Emotion Metaphors in New Englishes

A Corpus-Based Study of Emotion Concepts in Institutionalized Second-Language Varieties of English

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For Mom

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Contents

Abbreviations

CMT   Conceptual Metaphor Theory

GB   British English

GloWbE   *Corpus of Global Web-Based English*

I-C   individualism-collectivism

ICE   *International Corpus of English*

IN   Indian English

KE   Kenyan English

MIPVU   Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit

MPA   Metaphorical Pattern Analysis

MRWs   metaphor-related words

NG   Nigerian English

SD   source domain

SG   Singaporean English

TD   target domain

Style Conventions

In this thesis I make use of the following notational conventions: When illustrating linguistic metaphors, SD lexis is presented in italics, while TD lexis is marked in bold (e.g., He *burned with* **anger**). When referring to conceptual metaphors, I use capital letters and the format SD IS TD (e.g., ANGER IS FIRE).

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1   Introduction

During the time period in which the present study was conducted, the popular Pixar film *Inside Out* came out in movie theaters across the globe, introducing to its audience a well-understood, film-length metaphor that easily can stand in for a type of emotion metaphor that plays a universal role in the cognitive and folk model of emotions cross-culturally and cross-linguistically, i.e., EMOTIONS ARE PEOPLE. The story revolves around the inner workings of the mind of a girl on the verge of adolescence, Riley, whose emotions come to life in the personified forms of Anger, Disgust, Fear, Joy and Sadness – a rambunctious team of emotions guiding Riley through life via a control console in her mind. Joy, a bubbly and optimistic sort, is in charge of Riley's lighter moods and memories, while the rest of the team take their turns at the controls depending on the events of the day, like when Anger literally blows his top at the announcement of "no dessert", which results in Riley's scream-filled temper tantrum at the dinner table.

Inside Out presents a modally rich explanation for the conceptualization of EMOTIONS as PEOPLE that has resonated with audiences worldwide. In doing so, it has (probably unwittingly) tapped into a universal recognition that it is inevitably part of the human condition to allow emotions to control and influence our behavior. This personified understanding of emotions is even reflected in the tagline to a series of trailers for the movie: "Ever wonder why you feel the way you do? Well, get to know your emotions!"[1]

By now we can look back at a long and productive academic tradition of research into emotion concepts, particularly in the cognitive linguistic vein (see, e.g., Ansah 2011; Apresjan 1997; Baider & Cislaru 2014; Bednarek 2009; Beger 2011; Chen 2010; Constantinou 2014; Folkersma 2010; Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995; Gevaert 2001; King 1989; Kövecses 1990, 1991, 1998, 2000, 2008a; Kövecses et al. 2015; Lakoff 1987a; Lakoff & Kövecses 1984; Li 2015; Naidu 2009; Ogarkova 2007; Ogarkova & Soriano 2014; Patowari 2015; Schwarz-Friesel

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[1]   Trailer for "Inside Out": https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIGF-Fkxbk0

2007; Stefanowitsch 2004, 2006a; Tissari 2010, 2011; Türker 2013; Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017; Yu 1995). This scholarly interest is by no means surprising since emotions are a basic part of everyday, human experience, and the way we talk about emotional experience very commonly occurs in metaphors, often in the form of personification: *I had to fight my fear of writer's block*; *Anger overwhelmed me for missing a deadline*; *Happiness has been my constant companion since finishing my manuscript*. Since the conception of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, we have learned a lot about how such metaphorical concepts are realized on the linguistic level and beyond (Casasanto 2009; Deignan 2005, 2007, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Fauconnier & Turner 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008; Forceville 2017; Forceville & Urios-Aparisi 2009; Gibbs 2002, 2008, 2010, 2012; Grady 1997a; Johnson 1987, 2008; Lakoff 1987a, 2007, 2008; Steen 2008, 2011a; Steen et al. 2010b; Steen et al. 2010a; Steen et al. 2010b). Yet, thinking about emotion metaphors did not emerge with the inception of cognitive linguistic studies. Philosophy, in particular, has an attested long history of theorizing about emotion metaphors. Consider the following emotion analogy, which as a setting draws from a likely scenario in the 19th century American frontier:

> The year is 1846. You are a stagecoach driver. All is quiet and peaceful as the red sun sets beyond the horizon, the coach rumbles contentedly along, and sagebrush cast long shadows across the lonesome prairie. Hidden in the shadows, however, is a rattlesnake. Disturbed from its slumber by the horses, the rattler suddenly strikes out, scaring the horses into a fearful, frenzied sprint. Out of control, the stagecoach careens towards the edge of a sheer cliff. First you try to soothe your steeds, but they cannot hear you. Then you try to forcibly rein them in, but their strength is too great. Life itself hangs in the balance as you grimly struggle to control the careening stagecoach (Barret et al. 2007: 173).

Barret et al. (2007) use this highly emotive scenario – depicting the uncontrollable horses (= emotions) and the unlucky stagecoach driver (= the human mind / reason) – as a means of illustrating the difference "between feeling and thinking embedded within Western Culture", particularly in reference to the "primitive, automatic, animalistic" view of emotions, which "the more developed human part of our minds come to know about and control" (173). As Zlatev (2012) asserts, this understanding of emotion has a long historical echo, emanating from ancient Greece, which interestingly happens to be the often cited origin of the (albeit hotly debated) intellectual history of metaphor. In fact, as illustrated by the passage

above, it seems natural to fall into metaphorical musings while attempting to explicate the nature of human emotion. Barret et al.'s (2007) frontier metaphor of the nature of the mind and emotion draws its parallels from Plato's "Chariot Allegory" in *Phaedrus*, which equates emotion with "wild horses" that "drive us to emotional places we do not deliberately choose to visit and thus must be harnessed and restrained" (173).

> […] and first the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair [of horses, BAG], and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome (Plato, as cited by the Perseus Digital Library Project).

Both the charioteer and the stagecoach driver and their troublesome horses are used metaphorically to underline what Barret et al. (2007) refer to as the "commonsense view" that emotions automatically (and thus uncontrollably) arise when encountering particular life situations, which they, furthermore, maintain has been employed as the "consensual view" and, thus, the basis of academic investigations into the emotions (173), particularly in line with causal-evaluative theories of emotion in both philosophy and psychology (Lyons 1999: 21). Therefore, taking a historical view of a philosophy of cognition and emotion, we already find ourselves confronted with a widely held notion about emotion still residing in modern Western thought. In other words, a model that can be traced back to Plato in ancient Greece still dictates an understanding of emotion as "wild" and out of control as opposed to human rationality that can be "reigned in". In short, a still viable maxim of Western culture and thought dictates that reason must conquer emotion (Goleman 2003: 65) – a decidedly metaphorical interpretation of the nature of emotion. This construal of DANGEROUS ANIMALS can be attested even in modern metaphorical data relating EMOTION metaphors of English and thus underscores a folk theory of emotion as reflected in languages of various cultures. Yet, for now, it acts only as a minor preview to the various metaphorical construals of emotion concepts we can find attested in the conceptual systems in the language of various cultures across the world.

It was not until the early 1980s that scholarly interest on the part of linguists morphed into a so-called "metaphormania" (Johnson 1981b). "Only three decades ago the situation was just the opposite: poets created metaphors, everybody used

them, and philosophers (linguists, psychologists, etc.) ignored them. Today we seem possessed by metaphor" (xi), and the possession has only deepened since. While Aristotle provided the "first extended philosophical treatment of metaphor", his definition of metaphor posed three problematic views, especially for cognitive linguistics swept up in the "metaphormania": 1) metaphor analysis is restricted to the word level, overemphasizing the study of semantic change in words; 2) metaphor is understood as a deviant usage in comparison to literal usage of language; 3) metaphor is based on similarities between two things (Johnson 1981a: 5–6).

Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), whose beginnings are marked by the seminal work of Lakoff & Johnson (1980), provided paradigmatic changes to Aristotle's view of metaphor that had been considered valid for so long. Especially within Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor was no longer regulated to the realm of (poetic) language alone, but began to be viewed as fundamentally conceptual, an integral part of our human conceptual system. Seeing as human beings across the world share the same conceptual makeup, this quickly lead to exploration of the universal basis of metaphors in our conceptual system, culminating in an embodied view of conceptualization. However, since being human is not strictly a matter of existing in the physical world, but very importantly, a matter of participating in the cultural world as well, it became clear that, by comparison across cultures, we can be characterized by the metaphors in the conceptual system by which we think not only in terms of what we share (universal), but in terms of what we don't share (culture-specific). Therefore, embodiment (cognition structured by sensorimotor experience) has to be contrasted or critically evaluated by contrast to cultural influences on metaphorical thinking. This is particularly relevant when metaphor study involves language stemming from distinct cultural groups, such as a study on emotion metaphors in New Englishes, institutionalized second-language varieties of English.

Emotional experience is clearly also a fundamental part of the human experience and is talked about in and filtered by the cultures of the world. Much of the way we talk about our emotional experience is decidedly metaphorical. The question is whether culturally and regionally unique varieties of a pluricentric

language like English talk about emotional experience in the same way. On the one hand, the mere fact that speakers of New English share a common language with other native English speakers across the world would point to a 'common core' of metaphors reflected in language. On the other, it is a reasonable assumption that New Englishes (by virtue of their individual cultural circumstances, as well as being characterized by substrate language influence not present in traditional norm-providing varieties, such as British and American English) have the potential to use metaphors that can be seen as products of their respective cultural and multilingual contexts. In this, English as a pluricentric language with diverse cultural centers seems to offer an ideal testing ground for investigating what is shared and what is not shared in the conceptualizations of a basic human experience, such as emotions.

The present study intends to do just that for metaphors relating to the domains of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. This involves combining insights from Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and Cognitive Linguistics in general, with insights from the World English paradigm and research into emotion concepts. The discussion in the following study starts with the fundamental tenets of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, in Chapter 2, with a focus on the systematic and pervasive nature of metaphor and embodied cognition. It also considers some criticisms and challenges for Conceptual Metaphor Theory, most importantly how to introduce the cultural component to metaphor research. Chapter 3 expands on this by outlining the relationship of body and culture in emotion metaphor and providing an overview of the debate between universality and variation in conceptualizing emotions. This leads into establishing English as a pluricentric language as a testing ground to further the debate and introduces Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics as guiding paradigms. Furthermore, this chapter offers a brief review of previous research into New English metaphor, which has to date been largely underrepresented in metaphor research, especially for emotion, and outlines the research questions guiding the present study. Chapter 4 presents the methodology used to collect emotion metaphors from a corpus designed to investigate varieties of English worldwide. Importantly, this chapter not only outlines the detailed methodological steps from extraction of metaphor from the corpus to the process of labelling conceptual metaphors, but it also highlights a major issue of the corpus employed concerning the authentification of variety-specific authorship. Chapters

5-7 present the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, which are largely involved in capturing metaphor profiles (i.e., the sum of all source domains participating in conceptualizing ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, respectively) that are attributable to the each variety. Metaphor profiles are used in the case studies as the baseline for comparison across New Englishes and in reference to a (former) norm-providing variety, British English. The present study ends with Chapter 8, which provides some concluding remarks and an outlook for future research.

2 Theoretical Background for Investigating Conceptual Metaphor

The main purpose of this initial theoretical chapter is to situate the present study in the context of the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm, since it utilizes Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth, CMT) as the backdrop to its empirical findings (see Chapters 5-7). Specifically, a review of the basic assumptions underlying cognitive linguistic study, as well as establishing the theoretical ramifications for metaphor from a cognitive point of view, is the first step in outlining one major aim of the present study, i.e., to encounter a point of reference for a variational investigation of conceptual phenomena. This has hereto been underrepresented in variational linguistic studies of English varieties (see Chapter 3). Thus, the following chapter offers a brief discussion of the principal tenets to which a cognitive linguistic study of the present type should adhere. This is followed by a theoretical discussion of CMT in general and some fundamental insights that have particularly informed the motivation behind the present study. Finally, a few of the various criticisms of CMT will be addressed.

2.1 Principal Tenets of Cognitive Linguistics

Cognitive Linguistics has grown in recent decades into what prominent researchers have labelled as a "revolution" (see, e.g., Steen 2014), as well as an "enterprise" (see, e.g., Evans et al. 2007). By taking a metaphorical reading of these labels, it becomes clear why they are nowadays so readily applied to Cognitive Linguistics as the thriving school of linguistic thought it has become[2]. If we take *revolution* as it relates to the domain of POLITICS and *enterprise* as it relates to the domain of BUSINESS, the metaphorization of Cognitive Linguistics in these labels tells us something fundamental about the historical development of linguistic thought, in

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[2] For a convincing testimony of the "academic appeal" of Cognitive Linguistics, see Geeraerts & Cuyckens (2007: 10–15).

particular as regards the relationship between language and the human mind. A revolution signifies a fundamental transforming of (unsatisfying) political structures that often has as its driving force an underlying ideology at opposition with the previous political powers, whereas an enterprise often literally denotes an important organizational entity characterized by its involvement in satisfying the demand for a sought-after good or service. From a modern perspective, Cognitive Linguistics as an academic discipline can be considered as figuratively possessing the characteristics of both: Cognitive Linguistics has not only ideologically challenged the preeminent 20th century linguistic paradigm, most notably personified by Noam Chomsky and the proponents of a formal linguistic approach like Generative Grammar, who take a modular view of separate language areas in the mind. But, with this challenge, it has also become involved in the business of providing alternative 'goods and services' to the linguistic 'customers', in particular to those who acknowledge that language cannot be fully understood apart from its relationship to other cognitive mechanisms at work in the human mind.

These metaphorical readings can be found in the 'origin stories' of Cognitive Linguistics, as told by cognitive linguists themselves. Consider the following passage from Nerlich & Clarke (2007):

> Cognitive Linguistics emerged from its dissatisfaction with dominant orthodoxies in twentieth-century linguistics, among them the structuralist/formalist tradition in European semantics, the generative/formalist tradition that dominated research into syntax in North America, and the formalist/computational approach to semantics that prevailed in North America and Europe during the second half of the twentieth century. Natural allies of Cognitive Linguistics by contrast are functionalist and contextualists of all persuasions […]. Whereas previous generations of linguists had tended to search for simplicity, monosemy, regularity, and rules, cognitive linguists revel in complexity, flexibility, and patterns, including irregular ones (Nerlich & Clarke 2007: 590-591).

Not only does this passage position Cognitive Linguistics as the driving force behind the fundamental transformation of the previously prevailing linguistic powers of the 20th century, it also, like a revolution, claim "natural allies" for its oppositional and thus transforming ideology. Furthermore, Nerlich and Clarke (2007) implicitly state the difference in commodities offered by the 'supply and demand' of the Cognitive Linguistic enterprise: 20th century linguists sought out the 'goods' of "simplicity, monosemy, regularity, and rules", while 21st century

cognitive linguists not only go for the very opposition ("complexity, flexibility, and patterns, including irregular ones"), but, in fact, they positively "revel" in it[3].

Therefore, at the outset of the present study, it is well worth considering just what the motivating ideology of the cognitive linguistic revolution is and what it has to offer as the enterprise it has become. Evans et al. (2007) summarize this as follows:

> Cognitive linguistics is best described as a 'movement' or an 'enterprise', precisely because it does not constitute a single closely-articulated theory. Instead, it is an approach that has adopted a common set of core commitments and guiding principles, which have led to a diverse range of complementary, overlapping (and sometimes competing) theories (Evans et al. 2007: 3).

Cognitive linguists regard "language as interacting with perception, memory and reasoning. It emphasizes that even seemingly arbitrary aspects of language […] have meaningful systematic underpinnings in thought" (Krennmayr 2011: 11). According to Evans et al. (2007: 2), this approach to language has its roots in work inspired largely by cognitive science and cognitive psychology during the 1970s (e.g., Fillmore 1975; Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978; Rosch & Mervis 1975), especially concerning approaches to human categorization, which have been ushered into the mainstream of modern linguistic study during the 1980s, as evidenced by Lakoff's prominent contributions (e.g., Lakoff 1987a). The origins of the cognitive linguistic school of thought were motivated by a "dissatisfaction with formal approaches to language which were dominant, at that time, in the disciplines of linguistics and philosophy" (Evans et al. 2007: 2). This neatly falls in line with our metaphorical reading of COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AS A REVOLUTION above, since "dissatisfaction" at the status quo in 20th century linguistic schools of thought were born of a need to explain the relationship between language and cognition in ways that have previously been inaccessible with the previously reigning theories and methodologies of formal linguistics. Despite the practicality of partitioning the

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3   To extend these metaphorical readings of Cognitive Linguistics a bit further (perhaps to exhaustion), Nerlich & Clarke (2007: 591) claim that "[t]he beginnings of Cognitive Linguistics lie somewhere round 1975, which is the year when Lakoff appears to have used the term 'Cognitive Linguistics' for the first time", making Lakoff the revolutionary 'founding father" of Cognitive Linguistics, so to speak. In terms of its historical development, Nerlich & Clarke (2007: 592) pinpoint the fruition of the cognitive linguistic revolution during the 1990s when "Cognitive Linguistics changed its status from 'revolutionary' to 'established'."

study of language into distinct areas (such as semantics and syntax, each with its own individual structuring principles), as was the consequence of taking a modular view of mind in formal linguistic approaches, this did not satisfy the inquiries of a growing number of researchers who began to reject this view and started to postulate a more unified view of language and mind and set out "to openly investigat[e] how various aspects of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common set of human cognitive abilities upon which they draw" (Evans et al. 2007: 3-4). Therefore, at the outset of the present study, which hones in on metaphor, it is vital to consider the fundamental precepts, which are undeniably pertinent to theoretically framing a study of conceptual metaphor, that have guided Cognitive Linguistics since its "birth […] as a broadly grounded, self conscious intellectual movement" (Langacker 1990: xv)[4].

2.1.1   The Generalization and Cognitive Commitments

In his very influential article, incidentally published in the very first volume of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics*, which was instrumental in securing Cognitive Linguistics' status as an established linguistic discipline, George Lakoff (1990) made clear his intentions of "rallying the troops" under a common banner for the continuance of the cognitive linguistic revolution:

> I hope that if we make our primary commitments clear to ourselves and to others, we can avoid such bickering [an earlier reference to "the acrimonious bickering that has characterized generative linguistics throughout its history", BAG] both within our own discipline and with those who view linguistics from a different perspective (Lakoff 1990: 40).

He goes on to maintain that, for him, Cognitive Linguistics is a linguistic discipline that prescribes adherence to two primary commitments: the Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment (40). The present section will serve to briefly outline these commitments.

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[4]   I have repurposed this Langacker quote to fit the narrative of the beginnings of Cognitive Linguistics as a revolution. Originally, he was referring to the announcement of the journal *Cognitive Linguistics* at a symposium in Duisburg, Germany (qtd. in Evans et al.2007: 2). Since *birth* is often used to construe REVOLUTION in metaphorical language, this seemed like an apt quote to frame the inception of Cognitive Linguistics as an academic discipline in general.

Again, in defiance of the prevailing modular view of mind apparent in formal linguistics, the first primary commitment, the Generalization Commitment, breaks with linguistic tradition by demanding of cognitive linguists to be committed "to characterizing the general principles governing all aspects of human language" (Lakoff 1990: 40). Evans and Green (2006: 28) summarize this commitment as follows: "One of the assumptions that cognitive linguists make is that there are common structuring principles that hold across different aspects of language, and that an important function of linguistics is to identify these common principles". These structuring principles are viewed as both common to separately viewed language "subsystems", as well as cognition, so that an adherence to the Generalization Commitment makes the modular view, as well as a strict separation of the different areas of language in terms of their organization, unworkable for cognitive linguistic endeavors. For instance, "cognitive approaches to grammar treat lexicon and syntax not as distinct components of language, but instead as a continuum" (40)[5].

Taken as a guiding principle, what the Generalization Commitment offers the linguist is the means of viewing the fuller picture of what is going on in language, beyond what separate views concerning the organization of just syntax or just semantics can sustain. In order to illustrate this with an apt metaphor, Evans et al. (2007) explains the Generalization Commitment with the image of a cross-section of a multi-layered cake:

> […] cognitive linguistic approaches often take a 'vertical', rather than a 'horizontal' approach to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of distinct layers of organization – the sound structure, the set of words composed by these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are constitutive of, and so on. If we array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll over time (like layers of a cake), then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense that they take one layer and study it internally – just as a horizontal slice of cake. Vertical approaches get a richer view of language by taking a vertical slice of language, which includes phonology, morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics on top. A vertical slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a horizontal one – it is more varied and textured – but at the same time it affords possible explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective (Evans et al. 2007: 4).

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[5]   It should be noted that Lakoff does not maintain "a priori commitment […] to separate [linguistic] subfields [like phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics]." He views this as "an empirical matter" and emphasizes that "empirical considerations suggest that they are not – that, for example, generalizations about syntax depend on semantic and pragmatic considerations".

With this image in mind, let us turn to the proverbial icing on this cake, i.e., the Cognitive Commitment.

The second primary commitment outlined by Lakoff (1990) is known as the Cognitive Commitment. Although it "will mesh" with the Generalization Commitment outlined above, since "the general principles we seek [across areas of language] will be cognitively real", Lakoff makes a point to emphasize that if generalizations cannot be brought in line with the Cognitive Commitment, then it should be prioritized, since cognitive linguists "are concerned with cognitively real generalizations" (1990: 41). The Cognitive Commitment asks the linguist to principally bring in line what is known about human language with what is known about the human mind and brain (40). What makes the Cognitive Commitment particularly germane to a study of metaphor is that it provides the motivational basis for theorizing about and researching conceptual metaphor (41), see Section 2.2.2 for a discussion of embodiment and metaphor. Since "it follows from the 'Cognitive Commitment' that language and linguistic organisation should reflect general cognitive principles rather than cognitive principles that are specific to language" (Evans & Green 2006: 41), metaphor as it is realized in linguistic structure can tell us something about how concepts are organized in the mind. Since the function of metaphor in language and thought will be considered in more detail below, let us consider an example that illustrates the Cognitive Commitment during early developments in cognitive linguistic study (i.e., human categorization), which also has been associated with the study of metaphor[6].

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[6] An interesting debate took place in the pages of the journal *Psychological Review* in the early 1990s between Glucksberg & Keysar (1990) and Gibbs (1992) concerning the relationship of categorization and metaphor understanding. In their initial paper, Glucksberg & Keysar (1990) proposed a class-inclusion model of metaphor by maintaining that metaphors "are intended as class-inclusion statements" (16). Thus, for the *a is b* type of metaphors, like *My job is a jail*, where JOB is attributed to an ad-hoc category of which JAIL is a prototypical member. Gibbs (1992) took issue particularly with the view that metaphors are "instantiations of temporary, ad-hoc categories" and insisted instead on their ability to "reflect pre-existing conceptual mappings in long-term memory that are metaphorically structured" (572). In a response paper, Glucksberg et al. (1992) "acknowledge the potential role of conventional metaphors in the generation of ad hoc attributive metaphor categories" but point out that these conventional mappings "*need not* be accessed or used in the production and comprehension process. The issue then is not how many […] metaphorical expressions are understood by accessing prestored conventional metaphoric mappings, but rather under which circumstances (if any) such mappings come into play. Conventional metaphorical mappings, as well as other types of conceptual schema, can be available yet not accessible in given contexts" (578, emphasis in the original).

The classical theory of categories maintained that category membership was defined by identifying shared properties that were viewed as necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Potential category members were deemed as part of a category on the basis of common properties, which, in turn, served to supply the defining features of the category as such. Lakoff (1987a) points out that this view did not result from empirical study, but was nevertheless "taught in most disciplines […] as an unquestionable, definitional truth" (6).

Yet, with the advent of Prototype Theory, which *was* the result of empirical study, Rosch and her colleagues radically changed our understanding of how human beings categorize. Categorization is a fundamental ability within our conceptual system "because it accounts, in part, for the organisation of concepts within the network of encyclopaedic knowledge" and, as such, is of great importance "for both cognitive psychologists and semanticists, since both disciplines require a theory of categorisation in order to account for knowledge representation and indeed for linguistic meaning" (Evans & Green 2006: 248). Among many other things, like the discovery of the importance of basic-level categories, Rosch's research led to a rejection of the classical view of categorization by demonstrating that categories exhibit what is known as "family resemblance" (uncovered by Wittgenstein's (1953) philosophical analysis of the category GAME):

> Wittgenstein (1953) argued that the referents of a word need not have common elements to be understood and used in the normal functioning of language. He suggested that, rather, a family resemblance might be what linked the various referents of a word. […] That is, each item has at least one, probably several, elements in common with one or more items, but no, or few, elements in common to all items (Rosch & Mervis 1975: 574-575).

In line with this, Rosch discovered that not every member of a category can be counted as equally representative (e.g., robins are judged as a better example of the category BIRD than penguins); thus, categories exhibit prototype effects. Rosch (1978) explains this in the following:

> Most, if not all, categories do not have clear-cut boundaries. […] cognitive economy dictates that categories tend to be viewed as being as separate from each other and as clear-cut as possible. One way to achieve this is by means of formal, necessary and sufficient criteria for category membership. […] Another way to achieve separateness and clarity is by conceiving of each category in terms of its clearest cases rather than its boundaries. […] By prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest

cases of category membership defined operationally by people's judgements of goodness of membership in the category (Rosch 1978: 35–36).

Despite some problematic stances taken within (early) Prototype Theory, Rosch's prototype effects are "psychologically real" and have gone on to inspire work in the Cognitive Linguistic framework that seeks to unite the principles of language with findings from cognitive psychology (Evans & Green 2006: 250). In fact, as Lakoff (1990) states, "my present views on metaphor, image-schemas, radial categories and prototype theory in general are not a priori commitments in themselves. They are empirical consequences of adopting the generalization and cognitive commitments" (43). Therefore, adherence to Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment at times requires an adjustment to the approach we take to language.

With this brief outline of the primary commitments in Cognitive Linguistics, the present study aims to adhere to the generalizing capacity offered by a more unified view of language domains, as well as to take into account converging evidence as it relates to metaphors in language and cognition. Yet, before delving into a theoretical discussion of conceptual metaphors and related cognitive phenomena in specific, there is one more discussion to be had in the way of defining cognitive linguistic study as it pertains to the most prominent field of (linguistic) metaphor analysis, namely semantics.

2.1.2   Guiding Principles in Cognitive Semantics

Due to the fact that CMT was one of the earliest, and arguably most prominent, theories to adopt a cognitive semantic approach (Evans et al. 2007: 16), it is worthwhile in a study founded on the principal insights of CMT to consider the guiding principles that have driven cognitive semantics as a discipline.

Keeping with the narrative offered by the metaphor COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS AS A REVOLUTION, the cognitive semantic branch "began life as a reaction against formal theories of meaning"; in particular, it revolted against truth-conditional semantics by adopting four central assumptions or "guiding principles" which function to "characterise a cognitive semantics approach" (Evans & Green 2006: 156). Viewed as directly resulting from adherence to the two key

commitments of Cognitive Linguistics discussed above (157), the four fundamental beliefs about meaning and cognition can be summarized as follows:

1. Conceptual structure is embodied.
2. Semantic structure is conceptual structure.
3. Meaning representation is encyclopedic.
4. Meaning construction is conceptualization. (adapted from ibid: 157).

Since the subsequent theoretical discussion of CMT is primarily contingent on the first two principles listed above (286), the present section will put its focus on illustrating only these two. For explication of the last two principles, the reader is referred to Evans and Green (2006: 160-163) or Evans et al. (2007: 8-9). Despite not receiving full consideration here, they are nevertheless important insights into how cognitive semanticists view meaning and should not be taken as secondary.

The first guiding principle relevant to a cognitive semantic approach to metaphor, like CMT, has something to do with how we as human beings "have a species-specific view" of our external world; that is, due to our sensory experience and the general nature of inhabiting the bodies we have, "our construal of 'reality' is mediated, in large measure, by the nature of our embodiment" (Evans et al. 2007: 7). This is in stark contrast to the objectivist paradigm that views meaning as arising from arbitrary linguistic symbols and their relationship to the world (Lakoff 1988: 120).

> The fact that our experience is embodied – that is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies we have and by our neurological organization – has consequences for cognition. In other words, the concepts we have access to and the nature of the 'reality' we think and talk about are a function of our embodiment. We can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience. This thesis, central to cognitive semantics, is known as the thesis of embodied cognition. This position holds that conceptual structure (the nature of human concepts) is a consequence of the nature of our embodiment and thus is embodied (Evans et al. 2007: 7).

Therefore, the embodied cognition thesis guiding cognitive semantic inquiry centers on the human experience. "[G]iven our bodies and innate capacities and our way of functioning as part of a real word", human perceptual and sensory experience is a motivating factor for "what is meaningful in human thought" (Lakoff 1988: 120).

To illustrate in what way conceptual structure is embodied, consider the image schema associated with CONTAINER. Both Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987a) have been given credit with coining the term *image schema*[7] to account for concepts being the "products of sensorimotor experiences" and, thus, defined image schemas "as dynamic analog [conceptual] structures arising from perception, bodily movements, manipulation of objects, and experience of force" (Mandler & Pagán Cánovas 2014: 2). Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987a) demonstrate in detail how both our bodies and things in the world around us are continually experienced as containers and, thus, become meaningful to us – not in a deeply poignant or sententious way – but instead "in a more mundane sense, […] involv[ing] an exceedingly complex interaction with your environment in which you experience significant patterns and employ structured processes that give rise to a coherent world of which you are able to make sense" (Johnson 1987: 31). One particularly pertinent example of this concerns the embodied experiences of a commonplace (and thus relatable) morning ritual:

> Consider just a small fraction of the orientational feats you perform constantly in your daily activities – consider, for example, only a few of the many *in-out* orientations that might occur in the first few minutes of an ordinary day. You wake *out* of a deep sleep and peer *out* from beneath the covers *into* your room. You gradually emerge *out* of your stupor, pull yourself *out* from under the covers, climb *into* your robe, stretch *out* your limbs, and walk *in* a daze *out* of your bedroom *into* your bathroom […] (Johnson 1987: 30, emphasis in the original, qtd. also in Lakoff (1987a: 271) and Lakoff (1988: 140)).

The structural elements of the CONTAINER schema relate to INTERIOR, BOUNDARY and EXTERIOR (Lakoff 1987a: 272), and from this description of a banal morning ritual above, we can see how easily these basic experiential structures arise in our everyday experience and, consequently, become associated with the schematic properties of a CONTAINER in our conceptual system. Just based on the mere fact that some of our most basic bodily activities (i.e., ingesting food and excreting waste or walking out of the bedroom into the bathroom) serves to conceptualize BODY as a CONTAINER or THING, like ROOM, as a

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7   Gibbs (2009) highlights the importance of CMT's promotion of images schemas by stating, "CMT has been especially significant in showing – in concrete detail – something about the content of linguistic meaning and the substance of fundamental abstract concepts in terms of 'image schemas'" (15). For more discussion on image schema, particularly concerning the psychological reality of image schemas and its place in Cognitive Linguistics, see Gibbs & Colston (2006) and Oakley (2007) respectively.

CONTAINER (Lakoff 1987a: 271). Therefore, it is important to note that a motivating factor in formulating a concrete principle, like *conceptual structure is embodied*, has a lot to do with the fact that cognitive phenomena, like schemata, "are so pervasive and so constitutive of our ordinary experience that they are taken for granted (and thus overlooked) in standard accounts of meaning and understanding" (Johnson 1987: 31). Thus, a conscious following of the embodied cognition thesis helps to sharpen our attention to those facets of everyday (bodily) experience (and their cognitive by-products), which shape integral aspects of meaning in our conceptual systems.

In addition, as the Johnson (1987) example further illustrates, a great number of metaphors are grounded in the CONTAINER schema, which "extend[s] our body-based understanding of things in terms of CONTAINER schemas to a large range of abstract concepts […] emerging *out* of a stupor is a metaphorical, not a literal emergence from a container" (Lakoff 1987a: 272). Consequently, image schemas and metaphors, as attestations of embodied cognition in our conceptual system, provide an embodied basis for conceptual structure.[8]

The second guiding principle (i.e., *semantic structure is conceptual structure*) also takes on the objective paradigm – those semantic models which take into account the referential or denotational relationships between linguistic symbols and an external word – by maintaining that "*semantic structure* (the meanings conventionally associated with words and other linguistic units) can be equated with *conceptual structure* (i.e. concepts)" (Evans et al. 2007: 7, emphasis in the original). Cognitive semanticists, like Talmy (2000), highlight the fact that the cognitive approach to semantics is not only interested in studying the organizational patterns of conceptual content in language, but also concerns the general cognitive processes involved, making a point to define *structure* as a term employed to refer to both the

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[8] Furthermore, image schemas and metaphors work together during the process of abstract reasoning. "Image-schemas provide particularly important evidence for the claim that abstract reason is a matter of two things: (a) reason based on bodily experience, and (b) metaphoric projections from concrete to abstract domains" Lakoff (1988: 144). Lakoff (1988) cites evidence provided by Johnson (1987) that can be summed up in four essential points: 1) "Image schemas structure our experience preconceptually"; 2) "Corresponding image-schematic concepts exist"; 3) "There are metaphors mapping image-schemas into abstract domains, preserving their basic logic"; 4) "The metaphors are not arbitrary, but are themselves motivated by structures inhering in everyday bodily experience" (144).

patterns and processes (2). In point of fact, the term *cognitive semantics* itself has a touch of the superfluous in his opinion:

> For me, the addition of the word 'cognitive' to that of 'semantics' is in fact redundant, since semantics is intrinsically cognitive. The need for the qualifying word is due to the existence of alternative views of meaning as independent of mind (Talmy 2000: 18).

Be that as it may, Evans et al. (2007) caution against equating semantic structure with conceptual structure, since our thought life is rife with more conceptual entities "than we can conventionally encode in language" (8). This coding disparity, for instance, can be illustrated by the fact that languages conventionally encode concepts, for which other languages have no words. Although the German language contains words like *Weltschmerz* (i.e., a sadness you feel due to the state of the world) or *fremdschämen* (i.e., the act of feeling shame as the product of someone else's embarrassing behavior), English does not encode these particular concepts in specific lexical units – although they obviously can be thought of and, thus, described using the English language by other means. Nevertheless, the following elaborated version of the principle *semantic structure is conceptual structure* should be kept in mind:

> Semantics simply pertains to conceptual content as it is organized in language. Hence, the word 'semantic' simply refers to the specifically linguistic form of the more generic notion 'conceptual.' Thus, general conception – that is, thought – includes linguistic meaning within its greater compass. And while linguistic meaning […] apparently involves a selection from or constraints on general cognition, it is qualitatively of a piece with it. Thus, research on cognitive semantics is research on conceptual content and its organization in language and, hence, on the nature of conceptual content and organization in general. In this formulation, conceptual content is understood to encompass not just ideational content but any experiential content, including affect and perception. (Talmy 2000: 4)

Therefore, although we can pinpoint qualitative differences between semantic structure and conceptual structure, they are in some ways interconnected. Consequently, we can interpret this second guiding principle of cognitive semantics as involving two sides of the same coin.

To illustrate this point with an example pertinent to metaphor, consider the view in Cognitive Linguistics that "metaphor is not inherently a linguistic phenomenon. In fact, cognitive linguists do conceive of metaphors of patterns of

thought […]" (Grady 2007: 189). Metaphors are conceptual phenomena, born of our cognitive abilities, including perception, memory, analogical reasoning, etc., which are, in turn, reflected in systematic patterns (and, thus, not arbitrarily) in language (see Section 2.2.1 for more on systematicity in conceptual metaphor). This becomes more apparent when we compare a cognitive semantic view with a traditional semantic view of idioms. The cognitive semantic view suggests "a great deal of systematic conceptual motivation for the meaning of most idioms", to which, among other things, metaphor contributes (Kövecses & Szabó 1996: 326–327). By contrast, the traditional approach to idioms, like (1) below, take a non-compositional view (i.e., the meaning cannot be predicted by the sum the constituents) – an unobjectionable analysis, of course – but one that incorrectly assumes that idioms are dependent solely on language: "They are taken to be items of the lexicon that are independent of any conceptual system" (328). Kövecses & Szabó's (1996) analysis of (2) and (3) reject the traditional view and demonstrate how idioms are anything but isolated from the conceptual system.

(1) He was *spitting fire*. ('He was behaving in a very angry manner.')

In their analysis, Kövecses & Szabó (1996) point out that, in an utterance like (1), metaphor is at work as a cognitive mechanism that "relate[s] a domain […] of knowledge to an idiomatic meaning in an indirect way" (331). The knowledge stored in memory about our perceptual and sensory experience with fire is offered as the experiential basis for (1), which makes an idiom like *spit fire* "conceptual, and not linguistic, in nature" in terms of its meaning motivation (330). What is also at work here is a mapping of that knowledge about fire to a more abstract domain like ANGER (i.e., ANGER IS FIRE), which licenses the *spit fire* idiom along with various other linguistic surface realizations of this metaphor:

(2) He is *smoldering* with **anger**.
(3) She was *fuming*.

Furthermore, underscoring its role in the interplay between conceptual and linguistic structure, the FIRE mapping can account for idioms involving many other

domains, such as LOVE (4) and ENERGY (as it relates to human ability and resources) (5):

(4) She *carries a torch* for him.
(5) Don't *burn the candle at both ends*.

What we are seeing here in terms of *semantic structure is conceptual structure* is that, by evaluating the conceptual structure contributed by metaphor to idiomatic language, we can gain "a more precise notion of semantic transparency and that of the emergence of idiomatic meaning", which, in turn, can assist in "describ[ing] in a more systematic way the figurative idiomatic structure of English and other languages" (Kövecses & Szabó 1996: 352). This view, again, highlights something very fundamental to the success of the cognitive linguistic enterprise: Language opens up a window to the study of conceptual structure, whereas converging evidence for our understanding of cognition and the conceptual system deeply enriches our study of linguistic structure. There is a reciprocal trade-off, of sorts, for understanding structure in linguistic terms within the purview of conceptual structure, combined with an understanding of embodiment, i.e., investigating the two sides of the coin reveals something about the coin as a whole. To this point, Talmy (2000) offers a résumé of the cognitive linguistic enterprise:

> […] cognitive linguistics has […] addressed the structuring within language of such basic conceptual categories as those of space and time, scenes and events, entities and processes, motion and location, and force and causation. It has also addressed the linguistic structuring of basic ideational and affective categories attributed to cognitive agents, such as attention and perspective, volition and intention, and expectation and affect. It addresses the semantic structure of morphological and lexical forms, as well as of syntactic patterns. And it addresses the interrelationships of conceptual structures, such as those in metaphoric mapping, and those in the grouping of conceptual categories into large structuring systems. Overall, and perhaps above all, cognitive linguistics seeks to ascertain the global integrated system of conceptual structuring in language. (Talmy 2000: 3).

Furthermore, this global view offered by cognitive semantics has turned out to be a very productive force, in particular for the study of metaphor. It strives for integration over separation of language and cognition, so that an individual object of study, like metaphor, necessarily entails aspectual contributions to the whole picture. As Geeraerts (2010) puts it:

> *Cognitive semantics* emerged in the 1980s as an explicitly 'maximalist' attempt to integrate rather than separate meaning and cognition […]. Through the introduction of new models of description and analysis, like prototype theory and frame semantics, and through the revivification of metaphor studies in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, it has proved to be a highly productive approach, with a wide appeal among lexical semanticians (Geeraerts 2010: 275, emphasis in original).

After having painted the picture (albeit with broad strokes) of the cognitive linguistic revolution and, in particular, the nuances provided by cognitive semantics, we have gained a backdrop against which we can better examine (i.e., zoom into) the details of one its many flourishes (here CMT), to which we turn in the following section.

2.2   Fundamental Insights from Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Since the inception of CMT, commonly marked by the seminal work *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]), a proverbial tide of academic interest and scholarly work into conceptual metaphors has swept throughout various academic communities, most prominently in the field of Cognitive Linguistics. As "one of the earliest theoretical frameworks identified as part of the cognitive semantic enterprise", CMT has produced "much of the early theoretical impetus for the cognitive approach" (Evans & Green 2006: 286) and, playing on the metaphor highlighted above, has brought out the "second revolution" in cognitive science in terms of embodied cognition (Gibbs 2017: 6). The burgeoning interest in the conceptual aspects of metaphor (as opposed to the traditional view of metaphor as a rhetorical flourish and thus outside the realm of everyday language[9]) has also

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[9]   Since the time of Aristotle, scholars have maintained a "classical view" of metaphor, which was held firmly in the purview of language. Metaphors were considered "a matter of language not thought. Metaphorical expressions were assumed to be mutually exclusive with the realm of ordinary everyday language […]. The classical theory was taken so much for granted over the centuries that many people didn't realize that it was just a theory. The theory was not merely taken to be true, but came to be taken as definitional. The word metaphor was defined as a novel or poetic linguistic expression where one or more words for a concept are used outside of is normal conventional meaning to express a similar concept. But such issues are not matters for definitions; they are empirical questions" Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 267). Hence, a more traditional account of metaphor sets up a dichotomy between figurative and literal language, although such a distinction has not been borne out by empirical evidence (see Gibbs (1994)). Furthermore, Tendal & Gibbs (2008) point out that "[s]ince the time of Aristotle, scholars from many disciplines have struggled to define metaphor and understand its functions in language, thought, and culture", which resulted in a 20th century "explosion" in metaphor study, especially within the disciplines of cognitive science by participating linguists, philosophers and psychologists (1823). Yet, despite this vigorous interdisciplinary campaign to promote metaphor to the realm of cognition, in *Poetics of the Mind*, Gibbs (1994) highlights the fact that this struggle

driven lines of investigation into the relationship between metaphor as used in language and reasoning in areas as diverse as educational discourse and learner language (Cameron & Deignan 2003; Low 1988; Nacey 2013; Wan & Low 2015), politics and public discourse (Goatly 2007; Lakoff 2006; Musolff 2016, 2006, 2004), mathematics (Lakoff & Núñez 2002; Núñez 2008), academic discourse (Drewer 2003; Zichler 2010), among many others, as well as for specific groupings of concepts, like emotion (Kövecses 2008a, 2002, 2000; Kövecses et al. 2002; Kövecses 1990), etc. This interest extends as well to the various methodological gains being made in metaphor identification (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen et al. 2010b; Steen et al. 2010a) and is particularly productive in recent decades in the field of corpus linguistics (Berber Sardinha 2012, 2011, 2010, 2008, 2007; Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 2008b, 2008a, 2005, 1999, 1998; Stefanowitsch 2006a, 2004). This very brief sampling of the research into various developments pertaining to conceptual metaphor represents a trend that does not seem to be losing any steam since its foundation in the early 1980s. Despite various criticisms (see Section 2.3 for a brief overview) and the emergence of revised theoretical approaches to metaphors that have been put forth since (i.e, Primary Metaphor, Grady 1997a, 1997b, and Conceptual Integration (also known as Blending Theory), Fauconnier & Turner 1998, 2002), the impact of CMT is undeniable. Time and again, this has been evidenced by the indubitable "avalanche of studies from numerous academic disciplines that have been motivated by CMT", which "currently represents the dominant theoretical framework in the academic study of metaphor" (Gibbs 2011: 530).

In order to zoom into some select, central claims of CMT, which have informed the present study, the following sections will focus on the broad thematic areas: 1) systematicity and pervasiveness and 2) embodied cognition. In the

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is far from over for some scholars: "The merits of figurative thought and language have been fiercely debated since the time of the ancient Greeks. Even though the study of figurative thought and language is now a respectable topic in the humanities, arts, and cognitive sciences, there remains on the part of many scholars a deep mistrust toward all things figurative […]. Scientists, philosophers, educators, and psychologists have each, on occasion, rallied their forces against the supposed evils of figurative thought and language" (3). Therefore, the inheritance of ancient Greeks is still visible in some academic thinking surrounding metaphor. However, since the introduction of CMT with the publication of *Metaphors We Live By* by Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]), this "deep mistrust" inherited by the classical or traditional theory of metaphor can be answered by modern insights into the relationship between language and thought, as evidenced by a conceptual metaphor's capacity to be reflected on the linguistic level of an everyday, non-poetic utterance.

following sections, each area will be presented on the basis of their respective central tenets, cumulating in a brief listing of guiding questions that have provided a direction from the theoretical to the empirical work at hand.

2.2.1   The Systematic and Pervasive Nature of Metaphor

The story of the discovery of the systematicity of metaphor starts with a paradigmatic shift in views on conceptual structure. Beginning in the 1970s, psychologists have altered their views on conceptual structure, shifting from a reliance on (sufficient) similarity as the mechanism connecting concepts due to "a growing awareness of the inadequacy of such similarity based views" (Komatsu 1992: 521). One significant problem with viewing similarity to describe conceptual structure was "that the notion of similarity is too unconstrained to give an account of conceptual coherence" (Medin 1989: 1469; see also Murphy & Medin 1985[10]).

Instead, CMT suggests that "[t]he essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 5). Briefly stated, CMT is all about the exploration of inference mapping from one conceptual domain to another (Grady 2007: 191)[11]. To use the terms most commonly found in CMT, there is a set of systematic correspondences, referred to as mappings, that we draw on to understand (i.e., conceptualize) concept A (= a target domain) in terms of concept B (= a source domain)[12] (Kövecses 2010: 7). How these concepts relate to each other is now understood not to be based on similarity:

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[10]   According to Murphy and Medin (1985), "current ideas, maxims, and theories concerning the structure of concepts are insufficient to provide an account of conceptual coherence. All such accounts rely directly or indirectly on the notion of similarity, and we argue that the notion of similarity relationships is not sufficiently constraining to determine which concepts will be coherent or meaningful. These approaches are inadequate, in part, because they fail to represent intra- and inter-concept relations and more general world knowledge (289).

[11]   Grady (2007) claims that mapping is the "most fundamental notion" proposed in CMT (190). Yet, it should be acknowledged that "despite the widespread acceptance of viewing metaphors as cross-domain mappings, there is little consensus on how these mappings take place" (Bowdle & Gentner 2005: 193). Due to the scope of the present study, this issue will not be directly addressed but I find Bowdle and Gentner's (2005) suggestion compelling that "whether metaphors are processed directly or indirectly and whether they operate at the level of individual concepts or entire conceptual domains will depend both on their degree of conventionality and on their grammatical form" (213).

[12]   For early empirical evidence that abstract target domains are structured via mappings from the more concrete source domain, see Boroditsky's (2000) study on the domains of time and space.

> It holds that the concepts which are related to each other by metaphors often are not objectively 'similar' at all, but are associated because of how people are constituted and how they interact with the world. […] this type of explanation is much more satisfying than appeals to similarity. […] What could be the objective similarity between happiness and brightness, for instance (cf. *sunny disposition*, *bright mood*, *radiant smile*)? If the answer is that 'both are properties,' then this is an insufficient basis for associating these two particular properties […] If the answer is that 'both are pleasing,' this illustrates the point that it is not inherent features of the concepts which relate them but our interactions with them. (Grady 1997a: 5)[13]

We associate a happy feeling with physically experiencing the brightness of a light, which "is correlated with warmth and increased visibility, both of which trigger contentment" (Grady et al. 1999: 112). In other words, brightness entails that we are warm (a pleasant physical sensation) and we can see well (a general condition for feeling safe in a particular location) and these things tend to make us happy. Therefore, it is not the similarity inherent to the concepts themselves, but the inferences we draw about these concepts in our real world experience (i.e., the interactional properties) that serves to map those properties of one concept onto another (for a more detailed discussion of metaphorical inferences on a neural basis, see Lakoff 2008).

Another example should serve to provide clarity. Note that in this example ARGUMENT is acting as the target domain, which denotes a typically more abstract and subjective conceptual domain (Kövecses 2010: 329), while WAR is the source domain, which denotes a typically more concrete domain that aids in the construal of a target domain (328):

(6) ARGUMENT IS WAR[14]
He *attacked every weak point* in my argument
I *demolished* his argument.
If you use that *strategy*, he'll *wipe you out*.
He *shot down* all of my arguments.
(examples taken from (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 4).

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[13]   However, it should be noted that Grady (1999) does concede in his "resemblance hypothesis" that some metaphors can be motivated on the basis of non-literal similarity, like "Achilles is a lion", discussed in Lakoff and Turner (1989). This is reminiscent of the special status given to "image metaphors", also discussed in Lakoff and Turner (1989). Yet, "this kind of metaphor has a special status, since conceptual structure and inferences are not mapped from one domain to another. Instead the source and target of the metaphor share some feature in a single perceptual domain, such as color or shape" Grady (1999: 89).

[14]   The conventional shorthand used for conceptual metaphor is A IS B.

The concepts of ARGUMENT and WAR adhere to certain patterned experience, in terms of their interactional properties, i.e., there are typical things, events, and experiences we engage in when having an argument or participating in war. This is also mirrored in the way we talk about them and is indicative of the metaphorical connection between them as concepts:

> ARGUMENT IS WAR […] structure[s] (at least in part) what we do and how we understand what we are doing when we argue. […] It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are different kinds of things […] and the actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed and talked about in terms of WAR. The concept is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured.[…] A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially characterizes the concept of an argument, and the language follows suit (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 5, 7).

Therefore, ARGUMENT IS WAR is a typical example of a conceptual metaphor[15], which is defined as the construal of "a more abstract domain (or concept) through a more physical domain (or concept) offline – either by means of long-term memory or as a result of a historical-cultural process" (Kövecses 2010: 8). Viewed in this manner, conceptual metaphor is seen as an "construal operation" and "[t]he choice of metaphor to describe a situation in a particular domain construes the structure of that domain in a particular way that differs depending on the metaphor chosen" (Croft & Cruse 2004: 55). For instance, ARGUMENT can also be conceived of and talked about as a JOURNEY:

(7) ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY
We have *set out* to prove that bats are birds.
We will *proceed* in a *step-by-step* fashion.
We have *arrived at* a disturbing conclusion.
(examples taken from (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 90).

ARGUMENT IS WAR and ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY are often referred to by the term *structural metaphors* because they illustrate the ability of the target

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[15] Conceptual metaphors are also often discussed in terms of their conventionality (i.e., the mappings attributable to metaphors make up "a fixed part of our conceptual system" (Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 274)). Lakoff (1987b) maintains that there is a crucial distinction to be made between conventional metaphors and what he calls "historical metaphor", like in the word *pedigree* (origin: French for crane's foot). Metaphor behind this word comes from the mapping of the image of a crane's foot onto the structure of a family tree. However, this mapping is not systematic and is no longer active in our conceptual system.

concept (ARGUMENT) to be metaphorically structured in terms of its systematic correspondences with the source domains (WAR, JOURNEY) (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 14). At this point, it is important to highlight two insights underlying the cognitive linguistic understanding of metaphors: 1) mappings between the source and target domain are partial and constrained and 2) metaphors on the linguistic level reflect metaphors on the conceptual level.

Firstly, mappings between the source domain and the target domain are partial and constrained by what Lakoff (1990, 2007 [1993]) refers to as the "invariance hypothesis" (sometimes also referred to as the "invariance principle"):

> Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 279, for a more detailed discussion, see Lakoff & Turner 1989; Lakoff 1990; Turner 1990).

The introduction of the invariance principle to CMT sought to explain the phenomenon of "feature inheritance" from the source domain to the target (Jelec 2014: 65). What this means is that when the basic knowledge structure of the source domain comes into conflict with the knowledge structure of the target domain, then the invariance principle hinders the mapping of what would otherwise be a metaphorical entailment between the two domains (Kövecses 2010: 131). To illustrate this point, consider again the metaphor ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY. In (7) the linguistic realizations of this metaphor show that the knowledge about journeys involving a path and reaching a destination become entailments of ARGUMENT (*set out*, *proceed*, *step-by-step*, *arrived at*). However, journeys often also contain knowledge about the means of transportation (e.g., taking a trip by plane, bus, etc.), which is not coherent with the target domain concept of ARGUMENT and, thus, does not conventionally sanction linguistic realizations of the following kind: *I took the bus to arrive at this conclusion*. As a consequence of what Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 279-280) refers to as the "target domain override", this feature of journeys will not be transferred to the target ARGUMENT because the mapping would import conflicting material from the source" and be in violation of the invariance principle (Kövecses 2010: 132). This explains what we see of conceptual structure on the linguistic level, as well as what we do not see.

Secondly, having established that the systematic correspondences target domains have with source domains are partial and constrained by invariance on the conceptual level, linguistic evidence becomes crucial. Inference mapping between the two domains is found not only on the level of conceptual structure (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 46), but it is reflected (or in other words "realized") on the linguistic level (as examples (6) and (7) demonstrate). Accordingly, CMT maintains the "conventional cross-domain correspondences", which are involved in a conceptual metaphor, hinges on the fact that the topological structure of a source domain is "projected" onto a particular target domain in accordance with the invariance principle, and, in doing so, "supplies the language and imagery which are used to refer to the [target] domain" (Grady 2007: 190).

Note that CMT was not intended to provide an explanation for patterns found in language: "The relationship is the other way around; patterns observed in language provide some of the main evidence which led to the development of the theory" (Deignan 2006: 107). Therefore, it is clear that "the locus of metaphor is not language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another" and that CMT stands out exactly because it is in the business of characterizing "such cross-domain mappings" (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 267). Thus, the term *conceptual metaphor* emphasizes a notational difference to what is denoted by *linguistic metaphor* or *metaphorical expression*[16], which "refers to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such a cross-domain mapping" (268). The relationship between the two is as follows:

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[16] Grady (2007) makes a point to highlight that metaphor is not viewed as "inherently a linguistic phenomenon. In fact, cognitive linguistics do conceive of metaphors as patterns of thought which can be expressed on nonverbal ways, such as pictures and gestures" (189). For instance, Casasanto (2009), investigating the domains of TIME and SIMILARITY, comes to the conclusion that "[l]inguistic metaphors reveal only a subset of the conceptual metaphors that appear to structure our mental representations" (143). In line with this, Steen (2011b) reviews three dimensions of metaphor research (in grammar and usage, in language and thought, and in sign systems or behavior), which demonstrate that metaphor "is ambivalent between the semiotic structure of conceptual metaphor and its cognitive realization in individual behavior", so that evidence for conceptual metaphor collected in one dimension "may be more or less secure and convincing" for other dimensions of metaphor research (82). Similarly, Gibbs (2012) argues for an acknowledgement of "multiple interacting dynamic factors" that shape metaphor and cautions against "privileging certain levels of metaphor", like linguistic ones, in order to "recognize how all these [lexical, grammatical, conceptual, pragmatic, socio-cultural] constraints may be simultaneously operating at any given moment in time" (369). Being that this denotes the ideal situation for a metaphor researcher and due to the limited scope of the present study, conceptual metaphors and their linguistic realizations, as evidenced by corpus-based data, emerge as the focal points of the present examination, but do not exclude the possibility of being enriched by more balanced or converging evidence in the vein of Gibbs (2006).

> We can state the nature of the relationship between the conceptual metaphors and the metaphorical linguistic expressions in the following way: the linguistic expressions (i.e., the way of talking) make explicit, or are manifestations of, the conceptual metaphors (i.e., way of thinking). To put the same thing differently, it is the metaphorical linguistic expressions that reveal the existence of the conceptual metaphors" (Kövecses 2010: 7).

What follows from this is the assumption that systematic patterns in language use (e.g., using the semantics of WAR to talk about the experience of having an argument) is a key piece of evidence for how the conceptual system is constructed. In other words, systematicity in language points to systematicity in conceptual structure, which is the most common type of evidence given in support of CMT (Deignan 2006: 107–108; Grady 1997a: 6 ; see also Lakoff 1990 for a discussion of further evidence).

Yet, systematicity also goes hand in hand with another aspect of metaphor that has been postulated in CMT: pervasiveness. This core assumption can be found in a passage from Lakoff and Johnson's book, which, according to its highly influential insight, has been often cited in the initial pages of many a metaphorical study:

> [M]etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 3).

The pervasiveness aspect is an essential one to consider in a cognitive linguistic study of metaphor. If we adhere to the notion that metaphor is pervasive in language, thought and action, then we are forced to accept the notion that an entry point to discovering conceptual structure of metaphor is how it is realized in language. This is, of course, good news for linguistic researchers aiming at a better understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of metaphor in language, for obvious reasons. Pervasiveness of metaphor in our conceptual system, on which communicative activities of the speakers of a shared (conventional) language depends, underscores the realization (discussed in detail above) that conceptual structure is reflected in language and, thus, scrutinized, albeit indirectly, within the realm of its linguistic reflections. Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) formulate this assumption in the following manner: "Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking and acting, language is an important

source of evidence for what that system is like. […] Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person's conceptual system" (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 3, 6). Therefore, by postulating conceptual metaphors in their influential work, Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) have laid down a theoretical premise for exploring the conceptual system and its relationship to language. This notion of conceptual metaphor has been understood as a desideratum of sorts, due to its systematic and pervasive properties, for the cognitive linguistically inclined researchers to embrace linguistic evidence as an ingress to conceptual phenomena, resulting in an abundance of research and theory ever since.

In fact, the "original evidence" for conceptual metaphors can be traced back to "the systematic analysis of conventional expressions in different languages", (Gibbs 2011: 531). To my mind, these linguistic endeavors have demonstrated that pervasiveness of metaphor in language, thought and action presupposes a certain amount of systematicity – an examinable patterning in language and thought, which directs our attention to the assumed structuring function of metaphor in our conceptual systems. Indeed, this was Lakoff and Johnson's (2003 [1980]) original intention, as evidenced by the following quote:

> Since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 7).

Yet, to paraphrase Johnson-Laird (1983: 1) in the introduction to his book on mental models, is the metaphor researcher perhaps biting off more than she can chew in aiming at conceptual structure via linguistic surface realizations? Is it, in fact, an operable approach to a better understanding of the relationship between cognition and language by exploring the systemic nature of what can be perceived on the linguistic surface as reflections of conceptual structure? We are well aware of the fact from research in psychology and cognitive science that it is impossible to directly investigate concepts as such, which I define by taking a cue from Mandler (2004), who states, "a *concept* refers to declarative knowledge about object kinds and events that is potentially accessible to conscious thought" (4, emphasis in the original). As we know from knowledge elicitation tasks in psychology,

declarative knowledge that is potentially available to conscious thought can be verbalized (Gordon 1992: 111) and, thus, can offer insights (even elicit metalinguistic knowledge) about a certain lexical form's correspondence to a particular concept, for instance[17]. In this specific case, it is helpful to trace the knowledge of a lexical form as it pertains to a particular concept. Yet, this might not get us far in terms of systematicity. In order to discover conceptual structure, cognitive linguists, in particular, aim at uncovering cognitive systematicity on the linguistic level in language use, "[b]ecause [when] the metaphorical concept is systematic, the language we use to talk about that aspect of the concept is systematic" (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 7). Therefore, linguistic evidence for conceptual structure is the cognitive linguist's answer for tackling the conundrum faced by psychologists, who are tasked with understanding and theorizing about the complexities of the human mind:

> Introspection is not a direct route to understanding the mind and, as far as we know, there is no such route. Psychologists have available only a number of indirect methods, such as observing the characteristics and time course of behaviour. The phenomena that can be demonstrated in the psychological laboratory are only clues, but it is the progressive revelation of these clues that has convinced researchers that they are making progress in explaining human mentality (Johnson-Laird 1983: 2).

Luckily, for the metaphor researcher, the burden of introspection is somewhat alleviated by the assurance of the pervasiveness qualities of metaphor in language, thought and action. The linguistic evidence at the core of CMT is undoubtedly an indirect route to conceptualization[18]. Yet, analog to Johnson-Laird's (1983) quote above concerning the evidence available to the psychologist enquiring about the human mind as such, cognitive linguists within the tradition of CMT have continually found themselves engaging in the observation of "the characteristics […] of [linguistic] behavior" that provide convincing "clues" in "progressive

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[17]   For more on the relationship between word use and conceptual content, including a discussion of psychological views of word use directly indicating conceptual content and their corresponding challenges, see Braisby & Franks (1997).

[18]   Casasanto (2009) cautions the linguistic analyst from overemphasizing linguistic metaphors' ability to reveal everything about the conceptual nature of domains: "[T]hey appear to be related in more complex ways than linguistic analyses alone can discover. As such, linguistic metaphors should be treated as a source of *hypotheses* about the structure of abstract concepts. Evaluating these hypotheses – determining when a linguistic metaphor reflects an underlying conceptual metaphor – requires both linguistic and extra-linguistic methods, and calls for cooperation across disciplines of the cognitive sciences" (143, emphasis in the original).

revelation" that lead us to believe that systematic correspondences in language indicate systematic correspondences in thought. Consequently, it is these research activities in which a metaphor researcher must be involved in order to contemplate systematicity and pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor. Introspection, in this regard, will just not suffice.

Furthermore, from a historical perspective, CMT, as a theory aligned with the guiding principles of cognitive semantics (discussed in the Section 2.1.3), can be firmly placed into the general linguistic countermovement to 20th century generativists, who have been soundly criticized for an overreliance on introspection in regard to arguments concerning the well-formedness of a linguistic expression or its meaning: "intuitions have been tacitly granted a privileged position in generative grammar. The result has been the construction of elaborate theoretical edifices supported by disturbingly shaky empirical evidence" (Wasow & Arnold 2005: 1482). CMT not only provided a way beyond introspection via the authentification of systematicity in language as it relates to cognition, which necessitates empirical study of pervasive linguistic patterns, but it also ushered in a unifying approach to meaning, cognition and language use.

Therefore, the weeding out of correspondences in language that point toward an understanding of many concepts being "metaphorically structured makes it possible to explain what traditionally has been seen as unrelated, conventional expressions" (Gibbs 2011: 532). It is exactly this activity that will highly inform the empirical research presented in the present study, which adheres to the following assumptions:

- Systematicity of conceptual metaphors (including partial mapping of inferences) is reflected (and thus visible) in language use. Therefore, linguistic evidence is central to the hypothesizing of the existence of conceptual metaphors for specific concepts, like emotions.

- Conceptual metaphors are pervasive in everyday language and it is this pervasiveness that compels us to look for metaphors for specific concepts in language use in the first place.

These assumptions are combined to formulate the following guiding question for the present study:

- By assuming the systemic and pervasive nature of metaphors, can the examination of linguistic metaphors in a large collection of language data, (e.g., corpus data) reveal a better understanding of the metaphors for specific concepts (e.g., emotions) that exist in the conceptual systems of the speakers of a given language, e.g., English?

2.2.2   Embodiment and Metaphor

A highly influential insight from the cognitive neurosciences, which pertains to CMT, entails knowledge about the interworkings of the human brain: "[T]he physical brain does not process visual information in a disembodied, nonimagistic way, but instead maintains the perceptual topology of images presented to it, and then re-represents increasingly abstract spatial and imagistic details of that topology" (Rohrer 2007: 26). This insight provided the motivation behind the postulation of image schemas that act as topological links behind "the cross-domain mappings of systematic conceptual metaphors" (26). Furthermore, it connects to one of the most central lines of investigation in Cognitive Linguistics, particularly in the vein of CMT: How does the body itself, as an "apparatus" in the physical, cognitive and even social sense, "shape" our linguistic capacity for category and concept formation? (26; see also Grady 2007: 192). In other words, what is the experientialist basis for how we share meaning? The cognitive linguistic answer to this question, which relates directly to metaphor, is found in the principle of "embodiment" or "embodied cognition" (see Lakoff 1987a; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Johnson 1987; Gibbs 2006), which was briefly discussed in Section 2.1.3 above. In this section we will take a more direct look at how embodiment has been initially applied to metaphor.

The term *embodiment* has been used in various different (albeit not completely distinct) senses throughout Cognitive Linguistics (see Rohrer 2007: 27–31 for a survey of this term's uses). In its broadest sense, embodiment entails "the claim that human, physical, cognitive and social embodiment ground our conceptual and linguistic systems" and as a hypothesis "is intended to be an empirical one" (27), a sentiment reiterated by (Goschler 2005: 35).

Embodiment in CMT is often tied to what we know from linguistic evidence about the relationship between source and target domains. Reiterating a similar definition above, conceptual metaphor is "the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is partially 'mapped' […] onto a different experiential domain", that is, we " 'make sense' of our less directly apprehensible experiences […] on the basis of more directly apprehensible and more easily describable experiences, which are usually bodily experiences" (Barcelona & Valenzuela 2011: 27).

It becomes relatively clear that, within conceptual metaphors, source "domains stemming from bodily experience […] do the vast majority of work" in structuring more abstract target domain concepts (Rohrer 2007: 32). This result is a consequence of what has been called "directionality"[19] in metaphor (32):

> we have suggested that there is directionality in metaphor, that is, that we understand one concept in terms of another. Specifically, we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 112).

This tendency is borne out by linguistic evidence and, again, goes a long way to debunking the notion that metaphor is merely based on similarity (see Grady 1997a, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]). Consider example (8) below:

(8) He was so *cold* to me when I tried to apologize for cancelling our date.

Here, the physical feeling of being cold is not directly connected to the lacking of emotion being expressed in (8). In fact, Grady (2007) states that they "are not 'similar' in a straightforward way", but instead "are associated in our experience, for instance, because intimate interactions can entail physical proximity which leads to body heat being shared" (192). That is, when someone is emotionally cold towards another person, they usually do not seek out physical proximity with that person, which would otherwise feel warm. Therefore, it is this lack of physical proximity that is associated with a lack of the physically felt warmth. This, in turn,

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[19]   Note that "unidirectionality" has also been proposed for metaphorical mappings, which dictates that the source domain maps onto the target domain, but the reverse is not simultaneously true (for a more detailed discussion, see Lakoff & Turner 1989).

motivates the linguistic act of labelling someone displaying a lack of emotion as *cold*. It is the highlighting of this "experiential motivation" in conceptual metaphors that "most sharply distinguishes" CMT "from alternative theories" like traditional literary theories of metaphor (Grady 2007: 192). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) summarize the basis for this line of argumentation in the following way:

> Categorization […] is a consequence of how we are embodied. We have evolved to categorize; if we hadn't we would not have survived. Categorization is, for the most part, not a product of conscious reasoning. We categorize as we do because we have the brains and bodies we have and because we interact in the world the way we do. […]
>
> Most important, it is not just that our bodies and brains determine *that* we will categorize; they also determine what kinds of categories we will have and what their structure will be. Think of the properties of the human body that contribute to the peculiarities of our conceptual system. We have eyes and ears, arms and legs that work in certain very definite ways and not in others. We have a visual system, with topographic maps and orientation-sensitive cells, that provides structure for our ability to conceptualize spatial relations. Our abilities to move in the ways we do and to track motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system of causal concepts. What is important is not that we have bodies and that thought is somehow embodied. What is important is that the peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 18–19, emphasis in the original)

Therefore, the embodiment hypothesis was originally intended to ground "(universal) aspects of the human mind in (universal) aspects of the human body" (Hampe 2008: 4-5). Additionally, there is a more substantial view of embodiment that relates to metaphor: Concepts (like those linking temperature and emotion in example (8) above) are neural structures wired with a "inferential capacity", that is, they can be "bound together in ways that yield inferences" by utilizing the sensorimotor system available to us (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 20). Extending this to the linguistic realm, a strong version of the embodiment hypothesis compels us to take the perspective that meaning construction is a reflection of "our overall experiences as human beings. […] we are embodied beings, not pure minds. Our organic nature influences our experience of the world, and this experience is reflected in the language we use" (Geeraerts 2006: 5).

