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The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**ETHNIC INCLUSION, EDUCATION, DURABLE ASSETS AND
OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES**

A Thesis Submitted to the

Public Policy and Administration Department

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Public Policy**

By

Nihad Aboud

Summer 16

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy
Department of Public Policy and Administration

**ETHNIC INCLUSION, EDUCATION, DURABLE ASSETS AND
OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES**

Nihad Aboud

Supervised by Professor Hamid E. Ali

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of access to durable economic assets, education and occupational opportunities on political inclusion. The study uses aggregated cross sectional data from the DHS surveys and combines it with data from the EPR dataset to obtain measures of economic, social and political inequalities at the group level. The study assumes that the more economic deprivation would lead to reduced political inclusion, whereas increased share of access to education and modern occupations increase the likelihood of political inclusion. The main findings of the study suggest a negative relation between relative economic deprivation and moderns occupation (clerical...) on political inclusion, whereas a positive relation between education and political inclusion.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The continuous struggle of different ethnic groups around the world suggests that they experience deeper social and economic grievances as guiding framework to have more equal society by all necessary means. The uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 show that to sustain a political regime there should be a minimum level of fairness and social justice experienced by the different groups of the society (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013, p. 1), at the objective level, which corresponds to groups' real conditions and subjective level, which corresponds to the perceived status by the different groups. The main drivers to these uprisings were of primary inspiration to this research along with the different implications of the various economic, social and structural arrangements.

Over the past decades, the studies of applied social sciences have been closely linked to behavioral studies across various fields. For instance, economists and political scientists have been recognizing that to study the implications of the different economic, social and structural adjustments, it is necessary to pay attention to the mechanisms of decision-making processes and communication strategies that guide the different interacting units of societies. Similarly, policy analysts are being more concerned with studying how the different regulations result in altering the behavior of individuals by incentivizing and/or demotivating certain actions. The human agency has thus been able to place itself as a core focal point for analysis in most fields of study.

Yet at the same time, the ongoing debate between individual's agency and how it reflects human capacity, free will and rational choice on one hand, and social structure on the other hand, and how it reflects the limitations and constraints that guide human behavior

and practice, has never come to an end. Similarly, the existing dichotomy between autonomy and how it is reflected in individualism, against collective action, continue to emerge in almost all social sciences critiques and analyses, especially those examining different notions of fairness, wellbeing and political stability.

This tension between individual and collective rationality mostly prevails when scholars attempt to examine major collective actions ranging from activities of voluntary and participatory democratization, passing by violent mob actions, reaching both intra and inter state wars and armed conflicts. Throughout their continuous inquiry, over the past decades, scholars and policy analysts have also come up with different models and theories to explain collective action behavior and mobilization of the different groups. Among these theories are the structural theory of ethnic mobilization, the rational choice theory and the social identity model of collective action.

The structural theory assumes that when the members of ethnic groups occupy different and disadvantaged positions in any structural category, such as class and labor market, and when they become aware of their disadvantageous situation, collective action and mobilization will evidently follow (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982).

However, the main critique addressed to this category of theories is that it does not account for the non-occurrence of collective action and ethnic mobilization in many instances where ethnic structural and differential stratification exists. It thus only helps to explain the desirability of collective action and not its actual occurrence. It also ignores a very important feature of all collective actions and that is at the end, any action that happens for the pursuit of collective goals, is done by individuals (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982).

In an attempt to solve for the shortcomings of the structural theory, the rational choice is proposed. This theory advocates that individuals have different goals and utilities. And since individuals cannot pursue all their goals due to the scarcity of resources, they have to make rational choices between alternatives to maximize their utilities and welfare, which are limited by a set of structural constraints. The major premise of this theory is that individuals will only participate in collective actions when the benefits attributed to it outweigh the costs of participation (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982)

A critical dimension to the rational choice theory is the presence of ethnic organizations that governs the distribution of costs and benefits across the different individuals through private rewards and punishments in an attempt to solve for free riding. The free-rider dilemma acts as a main obstacle for collective actions as it could demotivate rational individuals to participate in collective action and mobilization, knowing that they could benefit from the end results of the collective production of public goods and goals without paying the adequate costs (Hechter, Friedman, & Appelbaum, 1982)

In an attempt to go further beyond the analysis of individual cost-benefit analysis, and to examine the factors that influence the valuation of these costs and outcomes that governs the individual's calculations, Zomeren et al. (2008) proposes the integrative social identity model of collective action to incorporate in the analysis the socio-psychological determinants of collective action. In this model, the three subjective variables that affect collective actions are perceived injustice, perceived efficacy and the strong sense of social identity. Perceived injustice shifts the attention from studying the consequences of objective inequality to studying the consequences of its subjective experience because it is believed that the latter carries greater weight than the material origins of the former and

a perceived sense of deprivation could be a strong motivator for collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). This variable could thus be seen as an added and enriching dimension to the structural theory.

As for perceived efficacy, it pertains to the subjective expectancy that a certain collective action will be successful and effective in bringing about the desired goals (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Again, this shift from objective cost-benefit analysis to subjective perceptions of efficacy is an added value to the rational choice theory.

As for the social identity element, its integration proposes that people generally seek to pursue a positive social identity associated with their membership groups; it thus serves to mobilize people for social change. A strong sense of social identity helps to shift the focus onto strong group-based emotions (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Along the same line of thought with the social identity model of collective action, was the evolution of concepts such as social capital and how it matters to new economic and political development theories. Individuals invest in building social networks to grant them power and solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase their capacity for collective action. In other words, social capital could be thought as a transformative channel that lies on the grounds of normative commitments that serves to transform individuals from self-seeking agents with little sense of obligation to others into community members with shared interests, a common identity, and a commitment to the common good (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The cultural affinities of the groups are therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is therefore important to pay attention to the norms and beliefs that serve to gather a community and form the boundaries of groups. In fact, it is often argued that the diffusion and authority of norms

and beliefs shape the choices of individuals in the smaller aggregate groups and communities in their continuous efforts to renegotiate their places within the larger aggregate, i.e. society (Adler & Kwon, 2002). As mentioned earlier by Stewart, these cultural identities have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and groups. They affect how others treat individuals within groups and also affect their overall wellbeing (Stewart, 2002).

For the purpose of this research, group identification is based on economic, education, and occupation opportunities that coincide with cultural differences and ethnicity. Often, the argument prevails that ethnic identities that are based on race, language, religion, tribal affiliation or even regional differences could serve as effective binder for the purposes of group formation. In fact, ethnicity is considered as a superior basis for group formation as compared to social class for instance (Murshed & Tadjoeeddin, 2007). In addition, we believe that the wealth ownership and types of occupations along with access to education can identify the ethnic inequality as consequence of marginalization.

The main hypothesis driving this research is that one of the most important factors that differentiate between the different ethnic groups' wellbeing and motivate their different behaviors is the presence of deep inequalities between them, in terms of access to political, economic and social resources. As implied by the concept of social capital and the integrative social identity model, since the individuals positions, merits and self-esteem are bound with the progress of the groups to which they belong by social and cultural networks as well as identities, the presence of such inequalities reduce the individuals' welfare within the deprived groups. The members of a deprived and discriminated group are thus expected to have a networking disadvantage accompanied

with economic and social implications. This results from the notion that the individual welfare does not only depend on the individual's own circumstances, but it is also linked to the prestige and attributed merit of the group to which she/he identifies (Stewart, 2002). In such cases, the perception of such inequalities can have an important effect on the groups' behaviors with respect to their mobilization and collective actions, which could in turn lead to a wide range of political instabilities. These political disturbances could take the form of riots organized by the deprived groups or they could take a more extreme form of mobilizations such as civil wars between the different competing groups. In fact, in many cases, it is not only the resentment of the deprived groups that could result in political instabilities, but the relatively privileged could also mobilize. In these cases, the privileged is motivated by fear that the deprived would demand and seek access for more resources, economical and political (Stewart, 2002).

