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COMPASSION
IN THE CARETAKER
& THE ZOO STORY

RANDA R. K. HELMY

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COMPASSION IN THE CARETAKER AND THE ZOO STORY

BY

RANDA RUSHDY KAMEL HELMY

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A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH AND COMPARATIVE LITERATURE
OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

APRIL 1984

This Thesis for the Master of Arts Degree

by

RANDA RUSHDY KAMEL HELMY

has been approved



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

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

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

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April 1984
Date

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INTRODUCTION

The Theatre of the Absurd emerges as a reflection of the philosophy of the Absurd, which was first expounded by the Existentialist philosopher, Albert Camus. In my thesis, I will attempt to expose the philosophy of the Absurd with special regard to Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus, and to his general philosophy that progresses from the awareness of the "absurd" in life and the non-intelligibility of the universe, to "rebellion" against the "absurd walls," but based on the incomprehension of the universe, and finally to the necessity for "compassion" as an end to absurdity and rebellion. Hence, the emphasis on the extreme importance and the urgent need for the establishment of authentic and compassionate relationships among people is a central issue in the overall philosophy of the absurd, or in the absurd world. The Theatre of the Absurd, being an artistic exploration of the philosophy of the Absurd, presents the problem of human compassion. It presents absurd heroes who have sensed their loneliness and isolation from other characters i.e. they have sensed the absurd wall of alienation, and have thus attempted to establish compassionate relationships with other characters as a kind of transcendence of this absurd wall in life. The problem of compassion, however, arises from the unawareness of other characters of

"the absurd" in their lives. I will try to deal with the problem of compassion in Harold Pinter's play The Caretaker, and Edward Albee's The Zoo Story, and examine the extent of these dramatists' commitment to the new dramatic standards that the theatre of the Absurd adopts.

CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ABSURD

The philosophy of the Absurd comes into existence with the appearance of Albert Camus, who gives the first systematical exposition of the term "absurd." Camus' philosophy of the absurd sprang from the historical context of his age, and from the fears and anxieties of his generation. The fact that he grew to maturity in Algeria helped him in achieving this task as he was able to view Europe clearly from this distant North African country. In his Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt, John Cruickshank states that:

> Camus himself described his writings as the outcome of an effort to understand the age into which he was born.... In one of his post-war essays he wrote: 'From the shores of Africa where I was born, helped by distance, we have a clearer view of the face of Europe and we know it is not beautiful.' Elsewhere he speaks of Europe as 'dark,' 'dreary,' 'sad,' and even 'ignoble' because of the spectacle it has offered in our time of wars and mass murder. In an essay of the same period he writes:
>
> > Do you know that over a period of twenty-five years, between 1922 and 1947, 70 million Europeans--men, women and children,--have been uprooted, deported and killed.[1]

Thus, it can be said that the recent history of Europe was the main preoccupation of Camus. He was greatly concerned with the human suffering, with mass deportations, mass murder, tor-

ture, and the destructive threat of scientific discoveries. According to Lev Braun in his Witness of Decline, Camus experienced the 'absurd' as a social experience. He states that:

> Camus entered the intellectual and political life of France in one of its darkest periods. There are moments in the lives of men when politics become their fate. Such was the case in France for those who entered adult life in the years preceding the Second World War. If ever a time created the impression that the universe was absurd, it was indeed that period. Events seemed beyond control. Men felt trapped, a prey to anonymous forces, unavoidably drawn into a war that nobody wanted to face, that spurred no heroic anticipations, not even an elementary feeling of national solidarity.[2]

Hence, the philosophy of the Absurd stemmed from a pessimistic view of Europe at the time of Camus. It reflects a nihilistic impression--a belief in "Nothingness," and a sense of void--that predominated the intellectual as well as the social scopes of life and that had the influence to affect most of Camus' generation.

In his book, Sartre and Camus, Leo Pollman suggests that:

> Camus's work has been seen--and certain theoretical statements of his own corroborate this--as falling into three parts: the absurd..., revolt, ... and an incipient final phase leading perhaps toward the goal of love.[3]

Perhaps the 'absurd' is most clearly expressed in Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus. In this book Camus conceives that the 'absurd'

is the conscious awareness of leading a purposeless, aimless, futile, yet fatal and mechanical life. He depicts the mythological figure of Sisyphus--who is perpetually condemned by the gods to roll a rock up the hill and as it rushes down, he has to push it up again toward the summit--in order to emphasize the futility and meaninglessness of life. The conscious awareness of leading a routine life is the clue to experiencing what Camus calls the "absurd walls." The 'absurd' then is open to different interpretations. It becomes the awareness of the passage of time and of death as an end to physical existence, the feeling of the "denseness" and "strangeness" of the world, the sense of estrangement between man and other people and the feeling that people too "secrete the inhuman," and finally the sense of alienation from ourselves, from that "familiar and yet alarming brother we encounter in our photographs"[4] i.e. man is alienated even from his identity and true self.

Camus believes that the universe is "dense" and "strange." He states that

> Strangeness creeps in: perceiving that the world is "dense," sensing to what a degree a stone is foreign and irreducible to us, with what intensity nature or a landscape can negate us. At the heart of all beauty lies something inhuman... The primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia... The world evades us because it becomes itself again.[5]

Hence, the feeling of absurdity is born out of the confrontation

between the mind that desires to comprehend the universe and to search for its unity and the "impossibility of reducing the world to a rational and reasonable principle."[6] It is the outcome of the contradiction between "nostalgia" for unity, and the "unreasonable silence of the world."[7] In attempting to express the latent anxieties of his generation, Camus was singularly obsessed by the individual--his freedom and happiness on earth. On the other hand, he refuses to base his belief on the "abstract" universe, or on systematic ideologies that do not answer his demands for the welfare, and happiness of man. Therefore, being convinced of the "uselessness of any principle of explanation," Camus founds his belief on the concrete, the given, and the perceptible. He does not concern himself with anything beyond his given criteria. He formulates his belief stating:

> what I touch, what resists me--that is what I understand.[8]

Thus, Camus directs his concern towards "the educative message of perceptible appearance."[9] To him, that which is concrete and which can be perceived is that which he comprehends and can learn from. A feeling of indifference has thus characterized the future and a "desire to use up everything that is given"[10] is created.