A consequence of adopting the strong version of embodiment hypothesis entails a tendency to view certain conceptual metaphors as universal. This particular perspective is summarized by Yu (2008):

> […] human meaning and understanding are to a considerable extent metaphorical, mapping from the concrete to the abstract and linking sensorimotor experience with subjective experience. It also follows that our body, with its experiences and functions, is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings from bodily experiences onto more abstract and subjective domains. This is because humans, despite their racial or ethnic peculiarities, all have the same basic body structure, and all share many common bodily experiences and functions which fundamentally define us as being human […]. Sharing this common cognitive foundation of embodiment, different languages should have parallel conceptual metaphors across their boundaries (Yu 2008: 250).

In citing Dirven (2002), Yu (2008) also points out that the "revolutionary" contribution of CMT has been to directly unite "this experientialist and universalist basis of metaphor" as "constructed around the core of the human body" (249).

Yet, Goschler (2005) points out that there is "a lack of differentiation" in the use of the term 'embodiment' in CMT and that it is not imperative to assume the grounding for all conceptual metaphors as embodied (34-35). Thus, her cautionary words against taking embodiment as "the ultimate explanation for all kinds of mapping, metaphor, analogy and blending" and equating empirical evidence for CMT with empirical evidence for embodiment (35). Furthermore, she argues for a "restricted" (albeit still "fuzzy") use of the term in Cognitive Linguistics by maintaining that embodiment simply "means that parts of our conceptual system and therefore some aspects of our language are structured by the features of our bodies and the functioning of our bodies in everyday life" (35). Making use of this restricted definition clears the way for empirical research to explore to what extent conceptual metaphors are linked to embodiment (36).

At this point it should be noted, as Rohrer (2007: 32-33) does, that the "natural experiences" making up more concrete, basic concepts, like source domains in conceptual metaphor, detailed by Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]), result from interacting with the physical environment as well as the cultural context in which we experience the world. He sums up Lakoff and Johnson's (2003 [1980]) position as follows:

> Reserving judgment for future research, they also indicated that while some of these natural kinds of experience might be universal, others might very well vary from culture to culture. They explicitly pointed out that they were using the terms 'nature' and 'natural' in the sense which encompasses at least the possibility of cultural variation, and not in the sense of the standard 'nature-culture' distinction. […] In short, they argued that three natural kinds of experience – experience of the body, of the physical environment, *and* of the culture – are what constitute the basic source

domains upon which metaphors draw. […] From the outset, then, the term 'embodiment' was intended to cover research on both the experiential and bodily substrates of language" (Rohrer 2007: 33, emphasis in the original).

From the Cultural Linguistic perspective, Yu (2015) takes this a step further by granting a more solidified position for culture in its relationship to embodiment. "The central idea is that embodiment is always situated in its sociocultural context", and, consequently, the sensorimotor experience of the human body "sets up the contours" without denying the "impact" of the cultural environment that is fundamental to human experience (237). In fact, from the outset, adherence to a strong view of the embodiment hypothesis overemphasized "a 'universalistic' conception of the mind and tended to obscure the socio-cultural dimensions of human cognition" (Hampe 2008: 5). Furthermore, the "two strands" of embodiment (i.e., universal views relating to the human body vs. socio-cultural dimensions) have not yet "been integrated in a unified theory" (6).

The embodiment hypothesis from the point of view of socio-cultural cognition is considered more carefully in the following chapter. However, it is clear from this brief survey of embodiment and metaphor that a strict understanding of embodied cognition as relating to our physical experiences can be problematic when approaching an empirical study of cognitive metaphor in culturally distinct varieties of English, which has given me cause to formulate the following guiding questions:

- Taking the view that embodiment can denote the grounding of metaphors from bodily and sociocultural experience, can the metaphorization of emotional experience, which is fundamental to human experience, be traced to both bodily and cultural experience?
- If so, can emotion metaphors (attributable to culturally distinct speakers of the same language) be placed on a continuum, ranging from more embodied by physical and bodily experience (universal) to more embodied by the sociocultural context (potentially variational)?

2.3 Criticisms of and Challenges for Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The previous sections served to highlight some fundamental insights of CMT that are particular pertinent to the present study. Along with various other important contributions, particularly stemming from CMT's ability to inspire a myriad of work in an interdisciplinary vein, it has become clear that CMT has emerged as "the dominant perspective on metaphor", while having "played a significant part in the rise of cognitive linguistics with its efforts to offer a new way of thinking about linguistic structure and behaviour" (Gibbs 2009: 14–15). Many individual scholars, particularly associated with CMT, have been quick to point out the undeniable influence CMT has wielded not only during the late 20th century, but also the continuing impact it has today (see, for example, Gibbs 2011, 2009; Kövecses 2008b; Tay 2014). Nevertheless, with great significance comes great challenges and criticisms that beg scrutiny and deserve clear positioning from researchers engaged in CMT. A range of critical issues, for instance concerning the limitations of the metaphor analyst, methodological concerns, implications of embodiment in body and culture, etc., have been collected and addressed by Gibbs (2009) and Kövecses (2008b). Each individual issue deserves attention within the overall scholarly discourse on CMT, which profits from a critical examination of the charges brought up against it. Yet, for the sake of brevity and in line with the limited scope of the present study, I will concentrate on a brief discussion of those criticisms and challenges that can be addressed for our present purposes. Therefore, in the following I will focus on criticisms pertaining to the psychological reality of metaphor, the abstract-concrete distinction for the domains involved in conceptual metaphor, and two issues that require fundamental positioning in terms of an approach to metaphor study: analyst intuition and understanding the role of embodiment and culture. The first two criticisms have a more general concern with establishing the status of conceptual metaphor, while the last two are common criticisms that I have directly addressed in the present study.

First and foremost, doubt has been expressed about the psychological reality of conceptual metaphor; that is, the assumption that metaphoric mappings shape

conceptual structure is deemed unsatisfactory or is flatly rejected (McGlone 2007; Murphy 1997, 1996). McGlone (2007), for instance, takes issue with CMT and its supposed inability to conceptually distinguish between the literal and figurative:

> Its atmospheric influence notwithstanding, the CM view has not fared well theoretically or empirically. There is an ironic quality to its shortcomings: the view trumpets the importance of metaphor in human cognition, yet its major flaw is a hyper-literal construal of the relationship between metaphoric language and thought. Although the linguistic evidence can support only the limited claim that certain abstract and concrete concepts are thematically parallel […], Lakoff asserts that our knowledge of abstract concepts is quite literally subsumed by our knowledge of concrete concepts. A conceptual system arranged in this fashion, however, would seem incapable of generating propositions about abstract concepts with figurative intent. For example, a conceptual system whose knowledge of theories was a subset of building knowledge should assume that theories are not merely metaphoric 'buildings,' but literal buildings! Lacking a concept of theories that is representationally independent from that for buildings, the system cannot cogitate about theories in and of themselves, and consequently is incapable of appreciating the literal-metaphorical distinction. (McGlone 2007: 122).

This assertion, however, runs contrary to the extensive study in experimental psycholinguistics that provides evidence for the psychological reality of conceptual metaphor (e.g., Athanasopoulous et al. 2017; Boroditsky 2001; Boroditsky & Ramscar 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008; Gentner 2001; Gibbs 2011; 1994; Katz & Law 2010; Núñez 2008, among others). Without delving into the findings in support of conceptual metaphor, which incidentally contradict the statement above that CMT "has not fared well", I find the sheer amount of experimental work devoted to this topic encouraging and, on that basis, allow for the acceptance of a solid foundation to the claim that conceptual metaphors are psychologically real.

Secondly, a somewhat related issue to the psychological reality of metaphor is the purported problem of the status of concepts as either inherently concrete or abstract, discussed in Goschler (2008: 31-32). She points out that, in line with the CMT principle of unidirectionality, metaphorical mappings follow from the concrete domain to the abstract domain (31). By taking a developmental view of metaphorical concepts, she questions the abstract status of concepts like LOVE and ANGER, which are claimed in CMT to be construed via more concrete concepts like A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (e.g., *I was boiling with rage*). Her conclusion is that these emotion concepts have (in terms of their sensory experience) the same basic status as HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER for a child

who has yet to develop adult conceptualizations because all these concepts can be experienced physically (32). She also points out that the inner structure of a concept is understood as the an indicator of "abstractness" or "concreteness" by citing the following passage from Lakoff & Johnson (1999): "Our experience of love is basic – as basic as our experience of motion or physical force or objects. But as an experience, it is not highly structured on its own terms" (70). Yet, Goschler (2008) does not make clear what exact physical experiences a child has of LOVE or ANGER, which would support their basic status. Furthermore, during early human development, emotion concepts require cognitive structures beyond image schemas, like complex schematic integrations because "[t]he conceptualization of affective experiences is highly complex and involves a variety of inputs that result in many different metaphors" (Mandler & Pagán Cánovas 2014: 16). This insight lends credence to the argument presented by Lakoff and Johnson ([2003] 1980) that emotion concepts, albeit basic to our experience, lack the more straightforward nature of a concept like HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. That is, as a child, the sensorimotor experience of drinking hot chocolate from a mug or watching water boil in a pot can rightly be viewed as a more concrete experience, in terms of its internal conceptual structure, than the warm embrace of a parent intended to convey love through physical proximity, for example. The latter, in fact, describes an event associated with emotions and, in Mandler & Pagán Cánovas' (2014) words, "that in itself is not enough to conceptualize them" (15). In addition, the mapping of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER to EMOTION, which is reflected on the linguistic level, helps to see that a domain, like ANGER, is more abstract vis-à-vis a more concrete domain, like HOT FLUID IN CONTAINER, as observed by the principle of unidirectionality (i.e., ANGER is simply not used to conceptualize a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER). Unidirectionality can also be taken to address those critics who take issue with the use of the terms "literal" and "metaphorical" or "figurative" in CMT (see, e.g., Glucksberg 2001). Gibbs 2009 provides the following answer:

> Cognitive linguists do *not* draw a rigid distinction between literal and metaphorical, primarily because of the polysemous nature of the concept 'literal' (Gibbs 2004); but they do clearly distinguish between metaphorical and non-metaphorical thought and language – although they do not see 'non-metaphorical' as defining an internally consistent category. Most simply, metaphorical thought involves a mapping from a

source domain into a target domain; non-metaphorical concepts and meaning do not.
(Gibbs 2009: 23, emphasis in the original).

Thirdly, a very common and important complaint expressed towards CMT has to do with constructed, intuition-based linguistic examples that are posited as evidence of underlying conceptual mappings (for an overview and critical examination of the introspective side of metaphor data collection, see Csatár 2014). The core of this criticism can be summarized as such: "much of the classic work on CMT suffers from a strong confirmation bias: individual linguistic expressions are selectively chosen and advanced as evidence in favour of one conceptual metaphor or another" (Gibbs 2009: 19). For instance, reconsider the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor presented as (6) above. The mapping between the domain of ARGUMENT and the domain of WAR is postulated by Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) on the grounds of linguistics metaphors (like "He *attacked*[20] *every weak point* in my argument" and "I *demolished* his argument"), which can be pulled from an analysts' intuition without any attestation in usage-based language. Without a stated methodology on how these examples were derived, Lakoff and Johnson leave the impression that the data, on which they found their theory, is purely intuitive and a result of an examination of their own linguistic competence (i.e., a heavy reliance on introspection) and thus not necessarily evidence for the systematic nature of metaphor. This, of course, is highly unsatisfactory in a field such as Cognitive Linguistics, which, being closely linked to the cognitive sciences and its interdisciplinary character, has been the recipient of pleas for more "methodological pluralism" and "converging evidence" (Steen 2011a), as well as for more devotion to empirical methods (Gibbs 2007). The issue of intuition-based elicitation of metaphors not only brings up the "circularity" problem some view in regard to linguistic expressions as evidence for conceptual metaphors (see McGlone 2001; Murphy 1996), but also highlights "a lack of explicit criteria" as "one of the major obstacles toward CMT's acceptance as a comprehensive theory of metaphor use and understanding" (Gibbs 2009: 20). An influential improvement in cognitive linguistic research of metaphor is, thus, the addition of corpus-based study (e.g.,

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[20] Vervaeke & Kennedy (1996) put forth the interpretation that *attack* simply evolved into two different meanings and *to attack an argument* is, therefore, not necessarily an instantiation of ARGUMENT IS WAR.

Deignan 2005) and carefully created protocol for metaphor identification in actual discourse (Pragglejaz Group 2007; Steen et al. 2010b). These developments have informed the methodology of the present study (see Chapter 4 for details, which serves to illustrate that I take the challenge of transparent criteria seriously).

Finally, the attempt to better understand the role of embodiment and (at times, conversely or complementary) the role of culture in motivating conceptual metaphor, which was briefly touched upon in the previous section, has led to a crucial point of criticism that will be addressed more fully in the following chapter. To put it succinctly, the overemphasis of embodied cognition in cognitive approaches to metaphor has been deemed problematic when trying "to account for universality and cultural specificity" (Kövecses 2008b: 177). Citing Rakova (2002), Kövecses addresses her concern that a theory like CMT that "builds on image schemas and, in general, on the universality of essential physical experiences cannot in the same breath be a theory of cultural variation – especially not if embodiment is conceived naturalistically" (Kövecses 2008b: 177). His answer to her criticism goes as follows:

> we need to change the way we think about embodiment; we should not see it as a homogeneous, monolithic factor. This is made possible by the idea that embodiment consists of several components and that any of these can be singled out and emphasized by different cultures […] it seems that different languages and cultures base their anger-concepts on different components and levels of embodiment, thereby creating partly universal, partly culture-specific concepts. This account is made possible by the process of differential experiential focus. The idea of differential experiential focus can serve us […] in responding to this criticism (Kövecses 2005). The embodiment of anger […] is complex and consists of several components. Of these, as a result of certain cultural influences over the ages, different components may occupy [a] central position in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger (Kövecses 2008b: 177–178).

Kövecses (2005) defines differential experiential focus in a way that intersects with Yu's (2015) position on embodiment and the sociocultural context (see previous section). "The universal bodily basis on which universal metaphors could be built is not utilized in the same way or to the same extent in different languages and varieties" due to differential experiential focus, meaning that culturally distinct people are potentially "attuned to different aspects of their bodily functioning in relation to the target domain, or that they can ignore or downplay certain aspects of bodily functioning as regards the metaphorical conceptualization of a particular

target domain" (Kövecses 2005: 246). In this manner, differential experiential focus can be a possible driving force that leads to metaphorical variation (293). However, while Yu (2015: 237) sees embodiment as "always situated in its sociocultural context", Kövecses (2008b) makes a more stark distinction between embodiment (as bodily experience) and the cultural context by conceiving of them as individual pressures on the motivation behind conceptual metaphors:

> Metaphorical conceptualization in natural situations occurs under two simultaneous pressures: the pressure of embodiment and the pressure of context. Context is determined by local culture. This dual pressure essentially amounts to our effort to be coherent both with the body and culture – coherent both with universal embodiment and the culture-specificity of local culture in the course of metaphorical conceptualization. We can achieve this in some cases, but in others it is either embodiment or cultural specificity that plays the more important role" (Kövecses 2008b: 179).

The overriding aim of the present study is to contribute to a better understanding of not only what emotion metaphors can be attested for culturally distinct varieties of English but also if they are shared by these culturally distinct varieties (and, if not, in what way can they be viewed as culturally conditioned products). The fact that speakers of New Englishes share a common language with each other and with a (formerly) norm-providing variety, like British English, does not automatically mean that they share the same metaphorical conceptualizations, even for concepts as fundamental as EMOTIONS. Therefore, whether or not we conceive of the cultural dimension as a competing pressure to bodily experience, like Kövecses (2008b), or as the situation in which it is embedded, like Yu (2015), it remains an important theoretical position to not discount culture's ability to shape the conceptualizations of emotion, even if, at times, emotional experience is also part of our bodily experience (i.e., getting red in the face when angry, running away when afraid or scared, jumping up and down when happy, etc.). Furthermore, it also remains an empirical desideratum to tease out what is shared (potentially universal) and what is different (potentially culture-specific) in the metaphors of emotions. With this, we now turn to a more detailed discussion of the case of emotion in the body and in culture and what that implies for a study of emotion metaphors in a pluricentric (and, thus, culturally diverse) language like English.

3   Body, Culture, Metaphors and Varieties: The Case of Emotion

The previous chapter, largely devoted to setting up the general theoretical background of CMT, emphasized fundamental insights that inform the present study: 1) Metaphors are systematic and pervasive in the way humans think, speak and behave, as well as 2) embodied. The latter insight, initially formulated in the embodiment hypothesis, opens a major issue up for debate: namely, to what extent are metaphors embodied by our experiences in the world, be they of a more bodily or culturally motivated kind? It is this debate that I have deemed most poignant for the study of emotion metaphors in varieties of English around the world. Therefore, a major aspect of the present chapter will be to further explore what can be gleaned about embodiment in metaphor along the physical-culture divide and consider the possibility that it is not really about a "divide" at all.

Yet, firstly, before delving into this discussion, it is necessary to critically examine how 'culture' has been previously defined (and problematized) in academic discourse. This serves to make clear in what way 'culture' as an object of study is being used in the present study and sets up a point of reference for the following debate. Thus, secondly, the debate concerning the 'competing' notions of universality (from the perspective of a strong version of embodied cognition as defined by bodily experience) and variation (as stemming from cross- and within-cultural forces) will be put into focus for emotion metaphors on the basis of previous research. Thirdly, English as a pluricentric language will be put forth as an ideal testing ground in furthering understanding to what extent embodiment can be seen through the lens of physical as opposed to cultural experience in relation to conceptual metaphors in the minds of New English speakers around the world. Furthermore, this section will also shine a spotlight on previous studies specific to New English metaphor, which can serve as a baseline for the current status of this emerging line of investigation and to which the present study aims to directly contribute. Finally, the chapter concludes with the specific research questions and formulates the aims of the present study.

3.1　A Note on Defining 'Culture'

At this point, it behooves us to consider what exactly we mean when we talk about culture. The academic discussion surrounding the notion of culture, like so many theoretically defined notions, turns out to be a tricky one when put into practice. From the outset I would like to emphasize that, in this study, I generally take a cue from Kövecses (2005) by using a definition of culture that glosses over a more comprehensive understanding of culture and individual people's participation in a specific culture. Nevertheless, like Kövecses, I maintain its workability for the present purposes:

> In line with some current thinking in anthropology, we can think of culture as *a set of shared understandings* that characterize smaller or larger groups of people […]. This is not an exhaustive definition of culture, in that it leaves out real objects, artifacts, institutions, practices, actions and so on, that people use and participate in any culture, but it includes a large portion of it: namely, the shared understandings that people have in connection with all of these 'things' (Kövecses 2005: 1, emphasis mine).

The intention in following Kövecses is to underscore that the relationship between metaphor and culture (which is the focal point of his 2005 study) does not allow us to have any forgone conclusions about metaphors being shared between varieties of English that have undoubtedly been influenced by different cultural settings and practices or patterns of behavior. Therefore, although it might be the case that English shares its metaphors of emotions throughout its global varieties on the whole, we cannot at the outset discount the potential of metaphorical (and thus culture-specific) variation. The key to the search of culture-based metaphorical variation (or, indeed, similarity) can be found in the "shared understandings". As it concerns metaphors of emotion, I interpret this to mean shared conceptualizations (as evidenced by linguistic metaphors) that drive the way members of a specific culture speak about individual emotions. This view has been adopted directly from Kövecses, who maintains that:

> if we think of culture as, in the main, a set of shared understandings of the world, the question of the role of figurative understanding in culture immediately arises. Because our understanding of the world includes both concrete and abstract objects and events, naturally figurative thought should play some role in the case of *abstract* objects and events. […] abstract thought is taken to be based on concrete domains of experience, of which the human body has a distinguished status. […] cultural models for abstract domains (i.e., our shared understandings of abstract objects and events) are, and can

only be, metaphorically constituted (Kövecses 2005: 283–284, emphasis in the original).

Furthermore, "a major component of culture" is in fact the way we use language (Kövecses 2005: 284), so that it is possible to hypothesize about culture as a motivating factor in how metaphors, reflected in language, are shaped and, in doing so, point to shared understandings.[21]

Yet, alas, the notion of culture, as it appears in academic discourse in general, does not play out as straightforwardly as one would like. In particular for the empirical research of the present kind, there is the matter of how to operationalize a definition of culture in order to explore metaphor. In the present study, I will not offer any concrete solutions to this dilemma, since I rely mostly on the sentiment of "shared understandings" outlined above. However, I deem it important to make clear what caveats we encounter when working with the term 'culture', which inevitably turns up in any linguistic research of varieties worldwide.

Spencer-Oately (2000) maintains that culture "is notoriously difficult to define" (3). As evidence of this, she cites the anthropologists Kroeber & Kluckhohn, who in a 1952 study found 164 different definitions for culture (3). Their highly influential and often cited definition, quoted below, has furthered the discussion by highlighting the patterned behavior of participants of a specific culture as a hallmark of their membership in that culture:

> Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1952: 181).

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[21] While also defining culture in terms of "shared understandings", Quinn (1991) argues that these shared understandings are not always realized solely in language and, more poignantly, that metaphors only reflect underlying cultural models, but do not necessarily constitute them, such as in her analysis of LOVE and MARRIAGE (see Quinn 1987; 1991). "I will be arguing that metaphors, far from constituting understanding, are ordinarily selected to fit a preexisting and culturally shared model" Quinn (1991: 60). For an opposing view of this conclusion, see Kövecses (1999; 2000; 2005). Other oppositional voices are found in Gibbs (1994) and Shore (1996), who like Kövecses, view basic cultural models as being metaphorically constructed.

Although this definition is intended to be taken in more social scientific terms, it can already say something a bit more about the "shared understandings" we intend to discover in emotion metaphors across varieties. Emotion metaphors may have the potential to reflect cultural differences and similarities by virtue of being what Kroeber and Kluckhohn call in their definition above "patterns […] of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols" (that is, in the case of metaphor, linguistic symbols). As such, we can expect patterns to emerge in the metaphors people use to talk about emotional experience (i.e., they will show up systematically in the way people use language to express emotional experience). Therefore, linguistic metaphors relating to underlying conceptualizations about emotion serve as "embodiments in artifacts", that is, the conceptual structure of ANGER IS FIRE is first made apparent and examinable when someone utters something like "I am burning up with rage". This utterance also makes this kind of metaphor a "product of action", albeit in the linguistic sense. Furthermore, if culture "consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas" and their corresponding values, then any time such an utterance is performed and its meaning is received and understood, it solidifies the "shared understanding" that we conceive of ANGER in this way and makes its replication in language more likely (i.e., "conditioning elements of further action"). Therefore, the main assumption to be derived from this particular view on culture and metaphor is that a culture's "shared understandings" (i.e., metaphorical conceptualizations) will show up as patterned language use in the discourse of that culture's members[22], which is something we can detect by means of linguistic inquiry. It can also be assumed that the more often a particular metaphor is repeated in linguistic performance, the further it is sanctioned by a particular culture as a "shared understanding" of the particular part of human experience it denotes: it becomes a culturally reinforced linguistic practice to conceptualize ANGER as FIRE, for instance.[23] Wilson & Lewandowska-

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[22] Sewell (2005) views culture as possessing a "distinct semiotic logic", which in Saussurian terms maintains a "coherence of symbol systems". Thus, members of a culture "will form a semiotic community […] and therefore be capable of engaging in mutually meaningful symbolic action" Sewell (2005: 86). In essence, this relationship between culture and its semiotic coherence also holds for the particular metaphors reflected in a culture's language.

[23] It could also be argued that the conceptualization ANGER IS FIRE arises from embodiment in the physical sense: We can feel something like an inner heat physically when we become angry. However, this understanding of embodiment should not at the outset of an empirical study be taken as given to the

Tomaszczyk (2017) lend further credence to this point in their discussion of the concept of culture:

> Numerous definitions of culture proposed throughout years of research involve constitutive properties […] which comprise patterning, that is human models for living and behavior, the sharing of these patterns, their repetitiveness and structure, learnability and acquisition, cultural transmission in terms of symbols and signs, and cultural imagery and its embodiment in artefacts and in human achievement in thought and language. […] a particular culture primarily involves patterns of thoughts and emotions shared by a given community of people (Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017: 247–248)

Therefore, "shared understandings" on the level of cognitive structure (as well as corresponding linguistic realizations) are always a matter of patterning, which is luckily observable in linguistic data. The question that remains for our present purposes is how to obtain these patterns from the data, to which we will turn in Chapter 4.

The notion of shared understandings observable in "patterns" only helps to operationalize one facet of how culture has been previously defined, albeit an important one. Another problematic facet to consider remains in the attempts to define 'culture', in particular in reference to the groupings of individuals we talk about as being the members of a specific culture. Spencer-Oately offers the following definition, albeit with additional caveats worth considering:

> Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural conventions, and basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each member's behavior and each member's interpretation of the 'meaning' of other people's behaviour (Spencer-Oately 2000: 4).

Four issues are inherent in this definition of culture, as pointed out by Spencer-Oately herself. Firstly, the "attitudes, belief, behavioural conventions, and basic assumptions and values" of a particular culture represent various "layers of depth" that can be pinpointed for the individual ("inner core"), the community members as a whole ("outer core") and the "surface-level" manifestations in behavior between the individual members (4). Secondly, what goes on in a cultural setting, which Spencer-Oatley terms the "sub-surface aspects of culture", has a tendency to influence the individual participants' behavior along with the meaning

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exclusion of the ability of culture to select or promote certain experiences and their corresponding conceptualizations over others.

attribution they conduct towards other people's behavior (4). Thirdly, this is complicated by the fact that culture is indeed a "fuzzy" concept in the sense that it is not clearly demarcated and, thus, individual participants in a particular culture most likely will not share the "identical sets of attitudes, and beliefs and so on, but rather show 'family resemblances', with the result that there is no absolute set of features that can distinguish definitively one cultural group from another" (4). Finally, culture, as defined in this way, is often lumped together with the notion of social group, which is (in circulatory fashion) a notion that can be defined by various aspects of culture. For instance, an individual participant of a particular culture is, at the same time, a member of various social groups within that larger cultural context (e.g., different ethnic groups, age groups, professional groups, etc.). These more fine-grained groupings can, in turn, be viewed in and of themselves as cultural groups in their own right (4). It is this issue that is important to discuss in a linguistic study, which has at its core speakers of different varieties and, thus, automatically representatives of diverse cultural groups within their respective cultures – a distinction that many researchers tend to gloss over. Culture is often "operationalized primarily in terms of ethnolinguistic and/or national or regional political identity", which is not meant to disregard the other types of cultural groups or to imply that homogeneity (as its members remain individuals). Equating culture with regional affiliation is simply a matter of the limited scope imposed on the researcher of (cross-)cultural variation in (linguistic) behavior (4). This is a fact that the present study does not attempt to overcome because, as a cognitive linguistic study of emotion metaphor using a corpus-based method, it is reliant on the demarcation of cultural groups by geographical location and, in fact, deals with the very same limited scope that Spencer-Oatley highlights.

However, it is important at least to acknowledge the palpably unsatisfactory use of 'culture' to equate national identity. In fact, this prompted Bond et al. (2000: 49-50) to refer to culture as an "empty" term. Its lack of explanatory value comes to light when we (as we commonly do) apply it to the situation of encountering differences in behavior, for example, that results from travel experiences that expose us to a 'foreign' way of speaking or acting. Bond et al. (2000) uses this scenario to highlight the circulatory nature of using the term *culture* in this manner, which leads to observations that are less than illuminating, e.g., the British act and

speak a certain way because they are British, Germans act and speak a certain way because they are German and so forth. In fact, what is needed to overcome the definitional emptiness is what Bond et al. (2000) deem "usable content". Usable content, in their view, is suggested by definitions of culture that, like Spencer-Oatley's above, uphold "values as a key role in differentiating cultures one from another" Bond et al. (2000: 50)[24]

One value (or, in other words, dimension of cultural variability) that is particularly applicable to the present study is the dimension of Individualism-Collectivism (henceforth I-C). The I-C dimension can be defined by viewing Individualism and Collectivism "as two poles of a dimension of national culture" (Hofstede 2001: 225). A individualistic society is "a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: Everybody is expected to look after him/herself and her/his immediate family only", while a collectivistic society denotes "a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty" (225). In other words, Individualism drives a society to value personal freedom and independence over reciprocity and the demands of community and established tradition.

It should be noted that I selected this dimension over the six others (see footnote 24 below) in Hofstede's work because, in my view, it lent itself most readily to emotional aspects of our cultural experiences. For instance, by applying I-C to their study of ANGER metaphor in English, Russian and Spanish, Ogarkova and Soriano (2014) point out that "[c]ultural variance on the individualism/collectivism dimension has been robustly supported by empirical evidence on various types of appraisal, conceptualization, expression and regulation of emotions" (96). Furthermore, they conclude that "in collectivistic […] cultures anger is predominantly viewed as more negative and socially disruptive, […] and thus, should be regulated with regard to its expression and one's acting on the

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[24]   An influential study conducted by Hofstede (1980), which is critically discussed by Bond et al. (2000: 51-60) attempted to analyze the work-related values of 40 individual nations working at IBM and, in doing so, came up with "culture scores" relating to four variational dimensions: 1) Power Distance, 2) Individualism / Collectivism, 3) Uncertainty Avoidance, and 4) Masculinity / Femininity. Hofstede later added a fifth and sixth dimension: 5) Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation (see Hofstede & Bond 1988; Hofstede 2001) and 6) Indulgence vs. Restraint (see Hofstede et al. 2010). For a summary of all six dimensions, see Hofstede (2011).

feeling. The evaluation is more positive in individualistic cultures, which are more favourable towards the open manifestation of intense emotional experience as affirmation of the self" (96-97).

Furthermore, from the outset of a study on New Englishes, the application of the I-C dimension helps to further differentiate the regional varieties under investigation, because I-C is "the major dimension of cultural variability used to explain cross-cultural differences in behaviour" (Gudykunst 2000: 296). In addition, I-C gives us grounds to assume that in linguistic behavior (on the level of metaphor) the influence of difference in cultural context cannot be discounted, even for the universal experience of conceptualizing emotion. "[I]t is important to recognize that behaviour is unique within each culture" and, thus, in the grand scheme of things resists overgeneralizations. There are similarities and differences that can be "explained and predicted theoretically" (Gudykunst 2000: 295) by the values an individual culture has a tendency to uphold between its members. The I-C dimension is characteristic of this predictability and can thus be deemed "usable content" in Bond et al.'s (2000) words.

Hofstede (2001, 1980) reports on the quantification of these values resulting in a "culture score" for individual nations participating in his study of the global corporation IBM. His statistical analysis for the I-C dimension on the basis of an "Individualism Index Value"(with a range of 0-100) resulted in a ranking of 50 countries and three regions, with the highest values indicating a nation with a tendency towards Individualism and, conversely, the lowest a tendency towards Collectivism (Hofstede 2001: 214). Within his study I was able to locate all nations and regions representing the varieties of English in my study, namely Great Britain, Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore, and, therefore, took a look their Individualism Index Value, presented in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Individualism Index Values for Great Britain, Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore
(adapted from Hofstede 2001: 215)

Rank (out of 53)	**Country / Region**	**Individualism Index Value** (IDV)
3	Great Britain	89
21	India	48
33/35	East Africa [Kenya]	27
39/41	West Africa [Nigeria]	20
39/41	Singapore	20

What I can glean from Hofstede's (2001) findings for my present purposes is that the nations (or regions) associated with the varieties of English I tend to investigate do mostly differ in terms of the I-C dimension, which, as it has been established above, is a major value dimension to explain unique culture behavior. What I find striking is that the lower Individualism Index Values of all New English representatives seem dramatically lower than the so-called norm-providing variety originating in Great Britain. Great Britain ranks very high on the Individualism scale - only other Western nations rank higher, namely the United States and Australia, according to Hofstede (2001). While India straddles the middle range, East Africa (presumably including Kenya), West Africa (presumably including Nigeria) and Singapore fall into the lower ranges, indicating a tendency towards Collectivism. It is important to note that with this there is not any concrete assumption about how this particular value plays a role in these varieties' linguistic behavior concerning emotion metaphors, although it could play a role.[25] However, I do find it valuable to have taken this dimension into consideration, so that it is

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[25]   A finding by Naidu (2009) about ANGER IS FIRE in British and Indian newspapers suggests that "Indian English uses the source domain of 'fire' in a culturally different way. It is speculated that this culturally determined way of using the source domain of 'fire' may reflect the 'collectivist' ideology of the culture/society which is different from the 'individualistic' ideology wherein an individual is in focus." (222). This finding relates to a comparison of the *Times of India* (e.g., *Rostock burns as G8 protests spiral*) with the *London Times* (e.g., *fiery speeches*) – the latter illustrating the construal of FIRE as being contained in the human body, which is determined as a tendency for British English. Naidu concludes that, in the Indian example, there is an extension of the containment of the FIRE domain to a geographical location, thus suggesting an emphasis on the collective and a culturally conditioned difference in mapping (172-175). Nevertheless, I am not entirely convinced by this analysis, considering the example Naidu highlighted (*Rostock*) is being used metonymically, and, as such, the conceptual connection to the individuals within the collective is present, if not made explicit on the linguistic level.

apparent that I am, in fact, dealing with regional varieties in my study with attested differences in a major cultural dimension. While that might be obvious from the varieties' regional context, this, nevertheless, helps in overcoming what I called above "the palpably unsatisfactory use of culture to equate national identity" by relying on a value that can differentiate the cultures, i.e., "usable content" (Bond et al. 2000: 50), and that goes beyond regional differences.

This is especially relevant for taking into account countries that share a common language. We are fully aware that a pluricentric language such as English is shaped by the unique histories and sociocultural contexts of the respective regions it is spoken in (e.g., for an explanatory model for World English varieties, see, e.g., Schneider 2009 [2007]). Nevertheless, the more graspable the framework for defining the cultural component of these individual influences on the language, the better our position is to approach similarities and differences in their linguistic behavior, also on the level of metaphor.

3.2   Body and Culture in Emotion Metaphor

Having established our working definition of culture and that the varieties of the present study seem to be culturally distinct from each other concerning a significant value dimension, we can now take our discussion a step further to an extended view of embodiment that includes culture. Embodiment was discussed in the previous chapter in terms of the theoretical framework of CMT. Yet, researchers have been quick to note that embodiment (in the strictest physical sense) is not the only driving force; at least, it has to be reconciled with the cultural environment in which bodily experience is found. Although Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]) give priority to "direct physical experience" in their explanations of how our conceptual system is grounded, they nevertheless indicate the importance of culture within these experiences:

> […] what we call 'direct physical experience' is never merely a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, *every* experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though there were some core of immediate experience which we then 'interpret' in terms of our conceptual system. Cultural assumptions, values, and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through

and through, that we experience our 'world' in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 57, emphasis in the original).

Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) do, however, go on to maintain that there is a distinction to be made in experiences that can be more readily attributable to the physical or to the cultural[26] (57). As evidence, they highlight orientational and ontological metaphors as more grounded in physical experience and thus are more likely embodied. For example, UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, etc. are illustrative of spatial concepts "that are relevant to our continual everyday bodily functioning, and this gives them priority over other possible structurings of space […] the structure of our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial experience, that is, our interaction with the physical environment" (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 56–57). Therefore, these concepts relate directly to how our bodies function in the physical world and are, thus, "more sharply delineated than others" (57).

When it comes to emotions, the lines are not as clearly drawn. "[O]ur emotional experiences are much less sharply delineated in terms of what we do with our bodies […] no sharply defined conceptual structure for the emotions emerges from our emotional functioning alone" (Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]): 58). Yet, orientational concepts (like UP) help to structure emotional experience (HAPPY IS UP), which, in turn, can help to "conceptualize our emotions in more sharply defined terms and also to relate them to other concepts having to do with general well-being (e.g., HEALTH, LIFE, CONTROL, etc.)", which can be called emergent metaphors (58).

The question that remains, however, is how to view culture's role in the structuring of concepts like emotions that perhaps reside on the cusp of direct physical experience (e.g., we feel our temperature rising when we get angry) and culturally mediated understanding of that experience (e.g., we may prefer to talk

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[26] Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) also say something about the basicness of experience and take pains to highlight the difference between an experience as such and the conceptualizing of that experience in grounding. "We are not claiming that physical experience is in any way more basic than other kinds of experience, whether emotional, mental, cultural, or whatever. All of these experiences may be just as basic as physical experiences. Rather, what we are claiming about grounding is that we typically conceptualize the nonphysical in terms of the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated *in terms of* the more clearly delineated" (59, emphasis in the original).

about the experience of our temperature rising when angry in different ways). The physiological effects of emotions are felt within the body and, thus, we see embodiment effects in the language we use to talk about emotions, like in *I was burning with anger*. However, are there cultural forces at play that also shape the way the metaphorization of emotion plays out in a given cultural context? Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980) do not have a direct answer for this, but they do claim that:

> [t]he most fundamental values in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in the culture […] We are not claiming that all cultural values coherent with a metaphorical system actually exist, only that those that do exist and are deeply entrenched are consistent with the metaphorical system (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 22–23).

In other words, from the set of values particular to a specific culture, some are prioritized, and it is these values, which are most connected to the metaphors of that culture. For example, "[n]ot all cultures give the priorities we do to up-down orientation. There are cultures where balance or centrality plays a much more important role [...]" which leaves room for a culture to dictate "which concepts are oriented which way and which orientations are most important" (24). For example, Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]) state that in American culture ACTIVE IS UP (e.g., *you should really rise to the occasion*) and PASSIVE IS DOWN (e.g., *the Wi-Fi is down again*) are products of prioritized values; yet, "there are cultures where passivity is valued more than activity" (24)[27]. In this vein, embodiment "attests not merely to the link between our body and mind, but also to the bodily experiences in a culture substantiated by meaningful imperatives, expectations, and norms" (Leung et al. 2011: 595).

Particularly productive in the 21st century, various other researchers have made attempts to explore culture's role in metaphor (see, e.g, Boers 2003; Boers & Littlemore 2003; Charteris-Black 2003; Deignan 2003; Kimmel 2004; Kövecses 2005; Littlemore 2003; Sharifian 2011; Sharifian et al. 2008; Yu 2008, 2009), centering on the debate between universality and cultural variation regarding

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[27] Note that the examples given in this sentence are of my own construction, since Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]) did not supply any directly.

metaphors. Within this debate, embodiment can be viewed as a "long-standing dualism" that has largely "been left intact" (Hampe 2008: 5).

> Taking a strong view of embodiment, which emphasizes bodily experience, tends "to obscure the socio-cultural dimensions of human cognition. […] To make up for this, proponents of the 'cultural-cognition' approach to the embodiment hypothesis have striven to understand language and cognition as part of the *triad body-mind-culture*, and 'extended' the notion of embodiment […] by 'situating' cognition in socio-culturally determined contexts" (Hampe 2008: 5, emphasis in the original).

Considering the universalist view again, I repeat the line of argumentation outlined in the previous chapter for convenience: Despite our more superficial racial or ethnic differences, we all share the same basic biology, that is, a body with its various functional properties and experiences, as well as the same cognitive makeup (summarized by Yu 2008: 250). Since, in Lakoff and Johnson's (2003 [1980]) words, our conceptual system is "fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (3) and "which metaphors we have and what they mean depend on the nature of our bodies" (247), it follows that a large bulk of the metaphors we have across the cultures of the world are shared and thus universal.

However, citing Strathern (1996), Yu (2015) maintains that, while embodiment does relate to our biology, what ends up as conceptually embodied is the result of "some set of meanings, values, tendencies, orientations that have derived from the sociocultural realm" (231). Furthermore, when considering the body as a culturally constructed concept in itself, "[t]he body is appreciated for its symbolic properties as people instill cultural meanings into bodily processes and activities. Culture does not just inform, but also constitute, embodied experience. Many embodied experiences are rooted in sociocultural contexts" (231). An example of this is found in the different conceptualizations of PERSON from Western and Chinese perspectives, summed up in two formulas: PERSON = BODY + MIND (Western view) and PERSON = BODY + HEART (Chinese view) (234). Because the Chinese concept of HEART "is traditionally conceptualized as the central faculty of cognition", it brings forth idiomatic expressions that do not have equivalents in English, e.g. *xin-xiang* (heart-think, 'think to oneself'), *jiao-xin* (scorch-heart, 'feel terribly worried'), *xin-zui* (be heart drunk, 'be charmed / enchanted'), etc. (235). Therefore, language realizes embodied cognition, but

language is also cultural, and, as such, "should be studied in its social and cultural context, as conceptualizations underlying language and language use are largely formed and informed by cultural systems" (233). It follows then that language and its underlying conceptualizations, like the concept of body, are also rooted in the realm of the sociocultural.

When it comes to metaphors, our biological and cultural selves obviously play a role. Taking into account a revised version of CMT, Primary Metaphor Theory (Grady 1997a), Lakoff & Johnson (1999) explain why some metaphors seem universal by allowing for the distinction between primary and complex metaphors. Grady (2007) defines primary metaphors as "simple patterns, like Lakoff and Johnson's MORE IS UP, which map fundamental perceptual concepts onto equally fundamental but not directly perceptual ones"[28] (192). Primary metaphors are different from complex metaphors because they constitute the building blocks of the latter.

> All complex metaphors are 'molecular', made up of 'atomic' metaphorical parts called primary metaphors. Each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed. Complex metaphors are formed by conceptual blending. Universal early experiences lead to universal conflations, which then develop into universal (or widespread) conventional conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 46).

Thus, primary metaphors fall into line with a physical and biological understanding of embodiment, while complex metaphors, like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, are "built out of primary metaphors plus forms of commonplace knowledge: cultural models, folk theories, or simply knowledge or beliefs that are widely accepted in culture" (60). Not only does embodied cultural experience play a greater role in complex metaphors, it is these metaphors that have the potential to "differ significantly from culture to culture" (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 257). Be that as it may, the adoption of the notions of primary and complex metaphor helps to theoretically reconcile (at least to some extent) the debated relationship of

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[28] "Source concepts for primary metaphors include UP, DOWN, HEAVY, BRIGHT, FORWARD, BACKWARD, SWEET, various simple 'force dynamic' concepts (in the sense of Talmy 2008), and so on. Corresponding target concepts are such basic building blocks of mental experience as DOMINANT, SAD, DIFFICULT, HAPPY, SUCCESS, THE PAST, APPEALING, and COMPULSION" (Grady 2007: 192–193).

universality and variation in the construction of metaphor. Whether or not New English complex metaphors of emotion tend to be of the more universal or culture-specific type in the empirical evidence will be a matter of discussion later on (see the case studies in Chapters 5 - 7 and Chapter 8 for concluding remarks).

At this point, it is good to consider again how researchers view the relationship of body and culture for metaphors in light of what we have now established for Primary Metaphor Theory. Kövecses' (2005) view (discussed in Section 2.3 in the previous chapter) is that it is a matter of the competing pressures of body and culture. Yu (2008) sees this less oppositionally and makes an appeal for the following view:

> [T]he interaction between body and culture contributes to the emergence of metaphors. I will argue that, for conceptual metaphors, body is a source, whereas culture is a filter. That is, while body is a potentially universal source domain from which bodily-based metaphors emerge, culture serves as a filter that only allows certain bodily experiences to pass through so that they can be mapped onto certain target-domain concepts. (Yu 2008: 249)

Yu (2008) illustrates how this works in a comparative study of FACE in Chinese and English (see also Yu 2001). By taking a decompositional approach to the conceptual metaphors DIGNITY IS FACE and PRESTIGE IS FACE, he shows that "these two, simple as they are, are indeed complex metaphors constructed out of more complicated combinations of primary and complex metaphors and metonymies, as well as cultural beliefs and assumptions" (254), which is illustrated below.

(1)   a. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS FACE AS A VALUABLE POSSESSION (a complex metaphor)
        b. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS FACE AS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a complex metaphor)
        c. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS A FEELING (a proposition)
        d. FACE IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a complex metaphor)
        e. A FEELING IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT (a primary metaphor)
        f. FACE STANDS FOR A FEELING (a metonymy)
        g. DIGNITY / PRESTIGE IS A DESIRABLE FEELING (a proposition)[29]

                                                                    (Yu 2008: 255-256)

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[29] (1g) represents a cultural belief (Yu 2008: 255).

DIGNITY IS FACE and PRESTIGE IS FACE consist of these multifaceted component parts, "with each of them being a condition for their selections or realization". Therefore, "[o]nly in those languages that meet all the conditions, which constitute […] the 'cultural filter', can" these metaphors "exist and be manifested linguistically", implying that even universal embodied experience must undergo a process of cultural filtration in order to participate in metaphorical mappings (254). For example, a culture could potentially conceptualize DIGNITY and PRESTIGE as an object other than FACE (although "there exists a robust experiential link between feelings and the face"), so that these metaphors would not emerge in that culture (256).

Assuming a cultural filter is in play for experiential, physical experience, the link between the body and culture in emerging metaphors becomes a bit clearer. The general allowance in CMT for universality on the basis of sensorimotor experience in the physical world and for variation in terms of culture's interaction with this experience in the function of a filter lends more contour to the understanding of this relationship and heightens the status of the sociocultural context. Nevertheless, researchers of emotion metaphors have not always positioned themselves as understanding the interplay between the body and culture, relying often only on attestations of particular conceptual metaphors of emotions as being present in a culture / language or not. That is, if a conceptual metaphor exists in a certain language and not in another, then it is considered to be specific to that culture or, at least, not shared by the culture in which it is not found. This may be perfectly appropriate considering intended research goals of such studies, e.g., to determine via linguistic analysis what metaphors are actually used in a specific culture / language. The present study admittedly does something similar. However, at its theoretical backdrop is at least the awareness that culture can act as a filter and, thus, could be the reason why varieties of English share emotion metaphors or why the cultural filter acts as a constraint on their emergence in a particular variety. That having been said, we now turn to previous research that has postulated conceptual metaphors in support of the notion of universality vis-à-vis conceptual metaphors that support variation.

3.3 Emotion Metaphors: The Embodied Cultural Prototype View

As a predominant focus of language typology and Universal Grammar, linguistic universals involve "generalizations that capture properties of language or languages that are essential to and stable across all possible languages and language types" (Siemund 2011: 1). Contrastingly, language variation, as its label suggests, concerns "the variable parts of language and languages" and the "charting [of] the range of variation" in terms of language contact, diachronic study of language change and acquisition, as well as "system-internal" grammatical variation, which has traditionally been in the purview of dialectology and sociolinguistics (1-2). However, "the boundaries between the research paradigms […] have become increasingly blurred" (3). The same can perhaps be said for metaphor research to a certain extent, based on the preceding discussion.

In the following I rely heavily on Kövecses (2000, 2005, 2008d) who has been a forerunner in emotion metaphor research and has extensively explored universality and culture-specificity as manifested in metaphor variation. Therefore, this section will serve to provide an overview of his "embodied cultural prototype" view, and, in doing so, introduce his typology of metaphor variation, of which a few types emerge as poignant to the contextualizing the results of the present study.

Citing Fernandez (1991), Kövecses (2008d) points out that the trend in Cognitive Linguistics concerning conceptual metaphor has been to overemphasize the universal proprieties in metaphor, while ignoring those instances where metaphor culturally varies (Kövecses 2008d: 52). In his view, this has something to do with the varying purposes of cognitive scientific research into metaphor as compared to anthropological interest in the same: Cognitive science seeks to ascertain something about the nature of metaphor in the mind, while the social sciences are more interested in viewing metaphor in its particular social-cultural contexts (51-52). In large part, this is due to the cognitive linguistic finding, going back to Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]), that conceptual metaphors are embodied (in the sense of the strong version of the embodiment hypothesis), without, at first, significant understanding of what their experiential basis is:

> We do not know very much about the experiential bases of metaphors. Because of our ignorance in this matter, we have described the [orientational, BAG] metaphors separately, only later adding speculative notes on their possible experiential bases. We are adopting this practice out of ignorance, not out of principle. *In actuality we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis* (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 19, emphasis in the original).

As a case in point, Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]: 15) discuss the orientational metaphors HAPPY IS UP vs. SAD IS DOWN (as in, *I'm feeling up*; *That boosted my spirits*; *I'm feeling down*; *My spirits sank*.). This up-down spatialization seems to clearly stem from our physical experience: When you are feeling happy, you tend to have an upright posture that correlates with this emotional state; when you are feeling sad, your posture tends to be drooping or hunched over. The correlation between emotional state and physical experience is also seen in metaphors, like ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (where an angry state produces physiological reactions like body heat, the feeling of rising internal pressure, etc.) and FEAR IS COLDNESS (corresponding to the chilled, cold feeling of the skin when fearful) (Kövecses 1990: 52, 72). The reason we are aware of this correlation has everything to do with what we see reflected on the linguistic level. If the conceptual system behind the languages of the world reflect metaphorical mappings, like ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER or HAPPY IS UP, then our tendency is to view them as universal and primarily motivated by bodily experience. Therefore, the extent to which a metaphor can be considered universally embodied (or, in other words, have (near-) universal status) can be gleaned by "look[ing] at how people in different cultures talk about their emotions in a detailed way. […] We have to check all the available linguistic evidence for the many figurative ways of talking about the emotions […] that characterize talk in presumably all cultures" (Kövecses 2000: 139). Various studies have been devoted to doing just that.

For instance, Kövecses (2000) reviews research conducted for ANGER metaphors in English, Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese, which show that the metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER may potentially have near-universal status. Along with the fact that "basic image schemas [like CONTAINER, BAG] emerging from fundamental bodily experiences can be expected to be universals" (Kövecses et al. 2002: 145), it is the

diversity of the cultures (represented by these diverse languages), which point to (near-) universality in that their linguistic metaphors seem to share a basic conceptual structure. Examples (2) – (5) illustrate this.

(2) English
He was *filled with* **anger**.

(3) Hungarian
Tele van dühvel [full is düh-with].
He is *full of* **anger**.

(4) Chinese
man qiang fen nu [full cavity anger]
to have one's body cavities *full of* **anger**

(5) Japanese
Ikari ga karadajyu ni jyuman shita [anger in my body to be filled was].
My body was *filled with* **anger**.   (Kövecses 2000: 147)

While the CONTAINER metaphor is proven here to exist in these vastly different languages in distinct cultural settings and, thus, acts as a folk theory of sorts, it also happens to be a metaphor that contributes to a scientific theory of emotion (see, Kövecses 1990; Lutz 1988; Solomon 1984)[30], which further boosts its potentially universal status. However, examining more specific instantiations of ANGER for English, Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese, Kövecses (2000) finds that this "general metaphor seems to be elaborated in more or less different ways" (147-148). Drawing on the study of the cognitive model of ANGER in English, published in Lakoff (1987a) by Lakoff and Kövecses, a major metaphor conceptualizing ANGER at a more specific level is ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (as in, *You make my blood boil*). Here, ANGER is conceptualized as a hot fluid within the body, which produces the following metaphorical entailments:

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[30] Similarly, in their study of emotion metaphors by experts of psychology and laypersons, Beger & Jäkel (2009) confirm the claim made by Lakoff and Kövecses in Lakoff (1987a) that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is the core metaphor for conceptualizing ANGER. The majority of ANGER metaphor attributable to both experts and laypersons centered on ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, in which the body of the angry person acts as the container.

(6) <u>When the intensity of anger increases, the fluid rises</u>:
His pent-up **anger** *welled up* inside him.

(7) <u>Intense anger produces steam / pressure on the container</u>:
Billy's just *blowing off steam*. / He was *bursting with* **anger**.

(8) <u>When anger becomes too intense, the person explodes</u>:
When I told him, he just *exploded*.

(9) <u>When a person explodes, parts of him go up in the air / what was inside him comes out</u>:
I *blew my stack*. / His **anger** finally *came out*.

<div align="right">(adapted from Kövecses 2000: 148–149)</div>

Hungarian and Japanese metaphors confirm most of these entailments, with the exception that in addition to conceptualizing the emotion CONTAINER as the whole body, in Hungarian the head can be the container of ANGER as a hot fluid, while in Japanese "the stomach/bowels area […] is seen as the principal container" (Kövecses 2000: 149; 152)[31]. The Chinese metaphors, based on the analyses by King (1989) and Yu (1995), offer a slightly different version based on the notion of *qi*, which is a culturally constructed concept that envisions *qi* as an energy that "as a fluid or gas […] flows through the body. It is also a fluid or gas that can increase and then produce excess […] when we have the emotion of anger" (Kövecses 2000: 150). The addition of this cultural concept to THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER for Chinese results in some marked differences:

> First, it may be observed that in Chinese anger *qi* may be present in a variety of places in the body, including the breast, heart, stomach, and spleen. Second, anger *qi* seems to be a fluid that, unlike in English, Hungarian, and Japanese, is not hot. Its temperature is not specified. As a result, Chinese does not have the entailment involving the idea of steam being produced. Third, anger *qi* is a fluid whose buildup produces pressure in the body or in a specific body organ. This pressure typically leads to an explosion that corresponds to loss of control over anger (Kövecses 2000: 151).

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[31] Ansah (2014a) in her study of ANGER in Akan, a Kwa language spoken in Ghana, also finds that different body parts, like the chest, heart and back of the head, can be conceptualized as "sub-containers" for ANGER, where intensity of the angry emotional experience plays an interesting role. "[T]he general knowledge that intense heat causes a rise in volume or upward movement of a fluid in a container corresponds to the increase in the intensity of anger in Akan where either the entire sub-container or the hot fluid in it moves upward, e.g., *n'akoma a-sɔre* 'his/her heart has risen'; *n'akomakɔsoro* 'his/her heart has gone up'; *neborehuru so* 'his chest is boiling over' (Ansah 2014a: 138).

Furthermore, it should be noted that not all scholars assume that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, as realized in English, has by necessity a universal, experiential basis. Geeraerts & Grondelaers (1995) argue for a culture-specific explanation by pointing to the medieval "four humors" doctrine as the motivation behind this metaphor (see also, Gevaert 2001; 2005).

Notice that in a discussion of linguistic evidence for a (near-) universal, like THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER, we are not far away from making cultural claims when taking a closer look at a more specific level. Going back to Kövecses' (2008d) claim that cognitive linguists are more interested in the nature of metaphor in the mind, while anthropological and social science interest falls more in the realm of metaphor in its socio-cultural context, he formulates a challenge to cognitive linguists researching metaphor in the form of a fundamental question: "Can the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor simultaneously explain both universality and diversity in metaphorical thought?" His body of work (e.g., Kövecses 2000; 2005, 2003a, 2008a, 2008d) and that of various others (e.g., Ansah 2011, Ansah 2014b; Deignan 2003; Gibbs 1999; Kövecses et al. 2002; Patowari 2015; Yu 2008) seem to answer this question in the affirmative. However, for this to be valid, CMT, in particular, "needs to be modified, revised, and supplemented in several ways" (Kövecses 2008d: 52). Part of this revision involves taking Primary Metaphor Theory seriously (as discussed in Section 3.2 above), which allows for viewing more general metaphors as motivated by universal bodily experience vis-à-vis complex metaphors built from them. Another significant part entails defining types of metaphoric variation as explanatory tools for culturally filtered metaphorizations.

Types of metaphor variation have been defined in Kövecses' (2005) "embodied cultural prototype" approach to CMT. It follows from the embodied cultural prototype view that conceptualizations of emotion can be simultaneously the products of universal embodied cognition and cultural embodied cognition. Gibbs (1999) underscores this point in the following:

> One cannot talk about, or study, cognition apart from our specific embodied interactions with the cultural world (and this includes the physical world which is not separate from the cultural one in the important sense that what we see as meaningful in the physical world is highly constrained by our cultural beliefs and values). Scholars

cannot, and should not assume, that mind, body, and culture can somehow be independently portioned out of human behavior as it is only appropriate to study particular 'interactions' between thought, language, and culture, respectively. Theories of human conceptual systems should be inherently cultural in that the cognition which occurs when the body meets world is inextricably culturally-based (Gibbs 1999: 153).

Consequently, the culture of a particular language community conceivably plays a role in making some aspects of otherwise universal emotion concepts more salient over other aspects that might be more central to another cultural group's understanding and manner of talking about the same concepts. Therefore, although we can expect to find great similarities in a cross-cultural study of metaphorical conceptualizations of emotion reflected in the many varieties of English, we can also readily expect to find differences in the way emotions are conceptualized, owing to each variety's unique socio-cultural circumstances. Kövecses (2000) addresses this point in the following way:

> My view is that, given the universal real physiology, members of different cultures cannot conceptualize their emotions in a way that *contradicts* universal physiology (or maybe even their conceptualization of universal physiology); but nevertheless they can choose to conceptualize their emotions in many different ways *within the constraints* imposed on them by universal physiology. These limits leave a lot of room for speakers of very different languages [and, potentially, of different varieties of a pluricentric language like English, BAG] to conceptualize their intense emotions in sometimes very different ways (Kövecses 2000: 165, emphasis in the original).

Since we have grounds to postulate the existence of culture-specific metaphors, the question is merited on what level of specificity it may be assumed that variation most obviously occurs and, thus, can be studied (also see Onysko 2017). The general expectation that has emerged from previous research on metaphor variation is that (cross-cultural) variation is observable in specific-level metaphors that can be considered "culturally embedded instantiations" of generic-level metaphors. These, in turn, are more likely to reflect shared conceptualizations that cut across cultural and linguistic backgrounds and thus have more potential as being identified as candidates for universals (Kövecses 2005: 67). Kövecses (2005)

outlines several types of metaphor variation[32], of which several are of particular interest for the present study.

The first type of metaphor variation is called *congruent metaphor*, which involve metaphors (like THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER) that may have near-universal status. Yet, from our discussion above, it is clear that culture plays a role as well, i.e., the interaction of universal general (or primary) metaphors with culture. "When the generic schema is filled out, it receives unique cultural content at a specific level. In other words, a generic-level conceptual metaphor is instantiated in culture-specific ways at a specific level" (Kövecses 2005: 68). Examples of congruent metaphors concerning the cultural content of THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER are discussed by Kövecses (2005) for Japanese, Chinese and Zulu (68-69). The Chinese example (ANGER IS AN EXCESS OF QI) was briefly discussed above and shows that concept of QI, which "is deeply embedded in the long history of Chinese philosophy and medicine" is the gas that is exerting pressure on the (body) container (unlike the hot fluid in English). In Japanese, citing Matsuki (1995), and Zulu, citing Taylor & Mbense (1998), Kövecses demonstrates congruent metaphors of THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER that culturally specify the container itself. In Japanese, "there is a large number of anger-related expressions that group around the Japanese concept of *hara* (literally, 'belly')" (68). In Zulu, ANGER IS IN THE HEART entails that internal pressure arises because "too much 'emotion substance' is crammed into a container of limited capacity" (69). These metaphors show that the generic schema of A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is expanded upon by culturally conditioned content, but remains in congruence with the generic schema, i.e., *qui* reflects a specific type of container substance, while *hara* and *heart* reflect specific types of containers.

The second type of variation involves *alternative metaphors*, which can be viewed from three perspectives: 1) the range of the target domain, 2) the scope of the source domain and 3) large-scale alternative conceptualizations. In its most basic form, we speak of alternative metaphors when languages are found to use

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[32] Boers (2003) and Deignan et al. (1997) also define types of metaphor variation, but in a less elaborated manner than Kövecses (2005).

different source domains for the same target domain (Kövecses 2005: 70). This is what Kövecses (2005) calls the "range of the target", which hinges on extensive comparative study of culturally distinct languages. Kövecses (2005) points out that the range of the target type is a common case for variation in emotion concepts and offers Yu's (1995, 1998) finding on Chinese and English as evidence. While Chinese and English share primary source domains like UP, LIGHT and FLUID IN A CONTAINER for HAPPINESS, Chinese makes use of a metaphor that has not been attested for English: HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART (Kövecses 2005: 70). The second and third perspective of alternative metaphors are not as relevant to the present study because they involve either a source domain-oriented study (as in the "scope of metaphor" referring to the set of target domains a specific source domain applies) or have, as far as I am aware, not been discussed in terms of emotion concepts, like large-scale alternative conceptualizations of spatial relations (see Kövecses 2005: 72-82).

Along with congruent metaphors and the range of the target domain, the perhaps most apt type of metaphor variation defined by Kövecses (2005) for our present purposes concerns the third type of metaphor variation, namely *preferential conceptualization*. Preferential conceptualization denotes the circumstance when "two languages / cultures may have many of the same conceptual metaphors for a given target domain, but speakers of the languages may prefer to use a different set of metaphors for this target" (82). He illustrates this with a study by one of his students concerning target concepts for LIFE, as evidenced by metaphors from Americans and Hungarians. While many of the target domains for LIFE were shared, like GAME and JOURNEY, a language-specific preference emerged: "Americans had preference for the PRECIOUS POSSESSION and GAME source domains, and the participating Hungarians opted for viewing life as a STRUGGLE or WAR and as a COMPROMISE" (84-85). Here, it should be noted that, in order to gauge the extent of preferential conceptualizations, quantifiable metaphor data is needed. Despite defining this type and illustrating his student's work as an example study involving metaphor frequencies, Kövecses (2005) does not provide any details into how preferential conceptualizations should be studied, although he does advocate in Kövecses (2008) for "a wide range of data" (52) and in later work applies quantifiable methods to corpus-data (e.g., Kövecses et al. 2015).

Finally, the fourth type of metaphor variation proposed by Kövecses (2005) involves *unique metaphors*. A unique metaphor can be viewed as purely cultural, in that it involves a conceptual metaphor in which both a culturally unique source domain and a culturally unique target domain participate (e.g., the conceptualization of American slaves' escape from the antebellum South fossilized in the Underground Railroad) (Kövecses 2005: 86). Another example of a unique metaphor in American English is the well-known AMERICA IS A MELTING POT (or even its modernized version SALAD BOWL). The target domain is clearly culturally unique in that it stands for the nation, and more specifically, the cultural and ethnic diversity within it. The target domain is also unique to American culture, used to highlight America's cultural and ethnic diversity. This mapping has a long-standing tradition in America's self-image as a land of immigrants. In her analysis of AMERICA IS A MELTING POT / SALAD bowl, Wcisło (2011) points out that "[o]ver the centuries, as waves of immigrants gradually contributed to the general picture of the United States as a country of freedom and great opportunities, the notion of melting pot gained popularity, becoming one of America's modern myths" (146). Furthermore, the culturally unique origin of the source domain MELTING POT can be traced back to the coinciding of the American Industrial Revolution and the second wave of immigration to the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries – a time period, in which AMERICA IS A MELTING POT was already in use "to idealiz[e] the process of immigration and colonization […] where people of different nationalities, cultures, and ethnicities blended into a new, righteous community, and a unique American identity emerged" (147).

Due to the fact that the present study elicits ANGER, HAPPINESS and FEAR metaphors from corpus data on the basis of the general basic terms (*anger*, *happiness*, *fear*) and their corresponding subordinate terms in English, the target domains at hand (i.e, the target domain ANGER reflected in a linguistic metaphor by *anger*, etc.) are not – at least obviously – culturally unique. Nevertheless, Kövecses (2005) maintains that the types *congruent metaphors*, *alternative metaphors* and *preferential conceptualization* account for the majority of cases concerning metaphor variation, especially in the case of conventional metaphor (86). It is for this reason that I do not assume to discover unique metaphors in this study and focus on congruent metaphors, alternative metaphors (i.e., range of the

target) and preferential conceptualizations in the discussion of the results of each case study (see Sections 5.4 for ANGER, 6.4 for FEAR and 7.4 for HAPPINESS).

In summary, while there is a largely uncontested (universal) bodily basis for metaphorical conceptualizations of emotions, often in the form of metonymic principles like BODY HEAT and REDNESS OF THE SKIN for ANGER (Lakoff 1987a: 382), there is still potential for the emergence of culturally distinct conceptualizations of emotions due to members of a cultural group participating in the unique negotiation processes shaping that cultural group's understanding of emotion concepts. Consequently, the culture of a particular language community conceivably plays a role in making some aspects of otherwise universal emotion concepts more salient over other aspects that might be more central to another cultural group's understanding and manner of talking about the same concepts. Therefore, in a study of New English emotion metaphors, the working hypothesis can be formulated as in the following: If the selected types of metaphor variation (i.e., congruent, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) are not frequent in the data attributable to the socio-culturally unique varieties of English, then we may more comfortably speak of a universal quality to emotion metaphors as they are realized through Englishes of the world.

3.4   Pluricentric Language as a Testing Ground

Before our working hypothesis can be tested, it is vital to take a closer look at our testing ground, that is, English as a pluricentric language. The notion of 'pluricentricity' was introduced by Kloss (1978) to denote national standard languages with varieties of more or less equal status like Portuguese in Portugal and Brazil or German in Germany, Switzerland and Austria (67). English, in its present-day form, "is probably the best example of a pluricentric language" with British and American English representing "the two most dominant – and primary – centres" that can be considered "norm-producing" (Hoffmann et al. 2011: 258). Along with British and American English, the 20th and 21st centuries have been witness to "other native varieties […] develop[ing] into norm-producing secondary centres in their own right with their own endo-normative standards, some of which may also serve as a model for their particular regions" (258). Since the 1980s, heightened

academic interest in institutionalized second-language varieties of English, commonly studied under the label of 'New Englishes'[33], has developed into the influential and largely descriptive paradigm of World Englishes[34], which examines these contact varieties in terms of their own "distinctive properties and functions" (Schneider 2013: 131–132) and, in doing so, establishes their legitimacy (Mesthrie 2009: 273).

Initially, due to British colonialism, New Englishes have emerged worldwide as varieties that have developed or are in the process of developing their own variety-specific features and preferences. Gut (2011) describes the use of *New Englishes* as "a collective term for the many postcolonial varieties of English that are spoken in – usually multilingual – countries in which English now has an important status as an official or national language and where it functions as the language of business and commerce, education, media and mass communication and as a means of interethnic communication" (101). Especially for research purposes, New Englishes "represent unique and vibrant areas of recent, ongoing and innovative change, given their typically multilingual contexts, their largely nonnative speech communities, and the widespread lack of codification" (Mukherjee & Schilk 2012: 190). Furthermore, as the extensive amount of research in the World Englishes paradigm has shown, it is a fruitful endeavor "to compare varieties of English *in their entireties* with each other to identify overarching intervarietal differences", which bolsters the view that English is by no means "a monolithic entity", especially since comparative research of New Englishes reveals a large extent of variation between the varieties (194, emphasis mine).

Nevertheless, with the present study and on the basis of emerging cognitively oriented research programs attuned to World Englishes, I would like to argue that to date not enough has been done in terms of comparing varieties of English "in their entireties". This is mostly due to an overemphasis on structural differences

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[33] The term 'New Englishes' is a coinage that has been attributed to Platt et al. (1984) and will be used throughout this study as a cover term for the varieties under examination. Very succinctly put, they have developed originally from British English, which at some point acted as a norm-providing variety and, to some extent, still may do so.

