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Power, Contribution and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing

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Power, Contribution and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing¹

Abstract

This article offers three new types of variables for computation of the share that NATO countries should contribute to the common defence. First, I assume the constructivist approach of Rasmussen and Kunertova, in which strategic cultures and framings of the security environment and security strategies affect the valuation of contributions to the alliance. I use Uppsala data on conflict participation to reveal how the asymmetry in power that allows the US to define most of the framings on which NATO's utility calculations are based, compensates for the greater material contribution made to NATO by the US.

Second, following Ringsmose's model of NATO burden sharing, two types of variables crucial to the calculation of burden sharing will be created. One reveals the share of US military protection aimed at protecting its NATO allies. The other measures how much US global security efforts against tyranny and terror are dependent on NATO allies.

These two variables are developed by

- 1. coding of US Presidential Papers since 1989 (over 30 million words; 17,455 clauses) for the referent objects of clauses on protection, and*
- 2. coding of clauses of US Presidential Papers since 1989 containing the word "protect" attached to a referent object outside US alliance (1,842 clauses) for the agency/subject of protection.*

These variables contribute to a more complex mathematical model on fair burden sharing, indicating at the same time that the imbalance between US and allied contributions is declining. If European allies have ever exploited the United States in the past, then at least the relationship has become more even during the past two decades.

Introduction

One of the key themes of NATO Summits in recent years has been the question of burden sharing in Western defence.² Are US allies paying their fair share towards common security? Some scholars feel that clarity on the fairness of contributions is necessary for the efficiency of any cooperation (Tyler 2003), while others claim that too much emphasis on distributional issues can hamper efficiency in the production of Western security (Cooper and Zycher 1989, 7; Kreps 2010). These two positions are not necessarily contradictory, as clear principles on burden sharing could be a condition for effective defence and focus on common security rather than on divisive internal discussions on distribution. The focus on distribution issues may well lead to internal divisions (Techau 2015), but it is the lack of clarity that causes both the focus and the friction, and thus, without clarity in the alliance, politics cannot be efficient. The intention of this article is to help bring clarity to the question of fairness in NATO burden sharing. Instead of trying to predict or explain burden sharing, this article will help to provide prescriptions on how a fair distribution should be defined and what should we consider constituting free riding, i.e. allies unfairly relying on the efforts of others to provide security for themselves (Walt 1987, 30). The question of burden sharing is much more than just a matter between the US and the rest of NATO. For example, there seems to be differences in burden sharing and commitment within European NATO between new and old European members (Jakobsen 2018). Yet, the burden sharing between the US and Europe has been the main challenge in the political debate. Therefore, this is also what this article focuses on. While not resolving the whole issue, this article will produce three types of variables for defining a fair distribution of contributions.

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3 Assuming the constructivist approach of Rasmussen and Kunertova (Rasmussen 2005;
4 Kunertova 2017b, 2017a), in which strategic cultures and framings of the security
5 environment and security strategies affect the valuation of contributions to the alliance, there
6 is a need to focus on whose prescriptions NATO cooperation follows. The power to create
7 diagnoses and prescriptions is crucial to burden sharing. If the sum of cooperation follows a
8 rationality calculus made by the United States, then all input to cooperation would constitute
9 a contribution to security in the American calculus. Such cooperation would constitute a
10 contribution to security in the allied calculus only to the degree that US and allied strategic
11 frames are similar. Thus, if allies follow the US into a war in Iraq that the US deems
12 important for the global security environment, but out of which US allies receive value in
13 varying degrees, then the costs of the operation are full contributions to the US security
14 calculation, but are less complete contributions to that of US allies. Thus, the degree to which
15 NATO operations are decided upon by the US or other allies must be factored into the
16 calculus of burden sharing. To account for this, I have used Uppsala conflict data (Allansson,
17 Melander, and Themner 2017) on conflict participation to create data on the extent to which
18 allied defence efforts are independent, the extent to which they are US-led and/or the extent
19 to which NATO military operations are, quite simply, US operations. In this way, I will show
20 to what degree NATO national defence contributions are based on US or on European
21 diagnoses and prescriptions.

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24 Following Ringsmose's idea of NATO burden sharing (Ringsmose 2009) being 1) a function
25 of a US excludable security guarantee to its NATO allies, and 2) an allied commitment to US
26 global operations that constitute US global leadership, we will need to measure two things to
27 define the development of the balance in burden sharing:

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29 On the one hand, we need to measure the United States' defence commitment to its allies.

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31 Who does the US defence effort protect? Since the deterrence contribution of the US is partly

