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The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**The Agenda-Setting Impact of Egyptian Nightly Television Talk
Shows on Attitudes towards Civic Engagement in Egypt**

A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

by Sara Nassar El-Khalili

under the supervision of Dr. Hussein Amin

May/2011

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

The Agenda-Setting Impact of Egyptian Nightly Television Talk Shows on Attitudes towards Civic Engagement in Egypt


A Thesis Submitted by


Sara Nassar El-Khalili


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
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
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DEDICATION

*To my father Nassar Hamdy El-Khalili (رحمه الله)
(May God bless his soul)*

You cultivated in me the love of knowledge and the eagerness to learn. You taught me perseverance, honor and self-respect. You inspired me to think critically and welcomed all my questions. You supported me all my life.

You will always be in my heart daddy.

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My unique auntie Antonia Sphicas, you are my friend and my mentor. My bright cousin Dr. Panos Sphicas, you inspire me. Thank you for being there for me. I'm thankful to my in-laws as well for their constant love and support. My dear father-in-law Fouad El-Reedi and my dearest mother-in-law Naema El-Bastaweesy, thank you for standing by my side.

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ABSTRACT

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

The Agenda-Setting Impact of Egyptian Nightly Television Talk Shows on Attitudes towards Civic Engagement in Egypt

A Thesis Submitted to
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by Sara Nassar El-Khalili
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May/2011

The awareness function of the mass media is at the heart of civic engagement, which is fundamental for a country in transition to democracy such as Egypt. This study examined the agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows on attitudes towards civic engagement among the Egyptian elite.

This primary research linked agenda-setting theory to civic engagement. Through setting the salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness, agenda-setting establishes the first step in civic engagement, creating an informed citizenry.

A primary content analysis of the three most popular Egyptian nightly television talk shows before the Jan.25th revolution: *Masr Enharda* (Egypt Today), *Al Ashera Masa'an* (10 PM), and *90 Deqeeqa* (90 Minutes), was conducted to measure the media agenda. A total of 78 episodes of talk shows were coded from October 6 to November 10, before the 2010 parliamentary elections. A primary survey was conducted among a purposive sample of the Egyptian elite (356 participants) to examine the public agenda and the relationships between exposure to talk shows, agenda-setting, and civic engagement.

The findings support an agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows at the first and second levels. Participants cited talk shows as their main source of information for the news issues they listed. Respondents' perceptions of the November 2010 parliamentary elections also corresponded with talk shows' framing of the elections. The first outcome of the agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the first and most basic level of civic engagement.

One of the primary findings of this study is the significant positive correlation between perception of talk shows as civically engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. This study also found a positive relationship between exposure to nightly television shows and attitudes towards civic engagement. A five-point civic engagement scale was created to measure the overall level of civic engagement among participants, which found that the elite sample surveyed is civically engaged.

This study proceeded with conducting qualitative interviews with experts, producing recommendations for talk shows in order to play a more active role in fostering civic engagement in Egypt.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Civic Engagement and Democracy

Citizen participation is the core of all existing and emerging democracies. The freedom of citizens to participate in government and engage in their communities is crucial to the success of democratic government. Democracy as defined by the Encyclopedia Britannica means “rule by the people.” The origin of the term is derived from the word *‘demokratia’* in Greek. The word *‘demos’* represents people and the word *‘kratos’* represents rule. Therefore, in a democracy, citizens rule. Ultimate power lies in citizens who have the right to vote and elect people to represent them in free elections. To participate effectively as citizens, democratic theory emphasizes that citizens must be able to acquire sufficient political information to be able to convey their interests, assess their problems and vote (Moy, 1998).

An informed citizenry is essential to bring about change in policy and society in general. Hopkins (1992) emphasized that education represents the real drive for mobilization. When people comprehend an issue and share information with others, they can take action and influence policy. For citizens to take action, they have to be informed first which is acquired through the mass media or direct engagement. The term civic engagement describes how citizens participate actively in civic affairs. It is about deliberations and activities intended for specific public issues or challenges yielding social change (Adler and Goggin, 2005). Active citizenship and a strong civil society encompass a lot of power and potential that aims at solving problems in countries, whether they have established or emerging democratic systems (Edwards, 2004). When citizens collaborate and organize their collective effort at solving social problems, they help in creating a stronger civil society. Civil society organizations,

journalists and intellectuals advocate publicly for democracy through meetings, demonstrations and the mass media.

For the Arab world, lack of civic engagement and political apathy constitute a major problem. Not a single Arab country is considered a full democracy (Martin, 2010). Although revolutions have swept a number of Arab countries beginning with Tunisia and Egypt and extending to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, most Arab countries represent variations of authoritarian rule. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions succeeded at toppling the heads of their regimes and achieving many changes as a result of citizen pressure. Although signs of optimism about the political future of Arab countries exist, the road to democracy is rocky because they have a long history of authoritarian rule.

1.2 Egypt's Political Environment

A look at the political environment in Egypt before and after the revolution explains why civic engagement is essential to democratize the country which has a population of 85 million with 34 percent under 30 years of age. The Egyptian youth uprising that swept the country on Jan. 25 snowballing into a revolution that included citizens from all walks of life is a result of growing public dissent piling up over the past decade. Although Egyptians never took to the streets in millions as they did during the Jan.25th revolution, they still expressed their frustration with the regime in mass demonstrations over the past few years. The piling up of anger was obvious in the increasing number of street sit-ins and demonstrations especially in front of the Egyptian parliament and the deadliest demonstrations of 2008 in the city of Mahalla over the shortage of bread (El-Shorbagy, 2010, personal interview).

According to the 2010 annual report of Freedom House International (FHI), Egypt scored 6 on political rights, just one point higher than the lowest score of 7. The country also scored 5 on civil liberties. The freedom organization ranks countries on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the top level of freedom and seven representing the lowest. Egypt's low scores on both civil liberties and political rights translate into a "not free" status by the freedom organization (FHI, 2010).

In his book *Egypt and the Egyptians in Mubarak's Reign*, Amin (2009) described Egypt as being in "distress". Amin explained that people complain about corruption and deficiencies across several platforms including economic, political, educational, cultural, and social platforms. In addition, Egyptian citizens also complain about the general quality of life. Ever since he assumed power in 1981 after President Anwar Sadat was assassinated, former president Mubarak had the emergency law in effect (McGann, 2008). The government claims that the law is implemented only in cases of terrorism and drug crimes. However, authorities make use of the emergency law to clamp down on political activists and members of the opposition. The same law is used to disperse and arrest peaceful demonstrators in opposition to the regime.

Inequality and political misrepresentation plagued the country's democratizing process for decades. Egypt's corrupt political system for years ensured that the former ruling National Democratic Party, recently dissolved by a court decision after the revolution, holds the majority of parliament. Despite the fact that Egypt witnessed its first presidential elections in 2005 after former President Mubarak endorsed a constitutional change, the former amendments restricted the nomination of non-NDP presidential candidates. Under the 1971 constitution which was suspended by the military council and amended into a temporary constitutional declaration after the Jan.

25th revolution, a candidate must be nominated by a party that holds a minimum of five percent of parliament seats, making it impossible for opposition parties to nominate candidates. The recent amendments, however, allow candidates to run for presidency. Women were also misrepresented in parliament as only 70 seats were given to women in the 454-seat parliament. Coptic Christians also hold only 10 percent of parliament seats (FHI, 2010).

Listing many of Egypt's shortcomings on political and civil liberties before the revolution, it's necessary to establish a strong civil society and active engaged citizenry to overcome such problems and help transform Egypt into a full democracy. The idea of civil society and its democratizing potential has been very popular over the past 15 years. The European Union and the United States view civil society as paving the way for democratizing authoritarian countries especially the Arab region (Abdalla, 2008). Although civil society is regarded as the democratic catalyst in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Abdalla (2008) doubts the western high expectations that a strong civil society will eventually lead to successful Arab democracies.

Abdalla justifies such doubts by citing examples of the former Egyptian regime's tight control over NGOs in Egypt through strict policies and regulations that represent a constraint to the autonomy of civil society. Egypt's Law of Association exemplifies such constraints on NGOs. The Ministry of Social Affairs must approve NGO board members. The ministry also has the right to dissolve NGOs on grounds such as threatening national unity or receiving donations from foreign countries which discourages citizens from being actively involved in the Egyptian civil society (FHI, 2010).

1.3 Civic Engagement in Egypt

Low political participation and general apathy used to paint a gloomy image of the political and social picture in pre-revolution Egypt. According to the EHDR (2010) report, civic engagement defined by EHDR as “volunteerism, social integrity and political participation” is very low among youth in Egypt with fewer than three percent of youth participating in volunteer work. Charity work comprises 64 percent of the nature of volunteer work among Egyptian youth. According to McGann (2008), Egyptians contribute to the strength of charity organizations because Muslims are obliged under religion to pay *zakat* or charity money every year. This form of engagement becomes very obvious in the holy month of Ramadan where Muslim charity is usually at its peak.

Other international Muslim and Coptic Christian communities also engage in charities to develop Egypt’s education, health system and help the country’s poor. In addition to charitable activities, a portion of youth provides training and assistance to poor people through providing them with loans to start small-scale projects. Volunteers also educate the needy in an effort to eliminate their illiteracy. Despite the fact that there are positive signs of philanthropy with most civic engagement revolving around charity in the Egyptian society, a fifth of Egyptians still live in poverty (McGann, 2008).

As for political participation, youth membership in political parties is very low, with only 2.2 percent active youth members. However, this is dramatically changing after the Jan.25th revolution as many members of the youth are currently at the stage of joining or establishing political parties. Although voter turnout has been very low in past Egyptian elections, almost 18 million Egyptians took to the polling stations after the revolution to cast a yes or no vote over a set of constitutional amendments.

The experience and level of participation was unprecedented in Egyptian history. However, only 18 million citizens voted out of the 45 million eligible voters. This means that 27 million Egyptians didn't participate (Saleh, 2011).

Lack of participation in former elections is mostly attributed to the fact that Egyptians used to have a general feeling of mistrust knowing that the election process is tainted by fraud (Ibrahim, 2010, personal interview). Incidents of voter intimidation in past elections also discourage voters. However, low voter turnout is not limited to elections. According to official government statistics, only 25 percent of eligible voters participated in the national referendum regarding the former amendments to the Egyptian constitution in 2007 (FHI, 2010). Participation was minimal in the 2007 referendum despite the degree of importance of such amendments and how they directly affected citizens' lives.

Although the majority of Egyptians shared lack of participation, general political apathy and lack of political efficacy, most citizens still preferred democracy to any other form government. The World Values Survey poll conducted in Egypt and other Arab countries found that more than 85 percent of respondents consider democracy the best option for effective government. Also, 80 percent of the respondents expressed their rejection to the authoritarian regimes (Rutherford, 2008).

The 2005 Civil Society Index Report for Egypt described civil society as being still at an "embryonic stage" (p.82). The report also described the Egyptian civil society as being in a weak condition due to limited participation among citizens, limited resources and a restrictive political environment. Although civil society organizations have strong civic values, the promotion of such values is very limited and doesn't have a significant impact on policy. Despite that, the year 2005 witnessed a breakthrough for Egyptian civil society when its organizations were permitted by

the former regime to monitor the 2005 parliamentary elections. This also reflected on the media coverage which started to give enough exposure to civil society organizations, highlighting their role as watchdogs, monitoring their reports and often interviewing them. This significant role played by the media helped foster civic engagement values in Egyptian society.

1.4 Media and Civic Engagement in Egypt

According to Amin (2002), media in Egypt need to overcome many political, cultural and economic challenges to bring about change. Although the media is currently witnessing more freedom after the revolution, issues such as occasional cases of military torture of civilians are considered very sensitive, controversial and out of discussion. Like other Arab media, Egypt's media struggled for years as it functioned in "a censorial political culture" (Amin, 2002, p.125). However, Amin (2002) asserts that new communication technologies will empower the media and pressure regimes to change, making censorship an obsolete idea in an environment where journalists find other alternatives for reporting.

Although Egypt went through decades of strictly authoritarian media where all media institutions were strictly owned by the state, that system is starting to change. The proliferation of independent media including privately-owned newspapers and Egyptian satellite channels such as *Dream* and *Mehwar* transformed media in Egypt. Such independent channels enjoy more freedom than state-owned channels but they still broadcast from the state-owned Media Production City. Rugh (2004) describes Egypt's media as going through a stage of transition, moving gradually away from authoritarianism. The logic for classifying Egyptian media as "transitional" under Rugh's four-type typology of the Arab media is a result of Egypt's media undergoing many changes in the past decade. Rugh (2004) described the transition as shaky and

didn't clearly indicate whether the transition will be heading toward a new democratic media system. However, Egyptian media experts believe the media will open up, corresponding with the democratization of the political system especially after the Jan. 25th revolution (Allam, 2011).

Theoretically, freedom was guaranteed for the media under the former 1971 Egyptian constitution. As stated in Article 48 of Egypt's constitution: "freedom of the press, printing, publication and mass media shall be guaranteed." The same article prohibited all forms of censorship by stating that "censorship of newspapers as well as their control, suspension or suppression by administrative methods is prohibited" (Egyptian Constitution 1971, amended 2007). However, despite such formal, legal and constitutional guarantees, media content in Egypt was subject to government control. Although private media existed in Egypt, it was subject to strict regulations and state interference. Journalists were subjected to high fines and in some cases prison sentences especially if they were charged with tarnishing the reputation of Egypt or threatening national security (Rugh, 2004).

In October 2010, an outspoken government critic was fired from his position as editor-in-chief of the independent daily *Al Dostour* newspaper which he also co-founded, allegedly over an article that Mohamed El-Baradei wrote. Before being fired from *Al-Dostour* newspaper, Ibrahim Eissa was also forced to quit hosting his nightly television talk show *Baladna Belmasri* (Our Country in Egyptian) broadcast on the private satellite channel OnTV. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) released a statement expressing its concern over firing Eissa from *Al-Dostour*. CPJ reported it was alarmed by "the deterioration of press freedoms in Egypt ahead of November's parliamentary elections and next year's presidential vote" (CPJ, 2010). The former government also suspended in September the popular talk show *Al-Qahera Al-Youm*

(Cairo Today) hosted by journalist Amr Adeeb on the Orbit Showtime Network (OSN). Adeeb was quoted by CNN Arabic as saying “political reasons” were behind his show’s suspension (CPJ, 2010). Egypt’s Media Production City stated that OSN owes the city EGP 5 million, claiming this was the sole reason behind the suspension of the show without prior notice (Abdoun, 2010). The show and its host Adeeb went back on air shortly after Egyptian revolutionists succeeded at overthrowing former President Mubarak and his regime.

In addition to satellite channels and privately-owned newspapers such as *Al Dostour*, *Al Shorouk* and *Al Masry Al Youm*, the internet is also playing the role of a catalyst in paving the way for the democratic transition. Many experts refer to the Egyptian revolution as the “Internet” or “digital” revolution. With internet users soaring to 17 million in 2010 compared to 10.5 million in 2008 at a penetration of 21.2 percent (Reporters Sans Frontiers, 2010), it’s becoming harder to suppress freedom of expression or hold information from the public. Even with an estimated 6 million users in 2007, citizens were able to influence the media and policy agendas by reporting police brutality and mass sexual harassment incidents on the internet within the same year. Egypt’s mainstream media denied the mass sexual harassment incidents at first but when the news leaked to the world through the internet, the media later admitted the incidents and reported the events.

In a separate incident where the non-traditional media set the policy and mainstream media agendas, Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas exposed in 2007 an incident of police brutality and posted the video of policemen torturing a minibus driver on YouTube. The video sparked a “media feeding-frenzy that ultimately forced the government to prosecute the kind of conduct that has long been condoned”

(Pintak, 2009, p.1). The policemen were accused of torture and were sent to prison, which was considered a great victory for activists in Egypt.

In addition to the role played by bloggers and internet users in general in liberalizing the Egyptian media, several television talk shows also appeared on state-owned and independent channels providing ordinary citizens with a channel that carries their voices, opinions, as well as concerns. Emphasizing the watchdog role and adopting a more liberal approach in discussing Egyptian affairs, television talk shows play a role in spotting the government's inefficiencies (El Demerdash, 2010).

According to talk show host and journalist Moataz El Demerdash, ordinary citizens resort to talk shows to voice their concerns and demand their rights. They turn to television talk shows hoping for a solution to their problems. El Demerdash who used to host *90 Deqeeqa (90 Minutes)* which began broadcasting on *Mehwar* channel in August 2006, said talk shows have inspired Egyptians to ask for their rights, influencing the government to take action. He emphasized that change will take place in Egypt overtime and will be witnessed by new generations.

Talk show coverage of Egypt's 2010 rain flood crisis sets the example of how popular talk shows such as *Al Qahera Al Youm* and *90 Deqeeqa* managed to mobilize the public to help save the country's rain-flood victims. *Al Qahera Al Youm* hosted by Amr Adeeb, raised EGP 50 million after launching a media campaign to rebuild the flood-hit areas in Aswan and Sinai. Talk show hosts repeatedly called on citizens help in any way they can. The result was that of collaboration between ordinary citizens, civil society organizations and media. Such collaboration raised millions despite government restrictions (Panel discussion, 2010) as Egyptian law prohibits collecting donations before acquiring the approval of the Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity. Violation of the law leads to a penalty of up to seven years in prison. However, in the

case of the rain floods, the government let the media and civil society members handle the situation because it didn't have the resources to handle the crisis on its own (Panel Discussion, 2010). The rain flood crisis exemplifies how Egypt's authoritarian media system is changing and how media empowered civil society in that special case.

Even before the rain floods crisis, the power of citizens and media was exemplified in 2008 when thousands of protestors marched to the streets of the Egyptian coastal city of Damietta against plans to establish an Agrium petrochemical site that would lead to environmental hazards affecting the health of the city's residents (Hussein, 2008). The issue was heavily reported by the Egyptian media especially television talk shows where several Damietta residents appeared voicing their concerns. The media described the petrochemical site as the "factory of death". The issue of the Agrium site illustrates how citizens took collective action and succeeded at enforcing their rights regardless of state and business interests. After multiple petitions, sit-ins, and demonstrations accompanied by heavy media coverage, the government took the decision to relocate the Agrium plant. The Damietta case also illustrates how the media could empower citizens even under authoritarian regimes. Active citizens in this case communicated their interests and needs through media which gave enough attention to their legitimate demands, generating pressure on the government to respond.

1.5 Statement of the Problem:

Considering the relatively low level of citizen participation in Egypt even after the revolution and the need to create a civically engaged society that would lead Egypt in its democratic transition, it's essential to study if the media play any role in fostering civic engagement and creating an informed citizenry. Active citizenship is important to push forward the transition to democracy. To achieve real democracy in Egypt, citizens have to be engaged and publicly heard through the mass media and other forms of direct engagement. Egyptians need to be informed about political rights and encouraged to practice those rights to lift their country up which has been suffering from a state of decline for decades.

Media all over the world play a significant role in spreading awareness and political knowledge among people. Such a role has always been attributed to the traditional news media, especially newspapers. However, in Egypt, where the mainstream media was mostly controlled by the government and traditional news on state-owned channels still broadcast mostly protocol news and bows too much to authority, Egyptians found new channels to voice their concerns. Mainly through the internet and television talk shows. This study is concerned with the latter because the television penetration in Egypt exceeds by far the internet penetration. Also, the popularity of nightly television talk shows is rooted in their ability to break sociopolitical boundaries by addressing controversial issues (Lee, 2002). Such ability becomes very significant in a country like Egypt, where talk shows address controversial issues holding politicians and officials accountable.

The proliferation of talk shows revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in news and current affairs (Menassat, 2008). "Talk shows became the most popular programs in the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique

and exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). The significance of talk shows in creating political awareness in the Arab world is discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserts that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a “pluralistic political culture”. Talk shows also address citizens’ concerns and open new channels of communication between the populace and the ruling elite (Lee, 2002).

This research study aims at examining whether television talk shows foster civic engagement through creating sociopolitical awareness. The theoretical foundation applied in this research is the agenda-setting theory. The theory is applied to determine whether Egyptian talk shows influence the public agenda of news priorities. Through setting the salience of news and creating sociopolitical awareness, agenda-setting establishes the first step in civic engagement. Moon (2008) found that the theory of agenda setting goes beyond the salience of issues and attributes to include influence on action. When the media sets issue priorities among the public, the public eventually starts thinking about these issues, and this process of thinking is most likely to lead to action (Moon, 2008). Based on Moon’s (2008) research which linked the media’s agenda-setting function to civic engagement in the US, it is important to examine whether the agenda-setting function of a popular media genre such as television talk shows in Egypt is linked to civic engagement attitudes. Having an informed and engaged citizenry is important to the success of any democracy and is crucial in the case of an emerging democracy such as Egypt. As Amin (2002) emphasized there is a serious “need to build the foundation of a civil society” in order to replace “fear with responsibility and censorship with freedom” (p.134).

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The current research on Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement applies agenda-setting as a theoretical foundation.

2.1 Agenda-Setting Theory

Introduced by Donald Shaw and Maxwell McCombs in 1972, agenda-setting theory was the outcome of their seminal research study conducted during the 1968 US presidential elections. The scholars' main hypothesis was as follows: The mass media influence the priority or salience of news issues among voters during a political campaign. The agenda-setting effect results from the press selectivity in reporting news. By choosing what to report, the news media establish the priority of significant issues in the minds of people, setting the initial step in opinion formation (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). McCombs and Shaw conducted their survey among voters in Chapel Hill in North Carolina asking them to list the main news topics. Simultaneously, the researchers content-analyzed the major sources of news that the voters listed. The ranking of news issues was determined by the number of stories dedicated by the media to each topic. The high correlation between the agenda of the media and the agenda of the voters in that study supported an agenda-setting effect.

Hundreds of studies were conducted since the Chapel Hill study on similar agenda-setting effects of the mass media, all providing a build-up of evidence in support of the effect of the media agenda on the public agenda (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Although McCombs and Shaw initiated the theory in their original 1968 Chapel Hill study, scholar David Weaver joined them in their one-year panel study of the US presidential elections in 1972. Weaver was also the main author of *Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Election* (McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, 1997). The three scholars continued their research contributions and development of

agenda-setting theory. Historically, origins of the thinking behind agenda-setting theory dates back to the 1920s when Walter Lippmann summarized the agenda-setting idea in the book *Public Opinion*, in the introductory chapter titled “The World Outside and Pictures in Our Heads.” Although Lippmann didn’t use the exact term agenda-setting, he summarized the idea behind such an effect. “His thesis is that the news media, our windows to the vast world beyond our direct experience, determine our cognitive maps of that world” (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p.2).

Although Lippmann is considered the intellectual father of the theory, the core idea behind the agenda-setting effect appeared in several writings also before the Chapel Hill study. As cited in Severin and Tankard (2001), Lan, K. & Lang, G.E. (1959) stated the same idea of the theory when they wrote that the news media have an impact on the public attention to specific issues. They added that the mass media build images and present objects influencing people’s thinking and feelings. Also cited by Severin and Tankard (2001) is the famous statement by Bernard Cohen revolving around the same idea of agenda-setting. Commenting on the power of the press, Cohen (1963) wrote that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p. 222).

2.2. Levels of Agenda-Setting

The first level of agenda-setting tackles what’s covered in the media or what items are on the agenda of the mass media. The process by which the media focus on specific issues ignoring others is called priming. The priming function constitutes the first level of agenda-setting, which happens when the media establish salience or issue priorities for the public. “The salience of an issue on the public agenda is defined by the percentage of people who regard that issue as the MIP [most important] facing the

state in a particular year” (Tan & Weaver, 2009). Therefore, the first level involves the issues on the agenda or the list of topics in order of priority. Cited in Ghanem (1996), Price and Tewksbury (1995) defined priming as “the tendency of audience members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular events and issues given attention in recent news reports” (p.5).

The second level of agenda-setting theory deals with how the media present or frame issues as opposed to what the media present in the first level of agenda-setting (Severin & Tankard, 2001). This level of agenda-setting which involves the framing of issues deals with media attributes of each issue which consequently influence the public agenda of attributes. Therefore, the second level of agenda-setting effects “examines how media coverage affects both what the public thinks about and how the public thinks about it” (Ghanem, 1997, p.3). Becker & McCombs (1978) examined the attributes’ agenda in the news media portrayals of candidates during the 1976 US presidential elections. The researchers found a strong connection between the media frames or portrayals and the public’s description of the candidates which represents the public’s attributes agenda (cited in Ghanem, 1997).

The attributes of a topic are the frames or viewpoints presented by the media for each issue. Frames are defined by Entman (1993) as the media’s focus on some sides of an issue while ignoring other sides. Framing focuses on the way issues are covered making agenda setting at the second level an examination of how such frames affect the public’s perception (Ghanem, 1997). At the second level of agenda-setting, media frames or attributes represent the independent variable. Ghanem (1997) broke frames covered by the media into four main categories: topic, the presentation of the topic, the topic’s cognitive attributes and finally its affective attributes. The topic is what’s covered in the news item. The presentation is the size and placement of the

news item. The cognitive attributes are the details included in the news item. The affective attributes include the tone of coverage. Takeshita (1995), cited in Ghanem (1997) defined the four dimensions on the attribute agenda as problem definition, attributed causes to the problem, evaluations or moral judgments of the problem, and finally the proposed solution to the problem.

Hundreds of research studies have applied agenda-setting theory. Although most of the research conducted so far examined the agenda-setting affect during elections, researchers have also explored the agenda-setting effect beyond election studies. For example, Holbrook and Hill (2005) cited by McCombs & Reynolds (2009) studied the agenda-setting effect of crime drama using data gathered from experimental research. They found that viewers of crime dramas shared growing crime-related concerns which consequently affected their opinions about the president. In this case, crime dramas set the salience of crime issues among viewers which affected their attitudes towards the president.

More recently scholars have extended the effect of the agenda-setting arguing that the news media may also show people what to think. By establishing this salience of news issues and influencing the public's picture of their surrounding world, the news media may also influence people's attitudes towards these issues and consequently influence action. When the media establish this salience, specific issues become the center of "public attention, thought, and perhaps even action" (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009, p.1). Future research on the agenda-setting theory application is moving beyond studying the formation of media agendas to considering how it can be applied by media to improve society (Severin and Tankard, 2001).

2.3. Agenda-Setting and Democracy

Mass media play a pivotal role in the democratic process of any country (McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997). The agenda-setting function of the media is central to comprehend the dynamics of established and emerging democracies.

Tan and Weaver (2009) studied agenda setting by examining public opinion at the level of the state and legislative policies. The researchers found a positive correlation between the newspaper and public agendas in five states in the United States over a period of 14 years. Citing Jones and Baumgartner (2005), the researchers noted that the legislature acquire, understand and prioritize information as a result of media exposure. The media also help in shifting the priority of policy issues by giving attention to different topics over a period of time (Tan and Weaver, 2009). Therefore, the media influence policy, pushing for change in favor of the public good.

Moon (2008) applied both the agenda-setting theory to media use and civic engagement. Moon's dissertation entitled "Agenda-Setting Effects as a Mediator of Media Use and Civic Engagement: From What the Public *Thinks About* to What the Public *Does*", examined both first and second level effects of agenda setting. The researcher tested the impact of each level on cognitive and affective attitudes, measuring attitude strength as opinion at the first level and the strength of emotions at the second level. Moon's study extended the theory of agenda setting to go beyond the salience of issues to include influence on attitudes and behaviors. After conducting a content analysis of the New York Times and NBC's nightly news along with analyzing secondary survey data on civic engagement applying the theory of agenda-setting and the OSOR model, Moon concluded that setting the public agenda influences the public to think about these issues and this process of thinking leads to

attitude change and consequently action. Therefore, the findings of Moon’s study support that using media to seek information has a positive impact on engagement. This influence is especially significant in newspaper usage (Moon, 2008). The researcher linked agenda-setting effects to engagement asserting that the process which begins with media use end up with potentially significant consequences that lead to informed and possibly engaged citizenry.

The agenda-setting effect on attitude strength can be explained as follows: “Since the mass media (from an agenda-setting perspective) tend to stimulate more thinking and learning about objects and attributes in people’s minds, one might consequently expect that this increased thinking would lead to strengthened attitudes” (Kiousis, 2005, p 7, cited in Moon, 2008, p.37). Because attitude predicts behavior, any change in attitude leads to behavioral change. According to the theory of agenda-setting in light of Moon’s study, the news media influence people on what and how to think about issues. This leads to a change in attitude strength which will further lead to behavioral change or action.

The following two figures used in Moon’s (2008) study illustrate how the agenda-setting function of the media influences civic engagement.

Figure 2.3a First level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement

(Moon, 2008, p.43)





Figure 2.3b Second level agenda-setting impact on civic engagement

(Moon, 2008, p.45) [sic]



Chapter 3: Literature Review

3.1. Defining Civic Engagement

“Civic engagement is gaining an awareness of your civic role and participating actively, nurturing competencies and civic skills to function as a citizen: One who knows his rights or responsibilities and takes action in forwarding their rights and responsibilities”

(Al Shimi, 2010)

The term civic engagement encompasses a broad variety of activities. The term is divided into two words civic and engagement. According to the *Merriam Webster* dictionary, the word civic comes from the Latin *civis* which means citizen.

Engagement means involvement or commitment. According to Adler and Goggin (2005), the term civic engagement describes several diverse viewpoints of citizenship and different types of activities associated with it. Adler and Goggin (2005) list several definitions for civic engagement. The first on the definitions' list is community service which emphasizes voluntary individual participation within local communities. The second definition views civic engagement as a collective action where individuals join hands acting as active citizens to influence their society. Some scholars also merge this collective actions definition of civic engagement with political involvement. Under this definition, civic engagement is seen as producing collective activities that are political or involving governmental action

Thorson (2005) defines civic engagement as the participation of people in their civic environment. This environment constitutes the “public sphere” where people communicate their civic or public affairs leading to common goals. Therefore, civic engagement is not limited to what's political. It encompasses people's social environment in its entirety. It also includes all aspects that lead to democratic citizenship from discussion to decision making. This also involves interest, knowledge and attitudes about public affairs. As Thorson (2005) puts it, the question

of civic engagement “must take into account at least four kinds of human response: civic interest, knowledge, attitudes, and behavior” (p. 206).

Putnam (2000) divides the term into formal and informal civic engagement. Informal societal activities include visiting friends and playing games. Formal social activities involve more organized community and political participation. There isn't any consensus between scholars over the definition of civic engagement, the term mostly refers to how citizens participate and engage in their communities to improve living conditions for themselves and for other people. Delli Carpini (2004) defines civic engagement as “individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern.” Civic engagement can be divided into two forms of participation, political and civic participation. The former involves individual actions that aim at government such as voting or calling for a change in public policy. The latter refers to voluntary activities that aim at helping others in a community (cited in Thorson, 2005).

“Civic engagement doesn't only involve voting ... it means other things like being aware of social ills, being involved, and working with associations that improve our daily life. It goes from associations that deal with motherhood to electoral monitoring” (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview).

3.2. Media and Civic Engagement

Numerous research studies demonstrate a positive correlation between civic engagement and media information use. News is considered the pivotal means that connects people to the civic world. Studies which examined strategies of information-processing also support that the dynamic processing of information transmitted through media has an essential role to perform in several aspects of political engagement such as learning, interest and participation. Numerous studies found that

attention to news had a positive influence on enhancing political knowledge, and hence promotes participation (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).

Boyd (2010) found positive correlations between adolescents' media use for political information and civic engagement. The findings of Boyd's (2010) study significantly associate media use with fostering civic skills and participation. In addition, the findings also support that the use of television to acquire news is more dominant than the use of the Internet for the same purpose (Boyd, 2010).

Similarly, Shah, McLeod & Yoon (2001) found positive influence of print, broadcast and the Internet media news use on civic engagement. The study found that the information use of the media is positively related to social capital as opposed to the entertainment use which is negatively related with social capital. The researchers also found that using the internet to exchange information had a strong influence on interpersonal trust and hence civic participation when compared to the traditional news media.