To Camus, the consequences of the absurd are: "revolt," "freedom," and "passion." Revolt is "the certainty of a crush-

ing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it."[11] Revolt thus stems from an awareness of the absurd. He is so obsessed by the love of life and the fear of death that "the resulting combination of exultancy and despair ultimately provided Camus with the basis of revolt."[12] Although the landscape is beautiful, "its beauty contains a disturbingly impersonal quality" and as Camus looks at it, he can find "no promise of immortality for himself. On the contrary, the enduring features of the natural scene are a reminder of the brevity of his existence."[13] And so, Camus accepts the beauty, grandeur, and splendour of the landscape, as well as his own temporal existence in the impersonal and unintelligible universe.

Consequently, Camus' philosophy depends upon: accepting the absurd in life as a truth, believing in the full consumption of the given at the present moments, and revolting against any "abstract" or "absolute" principles or beliefs whether they be religious or political. John Cruickshank states about Camus in this respect that

> He regards temporal, mortal life as the only reality and the only happiness of which he has certainty. He sees this attitude as loyalty to his human condition. He regards any form of consolation as being at best a pure hypothesis allowing of no verification. In this youthful world of sensual certainty and spiritual distrust belief is based only on sight... He embraces what is present to his senses and treats everything else as gratuitous construction.[14]

In order to maintain this philosophy Camus asks that the absurd man should base his revolt on the acceptance of the absurdity of life, while at the same time he should not look for any solutions. And that posture will include not even regarding revolt as a solution. The absurd man has to possess two main features: "lucidity" and "innocence" which will help him to accept the meaninglessness of life. Lucidity and innocence will enable him to live "without appeal," and "to live solely with what he knows, to accommodate himself to what is, and bring in nothing that is not certain."[15] This kind of lucid revolt will bring forth the peculiar happiness of the absurd man. Perhaps this illustrates Camus' view point that although Sisyphus is conscious of his eternal damnation, yet his lucidity enables him to triumph over his punishment so that "one must imagine Sisyphus happy."[16] Cruickhank comments on the condition of Sisyphus as he states:

> Thus Sisyphus, like l'homme absurde, scorned the gods, hated death and was passionately attached to life. His "absurdist" punishment, however, makes him a less hopeless figure, according to Camus, than one might at first think. Each time he tries again to push the rock to the top of the slope he is conscious of his torment and of the hopelessness of his task. Nevertheless, despite this knowledge, he continues his task. He realizes the nature of his destiny, and Camus claims that this consciousness makes him superior to it. The lucidity necessary to his torment is part of his victory over it.[17]

Therefore, in the consciousness of revolt, and in the "day-to-

day revolt," the absurd man "gives proof of his only truth, which is defiance. This is a first consequence"[18] of the absurd.

The second consequence of the Absurd, according to Camus, is "freedom." Camus conceives that freedom is restricted. In The Myth of Sisyphus he states:

> Thinking of the future, establishing aims for oneself, having preferences--all this presupposes a belief in freedom, even if one occasionally ascertains that one doesn't feel it. But at that moment I am well aware that that higher liberty, that freedom to be, which alone can serve as basis for a truth, does not exist. Death is there as the only reality... what freedom can exist in the fullest sense without assurance of eternity?[19]

According to this conception of freedom, the absurd man has to be conscious of its restriction. "The certainty of death and the conviction that absolute values do not exist cause l'homme absurde to reject a full metaphysical notion of freedom. L'homme absurde is without hope of any eternal freedom, located perhaps in an after life, that might nullify the effect of physical destruction."[20] Nevertheless, Camus argues that the absurd man is more free than those who are unaware of the absurd. To him, although people who are unconscious of the absurd can imagine that they choose the course of their lives and have a goal to achieve, yet, unknowingly, they are restricted to accomplishing that goal. Their freedom is incomplete. On the other hand, the absurd man is aware of those restrictions to freedom. John

Cruickshank comments that

> The essence of the absurdist position, in this respect, lies in the fact that to wager for the absurd can liberate the individual from such restraints. The absurdist freedom that results from this situation is the only real freedom just because it is subject to mortal, human limitations.[21]

The absurd man thus derives his freedom from the very recognition of its restraints, hence from his adherence and maintenance of the absurd attitude in his life. However, in spite of the awareness of the restrictions to freedom, the resulting freedom is also incomplete. It is a kind of freedom that "acts capriciously here and now, but not freedom that can outlast death."[22] After formulating his view of freedom, Camus concludes:

> It is clear that death and the absurd are here the principles of the only reasonable freedom: that which a human heart can experience and live. This is a second consequence.[23]

The third consequence of the absurd is "passion." The awareness of the absurd in life, the fact of death, the lucidity required for revolt and freedom are the basis for the absurd man to live his life as fully as possible. This is what Camus calls "passion." He states that

> The present and the succession of presents before a constantly conscious soul is the ideal of the absurd man. But the word "ideal" rings false in this connection. It is not even his vocation, but merely the third consequence of his reasoning.[24]

Hence, Camus urges the absurd man to live with passion and to

consume the present, which is given to him. The awareness of the absurd strengthens the desire to concentrate on the present moments, and to experience life to the greatest possible degree of passion so that "the argument that began as an invitation to commit suicide finally becomes an imperative to live life with passion."[25]

John Cruickshank comments on the three consequences of the absurd by stating that

> This series of affirmations, made up of such terms as revolt, freedom and intensity, is still finally subject to those negations from which awareness of the absurd originated. Thus the ethic of revolt does not mean deliverance. It is revolt paradoxically based on acceptance--indignant acceptance of the immutability of the absurd.[26]

Thus, revolt, freedom, and passion do not nullify the absurdity of life, but, on the contrary, are based on its acceptance as an inevitable truth.

