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# Xenophon's *Poroi*
# Risk, Rationality and Enterprise in Fourth-century Attica

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**Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**October 2014**

# Declaration

I declare that this work is entirely my own

Janet Powell

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## Abstract

This thesis is a reassessment of Xenophon's strategies in the *Poroi* in the light of recent scholarly studies of the Athenian mining industry, trade, honours and the scholarly debate around the ancient capacity for economically rational decision-making. It argues that Xenophon wrote for a wider audience than the Athenian citizenry alone, and that an interpretation of the *Poroi* as proposing a beneficent regime in which slaves would live semi-autonomous lives cannot be sustained. Primarily it focuses on three specific strands. Using archaeological, epigraphic and literary evidence, it argues that judgements of Xenophon's proposals as naïve underestimate the extent to which the heavy supply demands of the Laurion region reached into the lives of many Athenians from the elite to the artisan, and will have informed their reception of his plans with a financial literacy that obviated the need for detail. Using modern analyses of economic risk it explores the extent to which Xenophon acknowledged economic, physical and socially-constructed risks, demonstrating that despite their lack of detailed record-keeping, far from being unsophisticated in their judgement of the economic security of their commercial undertakings, Athenians had a developed recognition of risk and employed a variety of expedients to mitigate it. Finally, Xenophon's proposals to use honours to encourage commercial activity are discussed in the light of scholarly judgements that such awards would be subversive, or reflected mid-century decline. A detailed analysis of honours offered both before and after Xenophon wrote shows that his proposals exploited a robust institution that had always adapted to reflect changing circumstances and that he set careful boundaries both to the number and the social background of potential recipients. In an early work of political economy which attempted to manipulate individual commercial activity in order to manage inter-state relationships, Xenophon's ideas were innovative but sat within the Athenian democratic tradition.

For my parents
Barbara and Keith Powell

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## Acknowledgements

I cannot identify when and where my passion for Ancient Greece first arose, although it was nurtured by the English, Theatre and Philosophy Departments of the University of Warwick in the 1980s. However I can clearly pinpoint the moment when I decided to do something more formal about it, gazing at a white ground lekythos in the Ashmolean Museum,[1] a moment which led directly to the Department of History, Classics and Archaeology at Birkbeck. My thanks must begin there, in acknowledgement of its unique combination of an outstanding research environment and a practical understanding of the particular challenges facing part-time students. Catharine Edwards and Caroline Humfress were inspirational teachers through whom I discovered my love of research, but first and foremost my Supervisor, Christy Constantakopoulou, has been unfailingly supportive, guiding my thinking and a constant source of tremendous enthusiasm, encouragement and academic rigour.

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Throughout, my partner John put up with much and gave me unstinting and selfless practical and patient support in return. Without him I could never have arrived at this moment. To him, above all, I offer my love and gratitude.

[1] http://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/record/12891B5C-96A4-4798-B883-9CFC4D4D888B

## Abbreviations

The names of ancient authors used in this work are those listed in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* and abbreviations of journal titles follow the conventions of *l'Année Philologique*.

| | |
|---|---|
| *Agora* XV | Meritt, B. D. and Traill, J. S. (eds.), 'Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. The Athenian Councillors', *The Athenian Agora* 15, 1974. |
| *APF* | Davies, J. K. *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford, 1971). |
| *ATL* | Meritt, B. D., Wade-Gery, H. T. and McGregor, M. F. *The Athenian Tribute Lists I - IV* (Harvard, 1939 - 1953). |
| *BE* | Robert, J. and Robert, L. 'Dodone', *Bulletin épigraphique* Volumes 1–10 in the *Revue des études grecques* (1939 - 1984). |
| Camp | Camp, J. 'Greek Inscriptions', *Hesperia* 43, no. 3, 1974, pp. 314 - 324. |
| *CAT* | Clairmont, C. *Classic Attic Tombstones* (Kilchberg 1993-95), nine volumes. |
| Clinton | Clinton, K. *Eleusis : The Inscriptions on Stone. Documents of the Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses and Public Documents of the Deme. Volume IA: Text* (Athens, 2005); *Volume II: Commentary* (Athens, 2008). |
| Crosby 1950 | Crosby, M. 'The Leases of the Laureion Mines', *Hesperia* 19, no. 3, 1950, pp. 189 - 297. |
| Crosby 1957 | Crosby, M. 'More Fragments of Mining Leases from the Athenian Agora', *Hesperia* 26, no. 1, 1957, pp. 1 - 23. |
| Engen | Engen, D. T. *Honor and Profit : Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece, 415 - 307 BCE* (Michigan, 2010). |
| *Ep. Chron.* | Ηπειρωτικά Χρονικά, Ιωάννινα. |
| Fornara | Fornara, C. W. *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War* (Cambridge, 1983). |
| Harding | Harding, P. *From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus* (Cambridge, 1985). |
| *IALD* | Lambert, S.D. *Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1-322/1 BC. Epigraphical Essays* (Leiden, 2012). |
| *ID* | *Inscriptions de Délos* (Paris, 1926 - 1972). |
| *IG* $I^3$ | Lewis, D. M., Jeffery, L. H., Erxleben, E. and Hallof K. (eds.), *Inscriptiones Graecae Volume I*, *Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno anteriores*. Editio tertia (Berlin, 1981). |
| *IG* $II^2$ | Kirchner, J. (ed.), *Inscriptiones Graecae Volumes II and III Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriores*. Editio altera (Berlin, |

1913 - 1940).

*IG* II[3] 1 — Lambert, S. D., Bardani, V. N. and Tracy, S. V. (eds.), *Inscriptiones Graecae*, *Volumes II and III*. Editio tertia (Berlin, 2012).

*IGCH* — Thompson, M., Mørkholm, O. and Kraay, C. M. (eds.), *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards* (New York, 1973).

L1 etc — Walbank, M. B. 'Leases of Public Lands' in G.V. Lalonde, M. K. Langdon and M. B Walbank, 'Inscriptions : *Horoi*, *Poletai* Records, Leases of Public Lands', *The Athenian Agora* 1991, pp. 147 - 207.

LSJ — Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised by H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie. Ninth edition, reprinted Oxford, 1983.

ML — Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC (Oxford, 1988).

*OCD*[4] — Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) *The Oxford Classical Dictionary.* Fourth edition (Oxford, 2012).

Osborne *Nat*. — Osborne, M. J. *Naturalization in Athens*, Four Volumes (Brussels, 1981 - 1983).

P1 etc. — Langdon, M. K. 'Poletai Records' in G.V. Lalonde, M. K. Langdon and M. B Walbank, 'Inscriptions : *Horoi*, *Poletai* Records, Leases of Public Lands', *The Athenian Agora* 1991, pp. 54 - 143.

*PAE* — Πρακτικὰ τῆς ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας.

Parke — Parke, H. W. *The Oracles of Zeus : Dodona, Olympia, Ammon* (Oxford, 1967).

Reed — Reed, C. M. *Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World* (Cambridge, 2003).

RO — Rhodes, P. J. and Osborne, R. (eds.) *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404 - 323* (Oxford, 2003).

*SEG* — *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.*

*SGDI* — Hoffman, O. 'Die Orakelinschriften aus Dodona', in H. Collitz and F. Bechtel, (eds.), *Sammlung der Griechischen DialektInschriften* volume II (Göttingen, 1899), pp. 93 – 132, nos. 1557 - 1598.

*Syll.*[3] — Dittenberger W. (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*. Third edition, (1915 - 1924).

Walbank — Walbank, M. B. *Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto, 1978).

Greek texts and English translations are all those of the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise indicated.

# Chapter One - Introduction

## 1.1 Chapter introduction

Xenophon's *Poroi* is a remarkable text. It offers a rich route into the prevailing preoccupations of its era – war, peace, foreign policy, state income, immigration, trade, wealth, taxation, power and poverty. It addresses those issues with an infectious passion for Athens, and for the first time that we know of in the ancient world, it tries to map out ways in which these fields are interrelated in order that external relations might be controlled through internal economic change. It is a first attempt to get to grips with ideas of political economy.[1]

> For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not need her? Ship owners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and sophists and philosophers; poets and the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who want to buy or sell many things quickly meet with better success in their efforts than at Athens?[2]

This is Xenophon's beguiling depiction of a peaceful and prosperous Athens, which he envisaged could be achieved in consequence of the successful adoption of his proposals. It appears towards the end of the *Poroi* and echoes a passage from the beginning of the work in which he describes the natural beauty of Attica's topography

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1 Schwahn 1931, p. 258, called the *Poroi* 'Wirtschaftspolitik' in 1931, although he did not believe that it was written by Xenophon.

2 5.3-4. τίνες γὰρ ἡσυχίαν ἀγούσης τῆς πόλεως οὐ προσδέοιντ᾽ ἂν αὐτῆς ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ ναυκλήρων καὶ ἐμπόρων; οὐχ οἱ πολύσιτοι, οὐχ οἱ πολύοινοι οὐχ οἱ ἡδύοινοι; τί δὲ οἱ πολυέλαιοι, τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι, οἱ δὲ γνώμῃ καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; [4] καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιοθεάτων ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ ὁσίων ἐπιθυμοῦντες; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ δεόμενοι πολλὰ ταχὺ ἀποδίδοσθαι ἢ πρίασθαι ποῦ τούτων μᾶλλον ἂν τύχοιεν ἢ Ἀθήνησιν;
All quotations and line references are from Xenophon's *Poroi* unless otherwise indicated. English translations are adapted from Marchant 1925; manuscript, translation and vocabulary questions are discussed when directly relevant.

and the wealth of her physical resources.[3] In the few hundred lines between the two passages, he proposes the exploitation of those material assets, most particularly Attic silver deposits, but also the natural entrepreneurial skills of her citizens, residents and visitors, in order to generate widespread payments to Athenians and thereby provide a level of economic and physical security for all. Xenophon's proposals, made in 355/4[4] aspired to remove Athenian state finances from a reliance on *arche,* and to move the state closer to that most desirable of Greek conditions, self-sufficiency, or *autarkeia,* than she had achieved for perhaps a century.[5]

## 1.2 The need for a reassessment

There has been relatively little published work on the text since Gauthier's important commentary of 1976.[6] In the time that has since elapsed, attempts to model the wider shape of the Mediterranean economy have engendered a fierce academic debate which was picking up speed as Gauthier published, just three years after the appearance of Finley's hugely influential *The Ancient Economy*.[7] Concurrent with that theoretical discussion as to the relative level of sophistication of the economy and the ancients' recognition of economic forces, our understanding of the many individual sectors of the fourth-century Athenian economy has deepened thanks to the appearance of studies of land, trade, banking, mining, shipping, coinage and the movement of commodities such as grain and timber. Some of these studies have fed the debate, whilst others have hoped for a move beyond it.[8] As an evidential source the issues of the *Poroi* inevitably place it at the heart of these questions.

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3 1.2-8.

4 All dates are BC unless otherwise noted. See chapter 1.5.2 for the dating of the *Poroi.*

5 For the desirability of state *autarkeia,* see Arist. *Pol.* 1261$^{b}$10-17. Discussing trade and taxes Purcell 2005, p. 217 reminds us that, 'economic autarky was a dream in a world in which interdependence was essential.' Jansen 2007 discusses types of *autarkeia* at pp. 212-247. Gauthier 1976, pp. 251-252 cautions against confusing modern and ancient ideas of the State, particularly in Athens where political responsibility was not delegated to a central power and the sole authority recognised by individuals was the law. See the helpful discussion of state-formation and the term 'State' at van Wees 2013, pp. 5-10.

6 Gauthier 1976.

7 Finley 1999.

8 See for instance R. Osborne 1985a, R. Osborne 1987, Garnsey 1988, Millett 1991, Rathbone 1991, E. E. Cohen 1992, Gabrielsen 1994, Reger 1994, von Reden 1995, Lambert 1997, Figueira 1998, Loomis 1998, Samons 2000, Shipton 2000, E. M. Harris 2002, Christesen 2003, Reed 2003, Faraguna 2006, Fawcett 2006, Foxhall 2007, Moreno 2007a, Oliver 2007a, Bissa 2009, Engen 2010, Rihll 2010a, Davies 2011, van Wees 2013 and collections such as Mattingly and Salmon 2001; Meadows and Shipton 2001; Scheidel and von Reden 2002; Reger 2005, Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007; Verboven, Vandorpe and Chankowski 2008.

One approach to the study of mid fourth-century Athens, particularly in the 1970s, has been to see it in terms of crisis or decline – of the *polis*, of the economy, of Athens and her foreign policy. Here again the *Poroi* is helpfully situated to contribute to that study, one scholar recently characterising the *Poroi* as a 'response to decline'.[9] Equally importantly, there has been a resurgence of interest in Xenophon since the 1990s with two international conferences and a wealth of new research on all aspects of his voluminous and eclectic writing.[10]

Past reception of the *Poroi* has been mixed, and recent work in all these fields thus provides plentiful grounds for a reassessment of Xenophon's work at both a theoretical and a practical level, and a new analysis of what the *Poroi* offers to our picture of the Attic economy. Although it is a short text it covers a breath-taking number of topics. Open-minded, resourceful, optimistic and engaging, it has the rounded approach of one who has been both an outcast and an insider, by a man approaching the end of a lengthy and eventful life.

## 1.3 Structure and argument of the thesis

Xenophon's opening declares

> … But some of the leading men at Athens have stated that they recognize justice as clearly as other men; "but," they have said, "owing to the poverty of the masses, we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of the cities." This set me thinking whether by any means the citizens might obtain food entirely from their own soil, which would certainly be the fairest way. I felt that, were this so, they would be relieved of their poverty, and also of the suspicion with which they are regarded by the Greek world.[11]

Xenophon attempts to navigate the complex territory that leads from an understanding of citizen poverty as a motivation for empire, to the achievement of a thriving state

---

9 Lambert 2011a, pp. 196-7; for an overview of some of the approaches to fourth-century decline see Davies 1995, Herman 2011a and Lambert 2011b. Isager and Hansen 1975, pp. 52-55, refute the idea of a general Greek fourth-century economic crisis.

10 Tuplin 2004; Hobden and Tuplin 2012.

11 1.1 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθήνησι προεστηκότων ἔλεγόν τινες ὡς γιγνώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον οὐδενὸς ἧττον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἔφασαν ἀδικώτεροι εἶναι περὶ τὰς πόλεις, ἐκ τούτου ἐπεχείρησα σκοπεῖν εἴ πῃ δύναιντ᾽ ἂν οἱ πολῖται διατρέφεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτῶν, ὅθενπερ καὶ δικαιότατον, νομίζων, εἰ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἅμα τῇ τε πενίᾳ αὐτῶν ἐπικεκουρῆσθαι ἂν καὶ τῷ ὑπόπτους τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἶναι.

secure from external distrust. He does so by economic means. Concentrating on his mining proposals, his recognition of risk as an economic factor, and his proposals for the use of honours to encourage commercial activity, my objective will be to elucidate some aspects of the work itself and to assess the ways in which the *Poroi* can be used as an indicator of the development of economic structures of the mid-fourth century. I will also address the extent to which Xenophon's plans were innovative and invoked ideas new to Athenian political life. Thanks to the wealth of evidence the work gives us, at its simplest level this thesis therefore attempts to understand what some Athenians, including Xenophon, understood of the processes that underpinned their commercial transactions and the extent to which that understanding permeated Athenian society. This will involve situating the *Poroi* within the political, social and economic circumstances in which it was composed. The remainder of this chapter will look briefly at Xenophon's proposals and outline the arguments for his authorship and the dating of the text, then examine the situation within Athens and the circumstances of her relationships with the wider Greek world in the 350s. After a discussion of the several audiences who Xenophon may be addressing, it will look at the way that the text has fared in the hands of scholars during the last century or so.

In chapter 2, I will explore three themes which provide the foundation for my further discussion of the text. First, the evidence for the operation of the Laurion[12] silver mines, their relationship to the Athenian economy and the ways that our other evidence, archaeological, epigraphic and literary, relates to Xenophon's text, along with an appraisal of some of the various means by which the state received income from the exploitation of the mines. Silver extraction involved a series of sophisticated technical procedures taking place in a variety of locations and was reliant on a complex network of suppliers of consumable goods as well as workers who possessed a stratified range of technical skills. It is an industry which frequently provides the exception to generally stated rules about the degree of sophistication of Greek manufacturing and commerce, and I will argue that it is important to recognise the extent to which the industry was integrated within the Athenian economic 'mentality'

---

[12] Xenophon does not say 'the Laurion', although his references to Anaphlystos, Thorikos and Besa show that this is the region he is discussing (4.43-4.44). If there was a specific spot known as Laurion in antiquity, we do not know its whereabouts today, the modern coastal town of Laurion was formerly known as Ergastiria, and renamed much later (Photos-Jones and Jones 1994, p. 309 with n. 4). I use the term as shorthand for the region much as it was used in antiquity.

and to understand that the same men engaged in comparable commercial practices here as elsewhere. Secondly, using Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus* as a case study, I will explore the day to day management of mining enterprises, their scale and their place in Athenian legal and cultural life, as well as the ways in which Laurion slaves were employed by the Athenians at different stages of the industry and their variable opportunities for advancement or manumission, in order to contextualise Xenophon's proposals and to examine recent scholarship which has suggested that Xenophon intended a relatively beneficent regime for the state slaves whose purchase he was recommending. Finally I will look at the scholarly discussion about the degree of economic rationality evident in the ancient world and the way that our understanding of the silver industry contributes to that debate. This is a field which has become of increasing interest in the last twenty or so years as scholars have begun to question the received wisdom of the mid-twentieth century that undeveloped Greek and Roman record-keeping denied the trader the possibility of a detailed analysis of his profitability and hence restricted the potential for growth.[13] I will argue that the far reaching supply needs of the mining industry indicate a hitherto unacknowledged level of familiarity with the industry amongst Xenophon's Athenian audience which would have informed their reception of the text, demonstrating that far from presenting them with new concepts or naïve grand schemes, he assumes and draws on a level of financial literacy that enriched their reading and obviated the need for some of the detail that his later critics have found wanting.

The text of the *Poroi* is full of allusions to the danger and perceived pitfalls of Xenophon's ideas. Building on the discussion of economic rationality in chapter 2, chapter 3 will approach the text from the specific viewpoint of an analysis of Xenophon's understanding of risk. Scholarship around risk in the ancient world has previously focused on subsistence crisis, maritime risk and oracular appeals, and this chapter seeks to broaden that discussion. A detailed examination of the manner in which Xenophon identifies and contains a wide variety of economic, physical and socially-constructed risks is accompanied by a discussion of the way that he is able to recognise the projects' risks as perceived by different groups and then to readdress or reassure. The wide range of strategies he introduces in order to reduce or avert risk

[13] See for instance de Ste. Croix 1956 and Finley 1999 p. 110-111, 116-117, 142 for the older view, and Macve 1985, Rathbone 1991, Christesen 2003, Chankowski 2008b and Chandezon 2011 for more recent opinion.

suggests that far from being naïve in their judgement of the economic security of their commercial undertakings, Athenians had a sophisticated recognition of risk and were accustomed to employing a variety of expedients to reduce it.

One of the strategies Xenophon proposes at several different stages of the text is the awarding of honours and prizes to citizens and non-citizens, to encourage their participation in his schemes, and it is important to factor in to our investigation into the economy that such considerations could be pivotal for the ancient entrepreneur approaching new undertakings. Some scholars have found Xenophon's suggestions in this respect ground-breaking or even subversive, whilst the wider awarding of honours of the mid- to late-fourth century generally has been seen as an indicator of, and a response to, decline. In testing these assessments, chapter 4 benefits particularly from recent research into the fourth-century awarding of honours, and discusses Athenian attitudes to *philotimia* and the honours that Xenophon proposes within a longer chronological contextualisation of their earlier and later use by the Athenians. Far from debasing ancient Athenian institutions in an ill-judged response to crisis, it becomes apparent that Xenophon's proposed awards were rooted firmly in the habits of the past and do not contribute to a picture of a time of immediate crisis that was any wider than the obvious post-war lack of funds. His proposals exploited institutions that had always adapted to reflect changing circumstances and he set careful boundaries both to the number and the social background of their potential beneficiaries.

Regardless of Xenophon's capacity to engage at a conceptual level with theories of economics and political economy, his text broadens our grasp of the way that economic activity was weighed and evaluated in a society where rudimentary record-keeping was only one of a range of tools available to the effective businessman, and offers us a unique insight into the way that one intelligent man could appraise and attempt to manage interrelated financial networks across a range of social and political structures. Whilst accepting the limits to the *Poroi's* theoretical character, I will argue that Xenophon's grasp of economic processes goes beyond mere observation[14] and that the schemes in the *Poroi* are an articulation of an underlying appreciation of the

[14] Finley 1970, p. 4 warns against mistaking simple common sense observation of phenomena well-known to any ancient farmer for genuine economic analysis.

extent to which small operations are a part of a greater whole. Taking an essentially empirical approach my intention is to make a contribution at the micro-level to our understanding of how a practical man understood some aspects of the economic and political forces of his time, and to deepen our understanding of where his proposals are situated on a scale that runs from ground-breaking to derivative.

## 1.4 Ancient economics?

'Economics' in our contemporary sense of, say, the study of the allocation of resources, production, consumption and price levels, was not a science recognised in antiquity. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus,* written before the *Poroi,* was focused on household and estate management.[15] Applying good domestic management principles to state finances in any effective way requires not simply an adjustment of scale; a leap of imagination is necessary to recognise that localised economic pressure can affect regional and inter-state politics, and that state intervention on a local level can be used to manipulate these larger political relationships.[16] Xenophon's exposition of good 'economics' in the Greek sense, i.e. relating to the *oikos,* has been described as encompassing 'the art of managing all aspects of one's personal life,'[17] He had, after all, directly linked the two spheres in *On Hunting*:

> all who benefit their cities and their friends are more attentive to their domestic affairs than other men.'[18]

In wrestling with the interrelatedness of politics, finance and social affairs, Xenophon can be seen reconfiguring not only the fiscal aspects of household economics but also applying the processes of managing all aspects of one's personal life to the management of all aspects of the state's life. Well aware of the basics of the Micawberish equation between sufficiency for one's needs and happiness,[19]

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15 Similarly Aristotle's *Oeconomicus,* although it also begins to identify types of state and fundraising strategies. On Aristotle and the economy, see Polanyi 1957, Finley 1970, Meikle 1979, Meikle 1991, Booth 1993, pp. 55-72, Bresson 2000, pp. 109-130 and Audring and Brodersen 2008.

16 See Bresson 2000, pp. 247-261 for examples of the intersection of public and private revenues across the classical and Hellenistic Greek world and what they demonstrate of Greek recognition of the reciprocal relationship between the promotion of state policies and individual financial welfare.

17 Danzig 2003, p. 66.

18 *On Hunting* 12.10.

19 *Oeconomicos* 2.4; *Memorabilia* 4.2.37-38. 'Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen pounds nineteen shillings and six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.' Mr Micawber, *David Copperfield*

Xenophon's achievement is to map out an approach that is far more than just a scaling up from the domestic, or a straightforward Attic balance sheet. Mining the *Poroi* for Socratic influences can lead into complex territory,[20] but whilst the text has frequently been criticised for what it does not achieve (of which more below), when seen in the context of the other thinkers of the day, and when Xenophon's own theoretical leap is fully appreciated, it is clear that what he does achieve is ground-breaking.

In treating the *Poroi* principally for its economic aspects, this reappraisal does not necessarily place itself in opposition to some late twentieth-century work which saw the economic proposals as a means rather than as an end and which set the work on the 'political' side of a divide which viewed the ancient Athenian as *homo politicus* rather than *homo economicus*.[21] It seems to me that, however one may interpret Xenophon's underlying motivation, his ends are political – they are ultimately about inter-state relationships. But the means by which they can be achieved are economic. Nevertheless, 5.3-4 makes it clear that Xenophon's ultimate vision is not simply a state at peace and a citizenry that has a basic level of subsistence and better festivals. It encompasses a mode of living which actively welcomes men of all classes, Greeks and foreigners, not only because they yield revenue but as both commercial and intellectual partners whose presence will enhance the city in itself.[22] Income alone distributed to citizens, without the supporting infrastructure he plans for its achievement, would not create the cosmopolitan city he envisages. If a part of the 'means' is the variety of talented men who will be attracted to Athens in order to take advantage of Xenophon's proposals, furnish income and enrich the artisanal and creative life of the city, it is clear that their presence and their cultural contribution to the city is also an end in itself.

Xenophon has often been accused of failing to pursue any theoretical framework for understanding 'the economy.'[23] Underlying his proposals nevertheless, is an

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chapter 12.

20 See for instance Schorn 2012.

21 eg. Gauthier 1976, p. 30; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 4. See Humphreys 1978, pp. 159-160 for an overview of this Weberian dichotomy and the way it has shaped twentieth-century discussions of the ancient economy.

22 See Dillery 1993 for a comparison of this passage with Pericles' vision of Athens in the funeral speech at Thuc. 2.41.1.

23 eg. Finley 1999, p. 19; Mossé 1975.

expectation that when faced with specific sets of economic circumstances or opportunities, not only will most individuals behave in pre-ordainable ways,[24] but the exploitation of, and market for, commodities will predictably alter as well.[25] Thus particular environments may be created within which certain events will inevitably evolve because of imperatives which are in part about (1) an assumed desire across all strata of society for an increase in personal wealth; and (2) an expectation that certain less definable social factors such as more pleasant trading environments and the receipt of honours will be motivating factors in the choice of trading partners.[26] Recognition of such patterns is essential for the successful pursuit of economic rationality, and the mining industry in particular had already shown itself able to implement the fine tuning of every stage of the industry necessary to achieve optimum profit. The *Poroi* may not demonstrate an articulation of any systematisation of abstract knowledge, but a perceived, structured network of actions and reactions underpins Xenophon's understanding of economic forces.

### 1.4.1 The proposals

Before we go further it will be useful to extract the essential proposals from the *Poroi*:

2.2 Relieve metics of the obligations which impose indignities on them but do not help the city.
Exempt metics from serving as hoplites.

2.5 Grant metics the right to serve in the cavalry.

2.6 Allow approved metics to build houses within the city walls (*enktesis*).[27]

2.7 Appoint a Board of Guardians of metics and honour the Guardians who enrol the most metics.

3.3 Offer prizes to τῆ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῆ - the port magistrates - for the speedy and fair resolution of disputes so that merchants may sail away again quickly.

3.4 Give permanent theatre seats (*proedria*) and dinner in the *prytaneion* (*xenia*) to merchants and ship-owners who have been of service to the state.

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[24] eg. 4.7-8: when states are prosperous and there is plenty of silver people hoard it or take pleasure in personal adornment.

[25] eg. 4.10 - when gold is plentiful, silver rises in value but gold falls.

[26] 3.4.

[27] The honours and privileges Xenophon proposes are discussed in chapter 4.2.

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|---|---|
| 3.9 | Establish a capital fund for further projects, the income from which will ultimately be three obols per day for each citizen. |
| 3.11 | Encourage foreigners to subscribe to the capital fund by inscribing their names as *euergetai*. |
| 3.12 | At the harbour, build state lodging houses (*katagogia*) for ship-owners and for visitors, and places for buying and selling for merchants. |
| 3.13 | Put up houses and shops (πωλητήρια) for retail trade in Piraeus and the city. |
| 3.14 | Investigate the acquisition of a fleet of state merchant vessels to be leased out in the same way as other public property. |
| 4.17-24 | Purchase large numbers of slaves to be leased to mine operators, beginning with twelve hundred and using twenty talents of the annual rental income thus obtained in order to buy more slaves, whilst retaining the rest for other needs until there are three slaves for every citizen, yielding three obols per citizen, per day, and one hundred talents per year once ten thousand slaves are acquired. |
| 4.30 | Offer an equal number of mine slaves to each tribe so that the tribes may pool their luck and share the proceeds. |
| 4.35-38 | If necessary, proceed with each scheme slowly to reduce the need to raise large sums of capital. |
| 4.40 | Raise the money for the plan by spending only the equivalent of the taxes raised before the peace and save the additional state revenues received through the growth of peacetime trade for investment. |
| 4.42 | In the event of war, use the slaves in the infantry or as rowers. |
| 4.44 | Build a fortress at Besa between those at Thorikos and Anaphlystos to improve the defence of the mines. |
| 4.49 | Derive revenue from the furnaces, market, state-owned houses and other sources near the reinvigorated silver mines. |
| 5.1 | Set up a board of εἰρηνοφύλακες – guardians of the peace. |
| 5.9 | Send embassies throughout Greece with a view to making Delphi independent. |
| 6.2-3 | Enquire at Dodona and Delphi whether it would be better to manage things this way in future, and which gods should be worshipped for things to go well. Then make sacrifices and begin. |

### 1.4.2 Politics and rhetoric

Xenophon's stated aims are the encouragement of trade and industry in order to promote an increase in state revenues which can be used to enhance individual citizen prosperity. This will lead in turn to better relationships with other *poleis* and the re-establishment of Athens as a respected Greek state.[28] The poverty of the Athenian masses leads directly to unjust treatment of other Greek cities, causing suspicion abroad and must be addressed.[29]

But even that apparently clear agenda to improve state income, provide a daily allowance for all citizens and thereby restrain Athenian injustice in pursuit of coerced income, has been subject to shifts of scholarly focus, frequently led by readings that look for an implicit Socratic influence. Whilst they are not the central questions of this thesis, it is inescapable that scholars have argued at length over Xenophon's underlying motivations. His ultimate goal might be the daily triobol payment but to effect it would need a far wider economic regeneration of trade and silver mining – was this part of his grand plan or simply a side effect?[30] Was he a democrat or an oligarch? That is, did he plan to promote greater citizen engagement with, or widespread disengagement from, Athenian political processes (Gauthier promoting the former, and Schütrumpf the latter, views)?[31] Others have debated whether Xenophon was one of a growing movement looking for peace within the Greek world, perhaps with a re-focusing of Greek attention towards Persia; or whether he was part of a 'party' or a looser group of influential citizens looking for ways to overhaul financial management. Some have considered the extent to which the political ethos of the text is rooted in the Xenophontic Socrates, pursuing universal citizen *eudaimonie* alongside moral improvement[32] or whether the true aim was to regain leadership of a Greek economic hegemony.[33] The text has also been used to

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28 Relations with other states: 1.1, suspicion; 5.5-8, the Greeks chose Athens as their leader after the Persian wars, and restored that role to her when she restrained from acts of injustice; the Thebans and the Spartans both put themselves under Athenian leadership in return for generous treatment; 5.10, if his schemes succeed, 'all men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers' after their own country; 6.1, 'we shall be regarded with more affection by the Greeks, shall live in greater security.'

29 1.1. I can find no justification for J. D. Lewis' suggestion (2009, p. 372) that Xenophon was alluding to the 'ethical poverty' of the masses.

30 Giglioni 1970, p. LXXXVIII.

31 Gauthier 1976, Schütrumpf 1982.

32 Schorn 2011.

33 5.2; Higgins 1977, p. 138.

demonstrate aspects of Xenophon's understanding of the requirements of Socratic leadership and the achievement of 'willing obedience' from those who are led,[34] and has been shown as an exemplification of the role of an Athenian orator.[35] Hobden and Tuplin argue that Socrates' project, as represented by Xenophon, had been to benefit his associates and make them better, and that this ethos underpinned Xenophon's writing from first to last.[36] Stefan Schorn has gone further, suggesting that Xenophon's programmes in the *Hiero* and the *Poroi,*

> aim at nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the state along the precepts of the Socratic-Xenophontic philosophy.[37]

We will return to these analyses of the *Poroi* later in this chapter. However whilst they cannot be overlooked, these interpretations do not form the focus of this work.

## 1.5 The text, its context and reception

The following sections will address issues of authorship, dating and the social, economic and political circumstances that gave rise to the appearance of the *Poroi*.

### 1.5.1 Authorship

Diogenes Laertius included the *Poroi* in his list of Xenophon's works and Xenophon's authorship appears to have been widely accepted in antiquity.[38] Modern philologists have been similarly unified; nevertheless some historians at the end of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century had difficulty equating the resourceful soldier of the *Anabasis* with the putative economist of the *Poroi*. These judgements had perhaps more to do with modern characterisations of genre than with Xenophon.[39] The *Memorabilia* after all had shown that the Xenophontic Socrates believed that a would-be statesman would be well advised to understand state revenues and expenditure, and fluctuations in mining receipts[40] and in the *Hiero* Simonides remarked that trade brings good to a community and advised that a competitive spirit in agriculture would

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34 Gray 2011, on the *Poroi,* pp. 36-37; willing obedience, pp. 180-196.

35 Farrell 2012, p. 290.

36 Hobden and Tuplin 2012, p. 22.

37 Schorn 2012, p. 702.

38 Diog. Laert. 2.57; Ath. 6.272.c; *Etym. Magn.* 644.4; Men. Rhet. *Peri Epideiktikon* 3.345.22.

39 See Gauthier 1976, pp. 254-257 for the work of editors from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

40 Gauthier 1976, pp. 2-3; Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.3-12.

increase personal incomes.[41] The *Poroi* might even be read as a response to Xenophon's own suggestion in the *Hiero* that the discoverer of a means to make money without harm should be honoured by the state, a remarkable foreshadowing of some of the issues of the *Poroi*.[42]

In 1922 Thiel authoritatively established Xenophon's authorship through a close comparison of the subject, vocabulary and style of the *Poroi* with his other works.[43] Nevertheless in 1931, eschewing the philological arguments, Schwahn argued that Xenophon could not be the author because the writer of the *Poroi* was in possession of economic information and was moreover clearly a democrat.[44] Schwahn found echoes of the *Poroi* in Eubulus's administration of the theoric fund, and instead of Xenophon, preferred Eubulus or one of his associates as author, by virtue of his role as the promoter of peace at the end of the Social War and as the first statesman with a conscious economic policy.[45] He also identified apparent contradictions between the *Poroi* and the *Memorabilia*, and in particular suggested that there was an irreconcilable problem with the two texts' respective discussions of the origins of the wealth of Nikias – one from mining and the other from leasing slaves.[46] But as Momigliano pointed out the following year, these were very slight contradictions on which to base so confident an assertion,[47] and in 1934 Wilhelm addressed Schwahn's arguments in some detail,[48] criticising Schwahn's assertion that Sosias the Thracian was somehow 'mysterious' and that Hipponicus and Philemonides were fictitious, adducing evidence that Xenophon's depiction of ancient slave-owning and income were supportable.[49]

Rostovtzeff returned in 1941 to the proposition that the work was not by Xenophon,

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41 Xen. *Hiero* 9.7-10.

42 Aristotle also emphasises the importance of an understanding of state income for public life: *Rhet.* 1.4.7-8; (1359b19-32); 1.4.11 (1360a12-17).

43 Thiel 1922, pp. XIII-XXIII.

44 Schwahn 1931, pp. 258-259.

45 Schwahn 1931, p. 258. The theoric fund: *Ath. Pol.* 43.1; and see Rhodes 2013, pp. 219-222.

46 *Memorabilia* 2.5.2; *Poroi* 4.14. Schwahn also found inconsistencies 1. between *Memorabilia* 2.7-2.10 in which Socrates advocates that women should work to support the household, and the tone of the *Poroi* which promotes state support and 2. between the slave price of 180 drachmas on which the *Poroi* relies and the 2 minas mentioned at *Memorabilia* 2.5.2. But in this passage Socrates quotes a wide range of slave prices in order to make a comparison with the varying value of friends.

47 Momigliano1932, p. 252 n. 1.

48 Wilhelm 1934.

49 Sosias, Hipponicus and Philemonides, 4.14-15. Schwahn 1931, p. 256; Wilhelm 1934, pp. 20-28.

also denying that it could be by Eubulus[50] and in 1975 Hopper suggested that it was

> a 'votes-catching' work from someone on the more lunatic fringe of the party of Eubulus.[51]

But on the whole, in the second half of the twentieth century, on the basis of the philological evidence, Cawkwell, Giglioni, Gauthier and Schütrumpf all upheld Xenophon's authorship[52] and there has been no recent scholarly dispute.

### 1.5.2 The date

The dating of the *Poroi* has remained relatively uncontroversial for some time. Detailed study during the nineteenth century established a consensus that it was written in the winter of 355/354, and most twentieth-century commentators including Thiel, Delebecque, Giglioni and Gauthier endorsed this view.[53] In 1955 Sealey suggested tentatively that the balance might perhaps be tilted in favour of 346.[54] A robust response by Cawkwell in 1963[55] probably appeared too late for Thomsen, for whom Sealey's argument cast enough doubt that he thought it safest to disregard the *Poroi's* references to *eisphora* in his authoritative survey of the timing of *eisphorai* throughout the fifth and fourth centuries.[56] The issue arose again in a challenge to the dating of 355 made by Cataudella in 1984, who argued once more for a date of 346.[57] A detailed refutation of Cataudella's analysis by Bloch in 2004 provided a very useful survey of the generally overlooked nineteenth-century scholarship[58] and most recently Schorn has looked again at refining the date to within a matter of months.[59]

The text is scattered with small signposts that have been used to construct or bolster the dating question. The building blocks of the arguments are Xenophon's references to: (1) the cost of slave labour before the events at Decelea of 413,[60] which we gather

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50 Rostovtzeff 1941, p. 1328, n. 27.
51 Mussche, Spitaels and Goemaere-De Poerck 1975, p. 195.
52 Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63 n. 91; Giglioni 1970, pp. VII-XI; Gauthier 1976, pp. 1-4 and 256; Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 1-2.
53 Thiel 1922, pp. VIII-XIII; Delebecque 1957, pp. 470-473; Giglioni 1970, pp. VII-VIII; Gauthier 1976 pp. 4-6.
54 Sealey 1955, p. 76.
55 Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63, n. 90.
56 Thomsen 1964, p. 231, citing Sealey 1955.
57 Cataudella 1984.
58 Bloch 2004. The following survey of the issues draws on Bloch's very comprehensive analysis.
59 Schorn 2006.
60 4.25, cf. Thuc. 7.27.

a very few of those listening might still be able to remember; (2) recent occasions when the Athenians had raised money for troops, dispatching 400 cavalry under Lysistratus to support the Arcadians after the Elean attack during the Olympic Games in 364 and later sending 6,000 to support Hegesilaus at the Battle of Mantinea in 362;[61] (3) the fact that a particular war has just ended,[62] pinning it either to the end of the Social War in 355 or following the negotiation of the Peace of Philokrates with Philip II in 346;[63] (4) peace at sea[64] and (5) the Phocians' occupation of Delphi, which continued until 346.[65] Thus at the very least the date falls after the Battle of Mantinea in 362, but before it becomes so late that not even elderly Athenians could remember the period immediately before the Spartan occupation of Decelea of 413.

Nineteenth-century discussions in favour of 346 had focused, among other points, on a reading of 5.9 which appeared to imply that at the point of writing, the Phocians had already left Delphi, which they did not do until 346. As all other signs pointed to the end of the Social War, Boeckh dealt with this in 1817 by pushing back the date of composition to 356, before the Phocian occupation, on the grounds that the Phocians were perpetually laying claim to the administration of Delphi, and that Xenophon referred simply to this, rather than to their violent occupation which took place the following year.[66]

However in 1871 Madvig proposed a textual emendation at 5.9 from the imperfect ἐπειρῶντο to the optative πειρῷντο, thus implying that the possibility of abandonment by the Phocians was an uncertain, future event and thereby returning the focus to 355. This emendation was widely accepted and maintained by Thiel in 1922.[67] More recently Jansen has argued that the emendation is unnecessary and that the original text may still be read in this sense without changing the traditional interpretation.[68]

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61 3.7; cf. Xen. *Hellenica.* 7.5.3; Diod. Sic. 15.84 and Xen. *Hellenica* 7.4.29; Diod. Sic. 15.77.

62 4.40, 5.12.

63 Aeschin. *On the Embassy* 2.60, 85-86; *Against Ctesiphon* 3.69-74.

64 5.12.

65 5.9.

66 Boeckh 1976, pp. 600-602, n. 503. Xenophon made clear in *Hellenica* what he thought about the Phocian occupation of Delphi, when he juxtaposed Apollo's promise to 'take care' of anyone misusing Delphic treasure with the untimely death of Jason of Pherae; *Hellenica* 6.4.30; Cawkwell 1979a, p. 34.

67 Madvig 1871, p. 364 'united in alliance against any that attempted to seize the shrine in the event of the Phocians abandoning it', οἵτινες ἐκλιπόντων Φωκέων τὸ ἱερὸν καταλαμβάνειν πειρῷντο. mss. ἐπειρῶντο; Thiel 1922, pp. XII-XIII; Gauthier 1976, pp. 210-211.

68 Jansen 2007, p. 52, n. 63.

Sealey's proposal of 1955, which he admitted was inconclusive, was based on the suggestion at 5.12 that revenues had increased since the peace at sea, implying that peace must have existed long enough for the Athenians to have noticed an increase in income, pushing the date to 346 again. But Cawkwell's response juxtaposed this one sentence against the tenor of the whole work, which is premised around Athenian poverty, no longer the case by 346.[69]

In 1984, Cataudella proposed an entirely new argument for 346, based on Xenophon's reference at 4.40 to the raising of *eisphorai* (i.e. plural) during the late war, and citing Isocrates' *On the Peace* 8.20 and Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* to show that there was at most only evidence for the imposition of *eisphora* on one occasion during the Social War.[70] Brun's 1983 survey of *eisphorai* had demonstrated that they were imposed four times between 376 and 369 and then twice during the Social War,[71] and as Bloch suggests, Isocrates' argument, that an advantage of peace would be the absence of *eisphorai,* would be much weaker if there had in fact been no recent *eisphorai* in any case.[72] Bloch further argues that even if an *eisphora* had been imposed only once during the Social War, Xenophon might have used the plural for more vivid effect, implicitly recognising the effect that the wide distribution of the tax debt had on a large number of individual citizens. A further counter to Cataudella's argument lies within Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* which Cataudella cites in support of his proposal. Demosthenes refers to three unwelcome choices that faced Athenians in 355 after the failure to collect the full *eisphora* in the previous year – either to break up the sacred plate, to impose a fresh tax, or, the option they chose, to chase in the outstanding money from the defaulters.[73] Cataudella argues that this shows that an *eisphora* was imposed only once.[74] Bloch however contends that it would have been perfectly possible for a further tax to have been imposed after this choice were made, either later in 356 or in 355, and that given the parlous state of Athenian finances this would actually have been quite likely.[75] As Schorn pointed out, by 346 the theoric fund, widely seen as an interpretation of Xenophon's triobol

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69 Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63, n. 90.
70 Cataudella 1984, pp. 150-152.
71 Brun 1983, p. 55.
72 Bloch 2004, p. 13, Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.20.
73 Dem. *Against Androtion* 22.48.
74 Cataudella 1984, p. 153.
75 Bloch 2004, pp. 14-15.

proposal, had become well established.[76]

Delebecque had also argued for 355, and both he and later Schorn narrowed the date still further. Delebecque proposed autumn or winter 355, shortly after the end of the Social War in summer 355, and prior to the offensive by the Phocian general Onomarchos of Spring 354, arguing that Onomarchos' success would have made the chance of fruitful arbitration improbable, whilst the intervention of Philip shortly afterwards, made it impossible.[77] Working from Xenophon's references to the end of 'the recent war'[78] and the resumption of trade by sea,[79] Schorn however argued that maritime trade could not have begun again until the spring, when the dual risks of the winter seas and military uncertainty were past and the sea was safe for civilian travel. Assuming at least a couple of months for the re-establishment of seaborne commerce to have become widespread enough for Xenophon to be able to speak of its increase, and given that a later date could not be possible because Philip II's increasing expansionism draws no comment from Xenophon, Schorn pinned the text down to May/June 354.[80]

But Beresford's recent study of the high level of technical skills amongst ancient mariners and known instances of seafaring outside the generally accepted annual spring-through-autumn window has shown that the assumption that Mediterranean sailing was not year-round is influenced by the prejudice of ancient writers against technical skills in general and against trade in particular.[81] The argument for dating based on maritime trade therefore looks weaker. Once peace pertained, if sailing were possible, it would seem likely that merchants would take the earliest opportunity to resume business and optimise the commercial opportunities amongst communities who had been deprived of access to externally supplied commodities for some time. Even if trade were not yet at its full seasonal peak, an autumnal rise in traffic might still have been apparent enough for Xenophon to refer to it, meaning that Delebecque's proposed late 355 remains a fair suggestion.

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76 Schorn 2006, pp. 34-40.
77 Delebecque 1957, pp. 470-473.
78 4.40.
79 5.12.
80 Schorn 2006, pp. 25-40.
81 Beresford 2013.

### 1.5.3 Place of composition - Athens

Xenophon displays a close familiarity with a city whose internal social and economic circumstances had changed markedly since his departure at the start of the century.[82] As long ago as 1842 Boeckh had argued against other scholars, that 2.7 and 6.1 in particular proved that Xenophon returned to Athens from exile.[83] Diogenes Laertius tells us Eubulus proposed his return[84] and scholarly opinion is generally in favour of the view that he must at least have visited Athens after his exile was lifted, perhaps to check on his restored family estates.[85] Most recently Jansen has argued in some detail for a return to Athens between 366/5 and 362, noting Xenophon's engagement with her leading figures; circumstances such as Athens' unfriendly relations with Corinth, Xenophon's last documented residence; that Xenophon's sons Gryllus and Diodoros could only have served in the Athenian cavalry at Mantinea if they had been Athenian citizens, and specifically, that Xenophon's use of spatial and temporal vocabulary in the *Poroi* situates the composition of the text within the city.[86]

### 1.5.4 The context – external relations

Probably in 358/7,[87] maintaining her anti-Thebes policy of recent years, Athens involved herself unsuccessfully in the internal strife of Euboea, supporting the Eretrian tyrant Plutarch in opposition to Thebes.[88] Meanwhile her onetime allies in the Second Athenian Confederacy, Rhodes, Kos and Chios, took the opportunity of this Athenian preoccupation and revolted, supported by Byzantium and Mausolus of Caria.[89] The war which followed, probably over at least three years, involved the mobilisation of substantial Athenian and allied forces, beginning with a siege and

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[82] Xenophon's life and exile: Diog. Laert. 2.6.48-59. Tuplin 1987, p. 68, concludes that exile followed the start of the Corinthian War and Athens' alignment with Persia against Sparta, probably in late 395/4 or the very start of 394/3.

[83] Boeckh 1976, p. 660, n. 503.

[84] Diog. Laert. 2.6.59, although Eubulus would have been too young to propose his exile, as Diogenes also tells us; Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63, n. 89 also dismisses the suggestion that he was recalled in 370, suggesting that 387/6 is more likely.

[85] Badian 2004, p. 42; Delebecque 1957, pp. 340-341.

[86] Jansen 2007, pp. 32-50.

[87] For the dating issues, see Peake 1997, arguing for 358/7 and Cawkwell 1962 supporting 357/6.

[88] Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; Simonsen 2008, p. 73.

[89] The major sources for the Social War are Diod. Sic. 16.7.2–4 and 16.21-22 and Isoc. 8 *On the Peace*; also Dem. *For the Liberty of the Rhodians* 15.3-4. For background to the rebellion see Cargill 1981 and, more concisely, Cargill 1982, pp. 91-102; Cawkwell 1981, pp. 40-55 and Dreher 1995. For a counter to Cargill's argument that the Athenians had not been as heavy-handed towards their allies as has been suggested and an overview of the scholarship, see Hornblower's 1982 review of Cargill 1981.

naval blockade of Byzantium supported by sixty ships, in the course of which the Athenian naval commander Chabrias was killed. A further sixty Athenian ships were then dispatched, with Timotheus and Iphicrates sent to support Chares, who was already in command of the Athenian infantry. The rebel states and their allies sacked Imbros and Lemnos and lay waste the countryside of Samos, besieging the city and ravaging other islands loyal to Athens in order to raise funds to further their campaign. Athenian plans for a naval engagement at Embata near Erythrae went awry due to inclement weather, and the resulting recriminations led to the recall and prosecution of Timotheus, Iphicrates, and his son Menestheus, leaving Chares in lone command. Now needing to fund the continuing campaign, Chares entered into an arrangement with the rebel Satrap Artabazus, putting his forces at Artabazus' disposal in a victorious battle (which Chares proclaimed to be as great a victory as Marathon)[90] against the army of the Great King in return for a generous reward. This short-term advantage however proved to be a long-term misjudgement, as the King expressed his displeasure and threatened to weigh in on the side of the rebels to the extent of three hundred ships. Combined with the fall of Amphipolis, Pydna and Potideia to Philip in 357,[91] Athens found herself financially exhausted and militarily outplayed, and the Athenian assembly had little option but to make terms in 355/4.

It is unsurprising that this combination of political and economic circumstances led to the appearance of both the *Poroi* and Isocrates' *On the Peace* and there is no reason to suppose that there may not have been other pamphleteers reflecting dismay at Athens' predicament and offering solutions. We cannot be sure that the 'dramatic date' of *On the Peace* was the actual time of writing,[92] but it purports at least to be written in 355 just as the terms of peace were in negotiation. Isocrates refers to 'proposals which have been put before you by the *prytaneis*'[93] although the suggestion that these proposals were drafted by Eubulus, based on the scholia to Demosthenes' *Third Olynthiac*, does not bear scrutiny.[94] Sometimes described as a 'companion piece' to the *Poroi*,[95] *On the Peace* offers a different perspective on the recent war and relations with Greek and non-Greek states. Isocrates analyses Athenian actions and compares

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[90] Schol. to Dem. *The First Philippic* 4.19.
[91] Diod. Sic. 16.8.2-3.
[92] Papillon 2004, p. 134.
[93] Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.15.
[94] Sealey 1955, p. 75; Cawkwell 1963b, p. 48.
[95] eg. *OCD*[4], p. 747 under Isocrates.

them to those of their ancestors both when under threat from the Persians and at the outset of the Delian League, calling for piety, moderation, justice and virtue in her relations with other states. Unlike Xenophon, Isocrates argues that there is a moral imperative for the exercise of these qualities which will in themselves lead to beneficial ends.[96] For Farrell, the biggest difference between the two works is that where Isocrates simply advocates peace and chastises the *demos*, Xenophon makes a practical plan for future action once peace is achieved.[97] Nevertheless, both are united in giving a clear impression that thanks to the recent wars, Athens has been abandoned by her regular visitors and that there is an urgent need to attract traders back to the city.[98]

### 1.5.5 The context – internal politics and finances

There is a wealth of datable sources for both Athenian state and individual activity in the 350s, much of it focused either on interstate relations or internal economics. Political and legislative activity for which we have evidence ranges from the trial of the three generals after Embata,[99] to a series of measures designed to shore up state revenue which provide the immediate backdrop to Xenophon's proposals. Athenian income in the year that the *Poroi* was written may have been as low as 130 talents,[100] compared with 1,000 talents at the start of the Peloponnesian War,[101] from which the expenses of Athens' many festivals, her army, navy and political and judicial offices were all met.[102] The extant *poletai* leases from the period 367-350 for the Attic silver mines show only levels of activity which, when compared with the next twenty-five years, demonstrate that full capacity was not being reached.[103] The integrity of her

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96 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.33-35, 63.

97 Farrell 2012, p. 294.

98 2.1, 5.3; Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.21.

99 Isoc. *Antidosis* 15.129-131; Plut. *Moralia* 187-188.

100 Dem. *Fourth Philippic* 10.37. Demosthenes uses the figure to argue that trierarchies and *eisphora* were fully met despite the paucity of resources. The 10.38 reference to a later, improved income of 400 talents is repeated by Theopompus *FrGrH* 115F166. However it is in the interests of the argument of the *Fourth Philippic* to give a low first figure and of both pieces to be generous with the second. In the Theopompus fragment, Aristophon is arguing that Athens can afford continued war with Philip. See also Shrimpton 1991, p. 242.

101 Xen. *Anabasis* 7.1.27; this is income into the state from all sources; from Thucydides we learn that tribute income accounted for 600 talents out of this total (2.113.3). Both these figures should be approached with some caution, see for instance Meiggs 1972, pp. 253, 258, on the difficulties of rationalising Pericles' 600 talent income with the Athenian Tribute Lists for 432 which suggest actual tribute income in the region of 388 talents.

102 See Rhodes 2013, p. 206 for an overview of Athenian state expenditure.

103 See *poletai* leases Langdon P6-P14.

silver coinage was an essential aspect of the strength of Athens' trading power, but in 374, forged coins of inferior silver content, probably struck abroad, had become a sufficient problem that legislation was required to weed them out in order to reinstate confidence.[104] In 363, Athenian coinage may well have been recalled and restruck in order to extract a 3% or 5% minting fee from those holding coined wealth in larger denominations.[105] In 361, Timotheus had been forced to pay part of the military costs of taking towns in Chalcidice himself, although trierarchs providing their own equipment were not necessarily uncommon.[106] A general assessment of 378 had suggested that total citizen property was valued at 5,750 talents,[107] and taxation through the *eisphora*, imposed frequently after 378/7, would, if met in full, have yielded 200 talents on each occasion.[108] But *eisphorai* were not being fully collected[109] and some of the wealthy were additionally defaulting on their liturgical duties. Already by the late fifth century one trierarchy had been frequently shared by two men or more, and in 358/7 it had been necessary to introduce legislation to compel incoming trierarchs to recover equipment appropriated by their predecessors.[110] The same year a law of Periander had attempted to tighten up a 'general attitude of leniency towards naval defaulters'[111] by instituting twenty symmories of sixty citizens each, spreading the burden over larger numbers of citizens who would bear a financial role in the support of the trierarchs,[112] but deficiencies continued and there is evidence of the use of increasingly heavy handed measures and even violence in the attempt to extract payment.[113] In 357/6 there was not enough equipment in the dockyards to fit out an emergency force,[114] and anyone refusing to sell their naval equipment to the state might be threatened with the confiscation of their property.[115] Of 283 state-owned ships, only 89 could be fully equipped by the end of the year.[116] The *epimeletai* (naval commissioners') record of 356/5 is a

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104 Stroud 1974 = RO 25 (the Law of Nikophon).
105 Kroll 2011.
106 Isoc. *Antidosis* 15.113; Gabrielsen 1994, p. 117.
107 Assessment of 378, Polybius 2.62.7. In 354 Demosthenes gives this figure as 6,000, (Dem. *On the Symmories* 14.19), which may be rhetorical licence or the result of a further assessment.
108 Brun 1983, p. 55.
109 Dem. *Against Androtion* 22.42.
110 Dem. *Against Evergus* 47.18-23; Gabrielsen 1994, pp. 173-179.
111 Gabrielsen 1994, p. 166.
112 The precise financial nature of this relationship remains obscure: Gabrielsen 1994, p. 194.
113 Dem. *Against Androtion* 22.47-9, 52-58, although in an earlier year we hear that the collection had gone much more smoothly (22.63). See Gabrielsen 1994, p. 160.
114 Dem. *Against Evergus* 47.20.
115 Dem. *Against Evergus* 47.44.
116 Gabrielsen 1994, p. 147.

remarkable witness to the detail and complexity of the state's naval administration, as more meticulous (or more permanent) record keeping was introduced, supporting the impression that trierarchs were increasingly failing to return their vessels with a full complement of equipment at the end of each year.[117] In the same year the *boule* failed in its obligation to ensure the provision of new ships after the treasurer for trireme-building had apparently absconded with the money.[118] This inability or unwillingness to pay on the part of the wealthy affected the lower classes who traditionally relied on naval service as a source of income; the discrepancies between the sizeable number of state-owned triremes and the numbers of manned ships actually available in times of military need may be a reflection of the under-funding of the navy.[119] The greater availability of salaried naval posts during periods of conflict may have affected thetic opinions when it came to assembly votes for military action,[120] and in that sense the *Poroi* is a remarkable re-focussing of those tensions, reversing the push to war in pursuit of income to a push for income in pursuit of peace.

An enquiry of 356/5 occasioned by Aristophon directed anyone who knew of sacred or public money in private hands to give information to a commission.[121] The same year, Leptines introduced a law which removed exemption from financial service from all except the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton, with the intention that all the wealthiest would be obliged to perform liturgies.[122] Even whilst attacking this law the following year, the young Demosthenes admitted of a scenario in which it would be plausible to speak of the treasury being empty[123] and by 352, Demosthenes would himself make the accusation that the Athenian treasury did not have the reserves to cover even a day's emergency expenditure.[124]

The year after the *Poroi* was written, Demosthenes called for reforms to Periander's law which would increase the symmories from the original 1,200 to 2,000, to take

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117 *IG* II$^2$ 1612; see Simonsen 2008 for the collection of naval debts evidenced by this inscription, also Gabrielsen 1994, p. 157.

118 Dem. *Against Androtion* 22.8, 11-20; *Ath. Pol*. 46.1.

119 Badian 1995, p. 101.

120 Burke has argued that the need for thetic subsidisation through naval service had a direct influence on foreign policy in the fifth century: Burke 2005, p. 22.

121 Dem. *Against Timocrates* 24.11.

122 Dem. *Against Leptines* 20.127. For the context and date of the law of Leptines see Kremmydas 2012, pp. 1-53.

123 Dem. *Against Leptines* 20.24-25.

124 Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 23.209.

account of the losses from the list caused by discounting ineligible categories such as wards and orphans, in order to leave a true twelve hundred to share the burden.[125] In the same speech Demosthenes was to urge restraint against those who were alarmed by rumours of Persian naval preparations, proposing that rather than face a further *eisphora*, private wealth should remain in the hands of its owners 'for the benefit of the state.'[126]

For perhaps the first time in the classical era, the economic interests of mass and elite in relation to the pursuit of *arche* no longer coincided.[127] Crediting Eubulus with policies which may even have averted *stasis,* Badian has argued that the Athenian *demos* clung to the 'ghost of empire' long after the wealthy had recognised that their former foreign landholdings were irrevocably lost and that war reduced their personal wealth without increasing Athenian prosperity.[128] Furthermore, whilst land-ownership remained an essential factor in assessment for individual taxation and for military and political participation,[129] the breadth of alternative sources of personal wealth made available with the fifth-century expansion of empire may have led to tensions between the traditional liturgical class and those whose more liquid assets were trickier to assess.[130] Demosthenes' apparent defence of the wealthy elite early in his career may be reflective of the tensions evolving in the city around these issues.[131] Simply further squeezing the rich was not a long-term solution, and an aspect of Xenophon's presentational skill in the *Poroi* is that he addresses the whole of the Athenian citizenry without apparent differentiation, whilst offering each individual class what it most wants to hear. He recognises the political need to provide regular support for the poor, offers improved opportunities in commerce for the entrepreneurial individual of modest or greater means, and situates his major scheme within the traditional elite comfort zones of the silver mining industry and slave-ownership.

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125 Dem. *On the Symmories* 14.16.

126 Dem. *On the Symmories* 14.28.

127 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.51 'our democracy flourishes and endures in times of peace and security while in times of war it has twice already been overthrown, but we are hostile to those who desire peace as if suspecting them of favouring oligarchy, while we are friendly to those who advocate war as if assured of their devotion to democracy.'

128 Badian 1995, p. 101.

129 *Ath. Pol.* 7.3-4; 47.1 (treasurers of Athena appointed from the *pentakosiomedimnoi*).

130 Burke 1998, p. 50.

131 Burke 2002, p. 169.

This immediate topicality in the *Poroi* implies a commentator sensitively in touch with the city's urgent financial position and the social, political and military implications of making the right – or wrong – choices, suggesting that Xenophon was more open to innovative solutions than his younger contemporary. From the frequency and enormity of these legislative measures we quickly begin to see why Xenophon chose to focus so intently on state finances.

This leads us to note, importantly, what we do not have. Despite a wealth of information about the sources of income (if often and frustratingly lacking associated figures), aside from very occasional references, we lack a full understanding of the way that the Athenians perceived the management of their state's finances, or detail as to the administrative processes of legislating, accounting and auditing. Seventy years earlier Athenians had been accustomed to seeing tribute literally paraded in front of them and Athena's share inscribed in stone.[132] By the mid-fourth century without this very public income, other sources of revenue had become more important and gross figures may have been less easily accessible, because their diverse nature caused them to be recorded separately at several different sites. Only a small proportion of citizens will have had an opportunity to be even briefly involved in the detailed administration of state finances as they took their turn as *bouleutes*, and it would have taken a degree of determination to acquire the information and experience necessary for a holistic assessment of the way the state was managing her finances.[133] For the period after the Athenian Tribute Lists we have only very infrequent allusions to levels of state reserves or income. Because these references are usually made at times of difficulty, they tend to convey an impression of *ad hoc* financial crisis management rather than considered policy.[134]

But from the context in which the figures appear, Athenians clearly knew that 130 talents was a poor annual income and 400 talents substantially better,[135] and although the principles and procedures behind any long term financial planning are harder to judge, the funding of the city's activities was sophisticated. From at least early in the

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[132] Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.82 and *ATL.*
[133] L. Kallet-Marx 1994, pp. 230-231.
[134] Dem. *Fourth Philippic* 10.31 'There is nothing that the state needs so much for the coming struggle as money.' Dem. *First Olynthiac* 1.20 'Only money we must have, and without money nothing can be done that ought to be done.'
[135] Dem. *Fourth Philippic* 10.37.

fourth century there was a process of μερισμός, the allocation of monies throughout the year by the ἀποδέκται, 'receivers' of income, into individual funds such as the stratiotic and theoric funds,[136] a system which implies some level of budgeting against which the *apodektai* could make their distributions.[137] Individual citizens could make proposals regarding the *merismos* but they would first have to navigate them past the *nomothetai* and the *boule*. Later, men appointed ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει may have had particular responsibility to make such suggestions,[138] but again the implication is that there was a sufficient accumulation of oversight of city finances amongst these various post-holders to weed out the less providential proposals. The treasurers of some funds were elected rather than appointed by lot, and the post of theoric treasurer, probably established shortly after the *Poroi* was written, became particularly powerful, receiving all the surplus funds of the other treasuries. Eubulus' popular distribution of the theoric fund during his tenure of the post has been seen as a fulfilment of Xenophon's triobol proposal.[139]

Xenophon makes references to forward planning, reminding his readers that in peacetime large revenues had been received which were all spent in wartime, and suggesting that state administration costs should be reduced to the level of income previously raised by peacetime taxation (ie, without *eisphora* income) in order that a surplus may be accrued as a result of the additional income that will be raised through encouraging metics and merchants.[140] The neccessity of a balanced equivalence between income and expenditure cannot have been a revelation, and it is difficult to judge whether or not he is proposing something radically new. At the very least, however, Xenophon's suggestion implies that the structures are in place for a review of future budgets and a planned restraint in expenditure to within predetermined levels.

Despite the rich snapshot of Athenian economic life that the sources supply, we must, as always, be on our guard for the political dispositions and personal enmities that colour some of the activities described in our sources. Equally importantly, those

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136 Rhodes 2007, pp. 349-350.
137 The *apodektai* may have been instituted by Cleisthenes. Rhodes 2013, pp. 216-218 and van Wees 2013, p. 43.
138 Rhodes 2007, p. 354.
139 See for instance the discussion of Cawkwell 1963b at 1.6.2 above.
140 4.40; 5.12.

activities must be placed in a context that recognises the continuity and fluidity of economic and political change. Of central importance in the Greek world, the popularity of Piraeus as a market had been noted before;[141] Athens was to intervene in Euboea again as soon as 349/8[142] and, as Gauthier points out, the problem of 'the poverty of the masses' was hardly a new one.[143] It is usual to begin discussions of the *Poroi* with a statement to the effect that it was written as Athens emerged from the Social War in financial crisis.[144] Such a statement may then be counterpointed with a discussion of events enacted during the years that followed, such as the rebuilding of Piraeus, the increase of mining activity or the granting of honours to non-Athenians, in order to show the extent to which Xenophon may have been in touch with, or may even have influenced, leading politicians such as Eubulus, or else was verging to a greater - or lesser - degree on a breakthrough in economic thought. Bracketing the *Poroi* with Isocrates' *On the Peace* strengthens the implication that a turning point had been reached.[145] But this approach can imply that events somehow came to a standstill whilst Xenophon (with or without Eubulus) deliberated, and Attica held its breath. It quite possibly overestimates the significance that this piece of Xenophon's writing held for his contemporaries. Cawkwell rightly points out that Athens' immediate financial difficulties were more likely a result of longer term military and economic events than the effect of a single war of perhaps only twenty months.[146] We will explore the extent to which Xenophon's proposals seem to have taken life during the years that followed the writing of the *Poroi*, but it is important to see these ideas as only a part of a series of changes which had begun much earlier. The many initiatives of the 350s are testimony both to economic difficulty and to individual ingenuity and Xenophon was not the first citizen to try to address Athenian finances.

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141 Thuc. 2.38.2; [Xen.] *Constitution of the Athenians* 2.7; Isoc. *Panegyricus* 4.42.

142 Plut. *Phocion* 12.1.

143 Gauthier 1976, p. 126.

144 Giglioni 1970, XIV; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 1; Burke 1992, p. 208; Doty 2003, p. 4; J. D. Lewis 2009, p. 370. For Burke, this 'before and after' split is central to his argument for a readjustment to the primitivist model of the Athenian economy in the second half of the fourth century.

145 eg. Mossé 1973a: p. 32, 'the renunciation of hegemony and imperialism, the exploitation of resources in Attica and a policy calculated to attract foreigners and traders there. Such a policy was in opposition to all that had been attempted during the preceding years,' and p. 43, '...since in 356 in *Ways and Means,* Xenophon still complained that most of the mines were inactive, and only got under way after 356, that is to say from the moment Athens had to renounce her large-scale imperialism in the Aegean and was obliged to turn her resources to the best possible account'; Vannier 1993, p. 339: 'La guerre des alliés est généralement interprétée comme un tournant dans le IVe siècle athénien'. Gray 2000 compares the outlooks of Xenophon and Isocrates.

146 Cawkwell 1981, p. 54.

Nor was he the only Athenian to recognise that those revenue-producing merchants and metics who were important to her economic vitality had largely abandoned the city.[147] What Xenophon attempted to reach in the *Poroi* was a synthesis of social, political and economic activity that recognised the specific needs and circumstances of the many strata of Athenian society and planned to use their interconnectedness to manage change.

### 1.5.6 Xenophon's audience

Whilst we cannot know the circumstances in which the *Poroi* was first presented or received, we may make inferences from the text as to those it was intended to reach. Discussing the *Hellenica* and citing the *Poroi* as evidence, Tuplin points out that the most interested and sizeable readership was to be found in Athens.[148] A natural first audience might have been a group of like-minded elite citizens such as a *hetaireia*, not necessarily in the sense of the supporters of a leading politician, but a circle of acquaintances, 'who met for drink, talk, amusement and political jobbery.'[149] Farrell has demonstrated the ways the text evidences Xenophon's place within a tradition of Attic orators,[150] whilst Jansen has argued that it was a *bouleutic* text produced for colleagues with whom Xenophon was already in collaboration and circulated by pamphlet. Jansen lists Adams' categories of men for whom such a pamphlet might have been useful: those wishing to propagate doctrine that could not be discussed openly, those without access to the *bema,* those wishing to reach a small reading class with ideas that demanded greater deliberative thought than could be expressed in the assembly, and those wishing to influence public opinion abroad. He argues convincingly that the *Poroi* was intended to be read rather than 'performed' and suggests that Xenophon's target audience was a small reading class who could deliberate his ideas.[151] We will however return to these categories in due course.