Political communication scholars assert that discussion of public affairs among citizens is the foundation of democratic participation. Several recent research studies have supported the normative theory of political discussion by finding a strong correlation between political discussion and participation. Through political discussion, citizens develop more knowledge and comprehension of political issues and therefore become more integrated into their communities and more eager to participate (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004).

Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim (2004) analyzed the dynamics of political discussion as an influence on mobilization. The analyses touched upon several features of political discussion including the frequency, diversity and the desired effect which includes the form of engagement and participation. The researchers

found that frequent and attentive discussions of political issues among individuals, is positively related to political involvement.

In his article *Watching Television and Civic Engagement: Disentangling the Effects of Time, Programs, and Stations*, Hooghe (2002), examined the relationship between watching television and political attitudes. Hooghe's findings emphasize the need to examine programming preferences among viewers. The results of the study demonstrate that the type of programs people watch and not just the time of television exposure determine whether the impact on civic values and attitudes is positive or negative. The researcher didn't find any evidence to support television's negative effects. He found strong relations between the medium and attitudes towards social capital. The findings of Hooghe's study support a positive relation between news programming and such attitudes. Hooghe (2002) suggests that the amount of exposure to television, political orientations and type of programs influence civic engagement.

Hooghe's (2002) findings also support a negative relation with regards to entertainment programming and social capital attitudes. "This could imply that commercial stations, especially, cultivate a less civic-minded value pattern among their viewers" (Hooghe 2002, p.2). Several scholars disagree with the negative effects that are attributed to television viewing, arguing that results of such studies are not significant. Other studies demonstrate positive effects to television viewing.

Baum (2002) asserts that scholars have ignored the impact of the entertainment media on political participation or policymakers, arguing that the soft news media provide an alternative access to information to a large number of viewers who wouldn't learn about sophisticated issues if it wasn't for their exposure to the entertainment-oriented media. In other words, the presence of the soft news media

offers a broader access to political and public information to a huge population segment that refrains from tuning to the traditional news media.

Baum (2002) studied viewers' consumption of soft news in the entertainment media and its relation with political knowledge. The study concluded that individuals not interested in politics attend to public affairs and crisis news when presented in an entertainment context or in a soft news format. Consequently, opinions of politically apathetic audiences who tune to the entertainment media differ from the politically active people who get their information from the traditional news media. Although some scholars argue that the entertainment-oriented media is mainly concerned with sensationalism, drama, gossip and celebrity news, Baum (2002) demonstrated that the entertainment-oriented media also discuss significant political, public, affairs and foreign affairs in the United States. Accordingly, "public scrutiny" is raised which could possibly affect policy (Baum, 2002).

Entertainment and information can complement each other and are not necessarily competing for audience attention. Citing Garber (1994), Lee (2002) notes that adding drama to news might attract uninterested viewers who would ignore a new story if it was strictly informative. Therefore, adding an element of entertainment will stimulate viewers' thinking and hold their attention. Such wider penetration of political knowledge transforms the politically disinterested public into an attentive public especially during crisis situations.

There is an ongoing scholarly debate over the negative impact of television on civic engagement. Scholars like Putnam (2000) blame television over the decline in civic life in the United States. In his book *Bowling Alone*, Putnam argues that the erosion in America's social cohesion is linked to the rise in television viewing with a particular emphasis on entertainment programming. Putnam argues that the time spent

viewing television replaces the time that people dedicate to political participation and civic activities. In other words, television viewing reduces active citizenship leading to a decline in civic engagement and political participation. Putnam blames television for the civic participation decline in the United States.

According to Hooghe (2002), negative statistics on America's decline in voter turnout from 1960 to 2000 support Putnam's argument. Statistics also show a 25 percent decline in civic group involvement among American citizens. Television critic Neil Postman wrote that television was "amusing" Americans to "death". Also, after a series of studies on television's cultivation effects, George Gerbner found that watching television cultivates insecurity among viewers especially those who are heavily exposed to the medium. Such feelings of insecurity translate into distrust and withdrawal from society leading to a general misperception of the world as a meaner place than it actually is. Gerbner referred to this phenomenon as the "mean world syndrome" (cited in Hooghe, 2002).

Although Putnam blamed television for the decline in civic engagement, he asserts that other informational media usage promotes engagement. Newspaper reading doesn't have a negative impact on cohesion and therefore may actually promote civic engagement. However, statistics also depict a decline in the news use of media. Other scholars agree with Putnam about the general negative role of television but argue that television viewing may have a positive role if the medium is used for seeking information. Some see television as giving viewers the opportunity to learn about significant current events and political debates thus promoting awareness and civic engagement. Watching informative content such as news and current affairs programs may reinforce and promote political participation and civic engagement (Hooghe, 2002).

Norris (2001) stressed that research should not be limited to examining the number of hours people spend watching television, authors should also take into account the nature of programs people are watching. Norris (2001) associates watching news on television with an interest in politics and an increase in political participation. The researcher, however, emphasized that credibility does play a very important role because people are more likely to be encouraged to participate if they find their source of information credible (cited in Hooghe, 2002). Other researchers assert that the channel people watch plays a role in triggering civic engagement. According to many scholars, public broadcasting should mostly promote civic values as opposed to commercial channels which are entertainment driven and thus reduce civic engagement (cited in Hooghe, 2002).

Civic values are fundamental to the public sphere. Habermass sees a rational public sphere as a key to civil society in a liberal democracy. A civil society provides space for individuals to express, communicate, and debate their ideas freely. An “idealized civil society” involves social movements that break the limits of their specific spheres in an attempt to appeal to other spheres and gain their attention and support. The structure of this ideal civil society is based on a series of bipolar notions such as good and bad or democracy and counter-democracy (Alexander, 2000). In 1998, Alexander developed a set of “binary codes” that apply to liberal-democracies on a universal level. The codes that characterize civil society’s democratic discourse include characteristics such as activist, autonomous, rational, reasonable, control, realistic, calm and sane. The opposite set of codes in democratic discourse which restrict civil society and hinder the freedom allowed by a democracy, include passiveness, dependence, irrationality, hysteria, excitability, passion, unrealism and madness (Alexander, 2000).

3.3. Talk Shows

“Talk shows have increasingly become sites where news, entertainment, and political power converge.” - Bernard Timberg

A large number of politicians either call or appear on television talk shows to respond to citizens' calls and debate issues of public interest, establishing channels of virtual communication between the general public and policy makers. Politicians' appearances on talk shows since the 1990s created wide interest in this television genre, inciting communication scholars to study the political and social impact of television talk shows (Timberg 2002). In 1997, Schumuckler quoted estimates of American talk show viewers as reaching 14 million per day (cited in Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).

Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political and public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by the ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment blend often referred to by communication scholars as infotainment. This blend or infotainment is observable in the increase of drama in news stories and the frequent appearance of political figures on talk shows (Lee, 2002). Although the primary function of talk shows is to entertain, many viewers see talk shows as an informative source on several issues and many talk show hosts see their mission as providing information that serves the public in an entertaining way (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999).

The popularity of talk shows is rooted in their ability to break sociopolitical boundaries by addressing controversial issues and holding politicians and officials accountable. Talk shows address citizens' concerns and open new channels of communication between the populace and the ruling elite. Many politicians appear on talk shows to clarify their points of view on several issues. Most importantly, they appear on such shows for exposure, publicity and to spread their political agendas to a

wide audience (Lee, 2002). Politicians' appearance on talk shows dates back to 1968, when former US President Richard Nixon appeared on *Laugh-In*, a variety show (Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). However, former U.S. President Bill Clinton was named the first "talk-show President" after appearing as a presidential candidate on Donahue, The Arsenio Hall Show, and MTV.

Former president George W. Bush and presidential candidate Al Gore also appeared on many talk shows during their campaigns. In addition, when U.S. President Barak Obama wanted to publicize for his new political and economic plans to a significantly sizeable audience, he appeared on the "Tonight Show", NBC's late-night television talk show (Lloyd, 2009). Reuters predicted that the president's appearance on the late night television talk show "will give him a high-profile stage" (Mason and Colvin, 2009).

According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009), Obama's appearance on a late night comedy talk show is unprecedented and is considered the first for a sitting president. Lee (2002) asserts that by spreading out the political agenda and connecting people to politics, infotainment may help in diminishing the disparity in political participation among citizens (Lee, 2002). Therefore, infotainment may be perceived as providing a democratizing impact by giving viewers unconventional options to access political knowledge.

Infotainment media such as talk shows are considered a phenomenon that serves as a significant source of news and political information that may sometimes lead to a change in attitude (Moy, Xenos, and Hess, 2005). Many political candidates have used such shows to emphasize their personality away from politics to reach and attract potential voters. Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) studied the priming effects of late-night comedy talk shows which have become an extension to the traditional news

media as they include political information and may sometimes mobilize the public to participate in politics. The researchers studied the effects of *The Late Show with David Letterman* and the *Tonight Show with Jay Leno* during the 2000 US presidential campaign to determine whether viewing late-night comedy shows influenced how viewers evaluated the presidential candidates who appeared on the show. Viewers of the shows based their evaluations of candidates on their character traits after their appearance on the shows. The researchers found that viewing late night comedy influenced viewers' perceptions of candidates Bush and Al Gore.

Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) applied the priming function of agenda setting in their study of the effects of late-night comedy talk shows on viewers evaluations of presidential candidates. The researchers examined the priming-effect to understand how media content influences viewers' judgments and attitudes following their exposure to the talk shows. Citing McCombs & Shaw (1972), the researchers defined priming as excessive media coverage that increases the salience of a particular issue among viewers.

3.4. Definition, History and Development of Talk Shows

A talk show is a “television show that is entirely structured around the act of conversation itself” (Timberg, 2002, p.3). Different forms of talk shows share specific basic elements: They all have groups of guests and they all include audience participation whether a visible in-studio audience or an invisible audience (Tolson, 2001). Although conversations on talk shows seem unstructured, they are preplanned. Many interviews on talk shows are prepared for in advance by carefully selecting guests and screening questions (Timberg, 2002). However, regardless of such highly structured interviews, conversations on talk shows still seem spontaneous and are still characterized by immediacy and being in the present-tense.

To differentiate between television talk in general and talk shows, Timberg (2002) explains that television talk involves all kind of talk and is much broader than talk shows. Television talk is seen on a variety of programming including cooking programs, live court hearings, and beauty pageants. However, talk shows are characterized by several other features. They are presented by one or more hosts who guide their guests by setting limits, tones and directions of the conversation. The talk show revolves around the host who speaks to millions of viewers as if speaking to each individually. Once the talk show becomes a success, the host turns into a celebrity. The host acts mostly as managing editor and exercises great control over the show (Timberg, 2002).

Talk shows have become a valuable commodity for many parties. For advertisers and executives, the host is the brand name that sells. For the hosts, the more their talk shows become successful, the higher their salaries. In 1991, Johny Carson of the Tonight Show received around 30 million dollars from NBC and Oprah Winfrey's worth reached 900 million dollars in 2000 (Timberg, 2002). For the guests, appearance on the talk show is based on the celebrity status and impact of the host which brings them wide exposure. According to television critic Robert Lloyd (2009), President Obama selected the Tonight Show in particular because it is "the Great American Talk Show" and its host Jay Leno is "a kind of president of the United States himself" (Lloyd, 2009).

Munson (1993) traces the roots of talk shows to the coffeehouse gatherings of people in 18th century England. Such salon-like gatherings involved talk about a variety of issues including news, arts and philosophy. The development of printing supported this talk tradition as magazines carried commentaries by writers who participated in the coffeehouse discussions. Magazine names such as "Town Talk"

and “Chit Chat” which emerged during this period reflected the influence of ordinary citizen talk. This talk tradition remained and developed until the spread of radio on the late 1920s.

According to Munson (1993), the first radio talk show was aired in 1921. Radio historians noted that the talk show’s main theme was farming as it was transmitted over WBZ for rural dwellers of Springfield, Massachusetts in the US. Radio talk shows diversified in content as the medium itself grew bigger reaching wider audiences. However, talk shows in the late twenties lacked the interactivity between the host and audience that is popular today. Back then the talk show focused on the host talking to the audience about his daily experiences followed by interviews with experts on a specific topic.

More forms of talk shows with more room for audience participation started appearing in 1933 (Munson, 1993). Such shows were more tied to people’s problems. For example, The Voice of Experience talk show which broadcast from 1933 to 1940 encouraged audience members to donate to poor people. The program’s host was a social worker named Dr. Marian Sayle Taylor and her method reflected the economic problems of that period. The interview format or “man on the street” talk shows also emerged during that period, introducing a new form of spontaneous interviews with people (Munson, 1993).

The popularity of a talk show is built on the host-audience relationship. The more the host establishes rapport with his audience, the higher the show’s popularity. Other key factors that determine the show’s popularity include “audience participation and emotional involvement” (Scott, 1996, p.86). For example, radio call-in shows attract many audience members to call the show and engage in the discussion. Other viewers experience this form of engagement vicariously through listening to other

callers. In television talk shows, a big portion of the interaction is limited to the guests or the in-studio audience. However, some television talk shows still provide room for callers to interact with the programs such as Larry King who welcomes call-ins (Scott, 1996).

The expansion of audience participation talk shows was rooted in the growing importance of public opinion during this period as people were interested in finding out what others think. However, this period of audience participation didn't survive past the 1940s. This is because when World War II erupted, these shows were censored by government officials for fear of opinions that may disrupt public order. As a result, interest in radio talk shows plunged as the program's lacked their informality and spontaneity.

This period referred to as the golden age of radio soon ended not only because of lack of interest in censored talk shows but also as a result of the audience shifting away to television (Munson, 1993). Television talk shows emerged out of the success of radio talk shows. The early generation of television shows migrated from radio to television in the late 1940s. Although such shows were not exactly talk shows, they are considered the beginnings of television talk because they featured short interviews with celebrities in addition to variety shows (Scott, 1996).

In his book *Television Talk: A History of the TV Talk Show*, Timberg (2002) provides a detailed account of the historical cycles and development of television talk shows which emerged in 1948. Timberg (2002) divides the history of television talk shows into five cycles or periods. The first cycle (1948-1962) was marked by experimentation that extended into the early 1950s, consolidation from the mid to late 1950s, and network control dominated by CBS and NBC. The founders of television talk shows were the successful radio hosts whose reputation as successful radio star

hosts attracted advertisers, raised funds and paved the way for their new television shows. The founding talk show hosts include Edward R. Murrow and Arthur Godfrey from CBS, Dave Garroway, Arlene Francis, Steve Allen and Jack Paar from NBC, and Mike Wallace from DuMont. These founders came out of a variety of radio traditions such as news, variety talk, humor, live theater, quiz shows and sketch comedy.

This period was a time for experimenting and creating new form of talk shows suitable for the television industry which boomed during that era. During the period from 1948 to 1953, television penetration in the United States boomed expanding from one percent to 53 percent. Towards the end of the 1950s, television's penetration climbed reaching 90 percent. The founders of television talk shows all went off the air by 1962 due to lack of independence and tensions with corporate directors who were submissive to advertising and government pressure. For example, Jack Paar walked out of *The Tonight Show* after network supervisors censored a "harmless" joke from his show without prior notice. Edward R. Murrow also walked out of CBS because his investigative reports were considered problematic by network executives (Timberg, 2002).

The second cycle (1962-1974) marked the increase in network consolidation and power creating new challenges. The three large networks joined forces. Network executives exercised strict control of the talk shows content for fear of upsetting advertisers and sponsors. Video tape provided network directors with more power and control over live programming as they can run recorded shows on videotape as live. Talk show hosts like Barbara Walters, Johnny Carson, and Mike Wallace who had the skills to sustain and manage their careers in this new corporate system emerged as stars during that period. Although the networks had the biggest market share of talk

shows, some nationally syndicated talk shows managed to emerge and survive besides the networks during that period. Television during that period played a powerful role in American politics. The presidential debates of 1960 between Nixon and Kennedy were “major television talk events” (Timberg, 2002, p56). Towards the end of the 1960s, late-night talk shows became very popular and more profitable providing more competition from syndicated shows to the networks.

The third cycle (1974-1980) is a period of transitions. Independent stations, PBS, syndicators and cable acted as a real challenge to network dominance in the industry. Syndicators produced the shows and sold them to stations and networks. New production technologies and low costs attracted investors to produce the syndicated talk shows. The early 1970s marked a rise in talk about civil rights, women’s public and political participation, the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War. A series of talk shows tackled these issues often influencing each other to compete and provide their audiences with the news on demand. Talk shows changed during that period with on air confrontations and critical debate on the rise, as the control of networks loosened due to competition from syndication, independent stations and cable.

The fourth cycle (1980-1990) is described as the post-network era. New stars of television talk shows rose to fame through national syndication instead of networks. Names like Oprah Winfrey, Arsenio Hall, Sally Jessy Raphael, and Geraldo Rivera appeared through such national syndicated shows. Such new star hosts marked the new wave of recognition to previously misrepresented social classes. Winfrey and Hall were African Americans and Raphael and Rivera were Hispanic Americans. Their presence changed the scene in the talk show world. Talk shows were no longer limited to representing the White middle class. This era marked an interest among

television marketers to seek out new audiences including women and different ethnic and racial minorities and represent them on the shows. The representations of minorities and women were still very stereotypical (Timberg, 2002).

The fifth cycle (1990-1995) featured news content as entertainment. During this period, the lines between news and entertainment started to blur. New formats of talk shows appeared as a result of the cable expansion such as reality programs and infotainment. Many talk show products appeared such as sports talk, comedy, news talk, and specialized talk shows covering topics such as health, homes, cooking and religion. In the early 1990s, most talk shows were produced by cable or syndication. Talk shows expanded vigorously and producers had to develop new ways to keep the old shows fresh. Talk shows were integrated with other communication forms such as websites. Major talk show hosts like Oprah and Rosie established their own magazines (Timberg, 2002).

Timberg (2002) notes that each cycle in the history of talk shows carries with it cultural and economic changes that shape the television industry as well as the genre itself. New formats of television talk shows are seldom to appear but modifications of talk show subgenres take place to stay abreast of new developments in the broadcast industry. Such developments carry with them several changes including blurring the traditional lines separating news from entertainment, starting from the 1980s. The content of television talk shows, is influenced greatly by the programming schedule. The time of the day determines the nature of the show, whether its entertainment or news-orientated, because different parts of the day mean different audiences that the show must appeal to. Timberg (2002) divides the talk show genre into three main subgenres: late-night, daytime, and morning talk shows.

Late-night entertainment talk shows follow the format of *The Tonight Show* hosted by Jack Paar and Steve Allen from 1954 to 1961. This popular type involves a celebrity host talking with a single primary guest with secondary guests close by. This form of talk shows is rooted in friendly, informal and humorous chats between the host and his guests. David Letterman added new innovations to the late-night entertainment talk show format by adding political satire and stand-up comedy. Jay Leno and other hosts followed Letterman's approach in hosting late-night talk shows.

The second subgenre, the day-time talk show was found by Arlene Francis who started this format as a forum for education and providing service to the public through discussing family, home, women issues and public concerns. The daytime audience-participation talk show is based on the format of The Phil Donahue Show broadcast from 1967 to 1995. Donahue's television show is based on the success of his *Conversation Piece*, a call-in show broadcast on Radio from 1963 to 1967. The show's format is based on the interaction between the studio audience and guests. Audience members comment or address questions to celebrity or expert guests, creating an interactive type of program.

Viewers of daytime talk shows are mostly non-working women staying at home. Shattuc (1997) noted that because daytime talk shows attract a large audience of female viewers, they provide women with the opportunity to express their opinions, share their problems, and discuss their private lives in public. Shattuc emphasizes the effect of daytime talk shows on feminism. Famous followers of Donahue's successful format include Oprah Winfrey who appeared in the 1980s attracting more viewers and wide interest in daytime television talk shows. However, as the form became more popular it attracted imitators to shift from content that serves the public to purely entertainment and tabloid commercial standards. Such daytime tabloid talk shows

include *Jerry Springer*, *Rickie Lake* and other reality talk programs. As for the morning show, it adheres to a magazine format like that of Dave Garroway's *Today Show* of 1952. The morning show presents a mixture of news and entertainment.

3.5. An Overview of the Political Impact of Talk Shows

The significance of television talk shows lies in the fact that the genre is the center of substantial public discussion and scholarly debate, which produced opposite opinions regarding the nature and significance of these programs (Tolson, 2001, p.3). Previous studies produced two different views of talk shows (Lee, 2002). Some scholars describe the kind of talk on talk shows as “trash talk” while others regard them as valuable channels for public discourse. Critics see them as producing nothing but heated debates that only serve an entertaining purpose, failing to reach the functions of politically oriented journalism. Whereas, supporters of talk shows see them as channels for public opinion expression and democratic deliberation (Lee, 200).

Critics of the controversial TV genre argue that talk shows ‘desensitize’ viewers’ perception of human sufferings, raise naïve opinions about complex issues in society, and distort the audience perception of reality (Tolson, 2001). Abt and Seesholtz (1994) argue that talk shows cross the lines of traditional structures of social order, stating that the genre blurs the lines between reality and fiction, personal and public, and normal and abnormal (cited in Tolson, 2001). They assert that talk shows undermine moral and traditional values by providing exposure to abnormal subcultures such as presenting homosexuals or deviants. By breaking social stigmas, talk shows make what’s out of the ordinary seem acceptable (Tolson, 2001).

According to Tolson (2001), some scholars associate talk shows with fakeness, sensationalism, and misrepresentation of reality. In 1999, the Guardian

reported that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) suspended a researcher and two producers of the talk show *Vanessa* following a disclosure that some guests were fakes. In the United States, the *Jerry Springer* show was the center of attention and criticism when the talk show was held responsible for influencing the murder of a homosexual who appeared on the show in 1995. The family of the victim filed a lawsuit against Time Warner and Telepictures Productions. In this particular case, the talk show was held responsible for influencing someone to commit murder representing an extreme case of allegedly exploiting participants and subjecting them to danger (Tolson, 2001). A national debate in the US concerning tabloid talk shows hosted by Jerry Springer and Ricki Lake erupted in the mid-1990s. A “talk summit” led by the former US secretaries of health, education and human services was organized with the talk show hosts and sponsors urging them to control the talk in their shows (Timberg 2002).

On the other hand, supporters of the controversial television genre see talk shows as a public forum on political and social issues (Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun, 1999). Ordinary citizens can contact the program and voice their concerns or express their opinions through phone or email. Talk shows offer audiences a chance to publicly express their opinions, making the genre unique in its discursive dynamics. The popularity of talk shows is rooted in the enjoyment of seeing and hearing ordinary citizens engage in informal types of talk (Tolson, 2001). Participation by ordinary citizens is a key element of talk shows. Therefore, the genre provides a channel for opinion expression influencing public opinion formation (Glynn, Huges, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007). Nevertheless, critics of talk shows regard infotainment as affecting the seriousness of political talk and trivializing politics.

Lee (2002) noted that critics also argue that using entertainment in news supersedes significant information because infotainment weakens reasonable political discussion. However, such criticisms are based on the perception that entertainment is competing with information for attention (Lee, 2002). A study of a radio talk show in Hong Kong conducted by Lee (2002) found talk shows extremely critical of the government and people in power to the extent that talk show hosts in Hong Kong represent the public by speaking on behalf of them (Lee 2002). Therefore, talk shows are a blend of both views. They can be a forum for public opinion and an entertaining medium at the same time. Results of the Lee's study support that talk shows provide listeners with information on politics and the chance to express their opinion and voice their criticism of policy (Lee, 2002). In addition to seeing or hearing the voices of ordinary citizens, talk shows act as significant sources of news, playing a role in forming an "informed public opinion" and thus promoting "active democratic citizenship" (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007, p.13).

Young and Tisinger (2006) studied the effect of late-night comedy on young television viewers. The researchers examined whether young viewers use late-night comedy talk shows as a substitute for traditional news sources. They also studied the role the programs play in providing political information during election time. According to the study's findings, young people tune in to late night comedy shows which play an obvious role in U.S. presidential elections. Late-night comedy talk shows seek to play a significant role in politics (Young and Tisinger, 2006). The researchers explored a report published by the Pew Research Center (2000) about the information sources U.S. citizens use during election time. The report demonstrated that 34 percent of respondents aged 18 to 29 receive political information from late-night talk shows (Young and Tisinger, 2006). The press and other news programs

picked the report and released stories and commentaries on the role late-night shows play as a source of political news for America's youth.

Davis and Mares (1998) studied the effects of viewing talk shows on adolescents because this population is thought to be the most vulnerable to these kinds of shows (cited in Tolson, 2001). Testing four effects types, the researchers surveyed a number of 282 students at high school. Their study contradicted with the earlier findings of Abt and Seesholtz. Their results supported only the hypothesis that "talk shows might distort viewers' sense of reality" (Tolson, 2001, p.10). In other words, teenagers tend to overestimate teen-related problems in reality. However, findings of the study showed that exposure to talk shows encouraged teens to take issues more seriously, promoting 'moral judgment'.

Glynn, Huges, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan (2007) studied the influence of daytime talk shows on political opinion formation, using the agenda-setting and cultivation theories as a theoretical framework to their study. To determine the effect of talk shows on political opinion formation the researchers conducted a telephone survey of 596 adults. The researchers tested the relationship between talk show viewing and viewers' support for government help in family problems. They specifically selected family issues because previous content analysis studies of daytime talk shows showed that this theme of discussion is the most recurrent topic of discussion (Glynn, Huges, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007).

In addition, they also tested the relationship between perceptions of reality in talk shows to viewers' support for government help in family issues. Findings of the study support the researchers' hypothesis that talk shows influence political opinion formation. There is a positive relationship between exposure to talk shows and forming political opinions. The researchers also found that the more the perception

that talk shows present real issues, the higher the influence on forming political opinions among viewers. With regards to the cultivation effect of talk shows, the researchers found that heavy viewing of such shows results in a mainstreaming of opinions. Despite viewers' different political orientations, liberal or conservative, the more viewers are exposed to the show and the more real they perceive it, the more their opinions become consistent (Glynn, Huge, Reineke, Hardy, & Shanahan, 2007).

Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim (2004) studied the role of talk shows in political engagement among young adults. The researchers selected their sample based on a 2004 Pew Center survey which indicated that adults under 30-years-old seek nontraditional media sources for political information. Young viewers are believed to be more influenced by exposure to talk shows due to their heavy exposure to the entertainment media, low interest in politics, and lack of follow up on political issues. The survey also suggested that Americans are more likely to watch talk shows instead of network news during election time. Therefore, the researchers tested the relationship between talk show viewing and several forms of political engagement including political efficacy, trust and voting possibility (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). They conducted a secondary analysis of a national phone survey of 1,600 respondents. Findings of the study show that talk shows influence young adults' political engagement. The researchers also studied whether source credibility plays a role in young people's political engagement. The findings support that viewing talk shows and trust in the show messengers influences voting likelihood (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004).

Ross (2004) studied the effect of election call-in programs on public participation in the politics. The researcher conducted a case study on *Election Call*, broadcast on BBC radio and TV for almost two weeks before Britain's general

elections in 2001. The mission of the program is to target the apathetic British public to achieve a higher voter turnout. Although the voting turnout barely reached 60 percent, it was much higher than expectations. The researcher studied the impact of *Election Call* because it promotes dialogue between politicians and audience callers. About 250 callers contact the program each day, 12 of which get on air to ask politicians their questions (Ross, 2004). According to Ross (2004), television represents the “real public space in which politics occur and through which citizens comprehend the political process” (p.786). Viewers, listeners and participants in call-in programs perceive the talk show genre as a “public sphere” where different opinions are expressed and alternative voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786).

Ross (2004) surveyed audience callers because some scholars argue that citizens who call such programs are not representative of the population because they might be politically active in the first place. Findings of the study demonstrated that regardless of their political ideology 92 percent of the callers felt they were representing the public in general or speaking on behalf of other fellow citizens when they posed questions to politicians on the program. In addition, 76 percent of the callers took the decision to call the program in order to voice a “public disquiet”, dissatisfaction or cynicism about policies, and politicians’ lack of interaction with people and from the public’s real world (Ross, 2004). Also, 54 percent of the callers wanted to speak to a specific politician or party member in particular. Only 10 percent of the callers said they called to express their anger over a personal incident (Ross, 2004). Regardless of being critical of politicians and expressing criticism on air, callers felt positive about their interaction with politicians on the show. Also, 82 percent of the respondents said *Election Call* contributes to the process of democracy because it allows interaction with politicians, a chance for public engagement, holds

politicians accountable, clarifies positions on policies, and allows the dissemination of issues that are not very popular.

Several studies that conducted content analyses of late night talk shows found consistent results in terms of content tone on political figures and political issues, which is mostly negative (Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). A study conducted by Niven, Lichter, & Amundson (2003) found that leading political personalities including presidential candidates and the president are common targets for jokes on late night television talk shows (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Moy & Pfau (2000) also found that talk shows provide negative coverage of politicians and Young (2004) found that most talk shows focus on the shortcomings of presidential candidates (cited in Kwak, Wang & Guggenheim, 2004). Cited in Ross (2004), Barker and Knight (2000) argue that negative media messages are more significant in producing attitude change than positive media messages. Several media studies suggest that the audience tend to agree with the views of the program presenter (Ross, 2004).

Baum (2005) examined the impact of interviewing candidates running for presidency on television talk shows. To determine the reasons behind the talk shows coverage of the presidential elections and the candidates' choice to appear on entertainment talk shows, the researcher selected the 2000 U.S. elections as a case study. Baum conducted a content analysis of talk shows coverage of the elections. Furthermore, the researcher carried out a survey to explore the impact of such interviews on political attitudes and voting. Results of the study reveal that talk show viewers who lack political awareness tend to prefer the candidate from the opposition party compared to viewers who are not exposed to talk shows and who also enjoy more political awareness.

Davis and Owen (1998) found a positive correlation between exposure to daytime talk shows and the viewers' estimation of teen related problems. Their findings showed that daytime talk show viewers overestimate the frequency of teen pregnancy, runaways, and sexual activity. Testing an agenda-setting effect, the researchers found that the agenda of talk shows influenced the public agenda (Davis and Owen, 1998).

Hamo (2006) studied the democratizing impact of Israeli talk shows. The researcher analyzed lay or anonymous guests' discursive positioning on the popular Israeli talk show *Live*. According to Hamo (2006), US studies on participation in talk shows found that marginalized persons purposively seek the chance to appear on talk shows to have their social problems heard in public. However, what lay people often risk is misrepresentation and a limited participation. Simon-Vandenberg (2004) studied the discursive positioning of lay participants on British television talk show and found that they were represented as "inferior in the public sphere" (cited in Hamo 2006).

Similar results were found by Penz (1996) after studying daytime talk shows in America and finding the participation of lay persons to be very controlled by the program host. The researcher examined several dimensions of the dialogue including speaking turns (cited in Hamo 2006). Hamo (2006) examined the social roles of lay people analyzing power relations between the talk show host and the guests. The researcher examined natural and institutional discourse. The findings of Hamo's study indicate that anonymous guests' access to public discourse in talk shows is curbed by limitations and control. According to Hamo (2006), the findings of the study provide a cynical look at the talk shows' potential for democratization.

According to Munson (1993), talk shows tackle a wide-range of topics including significant political discussions, anecdotes, and touching personal stories.

Talk shows function differently in different cultures (Thompson, 2004). Instead of creating a worldwide liberal-democracy model, talk shows in different countries create a special democratic model for each society. Thompson referred to studies comparing talk shows in the United States America and Germany. The data revealed varied content based on the cultural differences between democratic societies. Talk shows in America center around the host's personality, but German talk shows are hosted by moderators and do not carry the name of an individual host like American talk shows. Also, American talk shows present the personal experiences of ordinary guest, experts and celebrities. Whereas, guests on German talk shows represent the group point of view and not the individual. Both American and German talk shows are similar in the fact that they voice national debates (Thompson, 2004).

