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**The American University in Cairo**

**School of Global Affairs and Public Policy**

**Framing of Terrorism and Ethiopian Dam on Online Egyptian Publications  
and Social Media**

**A Thesis Submitted to**

**Department of Journalism and Mass Communication**

**In partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Arts**

**by Noha El Tawil**

**under the supervision of Dr. RashaAllam  
May/2018**

## **Acknowledgment**

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Rasha Allam for the continuous support of my master's thesis and research. Her guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. Also, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Dr. Hussein Amin and Dr. Hesham Dinana, for their encouragement, and insightful comments.

## **Abstract**

This study aims at examining the framing of crises threatening the security and welfare of Egypt embodied in the ongoing terrorism and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that will drastically decrease the country's water share. The samples are derived from social media, specifically Facebook and Twitter, as well as online publications. The nine political Facebook pages selected are among the top 100 in Egypt in terms of followers. The three publications are chosen to reflect the type of ownership which varies from state-owned to privately-owned including partisan publications. The Tweets were picked according to hashtags of incidents that occurred within the time frame extending from September 2017 till March 2018. Those tweets had to be by citizen users and not professional publications or public figures. The study looks into types of frames, and stereotypical frames, as well as, rumors promoted to be bases for determining the master and tactical frames adopted by each political group on each topic. The theoretical framework is Framing Theory, Public Sphere Theory and Two-step-flow Theory. The research method used is content analysis to study social media posts, tweets, and online publications' op-eds collected through purposive sampling. For terrorism, the time frame included three major terror attacks publicly known as the Rawda Mosque Attack in North Sinai, the Wahat Incident, and Helwan Church. As for the Ethiopian dam, the time frame consisted of failure in technical negotiations throughout different rounds, and a great progress in the dam's construction. The research at hand draws a clear image of the dominant frames adopted by different political groups, and to what extent stereotypical frames and rumors were deployed to communicate different messages serving the master and tactical frames such groups adopt.

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction:**

Since 2011, Egypt has been struggling with two major nation-wide crisis framed as imminent threats. One is terrorism, and the other is a dam being built in Ethiopia and that would affect the country's historic water share, which is already insufficient due to overpopulation. As the Egyptian population surpassed 100 million, Egypt needs 114 billion cubic meters to become water self-sufficient (Mosaad, 2018). Egypt's share of Nile water remained at 55 billion cubic meters since the population was just 20 million. The current annual consumption is 80 billion cubic meters with a water deficit of 20 billion cubic meters as Egypt harnesses 4.5 billion cubic meters of rain and underground water. The annual increase in birth rate is 2.5 million so as the population is expected to be 170 million by 2030 (Mosaad, 2018). The agriculture of wheat, beans, and oil plants consumes 34 billion cubic meters of water. Water scarcity led to the importation of 12 million tons of wheat per year.

Egypt has been part of 18 rounds of talks and negotiations pertinent to the construction technicalities of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) but no progress has been achieved. Constructions in the Grand Renaissance Dam started on April 2, 2011 at a cost of \$4.8 billion. The dam is located on the Blue Nile with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, and is expected to generate up to 6,000 megawatts of power (El Tawil, 2017). Since May 2011, Cairo has voiced its concern over how the dam can reduce the country's annual share of Nile water. Egypt's average water per-capita is expected to drop from 663 cubic meters per year to 582 cubic meters by 2025, according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics

(CAPMAS) in 2014. Addis Ababa, however, claimed that the dam is necessary for its development and will not harm downstream countries.

Terrorism has claimed the lives of thousands of security personnel, and civilians and caused the destruction of dozens of vehicles and property. From 2013 through 2015, 214 electricity towers were blown up costing the state LE150 million (Gomaa, 2017). Between December 2013 and December 2016, terror attacks caused 588 deaths among civilians. From December 2016 till November 2017, terror attacks in Egypt incurred 507 deaths among civilians, while 76 percent of terror attacks in North Sinai targeted security forces resulting in 292 deaths. In addition, 396 civilians were killed in North Sinai during the same period increasing the death toll from 446 in 2016 to almost 700 in 2017 in that particular governorate (Gomaa, 2017).

In the aftermath of the overthrowing of former President Mohamed Morsi, who is affiliated with the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, the financial losses in North Sinai between July 2013 and September 2013 recorded LE33.5 million due to setting 55 state-owned vehicles on fire and other vandalism and robbery acts (Ashtewy, 2013). In 2015, the economic losses reached LE50 billion in the sectors of energy, transportation, and tourism – which is a key industry in the country - as a result of 2,533 terror attacks that also incurred 756 deaths and 1,433 injuries (Abdel Hafiz, 2016). Tourism, which provides employment for three million Egyptians with investments of LE500 billion, has yielded \$70 billion of losses since 2011 till 2016 (Shawky, 2016). Although, the security bodies have succeeded in the last couple of years in limiting terror attacks to North Sinai so as their numbers dropped drastically in other governorates, Egypt is still fighting terrorism and still holds the war against terrorism.

As social media have been increasingly a platform for the public to express their opinion, and for mainstream media to reach some segments of their target audiences, the thesis would study how both topics are tackled by regular users on Facebook, Twitter, and by three publications online.

### **1.1- Significance of the study**

As the two-step-flow theory suggests, opinion leaders are more influential than professional media (Katz, 1957). Those individuals constitute a part of the public sphere shaping public opinion. Currently, new media is considered to possess the same function and characteristics of Jürgen Habermas' public sphere (Mahlouly, 2013)

Since the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak, social media have been playing a major role in influencing younger generations' political views as well as mainstream media (Jebril & Loveless, 2017; Youssef, Arafa, & Kumar, 2014; Lim, 2012; Aref, 2013; Ali & Fahmy, 2013; Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey, 2013; Cherkaoui, 2017; Iskander, 2011; El-Hibri, 2014; Soukup, 2018; Mustafa, 2015). The mass communication studies conducted during that period focused on the political shifts that occurred due to overthrowing two presidents giving rise to two stormy transitional periods the studies were mainly linked to democracy, and freedoms (Jebril & Loveless, 2017; Youssef, Arafa, & Kumar, 2014; Lim, 2012; Aref, 2013; Ali & Fahmy, 2013; Halverson, Ruston, & Trethewey, 2013; Cherkaoui, 2017; Iskander, 2011; El-Hibri, 2014; Soukup, 2018; Mustafa, 2015). According to a 2016 report titled "Egypt returning to stability" by Oxford Business Group, Egypt is currently considered transitional democracy, and

has been achieving stability. However, such stability and economic reforms might be jeopardized by the impact of terrorism and GERD. This research focuses on how citizens on social media and columnists in online publications perceive and frame such crises.

## **1.2- Objective of the study:**

The study examines the content of the top nine political Facebook pages in Egypt in terms of number of followers, tweets with significant hashtags to the time frame, and op-eds on terrorism and GERD in online Arabic-language state-owned, privately-owned, and partisan newspapers. The study analyzes how different groups define, and perceive such crises, as well as, the magnitude of stereotypes and rumors used in their discourse. That is in addition to examining if the presence of such crises are linked to calls for participating or boycotting 2018 Presidential Election which took place within the study's time frame, and whereas incumbent President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi was re-elected.

## **Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework is framing and public sphere theories. Frames are 'persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse' (Gamson, & Modigliani, 1989). Framing theory was developed by sociologist Erving Goffman, in his book 'Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization' published 1974.

The concept of framing is "seen as rendering what would have been otherwise a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful" (Goffman, 1974). Goffman's aim is "to systemize the range of options that are available to persons for defining a situation and their relations to it" (Ytreberg, 2002).

The frame analysis is intertwined with other developments in the social theory such as social constructionism defined as "an overarching perspective on contemporary social orders" (Kent & Davis, 2006). "Communication is essential to the construction, maintenance of and changes in social order since it is the means by which meaning is negotiated and assigned to objects, persons and events in the social world" making up the reality of the social order (Kent & Davis, 2006).

According to Goffman, "frames are implicit and underlie all types of social activity" (Kent & Davis, 2006). Thus, individuals need to learn the frames that structure social activities in order to understand and participate in them. Frames also guide people on what to think about,

and not just what to think. The scholar observed that most news is about frame violations making up newsworthy events.

When journalists report the events deviating from normality they implicitly guard the status quo, especially is that coverage is coupled with shedding light on how elites restore order. James Carey (1989) argues that such coverage always provides ritualized messages of reassurance.

Framing research showcases that it is often hard for journalists to challenge the status and quo and the governing elites because consumers are more prone to favor such reassuring messages. Herbert Gans (1979) contends that journalists tend to "most effectively present the perspective of the upper-middle-class professional strata and to defend this class against social strata above it and below it" (Kent & Davis, 2006).

The framing theory gained popularity in journalism studies in the 1980s and the 1990s so that prominent scholars that added to it at the time were sociologists Todd Gitlin (1980) and Gaye Tuchman (1978). The former studied news coverage of "politically radical groups in the 1960s highlighting how they were "systematically presented in ways that demeaned their activities and ignored their ideas" (Kent & Davis, 2006).

The latter focused on detecting the limitations of strategies deployed in routine news coverage work causing the elimination of events' ambiguity and instead reinforcing "socially accepted and expected" perceptions of the social world. Another well-known framing scholar is

William Gamson (1991) who "has traced the success and failure of social movements in promoting frames consistent with their ideological interests" (Kent & Davis, 2006). Gamson argues that frames used in public discourse serve the interests of those who develop and promote them.

Other scholars like Robert Entman highlighted how governments and corporations employ public relations staff to provide for mass media material framed in ways that serve their interests maintaining and extending their control over the social world (Kent & Davis, 2006).

The public sphere theory was developed by Jurgen Habermas in 1962, and it is a sphere between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of the public opinion. Neidhardt (1994) contends that "public communication emerges wherever a speaker cannot control the boundaries of his audience" (Koller, 2007). Therefore, "the openness to strangers (Warner, 2002 & Calhoun, 2003) represents the central conceptual feature of the public sphere" (Koller, 2007).