The main aim of this study is to focus on the extent of impact of economic, social inequalities on political inequalities among culturally and economically defined ethnic groups, since a better understanding of such relationship provides an opportunity to discuss the different aspects of history and/or political choices that have resulted into the creation of such differences within the multi-ethnic societies. It further facilitates a better understanding of the concept of inter-group inequalities developed as a driving motive for the collective choices and behaviors of the different ethnic groups. This interrelation is better explained by Cramer's (2003) argument stating that economic inequalities exist by virtue of social and political forces that give rise to it, just as materials forces shape the social and political. In other words, economic inequalities are embedded and structured by the historical and social milieu (Muhula, 2009).

Research Question

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of economic, education and employment opportunities on political inequalities among culturally defined ethnic groups. More specifically, the study attempts to examine the effect of particular ethnic group's access to durable economic assets, education, and employment, on the probability of its political inclusion.

For the purpose of this research, political inclusion refers only to the degree of access to central state power by the different political ethnic groups and those who claim to represent them. This research, following the available data sources that will be elaborated in Chapter 3, limits state power to the access to executive power only, disregarding access to legislative and judicial institutions. Examples of executive power institutions that are examined to categorize the political inclusion include: "the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration in democratic regimes; the army command in military dictatorships; or the ruling party leadership in one-party states" (Vogt, 2014).

The existing interrelations between horizontal inequalities in multiethnic societies are studied, as an attempt to examine the multidimensionality of the horizontal inequalities.

Significance

The significance of this research is twofold, theoretical and practical. From the theoretical part, since the concept of the horizontal inequalities among groups is relatively new, this research strengthen the notions of existing and persistent inter-group inequalities by focusing on the different dimensions of inequalities, particularly political and socio-economic, among different ethnic groups.

In fact, most of the literature attempts to separately examine the consequences of the different dimension of horizontal inequalities, by focusing on the link between political or socio-economic inequalities and conflict onset and civil wars duration. However, this research takes a step back and attempts to examine the dynamics of wealth, employment and education opportunities on inequalities. This study contributes to the quantitative literature on horizontal inequalities and social exclusion. It attempts to carefully examine the interrelations and correlations existing between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities leading to social exclusion. It adopts the multidimensional approach advocated for the analysis of both concepts, as will be shown in Chapter 2, by attempting to examine the effect of social and economic opportunities, in the form of access to durable assets, education and occupation on political opportunities, in the form of political inclusion and access to executive power. As will be shown later in Chapter 3, the study relies on aggregating data from DHS surveys in a way that helps in assessing the differential status of the different ethnic groups in developing countries. It also combines the comprehensive EPR dataset with the DHS survey.

As for the practical part, by studying such interrelations among inequalities, this research will serve to identify a measure of corrective policies and regulations intended to resolve such structural inequalities and discrepancies at the group level.

The study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 discusses theoretical literature review that highlights the main guiding theories of the research and analysis. Chapter 3 presents the research design, with the study's argument and hypothesis, the sample, data sources and operationalization of the different variables used in the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis of the different models used to test the study's hypothesis. Finally,

Chapter 5 concludes with some closing remarks and briefly discusses the added value of this study and the implications for future research along with some brief policy recommendations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Multiethnic Societies

The importance of cultural ethnicity has been highlighted over the past decades in many instances in social sciences. As it is observed, instead of abandoning traditional ethnic identities for the search for socio-economic and political equity, ethnic groups have retained their identities along the way and irrespective of their political economic status. Increasingly, political and economic strife is defined along ethno-religious lines. (Scott, 1990). After years of social mobility and migration, people of different cultures have become closer to each other in terms of physical proximity. These culture differences have been accounting for most of the current conflicts and societal disorders that are taking place (Stewart, 2002).

In the literature, there are basically two types of multiethnic societies that differ in terms of inter-ethnic group relations. According to Horowitz, ethnic groups are ranked into two types (Horowitz, 1985). In the first type of multiethnic societies, ethnicity is represented in historically hierarchical power structures where one group dominates others. In the second type, “ethnicity constitutes the politically relevant cleavage between different groups that meet each other on a relatively equal footing” (Vogt, 2013). While ethnicity is employed to practice constant oppression and stabilize the state of inequality in the first type of societies, in the latter type it creates a competitive sense of ethno-nationalism accompanied by an alternating dominance over the society, resulting in fluctuating inclusion and exclusion arrangements (Vogt, 2013).

Horowitz’ (1985) conceptualization is based on the coincidence and non-coincidence of social class with ethnic origins. In ranked systems, the state of being divided into social

classes is identical to group membership, and group affiliations determine the possibility of social class mobility. (Horowitz, 1985, p. 22). On the other hand, unranked systems are marked by the coexistence of different parallel ethnic groups, which are internally divided (Horowitz, 1985, p. 23).

Ethnicity

We now move to the different conceptualizations of ethnicity and ethnic identity in the literature. Three main views guide the exact conceptualization of ethnicity: the primordialist view, the instrumentalist view and the constructionist view. For the primordialist, ethnicity is a cultural given. According to Anthony D. Smith (1984), socio-biological factors define ethnicity, making it a “quasi-natural matter of descent.” According to Horowitz, an inclusive conception of ethnicity embraces differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin (Horowitz, 1985, p. 41). It is based on collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate (Horowitz, 1985, p. 52). It cannot be discarded by social mobility, as in the case of social classes for instance (Bacal, 1991). It thus follows that ethnicity is both ascribed and static (Yang, 2000, p. 42). In this view ethnic affiliations are highly emotionally charged and, on some accounts, irrational (Østby, 2003). According to Persons (1999), there is a socio-psychological aspect to the primordial perspective, which sustains group solidarity, and which provides answers to essentialist questions pertaining to identity. Thereby, ethnicity sets the boundaries differentiating between one’s group and the others (Persons, 1999, p. 7). One main critique of the primordialist view is that it does not account for the change of ethnic groups over time.

Similarly, this view does not explain why the boundaries of the ethnic groups change (Stewart, 2002; Scott, 1990).

As for the instrumentalist view, it views ethnicity as an instrument or tool for gaining resources (Yang, 2000, p. 46). In this view, ethnic motivation and behavior are structurally determined and correspond to objective and adaptive socio-economic interests (Bacal, 1991). Group leaders and elites thus advocate ethnicity in order to achieve certain interests (Stewart, 2002) and it is greatly affected by the rights, opportunities and the distribution of power resources as determined deferentially by the rules of the game in a given social setting (Persons, 1999, p. 7). In other words, ethnic groups are also interest groups. The instrumentalist approach is inspired from the rational choice theory, which advocates that people act to promote their socioeconomic positions. In this view, ethnicity is nothing more than an option (Yang, 2000, p. 47). However, it has to be noted that it has often been argued that these different perspectives and approaches to conceptualize ethnicity are not mutually exclusive. In concrete behavioral contexts, we can expect to find cultural, social and strategic elements at play (Douglass, 1988; Scott, 1990)

As for the constructionist view, it is considered a midway approach between both instrumentalist and primordial approaches. It holds that ethnicity is socially constructed, without implying prerequisites of deep cultural ties (Persons, 1999, p. 7). Thereof, it is the result of historical and political processes. Constructionists argue that ethnicity is neither immutable nor completely open; it is not an individual attribute but a social phenomenon. In other words, a person's culture is partly inherited, but also constructed and chosen, with many people having multiple identities (Østby, 2003). Much of the

work of the constructionist view has been developed to respond to the primordialist critique mentioned above, by showing that some of the social categories, which have been taken for granted, have indeed changed over time (Fearon & Laitin, 2000). From that perspective, ethnic solidarity results from certain social circumstances, or rather changing or differential circumstances, both internal and external, under which the group exists. In that sense, ethnicity is dynamic (Yang, 2000, p. 44) and ethnic boundaries may be defended, penetrated, or ignored depending upon situational exigencies (Douglass, 1988). Yet the primordialists argue that while constructionists would be able to account for the change of ethnic identity over time, they would not be able to account for its persistence, which could last for centuries. In other words, “changing circumstances could explain the fluctuations, but only primordial sentiments can account for its persistence” (Scott, 1990).