[34] For an overview of the terminology, like 'World Englishes', 'Postcolonial Englishes', Kachru's Circle Model etc., see Schneider (2013). For an overview of approaches in the World English paradigm, see Bolton (2009) and Wolf & Polzenhagen (2009, Chapter 1).

inherent in the pluricentricity of global English in the World English paradigm. As extensive and important as this research has been, it has so far left out or even discounted the conceptual dimensions of variation. Here I take a cue from Wolf (2008), who responds to Huber's (2004) criticism that the cognitive linguistic approach is not suitable for the study of World Englishes. Wolf maintains that variation has been understood by the descriptivist tradition of World Englishes as being too restricted "with respect to linguistic form alone and that the cultural-cognitive dimension of variation is ignored or deliberately excluded" (Wolf 2008: 358). Sharifian (2010) echoes this view by claiming that "World Englishes should be differentiated and explored in terms of not just their phonological and syntactic dimensions, but also in terms of the cultural conceptualizations that underpin their semantic and pragmatic levels" (443). Furthermore, it is clear that the World Englishes paradigm continues to expand in focus beyond the structural aspects of variation, as can be attested by the emergence of Variational Pragmatics with the work of Schneider & Barron (2008), who have identified a research gap for the pragmatic level that "has not been systematically investigated in the study of language varieties", including all national varieties of English (2-3). Luckily, the research gap for the conceptual dimension in describing varieties of English is starting to be filled by cognitively oriented paradigms, like Cognitive Sociolinguistics (see, e.g., Geeraerts et al. 2010; Kristiansen & Dirven 2008a; Pütz et al. 2014) and Cultural Linguistics (see, e.g., Sharifian 2011; 2015a, 2017a), into which a study of a pluricentric language like English neatly fits (see, e.g., Callies & Onysko 2017; Polzenhagen 2007; Polzenhagen & Wolf 2010; Sharifian 2006; 2008, 2015b; Wolf 2008; Wolf & Polzenhagen 2009; Wolf & Chan 2016).

Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics share a common goal that is also at the heart of the present study – to better understand the interplay of cognition, culture/society and language. Cognitive Sociolinguistics, as the name suggests, bridges the work of sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics by extending:

> the cognitive paradigm into the regional and social patterns involved in linguistic symbolisation, to be studied either as a topic in its own right or parallel to conceptual structure. This focus on the way in which language usage in different regional and social groups is characterised by different conceptualisations, by different grammatical and lexical preferences, and by differences in the salience of particular connotations adds a necessary social dimension to the Cognitive Linguistic enterprise.

> And as a usage-based approach, Cognitive Linguistics has a very natural basis for sharing concerns with Sociolinguistics. […] Cognitive Sociolinguistics naturally puts speakers in their socio-cognitive functioning in the centre of attention (Kristiansen & Dirven 2008b: 4).

Wolf (2008) notes that culture has always been studied within Cognitive Linguistics and that "a socio-cultural approach" to cognitive linguistic study "rests on the assumption that culture-based conceptualizations underlying language or language varieties are systematic" (364). Furthermore, he argues for viewing World Englishes as "the ideal testing ground for the programmatic extension of CL, because variation can be studied among different varieties of one language, which still share a common core", doing away with issues of translation and comparability inherent in the study of diverse languages (365). This highlights a major assumption about English as a pluricentric language: "one can expect that cultural specifics and different cultural models in the cognitive systems of their speakers should be reflected in the respective varieties of English" (Dirven et al. 2007: 1213–1214). Therefore, the present study of emotion metaphors in New English can be suited in the cognitive sociolinguistic approach on the following points: 1) It assumes and aims to explore language-internal variation from the perspective of English as a pluricentric language; 2) Its focus is on those regionally and culturally distinct varieties in term of their conceptual preferences for emotion concepts; 3) It draws on CMT as a theoretical framework to discover these preferences; 4) It implements a usage-based approach by relying on corpus analysis. These are, in fact, the characteristics of Cognitive Sociolinguistic research that are outlined by Kristiansen & Dirven (2008b: 5–6).

Cultural Linguistics also has culture and social cognition as reflected in language at the core of its framework, but with the additional focus of understanding cognition "that moves beyond the level of the individual mind" (Sharifian 2017b: 1–2). It is involved in exploring the dynamics of cultural cognition as "a complex adaptive system", evolving from the interactive nature of a speech community, which "leave traces" in language and serves the speech community as "both a memory bank and a fluid vehicle for the (re-)transmission of cultural cognition" (2, see also, Sharifian 2009). This leads to the foundational assumption in Cultural Linguistics that:

language is entrenched in conceptualisation, which is largely culturally constructed. That is, language does not always encode an "objective reality", whatever that is, but largely communicates and embodies our construal and conceptualisation of various experiences, which […] emerge from the interaction between members of various cultural groups (Sharifian 2006: 14).

Central to this is the notion of 'cultural conceptualizations', introduced by Sharifian (2003). Cultural conceptualizations refer to conceptual structures, including metaphors, that "are developed through interactions between the members of a cultural group" and " are negotiated and renegotiated through time and across generations" (Sharifian 2003: 190). Although conceptualizations may originate from the mind of one individual, they can become cultural conceptualizations by virtue of a cultural group's interaction and are, thus, "best described as networks of distributed representations across the minds in cultural groups" (190).

Cultural conceptualizations have recently been investigated for emotion concepts (Wilson & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2017), as well as by means of corpus study (Ebensgaard Jensen 2017). For our purposes, I would like to highlight one type of cultural conceptualization[35] that can be captured by a cultural linguistic approach, namely cultural metaphor. 'Cultural metaphor' is defined as "cross-domain conceptualisations that have their conceptual basis grounded in cultural traditions such as folk medicine, worldview, or a spiritual belief system" (Sharifian 2017b: 4). An example of a cultural metaphor is LAND IS KIN in Aboriginal English, discussed by Sharifian (2006).

> [T]he use of kinship terms in referring to one's country is not merely a matter of labelling but arises out of a system of conceptualisation that underlies the Aboriginal Dreamtime. For example, one view is that during the Dreamtime, Ancestor Beings, who were an amalgam of animal and human forms, travelled the land creating landforms and laying down the customs and at the end they transformed into part of the land in the shape of stones, trees, etc. (Sharifian 2006: 18).

Postulating cultural metaphor puts it at odds with the universalist tendency of CMT, which has been involved in "regulating culture-specific variation [in metaphor, BAG] to a secondary, lexical and discursive 'elaboration' level" (Musolff 2017: 325–326). Taking a cultural metaphor view can complement

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[35] Sharifian uses *cultural conceptualizations* as a collective term to not only refer to metaphor but also more broadly to 'cultural schemas' and 'cultural categories'. For detailed discussion, see Sharifian (2003, 2011).

traditional notions of conceptual metaphor because it "can help to integrate the cultural mediation-aspect of linguistic meaning-construction" (339). Due to the unique cultural and linguistic circumstances surrounding the development of New Englishes, it is possible that a study of emotion concepts in these varieties could yield culture-specific patterns that can, then, be attributable to the presence of cultural metaphors in this sense. Furthermore, the medium of a single language uniting these culturally distinct varieties may have the potential to reveal differences in conceptualization of the same emotion by direct contrast concerning potentially culture-specific source domains. The notion of cultural metaphor is, therefore, less restrictive than Kövecses' (2005) unique metaphor that requires a culturally specific source domain and target domain.

In summary, Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics offer guiding paradigms for exploring the relationship between cognition, culture and language and, among other things, promote studies of pluricentric language like English. Therefore, it is with acknowledgement of these traditions that the focus in the present study is put on an emerging direction in metaphor and variationist study, namely metaphor in New Englishes.

3.4.1   Previous Research into Metaphors in New Englishes

Although in this section the survey of research is fundamentally in line with the present study, of necessity it will be briefer than one would like. This has to do with the fact that the direction metaphor research has taken towards New Englishes is an emerging new path and, thus, research into New English metaphor falls outside the mainstream of metaphor study. This claim is backed up by Callies & Onysko (2017), who highlight the fact that "the role of conceptual metaphor in varieties of English has been a largely neglected field of research so far" (1). The present study is directly situated in and, thus, attempts to contribute to this emerging field.

Understandably, the basic point of departure is that we will find variation in metaphor because with New Englishes we are exploring the conceptual systems of culturally distinct varieties that have been shaped dynamically by the diverse and culturally rich contexts of their speakers. This is not a surprising general assumption considering the proverbial explosion of work that has been done in variational paradigms, like World Englishes (discussed above). However, it remains an

empirical matter to discover to what extent variation is characteristic of New English metaphor, in general, and there is much work to be done in this vein. Thus, I am encouraged by the recent trend of cognitively oriented studies of the New Englishes (for instance, the special issue of *Cognitive Linguistic Studies* edited by Callies & Onysko (2017) resulting from the first international workshop *Metaphors in Englishes around the world* (Met(V)iew) at the University of Bremen in June 2015). In the following, I will shine a spotlight on some previous contributions to metaphor in New Englishes that inform the present study.

The most prominent researchers, and frontrunners, of metaphor in World Englishes are undoubtedly Wolf and Polzenhagen, working within the Cognitive Sociolinguistic approach. From their varied and extensive work I chose to focus on their highly influential (2009) publication, as it is commonly among the first to be cited in studies on metaphor in New Englishes. Along with a detailed discussion of approaches to World Englishes and the implications of their study for research into intercultural communication, the locus of Wolf and Polzenhagen's (2009) is an in-depth investigation of the cultural model of community in African English, which acts as a guiding study for research into conceptualizations in World Englishes. One of their major lines of argumentation is found in a discussion about a general network of EATING metaphors, which is briefly illustrated by the following. EATING can be mapped onto LOVE in the sense that a beloved person in a love relationship is understood as APPETIZING FOOD, while desire for that person's love is conceptualized as HUNGER (69-70). "A parallel network of EATING metaphors is at work in several other domains", like KNOWLEDGE and IDEAS, which can be conceptualized as HUNGER / THIRST and FOOD, respectively, and extended by ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS EATING / DIGESTING and GIVING INFORMATION IS FEEDING (70). This leads to "a general tendency to conceptualize all sorts of drives and desires as HUNGER, resources as FOOD, and achieving a purpose as EATING" – resulting in BEING BIG "which interacts with the metaphor IMPORTANT IS BIG" (70-71). Their major point is that "particular instantiations of such general networks may be specific or restricted to certain languages or language varieties, or better, to certain cultural contexts" (72). For example, while across all varieties of English, EATING is used to conceptualize domains like LOVE and IDEAS, Wolf and Polzenhagen (2009) find evidence for

African English-specific domains linked to the cultural model of community in Africa, i.e., LEADERSHIP, WEALTH and WITCHCRAFT, which are not systematic and, thus, entrenched in English in the Western world (72). Furthermore, they provide an extensive analysis of the African cultural model of community along the dimensions of group membership (in which KINSHIP IS COMMUNITY is central), of mutual obligations (in which EATING metaphors are central), of spiritual relations (in which the ANCESTOR concepts in African spirituality is central) and of tensions (in which the concept of WITCHCRAFT is central) (77-158). For the cultural model of community, they argue that "these dimensions are highly interwoven" and the source domains KINSHIP, EATING and WITCHCRAFT particularly emerge as "salient conceptualizations" (158).

In earlier work, Wolf & Polzenhagen (2007a, 2007b) describe culturally specific conceptual networks of EATING metaphors as particularly prevalent in West African Englishes, illustrating culture-specific metaphors, like BRIBE IS FOOD underlying various expressions that can indicate a bribe: *kola* 'cola nut', *(to have eaten) soya* 'fried beef skewers', *gombo* 'okra or okra sauce', etc. Callies (2017) takes these studies as a point of departure to examine cultural conceptualizations in idioms of African Englishes, and finds on the basis of corpus data that pepper-related idioms (such as, *to show pepper* 'give someone a hard time, punish someone') "can be considered a variety-specific signature-idiom of Nigerian English" (78).

In an earlier study, Callies (2011) investigates metaphor variation on the basis of sports-related idioms (from baseball, soccer and cricket) in newspapers written in American English, British English, Australian English, Indian English and South African English. Baseball-related idioms include *(to throw) a curve (ball)* 'unexpected, surprising, deceptive', *be (way) off base* 'completely wrong', etc. Soccer-related idioms are expressions like *to change / move the goalposts* 'change the rules', *score an own goal* 'create a problem for oneself', etc., while cricket-related idioms are illustrated by *(be on a) sticky wicket* 'difficult or tricky situation, *hit for six* 'score a big success', etc. (Callies 2011: 69). One major finding of this study is that when the generic SPORTS domain "is instantiated as a specific-level, culturally-embedded metaphorical mapping" (like in relation to BASEBALL,

SOCCER or CRICKET) preferences across the varieties emerge, such as baseball-related idioms being used more prominently in American English and cricket-related idioms in British and Australian English (Callies 2011: 77). This result provides evidence for the CMT view of cultural specificity emerging at a more specific or elaborated level of metaphor over generic or primary ones.

A doctoral dissertation by Naidu (2009) comes to similar conclusions about the culture dependency of more specific complex metaphors and their potential to vary across cultures, concluding that "conceptual metaphors are just as much cultural entities as they are cognitive ones" (225). The aim of this study was to explore to what extent Indian English varied regarding their metaphorical expressions by comparison to its norm-providing variety, British English. Metaphorical expressions were analyzed primarily in terms of their frequency and distribution in national newspapers of the respective varieties. Some major findings were that, in general, Indian English makes use of more metaphorical expressions overall when compared to British English, which is attributed to "the underlying philosophical disposition of Indian English" and to the combination of local Indian culture with historical influence of British rule, as well as general influences of globalization (223). However, there was a discernable overlap in source domains participating in the metaphors in Indian and British English. For instance, Naidu (2009) maintains that the source domain of FIRE in ANGER IS FIRE was used "in a culturally different way" in Indian English, attributable to the I-C dimension (discussed in Section 3.1), dividing Indian and British societies into more collectivist or more individualist types, respectively. (222) This finding is illustrated by a comparison of the *Times of India* (e.g., *Rostock burns as G8 protests spiral*) with the *London Times* (e.g., *fiery speeches*) – the latter illustrating the construal of FIRE as being contained in the human body, which is determined as a tendency for British English. Naidu concludes that, in the Indian example, there is an extension of in the containment of the FIRE domain to a geographical location, thus suggesting an emphasis on the collective and a culturally conditioned difference in mapping (172-175). Nevertheless, I am not entirely convinced by this analysis, considering the example Naidu highlighted (i.e., *Rostock*) is being used metonymically, and, as such, the conceptual connection to the individuals within the collective is present,

if not made explicit on the linguistic level. Therefore, more solid evidence for Naidu's conclusion is needed.

Closely connected to the aims of the present study is the small-scale study by Díaz-Vera (2015) on conceptualizations of LOVE in Englishes in Great Britain, India, Pakistan and Nigeria. Drawing metaphorical data from the GloWbE corpus, which is also the data basis of the present study, he aims at discovering how different English varieties around the world preferentially conceptualize LOVE and, in doing so, asks how social and cultural factors play a role in metaphor variation. Díaz-Vera (2015) bases his analysis on a random sample of 1,000 tokens of *love* for each variety and classified metaphorical instances as motivated by three general source domains, namely SPACE, FORCE and RELATIONSHIP.[36] His results demonstrate a preference in the British data for SPACE (BOUNDED SPACE and CONTAINER) vis-à-vis the other varieties, while FORCE metaphors emerge as preferential for India, Pakistan and Nigeria, including metaphors that are not attested to in the British data, like LOVE IS A DEITY, WARMTH or MAGIC[37]. However, these findings should be approached with some caution on the basis of his uncritical use of the GloWbE. As the studies by Callies (2017) and Güldenring (2017) demonstrate, researchers in English metaphor variation need to be fully aware of the limitations the GloWbe as a web-based corpus of English, primarily due to the question of authorship (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4), and acknowledge these limitations in their work. Otherwise, there is no basis on which to determine if the metaphors encountered were actually produced by a variety speaker. Furthermore, Díaz-Vera (2015) states the exploration of social and cultural factors behind conceptual variation as an aim of his study, but fails to offer any insight on what exactly is socially or culturally conditioned in the preferences he found. I naturally sympathize with the intention behind this aim and view it as an important step for future research on the basis of studies that uncover metaphor

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[36] In Díaz-Vera (2015), these three broad domains include subdomains: SPACE (e.g., BOUNDED SPACE, CONTAINER), FORCE (e.g., NATURAL FORCE, STRUGGLE, FIRE / LIGHT) and RELATIONSHIP (e.g., domains related to romantic or other human relationships, like FRIENDSHIP, as well as related to physical objects, like PLANT, BUILDINGS, etc. and interactive activities, like JOURNEYS, ECONOMIC EXCHANGE, etc.).

[37] Incidentally, Díaz-Vera (2015) does not illustrate any of his findings with actual examples from the GloWbE varieties he studies. This makes it difficult confirm that these mappings actually occur in his dataset.

preferences in varieties of English. However, it is my opinion that larger-scale preferences need to be discovered first, not only on the basis of more data pertaining to the emotions, but also on more detailed analyses pertaining to cultural influences in the way people talk about emotions (and, by extension, use emotion metaphors). Additionally, a deep understanding of the social and cultural circumstances of the varieties under investigation is needed on the part of the analyst to make claims about the extent to which social and cultural factors play a role. This is, indeed, a tall order for any one analyst, such as myself, who cannot simultaneously be a member of these culturally distinct speech communities. It is for this reason that I forgo any major claims about social and cultural factors in my discussion of variety-specific emotion metaphor and leave this line of investigation within the purview of future researchers.

With the present study, I intend to fill an essential gap in the previous research on New English metaphor by providing a larger-scale study of emotion metaphors from representative varieties from the supraregional areas of West Africa, East Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia as well as from their (former) norm-providing variety, British English.

3.4.2   Research Questions

The general aim of the present study is to uncover to what extent varieties of a pluricentric language like English are similar or different in their metaphorical construals of emotion concepts. As we have established, institutionalized second-language varieties, New Englishes, seem to offer a fruitful testing ground due to their unique socio-cultural and regional differences. Therefore, the hypothesis of the present study is that emotion metaphors will demonstrate, on the one hand, some variation (in line with Kövecses' (2005) congruent metaphors, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) by virtue of being socio-culturally unique varieties of English and, on the other hand, some commonality on the basis of having a common core, as well as the speakers of these varieties sharing a basic biological makeup.

The general research questions at the heart of the empirical part of this study can be formulated as follows:

- What conceptual metaphors exist for the emotion concepts of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS in New English varieties, as evidenced by corpus-based data?

- Does a comparison across New English varieties of these emotion metaphors reveal what is conceptually shared throughout the varieties? Conversely, does a comparison also reveal what is not conceptually shared and, thus, potentially culture-specific along the lines of Kövecses' (2005) types of metaphor variation (i.e., congruent metaphors, range of target and preferential conceptualizations)?

- How do emotion metaphors in New Englishes match up against emotion metaphors attributable to their (former) norm-providing variety, British English?

These questions will be answered through a corpus-based analysis of emotion metaphors attributable to representative varieties of the New Englishes along with British English, which results in individual metaphor profiles that can be compared and contrasted. A detailed discussion of the methodology follows in the next chapter.

4   Methodology

The present chapter serves to document the development of the methodology employed in this study, which is discussed in detail below and presents illustrative examples in order to make my approach to conceptual metaphors with corpus-based data as transparent as possible. The individual steps primarily concern: 1) raw data extraction, 2) identification of linguistic metaphors, 3) verification of authorship, i.e., linguistic metaphors are, in fact, attributable to the respective variety speakers, 4) annotation of conceptual metaphor types and, finally, 5) further classification of conceptual metaphors into different levels of granularity.

Prior to a detailed discussion of my method, I would like to draw attention to a valid point made by Gibbs (2009) about studies in line with CMT. "CMT needs to be more open about what it can accomplish – either because of methodological choices or simply because no single theory may be capable of explaining all aspects of the complex phenomena that are metaphorical language and thought" (Gibbs 2009: 32). I take this statement seriously and, therefore, attempt to make clear throughout this chapter what I am capable of accomplishing by adhering to CMT and the present methodology. First and foremost, the methodology allows at various points a step away from intuition-based decisions. However, it does not do away with intuition completely, as automatic identification of conceptual metaphor is not possible, although it is currently being researched (for studies in this vein, see, e.g., Gandy et al. 2013; Neuman et al. 2013)[38]. Secondly, the methodology serves to illustrate the steps that I took from linguistic metaphor to conceptual metaphor. The resulting conceptual metaphors are not intended to be understood as evidence for active cross-domain mappings in the minds of the individual speakers, but, instead, are offered by me, the analyst, as what I will call 'plausibility offerings'. These plausibility offerings set up the basis of comparison and it is conceivable that a New English speaker could potentially disagree with my conclusions based on culturally

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[38]   For an overview of the most prominent approaches to extracting metaphor from corpus data, see Stefanowitsch (2006b: 1–6). For an assessment of metaphor extraction approaches, see Berber Sardinha (2012). Semi-automatic retrieval and analysis approaches have been also developed, e.g., Berber Sardinha (2008, 2010), Gómez-Moreno & Faber (2011) and Majoros (2013), but do not yet represent the norm.

filtered metaphorical conceptualizations that I, as an American English native speaker, do not have the ability to ascertain. Thirdly, although the corpus data at hand, from which I draw the conceptual metaphors, are discourse-based, the scope of my study does not allow for adding a discourse-based approach to the analysis and, thus, does not make any conclusions about the rhetorical or communicative functions of these metaphor in the context of their use[39].

Furthermore, "there is an increasing awareness that the study of linguistic phenomena needs to be grounded in usage" in Cognitive Linguistics, resulting in the emergence of corpora as fundamental sources of data for cognitive linguistic study (Arppe et al. 2010: 2). The reliance on corpus data and methods helps to continue "the tradition of linguistic argumentation" in Cognitive Linguistics but counteracts intuition-based judgements (Stefanowitsch 2011a: 305)[40]. The marriage of conceptual metaphor study to corpus-based research has been particularly fruitful (see, e.g., Ahrens 2011; Berber Sardinha 2007, 2011; Cameron & Deignan 2003; Charteris-Black 2004; Deignan 1998, 1999, 2005, 2009; Koller 2006; Koller et al. 2008; Kreyer 2012; Ogarkova 2007; Stefanowitsch 2006a; Tissari 2010; Türker 2013; Vereza 2008). Therefore, at this point in time, we can already speak of the corpus-based study of metaphor as an established practice. This came about not only due to the fact that CMT and corpus linguistic methodology have developed and gained importance in roughly the same period of time (i.e., since the late 1970s) (Deignan 2008a: 149), but primarily stems from the major criticism of early CMT work concerning intuition. Luckily, as Gibbs (2009) points out, "corpora analyses mostly support the wide range of conceptual metaphors identified, by introspection […] at the same time, they are better able to quantify metaphorical patterns and so provide important insights on the relative salience of conceptual metaphors in different domains" (21). Moreover, the ability to quantify metaphorical patterns via corpus-based data and methods is also essential for understanding the cultural

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[39] For studies that do take a discourse-based approach to conceptual metaphor, see, e.g., Charteris-Black (2004), Hart (2008), Hart & Lukeš (2010), Musolff (2012), and Steen (2008).

[40] Stefanowitsch (2011b) calls the use of corpora in Cognitive Linguistics the "second wave" (the first being of an experimental nature) in terms of advancements in methodology. He also claims that "systematic corpus-linguistic studies only began to have a noticeable impact on the field around the early 2000s and corpus linguistic methods are still a long way from being a fully accepted method in the cognitive linguistic toolbox" (258).

salience of these patterns in cross-cultural and/or cross-linguistic study. With this in mind, we now turn to the methodology of the present study.

4.1   Data and Method

The following provides detailed discussion of the data and methodology of the present study. At various points I will provide illustrative examples of parts of my methodology that would otherwise not be as apparent, as well as some critical remarks that have driven the development of this methodology.

4.1.1   The Corpus: *Global Web-based English*

The following empirical study was conducted with data from the *Corpus of Global Web-based English* (GloWbE; Davies 2013). The GloWbE contains 1.9 billion words from general websites and blogs, which has been attributed to twenty different varieties of English around the world, including varieties that have been identified as New Englishes. The present study draws on data from New English varieties within the corpus that are represented by speakers from the following countries: Nigeria, Kenya, India and Singapore. As a reference variety, British English was chosen due to its status as a norm-providing variety within the dynamic evolution of these New Englishes (see, Schneider 2003, 2009 [2007]).

The main advantage of opting for the GloWbE in a comparative study of emotion metaphors over a well-established corpus like the *International Corpus of English* (ICE; Greenbaum 1996) lies in the amount of (raw) data the GloWbE can provide to the metaphor researcher. With its 1.9 billion words, the GloWbE appears to be particularly advantageous for the present study since one of its aims is to construct a 'metaphor profile'[41] of the emotion concepts ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS for each variety. Furthermore, the metaphor profiles obtained from GloWbE data offer the basis of comparison across varieties. It follows that for a

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[41] I originally used the term 'metaphorical profile', for instance in Güldenring (2017), but have since discovered the work of Ogarkova & Soriano (2014), who use 'metaphorical profile' to refer to their highly sophisticated, analytic method for emotion metaphors and who have applied it fruitfully to uncover variational aspects of ANGER metaphors in English, Russian and Spanish. In order to avoid confusion, I use 'metaphor profile' to denote the sum of conceptual metaphors I was able to collect for each variety per emotion, which was my original intention in using the term 'metaphorical profile'.

viable comparison of metaphor profiles across New Englishes and in reference to the (former) norm-providing variety, British English, a sizable amount of data is required, and the GloWbE appears, at first glance, to offer this.

Before opting for the GloWbE over ICE (which is to date "the most widely used corpus for research on World Englishes" (Davies & Fuchs 2015: 2)), I conducted a pilot study, in order to compare frequencies. As a proverbial test balloon, I chose to examine the recall of metaphorical instances pertaining to a lexical query of *anger* in the Singapore component of the ICE (ICE-SIN) and the Singapore subcorpus of the GloWbE. ICE-SIN, with its roughly one million words of spoken and written text, yielded only 21 hits for *anger*. Of these 21, twelve were deemed metaphorical (e.g., *Swallow your anger* […] <ICE-SIN:W1B-010#X295:7>). Disappointingly, five among these twelve metaphorical expressions found in ICE-SIN did not stem from utterances attributable to a Singapore English speaker: Two instances were from the title of a play by John Osborne; one was from a Bible verse; one was contained in an indirect quote attributed to Sigmund Freud and one was a quote from the dictionary. Hence, at least for larger-scale metaphor studies, size of corpus does matter. Nelson (2015) concedes this point in his response to Davies & Fuchs (2015) by stating, "Of course I am also aware of the limitations of the ICE corpora, chiefly in terms of their size, at one million words each. […] I must point out that ICE corpora were not designed to be 'all-purpose' corpora. Instead, they were designed primarily for the study of the grammar of English worldwide" (38). As will become clear from the results of the following case studies (see Chapters 5-7), the GloWbE provides the opportunity to examine far more instances of *anger*, *fear*, and *happiness* (including their subordinate terms), of which many were indeed used metaphorically. This alone suggested the use of the GloWbE as a more suitable corpus for constructing more extensive metaphor profiles of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS.

Nevertheless, the selection of the GloWbE from which to pull metaphorical data does, in fact, have two major caveats, namely the issue of text types (i.e., the diversity thereof), as well as the issue of authorship. These aspects have to be considered carefully when using the GloWbE. Firstly, as the name suggests and due to the nature of its compilation, the corpus only includes web-based texts (60% of

the words stem from informal blogs and 40% from other web-based genres (Davies & Fuchs 2015: 4). By contrast, the ICE corpora are a valued resource for their diversity of text types (both written and spoken).

Secondly, questions of representativity of the varieties featured in the GloWbE have been addressed during compilation (for details, see Davies 2013 and Davies & Fuchs 2015), which prompted Davies and Fuchs to maintain that the subcorpora of the GloWbE "constitute representative samples of how these national varieties of English are used in web-based communication" (2015: 5). Yet, as step 3 in the methodology outlined in Section 4.2.4 will demonstrate, this claim should be approached with some caution when working off the assumption that the data elicited from the GloWbE is in fact authored by particular speakers of a variety, despite claims by the compilers that the data originated from websites located in the respective countries. In their response papers to Davies & Fuchs (2015), Mair, Mukherjee and Nelson jointly voice the same warning:

> Background checks are sometimes difficult, because the source websites have disappeared (Mair 2015: 31).

> While small and controlled corpora like ICE […] have been construed very carefully in order to ensure the intended representativeness in corpus design, GloWbE is in many regards unspecified or, for that matter, aggregative: apart from the specification that approximately 40 per cent of the corpus is made up of informal blogs, we do not know which types of speakers and which language variants are represented by the national web domains included in GloWbE (Mukherjee 2015: 35).

> Obviously, in a globalised world with the Internet as a global network for communication, the fuzzy boundaries between varieties of English (and their speakers) are not identical with the rigid lines between national web domains (and their texts) (Mukherjee 2015: 36)

> [O]ne of the major attractions of the Internet is the anonymity that it affords to writers (especially of weblogs). For the corpus builder, however, this is a major drawback, since it means that we know little or nothing about the authors of the webpages. Even if a webpage is not anonymous, we still cannot rely on the domain name alone to indicate the author's nationality or background (Nelson 2015: 39).

Nevertheless, based on the fact that the GloWbE offers more extensive and more recent data than the ICE, four New Englishes, which differ from British English in terms of the I-C dimension (see Section 3.1), were selected from the current pool of twenty varieties of English in the GloWbE for the comparative study of emotion metaphors: Nigeria (NG) representing West Africa, Kenya (KE)

representing East Africa, India (IN) representing South Asia, and Singapore (SG) representing South-East Asia.

This categorization is important for the present study because it sets up the framework for discussing the potential of nativized construals or culture-specific conceptualizations of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS concepts in New Englishes from four major regions. It could be the case that we encounter source domain preferences or mappings specific to a certain variety or on the basis of overriding regional similarity between the varieties (African vs. Asian Englishes). Furthermore, dissimilarity across the varieties could also potentially emerge at a finer level of granularity, that is, by considering the specific-level metaphors involved in the conceptualizations of the emotions under examination (see step 5 in Section 4.1.4). Therefore, in order to determine how similar or different the varieties are in terms of metaphorizing ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, there needs to be, firstly, an examination of the variety-specific metaphor profiles, which provide an overview of the broadly labeled source domains involved, and, secondly, a breakdown of these broadly labeled source domains into more specific-level instantiations.

Before considering the results, it is essential to sketch the method guiding the identification of metaphorical expressions in the GloWbE subcorpora and their underlying conceptual mappings in the data, in order to be maximally transparent. The overriding methodology is informed, firstly, by Stefanowitsch's Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (MPA; 2004, 2006a), outlined in Section 4.1.2, and, secondly, by the revised version of the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIPVU[42], see Steen et al. 2010b), outlined in Section 4.1.3. After a brief introduction to these approaches to metaphorical identification and analysis, the details of the individual methodological steps will be presented in Section 4.1.4, followed by an additional note on authorship in the GloWbE in Section 4.1.5.

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[42] The revised version of the original MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007) is referred to as MIPVU, in which the VU stands for Vrije Universiteit – the university at which the authors of this extended version are employed Steen et al. (2010b: ix).

4.1.2   Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (MPA)

Cognitive metaphor research of a more intuitive bent has often "focused on uncovering large-scale mappings rather than an exhaustive description of the specific linguistic items instantiating these mappings in a particular language", which poses a problem for studies aiming at discovering the "systematic characterization of a specific source or target domain", particularly in terms of the quantification of results for comparative study (Stefanowitsch 2004: 138). This, in fact, has been one of the major criticisms levied at CMT. Specifically developed for corpus-based studies devoted to the exploration of the target domain, Stefanowitsch (2006a) proposed a method called "Metaphorical Pattern Analysis" (MPA) (see also, Stefanowitsch 2004). This approach is founded on the retrieval of target domain lexis from corpora, which in a further step leads to the identification of metaphorical expressions from the source domain and, in turn, the identification of conceptual metaphors. Accordingly, MPA is designed for the extraction and analysis of linguistic metaphors in corpus data that contain lexis associated directly with the target domain; the present study contains lexical items related to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS (for examples, see Sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). Hinging on the observation that the presence of both source domain and target domain lexis is at times used to identify metaphorical expressions in an utterance, Stefanowitsch proposes metaphorical patterns as the basis for studies using corpus data to explore a specific target domain. He defines a "metaphorical pattern" as such in the following:

> A metaphorical pattern is a multi-word expression from a given source domain (SD)
> into which one or more specific lexical item [sic] from a given target domain (TD)
> have been inserted (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 66).

By concordancing for lexical items from a specific target domain, such as ANGER (including the superordinate term *anger* and various subordinate terms, like *rage*, *wrath*, etc.), it is possible to focus on and identify metaphorical patterns for this target domain and thus set up the necessary grounds for comparison between the varieties.

Of course, employing MPA as an overriding approach underlying the present study does not allow for the retrieval of all metaphorical expressions related to

ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS that could potentially be contained in the corpus data, because the proposed procedure "will only capture a subset of metaphorical expressions – those manifesting themselves as metaphorical patterns for specific lexical items" (66). MPA would, for instance, not capture *He blew his top* or *She is smoldering*. However, any potential drawbacks are outweighed by the fact that quantification of the results is made easier through metaphorical patterns, which helps to generalize "the importance of the conceptual metaphors underlying these patterns" (66). This would not be such a straightforward endeavor for metaphorical expressions that do not reveal metaphorical patterns due to the lack of explicit target domain lexis, thus leaving the metaphor researcher with some uncertainty about which target domain is involved (see Stefanowitsch 2006a: 66–67). Furthermore, metaphorical patterns help to create a "standard of comparison for cross-linguistic research" (69) and, by logical extension for the present purposes, for cross-varietal research. In this vein, the present study is informed on the whole by MPA. The ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS metaphors identified in the preceding case studies have been formulated via analysis of their metaphorical patterns in the GloWbE. Reliance on MPA is beneficial to the researcher because, without having to intuitively construct examples of conceptual metaphors, MPA aids in identifying patterned metaphorical behavior in the data, which then act as the basis for contemplation of the conceptual mappings being reflected by them. Within this process, metaphors were also identified via (limited) application of the MIPVU (details provided below).

4.1.3   Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIPVU)

The Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit (MIPVU) procedure establishes detailed guidelines for discovering metaphor-related words in discourse. The basic procedure, as outlined by Steen et al. (2010b) is as follows:

> 1. Find metaphor-related words (MRWs) by examining the text on a word-by-word basis.
>
> 2. When a word is used indirectly and that use may potentially be explained by some form of cross-domain mapping from a more basic meaning of that word, mark the word as metaphorically used (MRW).

3. When a word is used directly and its use may potentially be explained by some form of cross-domain mapping to a more basic referent or topic in the text, mark the word as direct metaphor (MRW, direct).

4. When words used for the purpose of lexico-grammatical substitution, such as third person personal pronouns, or when ellipsis occurs where words may be seen as missing, as in some forms of co-ordination, and when a direct or indirect meaning is conveyed by those substitutions or ellipses that may potentially be explained by some form of cross-domain mapping from a more basic meaning, referent, or topic, insert a code for implicit metaphor (MRW, implicit).

5. When a word functions as a signal that a cross-domain mapping may be at play, mark it as a metaphor flag (MFlag).

6. When a word is a new-formation coined, examine the distinct words that are its independent parts according to steps 2 through 5 (Steen et al. 2010b: 25–26)

In order to ascertain basic meanings of words, Steen et al. (2010b) recommend consulting the *Macmillan Dictionary*, the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* and the *Oxford English Dictionary*, whose respective online versions I consulted throughout this study.

There were two ways in which the present study did not fully adhere to these guidelines, which I would like to make transparent. Firstly, there was no exhaustive examination of the full texts on a word-by-word basis. This had to do with the nature of elicitation. Extraction of the data resulted in concordance lines, so that the full text, in which the sentence containing the emotion lexeme (as the target domain lexeme) occurs, was not immediately available. However, during the authorship verification process (step 3 below), I did end up accessing each full text from which a concordance line originated. Yet, even for these cases, it did not seem necessary to examine each text on a word-by-word basis due to the fact that these texts, in general, were not topically about the emotion I was investigating and the application of MIPVU on the entirety of the text would not have yielded any more insight into the emotion metaphor at hand. Furthermore, it would have been too time-intensive considering the amount of originally extracted data.

Secondly, MIPVU, and originally MIP (Pragglejaz Group 2007) were not intended as a procedure for identifying conceptual metaphors. "Our current undertaking […] is to focus on the method for linguistic metaphor identification in usage. […] we do claim that it is possible to do empirical work […] without having to specify what distinct conceptual domains are mapped on to each other" (Steen et al. 2010b: 9–10). While within this study I do end up formulating conceptual

metaphors for the linguistic metaphors found in the data (see step 4 below), I do so with the acknowledgement that this was not in reference to the MIPVU procedure. Furthermore, I make use of the basic definitions in the dictionaries suggested by MIPVU to help formulate source domain labels with the recognition that using the basic definitions in this manner is not endorsed by MIPVU.

4.1.4   Methodological Steps

The following methodological steps have been used to ensure maximum consistency in a) the extraction of metaphorical expressions from the corpus, b) the annotation of metaphor-related words (MRWs) by applying the MIPVU procedure (Steen et al. 2010b)[43] to individual concordance lines, and c) the identification of conceptual metaphors by means of metaphorical patterns for specific lexical items related to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. Nevertheless, as common for research on conceptual metaphor, I was forced to take recourse to my intuition at various points during the following steps, albeit with the aid of what I call "intuition-boosters" (illustrated in step 4 below). Therefore, the conceptual metaphors, as they are formulated in the case studies, can be viewed as plausible interpretations, which are not intended to strictly reflect the mappings in the minds of individual speakers of a variety of English at the time of utterance. Since annotation decisions were carefully recorded for each variety, and the entirety of the data was analyzed and scrutinized in multiple rounds for consistency, I do consider the variety-specific data to be comparable with data from the other varieties.

Furthermore, the annotation of the metaphors extracted from the GloWbE also involved classifying them in terms of different levels of granularity, corresponding to the conceptual detail reflected on the linguistic level (illustrated in Figure 4.1 below).

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[43]   Key to Steen et al.'s procedure is "the demarcation of lexical units as the relevant unit of analysis" in which can be found "the linguistic structures that may qualify as Metaphor-Related Words, or MRWs" (2010: 167). Emphasizing that "[e]ven though it is true that metaphorical use may also be found at levels below the lexical unit (morphemes), above lexical units (phrases), and even 'around' lexical units (constructions)", which were not considered for theoretical reasons, it is important to note that " lexical units are the level of linguistic organization that is most closely related to the level of conceptual structures involved in cross-domain mappings: words activate concepts which apply to referents in direct ways (non-metaphorically) or indirect ways via cross-domain comparison (metaphor)" (167).

Figure 4.1: Illustration of levels of granularity in metaphor analysis

Once metaphorical instances were extracted from the corpus and authenticated as having been produced by a variety speaker, the MRWs provided clues for the source domain label, which in the first round of analysis was kept intentionally broad (e.g., ILLNESS). In further rounds of analysis, depending on the specificity of the MRWs in the linguistic metaphor, metaphors either retained this broad source domain label (= generic-level / level 1) or were further classified at level 2 (= specific-level) (e.g., ILLNESS → ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, INFECTIOUS ILLNESS, MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY, etc.). In addition, some level 2 metaphors were also able to be broken down into level 3 on the basis of an even more specific meaning focus (e.g., ILLNESS → ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS → LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, PHYSICAL PAIN, WOUND / SKIN-RELATED, etc.)

The following provides details, step-by-step, of the methodological decisions made for the present study:

Step 1: **Extraction of data from the GloWbE**

a) Extract all nominal instances of lexical items relating to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS by using the search strings: [=anger].[n*], [=fear].[n*] and [=happiness].[n*]. The use of these particular search strings is intended to exploit the internal thesaurus of the corpus and, in doing so, they act as a semi-automatic version of the first step of MPA: "choose a target domain that […] has vocabulary associated with it that is uncontroversially representative of the domain in question" (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 70).

b) Along with the superordinate (= basic) terms *anger*, *fear* and *happiness*, which, in general, are the most frequent terms and lend themselves as the labels of the target domains, select sufficiently synonymous subordinates – determined via their denotational properties in the dictionary – and discard unrelated (and possibly falsely coded) types. For example, for *anger* this included words like e.g., *dander* (i.e., animal dandruff). For this study, the six selected subordinate terms for each emotion category are:

ANGER – *annoyance*, *fury*, *irritation*, *rage*, *resentment*, and *wrath*.
FEAR – *concern*, *distress*, *dread*, *horror*, *terror* and *worry*
HAPPINESS – *bliss*, *delight*, *elation*, *gladness*, *glee*, and *joy*[44]

These terms were selected from the available synonyms in GloWbE on the basis of a study by Shaver et al. (1987), who, in testing the applicability of Rosch's (1978) principles of categorization to emotions, provide experiential evidence for *anger*, *fear* and *joy* as basic level terms and the terms in the lists above as subordinate clusters (1067). Although *joy* emerges at the basic level in their study, they concede

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[44]   The total of six synonyms arose due to the condition that they should denote concepts that are sufficiently synonymous with, e.g., *anger*. For example, despite some connotational differences, the subordinate terms selected for ANGER (*annoyance*, *fury*, *irritation*, *rage*, *resentment*, and *wrath*) were deemed as such after consideration of their dictionary definitions. The same holds for subordinates of *fear* and *happiness*. All other potential terms listed in the GloWbE as synonyms of the search term *anger*, *fear* or *happiness* were discarded.

that "*happiness* may be a better general name than *joy*, which intuitively seems briefer and more intense than happiness" (1065). Therefore, in view of this and due to the fact that HAPPINESS is the most common source domain label in metaphor study (e.g., Kövecses 2000), I have used *happiness* as the basic level term.[45]

c) Copy and paste concordance lines into a spreadsheet software and create randomized samples for further analysis.[46]

Step 2: **Identification of MRWs**[47]

a) Employ the metaphor identification procedure MIPVU to determine for each concordance line if it contains MRWs. For this decision, larger stretches of co-text made available through the GloWbE web interface had to be consulted at times.

b) For each concordance line, record the number of MRWs potentially instantiating an ANGER, FEAR or HAPPINESS metaphor. When MRWs are intuitively deemed to relate to the same potential source domain, record only one instance. An example of this in the GB subcorpus is shown in (1).

(1) It leaves a *bitter taste of biilious* [sic] **fury** in me. (GB G)[48] [49]

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[45] Furthermore, in the research on basic emotions (see, e.g., Ekman 1992; Izard 1992; Prinz 2004; Ortony & Turner 1990), there is no consensus on using *joy* or *happiness* as the basic emotion label. "One might point to the fact that nearly everybody who postulates basic emotions includes anger, happiness, sadness, and fear. One might also argue that not all of the variation in lists of basic emotion is real because the same emotion is often labeled differently by different researchers. […] the same pleasant emotion may be labeled *happiness* by one author, *joy* by another, and *elation* by yet another" Ortony & Turner (1990: 315).

[46] The need for randomized samples relate to the presentation of concordance lines in the GloWbE web interface. The results for each variety is presented according to the alphabetical listing of the source websites, initially for general websites and then for blogs. Thus, creating a random sample of the concordance lines guarantees a mix of different sources, as well as texts from general websites and blogs. Incidentally, the BYU corpus interface does allow for the drawing of a random sample containing 100, 200, 500 or 1,000 concordance lines but, for reasons of comprehensiveness, I opted for randomizing using a spreadsheet software containing all concordance lines from a search.

[47] Some false positives (e.g., due to polysemy) will be discarded in this step, e.g., *irritation* denoting a skin condition, *annoyance* denoting the thing that makes someone angry, *dread* denoting a part of a hairstyle, *horror* denoting a movie genre, etc. Also discarded are "false positives" that indicate proper nouns, e.g., *Rage Against the Machine* (a band), *St. Anger* (name of an Metallica album), *The Grapes of Wrath* (a book), etc., as well as compounds that denote something more specific than the emotion concept, e.g., *anger management*, *road rage*, etc.

[48] Italics were used to highlight source domain lexis, while target domain lexis is presented in bold.

[49] G refers to web-based texts that are part of the general section of the GloWbE, while B refers to the blog section.

bitter, *taste*, and *bilious* all point to a potential source domain related to something like a body fluid such as *bile* [= semantic frame]. Due to this interpretation, as well as these three words making up a single pre- and postmodified NP [= syntactic frame], only one potential metaphorical instance was recorded.

c) Repeat a) and b) for each concordance line until 350 metaphors are collected for each variety.[50]

Step 3: **Verification of authorship**

It was only after all 350 metaphors per variety were collected that the issue of authorship of the texts from which the data originated arose.[51] Although Davies and Fuchs (2015: 4) maintain that the websites collected for the GloWbE were associated with the 20 respective varieties according to their Google country tag, it remained unclear if the texts contained within these websites were actually produced by authors who are representative speakers of the respective varieties. This, in fact, mirrors the same issue found in the ICE-SIN data during the corpus selection process (see Section 4.1.1). Therefore, in order to confirm that a speaker of a certain variety is in fact the author of an individual text in which a metaphor was contained, I manually tracked down the original source for each concordance line and annotated the data according to three categories: authentic speaker, speaker from another variety and unverifiable (i.e., original website not found or not enough biographical information given to determine authenticity).

In order to identify the authenticity of a speaker, I examined various sources available via a Google search: biographical information on the website, location of author as listed by Twitter, Linkedin or biographical details provided by the authors themselves, Wikipedia for prominent authors, etc. (often including a combination of these). Examples of this procedure will be provided in Section 4.1.5 below.

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[50]   The threshold of 350 metaphors emerged during the analysis of the individual varieties, which was the highest number that could be gleaned for an individual variety. In order to maintain a comparative basis, this threshold was adhered to for the other varieties under investigation.

[51]   This vital realization comes courtesy of the thorough scrutiny of an anonymous reviewer of a previously published paper (see Güldenring 2017) who checked the source information of data presented in a previous draft of that paper. I am very grateful and deeply indebted to the efforts of said reviewer.

Although some of this information could still be somewhat based on speculation, as it was not possible to interview the authors personally, it did provide more solid evidence for determining if the author of a text was indeed a resident of the respective country, which was used as the benchmark for confirming that author's likely membership in a variety-specific speech community. For this study, I did not include any metaphors that were determined to have originated with speakers from other varieties or that were unverifiable because the websites were no longer available or the biographical information was too sparse to make an informed decision. This, of course, significantly reduced the amount of data from 350 metaphors to 150, which was the highest number I was able to determine as authentic in the Singapore subcorpus during the annotation of the ANGER metaphors. Thus, my study had to be limited to a random sample of 150 metaphors per emotion concept for each of the varieties. This resulted in a total of 750 metaphors each for ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS, i.e., a grand total of 2,250 emotion metaphors.

Step 4: **Identification of conceptual metaphors and annotation according to metaphor types**

a) On the basis of the MRWs identified in step 2, identify potential metaphorical patterns by formulating a broad label for a potential source domain with the aid of the following so-called "intuition boosters":

- previously postulated conceptual metaphors in the tradition of CMT, for instance with recourse to the Master Metaphor List (Lakoff et al. 1991);
- basic definitions in the dictionaries consulted during the application of the MIPVU procedure, chiefly the *Macmillan* online dictionary (http://www.macmillandictionary.com/), in step 2;
- a collocational analysis of MRWs using the entire GloWbE as a reference corpus[52].

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[52] Despite the problematic nature of an unscrutinized view of authorship in the GloWbE, I do consider the GloWbE, viewed in its entirety, as a good representation of English as it is collectively used around the world. The assumption behind using the collocational frames as a point of reference, without verification of authorship, was to discover collocations, which represent literal frames in which target domain lexis

Examples of how the use of intuition boosters led to the identification of a source domain is illustrated in (2) and (3).

(2) […] the **anger** may *lead to* hatred [...] (NG B)

When consulting the basic meaning in the *Macmillan* online dictionary, it was not entirely clear whether *lead to* as used here could be pointing to ANGER IS A PERSON, as in a person that shows someone the way to go, i.e., A GUIDE ON A JOURNEY, or if ANGER is more likely conceptualized in (2) as PART OF A JOURNEY, i.e., a path, road, etc. that leads in a certain direction. For this particular case, I conducted a collocational analysis in the GloWbE using the search string [*lead**].[v] *to* in a span of four words to the left and zero to the right, which revealed a great number of collocates that have a literal sense, e.g., *road* (934 tokens), *trail* (259 tokens), *paths* (255 tokens) and *pathway* (110 tokens). Due to Stefanowitsch's (2006a: 67) claim that metaphorical patterns can "establish specific paradigmatic relations between target domain lexical items and the source domain items that would be expected in their place in a non-metaphorical use", I viewed this as an instance in which such a paradigmatic relation is established, which gave me grounds to postulate a metaphor like ANGER IS A PATH ON A JOURNEY.

(3) **Resentment** against ex-militants was already *brewing for some time* because of rampant extortion […] (IN B)

According to the *Macmillan* online dictionary (and confirmed by the *Longman* online dictionary (http://www.ldoceonline.com/)), the basic sense for *brew* (both transitively and intransitively used) relates to the preparation of a (hot) beverage. The collocational analysis ([*brew**].[v] in a span of four words to the left and right) confirms this basic sense, the top three collocates being *coffee* (714 tokens), *beer* (700 tokens) and *tea* (438 tokens), which seems to suggest the source domain FOOD / DRINK. However, the decision for (3) was not so straightforward. In fact, (3) only offers the MRWs *brewing for some time* for analysis and, thus, does not provide any further textual cues that would lead to an interpretation that the

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occurs, in English as a whole and, therefore, that denote generally accepted and frequently encountered lexico-grammatical instantiations.

mapping involved is something like ANGER IS FOOD / DRINK (*being prepared*). The *Oxford English Dictionary* online (http://www.oed.com/) also confirms the basic sense for *brew* as relating to (hot) beverages, but additionally defines it by its relation to "natural phenomena, as rain, wind, a storm." The collocational analysis for *brew* also retrieved collocates aligning to this sense, *storm*(*s*) (178 tokens) and even *clouds* (12 tokens), as well as various words indicating a bad or unpleasant experience that could be conceivably conceptualized as a STORM, such as *trouble* (145 tokens), *crisis* (54 tokens), *controversy* (31 tokens), *tension* (26 tokens), over the usually pleasant experience of preparing a (hot) beverage. Therefore, when *brew* was used without any explicit textual cues indicating the source domain FOOD / DRINK, I counted *anger brewing* as relating to the mapping ANGER IS A STORM. Admittedly, *a storm brewing* is in itself metaphorically motivated. However, it remains to be determined if its figurative use is salient to the speakers of English. If not, then *anger* and *storm* are in a paradigmatic relationship, which further lends evidence to the interpretation that ANGER can be conceptualized as a STORM.

b) If intuitive analysis and consultation of the intuition boosters fail to yield a broadly formulated source domain label, like PERSON or FLUID IN A CONTAINER, then label these metaphors as type 1 (= general, basic)[53]. An example is given in (4).

(4) […] Mark, a foreign aid worker, wrote *in* **anger** in response to my suggestion […] (KE G) → type 1

c) If metaphors are determined to not be general, then annotate metaphors with a source domain label as type 2 metaphors (= more structural). An example is provided in (5).

(5) If they can address the heart of each problem, they will be able to *defuse* the **anger** (SG G) → type 2 → ANGER IS A WEAPON (likely A BOMB)

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[53] Type 1 metaphors will not be considered in the present study because, due to their general image schemas, like CONTAINMENT, they were not deemed as suitable objects for the study of potential metaphor variation, and they indeed seem to be uniformly used throughout the varieties examined in this study. Example (4) above is typical of a type 1 metaphor, *in anger*, i.e., ANGER IS A BOUNDED REGION, a specification of EMOTIONAL STATES ARE BOUNDED REGIONS, which Kövecses points to as a submetaphor of EVENT STRUCTURE (2000: 58–59).

Step 5: **Classification of type 2 metaphors into different levels of granularity**

For this step, only the type 2 metaphors were considered in terms of different levels of granularity / specificity that could be gleaned from an examination of the conceptual detail reflected on the linguistic level (i.e., in relation to the MRWs identified above). Recourse was also made to the above-mentioned intuition boosters.

a) Level 1 = It was not possible to find a more specific label and the broad source domain label from step 3c was retained (e.g., ANGER IS AN ILLNESS); the metaphor was thus considered a generic-level one. Example (6) illustrates a generic-level metaphor.[54]

(6) When one *suffers from* **anger**, it's not Buddhist anger, Hindu anger, or Christian anger. (IN G) → ANGER IS AN ILLNESS

b) Level 2 = It was possible to find a more specific label (e.g., ANGER IS MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY), which could be contrasted with other metaphors from the same broad category (e.g., ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, ANGER IS AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS, etc.). Example (7) demonstrates a specific-level metaphor.

(7) […] the beacon of light that keeps him from *going crazy with* **anger** at the unfair world around them. (SG B) → ANGER IS A MENTAL ILLNESS

c) Level 3 = It was possible to even further specify a level 2 metaphor (e.g., ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS) on the basis of a more

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[54] I would like to point out that when I use the terms *generic-level* and *specific-level* in this study, I am only referring to my annotation system here. This should not be confused with the notions of generic-level metaphor and specific-level metaphor in Lakoff & Turner (1989). They view a metaphor like EVENTS ARE ACTIONS as a generic-level metaphor due to a lack of specificity; "they do not have fixed source and target domains, and they do not have fixed lists of entities in the mapping." Accordingly, they view a metaphor like LIFE IS A JOURNEY as a specific-level metaphor because it doesn't lack this specificity (81).

specific meaning focus[55] in the mapping. Examples (8) and (9) illustrate level 3 metaphors.

(8) My body was *shaking with* **rage** as I opened the gate. (NG B)→ ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*)

(9) By letting the unresolved linger, silence *allows* **resentment** *to fester*. (IN B) → ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (*WOUND / SKIN-RELATED*)

Metaphorical expressions were extracted and classified by employing this methodology for each variety and emotion concept under consideration. In the following chapters, the results of this method are presented and discussed from a comparative point of view.

4.1.5   An Additional Note on Authorship

Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 briefly outlined the question of representativity in using the GloWbE corpus for a study of varieties of English and the methodological step of author identification (step 3). Since this represents a major challenge for the present study (and, by extension, any study relying on the GloWbE as a source of variety-specific data), I would like to conclude this chapter with some illustrative examples on how I went about identifying variety-specific authors for the linguistic metaphors found. As mentioned above, although this step gave me a much more solid grounds for attributing a linguistic metaphor to a particular variety speaker, complete certainty is unfortunately not possible, which would not be as much of an issue if a more representative corpus, like the ICE corpora, could have been consulted.

Step 3, outlined in Section 4.1.4, addressed the challenge of reviewing all concordance lines for each variety that were previously found to contain metaphorical instances of the respective emotion concept on the linguistic level in

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[55] Kövecses (2003b) maintains that conceptual metaphors have a major thematic orientation or what he terms a "main meaning focus", which serves to shine a spotlight on some (but not all) aspects of the target domain. "Each source is associated with a particular meaning focus (or foci) that is (or are) mapped onto the target. This meaning focus (or foci) is (are) constituted by the central knowledge that pertains to a particular entity or event within a speech community. The target inherits the main meaning focus (or foci) of the source" (82). For a discussion of CMT based on the main meaning focus in the context of other approaches to metaphor, like blending, see Kövecses (2011a).

order to determine if they can be contributable to variety speakers. During this reviewing process, it became clear that many of the previously collected 350 metaphors per variety and emotion could not be authenticated either due to the fluctuating nature of the internet (many original websites could not be found) or due to its anonymity (many authors did not provide biographical information from which to determine their regional membership[56]). Not only did this significantly reduce the amount of data I could collect (150 metaphors per variety and emotion), but it also revealed the particularly harsh consequence that entire varieties had to be excluded from the present study. For example, the GloWbE component of Hong Kong, which had been included at an earlier stage, had to be completely discarded due to a tendency to include webpages originating from expatriates from other English-speaking countries, who happen to live in Hong Kong. Example (10) illustrates how this was discovered.

(10) […] *to bear* the **anger** of a lot people (HK G)

After discovering this metaphorical instance of anger, I attempted to track down the original source, which revealed that it originated from a Hong Kong-based marketing consultant, who in her biography on the site, identifies as Scottish, see Figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2: Screenshot from a Hong Kong based blog with biographical information about the author

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[56] I acknowledge that "regional membership" is also not a fool-proof marker of variety membership, but at least it provides an indication that the person responsible for the text is indeed locatable in the region where the variety is spoken and, thus, an assumed member of the respective speech community.

Given that it is a reasonable assumption that the identified author of the blog is responsible for its text, particularly when it is the only source found, it was clear that incidences like these could not be included in the data.

However, it was this kind of biographical information particularly (and internet presence of the respective authors generally) that proved to be helpful for the 150 metaphors per variety and emotion that were deemed "authentic". In the following I will illustrate this process for some Nigerian FEAR metaphors and, in doing so, show that due to the amount of information about the authors that is available on the Internet there are different degrees of speculation at hand.

(11) The *termite of* **fear** […] has *eaten you up*? (NG G)

The metaphor contained in (11) originated from an author who luckily happened to be a prominent Nigerian pastor with a Wikipedia page confirming that he was born, educated and works in Nigeria (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Olukoya). Furthermore, a google search of the concordance line illustrated in (11) revealed his sermon "Termites of the Soul" is the only source. With this information at hand, the metaphor was deemed authentic.

The same level of confidence was attributed to those authors, journalists in particular, that had links to their Facebook and Twitter accounts, like for (12).

(12) The **fear** of disease outbreak was *heavy* […] (NG G)

The metaphor in (12) also stemmed from a single source and was attributable to the Nigerian journalist, Ahaoma Kanu, whose Twitter profile, which lists his location, can be seen in Figure 4.3 below.

Figure 4.3: Screenshot of Twitter account with information about geographical location

As helpful as the recourse to social media for identification of an author was, it was not always possible as (13) illustrates. For this case, contextual clues contained within the available text provided the basis for verification.

(13) […] the streets of Lagos are now *smouldering with* **fear** […] (NG G)

This metaphor was found in statement by Chief Olabode Ibyinka George, which was published by a Nigerian newspaper, *News of the People*. I was unable to find any social media accounts or the like linking to the website where (13) was found, but the textual cues in the published statement provided some evidence that its author is in fact Nigerian. Not only does the full text mention the Yoruba people (an ethnic group in Nigeria), but Chief Olabode Ibyinka George also signs his statement with "Atona Oodua" (a Yoruba native title), as well as with a time and place "Lagos, November 3, 2012". Additional google searches of this author confirmed his status.

By contrast to (11), (12) and (13), the authentification of authorship became more speculative when tracking down the author for (14).

(14) […] partly *benumbed by* **fear** (NG B)

While for (14) the situation was similar to the Hong Kong example above, with the important difference that the blog owner, Tolu Ogunlesi, identifies as living and working in Lagos, Nigeria in his on-site biography, no further information on the

author could be found other than he is a published author of a book of poetry. A google search of his book, *listen to the geckos singing from a balcony*, did not reveal any further information on his regional membership or nationality. In this case I had to rely solely information from his biography.

These examples are typical of the reviewing process it took to identify variety authors. However, they also serve to illustrate an important caveat regarding the present study that needs to be made transparent. I was only able to identify the authors as (speculative) variety speakers due to their internet presence. This, of course, implies that the speakers at my disposal are not necessarily representative of the entire speech community, but only represent more "prominent" members in the sense that they have made their texts available to a potentially global audience by virtue of being on the internet (This is especially true for online journalists who tend to be located in the urban centers). It may be the case that for those writing on the internet that their primary audience is, in fact, people from the same region, like, e.g., readers of the Nigerian newspaper in (13). However, whether conscious or not, the global availability of their texts makes their internet presence (and perhaps their use of language) less likely to be a true product of cultural influence or filtering. This is not an optimal situation for a study that assumes variation in metaphor to some degree and must be taken into account for the proceeding case studies. Nevertheless, if cultural forces are at play in the metaphorization of emotion concepts, it is my hope that they can also be revealed in widely distributed language use, like that stemming from web-based corpus data, due to the assumption that our systems of "conventional metaphor […] is constantly in use, automatically and below the level of consciousness" (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 310). The automaticity and unconsciousness behind our systems of conceptual metaphor may also allow for culture-specific conceptualizations to emerge in language as used on a global stage. With that being said, let us turn to the results of the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS in the following chapters.

5   Case Study: ANGER

The case study of ANGER starts with a brief discussion of previously attested metaphors of ANGER in English, which will shape expectations of what we can assume to occur in the GloWbE data. After this review, the metaphor profiles of ANGER for each variety will be presented, along with a ranking of the most common source domains. A finer-grained analysis follows by breaking down each of the most common source domains into specific levels, which will be illustrated by examples and considered for any indication of a variety-specific preference. This case study concludes with a discussion of what the results suggest in terms of metaphor variation and/or commonality across the varieties.

5.1   Previous Metaphors of ANGER

Before delving into the empirical findings of the present student, it behooves us to take into account the scholarly work that has previously discussed emotion metaphors as part of "folk theories", otherwise known as "cultural models"[57], for English in general. In this particular chapter the focus will naturally be on ANGER. However, it is here in the first case study that we need to have an introductory discussion of what folk theories entail in general. Thus, I will forgo this discussion in the following case study chapters.

Furthermore, prior to the presentation and analysis of the empirical data for emotion metaphors, the rationale for considering what we know about emotion concepts from what has been discovered from research into folk theories on emotion concepts is twofold. Firstly, "Cognitive Linguistics has stressed the idea that we think about social reality in terms of models – 'cultural models' or 'folk theories'" by emphasizing that cognitive linguistic analysis contributes to

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[57] There has been some debate surrounding the label "folk theory", also known variously as "cultural model", "folk psychology", "commonsense psychology" and "naïve psychology", which is prominently used in the realms of psychology and cognitive science in relation to what is also called "theory of mind". For an overview of three distinct senses of this term, along with a brief discussion of its varied uses, see Ravenscroft (2016). For more discussion in this vein, in particular to psychology, see Fletcher (1995).

understanding "how our conception of social reality is shaped by underlying patterns of thought" (Geeraerts 2003: 25). In terms of how we think about language in general as "a social and cultural reality", particularly in view of different varieties of the same language, the basic question can be asked: "[W]hat are the models that shape our conception of language?" (25). This question can be extended to particular aspects of our social and cultural reality like, in adherence to our present purposes, the conception of emotional experience: What are the models that shape our conception of emotions? A further question arises when considering a pluricentric language such as English: Do culturally and regionally distinct varieties of English share these models? This will be a major line of investigation when considering the emotion metaphors across varieties of English in the present study, since metaphor analysis has contributed significantly to the uncovering of theories of emotion.

Secondly, by initially exploring the cognitive models of emotions that have already been uncovered in previous scholarly work, we have a benchmark, that is, a point of reference, from which to contextualize the findings presented in this study. Therefore, the question guiding us here concerns to what extent previously explored folk theories or cognitive models of emotion relate to metaphorical patterns found in usage-based data.

In their edited volume on the subject, Holland & Quinn (1987) explore the cognitive view of the organization of cultural knowledge. Backgrounded by the anthropological perspective that culture can be viewed as "shared knowledge", they define folk theories or cultural models in the following way:

> *Cultural models* are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it. (Holland & Quinn 1987: 4, emphasis in the original).

Therefore, one definitional aspect of folk theories or cultural models lies in the "shared" quality of conceptual structures – a point reiterated by Kövecses (2000: 114), who further maintains that they can "in many cases […] be uncovered on the basis of ordinary language". A cognitive approach to folk theories outlines "an

attempt to specify the cognitive organization of such ideational complexes and to link this organization to what is known about the way human beings think" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 4). This is where metaphor can play a big role.

Folk theories or cultural models can also be defined as "a theory about mental phenomena that common folk allegedly hold, a theory in terms of which mental concepts are understood", making the study of folk theories "part of the psychology of concepts" in terms of both "the study of conceptualization and classification in general" and "the study of specific folk concepts or families of folk concepts, such as number concepts, material object concepts, and biological kind concepts" to which human beings do not usually have "direct introspective access" (Goldman 1993: 15). As discussed in Section 2.2.2, direct introspection does not lend itself to a scientific investigation of conceptual content because it cannot be directly accessed. However, consideration of folk theories, referred to in the following quote as "intuitive theories", offer indirect access – often on the basis of language – because "the mental representations that humans use to structure experience provide rich insights into how mind mediates world" (Gelman & Legare 2011: 380).

> The vast and unwieldy topic of mental content can be fruitfully approached by examining the intuitive "theories" that people construct […] Intuitive theories are not scientific theories – they are not formal, explicit, precise, or experimentally tested. Intuitive theories are implicit and imprecise, but as with scientific theories, intuitive theories have broad implications: They organize experience, generate inferences, guide learning, and influence behavior and social interactions. Most centrally, intuitive theories are causal and explanatory. Indeed, explanatory systems of knowledge are integral to human cognition and learning. A recurring theme is that intuitive theories are not neutral or passive snapshots of experience; they embody cognitive biases that influence thought and action. (Gelman & Legare 2011: 380).

Moreover, folk theories or cultural models can be contrasted with "[s]cientific, or expert, theories […] as the theories that experts […] construct to account for a given area of experience" (Kövecses 2000: 114). Kempton (1987) contrasts these two notions in the following manner:

> Human beings strive to connect related phenomena and make sense of the world. In doing so, they create what I call folk theory. The word folk signifies both that these theories are shared by a social group and that they are acquired from everyday experience or social interaction. To call them theories is to assert that they use abstractions that apply to many analogous situations, enable predictions, and guide behavior. I contrast folk theories with institutionalized theories, which are used by

> specialists and acquired from scientific literature or controlled experiments. Thus, a folk theory is one type of cultural model. (Kempton 1987: 222)

Since we are primarily concerned with the everyday language reflecting metaphors of the emotions, I will forgo a discussion of expert theories on the emotions, which would otherwise be beyond the scope of this study. However, the shared knowledge identifiable within a folk theory or cognitive model of emotion is vital to understanding the conceptualization of emotions for a particular cultural group. One such cultural model has been extensively discussed, albeit largely on the basis of intuition, for ANGER in American English by the work of Kövecses and Lakoff (see Kövecses 1990, Kövecses 2000, Lakoff & Kövecses 1984, Lakoff 1987a). The following provides a brief review of this cultural model and the metaphors constituting it.

In his 1990 book on emotion concepts, Kövecses summarizes the previous work on the cognitive model of ANGER for American English that was previously established in collaboration with Lakoff (see Lakoff & Kövecses 1984 and Case Study 1 in Lakoff 1987a) and further discussed in Kövecses (2000). Although American English does not feature in the present study, I take recourse to Lakoff and Kövecses' work because they were the first to present a systematic model of ANGER involving metaphor and, in doing so, uncovered fundamental insights into how anger is conceptualized that can be applied beyond American English.

The common assumption in all of Lakoff and Kövecses' publications is that the emotions themselves cannot be viewed as lacking in conceptual structure, but instead, by virtue of the conventionalized language used to talk about emotion, it can be determined that emotions have a complex conceptual structure, which in fact entail varied inferences (Kövecses 1990: 50). The point of departure for analyzing the metaphors and metonymies participating in the cognitive model of ANGER entails consideration of "the common cultural modal of the physiological effects of anger" (51). The physiological effects of anger include an increase in body heat and pressure felt within the body (i.e., blood and muscle pressure), general agitation and the impedance of visual perception (51). Due to the fact that as humans we all share the same basic biology and, thus, experience these physiological effects of anger as shared experiences, it is assumed that this model is universal and is largely

employed to understand anger in oneself or in others via a general metonymic principle that relates to all emotional experience: "The physiological effects of an emotion stand for the emotion" (51-52). Applied to ANGER, this principle helps to uncover a system of metonymies, given here with corresponding language examples supplied by Kövecses (1990: 52):

(1) ANGER IS BODY HEAT (Don't get *hot under the collar*.)