Public communication takes place in the public sphere "as a product of coordinated action by actors from all societal fields, especially from the political field, the economic field and the media field, but also from the academic field, the religious field and the art field" (Koller, 2007). Different arenas in the public sphere would always be connected regardless of any internal divisions due to "streams of communication" it contains (Habermas, 1996 & Imhof, 2005). Pierre Bourdieu (1998) defined the public sphere as the encompassing "field of power." At



first he attached the field of power to the ruling or dominant class but later identified it as a relational product of all fields.

Earlier studies of the dominant public sphere had overlooked the dynamics with its periphery, although focused on its structures. That led to the introduction of the counterpublic sphere concept (Negt/Kluge, 1993; Fraser, 1992; Asen, 2000; & Warner, 2002) which was later adopted by Habermas. "The counterpublic sphere represents dissident networks of communication whose communication streams are (currently) not diffusing into the dominant public sphere" (Keller, 2007).

The two-step-flow theory was developed by sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld in 1944 suggesting in his book 'The People's Choice' that ideas often flow from mass media to opinion leaders and from these to the less active sections of the population (Katz, 1957). Katz (1957) identified three main aspects of the theory derived from public opinion studies conducted in times of elections. Those are the impact of personal influence; the flow of personal influence; and the relationship of opinion leaders to the mass media.

For the impact of personal influence, a 1940 study indicates that personal influence affected voting decisions more than mass media did. Different studies demonstrate that opinion leaders in primary groups – meaning they have close ties with individuals they influence – are much more influential, and that personal influence is non-purposive, flexible, and trustworthy. As such, personal influence plays an informing role unlike professional media that plays a

legitimizing role reinforcing and strengthening predispositions and decisions already taken (Katz, 1957).

As for the flow of personal influence, a 1940 voting study shows that opinion leaders are not concentrated in the upper brackets of the society but are “located in almost equal proportions in every social group and stratum” (Katz, 1957). Finally, the relationship of opinion leaders to the mass media aspect “states that opinion leaders are more exposed to the mass media than those whom they influence” (Katz, 1957).

## **Chapter 3: Review of Literature**

Multiple studies have covered the role of opinion leaders in the public sphere as well as framing types and categories used. As this study is concerned with identifying the frameworks of op-eds and social media posts, the literature is divided as following: framing, significance of social media, and background on crises impacting Egypt's national security epitomized in terrorism and GERD.

### **3.1- Framing:**

Psychologist David J. Schneider (2004) suggested three basic features of stereotypes that distinguish them from ordinary generalizations. The first is that stereotypes are formed based upon "insufficient information" despite of containing "kernels-of-truth." That's because the process of stereotyping attributes a bunch of features to an entire group disregarding individual differences.

Second, when holding a stereotype toward a group, people are less likely to rely on objective experience than on culture. That makes stereotypes more rigid and resistant to change. Third, stereotypes are often rooted in culture, and are common within groups. In mass communication, "stereotypical frames" coupled with their "potential cognitive and affective effects" constitute "genres of media frames" which can be assessed through content analysis of media messages (Yang, 2015).

Commonly used themes in framing include emphasizing the conflict, an emotional aspect of the story, and the grim economic consequences (Entman, 1993; Severin & Tankard, 2001). Such frames can promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, or moral evaluation (Entman, 1993) and thus influence debates and structure the political outcomes (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

A study titled 'Nigeria as a country of interest in terrorism' used framing analysis to determine how four Nigerian newspapers framed an aborted suicide attack on a US-bound aircraft on Christmas Day in 2009. It revealed that perpetrator is a product of "alien cultural and religious values" and that radicalization and Islamic extremism are not common in Nigeria unlike other countries (Ette, 2012).

A study, conducted by Naila Hamdy and Ehab H. Gomaa (2012), depicts how the January 25 Revolution was framed in state-owned and independent newspapers as well as how it was framed in Facebook posts on "We are all Khaled Saeed" page, Tweets having the hashtag "#Thawra#jan25," and blog posts from popular Egyptian political blogs. The dominant frame in each media set was indicated in the study as well as the definition of the problem, diagnosis of the reason, and suggested solutions.

A study conducted by Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vreese(1999) depended on identifying the conflict frame, the responsibility frame, the economic consequences frame, and the human interest frames to examine readers' thoughts about and recall of two issues.

Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro (2015) included in analysis of Vancouver riots tweets descriptors, themes, and frames of the tweets. Focused coding was deployed to develop the themes as it identifies the most frequent or reoccurring codes to construct the salient categories within content (Saldana, 2009; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 2015).

Lastly, the qualitative coding methodology of axial coding was employed as an extension of focused coding, and further reduced and regrouped data into frames based upon similar dimensions or properties (Saldana, 2009; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 2015).

The frames were indicative of broad conceptual categories that provided culturally specific meaning to the reader (Goffman, 1974; Zaharopoulos, 2007; Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro, 2015).

The framing of an event or issue is a critical act by which we organize, categorize, and solve situations. Frames are publicly presented definitions of a situation containing three elements: a problem, a protagonist, and a solution (Levin, 2005). Humans subconsciously incorporate framing into nearly every communicative act (Goffman, 1974).

Social organizations utilize frames for four critical group maintenance functions: (a) identity (social organization/allies/opposition) definition, (b) problem definition, (c) solution definition, and (d) engendering motivation from the social organization and its allies to act to solve the problem with the solution proposed (Snow & Benford, 1988; Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994).

From framing perspective, "social organizations are a vehicle for expression of collective identity, a worldview of how the individual relates to various social groups and events," (Levin, 2005). Snow and Benford (1992) call this worldview a master frame. "A master frame structures the way in which its adherents process information coming from the environment and the manner in which they disseminate information to others," (Levin, 2005).

Starting the 1990s, "the RMT, PPA, and framing perspectives have been increasingly synthesized to allow researchers to assert how frames are used by competing social movement organizations" (Levin, 2005). Chong (1996, 2000) suggests that "master frames are what political entrepreneurs use to convince citizens that the cost-benefit calculation comes down in favor of mobilization and not inaction" (Levin, 2005).

"Chong presents a model of group identity and value formation in which rational political entrepreneurs seek to create social organizations by melding together material and social incentives with prior culturally salient norms and values while operating under the constraints of various laws and competition from other social actors" (Levin, 2005).

"The norms and values are rooted in the society's development of rules of the game the social interactions patterns that humans develop in order to add structure and regularity to social interaction (Lane, 1992; Migdal, 1988)," (Levin, 2005).

"In Chong's (2000) rational actor model, transformation of social values through instrumental selection and manipulation of frames is an iterative and gradual process wherein the

entrepreneur's ability to frame is bound by prior social norms and current political opportunities" (Levin, 2005). Chong's work synthesizes the current RMT, PPA, and framing perspectives to show how social organizations employ master frames.

These are both research questions asked by David Levin in the article titled "Framing Peace Policies." "First, since competing social movement organizations clearly act strategically in relation to political opportunity structures, do they also adopt *framing tactics* to suit the political opportunity structures they confront?" (Levin, 2005). "Second, do social movement organizations pay attention to the *cultural resonance* between a particular theme and recent events'?" (Levin, 2005).

"The primary task of a tactical frame is to demonstrate to the public that the social organization's master frame is the best definition of the reality that society is facing," (Levin, 2005). "Master frames do not decide who has the right to frame (a master frame by definition presumes that the social organization's own frame is the correct definition of the situation)," (Levin, 2005).

The tactical frames' consequences are: (a) directly respond to (not reshape) the conditions (political opportunity structures) immediately confronting the social organization'; (b) short-term effects (Levin, 2005). "Their purpose is to rally activists and allies behind the master frame in the face of competition from other social actors" (Levin, 2005).

"The role of the tactical frame thus defines the options available to a social organization," (Levin, 2005). A social organization confronted with competition has a choice between four tactical options: denial (fight), end run (innovate), incorporation (cooperate or symbiosis), and silence (flight) which is the absence of framing (Levin, 2005).

This typology of tactical frames is a micro-level reflection of three of the four master frame alignment processes described by Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986): transformation, amplification, and extension (Levin, 2005).

### *Denial*

"Denial tactical frames are primarily a response to real world events that have a prima facie interpretation threatening the values and logic that the social organization cherishes" (Levin, 2005). "Denial tactical frames claim that the values and logic of the competing actors are so fundamentally flawed that any serious consideration of their arguments is unnecessary."

"The typical denial tactical frame asserts that the values of the other side(s) are invalid. Occasionally, denial frames will also assert that even if the premises of the competing actors are sound, their conclusions are invalid. Thus, denial frames tend to be ideological arguments with an emphasis on appeals to strongly held values that provoke quick (often subconscious) reactions by observers" (Levin, 2005).



"In the sense that denial frames represent a defensive act to hold on to a particular master frame (worldview), they are the *reverse* image of a micro application of Snow et al.'s (1986) frame transformation, the process whereby new master frames gain ascendance over competing interpretations of events and experiences" (Levin, 2005).

"The primary audience of denial frames is the social core constituency. Denial frames are defensive acts, not attempts to reach new constituents. Denial frames are most likely to be used by social organizations at or near the center of the political spectrum or advantaged by social norms" (Levin, 2005).

"This is for two reasons: First, the social organization's arguments must be well known, if not universally accepted, by its constituents, and second, social organizations that espouse majoritarian values have more to lose if these values become pushed to the periphery than social organizations that espouse peripheral values do" (Levin, 2005).

### *End Run*

"End run frames are attempts to gain ground by reaching out to potential constituents. End run tactical frames claim that new considerations are necessary in making a decision on a policy. They are a real world application of Schattschneider's (1960) strategy of creating new cleavages" (Levin, 2005).

"End run tactical frames do not deny the validity of prior values and considerations. Rather, they suggest that older considerations need to be reweighted within a larger constellation of values. End run frames are generally an appeal to a value system couched in the frame of a logical argument" (Levin, 2005).

"In this sense, they are very similar to Snow et al.'s (1986) frame amplification: the clarification and invigoration of how an interpretive master frame bears on a set of issues. Social organizations that use end run tactical frames are at a relative disadvantage" (Levin, 2005).

"They have to make clear two ideas: (a) how the new considerations relate to the policy or issue in dispute and (b) why the new considerations should take priority over the old considerations. This means that in order to be successful, end run frames require a favorable balance of current events that support the internal logic of the frame" (Levin, 2005).