Group membership, social capital and intergroup relations

It thus follows that an inherent and fundamental part of human life is group membership. It is in fact a part of what defines individual identities. As stated by Gellner (1964), human beings have an instinctive need for a sense of belonging, identification, and exclusion. From this notion of belonging and exclusion come boundaries of the different ethnic groups, which have an important influence on the behavior of both individuals and groups (Stewart, 2002). Often the argument prevails that the various ethnic markers, like race, language, religion, form a strong ground for group identification. In fact, ethnicity is considered a superior basis for group formation compared to social class for instance (Murshed & Tadjoeeddin, 2007). The importance of group affiliation has been highlighted in many theories, most importantly theories of social capital and intergroup relations.

Social capital results from a strong sense of community, which brings together people over common interests. As elaborately mentioned by Adler and Kwon (2002), “social capital . . . has informed the study of families, youth behavior problems, schooling and education, public health, community life, democracy and governance, economic development and general problems of collective action”. In order to achieve this status of collective action, individuals invest in building social networks to grant them power and solidarity and to strengthen their collective identity in order to increase their capacity for future actions. Social capital tends to conceptualize the networking strategies that explain trust, cultural, social support, social resources and embeddedness. The cultural affinities of the groups are therefore an important pillar for the formation of social capital. It is thus important to pay attention to the norms and beliefs that serve to gather a community and form the boundaries of groups (Adler & Kwon, 2002).

Group affiliation and categorization is also important for theories of intergroup behavior, especially theories of intergroup conflict. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979), a group is conceptualized as a group of individuals who assign themselves to a certain social category and are emotionally attached to this collective definition. As a result, they also share common perceptions, to varying extents, of their group status. It is the social categorization that acts as a cognitive tool to segment, classify and order the surrounding environment, which enables the individuals to undertake many forms of social actions. The argument that social categorization provides the roots for intergroup behavioral analysis assumes the following: first, individuals aim at enhancing their self-esteem; second, social groups and group affiliation can have either positive or negative associations; third, the way members evaluate their own groups is usually affected by

comparison against other groups in terms of social status. It thus follows, from that perspective, that when social identity is negatively perceived and unsatisfactory, individuals will attempt to either leave the group with which they are identified and join a more positively perceived group, or make their existing group stand out (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). From that notion of intergroup comparisons, we can start to introduce the concept of horizontal inequalities.

Horizontal Inequalities

It is true that some countries managed to avoid the cultural cleavage caused by the different ethnic compositions. However, the post-colonial states in developing parts of the world were remarkably vulnerable when it came to dealing with cultural divisions. (Horowitz, 1985, p. 6). Both diffused and announced importance of ethnic affiliations and tendencies in multiethnic societies find their way in many evident aspects including developmental plans, educational controversies, land policy and so on. The importance of ethnicity is also reflected in the organizational structures of many multiethnic societies where ethnic affiliation guides the structure of economic and political organizations. In addition, capital and labor are often organized along ethnic lines. Political life in societies that are deeply influenced by ethnic division inevitably suffers ethnic repercussions. In such societies, governments tend to adopt discriminating policies that work in favor of some groups over others. Gradually, the adopted policies shape a differential economic system that operates strictly under these terms. Ethnic cleavage in divided societies has become a principal line of political division to the extent that it creates and fosters other cleavages (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 12-13).

As defined by Stewart (2002), horizontal inequalities are severe inequalities between culturally defined groups. Stewart adopts the term horizontal inequalities to set it apart from the conventional definitions of inequality, which maintain a vertical arrangement for individuals or households, and measures inequality across groups. Horizontal inequalities generally have their origins in historic circumstances, where colonial policy privileged some groups over others. Initial advantages led to long-term cumulative advantages, as resources and education allow the more privileged groups to secure further advantages (Stewart, 2003). Gurr (2000), however, proposes that group discrimination may be the result of either public policy practices or social practices. In the latter case, social prejudices and barriers in multi-ethnic societies could have a net effect that restricts some groups' access to education, public services and good jobs, and limit their participation in the political life (Gurr, 2000, p. 107). Indeed, and as clarified by Sen (1992), ethnic affinity can be a factor with far-reaching influence on many aspects of day-to-day living—varying from securing employment and receiving medical attention to being fairly treated by the police (Sen, 1992, p. 122). For instance, In South Africa under apartheid nonwhites were excluded from most skilled and professional occupations (Østby, 2003).

For Stewart, horizontal inequalities are multidimensional. She specified three categories of differentiation, in terms of inclusion and exclusion: First, the political participation in terms of access to government ministries, parliament and different levels of civil service and local government as well. Second, the economic aspects, in terms of access to the different assets, such as land, human capital, communal resources, privately owned capital and credit, government infrastructure and so on, in addition to differentiation in

terms of employment and income opportunities. Third, she classifies the aspects of social inclusion and exclusion, in terms of access to education, health services and housing and so on (Stewart, 2002).

Furthermore, Stewart and Langer (2007) argue that horizontal inequalities among groups tend to persist over long periods of time, especially where group markers and boundaries are rigid and tend to continue existing with time, as in the case of ethnicity. In addition, this persistence is explained by the notion of multidimensionality and interactions among the different categories of horizontal inequalities and the different elements within each of the categories. For instance, the outcome of income and economic inequalities cause political and social inequalities (Stewart & Langer, 2007).

Horizontal inequalities are similar in meaning and essence to what Tilly (1999) called “categorical durable inequalities”, which are inequalities that exist between distinctly joint categories such as female/male, citizen/foreigner. But it also extends to more complex classifications based on religion affiliation, ethnic origin or race (Tilly, 1999, p. 6). He highlighted two mechanisms for the durability of such inequalities. The first is exploitation by powerful people, who use their leverage to gain access to resources that generate great profits. This is typically done through capitalizing on the effort exerted by the very ones who are excluded by those in power. The second mechanism is opportunity hoarding, where access to a key resource is exclusively monopolized by one of the aforementioned categories to reinforce the operations of the group. (Tilly, 1999, p. 10)

Horizontal inequalities are also similar to what Gurr and Scarritt (1989) referred to as systematic differential treatment of group members by the larger society. They are also similar to socially embedded inequalities as referred to by Mogues and Carter (2005),

meaning that the wealthy and poor are distinguished not only by their assets, but also by their culture, language or appearance (Mogues & Carter, 2005)

There are two categories of reasons for which the study of horizontal inequalities between groups is important, both instrumentally, as means of achieving other objectives, and in themselves for the well-being of individuals and groups respectively—especially when the determinants of group affiliations are tight and less fluid, as is the case with ethnicity. The later direct welfare reasons are easily conceptualized as what happens to the group to which an individual belongs may have a direct effect on the individual's welfare. That is because individual welfare depends not only on a person's own circumstances, but also the prestige and wellbeing of the group with which they identify (Stewart, 2002). This reasoning is similar to the assumptions arranged by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in attempting to conceptualize social categorization and group comparisons, as shown earlier. In fact, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have included a person's identity in the individual's utility function arguing that a person assigned a category with a higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-image. One may consider that a person's sense of self is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave. In addition, in a world of social difference, one of the most important economic decisions that an individual makes may be the type of person to be. It thus follows that limits on this choice would also be critical determinants of economic behavior, opportunity, and wellbeing (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). This conclusion goes in line with Hoff and Pandey's (2006) when they concluded that a discriminatory regime affects not only the structure of opportunities open to the different social groups, but also the status and social meanings assigned to those groups; in other

words, their social identities (Hoff & Pandey, 2006). In accordance with this line of thought, Loury (2000) identifies different reasons to care explicitly about group inequalities. One of them is that race and ethnicity influence the social networks open to individuals, and these networks have a major effect on individuals' opportunities. In other words, factors like race, ethnicity and religious affiliations affect the individual's choice of association with the different networks of affiliation. In addition, the different processes through which individuals develop their productive capabilities are often shaped by custom, convention and social norms. They are not exclusively subject to market forces or reflective of the individual's capabilities. This highlights the importance of the role played by the social networks in mediating the effects of such market imperfections and negative externalities, as they help determine how resources important to the development of people's productive capacities are made available to individuals (Loury, 2000).

