic fundamentalist supporters. To Muslims, the anomic state of Bosnian society appeared to offer no other source of strength, cohesion, and stability than the affiliation with the Bosniak nation, whose patron the SDA rose to become. Because religion now represented the foremost distinctive characteristic of ethnicity, Islamic symbolism also appealed to the secularized part of the electorate.

Another influential factor was the transborder mobilization of Yugoslav Albanians. In December 1989, the writer Ibrahim Rugova founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) with hundreds of offshoot party groups in Germany, Switzerland, the United States, and Canada. His Kosovar shadow government, which set up its headquarters in Bonn in 1991, leveled a 3 percent solidarity tax on its fellow countrymen in order to support the political struggle back home.<sup>18</sup>

### *The Hot Spot, Eastern Bosnia*

Bosnia-Herzegovina lay in the crosshairs of the germinating controversy over Yugoslavia’s territorial inheritance since Croat and Serb nationalists each claimed the region and the Muslims considered it the very heart of their

homeland. Therefore, nationalism thrived also in local politics. Because the nationalist propaganda of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims was especially prevalent in multiethnic communities, the local newspapers tried to outdo each other in their accusations about who was exploiting, threatening, and supposedly soon driving away whom—very similar to the way things had developed earlier in Kosovo.<sup>19</sup>

At campaign rallies, powerful slogans beckoned people to support the common cause. Nationalist-oriented Serbs let themselves get caught up in the assertion repeated over and over again that the Serbian people had to assert themselves in a never-ending battle that required them to constantly be on their guard against persecution. In August 1990, the Muslim-leaning SDA held a mass commemoration for the victims of Chetnik violence during the Second World War in Foča. As a sign of forgiveness, it was planned to throw flowers from the historical bridge over the Drina. The Serbs who were invited to the event suspected it to be an open provocation and instead commemorated those persecuted in the Ustasha state.<sup>20</sup>

Tensions were building to dangerous levels in many areas, such as in the Eastern Bosnia town of Srebrenica, where local chapters of the new parties were formed in August 1990. An uneasiness spread as supporters of the Serb SDS raced through the center of town in an open car, outfitted with knives for everyone to see and giving the three-finger Serb salute. They did the same in Potočari, prompting people to throw rocks at them. The leading candidate of the Serb party, Miodrag Jokić, then gave a flaming campaign speech in which he declared his hometown to be inalienably Serbian land. As he spoke, supporters of the Muslim SDA gathered in front of the local culture center, waving green flags and yelling: “We want weapons, we want weapons!” Tensions spiraled upward throughout the evening, creating an explosive situation. In Kravica, Serbs built barricades and the Muslims followed suit in “their” municipalities.<sup>21</sup>

Here, as in other places, the tone of the election campaign rallies became increasingly aggressive. The SDA politician Ibran Mustafić attacked his political opponent, calling him Satan and saying that a stake should be driven through his heart to keep him from becoming a vampire. Another SDA man, Hamed Salihović threatened: “We will deepen the Drina, so that the enemy, the *dušman*, cannot cross it!” And yet another, Besim Ibišević predicted: “With our votes we will destroy the two greatest evils: communism and Yugoslavia . . . the prison of the Bosniak people!”<sup>22</sup> As these men spoke, the crowd shouted: “We want weapons!” and “Long live Saddam Hussein!”<sup>23</sup>

The campaign rhetoric had no causal connection whatsoever to the real problems that society was facing, but many people felt that the simple messages from the new leaders spoke to their concerns. Key terms like “people” and “nation” helped reduce complex, often unfathomable events to seemingly

obvious interests shared by their ethnic community. They were being offered a simple interpretation of the way things stood, and many were glad to embrace it in light of the fear, uncertainty, and helplessness that plagued them.<sup>24</sup> The new party leaders interpreted the staged approval of the masses as a mandate to refuse all willingness to negotiate. All that counted now was what the nation (allegedly) demanded: to implement a people's own interests without any consideration of the needs of the others.

### *Preparations for Independence*

Immediately after the elections, preparations began in Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo for independence. On 2 July 1990, both the Slovenian and the Croatian parliaments voted with overwhelming majorities to declare their sovereignty, as did a group of members of parliament from Kosovo. The Slovenian foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel rejoiced in announcing that "Yugoslavia no longer exists."<sup>25</sup> In December 1990, 88.5 percent of the Slovenian citizens voted in favor of independence in a referendum. The objection of the constitutional court was simply ignored.

The presidents of Slovenia and Croatia pushed ahead with a proposal to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states, de facto no more than a loosely organized customs and monetary union. When the Yugoslav government under Ante Marković convened a meeting between the leaders of the republics for the last time in December 1990, to debate constitutional reform, only a whisper of a chance still existed to save Yugoslavia, because the federation simply no longer possessed any legitimacy and authority.

Still bitter about the rescindment of Kosovo's autonomy, Albanians chose a path of open confrontation. They set up their own parallel state with a government, presidency, and systems for taxation, education, and health care. In September 1990, they presented the constitution for a sovereign republic. A year later a referendum was held on the question of independence.

The step-by-step disintegration of Yugoslavia put its strongest institution to the test: the Yugoslav People's Army was fast becoming an armed force without a country. In March 1990, Slovenia and Croatia began to build their own police and military forces and collected millions in donations from abroad to buy weapons.<sup>26</sup> General Kadijević declared publicly a month later that the People's Army was prepared to use "all means necessary" to defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia—an open threat to intervene.<sup>27</sup>

In the spring of 1991, Yugoslavia entered another stage in the irreversible process of its dissolution. The parties began to make concrete preparations for war.<sup>28</sup> The final straw came in May when Serbian and Montenegrin leaders blocked Croatia's Stipe Mesić from assuming the office of the federal presidency, as he was scheduled to do according to the rotation principle. He had

publicly boasted that he would be the last president of Yugoslavia, only to retract that statement later. This left Yugoslavia with no head of state and no commander in chief of the armed forces. All of the other components of Yugoslav statehood vanished. Identities and loyalties were being redefined, and the long-applied mechanisms of power sharing and mediation no longer existed. The collapse of the political order, the disintegration of the multiethnic spheres, and the loss of the state monopoly of power created a dangerous vacuum. Anyone closely observing the situation at the time could already sense that the country was headed toward a highly explosive conflict.

### *The Radicalization of the "Serbian Question"*

With the impending demise of Yugoslavia, the "Serbian Question" that had first arisen in the nineteenth century resurfaced. In 1991, more than a fourth of the Serb people of 8 million lived outside their own republic: 580,000 were in Croatia (12.2 percent), another 1.4 million lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina (31 percent), and 200,000 (10 percent) were threatened with separation from Serbia by the secession of historically significant Kosovo. Why should Serbs tolerate the division of their people just as the Germans were celebrating their reunification?

In Serbia, a consensus evolved across all the parties: the objective to be defended above all others in this historical situation was the national unity of the Serb people. Even formerly critical intellectuals were convinced that Serbian president Milošević finally had to rectify the historic injustice inflicted on his people.<sup>29</sup> In January 1991, Milošević expressed what many people were feeling when he declared: "The fate of Yugoslavia can only be decided by the peoples [not the republics]. . . . And administrative borders cannot simply be declared as national borders. . . . As far as the Serb people are concerned, they want to live together in one nation state. Therefore, any partition that divides the Serb people and disperses them among several sovereign states is unacceptable."<sup>30</sup> This message reverberated in catchy slogans like "One State for All Serbs!" and "Only Unity Can Save the Serbs!" At the same time, the other republics were also insisting on their sovereignty. For them, any change to the existing borders was completely out of the question.

The Serbs living in Croatia were motivated not only by hegemonic claims, injured national pride, and resentment over the *fait accompli* of national borders, they were also truly afraid. They felt embittered that the new constitution of their homeland defined the country as the "national state of the Croats," thereby denigrating all other ethnic groups to the status of minorities.<sup>31</sup> The introduction of old-new state symbols prompted concern and anger and evoked memories of the Second World War. Zagreb selected the historic red and white checked šahovnica (chessboard coat of arms) as the emblem on its

national flag, which is 500 years older than fascism but had been usurped by the Ustasha state during the war. Although the sequence of the colors in the checked pattern was different, this was not sufficient to dash the fears of anti-Serb sentiments. What did it mean that the Croatian language was being “cleansed,” that the *kuna* was introduced as the country’s currency (as it had been in the fascist era), and that streets and public buildings were being renamed after such people as the writer Mile Budak, the guiding spirit behind the persecution of the Serbs under Ante Pavelić?<sup>32</sup>

Nationalist Serbs came up with a simple antidote to the threatening independence of Croatia: if the Croats decided in favor of secession from the federation, the Serbs in Croatia would simply insist on remaining in Yugoslavia. After all, in the (so-called) Krajina, Serbs were in the majority and could count on strong allies on the other side of the Bosnia-Herzegovina border.

On 25 July 1990, just a few weeks after the parliament in Zagreb announced its declaration of sovereignty, the Serbs declared the “sovereignty and autonomy of the Serb people in Croatia.” They set up street blockades. “We saw many people from our village with arms,” remembered one contemporary. “Hunting rifles, but not weapons from the army. They gathered in the village center and discussed what to do at night. They were frightened that the Croats would come at night to kill Serbs.”<sup>33</sup> In August of that year, policemen in Knin refused to hiss the hated *šahovnica*, thus igniting the first armed conflicts. When Croatia held a referendum on independence on 19 May 1991, Croatian Serbs initiated a boycott and voted in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia in a plebiscite that they had organized themselves. Incidents of armed conflict then occurred in Pakrac, in the Plitvice National Park, and in Borovo Selo.<sup>34</sup>

### *War on Their Minds*

The less the political class was willing to compromise, the more the confrontation was fought out in the media. The new rulers took control, especially of the state television.<sup>35</sup> In October 1990, Yugoslav president Borisav Jović lamented “the wave of hatred and national prejudice” and the “open information and propaganda war” between the republics. “The media war has assumed such intensity that the opposing sides can be considered belligerents.”<sup>36</sup>

Like all other Yugoslav institutions, the media system was undergoing an internal process of disintegration. Previously, the Yugoslav broadcasting system had coordinated the eight studios operating in the republics, and each studio contributed its part to what was then compiled into a common program. After a period of great disgruntlement occurred over problems with this coordination in the 1980s, the broadcast stations started to send their own correspondents to neighboring republics and to produce their own news.

In 1988, Zagreb and then Sarajevo pulled out of the nationwide television and radio cooperation. When the Serbs celebrated the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989 and Slobodan Milošević held a major speech in commemoration of it, eight different camera crews bustled about at the historic site of the Gazimestan monument in Kosovo. Each reported its own version of the events. Forgotten was the maxim on which Tito's policy for disseminating information had been based, namely to criticize only the nationalism expressed in one's own republic, not that in the others. Now the media was immersed in attacks on other ethnic groups, and clear enemy images were used to distinguish between "us" and "them."<sup>37</sup>

The print press, radio, and television dedicated much of their reporting to historical topics, particularly to the atrocities of the Second World War. All sides gathered evidence with which to cultivate their own victimization and to incite a collective feeling of revenge. One example was the Serbian daily newspaper *Politika* in 1990 when it published headlines for stories on Croatia that read "1941 Started with the Same Methods!" and "The Genocide Is Not Allowed to Happen Again." Likewise, the Croatian newspaper *Vjesnik* reported on a Serbian "doomsday plan" and Croatian television on "Chetnik Lunacy" in May 1991.<sup>38</sup> The Serb writer Dobrica Ćosić said in a television broadcast in August 1991 that one of the greatest sins of his generation had been their wish to forget the crimes of the Ustasha regime.<sup>39</sup> In 1990, the Bosnian politician Adil Zulfikarpašić repeatedly sought Muslims who wanted to take revenge for the events of 1942. "I . . . asked them, how they envisioned to do this—after all, we were now dealing with another generation, and the times were also different."<sup>40</sup> But it was difficult to argue against the mainstream, when politicians, the media, clergy, and intellectuals were tooting the same horn.

However, public opinion was not at all dominated by outright enthusiasm for war. Instead, a yearning for normality was growing. In many areas, protests and demonstrations against intolerance and hate were held in 1990 by women's, youth, and veteran organizations, as well as the trade unions.<sup>41</sup> A poll taken in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, and Mostar in May 1990 showed that a large majority hoped with fatalistic optimism that the crisis could be overcome, and only a minority feared civil war.<sup>42</sup> The public became gradually and rather subliminally attuned to war as somber metaphors crept into people's vocabulary. Words like "fate," "soul," "martyr," "exodus," and "genocide" evoked a situation of existential threat in which the opposing sides seemed to be quarreling no longer over negotiable conflicts of interest, but over historically determined or strictly moral issues of principle. In January 1991, the leadership of Croatia announced apodictically that it would not negotiate any

solution that did not lead to independence, while the Serbian side proved to be no less stubborn in saying that they would not consider any option that would destroy the state of Yugoslavia.

No conflict must inevitably and unstoppably lead to catastrophe. At any time, immediately before and even after war broke out, there would have been opportunities to turn the ship around. But too many people were grimly prepared to assert the supposedly greater national interests at any price. In January 1991, the writer Slavenka Drakulić realized: “The war is already here. I know that now. It tricked me—it tricked us all. Its onset already lies in the fact that we expect it.”<sup>33</sup>

## PART VI

### THE DEMISE OF YUGOSLAVIA (1991 TO THE PRESENT)





# 19.

## The War of Succession (1991 to 1999)

### *The Diplomatic Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia*

On 25 June 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Suddenly the international community was confronted with a number of contentious issues. Did the actions of these two republics constitute unlawful secession or had Yugoslavia simply collapsed into its constituent parts? Were the borders between the republics international boundaries or were they only administrative divisions? Was an international armed conflict developing or a civil war?

That the path to independence would be clouded by violence had been obvious for months. After declaring independence, the Slovenes took the first step toward establishing an international border to Croatia, and in response, the Yugoslav People's Army occupied the border posts. Following the first armed confrontation, a "Ten-Day War" developed from which Slovenia emerged relatively unscathed, having lost eighteen soldiers, as opposed to forty-four dead JNA soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

Shocked representatives of the European Community managed to convince Slovenia and Croatia to sign a ceasefire agreement on 7 July 1991 on the Adriatic island of Brioni. The republics also agreed to postpone their independence for three months and to start negotiations over the future of Yugoslavia and its eventual breakup. Subsequently, the Yugoslav government ordered the pullback of its army on 18 July, which meant, in essence, the recognition of Slovenia's independence. Ever since this "little war," the two-million-people republic has been very proud that it repelled the attack of the powerful Yugoslav People's Army through its superior war strategy.<sup>2</sup> However, Belgrade's main concern at the time was not to prevent Slovenia's independence but to keep the entire Serb population in a single nation state. Since very few Serbs lived in Slovenia, the conflict was quickly over.

Already in the spring of 1991, isolated incidents of violent clashes between Croatian Serbs and Croatian police forces occurred in places like Plitvice and Borovo Selo. It was, however, not until after Croatia's declaration of independence on 25 June 1991 that larger armed conflicts erupted in the regions of Banija, Dalmatia, and Slavonia between Croatian armed forces, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav People's Army and rebel Serb forces, on the other. The first mass killing of Croatian civilians and soldiers by local Serb units occurred in Kozibrod on 26 July 1991, followed by atrocities in other villages in Slavonia, Banija, and Dalmatia and in the town of Vukovar.