### *Incorporation*

"Incorporation frames attempt to cut off the source of public support for other actors by including the values voiced by other actors in the incorporation frame. If successful, this forces the other actors to search for new values and issues to mobilize around. Incorporation frames acknowledge the validity and hierarchy of value claims made by other social actors" (Levin, 2005).

"However, these frames assert that the values a social organization holds in common with other social organizations originate from the social organization itself, not from some other

organization. Snow et al. (1986) refer to this process at the master frame level as frame extension" (Levin, 2005).

"The primary difference between frame extension and incorporation is the frame level. Both frame extension and incorporation seek to maximize the reach of the social organization by portraying the organization's values as congruent with values of persons not yet in the social organization" (Levin, 2005).

"Beyond the level of the frame, where extension and incorporation differ is in the competitive nature of the act. Frame extension does not necessarily try to cut off support for other public actors, while incorporation is an act done in a more zero-sum environment of frame competition" (Levin, 2005).

"Incorporation frames tend to stress one of two elements: majoritarian values or the status of the social organization as representing "the public," or at least "the public on one entire side of the issue" (Levin, 2005).

"Truly large actors, such as governments, use incorporation frames to demobilize social movements" (Levin, 2005). "Social movements use incorporation frames usually as a last ditch attempt to retain a foothold on an issue already being acted upon by the government."

"The success of incorporation framing depends on how much larger or smaller an actor is compared to its competitor(s) and the degree of positive media coverage the actor has relative to

its competitor(s). The larger the social organization and the more positive the coverage, the more successful the incorporation framing attempt is likely to be" (Levin, 2005).

Context specific meanings of frames emerging within groups, cultures, and situations are important to understand how master frames organize social movement activity (Porter & Hellsten, 2014). Snow (2004) suggests that master frames change as groups (re)constitute the target of their activity in light of the new events occurring in the world.

Collective action framing is an “active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” (Snow & Benford, 1992). Specifically, collective action framing describes a process of forming positions on an issue of concern through different discourses that call others to action (Porter & Hellsten, 2014). In social movement research, collective action framing has been shown to garner support for causes and demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1992).

### **3.2- Significance of Social Media:**

Homero Gil de Zúñiga and James H. Liu conducted a study in 2017 on dual screening which is when recipients resort to social media to discuss and know more on information and messages delivered by mainstream media, especially television, almost concurrently with consuming the original message. The study adopted the survey method in 22 countries.

The study examined whether there was a relation between second screening on one hand, and social media political expression, political participation, and voting on the other hand. It indicated that second screening is directly related to social media political expression, and offline political participation. On the other hand, results varied as there was not a significant relationship between second screening and voting in ten countries, while there was direct and inverse relationships in others.

Second screening shapes the masses' perception of journalists, political figures and entities (Chadwick, O'Loughlin, & Vaccari, 2017), and plays a role in promoting a discursive public sphere with space open to political persuasion, probably due to people getting exposed to newfangled information and ideas (Barnidge, Gil de Zúñiga, & Diehl, 2017).

Social media provide content from alternative sources to those common in mainstream media (Littler & Feldman, 2017). Littler and Feldman conducted a study in 2017 to examine how social media have become a platform for populist political figures to voice their ideas and stances avoiding the "cordon sanitaire."

The study focused on testing the relationship between social media usage and concern about populist political issues. The hypothesis was that those reporting Facebook and Twitter usage will be more likely to show concern about immigration. The methodology was regression analysis using data from the face-to-face survey portion of the 2015 British Election Study.

Although the research did not support the hypothesis, the result can be an indicator that participation in the digital community can help demoting the prevalence of radical ideas through its “pluralisation of the public space,” according to Dahlgren (2005).

The pluralization concept raises doubt on literary works on digital extremist communities suggesting that the adoption and entrenchment of extremist attitudes increases with greater online participation (Wojcieszak 2010).

Some scholars argue that social media either decreases or have no effect on civic engagement. Heavy users of social media are less likely to be engaged in civil matters (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie, 2001), and those politically engaged in social media are those who are originally interested in politics and do participate in real life (Norris, 2001).

Nir (2011) suggests that heterogeneous discussion may have two definitions. One is competition between points of view. The other is the opposition to another's view. In terms of network heterogeneity, competition means an array of divergent viewpoints within a given network (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Nir, 2005). On the other hand, opposition is understood from the perspective of ego position as a divergence between the preference of the ego position and all other discussants in the network (Mutz, 2006).

As social media has arguably created a different form of public sphere from the one created by mainstream media as users create the content, Rasmussen (2013) suggests that the rationale behind people's decision has become more complicated to understand.

However, social media are still a platform that is similar to the ideal public sphere Habermas describes as independent from the influence and power of political elites which used to have better access to traditional media.

A number of scholars perceive the Internet as not creating enough of the type of rational, deliberative debate between citizens and political actors to be considered a public sphere (Gil De Zuniga, 2015).

However, new media gave rise to a “public space” that enables access to information as well as discussion and engagement in public affairs without fulfilling the democratic objectives of the public sphere (Lunt & Livingstone, 2013; Papacharissi, 2010).

A comparison conducted by Saldaña, McGregor, and Gil de Zúñiga studying political social media use by citizens in the United Kingdom and the United States demonstrated that the free and open political discussion empowered by social media form a base for promoting informed public opinion which a "benchmark" for public sphere (Gil De Zuniga, 2015).

Those scholars view social media as a "marketplace of ideas" giving exposure to different networks of people offering new and complementary ideas, and encouraging political discussion and thus political mobilization.

A framing analysis assumed by Muñiz, Alvídrez, and Téllez showed that sometimes the public's online discussions are aligned with mainstream media's frame, while in some other times, they adopt independent frames (Gil De Zuniga, 2015). "Although the media does affect the nature of online political discussions, the public still retains autonomy in the way they debate politics," (Gil De Zuniga, 2015).

Social media has been playing a role in determining the story covered and tackled by mainstream media, which has pushed scholars to conduct intermedia agenda-setting by studying a social medium and a given mainstream medium. In 2007, Wallsten analyzed blogs and online discussions, and determined an immediate mutual agenda-setting influence between blogs and *The New York Times*. In 2008, Kushin determined an agenda-setting influence by Twitter over the same publication.

Another study by Ku, Kaid and Pfau (2003) indicated that new media set the agenda for traditional media. On the other hand, Sweetser et al. (2008) concluded that broadcast media have an agenda-setting influence over blogs. Gizem Melek conducted a study in 2017 to examine intermedia agenda-setting between the online version of the most circulated newspaper in Turkey *Hurriyet* and Twitter as Turkish media faces censorship. The hypothesis was not supported. However, an insignificant agenda-setting influence by Twitter on *Hurriyet* was detected.

Gillmor (2006) suggests that social media ensure that a large variety of ideas and unfiltered opinions are available in the public sphere. Larsson and Moe (2014) demonstrate that



regular citizens have the opportunity of getting the content they create shared and retweeted more than public figures.

A case in point is citizen journalism manifested during the April 2013 Boston marathon-attack whereas imagery taken by regular citizens became much more widespread than mainstream news photography (Allan, 2014). By contrast, some scholars, such as (Cammaerts, 2008), argue that socio-economic elites that dominate mainstream media continue to be powerful in new media.

Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao (2016) did content analysis of tweets to determine the amount of rumors circulated during Korean saber rattling 2013. Rumors are part of public opinions whose traits are:

"First, public opinions are composed of responses from citizens as opposed to government organizations; second, they are publicly expressed, collective opinions as opposed to private conversations; and third, public opinions are relevant to public affairs, with potential influence on political decision-making (Herbst, 1991; Peterson & Gist, 1951; Price, 1988; Speir, 1950)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"Polling is an institutionalized construction of public opinions that mainly aims for social control and surveillance (Bishop, 2004; Blumer, 1948) and is often mistaken for a true representation of collective minds (Moore, 2008; Stromback, 2012)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"In contrast to research that equates 'public opinion' and 'polling,' some scholars view rumors as an alternative form of public opinions. For example, Rosnow (1988) defines rumors as 'public communications that reflect private hypotheses about how the world works" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"According to Peterson and Gist (1951), rumors should be considered as special cases of public opinions because rumors are more 'affect-laden' collective responses than polling, which manifest 'expectations, fears, anxieties, hostilities, and aspirations'" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

Critical situations, such as disasters, riots or warfare, make fertile environment for rumors (Allport& Postman, 1947; Lee, Agrawal, & Rao, 2015). Rumors circulation can play a role in consensus building by making people feel they are obtaining additional information reducing their uncertainty (Oh et al., 2013).

"From this consensus-building approach, the rumor-milling phase ultimately progresses into what Turner and Killian (1987) refer to as the 'keynoting' phase where collective definitions of crises are reached and collective behaviors are initiated" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"In contrast to the consensus-building approach, conflict-inflicting approach suggests that rumors potentially cause conflict on intergroup relations and increase prejudice and discrimination, deteriorating consensus-building efforts (Knopf, 1975)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto,

and Rao, 2016). Rumors are categorized into two main themes. One is intergroup hostility and prejudice. The other is citizens' mistrust toward the elites (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

Knapp (1944) classifies crisis-related rumors into three types: pipedream (rumors about wished-for outcomes), bogie (rumors about dreadful consequences), and wedge-driving (WD) (group divisive rumors with aggression). They may be distinguishable but not necessarily exclusive from each other (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"A WDR is an unverified proposition toned with derogation, blame, or attack toward a specific target group (or individuals representative of the group) that is not a direct cause of the problem (e.g. Allport & Postman, 1947; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Garrett, 2011)" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"Like other types of rumors (e.g. pipedream and bogie), a WDR transmission is motivated by the desire to understand and interpret uncertain situations with causal attributions. WDR, however, poses greater sociopolitical consequences than other types in that it is closely linked to intergroup conflict" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

"Self-defense is an underlying trigger of WDRs: by putting others down, threatened individuals release anxiety and enhance a sense of positive self-identity (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis (Hovland & Sears, 1940), uncertain crisis situations induce frustration to which individuals respond by displaying aggression toward out-group members and by scapegoating them" (Kwon, Bang, Egnoto, and Rao, 2016).

