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The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**Saudi Women in the Media: Saudi and Egyptian
Perspectives**

A Thesis Submitted to
Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

by Rabaa Abu- Botain

Under the supervision of Dr. Rasha Abdulla
April/2011

"In the Name of God the most gracious and the most merciful"

This thesis is dedicated to my father; who has always been there for me, caring and supporting me through every step of my life. I hope I am making you proud.

May your soul rest in peace.

My mother,

My sisters and brother and your amazing spouses,

My lovely nieces and nephews,

Without you, I would have never been able to reach this point. I owe you my whole life.

And my loving husband;

Words are not enough to express my love for you. You have been there for me through this journey like no other person. Your support, love, patience and inspiration are what pushed through every bump in my life. I am lucky to have you in my life.

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I owe this thesis to many who have contributed to it and deserve appreciation and credit.

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Last, but not least, very warm and special thanks to my friends. Those of you who helped me brainstorm, distribute surveys and understand statistics and even those of you who always cared to lift me up whenever I was down. My father in law who wasted his time with me translating the Questionnaire. Without all of you, I would not have been able to reach this point.

Abstract

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Purpose of the Study:

The aim of this research is trying to differentiate between the way Saudi women see themselves as well as the Saudi males' perception of them; and the way Egyptians perceive them. Such perceptions are ignited by global media arms that have critical roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set ideas about Saudi woman.

Methodology:

This research is a quantitative study in which two non probability purposive/snowball samples are selected: Egyptian and Saudi. A 400 participant of both nationalities is asked to fill a survey that is created to show the perception they have of Saudi women. Participants included are above the age of 21, highly educated and must watch TV for at least an hour per week; however, the Egyptian participants who have lived, visited Saudi a couple of times for reasons other than religious (Hajj or Omra) will be excluded to ensure that their created perceptions are neither created, enforced or changed by what they saw in real.

Major Findings and Discussion:

Television viewership and exposure patterns of Saudis are different than Egyptians. Saudis follow Saudi and foreign news and never watch the Egyptian news channels, while Egyptians tend to follow Egyptian and foreign news and ignore the Saudi news channels. Saudis, on one hand, watch all the entertainment channels available when Egyptians only turn to Egyptian and foreign and never watch Saudi entertainment. When seeking information about Saudi women, Egyptians turn to foreign channels, while Saudis turn to their own local channels. Saudi participants tend to stick more to their initial source of information; whereas Egyptians tend to seek alternative sources than their initial chosen one. In general, Egyptians are considered to be a more active audience than Saudis.

Participants from both countries had different perceptions of the different media. Both Saudis and Egyptians agreed that foreign media are the most credible, have the highest quality and most variety; however, they disagreed on which media are the most trusted. Saudis believe that their own Saudi media are the most trusted, while Egyptians believe that foreign media are the most trusted.

Moreover, Saudis have a positive perception of their women as well as their country; however, Egyptians have a negative perception of Saudi women and Saudi Arabia. In general, participants with negative perceptions from each country had different TV watching habits. The very few Saudis with a negative perception were light viewers of TV. They never or rarely ever watch Saudi or Egyptian media and sometimes follow foreign media. However, Egyptians with negative perceptions were heavy viewers of TV. They never or rarely watched Saudi media and sometimes watch Egyptian and foreign media.

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Chapter 1: Introduction:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as one of the strongest global powers recently with strong international leverage primarily granted by its economic power stemming from its strength as the world's largest energy producer of oil and its evolving industrial power. Being a monarchy where Islamic Sharia is the base of every rule and decision, article 1 of Saudi law confirms that the Saudi constitution must be derived from Quran and Hadith only (Mtango, 2004). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is very unique in its characteristics, community and culture.

In Saudi, while abiding strictly to Shari'a, women are more focused upon than men. In other words, Islamic rules and laws are more apparent in the roles of the women than the men's. More focus is given to the women's dress code, education, job and seclusion rather than men praying in the mosques for instance. In the past, Mutawain (legitimate religious officers) forced men to pray in the mosques, trim their hair, wear certain clothes and not to wear silk or gold. But since the women are believed to be more obvious symbol or tradition, Mutawain shifted their focus. They became more concerned with the women's body and face coverings and their presence in the public areas. Therefore, Saudi women are more controlled than men and locked within strict borders.

Allowing no integration of genders, two separate societies exist in Saudi Arabia: male society and female society. Since the male society is the leading one with high responsibilities and visibility, Saudi is a male dominating country where women society is still limited with social, religious and cultural borders (Bahry, 1982). Meaning that, veil is still forced, driving is not allowed, husbands are the masters of the households, senior positions are held by men and most importantly women related policies are in the hands of male authorities. However, these factors

did not stop the emergence of Saudi women power. They became aware of their traits, skills, conditions and societies and began exerting efforts to develop their families, country as well as themselves.

In this study, an attempt is made to view the Saudi woman in her own eyes as well as the eyes of her husband, father, uncle and colleagues as expressed in the local and global media vehicles. This attempt is then compared to the Egyptian perception of Saudi women also as portrayed in the media. Such perceptions are ignited by global media arms that have critical roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set ideas about Saudi woman. Whether struggles, frustrations, dissatisfaction or even the opposite are portrayed on TV, viewers will be affected by watching. Therefore, a comparison between the Egyptians and Saudis' perceptions will be made.

To do so, two samples will be selected: Egyptian and Saudi. A 400 participant of both nationalities will be asked to fill a survey that is created to show the perception they have of Saudi women. Participants included must watch TV for at least an hour per week; however, the Egyptian participants who have lived, visited Saudi a couple of times for reasons other than religious (Hajj or Omra) will be excluded to ensure that their created perceptions are neither created, enforced or changed by what they saw in real.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework:

Whether it is cliché to say that Television plays an important role in affecting the Egyptian, Saudi or any other culture, it remains a fact. Television remains an important source of information, messages and shared images around the globe. No matter what types of new media become available, television shows no signals of weakening (Gerbner et al., 1980 & 1986). Drama, news, talk shows, commercials and many other programs are aired into every home on a daily basis. Television, having overcome literacy problem, remains a universally shared source of information and entertainment. Another factor that sets Television apart from other media forms is its audience. It targets a large diversified audience around the globe; after the “selka” invention in Egypt, for instance, the penetration rate of local and satellite TV sky rocketed. As defined by Gerbner et al. (1986), the TV audience is any available group at any certain time of the day viewing the TV.

People spend more time watching television than performing any other task apart from working and sleeping. According to Hammermeister et al. (2005), the time children waste watching TV is more than any other activity excluding the sleeping hours. Study performed by him showed that heavy TV users tend to be lonely, shy and sometimes more depressed than light viewers. This goes back to the fact that they spend more time watching TV than socializing, gathering with friends and family, reading, practicing sports or even hobby developing. Jennifer Good (2007) refers to the habit of TV as a social drug. To her, it is an addiction that remains pleasant when used in acceptable doses; but, causes major problems when over used.

I. Cultivation Theory History and Assumptions:

Realizing the popularity of television, cultivation theory was initially developed with intent to explain its effect and influence on its audience's cultures, attitudes, perceptions and values. George Gerbner along with Larry Gross, Micheal Morgan, Nancy Signorielli and James Shanahan developed the theory after extensive series of research and experiments (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

The Gerbner team's research was based on surveys and experiments done on heavy and light TV viewers. Answers given by heavy viewers were closer to the imaginary world of TV than real life while light viewers gave more realistic answers. For example, when a question was asked about the percentage of people living in America, heavy viewers tended to exaggerate the number. The reason behind such believed overestimated percentage is the high number of American drama, commercials and shows aired on TV than any other nationality. Also, another group of heavy TV viewers overestimated the number of Americans working as lawyers since the percentage of shows that portrays law jobs is high. Heavy viewers are more inclined to believe that the world is an unsafe place than light viewers as a result of TV's heavy portrayal of crimes, rapes and violence in general is elevated. Not only do they see the world full of violence, but they also have higher feelings of insecurity and risk (Gerbner & Gross, 1976).

The theory tends to differentiate between heavy and light viewers of TV. For Gerbner et al. (1980), the heavy viewer is a person who watches TV for more than 4 hours per day. For these types of viewers, television monopolizes over any other source of information such as newspaper or Internet for instance. The influence of heavy TV exposure is what Gerbner and his team referred to as cultivation (Gerbner et al., 1980).

The main hypothesis of the theory is that television provides certain ideas about the real life (whether it is positive or negative) to the audience who in return believe the concepts presented and live with it. In other words, their understanding of the world becomes “cultivated” by the heavy exposure to TV and so they live in the imaginary TV world; even though there are many inconsistencies between real life and that portrayed on TV (Bryant & Zillman, 1994).

II. Criticism:

The theory was criticized heavily by a number of researchers. Paul Hirsch (1980) for instance, criticized the Gerbner team for not controlling intervening variables such as age, gender, education and socioeconomic levels. To him, if all of these variables were controlled, the TV effect will not remain as large. As a reaction to these criticisms, Gerbner (1980) further developed on cultivation theory by adding two concepts: mainstreaming and resonance. Mainstreaming is “when heavy viewing leads to a convergence of outlooks across groups” (Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 269). Meaning that, even if heavy TV viewer participants of low and high income levels share the same view of crime, light viewers of both levels tend to differ from each other. Morgan (1986) and Gerbner et al. (1980) explain mainstreaming as the diminishing effect of intervening factors when dealing with a heavy viewer group while these variables do affect the results of the light viewers. Results of the heavy viewers tend to override the differences between the participants while it does not with the differences of light viewers. On the other hand, resonance is “when cultivation effect is boosted for a certain group of the population” (Severin & Tankard, 2001, p. 269). For example, when heavy viewers of both genders see crime

as a fearful problem, women in this group tend to agree more since their gender “resonates” with crimes portrayed on TV such as rape.

These additions to the theory modified it; the theory no longer assumes a unified homogeneous effect on heavy viewers, but it puts other factors into consideration. Though Gerbner et al. agree with Hirsch that if all intervening factors were controlled, the effect of TV will be small but it cannot be negligible due to the effect of constant TV exposure over time (Gerbner et al., 1980).

Criticism to the cultivation theory did not stop here; other researchers doubted the theory developed by Gerbner. For example, Rubin as well as Perse and Taylor (1988) concluded, after surveying a group of viewers, the effect resulting from TV viewing on perception is program based rather than time. Those heavy action viewers were more concerned about their security and safety while those daytime serial viewers are more concerned with trusting others. Rubin et al. realizes that the TV audience is an active target.

III. Cultivation Effects:

Gerbner and his team refined their theory by dividing the cultivation effect to two categories: “first order belief” and “second order belief” (Gerbner et al., 1986 and Hawkins & Pingree, 1990). “First order beliefs” are beliefs regarding the real life facts; percentage of raped women or percentage of murders for instance. “Second order beliefs” are believed to be driven from the “first order beliefs”. In other words, they are the expectations or generalizations created as a result from the “first order beliefs” such as believing that the world is a dangerous place for women or others. Hawkins & Pingree (1990) confirm that both types are not constantly correlated strongly.

Gerbner et al. (1986) agree that TV exposure over time will have a strong effect on “first order beliefs” while the “second order beliefs” are more affected by the other personal variables such as the experiences surrounding each individual or the neighborhood they live in.

IV. New Media Technologies and Cultivation:

The 21st century has introduced new communication media of many forms to the audience. Much more free satellite channels, prepaid channels, DVDs, VCRs and other devices have changed the audience’s exposure to TV. They are now capable of freezing a shot, skipping the commercials, rewind a missed program and choose between unlimited choices of channels. However, Morgan, Shanahan and Harris (1990) confirmed that this new technology does not affect the watching habits of the audience. Dobrow (1990) further confirmed this assumption by claiming that heavy viewers employ the new technology to view more of the programs they are used to watch and enjoy. Light viewers, on the other hand, use the new media to diversify the channels and programs they watch.

V. Previous Studies on Cultivation Theory and Perception:

A study by Moon Lee et al. (2009) attempted to show the effect of TV consumption on perceptions of America's ethnic groups. The groups included: Caucasians, African Americans, Asians, Latinos and Native Americans. The researchers proposed 5 research questions about whether the sample would hold a positive or negative perception about each ethnic group. More than 450 college students filled the survey prepared by the researchers to test the stereotypes created as well as their TV consumption. Results showed that the perceptions of participants

were positively related to the amount of TV watched and program chosen. For example, heavy viewers presented more negative stereotypes of all groups except for the Caucasians. Also, entertainment, sports and educational program watchers had a more negative perception than those who watched news. Research identified different perceptions held of each group. For example, African Americans were believed to be lazy, dishonest, dumb, inferior and unethical while Asians were seen as highly educated and wealthy. The dominant Latino perception held is hard worker, lower class and non college graduates while Native Americans were seen as uneducated, unemployed and alcoholics. As a general result, the more participants watched TV, the more they held to these TV created perceptions.

In 2009, Brian Quick examined the effect of the hit series "Grey's Anatomy" on viewers. Grey's Anatomy is a famous series about a group of doctors who work in a hospital together. Trying to fit in, excel and learn are a few of their concerns. Love relationships and friendships are created between them and the other hospital staff/doctors. Grey's Anatomy's doctors are brave and enjoy a lot of courageousness when dealing with their patients and colleagues. In order to answer and test the researcher's hypotheses as well as questions, students majoring in mass communication in a large university in America were asked to fill a survey. Results showed that students perceived the series as credible and real. The more episodes watched, the more participants believed that real life doctors are as brave and courage as those in the series. Risky decisions and heroic acts of the doctors in the show were seen as a real characteristic to the real world doctors. Grey's Anatomy's watchers showed more satisfaction with real American doctors for their talents and heroic acts.

On the other hand, Yang, Ramasubramanian and Oliver (2008) were concerned with the cultivation effect of the American media on the Korean and Indian

viewers. Surveys were filled by 352 Korean in Gwangju city and 333 Indian in Pune, Hyderabad, Chennai and Cochin cities. These cities were chosen because of their large size and ease of American media accessibility. Results showed that the more American TV is watched, the less satisfaction they had for their countries and personal lives. Results were universal for both countries in this sense. Participants fell in love with the American life style. Many of the participants associated nice cars, expensive watches, playing golf with the American life style.

Another study by Mastro, Behm-Morawitz and Ortiz (2007) aimed at comparing TV portrayal of Latinos and the real American perception of them. Almost 362 college students from a midsize university in America filled the questionnaires distributed. Female participants dominated the sample by over 69% of the whole sample. Results supported the relationship proposed by the researchers: the higher the TV consumption, the stronger the relation between TV's portrayal and real life perceptions of Latinos. For example, heavy TV viewers all thought that Latinos are mostly uneducated, lazy, unintelligent, and belong to the lower class while primetime entertainment programs examined by the researchers portrayed Latinos in the same exact way.

VI. Relevance to the Study:

Each publically or privately owned channel will reflect the owner's culture, perception, history, social, political and economic background (Gerbner 1958, 1969). Each owner, whether it is the government, institution or even a single businessman, will portray and create the imaginary world that he wants or believes. Therefore, the owner/s will have the power to "cultivate" their viewers according to their input. However, as Gerbner et al. confirm, the extent of cultivation in each country will

depend on many factors unique to each country such as number of available channels, duration of broadcast, watching habits of the population and diversity of the content available to view. Egyptians, for instance, might form their perception of the Saudi women based on what they see on TV whether it is newscasts or entertainment such as movies, programs and video clips. Whether they watch their local Egyptian channels or Saudi ones or even seek foreign channels will shape the way they view Saudis in general and Saudi women in specific. Beliefs can be created from the imaginary world of TV. Saudis also are affected by the way their women are portrayed on TV. Some might seek information that confirm their perception, others might reject the facts contradicting his/ her perception while other may actually change their perception (either to the positive or negative). Saudis may also insist on watching their local channels or other Saudi owned private channels or seek foreign channels to view.

As Kahlor and Morrison (2007) explain, the cultivation theory underlines two assumptions. First, perceptions influenced by TV are cultivated by the person's consumption of TV over time. Second, heavy viewers are presented by a unified perception of reality which mainly mirrors the mainstream view of the society. Therefore, no matter what type or program genre a person may watch, the amount spent viewing TV is what matters. Knowing the two assumptions, this study will search for the Egyptian perception of Saudi women (based on TV exposure) and Saudi perception of them (based on TV and their preexisting view of the society).

Introducing the Saudi Society and the Status of Women:

I. Measuring the Status of Women:

Throughout the study, some terms are continuously used to evaluate the status of women in Saudi Arabia such as women's freedom, development and progress. According to the Webster dictionary, freedom is defined as "the quality or state of being free, the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint in choice or action and liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of another"; development is defined as "the act, process or result of developing"; and progress is "a forward or onward movement and a gradual betterment" However, these dictionary definitions do not help when attempting to measure and evaluate the status of women. Hence, operational definitions are provided for indicators of freedom, development and progress. These include political, economic, educational, health, social and other elements. Universal standards set by well established organizations or conventions are used to evaluate the status of women. Therefore, before analyzing the areas of the Saudi community, conventions and Human Rights treaties and other declarations' decisions concerning women should be looked at. The articles set by them can be considered as a benchmark when evaluating the status of women in the Kingdom.

The 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. This declaration confirmed that all individuals of different genders, nationalities, religions and races are equal in all aspects of life. Hence, women should have equal rights of education, employment and marriage as their fellow men. For example, Article 16 of the UDHR confirms that men and women both have the same rights in marriage. They both have the power to consent the marriage or refuse it, for instance.

The 1952 "Convention on Political Rights" by the General Assembly agrees with the UDHR articles. For example, Article one confirms that women should be able to vote in political elections without bias. Article two further confirms that women should be capable of participating in the election and run for any position without discrimination. Article three declares that women can hold any position open for men without any bias.

The 1958 "Discrimination Convention by the International Labor Organization" agreed on certain articles that refuse the discrimination based on sex, race, religion or any other factor in employment. Any candidate preference or exclusion should be only made based on his/her qualification and job requirements only.

Another General Assembly adopted convention in 1979 agreed on eliminating any kind of discrimination against women. For example, Article 9 says that both parents have the equal rights regarding the nationality of their children. Article 10, on the other hand, focused on education. This article aims at ensuring that women get the same educational opportunity as their peer men. They both should have equal opportunities for scholarships and same access to schools, curriculums, exams and teaching techniques. Article 11 stresses on the equal employment rights for both genders. In this Article, they stress that women should have the power to freely choose their profession. Article 12, on the other hand, focuses on the health care where access should be equally granted to both genders. Article 15 of the convention says that both men and women shall be equally treated before law.

The 1993 declaration adopted by the General Assembly on "Eliminating Violence against Women" defined violence as any gender based act of violence which causes harm or suffering to women whether it is sexual, psychological or physical.

Article two expanded the violence to also include in family violence toward female children. The violence may include household abuse or other acts such as circumcision. Article two also included the harm and suffering to the women caused by the state or government laws.

Other conventions focused on marriage and all issues concerning it. For example, some conferences set a minimum age for marriage while others agreed that both parties of marriage have the right to either approve or refuse the proposal.

Through the study, different areas of Saudi women will be analyzed to determine whether they enjoy freedom and are developing their status or not. While reading, one must keep in mind the articles agreed upon internationally to further compare the women's freedom and development in Saudi Arabia.

II. Elements of the Saudi Society:

Saudi is very different than its neighboring countries as well as foreign countries when dealing with women related issues. As journalist Asmaa Almohamed (2007) mentioned, Saudi neighboring countries give much more freedom to its women than Saudi. In Bahrain for instance, women worked as ministers and parliament members. Kuwait also has female ministers who worked along with men. In Saudi on the other hand, women were only hired as advisors to the parliament and were asked for advice in women related subjects merely. Although many women recognize the importance of the step, others view it as a décor job. They have no power in actually changing rules or introducing new ones. It has to be noted that women of the highest jobs in Saudi still lack full control and power over decisions.

The Saudi community has unique characteristics that make the Kingdom more interesting to discover, such as the power and influence of Saudi religious clerics “Ulema”, sex segregation and the conflict between Saudi’s conservatives and liberals.

1) The Ulema or religious scholars enjoy tremendous power in Saudi Arabia. These Ulema have a defined role in the kingdom which is implementing Islamic Sharia into the lives and policies of the country. The Ulema shape the public opinion and affect the King and government’s policies. Their approval or disapproval is a priority prior to any decision. For example, in 1994 the Ulema forced Saudi to withdraw from the United Nations conference held in Cairo titled Population and Development (Doumato, 1999). This conference called for men and women equality, improving the women’s status, using contraceptives for family planning and increasing the marriage age for girls. The council of Ulema objected to the content of the conference and saw it as offensive to the Islamic regulations. Saudi Arabia did not send any sort of a delegation and withdrew from the conference.

For example, as an American living in Riyadh, Judith Caesar was surprised at the power a Mutawwa (Legitimate Religious Officer) enjoys (Caesar, 1997). They have the authority to arrest anyone for committing any action they see religiously inappropriate. There are no written rules that they follow and a Mutawwa can make use of this subjective manner due to the great power he enjoys. For example, one of her Christian friends living in Saudi was arrested by Mutawaeen (plural of Mutawwa) for wearing a cross. Though the Holy Quran encourages Muslims to respect other religions, Mutawaeen thought otherwise. They did not let him free until he removed the necklace he was wearing.

2) Saudi is characterized by its sex segregation policies. They both have “their” places they belong to, unless they are a family then the male companion is allowed into the women’s sections. For example, restaurants in Saudi usually have different seating areas: single men and families. The family section usually hosts women who come alone or have a relative male companion. Women’s sections usually included a children’s playing area. Airports also have different sealed rooms for women’s searching. Sex segregation is also applied in educational premises as well as working offices.