There are several instrumental reasons that lie behind the relevance of horizontal inequalities between groups, including the efficiency reason. Any system in which a group is discriminated against is likely to lead to less efficient outcomes than non-discriminating systems, in terms of both equity and market allocations. That is because severe mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on the basis of their potential merit or efficiency because of the group they belong to (Stewart & Langer, 2007). Furthermore, there is the reason of social stability, the link between horizontal inequalities and the potential of violent conflict (Stewart, 2002).

Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict

Armed conflicts disrupt infrastructure, markets and human resources (Ali & Lin, 2010).

Over the past decades, two theories have emerged attempting to explain conflict onset: Greed and Grievance. Grievances theories perceive conflicts as motivated by justice-seeking collective behaviors (Murshed & Tadjoeeddin, 2007)

From a psychological perspective, Ted Gurr (1970) has developed the theory of relative deprivation, which perceives the different types of collective violence as reactions to frustrations developed as result of a wide gap between aspirations and actual economic status and material well being (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). As defined by Ted Gurr (1970), relative deprivation is how individuals view the difference between “their value expectations and their value capabilities.” Value expectations include possessions and social statuses that people assume they justly qualify for. On the other hand, value capabilities are the possessions and social statuses that people believe they can actually acquire and maintain. Gurr (1970) proposes that the potential of collective violence is a function of scope and intensity of shared discontents among members of a society. By the extent of relative deprivation, Gurr (1970) means how much it prevails over group member in terms of the perceived evaluation of expectations and capabilities. For instance, individual and unexpected personal deprivation would affect fewer people than would the suppression of a political party or the decline of a group’s status with reference to others. As for intensity, Gurr (1970) refers to how the perception of deprivation would negatively affect the members of the group, and the type of negative emotions associated with it, like frustration, anger, or grievance etc. While developing this theory, Gurr (1970) pointed out that relative deprivation cannot only be a matter of

economic grievances, but can also derive from sudden exclusion or deprivation of political standing or status. Thus elites who lose or fail to attain expected status or power can also experience “relative deprivation” and harbor revolutionary discontents (Goldstone, Gurr, Marshall, & Ulfelder, 2004).

In an attempt to overcome the individualistic approach undertaken by Gurr, Michael Hetcher (1978) introduced the concept of “cultural division of labor,” which attempts to explain the emergence of grievances when cultural differences coincide with occupational exclusion. One other remarkable contribution to the literature is Horowitz’s book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985), which introduced theoretical arguments that linked inequality and grievances to conflict through cognitive comparisons among the different ethnic groups. By doing so, Horowitz analyzed power struggles that cannot be solely reduced to material motivations (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013).

Greed is reflected by the work of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), in which they used a comprehensive data set of civil wars. Their findings indicated that a model, which focuses on the opportunities for rebellion, performs well, whereas objective indicators of grievances—including inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization—add little explanatory significance. Among the factors that they highlighted influencing the opportunity of rebellion are the availability of finances, the cost of rebellion, the weakness of the government’s capability and, finally, social cohesion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Indeed, for “for any conflict to achieve its goals, the prerequisites are not only to inflict high and sustainable damage but also to prevent the military from utilizing its human and physical capital” (Ali, 2007).

Snyder and Tilly (1972) also conceptualized conflicts as caused by opportunity-based mobilization rather than grievances. From their perspective, since all societies have frustrated individuals, it is thus unlikely to establish a connection between collective violence and perceived “hardship” (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). Their work could be considered the basis of Collier and Hoeffler’s findings.

Along the same line of thought, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that the factors that explain civil wars are not the ethnic or religious characteristics of the respective countries. They are, in fact, the conditions that favor rebellion; including poverty, slow growth, and financially and bureaucratically weak states. These findings prove one set of the theoretical explanation to conflict onset, which claim that the cultural differences are superficial and instrumentalized in conflicts, and that the fundamental roots of a conflict are to be found in economic (or political) factors (Stewart, 2010). However, it has to be noted that while advocating that what matters to conflict is economic development and political institutions, and after showing that colonial heritage and the ethnic composition of a society have almost no effect on political stability, Goldstone et.al (2004) show that when ethnic differences are combined with active political discrimination against particular groups, political stability declines.

More recently, the literature has started to empirically substantiate the arguments in favor of grievances mechanisms. Scholars have started to assert the major challenges of the different methods used to assess horizontal inequalities and grievances.

The first problem encountered is how to determine the relevant groups within a country, since this requires a study of people’s own perceptions of identity and of the linkages between politics and group identities. The second problem is related to the lack of

consistent and systematic data, which affects the accuracy of conceptualizing the group disparities regarding the different elements of horizontal inequalities. For instance, data related to socioeconomic inequalities are often very limited because ethno-cultural variables are often not included in surveys. Also, gathering data regarding political inequalities would require an assessment of the different groups' distribution in the different power branches. The third problem encountered is of a more technical nature, and it is concerning how to measure group inequalities in a way that is comparable across countries and over time (Langer & Stewart, 2013)

Stewart (2002) recognizes the challenges of measuring such horizontal inequalities and resorts to individual case studies. She conducted an examination of different cases of multiethnic societies using censuses and special surveys. Stewart contextualized the measures of concern for each case study. In her analysis, she found that when ethnic identities coincide with economic and social inequalities, there is a higher probability that the country in question experiences social instability. As this happens, ethnic divisions are enforced (Stewart, 2002).

Most recently, Ostby (2008) has introduced in her studies large sample quantitative analysis, in order to find out the linkage between horizontal inequalities and grievances on the one hand, and conflict onset on the other. She used national household data across 36 developing countries in the period from 1986 to 2004 (from the Demographic and Health Surveys) to construct measures of social and economic horizontal inequalities. Her analysis shows a positive relation between horizontal inequalities and conflict onset (Østby, 2008).

For a more direct assessment of the impact of horizontal inequalities among groups, which are by definition multidimensional and aggregated, Cederman et.al (2011) had to incorporate data on the relevant ethnic groups and their access to executive power. The authors obtained spatial estimates of economic performance for EPR groups, by gathering data on the distribution of economic activity and group settlement pattern within the relevant countries. Their analysis shows a positive relation between economic and political inequality and conflict onset (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011).

Ethnic Political, Social and Economic Inequality and Capabilities Deprivation

Traps

Adopting an individualistic approach, Sen (1992) asked the important question: equality of what? He first argues that principally focusing on economic inequality leads to further conceptualization problems. He then argued that since living may be seen as a group of operations pertaining to “beings and doings”, it thus follows that social arrangements should be defined according to one’s capability to accomplish and sustain the presumably valuable status. This should factor in how equality and inequality are conceptualized.

In her influential article *Horizontal Inequalities: Two Types of Trap* (2009), Stewart criticized the individualistic approach adopted by Sen. She suggests that although the space of capabilities is also relevant for the analysis of horizontal inequalities, it might be more helpful to have a broader definition of capabilities. She first argues that there are certain group capabilities that do not fit easily into the individualistic conceptualization of capabilities like, for instance, group’s political power. Suffering from great deprivation in terms of political power has extremely negative impacts on the affected groups, most notably being unable to break this cycle of interrelated deprivation. Secondly, she argues

that there is a need to conceptualize the notion of capabilities deprivation in terms of inputs, such as access to education, and not only outcomes analysis that focuses on functions (Stewart, 2009).

Stewart then elaborates on the mechanisms of interaction between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which result into the persistence of such inequalities over time. The first mechanism is capability interaction, by which she means the interactions between capabilities, which take place at a certain time, and extend over the span of generations, creating “inequality traps”. For instance, parents with low health, education and nutrition capabilities tend to have low-income earnings. This, in turn, makes it difficult to provide for health, education and nutrition for their children. The second mechanism is interactions among capitals, by which she implies that a household’s income is determined by its ability to acquire various capital categories and the ensuing benefits. It has to be noted that both the mechanisms and the type of traps enforce and strengthen each other, which again is related to the notion of multidimensionality of inequalities among individuals and groups. Other factors, such as asymmetries in the different capitals, especially social and cultural, along with systematic discrimination and political exclusion, are expected to aggravate the persistence of inequalities (Stewart, 2009).