For a tweet content to be categorized as a rumor, it had to have two characteristics. One is "information ambiguity" which is lacking attribution to a verifiable source. The other is "proposition" so as the tweet refers to a person, object, situation and not an idea or theory.

### **3.3- Terrorism and Ethiopian Dam Crises:**

The main pressing national security issues that have been the focus of public discourse in Egypt have been terrorism and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam for its suspected harmful effects on Egypt's water share of the Nile River and water security. The roots of the issues go back to the year of the revolution in 2011.

#### **3.3.1- Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam**

Constructions in the Grand Renaissance Dam started on April 2, 2011 at a cost of \$4.8 billion. It was built by the Italian construction and engineering company Salini Impregilo. The Italian company is headquartered in Milan. The dam is located on the Blue Nile with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters, and is expected to generate up to 6,000 megawatts of power (El Tawil, 2017).

Since May 2011, Cairo has voiced its concern over how the dam can reduce the country's annual shares of more than 56 billion cubic meters of Nile water. Egypt's average water per-capita is expected to drop from 663 cubic meters per year to 582 cubic meters by 2025, according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) in 2014. Addis Ababa,

however, claimed that the dam is necessary for its development and will not harm downstream countries.

Meanwhile, President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi signed a tripartite joint cooperation agreement in Khartoum on March 23, 2015 between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. In December 2015, Sisi addressed the public, saying that there is no reason to worry about the dam and that the matter would be resolved. The three countries held 14 rounds of consultation on resolving the disputes over the Renaissance Dam. However, these rounds failed to solve the dispute (El Tawil, 2017).

Former Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hossam el-Moughazi stated in November 2015 that the dam's construction is going faster than the tripartite talks. In October, The Telegraph reported that Ethiopia is finalizing the construction of the dam and then will start filling its reservoir.

Cairo hosted a Tripartite National Committee on Renaissance Dam (TNCRD) meeting in November to discuss the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. However, the meeting ended without reaching consensus. The meeting has become a subject of concern among experts, parliament members, and former officials.

Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, Mohamed Abdel-Ati, said that TNCRD did not reach an agreement on adopting guidelines. The guidelines were indicated in a report prepared by a technical committee on the effects of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile Basin States after two days of talks.

Abdel-Ati declared that Egypt approves of the report's outcomes; however, Ethiopia and Sudan did not express consensus and called for amendments. Egypt halted all negotiations and said that all future decisions are at the hand of the cabinet (El Tawil, 2017).

### **Points of disagreement**

Abdel Aty clarified that one of the main disagreements during negotiations is that Ethiopia and Sudan insist on not abiding by the documents endorsed by the three countries to be used in studies conducted by the consulting company.

The documents indicate that the base that must be used for determining the effects and possible damages of the dam is the current status of the eastern Nile Basin without the presence of the dam. However, Ethiopia wants the dam to be included, which goes against logic, against what is done in studies on dams with trans-border effects and against the contracts.

On the other hand, Sudan wants to include "future usages" of the dam when measuring the current status of the basin. It also refused Egypt's proposition of depending on the water shares identified in the 1959 Agreement (El Tawil, 2017).

Sudan and Ethiopia also rejected an Egyptian proposition of not using data submitted to conduct the studies in another context, so that such data would not result in changing the current legal status of any party except for the execution of the studies and the Declaration of Principles

signed by the three countries in 2015.

The minister expressed his surprise at the Ethiopian and Sudanese rejection of the proposition that would eliminate their concerns, as these data would not be used against Sudan in the TNCRD. The data prove that Sudan only uses its water shares as determined in the 1959 Agreement guaranteeing that all three countries would not change their status over the agreement, which is a concern to Ethiopia(El Tawil, 2017).

Abdel Aty added that Sudan and Ethiopia insist that the data used in the studies should not entail any duties or rights for involved parties. They also insist that parties do not have to abide by the results of the studies on the dam's effects, which abolishes the purpose of conducting such studies in the first place.

Ethiopia wants to give directions to the consulting company, which contradicts the content of the contract on crucial aspects to include in the studies. For instance, Ethiopia wants the consulting company to disregard the dam's effect on soil salinity and the subsequent economic, social and environmental effects, so that the dam would appear to not have any effect on Egypt, the minister said.

Abdel Aty clarified that Egypt would be affected the most by the dam established on the Blue Nile, as it is the last downstream country and because constructions are taking place without prior agreement on how the dam will be operated and filled based on clear studies explaining its effects(El Tawil, 2017).

On January 30, 2018, a tripartite summit meeting between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia took place on the sidelines of the African Union (AU)'s 30th summit in Addis Ababa discussing mutual cooperation, the latest developments of GERD negotiations, and "means of overcoming the hurdles in their way." After the tripartite meeting, Sisi reiterated that none of the three countries would be harmed by GERD (Egypt Today staff, 2018).

The leaders of the three countries agreed to hold a meeting by their ministers of irrigation and foreign affairs and the National Tripartite Commission preparing a report in a month that includes solutions to all pending technical issues. That is in addition to exchanging technical information and studies.

The Sudanese president expressed his country's intention to work within the framework of the tripartite national committee in order to reach consensus on all outstanding technical issues.

"Ethiopia's and Sudan's interest is Egypt's as well...we are speaking as one country, not three states," Sisi stated. When asked by one of the reporters if the dam's crisis is over, Sisi answered, "There is no crisis" (Egypt Today staff; 2018).

On April 6, 2018, Egypt's Foreign Minister Sameh Shokry announced that the negotiations that took place in Khartoum by the delegations of the three countries had failed (Egypt Today staff, 2018).



### **3.2.2- Terrorism**

Amid the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolt in 2011, terrorism has started to take place in North Sinai as a natural gas pipeline supplying natural gas to Israel was blown up on February 5 six days before the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak. Three incidents of the sort occurred later in the same year, and another in 2015 (Aboudi, 2011).

On August 5, 2011, militants killed 16 border security guards stealing an armored vehicle and escaping across borders with Israel where they were killed (BBC Arabic, 2017). The incident incurred a forced resignation of former Defense Minister Field Marshal Hussein Tantawy and ex-chief of staff Lieutenant General Sami Anan. They were replaced respectively by incumbent President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, formerly head of military intelligence, and Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhy, currently the defense minister.

In May 2012, seven border security guards were abducted and released a week later through a tribal mediation with kidnapers. These belonged to al-Tawhid WalJehad group which demanded the release of six of its members sentenced to death in September 2011 for assassinating seven policemen in North Sinai. The same group was implicated in bomb attacks on Sinai tourist resorts in 2004 and 2006 (Perry & Mohamed, 2013).

Both incidents occurred under former President Mohamed Morsi, who was elected in June 2012 and ousted a year later over mass protests that took place between June 30 and July 3, 2013. Morsi was a member of the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and presided the Freedom

and Justice Party which was formed after the uprising. It won the majority of seats in the parliament in 2011 before it was resolved in 2012 as the election was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Following Morsi's ouster, terrorism was extended to other governorates targeting both civilians and security personnel. Although terror attacks have decreased significantly in most of Egypt, North Sinai remained a headquarters for terrorist groups. An attack on Al Rawda Mosque in North Sinai's Bir al-Abd claimed the lives of 311 civilians on November 24.

As a result, a massive security operation was launched against terrorists in the governorate starting February 9 for 20 days as the president had set a deadline to eradicate terrorism in the area in three months following the massacre. However, the Chief of Staff Mohamed Farid Hegazy asked the president to extend the operation till the goal is achieved.

Before the mosque attack, terrorism had targeted Christian citizens multiple times. The most prominent incidents were the bombing of the cathedral in Cairo on December 11, 2016, a twin attack on churches in Tanta and Alexandria cities on Easter day in 2017, and the shooting at a bus carrying Christian citizens in the Upper Egyptian governorate Minya on May 26, 2017 during Ramadan. The death tolls in each attack mounted to dozens in addition to injuries.

Attacks on churches, planting bombs in the streets, targeting security ambushes and checkpoints as well as public properties and establishments all over Egypt have become quite frequent right after the ouster of Morsi. In one year before Sisi became president in June 2014,

three security directorates had been bombed. These were the ones of South Sinai, Cairo and Daqahliya which was targeted twice. Terrorism caused hundreds of deaths among security personnel and civilians between 2013 till present.

On October 20, 2017, clashes between Egyptian Central Security Forces and terrorists near Wadi Gadid-Wahat Road in Giza Desert resulted in the death of 17 officers and the abduction of Captain Mohamed El Haeis after he was shot in his leg. A joint operation by the police and the army was launched on October 27, 2017 with air cover near Libyan borders where perpetrators were hiding leaving 15 terrorists killed and freeing Haeis (Moahmed, 2017). A terrorist was arrested and is being prosecuted while others had escaped.

On December 29, 2017, an attempted attack on Mar Mina church in Helwan occurred when two armed men used firearms to target dozens of Christian worshippers attending a religious service, according to a statement by the Ministry of Interior (Abdel Maguid, 2017).

The attackers opened fire at a household appliances shop, then attempted to trespass the church's security. The security forces captured one of the terrorists after shooting him and managed to defuse an explosive belt that was fastened around the militant's chest, while the other one fled the scene, the ministry said.

The attack resulted in the death of five citizens and a policeman. A citizen called Salah El Mougy had been the first to capture the terrorist before the security forces stationed around the church came.

## **Chapter 4- Methodology**

This research used the content analysis as a method to codify and to interpret variables, turning qualitative data into quantitative data. Content analysis is a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables (Neuendorf, 2002).

Systematic means that the content to be analyzed is selected according to explicit and consistently applied rules. Objective means that the researchers' idiosyncrasies and biases should not enter into the findings. Quantitative means that the goal of content analysis is an accurate representation of a body of messages (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).

Krippendorff (1980) argues that content analysis "can be traced back to inquisitorial pursuits by the Church in the 17<sup>th</sup> century" and to the Great Depression of the 1930s whereas newspapers in the United States were scrutinized by politicians seeking to determine the root causes of the economic downturn. Thereby, social scientists learnt of "newspaper analysis" as a research method, and later, the "content analysis" term emerged (Thayer, Evans, McBride, Queen, & Spyridakis).

