

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Theses and Dissertations

6-1-2017

Dabiq: A study of the usage of terrorist-produced publications in framing and selective moral disengagement

Nouran Hussein Mohamed Hussein Khalil

Follow this and additional works at: <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds>

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Khalil, N. (2017). *Dabiq: A study of the usage of terrorist-produced publications in framing and selective moral disengagement* [Master's thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/382>

MLA Citation

Khalil, Nouran Hussein Mohamed Hussein. *Dabiq: A study of the usage of terrorist-produced publications in framing and selective moral disengagement*. 2017. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/382>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Dabiq: A study of the usage of terrorist-produced publications in Framing and Selective Moral Disengagement

**Thesis submitted to
The department of Mass Communication at the American
University in Cairo
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts**

By Nouran Khalil

Bachelor of Arts, Multimedia Journalism, The American University in Cairo, 2011

Master of Arts, Television and Digital Journalism, The American University in
Cairo

Under the supervision of Professor Rasha Allam

May 2017

Abstract

Dabiq, the official English language publication of ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, has been widely circulated online, and has gained a relatively large audience. The study discusses the ways in which the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses their official publication, Dabiq, to promote its objectives and to spread terror. In this study, a content analysis is conducted to examine terrorist rhetoric in the magazine and its mediation for the sake of fulfilling the group's objectives. The study uses two main theories: the theory of framing analyzing how ISIS frames itself, its supporters and its opponents, and the theory of selective moral disengagement, analyzing the mechanisms ISIS uses through Dabiq to morally disengage their soldiers and supporters, thus allowing them to commit more violent acts without exercising their moral agency or feeling empathetic towards their victims. The content analysis was conducted on the whole Dabiq population (15 issues, containing 206 articles). The findings show that ISIS attempts to frame itself as a caliphate and a state, and a gateway to heaven, and its fighters and supporters as moral agents, and fighters for God, as opposed to the framing of their opponents and victims, which were framed as enemies of God. The interesting finding was that all supporters and fighters of ISIS are very strategically framed as part of the in-group, while all opponents and victims are framed as part of the out-group. On the other hand, when analyzing the rhetoric of the magazine from the perspective of the theory of selective moral disengagement, the findings suggest that all 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement are very significantly present in the rhetoric of the magazine, with the most used mechanism in the magazine, moral justification, being present in 97% of the total population of the magazine, and least mechanism used, dehumanization of victims, being present in 41% of the total population of the magazine. Through the study, it was found that ISIS attempts to assemble a united political identity for itself and its followers by means of framing the in-group and out-group, and morally disengaging its in-group to keep it loyal, supportive and active towards achieving its cause and purpose, and to have it enforce its attitudes of rejection and vicious behavior towards the out-group.

Dedication

This is dedicated to all those victims who fell as a result of the moral disengagement of their perpetrators...

Acknowledgements

It is with great honor and pleasure that I acknowledge the people who helped me throughout my journey. I am eternally thankful to my parents. My father, Hussein Khalil, taught me everything there is to know about success and patience and virtue, and my amazing mother, Peggy Abed, taught me love and compassion. This thesis is the harvest of everything my parents taught me. I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Rasha Allam, for really believing in me and for constantly motivating me and giving me the support I needed.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my two most favorite people in the world. Reem Hashem, the coolest, most awesome friend anyone could ever wish for. Thank you Reem for helping me, for pushing me and for staying by my side during my highs and my lows. And to my best friend, thank you for loving me and for all the constant support you've given me over the years. I would've never been where I am today if it weren't for you. You're my champ.

Table of Contents

Chapter.....	Page
ABSTRACT.....	2
DEDICATION.....	3
ACHNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
CHAPTERS	
CHAPTER 1- Introduction	6
CHAPTER 2- Background	9
CHAPTER 3- Literature Review	34
CHAPTER 4- Theoretical Framework	46
CHAPTER 5- Methodology	61
CHAPTER 6- Results	93
CHAPTER 7- Discussion	150
CHAPTER 8- Conclusion	164
CHAPTER 9- Recommendations for Future Research.....	166
CHAPTER 10- Limitations of the Study	168
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	169
APPENDIX.....	185

Chapter 1

Introduction

In recent years, since the year 2000, the world has witnessed more than a 250 percent growth in internet usage (Kim et.al., 2009). With this growth comes the positive aspects of the sharing of information, the vast online information sources, the crossing of cultural borders, and the obliteration of access borders there comes the negative aspects of Western information dominance and the sharing of information that could potentially do more harm than good, the most vivid example being online terrorist activity and recruitment.

This trend started when Al Qaeda, after the fall of Afghanistan, started having very strong online presence and recruiting jihadists, just through their online material (Schorn, 2007). Abu Musab al Zarqawi, founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq, used the internet to promote his organization, and held out a number of attacks, including the beheading of Nicolas Berg, abducted American civilian, just to provide material for broadcast (Schorn, 2007). CBS reporter Daniel Schorn calls it the assault with “bytes not bullets” (Schorn, 2007).

“It is certain that virtual reality is doing real damage with intelligence, recruiting, fundraising and the spread of Islamic extremism” (Schorn, 2007).

The internet has provided a vehicle for radicalization, Jihadist internet, where young men who have been exposed to radical material turn up on the battlefield and join radical organizations (Schorn, 2007) such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. United

States Army Brigadier General John Custer, the central command head of intelligence said that since 9/11, jihadist internet sites have increased dramatically, reaching about 5,000 sites.

One major factor contributing to the jihadist internet population in the time being is the media produced by ISIS. ISIS has been known for its brutality and vulgarity. It is a group known for its effective propaganda spectacles. According to Ben Labidi, “ISIS’s propagandists are tireless, constructing spectacles to win the hearts and minds of more alienated Westerners,” (Ben Labidi, 2016). ISIS’ media is known for its extremely professional production, and its large magnitude of distribution and circulation. Using its media, ISIS provides coverage of its terrorist and violent attacks and propagates itself and its causes, thus magnetizing young men and women to join its armies (AlHodhod, 2016). In its pages, Dabiq very violent images and wording. The magazine hosts picture of bloody corpses, demolished buildings and houses, and explicit beheadings. To maximize its magnetization, Dabiq uses very advanced graphics and slick images, a form of presentation that gives the illusion of a science fiction movie or a video game (McCoy, 2014).

However, In Dabiq, along with the usage of uses very graphic portrayals of its violences against its opponents, comes the usage of Quranic verses to justify the violent acts and legitimize the nature of the organization. This combination is believed and intended to capture and inspire young warriors into joining the group and fighting for the caliphate and for Islam (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 2014). This study focuses on identifying and analyzing the techniques with which ISIS uses Dabiq to promote its causes and to disengage its audiences morale, causing them to further accept their violent behavior, support it, and take part in it.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

ISIS has been recognized for using its media in very strategic ways which purposely have a very large and amplified effect on their audience. Through Dabiq, their official magazine, alone, it is estimated that ISIS has magnetized and recruited over 12,000 fighters, who migrated to ISIS' controlled territories. ISIS' publication, Dabiq, acts as a crucial tool for the propaganda of the group's purposes and acts. Therefore, it is very crucial to analyze the group's media content and rhetoric to study and identify the tools they use to spread their messages, and to study the rationale behind their terrorist radical behavior.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1: Terrorism

Terrorism, as defined by Wilkinson in his book “Terrorism versus democracy”, is “the systematic use of coercive intimidation” to achieve political objectives (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 17). Operationally, terrorism is the use of violence and criminal acts against civilians with the purpose of inflicting severe injury or death, and in some cases taking hostages, to provoke a state of terror and create an environment of extreme fear amongst a group of individuals, a nation, or a region (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 4). Typical methods of modern terrorism include shooting attacks and assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking and kidnapping, as well as hijacking (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 17). Terrorist attacks also involve “attacks on random or symbolic targets,”(Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 4).

The effect of terrorism, according to Wilkinson, goes beyond the immediate pain inflicted on the victim. “Terrorism is directed at a wider target,” (Wilkinson, 2011, Pg 4). It is used to intimidate a nation, threaten a population, or pressure a government or society to advance a political, religious, or ideological course of action of serious magnitude (Townshend, 2011, p. 2). According to Townshend, “terrorism is a distinctive form of modern political agency, intended to threaten the ability of the state to ensure the security of its members, and thus its claim to legitimacy,” (Townshend, 2011, p. 6).

1.2 Religious Terror

Religious terror has been gaining immense media attention in the recent years. Hoffman discusses the main characteristics of religious terrorism in his book *Inside Terrorism*. The first characteristic is that religious terrorism exercises a theological nature for the demands and operation of the groups. Hoffman argues that religious terrorism has a divine purpose and not a political one, and is carried out with a theological imperative. Religious terrorists use religion to justify their acts and to gain recruits. In religious terrorist groups, all leadership roles are occupied by clerical figures. The second characteristic of religious terrorism is that terrorist groups do not clearly define a specific enemy, but rather try to “eliminate” a broad category of enemies, and therefore practice mass amounts of indiscriminate killing. The third characteristic is, however, the most crucial and most destructive of the characteristics of these groups, being that religious terrorists do not attempt to recognize any source of power or authority other than themselves (Hoffman, 2006). Hoffman argues that the aim of religious terrorism is not persuasion, but rather elimination (Hoffman, 2006).

Perhaps one of the most prominent terrorist groups in America is the Ku Klux Klan, a white Protestant movement that mainly attacks people from ethnic origins and Catholics. The group advocates for white supremacy, anti-catholicism, and homophobia, among other properties (Olson, 2009; Feldman, 1997). Another prominent terrorist group is the Army of God, a Christian American anti-abortion group which killed and kidnapped physicians who performed abortions, and even planted bombs in abortion clinics in the United States, all under the name of God (Cotter, 2011).

A series of surveys in the 1990’s “asserted that the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorism today,” (Townshend, 2011, p. 98).

1.3: Islamic Fundamentalism

The shift from the 1980's to the 1990's saw the growth of a new remarkable phenomenon, religious Islamist fanaticism (Townshend, 2011, p. 97-98). One of the mainly used tactics in religious Islamic terrorism is suicide bombing, and the idea of self-sacrifice. Psychologist Arie Kruglanski discusses the psychology of self-sacrifice in his article "*Psychological insights into Indonesian Islamic terrorism: The what, the how and the why of violent extremism*", saying that the motivational underpinnings of suicide bombers is a universal process of radicalization used by terrorist leaders almost everywhere in the world.

"The idea that self-sacrifice is a particularly effective way of restoring or enhancing one's significance isn't just a matter of ideological dictate. It also rests on solid psychological foundation... [The augmentation principle states that] the greater the sacrifice, the more one gives up (i.e. the more pronounced the self-denial), the more effective joining the Jihad is in bestowing significance upon oneself, and the greater the sense that it is an assured path to betterment, glory, and eternal life. Or the 'no pain no gain' dictum is translated (in the logically fallacious way) into 'if pain then gain'." (Kruglanski, 2013- pp114)

1.4: The Rise of Islamist Terrorist Groups

In modern history, Islamist terrorist groups have been portrayed as the most dangerous and most notorious (DePetris, 2014; Delman, 2015). They have gained immense media attention and have been portrayed as the most lethal groups. These groups are Boko Haram, Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (DePetris, 2014; Delman, 2015).

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a Nigerian-based Islamist group committed to the Prophet's preaching and teachings for propagation and jihad. The group is opposed to "Western" education and try to stand in the way of the dissemination of Western education ("Foreign Terrorist Organizations", 2013). The group promotes a version of Islam which declares all forms of Western teachings, social behaviors and political activities to be forbidden, or "haram" for Muslims (Chothia, 2012). The group was established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, aiming to spread Islamic teachings, recruit jihadists, and to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (Johnson, 2011).

Before 2009, the group did not have violent plans, however, after rising clashes between Muslims and Christians and trouble by the government, where many members were arrested and killed, the group started taking more violent initiatives and carrying out lethal attacks (Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals, 2011). In 2009, members of Boko Haram carried out a number of suicide bombings (Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals, 2011) and assassinations, in 2010 they staged a prison break in Bauchi, freeing more than seven hundred inmates. Ever since then, they've been carrying out severely violent attacks against civilians, they murdered sixty-five students sleeping over at an agricultural college, in 2013, they beheaded hundreds of civilians travelling on Nigerian roads using chainsaws, and in 2014, they abducted more than two hundred school girls (Johnson, 2011). Boko Haram now operates in Northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and Lake Chad Basin ("Foreign Terrorist Organizations", 2013).

Even though Boko Haram did not establish solid online media promotion or publications in the past, in 2015, it launched a Twitter feed account, which, as Bull claims, acts as a valuable tool for the recruitment of fighters and supporters (Bull, 2015). Boko Haram, according to Bull,

is, following in the trails and learning from Al-Qaeda and ISIS, getting to know how to use this valuable media tool to fulfill its objectives (Bull, 2015).

Taliban

Taliban was formed in 1992 as a group of jihadists resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Laub, 2011). The group ruled Afghanistan, under the leadership of Muslim cleric Mullah Omar, from 1996 to 2001. During his rule, he granted sanctuary to Al Qaeda and neglected basic state functions and social services (Laub, 2011). Omar enforced very strict penalties on behavior that Taliban deemed un-Islamic. They required women to wear head-to-toe burqas, they jailed men whose beards were deemed too short, and they banned music and television (Laub, 2011).

Nowadays, Taliban is a major fighting force in Afghanistan and poses a great threat to the Afghani government ("Analysis: Who are the Taliban?", 2013). They also control parts of north-west Pakistan, where they carried out a number of suicide attacks and bombings, and are threatening to destabilize its government. Political analysts believe the only way the Afghani government can run peacefully in the future is if the government negotiates with Taliban ("Analysis: Who are the Taliban?", 2013).

As a means to reach transnational audiences, Taliban established its official English language magazine, Azan (Ingram, 2015). Producers of the magazine announced that the magazine was a vehicle for muslim communities to know the truth about Islam, and to join in the fight against the enemies of God and of prophet Muhammad (Ingram, 2015).

Al Qaeda

Islamist terrorists groups started rising with the aim of jihad, or fighting for God. They are mainly composed of Islamic extremist soldiers fighting under a leader. One of the most prominent terrorist groups in the world is Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence. The term Al Qaeda means “the base”. The group was founded in 1989 by Usama Bin Laden (“Al Amir” [the prince], or the leader of the group), Ayman El Zawahri and other Islamist leaders, and was headquartered in Peshwar, Pakistan. Al Qaeda relocated to Sudan in 1991, then back to Afghanistan in 1996, and has remained there since (Wander, 2008).

Al Qaeda identified and killed anyone who was suspected of collaborating against it. The group violently opposed the United States of America for its views on Islam, for its support of “infidel” governments such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, for its involvement with the United Nations, for its involvement in the Gulf War, and for its conviction and imprisonment of Al Qaeda members and associates. Therefore, Al Qaeda declared jihad (a holy war) on the United States (PBS, "Background: Al Qaeda").

Since 1989, Usama Bin Laden and the group sponsored, managed, and/or financially supported training camps in Afghanistan to train members of the group to be jihadists (holy fighters). They trained them in the use firearms, explosives, chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the use of security and counterintelligence methods codes and passwords. The camps were also used to organize and plan operations against United States targets (PBS, "Background: Al Qaeda").

Gradually, the scale and magnitude of the terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda got bigger. In an interview in 1998, Usama Bin Laden said "We do not have to differentiate between military or

civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets.” (“The rise of Islamist terrorist groups”, 2004)

In 1993, the group detonated a 500 KG bomb in the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people and injuring over a thousand (Wander, 2008). In 1997, Al Qaeda gunman killed 62 tourists in a massacre in Luxor city in Egypt. The largest Al Qaeda act, however, happened on September 11th, 2001, when 2,974 people were killed in the hijacking of the planes and their crashing into the two towers of World Trade Center in New York City, and into the West side of the Pentagon. The attacks caused Ten billion dollars of property and infrastructure damage (Wander, 2008). The September 11 attacks were the largest suicide attacks, where 19 Al Qaeda members hijacked four planes and crashed deliberately crashed them.

After the attacks of September 11, Islamophobia, a term which was first recorded in The Journal of Theological Studies in 1923, became a very widespread phenomenon and very popular in common usage. Islamophobic attacks increased 1,700% after 9/11 (Rose, 2013). Hate crimes against Muslims also drastically increased, from 28 crimes annually to 481 annually, to the extent that Indian Sikhs were often killed for being mistaken for Muslims (Rose, 2013).

Not only did Al Qaeda take advantage of traditional mass media to disseminate its videos and messages, but it also created its own official online English-language publication, Inspire (Lemieux, et al., 2014). Inspire, according to Kirke, appeals to the youth who have been alienated in their communities, to try to lure them to join the fighters of AL-Qaeda. The magazine uses a Western, stylish format, as to be in congruence with the contemporary of pop-culture (Kirke, 2015). The magazine features editorial content by foreign captives and fighters, guides to making one’s own explosives, and instruction on how to avoid being detected before performing a terrorist act (Lemieux, et al., 2014). Inspire puts forward and emphasizes the epic

conflict between muslims and crusaders, as well as the ummah and the political regimes of the Middle East and the West (Kirke, 2015). Inspire attempts to drive its target audience to participate in defending the ummah in their homeland, or risk being labeled as a traitor and enemy of AL Qaeda and the muslim ummah (Kirke, 2015).

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

Arab states, in modern history, have been unable to formulate an identity to achieve social cohesion, and to incorporate all social sectors. They practice tyranny, multiple forms of corruption, and demand submission to the ruling regime. Arab states have also been unable to fulfill their responsibilities towards their citizens. They have submitted to Western hegemony and the Israeli occupation. They have shown inability to serve their citizens, and have continuously resorted to dealing with them using extreme violence (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). These factors contributed to the rise of non-state actors, whom in return have adopted violence as a method. These non-state entities aim at either confronting and challenging state power and violence, and/or protecting the interests of certain communities, with the most prominent examples being Hamas and Hezbollah. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria falls within this framework (Al-Ibrahim, 2015).

“Their existence is an expression of the state's’ inability to represent the interests of citizens,”(Al-Ibrahim, 2015).

1.5: ISIS RISES AMIDST POLITICAL INSTABILITY

“ISIS rapidly exploited the chaos that the Arab Spring has brought in its wake,” (Phillips, 2014).

During the Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, jihadists and suicide bombers became an eminent part of the turmoil. Later, in April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi created ISIS presenting a dominant jihadist alternative (Holbrook, 2015). The Syrian civil war and the disintegration of its government provided an opportunity for jihadists to, as Phillips explains it, “gain battlefield experience” and invite new recruits (Phillips, 2014).

When ISIS was first created in northern Syria, it spread fear among the locals. It was brutal. However, many were in favour of it as it imposed some rule after two years of utter chaos, thuggery, murders, thievery, and anarchy. ISIS replaced checkpoint officers and tax collectors with their own members, it imposed its own ruling system, the Sharia system (Cheterian, 2015). In the areas it took power of, ISIS was also able to regain some control of the civil war where neither the Syrian loyalist forces were targeted, nor were the Syrian civilians targeted by air force, unlike the areas that were not under ISIS’ rule, such as Aleppo and the suburbs of Damascus, which endured months of barrel-bombing (Cheterian, 2015).

After the capturing of the Syrian city of Raqqa, ISIS gained control of its oil wells, which allowed the organization to finance itself and its operations. ISIS then had its independent resources for income. It became wealthier, bolder, and more threatening than any other terrorist organizations or jihadists (Phillips, 2014). This facilitated the attack and invasion of the Iraqi territories (Phillips, 2014).

In May 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s intelligence service sent warnings to Baghdad and Washington D.C. that ISIS was approaching the Kurdish border of Mosul. Their

warnings were ignored and ISIS did eventually seize Mosul and, subsequently, raced down to Baghdad (Phillips, 2015). The Iraqi army, which included 750,000 men, completely collapsed. The government and security forces were disintegrated, and police officers, terrified, removed their uniforms and tried to blend into the community. During that time, the conflict was heavily violent and about one million people were displaced (Phillips, 2015).

In the process, ISIS gained control of all the Iraqi army's weaponry, sophisticated artillery provided by the United States army, and became a very well-equipped army. ISIS also robbed the Central Bank in Mosul, garnering \$425 million, and seized oil sale revenues.. ISIS was then a very rich and dangerous body (Phillips, 2015). By the end of August 2014, ISIS had over 31,500 fighters, and was recruiting foreign fighters including, British, French, American, Turkish, Tunisian, Afghan, and Chechen recruits (Phillips, 2015).

1.6: THE CALIPHATE

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria has two main defining strategic priorities: declaring a caliphate and attacking its sectarian rivals (mainly shiites). The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria declared itself a caliphate and a State on June 28th, 2014, the first day of Ramadan ("The Jamestown Foundation", 2014).

The constitution of ISIS is influenced by the post-caliphate-Islamist movement where it focuses on the unity of Muslims under a caliphate ruled by a caliph (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). The Caliph being Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Fromson, et al., 2015). This concept is also governed by the desire for unlimited expansion and the conquering of as many lands as possible to be united under one caliphate, and the ruling of all Muslims (Al-Ibrahim, 2015).

ISIS declared itself a caliphate following its remarkable victories over the rivals of Bashar Al Assad's regime, and over the government of Iraq and the Kurdish forces (Hashim, 2014). After declaring its caliphate, ISIS started playing the role of state to feed its propaganda. It established its own courts, infrastructure, and even its own religious police, Al-Hisba, ensuring the strict application of the conservative Sharia laws and regulations (Turner, 2015). Nonetheless, not only did ISIS target forces of the regime and resistance groups, but it also made very little effort to eliminate the sufferings of the citizens it ruled. ISIS heavily intimidated the population into submission and alienated them, it paid little attention to the infrastructure, and it killed and imprisoned large numbers of citizens, which, as Turner argues, does not differentiate them from Arab government rulers (Turner, 2015).

"Legitimacy stems from providing services" (Fromson, et al., 2015).

Katagiri explains that there are three necessary steps to build a state: one must build organized armed forces, establish a centralized state, and win local support. Without those three steps, the state could be regarded as illegitimate (Katagiri, 2015). Katagiri argues that those necessary steps for building a state must be accomplished and that the state must provide services, order, and administration for locals. However, ISIS was unable to do so because it did not have the legitimacy and resources, and because they did not win people's hearts and minds, and therefore sustaining guerrilla operations and maintaining manpower would be very difficult (Katagiri, 2015). This type of state constitution is called 'competitive control'. It is the idea that insurgents gain strength through the use a range of methods, from persuasion to coercion, as well as their ability to mobilize and manipulate the population. In the meantime, ISIS fighters became highly unpopular following their mass civilian killings, imprisonment, torture, rape and sexual harassment, death threats, and sexual enslavement of women (Katagiri, 2015).