As key political and military leaders—including Serbia's member of the federal presidency, Borisav Jović, and JNA admiral Branko Mamula—have acknowledged, plans were already in place in summer 1991 to create a new rump-Yugoslavia that encompassed Croatia's and Bosnia's Serb populations.<sup>3</sup> The People's Army General Staff had decided to "defend" Serbs living in Croatia and to strive for full control over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another aim was to "create and defend a new Yugoslav state with those people who so desired it, currently the Serbs and the Montenegrins."<sup>4</sup>

The Croatian government decided on 14 September 1991 to attack all garrisons of the People's Army, which prompted the Yugoslav General Staff to respond by launching a major offensive from eastern Slavonia, expelling non-Serbs from the areas over which they took control.<sup>5</sup> Yugoslav troops surrounded the city of Vukovar and shelled its center. Serb paramilitary units invaded the city and its surrounding areas, leaving a bloody trail of horror behind them. For weeks, the baroque city suffered from massive bombardment until, reduced to rubble, it surrendered in November. The historic city of Dubrovnik, "the pearl of the Adriatic," was attacked in October 1991.<sup>6</sup> Within a few weeks the embattled region came completely under the control of the rebellious Serbs. The Croat population, a total of more than half a million people, were systematically driven out or fled. On 19 December 1991, President Milan Babić proclaimed the formation of the "Republic of Serb Krajina," the capital of which was Knin.<sup>7</sup>

The international community had few tools for managing such a crisis at the time. International crisis management was still considered an inadmissible external intervention in the domestic affairs of another state. Moreover, international law was contradictory. On the one hand, the United Nations Charter protected a people's right to self-determination, a right that Slovenia and Croatia invoked, but on the other, it obliged its members to safeguard sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, which is what Belgrade insisted on.<sup>8</sup> However, the Yugoslav problem was not just a question of international law, it was also a political dilemma to which various answers could be found. Germany and Austria supported the efforts of the republics of Slovenia and

Croatia to become independent, while the UN Secretary General and the governments in London, Paris, and Washington wished to see the unity of Yugoslavia maintained. Although these positions seemed to be subliminally reminiscent of the loyalties to their First World War alliances, what Paris, London, and Moscow actually feared above all else was that the precedent being set by Slovenia and Croatia would trigger a chain reaction of declarations of independence.

After Jacques Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg, proclaimed rather grandiloquently that “this is the hour of Europe,” the European Community hosted a peace conference in The Hague on 7 September 1991. Yet all attempts to mediate and all threats of sanctions came to nothing.<sup>9</sup> Innumerable ceasefires were broken. It was not until Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the UN secretary-general, proposed to send Blue Helmets into the disputed areas in November 1991 that the Yugoslav People’s Army pulled out of Croatia. Following a UN-brokered truce in January 1992, an international United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed a month later in those areas in Croatia where Serbs constituted the majority or a substantial minority of the population, with the aim of preparing for a political solution to this conflict.<sup>10</sup> Although many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) could return to their places of origin, the number of Croats living within the Krajina had fallen from 353,595 to 18,200 by 1993–1994. On the other hand, tens of thousands of Serbs fled Croatia. By mid-October 1991, 78,555 refugees from Croatia had arrived in Serbia.<sup>11</sup>

Contrary to his Luxembourgian counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the German foreign minister, thought in the spring of 1991 that Yugoslavia had already effectively broken apart into its constitutive parts, which was why the independence of Slovenia and Croatia were not to be seen as acts of secession violating international law but as legitimate legal acts. For this reason he sought to gain formal recognition of the two new states, especially since the German foreign ministry (as well as Austria’s foreign office) believed that the Yugoslav People’s Army could be deterred from undertaking larger military actions if the conflict was internationalized.<sup>12</sup> However, in London and Paris it was feared that a diplomatic *fait accompli* would only heat up the crisis militarily, since formal recognition would then deprive the international community of its only diplomatic leverage for an overall political solution. On 23 December 1991, Bonn duped its partners by officially recognizing Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally. The German public was disturbed to witness war and the plight of the refugees in neighboring regions, and media like the newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* never tired of condemning what they called Serbian-Orthodox barbarism, against which the Catholic countries of Slovenia and Croatia had to defend themselves. Following decades of reticence and

restraint in international relations, the German government also saw this crisis as the first favorable moment since its own reunification in 1990 to assume a more prominent role on the stage of international politics, one that corresponded to Germany's economic stature. For the sake of political unity, there was little else the other European countries could do but follow suit, which they did by formally recognizing Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992.<sup>13</sup>

Germany's unilateral action created facts on the ground and left a bitter aftertaste among its European partners,<sup>14</sup> and the internationalization of the Yugoslavia problem had all but the desired effect. After Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally recognized on 6 April 1992, the deterrence strategy failed. In a type of blitzkrieg, Bosnian Serb armed forces, supported by the JNA, conquered the greater part of Bosnian territory within weeks. The now rather sheepish Germans had to bear the brunt of the fierce criticism leveled against them by their allies.<sup>15</sup> Later, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) would spill into Kosovo (1998–1999) and Macedonia (2001).

To what degree did Germany's foreign policy contribute to the approaching disaster? Certainly the timing and circumstances of its formal recognition were poorly considered. Why should Slovenes and Croats be permitted to exercise the right to self-determination, but not the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia or the Albanians in Kosovo? Why were no plans drawn up to provide humanitarian relief for the very probable case of the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when all signs pointed in the fall of 1991 to an armed conflict? The policy of recognition aimed to appease the German public and neglected the wider regional dimensions of Yugoslavia's disintegration. The further course of events revealed, with disastrous consequences, the contradictions of the German approach. According to its constitutional law, Germany was barred from using its armed forces "out of area," that is, for purposes other than self-defense. Thus, it could not provide any military cover to non-NATO members such as the Yugoslav successor states. To think that other governments would deploy their military and thereby risk the lives of many soldiers for a policy they considered wrong was unrealistic. That said, it is more than questionable that diplomatic means would have been able by this point to prevent or even effectively contain the war, in light of the determination of actors on the ground to use military force.

### *War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*

During the bombardment of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, the Bosnian government in Sarajevo was deeply concerned about the future of its multiethnic republic. According to the 1991 census, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina totaled 4.37 million, of which 43.5 percent were Muslims, 31.2 percent Serbs, 17.4 percent Croats, and 5.5 percent Yugoslavs. The remaining 2.4 percent consisted

of numerous other nationalities. Not a single municipality was homogenous, and clear ethnic boundaries did not exist. Therefore, at first the Bosnian coalition government backed the idea to reform Yugoslavia, but not to dissolve it. Following the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, this option seemed obsolete. Bosnian Croats and Muslims did not want to remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslav rump state, and the Bosnian Serb leadership took steps toward forming autonomous areas with quasi-state powers.

On 14 October 1991, the Muslim SDA and the Croat HDZ-BiH party groups in Bosnia's parliament drafted a resolution for independence against the votes of the Serb SDS. The incensed Serbs then quit the coalition and, in protest, refused to participate any longer in the institutions. Reminiscent of what happened at the Yugoslav federal level in 1989/1990, all of the republic's institutions and organizations split into ethnic components, including parliament, city councils, factory assemblies, the media, and security forces. In one public speech, Radovan Karadžić, the Serb political leader, called for ethnic segregation "like in Turkish times."<sup>16</sup> On 24 December 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina's rump government successfully petitioned the European Community for official recognition, along with Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, Montenegro decided to remain united with Serbia. In 1992, the two republics formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Starting in the fall of 1991, Bosnian Serbs worked on their transition to independence in much the same way as their fellow Serbs in Croatia did. In November, they held an illegal plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia and on 9 January 1992, proclaimed the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Republika srpskog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine*; later, the Serb Republic, *Republika Srpska*) which was to include all municipalities, local communities, and populated places in which over 50 percent of the Serbs had voted in the plebiscite to remain in Yugoslavia.

In accordance with the terms set by the European Community for the recognition of new states, the Bosnian government organized a referendum on independence, held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, which the Serbs boycotted, as was expected. Voter participation in this referendum still reached nearly 64 percent, of which 99 percent voted in favor of independence. On 6 April 1992, the anniversary of the German attack on Yugoslavia in 1941 and the day of the liberation of Sarajevo in 1945, Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially recognized by the European Community as a sovereign state. The next day, the Bosnian Serbs then declared their own independence.<sup>18</sup>

Prior to these events, local skirmishes had already occurred. Both SDS and SDA members erected barricades and checkpoints in Sarajevo in order to take control of strategic buildings, military equipment, and city quarters. The first shooting began on 5 April, out of which extensive gunfire and shelling

developed on both sides. Violent clashes also occurred in many other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early April 1992 and quickly escalated into a major armed conflict. Once independence was declared, the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, aided by the Yugoslav People's Army, launched an assault and first overran eastern Bosnia along the Drina River, the northern Posavina corridor, eastern Herzegovina, and Bosnian Krajina, thereby creating a territorial bridge between Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia. General Ratko Mladić ordered his 250,000-man army to drive the non-Serb population out of the areas they conquered.<sup>19</sup> Within a couple of months, hundreds of thousands of people were on the move, and several tens of thousands were killed. The 100,000 soldiers from the Bosnian Muslim Territorial Defense Force and the SDA-loyal paramilitary troops were poorly armed and thus unable to stop the Serbs. By July 1992, barely four months after the outbreak of war, the Serb para-state controlled more than two-thirds of the Bosnian territory.<sup>20</sup>

In many regions, such as in the Eastern Bosnian town of Foča, where the Chetniks, the Ustashas, and Muslim militias had committed some of the worst atrocities of the Second World War, people experienced an eerie feeling of *déjà-vu*. Although half of the town's population were Bosniaks, the Bosnian-Serb leadership declared the town to be part of their new state in the fall of 1991. The region was remote and impoverished but important for the war due to its strategic location and transportation routes. On 8 April 1991, the Serb forces began shelling the town with grenades and artillery and conquered it a few days later.

Paramilitary units and volunteers like Arkan's Tigers, Vojislav Šešelj's Chetniks, and the White Eagles combed the streets and houses. They forced men and women to line up, then systematically separated and herded them into camps. The paramilitary bands revived practices known from the Second World War: the men were driven to the bridges, shot, and their bodies thrown into the river. Within a few weeks, nearly the entire Bosniak population had been driven out. The towns of Zvornik, Višegrad, Bijeljina, and many other locations were the scenes of similarly cruel and severe crimes.<sup>21</sup>

The Serb forces thoroughly encircled Sarajevo and maintained the siege on the city for forty-four torturous months until the war ended. From the hills surrounding Sarajevo, they shelled the city incessantly, sometimes showering it with as many as 500 grenades per hour. Snipers arbitrarily gunned down civilians when they went out to get water, stood in line for food, sat in the streetcar, or simply walked down the street. "We had been encircled . . . from all sides. . . . Everybody shot at us constantly, like beasts. They were trying to kill as many of us as they could." A man living in Sarajevo at the time, Bakir Nakaš, described how he managed to survive: "We managed to get by using only a litre of drinking water every day. We got used to it. We got used to

living, getting on without electricity, without drinking water. . . . Every day on your way to work you ran the risk of being killed or injured.”<sup>22</sup> Sheer survival became the central objective of the entire city.

Although Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had established joint command structures and had been fighting side by side against the Serbs since the start of the war, relations deteriorated in the autumn of 1992 when disputes arose over the future constitution of the independent state. The nationalist wing of the Croat HDZ party, centered in Herzegovina, advocated the unification of areas settled by Croats with Croatia. In November 1991 the autonomous region Herceg Bosna was formed and declared to be a separate state on 3 July 1992.<sup>23</sup> Its army, the Croatian Defense Council, now began to conquer areas in which the majority of the population were Muslims. In October 1992, the so-called “war within the war” broke out between these two former allies, resulting in serious violations of international humanitarian law against civilians on both sides. Franjo Tudjman, who did not preclude the idea of annexing Herzegovina for Croatia, sent troops to support his fellow countrymen militarily.<sup>24</sup> After a meeting between the Croatian president and Slobodan Milošević in Karadjordjevo on 25 March 1991, evidence grew stronger that Zagreb and Belgrade might reach an agreement on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a heavy toll to the Muslims.<sup>25</sup>

The “war within the war” changed the world’s image of Croatia as an innocent victim of Serb aggression and caused outright perplexity in the West. The fighting between the former allies caused horrendous destruction in central Bosnia and in Herzegovina, for which the demolition of the historic town of Mostar, including the famous sixteenth-century Old Bridge, by the Croatian Defense Council remains symbolic. Not until March 1994 could international mediators settle the conflict and commit the adversaries to the formation of a common state entity, the mutually disliked Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, the fighting continued in many regions.

### *“Ethnic Cleansing”*

As the war expanded, a form of mass atrocity thought to be forgotten suddenly confronted the shocked world community: “ethnic cleansing.” This euphemism stood for the planned and violent removal of undesired population groups from conquered territory, be it through deportation, displacement, or annihilation, as had occurred during the nineteenth century, the Balkan Wars, and the Second World War.<sup>26</sup>

There is no doubt whatsoever that “ethnic cleansing” took place in a systematic and planned way. The regional context, the systematic implementation, and the summation of the results preclude any other conclusion except that homogenization was not a side effect of war but its main objective.<sup>27</sup>



Approximately 70 percent of the expulsions, involving more than 2.2 million people, had already occurred between April and August 1992, during which time Serb armed forces attacked thirty-seven municipalities, most notably Zvornik, Bratunac, Vlasenica, Višegrad, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Ključ, and municipalities along the Sava River Valley. In total, approximately 850 Bosniak- and Croat-occupied villages were obliterated, and entire families disappeared. Roma and Romani communities were also heavily affected.<sup>28</sup>

“Ethnic cleansing” was sought after politically, prepared by administrative bodies, and carried out within the framework of military operations by special forces of the regular army or by paramilitary units. Very similar to what occurred during the Second World War, the attackers tortured and massacred civilians, and burned down houses and entire villages. The aim of “ethnic cleansing” was to reinforce claims to the conquered territory and to create there an unequivocal power structure.<sup>29</sup>

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was able to prove later that the political preparation of mass expulsion in Bosnia-Herzegovina dated back to the first half of 1991 when the Bosnian Serbs, led by the SDS, decided to form a separate state and to arm their fellow countrymen. When the parliament dissolved in October 1991, ethnic segregation was already evident. In December 1991, the so-called crisis staffs (later war presidencies) began to convene as extraordinary administrative bodies, which took steps in preparation for the separation of the ethnic groups. After the Bosnian-Serb parliament proclaimed the founding of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992, the new bodies brought the claimed regions systematically under their control starting in late March. Ethnic exclusion was a key organizing principle of the new state; Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serbs were not wanted there.<sup>30</sup>

The ethnic composition of many municipalities changed radically. For instance, in 1991, Bosniaks and Croats made up 51 percent of the population in the eastern Bosnian town of Foča, but by the end of the war, this figure had dropped to only 3.8 percent. Overall, four-fifths of all non-Serbs were driven out of the territory of the Republika Srpska during the three and a half years of war. As a result, in thirty-seven municipalities the share of non-Serbs fell from 726,960 (53.97 percent) in 1991 to 235,015 (36.39 percent) in 1997, whereas the number of non-Serbs in the Croat-Bosniak-held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina had increased by 41.18 percent. Altogether, the number of non-Serbs in the areas that now form the Republika Srpska had fallen by 81.74 percent.<sup>31</sup> Whereas most incidents of “ethnic cleansing” were attributed to the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of the war, the Croat and Bosniak armed forces also started in 1993 to homogenize the regions they conquered in order to consolidate territorial gains.<sup>32</sup> According to estimates made by the Office

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Serb population fell between 1991 and mid-1994 from 43,595 to 5,000 in Western Hercegovina; from 79,355 to 20,000 in the Zenica region; from 82,235 to 23,000 in the Tuzla area; and from 29,398 to 1,609 in the Bihać region.<sup>33</sup> Yet, a clear majority of the dead and displaced were Bosniaks.

In the spring of 1992, the world was alarmed when photographs became public of Serb prisoner of war camps that resembled concentration camps, such as Omarska, Keraterm, and Manjača. Experts would later compile a list of about 400 prisons, police stations, schools, warehouses, or factories in which the warring sides interned men, women, and children under inhumane conditions. On the heels of these revelations came shocking reports of mass executions and mass rapes, torture and mutilation. “Bosnia” became the code word for an extreme brutalization of the war—and of the guilty conscience of the international community.