Content analysis has two types. One is Manifest Analysis, which involves just counting words, phrases, or other "surface" features of the text itself. The other is Latent Analysis, which "involves interpreting the underlying meaning of the text" (Thayer, Evans, McBride, Queen, & Spyridakis). The latter is used in this study.

#### 4.1 - Uses of Content Analysis:

Content analysis helps describing communication content, testing hypothesis of message characteristics, comparing media content to the real world, assessing the image of particular groups in society, conducting framing analysis, and establishing a starting point for studies of media effects (Wimmer& Dominick, 2011).

#### 4.2 - Limitations of Content Analysis:

Content analysis alone cannot serve as basis for examining the effects of content on an audience. The findings of a particular content analysis are limited to the framework of the categories, and the definitions used in that analysis. While conducting a study, the researcher may face the obstacle of a lack of messages relevant to the research as some topics receive little exposure in the mass media (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).

#### **4.3- Research questions and Hypotheses**

**RQ1:** What are the frames dominantly used by top political Facebook pages, diverse publications, and regular Twitter users when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**RQ2:** To what extent stereotypical frames were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**RQ3:** To what extent rumors were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**RQ4:** To what extent those national security crises were linked to 2018 Presidential Election?

**RQ5:** What are the master and tactical frames adopted by each group when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

#### **4.4- Sampling**

Purposive sampling, which is a non-probability sampling method, was used in all studies conducting framing analysis for social media posts so it will be used in this one by analyzing online units on terrorism and GERD. A purposive sample consists of elements selected for specific characteristics or qualities and eliminates those who fail to meet these criteria (Wimmer, Dominick, 2011).

The universe of the population studied is the following top nine political pages as they have the highest number of followers on Facebook in Egypt, according to Socialbakers Website in January 2018.

The one million-Egyptian campaign against Baradei: 2,164,758 followers

President, I am Sorry (AsefyaRayes): 2, 021,465 followers

The electronic Egyptian army: 1, 568, 142 followers

Sawiris, we are also joking (BenhazaryaSawiris): 1, 497, 011 followers

6<sup>th</sup> of April Youth Movement: 1, 391, 069 followers

Ikhwan online: 1,067, 848 followers

Against the Muslim Brotherhood (Anti-Ikhwan): 1, 064,505 followers

Nation Guardians: 904, 137 followers

The Revolutionist Socialists: 747, 577 followers

That is in addition to state-owned newspaper Al Ahram, the privately-owned newspaper Al Masry El Youm, and the partisan newspaper Al Wafd. As such, the samples would represent different types of agenda-setting in online publications. The units of analysis will be all posts by those pages on terrorism and GERD, all op-eds published on the websites of the aforementioned publications tackling terrorism and GERD, and all tweets by regular Twitter users having the hashtags #Rawda\_Mosque, #Wahat\_accident, and #Helwan. That is within a time frame starting from September 1, 2017 till March 31, 2018. Less than five tweets found by regular users on the hashtag #Ethiopian\_Dam. Thus, no tweets on GERD were included in the sample studied. The total number of samples is 817.



#### **4.5 – Inter-coder Reliability and Internal Validity:**

According to Wimmer and Dominick (2011), it is essential to analyze a subsample (ranging from 10-25 percent) of the data analyzed in order to determine the inter-coder reliability coefficient.

Holsti (1969) suggests this formula  $\frac{2M}{N_1+N_2}$  for determining the reliability of nominal data in terms of percentage agreement (Wimmer, Dominick, 2011). *M* is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agree and *N*<sub>1</sub> and *N*<sub>2</sub> are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder respectively.

In this study, three coders coded 10 percent of the whole sample and the results for each two coders were compared independently using Holsti's formula. Later on, the results for all coders have been summed and divided by the number of coders showing an overall high percentage of 97 percent, meaning that the research results are reliable.

To ensure internal validity, meaning the study measures what is supposed to measure, categories must be exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and each variable must be measured with categories that are the highest level of measurement possible (Wimmer, Dominick, 2011).

#### **4.6- Data Analysis**

The statistical analysis used the SPSS statistical program and included simple frequencies, and Chi-square.

#### **4.7- Operational Definitions:**

Frame type:

**Conflict:** In the terrorism context, it refers to clashes and confrontations between security forces, and terrorists in order to eliminate them and achieve victory and stability. In the GERD context, it refers to Ethiopia's insistence on its stance.

**Emotional aspect:** In the terrorism context, it refers to the emphasis on human losses. In the GERD context, it is not applicable.

**Grim consequences:** In the terrorism context, it refers to the negative political, economic, and social consequences of terror, if it takes over the country and becomes further widespread. In the GERD context, it refers to the negative consequences of decreasing Egypt's water share.

**Responsibility:** In both contexts, it refers to calling for citizens, media and the state to act responsibly.

**Problem definition:** In both contexts, it refers to describing the nature of the crisis.

**Causal interpretation:** In both contexts, it refers to the causes and driving forces behind the crisis.

**Moral Evaluation:** In both contexts, it refers to judging the moral validity of the acts assumed by terrorists, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

**Solutions:** In both contexts, it refers to suggested solutions or those already sought by the state.

## Chapter 5- Data Findings and Analysis:

**Table A: The number of samples derived from each Facebook page - GERD**

<b>Pages</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	53	81.5%
<b>Asefyarayes</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Electronic army</b>	2	3.1%
<b>BenhazaryaSawiris</b>	0	0.0%
<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	1	1.5%
<b>Ikhwan online</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Anti-Ikhwan</b>	8	12.3%
<b>Nation guardians</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	1	1.5%
<b>Total</b>	65	100.0%

**Table B: The number of samples derived from each publication - GERD**

<b>Publication</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Ahram</b>	46	42.9%
<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	61	57.1%
<b>El Wafd</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	107	100%

**Table C: The number of samples derived from each Facebook page - Terrorism**

<b>Pages</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	42	36.8%
<b>Asefyarayes</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Electronic army</b>	17	14.9%
<b>BenhazaryaSawiris</b>	0	0.0%
<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movenments</b>	5	4.4%
<b>Ikhwan online</b>	0	0.0%
<b>Anti-Ikhwan</b>	39	34.2%
<b>Nation guardians</b>	10	8.8%
<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	1	0.9%
<b>Total</b>	114	100.0%

**Table D: The number of samples derived from each publication - Terrorism**

<b>Publication</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Ahram</b>	309	80.3%
<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	75	19.5%
<b>El Wafd</b>	1	0.3%
<b>Total</b>	385	100%

**Table E: The number of samples derived from Twitter through hashtags - Terrorism**


<b>Hashtag</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	109	75.70%
<b>Wahat Incident</b>	31	21.50%
<b>Helwan</b>	4	2.80%
<b>Total</b>	144	100%

**Table 1: Terrorism and GERD Publications**

<b>Publication</b>	<b>Terrorism publications</b>	<b>GERD Publications</b>
<b>Ahram</b>	80.3%	42.9%
<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	19.5%	57.1%
<b>El Wafd</b>	0.3%	0.0%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

Chi square = 30.110% (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different distributions of publications in the 2 groups.

**Figure 1: Terrorism and GERD Publications**



**Figure 1**


Figure (1) shows that the great majority of op-eds on terrorism are in the state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram (99%), while the percentages for GERD are more balanced between Al-Ahram (42.9) and the private newspaper El Masry El Youm (57.1%). El Wafd had no op-eds on GERD and only one on terrorism.

**Table 2: Terrorism and GERD - Facebook Pages**

<b>Pages</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>	<b>GERD Facebook</b>
<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	36.8%	81.5%
<b>Electronic army</b>	14.9%	3.1%
<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movement</b>	4.4%	1.5%
<b>Anti-Ikhwan</b>	34.2%	12.3%
<b>Nation guardians</b>	8.8%	0.0%
<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	0.9%	1.5%
	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square = 45.317 (p=0.0001) Highly significant indicating different distributions of pages for both themes.

**Table 2: Terrorism and GERD - Facebook Pages**



**Figure 2**

Figure (2) shows that both issues are more mentioned in pro-regime Facebook pages than anti-regime ones. Three studied pages did not mention both issues. These are AsefyaRayes, BenhazaryaSawiris, and Ikhwan Online.




**RQ1:** What are the frames dominantly used by top political Facebook pages, diverse publications, and regular Twitter users when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**Table 3: Terrorism and GERD - Frame types**

Frame type	Terrorism Publications	Terrorism Twitter	Terrorism Facebook	GERD Publications	GERD Facebook
<b>Conflict</b>	20.0%	9%	<b>50%</b>	20%	<b>64%</b>
<b>Emotional aspect</b>	10.3%	15%	21%	1%	0%
<b>Grim consequences</b>	1.9%	2%	3%	7%	4%
<b>Responsibility</b>	12.5%	16%	8%	3%	4%
<b>Problem definition</b>	9.9%	17%	1%	<b>37%</b>	1%
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	<b>25.7%</b>	<b>36%</b>	11%	5%	1%
<b>Moral Evaluation</b>	7.8%	4%	2%	7%	0%
<b>Solutions</b>	10%	1%	4%	21%	24%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square = 285.376(p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different distributions of frame types in the 5 groups. (very high chi square due to the existence of many values less than 5)

**Figure 3: Terrorism and GERD - Frame types**



**Figure 3**

Figure (3) shows that the conflict frame is most dominant in Facebook pages for both issues (50% for terrorism and 64% for GERD). The problem definition frame was most dominant in publications tackling the GERD issue (37%). The causal interpretation frame was most dominant when tackling the terrorism issue in studied publications (25.7%) and tweets (36%).


The conflict frame makes up one fifth of op-eds on terrorism, and Facebook posts on GERD. The emotional aspect frame represents 21 percent of Facebook posts on terrorism. The solutions frame is high in all samples on GERD (21 percent in op-eds and 24 percent in Facebook posts).

**Table 4: Terrorism:Publications - Twitter - Facebook - Causes of terrorism**

<b>Causes of Terrorism</b>	<b>Terrorism Publications</b>	<b>Terrorism Twitter</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>
<b>Poverty and ignorance</b>	4%	2%	0%
<b>Religious extremism</b>	29%	25%	9%
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	59%	26%	74%
<b>Political Conflict</b>	9%	48%	17%
<b>Total</b>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square = 70.436 (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different distributions of the causes of terrorism for the 3 groups.