Fromson and Simon, however, argue that ISIS' relative legitimacy is brought by its offerings of goods and services, but most of all, for offering security to its allies (Fromson, et al., 2015).

They report the sayings of one citizen from Mosul, who expressed similar attitudes and said that “the situation is quiet and normal now in Mosul. There is no pressure from ISIS. Yesterday there was a parade by them in the streets to show off the weapons that they took from the Iraqi army. Schools and hospitals have opened. People ... feel safe,” (Fromson, et al., 2015). Another citizen, Mohammed, a trader in the city of Mosul, as reported by the Financial Times, said that “Compared to past rulers, ISIS is a lot easier to deal with. Just don't piss them off and they leave you alone... If they could only maintain services — then people would support them until the last second” (Fromson, et al., 2015). ISIS has also left the majority of government technicians employed and in their jobs at oil facilities, power plants, and infrastructure sites, a strategy that Fromson and Simon argue is especially clever to keep the relatively normal life and daily systems operating (Fromson, et al., 2015).

However, these reports contradict others and understate how atrocious the situation is. According to one report, Mosul hardly has any drinkable water, due to the lack of chlorine, Raqqa receives only 3 or 4 hours of electricity daily, and as opposed to the contract between ISIS and the governed, most of the governed citizens have been living in dire war conditions for years (Fromson, et al., 2015).

ISIS exploited the war in Syria and the failures in the Iraqi government and succeeded in establishing its caliphate and controlling territory fairly quickly (Holbrook, 2015). Holbrook argues that the reason why ISIS thrived was because of its material strength, its ruthless and

well-planned tactics, and because it responded to the needs and concerns of the Sunnis in Syria and Iraq (Holbrook, 2015).

1.7: ISIS' Framed SUCCESSES

ISIS' victories, be it battlefield victories or propaganda victories cannot be disregarded. Its recent successes are, as Phillips puts it, "stunning and disturbing," (Phillips, 2014). Its successes indicate jihadist extremists' resilience and ability to adapt, as well as their eminent growth and capability to learn and develop. ISIS presents forceful threat to the stability of global peace and security, and is now arguably the richest and the most dangerous jihadist organization (Phillips, 2014).

By the end of 2014, ISIS' daily revenue was estimated to be from \$3 to \$5 million, of which 3\$ million come from smuggling oil alone. ISIS also taxed the citizens, shopkeepers, and companies that resided on ISIS-claimed territories. Moreover, ISIS performed significant criminal activity including bank robberies, kidnappings for ransom, seizing properties, and looting antiquities. The group claimed to have a \$2 billion budget (Fromson, et al., 2015). This wealth supported the construction of the caliphate and its government.

Exhibiting the image of a successful, prosperous and functioning state is key for the recruitment of international fighters (Fromson, et al., 2015).

" In one photo disseminated on Twitter, a group of women in black abayas and niqabs pose casually on a white BMW under the heading 'chillin' in the khilafa, lovin' life' (Fromson, et al., 2015).

1.8: ISIS' BRUTALITY

“There is something nauseating about the violence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Its celebration of brutality – decapitating prisoners and burning them alive, crucifying and exhibiting its victims – sickens even from a distance, ” (Cheterian, 2015).

Citizens in the territories conquered by ISIS are forced to choose one of two options: joining, or at least accepting, the new group, or death (Kfir, 2015).

In June 2013 in Aleppo, ISIS fighters executed 15 year old Mohammad Katta, a street-coffee vendor, in front of his parents. Katta was executed for the usage of an expression that ISIS considered sacrilegious. ISIS also displays the corpses they crucified in Raqqa's central square. On one occasion, an Australian fighter , Khaled Sharrouf, published photographs of his seven year old son with a decapitated head in his hands, “posting his child's lost innocence on the Internet for all to see,” (Cheterian, 2015).

In the summer of 2014, while ISIS fighters were taking over Deir ez-Zor, they killed over 700 Shiite civilians. In Mosul in May 2014, ISIS fighters performed an ethnic cleansing, and banished 30,000 Christians towards Erbil (Cheterian, 2015). Then in August of the same year, ISIS fighters attacked Yazidis- followers of an ancient religion derived from the Muslim, christian and Persian faiths, that is rumored to have been founded in the 11th century- in Sinjar. They assassinated about 500 Yazidis, including 40 children, they threatened the whole population with death threats, they kidnapped women and girls and forced them into sex slavery, and they led about 130,000 residents to flee to Kurdistan (Jalabi, 2014). Not only did ISIS attempt a genocide of its rivals, but it also exhibited it on social media (Cheterian, 2015). ISIS

celebrates and exhibits violence, and uses it as a tool of terror against their rivals, and as a tool for media attention (Cheterian, 2015).

ISIS uses grievance, insecurity, and a narrowing of the religion marketplace to develop its caliphate and to recruit its regional and international fighters (Kfir, 2015). This, as Kfir puts it, is “arguably the most dangerous brand of Al-Qaedaism,” (Kfir, 2015). This reinforces the notion that Al Qaeda and ISIS’ ideological basis aren’t religion, but the use of religion to justify the usage of extreme violence (Kfir, 2015).

ISIS’ success is attributed to three aspects: the size and quality of its troops, its sheer aggressiveness, and its highly sophisticated artillery (Fromson, et al., 2015).

In its attacks, ISIS adopted a very aggressive combat style which relies on the elements of mobility and surprise, therefore, its advanced artillery comes in handy combining huge numbers of armed pickup trucks and tanks and thus allowing it to quickly conquer a territory and achieve superiority, even if outnumbered (Fromson, et al., 2015).

Extremism is by definition a relative concept, and within the context of militant Islam, al-Qaeda now has the opportunity to present itself as the ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’ option (Holbrook, 2015).

“In order to be constantly on our screens, in competition with other violent groups, ISIS has escalated its violence: when beheadings became familiar, ISIS introduced a new, shocking form – placing a prisoner in a cage and burning him to death,” (Cheterian, 2015).

1.9: MEMBERS AND RECRUITMENT

ISIS' leader, Sheikh Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi said that the group is comprised mainly of Bedouins and communities from the Syrian Desert, but it doesn't stop at that. ISIS aims at being an international organization and, using modern methods of telecommunication, recruits fighters from all over the world (Al-Ibrahim, 2015).

It has been estimated, by numerous sources including the National Intelligence Center of the United States, the Pentagon, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, that ISIS claimed as much as 200,000 deployable troops, recruited around 20,000 foreign fighters (mostly Western inexperienced fighters), and rule as many as 7 -8 million people (Fromson, et al., 2015).

Whether the estimates are fairly accurate doesn't nullify the fact that ISIS is undoubtedly the biggest player in the fragmented Iraqi and Syrian landscape (Fromson, et al., 2015).

ISIS is regarded as a machine for war, recruitment, and propaganda (Fromson, et al., 2015).

1.10: DEFINING THEIR ENEMIES

"ISIS declared all opponents unbelievers," (Holbrook, 2015).

According to Holbrook, as ISIS attempted to intensify its legitimacy, it declared every person, organization or entity that were nonbelievers in its methods as enemies of the state, and thus justifying its violence targets and its application of terror on these non-believers (Holbrook, 2015). Holbrook reported that ISIS regarded those unbelievers as the reason for the death of ISIS' mujahideen, and that those unbelievers would be punished in the temporal world and in the afterlife (Holbrook, 2015).

1.11: THE CALIPHATE'S OBSTACLES

ISIS became widely unpopular all over the world because of their brutality and violence, therefore, it is unlikely that their structured state would be regarded as legitimate (Katagiri, 2015). In addition, even though ISIS is reported to earn 1-3 million dollars every day from Iraqi and Syrian oil exports, it does not have a stable income source, as it relies heavily on natural resources, which are expected to deplete, robberies, kidnapping, and forced taxation (Katagiri, 2015). Moreover, ISIS has very loose allies outside its combat zones. Even though it has sympathizers such as Boko Haram, most of the collaboration is rhetorical and takes place in the online and on social media, but involves no cooperation in logistics, finance, or operations (Katagiri, 2015).

1.12: AL QAEDA REACTION TO ISIS

Ayman Al Zawahiri, the second in command of Al Qaeda, published a statement following the creation of ISIS declaring that ISIS was a “branch affiliated to al-Qaeda” and that its ‘leader and soldiers pledge their loyalty to al-Qaeda ... and their leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, may God rest his soul in peace, and then myself after him,” (Holbrook, 2015). Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, however, declared ISIS an independent organization, and in February 2014, announced the revival of the Caliphate (Phillips, 2014). Phillips describes the break between AL Qaeda and ISIS and indicates that Al-Baghdadi remains Bin-Laden’s ideological heir, and exhibits similar sharpness in globally collecting extremists and gaining their support through controlling the basis of globalization and mass media platforms, however when it comes to

territorial rule, Al-Baghdadi was able to create a local caliphate, thus surpassing Bin-Laden's fulfillment (Phillips, 2014).

Even though Al Qaeda never announced establishing a caliphate to be one of their objectives, Ayman Al-Zawahiri expressed his dismay of ISIS' caliphate and, in an interview, said that unlike ISIS' caliphate, Al Qaeda's would be righteous and inclusive. He said that bringing the ummah together and unifying the whole Muslim world is their objective, and that Muslims need a rightly guided caliphate (Holbrook, 2015).

1.13: ISIS' Media Strategy

“The raison d'être of modern, small war forces is typically to win the populations support in order to implement their particular 'competitive system of control' (that is, a politico-military apparatus) over that of their opponents” (Ingram, 2014).

A huge component of ISIS' success and existence relies on the usage of its media and its media strategies. ISIS stands apart for its sharp and well-planned media strategies. It understands the media and uses it extremely well to achieve its goals (Farwell, 2014). Media and information operations have a very fundamental role in the success and development of ISIS. The main purpose for the usage of its media is to “shape the perceptions and polarize the support of its audiences”, (Ingram, 2014). ISIS founded a multidimensional media strategy that's spread across multiple platforms to be able to target both its 'friends' and 'foes'. With its media, ISIS targets local, regional, and international audiences, and offers its material in multiple languages, to increase its appeal to diverse global peoples. They produce Dabiq, their official online

magazine, they produce videos which they disseminate through YouTube and which they leak to official international news sources, they use social media forums such as Facebook, Diaspora and Twitter, they use multimedia phone messages which include text, pictures and videos, and they install billboards in the areas they control(Ingram, 2014).

ISIS' media is famed for its simple messages, striking graphic imagery, catchy phrases. All these components are backed up and augmented by ISIS' actions and violence on the grounds (Ingram, 2014). ISIS disseminates its messages using one of two ways: officials' statements released by its media center, or unofficial communications spread by its members. According to Ingram, ISIS' media is governed by three traits: its reach, relevance and resonance, its synchronization with its politico-military action, and its usage of and centralization around the ISIS brand (Ingram, 2014). ISIS' media is distinct for its diversity in style and format, and for the speed of the issuing of statements and communiqués, even if it takes time to produce the magazine, ISIS makes sure to communicate with its communities via text messages, press releases and statements issued through its various social media and online channels. There is a constant flow of information taking place (Ingram, 2014). ISIS also, through phone messages, sends greetings during official Islamic holidays, such as Ramadan and Eid, and distributes charity and food to its citizens.

The first trait that describes ISIS' media is its reach, relevance and resonance. Reach is the ability for a message to spread and reach target audiences (Ingram, 2014). ISIS' use of social media and online platforms, as an addition to its exploitation of mainstream media, has resulted in an incredible reach for their messages, to adversaries, journalists, supporters, and opponents. The group also uses cellular technology to address audiences on different poles of the technological spectrum (Farwell, 2014).

However for a message to reach masses of audiences, the message itself must be relevant to these audiences (Ingram, 2014). This is where relevance comes in. Relevance is the significance of the message and its presence within the audience's context of social, cultural, and situational factors. The messages' reach is complimented by its relevance to salient contemporary issues and events. Depending on the message's reach and relevance, resonance takes place. Resonance is the message's ability to resonate with the audiences and influence their perceptions. Resonance is the main key that ensures that ISIS' information operations are not just pieces of disseminated information, but also tools influence (Ingram, 2014). One major contributing factor that adds to the resonance of information is its packaging: the very slick design of the magazine Dabiq, the very graphic material, and the strong wording of the messages (Ingram, 2014). These methods allowed the group to disseminate very powerful messages, images and videos depicting its members as fearsome and extremely violent warriors- messages that are used to intimidate the group's opponents, build support among its followers, and recruit new members (Farwell, 2014).

In order to maximize resonance, ISIS uses three main techniques: exploiting psychosocial forces among its audience, actively employing counter-narrative campaigns, and synchronizing its narratives with its actions (Ingram, 2014). ISIS exploits the psychosocial dynamics in the audiences by binding concepts and notions of crisis with the framed 'out-group' identities, and offering solutions to anyone represented and framed as being part of ISIS' 'in-group' (Ingram, 2014). ISIS stresses on these polarized identities to exaggerate perceptions of crisis among its 'in-group'. ISIS implements that by elevating the position of Sunnis in Iraq and using the harsh conditions of the Syrian war to demonstrate the harsh conditions ISIS opponents have to endure. This technique is used to keep the 'in-group' loyal and supportive. ISIS employed itself as the

protector of its ‘in-group’, and implores its members to care for and attend to Muslim Sunnis (Ingram, 2014). The group mainly frames itself as the agent of change, the main proponent of faith, and the defender of social justice (Farwell, 2014). On the other hand, ISIS uses the exaggerated identity of the ‘out-group’, such as that of the Shiites and the Western nations, to link with the perceptions of malaise and malevolence. After establishing the Caliphate, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi gave a speech where he claimed that the world is divided into two camps, and two camps only, “the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy,” (Ingram, 2014). According to Ingram, ISIS believes that there is only one solution to the current crisis, and that is the commitment to Islam and the elimination of any and all ‘out-group’ identities, and that national borders are a construct of Kufr or disbelief, and so Muslims must transnationally unite to confront this threat (Ingram, 2014).

The second technique ISIS uses to maximize resonance is employing counter-narratives and vigorously confronting criticisms and accusations by its opponents, such as the accusation of ISIS not being a legitimate political project, of not having a political agenda, and of unnecessarily using violence, so as to reinforce its perceived legitimacy (Ingram, 2014).

Finally, since it’s merely impossible to only target an isolated single audience, ISIS uses each message to act as both a promotional tool and a counter-narrative tool, thus targeting both ‘friends’ and ‘foes’- the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’- simultaneously (Ingram, 2014). For example, when ISIS uses its media to promote the initiatives of its governance, this message would be designed to not only promote its political-administration capabilities, but also to counter the narratives set by its opponents accusing them of lacking a political agenda. When ISIS uses its media to disseminate photos and videos of brutal executions and torture, these

messages serve the purpose of not only terrorizing their opponents, but also forcing the support of civilians (Ingram, 2014).

The second trait that describes ISIS' media is its synchronization with politico-military action, a synchronization of narrative and action. ISIS uses its media not only to promote its successes, but also to use as a tool of psychological warfare preceding its military operations (Ingram, 2014). ISIS uses its Media as a tool to frame its 'guerrilla-warfare' politico-military activities. ISIS members flood social media with real-time videos, photos and reports of their conquests, they emphasize the brutality of their actions to uphold authority and to use coercion as a tool for civilian submission (Ingram, 2014).

The third trait that ISIS' media is based on is its centralization around the ISIS 'brand'. This brand is a symbol of the narrative action ISIS is based on. This trait is best evidenced by ISIS' name change. It went from being called Al tawhid wal Jihad, to being called ISI (The Islamic State in Iraq), to being called ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) to being called ISIL (The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), to being called IS (The Islamic State). This name change has been brought out to formalize its relationships and maximize its successes and benefits. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi framed ISIS' name changes as milestones in the evolution of the group and the rise of its authority (Ingram, 2014). These name changes, according to Ingram, were funded for the sake of the necessity of legitimacy, to match the group's level of growth and pinnacle (Ingram, 2014).

Aligning the group's brand with its messages and actions is extremely important as it benefits the group in terrorizing its opponents, and as it leads to having global resonance (Ingram, 2014).

The group's brand is a symbol of its entire campaign (Ingram, 2014). ISIS' successes are a result of the cumulative impact of all three of its media traits, which is what sets it apart and gives it an advantage over all its predecessor and all its contemporaries.

1.14: Dabiq

"We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted," Al-Adnani said. "If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market," (Bacchi, 2014).

Dabiq is the official magazine released by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. ISIS describes Dabiq as "a periodical magazine focusing on the issues of *tawhid* (unity), *manhaj* (truth-seeking), *hijrah* (migration), *jihad* (holy war) and *jama'ah* (community). It will also contain photo reports, current events, and informative articles on matters relating to the Islamic State." ("The Clarion Project", 2014). The magazine is available only through various online sources. It is published in a number of different languages, including Arabic and English. The magazine discusses ISIS' strategic direction, the political-military strategic plans, and their methods for recruiting fighters among other issues ("The Jamestown Foundation", 2014). ISIS also uses Dabiq to boast of their successes in conquering more lands and in carrying out various attacks on the entities they deem as their enemies. Additionally, the magazine also discusses the atrocities committed by ISIS' enemies ("The Jamestown Foundation", 2014).

Dabiq is named after a small village in northern Syria, near the Turkish border, with no more than 4,000 inhabitants. However, the village of Dabiq, according to one reading of Islamic tradition, is where the crusaders finally meet the Muslim armies in a confrontation “between good and evil”, where the Muslims finally win and destroy the crusaders (Fraser, 2014).

Dabiq frames the war against Islam as a “continuation of a battle of civilization”, rather than a singular event. It describes Westerners as modern day Romans and crusaders (McCoy, 2014).

The magazine is constructed to appeal to ISIS’ followers, and challenge its critics, to promote its successes, and to recruit new members transnationally (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 2014).

In the magazine, ISIS uses very graphic portrayals of its violences against its opponents, especially the Shiites and the Westerners. However, one very strong element in the magazine is the usage of Quranic verses to justify the violent acts and legitimize the nature of the organization. This combination is believed and intended to capture and inspire young warriors into joining the group and fighting for the caliphate and for Islam (“The Jamestown Foundation”, 2014). Dabiq is estimated to have magnetized at least 12,000 fighters from over 74 countries (McCoy, 2014).

In its pages, Dabiq very violent images and wording. The magazine hosts picture of bloody corpses, demolished buildings and houses, and explicit beheadings. To maximize its magnetization, Dabiq uses very advanced graphics and slick images, a form of presentation that gives the illusion of a science fiction movie or a video game (McCoy, 2014). This form of literary brutality is a tool for recruitment. Dabiq, not only hosts very graphic and brutal images and content, but also calls for violence against ISIS’ opponents. “Every Muslim should get out

of his house, find a crusader and kill him ... And the Islamic State will remain until its banner flies over Rome," (Bacchi, 2014). In one of its issues, Dabiq justified the killing of Yazidis and the selling and enslavement of their women and children. In the magazine, ISIS bragged about how it forced Yazidis into religious conversion, how it forced them into marriages, and how it forced them into sexual slavery (McDuffee, 2014). The magazine referred to Yazidis as 'Pagans' and 'infidels'. ISIS uses Dabiq to threaten and intimidate its enemies. In one issue, ISIS spokesperson Mohammed al-Adnani said, "We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women,"(McDuffee, 2014).

Chapter Three

Literature Review

3.1: Mass-mediated terrorism

“When one says “terrorism” in a democratic society, one also says “media.” For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society. This, in essence, is why terrorism and the media enjoy a symbiotic relationship,” (Weimann, 2008).

Since realizing the potential of mass media in reaching global audiences, the media has been classified as a vital tool for terrorist organizations’ success and has been playing a very substantial role in the dissemination of terrorist messages. According to Weimann, without the media, terrorism can never successfully achieve its objectives (Weimann, 2008).

Terrorism, by nature, is sensational and shocking, and therefore draws significant media attention (Powell, 2011). The existing literature seems to generally be in agreement with the idea that mass media has greatly emphasized the magnitude of terrorism (Weimann, 2008; Eid, 2013; Nacos, 2003; Powell, 2011). Eid and Nacos discuss how terrorism is no longer concerned with the act of harming a single individual or a small group, but now it focuses on exploiting the

media for attention and publicity; it went beyond the confines of violence and has become a spectacle (Eid, 2013; Nacos, 2003). Nacos explains that the obsession of American media with the sensationalization of violence has led American news media to transform terrorist activity and violence into an entertainment spectacle (Nacos, 2003). This has, not only, largely contributed to the dependence of terrorists on media coverage, but also led terrorists to tailor attacks to suit media coverage and to gain greater attention. Weimann states that terrorists provide visual aids, video tapes, films, press releases, and taped interviews for the media to use substantially, and as a way of directly and indirectly feeding the media with their own material for propaganda (Weimann, 2008).

Not only do terrorist organizations feed the media with their material, but they also operate their own media and disseminate their own information, messages, and multimedia. They operate a plethora of media platforms ranging from websites and online forums, to magazines, television stations, radio channels, newspapers and even news agencies (Weimann, 2008).

Media organizations and governments started adopting several methods to try and limit this dissemination of excruciatingly dangerous messages, some of these methods include limiting terrorists' access to conventional media platforms, censoring and reducing news coverage of terrorist acts, and attempting to minimize terrorists' manipulation of the media (Weimann, 2008). However, according to Weimann, computer-mediated communication and the Internet have facilitated the mediation of terrorist messages and are the ideal platforms for terrorist organizations to take advantage of (Weimann, 2008).

3.2: Internet and Terrorism

As a means of further increasing their reach to include global audiences and governments, terrorist organizations started relying on computer-mediated communications and the Internet (Klausen, 2015; Weimann 2008; Wright, et al., 2015; Neumann, 2013). Their presence on cyberspace ranges from website and online forums, to chat rooms, online publications and social media profiles. From 1998 till 2006, the number of terrorist websites grew from just a dozen to more than 5,300 websites. Today all terrorist organizations have and maintain more than one website, and even operate them in different languages (Weimann, 2008). The Internet has changed the landscape of terrorism. Wright and Bachmann argue that the Internet created a forum for “virtual jihad” making it much easier and much faster for terrorists to disseminate messages, recruit fighters, communicate with each other, and incite fear (Wright, et al., 2015; Klausen, 2015; Neumann, 2013). Klausen argued that the Internet has eliminated the terrorists’ dependencies on mainstream media, and in turn, caused mainstream media to be dependent on terrorist-run media (Klausen, 2015).

Weimann quoted Al Qaeda leader Al Baghdadi saying, “we strongly urge Muslim Internet professionals to spread and disseminate news and information about the jihad through e-mail lists, discussion groups and their own Web sites. The more Web sites, the better it is for us. We must make the Internet our tool,” (Weimann, 2008).