(2) ANGER IS INTERNAL PRESSURE (When I found out, I almost *burst a blood vessel*.)

(3) ANGER IS REDNESS IN FACE AND NECK AREA (She was *scarlet* with **rage**.)

(4) ANGER IS AGITATION (She was *shaking* with **anger**.)

(5) ANGER IS INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION (She was *blind* with **rage**.)

Kövecses (1990) claims that from these physiological effects, as indicated by the above metonymies, we can glean a more central general metaphor: ANGER IS HEAT (52). This general metaphor can be divided up into two versions depending on whether the heat is related to fluids or solids: ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER and ANGER IS FIRE, respectively (52-53). Of these two, the fluid version is considered to be more elaborate and can be considered a product of combining the general metaphor ANGER IS HEAT with a general emotion metaphor in which the body acts as a container for emotions, i.e., THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (53). This is illustrated in (6) below.

(6) ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (You make my *blood boil*. / *Simmer* down! /I had reached a *boiling point*. / Let him *stew*.)

                                                                 (Kövecses 1990: 53)

Furthermore, part of the more elaborated nature of ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER involves the metaphorical entailments pertaining to the nature of hot fluids in a container, which can be mapped onto the emotional experience of anger. Kövecses (1990: 54-56) outlines these entailments in the following way:

(7) WHEN THE INTENSITY OF ANGER INCREASES, THE FLUID RISES. (His pent-up **anger** *welled up* inside him.)

(8) INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES STEAM (She got all *steamed up*. /I was *fuming*.)

(9) INTENSE ANGER PRODUCES PRESSURE ON THE CONTAINER (He was *bursting with* **anger**. / I could barely *keep it in* anymore.)

(10) WHEN ANGER BECOMES TOO INTENSE, THE PERSON EXPLODES (When I told him, he just *exploded*. / She *blew up* at me.)

(11) WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, PARTS OF HIM GO UP IN THE AIR (I *blew my top*.)

(12) WHEN A PERSON EXPLODES, WHAT WAS INSIDE HIM COMES OUT (His **anger** finally *came out*. /Smoke was *pouring out of his ears*.)

According to Kövecses (1990), the central metaphor of ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER uncovers an "ontology of anger" that puts into focus central aspects of anger in our conceptual system, namely that anger is an intense emotional experience that can lead to a dangerous loss of control of ourselves, just as increasing heat in a container can lead to an explosion (56-57).

The second version of ANGER IS HEAT, namely ANGER IS FIRE, relates to its application to solids, according to Kövecses (1990). While intensity and danger also play a part in understanding ANGER IS FIRE, this metaphor further highlights the causes of anger, the duration of the emotional experience and the damage that can be incurred by the angry individual, as illustrated in the examples below (Kövecses 1990: 58):

(13) ANGER IS FIRE (*the cause of anger*) (That *kindled* my **ire**. / Those are *inflammatory* remarks.)

(14) ANGER IS FIRE (*intensity and duration*) (She was *doing a slow burn*. / After the argument, Dave was *smoldering* for days.)

(15) ANGER IS FIRE (*danger to others*) (He was *breathing fire*.)

(16) ANGER IS FIRE (*danger to the angry person*) (He was *consumed* by his **anger**.)

While ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER and ANGER IS FIRE very clearly relate to the physiological experiences outlined above, another metaphor can be identified particular to aspect of agitation. ANGER IS INSANITY draws from the cultural theory that insane individuals "are unduly

agitated – they go wild, start raving, flail their arms, foam at the mouth, and so on" – physiological effects and behavior that act as metonymies for insanity. (59).

(17) ANGER IS INSANITY (He got so angry, he *went out of his mind*.)

While insanity, particularly insane behavior, has the potential for danger, another metaphor focuses more clearly on the dangerous aspect of anger, particularly concerning the loss of control of the angry individual, that is, ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (61-62). This is illustrated by (18):

(18) ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (He was *battling* his **anger**. / She *fought back* her **anger**.)

However, when the focus is on a loss of control that is dangerous to other people, a metaphor arises that makes use of the widely accepted metaphor in Western culture PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE OF A PERSON, which is formulated for ANGER as ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (62).

(19) ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (He has a *monstrous* temper. / He *unleashed* his **anger**.)

ANGER can also be conceptualized in terms of physical annoyances, which involve to some extent a person committing an offence and a victim of that offence, i.e., the angry person (64-65). This is illustrated in (20) and (21), whereas (21) specifically relates to a territorial transgression:

(20) THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS A PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (Don't be a *pain in the ass*.)
(21) CAUSING ANGER IS TRESPASSING (You're beginning to *get to* me. / This is where I *draw the line*!)

In line with the dynamic of an offender and victim, the victim is seen to have experienced a type of injustice, in which getting angry can be thought of as a type of retribution (65). From the perspective of retribution, ANGER can be viewed as a BURDEN that one should do away with:

(22) ANGER IS A BURDEN (*retributive justice*) (After I lost my temper, I felt *lighter*.)

However, ANGER IS A BURDEN also relates to our sense of responsibility to control anger, which "may place a considerable burden on one's 'inner resources'" (65):

(23) ANGER IS A BURDEN (*controlling anger*) (He *carries* his anger around with him.)

The above outlined metaphors have been identified by Kövecses and Lakoff's work as contributing most significantly to the cultural model of ANGER for American English. In his 2000 publication, Kövecses adds three more metaphors conceptualizing ANGER, illustrated by (24) – (26), but beyond an example of each one he does not provide specific discussions of these additions (21).

(24) ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE (It was a *stormy* meeting.)
(25) AN ANGRY PERSON IS A FUNCTIONING MACHINE (That really *got* him *going*.)
(26) ANGER IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (His actions were completely *governed* by anger.)

Taking these metonymies and metaphors together as a prototypical cultural model of ANGER, we start to get a picture of the systematic nature of the everyday expressions of ANGER.

It is important to remind ourselves at this point that these metaphors and their illustrative examples on the linguistic level were discovered via introspection and, therefore, are not quantifiable. Stefanowitsch (2006a) takes issue with the introspective method used to create this cultural model of anger and, in his own study of emotion metaphors using BNC data and applying MPA, tests to what extent these metaphors can be found in naturally occurring language. Of the ANGER metaphors listed above, he finds metaphorical patterns for all but TRESPASSING, example (21), and A FUNCTIONING MACHINE, example (25). Nevertheless, the total of the metaphorical patterns identified for these metaphors only amount to 14.3% of all metaphorical patterns found in the corpus data by applying MPA, "which suggests that the introspective method misses the majority

of metaphorical expressions for the domain of ANGER" (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 73). Among other findings, like general emotion metaphors relating to EVENT STRUCTURE (see Lakoff 2007 [2003]) and very infrequent metaphors, like ANGER IS A BALLOON, Stefanowitsch is able to identify metaphors that are not mentioned in the model above or are categorized differently as dictated by the patterns in the corpus data (73-78). These metaphors are given in (27) – (38)[58] and their addition can be viewed as an extension and/or reworking of the conceptual system attributed to ANGER by Lakoff and Kövecses' work.

(27) ANGER IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) (X *filled with* **anger**, X *keep lid on/contain* **anger**, *burst/explosion/outburst of* **anger**, etc.)

(28) ANGER IS A LIQUID (**anger** *well up*, **anger** *bubble inside* X, *spurt of* **anger**, etc.)

(29) ANGER IS HEAT/COLD (*hot* **anger**, **anger** *grow/turn cold*, etc.)

(30) ANGER IS A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE (*mixture/mingling/combination of* **anger** *and* EMOTION, **anger** *be pure*, etc.)

(31) ANGER IS LIGHT (*flash/flicker/white glow of* **anger**, etc.)

(32) ANGER IS DARKNESS (*black gloom of* **anger**, **anger** *eclipse* EMOTION, etc.)

(33) ANGER IS HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY) (*level of* **anger**, **anger** *rise* (*in* X), **anger** *drop*, etc.)

(34) ANGER IS A SLEEPING ORGANISM (X *rouse* **anger**, X *arouse* **anger** (in Y))

(35) ANGER IS A DISEASE (*bouts of* **anger**, *festering/impotent/paralysing* **anger**, etc.)

(36) ANGER IS GORGE (= EATING) (**anger** *rise into* X's *mouth*, *bitter* **anger**, X *bite back/swallow* **anger**, etc.)

(37) ANGER IS A SHARP OBJECT (*sharp* **anger**, *pinpoint of* **anger**, *spike of* **anger**, etc.)

(38) ANGER IS A PLANT (**anger** *be rooted in* X, **anger** *stem from* EMOTION, **anger** *grow*)

(Stefanowitsch 2006a: 76)

While Stefanowitsch concedes that the combination of ANGER IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) together with ANGER

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[58] Stefanowitsch (2006a) does not report the full citations from the corpus data but presents the metaphorical patterns in an abstracted form, i.e., verbs are in the infinitive, patterns that are similar grouped together in a compact form, etc. (73).

IS HEAT being able to account for ANGER IS A HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (2006a: 75), he highlights those mappings which have not yet been mentioned in the previous literature. For instance, ANGER IS LIGHT, while related to ANGER IS FIRE, is found alongside its opposite ANGER IS DARKNESS, although they "do not encode the opposite ends of a scale" in terms of intensity (77). The others include A SLEEPING ORGANISM (which could be potentially related to A DANGEROUS ANIMAL), DISEASE, GORGE, A SHARP OBJECT and A PLANT.

Without going into a detailed discussion of these additions, which Stefanowitsch himself does not provide, a major point has been made by his study nonetheless: There is more to discover about the conceptual structure of emotions when we go beyond introspection. This is underscored by results found in Esenova's (2011) study, which makes use of mostly corpus-based examples (along with linguistic examples from dictionaries) and discovers even more metaphors for ANGER. (39) and (40) illustrates what Esenova considers to be sub-categories of CONTAINMENT (2011: 46-47).

(39) ANGER IS A COLOR (There is a *tinge of* **anger** *in* his voice.)
(40) ANGER IS A CHILD (Do not judge or humiliate anyone, for this *gives birth to* **anger**.)

(41) – (43) illustrate metaphors not discussed either by Kövecses or Stefanowitsch above (Esenova 2011: 53, 55, 64-65)

(41) ANGER IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING (I'm *haunted by* **anger**.)
(42) ANGER IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (**Rage** *creeps up on* you unawares too.)
(43) ANGER IS A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE (I've seen their cruelty, *smelt* their *putrid* **anger**. / Two *vinegary* fellows bickering.)

Therefore, quantifiable approaches like MPA help to fill in the gaps and, most importantly, gauge the frequency of the patterns instantiating the conceptual metaphors attributable to ANGER. This not only allows the metaphor researcher to examine the systematicity of these individual metaphors, but also act "as a basis for contrastive studies investigating cross-cultural and cross-linguistic similarities and differences in the metaphorical conceptualization of experience" (Stefanowitsch

2006a: 103). In recent work, Kövecses et al. (2015) aimed at uncovering metaphorical salience of ANGER metaphors in American English, Spanish, Turkish and Hungarian by employing quantitative corpus analysis. In the American English results, it turns out that the most salient source domains are CONTAINER, POSSESSED OBJECT and OPPONENT (including the subtypes of OPPONENT AS A PERSON and WEAPON) (346-348). This finding not only confirms two major aspects of the prototypical cultural model of ANGER outlined above, i.e., intensity and control of ANGER, which will be discussed in Section 5.3 for the present study's results. It also adds two more mappings to the conceptualization of ANGER, namely POSSESSED OBJECT and WEAPON. These recent additions make it clear that the full story of the prototypical cultural model of ANGER has yet to be told. Findings in the recent study will help to make the picture more complete. As it stands now, Table 5.1 provides an overview of the previously attested metaphors of ANGER for convenience. Note that I have grouped together those source domains that I deem to be sufficiently similar, although they were presented as separate mappings (OPPONENT and A SOCIAL SUPERIOR, who could be understood as an OPPONENT of sorts, as highlighting the control aspect of an emotion).

Table 5.1: Previously attested ANGER metaphors

ANGER IS:	Source
THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE / A LIQUID	Kövecses (1990) and Stefanowitsch (2006a)
FIRE / HEAT / A NATURAL FORCE	
INSANITY / DISEASE	
A DANGEROUS ANIMAL / A SLEEPING ORGANISM	
AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) / A HIDDEN ENEMY / A SOCIAL SUPERIOR	Kövecses (1990) and Esenova (2011)
A PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE	Kövecses (1990)
TRESPASSING	Kövecses (1990)
A BURDEN	Kövecses (1990)
A FUNCTIONING MACHINE	Kövecses (1990)
COLD	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
LIGHT / DARKNESS	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY)	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
GORGE	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
SHARP OBJECT	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
PLANT	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
COLOR (OF SOMETHING IN A CONTAINER)	Esenova (2011)
CHILD (IN MOTHER-CONTAINER)	Esenova (2011)
A SUPERNATURAL BEING	Esenova (2011)
A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE	Esenova (2011)

It is with this overview that we now turn to the results for the present case study on ANGER in New Englishes.

5.2   Metaphor Profiles for ANGER

The following section provides an initial overview of ANGER metaphors of the type 2 kind (see Section 4.1.4) found for all varieties in the GloWbE. This introductory glance is the first step in answering the research questions: 1) What conceptual metaphors exist for ANGER in New English, as evidenced by corpus data, and 2) Does a comparison across New English varieties reveal what is conceptually shared and/or what is conceptually different across the varieties? In fact, the creation of the metaphor profiles for each variety sets up the means of comparison across New English varieties along with the (former) norm-providing variety, British English, by directing the analysis along broader conceptual categories to, later on in this chapter, a breakdown into different levels of granularity.

For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which contained the target domain lexical items *anger, annoyance*, *fury*, *irritation*, *rage*, *resentment*, or *wrath*. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. Table 5.2 provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these metaphors, as well as their absolute frequencies and relative frequencies (in percent) for each variety. Table 5.2 also serves to illustrate the so-called metaphor profiles for ANGER metaphors in each variety and provides insight into the variety-specific source domain preferences.

Table 5.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in ANGER metaphors per variety

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG	total
Fluid In a Container	30 (20%)	35 (23.3%)	37 (24.7%)	31 (20.7%)	28 (18.7%)	161 (21.5%)
Food / Drink	6 (4%)	3 (2%)	1 (0.7%)	3 (2%)	3 (2%)	16 (2.1%)
Illness	17 (11.3%)	19 (12.7%)	8 (5.3%)	22 (14.7%)	17 (11.3%)	83 (11.1%)
Natural Force	26 (17.3%)	15 (10%)	13 (8.7%)	23 (15.3%)	17 (11.3%)	94 (12.5%)
Part of a Journey	4 (2.7%)	1 (0.7%)	1 (0.7%)	6 (4%)	5 (3.3)	17 (2.3%)
Person	32 (21.3%)	43 (28.7%)	47 (31.3)	36 (24%)	41 (27.3%)	199 (26.5%)
Possession	2 (1.3%)	1 (0.7%)	7 (4.7%)	5 (3.3%)	3 (2%)	18 (2.4%)
Punishment	3 (2%)	9 (6%)	3 (2%)	5 (3.3%)	9 (6%)	29 (3.9%)
Supernatural Being / Religious Practice	1 (0.7%)	6 (4%)	4 (2.7%)	5 (3.3%)	4 (2.7%)	20 (2.7%)
Weapon	24 (16%)	10 (6.7%)	17 (11.3%)	11 (7.3%)	17 (11.3%)	79 (10.5%)
Misc.	5 (3.3%)	8 (5.3%)	12 (8%)	3 (2%)	6 (4%)	34 (4.5%)
total	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**750**

Note that the "miscellaneous" category contains instances that did not contribute in large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., "metaphorical hapax legomena", as in (44) and (45), which seem to be of an innovative or novel kind, or those metaphors with a source domain that showed up less than five times in a single variety, as in (46) and (47).

(44) We know that **anger** can be a kind of *compost* […] (SG G) → ANGER IS COMPOST

(45) *A mask of* **anger** fell over his face, tightening his lips before he turned away. (NG G) → ANGER IS A MASK

(46) In such a situation you have lost substantial votes and *reaped* **resentment**. (KE G) → ANGER IS A PLANT

(47) He should not allow the **anger** to *take deep root* in his Antahkarana for a long time. (IN G) → ANGER IS A PLANT

Not taking into account the miscellaneous metaphors (which do not represent a cohesive group anyway), the metaphor profiles show that all varieties make use of the range of source domains for conceptualizing ANGER metaphors. In terms of source domain preference, the two highest ranked source domains are the same for all varieties, namely PERSON and A FLUID IN A CONTAINER. In British English they are almost equally present (32 (21.3%) for PERSON and 30 (20%) for A FLUID IN A CONTAINER). It was to be expected that PERSON and FLUID emerge as the most prominent source domains, considering the pervasiveness of personification as an ontological metaphor (Kövecses 2010: 39). This also coheres with Lakoff's claim that ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is the "central metaphor" for the metaphorical system of ANGER (Lakoff 1987a: 283). The current results confirm this centrality of both source domains in ANGER metaphors, although we can note that personification functions to attribute human characteristics to non-human beings (Kövecses 2010: 39) and, thus, cannot necessarily be compared to the specificity of A FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

Differences in the rankings, which were based on the frequencies in Table 5.2, start to become visible when considering the other source domains involved in conceptualizing ANGER. For instance, the third most frequent source domain is NATURAL FORCE in GB and IN, ILLNESS in NG, and WEAPON in KE. For the SG data, all three of these source domains occupy the third rank. In fact, PERSON, A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, and WEAPON emerge as the most salient source domains for all varieties.

However, considering the top five most frequently used source domains for all varieties collectively, there is a discernable overlap among preferred domains. Table 5.3 illustrates this.

Table 5.3: Five highest ranked ANGER source domains per variety

Rank	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
(1)	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON
(2)	FLUID	FLUID	FLUID	FLUID	FLUID
(3)	NATURAL FORCE	ILLNESS	WEAPON	NATURAL FORCE	ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE & WEAPON
(4)	WEAPON	NATURAL FORCE	NATURAL FORCE	ILLNESS	-
(5)	ILLNESS	WEAPON	ILLNESS	WEAPON	-
total % of metaphor profile	85.9%	81.4%	81.3%	82%	79.9%

PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and WEAPON are shared as the most frequently used source domains by all of the varieties and, as such, constitute the bulk of all data for each variety (between 79.9% to 85.9%).

Nevertheless, in view of their slightly different rankings, the distribution of the shared top five source domains was analyzed for any significant differences. Figure 5.1 illustrates this distribution on the basis of the absolute frequencies.

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
PERSON	32	43	47	36	41
FLUID	30	35	37	31	28
ILLNESS	17	19	8	22	17
NATURAL FORCE	26	15	13	23	17
WEAPON	24	10	17	11	17

Figure 5.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (shared) source domains in ANGER metaphors per variety

Since the data is in normal distribution, an analysis of variance was also conducted but the difference between the varieties was not significant (for $F_{(4, 20)} = 0.01636135$, $p < 0.05$). However, since up to this point we have been considering

broadly formulated source domains at a more general level (i.e., in some way related to the source domain at hand), it is plausible that differences start to emerge at a more fine-grained level for which the used methodology allows. Therefore, a finer-grained look at these broader domains has more potential to answer the question if these metaphors have been instantiated in a culture-specific (or at least variety-specific) way.

Before we delve into this finer-grained analysis, to which the following subsections that explore the so-called "specific-level" metaphors will be devoted, consider the individual percentages of the top five source domains shared across the varieties, which is illustrated in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Percentages of top five (shared) source domains in ANGER metaphors per variety

PERSON and FLUID basically behave the same way across the varieties (i.e., they occupy the first and second rank, respectively, for all varieties and constitute between 41.3% and 56% of all metaphorical data). ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and WEAPON offer a slightly different picture. These three source domains make up 44.6% of the GB data, which is more than the GB data for PERSON and FLUID combined (41.3%). Ranging from 44.7% to 56%, PERSON and FLUID provide the majority of metaphorical data of the top five source domains in the four New Englishes, while ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and WEAPON, taken together, provide 25.3% to 37.3% (as compared to 44.6% in GB). Considering their varied

rankings, a chi-square test was performed for ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and WEAPON with the absolute frequencies for each variety, which revealed no significant differences in distribution ($x^2 = 11.848$, df = 8, $p = 0.158$).

So far, the focus has been on the absolute and relative frequencies in the metaphor profiles of each variety, which show that the top five source domains are shared across the varieties and contribute the most metaphorical data to each individual profile. However, when considering the normalized frequencies, we receive another perspective on some potential differences in source domain preference between the varieties.

Figure 5.3: Normalized frequencies of ANGER metaphors to 100%

As Figure 5.3 demonstrates, there are differences across the varieties in terms of their relation to the average percentage of each source domain, especially for those source domains that are not in the top five ranking for each variety. This could provide some indication for variety-specific preferences for these source domains. Yet, it should be kept in mind that their absolute frequencies are, in general, low in comparison to the top five source domains. For instance, GB shows evidence of a preference for FOOD / DRINK, but this source domain contributed only 16 instances overall out of the 750. Likewise, the New English varieties show a preference for SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, especially NG and IN, vis-à-vis GB. However, this source domain contributed only 20 instances overall. Therefore, since source domains like FOOD / DRINK and

SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE do not contribute extensively to the individual metaphor profiles, and by extension to the entire dataset, it is difficult to assess if these are true preferences at present.

Considering the top five source domains shared by each variety, PERSON and FLUID IN A CONTAINER (again as the first and second ranks in all varieties) do not demonstrate major differences between the varieties, although the African varieties in both cases have slightly higher normalized frequencies for the African varieties. For ILLNESS, the biggest discrepancy is between IN, with the highest normalized frequency at 133%, and KE, with the lowest normalized frequency at 48%). The remaining varieties figure in closer to the mean with NG at 115% and SG and GB at 102%. GB has the highest normalized frequency of NATURAL FORCE at 138%, while the New Englishes follow in descending order, with IN well above the mean at 122% and with SG at 90%, NG at 80% and KE at 69% below the mean. GB also has the highest normalized frequency of WEAPON at 152%, while KE and SG are just above the mean at 108% and IN and NG are well below it with 70% and 63%, respectively. Taken together, this sets up the following assumptions: 1) PERSON and FLUID IN A CONTAINER do not seem to indicate any variety-specific preference or only slightly for the African varieties; 2) ILLNESS seems to be preferred by IN and (slightly less so) by NG; 3) NATURAL FORCE seems to be preferred by GB and (to some extent) by IN; 4) WEAPON seems to be preferred by GB.

Moreover, considering the broadness of these categories, further investigation is merited. As a reminder, the source domains were initially formulated as broad categories as a consequence of the annotation process of corpus data (see Section 4.1.4). It was only during later steps in the methodology that more specific levels (to varying degrees) emerged for the source domains found. In the following, we will breakdown each source domain individually and examine the results on a cross-variety basis.

5.3   Specific-Level ANGER Metaphors across Varieties

The above analysis of the broadly formulated source domains has not revealed any clear-cut variation on the whole for conceptualizing ANGER. In fact, it gives some

indication that they more likely share conceptualizations for ANGER in terms of the most frequent source domains, especially PERSON and FLUID IN A CONTAINER. However, a more in-depth look into the individual source domains is merited in order to be able to gauge if this similarity between the varieties holds. The following subsections are thus devoted to illustrating the inner structure of the source domain at hand via examples derived from the data. Individual subsections are provided for the most frequent source domains across all varieties, i.e., PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, NATURAL FORCE, WEAPON and ILLNESS. All remaining (infrequent) metaphors will be discussed together as "minor metaphors", as their absolute frequencies were low and, therefore, although existent in the metaphor profiles of all or some of the varieties, they contributed little in terms of the overall metaphorical content and, thus, make them less sufficient candidates for variety-based comparison.

5.3.1   ANGER IS A PERSON

To reiterate a point made above, it is not surprising that PERSON is the most prominent source domain for ANGER, considering that personification is pervasive as an ontological metaphor in general (Kövecses 2010: 39). Yet, this pervasive aspect tells us little about what can be defined as personification. A few thoughts on this are necessary before we turn to a specific-level breakdown of PERSON, as evidenced by the GloWbE data, because these thoughts directly relate to the decision-making process involved in deeming an utterance as belonging to the source domain PERSON or not.

Dorst (2011), after reviewing various definitions of personification, states:

> [W]hat counts as personification will depend greatly on the analysts' field of research (psychology, literature, linguistics, visual arts) and on whether personification is studied at the linguistic, conceptual, communicative or cognitive level. One essential factor seems to be the assignment of agency via a violation of selection restrictions. Such selection restrictions play a central role during linguistic analysis, while the specification of a particular agent occurs primarily at a conceptual level. (Dorst 2011: 117).

What is important to adopt from this insight for the present study is that, during linguistic analysis, agency can be assigned (and, thus, personification determined) when considering the role of selection restrictions and word class. "We personify

when we metaphorically ascribe agency to normally inanimate objects, turning non-existent or imaginary entities into realistic actors or agents" (Hamilton 2002: 411 cited in Dorst 2011: 116). During linguistic analysis, this ascription of agency can be accomplished via the selection restrictions and attention to word class.

Dorst (2011) illustrates this with metaphorical examples analyzed with MIPVU that have counterparts in the present study. I will first discuss Dorst's examples and, following her lead, apply them to examples from the GloWbE data. Importantly, by applying MIPVU, "there should be a non-human contextual sense […] and a basic human sense" that are available for contrast and comparison when analyzing an utterance for a personification metaphor (118). Dorst's examples are illustrated in (48) and (49).

(48) She has an obsession with the **drug** that verges on monomania. She tells me she needs to understand it if she's going to *defeat* it. (BNC-Baby: CCW)
(49) She studies the **drug**, you know? Like it was her *enemy*. (BNC-Baby: CCW)

(Dorst 2011: 117)

Both examples illustrate the personification of DRUG as an ENEMY. In (48) "the personification results from the fact that the verb *defeat* normally requires both a human subject (a human agent) and a human direct object (a human patient). The personification […] is thus realized via the selection restrictions of the verb", i.e., due to the argument structure of the verb (Dorst 2011: 119–120). Dorst provides a visualization of this analysis, replicated in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Personification derived from the argument structure of the verb (adapted from Dorst 2011: 120)

For (49) Dorst claims a more "straightforward entity-to-entity mapping between a human source domain […] and a non-human target" via "the nominal

comparison at the linguistic level [which] closely resembles the nominal conceptual structure" (119). She further maintains that this type of mapping may be more salient to the metaphor analyst than (48) and illustrates its straightforwardness, as replicated in Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.5: Personification set up by a noun-to-noun comparison (adapted from Dorst 2011: 119)

Dorst (2011) discusses another example on the linguistic level that can be directly compared to data from the GloWbE. Example (50) illustrates the personification of plants on the basis of a linguistic metaphor entailing adjectives (and also a verb).

(50) Leaves and yellow blossoms obscured the top of the window, while the bottom was covered by *aggressive* pink **hollyhocks**, seemingly *determined* to *fight* their way inside. (BNC-Baby: FPB)

(Dorst 2011: 120)

Adjectives (like *aggressive* and *determined*) and actions as denoted by verbs (like *fight*) directly link to the agency of a person. A person, who is characterized as aggressive and determined to fight, will, in our experience, likely carry out actions in accordance with this characterization, which in (50) is mapped onto the non-human entity of plants.

These three examples from Dorst (2011) have informed decisions on the personification status of the following examples in the ANGER dataset (and those similar to it). (51) illustrates personification derived from the argument structure of the verb, similar to (48) above.

(51) No man in this world can *conquer* **anger**. (IN G)

Here, personification is derived from the argument structure of the verb *conquer*, which necessitates having a human patient, which is then mapped onto ANGER, sanctioning the personification reading. The basic dictionary sense highlights the human aspect as well: "to take control of land or people using soldiers" (*Macmillan* online dictionary)

(52) illustrates the entity-to-entity mapping as expressed by a noun-to-noun correspondance, similar to (49) above.

(52) **Anger** is the greatest *enemy* of man. (IN G)

anger and *enemy* are in a noun-to-noun correspondence in this linguistic metaphor, which points to the entity-to-entity mapping on the conceptual level. The conceptual structure of ENEMY obviously entails a human (agent) in its most basic sense.

(53) – (54) illustrate a linguistic metaphor realized by metaphorically used adjectives, similar to (50) above.

(53) And the more sinful a man is becoming, the more *violent* his **anger** would become (NG G)
(54) They even act to help those in distress and they feel guilt, pride and *righteous* **anger** (SG B)

The adjectives *violent* and *righteous* are attributes readily used to characterize human beings. *violent*, in its most basic sense, is defined as "someone who is violent often gets into fights and attacks people" (*Macmillan* online dictionary). *righteous* is defined as "morally good or correct, especially according to standards set by religion" (*Macmillan* online dictionary) – a characteristic most likely to be given to people in our most basic experience, although the definition here does not directly indicate this. (Note, however, that the example given by *Macmillan* for this definition is "righteous people".) Furthermore, while *righteous anger*, in terms of its phraselogy, may be considered highly conventional, its metaphorical status still holds. Dorst (2011) provides a guideline here as well: "Personifications that are so conventional and automatic that we hardly notice them should not be disregarded, and the fact that an expression may not be processed as a personification or give

rise to a full conceptualization should not mean that the linguistic personification is ignored" (133). Therefore, even highly conventional personification, such as in (54), was considered as metaphorical in the data.

These insights provide a better understanding for why personification is so prevalent. Its status as an ontological metaphor that can be variously realized on the basis of direct mapping, as well as via argument structure and word class, opens up a lot of linguistic opportunities to reflect the conceptualization of EMOTION as a PERSON. This is at least the case for ANGER, as is demonstrated below.

Occupying the first rank for all varieties and comprising 26.5% of the total ANGER data, PERSON emerges as the most prominent source domain across all varieties. Figure 5.6 illustrates the percentages of PERSON metaphors in the metaphor profile of each variety.

Figure 5.6: Percentages of ANGER IS A PERSON per variety

As discussed in Section 5.2, PERSON is to be understood as an intentionally broad source domain category that requires a more fine-grained analysis in order to understand it more fully. So far, PERSON has been acting as a shorthand for personification metaphors and, as of yet, has not been fully explained in terms of its allocation to the human domain. When attempting to determine if the basic sense of a source domain lexical item in an ANGER linguistic metaphor reflects the domain of HUMAN BEINGS, some ambiguity remains. Dorst (2011) puts it this way, "it may not always be clear whether a basic sense should be interpreted as human only, human and animal, sentient beings, animate beings, concrete entities, and so forth" (118). Therefore, as will become apparent from Table 5.4 below, there is some conflation with HUMAN and ANIMAL in the GloWbE data, although the

majority of PERSON metaphors have been deemed as related to human experience. The reasoning for adding ANIMAL to the PERSON category has to do with a widened sense of personification, as I see it, i.e, the process of attributing qualities, including agency, of sentient or animate beings to something abstract, like EMOTIONS, which also conceptually belong in the realm of sentient experience. This brings to the forefront another aspect to be addressed. If EMOTIONS are part and parcel to the experience of humans (and animals), then we should also consider the role of metonymic readings of the following metaphors.

> Although it remains an empirical question whether personifications are processed as metaphors or metonymies or both, a study by Dorst, Mulder and Steen (submitted) on the recognition of personifications by non-expert readers showed that readers refer to both metaphoric and metonymic readings in their interpretations and indicate that the metonymic reading yields additional stylistic information in the interpretation of personification (Dorst 2011: 117).

Consider a metonymic reading of the example *righteous anger*, listed as (54) above. A conceivable alternative analysis to *righteous anger* as a metaphor is viewing it as a metonymy, i.e., the righteousness aspect of personhood encompasses the feeling of anger (= metonymy). Yet, as Dorst (2011) states, "the important question is whether a metonymic reading and a metaphorical reading may not sometimes be equally plausible and occur alongside each other" (115-116). Therefore, for (54), righteousness entailing the feeling of anger or righteous anger standing in for the righteous person, as metonymies, could be just as plausible as anger itself being conceived of in terms of a righteous person, as a metaphor. An important point, reiterated by Dorst (2011: 115), is that the difference between metaphor and metonymy is not always clear cut and has been found to interact with each other to some extent (see Goosens 1990, 2002). This makes it, of course, difficult for the metaphor analyst, which is a point also conceded by the Pragglejaz Group in the evaluation of their initial MIP procedure (2007: 31). Nevertheless, I personally have been lead to annotate examples like *righteous anger*, like in (54), as metaphorical on the basis of metaphorical and metonymic readings being able to stand alongside each other, as Dorst (2011) maintains, as well as due to the fact that a clear-cut distinction between metaphor and metonymy remains difficult to ascertain. Furthermore, examples like (55), which I view as mixed metaphors and have annotated as such, occur in the data, which favors a more metaphorical reading of

righteous anger, by its juxtaposition to another type of ANGER metaphor, in this case FLUID.

(55) There's something about *righteous* **anger**; it *wells up* within us when we think about how we've been wronged by one artisan or the other but it does make you think about ourselves too. (NG G)[59]

Having established these aspects, which will also apply to the following case studies in Chapter 6 (FEAR) and Chapter 7 (HAPPINESS), we have arrived at a point where PERSON can sensibly be broken down into its component metaphors. Table 5.4 provides an overview of the specific levels that have been gleaned for ANGER metaphors from the GloWbE data, along with the absolute frequencies across varieties. It should be noted that I do not consider this breakdown exhaustive. Many other conceptual correspondences between PERSON and ANGER, beyond what Table 5.4 demonstrates, are plausible and are surely reflected in language use. Simply put, this breakdown reveals what is most common in the varieties data from the GloWbE and is, therefore, the basis for our cross-variety comparison.

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[59] Note that, in terms of annotation, I have counted this single utterance as instantiating two metaphors, which are mixed. *righteous* was annotated as a single instance of PERSON and *wells up* was annotated as a single instance of FLUID. That they happened to occur within the context of a single utterance was inconsequential for my research, since I did not aim at uncovering the communicative function of doing so and was merely interested in what conceptualizations occur. However, it should be noted that these types of mixed metaphors were relatively infrequent in the data, i.e., the majority of utterances reflect only one conceptual metaphor.

Table 5.4: Breakdown of ANGER IS A PERSON[60]

PERSON	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	0	0	0	0
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	3	0	3
PERSON - BEING APPEASED / CALMED - specific-level (= level 2)	1	2	4	1	7
PERSON - COMPANION - specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	1	2	2
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= level 2)	2	8	8	2	5
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	1	0	0
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	0	0	1
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	0	3	0	3	0
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	5	7	13	13	8
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	0	1	2	0	1
BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) (= level 3)	3	0	1	1	2
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	1	3	1	3	0
FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE (= level 3)	0	3	5	1	0
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	1	1	1	2	0
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	2	4	0	4	2
WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)	0	2	0	0	0
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	1	1	2	3	1
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	0	0	1
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level (= level 2)	3	0	1	0	2
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= level 2)	4	1	1	0	1
Misc. - **ANGER TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	4	4	3	0	3
Misc. - **ANGER INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	1	0	0	1	2
total	**32**	**43**	**47**	**36**	**41**

The first notable result in this breakdown is that none of the varieties conceptualize ANGER as a PERSON on a very generic level (= level 1), e.g., *anger is a person, animal, being*, etc. The metaphorical bulk of PERSON is found on the specific levels (= level 2), which collectively act as a snapshot of what Kövecses (2010)

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[60]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.

calls "a main meaning focus" of conceptual metaphors: "[T]he main meaning focus represents some basic knowledge concerning a source that is widely shared in the speech community, that can be found in most instances of the source, and that uniquely characterizes the source" (Kövecses 2010: 138).

Therefore, let us consider what each specific level in Table 5.4 is highlighting about our basic understanding of PERSON and consider examples from the data that illustrate how this aspect is mapped onto ANGER. To do so, I will first proceed in alphabetical order (as presented in Table 5.4) and will then consider the variety-specific perspective.

We begin with a metaphor that has not been attested by previous research outlined in Section 5.2. ANGER can be conceptualized as an ACCOMPLICE, albeit relatively infrequently (as is the case for the majority of the specific levels here). An accomplice is someone who is complicit with someone else in criminal or socially harmful behavior, which can lead to a situation in which one accomplice feels the need to protect (= *harbor*[61]) or betray the other, as illustrated by (56) and (57).

(56) SADAM why do you *harbour* so much **anger**???? (KE B)
(57) His book *betrays* **rage**, rage that all his sacrifices were going down the drain (KE B)

ANGER can be understood as a PERSON BEING APPEASED / CALMED, which also has a metonymic reading and relates indirectly to the AGITATION metonymy outlined by Kövecses (1990). In our basic dealings with angry people, the agitated state manifests itself visibly (e.g., shaking) and it is common to take action to calm a visibly agitated person through acts of appeasement, as illustrated in (58) and (59).

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[61] The basic definition for *harbor* [V] in the *Macmillan* online dictionary is "to protect someone who has done something wrong". This is further supported by a collocational analysis in the GloWbE, where *harbor* [V] collocates 308 times with either a general term denoting a human being, like *people*, or with terms indicating the unlawful connotation: *terrorists*, *criminal*, *fugitive*, *rebels*, *dissidents*. Incidentally, this is higher than the top two collocations, which have a figurative meaning: *ambitions* (155 tokens) and *feelings* (111 tokens).

(58) No amount of ill-gotten wealth or blood money will *pacify* the outstretched hand of God's **anger**; no amount of offering and sacrifices will turn the face of God to favor those who feed on the flesh of others! (NG G)

(59) […] they know that the resentment of Sporeans towards the PAP are still strong... thats why every single Ministers doing a good post GE wayang getai show now to *appease* the **anger** of many Sporeans. (SG B)

Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, ANGER can also be seen as a COMPANION, e.g., a person being courted, as in (60), or partaking in companion-like rituals, as in (61). This mapping was not demonstrated by the outlined previous research.

(60) To do otherwise is to *court* the **wrath** of the people who can hardly afford a three-square meal daily. (NG G)

(61) **Resentment** *presented me with* another *gift* of being stubborn, the refusal to re-examine the situation […] (IN G)

ANGER can take on animalistic features, mostly of the potentially dangerous kind, as in (62) and (63), because an unencumbered animal (like Kövecses' (1990) DANGEROUS ANIMAL) or one that has been aroused from sleep (like Stefanowitsch's (2006a) SLEEPING ORGANISM) entails an ensuing attack in our experience with dangerous animals. However, not previously taken into account is that ANGER can also be conceptualized in a more inert way, as in an animal, like a cow, that is being taken advantage of, as in (64).

(62) Our nation, once a land exciting and exuding hope, confidence, pride and patriotism, has gradually become a dungeon that *arouses* the **anger** and melancholy of her citizens. (NG G)

(63) Given the chance, I am convinced that Nigerians abroad will not choose to remain silent, helpless witnesses to the *deadly* **fury** *unleashed on* unsuspecting Lagosians. (NG G)

(64) Obama was smart to *ride* that **anger** and *milk* it. He timed his candidacy well. (IN B)

Also previously unaccounted for is that ANGER can also be a HELPER, but in a more specific sense than a COMPANION (albeit, perhaps related, since a companion would also in specific instances act as a helper). Nevertheless, HELPER was annotated separately from COMPANION on the basis of the more specific

theme of rescuing someone in trouble, as in (65), or keeping someone from trouble, as in (66).

(65) S. T. Davis argues that the **wrath** of God *rescues* us from just such a moral relativism by showing us that right and wrong are objectively real and pointing us to the moral significance of our deeds. (GB G)

(66) Our **anger** *restores* our pride and our pride is what *keeps us grounded*. (KE G)

ANGER is a person involved in the political realm, which could call up a metonymic reading as well. ANGER in (67) stands in for the electorate, while (68) speaks of the politics attributable to a politician.

(67) […] a mild anger in Britain, an **anger** that could conceivably *elect* Buchanan in America. (GB G)

(68) The "us" versus "them" mentality has grown stronger since the 2011 General Elections. Unfortunately, the *politics of* **resentment** *can only go so far*. (SG B)

There was no previous attestation for this specific-level PERSON metaphor, but since it is very infrequent, i.e., restricted to these two instances above, it is not surprising that it has not previously been discussed in terms of a cognitive model of ANGER. Furthermore, by allowing for personification in general as a metaphorical mechanism, we have to concede all manner of human existence and experience is available for personification, if it is sanctioned by the particular discourse circumstances, i.e., in the case of (67) and (68) discourse about elections.

The creation or development of ANGER is highlighted by conceptualizing it as OFFSPRING. (69) illustrates that its relatedness to the ANIMAL domain, by conceiving of ANGER in terms of (large-scale) breeding, while (70) allocates responsibility for the arrival of ANGER in terms of birth (where the birthing mother in this instance is also a personified abstract concept).

(69) Putting all the blame on Awo for their suffering during the war won't help Igbo people; it will only *breed* **resentment** towards them in Yorubas. (NG G)

(70) Sooner or later they fall from these heights and then we want to trample them in the dirt. It is an **anger** *born from* disappointed admiration. (IN B)

Esenova (2011) postulated ANGER IS A CHILD as a subcategory of CONTAINMENT due to the nature of pregnancy and birth: A pregnant or birthing mother acts as a CONTAINER to the CHILD, which is mapped onto ANGER. However, utterances like (69) and (70) were not annotated in the present study in the sense of CONTAINMENT (along with the mirror image metaphor ANGER IS A PARENT in (73) and (74) below), because from the linguistic evidence I believe the CONTAINMENT sense is not in focus. For ANGER IS OFFSPRING, the onset of angry feelings is being highlighted, which suggested to me the creation process of bearing offspring over the containment sense, which is albeit indirectly conveyed.

To a large extent, ANGER is conceptualized as an OPPONENT in this study, which confirms previous findings by Kövecses (1990) and Stefanowitsch (2006a), as well as Esenova (2011), who postulates ANGER as a HIDDEN ENEMY, which I view as a specific-level instantiation of OPPONENT. This has mostly to do with the oppositional aspects of ANGER, which make sense in our basic experience. ANGER, expressed inappropriately, is widely considered a socially destructive emotion and as such needs to be opposed to in the individual or in society as a whole. Therefore, "the regulation and appropriate expression of anger are key developmental tasks. Individuals must learn their culture's 'display rules,' which concern when, to whom, and how to express emotions in culturally acceptable ways" (Lemerise & Dodge 2008: 730–731). This regulation takes on an oppositional character because anger exists and attempts have to be made to control it, so that it is appropriately expressed or not at all. (71) makes the confrontation inherent in experiencing anger and controlling anger for the individual apparent. (72) puts the focus on the confrontational aspect of behaving badly coupled with a negative societal response.

(71) […] keep an open attitude and sunny outlook in order to help *fight* negative emotions like **anger**, fear and guilt. (SG B)
(72) As it is in kenya now, you either deal with people with dignity or *face* the **wrath**. (KE B)

However, it should be noted that the ANGER IS AN OPPONENT metaphors are the only type of PERSON metaphors that can be broken down into further meaning

foci components (= level 3), which will be considered in more detail later in this section.

Conceptually related to OFFSPRING, ANGER can also be viewed as the PARENT, which was not discussed in the previous research outlined in Section 5.1. In this sense, ANGER is understood as responsible for having created something, like angry critics on social media, as in (73), or, even positively, as creating "something beautiful", in (74), although this reading is the result of the mixed metaphor with COMPOST.

(73) […] the idle and idling, twittering, collective *children of* **anger**, the distracted crowd of Facebook addicts, the BBM-pinging soap opera gossips of Nigeria […]. (NG G)
(74) We know that **anger** can be a kind of compost, and that **it** is within its power to *give birth to* something beautiful. (SG G)

ANGER, as a PERSON WITH THE ABILITY TO SPEAK, can also invoke a metonymic reading and was not previously discussed. The *collective voice* attributable to ANGER in (75) could stand in for the angry people themselves, while the same is true for ANGER greeting in (76). Example (77), however, seems to relate ANGER to a person inside oneself that screams, which solidifies a more metaphorical reading, particularly since what it is saying is quoted.

(75) We acknowledged common ground on this and more, reflecting on how hope and **anger** could *find collective voice*. (GB B)
(76) […] a new paradigm of citizenship in a country where resignation and cynicism (if not resentment and **anger**) *greets* any mention of politics (KE G)
(77) My tormented mind, wanting to reveal the truth, **anger** *screams* in my head... "Out with it... OUT with it... " (SG B)

ANGER can be personified as a PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS or WHO IS DYING. Not only is the death itself highlighted, as in (78), but also something related to ILLNESS, like blindness in (79), for which Kövecses (1990) pinpoints a metonymic relationship (ANGER IS INTERFERENCE WITH ACCURATE PERCEPTION). Furthermore, conceptually related and thus viewed as belonging to this particular categorization, is (80), which encodes the experience of taking care of someone who is ill or dying, i.e., nursing a person to health or a positive

physical state, such as, in this case, being warm. This particular mapping was not found in the previous research.

(78) When did you die? Is Jesus living in you now? Has your **anger** *died*? (NG G)

(79) […] I once threatened to smash the window of a car - acts of *blind* **rage** I still regret today. (SG B)

(80) And should this come to pass, then like Tam's Kate, this one will be *nursing* her **wrath** to *keep* **it** *warm* for a very long time to come. (GB B)

In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous categories within the broad ANGER IS A PERSON metaphor that concern various characteristics and actions that can be attributed to human beings. They were considered miscellaneous because they were not easily characterized by the other specific levels and do not display any conceptual cohesion within themselves. They also provide evidence for the relative freedom of personification to select aspects of human experience for metaphorization that are perhaps not as central to the cognitive model of an emotion, but can arise in an appropriate discourse context. (81) and (82) illustrate ANGER TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON; (83) and (84) illustrate ANGER INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON.

(81) The exposures grow by the day. So does the citizens *righteous* **anger**. (SG G)

(82) […] the resentment appears to have morphed into an intense, almost *irrational* **rage**. (SG B)

(83) This feeling of **rage** and hopelessness is what *flips the switch* for 4th Prince […]. (SG G)

(84) All the best to you. May you *stump* [= confuse, BAG] **anger** today! (IN G)

In terms of how the varieties compare regarding these above outlined specific-level instantiations of ANGER IS A PERSON, the unfortunate consequence of such a breakdown is that the frequencies available for comparison become relatively small. For instance, ANGER AS A HELPER, PERSON IN POLITICS and PARENT have no more than 2 or 3 instances. It would, therefore, be problematic to assume variety preferences on the basis of infrequency. For example, all three instances of PARENT show up in New English varieties only, in this case NG and SG, but this exclusivity is merely due to the infrequency with

which the GloWbE varieties has evidenced this mapping. It does not lead to the assumption that ANGER IS A PARENT can only be instantiated by New English varieties, especially since the constructions *breed* EMOTION or *born from / of* EMOTION do not strike me as a speaker of American English as culturally specific and, in fact, seem perfectly conventional and as possible utterances from other variety speakers. It is just that they are not attestable with the GloWbE data at hand beyond NG and SG.

A similar situation holds for the rest of the specific levels, with the exception of OPPONENT. ANGER IS AN OPPONENT emerges as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A PERSON based on the fact that with 101 total tokens, it makes up just over half of the PERSON metaphor grouping – 50.75% to be precise.

Furthermore, as Table 5.5 demonstrates, there are differences between varieties when conceptualizing ANGER as AN OPPONENT in comparison to the other types of PERSON (ex. ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, OFFSPRING, PARENT, etc.)

Table 5.5: Absolute frequencies of OPPONENT as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A PERSON

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
OPPONENT	13	22	25	27	14
PERSON (other)	19	21	22	9	27
total	**32**	**43**	**47**	**36**	**41**

A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.5 and revealed that the observed differences are significant (x^2 = 14.42, df = 4, *p* = 0.006068). It is striking that among all the varieties, the lowest proportion of OPPONENT metaphors is found in SG (34% of all PERSON metaphors) and GB (41% of all PERSON metaphors). The percentages in the other three New English varieties are much larger (NG with 51%, KE with 53% and IN with 75%). This perhaps indicates that the majority of the New Englishes, most prominently the Indian variety, tend to prefer conceptualizing ANGER as AN OPPONENT. Moreover, this leads us to look closer at the domain of OPPONENT.

As indicated above, OPPONENT can be broken down into different meaning foci, which are repeated in Table 5.6 for convenience.

Table 5.6: Breakdown of ANGER IS AN OPPONENT per variety

OPPONENT	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	5	7	13	13	8
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	0	1	2	0	1
BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) (= level 3)	3	0	1	1	2
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	1	3	1	3	0
FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE (= level 3)	0	3	5	1	0
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	1	1	1	2	0
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	2	4	0	4	2
WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)	0	2	0	0	0
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	1	1	2	3	1
total	**13**	**22**	**25**	**27**	**14**

All varieties make use of ANGER IS AN OPPONENT most frequently in the most general oppositional sense: ANGER is understood as an enemy or an opponent to be encountered. This is illustrated in the following examples.

(85) Many wronged householders were therefore instrumental in saving the lives of burglars and other felons who *faced* the full **wrath** of the so-called 'bloody code'. (GB B)

(86) […] the Senate expressing shock and surprise at the latest development, warning the legal body to desist or *face* the **wrath** of the Federal lawmakers. (NG B)

(87) Musieka revealed that it was under this tree that Shikuku made the prophecy warning that whoever would cut it down should be ready to *face* his **wrath**. (KE G)

(88) The Picasso of India had to *face* the **wrath** of hurting Hindu feelings and was compelled to live in exile till his death. (IN B)

(89) Anyone can *face* the **fury** of LKY…. anyone! (SG G)

In fact, making use of *face* to reflected the mapping ANGER IS AN OPPONENT constitutes the majority of metaphors of this kind (12 tokens (including *anger […]*

staring everyone in the face) in GB, all seven tokens in NG, eight tokens in KE, seven tokens in IN and 5 tokens (including *in the face of […] anger*) in SG), which speaks to its conventionality. Yet, the general oppositional meaning is also captured by the following examples, which demonstrate that this meaning can be encoded otherwise.

(90) Doyle's nervousness was *fighting with* **irritation** now. (GB G)

(91) […] he still *wrestles with* horrendous feelings of "**anger**, bitterness and yes, revenge" (GB G)

(92) I remember in primary school merely uttering the word "sex" was enough to *encounter* the **wrath** of an irate forty year old man wielding a cane […] (KE B)

(93) We *feared* his **wrath**, but we knew he was always on our side. (KE G)

(94) […] actually forced politicians of this country to come down to earth and **fear** the *wrath* of the people. (IN G)

(95) […] **anger** is a more *powerful foe* than desire. (IN G)

(96) The *greatest enemies* of the spiritual aspirant are wealth, sex, fame and **anger**. (IN G)

(97) And I have really been enduring an unwarranted *onslaught of* **anger** and spitefulness - knowing that the other person is intentionally taking it out on me. (SG G)

(98) I *struggle* a lot *with* unholy **anger**, especially on days where the kids are being difficult […] (SG G)

Level 3, as demonstrated in Table 5.6, retains the general oppositional meaning attached to ANGER AS AN OPPONENT, but highlights more specific focal meaning. The frequencies here are also very low, so that statistical analysis is difficult from a variety-specific perspective. Yet, they are nevertheless part of the metaphorical inventory of OPPONENT and are thus illustrated by examples (99) - (114) below.

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*A HIDDEN ENEMY*)

(99) "Okay now Joanne. Hold on", I said **anger** and righteous indignation *creeping in.* (KE G)

(100) However, more often than we like to admit, our own agenda *creeps in*, and along with that, unholy **anger**. (SG G)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*BEING CONTROLLED BY FORCE*)

(101) Even otherwise (if you are not a spiritual seeker) you tend to *suppress* **anger** (after it is born) to promote particular professional or social image. (IN G)

(102) Girls were taught to be obedient and *suppress* their **anger**. However, one should rage when one needs to. (SG G)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT*)

(103) A *major casualty of* the **fury** in Muslim nations over a movie made in the United State which insulted the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.) was the U.S Ambassador and three other US citizens. (NG B)

(104) […] the **anger** against the media *can turn vicious and dangerous* to the lives of media persons […] (IN B)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE*)

(105) Even after moving elections to 2013, I promise them that they'll not *escape* the **wrath** of Kenyans. (KE B)

(106) […] his obsequious servitors and promoters were forced to *flee* the **wrath** of the people. (NG G)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO EXERTS CONTROL*)

(107) **Anger** *makes everybody its slave and victim*. (IN G)

(108) There is no sign of righteousness, love, peace and hope, but injustice, unrighteousness, hate, **anger**, resentment, bitterness, evil, wickedness, violence, killings, and hopelessness *reign supreme* in every household, neighborhood and city. (NG B)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST*)

(109) The people *stood down* the **rage** of shibboleths and political predators to claim their state and it is a wakeup call for all Nigerians […] (NG G)

(110) At times they are able to *overcome* their **anger** and other negative emotions and sometimes such emotions overpower them. (IN G)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS IN PURSUIT*)

(111) […] their activities had been on the increase, while urging those still in the trade to stop it as the **wrath** of the law would soon *catch up* with them. (NG G)

(112) In recent literary history, one can think of only one parallel - the zealous **fury** that *hounded* Salman Rushdie after the publication of Satanic Verses. (NG B)

ANGER IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS PREVAILING*)

(113) If you loved me indulgently you would buy two cheap plates every month, place them within reach and point me in their direction when my **anger** *got the better of me* (KE G)

(114) Perhaps they *fell victims to* the hatred and **rage** of the raiders. (IN G)

This concludes the ANGER IS A PERSON breakdown, in which ANGER IS

AN OPPONENT emerges as the most salient for all varieties. There was also

indication that it is a metaphor that is preferred (in the Kövecsesian (2005) sense) in the African and Indian varieties.

5.3.2   ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER has been widely attested to in previous research (e.g., Kövecses 1990 and Stefanowitsch 2006a), so it comes as no surprise that it features in the GloWbE data. A close second to PERSON, ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER comprises 21.5% of the total ANGER data (161 total tokens) and is ranked in second place in all varieties. Figure 5.7 shows the percentages of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER in the individual metaphor profiles of the varieties.

Figure 5.7: Percentages of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety

There are no striking differences between the varieties for this source domain. KE has the largest amount of FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 24.7%, directly followed by NG with 23.3%, IN with 20.7%, GB with 20% and SG with 18.7%.

FLUID IN A CONTAINER, as an initially broadly labelled source domain, can be broken down, see Table 5.7 below, into specific levels that contribute different meaning foci. All specific levels variously highlight aspects about what we understand about the properties of a fluid in a container.

Table 5.7: Breakdown of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER[62]

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	3	2	2	0	0
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)	3	1	1	2	2
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	3	4	4	4	5
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	0	0	1
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
FLUID BEING DISRUPTED - (= level 3)	1	2	0	1	0
FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)- (= level 3)	0	3	0	1	1
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER- (= level 3)	0	0	3	4	0
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	4	6	12	7	7
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= level 3)	7	9	11	9	11
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)	8	8	4	3	1
total	**30**	**35**	**37**	**31**	**28**

The most frequent specific level source domain for ANGER is expectedly HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (including its level 3s), especially for KE with 27 instances. This frequency of HOT FLUID within the FLUID IN A CONTAINER domain harkens back to Lakoff's (1987a) claim that it is a central mapping for ANGER, cited in Section 5.2 above. Yet, as Table 5.7 illustrates, not all specific level source domains had HEAT as an explicit meaning focus, as evidenced by examples from the GloWbE. Therefore, the broadest label that was given to this group of mappings was FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

FLUID IN A CONTAINER maps onto ANGER the general properties constituting our knowledge of how contained fluid behaves. We can select from these properties in the construction of linguistic metaphors in various ways. This can also occur in a very general way, as evidenced by the GB, NG, and KE examples below.

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[62]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.

(115) I was in complete bits and *filled with* **rage**. (GB B)

(116) […] the employees were the taps and he and the other contract employees were *the buckets into which* the **wrath** *poured*. (NG B)

(117) […] Wanjiku was *filled with* **anger** and picked a wooden plunk from the ground and hit Kodoosi on the head […] (KE G)

The act of filling a container is one of our most basic experiences with containers, hence the labelling of utterances like (115) – (117) as generic. Example (116) is particularly clear about the container being filled with a fluid by the use of *buckets* and *poured*. However, *filled with* in (115) and (117) leaves some ambiguity about the substance being put into the container, because a container can be filled with something else other than a fluid (i.e., filling a bucket with dirt when working in the garden). Therefore, a collocational analysis of *filled with* was conducted with the GloWbE, which revealed that it most frequently collocates with terms denoting some sort of fluid: *water* (595 tokens), *tears* (305 tokens), *fluid* (46 tokens) and *liquid* (33 tokens). This finding boosted my intuition that *filled with* + emotion term likely reflects a mapping from the source domain FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

The first two specific levels listed in Table 5.7, namely BODY FLUID and ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER, demonstrate that ANGER is also generally understood as a FLUID, but it can be specified in terms of natural body fluids or on the basis of a folk model related to ENERGY AS A FLUID. We will consider BODY FLUID first.

ANGER can be understood as a BODY FLUID, like bile and vomit, although not very frequently (the most tokens were found in GB with three and IN and SG with two each).

(118) It leaves a *bitter taste of biilious* [sic] **fury** in me. (GB G) → ANGER IS BILE

(119) Their *spewing* their **wrath** against Obama […] (IN G) → ANGER IS VOMIT

(120) […] Singaporeans who knew nothing about critical social and political thinking and could only degenerate themselves into loudmouths who had nothing useful to say but with **anger** *spewing out* in every direction. (SG B) → ANGER IS VOMIT

These largely indicate unpleasant bodily experiences with fluid. For instance, the taste of bile, like in (118), is bitter, and vomiting is obviously an unpalatable

experience (note that in (119) and (120) it is being mapped onto expressing anger, exploiting the image of someone expelling vomit).

The mapping of ANGER IS ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER presents a special case. The association between ANGER and a FLUID IN THE BODY is made by way of a folk model that dictates our (non-expert) understanding of ENERGY[63], namely ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID. For instance, electricity is an energy source that "is a familiar phenomenon" but "its mechanisms are essentially invisible" (Gentner & Gentner 1983: 107). Because we have no real visual access to the mechanisms of electricity, it is common to explain it in terms of flowing water (108)[64]. Furthermore, "[g]iven that electricity is not something we can directly observe, our intuitive understanding of it is indirect", which leads to metaphors that become part of our conventional and, thus, literal ways of thinking and talking about electricity (Lakoff 1986: 4). Examples from the GloWbE provide evidence for this.

(121) Since **anger** is <u>energy</u>, try to *channel* it positively - exercise, art, sports etc. (GB G)

(122) While they are investigating, let us take justice in our own hands, and *channel* our **anger** *towards* the government. (NG B)

(123) […] persuade me into believing as though 'everything is fine' so that the **anger** <u>energy</u> *subsides* […] (KE G)

(124) The **anger** must be *channelized* this way and not by killing others. (IN G)

(125) A movement that is *energized by* outrage, **wrath** and hostility can hardly be something that can truly move the hearts […] (SG B)

The third specific level shows that ANGER can be conceived of as a BODY OF WATER, which also implies CONTAINMENT, albeit less prototypically. The BODY OF WATER domain merges the concept of FLUID with the CONTAINER

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[63]   For differences between the novice and expert models of an energy source, like electricity, see, e.g., Stocklmayer & Treagust (1996). They also highlight the long attested tradition of teaching electricity via recourse to the FLUID domain. "Children coming into high school have a vague and often fearful image of electricity. Once they encounter formal circuitry they are required to understand a mechanistic model of electron movement through a wire which, by analogy and metaphor, is closely allied to fluid transfer. All the language of electricity reinforces this model" (176).

[64]   Gentner & Gentner (1983) demonstrate this by citing instructions for making a homemade lamp. "An electrical system can be compared to a water system. Water flows through the pipes of a water system. Electricity can be considered as 'flowing' through the wires of an electrical system. Wire is the pipe that electricity 'flows' through" (108).

itself, since, in our physical experiences with large bodies of water, it is difficult to disentangle the accumulation of water (like in a pond, river, ocean, etc.) with its geologically demarcated basins. Therefore, like in (126) and (127), ANGER is being conceptualized as something that has been vastly accumulated, like a reservoir of water.

(126) As the right *taps into* a *reservoir of* **anger** and resentment in our divided society, it is harder than ever for the left to get a hearing on practically anything. (GB G)

(127) Reservoirs of good will have been replaced with *reservoirs of* **anger** and resentment. (SG G)

This metaphor, however, was very infrequent. The examples above show the only two instances found.

A more frequent specific level is that of FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER (16 total tokens), which can be broken down further into the meaning foci of FLUID BEING DISRUPTED, FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) and FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER. Although linguistic metaphors similar to those in (128) – (136) have at times been lumped together as instantiating the domain of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (e.g., like *His pent-up anger welled up inside him* in Kövecses (1990: 53)), I made the decision to consider them separately. This is largely due to the fact that the linguistic surface of the examples below did not suggest to me the inclusion of the HEAT component, at least not explicitly. Furthermore, the focus here lies on our understanding of how a fluid can move (or be moved) in a container, which is then mapped onto ANGER.

ANGER IS FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING DISRUPTED

(128) Sylvain Distin *stirred* the **rage** of the Newcastle support by turning them down […] (GB G)

(129) […] the fact that the military government did not prosecute the officers that killed the northern leaders *stirred* further **rage**. (NG G)

(130) […]American-made video denigrating the Prophet Muhammad that has *stirred* **anger** across the Muslim world. (IN B)

ANGER IS FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)

(131) There's something about righteous **anger**; it *wells up* within us when we think about how we've been wronged by one artisan […] (NG G)

(132) Cain would always *swell with* **anger** anytime Michael referred to him as a small boy. (NG B)

(133) […] the amount of **rage** that *builds up* inside you can only be immense. (SG B)

ANGER IS FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER

(134) […] i will now again *pour forth* my **wrath** upon you Kenya […] (KE B)

(135) […] an **anger** that, through the unravelling of many other scams, has now *spilled on to* the streets of Indian towns and cities. (IN G)

(136) […] the **anger** of the common men and women of India began to *spill out on* the social web. (IN B)

The most frequent specific level, which also can be dissected further, is HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 107 of the total 161 tokens (or 66.5%). What is being conveyed here is that the intensity of an angry feeling can increase like a heated fluid in a container (e.g., water boiling in a pot on the stove). Examples (137) – (141) illustrate this.

(137) I read it through and I'm still *seething with* **anger** - and more importantly, I want to help. (GB G)

(138) Nigerians are unaware of the source of this loot, don't wait for the **anger** of the people to *boil over* before you make amends. (NG G)

(139) No, I am speaking for those of us who have been letting our **anger** *simmer* inside of us […] (KE G)

(140) *Long-simmering* **resentment** among Uighurs over rule by China's Han majority […] (IN G)

(141) Lee Kuan Yew and his government are of course *boiling with* **anger** at what I am doing […] (SG G)

The two even more specific levels of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER speak to what happens when the intensity becomes a control issue. Our understanding of a HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is that, as the intensity of the heat of the fluid increases, it exerts so much pressure on the container that it has to be released, e.g., as gas or steam or even resulting in an explosion. These properties have been mapped onto ANGER and also exploit specific images we encounter in the physical

world, i.e., steam from a tea kettle, the powerful explosion of a volcano, etc. Examples below illustrate these mappings.

<u>ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM</u>

(142) His outrageous pen portraits, some comical, some *steaming with* **anger** […] (GB G)

(143) It is therefore not uncommon that when university students feel like *venting* their **rage**, they go in search of the police. (NG G)

(144) […] screaming at his students and even took off his clothes while he was *venting* his **rage**. (KE G)

(145) […] shout out all the filth they knew and *vent* their **anger**. (IN G)

(146) […] Singaporeans are sharing their frustrations and *venting* their **anger** at a 'no holds barred' Government. (SG G)

<u>ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION</u>

(147) Rock star Morrissey *exploded with* **anger** in the High Court when he was cross-examined […] (GB G)

(148) Years of piled up **anger** and frustrations just saw a reason to *erupt and inflame whatever was on its path*. (NG G)

(149) Mombasa *erupts in* **anger**, this being the last straw following assassinations […] (KE G)

(150) He was annoyed, and **anger** *burst* through his forehead. (IN G)

(151) And seemingly unable to contain their own angered embarrassment of having been exposed of thorough incompetence by this very public *eruption of* peasantry **anger** […] (SG G)

Since the majority of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER are of the HOT FLUID kind, this specific level lends itself to closer inspection. Table 5.8 shows the distribution of ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER vis-à-vis other FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphors and demonstrates that the African varieties (in particular KE) have the largest share of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

Table 5.8: Absolute frequencies of HOT FLUID as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
HOT FLUID	19	23	27	19	19
FLUID IN A CONTAINER (other)	11	12	10	12	9
total	**30**	**35**	**37**	**31**	**28**

All varieties have more instances of HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER over all other FLUID IN A CONTAINER source domains combined. A chi-square test performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.8 did not reveal any significant differences ($x^2 = 1.241$, df = 4, $p = 0.87130$). Therefore, it seems that for ANGER IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, the varieties collectively tend toward HOT FLUID, which again lends support to Lakoff's (1987a) claim of its centrality to the metaphorical system of ANGER.

5.3.3   ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE

Another prominent source domain for ANGER is NATURAL FORCE, which we will zoom into in this section. NATURAL FORCE contributes 94 instances of the 750 metaphors collected for ANGER – 12.5% to be precise. Although its contribution is not as pronounced as PERSON and FLUID, like these mappings, it has been attested to in the previous research, e.g., Kövecses' (1990) ANGER IS FIRE (*that kindled my ire*) and ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE (*it was a stormy meeting*). Despite Kövecses having separately treated these two, I decided to treat them together, since I view FIRE as a specific instance of the more broadly framed NATURAL FORCE, as will be apparent in the breakdown below.

In view of their metaphor profiles, the varieties range between 8.7% - 17.3% for NATURAL FORCE, with the largest proportion being attributable to GB and the lowest to KE. Figure 5.8 provides us with an overview of the percentages across varieties.

Figure 5.8: Percentages of ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety

Of course, NATURAL FORCE was initially broadly constructed (following the method employed in the present study). As such, it can be broken down into its component parts. What these components have in common, however, is that they can be categorized on the virtue of referring to elemental powers, i.e, forces of nature like fire, wind, rain, etc., that we physically experience and interact with continually. From experience, we know that we technically have no control over them, which demonstrates that ANGER understood as a NATURAL FORCE emphasizes the control aspect, like OPPONENT. Furthermore, at times, we experience natural forces as particularly intense, like a severe rain storm or a raging fire. This emphasizes the intensity aspect of a cognitive model of ANGER. Table 5.9 presents the breakdown of NATURAL FORCE for ANGER.

Table 5.9: Breakdown of ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety[65]

NATURAL FORCE	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	1	0	0	0	0
AVALANCHE – specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	0	0
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2)	3	3	4	4	4
CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3)	1	1	0	0	0
DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3)	1	0	0	2	1
MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3)	5	2	2	4	2
STARTING A FIRE (= level 3)	7	4	2	2	1
HEAT - specific-level (= level 2)	3	2	0	0	1
STORM - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	1	0
WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	1	0	0
RAIN (= level 3)	0	0	1	0	1
WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3)	5	2	2	9	7
WIND - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	1	1	0
total	26	15	13	23	17

The elements of NATURAL FORCE, which ANGER metaphors most commonly emphasize, are FIRE (including HEAT) and WATER, but not exclusively so. AVALANCHE, STORM and WIND are also represented, albeit in very small numbers, as illustrated by (152) - (154). Additionally, example (155) illustrates an instance of NATURAL FORCE that was determined to be generic, since *sweep* collocates with various terms denoting the elements (*wave, wind, sea, fire, storm*, etc.) and, therefore, it did not lend itself to specification.