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3 dependent on how much US power is devoted and committed to the defence of NATO
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5 countries, this article reviews data on US deployments and produces data on the US
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7 discursive distribution of commitment by coding clauses with the word “protect” in any of its
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9 forms in US Presidential Papers since 1989 (over 30 million words, 17,455 clauses) for the
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11 referent objects of the verb “protect”(Kivimäki 2019b). By drawing from that new data, this
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13 article will indicate the volume of US national military effort which can be considered an
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15 active contribution to its NATO allies.
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20 On the other hand, we need to measure the amount of US global security efforts which rely
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22 on allied or US-led Western ad hoc agency. I have also compiled this data from the textual
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24 analysis of US Presidential Papers since 1989 by looking at the agency/subject in clauses
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26 where the word “protect” in any of its forms is attached to a referent object outside US
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28 alliance (1,842 clauses).³
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32 These variables will give an indication of the direction in which burden sharing is moving.
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34 For a conclusive formula of fair burden sharing, one would need to develop variables in
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36 addition to those produced in this article, indicating numerous types of soft security
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38 contributions. Furthermore, one would need to assess how much of the US contribution to
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40 global security, assisted by NATO, is actually *for* NATO, and how much the ways in which
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42 the US and other NATO members frame security affect differences in judgement regarding
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44 how different security efforts contribute to the security of each NATO country.
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49 With the variables that this article offers to the debate it is possible to conclude that:
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- 52 1. The US power in the implementation of NATO’s military operations has increased.
- 53 2. American commitment to the protection of its allies has declined.
- 54 3. The US dependence on European NATO members in its global operations has
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58 increased.
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3 Thus, clearly the balance of contributions within NATO has moved towards Europe. The old
4 claim of European exploitation of the US is no longer as valid as it may have been before.
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8 **Existing Theoretical Literature on the Criteria of Burden Sharing**

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11 The literature on burden sharing has been divided into two types of contributions. One
12 attempts to create parsimonious mathematical predictions or normative definitions of a fair
13 distribution of burden or contribution. The other attempts to model burden sharing in a more
14 realistic but mathematically less elegant manner. While some of the models that represent the
15 former extreme manage to create numeric proofs of the development of burden sharing
16 (Boyer 1989; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990; Sandler and Hartley 2001), at the
17 other extreme there are scholars who reject the usefulness of numerical definitions due to the
18 complexity of the matter. According to Kunertova, for example, (Kunertova 2017b) the
19 numerical approach does not offer effective and fair distribution at the same time. Yet, we
20 cannot avoid numbers in our answers to a quantitative question. “How great a contribution is
21 sufficient?” is clearly a quantitative question requiring a quantitative answer. Still, a
22 quantitative formula that is both mathematically accurate and realistic will have to be
23 complicated, since so many things need to be accounted for. As a result, the creation of such
24 a formula will require some cooperation between specialists of many fields.
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44 The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious,
45 quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most
46 studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances
47 (Boyer 1989; Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990; Sandler and Hartley 2001). The use
48 of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and
49 activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled
50 through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering
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3 GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor
4 a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Kunertova 2017b; Techau 2015; Zyla 2009).
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8 US military spending in 2017 was at a level of 610 billion USD, thus representing not only a
9 majority of NATO spending, but 35% of the military spending of the entire globe; 9.2 times
10 that of Russia and 2.7 times that of China (These calculations are based on data by SIPRI
11 2018).⁴ Thus, if we use the GDP share of national military expenditure as an indicator, it
12 seems clear that the US, with about a 45% share of the NATO GDP, (GDP data is calculated
13 from “The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.) has a too high a national
14 expenditure, as it add up to more than 50% of the sum of national defence expenditures of all
15 NATO countries.
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27 If we look at the funding of NATO itself and of such functions and operations that are under
28 the direct control of the alliance rather than member countries, the picture changes
29 dramatically. If security is a public good and there is an agreement on how best to protect it,
30 one could assume that NATO countries should have no difficulties in channelling their
31 military spending through a common, rather than a national, decision-making structure. The
32 fact that this is not the case already challenges the credibility of seeing security as a public
33 good for NATO countries.
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44 Direct NATO funding is proportional to each member country’s GDP, with the exception of
45 the US, which is compensated in its NATO shares for its superior national spending.
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49 According to NATO statistics on defence spending (NATO 2018) from 2016 and the CIA
50 World Factbook (“The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency” n.d.; NATO 2018)
51 data on GDPs, all NATO countries contribute more to NATO’s budget than their GDP share
52 (the GDP share equals the GDP of the country divided by the GDP sum of all NATO
53 countries), excepting Luxembourg and the United States. While NATO’s budget share from
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3 Luxembourg is likely to be a result of fluctuation in GDPs and a specific year's (2016)
4 contribution, and while the share of Luxembourg's contribution to the NATO budget is still
5 very close to its share of GDP, the case of the US is different. US funding for NATO is
6 systematically lower than its GDP share, less than half of it. Obviously, this relates to US
7 superior national military spending, but again, it highlights problems with the assumption that
8 the security needs of NATO countries are identical. If the US actually contributes 22% of the
9 NATO budget while its GDP share would be 45%, then we either have to believe that US
10 national defence spending serves NATO's security needs or relinquish the conclusion that the
11 US is such a disproportionate contributor to NATO. However, the question of burden sharing
12 is much more complicated than the debate on defence expenditures may suggest.