Studying the participation of audiences on television talk shows, Livingstone and Lunt (1994) see such shows as giving people a chance to engage in a public discussion that is rooted in experiences and feelings. In addition, talk shows provide the ordinary public with an opportunity to dare the power of experts (cited in Lee, 2002). Leurdijk (1997) examined talk radio in the Netherlands and found that they illustrate the contradiction between people's experiences and the official policy (cited in Lee, 2002).

Livingstone and Lunt (1992) who analyzed European shows to determine why ordinary people would want to appear on such shows wrote that talk shows are a "cultural forum in which the viewer-as-citizen may participate in public debate". Talk shows influence societies through empowering ordinary citizens and marginalized

people. For example, Gamson (1999) noted that homosexual guests used their appearance on talk shows to win public exposure and serve their cause. It's clear that talk show participants grab the chance to present their individuality and define their identities. Livingstone and Lunt (1992) and Gamson (1999) agreed that there three types of guest who appear on talk shows: The political citizens who discuss political and social issues, the victimized guests who bring money to these shows through their highly viewed stories and the individuals who aspire for exposure to achieve self-actualization.

Trepte (2005) studied the motives behind viewers' participation in television talk shows as guests. The researcher analyzed audiences of German talk shows applying the theory of symbolic self-completion to determine the reasons why guests participated in the shows. The researcher found that realizing one's self is a primary motive behind viewers wanting to participate as guests. Other reasons include therapeutic talking and confessing on talk shows. Trepte (2005) conducted two studies. The first research study was conducted by interviewing more than 60 viewers of talk shows. The second study involved an experiment with exactly 33 participants. Findings of the study suggest that individuals who wish to participate as guests on talk shows do so because they strive for "self-realization and self-symbolizing."

Dixon and Spee (2003) analyzed talk on the Flemish talk show *Jan Publiek*, applying two theories namely speech act theory and Bakhtinian genre theory. The researchers wanted to test the assumption that television talk shows provide "ordinary participants" with the chance to express their opinions, identities and feelings to serve their own aims, contributing to democratic discourse. The researchers are optimistic about the type of therapeutic discourse often implemented through television talk shows such as Oprah Winfrey or *Jan Publiek*. When ordinary people on the show start

narrating their personal stories, a conscious and active discussion follows which transcends beyond the boundaries of the television studio leading to off air discussions that engage citizens. Dixon & Spee (2003) assert that such scenario is democratic.

Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) agree that former studies on talk shows demonstrate that viewers use them to seek advice. This excessive existence of expert guests endorses the idea that talk shows are a means of advice to their viewers. The researchers assert that research studies must be conducted to measure the effectiveness of advice delivered by experts on talk shows. Because television talk shows are influential, researchers must be concerned with their content to examine what's being presented to the audiences. Because talk shows describe themselves as public forums that transmit significant information to their audiences, assessing the quality of experts and content of their advice is very important. The researchers note that quantitative research conducted on the content of television talk shows is very limited. Analyzing educational topics on talk shows, for example, is very important. Such topics tackled by talk shows highlight the genre's public service function. Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) point out Oprah Winfrey's vow to focus on significant issues to help her viewers. However, the researchers also note that topics presented on talk shows are selected mostly to entertain and attract audiences rather than educate them.

Johnson, Smith, Mitchell, Orrego, & Yun (1999) conducted a content analysis of 78 transcripts of eight television talk shows. The primary research question is to determine the percentage of participation of experts by counting their speaking turns. The researchers also coded the qualifications of experts to determine whether they were credible enough to offer viewers advice. In addition, the nature of advice itself

and whether it solves people's problems or clarifies issues was also coded. Results of the study showed that experts were used in one half of the sample of talk shows examined in the study. This supports that experts are an integral part of talk shows. As for the qualification of experts, the research found that 29 percent of the experts are well trained with high academic degrees and 31 percent of the experts included writers and lecturers. Therefore, the research found that the experts were qualified to give advice to the public.

Zhong (2004) conducted a case study on *The Future Starts Now* talk show that is part of the *Dialogue* series on China Central Television (CCTV), to investigate whether the show promoted real dialogue. Zhong (2004) defines real dialogue as a discussion between several parties that allows for a free exchange of ideas in order to achieve common grounds of understanding. After reviewing recorded conversations of the show to examine both form and presentation, the researcher found that the program employs a hierarchical model of communication. Central speakers are given more time, turns, rights to speak, and better physical presence in relation to the supporting speakers and studio audience. Opinions lack in diversity and are primarily in agreement with the official agenda (Zhong, 2004). The way the show is structured divides the speakers from the studio audiences emphasizing the former as an authority on information and the latter as speechless and passive recipients of information. Zhong (2004) asserts that the CCTV dialogue series failed to engage the audience in a participatory form of communication that is supposed to be liberal and democratic.

Carpignano, Andersen, Aronowitz, and Difazio (1990) suggest that talk shows blur the space between the program and the audience, transforming the traditional public and creating new forms of audience participation (cited in Tolson, 2001). According to Tolson (2001), the work of Carpignano and his colleagues invokes that

the talk show genre is involved in constructing new kinds of public spheres. With reference to Habermass's public sphere, Tolson (2001) questions whether talk shows present a new public forum which allows diversity of opinion through debate and discussion.

The diversity of opinion is evident in the genre's ability to deliver voices, such as those of women, which were marginalized in the classical public sphere. According to Habermass (1984), a public sphere is a forum that is not controlled by special interests and where public opinion can be created through rational discussion and debate "within an informed and democratic community of citizens". According to Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), rational political debate is necessary for a working democracy (cited in Lee, 2002). Therefore, talk shows create an "electronic public place" in which discourse is exchanged and topics are discussed beyond any official political plan (Tolson, 2001, p.16).

Livingstone and Lunt (1994) argue that talk shows perform confrontations between ordinary people or the audience who tell their personal stories and experts who frequently use institutional talk that only reflects what other experts are saying. The fact that ordinary people speak for themselves grants them credibility and authenticity, challenging the rationale of experts who speak for others. The researchers argued that instead of creating a public sphere or a place in which public opinion can be created, talk shows create an "oppositional public sphere".

Developed by Negt and Kluge (1990), the oppositional sphere refers to an environment where different discourses circulate and oppositional voices are expressed but without reaching a consensus. Tolson notes that although talk shows allow viewers to actively participate in discussions, a common conclusion or a clear popular opinion or decision that transcends the boundaries of the program is unlikely.

Consequently, the genre's role in the formation of a public sphere cannot be established.

The public sphere is not restricted to a specific place or medium but rather an outcome of a flow of public discourses throughout multiple channels which might include talk shows. Tolson (2001) draws the line between audience access to the mass media and influencing "civic public opinion". Although there are cases that support the impact of talk shows like the impact of Oprah Winfrey's announcements on certain issues, the issue under debate is managed and controlled by the program host. Therefore, audience participants don't enjoy the absolute freedom to express their opinions or narrate their stories unless their information fits the show's agenda.

According to Ross (2004), television represents the "real public space in which politics occur and through which citizens comprehend the political process" (p.786). Viewers, listeners and participants in call-in programs perceive the talk show genre as a "public sphere" where different opinions are expressed and alternative voices are heard (Ross, 2004, p.786).

3.6. Television Talk Shows in the Arab World and Egypt

"Talk shows on Arab satellite television stations have been a forum for rollicking criticisms of Arab regimes and sharp discussion of taboo topics especially shows where listeners can call in with un-censorable opinions"

-The Associated Press (2008)

The establishment of private Arab satellite channels in the 1990s brought a series of television talk shows which capture the interest of Arab viewers who are hungry for an independent media. According to Lynch (2006), Al-Jazeera's talk shows provide the Arab public with a space to openly debate issues. Political debates on talk shows cultivate contention and a pluralistic political culture. In 2003, Lynch argued that the format of Al-Jazeera's talk shows negates the idea that the television

medium creates a passive audience. Although state-television may not create an active audience because it only focuses on protocol news covering meetings and visits of heads of states, Arab television “political talk shows spark energetic arguments among viewers and seem to be encouraging critical argument” (Lynch, 2003, p.65).

Lynch (2006) studied Al-Jazeera’s most significant talk shows to assess the impact of Al-Jazeera talk shows on Arab politics. He analyzed 976 episodes of five programs between 1999 and 2004. The researcher also created a separate database for programs discussing Iraq and analyzed their content. According to Lynch (2006), political talk shows reshaped the features of public opinion in the Arab World. The advent of Al-Jazeera news channel encouraged the emergence of a new environment of political debate in which new voices are heard that are in disagreement with the dominant regimes in power. A new public that challenged existing policies also emerged. The channel offers multiple viewpoints on issues of discussion and call-in programs portray the worries shared by ordinary Arab citizens. Lynch found that in 1999 alone, most talk shows on Al-Jazeera were critical of lack of democracy in the region.

Al-Shami (2005) conducted a content analysis study on Al-Jazeera’s talk show *Minbar Al-Jazeera*. His findings are in agreement with Lynch in that most of the issues raised by the talk show discussed Arab political reform. The total number of audience participation through phone, e-mail and fax reached 971 over a period of one year with 84.2 percent call-ins. The results show a huge gap in participation among genders with male participation reaching 95.7 percent and female participants at 4.3 percent. Most of the issues raised by the talk show revolved around Arab political reform, Iraq and Sudan. Abdel-Razek (2004) conducted a content analysis to describe the coverage of live Arab television talk shows. The researcher found that talk shows

heavily discussed social issues and political issues in the Arab world. Most issues revolved around women rights, human rights, women in Islam, and illiteracy.

Youssef (2008) studied the agenda of two Egyptian television talk shows. In her unpublished master's thesis titled "Role of Private and State-owned Television Talk Shows in Setting the Agenda of Social Issues among the Egyptian Audience", the researcher explored the agenda-setting effect of *Al-Ashera Masa'an* talk show broadcast on the privately-owned satellite channel Dream 2 and *Al Beit Beitak* broadcast on the state-owned terrestrial and satellite channels. Youssef (2008) content-analyzed two months of talk show programming and conducted a survey among a purposive sample of talk show viewers in Cairo. The results showed a positive correlation between the talk show agenda and the viewers' agenda. The results also supported an intra-media agenda-setting influence between private-channel talk shows and government-channel talk shows. Survey data revealed that around 98 percent of respondents watch talk shows to follow up on Egyptian affairs. Around 77 percent of respondents watch talk shows broadcast on Arab satellite channels including the Al Jazeera's *Opposite Direction* and Orbit's *Ala Al-Hawa* and *Al-Qahera Al Youm*.

Fathallah (2003) studied the exposure of the Egyptian elite to Arab television talk shows. The researcher used a non-random sample distributing his survey among 200 Egyptian professors at four universities. The findings show that 86.2 percent of respondents watch Egyptian television talk shows because they cover local issues. Respondents also cited that talk shows provide an in-depth analysis of local issues. Viewers also cited lack of freedom and low credibility among the drawbacks of talk shows.

Mahmoud (2007) who studied Egyptian youth's dependency on talk shows in acquiring knowledge about Egypt's societal problems also found that Egyptian youth are highly dependent on talk shows as a source of information on social problems. A big percentage of respondents noted that talk shows on private satellite channels enjoy more freedom and discuss a variety of issues compared to talk shows on state-owned terrestrial channels. The results showed that 91 percent of the respondents said they found talk shows useful in learning about society problems. With regards to the popularity of talk shows, *Al Bait Beitak* (defunct) topped the responses as the most useful show followed by *Al Ashera Masa'an*.

The link between talk shows and political awareness in the Arab world is discussed by Sakr (2007) who asserted that talk shows in the Arab world legitimize disagreement on political issues which helps in establishing the groundwork for a "pluralistic political culture". Therefore, it's essential to study the relationship between exposure to television talk shows and political engagement in Egypt. Mirazi (2010, personal interview) asserted that talk shows on Egyptian television channels are an effect of Al-Jazeera.

Many talk shows offer oppositional voices to the existing regimes and tackle sensitive social issues and taboos. According to AP (2008), one viewer called the talk show *Al Ashera Masa'an* criticizing Egypt's former president Mubarak and wondering if the president is aware of soaring prices and other public concerns. Al-Jazeera's talk show *Al Ittijah Al Mo'akes* (Opposite Direction) discussed police brutality in Egypt and several other Arab countries. In addition, a call-in talk show on LBC discussed the case of a Saudi woman who was raped by a gang but was sent to jail for going out with a man who is not related to her. The talk show shed light on sensitive and controversial issues dealing with Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. Ahmed

Moslemani, who hosts *Al Tabaa Al Oula* (The First Edition) on Dream TV, was quoted by AP (2008) as saying talk shows provide citizen callers with the chance to humiliate their government. “These talk-shows were like a disaster to the government” (AP, 2008).

Awareness of the impact of talk shows is evident in the amount of debate concerning talk shows and the nature of talk they deliver. Arguments for or against appear often in the local press or in online articles. Several talk shows aired on private satellite channels sparked waves of discussion or criticism in the local press. For example, a former talk show broadcast on Dream TV hosted by Hala Sarhan came under immediate flak after an entire episode dedicated to the discussion of sexual masturbation. Sarhan was also charged with harming the reputation of Egypt after she interviewed several Egyptian prostitutes on her talk show *Hala Show* aired on the Saudi-owned *Rotana Cinema* satellite channel (Shehata, 2007). The case erupted after the alleged prostitutes appeared on a talk show named *90 Deqeeqa* claiming they were not real prostitutes. The young women said Sarhan allegedly paid them to appear on her talk show as real prostitutes. Dream TV also faced criticism after its live broadcast of Mohamed Hassanein Heykal speech at the American University in Cairo in which he discussed Egyptian political heritage (Menassat, 2008).

The proliferation of talk shows in Egyptian privately-owned and state television which started in 2007 revived the interest of Egyptian citizens in news and current affairs (Menassat, 2008). “Talk shows became the most popular programs in the history of satellite channels, with each channel trying to be unique and exceptional, and covering the most controversial topics” (Menassat, 2008). El Sherif (2010, personal interview) noted that the talk show format existed in Egyptian state television in the sixties. However, the content changed dramatically because the new

format of talk shows presents a diversity of opinions and discusses issues that were considered taboos in the past.

Breaking such taboos started with Hala Sarhan's first talk show *Ya Hala*, which was "the Arab world's first American-style talk show" broadcast live on ART (Arab Radio and Television Network) in 1991. The now defunct show shocked the mostly conservative Arab audience when it started discussing sexual issues which were considered taboos in the Arab world. Sarhan was quoted by the Associated Press as saying she was the first "Arab woman to utter the word 'sex' on television" (Hendawi, 2001). The talk show also discussed Arab government's relations with the United States, which was also considered a sensitive topic of discussion in the nineties.

According to El Sherif (2010), television talk shows criticize the government, police and sometimes the president which is unprecedented in the history of Egyptian media. Talk shows proliferated in the Egyptian media following the success of *Al Qahera Al Youm* talk show which first appeared on the Saudi-owned Orbit Network. The show was introduced by Orbit following the success of *Ala Al Hawa* (On Air), a live call-in talk show which hit the airwaves in 1997. After years of *Ala Al Hawa*'s and *Al Qahera Al Youm*'s success, state-owned and privately owned Egyptian channels adopted the format. The first nightly television talk show that appeared on Egyptian state-owned television is *Al Beit Beitak* which now changed its name due to legal and copyright issues with the producing company into *Masr Ennaharda*. Two of the pioneering and popular talk shows that appeared on privately-owned Egyptian satellite channels are *Al Ashera Masa'an* on Dream TV and *90 Deqeeqa* on Mehwar.

According to Hamdy (2010), not only did talk shows revolutionize Egyptian mass media by approaching taboo topics, they also provided a platform to all political

and social ideologies by approaching a multiplicity of issues daily. Talk shows are also “Egypt-centric” with most of their news content covering Egypt’s relationship with others and community problems. Such a focus on local affairs was missing in the traditional media. Therefore, talk shows filled that vacuum by delivering day-to-day Egyptian news to people at home. Talk shows implement a journalistic informative approach but in an entertaining way (Hamdy, 2010, personal interview).

Now every private satellite channel has its popular talk show. Although talk shows enjoyed relative freedom of expression and did tackle taboos and criticize the government, according to the Associated Press (2008), such on-air criticisms provoked Arab governments to issue restrictions on Arab television talks shows in 2008. The Egyptian government, for example, went further to prevent new talk shows from hitting the air. *Al Sa’a* or Clock TV cancelled a new talk show after objections from the Egyptian government which didn’t want new critical voices (The Associated Press, 2008). To put that into effect, Arab information ministers approved a “Charter of Principles” in 2008 to regulate Arab satellite broadcasting. Many experts believe it was to silence these talk shows.

The charter restricts criticisms of leaders and warns against airing content that would harm the reputation of a country or disrupt its social peace (The Associated Press, 2008). Critics of the charter say it was adopted to curb freedom of popular television talk shows, such as *Al Qahera Al Youm*, *Al Ashera Masa’an*, *90 Deqeeqa* and *El Beit Beitak* (90 Minutes, episode, 2008). On the other hand, supporters say it was developed to regulate television programming and set rules that they deemed essential. After months of debates, some Arab countries including the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon abandoned the charter. Although it was never really put into effect, it took a big share of media debates at that time. Talk shows started to enjoy

more freedom relatively until a few months before Egypt's November 2010 parliamentary elections.

To plan ahead for the parliamentary elections, the former Egyptian government cracked down on independent media including talk shows. The state suspended *Al Qahera Al Youm* talk show and found ways to remove outspoken government critic and journalist Ibrahim Eissa from his position as editor-in-chief of *Al Dostour* newspaper as well as from hosting his nightly television talk show *Baladna Belmasry*. Other talk shows started to exercise some self-censorship for fear of a similar fate. A special committee was also established by the former minister of information a month before the elections to monitor media performance during the elections. Television talk show host Mona El Shazly of *Al Ashera Masa'an* received a warning from the committee after hosting two journalists who mildly criticized the former ruling NDP. This pre-election period is considered by many a setback for the freedom of independent media in general and television talk shows in particular. Mirazi (2010) asserted that in the few months before the 2010 parliamentary elections talk shows were asked directly by the government to host government officials. The also exercised a form of self-censorship for fear of following the fate of Adeeb and Eissa (personal interview).

On the other hand, after the Jan.25th revolution talk shows are witnessing an explosion in freedom of expression with one exception or red line remaining: the ruling military council. Although some talk shows still question army officers on air, many exercise self-censorship realizing that it's not smart to turn the people against the army at this critical stage in Egypt's history. Yet, military council members made their first live television interview on the popular talk show *Al Ashera Masa'an* and appeared later on many talk shows, realizing they will be reaching millions of home

viewers. Egypt's new Prime Minister Essam Sharaf also gave his first televised recorded interview to two talk shows: *Al Ashera Masa'an* and *Akher Kalam*. Some talk shows such as *Akher Kalam* and *Baladna Belmasry* started to integrate social media tools such as twitter to reach out to the audiences who send their questions to the host directly via twitter. Such shows gained immense popularity after the revolution at a time where the popularity of many talk shows along with their hosts plunged in the eyes of the public. It was simple, talk shows that supported the revolution gained sky rocketing popularity and talk shows which took the government's side lost their popularity and their credibility.

Talk shows which gained popularity like *Akher Kalam* and *Baladna Belmasry* continue to play an important role in exposing corruption of the former regime and thereby exerting pressure on Egypt's transitional government and military council to press charges against such allegedly corrupt officials. A few episodes of *Akher Kalam* hosted by former Al Jazeera correspondent Yusri Foda on OnTV recently (May, 2011) lead to the removal of Egypt's chief forensics doctor. The doctor was involved in writing a forged report on the killing of blogger Khaled Said at the hands of two plain clothes policemen in Alexandria last year. *Akher Kalam* hosted the doctor who reiterated the same lies about Said's death which angered the public. The show exposed more information and interviewed many experts who witnessed corruption at the forensics department.

OnTV's other popular nightly talk show *Baladna Belmasry* hosted by Reem Maged was also given the credit for helping remove former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik who was appointed by Egypt's ousted president Mubarak early during the revolution. Protestors were pressuring for the removal of Shafik who was removed

hours after he appeared on *Baladna Belmasry* where he showed little knowledge of the abuses of Egypt's former state security.

Although shows such as *Akher Kalam* and *Baladna Belmasry* gained more popularity after the Jan.25th revolution, the popularity of many shows and presenters plunged because they sided with the regime during the 18 days of the revolution. Egypt's popular talk show *Masr Ennaharda* broadcast on Egyptian state television, repeatedly showed celebrities crying over Mubarak and calling on the protestors to evacuate the square because they are destroying the country. Presenters of the show Khairy Ramadan and Tamer Amin refrained from calling the Egyptian uprising a revolution. Public anger was rising against Egyptian media corruption and lack of credibility witnessed during the revolution. However, soon after Mubarak stepped down, official media started appealing to the angry public by calling the Jan.25th uprising "our revolution".

Demonstrations in front of Egyptian television called for the removal of ERTU's top management and anchors perceived by the public as the regime's mouthpieces. After weeks of pressure, former information minister Anas El Fiqi was charged over allegations of financial and administrative corruption and is currently awaiting his trial in jail. *Masr Ennaharda* celebrity hosts Ramadan and Amin were also removed and a new team of young hosts took over. Despite such change in hosts, the show was suspended as its popularity continued to plunge. *Masr Ennaharda* was replaced with the new talk show *Betawqeet Al Qahera* (Cairo Local Time) hosted by Hafez Mirazi.

Siding with the regime was not unique to the state media, as some television talk shows on private channels followed suit. Mehwar's *48 Hours* talk show was also heavily criticized after hosting an alleged protestor from Tahrir Square saying that the

protests are funded by Iran. The alleged protestor's identity was later revealed and she was a journalist working for a state-owned newspaper. Several campaigns were also launched on Facebook calling for the removal of many talk show hosts.

The controversial coverage of talk shows is not unique to the revolution. Although Egyptian television talk shows have considerably replaced the traditional news for many viewers, these shows still used to operate within restrictions set by the country's authoritarian rule. Fathy (2008) commented on the talk show coverage of the sixth of April 2008 strike that took place all over Egypt. The strike was organized at the grass root level demanding higher wages and denouncing shooting inflation rates.

In *Al-Dostour* newspaper, Fathy (2008) wrote that talk shows received instructions from state security to tone down their coverage of the sixth of April strike. The "oral instructions" included framing the strike as a fiasco and blaming it on a few deviant opposition groups. Compared to the coverage of news agencies and satellite television news of the strike, talk shows failed to present a credible account. They also failed to portray the reality of the situation, leaning more towards the official point of view (Fathy, 2008).

Describing *90 Deqeeqa's* coverage of the strike as a "media suicide", Fathy (2008) noted that the first story on the show's agenda was Egypt's *Khamasin* winds that usually lead to a sand storm. The show then hosted a parliament member representing the former ruling NDP to talk about the failure of the strike. As for the coverage of *Al Ashera Masa'an*, the author noted that talk show host Mona El-Shazly tried to maintain a balanced coverage by broadcasting reports on the strike. But like *90 Deqeeqa's* former host Moataz El-Demerdash, El-Shazly toned down her talk about the strikes. Moving on to *Al Qahera Al Youm* hosted by Amr Adeeb, Fathy

wrote that Adeeb framed the post-riot destruction of Al Mahalla as the responsibility of some rebellious protestors, ignoring the role of security in aggravating the situation by clashing with the demonstrators.

Although the coverage of the state-owned television talk show *Al Bait Beitak* remained pro the former regime as expected, talk show host Mahmoud Saad's comments came as a surprise to Fathy (2008). Saad attacked the current government and called its ministers "failures", demanding that a government responsible for such incidents should resign (Fathy, 2008).

Other media commentators also explored the coverage of talk shows of the same riots that erupted in Mahalla. Pintak (2009) emphasized that talk shows on Orbit, Dream and Al-Mehwar channels didn't broadcast graphic images aired by other channels such as Al-Jazeera. According to Pintak (2009), the managers of such channels said they received warnings from the government to "tone down their coverage and to make sure their talk shows included a heavy representation of the government's viewpoint."

Chapter 4: Methodology

The current research study applies a triangulation of research methods by using two quantitative methods and one qualitative research method. To apply agenda setting theory, the media agenda was examined by conducting a content analysis of three television talk shows. To examine the public agenda as well as the correlation between exposure to talk shows and civic engagement, a survey was conducted before the 2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections. The qualitative methodology involves in depth interviews with media experts to examine their perception and futuristic outlook on the role of television talk shows and civic engagement in Egypt. The research was conducted before the Jan 25th revolution.

4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

There are three research questions and four research hypotheses in this study.

4.1.1 Research Questions

The research questions are answered by the qualitative part of this research.

RQs:

RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt?

RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in fostering civic engagement in Egypt?

RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt?

4.1.2 Research hypotheses:

The four research hypotheses are covered by the quantitative part of this study. The quantitative methodology is based on a content analysis of television talk shows to examine the media's first and second level agendas and a survey to test whether talk shows have an agenda-setting influence on the public agenda of news priorities.

The survey also examines whether there is a relationship between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes among viewers.

Hundreds of studies conducted worldwide support first-level and second-level agenda-setting effects of the media. In addition, studies conducted on talk shows in Egypt also support an agenda-setting impact of talk shows on the Egyptian public (Youssef, 2008). Accordingly, the following two hypotheses were formulated:

H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by Egyptian nightly television talk shows' news agenda.

H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows' portrayal of Egypt's parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers' perception of the parliamentary elections.

Several research studies support that exposure to news and sociopolitical information is positively correlated with civic engagement (Kwak, Wang, & Guggenheim, 2004). A number of studies also support a positive impact of talk shows on political knowledge and participation (Baum, 2002). Accordingly, the following two hypotheses were formulated:

H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic engagement.

Moon (2008) emphasized that an agenda-setting impact of the news media is linked to civic engagement. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was formulated.

H4: There is a positive relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes.

According to this hypothesis the more the public is exposed to Egyptian nightly television talk shows, the more they are likely to have positive attitudes towards civic engagement through prioritizing socio-political awareness, participation

in sociopolitical discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement, and political participation.

4.1.3. Independent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement.

Exposure to talk shows: is defined by the level of dependency on talk shows as a source of news. It is measured by the survey Question (8) by asking respondents how often they depend on different media sources for news about Egyptian affairs. The options include newspapers, television news, television talk shows, radio news, radio talk shows, magazines, and the internet. The answer categories are on the three-point scale always, sometimes, and never. The level of measurement is interval.

Talk shows news agenda: defined as the news priorities covered by Egyptian nightly television talk shows. The news agenda is measured by coding the issues and news stories discussed by talk shows in the quantitative content analysis methodology. The level of measurement is nominal.

Talk shows portrayal of the elections: It refers to the parliamentary election frames covered by talk shows. The issue examined is the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in November, 2010. The talk shows' attributes of the parliamentary elections are listed in the content analysis codebook. Several statements are coded to measure the talk shows' portrayal of the parliamentary elections in their advance election coverage. The level of measurement is nominal.

Perception of the role of television talk shows: It refers to how viewers perceive the role of talk shows in promoting civic engagement. The variable is measured through statements on a five-point likert scale in the questionnaire from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The level of measurement is interval. The statements in question (3) are as follows:

- a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt's affairs.
- b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving community problems in Egypt.
- c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to make charitable contributions
- d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms).
- e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness.
- f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in November, 2010.
- g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage citizens to vote.

4.1.4. Dependent Variables, operational definitions and levels of measurement.

Public perception of news priorities: It's defined as the news issues perceived as important by the public. The word public refers to viewers of Egyptian nightly television talk shows. This variable is measured by question 5 in the questionnaire which asks respondents to list the five most important issues that are happening in Egypt recently. The question tests the first-level of agenda-setting to determine whether the public agenda corresponds with the talk shows' agenda. The level of measurement is nominal. Question 6 in the questionnaire is designed to measure the source of information for each topic respondents listed to determine whether their source was Egyptian nightly television talk shows. The issues listed by respondents in addition to the source for each issue were coded separately to determine whether talk shows have an agenda setting influence. Furthermore, the name of each source was also coded to determine whether the agenda-setting impact is coming from the three talk shows examined in this research.

Public perception of the parliamentary elections: is how the public perceives the Egyptian parliamentary elections. In agenda-setting theory, the public perception is defined as the election attributes or frames on the public agenda. This is measured through survey question 9 which lists statements regarding the elections on a 5-point Likert scale. This is to examine whether the public attributes of the parliamentary elections correspond with the talk show attributes of the parliamentary elections. The statements listed in question 9 in the survey are the exact statements listed in the content analysis codebook. Question 9 in the survey asks respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with 22 opposite statements regarding the Egyptian parliamentary elections. Opposite statements were created to maintain balance and objectivity. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are as follows:

1. The government's recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections.
2. The elections will be fairly conducted.
3. National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates are expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament.
4. Judicial supervision is important to prevent election fraud.
5. The elections are expected to be peaceful.
6. It's important to have independent monitors.
7. Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation.
8. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government.
9. Women must have equal representation in parliament.

10. Coptic Christians should hold more than the current 10 percent of parliament seats.
11. The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament.
12. The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the elections.
13. The elections will not be fairly conducted.
14. NDP candidates are not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament.
15. Judicial supervision is not important to prevent election fraud.
16. The elections are expected to be violent.
17. It's not important to have independent monitors.
18. Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation.
19. Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections by the government.
20. Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president.
21. Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament.
22. The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament.

Attitudes towards civic engagement: is defined by 14 statements covering the different levels of civic engagement which is divided into awareness, interpersonal discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and political participation. All categories defining civic engagement are measured through several statements on a five-point Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree in question (4) in the survey. The level of measurement is interval. The statements are listed in question 4 in the questionnaire as follows:


- a) I consider voting a priority
- b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)
- c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)
- d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority
- e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important
- f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority
- g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems
- h) I make a difference in my community
- i) Contributing to community is my responsibility
- j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt
- k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011
- l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections
- m) I intend to vote in the upcoming presidential elections
- n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections

The overall civic engagement attitude level is calculated through placing the five subcategories measuring civic engagement on a five-point scale. Awareness represents the first point on the civic engagement scale, followed by interpersonal discussion, public opinion expression, community involvement, and finally political participation which marks the end of the civic engagement spectrum, representing the strongest level of engagement. Although in other cultures political participation might not be the highest level of engagement, it's considered the highest in pre-revolution Egypt because that form of participation was frowned upon and discouraged by the government. Figure 4.1.4 on the following page illustrates the categories that define civic engagement.

- **Sociopolitical awareness** is measured in question (4) by statements: (e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important and (f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority.

- **Interpersonal discussion** is measured in question 4 by the statement (d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority.
- **Public opinion expression** is measured in question 4 by statements (b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax) and (c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters).
- **Community involvement** is measured by the following statements in question 4 (g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems, (h) I make a difference in my community, (i) Contributing to community is my responsibility, and (j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt.
- **Political participation:** is measured by respondents' attitude towards voting in question 4 of the survey through the statements (k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011 (l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections (m) I intend to vote in the 2011 presidential elections and (n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Figure 4.1.4 Civic engagement categories and levels:



Experts' perception of civic engagement: experts are defined as academics and professionals in the fields of civic engagement, philanthropy, media, political science, and sociology. This dependent variable is defined in terms of how experts perceive the status of civic engagement in Egypt and the significance of civic engagement for Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview questions 1 and 2.

Experts' perception of the role of talk shows in civic engagement: this is defined as how experts perceive the role and potential for talk shows to foster civic engagement in Egypt. This variable is answered through the qualitative interview questions 3 and 4.

Experts' perception of media strategies: this is defined as experts' suggestions for the implementation of media strategies and recommendations that would foster civic engagement in Egypt. The variable is answered through question 6 in the qualitative interview.