When Saudi women were interviewed by Mona AlMunajjed (1997) to know what they think of Saudi’s strict segregation rule; many supported it. A 28 year old banker thinks that girls will lose concentration in classes if boys are around; therefore it is better to separate them. A 36 year old illiterate think that a girl’s honor is more important than education. If education was not sex segregated, she would not allow her daughters to attend schools since it would harm their honor and their family’s name. Women also refuse to work with men out of fear of harassment or sitting alone with them in a room. On the other hand, many saw benefits in gender mix such as developing a sense of confidence, learning and understanding the other sex and benefiting from each other’s experiences.

Sex segregation in Saudi put women in a category where they are treated differently than men. However, the government has lately tried to integrate women into the Kingdom’s organizations and institutions. Some women were appointed by the government as consultants for Majlis al Shura. As Amelie Le Renard (2008) pointed out, these women were selected from the elite families. Their roles were well defined between advising the Majlis on women related topics and representing the Kingdom in the international meetings. Elite women of the Majlis conveyed their

disappointment in their roles. They were dissatisfied with the women related issues' advisory role they were given. Other women were also unhappy with the elite women selected since they come from different backgrounds. Belonging to rich families, studying abroad and being exposed to different experiences made Saudi women feel unrelated to those consultant elites.

3) For Saudi to remain internally peaceful and with no conflict, a balance should be achieved between those who seek modernization and change and those who are tied to the Islamic community with all its restrictions. The problem remains in trying to balance between the liberals' needs and the conservatives' strictness. For example, Juhaiman Seif el Utaiba, student of the famous religious scholar Ibn Baz, demonstrated along with some followers in 1979 in Mecca against the foreign influence. He wanted an end to the westernized universities, television, shopping malls and the presence of the foreigners themselves in Saudi. The insurrection lasted for three days and caused the death of 127 soldiers. Foreign forces were called upon to help in ending the demonstration. This has forced the Saudi governments to revitalize the regulations and restrictions on women. Overseas scholarships for women were ended, the presence of a male companion along with women shopping, eating out and travelling was strictly monitored and women were firmly supervised in their work areas (Eleanor, 1991).

Having talked about Saudi's two groups, some of the reasons behind such division are discussed by Eleanor Doumato (1999). Conservatives view Saudi as the origin of Islam and so ultimate controls should be imposed since Saudi men and women are lucky and more privileged than the rest of world. They refer every factor of life to Islamic Sharia, according to their own understanding of it. Ruralization is another important factor. People migrate from the rural to the urban to improve their

economic condition, but remain shocked from the city development. Though Riyadh, for instance, is a closed community, it remains an open society in the eyes of rural villagers. The resistance takes place when they come to live in the city; hence fuel in the conservative group. On the other hand, liberals are fighting for what they think are basic human rights. Foreign education, travelling abroad and television open their eyes to the outside world. They come to realize how others live differently. Away from the state controlled terrestrial channels, Saudis are exposed to other Arab and non-Arab programs which affect their way of thinking. Education in Saudi has an effect on both groups. To the liberals, education prepares working material individuals. Hence, as soon as they graduate, they demand job opportunities. But, it is undeniable that the curriculums taught in primary schooling through high schools focuses on the Islamic Sharia and religion. Children are cultivated with ideas about the ideal Islamic man and woman that they turn to when they grow up.

Chapter 3: Literature Review:

Literature on Saudi women had an interesting characteristic: contradiction and extremism. When representing a certain topic about Saudi women, literature is either pro or against; positive or negative. Each media picked a certain direction, focused on it and portrayed it. A single writing is not enough to read to get the full perspective of the Saudi community.

Different elements of the Saudi society shall be discussed from different frames to show the conflict between them. Some will focus on the positive side of a certain element while others will focus on the negative. Below, both sides to each element will be presented.

I. Education:

According to Al Rawaf and Simmons (1991), the first girls' public school opened in the 60s but the real expansion did not occur up until the first Islamic education conference led by King Khalid Abdel Aziz in 1977. The conference encouraged families to send their daughters to schools and stressed the Islamic gain from girls' education. Girls' education in Saudi was never controlled by the Ministry of Education just like the boys', but by the General Presidency of Girls Education headed by a religious man reporting to the King directly (Al-Hariri, 1987). Being under the conflict of girls wanting to learn and religious scholars defining the rules, the government was not expanding its education system rapidly. The country's religion and traditions hindered the path of girls' education.

General Presidency of Girls Education (GPGE), being responsible for girls' education, created a curriculum a bit different for girls (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991). In elementary and intermediate levels, girls were learning household matters such as

cooking and sewing to improve their skills as better housewives; while secondary level taught them more than household issues to cater for those who wish to attend universities. In the first year books, girls learn stories about the mother who stays home taking care of it until the father comes back from work; fourth year books tells stories about how girls enjoy serving and cooking for the family as well as sewing in their spare time. By the fifth and sixth years, girls excel in household subjects and know by heart that a girl's noble place is at home taking care of the family (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991).

For those who aspire for higher education in the Kingdom, they are given a choice from a narrow range of alternatives (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991). There are the GPGE colleges which prepare girls to become elementary and intermediate teachers. There is also King Saud University off campus centers for women in all the courses it offers except for engineering, planning and those who conflict with Saudi women's nature. Majors varied from nursing and medical to public administration. Other universities initiated different campuses for girls and started offering more subjects like economics, arts and Islamic Sharia and Dawa: Um Al Qura University in Mecca was created in 1971 and King Faisal in Dammam in 1978 (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991).

The curriculum taught was further criticized by many. For example, Doumato (2003) claimed that, the Saudi curriculum focuses only on inoculating the youth against foreign influence and imported culture. They are taught to guard the Islam they learn at school and confront assaults on it. However, when Saudi graduates peruse higher education out of the Kingdom, they fail Islamic courses they thought were an easy "A". The reason behind such failure is the lack of diversity in curriculum taught. In Saudi, the texts focus on what they define as real Wahabi Islam and ignore

any other sect of Islam or other religions. Saudi cultivates religion as well as norms and culture accompanied in the way the government wants. Students believe that they are excellent learners of Islam but soon discover the narrow scope their country enforces.

Al Rawaf and Simmons (1991) also confirmed that girls in Saudi do not enjoy the same range of courses, majors or even job opportunities offered to their peer boys. Saudi men have a variety of majors and even schools to choose from while women are restricted with few options. Moreover, despite the available schools and universities, transportation remains a problem. Since they are not allowed to drive, they need to have a personal driver and a car at their disposal which not all Saudis can afford. And those who cannot, refuse to send their daughters using other transportation methods such as taxis or buses.

On the other hand, others saw potential in Saudi girls' education. According to Andrew Mills (2009), King Abdullah has been encouraging women to seek higher education and work in diversified fields. Almost one quarter of Saudi's budget is allocated for the education sector. Hence, more universities are opening up for women offering different majors. However as Mills states, the Saudi community has not been as enthusiastic as the government and remains suspicious about each move. For example, when only recently Effat College offered architecture and engineering, feedback was negative from the students' families as Ibrahim said. Parents refused to pay almost 100,000\$ for their daughters to be architects and then stay unemployed since no firm in Saudi hires female architects. Firms must first have the capacity to establish different offices for women then start hiring them as architects or engineers. However, there is a gradual improvement in this case since firms started to hire them. Students applying have also increased from 10 in architecture and 3 in engineering in

2005/06 to 62 and 45 respectively in 2009. Also, with no doubt the high salary the government offers to female teachers encourages more women to attend universities. These women later on pass the encouragement to their kids, family and neighbors to go to schools. This vicious circle helped in expanding the girls' education in Saudi Arabia.

Other literature also confirmed the positive moves Saudi is taking in develop girls' education. Laessing & Alsharif (2009) stated that, since 2005 King Abdallah has been pumping reforms that have all been new to the Saudi community which have been refuted by the conservatives and appraised by the liberals. In 2009, these reforms included the built of the first sex desegregated university King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). The new Aramco established 10 billion dollars university has come to life in 2009 where both genders will study and attend classes together. King Abdallah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) is the first university not under the educations ministry's responsibility and control. It is established and run by the country's oil company Aramco (Barclay, 2009). The university is built on the shores of the red sea in Thuwal, Jeddah. The 9000 acres sand was turned in just three years to glass and marble buildings surrounded by palm trees. The university's classes are gold plated, library has numerous diversified books and researches and laboratories are endorsed by the best technology including the 14th fastest computer in the world developed by IBM (Jenkins, 2009). The university is very well backed financially by the state that it requires no fees from all students and grants them with full scholarships.

What gives a lot of attention and focus to the university is not only its hugeness nor its well equipped buildings, but also the fact that it broke Saudi's most focused upon taboo: sex segregation. KAUST allows both students to take classes

together and mix up in university's gardens, cafes and restaurants (Associated Press, 2009). Liberals see the university as a tangible development and believe in its benefit to the young in specific and to the country as a whole. However, those who opposed objected to the KAUST's gender mixture. For the first time in the history of Saudi Arabia, religious clerics had no control and power over any educational institution; hence, could not change it. As Hoteit and Radsch confirm, the university being under Aramco, allows no intervention from the religious clerics. Sheikh Saad ben Nasser Alshithri was one of the clerics who fought harshly against the university but with no change. He resigned from the Saudi Senior Clerics Council and the king accepted his resignation. Soon after he resigned, he appeared on Al Majid channel based in Qatar lashing about the sex desegregated university and wondered whether the Islamic state is still following the Islamic Sharia or not. Al Majid channel soon announced that it carries no responsibility on what Sheikh Alshithri said and it remains his own personal judgment. Al Watan's editor in chief Jamal Khashoggi said that following such a strategy is one of the religious clerics' old tricks to gain power over the university (Hoteit & Radsch, 2009).

According to the reports of International Network News (2003), it is usual to witness members of the royal family and prominent businessmen donating for the education of the women. For example, King Fahd's wife, princess Al Jouhara held a reception in the University of King Saud to discuss women's condition and status in the country. She encouraged women to pursue their education and for that reason she donated almost 42 million Saudi Riyals for improving the education sector in Saudi. With such money, universities are capable of opening more women's departments. Women's only universities are being established too. As the Riazat Butt (2008) mentioned, by 2010, a new university will open its doors for women of Saudi which is

endorsed by King Abdallah personally. The university is considered one of the largest women's only institutions where majors that were once reserved for men are open. Researchers of Saudi believe that such university will empower women and open career opportunities that were once forbidden. The university will have all the needed facilities such as library, auditoriums and conference rooms. The university will host more than 40,000 students in the majors of medicine, nursing, dentistry, pharmacology and naturopathy along with a 700 bedded hospital.

At the end, as Mahmoud Saleh (1986) confirms higher education expenditure per student in Saudi Arabia is considered one of the largest ones of the world. Saudi's government does dedicate a huge portion of the national income for students' education. However the question here to ask is the position of women in this. According to him, women enrollment in universities depends on three factors. First the demand; whether girls are eager to apply or not. In fact, it does not only depend on the girls' eagerness, but also on their parents as well. Willingness of the families to send their daughters to universities will determine the demand on them. Second factor is the financial ability of the country itself to provide such a service, building separate universities with all its needs for instance. Libraries, equipments, classrooms and much more are needed to establish universities segregated from men. Last factor is human resource. These universities built for girls are female run institutions. All the teachers, staff and administrators must be women. Having qualified women employees in Saudi Arabia is not an easy matter at all. Having said all that, the girls' higher education sector in Saudi has grown fast. It started when four girls were admitted as external students with the calls of Kind Saud in 1961. In 20 years the number reached 19,860 and still jumping.

II. Employment:

Saudi women's involvement in the labor force was witnessed during the recent years. Data by Doumato (1999) showed that the private sector have employed women in the areas of journalism and advertising while the public sector remained the highest women employer. Most Saudi women work as teachers because it is the least controversial job for women. They work in a perfectly sex segregated areas, suitable working hours and with good salaries. By 1994, more than 70% of public school teachers were Saudi women who took the places of the foreigners. Nursing and medical physicians come in the second place following teaching (Doumato, 1999).

According to Bahry (1982), Al Rajihi initiated the first Saudi female bank in 1980 where all the operations were done by women for women customers. By 1982, almost 13 other women branches of different banks were created. This step not only gave women job opportunities, but also allowed Saudi women to have control over their own accounts without the need of their fathers, husbands or uncles (Bahry, 1982). The employees of the banks gained a lot of publicity and were being interviewed in the press or over the radio. They also gave speeches in schools and universities where they talked about their success and benefits of working.

Believing that banking, education and medicine are the only available fields was proven wrong when women entered journalism and headed many departments. In Zuhair Kutbi's (1998) book, he mentioned that Saudi women journalists have produced many writings and articles that enhanced and empowered women and their roles in the Kingdom. During the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi writers were one of the reasons that encouraged Saudi to interfere and free Kuwait. Their columns and petitions to the King allowed them many privileges that were once banned such as creating women's charity and empowerment associations. Journalist Suhailah Zain

Elabidin, working for Al Madina newspaper, was promoted to be the editor of the female section in 1981 (Bahry, 1982). She was the first Saudi woman to hold a high position and so received huge publicity. She became a role model for young girls and housewives who saw in her the aspired change.

Not only that, but many businesses in Saudi hired women to work in places created for women only. As Dan Murphy (2007) mentioned, Saudi women can now go shopping for their cars personally in female showrooms where sellers are from the same gender. They even work in women run factories' assembly lines; but as soon as the bell rings, workers cover up for the male workers to enter and collect the finished products (Murphy, 2007). Additionally, a female industrial city will soon be constructed in Saudi Arabia which will included more than 80 women run factories. Almost 10,000 women will be hired in this project that is cooperation between Saudi, China and Malaysia (Ambah, 2004).

Although, Saudi women lacked the education, skills, trainings and all the aspects needed for the job, King Fahd insisted on "Saudization" of the jobs even for women. Foreigners were rapidly replaced with local employees and officials pushed Saudi women to attend nursing schools and attracted them with lucrative salaries (Kolleen et. al., 2006). Many multinationals and other companies were asked by Saudi's officials to train the women so that they easily replace foreigners. For example, Hewlett Packard (HP) offered Saudi women training courses (Ame Info News, 2006). As Amr Hassan, general manager of HP, mentioned, Saudi women have a real demand toward information technology learning and products. Hence, HP offered an IT training special for the female population of the Kingdom. Until 2006, more than 2300 women have successfully completed the trainings with HP.

The working environment for women was questioned by many. For example, when journalist Karim El Gawhary wanted to speak to Saudi working women, he wondered how the meeting would go. He did not know whether he would be able to meet the women in their work places or it would end up being a phone interview. Salwa Alireza, employee of a Jeddah based advertising agency, confidently asked the journalist for a meeting in her office. During the interview, he was surprised to see a Saudi woman unveiled and professionally working in a western like atmosphere. Alireza said that on her first day of work, she asked her boss about the dress code necessary for the agency; he replied “anything goes”. She talks about how both men and women of the agency appreciate her efforts and work no matter how conservative they are (El Gawhary, 2004).

Prince Waleed Ben Talal’s music channel and production company “Rotana” is located in Riyadh. Though it is located in the capital of Saudi Arabia, it keeps a shocking working environment. Both genders work together in the same place and women can actually be the bosses over their male colleagues. Sultana Al Rowaili, Rotana’s human resources manager, says that only those who tolerate gender integration can work in the company. For that, she came up with a special “Rotana” hiring interview. While interviewing a male candidate, a woman employee interrupts as if she has papers to sign or a question to ask. If the male candidate looks uncomfortable, less concentrated or even stares greatly, Rowaili dismisses him. According to her, many have dismissed the room themselves as soon as knew they were going to be interviewed by a woman (Butters, 2009).

Saudi Women joining the labor force was looked from a different perspective by others. According to Canada News (2008), Saudi and Austrian scientist conducted a study over 4,400 college students between the years 2007 and 2008 to assess the

barrier to female employment. The study proved that even though women view having a job as a priority, they suffer to find one. Religion was not listed as the barrier; however, participants believe that societal beliefs are the main challenge to face. The belief that women are meant to be housewives not workers is why many women cannot work. Gender competition over job opportunities is another barrier. Over 80% of the women believed that they should and can compete with men while only 22% of men believed so. Occupying a top position was not very liked by women where only 8% agreed to it. Both genders had their opinions about women in the future where 44% of the women were certain that changes will occur to women's rights to 26% of their peer men.

Another challenge working women face is their appeal to marriage. Since marriage is one of the top priorities to both Saudi women and their families, the desirability of educated and working potential brides is a question to ask. Educated girls are the less desired wives to be among the Saudi community (Bahry, 1982). Many question and fear the character of the highly educated girl and her suitability as a wife and a mother. Grooms and their parents believe that the higher the education, the more arrogant a wife could be. She could also be more demanding than less educated wives. Grooms also fear that these highly educated brides would want to work, which is something not acceptable by all the society. Men also cannot bear upon the independency accompanied by high education and jobs. They are used to being sole masters of the house. But this does not deny the fact that women investing in their education and career are more selective and picking when accepting a marriage proposal (Bahry, 1982). Kolleen et al. (2006) further confirms that by claiming that many Saudis refuse to marry nurses for the old negative established idea

of nurses. The fear of not getting married forces some women away from this profession since marriage has a high priority in the Saudi society.

From a business perspective, journalist Asmaa Almohamed (2007) acknowledges that women are still facing difficulties in establishing their businesses. Some permits can never be obtained and others are difficult due to the absence of the male guardian. According to investor Loulwa al-Saidan, she faces many obstacles when trying to sell or buy a property. She has to take two men to the court to confirm her identity and then another four men to confirm that the other two are trustworthy witnesses. Guardian related rules hinders back Saudi business women in running and developing their businesses and sometimes even in starting them up.

Al Hayat Journalist Amjad Rida was promoted to be the new vice editor in chief in 1998. Her promotion was soon abolished when some men employees objected to the promotion and threatened the newspaper with their resignation (Al-Khamri, 2008). Another journalist Sabria Jawhar was not permitted into a press conference she was covering because guards wouldn't let her in. According to Hana' Al-Khamri, women journalists do not write their tribal or last names after their columns out of fear. They fear harassment from conservatives who object to women's employment.

The working conditions for women were also looked at from other angles. For example, Buzbee's interview with Reporter Hoda Al Salem exposed the difficulty working women face in Saudi. She talks about her experience in Saudi's largely circulated newspaper Al Riyadh. Working environment in the newspaper is customized to the country's sex segregation policy. Women work behind closed offices where they take off their abayas and veils. Every morning the office boy from the male's side would come leave a pile of letters, faxes and important documents at

the door for the women to pick up after he has left. She has never met the editor who is her direct boss. If they have to cover a certain event or speech, the newspaper provides them with a car and a driver since women cannot drive. During the event, women are seated in a different room and they cannot ask the speaker questions (Buzbee, 2001). According to Al Salem, most Saudi women journalists were appointed by pure luck. None of them attended journalism school; however, they are mostly good writers since their childhood. When Al Salem was writing about how Saudi boys spend their spare time, she faced many obstacles trying to interview them. She cannot meet them in a fast-food place nor wait outside their homes or schools. Finally she was able to fax questionnaires to internet cafes where young men usually go. Facing many difficulties surveying men, Al Salem and women journalists usually focus on women's topics to avoid problems.

III. Internet:

No doubt that technology has affected nations and cultures applying it; however, the question remains whether Saudi's well established culture has been affected by technology or not. In fact, Saudi's resistance to change is strong enough to preserve its culture against the imported technology as much as possible.

Saudi's goal is to adopt the technology while avoiding its accompanied "devil" or religiously believed sins. For example, women have not been able to benefit from the technology of automotives since women's driving is perceived as a sinful act that brings shame to the family. Women whom in the past were camel riders are now just passive riders in the technology of automotives (Elmusa, 1997). To the Saudi culture, they are making the best of the foreign technology by importing the latest cars while forbidding women to drive. On the other hand, technology that helps

in preserving the culture is highly imported and appreciated such as education technological techniques. Lack of female teachers does not cause a trouble now since male existent teachers can use audio visual techniques to teach without mixing or seeing female students.

Only in 1997 that Saudi started considering introducing the internet to the public. Those opposing to such a move anticipated danger to the Saudi culture and religion; in other words, they feared the “westernization” accompanied by the Internet (Teitelbaum, 2002). “King Abd El Aziz City for Science and Technology” (KACST) was in charge with introducing, setting up, enforcing laws and monitoring Internet in Saudi. Those interested in being service providers had to sign on abiding certain rules that included forbidding pornography and gambling websites as well as sites that violates cultural, religious and political values of the Saudi community. If internet surfers seek websites that are banned, a message will appear on the screen that says this website is not allowed and asks them to fill a form out if they think that this website should not be blocked. Though one might think that KACST receive many requests to unblock websites that they perceive harmless, they confirmed that they received hundreds requests from the public to block many more websites (Teitelbaum, 2002).

The phenomenon of Saudi women using the internet is growing rapidly. The Internet has given them room for freedom and independence away from the society’s constraints. No mahram (male guardian) or permission is needed; hence, women were opened up to a novel arena of freedom, networking, socializing, entertainment and knowledge. Being anonymous on the internet allowed Saudi women to turn to chat rooms and speak freely about any topic. They talk about sex, love and raise questions about their status in the society. As Teitelbaum (2002) mentioned, Saudi women’s

interest in the Internet urged companies to create female run websites. Laki Anti (i.e. For you), for instance, is a website exclusive for women where many topics discussed revolve around religion, family and other social issues. When women require technical help, Laki Anti women technicians answer their questions and offer help. Other female websites benefited from Laki Anti's success and created similar sites (Teitelbaum, 2002).