Social Exclusion

It is important to pay attention to the concept of social exclusion in the literature, as it is closely related to notions of deprivation and inequality traps. Social exclusion could be defined as a state experienced by particular groups of people. It is viewed as a dynamic and multidimensional process driven by unequal power relations. It is a concept that

operates along and interacts across four main dimensions: economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. These exclusionary processes create a continuum of inclusion/exclusion, characterized by an unjust distribution of resources and unequal access to the capabilities and rights (Popay, Escorel, Hernández, Johnston, Jane , & Rispel , 2008).

Hilary Silver (1994) has introduced three different paradigms to conceptualize the definition, including the causes and results of social exclusion: solidarity, specialization and monopoly (Silver, 1994). In light of the first paradigm, social exclusion is defined as the rupture of social bonds, which are primarily cultural and moral. This paradigm places emphasis upon the existence of core shared values forming a moral community, around which social order is constructed. In specialization—the second paradigm—exclusion reflects discrimination, which implies the drawing of group distinctions that denies individuals full participation in social interactions (De Haan, 2000). Discrimination in that sense is conceptualized as a failure in the system of society, which is composed of individuals who have certain rights and obligations. It is a failure in the structure of society that is built around a division of labor and an exchange in economic and social spheres (ILO, 1995). In the third paradigm, social exclusion is mainly driven by the monopolization practiced by the powerful groups against others. (ILO, 1995). In this paradigm, inequality overlaps with group distinctions (De Haan, 2000)

For this research, conceptualizing social exclusion as a sort of discrimination and a mechanism of inequality is of important relevance. By this focus on the inter-relational processes of exclusion and integration, the social exclusion framework serves to direct attention to another fundamental question alongside with Sen's questions "equality of

what?" and that is: "equality amongst whom?" (ILO, 1995). In fact, Sen (2000) welcomes the social exclusion framework. He argues that social exclusion may be directly a part of capability poverty, in the sense that it is not only an integral part of capability deprivation, but also an effective reason of further failure of capabilities.

Sen's arguments is better understood when the different manifestations of social exclusion are examined, which can be categorized within four dimensions. According the UN, the first refers to the possession and ownership of different assets. The second examines the course of acquiring and maintaining those assets, through taking part in productive economic activities. The third dimension pertains to providing the essential social needs, without compromising quality and levels of access. Finally, the fourth dimension relates to the political and socio-economic rights, which constitute the base for equal citizenship. This dimension is highly constrained by discriminating policies, and the institutional framework that governs decision-making (UN, 2009).

Chapter 3: Research Design

Study's Argument and Hypothesis

The argument in the study is that in multiethnic societies the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities across the different ethnic groups, namely political, economic and social are interrelated. They are closely linked to the different dimensions of the social exclusion approach. This interrelation is clarified by the notion of the vicious cycle of deprivation, as explained by Stewart (2010), when arguing that each type of inequality is notable in itself, but also has wide reaching impacts affecting other types of inequalities. For instance, political power is considered as both an end and a means, since in many cases, political exclusion leads to economic and social inequalities, and at the same time, poor education leads to poor income and underprivileged social status which undermines the opportunities for political participation and power sharing benefits (Stewart, 2010).

In other words, the opportunities available for a certain ethnic group to enhance the group's capabilities and different capitals, particularly human and social, directly affect the group's political power relations and vice versa.

This study relies heavily on the conceptualization of Ostby (2003) to horizontal inequalities. Throughout the course of this study, the opportunities and capabilities with the exclusion framework are conceptualized in terms of group's access to durable economic assets, education, and employment. The group's power relations are conceptualized in terms of political inclusion and access to executive power. The study thus argues that political inclusion is a function of durable economic assets, education and employment. This conceptualization is also inspired from the different dimensions of social exclusion as elaborated in the literature review.

The study assumes that access to durable economic assets, education and employment increase entitlement and empowerment, as they help to improve group's relative economic and social status, which in turns, increase the likelihood of political inclusion

The main hypotheses that is tested is as follows

H1: Reduced economic assets reduces the probability of political inclusion

H2: Increased access to education increases the probability of political inclusion

H3: Increasing employment increases the probability of political inclusion

Data Sources

The DHS Survey

Since 1984, the DHS has been able to conduct more than 300 surveys in over 90 countries. These surveys have served to provide technical assistance to advance global understanding of health and population trends in developing countries (DHS Program). The main purpose of the DHS surveys is to provide countries with the data needed to monitor and evaluate population, health and nutrition programs on a regular basis. In a DHS survey, a sample of households is selected throughout the entire country and then interviewed using a household questionnaire to collect housing characteristics and to identify all household members and their basic characteristics. Samples vary considerably in size, ranging from less than 5000 to almost 30000. The surveys are based on clustered sampling (Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). For each dataset the actual country is divided into between 100 and 521 areas, and 25 households are randomly drawn from each area (Østby, 2003)

For this study, we rely only on the household questionnaire since it provides basic information on age, sex, survivorship of the parents and schooling and occupation for

members of the household. It also provides information on household amenities (Vaessen, Thiam, & Lê, 2005). Since the DHS surveys offers information on ethnicity, religion and general welfare on individual bases, it is considered as promising for the purpose of measuring economic and social horizontal inequalities in terms of opportunities and capabilities of each ethnic group. “An obvious advantage with survey data is that one can aggregate the variables, allowing for the construction of descriptive measures of horizontal inequalities” (Østby, 2003), then combine them with EPR Dataset, which is described below.

The EPR Dataset

The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in all years from 1946 to 2013 (Vogt, Bormann, Rüeegger, Cederman, Hunziker, & Girardin, 2015). In collecting the data, the researched relied on the expert input of ethnic politics to assess formal and informal degrees of political participation and exclusion along ethnic lines. An ethnic group is classified as politically relevant “if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination”. The power-access coding is limited to executive power only. “Depending on a given country's power constellations, executive power amounts to control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including the army”. Three main categories were used to differentiate between the different arrangements of access to power. “The first is whether those who claimed to represent a group's interest held full control of the executive branch with no meaningful participation by members of any other group”. The second is “whether they divided power with members of other groups in a power-sharing

regime”. The third is “whether they were excluded altogether from decision-making authority within the halls of central state power” (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Groups that fall into the two first categories are classified as included, whereas those that belong to the last category are excluded. Furthermore, within each of these categories, coders were asked to differentiate between further subcategories as follows (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010)

- 1- Included groups that rule alone can be either in monopoly or dominant, depending on whether the control is total or allows for “token” representation.
- 2- Included groups that share power play either a senior or junior role, measured by their absolute influence over the cabinet
- 3- Excluded groups are powerless (access to power is blocked), discriminated against (exclusion is systematic and targeted), autonomous (granted regional autonomy), or separatist (unilaterally secured regional autonomy).

The Sample

The units of this study are ethnic groups-years. The study combines data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset. The study includes all countries where a DHS survey was undertaken between 1986 and 2014, given that the survey included information on the ethnic affinity or religion (variables 130 and 131 in the DHS household questionnaire) of the respondents, that could be mapped onto the cultural marker of the relevant ethnic groups as identified by the EPR dataset. To conduct the mapping, we compared the groups identified by the DHS with those identified by the EPR dataset. After the mapping, we ended up with 43 countries and 253 ethnic groups. The number of observations of ethnic groups- year is

reduced from 561 to 466. Although the time interval is not unified in the sample, we use time-series analysis and unbalanced panel data. A list of the countries included, along with years of examination and the relevant ethnic groups studied, is presented in Appendix 1.

Variables Definition

Dependent Variable

Political Inclusion

Horizontal political inequality is conceptualized in terms of inclusion/exclusion of the particular ethnic group from access to executive power. We use a dichotomous measure that captures EPR's distinction between excluded and included groups as defined above. We choose the political inclusion as the dependent variable of interest as we believe that it is the one dimension that has the highest potential of reversing the vicious cycle of continuous deprivation. In other words, in order to participate in inclusive policymaking that mediates the effects of discrimination and exclusion, the ethnic group needs to be represented in the executive power. The variable is measured as dichotomous values (0,1); 1 indicates political inclusion and 0 political exclusion.