4.2. The Content Analysis Methodology

The content analysis methodology is efficient in investigating media content in terms of quantity and quality of content (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). According to Kerlinger's (2000) classical definition, "content analysis is a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables" (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p.150). Agenda-setting studies rely heavily on content analysis to analyze media content and determine the significance of news subjects. Successive audience research is conducted to compare between the media and the public agendas (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). To study research hypotheses one and two which cover the first and second levels of agenda-setting, a content analysis based on primary data recorded by the researcher was conducted in this study.

The content analysis was conducted to analyze the agenda of Egyptian nightly television talk shows which specialize in covering and analyzing Egyptian affairs. Regardless of ownership, any television talk show that specializes in discussing Egyptian affairs is considered an Egyptian television talk show. This study covers Egyptian television talk shows broadcast in prime time during the first part of the fall broadcast season from October 6 to November 10 of the year 2010. The exact dates are included in (Appendix J).

4.2.1. Content Analysis Sample

Due to the absence of a credible program rating system in Egypt, 18 Egyptian television viewers were asked about the most popular talk shows in Egypt in order to select the most popular talk shows for this study. Respondents cited four talk shows as the most popular in Egypt: *Al Qahera Al Youm* (Cairo Today), *Masr Ennaharda* (Egypt Today), *Al Ashera Masa'an* (10 PM) and *90 Deqeeqa* (90 Minutes). Popular talk shows such as *Al Qahera Al Youm* (Cairo Today) aired on the Saudi-owned Orbit Showtime Network (OSN) lied within the population of this study because it discussed Egyptian affairs. *Al Qahera Al Youm* was initially included in the sample but the show was suspended by the Egyptian government during the course of this study and was therefore excluded from the sample.

Accordingly, a purposive sample of three of the four most popular television talk shows was selected for study. The importance of purposive sampling in studies applying a content analysis research methodology is confirmed by Riffe and Fretag (1997) who found that 68 % of the Journalism Quarterly's content analysis studies used purposive sampling (cited in Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). Also, research studies applying agenda-setting theory were conducted over periods ranging from two weeks, to two months, to more than two months. Several research studies found that

the media succeeded in setting the public agenda after two weeks of media exposure (Severin and Tankard, 2001).

4.2.2. The unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the topic. All topics discussed during the entire duration of the talk show were examined. The talk shows selected for analysis vary in airtime from two hours to three hours. A total of 78 episodes of talk shows were coded, representing an estimated total of 208 hours of television talk show airtime. The content was coded by the researcher with 15.6% percent of the sample coded by a second coder trained by the researcher for inter coder reliability (Appendix I).

Two code books (Appendix E & F) and coding sheets (Appendix G & H) were formulated covering several variables. The first codebook covers the first level of agenda setting and second covers the second level of agenda setting. The codebook and code sheet were updated following a pretest on a sample of talk show content coded by the researcher and the second coder. Inter coder reliability was conducted using the Holsti formula $R = 2M / N1 + N2$. The inter coder reliability result is as follows: $R = 0.99$ or 99%, which is very high (see Appendix I for calculations).

4.2.3 Categories of Content Analysis and Operational Definitions

The content was coded according to categories and subcategories created for each topic discussed. These categories were formulated during the pretest period to fit the purposes of the current study. Accurate coding of the topics and the subcategories is determined by assessing the most important element about the topic discussed. Neuendorf (2002) noted that when an issue was seen as strongly dominant, any other issue was regarded as secondary and therefore not coded.

Topics: to examine the first-level of agenda setting, topics were coded into 14 categories: Political, Economic, Social, Environmental, Health, Education, Criminal,

Human Interest, Religion, Sports, Arts & Culture, Media, Science and Technology, and Miscellaneous. The subcategories under each topic list the focus of the discussion. The 14 topic categories are defined as follows:

Topic 1 (Political): this category covers issues tackling Egyptian politics such as parliamentary elections, presidential candidates, and government. Attributes of covering the parliamentary elections were coded separately using the second codebook for the second-level of agenda setting.

Topic 2 (Economic): this category covers topics such as minimum wages, Egypt's investments, development, economic growth, national debt, inflation, poverty, unemployment and other economic topics.

Topic 3 (Social): this category includes topics such as labor rights, women rights, family, and divorce.

Topic 4 (Environmental): this category covers pollution, water shortage, endangered species, energy resources, natural disasters, and other environmental topics listed in the codebook.

Topic 5 (Health): this category covers health care, diseases, health insurance, and drugs.

Topic 6 (Education): this category covers quality of education, higher education, school education, and curricula.

Topic 7 (Criminal): this category covers thefts, murders, right to own a gun, terrorism, crime control, and trials.

Topic 8 (Human interest): this category covers ordinary citizen success stories or personal ordeal stories.

Topic 9 (Religion): this category covers religious preaching, sectarian tension, national unity, and religious discrimination.

Topic 10 (Sports): this category covers matches, accomplishments, and fan tension or violence.

Topic 11 (Arts & Culture): this category covers arts and culture and celebrity interviews

Topic 12 (Media): this category includes subcategories that deal with the status of the media in Egypt such as freedom of expression, censorship, media laws and regulations, mergers and acquisitions, jailing journalists, firing journalists, and suspension of programs or newspapers.

Topic 13 (Science & Technology): this category includes subcategories that cover scientific news or discoveries and technological advances.

Topic 14 (Miscellaneous): this category includes any topic that doesn't fit the list of topics above.

Second-level agenda setting: the talk show attribute agenda is measured by examining the advance coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary elections. The following issue attributes are coded: elections fairness, NDP representation, judicial supervision, election violence, independent monitoring, Muslim Brotherhood, women representation, opposition representation, and Coptic Christian representation. The 22 statements measuring the framing of the elections in the codebook are an exact copy of the statements formulated in the questionnaire in question 9. The frames were coded as mentioned, neutral and not mentioned depending on their dominance.

4.3. Survey Methodology

Due to the fact that a quantitative content analysis methodology couldn't be used to infer statements about the impact (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006) of television talk shows on viewers, this study proceeded with conducting a quantitative survey methodology. To measure whether talk shows influence the public agenda with a

specific impact on civic engagement attitudes among Egyptian viewers, a questionnaire (Appendix A) was formulated and self-administered. The questionnaire was translated from English to Arabic (Appendix B) to accommodate non-English speakers.

The questionnaire is composed of 15 questions including 13 closed ended questions on different scales of measurement and two open-ended questions. Responses for the open-ended questions which measure the first-level agenda of the public were coded using the codebook and coding sheet in (Appendix C & D). Many of the statements measuring civic engagement were adopted from national surveys conducted in the US and the civic measurement models created by Flanagan, C.A., Syvertsen, A.K. & Stout, M.D. (2007). The questions were rephrased to fit Egyptian culture. Fink's (2003) "How to Ask Survey Questions" was also used as a reference. The data was collected from November 5 to November 20, 2010 ahead of the Egyptian parliamentary elections to make sure that participants' responses were not affected by the election results. The questionnaire was reviewed by eight faculty members at the American University in Cairo. Several questions were reformulated and the questionnaire was updated based on the faculty and advisor's comments. A pretest has been conducted on an available sample of 20 students at AUC and the questionnaire was updated accordingly.

Due to the restrictive environment prior to the Jan.25th revolution and the government's constraints over conducting survey research in Egypt, this study was conducted on a non-random purposive sample of the well-educated Egyptian elite. The actual survey was administered among students, staff, and faculty at two private elite universities in Egypt: the American University in Cairo (AUC) and Modern Science and Arts University (MSA). An online survey was also created using

surveymonkey.com and was circulated on the social networking website Facebook.com. The survey was also self-administered among business people, lawyers, and other members of the elite.

It's worth noting that many respondents were worried over answering the question regarding the 2010 parliamentary elections amidst a clear government crackdown on the media during the period that preceded the elections. Many respondents quit the survey starting from question 9 which lists 22 statements about the parliamentary elections and were therefore, eliminated from the sample.

4.3.1. Survey Sample

This study examines the agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows on the participants' agenda and the relationship between exposure to talk shows and civic engagement attitudes among a purposive sample of the Egyptian well-educated elite. The elite are defined as well educated members of the Egyptian public. Elite by definition is composed of "a group of persons who by virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence" (Merriam-Webster, 2010). This stratum of society is selected for study because it's important to determine whether well-educated Egyptians are civically engaged and actively involved in the country's transition to democracy. According to Postel (1992), the 40 percent illiterate Egyptian citizens are not concerned about democracy in Egypt or civic engagement. People at the low socio-economic level are more concerned about sustaining a living. Therefore, for democratic change to take place in Egypt, it must be nurtured by informed, involved and active members of society who have the collective power and education to influence policies and empower the rest of the population.

Boyd (1977) studied mass media usage among Egyptian elites. His criteria for classifying elites were mainly based on occupation and economic status. Boyd divided

the sample into three sub-samples including top government officials, university administrators and professors, and well-off Egyptians. Shlapentokh and Woods (2004) defined elites as “people whose position in society allows them to shape public perceptions through the media” (p.160) but also asserted that elites vary across countries. As leaders in educational, political, social, and economic institutions, elites have a great influence on domestic policies and media which in turn influence the public. Therefore, elites in this study are defined as well educated Egyptians who are socially more privileged than the rest of the population by virtue of their education and socioeconomic status. Responses were filtered to determine the elite sample according to education and area of residence. Well educated elites include university students, bachelor degree holders, graduate students, master's degree holders, and PhD holders.

Therefore, this study classifies elite primarily as well educated individuals who are socially privileged. Respondents below 18 years of age were excluded from the study because voting cards in Egypt are only issued at 18. Accordingly, the purposive sample of Egyptian elites in this study covers elite Egyptians who are well educated and older than 18.

4.4 Qualitative in-depth interviews

A number of 11 in-depth interviews were conducted with media, sociology, political science, and philanthropy experts. The following six questions were formulated for the qualitative interview methodology which covers all the research questions. The questions were also translated into Arabic for interviews with non-English speakers.

To answer RQ1 with regards to the experts' perception of civic engagement in Egypt, the following interview questions were formulated:

- 1. “Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic.” What is your opinion about this statement?**
- 2. “Civic engagement is an essential aspect in any democratic society.” How do you evaluate civic engagement in Egypt?**

To answer RQ2 with regards to the perception of the role of media in general and talk shows in particular in promoting civic engagement in Egypt, the following interview questions were formulated:

- 3. In your opinion, do media have any role in fostering civic engagement in Egypt?**
- 4. Do talk shows play any role in promoting civic engagement in Egypt? How?**
 - Do Egyptian television talk shows create socio-political awareness in Egypt?
 - Do Egyptian television talk shows promote socio-political dialogue in Egypt?
 - Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage citizens to express their opinions publicly?
 - Do Egyptian television talk shows foster community involvement in Egypt?
 - Do Egyptian television talk shows encourage political participation?
- 5. How do you evaluate the performance of Egyptian television talk shows during their coverage of the Egyptian parliamentary coverage?**

To answer RQ3 with regards to the experts’ perception of the future strategies that should be adopted by talk shows to promote civic engagement, the following interview question was formulated:

- 6. What are the future strategies that should be adopted by Egyptian media in general and talk shows in specific to create a civically engaged society?**

Chapter 5: Results

The results of the current study were processed using PASW Statistics 18, a data analysis software previously known as SPSS. Microsoft Excel was also used for some graphs and tests. Hypothesis testing was conducted using the same software. The results are divided into two sections. The first section lists the survey results and the content analysis results and the second section lists qualitative interview results.

The results are listed in the following tables, most illustrated by accompanying charts. A total number of 676 stories were coded in three television shows in the content analysis study. In addition, a number of 356 respondents completed the survey. Respondents had the following demographics:

5.1: Level of education


Respondents were asked to specify their level of higher education on 5 categories because the purposive sample studied is the well-educated elite.

Table 5.1 Frequencies and percentages of the respondents' educational level

Level of Education	Frequency	%
Undergraduate Student	186	52.2%
Bachelor degree holder	79	22.2%
Graduate Student	39	11.0%
Master's degree holder	40	11.2%
Doctoral degree holder	12	3.4%
Total	356	100.0%

As shown in (Table 5.1), more than half the sample is undergraduate university students, representing 52.2%. They are followed by bachelor degree holders who represent 22.2% of the sample. Whereas, 11.2% are master's degree holders and 11% are graduate students. Only 3.4% are doctoral degree holders. The following figure illustrates the levels of higher education in the sample studied.

Figure 5.1 Level of education, arranged in descending order of percentages



5.2 Area of Residence


Respondents were asked to specify their area of residence among 9 closed-ended categories and one open-ended category ‘other’ which resulted in three new residence categories: Garden City, Alexandria and Shorouk.

Table 5.2 Area of residence, frequencies and percentages ranked in descending order

Area of Residence	Frequency	%
1. Heliopolis	72	20.2
2. New Cairo/Katameya	48	13.5
3. Alexandria	48	13.5
4. Maadi	35	9.8
5. Mohandiseen	34	9.6
6. Nasr City	33	9.3
7. 6th of October	26	7.3
8. Dokki	20	5.6
9. Haram	14	3.9
10. Garden City	14	3.9
11. Zamalek	11	3.1
12. Shorouk	1	.3
Total	356	100.0

As shown in (Table 5.2), the majority of the respondents reside in Heliopolis, representing 20.2 %. Respondents who reside in New Cairo/Katameya and the coastal city of Alexandria equally represented 13.5 % of the sample each. Maadi residents followed representing 9.8 % of the sample. Mohandiseen residents represented 9.6 % of the sample. Nasr city residents followed making 9.3 % of the sample followed by 7.3 % respondents residing in the 6th of October city. Dokki followed with 5.6 % respondents. Haram and Garden City had equal 3.9 % representation. Whereas, Zamalek had 3.1 respondents represented. Lastly, only 0.3 % reside in Shorouk.

Figure 5.2 Area of residence, percentages in descending order



5.3 Age


Respondents are classified according to five age categories listed in the following table. Respondents who were less than 18 years old were excluded. This is because Egyptian citizens who are less than 18 cannot vote and the survey includes questions about voting.

Table 5.3: Age frequency and percentage

Age	Frequency	%
18-29	261	73.3
30-41	69	19.4
42-53	14	3.9
54-65	10	2.8
Older than 65	2	.6
Total	356	100.0

As shown in (Table 5.3) the majority representing 73.3 % of the sample is 18-29 years old which is justified by the 52.2 % undergraduate students who took the survey. Respondents belonging to the age group from 30-41 years old represented 19.4 %. Whereas, 42-53 year olds and 54-65 years old had close representation in the sample, 3.9 % and 2.8 % respectively. Only 2 respondents representing 0.6 % of the sample are older than 65.

Figure 5.3 Age



5.4 Monthly Income


Respondents were asked to choose between seven income categories.

Table 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order

Monthly Income	Frequency	%
EGP 1,000 - less than EGP 3,000	83	23.3
EGP 3,000 - less than EGP 5,000	67	18.8
EGP 11,000 and above	63	17.7
Less than EGP 1,000	42	11.8
EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000	42	11.8
EGP 9,000 - less than EGP 11,000	30	8.4
EGP 7,000 - less than EGP 9,000	29	8.1
Total	356	100.0

As shown in (Table 5.4), the majority 23.3 % of respondents earn EGP 1,000 - less than EGP 3,000, followed by 18.8 % who earn EGP 3,000 - less than EGP 5,000. This is also followed by 17.7 % earning EGP 11,000 and above. A number of 42 respondents or 11.8 % earn less than EGP 1,000 which could be explained by the 52.2 % under graduate students who took the survey. On the other hand, 11.8 % earn EGP 5,000 - less than EGP 7,000. In addition, 8.4 % earn EGP 9,000 - less than EGP 11,000 and 8.1 % earn EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000.

Figure 5.4 Monthly Income, arranged in descending order of percentages



5.5 Gender


Both female and male respondents took the survey.

Table 5.5

Gender	Frequency	%
Female	241	67.7%
Male	115	32.3%
Total	356	100.0%

As show in (Table 5.5), females represent the majority of this sample, as 241 female respondents took the survey representing 67.7 %. Males represent 32.3 % as 115 male respondents took the survey.

Figure 5.5 Gender



5.6 Viewership


Viewership refers to whether respondents watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows such as *Masr Ennaharda*, *Al Ashera Masa'an*, and *90 Deqeeqa*. The first question in the questionnaire determines viewership with a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Those who answered 'no' were excluded from the sample of viewers and only answered the demographics questions.

Table 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows

<i>Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly television talk shows: Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, and Al-Ashera Masa'an?</i>	Frequency	%
Yes	286	80.3
No	70	19.7
Total	356	100.0

As shown in (Table 5.1), the majority of the 356 respondents who took the survey watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows, representing 286 respondents or 80.3 %. A number of 70 respondents representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed don't watch television talk shows.

Figure 5.6: Viewership of Egyptian nightly television talk shows



5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers

Popularity of the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows *Masr Ennaharda*, *Al Ashera Masa'an*, and *90 Deqeeqa* is defined by the degree to which respondents follow or view each talk show on a weekly basis. Accordingly, respondents were asked in the questionnaire how often they watch each show with six answer options from 5 times a week to never.

Table 5.7a *How often do you watch each television talk show per week?*

Viewership per week	Frequency (%) of respondents		
	Masr Ennaharda	Al Ashera Masa'an	90 Deqeeqa
5 times	8 (2.8%)	25 (8.7%)	18 (6.3%)
4 times	21 (7.3%)	28 (9.8%)	22 (7.7%)
3 times	38 (13.3%)	58 (20.3%)	46 (16.1%)
2 times	40 (14.0%)	49 (17.1%)	54 (18.9%)
1 time	77 (26.9%)	83 (29.0%)	75 (26.2%)
Never	102 (35.7%)	43 (15.0%)	71 (24.8%)
Total	286 (100.0%)	286 (100.0%)	286 (100.0%)

Masr Ennaharda: (Table 5.7) shows that only 2.8% of the respondents are regular viewers of *Masr Ennaharda*, 7.3% watch it 4 days per week, 13.3% and 14% of the respondents watch it 3 and 4 days respectively. Whereas 26.9% watch it once a week and the majority 35.7% never watch it.

Al Ashera Masa'an: (Table 5.7) shows that only 8.7% of the respondents regularly view *Al Ashera Masa'an*, 9.8% view the show 4 days a week, 20.3% watch it 3 days per week and 17.1% of the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of respondents 29% watch the show once a week and 15% never watch the show.


90 Deqeeqa: (Table 5.7) shows that 6.3% regularly view *90 Deqeeqa*, 7.7% watch the talk show 4 days a week. Whereas 16.1% watch it 3 days per week and 18.9% of the respondents watch it twice a week. The majority of viewers, 26.2% watch *90 Deqeeqa* once a week and 24.8% never watch the show.

A Chi square test was conducted as shown in (Table 5.7a) below to examine if there was any significant difference between the mean average rating. The result $\chi^2 = 14.71$ is non-significant, indicating a similar distribution of viewership times in the three talk shows. An analysis of variance was also conducted to test if there was any significant difference between the mean times per week for the three talk shows, and result was not significant. Therefore, because the popularity of the three programs is defined as the viewing times per week for each show and there is no significant difference in viewership, the three talk shows are more or less on the same popularity level.

Table 5.7b Statistical test for table 5.7a

Chi square		$\chi^2 = 14.71$ NS		
<i>Mean Average rating (times per week)</i>		1.38	2.07	1.74
<i>Standard deviation</i>		0.140	0.201	0.162
ANOVA		$F = 0.69$ NS		
<i>ANOVA</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>ss</i>	<i>ms</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Talk shows</i>	2	0.0396	0.0198	0.69 ns
<i>Error</i>	15	0.4301	0.0287	
<i>Total</i>	17	0.4697		

Fig 5.7 Popularity of the three talk shows among viewers, weekly viewership



5.8 Level of talk show exposure

The level of exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows was measured by comparing exposure to media sources on a three-point scale of always, sometimes, and never. Respondents were asked how often they depend on the media sources listed for news about Egyptian affairs. Since media and civic engagement previous research linked civic engagement to the news or information exposure rather than entertainment, it was necessary to specify the news dependency in the exposure question. Responses to always and sometimes were combined together in the following table to provide more robust results on the overall level of exposure.

Table 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media

Media Sources Arranged in order of Mean	Frequency (%) in degree of agreement		
	Always + Sometimes	Never	Mean av. Rating* ± SD
Internet	258 (90.2%)	28 (9.8%)	2.52 ± 0.918
TV Talk shows	283 (99%)	3 (1.0%)	2.46 ± 0.724
Newspapers	255 (89.2%)	31 (10.8%)	2.37 ± 0.660
TV news	241 (84.2%)	45 (15.7%)	2.18 ± 0.494
Radio news	158 (55.3%)	128 (44.8%)	1.64 ± 0.353
Magazines	145 (50.7%)	141 (49.3%)	1.59 ± 0.299
Radio talk shows	132 (46.1%)	154 (53.8%)	1.51 ± 0.332
Overall	1472 (73.6.4%)	530 (26.5%)	2.04 ± 0.360

* based on a 3-point scale: 3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never.

Table 5.8a: Statistical test for table 5.8

ANOVA

<i>Source of variation</i>	<i>Sum of squares</i>	<i>Degrees of freedom</i>	<i>Mean square</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Media sources</i>	<i>6.83</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>1.138</i>	<i>3.357</i>
<i>Error</i>	<i>4.75</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>0.339</i>	
<i>Total</i>	<i>11.58</i>	<i>20</i>		

ANOVA: F= 3.357 significant (p=0.029) indicating the existence of significant differences between the mean average ratings of media sources. ($s^2 = 0.339$)

Internet: (Table 5.8) shows that 90.2% depend on the Internet for news while 9.8% never depend on the Internet. A mean of 2.52 indicates that the majority falls between always and sometimes.

Television Talk Shows: (Table 5.8) shows that almost all respondents 99% depend on television talk shows for news about Egyptian affairs. Only 3 respondents, representing 1% never do. A mean of 2.46 indicates that the majority fall between always and sometimes.

Newspapers: (Table 5.8) shows that 89.2% depend on newspapers, compared to 10.8% who never depend on newspapers. A mean of 2.37 indicates that the majority fall between always and sometimes.

Television News: (Table 5.8) shows that 84.2% depend on television news and 15.7% never. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority sometimes depends on TV news.


Radio news: (Table 5.8) shows that 55.3% of the respondents depend on radio news and 44.8% never. A mean of 1.64 indicates that the majority fall between sometimes and never.

Magazines: (Table 5.8) shows that 50.7% depend on magazines and 49.3% never. A mean of 1.59 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and never.

Radio talk shows: (Table 5.8) shows that only 46.1% depend on radio talk shows and 53.8% never. A mean of 1.51 indicates that the majority falls between sometimes and never.

As shown in (Table 5.8a), a statistical test was conducted to determine if there was any significant difference in exposure. An ANOVA: $F= 3.357$ significant ($p=0.029$) value indicates the existence of significant differences between the mean average ratings of media sources.

Figure 5.8: Level of talk show exposure compared to other media, in descending order



5.9 Public & Media agendas of news priorities & H1: Public perception of issue salience is most likely influenced by Egyptian nightly television talk shows agenda

The public agenda is defined as the news issues that are perceived as important by the public. To measure the public news agenda, respondents were asked in the open-ended question (5) of the questionnaire to list the five most important news issues happening in Egypt that came to their knowledge recently. Open-ended survey responses were coded using the codebook in (Appendix C) which lists the same topics in the content analysis codebook (Appendix E).

As for the media agenda, it's defined as the news issues covered by the three popular television talk shows *Masr Ennaharda*, *Al Ashera Masa'an* and *90 Deqeeqa*. To measure their news agenda, a content analysis was conducted. (Table 5.9a) lists the public's news agenda and the talk show's news agenda.

Table 5.9a: Public news agenda vs. Nightly Television Talk shows news agenda

Respondents news agenda	F (%)	Talk Shows news agenda	F (%)
1. Parliamentary elections	229(20.8%)	1. Parliamentary elections	63 (9.3%)
2. Rising food prices	69 (6.3%)	2. Dostour crisis	25 (3.7%)
3. Presidential elections	56 (5.1%)	3. Health care	24 (3.6%)
4. Minimum wages	55 (5.0%)	4. Profiles	23 (3.4%)
5. School violence	54 (4.9%)	5. Other politics	22 (3.3%)
6. Terrorism	47 (4.3%)	6. People's ordeals	21 (3.1%)
7. Courts	42 (3.8%)	7. Rising food prices	18 (2.7%)
8. Dostour crisis	38 (3.5%)	8. Food shortages	16 (2.4%)
9. Suspension of media	37 (3.4%)	9. Media regulations	16 (2.4%)
10. University guards	35 (3.2%)	10. Pilgrimage	15 (2.2%)
11. Diseases	34 (3.1%)	11. Traffic problems	15 (2.2%)
12. Other topics in politics	32 (2.9%)	12. Higher education	14 (2.1%)
13. Illegal land acquisition	28 (2.5%)	13. University security	14 (2.1%)
14. Traffic problems	24 (2.2%)	14. Courts	14 (2.1%)
15. Total Inflation	19 (1.7%)	15. Football matches	14 (2.1%)
16. Sectarian tension	18 (1.6%)	16. School violence	13 (1.9%)

17. Media regulations	17 (1.5%)	17. Pollution	13 (1.9%)
18. Football matches	16 (1.5%)	18. Other sports	13 (1.9%)
19. Opposition	14 (1.3%)	19. Suspension of media	13 (1.9%)
20. Investments	14 (1.3%)	20. Minimum wages	12 (1.8%)
21. School education	13 (1.2%)	21. Private media	8 (1.2%)
22. Other social issues	11 (1.0%)	22. Terrorism	7 (1.0%)
23. Workers issues	10 (.9%)	23. Scientific research	7 (1.0%)
24. World affairs	10 (.9%)	24. Charity	7 (1.0%)
25. Demonstrations/strikes	8 (.7%)	25. Government	6 (.9%)
26. Food shortages	8 (.7%)	26. Natural disasters	6 (.9%)
27. Embezzlements	8 (.7%)	27. Diseases	6 (.9%)
28. People's ordeals	8 (.7%)	28. Fan tension	6 (.9%)
29. Water Shortage	7 (.6%)	29. Pol. achievements	5 (.7%)
30. Natural Disasters	7 (.6%)	30. Family issues	5 (.7%)
31. Nile Water Issues	7 (.6%)	31. Right to own guns	5 (.7%)
32. Health insurance	7 (.6%)	32. Land take overs	5 (.7%)
33. Police brutality	7 (.6%)	33. Religious preaching	5 (.7%)
34. Right to own guns	7 (.6%)	34. Achievements	5 (.7%)
35. Pilgrimage	7 (.6%)	35. Freedom of exp.	5 (.7%)
36. Pollution	6 (.5%)	36. Future of media	5 (.7%)
37. Electricity issues	6 (.5%)	37. Pol. representation	4 (.6%)
38. Fires	6 (.5%)	38. Total inflation	4 (.6%)
39. President	5 (.5%)	39. Nile water	4 (.6%)
40. Unemployment	5 (.5%)	40. Health corruption	4 (.6%)
41. Poverty	5 (.5%)	41. Sectarian tension	4 (.6%)
42. Antiquities	5 (.5%)	42. Cinema reviews	4 (.6%)
43. Wikileaks	5 (.5%)	43. Closing shops early	4 (.6%)
44. Development	4 (.4%)	44. World affairs	4 (.6%)
45. Education quality	4 (.4%)	45. Opposition	3 (.4%)
46. Fan tension	4 (.4%)	46. Demonstrations	3 (.4%)
47. Government	3 (.3%)	47. Taxes	3 (.4%)
48. Women issues	3 (.3%)	48. Women issues	3 (.4%)
49. Family issues	3 (.3%)	49. Drugs	3 (.4%)
50. Other crimes	3 (.3%)	50. Quality of education	3 (.4%)
51. Profiles	3 (.3%)	51. Edu-development	3 (.4%)
52. Loss of the satellite	3 (.3%)	52. Arrests	3 (.4%)
53. Health care	2 (.2%)	53. Police brutality	3 (.4%)
54. Other sports	2 (.2%)	54. Censorship	3 (.4%)
55. Media ethics	2 (.2%)	55. Scientific inventions	3 (.4%)

56. Scientific research	2 (.2%)	56. Unemployment	2 (.3%)
57. Underground metro	2 (.2%)	57. Other human int.	2 (.3%)
58. Closing shops early	2 (.2%)	58. Drama reviews	2 (.3%)
59. Government spending	1 (.1%)	59. Galleries & concerts	2 (.3%)
60. Energy resources	1 (.1%)	60. Jailing journalists	2 (.3%)
61. Drugs	1 (.1%)	61. Scientific projects	2 (.3%)
62. Health negligence	1 (.1%)	62. Electricity issues	2 (.3%)
63. Arrests	1 (.1%)	63. Loss of satellite	2 (.3%)
64. Crime control	1 (.1%)	64. Wikileaks	2 (.3%)
65. Religious preaching	1 (.1%)	65. Islam & the west	2 (.3%)
66. Achievements	1 (.1%)	66. Pol. participation	1 (.1%)
67. Cinema reviews	1 (.1%)	67. Health insurance	1 (.1%)
68. Jailing journalists	1 (.1%)	68. Crime control	1 (.1%)
69. Scientific projects	1 (.1%)	69. Underground metro	1 (.1%)
70. Gaza aid	1 (.1%)	70. Gaza aid	1 (.1%)
Total	1100 (100%)	Total	676 (100%)

As shown in (Table 5.9a), the most important topic happening in Egypt according to the respondents is the Egyptian parliamentary elections, representing 20.8% of the total topics listed by respondents. The parliamentary elections also topped the talk shows agenda, representing the mostly covered topic receiving 9.3 % of the total talk show coverage.

Figures 5.9aa: Respondents news agenda





Figure 5.9ab: Talk shows news agenda



5.9b Public and Media Agendas Classified into Main Topics

The public and media agendas of news priorities were also classified into main topics as shown in table 5.9b.

Table 5.9b: Main Topics of Public & Media agendas

Talk Shows Topics Frequency/%		Respondents Frequency/%	Main Topic
1. Political	114 (16.9%)	Political	346 (31.5%)
2. Media	85 (12.6%)	Economic	181 (16.5%)
3. Economic	74 (10.9%)	Criminal	143 (13.0%)
4. Criminal	59 (8.7%)	Media	96 (8.7%)
5. Miscellaneous	49 (7.2%)	Social	81 (7.4%)
6. Arts & Culture	45 (6.7%)	Miscellaneous	59 (5.4%)
7. Education	43 (6.4%)	Education	52 (4.7%)
8. Social	38 (5.6%)	Health	45 (4.1%)
9. Health	38 (5.6%)	Environmental	28 (2.5%)
10. Human Interest	35 (5.2%)	Religion	26 (2.4%)
11. Sports	35 (5.2%)	Sports	23 (2.1%)
12. Religion	25 (3.7%)	Human Interest	9 (.8%)
13. Environmental	24 (3.6%)	Arts & Culture	8 (.7%)
14. Science & Technology	12 (1.8%)	Science & Technology	3 (.3%)
Total	676 (100%)	Total	1100 (100%)

As shown in (Table 5.9b), the mostly covered topic by talk shows is the political topic (16.9%), which is also the first on the respondents' agenda (31.5%). Education, sports, and science and technology all fall on matching ranks on the two agendas. The media topic on the talk show agenda was much higher as the programs focused on media related developments heavily in their coverage before the Egyptian parliamentary elections. But for the respondents, economic issues (16.5%) were second on the agenda compared to third on the talk shows agenda (10.9%).

Criminal issues ranked third on the respondents' agenda (13%) compared with fourth on the media agenda (8.7%). The media topic ranked fourth on the public agenda (8.7%), followed by social issues (7.4%). The least mentioned topic on both agendas is science and technology which ranked 14th representing 0.3% of the public agenda and 1.8% on the media agenda. The following figures display the main topics on both agendas.