26 27 *Burden sharing as a bargain*

28
29 We look at the burden sharing debate within the context of the game theoretical logic of
30 bargaining. Who contributes what and who gets what depends, according to the Nash
31 bargaining game solution (Nash 1950, 1953; See also Harsanyi 1956; and Zeuthen 1930), on
32 how dependent negotiators are on cooperation and how determined they are to uphold their
33 own demands with regard to the sharing of both benefits and burdens.⁵ The nation with the
34 greatest critical risk (Schelling 1960) if (NATO) cooperation fails, or the lowest BATNA
35 (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Solution, i.e. NATO) (Fisher and Ury 1991) in comparison
36 to that nation's determination to defend its own understanding of the fair distribution of
37 benefits and burden, is the one that has the greatest need to compromise its demands
38 regarding burdens and benefit sharing. While Nash's bargaining game has been theorized as a
39 two-player game, its logic has been expanded to coalition games by Shapley and Shubik
40 (Shapley and Shubik 1954). In n-player bargaining game those who can stand on their own
41 and make others dependent on their contribution to a coalition are those holding the trump
42 card in negotiations on burden sharing. The greater the protection needs of a country, the

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3 more it needs to contribute. This is where the GDP share enters the equation. A small country
4 has less of its wealth and values to project, while a large, wealthy country has more (Sandler
5 and Arce 2004).⁶ Thus, instead of calculating absolute contributions, most formal models of
6 alliance burden sharing focus on the GDP share of contributions (Boyer 1989; Olson and
7 Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990; Sandler and Hartley 2001; Palmer 1990).
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12 The parsimonious burden sharing model, based in the bargaining model and using national
13 defence expenditure as a simple indicator, might be useful if we could assume that countries
14 that have large defence spending also have an equally large contribution to softer strategies of
15 security. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the opposite is true. Contributions to soft
16 and hard measures of security seem to be negatively correlated: countries that focus on
17 military protection tend to be less enthusiastic about absorbing refugees or giving stabilizing
18 development aid (Boyer 1989). Thus, there is a need to define other indicators to be taken into
19 account when contribution shares are calculated. For example, Wolfgang Ischinger,
20 chairman of the Munich Security Conference, recently suggested a 3% spending target that
21 would include military, development aid, and humanitarian expenditures (Kunertova 2017b,
22 554–55). Cimbala and Forster suggest that political, military and economic contributions be
23 counted separately with appropriate indicators (Cimbala and Forster 2017). Cooper and
24 Zycher consider many military indicators such as manpower, various types of hardware and
25 firepower. They conclude that although a military imbalance between the US and its NATO
26 allies still exists, it is nevertheless not that great if we look at political and economic
27 contributions, too. Furthermore, the contribution disparity is declining (Cooper and Zycher
28 1989).
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55 In addition to material contributions, the commitment to defend has been seen as one of the
56 fundamental contributions to the alliance. According to Cimbala and Forster “Regardless of
57 their other contributions, countries that refuse to place troops in the field do not accept a full
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3 share of the burdens.” (Cimbala and Forster 2017, 121) Here, Cimbala and Forster do not
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5 suggest that troops should be the only measure of NATO contributions, but do put forth that
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7 there should be a minimum to that, too. Similarly, instead of seeing the 2% as a measure to
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9 even out contribution shares, this and the willingness to contribute troops could be seen as a
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11 minimum contribution necessary, regardless of how different countries specialize in the rest
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13 of their contribution to the alliance. Using this interpretation of the NATO guidelines and
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15 agreements on the 2% GDP expenditure share, the operationalization of burden sharing based
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17 merely on national military expenditure contributions would seem to be nothing but a
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19 misunderstanding of the intention behind these NATO policies.
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24 As Kunertova has suggested, burden sharing also needs to be based on principles that are
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26 efficient. Clearly, a principle that compares only one aspect of contributions pushes countries
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28 to contribute in a similar manner, while a specialised pattern of cooperation would seem more
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30 optimal for the production of collective security. It would be possible to set minimum
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32 requirements for defence expenditures and troop contributions for each NATO country, but
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34 burden sharing needs to be based on a much more flexible system.
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39 The bargaining model, however, focuses on contributions or outputs, not on burden or
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41 sacrifice. This has been the trend in the focus of the political as well as the theoretical burden
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43 sharing debate (Kunertova 2017b). It means that strategic outputs rather than monetary inputs
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45 should be the focus of attention. According to Cooper and Zycher and Cimbala and Forster,
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47 efficiency in promoting the public benefits of many of NATO operations, especially those in
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49 areas outside the member countries, may be uncertain (Cimbala and Forster 2005, vii; Cooper
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51 and Zycher 1989, 7). While it would be difficult to trace the causal paths from NATO
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53 operations to security developments (real utility), it would be possible to see that a diagnosis
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55 of the situation and efficiency of various strategies is different for different NATO countries
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57 (expected utility). Kunertova mentions the possibility of defining frames within which
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3 objectives can be reached with the help of strategic outputs. Within these framings,
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5 assumptions exist regarding particular strategies which produce particular benefits
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7 (Kunertova 2017a; see also Rasmussen 2005). Due to the differences in diagnoses and
8
9 prescriptions, different NATO countries focus on slightly different strategies of international
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11 security production (Boyer 1989). While Boyer, Shapiro and Kunertova claim this is due to a
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13 strategy of maximising comparative advantage in security promotion (Boyer 1989; Kunertova
14
15 2017b; Shapiro 2017), another complementary interpretation could be that countries see the
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17 optimal strategy of security promotion differently. Both France and Germany have criticised
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19 US militarism in Iraq (Villepin 2003), Syria (Obermaier 2017) and elsewhere as provocative
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21 rather than protective. This suggests that their framing of security differs from that of the
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23 United States, and thus, strategies that produce utility in the US security frame, may be of
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25 limited expected utility in the European security frame. The risk of military power becoming