Independent Variables

Economic Relative Deprivation

This variable attempts to measure the level of relative economic deprivation on a scale from (0,1), where 1 implies relative deprivation, i.e. the group has the lowest share of household assets compared to the other groups, and 0 implies no relative deprivation, i.e. the group has the highest relative share of the household assets. It is inversely related to the share of household assets of each group. The first step to construct this variable is to

obtain the average total share ratio of durable household assets of each group, with respect to the other groups within a country. We use the variables v119 to v125, which identifies whether the household has electricity, has radio, has television, has refrigerator, has bicycle, has motorcycle and has truck, respectively. For each group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents who have answered positively to the questions of possession of each of these assets. Then, to obtain the share of the group for each of the assets, we divide the number of asset of the particular group, by the total number of this asset among the total groups within the country. We then sum these ratios for each of the assets and divide them by 7, the number of assets included in the study, to obtain the average share of total assets.

For example, the share of asset i of group k equals to the number of respondents who have asset i in group k divided by the total number of respondents who have asset i in groups $1,2,k...n$ where n is the total number of groups within a country.

$$\text{Average Total Share Ratio of group } k = \sum_{i=1}^M \frac{A_{ik}}{\sum_{j=1}^n A_{ij}} / M;$$

Where M is the number of household assets, j is the index of groups and i is the index of household assets.

Ostby (2004) used the below equation to compute an index of economic horizontal inequality (HEI) based on the different household assets in the DHS survey:

$$HEI = 1 - \exp \left(- \left| \ln \left(\sum_{i=1}^M \frac{A_{i1}/A_{i2}}{M} \right) \right| \right)$$

Where M is the number of household assets, and A_{i1} refers to the share of group 1, the largest ethnic group that owns asset i and A_{i2} refers to the share of group 2. However, since we are interested in the group level indicators, and since we want to include all

groups identified and not only the largest two ethnic groups, we substitute the ratio

$$\left(\frac{\frac{A_{i1}}{A_{i2}}}{\sum_{i=1}^M \frac{A_{i2}}{M}} \right)$$

by the total share ratio and obtain an index that reflects the relative share of deprivation of each group. As expected, the relation between the average share of total assets and the newly computed index at the group level is an inverse relationship as depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Relationship between Relative Economic Deprivation and Average Total Share Ratio

According to our hypothesis, we expect that the economic deprivation is negatively affecting the probability of the political inclusion. As the poor or deprived groups remain on political margins, lack the proper tools to exert pressure to be included in the political process.

Modern Occupation Opportunities

The first variable of horizontal social opportunities is conceptualized via the partners' (men) occupation as recorded in variable 705. The original values recorded by the respondents are as follows:

In the data set the coding 1 indicates 'professional, technical, managerial', 2 indicates 'Clerical', 3: 'Sales', 4: 'Agricultural self-employed' 5: 'Agricultural employee', 6: 'Household & domestic', 7: 'Services' 8: 'Skilled Manual', 9: 'Unskilled Manual' 96: 'Other', 98: 'Don't know'. Following Ostby (2003) approach, we have conceptualized the different responses into two categories: with modern occupation and without modern occupation. The rationale behind such categorizations is twofold. First, the modern categories are assumed to be the highest paying occupations, which presumably enable a sense of entitlement and empowerment. Second, they are assumed to be closer to the urban-central categorization, which is expected to increase the likelihood of political inclusion, as opposed to the rural-peripheral categorization. The first category includes professional, technical and managerial, clerical, and skilled manual. The other responses were categorized as without modern occupation, while deleting the responses of 'other' and 'don't know'. For each group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each category. In some of the models, as will be shown shortly, each category is used separately in absolute numbers, while in others, an aggregated value of group's men share of modern occupation is computed along the same line as the total economic assets share. Our hypothesis is as employment opportunities in modern occupations increases the probability of the political inclusion increases. The skilled and employed marginal groups are likely exerting pressure, teaming up to open the political space.

Education Opportunities

The second variable of horizontal social opportunities is operationalized via the education of women as recorded in variable 106 in the DHS surveys. There are four categories of response for the question of education of women. These categories are: no education, primary, secondary and higher, or don't know. The last response was omitted. For each group, using Excel, we count the number of respondents for each category. In some of the models, each category of education: primary, secondary and higher, is used separately in absolute numbers, however, in others, an aggregated value of group women's education share is computed, in which the three last categories are grouped together and the share of each group's access to education is obtained.

Our hypothesis is as educational access increases the probability of the political inclusion increases. The educated groups are likely to be more equipped for political inclusion.

Statistical Model: Logistic Regression

Given that the dependent variable is a dichotomous binary value of 0/1, we use the logistic regression to conduct the analysis. The logistic model is as follows:

$$P_i = E(Y = 1|X_i) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\beta_1 + \beta_2 X_i)}}$$

For ease of exposition, the equation is written as follows

$$P_i = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(Z_i)}} = \frac{e^{Z_i}}{1 + e^{Z_i}} ;$$

Where $Z_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_i$

We use STATA 10 software to conduct the analysis.

The major challenge faced while carrying out the data analysis was the limited number of observations. In many cases, there were missing data either in one or more of the

household assets responses. In these cases, the relative economic deprivation index was not computed as we attempted to unify the equation used in Excel for computations. In other instances, the DHS surveys were missing data on educational level of women or occupations of men. For STATA to be able to estimate the regression, it requires that a value is present for all variables for a case to be included in the equation. This has resulted in the reduction of total number of observations from 561 to 364 observations.

Data Summary

Table 1: Data Summary of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Included	466	0.6502146	0.4774146	0	1
Relative Economic Deprivation	483	0.8272313	0.1931606	0.0200437	0.9996342
Agriculture Men	512	1764.313	2454.267	0	16467
Clerical Men	512	101.2129	276.3845	0	3239
Skilled Men	512	612.5703	1364.022	0	16739
Professional Men	512	372.6738	1012.974	0	12649
Modern Occupation Men Share	500	0.182566	0.207374	0	0.983228
Primary Women	561	1135.07	1937.397	0	14316
Secondary Women	561	718.4973	1947.412	0	26869
Higher Education Women	561	107.4545	388.9808	0	6213
Education Women Share	561	0.1786466	0.2155936	0	0.9807889

Chapter 4: Empirical Results

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, the development and logical flow of modeling and the steps undertaken to reach the final model that tests the hypothesis inclusively are included. In the second section, we attempt to carry out a robustness check by reducing the number of observations and estimate the most important variables.

In the first models, we test the relationship between relative economic deprivation and the modern occupation categories and political inclusion. In some of the models, we add a category of agriculture occupation in an attempt to compare between modern and non-modern occupations.

In model 1, we examine the effect of relative economic deprivation and modern occupations on the probability of inclusion. We use an aggregate term for the modern occupation categories and employ the variable of modern occupation men share as elaborated in the research design section. Both variables of relative economic deprivation and share of modern occupations of men are significant but both have negative signs. For a better understanding of the negative sign of modern occupation share of men, we disaggregate modern occupations into its different categories in model 2-4

In Model 2, the relative economic deprivation is significant and has the expected negative relationship with political inclusion. As for the professional category of modern occupations, it is significant and has the expected positive relationship with political inclusion. The last variable included in this model is clerical occupation, which is significant but has a negative relationship with political inclusion.

Referring to Table 2, in Model 3, we add the agriculture occupation. The three variables included in Model 2 behave in the same way. As for the agriculture occupation, it is significant and has the expected negative relationship with political inclusion.