Figure 5.9ba: Public news agenda categorized into main topics





Figure 5.9bb: Talk shows' news agenda categorized into main topics



5.9c Talk show's agenda setting impact

To determine whether nightly television talk shows agenda had an agenda setting influence, respondents were asked to name the primary source of information for each of the five issues they listed. The responses were coded into categories of media sources and were also coded into specific names of such sources when mentioned. If respondents listed more than one source for the same issue, they were coded as miscellaneous. However, if they cited nightly television talk shows among those sources, they were coded as television talk shows and other. This is to separate it from the category specified for television talk shows when they were solely cited. Furthermore, to determine whether the three television talk shows studied had any agenda setting influencing, the names of the shows and sources mentioned were also coded. Tables 5.9c and 5.9d display the sources cited by respondents and the specific names whenever mentioned, respectively.

Table 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents

<i>How did these issues come to your knowledge? Specify the source</i>	Frequency	%
1. Television Talk Shows	465	42.3%
2. Newspapers	229	20.8%
3. Internet	172	15.6%
4. TV News	83	7.5%
5. Personal Communication	62	5.6%
6. Miscellaneous	34	3.1%
7. Radio News	22	2.0%
8. TV Talk Shows & other	20	1.8%
9. Magazines	6	.5%
10. SMS service	4	.4%
11. Radio Talk Shows	3	.3%
Total	1100	100.0%

As shown in (Table 5.9c), television talk shows topped respondents sources mentioned 465 times comprising 42.3 % of the total news sources listed. Newspapers came second listed 229 times by respondents at 20.8 %. The Internet came third, cited by 172 respondents as their source of news comprising 15.6 %. Television news ranked fourth, mentioned 83 times at 7.5 %. The remaining sources include personal communication, miscellaneous, radio news, television talk shows and other, magazines, SMS, and radio talk shows were the least mentioned. The following figure describes the results.

Figure 5.9c: Main source of news for the issues listed by respondents





Table 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents

<i>How did these issues first come to your knowledge? Specify the name</i>	Frequency	%
1. Al Ashera Masa'an TV talk show	119	28.7%
2. 90 Deqeeqa TV talk show	83	20.0%
3. Masr Ennaharda TV talk show	52	12.5%
4. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper	29	7.0%
5. Al Youm Al Sabe online paper	25	6.0%
6. Al Ahram newspaper	15	3.6%
7. Al Shorouk newspaper	14	3.4%
8. Facebook	14	3.4%
9. Al Shorouk Online	7	1.7%
10. Masrawy website	6	1.4%
11. Al Jazeera TV channel	6	1.4%
12. Men Qalb Masr TV talk show	6	1.4%
13. Al Hayat Al Youm TV talk show	6	1.4%
14. Twitter	4	1.0%
15. Akhbar Baladna sms service	4	1.0%
16. Al Qahera Al Youm TV talk show	3	.7%
17. Nogoum FM	3	.7%
18. Ahram Online	2	.5%
19. Sabah Dream TV talk show	2	.5%
20. Radio Masr	2	.5%
21. Al Arabeya.net	2	.5%
22. Baladna Belmasry talk show	2	.5%
23. 48 Sa'a TV talk show	1	.2%
24. Al Akhbar newspaper	1	.2%
25. Al Jazeera.net	1	.2%
26. Al Tab'a Al Akheera news program	1	.2%
27. Teen Stuff magazine	1	.2%
28. MSN News	1	.2%
29. Business Today magazine	1	.2%
30. Youtube	1	.2%
31. Al Tab'a Al Oula news program	1	.2%
Total	415	100.0%

As shown in (Table 5.9d), out of the 415 names listed by respondents as the main sources of news, television talk show *Al Ashera Masa'an* topped respondents sources, mentioned 119 times comprising 28.7 % of the news sources. *90 Deqeeka* talk show came second cited 83 times by respondents at 20 %. *Masr Ennaharda* came third cited by 52 respondents as their source of news comprising 12.5 %.

Figure 5.9d: Name of main source of news for the issues listed by respondents



To further investigate the agenda-setting influence of television talk shows, two cross tabulation tables were conducted: (Table 5.9e) shows the cross tabulation of the five main sources of news which include television talk shows with the main topics. (Table 5.9f) shows the cross tabulation of the same five main sources with the top 10 news issues by respondents.

Table 5.9e: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the main topics

Topic	News p.	TV News	TV Talk Shows	Inter-net	Pers-onal com.	Other	Total
Political	81 23.4%	26 7.5%	137 39.6%	55 15.9%	18 5.2%	29 8.4%	346 100%
Econ.	38 21%	12 6.6%	83 45.9%	21 11.6%	11 6.1%	16 8.8%	181 100%
Criminal	32 22.4%	10 7%	54 37.8%	25 17.5%	9 6.3%	13 9%	143 100%
Media	10 10.4%	8 8.2%	52 54.2%	14 14.6%	6 6.3%	6 6.3%	96 100%
Social	19 23.5%	1 1.2%	43 53%	11 13.6%	2 2.5%	5 6.2%	81 100%
Edu.	15 28.8%	4 7.7%	21 40%	6 11.5%	1 1.9%	5 9.6%	52 100%
Health	7 1.5%	5 11.5%	19 42.2%	6 13%	3 6.6%	5 11.1%	45 100%
Misc.	8 13.5%	8 13.5%	19 32.3%	11 18.6%	7 11.8%	6 10.1%	59 100%
Religion	5 19.2%	1 3.8%	10 38.4%	5 19.2%	3 11.5%	2 7.7%	26 100%
Sports	4 17.3%	3 3%	10 43.4%	6 26%	0 0%	0 0%	23 100%
Environ.	6 21.4%	5 17.8%	9 32%	6 21.4%	1 3.6%	1 3.6%	28 100%
Human Inst.	0 0%	0 0%	6 66.6%	2 22.2%	0 0%	1 11.1%	9 100%
Arts & Cult.	4 50%	0 0%	2 25%	2 25%	0 0%	0 0%	8 100%
Sci & Tech.	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 66.6%	1 33.3%	0 0%	3 100%
Total mean%	229 20.8%	83 7.5%	465 42.2%	172 15.6%	62 5.6%	89 8%	1100 100%

Table 5.9ea: Statistical test for table 5.9e

ANOVA

Source of variation	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	F
Sources of news	11731.77	5	2346.355	19.51409
Error	9378.643	78	120.239	
Total	21110.42	83	254.3424	

As shown in (Table 5.9e), television talk shows topped the news sources in all topics, cited 42.2 % out of the total number of sources cited for the 1,100 issues provided by respondents. Talk shows were cited for political topic at 39.6 % as the primary source of news which supports the previous results in table 5.9c.

As shown in (Table 5.9ea), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of news and to determine if there was any significant difference. The result $F = 19.514$ ($p=0.00001$), is highly significant, indicating that the differences between the sources of news are significant with nightly television talk shows significantly much higher than any other source.

Table 5.9f: Cross tabulation of the five main sources of news and the 10 mostly mentioned news issues listed by respondents

News Issue	Newspaper	TV News	TV Talk Shows	Internet	Personal Comm.	Other	Total
Parliamentary Elections	57 24.9%	15 6.6%	100 43.7%	32 14.0%	9 3.9%	16 7%	229 100 %
Minimum wages	13 23.6%	2 3.6%	27 49.1%	8 14.5%	1 1.8%	4 7.3%	55 100%
Rising Food Prices	14 20.3%	5 7.2%	31 44.9%	7 10.1%	5 7.2%	7 10.1%	69 100%
School violence	9 16.7%	1 1.9%	31 57.4%	7 13.0%	1 1.9%	5 9.3%	54 100%
University Guards	11 31.4%	1 2.9%	12 34.3%	5 14.3%	1 2.9%	5 14.3%	35 100%
Courts	11 26.2%	6 14.3%	14 33.3%	5 11.9%	1 2.4%	5 11.9%	42 100%
Terrorism	10 21.3%	0 .0%	14 29.8%	13 27.7%	6 12.8%	4 8.5%	47 100%
Dostour Crisis	3 7.9%	1 2.6%	23 60.5%	5 13.2%	3 7.9%	3 7.9%	38 100%
Suspension of Media	0 0%	5 13.5%	23 62.2%	7 18.9%	1 2.7%	1 2.7%	37 100%
Presidential Elections	12 21.4%	2 3.6%	17 30.4%	11 19.6%	4 7.1%	10 17.9%	56 100%
Mean %	19.3%	5.7%	44.5%	15.8%	5.1%	9.7%	100%

Table 5.9fa: Statistical test for table 5.9f

ANOVA

Source of variation	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	F
Source of news	10849.68	5	2169.937	40.38761
Error	2901.3	54	53.72778	
Total	13750.98	59	233.0675	

As shown in (Table 5.9f), television talk shows also topped the news sources in all 10 issues listed, representing 43.7% of the sources mentioned for parliamentary

elections. Television talk shows were also cited by respondents for the issue of minimum wages representing 49.1 %.

As shown in (Table 5.9fa), ANOVA was conducted to compare the sources of news. The result $F = 40.388$ ($p=0.00001$) is highly significant indicating that the differences between the sources of news are significant with TV talk shows much higher than any other source.

To further investigate whether respondents follow talk shows' coverage on the issues they listed and to insure internal validity, respondents were asked to specify how often they follow talk show's coverage for each issue they listed on a three-point scale with always representing the highest value of 3, sometimes representing a value of 2, and never representing the lowest value of 1.

Table 5.9g Exposure to talk show's coverage of news priorities on the public agenda

<i>How often do you follow talk shows' coverage of each issue you listed?</i>	Frequency	Percent
Always	376	34.2%
Sometimes	636	57.8%
Never	88	8.0%
Total	1100	100.0%
Mean Av. Rating*	2.26	
SD	0.587	

* based on a 3-point scale: 3 = Always, 2 = Sometimes, 1 = Never

As shown in (Table 5.9g), the majority of respondents sometimes (57.8%) follow talk shows' coverage of the 1,100 news issues they listed, followed by always (34.2%) and "never" (8 %). The mean value of 2.26 shows that the majority fall between sometimes and always.

5.10 Talk Shows' Coverage & Agenda Setting

The amount of coverage of talk shows is defined as the total number of news stories covered by the three Egyptian nightly television talk shows analyzed in the content-analysis study. As shown in (Table 5.9d) earlier, television talk show *Al Ashera Masa'an* topped respondents' sources representing 28.7 % of the news sources, followed by *90 Deqeeqa* (20%) and *Masr Ennaharda* (12.5 %). If the amount of coverage is related to the agenda-setting impact, then the talk show with the highest number of stories would be most cited by respondents. A cross tabulation of the three talk shows with the top story on the agenda, the parliamentary elections, was also formulated. This is to examine if a particular show's amount of coverage had any relation to its dominant agenda-setting influence. The following table shows the amount of coverage in the three shows.

Table 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk shows:

Talk Show	Frequency	Percent
<i>Masr Ennaharda</i>	258	38.2
<i>90 Deqeeqa</i>	211	31.2
<i>Al Ashera Masa'an</i>	207	30.6
Total	676	100.0

The total number of stories covered by the three talk shows is 676 stories.

- *Masr Ennaharda* produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories, representing 38.2%.
- *90 Deqeeqa* produced 31.2% of the stories.
- *Al Ashera Masa'an* produced 30.6% of the total stories.

As shown in (Table 5.10), There is no significant difference in the amount of coverage between the three talk shows.

Figure 5.10a: Total number of stories covered by Egyptian nightly television talk shows:




Table 5.10b Cross tabulation of the amount of coverage of the parliamentary elections in the three talk shows

News Issue	Talk Show			Total
	<i>Al Ashera Masa'an</i>	<i>Masr Ennaharda</i>	<i>90 Deqeeka</i>	
Parliamentary Elections	25 (39.7%)	20 (31.7%)	18 (28.6%)	63 (100%)

As shown in (Table 5.10b), *Al Ashera Masa'an* had the highest parliamentary election stories (39.7%), followed by *Masr Ennaharda* (31.7%) and *90 Deqeeka* (28.6%). The difference between the three shows in terms of the amount of coverage is not significant. Therefore, there is no relation between the amount of coverage and a particular talk show's agenda-setting impact.

5.11 Second-level agenda-setting: Public framing vs. media framing of the Egyptian parliamentary elections & H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows' portrayal of Egypt's parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers' perception of the parliamentary elections.

The second-level of agenda setting is applied in this study by examining the frames of the talk shows' advance coverage of the parliamentary elections and comparing it with respondents' frames of elections during the period that preceded the elections. Respondents were given 22 opposite statements in the questionnaire and were asked to specify their level of agreement on a five-point likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The statements tackled a variety of election attributes. The statements were categorized into separate tables according to topic for ease of analysis. To provide more robust results, strongly agree and agree results were combined into an overall agreement total. As well as strongly disagree and disagree as shown in the following table (**also for the rest of the tables**).

5.11a Results of survey framing statements

Table 5.11aa: Media Restrictions

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean Av. Rating* \pm SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>a) The government's recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections</i>	57 (19.9%)	43 (15.0%)	186 (65.0%)	2.20 \pm 0.121
<i>l) The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the elections</i>	206 (72.0%)	58 (20.3%)	22 (7.7%)	3.97 \pm 0.791

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)
 't' = 4.956 (p= 0.0011) highly significant difference between the two opposites

No election-related media restrictions: Table 5.11aa shows that 57% agree with statement (a), 5% are neutral, and 65% disagree. A mean of 2.20 indicates a disagreement level.

Election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11 aa) shows that 72% agree with statement (l), 20.3% are neutral, and 7.7% disagree. A mean of 3.97 indicates that the majority agree with the statement.

Table 5.11ab: Election Fairness

Opposite Statement	Frequency (%)			Mean av. rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>b) The elections will be fairly conducted</i>	41 (14.3%)	65 (22.7%)	180 (62.9%)	2.18 ± 0.211
<i>m) The elections will not be fairly conducted</i>	191 (66.8%)	62 (21.7%)	33 (11.5%)	3.88 ± 0.750

‘t’ = 4.875 (p= 0.0012) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Fair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that only 14.3% agree with statement (b), 22.7% are neutral, and 62.9% disagree. A mean of 2.18 indicates that the majority disagree with the statement.

Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11ab) shows that 66.8% agree with statement (m), 21.7% are neutral, and 11.5% disagree. A mean of 3.88 indicates that the majority are between agree and neutral.

Table 5.11ac: NDP

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>c) National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates are expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	213 (74.5%)	60 (21.0%)	13 (4.5%)	4.10 ± 0.880
<i>n) NDP candidates are <u>not</u> expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	56 (19.6%)	74 (25.9%)	156 (54.5%)	2.40 ± 0.196

‘t’ = 4.224 (p= 0.0029) highly significant difference between the two opposites

NDP Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 74.5% agree with statement (c), 21% are neutral, and only 4.5% disagree. A mean of 4.10 indicates that the majority is between strongly agree and agree.

NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11ac) shows that 19.6% agree with the statement (n), 25.9% are neutral, and 54.5% disagree.

Table 5.11ad: Judicial supervision

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>d) Judicial supervision is important to prevent election fraud</i>	199 (69.6%)	68 (23.8%)	19 (6.6%)	4.03 ± 0.856
<i>o) Judicial supervision is not important to prevent election fraud</i>	54 (18.9%)	64 (22.4%)	168 (58.7%)	2.33 ± 0.151

't' = 4.388 (p= 0.0023) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Important Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 69.6% agree with statement (d), 23.8% are neutral, and 6.6% disagree. A mean of 4.03 indicates that the majority is between strongly agree and agree.

Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11ad) shows that 18.9% agree with statement (o), 22.4% are neutral, and 58.7% disagree.

Table 5.11ae: Peaceful vs. violent elections

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>e) The elections are expected to be peaceful</i>	56 (19.6%)	83 (29.0%)	147 (51.4%)	2.52 ± 0.300
<i>p) The elections are expected to be violent</i>	160 (55.9%)	87 (30.4%)	39 (13.6%)	3.57 ± 0.594

't' = 3.500 (p= 0.0081) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11ae) shows that 19.6% agree with statement (e), 29% are neutral, and 51.4% disagree. A mean of 2.52 shows that the majority is between disagree and neutral.

Violent Elections: (Table 5.11ae) shows that 55.9% agree with statement (p), 30.4% are neutral, and 13.6% disagree. A mean of 3.57 shows that the majority is between agree and neutral.

Table 5.11af: Independent Monitors

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>f) It's important to have independent monitors</i>	223 78.0(%)	52 (18.2%)	11 (3.8%)	4.11 ± 0.879
<i>q) It's not important to have independent monitors</i>	36 (12.6%)	62 (21.7%)	188 (65.7%)	2.22 ± 0.269

't' = 4.592 (p= 0.0018) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Important Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11af) shows that 78% agree with statement (f), 18.2% are neutral, and 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.11 shows that the majority is between strongly agree and agree.

Unimportant Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11af) shows that 12.6 % agree with statement (q), 21.7 % are neutral, and 65.7 % disagree. A mean of 2.22 shows that the majority is between disagree and neutral.

Table 5.11ag: Opposition Representation

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>g) Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation</i>	77 (26.9%)	108 (37.8%)	101 (35.3%)	2.82 ± 0.431
<i>r) Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation</i>	140 (49.0%)	101 (35.3%)	45 (15.7%)	3.47 ± 0.531

't' = 2.136 (p= 0.0652) no significant difference between the two opposites

Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 26.9 % agree with statement (g), 37.8% are neutral, and 35.3 disagree. A mean of 2.82 shows that the majority is between disagree and neutral.

Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11ag) shows that 49 % agree with statement (r), 35.3 % are neutral, and 15.7% disagree. A mean of 3.47 shows that the majority is between agree and neutral.

Table 5.11ah: Muslim Brotherhood

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>Muslim Brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government</i>	49 (17.1%)	63 (22.0%)	174 (60.8%)	2.31 ± 0.213
<i>Muslim Brotherhood candidates will be restricted to run in the elections by the government</i>	153 (53.5%)	84 (29.4%)	49 (17.1%)	3.56 ± 0.533

‘t’ = 4.840 (p= 0.0013) highly significant difference between the two opposites

Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 17.1 % agree with statement (h), 22% are neutral, and 60.8% disagree. A mean of 2.31 shows a majority between disagree and neutral.

Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11ah) shows that 53.5% agree with statement (s), 29.4% are neutral, and 17.1% disagree. A mean of 3.56 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

Table 5.11ai: Women Representation

Statement	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>i) Women must have equal representation in parliament</i>	154 (53.8%)	90 (31.5%)	42 (14.7%)	3.66 ± 0.598
<i>t) Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president</i>	72 (25.2%)	92 (32.2%)	122 (42.7%)	2.73 ± 0.294

't' = 3.095 (p= 0.0148) significant difference between the two opposites

Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 53.8% agree with statement (i), 31.5% are neutral, and 14.7% disagree. A mean of 3.66 shows that the majority is between agree and neutral.

Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11ai) shows that 25.2% agree with statement (t), 32.2% are neutral, and 42.7% disagree. A mean of 2.73 indicates that the majority is between disagree and neutral.

Table 5.11aj: Coptic Representation

Statement	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>j) Coptic Christians should hold more than the current 10 percent of parliament seats</i>	114 (39.9%)	110 (38.5%)	62 (21.7%)	3.26 ± 0.468
<i>u) Coptic Christians should hold the current 10 percent of parliament seats</i>	83 (29.0%)	132 (46.2%)	71 (24.8%)	3.06 ± 0.504

't' = 0.637 (p= 0.5419) no significant difference between the two opposites

More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 39.9% agree with statement (j), 38.5% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.26 indicates the majority is between agree and neutral.

Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11aj) shows that 29 % agree with statement (u), 46.2% are neutral, and 24.8% disagree. A mean of 3.06 also indicates a majority that is also between agree and neutral.

Table 5.11ak: Wafd Opposition Party

Statement	Frequency (%)			Mean av. Rating* ± SD
	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	
<i>k)The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	83 (29.0%)	139 (48.6%)	64 (22.4%)	3.08 ± 0.557
<i>v)The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	92 (32.2%)	132 (46.2%)	62 (21.7%)	3.14 ± 0.538

't' = 0.161 (p= 0.9999) no significant difference between the two opposites

Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 29 % agree with statement (k), 48.6% are neutral, and 22.4% disagree. A mean of 3.08 indicates that the majority is between neutral and agree.

Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11ak) shows that 32.2 % agree with statement (v), 46.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.14 also shows that the majority is between agree and neutral.

As shown in the above tables most respondents expect the elections to be violent. However, the majority had positive attitudes towards election monitoring by judges and independent monitors agreeing that they are important to prevent election fraud. To determine whether the respondents overall frames corresponded with the talk shows' frames of the elections, the results of the content analysis which basically indicate which frame was mentioned more, thereby more dominant, are compared with the survey agreement results listed in the table below.

5.11b Results of Content Analysis Election Frames

Table 5.11ba: Election Frames: Media Restrictions

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>The government's recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections</i>	3 (8.3%)	2 (5.6%)	31 (86.1%)
<i>The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the elections</i>	5 (13.9%)	2 (5.6%)	29 (80.6%)

No election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11ba) displays how the media restrictions frame was presented out of the total 36 election stories coded. Framing the government's recent restrictions as having nothing to do with elections was mentioned 8.3%, not mentioned 86.1%, and neutral 5.6%.

Election-related media restrictions: (Table 5.11ba) shows that framing the media restrictions as being issued because of the elections was mentioned 13.9%, not mentioned 80.6%, and neutral 5.6%.

Table 5.11bb: Elections Fairness

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>The elections will be fairly conducted</i>	13 (36.1%)	4 (11.1%)	19 (52.8%)
<i>The elections will be unfairly conducted</i>	13 (36.1%)	4 (11.1%)	19 (52.8%)

Fair Elections vs. Unfair Elections: (Table 5.11bb) shows that framing the elections as fair and unfair was equally mentioned in 36.1% of the stories, not mentioned 52.8%, and neutral 11.1%.

Table 5.11bc: The National Democratic Party

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>The NDP is expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	9 (25.0%)	4 (11.1%)	23 (63.9%)
<i>The NDP is not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	0 (0%)	4 (11.1%)	32 (88.9%)

NDP Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as the majority was mentioned in 25% of the stories, not mentioned 63.9% and neutral 4%.

NDP Not Majority: (Table 5.11bc) shows that framing the NDP as not expected to hold the majority was mentioned in 0% of the stories, not mentioned in 88.9%, and neutral in 11.1%.

Table 5.11bd: Judicial Supervision

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>Judicial supervision is important to prevent fraud</i>	10 (27.8%)	9 (25.0%)	17 (47.2%)
<i>Judicial supervision is <u>not</u> important to prevent fraud</i>	10 (27.8%)	4 (11.1%)	22 (61.1%)

Important vs. Unimportant Judicial Supervision: (Table 5.11bd) shows that framing judicial supervision as important and as unimportant was equally mentioned in 27.8% of the stories. The importance of judicial supervision was not mentioned in 47.2% and was neutral in 25%. The unimportance of judicial supervision was neutral in 11.1% and not mentioned in 61.1%.

Table 5.11be: Peaceful vs. Violent Elections

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>The elections are expected to be peaceful</i>	7 (19.4%)	5 (13.9%)	24 (66.7%)
<i>The elections are expected to be violent</i>	10 (27.8%)	5 (13.9%)	21 (58.3%)

Peaceful Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as peaceful was mentioned 19.4%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 13.9%.

Violent Elections: (Table 5.11be) shows that framing the elections as violent was mentioned 27.8%, not mentioned 58.3% and neutral 13.9%.

Table 5.11bf: Independent Monitors

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>It's important to have independent monitors</i>	11 (30.6%)	1 (2.8%)	24 (66.7%)
<i>It's <u>not</u> important to have independent monitors</i>	5 (13.9%)	1 (2.8%)	30 (83.3%)

Important Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing independent monitors as important was mentioned 30.6%, not mentioned 66.7% and neutral 2.8%.

Unimportant Independent Monitors: (Table 5.11bf) shows that framing independent monitors as unimportant was only mentioned 13.9%, neutral 2.8%, and not mentioned 83.3%.

Table 5.11bg: Opposition Representation

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation</i>	6 (16.7%)	5 (13.9%)	25 (69.4%)
<i>Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation</i>	15 (41.7%)	6 (16.7%)	41.7 (83.3%)

Powerful Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition representation as powerful was only mentioned 16.7%, 13.9% neutral, and 69.4% not mentioned.

Weak Opposition: (Table 5.11bg) shows that framing the opposition representation as weak was mentioned 41.7%, neutral 16.7% and not mentioned 83.3%.

Table 5.11bh: Muslim Brotherhood

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government</i>	5 (13.9%)	5 (13.9%)	26 (72.2%)
<i>Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections by the government</i>	8 (22.2%)	5 (13.9%)	23 (63.9%)

Muslim Brotherhood Welcomed: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim Brotherhood as being welcomed to run in the elections was only mentioned 13.9%, neutral 13.9% and not mentioned 72.2%.

Muslim Brotherhood Restricted: (Table 5.11bh) shows that framing the Muslim Brotherhood as being restricted from running in the elections was mentioned 22.2%, 13.9% neutral, and 63.9% not mentioned.

Table 5.11bi: Women Representation

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>Women must have equal representation in parliament</i>	3 (8.3%)	3 (8.3%)	30 (83.3%)
<i>Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president</i>	0 (0%)	3 (8.3%)	33 (91.7%)

Equal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing equal women representation was 8.3% mentioned, neutral 8.3%, and not mentioned 83.3%.

Unequal Women Representation: (Table 5.11bi) shows that framing unequal women representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 8.3% and not mentioned 91.7%.

Table 5.11bj: Coptic Representation

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>Coptic Christians should hold more than the current 10 percent of parliament seats</i>	6 (16.7%)	1 (2.8%)	29 (80.6%)
<i>Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament</i>	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	36 (100.0%)

More Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing more Coptic representation was mentioned 16.7%, neutral 2.8% and not mentioned 80.6%.

Same Coptic Representation: (Table 5.11bj) shows that framing the same Coptic representation was mentioned 0%, neutral 0% and not mentioned 100%.

Table 5.11bk: Wafd Opposition Party

Opposite Statements	Frequency (%)		
	Mentioned	Neutral	Not Mentioned
<i>The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	9 (25.0%)	6 (16.7%)	21 (58.3%)
<i>The Wafd opposition party is <u>not</u> expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	0 (0%)	6 (16.7%)	30 (83.3%)

Wafd Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 25%, neutral 16.7%, and not mentioned 58.3%.

Wafd Not Majority: (Table 5.11bk) shows that framing the Wafd opposition party as not expected to hold most opposition seats was mentioned 0%, neutral 16.7%, and not mentioned 83.3%.

5.11c Comparing Content Analysis & Survey Election Frames

Table 5.11c Comparing content analysis and survey frames of the elections

Opposite Frames	Content Analysis % Mentioned	Survey % Agree	Match
1 <i>The government's recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections</i>	8.3-L	19.9-L	Yes
2 <i>The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the elections</i>	13.9-H	72.0-H	
3 <i>The elections will be fairly conducted</i>	36.1	14.3	No
4 <i>The elections will be unfairly conducted</i>	36.1	66.8	
5 <i>Judicial supervision is important to prevent fraud</i>	27.8	69.6-H	No
6 <i>Judicial supervision is <u>not</u> important to prevent fraud</i>	27.8	18.9-L	

7 <i>The elections are expected to be peaceful</i>	19.4-L	19.6-L	Yes
8 <i>The elections are expected to be violent</i>	27.8-H	55.9-H	
9 <i>It's important to have independent monitors</i>	30.6-H	78.0-H	Yes
10 <i>It's <u>not</u> important to have independent monitors</i>	13.9-L	12.6-L	
11 <i>Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation</i>	16.7-L	26.9-L	Yes
12 <i>Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation</i>	41.7-H	49.0-H	
13 <i>Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government</i>	13.9-L	17.1-L	Yes
14 <i>Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections by the government</i>	22.2-H	53.5-H	
15 <i>Women must have equal representation in parliament</i>	8.3-H	53.8-H	Yes
16 <i>Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president</i>	0-L	25.2-L	
17 <i>Coptic Christians should hold more than the current 10 percent of parliament seats</i>	16.7-H	39.9-H	Yes
18 <i>Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament</i>	0-L	29.0-L	
19 <i>The NDP is expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	25.0-H	74.5-H	Yes
20 <i>The NDP is not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament</i>	0-L	19.6-L	
21 <i>The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	25.0-H	29.0-L	No
22 <i>The Wafd opposition party is <u>not</u> expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament</i>	0-L	32.2-H	

As shown in (Table 5.11c), 8 framing statements out of 11 matched between being mentioned by talk shows and agreed upon by respondents, representing a 73% match.

5.12 Perception of the role of nightly TV talk shows and civic engagement attitudes & H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic engagement.

Perception of the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in civic engagement was measured through seven statements on a five-point likert scale. Civic engagement is operationally defined as sociopolitical awareness, sociopolitical discussions, public opinion expression, community involvement and political participation.

Table 5.12a: Perception of nightly television talk shows' role in civic engagement

Survey Statements of Question 3 Arranged in order of Mean*	Frequency (%) in degree of agreement			
	Agree (5+4)	Neutral (3)	Disagree (2+1)	Mean Av. Rating* ± SD
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt's affairs	264 (92.3%)	17 (5.9%)	5 (1.7%)	4.28 ± 1.084
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness	209 (73.1%)	57 (19.9%)	20 (7.0%)	3.90 ± 0.808
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms to the show)	208 (72.7%)	51 (17.8%)	27 (9.4%)	3.87 ± 0.791
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows encourage people to make charitable contributions	192 (67.1%)	76 (26.6%)	18 (6.3%)	3.82 ± 0.741
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving community problems in Egypt	144 (50.3%)	91 (31.8%)	51 (17.8%)	3.43 ± 0.542
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage citizens to vote	114 (39.9%)	103 (36.0%)	69 (24.1%)	3.22 ± 0.477
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in Nov. 2010	121 (42.3%)	82 (28.7%)	83 (29.0%)	3.21 ± 0.394
Total	1252 (%62.5)	477 (23.8%)	273 (13.6%)	3.68 ± 0.653

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)

Table 5.12aa: Statistical test for table 5.12a

<i>Source of variation</i>	<i>Sum of squares</i>	<i>Degrees of freedom</i>	<i>Mean square</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Media sources</i>	<i>2.74</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>0.457</i>	<i>1.053</i>
<i>Error</i>	<i>12.16</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>0.434</i>	
<i>Total</i>	<i>14.9</i>	<i>34</i>		

ANOVA: F= 1.053 not significant (p=0.4134) indicating no significant differences between the mean average ratings of talk shows role in civic engagement.

a) Perception of talk shows as a source of news: (Table 5.12a) shows that almost the entire sample, 92.3%, agree that talk shows are a source of news, 5.9% are neutral, and only 1.7% disagree. A mean of 4.28 indicates that the majority falls between agree and strongly agree.

e) Perception of talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12a) shows that the majority representing 73.1%, agree that talk shows promote sociopolitical awareness, 19.9% are neutral, and only 7% disagree. A mean of 3.90 indicates that the majority falls almost on the agree level.

d) Perception of talk shows as encouraging public opinion expression: (Table 5.12a) shows that the 72.7% representing the majority agree that talk shows encourage public opinion expression, 17.8% neutral, and only 9.4% disagree. A mean of 3.87 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

c) Perception of talk shows as encouraging charity: (Table 5.12a) shows that 67.1%, representing the majority, agree that talk shows encourage charity work, 26.6% neutral, and only 6.3% disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

b) Perception of talk shows as encouraging community participation: (Table 5.12a) shows that half the sample, 50.3%, agrees that talk shows encourage community participation, 31.8% neutral, and 17.8% disagree. A mean of 3.43 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.


g) Perception of talk shows as encouraging voting: (Table 5.12a) shows that 39.9% agree that talk shows encourage voting, followed by 36% neutral, and 24.1% disagree. A mean of 3.22 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

f) Perception of talk shows as a main source for information on the Egyptian parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12a) shows that 42.3%, agree that talk shows are a main source of news regarding the elections, 19.9% are neutral, and 29% disagree. A mean of 3.21 indicates that the majority falls between agree and neutral.