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27 a provocation rather than a deterrent, has been acknowledged already in the classical works
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29 of security studies (Hertz 1959, 1950; Booth and Wheeler 2008). Kissinger (Kissinger 2014a,
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31 2014a, 2014b) and a few others have applied this logic of provocation to the specific
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33 relationship between NATO and Russia. The same logic can be utilized also to the
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35 assessment of strategies against terrorism. The way in which the American strategy of
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37 “staying in the offensive” against terrorists provokes the “defence of Muslim lands” and
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39 “reciprocal” attacks in Western countries, can be revealed by studying the interaction
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41 between discourses of terror and counter-terrorism (Kivimäki 2019a, chap. 5 and 8).
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50 If there are differences in the assessments of the expected utility of different defence
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52 strategies, it is necessary to look at whose security strategy different NATO operations and
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54 NATO defence spending serves. For such a task, this paper will offer a proxy indicator based
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56 on an investigation of whose military operations NATO national military expenditure funds.
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3 For this purpose, I will look at developments in the participation of the US and its allies in
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5 independent US, US-led, or independent non-US allied operations.
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11 *Security as a public good*
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14 However, there is an additional theoretical complication. Security is not a commodity that
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16 can be freely divided or denied to individual allies in Europe. It is what economists call a
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18 public good. As a public good, security is 1) non-excludable – a European NATO ally cannot
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20 be excluded from European security under a Russian attack, even if it had not contributed its
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22 full share to the defence of NATO, since Russian dominance in any NATO country would be
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24 detrimental to the security of all NATO countries; and 2) non-rivalrous – one NATO
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26 country's enjoyment of security does not reduce that of another NATO country (Olson 2009;
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28 Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990; Sandler and Hartley 2001).
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33 For public goods such as security, the bargaining logic is slightly different from that used in
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35 terms of coalition cooperation in the case of private goods. The political argument putting
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37 forth the idea of the exploitation of the US by its allies is based upon the logic of hegemonic
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39 stability, in which smaller partners can take a free ride regarding common responsibility for
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41 the production of the public benefit of security, while a superpower cannot. The US taking a
42
43 free ride regarding security contributions would imply a collapse of the entire Western
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45 collective security construct. Consequently, asymmetry makes free riding possible.
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49 Hegemonic powers need to offer public goods to the international system even when smaller
50
51 nations take a free ride and refuse to offer their own contribution (Gilpin 1987; Kennedy
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53 1987). This is also the dominant view in the parsimonious, formal theoretical literature of
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55 alliances: as Olson and Zeckhauser have argued, larger countries are exploited by smaller
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57 ones in the provision of collective public goods – the latter “freeride” on the commitments of
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3 the former (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). This is what Olson calls the “exploitation of the
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5 big by the small.” (Olson 2009)
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8 Yet, with sticks and carrots, hegemonic powers can use other types of incentives and
9
10 disincentives to encourage fair contributions and discourage free-riding (Gilpin 1987). These
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12 incentives complicate the picture of security as a public good. Clearly, the carrots and sticks
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14 are part of the same bargain as the production of the public good of common security; still,
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16 they are private. The critique of the parsimonious models of burden sharing has been focused
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18 on this problem: while part of the bargain is clearly related to producing the public good of
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20 security, part of it produces private goods, such as international power, trade advantages, and
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22 so on. Within a constructivist frame, it is possible to model a system of disincentives for free
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24 riding, as the norms of the Atlantic community would make immorally low contributions to
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26 the common defence embarrassing and unattractive (Mérand and Rayroux 2016).
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32 According to Cimbala and Forster, many security operations produce both public and private
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34 goods. The central question, really, is to what extent security is a collective good (Cimbala
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36 and Forster 2005, 10; Palmer 1990; Ringsmose 2009, 2010). According to Cimbala and
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38 Forster, “public values may act as a catalyst for initial action. International response to
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40 Somalia was initially driven by a desire to provide humanitarian assistance. Over the course
41
42 of an operation, however, private incentives may gradually emerge. In Somalia, the shift from
43
44 providing humanitarian relief to nation building (and sometimes counterinsurgency) caused a
45
46 change in incentives. A changing or dynamic environment such as the one in Somalia often is
47
48 the cause for altering decisions on accepting risks and responsibilities and thus the
49
50 distribution of burdens.” Even more clearly, the global war on terror used to be a more global
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52 incentive for the United States until 11 September 2001, but thereafter it was perceived as a
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54 private national good (Cimbala and Forster 2017, 121-122). Thus, it can no longer be
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56 assumed that a contribution to defence is merely a matter of producing public good. It may
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3 partly be that and partly be simply a private good for the protection of the country alone. This
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5 complication needs to be factored into the calculation of burden sharing.
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8 *The NATO security bargain: US security guarantee vs. allied assistance to the US global*
9 *leadership*
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13 Ringsmose distinguishes two elements in NATO's production of security. One takes place in
14 the frame of public goods production, while the other does not. According to him, NATO
15 operations outside NATO territory for the creation of a safer world with more democratic
16 leaders and less chaotic polities, with reduced power for global terrorists, carry the logic of
