

Options for Poverty Reduction Through Community Empowerment Towards Sustainable Fisheries Resource Production and Equity



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By: P.W. Namisi

Ecology-Economics Sub - Component

Fisheries Research Component

Fisheries Resources Research Institute (FIRRI)

P.O. Box 343, Jinja, Uganda, Fax: 256-43-120192

Email: firi@infocom.co.ug or firi@firi.go.ug



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Enforcement

- Fisheries control monitoring and surveillance must be even-handed but this is limited by lack of financial resources.
- Regulations must be practically enforceable otherwise there will be a loss of credibility of enforcers.

Reasons for failure in fisheries management

- Traditionally, private entities (fishers) are given public rights (known exclusive access) to a common-pool good (the fishery). In other words, individual can fish from a resource that every one owns in common for their own private gain, but they cannot stop anyone from doing the same. Under these conditions, no body has an incentive to conserve the resource, because if they act responsibly they watch others continue fishing. More and more fishers and boats will arrive until profits disappear altogether, and the long-term health of fishery deteriorates.
- Fisheries management that emphasizes conventional regulatory tools like quotas, gear restrictions, and sizes, boat types, catch limits and other "technical conservation measures," simply results in more costly resource harvest. This results in competitive pressure among fishers to invest in improved gear and boats to maintain their harvests as each tries to make a living. Overfishing thus persists in the face of regulation because of capital investments.

Need for Alternative approaches

- From a social point of view, the crisis of fisheries is one of (future) employment, income generation, and income distribution. It also has gender dimensions.
- The crisis of fisheries is also a crisis of management—it is therefore worthwhile to reflect on various management options, their usefulness and consequences.

SOME USEFUL MODELS

There are several examples and models that can help improve fisheries management on a practical level.

- 1. Forum Fisheries Agency**
- 2. Japanese Villages**

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- 3. Individual Transferable Quotas**
- 4. Community Fishing Corporations**
- 5. The role of Incentives**
- 6. Precautionary approach to harvest**
- 7. Co-management**

Precautionary approach to harvest

- Achieving a realistic balance of management capabilities against the intensity and extent of fishing is part of what is known as the precautionary approach. In a precautionary context, absence of adequate scientific data should not justify delaying or not taking action to conserve target species, associated or dependent species and known target species and their environment.
- Incomplete or inadequate data are frequently the norm in fisheries management situations, as in most natural resource management activities. In some cases, conservation actions may need to be based on analyses of the probably consequences to the fishery, especially when long term, or irreversible consequences are more likely than not.
- A precautional approach to fisheries management places the responsibility to harvester to act effort promptly once reduced spawning stocks are identified by managers. When resource assessments are uncertain, managers of the fisheries of the option of restraining harvesting until better information allows them to be more certain about the consequences of fishing.

COMMUNITY-BASED FISHERY MANAGEMENT

- The conventional approach to fisheries management usually pits the manager and the managed against each other in an adversarial-type relationship. Excluded from the decision-making process and often not appreciating the need for particular management measures, fishermen will attempt to circumvent them in order to maximize catches and, in turn, revenue. They will do this even though penalties exist for infringements.
- In normal circumstances fishermen are not involved in designing and implementing fisheries management regimes, though this situation is changing particularly in developed countries. Indeed, consultation between the managers and fishers is often limited to an explanation by the managing authority as to the nature of management measures after they have been adopted and are in the process of being implemented.
- With the imposition of measures from above, fisheries managers rely on the goodwill of fishermen and legal sanctions for support. In Uganda, fisheries administrators have tended to underestimate the importance of

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- Complicated for the exploitation of multispecies fishery.
 - Use of maximum economic yield (MEY)
1. Limited by insufficient knowledge to calculate the optimum catch when recruitment of young fish to the fishery was constantly changing.
 2. Need to take account of all species and their interactions.
 3. MEY depends on demand since when demand is low the market would be saturated by a lower catch than is incorrectly sustainable.
- Success of objectives comes with need for a major reduction in fishing effort.
- Problem therefore becomes one of deciding on the amount of fishing, which can be allowed in order to optimize catch over the long term. This can be solved by:
1. Analysing stock levels and recruitment of all the key species and then deducing the catch to give the overall MEY. This would then need converting, through a knowledge of fishing power of vessels into the number of vessels allowed to fish.
 2. Carry out an assessment of the profitability of the fishing activity.

The causes of over-exploitation


- The Fisheries of Lake Kyoga basin, in common with most other fisheries are over-exploited, providing a lower yield of fish for more effort than need be the case. For over-exploitation to take place for an extended period two conditions need to exist:-
1. There must be common ownership of the resource (where ownership exists the owner would take steps to limit exploitation).
 2. It must continue to be economical to fish even when over-fishing occurs. (This of course assumes that there is a demand for the fish, because without that there will be no market, where there is no demand, or it is low, over fishing does not occur).

Control of Access

- Over-exploitation of Lake Kyoga fisheries is a result of fishers competing to take as big a share as possible from the common resource. Successful management of Lake Kyoga fishery requires the elimination of this competition and a reduction in fishing effort.
- Controlling access by existing fishing boats must be accompanied by measures to prevent new boats joining the fishing. Control of access should also be even handed across all riparian districts operating in the area. Otherwise the management would fail. This situation is complicated by open access resource and immigrating fishers.

traditional knowledge and practices in formulating management regimes and they have therefore failed to benefit from this knowledge.