Anonymity allowed women to create personal blogs and websites where they write about their lives and experiences freely. The government and appointed KACST to monitor the blogs closely and block any blog harming the country's welfare. Blog contents vary between chronicles to more outrages blogs (Abou Alsamh, 2002). Farah Aziz's blog for instance, causes no anxiety for the KACST since she records the educational experiences of college students with their professors. However, as Abou Alsamh stated the Saudi Eve's blog has been blocked on the 2nd of June 2006 when she wrote about her love life and Islam. No one really knows why her blog was banned, but she believes that the KACST blocked her since God, Love and sex were mentioned in the same post together. To many Saudis, talking about God and sex in the same blog is extremely offensive to Islam. To the Saudi community, romance is inoffensive only when written in English.

As Abou Alsamh (2002) has cited, Saudis themselves are as concerned about preserving their culture as their government and officials. Hence, many of them acted as unpaid un-hired watchdogs. Recently Mohamed Al Mossaed and his friends formed the "Official Community of Saudi Arabian Bloggers" which is a group that helps the KACST by reporting blogs they think are offensive to the Saudi community (Abou Alsamh, 2002). Such groups along with Internet engineers believe that their mission is to inform fathers and guardians of what the Internet might do to their

female subordinates. As the British Daily Mail (2008) newspaper reported, a father murdered his daughter when he found about her chats with a Saudi man on Facebook. He says that he read about Saudi girls who used Facebook to show their revealing photos and have web cam conversations with the other sex. Therefore, with the zero tolerance existence in Saudi in general, he committed his act to preserve the honor of his family.

IV. Driving:

According to Doumato (1992), the fear of invasion aroused among Saudis during the Gulf war, urged King Fahd to request the help of Americans. To protect the Kingdom, the American troops and military settled in the lands of Kingdom. These troops involved women personnel who were extremely visible to the Saudi community. A month later, the king encouraged governments to train and employ Saudi women in medical and civil defense services. In other words, women were called upon to join the change occurring in Saudi. King Fahd urged institutions of the public and private sectors to hire more women in the medical fields as well as the social services. Women from the royal families as well as others were volunteering for the training sessions across the kingdom. During this time, the conservative influence was weak which allowed Saudi to promote women's participation in different areas. Feelings of hope were felt by the people of Saudi which encouraged women to ask for more. They saw this attempt as a path for a brighter future; hence, a letter signed by Saudi women was addressed to Riyadh governor, Prince Salman bin Abdel Aziz. In the letter, Saudi women recognized the King's efforts to improve their status and hence asked for their right to drive. Being optimistic, women felt that their request will be approved; but no reply was given.

In 1990, around 50 women sent their drivers away and drove their cars in the streets of Riyadh calling for their right to drive. The angry response from the country was strong and immediate. The Ministry of Interior issued a law banning the women to drive, governments fired the working women who participated in the demonstration and their names were published to humiliate them as well as their families (Doumato, 1991). A "fatwa" was issued by the the religious police and Ulema of Saudi banning the women from driving. They considered it as a religious sin and to those who commit it as objectors to the sayings of God's Shari'a.

Such incident was reported from different angles. For example, a report by Ambah (2009) mentioned that, King Abdullah received a petition signed by almost 500 women who wanted to maintain the ban. They wrote about the harassments they suffer in malls, streets and working places and mentioned that it will increase if they were allowed to drive.

Also, Beichman's (2007) interview with Legal advisor Abdel Mohsen El Obkan, further portrayed support to the ban. He said that allowing women to drive would only cause harm and danger to the women driving and would cause unnecessary road congestion.

On the hand, many reports focused on the hostility of the Saudi's reaction to the strike. According to Doumato (1992), a list of participating women full names were posted across the country titled "sluts and promoters of corruption". Participating women were fired from their jobs, had their passports taken away and harassed by anonymous phone calls. Media was used to deliver the messages of the government. For example, one of the children's programs aired a song by the young girls singing "we Saudi women shall never drive a car".

Moreover, the British Daily Mail (2008) newspaper reported the arrest of a Saudi woman who was caught driving in the streets of Buraida city. While trying to get to her sick husband, police arrested her and forced her husband to sign a statement that as her guardian, he is responsible for banning her from driving ever again.

Other reports focused on the Saudi women's wishes for the ban to be lifted. Faiza Ambah's (2005) report focused on the 15th anniversary of the driving demonstration celebration by the Saudi women in a rented hall in Riyadh. These women privately met and discussed the issue. As Professor Fawzia Al Bakri mentioned she never thought that after 15 years the ban still exists and women will be reunited for its anniversary (Ambah, 2005). Women in the reunion agreed that they are not fighting for the sake of driving itself, but for the principle itself. To them, driving is a symbol of women's freedom and rights. One of the 1990 demonstration participants confirmed that she shall never drive even if the ban is lifted and she would still hire a driver. For her it is a matter of women empowerment.

Another event was the three minute video of Wajeha Huwaider driving her car in the streets of the Kingdom that was posted on YouTube (BBC News, 2008). In the clip, Huwaider drives her car in a private compound where women are allowed to drive; but then suddenly she takes an exist out of the compound and drives peacefully in a highway challenging the Saudi laws. The video was posted on the celebrated International Women day. To her, such act may urge the government to left the ban imposed on women in Saudi Arabia. Though Saudi conservatives see women driving "sinful" since it allows integration of both genders, King Abdullah believes that the day when women drive will soon come.

Also as Faiza Ambah (2005) mentioned, Mohammed El Zulfa completed a study of the pros and cons of women driving and proposed it to the responsible

officials who buried his study in a glance. Zulfa said that he received thousands of threat and anger calls, emails and faxes from Saudis who accused him of harming the harmony of the Islamic nation. Additionally, author Zuhair Kutbi (1998) believes that banning women to drive is not a religious driven law; but a cultural one. He says that there will be no door to hell labeled women drivers; however, those who sit alone with unrelated foreign drivers will be punished by God who specifically banned the non relative gender mingling.

Just two days before this thesis was defended, “Najla Alhariri”, a Saudi woman, drove her children to school herself. She was home with two cars and no driver to take her children to school; therefore, she decided to take them herself. According to the BBC news (Buchanan, 2011), she holds two driving licenses from Egypt and Lebanon where she lived for many years. The feedback was astonishing, Saudi women praised her and considered her a hero. Supporters of such a move created a Facebook group in which many Saudi and non Saudi women honored her. Her Twitter page was filled with tweets from hundreds of women who admired her and promised to follow her steps soon. According to Alhariri, the revolutions taking place in the Middle East urged her to do so (global voices, 2011). She also said that not being stopped nor arrested encouraged her to continue driving.

V. Gang Rape Incident:

The story of the Qatif girl shocked the Saudi community as well as the international arena. As a 16 year old teenager, she got involved in a relationship with a man who took many pictures of her. Later when she turned 18 years old and married another man, she wanted to take back the pictures her ex boyfriend took out of scandal fear. On the day they agreed to meet, her ex boyfriend along with other 6 men

kidnapped and raped her over 14 times. At first she was accused of adultery as she went to meet a non relative man and was sentenced to 90 lashes; but then when she and her lawyer raised the matter to the global media to gain sympathy, the judges raised the charges to 200 lashes.

Abdul Rahman Allahem, the Qatif girl's lawyer has been suspended for talking to the media about the case. His statements have caused an international outcry and criticism to the Saudi government. He has been known for his controversial cases he takes. He is a chief defender of women's rights in Saudi Arabia. In 2006, he defended the couple who were forced to divorce because of the wife's brothers. The wife and husband have been living happily until her brothers disapproved of his tribal and ethnic affiliation and forced their sister to separate (The Guardian, 2007).

The story was covered differently by different media. For example, the local coverage focused on the Saudi people's reaction who approved the punishment. According to the "Arab News" editor Rasheed Abou- Alsamh, some Saudis approve of her being lashed because of her meeting with a stranger. However, most of them believe that she has been through enough suffering and pain (The Guardian, 2007). The gang rape she went through is enough of a punishment to her and so her charges should be dropped.

International coverage was different. Most of the countries' officials and citizens were shocked by the judgment and expressed their disappointment on the international media. As the Canadian National Post (2007) reported, Hilary Clinton aggressively asked Bush during his presidential years to contact King Abdullah and intervene in the gang rape incident. She called for the drop of the cruel sentence. She

said that if she to be elected she would put human rights as America's top priority role all over the world.

Though the United States showed little criticism to the Qatif girl's sentence, Canada reported its protest to the Saudi authorities. Canada's Minister Josse Verner, who is in charge with women's condition and status, said that Canada has formally showed its disapproval to those in charge (The Globe, 2007). It also described the charges as barbaric.

CNN interviewed the Qatif girl's husband who said that the judges saw her as a guilty person before the hearing. Moreover, judges were mean to her and disregarded the criminals' gestures and looks to her. Human Rights Watch researcher Farida Deif, who interviewed the Qatif girl, confirmed that one of the rapists filmed the gang rape. The victim and her lawyer tried using the film as evidence to the assault; but the judges refused (Eltahawy, 2007).

Since the international coverage of the incident was more visible and had a greater effect, Saudi's administration had to react to calm the international outcry. As the Birmingham Evening Mail newspaper mentioned, a statement from the Justice Ministry was released to calm the international anxiety about the gang raped girl. The statement confirmed that the girl confessed her adultery. According to them, she said that she has had an affair with one of the rapist while she was married. The Ministry's statement intended to show the "truth" about the Qatif girl and refute the "false" information portrayed in the media about the unjust condition of Saudi women. Moreover, the King of Saudi Arabia pardoned the victim's case. The level of stress, humiliation and torture the victim went through is an enough punishment, said the King. The Qatif girl and her husband were relieved, but this does not assure relief from the social humiliation (The Globe, 2007).

The New York Times (2007) reports claim that the Qatif girl's brother has been trying to kill her after the rape to wash out the family's honor. Abdul Mohsen Alakkas, the social affairs minister, said that many accused Saudi women fear their relatives' reactions to crimes they committed to the extent that many of them refuse to depart the prison by the end of their sentence. His ministry has been offering shelters and houses to those of similar cases. He confirmed that Qatif girl will be offered that if she asked for one (The New York Times, 2007).

VI. Marriage:

When it comes to marriage and divorce, some believe that Saudi women have power in their relationships with their husbands to be or with their current spouses while others think otherwise. For example, Saudi researcher Soraya Al Toriki (1977) claims that women in Saudi enjoy supreme power in family organizations. To prove this she carries field research on Jeddah elite societies in the issues of marriage, travel and education. According to her, marriages in Saudi give power to women more than men in many cases. Power here means the capability of affecting others' behaviors as well as maneuvering negotiations to satisfy their own preferences. Sex segregation in Saudi allows the mothers and sisters of the groom to mingle with the future candidate brides rather than the fathers or the grooms themselves. Therefore, the women deliver the information they wish to transmit to the grooms. The groom trusts the mother's view of the bride since she is the only one from his family to see and interact with her. If the mother thinks that the girl would make a good daughter in law, she would "sweet talk" about the bride's beauty, charisma and good qualities and vice versa. The mother's opinion is formed according to her own view of the bride rather than her son's and so she imposes her own preference over his. Although sometimes in Saudi

communities the father of the groom gives a range of potential families, the mother still has the power to manipulate information and narrow the range to those who make up obedient daughters in law. Moreover, the brides enjoy much more power than assumed. Though they cannot go out and choose their husbands, they can refuse a certain proposal. They have the veto power and they use it well.

In her book, Samiyah Alkhashab (1989), she interviewed 450 female students in King Abdel Aziz University in Jeddah. Results showed that Saudi university girls can choose their husbands and they actually search for certain qualities. They prefer marrying a person who is not a widow or divorced and of the same nationality but of a higher education level than theirs. Younger women generations were more supportive of women's work and financial contribution to the house expenses. When asked to rank certain qualities according to importance, personality ranked as most important followed by emotional chemistry, educational level, family, status in the society and wealth as the least important.

Other media viewed Saudi women as suppressed and disregarded when it comes to their marriages. Their fathers or male guardians have the say in whom they marry or whom they do not marry. Divorce carries its miseries too for the Saudi women. Therefore, women suffer both before and after their marriages.

For example, as the Gazette newspaper reported (2009), the 50 year old man who married the 9 year old girl. According to Ahmed Al Mohi, religious scholar, there is no specific age for Islamic marriage; but the father or guardian has the right to marry off his daughter in the time he chooses. Hence, though the mother rejected the marriage, the girl got married with her father's approval. Although Al Mohi sees marriage as a way to secure the young girls' futures, a wife can reject the marriage contract when she reaches puberty (The Gazette, 2009).

Another striking setback in the women's condition in Saudi was released when a Saudi judge said that it is acceptable for a husband to slap his wife if she wasted his money extravagantly (The Boston Globe, 2009). Judge Hamad Al Razine (2009) mentioned to the Arab News that if a woman spent most of her husband's salary on buying useless branded clothes for herself then she deserves a slap from her husband.

As highlighted by Asia News reports (2007), Saudis also face many difficulties when wanting to marry a non Saudi. According to the intermarriage law of Saudi, the non Saudi partner has to meet a certain criteria set by the government: having acceptable nationality and religion (must be Muslim). A permission is needed from the Interior Affairs Ministry before the marriage which in turn ensures that the desired partner meet the set criteria. However, Saudi women face many more challenges pre and post their marriage than Saudi men do. Pre marriage permission is harder for women to get than it is for men. Almost any Saudi man can get the permission if his non Saudi partner meets the criteria. They may also marry non Muslims. On the other hand, not every woman's proposal is accepted and the non Saudi partner must be Muslim. Men may also pass their nationality to their foreign wives and children while Saudi women cannot. Women who are divorced or passed a certain age, i.e. 30, have better chances in approving their proposals.

Saudi Divorce Forum in Dammam was the first meeting where Saudi women talked about the problems they face during and after their divorces. According to Caryle Murphy's reports (2008), around 150 women gathered in the auditorium with one aim in mind: helping the divorced women legally, socially and psychologically. In a community like Saudi, women are heavily blamed for their failed marriages. This tears down the feelings of the divorcee and makes her blame herself too. Legally,

women have no right to speak or resort to the courts without their male guardians and since they are divorced they seek their fathers' help back to voice them out. However, by the time they are divorced, the fathers have either passed away or ashamed of the fact that their daughters are divorced and so divorced women remain voiceless and helpless. In the forum, women shared their experiences and discussed ways to help themselves. Luluah Al Shammari claimed that the divorce rates are rising since men in Saudi are brought up to think that they are the masters of the house and they must control everything in it including their wives. Refusing to be treated as a property, women seek divorce from controlling husbands. Psychologically and socially, divorced women are treated differently. Families look at them as a source of shame and fear that related unmarried girls would have fewer chances of marriage proposals. Their female friends do not like to be associated with them and their husbands and parents would actually ban them from seeing their divorced friends. The society as a whole would look down upon them.

VII. Guardianship:

Having a male companion when performing any basic routine in Saudi, is a must. The husband, father, uncle or brother guardianship over their women is negatively covered by the media.

After Human Rights Watch based in New York interviewed 100 Saudi women, it concluded that male guardian enforced in the kingdom put them in misery as they cannot pursue their lives as they wish to. As reported by Lara Setrakian (2008), male guardians deprive them of their freedom, hinder their education process and limit their marriage options as well as careers. According to the guardian law in Saudi, women are part of their father, husband or closest male relative custody while

divorcees or widows are under their sons' charge. Wajeda El Huwaider, one of the women interviewed, talked furiously about her 17 year old son. She wondered how government trusts her teenage son more than they trust her. She has to take his permission before travelling, working, or even having a surgery. Saudi women strive for protection from their men and officials. Legally, women above the age of forty five do not need permission from their male guardian to travel; but airport personnel insist on seeing the document (Economist, 2008). Moreover, women may work only if their husbands or fathers allow them. Girls can be forced to marry since only the fathers' approval counts (Almohamed, 2007).

According to the Human Rights Watch (2008), Saudi government does not want to jeopardize the men's control over their women; hence, they forgo women's basic rights. Women cannot take actions independently when it comes to their children's futures. They cannot enroll them, ask for their schooling documents, open account for them or even travel with them without her husband's presence or written permission.

As journalist Aber Mishkhas says, every time Saudi women are one step ahead, an invisible force drags them back. They managed to get personal IDs independently but their male guardian has to give his approval, they can have independent passports, but a male guardian has to permit the travel and yes they now own businesses but the male guardian's approval in any action is a mandatory. Governmental work is also of male's tasks since women are not permitted to do so unless accompanied by male guardian or dealing with female-only government departments which are not a lot (Theodoulou, 2003).

Belonging to such a closed community, Saudi women suffer from domestic abuse and sexual harassment. Men hit their wives with no cases reported out of social

and physical fear. Sexual harassment cases are very common in Saudi starting from fathers to relatives (Almohamed, 2007). Unfortunately, when women resorted to court, men were not punished or received light sentence while women either received severe punishments from the court or the society. A famous case of the thirty year old woman who was shot by her husband proves that Saudi women need protection in their country. The wife was shot twice by her husband, but she refused to report him since the court would ask for a male guardian to speak for her. She had no male guardian other than her husband. And so, having not reported, she was killed by the third time he shot her (Economist, 2008).

On the other hand, some saw hope and change in the guardian rules. According to the Women's International Network News (2000), the rules became less rigid in many ways. In end of the year 1999, Prince Ahmed gave women the right to hold their own identity cards separate from those of their fathers or husbands. Prince Ahmed, interior minister, mentioned that women will no longer need to carry around photocopies of their male guardians' IDs since they will be granted one of their own (Women's International Network News, 2000). Also, Reuters lately reported that Saudi women can now check in hotels and stay on their own without the need for a male's signature or even presence. Such a matter may be a right taken for granted in most countries; but in Saudi where women cannot dinner alone, it is considered a major reform.

VIII. Saudi Women in the Cinema:

On a recent "American Dad" animated cartoon aired on Fox, an alien started living with this American family. When the daughter decided to take the alien for a walk on the beach, she dressed the alien a full cover-up from head to toe that only the

alien's eyes can show. The alien was upset and said "you don't have to dress me like a Saudi woman to take me to the beach"; the daughter then replied by saying "this was the only way, I don't want my friends to see you".

Attending a movie in a cinema or a theatre is taken for granted by many westerns or even Arabs; however, Saudi has no theatres. Saudis either travels miles out of their country to watch the movie or watch it on TV or rent/buy the DVD to watch a film. Saudi's neighbor country "Bahrain" is always filled with Saudis coming on weekends to catch a movie. Movies rented or sold in the country are censored from any offensive words, actions or sexual attempts before put on display; in fact, many movies do not make it into the Kingdom for its excessive sexual or political display.

Many movies, from different nationalities, portray Saudis in either a negative or positive way. What matters is that these films, scenes or event one minute shots watched affects the viewers' perception of Saudis. For example in Egyptian movies, Saudi men are mostly portrayed as rich fat men sitting in a bar and throwing tons of money on the belly dancer. The Egyptian movie "Seventh Sense" showed an image of a Saudi man watching the news with his four face covered wives and ten children. Being exposed to such images over a long period of time, a person's perception is more likely to be affected by the constant images he/she views.

Below, some foreign and Saudi movies are analyzed.

a) Foreign Movies:

i. *Death of a Princess:*

This 1980 British produced film is about one of Saudi's princesses who was executed along with her lover by her family for the crime of adultery. At the beginning of the film, scenes of Saudi princesses cruising their cars in the streets of

Riyadh in search for men are shown. The Saudi feedback on the film was harsh where the government actually attempted to stop the screening of the movie in many countries. To the Saudi citizens, this movie insulted their princesses and accused them of adultery, driving their cars and with no morals. Under the Saudi pressure, many countries either banned the movie or wrote an introductory comment before the beginning of the film ensuring that the meant princess is not Saudi. The actress who played in the movie “Suzan Abu Taleb” intentionally changed her name after the film out of fear for her career. She is now known as “Sawsan Badr”.

ii. The Kingdom:

The American movie “The Kingdom” was produced in 2007 and directed by the American Peter Berg. The series of bombings occurring in Saudi’s compounds (inhabited by Americans and other nationalities) inspired the creators of the movie. The film is about an American FBI team coming to Saudi’s capital to investigate on a bombing and look for the terrorists. Throughout the film, the team stops many other terrorists’ attacks committed by Saudis against Americans and foreigners living in Saudi’s compounds.

Through the director’s lens, viewers get a glimpse on Saudi women. Throughout the film, images of Saudi women fully covered from head to toe are constantly shown. In many shots women are seen walking in groups behind men. Even “Mayes”, the only female in the FBI team, was forced to wear the abaya as soon as she entered the Kingdom. The gym in one of the compounds was where the FBI team slept. The place was set up with a curtain in the middle so that “Mayes” could sleep away from the men’s beds. Also, when one of the Saudi’s princes invited the team over dinner, “Mayes” was not invited to the men’s reception gathering because of her sex.

iii. Lawrence of Arabia:

The 1962 British film *Lawrence of Arabia* is about T. E. Lawrence's experience in the Arabian Peninsula, i.e. Saudi, during the World War one. One of the scenes gave a glimpse of Arabian women. When Lawrence went to meet one of the tribes' leaders in his tent; women come in carrying trays of food and fruits. Women, of course, completely body and face covered rush to exist the tent where a strange man is present. All the women in the tents surrounding the leader's tent were also hiding away from the strange man; however, since Lawrence looks different than any other man in their tribe, women sneak a look at him behind the curtains without being noticed.

b) Saudi Movies:

Many short low budget movies were produced by Saudis to portray the Saudi life. These movies, being short and low financed, were not watched by many. But they are still worth to be mentioned as first movie attempts.