In Model 4, we add the category of the Skilled Manual, which is considered as a modern occupation. The variables pertaining to the agriculture and professional occupations lose their significance. The variable of relative economic deprivation behaves in the same way as Model 1 and 2 and 3. The new variable of skilled occupation is significant and has a positive relationship with political inclusion. As for the clerical occupation, it is significant but again with a negative sign. We therefore conclude that the negative sign of modern occupation variable in Model 1 pertains to the negative effect of the clerical position in the different following models. A summary of models 1-4 is shown in Table 2

Table 2: Summary Models 1-4

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Relative Economic Deprivation	-75.2865 (-4.87)****	-14.41125 (-2.48)**	-12.08019 (-2.47)**	-18.77388 (-3.24)****
Professional Men	-----	0.0018305 (1.63)*	0.0043822 (2.67)***	0.0022601 (1.17)
Clerical Men	-----	-0.0063972 (-1.96)**	-0.0006018 (-2.74)*	-0.0118382 (-2.71)***
Skilled Men	-----	-----	-----	0.0025498 (1.72)***
Agriculture Men	-----	-----	-0.006018 (-2.74)***	-0.0002802 (-1.10)
Modern Occupation Men Share	-58.45421 (-4.53)****	-----	-----	-----

*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)

We now start to insert the variables of women education and explore the effect of the different educational levels on political inclusion.

In model 5, we add to model 1 the aggregate variable of education share of women. The three variables are significant, both relative economic deprivation and modern occupation have a negative relationship with political inclusion, whereas education share has a positive relationship, as expected.

In Model 6, we start to disaggregate the term of education share into the different categories, primary, secondary and higher. The variable of primary education is significant and has a positive sign as expected. In model 7 we add secondary education of women to model 6, but the newly added variable is not of statistic significance. In model 8, we add the higher education, but again, the newly added variable is not of statistic significance. A summary of the models 5-8 is presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of Models 5-8

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Relative Economic Deprivation	- 46.00078 (-2.07)**	-38.32028 (-2.42)**	-39.21505 (-3.09)***	-38.4679 (-2.79)***
Modern Occupation Men Share	- 64.11707 (-2.56)***	-32.71963 (-2.03)**	-35.10447 (-2.89)***	-34.49865 (-2.55)**
Primary Women	-----	0.001509 (2.70)***	0.0009707 (2.28)**	0.0009723 (1.75)*
Secondary Women	-----	-----	0.0002638 (0.55)	-0.000351 (-0.39)
Higher Women	-----	-----	-----	0.0050473 (0.80)
Education Women Share	45.25881 (1.98)**	-----	-----	-----

*p≤0.1; **p≤0.05; ***p≤0.01; ****p≤0.001, (z statistic in parentheses)

According to model 5, the negative effect of relative economic deprivation on the probability of inclusion is depicted in Figure 2. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units of Relative Economic Deprivation by 0.1 (X-axis) on the predicted probability of inclusion (Y-axis)




Figure 2: Predictive Margins Effect of Relative Economic Deprivation on Probability of Inclusion

As for the negative effect of modern occupation share on the probability of inclusion, it is shown in Figure 3. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units of the share of men's modern occupation by 0.1(X-axis) on the predicted probability of inclusion (Y-axis)




Figure 3: Predictive Margins Effect of Modern Occupation Share on Probability of Inclusion

The positive effect of education share on the probability of political inclusion is depicted in Figure 4. This is obtained by examining the marginal effect of a change in units of the share of women’s education by 0.1(X-axis) on the predicted probability of inclusion (Y-axis)




Figure 4: Predictive Margins Effect of Education Share on Probability of Inclusion

Robustness Check

In order to carry out a simple robustness check, we first reduce the number of observations by 5% and 15% and estimate model 5 in models 5a and 5b respectively. The reason for choosing this model for the robustness check is that it is the holistic model that serves to test for the different hypotheses of this study.

Table 4: Robustness Check Model 5

	Model 5a N=339	Model 5b N=306
Relative Economic Deprivation	-33.87247 (-2.53)***	-28.68785 (-1.92)*
Modern Occupation Men Share	-50.38192 (-3.06)***	-66.82941 (-3.98)****
Education Women Share	28.6731 (1.99)**	52.79047 (4.45)****

* $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$; **** $p \leq 0.001$, (z statistic in parentheses)

From these two estimates, we conclude that model 5 is a robust model, since none of the variables change its sign or loses statistical significance, as shown in Table 4.

A second robustness check is carried out, in which we substitute the absolute numbers of the variables in Models 2-4 and 6-8 by the relative share of each of the ethnic groups to the examined variable, in an attempt to account for the group size effect.

Robustness check of models 2-4 is presented in Table 5, while the robustness check results of models 6-8 are presented in Table 6.

Table 5: Robustness Check Models 2-4

	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a
Relative Economic Deprivation	-19.19473 (-2.00)**	-14.72309 (-1.39)	-9.450591 (-0.99)
Professional Men Share	1.770589 (-0.78)	8.322418 (0.79)	4.628678 (0.55)
Clerical Men Share	-4.135654 (-0.78)	-7.065769 (-1.27)	-0.5073303 (-0.10)
Skilled Men Share	-----	-----	-6.889683 (-1.58)
Agriculture Men Share	-----	5.873665 (1.10)	-1.02739 (-0.20)

* $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$; **** $p \leq 0.001$, (z statistic in parentheses)

Table 6: Robustness Check Models 6-8

	Model 6a	Model 7a	Model 8a
Relative Economic Deprivation	-21.93903 (-3.32)****	-65.70827 (-4.58)****	-68.34525 (-4.63)****
Modern Occupation Men Share	-30.18818 (-4.44)****	-70.95967 (-4.27)****	-66.48496 (-3.99)****
Primary Women Share	12.88059(3.38)****	6.291959 (0.90)	3.130824 (0.32)
Secondary Women Share	-----	14.72075 (1.54)	0.2632835 (0.02)
Higher Women Share	-----	-----	6.156725 (0.345)

* $p \leq 0.1$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$; **** $p \leq 0.001$, (z statistic in parentheses)

From these estimates, we conclude that the models 6-8 are more robust than models 2-4.

Many of these variables lose their statistical significance when computed in relative share terms. This could be due to the fact that the newly computed variables of relative share are very close to each other that patterns of change are not noticeable.

Evaluation of Hypothesis

Table 7 shows the summary of the hypothesis support evaluation.

Table 7: Evaluation of Hypothesis

	Supported	Not Supported
Relative Economic Deprivation reduces the probability of political inclusion	X	
Increased opportunities and capabilities in terms of modern occupation increases the probability of political inclusion		X
Increased opportunities and capabilities in terms of education increases the probability of political inclusion	X	

Findings Discussion

From these different models, we find that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the likelihood of political inclusion. This conclusion has an intuitive appeal since to get engaged in the political sphere, and to be influential in it with its liberal representative form, this requires strong political organization and broad influence and proliferation, which requires substantial material and organizational resources.

As for modern occupation, as modeled in this study, it reduces the likelihood of political inclusion, especially the clerical positions. However, it has to be noted, as reflected by model 2 and 3, that the professional and skilled manual occupations are positively related to political inclusion. We conclude from these positive relations that these two occupational categories matter more for political inclusion, as professional occupations could be considered as closely related to business and ruling elites, and skilled manual close to workers and labor unions. As for the clerical position, which has a powerful

negative effect on the aggregation term of modern occupation, we conclude that those who occupy this position do not have the interest or motivation to participate in the executive power. Since clerical position is mostly a middle class position, most probably they are not willing to sacrifice their stability and pay the costs attributed to political inclusion. They can secure their interests with their incomes instead. This demotivation could also be related to perceived corruption and low returns of political inclusion.

The models also reflect a positive relation between education and political inclusion, specifically, primary education. This could be attributed to the fact that primary education in low and middle income countries has the highest returns on investment, as opposed to high income countries, which have higher returns from secondary and tertiary education (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004)

Generally, we find strong evidence that the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities

Methodological Limitations

There are certain limitations associated with the methodology adopted throughout this research. First, there are some definitional limitations to political inclusion, constrained by the EPR dataset. As a result, this research adopts only the formulistic definition of state inclusion and disregards inclusion in the general polity beyond the central state. As a result, other spheres where political inclusion matters greatly are ignored, such as civil society for instance (Dryzek, 1996).

Second, there are certain limitations associated with the quantitative approach adopted and the use of global data, which results into the absence of an in-depth analysis to the different patterns, if any, of changes and fluctuations in terms of inclusion/exclusion of

the different ethnic groups within the examined countries, or in terms of their access to the different opportunities, including the durable assets, education and employment.