The Internet is very advantageous to terrorists. It is the ideal environment for them to spread their messages of violence and hate, to communicate with each other and establish their intranet, to communicate with their supporters, and most importantly, to launch a psychological warfare against their opponents (Weimann, 2008). Klausen states that not only is the Internet vital for the processes of terrorist propaganda, but it also allows them to fully control the messages rather than leave them in the hands of mainstream media (Klausen, 2015). One of the advantages of the Internet is that it is not constrained by geographical boundaries, and it is not financially or politically dependent on any particular state or government, thus making it much easier for terrorists to navigate through to their audiences (Weimann, 2008). The Internet is decentralized, and therefore not subjected to restrictions or control, and most importantly, the Internet is uncensored- a very important trait for terrorists as they tend to disseminate extremely graphic and dangerous material. The Internet also allows access to anyone, anywhere, and when taking the right precautions, allows anonymity.

According to Weimann, terrorists target three types of audiences online: current and potential supporters, the international communities, and their enemies. For their supporters they update them with their latest news, conquests, attacks, activities, and internal and foreign political news. They also offer them propagandist merchandise for sale, printed shirts, flags and badges with slogans and logos, as well as video tapes and audio cassettes. For the international bystander audience and web surfers, they offer them historical information and backgrounds, international reports, and press releases. A vital sector of this audience is international journalists who scour these websites for information, material and press releases. As for their third target audience, the enemy, they provide them with material to demoralize and scare them, and material to create feelings of guilt for the sufferings of victims. They post very graphic and frightening

material, such as footages of executions, beheadings, mass murders, snipers, bombings, and wreckages. They also deliver messages that contain threats to their enemies (Weimann, 2008).

Even though most of the existing literature suggests that the Internet was extremely advantageous to terrorists (Wright, et al., 2015; Klausen, 2015; Neumann, 2013; Weimann, 2008; Eid 2013), Nacos argues that a direct positive correlation has not been scientifically proven between the rise of internet terrorist activity and terrorist violence, however, she suggests that it is logical to assume a positive relationship between the two variables (Nacos, 2003; Eid, 2013).

3.3: Cyberterrorism

“The traditional view of war has changed from an empirical and a theoretical viewpoint. We progressively move from hard to soft powers,” (Durante, 2014). The development of digital technology and cyberspace has immensely changed modern-day activities. But with this change, comes the opportunity for cyberterrorism (Grabosky, 2007). War, Durante argues, has evolved to not only depend on physical kinetic armed attacks, but also on exploiting national political, ideological, economic and informational resources (Durante, 2014; Grabosky, 2007).

Cyberterrorism is the merging of terrorism and cyberspace through the usage of computers and networks to attack information systems for the sake of intimidating or coercing governments, entities or civil populations to achieve political, social, ideological or religious objectives, and to sabotage critical national infrastructures supported by computer networks and computer-based systems (Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Abeyratne, 2011; Durante, 2014; Ahmed, et al., 2015; Grabosky, 2007). Cyber terrorist attacks could be conducted anonymously

and remotely allowing the hacker to obliterate any traces leading back to them. They are low-budget attacks that only require the usage of computer networks and programming to interfere with a state's activities, security and stability (Stohl, 2007; Abeyratne, 2011; Frank et al., 2015). Abeyratne defines cyberterrorist attacks as assaults on electronic communications networks. Cyberterrorist attacks are conducted by non-state actors, subnational groups or clandestine agents (Abeyratne, 2011; Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Durante, 2014; Frank et al., 2015)

Cyberterrorism shows that terrorist attacks may not only be confined to physical domain, but may also target informational and virtual domains (Stevens, 2013).

Several authors argue that cyberterrorism could potentially cause immeasurable harm in domestic and global governance and security by interfering with major information systems in banking, finance, government services, healthcare, religion, transportation, aerospace and air traffic control, telecommunications, electricity and military bases among other systems (Abeyratne, 2011; Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Lu et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2015; Grabosky, 2007). Moreover, this puts more strain on the governments' abilities to perform their duties, especially when having to deal with an enemy that is no longer a physical, identifiable entity, but one that comprises non-state actors dispersed in a virtual space (Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Stevens, 2013; Lu et al., 2010).

Stohl argues that for an attack to qualify as a cyberterrorist attack, it should cause violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear, for instance attacks that cause bodily harm, death, explosions, plane crashes, or severe economic losses. They should be destructive enough to generate fear and loss similar to that of a traditional terrorist attack (Stohl, 2007). They might also potentially cause harm to other stakeholders in the state

such as businesses, citizens and relevant international players (Pawlack and Wendling, 2013). Some authors argue that cyberattacks are expected to increase and become more intrusive which might eventually lead to tensions between states and even ‘cyberwars’ (Pawlack and Wendling, 2013; Abeyratne, 2011; Grabosky, 2007; Stevens, 2013; Lu et al., 2010).

A substantial part of the literature, on the other hand, agrees that there have been no reported instances where cyberterrorism has caused catastrophic losses, physical damage or loss of life similar to that of traditional terrorist attacks, and that cyberterrorism fails to rise to the level of warfare (Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Durante, 2014; Lewis, 2003). Stohl argues that while most terrorist events involve large numbers of deaths and enormous property damage, cyberterrorist attacks do not seem to pose threats as imminent as those of traditional methods of terrorism (Stohl, 2007). Similarly, Helms argues that cyberterrorist attacks are less effective and less destructive than traditional physical terrorist attacks, and describes the usage of computer networks and cyberspace as “weapons of mass annoyance” (Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2003). They are no more than annoying acts that merely require mitigating the digital damage they cause and re-establishing system functionality (Lewis, 2002). The only advantage to cyberterrorist attacks, Helms argues, is that they are easier to carry out and cheaper than physical attacks, however, they are much less effective (Helms et al., 2012). Helms and Lewis argue that due to the very small number of cyberattacks, which in no way are comparable to traditional physical terrorist acts, and were not successful in widely spreading fear, cyberattacks should not be classified as acts of terrorism. Durante argues that the effects of cyberterrorism are usually non-physical damages, and that using the term cyberterrorism is a stretch of the magnitude and the effect of computer-mediated attacks (Durante, 2014). Lewis argues that the connection between physical and cyber terrorism seldom exists, and that hackers cannot fly

planes and detonate bombs, but the most damage they can do is to gain access to valuable information, which could lead to espionage and the theft of financial and intellectual data (Lewis, 2003). The authors argue that the media's alarmist claims and predictions of "an electronic Pearl Harbour" are highly exaggerated (Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 2003).

Despite the reality that cyberterrorism may not pose a potential physical threat, we are constantly reminded by the media of our vulnerability to cyberterrorist attacks, moreover, cyber terrorism is constantly being given tremendous attention and propaganda by the media and by governments which ultimately generates unwarranted fear and public anxiety of potential attacks (Stohl, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Lewis, 2003).

3.4: The Theatre of Terror

"Kill one- frighten ten thousand,"-Chinese proverb, (Prunchken, 2014).

The word terrorism originated from the Latin word *Terrere*, which means to frighten. The reign of terror started in 1793 during the French revolution, when 17,000 individuals were publicly executed before mass audiences in an attempt to instill fear in the French citizens.

Research on the concept of theatre of terror relies heavily on Gabriel Weimann, perhaps the largest contributor to the research of that field. Weimann coined the term theatre-of-terror referring to the usage of methods of orchestrated violence to communicate terrorists' messages (Weimann, 2008). Modern terrorist groups have realized the potential of mass-mediated terrorism, and thus have found it more alluring to perform their acts of violence on television for the whole world to see, rather than to just remain hidden guerrillas in the bush. They very

carefully choreograph terrorist attacks to attract media attention; they take hostages to elevate the element of drama; they plan their work very carefully and they make sure every step of the way is publicized (Weimann, 2008; Jenkins, 1975).

The target audience, Jenkins argues, is the people watching, not the actual victims. (Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 2008). The victims are not chosen because they are enemies, they are merely chosen for their symbolic importance (Klausen, 2015; Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 2008). Jenkins, Weimann and Klausen stated that modern acts of terrorism require theatrical production elements such as scripts, casts, sets, props and stage management, as well as great attention to detail, in order to be effective and to achieve their targets (Klausen, 2015; Jenkins, 1975; Weimann, 2008). This modern form of terrorism has become a means for persuasion and psychological warfare (Weimann, 2008). Prunckun explained that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, and that modern terrorist acts go beyond the immediate harm of the victim, but rather aim to frighten thousands (Prunckun, 2014). This new form of terrorism is achieved through the use of mediated, orchestrated symbolic violence, which the literature suggests has a much larger and amplified effect (Prunckun, 2014; Hoffmann, 2006; Weimann, 2008; Nacos, 2003; Menkhaus, 2014).

Weimann and Nacos both argue that the most violent performance of theatrical terror is the September 911 attacks on New York City's World Trade Center. These attacks were perfectly choreographed to attract the attention of American and international audiences. The bigger the spectacle, the wider the reach. To heighten the publicity for their attacks, terrorists, on most occasions, choose sentimental Landmarks as locations for their attacks as their destruction would bring about international publicity (Nacos, 2003; Weimann, 2008).

These attacks introduced a newer and more advanced level of mass-mediated terrorism. The planners of the attack very carefully organized the method, the targets, the timing, and the scope of the attacks (Weimann, 2008; Woods, 2011). The 911 attacks succeeded in capturing the whole world's attention. The planners of the attack set America's public agenda for years and opinion polls revealed that 99% of all Americans were following the news related to terrorist attacks (be it on television, radio, or the Internet), and that these attacks heightened fear in Americans, fear of themselves or of a family member being the victim of a similar attack. The September 11 attacks broke the record as the most watched terrorist spectacle of all time (Weimann, 2008).

These attacks brought the world into a new age of what Weimann labels as mega-terrorism. This new era of mega-terrorism, relies on the media to take care of the spreading of terrorist messages, and is the most powerfully media-oriented era in terrorism yet (Weimann, 2008). Following the attacks, Bin Laden said: "There is America, full of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that," (Weimann, 2008).

In fact, not only do terrorists choreograph their acts to make spectacles out of this, but they also tailor their attacks to suit the media and the media's convenience, to allow for the most amount of coverage possible. Klausen, Weimann and Prunckun argue that according to the preferences of the media, terrorists select their targets, timings, and locations, and try to meet the criteria for newsworthiness, media deadlines, and schedules. In most cases, analysts suggest, every terrorist act includes at least a cameraman, a soundman, a producer, and the perpetrator (Weimann, 2008; Prunckun, 2014; Klausen, 2015).

3.5: Inspire, Azan and Dabiq-

Al-Qaeda's Inspire, Taliban's Azan, and ISIS' Dabiq are three English-language magazines, which are also published in a number of different languages that are designed to disseminate their groups' messages. All three of these magazines are produced at a very high quality, they enjoy a very slick design, a Western stylish format, and very captivating content (Kirke, 2014; Lemieux, et al., 2014; Ingram, 2015). These three magazines have a common set of objectives: to recruit fighters to their groups, to gain supporters, to communicate with the global audiences (hence the different languages they're published in), to provide material for the media, and to assemble a unified identity (Ingram, 2015; Kirke, 2014; Lemieux, et al., 2014; Sivek, 2013; Fraser, 2014; Bacchi, 2014) However, there is a research gap in the literature when it comes to content analyses of terrorist-produced media, Dabiq in particular, and the psychological elements in the publication and in its rhetoric.

3.6: A unified identity-

Menkhaus suggests that Al Qaeda, through longitudinal observation, has devoted its objectives to transforming the Islamic identity and worldviews about Islam, and to bringing together the Muslim Ummah, or community (Menkhaus, 2014). On the other hand, the literature suggests that ISIS has also been seeking the same objective. Fromson and Simon stated that ISIS has been founding their own caliphate to bring together the muslim Ummah and to reunite Muslims under one collective identity (Fromson, et al., 2015; Al-Ibrahim, 2015; Turner, 2015;

Hashim, 2014). One of the main ways that these publications attempt to assemble a unified identity is the emphasis they put on one's belonging to the in-group and the out-group (Ingram, 2015; Ingram, 2014; Menkhaus, 2014). Kirke states that Inspire aims at creating this unified identity by both encouraging and driving their audiences to take part in the in-group and participate in and defend the Ummah, or risk being labeled as part of the out-group and the enemy (Kirke, 2015). This is perhaps ISIS' main objective, which the group boasted about on the front page of its first Dabiq issue. Al-Ibrahim suggests that ISIS developed this concept of the Caliphate to call for exponential expansion, the ruling of all Muslims, and to unite all Muslims under one identity (Al-Ibrahim, 2015). However, one of the main research gaps in the literature is the lack of studies that examine the ways in which terrorist groups attempt to instill these concepts of a shared identity in their audiences through their own produced media.

Chapter 4

Theoretical Framework

For the purpose of this study, two theories will be used to examine the content of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria's magazine Dabiq. The theory of framing, and the theory of selective moral disengagement. The theory of framing is best suited for this study as it allows the researcher to gain insight of the ways in which the organization, ISIS, encodes and shares its motives through the use of this mass mediated publication. The theory of selective moral disengagement allows the researcher to examine the rhetoric used by the organization in their media, and the psychology behind this rhetoric. This theory is vital for the understanding of the ways in which ISIS uses Dabiq to recruit fighters, and to turn normal citizens into ruthless killing machines.

4.1: The Theory of Framing

Framing is the practice of selecting aspects of perceived realities and making them more salient in order to promote specific problem definitions, moral evaluations, causal interpretations, and/or recommended treatments for that issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). A frame is a "central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to events related to an issue" (Pan, et al., 1993). Frames enable audiences to process large quantities of information routinely and quickly. They also help individuals package this information they perceived in an efficient manner for prompt retrieval of the information in the future (Pan, et al., 1993). According to Pan, frames are cognitive devices that are used to encode, interpret and retrieve information. They are activated

using five devices: “metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images” (Pan, et al., 1993).

Frames allow audiences to dissect and perceive an issue in very specific manners using culture-based connotations that are linked to their familiar and existing norms, values, beliefs and attitudes (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).

Frames are defined by Gitlin as “persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion” (Gitlin, 1980). Frames have substantial power in influencing people’s beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes, and can affect audiences’ treatment of a certain issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).

The origins of the theory of framing can be traced back to psychological and sociological approaches (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). The Sociological roots of framing are considered to be more macro-level. This approach describes frames as being “relatively stable and socially shared category systems” that individuals heuristically refer to when classifying new information (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). In this approach, individuals process complex information using causal attribution, or the link between the observed behavior and its potential cause. The psychological roots of framing are considered to be more micro-level and are associated with the individual’s cognitive processing (Pan, et al., 1993), where the individual would reflect upon a frame using their own judgments and perceptions. And where framing messages in multiple ways can inflict different interpretive schemas according to the individual on the receiving end of the information (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).

The theory of framing suggests that audiences are generally unaware of the presence of frames, which in most cases is the reason why frames can generate strong effects (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). Not only do frames influence people’s judgments, but they also influence their inference construction (Pan, et al., 1993). Framing affects how the issue can be perceived and

understood, and therefore influences people's attitudes, beliefs and behaviors towards certain issues (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). Framing affects how individuals prioritize values relating to issues, shaping the audience's views, and attitudes about strategies and interior and foreign issues. Framing has the power to shape and change the audience's mindset, which can ultimately induce the audience's support (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). When conducting research on framing as a dependent variable, researchers focus on frame creation and frame building as well as their adoption by their audiences, however, when studying framing as an independent variable, researchers focus on frame setting and the framing effects on audiences (Tewksbury, et al., 2009).

ISIS frames itself publicly as the harbinger or the bringer of the apocalypse, an ideology that has a very strong appeal to jihadists (Fromson, et al., 2015). It's members read and interpret the Quran in way to feed and suit their ideology and agenda. Part of its apocalyptic prophecy are two main defining strategies: the establishment of the caliphate, and the annihilation of its sectarian opponents (Fromson, et al., 2015).

ISIS exploits troubling situations and political unrest to feign an environment of security under its rule, and to promote its ability to protect the citizens and bring them to an era of peace and security, and to highlight the group's value and strength, in order to gain supporters and keep the loyalty of its existing backers. ISIS also tries to demonstrate that it has the power to take the rule from the hands of existing political actors, who themselves pose greater threat to the people (Kfir, 2015). Kfir argues that every social group needs a strong bond to hold it together and, to ISIS, religion acts as that bond. This religious bond enables its promoter, ISIS, to come up with radical interpretations to manipulate the people, while framing itself as the bringer of peace and security (Kfir, 2015).

Framing can have a great effect on audience perception. With great events comes huge media coverage, bringing about preconstructed frames that affect the public's perceptions. Literature on the matter suggests that the situation after the attacks of 911 and the media coverage which brought about major changes in social attitude concerning issues such as support of anti-terrorism tactics, presidential approval, increased support for military action, and negative attitudes towards, Muslims, Arabs, and immigrants (Woods, 2011; Powell, 2011). During this period, the most dominant frames being used by politicians and the media were "the terrorist threat" and "the war on terror". Terrorism shifted from being one minor concern, to being a "war on terror" (Powell, 2011; Woods, 2011).

In his study, Woods identifies three main frames for terrorism: The "Terrorism" frame, the "Radical Islamic" frame, and the "nuclear" frame (Woods, 2011). Woods argues that using the "terrorism" frame for labelling a violent act in itself primes people's concerns about danger and influences their assumptions, when in fact, depending on different schemes, a violent act can be labeled as a "crime" or a "struggle for freedom". The second frame is the "radical Islamic" frame, which according to Woods can be very influential because it goes a step further than terrorism and provides a diagnostic component to why these violent acts took place. The third frame, the "nuclear" frame, Woods argues accentuates high-threat and would likely trigger high-levels of fear. Woods findings show that the way terrorism is framed affects people's perceptions of the terrorist threat (Woods, 2011).

In her study, Powell argues that the tactics Bush used after 911 to win the support of the American people were the starting point of a rivalry between the Americans versus the Arabs, the West versus the East, the Us versus Them (Powell, 2011). Powell's study revealed a framing

pattern whereby fear of international organized Islamist terrorism against the “Christian America” is exponentially heightened.

Powell conducted a content analysis of the coverage of terrorism in six major news outlets- The New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, CNN, MSNBC, and FOX News. The content analysis highlighted five themes in terrorism coverage: naming/ labeling of the terror suspect (such as terrorist or Muslim), assigning adjectives/ descriptors to the agent (using adjectives such as angry, extremist), highlighting a motive for the act (revenge, killing), portraying victims (using adjectives such as good, innocent and hero), and highlighting possibilities of future threat (heightening the level of threat and fear, making (Powell, 2011). Powell argues that terrorism is framed as a problem associated mainly with Islam, as opposed to domestic terrorism which is framed as less threatening and as one-time cases (Powell, 2011).

Brinson and Stohl studied terrorism framing in the media, especially after the events of July 7, 2005, the bombings that hit London’s subway system. They analyzed two specific frames and their effects on audience perceptions of fear, attitudes towards Muslims, and the citizens’ willingness to decrease their civil liberties in support of government action. The two frames being studied were the domestic frame, referring homegrown terrorism, and the international frame, referring to terrorist acts committed by international terrorist organizations (Brinson and Stohl, 2012).

4.2: The Theory of Selective Moral Disengagement

“Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can do extraordinarily cruel things,” (Bandura, 2002).

For terrorist organizations to be able to recruit normal citizens and turn them into fighters who commit the most atrocious crimes, these new recruits start adopting mechanisms for moral disengagement to allow them to inflict harm in others. People can’t turn cruel overnight, but with moral disengagement practices, they can start performing mildly harmful deeds that they can tolerate performing, and then gradually move onto the more atrocious acts with little regard to their own anguish or self-censure; committing abhorrent terrorist acts just become everyday chores and duties (Bandura, 2002).

Selective moral disengagement is perhaps one of the most useful tools for the analyzing and the studying of terrorist rhetoric. Albert Bandura, a psychologist and leading researcher in the social cognitive theory and the theory of selective moral disengagement, argues that the moral agency is manifested in the power to refrain from acting inhumanely and the power to act humanely. Moral agency, according to Bandura, links moral reasoning and knowledge with moral conduct and behavior. With the presence of this moral agency, individuals develop their moral self, they adopt standards of wrong and right to serve as guides for their behavior, and they self-regulate themselves, where they monitor their conduct and judge it based on their moral standards, and thus subsequently regulate their conduct and actions. This process gives individuals self-worth, satisfaction and brings about positive self-sanctions. It makes them

refrain from behaving in manners that contradict their moral standards, so as not to bring about self-condemnation or negative self-sanctions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

Morality and self-regulatory mechanisms, however, do not automatically function unless they're willingly activated, and there are psychosocial maneuvers used in which individuals could disengage their moral self-sanctions, and therefore allowing the individual to commit inhumane acts. One person with the same moral standards, through either selective activation of morality or moral disengagement, can behave in either a humane or an inhumane manner (Bandura, 2002).

Weimann argues that, based on Bandura's theory, terrorists operate their inhumane and atrocious acts of violence by exercising moral disengagement (Weimann, 2008). In order to exercise moral disengagement, Bandura's theory suggests a set of seven disengagement practices-

4.2.1: Moral Justification

People usually do not conduct inhumane or harmful actions unless they have justified them first, and thus, over the centuries, according to Weimann and Bandura, people have been exercising moral disengagement in order to justify their harmful conduct using socially worthy and moral purposes. This gives individuals the freedom to conduct atrocious acts while viewing themselves as moral agents. People have conducted destructive actions in the name of religious principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalist imperatives. Combatants sanctify their aggressive actions but condemn the actions of their opponents as brutal and barbaric masquerading under a facade of outrageous moral reasoning, while each side feels moral superiority over the other (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

When recruiting fighters, whether to fight for national armies or for terrorist organizations, rapid radical shifts in behavior must take place in order to promote these, once normal, civilians to fight and kill. This is not achieved by altering the structures of their personalities, their moral standards, or their aggressive drives, but by cognitively reasoning and moralizing the act of killing through moral justification. This allows people to view themselves as combating oppression, protecting the weak, honoring their countries, and saving humanity. Bandura quotes Voltaire saying: “Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities,” (Bandura, 2002).

In the case of religious terrorists, they twist theology to view themselves as carrying out God’s will and serving a holy imperative. They mount their jihad on the notion that they’re fighting and decontaminating the world from infidels. “God’s law positively requires us to defend helpless people. God has used people, who are willing to die for their cause to save human life.” (Bandura, 2002).

4.2.2: Euphemistic Labelling

An action can be perceived much differently depending on the way it was labeled. Euphemistic language is the usage of respectable terms to label harmful conduct in order to reduce personal responsibility. It is a very injurious rhetorical weapon. Bandura argues that people behave more aggressively when their assaultive doings are given sanitized labels, rather than aggressive labels.