Haifa Al Mansor is the first Saudi female director who produced three short movies. According to her, she received many emails, messages and calls that insulted her (Rasmussen, 2010). Some actually threatened to kill her; but Haifa remains calm and continues with her mission. The most famous of them all is the movie "Women Without Shadows", which is about the women's lives inside the Kingdom; how they dress and live in Saudi. The film was screened in many festivals such as Oman and Damascus and received many awards. Her new film will also tackle another angle about women's life in Saudi.

Her first movie "Who?" was seen by Saudis online. It talked about a male killer who wears abaya and niqab and knocks at doors. Women allow him in thinking

that he is one of their female friends; then he kills them and steals their money. Saudis objected to Al Mansor's view on the official "Islamic" Saudi dress code. For that, she raised a lot of hate against her.

Another short film by Mohammed Al Khalif is being produced now. But Al Khalif is struggling to find a Saudi woman who agrees to star his movie. The Film is called "Garbage Bag" and it is about a Saudi woman who gets stuck in a public bathroom since her abaya was stolen. The movie shows her struggle inside the restroom until she turns a garbage bag to an abaya and finally leaves the bathroom. According to Faiza Ambah (2009), Khalif and many other are part of a group called "Talashi" or "Fade Out" whose mission is questioning their country's strictness along with passion and love for film production.

Abdallah Al Mohessein's "Cinema 500 km" and "Oppression of Silence" are two Saudi short movies. The first is about a Saudi man's journey to Bahrain to attend a movie theatre while the second is about government oppression.

Though there exist market for film production, only two long big budget movies were produced: Keif el Hal (How are you?) and Menahi. The cast in both movies were not fully Saudis and parts or most of the films were shot out of the Kingdom to avoid strict regulations.

i. Keif Al Hal:

This comedy is about a Saudi family torn between Saudi tradition and modernity. The film is the first long big budget Saudi movie. It was produced by Rotana and shot in Dubai. Director of the movie is a Palestinian with a Canadian passport and the script writers are an Egyptian and a Lebanese. Actors were Saudi, Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti, but it was starred by the first Saudi female cinema actor

ever “Hend”. Hend Mohammed’s voice is recognized by many Saudis since she has always worked in the radio stations and on animated translated cartoons, but this movie is the first film that shows her face to the population.

The movie was shown in the “Cannes Film Festival” and watched by many westerns. Saudis were able to watch the movie in many Arab countries’ theatres such as Cairo, Dubai and Bahrain. Showtime also aired the movie for a prepaid fee. The movie is about a girl “Mais Hemdan” who struggles with her family. She works as a journalist behind their back out of fear. She also falls in love with her cousin who works as a director. Her brother, tries marrying her off to one of the fundamentalists as he objects to the cousin’s “western evil” lifestyle. A tension between the family is felt throughout the movie. For example, during their vacation in Dubai, the daughter takes off her abaya and headscarf and wears jeans with a top. The father does not mind while her brother objects.

Saudi’s negative side is slightly portrayed in this movie in a comic way. For example, one of the actors keeps annoying a woman (covered from head to toe). Finally when he threw his number to her (an old Saudi technique that has been used by men when trying to approach women), he finds out that the woman is his mother's friend.

The creators of the movie were very careful about not offending any Saudi tradition or taboo. They intended to show the good and less good side of the Saudi family. At the end of the movie the fundamentalist brother agrees to marry his sister to their director cousin.

ii. Menahi:

Menahi is the second long movie produced in 2009 by Rotana. The movie is a comedy about a Saudi man's first journey out of the Kingdom. This film is special because it was watched by Saudis not in nearby countries nor on TV; however, they watched it in movie theatres in their own country. For the first in many decades, Saudis were able to watch a movie in a theatre in the Kingdom. Men, boys and girls up to 10 or 12 were allowed to attend; but women and girls older than 13 could not.

Opening a theatre caused some chaos in the Kingdom where many conservative Saudis objected to the idea. Groups of men gathered in front of the theatres trying to prevent the audience from entering, other Islamic clerics lectured, during prayer times, the people about the "evil" cinemas and how Islam forbids these gatherings (Abu Nasr, 2009). Fayz Al-Malki, the lead actor of the movie, said that he received many calls and messages from angry Saudis who cursed him and accused him of spreading evil, but he insists that Islam does not forbid movies that are free from any sexual content.

IX. Television:

Saudi women were never allowed to work in Television; then they were only allowed to work behind the cameras. Up until the former Saudi information minister Iyad Madani (2009) allowed women to work behind and in front of the camera. They interviewed men and they hosted many programs. Though they showed their faces, head veils were a must in the Saudi TV. Not all the media focused on the huge change in the history of Saudi; but many covered and portrayed the criticisms the minister went through for taking such a decision.

For example, one of the Sheikhs mentioned that women can use satellite channels to teach Islam and Sahri'a to other women. He said that they can take off their face veil; but must keep their abayas and head veils. Soon after the release of such a statement, Sheikh Al Fawzan fought against the idea claiming that even the women's voices is an awra; i.e. should not be seen or heard by any male except mahram (El Youssef, 2004).

As journalist Asmaa Almohamed (2007) confirms, Saudi women do not just appear in the media every day. Even if the society accepts women's achievements in different fields, they are still not ready to see them in TV shows or newspapers. Women of the royal family also have limited media coverage over them. Only in 2005, Princess Loulwa, King Faisal's daughter, got huge media coverage over her presence along with other Saudi women delegates in foreign trade conference.

Sohaylah Hammad (1984) sees women who work in the media as sinful victims of the media. To her, they are not improving but moving backwards even further since they are only readers of lines written by other men. She sees no good in women revealing their faces and wearing tons of makeup over them. If a woman wishes to work in the media then her role should only be behind the camera and not exceed writing stories or gathering information. She believes that other non media jobs that Islam approves would be teaching and nursing.

Moreover, England's Leicester University's Professor Atif Nassif (2008) conducted a content analysis of Saudi Arabia's advertisements aired on Saudi's terrestrial channel one. Saudi's media is very much controlled by the government and any advertisement aired, must be approved by the government which follow the Islamic Shari'a law. Therefore, Saudi marketers and advertisers face a difficulty in promoting their brand within the Islamic and culture restrictions. However, it has to

be noted that Saudi's advertising expenditure is one of the largest and most rapid growing of the world. The sample analyzed included 164 ads aired between May and April in the years 2000 and 2001. In general, results showed that men leads outnumbered women in ads aired in Saudi. Men appeared more in leisure ads while women were mostly performing household related ads. If the ad had a female lead, the setting would prevalently take place indoors (living room, kitchen or hair salons for instance); while male leads ads would normally have an outdoor setting (desert, garden, restaurant...etc). Moreover, male voiceovers were more common in Saudi Arabia. Overall, gender stereotyping is strongly felt in Saudi adverts where women only act the personal and house care and men act all the rest such as beverage, bookstores, restaurants...etc. (Nassif, 2008).

X. Human Rights Watch:

Human Rights Watch has been very critical of Saudi when dealing with its women. The HRW criticism has been heavily portrayed in the media.

For example, the United Nations' anti discrimination committee concluded that according to past incidents and present laws, women are in need of more protection and less discrimination. However, the Saudi officials claimed that there exists no discrimination against Saudi women (Harrison, 2008).

Though Saudi officials say that they abolished some of the rules concerning women, such as male signed permission or presence for women travelling or even receiving health care, Human Rights Watch confirms its existence. HRW reported that doctors require the presence of a male guardian or else they would not treat the female patients. The doctors interviewed by the HRW personals said that when women appear without a male guardian, they must be reported to the police who in

turn force them to refuse treating or discharging them until a guardian comes. Al Watan newspaper (2008) backs up HRW's report when it released interviews with some Saudi doctors who said that the Health Ministry still obliges them to ask for a guardian's presence or permission.

Human rights watchdog 2008's report condemned the continuous discrimination against women. According to the report, Saudi officials forgo women's rights to sustain the male control and power. Data collected from almost 100 interviews show that women have no control over their children's lives nor theirs (The Guardian, 2008).

Creating women's unions and support groups is beneficial for helping Saudi women. However, as Nora Pharaon (2004) mentioned that women's unions, associations and other groups are not acceptable in Saudi unless they have a charity cause. Women self improving and empowerment groups are forbidden, for instance. However, women from the royal family took the initiative in the 80s and started forming charitable groups that helped disabled handicapped children, poor women and those in need. They stayed away from politics and controversial issues and did not cross the line (Pharaon, 2004).

XI. Women's Satisfaction:

Media has portrayed Saudi women's dissatisfaction with their condition. For example, a rare study was conducted by Salwa Al Khatib in 2006 proved Saudi women's suicide cases reported are much higher than those of men; 96 and 4 respectively. Reasons for women suicide reported vary between forced marriage arrangements, lack of family communication, closed community sufferings and the life style of the average Saudi women in general (Hassan, 2007).

In Heinrichsdorff Bagader's book (1998), he chose a selection of stories that were written by Saudi writers and represent their frustrations. For example, a story by Najat Khayyat titled "Had I Been Male" tackles arranged forced marriages in Saudi. Another story by Wafa Munawwar titled "The Duties of a Working Mother" deals with Saudi working mothers and wives. The story shows her busy life schedule between her job, house, husband, children's home works and their sports and dentist appointments. Although she lacks a good rest and sleep, she refuses to give up the career she loves. Hence, the story shows the life of working mothers in Saudi where no man is willing to help with the housework or even children. Another story by Amal Abdul Hamid titled "In a Puzzling Whirlwind" revolves around women infertility in Saudi. Since women are seen as child bearers, the society does not tolerate those who are incapable of carrying one. Furthermore, "The Reflection" by Khayriyyah as-Saqqaf talks about girls running away from their houses hoping for a better life. To escape her loneliness and boredom, she accepted marrying the first man knocking on their door. Though she found him very repulsive, she married him.

However, when other media spoke to Saudi women, they expressed their satisfaction and happiness with their status in the society. A project by BBC and BBC Arabia (2005) jointly took a deeper look into the lives of young female Arabs. They spoke to the women of Jeddah who struggle to have their voices listened to. Quotes from these women represent a side of Saudi that has been ignored by the media. The project called "My Life" asks the women of what they would be doing or achieved by 2015. Hasna sees herself owning a publishing house while Rotana and Abla want to be in a position where they can prove that Saudi women are smart and ambitious. Rosana sees herself as a happy stay home wife and mother since this is the ultimate

happiness for her. “My Life” represented a happy satisfied side of the Saudi women whether they decided to work or stay home.

Moreover, the idea of suppressed Saudi women is a myth to researcher Delinda Hanley (2001) since almost every Saudi woman she met expressed her happiness and satisfaction. She came across successful journalists, doctors, business women, teachers and principals. According to Dr. Thoraya Ahmed, director of the UN’s Population Fund, Saudi women must be responsible for proving the myth wrong and changing the stereotype.

As part of the USA’s public diplomacy programs, Karen Hughes was responsible for spreading the message of the American to the Arab world. In Saudi, she met almost 500 women in one of the universities ballrooms. As she talked about the Saudi Muslim women frustrations of not being able to vote, drive or take part of the society, most of the audience challenged her (Weisman, 2005). In fact, one of the women stood up and talked about how happy Saudi women are with their position in the society; heartfelt applauses followed her statements. New York Times conducted several interviews with members of the audience to talk about their feedback which was not what Hughes or her aides predicted. Professor Nadia Jambi said furiously that she was not banned from talking to the other sex. She interacts with men in conferences, streets, supermarkets, malls and at work. Dr. Siddiqa Kamal, on the other hand talked about her passionless desire for driving cars. She said that we, Saudi women, do not want to drive cars around the Kingdom. Her daughter added that Saudi women have more rights than men and than any other foreign women. Nour El Sabbagh, a student, mentioned that she loves the abaya she wears. She also wondered why westerns believe that they are enforced to wear them when Saudis love their abayas and wear them contentedly (Weisman, 2005).

Though non-Saudis view abayas that Saudi women wear as one of the government's ways of suppression, women have no problems with it as Peyman Pejman reported (2004). Saudi women have been brought up in a conservative society that demands body and hair coverage since girls' puberty or even before it. The way women value Islamic traditions create no room for abaya discussion. For example, Mohsen al-Awaji is considered one of the most liberal Islamic activists who approve women carrying their own identification cards, driving and voting; but he is strictly against women abandoning their abayas (Pejman, 2004).

Saudi women consider themselves as the luckiest women on earth. They are very proud of their condition and status in the society and perceive their nation as the closest to ideal Islamic country where western values have no room to grow. In Riyadh's Maimouna Center, almost 500 women gathered for their veil defense as Faiza Ambah reported (2006). The lecturers, Mashael Eissa and Afrah Humaydi, gave speeches on women's responsibilities to God and their religion. They called for the protection of their veil and abaya and they urged women to dress their daughters modestly and raise them according to Islam's demands. Eissa fought against the Western values in any form and asked the women to do so as well. Even if the government or people allow us to deal with men for instance, we will not because God is watching us, she mentioned. Our pure Islamic nation and our love for God is greater than any western influence.

Many Saudi women are rising up and becoming pioneers in different fields to substitute for the absence years. No other nation was able to match the success of Saudi women in the past couple of years (Saud, 2009). For example, Ghada Ba'aqeel has recently been elected as the world's best female business for her noticeable achievements in establishing successful businesses for women in the Kingdom. Hayat

Sindi was also internationally rewarded for her academic research and medical invention. Sindi and her team successfully created a device called “Diagnostic For All” that helps in making medical tools cheaper in price, smaller in size; hence available. Pediatrician Howaida Al Qethamy was selected as the number one pediatric doctor in the Middle East and the second world wide. Soraya Al Turki is an anthropology professor known for her numerous research and lectures in top universities such as George Washington and American University in Cairo (Saud, 2009).

Elizabeth Scharpf (2007) interviewed three of the most famous women in Saudi: Lama Al Sulaiman, Nashwa Taher and Basmah Omair. The first two are the first Saudi women to run in elections and win seats in the “Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry” while the latter is the president of Khadija bent Khouwalid foundation. The three women along with other active women wanted to act upon the obstacles and problems women in Saudi face; hence, they met with Prince Abdel Majid, who is also Mecca governor. After their meeting, the Prince put together a committee of 18 women to work on the obstacles and problems raised. After three years, the Khadija bent Khouwalid foundation was established. At first, the center trained women who intend to open up new businesses or improve existing ones. Later, the center opened up a new department named government files. This department was responsible for examining laws and regulations that hindered women in any area. These reports were then presented to ministries in charge.

Al Sulaiman and Taher said that when the King approved women running for the elections, they were thrilled. They were almost certain they would never make it to the chamber; however, they insisted on taking the chance and started a campaign.

Their campaign focused on women empowerment, support and most importantly creating opportunities for women and removing obstacles they face.

XII. Positive Changes Occurring:

Siham Al Suwaigh (1989) conducted a research in the city of Dammam where she wanted to analyze the attitude toward women role in Saudi. The researcher chose personal interviews method with women of three different neighborhoods to represent different socioeconomic classes and age groups. Results showed change in many areas: family relations, marriage, education and employment. In all the neighborhoods, the younger generations have shown increase in the number of nuclear families, decline in arranged marriages, increase in unarranged marriages and a decrease in polygamy. Younger generations have also shown higher educational levels in general; but the higher the socio economic class, the more schooling is encouraged. The interviews confirmed that younger generation women were more welcomed to work in full time jobs. Number of unemployed women has noticeably declined between the two generations.

Political change was noticed in the year 2005 when the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce entered the history when it gave the chance to 17 Saudi women to run for the board elections (Ambah, 2005). Even if they lose elections, female candidates regarded themselves winners since they took part of this historic elections. Turnout for women voters was as low as 10%; but this percentage was not expected in the conservative Saudi community. Female candidates went through the full elections experience; they gave presentations, debates and ran a full campaign which touched upon the fact that as women candidates they know exactly the obstacles businesswomen face in the Saudi society.

Socially, change was seen and felt around and within the women themselves. For example, for the first time in Saudi, the government announced a conference that targeted women related issues and concerns in 2003 (Ambah, 2004). The public poured in documents with proposals, requests and worries. Lecturer Fatima Nassef along with 32 other women collected a seven page long document that talked about the unfair after divorce laws such as child custody. Other documents included work related matters. Lack of job opportunities was not the concern in focus, but the logistical aspect of working: women cannot drive and fear of public transportation. Another document included complains of 150 women about the judicial performance such as supporting victim women, insisting on having a male guardian and in general the women's lack of awareness of their rights. As reported by Faiza Ambah (2004), this conference shows the one of the most significant attempts to develop the women's status in Saudi Arabia where women freely discuss their problems and challenges they face and try to solve them. Officials listen to them rather than hearing from men appointed by the government.

Furthermore, even though domestic abuse is strictly forbidden in Islam, it is very common to the Saudi community. In the past, cases reported are minimal due to the fear of public humiliation and scandals. However, with the Kingdom developing, more women have been able to speak up and regain their rights. For example, the famous case of Rania El Baz. She was abused and beaten aggressively by her spouse. Her photos lying on the hospital's bed with a battered face and broken arms was spread on the internet and published in newspapers. The court did not support her nor defended her rights. But El Baz acted differently than the abused women who remained silent about their abuse. She broke the social taboo and spoke up in different media about her condition (Ambah, 2004). Finally, El Baz's husband was sentenced

to 300 lashes and 6 months to be spent in prison. Rania El Baz challenged her society's norms and traditions by talking publicly about her abuse. She allowed the Saudi as well as the foreign media to publish pictures of her scared faces lying down the hospital bed.

Chapter 4: Methodology

I. Significance of the Study:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has come forward as one of the most economically well established countries in the region and the rest of the world. Its large oil resources as well as rapidly growing industrial power have furthered its strength and importance. Moreover, September 11th incident has further increased the spot light on the Kingdom since almost 15 of the plane hijackers were Saudis. These factors increased the curiosity of the people to know more about the Kingdom and its citizens. Hence, the media replied to this curiosity with more media attention on the Kingdom (Mishra, 2007). Being a popular topic, the Saudi women were also focused upon.

Not all the media portrayed the good side of the Kingdom; however, many of them focused on the negative issues rather than the good or even just facts. In her book, Sohayla Hammad (1984) says that with the constant media's negative portrayal of Saudi women, they became discouraged and weakened. Women started having doubts about causes of such backwardness and began believing in the western culture and wishing for the western women's lifestyle. Being a diversified nation, this negative portrayal has, on the other hand, increased the defensiveness of other women. They believed more in their message and fought harder against foreign influence.

Significance of the study:

- Saudi women issues have been tackled before but such angle has not yet been touched upon. Though one might expect to find a lot of readings and studies on Saudi women, literature found was limited and sort of small.

- Due to the global media, the usual image of a Saudi woman is usually a frustrated housewife, mother of minimum 5 kids, victim of polygamy and early marriage, uneducated, unemployed, walking in cattle and covered from head to toe in black. Therefore, this study is meant to show the role of global media in creating stereotypes whether they are true or not. For example, though non-Saudis view abayas that Saudi women wear as one of the government's ways of suppression, women have no problems with it as Peyman Pejman reported (2004).
- The topic could show that the influence of global media is greater on the viewer's side rather than the topic or person meant. For example, Saudi women do not acknowledge or admit the frustrations they are into. They look at themselves as pioneers and happy to be close to the pure and ideal Islamic women.
- This study can show the strong effect of global media and how it shapes the perceptions and opinions of its viewers.
- Show whether media people frame subjects according to their own idea of them. Since there is an uneven flow of information in the media, usually one voice is loudly heard and rules over others; that is the voice of the core countries with stronger media and larger audience. For example, BBC news declared in 2005 that more than half of the graduates in Saudi are women; however, they only make up to 5% of workforce. They did not focus on the fact that Saudi women are going to schools but they gave attention to the inequality in job opportunities. If it had been stated in a Saudi media for instance, they would have celebrated the equality in education.

- Since Television is an important form, its effects on the audience remain powerful. According to Severin & Tankard (2001), it is of great importance to media persons to assess the effect of any medium on the public for many reasons: first, senders are curious about the effect of their messages; second, receivers are also concerned about the effect of the mass media on them; third and most important, understanding the cause effect relationship caused by the media is a rich knowledge that many strive to figure out.

II. Research Objectives:

- Show all the angles of the story. For example, global media shows disappointment in the fact that Saudi women do not have the right to vote or participate in political matters, well most men in Saudi cannot either. Being a Kingdom, gives no room for elections, for instance. Also the unemployment does not concern Saudi women alone. Thousands of men and even more cannot find suitable jobs either.
- Investigate whether global media show change or not. For example, when Effat College in Saudi Arabia removed the partisan in the graduation ceremony for the first time in the history of Saudi and allowed parents of both genders to witness their graduating daughters (Mills, 2009). Also, the first sex desegregated university (KAUST) is a first in the Kingdom. All these changes are not as focused upon and portrayed as the negative matters such as the Qatif girl's incident.
- See whether the global media have a role in directing the focus of the viewers. For example, a huge fuss was created over Saudi women's

driving by the media. People were guided to think that all the Kingdom's problems would be solved if only women are driving cars.