The more numerous and defiant the unwanted population groups were in a region, the more brutal were the measures taken against them. “Ethnic cleansing” was sometimes carried out through intimidation and discrimination, sometimes by way of detention and deportation or by torture and mass murder. Civilians were deliberately attacked and humiliated. Acts of savagery laden with symbolism and methods of killing and mutilating known to have been used throughout history intensified the feelings of indignity, intimidation, and fear not only among those experiencing it, but also among all those who had to witness it or heard about it: Muslims were forced to recite Christian prayers; women were publicly raped; people were tortured by having religious symbols scratched into their skins—practices that evoke cultural patterns and symbolic codes.

Part of the logic behind the permanent usurpation of territory was to thoroughly eradicate the basis of existence for the unwanted populations, so that they would never return. Houses, neighborhoods, town centers, and infrastructure were targeted for complete destruction. All cultural evidence of these groups were also to disappear, which explains why the historic centers of cities were deliberately shelled and churches, mosques, cemeteries, libraries, archives, and other buildings were destroyed. Nearly every mosque and three out of four Catholic churches were damaged or completely demolished during the war. Orthodox churches and monasteries were also targeted for attack.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, “ethnic cleansing” was not only directed against the physical presence of people, but also against sociocultural systems, meaning against institutions, identities, collective memory, and life worlds. The idea of turning these claimed regions into independent and homogeneously Serbian territory was supported in Belgrade.<sup>35</sup> This would later lead, for the first time in history, to the trial of a former head of state—President Slobodan Milošević—before

an international criminal tribunal on the charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war. The main counts against him were related to his command authority over the Yugoslav People's Army, which was involved "in the planning, preparation, facilitation and execution of the forcible removal of the majority of non-Serbs." The indictment also accused him of supporting the political leadership and armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, participating in the planning and execution of "ethnic cleansing" operations, supporting irregular forces, and manipulating the media. Charges of genocide and complicity to commit genocide included the mass killings in Srebrenica and murder or mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims in detention facilities. Milošević's unexpected death in 2006 at the detainment center in The Hague during the proceedings brought a sudden end to his trial.<sup>36</sup>

Yet, there is ample evidence that the Yugoslav People's Army logistically supported the campaign for a separate Serb state by providing supplies of arms and gasoline. As many as 2,000 of its soldiers fought alongside the Bosnian-Serb forces, and various Yugoslav officers served under their command. Special operation units of the Serbian ministry of internal affairs, such as the "Red Berets," also operated on Bosnian territory.<sup>37</sup> In February 2007, the International Court of Justice rejected the appeal made by Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 to apply the charge of genocide against Serbia. But the judges did find that Belgrade had not used its influence to prevent the serious mass crimes perpetrated in its neighboring state.<sup>38</sup>

### *The Perpetrators*

In every society people exist who voluntarily commit crimes. Whether due to narcissistic personality disorders or sadistic dispositions, these people experience a feeling of exuberance and liberation in their actions. The snipers of Sarajevo, for example, enjoyed putting victims in their crosshairs and having an unbridled power over life and death, as one of them stated in an interview. Among the volunteers in the special operations units were many who were filled with hatred toward an envisioned enemy, enjoyed killing, or simply craved the business of war. The warlords attracted social outsiders, petty criminals, hooligans, and weekend fighters who saw the war as an adventure or a way to earn extra income.<sup>39</sup>

However, the widespread expulsion on the scale experienced in Bosnia was only possible because thousands of "ordinary men," and very few women, participated in these crimes alongside those who were predisposed to violence.<sup>40</sup> The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia estimates that 15,000 to 20,000 people participated in planning, administering and executing "ethnic cleansing," including members of the political leadership, the bureaucracy, the police, and the military, who acted on their own or

carried out the instructions of their superiors. Many described later that they experienced the war as a matter of defense in which killing was a necessary evil.<sup>41</sup> A sense of duty, an ideal of masculinity, and group pressure interacted here. "There was no choice," testified the Serb commander Dragan Obrenović. "You could be either a soldier or a traitor. . . . We didn't even notice how we were drawn into the vortex of interethnic hatred."<sup>42</sup> Others were driven by delusion, a sense of duty, opportunism, fear, sadism, or greed. Exhaustion, stress, and alcohol led to emotional deadening and lowered inhibitions. The police chief of Bosanski Šamac, Stevan Todorović, simply lost his nerve in the face of the daily artillery shelling, the mountain of corpses, and the plight of refugees. He was scared, panicky, and became an alcoholic. In this condition, he paid little attention to the butchery carried out by his subordinates.<sup>43</sup> Many defended their actions on the reasoning that they were simply carrying out their superior's orders, similar to the excuses of German executioners from the Second World War. Dražan Erdemović, a 23-year-old executioner in Srebrenica, emphasized that he had fled from the executions at the first available opportunity. Allegedly he did not kill willingly.<sup>44</sup>

Amid all this, individuals still had leeway and opportunity to make their own choices. Grozdana Čećez, a Serb woman who was raped every evening by her Muslim guards at the Čelebići camp, tried to ward off the attacks by humiliating her abusers with the question: "I could be your mother . . . don't you have a mother?" The effect varied. Only one of the men was embarrassed, apologized, and left without having done what he had come for. Others, however, were not halted by her words, including one of her husband's former work colleagues and one of her son's classmates.<sup>45</sup>

Perpetrators found it easier to justify their own actions if they could resort to symbolic forms of legitimation. The president of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Biljana Plavšić, expressed remorse and referred to her obsession over time with experiences and memories from the Second World War.<sup>46</sup> Radovan Karadžić reached into the prop box of folklore to proclaim himself the descendant of the linguistic scholar Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and had himself filmed in a bizarre pose wearing historical costume. *Hajduks*, the Robin Hoods of the Balkans during the Ottoman era, were depicted as the role models for the warlords. Whoever took part in the battles were perpetuating the historical fight and carrying on the tradition of heroic deeds that had been celebrated in oral history for generations.<sup>47</sup>

### *The Media and the Escalation of Violence*

The International Tribunal for Yugoslavia came to the conclusion that the media was guilty of contributing significantly to the brutalization of the war. Radio, television, and the printed press created enemy images and stereotypes, spread rumors and untruths, provoked fear, hate, and revenge, and broke down

moral barriers. They resorted to well-tested propaganda strategies to give the war the necessary psychological underpinning, especially by portraying everything as black or white, by demonizing the enemy, by ignoring, exaggerating, and falsifying information, by drawing parallels between current occurrences and historic events and myths, by using hateful language and constantly repeating the same messages.<sup>48</sup> The authors of a study on media communication noted correctly that the Yugoslav war was “the mere continuation of the evening news by military means.”<sup>49</sup>

Since the motto “no pictures, no news” prevailed in the media age, the warring parties hired professional public relations agencies abroad to promote their cause. Alone in the United States, they signed at least 157 contracts with partners between 1991 and 2002, a figure that most certainly represents just the tip of the iceberg. Among the jobs to be done, for example, was to improve the image of Slovenia and Croatia as Western European countries or to equate the Serbs with Nazis.<sup>50</sup> Thanks to satellite technology and digital recording, editing, and transmission capabilities, international news channels—especially CNN, BBC, and later Al Jazeera—brought images of the war directly from the crisis regions to the rest of the world, thereby mobilizing a global civil society calling for humanitarian and military intervention.<sup>51</sup>

Hate-filled tirades appeared in the media on all sides, making it soon hard to distinguish between true and false. In the Serbian evening news, an alarmed public learned that Muslim extremists had supposedly fed Serb children to the lions in the Sarajevo zoo. More dangerous than such horror myths were the many unverifiable, one-sided, or falsified news stories about events that sounded plausible, such as the report that Bosnian troops were shelling their own civilian population in Sarajevo in order to place the blame on the Serbs.<sup>52</sup> German politicians were also tricked into believing a bogus report or two, including one in which Serb doctors were said to be implanting dog fetuses into Bosniak women. Such stories not only perpetuated repulsive images of the enemy, they also appealed to forms of media voyeurism.<sup>53</sup>

The war allowed aggression to be acted out openly and provided a framework in which violent acts were suddenly wanted, encouraged, and socially sanctioned.<sup>54</sup> Under exceptional conditions, people can certainly be tempted into committing deeds that they never would do under peaceful circumstances. This makes it almost impossible to maintain friendly neighborly relations in wartime. Once war has erupted, it becomes the source for a vicious cycle of never-ending violence. It alters ideas, emotions, aims, behavior, and identities of people from the ground up. People who are otherwise respectable citizens may carry out personal vendettas under the guise of higher national interests and thus attribute a type of private meaning to the war, and this may even prompt acquaintances to go after one another.<sup>55</sup>

Insecurity and anxiety are the most important means by which to transform ethnic distance and latent nationalism into open antagonism. The 1993 British documentary *We Are All Neighbors* shows how uncertainty and fear, rumors and media disinformation, followed by the first violent incidents and finally the outbreak of war, turned peaceful coexistence into distrust, then rejection, and eventually hate. In a village not far from Kiseljak in central Bosnia, life seemed to be rather normal in 1993. As long as the artillery fire was only to be heard faintly in the distance, Croats and Muslims met for coffee as usual. No one believed that anything could change the good neighborly relations. But the more the war interfered with daily life and the closer the front approached the village, the more uneasy people began to feel. By the time the first refugees arrived, people were talking about “us” and “them.” Visits with one another became less frequent; some no longer greeted the others. Out of doubt grew distrust, out of insecurity developed fear, and out of that, betrayal. When Croat troops were about to launch an attack on the village and therefore warned the local Croats, not one gathered up enough courage to inform their Muslim neighbors. All Muslims could do once the assault started was to tear out of town head over heels under a shower of grenades.<sup>56</sup>

Similar examples of crumbling solidarity could be observed everywhere as people became fearful of losing their homes or their lives.<sup>57</sup> In mid-1991, the Croat Witness E reported that, shortly before the assault on Vukovar, his Serb friends left town. Why, he asked them. “They would shrug their shoulders and they would say, ‘We believe you will see it soon too.’”<sup>58</sup> Witness DD, whose husband and two sons were murdered in the massacres in Srebrenica, described the relationship to her Serb acquaintances: “We were friends, in fact. We went to have coffee at each other’s houses. And if we were working on something, we would help one another. We would help them, and they would help us.” She later saw one of these neighbors standing among the soldiers who took away her 14-year-old son, who was never seen again. At that moment she remembered that many Serb women and children had left the area a few days before the attack. “Then someone asked, ‘Where are you going? What’s happening?’ . . . Their answer was very vague. ‘Some fools could come along and do who knows what.’ . . . And we were wondering. Until then, they didn’t do anything wrong. They didn’t hurt us and, of course, we didn’t hurt them either.”<sup>59</sup>

### *Containment Policy*

While public opinion in the West favored military intervention in light of the horrific images from Bosnia that flicked across people’s television screens every evening, political leaders remained reticent. Die for Sarajevo? Politicians and military experts knew that it would not be enough to simply make threatening gestures, but they feared the risks of deploying ground troops.<sup>60</sup> Nor

was there any hope that an intervention could offer political solutions since the warring parties had already rejected one peace plan after another.

Because the war continued to escalate, the credibility and reputation of the international community in dealing with Yugoslavia suffered. Miscalculations and delayed reactions as well as conflicting national interests and evaluations prevented the West from presenting a united front and made it look thoroughly helpless, disoriented, and devoid of any overall concept on how to cope with the situation. An army of special envoys, diplomats, and military experts scurried around just trying to catch up with the tumultuous events, hundreds of ceasefires were broken, and the heads of state of the world's greatest powers exposed themselves to public ridicule by arrogant provincial politicians from the Balkans. Not only did the international community lack the political will to form a united approach, it also possessed no effective instruments of conflict management.<sup>61</sup>

For all these reasons, the international community limited itself to developing a strategy of humanitarian relief and containment. It imposed an arms embargo and commissioned the United Nations in Sarajevo with the distribution of food and medicine. Serbia and Montenegro, which had united as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were punished in May 1992 with comprehensive economic and diplomatic sanctions. In February 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia to prosecute the worst war crimes.<sup>62</sup>

In light of the relatively weak response from the West, the Bosnian government received support from the Islamic world. Hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars are thought to have been spent between 1992 and 1995 on illegal weapon sales. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Indonesia were particularly prominent sponsors. Radical, violence-prone groups from abroad also arrived in the embattled region, including up to five thousand Iranian, Afghani, and Saudi *mujahideen* fighters who joined the Bosniak armed forces.<sup>63</sup> Although conflicts between Saudi Arabia and Iran, between the Sunnis and Shiites, stood in the way of a unified Islamic policy, pan-Islamic solidarity was strengthened. This encouraged the re-Islamization of Bosnian Muslims, who felt abandoned by the West.<sup>64</sup>

Brutal "ethnic cleansing" continued to force thousands of people to flee to the cities, where unsustainable conditions had prevailed for months. Therefore, the UN Security Council declared Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, and Bihać "safe areas" in April and May 1993. Lightly armed Blue Helmet peacekeeping forces were to provide humanitarian aid under the protection of possible NATO air strikes. The concept of the safe areas revealed serious flaws from day one, starting with the fact that peacekeepers were being sent into a region in which there was no peace to keep. The rules of their deployment referred to consent of the conflicting parties, impartiality, and nonuse of

force except in self-defense. The Blue Helmets therefore did not have either the mandate or equipment and arms necessary for active battle. "Knowing that any other course of action would jeopardize the lives of the troops, we tried to create—or imagine—an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping . . . could be upheld," stated UN secretary-general Kofi Annan later.<sup>65</sup> The Security Council passed more than 200 resolutions to stitch together a complex and contradictory mandate, the boundaries of which were incomprehensible to all. Where did this mandate start, where did it end? Ultimately, the tragedy was that the term "safe area" duped the population into believing these areas offered a measure of protection that actually never existed. Furthermore, there was an extreme disparity between the UN's aims and its resources: instead of the 34,000 soldiers demanded by UN headquarters to man the six designated safe areas, the UN member states only sent 7,500 soldiers to serve.<sup>66</sup>

Meanwhile, the possibility of "humanitarian intervention" was being debated throughout the West. These debates between advocates and opponents of such intervention were particularly controversial in Germany, where the central question was whether Germany should and could participate in military operations abroad in the future, although these were expressly prohibited by the constitution. Because the German air force had been participating in the international airlift to Sarajevo since July 1992, members of Germany's Liberal and Social Democratic parties turned to the Constitutional Court in April 1993. The judges ruled on 12 July 1994 that Germany could take part in peacekeeping missions without having to first amend the constitution, as long as parliament approved the mission by simple majority. Step by step, the self-imposed limitation on military involvement that had prevailed in Germany since 1945 gave way to a greater acceptance of the idea to deploy German troops abroad and to assume a new foreign policy role in world politics.<sup>67</sup>

### *Srebrenica*

On the morning of 11 July 1995, Bosnian-Serb army and police units stormed the safe area of Srebrenica, which had been under artillery fire for days. Although the president of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, had ordered the removal of the Muslim population from the enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa back on 8 March, the attack caught the 150 Dutch UN troops deployed there completely by surprise.<sup>68</sup> During the torturous July days that followed, as many as 8,200 men and boys were systematically executed by Serb forces, making the Srebrenica massacres the first legally recognized genocide on European soil since 1945. In a tragic way, this incident symbolized the belated, helpless, and fully inadequate response of the West.