**Figure 4: Terrorism: Publications - Twitter - Facebook - Causes of terrorism**



**Figure 4**


Figure (4) shows that most cited cause of terrorism in both publications and Facebook pages was conspiracy by enemy states (in order to divide the country's territories and make it comply with the demands serving their interests) as it made up almost two-thirds of the former and three-quarters of the latter. Religious extremism was present in almost one third of the causes cited in publications samples coming majorly from Al Ahram. The political conflict cause made up almost one third of the reasons cited behind terror on Twitter.

**Table 5: GERD: Publications-Facebook - Factors contributing to GERD crisis**

<b>Factors contributing to GERD crisis</b>	<b>GERD publications</b>	<b>GERD Facebook</b>
<b>Ethiopia's need for electricity</b>	23%	0%
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	54%	100%
<b>Both</b>	23%	0%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%

Chi square = 60.000 (p=0.0001) Highly significant indicating different distributions of factors contributing to GERD crisis among both groups.

**Figure 5: GERD: Publications-Facebook - Factors contributing to GERD crisis**



**Figure 5**


Figure (5) shows that GERD was mostly viewed as a conspiracy by enemy states in both media. Conspiracy by enemy states is the only cited factor to be contributing to the GERD crisis. Almost half of samples from publications shed light of Ethiopia's need for electricity. Those who stated both estimate that such need was exploited by enemy states.

**Table 6: Terrorism: Publications / Twitter / Facebook - Consequences of Terrorism**

<b>Consequences of terrorism</b>	<b>Terrorism publications</b>	<b>Terrorism Twitter</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>
<b>Socio-political</b>	76%	97%	60%
<b>Economic</b>	11%	3%	40%
<b>Both</b>	13%	0%	0%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%

Chi square = 77.234 (p=0.0001 )highly significant indicating different distributions of consequences of terrorism for the 3 groups.

**Figure 6: Terrorism: Publications / Twitter / Facebook - Consequences of Terrorism**



**Figure 6**

Figure (6) shows that the socio-political consequences were the most cited in all three media. The economic consequences were also emphasized often on Twitter (40%).




**RQ2:** To what extent stereotypical frames were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**Table 7: Terrorism and GERD - Accusations of**

<b>Accusations</b>	<b>Terrorism Publications</b>	<b>Terrorism Twitter</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>	<b>GERD publications</b>	<b>GERD Facebook</b>
<b>Treason against other group</b>	4%	1%	4%	0%	0%
<b>Ignorance against other group</b>	8%	1%	4%	0%	3%
<b>Treason against the regime</b>	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Regime's failure</b>	11%	18%	4%	25%	3%

Chi square = 75.296% (p=0.0001) highly significant indicating different distributions of accusations for the 5 groups. (Very high chi square due to the existence of too many zeros)

**Figure 7: Terrorism and GERD - Accusations of**




**Figure 7**

Figure (7) shows that accusations of regime failure are the highest when tackling GERD in publications, and when tackling terrorism on Twitter, and in publications. Accusations of treason against the regime only exist on Twitter in the context of terrorism as most of the Tweets were opposing the regime. For that same reason, accusations of regime failure on Twitter were the second highest (18%) after GERD in publications (25%) as the most samples came from El Masry El Youm, which is not affiliated with the regime. Accusations against the other group existed only in the context of terrorism, however, in small percentages, as it was intertwined with the responsibility frame. Accusations of ignorance among the other group was the highest when tackling terrorism in publications.

**Table 8: Terrorism and GERD - Emphasis on the regime's achievements**

<b>Emphasis</b>	<b>Terrorism Publications</b>	<b>Terrorism Twitter</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>	<b>GERD publications</b>	<b>GERD Facebook</b>
<b>Yes</b>	46%	4%	40%	11%	34%

**Figure 8: Terrorism and GERD - Emphasis on the regime's achievements**



**Figure 8**

Figure (8) shows that the emphasis on the regime's achievements was most common in the terrorism theme on Facebook and in publications whereas most samples came from pro-regime sources. The same applies to the GERD theme when tackled on Facebook.

**RQ3:** To what extent rumors were used when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

**Table 9: Terrorism and GERD - Rumors:**

<b>Rumors</b>	<b>Terrorism Publications</b>	<b>Terrorism Twitter</b>	<b>Terrorism Facebook</b>	<b>GERD Facebook</b>
<b>Rumors</b>	1%	3%	3%	20%
<b>Themes: Intergroup hostility</b>	0%	0%	0%	8%
<b>Themes: Mistrust toward the regime</b>	0%	50%	0%	8%
<b>Themes: Support to the regime</b>	100%	50%	100%	83%
<b>Rumors type: Pipedream</b>	0%	25%	100%	83%
<b>Rumors type: Bogie</b>	100%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Rumors type: Wedge-driving</b>	0%	75%	0%	17%

Chi square = 791.861(p=0.000) highly significant indicating different distributions of rumors/themes/types for the 4 groups.(very high chi square due to the existence of too many zeros)

**Figure 9: Terrorism and GERD - Rumors:**




Figure 9


Figure (9) shows that rumors are mostly present in Facebook posts tackling GERD. The most common theme among those is support to the regime as most samples found were from pro-regime pages. A positive point is that rumors are absent in publications when discussing GERD while it is only one percent for terrorism. The theme is also support to the regime. The percentages are even for both social media when tackling terrorism. However, the 'support to the regime' theme was the only one existing for rumors in the Facebook posts, while it made up only 50 percent of rumors in the Tweets. The other 50 percent went to the 'mistrust toward the regime' theme. The pipedream type made up the great majority of rumors on Facebook, while all rumors in publications when tackling terrorism were of the bogie type. The wedge-driving type was most common in Tweets tackling terrorism.

**RQ4:** To what extent terrorism and GERD crises were linked to 2018 Presidential Election?

**Table 10: Terrorism and GERD – Election**

Election	Terrorism Publications	Terrorism Facebook	GERD Facebook
	13.5%	14.0%	3.1%

**Figure 10: Terrorism and GERD – Election**



**Figure 10**

Figure (10) shows that the terrorism issue was most mentioned in the context of 2018 Presidential Election in the studied publications (13.5) and Facebook pages (14%). That was absent in Twitter and in publications' op-eds on GERD. All those samples were pro-regime posts and op-eds supporting President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi for a second term to stand in solidarity with the state in the face of such crisis.

**Table 11: Facebook pages – Terrorism – Election**

Elec	Pages	To
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tion							tal
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electron ic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwa n</b>	<b>Nation guardian s</b>	<b>Socialist Revolutionis ts</b>	
	7	2	0	5	1	1	16
	43.7%	12.5%	0%	31.2%	6.20%	6.2%	100 %



**Table 12: Facebook pages –Terrorism - Frame types**

Frame types	Pages						To tal
	Campaign against Baradei	Electro nic army	6 <sup>th</sup> of April movements	Anti-Ikhwan	Nation guardians	Socialist Revolutionists	
<b>Conflict</b>	23	8	1	28	6	0	66
	34.8%	12.1%	1.5%	42.4%	9.10%	0%	100 %
<b>Emotional aspect</b>	12	6	0	8	1	0	27
	44.4%	22.2%	0%	29.65 %	3.7%	0%	100 %
<b>Grim consequences</b>	0	0	1	1	2	0	4
	0%	0%	25.0%	25.0%	50.0%	0%	100 %
<b>Responsibility</b>	2	3	0	4	2	0	11
	18.2%	27.3%	0%	36.4%	18.2%	0%	100 %
<b>Problem definition</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	100.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100 %
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	3	0	2	7	1	1	14
	21.4%	0.0%	14.3%	50.0%	7.1%	7.1%	100 %
<b>Moral Evaluation</b>	0	1	0	2	0	0	3
	0%	33.3%	0%	66.7%	0%	0%	100 %
<b>Solutions</b>	1	1	0	3	5	0	10
	10.0%	10.0%	0%	30.0%	50.0%	0%	100 %

**Table 13: Facebook pages – Causes of terrorism**

Causes of terrorism	Pages							Total
	Campaign against Baradei	Electronic army	6 <sup>th</sup> of April movements	Anti-Ikhw an	Nation guards	Socialist Revolutionists		
Religious extremism	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	
	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%	
Conspiracy by enemy states	6	0	0	9	2	0	17	
	35.3%	0.0%	0.0%	52.9%	77.8%	0.0%	100%	
Political Conflict	0	0	3	0	0	1	4	
	0.0%	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	100%	

**Table 14: Facebook pages - Consequences of terrorism**

<b>Consequences of terrorism</b>	<b>Pages</b>						<b>Total</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electronic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	<b>Anti-Ikhwan</b>	<b>Nation guards</b>	<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	
<b>Socio-political</b>	0	1	0	1	1	0	3
	0%	33.3%	0%	33.3%	33.3%	0%	100%
<b>Economic</b>	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
	0%	0%	50.0%	0%	50.0%	0%	100%

**Table 15: Facebook pages – Terrorism – Accusations**

Accusations	Pages						T o t a l
	Campaign against Baradei	Electro nic army	6 <sup>th</sup> of April movement s	Anti- Ikhwan	Nation guardia ns	Socialist Revolutio nists	
of treason against the other group:	0	1	0	3	0	0	4
	0.0%	25.0%	0%	75.0%	0%	0%	100 %
of ignorance against the other group:	0	2	0	2	0	0	4
	0%	50.0%	0%	50.0%	0%	0%	100 %
of regime's failure:	0	0	4	0	0	1	5
	0%	0%	80.0%	0%	0%	20.0%	100 %

**Table 16: Facebook pages – Terrorism - Emphasis on regime achievements**

<b>Regime achievements</b>	<b>Pages</b>						<b>To tal</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electro nic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwan</b>	<b>Nation guardians</b>	<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	
	18	10	1	14	3	0	46
	3.9.1%	21.7%	2.17%	30.4%	6.5%	0%	100 %