- Show whether the role of global media in the globalized world is as it is assumed to be. Does or does not the ideal global “village” exist in true life. Many factors may hinder the global media's task such as the uneven flow of information, ownership of media and other problems on the viewers' sides such as selectivity and prior information.
- Look deeply whether the media have a constant frame of the Saudi women. Not only this, but whether media people also prime issues over others such in the case of the unemployed Saudi women. For example, not having a right to work was primed over the fact that the numbers of Saudi women university graduates are increasing rapidly. According to Mahmoud Saleh (1986) mentioned, higher education expenditure per student in Saudi is one of the largest ones in the world.

III. Statement of the Problem and Main Thesis:

The portrayal of Saudi women in the global media affects the way Egyptians perceive them. Newscasts as well as entertainment TV present the Saudi women's struggle with the norms, traditions and governmental laws as well as religion. Cases of Saudi women not having the rights to speak, vote, work, drive, learn or even to have a role in the society are heavily portrayed which influence the way Egyptians perceive them. However, Saudis of both genders have their own idea of the Saudi women that is not a result of the global media but a consequence of a Saudi Arabian way of bringing up. To them, the terms of “restrictions” and “struggle” does not go with the nature of the Saudi women; they are actually “pretty happy” as 500 women

declared in a conference in a respectable Saudi university as mentioned in the New York Times (2005).

IV. Population and Sample:

This study focuses on the perceptions and views of two different populations; thus two samples exist for the purpose of this study: Egyptian and Saudi. The researcher will survey 200 participants from both samples for analysis.

Since complete lists and demographics of both populations are unavailable, non-probability samples will be used where no mathematical guidelines are followed. The type of sampling for both populations used in this study would be purposive, where the two samples have to meet certain criteria. First, participants from both groups have to watch TV for at least one hour per week. Second, Egyptian participants living in Saudi or having travelled there would be excluded from the sample to ensure that their perception is not based on their true experience in Saudi. Those who have only travelled for Hajj or Omra will be included since their experiences in Mekka or Madina are very limited. They deal with millions from different countries, they travel in groups based according to their nationality, they spend most of their time praying and practicing religious activities; therefore their pilgrimage experience does not affect their TV based perception. On the other hand, those travelling for short periods, for a conference for instance, will be included in the sample since they get a glimpse of the country during their short stay which either changes their perceptions or reinforce existing ones. Therefore, the questionnaire will include filtering questions to ensure that the participants completing the survey are what the researcher is looking for. In addition, the researcher will be forced to use the snowball sampling technique in Saudi for a number of reasons. As a female, many

restrictions will hinder the researcher from reaching Saudi men in many places. Therefore, male participants will be asked to help with the distribution of the surveys to their friends and families. Also, Saudi's closed communities and strict regulations will be easier to manage by snowball sampling.

Moreover, this study will target participants who are highly educated and above the age of 21. Such high education and age levels are chosen so that individuals are able to form their own opinion, have the right to watch TV without parental guidance and are educated enough to seek other sources of information. The perceptions created should not be based on ignorance or low educational levels. Perceptions should not be a result of illiteracy, inability to understand the news casts (Arabic or foreign) or lack of access to different sources.

V. Research Questions and Hypotheses:

The study proposed a number of questions to be answered and hypotheses to be studied.

1) What are the patterns of Television viewership and exposure among Saudis and Egyptians?

RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?

RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?

RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?

RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?

2) What are the patterns of perception of Saudi and foreign media among Saudis and Egyptians?

RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.

RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.

RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

3) What are the patterns of perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and Egyptians?

RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.

RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.

RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

4) What are the patterns of Television exposure and perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and Egyptians?

RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

VI. Independent and Dependant Variables:

The dependant variable of this study is the perception of Saudi women: the perception of Egyptian men and women of the Saudi women, the perception of Saudi men of their women as well as the perception of Saudi women of themselves. In some cases, Saudi, Egyptian and foreign media are another dependant variable in this study.

However, the study includes a number of independent variables which are:

a) Country/ nationality:

Subjects are either Saudis or Egyptians.

b) Sources/ channels:

Channels and TV sources of information selected, chosen and watched by the subjects were divided to: local Egyptian, local Saudi and foreign. To the Saudi population, any sources other than Saudi's channels were considered foreign and to the Egyptian population, any sources other than Egyptian channels were considered foreign.

c) Exposure, knowledge and impact Level:

- i. Level of exposure to Egyptian media, level of exposure to Saudi media and level of exposure to foreign media.
- ii. Hours spent watching TV: mild (1- 4 hours per week), moderate (more than 4 hours per week) and heavy (more than 7 hours per week).
- iii. Knowledge about Egyptian media, knowledge about Saudi media and knowledge about foreign media.

d) TV programs:

- i. Fiction vs news.
- ii. Channels chosen by each country as well as programs preferred.

VII. Pilot Study:

The questionnaire was filled by 10 of each sample. Minor changes were done for a better comprehension of the survey.

VIII. Data Collection:

The distribution of surveys over both samples was done starting the month of November. The questionnaires were filled by participants by either filling out a hard copy of it or a soft copy sent via the internet. Other participants used the questionnaire posted by the researcher online on "survey monkey". The researcher was available to answer questions raised by the participants without leading them to any direction; only clarifications rather than leading. Not living in Saudi, the researcher asked other trained men and women assistants to help with the distribution and collection of the surveys. The male assistants were necessary to reach Saudi men while female assistants reached women. A translated version of the survey was also available at all times for participants from both samples.

For the Egyptian sample, the questionnaires were distributed in Cairo's companies, restaurants and hangouts starting the last week of November. However, because of Saudi's culture and restrictions, questionnaires were distributed in hospitals, companies and homes.

The difference between both samples was very clear. The Egyptian sample was much easier to reach and ask to fill a survey. They were familiar with the survey design and filling process. However, the Saudi sample needed some persuasion before accepting to fill a questionnaire. Still, many refused to fill them. They expressed fear and discomfort to the idea of survey. They claimed that they do not feel comfortable revealing their opinions. Others were offended and refused to fill surveys that aim at

showing the suppressions of Saudi women, as they believed. Some Saudis were also offended by some of the questions in the survey and refused to continue the questionnaire such as "Saudi men prefer their women to be second class citizens" or other questions related to Islam such as "Islam calls for sex segregation and face veil" and "please mention who sets the rules for women in Saudi Arabia". Though the researcher and assistants tried explaining that the survey only aims at revealing their opinions, they still excused themselves from participating. Hence, Saudi participants who agreed to fill the survey were asked to help recruiting their friends to participate.

IX. Statistical Technique:

Different statistical techniques have been employed to answer the questions and hypotheses raised by the study in hand. Techniques will be utilized to measure the reliability of the scales and questions, summary statistics to verify means and standard deviations as well as parametric (t-tests, for instance) and non parametric techniques such as Chi Square.

Chapter 5: Results:

After the distribution of the questionnaires on both samples, the researcher inputted and analyzed the data using the professional data analysis software SPSS.

The research targeted two samples: Saudis and Egyptians. Since the targets had to meet a certain criteria, a number of questions were placed at the beginning of the questionnaire to filter respondents. Those Egyptians and Saudis who watch TV for less than an hour per week were excluded from the sample. Also, Egyptians who have lived in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or visited it for longer than 10 days were excluded from the sample to ensure that their opinion is not formed or influenced by their real life experiences.

Filtering questions were:

- a) Have you ever visited Saudi Arabia for any reason other than Hajj or Omra?
- b) How long was your visit to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
- c) Do you watch TV for at least one hour per week?

The researcher also targeted highly educated and high income participants for a number of reasons. The perceptions created needed to be based on any reason other than illiteracy, inability to understand the news casts (Arabic or foreign) or lack of access to different sources. Whether a participant wanted to look for another source, for instance, or not should be based on his choice rather than his incapability or inability.

After excluding those who failed to pass the filtering questions, a total of 400 responses were collected where each one successfully met the criteria set.

I. Sample Description:

A. Nationality: Out of the 400 respondents, 200 were Saudis and 200 were Egyptians who have either never visited Saudi Arabia or spent 10 or fewer days there.

B. Age: No participant under the age of 21 was included in the sample. The mean age of the Saudi sample was 30.4 years while the Egyptian mean was 27.8 years.

For the Saudi sample, almost 58% (n=109) of Saudis aged between 21 to under 30, 30% (n=56) aged 30 to under 40 and only 12% (n=23) aged 40 to under 50. While the Egyptian sample ages were 76% (n=148) for those aging 21 to under 30, 20% (n=40) for those aging 30 to under 40 and 4% (n=7) aged 40 to under 50 years.

Age in years	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
21-< 30 years	109 (58%)	148 (76%)
30-< 40 years	56 (30%)	40 (20%)
40-<50 years	23 (12%)	7 (4%)
Total	188 (100)	195 (100)
Missing	12	5
Mean age in years	30.4	27.8

Table 5. 1: Participants' age

C. Gender: Both genders were targeted for the sake of the research. Females outnumbered the males in both countries. In the Saudi sample, 62% (n=120) were females while the males summed up to be a total of 73 participant. In the Egyptian sample, the females were 64% (n=127) of the total sample while the rest were males.

Gender	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Male	73 (38%)	70 (36%)
Female	120 (62%)	127 (64%)
Total	193 (100)	197 (100)
Missing	7	3

Table 5. 2: Participants' gender

D. **Education:** In the Saudi sample, the majority of respondents were currently enrolled in post graduate programs (n=109, 60%), followed by those who successfully completed their post graduate studies (n=40, 22%) and the bachelor degree holders (n=34, 19%). In the Egyptian sample, the majority of respondents were currently enrolled in post graduate programs (n=123, 62%), followed by the bachelor degree holders (n=42, 21%) and those who successfully completed their post graduate studies (n=32, 16%).

Level of education	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Bachelor degree holder	34 (19%)	42 (21%)
Graduate student	109 (60%)	123 (62%)
Graduate degree holder	40 (22%)	32 (16%)
Total	183 (100)	197 (100)
Missing	17	3

Table 5. 3: Participants' level of education

E. **Monthly income:** In the Saudi sample, almost 35% (n=64) participants earn 15,000 Saudi Riyals or more, followed by those making 10,000 to under 15,000 (n=42, 23%), followed by those earning 5,000 to under 10,000 SR (n=41, 22%), then those who make 1,000 to under 5,000 (n=30, 16%) and last those making less than 1,000 riyals (n=6, 3%).

In the Egyptian sample, majority of them were making 5,000 to under 10,000 L.E., followed by those making 15,000 or more (n=40, 22%), followed by those

earning 10,000 to under 15,000 (n=25, 14%) and last those 1% who make less than 1,000 Egyptian pounds.

For comparison purposes, the Saudi Riyals was converted to LE (1 SR \approx 1.5 LE). Mean incomes for the Saudi and Egyptian sample were 16,921.4, 11,017.9 L.E. respectively.

Monthly Income in SR	
Saudis	Frequency(%)
<1000 SR	6 (3%)
1,000-<5,000 SR	30 (16%)
5,000-<10,000 SR	41 (22%)
10,000-<15,000 SR	42 (23%)
15,000 & above SR	64 (35%)
Total	183 (100)
Missing	7

Table 5. 4: Saudis' monthly income

Monthly Income in LE	
Egyptians	Frequency(%)
<1000 LE	1 (1%)
1,000-<5,000 LE	58 (32%)
5,000-<10,000 LE	59 (32%)
10,000-<15,000 LE	25 (14%)
15,000 & above LE	40 (22%)
Total	183 (100)
missing	7

Table 5. 5: Egyptians' monthly income

Average rating		
	Saudis	Egyptians
Mean Income in LE	16,921.4	11,017.9
SD	3,473.16	2,471.82

Table 5. 6: Participants' average income rating (in L.E.)

F. Exposure: The majority of respondents have visited other countries than their own. Only 5% (n=10) of the Saudi sample and 4% (n=7) of the Egyptian sample have never travelled out of their countries.

Have you ever travelled out of your country?	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Yes	183 (95%)	189 (96%)
No	10 (5%)	7 (4%)
Total	193 (100)	196 (100)
Missing	7	4

Table 5. 7: Participants' exposure

For the Egyptian sample, only 20% (n=40) have visited Saudi for reasons other than Hajj or Omra where their visit did not exceed 10 days in the Kingdom.

Response	Egyptians	
	Frequency	%
Yes	40	20
No	159	80
Total	199	100
Missing	1	

Table 5. 8: Egyptian participants' visit to Saudi

G. TV: All of the 400 respondents of both countries watch TV for at least one hour per week.

For the Saudi sample, almost 35% watch TV for at least one to under 4 hours per week while 33% spend 4 to under 7 hours per week and the remaining 33% spend 7 or more hours watching TV per week.

The Egyptian sample scores are not very different from the Saudi. Almost 27% watch TV for at least one to under 4 hours per week while 33% spend 4 to under 7 hours per week and the remaining 40% spend 7 or more hours watching TV per week.




Figure 5. 1: Hours spent watching TV

II. What are the patterns of Television viewership and exposure among Saudis and Egyptians?

To study the sources selected, watched and trusted by both Egyptians and Saudis, the study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses:

RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?

RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?

RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?

RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?

To answer and test these questions and hypotheses, three forms of questions were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice questions, Likert scale and open ended questions.

RQ 1.a: Which channels are mostly watched by Egyptians?

RQ 1.b: Which channels are mostly watched by Saudis?

There were 6 questions in the survey to answer these questions. Respondents were asked how often they watch Saudi, Egyptian and foreign news and entertainment. Available answers were: never, rarely, sometimes, frequently and always where each participants were free to choose the most appropriate answer.

Table 5.9 shows the amount of time spent by each participant watching Saudi, Egyptian and foreign **news** channels. Results show that 53% (n= 105) of Saudis frequently and always watch Saudi news followed by the 22% (n= 43) who sometimes follow Saudi news channels and almost 26% (n= 51) never or rarely watch them. Most Egyptians, on the other hand, never follow Saudi news channels (n= 109, 55%) followed by the 27% (n= 54) who rarely follow them. Only 14% (n= 28) of Egyptians sometimes follow the Saudi news; while 4% (n= 6) of them frequently and always watch them.

Watching Egyptian news channels showed different results. Almost 76% (n= 150) of Saudis never or rarely watch them followed by those who sometimes watch them (n= 34, 17%); while only 7% (n= 13) frequently and always watch them. Egyptians' responses, on the other hand, were distributed with close percentages over the available answers. Most Egyptians sometimes followed their local news channels (n=77, 39%), followed by those who rarely view them (n=57, 29%), followed by 18% who frequently watch them (n= 36), 9% who always watch (n= 17) and finally the 6% who never follow them (n= 11).

Egyptian and Saudi participants' frequency of watching foreign news channels were almost the same. Most of them sometimes watch foreign news channels (n=62, 32% for Saudis, n=70, 36% for Egyptians), followed by those who frequently watch (n=54, 28% for Saudis, n=53, 27% for Egyptians), then those rarely follow them (n=30, 15% for Saudis, n=42, 21% for Egyptians), followed by those who always watch them (n=26, 13% for Saudis, n=23, 12% for Egyptians) and finally those who never watch them (n=24, 12% for Saudis, n=8, 4% for Egyptians).

The mean scores for Saudi news channel was 3.41 for Saudis and 1.66 for Egyptians; Egyptian news channels' mean score was 1.82 for Saudis and 2.95 for

Egyptians; while foreign news channels showed similar mean scores of 3.14 for Saudis and 3.2 for Egyptians. The t- test shows high significance in the cases of Saudi and Egyptian news channels indicating a highly significant difference between news watching habits for both nationalities with $t=6.4$, $p=0.00$ in the case of Saudi news channels; and $t=4.82$, $p=0.001$ in the case of Egyptian news channels. The t- test shows no significance between the two countries in watching foreign news.

Response	Channels/ Nationality					
	Saudi channels		Egyptian channels		Foreign channels	
	Saudis	Egyptians	Saudis	Egyptians	Saudis	Egyptians
Never	16 (8%)	109 (55%)	94 (48%)	11 (6%)	24 (12%)	8 (4%)
Rarely	35 (18%)	54 (27%)	56 (28%)	57 (29%)	30 (15%)	42 (21%)
Sometimes	43 (22%)	28 (14%)	34 (17%)	77 (39%)	62 (32%)	70 (36%)
Frequently	61 (31%)	3 (2%)	10 (5%)	36 (18%)	54 (28%)	53 (27%)
Always	44 (22%)	3 (2%)	3 (2%)	17 (9%)	26 (13%)	23 (12%)
Total	199 (100)	197 (100)	197 (100)	198 (100)	196 (100)	196 (100)
Missing	1	3	3	2	4	4
Mean response	3.41	1.66	1.82	2.95	3.14	3.21
SD	0.487	0.247	0.216	0.407	0.415	0.444
T	6.40		4.82		0.22	
P	0.000		0.001		0.831	

Table 5. 9: Participants watching habits: News

Table 5.10 shows the amount of time spent by each participant watching Saudi, Egyptian and foreign **entertainment** channels. Results show that for the Saudi entertainment channels, most Saudis always watch them ($n=49$, 25%), followed by those who frequently do ($n=48$, 24%), then those who sometimes watch them ($n=46$, 23%), then the 18% who rarely watch them ($n=35$) and finally 10% of them who never watch them ($n=19$). On the other hand, 61% ($n=120$) of Egyptians never watch them, followed by 20% ($n=40$) who rarely watch them, then the 13% ($n=25$) who sometimes follow these channels and finally only 7% ($n=13$) who frequently or always follow them.

As for the Egyptian entertainment channels, most Saudis sometimes watch them (n=66, 34%), followed by those who frequently do (n=51, 26%), then those who always follow (n=28, 14%), followed by those who rarely watch them (n=27, 14%) and finally those who never do (n=22, 11%). On the other hand, almost 66% (n=130) of Egyptians sometimes and frequently watch these channels followed by those who always follow them (n=43, 22%) and finally 13% who never or rarely watch them (n=24).

Foreign entertainment channels showed similar results for both samples. Both of them frequently and always watch these channels (n=128, 65% of Saudis, n=159, 81% of Egyptians), followed by those who sometimes watch them channels (n=48, 24% of Saudis, n=27, 14% of Egyptians), then those who rarely or never watch them channels (n=21, 11% of Saudis, n=11, 6% of Egyptians).

The mean scores for Saudi entertainment channels was 3.37 for Saudis and 1.68 for Egyptians; Egyptian entertainment channels' mean score was 3.19 for Saudis and 3.64 for Egyptians, while foreign news channels showed a mean scores of 3.78 for Saudis and 4.18 for Egyptians. A t- test shows high significance in the case of Saudi entertainment channels indicating a highly significant difference between watching habits for both nationalities ($t=6.76$, $p=0.00$). However, the t test shows no significance between the two countries in watching Egyptian and foreign entertainment channels ($t=1.23$, $p=0.254$ for Egyptian entertainment channels and $t=0.69$, $p=0.510$ for foreign entertainment channels).

Response	Channels/ Nationality					
	Saudi channels		Egyptian channels		Foreign channels	
	Saudis	Egyptians	Saudis	Egyptians	Saudis	Egyptians
Never	19 (10%)	120 (61%)	22 (11%)	7 (4%)	8 (4%)	1 (1%)
Rarely	35 (18%)	40 (20%)	27 (14%)	17 (9%)	13 (7%)	10 (5%)
Sometimes	46 (23%)	25 (13%)	66 (34%)	59 (30%)	48 (24%)	27 (14%)
Frequently	48 (24%)	8 (4%)	51 (26%)	71 (36%)	74 (38%)	73 (37%)
Always	49 (25%)	5 (3%)	28 (14%)	43 (22%)	54 (27%)	86 (44%)
Total	197 (100)	198 (100)	194 (100)	197 (100)	197 (100)	197 (100)
Missing	3	2	6	3	3	3
Mean response	3.37	1.68	3.19	3.64	3.78	4.18
SD	0.461	0.196	0.427	0.604	0.678	0.954
T	6.76		1.23		0.69	
P	0.000		0.254		0.510	

Table 5. 10: Participants watching habits: Entertainment

Therefore, regarding news channels, Saudis follow Saudi and foreign news channels and ignore the Egyptian channels while Egyptians follow Egyptian and foreign news channels and ignore Saudi ones. In terms of entertainment, Saudis follow Saudi, Egyptian and foreign entertainment channels; while Egyptians ignore the Saudi entertainment channels and follow the Egyptian and foreign ones.

RH 1.a: Egyptians tend to seek foreign and their local (Egyptian) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

RH 1.b: Saudis tend to seek their local (Saudi) sources when seeking information about Saudi women.

In order to test these hypotheses, five questions were used. First, respondents were asked about how much time they spent watching Saudi, Egyptian and Foreign news; second they were asked about a famous incident in Saudi and the sources they were seeking to find more about this incident.

As the above table 5.9 shows, the majority of Egyptians watch either foreign or Egyptian news channels and never watch the Saudi ones; while Saudis, on the other hand watch their own Saudi news and never watch Egyptian news channels.

When both samples were asked about the Qatif girl incident in Saudi Arabia, a significant difference between the sources they were seeking appeared. As figure 5.2 shows, majority of Saudis have heard of the incident and were seeking information through Saudi channels while most Egyptians turned to foreign channels.