(152) But the *avalanches of* mass **anger** from below [...] (NG B)

(153) **Resentment** against ex-militants was already *brewing* for some time because of rampant extortion […] (IN B)

(154) The class seven pupil at Kasosi Primary School soon found himself on the receiving end of *a whirling vortex of* crowd **anger** […] (KE B)

(155) We see far more alarming examples of it in the Muslim **fury** that *sweeps* the world. (GB B)

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[65]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.

Although these mappings are only attributable to a few varieties, this does not entirely discount their existence as part of the metaphorical system of ANGER in other varieties. It merely demonstrates that these particular mappings are not necessarily prominent. The focal point for ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE is solidly FIRE and WATER (evidenced by their ability to be broken down even further into level 3s), which we will consider in more detail.

Starting with FIRE, it is mapped onto ANGER in the general terms of burning and in terms of its component parts, like, fumes, flares, etc. Examples to illustrate this general association are given below.

(156) His essays on this subject are often great *flares of* truth and **anger**. (GB G)

(157) I was in a *burning* **rage** that dominated my first series of tweets […] (NG B)

(158) When he was confronted, he first *burned with* **anger**. (KE B)

(159) […] all shades of saffron were left *fuming in* **anger** and disbelief. (IN G)

(160) First comes the helplessness, then the indignation, followed by the burning anger. (SG G)

Naturally, the most basic concept of FIRE, i.e., BURNING, is retained at an even more specific level for ANGER IS FIRE. The main meaning focus of these levels highlight other characteristics of FIRE, which, in turn, are mapped onto ANGER.

ANGER IS A FIRE (*CONTROLLING A FIRE*)

(161) […] I can not *stamp out* the feeling of **resentment** towards the profession for most of the reasons listed by various contributors above. (GB G)

(162) When these are absent, no amount of armoured tanks would be able to *put out the inferno of* **rage** […] (NG G)

ANGER IS A FIRE (*A DESTRUCTIVE FIRE*)

(163) Christopher Calder clearly is *consumed with* **anger**, resentment and bitterness […] (IN G)

(164) The latter was *engulfed by* **anger** and embarassment [sic] at the same time. (SG G)

ANGER IS A FIRE (*MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE*)

(165) That's crazy, divisive, expensive and a recipe for *stoking up* **resentment**. (GB G)

(166) The decision to charge miners under the apartheid era "common purpose" law *fueled* **anger** […] (KE B)

(167) While the TMC and the CPI(M) are determined to *fan* the **anger** for electoral gain, Abhijit is scouting for Muslim leaders to campaign for him. (IN G)

ANGER IS A FIRE (*STARTING A FIRE*)

(168) This revelation, something that had not crossed his mind before, *sparked off* an **anger** in him […] (GB G)

(169) God is watching you and His **anger** is *kindled* waiting for the appropriate time to release vexation upon you. (NG G)

A related concept is that of HEAT. It was annotated separately from FIRE because the linguistic examples did not make the burning attribute of FIRE explicit, like in the examples above, although this is likely implied.

(170) The scene shows Plainview *incandescent with* **rage** at having to demean himself […] (GB G)

(171) Our **anger** must be felt in *the heat of the sun*. We must take back our nation; our lives depend on it. (NG G)

(172) In the *heat of* **anger**, we forgot to ask him to explain his remark. (SG G)

Nevertheless, HEAT can also be considered a component of FIRE and, therefore, there are grounds to merge it with FIRE, at least in terms of considering how the intensity of ANGER is metaphorized.

Moving on to WATER, there is only one instance that was considered to be generic, namely *drowning in anger*, because it was not clear from this linguistic metaphor if ANGER is being conceptualized as a body of water (which has obvious conceptual ties to CONTAINER) or something else more specific, like FLOOD. Nevertheless, there are two even more specific levels that highlight WATER's contribution to the conceptualization of ANGER, although one is clearly preferred across the varieties to the other.

The less significant of the two is RAIN, with only two instances in KE and SG.

(173) Dear God, as You rest Kasuku's soul in peace, may Your **wrath** and fury *rain down on* her killers! (KE G)

(174) […] u will die under my **wrath** which will *rain down* […] (SG G)

What is much more substantial is WAVES (FLOOD), which was found in all varieties. Here again, we see that ANGER is being highlighted as an uncontrollable

and particular intense emotion, analogous to the lack of control and intensity we experience with something like a FLOOD.

(175) […] Akin has attracted a small but determined band of female supporters who believe they can *stem the tide of* **resentment** against him. (GB G)

(176) Any man who stands in this path deserve to be *swept off with the deluge of* our **wrath**. (NG B)

(177) […] the Kismayo business community had been planning to demonstrate against the continued port closure, so there is a *groundswell of* **resentment** […] (KE B)

(178) Do not let yourself be *swept away by* the **rage**. (IN G)

(179) But anyway, after my little rant on twitter came *a tidal wave of* **fury** like I've never seen before (SG B)

From a cross-variety perspective, while GB makes use of the NATURAL FORCE domain more frequently overall, with 26 tokens (28%), there seems to be a consensus among the varieties that FIRE (including HEAT) is preferable to WATER. This preference for FIRE / HEAT is the most pronounced in NG (80%), GB (77%) and KE (62%). It is less so for the Asian Englishes. IN uses FIRE 52% of the time (there were no instances of HEAT in IN), while WATER is used 39% of the time. SG is similar: FIRE / HEAT is at 53%, while WATER is at 47%. Compared to the African Englishes and British English, the percentages for WATER trend lower (13% for NG, 19% for GB and 31% for KE).

Since three-fifths of the varieties clearly prefer FIRE over WATER, it is interesting to take a closer look. Table 5.10 demonstrates the distribution of FIRE + HEAT across the varieties in comparison to other NATURAL FORCE domains.

Table 5.10: Absolute frequencies of FIRE + HEAT as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A NATURAL FORCE

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
FIRE + HEAT	20	12	8	12	11
NATURAL FORCE (other)	6	3	5	11	6
total	**26**	**15**	**13**	**23**	**17**

A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.10 and disclosed that the observed differences are not significant (x^2 = 4.808, df = 4, *p* = 0.30757). Therefore, what can be basically gleaned from this overview of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE is that the varieties tend to prefer FIRE / HEAT and WATER, considering the bulk is found for these source domains and there is no clear preference between them in a variety-specific way.

5.3.4   ANGER IS AN ILLNESS

ANGER being conceived of in terms of an ILLNESS has been postulated in previous research on the cognitive model of ANGER, e.g., Kövecses (1990) describes ANGER IS INSANITY, while Stefanowitsch (2006a) puts forth a more general mapping, ANGER IS A DISEASE, of which INSANITY could be viewed as a subcategory. The following section outlines ANGER IS AN ILLNESS (opting for the more inclusive label over DISEASE), which occupied between the third and fourth rank across the varieties and provides 11.1% of the ANGER data overall. Figure 5.9 demonstrates the percentages of ILLNESS within each variety.

Figure 5.9: Percentages of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS per variety

KE is the most obvious outlier with only 5.3% of its ANGER metaphors being attributable to ILLNESS, while GB and SG are tied with 11.3%, and NG and IN proportionally demonstrate the most with 12.7% and 14.7%, respectively. Nevertheless, by dissecting ILLNESS into more specific-level components, as demonstrated in Table 5.11, it becomes apparent that the majority of these mappings congregate around a particular meaning focus on level 3, which, in

essence, provides indication that their preferences within the ILLNESS source domain are similar.

Table 5.11: Breakdown of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS per variety[66]

ILLNESS	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	1	0	1	4	1
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	1	0	0	0	0
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)	1	2	0	5	0
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL (= level 3)	0	0	0	0	2
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3)	6	5	4	7	10
PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	0
WOUND / SKIN-RELATED (= level 3)	1	0	1	1	1
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	3	4	0	0	0
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level (=level 2)	2	2	0	2	1
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	2	2	1	3	2
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	0	2	0	0	0
total	**17**	**19**	**8**	**22**	**17**

All varieties show that AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*) is the most salient way of conceptualizing ANGER, which will be discussed in more detail below. First, it is necessary to illustrate the levels in Table 5.11 with examples.

At the generic level, ANGER IS AN ILLNESS puts forth an understanding of this negative emotion as something unhealthy or dangerous to our system or general well-being. This general conceptual aspect of ILLNESS is illustrated in the examples below.

(180) […] my example of what I 'need' during *bouts of* **anger** is only figurative. (GB B)

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[66]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.

(181) When one *suffers from* **anger**, it's not Buddhist anger, Hindu anger, or Christian anger. (IN G)

(182) He suggests therefore a sovereign remedy that would at once cure him of the root cause of the *dangerous disease* that manifests itself in murder. **Anger**! (IN G)

(183) I love how we sometimes get upset with each other but never ever got into *full blown* **anger** before […] (SG B)

The general meaning is, of course, inherited by the more specific levels, which elaborate it in the following ways.

ANGER can be understood as so dangerous or so unhealthy that it is deadly to the person who experiences it. GB, provides, the only instance of this more elaborated mapping.

(184) As I get older I understand that **anger** does nothing except *kill me slowly*. (GB B)

ANGER is also related to AN ILLNESS that has been brought about due to the ingestion of an intoxicating substance, which is either toxic to the system, as in (185) and (186), creates a heightened state of agitation, as in (187) and (188), or promotes addiction, as in (189)

(185) Calder I feel has some very strong, deep and uncoscious [sic] **resentment** that turned into *poisoning* his awareness with skepticism and right/wrong. (IN G)

(186) Uncontrolled **anger** becomes *toxic* in nature. (IN B)

(187) A football crowd *fired up on* frustration and **anger** tends to get to the heart of the matter quickly […] (GB B)

(188) It is not scientifically impossible therefore for Tricia to have in a state of shock, or *adrenaline induced* **rage** to gain the strength needed to commit this murder. (NG B)

(189) But to make you *unaddicted to* your jealousy, to your ambition, to your competitiveness, to your **anger**, rage, your potentiality for violence, no Alcoholics Anonymous can be of any help. (IN G)

Another common property of ILLNESS is its ability to spread (at times rapidly) across a population – an attribute mapped on to ANGER for GB and NG, as (190) and (191) demonstrate.

(190) There is *widespread* **anger** across Greece to harsh measures imposed by the government in return for international bailouts. (GB G)

(191) It was only the latest *outbreak of* **anger** in a decade-long cycle of aggression and reprisals. (NG G)

A specific type of behavioral or mental disorder categorized as an illness is A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY, which coheres with an intense feeling of anger and the potential behavioral extremes that entails, i.e., a lack of control over one's actions. On the linguistic level, this is largely reflected by the construction (*go*) *mad / crazy with + anger* (or subordinate), which was present in all varieties, except for KE.

(192) *Mad with* **rage** the Old Man's blows had been unaimed, some fell across Johnny's back […] (GB G)

(193) […] so she told Emeka that she wants to take a break from sex she said Emeka almost *went mad with* **anger** when she told him […] (NG G)

(194) When he heard the news of his brother's death, he became *mad with* **rage**. (IN G)

(195) […] the beacon of light that keeps him from *going crazy with* **anger** at the unfair world around them. (SG B)

Two specific levels speak to some positive entailments of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS. Firstly, there can be relief from anger as an illness, because it can be cured (ANGER IS A TREATABLE ILLNESS). Secondly, in a related sense, ANGER itself can be viewed as part of the cure, i.e., MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS. The former is found in all varieties and illustrated by (196) – (200), while the latter was only found in NG, for which (201) provides an example.

(196) As a band, Primal Scream became a huge, human sledgehammer that slammed hard into the dark recesses of the last decade, finally *purging* their **anger** with XTRMNTR. (GB G)

(197) Some need to be *healed from* the **resentment** in their hearts. (NG G)

(198) […] 2012 is my year of *healing from* all the **anger**, bitterness, unforgiveness and guilt. (KE G)

(199) Maharaj, you have completely *eradicated* **anger**: And how?? (IN G)

(200) We have to increase our vibrations by *eradicating* greed, lust and **anger**. (SG B)

(201) But it needs *a heavy dose of* holy **anger** to rebuild our nation […] (NG B)

A specific level within ILLNESS that can be further dissected is ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. The physical symptoms being attributed to ANGER include: ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL, LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, PHYSICAL PAIN and WOUND / SKIN-RELATED. These are exemplified in the following examples.

(202) If you're reading this and *foaming at the mouth* in **anger**, there are a few things you can do. (SG B)

(203) My body was *shaking with* **rage** as I opened the gate. (NB G)

(204) […] as many smiles and laughs in such scenes as there are faces *twisted in* **rage**. (KE B)

(205) By letting the unresolved linger, silence *allows* **resentment** *to fester*. (IN B)

As mentioned above, ANGER IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*) is the most frequent at this level for all varieties and for ILLNESS as a whole. The others are infrequent. ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL is only found twice in SG; PHYSICAL PAIN is only found in the African varieties (twice in NG and once in KE); for WOUND / SKIN-RELATED there are single instances in GB, KE, IN and SG each. Therefore, LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY deserves a closer look.

As is clear from example (203) and further examples, given in (206) – (210), the main meaning focus of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, corresponding to what Kövecses (1990) identified as a metonymy of ANGER (namely AGITATION), is that ANGER can become so powerful an emotion that it inhibits agency over one's own body. This most commonly takes the form of fits, as in (206) – (208) or paralysis, as in (209) and (210).

(206) […] inopportune children sent a *tremor of* **rage** through his body […] (GB G)

(207) After picking up the quarrel, one of his friends *in a fit of* **rage** stabbed him with a knife on the left side of his chest. (IN G)

(208) Even before the latest *convulsion of* anti-US **rage**, Mr Obama had sought to restore relations with the Muslim world […] (SG G)

(209) Again, I am *incapacitated with* **rage**. (KE B)

(210) Islamic **rage** is functioning to *paralyze* the West into "walking on eggshells" around Muslims […] (GB B)

It should be noted that LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY is most frequently instantiated in the New Englishes by (*in*) (*a*) *fit*(*s*) *of* + *anger* or *rage* – four out of five times in NG, two out of four times in KE, all seven times in IN and nine out of ten times in SG. Conversely, it occurs two out of six times in GB.

Nevertheless, across the varieties, ILLNESS metaphors tend most frequently to be expressed as ANGER IS A LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY compared to any other specific level type. Of the 83 tokens, 32 were attributable to LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY or, in other words, 39%. Table 5.12 demonstrates this grouping vis-à-vis other ILLNESS metaphors.

Table 5.12: Absolute frequencies of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY as a special instantiation of ANGER IS AN ILLNESS

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY	6	5	4	7	10
ILLNESS (other)	11	14	4	15	7
total	**17**	**19**	**8**	**22**	**17**

The proportion of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY is similar for NG (26%), IN (32%) and GB (35%). It is at half for KE (50%) and over half for SG (58%), which testifies more to a preference. However, a chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.12 and the observed differences are not significant ($x^2 = 5.09$, df $= 4$, $p = 0.2782$).

5.3.5   ANGER IS A WEAPON

Providing 10.5% of the total ANGER data, WEAPON, which occupies the third, fourth or fifth rank in the variety-specific metaphor profiles, is the last of the major source domains to consider. Figure 5.10 illustrates the percentages of WEAPON metaphors for each variety.

Figure 5.10: Percentages of ANGER IS A WEAPON per variety

GB, with 16%, uses WEAPON to construe ANGER more commonly than the New Englishes, primarily due to two aspects apparent in the specific-level breakdown. Table 5.13 provides an overview of this breakdown and shows that WEAPON can be used to understand ANGER in general terms, a specific type of WEAPON and in terms of its directionality concerning its target. Note that ANGER IS A WEAPON was only briefly attested to in Stefanowitsch (2006a) as ANGER IS A SHARP OBJECT or as a subcategory of OPPONENT in Kövecses et al. (2015), but the breakdown in Table 5.13 suggests a more complex conceptual structure.

Table 5.13: Breakdown of ANGER IS A WEAPON per variety[67]

WEAPON	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	1	1	0	3	0
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE WITH (= level 3)	0	0	0	1	0
ARROWS (= level 3)	0	1	0	0	0
BLUNT INSTRUMENT (= level 3)	1	0	0	1	1
BOMB (= level 3)	4	2	3	1	2
GUN(-RELATED) (= level 3)	1	0	0	1	0
KNIFE (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET - specific-level (= level 2)	15	6	14	3	13
A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM ORIGINAL TARGET - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	0	1	1
total	**24**	**10**	**17**	**11**	**17**

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[67] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix A.

ANGER as a WEAPON, once again, calls to mind the potential dangerous or destructive quality we associate with ANGER unregulated or in excess. This understanding is already visible at a generic level, illustrated in (211) and (212).

(211) I experienced the worst form of rejection and unkindness, but I learnt to *fight back with* **anger** and aggression because that was the only way I knew to cope. (NG G)

(212) The manipulator uses anger to *brandish* sufficient emotional intensity and **rage** to shock the victim into submission. (IN G)

The general focal meaning of something destructive is inherited by the specific levels. ANGER is viewed as A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON, which exploits corresponding imagery. ANGER is dangerous and destructive in a similar way people are threatened by a weapon being aimed at them or are hurt by a weapon being used against them.

(213) I will overpower them with wrath and *suffocate them* with **rage**. (IN G) → ANGER IS A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE WITH

(214) Unfortunately Nigeria workers have been *shooting their arrows of* **anger** at the wrong direction. (NG G) →ANGER IS ARROWS

(215) Naturally, they have been *bearing the brunt of* the **wrath** of outsourcing opponents. (IN G) → ANGER IS A BLUNT INSTRUMENT

(216) This is Sarbok, a loudmouth, joker and living **anger** *bomb*, but he's quite a good friend. (GB G) → ANGER IS A BOMB

(217) Anger is the first of the kashayas to go. **Anger** is like *ammunition*. (IN G) → ANGER IS GUN-RELATED

(218) Instead of coming together en masse drawing knives and *stabbing* the film *with* the **rage** of Brutus, they are raising a glass in honor […]. (GB B) → ANGER IS A KNIFE[68]

Of these SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON images, BOMB is the most common and most often found in GB, which makes use of the SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON domain more frequently as compared to the New Englishes. However, the BOMB image also evinces the situation in which a bomb can be made inert, illustrated in (219) and (220), which is then applied to ANGER.

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[68] Note that this particular instance is likely motivated by the well-known circumstance of Julius Caesar's assassination with a dagger.

(219) It attributes to them a complete inability to *defuse* their **rage** by more democratic forms of protest, effectively viewing them as savages from which little better can be expected. (GB G)

(220) If they can address the heart of each problem, they will be able to *defuse* the **anger** and with it the vitriolic. (SG G)

Similarly, ANGER as A WEAPON can be directed away from the person it is aimed at, coded as ANGER IS A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM THE TARGET, although this is infrequent with only three tokens. (221) provides an example, in which the image of a shield implies a weapon missing its mark and being deflected.

(221) Although I too was Muslim, having researched and embraced Islam in a previous personal journey, my white skin *shielded me from* the **wrath** […] (GB G)

Nevertheless, directionality in terms of a weapon being aimed at a target is what motivates the largest amount of WEAPON metaphors; thus ANGER as A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET coheres with a basic cognitive topology of WEAPON, constituting the weapon itself, the user of the weapon and the target at which it is aimed. There is a one-to-one correspondence between ANGER and WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET by the occurrence of *target* [V] and *target(s) of / for* in the linguistic metaphors.

(222) At what or whom do you *target* your **anger**? (GB B)

(223) And who was the most qualified *target of* their **anger**? (NG G)

(224) Secondly, the goalkeeper whose poor timing cost the club the coveted title would have faced the wrath of the Gor faithful. Neither was a *target of* **fury** by Gor supporters. (KE G)

(225) […] the bodies of some Nepali girls from Bhutan in the Adivasi areas and the resultant **anger** being used to *target* the community. (IN G)

(226) You guys are just so fucking ANGRY all the time, wanting to find new *targets for* your **rage**. (SG G)

Moreover, ANGER as A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET presents a special case in the entirety of the metaphorical data due to the directionality meaning being reflected by the use of prepositions, either as part of phrasal verbs, as is the case for (227) and (228), or occurring in a mix of FLUID and WEAPON metaphors, as in (229) and (230).

(227) United did not go down without a show of tantrums. Their **annoyance** instead of being *directed at* Arsenal, should have been *aimed at* themselves. (GB B)

(228) Hey, do not crucify me, I did not cook the 'soup', please *direct* your **anger** *to* the former President of Nigeria […] (NG G)

(229) They decided to *vent* their **anger** *on* motorists and the police. (KE B)

(230) My advice to Singaporeans, please don't *vent* your **anger** *at* the Chinese migrant […] (SG B)

A mixed metaphor of FLUID and WEAPON to conceptualize ANGER occurred in almost all the varieties, with the exception of IN, namely twice in GB and NG, four times in SG and five times in KE.

In fact, A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET is overall the most common specific level (that is, 51 of the total 79 instances or 65%), especially for GB. Table 5.14 demonstrates the frequencies across varieties.

Table 5.14: Absolute frequencies of WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET as a special instantiation of ANGER IS A WEAPON

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET	15	6	14	3	13
WEAPON (other)	9	4	3	8	4
total	24	10	17	11	17

A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 5.14 and revealed that the observed differences are significant ($x^2 = 10.226$, df = 4, $p = 0.03679$). It is interesting that the lowest proportion of WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET is found in IN (27% of all WEAPON metaphors), which is the only variety that has A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON (4 tokens) as slightly more common than WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET (3 tokens). The percentages for the remaining varieties were well over half: NG with 60%, GB with 63%, KE with 82%, and SG leading the pack with 76%. Therefore, with the exception of IN, all varieties seem to prefer this specific-level conceptualization.

Leaving the major contributors to the conceptualization of ANGER behind, we now turn to "minor metaphors" of ANGER that, despite their lower numbers,

still make up a part of the metaphor profiles for ANGER and, thus, deserve attention.

5.3.6   Minor Metaphors of ANGER

This final section of the ANGER case study results provides an overview of those metaphor groupings and miscellaneous metaphors that did not contribute to a large extent to the metaphor profiles of the varieties. This characterizes PUNISHMENT (with 29 tokens or 3.9%), SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (with 20 tokens or 2.7%), POSSESSION (with 18 tokens or 2.4%), PART OF A JOURNEY (with 17 tokens or 2.3%), FOOD / DRINK (with 16 tokens or 2.1%), and the mostly non-cohesive miscellaneous category. Taken together, these categories represent 14% of the metaphors in GB, 17.9% in IN, 18.7% in NG, 18.8 in KE, and 20% in SG. For some of these source domains, it was possible to do a specific-level breakdown (which is visualized in Appendix A), but, as a rule, the frequencies remain so low that comparison across varieties was not possible. Moreover, with the exception of BURDEN, SUPERNATURAL BEING, and PLANT, the metaphors discussed here were not evidenced by the large-scale studies outlined in Section 5.2. The following provides an overview of these minor metaphors with some illustrative examples of each source domain category.

PUNISHMENT, the most frequent of the minor metaphors, hinged on four specific lexemes that relate ANGER to this domain: *earn*, *incur*, *risk* [V], and *spare* [V]. Examples of each are in (231) – (234).

(231) Ask an ex-employee or a co-employee who has *earned* the **wrath** of his boss. (IN G)

(232) […] if you gg [sic] to any country to do business, you have to follow the country's laws and even policies.. in order not to *incur* **wrath** of ppl and govt. (SG B)

(233) I told my friend not to try such lest he *risks* God's **wrath**, but his reply was not verbal, he merely took my IPad from me, opened the browser and showed me the "exploits" our men of God are making on Forbes magazine. (NG B)

(234) But the high and mighty prevailed on the heritage of the sage and the dunce was *spared* further **wrath** from an incensed race. (NG B)

The decision to code these as PUNISHMENT (over another source domain, like *earn* = MONEY) relates to an interpretation of their basic definitions in the context

of talk about anger as a negative or, at least, socially unwelcome emotion. The co-text in (231) – (234) demonstrates implied bad behavior throughout: In (231) the employee-boss relationship hierarchically entails potential punishment for bad behavior on the part of the employee; in (232) not following a country's laws is, obviously, bad behavior that could be punished by its citizens or government; in (233) the bad behavior is explicitly stated in that the friend reveals online information about the "exploits" of clergymen, which from the author's point of view risks punishment from God; in (234) the "dunce" encodes a social role that is often subjected to punishment, but in this instance is spared by the intervention of social superiors. Although the frequencies remain low (NG and SG have the most with nine tokens each, while IN has five and KE and GB have three), it was not previously discussed in terms of a cultural model of ANGER.

Of the twenty tokens overall in the data for SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, only one was contributed by GB (*exorcise some inner resentment* = ANGER IS A DEMON). The rest originated from the four New Englishes in this study, illustrated by examples (235) – (242).

(235) This is *spirit of* **Anger** at work in the life of Dotun, He need to pray to God for Help. (NG G)

(236) While Moses was calling fire on Mount Sinai, this *demon of* **anger** stood afar off watching him. (NG G)

(237) […] get determined to be *delivered from this spirit of* **anger** in the Name of Jesus. (KE B)

(238) I know cars need maintenance, insurance, and the patience of 69 saints (you know, to avoid *sacrificing* matatu crews to *the gods of* **wrath** and vengeance). (KE B)

(239) Esoterically, lust, **anger** and greed are the *demons who obstruct* the intellect from rising up. (IN G)

(240) Sometimes one is really in a deep rage. Then let **anger** be your *prayer*. (IN G)

(241) […] and when you also tell them that **anger** is a *spirit*, no one likes *to be used by a spirit*. (SG G)

(242) However, more often than we like to admit, our own agenda creeps in, and along with that, *unholy* **anger**. (SG G)

Although these metaphors did not contribute extensively to the data overall, they may point in a direction towards underlying nativized construals or culture-specific

conceptualizations similar to the SPIRIT / GHOST domain underlying various conceptualizations in Hong Kong English, as discussed by Wolf (2008) and Wolf & Chan (2016). Nevertheless, due to their more frequent presence in the New Englishes and to the nature of this domain, which potentially taps into a culturally conditioned understanding of spirituality and emotion, the SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE domain's more likely participation in ANGER metaphors in New Englishes may provide an indication of where to look for metaphoric variation in more depth. Unfortunately, the present dataset makes an in-depth analysis impossible. Furthermore, the previous study by Esenova (2011), as outlined in Section 5.1, attributes this conceptualization to English, but does not specify from what variety/varieties of English the linguistic examples originate.

ANGER IS A POSSESSION metaphors, with a total of 18 tokens, is found most frequently in KE (7) and IN (5). A more exhaustive examination of POSSESSION will be undertaken in the case study of HAPPINESS (see Chapter 7), because of its more prominent role there. For ANGER metaphors, out of the 18 POSSESSION tokens, the most widely used phrases are *let go of* (= LOSING OWNERSHIP), illustrated in (243) and (244), and *hold on(to)* (= MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP), illustrated in (245) and (246). It is in this way relatable to Kövecses' (1990) ANGER IS A BURDEN; yet, the linguistic examples do not make explicit the concept of heaviness, which is most prototypical for BURDEN, and speak more to the act of relinquishing something you possess. Kövecses et al. (2015) attest to this mapping (labeled as ANGER IS A POSSESSED OBJECT) in a corpus of American English (347).

(243) Some, who were participating for the first time, managed to *let go of* their **anger** and to move on. (KE B)

(244) Forgiveness is the power to *let go of* **anger**, hatred and resentment and to discover, in humility, the nobility and generosity of the Spirit. (IN G)

(245) That is, when somebody irritates you, love makes you to *hold on* your **anger** and seek a peaceful resolution without bitterness. (NG G)

(246) We *hold on to* the **anger**, pain and hurt. It can be hard to forgive […] (SG G)

ANGER IS A PART OF A JOURNEY comprised a total of 17 tokens, the most being found in IN (6) and SG (5). This metaphor grouping will be treated more extensively in the following case studies, because it played a more extensive role

for conceptualizing FEAR and HAPPINESS. However, for ANGER, it suffices to say that this source domain includes specific-level meanings of BARRIER / OBSTACLE, DESTINATION, PATH and STARTING POINT, which are illustrated by (247) – (253).

BARRIER / OBSTACLE

(247) It *broke through the barriers of* **anger** *held up between* us; it became our sanctuary, our home. (IN B)

(248) […] a body of people who will enter Parliament to make some speeches, but always remain inside the line without *crossing* Lee Kuan Yew's **wrath**. (SG G)

DESTINATION

(249) We are beginning to *move from* denial *to* **anger** about the reality that, what we commonly associate with a civilized life is not a possibility […]. (IN B)

(250) […] we give too much to others, we often under-value ourselves, which *leads to* **resentment**. (SG G)

PATH

(251) […] the **anger** may *lead to* hatred, the hatred may generate violence, and violence sometimes was soothing. (NG B)

(252) The *way of* the Christian should never be one of violence and **anger**. (SG G)

STARTING POINT

(253) The songs encapsulate the wrenching experience of having lost a great love - *starting with* **anger** and denial, and *moving on through* feelings of hurt and acceptance. (GB G)

PART OF A JOURNEY, as I have outlined it here has definite parallels to discussions about LIFE / LOVE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]; 1999; Lakoff 2007 [1993]), as well as EMOTION's relationship to EVENT STRUCTURE (Kövecses 2000, Chapter 4), which will be addressed more fully in the present study for HAPPINESS in Sections 7.3.2 – 7.3.3.

Although low in numbers, FOOD / DRINK was twice as likely to occur in GB (six tokens) over the New Englishes: NG, IN and SG has three tokens each, while KE only has one. In GB, five of the six metaphors concern ANGER being conceptualized as FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED, illustrated in (254) – (255).

(254) […] these attacks have boosted the resistance, which *feeds on* the **anger** and frustration of civilians (GB G)

(255) For a short period it seemed as if the glories of last year on March 26th, when every bank and The Ritz was given *a taste of* working class **rage**, might be repeated. (GB B)[69]

While the sixth metaphor in GB is a novel one (*reaching for the consoling cookies of anger*), this is also the case for the few metaphors of FOOD / DRINK found in the New Englishes.

(256) This volume of poetry is the sum of the poet's experience, smashed, broken china in the rain channeling JP Clark *hung over from* his **rage**. (NG B) → ANGER IS AN ALCOHOLIC DRINK

(257) It is painful, but GOD IS HONORED WITH *OIL, THAT THE OLIVES PRODUCE, THE PRESS WILL CRUSH* THE **ANGER**, THE FEAR, AND REBELLION, AND *FROM THAT WILL COME OIL*. (KE B) → ANGER IS OLIVES (BEING CRUSHED AND PRODUCING OIL)[70]

(258) But, then, now that the *first flush of* **rage** *has been spent* - or so one would like to assume […] (IN G) → ANGER IS TEA

(259) I am still keeping my cool. Very few words. **Anger** is still *well kept in the freezer*. (SG G) → ANGER IS HOT FOOD COOLED IN THE FREEZER[71]

Finally, as mentioned at various points, the ANGER metaphor profiles displayed miscellaneous metaphors for each variety, that either showed up less than five times in a single variety (e.g., CLUTTER / DEBRIS, PHYSICAL BURDEN, PLANT, MANUFACTURED PRODUCT, METAL BEING MANIPULATED and RESTRAINING DEVICE) or were metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., CORD, HAZE, MASK, etc.). They constituted only 4.5% of the total data. The majority of these metaphors are less conventional and, due to their rarity, could be viewed as innovate or novel metaphors. The following illustrates an example of each source domain that had less than five instances in one variety.

(260) You can not hear God with alot [sic] of *clutter* in you, and by *clutter* I mean the **anger** (NG B) → ANGER IS CLUTTER / DEBRIS

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[69] Relatable to Esenova's (2011) finding, ANGER IS A BAD TASTE

[70] Note that this particular metaphor is primed by the co-text, which evokes the symbolism of oil in Christian religious rituals.

[71] Note that this metaphor could also refer to HEAT, but I have decided to categorize it as belonging to FOOD / DRINK because of the convention of keeping FOOD in the freezer.

(261) Many feel very frustrated and complain and *lay all* their **anger** *on us* […] (KE B) → ANGER IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN[72]

(262) Igbo leaders seem oblivious of the fact that it is glaring injustices, oppressions and calculated attempt to subjugate and brutalise like this, which *water the seeds of* **resentment**, and rebellion […] (NG G)→ ANGER IS A PLANT[73]

(263) I don't remember any "secularist" even displaying *manufactured* **rage**. (IN G) → ANGER IS A MANUFACTURED PRODUCT

(264) […] the postmodern **anger** of the early New Adventures is *tempered* successfully with stories that are actually enjoying being Doctor Who. (GB B) → ANGER IS METAL BEING MANIPULATED

(265) To *free yourself from the shackles of* **anger**, you can disrupt it by asking what circumstance led you to be angry […] (SG B) → ANGER IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE

The following examples demonstrate the 11 metaphorical hapax legomena in the data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly innovative.

(266) When the Lord is angry and speaks of justice and *a cord of* **wrath** we must speak it in that way […] (KE B) → ANGER IS A CORD

(267) Our **anger** must *amplify our voices* now more than ever in challenging the rot in our system. (NG G) → ANGER IS A DEVICE TO AMPLIFY THE VOICE (LIKE A MEGAPHONE)

(268) […] black scholars and activists spent their lives *wandering around in a haze of* **rage** and anger […] (KE B) → ANGER IS A HAZE (OF WATER OR SMOKE)

(269) He survived Abacha, and not too long ago, he and President Olusegun Obasanjo exchanged *letters of* **anger**. (NG G) → ANGER IS A LETTER

(270) So he called the head of the labourers unto the palace, and gave him bags of gold, that they might *turn off* the **wrath** of the people against the king. (NG B) → ANGER IS A MACHINE

(271) A *mask of* **anger** fell over his face, tightening his lips before he turned away. (NG G) → ANGER IS A MASK

(272) I had *graduated from* fear *to* **anger**! (KE G) → ANGER IS A SCHOOL

(273) You can *treasure* your **resentment** and *sell* it for a song. No bargaining. That's my ultimatum. (SG G) → ANGER IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY

(274) We know that **anger** can be a kind of *compost*, and that it is within its power to give birth to something beautiful. (SG G) → ANGER IS COMPOST

(275) For your marriage to work, your spouse has to dedicate himself to *shedding old* **anger** and fears. (KE G) → ANGER IS SKIN BEING SHED

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[72] Attested by Kövecses (1990)

[73] Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) A PLANT (*anger be rooted in* X)

(276) I *wear* my **anger** at Richard's offhand manner *on my forehead* and he gets the message. (NG B) → ANGER IS SOMETHING WORN ON THE FOREHEAD

This concludes the overview and illustration of the ANGER metaphors across the varieties. In the following section, the results will be discussed on the basis of the dimensions of metaphor variation and end with a preliminary conclusion about universality and variation for conceptualizing ANGER.

5.4   Discussion

This section serves to contextualize the results in terms of Kövecses' (2005) types of metaphor variation, specifically congruent metaphors, range of the target and preferential conceptualizations. That is, from the collective point of view of the results, we will answer the question: What have the results revealed on the whole about shared and what is not shared across the New Englishes and their (former) norm-providing variety, British English? Furthermore, this section will offer a preliminary conclusion on what might be considered universal (the bodily sense of embodiment) and culture-specific (owing the socio-cultural setting of the varieties) regarding the conceptualizations of ANGER.

So far, it has been apparent from the case study in this chapter that a lot is in fact shared by the varieties. Consider first Kövecses' (2005) range of the target. As a reminder, the range of the target was discussed as one of the perspectives of alternative metaphors, in which Kövecses maintains that metaphors can be found to use different source domains for the same target domain. The target domain in this case study was, of course, ANGER, and as the metaphor profiles of each variety demonstrated, they all made use of each source domain to some extent (see Table 5.2 in Section 5.2). The range of target also holds when we consider the varieties in terms of the top 5 ranking. All varieties listed PERSON, FLUID, NATURAL FORCE, ILLNESS and WEAPON as the source domains used most extensively to conceptualize ANGER (see Table 5.3 in Section 5.2). Furthermore, within this ranking, PERSON and FLUID emerged as the first and second source domains for all varieties. Therefore, all varieties in this study shared the range of target.

Another type of variation that Kövecses (2005) identifies as accounting for variation in metaphor is congruent metaphor, which seems to have near-universal status, but demonstrates that a generic schema is being filled out in culture-specific ways. Even at the specific-level, where I assumed that congruent metaphors would occur, there did not seem to be any major indication that this is so on a large scale. There was, at best, only anecdotal evidence for congruent metaphors. For instance, consider an example from Indian English, repeated here as (277).

(277) He was annoyed, and **anger** *burst* through his forehead. (IN G) → ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER *(BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION)*

The exit point conceptualized for ANGER in this example is through the forehead, which was unique in the whole of the HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER set. In the other metaphors found for this specific level, there was no explicit indication of how ANGER as a HOT FLUID actually exits the (body) container. Thus, it could be the case that (277) is conveying cultural content that fills out the generic schema of ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER.[74] Nevertheless, without more data illustrating this in Indian English and without more data illustrating the exit point in other varieties, it is difficult to say if this is truly a congruent metaphor type or if it is just a novel extension of an established mapping.

The same can be said for examples from the minor source domain FOOD / DRINK, which could conceivably be even more open to cultural specification. Although it was in general more common in GB, there was at least one instance found in each of the New Englishes. Furthermore, examples, like (278) and (279), although perhaps novel conceptualizations, did have a hint of the cultural by comparing ANGER to COOKIES (in GB) and TEA (in IN).

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[74] Owing to the fact that I personally do not possess any culture-specific knowledge to draw from in the interpretation of (277), I am very grateful to my student Aditya Upadhyaya, who kindly provided me with valuable insight into this example. According to her, the cultural content filling out the generic schema here is related to the main energy center in the Hindu religion, i.e., the third eye – the energy center for enlightenment and anger located between the eyes. Representations of Lord Shiva, the God of Destruction in the Hindu religion, show him with the third eye, which he can open to dispense enlightenment or destruction. Furthermore, the subtle meaning of the third eye is wisdom, but Hindus (jokingly) use it in the sense of anger in relation to the mythological story of Lord Shiva destroying Kaamdeva (Lust) through his third eye. The existence of expressions in Hindi like मुझे परेशान मत करो वरना मेरा तीसरा नेत्र खुल जायेगा (Don't irritate me or my third eye will open) also reflect this culture-specific conceptualization of ANGER.

(278) I've been trying to "lose" my baggage, and dump years of negativity and years of *reaching for the consoling cookies of* **anger**, defeatism and criticism. (GB G)

(279) But, then, now that the *first flush of* **rage** *has been spent* - or so one would like to assume […] (IN G)

Yet, again, this evidence was only anecdotal and, thus, difficult to determine in terms of congruent metaphors that would hold for the culture as a whole. Nevertheless, as the normalized frequencies in Figure 5.3 in Section 5.2 above indicate, minor metaphors, like ANGER IS FOOD / DRINK, although low in numbers, seem to demonstrate the most variation between the varieties. An assumption that follows is that the less frequent a metaphor is on the whole, the more creative it tends to be, as in (278) comparing ANGER to COOKIES. This creative aspect, in turn, likely opens up the door for more obvious cultural content.

The majority of the case study was devoted to uncovering preferential conceptualizations at the specific-level metaphors determined for each broad source domain. Recall that by preferential conceptualizations Kövecses (2005) denotes the situation in which "two languages / cultures may have many of the same conceptual metaphors for a given target domain, but speakers of the languages may prefer to use a different set of metaphors for this target" (82). Since it was established from the perspective of the range of target that the varieties in this study indeed largely share the same conceptual metaphors for ANGER, it made sense to look closer for preferences, which I also assumed would reveal themselves in a specific-level breakdown. Yet, even here, the New Englishes and British English more or less behaved similarly.

No statistically verifiable preferential conceptualizations attributable to individual varieties or supraregional areas were found in the specific-level breakdowns of FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, and NATURAL FORCE. In fact, the preferences were the same for these source domains across the varieties. For FLUID IN A CONTAINER, all varieties collectively tended to emphasize HOT FLUID, which supported Lakoff's (1987a) claim of its centrality to the metaphorical system of ANGER. For ILLNESS, there was a general preference for LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, although this was scaled between 26% - 35% for

NG, IN and GB, while KE was at half and SG was at over half of the ILLNESS metaphors. And although for NATURAL FORCE the instances of WATER was slightly higher in the Asian varieties, all varieties showed a preference for FIRE over WATER, which were the two biggest contributors to NATURAL FORCE.

Some indication of preferential conceptualizations occurred in the breakdowns of PERSON and WEAPON, however. OPPONENT appeared to be preferred by the IN and African varieties within PERSON, while WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET was preferred by GB, NG, KE and SG, with the exception being IN. More data will be needed to confirm if these preferences hold, since OPPONENT and WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET were not exclusive to the varieties that prefer them in this dataset.

The minor metaphors discussed for the New Englishes and British English were relatively low in numbers and, thus, did not lend themselves well to statistical analysis. However, there was one source domain that begs further scrutiny for further research, namely, SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. This source domain only showed up once for GB and was more frequent in all of the New Englishes, albeit in low numbers (as a reminder, 6 tokens in NG, 5 tokens in IN and 4 tokens each in KE and SG). Considering the cultural element inherent to SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE, it would be interesting to see if this slight distinction between British English and the New Englishes holds with more data. However, due to their lower frequencies in the present dataset, I was not able to conclusively decide if this is a preferential conceptualization for the New Englishes. Again, it could be assumed that infrequency goes hand in hand with more creativity, for which culture-specific content provides a more accessible motivational basis.

Nevertheless, the case of ANGER in New Englishes and British English was essentially the same for the most frequent source domains. This leaves us to consider what this signifies for the emotion concept ANGER from the perspectives of universality and variation. It was striking in the data above that the motivational bases for the meaning foci found on the specific levels were often discussed in terms of bodily experience. For example, the metaphors found for ANGER IS AN ILLNESS (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*) correlated with the physical

experience of the body shaking in a fit or being in a state of paralysis, like in two examples highlighted in Section 5.3.4, repeated here as (280) and (281).

(280) Even before the latest *convulsion of* anti-US **rage**, Mr Obama had sought to restore relations with the Muslim world […] (SG G)

(281) Islamic **rage** is functioning to *paralyze* the West into "walking on eggshells" around Muslims […] (GB B)

The body as a prevalent motivational basis for metaphors such as these is not surprising considering our physical responses to emotional states. Therefore, it was to be expected that it would show up and not differ widely in the varieties at hand. However, what was surprising is that, considering the uniqueness of the socio-cultural context of these varieties there was not much in the way of cultural explanations to be found. The preliminary conclusion then for the case of ANGER is that throughout the New Englishes and British English, it is the bodily sense of embodiment that prevails.

With this preliminary conclusion we end the case study on ANGER and continue in the next chapter with FEAR.

6   Case Study: FEAR

Like the previous case study, this chapter will briefly discuss previously attested metaphors, which helps to gauge what might occur in the FEAR data at hand. This will be followed by the presentation of the metaphor profiles of FEAR for each variety, as well as a ranking of the most common source domains in each variety. Then a finer-grained analysis will be attempted at the specific levels of the most common source domains, which will be illustrated by examples from the GloWbE data. Here, I will also take into account any indication of preference. Finally, this case study concludes with a discussion of the results overall and what they imply in terms of variation and/or commonality among the varieties.

6.1   Previous Metaphors of FEAR

Before introducing the empirical results of the present study, it is worthwhile to briefly consider previous scholarly work concerning metaphors that can collectively be viewed as reflecting folk theories or cultural models of FEAR. To reiterate a point I made in the ANGER case study, by doing this we have a benchmark or point of reference with which to contextualize the findings presented in this study. The question that guides us in this case study is: To what extent do previously attested metaphors of FEAR (largely intuitively constructed) relate to metaphorical patterns found in usage-based data?

The following outlines a cognitive model of FEAR presented by the most prolific emotion metaphor researcher, Kövecses (e.g., 1990, 2000). The point of departure for constructing a model of FEAR is to reconstruct its metonymic system, because it is an emotion "often defined as a dangerous situation accompanied by a set of physiological and behavioral reactions that typically ends in flight" (Kövecses 1990: 69). While discussing a myriad of metonymies related to FEAR, Kövecses (1990) highlights the following as most central (73-74). They are illustrated below with corresponding linguistic examples (from Kövecses 1990: 70–73).

(1) FEAR IS PHYSICAL AGITATION (He was *shaking with* **fear**.)

(2) FEAR IS AN INCREASE IN HEART RATE (His heart *pounded with* **fear**.)

(3) FEAR IS BLOOD LEAVING THE FACE (You are *white* as a sheet.)

(4) FEAR IS SKIN SHRINKING (I felt my *flesh crawl* as he described the murder.)

(5) FEAR IS AN INABILITY TO MOVE (He was *paralyzed with* **fear**.)

(6) FEAR IS AN (INVOLUNTARY) RELEASE OF BOWELS or BLADDER (You scared the *shit out of* me. / I was almost *wetting myself* with **fear**.)

(7) FEAR IS SWEATING (The cold *sweat of* **fear** broke out.)

(8) FEAR IS NERVOUSNESS IN THE STOMACH (He got *butterflies in the stomach*.)

(9) FEAR IS DRYNESS OF THE MOUTH (He was scared *spitless*.)

(10) FEAR IS WAYS OF LOOKING (There was **fear** *in her eyes*.)

(11) FEAR IS A DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE (He *froze with* **fear**.)

(12) FEAR IS FLIGHT (When he heard the police coming, the thief *took to his heels*.)

With this metonymic basis, Kövecses (1990) turns to the metaphors of FEAR, but does not identify a central metaphor, as was the case for ANGER (i.e., ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER.) In his view, FEAR can be conceptualized as FLUID IN A CONTAINER, illustrated in (13) below, but is lacking in the HEAT entailment which holds for ANGER. "Since the conceptualization of fear does not have a heat component, the fluid in the container does not produce steam and pressure, there is no explosion, and nothing comes out whose outflow could be held back or reversed" (Kövecses 1990: 86). For the present study, this conclusion remains an empirical issue which will be addressed in Section 6.3.5. FEAR metaphors identified by Kövecses (1990: 75-79) are exemplified in the following.

(13) FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (The sight *filled* her *with* **fear**.)

(14) FEAR IS A VICIOUS ENEMY (HUMAN or ANIMAL) (He was *choked by* **fear**.)

(15) FEAR IS A TORMENTOR (Her parents were *tormented by* the **fear** that she might drown.)

(16) FEAR IS AN ILLNESS (She was *sick with* **fright**.)

(17) FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING (She was *haunted by* the **fear** of death.)

(18) FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (He was *wrestling with* his **fear**.)

(19) FEAR IS A BURDEN (**Fear** *weighed heavily on* them as they heard bombers overhead.)

(20) FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (**Fear** *swept over* him. / She was *engulfed in* **panic**.)

(21) FEAR IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (**Fear** *dominated* his actions.)

Furthermore, Kövecses (2000: 23) adds three more metaphors conceptualizing FEAR, illustrated by (22)-(24).

(22) FEAR IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (**Fear** slowly *crept up on* him.)

(23) FEAR IS INSANITY (Jack was *insane with* **fear**.)

(24) THE SUBJECT OF FEAR IS A DIVIDED SELF[75] (I was *beside myself with* **fear**.)

Stefanowitsch (2006a), employing his method MPA, tests these intuitively constructed metaphors and finds all of them in usage-based data, with the exception of BURDEN and A DIVIDED SELF (79). Furthermore, Stefanowitsch is able to identify metaphors that are not mentioned in the model above (81). These metaphors are illustrated in (25) – (37)[76] and expand on Kövecses' work.

(25) FEAR IS A LIQUID (*trickling/undercurrent of* **fear***, sap of* **fear***,* **fear** *evaporate*, etc.)

(26) FEAR IS A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) (**fear** *fill* X, **fear** *pour out*, *pent_up* **fear**, etc.)

(27) FEAR IS A MIX (*mixture of* **fear** *and* EMOTION, X *blend* **fear** *and* EMOTIONS, etc.)

(28) FEAR IS COLD (*icy/cold* **fear**, *shiver of* **fear**, *be frozen in* ***fear***, etc.)

(29) FEAR IS HEAT (*heat of* **fear**, *fuel/spark off* **fear**, etc.)

(30) FEAR IS LIGHT (*bright* **fear**, *flicker of* **fear**, etc.)

(31) FEAR IS DARK (*shadow of* **fear**, **fear** *darken* X, etc.)

(32) FEAR IS HIGH (INTENSITY) (**fear** *peak*, X *heighten* **fear**, etc.)

(33) FEAR IS PAIN (*agony/convulsion of* **fear**, X *ache with* **fear**, etc.)

(34) FEAR IS A SHARP OBJECT (*prick/shaft of* **fear**, **fear** *cut to* X, etc.)

(35) FEAR IS AN ORGANISM (*growing* **fear**, X *breed/regenerate* **fear**, etc.)

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[75] In Kövecses (1998) he labels this metaphor as FEAR IS AN INCOMPLETE OBJECT. He later changes the source domain to A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF when considering it for HAPPINESS (see Section 7.1).

[76] Stefanowitsch (2006a) does not report the full citations from the corpus data but presents the metaphorical patterns in an abstracted form, i.e., verbs are in the infinitive, patterns that are similar grouped together in a compact form, etc. (73).

(36) FEAR IS A WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL (X *handle/lose control over/unleash* **fear**, etc.)

(37) FEAR IS A BARRIER (*barrier of* **fear**, **fear** *(be) obstacle*, etc.)

Esenova's (2011) corpus-based study uncovers additional metaphors. (38) and (39) illustrates what Esenova considers to be sub-categories of CONTAINMENT (76-77).

(38) FEAR IS A COLOR ("You guys are doing this all wrong," I say, *a slight tint of* **panic** *coloring* my voice.)

(39) FEAR IS A CHILD (In the Middle Ages, ignorance *gave birth to* **fear**.)

Examples (40) – (42) illustrate metaphors not discussed either by Kövecses or Stefanowitsch above, but by Esenova (2011: 80, 92-93).

(40) FEAR IS A PURE SUBSTANCE (I felt *pure* **fear** in those jaws.)

(41) FEAR IS A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE (Nevertheless, he could almost *smell the stench of* **fear**: the house was too quiet. / […] a recent *rancid* **fear** of seeming a certain way ("snobbish") […])

(42) FEAR IS A PLANT (The uncertainty *blossomed into* **fear** again […])

I have consolidated these findings in Table 6.1. Note that I have grouped together those source domains, which, although presented as separate mappings in the previous research, seem to go together in terms of their main meaning focus (e.g., TORMENTOR, A SOCIAL SUPERIOR, etc. as specific types of OPPONENT).

Table 6.1: Previously attested FEAR metaphors

FEAR IS:	Source
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) / A LIQUID	Kövecses (1990) and Stefanowitsch (2006a)
AN ILLNESS / INSANITY / A DIVIDED SELF / PAIN	Kövecses (1990, 2000) and Stefanowitsch (2006a)
AN OPPONENT / A VICIOUS ENEMY (HUMAN or ANIMAL) / A TORMENTOR / A HIDDEN ENEMY / A SOCIAL SUPERIOR	Kövecses (1990, 2000)
A SUPERNATURAL BEING	Kövecses (1990)
A BURDEN	Kövecses (1990)
A NATURAL FORCE	Kövecses (1990)
A MIX	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
COLD / HEAT	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
LIGHT / DARK	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
HIGH (INTENSITY)	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
A SHARP OBJECT	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
AN ORGANISM	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
A WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
A BARRIER	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
COLOR (OF SOMETHING IN A CONTAINER)	Esenova (2011)
CHILD (IN MOTHER-CONTAINER)	Esenova (2011)
A PURE SUBSTANCE	Esenova (2011)
A BAD SMELL / BAD TASTE	Esenova (2011)
PLANT	Esenova (2011)

Taken together, we have previously attested metaphors that contribute to a prototypical model of FEAR, which can be compared and contrasted to the findings for New Englishes and British English, which we turn to in the following section.

6.2 Metaphor Profiles for FEAR

The following section provides an initial overview of FEAR metaphors found for New English varieties and British English. As in the ANGER case study, this overview acts as the first step in answering the research questions: 1) What conceptual metaphors exist for FEAR in New English, as evidenced by corpus data, and 2) Does a comparison across New English varieties reveal commonalities and/or differences across the varieties? As previously, these metaphor profiles at first represent broadly labelled conceptual categories that will be broken down at later points of analysis.

For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which contained the target domain lexical item *fear* or, alternatively, *concern, distress,*

dread, horror, terror, or *worry*. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these metaphors, as well as their absolute and relative frequencies for each variety.

Table 6.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in FEAR metaphors per variety

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG	total
A Deep Place	0 (0%)	3 (2%)	8 (5.3%)	5 (3.3%)	4 (2.7%)	20 (2.7%)
Fluid In a Container	16 (10.7%)	3 (2%)	5 (3.3%)	4 (2.7%)	4 (2.7%)	32 (4.3%)
Illness	23 (15.3%)	18 (12%)	19 (12.7%)	24 (16%)	20 (13.3%)	104 (13.9%)
Natural Force	8 (5.3%)	6 (4%)	12 (8%)	28 (18.7%)	12 (8%)	66 (8.8%)
Part of a Journey	12 (8%)	3 (2%)	6 (4%)	0 (0%)	10 (6.7%)	31 (4.1%)
Person	55 (36.7%)	78 (52%)	60 (40%)	64 (42.7%)	65 (43.3%)	322 (42.9%)
Possession	13 (8.7%)	1 (0.7%)	3 (2%)	4 (2.7%)	1 (0.7%)	22 (2.9%)
Related to Building / Structure	8 (5.3%)	10 (6.7%)	21 (14%)	3 (2%)	11 (7.3%)	53 (7.1%)
Supernatural Being	0 (0%)	13 (8.7%)	3 (2%)	2 (1.3%)	0 (0%)	18 (2.4%)
Weapon	3 (2%)	4 (2.7%)	5 (3.3%)	0 (0%)	7 (4.7%)	19 (2.5%)
Misc.	12 (8%)	11 (7.3%)	8 (5.3%)	16 (10.7%)	16 (10.7%)	63 (8.4%)
total	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**750**

Note that the "miscellaneous" category contains expressions that did not contribute in large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., "metaphorical hapax legomena", as in (43) and (44), which seem to be of an innovative or novel kind, or those metaphors that can be attributed to a broader source domain but that source domain showed up less than five times in a single variety, as in (45) and (46).

(43) […] all designed to play into the human pysche [sic] and to create a *giant bubble of* **fear** that if PAP goes, Singapore is ruined. (SG G) → FEAR IS A BUBBLE

(44) […] I will have to '*abandon the ship of* **fear**' and surrender to the process of creativity. (IN G) → FEAR IS A SHIP

(45) And that's what the tool is about for me, to *turn the engine of* **fear** *on* the perpetrators of fear, perpetrators of corruption and fraud. (NG B) → FEAR IS A MACHINE

(46) […] the black irony that the *machines of* **terror** and destruction *forged* in Afghanistan and Iraq were supplied by the US […] (GB G) → FEAR IS A MACHINE

Disregarding the miscellaneous metaphors for the moment, the metaphor profiles show that all varieties make use of the most common source domains for conceptualizing FEAR, i.e., FLUID, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, PERSON, RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE, but vary in terms of the less frequent source domains. For instance, POSSESSION metaphors are attributable to all varieties (but only in very low numbers to the New Englishes). Furthermore, while A DEEP PLACE is represented solely in the New Englishes, it was not attested in the GB data. Also, the IN dataset does not contain any PART OF A JOURNEY and WEAPON metaphors, while GB and SG does not make use of SUPERNATURAL BEING. This is a marked difference from the previous metaphor profiles for ANGER, in which all ANGER source domains were represented in each variety to some extent.

In terms of the rankings, which resulted from the frequencies in Table 6.2, the picture is also not so straightforward, as can be gleaned from Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Five highest ranked FEAR source domains per variety

Rank	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
(1)	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON	PERSON
(2)	ILLNESS	ILLNESS	RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE	NATURAL FORCE	ILLNESS
(3)	FLUID	SUPERNATURAL BEING	ILLNESS	ILLNESS	NATURAL FORCE
(4)	POSSESSION	RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE	NATURAL FORCE	A DEEP PLACE	RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE
(5)	PART OF A JOURNEY	NATURAL FORCE	A DEEP PLACE	FLUID & POSSESSION	PART OF A JOURNEY
total % of metaphor profile	79.4%	83.4%	80%	86.1%	78.6%

The highest ranked source domain for all varieties, which makes up 42.9% of all metaphorical data for FEAR, is PERSON. Yet, this is where the similarity ends.

GB, NG, and SG share ILLNESS as their second ranked source domain, while KE and IN have RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE and NATURAL FORCE in second place, respectively. Only KE and IN have ILLNESS in the third rank, while GB has FLUID; NG has SUPERNATURAL BEING; SG has NATURAL FORCE. The fourth and fifth ranks for all varieties are also not uniformly shared across the varieties: GB has POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY in the fourth and fifth rank, while NG has RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE and NATURAL FORCE; KE has NATURAL FORCE and A DEEP PLACE; IN has A DEEP PLACE and a tie between FLUID and POSSESSION; SG has RELATED TO BUILDING / STRUCTURE and JOURNEY. This made it difficult to identify which metaphors emerge as the most prominent for all varieties, other than PERSON and ILLNESS (which rank in the top 3 across the varieties). Thus, I forgo an analysis of variance, as was conducted in the ANGER case study for the (shared) top five most frequently used source domains.

Taking another glance at the absolute frequencies of all source domains in the top five ranking across the varieties, which is visualized in Figure 6.1, we can tease out some domains for statistical analysis.

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
■ A Deep Place	0	3	8	5	4
■ Fluid	16	3	5	4	4
■ Illness	23	18	19	24	20
■ Natural Force	8	6	12	28	12
■ Part of a Journey	12	3	6	0	10
■ Person	55	78	60	64	65
■ Possession	13	1	3	4	1
■ Related to Building / Structure	8	10	21	3	11
■ Supernatural Being	0	13	3	2	0

Figure 6.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (not shared) source domains in FEAR metaphors per variety

What becomes clear from Figure 6.1 is that PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE contribute to the bulk of metaphorical data, despite NATURAL FORCE being in the top five for the New English varieties (most prominently in IN) but not for GB. These source domains are given in percentages for each variety in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Percentages of ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and PERSON in FEAR metaphors per variety

These three source domains range from 57% to 77% of all metaphorical data for each variety. From a collective perspective across the varieties, they also make up the three most frequent source domains: PERSON with 322 tokens, ILLNESS with 104 and, with a dramatic drop, NATURAL FORCE with 66. A chi-square test was performed for PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE, which revealed significant differences in distribution ($x^2 = 21.151$, df = 8, $p = 0.006757$). It should be noted that this quantitative finding does not yet provide strong evidence for source domain preference, but we can use it as a point of reference to explore the more specific-level dimensions of the source domains.

Furthermore, normalized frequencies of the individual metaphor profiles have the potential to reveal another perspective. Consider the distributions of each metaphor in Figure 6.3 below.

Figure 6.3: Normalized frequencies of FEAR metaphors to 100%

Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the varieties display differences regarding their relation to the average percentage of each source domain, in particular for those source domains that did not feature prominently in the FEAR data overall (i.e., A DEEP PLACE, POSSESSION, SUPERNATURAL BEING and WEAPON). For example, NG provides evidence of a variety-specific preference for SUPERNATURAL BEING, which was infrequent with only 18 instances out of the 750 metaphors. In a similar way, GB shows a preference for POSSESSION vis-à-vis the New Englishes, but this source domain only contributed 22 instances

overall. Due to the low frequencies in general, it is difficult to ascertain if these source domains represent true preferences.

Out of those source domains that collectively contributed the majority of metaphor data across the varieties (i.e., FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, PART OF A JOURNEY, PERSON and RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE), the most frequent source domains (i.e., PERSON and ILLNESS) do not demonstrate any major differences between the varieties. The remaining source domains provide some evidence for preferences. IN seems to prefer NATURAL FORCE with the highest normalized frequency at 212%, while the other varieties are below the mean to varying degrees. KE seems to prefer RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE with a normalized frequency of 198%, followed by a dramatic drop in SG with 104% and the rest of the varieties below the mean, again to varying degrees. FLUID IN A CONTAINER seems to be a preference for GB with a normalized frequency of 250%, while PART OF A JOURNEY seems to be preferred by GB (194%) and to a lesser extent by SG (161%). Yet, again, frequency could be an issue here, considering NATURAL FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE, FLUID IN A CONTAINER and PART OF A JOURNEY are much less frequent than the two major source domains PERSON and ILLNESS.

Nevertheless, to reiterate an important point, the categories presented in this section are intentionally broad, as dictated by the methodology of this study (see Section 4.1.4). Only when we break down these categories into a more fine-grained analysis can we gain a better understanding of the potential for variation or commonality. This is what the following sections will attempt.

6.3   Specific-Level FEAR Metaphors across Varieties

The analysis above served as a first step to discovering what is shared and what is different across varieties concerning FEAR metaphors. The distribution of PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE was found to be significant and, from the perspective of the normalized frequencies, there is some indication of variety-specific preferences. These findings will guide further investigation into the breakdown of the most prominent source domains. Furthermore, in the following

subsections, examination of the internal structure of the source domains (PERSON, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING/STRUCTURE, FLUID IN A CONTAINER and PART OF A JOURNEY) will be discussed on the basis of the evidence provided by the corpus data and in a variety-specific manner. They have been selected for more comprehensive treatment due to the fact that they make up 79% - 82% of the FEAR data across the varieties. All remaining source domains will be discussed together as "minor metaphors", as their absolute frequencies were relatively low.

6.3.1   FEAR IS A PERSON

PERSON has been established as the most prominent source domain for FEAR, being ranked first by all varieties and constituting between 36.7% - 52% of all metaphor profiles. This is a considerable increase in comparison to the ANGER data, by which it was demonstrated that PERSON (also ranked first by all varieties) only represented 21.3% - 31.3% of the total metaphor profiles. Therefore, the personification of FEAR has a much greater share of the metaphors overall (42.9% of all FEAR data). Figure 6.4 illustrates the percentages of FEAR IS A PERSON for each variety, which shows it is most frequent in NG and least frequent in GB.

Figure 6.4: Percentages of FEAR IS A PERSON per variety

Recall that, from the ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.1), PERSON acts as a shorthand in this study for pervasive ontological metaphors involving personification (see Kövecses 2010). Personification involves the attribution of human qualities and actions to a non-human domain. The discovery of personification in linguistic metaphor analysis was illustrated by three examples

discussed in Dorst (2011), which had direct relevance to examples from the GloWbE data. These examples apply to FEAR as well. Furthermore, Dorst (2011) discusses a fourth example, reproduced in (47) below, which also has counterpart examples in this study. Therefore, a brief discussion of this fourth example is merited, before we turn to the breakdown of this broad category for FEAR.

(47) […] the flat meadows where here and there stunted **trees** *squatted like old men in cloaks*. (BNC-Baby: CDB)   (Dorst 2011: 120)

In this example, the personification of trees is due to the use of the verb *squatted* and the simile *like old men in cloaks*. Dorst notes that "[s]ince similes are necessarily more explicit in setting up and signalling comparisons, personifications expressed by similes are likely to be more noticeable and delibrate" and "may be similar to image mappings, with a strong visualization effect" (120-121). Personifications, expressed by similes[77], are found in the GloWbE data, as illustrated by (48).

(48) […] just *like a thief*, the **worry** habit *steals on me* […] (KE G) → ANGER IS A HIDDEN ENEMY (here A THIEF)

In this case, ANGER is being conceptualized as a thief – an analysis that is supported by the presence of the simile *like a thief* and underscored by the phrase *steals on me*.

        With this in mind, we now turn to an overview of the specific levels identified for FEAR IS A PERSON in Table 6.4. This demonstrates the breakdown of the PERSON source domain, as evidenced by the GloWbE data, and, as for the ANGER case study, it is not assumed to be exhaustive. Furthermore, the possiblity of metonymic readings of what I have identified here as metaphors also holds and will be discussed on a by-example basis.

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[77]   Note that there were no examples of this kind in the ANGER dataset.

Table 6.4: Breakdown of FEAR IS A PERSON per variety[78]

PERSON	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	0	0	0	0
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level (= level 2)	0	3	1	0	1
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= level 2)	4	10	2	2	3
PERSON - GUIDE - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	1	0	1
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)	3	0	0	1	4
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	1	0	0
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	7	9	7	15	8
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	5	1	3	1	1
A THIEF (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	0
BEING BULLIED (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	3
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	10	33	26	24	12
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	8	6	11	17	23
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	6	4	1	3	4
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	1	0
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level (= level 2)	3	3	4	0	3
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	0	0	0
Misc. – **FEAR TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	4	0	0	0	1
Misc. – **FEAR INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	1	3	1	0	1
total	**55**	**78**	**60**	**64**	**65**

The first insight from this breakdown is that none of the varieties conceptualize FEAR as a PERSON on a very generic level (= level 1), e.g., *fear is a person, animal, being*, etc. The majority of FEAR IS A PERSON metaphors are found on the specific level, which imply a main meaning focus or major theme in accordance with Kövecses (2010: 138). In order to explore this, I will first illustrate examples of each specific level as presented in Table 6.4 and then move on to examine the variety perspective.

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[78]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

Despite the infrequency of this specific-level source domain (which is the case for the majority here), there is evidence that FEAR can be conceptualized as an ACCOMPLICE, which was not attested to in previous research. ACCOMPLICE, in its basic sense entails a person who participates in criminal or bad behavior, with whom you are associated. You feel compelled either to maintain this association, as in (49), highlight this association, as in (50), hide this association, as in (51), or name the accomplice as the guilty party, as in (52).

(49) The turnout of registrants for the just-concluded exercise was massive - pleasantly assuaging the **fear** of voter apathy *harboured* before the exercise commenced. (NG G)

(50) And in order to actualise his policy he embraced any African dictator and constitutional monarchy in the Middle East who *joined* the US **fear**. (NG G)

(51) But it *hides* **fear** and insecurity as modernity challenges the roots of such heritage […] (NG G)

(52) Most people have plenty of thoughts and feelings, but the problem for many seems to be the ability to take action. The *culprit*, of course, is **fear**. (SG G)

This conceptualization of FEAR shows up only in NG, KE and SG, albeit only five times.

FEAR, in line with a broader interpretation of personification, can be compared to A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL, which is relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) WILD / CAPTIVE ANIMAL. It is not surprising that fear, as a generally viewed negative emotion, presents a danger not unlike an animal that has been unleashed or aroused from sleep, (53) and (54) respectively. These conceptualizations were also found for ANGER and, therefore, seem conventional for negative emotions in general.