One form of euphemism is sanitizing language. This form makes even the most repugnant actions seem like everyday chores. Soldiers “waste” people instead of kill them. Bombs “service targets”, attacks are “clean”, civilians bombed are regarded as “collateral

damage”, people losing their jobs are given “career alternative enhancements”, and nuclear mishap explosions become “energetic disassemblies”.

The other form of euphemism is the agentless passive voice. This form of rhetoric makes reprehensible acts appear as if they are works of nameless forces, and not people, and as if people were mechanically moved, and did not act by their own will. Sometimes even inanimate objects are turned into agents (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). For example, “the tank approached and struck the whole town.” Even specialized jargon can be misused to frame things differently. During Nixon’s administration, for example, criminal conspiracy turned into “game plan” and conspirators turned into merely “team players,” (Bandura, 2002). Al Qaeda always referred to the 911 attack as an attack on symbols of American power, wealth and consumerism, it never referred to 911 as the killing of over 3,000 people (Weimann, 2008). This type of rhetoric allows conduct to be perceived as respectable and mild.

4.2.3: Advantageous Comparison

The contrast between the way behavior is perceived and what it is compared with can make reprehensible acts seem righteous. The worse the contrasting inhumanities are, the more mild and benevolent one’s destructive conduct will seem. Terrorists’ behavior is viewed as self-martyrdom when compared to the cruelty of their enemies. The American military’s mass destruction of Vietnam was downsized when describing the American intervention as saving Vietnam from the communist enslavement (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). In Egypt, the economic and political instabilities that took place in the years following the January 25 revolution are minimized by the government when comparing to the Syrian state’s affairs during its civil war.

In this form of rhetoric, making violence morally acceptable is made easier by two sets of judgments, the non-violent options framed to be ineffective, and the violent options that would later prevent more suffering (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

4.2.4: Displacement of Responsibility

“Through the jihad, they are carrying out Allah’s will as a “religious duty.” The prime agency for the holy terror is displaced to Allah,” (Weimann, 2008).

Moral control strongly operates when individuals know they’re responsible for the harm of others, however by minimizing and obscuring one’s agentive role, moral disengagement takes over. Bandura argues that people will behave in atrocious ways when a legitimate authority claims responsibility for their conduct. Therefore, with displaced responsibility, one’s actions are dictates of authorities rather than one’s own conduct, thus sparing the individual their self-condemning reactions. Authorities explicitly give out orders and authorize explicit injurious actions, and claim full responsibility for them. The greater the legitimization of the authority, the higher the level of obedience aggression will be (Bandura, 2002).

Through displacement of responsibility, self-exemption from great and mass inhumane acts is revealed in the most gruesome mass executions, where individuals claim they were merely carrying out orders, such as the Nazi Holocaust, military atrocities, and terrorist attacks.

4.2.5: Diffusion of Responsibility

“Where everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible,” (Bandura, 2002). Diffusion of responsibility is the act of making group decisions, dividing labor, and taking

collective action, and thus weakening personal agency and moral control. In this case, people shift their attention from what they're specifically doing, to what their job description asks of them. By diffusing responsibility for injurious behavior, the personal agency is obscured, and the subdivided tasks every individual is responsible for seem harmless on their own. Bandura argues that people act more violently under a group than when they are holding themselves accountable for their actions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

4.2.6: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences

Weakening moral control can also operate by minimizing, distorting, or disregarding the effects and the harms caused by one's actions. When carrying out inhumane activities, individuals tend to avoid facing the harm they're causing. To keep self-censure deactivated, the harmful results from one's inhumane doings must be minimized, distorted, minimized, or disbelieved; when the suffering is invisible, it becomes much easier to inflict harm (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Due to the advancement of death technologies, in an era where mass destruction happens at the click of a button, or a laser-controlled system, faceless electronic warfare makes it much easier to depersonalize and disregard the inhumanity of one's actions. However, when people can see and hear the harm and suffering they're causing, they become self-restrained, self-censured, and distressed (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

Based on Milgram's experiments, Bandura suggests that individuals are much less compliant to commit injurious commands and less obedient to the authority commanding when the pain and suffering of victims become personalized and evident (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

During the Vietnamese war, a single photograph of a little girl with burnt off clothes near

the rubble of her destructed town rose so much public debate and turned the American public against the government and the war. Nowadays, the American military bans all cameras and journalists from the battlefield to censor, and prevent the dissemination of, disturbing images and graphic content that could obliterate public support in international disputes (Bandura, 2002).

4.2.7: Dehumanization

The strength and activation of moral control depends on the ways in which the perpetrators see their victims. Seeing their victims as humans, because of perceived similarity, activates empathetic reactions; identifying with one whom an individual is similar to, makes the victim's suffering and pain more arousing than that of a being not similar to one's self (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Thus, it becomes a very difficult task, which usually cannot happen without the causal of distress and self-condemnation to the perpetrator, to inflict pain and suffering on one with human qualities. To be able to deal with that, perpetrators resort to stripping victims of their human qualities and dehumanizing them. Once this happens, one can inflict pain upon them without taking into considerations their feelings, concerns, hopes, or families. The victims are merely regarded as sub-human objects, mindless savages, and unfortunate creatures. If dehumanizing the victims isn't enough to weaken self-censure, perpetrators attribute demonic and bestial qualities to them, visualizing them as low animal forms and satanic creatures (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). The combined effect of dehumanizing and diffusion of responsibility makes it much easier to kill one's victims (Bandura, 2002). In the act of dehumanization, perpetrators become power holders who devalue those they wield control over and have little desire to identify or associate with them, and thus they treat them in the most violent ways (Bandura, 2002).

On terrorist websites, all these methods can be used to justify the use of violence, which is framed as a necessity, and as the only way possible to deal with the opponents. Terrorist rhetoric tries to send a mixture of messages of love, peace and support, whereby terrorist organizations frame themselves as victims who were forced to resort to violence to save humanity and Islam from the face of the merciless and brutal enemies (Weimann, 2008).

4.3: The exercise of moral disengagement in modern day history-

Bandura's theory argues that moral disengagement is a process where violence and aggression are perceived to be justifiable, and where individuals cease to consider or apply fairness in treatment among themselves (Bandura, 2002; Greenhalgh, et al., 2015; Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016). Kyriacou and Zuin used Bandura's theory to analyze the relationship between cyberbullying and the moral disengagement of the bullies who practice it. They explain moral disengagement as the desensitization of emotional empathy and values towards victims, whereby the morally disengaged individuals consciously do not allow themselves to envision or feel their victims' pains, thus allowing themselves to continue carrying out their practices (Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016). The authors state that moral disengagement has already previously been indicated to be a common characteristic among bullies, and argue that it goes hand-in-hand with cyberbullying (Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016). The authors argue that, in cyberbullying, the distance between the victim and the target, since the bullying occurs online rather than face-to-face, facilitates the process of moral disengagement and makes cyberbullies much less likely to develop feelings of empathy towards their victims (Kyriacou and Zuin, 2016).

Moreover, with the growing number of refugees seeking asylum in various countries around the world, the Australian government, in an attempt to limit the amount of asylum seekers going into the country, started to deter and indefinitely detain refugees reaching Australia by sea. In their study, Greenhalgh, Watt and Schutte suggest that, in this situation, mechanisms of moral disengagement were at play, particularly among Australian citizens who endorsed the government's policies, (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015). Australian citizens heavily supported the government's actions, even though these actions were known to result in human loss and suffering. The government forced refugee boats to turn back, forced them to return to their origins, and indefinitely detained them in remote locations (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015). Greenhalgh, Watt and Schutte's study aimed at exploring how mechanisms of moral disengagement aided in the increased population's support of the Australian government (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015).

Moral disengagement can also occur among well-educated elites. There are numerous cases that took place concerning unethical business and science practices, some of which resulted in environmental destruction, financial loss, and even preventable deaths (Cory, 2015). For example, the accounting scandals that lead to the financial crises of the years 2000 and 2008, the 2010 explosion of the oil drilling rig in Mexico, which resulted in the killing of 11 crewmen and the spilling of 210 million oil gallons in the Gulf, and the epitome of unethical professional practices, according to Cory, was the designing of the Nazi gas chambers that resulted in the killing of millions of Jews (Cory, 2015). In her study, Cory examined undergraduate students in business and science majors in aims of understanding their ethical inclinations pertaining to Bandura's moral disengagement theory. Cory argues that business and science students are more susceptible to moral disengagement given their eventual employment opportunities and the

ability to harm the physical or financial welfare of others (Cory, 2015). One major finding from Cory's study was that males exhibited higher tendencies for moral disengagement than females (Cory, 2015).

The theory of moral disengagement offers a conceptual approach to developing education-based prevention strategies. Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky study a new program, named Beyond Bali, designed to equip young students and make them unsusceptible to moral disengagement, in an effort to combat terrorism recruitment and violent extremism through education. The program teaches students about the Bali bombings of 2002 and their impact, while exploring the students' own assumptions, values, and morals. Through Beyond Bali, the students learn to consciously activate their self-regulatory moral agency mechanisms and thus immunizing themselves against efforts of moral disengagement in violent extremism. The program was designed in Australia for school students to build cognitive resilience to the efforts and mechanisms of violent extremism and terrorism. This program helps students absorb self-sanctions and prepares them to confront any influences or attempts carried out by extremists that may lead to moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014). Beyond Bali is founded on Bandura's theory of moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014). The authors argue that moral education has the potential to prevent radicalization by reinforcing one's loyalty to moral standards and by countering attempts of moral disengagement (Aly, et al., 2014). Through a qualitative study of the program, the authors reached a conclusion that the program was successful in developing self-efficacy in resisting influences of extremism, building resilience, constructing violent extremism as inhumane and unjust, developing feelings of empathy with terrorism victims, and considering the devastating consequences of terrorism (Aly, et al., 2014).

Chapter 5

Methodology

This research analyzes the ways in which the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria uses Dabiq to disseminate their messages, to spread terror, and to gain followers and recruits. The research is approached through a survey of the literature to answer the research questions, and a quantitative content analysis to test the hypotheses. This content analysis is designed to examine the linguistic, rhetorical messages in select articles in the magazine in an aim to decipher the ways in which ISIS frames itself, its enemies, and its actions. Through the same content analysis, the ways in which ISIS uses Dabiq to disengage the morale of its fighters, supporters, and recruits is also examined.

5.1: Quantitative research- Content Analysis

Content analysis is a form of quantitative research that is used to examine media content in a systematic and objective manner. It is one of the most popular data-gathering methods (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). According to Kerlinger, a content analysis is characterized by three concepts: systematic, objective and quantitative (Kerlinger, 2000). He explains that it is systematic in the sense that there is uniformity in the coding and analysis, and that there is only one set of guidelines or categories that is used to examine to whole sample. A content analysis is objective in the sense that it should be completely free of the biases and idiosyncrasies of the researcher, and should another researcher analyze the same content using the same categories, the finding should not differ. The third characterization of a content analysis, according to Kerlinger, is that a content analysis is a quantitative method where the data is quantified

numerically to give researchers statistical tools to assist in the analysis and interpretation of the results (Kerlinger, 2000; Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). Content analyses are used to outline dominant themes and messages in the content of the media being analyzed.

Content analyses are used as the basis and starting point of research, and can identify directions for further research (Slater, 2013), however, it cannot serve as a basis for effects research and examine or make claims about the effects of media on audiences (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). This form of research can only describe media content. A content analysis can, for instance, define the dominant news frames used in a specific sample, but cannot analyze the effects of those frames on audiences (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014).

This research is conducted through a survey of the literature to answer the research questions, and a quantitative content analysis conducted to test the hypotheses.

5.2: Research Questions-

RQ1-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use Dabiq to frame itself, its actions, and its enemies?

RQ2-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the seven mechanisms of moral disengagement in their rhetoric for the moral disengagement of its fighters and supporters?

RQ3-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the framing and moral disengagement mechanisms to attempt to create a unified identity?

5.3: Hypotheses-

Hypothesis 1-

Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized labels to these actions.

Hypothesis 2-

There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq conducted by ISIS.

Hypothesis 3-

There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS' usage of the mechanism of moral justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of responsibility.

5.4: Defining the universe-

The first crucial stage of a content analysis is the definition of the universe. For the purposes of this research, the elements of analysis are the issues of Dabiq released by ISIS. Since July 2014, ISIS released fifteen issues of Dabiq magazine. The publications of the magazine became less frequent with time, but relatively larger in size. The magazine was initially published monthly, but then the publications grew further apart, and were issued bimonthly.

5.5: Sampling

Dabiq only published 15 issues since its inception. These 15 issues contain a total of 206 articles. Due to the small size of the population and for a more accurate set of results, and to better enable the researcher to answer the research questions as truthfully and accurately as possible, the whole population of Dabiq is analyzed in this study.

5.6 The Population- Elements of analysis-

Based on the parameters of the research, the whole population of Dabiq issues are analyzed.

Issue Number and Name	Date of Publishing
Issue One- "The Return of Khilafah"	July 5, 2014
Issue Two- "The Flood"	July 27, 2014
Issue Three- "A call to Hijrah"	September 10, 2014
Issue Four- "The failed crusade"	October 11, 2014
Issue Five- "Remaining and expanding"	November 21, 2014

Issue Six- "Al Qa'idah of Waziristan: A testimony from within"	December 29, 2014
Issue Seven- "From hypocrisy to Apostasy: The extinction of the gray zone"	February 12, 2015
Issue Eight- "Shari'ah Alone will rule Africa"	March 30, 2015
Issue Nine- "They Plot and Allah Plots"	May 21, 2015
Issue Ten- "The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men"	July 13, 2015
Issue Eleven- "From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions"	August 9, 2015
Issue Twelve- "Just Terror"	November 18, 2015
Issue Thirteen- "The Rafidah from Ibn Saba' to the Dajjal"	January 19, 2016
Issue Fourteen- "The Murtadd Brotherhood"	April 13, 2016
Issue Fifteen- "Break the Cross"	July 31, 2016

5.7: Unit of Analysis-

The unit of analysis for this study is the whole article. This includes the rhetorical text and the headlines. The whole article is chosen as a unit of analysis because the rhetoric in the full article provides a contextual assessment.

5.8: Coding Sheet Design-

The raison d'être of the content analysis is to objectively answer the research questions based on the theories of framing and selective moral disengagement. The content analysis consists of a number of questions aiming at describing the material and discovering recurrent themes and frames in the messages. The content analysis explores the frames used in Dabiq to portray ISIS, its supporters, its opponents, its territory, and its women and children. The content analysis also explores the rhetoric of the magazine in order to identify elements of moral disengagement.

5.9: Operational Definitions-

Term	Operational Definition
TECHNICAL DATA	
1) Issue Number	The number of the Dabiq issue from which the article being analyzed is chosen.

2) Page Number	The number of the page in the Dabiq issue from which the article being analyzed is on.
3) Slug	A short name/ keyword given to the article being analyzed, instead of using the full headline of the article
4) Size of Article	The size of the article being analyzed depending on its word count (ex- less than one page, more than 3 pages... etc)
GENERAL INFORMATION	
5) Format of Article	<p>The genre of the article being analyzed (ex- news report, feature, foreword... etc)</p> <p>1= News article- an article that discusses recent or current events.</p> <p>2= Feature- unlike news articles, a feature focuses on a specific issue/ event/ individual with the purpose of giving more information, detail and dimension regarding that specific issue.</p> <p>3= Foreword/ introduction- The first/ introductory article of every issue.</p> <p>4= In the enemy's words- An article appearing in each issue dedicated to reporting on the latest issues regarding speeches and events held by the "opponents" discussing ISIS. According to Smith, Burke, Leiuen, and Jackson, this section occurs in the magazine for the purpose of using statements made by Westerners to emphasize the</p>

	<p>Westerners' weakness and highlight ISIS' strength (Smith et. al., 2015).</p>
6) Theme of Article	<p>The general message behind the article (ex- ISIS boasting successes, reporting on capturing and occupation, advices and teachings...etc)</p> <p>1= Boasting of accomplishments/ successes- The article is used to highlight and announce the recent and current successful endeavors made by ISIS, it being conquering new lands, performing new attacks... etc.</p> <p>2= Reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents- The article is used to announce recent events/ speeches made by the enemy, where ISIS gets to comment on them, reply to them, and announce further actions that could be taken against them.</p> <p>3= Reporting on services provided for citizens- The article is used to highlight the services ISIS provides for its citizens, for example education, health care, social care... etc</p> <p>4= Advices, teachings- The article is used to provide wisdom, teachings and advice to ISIS' community (soldiers, citizens, readers, followers...). These teachings habitually range from religious teachings to teachings about societal issues.</p> <p>5= Reporting on training and training camps provided for ISIS' soldiers- The article is used to highlight the trainings and training camps ISIS provides for its soldiers, where they receive many forms</p>

	of exercising and practice, and also learn how to use artillery and advance weaponry, in order to prepare them for battle.
FRAMING	
7) Framing ISIS as	<p>Frames are selected aspects of perceived realities that are made more salient for the promotion of specific problem definitions, moral evaluations, causal interpretations, and/or recommended treatments for that issue (Tewksbury, et al., 2009). A frame is a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to events related to an issue” (Pan, et al., 1993). Frames such as calling for Muslim unity, blaming opponents for responsibility, trying to invoke fear... etc.</p> <p>1= Gateway to heaven- ISIS claims joining its entity and carrying out its deeds assures entry to heaven/ leads to heaven (Warner et. al., 2015).</p> <p>2= Caliphate, large political entity- ISIS refers to itself as a caliphate, a strong political organization, with its own governing system.</p> <p>3= Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity- ISIS frames itself as a dangerous terrorist group and criminalizes its own actions.</p> <p>0= Other- please specify</p>

<p>8) Framing ISIS supporters as</p>	<p>1= obedient to God/ Islam, brothers, role models for following ISIS, sons of Islam</p> <p>ISIS claims that for Muslims to be good, they have to devote themselves to jihad against the enemy (Xander, 2015). According to Zech and Zane, ISIS describes its members and supporters as “sons of Islam” and as brothers (Zech and Zane, 2015).</p> <p>2= victims of ISIS</p> <p>ISIS often uses violence against its own supporters as a means to internally sanction and/or to socialize them, and have them behave in a certain manner (Zech and Zane, 2015).</p> <p>3= Terrorists, evil, criminals</p> <p>ISIS criminalizes its supporters and frames them as evil, terrorists, murderers</p> <p>4= endangered by the ruling political regime/ other political entities (opponent countries/ opponent organizations)</p> <p>ISIS frames its supporters as endangered by governments and political organizations, and are accordingly taking measures to secure their supporters.</p>
<p>9) Framing ISIS opponents as</p>	<p>1= Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling and name-calling- Labelling opponents as disbelievers/ criminals/ savages...etc.</p> <p>ISIS frames its opponents, which include non-Muslims and Muslims who are not supporters of ISIS, Westerners, as well as Muslims who</p>

	<p>live with non-Muslims, as kufar (disbelievers) and Mushrikin (polytheists) who will not be accepted by God, and none of their deeds will be accepted by God, unless they join Islam and migrate to ISIS (Kibble, 2016 and Xander, 2015). ISIS also frames opponents and Westerns as criminals. According to Xander, ISIS constructs Western barbarism and Westerners as Crusaders who act as exemplars of moral decadence and cruelty, who conspire to invade the lands of the Muslims, invade their houses, and invade their intellect (Xander, 2015). Other labels may be used throughout the rhetoric, such as terrorists, mules (Bayoumy, 2014), apostate rulers, armies of the cross (Xander, 2015), zindiq (heretic) (kibble, 2016), culpable, deserving criminals (Zech, 2015), spiteful, filthy (Davidson, 2014), selfish, aggressive and shallow (Xander, 2015) among other labels. Labels as such are used by ISIS' militants to formulate narratives to be used for the justification of gruesome actions against "the oppressors", or their enemies (Zech, 2015).</p> <p>2= Innocent members of different communities who, in accordance with Islamic teachings, should be defended and protected (Lewis, 2016). They have the right and the freedom to practice their religion, whilst being under the protection of the ruling state (Lewis, 2016). Non-followers of the agenda of ISIS, but innocent practitioners of</p>
--	---

	<p>Islam or different religions, who may or may not reside with Muslims, but as mere parts of the concept of human civilization (Smith et. al., 2015).</p>
<p>10) Framing ISIS soldiers as</p>	<p>1= Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God)</p> <p>ISIS perceives violence used by their soldiers against their enemies to be virtuous (Xander, 2015). Xander reports some of ISIS quotes in which they say that “the “good” Muslim [is the one] who commits him/herself to violent Jihad in defense of the Umma,” (Xander, 2015).</p> <p>ISIS frames their jihadists with themes of bravery, heroism, accomplishment, as well as humility, honesty, and friendship (Xander, 2015). In his study, Dabiq, the Islamic State's Magazine: A Critical Analysis, Kibble says that ISIS propagates the notion that Muslims are required to fight for the establishment and expansion of the islamic State (Kibble, 2016). Kibble reports ISIS’ saying that “Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the sword and the evidence of this is so profuse than only a zindiq [heretic] would argue otherwise.” (Kibble, 2016).</p>

	<p>2= Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers</p> <p>Soldiers fighting for ISIS are criminalized and portrayed as murderers, evil, cruel, vicious, and a danger to both the out-groups, and the in-groups.</p>
11) Framing ISIS victims as	<p>1= Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards</p> <p>ISIS uses very graphic and vicious methods of killing (Kibble, 2016) and most articles in Dabiq are accompanied by graphic images of the murders. ISIS announces that all non-supporters (being Muslims against ISIS, non-Muslims, Westerners...etc) should be punished and killed (Xander, 2015 and Kibble, 2016)</p> <p>2= Innocent humans who should be saved</p> <p>Victims are portrayed as innocent creatures who should be defended and saved, in accordance with Islam's prophet Muhammad's teachings (Lewis, 2016). Victims are humanized and ISIS' aim is to evoke feelings of sympathy and remorse.</p>
12) Framing ISIS acts of violence as	<p>1= Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic or religious purpose.</p> <p>Purposes such as political objectives, punishing wrong-doers, and for the sake of ethnic cleansing.</p>

	<p>Xander quotes an article from the ISIS official publication, Dabiq that says that only the good Muslims are the ones who devote themselves to defending the Umma through violent Jihad (Xander, 2015). In their study, Off With Their Heads: The Islamic State and Civilian Beheadings, Zech and Zane state that the defining element of ISIS' brand is beheading their opponents. (Zech and Zane, 2015). ISIS uses portrayals of its gruesome and torturous actions to generate fear, intimidate and terrorize particular local and international audiences and gain compliance from their enemies (Zech and Zane, 2015).</p> <p>In many cases, Kibble reports, ISIS publishes films of its notorious acts online, which gain magnificent media attention, to exhibit the ways in which they punish their enemies (Kibble, 2016). Of these cases, there's the beheading of the Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya who refused to convert to Islam, the shooting of the 25 Syrian soldiers at Palmyra, the three spies who were locked in a car and blown up by a rocket-propelled grenade, and the group that was placed in a cage and lowered in the water to kill by drowning (Kibble, 2016). In Dabiq, graphic photographic images are used to exhibit the murders. There are many cases of extreme graphic imagery such as the Shia soldiers killed, the severed head of the journalist Stephen Sotloff resting on the rest of his body, and a woman being stoned to death for committing a sexual misconduct (Kibble, 2016).</p>
--	--