Figure 5. 2: Qatif girl incident

As table 5.11 shows 60% (n=78) of Saudis turned to Saudi channels while most Egyptians (n=23, 58%) of them turned to the foreign channels. Calculating the Chi square (χ^2) shows high significance indicating a high significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($\chi^2=86.7$, $p=0.00$). Therefore, both hypotheses are accepted. Egyptians mostly seek foreign channels while most Saudis turned to their local news channels.

Channels	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	78 (60%)	0
Egyptian channels	4 (3%)	8 (20%)
Foreign channels	22 (17%)	23 (58%)
Saudi & Foreign	23 (18%)	1 (3%)
Egyptian & Foreign	0	8 (20%)
Saudi, Egyptian & Foreign	2 (2%)	0
Total	129 (100)	40 (100)
Missing	71	160
chi square	86.7	
P	0.000	

Table 5. 11: Qatif girl's sources

RQ 1.c: Do Egyptians seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

RQ 1.d: Do Saudis seek alternative media than their initial chosen source?

There were five questions targeted at answering these questions. First, respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with the following statements:

- I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues
- TV is a source of entertainment for me.
- TV is a source of information for me.
- I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel

Second, they were also asked to choose between the channels they were seeking for information about "Qatif girl".

Table 5.12 shows the mean scores of each statement. Saudis and Egyptians' scores for the statement "I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues" is close, but Saudis are agreeing more with it (mean score= 3.54 for the Saudi sample, and 3.09 for the Egyptian sample). Both samples showed a stronger agreement with "TV is a source of entertainment for me" (mean score= 4.02 for the Saudi sample and 4.08

for the Egyptian sample). Also, they both agree that "TV is a source of information for me (mean score= 3.74 for the Saudi sample and 3.73 for the Egyptian sample). Saudis also agree with the statement "I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel", while Egyptians tend to disagree (mean score= 3.04 for the Saudi sample and 2.42 for the Egyptian sample).

A t-test shows no significance for the first three statements indicating no difference between both the Saudi and Egyptian sample, while the statement "I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel" showed significance indicating a significant difference between both samples ($t=2.79$, $p=0.024$).

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
47. I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues	3.54	0.57	3.09	0.533	1.17	0.276
56. TV is a source of entertainment for me.	4.02	0.948	4.08	0.998	0.08	0.938
57. TV is a source of information for me.	3.74	0.787	3.73	0.877	0.01	0.992
58. I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel	3.04	0.396	2.42	0.222	2.79	0.024

Table 5. 12: Alternative sources

Second, as proved in the above sections, most Saudis turned to their local news ($n= 78$, 60%), only 17% ($n=22$) turned to foreign channels while 3% ($n=4$) of them turned to Egyptian channels. A small percentage of them turned to alternative channels. For example, only 18% ($n= 23$) of Saudis turned to foreign news along with their Saudi channels while none of them turned to Egyptian and foreign news together and only 2% ($n= 2$) watched all news channels (Saudi, foreign and Egyptian).

Egyptians on the other hand, mostly turned to foreign channels ($n= 23$, 58%) while only 20% ($n=8$) turned to Egyptian channels and none to the Saudi news. A small percentage of them turned to alternative channels. For example, only 20% ($n=8$)

of Egyptians turned to foreign news along with their Egyptian channels while none of them turned watched all news channels (Saudi, foreign and Egyptian) and only 3% (n=1) turned to Saudi and foreign channels together.

Accordingly, TV is a source of information and entertainment for both samples and they both trust their favorite channel's coverage. Egyptians tend to seek alternative sources more than Saudis do. However, both of them remain loyal to their initial sources.

RQ 1.e: Is the Egyptian audience an active one?

RQ 1.f: Is the Saudi audience an active one?

There were four questions targeted at answering these questions. Respondents were asked to state their level of agreement with the following statements:

- My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other media.
- I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel.
- I usually flip between my favorite news channel and other channels.
- TV has an effect on my perception of issues.

Table 5.13 shows the mean scores for both samples. Saudis mean score for "My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other media" was 1.92; while Egyptians' mean was 2.92. The statement "I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel" showed a mean of 3.04 for Saudis and 2.42 for Egyptians. Saudis mean score for "I usually flip between my favorite news channel and other channels" was 3.2; while Egyptians' mean was 3.46. The statement "TV has an effect on my perception of issues" showed a mean of 3.72 for Saudis and 3.68 for Egyptians.

A t-test showed that high significance for the first statement indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($t=4.04$, $p=0.004$) and significance for the second statement indicating a significant difference between both samples ($t=2.79$, $p=0.024$). However, the test showed no significance for the third and fourth statements indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians for both statements.

Accordingly, the participants' idea of Saudi women was more TV based for Egyptians than Saudis. However, Saudis tend to only obtain information from their favorite channels and not switch or flip between channels more than Egyptians do. For both samples, TV has an effect on their perception of issues.

Statements	Saudis		Egyptians		t	p
	Mean score	SD	Mean score	SD		
55. My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other media.	1.92	0.211	2.92	0.444	4.04	0.004
58. I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel	3.04	0.396	2.42	0.222	2.79	0.024
60. I usually flip between my favorite news channel and other channels.	3.2	0.629	3.46	0.774	0.52	0.617
62. TV has an effect on my perception of issues.	3.72	0.668	3.68	0.746	0.08	0.938

Table 5. 13: Audience's activeness

III. What are the patterns of perception of Saudi and foreign media among Saudis and Egyptians?

The study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses to learn more about both media:

RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.

RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.

RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

To answer and test these questions and hypotheses, three forms of questions were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice questions, Likert scale and open ended questions.

RH 2.a: Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies.

RH 2.b: Saudis have high knowledge of Saudi movies.

There were three questions in the survey that targeted these hypotheses. Respondents were asked if they have heard of any Saudi movie, its name and whether they have watched it or not.

According to table 5.14, majority of Saudis (n=163, 84%) have heard of a Saudi movie while most Egyptians did not (n=109, 56%). Calculating the Chi square shows a high significance at $\chi^2=69.4$ and $p= 0.000$ indicating a highly significant difference between distributions of both samples which supports both hypotheses.

Response	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Yes	163 (84%)	85 (44%)
No	30 (16%)	109 (56%)
Total	193 (100)	194 (100)
Missing	7	6
chi square	69.4	
P	0.000	

Table 5. 14: Having heard of any Saudi movie

Table 5.15 shows that 77% (n=126) of Saudis have watched the movies they stated while only 31% (n=27) of Egyptians watched them. Therefore, even though 44% (n=85) of Egyptians have heard of a Saudi movie, almost 69% (n=60) of them have not watched it.

Response	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Yes	126 (77%)	27 (31%)
No	37 (23%)	60 (69%)
Total	163 (100)	87 (100)
Missing	37	113

Table 5. 15: Having watched any Saudi movie

RQ 2.a: How do Egyptians perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

RQ 2.b: How do Saudis perceive Saudi media vs. other media?

There were 11 questions in the survey to answer these questions. The first five questions asked the respondents to state which media they found most trustworthy, credible, accessible, of highest quality and variety of programs.

Tables 5.16 to 5.20 show the following:

a) Trustworthiness:

In terms of trust, Saudis believe that the Saudi media are the most trusted (n=101, 52%) followed by foreign media (n=88, 46%) and Egyptian (n=4, 2%). Egyptians on the other hand, believe that foreign media are the most trusted (n=152, 79%) followed by Egyptian media (n=37, 19%) and Saudi (n=4, 2%).

b) Credibility:

In terms of Credibility, Saudis believe that the media most credible are the foreign (n=104, 54%) followed by Saudi media (n=88, 45%) and Egyptian (n=2, 1%). Egyptians also believe that foreign media are the most credible too (n=167, 86%) followed by Egyptian media (n=22, 11%) and Saudi (n=5, 3%).

c) Accessibility:

In terms of accessibility, Saudis believe that the Saudi media are the most accessible to them (n=115, 60%) followed by foreign media (n= 61, 32%) and Egyptian (n= 16, 8%). Egyptians on the other hand, believe that Egyptian media are

the most accessible (n= 128, 66%) followed by foreign media (n=61, 32%) and Saudi (n= 4, 2%).

d) Quality:

When it comes to the quality, both Saudis and Egyptians believe that the foreign media have the highest quality (n=133, 68%, n=183, 93%, respectively). Saudis believe that Saudi media come in second place (n=58, 30%) followed by Egyptian (n=4, 2%) while Egyptians believe that Egyptian media come in second place (n=10, 5%) followed by Saudi (n=4, 2%).

e) Variety:

Regarding the media with the most variety of programs, Saudis and Egyptians had the same order with different percentages. They believe that the foreign media have the most variety (Saudi n=119, 60%, Egyptian n=148, 75%). Saudis and Egyptians ranked Egyptian media as the second (both with 21%); followed by the Saudi media (n=37, 19% and n=8, 4%, respectively).

Channels	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	101 (52%)	4 (2%)
Egyptian channels	4 (2%)	37 (19%)
Foreign channels	88 (46%)	152 (79%)
Total	193 (100)	193 (100)
Missing	7	7

Table 5. 16: Most trusted media

Channels	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	88 (45%)	5 (3%)
Egyptian channels	2 (1%)	22 (11%)
Foreign channels	104 (54%)	167 (86%)
Total	194 (100)	194 (100)
Missing	6	6

Table 5. 17: Most credible media

Channels	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	115 (60%)	4 (2%)
Egyptian channels	16 (8%)	128 (66%)
Foreign channels	61 (32%)	61 (32%)
Total	192 (100)	193 (100)
Missing	8	7

Table 5. 18: Most accessible media

Channels	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	58 (30%)	4 (2%)
Egyptian channels	4 (2%)	10 (5%)
Foreign channels	133 (68%)	183 (93%)
Total	195 (100)	197 (100)
Missing	5	3

Table 5. 19: Media with the highest quality

Channels	Frequency(%)	
	Saudis	Egyptians
Saudi channels	37 (19%)	8 (4%)
Egyptian channels	41 (21%)	41 (21%)
Foreign channels	119 (60%)	148 (75%)
Total	197 (100)	197 (100)
Missing	3	3

Table 5. 20: Media with most variety of programs

Second, respondents were asked to determine their level of agreement with these following 6 statements:

- Western media portray a **negative** image of Saudi women.
- Western media portray an **accurate** image of Saudi women
- Saudi media portray a **positive** image of Saudi women.
- Saudi media portray an **accurate** image of Saudi women.
- Egyptian media portray a **negative** image of Saudi women.
- Egyptian media portray an **accurate** image of Saudi women.

Table 5.21 shows the mean scores of each statement. Saudis agree with "Western media portray a **negative** image of Saudi women" more strongly than

Egyptians. Both Saudis and Egyptians disagree with the fact that western media portray an accurate image; however, the mean score shows that Saudis are in more disagreement than Egyptians. Also, Saudis agree more than Egyptians with Saudi media portraying a positive image of their women. Whether Saudi media portray an accurate image of Saudi women or not is neutral to both samples with the Saudi participants closer to agreeing than Egyptians. Both samples are neutral about Egyptian media portraying a negative image of Saudi women; however, Saudis are closer to agreeing while Egyptians are closer to disagreeing with the statement. Saudis and Egyptians also were neutral about Egyptian media portraying an accurate image of Saudi women.

A t-test shows no significance for all statements indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. The only statement that showed significance is "Western media portray an **accurate** image of Saudi women" indicating a difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($t=2.54$, $p=0.035$).

Statements	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean score	SD	Mean score	SD		
49. Western media portray a negative image of Saudi women.	4.26	1.024	3.83	0.748	0.68	0.516
50. Western media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.	1.89	0.304	2.46	0.331	2.54	0.035
51. Saudi media portray a positive image of Saudi women.	3.45	0.583	2.96	0.507	1.26	0.243
52. Saudi media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.	3.14	0.481	2.56	0.523	1.63	0.142
53. Egyptian media portray a negative image of Saudi women.	3.24	0.561	2.91	0.523	0.87	0.410
54. Egyptian media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.	2.47	0.602	2.78	0.68	0.66	0.528

Table 5. 21: Comparing media

IV. What are the patterns of perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and Egyptians?

To analyze the perception of Saudi women by both Egyptians and Saudis, the study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses:

RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.

RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.

RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

To answer these questions and test the hypotheses, four forms of questions were asked in the questionnaire: Multiple choice, ranking, Likert scale and true or false questions.

RH 3.a: Egyptians tend to have a negative perception of Saudi women.

RH 3.b: Saudis tend to have a positive perception of Saudi women.

For these hypotheses, three forms of questions were asked in the questionnaire: one rank question, 23 true or false statements and nine Likert scale ones.

The first question asked participants to rank the available answers (the king, Islam and Quran, Islamic clerics and Sheikhs, Saudi tradition and customs and interior ministry) according to their power in setting rules in Saudi for women. There exists no correct order for these factors. For example, sometimes Islamic clerics set rules when other times the king interferes. Each participant from both countries rank the

options according to his/her own perception of distribution of power in Saudi Arabia. A comparison between responses of both countries was made.

Table 5.22 shows that mean scores of each factor for both samples. As for the Saudis, the mean score for power of "Islam and Quran" is the highest of 3.61, followed by "Islamic clerics and sheikhs" with a mean of 3.27, then the "king" with a mean of 3.09, "Saudi tradition and customs" with a mean of 3.05 and last the "interior ministry" with a mean of 2.7.

Egyptians had different a perception of the distribution of power where they ranked the "Saudi tradition and custom" as number one with a mean of 3.47, followed by the "Islamic clerics" with a mean of 3.37, then "Islam and Quran" in the third place with a mean of 3.05, king with a mean of 3.01 and finally the "interior ministry" with a mean of 2.81.

A t- test for each factor shows:

- 1) King: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($p=0.765$ and $t=0.31$).
- 2) Islam and Quran: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($p=0.261$ and $t=1.21$).
- 3) Islamic clerics and Sheikhs: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($p=0.772$ and $t=0.3$).
- 4) Saudi tradition and customs: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($p=0.214$ and $t=1.35$).
- 5) Interior Ministry: no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($p=0.578$ and $t=0.58$).

Factors of power	Saudis			Egyptians			T	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Order	Mean Scores	SD	Order		
King	3.09	0.462	3	3.01	0.294	4	0.31	0.765
Islam & Quran	3.61	0.79	1	3.05	0.463	3	1.21	0.261
Islamic clerics & Sheikhs	3.27	0.448	2	3.37	0.465	2	0.3	0.772
Saudi traditions & customs	3.05	0.353	4	3.47	0.52	1	1.35	0.214
Interior ministry	2.7	0.207	5	2.81	0.335	5	0.58	0.578

Table 5. 22: Distribution of power

Second, 23 true or false statements are asked to test the knowledge and perceptions of both samples of the status of Saudi women, and to compare the results of the two samples. The statements are not all correct; some are incorrect. Other statements are not facts, but rather included to analyze the opinions of both samples.

The statements below are correct:

- Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom
- Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion
- Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card
- Saudi has gender mixed universities
- More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female
- Saudi women can work as journalists
- Saudi women can work as senior executives
- Saudi women can work as doctors
- Saudi women can share offices with men
- Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce

- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive

These statements are incorrect:

- Saudi women can drive in the kingdom
- Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public
- Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament
- Saudi women are allowed to work as judges
- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote
- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work

Table 5.23 shows the Chi square test results for all statements. The table shows that there is a general high significance in the majority of the statements indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians with $p < 0.01$. Only the statement "Saudi women are allowed to work as judges" shows significant difference with $p < 0.05$. However, the test indicates no significant difference between both groups in these statements:

- Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card
- Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament
- Saudi women are allowed to work as judges

Statement	Those who said "True" in percentages		Chi Square χ^2	p
	Saudis	Egyptians		
Correct Statements				
Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom	90	47	79.7	0.000
Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card	89	90	0.1	0.741

Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion	64	30	44.5	0.000
Saudi has gender mixed universities	63	30	42.1	0.000
More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female	86	36	97.8	0.000
Saudi women can work as journalists	96	57	97.7	0.000
Saudi women can work as senior executives	84	41	75.2	0.000
Saudi women can work as doctors	99	75	52.3	0.000
Saudi women can share offices with men	79	17	147.4	0.000
Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce	86	43	77.3	0.000
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive	74	62	5.9	0.017
Incorrect Statements				
Saudi women can drive in the kingdom	5	16	13.8	0.000
Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	11	61	106.1	0.000
Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament	16	17	0.03	0.892
Saudi women are allowed to work as judges	4	5	0.22	0.810
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote	86	44	72.8	0.000
Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work	28	67	58.0	0.000
Opinion Statements				
Saudi women are happy with their status in the society	65	16	97.8	0.000
Saudi women can choose their future husbands	87	56	46.9	0.000
Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam	76	52	23.6	0.000
Saudi women live as second class citizens	24	59	51.2	0.000
Saudi women live a struggled life	17	70	112.2	0.000
Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their peer men	94	81	15.8	0.000

Table 5. 23: True or False

Some particular Saudi participants' responses to these statements are worth mentioning. They did not just state if the above statements are true or false, but they

also commented on some of them. For example, a Saudi male participant stated that "Saudi has gender mixed universities" is *unfortunately* true. Another Saudi male said that "Saudi women can share offices with men" is a true statement *though he objects*. Another Saudi woman mentioned that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" is false *although women are negatively affected by the strict unfair guardianship and divorce laws*.

Third, nine Likert scale statements were asked to indicate opinions of the respondents of Saudi and its women. A comparison between responses of both nationalities can be made.

A t- test showed:

- Significance for "Saudi Arabia is the closet country to a pure Islamic society" indicating a significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with this statement more than Egyptians ($t=3.23$, $p=0.012$). The statement showed a mean score of 3.91 and standard deviation of 0.82 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 2.54 and standard deviation of 0.227 for the Egyptian population.
- High significance for "Islam calls for sex segregation" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis also agree with this statement much more than Egyptians ($t=3.97$, $p=0.004$). The statement showed a mean score of 3.24 and standard deviation of 0.425 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 2.3 and standard deviation of 0.211 for the Egyptian population.
- High significance for "Islam calls for face veil (niqab)" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis also agree with this statement while Egyptians disagree or strongly disagree ($t=6.66$, $p=0.000$).

The statement showed a mean score of 3.02 and standard deviation of 0.331 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 1.65 and standard deviation of 0.243 for the Egyptian population.

- High significance for "True Islam is implemented in Saudi Arabia" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with this statement while Egyptians disagree ($t=4.09$, $p=0.004$). The statement showed a mean score of 3.36 and standard deviation of 0.571 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 2 and standard deviation of 0.339 for the Egyptian population.
- High significance for "Saudi women are satisfied with their lives" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with this statement while Egyptians disagree ($t=4.06$, $p=0.004$). The statement showed a mean score of 3.45 and standard deviation of 0.605 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 2.14 and standard deviation of 0.335 for the Egyptian population.
- High significance for "Saudi women are the ideal Islamic women" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis agree with this statement while Egyptians disagree or strongly disagree ($t=5.56$, $p=0.001$). The statement showed a mean score of 3.34 and standard deviation of 0.443 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 1.79 and standard deviation of 0.333 for the Egyptian population.
- No significance for "Saudi's government is responsible for Saudi women's current condition and status" indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($t=0.15$, $p=0.885$). Both agreed with the statement. The statement showed a mean score of 3.63 and standard deviation of 0.608 for the

Saudi population and a mean score of 3.71 and standard deviation of 0.761 for the Egyptian population.

- High significance for "Saudi men prefer their women to be second class citizens" indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians. Saudis disagreed with the statement while Egyptians agreed ($t=3.45$, $p=0.009$). The statement showed a mean score of 2.39 and standard deviation of 0.199 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 3.53 and standard deviation of 0.627 for the Egyptian population.
- No significance for "Non Saudis have a wrong perception of Saudi women" indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians ($t=1.32$, $p=0.223$). Both agreed with the statement. The statement showed a mean score of 4.23 and standard deviation of 1.018 for the Saudi population and a mean score of 3.45 and standard deviation of 0.59 for the Egyptian population.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
41. Saudi Arabia is the closet country to a pure Islamic society.	3.91	0.82	2.54	0.227	3.23	0.012
42. Islam calls for sex segregation.	3.24	0.425	2.3	0.211	3.97	0.004
43. Islam calls for face veil (niqab).	3.02	0.331	1.65	0.243	6.66	0.000
44. True Islam is implemented in Saudi Arabia.	3.36	0.571	2	0.339	4.09	0.004
45. Saudi women are satisfied with their lives.	3.54	0.605	2.14	0.335	4.06	0.004
46. Saudi women are the ideal Islamic women.	3.34	0.443	1.79	0.333	5.56	0.001
48. Saudi's government is responsible for Saudi women's current condition and status.	3.63	0.608	3.71	0.761	0.15	0.885
59. Saudi men prefer their women to be second class citizens.	2.39	0.199	3.53	0.627	3.45	0.009
61. Non Saudis have a wrong perception of Saudi women.	4.23	1.018	3.45	0.59	1.32	0.223

Table 5.24: Participants perception

According to all the above, the way Saudis and Egyptians perceive Saudi women shows many differences. Each sample has a different perspective. Saudis have a positive perception of their women while Egyptians have a negative perception of them; hence, RH a.1 and RH a.2 are supported.

RQ 3.a: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 3.b: What is the relationship between the amount of TV watched and the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

To answer these questions, participants were asked about the number of hours they spend watching television. Moreover, participants were asked to indicate if they think these statements were true or false:

- Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public
- Saudi women live as second class citizens
- Saudi women live a struggled life

Every true answer is an indication of the negative perception while false answers are an indication of a positive perception.