(53) Would I tell a Luo officer to stand aside for them to go *unleash* **terror**[79]? (KE G)

(54) *Arouse* great **fear** and anxiety in many men and women […] (NG G)

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[79] A note here on *terror* is warranted, considering its contemporary use to denote to terrorism. This, in and of itself, is metonymic, considering part of terrorism and terrorists acts is to illicit widespread feelings of terror. In the FEAR dataset, I did not annotate any instance of *war on terror*, considering its most recent American usage, which has naturally been picked up in the Englishes globally, especially in journalistic and political discourse. However, I did consider those instances of *terror* in a metonymic relationship with terrorism as metaphorical when, like example (57), they lend themselves to a direct comparison with another domain, like AN OCTOPUS SPREADING ITS TENTACLES.

unleash is particular salient for this conceptualization 7 out of 21 times for this source domain grouping. Nevertheless, FEAR IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL metaphors can also be very specific in the images they invoke.

(55) A sickening, paralyzing **fear** *coiled around* my heart. (SG B)

(56) However, I managed to save myself from the *fangs of* **fear**, and fortunately I found new strategies on how to boost my confidence. (SG B)

(57) As **terror** *spreads its ugly tentacles across* the world, the instant reaction is one of horror (IN G)

(58) It was successful in causing almost *a stampede of* humanitarian **concern** and focus on Africa. (NG G)

(59) Is your mind in its resting place, or the termite of worry, *the termite of* **fear** or the termite of the fear of death, has *eaten you up*? (NG G)

In terms of the varieties, NG contributes the majority of FEAR IS A (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL with 10 of the total 21 tokens.

Previously unaccounted for is FEAR IS A GUIDE, represented by only three instances in GB, KE and SG, which demonstrates the understanding of FEAR as a person directing your actions in a particular endeavor, as in (60), or a person bringing you to a destination, as in (61). The latter aspect is, of course, closely related to PART OF A JOURNEY. Because of the obvious personification, I have, nevertheless, chosen to include it in here.

(60) […] this simply means he is playing the politics of another era, *guided by* the **fear** to disturb the status quo, or his desire to preserve the status quo […] (KE B)

(61) And interestingly enough, natural disasters don't really cause the kind of **fear** that *brings people to church* the way terrorism does. (SG B)

Also previously unaccounted for is that FEAR can be a HELPER, but in another sense than determined for GUIDE (although a guide is also technically a helper, albeit a rather specific one). FEAR as a HELPER highlights the protective properties of this emotion, which in essence give it a positive spin. The eight instances of this specific-level metaphor occur in GB, IN and SG.

(62) And many **fears** are rational, of course, and can be **friends** to our lives; the **fear** that *heightens our awareness* in a dark part of town, for example, or the fear

of falling that we suddenly develop when standing too near a cliff's edge on a windy day. (GB G)

(63) Many sitting MPs will lose badly. This **fear** will *keep* the LS being dissolved *at bay*. (IN B)

(64) **Fear** *teaches you to stay safe*, but it also predicts the outcome before it has happened, by focusing on the negative aspects and preventing you from taking risks. (SG G)

The advent or development of FEAR is highlighted by conceptualizing it as OFFSPRING, like in ANGER. (65) illustrates its relatedness to the ANIMAL domain by conceiving of FEAR in terms of (large-scale) breeding, while (66) describes first experiencing fear as a birth. Both senses would be covered by Stefanowitsch's (2006a) ORGANISM or, more specifically, by Esenova's (2011) special sense of CONTAINMENT, namely ANGER IS A CHILD.

(65) First, Wagalla Massacre *bred* **fear** and hatred. People began despising their neighbours and the other Somali clans. (KE B)

(66) While the fear of something happening is often unfounded, that doesn't make the fear any less real and such **fears** are *born out* of a lack of visible police presence combined with mind-bogglingly soft punishment for offenders. (GB B)

Like ANGER, FEAR is conceptualized to a large extent as an OPPONENT, which has been well established by previous research[80]. Also like ANGER, there are oppositional aspects that cohere to our basic experience of being afraid with origins in our biological evolution. FEAR, as an emotion concept, is "centered on threat" and functions "with a deep evolutionary origin, reflecting the fact that earth has always been a hazardous environment to inhabit" (Öhman 2008: 710). Hence, the world we live in (and in which our conceptual system is embodied) is dangerous and threatening, and fear has helped us to develop "defense responses to deal with life threats […] whether these are unhealthy chemicals in the surroundings, circumstances suggesting a hunting predator, or aggressive conspecifics" (710). In

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[80] In Section 6.1, the example of the metaphor FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*he was wrestling with his fear*) clearly highlights the physical struggle (Kövecses 1990: 77). Yet, I maintain that it is also apparent in Kövecses' FEAR IS A VICIOUS or HIDDEN ENEMY, TORMENTOR and even, as I see it, in FEAR AS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR. The reason I view A SOCIAL SUPERIOR as a subcategory of OPPONENT again relates to the oppositional aspects I determine as basic for understanding OPPONENT. To my mind, Kövecses' (1990: 78) examples to illustrate SOCIAL SUPERIOR (*her fear prevented her from going into the house, his actions were dictated by fear, fear dominated his actions*, etc.) speak to a situation in which a person's wishes or intentions are at odds with those of someone else, who then can compel that person into compliance.

other words, the relationship between FEAR and OPPONENTS (i.e., threats in both human and non-human form) has been biologically established.

However, the metaphors attributable to FEAR IS AN OPPONENT, raise FEAR to the level of the threats themselves. An excess of fear is a destructive emotion that will hinder the person experiencing it in a particular situation. Regulating the feeling of fear within ourselves is often talked about in terms of fighting or facing our fears, as we would human opponents, so that there is no hindering excess of fear or so that the feeling of fear disappears altogether. Moreover, FEAR can launch an attack on you, as well. The comparison between FEAR and AN OPPONENT can be demonstrated in these general terms in (67) – (71).

(67) When you are *attacked by* **fear**, go to your healing toolkit […] (GB G)

(68) **Fear** is, and always has been, the *greatest enemy of mankind*. (NG B)

(69) Her enemies *wrestle with* the **fear** that more Kenyan women will ascend to high office […] (KE B)

(70) How can you *look into the eyes of* **fear** when you have already decided that it is your *enemy*? (IN G)

(71) Be it a fear for pests or to face a huge group, you can only *face* those **fears** […] (SG B)

Beyond this basic oppositional meaning, FEAR IS AN OPPONENT metaphors are the only type of PERSON metaphors that can be broken down into further meaning foci components (= level 3), which will be illustrated later in this section.

Like in the ANGER case study, FEAR as a PARENT is, of course, conceptually related to OFFSPRING. Furthermore, it indirectly presents the flipside of the coin to Esenova's (2011) CONTAINMENT subcategory, FEAR IS A CHILD, by understanding FEAR as the PARENT-CONTAINER. In the PARENT sense FEAR is responsible for creating something (a sense I deem more visible at the linguistic level than CONTAINMENT), which, as illustrated by this single instance, is also related to the ANIMAL domain due to the use of *breeds* and *spawns*.

(72) […] **fear** of loss of originality *breeds* rejectionism and *spawns* negativism. (IN G)

Occurring in all varieties except IN; FEAR IS A PERSON WITH THE ABILITY TO SPEAK, similar to the ANGER types and also not found in previous research, can invoke a metonymic reading. The voice mentioned in (73) (which is further implied by the use of *tape*) can stand in for the fearful person him/herself.

(73) […] by understanding that the *voice of* **fear** is not you. It is only a conditioned "*tape*" from the past projecting into the future. Once you can recognize that you are the one *playing the tape* and not the tape itself, you are free! (SG G)

However, the more prominent conceptualization here is that of a person (inside oneself), speaking in lies (74), in whispers (75), in a particularly annoying way (76) or with whom we sit down for a conversation (77).

(74) I don't always folllow [sic] through - mostly from lack of strength or courage - **fear** jumps in there between the two and *fills my head with the lies*. (NG B)
(75) Every time **fear** *whispers to you* "what if this does not work" reply with "what if it does work". (NG B)
(76) We betray ourselves by being *nagged by* the **fear** that the lives we lead are not ours […]. (KE B)
(77) *Talk to* your **fear**. Sit your **fear** down across the table and *have a two-way conversation.* (KE G)

The two instances of FEAR IS A PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS or WHO IS DYING are found only in NG. As in the ANGER case study, FEAR is sustained in a manner similar to an ill person being nursed in (78), a mapping not discussed in the previous research, and is capable of experiencing death in (79), which is relatable to Stefanowitsch (2006a) general domain of ORGANISM.

(78) The **fear** we *nurse* before we get married is not really worth it. (NG G)
(79) Don't allow fear of failure hold you back, do the thing you fear and the *death of* **fear** *is certain....* (NG G)

In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous categories within the broad FEAR IS A PERSON metaphor type that indicate the assigning of human-like characteristics and actions to a fearful feeling. They are not only relatively infrequent but also do not demonstrate conceptual unity among themselves. (80) is an illustration of FEAR TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS

ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON, while (81) is an illustration of FEAR INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON.

(80) We need to decide if the **fear** is *reasonable* and *logical* or if it is unfounded and irrational. (SG B)
(81) It is also a **worry** that *touches* me as whenever I perform my role […] (SG B)

The various specific-level FEAR IS A PERSON metaphors occur in small numbers. This makes comparison across the varieties challenging. The exception is, of course, OPPONENT, which appears as a special instantiation of personified FEAR. It not only can be broken down further into a level 3, but also contributes the most PERSON tokens at 255 (or, in other words, 79% of the PERSON data).

Furthermore, as Table 6.5 demonstrates, there are differences between varieties when conceptualizing FEAR as AN OPPONENT in comparison to another type of PERSON (ex. ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, OFFSPRING, etc.)

Table 6.5: Absolute frequencies of OPPONENT as a special instantiation of FEAR IS A PERSON

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
OPPONENT	37	57	50	60	51
PERSON (other)	18	21	10	4	14
total	**55**	**78**	**60**	**64**	**65**

A chi-square test was performed on figures for all varieties in Table 6.5 and revealed that the observed differences are significant (x^2 = 15.389, df = 4, *p* = 0.003959). It is interesting that the lowest proportion of OPPONENT metaphors is found in GB (67% of all PERSON metaphors). The percentages in the New Englishes were higher (NG with 73%, SG with 78%, KE with 83% and IN with a whopping 94%). Similar results were found for the ANGER case study, although it is striking that for FEAR, the percentages of OPPONENT in the New Englishes are much higher and provide a stronger indication for a preference, especially for IN.

Taking a closer look at OPPONENT, it can be segmented into different meaning foci, which are reiterated in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6: Breakdown of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT per variety

OPPONENT	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	7	9	7	15	8
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	5	1	3	1	1
A THIEF (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	0
BEING BULLIED (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	3
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	10	33	26	24	12
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	8	6	11	17	23
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	6	4	1	3	4
total	55	78	60	64	65

All varieties make use of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT in the general sense, especially in IN – largely due to nine instances of the construction *face* [V] + *fear* (or subordinate term). Otherwise, the majority of FEAR IS AN OPPONENT metaphors fall into two level 3 categories that highlight a more specific, additional meaning.

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO EXERTS CONTROL*)

(82) […] looking around to see who else might be there and basically *letting* **fear** *control my life*. (GB G)

(83) Unfortunately, even many Christians are *under the grip of* the **fear** of death. (NG G)

(84) Besides, some of the contenders are held *hostage by* supporters and **fear** of losing them in case they enter political marriages unlikely to be embraced by their communities. (KE G)

(85) As most of the fireworks dealers have stocked crackers in their stores located in residential areas, a feeling of panic and **fear** has *gripped* the residents here. (IN G)

(86) He was *seized with* **terror** lest he should die of the strain. (SG G)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST*)

(87) It totally *eliminates* any **fear** of a blank page. (GB G)

(88) And then I would come home, incredibly proud of myself, for *conquering* my **fear** of death by cold water […] (NG G)

(89) […] you must be aware that you can stand to gain a lot by *overcoming* the **fear** of public speaking. (KE G)

(90) […] you will be able to *trounce* your **fear** of being emotional in a hassle free manner. (IN B)

(91) You too can learn how to *master* your **fear**, by understanding that the voice of fear is not you. (SG G)

In addition, FEAR can be conceptualized as AN OPPONENT in smaller numbers in accordance with additional meaning foci.

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*A HIDDEN ENEMY*)

(92) The **fear** of facing the situation *creeps in* and responsibility is avoided, and then temporarily clouded by another step in the wrong direction. (KE G)

(93) **Fear** is always *lurking around*, *waiting for the moment to appear*. (SG B)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*A THIEF*)

(94) The question is this, would you allow **fear** *rob* you of your financial destiny? (NG B)

(95) **Worry** *steals* our happiness. (KE G)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*BEING BULLIED*)

(96) […] when it does talk about it is not above *mocking* and *belittling* the genuine **concern** of others on that score. (GB G)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT*)

(97) **Fear** would *bury* your spiritual growth. (NG G)

(98) You know what really *tortures* people. The **fear** of the unknown more than the unknown itself. (SG B)

FEAR IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS PREVAILING*)

(99) And when you look back upon your existence on this planet, you can be sure that you'll be savouring all those moments of bravery and rueing all those moments when you were *captured by* **fear**. (GB B)

(100) […] Singaporeans *let* **fear** *get the upperhand*. (SG B)

This completes the discussion of FEAR IS A PERSON on the specific level, in which OPPONENT emerges as the most likely candidate for a preferential conceptualization, especially for the Indian variety. The following section will take a look at FEAR conceptualized as an ILLNESS.

6.3.2   FEAR IS AN ILLNESS

FEAR IS AN ILLNESS has been well testified to in the previous literature, most notably by Kövecses (1990), who identifies the mappings FEAR IS AN ILLNESS (*sick with fright*) and FEAR IS INSANITY (*insane with fear*). The ILLNESS domain is also implied in Stefanowitsch's (2006a) FEAR IS COLD (*shiver of fear, be frozen in fear*) and FEAR IS PAIN (*agony/convulsion of fear*), as well as in the metonymic system of FEAR outlined by Kövecses (1990). What they all have in common is a focal meaning being extended to a state of fright, that is, a physical condition that prevents your body or mind from properly functioning. This is why it comes as no surprise that FEAR IS AN ILLNESS metaphors are prevalent in all of the varieties, having been ranked in either the second (GB, NG, SG) or third position (KE, IN).

In fact, with 104 tokens overall (13.9% of the data) ILLNESS emerges as the second most common source domain for conceptualizing FEAR, although this is a dramatic decrease in preferential status in comparison to FEAR IS A PERSON (42.9%) outlined above. The percentages across varieties are illustrated in Figure 6.5.

Figure 6.5: Percentages of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS per variety

In terms of the metaphor profiles, GB and IN contain the largest portions of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS, yet for difference reasons when we take up a finer grain of analysis. Moreover, unlike ANGER IS ILLNESS outlined above, where we saw a more obvious grouping of this mapping at the more specific-level LOSS OF A

CONTROL OF BODY, this does not hold for a breakdown of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS, which is illustrated in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Breakdown of FEAR IS AN ILLNESS per variety[81]

ILLNESS	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	7	3	5	2	4
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	1	1	3	3	1
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)	1	1	0	1	1
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
COLD-RELATED (= level 3)	1	0	0	1	1
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3)	2	4	2	3	9
PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3)	4	2	0	0	2
STOMACH-RELATED (= level 3)	0	1	1	0	0
VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	2	3	5	12	2
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level (=level 2)	1	1	0	1	0
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	3	2	3	1	0
total	**23**	**18**	**19**	**24**	**20**

Before delving into examples of each level shown in this table, it is interesting to note that almost everything labelled "level 2" is also shared with ILLNESS conceptualizations of ANGER, the exception being MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS. Furthermore, in terms of ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS, which can be broken down into level 3s, two mappings emerge that are specific to FEAR, COLD-RELATED and STOMACH-RELATED. These two, in particular, are relatable to some aspects of the metonymic system Kövecses (1990) outlined, namely NERVOUSNESS IN THE STOMACH (*butterflies in the stomach*), DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE (*froze with fear*) and, perhaps, even SWEATING (*the cold sweat of fear broke out*).

What is also clear from Table 6.7 is that FEAR, as a generally undesired emotion, can be conceptualized in a generic sense as AN ILLNESS, which, of

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[81] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

course, describes a generally undesired physical condition. Thus, as a consequence of experiencing fear, we can talk in terms of feeling sick (101) and (102), suffering or implied suffering (103) and (104), having symptoms or bouts (105) and (106), etc.

(101) If you're feeling *sick with* **dread** every Sunday evening and preying [sic] each week that you will win the lottery […] (GB G)

(102) The people they asked must have been *sick with* **worry** about making the house payments […] (SG G)

(103) […] seem likely to become a target of Maliki's regime extending the **fear** that they *suffered* under Saddam Hussein. (GB G)

(104) No one has ever questioned that and he does not *live with* the **fear** that one day a woman might show up at a campaign rally […] (KE B)[82]

(105) Your dreams I think are a *sympton* [sic] *of* your inner **fear** of marriage and what you stand to lose […] (NG B)

(106) It is deeply disheartening that some regions in Kenya are experiencing *bouts of* insecurity and **fear**, so close to the 2013 general election. (KE G)

All examples above clearly demonstrate the comparison between FEAR and ILLNESS on the linguistic level. This comparison becomes more elaborated when we take a look at the more specific levels.

FEAR can be construed as such a precarious or unhealthy experience that it can lead to death. All varieties have at least one instance of this, with KE and IN both having three.

(107) […] just like a thief, the **worry** habit steals on me, and I find myself deep *in the throes of* **this** deadly **vice**. (KE G)

(108) The Sikh religious leadership heard and understood the message; and they *succumbed to* their **fear**. (IN G)

FEAR is being understood as AN ILLNESS as well when it is related to the partaking of an intoxicating substance, which, for this particular case, highlights its

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[82]   *live with* affords a good opportunity to illustrate collocational analysis as an aid to labelling the likely source domains. This phrase showed up twice in the KE data and my intuition was to initially annotate them as instances of personification, i.e., person you live with. This, after all, corresponds to a basic dictionary sense in *Macmillan* ("to live in the same house and have a sexual relationship with someone who you are not married to"). However, another definition ("to accept something unpleasant that you cannot change"), which is perhaps less structured, but, nevertheless, still a basic part of human experience, lead me to consult the collocations of *live with* in the GloWbE. The results spoke against my intuition. The human basic meaning was present (with 1,067 tokens), but the illness sense was much more prevalent (with 1,708), as in examples like to *live with disabilities, diabetes, aids, cancer*, etc.

origin outside of the body. You can be injected with it (109) or something you experience can be laced by it (110). It can be mind-altering in the manner of a drug (111) or just simply toxic (112).

(109) The more such cases, the more the population is *injected with* **fear** and eager to turn over more of its hard-won rights to the government. (IN G)

(110) […] our joy is discounted; *laced by* some **fear** over one of the success factors of his victory. (NG B)

(111) […] adrift in the set's vast mid-section, following literally hours of simply *mind-altering* **terror**. (GB B)

(112) […] we devour along their *toxins of* **fear** and hatred, which affects both our spiritual and physical health. (SG G)

Our experiences with being ill also include an illness' ability to spread rapidly from person to person. This is a particularly salient conceptualization of FEAR for IN (12 of the 24 tokens), but is found in all other varieties as well. It is solely instantiated by some form of *spread*.

(113) It's my first play, about the riots last year and the *spread of* **fear**. (GB G)

(114) […] it only served to **spread** uncertainty and *fear*. (NG G)

(115) […] if we burn you stand accused - because no politician can *spread* **fear** and hate without your help and support. (KE G)

(116) It is poor judgment and a deliberate act of *spreading* **fear** to compare a nuclear bomb with a nuclear plant. (IN G)

(117) An exaggeration or an attempt to *spread* **fear** (or otherwise silly) - one might think, but think about it. (SG B)

FEAR is also understood as AN ILLNESS, when it affects your mental health or, at least, your ability to think clearly. This mapping was not as common as in ANGER, but it is still present in the data for FEAR, as demonstrated below.

(118) *Dazed with* **fear**, Okonkwo drew his matchet [sic] and cut him down. (NG G)

(119) Once they rushed to seize it, a **fear** *psychosis* gripped the companies and that did the banks in. (IN G)

One specific level puts FEAR IS AN ILLNESS in a slightly more positive light. FEAR is an illness for which there is a treatment and, thus, relief, suggesting

it can be taken care of in the same way you can be treated for a certain illness. It is
is found in all varieties, except SG.

(120) […] I decided to have another go at *curing* her **fear** of loud bangs. (GB B)

(121) If the complaint has any substance, how can the government *mitigate* their
fear that this is going to end this way? (NG G)

(122) Hands at his side, he appears casual, too casual, as though to *assuage* her
fear, and his own. (KE B)

(123) The only *remedy for* this **fear** gripped masses lies in educating them. (IN G)

A specific level within ILLNESS that can be further broken down is FEAR
IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. The physical symptoms being
attributed to FEAR include COLD-RELATED (124) and (125), LOSS OF
CONTROL OF BODY (126) and (127), PHYSICAL PAIN (128) and (129),
STOMACH-RELATED (130) and (131), and VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (132).

(124) Why aren't parents *clammy with* **fear** that, without the priceless hurly-burly
of cash-strapped independence, their children will turn into cosseted, emotionally
stunted freaks? (GB G)

(125) That made Vandhiya Thevan *shiver in* **fear**. Ravidasan spoke in a loud voice.
(IN B)

(126) **Fear** got him *paralyzed*, and made him inactive. (NG B)

(127) […] what happens next? I didn't know. The **fear** was *crippling*. (SG G)

(128) I got the part and was *racked with* **fear** but I made a promise to myself not to
give up […] (GB G)

(129) Not only can my heart *feel the pain brought on by* each new **fear**, or loss I
experience, it could even differentiate each new sense of pain […] (SG G)

(130) […] shoulders sagged with relief, but his *stomach* was still *a roiling pit of*
fear. (NG G)

(131) The shock was jaw-dropping; the **terror** was *stomach-churning*, and the
tragedy of it all was just apocalyptic. (KE G)

(132) **Fear** is very *blinding*. (GB B)

From the variety-specific perspective, the FEAR IS AN ILLNESS breakdown
proved tricky, since it did not reveal any obvious grouping around a specific level,
like in the ANGER case study. In fact, the varieties tend to be all over the place in
terms of their preference within ILLNESS, although the numbers are too small for
any meaningful statistical analysis. For instance, GB makes most of the generic

mapping (with 7 tokens), while KE has a tie between the generic and AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS (with 5 each). NG has 4 tokens of LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY, but 3 each at the generic level and AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS. IN and SG show a slightly more verifiable preference, however. As mentioned above, IN has the majority of ILLNESS on the specific level of AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS. SG has almost half of its tokens (9 out of 20) attributable to LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY. Therefore, other than having established that all varieties make use of ILLNESS to a certain extent in order to conceptualize FEAR, we can conclude this section and move on to NATURAL FORCE.

6.3.3   FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE

Although NATURAL FORCE is not nearly as frequent as PERSON and ILLNESS (which together make up 56.8% of all FEAR metaphors), it is the third most common source domain for FEAR with 66 tokens or 8.8%. Figure 6.6 demonstrates the percentages of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE across the varieties.

Figure 6.6: Percentages of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety

With 28 tokens overall, IN displays the highest percentage (18.7%) of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE in its metaphor profile, followed by SG and KE with 8%. Therefore, it is useful to take a look at the internal structure of this broad source domain to understand what component parts contribute to this result. Before we do that, it should be noted that FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE (*fear swept over, engulfed by panic*, etc.), was previously discussed by Kövecses (1990) but not broken down into specific levels, like FIRE or WATER. In this study, NATURAL

FORCE was also initially used in annotation as shorthand for those metaphors demonstrating a mapping of the properties of the elements of the natural world onto FEAR, which can be classified by more specific source domains. Table 6.8 illustrates the dissection of NATURAL FORCE into specific levels.

Table 6.8: Breakdown of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE per variety[83]

NATURAL FORCE	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	1	0	0	0
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED – specific-level (= level 2)	3	4	3	13	9
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	1	0
CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3)	0	0	0	1	0
DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3)	1	0	3	0	0
MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3)	0	0	1	3	0
STARTING A FIRE (= level 3)	1	0	3	1	0
STORM - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	1	0	0
WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
RAIN (= level 3)	0	0	1	0	0
WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3)	3	0	0	9	3
total	**8**	**6**	**12**	**28**	**12**

FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE contains the more specific levels of ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED, FIRE, STORM and WATER, which are unevenly distributed across the varieties, seen in Table 6.8. Similar to ANGER, it also has one generic instance due to the ambiguity of *swept* in terms of source domain origin, illustrated in (133), as well as one instance of STORM, illustrated in (134).

(133) In Nigeria, the lesson of the earlier bank failures appeared to have been forgotten as generalized **distress** *swept* the banking sub-sector […] (NG G)

(134) At this stage of your marriage I would recommend that you have a heart to heart with him and for the both of you to be brutally honest with one another without the **fear** of a domestic *brewing up* […] (KE B)

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[83]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

This leaves the most common specific-level source domains of NATURAL FORCE as ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED, FIRE and WATER. The total tokens for FIRE and WATER overall were equal, 16 each, while ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED is at the helm with 32 total instances. As a reminder, FIRE and WATER were the most common source domains within NATURAL FORCE for ANGER. This is not the case for FEAR, in which ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED – in and of itself at first glance a somewhat broader category entailing atmospheric or climate-related phenomena, but, as will become clear below, acting as a cohesive unit – makes its first appearance. The following will first detail FIRE and WATER, which reveal level 3 analysis, as well, and then move on to ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED and the variety perspective.

Like ANGER, FEAR can be understood in terms of general burning, like in *smouldering with fear* (NG) and *flicker of fear* (IN), which were the only two instances. Unlike ANGER, we cannot trace it to the previous metonymic system set up by Kövecses (1990). Instead, it speaks to more of the correspondence between the intensity of burning and the intensity of a feeling of fright. The 14 other tokens of FEAR IS A FIRE can be broken down into the more specific-levels of CONTROLLING A FIRE, DESTRUCTIVE FIRE, MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE and STARTING A FIRE, which retain the intensity correlation. Notice that they were also the same for ANGER. Examples of these levels in FEAR are from GB, KE and IN, illustrated below. While SG did not indicate any FEAR IS A FIRE mappings, NG only had a generic instance (given above).

FEAR IS A FIRE (*CONTROLLING A FIRE*)

(135) […] they pierced and made a slow but steady entry into my very thought process, and eventually doused that *smouldering* **fear** […] (IN G)

FEAR IS A FIRE (*A DESTRUCTIVE FIRE*)

(136) I was *consumed in* **fear**, my heart was pounding. (KE B)

(137) He was *engulfed by* sudden **fear** of the unknown and his knees felt like giving in. (KE G)

FEAR IS A FIRE (*MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE*)

(138) Another follower of Malthusian population theory, Stephen Enke also helped *fuel* **fear** of overpopulation. (IN B)

(139) He felt that the lack of institutional credibility has *stoked the flames of* **fear**. (IN G)

FEAR IS A FIRE (*STARTING A FIRE*)

(140) The fighting has displaced hundreds of thousands of people and *sparked* **fear** of another large-scale war in the country. (KE G)

(141) His courage and pathetic promotion of it by this pathetic lawyer *ignites* **fear** among fellow non criminal and normal citizens […] (IN G)

The WATER domain has been previously attested to for FEAR by Stefanowitsch's (2006a) more general label LIQUID (*trickling / undercurrent of fear*). In the GloWbE data, WATER groups around one specific domain; that is, 15 of the 16 total instances are found in WAVES (FLOOD). The remaining instance is found in KE denoting a similarity between FEAR and RAIN (*reigned* [sic] *terror on*). FEAR IS WAVES (FLOOD) are found only in GB, IN, SG, with GB and SG contributing three instances each, while IN has the most with nine. Examples from this domain are illustrated in (142) – (146). They also indicate the mapping of intensity of this natural force, albeit by means of spotlighting the more specific image of waves or a flood.

(142) […] the reality is a *groundswell of* **concern** - if not opposition. (GB G)

(143) Anyone with links to the company rapidly gets *swept up in a wave of* **fear**. (SG G)

(144) […] individuals who have the fortitude to stand their ground in the face of *waves of* **fear** and greed that *sweep* through the market. (IN G)

(145) Being disrespectful to law of the land *sends waves of* **fear** among law abiders […] (IN B)

(146) The note, put up to the PM in November 2007 *in the wake of rising* **concern** over Raja's bid to ram through the 'first-come, first-served' policy […] (IN G)

It is noteworthy that for FEAR there is no clear preference between FIRE and WATER, although the majority of WATER mappings were found in the Asian Englishes, just like in the ANGER case study. Considering the prominence of the final NATURAL FORCE source domain in the following, this trend seems to be negligible.

The biggest contributor to FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE is ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED. It makes up nearly half (48%) of the

metaphors of this kind. As mentioned above, at first glance it appears to be a rather broad category (I was unable of breaking it down into more specific meaning units after all). As the examples in (147) – (151) will show, the metaphors found for this specific level cohere in the meaning being imparted to FEAR.

(147) If that's right, then maybe we can *emerge from a climate of* **fear**. (GB G)

(148) **Fear** *pervades* the entire city; classrooms have been burnt and reduced to shards […] (NG G)

(149) […] the early Moi years was vaporized and *a gloom of* darkness and **fear** *enveloped* the nation (KE B)

(150) This constancy of **fear** *hangs like a fog which obscures* the legendary beauty of the valley. (IN B)

(151) As a result, nobody knew who to trust. A *cloud of* suspicion and **fear** *hung over* Singapore. (SG G)

As these examples demonstrate, this source domain is employed to understand FEAR in terms of something that is all encompassing, like our climate or more distinct images like a cloud or fog. This highlights our experience with being fearful as something that not only hampers us, like our limited visibility in a fog, but also as something that is essentially shared beyond the individual, like a fog spreading across a city.

In terms of the variety-specific perspective, IN clearly contributes most readily to NATURAL FORCE regarding the raw frequencies. Furthermore, all 28 instances from IN fall into the most common source domains, ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED (13 tokens), FIRE (6 tokens) and WATER (9 tokens). In view of the other Asian variety, SG, ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED (9 tokens) is used over WATER (3 tokens) and no instances of FIRE exist in the dataset. The rest of the varieties show essentially the same picture for ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED with 3 tokens each in GB and KE and four in NG. The African varieties barely make use of WATER (with one instance in KE that proved to be an outlier as RAIN). Yet, NG and KE separate in terms of FIRE. KE is in a tie with IN with 6 tokens, but NG contributed only one. For the (former) norm-providing variety, GB, the instances of NATURAL FORCE are generally low (8 tokens), but are basically spread out almost evenly between

ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED (3 tokens), WATER (3 tokens) and FIRE (2 tokens).

Nevertheless, because the total bulk of NATURAL FORCE metaphors centers on ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED and considering it is the most common source domain in IN, which utilizes NATURAL FORCE most extensively, I decided to take a look at its distribution in comparison to all other NATURAL FORCE source domains across the varieties. Table 6.9 illustrates this.

Table 6.9: Absolute frequencies of ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED as a special instantiation of FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED	3	4	3	13	9
NATURAL FORCE (other)	5	2	9	15	3
total	**8**	**6**	**12**	**28**	**12**

A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 6.9 and revealed that the observed differences are not significant ($x^2 = 7.256$, df = 4, *p* = 0.12296).

Other than the fact that IN has the most NATURAL FORCE metaphors as part of its profile for FEAR, there is no good indication that this is a true preference. All varieties make use of it to some extent, as outlined above.

6.3.4   FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE

A mapping that did not feature in the previous research outlined in Section 6.1 is FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE. Although it only contributed to 7.1% of the overall FEAR data (53 instances), it showed up in the top 5 rankings for three varieties, KE (2nd), NG (3rd) and SG (5th). This ranking result is mirrored in the percentages across varieties, which demonstrate the highest proportion of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE in these three varieties, see Figure 6.7 below.

Figure 6.7: Percentages of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE per variety

KE makes use of this mapping 14% of the time in its metaphor profile and is, therefore, the biggest contributor of instances of this type. SG (7.3%) and NG (6.7%) half that, but still contribute more than GB (5.3%) and IN (2%). By taking a look at the internal structure of this broad source domain in more detail, in Table 6.10 below, and by examining the corresponding linguistic metaphors, a very specific reason for KE's prominence becomes apparent.

Table 6.10: Breakdown of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE per variety[84]

RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	2	0	0	0	1
ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE - specific-level (= level 2)	6	10	16	2	9
STRENGTHENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	5	1	0
WEAKENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	1
total	**8**	**10**	**21**	**3**	**11**

An obvious grouping for all varieties at the specific level is ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE, to which, again, KE, NG and SG contribute the most. We will consider this specific level in more detail below, after illustrating the less common instances.

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[84]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

First of all, a note on the label for this particular source domain is necessary. Although it contains various linguistic indications of the source domain HOUSE, that is not the whole story. HOUSE, of course, is one particular concept belonging to a more general source domain BUILDING / STRUCTURE, which entails some sort of construction. This is clear by examining the three generic instances from GB and SG.

(152) This series encourages us to consider the *artifice of* **fear**, and its psychological *construct*. (GB G)[85]
(153) It is *behind* **fear's** reasonable *façade* that the real danger lies […] (GB G)
(154) How can we ever be a real democracy if we keep retreating *behind the wall of* **fear**? (SG B)

These examples present evidence that FEAR is understood in terms of a construction, that is, a product of workmanship rather than occurring in nature (152) and, as such, something that can be hidden behind (153) and (154). The constructed property of BUILDING / STRUCTURE is also present in FEAR when we talk about FEAR as a STRUCTURE that can be strengthened, as in (155) and (156), or that can be weakened, as in (157).

(155) It is quite another to invoke and peddle not just lies in so doing, but also prejudice and stereotypes to *bolster* **fear** and hatred. (KE G)
(156) The **fear** had been *reinforced* for a number of appointments after their first painful experience. (IN B)
(157) This kind of damage would have riddled his ego, and more importantly *shaken the foundations of* **fear** nationwide. (SG B)

Yet, beyond this, the notion of construction also entails some sort of enclosure that in our basic experience is most prevalent in the places we dwell, stereotypically a HOUSE. The house itself can be implied, as in (158) and (159), but also specific images of its component parts, like a closet, a garage and rooms can be exploited for understanding FEAR, as in (160) – (162).

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[85] The OED provides a more historical definition of *artifice* ("Human skill or workmanship as opposed to nature or a natural phenomenon"), which suggested that this example belongs to RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE over PERSON, which would have been suggested by the basic definition of *artifice* in *Macmillan* ("behaviour that is intended to trick someone"). This is further supported by the addition of *construct* in this example.

(158) […] you don't have to *live in* **fear** for the rest of your life. (NG B)

(159) Many have been laid off thus the top mangers [sic] know that the remaining *live in* **fear** of losing their jobs. (KE G)

(160) […] issues which need to be spoken of and not *closeted* in shame or *in* **fear** of retributions. (IN G)

(161) Do not let the enemy *garage* you *with* **fear** […] (NG G)

(162) It's as if she's got lots of *little rooms* in her brain and she can *shut the door on* the **worry** ones […] (GB G)

The examples were annotated as FEAR IS AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE and they are clearly the most common across the varieties, especially so in KE. The main reason for this is the phrase *live in*, illustrated in (158) and (159) above, which constitutes 75.5% of all metaphors of this kind. It also generally makes up the bulk of this specific level when taking the variety-specific perspective: 5 out 6 in GB, 9 out of 10 in NG, 16 out of 21 in KE, 1 out of 2 in IN and all 9 in SG. Therefore, it is highly conventional.

Due to the obvious grouping of FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE around the specific level of AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE, it would be interesting to submit its distribution in comparison to all other BUILDING / STRUCTURE metaphors to statistical testing. However, this is not possible due to the zero value for NG that we would get, since all of its 10 instances are found in AN ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE. It suffices to say that for this particular source domain, NG, KE and SG contribute the most, but do not necessarily demonstrate a variety-specific preference since it can be also found in GB and IN. Therefore, we will leave it there and move on to FLUID IN A CONTAINER, which was surprisingly low in numbers for FEAR as compared to the ANGER case study.

6.3.5   FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

FLUID IN A CONTAINER is an attested source domain that is mapped onto FEAR (e.g., Kövecses 1990 and Stefanowitsch 2006a). That it would show up for FEAR metaphors in the GloWbE varieties was expected, but it is, nevertheless, surprising that it is not at all frequent. FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, with a total of

32 tokens, only makes up 4.3% of the total FEAR data. Correspondingly, the percentages in the individual metaphor profiles were low, as seen in Figure 6.8.

Figure 6.8: Percentages of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety

Despite these low proportions, it is interesting that GB has by far the biggest share in FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 10.7%. The New English varieties all range between 2% - 3.3%.

In order to get a better picture of what is contributing the most to the broad domain of FLUID IS A CONTAINER in GB, we can take a look at the specific levels. An overview is provided in Table 6.11.

Table 6.11: Breakdown of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER[86]

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	7	0	4	1	2
BODY FLUID (= SWEAT) - specific-level (= level 2)	2	1	0	0	0
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	4	1	1	2	1
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER- (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)- (= level 3)	1	0	0	0	0
FROM SOLID TO LIQUID - specific-level (= level 2)	1	1	0	1	1
total	**16**	**3**	**5**	**4**	**4**

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[86] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

GB, with the highest proportion of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, makes the most of the generic level of this source domain. The generic level mostly emphasizes the basic experience of filling a container, which is mapped onto FEAR, but also provides evidence that FEAR can be understood in another general way. The experience of immersion into a container full of a fluid (e.g., sinking into a bathtub full of water) is also used to construe the general confining sense we have when we are afraid. (163) and (162) illustrate the CONTAINER BEING FILLED sense, while (165) and (166) illustrate the BEING IMMERSED sense.

(163) The prospect of the reality TV drivel that will inevitably be served up in the autumn schedules is *filling* me *with* **dread**. (GB G)

(164) […] his actions during his short reign *filled* his Protestant subjects *with* **fear** […] (GB G)

(165) One minute self sufficient with some salary, the next *plunged into* poverty and **fear** […] (GB B)

(166) When you sleep securely yourself, it's not that difficult to *plunge* everyone else *into* **fear**. (KE G)

The bulk of the metaphors of this kind are found on this generic level (14 tokens or 43.8%). Seven of them are found in GB, while the other seven are in KE (4 tokens), SG (2 tokens) and IN (1 token).

The only other somewhat more numerous specific level was FEAR IS ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER. The 9 total tokens (or 28.1%) are also not spread out evenly. GB has four, while the New Englishes only have one or two. As a reminder, the source domain here is understood by way of a folk model of ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID (see discussion in Section 5.3.2). Examples from the data are given below.

(167) […] yes the paedophilia thing is *generating* **fear** […] (GB G)

(168) Her ambition was *fuelled by* the **fear** that India would stray from Nehru's path. (IN B)

While these representative examples do not make the underlying folk model of ENERGY AS (FLOWING) FLUID as explicit as in the ANGER case study, they, nevertheless, tap into this model concerning the presence of the verbs *generate* and

fuel. These verbs are commonly used to denote the production of energy, thus entailing its transfer, which is conventionally understood via FLOWING FLUID.[87]

The remaining specific levels in Table 6.11 are very infrequent. FROM SOLID TO LIQUID has a total of four instances (e.g*., fear dissolving like the cubes of sugar we sometimes threw into soaked garri*, NG). BODY FLUID (in particular SWEAT) is attested to a total of three times (e.g., *doused in fear*, GB), which is relatable to Kövecses' (1990) metonymy of SWEATING. FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER, although broken down into two level 3s, is attested to only twice in GB.

FEAR IS FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER
(169) But perhaps many of us could agree that **worry** *boils down* to not allowing ourselves rest or peace of mind. (GB B)

FEAR IS FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)
(170) I still remember the scene that most frightened me and that **fear** *came bubbling up to the surface* in 1998. (GB G)

It could be assumed on the basis of *boils down* and *bubbling up* that a HEAT component is involved here. However, some things speak against this. First of all, an insight by Kövecses (1990), which was quoted in Section 7.1, is repeated here for convenience. "Since the conceptualization of fear does not have a heat component, the fluid in the container does not produce steam and pressure, there is no explosion, and nothing comes out whose outflow could be held back or reversed" (86). In the examples above, I do not see any further indication that, for example, the bubbling up of fear is caused by a source of heat. Secondly, although *boils down* opens up the HEAT frame, its contextual meaning in (169) is related to a more general mapping that is not specific to emotion concepts, namely, something like DEDUCING THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING IS BOILING FLUID DOWN TO A RESIDUAL.

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[87] A brief glance at the collocates in the GloWbE reveals that among the most common are *electricity* (1,748 tokens) for *generate* and *energy* (1,695) for *fuel* as a verb.

There is no obvious grouping of FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER at a certain level. While GB makes use of it most frequently on the whole, I am not convinced that this is an indication of a preference. The overall frequencies were low here, and I assume that with a larger dataset the differences between GB and the New Englishes would be negligible.

6.3.6   FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY

A mapping relating FEAR to JOURNEY was suggested by the metonymy FLIGHT in Kövecses (1991), as well as by FEAR IS A BARRIER (*barrier of fear, fear (be) obstacle*) in Stefanowitsch (2006a), outlined in Section 6.1. Furthermore, FEAR can be understood as a JOURNEY in terms of the LOCATION system of the EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor by Lakoff (2007 [1993]). Therefore, we can expect FEAR to be conceptualized to some degree by the JOURNEY domain in the varieties, which, of course, is the case.

Nevertheless, it does not occur all too frequently. 4.1% of the FEAR data (a total of 31 tokens) is represented by FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY. Figure 6.9 displays the percentages it contributes to the metaphor profiles of the individual varieties.

Figure 6.9: Percentages of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety

The largest proportion of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY goes to GB (8%), followed by SG (6.7%), KE (4%) and NG (2%). For the IN data no instances were found. Like for ANGER, the PART OF A JOURNEY source domain plays a role in conceptualizing FEAR, but obviously not a considerable one. Therefore, a more

detailed discussion of this source domain will take place in the HAPPINESS case study, where its contribution is more pronounced (see Section 7.3.2). For now, it suffices to consider its breakdown for FEAR and, in doing so, illustrate the specific levels, which it shares with ANGER. Table 6.12 provides an overview of this breakdown.

Table 6.12: Breakdown of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety[88]

PART OF A JOURNEY	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	0	0	0	0
BARRIER / OBSTACLE – specific-level (= level 2)	8	2	4	0	8
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	0	0	1
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	2	0	1
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	0	0
total	**12**	**3**	**6**	**0**	**10**

Like ANGER, the FEAR data was distributed among the specific-level mappings BARRIER / OBSTACLE, DESTINATION, PATH and STARTING POINT, which are illustrated by (171) – (178).

BARRIER / OBSTACLE

(171) How can you *breakthrough* the **fear** of having another bad boring day, and instead feel more motivated than before? (GB G)

(172) […] the **fear** of more reprisals and the unsolved land question are *obstacles that still loom large*. (KE G)

(173) **Fear** can act as a *barrier* and *hinder* our personal growth. (SG B)

DESTINATION

(174) Sadly these conversations don't always take place, often *leading to* unnecessary **distress** at one of the most vulnerable times in people's lives. (GB B)

(175) Thanks for your part in getting us back home and out of this *detour into* **fear**. (SG G)

PATH

(176) However, the criminals and terrorists that have *chosen this path of* **terror** on innocent Kenyans […] (KE B)

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[88]   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix B.

(177) **Fear** can only *lead to* anger. (SG G)

STARTING POINT
(178) We have *come a long way from* **fear** and hate. (NG G)

Although BARRIER / OBSTACLE is the most frequent of these specific levels in all varieties in which PART OF A JOURNEY is present, the low numbers and the complete absence of PART OF A JOURNEY in IN make statistical testing difficult, in order to have indication that BARRIER / OBSTACLE is a preference. Therefore, we are left to conclude that, while most varieties make use of FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY to some extent, it is an uncommon occurrence.

With this section an overview of the source domains contributing the most to the metaphor profiles of the varieties is complete. We now turn to the collection of "minor metaphors" for FEAR that, as a whole, did not contribute extensively to conceptualizations of FEAR in GloWbE.

6.3.7   Minor Metaphors of FEAR

This final section of the FEAR case study results provides an overview of those metaphor groupings and miscellaneous metaphors that did not contribute to a large extent to the metaphor profiles of the varieties. This concerns POSSESSION (with 22 tokens), A DEEP PLACE (with 20 tokens), WEAPON (with 19 tokens), SUPERNATURAL BEING (with 18 tokens). Together with the miscellaneous metaphors, they represent 17.9% of the metaphors in KE, 18% in IN, 18.7% in GB, 18.8% in SG, and 21.4% in NG. For some of these source domains, it was possible to do a specific-level breakdown (which can be consulted in Appendix B), but, on the whole, the frequencies remain so low that statistical comparison across varieties was not possible. The following provides an overview of these minor metaphors with some illustrative examples of each source domain category.

FEAR IS A POSSESSION metaphors, like in the ANGER case study, is relatively infrequent with 22 tokens in the whole dataset. It is, however, found most frequently in GB (with 13 tokens). In the New Englishes, only one token each was found for NG and SG, three for KE and four for IN. Of the 13 GB instances, six

highlight POSSESSION in terms of SHARED OWNERSHIP (179), while four highlight TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP (180).

(179) I speak in an effort to unite the House, because the Opposition *share* the **concern** for farmers. (GB G)

(180) […] this *brings* feelings of **fear** and you may feel down that you feel awful again. (GB G)

The SHARED OWNERSHIP theme is also attested to in the New Englishes, as evidenced by (181) – (184).

(181) Except people who have no human feelings many people *share* the grief and **fear** […] (NG G)

(182) […] we Kenyans here can protest peacefully so that the rest of the world *shares* our **concern**. (KE B)

(183) Rich and poor, high and low, men and women, can cooperate with each other if there is a sound reason and *shared* **concern**. (IN G)

(184) To this day, I remember the deep **fear** and the tumbling waves of emotion the both of us *shared* back then. (SG G)

The examples above demonstrate the conventionality of the pairing of *share* and *fear (*or a subordinate term) in a linguistic metaphor, which underscores this meaning focus for FEAR IS A POSSESSION metaphors. This is also why the above examples were not annotated as BURDEN, which entails heaviness – an aspect not present on the linguistic level. A more exhaustive examination of POSSESSION will be undertaken in the case study of HAPPINESS (see Chapter 7), because it contributes much more extensively to the conceptualization of that emotion.

Despite only 20 tokens, A DEEP PLACE is a notable source domain due to the fact that it is only attested in the New Englishes (three tokens in NG, eight tokens in KE, five tokens in IN, and four tokens in SG), although an association between DEPTH and FEAR appears to be perfectly conventional and despite not being mentioned in the previous research discussed in Section 6.1.

(185) Expectedly, all these developmental moves are causing disquiet, sorrow and *deep* **concern** for those individuals […] (NG G)

(186) As for Tony, he was *in deep* **distress**, mourning a son and dreading the possible loss of his family. (KE G)

(187) That is why Mews fear police which others in Jaipur can not understand and *measure the depth of* **fear**. (IN B)

(188) The **worry** really *at the bottom of* your question is, can I afford an HDB flat […] (SG G)

The association of FEAR with A DEEP PLACE is highlighted by further findings. First of all, *deep-seated*, which albeit only shows up once in the KE data, collocates frequently with a negative emotion – in GloWbE the collocational analysis of *deep-seated* yielded *hatred* (50 tokens), *fear* (46 tokens) and *anger* (28 tokens) in the top 10 ranking. Secondly, as demonstrated in (189) – (192), the New Englishes specify FEAR as A DEEP PLACE, by denoting a physical activity associated with lowering the body, namely cowering.

(189) If we can only speak out and not *cower in* **fear**, then our voice will be more powerful. (NG G)

(190) Nostalgic because it brought back the memories of how we would *cower in* **dread** whenever she stood over our desks […] (KE G)

(191) Unless we stand up and fight against such behavior, we would be *cowering in* **fear** all the time and what would such life be worth? (IN B)

(192) […] we now have a Ministry of Education that is *cowering in* **fear** from (1) unknown, invisible conservative forces […] (SG G)

Like ANGER, FEAR can also be conceptualized as a WEAPON – albeit not as extensively, as evidenced by the total of 19 tokens (as compared to ANGER's 79 tokens). Of these 19 tokens, SG has the most with seven, while IN has none. FEAR IS A WEAPON can be attested at the generic level, as in (193) – (195)

(193) […] he bellowed, flanked by fearsome guys whose presence drove home the point that **fear** is *a legitimate weapon in* political *warfare*. (NG G)

(194) Once you make that initial mistake, you get into trouble. The enemy uses the *weapon of* **fear**. (NG G)

(195) He or she will use **fear** as the *weapon* to motivate the employees to work. (SG G)

Yet, it can also be conceptualized more specifically as A BOMB (196) and (197), as well as A KNIFE (198) and (199), which is in line with Stefanowitsch's (2006a) SHARP OBJECT.

(196) The one per cent levy was introduced early this year to fund research and marketing for the country's top income earner *triggering* **fear** that it would make Mombasa uncompetitive. (KE G)

(197) However, at some point, the QE is finally working in *defusing* people's **fear** to put money into riskier destinations. (SG B)

(198) To achieve immortality, judgments must pierce a man's heart without *striking* **fear** in the hearts of men. (KE G)

(199) So what's so scary about the Education Minister that his very utterance can *strike* **fear** into the hearts of the young and the old? (SG G)

SUPERNATURAL BEING is also found to conceptualize FEAR, as Kövecses (1990) previously points out, but unlike for ANGER, there was no indication that it also relates to RELIGIOUS PRACTICE (like the *let anger be your prayer* example in IN, see Section 5.3.6). Besides one instance of *aura of fear* in KE, the majority of FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING personifies FEAR as a demon, devil, evil spirit, etc.

(200) That *spirit of* **fear** *will show itself*. That is why it is often said that *the most common demon* in the whole world is **fear**. (NG G)

(201) Am also thanking God for *delivering* my brother from *the torment of* **fear**. (NG G)

(202) […] he kept away from the media glare or was struggling with an innate **fear** that still *haunts* the political pelicans who manned State House corridors then. (KE B)

(203) But the path can get clouded over by lethargy, lack of courage, **fear** of failure and insecurities. These *invisible enemies* are *demons* of the mind. (IN G)

(204) 12 million people of J &K can't be hijacked by India, by *raising the bogy of* **fear**. (IN G)

Once again, SUPERNATURAL BEING points to an emotion conceptualization that is preferred by the New Englishes – for the case of FEAR by NG, KE and IN. No metaphors of this kind are found in GB and SG. However, of the New Englishes conceptualizing FEAR as a SUPERNATURAL BEING, NG leads the pack, since 13 of the 18 metaphors are attributable to this variety. This indicates that the

potential cultural specificity of SUPERNATURAL BEING is something that should be explored on a larger scale in future research.

Finally, the FEAR metaphor profiles contained miscellaneous metaphors for each variety, that either showed up less than five times in a single variety (e.g., DARKNESS, MACHINE, PLANT, VALUABLE COMMODITY, etc.) or were metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., ARMOR, BUBBLE, SHIP, etc.). The majority of these metaphors are less conventional and, due to their low numbers, could be viewed as innovate or creative metaphors. The following illustrates an example of each source domain that occurred less than five times in one variety.

(205) This is because as one approaches their young adult years, it is important to have *outgrown* **fear** and a general mistrust of people. (KE G) → FEAR IS CLOTHING

(206) […] call it a fear of success, even though I'm *cloaking* it as a **fear** of blending in, an aversion to no longer being 'different'. (KE B) → FEAR IS A COVERING

(207) […] you might catch a cold at 8 weeks and *start the cycle of* **worry** all over again (SG G) → FEAR IS A CYCLE

(208) But unfortunately, at the ground level victims are leading lives *under the shadow of* **fear**. (IN G) → FEAR IS DARKNESS (here A SHADOW)[89]

(209) Sexual predators *feed off of* this **fear** to empower them […]. (GB B) → FEAR IS FOOD[90]

(210) That we can not cower at knuckle-head cowards who *use* **terror** *as an instrument* of propaganda. (NG G) → FEAR IS AN INSTRUMENT / TOOL

(211) And that's what the tool is about for me, to *turn the engine of* **fear** on the perpetrators of fear, perpetrators of corruption and fraud (NG B) → FEAR IS A MACHINE

(212) It is the same for those who transform ideas into idioms and then, bucking **fear** instead of *buckling under* **it**, stand up and throw down. (SG G)→ FEAR IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN[91]

(213) This kind of agenda can only *plant seeds of* **fear** *in* other people. (KE G) → FEAR IS A PLANT[92]

(214) Most teachers are fault cos they *impose* this silly '**fear**' on students especially pupils.... I repeat.. primary school pupils. (NG G)→ FEAR IS A PUNISHMENT

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[89]   Directly corresponding to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) DARK (*shadow of fear*)

[90]   Relatable to Esenova's (2011) BAD TASTE (*rancid fear*), although FEAR is being consumed in this example.

[91]   Directly corresponding to Kövecses' (1990) BURDEN (*fear weighed heavily*)

[92]   Relatable to Esenova's (20011) PLANT (*blossomed into fear*)

(215) […] as the electorate continues to mature and *free itself from the shackles of* a **fear** of the political alternative […] (SG B) → FEAR IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE

(216) He can *smell* still her *stink of* **fear** when his hand clamped over her mouth. (SG G)→ FEAR IS A SCENT[93]

(217) I think every director likes to *peddle* some kind of sensation over others. I like to *peddle* **fear**. (IN B) → FEAR IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY

(218) **Fear** is the greatest *violence* (IN G) → FEAR IS VIOLENCE

The following examples demonstrate the 15 metaphorical hapax legomena in the data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly creative.

(219) […] all designed to play into the human pysche [sic] and to create a giant *bubble of* **fear** that if PAP goes, Singapore is ruined. (SG G) → FEAR IS A BUBBLE

(220) […] must also convince Jack Frost to join their ranks, as Pitch's *campaign of* **fear** & darkness threatens to envelop the world. (SG G) → FEAR IS A CAMPAIGN

(221) And that's what the tool is about for me, to turn the engine of fear on the *perpetrators of* **fear**, perpetrators of corruption and fraud (NG B) → FEAR IS A CRIME

(222) That's just the way I play. Never *play with* emotion or **fear**, just odds. (SG B) → FEAR IS A GAME

(223) She stood outside a bathroom door, calling for her mother, *poking* her **fear** *through the keyhole* […] (KE G) → FEAR IS A KEY

(224) I can always tell - for a brief period **fear** *flashed* through the bully's face *like a meteorite tracing across the night skies*. (SG B) → FEAR IS A METEORITE

(225) I see the same characteristics now in moments of tremendous misery and loss coupled with having to adjust in dealing with hitherto unheard of *struggles* like power breakdown, disrupted train schedules and the **fear** of nuclear radiation. (IN G) → FEAR IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE

(226) The begging question is whether this ruling is sound in law as it is patently *engraved in* the **fear** of the unknown. (KE G) → FEAR IS A SURFACE FOR ENGRAVING

(227) The **fear** Mumbai *witnessed* after the announcement of Thackeray's death only details the politics […] (IN G) → FEAR IS AN EVENT

(228) […] I will have to '*abandon the ship of* **fear**' and surrender to the process of creativity. (IN G) → FEAR IS A SHIP

(229) Instead, they *pierced through the armour of* despair and **fear** which had gripped me […] (IN G) → FEAR IS ARMOR

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[93] Directly corresponding to Esenova's (2011) BAD SMELL (*smell the stench of fear*)

(230) But this is Britain we are talking about, so the unchecked power that created this *culture of* **fear** was not the military or secret police; it was tabloid newspapers. (GB G) → FEAR IS CULTURE

(231) […] this government will have to whip us and *rule by* **fear** but this would also be short lived and stupid. (SG G) → FEAR IS LAW

(232) […] the first year is the most painful, when doubts about the past and **concern** over the future *reach a crescendo*. (GB G) → FEAR IS MUSIC[94]

(233) Her hair was disheveled. **Fear** was *written upon her face*. (IN G) → FEAR IS WRITING ON THE FACE

On a final note, it is striking that the FEAR data presents a larger amount of miscellaneous metaphor data (63 tokens or 8.4% of the total data) in comparison to ANGER (34 tokens or 4.5%). This indicates that, taken as a whole, the domain of FEAR lends itself to more innovative metaphorization than ANGER, which makes use of more cohesive source domain groupings and which was reflected in the shared top five domains of PERSON, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, NATURAL FORCE, ILLNESS and WEAPON. This also explains why the rankings for FEAR only showed a wide preference for PERSON and ILLNESS across the varieties.

This concludes the overview and illustration of the FEAR metaphors in the New Englishes and GB. In the following section, the results will be discussed on the basis of the dimensions of metaphor variation and, in doing so, I will consider what this means for the debate surrounding universality and variation in metaphor.

6.4   Discussion

In this section, a brief discussion of the results focuses on what was shared (or not shared) between the varieties in terms of the whole picture. This will also involve taking account of the results in light of Kövecses' (2005) variation types (congruent metaphors, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) and formulating a preliminary conclusion on what this case study says about universality and variation in FEAR.

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[94]   Stefanowitsch (2006a) would have likely annotated this as HIGH (INTENSITY) (*fear peak*, X *heighten fear*, etc.) I was led to annotate it as FEAR IS MUSIC, suggested by the basic definition of *crescendo* in the *Macmillan* online dictionary, which was "a gradual increase in sound in a piece of music".

Firstly, the metaphor profiles for each variety introduced in Section 6.2 helped to gauge how the varieties compare in terms of the range of target. As a reminder, the range of target involves metaphors that make use of different source domains for the same target domain. In this case study, the target domain is FEAR, and, as the metaphor profiles in Table 6.2 indicated, FEAR metaphors were largely shared by the varieties. Nevertheless, the distribution of the most prominent source domains overall, i.e. PERSON, ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE, across the varieties was significant, which prompted an examination at the specific level concerning source domain preference. Furthermore, unlike in the case study of ANGER, there were a few source domains that featured in some varieties and not in others. For instance, all New English varieties attested to A DEEP PLACE, but none were found for GB. IN did not have any FEAR IS A WEAPON and FEAR IS PART OF A JOURNEY metaphors, although they showed up in the other varieties. In addition, although SUPERNATURAL BEING showed up in NG, KE and IN, there were no instances of it in GB and SG. In a larger dataset it would be interesting to see if the source domains not attested to here for GB, IN and SG, in fact, do emerge for FEAR.

Concerning congruent metaphors, which have generic schemas that can be expanded upon via cultural input, there was no major indication in the specific-level breakdowns of the major metaphors that they exist to large extent for FEAR. The evidence of them, like in the ANGER case study, remained anecdotal. For example, in the ILLNESS metaphors, the African varieties were the only ones to specify FEAR as an ILLNESS in terms of the stomach. Examples are repeated here below.

(234) […] shoulders sagged with relief, but his *stomach* was still *a roiling pit of fear*. (NG G)

(235) The shock was jaw-dropping; the **terror** was *stomach-churning*, and the tragedy of it all was just apocalyptic. (KE G)

Yet, this specification was confined to these two instances and more evidence is needed to determine if these are the result of culturally-conditioned extensions of the generic schema of ILLNESS.

Similar anecdotal evidence exists for the minor metaphors in this case study, which also presented the problem of low numbers and thus made definitive conclusions difficult. The mapping FEAR IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING may be a preferential conceptualization, as it was the most prominent in NG (but also attested to twice in KE and IN). NG exclusively made use of the specific-level (RELATED TO) AN EVIL SUPERNATURAL BEING, as in the repeated examples below, which conceivably connects to cultural beliefs or values.

(236) That *spirit of* **fear** *will show itself*. That is why it is often said that *the most common demon* in the whole world is **fear**. (NG G)

(237) Am also thanking God for *delivering* my brother from *the torment of* **fear**. (NG G)

However, it was problematic to assume a cultural force behind these instances with so few examples in the data. It does, however, point to an area that deserves further attention in future research – the assumption being that infrequency in emotion metaphors incites creative metaphorization, which would lend itself more readily to cultural filtration.

On the whole, preferential conceptualizations (which, if present, were assumed to occur when breaking down broader source domains into specific levels) were not prominent in the FEAR data. There was no real preference found for ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE, RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE, FLUID and PART OF A JOURNEY. For instance, although IN contributed the most FEAR IS A NATURAL FORCE metaphors overall and the largest grouping within NATURAL FORCE was ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE, all varieties made use of it to some extent and the observed differences between them were not significant. Nevertheless, for the PERSON source domain, the New Englishes did seem to prefer OPPONENT (especially IN on the level 3s of EXERTING CONTROL and BEING PREVAILED AGAINST). However, it is not certain that this preference would hold in a larger dataset. Although the New Englishes used OPPONENT 73% - 94% of the time in PERSON, it still constituted 67% of PERSON for GB and, thus, played a certifiable role in British English. Therefore,

we are left to conclude that, although the FEAR data does show some variation, on the whole we are dealing with the same metaphorical behavior for FEAR.

Since conceptualizations of FEAR were largely the same for the varieties in this study, our final concern is FEAR metaphors in terms of universality (regarding bodily experiences) and culture-specific variation. Variation was not present on a significant scale, which leads to the conclusion that FEAR is conceptualized throughout the New Englishes and British English in a more bodily embodied way and is not overwhelmingly culturally filtered. This does not necessarily discount the cultural force behind emotion metaphors, but it does indicate that it might not happen as much as expected, at least in the GloWbE data, which was pulled from the international presence of the Internet. Furthermore, like in the case study of ANGER, the motivational basis used to explain the occurrence of many of FEAR metaphors was grounded in our understanding of the physical body as part of the physical world. For example, the domain of ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED, which emerged as a specific level of NATURAL FORCE, relates to our physical experience of being enveloped by climate-related phenomena, like a fog, as illustrated by an example in IN, repeated in (238) below.

(238) This constancy of **fear** *hangs like a fog which obscures* the legendary beauty of the valley. (IN B)

Therefore, it was to be expected that body-based experiences would be mapped onto an emotion like FEAR, considering the relatedness of emotions to our body. However, the differences in the socio-cultural settings of the New Englishes and British English make it surprising that this is not extended or filtered in more culturally specific terms. Thus, the preliminary conclusion for FEAR, like ANGER, is that our physical experiences plays a larger role in conceptualizing this emotion throughout the varieties.

With this preliminary conclusion we end the case study on FEAR and continue on to HAPPINESS in the next chapter.

7   Case Study: HAPPINESS

As in the previous case studies, this chapter opens with a brief discussion of previously attested metaphors in English, which aid expectations of what mappings may be uncovered in the GloWbE varieties. After reviewing this previous research, I will present the overall metaphor profiles of HAPPINESS constructed from the data and, with it, the ranking of the most common source domains for each variety. An account of the specific levels contributing to these source domains follows, which includes discussion of illustrative examples and any indication of preference. This case study closes with a discussion of the results as a whole and what they indicate in terms of variation and/or commonality in the conceptualization of HAPPINESS across the varieties.

7.1   Previous Metaphors of HAPPINESS

Before discussing the empirical results of the present study, metaphors reflecting a folk theory or cognitive model of HAPPINESS in English will be presented. As in the ANGER and FEAR case studies, this is outlined in order to have a point of reference with which to compare and contrast the findings of this study. Furthermore, it is the first step in answering the question: To what extent do previously attested metaphors of HAPPINESS, which have been largely intuitively constructed, relate to metaphorical patterns found in usage-based data?

The following outlines a cognitive model of HAPPINESS deconstructed by Kövecses (1991, 2000, 2008c, 2011b). As for ANGER and FEAR, our starting point is the metonymic system of HAPPINESS, which is divided into behavioral, physiological and expressive responses and illustrated with linguistic examples in parentheses (from Kövecses 2011b: 35).

(1) Behavioral responses
    (a) JUMPING UP AND DOWN (*jump up and down with* **joy**)
    (b) DANCING / SINGING (*dance/sing with* **joy**)

(2) Physiological responses

    (a) FLUSHING (*flush*/*beam with* **joy**)

    (b) INCREASED HEART RATE (*heart beats with* **joy**)

    (c) BODY WARMTH (*be warm with* **joy**)

    (d) EXCITEMENT (*be excited with* **joy**)

(3) Expressive responses

    (a) BRIGHT EYES (*shine with* **happiness**/**joy**)

    (b) SMILING (*smile*/*laugh*)

Metaphors for HAPPINESS can be discussed in various Kövecses' publications (1991, 2000, 2008c, 2011b) and are presented here together in the following examples.

(4) HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (He was *overflowing with* **joy**. / She was *bursting with* **joy**.)

(5) HAPPINESS IS HEAT / FIRE (*Fires of* **joy** were *kindled* by the birth of her son.)

(6) HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL / PHYSICAL FORCE (He was *swept off his feet*. / He was *hit by* **happiness**.)

(7) HAPPINESS IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (They live a life *ruled by* **happiness**.)

(8) HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) (She was *overcome by* **joy**.)

(9) HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL (His feelings of **happiness** *broke loose*.)

(10) HAPPINESS IS AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL (I was *purring with* **delight**. / He is happy *as a pig in shit*.)

(11) HAPPINESS IS INSANITY (They were *crazy with* **happiness**)

(12) HAPPINESS IS DISEASE (Her good mood was *contagious*.)

(13) HAPPINESS IS A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF (He was *beside himself with* **joy**.)

(14) HAPPINESS IS LIGHT (Her face was *bright with* **happiness**.)

(15) HAPPINESS IS UP / FEELING LIGHT (BEING OFF THE GROUND) / BEING IN HEAVEN (We had to cheer him *up*. / I was *floating*. / I was *in seventh heaven*.)

(16) HAPPINESS IS A HIGH / BEING DRUNK (It was an *intoxicating* experience. / I was *drunk with* **joy**)

(17) HAPPINESS IS HEALTH / VITALITY (It made me *feel great*. / He was *alive with* **joy**.)

(18) HAPPINESS IS A PLEASURABLE SENSATION (I was *tickled pink*.)

(19) HAPPINESS IS WARMTH (That *warmed* my spirits.)

(20) HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (You can't *buy* **happiness**.)

(21) HAPPINESS IS A DESIRED HIDDEN OBJECT (I have *found* **happiness**.)

Stefanowitsch (2006a: 82) questions Kövecses' tendency to separate the source domains jointly illustrated in (15) and (17), respectively, since they appear to conceptually belong together, which is why I listed them as such. In his study, he find instances of the above illustrated metaphors, with the exception of BEING IN HEAVEN, which was problematically separated from UP anyway, and AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL (82-83). Furthermore, he identifies five more source domains being used to conceptualize HAPPINESS that are not attested to above (84).

(22) HAPPINESS IS A LIQUID (*source/spring of* **joy**, *flow/ river of* **joy**, etc.)

(23) HAPPINESS IS A MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (*pure/unalloyed* **joy**, *mixture of* EMOTION *and* **joy**, etc.)

(24) HAPPINESS IS A DESTROYABLE OBJECT (X *break/destroy/mar* Y's **joy**)

(25) HAPPINESS IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (*fierce/wild/savage* **joy**)

(26) HAPPINESS IS AN ORGANISM (*growing/short-lived* **joy**, *fruit of* **joy**)

Employing MPA in a study of HAPPINESS in English and German, Stefanowitsch (2004: 143-147) finds the following mappings that he collective refers to as the QUEST model (examples (27) – (31)) and the TRANSFER model (examples (32) – (34)), respectively. These models will be discuss in more detail in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2.