There is a high agreement on the total 2,002 responses. As shown in (Table 5.12a), the total number of agreement on all talk show perception statements is 62.5% or 1,252 agreement responses, compared to 23.8% neutral and a low disagreement total of 13.6%. The overall mean is 3.68, which is between agree and neutral indicating a positive perception of the role of television talks shows.

An ANOVA was conducted, as shown in (Table 5.12aa), to test if there was any significant difference between the statements. The result $F= 1.053$ is not significant ($p=0.4134$), indicating that there is no significant difference between the mean average ratings of the perceptions of talk shows role in civic engagement.

Figure 5.12a: Perception of nightly TV talk shows’ role in civic engagement



5.12b Attitudes towards civic engagement

Civic engagement attitudes were measured through 14 statements on a five-point likert scale. Civic engagement is defined into sociopolitical awareness, public opinion expression, sociopolitical discussions, community participation and political participation through voting.

Table 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement, listed in descending order of mean

Statements of Question 4 Arranged in order of Mean	Frequency (%) in degree of agreement			
	Agree (5+4)	Neutral (3)	Disagree (2+1)	Mean av. Rating* ± SD
e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important	254 (88.8%)	21 (7.3%)	11 (3.8%)	4.30 ± 1.068
f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority	224 (78.3%)	43 (15.0%)	19 (6.6%)	4.09 ± 0.889
i) Contributing to community is my responsibility	206 (72.0%)	59 (20.6%)	21 (7.3%)	3.88 ± 0.787
g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems	189 (66.1%)	35 (12.2%)	62 (21.7%)	3.70 ± 0.720
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority	176 (61.5%)	70 (24.5%)	40 (14.0%)	3.69 ± 0.626
j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt	157 (54.9%)	91 (31.8%)	38 (13.3%)	3.60 ± 0.570
h) I make a difference in my community	160 (55.9%)	79 (27.6%)	47 (16.4%)	3.54 ± 0.570
k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011	159 (55.6%)	72 (25.2%)	55 (19.2%)	3.55 ± 0.552
a) I consider voting a priority	146 (51.0%)	77 (26.9%)	63 (22.0%)	3.45 ± 0.487
l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections	140 (49.0%)	79 (27.6%)	67 (23.4%)	3.38 ± 0.461
m) I intend to vote in Egypt's upcoming presidential elections	138 (48.3%)	61 (21.3%)	87 (30.4%)	3.31 ± 0.438
n) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections	104 (36.4%)	81 (28.3%)	101 (35.3%)	3.03 ± 0.319
b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, etc.)	86 (30.1%)	76 (26.6%)	124 (43.4%)	2.81 ± 0.316
c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)	68 (23.8%)	74 (25.9%)	144 (50.3%)	2.65 ± 0.308
Overall	2207 (55.1%)	918 (22.9%)	879 (22.0%)	3.50 ± 0.525

* based on a 5-point scale (5=S. Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 2=Disagree, 1=S. Disagree)

Table 5.12ba: Statistical test for table 5.12b

<i>Source of variation</i>	<i>Sum of squares</i>	<i>Degrees of freedom</i>	<i>Mean square</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>Media sources</i>	<i>0.557</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.112</i>
<i>Error</i>	<i>21.394</i>	<i>56</i>	<i>0.382</i>	
<i>Total</i>	<i>21.951</i>	<i>69</i>		

ANOVA: F= 0.112 not significant (p=0.9999) indicating no significant differences between the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic engagement. ($s^2 = 0.382$)

e) Informed about Egyptian affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 88.8% agree that being informed about Egyptian affairs is a priority, 7.3% are neutral, and only 3.8% disagree. A mean of 4.30 indicates that the majority is between strongly agree and agree.

f) Sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority 78.3% agree that sociopolitical awareness is a priority, 15% neutral, and only 6.6% disagree. A mean of 4.09 indicates that the majority is between agree and strongly agree.

i) Community responsibility: (Table 5.12b) shows that 72% agree that contributing to community is their responsibility, 20.6% are neutral, and 7.3% disagree. A mean of 3.88 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

g) Community action: (Table 5.12b) shows that the majority comprising 66.1% agree that citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems, 12.2% are neutral, and 21.7% disagree. A mean of 3.70 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

d) Discussing sociopolitical affairs: (Table 5.12b) shows that 61.5% agree that discussing sociopolitical affairs is a priority, 24.5% are neutral, and 14% disagree. A mean of 3.69 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

j) Volunteer to solve community problems: (Table 5.12b) shows that 54.9% agree with the statement that they volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt,

31.8% are neutral, and 13.3% disagree. A mean of 3.60 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

h) Community value: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.9% agree that they make a difference in their communities, 27.6% are neutral, and 16.4% disagree. A mean of 3.54 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

k) Voting responsibility, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 55.6% agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011, 25.2% are neutral, 19.2% disagree. A mean of 3.55 indicates that the majority agree.

a) I consider voting a priority: (Table 5.12b) shows that 51% agree that they consider voting a priority, 26.9% are neutral, and 22% disagree. A mean of 3.45 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

l) Voting responsibility, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 49% agree that it's their responsibility to vote in Egypt's 2010 parliamentary elections, 27.6% are neutral, and 23.4% disagree. A mean of 3.38 indicates that the majority is between agree and neutral.

m) Voting intention, presidential elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 48.3% agree that they intend to vote in the presidential elections, 21.3% are neutral, and 30.4% disagree. A mean of 3.31 indicates that the majority is between neutral and agree.

n) Voting intention, parliamentary elections: (Table 5.12b) shows that 36.4% agree that they intend to vote in the Nov.2010 parliamentary elections, 28.4% are neutral, and 35.3% disagree. A mean of 3.03 indicates that the majority is neutral.


b) Public opinion expression through media: (Table 5.12b) shows that 30.1% agree that they express their opinions through mass media, 26.6% are neutral, and 43.4% disagree. A mean of 2.81 indicates that the majority is between neutral and disagree.

c) I express my opinion to public officials: (Table 5.12b) shows that 23.8% agree that they express their opinions to public officials, 25.9% are neutral, and 50.3% disagree. A mean of 2.65 indicates that the majority is between neutral and disagree.

Overall, as shown in (Table 5.12b) the agreement percentage on the total 14 statements measuring civic engagement attitudes is more than half (55.1 %). The overall neutrality and disagreement percentage with the civic engagement attitudes are almost the same, 22.9% and 22% respectively. The total mean average for all the statements is 3.50 which indicates that the majority of respondents are between agree and neutral. The majority fall midpoint between agree and neutral with regards to civic engagement attitudes, which indicate positive attitudes.

As shown in (Table 5.12ba), an ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there was a significant between the mean average ratings of attitudes towards civic engagement and the result was ANOVA: $F= 0.112$ not significant ($p=0.9999$) indicating no significant differences. ($s^2 = 0.382$)

Figure 5.12b: Attitudes towards civic engagement



Q4

5.12c Perception of the role of television talk shows & attitudes towards civic engagement

Perception of talk shows as promoting civic engagement was measured through seven statements on a five-point liker scale in question 4 in the questionnaire. The results were listed earlier in section 5.12a, showing an average mean of agreement on perceiving talk shows as having a positive role regarding civic engagement. A correlation coefficient was carried out to test H3 to determine if there is a significant correlation between perception of talk shows as civically engaging and positive attitudes towards civic engagement. Statements from survey question (3) which measure the perception were correlated with corresponding statements in question (4) measuring attitudes towards civic engagement. Statement (c) regarding the perception of talk shows as encouraging charity was not included in the correlations table because it didn't have corresponding attitude statement. The following table shows lists the results.

Table 5.12c: Correlations between perception of the role of talk shows and civic engagement attitudes

Correlated variables	R	P
a)TV talk shows are a source of news & -Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important - I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority	0.173** 0.166**	0.003 0.005
b)TV talk shows encourage community participation & - Citizens should not wait for government to solve problems - I make a difference in my community - Community contribution a responsibility - I volunteer to solve community problems	-0.032 0.047 0.029 0.178**	0.585 0.433 0.631 0.003
d)TV talk shows encourage opinion expression & - Opinion expression through Media - Opinion expression to public officials - Discussing sociopolitical affairs	0.190** 0.073 0.209**	0.001 0.216 0.000
e)TV talk shows promote sociopolitical awareness & - Informed about Egyptian affairs - Sociopolitical awareness priority	0.244** 0.295**	0.000 0.000

f)TV talk shows are a main source of election information &		
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections	0.083	0.160
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections	0.128*	0.030
g)TV talk shows encourage voting &		
- Voting priority	0.256**	0.000
- Responsibility to vote in presidential elections	0.204**	0.001
- Responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections	0.215**	0.000
- Intention to vote in presidential elections	0.192**	0.001
- Intention to vote in parliamentary elections	0.264**	0.000

* Correlation coefficient 'r' significant (at 0.05 level of probability)

** Correlation coefficient 'r' highly significant (at 0.01 level of probability)

a) Correlations between perception of talk shows as source of news and

attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness: (Table 5.12c) shows that the correlation was highly significant at 0.173** and 0.166** with the two statements measuring attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness.

b) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging

community participation and respondents' attitudes towards community participation were highly significant, 0.178**, with one statement: 'I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt'. There was no significance with the remaining three statements shown in (Table 5.12c).

d) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging opinion

expression and respondent's attitudes towards opinion expression were highly significant with expression opinion through media, 0.190**, and discussing sociopolitical affairs, 0.209**. The correlation was insignificant with expressing opinions directly to public officials.

e) Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as promoting

sociopolitical awareness and attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness were highly significant with 0.244** for being informed about Egyptian affairs, and 0.295** for considering sociopolitical awareness a priority.

- f) **Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as a primary source for election information and attitudes towards the elections** were significant, 0.128*, with the intention to vote in the elections. However, they were insignificant, 0.083, with the responsibility to vote in the elections.
- g) **Correlations between perception of TV talk shows as encouraging voting and the five attitudes towards voting** were all highly significant: Voting priority, 0.256**, Responsibility to vote in presidential elections, 0.204**, responsibility to vote in parliamentary elections, 0.215**, intention to vote in presidential elections, 0.192**, and the intention to vote in the parliamentary elections, 0.264**

As shown in table 5.12c and the corresponding results, there is a significant to highly significant correlation between most of the talk show perception statements and corresponding attitudes towards civic engagement.

5.13 Exposure & attitudes towards civic engagement & H4: There is a relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes.

Exposure to nightly television talk shows was defined earlier in section 5.8 of the results as the degree of dependency on talk shows for news. This was measured on the three-point scale: always, sometimes, never. A mean average result of 2.46 indicates that the majority fall between always and sometimes. Civic engagement attitudes are measured in question (4) in the survey on a five-point liker scale. The following table is based on cross tabulations between each statement in question (4) with exposure (see Appendix K). The ratio results and percentages are listed below.

Table 5.13a: Relationship between Exposure to Talk Shows and Civic Engagement Attitudes

Civic Engagement Attitudes (Strongly agree & Agree)	Television Talk Shows Exposure (Always & Sometimes)	
	Ratio	%
a) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important	251 / 286	87.8%
b) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority	222 / 286	77.8%
c) Community contribution is my responsibility	203 / 286	71.0%
d) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve community	187 / 286	65.4%
e) Discussing sociopolitical affairs	175 / 286	61.2%
f) Responsibility to vote at presidential elections	159 / 286	55.6%
g) Making a difference in community	158 / 286	55.2%
h) Volunteer to solve community problems	156 / 286	54.5%
i) Voting priority	145 / 286	50.7%
j) Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections	140 / 286	48.9%
k) Intention to vote at presidential elections	138 / 286	48.3%
l) Intend to vote at parliamentary elections	104 / 286	36.4%
m) Opinion expression through media	85 / 286	29.7%
n) Opinion expression to public officials	68 / 286	23.8%


- a) **Relationship between exposure to talk shows and attitudes towards being informed about Egyptian affairs** was the highest relationship, representing 87.8%
- b) **Relationship between exposure and considering sociopolitical awareness a priority** was the second highest, representing 77.8%
- c) **Relationship between exposure and considering community contribution a responsibility** was also high, representing 71.0%
- d) **Relationship between exposure and considering that citizens should not wait for the government to solve community problems** was relatively high, representing 65.4%
- e) **Relationship between exposure and discussing sociopolitical affairs** was relatively high, representing 61.2%
- f) **Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at presidential elections** was moderate, representing 55.6%
- g) **Relationship between exposure and making a difference in community** was moderate, representing 55.2%
- h) **Relationship between exposure and volunteering to solve community problems in Egypt** was moderate, representing 54.5%
- i) **Relationship between exposure and considering voting a priority** was moderate, representing 50.7%
- j) **Relationship between exposure and responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections** was low, representing 48.9%
- k) **Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at presidential elections** was low, representing 48.3%
- l) **Relationship between exposure and the intention to vote at parliamentary elections** was low, representing 36.4%

m) **Relationship between exposure and opinion expression through media** was very low, representing 29.7%

n) **Relationship between exposure and opinion expression to public officials** was very low, representing 23.8%

The following figure shows the relationships between exposure and civic engagement attitudes as displayed in (Table 5.13a).

Figure 5.13a Relationship between Television Talk Shows Exposure and Civic Engagement Attitudes



5.13b Overall level of civic engagement

Civic engagement attitudes were categorized and rated on a five-point scale according to the operational definition of civic engagement: sociopolitical awareness, sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political participation. Each of the five aspects is given a value from 1 to 5, representing a specific weight on the civic engagement scale created by the researcher. Political participation was considered the highest level of engagement and hence given a value of 5. Community engagement is the second highest level (4), opinion expression (3), sociopolitical discussions (2), and sociopolitical awareness was given a value of (1). Accordingly, the total percentage of agreement with attitude statements measuring a specific category was calculated and translated into a corresponding value for each category of civic engagement with 1 (representing the basic level of engagement) to 5 (representing the top level of engagement).

Table 5.13b Overall Level and Value of Civic Engagement

<i>Civic Engagement Categories [Agree + Strongly Agree/exposure]</i>	N	%	Value
Sociopolitical Awareness (Value=1)	473	82.6%	0.8/1
<i>Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important</i>	251	87.8%	
<i>I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority</i>	222	77.8%	
Community Involvement (Value=4)	704	82.05%	3.8/4
<i>Contributing to community is my responsibility</i>	203	71.0%	
<i>Citizens shouldn't wait for the government to solve their community problems</i>	187	65.4%	
<i>I make a difference in my community</i>	158	55.2%	
<i>I volunteer to solve community problems in Egypt</i>	156	54.5%	
Sociopolitical Discussions (Value=2)	157	61.2%	1.1/2
<i>I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority</i>			
Political Participation (Value=5)	686	47.9%	2.4/5
<i>It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming presidential elections</i>	159	55.6%	
<i>I consider voting a priority</i>	145	50.7%	
<i>It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections</i>	140	48.9%	
<i>I intend to vote in Egypt's upcoming presidential elections</i>	138	48.3%	
<i>I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections</i>	104	36.4%	
Opinion Expression (Value=3)	153	26.7%	0.8/3
<i>I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails)</i>	85	29.7%	
<i>I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)</i>	68	23.8%	
Total Value		2.96/5	

Sociopolitical Awareness: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of agreement with the two statements measuring sociopolitical awareness, represents the highest category of civic engagement (82.6%). The calculated rating value of this category is 0.82/1.

Community Involvement: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of agreement with the four statements measuring community involvement represents is (82.05%), making community involvement the second highest category. The calculated value is 3.8/4.

Sociopolitical Discussions: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the percentage of the statement measuring sociopolitical affairs discussions is (61.2%), representing the third highest category. The calculated rating value is 1.08/2.

Political participation: as shown in (Table 5.13b) the total percentage of agreement with the five statements measuring political participation is (47.9%) making political participation the fourth category of engagement. The calculated value is 2.4/5.

Opinion Expression: as shown in (Table 5.13b), the total percentage of agreement with the two statements measuring opinion expression is the lowest (26.7%). The calculated value of this category is 0.78/3.

The overall value as shown in (Table 5.13b) is 2.96/5, as illustrated in (Figure 5.13bb). The value was derived through calculating the total values (in the values column) which produced 8.88/15. The total was then multiplied by 5, for placement on the 5-point civic engagement scale created by the researcher. The following figures illustrate the results.

Figure 5.13ba Percentages of civic engagement categories





Figure 5.13bb Overall value of civic engagement



5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk shows

Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with the perception of the role of talk shows.

Table 5.14 Mean average ratings of education level and perception of the role of talk shows

Statements on the role of talk shows	Av. Rating* of Education levels				
	Undergrad	BA	Grad. Student	MA	PHD
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt's affairs	4.19	4.39	4.3	4.41	4.25
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving community problems in Egypt	3.53	3.45	3.07	3.5	2.63
c) Egyptian nightly TV Talk shows encourage people to make charitable contributions	3.71	4.01	3.93	3.97	3
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms to the show)	3.88	3.84	4	3.79	3.63
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness	3.86	4.01	3.87	3.91	3.75
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in Nov. 2010	3.31	3.43	2.63	3.06	2.5
g) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage citizens to vote	3.39	3.27	2.73	3.03	2.5
Mean	3.70	3.77	3.50	3.67	3.18

* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.14a Statistical test for table 5.14

Source of variation	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	F
Education levels	1.55	4	0.3875	1.33
Error	8.75	30	0.2917	
Total	10.3	34		

As shown in (Table 5.14a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.33 not significant (p=0.2816), indicating no significant differences between the mean average ratings of education levels. Error mean square $s^2=0.292$.

5.15 Mean average ratings of education level and civic engagement attitudes

Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with attitudes towards civic engagement.

Table 5.15 Mean average ratings of education levels and civic engagement attitudes

Civic engagement attitudes	Average rating* of Education levels				
	Undergrad	BA	Grad. student	MA	PH D
a) voting a priority	3.59	3.34	3.5	3.06	3.5
b) opinion through the media	2.88	2.96	2.6	2.35	2.88
c) opinion to public officials	2.65	2.88	2.43	2.35	3
d) discussing sociopolitical affairs	2.58	3.88	3.8	3.59	4.13
e) informed about Egyptian affairs	4.29	4.27	4.27	4.38	4.5
f) sociopolitical awareness a priority	3.99	4.12	4.27	4.21	4.5
g) Citizens should solve their problems	3.63	3.63	3.6	4.03	4.5
h) I make a difference in my community	3.56	3.45	3.6	3.53	3.63
i) Contributing to community	3.9	3.78	4.07	3.85	3.88
j) volunteer to help solve community problems	3.63	3.61	3.63	3.47	3.63
k) responsibility to vote presidential elections	3.62	3.52	3.83	3	3.75
l) responsibility to vote parliamentary elections	3.44	3.33	3.53	3.06	3.75
m) vote intent presidential elections	3.36	3.34	3.63	2.71	3.38
n) vote intent parliamentary elections	3.13	3.13	2.9	2.5	3.13
Mean av. rating	3.45	3.52	3.55	3.29	3.73

* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.15a Statistical test for table 5.15

ANOVA

Source of variation	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	F
Education levels	1.39	4	0.35	1.21
Error	19.09	65	0.29	
Total	20.48	69		

As shown in (Table 5.15a), ANOVA F between education levels = 1.21 not significant (p=0.3151), indicating no significant differences between the mean average ratings of education levels. Error mean square $s^2=0.294$.

5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure

Because the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, it was necessary to conduct further statistical tests to examine if there was any significant difference between the different levels of education, listed in (Table 5.1) with media exposure.

Table 5.16 Mean average ratings of education level and media exposure

Media Exposure	Average rating *of Education levels				
	Undergrad.	BA	Grad. Student	MA	PHD
Newspapers	2.27	2.49	2.53	2.29	2.75
Television news	2.29	2.21	1.83	2.03	2
Television talk shows	2.51	2.43	2.33	2.35	2.63
Radio news	1.64	1.61	1.6	1.68	1.75
Radio talk shows	1.54	1.61	1.37	1.41	1.13
Magazines	1.7	1.57	1.27	1.5	1.38
Internet	2.67	2.22	2.7	2.41	2.25
Mean av. rating	2.09	2.02	1.95	1.95	1.98

* based on: 5= Strongly agree, 4= Agree, 3= Neutral, 2= Disagree, 1= Strongly disagree.

Table 5.16a Statistical test for table 5.16

ANOVA

Source of variation	Sum of squares	Degrees of freedom	Mean square	F
Education levels	0.09	4	0.0225	0.09
Error	7.51	30	0.25	ns
Total	7.6	34		

As shown in (Table 5.16a), ANOVA F between education levels = 0.09 not significant (p=0.9849) indicating no significant differences between the mean average ratings of education levels. Error mean square $s^2=0.250$.

5.17 Qualitative Interview Results

5.17.1 Experts perception of civic engagement in Egypt

RQ1: How do experts perceive civic engagement in Egypt?

Experts were divided over the status of civic engagement in pre-revolution Egypt. Some experts agreed with the statement that Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic and some didn't.

Dr. Barbara Ibrahim, director of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement at the American University in Cairo, disagrees with the statement that Egyptians are politically apathetic. Ibrahim asserted that "Egyptians are politically well informed." She asserted that when Egyptians see a window of opportunity for free and fair elections, they will feel that their voices really count and they will be politically engaged citizens. The lack of political participation is a result of three decades of what Ibrahim describes as a "fossilized political system [with] no circulation of power". Egyptians have figured out that their voices do not count, that elections are forged, and that the national democratic ruling party enforces its will, regardless of people's engagement.

Dr. Ibrahim noted that youth are engaged in Egypt and cited examples such as the 6th of April movement and bloggers. She also cited youth involvement in the social service group called *Resala* which has 90 thousand members operating 34 branches across Egypt. "I can't even think about any US organization that is founded and led by young people that reached that level," she said.

Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Naila Hamdy believes that Egyptians used to be politically apathetic but they have started to change over the past few years. According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptians engagement may not go as far as voting but "they still discuss, watch, analyze, comment, [and] circulate media about

events.” Dr. Hamdy noted that even the Egyptian elite who gave up and stopped being interested in politics for many years, are much more active now.

Dr. Amani Al Shimi of the John D. Gerhart Center for Philanthropy and Civic Engagement, also agrees with Dr. Ibrahim and Dr. Hamdy. She explains that Egyptians don’t take steps toward voicing their opinions on the assumption that their opinion will not change the status quo but asserts that a large portion of the Egyptian population has opinions and insights about the political ruling in Egypt. “They are very critical and analytic about their future situation. They do have a voice. They, sometimes, choose not to use it,” Al Shimi explained. However, when it comes to voting, they are discouraged by the tedious process for issuing a voting card.

Director of the Adham Center for Journalism Training and Research, Hafez Mirazi, emphasized that there needs to be a clear definition for political apathy. “If political apathy means the low numbers for voting or political participation in the way that it could be measured by American standards or western standards,” then Egyptians would be apathetic. However, Mirazi believes that Egyptians are involved and interested in politics. Empirically speaking by American standards, no voting would make someone apathetic, but when it comes to involvement or interest, Egyptians are very active. Their “sense of perceived powerlessness” is the reason for their political inactivity, he explained. They could be discouraged and feel it’s not worth the trouble because they don’t have the power to make real change but they frequently discuss politics. “It is not fair to call someone who is talking politics and eating and drinking politics apathetic,” Professor Mirazi asserted.

Professor Mirazi added that in order to accurately measure civic engagement in Egypt, charity and activities at religious institutions including mosques and churches should be considered. Disregarding this form of activity in Egypt and dealing

with civic engagement as strictly secular is not fair and would make everyone apathetic, he explained. Civic engagement could be an alternative for people because they gave up on the political democratic process. By being engaged, Egyptians feel they can do something about their society. This in turn should lead to more political participation because it trains people to be more involved. “You can’t have a democratic society without civic engagement. But, you can have civic engagement without a democratic society,” Professor Mirazi explained. “A prerequisite of democratic society is civic engagement.”

Dr. El Shimi noted that there is an awakening among the youth population in Egypt. Large numbers of young people create or participate in groups with a mission to serve the community in a variety of ways. For example some groups address poverty related issues, gender equity, or support child rights. The themes are various and the fact that large numbers of students from schools and universities engage in such activities shows that people are not apathetic.

On the other hand, Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Amani Ismail agrees with the statement saying that a significant portion of Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic. Dr. Ismail attributed the low voter turnout in the November 2010 parliamentary elections to political apathy in Egypt. According to Dr. Ismail, the voter turnout was about quarter of the total aggregate of the eligible population. She also argued that political apathy is also manifested in the fact that there aren’t demonstrations and protests against issues that people complain about all the time.

Although professor Ismail perceives Egyptians as politically apathetic, she noted that one can’t accuse Egyptian citizens of political apathy without taking into consideration the root causes behind their apathy. Citing Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which places the most essential needs for survival such as food, shelter, and

water at the very base of the needs pyramid, Professor Ismail argues that one can't expect Egyptians to be politically active when a big portion of the population is deprived of such basic needs. "More than third of the population are under the poverty line. You can't really expect them to be politically active," said Dr. Ismail, explaining one of the reasons behind political apathy.

Professor Ismail added that about half of the Egyptian population can't read or write and by excluding this 50 percent in addition to the population under 18 who can't vote, a small portion of the population is left which includes the vocal intellectual elite. Dr. Ismail said the intellectual elite are very vocal but in terms of mobilizing for political activism and for political reform in society, it's more about the quantity and not the quality. Numbers do matter, she asserted citing the example of US women who were able to achieve suffrage by 1920 because many open-minded men believed in their cause and supported them.

Dr. Laila Abdul Meguid, journalism and mass communication professor and former dean at Cairo University, also agrees with Dr. Ismail that the majority of Egyptians have been politically apathetic for many years. She attributes this apathy to the historical, social and economic structure of Egypt. Professor Abdul Meguid explains that in Egyptian culture, there is usually no space for people to express their opinions. The Egyptian society is built on a tribal system. She added that under this system, any institution whether educational, media or even family is hierarchical in nature. Furthermore, democracy is not even instilled in the educational system. Therefore, the ideas of establishing dialogue, accepting opposition, and the differences in opinion are not well established in Egyptian culture. She also noted that Egyptian society is a centralized one. Decisions come from top to bottom. Therefore,

citizens don't feel that they are real partners so they don't take the initiative to change their communities.

The concept of democracy must be nurtured for the coming generations, beginning with the family and the educational system. In many instances, one can find an amount of censorship and direct supervision from the parental authority or the educators who impose their supervision on their children or students rather than encourage discussion or dialogue. This is one of the reasons why most Egyptian citizens are politically apathetic, asserted Dr. Abdel Meguid. When students voice their opinions at the university, their voices should be heard and others should respect their opinions. In Egyptian culture, the voices of young people are often ignored just because they are young and their opinions are not perceived as important. Therefore, when citizens reach the eligible age of voting at 18, they do not transform into active citizens just because they reached the legal age. They were raised up in a passive culture that doesn't encourage them to be active or even make decisions on their own including crucial life changing decisions such as which university to join or which partner to marry, said Dr. Abdel Meguid.

AUC Political Science Professor Manar El-Shorbagy, who also agrees that Egyptians are politically apathetic, noted that people have learned throughout the last 50 years that engagement in politics is risky. Egyptians fear being subjected to trouble so they avoid participating in politics but they are not "genetically apathetic". Dr. El-Shorbagy agrees with Dr. Ismail that Egyptians learned that their votes don't count, which was recently exemplified by the most fraudulent parliamentary elections of November 2010. Although it's a "smart position" for people to choose not to waste their time when they already know in advance that their votes won't count, the problem is total withdrawal. Dr. Hassan Hamed, journalism and mass communication

professor, also believes that Egyptians suffer from political apathy. They are very negative and their participation is very limited, consequently, most of the population is not engaged, Professor Hamed explained.

AUC Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Mervat Abou Ouf, agrees that apathy is becoming a norm in Egypt. People are taking a passive approach because they perceive it as an equivalent to being safe and secure. Egypt is not a democratic nation and people fear retaliation if they take action. People have to have some sort of an incentive or sense of belonging to become active. Professor Abou Ouf said the young generation who has the educational means are the country's hope and all what they need to do to is get engaged. All the engaging social networking on the Internet is a platform for these young people to express their ideas and beliefs freely. This is a sign that youth care. But they need a push to get more involved. They need to trust that they can make a difference, asserted Professor Abou Ouf.

Sociology Professor Madiha Safty, who conducted a research in 2005 for UNDP on social capital which involves public and political community participation, found that Egyptians were very apathetic. She noted that, they are "indifferent to the point of apathy." Dr. Safty explained that Egyptians are not willing to participate because they don't affiliate with their communities for several reasons. Like Abdel Meguid, Dr.Safty attributed this passiveness to the absence of political education in the Egypt.

Cairo University Journalism and Mass Communication Professor Sami El-Sherif, believes that not all Egyptians are apathetic. He emphasized that the intellectuals and elites are the most involved politically and socially. As for the rest the population who struggle with finding a living, they are less active. According to Dr. El-Sherif, civic engagement is still a newly born idea in Egypt.

5.17.2 Experts perception of the role of media in general and Egyptian nightly television talk shows in particular in fostering civic engagement in Egypt

RQ2: How do experts perceive the role of Egyptian nightly television talk shows in fostering civic engagement in Egypt?

As for the role of media, most experts believed that the media's role starts with creating awareness and that change will have to come from the well-informed citizens.

Regarding the role of media in fostering civic engagement in Egypt, Dr. Ibrahim agrees that the media play a vital role because unless citizens are well informed, they can't act responsibly. According to Ibrahim, 10 years ago all of the Egyptian media was controlled by the state, and there were only two or three television channels. Now, there is an "explosive growth of satellite channels and independent newspapers in Egypt." Regardless of the fact that the independent media is occasionally attacked and their editors fined or jailed, Ibrahim thinks it is almost impossible to go backward. The media give people a voice, encouraging them to express their opinions publicly about social and political issues in Egypt. She cited the examples of television talk shows and call-in radio programs, adding that the Internet is partly contributing to that as well. Ibrahim attributes the increase in political activism over the past 20 years to the corresponding increase in sources of information. "The multiplicity of sources of information inspire more activism," she said.

In getting audience's to voice their opinions and to voice their agendas, the media itself can act as a form of civic engagement, explained Dr. El Shimi. By providing a space for citizens' voices and raising awareness, discussions, and debates the media becomes a mean of civic engagement. The media has a lot of potential

because it can help people be more critical viewers and provide space for people to talk about their problems. “The media can act as a teacher and at the same time a bridge or a facilitator of civic engagement,” Professor El Shimi explained.

According to Dr. Hamdy, Egyptian media has changed dramatically over the past few years. “The media is much more vibrant and they handle all kinds of issues and that allows for changing the way people think. It makes people want to be part of their society and be civically engaged.” Whether talk shows promote civic engagement depends on the nature of the show and the selection of topics, explained Dr. Hamdy. But many of them play a role in promoting civic engagement. They create awareness among audiences who learn about new issues through these talk shows. The effect of talk shows on awareness is seen across different strata in Egyptian society but most impressively the unprivileged population. Professor Hamdy noted that before the introduction of talk shows, it was seldom to witness uneducated citizens at public transportation means engaging in debates about politics in reference to what they saw the night before on a television talk show.

Although Dr. Hamdy emphasized that it is difficult to measure the direct impact of talk shows and other media, she believes that talk shows “have helped people think about engaging in community issues and community awareness.” Citing the Agrium petrochemical case as an example, Dr. Hamdy said ordinary citizens protested against the establishment of the factory because they learned about environmental hazards through media. According to Professor Hamdy, a lot of the influence in the Agrium case came from television as well.