	<p>2= Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act.</p> <p>ISIS frames its acts as violent and extremely aggressive, but necessary acts committed without reason or justification.</p> <p>3= Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act.</p> <p>ISIS frames its acts as unnecessary acts committed without reason or justification.</p>
13) Presence of women in article	The article includes, discusses, or is centered around female subjects.
14) If yes, Framing women as	<p>According to Huey, women and young girls started immigrating from the West to join ISIS and “begin radically different lives,” (Huey, 2016).</p> <p>Huey describes the many different roles women play in the jihadist group. Besides the obvious roles of participating in direct terrorist activities such as suicide attacks and killings, women in jihadist groups actively play a role in the propaganda of recruitment, play the role of supporters and family members of the group, train other women, run and participate in Islamist summer camps, run women’s organizations, distribute Qur’ans in schools and prisons, run internet publications, create Islamist organizations and charities, and</p>

	<p>participate in Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) (Huey, 2016).</p> <p>Women have also been reported to immigrate from the West and North Africa to become “jihadi brides,” (Christien, 2016).</p> <p>In some cases, Kibble reports, women have written articles in the magazine Dabiq, discussing the taking of slaves during war, which they say is a great prophetic sunnah, and discussing how men are allowed to marry up to four women (Kibble, 2016). Kibble reports that it’s a common occurrence for members of ISIS to take female slaves after killing their husbands (Kibble, 2016).</p> <p>1= portrayed as fighters</p> <p>Women are portrayed as having and practicing military skills, are armed, and/or are taking part in violent attacks and missions.</p> <p>2= portrayed as victims</p> <p>Women are portrayed in an injurious state, are suffering from severe injure, or are deceased.</p> <p>3= portrayed as brides/ wives</p> <p>Women are portrayed as married brides, and/or performing their duties as wives, such as submitting to the leadership of their</p>
--	---

	<p>husbands, respecting and helping their husbands, and/or taking on the wives' household duties, such as cooking, cleaning, and managing a household.</p> <p>4= portrayed as criminals</p> <p>Women are portrayed as performing illegal acts that are frowned upon and could be punishable by governmental law.</p> <p>5=portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves</p> <p>Women are portrayed as property of another and held captive and completely subservient under the dominance of another. Women portrayed as sexual slaves are held against their will and forced to perform sexual acts.</p> <p>6= portrayed as mothers</p> <p>Women are portrayed as caregivers for their children, providing them with basic physiological needs, nurture, affection and protection.</p> <p>7= Portrayed as leaders</p> <p>Women are portrayed principal players in society, as commanders or directing heads of an army, group, or organization.</p> <p>8= Portrayed as teachers</p>
--	---

	<p>Women are portrayed as teachers and instructors passing down their knowledge and experience to less-experienced individuals.</p>
<p>15) Presence of children/ youth in article</p>	<p>The article includes, discusses, or is centered around children/ youth subjects.</p> <p>According to Christien, children indicates anyone from 0 to 12 years of age, and youth refers to anyone from 12-24 years of age (Christien, 2016)</p>
<p>16) If yes, Framing Children/ youth as</p>	<p>According to Christien, children and youth have been featured and portrayed in the magazine on very numerous occasions.</p> <p>1= portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heroes/ seeds of ISIS/ the next generation of ISIS jihadis</p> <p>Children and youth have been taking part in many violent attacks, and have been acting as fighters and child soldiers for ISIS (Kibble, 2016 and Christien, 2016). Children have been portrayed in violent graphic imagery (Christien, 2016) in Dabiq taking part in executions, holding weaponry and standing in front of dead bodies (Kibble, 2016). In these cases, youth and child soldiers were glorified by ISIS for carrying out the prophet's teachings and wishes against the Kuffar, or the non-believers, and the mushrikeen, the polytheists (Kibble, 2016).</p>

	<p>2= portrayed as victims</p> <p>Children and youth are portrayed in an injurious state, are suffering from severe injure, or are deceased.</p> <p>Children and youth have been portrayed as victimization tools to represent being victims of Western intervention against Islamist and the Islamic state, in an effort to awaken frustration and sentiment among the magazine's target and Western audience (Christien, 2016).</p> <p>In some cases, Dabiq published pictures of deceased children's heads and bodies of children killed in bombings (Christien, 2016).</p> <p>3= portrayed as criminals</p> <p>Children and youth are portrayed as performing illegal acts that are frowned upon and could be punishable by governmental law.</p> <p>4= portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child labor, slavery, kidnapping)</p> <p>Children and youth are portrayed as creatures in physical and physiological danger, where they are being held captive, are kidnapped, are threatened, or are imprisoned.</p> <p>According to Christien, there are many references to children's slavery in Dabiq, and especially young girls enslaved to become wives and bear the soldiers' children, and young boys sold at markets</p>
--	---

	<p>(Christien, 2016). These references are mainly made to threaten the enemy's youth and children (Christien, 2016).</p> <p>5= taking part in social and institutional roles (learning, reading, in social care, in health care)</p> <p>In order to highlight their role as an institution and a cohesive state, ISIS uses the representation of youth and children while taking part in institutional roles such as education, healthcare, and justice court (Christien, 2016). In Dabiq, youth and children can be seen reading the Qur'an while smiling, learning, and being taken care of in hospitals, and being looked after in orphanages (Christien, 2016).</p>
17) Presence of inhumane graphic acts	<p>Inhumane acts refer to cruel and violent acts committed with no remorse or compassion. Graphic acts refer to brutal, vivid and realistic violent acts portrayed in visual media.</p> <p>In Dabiq, an abundance of examples can be seen of inhumane soldiers committing gruesome acts while smiling and while enjoying the brutality of their actions. Many graphic scenes are shown of soldiers killing, converts to Islam training for war, and even eager children learning the ways of ISIS, and learning to fight as well</p>

	<p>(Kibble, 2016). Dabiq hosts a very large variety of such acts, to name a few, executions of prisoners, throat cutting, and burning alive (Kibble, 2016).</p>
ELEMENTS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT	
18) Moral justification for inhumane acts	<p>The first mechanism for moral disengagement is moral justification for inhumane acts. In order to justify their harmful conduct, people throughout the ages have been exercising moral justification by using socially worthy and moral purposes and using themselves as moral agents to achieve these moral purposes (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Thus, people can reach a level where they view themselves as moral agents and sanctify their acts accordingly (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>1= aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles</p> <p>According to Kibble, some cases of violence present in Dabiq are accompanied by justification of the act and justification of the mode of killing, such as in the article that depicts a homosexual man being thrown off the roof of a tall building, and the act is justified as an act that was previously performed by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the prophet's companion (Kibble, 2016)</p>

	<p>Article justifies violent acts as acts of sacred acts, performed for religious purposes and as religious duties, for god, the prophet, in accordance with the Qur'an's teachings, for following the practices of the early Muslim communities (Kibble, 2016), or for any other religious or sacred reason by ISIS soldiers, who are regarded as moral agents carrying out God's will and obeying God's commands, saviors, and protectors of Islam and the Ummah (Kibble, 2016).</p> <p>2= reprimanding political states/ governments</p> <p>Article justifies violent acts as acts performed to reprimand enemy states, and acts that are performed due to the, or indirectly by, the cruelty of enemy states. In this case, ISIS blames the enemy for the occurrence of this act.</p> <p>In addition, ISIS blames the enemy, and believes that aggressiveness is crucial and is vital for combating and defeating the oppressor/ the enemy. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a prominent jihadist and one of the founders of Al-Qaeda, announced that his main purpose for jihad was to protect the Muslim countries against the invasion of foreign forces (Kibble, 2016). Similarly, in ISIS' Dabiq, ISIS urges Muslims to kill non-muslim countries to protect their Islamic state (Kibble, 2016).</p>
--	--

<p>19) Euphemistic</p> <p>Labels given to ISIS soldiers</p>	<p>Using respectable terms to label harmful conduct reduces the feelings of personal responsibility and empathy. According to Bandura, people tend to behave more aggressively when their acts are given sanitized labels instead of aggressive ones (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). For example, when soldiers “waste” people instead of “kill” them, and when fighters “hit targets” causing “collateral damage” instead of “kill people” causing “a massacre of mass murders,” (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <hr/> <p>1= Takes Place - Sanitized labels given to ISIS Soldiers (mujahideen, martyrs)</p> <p>Soldiers are given sanitized labels to make their job appear holy and “good”. Instead of being labeled killers or murderers, they are being labeled as “mujahideen”, fighters for God, “martyrs”, a person killed defending his religious beliefs and/or people.</p> <hr/> <p>2= Doesn’t take place</p>
<p>20) Euphemistic</p> <p>Labels given to ISIS victims/ opponents</p>	<p>1= Takes place</p> <p>Sanitized labels given to ISIS opponents and victims (crusaders, mushrikin, kufar)</p>

	<p>ISIS opponents are given sanitized labels to make them appear like the cruel and bad agents. Instead of being labeled as Americans or Westerners, or ordinary citizens, they are being labeled as “Kuffar”, non-believers, “crusaders”, militant Christians, or “Mushrikeen”, Polytheists.</p> <p>2= Doesn’t take place</p>
<p>21) Euphemistic</p> <p>Labels given to ISIS acts of violence</p>	<p>1= Takes place</p> <p>Sanitized labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence (waste, clean, finish off)</p> <p>ISIS’ acts of violence are given sanitized labels to make them appear less invasive and aggressive. Instead of being labeled as massacres, mass murders, or executions, they are being labeled as “finishing off”, “wasting”, and “cleaning”.</p> <p>2= Doesn’t take place</p>
<p>22) Using the agentless passive voice</p>	<p>Making inhumane acts appear as the works of nameless forces, and not humans, where one turns objects into agents to minimize the feeling of empathy and moral agency by evoking the feeling that people were mechanically moved and did not kill by hand.</p>

	<p>For instance saying “the tank bombed the town”, or labelling ISIS’ supporters and allies as “team players”, and labelling conspiracies as “game plans,” (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>1= Takes Place</p> <p>2= Doesn’t take place</p>
23) Using advantageous comparisons	<p>Using advantageous comparisons to compare one’s own actions to actions that are regarded as much worse, to make it seem like one’s actions aren’t nearly as bad. For instance, ISIS comparing its violent acts to those of the enemies or the American government, would make it seem like ISIS’ actions aren’t as bad as the enemy’s (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>ISIS’ acts are compared with more reprehensible acts, to make ISIS’ seem righteous.</p> <p>ex- Terrorists’ behavior is viewed as self-martyrdom when compared to the cruelty of their enemies.</p> <p>1= Takes Place</p> <p>2= Does not take place</p>

<p>24) Displacement of responsibility</p>	<p>Bandura argues that people behave in a more aggressive and atrocious way when they are given orders from a legitimate authority, and thus the responsibility of the acts lie on the higher authority and not on themselves (Bandura, 2002).</p> <p>According to Kibble, in the instance of the burning of the Jordanian pilot, ISIS claims it was merely following the example of their prophet Muhammad and his companions at the time (Kibble, 2016).</p> <p>“The greater the legitimization of the authority, the higher the level of obedience aggression will be,” (Bandura, 2002).</p> <div data-bbox="505 1014 1408 1890"> <p>1= Carrying out Allah’s orders/ religious duty</p> <p>Acts are carried out solely for the purpose of following God’s orders, and following the orders of Muhammad, and of Islam.</p> <p>2= Carrying out ISIS’/ higher authority's orders</p> <p>Acts are carried out on the basis of following orders from higher hierarchy in the ISIS organization.</p> <p>3= Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves)</p> <p>The responsibility of the acts being committed lies on the opponents and victims. The opponents did not obey the rules, the opponents</p> </div>
---	---

	<p>were trying to sabotage the state, the opponents are against the state, and therefore they brought this act on themselves.</p>
25) Diffusion of responsibility	<p>“Where everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible,” (Bandura, 2002).</p> <p>Diffusion of responsibility takes place when atrocious actions are performed collectively and in groups, and thus people’s attention shifts from what they’re specifically doing (the violent act), to what their job description asks of them, and what everyone around them is doing without question (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). According to Bandura, diffusing responsibility for aggressive behavior obscures a person’s moral agency, which results in individuals tending to become even more aggressive, as they cease from holding themselves accountable, and as they perceive themselves as harmless in a group (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>In this article, soldiers perform violent actions together in a collective act of violence and/or act in armies.</p> <p>1= Takes Place</p> <p>2= Does not take place</p>

<p>26) Disregard or distortion of consequences</p>	<p>Obscuring and weakening moral control can also take place by minimizing, disregarding, or distorting the effects and harms caused by one's actions. Due to the advancement of warfare artillery, in this era of mass destruction, it has become very easy for soldiers to commit atrocious murders without having to look at the face of the victim at all, for example by using laser-controlled systems, grenades and laser-bombs, as well as faceless electronic machinery that only require the click of a button, as these methods help depersonalize and disregard the inhumanity of one's actions (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>“When the suffering is invisible, it becomes much easier to inflict harm,” however when people see the harm they’re causing, they become distressed, self-restrained, self-censured (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).</p> <p>Distorting consequences through the usage of advance war machinery that facilitates faceless acts, and aids soldiers in committing crime without having to regard the victim’s sufferings.</p> <p>1= Takes Place</p> <p>2= Does not take place</p>
--	--

<p>27) Dehumanization of victims</p>	<p>Seeing their victims as humans, like themselves, makes it much harder and very distressful to inflict pain upon them, however stripping their victims from their human qualities and dehumanizing the victims, makes it much easier to inflict pain upon them without the distress of the moral agency (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Victims can be labeled as mindless savages, sub-human objects, or unfortunate creatures, additionally, bestial and demonic qualities could be given to the victims, for instance visualizing the victims as low animal forms and satanic creatures (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). This mechanism helps perpetrators inflict pain more aggressively upon their victims without considering their pain, families, lives, loved ones, fears, hopes, and concerns (Bandura, 2002).</p> <p>ISIS uses name calling in their writing, such as tyrants, infidels, polytheists, and evil-doers, to describe their victims and opponents (Wright and Bachmann, 2015).</p> <p>In this article, victims and opponents of ISIS are being dehumanized and labelled in a derogatory way to lessen their value in front of the perpetrator.</p>
--------------------------------------	--

	1= Takes Place 2= Does not take place
--	--

5.10: Intercoder reliability-

Intercoder reliability is very important to ensure consistency, shared understanding of conceptions, and the lack of bias in a study (Wimmer and Dominick, 2014). As a means of strengthening the reliability of the results, two coders, the researcher and a drama therapy master's degree holder, independently coded 15 percent of the total population. For the purpose of cohesion in variable definitions and identifications, training sessions were conducted with the second coder to ensure accurate results and accurate inter-coder reliability.

The statistical analysis used in this study followed the SPSS statistical program. The following statistical parameters were calculated as shown below, Wimmer and Dominick (2003).

5.11: Inter-coder Reliability test

For Nominal data, reliability can be tested in terms of percentage of agreement as follows, Holsti (1969):

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

Where M is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agree, and N₁ and N₂ are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively.

In our case, a good sample of 30 out of 206 coded sheets were re-coded by a second coder.

(M=10 and N₁=N₂=1440)

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2 \times 710}{720 + 720} = 0.986111 = 98.6111 \%$$

An almost perfect match indicating very reliable coding.

5.12: The Chi-Square (χ^2) Test:

χ^2 is used to test the homogeneity of distribution of any two variables. We assume the null hypothesis that the 2 distributions are similar. χ^2 will measure if the null hypothesis is true or false.

χ^2 is calculated as the summation of the squares of the differences between expected and observed values as a ratio of the expected value, Wimmer and Dominick (2003).

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(\text{Observed} - \text{expected})^2}{\text{expected}}$$

The significance of the resulted value of χ^2 is measured by its probability parameter p at 0.05 or 0.01 levels of probability. If the p value is <0.05 or <0.01, the calculated value of χ^2 is significant

or highly significant and the distributions of A & B are different (not the same). If p is >0.05 , the calculated value of χ^2 is not significant and the distributions of A & B are similar.

Chapter 6

Results

In this chapter, the results of the content analysis conducted on the population are presented.

There were two main objectives for the content analysis. The first objective was to determine the ways in which ISIS uses crayon frames in its writing. The frames analyzed were the frames regarding how ISIS portrayed itself in its media, how it portrayed its soldiers, its victims, its acts of violence, as well as its women and children, if available in the article. The second objective of the content analysis was to pinpoint the mechanisms of moral disengagement which are present in the writing of ISIS. There are 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement, and the goal was to see if these mechanisms are being used, and if they are in fact present in the writing.

6.1: Statistics of General Information-


The whole population of Dabiq was analyzed, as the population itself is not a large one. Dabiq published 15 issues since its inception. The 15 issues contained a total of 206 articles, containing 941 pages worth of material.

The articles were classified into small (one page or less), medium (more than one page, up till 3 pages), or large (more than 3 pages) articles. The majority of articles present in Dabiq ranged from medium to large articles.

Table 1: Size of article

Size	Frequency	%
Small	17	8.3%
Medium	96	46.6%
Large	93	45.1%
Total	206	100%

Chart 1: Size of article:



The format/ genre of the articles present in Dabiq ranged from news reports (articles that discusses recent or current events), feature stories (articles that focus on a specific issue/ event/ individual with the purpose of giving more information, detail and dimension regarding that


specific issue), foreword/ introduction (the first/ introductory article of every issue), or articles titles “in the enemy’s words” (articles appearing in each issue dedicated to reporting on the latest issues regarding speeches and events held by the “opponents” discussing ISIS).

The most frequent article genre was the feature articles, followed by the news reports.

Table 2: Format of article

Format of article	Frequency	%
News report	71	34.5%
Feature	108	52.4%
Foreword	11	5.3%
In the enemy's words	16	7.8%
Total	206	100%

Chart 2: Format of article:



The themes of the articles were analyzed to determine which type of messages is mostly circulated and conveyed through the magazine. The themes were 1. boasting of


accomplishments/ successes, reporting on capturing/ occupation, prominent executions/ Foley and Moath and others, 2. reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents, warning the enemy, 3. reporting on services provided for citizens, 4. advices, teachings, 5. reporting on trainings and training camps provided for ISIS' soldiers.

The most prominent theme for the articles was the theme of ISIS boasting of its successes and accomplishments, whether its in capturing a prominent figure, performing a mass-mediated murder, or conquering new towns and expanding its reign of control.

Table 3: Theme of article:

Theme of article	Frequency	%
boasting of accomplishments/ successes, reporting on capturing/ occupation, prominent executions/ foley and moath and others	92	44.9%
reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents, warning the enemy	37	18.0%
reporting on services provided for citizens	6	2.9%
advices, teachings	69	33.7%
reporting on trainings and training camps provided for ISIS' soldiers	1	0.5%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 3: Theme of article:



6.2: Framing statistics-

Frames are selected aspects of a perceived reality that are made more salient for the promotion of a specific message, interpretation, problem definition, causal interpretation or treatment.

Framing of ISIS


The first set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame itself as an organization. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing itself as a caliphate/ large political organization. ISIS framed itself as such in 106 of the 206 articles of Dabiq, this frame represented 52.5% of the frames being used to describe the organization. The second largely dominant frame is ISIS describing itself as the gateway to heaven, or the shortcut to heaven. ISIS constantly used that frame for its audience to highlight the phenomenon that one can only go to heaven by joining ISIS. Belonging to a different religion is considered disbelieving, being a practicing Muslim living among non-Muslims is considered disbelieving, and being a practicing Muslim, living among practicing ones but not migrating to ISIS is also considered a form of disbelief in God. ISIS constantly stressed on the idea that the only way one is going to heaven is through joining ISIS, and that the only form of worship is through jihad (fighting for God) and through implementing the strategy of ISIS. This frame was used in 95 out of the 206 articles, representing 47% of the frames being used to describe Dabiq. However, framing ISIS as a terrorist organization, such as how the West, the media, and many civilian populations frame it, took place in just 1 article out of the whole population of 206 articles.

Table 4: Framing ISIS as:

Framing ISIS as	Frequency	%
Gateway to heaven	95	47.0%
Caliphate/ governing entity, large political entity/ terrorizes the enemy	106	52.5%

Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity	1	0.5%
Total	202	100%
Missing	4	
	206	

Chart 4: Framing ISIS as:



Framing of ISIS' supporters


The second set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame their supporters. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing

its supporters as true role models for Muslims, and as the only figures completely obedient to God and to Islam. Supporters of ISIS are framed as brothers and as true good Muslims. ISIS mentions its supporters in 182 out of the 206 articles in the population. Out of these 182 mentions, this frame was used 181 times, representing 99.5% of the amount of times ISIS supporters were framed in the whole population of Dabiq. In only one occurrence were ISIS supporters framed as victims, 0.5% of the amount of times ISIS supporters were framed in the whole population of Dabiq. ISIS supporters were never framed as terrorists or evil-doers, and they were never framed as endangered by other ruling political regimes or governments. ISIS supporters were constantly framed as victorious and winners of heaven and of God's satisfaction.

Table 5: Framing ISIS supporters as:

Framing ISIS' supporters as	Frequency	%
Obedient to God/ Islam, true Muslims, brothers, role models for following ISIS	181	99.5%
Victims	1	0.5%
Terrorists, evil, criminals	0	0%
endangered by the ruling political regime/ other political entities (opponent countries/ opponent organizations)	0	0%
Total	182	100%
Missing	24	
	206	

Chart 5: Framing ISIS supporters as:



Framing of ISIS' opponents


The third set of frames analyzed in the study are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame its opponents. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing its opponents as members of the out-group, and as enemies. The rhetoric of the magazine also referred to ISIS' opponents through the use of name calling, such as savage beasts, and labelling, using labels kuffar and murtaddin. Opponents of ISIS were mentioned in the whole population of 206 Dabiq articles 189 times. This frame was used in all of the 189 mentions of the opponents, or

100% of the whole mentions of the opponents, making it the only frame used for describing ISIS' opponents. ISIS supporters, however, are never framed in the magazine as terrorists, or criminals or evil-doers, and they are also never mentioned as wanted by the government, or endangered by the ruling regime.