Whereas the "absurd," and "revolt" can be considered two main and earliest phases in Camus' intellectual thinking, the emphasis on man's humanism and on the formation of compassionate and genuine relationships among people can be considered a later and developed phase. The first two stages originated in what can be called the "negations" that he found in life, which led to the feeling of absurdity, and consequently necessitated the reaffirmation of the vanishing humanism. The philosophy of the absurd, and of revolt led to a belief in the concrete truths

of given and perceptible situations. According to Camus, the world contains the truth of Man. Cruickshank reports that in his Lettres à un ami Allemand, Camus states:

> I continue to believe that this world has no supernatural meaning. But I know that something in the world has meaning--man--because he is the only being who demands meaning for himself. This world at least contains the truth of man, and our task is to justify him in the face of destiny itself.[27]

Thus, to Camus, man is to live his life fully and to the greatest possible degree of passion. He is to accept the irrationality of the world and to attempt forming compassionate and authentic relationships with others as a way to live passionately. In order to achieve this formation, man is to rebel against any system that limits or undermines his freedom to live intensely. Revolt against the "absurd walls" for the purpose of asserting one's identity, and one's right to live happily then become an essential act. To Camus, human dignity can only be defended by rebelling against any confining and limiting authority. Accordingly, revolt implies a positive meaning which is the assertion and safeguarding of values. Lev Braun reports what Camus has written in The Rebel as he states

> Rebellion cannot exist without the feeling that, somewhere and somehow, one is right... He /the rebel/ demonstrates, with obstinacy, that there is something in him which "is worthwhile..." Every act of rebellion tactily invokes a value.[28]

This individual human worth is enlarged by Camus to include not

only the individual's identification and his belonging to the human race, but also human solidarity. Camus' values are thus human values and not absolutes. He recognizes these values in the individual consciousness that "refuse to be regarded as a tool or a plaything by another man, by society, or even by fate or the gods."[29] It can be said, therefore, that--according to Camus--in revolt man transcends himself and discovers other people and from this act, human solidarity results. Thus, the loneliness with others and the alienation from them become an elementary consequence of the awareness of the absurd, since in revolt, man transcends his loneliness and his inevitable existence in an absurd world, and tries to achieve a kind of human solidarity by discovering other people in order to face the "absurdity" of life and all the "absurd walls." Hence, the rebel's aim is not to conquer or oppress, but to free himself and other people from what can be called the "master-slave relationship" in order to defend his own and other people's dignity, freedom, and humanity. This can be achieved by the attempt to form with others compassionate relationships that are based on the passion of the absurd. Consequently, Camus states in his Carnets that

> The end of the movement of absurdity, of rebellion, etc., ... is compassion in the original meaning of the word, that is to say, in the last analysis, love.[30]

In an age of war and its destructive repercussions, Camus yearns

for the forgotten humanism of man. His call for compassion can be seen as an invitation to revive man's humaneness in an age of its decadence. In his Witness of Decline, Lev Braun states about Camus that

> He demands humaneness and decency in politics. He gives the highest place to respect for life and happiness and denounces the senselessness of ambition and conquest.[31]

Thus, Camus denounces war, ambitious conquest, and materialism that bring forth human suffering, isolation, and cause lack of compassionate relationships among people. Braun reports what Camus has written in his Actuelles I as he states

> We live in a world of abstractions, of bureaus and machines, of absolute ideas... We are being smothered by people who believe themselves to be absolutely in the right, whether because of their machines or their ideas. And for all who cannot live except in dialogue and friendship with man, this silence is the end of the world.[32]

Thus, compassion itself becomes, as it were, a second revolt that is born from the 'first' revolt of the individual in struggle with his alienation.

CHAPTER II

THE THEATRE OF THE ABSURD

The Theatre of the Absurd reflects the philosophy of the Absurd. It revolts against the themes and styles of older drama and adopts new ones, centering on protagonists who have sensed "the absurd" in their lives, and have thus felt the importance of the establishment of compassionate relationships with other characters as a way of transcending their existence in a meaningless universe, and their countering of all the "absurd walls" in life.

The dramatists of the Absurd typically present absurd heroes who are confronted with the hopelessness of the human condition. These heroes are lucidly conscious of man's position of "strangeness" and "aloneness" in a "non-intelligible" and "fragmented" universe that offers no hope. Attempting to transcend the absurdity of life, to triumph over their fate, they consequently attempt to live their lives to the greatest possible degree of passion. They are indifferent towards the future, yet to live their lives passionately they use up the given at the present moments. Just as Sisiphus concludes that "all is well" and consumes the truth of the given situation intensely to the extent that Camus perceives that "each atom

of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world," and that the "struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart" with joy so that "one must imagine Sisyphus happy,"[1] likewise the absurd hero consumes the given and triumphs over the "crushing" and inevitable fate, transcending it through the possibility of being compassionate toward others, i.e. towards Man, who is a truth in the world. The task of the absurd hero [--who intends to transcend his loneliness--] then becomes confronting other characters with the absurdity of their lives, and trying to awaken them to the urgent need for the establishment of compassionate relationships that are completely devoid of egocentricity, self-interest, and false self-sufficiency. Compassionate relationships, however, do not negate the absurdity of life, but on the contrary, are based on its acceptance. Yet, it is a kind of acceptance that does not contain resignation to the inevitable fate of man, but that invokes revolt and transcendence. What differentiates the absurd hero from another character is that he has recognized the "absurdity" of his life, and has transcended it by his attempt to live passionately and compassionately, while the other has not.

As older drama had offered plays in which the beliefs and ideological conceptions of previous eras can be discerned, so the Theatre of the Absurd also presents drama that is in

accordance with the features of its time. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus outlines a mythic vision of the universe and a definition of what he believed to be the central insight of that time. He states:

> A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.[2]

Basing their plays upon the belief in the world's absurdity, absurd dramatists neither express an ideological conception, nor reject its lack, though they may express bewilderment at that lack. They solely present their vision of the world as it appears to them and as they sense it. In his Reflections, Martin Esslin states that

> What these writers express is not an ideological position but rather their bewilderment at the absence of a coherent and generally accepted integrating principle, ideology, ethical system... in our world. And the lack of such a unifying force, an individual's sense that it is lacking, is not an ideological position; it is a matter of fact.[3]

This vision of the world's lack of cohesion is shared by various dramatists in the Western World, but, they do not collaborate and form a group with specific goals and characteristics. In The Theatre of the Absurd, Esslin states about the absurd

dramatists that they

> do not form part of any self-proclaimed or self-conscious school or movement. On the contrary, each of the writers in question is an individual who regards himself as a lone outsider, cut off and isolated in his private world. Each has his own personal approach to both subject-matter and form; his own roots, sources, and background. If they also, very clearly and in spite of themselves, have a good deal in common, it is because their work most sensitively mirrors and reflects the preoccupations and anxieties, the emotions and thinking of many of their contemporaries in the Western World.[4]

Thus, the awareness of absurdity in the universe was the only common factor that linked these dramatists together and allowed for the name "absurd dramatists."