Sociopolitical discussions on talk shows help make people more aware of what is going especially when politics is of interest to the Egyptian audience. Talk shows discuss issues that are of interest to the audience. Professor Mirazi described how

ironic it is to find people tuned to television talk shows discussing politics late at night instead of watching something entertaining such as a movie or drama. “It gives you a statement about how people are really glued to political issues and that they are not apathetic... These talk shows keep them more interested and sometimes guide the discussions,” Professor Mirazi said.

Dr. El Sherif described the media’s role as essential in creating a democratic environment that fosters effective community and political participation. To fulfill this role, it’s crucial to have a free media which is an integral part in any political reform experience. By informing people of their social and political rights and responsibilities and by giving them space to express their opinions freely, the media encourage people to be civically engaged. However, Professor El Sherif emphasized that it’s difficult to evaluate the role of media in Egypt because the free and independent media is newly born and the state-owned media strongly portrays the views of the government.

Professor El Sherif explained that television talk shows encourage people to express their opinions by criticizing certain negative aspects in their community including high profile individuals such as ministers in the government, which never existed in the Egyptian media before. When people get exposed to such shows and see others expressing a diversity of opinions, they get affected and it creates some sort of a movement in society. On the other hand, Dr. El Sherif asserted that media alone cannot push people to go and vote. Media can only call on people to participate because there are other factors involved, such as how citizens value the importance of their voices.

As for encouraging political participation, Dr. El Sherif noted that despite the fact that the media covered the parliamentary elections extensively, official

participation was 14 million. However, he considered this 35 % participation “reasonable”. Professor El Sherif who was also a member of the committee assigned by former information minister Anas El Fiki to monitor the performance of the Egyptian media during the Nov.2010 parliamentary Elections, argued that the best aspect about the elections was the media coverage. According to Dr. El Sherif, state television provided opposition parties with the opportunity to express their points of view and gave every candidate five minutes to present their views.

Professor El Sherif asserted that television talk shows on state-owned channels encouraged participation in the elections through covering candidates from all walk of politics. The media’s role in covering the elections was rated by El Sherif as 80 percent successful. He further elaborated that programs did abide by the committee’s rules. Chief among these rules is separating editorial content from the elections’ advertising content. For example, if a minister is running in the elections, there should be a clear separation between covering his day-to-day activities as a minister and covering his race in the elections.

On the other hand, Professor Abou Ouf disagrees with El Sherif emphasizing that “media have loads of defects in fulfilling” their role because they are heavily affected by agendas from different parties including the government and businessmen. This affects media content as each party tries to serve its interests. Professor Abou Ouf noted that Egypt is “far lagging” compared to the rest of the world when it comes to the role of media in promoting active citizenship. Media is also restricted by the government when it comes to fulfilling its functions freely. Freedom of expression is not absolute. For example, the talk show which enjoyed almost absolute freedom was *Al Qahera Al Youm* and it was shut down for political reasons ahead of the Nov.2010 parliamentary elections.

In order for the media to play an effective role in civic engagement, the media should be free, said Dr. Safty supporting Professor Abu Ouf's point of view. If people can say what they feel and express themselves freely on the media, they can pave the road to democracy. Dr. Safty explained that the last few years before the revolution witnessed more rallies, strikes, and protests because the media enjoyed more freedom. People had more space to express their frustration on the media which stirred up ideas and opposition which didn't exist in the past.

Dr. Shorbagy noted that it's difficult to analyze the role of the media without putting the whole political context into consideration. If there is relative openness in the media but political parties remain restrained and demonstrations remain risky, the media openness becomes just a way for people to express their frustration. She argued that people talk about issues, listen and feel angry but at the end of the day they switch off their "TV and they go to sleep." On the other hand, the government realized that this openness in the media is making people angry at the government and dissatisfied so they started to limit that freedom again by closing down several satellite channels and talk shows before the November 2010 elections.

Dr. Hassan Hamed believes the media has a limited role. Civil society groups must unite their efforts in order to do something beneficial for the welfare of society. If all elements of society are not involved, media will not be able to fulfill a civically engaging role in society on its own. Thus, all the roles need to be integrated together, explained Dr. Hamed. Television talk shows and the media create political awareness and motivate citizens to participate but this is not enough, Dr. Hamed asserted.

5.17.3 Experts perception of the future strategies that should be adopted by talk shows to foster civic engagement in Egypt

RQ3: How do experts perceive the strategies that Egyptian nightly television talk shows should implement to foster civic engagement in Egypt?

Experts provided a multiplicity of ideas that would serve as recommendations for media outlets in general and talk shows in particular to play a more effective and responsible role in society. Many experts called for the need to establish credibility, professionalism, and balance in the media coverage.

Ibrahim noted that for Egypt to change, new mechanisms, institutions, and networks that allow youth voices to be heard must be established. New ideas need to circulate in society which always originate from young people, explained Dr. Ibrahim adding that more outlets are needed to provide young people with a platform to share their opinions. Ibrahim noted that democracy can only work if citizens are engaged and if they invest in taking the time to inform themselves through a variety of sources as well as expose themselves to different perspectives. She asserted that media play a pivotal role in informing the Egyptian public, yet they still need to be more professional and more disciplined in the way they cover the news. Lack of professionalism is seen in how factual reporting gets mixed with opinions by the Egyptian media. As for talk shows to play a more constructive role in promoting civic engagement, Ibrahim suggested hosting government officials, parliamentarians and governors and asking a panel of citizens to interview them on the talk show.

Dr. El Shimi said that although talk shows like *Masr Ennaharda* have diverse themes or topics to cover, there is still no diversity among the guests they interview. She also said that interviewers or talk show hosts should only be facilitators who guide the audience to critically observe and form opinions rather than enforce their

opinions on their audiences. This is crucial because anything interviewers communicate can be taken by the average viewer as the right opinion to adopt. The interviewer's input should be minimized to facilitating or moderating the discussion. In addition, the media's role in fostering civic engagement should be accomplished by giving the people media space to voice their opinions. Ordinary citizens can appear on talk shows, talk to people like themselves, and discuss problems together to come up with solutions for their community problems, Professor El Shimi suggested.

Professor El Sherif noted that some talk shows focus only on the negative side ignoring what's positive which gradually affects their credibility because they only show their audiences one side of the story. If they continue to paint a gloomy image of Egypt, they will lose future viewership. Focusing on the problems without suggesting any solutions drives people away. Successful television talk shows engage people without depressing them, he said. People need to see both the dark side and bright side. Talk shows also need to maintain balance by showing the argument and the counter argument without being biased towards the government or a specific political party. They must also present issues that cater to the needs of ordinary citizens and not issues that serve the interests of the channel or the ruling party. Dr. El Sherif emphasized that there is no ready recipe for any talk show to succeed in encouraging Egyptians to participate. But he asserted that successful talk shows are the ones that engage citizens by allowing them to personally participate on these shows.

Dr. Safty said there is no particular strategy to follow explaining that all what the media need is more freedom to be able to create public awareness and development. It is important to encourage civic involvement at the very early stages through education and the media can also play a role of an educator. The media

should encourage people to be active, express themselves freely, and cultivate their sense of belongingness, Dr. Safty said.

According to Dr. Hamdy, it is not a “mandate” for the talk show itself to establish a strategy to foster civic engagement unless people decide to take action. Talk shows can perform their role by giving people space to express their opinions. Also, civil society organizations should influence media to take issues of civic engagement seriously. Talk shows exercise social responsibility through performing their journalistic function and they should focus on establishing more credibility and professionalism. Many shows will die out, but those who have established credibility will survive. There is an abundance of talk shows on Egyptian satellite channels and the only ones who are going to survive are the credible shows. As professor Hamdy puts it “all the taboos have been broken, now is the time for credibility.”

Dr. Ismail said talk shows should shed more light on offering concrete solutions to problems. The media need to educate people about good practices to fill the gap between what’s taught and what is practiced. Dr. Abdel Meguid agrees, criticizing talk shows for magnifying issues and focusing on problems all the time without offering solutions. The media make people hate and refuse everything without offering an alternative, she said. By shedding light on the negative aspects of society, they tend to portray a gloomy picture of reality. Eventually, people suffer from depression because they see everything as negative. Talk shows need to give people more hope by showing more positive images of society. Media tend to frighten people to a great extent until they become apathetic. To overcome this problem, talk shows should introduce both positive and negative aspects but in a balanced way to provide people with hope to change, Dr. Abdel Meguid said.

In order for talk shows to be professional and balanced, Dr. Abu Ouf agrees with Dr. Abdel Meguid that they need to convey negative and positive aspects of society. Talk shows have to realize how popular they are and the “powerful effect” they have on people. They create an “output for viewers to convey what [they] believe in at the spur of the moment and [they] get [their] responses immediately.” This makes the responsibility for talk shows “humongous”. They must cover issues in an ethical and balanced approach which gives hope. They also have to find a way to promote nationalism as well as activism. “The mistrust is overwhelming Egyptians. That is the core of our problems. We need to establish a sense of trust and belongingness among people in Egypt,” Abu Ouf said.

Professor Abu Ouf noted that although talk shows create sociopolitical awareness, sometimes they end up sensationalizing news. She gave the example of talk show host Amr Adeeb and how he tackles controversial issues in a sarcastic and in some cases gossipy way. She noted that this makes viewers not take important issues very seriously. Although the standard varies among talk shows as some are presentable to an extent, but they tend to move in a direction of sensationalism in their coverage. Professor Abu Ouf asserted that making profits should not be at the expense of the quality of the message and ethics because talk shows at the end of the day would rather have scoops of news to attract the audience.

Professor Mirazi criticized talk shows for trying to attract the sympathy of viewers by calling for charity. He said they need to separate the editorial content from charity. If talk shows wish to collect money for special cases, then they can organize an event and raise funds for that purpose. There should be a clear separation from the professional work of these talk shows and charity. Mirazi referred to the now defunct *Masr Ennaharda* where the former host Mahmoud Saad calls on businessmen to

donate money to special cases. He also airs special requests or petitions written by viewers. Mirazi said this gives an indication that it is a service provided by the show. “People are really abusing it and it is a way to attract an audience,” he said. Professor Mirazi argued that such individual cases of charity should be carried out at the mosque or church level. They take a big portion of airtime when audiences are expecting to hear news from the show. However, Professor Mirazi argued that if it’s a national cause like the rain floods crisis, then it would be valid to give it enough exposure. However, giving individual cases national attention is not professional. It wears donors out, said Mirazi adding that it would be better to create an annual telethon instead of soliciting for individual cases most of the time.

According to professor Mirazi, part of the intention behind these calls for charity is finding a good story and appealing to the audience through using the cases of these poor people. However, this embarrasses the people who are not aware of their right to remain anonymous, he said. There should be clear guidelines regarding this matter. The intention maybe good but talk shows need to develop ethical rules that would protect individuals who resorted to the show for help as well as maintain a level of professionalism, he emphasized.

Mirazi noted that talk shows succeeded in giving the Egyptian audience a national media outlet compared to pan Arab outlets. National talk shows allowed people to focus on Egyptian issues instead of the pan Arab ones, which allowed people to be more engaged because they can actually do something about issues in proximity. This was evident in the case of the rain floods in Aswan and Sinai. “At least you are not telling them about Iraq or Palestine because they cannot do anything about it,” said Mirazi.

However, Mirazi added that talk shows and other media outlets need to move further from the national level to a more local level by establishing talk shows that cater to different Egyptian communities at the village level and not just at the national level. Getting local involves real liberalization of the Egyptian media which hasn't been achieved until now.

Making it possible to issue a license for FM and AM stations on a local level provides citizens with their rights to air waves. According to Mirazi, if local media outlets are established, the level of engagement would be very high. This is because it will no longer be about an anchor in Cairo talking about problems in a remote village. Instead, it will be an anchor within the village discussing its community problems. Abu Ouf agreed with Mirazi and noted that more specialized talk shows in terms of content also need to be developed.

Dr. Abdel Meguid believes the media has an essential role but "it is not a magical stick". The media has a role just like any other educational and social institution. Professor Abdel Meguid emphasized that the more the media engage as a real partner in the decision making process, the more influence it will have on society. Without media, people will not be able to convey their plans or programs or urge people to participate. Thus, media should take part in the early stages by creating debates and not just covering the end result.

Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion

6.1 Talk shows information function and civic engagement

As the number and popularity of Egyptian nightly television talk shows increase, as well as people's dependency on them for news on Egyptian affairs, it was important to examine how viewers perceive these shows and their possible impact on their attitudes. Talk shows substituted traditional news by providing social, political and public affairs information in a simplified entertaining way that is easy to grasp by the ordinary citizen, forming an information-entertainment mix often referred to by communication scholars as infotainment. This also bridged the gap between the mainstream media and the Egyptian audience by establishing virtual channels of communication between the public and policy makers who appear on talk shows responding to citizens' queries, often about controversial economic, political or social issues.

Since many scholars associate the information and awareness function of the mass media with civic engagement, it was essential to study the impact of such a developing and important genre in Egypt on civic engagement attitudes among viewers. Civic engagement is fundamental for any democracy and especially for countries in transition such as Egypt. In both developed and emerging democracies, there is always a dire need to foster civic engagement which represents sociopolitical awareness, discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political participation. In a democracy, citizens rule. In order to achieve this status, citizens should engage in politics and their communities effectively and responsibly. However, to reach this level of engagement, citizens must get well-informed first. Information comes from many sources with the mass media in the lead.

6.2 Agenda-setting impact of Egyptian nightly television talk shows

To study whether television talk shows play such an important role in informing the public and influencing civic engagement attitudes, the current research examined three research questions and four research hypotheses that test the relationship between exposure to television talks, agenda-setting and attitudes towards civic engagement. Since seeking sociopolitical awareness is the first level of being civically engaged, this research applied agenda-setting theory to determine whether Egyptian nightly television talk shows set the news agenda among their viewers. By setting the news priorities, talk shows satisfy the first-level of agenda setting which translates into the first level of civic engagement, which represents awareness. The second-level of agenda setting or framing shapes the audience's opinions. If the agenda-setting effect is achieved at the first and second levels, then it will most likely extend to shaping attitudes and possibly influence behavior. This research studied the first three levels beginning with awareness, opinions, and ending with attitudes towards civic engagement. At the core of these civic engagement attitudes lies the intention to take action.

Beginning with the viewership of talk shows, the results of the study found that 286 respondents representing an 80.3% majority of the total 356 sample surveyed watch Egyptian nightly television talk shows. A number of 70 respondents representing 19.7 % of the sample surveyed don't watch television talk shows (Table 5.6). As for the popularity of the three television talk shows *Masr Ennaharda*, *Al Ashera Masa'an*, and *90 Deqeeqa*, an analysis of variance testing if there was any significant difference between the mean times of viewership per week was not significant (Table 5.7a). Since popularity of the three programs is defined as the

viewing times per week which were not significantly different, the three talk shows are more or less on the same popularity level.

The content analysis conducted also showed that there was no significant difference between the quantities of news coverage provided by the three talk shows. As shown in (Table 5.10a), the total number of stories covered by the three talk shows is 676 stories. *Masr Ennaharda* produced a slightly larger number with 258 stories (38.2%), followed by *90 Deqeeqa* (31.2%) which was very close to *Al Ashera Masa'an* representing 30.6% of the total stories. However, there is no significant difference in the amount of coverage between the three talk shows.

Moving on to the information function of talk shows, the results of the study confirm that Egyptian viewers do depend on talk shows as a primary source of news. Almost all respondents (99 %) depend on Egyptian nightly television talk shows for news, significantly higher than any other source of news with the exception of the Internet which ranked second with 90.2 % news dependency as shown in (Table 5.8). Although more respondents depend on television talk shows for news as compared to the Internet, the mean average rating for the Internet was slightly higher (2.52), compared to television talk shows (2.46). This is explained by the larger number of respondents who always depend on the Internet (62.2%) compared to (46.9%) who always depend on television talk shows. Since 'always' carries more weight representing a value of 3 on the three point exposure scale, the mean for the Internet was slightly higher with 0.06 than television talk shows. However, a larger number of respondents 'never' depend on the Internet for news representing 9.8% compared to only 1% who 'never' depend on talk shows for news. The differences in the 'never' value which equals (1) re-established the balance between the mean scores for the Internet and television talk shows.

The exposure results support the widespread opinion that talk shows have become an important source of news for the Egyptian audience. The quantitative survey results also support the qualitative interview results as most experts perceived talk shows as a source of news, emphasizing the role of talk shows in creating sociopolitical awareness and thereby fostering the first level of civic engagement. This finding is in agreement with Mahmoud's (2007) study about Egyptian youth's dependency on television talk shows for news and information.

In order to determine whether an agenda-setting effect is a likely outcome of this exposure, results of the primary content analysis and primary survey conducted in this research were compared. The 676 stories coded from the three talk shows were compared with the 1,100 news issues listed by the 286 respondents who watch the three television talk shows. After examining whether the public's agenda of news priorities corresponds with the talk shows' agenda, the results in (Table 5.9a), show corresponding agendas with the Egyptian 2010 parliamentary elections leading both agendas. Out of the 70 news categories coded, 51 matched representing 72.85% similarity. The parliamentary elections represented 20.8% of the total topics listed by respondents and received the highest quantity (9.3 %) with regards to the talk show overall coverage. Moreover, among the top 20 news issues on the public and media agendas, 12 news issues were common which include rising food prices, minimum wages, school violence, courts, *Dostour* crisis, suspension of media programs and channels, university security, other political topics, traffic problems, media regulations, and football matches.

A brief description of the top five news issues on the public versus the media agendas in (Table 5.9a), shows that the rising food prices ranked second (6.3%) on the viewers' news agenda, followed by presidential elections (5.1%). It is worth noting

that the issue of the presidential elections ranked as the third most important issue for the public but was never covered by talk shows. The fourth issue is the minimum wages representing 5% of the respondents' news agenda and the fifth news issue is school violence, representing 4.9 % of the total issues. On the other hand, the remaining top five news issues on the talk shows agenda, as shown in (Table 5.9a), include the *Dostour* newspaper crisis (3.7%) which followed the parliamentary elections, health care and awareness (3.6%), profiles (3.4%) and other simultaneous topics in politics which ranked fifth (3.3%).

After examining whether the viewers' agenda was set by nightly television talk shows as opposed to other sources of news, the results showed that respondents listed talk shows as their source of news for the majority of issues. The results support an agenda-setting impact as talk shows were cited by respondents 465 times, representing a significant 42.3 % of the total news sources listed as shown in (Table 5.9c).

Furthermore, the agenda-setting impact did come from the three nightly television talk shows under study, as the names of talk shows listed by respondents were coded separately and the results in (Table 5.9d) were as follows: *Al Ashera Masa'an* topped respondents news sources (28.7 %), followed by *90 Deqeeqa* (20 %), and the third talk show on the list of news sources is *Masr Ennaharda* (12.5 %). The results support H1: Public perception of news priorities is most likely influenced by Egyptian nightly television talk shows' news agenda. Therefore, H1 is accepted and this study found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting impact on viewers. This finding is in agreement with previous research studies such as Youssef's (2008) study which also found that Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting impact on viewers.

After supporting an agenda-setting impact on the first-level which corresponds with the exposure results supporting further that viewers depend on talk shows for news, it is necessary to move on to the second-level of agenda setting to determine whether talk show have an impact on viewers' perceptions of the Egyptian 2010 parliamentary elections. After analyzing 11 election frames in the content analysis study and comparing them with corresponding frames rated by respondents in the survey, the result was a high match between the talk shows' frames and the viewers' frames. Eight frames out of 11 frames examined matched, representing a 73% similarity which is considerably high as shown in (Table 5.11c). The results indicate a relatively strong relationship between the media and public second-level agendas, thereby supporting H2: Egyptian nightly television talk shows' portrayal of Egypt's parliamentary elections is likely to influence viewers' perception of the parliamentary elections.

It's worth noting that the three frames which didn't match between the viewers and the talk shows were election fairness, judicial supervision, and the Wafd opposition party. Such a disagreement in frames could be attributed to the fact that talk shows provided equal mention to the opposite statements "the elections will be fairly conducted" versus "the elections will be unfairly conducted". This discrepancy which could be regarded as neutral or balanced coverage supports what experts noted in the qualitative results with reference to the government's pressure on talk shows before the elections. With many media outlets shutdown by the government ahead of the elections, it seemed that self-censorship was a safe way to keep the shows and their hosts on air.

Self-censorship was evident in the Oct.10 episode of *Al Ashera Masa'an* which featured two women candidates who discussed their representation in

parliament. Although one was an NDP candidate and the other an opposition candidate, the discussion was far from being free. When opposition member Gamila Ismail described how the former ruling party forged previous elections and how it failed in running the country, the presenter Mona El Shazly interrupted Ismail several times trying to explain to her that she's not asking her to evaluate NDP's performance. El-Shazly stressed more than once that she's only asking about women representation in parliament. The same show received a warning on Nov.11 for allowing two guests to make negative remarks about how the NDP is running the election. Ironically enough, the guests were state-owned newspaper editors Nasr El Qaffas and Mahmoud Nafadi.

The second frame which didn't match is the importance of judicial supervision to prevent election fraud. The same reasons could be attributed to this frame as well because talk shows also gave that frame equal coverage which could be explained as an attempt to be balanced or to avoid a possible government crackdown. The third frame was about the Wafd party's representation in parliament which is not a controversial frame and is therefore insignificant to the analysis. Despite these three mismatching frames, the survey results confirmed the content analysis results as shown in (Table 5.11c), supporting a second-level agenda setting impact on the viewers' perception of the 2010 parliamentary elections. It's worth noting that the survey was collected before the elections to make certain that the viewers' perceptions were not affected by the actual election results.

6.3 Perception of talk shows, exposure, and civic engagement

With regards to how viewers perceive talk show's role in civic engagement, participants highly agreed (62.5%) with the seven statements rating talk shows' role. The five-point likert statements rate talk shows' role starting from the first level of civic engagement which is creating awareness and ending with encouraging voting. The results in (Table 5.12a), show that perception of talk shows as a source of news received the highest percentage of agreement (92.3%). This finding further explains why talk shows have an agenda-setting impact. Likewise, respondents also perceived talk shows as creating sociopolitical awareness (73.1%). This finding is in further agreement with the qualitative results regarding experts' perception of talk shows, which also supports why talk shows have a strong agenda-setting impact on their viewers. The perception of talk shows as encouraging voting received the least degree of agreement (39.9%), which had a mean average rating of 3.22 indicating that the majority falls between agree and neutral. Overall, respondents perceive talk shows as civically engaging as the total percentage of agreement with the statements represents (62.5%).

To determine which civic engagement attitudes had a positive correlation with viewers' perception of talk shows role, 14 statements on a five-point likert scale were rated by respondents according to their degree of agreement with the different aspects of civic engagement, also covered in the perception statements. The results in (Table 5.12b) indicate that the highest percentage of agreement went to sociopolitical awareness (88.8%), followed by community participation (66.1%), and discussing sociopolitical affairs (61.5). The total agreement percentage on civic engagement attitudes is (55.1 %). The results show a positive correlation between the perception statements and their corresponding civic engagement attitudes as shown in (Table

5.12c) which illustrates a significant to highly significant correlation results. These results support H3: The more the public perceives talk shows as promoting civic engagement, the more positive attitudes the public will have towards civic engagement.

Accepting H3 which supports a positive correlation between perception of talk shows and civic engagement attitudes is in itself an indicator of the extension of the agenda-setting impact beyond the first and second levels to shaping perceptions and influencing attitudes. Therefore, to examine whether the news exposure to talk shows is related to civic engagement attitudes, each attitude was cross-tabulated with exposure (Appendix K). The findings in (Table 5.13a) confirm that exposure to talk shows has the highest relationship (87.7 %) with attitudes towards sociopolitical awareness. This further confirms the agenda-setting link to civic engagement attitudes. The second highest relationship with exposure also measures sociopolitical awareness (77.8%). The least relationships with exposure were opinion expression through media (29.7%) and opinion expression to public officials (23.8 %). Most relations in (Table 5.13a) are high with 9 out of the 14 attitudes having over 50% agreement. Therefore, the results support H4: There is a positive relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement attitudes. Thus, H4 is accepted.

Due to the fact that the sample surveyed is the well-educated elite, statistical tests were conducted to examine if there was any significant difference between the different levels of education listed in (Table 5.1) and respondents' perception of the role of talk shows, civic engagement attitudes and talk show exposure. The results in section 5.14 show no significant difference between education and the other variables.

In order to rate the overall level of civic engagement, attitudes were organized into the categories which operationally define civic engagement (sociopolitical awareness, sociopolitical discussions, opinion expression, community involvement, and political participation). The results show that sociopolitical awareness which represents the basic level of engagement was leading with (82.6%). It's interesting to find that community involvement represented the second highest category of engagement with (82.05%), followed by sociopolitical affairs discussions (61.2%), representing the third highest category. The categories which fell below (50%) were political participation (47.9%) and opinion expression, representing the lowest (26.7%).

These findings emphasize further that there's a strong relation between exposure to Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement. However, the strongest relations are with the first three categories: sociopolitical awareness, community involvement and sociopolitical discussions. The strongest positive attitude towards civic engagement is sociopolitical awareness as shown in (Table 5.13b). This finding is in agreement with the qualitative interview results as most experts noted that Egyptians seek sociopolitical awareness emphasizing how much the public is interested in politics regardless of any tangible political participation. The finding regarding community involvement illustrates that despite the common misperception about Egyptians being involved in their communities, they had strong positive attitudes towards involvement with (71%) agreeing to the statement "contributing to community is my responsibility". Also, more than half the sample agreed with the statements "I make a difference in my community", "I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt" and "citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems". This finding is in line with some of the experts

perceptions about community involvement in Egypt. Almost half the experts noted how Egyptians collaborate at the community level by forming informal fundraising networks for the poor, volunteering with NGOs or other forms of community activities. This finding illustrates that the well-educated elite sample surveyed in this research has very positive attitudes towards community engagement.

As for political participation, the findings are in agreement with the experts' perception that Egyptians are not active politically. This is mostly because the environment in pre-revolution Egypt discouraged such participation. As many experts noted, Egyptians had a general feeling that their voices are not going to count, so they were not likely to invest their energies in political activities such as voting especially when they can tell the results beforehand. This is evident in the (36.4%) agreement with the statement "I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections" (36.4%), which represents the lowest percentage of agreement among the five statements measuring political participation. Despite that, (55.6%) still agreed that it's their responsibility to vote in the presidential elections and (50.7%) considered voting a priority.

The very low agreement level with public opinion expression through the mass media or through petitions or letters to government officials (26.7%) could also be explained by the atmosphere of mistrust that the experts referred to in the qualitative interview results. As many Egyptians felt voiceless or didn't care to voice their concerns before the revolution believing that their opinion won't be taken seriously and won't change anything. Despite that, the overall rating of the categories mentioned above on the civic engagement scale produced a value almost at midpoint (2.96/5) illustrating that the elite sample surveyed are civically engaged mostly when it comes to awareness, community involvement, and discussing sociopolitical affairs.

Due to the fact that sociopolitical awareness ranked the highest in terms of agreement among viewers, it's crucial that Egyptian nightly television talk shows adopt more professional and ethical standards in their coverage of Egyptian affairs. Most experts noted that talk show hosts and reporters are often opinionated when they should be reporting facts and moderating discussions. They must also refrain from dramatizing the news. Experts interviewed in this research also emphasized the need to diversify sources appearing on talk shows. This is because talk shows often interview the same sources over and over again which creates redundancy. In addition, providing excessive exposure creates a misperceived status for such sources in the eyes of viewers. Abiding by an ethical standard of coverage is extremely important for a genre perceived by 92.3% of the sample as a primary source of news.

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations

7.1 Conclusion

The findings of this study are in agreement with the findings of previous studies conducted on the agenda-setting effect of the media. The findings support that Egyptian nightly television talk shows have an agenda-setting impact on elite viewers both on the first-level, which sets the news priorities, and on the second-level, which sets the framing of issues. The findings also support that the agenda-setting at the second-level shaped how viewers perceived the Egyptian parliamentary elections examined in this research.

The primary finding of this research is that the agenda-setting function of television talk shows has an impact on attitudes towards civic engagement. The findings support that the more viewers are exposed to talk shows, the more they perceive issues covered by talk shows as important (first-level agenda-setting). Furthermore, viewers' perceptions of particular issues were most likely shaped by talk shows' frames of coverage (second-level agenda-setting). The first outcome of the agenda-setting impact on both levels is sociopolitical awareness, which represents the first and most basic level of civic engagement. One of the primary findings of this research is the positive correlation between the perception of talk shows as civically engaging and attitudes towards civic engagement. Another significant finding is the positive relationship between exposure to Egyptian nightly television shows and civic engagement attitudes.

The findings of this study also show that the Egyptian elite scored a 2.96 on the civic engagement rating scale. This illustrates that they are engaged when it comes to sociopolitical awareness, community involvement and sociopolitical discussions. Although more is needed from talk shows to foster higher levels of civic engagement

as Egypt transcends this transitional period and transforms into a democracy, it's important to note that political participation was discouraged in pre-revolution Egypt. Talk shows themselves didn't really promote voting per se but worked more on fostering awareness and community level engagement. The significance of the agenda-setting impact of television talk shows calls for an urgent need to establish a high level of professionalism with regards to talk shows' news coverage and discussions.

Since they are perceived as a source of news and were found to have an agenda-setting impact as well as an impact on perceptions and civic engagement attitudes, Egyptian nightly television talk shows have a greater responsibility towards their viewers. They must maintain balance and accuracy in their coverage. They must moderate discussions and not impose opinions. The fact that Egypt is hopefully on the right way to democracy entails that these talk shows also need to establish the fundamentals of democracy within their coverage. They need to give ordinary citizens airtime and not just officials or experts. Provide minorities with a voice and not just the vocal mainstream Egyptian majority. Maintain balance and give interviewees full freedom to express their opinions even if they are not in line with the channel's ideology. Question officials and hold them accountable. Allow citizens to question them as well. Egyptian nightly television talk shows must implement a greater degree of social responsibility as they are held accountable to millions of viewers who resort to this genre for news and information. Therefore, they must perform their information function professionally and responsibly to help establish well-informed and engaged citizenry in Egypt.

7.2 Recommendations for talk shows

Experts provided recommendations for talk shows to play a more effective and responsible role with regards to news coverage and civic engagement. Following is a summary of their recommendations:

- Establish credibility, professionalism, and balance in coverage.
- Separate factual reporting from opinions.
- Provide more voices to youth to circulate fresh and new ideas in society.
- Establish more diversity in guests.
- Hosts should facilitate discussion and not enforce their opinions.
- Give ordinary citizens more representation and interaction with the show.
- Provide both sides of the picture. The positive as well as the negative side to avoid painting a gloomy image of society and driving audiences away.
- Offer concrete solutions to problems.
- Separate editorial content from charity soliciting by organizing fundraising events for that purpose instead of using airtime for it.
- Establish local talk shows that cater to different Egyptian communities at the village level and not just on the national level to focus on smaller communities and foster civic engagement.

7.3 Recommendations for future research

- The current study was conducted before the Egyptian revolution, a similar study examining exposure to nightly television talk shows and civic engagement after the revolution is necessary to examine how far political participation attitudes have changed after the revolution.
- Apply the uses and gratifications theory in future research.
- Conduct focus groups with television talk show viewers to provide a more in depth analysis of their perceptions and attitudes.
- Conduct research on different television talk shows which have become popular after the revolution such as *Baladna Belmasry* and *Akher Kalam*
- Conduct research on the popularity and credibility of talk shows during and after the revolution.

8. Limitations of the study

- The study surveyed a non-random purposive sample. Therefore, the results can't be generalized.
- Lack of studies conducted on media and civic engagement in Egypt.
- Lack of published scholarly research on Egyptian television talk shows.
- Lack of freedom of expression before the revolution. Several respondents were worried about answering the questions about their perception of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Many online surveys were disregarded for that specific reason because many participants skipped that section all together.
- *Al Qahera Al Youm*, one of the very popular talk shows before the revolution, intended for this study, was suspended after a few episodes were recorded. Therefore, it was excluded from the sample.