From the standpoint of the Bosnian Serbs, there were many reasons to attack the city. They viewed eastern Bosnia as ancient Serbian territory, the Drina River as an "internal river" and not a "border," as General Mladić



expressed it. “The main obstacle today is Srebrenica with which the Germans and Americans, who defend it, want to fix Serbia’s border at the Drina,” he said in addressing his soldiers. “It is your task to prevent this.”<sup>69</sup> In the summer of 1995, Mladić’s troops controlled all of eastern Bosnia with the exception of a few enclaves, while the Bosnian army only launched attacks periodically against the regions surrounding what were actually demilitarized safe areas. Bosniak troops had grown increasingly strong since 1994, had retaken regions, and were preparing to break the siege of Sarajevo in the summer of 1995. In this context, the Bosnian military pulled soldiers out of Srebrenica, a clear indication that they did not intend to make a serious effort to defend the enclave. Furthermore, the Serbs could count on encountering no resistance from the UN peacekeeping troops. That spring a precedent had been set in Croatia in which the Croatian army had overrun the UN safe area in western Slavonia and driven out the Serb population living there. Last but not least, contempt and revenge against the *balija*, a derogatory term for Muslims, played a role after Muslim militias had caused a bloodbath in the villages of Glogova and Kravica on the Orthodox Christmas Eve of 1993. “*Kad, tad*”—sooner or later, Serbs vowed, there would be revenge.<sup>70</sup>

A dangerous concoction of strategic scheming, nationalist incitement, and outright vengefulness was brewing as Mladić’s men waited for an opportunity for the ultimate reckoning with the Muslims. In the preceding months, thousands had flown to the safe area from the large territories under Serb control. Instead of 9,000 people, there were now 30,000 people in the city—another reason why the UN military experts believed that Srebrenica could not be taken by force. General Mladić assessed the situation differently and assumed that he could force the city to surrender without a major battle by placing it under siege. However, contrary to expectations, Muslim soldiers, along with a good number of the male population, decided to break out of town during the night of 11 July. This made the Serbs hopping mad. It was then, at the latest, that Mladić must have given the order to massacre as many men and boys as they could find. Following the assault on the city, his troops captured all those seeking protection on the grounds of the UN compound in Potočari or hiding in the surrounding woods. Thousands were taken away in buses, packed into empty school buildings or warehouses, and then slaughtered like livestock or systematically executed.

The 17-year-old Witness O, who was able to escape, severely injured, after a mass shooting on the morning of 15 July 1995, recounted the events of that night: “The situation was chaotic. We were all tied up. . . . the firing started, and then they would call out people in groups of five. . . . And when it was my turn . . . we were told to find a place for us, . . . when we were on the right-hand side of the truck, I saw rows of killed people. It looked like they had been lined up one row after the other. . . . And when we reached the spot,

somebody said, ‘Lie down.’ And when we started to fall down to the front, they were behind our backs, the shooting started. . . . I felt pain in the right side of my chest . . . . I was waiting for another bullet to come and hit me and I was waiting to die. . . . I don’t know how long it took. They kept bringing people up. . . . Once they had finished, somebody said that all the dead should be inspected . . . and if they find a warm body, they should fire one more bullet into their head.’<sup>71</sup> Miraculously, Witness O was overlooked, so that he was later able to crawl away on all fours into the forest.

Both the UN and the government of the Netherlands promised to investigate and report their findings on the greatest mass murder of postwar European history to a shocked world. Their reports placed responsibility on many shoulders:<sup>72</sup> the UN Security Council, for limiting its involvement to containment and choosing a peacekeeping mission that was not implementable and based on an ill-conceived concept of safe areas; the UN member states, for sending too few, poorly trained, and insufficiently equipped Blue Helmets into a highly dangerous operation; the imprudent UN commanders in Srebrenica who did not have serious reconnaissance equipment at their disposal, for evaluating the situation quite falsely up to the bitter end and for not concerning themselves with the fate of those taken prisoner by the Serbs after the town fell; the headquarters of the UN peacekeeping forces in Zagreb, for turning down requests by the UN troops on site for NATO air power; and the defense minister of the Netherlands, for supporting that decision because he feared reprisals against fifty-five of his soldiers who served as Blue Helmets and who were being held hostage by the Serbs. Yet, with all that said, incidents of mass murder on this scale far exceeded what most people could have imagined.

### *The Dayton Peace Accord*

NATO had been bombing Serb positions on a limited scale since the brutal mortar attack on the Markale market in Sarajevo on 6 February 1994, in which at least 68 people were killed and 197 injured. But the Srebrenica massacre became a clarion call to action for the West, and the alliance started a campaign of massive bombardment. With the help of foreign arms shipments and American military advisers, the Croatian and Bosniak armed forces became more professionally run, improved their military clout, and could seriously challenge the previously superior Bosnian Serb army.<sup>73</sup> The myth of Serb invincibility was definitely shattered when the Croatian army overran the UN safe area in western Slavonia in May 1995 and finally conquered the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina in its Operation *oluja* (Storm) in August 1995, thereby driving away 150,000 to 200,000 Serbs. In cars, buses, and horse-drawn wagons, tens of thousands of men, women, and children fled head over heels, with barely any time to gather together the bare necessities. Once the political leadership also bolted, the statelet collapsed altogether. The

Serbs only managed to hold onto an area in eastern Slavonia that was later reincorporated peacefully into Croatia. As far as it was concerned, Zagreb had thus solved the “Serb question” permanently. Very few of the displaced Serbs returned to their homes when the war ended.<sup>74</sup>

All of these factors led to a military standoff in mid-1995. Bosnian Serbs and Croat-Muslim troops each controlled about half of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That fall, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke presented an agreement that he intended to bulldoze through. For three weeks, the presidents and the delegations from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia were housed in a lockdown situation at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, until they came to an agreement on 21 November 1995. The peace accord was formally signed in Paris a month later on 14 December.<sup>75</sup>

The Dayton Accord squared the circle by keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified state with its prewar borders (Muslim position) and by dividing it into two quite independent yet constituent entities (Serb position). The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was ruled by Croats and Muslims, received 51 percent of the territory and thus a symbolic majority. A complicated system of cantons was meant to fulfill the Croat demand for autonomy (but never did). The other entity continued to be the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), which received 49 percent of the territory. Very few competencies were delegated to the central government in Sarajevo, namely foreign policy, issues of citizenship, and monetary policy. The so-called entities governed themselves practically autonomously and were permitted their own currency, police force, and army. The agreement guaranteed that all refugees and displaced persons could return and demanded the prosecution of war criminals. To implement the accord, the international community installed a High Representative with quasi-dictatorial powers and sent a 60,000-strong peacekeeping force under NATO (and later EU) command.<sup>76</sup>

The initial euphoria over the end of the war soon subsided, and the general mood sobered. Society had changed to such a degree that peaceful coexistence of the different nationalities seemed impossible. Roughly 100,000 people had lost their lives, and more than two million had been driven from their homes. The Dayton Accord created a highly complicated and barely functional state that was weakened by a general unwillingness to cooperate, political radicalism, and serious economic problems. Last but not least, the new state suffered from the fact that a major part of the population did not identify with it.<sup>77</sup>

### *War in Kosovo*

All hopes that the Dayton agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina would bring lasting peace to the former Yugoslavia were dashed when unrest broke out in Kosovo in 1997. The “forgotten of Dayton”—the Albanians in Kosovo—drew attention to themselves after the West continued to consistently ignore their

demands for independence. Radicalized by the loss of autonomy, human rights abuse at the hands of Serb security forces, and growing economic problems, the underground organization Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) burst onto the scene with a series of terror attacks. The Serb special police forces and army started a massive crackdown that caused mass expulsions and killings. Yet, neither the sanctions leveled against Belgrade by the European Community nor the numerous warnings of the United States and European powers were of any avail. When forty-five Albanians were murdered in Račak in January 1999, determination grew in the West to end the conflict militarily in order to prevent a “second Bosnia.” The last diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group failed in February 1999 at the Château de Rambouillet near Paris when, despite being threatened with military action, Slobodan Milošević rejected the final version of a peace plan, because this would have meant the stationing of NATO troops on the FRY sovereign state’s territory, which he deemed a violation of international law.<sup>78</sup>

The Social Democratic Party–Green Party coalition government of Germany was soon faced with the parliamentary inquiry on whether Germany could participate in NATO air strikes even without a mandate from the UN Security Council. Those in favor drew parallels between the crimes occurring in Kosovo and Hitler’s annihilation policy, which gave the basic German narrative of its Nazi history a new emphasis. No longer was the main lesson from the past “never again war,” but rather “never again Auschwitz!” The order of the day was not military abstinence, but intervention. The German parliament decided by a large majority to participate in Operation Allied Force against Serbia.<sup>79</sup>

On 24 March 1999, NATO began its first air war “out of area” against military installations, infrastructure, and industrial plants in Serbia and Kosovo, accompanied by a large media campaign to present the intervention as a “just war.” “Our credo at NATO was just to be on the air the whole time,” NATO spokesman Jamie Shea explained later, “crowd out the opposition, give every interview, do every briefing.”<sup>80</sup> But instead of forcing Belgrade to relent, the air strikes only incited Serbian armed forces and special police to even greater destructiveness. Within a few days, as many as 800,000 people fled their homes or were expelled, most of them finding refuge in Macedonia and Albania. Yet the accusation persistently leveled by Western governments and NATO that the Serbian armed forces were deploying a long-prepared “Horseshoe Plan” of targeted “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo was proven later to be false.<sup>81</sup>

Slobodan Milošević did not give in until eleven weeks later, on 9 June 1999. Under the pressure of the air strikes, he eventually agreed to transform Kosovo into a UN protectorate within Yugoslavia. The relieved Contact Group, which had been having painful discussions about the necessity of ground-troop intervention, assured that the territorial integrity of the FRY

would be upheld. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, which established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and shortly thereafter a peacekeeping force under NATO command arrived there. The international civilian and military presence would oversee the return of refugees and IDPs and the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. The main objective was to promote “the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.” A process to determine the future status of Kosovo was started, which resulted in a proposal by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari to grant Kosovo “supervised independence,” which Serbia immediately rejected and which therefore did not obtain Security Council approval.

However, in Serbia, the end of the Kosovo war set the country on a new political course. In October 2000, after a lost election, mass demonstrations, and a march on Belgrade, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia swept Slobodan Milošević out of office and extradited him a year later to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Under a new democratic government, Serbia started a process of “Europeanization,” and sanctions were lifted.

Meanwhile, the UÇK looked around for a new field of operation. In the Preševo Valley of southern Serbia and in Macedonia, where a fourth of the population is Albanian, it carried out attacks with the aim being to consolidate all areas inhabited by Albanians. More than 200 people died in its conflict against the Macedonian security forces, and about 100,000 fled or were driven out. The EU and the United States mediated a peace agreement in August 2001 that granted Albanians more rights and left the country with at least the temporary hope of more stability.<sup>82</sup>

Shortly thereafter, with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the last institutional remnant of Yugoslavia dissolved. It was transformed in 2003 into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In May 2006, Montenegro left the union with Serbia after a slight majority of 55.5 percent of voters backed independence in a referendum. The new state was immediately recognized by Belgrade.<sup>83</sup>

On the basis of the Ahtisaari plan, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence on 17 February 2008. Although the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, concluded that the unilateral declaration of independence did not violate general international law or Security Council resolutions, the international community remained split over this question, including the EU. The United States was one of the first countries to officially recognize the newest state in Europe. As of May 2018, 113 out of 193 UN member states have recognized Kosovo.<sup>84</sup>

Gradually Yugoslavia dissolved into its constitutive parts in what seems to be an almost logical consequence of the process of disintegration that had

started in the 1980s. The erosion of political institutions, the demise of the state's monopoly on the use of force, and the cessation of international control mechanisms created a vacuum of authority that enabled actors to pursue their specific interests ruthlessly with military means. The result was a hybrid of civil war and war of aggression in which more than 100,000 people lost their lives. The economization of the conflicts and the media involvement in them led some to believe that what occurred in Yugoslavia constituted the prototype of "new war."<sup>85</sup> However, the form of this armed conflict was not new, only the way in which it was perceived and subsequently interpreted from abroad. Actually, it was but a continuation of the secular process of nation and state building that began in the nineteenth century with the collapse of foreign rule over the Balkans and led in periodic stages to armed conflicts and "ethnic cleansing." In this process, the ethnic-inclusive South Slavic idea has eventually succumbed to its strongest rival, the idea of a homogeneous nation state. The new political order of the post-Yugoslav era arose as a consequence of military force, in the same way as the entire map of European statehood evolved.

## 20.

# What Remained of Yugoslavia

### *Unfinished Peace*

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, seven states have emerged where Yugoslavia once existed: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo. In a region of the world known for centuries for its unique ethnic and cultural plurality, more than four million people were shifted around in pursuit of the ideal homogeneous nation state.

The new map of the Balkans reflects the federal makeup of the former multinational state and all its shortcomings. When Yugoslavia broke apart, the national question again became acute, yet was left unresolved. This question seems somehow anachronistic in a coalescing Europe, but it still harbors a significant potential for unrest. Only the Slovenes and—with minor exceptions—the Croats and Montenegrins came out of the breakup with territorially consolidated state entities. The Serb people, however, were divided into three states. Serbia was not to include historic areas of Serb settlement in Croatia and lost its medieval center, Kosovo. The societies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo became deeply divided ethnically and suffered severe economic setbacks. It cannot be thoroughly ruled out that border changes will occur in the future should the areas inhabited by Serbs or by Albanians unite to create larger nation states. Macedonia also suffers from the repercussions of Yugoslavia's demise. Because of Greek objections the small country could not be recognized under its chosen name. In 1993, it was accepted for membership in the United Nations under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Since then Greece also blocked the admission of its small neighbor into the EU and NATO. Countless international attempts at mediation had failed before, in mid-2018, the parties eventually agreed to name the country Republic of North Macedonia. These examples show that the phase of independent nation-state building may not simply be skipped on the path to an integrated Europe.

On the surface, calm has been restored throughout the entire region. The main protagonists of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, presidents Milošević,

Tudjman, and Izetbegović, are dead and were replaced by a new generation of politicians. The worst excesses of nationalism have been fenced in, and progress is being made, if at very different speeds, in establishing democratic institutions, rule of law, and freedom of the press.

Except for the Serbian veto of Kosovo's declared independence, the new states have formally recognized each other and publicly apologized for the war crimes committed. But even Serbia and Kosovo have started a process of normalization. Those individuals who shouldered the major political responsibility for "ethnic cleansing" were extradited to the ICTY in The Hague. Limited capacity made it impossible to try all but the most important defendants there, so the tribunal turned over the less prominent cases to the jurisdiction of the successor states. By December 2017, when the tribunal had concluded all 161 cases and was closed down, no suspect was still at large, including the Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladić and Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić.

There is also a glimmer of hope regarding the economic situation in the Balkans. The Yugoslav wars, followed by the international embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, caused immense damage, estimated to be well over \$110 billion. The collapse of Yugoslavia also broke up a cohesive economic area into unproductive mini-economies, and the introduction of a market economy came at a high price. Severely hit by the global economic and financial crisis in 2007–2008, the region suffered from deep recession, shrinking employment, and declining income. A decade later, relevant economic data is pointing upward. But whereas growth rates nearly match the high rates of the eastern Central European EU accession countries, unemployment and brain-drain remains persistently high. Meanwhile, regional cooperation has been revived, for example through free trade agreements and common infrastructure projects. Although not all disputes stemming from secession have been settled, the relations between the countries have nearly normalized.

Only Bosnia-Herzegovina, the broken heart of Yugoslavia, could not be mended. Not only was it stipulated that institutions, currencies, and the armed forces be separated along ethnic lines, but this also became the case for languages, schoolbooks, and even restaurant menus. Everything is translated back and forth between Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian, which is known in international newspeak simply as "BSC." Children are taught in separate classrooms, where the spirit of community and communality is systematically drilled out of them. Those who do not agree with this new apartheid must live abroad or in internal emigration.

Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina also left Europe with a political system in which Islam assumes an important role in public life. The formerly open-minded, tolerant Bosnian Muslim culture yielded to a systematic Islamization



from the top down. “The Islamic tradition is the foundation of the Bosnian people’s identity,” said the religious leader of the country, Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Cerić. “Without Islam . . . we are nothing and nobody.”<sup>1</sup> A novelty in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war is the presence of followers of fundamentalist Wahhabism, who maintain veritable strongholds in central Bosnia between the cities of Tuzla, Zenica, and Travnik.<sup>2</sup> Overall, the strategy of Islamization has had mixed success. Although more veiled women now populate the streets, other religious practices, including the Koran studies, the prohibition of alcohol and pork, the introduction of Sharia, and daily prayers, have remained rather uncommon and seem to many to be superimposed and strange. At the end of the 1990s, only 5 to 10 percent of the adult men attended Friday prayers, and not even every tenth child participated in classes learning the Koran.<sup>3</sup> Therefore it seems unlikely that Bosnia-Herzegovina will ever become an Islamic state.

### *Titostalgia*

Since the political system underwent change, so did memory culture. However, the biographies of many people are still influenced by their earlier socialist socialization.<sup>4</sup> Faced with deep social insecurity and uncertain prospects for the future resulting from the transformation, many seek refuge in the vision of an idealized past, be it out of political conviction, out of spite, or simply as a psychological reflex to help them cope with their new social environment. This yearning for the good days of long ago and for the old emotional hearth made Josip Broz one of the most beloved and respected personalities in the post-Yugoslav region.<sup>5</sup> For his documentary *Tito among the Serbs for the Second Time*, the director Željimir Žilnik had a Tito double, dressed in a uniform and wearing sunglasses, stroll down the Belgrade’s central pedestrian zone in 1992. A man on the street beams at the sight of him: “You are back. Back then we had [only] one Tito. Now we have a dozen. It’s wonderful that you are back!”<sup>6</sup>

In the new millennium, the appeal of this idol has not changed much for people. Antique shops, souvenir stands, and street vendors offer a wide assortment of artifacts from industrial mass culture that are linked to a nostalgia for better times: retro-fashion, keyrings, cigarette lighters, pens, postcards, T-shirts, socks, and busts with Tito’s image. There are Tito parties and Tito doubles, Tito cooking classes and a federation of Tito societies. In Slovenia, it is very popular to take nostalgic trips on the Blue Train.<sup>7</sup> Each day people sign their names in the guestbook at the house in Kumrovec where Josip Broz was born. To those living in a present full of disappointment and uncertainty, Tito appears as the incarnate positive, as the indefinable good. The idealization and romanticization of an irretrievable past consolidate in the focus on this

one man to become a type of retrospective utopia and the antithesis of the problem-ridden future.<sup>8</sup>

Yet there will be no return to Yugoslavia. Article 142 of the Croatian constitution reads: "It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association of the Republic of Croatia into alliances with other states if such association leads, or might lead, to a renewal of a South Slavic state community or to any Balkan state form of any kind."<sup>9</sup> In Croatia and its neighboring countries, "Yugo-nostalgia" has become a damning label to stigmatize all things yesteryear and morally suspect, even though usually this nostalgia does not express a yearning for the return of the old regime but for the return "of an era of peace and a united, open, and tolerant country," claims the writer Rada Iveković.<sup>10</sup> "Suddenly all this national classification started, which was thoroughly foreign to us," explained a journalist. She found it totally "incomprehensible how people should so classify others or themselves and even invoke an association with a certain past, with some history."<sup>11</sup>

The younger generation no longer has personal memories of Yugoslavia and did not even consciously experience the war. When a feeling of solidarity arises among the fraternal foes, as it sometimes does, then it is usually of a folkloric nature, not a political one. One example was when Marija Šerifović from Serbia won the 2007 Eurovision Song Contest in Helsinki due in part to the enthusiastic support she received from all of the neighboring countries of the former Yugoslavia. Many young people have never left their country, so that the horizon of their experience ends at the respective national borders, while older generations reminisce about how wonderful the times were when the red passport of Yugoslavia opened all border gates.

### *European Perspectives*

Amid unified Europe, with its more than 512 million inhabitants, the post-Yugoslav region remains a blank spot on the political map at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The per capita prosperity of the Western Balkan candidate and potential candidate states is, at best, a third of that in the EU.<sup>12</sup> This alone is a great motivation for many to join the EU. They want finally to be a part of the family of European peoples and to be viewed no longer as urchins and notorious troublemakers from the Balkans. As one journalist summarized: "Those of us from the other Europe . . . are always somewhat aware that, no matter how famous or successful we are, we are looked upon as children of communism, like people with a handicap who can never accept [the] rules of democratic, Christian, liberal, capitalist Europe."<sup>13</sup>

For the people of the Balkans, "Europe" invokes images and stirs imaginations in a way that coalesces into a shining new myth, capturing a wide spectrum of hopes and emotions. Visions of the future associated with

this magical term are diffuse and often completely unrealistic. However, “Europeanization” is presented as an objective barring any alternative, as promise, as fate. Actually, the European Union has indeed held out the prospect of full membership for all post-Yugoslav states, but under conditions that most of them will probably not be able to fulfill for many years. The first country to join the EU was Slovenia in 2004, followed by Croatia in 2013. The hurdles confronting the other countries are the slow development of institutions, sprawling corruption, and the continued discrimination against minorities. Along the lines of “we are acting as if we want to take them in, and they act as if they believe us,” each side still mutually reassures the other of the good will between them. In early 2018, the European Commission declared, within the framework of a new Western Balkans strategy, that Serbia and Montenegro could join the EU in 2025 if conditionality was met. The conditions include the strengthening of the rule of law, the transformation to a market economy, efforts to fight corruption, the establishment of good neighborly relations, and structural adjustments to enable acceptance of the Community *acquis*.

Yet the fervor about Europe continues unabated, just as it did throughout the entire twentieth century. Once again, postulates of national identity clash with those of European modernity, political parties and societies are divided into Westerners and traditionalists, and those mired in yesteryear depict their national culture as authentic and morally uncorrupt. Due to the paternalistic attitude of Americans and West Europeans, there is a good measure of ambivalence concerning a liberal market economy, foreign investment, Euro-Atlantic integration, and dealing with one’s own wartime past. For some, wrote the Bosnian magazine *Dani*, Europe is a “magic formula for peace, prosperity, freedom to travel, and free chance to work abroad,” while for others it represents nothing but “new slavery . . . known as West European democracy.” Even today, just as in the past, the postulates of progress and Europeanization are not fundamentally questioned. The only concern centers on choosing the proper path to “reasonably defend our identity, our cultural and spiritual values.”<sup>14</sup> So, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the observation once made by a Bosnian intellectual still appears to be accurate: “Nothing is as it once was. And nothing is different.”<sup>15</sup>

## Concluding Remarks

The South Slavic idea was born of the Enlightenment. The ideals of progress, humanism, reason, and science nurtured the concept of a commonality of Croats and Serbs and directed the desire for self-determination, participation, and prosperity toward a concrete political program: the formation of the state of Yugoslavia. Not only elite groups but many ordinary people held high hopes in this project, which in the nineteenth century still felt utterly utopian. So, although the founding of the state only came about as a consequence of the First World War, it was not an “artificial” creation.

However, unification in 1918 came late, too late for the various identities that prevailed among the South Slavic peoples to merge into an understanding of the Yugoslav nation as the synthesis of different cultures and historical traditions. Although the different populations spoke similar dialects or languages and shared many cultural characteristics, their sense of belonging was based in each case on different criteria. For the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, a major source of ethnic identity and distinction was religion, for the Slovenes and Macedonians it was language that counted, and for the Montenegrins it was a specific historical-political heritage. Because various foreign powers had long dominated the Balkans, no consensus emerged about what it was that united a nation. Was it a common language and culture (as in Germany and Italy) or the tradition of the state (as in France)? In a way, the South Slavic lands appeared to be a laboratory for competing and sometimes even contradictory concepts of identity and national ideologies.

The peoples of Yugoslavia were unequally involved in the conception and construction of their state. Nation building did not occur synchronously in the South Slavic regions. In the run-up to the First World War, the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs had a fairly well-established ethnic self-awareness, whereas the Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians only developed this decades later. This time lag may also account for the failure to consolidate an integral South Slavic understanding of nationhood—a Balkan version of the melting pot—either before or after the founding of Yugoslavia, despite linguistic and cultural ties, traditions of ethnic coexistence, and the active steps taken by the state toward nation building. If the masses failed to seize upon the overarching

Yugoslav identity offered to them, it was because their different forms of collective awareness were already too solidified, the social barriers erected by tradition too high, and expressions of collective interests and political cultures often incompatible.

Enormous historical-political and socioeconomic disparities intensified the diversity of living conditions, experiences, and interests. This led to more conspicuous divisions and conflicts, especially during crises. Yet at all times it was a Herculean task to reconcile the various local conditions and traditions: Central European features emanating from Slovenia and Croatia; Ottoman-Balkan ones from Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; and the Islamic heritage that marked Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both Yugoslav states, each with its own unique approach, floundered in the attempt to offset this diversity.

A powerful motive for South Slavic unification from the nineteenth century onward was the desire to overcome backwardness. The elites in Zagreb and Belgrade were completely under the spell of the European model of progress and sought to imitate Western developmental strategies. Politically they promoted the ideals of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and liberalism, but the highly agrarian nature of their societies meant that they lacked the requisite societal structure. This is why elements of a modern constitutional state, economic policy, and governance are oddly mixed together with older traditions, identities, and values. In other words, the ambivalence of Southeast European reform policy did not result from anti-Western attitudes but from the effort to harmonize tensions between a need for cultural identity, on the one hand, and rational progressive thinking, on the other.

At the turn of the twentieth century the long march toward modernity began. For the first time, one could see signs of the fundamental transformation that was to come in the economy, social relations, cultural expression, mentalities, and everyday life. Around 1900, the essential tracks were laid for the development of an industrial society even in the South Slavic agrarian regions. The first areas of industrial concentration were formed; large-scale migration ensured that cities grew and were transformed; new methods of communication, such as the distribution of printed matter, led to social mobilization and the spread of critical self-reflection, one of the key characteristics of modernity.

Yet these processes did not develop fully until after the Second World War. A mixture of optimism about progress, planning euphoria, and modernizing furor catapulted the Yugoslavs after 1945 into a period of epoch-making, sociocultural innovation in employment and social stratification, in lifestyles and everyday living, in the role of the sexes and generations, in attitudes and values. It took until the 1960s for these innovations to permeate all spheres of human life, aided not least by modern social policy, the revolution in education,

the spread of technology and the media, and the changing aesthetic standards of modern art, literature, architecture, and film. Admittedly, as in other southern European states, remnants of older social interrelationships persisted, such as patronage and cronyism. Still, within a generation, Yugoslavs were literally “up to speed.” The desire to make up for lost time and catch up with the more developed world was no longer confined to the political and intellectual classes, but encompassed almost the entire population.

The Yugoslav model of socialism combined a variety of ideas and concepts, originating from nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers, social reformers, and politicians on ways to cope with the challenges of modernity. The notion prevailed that entire societies could be designed and constructed on the basis of reason—one of the basic intellectual assumptions of modernity. Socialism committed itself explicitly to the attempt to achieve justice and modernity by way of comprehensive social intervention. On one hand, its ideals were inspired by the Enlightenment and nineteenth- and twentieth-century reform movements that emphasized values such as rationality, efficiency, education, hygiene, prosperity, and social security. These ideas fit into the Europe-wide context of a world permeated by science and technology. On the other hand, its ideals were substantially influenced by communist dogma: the Marxist ideology, a radical humanism, atheism, collectivism, and patriotic virtues such as friendship between peoples and “brotherhood and unity.” Last but not least, the Yugoslav social model also incorporated liberal-bourgeois values, principles, and practices into its modernizing strategies, including—within limits—the market economy and private property, consumer goods fetishism, and the free movement of labor. The system even tolerated the fact that a segment of its citizenry submitted themselves to the laws of capitalist wage labor by working abroad. So Yugoslav modernity after 1945 consisted of a particular combination of various norms, values, and practices, on the basis of which the multinational state formulated its own unique response to the challenge of the new age.

As varied as the preconditions were at the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe and as contrasting as the various blueprints for a social order became as time wore on, by the end of the century a strong degree of uniformity existed across the entire continent in terms of the social and occupational structures, family types and gender roles, ways of life, attitudes, and values. Fundamental long-term processes such as industrialization, secularization, the advance of technology, urbanization, and the development of critical self-reflection began later in Yugoslavia, progressed at a different pace and along somewhat different lines than in the West, but in the long run followed the trend toward inner-European convergence. Tito’s system favored and fostered close exchange relationships with foreign countries and thus a

constant transfer of goods, knowledge, and values. International connections, for example in the form of labor migration and tourism, even served as major pillars supporting this model, which is why the social and attitudinal differences between Yugoslavia and Western Europe never ran as deep as they did between the capitalist and the Eastern bloc countries.

Independent of the evolving political, social, and economic parameters, four long-standing structural phenomena influenced the development of Yugoslavia in the twentieth century: first, ethnic and religious diversity, which repeatedly cast a new light on the question of a fair reconciliation of interests and of the legitimacy of the political system; second, a striking backwardness compared to West and Central Europe, which put the economy at a competitive disadvantage; third, exposure to rival Great Powers influences; and fourth, regional disparities that caused persistent feelings of discrimination. These four factors, exacerbated by global economic crises, repeatedly narrowed the political leeway, which in turn reinforced doubts about the legitimacy of the state and its ability to fulfill its promises of progress.

Therefore, internal conflicts were not predetermined by questions of ethnic, cultural, or religious identity but arose primarily from diverging interests, worldviews, and political persuasions. They were caused particularly by the tensions resulting from the dynamics of sociocultural transformation in general and recurring crises of modernization in particular. The battle over the best model of government did not necessarily take place between Serbs and Croats, but first and foremost between bourgeois liberals, right-wing nationalists, and communists. Sometimes it was separatists fighting unitarists, sometimes federalists against centralists. One ongoing confrontation was between the defenders and reformers of the constitution. The battle lines cut right across peoples, regions, and republics. Yet with the development of mass society and the mass media in the twentieth century, the politicizing of differences became a main contributor to political strife.

As everywhere on the Continent, large-scale change in the twentieth century led to a hostile backlash in the form of hostility toward science and rationality, a kind of civilization criticism. The proliferation of lifestyles and the encroachments of the modern state resulted in deep insecurities and even in an entrenched anti-Western stance. Because the sociocultural transformation of South Slavic societies took place over a much shorter period and at a faster pace than in the West, the mental, psychological, and social shocks were particularly severe. Exclusivist nationalism, ethnic fervor, and fundamentalist religion flourished particularly in times of historic upheaval, such as the late 1930s and the 1980s.

The ongoing European crisis of the interwar period aggravated the Yugoslav structural problems of diverse legacies, social plight, and ethno-

political confrontation. The lack of legitimacy and the teething troubles of a young parliamentary system, exacerbated by the syndrome of backwardness and the shock waves of the world economic crisis, narrowed the scope for compromise and compensation between the various political camps and interest groups, entrenched the blockades on decision making, deepened internal contradictions, and undermined the acceptability of a state whose optimistic promises collided all too brutally with the bitter reality of the crisis. New social experiences turned enthusiasm into anxiety. In contrast to more developed European countries under quite similar conditions, however, the societal soil was not fertile for the germination and growth of the extremist ideologies of fascism and bolshevism; they never became widely attractive as alternatives to the liberal bourgeois model. It is true that other undermining factors were also at work here, such as the experience of the world war, the weaknesses of the parliamentary political system, burgeoning class warfare, and cultural pessimism. But unlike its neighbors, Yugoslavia did not provide advantageous conditions for these extremist ideologies. In the countryside, deep-seated religious, family, and social affinities left few possibilities for a radical critique of society. Unlike in Italy, Germany, and Spain, the conservative and monarchist forces in Yugoslavia did not enter into power-sharing compromises with the radical right. If Hitler had not invaded the whole of Europe and subjected the Balkans to his inhuman scheme for a New World Order, it is unlikely that either the fascist Ustasha or the communists would ever have had a chance to gain political power. The most popular alternative to the bourgeois-capitalist model of development at that time was the agrarian movement.