The dramatists of the Absurd frequently reject all or most of the elements that were previously thought to make up a "good play." Martin Esslin, in The Theatre of the Absurd, gives a significant account of the opposition between older standards and the absurd plays as he states:

> If a good play must have a clearly constructed story, these have no story or plot to speak of; if a good play is judged by subtlety of characterization and motivation, these are often without recognizable characters and present the audience with almost mechanical puppets; if a good play has to have a fully explained theme, which is neatly exposed and finally solved, these often have neither a beginning nor an end; if a good play is to hold the mirror up to nature and portray the manners and mannerisms of the age in finely observed sketches, these seem often to be reflections of dreams and nightmares; if a good play relies on witty repartee and pointed dialogue, these often consist of incoherent babblings.[5]

The new content of absurd plays is the portrayal of the dramatist's vision of what he considers to be the basic and fundamental absurdity of the human condition i.e. man's loneliness, isolation, alienation and estrangement in an unintelligible and disintegrated universe. Absurd plays present their characters' fears, anxieties, restlessness, hopelessness, and frustrated desires. They also question personal integrity and personal relationships and explode egocentricity and delusions of self-sufficiency. Moreover, absurd plays attack man's submission to a mechanical and routine way of life which alienates him from his fellow man.

This new content sometimes had to be transmitted in a novel form. According to Esslin, "the devaluation of language, the disintegration of plot, characterization and final solution" had to be substituted by "concrete stage imagery, repetition or intensification, a whole new stage language."[6] Esslin conceives that

> Because the Theatre of the Absurd projects its author's personal world, it lacks objectively valid characters. It cannot show the clash of opposing temperaments or study human passions locked in conflict... Nor is it concerned with telling a story in order to communicate some moral or social lesson.... The action in a play of the Theatre of the Absurd is not intended to tell a story but to communicate a pattern of poetic images.[7]

Content and form are inseparable in communicating to the audience a fundamental situation that the characters confront. "Concrete"

imagery is used as the essential agent of the meaning or message of the play. According to Esslin, moreover, the more complex the image is, the more ambiguous the process of its interpretation will be. Such poetic images are not regarded as "accidental by-products of conventional plot but are capable of being put on the stage as the very center and essence of a play" so that they have become "the center of the dramatic experience."[8] This new emphasis on imagery illustrates an attempt to convey to the audience an impression similar to that logical conversation could have conveyed in older drama. TO Camus, writers who prefer "writing in images rather than in reasoned arguments" are those who are "sure of the educative message of perceptible appearance."[9]

Another characteristic feature of absurd plays is the special use of language. Absurd dramatists present characters who do not converse in poetry, but in a kind of prose that concentrates on the rhythm of everyday speech. In his Twentieth-Century Drama, Bamber Gascoigne states that

> The real poetic drama of this century is in prose. Leaving aside the imagistic aspect of poetry, by which a whole play can be a symbolist poem, and concentrating on its rhythmic aspect, there are two main ways in which prose can be patterned and hightened until it achieves the effect of poetry. The first is inside a speech--and the second is from speech to speech, in the ripple of dialogue.[10]

Rhythm can be created through the repetitions, inversions,

pauses and evasions of ordinary speech in two different ways. The first is inside the speech itself, while the second is through the "staccato effect of dialogue "i.e. the short, balanced remarks. The melodious aspect of language has become the most important one regardless of the meaning conveyed. In addition, language is set against action in most of Absurd plays.

The dramatists of the Absurd present their personal vision of the universe. However harsh and stark the picture conveyed is, absurd heroes accept it and bear it bravely, just as Sisyphus triumphs over his fate by lucidly accepting it. In an introduction to a group of absurd plays, Martin Esslin states about The Theatre of the Absurd that

> It aims to shock its audience out of complacency, to bring it face to face with the harsh facts of the human situation as these writers see it. But the challenge behind this message is anything but one of despair. It is a challenge to accept the human condition as it is in all its mystery and absurdity, and to bear it with dignity, nobly, responsibly; precisely because there are no easy solutions to the mysteries of existence, because ultimately man is alone in a meaningless world.[11]

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN COMPASSION IN PINTER'S THE CARETAKER AND ALBEE'S THE ZOO STORY

"Compassion" is the ability to share emotionally with other people in their real sufferings, and to be conscious of their real needs. It therefore hinges not only on the emotional capacity of the person who would feel compassionate, but also on the honesty and receptivity of the object of compassion, for without that object it is incomplete. *The Caretaker* and *The Zoo Story* confront us with "absurd heroes" who have felt the "meaninglessness" and "hopelessness" of the human condition. They are aware of "the absurd" in life, of man's position of "strangeness" and "aloneness" in the universe, and of the "absurd wall" of alienation between Man and his fellow man. They, therefore, attempt to triumph over the hopelessness of the human fate, and to awaken other characters to the necessity of transcending the barrier of human isolation through the establishment of compassionate relationships. However, the possibility of the true establishment of such relationships remains in question as other characters are egocentric, and content with their self-constructed image and are unaware of their self-deception.

Alienation of man from his fellow man, and of man from

his true self can be seen to be the main wall that hinders the establishment of true and authentic relationships. The Caretaker starts with Aston, a man in his early thirties, escorting Davies, an old tramp, to his room after having rescued him from a quarrel in a café. We notice that from the beginning and throughout the play, Aston shows a generosity to Davis that is not limited to only allowing him to stay in the room, but is also extended to offering him money, bringing him his bag, and buying him a pair of shoes. Yet, these acts of kindness are countered by Davies' ingratitude and denial. Although Davies declares that he is not "the sort of man who wants to take any liberties,"[1] his demands increase gradually. He asks for more money, for another pair of shoes that fit him better, for a clock to know the time, for a mirror, and lastly for keeping the window closed while sleeping, thus ignoring Aston's desire to keep it open. Davies' constant discontent with Aston's offerings, and especially with the pair of shoes, reveals a pride and a lack of humility that contrast strongly with his desperate and abject condition. Arnold Hinchliffe states in his Harold Pinter that

> The shoes that Aston offers him in the play are usually the wrong color, the wrong shape, the wrong size, or the wrong material; or they have no shoelaces; or the shoelaces offered are the wrong color for the shoes--details that, in Davies's homeless, shabby condition, seem ludicrously insisted upon.[2]

Not only is Davies "homeless" and in a "shabby condition," but

also is his true identity unknown. He claims that the papers that prove his identity are at Sidcup and promises more than once during the play to bring them. Yet, the journey to Sidcup becomes a plan that is never actually realized.