17 the production of public goods.⁷ Small countries can opt out of the production of a safer
18 world with counter-terrorist, counter-tyrant operations, and simply rely on the United States
19 (or the US, France and the UK). However, out-of-area operations are linked with the US
20 security guarantee in the NATO area; according to Ringsmose, the United States could leave
21 individual NATO countries outside its protective umbrella. Ringsmose's logic corresponds to
22 the logic of entrapment and abandonment by Glenn Snyder. The balance between the utility
23 deficits of being entrapped in the wars of allies⁸ and the utility gains of not being abandoned⁹
24 in one's own wars is what determines burden sharing in alliances, according to Snyder
25 (Snyder 1984). While conventional defence in Europe is non-rivalrous, it is not non-
26 excludable. Countries that take a free ride in global operations risk being left alone when their
27 own territories are attacked (Ringsmose 2010, 320, 2009, 79).
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49 I will accept the idea that the contributions of NATO countries partly produce private goods
50 and only partly contribute to the public good of common security. Thus, I will need to sort
51 out how much of the US contribution goes to the defence of Europe, and how much goes to
52 national defence or changes in the global security environment (which are only partly a
53 contribution to NATO security). To investigate the balance of contributions one would then
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3 also need to see how much European contributions target US global operations, and how
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5 much one should consider these contributions to European security.
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8 The former (the share of US power focused on the defence of allies) could partly be indicated
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10 by the share of American troops in allied areas, which signals commitment to the security of
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12 allies, and adds to the deterrent effect against enemies of US allies. Furthermore, since
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14 deterrence of war against allies is not only a function of an experienced use of military force,
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16 one should also look at protection discourse: that is to say, how much the US commits itself
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18 to the protection of its allies, and how much its military effort is devoted to serving other
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20 areas or to its own national defence. This paper will help analyse the focus of deterrent by
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22 producing and analysing data that reveals the referent objects of US discursive commitment
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24 to deterrence. The source data is compiled from the 17,455 clauses with the word “protect” in
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26 the US Presidential Papers since 1989 (Kivimäki 2019b), and the method has been based on a
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28 grammatical NVivo-based coding of clauses by identifying the object of the verb “protect”.
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34 In the case of allied contributions to US global operations, this paper will measure the degree
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36 to which allies are central to operations protecting people outside US alliances by looking at
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38 each of the clauses with the word “protect” in all its forms which have people outside US
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40 alliances as the referent object of the verb “protect”. I will see how often since 1989 allies or
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42 ad hoc coalitions based on US allies have been agents (subjects) of such protection (Kivimäki
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44 2019b).
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49 **To what degree are NATO operations based on US framing of the world: the**
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51 **distribution of power as a matter of sharing contributions.**
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54 The benefit of NATO’s global operations to each member country could be debated after
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56 each operation.¹⁰ However, this speculation should not enter the debate on burden sharing.
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59 Whether NATO succeeds or makes mistakes, can only be judged afterwards, while decisions
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3 on who contributes what in each operation, are made before operations, on the basis of an
4 assessments of expected utility. In such context, the key question of burden sharing is, whose
5 strategy, and whose framing of the situation is followed. The more a country has power in the
6 definition of the factual and normative framework within which military operations are being
7 implemented, the greater its expected utility. Since the security assessments and values of
8 NATO countries only overlap partly, and since the contribution of each member of the
9 alliance is constructed within the various framings of the security situation (Kunertova 2017a;
10 Rasmussen 2005), the question of who decides on NATO's defence efforts is crucial for
11 burden sharing.
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
24 NATO Summits have reflected the development of NATO's broader role. In Brussels, 10-11
25 January 1994, NATO declared its preparedness to support UN objectives, as NATO countries
26 defined them, with air strikes in Bosnia. In the Washington D.C. Summit of 23-24 April
27 1999, the NATO launched its WMD Initiative as part of its revised Strategic Concept. In
28 NATO Summit in Prague, 21-22 November 2002, the NATO launched its Military Concept
29 for Defence against Terrorism, while in Istanbul two years later it initiated the Istanbul
30 Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region. NATO's decisions
31 related to specific conflicts, perhaps most notably the ones in Bosnia, Kosovo and
32 Afghanistan, have further developed NATO's agreed framework for global operations.¹¹
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46 Yet, even if NATO agrees on expanding its mission to include operations against terror or the
47 spread of WMDs and even if there are agreements on operations to protect civilians from
48 authoritarian violence, this does not indicate equal authorship, ownership and power of
49 implementation in these missions. NATO's agreements of its out-of-area role are, in the
50 Ringsmose framework, only one side of a bargain where the US security guarantees are the
51 other side. This framework does not presume that global operations are not in the security
52 interests of the European NATO, but rather that their expected utility in the calculations of
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3 each of the allies depends partly on who decides and leads the implementation of each
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5 operation.
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8 If the use of force is largely US-led, it is likely that its expected utility is greater in the US
9 framing of security than it is in the framing of US allies – who might be in disagreement with
10 some of the common NATO strategies. How independent US European allies are in military
11 operations can be revealed using the Uppsala data (Allansson, Melander, and Themner 2017)
12 on military operations and by looking at US and NATO participation in conflicts. Uppsala
13 data lists secondary conflicting parties and uses the existence of war-fighting troops in the
14 conflict area as the criterion of conflict participation. This operationalisation of conflict
15 participation rules out some of the obvious NATO conflict participations with air operations
16 from bases outside the conflict country (For the list of conflict participations outside the
17 Uppsala data, see Kivimäki 2019a). The effect of this limitation in the Uppsala data
18 undermines rather than exaggerates the conclusions on the US growing leadership and power
19 in NATO operations.
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36 I have differentiated Western operations conducted by the US without France and the UK
37 (the two allies that also conduct and lead independent operations), those it conducts with
38 these two powers, and those that the UK or France or both conduct without the US (Graph 1).
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Graph 1: How Do NATO Allies Cooperate?