Unlike his other work, which may have been written with a Spartan as well as an

[147] Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.21.
[148] Tuplin 1993, p. 166.
[149] Rhodes 1986, p. 139.
[150] Farrell 2012, pp. 280-358.
[151] Jansen 2012, pp. 92-101.

Athenian audience in mind,[152] the addressees here seem clear. Xenophon writes self-confidently in the first person; as it has come down to us, 'I' is the first word of the text.[153] He may never say ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι but he uses the first person plural continuously throughout, identifying himself as an Athenian, placing himself within the citizenry,[154] adding immediacy of place and sharing his vision with his fellow citizens. It is those citizens, after all, who would benefit from his proposals and who held the power to enact them. Thiel saw it as an imaginary speech to the assembly,[155] and Gauthier maintained that Xenophon only considered his plans from the point of view of Athenian citizens, albeit having to make concessions thanks to a dichotomy between the *homines politici* who would vote for them and the *homines oeconomici* who would have to fund them.[156] But as we look more closely at the proposals and the individuals whose participation would be vital for their fulfilment, we may see that Xenophon is aware that many classes of free men, Athenian and others, would need to engage actively in his projects and would only do so if they had confidence in the likelihood of a successful outcome. Xenophon refers directly to many categories of free men (and once, to women[157]). 'Athenians' figure prominently: as active participants in his schemes; as vicarious owners of slaves via the state, and as passive recipients of τροφή.[158] But they are also described within their formal political and military categories: as citizens, οἱ πολῖται[159] and τοῖς ἀστοῖς;[160] as councillors, τῇ βουλῇ;[161] as treasurers, τῷ δημοσίῳ;[162] as members of the ten tribes, the δέκα φυλαί,[163] as hoplites, cavalry and patrolling the countryside, ὁπλίτας, ἱππέων, περιπόλων,[164] as torch race superintendents, ταῖς λαμπάσι γυμνασιαρχούμενοι and as peltasts and those on garrison duty, οἵ τε φρουρεῖν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις οἵ τε

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152 Cuniberti 2007, pp. 379-390.

153 *Agesilaus*, *Constitution of the Lacedaimonians, Oeconomikos, Symposium* and *Cyropaedia* all open in the first person, although *Cyropaedia* is in the plural and only the *Constitution of the Lacedaimonians* has the *Poroi*'s assertive ἐγὼ. This use of the first person is not unusual in the Xenophontic corpus; Jansen 2007, pp. 101-102, points to the extent of its use and of the intensifier ἔγωγε.

154 Delebecque 1957, p. 475.

155 Thiel 1922, p. XXVIII.

156 Gauthier 1976, p. 165, 170. See also chapter 1.4.

157 4.8.

158 2.4, 3.10, 4.17, 4.22.

159 1.1, 2.3, 3.7, 5.12.

160 2.2.

161 4.18.

162 4.20.

163 4.30.

164 2.2, 4.47, 4.52.

πελτάζειν.[165] Political appointees - τῇ τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἀρχῇ[166] - would play an important role in managing mercantile disputes and two entirely new boards are proposed for the promotion of metic settlement and the maintenance of peace.[167] It is clear that these proposals are to be carried out entirely within the democratic mechanisms of the city and will be 'guaranteed by the *polis*, which is to all appearances the safest and most durable of human institutions.'[168] If any citizen had harboured a lingering doubt as to Xenophon's oligarchic tendencies, his language is reassuring.

Athenian working men also populate the text, such as farmers, coppersmiths and iron workers[169] whose professions are used to illustrate general truths and whose presence engenders a sense of inclusiveness of all ranks of the citizenry. Undoubtedly then the *Poroi* was written for and about Athens and her citizens. In the opening paragraph wider categories set the scene; the many poor, τὴν τοῦ πλήθους πενίαν, the leading men of Athens, οἱ προστάται and all other men, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων. Those who are to be helped, the poor; and those who should provide solutions, the leading men; are posed against a generality of all other men who set a standard of justness against which Athenians are measured, and indeed are found wanting. Athenians having just been defined as the combination of the leading men and the masses, the implication here is that those 'other men' who are judging Athenian behaviour must be non-Athenian. Thus in his very opening Xenophon sets up Athenians to be judged by outsiders and in particular by the Greek world.[170] Some of these outsiders will play a pivotal role in his plans as providers of revenue and it is instructive to see how Xenophon talks about them.

Non-Athenians appear frequently. Kings, tyrants and satraps are likely to be attracted to invest in the city and receive her honours.[171] Such high-status foreigners might be unlikely to move to Athens, but resident aliens are to be an important source of

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165 4.52.
166 3.3.
167 2.7 μετοικοφύλακας; 5.1 εἰρηνοφύλακας.
168 3.10: καὶ ταῦτα ἐν πόλει, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀσφαλέστατόν τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι. For Pontier (2006, p. 394), Xenophon's use of democratic structures is to ensure the εὐταξία of the city.
169 4.5 οἱ μὲν ἀγροὺς κεκτημένοι; 4.6 χαλκοτύποι, οἱ σιδηρεῖς.
170 1.1.
171 3.11.

income through the metic tax.[172] Barbarians may be troublesome for other Greek states who share borders with them but in Athens metics such as Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians and even the stateless are to be encouraged, relieved of certain unwelcome military duties and given privileges which will encourage them to settle and trade.[173] Metics should have unwelcome disadvantages removed and merchants should be treated with consideration;[174] this is neither the language of exploitation nor of exclusivity.

Gauthier writes that Xenophon deplored the presence of non-Greeks in Athens[175] but it is hard to square this with his encouragement of non-Greeks to invest,[176] his neutral reference to the state having opened up mining to foreigners, and his suggestion that foreigners might become managers.[177] Nowhere does he specify that he only intends Greek metics and Greek foreigners to participate. If Xenophon found barbarians too numerous, it seems unlikely that he would have offered them the opportunity to serve in the cavalry, a proposal he had also made in *On the Cavalry Commander* where he spoke highly of the reputation of foreign contingents in other cavalries.[178] Although he suggests freeing non-Athenians from the requirement for hoplite service this is presented as a benefit to them and he simply says that it would be an ornament to the state if the hoplite force consisted only of citizens. Gauthier's suggestion elsewhere, that barbarians did not make good hoplites[179] seems explanation enough, without the need to extrapolate the passage to a wider comment on non-Greeks in Athenian society.

Nevertheless, thus far the Athenian/non Athenian opposition is clear. What is remarkable is the number of instances when Athenian and foreigner are lined up side by side, or even indistinguishable. Xenophon's proposals are not for a state-run industry; they are instead about bolstering the support needed by entrepreneurs, Athenian and others, to encourage the generation of income. This entails that a detailed understanding of the risks and difficulties of those enterprises, mining and

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172 2.1-7, 4.40.
173 1.8, 2.1-7.
174 2.2, 4.40.
175 Gauthier 1972, p. 124.
176 3.11.
177 4.12.
178 2.5; Xen. *On the Cavalry Commander* 9.3-7.
179 Gauthier 1976, p. 64.

maritime trade, is essential in order to provide support systems that will promote them and to persuade his listeners that the proposals will be effective. Tentative mine operators, not necessarily Athenians, are offered *de facto* financial support; the state will meet the initial purchase cost of slaves, reducing the capital outlay and risk inherent in large-scale acquisitions of manpower at the outset of an enterprise. The state has already opened mining to foreigners and given them equality of taxation (*isoteleia)* with citizens[180] and many, both Athenians and foreigners, would gladly become managers of mines.[181] Individual private operators (οἱ ἰδιῶται, οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα) are not defined by their origins but by their occupation.[182] The backgrounds of other tradesmen are similarly ambiguous. The ship-owners and merchants who are to be encouraged to unload their goods in Piraeus are foreigners who have a choice of ports against which Athens must compete,[183] but improved facilities and a wider range of incoming goods similarly encourage Athenian traders, importers and captains. Such incentives would equally benefit citizens and non-citizens. Xenophon moves on to discuss places of exchange in Piraeus and market facilities in the *asty* through proposals that are again attractive both to the foreigner and to the Athenian listener who will also benefit from a wider range of commodities available for sale.[184]

Beyond such recipients, there may be yet another audience. Having established in his opening that Athens is perceived as unjust towards other cities, Xenophon demonstrates that past Athenian hegemony has been gained through goodwill and lost through arrogance.[185] In the *Memorabilia* he had argued that

> many supporters are necessary to him who ventures to use force: but he who can persuade needs no confederate, having confidence in his own unaided power of persuasion. And such a man has no occasion to shed blood: for who would rather take a man's life than have a live and willing follower?[186]

This idea of the use of persuasion rather than force to attract willing followers is central to the *Poroi*. Xenophon's vision is not pacifist, but it does describe a non-

180 4.12.
181 4.22.
182 4.17, 4.19, 4.28, 4.32.
183 3.1-4, 5.3.
184 3.12.
185 5.5-7.
186 Xen. *Memorabilia* 1.2.11 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ συμμάχων ὁ μὲν βιάζεσθαι τολμῶν δέοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ὀλίγων, ὁ δὲ πείθειν δυνάμενος οὐδενός: καὶ γὰρ μόνος ἡγοῖτ᾽ ἂν δύνασθαι πείθειν. καὶ φονεύειν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἥκιστα συμβαίνει: τίς γὰρ ἀποκτεῖναί τινα βούλοιτ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι πειθομένῳ χρῆσθαι.

aggressive state which seeks to entice rather than to dominate other *poleis*. Whilst he admits of the possibility of future wars, any adversary is left unnamed, referred to, if at all, simply as 'the enemy',[187] and his ambition is that the other Greek states will one day pray for Athenian safety.[188] His final proposal concerns a pan-Hellenic sanctuary and concurrent with the avowed appeal for divine approval, is self-evidently destined, subject to the endorsement of his fellow citizens, to reach a pan-Hellenic audience through Athenian embassies dispatched for the purpose.[189] Through the medium of his text, Xenophon reconfigures interstate relationships by positioning Athens as a peaceable, devout, prosperous and attractive city that is generous to her allies and has learned lessons from her past behaviour.

Let us return to Jansen's discussion of the various potential recipients of pamphlets such as the *Poroi*.[190] Given the recognition of interstate issues, the intensive appeal to non-Athenian Greeks and to non-Greeks, and the success with which his proposals are focused to appeal to all groups, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that, to the extent that wider dissemination were practicable (an important caveat), his paper is aimed at a very general readership and we may not exclude the intention to influence public opinion abroad. It seems likely that Xenophon had in mind both a domestic and a foreign audience. His language is non-coercive and open and is as focused on attracting individual entrepreneurs from the wider Greek world and beyond as it is on persuading his fellow citizens to adopt his ideas. Presenting his schemes solely from the viewpoint of those citizens who would benefit, would risk making them appear exploitative, and it is a remarkable aspect of Xenophon's worldview that he encompassed so many different perspectives.

Seen in this way the *Poroi* emerges as a complex and multi-layered text which addresses both a domestic and foreign audience. Within the Athenian citizenry, the wealthy, apparently struggling under the burden of recent taxation and liturgies, are enticed by the prospect of relief from the expense of war; the poor can anticipate sharing the profits of mining through their tribes[191] and ultimately may expect to be in

[187] 4.42, 4.45, 4.46, 4.47.
[188] 5.10.
[189] 5.9-10.
[190] See chapter 1.5.6 above.
[191] 4.30-31.

receipt of daily τροφή, whilst mercantile and mining opportunities will be opened up for the entrepreneur. Non-Athenians are offered the possibility of honours and privileges, relief from certain military services and profit through trading opportunities supported by a better legal and physical market infrastructure. The language towards non-Greeks is equally friendly; Xenophon distances Athens from those Greek states who have poor relations with their barbarian neighbours and offers those barbarians the same opportunities that are available to Greeks. He avoids presenting his proposals as solely exploitative of the skills and taxation potential of non-Athenians in the way that he might do if he were only talking to fellow citizens. In order to establish that they have potential for success Xenophon has assessed his propositions from the point of view of these non-Athenians. The engagement of long-term resident metics is essential; they might well be expected to hear or read Xenophon's ideas and to provide an influential, if non-voting, opinion. To secure their economic participation they would have to be persuaded by the arguments from their inception. Nothing in the text is overtly discriminating towards these vital elements in Athenian society, who are presented as valuable contributors to be honoured and encouraged to settle in the *asty*.[192]

Beyond these individual recipients of his arguments, the ship-owners, mine operators and importers, we may also discern a broader appeal. As we have seen, there is a repositioning of Athens in relation to other states. A revitalised Athens is presented as friendly and peaceable rather than exploitative and aggressive. Sensible precautions for war may be inevitable, but no potential enemy is identified, not even the Persians, ever the traditional Greek rallying point,[193] then holding the balance of power. Even were the proposals not taken up, an idea of a different Athens, sensitive to her past errors and open to future alliances, has begun to be created. In this sense, Xenophon's further audience is the broader population of the Greek and non-Greek world in an era when all her relationships were once more being reassessed.

## 1.6 Earlier scholarship

The many evaluative comments made by scholars about Xenophon and the *Poroi,*

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[192] 2.7.

[193] For example, Isocrates' *Panegyricus* 4.158 of 380, the first in a series of appeals to leaders from Agesilaus to Philip, to take leadership of the Hellenes against the Persians.

which range from 'fantastic' (Cawkwell)[194] to 'the Father of Economics' (Doty)[195] tend to reflect the political and scholarly obsessions of their times whilst mirroring the evolution of the wider assessment of Xenophon's writing, and it is difficult not to sympathise with Noreen Humble's dismay at the 'still all too common tendency to criticize Xenophon for what he has not done.'[196] For the admirer of Xenophon, there is a sort of grim pleasure in reporting some of the ruder verdicts that have been pronounced on the *Poroi* in the past: 'corruption or graft in its most odious form' from Andreades in 1933 is particularly worthy of repetition.[197] Looking more widely at Xenophon's corpus however, modern scholars are now finding him a more subtle and complex writer.[198] Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship had concentrated particularly on the economic viability of Xenophon's proposals and on textual issues, dating and authorship,[199] whilst the scholarship of the later twentieth- and early twenty-first centuries has tended to assess the quality of his economic thought, to appraise his political motivation and to look for the philosophical underpinning of the work.

The *Poroi* has frequently been the object of conflicting interpretations. Given the brief and at times allusory nature of the text, it is inevitable that contextualisation has played a heavy role in eliciting useful readings. Two very recent studies have found Xenophon in the *Poroi* to be both anti-imperialist, and not anti-imperialist.[200] Further back, Gauthier and Schütrumpf argued for widely different interpretations of Xenophon's motives in introducing a triobol payment, on the one hand as a support to democratic participation and the other, as a suppressant of it.[201] A surface reading may not always provide the richest interpretation, but such conflicts argue for a careful analysis of what is actually in the text, and acknowledgement of those points where references are too fleeting for useful enlargement.

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194 Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63.
195 Doty 2003, p. 9.
196 Humble 2011, similarly Gish 2011.
197 Andreades 1933, p. 384 n. 3.
198 See for instance Tuplin 1993, Gray 2007 and Gray 2011, and the collected papers in Tuplin 2004 and Hobden and Tuplin 2012.
199 e.g. Boeckh 1976, pp. 599-610; Madvig 1871, p. 364; Thiel 1922, pp. XIII-XXIII; Andreades 1933, pp. 384-391. Bloch 2004 has a comprehensive survey of nineteenth-century scholarship.
200 Anti-imperialist: Jansen 2007, see chapter 4, 'Xenophon's Anti-imperialistic Economics'. Not anti-imperialist: Farrell 2012, pp. 327-328.
201 Pro-democracy: Gauthier 1976; anti-democratic: Schütrumpf 1995.

### 1.6.1 Economic debates

Given that my interest lies particularly in what the *Poroi* can reveal of ancient Athenian economic understanding, a study of secondary literature also requires recognition of the substantial body of late twentieth-century discussion on the nature of the classical economy, much of which sprang from the opposing 'primitivist' and 'modernist' models, and took its energy predominantly from the 1973 publication of Moses Finley's *The Ancient Economy.*[202] Building on the work of Max Weber[203] and, more recently, Karl Polanyi,[204] Finley argued for an anthropologically situated model of the antique Mediterranean economy that saw levels of economic activity controlled by social and political factors – 'embedded' in cultural attitudes to trade and ideas of individual status. These prioritised agriculture, leading to limited technological innovation and growth, with activity based around small-scale agricultural production for home and local consumption with little inter-regional exchange or competitive or interdependent markets.[205] The quest for profit existed, but

> … the citizen-élite were not prepared *in sufficient numbers,* to carry on those branches of the economy without which neither they nor their communities could live at the level to which they were accustomed. The élite possessed the resources and the political power, they could also command a large personnel. They lacked the will; that is to say, they were inhibited as a group (whatever the responses of a minority), by over-riding values.[206]

This oft-quoted assertion was made in relation to the management of both the Athenian corn trade and Roman provincial tax collection, and whilst Finley was careful to admit always of exceptions (indeed *The Ancient Economy* is a more nuanced text than some of his detractors might at times suggest), one of the difficulties of his approach is that it intentionally creates a model over a wide geographical area and a lengthy time span, neither of which, on closer examination, necessarily offers the unity of environmental, social or political circumstance implied by the suggestion that 'in its final centuries the ancient world was a single political unit, [with a] common cultural psychological framework'.[207]

This more sophisticated development of the 'primitivist' model became known as

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202 Finley 1999.
203 Weber 1891 and Weber 1909.
204 Polanyi 1968; see also Nafissi 2005.
205 Finley 1999, p. 34, pp. 125-126; see also Finley 1965, pp. 29-45.
206 Finley 1999, p. 60, Finley's italics.
207 Finley 1999, p. 34.

substantivism and had itself been in part a response to the work of modernist economic historians such as Rostovtzeff[208] whose tendency to identify economic phenomena in contemporary terms was an approach which subsequently developed into formalism, succinctly described by Cartledge as a view of the ancient economy as

> a functionally segregated and independently instituted sphere of activity with its own profit maximising, want-satisfying logic and rationality, less 'developed' no doubt than any modern economy but nevertheless recognisably similar in kind.'[209]

Such a very brief overview of a complex debate is inevitably only a limited introduction and cannot begin to do justice to the vast amount of intensive discussion that has taken place even over the last forty years or so. But for our present purposes it serves to describe the way that these differing vantage points inevitably colour the way that scholars have both understood Xenophon's work and have taken its details as supporting evidence for one or other viewpoint. It also underlines the necessity for care in our choice of terminology. Athenian economic activities look remarkably like ours and the use of modern economists' terms such as 'profit maximisation' and 'capital' may be inescapable when processes that are familiar to us today are clearly seen at work in fourth-century Greece. But that is not to assume that it is appropriate to map modern capitalist or utilitarian theory on to ancient evidence.[210] Economic terms, in both Athenian and contemporary society, may be ethically value-laden or evoke wider, modern associations which do not necessarily marry with ancient understanding or practice. Similarly, using the modern economy as a yardstick inevitably sets up the ancient world to fall short of evaluative, developmental staging points which do not always help us to understand processes as they actually took place on a daily basis. Conversely, whilst it would be foolish to attempt to define an entire economic system on the basis of one brief text, it is noteworthy that many of the patterns of behaviour, both social and economic, that have formed the basis for scholarly opinions on all sides of the debate about the nature of the ancient economy, are both described and challenged by Xenophon, making it all the more remarkable that the text has been so frequently dismissed. Xenophon presupposes that certain

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[208] Rostovtzeff 1926 and Rostovtzeff 1941. See Bruhns 2003 and the collected papers in *MediterrAnt* 6, no. 2, 2003, pp. 571-694 and *MediterrAnt* 7, no. 1, 2004, pp. 15–193 for recent scholarship on Rostovtzeff and his legacy; Davies 2004a in that collection discusses his influence on the subsequent agenda.

[209] Cartledge 2002a, p. 15.

[210] See for instance Davies 2005, pp. 128-129 on some of the pitfalls inherent in this approach.

economic choices might be made due to considerations of honour and status[211] but his entire project assumes that at least some Athenian and non-Athenian individuals will be motivated by consideration of the acquisition of wealth through means unrelated to land, many of them taking up individual and shared enterprises. This does not necessarily entail that we are looking at a 'utilitarian' economy where profit is the only motivator, if indeed such an economy exists anywhere. However it is noteworthy that all of Xenophon's proposals will fail if there are not sufficient ship owners, ship-builders, merchants, retailers, slave traders, mine operators, smelters, timber suppliers and a myriad providers of ancillary services to the mining industry, with not only the available surplus but the commercial nous to extend their operations when profitable opportunities open up for them. We will explore the varied facets of the silver industry as they relate to the *Poroi* in chapter 2. On the other hand, at least some of those operators (some foreign merchants and some resident metics) may be swayed in their trading choices by additional, non-profit considerations such as the comfort and convenience of harbour and market facilities and the opportunity to receive honours such as theatre seats and hospitality. Status considerations, yes, but certainly not confined to the ancient economy - what twentyfirst-century client has not made commercial choices on the back of an excellent lunch courtesy of a supplier, or a free seat at a sponsor's gala night? At a first glance we may judge that no Athenian citizen is necessarily required personally to enter a mine, involve themselves in commerce or undertake manual labour in order to benefit financially from a scheme which relies on investment by citizens in the (largely unfree) labour of others. But as we see from the list of suppliers above, it is untenable to believe that Athenian citizens should not be involved in many of the industries necessary for its success.[212]

Mining may have been open to metics[213] but the majority of fourth-century mine leaseholders and associated operators were, and remained, Athenian.[214] The eventual outcomes of Xenophon's schemes may be the funding of state beneficence with the objective of inter-state peace, but they are dependent on profit-seeking individuals for their fulfilment. The motivations of those individuals may be complex and we should

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211 3.4.

212 See Rihll 2001 for an overview of the many suppliers involved directly in silver extraction and E. M. Harris 2002 for a list of the wide variety of technical specialisations available in Athenian commerce.

213 4.12.

214 Crosby 1950, pp. 293-297.

avoid unnecessary simplicity in our analysis.

### 1.6.2 Scholarship overview

In 1842 Boeckh's severe criticism centred on Xenophon's proposals for metics, which he believed would have put Athenians in a perpetual state of war, with noble families becoming extinct whilst metics appropriated all the land and wealth and lived in security.[215] Boeckh's emphases on the purity of the nobility and the usurious practices of foreigners betray the ethos of an earlier age and a difference in critical textual approach; only Xenophon's 'exhortation to peace' is found to be 'entirely unobjectionable.'[216] Elsewhere Boeckh's criticism is of the point picked up perhaps most consistently by commentators, Xenophon's delusory expectation that the silver resources of the Laurion would never run out.[217] But Boeckh is ultimately reconciled to Xenophon's 'sincere conviction and earnestness'[218] and he uses the *Poroi* to support his essay on the operation of the Athenian silver mines, also drawing on visits to the region by Hobhouse.[219] Lewis' English edition of 1842 added further information from the visits of Dodswell and Wordsworth,[220] and although later supplanted by Ardaillon and then Conophagos,[221] Boeckh's essay remains in many respects a coherent analysis of the operation of the silver mines in antiquity.

A hundred years later, Andreades took issue with Boeckh's strictures, emphasising that the financial basis for some of Xenophon's arguments was sound and maintaining that the economic benefits of attracting more metics were unquestionable.[222] For Andreades, the *Poroi* reflected the views of an oligarchic party whose programme involved, 'the bribing of the populace,'[223] making the triobol scheme 'repugnant to our sentiments;' again as with Boeckh, revealing contemporary attitudes. Despite admiration for his economic skills, Andreades cannot hide a distaste for Xenophon's central scheme, and he makes the unlikely suggestion that one of the reasons it was

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215 Boeckh 1976, p. 603.
216 Boeckh 1976, p. 609.
217 Boeckh 1976, p. 608.
218 Boeckh 1976, p. 610.
219 Boeckh 1976, p. 619, n. 16; p. 620, n. 22; p. 633.
220 Boeckh 1976, pp. 677-678.
221 Ardaillon 1897; Conophagos 1980.
222 Andreades 1933, pp. 384-385 n. 7; 390. Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.21 tells us that metics had deserted the city during the Social War.
223 Andreades 1933, pp. 383-384.

never put in place was the Athenians' 'instinctive humane feelings' which would have rejected the idea of industrial exploitation of slaves, with its Laconising implications.[224]

Hasebroek's *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*,[225] influenced by Weber and appearing in English in the same year as Andreades,[226] took a broader view of the *Poroi* that read it, not as an oligarchic work, but as a programme of economic reform that demonstrated the Greek city's primary duty, the maintenance of its people, and was an affirmation of the Athenian understanding of the relationship between the economy, the state and the empire.[227] Hasebroek nevertheless saw fourth-century Athenian commerce in terms of limited development, with small manufacturing establishments unable to increase efficiency because capital accumulation, investment and the institution of slavery were problematic and demand could not be forecast. Hasebroek argued that Hipponicus, Philemonides and Nikias did not hire their slaves into large scale production.[228] But Hasebroek's analysis overlooks the combined developmental power of many small enterprises engaged in highly intensive, profit-driven silver mining, which we will look at in more detail in chapter 2.

In 1941 Rostovtzeff dismissed the *Poroi* as 'rather in the nature of political propaganda than a serious suggestion by an experienced financier,'[229] and in the 1950s, Romilly picked up the focus on underlying Athenian politics. Romilly argued that Xenophon's Socrates deplored Athenian citizens' attitude to the state, a dismay which motivated the *Poroi*, although the passage she cites in the *Memorabilia* is in the voice of the son of Pericles, and Socrates' response is more optimistic as to the possibility of change.[230] Shortly after, Delebecque suggested that Xenophon rallied to Isocrates' programme and seemed to compose the *Poroi* as a promulgation of the ideas of *The Areopagiticus* and *On the Peace*.[231] Forgetting Persia, and closing his eyes to Philip, Delebecque says, Xenophon optimistically expressed ideas that would not take shape for another twenty-five centuries – for in the *Poroi* one can see the first model

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224 Andreades 1933, pp. 388-389.
225 Hasebroek 1933.
226 Humphreys 1978, p. 159.
227 Hasebroek 1933, pp. 136-138.
228 Hasebroek 1933, pp. 71-77.
229 Rostovtzeff 1941, p. 1328 n. 27.
230 Romilly 1954, p. 337, citing Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.5.16.
231 Delebecque 1957, p. 471.

for nationalisation and the United Nations.[232]

Like Andreades and Schwahn,[233] these two scholars illustrate a further theme within interpretations of the *Poroi*, the alignment of Xenophon with supposed political groupings. In 1963 Cawkwell examined the links between Xenophon's proposals and the known or assumed work of Eubulus, suggesting that whilst the theoric commission was perhaps a fulfilment of Xenophon's proposed board of guardians of the peace, Eubulus might have been less optimistic about the extent of the silver deposits, even if he didn't recognise the pitfalls of increasing the silver in circulation.[234] Nevertheless Xenophon provided 'a theoretical exposition of the advantages of the policy actually pursued by Eubulus.' He also noted that until the *Poroi* there was no hint anywhere that Athenian prosperity was grounded in trade,[235] and points to a passing suggestion in Aristotle that state slaves may have been purchased for hiring.[236] Otherwise, much of the remainder he found naïve, an adjective with which we will become increasingly familiar.[237]

Twentieth-century scholarship has been dominated by the commentaries and editions of Thiel, Giglioni, Gauthier and Schütrumpf. Thiel's commentary had appeared in 1922, and was particularly valuable for its careful comparison of the language of the *Poroi* with that of other works of Xenophon, which conclusively established Xenophon's authorship,[238] whilst his Latin commentary also emphasised the links between Xenophon and Eubulus, seeing Xenophon as a conduit for Eubulus's vision.[239] Giglioni's Italian translation and commentary was not to appear until 1970; although criticised by Lewis for the unevenness of its introduction and *apparatus criticus*,[240] Giglioni turned the spotlight away from the practicability of Xenophon's plans and onto their theoretical underpinning.[241] Addressing ways to connect the issues of peace, autarchy, hegemony, pan-Hellenism and the struggle against Persia

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232 Delebecque 1957, pp. 475-476.

233 Schwahn 1931, p. 258. See chapter 1.5.1. above.

234 5.1.

235 Cawkwell 1963b, p. 63, n. 89. Cawkwell notes that trading facilities and hostels were provided and grants of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις, (see chapter 4.2.3), rare before the Social War, were given 'very freely indeed' afterwards. Prosperity grounded in trade: Cawkwell 1963b, p. 52.

236 Slaves for hire, Cawkwell 1963b, p. 64, n. 100 with p. 58, n. 67; citing Arist. *Pol.* 1267b 18.

237 Most recently in Bissa 2009, p. 64.

238 Thiel 1922, pp. XVI-XXIII.

239 Thiel 1922, pp. XXIV-XXV.

240 D. Lewis 1973, review of Giglioni 1970, p. 86.

241 Giglioni 1970, p. XC.

and Macedonia, Giglioni rejected the idea that Xenophon's board of *eirenophylakes* would be the precursor to a panhellenic movement unified initially in defence of Delphi and then moving in opposition to Asia and Macedonia, because to be successful, at least at first, Xenophon's other plans required peace.[242] For Giglioni, the main thrust of the *Poroi* was economic revival, demonstrating an understanding of the laws of supply and demand, and budgeting in which expenditure was not reliant on unpredictable income.[243] The triobol payment, shortly to be hotly debated between Gauthier and Schütrumpf, was not Xenophon's principal consideration.[244] Rather, in an interpretation which Gauthier described as, 'through a very modern lens,'[245] Giglioni outlined a Xenophon whose innovation was to see economic phenomena as a coherent and organic whole.[246]

Despite this proposed new focus, the next ten years or so saw a flurry of work which generally did not see either Xenophon or his treatise as economically-minded, with Meiggs setting the tone in 1972. Discussing the elusiveness of the Greek economy for modern commentators he said that Xenophon recognised some essential truths, but found most of the work naïve.[247] Finley, in his seminal work on the ancient economy, has had a significant influence over academic opinions of Xenophon for some time. On the *Poroi*:

> Xenophon's ideas, bold in some respects, never really broke through the conventional limits[248]

and referring to Xenophon's *Oeconomicos*, Finley finds

> not one sentence that expresses an economic principle or offers any economic analysis, nothing on efficiency of production, "rational" choice, the marketing of crops.[249]

Finley used the *Poroi* to illustrate two key aspects of his analysis of the ancient Greek economy. Referring to Xenophon's statement that a glut of copper and iron leads to a reduction in prices and the retirement of the coppersmiths,[250] he argued that this

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242 Giglioni 1970, pp. XXIX-XXXIII.
243 Giglioni 1970, pp. XXX-XXXIII and CXXXI.
244 Giglioni 1970, p. LXXXVIII.
245 Gauthier 2010, p. 113.
246 Giglioni 1970, p. CXXXI.
247 Meiggs 1972, p. 255.
248 Finley 1999, p. 163.
249 Finley 1999, p. 19.
250 4.6.

showed that Xenophon thought only of a local market and therefore that export markets for manufactured goods other than pottery were effectively non-existent.[251] Xenophon's proposals to encourage metics without making any changes to the metic tax, demonstrated that the Greek conceptual world did not recognise the impact of the tax system on the economy: taxes (and honours) were not used as economic levers to encourage home production or imports. Instead, choices about revenues were made through consideration of tradition and social psychology, combining the imposition of liturgies with the avoidance of property tax.[252]

But whilst Xenophon does not articulate the use of tax to manipulate trade, it is clear from his description that he anticipates that an increase in imports will lead to a corresponding increase in goods being exported, as merchants attracted by improved harbour facilities will carry away Athenian goods (or silver),[253] and he recognises that demand stimulates production – a *boule* announcement that slaves are to be purchased will induce traders to supply them for sale.[254] Elsewhere, Finley cited the *Poroi* as evidence that the Athenians believed that the economic realm was best left to outsiders - slaves, non-citizens and foreigners.[255] But as will become apparent in the following chapters, such an analysis ignores the extent to which Xenophon's schemes are woven into Athenian social and political structures and fails to appreciate the manner in which the mining proposal is reliant on the participation of every citizen as both beneficiary and operator. Finley also argued that whilst Xenophon observed the phenomenon of specialisation he only saw its benefits insofar as it could affect the quality of goods produced, and did not make a connection between specialisation and increased productivity.[256] Mossé too, despite her promising title, *Xenophon Économiste*, found that the search for economic thought in the *Poroi* was ultimately disappointing. Writing shortly after *The Ancient Economy*, she deduced that whilst Xenophon was an articulate witness to the economic transformations of his era and aware of certain economic phenomena, he was ultimately unable to be an

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251 Finley 1999, p. 135.
252 Finley 1999, pp. 163-165. *Contra*, see Bissa 2009 for the use of taxation and honours in the encouragement of the production and distribution of essential commodities.
253 3.2; 4.40.
254 4.18.
255 Finley 1970, p. 25.
256 Finley 1970, pp. 3-4, referring to *Cyropaedia* 8.2.5.

economist.[257] In *Athens in Decline,* Mossé expressed astonishment at Xenophon's proposal that the state should effectively replace the individual, given that the state's prosperity relied on the wealth of the individual.[258] Mossé found that for Xenophon, specialisation and division of labour were not about producing more, but about producing better, with no augmentation of techniques of production.[259]

Mossé's aim, like Finley's, was less about establishing the viability of Xenophon's plans and more about trying to characterise his thinking about the economy, its originality and its limits.[260] She noted that Xenophon recognised the laws of supply and demand; that land could be an object of speculation; and other phenomena, such as prices reducing when too many metal workers flooded the market; or farmers abandoning their land for commerce when times were tough. She also found that he saw a link between certain economic phenomena and their social consequences,[261] but whilst he recognised that Athenian pre-eminence was partly due to how highly her silver coinage was valued, he did not explain the phenomenon. Xenophon nevertheless partially redeems himself in Mossé's eyes. Had he not progressed his thinking further, she suggests, then he might have been just another in the tradition of fourth-century political thinking that dreamt of living on slave-income. But he saw that there was no point in the state acquiring slaves if entrepreneurs hesitated to open new concessions, and he made the state itself into an entrepreneur without ending private enterprise.[262] Therefore, although she saw it as limited, for Mossé Xenophon's interest in economic problems was exceptional for the first half of the fourth century, but ultimately she emphasises that like Aristotle, Xenophon's thinking was based less on theoretical reflection and more on experience, rooted in a social reality, wherein the notion of production was not yet disengaged from the idea of the quality of the producer.[263]

Yet as will become apparent when we look in more detail at silver extraction and

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[257] Mossé 1975, p. 176.
[258] Mossé 1973a, p. 44.
[259] Mossé 1975, p. 172.
[260] Mossé 1975, p. 174.
[261] Mossé 1975, p. 171.
[262] Mossé 1975, p. 173.
[263] Mossé 1975, p. 176.

processing,[264] silver mining was one industry where division of labour through technical specialisation was essential to a degree far greater than we see in other aspects of ancient commercial life, relying on a multiplicity of individual processes carried out by differently skilled operators, in purpose-built workshops. Over several centuries, specialisation had evolved specifically through the most efficient use of, and access to, scarce resources in order to increase productivity and minimise waste and expenditure. Specialisation as a stimulus to increased production was therefore already well known and in daily operation.

Two years later, Austin and Vidal-Naquet's *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece*, still an important source book for the study of the Greek economy, called the *Poroi*, 'a remarkable commentary on the economic mentality of a Greek City in the classical period,'[265] but urged caution:

> But one must be careful: in the aftermath of the failure of the second imperial adventure of Athens, Xenophon is suggesting to his fellow citizens that they should divert towards 'economic' activities the spirit of enterprise and audacity which had characterised their political adventures.[266]

It is not clear how recognition of Xenophon's motives is reason to take care when analysing the development of his economic thinking; one might wonder what is wrong with enterprise and audacity in economic ventures.[267] They also stress that, 'there is no trace of mercantilism in this work;'[268] the *Poroi* is not an attempt to address the balance of trade to Athenian advantage. As for giving more metics the right to build in the city,[269] they argue that whilst Xenophon might appear subversive, in practice his proposal took account of a fourth-century antithesis between city and countryside, the result of the weakening of the 'peasant class' and Xenophon would not have dreamed of letting metics own agricultural land, the inalienable right of Athenian citizens. The authors therefore see Xenophon's restriction on ownership as a reflection of a whole system of archaic values linked to land, which was not a genuine marketable commodity to be exploited for economic possibilities.[270] Yet Xenophon

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264 Chapter 2.2.3.
265 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 27.
266 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 316.
267 For entrepreneurism, see chapter 3.8.3.
268 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 367, n. 16.
269 2.6.
270 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977: metics and land, pp. 95-96; city, countryside and fourth-century

himself contradicts this suggestion, when he predicts, as an economic advantage, that plots of land near the developing mining region could become as valuable as those in the city.[271]

The prevailing mood of seventies substantivism went unchallenged by Gauthier, whose 1976 commentary still remains the most comprehensive modern work on the text. Gauthier combined a detailed historical and linguistic commentary with an analysis of Xenophon's programme which saw him as a champion of democracy who understood that the question facing Athenian citizens was, whether democracy could prosper in the absence of empire, whilst avoiding conflict between rich and poor.[272] So far, so good; however Gauthier questioned the extent to which the treatise should be seen as a programme of economic reform. Influenced by Finley and distancing his views from those of Hasebroek and Cawkwell he suggested Giglioni could only have found an expert economist in Xenophon, 'en songeant avec émotion que K. Marx avait lu les *Poroi*.'[273] Gauthier denied that the *Poroi* was a work of political economy, describing it instead as a treatise whose goals were political, but whose aims entailed the use of fiscal means.[274] Like Andreades, Gauthier found echoes of Sparta. In an interpretation which he was to modify in 1984, he argued that Xenophon's ultimate aim was the enabling of all Athenian citizens to take the fullest part in the democracy in the way that the Spartans were able to leave the day to day running of their estates to their helots in order to engage in their civic responsibilities.[275] But in the early days, as the scheme was getting under way and income was achieved more slowly, Gauthier believed that the three obol payment would be intended solely as payment for assembly attendance and jury service, payment of which had at times been erratic.[276] As income grew, payments could be extended to other democratic institutions such as attendance at the Great Dionysia or ephebic patrols, until ultimately there was sufficient revenue for a universal triobol.[277]

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crisis pp. 150-151.

271 4.50.

272 Gauthier 1976, p. 230.

273 Gauthier 1976, p. 265 and n. 32, referring to Cawkwell 1963b and Hasebroek 1933, p. 136.

274 Gauthier 1976, p. x.

275 Gauthier 1976, p. 244.

276 Gauthier revised this opinion in 1984 and included all types of citizen subsidy in these early distributions; see Gauthier 2010, p. 124. Jury payments continued to be problematic: Dem. *Against Boeotus I* 39.17.

277 Gauthier 1976, pp. 29-30. On *ephebes* as part of Xenophon's defence programme, see pp. 191-

Gauthier argued that for the purposes of Xenophon's proposals the word *trophe* was intended to represent the totality of *misthoi* payments made to citizens for assembly attendance and dicast service and that the new revenues from Xenophon's projects would be assigned to meet that expenditure. The perspective was political - the poor were to be recompensed in order that the democracy might function.[278] Countering the 'reticence' of modern scholars in accepting this solution, Gauthier noted two explanations. The first is that Xenophon himself barely distinguishes between a *trophe* paid to the *demos,* and other *misthoi*, of which the assembly and court pay were seen by him and probably most Athenians as being the most onerous. The second explanation lies in the equivocal nature of *trophe.* Gauthier drew a distinction between payments for food, such as were made to slaves or ephebes, and a salary. Apart from the very needy, most citizens had no need to be ecclesiasts or dicasts in order to live – their income came from being farmers, craftsmen and tradesmen, as long as their work was not interrupted. The *trophe* was not the means of existence, but an additional compensation for political service that would mean that direct democracy could become a reality.[279] Thus in 355, assembly and dicast pay – and by extension, Xenophon's scheme, was not about feeding the human being as much as about feeding the 'political animal.'[280]

Whilst admiring Gauthier's careful commentary, Cawkwell took issue with some aspects of his interpretation. In particular he found it unlikely that Xenophon, the 'devotee of the Peloponnesian ethos, the life of the landed aristocracy, at its best when free of 'troublesome demagogues' who was to be found in *Hellenica*,'[281] could have become a supporter of the fullest democracy so soon after completing that work.[282] Rather, Cawkwell saw Xenophon's projected provision of *trophe* as an attempt to dissuade Athenians from their obsession with Amphipolis and the Chersonese. The same year, Hopper's wide-ranging survey of Greek trade and industry once more found Xenophon's understanding of the silver supply naïve.[283]

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193. See also Gauthier 2010, pp. 123-124.

278 Gauthier 1976, p. 30.

279 Gauthier 1976, pp. 241-242.

280 Gauthier 1976, pp. 30-32.

281 Xen. *Hellenica* 5.2.7.

282 Cawkwell 1979b, p. 18.

283 Hopper 1979, p. 188.

The desire to identify an undeclared political subtext was pursued by Schütrumpf in 1982.[284] Schütrumpf's German commentary and translation had a very different understanding of Xenophon's political programme and was to provoke a response from Gauthier in 1984.[285] Schütrumpf also found Xenophon to be less interested in the efficiency of trade and securing markets for import and export, than in political economy.[286] The state would no longer live hand to mouth, maintenance of the *demos* would be secure and the rich could be assured that their property would no longer be appropriated.[287] But, denying that Xenophon's proposals were about radical democracy,[288] he argued that in 355 even the most assiduous assembly and jury attendee would be lucky to achieve an annual income of 180 drachmas – therefore three obols per day could not be intended to replace such payments.[289] Xenophon did not propose that the payment be made in return for political service, but instead, wished to replace those sums with a daily payment for all citizens.[290] This would have the effect of entirely changing the nature of the Athenian democracy. Assembly attendance would no longer be paid; the poor would receive their three obols without the requirement of political participation, and thus would no longer dominate assembly and court proceedings.[291]

This interpretation assumes that Xenophon believed that the poor only went to the assembly to claim their payments and had no interest in attending otherwise, an idea which at the least seems at odds with the vigorous citizen engagement with democratic processes that we hear of from the orators. Xenophon certainly does not express that intention in so many words and Farrell observes that such interpretations are borne of an elitist viewpoint based on a cynical expectation of the outcome of Xenophon's proposals.[292] But Schütrumpf positions Xenophon with those mid-century Athenians who wanted to curtail the influence of the *demos* and thus he finds it hardly surprising that Xenophon might choose not to emphasise this aspect of his

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284 Schütrumpf 1982.
285 Gauthier 2010.
286 Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 4-5.
287 Schütrumpf 1982, p. 16.
288 Schütrumpf 1982, p. 25.
289 Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 19-21 and n. 96.
290 Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 21-22.
291 Schütrumpf 1982, p. 24.
292 Farrell 2012, p. 315.

plan.[293] Analysing 6.1, Schütrumpf finds that Xenophon separates out two outcomes from his project – the feeding of the *demos* and the freeing of the wealthy from heavy taxation on the one hand, and the financing of other enterprises such as festivals, building programmes and payments to officials such as councillors and the cavalry on the other.[294] Because, in listing officials' payments at 6.1, Xenophon omits to mention assembly and jury payments, Schütrumpf suggests that there are echoes of the oligarchy of 411, with its reduced levels of democratic participation and abolition of certain political payments.[295] Engaging directly with Gauthier, he finds it unconvincing that Xenophon wanted to make it possible for citizens to live a political life undisturbed by the need to work.[296] The triobol alone would not be sufficient to support a citizen, and thus he would still be obliged to undertake gainful employment.

Despite the more nuanced debate that later emerged between Gauthier and Schütrumpf, inescapably whereas one saw daily payments as a plan to support citizen participation in democracy, the other saw them as an intentional inhibition to it; and such observations are tied in turn either to a belief that everyone would willingly take part in democratic processes as long as they had the economic freedom to do so, or to an oligarchic viewpoint that imagined that the *demos* generally only turned up to debate, judge and vote if they were paid. Neither outcome is well-supported by the text, and the debate is a prime example of the way in which the limited information Xenophon gives in some areas allows for widely varying interpretations of both the practicalities and the motivations underlying his proposals.

Replying to Schütrumpf, Gauthier revised some of his arguments. He widened his interpretation of the subsidy, to include not just payments for assembly and law court attendance but all the civic subsidies including, ultimately, the triobol, suggesting that it was implicit in the text that in the early days when income was still too low to institute the full triobol payment, it would be used to shore up civic payments.[297]

But Xenophon simply does not say how the more limited income was to be spent in

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293 Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 24-25.
294 Schütrumpf 1982, p. 22. n. 101.
295 *Ath. Pol.* 29.5; 30.2. Schütrumpf 1982, pp. 25-28.
296 Schütrumpf 1982, p. 28, n. 125.
297 Gauthier 2010, p. 124.

the early days, and his only clearly expressed intention is to create a universal payment. The discussion thus highlights two issues worthy of consideration: the apportionment of income in the early days of the scheme, and the period required for its full development. If, as Xenophon appears to suggest, only 20 talents of slave rental income were to be reinvested yearly once slave numbers reach 6,000,[298] at a cost of around 180 drachmas each this sum would purchase perhaps 670 slaves every year. To finally attain the 90,000 slaves required to furnish three for each citizen and thus three obols each per day[299] would take more than another 125 years beyond the initial five or six.[300] Therefore the question of how Xenophon intended to share out the income in the early years before the full distribution could be achieved is pertinent, but the answer seems to be clear enough. The advantage of the slow growth of his schemes is a theme Xenophon refers to several times[301] and he is clear that however fast they grow, there will be benefit.[302] Rather than raise all the capital at once, income from a reduced initial scheme might fund the initiation of other aspects, for instance.[303] But every time Xenophon mentions the individual citizen recipients of the triobol, his description is inclusive – at 3.9-10, *some* Athenians will get high rates of return on the initial contribution, but *most* will get over a hundred percent – the entire citizenry falls into one category or the other. At 4.17, there will be three slaves for *every* citizen, at 4.33, *all* the Athenians will be maintained; at 4.49 and 6.1, the city and the *demos* respectively will be fed. Whenever he discusses making a general distribution, as opposed to investing in infrastructure projects, Xenophon's language is inclusive.

After the deduction of twenty talents to purchase further slaves, the 100 talents annual income Xenophon mentions at 4.24 would yield 16 drachmas each even to as many as

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298 4.23-24.

299 3.9, 4.17. Hansen estimates approximately 30,000 adult male Athenian citizens in the fourth century – for citizen and non-citizen figures see M. H. Hansen 1985, pp. 65-69; M. H. Hansen 1988a, pp. 26-28; M. H. Hansen 1999, pp. 92-94; and Moreno 2007a, pp. 28-31 for an overview of recent scholarship.

300 All else being equal, an average slave cost of 180 drachmas would lead to a total of about 5,720 slaves by the end of year six: Xenophon calculates that the revenue from the initial 1,200 slaves, reinvested in total each year in further slave purchases, would yield around 6,000 slaves after five or six years. At the estimate of 30,000 citizens, 3 slaves each = 90,000. Less the 6,000 already purchased by year five or six leaves 84,000 still to acquire. Each year, 20 talents buys 667 slaves at 180 drachmas each; 667 x 125 years = 83,375 slaves.

301 4.35-39.

302 3.12-13.

303 4.35-38.

30,000 citizens,[304] more to a smaller number, and this annual sum is achieved relatively early in the development of the project. In order for the scheme to be effective, the poverty of the masses would need to be addressed quickly, and the possibility of a wide distribution of even quite small sums should not be overlooked. It is also important to recognise the effect that relatively small sums of money can have on the lives of those living at or just above subsistence level. From Plutarch's story of a distribution by Lykourgos, we may infer that sums such as 50 or 100 drachmas would not have been unwelcome,[305] whilst the story told by Herodotus and Aristotle of the proposed citizen distribution of silver mining proceeds a century earlier indicates that the sharing of 100 talents, or the individual receipt of ten drachmas, although a very long way short of a daily triobol, was not to be sniffed at.[306]

But Gauthier also accepted that there were unresolved issues arising from his interpretation of the triobol as payment for daily 'full-time' citizenship: such wholehearted citizen involvement would leave Athenians with no time to be, 'hard at work, driving the economic machine,' in the way that Xenophon's plans required of them and in practice only the very poorest would find the subsidy essential and for the slightly better off, it would not alone be sufficient to deter them from their usual economic activities.[307] Gauthier emphasised that in the *Poroi* poverty and wealth are seen from a political viewpoint; Xenophon was not interested in developing land because of what he sees as 'supplementary resources' that it might yield for - poor - individuals, he was concerned with increasing revenues which would then go to the state to be equally shared between all citizens. The 'poverty of the masses,'[308] which prevents many citizens from engaging with democratic processes, would be alleviated in the future by replacing imperial revenues with state income which would in turn provide civic *trophe*. 'Thus the *trophe* of the *demos* is the maintenance of the political animal,' and Xenophon's vision that

> the democratic *trophe* would be abundant 'for all Athenians' understood that the majority among them would continue to attend to their own

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304 100T- 20T = 80T. 80 x 6,000 drachmas = 480,000 dr. 480,000 dr. ÷ 30,000 citizens = 16 dr. each.
305 Plut. *Moralia* 843d.
306 Hdt. 7.144; *Ath. Pol*. 22.7. See chapter 2.3.1.2 for a discussion of this episode.
307 Gauthier 2010, p. 132; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 72.
308 1.1.

> habitual occupations.[309]

Gauthier concedes that Xenophon's measures would require the effort, and consequently the enrichment, of individuals, but notes that Xenophon does not mention this because his aim was, 'not the economic development of Attica, nor the extinction of poverty.'[310] But this analysis denies two particular aspects of the complexity of Xenophon's vision. In particular it denies the fact that individuals seeking personal or shared profit are not only recognised and encouraged by Xenophon's plans, but are absolutely vital to it. The possibility of profit is equally available to individuals, partnerships, groups, tribes and the *polis*.[311] Tribes are an entirely political construction and yet their potential profits are not deemed any more desirable than that of the individual. Xenophon shows himself to be completely *au fait* with the idea that entrepreneurs have to be nurtured in order to engender wider wealth and is ingenious in the many methods he devises to reassure potential speculators that they should engage with his plans, not only by contributing to a capital fund, but by engaging in the industries that will ultimately yield revenues for the state.[312] Rather than simply acquiring revenue from a pre-existing resource on an opportunistic basis, Athenians were being urged to promote and encourage activities specifically in order to increase the resulting duties.

Xenophon also clearly *does* wish to promote the economic development of Attica. To this extent it makes no sense to separate the means from the end, and the 'end' is entirely predicated on the possibility of increasing imports and exports, lettings and visitor income, promoting a huge increase in the slave trade, and in the production, refining and distribution of silver. Simply to wish that everyone should have a daily triobol without addressing ways to achieve it would indeed be a utopian scheme. In order to become the thriving city that Xenophon describes at 5.3-4, Athens will have to have gone through the mechanics of infrastructure improvement and economic regeneration that Xenophon proposes. Giving citizens three obols a day without any of the other activity Xenophon describes, would not be sufficient to establish Athens as the celebrated and cosmopolitan centre he predicts.

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309 Gauthier 2010, pp. 127-131, 134.
310 Gauthier 2010, p. 131 n. 18.
311 4.30-32.
312 See chapter 3.

The Gauthier/Schütrumpf debate tended to polarise scholarship that followed it, particularly any which moved towards an analysis of Xenophon's underlying philosophy. Azoulay and Schorn in particular have argued for a Xenophontic/Socratic tendency to suppress the opinionated *demos*. Azoulay's 2004 exploration of *charis* and reciprocity in Xenophon argues that the *Poroi* encourages commerce only to the extent that it can be controlled within a defined space and devolved to foreigners,[313] and ultimately encourages the political passivity of the *demos* through a relationship of gratitude which turns them into docile and useful subjects.[314] The judicious bestowal of *epimeleia* on metics will similarly place them in a position of ongoing gratitude at the removal of dishonourable conditions,[315] and honours are to be awarded not simply in recognition of past good, but as a means of inspiring gratitude, with on-going benefits for, and obligations to, the city, without great expenditure.

Azoulay's emphasis on the lack of costs associated with Xenophon's proposals gives a somewhat skewed reading of the text – in a piece devoted to raising income, it is inevitable that the cost of each measure should be noted, but when Xenophon says such measures would cost little,[316] he is discussing several measures including prizes for Athenian magistrates, and importantly, he is not implying that the awards of honour in themselves are valueless. The reference is also a structural device; Xenophon is effectively saying, 'these are some ideas which will cost little, now here are some which need investment'. As we will see in chapter 4, Athenian motives around the award of honours were complex, and Xenophon's suggested use of them has careful boundaries and draws on precedents which imply that their use would continue to be relatively parsimonious. Xenophon is live to the complex relationship between Athens and the various businessmen and benefactors he wishes to attract, but his appreciation of the mutual benefits to be achieved is more nuanced than Azoulay's reading suggests. In the first instance, it is Athens who needs the goodwill of non-citizens, rather than the other way round.

Along similar lines to Schütrumpf, Schorn, who finds the scheme utopian,[317] also

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[313] Azoulay 2004a, p. 206. See Gray 2006 for a thoughtful response.
[314] Azoulay 2004a, p. 224.
[315] Azoulay 2004a, p. 107.
[316] 3.6.
[317] Schorn 2012, pp. 706, 711.

assumes that a concealed purpose underlies the outward message of the text. Schorn argues that if the assembly was no longer dominated by those who had promoted imperialism, then Athenians would no longer be unjust to her allies. Xenophon, he suggests, intended to abandon the allowances for assembly attendance but was 'cautious regarding this sensitive topic' and therefore many readers might not have noticed.[318] Yet if Xenophon's purpose was to remove this payment and yet not reveal his intention, one wonders why he would have cited a list of offices at 6.1 at all. If the omission of just one is so apparent to us today, surely it would have been yet more so to the original readers. Alternatively, perhaps assembly payments were simply inviolate and needed not to be mentioned.

Comparing the *Poroi* with passages in the *Hiero*, Schorn argues that Xenophon appeals to Athenian citizens through schemes to increase their wealth, in order that they will be convinced by reform programmes which in reality 'aim at nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the state along the precepts of the Socratic-Xenophontic philosophy.'[319] But because Xenophon once counselled using the lure of financial advantage as a strategy for a tyrant, must this always entail that wealth can only be offered as a ruse? Schorn further suggests that with the abolition of assembly pay, the lower classes would need to work and so could not attend the assembly, and he agreed with Schütrumpf that the triobol would not be enough to meet basic requirements.[320] Yet given that the triobol would be paid week in, week out, and that assembly and dicast pay was intermittent, those poor who were currently reliant solely on political payments would be better off under the new arrangement, not worse, and so the suggestion that the lower classes, 'will be forced to hold down a job,'[321] when they were not previously, is not a logical deduction. Ultimately, Schorn argues, citizen prosperity would increase but also the 'boisterous masses' would become obedient and morally better. Schorn seems to accuse Xenophon of an anti-democratic confidence trick, with a plan that is both going to make citizens personally wealthier and at the same time ensure that they are worse-off and need to seek employment. And where, one might wonder, are the 'jobs'?[322]

318 Schorn 2012, p. 707.
319 Schorn 2012, p. 702, citing *Hiero* 8.9-10, 9.4-11, 11.1-5 and 11.13.
320 Schorn 2012, p. 707-708.
321 Schorn 2012, p. 708.
322 4.22 and Xen. *Memorabilia* 2.8.1-6 indicate the possibility of citizens taking managerial or supervisory work, but their context tends to suggest they are exceptions. R. Osborne 1985a, pp.

In considering some of the interpretations discussed above it may be noted that at no point does Xenophon refer directly to assembly or jury duty payments or suggest that his triobol is intended either to support or to replace them, nor does he refer to any recent difficulty in making political payments. There is no direct evidence in the text that Xenophon does not intend the triobol to be paid *in addition to* any civic allowances for political participation, in which event there would still be further income to be made from active attendance, and Schütrumpf's argument falls, because even when in receipt of the triobol, Athenians would still have a financial incentive for political participation. Both interpretations are based to a great extent on imputations as to Xenophon's political motivations, not in itself an impossible task given the volume of his other writing, his affinity with Sparta and his affection for Socrates. However they prioritise Xenophon's 'hidden' agenda above his simply stated ends – the relief of internal poverty in order to improve relations with the rest of the Greek world. The detail of Xenophon's text carefully proceeds to build proposals to achieve just this. Both readings are interesting, but read more into the text than may be there. Xenophon was dealing with the reality of Athenian finances as he found them. Given the delicacy of his previous situation in relation to the state he would have been foolish to profess any level of oligarchy, (and Schütrumpf's reading assumes that the average Athenian citizen was just too simple to read between the lines), whilst Gauthier's case seems oddly undermined by Xenophon's failure to mention that he wishes to promote political participation.

Away from this controversy, in 1992 Burke looked for ways to explain the increased commercialism of the fourth century within the context of a status-driven ethic, and took the *Poroi* as one of his models.[323] Whilst describing some of Xenophon's assumptions as 'remarkably innocent,' Burke used the *Poroi* to explore grants of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις,[324] the *dikai emporikai* (maritime courts), and awards of citizenship, the first two apparently directly connected to Xenophon's proposals.[325]

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143-146 for example, notes that whilst agricultural hired labour was a familiar phenomenon, it was of low status and seasonal, with opportunities at deme level for informal hiring on a casual basis at short notice.

323 Burke 1992.

324 'Grants awarded to foreign nationals allowing them ownership of land in the city,' Burke 1992, p. 208.

325 2.6; 3.3.

He found increasingly in the mid- to late-fourth century ‘the taking of public action to promote economic activity, notably maritime commerce’ in the steps the state took to attract metics to the city, promoting commercial advantage by giving foreigners equal status to citizens in the *dikai emporikai* regardless of their nationality. After the Social War he noted an increase in grants of *enktesis*, and a parallel increase in the granting of citizenship, nine such grants being made to ‘bankers or men otherwise engaged in maritime commerce.’[326] For Burke these reflected the beginning of a move towards genuine market trading in the years after the Social War, the start of the ‘disembedding’ of an economy which, on the Finley model, Burke saw as ‘controlled by a complex of social and political institutions and practices, with economic behaviour shaped by familial, religious, and socio-political values.’[327] This ‘disembedding’ he suggested, was not stimulated by the laws of a disembedded market economy, but made possible by ‘the erosion of an ethic bound to status, by the experience gained from economic exigency, and by the circumstances of an imposed peace.’[328] ‘Economic exigency’ sounds somewhat like another way of describing the very rules of utilitarian economics whose influence Burke denies. However, Burke’s ‘adjustments’ were still a step too far for some.[329]

The following year, looking at parallels between *oikos* and *polis* economic management, Booth concluded that Xenophon omitted to mention the encouragement of individual citizen producers or their protection against foreign competition. Booth’s explanation, that the promotion or protection of native industry was not seen as a requirement of *polis* government,[330] overlooks the reliance of Xenophon’s plans on the enterprise of citizens, whether as mine operators, sea captains or merchants. Far from protecting citizens’ interests against foreign competitors, in the mining industry, opportunities and tax benefits had been extended to non-Athenians in the state’s best interests.[331]

Also in 1993, Dillery demonstrated the manner in which the *Poroi* used the fifth-century rhetoric of Athenian imperialism in order to present a vision of the Greek

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[326] Burke 1992, pp. 208-211; see discussion of *enktesis* at chapters 4.2.3 and 4.5.
[327] Burke 1992, pp. 199-200.
[328] Burke 1992, p. 225.
[329] See eg. Descat 1995, pp. 961-989.
[330] Booth 1993, pp. 56-66.
[331] See chapter 2.3.2.12.

world in which it was not necessary to have an empire to survive. Xenophon maintained the idea of Athenian centrality, for instance, but ascribed it to her geographical situation rather than her naval supremacy.[332] Xenophon's 'radical insight' was that internal economic growth could replace interstate war as a means to support the population.[333] Building on this, Dillery argued that the *Poroi* could help shed light on the later parts of *Hellenica*, written at around the same time, in which he suggests there are echoes of the 'pacifist and conciliatory tone' of the *Poroi*.[334] Dillery's strong textual analysis of the *Poroi* and *Hellenica* is supported with readings of Isocrates, but whilst one cannot fail to be moved by the sense of desolation in the final lines of the *Hellenica*, and Dillery (following others) draws strong parallels between the two Xenophontic works, it is important to distinguish the positioning of *On the Peace* with its rejection of empire reaching back to the early fifth century, from that of the *Poroi*.[335] Xenophon may recognise the advantages of peace, but he does not deny the possibility of war, and does not assume that such war might not be initiated by Athens herself. Xenophon still sees the diplomatic opportunities available to Athens through seizing popularity by uniting her allies in the protection of Delphi[336] and depicts a defensive alliance which would offer support to a vengeful Athens in the event that she were attacked.[337] Isocrates, with his bitter complaints against the influx of non-Athenians, would not have taken delight in the promotion of metics into the cavalry and the encouragement of foreign entrepreneurs advanced by Xenophon.[338]

The most recent editions of the *Poroi* are Ralph Doty's 2003 translation into English, and Audring and Brodersen's 2008 translation into German. Closer to my own reading, Audring and Brodersen stress that it was not Xenophon's intention that the populace live a carefree life, but rather that the triobol was simply a maintenance grant and that Xenophon's plan required the active engagement of Athenians in commerce.[339] Doty's evaluation of Xenophon's economics is an unavowedly modernist comparison with Keynesian macroeconomics, describing Xenophon as

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[332] Dillery 1993, p. 2.
[333] Dillery 1993, p. 9.
[334] Dillery 1993, p. 10, citing speeches at *Hellenica* 6.3.10-17 and 6.5.38-48.
[335] see Davidson 1990, pp. 23-24.
[336] 5.9.
[337] 5.13.
[338] Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.88-89.
[339] Audring and Brodersen 2008, pp. 23-27.

more worthy to be called the Father of Economics than Adam Smith. For Doty, Xenophon sees that government investment would be necessary to encourage trade, further develop the silver mines and stimulate consumption, thus raising private investment and increasing sources of revenue.[340] There are some concepts in Doty's discussion that require caution; for instance Doty's discussion of calculus and the investment multiplier seems somewhat abstruse as these are concepts plainly unavailable to Xenophon,[341] and his claim that Xenophon was aware of the (Keynesian) principle that

> to justify any given amount of employment there must be an amount of current investment sufficient to absorb the excess of total output over what the community chooses to consume when employment is at the given level

is something of a stretch.[342] Whether or not we may recognise their effects in Xenophon's description, we should be careful in discussing the extent to which such ideas were identified or applied by Xenophon.

Jansen's doctoral thesis of 2007 builds on Dillery in its understanding of the *Poroi* as a, 'unique anti-imperialistic discourse,'[343] which uses innovative methods to achieve conventional ends. Jansen focusses on the *Poroi's* literary and biographical features,[344] arguing that Xenophon was not a pacifist but intent on showing that empire was not necessary for survival. With a careful analysis of the evidence of the literary uses of '*misthos'* and '*trophe'*, he shows that the two words were not synonymous, concluding that because *trophe* refers to food or money for food, that the *Poroi* is not about payment to citizens in return for political activity.[345] Although he emphasises that Xenophon discovered the concept of marginal utility[346] and proposed a partial break-down of the citizen/non-citizen status divide, Jansen finds Xenophon to be a reformer rather than a revolutionary, with *homo politicus* alive and well within the text.[347]

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340 Doty 2003, p. 9.
341 Doty 2003, p. 14.
342 Doty 2003, p. 10, citing Keynes 1936, p. 27. There are also some odd assertions, such as that ten drachmas equal a mina and that Xenophon says 36,000 minas equal 60 talents (p. 8).
343 Jansen 2007, p. vi. Jansen also discusses the *Poroi*'s proposals around slavery and metics in his 2012 paper, for which see chapter 2.4.3.
344 Jansen 2007, p. 29.
345 Jansen 2007, pp. 119-135, 205-206.
346 Jansen 2007, p. 383.
347 Jansen 2007, pp. 403-404.

J. D. Lewis's article of 2009 takes Doty's discussion a step further.[348] He maintains that Xenophon lays out principles that are, 'fundamental to political economy as a science,' and attempts to establish which particular economic model best describes Xenophon's proposals. He proposes, *contra* Doty, that Xenophon was not proto-Keynesian, believing his views to be more akin to the ideas of Jean Baptiste Say.[349] He finds in Xenophon a justice-centred approach (as opposed to power-centred or state-centred) that is compatible with the pursuit of material prosperity, 'a goal directed conception of economic action for the purpose of self-interested gain,' but criticises it as a production-oriented, as opposed to consumption-oriented, plan.[350] Despite his caution against using modern economic terms to describe ancient practices, and endorsing the view that the Greeks did not conceptually isolate economic forces from their social context, he presents a formalist analysis.[351] This means that whilst he does not engage with them, J. D. Lewis's attempt to extract a level of economic theory from Xenophon's practical proposals is in direct opposition to the views of some earlier scholars and distinctly less reliant (although not completely so) on superimposing on to the text ideas of democracy or Socratic influence. Although it fails to recognise the extent to which Xenophon understood the importance of entrepreneurs to the economic equation, it is nevertheless a further step on the route to demonstrating the extent to which Xenophon understood economic processes. In a more measured although passing reference to the *Poroi* Oliver also suggested that it would be surprising if contemporary scholars maintained Gauthier's view that the *Poroi* was not an economic text.[352]

The theme of Xenophon's proposed use of honours was raised again by Engen's 2010 study of the relationship between honours and profit. Engen argued that the use of honours for the 'traditionally disesteemed' activity of trade had a negative effect on traditional values. Nevertheless he found that the honours appearing in the later fourth century which mirrored Xenophon's ideas were 'testament to the practical nature' of Xenophon's treatise.[353] Xenophon's apparent extension of the award of

348 J. D. Lewis 2009.
349 J. D. Lewis 2009, pp. 372, 386.
350 J. D. Lewis 2009, pp. 380-381, 386 and n. 47.
351 J. D. Lewis 2009, p. 372.
352 Oliver 2011, p. 122.
353 Engen 2010, pp. 141, 169.

honours as incentive continued to engage scholars, and as we have seen, in his study of fourth-century Athenian honours Lambert characterised the *Poroi* as 'a response to decline.'[354] Both Engen's analysis, and Lambert's work on the inscriptions of Athenian honours, are important starting points for any further assessment of this aspect of Xenophon's schemes and we will return to them both in chapter 4.