**Table 17: Facebook pages – Terrorism –Rumors**

<b>Rumors</b>	<b>Pages</b>						<b>T ot al</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electro nic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwan</b>	<b>Nation guardia ns</b>	<b>Socialist Revolution ists</b>	
<b>Rumors</b>	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
	66.7%	0%	0%	33.3%	0%	0%	100 %
<b>Themes of rumors : Support to the regime</b>	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
	66.7%	0%	0%	33.3%	0%	0%	100 %
<b>Rumor's Types : Pipedream</b>	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
	50.0%	0%	0%	50.0%	0%	0%	100 %

**Table 18: Facebook – GERD – Election**

<b>Election</b>	<b>Pages</b>					<b>Total</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electronic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movements</b>	<b>Anti-Ikhwan</b>	<b>Socialist Revolutionists</b>	
	1	0	0	0	1	2
	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100%

**Table 19: Facebook pages - GERD - Frame types**

Frame types	Pages					Total
	Campaign against Baradei	Electronic army	6 <sup>th</sup> of April movements	Anti-Ikhwan	Socialist Revolutionists	
<b>Conflict</b>	37	2	0	6	0	45
	82.2%	4.4%	0.0%	13.3%	0.0%	100%
<b>Grim consequences</b>	0	1	1	0	1	3
	0%	33.3%	33.3%	0%	33.3%	100%
<b>Responsibility</b>	0	1	0	2	0	3
	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	100%
<b>Problem definition</b>	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	0	1	0	0	0	1
	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Solutions</b>	16	1	0	0	0	17
	94.1%	5.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%



**Table 20: Facebook pages - Factors contributing to GERD crisis**

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Pages</b>					<b>T o t a l</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electro nic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movenment s</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwa n</b>	<b>Socialist Revolution ists</b>	
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	11	1	0	1	0	13
	84.60%	7.70%	0.00%	7.70%	0.00%	10 0 %

**Table 21- Facebook pages – GERD – Accusations**

Accusations	Pages					Total
	Campaign against Baradei	Electronic army	6 <sup>th</sup> of April movements	Anti-Ikhwan	Socialist Revolutionists	
of ignorance against the other group:	0	0	0	2	0	2
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100%
of regime's failure:	0	0	1	0	1	2
	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100%

**Table 22: Facebook pages –GERD - Emphasis on regime achievements**

<b>Emphasis on Regime's achievements</b>	<b>Pages</b>					<b>T ot al</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electro nic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movenmen ts</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwan</b>	<b>Socialist Revolutio nists</b>	
	14	2	0	6	0	22
	63.60%	9.10%	0.00%	27.30 %	0.00%	10 0 %

**Table 23: Facebook pages – GERD –Rumors**

<b>Rumors</b>	<b>Pages</b>					<b>T o t a l</b>
	<b>Campaign against Baradei</b>	<b>Electro nic army</b>	<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April movement s</b>	<b>Anti- Ikhwan</b>	<b>Socialist Revolution ists</b>	
<b>Rumors</b>	7	1	1	4	0	13
	53.8%	7.7%	7.7%	30.8%	0.0%	100%
<b>Themes of rumors : Intergroup hostility</b>	0	0	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Themes of rumors : Mistrust toward the regime</b>	0	0	1	0	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Themes of rumors : Support to the regime</b>	7	0	0	3	0	10
	70.0%	0.0%	0.0%	30.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Rumor's Types : Pipedream</b>	7	0	0	3	0	10
	70.0%	0.0%	0.0%	30.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Rumor's Types : Wedge driving</b>	0	0	1	1	0	2
	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100%

**Table 24: Publications – GERD - Frame types**

<b>Frames</b>	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Conflict</b>	12	19	31
	38.7%	61.3%	100%
<b>Emotional aspect</b>	2	0	2
	100.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Grim consequences</b>	2	9	11
	18.2%	81.8%	100%
<b>Responsibility</b>	0	4	4
	0.0%	100.0%	100%
<b>Problem definition</b>	24	33	57
	42.1%	57.9%	100%
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	2	5	7
	28.6%	71.4%	100%
<b>Moral Evaluation</b>	5	5	10
	50.0%	50.0%	100%
<b>Solutions</b>	15	18	33
	45.5%	54.5%	100%

**Table 25: Publications – GERD - Factors contributing to GERD crisis**

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Ethiopia's need for electricity</b>	1	5	6
	16.7%	83.3%	100%
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	8	6	14
	57.1%	42.9%	100%
<b>Both</b>	4	2	6
	66.7%	33.3%	100%

**Table 26: Publications - GERD –Accusations**

<b>Accusations of regime's failure</b>	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>Total</b>
	0	27	27
	0.0%	100.0%	100%

**Table 27: Publications - GERD - Emphasis on regime's achievements**

<b>Emphasis on regime's achievements</b>	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>Total</b>
	6	6	12
	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%



**Table 28: Twitter Hashtags - Frame types**

<b>Frame types</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Conflict</b>	14	2	0	16
	87.5%	12.5%	0.0%	100%
<b>Emotional aspect</b>	14	10	2	26
	53.8%	38.5%	7.7%	100%
<b>Grim consequences</b>	3	0	0	3
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Responsibility</b>	11	14	2	27
	40.7%	51.9%	7.4%	100%
<b>Problem definition</b>	29	0	0	29
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	55	7	0	62
	88.7%	11.3%	0.0%	100%
<b>Moral Evaluation</b>	6	1	0	7
	85.7%	14.3%	0.0%	100%
<b>Solutions</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%

**Table 29: Twitter Hashtags - Causes of terrorism**

<b>Cause</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Poverty and ignorance</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Religious extremism</b>	16	0	0	16
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	14	3	0	17
	82.4%	17.6%	0.0%	100%
<b>Political Conflict</b>	27	4	0	31
	87.1%	12.9%	0.0%	100%

**Table 30: Twitter Hashtags - Consequences of terrorism**

<b>Consequences</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Socio-political</b>	29	0	0	29
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>Economic</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100%

**Table 31: Twitter Hashtags – Accusations**

<b>Accusations</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>of treason against the other group</b>	2	0	0	2
	100%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>of ignorance against the other group:</b>	1	1	0	2
	50%	50.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>of treason against the regime</b>	14	0	0	14
	100%	0.0%	0.0%	100%
<b>of regime's failure</b>	13	10	3	26
	50%	38.5%	11.5%	100%

**Table 32: Twitter Hashtags - Emphasis on regime's achievements:**

<b>Emphasis on regime's achievements</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
	3	2	0	5
	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	100%

**Table 33: Twitter Hashtags – Rumors**

<b>Rumors</b>	<b>Rawda Mosque</b>	<b>Wahat Incident</b>	<b>Helwan</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Rumors</b>	4	0	0	4
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Themes: Mistrust toward the regime</b>	2	0	0	2
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Themes: Support to the regime</b>	2	0	0	2
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Types: Pipedream (rumors about wished-for outcomes)</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Types: Wedge-driving (group divisive rumors with aggression)</b>	3	0	0	3
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

**Table 34: Publications - Terrorism –Election**

Election	Publications			Total
	Ahram	El Masry El Youm	El Wafd	
Yes	52	0	0	52
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

**Table 35: Publications - Terrorism - Frame type**

Frame types	Publications			Total
	Ahram	El Masry El Youm	El Wafd	
<b>Conflict</b>	113	2	0	115
	98.3%	1.7%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Emotional aspect</b>	48	10	1	59
	81.4%	16.9%	1.7%	100.0%
<b>Grim consequences</b>	11	0	0	11
	100.0%			100.0%
<b>Responsibility</b>	54	18	0	72
	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Problem definition</b>	47	10	0	57
	82.5%	17.5%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Causal interpretation</b>	136	12	0	148
	91.9%	8.1%		100.0%
<b>Moral Evaluation</b>	39	6	0	45
	86.7%	13.3%		100.0%
<b>Solutions</b>	51	17	0	68
	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%



**Table 36: Publications - Terrorism - Causes of terrorism**

<b>Causes</b>	<b>Publications</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>El Wafd</b>	
<b>Poverty and ignorance</b>	6	1	0	7
	85.7%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Religious extremism</b>	47	10	0	57
	82.5%	17.5%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Conspiracy by enemy states</b>	106	11	0	117
	90.6%	9.4%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Political Conflict</b>	17	1	0	18
	94.4%	5.6%	0.0%	100.0%

**Table 37: Publications - Terrorism- Consequences of terrorism**

<b>Consequences</b>	<b>Publications</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>El Wafd</b>	
<b>Socio-political</b>	55	3	0	58
	94.8%	5.2%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Economic</b>	6	2	0	8
	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Both</b>	10	0	0	10
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

**Table 38: Publications - Terrorism – Accusations**

Accusations	Publications			Total
	Ahram	El Masry El Youm	El Wafd	
<b>of treason against the other group</b>	15 88.2%	2 11.8%	0 0.0%	17 100.0%
<b>of ignorance against the other group:</b>	29 93.5%	2 6.5%	0 0.0%	31 100.0%
<b>of treason against the regime</b>	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%
<b>of regime's failure</b>	17 38.6%	27 61.4%	0 0.0%	44 100.0%

**Table 39: Publications - Terrorism - Emphasis on regime's achievements**

<b>Emphasis on regime's achievements</b>	<b>Publications</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>El Wafd</b>	
	174	3	1	178
	97.8%	1.7%	0.6%	100.0%

**Table 40: Publications - Terrorism – Rumors**

<b>Rumors</b>	<b>Publications</b>			<b>Total</b>
	<b>Ahram</b>	<b>El Masry El Youm</b>	<b>El Wafd</b>	
<b>Rumors</b>	2	0	0	2
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Themes: Support to the regime</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
<b>Types: Bogie (rumors about dreadful consequences)</b>	1	0	0	1
	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%

## **Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion:**

The study found that the most dominant frames when tackling the terrorism and GERD crises are conflict, causal interpretation, and problem definition, while stereotypical frames and rumors did not exceed 25 percent and 20 percent respectively in any of the samples derived from each source on each topic. That is unlike Hamdy and Gomaa's (2012) study of the 2011 Egyptian uprising whereas the most dominant frame on social media was emotional aspect. On the other hand, the moral evaluation frame was the most dominant frame in Burch, Frederick, & Pegoraro's (2015) study of tweets on Vancouver riots.