Here we can clearly see that:

1. Independent allied operations have almost disappeared, and thus allied military effort tends to take place within US-led operations. Only in Libya and Mali can one doubt US leadership of joint operations. Thus, to compensate for the imbalanced military spending, the US does wield greater power. Allies mainly use their military spending wherever the US leads them to do so, and no longer in their own colonial wars as was the case during the Cold War.
2. Much of US military effort takes place in war operations in which allies do not wish to participate. This could be turned around to say that in many operations that the US has seen as important for shaping the global security environment, NATO allies have either not been asked to join or they have refused. The share of independent US operations has increased drastically, and so has US spending in operations that allies do not see to be in their interests.

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3 Thus, if we take into account the socially constructed nature of security and burden sharing,
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5 we can conclude that since the US has an increasing say in the operations of NATO, it seems
6
7 clear that the balance of contributions is affected by this increase in the US power to frame
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9 and lead NATO operations.
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16 **How much of the US defence effort is for the common security of NATO?**

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19 According to the US Congressional debate, some 60% of US military spending benefits
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21 NATO, and this percentage has been used for the calculations in some of the scholarly work
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23 on NATO burden sharing (Cooper and Zycher 1989, 15).¹² Furthermore, more than 31% of
24
25 the almost 200,000 US troops stationed outside US territory are placed in NATO countries,
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27 adding to the deterrence against a Russian attack (Bialik 2017).¹³ The fact that over 55% of
28
29 US troops in NATO countries are in Germany, where US presence was established due to
30
31 occupation rather than military assistance, does not necessarily alter the fact that these troops
32
33 can now be seen as a deterrent against Russia rather than as forces controlling Germany.
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35 Their role is, however, formidable, also in US operations outside Europe, especially in the
36
37 Middle East. Some of the drone operations, however, or support operations for Syrian rebels
38
39 that take place from the headquarters of the (USAFE) US Air Forces in Europe in Ramstein,
40
41 have considerable political costs for the German regime, due to the ethical issues. Still, these
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43 troops increase the likelihood of US reaction should Russia attack one of those countries with
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45 US troops and harm American soldiers. The fact that US military spending is almost ten
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47 times bigger than that of Russia could, therefore, be used as an argument for a greater
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49 European contribution: the US share in the production of deterrence against Russia is
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51 disproportionate, assuming that the US is willing to defend its European allies against a
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53 Russian attack.
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3 US overseas deployment of troops has declined to one-sixth of the level of the cold war peak
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5 years in the late 1960s, but this does not mean that the US contribution has been reduced as
6
7 dramatically. Warfare has become more technology-intensive, thus, it requires more money
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9 and less men. The decrease in the number of US troops in NATO countries, therefore, does
10
11 not necessarily indicate a decreasing contribution to European deterrence.
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15 If we follow Ringsmose's model of alliance dynamics and consider US nuclear and
16
17 conventional umbrella and deterrence as the main American contribution to its allies, we will
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19 have to be able to measure the degree of US military effort that is put into the deterrence of
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21 NATO enemies. Since the US has not actually defended any of its NATO allies after the
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23 establishment of the alliance (perhaps, partly due to effective deterrence, there has been no
24
25 need), we will have to investigate the contribution of deterrence from its public
26
27 communications and discourses that, for NATO's enemies, constitutes the deterrence of war
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29 (Morgan 2003; Schelling 1960). US power is a deterrent upholding NATO security to the
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31 degree in which it is focussed thereon in the US discourse on deterrence. Thus, it is possible
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33 to look at how US military power is used in US public discourse, thus creating expectations
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35 that deter attacks (Morgan 2003).
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
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41 I have identified clauses in the US Presidential Papers¹⁴ containing the word "protect" in any
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43 of its forms – 17,455 in total – and coded them according to the referent object of protection
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45 in those clauses. This coding could be done with almost exclusively grammatical rules,
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47 avoiding political interpretations. The referent object is simply the object to which the word
48
49 "protect" refers. I have then distinguished foreign policy relevant protection from irrelevant
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51 protection by coding as irrelevant clauses where protection is needed for Americans from
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53 non-intentional threats (for example, protection of children from the dangers of tobacco). In
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55 this way, I could identify 10,922 clauses of presidential papers dealing with foreign policy
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57 relevant protection. I have still considered as foreign policy relevant clauses those related to
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3 protection of the environment (there, the referent object is not Americans, but nature), and
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5 thus environmental foreign policies are counted as part of the relevant protection discourse. It
6
7 will be possible to identify four clusters of referent objects in American protection speech:
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- 10 1. protection of the US and Americans,
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- 12 2. protection of allies,
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- 14 3. protection of people outside US alliances (cosmopolitan protection of “global
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civilians”), and
4. protection of the environment.

Graph 2 reveals that the post-cold war era is marked by a relative irrelevance of alliances in US protection discourse. American security policy is not protecting its allies as much as it is protecting global civilians (cosmopolitan protection) or US national interests. Thus, the benefit from deterrence for America’s European allies is lesser than the US national defence spending contribution suggests. Most of the spending is explicitly for the US security or for the security of countries not in US alliance. In the 1990s, US foreign policy was dominated by the idea of the protection of global civilians in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Since 1999 the US has only fought wars in areas where “global civilians” are threatened by terrorists or dictators.

Graph 2: Who Does US Military Effort Protect?