Table 6: Framing ISIS opponents as:

Framing ISIS' opponents as	Frequency	%
Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling and name-calling	189	100.0%
Innocent members of different communities who should be defended and protected.	0	0%
Total	189	100%
Missing	17	
	206	

Chart 6: Framing ISIS opponents as:



Framing of ISIS' soldiers


The fourth set of frames analyzed in the magazine are the frames used by ISIS to describe and frame their soldiers. ISIS' soldiers were mentioned in 173 of the 206 articles. The most dominant frame recognized throughout the Dabiq issues is ISIS framing its soldiers as Mujahideen, or fighters in the name of God. The rhetoric of the magazine also referred to ISIS' soldiers through the use of labels, such as lions, heroes, saviors, protectors, moral agents or martyrs (soldiers who die in battle) in the name of God. This particular frame appeared 172 times, representing 99.4% of the whole population of soldiers mentioned in the magazine. In only one occasion, 0.6%, were soldiers mentioned as terrorists (ones who inflict terror) and vicious.

Table 7: Framing ISIS soldiers as:

Framing ISIS soldiers as	Frequency	%
Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God)	172	99.4%
Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers	1	0.6%
Total	173	100%
Missing	33	
	206	

Chart 7: Framing ISIS soldiers as

- Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God)
- Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers



Framing of ISIS' victims


The fifth set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame the victims on which they inflicted pain. Of 206 articles, victims were mentioned, shown, and portrayed 160 times. The most dominant frame present in those mentions is the frame that emphasized that these victims deserve to be hurt, that they must be punished for their actions, for their beliefs, or for not supporting ISIS, and that these victims brought this pain onto themselves by not joining ISIS. This frame was present 159 times of the 160 times, therefore representing 99.4% of the

entire population of victims mentioned in the magazine. In only one occasion, 0.6%, victims were portrayed as innocent humans.

Table 8: Framing ISIS victims as:

Framing ISIS victims as	Frequency	%
Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards	159	99.4%
Innocent humans who should be saved	1	0.6%
Total	160	100%
Missing	46	
	206	

Chart 8: Framing ISIS victims as:



Framing of ISIS' acts of violence


The sixth set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame their actions of violence. Of 206 articles, violent actions were mentioned, shown, and portrayed 159 times. The most dominant frame present in those mentions is the frame that emphasized that these actions of violence were necessary actions taken to either fulfil a strategic purpose, for instance to gain more land or to pressure a certain enemy/government, or they were taken to fulfil a religious purpose, for instance killing the “Crusaders” (Christians) or the Muslim Shi’ites because they are considered by ISIS to be non-believers.. This frame was present 146 times of the 159 times, therefore representing 91.8% of the entire population of violent actions mentioned in the magazine. The second frame that was used to describe violent actions is that they are necessary actions of gruesome torture or extreme violence. This frame is used for specific individual cases, for example the capturing of journalists, spies, or foreign soldiers. In these cases, ISIS commits extremely violent acts, such as beheading a spy and placing his head on top of his torso, making child soldiers (not older than 8 or 9 years old) murder an enemy of ISIS. In these cases, the purpose of the violent act is to show gruesome torture that would frighten the enemy, and make as an example of the victims. These cases, unlike the previous ones, are not meant to be framed to fulfil a political or religious purpose, but are only meant to be framed as necessary actions of gruesome torture. This frame is present 13 times in the issues, which makes it represent 8.2% of the population of violent acts present in the magazine. The violent acts in the magazine were never framed as unnecessary, as criminal acts, or as inhumane acts.

Table 9: Framing ISIS acts of violence as:

Framing ISIS acts of violence as	Frequency	%
Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and religious purpose.	146	91.8%
Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence	13	8.2%
Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act	0	0%
Total	159	100%
Missing	47	
	206	

Chart 9: Framing ISIS acts of violence as:

- Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and religious purpose
- Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence
- Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act



Framing of women


The seventh set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame ISIS' women. Of 206 articles, women were only mentioned, shown, and portrayed in 14 articles, or in only 6.8% of the entire Dabiq population. In 2 cases, 1%, women were framed as fighters/ soldiers of ISIS, armed and participating in battle. In 2 other cases, 1%, women were framed as victims of ISIS, ones being murdered or severely injured by the organization. In 3 cases, 1.5%, women were framed as criminals, committing crime against ISIS, by supporting causes that oppose ISIS. In 2 cases, 1%, women were framed as slaves, this includes being sold and bought in slavery markets, being taken as slaves after their non-ISIS supporting husbands are murdered by ISIS, and being used as sexual slaves to please ISIS soldiers after battle. In 5 cases, 2.4%, women were framed in "habitual" societal roles, such as being mothers and performing their motherly duties with their children, being framed as wives, supporting their husbands, and taking care of their households. The frames that did not exist at all in the Dabiq population is framing women as leaders, as teachers, or as new brides.

Table 10: Framing of women

Framing of women	Frequency	%
Women not present	192	93.2%
portrayed as fighters	2	1.0%
portrayed as victims	2	1.0%
portrayed as brides/ wives	0	0%
portrayed as criminals	3	1.5%

portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves	2	1.0%
portrayed as mothers/ wives/ supporters of their husbands	5	2.4%
portrayed as leaders	0	0%
portrayed as teachers	0	0%
Total	206	100%

Chart 10: Framing of women



Framing of children

The final set of frames analyzed are the frames used in Dabiq by ISIS to frame ISIS' children. Of 206 articles, children were only mentioned, shown, and portrayed in 26 articles, or in only 12.6% of the entire Dabiq population. In 11 cases, 5.3%, children were frames as fighters/ soldiers of ISIS, armed, participating in battle, and taking part in extremely graphic and violent acts and murders. In this frame, children were labeled as lions, heroes, seeds of ISIS, true Muslims, the next of generation of jihadists, and role models. In 4 cases, 1.9%, children were framed as victims of ISIS, being murdered or severely injured by the organization. In only 1 case, 0.5%, children were framed as criminals, committing crime against ISIS, by supporting causes that oppose ISIS. In 2 cases, 1%, children were framed as being endangered. This includes physiological danger, being forced into child labor, being captured, kidnapped, or sold in slavery markets.

In 8 cases, 3.9%, children were framed as taking part in "habitual" societal and institutional roles, such as being in school, learning, reading Qur'an, in social care and orphanages, or being taken care of in health care institutions and hospitals.


Table 11: Framing of children/youth

Framing of children/ youth	Frequency	%
Not present	180	87.4%
portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heroes/ seeds of ISIS/ the next generation of ISIS jihadis	11	5.3%
portrayed as victims	4	1.9%
portrayed as criminals	1	0.5%
portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child labor, slavery, kidnapping)	2	1.0%

portrayed as taking part in social and institutional roles (learning, reading, in social care, in health care)	8	3.9%
Total	206	100%

Chart 11: Framing of children/youth

- Children not present
- portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heroes/ seeds of ISIS/ the next generation of ISIS jihadis
- portrayed as victims
- portrayed as criminals




Presence of inhumane, violent, and graphic acts

Dabiq, just like other methods of terrorist media, is known for its detailed and abundant portrayals of graphic content featuring extremely violent and inhumane acts. In 206 articles, violent acts are present 125 times, 61.3%, of the total population of the Dabiq articles.

Table 12: Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Presence of violent acts	Frequency	%
Yes	125	61.3%
No	79	38.7%
Total	204	100%
Missing	2	
	206	

Chart 12: Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



6.3: Statistics of presence of Elements of moral disengagement

The theory of selective moral disengagement, proposed by Albert Bandura, suggests that morality functions only when it is willingly activated. However, certain mechanisms and psychological maneuvers could be used to disengage one's morality, thus allowing them to commit immoral and atrocious acts and behave in an inhumane manner (Bandura, 2002 and Weimann, 2008). In order to willingly exercise moral disengagement, the theory suggests seven mechanisms: Moral justification, euphemistic labelling, advantageous comparisons, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion of consequences, and dehumanization.

For the purpose of this study, the rhetoric of the magazine Dabiq was analyzed to recognize the presence of these seven mechanisms that allow ISIS to disengage the morality of their soldiers, their community, their supporters, and their readers.


Moral justification for inhumane acts

The first mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the element of moral justification for inhumane acts. This mechanism is present in 199 of the 206 Dabiq articles, making it one of the pillars of the rhetoric in the magazine, representing 97.2% of the entire Dabiq population. In 118 articles, 57.6%, aggressiveness and inhumane acts are justified in the name of religious principles, where ISIS states that its actions are conducted in the name of God, in the name of the prophet, or in honor of Islam. In 81 articles, 39.5%, aggressiveness and inhumane acts are said to be performed as a way of reprimanding political states and governments for the political stances and their actions against ISIS. Moral justification is not present in only 7 articles, 3%, out of the whole population of 206 articles.

Table 13: Moral justification for inhumane acts

Moral Justification	Frequency	%
aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles	118	57.6%
reprimanding political states/ governments	81	39.5%
Does not take place	6	2.9%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 13: Moral justification for inhumane acts



Euphemistic Labelling

The second mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the element of euphemistic labelling. In this study, euphemistic labelling was analyzed on a number of factors: labelling ISIS soldiers, labelling ISIS victims/ opponents, and labelling ISIS' acts of violence.


Euphemistic labels given to ISIS soldiers

Sanitized labels are given to the soldiers of ISIS in order to undertone their real job description. Therefore instead of being named murderers or terrorists, they are given sanitized labels, such as mujahideen (fighters of God), martyrs (fighters who die in the name of God) and lions. Such labels assist in elevating their status, and make them unaware of the true repercussions of their acts. This mechanism of labelling is applied to soldiers in 178 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 87.3% of the entire population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in only 26 articles, 12.7%.

Table 14: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers-

Sanitized Labels given to ISIS' Soldiers	Frequency	%
Takes place	178	87.3%
Does not take place	26	12.7%
Total	204	100%
Missing	2	
	206	

Chart 14: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers-



Euphemistic labels given to ISIS victims and opponents


Sanitized labels are given to ISIS' victims and opponents in order to morally disengage the soldiers inflicting harm upon them, and in order to morally disengage the supporters and citizens of ISIS from feeling sympathetic towards them.

Therefore instead of being named victims, they are given sanitized labels, such as kuffar (disbelievers) and murtaddin (previously Muslims, but not regarded as ones anymore). Such labels assist in devaluating the victims and the opponents, and makes it easier for soldiers to inflict harm upon them. This mechanism of labelling is applied to victims and opponents in 174 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 84.9% of the entire population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in only 31 articles, 15.1%.

Table 15: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS' Victims/opponents

Sanitized Labels given to ISIS' Victims/opponents	Frequency	%
Takes place	174	84.9%
Does not take place	31	15.1%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 15: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Victims/opponents



Euphemistic labels given to ISIS' acts of violence


Sanitized labels are given to ISIS' acts of violence in order to undertone to atrocity and severity of the acts, and undertone to harm caused and inflicted onto the victims. Therefore instead of being called mass murders and massacres, ISIS' violent acts are given sanitized labels, such as waste, clean and finish off. Such labels assist in decreasing the perception of the violent acts, so they sound more naive and less invasive and violent. This mechanism of labelling is applied to ISIS' acts of violence in 146 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 71.6% of the entire

population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in 58 articles, 28.4%.

Table 16: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence

Sanitized labels given to ISIS’ acts of violence	Frequency	%
Takes place	146	71.6%
Does not take place	58	28.4%
Total	204	100%
Missing	2	
	206	

Chart 16: Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence



Using the agentless passive voice


Using the agentless passive voice is a technique that lies under the umbrella of euphemistic labelling. This technique is used to make inhumane and violent acts appear as the works of nameless forces, not humans, thus turning objects into agents. For instance saying “the tank bombed the town” instead of saying the soldiers attacked the town and massacred its people, thus turning the tank into an agent, rather than an object. This technique of euphemistic labelling is applied to ISIS’ acts of violence in 96 of the 206 Dabiq articles, representing 46.8% of the entire population of soldier mentions in Dabiq. This mechanism does not take place in 109 articles, 53.2%.

Table 17: Using the agentless passive voice

Using the agentless passive voice	Frequency	%
Takes place	96	46.8%
Does not take place	109	53.2%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 17: Using the agentless passive voice

Using advantageous comparisons




The third mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism of using advantageous comparisons. The use of advantageous comparisons occurs when someone tries to compare their acts with the more reprehensible acts of others, for their own advantageous benefit and/or to make their acts seem more righteous. In the case of Dabiq, in many cases ISIS' compares its acts to more reprehensible acts of others, for example comparing one of their raids with the Nazi Holocaust, comparing a vicious beheading to the US invasion of Iraq, or viewing suicide bombing as self-martyrdom where a soldier sacrifices their life to protect the state from the atrocities of a certain political state. This mechanism occurs in 129 of the Dabiq articles, 63%, or in about two-thirds of the whole Dabiq population.

Table 18: Using advantageous comparisons

Using advantageous comparisons	Frequency	%
Takes place	129	63%
Does not take place	76	37%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 18: Using advantageous comparisons



Displacement of responsibility


The fourth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism of displacement of responsibility. Moral control is highly affective when individuals perceive their responsibility of harming someone, however, when individuals cease from taking responsibility, and the responsibility is thus placed on a different agent, or this responsibility is minimalized or obscured, moral disengagement takes place. Thus, Bandura argues, that when a legitimate authority claims responsibility for the act, soldiers become morally disengaged and become more comfortable performing the act, no matter how violent it is. The greater the legitimization of the authority, the higher the level of obedience aggression will be (Bandura, 2002). In the case of ISIS, not only is responsibility placed on higher authority, but it is placed on God and Islam. ISIS leaders constantly teach their soldiers that God asked them to kill the disbelievers, and that God wants them to commit these acts. This scenario takes place in 110 of the Dabiq articles, 53.4% of the total population of articles. In other cases, ISIS' leaders blame the responsibility on their enemies and opponents. They claim that by being disbelievers, they brought it onto themselves, and they deserve killing, or that by supporting certain policies, they deserve punishing. This scenario has occurred in 84 Dabiq articles, 40.8% of the total population of articles. Only in 12 articles out of the whole Dabiq population, 5.8%, does this mechanism not take place.

Table 19: Displacement of responsibility

Displacement of responsibility	Frequency	%
Carrying out Allah's orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority's orders, including ISIS	110	53.4%
Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves)	84	40.8%
Does not take place	12	5.8%
Total	206	100%

Chart 19: Displacement of responsibility

- Carrying out Allah's orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority's orders, including ISIS
- Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves)
- Does not take place




Diffusion of responsibility

The fifth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility. People act more violently under a group then when they are taking all the responsibility of the harm themselves (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Diffusion of responsibility is the act of dividing the labor, taking collective action, and making group decisions, and thus acting in groups weakens moral control and personal agency, allowing soldiers to act more violently without feeling responsible, and while obscuring their moral agency. In the case of ISIS, not only is responsibility diffused among the collective acts of the army, the group fighting, and even the group suicide bombing, but responsibility is also shared with God. In Dabiq, ISIS constantly mentions that with God, soldiers have been able to capture a certain town, or with the blessings of God and the Prophet, someone was successfully murdered. This scenario takes place in 150 of the Dabiq articles, 73.2% of the total population of articles. This scenario, however, does not occur in 55 articles, 26.8%, out of the Dabiq population.

Table 20: Diffusion of responsibility

Diffusion of responsibility	Frequency	%
Takes place	150	73.2%
Does not take place	55	26.8%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 20: Diffusion of responsibility



Disregard or distortion of consequences

The sixth mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism of disregard and distortion of consequences. By distorting, minimizing, or obscuring the effects caused by one's violent actions, moral control is weakened. When the suffering is invisible, it becomes much easier to inflict harm (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). Due to the advancement of artillery and weapon technology, mass destruction takes place with the push of a button. Also, faceless electronic warfare, such as laser-controlled artillery and faceless electronic warfare make it much easier to inflict pain without ever having to look in the victim's face. Soldiers act more violently when they cannot see or hear their victims' pain and suffering (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996).

This scenario takes place in Dabiq as the advancement of technology allow soldiers to commit the most atrocious of acts without ever having to come in contact with their victims, and thus severely weakening their moral agency and disengaging their morality. This scenario takes place in 142 of the Dabiq articles, 69.3% of the total population of articles. This scenario, however, does not occur in 63 articles, 30.7%, out of the Dabiq population.

Table 21: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences

Disregard or Distortion of Consequences	Frequency	%
Takes place	142	69.3%
Does not take place	63	30.7%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 21: Disregard or Distortion of Consequences



Dehumanization of victims


The final mechanism of moral disengagement being recognized in the articles is the mechanism of dehumanization of victims. When perpetrator see the victims as humans such as themselves, elements of similarity activate empathetic reactions. Therefore, it is much easier for perpetrators to strip their victims of their human qualities, and instead dehumanize them, so they don't have to consider their feelings, their families, and their pain (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). ISIS implements this technique by regarding its victims as sub-human objects, and unfortunate creatures. In many cases in the magazine, victims are labeled in ways such as mindless savages and unfortunate creatures, furthermore, bestial and satanic qualities are attributed to them.

By dehumanizing the victims, it becomes much easier to inflict harm upon them (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, 1996). This scenario takes place in 84 of the Dabiq articles, 41% of the total population of articles. This scenario, however, does not occur in 121 articles, 59%, of the Dabiq population.

Table 22: Dehumanization of victims

Dehumanization of victims	Frequency	%
Takes place	84	41%
Does not take place	121	59%
Total	205	100%
Missing	1	
	206	

Chart 22: Dehumanization of victims



6.4: Hypothesis 1

Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized labels to these actions.

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between framing ISIS' acts of violence and the euphemistic labels attributed to them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of framing ISIS' acts of violence for the two necessities (Euphemistic labels takes place 89.7% for the necessary actions taken to fulfill a strategic and religious purpose; while it takes place 38.5% for the necessary acts of gruesome torture / extreme violence).


Chi square $\chi^2 = 84.511$ (p=0.000) Highly significant

Table 23: Relationship of Framing ISIS acts of violence and Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence

Framing ISIS acts of violence as	Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence-		Total
	Takes Place	Doesn't take place	
Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and religious purpose.	131	15	146
	89.7%	10.3%	100.0%
Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence	5	8	13
	38.5%	61.5%	100.0%
Total	136	23	159
	85.5%	14.5%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 84.511$ (p=0.000) Highly significant

Chart 23: Relationship of Framing ISIS acts of violence and Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence



6.5: HYPOTHESIS 2

There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq conducted by ISIS.

Mechanism 1- Moral justification

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between moral justification for inhumane acts and the presence or absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts. Results indicate different distributions of percentages for inhumane acts for the presence or absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts (Percent presence of inhumane acts is higher for aggressiveness - 70.1% - and lower for reprimanding - 53.1% and 0.0% does not take place. The distributions are the reverse in case of absence of inhumane acts).


Chi square $\chi^2 = 14.061$ ($p = 0.001$) highly significant

Table 24: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Moral justification for inhumane acts-	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles	82	35	117
	70.1%	29.9%	100.0%
reprimanding political states/ governments	43	38	81
	53.1%	46.9%	100.0%
Does not take place	0	5	5
	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 14.061$ (p=0.001) highly significant

Chart 24: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the euphemistic labels attributed to them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence (In case Yes, taking place is 70.5% and Not taking place is 39.3%. The reverse is true in case of No)


Chi square $\chi^2 = 16.770$ ($p=0.000$) highly significant.

Table 25: Relationship of Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence-	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	103	43	146
	70.5%	29.5%	100.0%
Does not take place	22	34	56
	39.3%	60.7%	100.0%
Total	125	77	202
	61.9%	38.1%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 16.770$ (p=0.000) highly significant.

Chart 25: Relationship of Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling- Using the agentless passive voice

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of the agentless passive voice when mentioning them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of Using the agentless passive voice (Yes has high Takes place – 78.1% - and low does not take place - 46.7% -,and No has a reverse distribution)


Chi square $\chi^2 = 21.081$ ($p=0.000$) highly significant.

Table 26: Relationship of Using the agentless passive voice and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Using the agentless passive voice-	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	75	21	96
	78.1%	21.9%	100.0%
Does not take place	50	57	107
	46.7%	53.3%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 21.081$ (p=0.000) highly significant.

Chart 26: Relationship of Using the agentless passive voice and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 3- Using advantageous comparisons-

A chi square test was performed showing a significant ($p < 0.05$) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of advantageous comparisons when mentioning them. Results indicate different distributions of percentages of using advantageous comparisons (takes place higher- 66.7% - in Yes and lower -33.3% - in No)


Chi square $\chi^2 = 8.946$ ($p = 0.011$) significant

Table 27: Relationship of Using advantageous comparisons and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Using advantageous comparisons	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	86	43	129
	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Does not take place	39	35	74
	52.7%	47.3%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 8.946$ (p=0.011) significant

Chart 27: Relationship of Using advantageous comparisons and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 4- Diffusion of responsibility-

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. Results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of Diffusion of responsibility in case of Yes or No)


Chi square $\chi^2 = 23.117$ ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Table 28: Relationship of Diffusion of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Diffusion of responsibility- Soldiers act alone- act together- collective violence in armies- with allah	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	107	43	150
	71.3%	28.7%	100.0%
Does not take place	18	35	53
	34.0%	66.0%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 23.117$ ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Chart 28: Relationship of Diffusion of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 5- Displacement of responsibility-

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of displacement of responsibility when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. Results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of carrying out Allah's orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority's orders, including ISIS (Yes has high

percent of the two items of Takes place – 60.9% & 70.7% - and low does not take place – 46.2% , while No has a reverse distribution) The highly significant ($p < 0.01$) chi square indicates different)


Chi square = 22.084 ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Table 29: Relationship of Displacement of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Displacement of responsibility-	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Carrying out Allah's orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority's orders, including ISIS	67	43	110
	60.9%	39.1%	100.0%
Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves)	58	24	82
	70.7%	29.3%	100.0%
Does not take place	0	12	12
	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	125	79	204
	61.3%	38.7%	100.0%

Chi square = 22.084 ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Chart 29: Relationship of Displacement of responsibility and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 6- Disregard or Distortion of Consequences-

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of the mechanism of disregard and distortion of consequences when mentioning and describing the acts to the Dabiq audience. The results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of the percentage of the mechanism of disregard or distortion of consequences (Yes has high Takes place – 78.2% - and low does not take place – 23.0% -, while No has a reverse distribution)


Chi square = 54.989 ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant)

Table 30: Relationship of Disregard or Distortion of Consequences and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Disregard or Distortion of Consequences-	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	111	31	142
	78.2%	21.8%	100.0%
Does not take place	14	47	61
	23.0%	77.0%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square = 54.989 ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Chart 30: Relationship of Disregard or Distortion of Consequences and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



Mechanism 7- Dehumanization of victims-

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the usage of the victim dehumanization. The results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of the mechanism of dehumanization of victims (Yes has high Takes place – 83.3% - and low does not take place – 46.2% -, while No has a reverse distribution).