**RQ5:** What are the master and tactical frames adopted by each group when tackling terrorism and GERD crises?

When tackled in studied Facebook pages and publications, terrorism was mostly identified as a conspiracy by enemy states who have exploited some existing social diseases in Egypt in order to destabilize, weaken, and divide the country's territory. Although the state has been viewed as taking all necessary security measures, many Al Ahram columnists reiterated that the state is doing little to combat religious extremism.

The calls for solidarity with the state, and dealing with news and ideas circulating in different media with caution and increasing sense of responsibility have been quite dominant. In the overall across all media, the responsibility frame was used by supporters toward media people and social media users.

In the aftermath of the Rawda Mosque attack, the solutions suggested by Al Ahram columnists to combat terrorism consisted of developing Sinai, eliminating extremism, and holding accelerated prosecutions for terrorists, especially before military courts. There has been a great emphasis on the state's failure to achieve the last measure. Those writers linked that specific major attack to the security forces' success in laying a siege to terrorists' hiding areas and in achieving Palestinian reconciliation. They argued that such accomplishments triggered foreign powers conspiring against the country to back the attack as retaliation.

As the number of victims was very high and many started to question the progress achieved in combating terror, the writers in the publication called for their colleagues to have a better sense of responsibility and help recipients understand that war on terror is a long battle that needs time. The same calls were promoted in Al Ahram during the Wahat incident as false numbers on the number of police officers' victims went viral, and it took days to liberate the injured officer Captain Mohamed El Hayes while there had been doubts he might be dead.

By contrast, many columnists in El Masry El Youm called for the state to be faster in announcing numbers and explaining what is happening so that citizens would not resort to unreliable sources of information. They stated that it is the responsibility of the state to "respect the citizens' minds" and cope with the technology era whereas lots of information has been available in open and instant ways.

El Masry El Youm columnists highlighted the state's failure in combating religious extremism stressing that, although terror in Egypt is funded by enemy states conspiring against Egypt, the attacks are accomplished by brainwashed individuals. In the aftermath of the attack on the Rawda Mosque, the majority of those columnists suggested the socio-economic development of Sinai as a solution to deter terrorism in its northern part so as terrorist groups would not be able to move and hide easily without getting noticed.

The pro-regime Facebook pages that tackled the GERD crisis pre-dominantly emphasized the conflict with Ethiopia and "entities" funding the dam to purposefully harm Egypt. The enemy states mentioned are Israel, Turkey, Qatar, and some business people having strong ties with them. On the other hand, the tactical frame deployed in such pages for that theme has been denial as the majority of posts repeatedly stated that the Egyptian state has a plan to deal with the crisis, and that no harm would be inflicted on the country.

Some of the speculations indicated are that Egypt would be able to cut funding to the dam by enemy entities, and that it would resort to international arbitration which would be in its favor as the harm would be proven. The pages came up with speculations about measures that would mitigate the expected harm of the dam when it is completed and the filling of the reservoir finishes.

In the first place, the construction of the five new electricity stations by Siemens would make up for the electricity that would not be generated by the high dam when its turbines stop due to low water levels. Some posts even claimed that they had already stopped by other stations

generated electricity instead so that citizens felt no difference. In the second place, based on what is clarified by experts that the dam is built on an earthquake belt, some posts argued that Egypt would not be flooded as the water would be directed to the channels of Toshka project, and Serapeum Siphon consisting of four underground pipes carrying Nile water beneath Suez Canal to Sinai for irrigation purposes.

The international arbitration solution was also emphasized in Al Ahram so often expecting it would be in Egypt's favor as well with the conflict and conspiracy being dominant frames the same as studied Facebook posts. By contrast, El Masry El Youm adopted the end-run tactical frame as its columnists criticized the state for wasting time in technical negotiations rather than dealing with the political reasons/forces driving the dam's construction. They also emphasized Egypt's failure to internationalize the crisis so far.

Al Ahram columnists emphasized the state's success in the face of the water crisis Egypt is facing and that would be worsened by the GERD by creating alternative water resources such as water recycling, and planning to establish desalination stations. Some shed light that Egypt is attempting to connect the Congo River with the Nile, and redirecting the Nile water wasted in swamps into channels that would reach Egypt.

However, some of them warned of an upcoming war for water as a grim consequence, if Ethiopia insists on building such a large dam breaching international laws regulating projects on international rivers as only small dams are allowed. Some others suggested that Egypt has to create alternative water resources in parallel to harnessing Arab and global support for Egypt.



Al Ahram op-eds included applause to the tripartite summit meeting that took place in Addis Ababa in January 2018, and Egypt's endeavors to increase the economic and educational cooperation with both Ethiopia and Sudan. Those emphasized Egypt's good intentions since the beginning of the crisis and its historic ties with both countries which would enable them to go over any problems.

The majority of tweets on terrorism came from the opposition which was known from the Rabaa sign put as the users' profile picture or describing the ouster of former President Mohamed Morsi, who is affiliated with the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, over mass protests as a coup. That is not a term used by regime supporters and most non-Islamist opposition as they perceive it as a revolution.

Those users used the incorporation frame when reacting to the Rawda Mosque Attack as they accused the regime of orchestrating the incident for residents to leave North Sinai making room for Palestinians to be relocated from Gaza Strip closing the "century's deal" with Israel. That frame is pre-dominantly adopted by regime supporters and neutral citizens but is used in the context of conspiracy by enemy states, which are in this case Israel as it is accused of supporting terrorists in North Sinai to make residents flee the area and exacerbate the Egyptian state's resources to accept the deal.

Such plan is perceived as part of a bigger conspiracy to divide existing Arab countries into mini-states divided according to creed and ethnicity, and that is an expansion to what is happening in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen as the Islamic State – in the former three - and some

militant factions are trying to seize and rule different territories within the border of each state. The guerrilla war that took place in those countries made room for foreign military intervention and turned them into fail states except for Iraq which has started recovering regaining full control over its territories.

After the police succeeded in identifying the perpetrators of Wahat incident and they died in clashes in relatively short time, those regime-opponent users accused the interior ministry of killing "political detainees" and claiming they are terrorists. Some others claimed that the ministry wanted to kill the police officers participating in the mission for reasons they did not mention so it had to stage the whole attack. In sum, those opposition Twitter users went on accusing the current regime and the state of terrorism and treason applauding the brotherhood's regime despite of the group's long history of terror and ambition of establishing the Islamic Caliphate.

On the other hand, those regime-opponents did not react, neither positively nor negatively, to the Helwan incident. Most of the tweets on the incident came from regular citizens who condemned the attack that targeted a church in Christmas time, while applauding the bravery of the citizens who stopped the terrorist. The few tweets from regime-opponents accused the police of staging the attack still without mentioning the purpose.

It is very noticeable that anti-regime Facebook pages had little interest to terrorism so that BenhazaryaSawiris, and Anti-Ikhwan had zero posts on the issue, while the Socialist Revolutionists page had only one relevant post and the 6<sup>th</sup> of April just five posts.

On the other hand, pro-regime Facebook pages, especially Anti-Ikhwan and the One Hundred Million Campaign against Baradei, almost had daily posts on terrorism which indicates a big attention to the issue.

AsefYaRayes page only focused on stating Mubarak's achievements without commenting on any current public events, and there is no indication whether it supports or opposes the current regime. Thus, there was no post on both studied topics.

As for GERD, most pages – regardless of their tendencies – did not tackle the issue, except for the One Hundred Million Campaign against Baradei which had contributed the most to the sample (81.5%) followed by Anti Ikhwan (12.3%).

**Limitations of the Study:**

- The study only includes nine political Facebook pages, the online versions of three publications, and twitter hashtags of three major terror incidents. There are other pages, publications, and relevant hashtags.
- The study is limited to a seven months time frame, while terrorism and GERD crises have been going on for years and may continue for long as well.
- The use of internet and social media is limited to certain social segments so that the study does not help understanding how messages directed to other social segments counting only on mainstream media are framed.

**Recommendations for Future Research:**

- Further research can replicate the study on similar research populations in the Arab World tackling terrorism and any other external threats conducting a comparative analysis between both studies.
- Another replication examining other matters of national interests in Egypt such as economic reforms and human development can take place.
- The study can be used by decision makers to understand the public opinion on terrorism and GERD crises, which would serve in enhancing communication over both matters.

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**Appendix**  
**"Coding Sheet"**

#### Facebook Pages

- 1) Campaign against Baradei
- 2) Asefyarayes
- 3) Electronic army
- 4) BenhazaryaSawiris
- 5) 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement
- 6) Ikhwan online
- 7) Anti-Ikhwan
- 8) Nation guardians
- 9) Socialist Revolutionists

#### Publication

- 1) Ahram
- 2) El Masry El Youm
- 3) El Wafd

#### Twitter Hashtags

- 1) Rawda Mosque
- 2) Wahat Incident
- 3) Helwan

#### Mention of Election

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

#### Frame type:

- 1) Conflict
- 2) Emotional aspect
- 3) Grim consequences
- 4) Responsibility
- 5) Problem definition
- 6) Causal interpretation
- 7) Moral Evaluation
- 8) Solutions

#### Causes of terrorism:

- 0) Not mentioned
- 1) Poverty and ignorance

- 2) Religious extremism
- 3) Conspiracy by enemy states
- 4) Political Conflict

Factors contributing to GERD crisis:

- 0) Not mentioned
- 1) Ethiopia's need for electricity
- 2) Conspiracy by enemy states
- 3) Both

Consequences of terrorism:

- 0) Not mentioned
- 1) Socio-political
- 2) Economic
- 3) Both

### **Stereotypical Frames:**

Accusations of treason against the other group:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Accusations of ignorance against the other group:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Accusations of treason against the regime:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Accusations of regime's failure:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Statements of regime's achievements:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Rumors:

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

Themes of Rumors:

- 1) Intergroup hostility
- 2) Mistrust toward the regime
- 3) Support to the regime

Rumors Type:

- 1) Pipedream (rumors about wished-for outcomes)
- 2) Bogie (rumors about dreadful consequences)
- 3) Wedge-driving (group divisive rumors with aggression)