23 However, the role of allies as referent objects of protection has shrunk even further after the
 24 United States itself became the target of a terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. Then, the
 25 globalist cosmopolitan approach was transformed into a globalist nationalist approach in
 26 which the main focus of global operations has been the national interest of the United States.
 27 Drone technology and the use of air power for the punishment (or justice, as it is referred to
 28 in the presidential discourse) of individuals rather than enemy military forces has, since 2001,
 29 been justified mainly by references to US rather than global (Iraqi, Afghan, Syrian, etc.), let
 30 alone allied, interests (Data from Kivimäki 2019c). During the entire post-cold war period,
 31 US references to foreign policy relevant protection have referred to US interests slightly less
 32 than 40% of the time and to allies in 3.6% of the clauses.¹⁵ However, before 2002, national
 33 references constituted only 22% of the protection speech of presidents, while after 2001
 34 references to US national interest have increased to 56.9%. The share of references handling
 35 protection of allies was at 4.4% before 2002, but fell to 2.6% after the end of 2001. This,
 36 clearly, affects the balance of contributions between the US and its allies. Only 2.6% of US
 37 protection targets US allies, and the rest may or may not be beneficial for NATO allies,
 38 depending on how the US national and global role is judged in different strategic framings of
 39 US NATO allies. Furthermore, we know from this that US contribution to the deterrence that
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
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3 protects US NATO allies is declining, thus reducing the possible imbalance between
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5 contributions from the US and from its NATO allies.
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11 **To what extent are American global leadership and global security operations**
12 **dependent on its NATO allies?**
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16 If we then want to see how important US allies are for the American global role that it
17 controls with its power, we can check the agency of protection outside allies' areas. We will
18 investigate this by coding the 1,842 clauses in US Presidential Papers with the word "protect"
19 and an object of protection outside allied territories. In my coding I have used four categories
20 of agency:
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- 28 1. US national agency
- 29 2. Allied agency
- 30 3. Ad hoc agency under US leadership based on US alliance
- 31 4. Bilateral agency between the target of protection and the US/alliance/ad hoc coalition
- 32 5. UN or other representative agency (in which the target of protection is a member of
33 the agency)
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43 The trend in US reliance on its allies in its global operations can be seen in the stacked line
44 chart of Graph 3.
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Graph 3: Allies in US Global Operations

If we then look at all clauses where protection refers to areas outside alliances within the share of clauses in US Presidential Papers mentioning allies or US-led coalitions with an allied core, we can see that in general there is an upward trend in US reliance on alliance members. However, the main change is not in the number of clauses mentioning allied agency in the protection of global civilians from terror and tyranny: in fact, the number of such clauses was higher during the 1990s than it was after the turn of century. The main change is in the number of clauses regarding ad hoc agency with NATO as a core. I have shown elsewhere that ad hoc agency has been used as a substitute for the representative UN agency and that it has been used so as to conceal the way in which the UN was overtaken by US global operations after the UN failure in Rwanda and Bosnia (Kivimäki 2019a, chap. 7). Ad hoc coalitions were given names such as International Security Forces (Kosovo). They were presented to international audiences as genuinely global forces and justified in the eyes of domestic audiences as US-led, US-controlled allied forces with a few additional member countries. In this way, NATO, or some of its members, participated in legitimising

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3 unilateralist, non-representative global governance by the United States. The role of ad hoc
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5 coalitions was especially crucial for the legitimization of the first protective operations against
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7 tyrants and terrorists. In these operations in Kosovo and Iraq, a precedent was created,
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9 making it easier for the United States to continue a policy that enabled it to “provide a lethal
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11 Joint Force to defend the security of our country and sustain American influence abroad.”
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13 (This is the new mission statement of the US Department of Defense, see US Department of
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15 Defense 2018). Following Ringsmose’s argument that the US security guarantee is its
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17 contribution to burden sharing in the alliance, and that participation in US global operations
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19 is the contribution of the other allies of NATO, it seems that the contribution of US allies has
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21 increased during the post-Cold War era, especially after the emergence of US-led operations
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23 of humanitarian intervention (since 1999).
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29 **Conclusions**