Farrell's careful analysis of the political ethos of the *Poroi* demonstrates that the work is consistent with the ideas of governance and leadership expressed throughout the Xenophontic corpus, the *trophe* enabling both more leisure and more opportunity for political participation. Contrary to Schütrumpf and Azoulay he argues that the proposals are not oligarchically-inclined, but reflect Athenian democratic ideology and that his promotion of *homonoia* reflects Xenophon's Socratic education.[355] He also argues that Xenophon was not anti-imperialist, 'rather befitting an Attic orator, he attempts to realign democracy including its imperial aspirations, with its own professed ideals.'[356]

In 2012 Figueira returned to the question of Xenophon's economic thinking, using the *Poroi* amongst other texts, as a case study to reassess Finley's judgements on Athenian economic thought. Whilst careful to protect himself against charges of modernism[357] he stresses Xenophon's appreciation of the challenges of increasing marginal utility across several types of enterprises.[358] Finding Finley's assessment, 'minimising and tendentious,' ultimately Figueira characterises Xenophon as nearer to a contemporary management guru than a discoverer of the economy, finding that Xenophon is sensitive to economic phenomena, but that he and his contemporaries did not have a concept of 'the economy,' because their, 'conceptual boundaries were circumscribed by their limited abilities to count, measure, record, and calculate.'[359] We will return in chapter 2 to questions as to whether unsophisticated record-keeping obstructed the ability to recognise and theorise about economic phenomena or to make rational economic choices.[360]

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[354] Lambert 2011a, pp. 196-197. See 4.3.2 for the debate over fourth-century decline.
[355] Farrell 2012, pp. 280-358.
[356] Farrell 2012, p. 282.
[357] Figueira 2012, p. 666.
[358] Figueira 2012, p. 668.
[359] Figueira 2012, pp. 683-4.
[360] Chapter 2.5.1.

### 1.6.3 Conclusion

Inevitably, due to the scarcity of ancient evidence, the *Poroi* has been a point of focus for those in search of recognition of economic theory in the ancient world. In 1957 Polanyi had argued that the lack of a concept of the economy was essentially because economic processes were hard to identify in a society where they were embedded in institutions that were non-economic.[361] But as we will see, the *Poroi* does identify certain familiar mechanisms, such as supply and demand,[362] whilst the thriving complexity of economic practices available in the fourth century entailed that for every type of activity that might be regarded as socially framed or grounded in principles of reciprocity, there was an alternative available of a more impersonal, profit-seeking nature, from *eranist* loans to bottomry, gift-exchange to market trade, with a graduated range of transactions in between.

The following chapters will address aspects of the text as they reflect social and economic life in fourth-century Athens, and I do not intend to explore the political and philosophical aspects of the work in greater depth. It will however be apparent from the preceding overview that I do not give credence to the view that Xenophon intended to suppress mass political participation, nor however do I think that he was looking for a way to enable the opposite. My general theme is moderation – it is necessary to contextualise the *Poroi* within Xenophon's whole corpus, but that does not mean that we can import wholesale ideas which are simply not expressed in the text, or indeed are in conflict with it, on the grounds that Xenophon could not speak freely because he sought to deceive the masses but wrote knowing that his agenda would be understood by an elite readership. Nor, despite an inclination towards admiration of his percipience, can one engage in detailed discussion as to which nineteenth-century economist Xenophon most nearly approximates with any very fruitful result for our understanding of the Athenian economy.

In considering the economic aspects of the text some later scholarship has tended towards a formalist approach, although certain sections of the most recent American

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[361] Polanyi 1957, p. 71.
[362] 4.18.

scholarship has perhaps run a good deal further with this line of thought than the text might justify. But on the whole, late twentieth-century scholarship parked itself fairly wholeheartedly in the substantivist camp, taking individual examples from the text to demonstrate, for instance, apparent citizen disinclination against involvement in commerce and a preference for state revenues achieved from rentier income and metic tax rather than citizen labour. Yet in the context of a proposal whose schemes will simply fail if there are not very many people, citizens as well as metics and foreigners, sufficiently profit-oriented to engage with them, it is difficult to see how Xenophon might have believed his proposals could meet with success if there were not in Athens 'sufficient numbers' of citizens who would be prepared to become involved. Discussing Spartan attitudes to commerce, he had after all contrasted them with other Greek states where 'all men make as much money as they can. One is a farmer, another a ship-owner, another a merchant, and others live by different handicrafts,'[363] indicating that Xenophon saw nothing unusual in Athenian citizens taking up commerce. One might see in Xenophon's persuasive language an attempt to cut through not just caution but deeply-rooted social attitudes which he may have recognised as culturally situated inhibitors to growth.

Perhaps what emerges most clearly is that the Xenophon of the *Poroi* seems able to be all things to all men. That quality in part explains the text's continuing allure. It may be a flaw – or a strength, and it may be that Xenophon's skill in reaching out to all sections of Athenian society entails that different readers can continue to receive his words in different ways. But it is also a warning. There has been a tendency to look for the unspoken, to impose onto the *Poroi* a political or economic programme that is undeclared but reinforced by Xenophon's other work, by his debt to Socrates, or his aristocratic upbringing. Such contextualisation is vital of course, but it should be used with care. Xenophon wrote the *Poroi* as he neared the end of his life. He had lost a son to Athenian hegemonic pretensions; he had a passion for Athens and certainly no reason to avoid using the word democracy. The *Poroi* is packed with vibrant ideas and it may not be necessary to dig more than a small way beneath the surface to understand what Xenophon was promoting.

Arguments that compare the nature of Xenophon's thought with those who followed

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[363] Xen. *Constitution of the Lacedaimonians* 7.1.

him two thousand years later are only of use if they can then shed light back on the text and its contexts; discussed in isolation they can contribute little to our understanding of ancient politics or economics. If we choose to lay a particular political interpretation on Xenophon's programme, which does not pull its punches in the clarity of its views, then we must immediately also ask why Xenophon chose not to articulate the specific political philosophy that allegedly underpinned his proposals. Why would he be wary of appearing to be a democrat looking to feed the masses? If he were an unreconstructed oligarch, why make proposals that would entail yet more expenditure by the wealthy? To what extent would regular payments either promote or deter regular assembly attendance and political participation?

Gauthier stressed, in his 1984 article, that because of the lack of detail Xenophon gives us about the practical implementation or the political and economic motivations of his proposals, that:

> … interpreters are driven to extend Xenophon's observations, credit him with certain attitudes of mind or political ulterior motives, bring in comparisons with other authors; in a word interpret his proposals in the manner that appears to them appropriate.[364]

The following pages will try to be wary of this tendency.

[364] Gauthier 2010, p. 114.

# Chapter Two - The mines, their slaves, state income and rationality

## 2.1 Chapter introduction

The following chapter will explore and contextualise Xenophon's ideas for the mining industry within three specific areas: firstly, our understanding of the way that the Laurion silver mines operated and the financial relationship between the mines and the city; secondly, the use of slave labour in the silver mines; and thirdly, the level of sophistication of Athenian financial management. This will lead to a closer examination of the way the text can inform us about the Athenian understanding of entrepreneurial risk that follows in chapter 3 and Xenophon's proposed use of honours in chapter 4.

## 2.2 The Laurion silver mines – introduction

We have a surprising amount of evidence as to the practical and administrative operation of the silver mines and of the role of silver in the assumption and retention of Athenian power. Before trying to unpick the financial benefits yielded by the industry in section three of this chapter, it is useful to look briefly at some of these sources to understand how the Athenians viewed their relationship with Laureotic silver and to discuss the way that slave ownership, which lies at the heart of Xenophon's proposals, was already providing a cash income for slave owners on both a large and small scale. We cannot fully appreciate Xenophon's ideas without recognition of the technical and economic complexity of the industry and the extent to which its enormous inputs and outputs must have affected every aspect of daily Attic life. In sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 I will look at some of the sources available to us and discuss some of the scholarly controversies to which the partial state of the evidence

has given rise, along with an overview of the processes of mining and refinement.

The role of mining income in the analysis of Attic prosperity and power was not a new theme for Xenophon. In the *Memorabilia*, teasing Glaucon about his political ambitions, the Xenophontic Socrates proves him unprepared to lead because he is uninformed in a variety of fields which Socrates argues are essential for the well-being of the State.[1] One by one he demonstrates Glaucon's ignorance of the extent and sources of the city's revenues, of the city's expenditure and how it might be reduced, of the contrasting military strengths of Athens and of her enemies, of the specifics of the placing of defence garrisons, of the quantity of corn required to feed the population and of strategies to deal with the falling income from the silver mines. To Glaucon, Socrates says

> "If you wanted to add to a friend's fortune, you would set about making him richer. Will you try, then, to make your city richer?"[2]

Not only do city revenues and particularly income from silver, clearly occupy a central place amongst Xenophon's concerns for state prosperity and interstate security, but Socrates' dismissal of Glaucon's suggestion that the city should be enriched by her enemies[3] is echoed in the opening lines of the *Poroi*.[4] In his final work, Xenophon is still concerned with the silver industry and promoting the need for locally-sourced revenue which does not have an adverse effect on inter-state relations. In the *Poroi* these themes have become inextricably linked.

The Peloponnesian wars had brought a decline in mining activity. Thucydides tells us that as early as 430 BC the Spartans penetrated as far as the Laurion area and fifteen years later Alcibiades is seen persuading the Spartans of the importance of depriving Athens of the revenue from her silver mines, a loss second only to the loss of her allies' tribute.[5] Although Thorikos appears to have continued to be inhabited throughout the Decelean War,[6] and Xenophon himself throws some doubt on the extent that an invading army could take advantage of the Laurion's mineral

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1 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.2-18.
2 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.4.
3 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.7-8.
4 1.1.
5 Thuc. 2.55.1; 6.91.7.
6 Hanson 1983, p. 133.

resources,[7] the Spartan occupation of Decelea caused enough disruption in the region that the silver supply did indeed diminish. As the Athenian cavalry struggled to protect farms and livestock from hostile incursions,[8] Thucydides tells us that more than twenty thousand slaves escaped. Many of these must have been involved in the silver industry, whether directly employed in it or involved in the production and supply of agricultural or other resources to its huge labour force.[9] By 406/5 Athens was forced to issue gold coinage[10] and shortly afterwards, silver-coated copper, with silver currency only regaining prominence as a result of Conon's victorious return from Asia Minor.[11]

The recovery was slow. A fourth-century plaintiff, challenging his opponent to *antidosis*, tells him, 'those engaged in mining have suffered reverses while you farmers are prospering beyond what is your due'.[12] Later, after the battle of Chaeroneia, Hypereides tells us that, 'excavation of new mines, neglected previously because men were afraid' (διὰ τὸν φόβον νῦν ἐνεργοί) is now in progress, and the city's revenues from these are increased,'[13] and there is evidence that the state did make some attempt to ease the strains of those involved in the industry by reducing their tax burden.[14] In testament to Xenophon's recognition of the potential value for the state in encouraging silver prospecting, numismatic evidence shows that by the second half of the fourth century, silver coins began to be produced once more in 'massive' amounts.[15]

Archaeological evidence supports the literary references to late fifth-century decline and a subsequent rejuvenation in mining enterprise. The deme of Thorikos, whose prosperity was closely linked to the fortunes of the mining activity which took place under its very foundations, had started to build an unusual Doric peristyle temple,

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7 4.46-48.

8 Although the extent of the devastation caused by the Spartans is a matter of debate – see Hanson 1983, pp. 133-143 for the limited effects of the Spartan occupation on agriculture and Constantakopoulou 2007, p. 150 for a discussion of the scholarship.

9 Thuc. 7.27.5. See the fuller discussion of the effects of the Decelean occupation later in this chapter.

10 Figueira 1998, pp. 516-519.

11 Hopper 1979, p. 178; Kroll 1993, pp. 5-10.

12 Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.21.

13 Hyp. *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.36. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the use of the word φόβος in relation to business risk.

14 Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.18 (see also the section on tax exemption at chapter 2.3.2.12).

15 Kroll 1993, p. 8.

probably dedicated to Demeter and Kore, whose construction seems to have been halted after 421. Between 525 and the beginning of the fifth century, the deme had built a theatre, the earliest that we currently know of to have been built of stone,[16] and had enlarged it between 480 and 425. Remaining adequate for its purposes, we may surmise, until around 350, it was then increased in capacity by the addition of an upper *koilon* and two access ramps, indicative of increased local wealth and population,[17] the rural Dionysia at the Thorikos theatre now being 'sufficiently glamorous' to merit competitive tendering for the role of *choregos*.[18] Elsewhere in Thorikos there is an indication of an interruption in industrial activity between around 404 and 375 BC, whilst in the third quarter of the fourth century the archaeological evidence shows an increase in population, with many houses hastily and carelessly constructed and the character of the town becoming 'markedly industrial'.[19]

### 2.2.1 Athenian mine slave ownership and the *Poroi*

When Diocleides cowered behind the statue of a general in the early hours of the morning, an unwilling witness as three hundred men gathered in the prelude to one of classical Athens' most significant events, the mutilation of the herms, he had, he told the jury, been on his way to the Laurion to collect the earnings of a slave. It is probable that his slave was hired out to the mining industry. Whilst Andocides did his best to cast doubt on much of Diocleides' reliability as the accuser of those involved in the outrage, this mundane activity draws no comment.[20] Discussing this passage, MacDowell remarks that Athenians invested in mine-slaves the way a modern businessman buys shares on the Stock Exchange.[21] This analogy provides an interesting lens through which to view Xenophon's plans. In addition to their more immediate use within the workshop, farm or home, Athenians were accustomed to the notion of slaves as an 'investment' realising monetary income. Even if not everyone could expect to afford it personally, Athenian social expectations led them to aspire to slave ownership[22] and D. Lewis suggests that there may have been a prevailing

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16 Wilson 2007, p. 129, Goette 2001, pp. 218-219.
17 Hopper 1968, p. 295.
18 Wilson 2007, p. 128.
19 Mussche 1998, p. 64 and Mussche 1975, p. 53.
20 Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 1.37-39. Hired slaves also for instance at Isae. *On the Estate of Ciron* 8.35.
21 MacDowell 1962, p. 88.
22 Cartledge 2002b, p. 163 and Oliver 2006, p. 287, citing Xen. *Oeconomicos* 3.4 and Lysias *For*

sentiment that it was 'more proper that the city should own a large number of slaves,' estimating that in the fourth century Athenian public slave numbers may have reached four figures.[23] The activities of state-owned slaves encompassed policing, silver assaying, prison guarding, operating court proceedings, road building, the maintenance of shrines, assisting in the theatre of Dionysus and in the dockyards, maintaining various official records and carrying out death penalties.[24] The prospect of state ownership of three slaves per citizen thus spoke directly to that desire for private and public self-esteem through slave ownership in a context that was within Athenians' daily experience. Putting all these factors together, we can see that Xenophon's proposals targeted the citizen's sense of himself as an individual and as a member of his *demos* in a compelling manner.

Like the *Poroi* itself, this chapter is not intended to be a treatise on ancient mining techniques, and it is not relevant for our purposes whether or not Xenophon wholly understood the detailed technicalities of silver mining, although I believe that there was a greater collective awareness of the industry than has often been acknowledged, or whether his proposals could have been successful. But recent work has demonstrated the significant scale of the silver mining industry and the extent to which its very weighty supply needs permeated every aspect of the Attic economy.[25] Whilst it may have had a contained geographic location, this was not a cottage industry which could be operated in isolation from mainstream society. Its manufacturing processes required substantial quantities of materials from charcoal to bones; artefacts such as baskets, rope, pots and hides, and the skills of masons, wheelwrights, woodworkers, ironmongers and engravers amongst others.[26] The majority of these ancillary operations will have been provided by Athenian tradesmen, for whom a healthy silver industry provided a substantial consumer.

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*Callias* 5.5 as indicative of a general assumption of domestic slave ownership. Todd 2007, p. 396, calls it 'extremely dangerous' to use the Lysias remark in order to draw demographic conclusions, nevertheless for our purposes it is enough that to be effective the texts imply a general expectation of, or aspiration to, wide slave ownership.

[23] D. Lewis 1990, p. 257. Braund calls the number of public slaves 'statistically insignificant,' but he is talking of the Greek world in general; Braund 2011, p. 114.

[24] D. Lewis 1990, pp. 254-257 and Rihll 2011, pp. 60-61.

[25] See in particular the work of Tracey Rihll who has made an unassailable case for the scale and technological complexity of Attic silver mining in Rihll 2001, Rihll and Tucker 2002, Rihll 2008, Rihll 2010a and Rihll 2010b.

[26] Rihll 2001, p. 133.

Xenophon was a keen horseman; when he describes the strategic positions of the forts at Anaphlystos and Thorikos and proposes building a third at the high point of Besa,[27] it is reasonable to suppose that in his youth he had some familiarity with the region and would have encountered the mining operations in the surrounding territory even if they were depleted in volume.[28] The Xenophontic Socrates could hardly have scoffed at Glaucon for not having visited the region, if Xenophon had never done so either.[29]

Undoubtedly, then, Xenophon recognised the importance of the mines to state prosperity, and if he practised what he preached in the *Memorabilia* he would have had a working knowledge of the mechanisms by which the state exploited the product of the mines and the sums the state could realise. To provide a context for his proposals therefore it is useful here to refer to some of the very important work that took place in the second half of the twentieth century and the continuing scholarly analysis of the various ways in which the industry may be thought to have created income for the state. We may then look at the specific aspects of the relatively complex legal and economic relationships within the industry in which Xenophon proposed state intervention.

### 2.2.2 The evidence for Attic mine operations – speeches, lease inscriptions and archaeology

Frustratingly, despite a wealth of evidence – literary, epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological – it is well-nigh impossible to pin down the missing links which would tell us by precisely what processes and in what sums the state took its share of income from silver prospecting. Several major studies have appeared since Cunningham explored the mining region in 1962 and subsequently bemoaned the lack of archaeological investigation or publication of the many surface structures which were evident even then.[30] The bulk of our information about Attic silver mining in the fourth century comes from two sources. The first is the voluminous but fragmentary body of mining leases issued by the *poletai*, the board of ten magistrates responsible to the *boule* for various sales and lettings, including confiscated lands, tax collection

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[27] 4.43-44; the map at Lauffer 1979 p. 221, Tab. 14 shows the relative defensive positions very clearly.

[28] Xenophon's deme of *Erchia* was near modern Spata; Vanderpool 1965.

[29] Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.11-12.

[30] Cunningham 1967, p. 145.

and mine leases, whose work was recorded on *stelae* originally displayed near the *bouleuterion* and *tholos* in the Athenian *agora* and later excavated by the American School at Athens.[31] The great bulk of the work on the *poletai* leases was undertaken originally by Crosby in 1950, with a (re)publication of existing and new material by Langdon in 1991 bringing all the *poletai* records together in one place.[32]

The other significant source is the profusion of archaeological remains in southern Attica. Excavations took place from the 1970s alongside virtually continuous rescue excavations, particularly in the coastal and the still-active industrial regions, and the works carried out by Kakavoyannis at Pasa Limani, by the Belgian School at Thorikos and by the British School at Agrileza.[33] In addition there are literary references such as that by [Aristotle] to the role of the *poletai* in awarding mining leases[34] and an entire Demosthenic speech, *Against Pantaenetus*, relating to a mining dispute.[35] There is also a variety of passing references in other sources, such as to those made wealthy by mining,[36] to mine purchasing and related loans,[37] to the renting of slaves to the mines,[38] to state aid to support mine operators and to the general vicissitudes of the enterprise.[39]

Scholarly discussions of the silver mining industry remain complex and questions are still unresolved, but notably the discussion over fifty years has moved from an interpretation of the issues based on the internal evidence of the leases to a far wider ranging debate involving the archaeology of the region, the scientific analysis of pre-industrial mining techniques and the comparative evidence of slavery. Over a period of twenty five years Hopper drew on Crosby's publication of the *poletai* leases and the gradually appearing excavation reports to publish three surveys of Attic silver

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31 *Ath. Pol.* 47.2-3; see Langdon 1991, pp. 57-69 and Papazarkadas 2011, pp. 53-57 for the history and functions of the *poletai.*

32 Crosby and Young 1941; Crosby 1950; Crosby 1957; Langdon 1991. Langdon includes a complete concordance of all the published leases and inventory numbers (pp. 211-216). I will refer to individual leases by their catalogue and line number from Langdon with cross reference to other publications where it may be helpful.

33 Kakavoyannis 1977, Kakavoyannis 2001, Kakavoyannis 2005, and the Thorikos series of reports by Mussche *et al* published by the Comité des fouilles belges en Grèce between 1967 and 1998. For Agrileza: J. E. Jones 1982; J. E. Jones 1985 and Photos-Jones and J. E. Jones 1994.

34 *Ath. Pol.* 47.2.

35 Dem. 37 *Against Pantaenetus*.

36 Hyp. *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.35; Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.20; Plut. *Nicias* 4.2.

37 Dem. *Against Boeotus II* 40.52.

38 Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 1.38.

39 Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.18, 21.

mining as well as a detailed chapter within his *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece.*[40] In 1980 Conophagos published a comprehensive description of ancient industrial techniques, metallurgy and the topography and archaeology of the region alongside analyses of some of the ancient sources, replacing Ardaillon's *Les Mines du Laurion* of 1897 which had hitherto been the standard reference work.[41] In 1985 Osborne's succinct analysis of the *poletai* leases drew conclusions about the economic and geographical relationships between the various parties engaged in the industry and the way the industry impacted on settlement patterns in the Laurion region.[42]

Most recently, Rihll, Bissa, Shipton and Faraguna have paid close attention to the industrial processes, the work of the slaves and the individual operators, and the technical processes are now generally understood. But for readers of the *Poroi*, one of the most vexed questions to emerge relates to the income that mining enterprises yielded for the state, and in particular, how to understand the evidence as to the length of the concessions, the frequency of lease payments, and whether or how tax was levied on silver production, a debate which will be examined in chapter 2.3.[43]

### 2.2.3 The practicalities and processes of silver mining and refinement

Tacitus gives a flavour of the arduousness of ancient silver mining even for free men:

> … Curtius Rufus obtained the same honour. He had opened mines in the territory of the Mattiaci for working certain veins of silver. The produce was small and soon exhausted. The toil meanwhile of the legions was only to a loss, while they dug channels for water and constructed below the surface works which are difficult enough in the open air. Worn out by the labour, and knowing that similar hardships were endured in several provinces, the soldiers wrote a secret despatch in the name of the armies, begging the emperor to give in advance triumphal distinctions to anyone to whom he was about to entrust his forces.[44]

The mines themselves would begin with the digging of a vertical reconnaissance

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40 Hopper 1953; Hopper 1961; Hopper 1968; Hopper 1979, pp. 164-189.

41 Conophagos 1980; Ardaillon 1897.

42 R. Osborne 1985a, pp. 111-126.

43 Shipton 2000 and Bissa 2008 for investment patterns; Faraguna 2006 for the role of the state; Bissa 2009, pp. 51-55 on lease categories and more generally, chapter 2 for government involvement in the silver mining industry; Rihll 2001 for the industrial processes, and Rihll 2008 and 2010 for slavery. Vanhove 1996 and Aperghis 1998 each reassessed earlier analyses of the leases, reinterpreting the evidence on all these points and Kakavoyannis 2005 looked at the structure of the leases drawing on extensive archaeological investigations in the region.

44 Tac. *Annals* 11.20 trans. Church and Brodribb.

shaft, which may have taken in the region of two years to complete[45] and the deepest of which yet found is 119m, a depth rarely seen in ancient mining anywhere in the world.[46] In the event of a successful strike, horizontal galleries then followed the seam and might be interconnected or divided to promote ventilation. Some galleries were only three foot high, others substantially bigger, requiring pit props or rock pillars left in situ.[47] The rock was extremely hard, and operators generally preferred to re-work old seams than to sink new shafts, sometimes returning to much older workings once improved metallurgical skills meant that seams which had been abandoned could be more effectively exploited.[48] The ore was then hand sorted, with richer ore (i.e. that containing more than about one-third lead) being sent straight for smelting.[49] The remainder was first ground and milled to prepare it for separation[50] at one of the washing tables of which there remain today several remarkably complete examples along with their allied systems of connecting cisterns, which provided the large amounts of water required to separate out the argentiferous lead ore by a process of sedimentation.[51] The washing tables ranged in complexity from a simple flat circular or rectangular drying area surrounded by channels which fed the ore-bearing water around their edges via sedimentation tanks, to complexes such as the Agrileza 'Washery C' which included grinding spaces, store rooms and (probably) slave quarters.[52] Once the sediment had been recovered and dried, the lead and silver were extracted and separated at smelting furnaces that were sometimes situated further away, either on higher ground or at coastal sites, although there may be evidence of some separation taking place in the washeries.[53] The smelting process involved harmful fumes, particularly dangerous to dogs, according to Pliny the Elder,[54] and the release of lead oxide in the form of a white ash that was extremely toxic if inhaled.[55] Therefore furnaces were sited where they could do less harm, perhaps on higher

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45 Ardaillon 1897, p. 25.
46 Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 333; Morin, Herbach and Rosenthal 2012, p. 9.
47 Cunningham 1967, pp. 149-150; J. E. Jones 1982, p. 176. See Morin, Herbach and Rosenthal 2012 for an analysis of the sophistication of Laurion ventilation systems.
48 Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 333.
49 Rihll 2001, p. 117.
50 See section 2.5.4 for the implications of this stage of the process as evidence of economic rationality.
51 The lead also had a commercial value: Arist. *Econ*. 2.1353a.
52 J. E. Jones 1985.
53 Kakavoyannis 1977; *AR* 1980 p. 17; J. E. Jones 1982, pp. 172-173 and fig. 1; J. E. Jones 1985, p. 120.
54 Pliny *Nat. Hist*. 33.31.
55 Rihll and Tucker 2002, p 282.

ground.[56] Then later, once deforestation took hold thanks to the industry's heavy demand for timber, coastal sites suggest that forethought also had to be given to the necessity of easy access to imported fuel. Nevertheless, the region may have smelled permanently sulphurous.[57]

From the above brief résumé it will be obvious that a considerable investment was required to enable the effective exploitation of the 'virgin and silver-laden hills.'[58] An initial cutting required time-consuming, labour intensive work with no guarantee of success, but despite this, over 1,000 ancient mine shafts have been discovered in the region.[59] The numerous surface buildings from the classical era were well made, often terraced and partially roofed. High quality fine hydraulic cement and careful engineering achieved the requisite gradual flow of water through the system.[60] Cisterns, sometimes involving major earthworks, were required not only for the heavy water consumption of the washeries but also for the support of the large numbers of slaves and managers in residence.[61] The workforce had to be equipped with tools, clothed, housed and fed, and as the landscape became stripped of its woodlands and productive soil, timber and other materials had to be brought in with the concomitant need for sea transportation, waggons and animals for haulage.[62] Given the challenges of victualing such a large population (at a conservative estimate, perhaps anything up to 11,000 at any one time at the height of productivity[63]) it seems a fair hypothesis that the series of grain crises of the late fourth century might have played a part in the industry's decline.[64] With goods and manpower clearly being transported into and out of the region in some quantities it is hardly surprising that two *agoras* have been identified in the region. In the later fourth century Leucius of Sounion, a landowner appearing in the *poletai* leases, donated land at Cape Sounion for the necessary enlargement of the *agora* because of lack of space, which may well have been due to

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56 Hopper 1953, p. 204, n. 5; Hopper 1968, pp. 295, 307; Hopper 1979, p. 175; J. E. Jones 1982, fig. 1.

57 Rihll 2001, p. 126.

58 4.2.

59 Conophagos 1980, p. 163.

60 Hopper 1968, p. 297; J. E. Jones 1985, pp. 106, 110, 115. See Rihll 2001, p. 137 n. 12 on the unresolved issues around our understanding of the hydraulic engineering.

61 See eg. J. E. Jones 1985, p. 117.

62 Dem. *Against Meidias* 21.167; Young 1956, p. 141; J. E. Jones 1982, p. 173.

63 See the discussion of the size of the slave population at chapter 2.4.2.

64 Isager and Hansen 1975, p. 200.

the increased volume of the mining industry,[65] and a large site on the south-east coast at Pasa Limani has been interpreted as an '*agora* or depot of the metallurgical trade'.[66]

Despite this ample evidence of industrial activity, less clear are the precise relationships between the various parties involved in silver extraction and, most importantly for our purposes, the ways in which the state ultimately profited. In the following section we will look at the way the city and her inhabitants benefited from the industry.

## 2.3 State income from silver mining - introduction

Xenophon anticipates that his plan, when implemented, will yield lease income from the increasing volume of slave hire. But it is clear that with the re-energising of the industry he expects more than that: he talks about revenue from busier markets, harbour dues and state owned houses, and reminds his readers of the income the state received through slavery before the Spartan occupation of Decelea.[67] Xenophon's readers will undoubtedly have been aware of the state income yielded by the mines in happier times and an examination of such income sources, both those referenced by Xenophon directly and those which are not, demonstrates that Xenophon well understood the wider income achievable beyond the slave lease receipts and that these will have been recognised by his readers. Nevertheless as we will see, quantifying essential inputs and outputs of the mining industry such as slave numbers and production costs, or the proportion of bullion to minted coinage, is complex and ultimately unachievable, whilst levels of production varied over time such that even generalisations can be tendentious, thus this account is 'qualitative and descriptive.'[68]

It is surprisingly difficult to untangle precisely what mechanisms enabled the silver mines to contribute to state prosperity. Bissa has shown that the state legislated to protect the works, administering their leasing, regulating the quality of the product and providing the prospector with a safe operating environment,[69] but what did the state receive in return? The following section will attempt to give an overview of the

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65 *IG* II² 1180; P5=RO36.46, 80.
66 J. E. Jones 1982, p. 172.
67 4.25; 4.40; 4.49.
68 cf. Davies 1998, p. 244.
69 Bissa 2009, p. 65.

direct and indirect ways in which income could be realised for the state through Xenophon's plan for the silver mines.

### 2.3.1 The *poletai* leases - introduction

The *poletai* issued leases which licensed the right to mine; mine operators did not necessarily mine under land they owned themselves, although in general landowners appear to make the most money from the industry and they (as well as others) probably operated the various surface works and presumably hoped to profit from the leaseholders' need to process their ore in a relatively convenient location. Osborne suggests that landowners may have invested in the infrastructure on their land, for which mine operators would have had to pay ground rent, in addition to making lease payments to the *poletai*.[70]

From at least shortly before 367/6, leases appear to have been inscribed annually. They usually name the registrant and lessee (generally Athenians); the owner on whose land a concession is situated; adjacent identifying features such as *ergasteria*, roads, and boundaries with other properties; the classification and price of the lease, and a reference to any earlier *stele* on which the mine had previously been registered. Analysis of the surviving *stelae* and projections relating to the missing years suggest that there may have been in the region of 2,500 leases registered between 367/6 and around 300.[71] Although they are rarely securely dated, letter forms and the occasional reference to an archon from an earlier lease have made it possible to arrange them in roughly chronological order. All the scholars discussed here work on the assumption that the surviving *stelae*, representing 39 out of the 67 years from the first inscription through to the end of the century, present a random representative sample.[72]

#### 2.3.1.1 The *Athenaion politeia* and the *poletai* leases

The history of the way that mining rights came to be 'owned' and administered by the state is probably irretrievable, although it has been surmised that mining territories had been confiscated from the Peisistratids.[73] The extant inscribed leases do not reflect a system evidenced to be in operation very much earlier than the 370s,

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70 R. Osborne 1985a, p. 118.
71 Projections of lease numbers, Aperghis 1998, p. 3.
72 For the sample as representative, see eg. R. Osborne 1985a, p. 112, Aperghis 1998, p. 3.
73 D. Lewis 1990, pp. 248-9, 258.

although mining has been demonstrated to go back as far as the Early Helladic era at Thorikos[74] and the institution of the μεταλλικός νόμος, law which dealt with transgressions within the mining industry, demonstrates the way that codification and organisation of mining operations evolved to cope with increased activity.[75] The stele of 367/6 refers to certain renewed leases being from the *stele*, ἐκ τῆς στήλης, without reference to an archon for the earlier stele, whereas the same formula used on successive stones identifies an archon for the earlier lease period. Crosby posits that there might thus only have been one earlier inscribed stele.[76] Hopper suggests that a change from direct state operation to private leasing might have taken place either under the Oligarchs or immediately after.[77] If the state had indeed operated the mines in the late fourth century, then the slaves from whom Nikias made such profits[78] would have been leased to the state, in an exact reversal of the lessee/lessor relationship that Xenophon proposes, but from a reference in Aristophanes' *Knights* we know that the mines were in state hands in the second half of the fifth century.[79]

Hopper and Osborne assume that the adoption of inscribed leases was in response to some procedural change,[80] whilst Langdon is more inclined to see the move to inscription as a straightforward change from recording on tablets, in order to make an existing lease a more accessible matter of public record. Langdon argues that if any major change in mining administration did occur, it was more likely to have been in the second century, when a known revival in mining does not seem to have been accompanied by inscribed leases, possibly indicating that mines were no longer individually leased and the state was taking possession of all silver ore for coinage.[81] By way of comparison, temple accounting on Delos saw big alterations in recording methods at the beginning of the second century and Migeotte has suggested that the changes may have been instituted there because of a period of negligence; it is not impossible that a similar motivation led to a change of leasing procedure in Athens.[82] It is also quite possible that, as with many aspects of public life which began to appear

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74 See eg. Spitaels 1984; *AR* 1981-1982, p. 13.
75 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.34–38.
76 Crosby 1950, p. 190.
77 Hopper 1953, p. 248, n. 348;
78 4.14.
79 Ar. *Knights* 362; Faraguna 2006, p. 142.
80 Hopper 1968, p. 303; R. Osborne 1985a, p. 116.
81 Langdon 1991, p. 61.
82 Migeotte 2008, p. 72.

on stone in fourth-century Athens, only the manner of recording, and not the procedure, was innovative. Nevertheless, we do not know for sure whether we are comparing like with like when we try to make some comparison between state income from silver and the mechanisms by which it was achieved in the fifth and fourth centuries.

The *Ath. Pol*. refers to two categories of lease, ἐργάσιμα, let for three years and συγκεχωρημένα, 'those that have been conceded' according to Crosby, [83] let for perhaps three, seven or ten years: there is controversy over the papyrus in the British Library.[84] However the inscribed categories of mine on the *stelae* do not precisely coincide with those of the *Ath. Pol.* and scholars have disputed at length how best to marry them up. There are conflicting opinions even as to the word συγκεχωρημένα which has also been read as συγκεχωσμένα, 'filled up'.[85] Whilst the *Ath. Pol.* gives just two categories of leases, the inscriptions describe four types of mine, *ergasima*, *anasaxima*, *palaia anasaxima* and *kainotomia*. Not only is it tricky to ascertain the length of the lease terms, but the inscriptions tell us how much the payments were without telling us how frequently they were to be paid, which could be one-off, annually, monthly or per prytany throughout the term, making it impossible to calculate the full costs. It has also proved difficult so far to identify with certainty any individual leases which are renewals of earlier registrations. Therefore, central to understanding the way the system of payment operated together with the sums yielded, is clarification of both the lease term on the *Ath. Pol*. papyrus and the relationship between [Aristotle's] categories and the classifications of the *poletai* inscriptions. The depth of the scholarly debate over the Aristotelian passage and the interpretation of the *poletai* leases is indicative in part of the fragmentary nature of the leases themselves but also of an increasing understanding of the actuality of mining operations which have proved resistant to the simplistic mapping of a small number of terms onto a wide range of specialised undertakings. The sophistication introduced into the debate by the discussion of operational issues such as a natural preference to

[83] Crosby 1950, p. 199.

[84] *Ath. Pol*. 47.2; discussion can be found at: Crosby 1950, p. 199; Hopper 1953, p. 226; Chambers 1965, pp. 36-37; Rhodes 1981, p. 554; Langdon 1991, p. 60 and n. 21; Vanhove 1996, p. 243; Shipton 1998 p. 60, n. 17; Bissa 2009, pp. 51-52. For a summary of earlier conflicting interpretations of the leases see Aperghis 1998, pp. 1-6.

[85] See e.g. Vanhove 1996, p. 243. Rhodes 1981, p. 554, finds this reading of the papyrus improbable.

extract the richest ore first and the regular return to re-work older cuttings as metallurgical skills improved[86] demonstrates the complexity of the industry. The unknowable productivity of any mine from one month to another may mean that the *poletai* categories provided at best a rough schema within which the industry could be categorised. Whilst we have evidence that a blind eye might be turned when it suited the state to encourage speculation,[87] regular inspections and constant vigilance amongst neighbours would have been essential to ensure that the system could remain fair.

#### 2.3.1.2 Income to the state from the leases

A further issue that quickly arises from the study of the *poletai* leases, is that whilst there are occasional high figures, many of the lease payments are very low indeed – 20 drachmas or so – and whether these represent single payments or even, say, payments made every prytany for ten years, it is difficult to see how they might have yielded any significant level of income to the state.

Whilst the volume of those leases which can be securely dated does show a steady increase up to just beyond the mid-century before declining once more,[88] nevertheless they do not seem to provide evidence for the sort of state income suggested by the famous trireme-building episode of Herodotus and the *Ath. Pol*,[89] although this too presents interpretative challenges.[90] The ten drachmas per head distribution of Herodotus' account would equate to no more than 50 talents even if the Athenian population were estimated at 30,000, and at, say, a talent per ship such a sum could thus represent only a partial contribution to the cost of the two hundred triremes Herodotus tells us were built. Aristotle's account achieves half this number – only one hundred triremes - for 100 talents, perhaps double the expenditure described by Herodotus, a substantial disparity. The episode clearly has a level of myth about it; Loomis rightly advises that the two accounts should not be merged[91] and Gabrielsen views the increase in the fleet as:

> a gradual build-up over a relatively longer span of time, rather than a crash

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86 Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 333.
87 Hyp. *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.34.
88 Hopper 1953, p. 216.
89 Hdt. 7.144; *Ath. Pol*. 22.7.
90 Van Wees 2013, pp. 2-5 for instance, argues that Herodotus deliberately downplayed the pre-existing public finance structures.
91 Loomis 1998, pp. 220-221.

programme that produced 200 *triereis* within two years' time.[92]

It is in any case impractical to imagine that one year's production yielded such an immediate windfall and Picard argues that it would have taken a matter of years, perhaps as many as thirty, for the benefits of the newly discovered 'third contact' to be exploited to the extent that such a surplus might be mined, refined and amassed.[93] As Hopper suggests, it might be better to ignore the events of 483 when trying to ascertain fourth-century procedure, although scholars return frequently to a putative 100 talents when trying to reconstruct a formula for annual state income in this period.[94]

Sales by the *poletai* were by auction[95] although the regular appearance of the sum of 20 drachmas throughout the fourth century for new cuttings and re-opened workings may suggest a pre-fixed 'reserve' and/or a lack of competition. Of the seventeen mines leased in 367/6, the year of our earliest extant records, only five were set at more than this, in a range from 50 to 1,550 drachmas.[96] Later in the century the highest figures appearing in the leases are 6,100[97] and 17,550 drachmas.[98] Langdon dates this highest figure to 346/5 and it is interesting that this, the most elevated price yet discovered, appears just as the evidence of the leases suggests that mining activity is approaching its fourth-century height, and just as Nicobulus and Evergus embark on their fractious business relationship with Pantaenetus over an *ergasterion* and slaves mortgaged for 105 minas.[99] But the figure of 17,550 drachmas is apparently quite exceptional and otherwise amongst the known leases the income received by the state seems disappointingly low for those seeking the source of Athenian wealth, even allowing for the depressed state of the industry. As we have seen, the *stelae* do not record either the length of the lease or the frequency of the payments, only the sum. Xenophon is called on as a witness by Crosby, in considering whether the listing of leases by prytany is evidence for payments also made on this basis, ie ten times per

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92 Gabrielsen 1994, p. 29; cf. van Wees 2013, pp. 30-37.

93 Picard 2001, pp. 7-10.

94 Hopper 1979, p. 184; Conophagos 1980, p. 350; Aperghis 1998, p. 19.

95 Langdon 1994 addresses the question of the nature of *poletai* sales and argues, *contra* Hallof 1990, that some were conducted by auction, in the case of mines (p. 259) these were those where more than one prospective lessee came forward.

96 Crosby and Young 1941, pp. 14-19 (with translation) = P5, p. 76.

97 Crosby 1950, no. 16.299, pp. 244-254 = P26.93, p. 107, 342/1-339/8.

98 Crosby 1957, S5 = P19.30, p. 94, 346/5.

99 Dem. 37 *Against Pantaenetus*.

year over the term of the lease. By way of example Crosby calculates potential income from the lease list of 367/6 if payments were made per prytany, at just over twenty talents[100] and from the list of 342/1 the total income calculated by this method would have risen to in the region of 160 talents.[101] Crosby, admitting that she is arguing *ex silentio*, therefore rejects the suggestion of payments per prytany on the basis that had Xenophon's proposal to increase mining activity come to fruition, increased lease income would have been significant and it is unlikely that Xenophon would not have mentioned it. Therefore, she argues that lease income must have been relatively low and that if lease payments represented the sole direct state mining revenue, the sums must have been payable annually (ie three or seven times over the life of the lease) rather than once per term, although ultimately she can suggest no basis on which to choose between the two theories.[102]

Hopper finds an annual payment of, say, twenty drachmas 'ridiculously small' and infers not only from the organisation of the lease lists by prytany but also from the evidence relating to other *poletai* receipts that the payments were made by prytany and contrary to Crosby, suggests that an increase in rent payments lay behind Xenophon's desire to see an increase in mining activity. In particular, he finds the individual sums thereby derived per mine and the putative 160 talents for 342/1 to be figures in line both with the reference to an individual mine 'purchase' for 90 minas in Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus* and with the increase in annual city revenues from 130 talents to 400 talents described in Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic*.[103]

Other interpretations abound.[104] Faraguna, for instance, has made a sound case for two payments - the initial fee, shown on the *poletai* inscriptions, represented a filing fee to register the lease and set the boundaries, and the second, a share of the results of extraction, greater or lesser depending on the operator's success.[105]

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[100] 20 drachmas per prytany for (say) seven years for the twelve new leases, plus the larger amounts, successively 1550, 1550, 150, 50 and 150 drachmas per prytany for three years, a total of 120,300 drachmas.

[101] Crosby 1950, p. 203.

[102] Crosby 1950, pp. 203-204.

[103] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.22; Dem. *The Fourth Philippic* 10.37-38; Hopper 1953, pp. 238-239; Hopper 1979, p. 184.

[104] See for example the discussion of Shipton 1998 at 2.3.2.1.

[105] Faraguna 2006, see discussion at 2.3.2.5.

Returning to Crosby's observation that Xenophon does not mention lease income, Conophagos' explanation of the omission is twofold and ingenious: he argues that the συγκεχωρημένα mines, the second category found in the *Ath. Pol.*, was an entirely separate lease category from those appearing on the inscriptions. These were the productive, fully operational mines and should not be looked for in the *poletai* leases at all. Their higher productivity would not be known in advance and so they would be subject to annual variable assessments to determine their lease payments, which would have to be recorded elsewhere. Therefore he argues that Xenophon does not refer to receipts from ἐργάσιμα mines, because they are unimportant, and he does not mention receipts from συγκεχωρημένα mines because they are well known by all, and that Xenophon chose only to focus on the new income source derived from his scheme – the hiring of state slaves.[106]

Conophagos also suggests that some of the mines which were known to have employed 500-1,000 slaves must have employed them on several neighbouring concessions – the fact that these large neighbouring concessions with the same lessees do not appear on the *poletai* lists he takes as further proof that wealthier, successful mines were recorded elsewhere.[107] But the evidence for large slaveholdings comes from Xenophon who does not say that such slaves were all leased to the same or even to just a few individual operators and cannot be taken alone as proof of single individual enterprises substantially greater than the average.[108] Instances of large numbers of slaves might equally be evidence of many individual renting arrangements for the supply of smaller numbers of slaves between slave owner and multiple mine operators. *Against Pantaenetus*[109] shows the potential complexity of such renting arrangements and the speed with which the ownership of groups of slaves might change hands even whilst employed at one establishment.

Only Osborne has, briefly, rebutted Conophagos' analysis of the leases and their terms[110] (although Langdon, referring *en passant* to his 'radically different

106 Conophagos 1980, p. 439.
107 Conophagos 1980, pp. 350-351.
108 4.14-15.
109 See chapter 2.4 below.
110 Osborne 1985a, p. 243 n. 7, refers to Conophagos' 'unnatural interpretation of συγκεχωρημένα and his forced reading of the *Ath. Pol.*'

interpretation' directs readers to the 'more convincing orthodox view' of Hopper).[111] Almost certainly, we do not have the evidence finally to assess the way that the leases were costed and administered, and Conophagos' imaginative interpretation of the evidence demonstrates the way in which an apparently large body of evidence might be open to wider re-interpretation than the earlier debates suggest. It seems almost certain that we have to look beyond the initial mine registrations for the bulk of income received by the state.

#### 2.3.1.3 The *poletai* leases – conclusion

We are left, then, with various interpretations of the leases, (not all of which have been discussed here) and whilst the scholarly explanations may suggest more ingeniously complex solutions, none of them sufficiently ties up all the loose ends. If state income is to be found only in the lease records, Hopper's explanation remains the most convincing. But this would entail that the *poletai* would be reliant solely on the competitive bidding process to achieve the greatest income, and such income could take no account of the wealth that might subsequently be achieved by a lucky strike. That Xenophon does not reference lease income, does not in itself demonstrate either that such income was insignificant, or that it was so well known that it need not be remarked upon, but I tend towards the latter interpretation. Even when the lease income appears to be low, there is sufficient evidence of the considerable financial advantages accruing to the state from silver production that either the lease income alone, or such income along with allied taxation on production, can hardly have been ignored by Xenophon and his audience even if they are not enumerated within his text. The many other routes through which the *demos* may have profited from the mining industry are discussed in the following section.

### 2.3.2 Tax income on mining and associated activities - introduction

Xenophon refers several times to tax income. At 2.1 he mentions the metic tax; at 4.25 he looks ahead to the income from taxation on the sale of the slaves; at 4.40 he says there will be revenues from the harbours and markets; at 4.20 he refers in passing to tax-farmers and at 4.49 to a tax on furnaces and the markets in the mining region. He is evidently alive to all the income-potential for the state. Figueira suggests that at

[111] Langdon 1991, p. 60. n. 19.

the height of production during the *pentekontaetia*, annual state income from direct and indirect taxes drawing on the output of the mines would have been in the region of 75-100 talents.[112] Some of the ancillary activities that supported the industry were taxed, and there were other ways in which the industry made contributions to the life of the *demos*. Our evidence is scanty and certainly not sufficient to enable quantification, but the economic repercussions of the industry permeate Athenian life. When Xenophon says, 'and all the other sources of revenue,'[113] this catch-all phrase must wrap up within it many contributions by the silver industry to public resources which Xenophon's audience will be aware of but which he does not detail, and furnishes the answer to those who question why Xenophon does not mention the leases explicitly.[114]

As we have seen, there can be little doubt that the state took a share in addition to the lease payment. In Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus* we hear of a καταβολή, an instalment due to the state from a mine operator, of 90 minas, a substantial sum that cannot be easily squared with the lease payments we know of.[115] In its definition of Ἀπονομή, the Suda describes 'The apportionment, whether in the case of the city taking some part of the proceeds from the mine-workings or in the case of a division amongst a multiplicity of contractors, so that each takes some part'[116] clearly implying that the state received a part of a mine operator's profit.[117]

Rejecting Faraguna's idea of a levy on the final product of the mines, Bissa argues that state resources were traditionally either managed directly by the state, or exploited by lease arrangement.[118] But Athenian silver resources held a unique position in public life. Athens' wealth and power are, and were, widely attributed to Laurion silver. If the leases cannot provide a satisfactory answer in the search for public revenue, then it is inevitable that we must look elsewhere. What becomes clear

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112 Figueira 1998, p. 185.

113 4.49 καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πρόσοδοι ἂν πολλαὶ γίγνοιντο.

114 eg. Crosby 1950, p. 203.

115 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.22.

116 Ἀπονομή: ἡ ἀπόμοιρα, ὡς μέρος τι τῶν περιγινομένων ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων λαμβανούσης τῆς πόλεως. ἢ ὡς διαιρουμένων εἰς πλείους μισθωτάς, ἵν' ἕκαστος λάβοι τι μέρος. Suda On Line, trans: David Whitehead, 8 October 2000 http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/alpha/3456.

117 A further definition from the Suda and the difficulties of this late source are discussed at chapter 2.3.2.2.

118 Bissa 2009, pp. 53-56 calculating relatively large revenues from the leases on the assumption that most ran concurrently for ten years with payments made by prytany.

from a study of the sources and the scholarship, however, is that the most we can achieve is an impressionistic picture. Some assumptions are based on (varying) interpretations of the income from the leases; others take an assumed annual yield of bullion and work backwards. The overview that follows therefore quite deliberately does not attempt any sort of quantitative analysis and whilst I draw on the sometimes impressive calculations of others, the wide variety of assumptions on which they are based means that it is important to avoid the implication that they form a coherent whole; a level of scepticism remains essential and any integrated synthesis is impossible.

It is informative, for instance, to consider what the operators might actually afford to contribute out of their profits. Aperghis takes a notional 500 working mines, and calculates, based on a rather large number of hypotheses, that it would have been possible for an 'average' mine to make an average payment of 1,200 drachmas a year, and therefore yield between them an annual income to the state of 100 talents. This set of calculations suggests tax levied at 10% of production, and would still leave the operator with 6,000 drachmas in hand that might be shared with the landowner, *ergasterion* and furnace operators.[119] Over several closely worked pages Conophagos, on the other hand, takes a notional 20,000 kg annual silver bullion yield and assesses each stage of production in some detail; manpower and associated expenses such as fuel, food and clothing are separately quantified for extraction, washeries, furnaces and cupellation. Aperghis' calculations, which he calls, 'my very rough analysis,' lack the detail of Conophagos' work and are intended to show simply that a mine tax would have been feasible, but although Aperghis draws on some of Conophagos' observations, it is not possible to merge the two exercises usefully. Both, however, project an average annual payment to the state of 100 talents at the peak of production, Conophagos specifically looking at the fifth century and Aperghis at the fourth, and their very different approaches indicate that, however exacted, the industry could bear such a cost.[120] Most recently, Davis has argued that both scholars' projections would lead to operators making losses and that taxation must have been lower.[121] The following sections will look at the evidence for various mechanisms through which the state might have extracted its share.

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[119] Aperghis 1998, pp. 18-19.

[120] Conophagos 1980, pp. 341-352; Aperghis 1998, p. 19.

[121] Davis 2014, pp. 269–274. See chapter 2.3.2.2.

### 2.3.2.1 The *pentedrachmia* – the five drachma tax

There are only two clear references to mine taxation in our sources, one of which is very late. A *poletai* record of 342/1-339/8 records the confiscation of an apartment house in Piraeus belonging to Meixidemos of Myrrhinous, in settlement of a bond owed to the public treasury which Meixidemos had guaranteed for Philistides, son of Philistides, for the levying of a tax:

> ἐγγύην ἐν τοῖς ἔργ-
> οις τὴν πεντεδραχμίαν ἕκτην καὶ ἑβδόμην κ-
> αὶ ὀγδόην τρεῖς ταύτας ἑκάστην τὴν καταβ[ο]-
> λήν: ΗΔΔΠ: δραχμὰς[122]

Both Meritt and later Langdon interpret this as a five drachma mine tax;[123] Shipton qualifies this with the thought that even if it were 'not an actual tax, it was clearly a regular payment due each prytany, by those exploiting the mines.'[124] Shipton noted that the 'remarkable' aspect of all the known lease prices was that all were divisible by five and suggested that this was the key to understanding this inscription and the lease costs, suggesting that there was a 5 drachma charge per prytany, such that a three year lease would cost 150 drachmas. A 20 drachma price would reflect the nominal fee at the opening of an old cutting (a *palaion anasaximon*), and fees of more than 500 drachmas (ie. ten years) would represent a multiplicity of mines within a single concession, perhaps shared by several partners.

Shipton was right to pay attention to the *pentedrachmia*, which had hitherto been barely addressed. However there is an inevitable need for imaginative thinking in finding ways to construct a plan that allows for a range of prices from 20 to 6,100 drachmas. In particular it is not clear why it should be so very remarkable that lease prices increased in five drachma stages – Athenian coinage may not have been decimal, but her numbering certainly was, and five is a convenient point between zero and ten. The exceptionally highly priced leases do need some explanation, but Shipton's own gloss on the highest price – 12 concessions x 5 drachmas x ten prytanies x ten years – only adds up to 6,000, the same sum, as she says, that we see quoted in Demosthenes 42.3, but not actually the precise 6,100 we see recorded on the

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[122] Meritt 1936, pp. 393-413, 10.129-130; pp. 393-406 = Traill 1986, pp. 82-83, n.3 = Walbank 1991, pp. 147-207; P26.474-475.

[123] Langdon 1991, p. 65.

[124] Shipton 1998, p. 59.

*stele*. The lower prices are also unhelpful, as Faraguna points out; a 20 drachma lease would represent a term of four prytanies, not long enough for any useful activity. Fawcett rejects the five drachma tax in favour of the 1/24$^{th}$ of the Suda (see below), although he does not go into any detail.[125] However this assumes that only one or the other tax must be correct. It is quite possible, given the stages of leasing, extracting and refining, that different charges could be levied at different stages, and it is equally possible, given the lateness of the Suda as a reference, that the taxes existed at different times.

#### 2.3.2.2 The one twenty-fourth

The *Suda* tells us that when a new mine was registered, one twenty-fourth was promised to the state:

> Prosecution for an unregistered mine. When those who worked the silver mines wanted to begin a new working, they would notify those the people had put in charge of mines and would register a twenty-fourth part of the new mine as a tax payable to the people. So if someone appeared to be working a mine in secret, anyone who wanted could indict and expose him for not having registered.[126]

This charge is not mentioned in the *Ath. Pol.* at 47.2 where the allocation by the *poletai* of mine leases and tax contracts is discussed, and Rhodes suggests that it may have been levied at a later period, when activity was declining.[127] On the other hand, other taxes are not individually itemised there either, and other scholars have discussed the implications of the *Suda* reference in relation to fourth-century mining in some detail. Hopper suggests that the only way it might have been imposed would have been to make a second charge, based on a mine's productivity, beyond the initial lease payment. Thus one twenty-fourth of the previous year's production might perhaps equate to the cost of the forthcoming lease. Following Andreades and Ardaillon, Hopper points out that if the one hundred talents the state received in 483 were only one twenty-fourth of production, the total silver production would have been 2,400 talents worth, achieved by digging 945,000 tons of ore, 'chose impossible'

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[125] Fawcett 2006, pp. 62-65.

[126] Suida s.v. Ἀγράφου μετάλλου δίκη: οἱ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλα ἐργαζόμενοι ὅπου βούλοιντο καινοῦ ἔργου ἄρξασθαι, φανερὸν ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς ἐπ' ἐκείνοις τεταγμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ ἀπεγράφοντο τοῦ τελεῖν ἕνεκα τῶ δήμῳ εἰκοστὴν τετάρτην τοῦ καινοῦ μετάλλου. εἴ τις οὖν ἐδόκει λάθρα ἐργάζεσθαι μέταλλον, τὸν μὴ ἀπογραψάμενον ἐξῆν τῶ βουλομένῳ γράφεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. Suda on Line, Trans. Anne Mahoney, 27 August 1998 http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/alpha/345 .

[127] Rhodes 1981, p. 554.

as Conophagos puts it.[128] But as we have seen, we do not know whether Aristotle's 100 talents was an annual income, a windfall, or a steady accumulation; all this ore need not have been dug in twelve months.[129] And if there is doubt that the charge had yet been imposed in the fourth century, there must be still greater doubt that it already existed in the early fifth.

Conophagos and Kakavoyannis both focus on the Suda's reference to τοῦ καινοῦ μετάλλου which they believe implies that the one twenty-fourth applied to new cuttings alone. Conophagos believed that new cuttings were leased for a term of three years, with no advance payment whatever, registered, at most, for a minimal fee of 5 drachmas. This registration would then be followed by a payment of one twenty-fourth of the value of any ore found during the lease term.[130] But even in the fragmentary state of the records, *anasaxima* and *palaia anasaxima* mines appear more frequently than *kainotomia*, suggesting that if Conophagos is correct, any income to the state based on one twenty-fourth of the product of *kainotomia* cuttings alone must have been low and probably unpredictable. Alternatively Kakavoyannis suggests that such mines were not recorded with other leases until later in the fourth century.[131]

Hopper argued that if payments were calculated on instalments by prytany, rival bidding for leases on productive mines would ensure that the state profited from operators' success. Summing up the arguments of his predecessors who tried to construct different combinations of lease payments and twenty-fourths, he concludes wisely that, 'In fact, the one twenty-fourth is a nuisance if an attempt is made to fit it in with other probable modes of payment.'[132] Undeterred, following Aperghis' attempt to model what the industry was likely to be able to bear in tax, recently Davis has argued that the most likely mode of taxation was a combination of the registration fees and the one twenty-fourth, although as we have seen, such exercises rely on a

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128 Andreades 1933, p. 271; Hopper 1979, p. 184; Conophagos 1980, p. 438.

129 Chapter 2.3.1.2.

130 Conophagos 1980, p. 438, basing his argument on the fact that the extant *kainotomia* leases appear to have no price. Of the previously unpublished leases appearing after Conophagos wrote, in Langdon 1991, only one further example seems to include the word *kainotomia* that I have been able to find, and it too does not have a price attached. However this in itself is not a guarantee that they were unpriced; each is part of a very fragmentary record and in only one instance is the word *kainotomia* itself even complete (P51). The relevant inscriptions are P34, P38, P41, P44, P51 (previously unpublished) and P56.

131 Kakavoyannis 2005, p. 335.

132 Hopper 1953, pp. 229, 238; Hopper 1979, pp. 184-186.

large number of hypotheses.[133] Thus despite its superficial precision, when we try to unpick the implications of the Suda reference, its lateness and lack of detail mean that there are too many unknowns to enable us to draw clear conclusions.

#### 2.3.2.3 The Attic demes

Aperghis tentatively proposed that the demes in which the mines were situated, noted on the *poletai* leases, were in some way involved in mine registration and may possibly have levied a local tax.[134] We have very little evidence from which to guess at the level of involvement, if any, that demes may have played in the administration of the industry. An inscription from Eleusis shows that stone quarries could be leased by demes,[135] but Osborne notes that apparently to do so was a new idea to the Eleusinians in 332/1 and he cautions against the assumption of automatic public ownership, showing that payments to suppliers of stone from Eleusis were for the work of cutting, not for the stone itself.[136] There are further differences between what we know of mine leasing and the Eleusinian quarry: the Eleusinians honoured Philokomos, the proposer of the leasing enactment and also the lessee Moirokles. Papazarkadas argues that the Eleusinians saw Moirokles not only as an entrepreneur, but as pious, implying a quasi-liturgical aspect to deme leases, and points to similar recognition afforded to the lessees of a Piraeus theatre.[137] This liturgical and/or religious aspect is missing entirely from mining enactments as far as can be seen.

These differences probably make any use of quarrying as a comparator unreliable. Had demes profited from the mining rights there would have been a disproportionate effect on the relative wealth of those demes in the mining region and it is perhaps more in keeping with democratic ideology that what registration or leasing income was to be had from an Attic resource should be managed on behalf of the whole *demos*.

#### 2.3.2.4 The Athenian mint

From the Coinage Decree we learn that there was a margin of 3% or 5% between the

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133 Davis 2014, pp. 269–274.
134 Aperghis 1998, p. 11.
135 *SEG* 28.103 = Clinton 85 and 185.
136 R. Osborne 1985a, pp. 104-105.
137 Papazarkadas 2011, pp. 150-152: L13.32-40.

nominal and intrinsic values of Athenian silver coins.[138] Faraguna suggests that this represents a margin retained by the city in order to give it a share of the miners' profits and that the absence of silver in the excavations of the 'mint' in the Athenian *agora* (despite the plentiful presence of bronze blanks and rods) may imply that, at least in the first stage of Athenian coinage, the minting of coins may have taken place in the Laurion – they were, after all, described by Aristophanes as Laurion owls.[139] There is certainly evidence pointing to the minting of bronze coins at Sounion,[140] and possibly to the preparation of coin blanks for minting at Thorikos.[141] The hoard of 282 recently minted early third-century Athenian tetradrachms discovered at Thorikos,[142] coming 'immediately from the mint through three or four deposits' provides, at least, food for thought as to why uncirculated coins would be found in the Laurion, although it is entirely reasonable that a mine operator would return from Athens and bury the coins he had had minted from his own ingots.[143]

It should be remembered of course that not all silver will have been coined, and so this could not be an across-the-board tax; Bissa suggests that when Xenophon talks of the profit available from the export of Athenian silver, he is speaking specifically of the export of bullion,[144] but this margin is still likely to have yielded significant revenue. And it is interesting to consider whether all payments due to the state (however calculated) relating to the proceeds of silver mining were required to be in coined money – when Pantaenetus' slave was waylaid by Antigenes, where had he been taking the *argurion* instalment that failed to reach the state and keep him debt-free?[145] Was it silver ore, either as direct payment or on its way to be minted, or was it already coined money? If payments were to be made only in coin, this would represent a compulsory additional deduction from the operator's annual production.

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138 *IG* I³ 1453 C.12-13; ML 45.5 with discussion at p. 113 and Kroll 2011, p. 236 n. 23; both prefer 3%. Le Rider 1989, p. 163 describes several analyses of the silver, copper, gold and lead content of Athenian tetradrachms of the fifth-third centuries.

139 Ar. *Birds* 1106; Faraguna 2006, pp. 144-145. Bissa 2009, pp. 57-58, n. 42, is sceptical of the suggestion that the mint may have been in the Laurion, on the grounds that Xenophon does not refer to it in the *Poroi*. But there is a lot that Xenophon does not refer to.

140 Faraguna 2006 p. 152, citing Calligas 1997, Kroll 1993, pp. 292-295 and Camp and Kroll 2001, pp. 142-145, who tentatively proposes that private minting may have taken place in the archaic era and then moved under state control within the city with Cleisthenes' reforms – Faraguna does not consider the possibility that minting may have remained in the Laurion.

141 Bissa 2009, pp. 57-59.

142 *IGCH* 134.

143 Bingen 1973, p. 19; Bingen 1975, p. 170.

144 3.1-3; Bissa 2009, p. 62.

145 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.22.

On the other hand the Athenian *argurokopeion* remains to be found[146] and may yet yield important information as to the location of both minting and reminting of Athenian coinage.

#### 2.3.2.5 The furnaces

One of the sources of state revenue which Xenophon specifically expects to increase once the mines become busier is the furnaces (καμίνων).[147] Bissa suggests that the furnaces might have been state operated, or owned and leased out by the state, although she has to dispose of a small amount of apparent evidence for privately owned furnaces in order to make her case,[148] arguing against Faraguna, who suggested that the furnaces might levy a proportion of all silver processed in situ in the Laurion. Faraguna supports his argument with a wide range of evidence, including the same reference in the *Poroi,* by analogy with the Vipasca tablets of the second century AD which regulate copper and silver mining activity, and with an as yet unpublished and incomplete law from fourth century Athens which refers to silver purification and the furnaces. [149] Bissa however focusses on Faraguna's reliance on lexicographers and says that such a tax would be unique, direct taxation being generally avoided in Athens.[150] But again, the silver industry surely presents an entirely unique set of circumstances. The traditional view that Greeks avoided personal taxation because they viewed it as tyrannical has been challenged by both Gallo and Fawcett, Gallo arguing that the known examples of direct taxation under tyrannies all appear under regimes characterised by ancient writers as moderate, and finding evidence elsewhere that ancient references to the absence of direct taxation (for instance on Thasos) make it clear that such a lack is the exception rather than the rule.[151] Fawcett further argues that the reason most states fail to introduce direct taxation is because of the complexity of administering thousands of separate sets of arrangements, rather than because of any cultural disinclination.[152] Tax at the point of silver refinement would not be all that different from tax at the point of sale or import/export, whilst on a practical level the furnaces would furnish the best opportunity for the on-the-spot

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146 Faraguna 2006, p. 152; *argurokopeion*: Andoc. Fr. 5.
147 4.49.
148 Bissa 2009, pp. 55-56.
149 Faraguna 2006. For the Vipasca tablets see Domergue 1983 and Lazzarini 2001.
150 Bissa 2009, p. 55, citing Harpocration ἀπονομὴ and Suda ἀγράφου μετάλλου δίκη (see chapter 2.3.2.2).
151 Gallo 2000.
152 Fawcett 2006, pp. 239-244; also van Wees 2013, p. 11.

assessment of the precise amount of silver processed by individual mine operators. This must otherwise have been extremely difficult – it seems unlikely that volume could realistically have been measured from as far away as the city. Whether or not the state owned the furnaces, Faraguna's proposal, involving as it would have done, administration of silver revenues in the field, seems to me to provide the most effective means of ensuring that the city could monitor mining yields.

#### 2.3.2.6 A tax on slave sales?

There are other ways in which mining activity might have raised taxation income. Calling as witness those old enough to remember the era before the Peloponnesian occupation of Decelea, Xenophon reminds the reader how much the tax on slaves used to bring in:

> ὅτι δὲ δέξεται πολλαπλάσια τούτων μαρτυρήσαιεν ἄν μοι εἴ τινες ἔτι εἰσὶ τῶν μεμνημένων ὅσον τὸ τέλος ηὕρισκε τῶν ἀνδραπόδων πρὸ τῶν ἐν Δεκελείᾳ.[153]

Here Xenophon is a prime source, in a passage that is more usually cited as a part of the evidence for Attic slave numbers. At 4.24 and 4.25 he proposes that by increasing slave levels to at least 10,000, a state income of 100 talents could be achieved,[154] and *far more* than that. 'Far more' has been taken by Gauthier (citing Lauffer and Thiel[155]) as an indication by Xenophon of the number of slaves that he believes might potentially be employed in ('received by') the mines, i.e. the mines have the capacity to employ many more than 10,000 slaves, as witnessed by the high slave taxation income pre-Decelea, thereby implying that there had been many more than 10,000 in the mines before 413.

Alternatively the subject of δέξεται might be the state, the implied recipient of the 100 talents, which could receive 'many times more' in income, and Marchant explicitly translates, 'But the state will receive far more than that.'[156] Gauthier argues that Xenophon would have used ἀπολαμβάνειν or κομίζεσθαι rather than δέξεται if he was referring to receipts by the city treasury, suggesting that rather than propose a

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[153] 4.25. 'But the state will receive far more than that, as anyone will testify who is old enough to remember how much the charge for slave labour brought in before the trouble at Decelea.'

[154] 10,000 slaves each earning an obol per day would yield 3,600,000 obols per year, i.e. 600,000 drachmas = 100 talents.

[155] Gauthier 1976, pp. 156-159. Conophagos 1980, pp. 348-349, n. 1, rejects the suggestion without explanation.

[156] Marchant 1925, p. 213.

hypothetical future projection, he refers his reader to a known past when the mines had 20 or 30,000 slaves. Thus he translates the passage as 'quelle somme produisait la taxe des esclaves avant les événements de Décelie.'