Only by way of what were—in every respect—the revolutionary upheavals of the Second World War, coupled with the experience of years of marginal existence in a society struggling to survive, could the communists rise to power in Yugoslavia in their own right. Under the firm control of Tito, they succeeded in bringing under their wing a very diverse spectrum of milieus and motivations for the fight against occupation, exploitation, and terror, while the established power groups, such as the bourgeois classes, the monarchists, and the nationalists, compromised themselves through collaboration. With their backs against the wall, the communists also made the most spellbinding promises. Their program brought together the three existential questions that had constantly bedeviled the South Slavic lands: addressing the existential concerns of peasants and workers, ending exploitation and foreign domination, and achieving national reconciliation through “brotherhood and unity,” something that acquired paramount significance in the age of fascism. Against the backdrop of terror and mass violence, a fundamental historical shift was in the making. It was facilitated by the complete collapse and irretrievable loss



of respect for the old system, shaped by the rapid and radical transformation in social conditions, and facilitated by a new international environment.

In contrast to the Eastern bloc countries and despite the limitations imposed on individual liberties, Tito's rule possessed genuine legitimacy. It sprang from three sources: the successful war of liberation, the defiance of Stalin, and Tito's personal integrity and authority. The relative stability of the regime resulted from a number of internal and external factors: Tito's skillful balancing act between East and West, which earned his policies a great deal of international recognition and made a name for Yugoslavia in its own right with regard to foreign affairs; a complex state model combining federal rights with the principles of ethnic power-sharing that helped curb nationalist infighting; and a socialist system that did not eschew elements of a free market economy, cultural liberalism, or civil rights and garnered international prestige. The average citizen harbored the illusion of living in an everlasting consumer wonderland and was particularly glad to have escaped the clutches of the Soviet Union. In short, Tito breathed new self-confidence into this deeply traumatized and humiliated nation.

Abroad, Yugoslavia was also widely viewed as a bearer of hope, because its system of self-management rejected bolshevism and its politics of non-alignment represented a clear counterpoint to the Cold War. Especially in the so-called Third World, high expectations were pinned on the former Balkan no-man's-land, which prominently propagated such global issues as decolonization, disarmament, and the fight against poverty at the United Nations. Yugoslavia's international reputation helped cover up both the country's incomplete modernization and its internal divisions.

By the early 1960s, a shadow was already growing across the unbridled faith in progress that characterized Yugoslavia's development during the postwar decades. Changes in society and political reforms since the 1950s accelerated the complexity of social stratification, lifestyles, and values; increased the range of interests and opinions; and strengthened centrifugal forces that challenged one-party rule. Inadvertently, socialist modernization acted as the catalyst for a new nationalism. First, it served to deepen regional disparities rather than level them out. Second, the revolution in education, the structural changes in the economy, and geographical mobility produced upwardly mobile social groups, who would end up being the ones to actually complete the process of nation building among Muslims, Albanians, and Macedonians. Third, this created new competition for advancement, status, power, and resources between the Yugoslav peoples. Fourth, mass media and mass society provided new means of communication and political mobilization that new elites could use for their nationalist cause, thereby enabling a growing alienation from the Yugoslav mainstream to take root.

Tito ruled the country with his charismatic leadership style until his death in 1980. Under the specific historical circumstances of the Second World War, his exceptional political ability took him right to the top, earning him unquestioned loyalty and legitimacy among the political class and enormous, emotionally laden popularity among his fellow countrymen. He represented the most important and sometimes sole guarantee of the political compromise hammered out by the leaders of the nationalities during wartime. It is hard to overstate how important his role as a referee was to the survival of the system, a reality that the elites accepted until the very end, if often with clenched teeth. But even if Tito had been granted immortality, he could not have held back the internal erosion of the Yugoslav system. Ever more complex realities, together with the increasing pluralism of Yugoslav society and growing dependence on the world economy, diminished the value of talents that had been ultimately important in wartime but counted for little in a global industrial society. From the 1960s onward, the forces demanding more freedom of speech, democracy, and civil rights multiplied.

The 1970s—here, too, there are parallels across all of Europe—signaled the onset of a profound crisis of modernity and modernization that marked an epochal turning point. Old industrial sectors of the economy went into decline during these years and thereby undermined the foundation of Yugoslavia's postwar boom. Its industries were chronically underfinanced, technologically backward, and overly bureaucratized. The negotiated economy, built on privileges, showed no capacity to adjust to the changed global context. Declining industrialization in the 1970s brought on a crisis of the system. Planning for the future became impossible, and the *raison d'être* of socialism was rendered null and void. The Yugoslav state lost its inner logic and its structure. Consensus was replaced by doubt, disengagement, and demoralization.

As republics and nations drifted ever further apart in socioeconomic terms and the unifying political ideology of communism became obsolete, the supposedly undisputed legitimacy of Tito's regime came under pressure even while he was still alive. The people's democracy promised "brotherhood and unity" by invoking the ideals of the French Revolution to weld the nationalities together on the basis of a socialist order. But by foregrounding the equality of nations and nationalities, the communists reduced the triad of "liberty, equality, fraternity" to a question of nationality. Tito's Yugoslavia was based by definition on a compact between its peoples and republics; that is to say, on collective and not individual rights. As a result, the central premises of the liberal era—liberty and democracy—went by the board. Because the one-party system only knew mechanisms for reducing social pluralism to national interests, it strengthened the trend toward the affirmation of national affiliation. Especially after 1974, federalism and proportional representation

for nationalities institutionalized competition and conflicts between peoples and republics, rather than along political and ideological lines. What could be more obvious than to discover that regional elites compensated for a lack of democracy with nationalism?

In the 1980s, Yugoslavia slipped into the deepest economic, political, and social-psychological crisis in its history, resulting in disorientation, insecurity, and a fear of the future. Economic plight and a reform backlog contributed to a growing loss of legitimacy, sense of purpose, and confidence, while the intransigence of the republics robbed the central government of its last vestiges of governance. As the crisis became more complex and comprehensive, the adversaries became more unyielding, the compromise more unstable, and the strategies proposed to deal with the situation less convincing. The political system proved to be structurally incapable of adjusting to changing social and world economic conditions without abolishing itself in the process. Thus, a growing discrepancy evolved in these years between expectations and reality, which threw into flux the life plans of many people.

This crisis was total in its dimensions and impact, particularly because it chipped away at roles, values, and identity. The more communism lost its power of conviction, the more tempting it seemed to escape into faith, ethnic identity, folk culture, and history. Yet the aim was not to revive the past but to renegotiate the troubled relationship between state, politics, and society. In this context, many remarkable ideological hybrids emerged, such as Milošević's brand of socialist market-economy nationalism or the Bosniak variant of a secular-religious Islam—a paradox only on the surface. These new nationalisms did not bring down the system themselves but were rather the unwanted product of it.

The 1980s marked a turn to nationalism in all the republics, from which new political parties profited the most. They created a new sense of purpose in the ideological vacuum that followed disenchantment with socialism. All types of conflict were now declared to be genuine national differences. The new aggressive and overbearing nationalisms in the republics all had similar roots, defined themselves in contrast to one another, and used similar rhetoric in their arguments. The tragic conclusion is that, as so often in ethnically diverse states, democratization acted as an accelerant in the process of polarization and disintegration. In such difficult times, many people felt the only acceptable leaders were those who, with the aid of mass nationalistic agitation, upheld a pretense of democratic legitimacy that never actually existed, perhaps because the new party structures now controlled the public domain, above all the media.

Why Yugoslavia broke up and why this happened through military force are two distinct questions that need to be analyzed separately. The collapse itself can be attributed to two sets of causes. First, the state was burdened from

its inception with structural problems of the *longue durée*, particularly the large discrepancies in socioeconomic development, the ethnic rifts between the peoples that were never quite overcome, and disparate political-historical traditions. Sources of friction were reduced through major and fundamental historical compromise, such as the one agreed upon in 1917 by the leaders in Corfu and renewed in 1943 in Jajce. However, in times of crisis the scope for compensation narrowed, and a sense of disadvantage and discrimination emerged. Besides these structural factors, a second set of causes is made up of situational factors. Against the backdrop of Tito's death, a profound economic and sociopolitical crisis in the mid-1980s, and the ensuing existential concerns and anxieties people had about the future, many Yugoslavs turned to language, nation, and religion for their main sources of identity. With the ideological turn initiated by *perestroika*, followed by the downfall of communism all over Europe, central integrating forces disappeared, the first and foremost of these being the unifying socialist ideology but also the Soviet menace as the *ultima ratio* of a stable polity. The end of the East–West conflict marked the collapse of the “third way” of workers' self-management and international nonalignment, two fundamental pillars of Yugoslav state identity. In other words, under very specific historical circumstances, certain economic, socio-cultural, and power-political conflicts came to a head. Faced with changing conditions in global politics and radicalized by a dramatic crisis in state and society, these conflicts were reinterpreted into ethnonationalist contexts. The erosion of political order, the disintegration of a multiethnic space, and the loss of the state monopoly of force left a dangerous vacuum at the end of the 1980s.

So why did Yugoslavia implode with military violence, when Czechs and Slovaks parted company on peaceful terms? In both countries there were structural conflicts, but in Yugoslavia the internal tensions appeared incomparably deeper and all-encompassing. On one hand, they were driven by power-political and socioeconomic antagonisms, which steadily increased after 1945, instead of gradually fading away, as they did in Czechoslovakia. On the other, these tensions were permanently underlaid by a history of bloody conflict that was ever accessible for update and reinterpretation, with the Second World War serving as its chief point of reference. Czechs and Slovaks had never fought each other in a cruel civil war.

The constellation of the main players was also specific to Yugoslavia. With its republics, the country had created competing rivals roughly equal in strength and in possession of all the features of a sovereign state, including military power. This ostensible symmetry was particularly dangerous during the period of Yugoslavia's dissolution because there was a clash of irreconcilable interests—interests that were perceived by the opposing parties as vital. While the renegade republics and provinces saw no alternative to independence, for the Serbs the collapse of the state posed a threat to their

core national priorities. So a conflict ensued from which it was only possible to emerge either as the winner or the loser, a typical “zero-sum” situation.

Still, the decision for or against war was not made by structures, but by people. In the end the decision on how to handle the deep fissures in the relationships between the republics was a political one. If there must be a divorce, then let us make it a peaceful one, said the more judicious and prudent participants, who had recognized the dangers early on of an all-or-nothing approach. But too many players on each side were determined to assert supposedly higher nationalist interests by any means and at any cost. As the last vestiges of the Yugoslav state system, such as the party, the presidency, media networks, and security sector, vanished in 1990/1991, no checks and balances were left to steer the process of disintegration. Identities and loyalties were redefined, and well-established mechanisms of power-sharing and mediation were cast aside. Neither the political will nor any institutional mechanism existed to unlock the internal stalemate.

In the final analysis, the likelihood of escalation into war arose only because the state monopoly on the use of force folded with the demise of state institutions. In the resulting vacuum, those presidents, politicians, and generals with a political will to make war were joined by other influential agents, such as warlords, criminal networks, and diaspora circles, who stood to gain also financially from armed conflict. In a functioning state polity such groups could never have influenced the course of events as greatly as they did in ex-Yugoslavia after 1991/1992.

The much-cited Balkan culture played actually only a minor role in the final act of the Yugoslav drama. The traditional glorification of violence, the bloodthirsty folk epics, the cult of arms, and patriarchal customs formed the backdrop for strategies of communication and ways of acting in warfare, but they do not explain its deeper causes. Structural phenomena, including experiences, events, and memories, were never static variables but were constantly being reinterpreted and reconstructed as conditions changed. The invocation of symbolic language helped activate the resources of history, culture, and religion, mobilize people, and legitimize the power of certain authorities. The media and nationalistic propaganda created a climate of violence but did not cause an automatism of reaction. At literally every point in historical development there was latitude for individual decision making. No one can use anthropology, structure, culture, or the inherent dynamics of violence to excuse themselves from their responsibility for war and crimes against humanity. Nothing was irreversible, nothing was inevitable.

# Appendix A

## Parties, Political Organizations, and Committees

- Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ)
- Black Hand (Crna ruka)
- Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ)
- Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ)
- Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava, HSP)
- Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK)
- Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demokratska opozicija Slovenije, DEMOS)
- Democratic Party (Kingdom of Yugoslavia) (Jugoslavenska demokratska stranka, JDS)
- Democratic Party (Serbia) (Demokratska stranka, DS)
- Democratic Peasant Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija, HSS-SDS)
- Frankians (Frankovci)
- Green Shirts (Zelene košulje)
- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija, VMRO)
- Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija—Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo, VMRO-DPMNE)
- League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ)
- League of Communists (1990, Savez komunista—Pokret za Jugoslaviju, SK-PJ)
- Liberation Front (Oslobodilna fronta, OF)
- Nationalist Youth (Jugoslavenska napredna nacionalistička omladina, JNNO)
- National Defense (Narodna odbrana)


- Organization of Yugoslav Nationalists (Organizacija Jugoslavenkih nacionalista, ORJUNA)
- Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA)
- Peasant Party (Croatia)
- Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party (Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka, HPSS)
  - Croatian Republican Peasant Party (Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka, HRSS)
  - Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS)
- Radical Party/Radical People's Party (Narodna radikalna stranka, NRS)
- Serb Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka, SDS)
- Serb Liberal Party (Srpska liberalna stranka, SLS)
- Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka, SNS)
- Slovene People's Party (Slovenska ljudska stranka, SLS)
- Social Democratic Party of Croatia and Slavonia (Socijal-demokratska stranka Hrvatske i Slavonije)
- Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička radnička partija Jugoslavije, SRPJ)
- Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili smrt)
- Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia (Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije)
- United Opposition (Udružena opozicija)
- Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna)
- Yugoslav Action (Jugoslovenska akcija, JA)
- Yugoslav Club (Jugoslavenski klub)
- Yugoslav Committee (Jugoslavenski odbor)
- Yugoslav Muslim Organization (Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija, JMO)
- Yugoslav National Movement Zbor (Jugoslovenski narodni pokret Zbor)
- Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslavenska nacionalna stranka, JNS)
- Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica, JRZ)
- Yugoslav Social Democratic Party (Jugoslovenska socijaldemokratska stranka, JSDS)

# Appendix B

## Maps















# Appendix C

## Tables

TABLE 1 Historic Regions of the Kingdom of SHS, 1918

<b>Region</b>	<b>Area in km<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Population Size (1910/1914)</b>
Serbia (including Kosovo, Vardar-Macedonia, and part of Sandžak)	95,405	4,670,000
Montenegro (including part of Sandžak)	9,840	238,423
Bosnia-Herzegovina	51,199	1,898,044
Vojvodina (Baranya, Bačka, Banat)	19,233	1,380,000
Croatia (including Slavonia, Syrmia, and Međimurje)	43,307	2,715,237
Dalmatia (without Rijeka, Cres, Lošinj, Zadar, and Lastovo)	12,729	621,503
Slovenia (Carniola, Styria, Mur River Region)	16,198	1,056,464
<b>Total</b>	<b>247,911</b>	<b>12,579,671</b>

*Source:* Džaja, *Jugoslavismus*, 13.