The QUEST model for HAPPINESS

(27) TRYING TO ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS (*look for / search (for)* **happiness**, etc.)

(28) TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING HAPPINESS (*pursuit of / pursue* **happiness**, etc.)

(29) ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING HAPPINESS (*find / (re)discover* **happiness**, etc.)

(30) ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS (ca*pture / grab* **happiness**, etc.)

(31) THE PROCESS OF ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY TO HAPPINESS (*way to* **happiness** */ obstacle to* **happiness**, etc.)

The TRANSFER model for HAPPINESS

(32) (POTENTIALLY) MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) GIVING SOMEONE HAPPINESS (*bring / give **happiness***, etc.)

(33) (POTENTIALLY) BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING HAPPINESS (*receive / gain **happiness***, etc.)

(34) BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS (*buy **happiness**, **happiness** be for sale*, etc.)

I have consolidated these findings in Table 7.1. Note that I have grouped together those source domains, which, although presented as separate mappings in the previous research, seem to go together in terms of their main meaning focus (e.g., A SOCIAL SUPERIOR and AN AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL can be viewed as specific types of OPPONENT).

Table 7.1: Previously attested HAPPINESS metaphors

HAPPINESS IS:	Source
A FLUID IN A CONTAINER / A LIQUID	Kövecses (1991) and Stefanowitsch (2006a)
AN OPPONENT / A SOCIAL SUPERIOR / AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR	Kövecses (1991, 2008c) and Stefanowitsch (2006a)
A NATURAL / PHYSICAL FORCE / HEAT / FIRE	Kövecses (1991, 2008c)
A CAPTIVE ANIMAL / AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL	Kövecses (1991)
INSANITY / DISEASE / A HIGH / BEING DRUNK	Kövecses (1991
LIGHT	Kövecses (1991)
UP / FEELING LIGHT (BEING OFF THE GROUND) / BEING IN HEAVEN	Kövecses (1991)
HEATH / VITALITY	Kövecses (1991)
WARMTH	Kövecses (1991)
A VALUABLE COMMODITY (see also TRANSFER model below)	Kövecses (1991)
A HIDDEN OBJECT (see also QUEST model below)	Kövecses (1991)
A PLEASURABLE SENSATION	Kövecses (2000)
A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF	Kövecses (2008c)
SOMETHING SEARCHED FOR, PURSUED, FOUND, CAPTURED or A JOURNEY (the QUEST model)	Stefanowitsch (2004)
SOMETHING GIVEN / RECEIVED / BOUGHT (the TRANSFER model)	Stefanowitsch (2004)
A MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
A DESTROYABLE OBJECT	Stefanowitsch (2006a)
AN ORGANISM	Stefanowitsch (2006a)

Collectively viewed, the above outlined metaphors contribute to a prototypical cultural model of HAPPINESS. This serves as the benchmark to which the findings

in the present study will be compared. The following section provides an overview of these findings, initially as metaphor profiles for the New Englishes and British English.

7.2   Metaphor Profiles for HAPPINESS

The following section provides an initial overview of HAPPINESS metaphors attributable to the varieties in the GloWbE. As in the previous case studies on ANGER and FEAR, this overview illustrates the metaphor profiles for all New English varieties in the study along with British English, as a (former) norm-providing variety. This preliminary setup acts as the first step in answering the research questions: 1) What conceptual metaphors exist for HAPPINESS in New English, as evidenced by corpus data, and 2) Does a comparison across New English varieties reveal commonalities and/or differences in these emotion metaphors? Again, it should be noted that in this first step we are dealing with broadly formulated conceptual categories concerning the source domain labels, which will be broken down during further analysis in this chapter.

For each variety, a total of 150 mappings (= type 2) were identified, which contained the target domain lexical item *happiness* or, alternatively, *bliss, delight, elation, gladness, glee,* or *joy*. This resulted in a total sample of 750 metaphors. Table 7.2 provides an overview of the various source domains participating in these metaphors, as well as their absolute and relative frequencies for each variety.

Table 7.2: Overview of absolute and relative frequencies of all source domains in HAPPINESS metaphors per variety

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG	total
Fluid In a Container	17 (11.3%)	16 (10.7%)	13 (8.7%)	13 (8.7%)	12 (8%)	71 (9.5%)
Food / Drink	11 (7.3%)	1 (0.7%)	5 (3.3%)	4 (2.7%)	1 (0.7%)	22 (2.9%)
Illness	5 (3.3%)	0 (0%)	6 (4%)	2 (1.3%)	6 (4%)	19 (2.5%)
Light	13 (8.7%)	13 (8.7%)	13 (8.7%)	16 (10.7%)	8 (5.3%)	63 (8.4%)
Natural Force	7 (4.7%)	1 (0.7%)	3 (2%)	17 (11.3%)	4 (2.7%)	32 (4.3%)
Part of a Journey	37 (24.7%)	33 (22%)	36 (24%)	28 (18.7%)	43 (28.7%)	177 (23.6%)
Person	13 (8.7%)	18 (12%)	12 (8%)	6 (4%)	10 (6.7%)	59 (7.9%)
Possession	19 (12.7%)	49 (32.7%)	38 (25.3%)	40 (26.7%)	37 (24.7%)	183 (24.4%)
Up	10 (6.7%)	10 (6.7%)	6 (4%)	12 (8%)	10 (6.7%)	48 (6.4%)
Valuable Commodity	1 (0.7%)	1 (0.7%)	3 (2%)	2 (1.3%)	9 (6%)	16 (2.1%)
Misc.	17 (11.3%)	8 (5.3%)	15 (10%)	10 (6.7%)	10 (6.7%)	60 (8%)
total	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**750**

Note that the "miscellaneous" category contains expressions that did not contribute in large numbers to the overall metaphor profile, i.e., "metaphorical hapax legomena", as in (35) – (36), which seem to be of an innovative or creative kind, or those metaphors that can be attributed to a broader source domain but that source domain showed up less than five times in a single variety, as in (37) – (38).

(35) If we really feel that inner **joy** is the *breath of our lif*e, if we feel that we cannot exist without joy and we will die at this very moment if we do not have it […] (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS BREATH

(36) Prayer, **Happiness** and ur huge smile is your only *weapon*. (NG B) → HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON

(37) It is the brilliance of the wedding gown which the church wears that will *emit the fragrance of* **gladness** during the wedding of the Lamb. (KE G) → HAPPINESS IS A SCENT

(38) The house *smelled of* ripe guava and blackcurrant juice, and.... **happiness**. (NG G) → HAPPINESS IS A SCENT

Ignoring the miscellaneous metaphors for the moment, the metaphor profiles show that all varieties make use of the range of source domains for conceptualizing FEAR, with the exception of ILLNESS, which proves to be an infrequently used

source domain for HAPPINESS in general (it is not attested in NG and constitutes only 2.5% of all metaphorical data). In terms of the highest preference, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION emerge as the two most prominent source domains across all varieties. They collectively make up nearly half of all HAPPINESS metaphors at 48% and are more frequent than all other source domains (not including the miscellaneous ones), which together make up 44% of the data. The centrality of PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION to HAPPINESS will be explored further in the following sections.

The rankings of the source domains was conducted in view of their frequencies in each variety in Table 7.2. The five highest ranked source domains for each variety are illustrated by Table 7.3, which demonstrates a different situation from what was previously encountered in the ANGER and FEAR case studies.

Table 7.3: Five highest ranked HAPPINESS source domains per variety

Rank	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
(1)	PART OF A JOURNEY	POSSESSION	POSSESSION	POSSESSION	PART OF A JOURNEY
(2)	POSSESSION	PART OF A JOURNEY	PART OF A JOURNEY	PART OF A JOURNEY	POSSESSION
(3)	FLUID	PERSON	FLUID / LIGHT	NATURAL FORCE	FLUID
(4)	LIGHT / PERSON	FLUID	PERSON	LIGHT	PERSON / UP
(5)	FOOD & DRINK	LIGHT	ILLNESS / UP	FLUID	VALUABLE COMMODITY
total % of metaphor profile	73.4%	86.1%	82.7%	76.1%	80.8%

Here it is notable that all source domains have made it into the top five ranking across the varieties, which initially suggests a relatively uneven spread of the source domains throughout the varieties. As mentioned above, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION contribute to the bulk of the data, where PART OF A JOURNEY constitutes between 18.7% to 28.7% and POSSESSION between 12.7% to 32.7%. PART OF A JOURNEY occupies the first rank for GB and SG and the

second rank for NG, KE, and IN. Conversely, POSSESSION is ranked firstly for NG, KE, and IN and secondly for GB and SG. Preferences, in terms of ranking, diversify in the third, fourth and fifth ranks. FLUID IN A CONTAINER occupies the third rank for GB, KE (in a tie with LIGHT), and SG, while NG and IN have PERSON and NATURAL FORCE, respectively, in the third position. The fourth rank is a tie between LIGHT and PERSON in GB and PERSON and UP in SG, while NG, KE, and IN has FLUID IN A CONTAINER, PERSON, and LIGHT in the fourth place, respectively. FOOD / DRINK and VALUABLE COMMODITY debut in the ranking at fifth place for GB and SG, respectively, while NG has LIGHT, KE has a tie between ILLNESS and UP and IN has FLUID IN A CONTAINER.

Similar to the FEAR dataset, the ranking process for HAPPINESS did not go as straightforwardly as for ANGER. Considering that the top five source domains per variety are spread out across all available source domains, discounting the miscellaneous category, it was possible to only identify two source domains as prominent, i.e., PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION. Therefore, like in the FEAR case study, I forgo an analysis of variance.

Examining the frequencies of all source domains in the top five ranking across the varieties, provided in Figure 7.1, it is, nevertheless, possible to identify some source domains available for statistical analysis.

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Fluid	17	16	13	13	12
Food / Drink	11	1	5	4	1
Illness	5	0	6	2	6
Light	13	13	13	16	8
Natural Force	7	1	3	17	4
Part of a Journey	37	33	36	28	43
Person	13	18	12	6	10
Possession	19	49	38	40	37
Up	10	10	6	12	10
Valuable Commodity	1	1	3	2	9

Figure 7.1: Absolute frequencies of top five (not shared) source domains in HAPPINESS metaphors per variety

Figure 7.1 makes it apparent that FLUID, LIGHT, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION, taken together, comprise the majority of the metaphorical data for HAPPINESS, namely 65.9%. These source domains are given in percentages for each variety in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: Percentages of FLUID, LIGHT, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION in FEAR metaphors per variety

These four source domains range from 57.4% to 74.1% of all metaphorical data for each variety. They also make up the four most frequent source domains of the 750 metaphors collected: POSSESSION with 183 tokens, PART OF A JOURNEY with 177 tokens, FLUID IN A CONTAINER with 71 tokens and LIGHT with 63 tokens. A chi-square test was performed for FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PART OF A JOURNEY and POSSESSION, which revealed no significant differences in distribution (x^2 = 17.968, df = 12, p = 0.11667).

In order to examine another perspective, Figure 7.3 below illustrates the normalized frequencies within the metaphor profiles of each variety.

Figure 7.3: Normalized frequencies of HAPPINESS metaphors to 100%

As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, the varieties show some differences in terms of their relation to the average percentage of each source domain, especially when considering those source domains that did not contribute extensively to the overall HAPPINESS data (i.e., FOOD / DRINK, ILLNESS, NATURAL FORCE and VALUABLE COMMODITY). For example, GB (with a normalized frequency of 250%) provides evidence of a variety-specific preference for FOOD / DRINK, although it should be kept in mind that this source domain only occurred 22 times out of the 750 total metaphors. Similarly, SG (with a normalized frequency of 281%) shows a preference for VALUABLE COMMODITY, but this source domain was only accounted for 16 times overall. These lower frequencies in FOOD / DRINK and VALUABLE COMMODITY (along with ILLNESS and NATURAL FORCE) make it difficult to verify true variety-specific preferences

Considering the source domains that collectively contributed the most to the metaphorical data for HAPPINESS (i.e., POSSESSION, PART OF A JOURNEY, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PERSON and UP), one of the most frequent source domains (i.e., PART OF A JOURNEY) does not display dramatic

differences between the varieties. For POSSESSION, there seems to be a slight preference for NG (with a normalized frequency of 134%) in comparison to the other New Englishes, which are close to the mean, and especially in comparison to GB (with a normalized frequency of 52%). FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PERSON and UP are infrequent compared to POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY. FLUID IN A CONTAINER does not display any major differences between the varieties. IN (with a normalized frequency of 127%) seems to slightly prefer LIGHT in comparison to GB, NE and KE, which are close to the mean, while SG (with 63%) is well below it. For PERSON, the biggest discrepancy is between NG (with a normalized frequency of 153%) and IN (with a normalized frequency of 51%), while the remaining varieties are closer to the mean. IN (with a normalized frequency of 125%) also seems to slightly prefer UP in comparison to GB, NG and SG, which are close to the mean (with KE below it at 63%).

Yet, as in the previous case studies on ANGER and FEAR, we are again at this stage dealing with broad source domain categories, which must be broken down in order to further our investigation into variety-specific preferences. In the following sections, each source domain will be examined individually and discussed on a cross-variety basis.

7.3   Specific-Level HAPPINESS Metaphors across Varieties

The previous analysis acted as the first step in discovering any source domain preferences across the varieties. We have yet to pinpoint any major dimensions of variation, considering the distribution between the most prominent source domains is not significant and the overall spread of the remaining source domains is extensive, although the perspective provided by the normalized frequencies give some indication of variety-specific preferences. Therefore, the following subsections will be devoted to breaking down these broadly formulated source domains in order to 1) gain insight into the inner structure of the individual source domains, as evidenced by the corpus data, and 2) continue to follow the line of investigation towards what is shared and what is different in terms of HAPPINESS

metaphors across the varieties. Each broadly formulated source domain (POSSESSION, PART OF A JOURNEY, FLUID IN A CONTAINER, LIGHT, PERSON, UP) will be discussed on the basis of examples in separate subsections, since they all made it into the top five ranking, when considering the varieties as a whole, and constitute between 73% - 93% of the data. All remaining metaphors along with the miscellaneous metaphors (which neither form a cohesive group nor contribute to the overall metaphorical content extensively) will be briefly treated in the section on "minor metaphors".

7.3.1   HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION

Regarding the overall tokens, POSSESSION prevails as the most common source domain for HAPPINESS (183 tokens or 24.4% of the total data). Across the varieties, it is also ranked in either first (NG, KE, IN) or second place (GB, SG), which was the initial clue of its prominence. This was not anticipated on the basis of the review of previous HAPPINESS metaphors in Section 7.1., which did not discuss this mapping at all. Furthermore, while ANGER and FEAR presented PERSON metaphors as the most common overall, personification, in fact, did not play as extensive a role for HAPPINESS (7.9% of the total data). This is perhaps a curious result considering the metonymic relationship between EMOTIONS and PERSON. Nevertheless, the frequency with which POSSESSION shows up in the data for HAPPINESS can be explained by the fact that this particular mapping focuses on some aspects Kövecses (1991) has previously distinguished for a prototypical cognitive model for HAPPINESS understood as a value (versus a prototypical cognitive for HAPPINESS understood as the emotion itself, which I discuss in Section 7.3.3).[95] The set of properties he arrives at for the value-based assessment of HAPPINESS are characterized by the following collection of our "folk knowledge" of this concept:

> Happiness is a state that lasts a long time.
> It is associated with a positive value.
> It is a desired state.

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[95] Kövecses (1991) arrives at the set of properties in each prototypical cognitive model primarily via conceptual metaphors and metonymies for HAPPINESS (39-40).

It is pleasurable.

It gives you a feeling of harmony with the world.

It is something that you can 'spread' to others.

It exists separately from you and is outside you.

It is not readily available: it either requires an effort to achieve it or comes to you from external sources.

It takes a long time to achieve it.

It is just as difficult to maintain it as it is to attain it. (Kövecses 1991: 39).

What especially relates to a general understanding of POSSESSION is the seventh property listed ("It exits separately from you and is outside of you"). While some people may go to great lengths to define themselves by virtue of what they possess, possessions, in the most basic sense, remain firmly in the object world and cannot be derived from some internal source. By mapping POSSESSION onto HAPPINESS, we construe it as we would any common possessions; we have ownership over something material that can be maintained, lost, transferred to another person or even shared.

Furthermore, POSSESSION, as it is understood here for HAPPINESS, has been previously accounted for in reference to the duality of Lakoff's (2007 [1993]) EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor, albeit indirectly. The duals in this general metaphor involve construing states as locations or objects and emphasize change of state as either movement of the thing changing to a location or movement of an object to or away from the thing changing (290). While the LOCATION system of EVENT STRUCTURE will be more relevant for the following section on PART OF A JOURNEY, the OBJECT system is relevant here for POSSESSION. As a submapping of EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), Lakoff describes the metaphor ATTRIBUTES ARE POSSESSIONS (291) and since HAPPINESS can be considered an attribute of a person experiencing this emotion, HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION can be seen as inheriting from EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system). A study by Stefanowitsch (2004) on HAPPINESS in German and English confirms this relationship of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION to EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), which he terms the TRANSFER model that, based on linguistic metaphor evidence, contain three mappings: (POTENTIALLY) MAKING SOMEONE HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY GIVING), (POTENTIALLY) BECOMING HAPPY IS (POTENTIALLY) RECEIVING HAPPINESS,

BECOMING HAPPY IS BUYING HAPPINESS (146). The first two contribute to
what I have termed broadly as POSSESSION, while the later was annotated under
VALUABLE COMMODITY, which although it is obviously related, I considered
sufficiently different in the meaning these metaphors conveyed, in order to give it
a separate source domain category.

Considering Kövecses' (1991) outline of "folk knowledge" of HAPPINESS
along with its relationship to Lakoff's (2007 [1993]) EVENT STRUCTURE, it is,
therefore, unsurprising that POSSESSION is frequently used across all the varieties
to highlight the value of HAPPINESS. Figure 7.4 illustrates the percentages of
HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, which demonstrates the proportion of its
contribution to the individual metaphor profiles.

Figure 7.4: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION per variety

Interestingly, POSSESSION contributes much more to the metaphor profiles of the
New Englishes (most prominently NG) than to GB, although GB has it in second
place in the ranking. However, before we can take up this issue, it is important to
zoom in to the internal structure of this broad source domain, as it presented itself
via the linguistic metaphors in the data. Table 7.4 illustrates this breakdown into
specific levels for POSSESSION, which is followed by a discussion of
corresponding examples.

Table 7.4: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION per variety[96]

POSSESSION	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	0	0	0	1
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	3	6	4	8	6
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	0	0	1
PREVENTING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	0	0	0
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	4	4	7	9	8
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	4	6	3	3	2
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	8	29	24	20	19
total	**19**	**49**	**38**	**40**	**37**

HAPPINESS is conceived of in the most generic terms as something that we possess, that is, in its most literal sense, something material. This was very rare in the GloWbE data, as only one instance was found in SG (*joy is something we possess*). Also rare are PREVENTING OWNERSHIP, with just two instances in NG (*deprived of marital bliss*), and MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP, with just three instances in NG (*holding onto joy*) and SG (*horde it [happiness]*). Although these two highlight more specific aspects about the nature of ownership entailed in HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, as is apparent from Table 7.4, the remaining specific levels (are on the whole) much more frequent.

The last property listed by Kövecses (1991) of our "folk knowledge" speaks to the difficulty of maintaining HAPPINESS, i.e., if HAPPINESS is hard to keep in your possession, then it can be readily lost. This understanding is exemplified by metaphors annotated for LOSING OWNERSHIP.

(39) Still hanging over your now-adult head and still *stealing* your **joy**, your security and your identity. (GB G)

(40) […] if u keep *sacrificing* ur **happiness** for their personal gratification, u may just loose [sic] out on the best thing that has ever happened to u. (NG G)

(41) […] the devil have *stolen* everything from me i mean every thing **joy**, husband, money, name it. (KE G)

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96   For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

(42) In this age when electronic media has *robbed* man of the **joy** of reading books in seclusion, there is still an escape route for the seekers of the peace of mind. (IN G)

(43) […] it just *takes away* the **joy** of learning and that is something we want to take a look at […] (SG G)

HAPPINESS can also be understood in terms of SHARED OWNERSHIP. This is also suggested by our folk understanding of happiness – in Kövecses' (1991: 39) words, HAPPINESS is "something that you can 'spread' to others." That is, you can maintain a happy feeling for yourself, while simultaneously allowing others to participate in that same happy feeling. This is most commonly reflected by *share* (91% of the tokens), but not exclusively so.

(44) It was more like happiness, a **happiness** *shared* between the cheering crowd, with their proud little Union flags and periscopes, and shared with the royal couple. (GB B)

(45) If women learnt to get along a lot better and forgot about fighting, with each other, those silly wars we seem to thrive on, there would be a lot more **happiness** *to go round*. (NG B)

(46) And President Kibaki was on hand to *share* in the **joy** of four million individual members […] (KE G)

(47) But most importantly, they've laughed with me and *spread* the kind of **joy** in my life which is quite irreplaceable. (IN B)

(48) *Share* with your children the **joy** of giving by sharing your time or resources to loved ones and worthy causes. (SG G)

The specific level of TAKING OWNERSHIP refers to the initial moment when someone takes something into ownership. This moment is most frequently reflected by the use of *take* (61% of the tokens), which also includes in the idiomatic *take delight in*.

(49) What kind of person would *take* such **delight** in running Britain down and predicting catastrophe? (GB G)

(50) The only reason Nigerians are so eager to know is that we *take* **delight** in hearing bad news which is a terrible trend. (NG G)

(51) […] studies show that divorced couples tend to *gain* **happiness** from the dissolution of their marriage. (KE G)

(52) It is a give and take. You can't simply *take* **happiness** for the asking. (IN G)

(53) […] for every **joy** I *receive* from being a Daddy, I have learnt something from my kids as well. (SG B)

TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP, which is the most frequent specific-level source domain in the breakdown with 100 total tokens, is encoded most frequently by *bring* (51%) and *give* (42%). Therefore, they are highly conventional patterns within the linguistic metaphors of this type. Their basic meanings in *Macmillan* focus on the transferring aspect of POSSESSION, which also entails a motion of sorts. The definition of *bring* is "to have something with you so that you can give it to someone when you arrive", while for *give* it is "to put something in someone's hand, or to pass something to someone". These two aspects are highlighted in the examples below, as well.

(54) I look back, the happiest times I had then, and that *bring* me **happiness** now, were not to do with economic growth […] (GB G)

(55) […] the things I thought would *give* me **joy** and satisfaction are now the things that cause me so much pain […] (NG B)

(56) […] many have given up on their marriages when they realized they just weren't *delivering* **happiness**. (KE G)

(57) Running the theatre *gives* us **happiness**, regardless of whether we make money out of it or not. (IN B)

(58) Only a dog owner can experience the **joy** the pet *brings*. (SG G)

The biggest grouping of POSSESSION metaphors is found on this specific level. Since TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP is largely comprised of the conventional patterns of *bring* + happiness term and *give* + happiness term, this apparent preference is unexpected, since it would be reasonable to assume that these patterns are also frequent in GB. However, all 8 tokens in GB that were attributable to TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP took the *bring* + happiness term pattern. This could just be a consequence of the randomized sample, but it is striking nonetheless.

With this in mind, it is interesting to consider the distribution of TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP in comparison to all other POSSESSION domains. Table 7.5 demonstrates their absolute frequencies.

Table 7.5: Absolute frequencies of TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP as a special instantiation of HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP	8	29	24	20	19
POSSESSION (other)	11	20	14	20	18
total	**19**	**49**	**38**	**40**	**37**

New Englishes, with the exception of IN, have slightly higher numbers for TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP and, therefore, on the surface prefer this mapping given the choice between other POSSESSION source domains. A chi-square test was performed on the figures for all varieties in Table 7.5 and revealed that the observed differences are not significant ($x^2 = 3.234$, df = 4, $p = 0.51946$).

Since no major variation can be pinpointed, it can be concluded from this overview that POSSESSION is a viable source domain for conceptualizing HAPPINESS in all varieties in general. We now move on to the second most frequent source domain for HAPPINESS, which is PART OF A JOURNEY.

7.3.2   HAPPINESS IS A PART OF A JOURNEY

In the previous section, HAPPINESS's connection to the duality of EVENT STRUCTURE (Lakoff 2007 [1993]), namely its LOCATION and OBJECT systems, was briefly touched upon. While the OBJECT system plays a more obvious role for HAPPINESS IS A POSSESSION, it is the LOCATION system that is emphasized in the HAPPINESS metaphors found utilizing PART OF A JOURNEY. To reiterate, the EVENT STRUCTURE in terms of the LOCATION SYSTEM (of which the OBJECT system is its dual) construes states / events as locations and change as movements of the thing changing to destinations (i.e., desired locations) (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 283-284, 291). EVENT STRUCTURE is inherited to prevalent mappings like LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which, in turn, inherit its structure to metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY (288). In the same manner,

we can view this inheritance for HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY[97]. Stefanowitsch (2004) shows that the OBJECT system of EVENT STRUCTURE is attestable for HAPPINESS, in what he calls the QUEST model. In his study of German and English terms denoting happiness, he found five mappings that constitute this model: TRYING TO ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS, TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING HAPPINESS, ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING HAPPINESS, ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS and THE PROCESS OF ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY TO HAPPINESS (143-145)[98]. Furthermore, Kövecses (1991: 38) attests to the existence of HAPPINESS IS A DESIRED HIDDEN OBJECT (*I have found happiness*), which is a selection for HAPPINESS from the submappings of EVENT STRUCTURE (OBJECT system), specifically PURPOSES ARE DESIRED OBJECTS and ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS ACQUIRING A DESIRED OBJECT Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 291).

Given its attested relationship to EVENT STRUCTURE, the extensive contribution of the source domain A PART OF A JOURNEY to the conceptualization of HAPPINESS in the varieties is not unexpected. It is a close second to POSSESSION for the varieties, as evidenced by the 117 tokens or 23.6% of total HAPPINESS metaphors. Furthermore, it was ranked high in the top five source domains for each variety (first in GB and SG and second in NG, KE, and IN). Figure 7.5 demonstrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY in the individual metaphor profiles of the varieties.

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[97]   Note that this can also be read as HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY. I initially chose A PART OF A JOURNEY for the source domain label, in order to demonstrate its component parts. Furthermore, the linguistic metaphors instantiating HAPPINESS as the JOURNEY itself are in fact rare in the data.

[98]   As will be apparent from the following, I tend to consolidate the first four of these mappings, due to their relatedness in basic meaning.

Figure 7.5: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety

SG makes use of this source domain most widely at 28.7%, followed by GB with 24.7%, KE with 24%, NG with 22% and IN with 18.7%. Yet, before we consider the variety-perspective, it is important to consider and illustrate the breakdown of PART OF A JOURNEY, which is given in Table 7.6 below.

Table 7.6: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY per variety[99]

PART OF A JOURNEY	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	2	3	0	0
A SEARCH – specific-level (= level 2)	20	21	21	16	30
DESTINATION (including special case: **GOAL**) – specific-level (= level 2)	16	8	10	9	12
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	2	3	1
POINTS ON A JOURNEY – specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	0	0	0
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	0	0
total	37	33	36	28	43

HAPPINESS is understood in general JOURNEY terms by either being labeled as the journey itself (*journey of happiness*) or being described with a phrase that frequently collocates with JOURNEY *terms* (*joy [...] cut short*)[100]. This was

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[99] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

[100] The JOURNEY terms in GloWbE that frequently collocate with *cut short* are: *trip* (87), *holiday*(s) (44), *tour* (41), *journey* (11), *road* (10) and *race* (8). Incidentally, the most frequent collocates of *cut short* are from target domains that are often participate in JOURNEY metaphors: *life/lives* (448) and *career*(s) (217). For evidence of LIFE / CAREER IS A JOURNEY, especially in the context of EVENT STRUCTURE, see Lakoff (2007 [1993]: 288-289).

relatively rare in the data, occurring only twice in NG and three times in KE. Very rare were the specific levels POINTS ON A JOURNEY (one instance in GB, *veering wildly between elation and dread*) and STARTING POINT (one instance in NG, *a new beginning of joy*).

The specific levels that contribute the most to PART OF A JOURNEY are A SEARCH, DESTINATION and PATH, although their contributions are uneven. HAPPINESS IS A PATH has at least one instance in the New Englishes (a total of 7) and none in GB.

(59) U are really a f**l that thinks that **happiness** *ends in* marriage. (NG G)

(60) He formed our hearts n am beggin Him daily to mend it n get me (us) back to the *path of* **joy** n hope he intended for me (us). (KE G)

(61) **Happiness** is a simple *path* and you make it complicated […] (IN B)

(62) […] we don't know how to *navigate the terrains of* pure **bliss** because it is foreign territory […] (SG G)[101]

The scarcity of PATH in the GloWbE data was unexpected, considering its centrality in the source-path-goal image schema of the domain JOURNEY (Lakoff 1987a; Johnson 1987) and the EVENT STRUCTURE submapping MEANS ARE PATHS (TO DESTINATIONS) (Lakoff 2007 [1993]: 284). However, this is a similar result to what was found for ANGER and FEAR, leaving us to conclude that the mapping of PATH onto the emotions is possible, but it is not done very frequently.

HAPPINESS IS A DESTINATION is much more frequent (55 tokens or 31% of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY). It is most often found in GB (16 tokens), but also attested to by the New Englishes – 12 tokens in SG, 10 in KE, 9 in IN and 8 in NG. Examples from each variety are listed below.

(63) Leaving their humdrum selves behind on the bank like a shed skin and *taking a short cut to* **happiness**. (GB B)

(64) Yet some others say that following your passion is the true *road to* **happiness**. (NG B)

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[101] This particular example, although emphasizing HAPPINESS as the terrain itself, was added here due to the basic definition of *navigate*, which is "to choose a path so that a ship, plane, or car can go in a particular direction, especially by using maps or instruments" (*Macmillan* online). Therefore, navigating the terrain also entails discovering the paths within it.

(65) The damage was done when we placed *roadblocks in her path to* emotional **happiness**. (KE G)

(66) Spirituality is a way of life that not only makes you a true human being but also helps you *take the right track to* **bliss** (IN G)

(67) The bewildered in life can *return to* **joy** because the LORD keeps watch over him now, and forevermore. (SG B)

By far the most frequent specific level is HAPPINESS IS A SEARCH (108 tokens or 61%), which was not present in the ANGER and FEAR data[102]. This specific level emphasizes a distinct type of JOURNEY and relates to four of the five mappings in Stefanowitsch's (2004) QUEST model, namely TRYING TO ACHIEVE HAPPINESS IS SEARCHING FOR HAPPINESS (*look for / search (for) happiness*), TRYING TO ATTAIN HAPPINESS IS PURSUING HAPPINESS (*pursuit of / pursue happiness*), ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS FINDING HAPPINESS (*find / (re)discover happiness*), and ATTAINING HAPPINESS IS CAPTURING HAPPINESS (*capture / grab happiness*) (143-144). Here, I have consolidated Stefanowitsch's separate mappings into HAPPINESS IS A SEARCH, because searching, pursuing, finding and capturing, in their basic senses, involve a journey during which you are specifically looking for something or someone.[103] Examples from all varieties are illustrated below.

(68) In fact the movie's default state is two people desperately reaching for **happiness** but *looking for* **it** *in the wrong places*. (GB G)

(69) The *quest in pursuit of* **happiness** under democracy continues. (NG G)

(70) Campus girls *seeking* their **happiness** in the Benz of an elder men dishing out drinks […] (KE B)

(71) In our final Writing Story, Gauri Trivedi writes about how she *finds* **joy** and contentment with writing. (IN B)

(72) We are all pilgrims *looking for* the **joy** of our Promised Land. (SG B)

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[102] In the same vein, HAPPINESS did not have a specific level for OBSTACLE / BARRIER. That A SEARCH and OBSTACLE / BARRIER are missing for ANGER / FEAR and HAPPINESS, respectively, is to be expected considering the cognitive topology of these emotion concepts. ANGER and FEAR are not something you usually go looking for, while HAPPINESS is not deemed as a hindering emotional state.

[103] The basic definitions are as follows. *search* is defined as "to try to find something or someone by looking carefully", while *find* is defined as "to discover something or someone, or to see where it is by searching for it." Here, the entailment of LOOKING is made clear in the basic definitions. The definitions of *pursue* ("to chase someone or something in order to catch them") and *capture* ("to catch someone") don't make LOOKING explicit, but it is nevertheless implied in both, i.e., in order to pursue or capture someone you have to have them in your sights. All definitions were taken from *Macmillan* online.

Since this is the most obvious grouping of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY for all of the varieties, it is considered a special instantiation. Table 7.7 shows its distribution in comparison to other PART OF A JOURNEY levels.

Table 7.7: Absolute frequencies of A SEARCH as a special instantiation of HAPPINESS IS PART OF A JOURNEY

	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
A SEARCH	20	21	21	16	30
PART OF A JOURNEY (other)	17	12	15	12	13
total	37	33	36	28	43

The preference between A SEARCH and other levels of PART OF A JOURNEY is starkest for NG, KE and, especially, SG. Nevertheless, a chi-square test was performed on the figures in Table 7.7 and the observed differences are not significant ($x^2 = 2.519$, df $= 4$, $p = 0.64124$). Therefore, we have no indication that a major preference is at play here in variety-specific terms. All varieties focus on A SEARCH and DESTINATION source domains in the HAPPINESS IS A JOURNEY metaphors.

7.3.3   HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER

FLUID IN A CONTAINER is a previously attested source domain for HAPPINESS (e.g, Kövecses 1991 and Stefanowitsch 2006a). With 71 tokens, it constitutes 9.5% of the HAPPINESS data in the present study. Therefore, in view of the ANGER and FEAR case study results, the FLUID AS A CONTAINER domain is in the middle (albeit on the lower end of the scale) in terms of its contribution for conceptualizing HAPPINESS – as a reminder, FLUID IN A CONTAINER contributed 21.5% to the overall data for ANGER and 4.3% for FEAR. Regarding its placement in the rankings on the basis of its absolute frequencies, GB and SG have it in third place; KE has it in third place in a tie with LIGHT; NG has it in fourth place; IN has it in fifth place. The percentages within the variety-specific metaphor profiles are illustrated in Figure 7.6.

Figure 7.6: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER per variety

GB displays the biggest proportion of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (with 11.3%), but not obviously so like in the FEAR data. The New Englishes follow closely behind with 10.7% for NG, 8.7% for both KE and IN, and 8% for SG.

To understand what meaning foci are part of the broad source domain FLUID IN A CONTAINER, it has to be broken down into specific levels, which were suggested by the GloWbE data. An overview of this breakdown is provided in Table 7.8.

Table 7.8: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER[104]

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	5	9	5	5	6
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)	1	4	6	4	2
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	0	0	0
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	1	0	1
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	1	3	0	2	0
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	0
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= level 3)	2	0	0	0	0
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)	6	0	1	2	3
total	**17**	**16**	**13**	**13**	**12**

Note that the specific levels in Table 7.8 largely correspond to those found in the ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.2). The notable exceptions regard FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER, which for ANGER was broken down into FLUID BEING DISRUPTED, FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE), and FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER. For HAPPINESS, the first two did not show up in the data, although FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER did (which is why it is not listed here as a level 3, as it was for ANGER). Furthermore, although HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is attested for HAPPINESS in this dataset, it is not at all as frequent as it was for ANGER. The reasons for these discrepancies can be found by contrasting the physiological responses of HAPPINESS and ANGER. As Kövecses (2011b) notes (discussed in Section 7.1 above), our physiological responses include flushing, an increased heart rate, body warmth and excitement. The difference seems to correspond to the intensity of the (albeit similar) physiological responses Kövecses (1990) outlines for ANGER (discussed in Section 5.1). The body heat attributable to ANGER is more intense than body warmth felt for HAPPINESS; redness in the face has a heightened

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[104] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

visibility compared to flushing; agitation is understood as more extreme than excitement. Furthermore, unlike ANGER, there was no physiological response entailing internal pressure for HAPPINESS. Nevertheless, as the presence of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER attests to, an excess of both ANGER and HAPPINESS is being compared to what happens when an excess of fluid in a container causes it to flow out.

That being said, the majority FLUID source domain for HAPPINESS is, in fact, just the generic FLUID IN A CONTAINER. With 30 overall tokens, it makes up 42.3% and is represented in all varieties (9 times in NG, 6 times in SG and 5 times each in NG, IN and GB). Again, the general mapping being conveyed by FLUID IN A CONTAINER to HAPPINESS involves our basic experiences with filling a container and the knowledge that a container can be full. The following examples illustrate this general understanding.

(73) […] installations that would *fill* even the world's biggest grump *with* a feeling of happiness and utopian **joy**. (GB G)

(74) […] I ran towards them, unashamed, unafraid but *full of* love, hope and **joy**. (NG B)

(75) […] her heart was pure and *filled with* **joy** and as long as we live, she too shall live […] (KE G)

(76) *Brimming with* the **joy** of having sacrificed their lives to bring drinking water to thirsty millions in Gujarat? (IN G)

(77) We would roam freely and *full of* **joy**, not tainted by limitations or obstacles in our path. (SG G)

The BODY FLUID domain, which is the second most common (with 17 total tokens or 24%), was mostly in reference to TEARS in the New Englishes, like in the following examples.

(78) We would always remember the tears, the *tears of* **joy** ChiomaAjunwa brought to our eyes. (NG)

(79) […] the lucky lot who *shed tears of* **joy** when they left the shanties and kissed goodbye the flying toilets. (KE G)

(80) When she came up to the stage she was *bubbling with the tears of joy* […] (IN G) *Tears of* **joy** *welled from her eyes* as she thought of all the wonderful rewards if [sic] parenting. (SG G)

However, tears were not the only body fluid associated with HAPPINESS. Although infrequent, there were instances found in which HAPPINESS behaves like blood, as in (81) and (82), and in one novel metaphor, (83), like the milk of a cow.

(81) […] the first GB gold medal of London 2012, emotion *coursed through me* - relief, pride and sheer **elation**. (GB G)

(82) He says he still gets *a rush of* **joy** when he sees it hosting a match! (KE G)[105]

(83) As milk is oozed out from the udder of the cow, it appears that objects *ooze out s*atisfaction, **joy** […] (IN G)

The third most common source domain in general is HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (with 14 total tokens or 19.8%), although no instances were found in NG. Like for ANGER, it can be broken down into HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM (only two tokens in GB) and HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION (6 tokens in GB, 2 in IN, 3 in SG and 1 in KE).

HOT FLUID BEING RELEASE AS GAS / STEAM

(84) […] John himself had *given vent to* his **elation** in song. (GB G)

(85) […]this is the place to *vent* those frustrations (or **happiness** when we win all be it not very often) isn't it? (GB B)

HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION

(86) […] sometimes just Mum and at others just Dad - absolutely *bursting with* pride and **joy** at watching their children give of their very best. (GB B)

(87) The jubilant and confident Wangui *exploded with* **joy** when she was declared winner of the by-election at Eldoret Municipal Hall tallying centre on Monday evening. (KE G)

(88) The packed audience, who had been waiting for over an hour, *erupted with* **joy**, the moment Ranbir arrived along with Imtiaz and Karan. (IN G)

(89) My heart *bursts with* **joy** and pride with each moment I get back into contact with these new batches of instructors […] (SG B)

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[105] This was determined collocationally. The most frequent collocate of *rush of* in the GloWbE is *blood* (218 tokens).

Disregarding the fact that in (85) *vent happiness* is most likely piggybacking on the early instance of *vent frustrations*, these metaphors, however infrequent for HAPPINESS, demonstrate a similar mapping process, as was discussed in the ANGER case study (see Section 5.3.2). As a reminder, our common knowledge about the properties of heated fluid in a container is that it exerts pressure on the container so that a release (in the form of gas, steam or an explosion) is the natural consequence. These mappings illustrate the marriage of two aspectual properties of emotions, namely intensity and control, which provide evidence, no matter how scant, that even HAPPINESS can be so intense that it becomes uncontrollable and manifests itself in some form of release, like the extreme joy of an electoral victory in (87) or at the arrival of a beloved celebrity (88). Furthermore, this has already been accounted for in a prototypical cognitive model of HAPPINESS as the emotion itself (rather than a value, which was discussed for POSSESSION in Section 7.3.1). Among various other aspects of this model, Kövecses (1991) highlights that, when you experience a joyful feeling:

> The intensity of your experiences is high. Beyond a certain limit, an increase in intensity implies a danger for you to become dysfunctional, that is, to lose control. It is not entirely acceptable to communicate and/or give free expression of what you feel (i.e., to become dysfunctional). […] you try to keep the emotion under control: You attempt not to engage in the behavioral responses and/or not to display the expressive reactions and/or not to communicate what you feel. […] You nevertheless lose control. (Kövecses 1991: 40-41).

HAPPINESS IS A FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER can be understood in a similar fashion. As stated above, the mapping of this domain onto HAPPINESS is used to understand this emotion in terms of what occurs when the volume of fluid is greater than the capacity of the container (i.e., it overflows). This mapping is evidenced by NG and IN only.

(90) Last month we did our introduction and a lot of my relatives and friends were *gushing with* **joy** for me. (NG B)

(91) He said there is someone here tonight, long before this year is over, your **joy** will *over flow*. (NG G)

(92) When that happens, you will feel tremendous **joy**, so much so, that it will *overflow*. (IN G)

(93) […] he wants to share his *overflowing* **bliss** with others (IN B)

Yet, this is not the only mapping that FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER entails for HAPPINESS. There are two instances that speak to something altogether different. In (94), HAPPINESS as FLUID can be poured from a container to highlight that it can be something that is shared. In (95), HAPPINESS as FLUID can be forced out of a container (e.g., squeezing the something out of a bottle), which emphasizes that it is something that can be lost (to the PERSON CONTAINER). In this manner, although rare, these FLUID mappings demonstrate a relatedness to POSSESSION.

(94) Misaki Kawai *pouring* **happiness** all over the world one installation at a time. (GB G)

(95) […] somebody who can point you to the solution to a knotty problem that is *squeezing* **joy** *out of* your life. (NG B)

The final two specific levels of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER were equally infrequent with 2 instances each. FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER, as illustrated by (96) and (97), was only found in KE and SG, while ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER, making use of the folk model ENERGY AS A (FLOWING) FLUID, were only found twice in GB, as illustrated by (98) and (99).

(96) However, ignorance is **bliss**, *bath in* it pal! (KE G)

(97) I see all my past painful sufferings through the eyes of one who had been *bathed in this pool of* His incredible love and **joy**. (SG G)

(98) "The chamber," wrote Alistair Cooke, our correspondent, "was *crackling with currents of* **elation** and despair." (GB B)

(99) On the contrary, it remorselessly unpicks romantic love and its supposed capacity to *generate* and sustain **happiness**. (GB G)

Taking the variety perspective on the whole of the domain FLUID IN A CONTAINER, there is no single specific level that emerges as the most frequent. Although GB has the biggest overall proportion and attested instances of all specific levels except for ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER, the numbers are too small here to have solid evidence for it as a preference. Regarding the specific levels, GB has HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER as its most frequently used source domain, while for KE it is BODY FLUID. The other New English varieties use the generic

level most frequently. Therefore, it is difficult to identify a more pronounced grouping to examine statistically. The determination of a preference for FLUID IN A CONTAINER will have to be left to larger-scale studies, although considering its relationship to the physical experience of fluid containment, it is unlikely that a culturally specific preference will emerge.

7.3.4   HAPPINESS IS LIGHT

The correspondence between LIGHT and HAPPINESS has been attested to by Kövecses (1991: 30) in linguistics metaphors like *her face was bright with happiness*. LIGHT, in the sense of brightness from the sun or some other source, is also implied in the metonymic system of HAPPINESS by the physiological response of FLUSHING (*beam with joy*) and the expressive response of BRIGHT EYES (*shine with happiness*) (Kövecses 2011b: 35). Therefore, we have grounds to expect its occurrence across the varieties in this study.

HAPPINESS IS LIGHT makes up 8.4% of the HAPPINESS metaphors (63 tokens of the total 750), which is perhaps not as common as one would expect considering its experiential basis. In terms its contribution to the metaphor profiles of the varieties, the percentages can be gleaned from Figure 7.7.


Figure 7.7: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT per variety

IN (with 10.7%) and SG (with 5.3%) make for the two ends of the spectrum, while GB, NG and KE come in the middle with 8.7% each. LIGHT, although indicating a general sense of brightness, can be broken down into specific levels, for which an obvious grouping for the New Englishes emerges. This breakdown is provided by Table 7.9.

Table 7.9: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT per variety[106]

LIGHT	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	7	3	1	3	1
A LAMP - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	1	0
LIGHT FROM WITHIN - specific-level (= level 2)	5	9	10	8	7
SUN-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2)	1	1	2	4	0
total	13	13	13	16	8

While the generic level is the most common for GB, New Englishes seem to prefer the specific level LIGHT FROM WITHIN. Before examining this preference, the following provides illustrates of each level.

The generic level of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT includes all linguistic metaphors that simply reflect the brightness aspect of LIGHT; i.e., there is no further indication on the linguistic level that it is elaborated otherwise. This is illustrated by (100) – (104).

(100) Your **happiness** today is all the *brighter* for its rarity […] (GB G)

(101) The joy too, even *vivid* **joy** to *illuminate* the loss, that such a man existed, worked to such great effect, changed to realities the problems of the Niger Delta. (NG G)

(102) This **happiness** *does not fade away* as the joy of touching a life and giving back to the society is irreversible. (KE B)

(103) That they are in police custody has done *nothing to dim* their **glee**. (IN G)

(104) But recently, whenever we young dads have lunch together, we no longer bring up the **joy** of parenthood that *lit up* our lives when our children were cute babies and toddlers. (SG G)

The brightness aspect in the examples above can be elaborated in three specific ways in this study. One of the specific levels was so rare (only one instance in IN) that it can be considered a novel extension of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT.

(105) Let the *Lamp of* Wealth, Health and **Happiness** *be Lit* for You and fill You with Joy and Cheer […] (IN B)

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[106] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

Another elaboration that is more common, at least for GB, NG, KE and IN, understands HAPPINESS as a source of light similar to the Sun. Although uncommon in this data, this is not a surprising comparison considering how salient the Sun is to our daily experience. In the examples below, various aspects of the Sun are being highlighted, which all imply brightness. The sunrays attributed to HAPPINESS in (107) and (109) are obvious, as well as the ability to bask in them, as in (108). A less obvious (but, nevertheless, implied sense of the Sun's brightness) is (106), in which we understand that HAPPINESS will be able to shine like the Sun, once it has passed the darkness of a cloud.

(106) […] it won t be long until ur true **happiness** *resurfaces from this giant cloud of doom* […] (GB B)

(107) […] to the suposed [sic] lucky n favoured ones whose smiles and grin forms a magmanimous [sic] and *beaming sunlight rays of* **happiness** […] (NG G)

(108) Looking at them seated side by side in their home in Mweiga, Central Kenya, one gets the impression of a couple that has already *basked in* the initial marital **bliss** […] (KE G)

(109) It is because whenever the smallest *ray of* **happiness** enters your life - you resist it with all your might and continue being unhappy. (IN B)

Among the New Englishes, the most common specific level source domain for HAPPINESS is LIGHT FROM WITHIN. There are 10 instances in KE, 9 in NG, 8 in IN and 7 in SG, compared to the 5 in GB. LIGHT FROM WITHIN entails something that has already been pointed out by Kövecses (1991), who maintains that "the happy person is characterized by a great deal of energy; the light appears to derive from an internal heat energy" (30). This is apparent in the following examples, as well.

(110) But then a "giant hormonal valve was opened in the minds of the people" and people were "*suffused with a* Ready Brek *glow of* **happiness**". (GB G)

(111) **Happiness** *radiates from within*. (NG B)

(112) Boit, a firstborn in a family of 10, was *beaming with* **happiness** after he received the pay award news […] (KE G)

(113) He seemed cheer personified and was *glowing with* **happiness**. (IN G)

(114) […] being with the Yasukawas… how their faces *radiate with* **happiness**, kindness and warmth. (SG B)

If more data was available, it would be interesting to test if this grouping around LIGHT FROM WITHIN holds for the New Englishes. A chi-square test of the frequencies for LIGHT FROM WITHIN and LIGHT (OTHER) in the varieties was not possible because over 20% of the expected frequencies were less than 5. Thus, we are left to conclude that, on the basis of the absolute frequencies, there seems to be a preference for LIGHT FROM WITHIN for the New Englishes. However, considering it also showed up in the GB data five times, this does not seem to be a true preference.

7.3.5   HAPPINESS IS A PERSON

PERSON plays a less substantial role in the conceptualization of HAPPINESS, making up merely 7.9% of the data with a total of 59 tokens across the varieties. Figure 7.8 illustrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON for each variety.

Figure 7.8: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON per variety

While Figure 7.8 makes evident that this metaphor type is used most commonly in the African varieties and GB (in comparison to the Asian varieties), this does not necessarily demonstrate any real preference when taking into account the centrality of POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY, outlined above. This is a surprising result considering personification's pervasiveness as an ontological metaphor (see Kövecses 2010) and its prominence in the conceptualization of ANGER and FEAR, which could have initially led us to believe that PERSON metaphors lend themselves easily to all emotional target domains.

Yet, despite its lack of prominence, HAPPINESS can still be conceptualized in terms of broad personification. HAPPINESS IS A PERSON can also be segmented into more specific levels, albeit less extensively than ANGER and FEAR. This breakdown into specific levels are illustrated in Table 7.10 below.

Table 7.10: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON per variety[107]

PERSON	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	0	0	5	0	1
PERSON - ANIMAL-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	1	0
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2)	2	0	0	0	0
PERSON - LIVING IN A HOME - specific-level (= level 2)	1	1	1	1	0
PERSON - OFFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	1	0	0	0	0
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	0	1	0
WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED (= level 3)	1	0	0	2	0
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	0	2	1	0	0
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	5	1	2	1	0
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	0	0	0	0	1
PERSON - RELATED TO A JOURNEY - specific-level (= level 2)	2	7	1	0	5
PERSON - SHOUTING - specific-level (= level 2)	0	2	1	0	0
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS - specific-level (= level 2)	0	1	0	0	0
Misc. - **HAPPINESS TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	0	1	1	0	1
Misc. - **HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	1	0	0	0	2
total	**13**	**18**	**12**	**6**	**10**

KE and SG are the only varieties to make use of the generic level (= level 1). In fact, for KE, a general personification of HAPPINESS is the most common, illustrated in (115) and (116) below.

(115) I was happy but my **joy** was *short lived* when I opened the emails to read the cover letters and resumes! (KE B)

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[107] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

(116) Jackie says that although they incurred a bill of Sh700,000, nothing could match their joy at the survival of their baby. Unfortunately, their **joy** was *short-lived*. (KE G)

short(-)lived was the only term reflecting a PERSON metaphor on the generic-level in the entire study. It was considered an instance of general personification because of its meaning denoting organic existence, albeit a brief one. Stefanowitsch (2006a) reached a similar conclusion by including it as an instance of HAPPINESS IS AN ORGANISM (*short-lived joy*) (84). Although *short(-)lived* is admittedly a term not necessarily applied to people, it can be found to refer to other animate beings, like the mayfly. However, in all instances, the co-text of *short(-)lived happiness* did not specify the insect meaning, which prompted me to categorize it as reflecting personification in general and not as the following specific-level category, ANIMAL-RELATED.

There are only two instances of HAPPINESS IS ANIMAL-RELATED, which was intentionally styled in this manner due to these instances lacking in the DANGEROUS component that characterized the majority of ANGER and FEAR metaphors of this type. This is also the case for HAPPINESS and ANIMAL mappings Kövecses (1991) discusses, i.e., HAPPINESS IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL (*his feelings of happiness broke loose*) and HAPPINESS IS AN ANIMAL THAT LIVES WELL (*she was purring with delight*) (35-36). Although these particular mappings were not found in the present study, the two instances that were uncovered have a decidedly creative quality.

(117) […] you and your cohorts *reel in* opulence and **happiness** […] (NG G) → FISH
(118) It is my observation that learning to live with a smile is a road to **happiness**. It is inside you and try *catching* **it** and *like a butterfly* **it** *flies away*. *Don't disturb* **it** *if it comes and sits on your shoulder*. (IN G) → BUTTERFLY

Due to the positive affect associated with HAPPINESS, it is unsurprising that DANGEROUS ANIMAL is not used. (117) highlights the attainment of a happy state by exploiting the image of a fish on a line being reeled in. (118) underscores our experience with happiness as a fleeting emotion, which is visualized as a butterfly flying and the tenuous situation of it alighting on your shoulder.

HAPPINESS is a PERSON IN POLITICS, which could elicit a metonymic reading. This was only found in the GB data, illustrated by (119) and (120).

(119) […] does a *politics of* **happiness** really give us the strength of character to match those challenges? (GB G)

(120) Thus the *politics of* **happiness** should not be fought out over ONS survey data […] (GB B)

Being rare, it is not surprising that this was not accounted for in the previous research.

Similar to ANGER, HAPPINESS takes on the meaning of a COMPANION, but in a very restricted sense, i.e., that of a person with whom you share an abode. It was also not previously discussed in the studies outlined in Section 7.1.

(121) Happiness is retrospective. Memory is the *home of* **happiness**. (GB G)

(122) […] may **joy** and blessings success and divine health *abide in* your family […] (NG G)

(123) Married women need to realize that **happiness** does not *reside in* marriage. **Happiness** does not *reside in* a spouse or in children. (KE B)

(124) All **happiness** and fulfillment is *residing within* you. (IN B)

HAPPINESS is conceptualized as a PERSON LIVING IN A HOME, possibly primed by the familial associations mentioned in the co-text of (122) and (123). Also, the dwelling of HAPPINESS can be the individuals themselves (124), something associated with the individual, like memory in (121), or in terms of a human relationship (123).

The related domains of OFFSPRING and PARENT also occur in the HAPPINESS data and would likely have been attributed to the general source domain ORGANISM in Stefanowitsch's (2006a) study, if they would have showed up in his results. Like in ANGER and FEAR, *breed* is again used to denote the elicitation of this emotion (perhaps in an animalistic sense), while the advent of a happy feeling is understood in terms of a birth.

(125) The feelings of abundance *breed* **happiness** and joy, happiness and joy in turn create the results you want in life […] (GB G)

(126) But we all know the best pictures are the ones that capture genuine smiles spontaneously *borne* [sic] *out of* real **delight**. (SG G)

HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT shows up in the GloWbE data in a manner comparable to Kövecses (1991). He views this mapping as an indication of our understanding of HAPPINESS "as a powerful and intense emotion that we regard as taking control of us" (36). However, HAPPINESS as AN OPPONENT does not have the same entailments as ANGER or FEAR as AN OPPONENT. ANGER and FEAR present oppositional senses that come from our experience of regulating these negative emotions within ourselves. There are no oppositional aspects that connect to our basic experience of feeling happy or a need to regulate it in order to be better individuals or social beings. That being said, HAPPINESS can be understood as a temporal OPPONENT in moments when it is at its most intense, usually immediately after or during a fortunate event. This is reflected in (127) – (129), which illustrate HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS PREVAILING*).

(127) It's like a dream come true to me. I'm just *overwhelmed with* **joy** right now. (GB G)

(128) I was *overwhelmed with* **joy** and happiness at the look of my result. (KE G)

(129) A son of a junk dealer, Ankur was *unable to control* his **happiness** after he came to know that he had secured an all India rank of 956 in the prestigious All India Engineering Entrance Examination […] (IN G)

The African varieties also demonstrate that HAPPINESS can be conceptualized as AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST*) when harm or a threat comes from an external source, i.e., outside the individual.

(130) All of you *harming* the **joy** of nationhood from Nigerian [sic] will be destroyed. (NG G)

(131) […] all u so called journalists are only interested in *killing and destroying* another person's **happiness**, image and character. (NG G)

(132) Tell her that it is unfair that someone somewhere, with ill-motives made these stupid rules about marriage that *trod on* all human rights and **happiness**. (KE G)

Furthermore, the conceptualization of HAPPINESS takes on oppositional qualities, when it is construed of as AN OPPONENT (*WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED*). The

controlling aspect entails the sense of weakening someone (= *undermine*) or restricting them (= *hamper*).

(133) By creating this inherent sense of security, authoritative parenting insulates the developing child against the nagging anxiety that can easily *undermine* **happiness**. (GB G)

(134) When you form close bonds, you get uncomfortable. This could *hamper* your lasting **happiness**. Get to a shrink now. (IN G)

Despite the small numbers, HAPPINESS IS AN OPPONENT turns out to be the most frequent HAPPINESS IS A PERSON metaphor, with 18 instances spread out among GB, NG, KE and IN (SG being the exception).

Considering the prominence of HAPPINESS as a PART OF A JOURNEY, outlined above, it is not a surprise that it would also be understood in term of a PERSON RELATED TO A JOURNEY, which is the second most frequent HAPPINESS IS A PERSON metaphor with 16 instances (NG and SG contributing the most with 7 and 5 tokens, respectively). It was not accounted for in previous research, but is exemplified by the varieties in this study, as in (137) – (138).

(135) If it's ambiguous and you spend more time in your mind trying to work out what the frick is going on or can not categorically say where you stand, **happiness** within a healthy relationship will *elude* you. (GB G)

(136) That single act of forgiveness can *open up great doors for* your future and **happiness**. (NG G)

(137) Are you the kind of man who sits and *waits for* **happiness** *to find you*? (KE B)

(138) Others take the long road. In either case, we lay the injustice at God's feet, and then arise and do good to those who abuse us. That is when **joy** *returns*. (SG B)

Like ANGER and FEAR, HAPPINESS has the ability to vocalize, but in the restricted sense of a shout or a squeal rather than being able to speak. This could also be read metonymically since a joyous person often expresses his/her joy in this manner.

(139) It would be amazing have bird's eye view of the whole world and *hear the shouts of* **joy** ascending in an orchestra of voice boxes... (NG G)

(140) She took it personally that I did not accept her gift with the *squeals of* **delight** that greeted her when my sisters got their 'Christmas clothes'. (KE G)

This has an obvious relationship to the metonymic behavioral response Kövecses (2011b) identified as SINGING.

There is only one instance of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS, which makes use of *nursing* – a term that has co-occurred with ANGER and FEAR terms. This collocational tendency seems to be a conventional way of talking about sustaining emotions in general, although it has not featured in any of the research discussed for a folk theory of HAPPINESS.

(141) You wake up the next day and you are still *nursing* that inward feeling of uneasiness and **happiness**. (NG G)

In addition to the specific levels outlined above, there are two miscellaneous categories attributable to HAPPINESS IS A PERSON, in which human-like characteristics and actions are assigned to HAPPINESS, which did not display any conceptual unity. As such, they occur infrequently. HAPPINESS TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON is illustrated by (142), and HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON is illustrated by (143).

(142) So it was with *startled* **joy** that I came across a piece from The Banker recording our achievements in banking - and suggesting that Kenya has something to teach the world. (KE G)[108]
(143) There is no doubt at all that kindness and **happiness** *feed on* each other. (SG G)

It should be noted that HAPPINESS as a PERSON metaphors do not obviously group around a particular specific level, like OPPONENT for ANGER and FEAR. While OPPONENT is the most frequent source domain overall (despite no instances found in SG), from the variety-specific perspective, it is only the most frequent in GB (6 total tokens) and IN (4 total tokens). Compared to OPPONENT, NG and SG uses PERSON RELATED TO A JOURNEY more frequently (7 and 5

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[108] Relatable to Kövecses' (2011b) metonymy EXCITEMENT

tokens, respectively), while KE uses the generic level more frequently (5 tokens). Therefore, it is difficult to determine if OPPONENT has the status of a special instantiation of PERSON for the varieties. Thus, we will move to a more orientational metaphor that occurred in the data, i.e., HAPPINESS IS UP.

7.3.6   HAPPINESS IS UP

HAPPINESS IS UP is a well-established orientational metaphor, going all the way back to Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]), who define orientational metaphors as providing an abstract concept with a spatial orientation (14). The experiential basis for HAPPINESS IS UP has not only to do with the correlation of "erect posture with a positive emotional state" (15), but also is related to a behavioral and expressive metonymic response to HAPPINESS. Kövecses (1991) maintains that the "cognitive motivation for the upward orientation" of HAPPINESS IS UP is grounded in jumping up and down (behavioral response) and smiling (expressive response). "When we smile, the ends of the mouth turn upwards", while "the action of jumping (up and down)" motivates metaphors like "*He jumped for joy*" (32). Furthermore, Grady (1997a) identifies HAPPY IS UP as a primary metaphor with the same physical basis as Lakoff and Johnson, i.e, erect posture, but also adds that it can be grounded in the "correlation between being in a higher position (e.g., on a hill and feeling safe, in control, etc." (295). Therefore, the previous evidence leads to the expectation that HAPPINESS IS UP will occur in the GloWbE data.

This is, of course, the case. Nevertheless, the extent to which HAPPINESS IS UP occurs is surprising, because it does not seem at all that common. Out of the 750 HAPPINESS metaphors, it collectively only occurs 48 times (6.4%). Figure 7.9 illustrates the percentages of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON in the respective variety-specific metaphor profiles.

Figure 7.9: Percentages of HAPPINESS IS UP per variety

GB, NG and SG share the same proportion of HAPPINESS IS UP, namely 6.7%, while KE is on the lower end of the scale with 4% and IN is on the higher end with 8%. The breakdown of HAPPINESS IS UP was also limited – merely distinguishing between a generic sense (that of upward orientation) and a specific level that relates to the behavioral metonymic response of JUMPING UP AND DOWN. The latter was the most frequent for all varieties, as shown in Table 7.11.

Table 7.11: Breakdown of HAPPINESS IS UP per variety[109]

UP	GB	NG	KE	IN	SG
Generic-Level (= level 1)	4	1	1	4	1
JUMPING - specific-level (= level 2)	6	9	5	8	9
total	**10**	**10**	**6**	**12**	**10**

All varieties provide at least one example of the generic level (= level 1), which demonstrate that HAPPINESS has an upward spatial orientation that is otherwise unspecified for this emotion concept.

(144) There will be *a come down from* my **elation** today &; I have no doubt that there will be some difficult times ahead […] (GB G)

(145) […] God's servants experience absolute peace and internal **joy** and they are progressively *lifted up* and prosperous. (NG B)

(146) I was *over the moon with* **happiness**. At last this is happening. (KE G)

(147) The object that you love deeply can upset your mind or *raise* your mind *to heights of* **joy**, as the case may be. (IN G)

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[109] For a list of corresponding MRWs and source domain lexemes and phrases, see Appendix C.

(148) I was literally *over the moon with* **joy** because I could run & swim with almost double my speed and not feel tired. (SG G)

Although it might seem that (146) and (148) are making use of the specific image of the moon, which would be reflecting a mapping like HAPPINESS IS A HIGH PLACE OVER THE MOON, I consider the general idiomatic meaning of *over the moon* as encoding the general upward spatial orientation attributed to the conceptualization of HAPPINESS and, thus, not necessarily an elaboration of it. Furthermore, the use of *moon* acts as a stand-in for something we perceive of as being stereotypically above us, i.e., in the sky or out in space, which we commonly give an upward spatial orientation.

As mentioned above, the only specific level of HAPPINESS IS UP is that of JUMPING, which is also more frequent than the generic level in all varieties and, thus, their common preference. The source domain of JUMPING illustrates the interaction between this metonymy of HAPPINESS and corresponding metaphors. Although it is commonly reflected by *jump for / in / with* on the linguistic level, this is not exclusively so. With the exception of IN, all varieties use other phrasing as well.

(149) The boat and being on the water excited him so much he was *jumping for* **joy**. (GB B)

(150) He then fell to his knees in prayer while up in the stands his daughter Rihanna *leapt up and down with* **delight**. (GB B)

(151) I wish I could *jump for* **joy** and give a high five to my granddaughter who was in the living room when I stumbled on the news on my laptop. (NG G)

(152) A 34-year-old Nigerian nurse on Friday *leapt for* **joy** when an Oshodi Customary Court in Lagos dissolved the five-year-old marriage to her husband […] (NG G)

(153) Ruth *jumped with* **joy** and laid flat on the stage after she was announced the winner. (KE B)

(154) […] the part that had staged a prison-break from her brain and was wanted back dead or alive - *leaped for* **joy** at the prospect of spending an indefinite period close to Rashid. (KE B)

(155) We are very elated. We *jump up in* **joy**. We cuddle. We are blissful. (IN B)

(156) He would dash out from where he is at... and *jump up and down with* **delight** asking for a cuddle. (SG G)

(157) Sam, for some reason, wasn't *bouncing with* **joy** like I was. (SG G)

Finally, it should be noted that the metaphor BEING HAPPY IS BEING IN HEAVEN, which Kövecses (1991: 38) also assigns an upward orientation and views as motivated by the religious belief that the dichotomy of heaven and hell has an up-down orientation related to GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN, is not present in the data at all. Nevertheless, the general upward spatial orientation and the more specific JUMPING aspect is evidenced for all varieties and, thus, is not specific to any of them.

This concludes the overview of the biggest contributors to HAPPINESS regarding the source domains that map onto it. In the following, we will briefly rundown the minor metaphors that were found for HAPPINESS.

7.3.7   Minor Metaphors of HAPPINESS

This final section of the HAPPINESS results offers a glimpse at those metaphors that did not form a large portion of the variety-specific metaphor profiles. This pertains to NATURAL FORCE, FOOD / DRINK, ILLNESS and VALUABLE COMMODITY, which despite their lower numbers could be broken down into specific levels (see Appendix C). However, the minor metaphors of HAPPINESS also include the various miscellaneous metaphors. Collectively, these groups comprise 19.8% of the total HAPPINESS data overall. From a cross-variety perspective, they represent 27.3% in GB, 23.3% in IN, 21.3% in KE, 20.1% in SG, and, interestingly, only 7.4% in NG, which makes much more extensive use of the major HAPPINESS metaphors outlined in the sections above. The following provides an overview of these minor metaphors, which are illustrated by linguistic examples.

NATURAL FORCE is a source domain that maps onto HAPPINESS, but not as prominently as it does for ANGER and FEAR. Therefore, it was relegated to the minor metaphor grouping. The specific levels of HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE are FIRE, STORM and WATER and are illustrated below. Note that all three are relatable to previously attested metaphors, namely HEAT / FIRE and NATURAL FORCE by Kövecses (1991; 2008c) and, for (160), the more general LIQUID Stefanowitsch (2006a).

(158) Pastor William Kumuyi *sparked* **joy** and spontaneous happiness among members of the church […] (NG G)

(159) Thunder and Lightning conjured up a tempest within, a *tempest of* **elation**. (GB B)

(160) The soul is *drowned in the ocean of* **joy**. (IN G)

Nevertheless, HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE is infrequent (4.3% of the total data or 32 tokens). Yet, it should be noted that it is unevenly spread across the varieties. In GB, NG, KE and SG, it is between 0.7% - 4.7%. In IN, 11.3% of the metaphor profile is constructed by HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE, exclusively due to the specific-level WATER, which can be further broken down into a level 3, and perhaps is evidence for a slight preference.