With the entrance of Mick, Aston's brother who is in his late twenties, a new atmosphere of menace and fear is created. It is interesting to notice that each of the three characters assumes an air of superiority and self-sufficiency that Pinter gradually unmasks. When Mick enters the room, his frightening actions make Davies almost die of fear. According to the /Instructions/, "Mick seizes his arm and forces it up his back. Davies screams. Mick swiftly forces him to the floor, with Davies struggling, grimacing, whimpering and staring."[3] Not only does Mick frighten Davies by physical, but also by verbal force. The following dialogue between Mick and Davies illustrates Mick's power and apparent superiority as well as Davies' tremendous fear:

Mick : What's your name?

Davies : I don't know you. I don't know who you are.

Pause

Mick : Eh?

Davies : Jenkins

Mick : Jenkins?

Davies : Yes.

Mick : Jen---kins.

Pause

What did you say your name was?

Davies: Jenkins.

Mick : I beg your pardon?

Davies: Jenkins!

Pause

Mick : Jen---kins.[4]

Austin E. Quigley in The Pinter Problem comments on Mick's behaviour by stating that:

> Mick's early motives are not immediately clear, but his initial aim is obviously to establish control over Davies. His technique follows up a physical demonstration of his superior power with a verbal demonstration.... Mick goes through a ritual of repeated questions and forces Davies to acknowledge his subservience by repeating answers that he has already given.

The fear that Mick creates in the room makes Davies regard him as a powerful figure. It is he who owns the room and following his orders, Davies can either be dismissed or remain safely in the cosy room. Mick's apparent power makes Davies obey him, and reject Aston's generosity.

The relationships among the three characters change into a new phase after Aston's account of his personal experience in psychiatric hospital. Aston loses his standing when he relates this experience to Davies: Davies then begins to despise

him and tries to satisfy Mick's whims instead, while Mick's threatening power is reduced as he has become more friendly with Davies. This friendliness, however, does not last long. When Davies insinuates to Mick that in order to realize his aim of decorating the room, he has to dismiss Aston, both brothers stand firmly against the outsider.

Quigley states about Aston, Davies, and Mick that:

> They have different needs and different perspectives, but they share one problem--both require the sympathy and reinforcement that will help them to adjust to and overcome a chronic sense of weakness and vulnerability. This pattern of common ground emerging among such diverse characters is extended... to include to a lesser degree, the apparently self-sufficient Mick.[6]

In a long speech, Aston relates to Davies his personal experience in that hospital where he was given an electric shock treatment because he used "to talk to people." He tells Davies:

> They were all... a good bit older than me. But they always used to listen. I thought... they understood what I said. I mean I used to talk to them.... That was my mistake.... I used to get the feeling I could see things... very clearly... everything... was so clear.[7]

This experience has made Aston refrain from talking to people. He says:

> I don't talk to people now... I don't talk to anyone... I want to build that shed out in the garden.[8]

In spite of the fact that Aston resolves not to speak to people

anymore, yet the very narration of his past experience can be considered as an attempt to relate to people once more. But, this one and simple attempt to form a relationship is also frustrated, as Davies is unable to comprehend Aston's psyche and to give him the sympathy that he undemandingly asks for. According to Quigley:

> What begins as an urge to communicate to Davies something that will enhance understanding and repair the damaged relationship, ends in isolation and helpless self-concern.[9]

Aston's desire for the formation of humane relationships with people, his ability to see "very clearly" is countered by a general judgement of his "insanity." Even his mother "signed their form... giving them permission." The doctor's opinion was that after administering the shock treatment, Aston could go out and "live like the others." Yet, it may be asked, if it was not exactly this living "like the others" which was at the root of his "insanity." And thus, even on leaving the hospital, Aston will be confined to a larger hospital, and will be prevented from finding himself.

Aston does not speak much, but reveals his compassion towards Davies by deeds. As Davies is unable to understand him, however, Aston loses again. Davies even refuses to be called Aston's friend. When Mick tells him:

> You're my brother's friend, aren't you?

Davies replies:

> Well, I... I couldn't put it as far as that.[10]

By solely depending on conversation--that is, on words--as a means to realize his self-seeking interests and demands, and as a unique way for expressing oneself, Davies is unable to comprehend Aston. He complains to Mick about his relationship with Aston as he says:

> We don't have any conversation, you see? You can't live in the same room with someone who ... don't have any conversation with you.[11]

Regarding Aston and Davies' relationship, Quigley states:

> Aston, however, cannot utilize dialogue for his needs in the ways that Davies seeks to, and dialogue serves more to thwart his hopes for the relationship than to serve them. Davies, meanwhile, seeks conversation to promote his own ends. Aston loses both ways. He cannot change Davies by dialogue, and Davies does not respond sympathetically to his monologues.[12]

Hence, it seems that, Davies can be expected to establish a relationship with either Aston or Mick only after learning to accept and understand the "absurd" situation.

After Aston's hopes were thwarted, he directs his aspiration towards building a shed with his own hands. Perhaps, a contact with animals will give him some satisfaction and compensate him for the constant frustration of his attempts to establish human compassion in his own way i.e. by deeds and actions. According to Quigley:

> Aston's shed supplies a focus for optimism which is indispensable to his attempts to cope with daily failures.[13]

Meanwhile, Davies assumes a new relationship with Mick. After having rejected Aston's offer to be the caretaker of the room, Davies now accepts Mick's offer. He suggests to Mick that he can decorate the room, if Mick dismisses Aston from it. He tells Mick:

> You see, I could decorate it out for you, I could give you a hand in doing it... between us.[14]

Davies believes that after having been offered the post of the caretaker by Mick, whom he regards a powerful figure, he has forever won Mick's confidence, and can thus feel secure enough in the room. Thus, when Aston asks him to leave, he attacks him severely:

> I've had just about enough with you... I've seen better days than you have, man. Nobody ever get me inside one of them places, anyway. I'm a sane man!... I'll be all right as long as you keep your place. Just you keep your place, that's all.[15]

Davies reacts to Aston's previous generosity towards him with this bitter attack that, ironically, culminates in his order: "You! you better find somewhere else." Yet, it is not until Davies' ungraceful remark about the would-be shed that Aston becomes really furious and moves towards him. As Davies believes that he is backed by Mick, he quickly rushes to him demanding his support and complaining:

> He's got no right to order me about. I take orders from you, I do my caretaking for you, I mean, you look upon me... we can both... we can both see him for what he is.[16]

However, there is a mutual understanding between the brothers that now excludes Davies. They have silently agreed that he should not stay any longer. Arnold Hinchliffe observes,

> Although the two brothers rarely speak--indeed they are rarely on the stage together--they seem to communicate without words; and each protects the other in his own way.[17]