Conophagos discusses but rejects a further reading, 'à quel prix la cité trouvait les esclaves avant Decelea,' that is, how much the city paid for slaves before Decelea.[157] Gauthier however, although he does not address this possible interpretation, demonstrates a clear connection with Xenophon's use of τέλος at 4.40, which is unambiguously about tax.[158] Whichever way one reads the passage, the additional income Xenophon refers to is from a *telos*. Gauthier dismisses Boeckh's suggestion that there was an annual, though small, tax on slave ownership of around three obols, for two reasons:[159] such a tax is otherwise unknown in the Greek world, and would have been made difficult to administer because owners would sell or buy slaves during each year, despite which, no examples of fraud have survived. Instead he cites taxes imposed on slaves sales in other Greek *poleis* and suggests that this is an import tax (see below).[160] Xenophon is showing that tax income would be available to the state in addition to slave rental income and would seem to be referring to an import tax and/or a sales tax, and his words show a clear line of thought – there is a potential state income of 100 talents from slave leasing; this income could be many times greater, because of the tax revenue on slave sales, which is evidenced by pre-Decelea slave tax in general and – he continues – because there is no limit to the number of slaves the mines can accommodate and still be productive.

Given that the creation of more state income is central to Xenophon's agenda, it is unlikely that he could refer to historic taxation income simply as a signifier of the number of slaves that could be inserted into the mines without noting the significance of that tax for future revenues. A general increase in productivity will have other financial benefits for Athens of which neither he nor his readers can be unaware. Assuming that this is indeed a sales tax, then it is probably either the *eponion* or the *pentekoste*.

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[157] Conophagos 1980, p. 348, n. 1.

[158] 4.40: ὅσα … χρήματα ηὕρισκε τὰ τέλη, Gauthier 1976, p. 157; also Lauffer 1979, p. 72, n.1. See Chankowski 2007, p. 305 for the evolution of the word τέλος as a financial term.

[159] Boeckh 1976, p. 402.

[160] Gauthier 1976, pp. 157-158.

#### 2.3.2.7 The *eponion*

The Attic Stelae documenting the sale of the property of the *Hermokopidae* show tax paid on a variety of goods including slaves, and are our main source for the *eponion.* Once thought to be levied on confiscated goods only, it is possible that the term refers to a more widespread sales tax.[161] Calculated either in bands or as a simple 1%, it was probably paid by the buyer on sales administered by the *poletai*.[162] In Athens forthcoming sales of slaves were probably announced by the public herald and the slaves themselves were sold from 'rings' in the *agora,* or from the *anakeion*.[163] Rihll convincingly dismisses Garland's assertion that slave sales were held only monthly.[164] But with the Athenian port as a likely point of arrival it seems reasonable to assume that slaves were also sold at Piraeus, whilst the *agoras* at Sounion and Pasa Limani would also have been convenient trading points for the mining industry, and Thorikos itself was situated on a convenient bay. Given the lack of evidence of specific locations acting as particularly busy slave markets, Braund stresses rather the diversity of the trade and the slavers' inclusion of slaves as just one of a variety of commodities to be carried.[165]

Public sales in the Athenian *agora* would only have been necessary for sales where a buyer was not prearranged; there is a gap in our understanding of the way sales of slaves were handled where owners made a private agreement. Unless taxation demanded it or witnesses and a public recognition of the transaction were required by either party, there would be no value, and additional costs, in bringing them to the *asty* for public sale and thus it may be reasonable to suggest that slaves intended for the mines might have been sold at Thorikos where buyers would have been conveniently found. However it is difficult to reconstruct quite how a tax could be assessed on sales such as those in Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus,* where slaves pass between owners several times without leaving their workshop.[166] As we have just seen,[167]

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[161] Fawcett 2006, pp. 41-44. Fawcett wonders why tax would be paid on a sale whose proceeds were all in any event going to the state and concludes that the *eponion* went to Athena.

[162] Pritchett 1953, pp. 226-230; Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, no. 75; *IG* I$^3$ 421-430; Fornara 147, p. 284; ML 79. Pritchett argues for a banded system, Hallof 1990, p. 409 disagrees.

[163] *Agora*: Pollux 7.11, 13; 10.19. *Anakeion*: Dem. *Against Stephanus I* 45.80; Westermann 1955, p. 16.

[164] Rihll 2011, p. 72.

[165] Braund 2011, pp. 122-123 and n. 25.

[166] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.

[167] Chapter 2.3.2.6.

Gauthier considers whether Xenophon is referring to a capitation tax, perhaps payable monthly by slave owners in order to keep pace with the exchange of slaves taking place throughout the year, but rejects this, because there is no evidence of any actions for fraud on account of such a tax although opportunities would have been widespread.[168] Gauthier therefore concludes that at 4.25 Xenophon is talking of the *pentekoste* tax, discussed below. But the *eponion* should not be rejected outright. The large-scale slave sales that would be necessary for the fulfilment of Xenophon's plans were to be arranged by announcement of the *boule,*[169] bringing them quite possibly within the orbit of the *poletai,* who would be still more likely to have a role in any later sales made by the state back into the private sector.

#### 2.3.2.8 Import/export taxes and harbour fees: the *ellimenia* and the *pentekoste*

The vibrancy of seaborne trade towards the end of the fifth century is attested by the Athenians' anticipation that a tax of one twentieth on goods moved at sea by their subject states, could replace and increase the revenues previously yielded by the *phoros*, tribute.[170] Harris has estimated that the value of goods imported in to Attica in 401/400 might have been in the region of 2,000 talents, and would have increased substantially during the course of the following century.[171] Greek ports charged tax on goods departing as well as entering, and at 4.40 Xenophon says that with more imports and exports there will be revenues from the *ellimenia*. Chankowski describes widely varying usage of the term *ellimenia* across the Greek states, and argues that at times it may be a general term referring to a variety (or the totality) of harbour duties and tithes levied on goods as well as charges for the use of harbour facilities. In fifth-century Sounion for instance, we see levies related to tonnage rather than the value of goods, and later in Pollux, payments are due prior to embarkation at Athens.[172] Purcell also notes that it is not easy or useful in most cases to detach customs payments from charges for services connected with the movement of materials or

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168 Gauthier 1976, pp. 156-157.

169 4.18.

170 Thuc. 7.28.4; Purcell 2005, pp. 223-224; see Hornblower 2008, pp. 595-596 for this passage and the scholarly debate about whether or not the tribute was subsequently re-imposed – it is now generally thought not.

171 E. M. Harris 2002, p. 79, basing his calculations on a bid for the 2% *pentekoste* import tax of 36 talents, and citing Andokides' *On the Mysteries* 1.133-5; cf. Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 308-309, who estimate that this is the equivalent of 1,200,000 days' labour.

172 Chankowski 2007, pp. 313-319, Sounion and Athens specifically at pp. 316-317 citing *SEG* 10 Addendum 1, p. 156 and Pollux 10.30.

people[173] and Migeotte concludes that the meaning of the term varied according to the reality of linguistic usage and the differing intensity of trade practices in Greek cities, although he rejects Chankowski's argument that *ellimenion* (singular) always referred solely to harbour usage fees.[174]

Thus there are at least two and perhaps more interpretations of Xenophon's use of the term *ellimenia.*[175] Gauthier suggests that he may be referring specifically to the *pentekoste,*[176] a tax which had been in place since the turn of the century and which, by the Lykourgan era, had become the city's biggest revenue provider,[177] consisting of a 1/50th (ie. 2%) sales tax levied on all imported and exported goods passing through Piraeus.[178] For Migeotte, however, Xenophon does not give us enough context for clarity.[179] Yet at 4.40 Xenophon is talking in general terms about the outcome of his schemes, juxtaposing three pairs of contrasting opposites: 'with considerate treatment of resident aliens and merchants', 'the growth of imports and exports' and 'the expansion of harbour dues (*ellimenia)* and markets.'[180] This indicates, I would argue, that by *ellimenia* he alludes not to a specific levy but to the totality of fees, taxes and tithes (including, but not limited to, the *pentekoste*) available to the state through harbour activities, as opposed to those realised from the markets.

#### 2.3.2.9 The *metoikion, xenicon* and market taxes

Representing for Xenophon just one of the benefits that resident aliens brought to the city, the *metoikion* was the tax paid by metics who took up residence in Attica, levied at twelve drachmas per man and six per independent woman.[181] Xenophon was more than aware of the contribution of the metic tax and refers to it specifically at 2.1. Estimates of the income yielded by the *metoikion* are dependent of course on an accurate estimate of the size of the resident metic population – Isocrates tells us that merchants, foreigners and resident aliens were all fewer in number after the Social

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173 Purcell 2005, p. 205.

174 Chankowski 2007, p. 314; Migeotte 2014, p. 263, n. 595. Unfortunately Migeotte's work appeared too late for it to benefit this thesis to the extent that it undoubtedly could have done.

175 4.40.

176 Gauthier 1976, p. 173.

177 Fawcett 2006, pp. 97-98.

178 Dem. *Against Neaera* 59.27.

179 Migeotte 2014, p. 262.

180 4.40 διὰ τὸ θεραπεύεσθαι μετοίκους καὶ ἐμπόρους καὶ διὰ τὸ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων πλείω εἰσάγεσθαι καὶ ἐξάγεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιμένια καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς αὐξάνεσθαι...

181 Harpocration s.v.

War.[182] The census carried out by Demetrius of Phaleron in 318/7 reputedly counted 10,000 metics,[183] although van Wees has argued that this number was heavily inflated by the addition of recently disenfranchised Athenians who no longer met the property requirements for citizenship.[184] Based on 10,000 men and 1,000 independent women, Boeckh calculated an annual revenue of 21 talents, an exercise which provides some insight into the potential scale of income realised by the *metoikion* at its fullest.

We are also told at 4.40 that revenues received through the markets will increase. It is not entirely clear what this revenue source is, but given Xenophon's particular focus on the role of metics in Athenian trade, it is likely that this is the *xenicon*. In addition to the *metoikion*, a second tax was payable by those metics who wished to trade in the market.[185] A woman's metic status might even be proved by reference to her payment of the *xenica:*

> If she was an alien, they ought to have examined the market-tolls, and have shown whether she paid the alien's tax.[186]

Xenophon's other schemes might promote the mass return of metics to the city, but mine leasing, whilst available to them, was less likely to be taken up by large numbers given the capital required for successful exploitation, even if the need for heavy outlay on slaves could be avoided. The *metoikion* then, may have a smaller direct relationship with the mine industry than some other forms of levy, but the return of peace and the growth of the industry in general would lead to greater supply opportunities, a field in which metics could participate more fully, thus promoting income from both the *metoikion* and the *xenicon*.

#### 2.3.2.10 State owned houses near the mines

At 4.49-50 Xenophon indicates that the state will receive revenue from various interests associated with the thriving population that will grow up in the mining region, including state owned houses and other revenues - ἀπ᾽ οἰκιῶν περὶ τἀργύρεια δημοσίων and ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πρόσοδοι ἂν πολλαὶ γίγνοιντο. The reference is too brief to elicit much information, but notably the idea of state-owned dwellings

[182] Isocrates *On the Peace* 8.21.
[183] Ctesicles, *FGrH* 245 F1.
[184] Van Wees 2011, pp. 101-106.
[185] Fawcett 2006, p. 72.
[186] Dem. *Against Eubulides* 57.34. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν ξένη ἦν, τὰ τέλη ἐξετάσαντας τὰ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, εἰ ξενικὰ ἐτέλει.

near the mines is not presented as new, indicating that such a system was already in operation.

#### 2.3.2.11 The Hephaistic fund

The *demos* might also benefit from the wealth produced by silver mining in less direct ways. The Laurion region had furnished funds to the Acropolis building programme at least twice and probably more frequently in the fifth century, with the Parthenon accounts for 439/8 and the Propyleia accounts for 434/3 both showing contributions

> [παρὰ ταμ]ιôν *h*εφα[ισ]τικô ἀπὸ Λ[αυ]ρ[είο]
> 'from the treasurers of the Hephaestic fund from Laurium.'[187]

Hephaistos was the god for whom metal workers had a special affection. Metal workers carried out their trade around the Hephaistion in the Athenian *agora*; there is a reference to Hephaistos and possibly Athena in the Coinage Decree which may be about a debt to the gods but is difficult to interpret,[188] and Rihll and Tucker note that metics took part in the *Hephaistia*, possibly because they were allowed to operate mines on the same terms as citizens.[189] It is not surprising that there should have been a strong engagement with his cult in the mining region, and that those who made their living through the mines should make offerings to him. We do not, however, know where the Laurion sanctuary was, how the fund was administered, or indeed whether it was still in operation in the fourth century, but in the fifth it had helped to beautify the city's monuments just as Xenophon anticipated his scheme might achieve in the fourth.[190] When he predicts the restoration of the city's temples, this historic link between the wealth of the Laurion's sanctuaries and the sacred structures of the city may not have been far from his mind.

#### 2.3.2.12 Tax exemption

Some indication of the value of the silver industry to the state is evident from the fact that those with mining interests had their mining property exempted from assessment for liturgical responsibilities. Mining property was apparently exempt from tax by grant of *ateleia* and not included in property inventories for the purposes of liturgy or *antidosis*.[191] Hopper views this as an indication that mining was not always

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187 439/8, Parthenon: *IG* I³ 444.249; 434/3, Propyleia: ML 60.14 = *IG* I³ 465, translation RO p. 181.
188 ML 45.7, p. 114; *IG* I³ 1453, C.17-18.
189 Rihll and Tucker 2002, pp. 283-284.
190 6.1.
191 Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.18. On the reading of laws within Attic speeches generally see

profitable,[192] whilst Davis reads it as a reflection of the extent to which capital investment was a 'wasting asset,'[193] but it is more likely that it was for the purpose of encouraging the mining entrepreneur by relieving him of some taxation. We know from the *poletai* leases that a significant number of operators were wealthy enough to be of the liturgical class, 19% of the known lessees are either liturgists or the immediate ascendant/descendant of a liturgist.[194] Boeckh suggests that immunity from taxation was not to encourage mining, but rather a legal principle because the property was leased from the state.[195] But even demes were liable to pay tax, whilst land owned by demes was taxable and this principle alone would not really explain why any Athenians, particularly those perceived to be wealthy ones, would be exempted from tax.[196] A better explanation is provided by Hypereides, from whom we learn that mine operators were indemnified because a small short term gain for the state would be at the expense of a greater one, as operators could be deterred from the industry.[197] Given the number of known liturgists involved in the mining industry then, this is potentially a major concession. Significantly, and perhaps not sufficiently recognised in scholarship, this is an example of taxation policy used to promote industrial expansion. The fact that such a law could have been passed is indicative of a wide understanding amongst the *demos,* many of whom must have had some economic relationship with the enormous consumptive demands of the Laurion, both of the extent to which the various aspects of the industry benefited wider society and the degree to which the mines' successful exploitation was reliant on the risk-taking of a few.

### 2.3.3 Income from mining and associated activities – conclusion

Despite our difficulty in interpreting the evidence presented by the mine leases and creating a cast-iron case for the taxation of silver production, what has become clear are the many ways in which the state stood to benefit directly from the rejuvenation of

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Canevaro 2013, pp. 1-3, however in this instance the law itself has not survived.

192 Hopper 1979, pp. 186-187.

193 Davis 2014, p. 270.

194 Shipton 2000, pp. 30-31 with her chart MINES 1.

195 Boeckh 1976, pp. 673-674.

196 Deme taxation: Finley 1985, p. 93; Whitehead 1986, p. 155.

197 Hypereides *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.36-7. Hypereides talks of δασμολογήσαντες τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν, 'subjecting the mine-workers to tribute' (trans. Burtt), which has a different connotation to simply excluding mine property from an assessment, but the principle of giving some protection to mining entrepreneurs seems clear.

the Laurion mines; through direct receipts related to the output of the mines and through levies on personnel, import/export and market activities associated with the industry, the exploitation of state owned resources such as housing, and from donations to religious funds which might contribute to the restoration of the city's festivals and sacred structures. As well as these additions to state-held funds, the enormous daily consumption by the industry and its workers of tools, timber, slaves, building materials, animal power and agricultural produce created a vast demand for goods and services which promoted manufacturing and farming both locally and abroad, creating income streams at all levels of Attic society and ultimately stimulating the production of goods for the export market created by those foreign traders who provided commodities to the industry but preferred to carry away a return cargo rather than silver. Xenophon recognises this high level of interdependence and its importance to the city's economy,[198] countering the views of those such as Booth who argue that he omits to mention the idea that citizen commercial activity should be promoted because the city did not recognise such promotion as a requirement of governance.[199]

With the possible exception of the Suda's one twenty-fourth, all of these revenue sources, as well as the interdependency of the many supply chains, will have been so central to the Attic economy as to be understood by both Xenophon and his readership. Whatever one produced: foodstuffs, baskets, shoes, quarried stone or wool, one possible outlet for it was to be found in the Laurion. Xenophon's proposal was intended to motivate silver production and create a new source of income through slave hire, but it is impossible that the associated stimulation of agricultural and manufacturing activity across Attica and also abroad could be overlooked by his contemporaries.

## 2.4 The Laurion slaves, Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus* and the mining industry - introduction

Demosthenes' speech *Against Pantaenetus* of 347/6[200] provides a colourful insight

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[198] 4.49.

[199] Booth 1993, pp. 56-66.

[200] After completing the initial transaction, Nicobulus sailed to Pontus in Elaphebolion in the Archonship of Theophilus, March 347, (37.6). There is a good deal of scholarly discussion of this

into some aspects of mining economics, and although it does not assist us in unravelling the system of lease payments or taxation, it provides a good understanding of the level of complexity, mortgaging and re-mortgaging, not revealed by the leases, that might be undertaken where a property was regarded as a sufficiently attractive risk. It also provides useful evidence of the way in which slaves were traded and employed in the mining industry.

Some scholars have viewed the *paragraphe* case, in which Nicobulus tries to prevent Pantaenetus from prosecuting him, as a dispute over a mine,[201] but it is clear from the vocabulary that Pantaenetus purchased a workshop and thirty slaves; we hear at the outset that the loan was ἐπ᾽ ἐργαστηρίῳ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐν Μαρωνείᾳ καὶ τριάκοντ᾽ ἀνδραπόδοις[202] with the phrase τὸ ἐργαστήριον καὶ τἀνδράποδα recurring in different contexts. The building where Nicobulus's slaves 'sat down',[203] a κεγχρεών, was interpreted by Murray as a foundry[204] but it seems more likely the word refers to a part of the workshop[205] or an activity that was part of the purification process, perhaps milling or grinding, an interpretation supported by the Suda.[206]

### 2.4.1 The actions and transactions of the speech

As Nicobulus tells the story, Pantaenetus bought an *ergasterion* and thirty slaves from Telemachus.[207] To pay Telemachus, he borrowed a talent from Mnesicles. We hear

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speech in relation to what it tells us about both property law and mining: see for instance Isager and Hansen 1975, pp. 191-196; E. M. Harris 1988, pp. 370-377; E. M. Harris 1989a, pp. 342-343; MacDowell 2006, pp. 128-131; E. M. Harris 2008, p 194; MacDowell 2009, pp. 266-271 and E. M. Harris 2012, pp. 437-438.

201 eg. Murray 1939, p. 371.

202 'of a mining property in Maroneia and of thirty slaves.' Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.4; also at 37.9, 12, 25.

203 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.26.

204 Murray 1939, p. 393, n. c. Murray translates as 'And then having persuaded my slaves to sit in the foundry to my prejudice,'

205 MacDowell 2009, p. 268, n. 46; Bissa 2009, pp. 55-56.

206 Κεγχρεών: Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πανταίνετον γραφῇ: κἄπειτα ἔπεισε τοὺς οἰκέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς καθέζεσθαι εἰς τὸν κεγχρεῶνα. ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς τὸ καθαριστήριον, ὅπου τὴν ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων διέψυχον κέγχρον. 'Demosthenes in the indictment [-speech] *Against Pantainetos* [writes]: "and then he induced my slaves to go and sit in the foundry". Meaning, in the purifying-place, where they used to dry the granules from the silver-mines.' Suda On Line, trans: David Whitehead, 30 November 2000 http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/kappa/1221. LSJ p. 933 gives us a 'place where iron is granulated and made malleable.'

207 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.5. Isager and Hansen say that Pantaenetus owned the property and then took a loan from Telemachus against it, but it seems clear from the wording that Telemachus had previously owned the property outright: καὶ γὰρ ἐώνητ᾽ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ τούτῳ παρὰ Τηλεμάχου τοῦ πρότερον κεκτημένου, 'for he had purchased them for the plaintiff from Telemachus, the

that he also owed 45 minas to Phileas of Eustor and Pleistor, probably a loan which had also helped to fund the original purchase.[208]

Mnesicles then introduced Nicobulus and Evergus to each other and the two men went into partnership.[209] Together they loaned Pantaenetus 105 minas, this was paid to Mnesicles, relieving Pantaenetus of his obligation to Mnesicles and using the workshop and slaves as security. Evergus put in 60 minas and Nicobulus 45, on the understanding that they would be paid interest at the rate of 105 drachmas, i.e. 1% of the loan, each month, Pantaenetus having the right to repay the full sum and take over the title to the workshop and slaves within a specified time.[210]

With matters apparently concluded, in spring 347 Nicobulus left for Pontus.[211] But in his absence Pantaenetus stopped making the interest payments and Evergus took matters into his own hands, taking possession of the property and slaves and also perhaps the silver ore that was then on the premises.[212] Nicobulus returned to find himself in the unwelcome position of either having to go into business with Evergus and run the workshop in partnership, or to give Evergus full control, with Evergus thus becoming Nicobulus' debtor.[213] At this stage, further creditors of Pantaenetus emerged, unsavoury characters who had also advanced loans to Pantaenetus on the security of the property. After an unsatisfactory meeting with these new creditors, Pantaenetus then implored Nicobulus and Evergus to sell the property to them entirely

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former owner' in Murray's translation. There is a lot of obfuscation about ownership in the speech but there seems little advantage to Nicobulus in confusing the issue over this particular part of the narrative. I am reliant on E. M. Harris 2008 generally and E. M. Harris 2012, pp. 437-438 in particular for the view that the central transaction in the case was a loan made by Nicobulus and Evergus against which the *ergasterion* and slaves were not substitutive security, but collateral security reclaimable only in the event of a default on repayment of the principal sum. Thus, there having been no default in repayment of the principal, Evergus was wrong to take possession of the security simply because of a default in interest payments. This is contrary to MacDowell's reading, which sees Telemachus, Mnesicles/Phileas/Pleistor and then Nicobulus/Evergus as the successive owners, with Pantaenetus paying rent/interest and retaining the right to purchase (McDowell 2009, pp. 266-267) but Harris' argument seems to me to provide the clearest untangling of the confusing and sometimes conflicting ownership issues in the case.

208 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.4. Pantaenetus had separate debts of one talent and 45 minas to Mnesicles and Phileas respectively - the same sums as were later loaned by Nicobulus and Evergus against the workshop and slaves. Phileas vanishes from the narrative and we do not hear whether he got his money back, although it may be that the 105 minas paid to Mnesicles was shared between Mnesicles and Phileas. If not, then Mnesicles made a substantial profit.

209 See also the brief discussion of Athenian business partnerships in chapter 3.8.3.2.

210 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.4-5.

211 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.6.

212 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.6-7; 28.

213 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.10.

and, by now, more than willing to be rid of this toxic asset, they agreed. The sale price received by Pantaenetus was three talents, two thousand six hundred drachmas, indicating either a speedy increase in value, or that the original loan was for only a part of the property's original cost. The fact that Pantaenetus had been able to take out further loans against the security of the property probably indicates that it was not previously secured fully against the first loan made to him, and the new creditors indicate as much,[214] although if credence is given to Nicobulus' description of Pantaenetus, he might be suspected of not being even-handed with those he borrowed from and they may not have known that the property was already secured against loans taken elsewhere.

Despite obtaining a written release from Pantaenetus to show that final settlement had been agreed and all claims were discharged, Evergus was subsequently sued by Pantaenetus over his forcible acquisition of the property and the silver ore, and prior to the hearing recorded in *Against Pantaenetus,* Pantaenetus had been awarded damages of two talents.[215] Pantaenetus then brought a charge against Nicobulus, accusing him of ordering his slave Antigenes to waylay Pantaenetus' slave and take possession of a consignment of silver that the slave was carrying as a mine instalment payment (a καταβολή) to the state, thus causing him to be inscribed as a state debtor for 180 minas, twice the sum he says he paid for the mine.[216] Nicobulus' counter arguments were several - Evergus had already been successfully charged over these events, and in any case Nicobulus had been out of the country at the time with no idea of what was happening and in no position to order his slave to do anything; he had a written discharge from Pantaenetus showing that all matters were completely settled; and most significantly, the mining courts were not the right place to bring such an action.

It is a complicated sequence of events, and scholarly interpretation of the types of collateral that Athenians might offer against a loan has changed our understanding of just who regarded themselves as the rightful owner of what, regardless of how they may present the facts in court, but several points emerge from this speech. First, Pantaenetus' operation involves both running the *ergasterion* and leasing at least one

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[214] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.12.
[215] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.46.
[216] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.22.

mine, whose material is dug by his slaves and processed in his workshop.[217] He does not seem to be processing on behalf of another mine operator as there is no suggestion that the ore forcibly obtained by Evergus did not belong to Pantaenetus. Secondly, the speed with which the property, including the slaves, notionally and in fact changes hands; thirdly, the large sums involved: 105 minas for the original loan; 3 talents, 2,600 drachmas for the final sale as well as the 90 mina καταβολή payable to the state, and an unquantified amount of silver ore in the workshop.

By way of comparison, in Hypereides' *In Defence of Euxenippus* of around 330-324, we hear that there has recently been an accusation that three years' excavation of an illegally dug mine had yielded 300 talents for its operator, Epicrates of Pallene. The jury seem to have decided that the mine was legal, and that Epicrates and his partners - some of the richest men in Athens - could keep their profits.[218] We cannot tell whether the figure of 300 talents was real or not but evidently the mine was visibly successful and its operators wealthy enough, that the man who brought the case expected a jury to give credence to an astonishingly large sum, whilst Hypereides could expect that the jurors hearing Euxenippus' case would be familiar with the case of Epicrates.

Given the involvement of such sizeable and probably visible amounts of money, it is perhaps unsurprising that some unappealing individuals were attracted to the industry. Phokian commanders looking for ways to pay their mercenaries may have found support motivated both by politics and profit amongst mine operators willing to undertake the clandestine exchange of Laureotic silver for looted Delphic gold, a demand that may even have contributed to the mid-fourth century growth in production.[219] The frontiersman character of mining society is revealed in the list of matters which Nicobulus tells us are governed by the mining laws: boring beyond one's boundaries into another's property, smoking someone out, making an armed attack, and actions against one another by men who have gone into business together.[220] To this list we can add, operating an unregistered mine and removing a mine's

217 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.28.
218 Hyp. *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.34-5.
219 Davies 2007c, p. 81; Davies 2010, pp. 97-98.
220 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.34–38.

supporting pillars.[221] All are suggestive of a potentially fractious and competitive industry where each man knew the worth of his neighbour's property - of neccessity if he were to bid successfully when leases were renewed - and might take the law into his own hands, supported by a threat of violence if he thought he could get away with it.

But the most striking aspect of the story is the number of men willing to risk substantial sums in a mining enterprise. Despite the fact that Pantaenetus had got himself into serious financial difficulty, his lenders must have perceived his business as an operation with potential, if ill-managed. Were Pantaenetus' mine to become less productive, he could not produce the ore to keep the workshop active or ultimately the income to pay his various creditors. If he processed only his own ore, the value of the workshop rested solely on his own rate of production, and if his output fell, unless he could acquire other customers it would become almost worthless. Hopper suggests that washeries would not depreciate in value in 'slack' times,[222] but whilst that may be so over very short periods, the pattern of the relatively speedy increase and decrease of mining activity over the last two thirds of the fourth century suggests that in the medium term, there would be little value in an *ergasterion* that was not able to be operated as a going concern, and it is arguable that in that event, only the slaves would have a resale value, which would quickly decline if every operator found themselves in the same position.

From the seventeen mines leased in 367/6 the annual count of mine leases seems to have slowly increased through the mid-century, reaching as many as 140 in the period 345 - 342/1, ie up to 500 mines in simultaneous operation in any one year,[223] followed by a swift decline down to single figures by the end of the century. Just as Xenophon had indicated, silver mining was not a secure undertaking; however the boom of the mid-century appears to have encouraged quite a degree of speculation. In a community which might call to mind the successes of the past in support of its arguments but which still had few written records with which to quantify those histories, such an increase may indicate a short-term approach to trade and investment

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[221] Plut. *Moralia* 843d, MacDowell 2006, p. 131.
[222] Hopper 1961, p. 148.
[223] Crosby 1950, p. 245; Aperghis 1998, p. 18.

based on stories of glory days as exemplified by the *Poroi*,[224] rather than a close examination of any accurate records which might still exist from the height of productivity in the fifth century or a careful projection of future turnover. Notably however Xenophon supports his recollection of the past with a structured business plan which takes account of expenditure, income and a range of trading conditions.[225] When a mine operator calculated his outgoings he would be likely to prioritise payments to the state because of the serious risk of the debt doubling in the event of default, whilst immediate running costs would have to be met next to keep the manpower fed and the mine in operation. In the event of any difficulty, interest payments such as those to Nicobulus and Evergus might well have had a lower priority. An interest payment of 105 drachmas per month appears to be higher than many lease payments, but the ninety minas payment to the state, whatever it represented, indicates that we have here a very successful mine which attracted a particularly high premium. Potential lenders were clearly aware that Pantaenetus was in control of a wealthy operation, and less than a decade after the *Poroi* was written, mining had become a risk worthy of consideration not just as a primary activity, but against which to lend considerable sums of money in the reasonable expectation of repayment. The importance of the issues of business risk and entrepreneurial confidence will be explored further in chapter 3. Strikingly however, the leading men in our story do not appear to have any passion for industry or interest in effective management or the pastoral care of their workers. Probably only Pantaenetus and perhaps the ultimate buyers truly want to be actual mine operators – Nicobulus says he was dismayed when he thought he might have to run the mine himself[226] - and even Pantaenetus cannot have been in full time residence at the mine – he was away when his slave was bringing the silver, and when Antigenes allegedly took control.

### 2.4.2 Slave numbers, skills and costs

In 1973 Finley remarked that, 'Throughout antiquity free miners were a negligible element,'[227] and although various scholars have assumed that some free miners

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224 See eg. 4.25 and even the Edwardian case study at chapter 3.3.
225 See chapter 2.5.5.
226 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.10.
227 Finley 1999, pp. 72-73.

worked their lease holdings alone,[228] a glance at the sort of labour needed simply for the hauling up of ore and spoil would suggest that only the most cash-strapped would wish to undertake such tasks without a second pair of hands, one at each end of a rope and bucket. When the plaintiff who challenges Phaenippus to *antidosis* exclaims that

> From my silver mines …I formerly by my own bodily toil and labour reaped a large profit'[229]

we should not be misled into thinking that reaping mining profits of an order large enough to maintain liturgical status could be achieved by one man alone. Rihll has demonstrated that the nature of the industry entailed that whilst a sole owner-operator might just manage (slowly) to produce raw ore, every other stage of production was highly labour-intensive.[230] In proportionate terms actual mine-working probably used only just over a third of the total labour force necessary for industrial scale silver production: Conophagos' estimates suggest 36% would actually be employed in the mines themselves, 17% in the *ergasteria*, 15% in metallurgy, with the remaining 32% working in support activities: cistern maintenance, building, carting, accounting, minting, stoneworking etc. and at the ports.[231]

In a non-mining context the extent to which additional help was always unfree is by no means clear – Lysias' *On the Refusal of a Pension*[232] is often quoted as evidence that the first resource of a citizen looking for assistance outside his family would be the slave market. But whilst the extent of free waged labour in Attica, particularly in agriculture, has been a matter of some debate, (see below) it is generally assumed that the mine labour force consisted almost exclusively of slaves who were probably non-Greek and unlikely to have been born into slavery in a Greek household.[233] Yet Xenophon tells us clearly that there were free men, both Athenian and foreigners, who would gladly earn a living as mine managers.[234] This is not the only occasion when Xenophon suggests that managers might be free men.[235] We must be careful therefore not to categorise the workforce in the Laurion as simply made up of thousands of men of little or no skill employed solely to dig. Both small and large scale free contractors,

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228 eg. Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 102-103, say categorically that 'free prospectors worked on their own, whereas groups of men working for someone else were made up solely of slaves.'
229 Dem. *Against Phaenippus* 42.20.
230 Rihll 2001, pp. 134-135.
231 Conophagos 1980, p. 348, but see below for some reservations about these figures.
232 Lysias *On the Refusal of a Pension* 24.6.
233 eg. Finley 1959, p. 101; Jameson 2002, p. 168, Braund 2011, pp. 116, 126.
234 4.22.
235 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 1.3-4; Xen. *Memorabilia* 2.8.3.

some, but not necessarily all, supported by slaves, would have supplied consumables either through markets or direct to workshops and furnaces. Free individuals, both citizens and metics, will have managed their own mines, workshops and furnaces, all of which were privately owned. Some slaves, such as the one Pantaenetus trusted to carry his silver as a καταβολή for payment to the state, would be trusted managers[236] and each individual site will have required an overseer. Great skill was needed particularly in the furnaces, which had to be heated to above 810ºC and below 950ºC; this and complex chemical processes were judged solely by eye and experience. Metallurgists would also have had to be familiar with processing zinc, iron, antimony, arsenic, copper and gold, all of which were found in the region, as well as producing different coloured ochres for the Attic pottery industry.[237] Such men must inevitably have commanded a higher price than the unskilled labour used for breaking up ore or hauling it from the mines and washeries to the furnaces. Calculating work rates, Rihll notes that in the nineteenth century rock breaking was undertaken by women and children,[238] and there is evidence of women employed in stone grinding in Roman quarries[239] whilst artefacts found in *ergasteria* and with burials in the Laurion region indicate the presence of women and children, perhaps free family units, or slaves performing traditional domestic duties to provide support for the vast work force.[240] Garlan sees little reason to believe that Laurion miners performing unskilled tasks such as ore extraction and rock grinding would not have suffered the same terrible conditions as the Egyptian miners described by Diodorus, with no leniency or respite despite illness or old age,[241] in what Rihll describes as 'chain gang labour in horrible conditions.'[242]

What is important to stress is not only the wide variation of roles from unskilled rock breaker to highly skilled technical specialists but also that 'Laurion miners' commonly referred to as a homogenous group were far from being one large mass of slaves literally down the Laurion mines making income for a few wealthy absent Athenians. The smaller operators in particular would have needed an understanding

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236 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.22.
237 Rihll 2001, pp. 122-132. Rihll and Tucker 2002 stress the difference between the practical knowledge of those working in the Laurion and theoretical or scientific knowledge.
238 Rihll 2001, pp. 118, 137, n. 10.
239 Burford 1972. p. 74.
240 Kakavoyannis 2001, p. 376, Rihll 2010a, p. 209.
241 Garlan 1982, p. 145; Diod. Sic. 3.13.
242 Rihll 2011, pp. 68-69.

of the full range of requisite skills in order to run their establishments efficiently. In turn this means that because of the wide range of independently run supply and manufacturing outlets involved in the various stages of production, free men from one-man operators to large workshop owners will have been involved at every stage of every operation and it is likely that at least some level of familiarity with aspects of the industry will have permeated Athenian society.

Xenophon's proposal does not of course deal with the detail of slave employment or welfare, although he certainly knew that simply the difference between good and poor management might mean that some household slaves had to be fettered to stop them running away whilst others stayed willingly,[243] and that the Laureotic region was considered unhealthy and best avoided.[244] It is unclear, particularly in relation to mining activity, what split of wage there was, where there was any, between owner and worker.[245] On Xenophon's figures, an 'average' slave at an 'average' price of 180-190 drachmas, leased out at one obol per day, would repay his purchase price in three years, beyond which he represented pure profit as long as he was permanently let out and his owner was not responsible for his upkeep or for maintaining the numbers – and hence transaction costs – when his slaves were in someone else's employ.[246] A skilled or highly skilled slave could attract a higher rent as he gained experience and moved from establishment to establishment and might perhaps be in a position to negotiate small concessions from an owner who relied on his skills for greater financial gain. Slaves with accounting skills might be more commercially valuable than others – in 221/220 public slaves keeping accounts received a daily allowance of three obols.[247] At the other end of the scale, hiring slaves at the lowest price for the most menial work might leave budgetary headroom to pay a higher sum for the employment of more skilled workers or an overseer. This overseer might be a slave, and the obvious hierarchy that starts to emerge is also indicative of the sliding scale of pain and reward incentives that might be applied for greatest productivity.[248]

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243 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 3.4.
244 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.12.
245 See chapter 2.4.3.
246 4.14.
247 Wiedemann 1981, p. 156.
248 See the discussion of Fenoaltea, chapter 2.4.3.

Scholarly estimates of the total number of slaves employed in the silver mines vary considerably. Central to every discussion is the controversy over the number of slaves employed in agriculture[249] and Thucydides' description of the loss of 20,000 slaves after Decelea, many of whom were 'χειροτέχναι.'[250] Wisely Austin and Vidal-Naquet commented only that many of these 'artisans' must have been miners, but one cannot deduce from this figure of 20,000 any statistical data on the number of slave miners, pointing out that silver production does not seem to have come to a sudden halt.[251] Applying a detailed linguistic analysis to the text and re-examining contemporary references, Hanson argued that Thucydides based his number on his understanding that the hoplite and cavalry ranks, most of whom would be farmers, numbered between 18,000 and 25,000. Hanson suggests that Thucydides simply assumed an average one slave per landowner, and probably intended only to refer to rural, agriculturally employed slaves.[252]

This clearly does not help to quantify the slaves in the mining industry. However for the present discussion, it is perhaps more relevant to look at the number of actual or potential slaves after the reduction of mining activity in the late fifth century. But here too, the calculations are well-nigh impossible. From the varying prices of leases we may deduce that individual mines and their consequent manning levels must have differed considerably, whilst washeries vary from single tables to large building complexes. We cannot take evidence about individual operations and assume that these were representative; we can only make rough guesses at the number of mining explorations taking place at any one time, and despite the continued appearance of new archaeological evidence we can only guess at the number of washeries and smelting operations and the quantity of manpower required to keep them in operation. Conophagos estimates the number of slaves needed across the Laurion in order to

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249 Jameson 1977; de Ste. Croix 1981, pp. 505-506; Wood 1988, pp. 64-80. For other recent scholarship on both sides of the debate see Scheidel 2008, p. 107, n. 6.

250 Thuc. 7.27.5. Hornblower 2008, p. 591 suggests that 'more than' gives the number more plausibility. The slaves may have been escaping starvation (Rihll 2010a, p. 211, n. 30) and Figueira 1998, p. 229, points out that skilled slaves were more likely to be able to escape and more able to survive as free men . Spartan and Theban treatment of the escaped slaves was probably not what they might have hoped for; see Hunt 1998, pp. 111-115.

251 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 285. Mossé 1972, p. 136, n. 5 similarly deduces that there were numerous miners amongst the fugitives, otherwise Xenophon's concerns about the repercussions on the mining industry of a possible war, and his reference to the events at Decelea, are difficult to understand. Cartledge 2002b, p. 161 is also cautious about the possibility of extracting precise numbers from this and other ancient references.

252 Hanson 1992.

achieve an annual production of 20,000kg of silver at 11,000, with around 100 mining concessions in operation at any one time, and he therefore rejects arguments for 20,000 slaves.[253] Conophagos' calculations range from the minutely detailed – such as the workforce in the furnaces over the two stages of reduction – to the very broad – the final number is arbitrarily inflated by 25% to achieve a provision for ancillary workers on the grounds that there would be a natural tendency to use extra slaves because they were cheap. Greek slaves were indeed comparatively cheap compared with those in other eras[254] but in an industry motivated foremost by profit there is no reason to suppose that operators would have unnecessarily over-staffed, particularly in the smaller operations where every man would be expected to pull his weight.

Hypereides' proposal of 338 to free slaves suggests a population of 150,000:

> that is in the first place the slaves both from the silver mines and up and down the country, more than a hundred and fifty thousand in number[255]

and Hopper rightly argues that this raises the same interpretative issues as Thucydides' 20,000.[256] But the figure of 20,000 has retained its ostensible authority as a round number of slaves when the region was working with good productivity – Aperghis, for instance, takes it as a basis for his calculations without reference to its original source or to either Conophagos or Hanson;[257] Rihll and Tucker, and Cartledge both assume that most of the escaped slaves had been associated with silver mining;[258] Wood takes what she calls a conservative figure of 15,000-20,000, and Osborne points out that, however calculated, this was a significant proportion of the Athenian population.[259]

Davies lists industrial slavery in workshops and the silver mines as probably the most important of the sources of personal wealth emerging during the fifth century, with large individual slaveholdings leased out into the silver mines. Xenophon is our main source for the largest of these reputed slaveholdings in the fifth century, citing Nikias

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253 Conophagos 1980, pp. 341-354. Rihll 2010a, p. 216, n. 48 is rightly sceptical about Conophagos' methods of calculating numbers.

254 Scheidel 2005, p. 12.

255 Hypereides fr. 18, l.3. Ὅπως πρῶτον μὲν μυριάδας πλείους ἢ ιέ τοὺς δούλους τούς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν.

256 Hopper 1968, p. 294, n. 11.

257 Aperghis 1998, p. 18.

258 Cartledge 2002b, p. 161; Rihll and Tucker 2002, p. 285.

259 R. Osborne 1985a, pp. 111, 242, n. 2.

with 1,000, Hipponikos with 600 and Philemonides with 300, each slave yielding one obol per day for his owner,[260] but there are many other instances of smaller numbers in a variety of industries from lyre and flute making to shield manufacture.[261] As we have seen, Nicobulus and Evergus loaned 105 minas to Pantaenetus to enable him to pay for a workshop and thirty slaves,[262] but it is inevitable that such evidence as reaches us through the courts is more likely to relate to cases involving larger undertakings and greater sums of money, and it is thus difficult to know where to place Pantaenetus in the wider scale of industrial slave ownership. The knife makers in Demosthenes' father's factory were, Demosthenes claimed, generally worth 5 or 6 minas each, and at the least no less than 3 minas.[263] On the other hand the male slaves of Kephisodoros, confiscated and sold in 414 after the Mutilation of the Herms, only attracted prices of between 105 drachmas and 301 drachmas, although their sale price may have been affected by the taint of impiety.[264] In his *Memorabilia*, Xenophon suggests a range of values from half a mina to two, five and ten, with a whole talent allegedly paid for a mine manager by Nikias son of Nikeratos.[265] Nikias does however seem to play a Croesus-like role in Xenophon's imagination, always occupying the superlative position and to whom any excessive number may be attached without fear of challenge. Xenophon would not be the only Athenian to have miscalculated Nikias' fortune - Lysias describes with surprise the discrepancy between the 100 talent fortune Nikias was believed to have left behind, and the 14 talents his son handed down in his turn. If Aristophanes is to be believed in this speech, public over-estimation of the fortunes of the wealthy was not unusual.[266]

It is difficult to assess what proportion of mine slaves might necessarily be skilled or highly skilled, but the implied average price in Xenophon's scheme is 180 – 190 drachmas. If, as Conophagos' figures suggest, around half to two thirds of the mining slaves need have little or few skills, then their lower price would leave a surplus with which to purchase those with more technical ability. If any of them might have been women or children the average price may perhaps come down still further. In any

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[260] 4.13-15.
[261] Davies 1981, pp. 41-43.
[262] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.4, 22.
[263] Dem. *Against Aphobus I*, 27.9.
[264] ML 79.
[265] Xen. *Memorabilia* 2.5.2.
[266] Lysias *On the Property of Aristophanes* 19.45-49.

case, given the numbers Xenophon anticipates, it is highly unlikely that large numbers of new slaves already skilled in cupellation or managing a washery would be suddenly available and in most cases training must have taken place on site, with those showing most aptitude acquiring greater levels of skill and, concomitantly, greater resale or leasing value.

Scheidel suggests that two fundamental preconditions are necessary for the emergence of large scale slavery across economic sectors – first, a relative shortage of labour and second, access to slaves. Further variables include a demand for the goods and services produced by the slaves, high real wages among the free labour force, and the accumulation of capital for slave purchase.[267] Applying these signifiers to the situation in the industry as Xenophon was writing we see that virtually all appear to be present. Xenophon, at least, foresees neither difficulty in accessing slaves,[268] nor any lack of demand for the final product of silver mining;[269] there are, he says, always more jobs than the labourers can deal with and everyone in mining says they are short of labour.[270]

The well-rehearsed arguments as to the time consumed by the military and democratic commitments of the citizenry, their approach to waged employment and expectations of payment for participation in democratic processes may well in the past have suggested that even if there were substantial numbers of 'unemployed', mining was an acceptable choice only for the most desperate.[271] But mining was unpleasant and such work might well not be popular amongst the free work force even if pay was reasonable, prejudice against paid labour did not exist, and there was little else available. Perhaps more significantly, using equivalent wheat values and a food and housing regime more generous than the notoriously mean level of slave maintenance indicated by the Roman Cato, Scheidel has demonstrated that 'no reasonable amount of fiddling can alter the basic fact that it must have paid to buy slaves instead of

[267] Scheidel 2008, pp. 115-116.
[268] 4.18.
[269] 4.8.
[270] 4.4-5.
[271] See eg. Wood 1988, pp. 5-41 for the debate on 'the idle mob'; Scheidel 2008, p. 118 on long-term labour arrangements and rising wages and Cartledge 2002b for economic factors in Athens' emergence as a slave society.

relying on hired labour.'[272]

At the end of Scheidel's list of necessary conditions for the emergence of large scale slavery is the accumulation of capital with which to purchase slaves.[273] Again Xenophon tells us clearly that this is not an issue – there is capital in abundance.[274] Why then, given the coincidence of these factors, was mine slavery so much lower than in the fifth century? Missing I think from Scheidel's determinants are the individuals foresighted enough and on occasion foolhardy enough to spot the opportunity and get into business. Athens has not been short of such entrepreneurs in the past and Xenophon, in analysing the state of the industry and addressing all the above, shows that in another life he might have been one of them.[275] What he well sees to be holding back such entrepreneurs is the element of risk – there is money to be made, but also to be lost,[276] and his aim is to kick start the exploitation of the mines, which we might see as a commercial inevitability. As we will discuss in chapter 3, he does this by reducing risk, and Xenophon's prescience in this regard is remarkable. As it was, the economic environment combined with entrepreneurism, and entailed that only ten years later, as *Against Pantaenetus* demonstrates, speculators were again willing to risk large sums in the Laurion.

### 2.4.3 *Choris oikountes?*

These insights into the lives of manufacturing slaves working in heavy industry are particularly interesting in the light of some recent opinions on Xenophon's attitude to slaves in the *Poroi*. Jansen has argued that Xenophon envisaged the mine slaves in his project occupying a status similar to *choris oikountes*:

> It looks like Xenophon is trying to incorporate these slaves into the city's economy of *charis* by treating them as quasi-*euergetai*: in exchange for their willing and active support both in the mines and the military, the possibility of manumission and further status mobility are to remain open.[277]

Discussing the large number of slaves who would be in the mining region as Xenophon's project took shape, Jansen argues that because their masters would be

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272 Scheidel 2005, pp. 14-15.
273 Scheidel 2008, pp. 115-116.
274 4.22.
275 See eg. Xen. *Oec.* 3.1-4.
276 4.28-29.
277 Jansen 2012, p. 740.

largely absent, deputising management to non-citizens or slave managers: slaves would not be subject to direct domination in the way that household slaves might be, enjoying, 'a degree of freedom and autonomy in their daily lives greater than most common chattel slaves.'[278]

We do not know for certain whether mining slaves were shackled, although Xenophon certainly expects that the mines slaves will be branded,[279] and as Rihll remarks, a slave living independently might indeed work harder if each obol earned took him nearer to freedom.[280] But silver mining was a tough industry carried out in truly unpleasant conditions and slaves were unlikely to whistle their way to work without some degree of compulsion. Recent comparative discussions of slavery have examined the degree of punishment and reward used to motivate chattel slaves in antiquity. Scheidel has argued for a more nuanced version of a model proposed by Fenoaltea, wherein those in the least skilful, effort-intensive roles (quarry workers, plantation slaves) are subjected to low subsistence levels and close supervision with the use of pain incentives whilst those whose work is care-intensive (viticulture, animal husbandry) require rewards to reduce ill-will and theft, the ultimate reward for a slave who has pleased his master or earned sufficient being manumission. Whilst Scheidel refined this model, he classified mining as an effort-intensive activity at one extreme end of the scale,[281] although we have seen that some aspects of refinement required great skill. Ill-will at this, the sharpest end of silver production, could be costly indeed. Within the silver industry, a more nuanced assessment of pain/reward incentives is probably necessary, but the majority of occupations in the industry would nevertheless fall into the effort-intensive category.

Laurion slaves are not as entirely anonymous as we might imagine; there is evidence provided by epitaphs and dedications of slaves achieving, if not freedom, then wealth accumulation and relatively high status.[282] To reinforce the link between mine slaves and manumission, Jansen cites an Anaxandrides fragment which tells of a slave-

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278 Jansen 2012, p. 737.

279 Slaves branded: 4.21. Hanson 1992 p. 216, says Laurion slaves were guarded, fettered and grouped in large gangs but does not cite a source; Rihll 2010a, p. 208 argues that the single pair of shackles actually found in the region is more likely to be related to punishment than normality, Morris 2011, p. 189, adds that shackled slaves would not be very productive.

280 Rihll 2008, p. 127.

281 Scheidel 2008, pp. 107-111; see also briefly Rihll 2011 pp. 64-65.

282 See Burford 1972, pp. 171, 177, 209.

resident of Sounion gaining his freedom,[283] and further argues that mine slaves leased out by the state under Xenophon's scheme might be able to buy their freedom because they could take on additional work during slack periods and earn money which they could keep, or even because they already possessed personal wealth when they were first leased. Many slaves paid a portion of their wages to their owners as *apophora*, keeping the rest for themselves, and Rihll suggests that the margin that the slave retained was an incentive for him to work unsupervised.[284] As we have seen, Diocleides earned sufficient from his Laurion slave to be worth the early start and lengthy walk from the city, but he probably did not go every week; even if he went every full moon, at, say, an obol per day, he would collect less than 5 drachmas each trip and it is unlikely that more than a fraction would be shared with the slave, particularly in the case of an unskilled manual labourer supervised by someone other than his owner, whose work was more likely to have been incentivised by pain than by income.[285] In a highly competitive, profit-driven industry it is unlikely that this retained income could be very high and it is hard to see on a practical level how slaves leased under Xenophon's scheme could amass any significant sums. We do not know enough about the *apophora* system, or at least precisely how it functioned in the case of large scale slave leasing, or whether Xenophon envisaged that the operator leasing the slaves would still be expected to pay the state even if his slaves were under-employed or had no work at all. It would seem likely, at least, that in such mass slave-leasing the financial arrangement would be with each hirer, rather than the state having to manage thousands of individuals' work patterns and income, and this is certainly the way that Xenophon's proposal and his description of Nikias' arrangement with Sosias the Thracian is most easily interpreted.[286] An operator with underemployed slaves on his hands for whom he still had to pay the state would look to lease their work out elsewhere in order to recoup his outlay, and in any case Xenophon's project is predicated on there being an unceasing supply of work. This would not lead to any additional excess of income available to the slave through finding himself independent temporary employment. On the other hand, were each slave individually paying over a portion of their wages, in slack times, even if they did as Jansen suggests and found work elsewhere, the only nearby opportunities would be

[283] Jansen 2012, p. 738, citing Anax. F4 K-A.
[284] Rihll 2011, p. 65.
[285] See the discussion of Andoc. *On the Mysteries* 1.37-39. at 2.2.1 above.
[286] 4.14; Gauthier 1976, p. 138.

within the mining industry and on similar pay rates. Again, this would not provide any additional income to the individual slave after the state had taken its share.

Reading into Xenophon's admittedly unusual use of the word *polis* to describe this expanding population,[287] Jansen suggests that the word is chosen to represent the unorthodox nature of this community who had a greater chance than other slaves of being freed.[288] But Gauthier's gloss on the passage provides a less complex reading: he notes that Xenophon elsewhere compares the Laurion to a fortress, shows that the addition of a fort at Besa would bring all the works together (συνήκοι) into a whole,[289] perhaps like a town sheltered by its walls, and he compares the future value of land in the Laurion to that in the outskirts of the Athenian *asty*.[290] Such a reading contextualises the use of the word *polis* at 4.50 as part of an extended metaphor rather than a subtle reference to a new world order.

Xenophon's suggestion that during war, slaves might be useful in the navy or infantry[291] is where, according to Jansen, 'Xenophon shows his true feelings towards the slaves', because he recommends that they be treated with care, and because in the past a slave's bravery in war might lead to his manumission.[292] But as Giglioni cautions, this is not sentimentality – a slave is an instrument of production which must be maintained, because a job too exhausting might reduce his efficiency.[293] Xenophon knows well enough the level of care required to nurture a loyal, trained fighter, and Gauthier's interpretation of '*therapeuein'* at 4.42 – that Xenophon probably refers to food and clothing – seems closer to the mark.[294] Hunt reminds us that the difficulties of recruiting and motivating armies from disaffected populations have been overcome throughout history.[295] In any event, manumission after battle may not always have been straightforward; owners might simply have retained both

287 4.50.
288 Jansen 2012, pp. 737-738.
289 4.44.
290 4.50.
291 4.42.
292 Jansen 2012, pp. 739-740. Similarly J. D. Lewis (2009, p. 386) questions, in what sense the slaves would really be slaves, if they participated in economic activity, and suggests they might be more akin to benevolent servants.
293 Giglioni 1970, pp. CXX-CXXI.
294 Gauthier 1976, p. 178.
295 Hunt 2011, p. 29. Xenophon also uses *therapeuein* to describe the way the city should treat metics, but LSJ p. 793 records a broad range of senses depending on context, from doing service to the gods, to training animals.

their slaves and a share of their wages,[296] and Hunt has argued that the mass manumission and enfranchisement of slave rowers after Arginusae might have been controversial enough to colour the *demos'* reaction to the accusations in the notorious trial and execution of the generals, and a contributing factor to the ultimate verdict, as the notional purity of the citizenship was diminished and slave owners lost both their property and the income slaves provided.[297]

Returning to Jansen's proposal, his suggestion that,

> The master/slave relationship envisioned here appears to be based on the kind of mutuality befitting of friends, where kindnesses, favours, and gifts come with the expectation that the recipient will one day requite all past benefactions out of a sense of gratitude (*charis*).[298]

may well echo the relationship promoted by Ischomachus' wife towards her household servants,[299] but there is barely room for it in an industry involving thousands and thousands of workers impersonally leased for exploitation in an unremittingly harsh environment. Whilst Ischomachus' servants might be allowed to share in the estate's success,[300] Pomeroy remarks that Ischomachus expects that his household slaves will remain with him permanently. Xenophon makes no reference to their future sale or manumission.[301] A trusted bailiff might be rewarded with treatment akin to that of a free man[302] but that is not the same as freedom itself. Privileged and skilled workers may have more independence, but the unskilled majority was probably less lucky. There would be good managers and bad ones, and on an individual basis Xenophon might well believe that the better managers will treat their slaves well and achieve greater productivity and loyalty. But above all we need to remember the scale of Xenophon's plan. To portray this as a scheme in which (tens of) thousands of slaves would have relative independence and self-determination with the possibility of manumission and even citizenship is over-generous. As a soldier Xenophon had spent time regularly taking and selling off slaves and the campaign of the Cyreans in Thrace was largely about securing booty.[303] In the *Cyropaedia* Cyrus

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296 Hunt 2001, p. 373.
297 Hunt 2001, p. 372.
298 Jansen 2012, p. 740.
299 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 7.37. Plato refers to slaves who have shown themselves to be better brothers or sons: *Laws* 6.776d-e; see Hunt 2011, p. 28.
300 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 9.12; 12.16.
301 Pomeroy 1994, p. 65.
302 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 14.9.
303 Xen. *Anabasis* 6.6.38; 7.3.48; 7.8.19; at 2.4.27 Tissaphernes expressly excludes slaves from the

reassured his men that they need have no qualms about taking slaves[304] and in *Hiero* Xenophon depicted the freeing of slaves as an aspect of tyranny.[305] In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates asked of Euthydemus, "Now suppose a man who has been elected general enslaves an unjust and hostile city, shall we say that he acts unjustly?" The required answer was, "no."[306]

If the enslaving of captives *en masse* is depicted in Xenophon as an accepted facet of Greek life,[307] it seems clear from the *Hiero* passage that for Xenophon freeing slaves is a feature of tyranny and does not fall within the natural world order. We only have to pause a little longer to take on board the significance of his words 'and filled all vacancies as they occurred'[308] to understand the situations this provides for: slaves who become injured, infirm or even die whilst they are leased out, are described simply in terms that reflect the lessor's financial liability. What we know (because Xenophon, amongst others, tell us so[309]) of the unwholesome environment around the mining region suggests that life will be cut short. Some may indeed achieve freedom, but the vast majority will die ignominious, anonymous deaths.

### 2.4.4 The Laurion slaves - conclusion

Several themes have emerged over the preceding discussion. By the mid-fourth century, speculators were willing to invest huge sums in the Attic silver industry in the expectation of generous rewards, sometimes investing third hand in the enterprise or the debt of those with more direct participation. It was an industry in which the wealthier Athenians, landowners and the liturgical class, participated and profited, but which could not be accused of any of the romantic associations attached to wealth acquired through agriculture which has been a feature of some discussions of the

plunder he allows the Greeks to take from Parysatis' lands and at 7.2.6, 400 of the Greeks are themselves sold by the governor of Byzantium. At 7.4.24 matters are more nuanced, informed by both vengeance and mercy – or possibly pragmatism: offered the opportunity to punish the Thynians, Xenophon says "Why, for my part I think I have abundant satisfaction as it is, if these people are to be slaves instead of free men."

304 Xen. *Cyropaedia* 7.5.73; see also 4.2.26.

305 Xen. *Hiero* 6.5.

306 Xen. *Memorabilia* 4.2.15.

307 See Braund 2011, p. 113 for the mechanics of slave supply and 'the normality of enslavement, slave-trading and the commodification of human beings.'

308 4.14 τὸν δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἴσους ἀεὶ παρέχειν.

309 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.12 and see chapter 2.2.3.

ancient economy. The resurgence in mining activity of the 340s is likely to have been similar to that seen in the heyday of the fifth-century industry. The conditions for such a renaissance, including the optimum conditions for the use of slave labour which we can analyse today with the benefit of comparative evidence, were once again in place for a revitalisation of the industry. Laurion slaves came from a wide range of backgrounds and undertook tasks which ranged from the unskilled, repetitive and physically strenuous to the technically proficient. The vast majority exercised little or no control over their fate, whilst the lucky few might accumulate savings or be trusted with the supervision of others. We have virtually no direct evidence of their living conditions, but what becomes apparent, both from an examination of contemporary practice and the very slight allusions within the text, is that Xenophon's expectation was that the state slaves employed in his industrial-scale project would be managed in order to extract the greatest profit from their work. As an experienced commander of sometimes unwilling forces, he recognised that this might entail careful management, but Xenophon was not idealistic or ground-breaking in his treatment of slaves; manumission, honours and citizenship were not part of his incentive package.

## 2.5 Silver mining and economic rationality - introduction

The preceding sections have demonstrated the extent to which the intent and the possible success of Xenophon's plans rested on schemes undertaken entirely for their potential to achieve profits for individual entrepreneurs in order to yield income for the state. Given the extraordinary scale of Xenophon's project, the substantial income and expenditure involved in the silver industry, and the high risk of losses, success could only be expected if ancient entrepreneurs had a sound basis on which to make their business choices and a continuous ability to analyse profitability. The remainder of this chapter will situate the text within the wider debate about the capability of ancient managers to make economically rational choices. This in turn should inform our understanding of the wider recognition of economic forces which lay behind the writing and the contemporary reception of the *Poroi*.

Weber's succinct overview of measures of rational economic action provides for: '(1) the systematic allocation of utilities between the present and the future; (2) the systematic allocation of available utilities to various uses in order of urgency ranked according to the principle of marginal utility; (3) the procurement through production

or transportation of utilities for which the necessary means of production are controlled by the actor himself; and (4) the acquisition of assured powers of control and disposal over utilities.'[310] In the study of the ancient world this emphasis on a model centred on the accretion of marginal utility has collided with views which see Greek economic choices as heavily subject to social factors such as status and honour.[311] Given that Xenophon's proposals include the use of honours and privileges as motivating factors in the encouragement of both Athenian and non-Athenian investors and merchants, it is apparent that we need a model which allows for both the primacy of profit maximisation but also for the influence of status considerations. In his analysis of economic rationality within silver mining which we will discuss later in this chapter, Christesen argues for a more flexible model, that of 'expressive rationality' which 'assumes that individual agents are self-consciously reflexive about their preferences *and* that they are sensitive to social norms' when formulating choices about investment.[312] This, he argues, better helps us to analyse the real-world economic choices made by economic agents. Engen, in his analysis of the bestowal of honours in relation to trade, follows Christesen in his adoption of this '…"middle ground" between "oversocialized" and "undersocialized" conceptions of economic action,'[313] and this is the overview of rationality that I will adopt. It will become apparent however that whatever the motivating factors involved in an initial decision to become involved in the mining industry, most of its day to day aspects are intensively competitive and profit-driven. Christesen draws our attention to a line in the *Politics* in which Aristotle categorises mining as an intermediate type of acquisition between natural and non-natural, because its product comes from the earth.[314] Christesen suggests that this categorisation gave mining a special attraction, although one might consider that intermediacy is hardly a ringing endorsement; mining does not appear to be an industry either which attracted approbation, or which one took up in anticipation of social recognition.

### 2.5.1 Record keeping and financial analysis

The mid-twentieth century search for the ancient ability to make economically rational

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310 See Weber 1968, pp. 71-74.
311 See Engen 2010, pp. 20-36 for an overview of the theoretical discussion.
312 Christesen 2003, pp. 32-34, Christesen's italics.
313 Engen 2010, p. 32.
314 Arist. *Pol.* 1258b28-32.

choices focused on the degree of sophistication of record-keeping, the extent to which analytical record-keeping was, or was not, the only reliable tool for informed financial decision-making, and whether such records are the only evidence available to us for the identification of economically rational decision-making in the ancient world. De Ste. Croix's influential study of Greek accounting established what became for some time the prevailing view, that the limitations of Greek numbering systems and their manner of recording transactions ensured that the ancient economy was unable to expand, because double-entry bookkeeping never evolved. Proponents of this view argued that the ancient entrepreneur lacked the financial records which would enable him to balance the relative success or failure of different aspects of his ventures, and bearing in mind an apparent absence of the concept of amortisation, he would have had only the limited possibility of promoting economic growth.[315] De Ste. Croix argued that the Greek acrophonic and alphabetic numeral systems both lacked place value,[316] which meant that modern style columnar journals might not easily be kept and 'surely helped to prevent the advanced antithetical concepts of debit and credit from emerging.'[317] For de Ste. Croix, more sophisticated bookkeeping did not emerge because the economy did not develop to such a stage where it would have been necessary. For Finley, the failure of economic development was partly attributable to the lack of information that would have been available from more complex accounting systems, whilst:

> the widespread use of slaves in agriculture and manufacture restricted the scope for free labour and blocked expansion of the market. It also hindered, and effectively prevented, increasing rationalisation of production: given the uncertainty of the market and the fluctuating costs of slaves (for both procurement and maintenance), the slave-owner had to be free to dispose of a portion of his slave force at a moment's notice, or to exploit them in ways other than direct employment in production.[318]

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315 De Ste. Croix 1956. See Finley 1999, pp. 110-111 and 116-117 for an influential example of this view.

316 Place value is the convention we are familiar with from our own numbering system which entails that the value of any digit is implied by its position within the whole number – in the numbers 123 or 456, numbers 1 and 4 signify quantities of hundreds, ie one hundred and four hundred respectively; numbers 2 and 5 signify quantities of tens, ie twenty and fifty respectively, and 3 and 6 are single units. Were 3 placed elsewhere within the number, its value would be changed according to its position. Thus for the purposes of, say, addition or subtraction we can place
123 and
456
in lines above each other and thereby group all the units, tens and hundreds in their own columns.

317 De Ste. Croix 1956, p. 60.

318 Finley 1981, p. 15.

There is a lot here worthy of discussion, not least that these observations led Finley to the conclusion that the slave-owner of antiquity was a rentier rather than an entrepreneur. The essence of entrepreneurship is the taking of risks in order to exploit opportunities and reap rewards. To see slave-owners involved in manufacturing as rentiers suggests a passivity on the part of the owner which, if the risks were truly as great as Finley describes in the passage cited, could not have been the case. Active management of just the sort he outlines – the search for different ways to exploit underemployed workers, the acumen to respond to differing conditions and the flexibility to purchase or dispose of assets, are all indicative of a degree of 'hands-on' management and entrepreneurial skill. Taking silver mining as a case study, our increasing understanding of the level of specialisation in the manufacturing stages of silver extraction, and Christesen's analysis discussed below, all argue strongly against the case that there was a lack of rationalisation in industry due to the use of slave labour. If the uncertainty of the market and the fluctuating cost of slaves were obvious to Finley, they do not seem to have been an inhibiting factor to Xenophon or one which he anticipated would unduly concern his audience. Xenophon's analysis was that costs were straightforward and predictable, and the market for silver was stable. Whether these observations were correct is another matter, but the *Poroi* could be seen as first hand evidence that they were not perceived as constraints by the individuals responsible for entrepreneurism and growth.

### 2.5.2 Other case studies in the analysis of profitability and economic rationality

Earlier scholarship tended to look across the entire Greek and Roman worlds for evidence and view them as well-nigh unitary in their accounting methodology, but more recently there has been a tendency to focus on specific sectors and individual examples which have led to a more nuanced picture of the evolution of the management of financial affairs over a longer period. Such detailed studies throw more light on the potential for economically rational decision-making than de Ste. Croix's study, which looked at both Greek and Roman accounting with a small number of mainly Roman examples.

In the earliest direct response to de Ste. Croix's views on ancient bookkeeping, Macve

argued that a double entry system was not required for the demonstration of profitability[319] and found that:

> We should not conclude that the state of ancient accounting would have systematically misled people into making irrational decisions.[320]

So we must look elsewhere than ancient bookkeeping for evidence of the ability to tally up one's financial position and pre-judge potential financial outcomes. For third century AD Egypt, Rathbone demonstrated a detailed level of monthly accounting on the Appianus estate which monitored inputs and outputs, with the majority of the estate's produce being sold, indicating a high level of economic rationality.[321] Closer in time to the *Poroi*, but again in Egyptian estate management, Chandezon offers an assessment of Hellenistic financial management practices, focussing particularly on Grier's study of the Zenon papyri,[322] and finds that in large estates, innovation evolved with the emergence of managers, complex accounting systems and the opening of agricultural processes to the sales markets.[323] He does not however engage with the mining industry, arguing that we must look to agriculture not industrial workshops for the real heart of ancient economics.[324] But the complex and large-scale web of manufacturing supply and production evident in the Laurion argues against the sole emphasis on agriculture in any analysis of Attica.