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32 A clear formula that could define the fair share of the burden for the US and its NATO allies
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34 is still far from realisation. Parsimonious, mathematical formula tend to be unrealistic, whilst
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36 more realistic descriptions lack the mathematical rigour that could define with certainty
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38 whether an ally is taking a free ride or contributing its fair share. This paper has relied on the
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40 constructivist work that asserts that contributions and benefits of an alliance cannot be
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42 calculated using objective, material variables. Instead, studies need to be held up against the
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44 strategic cultural framings of each ally.
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50 This paper has offered a tool that helps to foster clarity on the measures of perceived benefits
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52 and contributions to the debate. The tool is the measurement of to what degree security
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54 efforts are optimised in accord with US framing and to what degree they are set on the basis
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56 of allied framings. The power to define the frame multiplies value in burden sharing: it
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58 enables a country to focus on cooperation that gives the optimal yield in its own calculus
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3 rather than having to contribute to operations that one does not see as valuable. On the basis
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5 of this power calculation, it appears that part of the exploitation of the US by its allies is
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7 gradually disappearing as it seems that an increasing amount of NATO cooperation is led by
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9 the US, and that fewer NATO military efforts are independently led by other nations.
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13 In addition to the matter of power, this paper has also produced two other variables for
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15 calculation of contributions based on the model of balance of NATO contributions by
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17 Ringsmose. According to this model, the main US contribution to the NATO alliance is
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19 related to its security guarantees to its allies, guarantees which the US can also deny to
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21 individual allies, while the main allied contribution to the US is related to US global security
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23 leadership. To help in calculating benefits and contributions within this frame, the paper has
24
25 produced data on the discursive build-up of US deterrence and demonstrated that the share of
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27 US military power devoted to the protection of NATO allies is relatively small – and
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29 declining.
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35 Furthermore, the paper has produced numerical data based on US presidential texts on the
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37 dependence of the US on allied agency in its efforts towards protection outside the NATO
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39 area. This data suggests that while the agency of NATO as such has not increased during the
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41 post-Cold War era, the rise of an American unilateral role in global security governance has
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43 been crucially contributed to by ad hoc coalitions of which NATO formed a core. This has
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45 increased the normative, political and military contribution of US allies to the US global role
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47 and power, which has been defined in the US defence force mission statement as the main
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49 national objective. Thus, this data, too, suggests that the exploitation of the US by its allies is
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51 declining.
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57 While these contributions to the calculus of security burden sharing in NATO are not by
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59 themselves sufficient for building a complete, realistic model of an expected and fair
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3 distribution of contributions, they add to the number of variables that need to be quantified
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5 and taken into account when a full model on fair burden sharing is built. The variables that
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7 this paper has added to the debate can, on their own, however, strengthen the impression that
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9 the imbalance in NATO burden sharing is shrinking, and that the superior contribution of the
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11 United States is no longer as great a distributional unfairness as it may have been before.
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Endnotes

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4 topic of this article. I am, of course, alone responsible for interpretations and possible
5 misunderstandings that this article contains.

6 ² According to Trump's post-summit statement in London: "I have just come from a truly
7 productive NATO summit. My priority was getting NATO members to pay their full and fair
8 share." (Politico 2018)

9
10 ³ The data produced for these variables and the coding on NVivo of the presidential papers
11 and the quantitative data on relational frequencies (Kivimäki 2019b) are openly available in
12 NVivo and Stata formats respectively, from the replication data depository of the University
13 of Bath, Research Data Archive at doi:10.15125/BATH-00535.

14
15 ⁴ This examination of total military spending not only raises the question of why the United
16 States has to put up with contributing a disproportionate share of the military spending of
17 NATO countries, but also why NATO has to spend as much as it does. Since burden relates
18 to benefit, one could ask whether the excess burden is really needed, and instead of
19 increasing allied military spending, the US should reduce all spending that does not add to
20 security for allies or the US. According to NATO and SIPRI (NATO 2018; SIPRI 2018),
21 NATO's military spending is currently greater than that of all the rest of the world put
22 together.

23
24 ⁵ This verbalization of the mathematical logic can be found in (Kivimäki, 2003). In this
25 verbalization, the difference in utility for negotiator A between a negotiated solution on A's
26 terms and no solution is described as dependence on a negotiated solution. This is what is
27 sometimes called the critical risk. The smaller this risk is, the more negotiator A is willing to
28 push for her own terms. The difference in utility for player A between a negotiated solution
29 on A's terms and a negotiated solution on B's terms is described as determination. The
30 greater this difference is, the more negotiator A is willing to fight for her own terms rather
31 than yielding to the terms of player B. In most of the verbalizations of the logic of bargaining
32 the latter element is forgotten and international security scholars have only taken the critical
33 risk into account when considering bargaining strength. The discussion in economics on price
34 sensitivity (which affects the price) focuses, however, solely on the second element of
35 bargaining strength, the determination to stick to one's own acceptable terms/price of an
36 agreement/purchase.

37
38
39 ⁶ While this is the game theoretical explanation of the idea of considering contributions in
40 relation to GDP, the political and theoretical debate on burden sharing has suggested many
41 alternatives to this. Kunertova, for example, shows that the GDP share was also used as an
42 indicator of the ability to pay as in the metaphor of tax systems, where citizens pay in
43 accordance with their income (Kunertova 2017b; See also Ringsmose 2010).

44
45 ⁷ For the same conclusion, see (Jakobsen 2018).

46
47 ⁸ This deficit for the US comes from the American security guarantee, while for European
48 allies it comes from the entrapment to out-of-region operations of the United States.

49
50 ⁹ For the US, this utility comes from allied participation in US operations outside Europe,
51 while for European allies it comes from the US security guarantee.

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53 ¹⁰ For a pessimistic assessment based on the consequences to conflict fatalities and state
54 fragility of NATO's protective global operations, see (Kivimäki 2019a, chap. 4)

55
56 ¹¹ An overview of the development of the broader role and its relationship with burden
57 sharing can be found in (Jakobsen 2018).

58
59 ¹² Similarly, one should also measure how much of the defence effort of US allies contributes
60 to US security, but comparisons between the value of contributions of US allies to US and
61 allied security have not yet been made.

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63 ¹³ Based on US Defence Manpower Data Center data (see,
64 https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp).

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¹⁴ *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1989-2012* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office). The years after 2012 are not yet in the format required for the NVivo analysis of the content. Thus, the focus here is not on the very recent, but generally on the entire field of post-cold war years up until 2012.

¹⁵ To have an equal emphasis in each year, I have calculated these percentages from annual shares, rather than shares from the entire period.

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