Finally, Mick is fed up with Davies' pretence and lies. He confronts Davies:

> What a strange man you are... you're really strange. Ever since you come into this house there's nothing but trouble... I can take nothing you say at face value. Every word you speak is open to any number of different interpretations. Most of what you say is lies. You're violent, you're erratic, you're just completely unpredictable. You're nothing else but a wild animal... You come here recommending yourself as an interior decorator, whereupon I take you on, and what happens? You make a long speech about all the references you've got down at Sidcup, and what happens? I haven't noticed you go down to Sidcup to obtain them.[18]

Here, Pinter exposes Davies' pretence. The caretaker is himself in need of caretaking. Quigley remarks that

> Davies has revealed his character to be substantially the same in interacting with both brothers; he has nothing else to reveal. The interdependent nature of a close relationship is beyond him; his verbal strategies are limited to domination or dependence."[19]

Thus, neither his attempt at domination over Aston's cranky character nor his attempt to serve himself by dependence on

Mick's power serves Davies in establishing an "authentic" relationship. Having lost the interest of both brothers, Davies' last words are not given any notice by either of them. He begs them to stay as he says:

> Where am I going to go?
>
> Pause
>
> If you want me to go... I'll go. You just say the word.
>
> Pause
>
> I'll tell you what though... them shoes... them shoes you give me... they're working out all right... they're all right. Maybe I could... get down...
>
> [Aston remains still, his back to him, at the window.]
>
> Listen... if I... get down... If I was to... get my papers... would you... would you let... would you... if I got down... and get my... Long Silence.[20]

In an "absurd" reading, Davies is interpreted as a kind of Everyman. He is "illusioned" about his true self, and unable to comprehend other people's actions.

Pinter leaves what may happen beyond the end of the play uncertain. We do not know whether Davies will get down to Sidcup and find his papers, in order to assert a peculiar "identity;" whether Aston will be able to build the shed that symbolizes for him some hope for his future years; or whether Mick will realize his aim and decorate the room. What is certain, however, is that while the two brothers have independence and hope, Davies will continue to live in servile self-delusion.

In The Caretaker, Pinter conveys his vision of the problem of human compassion to a large extent through the setting." Place was already seen to play an important role in the attempts of the three characters to determine their status vis-a-vis each other. It becomes even clearer; if we take into account the "room" that they act in. Each of the three characters has his own aim or aspiration regarding the room. Mick desires turning it into a luxurious one; Aston hopes to repair the room's roof and build the shed in the garden, and Davies aims at making it a permanent residence where he can live without doing any work. The room itself contains trivial possessions of Aston: "a small cupboard, paint buckets... a rolled carpet, a blow-lamp... a very old electric toaster." This disconnected concrete stage imagery illustrates Aston's inability to find a "meaning" to life, except as something like endeavor, and all the various things in the room are precisely the result of his endeavors.

The inter-relations among the three characters point to the problem of human compassion. The following dialogue between Aston and Davies reveals Aston's desire to establish with Davies an authentic relationship, and it reveals Davies' evasions as a form of submission. Moreover the problem of verification can be seen.

Aston : What did you say your name was?

Davies : Bernard Jenkins is my assumed one.

Aston : No, your other one?

Davies : Davies, Mac Davies.

Aston : Welsh, are you?

Davies : Eh?

Aston : You Welsh?

Pause

Davies : Well, I been around you know...
what I mean... I been about...

Aston : Where were you born then?

Davies : (darkly) What do you mean?

Aston : Where were you born?

Davies : I was... uh... oh, it's a bit hard, like
to set your mind back... see what I mean...
going back... a good way... lose a bit of
track, like... you know...[21]

Davies evades fundamental questions, hence he proves unworthy of Aston's desire to be compassionate towards him. He refuses to acknowledge his own identity, and fails to understand that he is the recipient of charity or that it is offered on the most dignified terms. To Pinter, however, "a character on stage who can present no convincing argument or information as to his past experience, his present behaviour or his aspirations, nor give a comprehensive analysis of his motives, is as legitimate and as worthy of attention as one who, alarmingly, can do all these things."[22] Regarding the apparent difficulty in inter-relations, Pinter believes that "instead of any inability to communicate, there is a deliberate evasion of communication."[23]

Although The Caretaker contains comic parts, the play as a whole is not funny. Pinter himself says that "The Caretaker is funny up to a point. Beyond that point it ceases to be funny, and it was because of that point that I wrote it."[24] In spite of the fact that we do not know much about the lives of the three characters of the play, yet Aston can be regarded the hero who has transcended the absurd wall of loneliness and alienation from other people by his attempts to form with them genuine and compassionate relationships. The result of this attempt is first his condemnation as insane by those who used to listen to him, and second, the ingratitude of Davies and his rejection of Aston's generosity, and extended compassion. Davies can be seen as completely inauthentic. He is sharply contrasted to the absurd hero, being both alienated from others and from his true identity. On a symbolical level, Davies' lack of identity can be considered as an alienation of him from his true self. The play's open ending makes us unsure of his real going to Sidcup and bringing the papers that assert his identity. We are unsure of his actual noticing of the reality of himself, and of his condition. It is clear that Davies is unconscious of his egoism, of his self-seeking demands, his subservience to powerful figures, and negligence of the unspoken call for an authentic relationship with him. Unknowingly--and by being unknowing--Davies has contributed to the continuation of his loneliness. There is no doubt,

however, that Davies is the center of the play. He is in fact never off-stage, and his presence has actually created a temporal change in the lives of both brothers.

In The Zoo Story, Edward Albee presents us with a different view of the notion of compassion. The play deals with two characters, Peter and Jerry, who do not know each other before the play begins. Peter is a man in his early forties. He wears tweeds, smokes a pipe and reads a book while sitting on a bench in Central Park. His general mood gives the impression that he is an average middle-class man. Contrasted to Peter, there is Jerry, a man in his late thirties. He is not handsome. His "fall from physical grace" suggests that he has come "closest to a great weariness." Jerry enters, telling Peter that he has been to the zoo and that he wants to talk to him. Although Peter is reluctant in answering Jerry's questions, Jerry inflicts himself upon him with the inflexible determination to know all about him, and to tell him about himself. He manages to know that Peter is married, has two girls who have two parakeets, and that he works as an executive in a company that publishes textbooks. Concerning Jerry's life, we learn that he is an orphan who lives all by himself in a room, and who does not have any relationship with his neighbours, except for the landlady from whom he always escapes. Jerry's awareness of his loneliness and

alienation from other people, as well as his hard social condition have affected his psychological state. It has made him try to form any sort of relationship with any person; any object, or any animal.