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- Personal Interview. Dr. Sami El-Sherif, Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at Cairo University current head of the ERTU, Egypt, December 6, 2010.
- Personal Interview. Dr. Hassan Hamed, Former Chairman of Egyptian Radio and Television Union and Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication, Egypt, December 6, 2010.
- Personal Interview. Dr. Manar El-Shorbagy, Professor of Political Science, The American University Cairo, Egypt, December 6, 2010.
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10. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE

This is an academic questionnaire conducted for graduate studies in Journalism and Mass Communication at the American University in Cairo. This study focuses on media and civic engagement in Egypt with a particular emphasis on Egyptian nightly television talk shows *Masr Ennaharda* (Egypt Today), *90 Deqeeqa* (90 Minutes), and *Al-Ashera Masa'an* (10 PM). Your participation is of extreme importance. By filling out this questionnaire you will contribute to social science research in Egypt and help make our society better. Your participation is voluntary and your data will remain anonymous. Thank you for your time.

1) Do you watch any of the following Egyptian nightly television talk shows: *Masr Ennaharda*, *90 Deqeeqa*, and *Al-Ashera Masa'an*? Please select one answer.

- a. Yes
- b. No (if you answered "No", please jump to question 10 and answer questions 10 to 15)

2) Please indicate with (√) how often you watch each talk show per week?

	Five times	Four times	Three times	Two times	Once a week	Never
1. <i>Masr Ennaharda</i>						
2. <i>Al Ashera Masa'an</i>						
3. <i>90 Deqeeqa</i>						

3) Please indicate with (√) your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements about Egyptian nightly television talk shows and civic engagement:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are a source of news about Egypt's affairs					
b) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to participate in solving community problems in Egypt					
c) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage people to make charitable contributions					
d) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows encourage ordinary citizens to express their opinions publicly (e.g. calls, emails, fax, letters, sms).					
e) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows create sociopolitical awareness					
f) Egyptian nightly TV talk shows are my primary source of information about the Egyptian parliamentary elections held in November, 2010.					
g) Egyptian nightly TV talks shows encourage citizens to vote					

4) Please indicate with (✓) your degree of agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about civic engagement:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a) I consider voting a priority					
b) I express my opinion through the media (e.g. call-ins, emails, letters, sms, fax)					
c) I express my opinion to public officials (e.g. petitions, letters)					
d) I consider discussing sociopolitical affairs a priority					
e) Being informed about Egyptian affairs is important					
f) I consider sociopolitical awareness a priority					
g) Citizens should not wait for the government to solve their community problems					
h) I make a difference in my community					
i) Contributing to community is my responsibility					
j) I volunteer to help solve community problems in Egypt					
k) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's presidential elections in 2011					
l) It's my responsibility to vote in Egypt's upcoming parliamentary elections					
m) I intend to vote in the upcoming presidential elections					
o) I intend to vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections					

5) What is the most important news happening in Egypt that came to your knowledge recently? Please list five issues.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

6) How did these issues first come to your knowledge? Please specify your source of information for each issue and name the source (e.g. 90 Deqeeqa TV talk show).

You may choose from the following sources:

[Newspapers, Magazines, Radio News, Radio talk shows, Television News, Internet, Egyptian TV Talk Shows including Masr Ennaharda, 90 Deqeeqa, or Al Ashera Masa'an , Personal communication].

1. Source for issue one: _____
2. Source for issue two: _____
3. Source for issue three: _____
4. Source for issue four: _____
5. Source for issue five: _____

7) How often do you follow Egyptian nightly television talk shows' coverage for each issue you listed? Please indicate with (√) for each issue.

	Always	Sometimes	Never
Issue 1 you listed			
Issue 2 you listed			
Issue 3 you listed			
Issue 4 you listed			
Issue 5 you listed			

8) How often do you depend on the following media sources for news about Egyptian affairs? Please indicate with (√) for each source.

	Always	Sometimes	Never
Newspapers			
Television news			
Television talk shows			
Radio news			
Radio talk shows			
Magazines			
Internet			

9) Please indicate with (√) your degree of agreement with the following statements about the upcoming Egyptian parliamentary elections.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
a) The government's recent restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections					
b) The elections will be fairly conducted					
c) National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates are expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament					
d) Judicial supervision is important to prevent election fraud					
e) The elections are expected to be peaceful					
f) It's important to have independent monitors					
g) Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation					
h) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government					
i) Women must have equal representation in parliament					
j) Coptic Christians should hold more than the current 10 percent of parliament seats					
k) The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament					
l) The government recently issued restrictions on private media because of the elections					
m) The elections will <u>not</u> be fairly conducted					
n) NDP candidates are <u>not</u> expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament					
o) Judicial supervision is <u>not</u> important to prevent election fraud					
p) The elections are expected to be violent					
q) It's <u>not</u> important to have independent monitors					
r) Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation					
s) Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections by the government					
t) Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president					
u) Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament					
v) The Wafd opposition party is <u>not</u> expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament					

10) Gender

- a. Female
- b. Male

11) What is your area of residence? Check one answer only.

- a. Heliopolis
- b. Nasr City
- c. New Cairo/Katameya
- d. Maadi
- e. Dokki
- f. Mohandiseen
- g. Zamalek
- h. Haram
- i. 6th of October
- j. Other, Please specify_____

12) How old are you? Check one answer only.

- a. Less than 18
- b. 18 – 29
- c. 30 – 41
- d. 42 – 53
- e. 54 – 65
- f. Older than 65

13) What is your nationality? Check one answer only.

- a. Egyptian
- b. Other, Please specify_____

14) What is your level of education? Check one answer only.

- a. Undergraduate student
- b. Bachelor degree holder
- c. Graduate student
- d. Master's degree holder
- e. Doctoral degree holder
- f. Other, Please specify_____

15) Which best describes your monthly income? Check one answer only.

- a. Less than 1,000
- b. EGP 1,000 – less than EGP 3,000
- c. EGP 3,000 – less than EGP 5,000
- d. EGP 5,000 – less than EGP 7,000
- e. EGP 7,000 – less than EGP 9,000
- f. EGP 9,000 – less than EGP 11,000
- g. EGP 11,000 and above

Thank you for your most valuable participation



APPENDIX B:Arabic Questionnaire

إستبيان أكاديمي

هذا إستبيان أكاديمي معد للدراسات العليا بقسم الصحافة و الإعلام بالجامعة الأمريكية بالقاهرة. تركز هذه الدراسة على المشاركة المدنية في مصر و دور برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية مثل: مصر النهارده، 90 دقيقة، والعاشره مساءً. إن هذا الإستبيان مخصص فقط للبحث العلمي ولا يتطلب معرفة اسم أو هوية المشارك، و المعلومات التي ستضاف إلى النتائج لن تنسب إلى هويتك. مشاركتك مهمة للمساعدة على تفهم ما يحدث في المجتمع المصري. شكراً مسبقاً على وقتك.

(1) هل تشاهد أي من برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية: مصر النهارده، 90 دقيقة، العاشره مساءً؟ الرجاء إختيار إجابة واحدة.

أ- نعم

ب- لا (إنما كانت الإجابة "لا"، الرجاء الانتقال إلى السؤال رقم 10 والإجابة على الأسئلة 10 إلى 15)

(2) ما مدى مشاهدتك لبرامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية في خلال الأسبوع ؟ ضع علامة (√)

أبدا	مرة	مرتين	ثلاث مرات	أربع مرات	خمس مرات	
						مصر النهارده
						العاشره مساء
						90 دقيقة

(3) ضع علامة (√) لتحدد درجة موافقتك أو اختلافك مع العبارات التالية حول برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية والمشاركة المدنية:

موافق جدا	موافق	محايد	غير موافق	غير موافق جدا	
					(1) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تعد مصدر من مصادر الأخبار حول الشؤون المصرية
					(2) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تشجع الناس على المشاركة في حل مشاكل المجتمع المصري
					(3) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تشجع الناس على تقديم مساهمات خيرية
					(4) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تشجع المواطن العادي على التعبير عن رأيه (من خلال المكالمات، رسائل البريد الإلكتروني، الفاكس، الرسائل القصيرة، الخ)
					(5) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تنشئ توعية إجتماعية- سياسية
					(6) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تعد مصدراً رئيسياً للمعلومات حول الإنتخابات البرلمانية المصرية التي ستعقد في نوفمبر 2010
					(7) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائيه المصرية تشجع المواطنين على التصويت في الإنتخابات بشكل عام

4) من فضلك قم بتوضيح مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك مع كل واحدة من العبارات التالية والتي تدور عن المشاركة المدنية عن طريق وضع علامة (✓) بما يناسبك

غير موافق جدا	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق جدا	
					1) أعتبر التصويت الانتخابي أولوية
					2) أعتبر رأيي من خلال وسائل الإعلام (مثل: المكالمات الهاتفية، البريد الإلكتروني، الرسائل، الرسائل القصيرة، والفاكس)
					3) أعتبر رأيي للمسؤولين (مثل: تظلمات، ورسائل)
					4) أعتبر مناقشة القضايا الإجتماعية- السياسية أولوية
					5) أن أعرف عن الشؤون المصرية أولوية
					6) أعتبر الوعي السياسي الإجتماعي أولوية
					7) لا ينبغي على المواطنين أن ينتظروا من الحكومة حل مشاكل مجتمعاتهم
					8) أنا أصنع فارق وإختلاف في مجتمعي
					9) المساهمة في مجتمعي هي أولويتي
					10) أقوم بالتطوع للمساعدة في حل المشكلات المجتمعية في مصر
					11) إنها مسؤوليتي أن أقوم بالتصويت في إنتخابات الرئاسة المصرية في 2011
					12) إنها مسؤوليتي أن أقوم بالتصويت في الإنتخابات البرلمانية القادمة
					13) أنا أنوي الإدلاء بصوتي في الإنتخابات الرئاسية القادمة
					14) أنا أنوي الإدلاء بصوتي في الإنتخابات البرلمانية القادمة

5) ما هي أهم الأنباء/ الأخبار التي تحدث في مصر والتي عرفت عنها في الآونة الاخيرة. قم بذكر خمسة قضايا/ أخبار

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)
- 5)

6) كيف عرفت عن هذه القضايا ؟ من فضلك قم بتحديد مصدر معلوماتك لكل قضية من القضايا الخمسة واذكر اسم المصدر (مثل: البرنامج التلفزيوني الحواري 90 دقيقة).

يمكنك الإختيار من بين تلك المصادر (مجلات، صحف، أخبار إذاعية، أخبار تلفزيونية، إنترنت، برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائية المصرية مثل مصر النهار، 90 دقيقة أو العاشرة مساءً، الإتصال الشخصي)

- 1) مصدر القضية أو الخبر الأول.....
- 2) مصدر القضية أو الخبر الثاني.....
- 3) مصدر القضية أو الخبر الثالث.....
- 4) مصدر القضية أو الخبر الرابع.....
- 5) مصدر القضية أو الخبر الخامس.....

7) هل تقوم بمتابعة القضايا التي ذكرتها بالأعلى من خلال برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائية المصرية مثل مصر النهار، 90 دقيقة أو العاشرة مساءً ؟ من فضلك ضع علامة (✓) لكل قضية أو خبر قمت بذكره

أبداً	أحياناً	دائماً	
			1) القضية الأولى
			2) القضية الثانية
			3) القضية الثالثة
			4) القضية الرابعة
			5) القضية الخامسة

8) كم مرة تقوم بالإعتماد على هذه المصادر الإعلامية لمعرفة أخبار عن الشئون المصرية؟ من فضلك قم بالتوضيح عن طريق وضع علامة (✓) لكل مصدر

أبداً	أحياناً	دائماً	
			1) صحف إخبارية
			2) أخبار تلفزيونية
			3) برامج التلفزيون الحوارية المسائية المصرية
			4) أخبار إذاعية
			5) برامج حوارية إذاعية
			6) مجلات
			7) إنترنت

9) من فضلك قم بالإشارة مستخدماً (√) لتوضح مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك مع كل من العبارات التالية عن الانتخابات البرلمانية المصرية القادمة

غير موافق جدا	غير موافق	محايد	موافق	موافق جدا	
					1) القيود الحكومية الحالية على الإعلام الخاص ليس لها علاقة بالانتخابات
					2) الانتخابات البرلمانية القادمة ستعقد بنزاهة
					3) مرشحو الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي من المتوقع أن ينالوا معظم المقاعد في البرلمان
					4) الرقابة والإشراف القضائي أمر هام لمنع تزوير الانتخابات
					5) من المتوقع أن تكون الانتخابات سلمية
					6) من المهم أن يكون هناك مراقبين مستقلين
					7) مرشحي الأحزاب المعارضة سيكون لهم تمثيل قوي
					8) مرشحو الإخوان المسلمين سيرحب بهم لخوض الانتخابات من قبل الحكومة
					9) لا بد أن يكون هناك تمثيل متساوي للنساء في البرلمان
					10) المسيحيون الأقباط لا بد أن يكون لهم تمثيل في البرلمان بنسبة تزيد عن 10 بالمئة من المقاعد
					11) حزب الوفد المعارض من المتوقع أن يفوز بمعظم مقاعد المعارضة في البرلمان
					12) أصدرت الحكومة مؤخراً قيود علي الإعلام الخاص بسبب الانتخابات
					13) الانتخابات لن يتم إنعقادها بنزاهة وعدل
					14) مرشحو الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي من المتوقع أن لا ينالوا معظم المقاعد في البرلمان
					15) ليس من المهم أن يكون هناك رقابة وإشراف القضائي لمنع تزوير الانتخابات
					16) من المتوقع أن تكون الانتخابات عنيفة
					17) ليس من المهم أن يكون هناك مراقبين مستقلين
					18) مرشحي الأحزاب المعارضة لن يكون لهم تمثيل قوي في البرلمان
					19) مرشحو الإخوان المسلمين سيفرض عليهم قيود لخوض الانتخابات من قبل الحكومة
					20) التمثيل النسائي لا بد أن يحدد بالنسبة التي يفرضها رئيس الجمهورية
					21) المسيحيون الأقباط لا بد أن تبقى نسبتهم في البرلمان 10 بالمئة من المقاعد كالمعتاد
					22) حزب الوفد المعارض ليس من المتوقع أن يفوز بمعظم مقاعد المعارضة في البرلمان

10 النوع: أ- أنثى ب- ذكر

11 ما هي المنطقة التي تعيش بها؟ من فضلك قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط

- 1 مصر الجديدة
- 2 مدينة نصر
- 3 القاهرة الجديدة/ القطامية
- 4 معادي
- 5 دقي
- 6 مهندسين
- 7 زمالك
- 8 هرم
- 9 6 أكتوبر
- 10 آخر، من فضلك قم بالتوضيح.....

12 كم عمرك؟ من فضلك قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط

- 1 أقل من 18
- 2 18-29
- 3 30-41
- 4 42-53
- 5 54-65
- 6 أكبر من 65

13 ما هي جنسيتك؟ من فضلك قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط

- 1 مصري
- 2 آخر، من فضلك قم بالتوضيح.....

14 ما هو مستوى تعليمك؟ من فضلك قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط

- 1 طالب جامعي
- 2 حائز على شهادة جامعية
- 3 طالب دراسات عليا
- 4 حائز على درجة الماجستير
- 5 حائز على درجة الدكتوراه
- 6 آخر، من فضلك قم بالتوضيح.....

15 ما الإختيار الملائم الذي يصف دخلك الشهري؟ من فضلك قم باختيار إجابة واحدة فقط

- 1 أقل من 1,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 2 من 1,000 - أقل من 3,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 3 من 3,000 - أقل من 5,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 4 من 5,000 - أقل من 7,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 5 من 7,000 - أقل من 9,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 6 من 9,000 - أقل من 11,000 جنيهاً مصرياً
- 7 من 11,000 جنيهاً مصرياً فما أكثر

شكراً جزيلاً على هذه المشاركة القيّمة ☺

APPENDIX C: Codebook for the Open-Ended Survey Questions

A. Topic Number: _____

B. Topic: _____

C. Sub-topic: _____

1. Topic (1): Political

1. Parliamentary elections
2. Presidential elections
3. President Mubarak's meetings/visits/communications
4. Political participation
5. Political representation
6. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc)
7. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law)
8. Demonstrations/strikes
9. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October)
10. Foreign affairs

2. Topic (2): Economic

11. Minimum wages
12. Government spending
13. National debts
14. Investments
15. General Inflation
16. Rising food prices
17. Taxes
18. Unemployment
19. Poverty
20. Development
21. Shortages in food and supplies

3. Topic (3): Social

22. Workers issues
23. Women issues
24. Religious rights
25. Family issues (marriages, divorce)
26. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children...etc)
27. Other, _____

4. Topic (4): Environmental

28. Pollution (air, water, garbage)
29. Water shortage
30. Endangered species
31. Energy resources
32. Natural disasters
33. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements)

5. **Topic (5): Health**
 34. Health care/awareness
 35. Diseases
 36. Health insurance
 37. Drugs
 38. Negligence and corruption

6. **Topic (6): Education**
 39. Problems in quality of education
 40. Higher education
 41. School education
 42. Illiteracy
 43. Education development
 44. University violence and security

7. **Topic (7): Criminal**
 45. Court sentences and trials
 46. Arrests
 47. Police brutality
 48. Thefts
 49. Embezzlements
 50. Murders
 51. Right to own a gun
 52. Terrorism
 53. Crime control
 54. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands)
 55. Other,(hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting)

8. **Topic (8): Human interest**
 56. Ordinary peoples success stories
 57. Ordinary peoples ordeal stories
 58. Other,_____

9. **Topic (9): Religion**
 59. Religious preaching
 60. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension)
 61. Religious discrimination
 62. Pilgrimage

10. **Topic (10): Sports**
 63. Matches
 64. Fan tension
 65. Achievements
 66. Other,_____

11. **Topic (11): Arts & Culture**
 67. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors...etc)
 68. Drama reviews
 69. Cinema reviews

- 70. Galleries, concerts
- 71. Antiquities

12. Topic (12): Media

- 72. Freedom of expression
- 73. Censorship
- 74. Mergers and acquisitions
- 75. Jailing journalists/trials
- 76. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis
- 77. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels
- 78. Future of media (online media...etc.)
- 79. Media ethics and law
- 80. Media regulations vs restrictions ahead of the parliamentary elections
- 81. Privately owned media

13. Topic (13): Science & Technology

- 82.** Inventions
- 83.** Scientific research
- 84.** Science projects

14. Topic (13): Miscellaneous

- 85. Electricity issues (problems, regulations, new rules)
- 86. Traffic issues (traffic jams, accidents)
- 87. Underground metro issues
- 88. Closing shops early
- 90. Fires (metro fire, explosions...etc)
- 91. Charity
- 92. Loss of the Egyptian satellite
- 93. Wikileaks (Iraqi warlogs)
- 94. Gaza aid
- 95. Islam and the West
- 96. World News

D. MAIN SOURCE OF TOPIC

- 1. Newspapers
- 2. TV news
- 3. Tv talk shows
- 4. Radio News
- 5. Radio Talk shows
- 6. Magazines
- 7. Internet
- 8. TV talk shows among other sources
- 9. Personal Communication
- 10. Miscellaneous
- 11. SMS service

E. Name of Sources Cited by Respondents

- 1. Al Ashera Masa'an tv talk show
- 2. Masr Ennaharda tv talk show

3. 90 Dekeeka tv talk show
4. 48 Sa'a tv talk show
5. Not Applicable
6. Al Masry Al Youm newspaper
7. Al Ahram newspaper
8. Al Akhbar newspaper
9. Al Wafd newspaper
10. Al Youm Al Sabe'a online newspaper
11. Masrawy website
12. Twitter
13. Al Shorouk newspaper
14. Al Jazeera TV channel
15. Al Qahera Al Youm tv talk show
17. Akhbar Baladna
18. Men Qalb Masr tv talk show
19. AlJazeera.net
20. Al Shorouk online
21. Al Tab'a Al Akheera news program
22. Facebook
23. Ahram online
24. Sabah Dream tv talk show
25. Nogoum FM
26. Radio Masr
27. Teen Stuff magazine
28. MSN news
29. Al Hayat Al Youm tv talk show
30. Business Today magazine
31. Al Arabeya.net
32. Baladna Belmasri tv talk show
33. Youtube.
34. Al Tab'a Al Oula news program
35. BBC.

F. Exposure to talk shows with regards to each topic

1. Always
2. Sometimes
3. Neutral

APPENDIX E: Codebook 1: First-level Agenda Setting

G. Coder

1. Sara
2. Sahar

H. Talk show

1. Al Ashera Masa'an
2. Masr Ennaharda
3. 90 Deqeeqa

I. Broadcast Day

1. Saturday
2. Sunday
3. Monday
4. Tuesday
5. Wednesday

J. Broadcast Date:_____

K. Topic Number: _____

L. Topic:_____

M. Sub-topic:_____

15. Topic (1): Political

82. Parliamentary elections
83. Presidential elections
84. President Mubarak's meetings/visits/communications
85. Political participation
86. Political representation
87. Opposition (e.g. arrests of MB..etc)
88. Government (problems, corruption, emergency law)
89. Demonstrations/strikes
90. Achievements/Celebrations (6th of October)
91. Other, (foreign affairs, deaths of political figures)_____

16. Topic (2): Economic

92. Minimum wages
93. Government spending
94. National debts
95. Investments
96. General Inflation
97. Rising food prices
98. Taxes
99. Unemployment
100. Poverty
101. Development
102. Other, (food shortage, gas canisters, consumers)_____

17. Topic (3): Social

- 103. Workers issues
- 104. Women issues
- 105. Religious rights
- 106. Family issues (marriages, divorce)
- 107. School violence (sexual abuse, beating up children... etc.)
- 108. Other, _____

18. Topic (4): Environmental

- 109. Pollution (air, water, garbage)
- 110. Water shortage
- 111. Endangered species
- 112. Energy resources
- 113. Natural disasters
- 114. Other, (Nile water protection and agreements)

19. Topic (5): Health

- 115. Health care/awareness
- 116. Diseases
- 117. Health insurance
- 118. Drugs
- 119. Other, (Negligence, corruption)

20. Topic (6): Education

- 120. Problems in quality of education
- 121. Higher education
- 122. School education
- 123. Illiteracy
- 124. Education development
- 125. Other, (university violence and security, e.g. Ain Shams University)

21. Topic (7): Criminal

- 126. Courts (sentences, trials)
- 127. Arrests
- 128. Police brutality
- 129. Thefts
- 130. Embezzlements
- 131. Murders
- 132. Right to own a gun
- 133. Terrorism
- 134. Crime control
- 135. Illegal acquisition of public properties (e.g. lands)
- 136. Other, (hit and run accidents/ building collapse, shooting)

22. Topic (8): Human interest

- 137. Ordinary citizen success stories
- 138. Ordinary citizen personal ordeal stories
- 139. Other, _____

23. Topic (9): Religion

- 140. Religious preaching
- 141. Sectarian tension (and instigating tension)
- 142. Religious discrimination
- 143. Other, (Pilgrimage)_____

24. Topic (10): Sports

- 144. Matches
- 145. Fan tension
- 146. Achievements
- 147. Other, _____

25. Topic (11): Arts & Culture

- 148. Profiles (actors, singers, writers, directors...etc.)
- 149. Drama reviews
- 150. Cinema reviews
- 151. Galleries, concerts
- 152. Other, (Antiquities, books ...)_____

26. Topic (12): Media

- 153. Freedom of expression
- 154. Censorship
- 155. Mergers and acquisitions
- 156. Jailing journalists/trials
- 157. Firing journalists/Dostour crisis
- 158. Suspension of programs or newspapers or channels
- 159. Future of media (online media...etc.)
- 160. Media ethics and law
- 161. Media regulations vs. restrictions ahead of the parliamentary elections
- 162. Other, (evaluation of privately owned media)_____

27. Topic (13): Science & Technology

- 82.** Inventions
- 83.** Scientific research
- 84.** Science projects

28. Topic (13): Miscellaneous

- 85.** Electricity (problems, regulations, new rules)
- 86.** Traffic problems (traffic jams, accidents)
- 87.** Underground metro drilling problems
- 88.** Closing shops early
- 90.** Fires (metro fire, explosions...etc.)
- 91.** Charity calls
- 92.** Loss of the Egyptian satellite
- 93.** Wikileaks (Iraqi war logs)
- 94.** Gaza aid convoys
- 95.** Islam and the West
- 96.** World Affairs

APPENDIX F: Codebook 2: Second-level Agenda Setting

Overall frames of advance parliamentary elections’ coverage

Coding Instructions: The statements below are meant to measure how talk shows portray the Egyptian parliamentary elections. Pick the number in each column that best represents how they portray the elections in their coverage/discussions. 3= Mentioned, 2 = Neutral, and 1=Not Mentioned. (*A topic is neutral if the opposite frames are covered within the same story and if the story was balanced*).

					1	2	3
	1	2	3				
1)The government’s restrictions on private media have nothing to do with the elections				2) The government issued restrictions on private media because of the elections			
3)The elections will be fairly conducted				4) The elections will be unfairly conducted			
5)Judicial supervision is important to prevent fraud				6)Judicial supervision is not important to prevent fraud			
7)The elections are expected to be peaceful				8)The elections are expected to be violent			
9)It’s important to have independent monitors				10)It’s not important to have independent monitors			
11)Opposition party candidates will have a powerful representation				12)Opposition party candidates will have a weak representation			
13)Muslim brotherhood candidates will be welcomed to run in the elections by the government				14)Muslim brotherhood candidates will be restricted from running in the elections by the government			
15)Women must have equal representation in parliament				16)Women representation should be restricted to the quota set by the president			
17)Coptic Christians should hold more than the current10 percent of parliament seats				18)Coptic Christians should hold the usual current 10 percent seats in parliament			
19)The NDP is expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament				20)The NDP is not expected to hold the majority of seats in parliament			
21)The Wafd opposition party is expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament				22)The Wafd opposition party is not expected to hold most opposition seats in parliament			

APPENDIX I: Inter-Coder Reliability

The Holsti Formula was used to calculate inter-coder reliability as follows:

$$R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$$

M = total number of coding decisions agreed upon by the two coders

N = total number of coding decisions in the subsample tested for reliability by each coder (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006).

The total sample of 676 stories included 4,596 coding decisions. A subsample including 719 coding decisions, representing 15.6 % of the total sample was re-coded by a second coder to test inter-coder reliability.

The results are as follows:

$$R = \frac{2(714)}{719 + 719}$$

$$R = \frac{1428}{1438} = 0.99$$

APPENDIX J: Coding Dates:

The following table shows the dates included the content analysis sample which ranged from Oct. 6 to Nov. 10.

Dates /2010
Nov.10
Nov.9
Nov.8
Nov.7
Nov.6
Nov.3
Nov.2
Nov.1
Oct.31
Oct.30
Oct.27
Oct.26
Oct.25
Oct.24
Oct.23
Oct.20
Oct.19
Oct.18
Oct.17
Oct.16
Oct.13
Oct.12
Oct.11
Oct.10
Oct.9
Oct.6
Total

APPENDIX K: Cross Tabulations for Table 5.13: between each statement measuring civic engagement attitudes in question (4) with exposure:

Voting Priority	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	27	38	1	66
Agree	32	48	0	80
Neutral	45	32	0	77
Disagree	21	21	2	44
Strongly Disagree	9	10	0	19
Total	134	149	3	286
Discussing Sociopolitical Affairs	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	38	30	0	68
Agree	45	62	1	108
Neutral	31	38	1	70
Disagree	18	14	1	33
Strongly Disagree	2	5	0	7
Total	134	149	3	286
Informed About Egyptian Affairs	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	71	59	1	131
Agree	46	75	2	123
Neutral	13	8	0	21
Disagree	3	5	0	8
Strongly Disagree	1	2	0	3
Total	134	149	3	286
Sociopolitical Awareness Priority	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	58	52	2	112
Agree	44	68	0	112
Neutral	22	20	1	43
Disagree	8	5	0	13
Strongly Disagree	2	4	0	6
Total	134	149	3	286
Community Contribution A Responsibility	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	40	31	1	72
Agree	61	71	2	134
Neutral	27	32	0	59
Disagree	5	11	0	16
Strongly Disagree	1	4	0	5
My Responsibility To Vote Presidential	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total

Elections	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	29	47	0	76
Agree	40	43	0	83
Neutral	42	30	0	72
Disagree	13	18	1	32
Strongly Disagree	10	11	2	23
Total	134	149	3	286
My Responsibility To Vote Parliamentary Elections	Television Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	26	35	0	61
Agree	38	41	0	79
Neutral	40	39	0	79
Disagree	18	24	1	43
Strongly Disagree	12	10	2	24
Total	134	149	3	286
Citizens Should Not Wait For Government To Solve Problems	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	43	56	1	100
Agree	40	48	1	89
Neutral	17	18	0	35
Disagree	19	16	0	35
Strongly Disagree	15	11	1	27
Total	134	149	3	286
Opinion Expression Through Media	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	10	11	0	21
Agree	32	32	1	65
Neutral	46	30	0	76
Disagree	33	52	1	86
Strongly Disagree	13	24	1	38
Total	134	149	3	286
Opinion Expression To Public Officials	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	6	9	0	15
Agree	25	28	0	53
Neutral	36	37	1	74
Disagree	53	52	1	106
Strongly Disagree	14	23	1	38
Total	134	149	3	286
Make A Difference In My Community	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	25	31	1	57
Agree	55	47	1	103
Neutral	38	41	0	79
Disagree	13	18	0	31
Strongly Disagree	3	12	1	16
Total	134	149	3	286
I Volunteer To Solve Community	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total

Problems	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	27	33	1	61
Agree	47	49	0	96
Neutral	47	42	2	91
Disagree	11	20	0	31
Strongly Disagree	2	5	0	7
Total	134	149	3	286
Intend To Vote In Presidential Elections	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	31	38	0	69
Agree	34	35	0	69
Neutral	30	31	0	61
Disagree	25	28	2	55
Strongly Disagree	14	17	1	32
Total	134	149	3	286
Intend To Vote In Parliamentary Elections	TV Talk Shows Exposure			Total
	Always	Sometimes	Never	
Strongly Agree	19	21	0	40
Agree	32	32	0	64
Neutral	39	42	0	81
Disagree	30	35	2	67
Strongly Disagree	14	19	1	34
Total	134	149	3	286

APPENDIX L: Significance in Relationships between Exposure and Civic Engagement Attitudes for Table 5.13a

Civic Engagement Attitudes (Strongly agree & Agree)	Television Talk Shows Exposure (Always & Sometimes)		
	Ratio	%	Comparison*
Informed about Egyptian affairs	251 / 286	87.8%	a
Sociopolitical awareness priority	222 / 286	77.8%	ab
Community contribution responsibility	203 / 286	71.0%	bc
Citizens should take action and not wait for government	187 / 286	65.4	bcd
Discussing sociopolitical affairs	175 / 286	61.2%	cde
Responsibility to vote at presidential elections	159 / 286	55.6%	de
Making a difference in community	158 / 286	55.2%	de
Volunteer to solve community problems	156 / 286	54.5%	de
Voting priority	145 / 286	50.7%	e
Responsibility to vote at parliamentary elections	140 / 286	48.9%	ef
Intention to vote at presidential elections	138 / 286	48.3%	ef
Intend to vote at parliamentary elections	104 / 286	36.4%	fg
Opinion expression through media	85 / 286	29.7%	g
Opinion expression to public officials	68 / 286	23.8%	g

Calculated Least significant difference (*lsd*) between any two attitudes = 14.4% (at $p < 0.05$). Any two attitudes are significantly different if the difference is more than 14.4%.

* Based on the *lsd*, percentages followed by the same letter are not significantly different.