- The involvement of fishers in the development, implementation and supervision of fisheries management regimes has been widely practised in some countries (e.g., Japan) and is gaining prominence into the countries as a means of making a regime a regroups scientific foundation more efficient. FAO (1992 forthcoming) has noted that community based management could lead to welfare improvements if it is possible to rehabilitate or build on traditional management systems.
- When fishermen are involved in attempting to solve problems associated with fisheries over exploitation, they become active agents for change in the process. They are likely to understand the rationale and need for management, even though measures proposed might appear to disadvantage them, albeit in short term. Moreover, it is likely that such regimes will be more cost effective because, through participation, fishers will ensure that measures are observed and surveillance and enforcement costs will therefore be lower.
- In Uganda, although the effectiveness of customary institutions and values have been eroded in the course of social change, attempts to build on traditional experience and modes of operation for fisheries management , has merit. Community based approaches to management essentially involve “bottom -up” or “grass- root” planning. This means that communities would be involved in determining fisheries management measures, supervising their implementation and invoking penalties when management measures and guidelines are ignored.
- The Uganda Government has recognised the need to decentralise decision making and authority in a number of important policy and development areas including financial administration, the public service, fisheries and agriculture. Devolution of responsibility has involved transfers of power from national to district governments.
- Government have adapted a policy of decentralisation principally for political reasons. Their objective has primarily been to give people greater role in decision making and policy development. Governments have also acknowledged that in traditional small scale societies people were consulted on important matters and that their contributions were taken into account.
- Decentralisation has also been a priority for Uganda government because of the failure of institutions established in colonial periods, and continued after political independence, to meet community needs. This failure has provided a strong incentive for governments to pursue decentralisation policies as an alternative development strategy. The devolution of fisheries powers to districts or lower levels has enabled fishers and related



interests groups to be more closely involved in decisions concerning management issues.

Co-management




Fig. 1. Fisheries Co-management as a partnership

- Fisheries co-management can be defined as a partnership arrangement in which government agencies, the community of local resource users (fishers), non-government organisations, and other stakeholders (fish traders, boat owners, business people, etc.) share the responsibility and authority for the management of a fishery.
- Co-management covers various partnership arrangements and degrees of power-sharing and integration of local (informal, traditional, customary) and centralized government management systems.

Five Broad types of Co-management

- Based on role played by Government and Resource users
 1. Instructive (minimal information exchange)
 2. Consultative (consultation exists)
 3. Co-operative (co-operation as equal partners)
 4. Advisory (user advice to government)

5. Informative (delegation of authority to users).

However, this is an oversimplification. In actual situation a multitude of tasks that can be co-managed under a different type of co-management arrangement at different stages in the management process exists.

- Co-management is a middle course between state-level concerns on fisheries management for efficiency and equity, and local concerns for self-governance, self-regulation and active participation. It is a process of resource management: adjusting and maturing to changing conditions over time and involving aspects of democratization, social empowerment, power sharing and decentralization.
- **Co-management is not a regulatory technique but should be seen as flexible management strategy in which a forum or structure for action on participation, rule making, conflict management, power sharing, leadership, dialogue, decision-making, knowledge generation and sharing, learning, and development among resource users, stakeholders and government is provided and maintained.**
- Partnerships are pursued, strengthened and redefined at different times in the co-management process, "depending on the existing policy and legal environment, the political support of government for community-based actions and initiatives, and the capacities of community organizations to become government partners" (Rivera 1997).
The co-management process may include formal and/or informal organizations of resource users and stakeholders.

Community-based Fisheries Co-Management

- Community-based resource management is a central element of co-management.
- CBCRM according to Korten (1987) includes several elements: a group of people with common interests, mechanisms for effective and equitable management of conflict, community control and management of productive resources, local systems or mechanisms for capture and use of available resources, broadly distributed participation in control of resources within the community, and local accountability in management. It is basically seen as community empowerment for resource productivity, sustainability and equity.
- Community-based resource management is people-centred and community-focused, while co-management focuses not only on these issues but also on partnership arrangement between government and the local community and resource users. The government usually plays a minor role in CBCRM.

- Co-management, on the other hand, has a major and active role for government. Government serves a number of important functions including provision of supporting policies and legislation such as decentralization of management power and authority, fostering of participation and dialogue, legitimization of community rights, initiatives and interventions, enforcement, addressing problems beyond the scope of the community, co-ordination at various levels, and financial and technical assistance, among others.
- Government provides legitimacy and accountability to CBRM through co-management. Only government can legally establish and defend user rights and security of tenure at the community level.
- Co-management often addresses issues beyond the community level, at regional and national levels, and of multiple stakeholders, and allows these issues, as they affect the community, to be brought more effectively into the domain of the community.
- Fisheries co-management, however, is not a panacea for sustainable fisheries management but just an alternative strategy for resource management. Interestingly, it is a strategy which is receiving more attention from resource managers, policy-makers, development agencies, non-governmental organizations, and donors worldwide.

Role of Fisheries Marketing under Co-management in Poverty Reduction

- One of the main challenges facing small-scale subsistence fishers, as well as commercial fishers, is the need to reach markets. Markets are the primary transmission channels of economic information (prices, wages) to economic agents. With this information, decisions can be made on what and how much to produce, and by what method, and when to consume. Changes in this information may stimulate new consumption choices, production processes and technologies. Market information may also transmit the need for regulation to public officials. If they work properly markets are potentially the most efficient means by which this information can be conveyed.
- This can be done much more successfully by working as a group. It is a proven fact—there is strength in numbers. Take a look at any successful economy and you will find that much of the driving force comes from group activity. From teachers' Unions to cooperatives, people from all background find new strength in working together. But fishers' organizations are often few and far between because, until recently, fishers in African countries have not been encouraged to form themselves into groups, which can represent their interests. This omission has been the missing link in our development strategy.