This strangely "undifferentiated" desire for relationships with anything and anyone contrasts in a peculiar way with Jerry's obsession by norms and limits. Throughout the play, this motive of limits and their transgression becomes apparent. It can be said that, for Jerry, limits and norms cause the absurd wall of isolation. Hence, "Compassion," to him, is bound up with limits and their transgression. Thus, why not form a compassionate relationship with anybody, anything, or any animal so long as "norms" are "absurd"? Regarding his relationship with people, the transgression of norms--for the purpose of being the recipient of compassion--can be viewed in two attempts. The first was in his early youth, while the second takes place in his "late thirties." Speaking about his early youth, Jerry tells Peter:

> I hang my head in shame that puberty was late...
> I was a homosexual.[25]

The second attempt is in his youth. He has come to the awareness that "isolation" has become a "norm" in life, and that it is only through its "transgression" that there can be any compassionate relationship among people. However, Jerry has come closest to a "great weariness," being alienated from the com-

passion of people--as they are unaware of the absurdity of isolation--though he desires to win their compassion. Jerry's very narration of his past experiences, as well as of his present dilemma can be considered as a renewed attempt for overcoming his isolation by speaking to a man whom he did not know before. Yet, to Peter,--like to any other person--it is somewhat strange that a man whom he does not know talks to him, desiring to know all about him and determining to tell him about himself. Surprised, Peter says:

> Hm?... what?... I'm sorry, were you talking to me?[26]

And Jerry answers:

> Every once in a while I like to talk to somebody really talk; like to get to know somebody, know all about him.[27]

Jerry also tells Peter about his attempt to form a relationship with an animal, hoping to be perhaps loved and understood by a dog. Since, for Jerry, norms "make up" life, yet prevent it from being lived, it seems that through attempting to form 'relationships' "outside of the norm" (be they of a homosexual character, be they relationships with things!), that he tries to show the "absurdity" of the norm. It is, however, a question if a real compassionate relationship can be established rather through the transgression of norms, than through their acknowledgement. However, Jerry's "isolation" is his main preoccupation, and its transcendence is his sole obsession. "Com-

passion" for him can only be achieved by transgressing the "absurdity" of limits. He tells Peter:

> A person has to have some way of dealing with Something. If not with people... something. With a bed, with a cock-roach, with a mirror... with a carpet,.... It would be A START! Where better to make a beginning... to understand and just possibly be understood... a beginning of an understanding, than with... A Dog. Just that; a dog.[28]

The repetition of the phrase "if not with people" implies the difficulty of the establishment of authentic and compassionate relationships among people due to their unawareness of the absurdity of isolation and alienation. Thus, having been alienated from the compassion of Man, Jerry tries to form a relationship with an object, or an animal. He has tried to make friends with the dog that attacked him whenever he entered the house. He bought hamburgers for it for five days, but as the dog continued attacking him, he mixed rat poison into the meat. Though Jerry desired to kill the dog, he would have been sorry if he had really died. The result of this attempt was that Jerry lost contact even with the dog. As the dog recovered, he no longer attacked him, but allowed Jerry free passage. Jerry then felt lonelier than ever. He says:

> I have gained solitary free passage, if that much further loss can be said to be gain.[29]

Once more, Jerry has returned to a solitary life. In his point of view, marriage--though it may not correspond to his desires--is no cure to loneliness. He tells Peter:

> Look! Are you going to tell me to get married and have parakeets?[30]

Still, "loneliness" is Jerry's main preoccupation: bars, spots of seclusion, the zoo, norms and limits have provided for Jerry an image for human reality. Consequently, when he sees Peter sitting alone on a bench in a secluded place, he immediately talks to him. Being obsessed by images of isolation and their transgression, he tells Peter when he first sees him: "I've been to the zoo."[31] Gradually, we learn of the motive of his going to the zoo as Jerry says that he has gone there so as to "find out more about the way people exist with animals and the way animals exist with each other, and with people... What with everyone separated by bars from everyone else, the animals for the most part from each other... But, if it's a zoo, that's the way it is."[32] In other words, people should not be separated from each other the way they are. They should be aware of the need for compassion. Yet, to Peter, "need" is associated only with physical possessions. When Jerry asks him:

> Don't you have any idea, not even the slightest what other people need?[33]

Peter answers:

> Well, you don't need this bench.[34]

Perhaps Jerry's desire to take the bench, on which Peter sits, for himself, can be considered a test for Peter's reaction to "isolation." But, Jerry has found that Peter is not only isolated, but also defends his isolation, as he says:

> I see no reason why I should give up the bench. I sit on this bench almost every Sunday afternoon, in good weather. It's secluded here; there's never anyone sitting here, so I have it all to myself.[35]

Thus, Jerry obliges Peter to fight for the bench i.e. his isolation. At last, a violent contact has been made as Jerry impales himself onto the knife Peter holds. While dying, Jerry says:

> And now I'll tell you what happened at the zoo... I think... I think this is what happened at the zoo... You won't be coming back here any more, Peter; you've been dispossessed. You've lost your bench.... And Peter, I'll tell you something now;... you're an animal. You're an animal, too.[36]

In this context, it can be said that, Peter reacts towards the invasion of his territory and towards what he considers to be his property with the same ferocity the dog has shown when Jerry entered the house i.e. invade its territory. Although Jerry dies, he has narrowed the gap between Peter and other people, and between him and his true self. Peter has been "dispossessed" of what can be considered his "bench of isolation," and will probably never avoid contact with himself. His pitiful howl "Oh my God!" implies this.

Jerry's death can be seen as an act of revolt against an alienated and isolated life that he could not live. In this sense, he can be considered an absurd hero who, conscious of being only a "transient" in life, and fully aware of the absurdity of a life without genuine and compassionate relationships,

has attempted to transcend his isolation--even if this has meant the transgression of norms and limits, and even if it has meant his death. He has led a life characterized as a "solitary free passage," hence he put an end to it. Jerry's death, therefore, gives a lesson to the audience, namely, reviving in them the need for the establishment of compassionate relationships among them as they are only "transients" in life.