TABLE 2 Populations of the Kingdom of SHS (according to the census of 31 January 1921)

<b>Native Language</b>	<b>In Numbers</b>	<b>In %</b>
Serbo-Croatian	8,911,509	74.36
Slovenian	1,019,997	8.51
Czech or Slovakian	115,532	0.96
Ruthenian (Ukrainian)	25,615	0.21
Polish	14,764	0.12
Russian	20,568	0.17
Hungarian	467,658	3.90
German	505,790	4.22
Albanian	439,657	3.67
Turkish	150,322	1.26
Romanian	231,068	1.93
Italian	12,553	0.11
Other	69,878	0.58
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,984,911</b>	<b>100.00</b>

*Source: Statistički pregled Kraljevine Jugoslavije [1921] po banovinama, Belgrade 1930, 5.*

TABLE 3 The Partition of Yugoslav Territory, 1941

<b>Acquired by</b>	<b>Area in km<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Population Size, 1941 (estimated)</b>	
		<b>In Numbers</b>	<b>In %</b>
German Empire	9,600	775,000	4.9
Italy	10,600	760,000	4.8
Montenegro	—	435,000	2.7
Albania	28,000	795,000	5.0
Croatia	98,600	6,300,000	39.6
Bulgaria	28,200	1,260,000	7.9
Hungary	11,600	1,145,000	7.2
Banat	9,800	640,000	4.0
Serbia	51,100	3,810,000	23.9
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	<b>247,500</b>	<b>15,920,000</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Sundhaussen, Geschichte Jugoslawiens, 113.*



TABLE 4 Ethnic Composition of Yugoslavia, 1948–1981

Nation/ Nationality	1948		1961		1981	
	In Numbers	In %	In Numbers	In %	In Numbers	In %
Serb	6,547,117	41.51	7,806,152	42.08	8,140,452	36.30
Croat	3,784,353	23.99	4,293,809	23.15	4,428,005	19.75
Muslim	808,921	5.13	972,960	5.25	1,999,957	8.92
Montenegrin	425,703	2.70	513,832	2.77	579,023	2.58
Macedonian	810,126	5.14	1,045,516	5.64	1,339,729	5.97
Slovene	1,415,432	8.97	1,589,211	8.57	1,753,554	7.82
Albanian	750,431	4.76	914,733	4.93	1,730,364	7.72
German	55,337	0.35	20,015	0.11	8,712	0.04
Hungarian	496,492	3.15	504,369	2.72	426,866	1.90
“Yugoslav”	—	—	317,124	1.71	1,219,045	5.44
Other	678,186	4.30	571,570	3.08	799,004	3.56

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija 1945–1985*, 56.

TABLE 5 Ethnic Homogeneity of Republics and Provinces, 1981

Republic/Province	Nation/ Nationality	% of Total Population	Second Largest Nationality	% of Total Population
Slovenia	Slovene	90.5	Croat	2.9
Serbia (proper) <sup>1</sup>	Serb	85.4	Yugoslav	4.8
Kosovo	Albanian	77.4	Serb	13.2
Croatia	Croat	75.1	Serb	11.5
Montenegro	Montenegrin	68.5	Muslim	13.4
Macedonia	Macedonian	67.0	Albanian	19.8
Serbia (entire)	Serb	66.4	Albanian	14.0
Vojvodina	Serb	54.4	Hungarian	18.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Muslim	39.4	Serb	32.0

Source: Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 519.

<sup>1</sup>Serbia excluding Kosovo and Vojvodina.

TABLE 6 Regional Distribution of Nations and Nationalities, 1981

Nation/ Nationality	Republic/ Province	Population Size in Yugoslavia (in millions)	Population Size in Republic/ Province (in millions)	% of Population in Republic/ Province
Slovene	Slovenia	1,753	1,712	97.7
Macedonian	Macedonia	1,339	1,279	95.5
Muslim	Bosnia- Herzegovina	1,999	1,630	81.5
Croat	Croatia	4,428	3,454	78.0
Serb	Serbia	8,140	6,182	75.9
Montenegrin	Montenegro	579	400	69.2
Albanian	Kosovo	1,730	1,226	70.9
Hungarian	Vojvodina	426	385	90.3

Source: Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 519.

TABLE 7 Percentage of Economic Sectors in the Yugoslav Gross Domestic Product, 1947–1984<sup>1</sup>

	1947	1965	1975	1984
<b>Primary sector:</b> Agriculture, forestry, water management	44.6	21.7	16.9	15.7
<b>Secondary sector:</b> Industry, construction, skilled crafts, and trades	37.6	47.6	50.5	53.5
<b>Tertiary sector:</b> Transport, trade, gastronomy, other	17.8	30.7	32.6	30.8

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija 1945–1985*, 75.

<sup>1</sup>1974 prices.

TABLE 8 Level of Prosperity in Yugoslavia Compared with Other European Countries: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (index numbers)

Country	1965	1983	Average Economic
			Growth Rate, 1965–1983 (%)
Yugoslavia	100	100	4.70
Italy	346	249	2.80
Austria	428	360	3.70
Hungary	63	84	6.50
Greece	172	153	4.00
West Germany	619	445	2.80
France	539	409	3.10
Great Britain	604	358	1.70
Spain	250	186	3.00
Portugal	103	87	3.70

Source: Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija 1945–1985*, 220.

TABLE 9 Social Distance to Other Ethnicities (in %)<sup>1</sup>

	Serbs		Croats		Slovenes		Macedonians	
	1966	1990	1966	1990	1966	1990	1966	1990
<b>Montenegro</b>	9	8	16	29	13	31	15	22
<b>Croatia</b>	10	24	—	4	12	18	18	27
<b>Macedonia</b>	13	22	16	34	17	34	—	11
<b>Slovenia</b>	45	52	45	36	—	2	47	49
<b>Serbia</b>	—	3	26	35	25	39	25	23

	Montenegrins		Albanians		Hungarians		Muslims	
	1966	1990	1966	1990	1966	1990	1966	1990
<b>Montenegro</b>	—	7	29	42	30	24	27	35
<b>Croatia</b>	14	27	22	43	15	26	15	37
<b>Macedonia</b>	17	29	49	60	36	39	48	54
<b>Slovenia</b>	48	53	50	56	46	49	47	58
<b>Serbia</b>	22	14	39	58	31	29	31	48

Source: Bačević et al., *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici*, 174.

<sup>1</sup>Explicit nonacceptance of a marriage partner from another ethnic group.

TABLE 10 Regional Disparities, 1947–1988

Republic/Province	Population (index no.)		GDP per capita (index no.)		Birthrate <sup>1</sup>	
	1953	1988	1953	1988	1947	1987
Yugoslavia	100	100	100	100	26.1	15.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	16.7	18.8	83	68	35.1	15.3
Croatia	23.2	19.9	122	128	22.4	12.8
Macedonia	7.7	8.9	68	63	35.0	18.5
Montenegro	2.5	2.7	77	74	28.9	15.8
Serbia (entire)	41.1	41.5	86	90	25.1	15.6
Serbia (proper) <sup>2</sup>	26.3	24.8	91	101	23.1	12.6
Kosovo	4.8	8.0	43	27	38.5	29.1
Vojvodina	10.0	8.7	94	119	24.4	11.5
Slovenia	8.8	8.2	175	203	22.4	14.2

Republic/Province	Illiteracy Rate (%)		Inhabitants per Physician	
	1948	1981	1952	1987
Yugoslavia	25.4	9.5	2,565	534
Bosnia-Herzegovina	44.9	14.5	3,314	680
Croatia	15.6	5.6	1,947	477
Macedonia	40.3	10.9	4,324	530
Montenegro	26.4	9.4	4,473	674
Serbia (entire)	26.8	10.9	2,440	515
Serbia (proper) <sup>2</sup>	27.4	11.1	2,104	440
Kosovo	62.5	17.6	8,527	1,092
Vojvodina	11.8	5.8	2,556	511
Slovenia	2.4	0.8	1,704	496

Source: Pleština, *Regional Development*, 180–81.

<sup>1</sup>Number of live births per 1,000 inhabitants.

<sup>2</sup>Serbia excluding Kosovo and Vojvodina.



# Notes

## *Introduction*

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2. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*; Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*.
3. Bayly, *Birth*.
4. Herbert, "Europe in High Modernity."
5. Pavlowitch, *The Improbable Survivor*; Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*; Benson, *Yugoslavia*; Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias*.
6. Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija*; Matković, *Povijest Jugoslavije*.
7. For example, Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*; Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*.

## PART I

### *1. The South Slavic Countries around 1900*

1. Andrić, *Bridge on the Drina*, 217.
2. Gaćinović, *Ogledi i pisma*, 71.
3. Pleterski, "Die Slowenen"; Stih, Simoniti, and Vodopivec, *Slowenische Geschichte*; Hösl, *Slowenien*.
4. Suppan, "Die Kroaten."
5. Karaman, *Hrvatska na pragu modernizacije*, 216.
6. Budak, *Kroatien*; Bartlett, *Croatia*; Goldstein, *Croatia*; Lauer, *Kroatien*.
7. Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat*.
8. Libal, *Balkan*, 292.
9. Andrić, *Bridge on the Drina*.
10. Donia, *Sarajevo: A Biography*; Hadžibegović, *Bosanskohercegovački gradovi*.
11. Renner, *Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina*, 44.
12. Gross, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatien*, 165.
13. Quoted in Libal, *Balkan*, 39–40.
14. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 60.
15. Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change*, 133–34.
16. The two other dialects, Kajkavian and Čakavian, are only spoken in a few regions of Croatia.
17. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 96.

18. Clewing, *Staatlichkeit*, 364.
19. Stančić, *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*.
20. *Ibid.*, 81ff.
21. Quoted in Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 475.
22. Stančić, *Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam*.
23. Karić, *Srbija*, 226.
24. Adanir, "Formation of a Muslim Nation."
25. Malcolm, *Geschichte Bosniens*, 78. Krstić, *Contested Conversions*.
26. Bosnian Muslim family names often express affiliation with an occupational or status group. For example, the name "Begović" combines the Ottoman honorary title of "beg" with the possessive suffix "ov" common in South Slavic names and the historic diminutive "ić."
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28. Adanir, *Die makedonische Frage*.
29. Jezernik, *Wild Europe*, 182.
30. Opfer-Klinger, *Schatten des Krieges*, 41.
31. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 81.
32. Petrović, *Rakovica*, vol. 2, 57.
33. Bringa, *Being Muslim*, 18.
34. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.
35. Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change*, 157.
36. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 59.
37. Erlich, *Family in Transition*, 32ff.
38. Bičanić, *How the People Live*, 125.
39. Nečak, Repe, and Kerec, *Slowenien*, 89; Sundhaussen, *Historische Statistik Serbiens*, 178.
40. Jakir, *Dalmatien*, 145–46.
41. Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change*, 108ff.
42. Calic, "Probleme nachholender Entwicklung in Serbien."
43. Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change*, 203ff.; Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 79–80
44. Avramović, *Naše seljačko gazdinstvo*, and Avramović, "Selo u Srbiji pre rata."
45. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 77ff.
46. Stamenovitch, *L'émigration Yougoslave*, 124.
47. Berend and Ránki, *European Periphery*, 153–54
48. Gyimesi, "Motive und Probleme der Industrialisierung in den Staaten Südosteuropas."
49. Karaman, *Industrijalizacija građanske Hrvatske*, 60, 225; Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 165.
50. Karaman, *Industrijalizacija građanske Hrvatske*, 56ff.
51. Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*.
52. Hadžibegović, *Bosanskohercegovački gradovi*; Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 195ff.; Gross and Szabo, "Stadt Zagreb an der Wende."
53. Quoted in Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, 306.

54. Karaman, *Hrvatska na pragu modernizacije*, 234ff. Hadžibegović, *Bosansko-hercegovački gradovi*, 38ff.
55. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 68.
56. Jezernik, *Wild Europe*, 221–22.
57. Höpken, “Schrittmacher der Moderne?,” 79.
58. Stojanović, *Kaldrma i asfalt*.
59. Mišković, *Basare und Boulevards*, 262.
60. Studen, *Stanovati v Ljubljani*; Heppner, *Hauptstädte*.
61. Renner, *Durch Bosnien und die Hercegovina*, 7.
62. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 66–67.
63. Daskalov, “Ideas about and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans.”
64. Trgovčević, *Planirana elita*; Despotović, *Srpska politička moderna*.
65. Clayer and Germain, *Islam in Interwar Europe*; Karčić, *The Bosniaks*.
66. Karčić, *The Bosniaks*, 25ff.
67. Schubert, *Prowestliche und Antiwestliche Diskurse*. On enlightenment, see Calic, *The Great Cauldron*.
68. Gross, “Entstehung und Struktur des Bürgertums,” 14–15.
69. Ibid.
70. Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, 21.
71. Mišković, “Marriage and Household in the Belgrade Elite,” 154.
72. Stojanović, “Rural against Urban,” 78.
73. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 414ff.
74. Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, 262.
75. Ibid.
76. Trencsényi and Kopeček, *Discourses of Collective Identity*, 15–16.
77. Filandra, *Bošnjaci i moderna*.
78. Ibid., 313ff.
79. Karčić, *The Bosniaks*; Bougarel, *Islam et politique*.
80. Stojanović, “Rural against Urban.”
81. Norris, *Balkan Myth*, 80ff.; Hammond, *The Balkans and the West*.
82. Stoianovich, “Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution,” 258–59.
83. Stojanović, “Rural against Urban,” 72–73.
84. Calic, *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*, 163ff.
85. Perović, *Srpski socijalisti*.
86. Perović, *Između anarhije i autokratije*, 22.
87. Karčić, *The Bosniaks*, 109ff.; see also Bougarel, *Islam et politique*; Donia, *Islam*.

## 2. The National Question across the Balkans (1875 to 1903)

1. Evans, *Through Bosnia*, 258, 331.
2. Anderson, *Eastern Question*; Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire*.
3. Quote in Gall, “Die europäischen Mächte und der Balkan im 19. Jahrhundert,” 4; Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 213ff.
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5. Bartl, *Albanien*.
6. Bataković, *Nova istorija srpskog naroda*, 177.
7. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 58–59.
8. Judson, *Habsburg*.
9. Jászi, *Dissolution*; Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism*, 10ff.
10. Schödl, *Kroatische Nationalpolitik*, 47.
11. Sked, *Der Fall*, 308.
12. Gross, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatien*, 119ff.; Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe*, 245ff.
13. Jászi, *Dissolution*, 370ff.
14. Gross, “On the Integration of the Croatian Nation”; Korunić, “Nacija i nacionalni identitet.”
15. Schödl, *Kroatische Nationalpolitik*, 51ff.
16. Rogel, *The Slovenes*; Stih, Simoniti, and Vodopivec, *Slowenische Geschichte*
17. *Erklärung der Südslawen auf der Konferenz von Ljubljana*, 1 Dec. 1870, quoted in Behschnitt, *Nationalismus*, 343
18. Gross, *Izvorno pravaštvo*.
19. Gross, *Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatien*, 72.
20. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 61ff.
21. Kann, *Geschichte des Habsburgerreiches*, 581.
22. Hauptmann, *Privreda i društvo Bosne i Hercegovine*.
23. Afflerbach, *Dreibund*, 596; Bled, *François-Ferdinand d’Autriche*, 328ff.
24. Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 256–57.
25. Sugar, *Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 202.
26. Malcolm, *Geschichte Bosniens*, 20ff.
27. Karčić, *The Bosniaks*, 93.
28. Džaja, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, 235ff.
29. Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak*, 142.
30. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim*.
31. Bougarel, *Islam et politique*, 43ff.
32. Okey, *Taming*.
33. Protić, *Uspon i pad srpske ideje*, 47.
34. Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli*, 159ff.
35. Quoted in Protić, *Uspon i pad srpske ideje*, 49.
36. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Serbiens*, 115ff.
37. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 397.
38. Stoianovich, “Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution,” 260–61.
39. Protić, *Uspon i pad srpske ideje*, 77ff.
40. Protić, *Serbian Radical Movement*, 161–62.
41. *Ibid.*, 170–71.
42. Ćirković, *The Serbs*, 236–37.
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45. Čolović, *Smrt*.

46. See François and Schulze, “Das emotionale Fundament der Nationen.”
47. Krumeich and Brandt, *Schlachtenmythen*.
48. Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha*, 127–28.