Table 5.25 shows the relation between the hours spent watching television and the negative perception created by Saudi participants. The table sums the results of those who thought the above statements were true as well as the hours they spent watching TV. The table shows that the number of Saudis with a general negative perception is minimal. The 43% of Saudis (n=9) who thought that "every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public" is a true statement, were those who watched TV for less than 4 hours per week. Almost 51% of Saudis (n=23) who believed that "Saudi women live as second class citizens", were not heavy TV viewers

as well and watched TV for one to less than four hours per week. Similarly, most Saudis (58%, n=19) believing that "Saudi women live a struggled life" were those who watched TV for one hour up to less than 4 hours.

Statement	Nationality	Frequency(%)			
		1-<4	4-<7	7 or more	Total
Q24 Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	Saudis	9(43%)	5(24%)	7(33%)	21(100)
Q38 Saudi women live as second class citizens	Saudis	23(51%)	12(27%)	10(22%)	45(100)
Q39 Saudi women live a struggled life	Saudis	19(58%)	7(21%)	7(21%)	33(100)

Table 5. 25: Hours watched vs. Saudi perception

Table 5.26 shows the relation between the hours spent watching television and the negative perception created by Egyptian participants. The table sums the results of those who thought the above statements were true as well as the hours they spent watching TV. The table shows that most Egyptians have a negative perception of Saudi women. Most Egyptians (45%, n=53) who thought that the statement is true were heavy TV viewers (those who watched for seven hours or more per week). Also, Egyptians (43%, n=50) who believed the second statement is true, watched TV for 7 hours or more. For the third statement, Egyptians (39%, n=54) who agreed were also heavy TV viewers.

Statement	Nationality	Frequency(%)			
		1-<4	4-<7	7 or more	Total
Q24 Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	Egyptians	30(25%)	35(30%)	53(45%)	118(100)
Q38 Saudi women live as second class citizens	Egyptians	26(22%)	40(34%)	50(43%)	116(100)
Q39 Saudi women live a struggled life	Egyptians	37(27%)	46(34%)	54(39%)	137(100)

Table 5. 26: Hours watched vs. Egyptian perception

Calculating the Chi square (χ^2) for each statement showed significance at $\chi^2=6.81$ and $p=0.033$ indicating a significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians for the first statement. Also, believing that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" showed high significance at $\chi^2=18.87$ and $p=0.000$ indicating a highly significant difference between both samples. The last statement also showed high significance levels at $\chi^2=19.3$ and $p=0.000$ indicating a high significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement	chi	P
Q24 Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	6.81	.033
Q38 Saudi women live as second class citizens	18.87	0.000
Q39 Saudi women live a struggled life	19.3	0.000

Table 5. 27: Chi Square test

According to the above, the amount of TV watched has an effect on the Egyptian participants. The more they watch, the more negative their perception is. However, amount of time spent watching TV did not affect the Saudi sample similarly since only a minority of them had a negative perception and all of those with negative perception were light viewers of TV.

V. What are the patterns of Television exposure and perceptions of Saudi women among Saudis and Egyptians?

To study the effect of the amount of TV watched by both Egyptians and Saudis on the perception of Saudi women, the study proposed a number of research questions and hypotheses:

RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

To answer the above questions, participants were asked to indicate the frequency of time they spent watching each media (foreign, Saudi and Egyptian) as well as their opinion on the below statements to indicate their perception:

- Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public
- Saudi women live as second class citizens
- Saudi women live a struggled life

Every true answer is an indication of a negative perception while false answers are an indication of a positive perception.

While reading this section, one has to bear in mind a number of factors that will affect results:

1. Very few Saudis had a negative perception of Saudi women while most Egyptians had a negative perception.
2. Most Egyptians did not follow Saudi news or entertainment channels.
3. Most Saudis did not watch Egyptian news channels.

RQ 4.a: How do foreign media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.b: How do foreign media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching foreign media. There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those foreign media followers. They were asked about the frequency of watching foreign 1) news and 2) entertainment.

Table 5.28 shows the relation between the frequency of watching foreign **news** and the negative or positive perception created. Assuming values as Never=1, Rarely=2, Sometimes=3, Frequently=4, Always=5, the table gives the mean scores for both samples. The results of Saudis and Egyptians are very similar for all the statements. Most Saudis who had a negative perception (those agreed with the three statements) were sometimes following foreign news channels. Similarly Egyptians with negative perception were also sometimes following foreign news channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 2.95 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 3.28.

A t-test for all the statements shows no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	3.05	0.347	3.30	0.444	1.01	0.370
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	2.95	0.518	3.31	0.440	1.18	0.303
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	3.23	0.543	2.83	0.409	1.16	0.311
TOTAL	2.95	0.451	3.28	0.429	1.18	0.303

Table 5. 28: Perceptions by viewers of foreign news channels

Table 5.29 shows the relation between the frequency of watching foreign **entertainment** and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who had a negative perception (those agreed with the three statements) were sometimes following foreign entertainment channels; while Egyptians with negative perception

were frequently following foreign entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 3.72 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 4.13.

A t-test for all the statements also shows no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	3.86	0.695	4.17	0.959	0.59	0.587
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	3.73	0.710	4.15	0.932	0.80	0.468
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	3.61	0.585	4.09	0.882	1.02	0.365
TOTAL	3.72	0.661	4.13	0.921	0.82	0.458

Table 5. 29: Perceptions by viewers of foreign entertainment channels

Accordingly, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of Saudi women sometimes watch foreign news and entertainment channels. However, most Egyptians with the negative perception are those who sometimes watch foreign news channels and frequently watch foreign entertainment.

RQ 4.c: How do Saudi media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.d: How do Saudi media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching Saudi media. There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those Saudi media followers. They were asked about the frequency of watching Saudi 1) news and 2) entertainment.

Table 5.30 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Saudi **news** and the negative or positive perception created. Assuming values as Never=1, Rarely=2, Sometimes=3, Frequently=4, Always=5, the table gives the mean scores for both samples. Majority of Saudis who agreed that "every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe" were sometimes following Saudi news channels. However, Saudis who believed that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" and "Saudi women live a struggled life" were rarely following Saudi news channels. On the other hand, most Egyptians with negative perception (those who agreed with all the statements) rarely or never watched Saudi news channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 2.78 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 1.62.

A t-test shows high significance for the first and second statements, indicating a highly significant difference between Saudis' and Egyptians' mean scores. The third statement also showed significance indicating a significant difference between both samples.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	3.52	0.494	1.58	0.274	7.69	0.001
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	2.67	0.353	1.68	0.262	5.05	0.007
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	2.45	0.417	1.60	0.259	3.89	0.018
TOTAL	2.78	0.328	1.62	0.263	6.17	0.003

Table 5. 30: Perceptions by viewers of Saudi news channels

Table 5.31 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Saudi **entertainment** and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who agreed that "every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe" were sometimes following Saudi entertainment channels. However, Saudis who believed that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" and "Saudi women live a struggled

life" were rarely following Saudi entertainment channels. On the other hand, most Egyptians with negative perception (those who agreed with all the statements) rarely or never watched Saudi entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 2.76 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 1.61.

A t-test for all the statements also shows high significance indicating high significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians mean scores.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	3.43	0.545	1.62	0.205	6.96	0.002
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	2.53	0.316	1.59	0.212	5.54	0.005
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	2.64	0.415	1.61	0.213	4.92	0.008
TOTAL	2.76	0.322	1.61	0.210	6.70	0.003

Table 5. 31: Perceptions by viewers of Saudi entertainment channels

Accordingly, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of Saudi women sometimes or rarely watch Saudi news and entertainment channels. However, most Egyptians with the negative perception are those who rarely or never watch Saudi news channels and entertainment.

RQ 4.e: How do Egyptian media affect the Saudi perception of Saudi women?

RQ 4.f: How do Egyptian media affect the Egyptian perception of Saudi women?

The statements mentioned above will be linked with watching Egyptian media. There are two questions in the questionnaire that target those Egyptian media

followers. They were asked about the frequency of watching Egyptian 1) news and 2) entertainment.

Table 5.32 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Egyptian **news** and the negative or positive perception created. Most Saudis who agreed with all the statements (hence had a negative perception) were rarely following Egyptians news channels. On the other hand, most Egyptians with negative perception (those who agreed with all the statements) sometimes watched Egyptian news channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 1.89 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 2.98.

A t-test for the first and second statements showed high significance indicating highly significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians mean scores. The third statement also showed significance indicating a significant difference between both samples.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	1.95	0.270	2.95	0.375	4.82	0.008
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	1.84	0.251	2.97	0.395	5.40	0.006
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	1.91	0.386	3.01	0.442	4.46	0.011
TOTAL	1.89	0.255	2.98	0.404	5.10	0.007

Table 5. 32: Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian news channels

Table 5.33 shows the relation between the frequency of watching Egyptian **entertainment** and the negative or positive perception created. The results of Saudis and Egyptians are very similar for all the statements. Most Saudis who had a negative perception (those agreed with the three statements) were sometimes following Egyptian entertainment channels. Similarly Egyptians with negative perception were

also sometimes following Egyptian entertainment channels. Total mean scores for the Saudi sample is 2.89 and total mean scores for the Egyptian sample is 3.67.

A t-test for all the statements shows no significance indicating no significant difference between Saudis and Egyptians.

Statement	Saudis		Egyptians		t	P
	Mean Scores	SD	Mean Scores	SD		
Q24. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public	3.05	0.373	3.66	0.591	1.95	0.123
Q38. Saudi women live as second class citizens	2.84	0.383	3.66	0.610	2.54	0.064
Q39. Saudi women live a struggled life	2.84	0.386	3.69	0.629	2.57	0.062
TOTAL	2.89	0.359	3.67	0.610	2.48	0.068

Table 5. 33: Perceptions by viewers of Egyptian entertainment channels

According to that, a minority of Saudis who have negative perceptions of Saudi women rarely watch Egyptian news channels and sometimes following Egyptians entertainment channels. However, most Egyptians with the negative perception are those who sometimes watch Egyptian news channels and entertainment.

Chapter 6: Discussion:

I. Conclusion:

The aim of this research is trying to differentiate between the way Saudi women see themselves as well as the Saudi males' perception of them; and the way Egyptians perceive them. Such perceptions are ignited by local and global media arms that have critical roles in shaping and forming opinions or pre-set ideas about Saudi women. Therefore, the study targeted two groups: Saudis and Egyptians of both genders. The questionnaire aimed at revealing the perception each participant had of Saudi women.

a) Television Viewership and Exposure:

Both Saudis and Egyptians consider TV to be an important source of information and entertainment, which is consistent with Gerbner's assumption that television remains an important source of messages, information and images around the globe. Other media do not weaken the importance of television as it remains a crucial source of information and entertainment (Gerbner et al., 1980 & 1986).

Although most Saudis and Egyptians sometimes resort to foreign news channels; they both seek their local news. Saudis resort to their news channels for information while never caring to follow the Egyptian channels; and vice versa Egyptians turn to their local news channels while never follow the Saudi news channels.

Most Saudis also follow Saudi entertainment while Egyptians never do. However in the case of entertainment, Saudis follow the Egyptian entertainment. Both follow the foreign entertainment.

The famous gang rape incident in Saudi (Qatif girl) was reported differently by each country's media. While the Saudi coverage showed the religious aspect of the incident, the international coverage was sympathizing with the girl. For example, editor Rasheed Abou Alsamh (Arab news, 2007) focused on the sin of adultery she committed and Saudi people's approval of the punishment for the girl who went to meet a stranger alone. The foreign sources, on the other hand, considered the girl a victim and talked about how the girl was raped by a group of men over and over. For example, Canadian National Post, The Globe, CNN, BBC and many other international sources focused on the countries' officials and citizens' disappointment from the Saudi punishment. They called for the drop of the cruel sentence. Since the foreign media was more visible and stronger than the Saudi media, the Saudi administration feared the international outcry and changed its status to calm the international pressure. (The Globe, 2007, The Guardian, 2007, Eltahawy, 2007 and Black, 2008)

Questionnaire results show that 72% of Saudis heard of this incident while only 21% of Egyptians heard of it. As expected, Saudis turned to their own local channels while Egyptians turned to foreign channels. Not a single Egyptian turned to a Saudi channel for information about this incident. Knowing what each country's media presented; it is clear how each group understood and comprehend this incident. Their position on this incident could be indicated by the information they got from each media.

It is interesting to see that almost 58% of Egyptians were seeking foreign channels only, 20% turned to Egyptian channels only, while none turned to Saudi channels. Only 20% of them turned to both foreign and Egyptian. On the other hand, only 2% of Saudis turned to all channels (foreign, Egyptian and Saudi) while 0% of

Egyptians did. Saudis were mostly seeking Saudi channels (60%) followed by the 18% who followed Saudi and Foreign, then 17% followed foreign only, and finally 3% Egyptian channels only.

Based on the above results, small percentages of Saudis and Egyptians did seek alternative sources in this incident. Both samples remain loyal to their initial sources.

Other Likert scale statements showed more characteristics of the Saudi and Egyptian audience. Most Saudis were in more agreement with trusting their favorite channels' coverage of events and only obtaining information from their favorite TV channel. However, most Egyptians were in less agreement with trusting their favorite channels' coverage of events and disagreeing with only obtaining information from their favorite TV channel. This confirms that Saudi TV viewers are not an active audience and do not seek alternative sources while Egyptians can be considered an active audience (apart from the rape incident).

While Rubin et al. considered the TV audience an active one, this contradicts with the case of Saudi audience. They give attention to their channels, trust them and only obtain information from them. Very few Saudis considered following different sources. (Rubin, Perse & Taylor, 1988)

b) Saudi vs. Foreign media:

The movie industry is still new in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Although a number of short and long Saudi movies have been released (whether promoting Saudi and its women, portraying frustrations or just pure comedy), 44% of Egyptians heard of any Saudi movie while more than 84% Saudis did. Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies while Saudis have a much higher knowledge about them. Out of

these 44% of Egyptians who have heard about any Saudi movie, only 31% were eager to watch the movie. Asking participants about the name of the movie they heard of yielded interesting results. Majority of Egyptians (75%) recalled the first long Saudi movie ever "Keif El Hal", which was shown in the "Cannes Film Festival" and watched by many non Saudis, while only 6% heard of the second long movie ever made "Menahi". Almost 13% of them wrote "Mais Hemdan's movie" or "the one that has Mais in it" or "the one starred by Mais". Mais Hemdan is not a Saudi woman; however, she played the role of one in the movie "Keif Al Hal". It is interesting to see that out of the whole Saudi/Syrian cast, the one that people recalled was Mais who is not Saudi and already famous among Egyptians. Furthermore, 2% mentioned "Tash ma Tash", which is not a Saudi movie. It is a famous Saudi sitcom that is very popular among Saudis. The 2% have just heard the name and wrote it down for a movie. On the other hand, Saudis' answers were of much more variety. They mentioned the two long movies as well as some short movies.

The Saudi movies were screened on Egyptian cinemas and air on Rotana Cinema regularly. However, the majority of Egyptians choose to flip the channel and not watch the movies. This has nothing to do with accessibility because Egyptians visit the movie theatres for Egyptian and western movies and they also watch their favorite movies and programs on Rotana Cinema. The reason maybe either not comprehending the accent or not accepting the culture or trusting the quality of the movie or even not being interested in watching it. The conclusion is that Egyptians have low knowledge of Saudi movies and it is not a result of accessibility nor availability. This is further confirmed by Morgan, Shanahan and Harris (1990) who confirmed that even with the appearance of new technology that solves the problem of accessibility; the watching habits of the audience will not be affected. They will still

look for their favorites and might resist diversifying. Dobrow (1990) further confirmed this by claiming that heavy viewers will use the new technology available to view more of the programs and movies they are used to watch.

The perception each participant had of the different media gave interesting results. Though both Egyptians and Saudis agreed that foreign media are the most credible, have highest quality and most variety, they disagreed on which media they trusted more. Saudis picked their own media as the most trusted while Egyptians trusted foreign media the most.

Each country's media had a different way in covering issues related to Saudi women. Saudis believe that western media portray a negative incorrect image of Saudi women while Saudi media portray the accurate positive image of them. Saudis were neutral on the way Egyptian media portrayed their women but many of them believed that they portray a negative inaccurate image of them. Egyptians on the other hand, agreed that western media portray a negative inaccurate image of Saudi women but their percentages of agreement were which much lower than those of Saudis. Egyptians were neutral on how Saudi media portrayed them, but they were less convinced that the Saudi media portray accurate or positive image. They were also neutral on the portrayal of Egyptian media, but they were less convinced that they portray an accurate or negative image.

When participants were asked to name a Saudi, Egyptian and foreign woman pioneer in any field, most Egyptian participants skipped and did not know any Saudi woman while Saudis wrote a long list of women pioneer in different fields. Names that Egyptians came up with were mostly media persons (book authors, directors, singers and TV presenters). They are more familiar with these than other scientists or political figures. On the other hand, most participants of both nationalities did not find

it difficult to recall a foreign pioneer woman. Also, participants from both nationalities easily recalled Egyptian pioneer women from different fields.

To conclude, Saudi media have a stronger impact on Saudis than Egyptians while foreign media have a greater influence on Egyptians. Saudis turn to their channels to access information while Egyptians never turn to them and resort to foreign media. Moreover, the foreign media are thought to be the most trusted, credible and of highest quality by Egyptians, while Saudis still trust their own channels though not finding them the most diversified in programs nor of highest quality.

A cultivation effect was illustrated in understanding the issue of Saudi women for TV audience. They see through the eyes of TV even if there are many inconsistencies between the truth and what is portrayed on the screen (Byrant and Zillman, 1994). In the light of this, Egyptians' negative perception of Saudi women is understandable since they choose foreign media for reference; while Saudis stick to their local channels and are religiously inoculated since childhood. The huge difference between both groups in describing the status of Saudi women can be related not only to their TV exposure over time but also to the source they choose.

*c) **Perception:***

Regarding the perception, the questionnaire revealed interesting results. In most parts, Saudis and Egyptians had very different and contradicting perceptions of Saudi women. For example, most Saudi participants confirmed that the rules set for women in Saudi are derived from Islamic Sharia and Quran. On the other hand, Egyptians had a different opinion; they saw that these rules are enforced and derived from the Saudi traditions and customs. However, both samples agreed that Islamic

clerics rank the second most powerful while the interior ministry is the least powerful. According to Mtango (2004), article 1 of the Saudi law confirms that the constitution and everything that has to do with the country as a whole must be derived from Quran and Hadith only. Saudis study this in schools and the government never forgets to remind its nation of this fact. However, such a concept may not be strongly announced to the outside world.

A series of true or false statements revealed interesting results as well. As mentioned before not all of these statements are true: some are correct, some are incorrect while a couple of other statements were not true nor false but intended to give an indication about the perception each person had.

The below correct statements showed significant difference between Saudis who knew they were true and Egyptians who did not:

- Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom.
- Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion.
- Saudi has gender mixed universities. (*King Abdullah University of Science and Technology is the first sex desegregated university in Saudi*). (Laessing & Alsharif, 2009)
- Saudi women can work as journalists. (*For example, Al Hayat's Amjad Rida or Al Madina's Suhailah Zain El Abidin*)
- Saudi women can work as senior executives. (*For example, Ghada Ba'ageel, Lama Al Sulaiman*)
- Saudi women can share offices with men. (*Such as in Unilever and Rotana*). (Butters, 2009)

- Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce. *(Lama Al Sulaiman and Nashwa Taher are the first two women to be elected and join the chamber)*

The below statements are correct too and showed differences between Saudis who knew they were true and Egyptians who did not; but the difference was not as huge:

- Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card. *(By the year 1999, Prince Ahmed gave Saudi women the right to hold their own IDs and passports separate from their fathers and husbands). (Women's International Network News, 2000)*
- Saudi women can work as doctors. *(For example, Hayat Sindi)*
- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive. *(In 1990, around 50 women sent their drivers away and drove their own cars in the streets of Riyadh calling for their right to drive). (Doumato, 1991)*

The below are incorrect statements that showed huge difference between Saudi who knew they were false and Egyptians who did not:

- Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public.
- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote.
- Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work.

The below are also incorrect statements that showed difference between Saudis who knew they were untrue and Egyptians who did not, but the difference was not as huge:

- Saudi women can drive in the kingdom.
- Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament.
- Saudi women are allowed to work as judges.

The below statements are neither true nor false; but stating that they are true gives an indication of a positive perception of Saudi women:

- Saudi women are happy with their status in the society.
- Saudi women can choose their future husbands.
- Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their peer men.

Results showed that the difference between Saudis and Egyptians who approved these statements is huge except for the last statement. Most Saudis indicated that the above statements were true while most Egyptians thought otherwise.

The below statements are neither true nor false; but stating that they are true gives an indication of a negative perception of Saudi women:

- Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam.
- Saudi women live as second class citizens.
- Saudi women live a struggled life.

Results also showed that the difference between Saudis and Egyptians who approved these statements is significant except for the first statement. Most Saudis indicated that the above statements were true while most Egyptians thought otherwise. It is important to note that many Saudis were offended and expressed their anger from the above statements; in fact some of them refused to continue the questionnaire.

A number of statements on the Likert scale also showed intriguing results. Majority of Saudis perceive their country as the closet country to Islam, agree that Islam called for face veil as well as sex segregation, believe that true Islam is implemented in their country, trust that Saudi women are satisfied with their conditions, consider the Saudi women to be ideal Islamic women and disagree that Saudi men prefer women to be second class citizens. However, Egyptians disagreed with all the statements and believed that Saudi men prefer to keep their women as second class citizens. But both samples agreed that non Saudis have a wrong perception of Saudi women. Saudis expressed more agreement with this statement than Egyptians did. Overall, the difference between both samples' results was huge; they both took extreme sides of the coin.