Both Aston in The Caretaker and Jerry in The Zoo Story are absurd heroes who have come to the awareness that only through compassion will the absurd wall of alienation be transcended. Yet, it is interesting to notice their differences, Aston attempts transcending his alienation through various ways that reveal his compassion towards others. It is true that other people did not understand him, yet he shows his compassion towards them through deeds and actions. He has rescued Davies from the quarrel, accepting him in his room, giving him a bed, and buying for him all he needed. He is the giver and other people are the recipients. Jerry, on the other hand, is unable to be compassionate as he is deprived of compassion since his childhood. Thus he is in a dire need for the compassion of others--an element which he has not found in life. Hence, his death can be considered a revolt against the lack of genuine relationships. Whereas Aston has himself tried--and it is possible that he will try in his future life--to establish a kind

of human solidarity in order to face the absurdity of life, and triumph over the absurd wall of alienation, Jerry's death can be seen as a call for solidarity directed to the audience. Albee wants the audience to recognize that the world has become a zoo, thanks to the creation of a human environment in which, in order to establish any real relationship with Peter, Jerry must die. To Albee, absurdity "stems not from the human situation but from man's response to that situation--a response which values the achievement of success above genuine fulfilment."[37] Thus, Albee attacks man's acceptance of loneliness and isolation as a norm in life. According to Bigsby,

> The Zoo Story describes the life which man has created for himself as a "solitary free passage" characterized by indifference towards others. The isolation, which is the result of this attitude towards life, is stressed by the image of the zoo which is established in the course of the play as a valid image for man who has come to accept loneliness as the norm of existence. Albee's thesis is that there is a need to make contact, to emerge from these self-imposed cages of convention and false values so that one individual consciousness may impinge on another. This act he defines as love.[38]

Therefore, Albee's drama depends on confrontation that has the possibility of transformation. The Zoo Story, thus, conveys the message of the necessity of the revival of human compassion. In an article published by R. S. Stewart, Albee declares that

> It was one of the responsibilities of the playwrights to show people how they are and what their time is like in the hope that perhaps they'll change it.[39]

To Bigsby, Camus' progression from "absurdity," to "rebellion," and lastly to "compassion" underlies contemporary American drama; specifically "the drama of confrontation which is concerned with confronting the apocalyptic vision of the human situation and through this 'momentous enlightenment "establishing a genuine basis for a life centred on man and tempered by the affirmative nature of compassion.40

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I attempted to examine the element of compassion in Harold Pinter's play, The Caretaker, and Edward Albee's The Zoo Story. Both Pinter and Albee have reflected the difficulty of human compassion, although their plays end differently. Pinter is committed more than Albee to the beliefs and techniques of the Theatre of the Absurd. He presents his vision regarding the problem of compassion without offering any solutions. Hence, the play is a practice of the new dramatic standards that the Theatre of the Absurd adopts. On the other hand, Albee has an end in view; his belief that in confrontation there can be a possibility for transformation makes his plays deviate from truly absurd drama that solely conveys a picture of reality as sensed by its dramatist, without offering any solutions, suggestions, or hopes. The Zoo Story can thus be viewed as a statement about the absolute necessity and "possibility" of the establishment of authentic and compassionate relationships among people. However, both Pinter and Albee have skilfully exposed the dichotomy between the absurd heroes' lives and those of other characters. Thus, the absurd wall of alienation between man and his fellow man, and between man and his true identity has been carefully described.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

[1] John Cruickshank, Albert Camus, ((c) 1959, 1960, Oxford University Press, Inc., First published as a Galaxy Book, 1960, Printed in the United States of America), p. viii, ix.

[2] Lev Braun, Witness of Decline, (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, (c) 1974 by Associated University Presses, Inc.), p. 30.

[3] Leo Pollman, Sartre and Camus, (Trans. by Helen and Gregor Sebba, copyright (c) 1970 by Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., Inc., printed in the United States of America), p. 114.

[4] Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, (Trans. from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1969, copyright 1955 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Seventh Printing, November 1969), pp. 14-15.

[5] Ibid., p. 14.

[6] Ibid., p. 51.

[7] Ibid., p. 28.

[8] Ibid., p. 51.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[12] John Cruickshank, *Albert Camus*, ((c) 1959, 1960, Oxford University Press, Inc., First published as a Galaxy Book, 1960, Printed in the United States of America), p. 24.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[14] *IBid.*, p. 35.

[15] Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, (Trans. from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1969, copyright 1955 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Seventh Printing, November 1969), p. 53.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[17] John Cruickshank, *Albert Camus*, ((c) 1959, 1960, Oxford University Press, Inc., First published as a Galaxy Book, 1960, Printed in the United States of America), p. 87.

[18] Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, (Trans. from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1969), copyright 1955 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Seventh Printing, November 1969), p. 55.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[20] John Cruickshank, Albert Camus, ((c) 1959, 1960, Oxford University Press, Inc., First published as a Galaxy Book, 1960, Printed in the United States of America), p. 71.

[21] Ibid., p. 71.

[22] Ibid., p. 71.

[23] Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, (Trans. from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1969, copyright 1955 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Seventh Printing, November 1969), p. 60.

[24] Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[25] John Cruickshank, Albert Camus, ((c) 1959, 1960, Oxford University Press, Inc., First published as a Galaxy Book, 1960, Printed in the United States of America), p. 73.

[26] Ibid., p. 74.

[27] Ibid., p. 64.

[28] Lev Braun, Witness of Decline, (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, (c) 1974 by Associated University Presses, Inc.), p. 117.

[29] Ibid., p. 117.

[30] Albert Camus, Carnets: 1942-1951), (Trans. by Philip Thody, copyright (c) 1964 by Editions Gallimard, Translation copyright (c) 1966 by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., Printed in Great Britain by Western Printing Services Ltd., Bristol), p. 103.

[31] Lev Braun, Witness of Decline, (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press (c) 1974 by Associated University Presses, Inc.), p. 249.

[32] Ibid., p. 258.

CHAPTER II

[1] Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, (Trans. from the French by Justin O'Brien, New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1969, copyright 1955 by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., Seventh Printing, November 1969), p. 123.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] Martin Esslin, Reflections: Essays on Modern Theatre, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., copyright (c) 1969 by Martin Esslin), p. 184.

[4] Martin Esslin, The Theatre of the Absurd, (Published by Pelican Books 1968, copyright (c) Martin Esslin, 1961, 1968, Made and Printed in Great Britain by Cox and Wyman Ltd., London), p. 22.

[5] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[6] Martin Esslin, Reflections: Essays on Modern Theatre, (Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc., copyright (c) 1969 by Martin Esslin), p. 184.

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