Chi square = 28.669 ($p = 0.000$) Highly significant

Table 31: Relationship of Dehumanization of victims and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts

Dehumanization of victims	Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-		Total
	Yes	No	
Takes place	70	14	84
	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%
Does not take place	55	64	119
	46.2%	53.8%	100.0%
Total	125	78	203
	61.6%	38.4%	100.0%

Chi square = 28.669 (p=0.000) Highly significant

Chart 31: Relationship of Dehumanization of victims and presence/absence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts



6.6: HYPOTHESIS 3-

There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS' usage of the mechanism of moral justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of responsibility.

A chi square test was performed showing a highly significant ($p < 0.01$) relationship between the Moral justification for ISIS' inhumane acts and the Displacement of responsibility on Allah and the opposing governments. Results indicate a highly significant chi square showing different distributions of percentages of moral justification for inhumane acts (In case of carrying Allah's orders , aggressiveness high -79.7% - and reprimanding political states low - 18.5% - and down to zero does not take place. The reverse is true for Acts carried out... and does not take place) =


Chi square $\chi^2 = 96.280$ ($p=0.000$) Highly significant

Table 32: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Displacement of responsibility

Moral justification for inhumane acts-	Displacement of responsibility-			Total
	Carrying out Allah's orders	Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents	Does not take place	
aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles	94	23	1	118
	79.7%	19.5%	0.8%	100.0%
reprimanding political states/ governments	15	58	8	81
	18.5%	71.6%	9.9%	100.0%
Does not take place	0	3	3	6
	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
Total	109	84	12	205
	53.20%	41.00%	5.90%	100.00%

Chi square $\chi^2 = 96.280$ ($p=0.000$) Highly significant

Chart 32: Relationship of Moral justification for inhumane acts and Displacement of responsibility



Chapter 7

Discussion

The final chapter of this thesis provides a brief overview of the findings of the study as well as the discussion of the three research questions posed according to the pertinence of the results.

7.1: Summary of study problem and methodology-

For the purposes of this study, a content analysis was conducted to analyze the rhetoric of the full population of 15 Dabiq issues published. Dab is the official English language magazine produced by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The content analysis was conducted to study two main aspects of the rhetoric in Dabiq, the use of framing, and the use of the 7 mechanisms of selective moral disengagement.

7.2: Review and discussion of the main conclusions of the study

Three research questions were posed for this study.

7.2.1: Research Questions-

Framing- Research Question 1-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use Dabiq to frame itself, its actions, and its enemies?

The first research question posed for this study was posed to analyze the way in which ISIS uses the rhetoric in Dabiq to frame itself as an organization, to frame its actions, and to frame its enemies.

Through Dabiq, ISIS attempts to frame itself and its fighters and supporters in a direction completely opposite of the one they are framed with in global media. In most global media, ISIS is constantly framed as a terrorist group, as a bunch of guerilla fighters, and as a group that does not represent Islam. Using their own media, Dabiq, ISIS attempts to change the way it is framed in the perception of its target audience, mainly its fighters and supporters. The results of the content analysis show that there are two main directions ISIS uses to frame itself in its media. The first direction is ISIS framing itself as a gateway to heaven, as the shortcut to heaven, and the one way to God's acceptance. The second direction is ISIS framing itself as a caliphate, a governing entity, and a large political organization, that has a governing body, and a caliph (president). This caliphate is meant to be regarded as such, should be feared by the enemy, and works on terrorizing the enemy. Through the content analysis, the framing of ISIS to its supporters was also analyzed. Unlike how they are framed in global media, as terrorists and non-representative of Muslims, through most of the rhetoric of the magazine, 99.5%, ISIS frames its supporters as true role models for Muslims, as obedient to God into Islam and as part of the in-group. ISIS opponents were framed very significantly in the magazine as well. In all of the cases in the magazine, 100%, where the opponents were mentioned, they were mentioned as being part of the out-group, they were portrayed as enemies, and they were always given derogatory labels such as filthy beasts and mindless savages. Opponents in the magazine were also framed as being Kuffar (disbelievers), murtaddin, and unworthy of living. ISIS' soldiers were also remarkably framed as heroes, lions, saviors and protectors, as well as mujahideen (fighters for God) and martyrs (ones who sacrificed their lives for God). Soldiers were framed as moral agents, unlike how they are framed in global media as terrorists and criminals. As for ISIS' victims, the ones portrayed in global media as innocent lives that should be saved from the atrocities of jihadists,

ISIS frames them as opponents who deserve to be hurt and punished for the beliefs, for their actions, and for not-supporting ISIS. They are framed as kuffar who should be killed for the sake and acceptance of God and Islam. ISIS' acts of violence and attacks, which are framed by global media as atrocious and vicious acts of terror and crime, are framed in quite the opposite way in the magazine. In Dabiq, these actions are framed as necessary acts taken to fulfil a strategic or religious purpose. These purposes range from being performed for political purposes such as challenging a certain government/ political leader, conquering new land, or terrorizing a certain enemy/ government/ entity, to being performed for religious purposes, such as killing a group ISIS deems is a disbeliever (such as Christians, or Shi'ite Muslims), or punishing a Muslim wrong-doer (for instance, a women who committed adultery or a homosexual man).

In global media, ISIS is framed as a terrorist fighter group, however in the magazine, ISIS is framed as a complete caliphate, ruled by a government, and containing all institutional roles of a state, such as schools, hospitals and orphanages. Women and children of ISIS rarely take part in global media coverage. However in Dabiq, they do take a slight part in the coverage. Women are portrayed in 6.8% of the total Dabiq population. Even though they are minimally portrayed, they are framed in ways that show that they are taking part in all societal roles. In some cases women are framed as fighters and soldiers, in other cases, women are framed as mothers and wives supporting their husbands. Besides these frames, in other cases, women are framed as criminals, slaves, sexual slaves, and victims. Children, on the other hand, are mentioned slightly more than women are in the magazine. They are present in 12.6% of the total Dabiq population. However, in their framing the two most dominant frames used are: framing children as fighters where they're describes as being lions, heroes, jihadists, and role models, and framing children as taking part in societal and institutional roles, such as learning in schools,

reading Qur'an, being taken care of in hospitals, or living in social care or orphanages. This connotes the two most dominant frames ISIS attempts to use to frame itself: a large fighter group, and a state, with all its institutional roles.

Selective Moral disengagement- Research Question 2-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the seven mechanisms of moral disengagement in their rhetoric? And for the moral disengagement of its fighters and supporters?

The purpose of the second part of the study was to recognize the existence of the elements of moral disengagement in the rhetoric of Dabiq. After conducting the content analysis, it was found that all 7 mechanisms were indeed present in the writing of Dabiq, and in fact, and very significantly present, with some mechanisms, such as moral justification, present in 97.1% of the whole population of Dabiq rhetoric, and other mechanisms, such as dehumanization of victims, being present in 41% of the whole rhetoric. Even though the dehumanization mechanism is the least present mechanism, it takes place in 41% of the population, which signifies how heavily these mechanisms are used in the writing of Dabiq.

The most largely present mechanism used in Dabiq is the mechanism of moral justification. Moral justification, appearing in 97.1% of the population, appears in two ways: justifying aggressiveness in the name of God and religious principles, and justifying aggressiveness in the name of reprimanding political states and governments for their actions and their policies. According to Bandura, people are unable to conduct inhumane or harmful actions unless they have justified them first. Through moral justification of their acts ISIS soldiers are able to conduct harmful and atrocious acts while viewing themselves as moral agents acting in the name of religious principles, righteous ideologies, and nationalist imperatives.

The second mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of Euphemistic labelling. In Dabiq, euphemistic and sanitized labels are given to ISIS' soldiers, to make them appear as moral agents, fighters for God, and heroes, instead of framing them as terrorists and criminals. Sanitized labels are given to ISIS' victims and opponents to morally disengage the soldiers inflicting harm upon them and to morally disengage the supporters and citizens of ISIS from feeling sympathetic towards them. Victims and opponents are given labels such as Kuffar, murtaddin, and Crusaders. ISIS' acts of violence are also given sanitized labels such as cleaning instead of massacring. This causes a decrease in the moral agent in soldiers as the terms make the act sound less invasive and less violent. Another technique of euphemistic labelling, which is also present in the rhetoric, is the technique of using the agentless passive voice. In this technique, inhumane and violent acts appear as the works of nameless forces, not humans, thus turning objects into agents. This technique is very effective in relieving the soldiers of the responsibility of the actions, and thus weakening their moral agency and causing them to be more comfortable committing violent acts.

The third mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of using advantageous comparisons. This mechanism occurs when an entity compares its actions with the more reprehensible actions of other entities, for its own advantageous benefit and/or to make its acts seem more righteous. In the case of Dabiq, ISIS repeatedly uses this technique to compare its actions to these of other governments such as the US government and the Israeli government. The worse the contrasting inhumanities are, the more mild and benevolent one's destructive conduct will seem. Using this technique allows soldiers to perceive their actions to be mild and righteous in comparison to others', as opposed to seeing their actions as violent and atrocious murders.

The fourth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of displacement of responsibility. This mechanism is perhaps one of the most powerful mechanisms for moral disengagement, and it is very widely used in 94.2% the population of the magazine. Moral control strongly operates when individuals know they're responsible for the harm of others, however by minimizing and obscuring one's agentive role, moral disengagement takes over. In Dabiq, ISIS uses this mechanism in two ways: displacing the responsibility on God, Islam or on a higher hierarchical power, and displacing the responsibility on the opponents, by mentioning the wrong-doings of the opponents, their actions and policies and implying that the opponents deserve to be punished for their acts, and thus displacing the responsibility on them.

The fifth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility. Diffusion of responsibility happens when an act is committed by a group instead of a single individual, thus when everyone is responsible, no one really feels responsible. This appears in the magazine in two ways: having soldiers act collectively in most of their violent acts, for instance, group fighting, suicide bombings in groups, and groups attacks, and also convincing the soldiers that they're acting with God, with the aid of God, and by God's side, so the responsibility is diffused with God, and the soldiers are more inclined to perform graphic acts as long as they perceive God to be on their side.

The sixth mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of distortion or disregard of consequences. This mechanism plays on obscuring or minimizing one's harmful impact of inhumane activities, thus resulting in soldiers carrying out inhumane activities without having to face the harm they caused. This mechanism is triggered by the use of advanced artillery and death technologies as these forms of technologies allow soldiers to commit violent mass acts without ever having to even see their victims. Only by pressing a button, or pointing a laser beam that the

victim gets affected, but the perpetrator never gets to closely see or face the victim. This allows the soldiers to commit harmful acts more freely and at a much bigger scale.

The final mechanism present in the rhetoric is the mechanism of dehumanization. Regarding one's victim as human as oneself activates empathetic reactions, which are unwanted reactions in the case of terrorist and fighter groups such as ISIS. Therefore, in Dabiq, ISIS plays on dehumanizing many of its victims and opponents in order to devalue them and allow their soldiers and supports to easily inflict pain on them. In Dabiq, dehumanizing the victims appears in the form of labelling the victims and opponents using labels such as filthy beasts, unfortunate creatures, animals, and mindless savages, as well as attributing bestial and satanic qualities to them.

Effect of Moral Disengagement

The 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement are very significantly present in the rhetoric of the magazine. In at least 41% of the articles, all 7 mechanisms could be present in the one article. ISIS uses Dabiq, to morally disengage its soldiers and supporters. Through the use of these 7 mechanisms, ISIS' soldiers successfully committed a number of very violent and aggressive acts. Moreover, through the use of moral disengagement, ISIS supporters continue to support their case. On another note, being the official and only English language publication produced by ISIS, this magazine is used in the recruiting process of Western jihadists, thus by imposing the mechanisms of moral disengagement, one can argue that moral disengagement plays a tremendous role that is crucial for the acceptance of a foreign audience of the content of the magazine.

Creating a unified identity- Research Question 3-

How does the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria use the framing and moral disengagement mechanisms to attempt to create a unified identity?

According to Ingram, ISIS' main purpose for the usage of its media is to "shape the perceptions and polarize the support of its audiences", (Ingram, 2014). In its media, ISIS targets both its "friends" and "foes", while strategically using the frames of in-group versus out-group. In Dabiq, ISIS associates concepts of crisis with the framed "out-group" identities, and associated concepts of solutions and change with the framed "in-group" identities. This technique, according to Ingram, is used to keep the "in-group" supportive and loyal. Through Dabiq, ISIS also employs itself as the protector of its "in-group" against all those framed as "out-groups". On the other hand, ISIS exaggerates the identities of the "out-groups", such as Shi'ite Muslims, Christians, and Westerners, and associates these identities with malaise and viciousness. ISIS divides the world into these two groups only, "the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr [disbelief] and hypocrisy," (Ingram, 2014). Ingram states ISIS' only solution to the current crisis, which is the elimination and complete annihilation of any and all framed out-group identities. This is, according to Ingram, one main pillar for the unification of Muslims against the threat of the out-groups. Through framing of the in-group and out-group, ISIS attempts to create a unified identity for its perceived community. By morally disengaging its in-group, ISIS strives to keep it loyal, supportive and active towards achieving its cause and purpose.

7.2.2: Hypotheses-

HYPOTHESIS 1

Framing violent actions conducted by ISIS takes place by attributing euphemistic and sanitized labels to these actions.

One of ISIS' main purposes in their magazine Dabiq is boasting about accomplishing their violent acts, yet describing and framing these acts in a way that makes ISIS appear to be a moral agent. This process of framing takes place through the use of attributing euphemistic and sanitized labels to violent actions. A chi square test was performed to test this relationship between the framing ISIS' acts of violence and attributing euphemistic labels attributed to the acts being framed. Results indicate a highly significant relationship (Chi square $\chi^2 = 84.511$ ($p=0.000$)) between the variables suggesting that framing violent acts conducted by ISIS does in fact take place through the attribution of sanitized and euphemistic labels to these acts. This process of framing violent acts using sanitized labels allows the violent acts to appear less invasive, and less violent, and therefore assists in the moral disengagement of ISIS' soldiers and supporters. This hypothesis is therefore supported.

HYPOTHESIS 2

There is a strong positive relationship between the application of the theory of Moral disengagement with its 7 mechanisms and the violent and inhumane actions present in Dabiq conducted by ISIS.

One of the main purposes of this study is to analyze and study the existence of the mechanisms of moral disengagement in the rhetoric of ISIS' magazine, to test whether ISIS truly applies the 7 mechanisms of the theory to disengage the morality of its soldiers and supporters. For the

purpose of testing this hypothesis, a chi square test was administered for each and every mechanism of moral disengagement to test the relationship between the mechanisms of moral disengagement and the violent acts conducted by ISIS. The purpose of these chi square tests were to identify a relationship between the violent acts of ISIS and the mechanisms of moral disengagement.

Mechanism 1- Moral justification

When it came to testing the mechanism of Moral justification and ISIS' violent acts, it was found that there is a strong positive relationship between the two variables, indicating that this mechanism is, in fact, applied by ISIS when mentioning and describing its violent acts. A chi square test was performed to test the relationship between the two variables and it indicated a highly significant relationship (Chi square $\chi^2 = 14.061$ ($p=0.001$) highly significant) between the two variables.

Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling

As for the second mechanism, euphemistic labelling, a chi square was administered to test the relationship between the use of euphemistic labelling and the presence of violent acts.

The chi square test showed a highly significant (Chi square $\chi^2 = 16.770$ ($p=0.000$) highly significant) relationship between the presence or absence of ISIS' acts of violence and the euphemistic labels attributed to them.

Mechanism 2- Euphemistic Labeling- Using the agentless passive voice

Under euphemistic labelling exists another technique of the same mechanism, which is the use of the agentless passive voice. A chi square test was performed to test the relationship between the technique of using the agentless passive voice, and the presence of violent acts. The chi square performed showed another highly significant (Chi square $\chi^2 = 21.081$ ($p=0.000$) highly significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that this technique is surely used in the moral disengagement of soldiers and supporters when describing and mentioning violent and graphic acts.

Mechanism 3- Using advantageous comparisons-

Using advantageous comparisons is another one of the mechanisms used for the moral disengagement of ISIS' soldiers and supporters. A chi square test was performed to test the relationship between the technique of using the advantageous comparisons, and the presence of violent acts. The chi square performed showed a significant (Chi square $\chi^2 = 8.946$ ($p=0.011$) significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that the usage of advantageous comparisons does take place in the rhetoric in accordance with the mentioning and describing of the violent acts of ISIS.

Mechanism 4- Diffusion of responsibility-

Diffusion of responsibility is a mechanism that is heavily present in the issues. Diffusion of responsibility refers to the act of making soldiers act collectively, or with God, and therefore not feel like they are responsible for their acts. . A chi square test was performed to test the relationship between the mechanism of diffusion of responsibility, and the presence of violent acts. The chi square performed showed a highly significant (Chi square $\chi^2 = 23.117$ ($p=0.000$) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables, indicating that diffusing the responsibility from the soldiers does take place in the rhetoric in accordance with the mentioning and describing of the violent acts of ISIS.

Mechanism 5- Displacement of responsibility-

Perhaps, one of the most significantly used mechanisms in the rhetoric of Dabiq is the mechanism of displacement of responsibility, where, largely, the responsibility of the violent actions were placed on God's hands, or in the enemy's hands. Upon administering the chi square test to test out the relationship between the two variables, displacement of responsibility and the presence of inhumane or violent acts, a very highly significant (Chi square = 22.084 ($p=0.000$) Highly significant) relationship was established between the variables. This dictates that this

mechanism is in fact heavily used in the magazine in accordance with the mentioning and describing of atrocious acts.

Mechanism 6- Disregard or Distortion of Consequences-

As a method of disengaging the morality of their soldiers and supporters, ISIS trains its soldiers to disregard or distort the consequences of their acts. This can range from ignoring a crying child of war, till learning the usage of very advanced artillery that doesn't allow you the perpetrator to see the victim, let alone interact with him or feel empathy. The chi square test performed on this mechanism showed a highly significant (Chi square = 54.989 (p=0.000) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables.

Mechanism 7- Dehumanization of victims-

Dehumanizing someone's victims usually plays a big role in the moral disengagement of the perpetrator. For the purpose of the study, a chi square test was conducted to test the relationship between the presence of inhumane acts in the magazine, and the dehumanization of the perpetrator's victims. The chi square test showed a highly significant (Chi square = 28.669 (p=0.000) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables, suggesting that this variable does in fact have a strong positive relationship with the presence of violent actions in Dabiq.

In the cases of all 7 mechanisms, it was shown that all of the 7 mechanisms of moral disengagement in fact had strong positive relationships with the presence of violent actions. In other words, it was shown that the presence of violent actions is highly significantly related to the usage of the mechanisms of selective moral disengagement, thus the hypothesis is supported.

HYPOTHESIS 3

There is a strong positive relationship between ISIS' usage of the mechanism of moral justification of its inhumane acts and its usage of the mechanism of displacement of responsibility.

A chi square test was conducted to test the relationship of two mechanisms of moral disengagement: moral justification and displacement of responsibility. Through the chi square test, it was shown that the usage of moral justification takes place through displacement of responsibility, either on Allah and religious principles, or on opposing governments. The chi square conducted for this hypothesis showed a highly significant (Chi square $\chi^2 = 96.280$ (p=0.000) Highly significant) relationship between the two variables. Thus, this shows that the hypothesis is once more supported.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Ingram says that ISIS' main purpose for the usage of its media is to "shape the perceptions and polarize the support of its audiences", (Ingram, 2014). The main conclusion of this research is that ISIS does in fact use its media, and its media tactics, such as its framing techniques and its usage of the mechanisms of moral disengagement, to shape the perceptions of its audiences and to create polarized identities of in-group and out-group.

The main findings of the study show that unlike the way Islamist extremists are portrayed in the media, they portray themselves in a very different light. ISIS portrays its soldiers as moral agents and its supporters as role models. It portrays its opponents and non-supporters as part of the out-group and as enemies who deserve to be punished. As for their acts of violence, they are merely portrayed as the only means to achieving peace and to gaining God's acceptance.

The second set of findings shows that ISIS uses the mechanisms of moral disengagement to disengage the morality of their soldiers, supporters and audience. Dabiq, according to research, is found to have magnetized over 12,000 soldiers from all over the world. I would argue that the usage of these 7 mechanisms plays a very crucial role in this recruitment process. It allows men and women from all over the world to leave their whole lives behind and travel to ISIS-controlled territories, risking their lives, to fight for what they were manipulated to think is a moral and holy cause. These mechanisms are an extremely dangerous weapon that we see being used in our everyday lives; from people morally disengaging themselves to control others, whether it's at home or at work, to large businesses using the mechanisms to lay people off from work, to governments refusing to take in refugees, to students bullying their school mates, to

nations going to war against less fortunate and less powerful nations, to extremely lethal radical organizations trying to gain power, and the list doesn't end.

ISIS is an organization with extremely strong and smart media strategies. It uses a combination of extremely powerful psychological tactics to securely reach its goals and to create a magnitude of propaganda for itself. Their media content is very widely circulated. This mass-mediated terrorist content is no longer concerned with the act of harming a single individual or a small group, but rather it focuses on exploiting the media for attention and publicity; it goes beyond the confines of violence and has become a spectacle (Eid, 2013; Nacos, 2003). Which brings us to the theatre of terror, the phenomenon adopted by radical terrorist groups where they take advantage of mass-media to perform their acts of violence on television for the whole world to see. ISIS very strategically choreographs its acts to attract media attention, through the usage of theatrical production elements such as scripts, casts, sets, props and stage management, to elevate the drama and make sure every step of the way is largely publicized. This modern form of terrorism is what Weimann calls psychological warfare. The usage of these psychological elements and means of persuasion go beyond the immediate harm of the victim, but rather aim to frighten thousands. Through the use of mediated, orchestrated symbolic violence, together with mechanisms of psychological persuasion, such as framing, and mechanisms of moral disengagement, the terrorists' effect has a much larger and amplified effect, which has the ability to reach millions of people, and magnetize thousands of fighters into this whirlpool of psychological manipulation.

Chapter 9

Recommendations for Future Research

The research body available on the theory of selective moral disengagement is barely ever applied on terrorism and terrorist-produced publications. Most research available on the theory of selective moral disengagement is applied on bullying and cyberbullying (Greenhalgh, et al., 2015), as well as government policies and refugee studies, and government actions, such as the Nazi gas chambers which resulted in the killing of over 6 million Jews (Cory, 2015). A substantial amount of the research on the theory is also present on unethical science and business practices which resulted in financial loss, such as the accounting scandals that lead to the economic crises of 2000 and 2008, as well as environmental destruction, and preventable deaths, such as the oil drilling rig explosion in Mexico in 2010, which killed 11 crewmen, and caused the spilling of 210 million gallons of oil in the Gulf of Mexico (Cory, 2015). Future research is needed on the application of the theory of selective moral disengagement on terrorism and terrorist-produced media.