It has been argued that Rathbone's analysis of a large-scale Egyptian landholding does not demonstrate economically rational choice because very wealthy Romans had no other investment opportunities available to them, and therefore no 'choice' was made.[325] For the potential investor in the silver mines, however, alternatives were available, and Xenophon not only recognises this but promotes the better return available through his own scheme by comparison with maritime investment.[326] He is specifically asking his audience to engage in economically rational decision-making.

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319 Macve 1985, pp. 239-40.

320 Macve 1985, p. 247. Zaid's 2004 study of early Islamic state accounting systems also questions de Ste. Croix's assertion that double entry bookkeeping did not emerge until thirteenth-century mediaeval Europe.

321 Rathbone 1991, pp. 399-400; see Andreau and Maucourant 1999 for a critique of Rathbone's argument.

322 Grier 1934; Chandezon 2011, pp. 108-114.

323 Chandezon 2011, p. 119.

324 Chandezon 2011, pp. 117-118.

325 Christesen 2003, p. 36.

326 3.9.

Our most detailed evidence for Greek financial management and record keeping in the classical and Hellenistic periods comes from the sanctuary of Apollo on Delos. In the fifth century the varied sums arriving in Athens by virtue of the Delian League entailed the development of financial management skills at a speedier rate than elsewhere[327] and as we shall see, a continuing exchange of methods took place between Athens and Delos.

The Delian temple accounts served two main functions. Firstly they held magistrates accountable; this could be achieved through examination of the underlying records and each end of term audit,[328] but inscription left a permanent record, for all to see, of the probity or otherwise of officials. Secondly, the monumentalisation summed up a year's activity and exalted the sanctuary's wealth for the appreciation of worshippers and also her current and potential debtors. Inscription therefore was about achieving different ends from the papyrus accounts we have discussed from Egypt and from the sanctuary's daily records, which must have underpinned the intricate series of transactions throughout the year. We can extract from the annual totals a good indication of the complexity of the day to day management of sanctuary income and expenditure, which should not be underestimated. *ID* 98 for the years 377/6 down to 374/3 shows that over a four year period which included the quadrennial Delia festival, receipts from a large number of sources totalled 61,656 drachmas and exceeded expenditure (including monies newly loaned, which are regarded as an expense) by just 91 drachmas.[329] Over half of the income (33,318 drachmas[330]) came from interest received on loans made both to cities and individuals, yet elsewhere the inscription lists debtors from earlier periods who have repaid none, or only some, of the instalments due during the period in question.[331] Given that anticipated receipts might be erratic, careful, constant recording and a tight grip must necessarily have

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327 Rhodes 2013, p. 203.

328 In Athens magistrates may have been depositing underlying accounts in the Metroon for consideration by the *boule* as early as the mid-fifth century (Sickinger 1999, pp. 125-127). In Delos during the Independence, monthly accounts were displayed in the *agora* (Migeotte 2008, pp. 62-63).

329 Chankowski 2008a, pp. 314-317 for a tabulation of the relevant sums and pp. 417-424 for the inscription and translation into French. Today money out on loan would be regarded as an asset, because the lender still owns it. In contrast, ML 53.5-9, 22-24, 28-30, 35-37, an inscription from Rhamnous of the 440s, shows that the deme recognised that loans of the goddess's money remained an asset.

330 *ID* 98 *Aa* 11–14 (interest from cities) and *ID* 98 *Aa* 15-23 (interest from individuals). For simplicity figures of less than one drachma are omitted here.

331 *ID* 98 *Ba* 1-10.

been maintained on all income and expenses throughout the year in order to balance so finely over such a period. The year 376 for instance, saw an unlooked-for windfall in fines of 10,000 drachmas each, imposed on seven men for their *asebeia*, in having chased the *amphyctions* outside the sanctuary and attacked them.[332] The narrative of this inscription first calculates a surplus for the four years of 11,861 drachmas and remarks that of this sum, the bulk of it was loaned at interest. This narrative cannot have reflected the cash position – the assessment of how much to spend or loan out was not made yearly or quadrennially after the income had been counted; had this been so, and a true cash balance of only 91 drachmas remained after four years, this would have left sufficient reserve only to pay one official for three months.[333] Balancing income and expenditure must have been a rolling process requiring thorough local knowledge of the reliability and changing fortunes of the sanctuary's historic and prospective debtors. Sacrificial and festival expenses will have occurred irregularly although predictably throughout the year and accurate estimations of the likelihood that debts would be repaid on schedule would be essential in assessing how much cash would be available for future loans.

Not only was housekeeping efficient, but there is a clear sense of building a reserve that is immediately put to use to generate further income. The level of financial acumen required to manage these fluctuating circumstances suggests that there is here a fine line between careful husbandry and income maximisation. Chankowski draws our attention to the way that reserves must have accumulated through the receipt of *aparche* during the second quarter of the fifth century up until the transfer of the treasury of the Delian League, in order to fund the monumentalisation of the sanctuary and yet leave sufficient reserve to generate enough interest to sustain sanctuary activity. She estimates that a sum acquired through *aparche* not exceeding 50 talents was available for loan to the cities who had effectively furnished it in the first instance, and that as such loans were repaid, the capital was loaned to cities once more, whilst any excess of annual income over expenditure was loaned in small amounts to individuals.[334] Thus already an operating distinction is drawn between capital funds, loaned out to cities to provide income, and running costs paid for from

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332 *ID* 98 *Ba* 24-27.

333 Five *amphyctions* and their secretary each received one drachma per day. Chankowski 2008a, p. 310.

334 Chankowski 2008a, pp. 317-320.

that income, which is enshrined in the accounting; *ID* 98 does not have the integration of capital and running accounts or the move towards debit and credit that we see from the early second century;[335] it is essentially a running account, and it is evident from the store of information it contains that detailed underlying records must have existed relating to both the current year's activities and the pre-existing arrangements with earlier debtors whose payments were so important to the life of the sanctuary.

Delian record keeping evolved over time and, importantly, did not exist in a vacuum. After Independence in 314, Delian methods of making private loans in instalments mirrored fourth-century Athenian private practice; entries akin to debits and credits appear from the mid-third century and a constant exchange of expertise between the temple administrators and the banking sector enabled the *hieropoioi* to appropriate the more specialised techniques of the bankers.[336] Later, the exemplary record made by the *hieropoios* Silenus, thought to be a banker, in 179 suggests that specialised methods could be appropriated immediately if the expertise were available.[337]

### 2.5.3 Record keeping and economic rationality in fourth-century Athens

In the early part of the 320s, Athenogenes was derided in court for suggesting that despite receiving monthly accounts, he did not know the level of his debts, or that the sale of his assets would not cover them. Some modern scholars might be content to think that ancient traders could not analyse their profitability; an Athenian jury might not be so forgiving.[338] Whilst we have less systematic operational detail, several case studies have identified the capability to recognise and implement financial management practices and quantify profitability in fourth-century Attica. In particular, Bresson and Bresson[339] have conclusively demonstrated that the sophistication of the calculations involved in setting interest rates for maritime loans show that lender and borrower could relate the level of shipping failure to interest rates, were able to make complex judgements about the use of capital for the best return on investment, and used these skills to plan the spreading of risk across

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335 Migeotte 2008, p. 74, referencing in particular *ID* 442, the complete account for the year 179, and the records for the years 180-168, *ID* 440-453; 455-465; 467-468, discussed in Chankowski and Feyel 1997, pp. 117-118.

336 Chankowski 2008b, pp. 79-81, 88.

337 *ID* 442; Chankowski 2008b, pp. 80, 88.

338 Hyp. *Against Athenogenes* 3.19.

339 Bresson and Bresson 2004.

different projects. Drawing together a wide variety of sources Faraguna subsequently built on Macve's discussion with an analysis of means of calculation, commercial transactions, and sacred and public financial management from the archaic era through to the fourth century. Faraguna argued convincingly that the extensive use of the abacus made up for any deficiency in numbering systems, and that the Greeks were able to estimate profitability, developing forms of economic behaviour that were aimed at profit maximisation.[340]

Similarly, on the small scale, Cohen demonstrated that Demosthenes' speeches against his guardians show that Athenians understood the concepts determining the profitability of business operations without the need for double entry bookkeeping.[341] On the larger scale, Davies has shown that Chabrias' money-raising strategies in Egypt in July 362 – July 359 show 'a high level of sophistication and an ability to 'read' an economy for the sake of extracting revenue from it.'[342] Osborne has established that the heavy cash requirements placed on the liturgical class entailed that the wealthy Attic landowner might manage a variety of agricultural activities alongside business interests such as mining in order to secure the necessary monetised income,[343] and Moreno has made a case for a far greater involvement in the grain trade by the Athenian wealthy than has previously been recognised.[344] Analysing the financial provisions put in place by Lykourgos a little later in the fourth century, Davies concluded that:

> … we have to view the Athenian political class as collectively (and competitively) possessing a knowledge of fiscal possibilities and techniques probably unrivalled anywhere else in the Mediterranean.[345]

This is the class of Athenians who purchased leases, invested in mining operations and owned the land on which the mines were situated. Given the apparent success of the mid-fourth century mining industry it seems evident therefore that the question should not be, *whether* the Greeks had the numerical and accounting sophistication to manage and develop their enterprises effectively, but *how* they did it.

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340 Faraguna 2008.
341 Dem. *Against Aphobus I-III;* E. E. Cohen 1992, p. 124, n. 56.
342 Davies 2004b, p. 493.
343 R. Osborne 1991, p. 137.
344 Moreno 2007a, pp. 259-260.
345 Davies 2004b, p. 508.

### 2.5.4 The ore washeries and economic rationality

Returning to the silver industry, Christesen has shown that the heavy investment made in the construction and running of silver ore washeries in the Laurion in the classical era demonstrates the pursuit of profit maximisation in the Athenian silver mining industry. Grinding and washing the lower grade, silver bearing ore prior to cupellation was not strictly necessary, but it saved expenditure on the large amounts of charcoal that would have been used had the ore not first been refined and reduced in volume.[346] Conophagos estimated the cost of processing ore at about 61 drachmas per ton when the raw ore was taken straight to the furnaces, as against 38 drachmas per ton for pre-refined, sorted material. As Conophagos estimates the average income per ton of material dug at 70 drachmas, the importance of not overspending on the refining process becomes self-evident. This, Christesen argues, demonstrates the Athenian ability to employ careful cost analysis and economically rational decision-making.[347]

We may take this analysis further. Conophagos' figures are averages; not every operator would have achieved 70 drachmas of income (before costs) per ton of material dug. Some would have been lucky enough, on some days, to dig ore of such high quality that it did not need pre-refining. Others might have dug for some time before finding anything even worth crushing. Crushing and grinding produced concentrated ore, 'middlings' and 'tailings.' Tailings would usually be discarded; middlings still had useful ore caught within the gangue (the material that could not be commercially processed), and might be refined further. Without the benefit of modern analytical techniques, this was a judgement to be made from experience alone, on the basis of cost.[348]

Thus operators had to assess not only the simple cost/benefit equation above, but also had to take into account the risk that no silver at all might be produced for some time or that some would require greater levels of pre-furnace processing at the washeries. In such circumstances the flexibility of the labour supply and of access to washeries

346 Photos-Jones and Jones 1994, p. 332. Agrileza was primarily an ore-dressing site: pp. 327-358 describe the sampling and chemical analysis of metallurgical waste, plaster, earth and soil from the site. They warn that Conophagos was 'somewhat imprecise,' p. 333.

347 Christesen 2003, pp. 39-45. See Conophagos 1980, pp. 213-273 and 341-354 for his detailed calculations. See also chapter 3.6.3.

348 Photos-Jones and Jones 1994, p. 333.

only when their services were needed would have been paramount in order to avoid maintaining underemployed and expensive slaves and installations, suggesting that perhaps only the large and regularly productive mines (such as that operated by Pantaenetus) would make the ownership of a dedicated *ergasterion* economically viable. Smaller operators would probably 'outsource' the refinement of their ore. Choices would have had to be made on the basis of long term projections taking into account the unpredictability of the silver supply. Given this risk, for any individual operator it would make sense to employ the most efficient means of purification not simply as a general rule that profit should be maximised, but as a protection against the constant possibility that a seam may disappoint and that last week's profits might be spent on this week's wasted labour. Even an operator who was digging mostly high grade ore might still want to refine the lower grade ore he digs and send it to a washery in order to protect against the unevenness of the quality of supply.

Whilst Christesen focuses on fourth-century Attica, the archaeological report by Kakavoyannis from which Christesen draws much of his evidence also shows the existence of rock-cut washeries crammed together along one of the water courses of the Bertseko Valley dating from at least the start of the fifth century and perhaps earlier.[349] This profusion of more primitive versions of the later washery complex with its own associated cisterns demonstrates that the benefits of pre-processing the ore were long recognised, and is indicative of both the technological evolution of the process and a demand for greater capacity as silver mining increased. We cannot tell what the financial and proprietorial relationship was between the rock-cut washeries and the individual miners, but in the fourth century we know from epigraphic evidence that washeries might be owned independently of the mines.[350] Kakavoyannis posits that although washeries might have been originally built by a mine owner in association with an adjacent mine, as a lease ended or a mine became exhausted the owner would look for a further mine to lease nearby in order to avoid additional building and would let out its services to other operators.[351] The calculation thus becomes even more sophisticated. A potential washery builder, an existing owner deciding whether to keep a washery in operation, or an individual

349 Kakavoyannis 2001, pp. 369-372.

350 Of the 240 leases tabulated by Shipton 2000, Appendix 1, pp. 97 – 109, only 12 leaseholders are also mentioned as workshop owners.

351 Kakavoyannis 2001, p. 377.

making a loan against the purchase of a washery, all had to factor in a range of issues when deciding on the income-potential of an individual workshop. As well as having a good understanding of its running costs, such as site maintenance and the support of slave labour, he would have to be able to estimate the amount of use to be made of it in processing ore from the owner's own mine and the likely level of demand for, and income from, its services to other nearby mine operators. Therefore he would have to consider the factors taken into account by likely customers – the relative costs of processing the ore in a washery before taking it to the furnace, measured against the higher cost (because of the heavier requirement for charcoal) of the cupellation of larger amounts of lower grade ore. If the price of using a washery was higher than the additional cost of cupellation, then the miner might as well miss out the washery stage and pay for the furnace. A lower limit could be set by a washery operator who had a good grasp of his outgoings and understood the need to estimate and ensure that he covered his overheads, whilst remaining competitive, particularly if a large job meant bringing in – probably hiring – more slaves. In between, given the profusion of washeries in the Laurion, it seems perfectly possible that there would be something akin to a market rate for processing. Washeries reasonably adjacent to each other and to the mines that used them might have to compete for business; where there was only one washery near to a mine, that washery might have something of a monopoly, unless his price was so high that it was cheaper to pay for slaves to carry the ore further afield to a less costly workshop.

As I hope I have demonstrated, with a fair amount of independent but heavily interdependent industrial activity taking place in a very small area there can be little doubt that the most successful managers must have been those who could make quite fine financial judgements. These would not simply have been, as Christesen describes, choosing whether to spend large sums on building a washery to go with one's mine, but on a daily basis, forecasting short-term activity. As a washery owner, this entailed understanding one's overheads and the choices available to potential customers in order to judge the competition and set one's prices for services as a provider. As a mine operator, it necessitated being able to judge the difference between the differently costed processes of washing and cupellation and their different levels of associated preparatory costs.

### 2.5.5 The *Poroi* and economic rationality – conclusion. Xenophon's economically rational planning

The silver industry then was already the object of constant analysis of cost to profit ratios as the quality of the ore led to daily assessment of alternate processing strategies alongside a necessarily intensive and probably competitive ancillary supply system. The industry's importance as a provider of state income, and the way in which its heavy supply requirements will have touched many Athenian tradesmen and farmers, mean that Xenophon's precise calculations and familiarity with the industry should not be a surprise. Can the *Poroi* add to our picture of economically-rational decision making in the fourth century?

Careful examination of temple accounts, legal speeches, historical episodes and industrial archaeology reveal a sophisticated degree of financial planning and the ability to maximise profit across a range of sectors. The evidence of Delos and our knowledge of the Athenian liturgical system suggest a high degree of cross-fertilisation of management practices and accounting methods between the sacred and secular spheres. Contemporary readers of the *Poroi* from across the Greek world would be familiar with the administration of these religious and political financial institutions, which were not confined either to Athens or to democracies. It is therefore productive to readdress Xenophon's plans, bearing in mind that his audience would have had this level of financial and commercial literacy.

In the first instance, we should note that the arithmetical logic of Xenophon's argument is compelling.[352] How then does Xenophon's business planning stand up to scrutiny? Rostovtzeff, we may recall, pronounced it a political piece rather than 'a serious suggestion by an experienced financier'.[353] But at the very least, it furnishes a validation of Cartledge's claim that

> ..the Athenians' purchase and use of slaves were in the first instance the outcome of hard-headed prudential calculation – as that was then understood.[354]

Westermann suggests that Xenophon does not make any allowance for amortisation in his calculation of income,[355] yet once the workforce reaches 6,000 Xenophon

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352 See chapter 1.6.2 for the calculations involved.
353 Rostovtzeff 1941, p. 1328, n. 27.
354 Cartledge 2002b, p. 164.

proposes that the resulting income of sixty talents for that year should be split, twenty to buy further slaves and forty for the state. The *polis* thus recoups the initial 38 talent outlay in this year,[356] as well as owning a workforce worth 180–200 talents. ‘Investors’ are ultimately to be rewarded through the triobol distribution; we are even told at what rate.[357] If 20 talents continued to be used to buy slaves each year, there would be almost 10,000 slaves by the end of the twelfth year and if at that stage no more slaves were purchased, these 10,000 slaves would yield an annual state income of 100 talents. Xenophon may not address any of the practicalities: moving, housing, feeding and clothing the workforce immediately after purchase or between employment, or the personnel involved in organising such a large undertaking, but this is big-picture thinking.

In making his proposals, Xenophon analyses the future potential of the extraction industry,[358] draws parallels with previous and current practices[359] and assesses the markets for silver and for slaves using comparative indicators from other fields of production, recognising that demand drives production at every stage of the enterprise such that demand for silver will drive demand for slaves.[360] He identifies sources of initial capital;[361] recognises that potential investors have a choice over where to place their funds, and therefore not only calculates rates of return for investors but compares them favourably with other investment opportunities.[362] He suggests ways to reinvest profits in order to promote further business activity[363] and insures against embezzlement, by the use of guarantors.[364] Ancillary income is noted in the form of additional tax revenues,[365] depreciation is to an extent considered, in that the lessee has to pay for replacement slaves[366] and whilst Xenophon only supplies a few of the figures, his numbers are carefully put together. It may be audacious in its scale and alien to a modern readership in its exploitation of human capital, but this is a well-

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355 Westermann 1955, p. 15.
356 4.2-3, 4.24.
357 3.9.
358 4.2-5, 4.25-27.
359 4.13-16.
360 4.6-9, 4.22.
361 3.7, 3.11.
362 3.10.
363 3.12-14.
364 4.20.
365 See chapter 2.3.2.
366 4.14.

considered business plan that looks above all to maximise profit for the state by offering profit maximising opportunities to its participants.

## 2.6 Chapter conclusion

Through a contextualisation of Xenophon's proposals for the silver mines, the preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate the probable level of appreciation by the *Poroi's* first audience of the position occupied by the silver industry within a complex web of transactions at personal and state level. Both the conception and reception of the text will have been informed by a far wider recognition of the economics of silver extraction and the role of the Laurion in daily Attic life than has generally been recognised; Xenophon's suggestions may appear artless or naïve to a modern reader, but we lack the Athenians' familiarity with the particulars of slave ownership and industrial and commercial practice that obviated the need for detail. Recognition of the economic benefits of the silver industry and a familiarity with the nuts and bolts of its operation permeated every aspect of Athenian society, whether as a beneficiary of its levies, as a supplier, an investor, a user of its coinage or a seller of its leases. Vast numbers of slaves and free men worked directly in extraction, supplied the industry, and crafted and spent its final product. As will have been seen, I am cautious about the extent to which Xenophon concerned himself with the welfare of slave workers other than to the extent that benign management might extract greatest profit. I do not believe he planned manumission or independence as a cornerstone of his proposals – the incentives he offers are all for free men.

Xenophon's proposals rested on the firm foundation of a wider recognition amongst his audience of the industry's history and a financial literacy that is only in recent years becoming apparent. They also played on Athenians' sense of themselves, their pride in their coinage and the part played by silver in their history and the Persian wars. The *Poroi* is aspirational in its promises of widespread slave ownership and the regeneration of the city's institutions. Within ten years of its appearance, the economic forces which to an extent Xenophon recognised, had had their inevitable effect, and large sums were again being risked by investors.

Notably, status considerations or negative attitudes to participation in manufacturing and trade do not appear to have had any detrimental effect on the exploitation of

Laurion silver. There is no indication in our sources, and certainly not in the *Poroi*, that wealth-generation through citizen involvement in mining, at least at the level of supervisor or owner, carried with it any sense of dishonour. The incentives Xenophon offers to mining participation are essentially to do with profit and reflect the profit-driven motivations of those mine operators we have seen portrayed by the orators.

However other aspects of his schemes, particularly those which were to rely on the involvement of non-Athenians, might need additional inducements. Xenophon was aware of the ways in which Greek *philotimia*, love of honour, might be manipulated to encourage economic activity and in chapter 4 we will look further at the Athenians' manipulation of honours in order to engineer economic choices that were not wholly driven by profit considerations. Whilst the debate about Athenian citizen attitudes to economic activity remains vibrant, we have seen that Athenians with cash to spare had investment choices available to them and that given the right conditions, investment in the silver mines presented an economically rational choice in itself. The silver industry was profit-driven, competitive and involved constant rational decision-making in the pursuit of the maximisation of what we would call marginal utility during refinement and processing. Fourth-century evidence supports a picture of the financial sophistication of those who had had any experience of sacred, political or military administration, of shop keeping, banking or estate management, unhindered by the relatively rudimentary nature of recording techniques. Xenophon and his audience had first-hand experience of many of these sectors. His essential proposal, that the state should purchase thousands of slaves and profit from their rental, was innovative and daring, but it was offered to an audience whose commercial expertise should not be underrated. In the following chapter, we will see that the text has much to reveal about the sort of considerations that Athenians might contemplate in making their investment choices in an exceptionally risky industry.

# Chapter Three - Managing risk and promoting confidence

For when anxiety is attached to earning and saving, who will want to take the risk?
*Hypereides*[1]

Business repays men, not only for their labors, but for their fears
*Clark* [2]

## 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I want to investigate further the extent to which an analysis of the *Poroi* can contribute to the debate about economic rationality in the ancient world, focussing specifically on what Xenophon's text reveals about ancient understanding of, and attitudes to, risk. We have seen in *Against Pantaenetus* the number of men who were willing to chance large sums in mining, whether as financiers or operators.[3] On what basis did they make these judgements? How had confidence in the industry turned around in the few years since Xenophon had said that no-one wanted to take the risk of a new cutting?[4] Schorn contrasts Plato's caution over the feasibility of his project in the *Republic* with Xenophon's unquestioning optimism at the practicability of his plans, but as the following analysis will demonstrate, Xenophon's overt confidence is belied by his cautious approach.[5]

The concepts of risk and rationality are inextricably intertwined in post-modern thought, particularly so in the field of economics. Here I will focus on Xenophon's

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1. Hypereides *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.37; ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ φοβερὸν τὸ κτᾶσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, τίς βουλήσεται κινδυνεύειν;
2. Clark 1892, p. 40.
3. Chapter 2 4.1.
4. 4.28.
5. Schorn 2012, p. 720 and n. 121.

approach to risk and what it reveals of the strategies available to ancient entrepreneurs in their analysis of their economic undertakings. As Eidinow asks in relation to her study of oracles and curses at Dodona, is risk 'good to think with?'[6] I hope to demonstrate that despite the danger of imposing contemporary concepts on to ancient activities, in the study of the Greek economy the answer is emphatically 'yes'. Polanyi, building on the proposal that the Greeks pioneered market trading, rather than the Sumerians, Babylonians and Assyrians, asked,

> whence then did the Hellenes … derive their arts of individual business initiative, *risky* and gainful?'[7]

Whatever one's view of the developmental stage of the economy of the fourth century, in the evolution of economic processes from gift exchange, reciprocity and barter to the non-personal exchange of goods for profit, the conscious undertaking of 'commercial' risk is a key step, pivotal to the analysis of the emergence of ideas of individual entrepreneurism. Risk has not been used hitherto as an analytical tool in the study of the *Poroi* and it yields fascinating and informative results about the way the Greeks managed their enterprises.

### 3.1.1 Chapter outline

This chapter will begin with a discussion of modern approaches to risk and then apply some of the concepts discussed to two non-Attic texts, one fourth-century and one Edwardian, in order to demonstrate the value of the model. I will then look at the vocabulary that Xenophon uses, identifying the manner in which, whilst lacking a specific word, he describes different degrees of risk by juxtaposing concepts of danger and safety. This is followed by a brief survey of ancient strategies for tackling subsistence and lending risk. The bulk of the chapter is an analysis of the manner in which Xenophon presents the reader with the daily risks faced by the various agents whose activities he discusses alongside the specific risks inherent in each of his proposals, and then offers strategies to contain and reduce them. The discussion is grouped around particular categories of men who would be involved in the projects – the individual entrepreneur, the *polis*, the non-Athenian, the wealthy and the impoverished. Finally, I categorise the different strategies that Xenophon

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[6] Eidinow 2007, p. 16.
[7] Polanyi 1957, pp. 64-65, my italics.

demonstrates for exploring and managing uncertainty to show that the businessman in the ancient Greek world could, if he chose, exercise sound analytical skills in identifying economic opportunities as well as threats, and plan his enterprises from the outset with a clear strategy for long-term development whilst holding in reserve pre-planned short term tactics that would respond to specific, foreseen sets of scenarios.

## 3.2 Definitions and derivations

Athenian recognition of an apparently self-evident, but pivotal principle of entrepreneurial risk, that whoever risked their capital in a commercial enterprise was entitled to any profit it yielded, is clearly demonstrated in Lysias' *Against Diogeiton*. Amongst a catalogue of ill-dealings, Diogeiton is accused of having used two talents of his wards' inheritance to fund a merchant shipment to the Adriatic, telling their mother that the enterprise was at the boys' risk (ἔλεγε πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτῶν ὅτι τῶν παίδων ὁ κίνδυνος εἴη). The boys stood to lose their capital, yet when it was successful, Diogeiton unscrupulously claimed the profits as his own; such behaviour, the court is told, providing proof of the ease with which he enriched himself at other people's expense.[8]

Lysias uses the word κίνδυνος to describe the risk taken with the boys' money, and Eidinow rightly warns against the ambiguity of modern usage of the word risk and argues that there is a negotiation to be undertaken between ancient and modern systems of meaning.[9] We should then establish what we mean by risk for the purposes of this discussion. The word 'risk', from the Latin *riscum*, did not apparently become current until the mediaeval era, where usage appears to have evolved in relation to maritime activity and focused only around 'acts of god,' rather than referring to dangers rooted in human fault and responsibility.[10] This idea of man as subject to external and uncontrollable forces[11] evolved significantly in the Renaissance with the introduction of the concept of man as a rational actor able to control outcomes through purposive actions. The Enlightenment brought with it the

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8 Lysias *Against Diogeiton* 32.25.

9 Eidinow 2007, pp. 18-20.

10 Lupton 1999a, p. 5.

11 Which the ancients might have regarded as τύχη: see Eidinow 2011, pp. 119-142.

application of science and the mathematics of probability to enable the calculability and control of alternative objectives,[12] whilst Adam Smith developed the idea of 'the invisible hand' by situating the idea of the rational actor within the field of economics.[13] This conceptual evolution from man as the object of unpredictable events to man as an active agent in control of his universe has entailed that, in the twenty first century, regularly employed terms such as 'risk management' imply that all risk can be predicted, managed and contained. Within economic theory, the idea of the rational actor, who will whenever possible act with a view to utility maximisation,[14] has assumed primacy.[15]

When Knight wrote his influential *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit* in 1921,[16] he was in part responding to the attempt to define categories of (economic) risk and the way that they related to categories of profit. Thirty years earlier, distinguishing between the entrepreneur, the capitalist, and the worker,[17] Clark had argued that the entrepreneur does not carry risk; rather the capitalist undertakes risk and receives the reward of risk-taking. As profit equates to 'excess of price of goods over their cost,' then income from risk-taking was not part of profit.[18] In response, Hawley argued that profit was to be explained exclusively in terms of risk. Risk-taking is the essential function of the entrepreneur and therefore the basis of his peculiar income.[19] Responding to Clark and Hawley, Knight reformulated the question by drawing a distinction between 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' risk.[20] After all, that which was measurable, known either *a priori* or from statistical analysis, was insurable:

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12 Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 20-22.

13 'By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [every individual] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.' (Smith 1776, book 4, chapter 2, p. 351).

14 'Utility maximisation' describes the theory that quantities of goods and labour are chosen optimally so as to increase utility, where utility, first discussed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, is a scale of individual happiness or welfare, an increasing function of goods consumed, and a decreasing function of work carried out.

15 Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 25, 41-47.

16 Knight 1921.

17 'Working is one thing, lending "money" is another, and hiring men and money and setting them at work is still another.' Clarke 1892, p. 45. The entrepreneur is frequently regarded as a fourth axis of the 'land, labour, capital' configuration.

18 Clarke 1892, p. 46.

19 Hawley 1893.

20 Knight 1921, pp. 46, 233.

> There is a fundamental distinction between the reward for taking a known risk and that for assuming a risk whose value itself is not known. It is so fundamental, indeed, that … a known risk will not lead to any reward or special payment at all.[21]

(Financial) risk then, for Knight, was a far narrower category than the uninitiated may imagine, not simply because it comprises only financial hazard, but because it can be narrowed down still further to hazard that is quantifiable. To clarify the distinction, Knight classified any other sort of risk as 'uncertainty.' The application of research and the introduction of knowledge may turn 'uncertainty' into 'risk'.

Where chance events are concerned ('aleatory' uncertainty), we might today try to quantify our uncertainty, perhaps through mathematical probabilities or using historical data, taking past frequencies of an event as an indicator of future occurrences.[22] But neither the scientific calculation of probability nor statistical data were available to the classical entrepreneur[23] and so the bulk of the financial risks Xenophon identifies would, in Knight's terminology, be 'uncertainties.'
Other commentators in the fields of anthropology and the social sciences have identified and enlarged on further distinctions – objective versus subjective risk,[24] and culturally conceived risk, which we will explore below. Before we go further down the theoretical path, and as a vehicle for demonstrating how these various post-modern approaches are instructive for the analysis of an ancient text, two examples of attitude to risk are instructive.

## 3.3 Timodamos and the Edwardians

The first of my two brief case-studies took place somewhere between 350 and 320 BC, when a Greek called Timodamos travelled to Dodona to ask the oracle of Zeus whether or not he should 'do business by land and by sea, using his silver mine' or perhaps, 'using his money.'[25] The second example is more recent. In the early

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[21] Knight 1921, pp. 43-44.

[22] Spiegelhalter 2011, pp. 18-21, although he goes on to argue that 'probabilities are based on existing knowledge and therefore contingent.'

[23] Although to stay afloat the banker making maritime loans must have had some measure of the frequency with which cargoes were lost.

[24] Knight refers to the contemporary currency of these terms but does not enlarge on them other than to say that they are akin to his definitions. Our use of them here is in a wider, anthropological sense.

[25] Side A: Gods. Good luck. O Zeus, will you tell Timodamos that these things are best: to do

twentieth century, British investment in mining enterprises in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was surprisingly popular, despite the fact that most mining companies failed.[26] Aside from the pleasing coincidence that both perhaps relate to mining, what is interesting about these cases is the way that those directly at risk in commercial operations made their choices about how to proceed. Timodamos, facing the unknown in assessing his commercial choices, relies on a source of information that probably came quite naturally to him, and asked the oracle of Zeus. Over 4,200 oracular lamellae have been uncovered at Dodona[27] and he was by no means alone in his search for business guidance; fifth- and fourth-century enquiries include questions about the advisability of specific professions, such as whether to keep cattle,[28] be a bronze smith[29] or become a ship-owner,[30] and whether or not to take up the family business.[31] As Bresson points out, 'if it was believed that some devices could be used either to predict or to manage the future, it became perfectly 'rational' to use them.'[32] Two questions which ask whether travel would make trading more successful, one perhaps from a Rhodian, are particular testimony to the distance consultants might travel to make their enquiry and the level of risk in foreign trade that made an

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business by land or sea, using his money/his silver mine, for however much time he chooses?
Θεοί· Τύχαν ἀγαθάν·
ο Ζεῦ, ἀναίρει Τ[ι]μοδά-
μοι ἐμπ[ο]ρεύεσθαι
καὶ κατὰ γ[ᾶ]ν καὶ
κατὰ θάλασσαν
τἀπὸ τô [ἀ]ργυρίο, ὅσσον
καὐτὸς [*h*]έληται χρόνον
ταῦτα κράτιστα;
Side B: Gods. Good fortune. Dwell in the city and work as a trader and do business, and give up the share in the boat. Trade on land and sea, selling and buying.
Θεοί· τύχαν ἀγαθάν· Ἐν τôι
ἄστει οἰ[κ]ῆν καὶ καπηλεύ-
ην καὶ ἐμ[π]ορεύεσθαι, τὰ δ'ἐ-
ν τôι γαυ.. ἐγδιδόμεν ·
ἐμπορε[ύ]εσθαι δὲ χρήματα
ἄγοντα [καὶ] κατὰ γᾶν καὶ κα-
τὰ θάλασ[σα]ν, πωλôντα καὶ
ὠνόμ[ε]νο[ν]
Trans. Eidinow. *SEG* 43.341; *BE* 1993: 346; *PAE* 1968, 53-4; Lhôte 2006: no. 95. Salviat 1993, pp. 61-64, does not think that the reading of a mine is decisive. Lhôte 2006, p. 205 translates as 'son capital'. Discussed in Eidinow 2007, pp. 97-98.

26 Mollan 2009.

27 E. Meyer 2013a, p. 20.

28 Eidinow 2007, p. 95, no. 1 = Parke 17; *SGDI* 1559; Karapanos 1878: pl. 37.1.

29 Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 5 = *SEG* 15.403; *BE*1956:143; *PAE* 1952: 304, 18.

30 Eidinow 2007, p. 98, no. 11 = *SGDI* 1583; Karapanos 1878: pl. 37.3.

31 Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 6 = Parke 18.

32 Bresson 2012, p. 239.

expensive journey to Dodona a good investment.[33]

The Edwardian gentleman investors did not have the detailed information that they needed to make informed investment decisions any more than did Timodamos (in fact, at such a great distance from their enterprise, they quite possibly had less), and yet Mollan tells us that they went ahead thanks to the, 'gentlemanly nature of the City of London,' and 'inaccurate notions of mineral wealth located in the colony.' Remarkably, 'A nexus of social, organisational and financial interests centred on the City of London' and, 'popularised myths of exotic lands and easy riches promoted by writers such as Rider Haggard in novels like *King Solomon's Mines,*' played a vital role in their attitude to investment risk.[34] Much of the excitement centred on the presence in the Sudan of ancient mine-workings. We may hazard that there is some correspondence between this semi-mythologising of ancient fortunes in Africa and the unspoken romantic appeal of the Athenian silver mines to a fourth-century citizenry who were regularly reminded by the orators[35] of the naval glory achieved by the fleet built with the proceeds of the silver strike of the early fifth century.[36]

Different societies highlight different areas of threat in their daily lives, focussing on some more than others for reasons which may be specific to their shared history and experience. As Douglas and Wildavsky put it, 'common values lead to common fears'[37] and so we may not assume that the issues that the Athenians identified as 'risky' and worthy of countermeasure and containment would have been the same as those we might choose to prioritise today, nor, more relevantly, can we be sure that we may entirely understand Athenian attitudes to risk even when we take care to examine the cultural setting. However a society may choose which specific risks it will prioritise, the way that it approaches those risks is subject to further cultural factors.

In the cases just described, we can see that in different ways our ancient and

[33] Eidinow 2007, p. 96, no. 7 = *Ep. Chron*. 1935:254, 12. Rhodian: Eidinow 2007, p. 97, no. 6 = Parke 19, *Syll.*[3] 1166.

[34] Mollan 2009, pp. 229, 231 and 232.

[35] eg. Dem. *Against Androtion* 22.13.

[36] Hdt. 7.144; Arist. *Ath Pol.* 22.7, see chapter 2.3.1.2. In a circular twist, Hilton (2011) has recently shown the high degree of classical influence reflected in Haggard's African romances due to his friendship with the classical scholar Andrew Lang.

[37] Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 8.

Edwardian prospectors have attempted to deal with uncertainty by using sources of information they regarded as reliable in order to turn uncertainty into a more knowable risk. Resources such as geological surveying and actuarial forecasting were unavailable to Athenian entrepreneurs, who were unable to achieve the sort of rigorously testable knowledge that a modern scientist might recognise. But both Greek and Edwardian were able to enquire of sources they trusted, whether a persuasive investment prospectus or an oracle, in order to build a fuller picture of the degree of hazard in a given proposal.

This brings us to the distinction between 'objective' risk, the sort of risk that a physical scientist can measure with research and statistics, and 'perceived' (or 'subjective') risk, the individual's understanding of risk in their daily life.[38] In this instance, the relative value of the information available to the risk-taker is measured by his estimation of the reliability of the informant, whether a deity or a fellow club member, and his assessment of the risk is determined by this evaluation as well as by cultural factors such as shared mythology or club membership. What becomes clear is that perceived risk is culturally constructed, through individual experience, belief and even moral values. In practice how, or even whether, objective and subjective risk can be reconciled remains an area of debate between physical and social scientists.[39] Where perceived risk comes into contact with quantifiable risk it can skew calculations, as perceived risk leads individuals to change their behaviour in ways that may or may not be 'rational' when risks are analysed through statistics alone.[40] Subjective assessment of risks may therefore lead to unnecessary prudence. Thus in response to perceived risk, objective risk changes, because behaviour, and so outcomes, change, and here we come back to Xenophon. As we shall see, in making propositions relating to maritime trade and silver mining, two aspects of Athenian commerce that were generally regarded as risky, he not only applies knowledge but contextualises his plans in an attempt to modify perceptions of risk and to influence behaviour.

These two non-Xenophontic examples demonstrate that we cannot assume that what may seem obvious pros and cons to us from a twenty-first century perspective

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[38] Adams 1995; the following is taken from pages 7-9 and 25-27.

[39] Economists may be more inclined to agree with the physical scientists - Adams 1995, p. 7.

[40] Adams 1995, p. 13.

necessarily appeared so to the Greeks, whose fates were pre-ordained by what Eidinow memorably describes as a 'vast bureaucracy' of entities forming a 'supernatural civil service.'[41] Much of the argument that Xenophon presents has a surprisingly modern ring to it, his voice is clear and persuasive and his description of economic processes is very accessible, but it is important to bear in mind that whilst assessing his approach to the risks involved in his projects, we must remember to give weight to the unspoken cultural context which underpins it.

## 3.4 Definitions once more

As we will discover, Xenophon addresses a variety of risks which are physical, social and economic, and it will not always be appropriate to use economic determinants to analyse the categories of risk he addresses, nor can we confine ourselves to anthropological theory without losing some degree of analysis of the economic. A useful and more neutral, ontologically based, definition of risk is provided by Rosa:

> A situation or event in which something of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.[42]

This is the definition I shall use for the purpose of this study. It is particularly useful because it does not specify a category of what is risked, except that it is something which has value to the person for whom it is at stake; it does not operate in a discrete social or economic sphere, nor does it indicate any distinction between quantifiable or unquantifiable risk, or between perceived and objective risk. This broader definition enables us to gather together a range of types of risk addressed by Xenophon. Nevertheless, as I hope the preceding discussion has shown, our understanding of the text will be enriched if we remain alive to these distinctions and to the cultural indicators that are at play.

## 3.5 Xenophon's vocabulary

The *Poroi* is sprinkled with vocabulary related to fear and danger, counterpointed by words related to safety.[43] The use of these words in a context where he is not

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[41] Eidinow 2011, p. 6.

[42] Rosa, 1998 discussed in Jaeger, Renn, Rosa and Webler 2001, pp. 17-18

[43] Five instances of words derived from fear; 4.32 φοβεῖσθε, 4.39 φοβερώτατον, φόβου, 4.41 φοβοῦνται, φοβερώτερος, five of words derived from danger; 2.2 κίνδυνος, 4.28 κίνδυνος, 4.29 κίνδυνον, 4.32 κινδυνεύειν, 5.8 κινδύνων, seven of words derived from safety; 3.1 ἀσφαλεστάτας,

describing physical threats makes it clear that what Xenophon is describing is what we would refer to as risk. κίνδυνος for the Greeks could also carry implications of hazard,[44] and translations of the *Poroi* generally imply this, for instance both Marchant and Doty translate κίνδυνος as 'risk' at 4.28, 4.29 and 4.32, as does Todd when Antisthenes describes those 'who although possessors of large resources, yet look upon themselves as so poor that they bend their backs to any toil, any risk (κίνδυνος), if only they may increase their holdings.'[45]

Words such as 'fear', 'danger' and 'safety' in relation to financial undertakings apparently define the extreme places where actions might take Xenophon's readers, without the middle ground wherein the two extremes might be negotiated in the way that is implied by our term 'risk'. Describing the choice made by Apollodorus between running a shield factory and a bank, the former a less 'risky' business proposition than the latter, Demosthenes defines the factory as ἀκίνδυνόν and the bank as ἐπικινδύνους,[46] and Hypereides similarly uses φόβον, φοβερὸν and κινδυνεύειν in describing the worry involved in investing in silver mining, translated by Burtt as 'afraid,' 'anxiety' and 'risk.'[47]

'Danger' may be too strong a word for modern translators to apply to concern about economic activity but we have to be wary of the modern connotations of the word risk in a world where the concepts of aversion, assessment and management have become intertwined with danger to imply something more containable than the variety of unknowns wrestled with by the ancients. For our current purposes however we are stuck with the word risk, and if we wonder whether its use may represent the imposition of a modern concept on to an ancient sensibility, it is interesting to note the more complex phrase that Xenophon uses further on in the *Poroi*. At 4.32 he abuts the idea of safety against the concepts of fortune and danger; τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστερον

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3.10 ἀσφαλέστατόν, 4.30 ἀσφαλέστατα, 4.32 ἀσφαλέστερον, 4.44 ἀσφαλές, 6.1 ἀσφαλέστερον, ἀσφαλείας.

44 LSJ, p. 952. See Kremmydas 2012, p. 2 for examples of the use of κίνδυνος to denote the risk of penalty in a legal case; [Aristotle] *Oec*. 1344b20 warns that produce should be employed so as not to risk all one's possessions at once. ὅπως μὴ ἅμα <u>κινδυνεύσωσιν</u> ἅπασιν.

45 Xen. *Symposium* 4.35. The context is the praise of poverty, but the implication is clearly that men exist who pursue additional wealth even when they may not be thought to 'need' it.

46 Dem. *For Phormio* 36.11. ἀκίνδυνόν without danger; ἐπικινδύνους dangerous, insecure, precarious. LSJ, pp. 50, 638.

47 Hypereides *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.36 and immediately again at 4.37, cited at the head of this chapter.

κινδυνεύειν. The verb κινδυνεύω can refer to situations in which danger is incurred and/or may imply ideas of being daring and engaging in a venture.[48] This phrase suggests that the translation into the word risk, despite its multi-layered modern connotations, is a fair representation of Xenophon's recognition of our more modern concept at its simplest level. He implies that an unknown outcome or fate (τὴν τύχην) to a dangerous venture, may be made safer (ἀσφαλέστερον) by the application of certain strategies. This is the attempt to manage risk.

## 3.6 Subsistence crisis and maritime risk

Modern scholarship relating to risk in the ancient world has essentially focused on three spheres: the methods employed by agriculturalists to limit their vulnerability to food shortages;[49] the study of interest rates on maritime loans in order to ascertain the ways in which financial risk could be rewarded or at least balanced across several risky enterprises;[50] and the study of the rich range of daily activities from love affairs and family disputes to politics, farming and seafaring whose unknowable outcomes led many Greeks to turn to oracles and curses as a means of control.[51] Such scholarship has generally not examined the areas of concern for businesses which are highlighted, for instance, in Eidinow's study of the Dodona oracles, and so it is illuminating to see the extent to which Xenophon goes in order to identify, evaluate and contain the risks that he expects his readers to foresee.[52]

### 3.6.1 Grain shortages

Xenophon wrote the *Poroi* two years after Athens had been hit by grain shortage.[53] Gallant, in his study of risk in the rural domestic economy, has shown that 'a delicate web of risk-buffering strategies' was in place in order to protect subsistence farmers from the effects of famine.[54] There may not have been any theoretical structure for the appraisal of risk, but for many the idea of risk and its avoidance must have been a

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48 LSJ, p. 952.
49 Garnsey 1988, Garnsey and Morris 1989 and Gallant 1991.
50 Cohen 1989, Christesen 2003 and Bresson and Bresson 2004.
51 Eidinow 2007, pp. 72-124 and Eidinow 2011.
52 Bresson 2012, pp. 238–240, usefully summarises recent scholarship on economic and business risk and notes that much remains to be said.
53 Dem. *Against Leptines*, 20.33; Oliver 2007a, p. 28.
54 Gallant 1991, p. ix.

daily preoccupation. Less so perhaps for some men of Xenophon's wealth, but an issue with which he had become closely familiar during his military career as he dealt with provisioning for large numbers of men in hostile territory.

The crisis of 357 was addressed in part through grain imported by the good will of the Bosporan ruler Leucon.[55] The need for such external aid may not have sat comfortably alongside the ideal of individual and *polis autarkeia*,[56] inextricably entwined with Athenians' concept of Attica as an island.[57] But that ideal might not have been attainable for the city's grain supply in the fourth century,[58] and the ability to raise the cash or call on foreign friends to make good the shortfall through safe open seaways was an essential state function.

### 3.6.2 Local support networks

At an individual level, phratries and demes may have provided access to the elite for those who needed their assistance in crises, these relationships being built within both ritualised structures and in day to day economic transactions such as the provision of wage labour.[59] Such periodic reliance on individuals risked increasing levels of indebtedness as loans of grain or cash had to be repaid after the emergency receded, whilst even farming households became subject to what Gallant describes as a 'vulnerability cycle' which reduced their capacity to recover from each crisis as land, slaves and tools were sold and livestock and stored foodstuffs consumed in the urgency of short-term survival.[60] Millett has argued that what small evidence we have for activity akin to patronage suggests that it was seen as counter-democratic and that instead of patronage, the needy relied on state political payments supported by *eranos* loans.[61] Zelnick-Abramowitz suggests that instead of patronage *per se,* '*philia'* relationships operated. These were unequal power relationships that brought with

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55 Dem. *Against Leptines*, 20.33. See chapter 4.4.1 for the Athenian relationship with the Bosporan kings.

56 Arist. *Pol.* $1252^b27$; $1261^b10$-15; $1328^b16$ and particularly $1326^b27$.

57 1.7; Constantakopoulou 2007, pp. 100-101.

58 See Oliver 2007a, pp. 15-47 and Moreno 2007a, pp. 3-33 for overviews and recent scholarship relating to production, import and consumption of grain in classical Attica. Garnsey 1988 and R. Osborne 1987 had argued for low dependency on imported grain whilst Whitby 1998 and Moreno 2007a suggest that Athens was more dependent on imports than Garnsey had calculated.

59 Gallant 1991, pp. 162-166.

60 Gallant 1991, pp. 121-141.

61 Millett 1989, pp. 37, 41.

them certain obligations for an exchange of services over time but were 'of a shifting nature.'[62] But there is no evidence that wealthy individuals took on wide-scale and consistent responsibility for the support of large numbers of citizens; that was the role of the *polis*, which intervened where necessary to ensure the availability of grain and the attractiveness of Attica as a destination for foreign grain traders.[63] Athenians seem to have been able to put in place a variety of long term social and political relationships with a reciprocal aspect, which mitigated against the most basic risk of starvation.

### 3.6.3 Investment rates of return

Strategies such as crop diversification, seed storing and fragmentation of landholdings respond to agricultural risk by bolstering the potential for higher yields and, importantly, we should also note that in areas of economic activity, managing risk is only a very short step from maximising profit. If a banker demands high interest rates on maritime loans because there is a risk that they may not all come good, and yet all the loans are repaid, then rather than simply covering his outlay and making a modest return, he may well make a substantial surplus. Such a return might nevertheless be balanced out against a string of disasters the following year, but clearly the banker has demonstrated that he has the skill to maximise his return as long as he can offer terms that are competitive with his neighbours in the *agora.* The same applies to the *Poroi*; as we shall see, Xenophon's responses to risk are partly psychological, he presents large scale projects but reassures any sceptical readers that slow realisation is the key. But they are also designed to encourage risk-taking by highlighting the potential for profit.

Christesen has shown that the rate of return on a range of investments available to the fourth-century Athenian rose in relation to the risks encountered, and in the light of such apparently clear links between risk and reward and the evidence of repeated patterns of return in differently demarcated sectors, the ability of an Athenian investor to make rational choices about investment opportunities is undeniable.[64] Christesen

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[62] Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000. See also Rhodes 1986 on political activity and Mossé 2007a and 2007b on political patronage.

[63] Bissa 2009, pp. 153-191.

[64] Christesen 2003, p. 52. See chapter 2.5 for a further discussion of Christesen's findings.

evidences interest rates, albeit with sometimes quite wide ranging percentage points, across the investment categories of real property (8%), land and domestic commercial loans (10–18%), slave-ownership (15–25%) and maritime lending (25–50%). However he finds that the returns on silver mining are 'too variable to state a meaningful average.' There, one might argue, lies the rub.[65] For an industry where the balance of risk is high, the *Poroi* offers a rare opportunity to see at first hand the concerns an investor might take into consideration when approaching a new venture and the set of strategies that might be available to try to make the risk more attractive.

## 3.7 Xenophon and commerce

When we compare Xenophon with the great thinkers of his day, we might note that neither Aristotle nor Plato had much time for trade. Aristotle cites with apparent approval an ancient law of Thebes preventing anyone who had engaged in trade in the previous ten years from holding public office. He found the calling of market trader to be without virtue, regretting that their work put them in easy reach of assembly meetings, and would ideally have designated a separate *agora* for artisans.[66] Plato recognised that a class of retailers was necessary to prevent farmers having to waste time selling their produce, but he implied that there was no more to successful commerce than sitting waiting for the right price to come along. Farmers could simply leave their spare produce in the marketplace in the care of those who were unfit to do anything more productive, a view which did not recognise the skill of buying and selling or indeed the risk the retailer had to negotiate.[67] Zeus, on the other hand, judging from his response to Timodamos, had no problem in recommending trade as a suitable calling.[68] There was apparently a prohibition forbidding the reproach of anyone for working in the *agora*, implying that attitudes to those engaged in trade were more complex than the philosophers might suggest.[69] Prejudice must have existed but may well have been seen as anti-democratic, hence the regulation.

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65 It took a long time for anything to change. In 1921 Knight commented that 'Under old-fashioned methods there is no question that prospecting for the precious metals involved in the aggregate enormous losses. Recently the search for precious metals has been placed on a much more scientific basis and there is doubtless in the aggregate less discrepancy than formerly between the returns realized and a normal competitive return on the resources invested' (p. 338).

66 Arist. *Politics* 1278a8, 1319a20-29; 1331b1-13.

67 Plato *Republic* 371c.

68 See chapter 3.3.

69 Dem. *Against Eubulides* 57.30.

Nevertheless large-scale lending, and buying in bulk to sell at a profit, may have been more likely to arouse suspicion than the small-scale trading of *oikos*-produced consumables by those with no land and no other way to make an income.[70]

But it should be acknowledged that some Xenophontic texts imply that Xenophon did not necessarily believe that tradesmen made the most fitting citizens. In the *Oeconomicos,* Socrates suggests that they compare badly with their rural compatriots in both their fitness and willingness to defend their country.[71] What Xenophon does value however, is leadership and the ability to motivate others, and in the *Memorabilia* he goes so far as to suggest that a successful business man could make a good general.[72] There is perhaps a distinction between artisans who toil day in, day out producing life's essentials, and those with the vision to inspire others, negotiate successfully and serve their community. The entrepreneurs who will be necessary to fulfil Xenophon's schemes will all ultimately be relieved of the taint of commerce because they are part of a larger scheme for the benefit of the entire *demos*. And on that basis, it may be acceptable to honour some of them. Put in this context, we may see that Xenophon was way ahead of his philosopher contemporaries, recognising the importance of commerce to the city's well-being, and appreciating that it was possible to control it. In the *Memorabilia* Xenophon acknowledged that those involved in trade made up a significant section of the *demos*, which included:

> The fullers or the cobblers or the builders or the smiths or the farmers or the merchants, or the traffickers in the market-place who think of nothing but buying cheap and selling dear? For these are the people who make up the assembly.[73]

Again, Socrates does not appear to value these people particularly highly, together they comprise an audience of 'mere dunces and weaklings.'[74] But note that they include farmers, the very group that received such praise in the *Oeconomicos*. Here, Socrates is intent on showing Charmides that his potential audience in the assembly are nothing to be alarmed by, and it suits him to downplay their intellectual

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70 Ober 1989, pp. 274-277.
71 Xen. *Oeconomicos* 6.6-7.
72 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.8–10. See chapter 4.1.1.
73 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.7.6. πότερον γὰρ τοὺς γναφέας αὐτῶν ἢ τοὺς σκυτέας ἢ τοὺς τέκτονας ἢ τοὺς χαλκέας ἢ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ μεταβαλλομένους καὶ φροντίζοντας ὅ τι ἐλάττονος πριάμενοι πλείονος ἀποδῶνται αἰσχύνει; ἐκ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων ἡ ἐκκλησία συνίσταται.
74 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.7.6.

capabilities. For our purposes, what this passage tells us is that all these craftsmen and traders were citizens. Some scholarship has a tendency to group all the traders Xenophon references in the *Poroi* into one group, essentially non-citizen,[75] and we should bear in mind that whilst his proposals highlight the role of resident aliens and foreigners, he understood the centrality of Athenians to Attic commercial life.

Xenophon recognised that successful trading entailed far more than sitting and waiting for a likely customer. None of his proposals in the *Poroi* could be effective unless large numbers of men, citizens and non-citizens alike, engaged at the sharp end of his projects. However despite the fact that the state had opened access to mining concessions to non-Athenians and had given them equality of taxation in mining,[76] the bulk of leases were still sold to Athenian citizens.[77] From the *poletai* leases we know that whilst small numbers of wealthy liturgy-paying families appear repeatedly as lease holders, 59% of attested concessionaires are not found elsewhere in our records.[78] It is these less prominent and perhaps less wealthy individuals who Xenophon needed to encourage. As he tells us:

> ... operations have only lately been resumed, and a man who makes a new cutting incurs a serious risk. If he strikes good stuff he makes a fortune; but if he is disappointed, he loses the money he has spent. Therefore people nowadays are very chary of taking such a risk.[79]

Indeed on closer inspection, in a piece which on first appearance is strikingly upbeat about the glories of Attica, the possibility of financial success and the potential for peace, there is a surprising amount of attention paid to the chances of failure. At the same time as he grapples with fundamental economic principles Xenophon shows himself to be aware that to be a trailblazer in any economic field is to take risks where no-one else has yet dared. When, with hindsight, we look at the pattern of increasing take-up of mining leases,[80] the way that Athenian income from mining increased in the twenty or so years after he wrote,[81] and the rise in trade of the second half of the fourth century, it is apparent that Xenophon foresaw that conditions were right for an

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75 We have seen Boeckh's horrified response at chapter 1.6.2.
76 4.12.
77 Crosby 1950, pp. 189-297: pp. 293-297; Shipton 2000, pp. 45-46.
78 Shipton 2000, pp. 31-37.
79 4.28-29. νεωστὶ γὰρ πάλιν κατασκευάζονται: κίνδυνος δὲ μέγας τῷ καινοτομοῦντι: [29] ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὑρὼν ἀγαθὴν ἐργασίαν πλούσιος γίγνεται, ὁ δὲ μὴ εὑρὼν πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν ὅσα ἂν δαπανήσῃ. εἰς τοῦτον οὖν τὸν κίνδυνον οὐ μάλα πως ἐθέλουσιν οἱ νῦν ἰέναι.
80 See chapter 2.3.1 for a discussion of the *poletai* leases.
81 Hyp. *In Defence of Euxenippus* 4.36.

economic resurgence which need not be predicated on military power. But what he also understood was that someone had to make the first move. The first expansion would be undertaken by the least risk-averse – some of whom had already started. After all, some mines *were* being dug and some merchants *were* already coming to the city. Xenophon wanted to find ways to persuade the next wave of investors and businessmen to follow in their steps, and he does so by pinpointing and quantifying the risks involved, thus making them less daunting. He does not simply demonstrate that an opportunity exists. As we will see, his schemes are almost all aimed at creating conditions where the individual businessman, whether Greek, metic or foreigner, can engage more profitably, with greater capacity – and at reduced risk.

## 3.8 The risk-takers

Beyond agricultural practice and short term crisis support, how did Athenians respond to risk as it affected their daily lives? In the following sections I will look at the way Xenophon's proposals address risk for the different categories of their participants.

### 3.8.1 Risks for Athens

For the city, the greatest risk addressed by Xenophon is the possibility of war. Each of his plans is part of a scheme to keep Athens on friendly relations with her neighbours, by making the city and port attractive and regulated places to do business and by yielding enough income that there is no longer a need for imperialist demands for tribute from her subject/allies and the military activity that necessarily supports such impositions. In that sense, the entire text is a response to external geo-political risk. Xenophon describes this moment as 'an opportunity to win back the Greeks without trouble, without danger, and without expense.'[82] He does not enumerate the risks of returning to a condition of ill relations with the other Greek states – his readers need no reminding of their recent hardship, and Xenophon's purpose is not to persuade them that war may be undertaken without risk. In that sense it is the very opposite of Pericles' speech to the assembly at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, in which every financial and military resource was quantified and every danger

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[82] 5.8 νῦν δέ γε διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχὴν παραπεπτωκέναι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ ἄνευ πόνων καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων καὶ ἄνευ δαπάνης ἀνακτᾶσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

countered.[83] Hornblower points out that Pericles does not specifically mention either income from the silver mines, or Athenians' private resources:

> It might not sound very encouraging to say "and if the worst comes to the worst you can dig a bit deeper into your own pockets."[84]

This presents an interesting contrast with Xenophon, who is actively persuading Athenians to invest their capital in the cause of inter-state harmony. Athenians now have bitter experience of the cost of war and can balance it against the cost of peace. One of Xenophon's final proposals is that a board of Guardians of the Peace should be set up to ensure that the peaceful conditions necessary to acquire the fullest revenue might be obtained. Whatever their political subtext, Xenophon's schemes are designed to maintain peace, and peace is necessary in order to enact all the proposals. It is a circular proposition but it leaves no doubt for his audience that the threat of war is the ultimate reason why Xenophon's plans should be enacted.

Nevertheless when it suits his purpose, Xenophon does indeed mention the war. After a lifetime of observing combat, he cannot help but note the military advantages to his plan for peace, should the state one day find itself *in extremis.*[85] This is not merely an idealistic plan for the promotion of universal peace. Citizens who are in regular receipt of their three obols will show more alacrity on garrison duty or on patrol, whilst silver is useful in wartime to pay for mercenaries. There was already a precedent for slaves fighting for Athens[86] and the large numbers of mine slaves could be equipped to row or to fight on behalf of the state. In the quest for the unity amongst the Greek states, Athens will lead a defensive alliance in protection of Delphi[87] which, we may assume, would make war along with her allies should the sanctuary be attacked. Xenophon craftily appeals to the warmonger as well as the peacemaker in his audience, turning his plan into a defence (or attack) strategy.

### 3.8.2 The entrepreneurial *polis*

But this chapter will be more concerned with strategies around economic risk. What

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83 Thuc. 2.13.

84 Hornblower 1991, p. 253.

85 4.51-52; 4.9; 4.42.

86 After Arginusae, slaves who had been in the battle were freed with limited citizen rights. Burford 1972, p. 46; Hunt 1998, pp. 87-95; see chapter 2.4.3.

87 5.9.

are the risks that Xenophon identifies for the *polis* if it is to undertake his proposals? He refers to several:

(1) the silver in the Laurion might run out or lose value leading to the collapse of the whole industry;[88]

(2) the operators hiring slaves from the state might default on their payments;[89]

(3) the lessees of the mining slaves might steal the slaves;[90]

(4) the quantity and quality of the mine slaves available to be purchased might decline due to over-demand;[91]

(5) the operators might hire from other slave owners instead of the state;[92]and

(6) the state may not be able to find enough people to hire the slave labour.[93]

It is essential to the plans that the individual operators can expect to be successful, that existing operators can be persuaded to expand, and that new prospectors can be encouraged to take up the industry. If the operators are not confident, they will not invest in the mines, take up mine leases or hire slaves from the state. Therefore Xenophon counters these objections in detail.

#### 3.8.2.1 Silver deposits may become exhausted or lose their value

Xenophon points out that the silver producing hills are still far larger than the size of the spoil dumps and the silver yielding area continually expands such that there has always been more work available than the labour could keep up with. Miners, he says, find no limit to the number of galleries they may open up. He takes the apparently elusively unquantifiable risk that the mines will become exhausted, and reformulates it using the evidence of precedent and topography to re-state it as a quantifiable risk with a near-certain outcome. As to demand, silver itself is always popular: if there is a surplus, people love to decorate their homes or to wear or hoard it, whilst in war or famine, cash is necessary to pay for food. Furthermore, he says, when gold falls in value, silver rises.[94]

Xenophon's observations about the attractions of silver appear confident and irrefutable. His expectations as to its volume and value may not be quite accurate –

88 4.11.
89 4.20.
90 4.21.
91 4.36.
92 4.19.
93 4.22.
94 4.3; 4.9; 4.10, also at 4.11 and 4.26.

the silver did one day run out and the gold-to-silver ratio probably fell during the fifth century, although gold recovered some of its comparative value in the early fourth. The evidence for the relative values of gold and silver is complex and technical, encompassing literary and epigraphic material relating to exchange rates with Babylonian talents and the Cyzicene stater; the value of gold dedications; *epistatai* accounts for the purchase of gold for the chryselephantine statue of Athena, and the changing cost of gold crowns.[95] It may be unrealistic to expect Xenophon to be conversant with these long-term adjustments, but what is significant is that he understands the hazards such adverse trends might pose to the potential entrepreneur, and the success of his project is dependent on entrepreneurial confidence. He counters both risks with certainty and conjures visions of silver supplies so limitless that it will be displayed, hoarded and even used for décor. We can, he says, be confident that the ore will never run out and that silver will never lose its value.[96] It is a rich picture which disarms and persuades.

#### 3.8.2.2 Slave hirers might default on their payments

Against the risk (2) that slave hirers might default on their payments, Xenophon suggests that rental payments might be guaranteed upfront in the same manner as the sale of tax farming rights and the renting of sacred lands.[97] Thus like tax farming, the scheme would not allow of concessions should the lessee's anticipated revenue fail; in fourth-century Athens a *telones* who was unable to meet his obligations to the state could be declared *atimos* as a public debtor.[98] Whilst exacting such surety was nothing new in the realm of state and religious transactions, Xenophon's use of it here is a novelty: Gauthier notes that Nikias and Hipponikos after all would not have taken such a security from their customers, and highlights the way that Xenophon's

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95 Figueira 1998, pp. 511-527, proposes that the ratio was 1:14 before the Peloponnesian War but 'bottomed out' at 1:10 and rebounded in the early fourth century. Lambert 1996 addresses the issues specifically in relation to the cost of the known weight of gold *phialai* dedicated in the 320s. Jansen, (2007, pp. 375-377 and n. 279) following Bresson, sees 4.7 as an allusion to silver *money* as distinct from bullion: though interesting for our recognition of the sophistication of Xenophon's observation, for the purposes of the present discussion the distinction is less important.

96 4.11.

97 4.20.

98 Rubinstein 2009, p. 117. The more usual form of *atimia* would have entailed exclusion from the *agora*, a ban on addressing the assembly and *boule*, on serving as a juror, giving evidence, suing in a private action, or holding any public office or priesthood, and exclusion from sacred places and participation in public rites. Providing these conditions were observed, there was no bar on remaining in Attica or owning property (Harrison 1971, pp. 170-171, 175-176; Sealey 1991, pp. 153-154).

vocabulary closely aligns with official texts.[99] Xenophon has appropriated to the state a 'commercial' means of income-generation and bolted on to it one of the functions the state regularly uses to protect itself from negligence or fraud.

It has to be acknowledged that such a sanction would in practice make the state slaves a less advantageous proposition to the hirer than those rented from a private slave trader, unless such an advance payment were accompanied by other favourable terms. If an attraction of hiring was the avoidance of the large capital outlay involved in slave purchasing, the requirement to pay a guarantee would diminish that benefit to a mine operator careful about his cash flow, unless he were able to procure a guarantor. As we have seen, we do not know enough about the Greek arrangements for payment of slave hire to guess the normal hire term and how that might relate to the level of any advance payment.[100] There is no reason why different terms might not be offered to different lessees, but as Xenophon gives us no further insight into his thinking we cannot tell whether his idea is well thought-through or short-sighted. We may, nevertheless, recognise the way that he identifies a risk and finds a familiar solution from within the state sphere to reassure his readers.

#### 3.8.2.3 The state-owned slaves might be stolen

Familiarity is certainly on the side of the solution to the third risk on our list – that the state's slaves might be stolen. They would after all carry the public brand, a permanent symbol of security of ownership that Athenians encountered regularly. Thus by requiring payment in advance, providing an asset that was not vulnerable to theft and on terms which required return or replacement,[101] once a customer had been identified there would be no financial risk to the state at all until the end of the contract term.

#### 3.8.2.4 The quality and quantity of slaves available may diminish

Gauthier finds it troublesome that Xenophon does not address either the issue of the supply of slaves on a large scale for purchase by the Athenians, or the uncertainty of finding a market for them once bought, suggesting that Xenophon is more optimistic

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[99] Gauthier 1976, pp. 148-149.
[100] Chapter 2.4.3.
[101] 4.14.

than convincing.[102] But arguably he does. He recognises that moving too fast will diminish the supply and raise prices, and the solution he offers is to proceed slowly and with care,[103] a clear apprehension of the way that laws of supply and demand could affect his scheme. Gauthier's point that finding slaves with sufficient technical skills would be difficult is well-made, but Xenophon, it should be remembered, spent his military career involved in engagements which inevitably ended with a large sale of booty – including slaves – by the winning side.[104] He is demonstrably familiar with the mechanisms of the slave market.