### 3. Radicalization (1903 to 1912)

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3. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 50–51.
4. Quoted in Troebst, *Das makedonische Jahrhundert*, 27.
5. Stavrianos, *The Balkans*, 521ff.
6. Szabo, “Uzroci i posljedice političkih demonstracija.”
7. Rumpler, *Chance*, 521.
8. Magaš, *Croatia*, 450.
9. Jakir, *Dalmatien*, 74.
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11. Jakir, *Dalmatien*, 70.
12. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 21ff.
13. Hösler, *Slowenien*, 117.
14. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 487.
15. Andrić, *Bridge on the Drina*, 215–16.
16. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 351–52.
17. *Ibid.*, 476.
18. Macartney, *Habsburg Empire*, 791.
19. Grdina, *Slovenci*; Stojanović, *Srbija i demokratija*.
20. Stokes, *Politics as Development*; Protić, *Serbian Radical Movement*.
21. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 385.
22. Valentić and Čoralić, *Povijest Hrvata*, 574ff.
23. Moritsch, “Bauernparteien.”
24. Djilas, *Contested Country*, 43ff.
25. Redžić, *Austromarksizam*.
26. Behschnitt, *Nationalismus*, 202.
27. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 671.
28. Djilas, *Contested Country*, 36–37.
29. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 494–95.
30. Ministerium des K. und K. Hauses und des Äussern, *Österreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch*, 15ff.
31. Zirojević, “Kosovo in the Collective Memory.”
32. Protić, *Uspon i pad srpske ideje*, 75.
33. Trgovčević, “South Slav Intellectuals and the Creation of Yugoslavia.”
34. Quoted in Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 480.

35. Ignjatović, "Images of the Nation Foreseen."
36. Ibid.
37. Wachtel, *Making a Nation*, 53ff.
38. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 479–80.
39. Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 492.
40. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 526.
41. Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 436–37.
42. Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije*, vol. 2, 532ff.; Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 335ff., 445ff.
43. Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 439.
44. Ibid., 681ff.; Kazimirović, *Crna Ruka*; Bataković, "La 'Main Noire' (1911–1917)."

#### 4. *The Three Balkan Wars (1912/1913 to 1914/1918)*

1. Hooton, *Prelude*; Boeckh and Rutar, *Balkan Wars*.
2. Schwartz, *Ethnische "Säuberungen,"* 244; Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*.
3. Quoted in Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 253.
4. International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars and Kennan, *Balkan Wars*, 151.
5. Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen*; Ivetić, *Le guerre balcaniche*; Hall, *Balkan Wars*; Ginio, *Ottoman Culture*.
6. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 124ff.
7. Ibid., 155–56.
8. Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen*, 119ff.
9. Opfer-Klinger, *Schatten des Krieges*.
10. Hoyos, *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz*, 74.
11. Jakir, *Dalmatien*, 13.
12. Rakočević, *Politički odnosi*.
13. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 156.
14. Hoyos, *Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz*, 75.
15. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, 50, 165ff.
16. Berghahn, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*; Mommsen, *Der Erste Weltkrieg*; Mitrović, *Prodor na Balkan*.
17. Dedijer, *Zeitbombe*, 586.
18. "Prozeß."
19. In his book *Sleepwalkers*, Christopher Clark erroneously follows the argument of the Austro-Hungarian prosecution and alleges that the Serbian government had arranged the assassination, because Franz Ferdinand planned to reform the empire and thereby pull the rug out from underneath the feet of Serb nationalism. The Austrian presiding judge wanted to force Princip to confess to this charge: "Had you heard that it was being said of him [Franz Ferdinand] that he was thinking of fulfilling the demands made by the Slavs? That's why you killed him. Perhaps what you wanted was that the Slavs living in the monarchy would never be content?" Princip did not respond to this rhetorical question. See "Der Prozeß gegen die Attentäter von Sarajewo (vom 12.–23. Oktober

- 1914.) Aktenmäßig dargestellt von Professor Pharos,” *Archiv für Strafrecht und Strafprozess* 64 (1917) 5–6, 385–418, here 414. A longer explanation is found in Calic, “Kriegstreiber Serbien?”
20. Krumeich, *Juli 1914*, 128.
  21. Cornwall, “Serbia,” 56–57.
  22. Mitrović, *Serbia’s Great War*, 6–7; Zametica, *Folly*; Fried, *War Aims*.
  23. Ibid.
  24. Quoted in Bjelajac, “Novi (stari) zapleti,” 23.
  25. Tschirschky to Jagow, telegram no. 85, “Ganz geheim!,” Vienna, 10 July 1914, quoted in Geiss, *Juli 1914*, 85.
  26. Stevenson, *1914–1918*, 25.
  27. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*.
  28. [https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The\\_Austro-Hungarian\\_Ultimatum\\_to\\_Serbia\\_\(English\\_translation\)](https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Austro-Hungarian_Ultimatum_to_Serbia_(English_translation)). Accessed on 4 May 2017.
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  32. Spence, “Yugoslav Role.”
  33. Duijzings, “History and Reminders in East Bosnia.”
  34. Gumz, *Resurrection and Collapse*, 21; see also Kramer, *Dynamic*.
  35. Strachan, *First World War*, 27.
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#### PART IV

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40. Bilandžić and Vukadinović, *Osnovne društvene promjene*, 21.
41. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija. Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija*, 191ff.
42. Kamberović, *Prema modernom društvu*, 19–20.
43. Obradović, “*Narodna demokratija*,” 147–48.
44. Donia, *Sarajevo*, 216.
45. Obradović, “*Narodna demokratija*,” 158.
46. Džaja, *Jugoslavismus*, 104.
47. Puljiz, *Eksodus poljoprivrednika*, 86.
48. Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment*, 15ff.
49. Kamberović, *Prema modernom društvu*, 148ff.
50. Bokovoy, *Peasants and Communists*, 75ff.
51. Bokovoy, *Separate Road*, 38–39.
52. Hoffmann, *Stalinist Values*, 7ff.; Lilly, *Power*, 240ff.
53. Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*; Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*.
54. Rosandić and Pešić, *Ratništvo, patriotizam, patrijarhalnost*.
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2. Kačavenda and Tripković, *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob*.
3. Clissold, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*.
4. Djilas, *Jahre der Macht*, 102–3.
5. Quoted in Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 28.
6. Petranović, *Jugoslavija*.
7. Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, 118.
8. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*.
9. Heuser, *Western “Containment” Policies*.
10. Banac, *Stalin against Tito*, 150, 223.
11. Dedijer, *Novi prilozi*, vol. 3, 464.
12. *Ibid.*, 467–68.

13. The quote is found in part 3, chapter 2, of *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, by Friedrich Engels: "The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it *withers away*." Taken from Slocock, "Withering Away," 1775.
14. Denitch, *Legitimation*.
15. Vranicki, *Marxismus*, 1020.
16. Translated from Kuljić, *Tito*, 477, 481.
17. Koštunica and Čavoški, *Party Pluralism*, 215.
18. Sundhaussen, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens*, 165.
19. Quoted in Kanzleiter and Stojaković, "1968" in *Jugoslawien*, 204–5.
20. Quoted in *ibid.*, 207.
21. Šuvar, *Nacije i međunacionalni odnosi*, 10.
22. Dimić, *Agitprop kultura*; Spehnjak, *Javnost i propaganda*.
23. Djilas, *The New Class*.
24. Dragović-Soso, *Saviours*, 17ff.
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26. Dragović-Soso, *Saviours*, 22ff.
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28. *Ibid.*, 442.
29. Bilandžić and Vukadinović, *Osnovne društvene promjene*, 32.
30. Obradović, "Narodna demokratija," 158.
31. Bilandžić and Vukadinović, *Osnovne društvene promjene*, 124.
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33. Bockman, *Markets*, 17ff.
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35. Höpken, *Sozialismus*, 234ff.
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38. Kržišnik-Bukić, *Cazinska buna 1950*.
39. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 83.
40. Kuljić, *Tito*, 342.
41. Clissold, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, 66ff.
42. Nećak, *Hallsteinova doktrina*; Nećak, *Ostpolitik*.
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44. Čavoški, *Nasser's Neutralism*, 90, 92.
45. Vučković, *Nesvrstanost*; Niebuhr, *Search*.
46. Petrović, "Summit Diplomacy."
47. Petrović, *Titova lična diplomatija*, 319; Rakove, *Rise and Fall*.
48. Petković, *Nesvrstanost*.
49. Kuljić, *Tito*, 354.

50. Wachtel, *Making a Nation*, 144–45.
51. Mojić, “Evolucija kulta Josipa Broza Tita”; Halder, *Titokult*.
52. Nikolić, *Tito*.
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54. Sundhaussen, “Jugoslawien.”

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3. Krleža, *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, 429.
4. Milić, *Revolucija i socijalna struktura*, 250ff.
5. Kostić, *Seljaci industriski radnici*, 5.
6. *Ibid.*, 6.
7. *Ibid.*, 210.
8. *Ibid.*, 176f.
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10. *Ibid.*, 90f.
11. Simić, *Peasant Urbanities*, 111.
12. Halpern and Halpern, *Serbian Village*, 294–95.
13. Milić, *Revolucija i socijalna struktura*, 237–38.
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15. *Ibid.*, 132.
16. Simić, *Peasant Urbanities*, 29ff.
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18. Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, 5f.
19. Simić, *Peasant Urbanities*, 65ff.
20. *Ibid.*, 68.
21. Münnich, “Ein ‘Dritter Weg?’”
22. Simić, *Peasant Urbanities*, 69–70.
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24. Doder, *The Yugoslavs*, 197.
25. Šušar, *Sociologija sela*, vol. 1, 172ff.
26. Tomšić, *Žena*, 119.
27. Ramet, *Politics, Culture, and Religion*, 65.
28. Velimirović, “Odevanje i moda,” 350.
29. Novinščak, “Yugoslav ‘Gastarbeiters’ to Germany.”
30. Brunnbauer, *Transnational Societies*.
31. Brunnbauer, “Labour Emigration from the Yugoslav Region.”
32. Marković, “Gastarbeiters”; Schierup, *Migration*.
33. Novinščak, “From ‘Yugoslav Gastarbeiter’ to ‘Diaspora-Croats.’”
34. Baučić, “Socijalno-ekonomske posljedice.”
35. Vukonić, “Tourism Theory.”



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38. Grandits and Taylor, *Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side*.
39. Vukonić, *Povijest hrvatskog turizma*, 153ff.
40. Gosar, “Structural Impact of International Tourism.”
41. Bodrožić, “Mandelbaumträume,” 15.
42. Shoup, *Communism*, 273.
43. Ljuboja and Sekelj, *Identitet*, 180.
44. Dugandžija, *Jugoslavenstvo*, 7.
45. Velikonja, *Religious Separation*, 189.
46. Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 38.
47. *Ibid.*, 37.
48. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 299ff.
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52. Tomšić, *Žena*, 113.
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63. *Statistički bilten*, no. 298, January 1964, 8.
64. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija. Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija*, 113.
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90. Goulding, *Liberated Cinema*.

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6. Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita*, 32.
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10. Unkovski-Korica, *Economic Struggle*, 165ff.
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21. Vranicki, *Marxismus*.
22. Goulding, *Liberated Cinema*.
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24. Kanzleiter and Stojaković, "1968" in *Jugoslawien*, 23.

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27. Bilandžić, *Historija*, 337–38.
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29. Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu. *Strategija*; Živković, *Teritorijalna odbrana Jugoslavije*.

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3. Buchenau, *Aufrussischen Spuren*.
4. Stefanov, *Serbische Akademie*, 113.
5. Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs."
6. Tuđman, *Bespuća*, 83.
7. Krušelj, *Franjo Tuđman*, 67ff.
8. Hodson, Sekulić, and Massey, "National Tolerance."
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10. Calic, *Krieg und Frieden*, 78.
11. Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 292–93.
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13. Purivatra, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak*, 30ff.; Lučić, *Namen der Nation*; Pearson, "Nation-Building Process."
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15. Quoted in Mlivončić, *Al Qaida*, 74.
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19. Calic, *Krieg und Frieden*, 78.
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21. *Ibid.*, 348.
22. Troebst, *Das makedonische Jahrhundert*.
23. Canapa, "L'islam," 149.
24. Hadžijahić, Traljić, and Šukrić, *Islam i Muslimani*, 160ff.
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31. Pantić, "Nacionalna distanca."
32. Bolčić, *Razvoj i kriza*, 119ff.

33. Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 234ff.
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36. Dragović-Soso, *Saviours*, 39ff.
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55. *Ibid.*, 466.
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3. Patterson, *Bought and Sold*, 319.
4. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 493.
5. Berend, *Economic History*, 183–85.
6. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija. Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija*, 135–36.
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8. *Jugosloveni o društvenoj krizi*, 6.
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11. Zielinski, *Die neutralen und blockfreien Staaten*.
12. Bilandžić, *Historija*, 436.
13. Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja*.
14. Kuljić, *Tito*, 154.
15. Dragović-Soso, *Saviours*, 52.
16. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija. Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija*, 39.
17. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 479–80.
18. Jović, *Jugoslavija*, 209.
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21. See this argument developed in Sekelj, *Yugoslavia*.
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24. Wachtel, *Making a Nation*, 186ff.
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27. Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 90–91.
28. Translated from quote in Jović, *Jugoslavija*, 79.
29. Kuljić, *Tito*, 169ff.
30. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 483.

## PART V

### *16. The Crisis of Socialist Modernity (1980 to 1989)*

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2. *Ibid.*, 167–68.
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6. Pleština, *Regional Development*, 118ff.
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16. Vacić, *Jugoslavija i Evropa*, 72.
17. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 502–3.
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19. Ramet, “Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents,” 111.
20. Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija*, 202–3.
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24. *Ibid.*, 37.
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53. *Nova Revija* 6 (1987) 1.
54. Urbančič, “Jugoslovenska ‘nacionalistična kriza’ in Sloveni.”
55. Djukić, *Milošević*, 45.
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57. “Jugoslovensko i nacionalno u udžbenicima istorije.”

58. Kenney, *Carnival*, 225ff.
59. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 61.
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2. *Ibid.*, 20.
3. Cohen, *Socialist Pyramid*, 375.
4. Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija. Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija*, 13.
5. *Ibid.*, 55–56.
6. *Ibid.*, 53.
7. Berković, *Socijalne nejednakosti*; Lazić, *Sistem i slom*.
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13. Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichten*, 203.
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16. Institut Društvenih Nauka, *Deca krize*, 271.
17. Pantić, “Vrednosti mladih,” 177.
18. Županov, *Marginalije*, 60–61.
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20. Pantić, “Prostorne.”
21. Radelić, *Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji*, 299ff.
22. Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 63.
23. Buchenau, *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus*, 367–68.
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25. Jokić, *Turizam*, 197.
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27. *Ibid.*, 54.
28. Pantić, “Prostorne,” 222.
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30. Bougarel, “Ramadan.”
31. Perica, *Balkan Idols*, 86.
32. Graf, “Die Nation.”
33. Marković, Ković, and Milićević, “Developments.”
34. Nikolić, *Tito*.
35. Petranović, *Revolucija i kontrarevolucija*.

36. Đuretić, *Saveznici*.
37. Koštunica and Čavoški, *Party Pluralism*.
38. Dragović-Soso, *Saviours*, 54.
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41. Quote from Krušelj, *Franjo Tuđman*, 120.
42. Beljo, *Yugoslavia Genocide*; Beljo, *Yu-Genocide: Bleiburg*.
43. MacDonald, *Balkan Holocausts?*, 175.
44. Miller, *Nonconformists*, 215ff.
45. Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, 271ff.
46. Čolović, *Bordel ratnika*, 150ff.
47. Bieber, "Nationalist Mobilization."
48. *Ibid.*, 30ff. For example: "Slobodane, sad se narod pita, ko će nama da zameni Tita" (Slobodan, now the nation is wondering who will replace Tito).
49. Popović, *Mythologisierung des Alltags*, 86ff.
50. Gordy, *Culture of Power*, 130–31.
51. Spaskovska, *Last Yugoslav Generation*.
52. Andrić, *Leksikon YU mitologije*, 149–50.
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42. “Strah od vlastitih nacija,” *Danas*, 22 May 1990, 24–25 and 29 May 1990, 24–25.
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## PART VI

### *19. The War of Succession (1991 to 1999)*

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3. Čekić, *Aggression*, 363.

4. Kadrijević, *Moje viđenje raspada*, 93.
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