Furthermore, the limitations employed by the use of DHS surveys constraint the conclusions reached to developing countries, and limit comparisons between developed versus developing countries.

Finally, due to the limited number of time variant observations, we were unable to use lagged-dependent variables.

Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks

The main goal of this study has been to investigate the relationship existing between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities, which lead to the social exclusion of certain ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies. To test this interrelation, we decided to examine the effect of the different capabilities and opportunities, namely access to durable assets, education and occupation, on political inclusion and participation in the executive power. We carried out the analysis at the group level. From the empirical analysis, we were able to show that deprivation of wealth assets always reduce the likelihood of political inclusion. In addition, the increased share of education among a certain ethnic group increases the probability of its political inclusion. The hypothesis claiming that increased opportunities in terms of market entitlements and occupation would increase the probability of political inclusion was not supported in the different models. However, this relationship is only understood when we disaggregate modern occupation into the different types of occupations, showing positive relation between some of these occupations and inclusion (professional and skilled manual) while negative relation in other positions (clerical). As for non-modern occupations, like agriculture, they were negatively associated with political inclusion. These results serve to prove that identity matters for inclusion/exclusion along the different dimensions, namely political, economic and social, in low and middle-income countries as differential access to the different resources create further cleavages between the different ethnic groups.

Implications for future research

Despite the fact that this study has developed some simple indicators of horizontal inequalities in terms of access to durable assets, opportunities of education and

employment, the data was limited in number due to the limited number of countries, mostly developed countries, in which the DHS surveys was carried out. Furthermore, it was limited by the presence of data on ethnicity and/or religion in the DHS questionnaires and the mapping between the groups identified in the DHS and those identified in the EPR dataset. Future research should imply the incorporation of other surveys to obtain measures on horizontal inequalities, such as the Afrobarometer and the World Value Surveys. Having more observations for more countries would help in reaching more generalized conclusions.

In addition, the study has relied on the shares of each group with respect to the different dimensions, which is a general simplification to the measurement of horizontal inequalities. Future research should imply more refined operationalization of the different dimensions of inequalities and the incorporation of the relative group size.

Moreover, future research should involve the employment of more control variables that contribute to the dimensions of horizontal inequalities, including variables pertaining to vertical inequalities and GDP and population, etc....

Finally, future research should address the issue of reverse causation, i.e., the impact of political inclusion/exclusion on the socio-economic opportunities. However, this requires the use of more instrumental variables beyond the scope of this study

Policy Recommendations

The interrelation between the different dimensions of horizontal inequalities that was shown in this study, particularly economic and political inequality, gives insight on the need to develop more comprehensive policies with more effective targeting. Corrective measures should incorporate actions on all levels, political, economic and social. Such

measures could be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. “This is action taken towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements on the basis of membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified groups’ share of entitlements” (Stewart, 2005)

On the economic level, there is a need for more government interventions and regulations that guarantee fair competition over the scarce resources. More public investment is required to reduce the relative level of deprivation between the different ethnic groups within a society. Stewart (2002) also proposes group distribution requirements imposed on the private sector in the form of shares of different groups in employment; credit allocation and so on. On the social level, more attention should be paid to education policies. Positive discrimination policies in the form of quotas for each group are possible solution. However, it has to be noted that such policies increase the salience of group boundaries and it preferable that they are implemented for a short period of time before the implementation of a more integrative educational policy that ensure the rights and access to education for all members of a society (Stewart, 2010). As for the political level, there is a need for more inclusivity. As stated by Stewart (2002), “the monopolization of political power by one group or another is often responsible for many of the other inequalities, and for violent reactions because this appears the only way to change the system”. In ethnically divided societies, there is a strong tendency for political parties to represent and argue for particular ethnicities and neglect others. There is therefore a need for a constrained democracy, designed to ensure an inclusive system. Features of a constrained democracy include among others: strong human rights provisions to protect all groups; requirements that members of each group participate in

government; job allocations to different groups; decentralization of government so that power sharing occurs (Stewart, 2002).

Appendix 1

ID	Country	Years	Ethnic Groups
1	Albania	2008	Albanian, Greek, Macedoni
2	Armenia	2000	Armenian, Russian
3	Azerbaijan	2006	Arebajj, Lesgin
4	Benin	1996, 2001, 2006, 2011	Adja, Bariba, Dendi, Fon, Peulh, Yoa, Yoruba
5	Bangladesh	1993, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2011	Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists
6	Cameroon	1998, 2004, 2011	Bamilike, Beti
7	Central Africa	1994	Ngbaka, Yakoma, Sara
8	Chad	1996, 2004	Arabic, Hadjarai, Sara
9	Congo	2005	Bakondo, Bateke, Babembe, Balari, Mbosi
10	Egypt	1992, 1995, 2005, 2008, 2014	Muslim, Christian
11	Ethiopia	2000, 2005, 2011	Amharra, Affar, Oromo, Tigray, Somalie, Gumuz, Harrari, Anyiwak
12	Gabon	2000, 2012	Fang, Myene, Mbede-te
13	Gambia	2013	Creole/AkuMarabout, Fula/Tukulur/Lorobo, Madinka/Jajanka, Wollof
14	Ghana	1998	Ewe, Akan, Molo-Dagbani, Ga-Adangbe, Grussi
15	Guinea	1999, 2005, 2012	Soussou, Malinke, Peulh
16	Kazakistan	1995	Kazakh, Russian, Uigur, German, Uzbek, Tatar
17	Kyrgistan	1997	Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian, Uigur
18	Kenya	1989, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2009, 2014	Kalenjin, Kamba, Kikuyu, Meru/Embu, Kisii, Luhya, Luo, Mijikenda/Sawahili, Somalie,
19	Liberia	1986, 2013	Gio, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Mandingo, Mano
20	Malawi	2000, 2004, 2010	Chewa, Tumbuka, Tonga, Nkonde, Lomwe, Amanganja/Anyanja, Yao,
21	Mali	1987, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2012	Peulh
22	Moldova	2005	Bulgarian, Moldovan, Russian, Gagauzan
23	Mozambique	1997, 2011	Xitson, Chona, Cichopi, Shimakonde, Ciyao

24	Namibia	1992, 2000	Oshivamb, Herero, San, Damara, Kavango
25	Nepal	2011	Hill Janajati, Hill Dalit, Newar, Terai Janajati, Muslim, Terai Dalit
26	Niger	1992, 1998, 2006	Djerma, Haoussa, Peulh, Kanouri, Touareg
27	Nigeria	2008, 2010	Tiv, Ijaw, Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, Yorouba
28	Pakistan	2007	Punjabi, Pushto, Balochi
29	Rwanda	1992	Hutu, Tutsi
30	Senegal	1986, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2010	Wolof, Poular, Serer, Mandinge, Diola
31	Sierra Leone	2008, 2013	Mende, Temne, Limba, Kono, Kriole
32	South Africa	1998	White, Colored, Black/African, Asian/Indian
33	Sri Lanka	1987	Low-Sinhalese, Indian-Tamil, Sri Lankan-Moor, Up-Sinhalese, Sri Lankan-Tamil
34	Togo	1988, 2013	Adja-Ewe, Kabje-Tem, Para-Gourra,
35	Turkey	1993	199
36	Uganda	1995, 2011	Langi, Acholi, Basoga, Baganda, Iteso, Kakwa, Alur, Nubiam, Madi, Lihbara, Karimojong, Banyankole, Banyoro, Banyarwanda
37	Uzbekstan	1996	Uzbek, Karakaplak, Russian, Tadzikh
38	Vietnam	1997, 2002	Tay, Dao, Thai, Chinese, Khmer, Nung, Vietnamese, Muong
39	Zambia	1992, 1996, 2001, 2007, 2013	Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja, Baroste, North-western, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, Kaonde
40	Bolivia	2003	Quecha, Aymara, Guarani
41	Brazil	1991, 1996	White, Black
42	Guatemala	1987	ladino
43	Hounduras	2011	Garifuna, Lenca, Maya-Chorti, Misquito, Tawaka (sumo), Pech (paya), Nahoa
44	Trinidad	1987	African, Indian

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