In practice, he argues that whatever the speed with which each plan is instigated, whether houses built, ships constructed or slaves purchased, each will yield income from the outset.[105] This solution has a double value – it deals with the supply and demand issue, and also reassures any who may be uneasy about the scale of the project, proportionately diminishing the risk and simultaneously engineering acceptance.

#### 3.8.2.5 Competition from other slave owners

Addressing a readership well-versed in the economics of slave-ownership, Xenophon does not need to expand on the risk that the state might not be able to hire out her slaves, either because of competition from private hirers (5) or because there is a lack of mine operators (6). In the event that the slaves are not immediately hired out, the cost of feeding and housing large numbers of them would fast become onerous, and indeed it has been argued that the grain supply crises of the late fourth century had a strongly adverse effect on the mining industry as it became prohibitively expensive to feed the mine slaves.[106] Thus it is necessary for the industry to expand sufficiently that there will be the capacity to employ multiple additions to the workforce, and to ensure that state slaves are offered on terms that are competitive with those offered by private slave owners, without saturating the rental market. Understanding this, Xenophon explicitly argues that there would be no reason why anyone should hesitate

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[102] Gauthier 1976, p. 165.

[103] 4.35-36.

[104] For example, Xen. *Hellenica* 1.2.4; 1.6.14; 3.2.2 and 4.6.6 are just the references which specify slaves amongst captured booty; many others do not specify slaves but could be assumed to include them. See chapter 2.4.3 for references to slave sales in the *Anabasis*. It might of course be argued that such experiences as this gave Xenophon an exaggerated understanding of the possibilities of large-scale slave acquisition in peacetime.

[105] 4.36.

[106] Isager and Hansen 1975, p. 200.

to hire from the state instead of from private individuals if the terms are the same,[107] although as we have just seen, his recognition of this fact of economic life is at odds with his proposal to elicit guarantees from hirers, which would put the state at a competitive disadvantage.[108]

#### 3.8.2.6 Lack of operators to hire the slaves

The greatest risk (6), to Xenophon's mining proposal is that individual business men will not want to take on the risk of opening a new mine at all, in which event no market will be created for slave hire and no silver will be dug. Xenophon counters concerns about the market for slave leasing by building on what is already familiar and quoting precedent – akin perhaps to the use of 'historical data' in modern risk analysis, although the data available to him are not particularly rich.[109] We are reminded of previous wealthy slave owners and the levels of income yielded by their slaveholdings – one obol per day per slave, just the same as the figures Xenophon himself is using. He indicates that these figures have been known for so long that it may even seem surprising that the state has not already sought to imitate private enterprise.[110] Here Xenophon prioritises financial arguments but simultaneously downplays the vastness of his project by citing individuals who have already achieved the same, presenting the figures in such a way that the reader half believes he had already thought of it himself. The state has effectively become the entrepreneur – and would be almost foolhardy not to take up the opportunity. As we have seen before, risk is once more evaluated and diminished and as the unknown becomes known, Xenophon builds his readers' confidence.

Nevertheless there is a further protection against the risk that insufficient operators will be found to hire the slaves, and it is a truly novel idea. The ten Athenian tribes will each themselves go into business as mining consortia, digging for silver with slaves leased from the state.[111] The tribes were essentially artificial political constructions, managing local sanctuaries,[112] supplying *choregoi* and distributing

[107] 4.19.
[108] 4.20 and above.
[109] 4.14 and 3.2 above.
[110] 4.14. See Baragwanath 2012 for Xenophon's use of τὸ θαυμάζειν, discourse of wonder or surprise, as a stimulator of philosophical or challenging thought, here in relation to slavery.
[111] 4.30.
[112] eg. *IG* II$^2$ 1138-1171.

other political and military responsibilities across the state.[113] Whilst they were responsible for the administration of the leasing of sacred land,[114] the notion that they could set up and run a business enterprise is not, I think, attested elsewhere. This is an example of Xenophon's ability to find an innovative approach to a familiar problem. Much as he uses the notion of the *polis* as a guarantee of safety and durability at 3.10, here he uses a pre-existing structure deeply entrenched in his readers' daily lives which brings with it strong local and political associations of order and certainty. In this way he ensures that the novelty, and risk, which his proposal holds for the tribes taking up mining, is wrapped up in a security blanket of familiarity.

Xenophon thus ensures that the risk that there may be no rental market for the slaves is diminished, because the tribes will provide the purchasing capacity.[115] And then he goes a stage further - the risk for each individual tribe is diminished, because even if not all find silver, they will share what proceeds there are equally amongst themselves. This is risk buffering on a magnificent scale. The Athenian citizen becomes at once a vicarious slave operator – via the state; a mine operator and slave lessee – via his tribe, and a benefit recipient, getting his three obols per day from the *polis* out of its profits. The risk that there will be no market for the slaves is reduced and the risk for the mine operators – now become the citizens themselves in their tribes – is also reduced. Fulfilling Simonides' desire for 'some way of raising revenue without hurting anyone,'[116] the mass of citizens would have a stake in the silver industry both as supplier to it and operator in it.

### 3.8.3 Risk and the entrepreneur

If, at the simplest level, an entrepreneur is the person who takes decisions, receives profits and bears losses, then such men (or the entrepreneurial state) must pinpoint that moment when the opportunities outweigh the threats, and when risk reduces to a point where it becomes manageable. Xenophon's economic worldview in the *Poroi* is

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113 *Ath. Pol.* 21, 56.2-3 and many other references.

114 Papazarkadas 2011.

115 Jansen 2007, p. 381, n. 292, proposes that the slaves would be offered free of rental to the tribes and can see 'no good reason' why this would not be the case. But the central purpose of the scheme is the raising of slave lease income: offering them free of charge would not only give up a large part of the anticipated revenue but would give the tribes such an enormous advantage in the reduction of their overheads that the industry might capsize, making any other encouragement of entrepreneurs pointless.

116 Xen. *Hiero* 9.9. Excepting, of course, the slaves.

shot through with an appreciation of this element in the commercial equation. As we have seen, the scheme cannot work unless there are both men willing to become mine operators themselves and others to invest in the enterprise of those operators. Yet as Xenophon himself tells us, ‘fewer new cuttings are being made than formerly’ and ‘those interested in the mines are poorer.’[117] Therefore he has to convince all his readers that silver mining as a whole can be successful, representing as they do, both the citizens who may benefit and the entrepreneurs who may invest. It is an important facet of the manner in which Xenophon presents his arguments that they are formulated to assuage the doubts of both *polis* and individual, two actors who might be seen to represent opposing sides of this particular scheme, as supplier and customer.[118] Several of the risks already discussed in relation to the state are similarly perilous for the individual entrepreneur, such as the value and quantity of available silver, and the cost and quality of slaves, but others are more immediately risks for the operator. In the following section, we will examine three risks faced by the independent mine operator:

(1) that the large number of additional slaves will lead to over-crowding;[119]

(2) that the tribes will create competition;[120] and

(3) that rivals will be envious of an operator’s success.[121]

It is noteworthy that the first two risks are in the economic sphere, and the last is culturally situated.

#### 3.8.3.1 Overcrowding in the mines

At 4.39 Xenophon says:

> Possibly the gravest fear in everyone's mind is that the works may become overcrowded if the state acquires too many slaves. But we can rid ourselves of that fear by not putting more men in year by year than the works themselves require.[122]

Thus, his revised proposal reduces risk and also ensures that the greatest capacity for profit is maintained. Just as in farming, to maintain productivity labour must be

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[117] 4.28. τί δῆτα, φαίη ἄν τις, οὐ καὶ νῦν, ὥσπερ ἔμπροσθεν, πολλοὶ καινοτομοῦσιν; ὅτι πενέστεροι μὲν νῦν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ τὰ μέταλλα.

[118] See chapter 1.5.6 for a discussion of the intended readership of the *Poroi.*

[119] 4.39.

[120] 4.32.

[121] 4.4.

[122] 4.39. ὃ δὲ ἴσως φοβερώτατον δοκεῖ πᾶσιν εἶναι, μή, εἰ ἄγαν πολλὰ κτήσαιτο ἡ πόλις ἀνδράποδα, ὑπεργεμισθείη ἂν τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τούτου τοῦ φόβου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν, εἰ μὴ πλείονας ἀνθρώπους ἢ ὅσους αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα προσαιτοίη κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐμβάλοιμεν.

allocated at levels that will sustain or increase, rather than diminish, the yield per man.[123] Xenophon scales down his initial proposal, 'to bring as much labour as we can into the mines'[124] and the listener's potential fear of failure is reduced, because the level of risk is reduced by slowing down the expansion of the project and the rate at which money is invested.

This demonstrates a structure Xenophon uses repeatedly and to great effect. He makes a proposal, raises possible objections and then explains why they are incorrect or how they might be overcome. This is of course a proven rhetorical device in its own right, continuously building and re-enforcing the strength of his arguments,[125] but it achieves more than that, because Xenophon understands his audience and the counter-arguments are specifically directed at the risks they are likely to perceive. They not only reassure and build confidence, but demonstrate that the plans may be revised to respond to changing conditions.

#### 3.8.3.2 Competition from the tribes

As we have seen, one of the risks to the entire scheme identified by Xenophon is that not enough mine operators will be in business to hire the slaves, and Xenophon counters this by suggesting that the ten tribes go into business. This however might be seen to represent a threat to private enterprise. Not so, according to Xenophon; the interests of the tribes will not conflict with those of individual operators. Just as a confederacy is strengthened by an increase in members, more operators simply means more silver.[126] And of course, individuals can also go into partnership just as they always have:

> … private individuals also are able to combine on this principle and pool their fortunes in order to diminish the risk.[127]

As we have seen at chapter 2.3.2, the Suda's entry for Ἀπονομή refers to 'a division amongst a multiplicity of contractors, so that each takes some part.'[128] Although

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[123] 4.5.
[124] 4.11.
[125] See Jansen 2007, pp. 70-71 for the rhetorician's anticipation of possible objections, *prokatalepsis*, as demonstrated in the *Poroi*.
[126] 4.32.
[127] 4.32.
[128] Ἀπονομή: Suda On Line, trans: David Whitehead, 8 October 2000 http://www.stoa.org/sol-entries/alpha/3456.

Athenian law did not recognise a partnership as a separate legal entity,[129] as we have seen in the case of Nicobulus and Evergus[130] partnerships in mining were not unusual[131] and were a regular occurrence in maritime financing, where funding might come from diverse sources in order to limit exposure to risk.[132] Xenophon turns the threat of competition into the strength of numbers and deals with the individual's risk by proposing that it is shared. Just as the tribes will share in their enterprise, so will individual operators, and the combined efforts of all, far from providing competition, will strengthen the whole undertaking. The point of the exercise is to dig up silver, and the more there are to dig, the more successful everyone will be.

#### 3.8.3.3 Envy

Most of the objections Xenophon raises are not based on political or social issues; they are the sort of practical and economic considerations that a business man might take into account before risking his capital in a new project. He pinpoints a potential risk and then shows how it can be managed and contained. However we cannot assume that because he spends a certain amount of time on one specific risk that this necessarily relates to the level of importance that the issue holds for his reader. Like any good persuader, he may skirt around tricky issues in order not to alert the reader to unforeseen pitfalls. Other perils, such as the risk of becoming an object of envy, might be so essential to Athenian daily life that they do not need to be expounded, and we need to be particularly live to the cultural context in order to pick these up.

For the mine operator, then, overcrowding might be a concern; envy, perhaps surprisingly, is another. Silver mining, Xenophon says, is so successful that 'expansion of business excites no jealousy.'[133] Today we might think that it is not too tough to have to contend with the jealousy expressed by others at our own success, but in 1978 Walcot showed that notions of envy and jealousy were widespread in Greek society and that Greeks were willing to acknowledge them openly as a motivating factor.[134] It is a familiar topos in Xenophon, who recognised the power of emotion as

[129] E. M. Harris 1989a, p. 339.
[130] Chapter 2.4.1.
[131] A mining partnership is also found in Dem. *Against Boeotus 2* 40.52.
[132] E. E. Cohen 1992, p. 142.
[133] 4.4.
[134] Walcot 1978, p. 7.

a motivating factor in all spheres of conduct.[135] When the Xenophontic Socrates considered the nature of envy,

> … he found it to be a kind of pain, not, however, at a friend's misfortune, nor at an enemy's good fortune, but the envious are those only who are annoyed at their friends' successes … This, however, could not happen to a man of sense, but it is always the case with fools.[136]

In the dialogue *Hiero,* Simonides proposes a programme for the tyrant Hiero, the outcome of which will be that he could have 'the fairest and most blessed possession in the world,' to be prosperous and happy but not be envied for it.[137] But far earlier in Greek culture, we can see a complex picture of φθόνος in its several guises emerging in Pindar[138] and Hesiod describes potter in competition with potter whilst the work-shy were envious of the wealth of the hard working.[139] Its ambiguity in the classical era is highlighted by Sanders, who contends that it might even be a morally positive emotion when used to 'cut someone down to size,' the context in which it is most used by the orators.[140]

In the *Poroi* however we are not dealing with an emotion deliberately roused by an avenging law court speech composed by a third party, but a more passive recognition of the success of another and what that success might be understood to imply for the man who feels envious. In matters of commerce, the concept of envy was closely tied in to what may be described as a 'zero sum' mentality; that is, the idea that good things exist in finite quantities. Such an ethos has been found by anthropologists in contemporary peasant societies

> Not only do … "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities. It is as if the obvious fact of land shortage in a densely populated area applied to all other desired things: not enough to go around. "Good," like land, is seen as inherent in nature, there to be divided and re-divided, if necessary, but not to be augmented.[141]

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135 Sanders 2012a, p. 164, citing Xen. *Memorabilia* 2.6.21-23.

136 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.9.8.

137 Xen. *Hiero* 11.15.

138 Bulman 1992, p. 1.

139 Hes. *W & D* 25-26; 312-313, also cited by Aristotle, *Rhet*. 2.4.21; Isoc. 1.24-26: 'Admit to your companionship, not those alone who show distress at your reverses, but those also who show no envy at your good fortune; for there are many who sympathise with their friends in adversity, but envy them in prosperity.' In general on envy in ancient Greece see the collected papers in Konstan and Rutter 2003.

140 Sanders 2012b, pp. 374-375.

141 Foster, 1965, p. 296 argues that 'this behaviour - however incompatible with national economic

It is important to recognise that Foster is discussing closed peasant communities within which, as he remarks, the possibilities for economic progression are indeed limited by the available local resources,[142] but they tie in well to a society where reciprocity and balance in all forms of social relations are seen as essential.[143] An ethos of limited good,

> easily follows the reasoning of trade-offs, but it is likely to take the results of cost-benefit analysis much more literally and seriously than the other mentality that believes in an expanding economic universe.[144]

In a world of limited good, if you are in the same business as your neighbour, your success must inevitably be his loss, leading to envy on his part. Thus in a society where reciprocity was an essential element in community support networks,[145] it is good to have neighbours who can be happy for one's good fortune.

This is a particular example of the way that putting ourselves in Athenian shoes can be challenging when we are trying to understand the factors that affected their assessment of risk. We have already seen, for instance, the way that the idea of the silver mines may have held romantic associations with Athenian glory days such as the victory against the Persians at Salamis.[146] Xenophon employs precedent several times, and we cannot always know the associations his references bring with them. When he reminds his readers that Nikias owned 1,000 slaves,[147] as he intends, they no doubt recall his reputed wealth and lavish dedicatory offerings,[148] and may be encouraged to think that these are achievable for themselves by the same route. But they are also probably reminded of the Sicilian expedition, perhaps of Nikias' terrible end, of Thucydides' description of his nobility, or even of some other tradition to which we lack access.[149] It is these allusions which can be hardest to unpick as they affect the judgement of risk in ways that we cannot evaluate. As we saw with the

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growth - is not only highly rational in the context of the cognition that determines it, but that for the maintenance of peasant society in its classic form, it is indispensable.' Also Gallant 1991, p. 148 and Eidinow 2007, pp. 191-205, who interprets the 'commercial' curse tablets found at Dodona as representative of the breakdown of local relationships rather than simply a response to commercial competition.

142 Foster 1965, p. 297.

143 Arist. *NE* 1155b 34; 1162b 18; 1163a 1-10; 1163a 19; 1171b 21-4; Xen. *Memorabilia* 2.3.11; 2.5.1-5.

144 Douglas and Wildavsky 1982, p. 88.

145 See chapter 3.6.2 for support structures available to Athenians in times of crisis.

146 Hdt. 7.144, see chapters 2.3.1.3 and 3.3.

147 4.14.

148 Plut. *Nik.* 3.3-4.3; Davies 1981, pp. 41-43.

149 Thuc. 7.86.

Edwardian speculators at the start of this chapter, investment choices are guided, sometimes unconsciously, by a variety of factors.

Beyond the cultural challenges of understanding the way that an Athenian might be wary of success as a signifier of a mode of commercial rivalry in which there must be a loser for every winner, we can see that Xenophon is here also beginning to wrestle with a question of economics which he identifies but cannot quite pin down on a theoretical level. The zero-sum mentality does not sit comfortably with a world of economic expansionism.[150] Runciman argues that the Greeks' mode of production,

> … prevented them from seeing that profit … is not zero sum: one person's gain need not be entirely at another's expense[151]

I would suggest however, that in his micro-investigation of one industry and its wider associations, Xenophon explores this apparent conflict between limitless potential profit and a cultural norm within which good is finite and gain for one individual must entail loss by another. As he begins to identify two theoretical categorisations of economic possibility, of zero sum as opposed to expanding economies, he explores this contradiction through analogies with farming, where putting in too many oxen or men simply lowers the return[152] and in other areas of consumption where levels of increased production in commodities such as corn and copper work can have a negative effect on demand and prices, such that one man's success can indeed be another's loss.[153] By contrast, in the silver industry, both supply and demand are apparently unceasing and prices remain stable regardless of the level of availability of the products.[154] Limitless gain from the silver industry may sound charmingly naïve to a modern reader but economic expansion *per se* does not. Yet to an ancient listener, it was in direct conflict with his understanding of the way the world worked. The wider societal idea of limited good has become bound up with the notion of economic growth.

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[150] Jansen 2007 p. 236 suggests that Xenophon does not see commerce as zero sum because it offers an opportunity to strengthen inter-state relationships.

[151] Runciman 1990, p. 351.

[152] 4.4–5; examples of the 'variable proportions in the theory of production' formula, also known as the law of diminishing returns.

[153] 4.5-6.

[154] 4.6-10.

### 3.8.4 Risk and the non-Athenian

What reassurance against risk does the *Poroi* hold for the non-Athenian reader? Xenophon demonstrates himself to be particularly conscious of the contribution made by non-Athenians to Attic commercial life. His proposals are divided between those targeted specifically at metics, and those which will encourage all sections of the mercantile community, Athenian, metic and foreign.[155] As we have seen, the volume of trade passing through Piraeus in peace time was substantial[156] and Xenophon is explicit in his discussion both of metics and of traders in general, that their activity should be encouraged in order to promote an increase in tax revenue.[157]

A foreigner, investing in the mines or trading in Piraeus might be prey to just the same commercial risks as an Athenian citizen, but his status means that his access to redress and his ability to enjoy his success were both legally curtailed. Metics were required to undertake military service and to pay an annual tax in return for residency; freedmen metics may have paid more.[158] From their deme enrolment on, they maintained, probably permanently, a relationship with a *prostates* who may have been required to have some involvement in any court proceeding they were involved in; their cases were held in different courts from those of Athenian citizens, and they were subject to other non-legal handicaps because of their social status.[159] Even when successful, the most respectable non-Athenian trader would be assessed for the *eisphora* on a different basis to citizens and was not allowed to own land in his adoptive state.[160]

Of those risks which were peculiar to metics and/or foreigners, Xenophon addresses:

(1) vulnerability to commercial disputes;[161]

(2) the hazards of finding a suitable return cargo and trading in foreign currencies;[162] and

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155 Resident aliens, 2.1-7; wider incentives to merchants and shopkeepers, 3.3-4; 3.12-13.

156 Chapter 2.3.2.8.

157 3.5.

158 Freedman metic tax: Kamen 2013, p. 44. For an overview of scholarship relating to metics, and a discussion of their status, see Kamen 2013, pp. 43-54.

159 Kamen 2013, pp. 47-49.

160 For metic *eisphora* see Christ 2007, pp. 60-63.

161 3.3.

162 3.2.

(3) the obligation for metics to serve as hoplites.[163]

For the trader arriving in any foreign port, opportunities to sell his cargo and to purchase a suitable return load might be unreliable, and a merchant might waste precious time waiting for the availability of the right goods. Trading in unfamiliar currencies and subject to unfamiliar laws and customs, he could find himself unwittingly involved in protracted disputes awaiting a resolution whilst profitable opportunities passed him by and his cargo rotted. Vulnerable to storms and piracy, and prey to navies from hostile states looking for easy pickings, sea-borne trade could be a hazardous calling whatever one's nationality.

#### 3.8.4.1 Commercial disputes

One of the obstacles to any trade which crossed between jurisdictions was that a lack of shared business protocols and legal structures could entail that in a commercial dispute no means of resolution might be available that was acceptable to both parties. A merchant arriving in a foreign state was inevitably at a disadvantage if there were not local agents and reliable witnesses to his transactions who could support his interests in the event of any hint of maladministration. The markets of fourth-century Athens and Piraeus had structures in place to enforce lawful practice and to support traders in the event of a dispute. Magistrates were responsible for overseeing the exchange, the pricing and quality of goods, weights and measures, and sales of barley, wheat and bread.[164] If a deal turned sour, Athens boasted an accessible and robust legal system:

> Codified Athenian legislation helped individual Athenians, and others subject to Athenian rules, to weigh the likely costs and benefits of any given action and to be more confident in assessing the risks entailed by their own choices.[165]

This was a function of the democratic state which was an advantage to both buyer and seller as they entered any arrangement with equal knowledge of the law and its sanctions. This would lead to what we might describe as a reduction of transaction costs, offering traders greater protection from rogue practices and simplifying the expensive precautions they might otherwise need to put in place to attain the

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163 2.2.

164 *Ath. Pol.* 51.

165 Ober 2008, p. 213.

knowledge necessary to ensure that a fair deal was reached.[166] In practice however in the 350s access to justice, probably through the port magistrates, could be slow and time spent waiting for a judgement was costly.[167] Xenophon recognised the risks encountered by foreign traders and looked to assuage them, encouraging faster turnaround of such cases by offering magistrates prizes for fair and speedy judgements.[168] In the event, shortly after Xenophon wrote, processes were accelerated through the establishment of the δίκαι ἐμπορικαί; courts which were probably δίκαι ἔμμενοι, i.e. those which were obliged to make a judgement within thirty days. The *dikai emporikai* were characterised by 'rapidity, supra-nationality and rigor.'[169] Although not the solution he had suggested, an indication nevertheless that Xenophon had identified the problem and evolved a pragmatic and informed response, the implementation of which would make Piraeus worthy of serious consideration by any hard-nosed business man.

#### 3.8.4.2 Return cargo and currency exchange

New inns and market facilities[170] might also increase the attraction of Piraeus to traders from outside Attica, but Xenophon was aware that merchants did not only choose Athens for a comfortable night's sleep. The moorings were sheltered and should a merchant not find goods to his liking to carry back home, the silver he had been paid in return for his inbound cargo, was a sound export in itself.[171] The vulnerability of maritime trade to storms was a major consideration to a ship-owner whose entire livelihood might be at risk if he lost his vessel, and the combination of geographical centrality and safe harbours were at the heart of Piraeus' success as a marketplace. If a merchant took payment in coin rather than bullion, the reliability of Athenian currency and the opportunity for its immediate testing and verification by a state-appointed slave[172] was a powerful attraction, and Xenophon underlines the universality of Attic coinage in an era when uncertain knowledge of different currencies was problematic even for money-changers.[173]

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166 Ober 2008, pp. 214-220.
167 Gauthier 1972, pp. 150-151.
168 3.3.
169 *Ath. Pol.* 52.2; E. E. Cohen 1973, pp. 8-9.
170 3.12-13.
171 3.1-2.
172 As evidenced by Nikophon's Law, RO 25 = Stroud 1974.
173 3.2; E. E. Cohen 1992, p. 19.

#### 3.8.4.3 Military service

Appreciating the volume of trade and taxation income that metics attract to the city, Xenophon suggests that they might be relieved of their obligation to serve in the Athenian hoplite forces. In an era of constant warfare this was a serious physical risk to have to undertake in return for the right to live and trade in Athens, placing metics in personal danger and requiring them to leave their trades and private affairs.[174] That an entrepreneur might have to die for his adopted country as a result of his choice of city in which to settle is not a hazard we might immediately think of when we assess commercial risks but it was all too real for a resident alien. Xenophon proposes exchanging this obligation for enlistment in the cavalry, an expensive undertaking and perhaps limited in its application, but safer and of greater prestige.[175] We cannot easily judge how many metics would have the resources to keep a horse and to train with the cavalry; the proposal indicates that some metics at least could already afford a hoplite panoply and might have aspirations to roles with a higher status;[176] it may be however that the very fact that some metics might be afforded such privileges would have the effect of raising the status of all.

#### 3.8.4.4 Non-Athenians in silver mining

Xenophon reminds his readers that the state has already helped out non-Athenians in the mining industry, giving them *isoteleia*, equality of taxation with Athenians, in relation to their mining income.[177] The evidence of the *poletai* leases suggests that this inducement may not have led to any rush by non-Athenians to take up the calling; surviving records show none at all prior to about 350.[178] Shipton suggests that Xenophon may have exaggerated the role played by foreigners in the mines because he was anxious to promote their involvement.[179] But Xenophon actually says that there are many Athenians and foreigners who would gladly take up the role of manager, not that there are already many there.[180] Far from exaggerating their

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174 2.2. See Gauthier 1976, p. 62; the manuscript may alternatively read 'children and homes.'

175 2.5. A wealthy Athenian wanting to prove his democratic credentials might make a reverse transition from the cavalry to the more dangerous infantry; Lys. *In Defence of Mantitheus* 16.13. Bugh 1988, pp. 122-125, 151, 177-178 suggests that after 404/3 the cavalry had lost its most experienced horsemen and enrolment had fallen because of its association with the oligarchy.

176 In *On the Cavalry Commander* 9.3-6 Xenophon also proposes that foreigners could join the cavalry and that the maintenance of the horses could be borne by Athenians not wishing to take their places, see Bugh 1998, pp. 156-157.

177 4.12; Gauthier 1976, p. 135.

178 Shipton 2000, p. 45, n. 19.

179 Shipton 2000, pp. 45-46.

180 4.22.

involvement, (and we must remember that we have very few surviving records between 367/6 and the late 350s) Xenophon might be reacting against a disappointing lack of engagement. Shipton notes that those foreigners we do see in the records all come from Siphnos, an island with a vigorous gold and silver mining heritage of its own.[181] This phenomenon neatly demonstrates the conservative attitude to business that Xenophon is confronting: it is less daunting to stick with an industry one is familiar with than to take risks getting to grips with the unknown, and Shipton's analysis of the relationships between lease holders particularly highlights the tendency for mining and mining-related investment to stay within families where expertise has grown over one or more generations.[182]

### 3.8.5 Who pays? Risk and the wealthy Athenian

The group of Athenians, one imagines, who may need the most persuasion to buy in to Xenophon's mining scheme, are those who are going to have to pay for it. The risk is that they may not see their money back; their greatest incentive is that future peace entails that they will no longer have to bear the costs of war.[183] But there will be a significant outlay required to create those peaceful conditions. When he discusses the raising of the large sums required to start the fund, Xenophon frames his proposals as a business opportunity using terminology the wealthy will recognise.[184] Jansen argues convincingly that the capital will be raised through voluntary contributions by the wealthy in the form of *epidoseis*.[185] Xenophon likens the payment to an *eisphora*, but an *eisphora* with a graduated level of contribution, and with a quantifiable return.[186]

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181 Hdt. 3.57; Paus. 10.11.2; Shipton 2000, pp. 45-50.
182 Shipton 2000, p. 37.
183 6.1.
184 3.9.
185 Jansen 2007, pp. 343-351.
186 Gauthier 1976, pp. 99-101, argues that Xenophon's terminology has misled modern commentators and that the arguments for a voluntary contribution are not proven, however Thiel, Giglioni and Schütrumpf all interpret these 'eisphora' contributions as loans rather than tax (Giglioni 1970, p. LXXXIV; Thiel 1922, pp. 48-50; Schütrumpf 1982, p. 13). For Giglioni such a forced loan is unexceptional in Greek finance, for Schütrumpf this interpretation as a loan is based on Xenophon's use of προτελέσωσιν and προτελέσαντες (3.9; 3.10) which imply an advance (LSJ, p.1534: προτελέω to pay as a toll or tribute, generally to pay or expend beforehand.) As the fund has in any event to be established in advance of the scheme getting under way this in itself might not be conclusive, and the suggestion of tribute complicates matters further. Xenophon's own comparison with maritime loans (3.9), in which the principal as well as the interest is repaid, might tend to suggest these contributions are also loans, but his adjacent reference to raising money for warships (3.8) implies the opposite. Brun, in his survey of Athenian *eisphora*, does not comment on Xenophon's use of the word in this context, although when discussing Xenophon's reference to previous *eisphora* (3.7) he finds the use of the verb *eisphorein* conclusive evidence

Yet another round of taxation, when the city is not even at war, is hardly likely to prove popular, but this is a tax with a potential payback. As Gauthier notes, having raised the possibility of a tax Xenophon is quick to diffuse it with the suggestion of future profits.[187] Every citizen will ultimately receive three obols per day. For someone who has put in five hundred drachmas, this is the equivalent of a more than thirty per cent return per annum. Even a subscriber of ten minas will get almost twenty per cent back. For anyone contributing at a higher rate, the return is lower, but for someone assessed at 100 drachmas, the annual return is almost double. And after all, the scheme is underwritten by the *polis*, 'the safest and most durable of human institutions.'[188] This perhaps idealistic appeal to the character of the state may have been in conflict with prevailing opinion about her fiscal reliability. It was rare for loans to be made to the state by individuals and there was 'a perceived lack of commitment to repay.'[189] Xenophon counters any doubts about the cost of the initial outlay or the chances of ever seeing a return by comparing the potential profits to those achievable on maritime loans,[190] which attracted the highest rates of interest.

The cultural context here is interesting. Attitudes to moneylenders were ambivalent: Pantaenetus declares that, "the Athenians hate money-lenders"[191] and for Aristotle usury was the 'most hated' method of wealth-getting, making money out of money.[192] But money-lenders were men of standing in the community who were reliant on their reputation for probity to be able to carry out their business effectively[193] and, often overlooked, included Athenian citizens amongst their number.[194] They were of course perceived to be wealthy, yet conspicuous wealth could cause envy and resentment;[195] it is perhaps significant that in referring to maritime loans Xenophon conjures up a

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that the reference is to actual *eisphora* levies despite some scholarly disagreement, which might imply that he would argue the same about Xenophon's use of the word in relation to raising his initial capital (Brun 1983, pp. 43-44). Nevertheless it would be many years before the scheme were running at a profit and able to begin repayments, and Xenophon's use of the term ἐισφορὰ is, to say the least, unhelpful. It seems most likely that these are voluntary contributions with the possibility of a very slowly graduated return.

187 3.9-11. Gauthier 1976, p. 93.

188 3.10.

189 Cohen 1992, p. 143.

190 3.9.

191 Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.52.

192 Arist. *Pol* 1258$^{b}$2-5.

193 Cohen 1992, pp. 24-25.

194 Isae. *On the Estate of Ciron* 8.35; Lys. *Against Diogeiton* 32.6, 14, 15.

195 Ober 1989, pp. 205-208.

role model who may not be Athenian and whose enjoyment of his wealth may be tempered by perceptions either of his social status or the antipathy of others. Just as when he later uses the example of Nikias,[196] there is an ambiguous relationship with the idea of personal wealth. To entice both profit-seeking entrepreneurs and the Athenian wealthy it is necessary to invoke a profit motive, but Xenophon underplays the notion of individual profit and concentrates instead on his schemes' redistributive aspects. The implication for the concerned rich is not only that they can avoid future impositions of *eisphorai* but that even they can profit, through a proposed rate of return which implies that they would do so at substantially less risk than if they were to sink their money into other opportunities. For the wealthy, in addition to the attraction of the end of unpopular *eisphora* impositions, the scheme is acceptably packaged as civic philanthropy with a potentially healthy yield attached.

### 3.8.6 Who benefits? Risk and the poor

How then, might we approach risk in relation to those Athenians whose poverty is at the heart of the *Poroi*? We might begin by noting that Xenophon does not appear to present an altruistic set of proposals constructed out of sympathy for the hardship of fellow citizens. Rather, he argues that the poverty of those citizens – who collectively hold huge political influence – risks inducing a state of war. Statistics about ancient populations are notoriously difficult to establish, but by way of example, fifty years before the *Poroi* was written, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, as many as 5,000 Athenians may have been completely landless,[197] and perhaps around 60% of the total citizenry fell within the lowest property class.[198]

Performing the duties of a juror at a court case was rewarded by a payment of three obols per day, although this sum had not risen since 425 and appears to be at the lower

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[196] 4.14, see discussion above at chapter 3.8.3.3.

[197] Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 34 suggests that a proposal approved by Sparta, to restrict citizen rights to property owners, would have disenfranchised 5,000 citizens.

[198] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 266. The number of citizens in the lowest property category, those whose land, if they owned any, yielded less than 200 *medimnoi* of grain each year, *(Ath. Pol.* 7.4) was estimated by A. H. M. Jones at between 66% of the citizenry in the early fifth century and 57% in 322, although Jones estimated lower overall numbers of citizens than Hansen, whose estimate of fourth century citizen numbers is far higher at 30,000; see discussion at chapter 1.6.2. The tables at van Wees 2001, pp. 52 and 53 indicate even higher proportions of thetes to other classes, although van Wees argues that many thetes could afford to be hoplites: A. H. M. Jones 1975, pp. 8, 76-81; M. H. Hansen 1988a, pp. 9-10 and van Wees 2001, pp. 52-53.

end of state pay rates for the fourth century, with assembly attendance rewarded at double that amount.[199] Loomis argues that the idea that one drachma per day was an average wage is misguided;[200] nevertheless if we might assume that average pay fell somewhere between these two figures, it would indicate that a widespread payment of three obols per day would make a startling difference to household economics for a sizeable section of the citizen population.[201] In a society where fortifying one's household against the risk of starvation was a daily obsession and 'peasant households existed on the very edge of viability,'[202] the opportunity simply to buy foodstuffs for storage and small tools in order to increase productivity would be more than welcome. Such a boost in income would also provide a bolster against additional expense in times of crisis and, importantly, provide opportunities for repaying existing debt and avoiding it in the future.

On the surface, the impoverished citizen might have the least to lose, but the individual citizen was also a member of the state, and the state's risk was *de facto* his risk too. For every citizen, as a member of a tribe, the proposal that each tribe should go into business as a mine operator carried all the risk that burdened individual investors. Every single citizen, poor or rich, was thus at risk through his tribe, which would be required to raise funds in order to operate their mines and to hire the state's slaves, a risk, as we have seen, that Xenophon mitigates by proposing to share the profits amongst the tribes.

If the mining scheme failed, who would lose out? As we have seen, it relied particularly on the increased activity of individual mining lease holders. If there were a general failure of the industry, it would be these men and their associated suppliers and refiners who would be the first to go under. The *polis* and thus her individual citizens were each at risk only to the extent of their capital. If the scheme had been going some time before its failure, then the state would be left with a large number of slaves to dispose of. They would have some capital value, although this would be offset by their immediate maintenance and transportation costs, and there would be a

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199 *Ath. Pol.* 62.2.

200 Loomis 1998, pp. 232-239.

201 However Jansen's suggestion that these three obols might enable the less impoverished to take up mining seems unlikely as part of Xenophon's plan, given that they would have such a lengthy wait to achieve it. Jansen 2007, p. 141.

202 Gallant 1991, pp. ix-xi.

significant glut in the market. But in terms of start-up costs the bulk of the apparent risk fell on the shoulders of the better-off citizens who would be obliged to provide the initial capital, and they would not see an appreciable return on their deposit until the scheme was running at full capacity.

The extent to which the poorer citizens would be concerned at the losses of their richer counterparts is hard to judge, but they do appear to have had the least at stake in a scheme which was designed to be self-supporting. Core state assets, the property of the *demos*, would not be risked.

## 3.9 Conclusion

Xenophon was not naïve about the risks involved in a project whose scale would take the Athenians in to uncharted territory. He acknowledges that there will be both successes and mistakes which will enable them to learn as they go along.[203] Throughout the *Poroi* he undertakes a constant re-negotiation of his plans in order to address uncertainty, quantifying risk and proposing means by which to control it. His vocabulary indicates his awareness of a middle ground to be negotiated between danger and safety, wherein danger can be managed and made 'more safe' in much the same way that we might apply modern forms of statistical knowledge to an uncertainty in order to evaluate quantifiable risk.

The risks that Xenophon describes are wide ranging and for the purpose of this study a neutral definition of risk has been assumed in order to encompass them all without loading them with pre-determined theoretical baggage. Nevertheless modern discussions of risk have proved valuable in helping to characterise the anthropological contexts and the ways in which risks are presented, perceived and resolved.

### 3.9.1 The risks

It is probably worth a moment to repeat in one place the risks Xenophon considers: the risk that poor relations with other states leads to war;[204] the risk that the silver in the Laurion might run out or lose value leading to the collapse of the whole

[203] 4.37.
[204] 1.1.

industry;[205] the risk that the quantity and quality of mine slaves available to purchase might decline due to over-demand;[206] the risk that the operators hiring slaves from the state might default on their payments;[207] the risk that the mining slaves might be stolen by their lessees;[208] the risk of commercial competition, because the operators might hire from other slave owners;[209] the risk of insufficient demand, such that the state may not be able to find enough people to hire the slave labour;[210] the risk of becoming an object of envy[211] and the risk that too many slaves might be put at work too quickly to be productive.[212] For non-Athenians considering settling in Athens, there are the obligations to pay the metic tax[213] and to undertake hoplite service;[214] restricted housing rights[215] and lower social status.[216] For traders in general, there are the dangers of dealing in foreign currencies;[217] the potential lack of a viable return cargo;[218] the potential lack of shared business protocols[219] and the general physical hazards of sea-borne trade. For the wealthy, the risk that continued war entails continued taxation, balanced against the risk that they may be expected to fund the entire project.[220] This is a wide-ranging assessment from a remarkable man who is able to analyse an undertaking from a variety of vantage points.

Working through the text of the *Poroi,* there is a strongly persuasive power in Xenophon's presentation of a series of drawbacks countered by reassurance and containment, and there is no doubt that this was intentional. But for our purposes, this stylistic tactic also reveals much about the way that Athenians approached risk in their daily endeavours and particularly in their financial and commercial undertakings. We see that Xenophon has incorporated an astonishing number of risks into his discussion, providing us with important insights into the social, political and

205 4.11.
206 4.36.
207 4.20.
208 4.21.
209 4.19.
210 4.22.
211 4.4.
212 4.39.
213 2.1.
214 2.2.
215 2.6.
216 2.5.
217 3.2.
218 3.2.
219 3.3.
220 3.6-8.

economic considerations which were pivotal to the decision to engage in commercial ventures.

### 3.9.2 Exploring uncertainties

Xenophon explores and contains what we may call ‘uncertainties’ through the following approaches:

(1) specific precedent. Xenophon reminds us of wealthy men who have been successful with similar schemes in the past;[221]

(2) general precedent – there are other successful state-run enterprises from which entrepreneurs may profit, such as rental of sacred land[222] and tax farming;[223]

(3) the reassurance of familiar, shared knowledge. Everyone can see the extent of the silver region;[224] everyone knows that foreigners and resident aliens are a good source of trade and tax income;[225] everyone knows that silver has been mined for generations;[226]

(4) the application of arithmetic. Xenophon’s numbers add up. From an initial outlay of thirty eight talents, all else being equal, after five or six years of investing the proceeds in further slaves, the state could then re-invest twenty talents each year and still take an income which would rise from sixty to one hundred talents after twelve years.[227] These are not calculations about probability applied in the way that it might be applied to uncertainty in the modern sense, but their arithmetical reliability imposes a reassuring level of certainty onto an uncertain undertaking;

(5) cultural associations and shared memories. The silver mines have been the source of Athenian prosperity in the past, and can be so again; in ancestral times the mines were remembered equally as having always been successful;[228] success in this field does not engender the envy of one’s neighbours;

[221] 4.14-15.
[222] 4.19.
[223] 4.20.
[224] 4.2.
[225] 2.1.
[226] 4.2.
[227] 4.23.
[228] 4.25.

(6) the security of state institutions;[229] and

(7) the contrast with the alternative. The possible financial return is measured against that achievable through other investments;[230] the cost of war is countered by the cost of peace.[231]

In the parlance we have adopted from modern theory, using the preceding strategies Xenophon has applied 'knowledge' and turned 'uncertainty' into 'risk.' He then attempts to contain the risks he has identified, controlling perceived risk within specific contexts in order to make his schemes more attractive to citizens, potential investors and hirers of state slaves.

### 3.9.3 Strategies

Xenophon's principal strategies, along with a small number of the examples we have discussed, are:

(1) reduction of scale: only invest what we can afford,[232] put fewer slaves into the mines and expand the scheme only as capacity grows;[233]

(2) change the political system: speed up court systems,[234] change dwelling rights;[235]

(3) reduce physical hazards: metics need not serve as hoplites;[236] Piraeus has safe anchorage;[237]

(4) share the risk: the tribes will all become involved in prospecting and those which are successful will share their finds with those which are not;[238]

(5) mitigate the risk: miners hiring slaves will be guarantors just like tax farmers;[239]

(6) deny the risk: success in mining does not elicit envy the way that success does in other trades;[240] the ore will never run out;[241]

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229 3.6.
230 3.9.
231 5.11, 6.1.
232 4.36-37.
233 4.39.
234 3.3.
235 2.6.
236 2.2.
237 3.1.
238 4.30-31.
239 4.20.
240 4.4.
241 4.2-3; 4.25.

(7) pass the risk elsewhere: entrepreneurs will not have to spend their capital on large slave purchases, they can rent them from the state as and when they require them. The state will not become involved in mining herself but will benefit from risks undertaken by others;

(8) balance risk against the prospect of social recognition: offer state honours;[242]

(9) turn risk in one sphere into opportunity in another: if there were to be a war, there would be plenty of available manpower;[243]

and finally

(10) get the gods on side. As we have seen, Greeks always had the option to call on the gods to come to their aid in the management of fate. We are back to Timodamos and his enquiry at Dodona. Xenophon's last proposal is that the oracles of both Delphi and Dodona should be consulted, first to ask for consent, and then to find out which gods should be propitiated in order that the undertakings might prosper.[244]

### 3.9.4 Athenian approaches to economic risk

What this analysis has shown is that the Athenians were not naïve about economic decision-making. They had a sophisticated recognition of risk and we know from their calculation of maritime interest rates that to a certain extent they could quantify it.[245] Whilst they might not necessarily employ actuarial evaluations, risks could nevertheless be differentiated and ranked sufficiently to identify greater or lesser hazards in order to inform commercial choices, and to enable the establishment of arrangements to reward those who were prepared to undertake it, both militarily and economically speaking, to a greater degree than might be the norm. In their economic planning they took into account the legal systems which affected their capacity to do business and in setting up a new enterprise they could put a structured plan in place which would enable them to employ a variety of pre-conceived strategies which would respond to a range of anticipated business conditions, as and when they arose. If the *Poroi* is any guide, the most frequent tactic might be a reduction of scale, but the resourceful entrepreneur had a range of expedients at his finger-tips. The risk and

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[242] 3.4.
[243] 4.42.
[244] 6.2-3.
[245] See chapter 2.5.3.

the burden could be shared, devolved, pledged and even brazened out if the activity could bear it and the gods or the law courts had failed.

Thucydides, in the voice of the Corinthians, draws a contrast between the risk-averse Spartans who, they are told,

> have a genius for keeping what you have got, accompanied by a total want of invention, and when forced to act you never go far enough,

and the Athenians,

> addicted to innovation ... their designs are characterised by swiftness alike in conception and execution ... adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment.'[246]

Whatever Thucydides' motive for this breathless encomium, as Crane demonstrates, its (admittedly generalised) picture allows us to consider the contrast not simply between the two states, but the extent to which they represent a collision between a conservative subsistence-ethic and a more daring and forward-looking pursuit of innovation.[247] This characterisation is not only about military tactics – according to Pericles, the Peloponnesians were each so keen to hold on to what they had that they were 'more anxious about their money than their lives.'[248] By contrast, secure income from empire had accustomed the Athenians to take military risks without threatening the basic survival of her citizens.[249] Seventy years later, Xenophon's text implies that this fearless pursuit of novelty remained an essential Athenian characteristic.[250] We may surmise that the continuing importance and centrality of Piraeus enabled an exchange of skills and an openness to new opportunity from around the Greek and wider world. We have seen in chapter 2 the extent of Athens' long exploitation of the silver mines, and of her citizens' engagement on many levels with their operational requirements, which may well have made them more receptive to income-generating ideas which looked beyond traditional agriculture. That familiarity will certainly have informed their understanding of Xenophon's plans. Those who see a Laconising agenda in the *Poroi* overlook this peculiarly Athenian combination of circumstances.

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[246] Thuc. 1.70.
[247] Crane, 1992, p. 241.
[248] Thuc. 1.141.5, Crane 1992, pp. 231-232.
[249] Crane, 1992, p. 252.
[250] As we saw in chapter 1.6.2, Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977, p. 316) interpreted the *Poroi* as a diversion of Athenian military 'enterprise and audacity' in the pursuit of economic success and cautioned against mistaking it for a theory of economic development.

In his closing passages,[251] Xenophon draws an enticing picture of a prosperous Athens as a popular trading centre visited by wealthy and successful foreigners, craftsmen, philosophers and poets, where festivals are celebrated with splendour, and docks, walls and temples are all restored.[252] Nothing has yet changed – annual income is still depressed and the mining industry remains in the doldrums, and yet the future has become rosy. The high level of risk in his proposals has been reduced because every pitfall has been addressed, quantified and countered or dismissed. Xenophon's confidence is infectious, and ultimately, that is the key to the text's inexorable sense of persuasion. But this is a far more sophisticated approach. By systematically building a plan and deconstructing every apparent risk, he builds confidence in Athenian entrepreneurism. And confidence is at the heart of successful enterprise.

[251] 5.3-4; 6.1.
[252] cf. Xen. *Hiero* 11.2 for a similar emphasis on the importance of the adornment of the city's public spaces.

# Chapter Four - Xenophon's use of honours

Don't look down on business men, Nicomachides
*Socrates*[1]

## 4.1 Chapter introduction

In chapter 3 we engaged with those commentators on the *Poroi* who have argued that Xenophon's ideas were naïve, by contextualising them in some detail within the trading environment of fourth-century Athens, and saw that cultural, as well as financial, considerations influenced the appraisal of risk and subsequent decision-making in commercial projects.[2] In this chapter I would like to pursue one specific cultural factor which Xenophon brings in to play in his attempt to steer economic choices. Xenophon's suggestion that men whose commercial activities are useful to the city could be awarded honours by the *demos* has drawn frequent scholarly comment. As is the case with his recognition of the potential of the silver mines, some of Xenophon's ideas can be seen in practice later on in the fourth century; others appear ground-breaking and were never enacted. In the course of this chapter I hope to unpick both earlier and later usage of honours by the Athenians, measured against the staging point offered by Xenophon's text, in order to see what light that throws on those scholarly assessments and on Xenophon's originality and resourcefulness. In particular I will look in more detail at those of Xenophon's proposals in the *Poroi* which have been regarded as proposing significant changes in the traditional structures of Athenian society. By focusing on Xenophon's proposals to extend the award of honours in order to encourage trade and investment I will argue that whilst

1 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.12.
2 Chapter 3.2; 3.3; 3.8.3.3 and 3.9.2.

the *Poroi* is undoubtedly a product of immediate financial crisis, it neither reflects, nor would potentially have generated, a longer term 'decline' as has on occasion been suggested, and that Xenophon's proposals sit innovatively yet easily within the wider context of Athenian society: easily, in the manner in which they align with earlier practices, and innovatively, in the way they gather existing mechanisms and re-focus them in an attempt to address wider issues of interrelated social, political and financial structures. Xenophon recognises that traders whose motivations are not only profit-driven, but also honour-driven, may offer enhanced benefits for the Athenians, and the importance he attaches to honours as drivers of some of his proposals indicates that those he hopes to engage are sensitive to social factors, indicating that it is useful to use the model of 'expressive rationality' discussed above[3] when assessing fourth-century commercial choices made by those who had the opportunity to choose where and with whom to trade. In assessing how honours may relate to trade, we should recognise the various modes in which the exchange of goods and services might have operated in the fourth century. For the purposes of his analysis of the relationship between honours and profit, Engen characterises the trade-related services provided by Athenian honorands as encompassing all the means by which Athens acquired resources, not simply those purchased at a market price; this is a useful distinction which it is important to bear in mind.[4] The flow of imported and exported goods cannot be fully considered without the inclusion of goods both gifted and subsidised by benefactors, indeed the attempt to disregard from an analysis of trade, some of the bulk supplies of produce arriving in Athens as a result of such benefactions would give a distorted picture of the various mechanisms at play.

The wider awarding of honours did not always sit comfortably with Xenophon's contemporaries, as we shall see,[5] and the gradual broadening of the social and economic profile of recipients of honours has been seen by scholars as an indication of 'decline' as well as of an erosion of traditional values. The scholarly debate over fourth-century decline was at its peak in the late twentieth century, but aspects of it are still influential in the way that some of the *Poroi* is viewed today, and the nature of the work leaves it vulnerable to characterisations that relate it not only to immediate crisis

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[3] See chapter 2.5 above.

[4] Engen 2010, pp. 75-76.

[5] Liddel forthcoming.

but also to a longer-term failure of internal and inter-state structures. Therefore this chapter will also briefly survey that discussion where it is of relevance to an understanding of Xenophon's proposals concerning honours.

### 4.1.1 Xenophon, Socrates, honour and usefulness

In approaching Xenophon's ideas of honour, ability and responsibility, the perhaps unexpected opinion from the Xenophontic Socrates quoted at the head of this chapter is a useful introduction.[6] The desire for honour is a preoccupation of Xenophon's Socrates, underpinning Xenophon's view of the citizen's role in Athenian society.[7] The desire for honour is an (honourably) motivating factor. Love of honour is an incentive to Athenian heroism[8] and, importantly, in order to win honour, one must bring advantages to the city.[9] Aiming for the well-being of the city is one of the features that, for Xenophon, distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist.[10] Significantly, Xenophon shows that honours should be earned through one's usefulness to the community, and not as a result of wealth or status. This principle is expounded in *Memorabilia* 3

> I will now explain how he [Socrates] helped those who were eager to win distinction by making them qualify themselves for the honours they coveted.[11]

Xenophon's Socrates argued that (even) a merchant who had been a successful *choregos* might use his management skills to command an army.

> "Really, Socrates," cried Nicomachides, "I should never have thought to hear you say that a good business man would make a good general."[12]

In response, Socrates shows that the same talents are necessary to succeed in both

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6 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.12. The discussion is about Antisthenes, "who has never served in a marching regiment nor distinguished himself in the cavalry and understands nothing but money-making," 3.4.1; he is described as an οἰκόνομος (3.4.7 and 3.4.12).

7 See Gray 2000, pp. 143-145 for a discussion of honour in Xenophon.

8 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.5.3. Socrates: "And again, the Athenians are more ambitious and more high-minded than other peoples; and these qualities are among the strongest incentives to heroism and patriotic self-sacrifice." ἀλλὰ μὴν φιλοτιμότατοί γε καὶ γε φιλοφρονέστατοι πάντων εἰσίν: ἅπερ οὐχ ἥκιστα παροξύνει κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ εὐδοξίας τε καὶ πατρίδος.

9 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.6.3. Socrates: "Well, Glaucon, as you want to win honour, is it not obvious that you must benefit your city?" ὦ Γλαύκων, δῆλον, ὅτι, εἴπερ τιμᾶσθαι βούλει, ὠφελητέα σοι ἡ πόλις ἐστί;

10 L'Allier 2012, p. 488, citing Xen. *On Hunting* 13.9-11.

11 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.1.1. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς ὀρεγομένους τῶν καλῶν ἐπιμελεῖς ὧν ὀρέγοιντο ποιῶν ὠφέλει, νῦν τοῦτο διηγήσομαι.

12 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.7. καὶ ὁ Νικομαχίδης, μὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ᾤμην ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἶεν.

battle and commerce – industriousness, the ability to punish the bad and reward the good, to attract and keep supporters, and to get the better of one's enemies.[13] Xenophon demonstrates that, aside from Socrates' interesting take on transferable skills, the significance of his apparently uncharacteristic generosity towards a man of commerce lies in his ability to be useful to his community.

> "..but you don't say how business capacity will help when it comes to fighting."
>
> "That is just where it will be most helpful. For the good business man, through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees he is strong enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not ready."[14]

As Gray points out, Xenophon tells us in the *Memorabilia* that Socrates opposed the random ballot because it was in opposition to the principle that honours should be awarded in return for usefulness, the ballot giving authority to the untalented and perhaps even the dangerous.[15] Along the same line of thought, Xenophon's Cyrus gives opportunities to commoners:

> Fellow-citizens of Persia, you were born and bred upon the same soil as we; the bodies you have are no whit inferior to ours, and it is not likely that you have hearts in the least less brave than our own. In spite of this, in our own country you did not enjoy equal privileges with us, not because we drove you out, but because you were obliged to earn your own livelihood. Now, however, with the help of the gods, I shall see to it that you are provided with the necessaries of life; and you are permitted, if you wish, to receive arms like ours, to face the same danger as we, and, if any fair success crowns our enterprise, to be counted worthy of an equal share with us.[16]

Gray demonstrates that:

> Both commoners and elite then voluntarily chose reward for merit over equal

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13 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.8-10.

14 Xen. *Memorabilia* 3.4.11. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο παρίης, ἂν δέῃ μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσει ἡ οἰκονομική; ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλεῖστον, ἔφη: ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ ζημιῶδες, ὡς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσει καὶ παρασκευάσεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καὶ φυλάξεται, ἐνεργῶς δ᾽, ἂν τὴν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾷ νικητικὴν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τούτων, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, φυλάξεται συνάπτειν μάχην.

15 Gray 2000, p. 144, citing Xen. *Memorabilia* 1.2.9.

16 Xen. *Cyropaedia* 2.1.15.

> reward regardless of merit (merit = use, reward = honour)[17]

and that Xenophon explicitly makes equality at home depend on empire.[18] For Gray, the ultimate outcome of this ethos is that:

> Xenophon goes beyond other ancient thinkers in having Cyrus eliminate social hierarchies in his promotion of the Persian commoners to equal status with the elite and secure the maintenance of both through the profits of empire.[19]

And we can see that this approach is reflected in the *Poroi*. The divide in society between those who are useful and those who are inactive does not follow the same fault line as the divide between rich and poor. If Plutarch can be believed, idleness had been a transgression dealt with by the very harshest of penalties under Draco and was a matter for the Areopagus under Solon's reforms,[20] whilst fourth-century Athenian legal sanctions for the discouragement of idleness are hinted at in Demosthenes' *Against Eubulides*, in which he places in opposition a poverty-stricken trader and the accuser Eubulides.[21] Rewarding those who were useful in order to incentivise their contribution to society thus meant expanding the categories of honorands in ways which entailed that traditional oppositions, citizen/non-citizen; wealthy elite/trader; Greek/non-Greek may become blurred. Xenophon's proposal to honour merchants and ship-owners thus follows a line of thought already expounded in his Socratic writings.

### 4.1.2 *Philotimia*

At 2.6, 3.4 and at 3.11, Xenophon proposes offering traders, ship-owners and merchants the honours and benefits of προεδρία, ξένια, ἔγκτησις and inscription as εὐεργέται.

> If, moreover, we granted the resident aliens the right to serve in the cavalry and various other privileges which it is proper to grant them, I think that we should find their loyalty increase and at the same time should add to the strength and greatness of the state. Then again, since there are many vacant sites for houses within the walls, if the state allowed approved applicants to erect houses on these and granted them the freehold of the land [ἐγκεκτῆσθαι],

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17 Gray 2000, p. 145.

18 Gray 2000, p. 145, citing *Cyropaedia* 8.3.5-8.

19 Gray 2010, p. 374.

20 Plut. *Sol*. 17.1 and 22.3.

21 Dem. *Against Eubulides* 57.32. The exact sanction and its legal status is a matter of debate. Isager and Skydsgaard 1992, p. 145, arguing against Hansen's suggestion that this was a sanction against 'habitual idleness,' propose that it was about enforcing land cultivation.

> I think that we should find a larger and better class of persons desiring to live at Athens.[22]
>
> It would also be an excellent plan to reserve front seats in the theatre [προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι] for merchants and ship-owners, and to offer them hospitality [ξένια] occasionally, when the high quality of their ships and merchandise entitles them to be considered benefactors of the state [ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν]. With the prospect of these honours [τιμώμενοι] before them they would look on us as friends and hasten to visit us to win the honour [τιμῆς] as well as the profit [κέρδους].[23]
>
> I think, too, that if their names were to be recorded in the roll of benefactors [ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται] for all time, many foreigners also would subscribe, and a certain number of states would be attracted by the prospect of enrolment. I believe that even kings and despots and oriental governors would desire to share in this reward.[24]

As we have seen, for Xenophon it is incontestable that the public acknowledgement of one's honour would be a powerful incentive. *Philotimia,* love of honour, litters Xenophon's other work. He tells us early in the *Cyropaedia* that as well as being most handsome, Cyrus was 'φιλανθρωπότατος καὶ φιλομαθέστατος καὶ φιλοτιμότατος.'[25] His Simonides had said, 'no human joy seems to be more nearly akin to that of heaven than the gladness which attends upon honours,'[26] and Whitehead calls this speech, in which we are told that it is the striving for τιμή that distinguishes men not only from other animals, but from other mere human beings, the *locus classicus* of *philotimia.*[27]

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[22] 2.5-6. καὶ μεταδιδόντες δ᾽ ἄν μοι δοκοῦμεν τοῖς μετοίκοις τῶν τ᾽ ἄλλων ὧν καλὸν μεταδιδόναι καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ εὐνουστέρους ἂν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἅμα ἰσχυροτέραν ἂν καὶ μείζω τὴν πόλιν ἀποδεικνύναι [2.6] εἶτα ἐπειδὴ καὶ πολλὰ οἰκιῶν ἔρημά ἐστιν ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν καὶ οἰκόπεδα, εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι δοκῶσιν εἶναι, πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως. Gauthier 1976, p. 67 rejects Thiel's suggestion that this proposal reflected a relocation of the population from the city to Piraeus.

[23] 3.4. ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολόγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. ταῦτα γὰρ τιμώμενοι οὐ μόνον τοῦ κέρδους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ἕνεκεν ὡς πρὸς φίλους ἐπισπεύδοιεν ἄν.

[24] 3.11. οἶμαι δὲ ἔγωγε, εἰ μέλλοιεν ἀναγραφήσεσθαι εὐεργέται εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, καὶ ξένους ἂν πολλοὺς εἰσενεγκεῖν, ἔστι δ᾽ ἃς ἂν καὶ πόλεις τῆς ἀναγραφῆς ὀρεγομένας. ἐλπίζω δὲ καὶ βασιλέας ἄν τινας καὶ τυράννους καὶ σατράπας ἐπιθυμῆσαι μετασχεῖν ταύτης τῆς χάριτος.

[25] Xen. *Cyropaedia* 1.2.1. 'Most loving of mankind, most fond of learning and most loving of honour.' We also hear of his boyhood *philotimia* at 1.3.3.

[26] Xen. *Hiero* 7.4. καὶ γὰρ οὐδεμία ἀνθρωπίνη ἡδονὴ τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτέρω δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς τιμὰς εὐφροσύνη.

[27] Whitehead 1983, p. 57.

Love of honour is also an important characteristic of the good leader himself. Addressing *philotimia* as a superlative character trait of leaders as depicted and admired by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia,* Sandridge finds that it is a complex idea which carries risks unless tempered by *philomatheia* and *philanthropia*[28] but ultimately

> ... *philotimia* comes to be more than liberating one's people and winning everlasting glory, also known as *megalopsychia*. It is the desire to fit in, to win the approval and gratitude of one's peers, those in authority, and those who are good people.[29]

Xenophon may not be a leader *per se*, but we can see that his advice to the Athenians shows him both demonstrating the personal pursuit of these qualities and manipulating the *philotimia* of others.

But *philotimia* had more complex associations when used in a democratic context, and Whitehead suggests that Xenophon was 'burying his head in the sand', citing amongst several literary instances where *philotimia* was not the ideal virtue, Plutarch's citation of Pindar:

> But worst of all are
> Men who court too eagerly
> Ambition in the towns:
> Manifest is the pain they bring,
> as Pindar has it..' [30]

Not only, as we have seen, are the rich not necessarily useful or the poor inevitably not so, but the 'bad' may strive for public commendation of their *philotimia* just as vigorously as the 'good'.[31] Individual aspirations may not coincide with the greater good, and self-promotion may be inappropriate in a democratic context, even if suffered on the inter-state stage. A traditionally elite value, there were risks to the ethos of democratic equality in honouring the wealthy for their *philotimia* in providing services to their own state, which they might reasonably have been expected to do for love of the *demos*. Whitehead finds three occasions in Thucydides where actions motivated by *philotimia* run contrary either to the best interests of the *demos*, or on one occasion, counter to the interests of the oligarchy when practised by its own

[28] Sandridge 2012, pp. 107-117.
[29] Sandridge 2012, p. 120.
[30] Pind. Sn-M 210; Plut. *de cohibenda ira* 8; *Moralia* 6.32.
[31] I am here inevitably using the terms 'good' and 'bad' very loosely simply in order to elucidate the problem.

members.[32] There was an ambiguity in a value which commended work for the public good, where the desire for commendation might promote ambitions counter to the common good, and the complex issues aroused by the honouring of individuals are reflected in the frequent use of the procedure of *graphe paranomon* as a means of attacking political opponents who had been honoured by decree in the fourth century.[33]

Nevertheless *philotimia*, says Davies, 'came to be used universally to denote ambitiously energetic public activity, sometimes pejoratively but increasingly as commendation.'[34] Whilst we need to remain aware that the lack of inscribed records earlier in the fourth century can make comparisons tricky, as far as we are aware, when Xenophon wrote, the term *euergetes,* benefactor, was never formally bestowed on citizens but only on non-Athenians.[35] Only later in the fourth century do we see the official encouragement of citizen *philotimia* which had by then come to be seen as a benefit to the city, where once the promotion of the individual pursuit of honour might have been seen as a threat to democratic values.[36]

For his honours proposals to be effective, Xenophon assumes *philotimia* on the part of the foreign rulers, metics and Greek traders that he hopes to attract, and the word *philotimia* itself began to appear on stone from the 340s.[37] Instead of relying on the codified beneficence of the rich through liturgies and the *eisphora* which had caused such resentment,[38] Xenophon saw an opportunity to encourage traders and to reward munificence by appealing to the dual aspirations of both the profit-motivated and the well-resourced non-Athenian lover of honour. Decrees of honours granted to non-Athenians, inscribed or otherwise, were already a frequent occurrence,[39] and Engen

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32 Whitehead 1983, p. 58.

33 See M. H. Hansen 1974 for a catalogue of such cases; also Rhodes 2010, p. 71.

34 Davies 1993, p. 115.

35 Engen 2010, p. 49.

36 Lambert 2011a, p. 197 and Engen 2010, p. 133. Deene 2013, p. 81, argues that the limited access to citizen honours at *polis* level pushed competition for prestige to deme level.

37 Lambert 2004, p. 86. See also RO, p. 485: *philotimia*, which had once been '… perceived as a good quality came to be perceived as dangerous to a city, but was eventually judged to be acceptable if harnessed for civic purposes; the term begins to appear in Athenian decrees about the 340s.'

38 6.1.

39 See eg. And. *On his Return* 2.23 of between 410 and 405 (for the date, Gagarin and MacDowell 1998, p. 141); Pečírka 1966, pp. 152-155 for fifth-century grants of *enktesis*; Walbank 1978 for fifth-century grants of *proxenia* and Engen 2010, pp. 225-226 for honours to non-Athenians for

charts the use of such honours in recognition of suppliers of imported goods from as early as 414 - 412. Many of these early honorands brought goods to Athens, not in pursuit of trade and profit but as gifts.[40] Reflecting the changing motivations behind the large-scale supply of goods, Jansen supports Engen's view that Xenophon was subversive in his proposals, and argues that Xenophon 'aims to bring foreign traders into the realm of ritualized friendship.'[41] In the following section we will look in a little more detail at the honours Xenophon discusses in order to contextualise his ideas.

## 4.2 The honours and privileges Xenophon proposes

Pleading to be admitted back into Athenian civil society some time between 410 and 405[42] despite his dubious role in the Mutilation of the Herms, Andocides declared:

> I often see you bestowing civic rights (πολιτείαν) and substantial grants of money upon both slaves and foreigners from every part of the world, if they prove to have done you some service. And you are acting wisely in making such gifts; they engender the greatest possible willingness to serve you.[43]

Whilst entreating on his own behalf, in relating his case to the Athenian manner of awarding privileges to foreigners, Andocides encapsulates some of the motivating factors around the city's bestowal of honours: good service from the honorand provokes the award of the honour which in turn engenders further willingness to serve. Andocides' rueful 'καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ξένοις' emphasises the impartiality of such awards in terms of statehood and status, if Athens' interests might be thus best served. If his, 'And you are acting wisely in making such gifts,' may sound just a little as though through gritted teeth - it was, after all, his second attempt at a return - he nevertheless reflected Athenian practice. In arriving at Piraeus with fourteen shiploads of grain in his wake, he assiduously inhabited the profile of earlier grateful honorands, suppliers to the city, who had trodden such a path before him.

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trade-related services generally.

[40] Engen 2010, pp. 101-102.

[41] Jansen 2007, pp. 323-329; Jansen 2012, p. 744. See chapter 4.4.5 below.

[42] Gagarin and MacDowell 1998, p. 141.

[43] And. *On his Return.* 2.23 ὁρῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς πολλάκις καὶ δούλοις ἀνθρώποις καὶ ξένοις παντοδαποῖς πολιτείαν τε διδόντας καὶ εἰς χρήματα μεγάλας δωρείας, οἳ ἂν ὑμᾶς φαίνωνται ποιοῦντές τι ἀγαθόν. καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι ὀρθῶς ὑμεῖς φρονοῦντες δίδοτε: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ πλείστων ἀνθρώπων εὖ πάσχοιτε.