(161) A person *floats on the surface of the sea of* **happiness** and sorrow, and does not know what will actually be in store for him tomorrow (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS WATER (*OCEAN / SEA*)

(162) […] Kaka you were the ARADHANA of millions of Indians, you *showered* us *with* abundance **bliss** […] (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS WATER (*RAIN*)

(163) We will be *flooded with* **bliss**. (IN B) → HAPPINESS IS WATER (*FLOOD / WAVES*)

Conventional constructions are associated with these last two examples. The RAIN domain is solely reflected by *shower* [V] *on / over / upon / with*, while the majority of FLOOD / WAVES is instantiated by *flood* [V] *with*.

The mapping of FOOD / DRINK onto HAPPINESS was neither discussed in Kövecses' work nor in Stefanowitsch (2006a); yet, it was briefly treated as a minor metaphor of ANGER and FEAR in the present study. Like HAPPINESS IS A NATURAL FORCE above, the 22 total tokens (2.9% of the overall data) are unevenly spread across the data, with GB commanding exactly half (11 tokens), which indicates a slight preference. The structure of HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK is illustrated by the following examples.

HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK (generic level)

(164) Having a rich network of close, supportive relationships with partners, friends, family and colleagues is probably the single most important *ingredient of* **happiness**. (GB G)

HAPPINESS IS CHOCOLATE

(165) So you eat more, and more…secretly looking for chocolate to relieve the boredom, to have your treat, you deserve a reward (what did you do, save a life or just wash the dishes?), looking for it to give you that *slice of* **happiness** you *crave under the wrapper*. (GB G)

HAPPINESS IS FRUIT

(166) […] they become the sort of people who don't take offence at certain things, who are concerned about other things more, who display the *fruits of* the spirit. The love, the **joy**, the gentleness, the peace and so on. (GB B)[110]

HAPPINESS IS SUGAR

(167) Instead of consuming sugar, you can become sugar itself! This is the *sugar of* ananda, **bliss**. (IN B)

HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED

(168) Being a stage, the world *feeds us on* all manner of emotions be they those of **joy**, happiness and sorrow, but in the end, we are heard no more. (KE G)

(169) My *tastebuds were tingling with* **delight** as I tasted each dish. (GB G)

(170) I have *drunk in* the **elation** on Kubri al-Nil as Egypt's first democratically elected President […] (GB B)

HAPPINESS IS FOOD / DRINK GOING BAD

(171) It had taken a long time. His **elation** *soured*. (GB G)

The emotional experience of being happy is not widely conceptualized in terms of ILLNESS in our varieties (with only 19 tokens in total). HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS composes just 2.5% of the total of data and is not found in NG at all. In fact, the percentages are low across the board (4% or 6 tokens each in KE and SG, 3.3% or 5 tokens in GB, and 1.3% or 2 tokens in IN). This makes clear that it is not a very common conceptualization for HAPPINESS in English in general and is perhaps contingent on the fact that happy feelings do not intuitively come to mind in connection with ILLNESS.

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[110] This, of course, has its origins in the Bible. Galatians 5: 22-23 says, "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. Against such things there is no law." Nevertheless, I have included this example as a metaphor in GB because it is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition and otherwise widely known. It is, therefore, available to speakers, albeit as a historical metaphor. Furthermore, example (166) is not a direct quote from this passage in Galatians.

Nevertheless, HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS has been previously attested to within a cognitive model of HAPPINESS. Kövecses (2000: 25) establishes that HAPPINESS is understood of in terms of INSANITY (*they were crazy with happiness*), which can be considered a specific instance of illness. He also demonstrates that HAPPINESS can be conceived of as DISEASE (*her good mood was contagious*) or as HIGH / BEING DRUNK (*it was an intoxicating experience*) (Kövecses 2008c: 135–136). Admittedly, the latter is not prototypical for ILLNESS, but it can be considered related, insomuch as it entails the experience of being in a physical state in which the body does not operate as normal. Despite this fuzzy boundary, I have included all linguistic metaphors reflecting HAPPINESS as being compared to a state beyond a normally functioning body as drawing from the source domain of ILLNESS, along with the related concept of MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS. These linguistic metaphors are illustrated in the following via their specific-level breakdown.

HAPPINESS IS A DEADLY ILLNESS
(172) LUCKY!!! I would've *died of* **happiness**. (SG G)

HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE
(173) **Happiness** is a *high* - it only lasts a while. (GB G) → (here A DRUG-INDUCED HIGH)

HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS
(174) Totally awed as I grinned from ear to ear. My heart *fluttered with* **joy**. (KE B) → (*HEART-RELATED*)[111]

(175) So they ooh when he uses the backhand slice, sigh when he (occasionally) follows it in to the net to volley and become *incontinent with* **delight** when he scimitars that backhand down the line "on the dead run" as Amritraj loves to say. (IN B) → (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*)

(176) Sorry, I didn't know it was also my job to send you into *paroxysms of* **joy**. (GB G) → (*LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY*)

(177) Sometimes, especially if it is an ugly person calling me ugly or a stupid person calling me stupid, I even feel a *twinge of* **joy** because it is so funny and ironic. (SG G) → (*PHYSICAL PAIN*)

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[111] Relatable to Kövecses' (2008c) metonymy INCREASED HEART RATE (*heart beats with joy*)

HAPPINESS IS AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS

(178) As I listened to Jim, I could tell he had learnt his lessons well and he in turn had taught his wife and the **joy** and transformation in their marriage was *infectious*. (KE G)

HAPPINESS IS A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY

(179) But when Warren appeared on stage to accept the results, the crowd *went delirious with* **joy** (KE B)

(180) Wilson, the bridegroom who is a painter in Nairobi, was *beside himself with* **joy**[112] as he kissed his bride, sending the crowd into a frenzy of hand-clapping and ululation. (KE G) → HAPPINESS IS A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY

HAPPINESS IS A MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS

(181) *A Little Dose of* **Happiness** Here and There (SG G)

HAPPINESS is like a deadly disease, when it is experienced suddenly or in excess, (i.e., outside of the realm of a normally functioning body, that is, a shock to the system), as in (182). The same is true for a LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE BODY and MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY in that HAPPINESS can induce a loss of physical faculties (i.e., wetting oneself), as in (187), or – like in ANGER and FEAR – convulsing, as in (176) or loss of mental faculties, as in (179) and (180). AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE, PHYSICAL PAIN and AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS are positively connoted in the context of HAPPINESS, but the language is clearly borrowed from the domain of ILLNESS as I define it (*a* [drug-induced] *high*, *twinge of*, *infectious*).

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[112] This particular metaphorical instance was problematic and begs explanation for why it shows up here. First of all, recall that Kövecses (1990) coded a similar instance for FEAR (*I was beside myself with fear*) as A DIVIDED SELF, which likely presented problems for him as well, considering that he changed the label of this source domain in later publications (see footnote in Section 6.1). I initially thought I would get around this problem by employing the collocational analysis afforded by my methodology. However, this was only one of two instances that proved unsolvable with collocational analysis - the other being *my head being all over the place* in FEAR, which has similarity to Kövecses' A DIVIDED SELF. Nevertheless, I decided to annotate both the FEAR and HAPPINESS example as MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY for the following reason. For instance, a collocational analysis, using the search string *beside PRON with*, in the GloWbE, yielded 412 results. I took a sample of 100 tokens and, after sorting out literal instances (like *skip beside you with a baseball bat* (GB G)), analyzed all *beside PRON with + NOUN* constructions. It was striking that all remaining 69 of the 100 tokens included an emotion term in the noun slot, 15 of which related to HAPPINESS. Despite this construction exclusively co-occurring with an emotion term, I made the analyst-specific decision to include it in my ILLNESS data set, since being beside oneself, in my opinion, denotes a mental state outside of the norm, which happens to also be deeply connected to one's emotional state. Examples from the corpus, like *The child's clueless young father was beside himself with anxiety* (JM G), supported me in my decision, since *anxiety* is a term that both denotes an emotional state and an emotional disorder, which require clinical treatment (see, e.g., House & Hosker 2013)

Kövecses (1990) discusses HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY, like in *buy happiness*, which focuses on our understanding of HAPPINESS as something "that does not arise within the self, but comes from a source external to the self" (38). In general, this is also a valid reading for HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY examples in the present study.

HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY (generic level)
(182) […] Singapore, bereft of even limited natural resources, lately shorn of its hinterland, and now finding itself in a hostile 'Malay sea', could little *afford* such fripperies as human dignity and **joy** (SG G)

HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING BOUGHT
(183) Money can *buy* you **happiness** - it's just that this happiness won't be as great as you expect […] (SG B)

HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING SOLD
(184) […] we should not *sell* our **happiness** for material things (NG G)

HAPPINESS IS A CURRENCY / INCOME
(185) […] the universe has no choice but to *start deducting from your* **happiness** *credit*. (KE G)

With a total of 16 overall instances of VALUABLE COMMODITY, which is just 2.1% of the HAPPINESS data, this mapping is verifiably rare. However, looking at its distribution across the varieties, it is noteworthy that 9 of these 16 instances were found in SG, which make up 6% of its metaphor profile, as opposed to 0.7% in GB and NG, 1.3% in IN, and 2% in KE. Moreover, 7 of the 9 tokens of HAPPINESS IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY in SG are captured under the specific level of A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING BOUGHT, solely reflected in the use of *buy + happiness* (which is incidentally never negated, as in the saying *money can't buy you happiness*).

Finally, the miscellaneous group of metaphors contributed little to the metaphorical content of the profiles of each variety. They constitute only 11.3% of the data in GB, 5.3% in NG, 10% in KE, and 6.77% in IN and SG. As a reminder, metaphors were considered miscellaneous when they either contributed less than five instances in a single variety (e.g., PHYSICAL BURDEN, PURE

SUBSTANCE, REWARD, etc.) or were metaphorical hapax legomena (e.g., BREATH, CALLING CARD, FRAGILE THING, etc.) As in the previous case studies on ANGER and FEAR, these metaphors appear to be less conventional and are infrequent, making them likely candidates for innovative or creative metaphors, but consequentially not suitable candidates for comparison. The following illustrates an example of each source domain that occurred less than five times in a single variety.

(186) Anything to drown or swoon out that ghastly punk noise, and you can't even hear the words, is a man or a woman, I turn into my parents with great, society-*crushing* **joy**. (GB B) → HAPPINESS IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN

(187) In fact it creates an integrated individual in you and only in that integration do *flowers of* **bliss** *blossom*, *bloom*; you start growing. (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS A PLANT (here FLOWERS)[113]

(188) […] nightmares of their offspring writing in *unadulterated* **joy** the taboo words "Like that lor!" in response to comprehension questions, keeping them awake at night. (SG B) → HAPPINESS IS A PURE SUBSTANCE[114]

(189) Your body will thank you by *rewarding* you *with* energy and **happiness**. (SG G) → HAPPINESS IS A REWARD

(190) It is the brilliance of the wedding gown which the church wears that will *emit the fragrance of* **gladness** during the wedding of the Lamb. (KE G) → HAPPINESS IS A SCENT

(191) May he see many seasons of joy, good health and victories. (NG G) → HAPPINESS IS A SEASON

(192) They were not crazy people. It was the bursting experience of a *supernatural* **delight** that entered them.(IN G) → HAPPINESS IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING

(193) […] the lights went up there was a rich air of peace and joy throughout the huge auditorium of the Rainbow Theatre. (GB B) → HAPPINESS IS AIR

(194) […] women whose entire **happiness** *is built on* marriage and children. (KE B) → HAPPINESS IS BUILDING-RELATED

(195) The boys celebrated the victory but the **elation** was *tempered* with the fact that a bonus point was not registered. (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS STEEL BEING TEMPERED

Note that SUPERNATURAL BEING only occurs in the New Englishes, namely one instance each in KE and IN. Unlike ANGER and FEAR, the conceptualization of HAPPINESS as a SUPERNATURAL BEING has positive connotations. In

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[113] Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) ORGANISM (*fruit of joy*)

[114] Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (*pure joy*)

(192) above, HAPPINESS is understood in a mixed metaphor with *bursting* (i.e., FLUID IN A CONTAINER) as a pleasant experience (and, incidentally, used to debunk the notion that the people experiencing it are crazy). The instance occurring in the KE data makes the positive connotation even clearer by associating HAPPINESS with mythical creatures that children believe to bring good things: *sustaining the happiness fairies when we finally have them in our arms* (KE G).

The following examples demonstrate the 20 metaphorical hapax legomena in the data, and, as such, can be viewed as highly creative.

(196) Stevie's beautiful improvisation around a melody can convey pretty much any emotion, but **joy** is his *calling card*. (GB B) → HAPPINESS IS A CALLING CARD

(197) It happened around the same time as the ACS clock-tower revival but it developed differently: it became a church. It was a *revival of* tears, love and **joy**: one where the deep moving of the Spirit resulted in hundreds turning to Christ and being baptized, filled with the Spirit and having their lives transformed. (SG B) → HAPPINESS IS A CHURCH REVIVAL

(198) You will need to be able to deal with the *cocktail of* surprise, **happiness** and mild uncertainty. (SG B) → HAPPINESS IS A COCKTAIL (= MIXED SUBSTANCE)[115]

(199) I think I probably *shattered* any post-set **elation** by taking them back to when things were less glamorous […] (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS A FRAGILE THING[116]

(200) Christ's ministry was simple, to stop the suffering, to *establish His kingdom of* righteousness, peace and **joy** in the Holy Ghost. (KE B) → HAPPINESS IS A KINGDOM

(201) So skilfully is the young pretender, David Cameron, *pressing buttons on* wellbeing, quality of life and **happiness** that charges of superficiality and empty trendiness are coming thick and fast. (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS A MACHINE

(202) To *pin* your hope and **joy** *on* the response of any imperfect human being is at best a precarious move […] (SG G) → HAPPINESS IS A PIN

(203) It is the kind of **joy** and pride that *overshadows* his every nano-achievement […] (SG G) → HAPPINESS IS A SHADOW BEING CAST

(204) The players were *singing songs of* **joy** as they were travelling back […] (KE B) → HAPPINESS IS A SONG[117]

(205) […] the survival of the Nigerian dream, which shall be *measured by* her people's and outsiders' **happiness**. (NG G) → HAPPINESS IS A TOOL FOR MEASURING

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[115] Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) MIXED / PURE SUBSTANCE (*mixture of* EMOTION *and joy*)

[116] Relatable to Stefanowitsch's (2006a) DESTROYABLE OBJECT (X *break* Y's *joy*)

[117] Relatable to Kövecses' (2011b) metonymy detailing an expressive response (*sing with joy*)

(206) The moment you know Brahman, the whole *Universe of* **Bliss** enters into you and simultaneously you enjoy the whole universe; saha brahmana vipashchita. (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS A UNIVERSE

(207) Prayer, **Happiness** and ur huge smile is your only *weapon*. (NG B) → HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON

(208) She never got unnoticed when she walked into a room; she had a way of *throwing in* some **happiness** and made everyone laugh with her jokes. (NG G) → HAPPINESS IS AN OBJECT TO THROW

(209) Most of us have hopefully felt the *unmoored* **elation** of staying up all night talking with a friend or a lover. (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS AN UNMOORED BOAT

(210) If we really feel that inner **joy** is the *breath of our life*, if we feel that we cannot exist without joy and we will die at this very moment if we do not have it […] (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS BREATH

(211) […] few Christians today ever come close to *living that abandoned life of* **joy**, generosity and radical other-centeredness that made the first church so attractive to the city of Jerusalem. (KE B) → HAPPINESS IS LIFE

(212) There will be a great *commotion* of **joy**: "The king has come to my house!" (IN G) → HAPPINESS IS NOISE

(213) So does **happiness** need to be *built-in to the fabric of* an office place? (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS PART OF A FABRIC

(214) […] for those whose families live at a distance this **elation** can be *tinged with* sadness as most grandparents desperately want to be involved in their grandchildren's lives. (GB G) → HAPPINESS IS SOMETHING COLORED

(215) And on Tuesday, **happiness** was *written all over the face of* the former Law Society of Kenya chairman as he reflected […]. (KE G) → HAPPINESS IS WRITING ON THE FACE

On a final note, similar to the FEAR data, HAPPINESS has almost double the amount of miscellaneous metaphor data (60 tokens or 8% of the total data) in comparison to ANGER (34 tokens or 4.5%). This could be indicative of HAPPINESS being an emotion that lends itself more easily to innovative metaphorization in comparison to ANGER, which saw the varieties sharing in five frequent source domains. This is also part of the explanation for why the rankings for HAPPINESS demonstrated only a preferred standing for two source domains, namely POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY,

This concludes the survey of HAPPINESS metaphors across the varieties. In the following section, the results will be discussed on the basis of the dimensions of metaphor variation, which will also be contextualized in terms of the notions of universality and variation.

7.4   Discussion

This section discusses the results of the HAPPINESS case study according to Kövecses' (2005) types of metaphor variation (i.e., congruent metaphors, range of the target and preferential conceptualizations), in order to sum up what has been shared by the varieties and what has not been shared. In addition, this section will offer a preliminary conclusion on universality (in the sense of having physical bodies) and variation (in the sense of cultural specificity) regarding the conceptualizations of HAPPINESS.

Firstly, in terms of the range of target (= metaphors using different source domains for the same target domain), which can be gleaned from the individual variety-specific metaphor profiles of HAPPINESS in Table 7.2. (see Section 7.2), the varieties shared the same source domains, with one small exception. NG had no attested instances of HAPPINESS IS AN ILLNESS, although it should be noted that ILLNESS was considered a minor metaphor and did not contribute to the data extensively overall. Regarding the ranking of the most prominent source domains, the varieties were similar in that they had either PART OF A JOURNEY or POSSESSION listed in either the first or second rank. These two source domains were the most prominent for HAPPINESS across all varieties. Therefore, the New Englishes and British English are comparable regarding the range of target and do not display any major variation.

Kövecses (2005) also postulates metaphor variation along the lines of congruent metaphors, which have a generic schema that can be filled out by culturally specific content. At the specific-level analysis of HAPPINESS, where I assumed congruent metaphors would arise, there was no major indications that this in fact was the case on a large scale. As in the previous case studies, we can only point to anecdotal evidence that would have to be confirmed in further research endeavors. For instance, consider (216), which was one of two instances of HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (*ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER*) found only in GB.

(216) "The chamber," wrote Alistair Cooke, our correspondent, "was *crackling with currents of* **elation** and despair." (GB B)

The image being evoked here is one of electricity, which is understood by a folk model of ENERGY AS (FLOWING) FLUID. While it only occurred in the GB data, the previous case study findings speak against this being a congruent metaphor, since the other emotions, ANGER and FEAR, were conceptualized as ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER in all varieties.

Another anecdotal piece of evidence for a congruent metaphor could be found in what seemed a novel extension of HAPPINESS IS LIGHT, since it occurred only once in IN. It is repeated here in (217).

(217) Let the *Lamp of* Wealth, Health and **Happiness** *be Lit* for You and fill You with Joy and Cheer […] (IN B)

There could be particular cultural significance to HAPPINESS as a LAMP that is not immediately assessable to me as an analyst who does not speak Indian English as a native language. Therefore, more data is needed to determine if examples like (216) and (217) are indeed congruent metaphors and not just novel extensions of an established mapping on the part of the individual speakers.

The same could be valid for the minor source domain FOOD / DRINK, which could conceivably be more inclined to cultural specification. Although, like in the ANGER case study, it was slightly more common in GB, there was at least one instance found in each of the New Englishes. Furthermore, examples, like (218) and (219), although perhaps novel extensions, could be considered cultural to a certain degree, considering (218) makes use of a food item that is a common snack in Great Britain, while (219) is an extension of the imagery used in the Bible and, thus, common in Christian societies.

(218) So you eat more, and more…secretly looking for chocolate to relieve the boredom, to have your treat, you deserve a reward (what did you do, save a life or just wash the dishes?), looking for it to give you that *slice of* **happiness** you *crave under the wrapper*. (GB G)

(219) […] they become the sort of people who don't take offence at certain things, who are concerned about other things more, who display the *fruits of* the spirit. The love, the **joy**, the gentleness, the peace and so on. (GB B)

However, FOOD / DRINK was considered a minor metaphor. Yet, again we are forced to accept that more data is needed to determine its cultural salience. Furthermore, a viable assumption for these infrequent metaphors is that it is their infrequency that necessitates creativity, which would lend itself more readily to cultural influences as a motivational basis.

Kövecses' (2005) preferential conceptualizations (= metaphors that are shared, but some are preferred over others) made up the bulk of the specific-level analysis. It was assumed that the breakdown of the broad source domains would aid in uncovering what mappings are, in fact, preferred by the varieties, especially since it was already previously established that they behave similarly concerning the range of the target. However, no major preferences were found in the varieties, leading to the conclusion that they, on the whole, share conceptualizations.

For example, it was determined that POSSESSION and PART OF A JOURNEY were the largest contributors of HAPPINESS metaphorical data across the varieties. On the basis of absolute frequencies it first appeared that the New Englishes prefer the specific level TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP within POSSESSION, but the distribution was not significant. For PART OF A JOURNEY, all varieties had A SEARCH as the most widely used source domain in their respective metaphor profiles, with DESTINATION coming in as a close second in all varieties. Therefore, we cannot speak of differences along the lines of preferred conceptualizations. This was also true of FLUID and PERSON, in which there was no obvious grouping around a specific level, and LIGHT, in which LIGHT FROM WITHIN seemed like a preference in the New Englishes, although it did show up multiple times in GB. Finally, in UP, although the smallest of the source domains considered under the label of "major" metaphors, all varieties made use of the specific level JUMPING most frequently.

The minor metaphors discussed for the New Englishes and British English also suffered from the problem of low numbers, so that further statistical analysis was not possible and thus the status of preferential conceptualizations here is questionable. On the basis of absolute frequencies, however, there were slight indications that a preference could be found if more data was available. This included a slight preference for IN to use WATER in NATURAL FORCE, GB to

use FOOD / DRINK more frequently overall and SG to use VALUABLE COMMODITY (especially on the specific level of A VALUABLE COMMODITY BEING BOUGHT).

Therefore, on the whole, HAPPINESS seems to be conceptualized in a similar manner overall in New Englishes and British English. In terms of the motivational bases for the meaning foci discussed in the specific-level breakdowns, HAPPINESS demonstrated the same result as ANGER and FEAR. That is, the metaphors were largely discussed in terms of their relationship to our bodily experience. For example, LIGHT and UP have an obvious bodily basis, which is illustrated in repeated examples below.

(220) But recently, whenever we young dads have lunch together, we no longer bring up the **joy** of parenthood that *lit up* our lives when our children were cute babies and toddlers. (SG G)
(221) Ruth *jumped with* **joy** and laid flat on the stage after she was announced the winner. (KE B)

The correlation of LIGHT and HAPPINESS as in (220) goes back to the interactional properties we experience with our physical bodies. We feel light and the warmth it brings on our skin and we can see in a lighted area and that makes us feel safe. Both feelings can be thought of as pleasant and, thus, are not that far from evoking a feeling of happiness. In (221) the spatial orientation of HAPPINESS as UP is also clear and made possible by having the types of bodies that we have, as well as connects to the things we do with those bodies when we feel happy, i.e. jumping up and down.

This prevalent motivational basis for metaphors was not unexpected and, in fact, assumed that it would show up to some degree. However, what was striking was how little could be said for the motivational basis on cultural terms, considering the unique socio-cultural and regional circumstances of the varieties under investigation. Therefore, the preliminary conclusion for the case of HAPPINESS is that, across the Englishes, it is the body-rooted sense of embodiment that seems to be the more likely motivation.

This concludes the case study of HAPPINESS, which is the final one in the present study that will end in the following chapter with a brief overall conclusion, as well as an outlook for further research.

8 Conclusion and Outlook

The present study was devoted to exploring the conceptualization of the emotions ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS in the New Englishes and their (former) norm-providing variety, British English. Chapter 1 positioned the present study in the tradition of CMT. It also highlighted central tenets from CMT (i.e., systematicity, pervasiveness and embodiment) that were crucial to approaching a cross-variety study of emotion metaphors. These tenets set up basic expectations for the empirical part of this study. 1) By assuming the systematic and pervasive nature of conceptual metaphors, linguistic metaphors can be examined in usage-based data (like corpora) and used as evidence to further our understanding of the conceptual structure of emotions that exist for speakers of a pluricentric language. 2) By assuming that the grounding of metaphors is in bodily and sociocultural experience, emotion metaphors in Englishes around the world will (by virtue of their unique socio-cultural and regional settings) display both bases of motivation in their conceptualizations of emotion concepts (i.e., in the metaphors they use to talk about the emotions).

Chapter 2 delved deeper into this last assumption by discussing an extended view of embodiment to more clearly account for culture that could either be understood as an oppositional force that has to be reconciled with the strong view of embodiment (in the sensorimotor sense) or, alternatively, as functioning as a cultural filter for bodily experiences that shape cognition. This was applied to a discussion of the universal and culture-specific properties of emotion metaphors, which also outlined types of metaphor variation (specifically, congruent metaphors, range of target and preferential conceptualizations) that were introduced in Kövecses' (2005) "embodied cultural prototype" approach. It was these types that were deemed most likely to occur in the data of the present study and were, thus, the focus for contextualizing the results. Furthermore, Chapter 2 discussed the suitability of the New Englishes as a testing ground for this approach and, in doing so, briefly reviewed newly emerging cognitively-oriented paradigms like Cognitive Sociolinguistics and Cultural Linguistics, which offer valuable insight into the study of a cognitive phenomenon like conceptual metaphor in a single language

with diverse cultures. This section also highlighted the heightened academic interest in New English metaphor that has as an overall aim the uncovering of what is shared and what is not shared in terms of the metaphors of these varieties. The present study directly contributes to this growing body of work by filling a research gap in larger-scale studies that take into account not only a (former) norm-providing variety but also representatives from four supraregional areas. Furthermore, it promotes the visibility of a target domain in metaphors (i.e., EMOTIONS). While EMOTIONS are, on the whole, well researched, they are yet underrepresented in studies that compare multiple varieties of New Englishes simultaneously.

Chapter 4 outlined a transparent and detailed methodology used to extract and analyze metaphor data from a large-scale corpus, which included established procedures for metaphor extraction and identification, MPA and MIPVU, respectively. It not only introduced so-called "intuition-boosters" (e.g., collocational analysis) to aid the analyst in making decisions that were unavoidably more of an intuitive nature, but it also developed a level system to gain deeper insight into the granularity of the metaphors, once they were determined to be of the conceptual kind. This methodology was employed consistently throughout the case studies on ANGER (Chapter 5), FEAR (Chapter 6) and HAPPINESS (Chapter 7). It also helped to reveal previously unattested metaphors for each emotion concept. For ANGER, these included the specific-levels of ANGER IS A PERSON (i.e., ACCOMPLICE, COMPANION, HELPER, PARENT, PERSON IN POLITICS, PERSON WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK, PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS / DYING), as well as PUNISHMENT, FOOD / DRINK and a more complex conceptual structure surrounding ANGER IS A WEAPON. For FEAR, the specific-level breakdown of FEAR IS A PERSON also uncovered the source domains ACCOMPLICE, HELPER, PARENT, PERSON WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK and PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS / DYING along with GUIDE. Further previously unattested metaphors for FEAR included FEAR IS RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE, FEAR IS A POSSESSION, FEAR IS A DEEP PLACE, as well as more conceptual complexity for FEAR IS A WEAPON. For HAPPINESS, along with FOOD / DRINK, the specific-levels of HAPPINESS IS A PERSON revealed COMPANION, PERSON IN POLITICS, PERSON SHOUTING and PERSON WITH AN ILLNESS. Furthermore, the methodology

also brought forth various miscellaneous metaphors, of which many were innovative (e.g., ANGER IS COMPOST, FEAR IS A SHIP, HAPPINESS IS BREATH).

The hypothesis going into the case studies was that the emotion metaphors would, on the one hand, demonstrate variation on the basis of the socio-cultural distinctions between the varieties. On the other, they would also demonstrate commonalities by virtue of English having a common core and its speakers (naturally) sharing the same basic biological makeup. To repeat something I stated in Section 3.3, "although we can expect to find great similarities in a cross-cultural study of metaphorical conceptualizations of emotion reflected in the many varieties of English, we can also readily expect to find differences in the way emotions are conceptualized, owing to each variety's unique socio-cultural circumstances." As the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS illustrate, this expectation was not fully met. For all three emotion concepts, little difference between the varieties was visible in their emotion metaphors, which were largely of the conventional type. Even when a preference (like ANGER IS AN OPPONENT for IN and the African Englishes) came to light, it is not entirely certain that this preference would not become negligible with more data, especially considering this mapping was attested to in the remaining varieties, i.e., GB and SG. Furthermore, there were no conceptualizations that were completely unique to a single variety or even a single supraregional area, like East Africa, West Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, which would have been stronger evidence for culture-specific metaphors or preferences. Therefore, the original hypothesis was not confirmed and the overall conclusion of the case studies of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS is that no major differences exist between the varieties in terms of their emotion metaphors.

Additionally, preliminary conclusions in the case studies about the universal vs. cultural qualities of the metaphors were in accord. The emotions, at least in this study, are more grounded in bodily experience. That is, for the particular data at hand there were no obvious clues that the emotions were undergoing a cultural filtration or being extended via conceptual content specific to the cultures of the varieties. Nevertheless, this is where I see the most potential for future research, since the scope of this study was limited and a few caveats must be conceded.

First of all, the nature of the data, originating from the GloWbE corpus, only provided a snapshot of the language of emotion metaphors. This means that the text types were not as diversified as in other corpora (like ICE) and text type could play a role in what metaphor is used, although this was not explored in the current study. In a related sense, web-based English could potentially cause (albeit unconsciously) people to speak and write in a less regionally specific way, considering the potential of reaching a global audience by publishing something on the Internet. Secondly, the issue of authorship in the GloWbE was problematic, resulting in the forced verification of each author in long Internet searches, which then yielded only those members of the language communities that had enough web presence. This undoubtedly skewed the data towards prominent members (like public figures, journalists, etc.), although there is a selection of private citizens, especially those who put their biographies in the format of a blog or identified themselves as living in a certain country via their social media accounts. Be that as it may, it was not possible to control the data for a representative cross-section of the respective populations – a consequence of having to rely on a corpus like the GloWbE. However, this can be remedied in future research by employing more qualitative methods like interviews, surveys and the like. Finally, I restricted the target domains under investigation to ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. This, too, presented only a limited scope in terms of the emotion concepts. Other emotion concepts (like SADNESS, PRIDE, SHAME, etc.) need to be explored for the New Englishes, which could reveal very different results.

As the results in this study indicate, there is no strong evidence for the varieties behaving significantly different for the conceptualizations of ANGER, FEAR and HAPPINESS. The New Englishes neither stand out as a group from British English, a traditionally norm-providing variety, in terms of source domain preference, nor do they display major cultural differences among themselves. Overall, the conclusion is that emotion metaphors are largely the same for these particular target domains and these particular varieties. One could speculate on, for example, the universal characteristics of embodied cognition pertaining to emotion, the erosion of cross-cultural differences due to globalization (Boers 2003: 236), and so on. This would certainly merit more extensive investigation for cognitive phenomena like metaphors. With this study, I do not intend to discount the many

findings that illustrate conceptual differences between varieties or even between different languages. I do, however, intend to further question the extensiveness of these differences in the metaphorical systems for emotion concepts, since it is yet unclear how pervasive these differences may be in shaping said systems. For instance, in the respective discussion sections of the case studies, I formulated the assumption that the less frequent a metaphor is, the more creative it tends to be, which, in turn, apparently invites culture-specific content and experiences as a more readily available motivational basis. An indication of the validity of this assumption can be seen in the findings pertaining to the normalized frequencies, which revealed that FOOD / DRINK was preferred by GB in ANGER and HAPPINESS, while NG preferred SUPERNATURAL BEING in both ANGER and FEAR. Considering that these variety-specific preferences showed up for more than one emotion concept, it is worth further exploring to what extent the unique cultural contexts of these varieties plays a role.

Therefore, the extent of conceptual difference in the varieties' metaphorical systems for emotion concepts is an important point to be further considered, especially since the domain of emotions is so pivotal in human experience. It is still reasonable to expect some variation considering the interplay of body and culture that can influence construal of emotion concepts and, thus, impact the way they are talked about. However, in order to understand how extensively this occurs in the shaping of the complex metaphorical systems from speakers of the same language, with varieties emerging in different cultures, it is imperative to conduct more research in the future. Thus, I encourage further work to expand the picture of emotion language and metaphor in Englishes worldwide.

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Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online, http://www.ldoceonline.com/

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Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/

Appendix A

MRWs Used in Annotation of ANGER According to Source Domain

Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation process.

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*brimming with, buckets into which [...] poured, dilution to, filled with, full of*
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)	*drips with, flow through you and then out from your body, rushed thru [someone], seeping, spewing (out), surge of [...] course through me, taste of biilous* [sic]
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	*reservoir(s) of*
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	–
FLUID BEING DISRUPTED - (= level 3)	*stir up / with*
FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) - (= level 3)	*bottled up, build up, surge of, swell with, well up*
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER - (= level 3)	*evaporated, pour (forth), over-pouring* [ADJ]*, spill onto / out*

HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	*boiling* [N], *boiling* [ADJ], *boil over / with, brimming hot, broiling* [ADJ], *bubble up / forth, long-simmering, need to cool down, reach boiling points, seething* [ADJ], *seethe (with), simmering* [ADJ], *simmer* [V]
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= level 3)	*vent (off / out), steaming with*
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)	*(a) burst(s) (of), burst (forth / out (of) / through), erupt, erupt and inflame whatever was on its path, eruption of, explode (in / with), explosion of, lava (of), lava of [...] swept through the streets with scorching frenzy, simmering [...] eruption, volcanic (vent)*
Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID	
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	*channel* [V] (also: *channelise, channelize), drive* [V], *(driving) force(s), energy, energy subsides, energized by, fuel* [V], *generate*

FOOD / DRINK	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*food [...] decays, grow stale, well kept in the freezer*
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF FOOD / DRINK – specific-level (= level 2)	–
ALCOHOLIC DRINK (= level 3)	*hung over from*
COOKIES (= level 3)	*cookies*
OLIVES (= level 3)	[Co-text]: *[...] OIL, THAT THE OLIVES PRODUCE, THE PRESS WILL CRUSH THE ANGER [...] AND FROM THAT WILL COME OIL.*
TEA (= level 3)	*first flush of, infuse (with)*
FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED – specific-level (= level 2)	*feed on / off, give taste of, swallow, taste* [V]
FOOD / DRINK BEING PREPARED – specific-level (= level 2)	*whip up*

ILLNESS	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*bout(s) of, dangerous disease, full-blown, immune from, suffer*
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*slowly kill*

AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)	*adrenaline induced, fired up on, intoxicating, poison* [V] *(with),toxic, unaddicted to, under the influence of*
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)	–
ACTING LIKE A WILD ANIMAL (= level 3)	*foaming at the mouth, hurling […] venom*
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3)	*apoplectic, convulsion of, cripple* [V], *fit(s) of* (also: *in a fit of* and *prone to fits of*), *incapacitated with, paralyze, shake with, tremor of*
PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3)	*endure, faces twisted in*
WOUND / SKIN-RELATED (= level 3)	*fester* [V], *festering* [ADJ], *red […] pocked* [V]
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*outbreak of, spread, widespread*
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level (=level 2)	*(go) crazy with, (become / go) mad (with)*
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*assuage, eradicate, get out of system, heal from, purge* [V], *relief from, survive*
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*a (heavy) dose of*

NATURAL FORCE	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*sweep*
AVALANCHE – specific-level (= level 2)	*avalanches of*
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2)	*burn[V] (bright), burn [V] (over / with), fiery, fire, flares of, full-scale […] blazed, fume (in / with), (slow-)burning, spark of*
CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3)	*put out the inferno of, stamp out*
DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3)	*consumed (by / with), engulfed by, setting fire to one's own home*
MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3)	*fan (the flames / embers of), fuel [V], pour petrol on the raving fires of, stoke (up)*
STARTING A FIRE (= level 3)	*(en)flamed by, (re)ignite (a fire), kindle [V], spark [V] (off)*
HEAT - specific-level (= level 2)	*hot, heat (of the sun), incandescent with*
STORM - specific-level (= level 2)	*brewing*
WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	*drowning in*
RAIN (= level 3)	*rain down*
WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3)	*groundswell, on a wave of, riding on the crest of, riding on (the) wave(s) of, rising tide of, stem the tide of, subside, swept away by, swept off by the torrent of, swept off with the deluge of,*

	tidal wave of, wave of ([...] swept), wave(s)
WIND - specific-level (= level 2)	*blowing, whirling vortex of*

PART OF A JOURNEY	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
BARRIER / OBSTACLE – specific-level (= level 2)	*the barriers of, the obstacle of, crossing, move beyond*
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)	*lead to [...], move from [...] to*
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)	*bring* [someone somewhere], *[...] lead to, the only way forward, the way of*
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)	*starting with[...] and moving on through*

PERSON	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
PERSON - ACCOMPLICE - specific-level (= level 2)	*betray, harbour* [V], *surrender [...] had been harbouring*
PERSON - BEING APPEASED / CALMED - specific-level (= level 2)	*appease, calm down, catering to the sensitivities of, mellow* [V], *pacify, placate*
PERSON - COMPANION - specific-level (= level 2)	*bring to bed, court* [V], *dwell in, invite, present me with [...] gift*

PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= level 2)	*arouse, howl of, let out [...] roar of, milk* [V]*, released (on), squeals and roars, unbounded [...] struck, unbridled, unleash (our beasts of)*
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)	*rescue* [V]*, restore [...] keep grounded*
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2)	*elect* [= vote]*, politics of [...] go so far*
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	*breed, born (of / from), grandfathers of*
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*afraid of, encounter* [V]*, face* [V]*, fear* [V]*, fight* [V] *with, greatest enemy / enemies, in the face of, onslaught of, powerful foe, staring everyone in the face, struggle* [V] *with, wrestle with*
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	*creep in, lurking*
BEING CONTROLLED (BY FORCE) (= level 3)	*control, hold back, repress, restrain* [V]*, suppress*
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	*casualty of, destroyer, killing* [ADJ]*, murderous, rage* [V]*, turn vicious and dangerous, violent, vitriolic*
FROM WHOM YOU ESCAPE (= level 3)	*escape* [V]*, evade, flee*
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	*dictate, holds so many back, reign supreme, slave and victim of, took control*
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	*defeated* [ADJ]*, conquer, curtail, fend off, overcome,*

	prevail (over), protected from, stave off, stood down, withstand
WHO IS IN PURSUIT (= level 3)	*catch up with [someone], hound* [V]
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	*allowed to conquer, fell victims to, get / take the best of [someone], get the better of [someone], overcome (by)*
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*children of, give birth*
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level (= level 2)	*find a collective voice, greet, respond to, screams, silent, quiet*
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= level 2)	*blind, demise of, die, frenzied* [= crazy]*, hyperventilating, nursing*
Misc. - **ANGER TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*furious, irrational, jealous, petulant, rational, righteous, zealous*
Misc. - **ANGER INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*flips the switch, sculpted by, soil* [V]*, stump* [V] [= confuse]*, tool of*

POSSESSION	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*got (= have, own* [V]*), possess*
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*let go of, lose*

MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*hold on / onto*
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*share* [V]
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*leave here with*
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP- specific-level (= level 2)	*be left with*

PUNISHMENT	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
DESERVING PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*earn*
RECEIVING PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*incur*
RISKING PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*risk* [V]
SPARED PUNISHMENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*spared*

SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE – specific-level (= level 2)	*invoke, prayer*
(RELATED TO) A DEITY – specific-level (= level 2)	*holy, from heaven, in the glory of an omnipotent, sacrificing to the gods of*

(RELATED TO) AN EVIL SUPERNATURAL BEING – specific-level (= level 2)	*cast out the devil of, delivered from this spirit of, demon of, demons who obstruct, evil spirits of, exorcise, spirit (of), unholy*

WEAPON	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*brandish, deadly* [co-text: *confront enemies*], *fight back with, hurt someone with, overpower with*
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - specific-level (= level 2)	–
A WEAPON TO SUFFOCATE SOMEONE WITH (= level 3)	*suffocate with*
ARROWS (= level 3)	*shooting their arrows of*
BLUNT INSTRUMENT (= level 3)	*(bear) the (full) brunt of, strike down with*
BOMB (= level 3)	*bomb, bring down on, defuse, fall on someone, navigate a minefield of, trigger* [V]
GUN(-RELATED) (= level 3)	*ammunition, shot of*
KNIFE (= level 3)	*stab with*
A WEAPON AIMED AT A TARGET - specific-level (= level 2)	*aim at, direct (against / at / towards), focus on, misdirected, point at, take out on /at, target* [V], *target(s) of / for, turn on someone,* [prepositions= special case]*: against, at, on*

A WEAPON DIRECTED AWAY FROM ORIGINAL TARGET - specific-level (= level 2)	*deflect, shield from*

MISC.	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
ANGER IS A CORD	*cord of*
ANGER IS A DEVICE TO AMPLIFY THE VOICE	*must amplify our voices*
ANGER IS A HAZE (OF WATER OR SMOKE)	*wandering around in a haze of*
ANGER IS A LETTER	*letters of*
ANGER IS A MACHINE	*turn off*
ANGER IS A MANUFACTURED PRODUCT	*manufactured*
ANGER IS A MASK	*a mask of*
ANGER IS A METAL BEING MANIPULATED	*galvanizing, tempered*
ANGER IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN	*bear* [V], *bring [...] on* [someone], *displacing [...] on you, lay all [...] on us, letting [...] strain, weight of*
ANGER IS A PLANT	*reap, rooted out, sow (the seeds of (growing)), take deep root in, water the seeds of*
ANGER IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE	*free yourself from the shackles of, wear [...] around my neck like a yoke*
ANGER IS A SCHOOL	*graduated from*
ANGER IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY	*treasure* [V] *[...] sell*

ANGER IS CLUTTER / DEBRIS	*clutter, his confusing debris of*
ANGER IS COMPOST	*a kind of compost*
ANGER IS SKIN BEING SHED	*shed* [V]
ANGER IS SOMETHING WORN ON THE FOREHEAD	*wear [...]on my forehead*

Appendix B

MRWs Used in Annotation of FEAR According to Source Domain

Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation process.

A DEEP PLACE	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*at the bottom of, deep, deep-seated, measure the depth of*
TO COWER IN - specific-level (= level 2)	*cower in, cringe in*

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*filling, fill with, plunge into*
BODY FLUID (= SWEAT) - specific-level (= level 2)	*bathed with, coated in, doused in*
FLUID MOVING IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	–
FLUID BOILING DOWN IN A CONTAINER - (= level 3)	*boils down*
FLUID INCREASING IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE) - (= level 3)	*came bubbling up to the surface*
FROM SOLID TO LIQUID - specific-level (= level 2)	*dissolve, dissolving like the cubes of sugar we sometimes*

	threw into soaked garri, melted into

<u>Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID</u>	
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	*fuel* [V], *fuelled by / through, generate, outlet for, surge* [tr. V],

ILLNESS	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*bouts of, chronic, develop […] syndrome, feeling sick with, feigns acute, latent, live with, pathological, plagued, sick with, stricken, suffer (from), sympton* [sic] *of, syndrome of*
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*death, die, killing, mortal, succumb to, throes of […] deadly*
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)	*injected with, laced by, mind-altering, toxins of*
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)	–
COLD-RELATED (= level 3)	*clammy with, shiver and shudder in, shiver in*

LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3)	*benumbed by, cripple* [V], *crippling* [ADJ], *distorted by, fainting with, frozen by, numb with, paralyse* (also *paralyzed* and *papralysing* [sic]), *shakes with, tremble*
PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3)	*contortions of stark, get pang(s) of, pain brought on by, numb*[V], *racked with, searing pang, wracked*
STOMACH-RELATED (= level 3)	*stomach-churning, stomach […] roiling pit*
VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (= level 3)	*blinding*
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*(curb) the spread of, spread* [V], *spread of, spread over, widespread* (also *wide spread*)
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level (=level 2)	*dazed with, my head being all over the place with, psychosis*
A TREATABLE ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*assuage, curing, free from, magical cure to take the fear away, mitigate, relieved from, remedy for*

NATURAL FORCE	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*swept*

ATMOSPHERE / CLIMATE-RELATED – specific-level (= level 2)	*atmosphere of, climate of, cloud of […] hung over, clouded (over) by, clouds of […] darken, dark cloud of, emerge from a climate of, enveloped in a climate of, fogged out, gloom of darkness […] enveloped, hangs like a fog which obscures, heightened the […] barometer, miasma of ([...] descended), pervade, shrouded in a fog of, under cloud of*
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2)	*flicker of, smouldering with*
CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3)	*doused that smouldering*
DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3)	*consumed (by / in), engulfed by*
MAKING A FIRE MORE INTENSE (= level 3)	*fuel* [V]*, fuelled by, stoked (the flames of)*
STARTING A FIRE (= level 3)	*ignites, sparked* [tr. V.]
STORM - specific-level (= level 2)	*brewing up*
WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	–
RAIN (= level 3)	*reigned* [sic] *on*
WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3)	*breaking upon, flood surge of, groundswell, in the wake of rising, tumbling waves of, wave of […] passes over, rise new waves of, sends waves of, swept up in a wave of, wave(s) of, wave of [...]*

	struck, wave of [...] sweep, wave [...] spread

PART OF A JOURNEY	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
BARRIER / OBSTACLE – specific-level (= level 2)	*avoiding [...] only way to get 'past' is to go 'through', barrier (of), being a block, broken through* (also: *breakthrough*), *get over / past, go through, hindrance, huge obstacle, hurdle to overcome, jump that [...] huddle* [sic]*, move through, moved past, obstacles that still loom large, overcome [...] in the journey, stumbling block*
DESTINATION – specific-level (= level 2)	*detour into, lead to [...]*
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)	*chosen this path of, [...] lead to*
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)	*come a long way from*

PERSON	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–

PERSON - ACCOMPLICE / CRIMINAL - specific-level (= level 2)	*culprit, harbour* [V], *hides, join*
PERSON - (DANGEROUS) ANIMAL - specific-level (= level 2)	*a clever beast, arouse, coiled around, driven by, fangs of, let loose, rear it's* [sic] *head, release, spread its ugly tentacles, stampede of, swallow up, tame* [V], *termite […] has eaten you up, unleash*
PERSON - GUIDE - specific-level (= level 2)	*brings people to church, guided by*
PERSON - HELPER - specific-level (= level 2)	*friends […] that heightens our awareness, given succour, keeps […] at bay, makes us aware of situations and things that could harm us, protect, protective, teaches you to stay safe, underwrites*
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	*born out of, bred, breeding*
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*attacked by, baleful, battle (against / with), combat* [V], *comes upon, confront, cowering away from, disengage, enemies, face* [V], *face head on, fighting, fight (off), greatest enemy of mankind, in the face of, keep us safe from the threat of,*

	leader of, look [...] in the eye, look into the eyes [...] your enemy, onslaught of , smiling at [co-text: *stood their ground*], *struggle with, tackle* [V], *take on, trade tackles with, wrestle with*
A HIDDEN ENEMY (= level 3)	*cold fingers of [...] begin to creep, creeping* [ADJ], *creeps up on / in, lurking* [ADJ], *lurk (around), stalked the corridors, stalk* [V], *steals on me*
A THIEF (= level 3)	*rob, steals*
BEING BULLIED (= level 3)	*mocking [...] belittling*
DEADLY / PHYSICALLY VIOLENT OPPONENT (= level 3)	*bury, destroyer, destroying, torture* [V], *violence meted out [...] by*
WHO EXERTS CONTROL (= level 3)	*allow [...] to rule, allow(ed) ([...]) to stop, cage* [V], *captive of, controlled by, dictated by, did not allow, dominate (by), drive* [V], *driven by, enslaved by, give [...] its power, grip* [V], *held hostage by, hindering, hold [...] back, holds us, hostage of, impeded by, imprisoned by, in / under the (tight) grip of, keeping you from, keeps [...] poor, kept me away,*

	kingdom of, left unchecked [...] continue to obstruct, letting [...] control my life, lets us, made me keep away, made some people remain where they are, make [...] jump [...] and whip, makes everyone wear a mask, makes [...] less competitive, nut [= not] let, prevent, pushed, put a person in bondage, reign [V], reign of, restrained by, rule of, seize (by / with), slavishly subdued by, step on the toes, stop [V], takes hold, tightened the [...] grip of, won't allow
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	*a master over, banish, bucking, conquer, conquest of, destroy, eliminate, handle [V], keeping at bay, loses its power over, master [V], mastery thereof, overcome, pushing back, set free from, taking the control away from, triumph [N], trounce*
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	*captured by, checkmated by, finishes them off, fooled by, got the better of, kept getting at me, let [...] get the upperhand, overcome (with), overwhelmed, overwhelming*

	[ADJ], *presses in from every direction, tear down the hedge of protection, trump*
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*breeds […] spawns*
PERSON - WITH ABILITY TO SPEAK - specific-level (= level 2)	*fills my head with lies, nagged by, nagging* [ADJ], *niggled, niggling* [ADJ], *talk to […] have a two-way conversation, tape […] playing the tape* [i.e., audio recording of a voice], *voice of, whispers to you*
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS / DYING - specific-level (= level 2)	*death of […] is certain, nurse* [V]
Misc. - **FEAR TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*irrational, rational, reasonable […] logical, relentless*
Misc. - **FEAR INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*come in, has been vindicated, jumps in there, put to rest, ran meetings, touches*

POSSESSION	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*get rid of, let go of, lose*
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*holding on to*

SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*share*[V]*, shared* [ADJ]
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*bring (to), brings home, gives, left [...] with, pass on*

RELATED TO A BUILDING / STRUCTURE	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*artifice of [...] construct, behind [...] façade, behind the wall of*
ENCLOSURE RELATED TO A HOUSE - specific-level (= level 2)	*closeted in, garage* [V] *with, little rooms [...] shut the door on, live in*
STRENGTHENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2)	*bolster, founded on, pillar, reinforced, well-founded*
WEAKENING A BUILDING / STRUCTURE - specific-level (= level 2)	*shaken the foundations of*

SUPERNATURAL BEING / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
AURA – specific-level (= level 2)	*aura of*
(RELATED TO) AN EVIL SUPERNATURAL BEING – specific-level (= level 2)	*delivering [...] from the torment of, demon(s), haunts, making the devil [...] more strong, raising the bogy of, releases the power of the*

	devil, spirit of, spiritual force that kills, torment ([...] one of devil's age-long tricks), ungodly

WEAPON	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*a legitimate weapon in [...] warfare, blunt* [V] *the force of, killed with, use [...] as the weapon, uses the weapon of*
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF WEAPON - specific-level (= level 2)	–
BOMB (= level 3)	*defuse, trigger* [V], *shot down [...] like a rocket*
KNIFE (= level 3)	*stab, strike (in / into)*

MISC.	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
FEAR IS A BUBBLE	*giant bubble of*
FEAR IS A CAMPAIGN	*campaign of*
FEAR IS A COVERING	*cloaking* [V], *under the cover of*
FEAR IS A CRIME	*perpetrators of*
FEAR IS A CYCLE (CIRCLE)	*rescued from this vicious circle of, start the cycle of*
FEAR IS A GAME	*play with*

FEAR IS A KEY	*poking […] through the keyhole*
FEAR IS A MACHINE	*machines of […] forged, turn the engine of […] on*
FEAR IS A METEORITE	*flashed through […] like a meteorite tracing across the night skies*
FEAR IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN	*buckling under, carried over, heavy*
FEAR IS A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE	*struggles*
FEAR IS A PLANT	*fertile soil to plant seeds of, plant* [V]*, plant the seeds of, root, rooted in, seed* [V]*, sow (the seeds of)*
FEAR IS A RESTRAINING DEVICE	*break the […] shackles of, free […] from the shackles of, yoke of*
FEAR IS A SCENT	*exudes, smell […] stink of*
FEAR IS A SHIP	*abandon the ship of*
FEAR IS A SURFACE FOR ENGRAVING	*engraved in*
FEAR IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY	*cheap, make money out of, making a quick buck out of, peddle, worth anything*
FEAR IS AN EVENT	*witnessed*
FEAR IS AN INSTRUMENT / TOOL	*the use of […] to achieve, tool, tools of, use […] as an instrument, uses […] to control, use […] to help protect*

FEAR IS ARMOR	*pierced through the armour of*
FEAR IS CLOTHING	*outgrown, wore off*
FEAR IS CULTURE	*culture of*
FEAR IS DARKNESS	*dark, darkness, oppressive night of, (under the) shadow of*
FEAR IS FOOD	*feed off of, survive on*
FEAR IS LAW	*rule by*
FEAR IS MUSIC	*reach a crescendo*
FEAR IS PUNISHMENT	*impose […] on, visited on*
FEAR IS VIOLENCE	*chokehold, violence*
FEAR IS WRITING ON THE FACE	*written upon her face*

Appendix C

MRWs Used in Annotation of HAPPINESS According to Source Domain

Note that, in order to avoid repetition, MRWs are listed as lexemes unless it was necessary to provide more unique direct phrasing to understand the annotation process.

FLUID IN A CONTAINER	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*brimming with, fill [V] (with), filled with, full of*
BODY FLUID - specific-level (= level 2)	*bubbling with tears of, coursed through me, ooze out, rush of, shed* [V], *(shed) tears of, tears of [...] taste sweet, tears of [...] welled from her eyes, weep [...] tears of*
FLUID ACTING AS A BODY OF WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	*bath in, bathed in this pool of*
FLUID LEAVING A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	*gushing with, over flow / overflow, overflowing* [ADJ], *pouring [...] all over, squeezing [...] out of*
HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	–
HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED AS GAS / STEAM - (= level 3)	*vent* [V], *given vent to*

HOT FLUID BEING RELEASED IN A (VOLCANIC) EXPLOSION - (= level 3)	*bursting* [ADJ]*, burst (out) with, erupted with, exploded with, explosion of, the burst of*
Special Case Based on Folk Model: ENERGY AS FLUID	
ENERGY IN A (BODY) CONTAINER - specific-level (= level 2)	*crackling with currents of, generate*

FOOD / DRINK	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*ingredient of, long for, recipe for, served on a platter, [...]-starved, thirst for*
A SPECIFIC TYPE OF FOOD / DRINK – specific-level (= level 2)	–
CHOCOLATE (= level 3)	*slice of [...] you crave under the wrapper*
FRUIT (= level 3)	*fruits of the spirit* [analogous to biblical metaphor]
SUGAR (= level 3)	*sugar of*
FOOD / DRINK BEING CONSUMED – specific-level (= level 2)	*drunk in, eating [...] away, feeds us on, smacks of, taste* [V]*, tastebuds were tingling with*
FOOD / DRINK GOING BAD – specific-level (= level 2)	*sour* [V]*, spoil*

ILLNESS	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
A DEADLY ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*can also kill, die from, died of*
AN ILLNESS RELATED TO AN INTOXICATING SUBSTANCE – specific-level (=level 2)	*a high […] only last a while*
AN ILLNESS WITH PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS – specific-level (=level 2)	–
HEART-RELATED (= level 3)	*fluttered with, pulsating with*
LOSS OF CONTROL OF BODY (= level 3)	*catatonic, incontinent with, send you into paroxysms of*
PHYSICAL PAIN (= level 3)	*feel a little twist of, twinge of*
AN INFECTIOUS ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*infectious*
A MENTAL ILLNESS / INSANITY – specific-level (=level 2)	*beside himself / myself with, delirious with, mad with, wild with*
MEDICINE TO TREAT AN ILLNESS – specific-level (=level 2)	*a little dose of*

LIGHT	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*all the brighter, does not fade away, effulgent, faded (away), flashes of, glittery, lit up, nothing to dim, reflecting,*

	scintillating, shine through, sparkling, vivid [...] illuminate
A LAMP - specific-level (= level 2)	*Lamp of [...] be lit*
LIGHT FROM WITHIN - specific-level (= level 2)	*beam with, beamed up with, beams of, flashes forth as, gleamed with, glow with, glowing [ADJ], inner glow of, lit up with, radiant [...] from, radiate (with), seen the radiance of [...] in, shine in, shining with, suffused with a [...] glow of, the glow of*
SUN-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2)	*bask in, beaming sunlight rays of, ray, resurfaces from this giant cloud, sunlit [...] sky blue*

NATURAL FORCE	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	–
FIRE - specific-level (= level 2)	*spark of*
CONTROLLING A FIRE (= level 3)	*dampened, doused*
DESTRUCTIVE FIRE (= level 3)	*combust out of*
STARTING A FIRE (= level 3)	*sparked*
STORM - specific-level (= level 2)	*a tempest of, struck*
WATER - specific-level (= level 2)	–

RAIN (= level 3)	*shower* [V] *(on, over, upon, with)*
OCEAN / SEA (= level 3)	*drowned in the ocean of, floats on the surface of the sea of, oceanic*
WAVES (FLOOD) (= level 3)	*flood* [V] *(with), flow* [V]*, heady, ride [...] the wave of, ripples of, wave of [...] that swept, waves of [...] remain as buoyant*

PART OF A JOURNEY	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*cut short, journey of*
A SEARCH – specific-level (= level 2)	*bucket of gold at the end of the rainbow, embark on their pursuit of, find* [V]*, found [...] the hidden treasure of, in search of, look for or chase after, looking for it in the wrong places, place to find, pilgrims looking for, pursue, pursuit of, quest for, quest in pursuit of, search* [N]*, search* [V] *for, seek*

DESTINATION (including special case: **GOAL**) – specific-level (= level 2)	*achieve, attain the supreme goal, back to, barrier to, bound for, discovering, doorway to, find* [V]*, found some island of, get closer to, go to, guide [...] into, hinder us from the realm of, holding you back from, journey to, lead to [...], path to / that will bring, pathways to, return to, road to, road to [...] best walked, roadblocks in / on [...] path to, route(s) to, stand between you and your / in the way of, strive for, take the right track to, taking a short cut to, trip to the land of, way(s) to*
PATH – specific-level (= level 2)	*[...] ends in, navigate the terrains of, navigating the [...] terrain, one-way street, path, road [...] paved with*
POINTS ON A JOURNEY – specific-level (= level 2)	*veering wildly between*
STARTING POINT – specific-level (= level 2)	*a new beginning of*

PERSON	**MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases**
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*short(-)lived*

PERSON - ANIMAL-RELATED - specific-level (= level 2)	*catching [...] butterfly [...] flies away, reel in*
PERSON - IN POLITICS - specific-level (= level 2)	*politics of [...] give us the strength of character [...], politics of [...] should not be fought out [...]*
PERSON - LIVING IN A HOME - specific-level (= level 2)	*abide in, home of, resides in, residing within*
PERSON - OFFSPRING - specific-level (= level 2)	*breed* [V]
PERSON - OPPONENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*enemy of, sadistic, versus*
WHO IS BEING CONTROLLED (= level 3)	*hamper* [V], *master of, undermine*
WHO IS BEING PREVAILED AGAINST (= level 3)	*harming, killing and destroying, trod on*
WHO IS PREVAILING (= level 3)	*overcome with, overwhelm, overwhelmed with, pale into oblivion in the face of , unable to control, win* [V]
PERSON - PARENT - specific-level (= level 2)	*borne* [sic] *out of*
PERSON - RELATED TO A JOURNEY - specific-level (= level 2)	*elude, fled, knew no bounds, open up great doors for, propel, return, waits for [...] to find you*
PERSON - SHOUTING - specific-level (= level 2)	*shouts of, squeals of*
PERSON - WITH ILLNESS - specific-level (= level 2)	*nursing*

Misc. - **HAPPINESS TAKING ON CHARACTERISTICS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*giddy, gin-filled, startled*
Misc. - **HAPPINESS INVOLVED IN ACTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO A PERSON**	*embraces, feed on, serve* [V]

POSSESSION	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*possess*
LOSING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*gave […] away, gamble* [V], *grabbed, lose, risk* [V], *robbed, sacrifice* [V], *snatched, steal, take away*
MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*holding onto, horde* [V, sic], *keep*
PREVENTING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*deprive*
SHARED OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*share* [V] *(in), spread* [V], *to go around*
TAKING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*gain* [V], *take, receive, reclaim back*
TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP - specific-level (= level 2)	*bestow, bless […] with, bring, deliver, gift of, give, leaves them with, trust […] with*

UP	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*a come down from, at its highest, begins to peak, higher, lift up with, lifted up, over the moon with, raise […] to heights of, reaches a pinnacle, soaring with*
JUMPING - specific-level (= level 2)	*bouncing with, hopping with, jump for / in / with, jump up in, jump up and down for / with, leap for / from / with, leaping into the air in, leapt out of, leapt up and down with, makes you leap and punch the air,*

VALUABLE COMMODITY	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
Generic-Level (= level 1)	*afford*
VALUABLE COMMODITY - BEING BOUGHT - specific-level (= level 2)	*buy, no price too high for*
VALUABLE COMMODITY - BEING SOLD - specific-level (= level 2)	*sell*
VALUABLE COMMODITY - CURRENCY / INCOME - specific-level (= level 2)	*heaps of shillings, start deducting from your […] credit, TOTAL […] but nett nett* [sic]

MISC.	MRWs / SD Lexemes and Phrases
HAPPINESS IS A CALLING CARD	*calling card*
HAPPINESS IS A CHURCH REVIVAL	*revival of* [co-text: *church*]
HAPPINESS IS A COCKTAIL (= MIXED SUBSTANCE)	*cocktail of*
HAPPINESS IS A FRAGILE THING	*shattered*
HAPPINESS IS A KINGDOM	*establish His kingdom of*
HAPPINESS IS A MACHINE	*pressing buttons on*
HAPPINESS IS A PHYSICAL BURDEN	*carrier of, casts off, crushing*
HAPPINESS IS A PIN	*pin* [V] *[…] on*
HAPPINESS IS A PLANT	*blight* [V]*, cultivate, flowers of […] blossom, harvest of, reap*
HAPPINESS IS A PURE SUBSTANCE	*pure, (pure, purely) unadulterated, unmixed […] not be contaminated*
HAPPINESS IS A REWARD	*deserve, reward, rewarding […] with, worthy of deserving*
HAPPINESS IS A SCENT	*emit the fragrance of, exude, scent that encapsulates, smelled of*
HAPPINESS IS A SEASON	*season(s) of*
HAPPINESS IS A SHADOW BEING CAST	*overshadows*
HAPPINESS IS A SONG	*singing songs of*
HAPPINESS IS A SUPERNATURAL BEING	*[…]-fairies, supernatural*

HAPPINESS IS A TOOL FOR MEASURING	*measured by*
HAPPINESS IS A UNIVERSE	*universe of*
HAPPINESS IS A WEAPON	*weapon*
HAPPINESS IS AIR	*(rich) air of*
HAPPINESS IS AN OBJECT TO THROW	*throwing in*
HAPPINESS IS AN UNMOORED BOAT	*unmoored*
HAPPINESS IS BREATH	*breath of our life*
HAPPINESS IS BUILDING-RELATED	*built on, golden castle of, living in, reinforce, unlocking*
HAPPINESS IS LIFE	*living that abandoned life of*
HAPPINESS IS NOISE	*commotion*
HAPPINESS IS PART OF A FABRIC	*built-in to the fabric*
HAPPINESS IS SOMETHING COLORED	*tinged with*
HAPPINESS IS STEEL BEING TEMPERED	*tempered*
HAPPINESS IS WRITING ON THE FACE	*written all over the face of*

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht Emotion Metaphern in den so genannten „New Englishes". New Englishes sind die globalen Varietäten des Englischen, die in Regionen, wie z.B. Ost- und Westafrika, Südasien und Südostasien, neben einheimischen Sprachen gesprochen werden und die meist als Konsequenz der britischen Kolonialisierung entstanden sind. Emotion Metaphern werden als konzeptuelle Metaphern nach der Konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie von Lakoff & Johnson (2003 [1980]) verstanden, wobei Metaphern nicht nur auf der linguistischen Ebene fungieren, sondern eine Verbindung zwischen Sprache, Denken und Handeln darstellen. Demnach hat unser konzeptuelles System eine grundsätzliche metaphorische Natur (3).

Eine zentrale Hypothese der Studie war, dass die unterschiedlichen soziokulturellen Gegebenheiten der New Englishes in der Art Emotionen zu konzeptualisieren sichtbar sind. Obwohl emotionale Erfahrungen zu grundsätzlichen menschlichen (und auch körperlichen) Erfahrungen gehören, können diese jedoch durch die jeweiligen Kulturen gefiltert werden. So entstehen kulturspezifische Konzeptualisierungen der Emotionen, die wiederum in Metaphern zu finden sind. Es wurde angenommen, dass Emotion Metaphern diesen kulturellen Filterprozess in gewissem Maße in den New Englishes belegen können, besonders wenn Emotion Metaphern von verschiedenen Varietäten der New Englishes mit einander und mit Emotion Metaphern des britischen Englisch verglichen werden.

Um festzustellen inwieweit New English Emotion Metaphern sich voneinander und vom britischen Englisch unterscheiden (oder gar Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen), wurde eine Korpusstudie anhand des GloWbE-Korpus (*Corpus of Global Web-Based English*) geplant und durchgeführt. Hierfür wurde eine mehrstufige Methode (auf der Basis von „Metaphorical Pattern Analysis" (Stefanowitsch 2006a) und „Metaphor Identification Procedure Vrije Universiteit" (Steen et al. 2010b)) entwickelt, um linguistische Metaphern, die konzeptuelle Metaphern im konzeptuellen System der Varietäten-Sprechern reflektieren, aus dem Korpus zu

extrahieren und nach „Source Domain" (Quellbereich, der das Zielbereich-Konzept, i.e., eine bestimmte Emotion, strukturiert, z.B. WUT IST FEUER (*ich brannte vor Wut*)) zu klassifizieren. Die korpus-basierten Daten wurden als Vergleichsbasis zwischen den Varietäten verwendet.

Der empirische Teil der vorliegenden Studie wurde in drei Fallstudien, die jeweils einem Emotionskonzept gewidmet wurden, aufgeteilt. Die erste Fallstudie befasst sich mit New English Metaphern zu WUT (englisch: ANGER). In der zweiten Fallstudie stand ANGST (englisch: FEAR) im Fokus. Die dritte und letzte Fallstudie stellte Metaphern zu FREUDE (englisch: HAPPINESS) in den Mittelpunkt.

Die Ergebnisse der Fallstudien zeigten, dass die anfängliche Hypothese für Emotion Metaphern zum Teil zurückgewiesen werden muss. Es gab keine signifikanten Indikatoren, dass sich die Varietäten vor dem jeweiligen Hintergrund der Kulturen in den Emotion Metaphern weitestgehend unterscheiden, besonders wenn es um häufige Metaphern, wie z.B. WUT IST EINE PERSON oder WUT IST FLÜSSIGKEIT IN EINEM BEHÄLTER, handelte. Die Unterschiede zwischen den Varietäten waren hinsichtlich der weniger häufigen Metaphern, wie z.B. WUT IST ESSEN / TRINKEN, in der Regel am stärksten ausgeprägt. Allerdings eigneten sich solche Metaphern auf Grund der geringeren Zahlen nicht für eine statistische Auswertung. Zudem war die Motivationsbasis der meisten New English und britischen Metaphern in Bezug auf die so genannte Embodiment-These, die unsere körperliche Erfahrung als Basis für Konzeptbildung betont, erklärbar, was den universellen Charakter der Metaphern um WUT, ANGST und FREUDE in den Varietäten des Englischen unterstreicht.