To conclude the above results, it is clear that Egyptians have a negative perception of Saudi women while Saudis have a positive perception of them. When relating the perception each group had with the hours spent watching TV, results grab anyone's attention. Saudis with the most negative perception are those who watched TV the least (between 1 to less than 4 hours per week). Egyptians, on the other hand, had different results. Those who had negative perceptions of Saudi women were heavy TV watchers (who watched for 7 hours or more per week). This goes in harmony with Gerbner et al. (1980) assumptions. They defined the heavy TV user as anyone who watches TV for 4 hours or more per day. They believe that for these heavy users, TV will monopolize over any other media; the influence of the heavy TV exposure is what they called cultivation.

d) TV Exposure and Perceptions of Saudi Women:

Egyptians with the most negative perception of Saudi women were those who never or rarely watched Saudi media (news or entertainment). They sometimes followed their own Egyptian news and entertainment channels. However, they were heavy users of foreign media. Those Egyptians who indicated negative perceptions were those who were addictive to foreign media. They sometimes watched foreign news and frequently turned to foreign entertainment. As Gerbner and Gross (1976) claimed, heavy users will see through the TV eyes; the televised side of matters. Since Egyptians are heavy viewers of foreign media, their perception of Saudi women are close to the foreign media coverage and sources rather than any other source.

Saudis, on the other hand, mostly had a positive perception of their women. A minority of them believed otherwise. This minority never or rarely turned to Saudi news or entertainment channels; however they sometimes watched the foreign media. Though they rarely followed Egyptian news channels, they sometimes watched Egyptian entertainment.

According to this sample, the majority of Saudis were following the Saudi channels more than any other available channel. However, they also turned to foreign channels in many cases; but the impact of foreign channels on Saudis remains weak to an extent. Most Saudis have a positive perception about their country and women. This is confirmed by Abou Alsamh (2002) who said that Saudis themselves are as concerned about preserving their culture as their governments and officials. They are convinced that they are the luckiest and most privileged to belong to the Kingdom as Elanor Doumato (1990) also mentioned.

II. Limitations of the research:

The use of non random sampling technique in the research does not allow the results to be generalized to both populations. However, the lack of population information in both countries forces the researcher to utilize the non random techniques. Moreover, Egyptian participants were Cairo residents only and Saudi participants were Riyadh and Jeddah residents; therefore, results cannot be generalized to the whole populations.

The researcher focuses on the general perceptions of both populations and does not expand to include more details and other factors affecting the perceptions created.

Most literature found about the Saudi women was done by foreigners who are not very welcomed by the Saudi community; therefore, they see an artificial outside look of the Saudi community.

Saudi by nature is a closed gated community which made the distribution of the survey more difficult. One cannot walk in the streets of the Kingdom and ask people to fill questionnaires. Reaching enough Saudi participants for the sake of the research was difficult. Moreover, many Saudis refused to fill the questionnaire for different reasons: some were afraid to speak their mind while others did not understand what a questionnaire is. Other participants refused for other reasons that they refused to mention. Several Saudis were offended by the study and some of the questions in the questionnaire. For example, rather than just indicating that "Saudi women live as second class citizens" is false, they expressed their anger and refused to complete the questionnaire.

The distribution of questionnaires and analysis were done before the Egyptian and Tunisian revolution took place. The revolutions spread in the Middle

East might urge some Saudis to revolt against the regime and call for freedom, such as Najla Elhariri who drove her car in the streets of Jeddah influenced by the revolutions taking place in different Middle East countries. However, it is important to note that this research was conducted before the revolutions.

III. Recommendations for Future Studies:

This study has focused on the preexisting perceptions about Saudi women; therefore, researchers should focus on the factors behind such perception. Is television the sole factor? Is it the strongest factor in creating stereotypes? What are the other influences?

Saudis own different channels which air their newly directed movies, programs and series. Researchers should direct their attention to study the effectiveness, availability and reach of these channels on the Saudi population as well as the foreign audience. Reasons for watching or not watching them should also be investigated.

More female Saudi researchers should study the Saudi community because they are the most welcomed to enter and investigate the community. Being a female and a Saudi powers their status and gives them access to many angles. Portraying Saudi from an inside eye is important.

Moreover, using media as tools to eliminate or change stereotypes about Saudi women should be focused upon and studied by media scholars.

Finally, the revolutions occurring in many Arab countries should be focused upon. Would it reach Saudi? Would Saudis revolt and ask for a freer country? Or would they still resist? Future research should look for reasons leading to or hindering a Saudi revolution.

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Appendix A: Questionnaire Sample (English Version)

Dear Participant,

This survey is conducted for a journalism and mass communication graduate thesis at the American University in Cairo. The aim of the study is to investigate perceptions of Saudi women. Anonymity of the participants is promised. Please answer the following:

1. What is your nationality?
 - A. Egyptian
 - B. Saudi (please move to Question 4)
 - C. Other (please terminate, thank you for your time)

2. Have you ever visited Saudi Arabia for any reason other than Hajj or Omra?
 - A. Yes
 - B. No (please move to Question 4)

3. How long was your visit to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
 - A. 10 days or less
 - B. More than 10 (Please terminate, thank you for your time)

4. Do you watch TV for at least one hour **per week**?
 - A. Yes.
 - B. No (*Please terminate, thank you for your time*).

5. On average, how many hours do you spend watching TV **per week**?
 - A. 1- under 4 hours
 - B. 4 hours – under 7 hours
 - C. 7 hours or more

6. How often do you watch **Saudi news** channels (Saudi channels or channels owned by Saudis)?
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

7. How often do you watch **Egyptian news** channels (Egyptian channels or channels owned by Egyptians)?
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

8. How often do you watch **foreign news** channels? (Foreign channels or channels owned by foreigners)
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

9. How often do you watch **Saudi entertainment** channels? (programs, films, series hosted, presented or acted by Saudis)
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

10. How often do you watch **Egyptian entertainment** channels? (programs, films, series hosted, presented or acted by Egyptians)
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

11. How often do you watch **foreign entertainment** channels? (programs, films, series hosted, presented or acted by foreigners)
 - A. Never
 - B. Rarely
 - C. Sometimes
 - D. Frequently
 - E. Always

12. Which TV channels do you trust the most? (Please pick one only)
 - A. Saudi
 - B. Egyptian
 - C. Foreign

13. Which TV channels are the **most** credible? (Please pick one only)
 - A. Saudi
 - B. Egyptian
 - C. Foreign

14. Which TV channels are the **most** accessible to you? (Please pick one only)
 - A. Saudi
 - B. Egyptian
 - C. Foreign

15. Which TV channels have the highest quality? (Please pick one only)

- A. Saudi B. Egyptian C. Foreign

16. Which TV channels have the most variety of programs? (Please pick one only)

- A. Saudi B. Egyptian C. Foreign

17. Please rank the following according to their power in setting the rules in Saudi for women? (**Give scores to each: 1 being least powerful and 5 being the most powerful**)

- A. The King. ()
 B. Islam and Quran. ()
 C. Islamic clerics and sheikhs. ()
 D. Saudi traditions and customs. ()
 E. Interior ministry. ()
 F. others, please specify: _____

In your opinion, please indicate if the following statements are either true (✓) or false (x):

41. Saudi women are happy with their status in the society ()
 42. Saudi women can drive in the kingdom ()
 43. Saudi women can own a car in their name in the kingdom ()
 44. Saudi women can have a passport or an identification card ()
 45. Saudi women can choose their future husbands ()
 46. Saudi women can travel abroad without a male companion ()
 47. Every woman in Saudi must be covered from head to toe in public ()
 48. Saudi's schools' curricula are completely based on Islam ()
 49. Saudi has gender mixed universities ()
 50. More than half of Saudi's school graduates are female ()
 51. Saudi women can work as journalists ()
 52. Saudi women can work as senior executives ()
 53. Saudi women can work as doctors ()
 54. Saudi women can share offices with men ()
 55. Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi chamber of commerce ()
 56. Saudi women are allowed to work in the Saudi parliament ()
 57. Saudi women are allowed to work as judges ()
 58. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to drive ()
 59. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to vote ()
 60. Saudi women have demonstrated for their right to work ()
 61. Saudi women live as second class citizens ()
 62. Saudi women live a struggled life ()
 63. Saudi women are eager to seek higher education as their peer men ()

Please mark with (✓) your agreement with the following statements:

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
41. Saudi Arabia is the closet country to a pure Islamic society.					
42. Islam calls for sex segregation.					
43. Islam calls for face veil (niqab).					
44. True Islam is implemented in Saudi Arabia.					
45. Saudi women are satisfied with their lives.					
46. Saudi women are the ideal					

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly agree
Islamic women.					
47. I trust my favorite TV channel's coverage of issues					
48. Saudi's government is responsible for Saudi women's current condition and status.					
49. Western media portray a negative image of Saudi women.					
50. Western media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.					
51. Saudi media portray a positive image of Saudi women.					
52. Saudi media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.					
53. Egyptian media portray a negative image of Saudi women.					
54. Egyptian media portray an accurate image of Saudi women.					
55. My idea of Saudi women is based on what I saw and heard on TV or any other media.					
56. TV is a source of entertainment for me.					
57. TV is a source of information for me.					
58. I only obtain information from my favorite TV channel					
59. Saudi men prefer their women to be second class citizens.					
60. I usually flip between my favorite news channel and other channels.					
61. Non Saudis have a wrong perception of Saudi women.					
62. TV has an effect on my perception of issues.					

63. Have you travelled outside your country?

A. Yes

B. No

64. Have you heard about any Saudi movie?

A. Yes

B. No (Please move to Question 67)

65. Please tell us its name: _____

66. Have you watched it?

- A. Yes.
- B. No.

67. Have you heard about the Saudi girl who was raped in Qatif?

- A. Yes
- B. No (Please move to Question 69)

68. If yes, then from which channel? (pick all that apply)

- A. Saudi channels
- B. Egyptian channels
- C. Foreign channels

69. Name a Saudi woman pioneer in any field: _____

70. Name an Egyptian woman pioneer in any field: _____

71. Name a foreign woman pioneer in any field: _____

72. Your Age:

- A. Less than 21.
- B. 21 – less than 30.
- D. 30 – less than 40.
- E. 40 – less than 50.
- F. 50 and above.

73. Gender:

- A. Female
- B. Male

74. Level of education:

- A. No formal education
- B. Primary-High School
- C. Community college/ Diploma
- D. Undergraduate Student
- E. Bachelor Degree Holder
- F. Graduate Student
- G. Graduate degree holder, please specify: _____

75. If you are Egyptian, Please specify your income level per month below: (Saudis go to next question)

- A. Less than 1000.
- B. 1,000 – less than 5,000.
- C. 5,000 – less than 10,000.
- D. 10,000 – less than 15,000.
- E. 15,000 and above.

76. If you are Saudi, Please specify your income level per month below:

- A. Less than 1000.
- B. 1,000 – less than 5,000.
- C. 5,000 – less than 10,000.
- D. 10,000 – less than 15,000.
- E. 15,000 and above.

Thank you for your time and participation.

Appendix B: Questionnaire Sample (Arabic Version)

هذا بحث ميداني لرسالة ماجستير بالجامعة الأميركية بالقاهرة؛ بقسم الصحافة والإعلام. الهدف من هذا البحث هو استكشاف مفهوم المرأة السعودية في المجتمع وهذا البحث يضمن سرية معلومات المشاركين. رجاء التفضل بدقائق من وقتكم للإجابة علي الأسئلة التالية:

١. ما هي جنسيتك؟
 - أ. مصري .
 - ب. سعودي برجاء الذهاب للسؤال رقم (:) .
 - ج. أخرى شكراً لوقتكم برجاء عدم الاستمرار .
٢. هل سبق لك زيارة المملكة العربية السعودية لسبب غير الحج أو العمرة؟
 - أ. نعم .
 - ب. لا برجاء الذهاب للسؤال رقم (:) .
٣. كم كانت فترة زيارتك للمملكة العربية السعودية؟
 - أ. ١٠ أيام أو أقل م ١٠ أيا .
 - ب. أكثر من ١٠ أيام شكراً لوقتكم برجاء عدم الاستمرار .
٤. هل تشاهد التلفاز لمدة أكثر من ساعة في الأسبوع؟
 - أ. نعم .
 - ب. لا شكراً لوقتكم برجاء عدم الاستمرار .
٥. في المتوسط كم عدد الساعات التي تشاهد فيها التلفاز في الأسبوع؟
 - أ. من ١ – أقل من ٤ ساعات .
 - ب. من ٤ – أقل من ٧ ساعات .
 - ج. ٧ ساعات أو أكثر .
٦. هل تشاهد قنوات الأخبار السعودية ؟ القنوات السعودية او القنوات التي يمتلكها سعودي)
 - أ. أبد .
 - ب. نادر .
 - ج. أحيانا .
 - د. غالب .
 - هـ. دائم .
٧. هل تشاهد قنوات الأخبار المصري ؟ القنوات المصرية او القنوات التي يمتلكها مصري)
 - أ. أبد .
 - ب. نادر .
 - ج. أحيانا .
 - د. غالب .
 - هـ. دائم .

٨. هل تشاهد قنوات الأخبار الأجنبية ؟ القنوات الأجنبية أو القنوات التي يمتلكها اجنبي (أ. أبد . ب. نادر . ج. أحياء . د. غالب . هـ . دائم .
٩. هل تشاهد قنوات الترفيه السعودي ؟ البرامج و المسلسلات و الافلام ذات المقدمين و الممثلين (السعودي) (أ. أبد . ب. نادر . ج. أحياء . د. غالب . هـ . دائم .
١٠. هل تشاهد قنوات الترفيه المصري ؟ البرامج و المسلسلات و الافلام ذات المقدمين و الممثلين (المصري) (أ. أبد . ب. نادر . ج. أحياء . د. غالب . هـ . دائم .
١١. هل تشاهد قنوات الترفيه الأجنبي ؟ البرامج و المسلسلات و الافلام ذات المقدمين و الممثلين الاجانب (أ. أبد . ب. نادر . ج. أحياء . د. غالب . هـ . دائم .
١٢. أي محطات التلفاز تثق بها أكثر ؟ فضلا اختر واحد فقد (أ. السعودي . ب. المصري . ج. الأجنبي .
١٣. أي محطات التلفاز تتمتع بالمصداقية الأكثر ؟ فضلا اختر واحد فقد (أ. السعودي . ب. المصري . ج. الأجنبي .
١٤. أي محطات التلفاز الأكثر إتاحة لك؟ فضلا اختر واحد فقد (أ. السعودي . ب. المصري . ج. الأجنبي .
١٥. أي محطات التلفاز ذات جودة أعلى ؟ فضلا اختر واحد فقد (أ. السعودي . ب. المصري . ج. الأجنبي .
١٦. أي محطات التلفاز لديها أكثر تنوع في البرامج؟ فضلا اختر واحد فقد (أ. السعودي . ب. المصري . ج. الأجنبي .
١٧. برجاه ترتيب التالي حسب تأثيره في وضع قوانين المرأة في السعودية رقم [الأقل تأثيراً - رقم ١] الأكثر تأثير):
- أ. الملك ()
- ب. الإسلام والقرآن ()

- ج. المشايخ والعلماء المسلمون ()
- د. العادات والتقاليد السعودي ()
- هـ. وزارة الداخلية ()
- و. أخرى :

من وجهة نظرك أي العبارات التالية صح (✓) وأيها خطأ (×):

١٨. المرأة السعودية سعيدة بمكانتها في المجتمع ()
١٩. المرأة السعودية تستطيع أن تقود السيارة في السعودي ()
٢٠. المرأة السعودية تستطيع أن تمتلك سيارة بإسمها في السعودي ()
٢١. للمرأة السعودية تستطيع أن تستخرج جواز سفر أو بطاقة هوية ()
٢٢. المرأة السعودية تستطيع أن تختار زوج المستقبل ()
٢٣. المرأة السعودية تستطيع أن تسافر خارج البلاد بدون محرم ()
٢٤. كل سيدة في السعودية يجب أن تغطي من قمة الرأس إلى القدم ()
٢٥. مناهج المدارس سعودية مبنية على الدين الإسلامي ()
٢٦. توجد جامعات بها اختلاط للجنسين في السعودي ()
٢٧. أكثر من نصف خريجي المدارس السعودية من النساء ()
٢٨. السيدات السعوديات يمكن لهن العمل كصحفيات ()
٢٩. السيدات السعوديات يمكن لهن العمل كمديرات تنفيذيات ()
٣٠. السيدات السعوديات يمكن لهن العمل كطبيبات ()
٣١. يمكن للسيدات في السعودية أن يشتركن مع الرجال في نفس مكان العمل ()
٣٢. يمكن للسيدات السعوديات العمل في الغرفة التجارية ()
٣٣. يمكن للسيدات السعوديات العمل في البرلمان ()
٣٤. يمكن للسيدات السعوديات العمل كقاضيات ()
٣٥. السيدات السعوديات تظاهرن من أجل حقهن في قيادة السيارات ()
٣٦. السيدات السعوديات تظاهرن من أجل حقهن في التصويت الانتخابي ()
٣٧. السيدات السعوديات تظاهرن من أجل حقهن في العمل ()
٣٨. السيدات السعوديات يعشن كمواطنات من الدرجة الثانية ()
٣٩. السيدات لسعوديات يعشن حياة قاسية ()
٤٠. السيدات السعوديات يتطلعن للتعليم العالي مثلهن مثل الرجال ()

برجاء وضع علامة (٦) للتعبير عن مدى موافقتك مع العبارات التالية

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	أرفض	أرفض بشدة	
					٤١. السعودية هي أقرب بلد للمجتمع الإسلامي الحقيقي .
					٤٢. الإسلام يحث على عدم اختلاط الجنسيز .
					٤٣. الإسلام يحث على ارتداء النقاب .
					٤٤. الإسلام الحقيقي يطبق في السعودي .
					٤٥. النساء السعوديات سعيدات بحياتهن .
					٤٦. المرأة السعودية هي المرأة المسلمة المثالي .
					٤٧. أثق في تغطية المحطة أو القناة المفضلة لدي للأحداث .
					٤٨. الحكومة السعودية مسؤولة عن الوضع الحالي للمرأة السعودي .
					٤٩. الإعلام الغربي ينقل صورة <u>سلبية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥٠. الإعلام الغربي ينقل صورة <u>حقيقية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥١. الإعلام السعودي ينقل صورة <u>إيجابية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥٢. الإعلام السعودي ينقل صورة <u>حقيقية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥٣. الإعلام المصري ينقل صورة <u>سلبية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥٤. الإعلام المصري ينقل صورة <u>حقيقية</u> عن المرأة السعودي .
					٥٥. رأيي عن المرأة السعودية مبني على ما أرى وأسمع عبر التلفاز أو أي وسيلة من وسائل الإعلا .
					٥٦. التلفاز هو مصدر للتسلية والترفيه لي .

أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	أرفض	أرفض بشدة	
					٥٧. التلفاز هو مصدر للمعلومات لي .
					٥٨. أحصل على المعلومات من المحطة — القناة المفضلة لدي فقد .
					٥٩. الرجال السعوديون يفضلون أن تكون المرأة مواطنة من الدرجة الثاني .
					٦٠. غالباً ما انتقل بين محطة الأخبار المفضلة لدي والمحطات الأخرى .
					٦١. غير السعوديين لديهم مفهوم خاطيء عن المرأة السعودي .
					٦٢. التلفاز يؤثر على مفهومي للمسائل المختلفة .

٦٣. هل قمت بالسفر إلى خارج بلادك؟

أ. نعم .

ب. لا .

٦٤. هل سمعت عن أي أفلام سعودية؟

أ. نعم .

ب. لا برجاء الذهاب إلى السؤال رقم (٧٠).

٦٥. برجاء اذكر اسم الفيلم :

٦٦. هل شاهدت هذا الفيلم؟

أ. نعم .

ب. لا .

٦٧. هل سمعت عن الفتاة التي اغتصبت في القطيف؟

أ. نعم .

ب. لا برجاء الذهاب إلى السؤال رقم (٧٩).

٦٨. في حالة إجابتك بنعم فعبّر أي قناة؟ يمكن اختيار أكثر من واحد).
أ. القنوات السعودي . ب. القنوات المصري . ج. القنوات الأجنبي .

٦٩. برجاء تسمية سيدة سعودية رائدة في أية مجال :

٧٠. برجاء تسمية سيدة مصرية رائدة في أية مجال :

٧١. برجاء تسمية سيدة أجنبية رائدة في أية مجال :

٧٢. السن :

٧٣. الجنس :

أ. أنثى .

ب. ذكر .

٧٤. مستوى التعليق :

أ. غير متعل .

ب. تعليم أساسي — ثانوي .

ج. معاهد أو دبلو .

د. طالب جامعي حالي .

هـ. حاصل على البكالوريوس .

و. طالب دراسات عليا حالي .

ز. حاصل على ماجستير أو دكتوراه، برجاء ذكر الدرجة العلمي :

٧٥. الدخل الشهري :

أ. أقل من ٠٠٠ .

ب. ١٠٠٠ — أقل من ١٠٠٠٠ .

ج. ٥٠٠٠ — أقل من ١٠٠٠٠ .

د. ١٠٠٠٠ — أقل من ٥٠٠٠٠ .

هـ. ١٥٠٠٠ أو أكثر .

شكرا لمشاركتك !