Andocides' grain was not, for the moment, sufficient to sway the *ekklesia*, and the ambivalent role played by the men that he emulated is neatly demonstrated in this episode. At times what was most deserving of recognition was not the character of the man but the nature of the service he had undertaken for the *demos*, and to a certain extent these two aspects had to be separable for the system to be effective. But whilst it might be pragmatic to overlook the non-democratic credentials of foreign kings, the *demos* was far more wary of re-embracing one of its own disgraced members, just as it was cautious in using honours to promote one of its members above any other.[44]

The following sections will examine the relative extent of Xenophon's proposals and the way his ideas sit within the unfolding picture of Athenian honours. First we will look briefly at the individual honours he mentions and the ways in which they had previously been awarded by the Athenians.[45]

### 4.2.1 *Xenia*

Xenophon suggests awarding *xenia* and *proedria* to merchants and shipowners;[46] *xenia* consisted of entertainment by the *demos* to (one) dinner in the *prytaneion,* the traditional venue where Athens gave hospitality to those she honoured, from the descendants of her heroes to distinguished citizens and visiting ambassadors, usually on the day following the decree.

Similarly honoured Athenians, in contrast, received *deipnon,* also a one-off grant of dinner, rather than *xenia*, whilst the greatest honour, *sitesis*, was continuous and reserved for only the most worthy.[47] The Athenians appear always to have maintained this distinction of nomenclature, although precisely what practice it reflected is harder to ascertain. Miller proposes that *deipnon* may have involved a religious ceremony

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[44] See the discussion of honours awarded to Athenians by Athenians at chapter 4.4.3.

[45] Henry 1983 gives the formulae for honorific grants and Engen provides a thorough and useful overview of the honours and privileges awarded in fourth-century Athens; the following discussion of individual honours leans heavily on Engen's helpful chapters. Engen 2010, pp. 140-213.

[46] 3.4. See chapter 4.2.5 for *proedria*.

[47] Miller 1978, pp. 4-7. On the rare occasions when the distinction between Athenian and non-Athenian appears not to have been upheld see Miller 1978, pp. 5-6, M. J. Osborne 1981 and Rhodes 1984.

and/or a better dinner,[48] whilst M. J. Osborne suggests that Athenians got to eat with the members of the more select 'club' such as the descendants of Harmodios and Aristogeiton who had been awarded *sitesis*, whilst non-Athenians might have eaten separately.[49] In practice, the very great majority of invitations to Athenian *xenia* up to the end of the fourth century appear, where their motivation can be discerned, to be political in intent, with ambassadors and *proxenoi* featuring heavily. Engen categorises just one invitation which appears before the end of the fourth century as solely motivated by trade interests, although others may have had mixed concerns.[50] *Xenia* may no longer have been offered after 330.[51] Engen remarks on 'the costs in terms of traditional social values' of granting *xenia* to traders in the light of the 'customary disdain' in which they were held[52] and sees in the maintenance of the distinction between *deipnon*, *xenia* and *sitesis,* and the care with which the categories were defined, an awareness of the potential social costs of crossing these boundaries. Foreign ambassadors had always to be invited to the *prytaneion* but the decision on inviting others, including traders, was at the behest of the *demos*.[53]

### 4.2.2 *Euergesia*

At 3.11 Xenophon suggests that benefactors be inscribed as *euergetai*. Closely linked with awards of *proxenia*, the status of *euergetes,* a foreign benefactor of the *polis*, can be seen as early as Herodotus Book 8, in which Mardonius sends the Macedonian Alexander, a son of Amyntas as a messenger to Athens 'partly because he learned that Alexander was a protector and benefactor (εὐεργέτης) to the Athenians.'[54] Often associated with proxeny, and awarded only rarely on its own,[55] the title had been formally granted to non-Athenians, including non-Greeks, since at least the late fifth century; Gauthier cautions against confusing recognition of a citizen's demonstration of euergesy in his own city with the formal *title* given to non-Athenians by decree.

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48 Miller 1978, p. 6.

49 M. J. Osborne, 1981, pp. 153-155, discussing amongst other sources, *IG* II$^2$ 77 which gives us some detail of the way the Athenians awarded this honour from the 430s.

50 Engen 2010, p. 170; see Miller 1978, pp. 136-163 for the inscriptions and literary references for invitations to the *prytaneion* across the Greek world.

51 Engen 2010, p. 170, although Henry 1983, p. 262 says this claim, made by M. J. Osborne, cannot be maintained.

52 Engen 2010, p. 169.

53 Engen 2010, p. 170.

54 Hdt. 8.136.

55 Henry 1983, p. 129.

The distinction, he points out, is made clear in the *Poroi* at 3.2:

> Obtenir l'inscription, c'est obtenir le titre *euergetes*[56]

Even in the Hellenistic period the title was withheld from Athenian citizens, who might instead be honoured for carrying out benefactions, *euergesia*, during a period of public duty, without being granted the formal status. In this way euergesy, the requirement of public benefaction as a feature of citizenship, was not undermined. This tension between the bestowal of honours and the expectation of citizen obligation was a defining aspect of the award of honours by the Athenians.[57]

### 4.2.3 *Enktesis*

The right of land ownership was one of the quintessential and most jealously guarded privileges of Athenian citizenship.[58] A grant of γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις awarded the right to acquire a house with land, and although some grants were solely for a house, they do not ever seem to have been for land alone.[59] Xenophon does not use quite this formulation, but Jansen argues convincingly that Xenophon intended that non-Athenians be afforded the privilege of owning as well as building on Attic soil within the city walls.[60] The Athenians had made grants of *enktesis* since at least 429/8 (to the Thracians, for the construction of a temple to Bendis[61]), with the earliest known grant to individuals appearing in 410/09[62] and possibly as early as 424/3.[63] Since the formation of the Second Athenian League this was not, strictly speaking, a privilege available for Athenians to take up in the cities of their allies, although Athenian control of land abroad had been on an intrusively different scale to Xenophon's

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56 Gauthier 1985, p. 18. Generally on the awarding of the title *euergetes* see Gauthier 1985, pp. 9-24. At p. 10, 'De l'époque de Périclès à celle d'Auguste, aucun décret athénien n'octroie à un citoyen le titre d'*euergétès'*.

57 See Engen 2010, pp. 48-49, 70, 225-226. Lambert 2006 gives Athenian euergesy decrees between 352/1 and 322/1.

58 Lambert notes that, unsurprisingly, all the purchasers recorded in the *Rationes Centesimarum* accounts of the second half of the fourth century which recorded the 1% levy on Attic land sales were male Athenian citizens. Lambert 1997, pp. 243-244.

59 Henry 1983, p. 205 and p. 225, n. 10.

60 Jansen 2012, p. 748. Gauthier 1976, p. 224, argues that Xenophon intended to award a house without land.

61 Thracians: *IG* II$^2$ 1283, Pečírka 1966, pp. 122-130, 137. See the wider discussion at chapter 4.5.1.

62 Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others: *IG* I$^2$ 110 = *IG* I$^3$ 102 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 18-21 = Fornara 155 = Walbank 1978, p. 488.

63 Herakleides: *IG* II$^2$ 8 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 22-25 = Walbank 47 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 35-55.

proposition for Athens.[64] Marchant translates the lots Xenophon refers to simply as 'many vacant sites;' however addressing ancient usage of the word οἰκόπεδα Daniel has recently emphasised that a more accurate translation of 2.6 than that commonly used would be:

> So since within the walls of the city not only are many sites devoid of houses but also occupied by ruins [οἰκόπεδα], if the city would give them to approved applicants to own for house-building, this too in my opinion would induce many more and far better individuals to seek residence in Athens.[65]

These are not, then, simply vacant lots, but run down sites. A passing reference by Aeschines in *Against Timarchos* supplies some context. In the same meeting as that at which the legal procedure against Timarchos was instituted (at the end of Skirophorion in 347/6), the Assembly had considered a proposal about dwelling houses on the Pnyx.[66] Fisher relates this to the late fourth-century building programme on the Pnyx and also to the wider Lykourgan rebuilding of Athens.[67] By later in the century the Athenians were directing their assets towards the regeneration of the city's physical structures, but Xenophon's plan ingeniously contrives that the resources of (approved) non-Athenians would be employed in the revival and redevelopment of the city towards the fulfillment of his vision of a glorious Athens.[68]

### 4.2.4 Inscription

If the honours themselves were not wholly new, wholesale inscription certainly was.[69] The mid-century marked a significant change in the practice of the honouring of both citizens and non-citizens. At the time Xenophon wrote, most honorary decrees were not inscribed, and although the literary record and the occasional re-inscription demonstrate that the practice of honouring was not in itself new, by far the majority of

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64 RO 22.35-46. J. D. Lewis (2009, pp. 375-376) relates Xenophon's offer of *enktesis* to non-Athenians, to the Athenians' renunciation of cleruchies in the Prospectus of the Second Athenian League (RO 22.25-35), the contrast (Athenians might not own foreign land of their allies, but foreigners could own property within the *asty*) thereby making the proposal radical. But, aside from the fact that *enktesis* was already an established privilege offered, by definition, to non-Athenians, relating these two issues takes no account of the very small scale of Xenophon's proposal, which was certainly not to allow farming, and the significant issue of Athenian cleruchies often forcibly held, and their detrimental effect on Athenian foreign relations over the preceding 100 years.

65 Daniel 2007, p. 63.

66 Aesch. *Against Timarchos* 1.81.

67 Fisher 2001, date of *epangelia* procedure, pp. 5-6; dwelling houses, pp. 216-219.

68 6.1.

69 Lambert 2004, p. 86.

the now extant honorary inscriptions of the fourth century were yet to be produced.[70] The comparative number and dating of the hundreds of extant *stelai* representing honours awarded by the Athenians indicate that the inscription of honours of all categories mushroomed in the second half of the fourth century.

Around three quarters of the (around 1,000) existing inscribed decrees of the Athenian Council and Assembly are honorific in nature.[71] Many of the honours we know of from the era before the *Poroi* are evidenced in the literary record. Walbank suggests that in the fifth century, publication was an additional privilege, usually at the expense of the *demos*, and that those instances when the honorand arranged for inscription at his own cost, perhaps indicated that the recipient thought more of himself than did the state.[72]

Decrees honouring non-Athenians could be inscribed in their home city as well as in Athens, a practice begun in the fifth century but appearing with increasing frequency during the fourth.[73] The power of the physical inscribing of honours is attested in Xenophon's further suggestion that benefactors' names be inscribed as a record for all time.[74] After all, as Lambert points out, honours cannot exist in a vacuum, they need to be broadcast to have effect,[75] and whilst issues of the siting of the stones amidst the mass of *stelai* on the acropolis, not to mention the levels of literacy amongst those who might come across them, remain important areas of debate,[76] the motivation for the inscribing of an honour was

> to endow it with enhanced, solemn significance and validity as expression of

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70 Honours in the literary record: Liddel forthcoming. Reinscription: eg. *IG* II$^2$ 212 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 298 = RO 64 = Engen 12 = *IALD* 98-99, 100-101, 102 no. 3. recording both new honours and those awarded to earlier generations of Bosporan rulers.

71 Lambert 2011a, p. 194.

72 Walbank 1978, pp. 7-8, discussing proxeny decrees.

73 Liddel 2003, p. 84.

74 3.11. Gauthier 1976, p. 96 sees ἀναγραφήσεσθαι as 'inscription sur une stèle' without discussion of the language and LSJ pp. 101-102 gives 'to be inscribed or entered in a public register' citing this example from the *Poroi*. The sense of permanence offered by εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον would seem to endorse an interpretation of inscription for public display in this instance.

75 Lambert 2011a, pp. 199-201.

76 See eg. L. Kallet-Marx 1994, Liddel 2003 and Lambert 2011a, pp. 200-201; also more generally on literacy, Yunis 2003, Minchin 2008 and most recently Missiou 2011, arguing for wider literacy than hitherto understood on the basis of analysis of ostraka inscriptions and inter-deme tribal communications.

the collective Athenian will.[77]

In proposing inscription Xenophon refers specifically to those making a contribution to the 'capital fund,' reflecting an expectation that inscription would in itself be an attraction separate and additional to any honours. Lambert finds this suggestion echoed in an inscription nominating Eudemos of Plataia as a benefactor of the Athenians for his offer of financial help in the event of war and assistance with building the Panathenaic stadium and theatre.[78] If the vast disproportion in the numbers of extant honorary decrees dating from the second half of the fourth century is anything to go by, Xenophon was not alone in appreciating the significance to the honorands of the public recognition afforded by the permanent recording of honourable actions.

### 4.2.5 *Proedria*

*Proedria,* awarding its recipient with a permanently reserved theatre seat, was one of the three *megistai timai* originally given to the descendants of the tyrannicides, along with a statue in the *agora* and *sitesis* at the *prytaneion*.[79] Xenophon proposes that it be awarded to merchants and ship-owners,[80] although at the time it was generally, but not only, afforded to Athenian officials such as *taxiarchs, hipparchs* and *phylarchs*.[81] Jansen stresses the lifelong character of *proedria* and that it provided entrance, possibly ceremonial, at all the city's contests.[82]

In practice when the Athenians did begin to award a theatre seat to non-Athenians later in the fourth century, rather than give *proedria,* they evolved a lesser privilege, *thea,* which was awarded for one occasion only, and there are only four extant instances of its use, one of which was to a trader.[83]

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77 Lambert 2011a, p. 202.

78 Eudemos of Plataia, *IG* II$^2$ 351+624 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 352 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 68-70 = RO 94 = *IALD* 121 no. 42, 319, 339-43, 352-55 no. 5, 402.

79 Gauthier 1985, p. 81.

80 3.4.

81 Henry 1983, p. 291 and Engen 2010, pp. 174-175.

82 Jansen 2012, p. 743.

83 Trader: Sopatros of Akragas: *IG* II$^3$ 1 432 = Camp 3 = Reed 55 = Engen 17 = *IALD* 120 no. 37 (see chapter 4.5.2); non-traders: *IG* II$^2$ 456 (307/6); *IG* II² 466 (307/6); *IG* II² 567 (late fourth century); Henry 1983, p. 292; Engen 2010, p. 174.

### 4.2.6 Further aspects of Athenian honours

Trade was not the only realm in which Athens was later to use honours to compete on an international basis. The *Poroi* may represent the first written recognition of the importance of attracting entrepreneurial skill, but just as for grain, in the realm of theatre Athens was beginning to compete within a larger market. In order to attract the best theatre practitioners, from at least the 330s Athens began to employ both financial and honorific incentives to encourage the very best non-Athenian performers to the City Dionysia. Such awards could be displayed on the Acropolis or by the theatre of Dionysos. Currently, ten such decrees are known, very similar numbers to those offered to grain traders in the same period.[84] It is interesting to note that honour and honours alone were no longer sufficient, and that financial reward became acceptable for participation in religious activity. Xenophon's wish to see poets attracted to the city and festivals celebrated with more splendour[85] was ultimately also to be achieved with the same mix of honours and profit that he had advocated for the promotion of trade. What had been activities undertaken (superficially at least) for honour alone – religious theatrical performances, the provision of substantial grain supplies – now needed the additional inducement of profit to enable Athens to attract sufficient resources to fulfil the city's requirements. Xenophon may not have proposed extending honours in relation to theatre this way, but his ideas indicate a strong prescience that a mix of honour-driven and financial motivation was to become an acceptable aspect of the way that the city promoted herself.

### 4.2.7 The introduction of the hortatory intention clause

Not only were honorific decrees increasingly being inscribed; from shortly after the mid-century a specific purpose is ascribed to the granting of the decree itself, broadcast in the so-called 'hortatory intention clause.' Lambert cites the inscription to Herakleides of Salamis from 330/29:

> To praise Herakleides son of Charikleides of Salamis and crown him with a gold crown of 500 drachmas and permit him to seek from the People what good he can, so that others also may behave in an honour-seeking way (φιλοτιμῶνται), knowing that the Council honours and crowns those who

[84] Lambert 2008, pp. 60-61.
[85] 5.4, 6.1.

> behave in an honour-seeking way (τοὺς φιλοτιμουμένους).[86]

As we have seen, Andocides had described this enduring reciprocal relationship between Athens and her honorands in the late fifth century.[87] Lambert argues that the phrase, 'so that others also may behave in an honour-seeking way' makes explicit that the intention of the decree is to set an example to others and to encourage future benefaction by the honorand, reflecting motivations which were already implicit in the awarding of honours, and long-held ideology in which the benefaction and the honour were two halves of the same reciprocal relationship:[88]

> Honorific decrees not only recognised past benefactions, they were intended to influence future behaviour… not only of honorands, but also of others, who, after c. 350, are often explicitly encouraged to emulate the honorands in order to attract similar honours for themselves.[89]

It seems clear from Xenophon's suggestion at 3.11 that the offer of simple inscription as *euergetes* would be an additional means of attracting investment, and that this additional level of recognition, not just honouring, but publicly advertised honouring as a means of attracting other benefactors, was already understood by the Athenians as a method of securing new benefactions as Lambert suggests, even before the hortatory intention clause overtly publicised the city's motivation. Liddel, however, draws our attention to Athenian anxiety behind the awarding of honorific decrees which is evident in the contrast between the stated intention displayed in inscriptions, and the private and political motivations behind some proposals of honours insinuated in oratory, to the extent even of being against the best interests of Athens. Demosthenes pointed out that at times the Athenians honoured bad as well as good men[90] and

86 Herakleides of Salamis: *IG* II$^2$ 360 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 367 = RO 95 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 165-182 = Reed 60 = Engen 27 = *IALD* 98-99, 121 no. 43, 131-34, 278, 394 n. 23, cited at Lambert 2011a, p. 194. Henry 1996 provides a comprehensive analysis of the different varieties of the hortatory intention formula.

87 And. *On His Return* 2.23 and chapter 4.2 above.

88 Lambert 2011a, p. 195.

89 Lambert 2006, pp. 116-117.

90 Liddel forthcoming, citing Dem. *Against Leptines* 20.39, 'For it is the custom of all nations, for the sake of their benefactors, rather to include some bad men in their rewards, than to make the worthless men an excuse for withholding their rewards from those who are acknowledged to merit them,' and Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 23.141, 'Once upon a time, on a certain occasion, you gave your citizenship to Ariobarzanes, and also, on his account, to Philiscus … Philiscus … began to use the power of Ariobarzanes by occupying Hellenic cities. He entered them and committed many outrages, mutilating free-born boys, insulting women, and behaving in general as you would expect a man, who had been brought up where there were no laws, and none of the advantages of a free constitution, to behave if he attained to power.'

Demosthenes himself was accused of taking bribes in return for proposing honours.[91] Motivating potential benefactors by appealing to their *philotimia* might produce reciprocal honours without actually provoking honourable behaviour. ‘Bad’ men might perform ‘good’ deeds if they will be rewarded by a change in nomenclature, even if that change does not reflect the benefactor’s true nature. This is a useful reminder that had any of Xenophon’s proposals been implemented, they might have been manipulated for self-interest, and that manipulation was an inherent aspect of a system which incentivised certain actions motivated by self-interest.[92] As we have noted elsewhere his ideas, whilst proposed in the interests of the city, are reliant for their success on individuals’ desire for self-promotion and profit.

Liddel’s discussion of the way that references to honours in literary texts (mis)align with the physical evidence has shown how Athenians remained aware of the tensions inherent in the honouring of both citizens and non-citizens. In particular the literary evidence demonstrates the manner in which self-interested parties might use the nomination procedure, whereby individual citizens proposed honours for third parties, with a variety of more or less straightforward motives.[93] There is undoubtedly a relationship between the proposer and the honorand that is worthy of some attention, and Moreno has suggested that the proposal of honours by an individual Athenian to be awarded to the leaders of non-democratic states might raise doubts about the democratic credentials of the proposer. His reading of the award to the Bosporan Kings proposed by Androtion is a useful reminder that the inscriptions alone reveal very little of the web of relationships and political concerns within which these awards took place.[94] What we will see, I believe, is that within his proposals, Xenophon set boundaries to the wider awarding of honours so as not to undermine established institutions by making them available only to non-citizens who had met specific criteria.

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[91] Din. *Against Demosthenes* 1.41-45.

[92] cf. Christ 2006, p. 35, ‘Shrewdness and self-interest go hand-in-hand in Hellenic culture, and not least in the way Athenians approached their civic duties and represented their civic behaviour to others.’

[93] Liddel forthcoming.

[94] Moreno 2007a, pp. 260-269.

## 4.3 The *Poroi* and fourth-century decline?

Lambert relates the emergence of the hortatory intention clause to a 'heightened sense of decline,' suggesting that Athenian awareness of the rise of Macedon and the weakening of the Second Athenian League led to the city exercising her power to make her decrees as effective as possible. He draws a parallel with the *Poroi* whose package of measures after the Social War 'was certainly a "response to decline".' [95] This is by no means an unusual characterisation of the *Poroi*. A substantial extract from the text appears in Austin and Vidal-Naquet's seminal *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* within the section 'The Time of Crises,'[96] and the wider awarding of honours by the Athenians from the middle of the fourth century has been viewed as representing a decline of the institutions themselves.[97] 'Crisis', as we shall see, is a word which appears frequently in characterisations of fourth-century Athens, and although the intensity of the scholarly debate over fourth-century crisis has to some extent diminished since the end of the last century, the discussion has become instead about assessing change and the way it affected older social and political structures, complemented by case studies of individual aspects of politics and society.[98] Fourth-century crisis has even been seen reflected in Xenophon's promotion of hunting by the individual, as opposed to hunting by groups of young men belonging to a particular age and class.[99]

Given the *Poroi's* particular context, its timing as Athens was getting to grips with the implications of her loss of allies and income, its attempt to understand a wider set of financial, intra and inter-state relationships and the insight it offers into Athens' view of herself, it is well situated to help in the analysis of a period when change is not only an inevitability but a necessity. In the following sections we will review some of the scholarship around the issue in order to further contextualise the discussion of Xenophon's proposals.

To understand whether or how 'crisis' and 'decline' are evidenced in the *Poroi* we

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95 Lambert 2011a, p. 196.

96 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 362-368.

97 See eg Gauthier 1985, pp. 131-140 for bibliography and refutation of the argument that an increase in the number of awards implies a 'decline' in the institution of proxeny.

98 See collections such as Eder 1995, Linke, Meier and Strothman 2010, Herman 2011a and Azoulay and Ismard 2011.

99 L'Allier 2012, pp. 493-494 discussing Xen. *On Hunting*.

need to unpick the apparent indicators as seen both by modern scholars and ancient observers. For Austin and Vidal-Naquet, fourth-century crises had their roots in the Peloponnesian War. Careful to disclaim any general crisis of the Greek world, they see a crisis of the *polis* evidenced by an increasing gap between the ideal of political and military independence, self-sufficiency and citizen concord, and a fourth-century reality of social and political conflicts, the threat from external powers such as Macedon and Persia, and the challenges of economic self-reliance, particularly for the larger cities in commodities such as grain and metals.[100] It is tempting, *en passant,* to note that these are all factors we can identify in the fifth century, and that they bear some similarity to Isocrates' glum version of the rack and ruin towards which he believed his contemporaries were travelling; I am, however concerned here to look at the way that some of Xenophon's proposals sit within ideas about fourth-century evolution and change.

It is perhaps too easy to project back from Chaeroneia and observe features in Athenian society which foreshadowed the rise of Macedon even before the rest of the Greek world had really started to understand the level of threat posed by Philip. Evidence for the beginning of the end of the Greek *polis* and thus a crisis wider than simply the challenge of Attic cash flow tends to be taken from a broader span of the fourth century with projections back into the fifth for specific issues, but often without precise reference to the chronology of contemporary events, which can lead to a somewhat skewed analysis by attributing a variety of - perhaps disconnected - features to an apparent path of decline. This can imply an interrelatedness that may not be demonstrable, and which may have been neither apparent nor predictable in the 350s.

Athens had recently seen military defeat, the loss of her allies and financial difficulty, but this was not the first time that she had been in such a situation; it was pretty much an unavoidable outcome of the Greek way of managing inter-state relationships and is not sufficient reason for a characterisation of decline over a longer period.[101] Separating those features which would have been apparent to Xenophon and his

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[100] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 131-132. See Davies 1995 for a discussion of the scholarship of fourth-century crisis.

[101] Although Low 2007, p. 255 has shown that interstate politics were more complex than simple 'internecine squabbling'.

contemporaries, from those which we may or may not infer with hindsight, is essential in any analysis of Xenophon's prescience. In the light of scholarship on fourth-century crisis, decline and change, and the various reassessments of the *Poroi* and of Xenophon's political astuteness, my hope in the following section is not so much to answer the question about decline but to see to what extent the roots of any decline were already evident in the work of Xenophon in 355.

### 4.3.1 Isocrates and decline

'Decline' is an emotive and, to some extent subjective word with pejorative connotations and a wide range of applications - moral, physical, social, economic, political and institutional. It is a state which requires a series of measurements against a yardstick of some apparently more successful era, begging endless questions about how such benchmarks are evaluated and quantified. We should perhaps be careful to document change rather than to characterise it descriptively. Decline is a word, however, of which Isocrates might have approved. Writing contemporaneously with Xenophon's *Poroi* as the Athenians considered peace proposals towards the end of the Social War, his political analysis of the contemporary Athenian state and the ills inherited by any who attempt to wield empire is made against a strict comparison between a former military and political golden age and the excesses of his day.

> If you will go over these and similar questions in your minds, you will discover that arrogance [τὴν ἀκολασίαν] and insolence [τὴν ὕβριν] have been the cause of our misfortunes [τῶν κακῶν] while sobriety and self-control [τὴν σωφροσύνην] have been the source of our blessings.[102]

Hirsch argues that Isocrates' judgement of the Persian barbarian, represented in a sequence of acid generalisations in his *Panegyricus*, did not represent the thinking of most of his contemporaries and suggests that Isocrates may not even have fully believed what he said himself.[103] But finding a common enemy is a strategy that has served nefarious politicians well for the subsequent 2,300 years, and in calling on the Greeks to lead a hegemony against Persia,[104] and identifying Philip as the leader to unite them,[105] Isocrates' Greek-oriented outlook palpably failed to identify the true

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102 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.119. ἢν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξίητε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, εὑρήσετε τὴν μὲν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τὴν ὕβριν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν γιγνομένην, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

103 Hirsch 1985, p. 3, discussing Isoc. *Panegyricus* 4.150–158.

104 Isoc. *Panegyricus* 4.184-185; Isoc. *Panathenaicus* 12.13-14.

105 Isoc. 5 *To Philip*.

threat which came ultimately, not from Persia and the east but from within the Greek world in the form of the very saviour to whom Isocrates' appeals were addressed. Greece was ultimately united by Philip and his son in a way Isocrates did not foresee: as Gray remarks, 'Political realities regularly fall short of models.'[106]

For Isocrates, decline had started way back, at least under the leadership of Pericles, if not earlier.[107] The power and temptations of empire brought ruin to any who tried to pursue them, Spartans included:

> For in place of the ways of life established among them it filled the citizens with injustice, indolence, lawlessness and avarice and the commonwealth with contempt for its allies, covetousness of the possessions of other states, and indifference to its oaths and covenants.[108]

Athens' current poverty was unquestionably the fault of her citizens, (mis)led by men such as Chares and Aristophon,[109] who despite the state's lack of resources, employed mercenaries to fight on their behalf on land and who took along cushions if they were required to man the triremes in person.[110] Isocrates accused his opponents of characterising the war/anti-war debate as democratic versus oligarchic interests, despite the fact that war had twice led to the overthrow of the democracy. In a manner very different to Xenophon's encouragement of the skills of those of other *poleis*,[111] he decried Athens' welcoming attitude to non-Athenians.[112] Xenophon demonstrated a far more nuanced view of individual Persians and a more pragmatic approach to relations with Persia,[113] and when we examine the *Poroi* in the context of this suggestion of decline, Xenophon's outlook becomes all the more remarkable. His language in the *Poroi* is constantly present tense and forward facing about the glories and resources of the city, reflecting neither a sense of a downward trajectory nor a

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106 Gray 2000, p. 154.

107 Davidson 1990, p. 21 on the debate as to the origins of decline as seen by Isocrates. *On the Peace* 8.75-80.

108 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.96. ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστώτων παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοὺς μὲν ἰδιώτας ἐνέπλησεν ἀδικίας, ῥᾳθυμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροψίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὀλιγωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν.

109 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.50, 53-55.

110 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.48.

111 2.1.

112 Isoc. *On the Peace* 8.50, 88.

113 See eg. Hirsch 1985, p. 37: 'the *Anabasis* is not about Persian deceit, but about deceit in human affairs,' and Millender 2012, p. 396. 'Nevertheless Xenophon's participation in Cyrus' expedition, his account of his exemplary behaviour at Cunaxa (1.8.15) and repeated allusions to Cyrus' fidelity make it clear that he is neither uniformly biased against Persians nor as hostile to connections between Greeks and Persians as Isocrates.'

reactionary call for the simple reinstatement of past moral standards, but a resourceful and pragmatic utilisation of changing socio-economic modes of operation to rebuild a more robust city.

### 4.3.2 Crisis and decline?

The 'classical' view of fourth-century crisis in Athens takes certain features evidenced in contemporary sources and builds a picture of wide ranging social, economic and political tensions. Two important staging posts of the discussion of fourth-century crisis and decline are Pečírka's 'The crisis of the Athenian Polis in the fourth century B.C.' of 1976[114] and Davies' 1995 article 'The Fourth Century Crisis: What Crisis?'[115] Conveniently summarising their individual views on the debate within their respective titles, between them they provide a thorough survey of the late twentieth-century scholarship. Both take the work of Claude Mossé[116] as the starting point, encompassing within their analyses that Mossé herself changed her views over the course of her work.[117] Mossé had argued that following the Peloponnesian War, land was increasingly controlled by a smaller number of people and exploited through the more widespread use of slave labour. This had led to the greater urbanisation of the population and the rise in mercenary service of a class who could no longer make their living from small landholdings. The emergence of competition for trade in artisanal products from expanding *poleis* at the fringes of the Greek world saw in addition the loss of markets for Athenian goods, whilst a widening gulf between rich and poor increased the burden of taxation on the rich.

The 1992 conference featured in Eder's collection *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* in which Davies' paper appeared, apparently included the word crisis 'prominently' in its brief.[118] Yet just twenty years later, it could be said of a 2011 collection of papers dedicated to Fuks,[119] a leading proponent of theories of

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114 Pečírka 1976.
115 Davies 1995.
116 Mossé 1962, 1972, 1973a.
117 Pečírka 1976, p. 20, encapsulates Mossé's revised view: 'it was incorrect to postulate an economic crisis in order to explain the social and political problems Athens had to face in the fourth century.'
118 Davies 1995, p. 29.
119 Herman 2011a.

fourth-century crisis, that

> it seems somewhat ironic that the consensus of the papers, according to Herman, is that Athens enjoyed "unusual stability" under almost two centuries of democratic rule.[120]

Undoubtedly at the point the *Poroi* was written, Athenian finances were in a parlous state, but throughout the 350s there is evidence of a lively engagement in democratic debate and in the decades immediately following the Social War we see the revival of Athenian trade, the speedy improvement of her finances[121] and her continued military and political engagement with the rest of the Greek world. As Pečírka pointed out in 1976, a closer analysis of the individual sources for evidence of decline does not always bear out the wider argument.[122] Pečírka's conclusion, that it was right to speak of a crisis in the fourth century in a limited sense, was based on three specific findings: one, that new fortunes were increasingly being made that were monetary in nature and not land-based, leading to a significant change in the balance of social relationships; two, that slave-ownership, which was not restricted to citizens in the same way as land-ownership, was a significant factor in the increase in wealth of non-citizens; and three, building on Mossé's observation of an erosion of the difference between citizens and metics, a new social structure grew up based on 'economic' wealth which was not bound to status.[123]

Writing shortly after Pečírka, Austin and Vidal-Naquet characterise fourth-century crises under several headings: war, a state of war becoming more or less permanent along with the development of military techniques such as the use of light armed infantry; the rise of the military specialist and the development of mercenary service,[124] which had long-term fatal consequences for the *poleis* 'since they gradually lost control of warfare;'[125] social conflicts and the impoverishment of the masses as the gulf between rich and poor widened, aggravated by ambiguously defined ideas of egalitarianism and rooted in the abandonment of the country for the city by Pericles; the oligarchies of the end of the fifth century; and an increase in the number of *thetes*

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[120] Forsdyke 2012.
[121] Athenian income increasing from 130 talents as Xenophon was writing, to 400 talents in 346. Dem. *Fourth Philippic* 10.37-38, Theopompus *FrGrH* 115F166. See chapter 1.5.5.
[122] Pečírka 1976, p. 9.
[123] Pečírka 1976, pp. 26-29.
[124] Isocrates *To Philip* 5.120-1 for the scourge of mercenaries.
[125] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 137. But control of distant generals had been a difficulty for some time, see Low 2011.

and a growing reliance on *misthoi.*[126] They also identified internal aspects of the decline in Athens, with family feelings more openly expressed[127] and politics ceasing to play a dominant role, giving way to private affairs.[128] Xenophon, with his well-known restraint at the fate of his son Gryllus[129] and his sustained interest well into old age in the affairs of the *polis,* can be accused of neither of these tendencies. And whilst there may well be evidence of change of practice, evidence of change is not necessarily evidence of crisis.

The characterisation of fourth-century Athens as a hotbed of social and economic unrest is encapsulated in Fuks' 1984 *Social conflict in Ancient Greece*, a posthumously published collection of his papers. Taking his evidence from the orators and philosophers, and most particularly from Isocrates, Fuks' paper, 'Isokrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece,' presents a picture of a city unable to create lasting alliances with her allies, internally divided by the resentment of wealth[130] and the disdain for the poor,[131] threatened by an influx of non-Athenians, and whose ability to secure peaceful relations with her neighbours was threatened by roving bands of mercenaries and their dependent families.[132] But Fuks' analysis is perhaps too strongly influenced by the firmly held views of Isocrates.[133] We should question the extent to which Isocrates' description truly reflected Athenian concerns as evidenced in daily social intercourse.

Runciman, writing in 1990, took a broader organisational approach, examining the entrenched structures of the Greek *poleis*, comparing them with Rome and Venice in order to establish why some city states had had the ability to expand their authority and create sustainable empires, whilst the Greek *poleis* had not proved able to adapt sufficiently that any one of them could sustain in the face of the encroaching power of Macedon. He found the Greek *poleis* both anti-monarchical and strongly populist:

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[126] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 140.

[127] Evidenced, for instance, by the increasing appearance of white ground funerary *lekythoi* from the last third of the fifth century.

[128] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, pp. 144-145.

[129] Xen. *Hellenica* 7.5.15-17; Plut. *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 33.

[130] Fuks 1984, p. 22 citing Isoc. *Antidosis* 15.159–160.

[131] Fuks 1984, p. 32.

[132] Fuks 1984, pp. 61-66.

[133] Fuks 1984, p. 52: 'Isocrates is first rate evidence for the social-economic situation in Greece from the eighties to the thirties of the fourth century BC.'

> Against this background, the change in the mode of coercion from militia to mercenaries which all commentators agree to be significant could hardly fail to work more against the adaptation – that is, augmentation of power – of the *poleis* than in favour of it.[134]

Runciman's conclusions are essentially about the control of power within each *polis*, arguing that the full exploitation of the modes of production, persuasion and coercion were hampered by an ethos which took a dim view of the rise of individual ambition, which he describes as a 'collective jealousy'[135] of the concentration of authority being held by a single inheritance group:

> the *poleis* were all, without exception, far too democratic … In terms of a close concentration of economic, ideological, and coercive power in the hands of a compact, self-reproducing elite, no Greek *polis* ever came anywhere near the degree of oligarchy which characterized the institutions of both Rome and Venice during the period of their achievement of world power status.[136]

In response, Davies argued that Athens was not more obviously democratic in the fourth century than the fifth. There was change, but it was gradual and non-disruptive and ran side by side with a great advancement in intellectual thought. Nevertheless there was a tension between slowly altering practice, contemporary political theory and the ideology of static institutions in a society which looked back to a lawgiver. Davies highlighted the issue of technology transfer, as other *poleis* caught up with Athenian expertise not just in warfare but in the efficient administration of regional resources. Ultimately, he argued, the actual crisis was about how to manage interstate relationships and where necessary, to pool resources and reach agreement about command structure:[137]

> … contemporary political perceptions saw hegemonies in the sense of combinations of resources of several states as no longer necessary – a mood which Xenophon with his *Poroi* and Isokrates with his *Peace* both caught and distilled.[138]

The *Poroi* however does not so much see hegemony as unnecessary; Xenophon after all suggests a wide military alliance to defend Delphi.[139] Rather he sees war as unprofitable[140] and hegemony, as previously practised, not to be ultimately fruitful in

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[134] Runciman 1990, p. 353.
[135] Runciman 1990, p. 366.
[136] Runciman 1990, p. 364.
[137] Davies 1995.
[138] Davies 1995, p. 36.
[139] 5.9.
[140] 5.11-12.

the retention of allies.[141] He speaks warmly of the Athenian-led alliances of the past and specifically highlights Athenian re-ascendency at the behest of the islands after her loss of *arche* due to the harshness of her authority.[142] What he certainly had seen was that the endless reconfiguring of inter-*poleis* alliances had not brought peace, and his solution seems to be that restraint and goodwill were the key to successful hegemonic relationships.[143] The *Poroi* picks at the edges of the issues Davies discusses – Xenophon recognised the value of intellectual and entrepreneurial resources available in other states,[144] and he certainly recognised the need to find different ways to manage external relationships. The mechanisms he chooses however, obviating the need for the oppressive demand for tribute and promoting relationships with individual benefactors, were respectively too lengthy to establish and too small in their application, to be able to address the wider problems that Davies identifies.

## 4.4 Athenian honouring in practice

Addressing the second of the above themes, relationships with individual benefactors, in this section we will look in some detail at evidence for the awarding of honours by the Athenians in order further to contextualise Xenophon's proposals.

### 4.4.1 Honours to non-Greeks

Until 330, the only attested non-Greeks awarded honours by the Athenians in relation to the provision of goods are the Persian Orontes, Satrap of Mysia, who was awarded a gold crown and citizenship in 349/8 for the provision of grain,[145] the Bosporans, Satyros I and his sons, and later on his own account, Satyros himself, his son and successor Leukon with his sons in turn. Leukon's successors Spartokos and Pairisades, with Apollonios, were then also awarded honours in 347/6, all these honours demonstrating the immense importance of north-west Asia Minor for the

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[141] 1.1.

[142] 5.6.

[143] 5.6-8.

[144] 5.3-4.

[145] Orontes, *IG* II$^2$ 207 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 295 = Osborne *Nat*. D12 = Engen 11 = *IALD* 101 no. 2, 107-13, 402. The decree is fragmented and a part is now missing. See Lambert 2006, pp. 125-127 for a summary of the debate over dating; Lambert concludes, with reservations, that 349/8 is the most likely.

provision of grain to Athens.[146] This aspect of the relationship between Athens and the Bosporan kings was a part of a more complex web of connections between Bosporan and Athenian aristocracy which included marriage ties, the education of sons of the Bosporan nobility and the provision of refuge to Athenians in need of temporary shelter.[147] The Bosporan inscription indicates that Spartokos II and Pairisades II had themselves asked for confirmation that the honours granted to their father would remain in place,[148] and also refers to *hyperesiai* provided to the Bosporans by Athens,[149] Athenian naval expertise furnishing an important aspect of what was clearly more than a symbolic or one-sided relationship.

When awarded to non-Greeks for the provision of goods then, as far as we can see from this limited evidence, honours had been offered only to those of notably high status. The elaborate relief at the top of *IG* II $^{2}$ 212 is testament to the prominence of both the Bosporan honorands *per se* and the considerable significance of their relationship with Athens.[150] However, whilst these non-Greeks, who were honoured in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, were foreign leaders who had provided vital resources in serious quantities, there are other suppliers, non-Athenian Greeks of lesser status, who received not crowns, but honours such as *proxenia*, *euergesia*, sailing privileges, *asylia*, citizenship and *ateleia* from around 414.[151] We will look at these again in due course.

### 4.4.2. Honours and trade

To provide some context for the discussion that follows, two particular aspects of the debate about Athenian honours are worthy of particular consideration: issues within

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146 These Bosporan honours are all recorded at *IG* II$^2$ 212 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 298 = RO 64 = Engen 12 = *IALD* 98-99, 100-101, 102 no. 3; Dem. *Against Leptines* 20.29-41; Isocrates *Trapeziticus* 17.57.

147 Moreno 2007a, pp. 175-180.

148 lines 9-11; 15-16.

149 lines 59-60. Interpreted by RO as 'almost certainly… skilled officers who together with the trierarch made up the full crew of a ship and could be regarded as the 'assistants' of the trierarch.' RO p. 324.

150 Lambert 2006, p. 119; the relief can be seen there at fig. 6, p 149, at the frontispiece to Moreno 2007a and is discussed and reproduced both in Lawton 1995 at p. 98 (no. 35) and plate 18, and in C. Meyer 2013, pp. 159-164. Meyer's chapter 4 (pp. 133-187) discusses the wider context of early Spartokid political monuments. See Moreno 2007a, pp. 260-269 for a detailed analysis of the personalities, politics and iconography of this decree. On trade with the Black Sea, see Gabrielsen and Lund 2007.

151 Engen 2010, pp. 225-226.

Xenophontic scholarship around the status of traders, and then, briefly, the actual practice of the later fourth century.

#### 4.4.2.1 Traders and status

Scholars have noted the way in which honorific decrees favouring traders later in the fourth century echoed Xenophon's writing.[152] Engen determined it 'possible but unlikely' that the *Poroi* was responsible for Athens' later decision to award *thea* to traders,[153] and Cawkwell saw the increase in the awarding γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτησις as a likely implementation by Eubulus of Xenophon's idea.[154] The awarding of honours and privileges to non-Athenians was not in itself controversial, but the *Poroi's* proposed recipients of such awards have raised eyebrows. Austin and Vidal-Naquet distinguish between the 'non-commercial motivations' underlying Xenophon's suggestion that merchants would visit Athens in order to win honour, as against the 'strictly commercial criteria' relating to their desire for profit, but this is surely too simple a distinction to make between motivating factors which must both have played their part in a merchant's choice of destination. Most might not choose Athens if they could not also expect to make a profit, but considerations such as honour and trading and ancillary facilities might be another deciding factor. If the dating of the Pistiros inscription attributed to a 'Thracian dynast' of shortly after 359 is correct, other polities were also beginning to see the benefits of granting privileges to traders.[155] Austin and Vidal-Naquet argued that Xenophon's suggestion to offer *proedria* to traders was 'deeply subversive'[156] because honorific seats were an award made hitherto only to Athenian magistrates and high status priests. Much of the discussion of trade-honours, whether or not about Xenophon, has been bound up with the status issues which have affected the study of economic history. Discussing the proposal to grant *enktesis* to non-Athenians, Austin and Vidal-Naquet say,

> Xenophon is probably not well aware of the profoundly subversive aspects of some of his proposals, notably the proposal to extend for the benefit of the metics the right to own land in the city[157]

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[152] eg. Mossé 1973a, p. 47, Lambert 1997, p. 281 and Lambert 2011a, pp. 196-197.
[153] Engen 2010, p. 174; see chapter 4.2.5.
[154] Cawkwell 1963b, p. 64.
[155] *SEG* 43.486. Date: Salviat 1999, pp. 259-260 and Hatzopoulos 2013, p. 15, with an overview of the scholarship and perplexities of the document at p. 13.
[156] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 367, n. 14.
[157] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 362.

Pečírka, by contrast, thought the idea

> a very serious - and I should say very enlightened - attempt to change, though very partially, the legal situation of the metic population according to their real economic role in fourth-century Athens.[158]

As we have earlier noted, Xenophon suggests only that the state should consider offering *enktesis* to approved or worthy applicants, not to the metic population as a whole, and one might think that he was better positioned to assess the degree of subversiveness of his ideas than commentators over 2,000 years later.[159] *Enktesis* was already granted to non-resident, non-Athenians and the extent to which Xenophon was suggesting that it might be extended is arguable as we shall shortly see.

Austin and Vidal-Naquet also found the proposal to offer *xenia* to traders 'again deeply subversive' because traders were to be given what they called the 'exceptional honour' of dining at the *prytaneion* 'simply in relation to the importance of their cargo.'[160] On the other hand, in quite startling contrast, Lambert describes hospitality at the *prytaneion* and theatre tickets as 'minor' honours, whilst in practice he suggests that crowns and the title of *euergetes* are not only symbolic but 'ubiquitous.'[161] Austin and Vidal-Naquet are placing Xenophon's proposals within the context of earlier practice, and Lambert is assessing them in terms of status and of their frequency in the later fourth century and so this opposition is not quite as straightforward as it might seem. The way, however, in which Athenians changed their practice as the century progressed would suggest that Xenophon's ideas were not quite so subversive as Austin and Vidal-Naquet indicate, whilst as we shall see, there were already some instances of awarding honours which set precedents for Xenophon's proposals.

Gauthier is certain that Xenophon's intention in offering theatre seats is to offer honours only to non-Athenian Greeks,[162] but this distinction between Greek and non-Greek is not clear from the text, which refers only to *emporoi* and *naukleroi*. As a rule Xenophon appears inclusive in his approach to non-Athenians, Greek or otherwise –

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158 Pečírka 1967, p. 25.
159 2.6.
160 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 367 n. 14.
161 Lambert 2011b, p 179, n. 15.
162 3.4; Gauthier 1976, p. 84.

elsewhere he is clear that the resident alien community he wishes to encourage includes 'Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large part of our alien population consists'[163] whilst those who would be inscribed on his list of benefactors include kings, tyrants and satraps.[164] Nevertheless the high status of this second list should not go unnoticed, whilst the former group, although offered the opportunity to serve in the cavalry, (which may come with the unspoken caveat that they would have to be wealthy enough to afford it), would also improve the quality of the hoplite forces by their absence. Xenophon is by no means misty-eyed about the non-citizens on whom his plans depend. What is important is not nationality, but wealth and enterprise.

In his detailed study of the Athenian practice of honouring the city's benefactors, Engen argues that in overseas trade, exchange had two goals, honour and profit and that Xenophon (and Aristotle) recognised the dynamic relationship between the two, the degree of significance of each varying according to the status and relative wealth of individual traders.[165] But Engen also describes

> … the corrosive effect that granting … honours for trade-related services had on traditional values.[166]

'Corrosive' is a striking and negative description of what might also have been the outcome of a policy that forms one of the central planks of the *Poroi* and this judgement merits some analysis. Contrary to what Engen describes as 'the Finley/Hasebroek model', his analysis of honours granted by Athens in return for trade-related services shows that the socio-economic statuses of those involved in trade were very diverse, and that Xenophon recognised that Athens needed to look after the interests of all involved in trade, ranging from traders of modest means to foreign potentates.[167] He sees in Xenophon's proposal to offer honours to *emporoi* and *naukleroi* recognition that

> … contrary to the view of Finley, such men would not simply benefit as unintended by-products of Athenian policy; the satisfaction of their interests

[163] 2.3. Λυδοὶ καὶ Φρύγες καὶ Σύροι καὶ ἄλλοι παντοδαποὶ βάρβαροι: πολλοὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῶν μετοίκων.

[164] 3.11.

[165] Engen 2010, pp. 214-218.

[166] Engen 2010, p. 141.

[167] Engen 2010, pp. 60, 109-110.

was integral to the success of Athenian trade policy.[168]

Discussing the changes that occurred in the granting of honours for trade-related services over the course of the fourth century, Engen states:

> … granting honors such as gold crowns for trade-related as well as political and military services required an adjustment to long-held social values. This was especially true when the trade-related service was the simple importation of grain for sale at the going price, since in the absence of Athenian honors, such an act was motivated solely by profit seeking on the part of the honorand. Perhaps even worse for traditional Greek values, all the honorands who had performed trade-related services were foreigners, and some of them were common professional traders.[169]

This juxtaposition of value, motivation by 'monetary gain' set against 'traditional values', is difficult either to uphold or to deny, since the scales are manifestly different, and Engen provides little evidence of the 'corrosive effect' itself, his conclusions being taken essentially from the internal evidence of the extant honours rather than a wider analysis of any demonstrable effect within society.[170] Given Xenophon's education, his career in Persia, his subsequent exile by, and delicate relationship with, the Athenians, the recent loss of his son and his detailed knowledge of Greek politics of the preceding decades, it is hard to imagine that Xenophon would be either deliberately subversive or could realistically be accused of naïvety or a lack of awareness in his understanding of the complexities of Athenian social and hierarchical structures. As we have seen, every proposal is situated within existing Athenian legal and democratic structures.[171] We should also note that whilst he is clearly making new proposals, he sees no reason to apologise for them; he believes they are worthy, but nothing in his tone suggests that he believes that his listeners would think them shocking.

In relation to proxeny, Gauthier offers a useful case study against the argument that the increased awarding of honours in the second half of the fourth century is an indicator of decline. He shows that attempts to see decline in the use of the institution over time through the literary sources, and the simple numeric analyses of

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168 Engen 2010, p. 60.

169 Engen 2010, p. 141.

170 The implication of vulgarity in the phrase 'common' professional trader is also not perhaps helpful within a status-conscious study. Engen 2010, p. 277, defines these as, 'men (commonly referred to as *emporoi*) who made their living primarily from trade and for whom there is no evidence to indicate that they were particularly wealthy.'

171 Chapter 1.5.6.

inscriptions, do not take sufficient account of the nature of the relative historians. Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon were dealing with 'fratricidal cities' whilst Polybius and Diodorus were envisaging a 'world history' in which Kings and Romans held sway, thus their comparative degree of focus on politics at a civic level is inevitably different. An increase in honours awarded to non-Athenians from the fifth down to the third century might be reflective of the more intensive nature of relations between cities, whilst the very survival of such institutions implies a flourishing and persistent relevance, albeit with a diminution of prestige.[172]

Nevertheless the view that an apparently broader application of honours has some level of harmfulness, either for society or for the institution of the honour itself, persists. In the granting of traditional honours, Engen sees an attempt by the Athenians 'to mask traditionally disesteemed economic activities by representing them in traditional terms of esteem.'[173] He views Athens as a state whose chief interest in trade was in consumption and where the increasing numbers of trade-related honours awarded in the fourth century were essentially about the encouragement of vital imports. Whilst tax revenue would also have been a welcome result, he argues that honours were not aimed at encouraging general growth in the quantities of both incoming and outgoing commodities.[174] This seems to me to be directly contradicted at 3.2, where Xenophon describes how traders have at Athens, 'the opportunity of exchanging their cargo and exporting very many classes of goods that are in demand,' in addition to her silver.[175] The attraction of goods on offer for export is surely one of the reasons for what Xenophon calls her 'vast land trade.'[176]

This sense of a thriving trade which might be manipulated for the wider benefit of Athenians is quite contrary to any idea of 'decline' and decline is not what I believe prompted Xenophon to write the text, nor do I believe that his proposals themselves either reflect or potentially engender it.

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[172] Gauthier 1985, pp. 131-140.
[173] Engen 2010, p. 34.
[174] Engen 2010, pp. 216-217.
[175] 3.2 ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πλεῖστα μὲν ἔστιν ἀντεξάγειν ὧν ἂν δέωνται ἄνθρωποι.
[176] 1.7.

#### 4.4.2.2 Honours awarded to traders in the later fourth century

To whom, then, and to what extent, did the Athenians award honours to traders later in the fourth century after Xenophon had written the *Poroi?*

Lambert gives us an interesting overview of the relative proportions of the different concerns of the *demos* as represented in the 270 inscribed laws and decrees that survive from the thirty or so years after Xenophon wrote, 352/1 to 322/1. 150 honour foreigners; of these, the context of sixty can be deduced, and around half of those are military/political in nature. Ten are related to the theatre, and twelve honour grain traders.[177] A glance at Engen's analysis of honours for trade-related services which includes those found in the literary sources confirms this heavy bias towards the encouragement of grain importers throughout the century, and is supported by Culasso Gastaldi's discussion of fourth-century Athenian proxenies in Asia Minor. Of twenty eight known fourth-century decrees recorded within Engen's broader category of trade-related services, twenty two are for the provision of grain, five cannot be certain and one is for the supply of fish.[178] Lambert notes that such trade-related honours do not significantly appear in our records until after Chaeroneia:[179]

> the systematic honouring of grain traders was a new policy after Chaironeia, a product of Athens' sudden loss of international power and influence following the defeat and the consequent dissolution of the Second Athenian League, and a response to increased vulnerability to the acute supply problems of the 30s and 20s.[180]

This is not, then, the wide encouragement of import and export trade in all commodities that Xenophon proposed, and certainly not an immediate implementation of his treatise, but a more measured response to Athens' specific supply needs. It does however indicate that his suggestion was not out of keeping with Athenian thinking on the ways that honours could bring essential benefits to the city.

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[177] Lambert 2008, p. 60.

[178] Engen 2010, pp. 225-229 (Engen's nos. 7–34); *IG* II$^2$ 283 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 430 = Engen 15 may be for fish as well as grain; Culasso Gastaldi 2004, pp. 23-26. Liddel forthcoming lists of all the literary sources for Athenian awards to citizens and non-citizens and notes that the literary record tends predominantly to record citizenship awards with less focus on the minor honours, perhaps due to the more generally litigious nature of the sources.

[179] Between 352/1 and Chaeroneia, Lambert finds only *IG* II$^2$ 207 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 295 (349/8), *IG* II$^2$ 212 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 298 (347/6) and *IG* II$^2$ 543 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 414 (c. 340). Earlier, there is also *IG* II$^2$ 81 = Reed 49 = Engen 8 (390-378/7?) Lambert 2006, pp. 117, 120 and Lambert 2007a, p. 103.

[180] Lambert 2006, p. 117.

### 4.4.3 Honours for Athenians

So where do Xenophon's proposals for prizes for magistrates[181] sit within the evolving practice of Athenian honours? Although there had been Athenian decrees honouring citizens for outstanding undertakings earlier in the fourth century,[182] this was unusual; Lambert points out that out of over 250 surviving Athenian decrees from between 403 and 352, not one has the honouring of an Athenian as its 'main purpose'. We receive the impression from Demosthenes' *Against Androtion* that a mechanism was in place for honouring a successful *boule* with crowns at the point of departure should they ask for it, and Demosthenes' attack on Androtion, whilst confessedly personally motivated, does reveal that such honours could not be awarded unless the incumbents had achieved certain requirements such as the minimum refitting of the navy that was essential both to Athenian naval pre-eminence and to her self-esteem.[183] From the 340s, however, it became more common to honour Athenian citizens for carrying out their public duties.[184] Lambert suggests that concern about the ability and probity of Athenian officials and the need to encourage them may have been a factor, so that the punishment of under-performing officials had to be countered by public praise for those who undertook their duties well.[185] For Liddel this awarding of prizes indicates a recognition of the importance of individual participation in the Athenian administration.[186] Thus those Athenians who we see honoured from the 340s were likely to be recognised for carrying out (sometimes routine) official duties rather than for their political status[187] and inscribed state decrees honouring Athenians were not usually decorated,[188] both features reflecting the concern that the honouring of citizens might unbalance the notion of democratic duty which made the fulfillment of civic responsibility both an obligation and an honour in itself.

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181 2.7, 3.3.

182 Dem. *Against Leptines,* 20.69 refers to honours awarded to Konon, Iphikrates, Chabrias and Timotheos.

183 Dem. *Against Androtion:* personal motivations, 22.1-3; honours to the council 22.8-10; strategic importance and neccessity of building warships, 22.10-16.

184 eg. honours for a council and councillors, *IG* II$^2$ 223 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 306 = *Syll.*$^3$ 227 = *Agora* XV 34 = *IALD* 9 no. 1, 12, 52-53, 338.

185 Lambert 2011a, p. 198.

186 '…the tendency to honour individual low-level magistrates who had held primarily administrative roles … suggests a high valuation of moderate contributions to the political process,' Liddel forthcoming.

187 Lambert 2011a, p. 197; Liddel forthcoming.

188 Lambert 2006, p. 118, n. 12.

Building on Ober's observations that elite values were appropriated to the purposes of democracy,[189] Engen sees Athenian concern for the integrity of the democracy as a far stronger explanation of the earlier disinclination to award honours to Athenians than any judgments about the social acceptability of trade.[190] These scholarly views all emphasise the concern of the *demos* that the notions of citizen equality should not be undermined by the injudicious awarding of honours. Turning to Xenophon, we see that alongside his proposals for honours to be offered to non-Athenians, he suggests a new Athenian magistracy, a board of guardians of aliens similar to the guardians of orphans, who would compete to attract the greatest number of metics, and that both this magistracy and the already existing market magistrates would receive recognition in the form of honour [τιμή] or prizes [ἆθλα] for the effective fulfilment of their duties.[191]

In suggesting prizes for magistrates, Xenophon operates within established practice in the honouring of Athenians for the conscientious completion of democratic duties. Good practice of regular, state-managed activity would be rewarded but however exceptional, Athenians would not be honoured for activity outside their democratic responsibilities in the way that non-Athenians might be. Xenophon's Athenian honours proposal sits unobtrusively within the pattern of the granting of honours to Athenians for the completion of regular duties.

#### 4.4.4 The language of praise

Over the course of the century, the manner in which terms of praise were applied also evolved, with terms that had hitherto only been applied to non-citizens slowly appearing in praise of citizens too.[192] Alongside the first appearance of *philotimia* as an explicit motivator,[193] there was a continuing clear distinction between the way that Athens honoured her own citizens, and the manner in which she honoured non-Athenian Greeks and foreigners. Terms of praise such as *aner agathos/andres agathoi*

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[189] Engen 2010, p. 42, citing Ober 1989, pp. xiii-xiv, 38-49, 291, 308 and 339.
[190] Engen 2010, pp. 116-118.
[191] 2.7, 3.3
[192] Engen 2010, pp. 119-121.
[193] Engen 2010, p. 120 and pp. 133-134. Surviving evidence shows use for non-Athenians from 352/1 and for Athenians from 343/2.

(good man/men)*,* *chresimos* (useful), *arete* (excellence/virtue), *eunoia*, *eunous* (good will/goodwilled) and *philotimia* (love of honour) make their first appearances in the records at different times from the mid-fifth down to the mid-fourth century. But in the case of all except *philotimia*, the term is applied at the earliest to non-Athenians, then later to non-Athenians in respect of trade-related services, (with six out of twenty five extant decrees honouring traders using the terms *aner agathos/andres agathoi,* all of whom were foreigners, although some had been naturalised),[194] and finally only to Athenians in the 340s and 330s. *Eunoia* and *eunous* were not used in referring to Athenians until the last decade of the century.[195] As we have seen, inscription as *euergetes* is only suggested by Xenophon for foreigners contributing to his 'capital fund' and not to be offered to Athenians;[196] Xenophon does not transgress a strict distinction. J. D. Lewis says of this proposal that honouring foreigners in this way 'would have been major steps towards extending to foreigners some of the special distinctions reserved for free-born Athenian males.' But as inscription as *euergetes* had only hitherto been offered to non-Athenians and not to Athenians, and was not afforded to Athenians even in the Hellenistic era, this view is misjudged.[197]

In his discussion of the evolution of Greek cardinal virtues, Whitehead notes that once it has become familiar and apparently even formulaic, it is difficult for us to appreciate the impact that approbatory language had when it was first used. Examining the honorific vocabulary Athenians began to use in the fourth century, he observes that when words such as *andres agathoi* were applied to an entire population, as they were in 451/450 to the people of Sigeion,[198] honorary vocabulary previously applied to the dead was now being applied to the living. Stressing the, 'caution, even inhibition,' that would have surrounded the application to the living of language previously used to describe Athens' deceased heroes, Whitehead wonders, 'what stages of thought were needed - conceptual stages if not chronological ones - before it became acceptable to call the men of Sigeion 'noble' in 451/450?' This was after all a

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194 Engen 2010, p. 121.

195 See Engen 2010, pp. 119-139 for a detailed analysis of the use of honorary language, and particularly the table at p. 120, from which this overview is taken.

196 3.11 and chapters 4.2.2 and 4.2.4.

197 J. D. Lewis 2009, p. 375. Lewis' observation on the same page, that Xenophon intends, radically, 'that Athenian males should join the infantry' is also counter to the well-attested history of the structure of the Athenian army.

198 *IG* I$^3$ 17.

Homeric phrase implying both heroism and status, later applied by the Athenians to the dead of Thermopylae and Plataia but later still, as Whitehead puts it, to a soldier who came home, 'not on his shield, but with it!'[199]

Pursuing the term a little further, by 407 we see it applied to Archelaos of Macedon on the proposal (perhaps) of Alcibiades, for his support of Athenian ships at Pydna, support which included the provision of timber and oar spars.[200] Meiggs and Lewis suggest that this decree illustrates, 'the boldness and originality of Alcibiades,' with its provision to send shipbuilders out to Macedon for the faster construction of new ships, urgently needed.[201]

Archelaos may be 'noble' in birth, and his help to the Athenians essential when the fleet is reduced and timber transportation dangerous, but his services are different again to those of the steadfast men of Sigeion, and this decree falls into the category of those first, very late fifth-century awards of honours in return for essentially material provisions.

What Whitehead's discussion and this later example show us is the manner in which the *demos* reconfigured its use of language to articulate Athens' relationship with living, non-Athenians where previously it had been used to commemorate her own heroic dead. One hundred years before Xenophon's text, honorary language previously reserved for men of a certain status began to be applied to those in a very different category, for the benefit of the *polis*. Fifty years later, Alcibiades' inventive proposal changed its use again. The precise sequence, of course, is conjecture – when it comes to the epigraphic record, there are 'unknown unknowns.' And as Whitehead says, we cannot know the stages of thought through which such usage changed, nevertheless it seems clear that precisely the sort of political expediency which motivates Xenophon's proposals, also motivated Alcibiades, and would have similarly inspired the earliest usage of what had previously been more familiar in a funerary context. By the middle of the fourth century, broadening the reach of honorary

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[199] Whitehead 1993, pp. 44-45. Whitehead 2009 further finesses the discussion of the abstraction *andragathia* and its use alongside *arete*.

[200] *IG* I[3] 117 = ML 91 = Walbank 90 = Engen 6. The text is heavily restored including the full restoration of Alcibiades' name, but ML finds the restoration 'tempting,' p. 279.

[201] ML p. 279.

language was not new, and in the application of the honorific lexicon, perhaps never had been. The use of honorary language evolved with time, always controlled by the *demos* for its own specific purposes, whether to encourage the heroism of Athenian soldiers or the support of her allies. The carefully differentiated deployment of terminology between Athenian and non-Athenian tends to support Ober's contention that 'aristocratic ideals were made to conform to the needs of the democratic state.'[202] Whoever may have proposed the awarding of honours and the wording to be proffered, the evolving use of honorific language was always mediated by the *demos*. Xenophon's suggestion that subscribers to his fund be awarded the title *euergetes* continues a tradition of shaping the use of Athenian honorary language to achieve the optimum results for the *polis* just as previous generations had done.

### 4.4.5 The quality of ships and merchandise

Xenophon specifically ties the bestowal of *proedria* and *xenia* on *emporoi* and *naukleroi* to the high quality of their ships and merchandise.[203] We might wonder why he would be concerned about the quality of the *ships*? Austin and Vidal-Naquet relate the honours to 'the importance of their cargo.'[204] Gauthier's broader interpretation is that the essential thing for Xenophon was that the merchants were useful for the city and responded to her needs – he remembered the decrees made by the city *'en temps de crises'* in which some merchant had brought the city an important cargo. In particular, says Gauthier, Xenophon would have remembered other decrees granted in times of crisis such as war and famine, recognising that important cargoes had been delivered in the time of greatest need.[205]

Undoubtedly this is correct, but it goes further than that. By restricting qualification for these awards in this manner, Xenophon is not suggesting honouring just any common trader, but those who are ship-owners and/or who possess the means to import such significant quantities of high-quality merchandise that they are of use to the city. Such men might not be of traditionally elite status, but they would be unlikely to be men whose businesses only survived from one cargo to another,

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202 Ober 1989, p. 291.
203 3.4.
204 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 367, n. 14.
205 Gauthier 1976, p. 85.

transported in a boat owned by somebody else who let out space to an assortment of traders. Xenophon's allocation of honours is within carefully prescribed boundaries.

Jansen argues that Xenophon intended to 'moralise' commercial exchange by incorporating short term market-based relationships within long term friendship categories in order to try to militate against the uncertainties of the market that might otherwise lead traders to take their merchandise elsewhere.[206] Whilst the bestowal of honours might well be expected to create a greater sense of obligation towards the granter on the part of the honorand, this analysis is based on an overly simplistic division between types of exchange. Describing market-based relationships as 'short-term' does not recognise the network of interactions and transactions involved in acquiring, shipping and disposing of commodities over long distances, or the importance of the maintenance of personal reputation in a society where maritime trade in particular was hazardous and without written records to identify loans or other agreements, made or broken. In practice the sort of men who might benefit from the honours Xenophon suggests would already be likely to have their own network of suppliers, carriers and customers, relationships built up over the course of trading, possibly over generations. The significant change would be that awarding them honours would build on those relationships by raising them from the personal to state level.

A further complexity appears when we consider that some of the Athenian wealthy might have been more heavily involved in trade than has been hitherto understood. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of the speeches of Demosthenes, Andocides and others, Moreno has suggested that an Orwellian 'doublethink' may have been in play. Despite (and also because of) a lack of evidence other than in Andocides[207] he suggests that there was 'a careful and complicated use of rhetoric to dress up the entrenched role of an elite few in a system that simultaneously benefited the entire community.'[208] The gap between the ship-owner/merchant and certain members of the elite who were themselves involved in the grain trade as importers was evidenced in their knowledge of the trade, whilst elite relationships with the Bosporan kingdom

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[206] Jansen 2007, p. 329.
[207] Andoc. *On his Return* 2.19-21.
[208] Moreno 2007a, pp. 259-260.

were essential to keep the grain supply to Athens flowing.[209] In this scenario, an honorary recognition of the quality of ships and merchandise would directly enhance the general perception of grain importers, some of whom may have been Athenian. Moreno specifically dissociates importers from the dealers within the city, showing an opposition between those shipping the grain to the city and the powerful local dealers who could collectively influence the price paid in the market place.[210] This has implications, indeed, for any argument founded on the suggestion that Xenophon's proposed honouring of merchants would have given greater than usual status to those involved in trade as it indicates that at least some of those involved in this 'disesteemed' activity were already members of the wealthy elite. But in any case Xenophon may not, perhaps, be proposing something new. Engen draws our attention to one decree of between 390 and 377 which proposes honours apparently to a Megarian 'common professional trader', although for services that are not identified and which may also, Engen conjectures, have included those of a political or military nature.[211] Engen suggests that this decree, taken with a slightly different reading of 3.4, indicates that far from being naïve in his proposal, Xenophon was already aware that honours might be awarded to such men and that the *Poroi* was intended to imply his approval of the practice. Rather than translate 3.4 ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προεδρίαις τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξένιά γ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, as 'It *would* also *be* an excellent plan' as per Marchant, (my italics), Engen convincingly proposes 'It *is* also a good and fine thing...' (Engen's italics). Translators, he suggests, have taken the optative mood in the preceding and following passages as their guide, but the lack of an explicit use of the verb 'to be' in the sentence leaves the interpretation open. For Engen, this inscription absolves Xenophon from the charge of naïvety.[212] But supported by other evidence as we shall see, sadly, and perhaps more tellingly, it may also relieve him of some of the burden of originality.

Further examination of the list of attested *emporoi* and *naukleroi* in Reed's study of

[209] Moreno 2007b.
[210] Moreno 2007a, pp. 219-220, chapter 5 for the full argument.
[211] *IG* II$^2$ 81 = Walbank 1990: no. 5 = *SEG* 40.57 = Reed 49 = Engen 8. Identified by Engen as a common professional trader because he and his sons are granted *asylia* (protection from seizure of property) for themselves and their goods and do not have any other obvious signs of wealth. Discussed at Engen 2010, pp. 172-3, 285-6; *asylia* discussed at pp. 183-187.
[212] Engen 2010, p. 172.

maritime traders, reveals two more probable traders who were awarded *proxenia* and *euergesy* still earlier than the Megarian: Lykon of Achaia,[213] awarded *proxenia* and *euergesia* in the period 414 - 412, and Pythophanes,[214] whose decree orders the re-inscription of a previous award of *proxenia* and *euergesia*, and is dated to the late fifth century. Engen describes both men as 'moderately wealthy professional traders.' A ship-owning *naukleros* may well have been wealthier and of higher status than an *emporos* such as the Megarian trader of *IG* II$^2$ 81 who perhaps would not have undertaken the significant capital outlay involved in the purchase of a vessel, but these three examples from fifty years before Xenophon wrote, indicate that his proposals build on pre-established precedents. The awarding of honours to a man who carried goods in return for profit was not in itself a new idea.

## 4.5 *Enktesis* again

In the following section I will look again at fifth- and fourth-century grants of *enktesis* in order to contextualise Xenophon's proposal and assess both its intended reach and degree of innovation.

### 4.5.1 *Enktesis* for religious and community groups

The earliest grant of *enktesis* for which we have evidence is for religious purposes, permitting the Thracians to put up a temple to Bendis in Piraeus in around 429/8.[215] The inscription recording the original grant was made in the third century, but income from the cult of Bendis came within the orbit of the Treasurers of the Other Gods at least as early as 429/8[216] and so the cult had already been introduced into Attica at the point the grant of *enktesis* was made, whilst its manner of celebration may have expanded around 410.[217] Like many Athenians, Xenophon was familiar with the temple of Bendis. In the *Hellenica* he had vividly described how the troops of the Thirty had mustered in Piraeus ready to meet the men led by Thrasybulus, filling the

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213 Lykon of Achaia: *IG* I$^3$ 174 = Walbank 50 = Engen 1 = Reed 47.

214 Pythophanes: *IG* I$^3$ 98 = ML 80 = Fornara 149 = Walbank 75 = Reed 48 = Engen 2, 3. Fornara questions the reading of the name Pythophanes.

215 Thracians: *IG* II$^2$ 1283 = Pečírka 1966 pp. 122-130; this and the following examples of *enktesis* are tabulated at Pečírka 1966, pp. 152-155.

216 *IG* I$^3$ 383.143, also *IG* I$^3$ 369.68 of 426/5; Parker 1996, pp. 172 and 195. For the introduction and practice of the cult in Athens see Archibald 1999, pp. 456-459.

217 Parker 1996, p. 172.

road from the Hippodamian market place to the sanctuary of Bendis in Munychia, events that he quite possibly witnessed.[218] The *Bendideia* celebration with its horse-back torch-race evocatively set the opening scene of the *Republic,*[219] and by the 330s it was being observed in extravagant style with sacrifices on a large scale, perhaps even with a *hecatomb*.[220] Addressing the speed with which we begin to see the involvement of the Athenian state, Parker suggests a geopolitical angle in Athens' admission of the cult if, indeed, they had not actually founded it themselves and then given it to the Thracians to take care of. In this immediate period he points to the importance of Thrace in Athenian eyes. Sadokos, the son of Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians, was given Athenian citizenship in 431, just as the Athenians were looking to Sitalces for military help.[221] In the longer term, the expansion of the celebration may reflect the 'ambiguous' status of Thrace:

> A savage country and home of a savage people, but one with which it was indispensable for economic and strategic reasons constantly to grapple.[222]

A century later, in 333/332 merchants from the Phoenician city of Citium in Cyprus were granted the right to acquire a plot of land in order to found a sanctuary to Aphrodite in Piraeus.[223] This later honouring of merchants with a grant of land is an interesting echo of Xenophon's idea because it is made to a group of traders, although the grant is not to enable private occupation of city space. Austin and Vidal-Naquet suggest that the way that the request is worded as 'by the men of Kition' indicates that the grant was made to them as members of the *demos* of Kition rather than as metics.[224] But they are clearly traders, οἱ ἔνποροι οἱ Κιτιεῖς,[225] and whatever the residency status of these Cypriot worshippers (and they could after all have been a mixture of residents and regular visitors), they stayed in Athens often enough and for lengthy enough stretches of time to be concerned about proper religious observance. They are also of sufficient number and probably economic power to wield enough

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218 Xen. *Hellenica* 2.4.11.
219 Plato *Rep.* 327a–328a.
220 Parker 1996, p. 173; Archibald 1999, p. 457.
221 Parker 1996, pp. 173-175; Thuc. 2.29.1-5. See Mitchell 1997, pp. 142-147, for an analysis of Athenian attempts to promote Athenian - Thracian relations through the bestowal of citizenship.
222 Parker 1996, p. 174.
223 *IG* II$^2$ 337 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 337 = Harding 111 = RO 91 = Engen R11 = *IALD* 65 no. 4, 278. See Parker 1996, pp. 158-161.
224 Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 275, n. 2.
225 lines 33-35.

influence to initiate a *proboulema*[226] in relation to their supplication for the land. Should their economic clout still be in any doubt, they must presumably have been confident in their ability to raise the funds to found and maintain a new sanctuary, and the Athenians too must have imagined that they had a fair chance of succeeding. They may have included a range of socio-economic backgrounds amongst their number, but in total they had financial confidence, and it seems a fair bet that whilst some might have been small-scale traders surviving on a shoestring, those with the ear of Lykourgos, the proposer of the decree, will have been wealthy providers of the goods which made Athenian life more comfortable.

The status of the Thracians who had established their temple to Bendis one hundred years earlier is less clear. Describing the Thracians of Athens as 'bafflingly unknown,' Parker finds small evidence of them, spread thinly in different strata of Athenian life.[227] Thracian slaves and passing mercenaries might not wield sufficient influence to merit much consideration by the Athenians, nor would they have the resources to build and maintain a temple, but others such as Sosias, the slave owner of the *Poroi,* and the resident Thracians who may have provided the horses for the torch race of the *Bendideia,* were clearly better off, and Archibald suggests that they may have been members of leading Thracian families rather than traders.[228] Nevertheless, more than sixty years later, the temple and festival are likely to have become a focal point for worshippers from all levels of Thracian society passing through the city. Like the men of Citium there may well have been both wealthy metics and non-resident traders with sufficient power both at home and in Athens to be worth pandering to for the sake of relations with a region that was a constant focus of Athenian policy, but it has proved difficult to establish a political reason for the adoption of the cult.[229] Xenophon himself had benefited from the sense of kinship between Athens and Thrace when in Thrace with the army of the ten thousand, although this could be a movable (if not repayable) feast; Mitchell's entertaining account of Athenian-Thracian relationships shows that on a personal scale Xenophon

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[226] lines 2-25. See Rhodes 1972, pp. 52-87 for the procedures for making *proboulema*, which the *boule* was able to prevent should it wish (p. 63).

[227] Parker 1996, p. 174.

[228] 4.14; Archibald 1999, p. 458.

[229] Archibald 1999, p. 456.

had ended up the loser in the gift-exchange game with Seuthes[230] and that despite prolonged efforts to manoeuvre the relationship to their advantage, the Athenians never truly understood Thracian society and the differences between Thracian and Athenian ideas of exchange:

> … the awarding of … honours did not always produce the desired results, and even placed the Athenians in the embarrassing situation of being openly at war with their own honorands.[231]

At some time between the founding of these temples to Bendis and Aphrodite, and recently enough for the Lykourgan decree to refer to it as an exemplar, the Egyptians had also been allocated land on which to build a temple to Isis.[232] Of these putative worshippers we know still less, but the same financial pre-conditions might reasonably apply – sufficient numbers for their case to be convincingly and influentially made, and the possession, by some at least, of the means to enable the establishment and upkeep of a temple.

The themes that seem to emerge from this analysis are three-fold. First and most obviously, the awarding of land to non-Athenians identified primarily by their trading activities (rather than, say, as *proxenoi*) as suggested by Xenophon is not new. Secondly, the Athenians continue the practice through the fourth century, but in these examples, only on the basis of a grant to an ethnic group, not to individual traders. Thirdly, the religious and community-focused grant of *enktesis* for the temple of Bendis, may seem an unlikely precursor to Xenophon's proposal given that Xenophon's suggestion was essentially about private occupation to allow metics to live in the *asty*, but given the political and economic power of Thrace, what seems both likely and significant in this context is the way in which the grant of *enktesis* has been used not just to allow Thracians resident or passing through to worship their god, but as part of a wider policy to encourage good political and financial relations between the two states. This is precisely the way in which Xenophon suggests using *enktesis* - not simply to promote trade, but the promotion of trade as a component part

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230 *Anabasis* 7.2.10-7.3.24. The 'kinship' between Athens and Thrace, was part founded in the myth of Tereus and Procne. 'Seuthes said that he should not distrust anyone who was an Athenian for he knew, he said, that the Athenians were kinsmen of his, and he believed they were loyal friends.' *Anabasis* 7.2.31.

231 Mitchell 1997, pp. 134-147, quotation at p. 134.

232 *IG* II$^3$ 1 337.43-45. καθ|άπερ καὶ οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸ|τῆς Ἴσιδος ἱερὸν ἵδρυντ|αι. See Parker 1996, p. 160.

of his wider policy to use healthier finances to smooth inter-state relationships.

### 4.5.2 *Enktesis* for individuals

Between these three religious and community-focused grants of *enktesis*, there are grants which are remarkably similar to those such as Xenophon recommends, made to private individuals. Of these, the first we are aware of is dated by Pečírka, in his authoritative survey of Athenian grants of *enktesis,* to 410/9. As well as *enktesis* it grants *euergesia, oikesis* and *epimeleia* to seven men, Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others, probably metics, who had been involved in the assassination of the oligarch Phrynichos,[233] activities very different to those for which Xenophon suggests *enktesis* as a reward. The majority of such grants recorded by Pečírka both before and after Xenophon wrote, are to *proxenoi*, and the first awarded to someone clearly a metic and not a *proxenos*, came after the appearance of the *Poroi*, in 330/29. It is nevertheless awarded to a man of substantial means. Eudemos of Plataia is praised for his offer of a contribution of 4,000 drachmas to the war effort against Macedonia, and the provision of 1,000 yoke of oxen to assist the building of the Panathenaic stadium and theatre.[234] Lambert remarks on the similarity of Eudemos' offer of financial support to Xenophon's proposal of a capital fund,[235] and in other ways, the case of Eudemos, granted an olive crown, *euergesia*, and financial and military equality with Athenian citizens, wraps together most of the honours Xenophon proposes.[236] Eudemos himself probably also matches Xenophon's desired profile of 'a better class of persons desiring to live at Athens.'[237]

Engen identifies four grants of *enktesis* for trade-related services in the 330s and 320s, arguing that, 'Athens granted *enktesis* to both metics and *xenoi* without discrimination, and this is probably true for trade-related as for other types of services.'[238] Between 331-324 there is a grant to Apses of Tyre and his son in return

[233] Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others: *IG* I² 110 = *IG* I³ 102 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 18-21 = Fornara 155 = Walbank 1978, p. 488. See also Lysias 13, *Against Agoratos* in which Agoratos' role in the murder is put in some doubt.

[234] Eudemos of Plataia: *IG* II² 351 + 624 = *IG* II³ 1 352 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 68-70 = RO 94 = *IALD* 121 no. 42, 319, 339-43, 352-55 no. 5, 402.

[235] Lambert 2011a, p. 197.

[236] Engen 2010, p. 157, feels that an olive (rather than a gold) crown was 'stingy'.

[237] 2.6. πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως.

[238] Engen 2010, pp. 192-193, citing Engen nos. 17, 25, 27 and 28. Despite listing it here, Engen does

for the provision of grain[239] and a second, first published after the appearance of Pečírka's seminal work, is the award of *proxenia, euergesia, enktesis, xenia* and a seat at the Dionysia, to the Sicilian trader Sopatros of Akragas.[240] Dating can be narrowed no further than the known dates of the letter cutter, 337-324,[241] but proposed by Lykourgos in recognition of Sopatros' assistance with supplies of grain, this award reflects Xenophon's proposals to a quite remarkable degree.[242]

Camp relates the award to Sopatros to the famine of these years,[243] and the final two of these four awards of *enktesis* may also reflect the challenges of this period, granted to Apollonides of Sidon for unknown services (323/322)[244] and to Herakleides of Salamis, the subject of five decrees between 330/29 and 325/4 (but inscribed only once), for the repeated supply of grain and the gift of money with which to buy it.[245] Reed includes Apollonides on his list of honorands for whom the status of *naukleros* or *emporos* was 'too implausible,'[246] but Engen points out that, recommended for his honours by *emporoi* and *naukleroi*, his services are likely to have been related to trade.[247]

It may be noted that even at the earliest of those dates, this would place a hiatus of almost twenty years between the composition of the *Poroi* and the award of these honours, and that these very occasional grants were unlikely to have ensured that a better class of residents grew very much larger. But what we are certainly starting to see in the 330s and 320s is that traders begin to be awarded *enktesis*, a fulfilment of Xenophon's idea. Just how innovative was it? In order to achieve a wider picture of the pre-existing links between *enktesis* and trade, there is some value in an

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not include *enktesis* against his no. 17 (Sopatros of Akragas) in his commentary or tabulation of grants (pp. 227 and 296) but Camp 1974 p. 324 is clear that whilst the formulation here is unusual, the grant of *enktesis* is certain.

239 Apses of Tyre: *IG* II$^2$ 342 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 468 = Walbank 1985, 107-11 = *SEG* 35.70 = Reed 51 and 52 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 193-203 = Engen 25 = *IALD* 122 no. 44, 278, 403.

240 Sopatros of Akragas: *IG* II$^3$ 1 432 = Camp 3 = Reed 55 = Engen 17 = *IALD* 120 no. 37.

241 Lambert 2006, p. 132, n. 68.

242 Lambert 2011a, p. 197.

243 Dem. *Against Phormio* 34.37, 39; Camp 1974, p. 323.

244 Apollonides of Sidon: *IG* II$^2$ 343 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 379 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 183-192 = Engen 28 = *IALD* 124 no. 50, 210-11, 278, 283 n. 20.

245 Herakleides of Salamis: *IG* II$^2$ 360 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 367 = RO 95 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 165-182 = Reed 60 = Engen 27 = *IALD* 98-99, 121 no. 43, 131-34, 278, 394 n. 23.

246 Reed 2003, p. 94.

247 Engen 2010, p. 310.

examination of the Athenian use of the award most regularly associated with *enktesis*, that of proxeny.

### 4.5.3 *Enktesis* and *proxenia*

The great majority of recorded awards of *enktesis* made before the 330s, eleven out of sixteen, are to *proxenoi*, and seven or eight of these pre-date the *Poroi*.[248] As a general rule, *proxenoi* were men of elite status,[249] living at home in their native cities where they were expected to look after the interests of the honouring city. This classic profile of a *proxenos* was reason enough for Walbank to date the Athenians' honouring of Apses of Tyre to a date before that city was destroyed in 332.[250] If we see Xenophon's proposed extension of the award of *enktesis* from men such as these, of high status, resident abroad and powerful enough in their own lands to safeguard Athenian interests, to the common professional trader, a politically powerless foreigner possibly resident in Athens, we are indeed looking at a significant proposal. But there is good reason to see Xenophon's ideas as far less ground-breaking and much more pragmatic.

Burke notes that in the classical era the award of proxeny moves away from its archaic mainland origins, to a focus on the coastal and island states of the Aegean which were active in maritime commerce;[251] it is interesting to consider the link between proxeny and trade. There has long been thought to be a correspondence between the two,[252]

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248 Pečírka 1966, pp. 152-155.

249 The earliest known reference to proxeny appears on a Corcyran funeral monument of the late seventh century (ML 4). See Herman 1987, pp. 130-142 for the relationship between the older institution of *xenia* and proxeny. Of fifth-century *proxenoi*: 'Their success to a large extent depended on their influence, so that naturally the most prominent individuals would be chosen as *proxenoi*; wealth and prestige were no hindrance to the performance of their other duties.' Walbank 1978, p. 3. Perlman 1958, p. 186, describes fourth-century *proxenoi* as prominent politicians who carried out a vital role in inter-state negotiations and competed for the honours which could bring considerable benefits. cf. Callias speaking to the Spartans: 'Men of Lacedaemon, as regards the position I hold as your diplomatic agent (προξενίαν), I am not the only member of our family who has held it, but my father's father received it from his father and handed it on to his descendants; and I also wish to make clear to you how highly esteemed we have been by our own state. For whenever there is war she chooses us as generals, and whenever she becomes desirous of tranquillity she sends us out as peacemakers.' Xen. *Hellenica* 6.3.4.

250 '… wherever these honorands were actually living at the time of the grant, the Athenians must have believed that they would eventually return to Tyre and carry out their duties there: since Tyre, in effect, ceased to exist after 332 B.C., Apses and his father would not have been made *proxenoi* after this date. The proxenia was not an empty honour at Athens.' Walbank 1985, p. 110, discussing *IG* II$^2$ 342$^+$ = *IG* II$^3$ 1 468.

251 Burke 1992, p. 206.

252 See Engen 2010, pp. 147-149 for discussion and bibliography; also Culasso Gastaldi 2004, pp. 23-

and indeed the honour of *proxenia* was only granted when the honorand had provided a city with some sort of *euergesia* to the *polis*, often in kind, even if not profit-motivated;[253] there are five or six recorded Athenian awards of *proxenia* for trade-related services between 414 and 349.[254] One of these, awarded between 390 and 378/7, is to the common professional trader from Megara which was discussed above.[255]

Proxeny was an award dating back at least to the 480s,[256] reflecting the far older institution of ritualised guest-friendship. Walbank lists ninety four known Athenian grants for the fifth century alone. Eleven out of thirty four of the known honorands for trade-related services before 307 received the award of proxeny and a further twelve of those thirty four honorands either already had *proxenia* or were becoming citizens.[257] Fifth-century awards of proxeny attracted the additional award of *enktesis* only rarely,[258] but it is an interesting pattern of grants of *enktesis* in the fourth-century that they were almost always accompanied by proxeny, (even if proxeny did not always attract *enktesis*).[259] As we have seen above, we only have evidence for four overtly trade-related awards of *enktesis*.[260] Marek, in his survey of awards of proxeny across the Greek world, was adamant that proxeny was neither trade-related nor a plank of any *polis'* trade policy. Addressing some of the aspects of this argument for a link between proxeny and trade, such as the identity of the honorands themselves, the increasing mobility of the Hellenistic world and the archaeological evidence of coins

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25 for trade and fourth-century Athenian proxenies in Asia Minor.

253 Walbank 1978, p. 5, also Burke 1992, p. 206: 'the manner of the award, or its renewal, bespeaks equally a satisfaction by the members of the ecclesia that the honorand, or his predecessor, had acted in their interests.'

254 Engen 2010, pp. 225-226.

255 *IG* II$^2$ 81 = Walbank 1990: no. 5 = *SEG* 40.57 = Reed 49 = Engen 8; chapter 4.4.5.

256 Walbank 1978, p. 10.

257 Engen 2010, p. 149.

258 Four known occasions before the start of the fourth century: Herakleides *IG* II$^2$ 8 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 22-25 = Walbank 47 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 35-55 (the date of this however is uncertain and may be early fourth century); Polystratos *IG* I$^2$ 83 = *IG* I$^3$ 81 = Walbank 48; possibly Polykles, Peraieus and Aristoboulos, *IG* I$^2$ 106 = *IG* I$^3$ 106 = Walbank 8; possibly the two exiles of *IG* I$^2$ 106a = *IG* I$^3$ 107 = Walbank 93.

259 See catalogue at Pečírka 1967, pp. 152-157.

260 Apses of Tyre: *IG* II$^2$ 342 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 468 = Walbank 1985, 107-11 = *SEG* 35.70 = Reed 51 and 52 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 193-203 = Engen 25 = *IALD* 122 no. 44, 278, 403, 331-324. Herakleides of Salamis: *IG* II$^2$ 360 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 367 = RO 95 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 165-182 = Reed 60 = Engen 27 = *IALD* 98-99, 121 no. 43, 131-34, 278, 394 n. 23; 330/29 and 325/4. Sopatros of Akragas: *IG* II$^3$ 1 432 = Camp 3 = Reed 55 = Engen 17 = *IALD* 120 no. 37; 331-324. Apollonides of Sidon, *IG* II$^2$ 343 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 379 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 183-192 = Engen 28 = *IALD* 124 no. 50, 210-11, 278, 283 n. 20; 323/322.

and traded goods between *poleis*, he could find no evidence within the decrees that confirmed a link, except in the very specific circumstances of a city's recognition of the securing of grain supply by a *proxenos*, sometimes at a loss of income to himself.[261] But Marek's analysis is very narrowly focused. Walbank's emphasis is quite different:

> Because each state reserved to its own citizens the privilege and the protection of its laws, its courts, and its gods, foreigners were forced to make use of citizens of the host-city to plead their causes before the courts or the Assembly, to sponsor them at religious observances, to witness documents, or to act as agents, commercial or otherwise.[262]

This broader view of the sort of functions that could be expected of a *proxenos*, as opposed to the formula of his grant, is surely a better way to understand his place in the social, economic, political and religious life of the *polis*. Reed lists nine men awarded proxeny, euergesy, crowns and *enktesis* in Athenian honorary decrees who are probably local *proxenoi* resident in their home state (rather than travelling merchants) whose decrees imply that they have given assistance to Athenian merchants or looked after Athenian interests, sometimes in the form of 'regular, sustained assistance and protection' thus providing just such support to the trading community as Walbank describes.[263] Reed discusses these men because they might otherwise have been candidates as *naukleroi* or *emporoi*, and he argues that if they had been active traders, they would not have been able to be on hand in their home cities to offer their services to visiting Athenians during the sailing season. But the link between proxeny and trade interests more generally is implied by the nature of their decrees, whilst the idea that a *proxenos* must be permanently stationed in his home town, on hand to support visiting Athenians, has come under some scrutiny. As Gauthier points out, the accepted existence of multiple proxenies of one state are implied in both Thucydides and in Aristophanes' *Birds*,[264] and so it was by no means necessary that to be a *proxenos* one must never leave home, as it is likely that there may have been others who could fulfill the same functions in one's absence. Discussing an award of proxeny and *enktesis* made to Theogenes son of Xenocles of

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261 Marek 1984, pp. 359-360.
262 Walbank 1978, pp. 2-3.
263 Reed 2003, pp. 94-95.
264 'These the Corinthians had released, nominally upon the security of eight hundred talents given by their proxenies [προξένοις] but in reality upon their engagement to bring over Corcyra to Corinth,' Thuc. 3.70.1. "Inspector: Where are the proxenies [πρόξενοι;]?" Ar. *Birds* 1021. Gauthier 1985, p. 138.

Naukratis in 349/8,[265] Pečírka suggests that whilst Theogenes would be unlikely to settle in Attica, the grant of *enktesis* being for a house and not land, he might still use the house for visits or 'business negotiations.'

Engen makes a case against the proxeny/trade connection as it had been made by earlier scholars, arguing that just because *proxenoi* were appointed from cities on trade routes there is no proven link between the appointments and trade. Although he concludes that Athens used proxeny in an honorary manner to reward those who had provided trade, as well as political and military services, he rejects the suggestion that the state 'set up an intercity trading network.' He suggests that some *proxenoi* appeared to live in Athens and therefore could not have been available to offer help in their home cities; that even if they did live in their home cities, there is not always evidence of trade between the city making the award and the recipient's *polis,* and that even where a *proxenos* is securely identified as a professional trader, the relationship between *proxenos* and Athens was that between a state and an individual, not between two states.[266]

These are all reasonable arguments against the suggestion that the state used the award of proxeny as part of a concerted policy to encourage trade. But there is no reason to suppose that all *proxenoi* should always be required to stay in their home city, (or that at any given time there might not be one in Athens, another at home and a third elsewhere…). Indeed it is most unlikely that they would always do so; they are, after all, likely to be the citizens used by their *polis* as ambassadors, and are most likely to be effective if they have visited the state they represent and have a working relationship with their patrons. Given the huge numbers of Greek states able to furnish *proxenoi,* and Attica's attraction as a trading centre, there is every possibility of a blurring at the margins between a wealthy man who stayed at home, using his role simply to lobby for his patron city with his fellow citizens, and one whose interest in his patron-city was more material, and whose materiality demanded occasional or even regular visits. If Athens had a trade policy reflected in her proxeny decrees, there was no reason why it should not be aimed at the individuals who supplied the necessary commodities. Agreements at inter-state level would only be necessary

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[265] Theogenes of Naukratis *IG* II[2] 206 = *IG* II[3] 1 294 = Pečírka 1967, p. 46 = *IALD* 115 no. 23.
[266] Engen 2010, pp. 148-149; 152-153.

when the handling of exports was actually controlled at state level, as we see in the honours awarded to the Bosporan Kings. And whilst the geographical spread of awards alone may not prove a motivation related to trade, it certainly does not disprove it. Such arguments do not undermine the idea of a more organic relationship between individual traders and *proxenoi*, a network of interpersonal relations around a nexus of honorary, religious, personal and commercial concerns which need not imply that the *proxenos* himself was a trader, without discounting that he might play a pivotal role in the commercial life of a city.

### 4.5.4 *Proxenia* and metics

Why is this discussion of proxeny significant given that *proxenia* was not one of the honours that Xenophon proposed? The key is in the very close link between *enktesis* and proxeny in the fourth century, and the way they relate to honours for traders, both non-resident and metic.

As we have seen, as well as the more familiar profile of *proxenoi* as high-status residents of their own *poleis*, Engen has suggested that they might not live in their home state, and he further proposed that they might on occasion even be metics, living in Athens rather than representing her in their home cities.[267] He finds four exceptions to the rule that *proxenoi* could not be metics, two early and two late: Phanosthenes and Antiochides, circa 410 – 407/6,[268] Herakleides, honoured in 330/29 and 325/24,[269] and Hieron with his son Apses of Tyre, honoured after 330.[270] In addition he concludes that Sopatros of Akragas, awarded *enktesis* and *proxenia* between 337 and 325 for trade-related services, whilst clearly a non-citizen, might be a metic, although he could not be conclusively identified either as a *xenos* or a metic.[271] Reed is dubious about the metic status of the later honorands,[272] whilst admitting that scholars have

[267] Engen 2010, p. 307.

[268] Phanosthenes and Antiochides: *IG* I$^3$ 182 = Engen 4 and 6.

[269] Herakleides of Salamis: *IG* II$^2$ 360 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 367 = RO 95 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 165-182 = Reed 60 = Engen 27 = *IALD* 98-99, 121 no. 43, 131-34, 278, 394 n. 23.

[270] Apses of Tyre: *IG* II$^2$ 342 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 468 = Walbank 1985, 107-11 = *SEG* 35.70 = Reed 51 and 52 = Culasso Gastaldi pp. 193-203 = Engen 25 = *IALD* 122 no. 44, 278, 403.

[271] Sopatros of Akragas: *IG* II$^3$ 1 432 = Camp 3 = Reed 55 = Engen 17 = *IALD* 120 no. 37. Discussed at chapter 4.5.2 and also at Engen 2010, p. 296.

[272] Reed 2003, pp. 126, 129.

tended to see Herakleides as a metic, including Pečírka[273] who finds metic status not certain but 'very probable'. However a part of Reed's case in each instance is that the grants of *enktesis* (for Herakleides) and *proxenia* (for Hieron and Apses) demonstrate that they were not Athenian residents, so by pre-supposing that *enktesis* cannot be granted to Athenian residents, the arguments here are rather circular for our purposes. Reed thus argues that possession of *enktesis* and *proxenia* together demonstrates that the honorand *could not* be a resident of Athens, whereas, with Engen, I would argue that the mobility of the Greek world meant that it could be entirely possible to have both awards and to live in Athens, taking advantage of the award of *enktesis* which in this event, would not be simply symbolic.

But what is perhaps more significant is the practice prior to the time Xenophon wrote. Phanosthenes was honoured twice between 410 and 407/6, the first time with Antiochides and the second time alone.[274] On the first occasion, both he and Antiochides were inscribed as *proxenos* and *euergetes* in recognition of the provision of oar spars and timber, either at market price or as a gift, the language is unclear. Given that Phanosthenes was then awarded citizenship and that by 407/6 he was serving as an Athenian general, Engen argues that it is likely that he had previously been a metic and that the grant of citizenship was due to services related to trade.[275] As we have discussed, in 410/9 a grant of *enktesis* was made to a group, some or all of whom were non-Athenians and probably metics, Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others.[276] Xenophon would have been a youth when it was granted, but the decree and the honours it records were controversial enough in their day to generate a speech from Lysias.[277] Thus at around the same time we see Phanosthenes and Antiochides as well as Agoratos and his six associates, all Greek non-citizens and some if not all metics, awarded *enktesis* and living in Athens.

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[273] Pečírka 1966, p. 72; Reed 2003, p. 129.

[274] Phanosthenes and Antiochides: *IG* I$^3$ 182 = Engen 4 and 6.

[275] Engen 2010, pp. 280-282; Xen. *Hellenica* 1.5.18.

[276] Agoratos, Komon, Simos, Philinos and three others, *IG* I$^2$ 110 = *IG* I$^3$ 102 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 18-21 = Fornara 155 = Walbank 1978, p. 488.

[277] Lysias 13, *Against Agoratos*.

### 4.5.5 *Enktesis* conclusion

These few examples of Greek non-citizens and metics imply a less clear-cut division between what had seemed apparently distinct categories. *Proxenoi* were not always of high social status, and might even be a metics. A *proxenos* was not always permanently resident away from Athens, and could still carry out his duties if he also traded abroad. When it was allied to proxeny, *enktesis* was not only granted as an honorary award, as we have clear evidence of *proxenoi* who were awarded *enktesis* and yet were resident in Athens. In addition we see proxeny, with its allied grant of *enktesis*, as closely associated with trade, and metics awarded *enktesis* as early as the late fifth century. This picture suggests a far more fluid use of *enktesis* and *proxenia* both by the awarding city and by the honorand than that of a purely symbolic grant.

Not only was there a precedent for a grant of *enktesis* to metics, Gauthier has shown that there may already have been a mechanism in place for the regular request by metics themselves for such a grant. Gauthier draws our attention to a hint in the *Poroi:*

> 'if the state allowed <u>approved applicants</u> to erect houses on these and granted them the freehold of the land…'
>
> εἰ ἡ πόλις διδοίη οἰκοδομησομένοις ἐγκεκτῆσθαι οἳ ἂν <u>αἰτούμενοι ἄξιοι</u> δοκῶσιν εἶναι'[278]

and he also highlights the use of αἴτησις [request, demand] in later honorific inscriptions, suggesting that non-Athenians might have been able to make a formal request to the *boule*, perhaps at given dates, for the right of *enktesis*.[279]

As we have noted, Xenophon carefully qualifies his suggestion: he does not say that *enktesis* could be awarded to metics, as some commentators have implied, but that it could be given to worthy or approved applicants, in order to produce 'a larger and better class of persons desiring to live in Athens.'[280] This means that an existing level of control, duly approved by the *demos,* is immediately in place around who might receive such an award, and Xenophon might reasonably assume that those involved in

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[278] 2.6

[279] Gauthier 1985, pp. 184-187. Gauthier refers to Xenophon's use of the phrase to build his argument but does not extrapolate further in relation to the *Poroi*.

[280] 2.6. πολὺ ἂν οἴομαι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα πλείους τε καὶ βελτίους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς Ἀθήνησιν οἰκήσεως.

the awarding of *enktesis* would not radically change their standards in choosing recipients, albeit that the pool of applicants might slightly increase.[281]

On their own, the examples we have discussed present only very limited evidence and this argument can be tentative only. If at the time Xenophon wrote, however, *proxenoi* based in their home countries had already been taking a role, even if marginal, in the support of visiting or resident traders arriving from Athens, receiving *enktesis* among other privileges in return, and conducting business interests of their own from time to time in Athens, then it is a much less significant leap to think of extending that right to live in the city to carefully selected traders themselves. Similarly for the Athenians, as the century progressed and the difficulties in securing essential supplies became more intense, it was evidently not unthinkable to begin to award various honours to traders.

## 4.6 Aeneas Tacticus

We should note briefly that, writing probably contemporaneously with Xenophon,[282] Aeneas Tacticus recommends honouring merchants in time of shortage:

> When the city is short of corn, oil or other supplies, a premium [τόκους] proportionate to the value of his cargo should be offered to any merchant who brings in a consignment, and also a wreath as a mark of honour, while the captain should be granted exemption from harbour dues.[283]

Whitehead wonders whether one writer influenced the other.[284] It is unlikely we can ever know, but two possible conclusions may be drawn; first, that if either did indeed know of the other's work, the suggestion of honours for trade was immediately understood as an idea worthy of promulgation and thought likely to be well-received and second, that if they did not, then both independently recognised not only that such a proposition was a practical proposal, but also that the prevailing social and political mood would deem it worthy of consideration.

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281 Jansen 2007, pp. 307-309 argues that metic applicants would be judged essentially on their potential to generate income and that Xenophon's intention was 'to promote metic household businesses,' but I feel that Xenophon qualifies his proposal too carefully to indicate that he intends a substantial increase in metic residents, although Jansen's suggestion that it would be applied to metics who already occupy sites but do not own them is worthy of consideration.

282 Whitehead 2003, pp. 8-10, suggests the second half of the 350s.

283 Aen. Tact. 10.12. καὶ ὧν ἂν σπανίζῃ ἡ πόλις, σίτου ἢ ἐλαίου ἢ ἄλλου τινός, τῷ εἰσάγοντι κατὰ πλῆθος τῶν εἰσαγομένων τόκους προκεῖσθαι καὶ στέφανον δίδοσθαι εἰς τιμήν, τῷ δὲ ναυκλήρῳ ἀνολκὴν καὶ καθολκήν.

284 Whitehead 2003, p. 36.

## 4.7 Chapter conclusion

So how ‘enlightened’[285] was Xenophon in his suggestions about honours, and how ‘subversive’?[286] We have seen that Xenophon’s ideas in relation to honour are pre-figured in the *Cyropaedia* and in his Socratic writing, where he shows that the possession of honour crosses the traditional elite/non-elite boundaries and that ‘honours for use’ in particular, are an important aspect of the way he sees honour attributed across all strata of society. As we have seen in earlier chapters, Xenophon’s proposals relied heavily on the manipulation of individual ambition, native or otherwise, for the benefit of the Athenian *polis,* both through the pursuit of individual *philotimia* and the enticement of personal profit and public honours. But *philotimia* could have challenging implications for citizen equality unless exercised within a carefully bounded democratic context, and where Athenian citizens are concerned Xenophon’s proposal reinforces Athenian practice by offering rewards to Athenians only for the successful completion of their democratic duties.

In this chapter we have undertaken a closer examination of the dynamic relationship between Athenian and non-Athenian elites, recognised for instance in the awards to the Bosporan kingdom; grants of *enktesis* for religious purposes made to resident non-Athenians, and the flexible relationship between the old honour of proxeny with trade. This appraisal begins to demonstrate that in Xenophon’s proposals we are not looking at a straightforward shift from honours granted to exclusively foreign elites for non-profit related endeavours, to honours granted to non-elites for commercial activity. We have seen that, on at least three occasions that we know of before Xenophon wrote, honours had been granted by the Athenians to suppliers of goods who were of a different status to the familiar elite foreign honorands, and importantly given the reactions of some scholars to the *Poroi*, these are men who would have profited from the sale of their goods.[287] Xenophon’s potential honorands are strongly qualified, restricted to men whose goods and ships have helped the *polis*. One might reasonably

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[285] Pečírka 1967, p. 25.

[286] Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, p. 367, n. 14.

[287] Megarian: *IG* II$^2$ 81 = Walbank 1990: no. 5 = *SEG* 40.57 = Reed 49 = Engen 8; Lykon of Achaia: *IG* I$^3$ 174 = Walbank 50 = Engen 1 = Reed 47; Pythophanes: *IG* I$^3$ 98 = ML 80 = Fornara 149 = Walbank 75 = Reed 48 = Engen 2, 3.

think that quantities of any goods in some bulk would have been necessary to meet such a benchmark; ship-owners or merchants trading in important cargoes of sufficient size and quality to attract the grateful attention of the city must have been of substantial means and were probably not two a penny.

The proposal to offer *enktesis*, which has attracted such notoriety from commentators, is qualified. After all, a procedure may well already have been in place to allow non-Athenians to apply for the grant, and Xenophon is not suggesting that metics be allowed to occupy or farm agricultural land. Awards of *enktesis* had already begun to blur the boundaries between those for whom such grants were honorary in nature only, and those who might well take up the opportunity to use Athenian residence for private and commercial purposes. The work of both Gauthier and Daniel on the wording at 2.6 shows that in proposing such settlement, solely by approved applicants, of sites occupied by ruins, Xenophon's intention is twofold: the redevelopment of run-down areas of the city and the encouragement of carefully selected non-Athenians. Not only will useful members of the wider Athenian community be encouraged to stay, but ruined sites will be rebuilt, adding to the glory of the city.

Addressing Aristotle's conception of those who were indispensable to the citizenship,[288] Pečírka points by way of example to three wealthy non-citizens, whose awards of honours were in recognition of their considerable contributions to the city's finances,[289] thus demonstrating that some wealthy men were indispensable to the *polis* and yet were not, as per Aristotle's ideal state, citizens of it.[290] Such men symbolised the contradiction between the growing importance of wealthy metics and their status, which for Pečírka was 'one of the important factors in the crisis of fourth-century Athens.'[291] Like Finley,[292] Pečírka describes Xenophon's suggestion that *enktesis* be offered to traders as 'a bold, if at the same time half-way, remedy.' The proposals did

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[288] Pečírka 1967, discussing Arist. *Pol.* 1275a23; 1328b2-3, 6-11, 19-23; 1277b33-35; 1278a2-3.

[289] Eudemos of Plataia: *IG* II$^2$ 351 + 624 = *IG* II$^3$ 1 352 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 68-70 = RO 94 = *IALD* 121 no. 42, 319, 339-43, 352-55 no. 5, 402 and Nikandros of Ilion and Polyzelos of Ephesos *IG* II$^2$ 505 = Pečírka 1966, pp. 80-81.

[290] Pečírka 1967, pp. 25-26.

[291] Pečírka 1967, p. 24.

[292] 'It was bold to propose a reach in the land-citizen tie to the extent of allowing metics to own house property (for their own use only), but it is significant that he went no further than that,' Finley 1999, p. 163.

not happen, he argues, because 'it would have meant massive encroachment upon one of the basic principles of the Greek city-state: to reserve the right to own real property to the citizen population.'[293]

But Xenophon does not by any means suggest a 'massive' awarding of *enktesis*.[294] As we have seen, he limits it to suitable candidates who must go through an application procedure of some sort and meet Xenophon's high criteria. Indeed the honorands cited by Pečírka are quite exceptionally wealthy *euergetes*, financial benefactors and voluntary liturgists who would hardly be representative of the majority of metics and other non-Athenians trading in Athens. The awards to these prosperous examples are separated by almost thirty years. Granting *enktesis* to men of such status would hardly risk a housing crisis, let alone an upheaval in the Athenian social fabric.

Miller describes the energetic Athenian awarding of hospitality in the *prytaneion* as 'an exhibition of the vitality of the city in international politics'[295] and it is important to recognise *xenia* as a political tool in its own right with an established place in the consolidation of inter-state relations. In applying the honour to trade, Xenophon is not simply offering a one-off symbolic moment; he is inviting selected men of commerce to become a part of a complex nexus of relationships. Here as elsewhere he reconfigures the link between the political and the economic, refocusing the application of honours in order to reinforce the connection and recognising that commercial men of substantial means have an increasingly influential role to play within both their native and Athenian societies. By 330 we see Aeschines complaining about the wider awarding of *sitesis* to less worthy recipients,[296] but in the invitation to the *prytaneion*, as in most instances, Xenophon was careful to maintain the pre-existing distinction between honours awarded to citizens, such as *deipnon*, and those awarded to non-citizens, such as *xenia* and *euergesy*.[297]

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[293] Pečírka 1967, p. 25.

[294] I interpret 'massive' as a quantitative term. Pečírka cannot, I assume, intend it qualitatively since *enktesis* was already widely in operation and by definition was granted to non-citizens.

[295] Miller 1978, p. 129.

[296] Aesch. *Against Ktesiphon* 3.178. Aeschines was specifically challenging the proposal to award honours to Demosthenes.

[297] When the citizen/non-citizen boundaries were apparently transgressed, we should perhaps remain open to the possibility that there was not a considered reason. Rhodes 1984, p. 194, writing of *IG* II$^2$ 109, describes the Athenian invitation to *xenia* to their recently-created citizen Astycrates in 363/2 as 'a piece of carelessness', a refreshing option.

Perhaps Xenophon's most prescient suggestion is that of the inscription of the names of benefactors. His recognition of the power of the publication of honours is unsurprising, given the importance he attaches to *philotimia* and to honours as a public validation of one's usefulness to the community. Xenophon picked up on a desire for such acknowledgement which was about to receive widespread endorsement in stone as the *polis* began to acknowledge the importance of public recognition for the encouragement of future benefactions. The inscribing of Athenian honours mushroomed from the 340s with a frequency well beyond anything with which Xenophon would have been familiar. Writing on the cusp of a significant change in practice, as we have seen elsewhere Xenophon shows himself to be closely in touch with popular sentiment.[298]

Xenophon's proposed extension of honours is also carefully bounded. What he left out throws some further light on what he included. Proxeny, as we have seen, was already appearing in decrees for traders by the 350s,[299] but does not feature in Xenophon's list. Grants of *ateleia,* whether symbolic or practical,[300] are excluded, and it is noteworthy that whilst Xenophon suggests honours specifically to reward the importation of good quality commodities, he does not go so far as to suggest *ateleia,* perhaps because the waiving of tax-income would have been at odds with a programme intended to increase revenues, or perhaps more likely, that the grant remained controversial following the introduction of Leptines' law removing exemptions from taxation the previous year. Nor do we hear of gold crowns, and certainly not statues, which in the early half of fourth-century Athens were still rare and set up only in commemoration of military success.[301] When he wrote, in the context of trade, gold crowns appear only to have been afforded to foreign rulers; we only have evidence for such a grant to the Bosporans.[302] Xenophon does not break this precedent, even though such a move was to become acceptable as the century

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298 See for instance the comparison with Dem. 14 *On the Symmories* at chapter 1.5.5 above.

299 Engen 1, 2, 4, 8.

300 Rubinstein argues that hereditary grants of *ateleia*, usually accompanying proxeny, would have been difficult to prove and were probably essentially honorary: Rubinstein 2009, pp. 122-123 for symbolic grants, and generally for some of the tensions in the granting of *ateleia* across the Greek world.

301 Ma 2013, pp. 166-167.

302 Engen 7 and 9.

progressed. By the end of the century, the status of those receiving gold crowns was far broader, encompassing both wealthy and common professional traders.[303] Perhaps most significantly, citizenship does not feature. After all, as Gauthier argues, in Xenophon's eyes, privileges granted by the Athenians were still greatly appreciated by foreigners, and there was not any obvious need to extend them further.[304] But foreign traders, particularly if they were not resident, had no opportunity for direct political engagement in the running of the city, a correspondingly lesser reciprocal stake in her wider success and not necessarily any commitment to her wellbeing beyond the extent to which they could profit from it. Athens' disinclination to extend her citizenship thus risked disaffecting those on whom she had now increasingly come to rely.

For Davies, Athens' vulnerability when she was unable to recreate her fifth-century empire is linked to the political impasse between the Greek states and their joint inability to withstand the advance of Macedon. As other regions acquired the skills that had once made Athens pre-eminent, the failures of hegemony had left Athens unable and unwilling to create structures within which states could share resources and resist external aggression.[305] Looking to identify the sort of direction in which Athenian institutions might more successfully have evolved, Davies identifies two avenues which had they been explored, might have strengthened the state: the failure to restructure the tribes and the *boule*, and the lack of recognition that the citizen/non-citizen boundary was under stress.

Xenophon began to identify the second problem, but his solution was not radical enough to have made a substantial difference, even were his countrymen to have accepted it. Given that Xenophon clearly did see the importance of encouraging the loyalty and integration of *emporoi* and *naukleroi* into Athenian society, this omission may be an indication of Xenophon's conservatism. If so, then he was by no means alone in his short sightedness. Despite protestations such as those discussed above by Andocides at the very end of the fifth century[306] and that of Demosthenes in 352 that citizenship had become a worthless honour,[307] the evidence suggests that Athenian

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303 Wealthy: Engen 15, 21, 24, 27; common: Engen 25, 31.
304 Gauthier 1985, p. 151.
305 Davies 1995, pp. 33, 35-36.
306 And. *On his Return* 2.23. See chapter 4.2.
307 Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 23.200.

citizenship continued to be awarded only very sparingly until at least the second century and probably beyond.[308]

Nevertheless the change in the Athenian pattern of the awarding of honours in the second half of the fourth century has been seen as an indicator of 'decline'. The mid-century appearance of the *Poroi*, with its apparently novel framework for granting honours, offers a useful point in time for us to take stock of the practice against the background of both earlier and later awards. The task is made more complex by the virtually simultaneous emergence of the honorific epigraphical habit, which provides us with a large amount of evidence for the period following the *Poroi* but much less to compare it against for the earlier period. Rather than being able to judge for ourselves, we are thus sometimes reliant on literary evidence to tell us what was unusual or shocking, and legal contexts in particular come with their own agendas. The two speeches just discussed[309] stand as a warning against taking either the chance survival of inscriptions or the jaundiced view of the orators alone at face value. Meyer has recently argued that the 'honor-soaked epigraphic habit' reflected a specifically Athenian view that the good governance of the city was approved by the gods. Thus the permanent records of the many functions of democratic life placed in carefully chosen positions in the *agora* adjacent to temples and to monuments such as the Tyrannicides, were *de facto* honours for the gods themselves.[310] Lambert however interprets the introduction of hortatory intention clauses as an indication of the city's sense of her own decline, 'an expression of the city's exerting herself, straining to make the decrees as efficacious as possible.'[311] For Lambert this sense of decline is a strongly motivating factor both in the inclusion of the hortatory intention clause and in the appearance of decrees in which Athens honoured her own citizens:

> Because, I suggest, it is in the 340s that the Athenians are gripped by an intensified sense of the decline of their *polis*, decline in comparison with the glory days of the fifth century, decline in the face of the rise of Macedon, and by an acute sense that the performance of the *polis* is crucially dependent on

[308] 'the *polis* continued to value highly citizenship in the later Hellenistic period and the Athenians granted citizenship with discretion in the later second century,' Oliver 2007b, p. 274; see also Davies 1977 and M. J. Osborne 1983.

[309] And. *On his Return* 2.23 and Dem. *Against Aristocrates* 23.200.

[310] E. A. Meyer 2013b, quotation at p. 493.

[311] Lambert 2011a, p. 196.

> the performance of its officials.[312]

But this reading of Athenian lack of confidence in their officials, and of their understanding of their own status vis à vis their glorious past and their overweening northern neighbours has a very different timbre to the words of Xenophon. In contrast, Meyer's interpretation of the epigraphic habit as a representation of Athenian confidence in her democratic achievements is far closer to Xenophon's tone. Looking at the period just after the appearance of the *Poroi*, Lambert's analysis suggests that the state's decrees produce a picture of an Athens uncertain how to manage foreign relations, with interstate diplomacy looking to foreign individuals as a means to exercise control:

> Both before Chaironeia and for a few years after, and again after the Lamian War, it [Athenian diplomacy] is concerned with providing for opponents of Macedon who, in consequence of their opposition, are in exile at Athens from their home cities.[313]

Lambert (with Fisher), dates the start of this 'downward trajectory' to 346, coinciding with the Peace of Philocrates between Macedon and Athens of 346,[314] and although Lambert also characterises the *Poroi* as 'certainly a "response to decline," '[315] his discussion of decline points essentially to evidence from the 340s. The *Poroi* may well be a response to immediate financial difficulty, underpinned by a long term attempt to understand the evolving relationship between personal and state economics and its repercussions for inter-state relations, but it does not reflect from its author any sense of long-term decline.

For Pečírka, one aspect of the fourth-century crisis was the conflict between the rise in wealth of certain metics, without a concomitant rise in status, and Xenophon's proposal to offer *enktesis* to some traders was an honest recognition of this problem and a creditable attempt to find a solution to it.[316] For Engen, conversely, the broader award of honours in itself was a symptom of the complexity and dynamism of the Greek economy, but achieved at a 'social cost' to Athenian society as Athens adapted her awards system rather than create 'new public institutions that would acknowledge

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312 Lambert 2011b, p. 177.
313 Lambert 2006, p. 117.
314 Lambert 2011b, p. 177, n. 5.
315 Lambert 2011a, p. 196, although 'decline' is not explored any further in this paper and Lambert's references relate to the post-Chaironeia era.
316 Pečírka 1967, p. 25.

the economic needs of the state.' But whilst Engen refers several times to what he calls the 'corrosive' effect of the wider award of honours, because it involved adapting traditional honours for application to 'traditionally disesteemed market-oriented, profit seeking behavior from lowly outsiders,' [317] he does not, as far as I can see, provide evidence demonstrating this effect. I would argue instead that Xenophon's approach enables us to see that wider honouring could be viewed, by one Athenian at least (and an elite Athenian at that), not to have a corrosive effect, but to constitute an inclusive adaptation of a robust institution. If we follow Moreno's argument for the discreet involvement of the Athenian elite in trade, then the description of trade as 'traditionally disesteemed' requires a re-evaluation.[318] Where Pečírka sees the rise of monetary (rather than landed) fortunes, slave-ownership in non-traditional hands and a societal structure based on economic wealth, [319] one might argue that Xenophon notes the potential of these phenomena and attempts to appropriate them to the state. In one sense, there was a Solonic precedent even for this. Although Xenophon was far too conservative to think on such a scale, wealth had been the basis of the reassessment of status-driven political categories once before,[320] and what Athens probably most required was (re-) thinking on a similar scale.

Xenophon's proposals to honour worthy traders may not ultimately have been fulfilled in all their detail, but they were clearly a strong reflection of current thinking and they were built on precedent. As the fourth century progressed, the use of honours to promote trade increased enormously. Land was awarded to merchants from Citium for a temple; Eudemos of Plataia received strikingly similar honours to those Xenophon had proposed. However whilst honours continued to be used for political purposes: inviting ambassadors to the *prytaneion*, recognising the support of foreign powers,[321] those honours that were awarded in relation to trade appear not to have been given with a view to the wider encouragement of trade *per se*, but for the specific purpose of securing grain supplies and on occasion, fish.

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[317] Engen 2010, p. 220.

[318] Moreno 2007a, pp. 259-260.

[319] Pečírka 1976, pp. 26-29.

[320] 'The replacement of *Eupatridai* by *Pentakosiomedimnoi* represents a shift, in the definition of those entitled to hold office, away from a descent-group definition to a definition in terms of economic resources.' Davies 1977, p. 115.

[321] Lambert 2006 and 2007a provide a thorough survey of honours awarded to foreigners in the period 352/1 - 322/1.

Although Xenophon's proposals may have been built on earlier practice, they were innovative in their purpose and direction – improving the class of resident aliens, increasing trade with its concomitant financial benefits and renewing the cultural life of the city. The oft-quoted occasions on which Athenians did appear to implement or echo them indicate nevertheless a more conservative and cautious approach by the *demos*. It is very difficult to extrapolate wider policy from a relatively small base of inscriptions spread over a period of more than fifty years, but the honours granted by the Athenians over the remainder of the fourth century (some of them under a very different political climate) do not imply a substantial enough change of strategy to enable the significant evolution of the profile of individual resident and non-resident traders in Athens by this means alone, nor to initiate a consistent encouragement of their commercial activity. After the Social War, if Athens was to thrive, and on occasion even to feed herself, she would now be reliant on the goodwill of non-citizen individuals, rather than the coerced co-operation of other states. Whilst a flourishing city would be advantageous to their individual enterprises, so might any other busy place of exchange, and Xenophon saw the importance of finding ways to attract and retain such men and to give them a stake in the fortunes of the city. There may not be quite enough evidence to establish a 'trend', but there is certainly evidence that the apparently clear split between the non-Greek potentates honoured in the fifth century and the 'common professional trader' honoured from the 340s is not as clear cut as it might appear. With conservative caution Xenophon was remodeling and entrenching practices that were already evolving, just as they had done in the fifth century and as they would in the way that the city was later to use financial and honorific incentives to attract the best actors to her religious festivals.

If Xenophon was 'subversive' to offer *enktesis* to traders, then how might one categorise the Athenian extension of that most esteemed award, the grant of *sitesis*, to non-Athenians from 314/3?[322] Times had indeed changed. But then they always had. What this brief overview has shown above all is the evolving nature of honours and the way the Athenians had always used them as a reflection of political and economic

[322] *IG* II$^2$ 450, Asandros of Macedon, M. J. Osborne 1981, p. 160. Miller 1978, p. 11, notes that, 'By the Roman period a double portion of *sitesis* had to be awarded in order to signify any real honour in the grant.'

circumstances. Their strength lay both in their appeal as an apparently stable and unchanging reflection of historic practice, and in their adaptability in times of need.

## Chapter Five - Conclusion

In 1603 a French visitor to Spain reported that the Spanish had a proverb, 'Everything is dear in Spain, except silver.'[1] Two thousand years after the *Poroi*, European states could still fail to anticipate or manage the consequences of the arrival of large quantities of a highly valued commodity. The contextualisation of Xenophon's treatise within its social, political and economic setting has been central to my reappraisal, but such occasional comparators can still provide a useful reminder that it is not always reasonable to criticise an ancient writer for a failure to forecast the practical outcome of the implementation of what appears on the surface to be a fine idea. Xenophon may not theorise about the economy, but his writing is peppered with appreciation of economic causes and effects, allied to a nascent recognition that the anthropological concept of limited good, when evolved into the economic concept of zero sum, is in conflict with the idea of an expanding economy that is reflected in his treatise. This thesis has argued for the first time that he furnishes us with detailed evidence of the Athenians' understanding of the mechanics of their business enterprises and their ability to make economically rational decisions which, in particular circumstances for those possessing the level of wealth which enabled them to make choices, may or may not also have involved the consideration of social factors. The *Poroi* nevertheless sits apart from contemporaneous endeavours to manage deficiencies in state income in discrete spheres of liturgical default and one-off levies, in its audacious attempt to manipulate individual commercial enterprise for the benefit of the state and the rebuilding of foreign alliances, recognising that the collective need of the *demos* for resources was a primary motivator for war and looking to satisfy that need through the exploitation of internal assets. The goodwill of other states was essential to peace, and the financial self-sufficiency necessary to achieve that goodwill would be reliant on the collective friendship of individual men

[1] Braudel 1992, p. 171.

in Athens and abroad, a rebuilding, even re-inventing, of interstate relationships through the medium of myriad personal connections between Athenians and non-Athenians whose individual transactions, whether within the commercial, religious or intellectual domain, would provide the bulwark against future aggression. Despite looking to the location and resources of Attica for the revenues Athens required, the *Poroi* goes on to demonstrate that exploitation of those resources depended heavily on non-Athenians as trading partners, making pure *autarkeia* an impossibility. What becomes apparent, as commentators have always noted, is the extent to which, at the micro level, Athens needs the engagement of non-Athenians both at home and abroad and at the macro-level looks to other states not only for financial and political support but for approbation. But these are not relationships in which the Athenians unilaterally benefit from the labours of others in activities which Athenians themselves disdain. Instead I have argued that the extent to which Xenophon goes to mitigate the disadvantages to the non-Athenian of operating within her immediate commercial arena, demonstrates that these are trading and commercial relationships between equal partners both within and beyond Attica, providing consumers for Attic silver and products from Athenian farms and workshops in return for imported goods.

For the purposes of this study, it is not particularly relevant whether the *Poroi* is an entirely political or an entirely economically-focused treatise. What is important is that it furnishes an insight into the way that the Athenians understood their economic activity and that for the first time in our records, one Athenian analysed and applied this understanding in order to control wider political power relationships. Xenophon combines a recognition of Attica's underused resources with a comprehension of the underlying economic forces that engender individual actions, such as the stability of silver and the immediate lure of potential profits allied with the attraction of additional social benefits, in a city which already has the technical expertise, manufacturing experience and trading infrastructure to capitalise on her assets. Thus offering limited honours in return for usefulness to society regardless of status does not reflect a sense of Athenian decline or risk promoting social degeneration. Rather it sits entirely within both the city's evolving traditions and Xenophon's earlier thinking. In particular I have argued that the *Poroi's* proposals build on existing relationships between trade and honours evidenced not only in the overt offering of privileges to occasional recipients engaged in large-scale commerce, but on an

underlying pattern of relationships between elite individuals representing the interests of external states, and the visiting citizens of those states, associations that will have evolved over generations on a personal as well as on a political basis. Such relationships had long been acknowledged at state level by awards of *proxenia* and *enktesis*, the latter not always simply honorary. Although we do not have wide evidence of a subsequent granting of honours precisely on the model that Xenophon proposes, we have seen that the *Poroi* sits within a more fluid tradition of the granting of honours than has hitherto been acknowledged. But what is innovative about his proposals is that he comprehends that economic activity is initiated and influenced by a variety of manageable external factors and that he wraps together the many structures which can affect economic behaviour and hones them into a policy with the specific aim of economic regeneration.

This study has looked at the way that two aspects of economic motivation are represented within one example of ancient thought: the undertaking of risk for profit entirely unencumbered by social considerations of worth and status, and undertakings which are motivated or directed by considerations of honour above or equally to those of profit. The honours Xenophon proposes for non-Athenians would have been awarded only in very carefully controlled circumstances to individuals of exceptional worth to the *polis,* in situations where the attraction of honours might sway the choices of those individuals towards an economic relationship with Athens. But the bulk of the *Poroi* is about the mine-slave scheme, and here honours are not proposed. For the potential speculator in the silver mines, alternative investments were available,[2] and Xenophon not only recognises this but promotes the better return available through his own scheme by comparison with maritime investment.[3] Profit alone is expected to motivate individual Athenians and non-Athenians to set up in the silver industry as customers for his state slaves, and some of those operators, at least, may be personally expected to manage their own enterprises. There may be prizes for Athenian magistrates who can acquire the greatest number of metics, but no such incentives are required for silver-prospecting. Just as Athenian citizens with cash to invest were engaged in money-lending and perhaps the grain trade, they also invested in the mining industry in a variety of different ways, such as small scale slave leasing.

[2] Christesen 2003, p. 48.
[3] 3.9.

Of the leading figures in *Against Pantaenetus* not all truly want to be hands-on mine operators. Nicobulus was dismayed when he thought he might have to run the mine himself,[4] and there were plenty of men like him for whom the attraction of a return on money-lending alone was sufficient, whilst its means of achievement did not dent either their own, or their community's, evaluation of their status or self-worth. But there remained many others, such as Pantaenetus and the ultimate buyers of his business, who were willing to get involved in the daily management and decision-making of mine-operation. Such men had the pressures of meeting regular repayments to lenders and the state, of covering their overheads and feeding their workers, and of constant supervision and fine judgements as to the quality of the ore and the means of refinement. Contrary to those scholars who have seen Xenophon's proposals as evidence of an elite Athenian desire to live in leisure off the labours of non-citizens, I consider that successful mine-operation in such instances was not a hands-off, rentier lifestyle, and without such men, the system was unsustainable.

Whether they are evaluating his proposals as opportunists or as beneficiaries, Xenophon is asking his audience to engage in economically rational decision-making, whilst appealing to a complex self-esteem which wraps together Athenian aspirations to slave ownership with pride in her commercial centrality, in her historical leadership of the Greeks and in her religious and civic structures. The majority of his proposals centre on her silver resources, which held a particular place in Athenian collective life both because of the semi-mythologised role of silver in the Greek victory over the Persians more than a century earlier and thanks to her citizens' wide engagement with multitudinous aspects of the industry. In assessing his analysis of a variety of types of risk, I have shown that Athenian commercial planning was dependent on other indicators than are provided by record-keeping alone. Building on Christesen's demonstration that the Greeks had a surprising capacity to forecast stratified financial returns on investments in various enterprises,[5] I have shown some of the ways such projections were supported by a sophisticated ability to recognise, manage and mitigate business risks. We have further seen that Xenophon addresses a wide range of dangers throughout the exploration of his projects, and when we add in those considerations for merchants and entrepreneurs which do not even entail risk, such as

[4] Dem. *Against Pantaenetus* 37.10.
[5] Christesen 2003, p. 52.

harbour facilities and the comparative poverty of mine operators,[6] we can see that the *Poroi* reveals, not naivety, but a breathtakingly thorough exploration of the social, financial, physical and psychological barriers to Athenian economic development.

It is important to contextualise the *Poroi* within the Xenophontic corpus, but any apparent political subtext need not be prioritised at the expense of recognising its social and cultural setting. We should not forget that Xenophon was the resourceful improviser of the *Anabasis* and the careful manager of the *Oikonomikos*. I have suggested that hitherto, scholarship has failed to acknowledge the extent to which the daily experiences of his readers will have enriched contemporary readings with a detailed knowledge of the commercial and industrial life of Attica that we cannot reconstruct. Athenian pre-existing recognition of the importance of individual entrepreneurs to the silver industry is evidenced in the exemption of mine operators from tax even at a time of significant hardship when the citizen base for symmories had been broadened and other liturgical exemptions had been reduced. Jansen discusses the evidence for the fifth-century *poristai* who oversaw revenues, and their formal or informal continuation into the fourth century, noting that at the least, the office demonstrates an expectation that 'politicians and statesmen' were involved in the search for income-raising strategies.[7] Continuous, rather than crisis-led, approaches to revenue generation had been enmeshed within the political structure and the consciousness of its lead actors for some time.

Was Xenophon then pragmatic, recognising real problems and applying soldierly solutions; subversive, offering controversial upheaval to the social order; or simply picking up on a prevailing *zeitgeist* and employing it within the limited setting of immediate issues? From the *Ath. Pol.*[8] we learn that when in full operation, the mechanics of Athenian democracy might require payments to 20,000 citizens. Xenophon's solution to the stalemate of the preceding decades was to propose a shift from income-acquisition through thalassocracy, with its substantial demand on resources for naval maintenance and crewing, to the exploitation of land-based income sources, neighbourly trade and individual entrepreneurship. This in itself was

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[6] 4.12; 4.24.
[7] Jansen 2007, pp. 73-77.
[8] *Ath. Pol.* 24.3.

almost certainly controversial even in an era when political payments may not have been regularly met and when others were also calling for a reassessment of imperial ambitions. The schemes are certainly practical and thought through; innovative rather than subversive, and yet worked out within established conventions. Demosthenes and Isocrates offer plentiful evidence of contemporary attempts to improve Athenian finances and to change her foreign policy, whilst Aeneas Tacticus demonstrates that Xenophon's ideas about honours were not necessarily as controversial as has been suggested. What is original is his synthesis of these concerns within a continuous tradition of citizen political engagement to create a work of political economy.

These then, are the contributions that I hope this discussion has made to the study of the *Poroi* and to wider discussions of the Attic economy. In particular I have argued (1) that Xenophon was writing for a wider audience than his fellow citizens alone; (2) that we cannot appreciate the ancient reception of the text without recognising that the shared knowledge of the Laurion of many of its local, contemporary readers from elite investors to artisan suppliers enriched their reading, and that given the extent to which the silver industry permeated Athenian life, much of what may appear 'naïve' would have been read quite differently by an audience with daily experience of the web of activity that supported and profited from it. Analysis of the text has enabled (3) the broadening of the scholarly discussion of risk in the ancient world, demonstrating that Athenians could undertake a sophisticated appraisal and management of risk as a factor which contributed to their ability to make economically-rational decisions in commercial environments unhampered by the lack of sophisticated record-keeping. Xenophon had extensive experience of the large-scale acquisition and disposal of slaves, and an examination of comparative evidence, the experience of slaves in ancient mining and a review of his other texts shows that (4) both in the practical activities he reports and in his references to slavery elsewhere, any interpretation of the *Poroi* as a proposal for a beneficent regime in which slaves live with semi-autonomy in a *charis* relationship wherein the state would treat them as quasi-*euergetai* cannot be sustained.

Recognition of the continuity of citizen engagement with economic affairs, Xenophon's view of the role of the leader as advisor, and his promotion of the awarding of 'honours for use,' when allied with the immediate financial crisis,

demonstrate that (5) the *Poroi* contrasts directly with the notion of Athenian mid-century decline, broadly defined, identified by certain of his contemporaries and subsequent scholars. Rather (6) his use of prizes and honours sits within democratic structures and builds on earlier patterns of use which have been seen to be more flexible than hitherto recognised in their relevance to trade, reflecting established relationships between the Athenians and those who can offer something of value to the state.

It is indicative of the extent to which the *Poroi* has been subject to opposing interpretations over time, to note that in 1933 Andreades could contend that Xenophon's slave purchase scheme was not realised because of the humanity of the Athenians, a reading which put Xenophon and the Athenians at odds, with Xenophon appearing the more exploitative. By 2012, Jansen's reading exactly reversed the two positions, Xenophon offering 'a degree of freedom and autonomy' to the slaves and appearing more enlightened than his contemporaries.[9] But Xenophon's attitude to slavery was doubtless in tune with that of his fellow citizens and more than likely, neither interpretation applied. Caution, lack of collective will, preoccupation with immediate events, all would hamper the progress of a plan that required a refocusing of the *demos* and the persuasive confidence to steer through a scheme of immense magnitude. But on the smaller scale, as we have seen, many of the text's ideas took shape, with the refurbishment of harbour facilities, the extension of the theoric fund and the honouring of certain suppliers. The economic potential of the silver mines and the entrepreneurship of Athenians and others inevitably combined without the need for a state facilitator. Within ten years, acrimonious court encounters over significant sums of money reflect the rejuvenation of the silver industry and within a further decade annual state income had tripled without the exploitation of empire. On the political stage, Athenian external relationships continued to be complex, but as Xenophon predicted, with the arrival of peace, and even without some of the support his plan had proposed, the Attic economy began to expand once more.

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[9] Andreades 1933, pp. 388-389; Jansen 2012, p. 737.

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