The majority of research available on framing and terrorism is focused on how terrorism is framed in the media, whether by media agencies, governments, or civilian populations, however, very limited research is available on the frames used with the terrorist-media itself. Terrorist organizations make use of their media to frame themselves, their enemies, and their actions. An abundance of frames are used in terrorist-produced media, which should be analyzed.

Research on the rhetoric of terrorist-produced media is also very limited. Future research should focus on the contextual and in-depth analyses of the rhetorical language being used in terrorist-produced media.

Furthermore, research should include in-depth analyses of the issues and of the mechanisms being used for moral disengagement, as well as of the frames being used in terrorist-produced media and publications. Additionally, more research should be conducted on the other forms of media produced by ISIS, such as their videos, YouTube channels, and poetry and songs.

For the purpose of this study, a content analysis was geared towards using a full article as the unit of analysis, as the whole article provides contextual value. However, more content analyses should be conducted to analyze certain key terms and phrases (such as kuffar, murtaddin, mujahideen), and the frequency of their existence in the article, and ratio of their existence compared to other key terms and phrases.

In this study, the focus of the analysis was on the rhetoric of the magazine and not the graphic content. In addition to the analysis of the rhetoric, in-depth analyses of the graphics and imagery in terrorist-produced publications should be analyzed, as these graphic portrayals are extremely loaded with content, themes and frames. The graphic imagery in the magazine Dabiq, as well as other terrorist-produced media, is very substantial and rich with messages and content.

Chapter 10

Limitations of the Study

The main limitation in this study is the fact that the whole population analyzed is considered a small population. Dabiq only published 15 issues, since its debut, and therefore when the whole issues were analyzed, the population mounted up to be 205 articles only.

Unlike other research on terrorist-produced publications such as Al Qaeda's Inspire and Taliban's Azan, very little research has been conducted on ISIS' Dabiq. Therefore, this study has been geared towards an overview analysis of the general themes used in the magazine, and the main messages communicated through the publication. However, more in-depth research is needed to fully explore and analyze the issue at hand.

Moreover, for the sake of this study, the unit of analysis being the whole article merely indicated the presence of frames and moral disengagement mechanisms in the articles. However, these issues should be analyzed using a narrower unit of analysis to give more weight and substance to the amount of existence of the frames and of the mechanisms.

Bibliography

Abeyratne, R. (2011) Cyber terrorism and aviation—national and international responses.

Journal of Transportation Security. Volume 4, Issue 4. Pp. 337-349. Doi:
10.1007/s12198-011-0074-3.

Ahmed, U., raza, I., Hussain, S. A., Ali, A., Iqbal, M. and Wang, X. (2015) Modelling cyber security for software-defined networks those grow strong when exposed to threats.

Journal of Reliable Intelligent Environments. Volume 1, Issue 2. Pp. 123-146.

Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40860-015-0008-0>

AlHodhod, Ibrahim Salah. (2016, May 31). Using Religious Texts to Justify Terrorism. *Arab*

Media and Society Journal. Retrieved from:

<http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=937>.

Al-Ibrahim, B. (2015, June 26). ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir. *Contemporary Arab*

Affairs. Volume 8, Issue 3. Pp 408- 415. DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2015.1051376.

Aly, A. & Taylor, E. & Karnovsky, S. (2014) Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience

to Violent Extremism: An Education Intervention. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,*

Volume 37, Issue 4. Pp. 369-385, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.879379

Analysis: Understanding Nigeria's Boko Haram radicals. (2011, July 18). Retrieved

from www.irinnews.org.

Analysis: Who are the Taliban? (2013, 1 November). *BBC News*. Retrieved from

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11451718>. BBC News.

Bacchi, U. (2014, October 13). Isis magazine Dabiq Threatens 'Rome Crusaders' Flying Islamic State Flag at Vatican on Front Cover. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-magazine-dabiq-threatens-rome-crusaders-flying-islamic-state-flag-vatican-front-cover-1469712>.

Background: Al Qaeda. *Frontline*, PBS. Retrieved from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/network/alqaeda/indictment.html>

Bandura, A. (2002). Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency. *Journal of Moral Education*. Volume 31, Issue 2. Pp. 101-119. DOI: 10.1080/0305724022014322.

Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). *Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency*. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71, 364–374.

Bayoumy, Y. (2015, September 22). Isis urges more attacks on Western 'disbelievers'. *The Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-urges-more-attacks-on-western-disbelievers-9749512.html>.

Beaumont, P. (2016, February 10). Netanyahu plans fence around Israel to protect it from 'wild beasts'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/10/netanyahu-plans-fence-around-israel-to-protect-it-from-wild-beasts>.

Ben Labidi, Imed (2016). ISIS's Euro-American Fighters: Western Failures and the Narratives of Denial. *Arab Media and Society*.

Brinson, M. E. & Stohl, M. (2012) Media Framing of Terrorism: Implications for Public Opinion, Civil Liberties, and Counterterrorism Policies. *Journal of International and Intercultural Communication, Volume 5, Issue 4*. Pp. 270-290, DOI: 10.1080/17513057.2012.713973

Bull, K. (2015, February 18) Boko Haram Expands With ISIS-Style Social Media Presence. *In Homeland Security: Relevant insights by the experts from American military university*. Retrieved from <http://inhomelandsecurity.com/boko-haram-expands-with-isis-style-social-media-presence/>.

Cheterian, V. (2015, March 20), ISIS and the Killing Fields of the Middle East. *Global Politics and Survival. Volume 57, Issue 2*. Pp. 105-118. DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1026089.

Chothia, Farouk (2012, January 11). Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? . *BBC News*.

Cory, S. N. (2015) Moral Disengagement in Science and Business Students: An Exploratory Study. *Journal of Education for Business, Volume 90, Issue 5*. Pp. 270-277. DOI: 10.1080/08832323.2015.1027162

Cotter, A. (2011). Jennifer jefferis. armed for life: The army of god and anti-abortion terror in the united states. *Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 5, Issue 5*.

Dabiq: What Islamic State's New Magazine Tells Us about Their Strategic Direction, Recruitment Patterns and Guerrilla Doctrine. (2014, August 1). *The Jamestown Foundation*. Retrieved from http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42702&cHash=0efbd71af77fb92c064b9403dc8ea838#.VrnGq_l97rc.

Davidson, H. (2014, September 23). Islamic State's call to kill westerners has terrorism experts divided. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/23/islamic-states-call-to-kill-westerners-has-terrorism-experts-divided>.

Delman, E. (2015, November 18). The World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved From <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/isis-boko-haram-terrorism/416673/>.

DePetris, D. R. (2014, November 16). The 5 Deadliest Terrorist Groups on the Planet. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/washington-watching-the-5-deadliest-terrorist-groups-the-11687>.

Durante, M. (2014) Violence, Just Cyber War and Information. *Philosophy & Technology*. Volume 28, Issue 3. Pp. 369-385. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-014-0176-5>.

- Eid, M. (2013). The New Era of Media and Terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. Volume 36, Issue 7. Pp. 609–615. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.793638
- Erlanger, S. & Myre, G. (2006, January 25). A Narrow Win for Fatah Expected in Palestinian Elections. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/25/international/middleeast/25cnd-palestinian.html?_r=2&.
- Farwell, J. P. (2014, November 25). The Media Strategy of ISIS. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. Volume 56, Issue 6. Pp. 49-55, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.985436.
- Feldman, G. (1997). Soft opposition: Elite acquaintance and Klan-sponsored terrorism in Alabama, 1946-1950. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 40, Issue 3. Pp. 753-777. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/stable/2639886?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
- Ferran, L. & Momtaz, R. (2015, February 23). ISIS Trail of Terror. *ABC News*. Retrieved from <http://abcnews.go.com/WN/fullpage/isis-trail-terror-isis-threat-us-25053190>.
- Ferran, L., Meek, J. & Keneally, M. (2014, August 9). ISIS Beating Iraqis and Kurds As One Lacks 'Heart' and the Other Ammo. *ABC News*. Retrieved from <http://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-beating-iraqis-kurds-lacks-heart-ammo/story?id=24907091>.
- Foreign Terrorist Organizations. (2013, January 1). *U.S. Department of State- Diplomacy in Action*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm#>.

- Frank Fransen, F., Smulders, A. And Kerkdijk, R. (2015) Cybersecurity information exchange to gain insight into the effects of cyber threats and incidents. *e & i Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik*. Volume 132, Issue 2. Pp. 106-112. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00502-015-0289-2>.
- Fraser, G. (2014, October 10). To Islamic State, Dabiq is important – but it's not the end of the world. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2014/oct/10/islamic-state-dabiq-important-not-end-of-the-world>.
- Fromson, J. & Simon, S. (2015, May 19). ISIS: The Dubious Paradise of Apocalypse Now. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. Volume 57, Issue 3. Pp. 7-56, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1046222.
- Frum, M. (2016). Terrorists turn magazine publishers. *Maclean's*, Volume 129, Issue 5, Pp. 43-44.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass Media in the making and the unmaking of the new left. *Berkeley, CA: University of California Press*.
- Grabosky, P. (2007) Requirements of prosecution services to deal with cyber crime. *Crime, Law and Social Change*. Volume 47, Issue 4. Pp. 201-223. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-007-9069-1>.

- Greenhalgh, E. M. and Watt, S. E. and Schutte, N. S. (2015) Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Endorsement of Asylum Seeker Policies in Australia. *Ethics & Behavior, Volume 25, Issue 6*. Pp. 482- 499. DOI: 10.1080/10508422.2014.951720
- Hamas calls for suicide bombings in Israeli buses. (2016, February 7). *The Times of Israel*. Retrieved from <http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-calls-for-suicide-bombings-in-israelis-buses/>.
- Helms, R., Costanza, S. E., and Johnson, N. (2012) Crouching tiger or phantom dragon? Examining the discourse on global cyber-terror. *Security Journal Volume 25*. Pp. 57–75. doi:10.1057/sj.2011.6.
- Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows victory in Syria. (2013, May 25). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22669230>
- Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism (Rev. and expanded ed.). *New York: Columbia University Press*.
- Holbrook, D. (2015) A critical analysis of the role of the internet in the preparation and planning of acts of terrorism. *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. Volume 8:Issue 2*. Pp. 121-133, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2015.1065102
- Holsti, O. (1969). Content analysis for the social sciences and humanities. *Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley*.

Huey, L., (2015). This is Not Your Mother's Terrorism: Social Media, Online Radicalization and the Practice of Political Jamming. *Journal of Terrorism Research. Volume 6, Issue 2*. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.115>

Ingram, H. J. (2015, March 31). An Analysis of the Taliban in Khurasan's Azan. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Volume 38, Issue 7*. Pp. 560-579, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1022093 .

Ingram, H. J. (2014, December 23). Three Traits of the Islamic State's Information Warfare. *The RUSI Journal. Volume 159, Issue 6*. Pp. 4-11, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2014.990810 .

Jalabi, R. (2014, August 11). Who are the Yazidis and why is Isis hunting them?. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/who-yazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains>.

Jenkins, B. (1975). International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. *California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy*.

Johnson, Toni (2011-12-27). Backgrounder - Boko Haram. *Council of Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from www.cfr.org.

Katagiri, N. (2015, March 5). ISIL, insurgent strategies for statehood, and the challenge for security studies. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 26, Issue 3*, Pp. 542-556, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.989672.

Kerlinger, F. (2000) Foundations of Behavioural Research (4th edition). *New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.*

Kfir, I. (2015, February 11). Social Identity Group and Human (In)Security: The Case of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 38, Issue 4.* Pp. 233-252, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.997510.

Kibble, D. (2016, September 9). Dabiq, the Islamic State's Magazine: A Critical Analysis. *Middle East Policy. Volume 23, Issue 3.* Pp. 133-143. DOI: 10.1111/mepo.12222

Kim, D., & Johnson T. J., (2009). A Shift in Media Credibility Comparing Internet and Traditional News Sources in South Korea. *International Communication Gazette. Vol. 71, (no. 4).* pp. 283- pp. 302. doi: 10.1177/1748048509102182. Retrieved from <http://gaz.sagepub.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/2048/content/71/4/283>.

Kirke, X. (2015, December 1). Violence and political myth: Radicalizing believers in the pages of Inspire magazine. *International Political Sociology. Volume 9, Issue 4.* pp. 283- 298. Retrieved from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ips.12098>.

Klausen, J. (2015) Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Volume 38, issue 1.* Pp. 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.974948

- Kruglanski, A. W. (2013). Psychological insights into Indonesian Islamic terrorism: The what, the how and the why of violent extremism. *Asian Journal Of Social Psychology*. *Volume 16, Issue 2*. Pp. 112-116. doi:10.1111/ajsp.12019
- Kyriacou, C. & Zuin, A. (2016) Cyberbullying and moral disengagement: an analysis based on a social pedagogy of pastoral care in schools. *Pastoral Care in Education: An International Journal of Personal, Social and Emotional Development*. *Volume 34, Issue 1*. Pp. 34- 42. DOI: 10.1080/02643944.2015.1134631
- Labott, E. & Schuster, H. (2006, March 24). Lebanese media outlets' assets blocked: U.S. brands Hezbollah-linked TV, radio as terrorist entities. *CNN International*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/23/hezbollah.tv/index.html>.
- Laub, Zachary. (2014, July 4). The Taliban in Afghanistan. *Council of Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from www.cfr.org.
- Lemieux, A. F., & Brachman, J. M., & Levitt, J. & Wood, J. (2014, January 14). Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Volume 26, Issue 2*. Pp. 354-371. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2013.828604
- Lewis, J.A. (2002) Assessing the risks of cyber-terrorism, cyber war and other cyber threats. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/021101_risks_of_cyberterror.pdf.

Lewis, J. (2003) Cyber terror: Missing in action. *Knowledge, Technology & Policy*. Volume 16, Issue 2. Pp. 34-41. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12130-003-1024-6>.

Lewis, K. (2016, March 15). Isis persecution of Christians not justified by Prophet Mohammed's teachings, says study. *The Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-christian-islam-muslim-prophet-mohammed-study-a6932021.html>.

Lu, H., Liang, B. and Taylor, M. (2010) A Comparative Analysis of Cybercrimes and Governmental Law Enforcement in China and the United States. *Asian Journal of Criminology*. Volume 5, Issue 2. Pp. 123-135. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11417-010-9092-5>.

Masters, Jonathan and Laub, Zacary. (2014, January 3). Hezbollah. *Council of Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from www.cfr.org.

McCoy, T. (2014, September 16). The apocalyptic magazine the Islamic State uses to recruit and radicalize foreigners. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/09/16/the-apocalyptic-magazine-the-islamic-state-uses-to-recruit-and-radicalize-foreigners/>.

McDuffee, A. (2014, October 13). ISIS Is Now Bragging About Enslaving Women and Children. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/isis-confirms-and-justifies-enslaving-yazidis-in-new-magazine-article/381394/>.

Menkhaus, K. (2014). Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword. *Brown Journal Of World Affairs*, Volume 20, Issue 2, Pp. 309-327.

Mokhtari, F. (2007, February 14). Countering Terrorism: Could Hezbollah and Hamas Show the Way? *Contemporary Security Policy*. Volume 27, Issue 3. Pp 376-396. DOI: 10.1080/13523260601060305.

Montero, David. (2013, May). Bullets to Ballot Box: A history of Hezbollah. *Frontline*, PBS. Retrieved from <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/lebanon/history.html>.

Nacos, B. (2003). The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11: A Model for Future Terrorism?. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Volume 26, Issue 1. Pp. 1-16. DOI: 10.1080/10576100390145134.

Neumann, P. R. (2013). Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States. *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism*, Volume 36, Issue 6, 431-459. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568

Olson, J. (2009). The rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing Movements and National Politics. *American Studies*, Vol. 50, Issue 3. Pp. 179-180. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41287792>.

Pan, Z. & Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse. *Political Communication*, Volume 10, Issue 1, Pp. 55-75.

Pawlak, P. and Wendling, C. (2013) Trends in cyberspace: can governments keep up?.

Environment Systems and Decisions. Volume 33, Issue 4. Pp. 536-543. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10669-013-9470-5>.

Phillips, D. L. (2015, January 20). ISIS Crisis, American Foreign Policy Interests. *The*

Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Volume 36, Issue 6,
Pp. 351-360, DOI: 10.1080/10803920.2014.993254.

Powell, K. A. (2011) Framing Islam: An Analysis of U.S.

Media Coverage of Terrorism Since 9/11. *Communication Studies, Volume 62, Issue*
Pp. 90-112, DOI: 10.1080/10510974.2011.533599

Prunckun, H. (2014). The First Pillar of Terror - Kill One, Frighten Ten Thousand: a Critical

Discussion of the Doctrinal Shift Associated with the 'New Terrorism'. *Police*
Journal:Theory, Practice and Principles Volume 87, Issue 3. Pp. 178-185.

Rose, S. (2013, September 1). Since 9/11, Racism and Islamophobia Remain Intertwined. *The*

Huffington Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/steve-rose/911-racism-islamophobia_b_3908411.html.

Schorn, D. (2007, March 2). Terrorists Take Recruitment Efforts Online. *CBS News.*

Retrieved from <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/terrorists-take-recruitment-efforts-online/>.

- Sen, S. (2014, July 30). Journalism as Resistance: Contextualizing Media Culture in the Gaza Strip. *Asian Politics and Policy*. Volume 6, Issue 3. Pp. 487- 492. doi: 10.1111/aspp.12130.
- Sivek, S. C. (2013, January 1). Packaging Inspiration: Al Qaeda's Digital Magazine Inspire in the Self-Radicalization Process. *International Journal of Communication*. Volume 7. pp 584-606. (19328036), 7584-606.
- Slater, M. D. (2013) Content Analysis as a Foundation for Programmatic Research In Communications. *Communication Methods and Measures*, Volume 7. Pp. 85-93. DOI: 10.1080/19312458.2013.789836
- Stevens, T. (2013) Information Warfare: A Response to Taddeo. *Philosophy & Technology*. Volume 26, Issue 2. Pp. 221-225. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-012-0070-y>.
- Stohl, M. (2007) Cyber terrorism: a clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, breaking point or patriot games?. *Crime, Law and Social Change*. Volume 46, Issue 4. Pp. 223-238. Retrieved from <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-007-9061-9/fulltext.html>.
- Syria Iraq: The Islamic State militant group.(2014, August 2). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084>

Tewksbury, D., & Scheufele D. A. (2009). News Framing theory and research. *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research. Third Edition.* (pp 17-33). New York, NY: Routledge.

The Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine. (2014, September 10). *The Clarion Project*. Retrieved from <http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq#>.

The rise of Islamist terrorist groups. (2004, January 1). *Constitutional Rights Foundation*. <http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-20-1-c-the-rise-of-islamist-terrorist-groups>

Townshend, C. (2011). The Trouble with Terrorism. *Terrorism a very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turner, J. (2015, March 5). Strategic differences: Al Qaeda's Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 26, Issue 2*. Pp. 208-225. DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1007563.

Wander, A. (2008, July 1). A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1988-2008. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida>

Warner, L., Neubert, C., Mesta, R., and Cuesta, M. (2015). ISIS Recruitment of Women: Western and Gulf State Narratives. *Coventry University*. Retrieved from <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/...ISIS.../566073b008ae4931cd597b3e>.

- Weimann, G. (2008, September). The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism. *American Behavioural Scientist. Volume 52, Issue 1*. Pp. 69-86. doi:
10.1177/0002764208321342.
- Wilkinson, P. (2011). Terrorism, insurgency, asymmetrical conflict. *Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response (Third edition)*. Routledge.
- Wimmer, R.D. and Dominick, J.R. (2003). *Mass Media Research: An Introduction*. Thomson, Wadsworth. Australia.
- Wimmer, R. and Dominick, J. (2014) Content Analysis. *Mass Media Research: An Introduction (10th Edition)*. Pp. 158- 190. Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Woods, J. (2011) Framing terror: an experimental framing effects study of the perceived threat of terrorism. *Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 4, Issue 2*. Pp. 199-217.
DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2011.586205
- Xander, K. (2015) Violence and Political Myth: Radicalizing Believers in the Pages of Inspire Magazine. *International Political Sociology. Volume 9*, Pp. 283–298. doi:
10.1111/ips.12098
- Zech, S.T. & Kelly, Z.M., (2015). Off With Their Heads: The Islamic State and Civilian Beheadings. *Journal of Terrorism Research. Volume 6, Issue 2*. DOI:
<http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.1157>

APPENDIX

Coding Book-

The following coding categories will be used to assess and analyze the selected articles from Dabiq-

Technical Data-

1. **Issue Number-**
Coder will supply the number of the issue (from 1 through 15).
2. **Page Number-**
Coder will supply the number of the page in which the article being analyzed is on.
3. **Slug-**
Coder will supply a slug for the article being coded
4. **Size of article-**
1= small (1 page or less)
2= medium (more than one page, up till 3 pages)
3= large (more than 3 pages)

General Information-

5. **Format of article-**
1= News report
2= Feature
3= Foreword/ Introduction
4= In the enemy's words
0= Other- please specify
6. **Theme of article-**
1= boasting of accomplishments/ successes, reporting on capturing/ occupation, prominent executions/ foley and moath and others
2= reporting on and replying to the words of their opponents, warning the enemy
3= reporting on services provided for citizens
4= advices, teachings
5= reporting on trainings and training camps provided for ISIS' soldiers
0= Other- please specify

Framing-

7. **Framing ISIS as-**
1= Gateway to heaven
2= Caliphate/ governing entity, large political entity/ terrorizes the enemy
3= Terrorist organization/ war group/ dangerous entity
0= other- please specify
8. **Framing ISIS supporters as-**
1= Obedient to God/ Islam, true Muslims, brothers, role models for following ISIS
2= Victims
3= Terrorists, evil, criminals
4= endangered by the ruling political regime/ other political entities (opponent countries/ opponent organizations)
0= other- please specify

9. **Framing ISIS opponents as-**

- 1= Members of the out-group/ enemies, through the use of labelling and name-calling
- 2= Innocent members of different communities who should be defended and protected.
- 0= other- please specify

10. **Framing ISIS soldiers as-**

- 1= Mujahideen (fighters in the name of God), heroes/ lions/ saviours/ protectors, moral agents, martyrs (died for God)
- 2= Terrorists/ vicious murderers/ criminals/ evil-doers
- 0= other- please specify

11. **Framing ISIS victims as-**

- 1= Deserve to be hurt/ must be punished/ cowards
- 2= Innocent humans who should be saved
- 0= other- please specify

12. **Framing ISIS acts of violence as-**

- 1= Necessary actions taken to fulfil a strategic and religious purpose.
- 2= Necessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence
- 3= Unnecessary acts of gruesome torture/ extreme violence/ criminal act
- 0= other- please specify

13. **Presence of women in article?**

- 1= yes
- 2= No

14. **If no, skip category**

If Yes, Framing of women-

- 1= portrayed as fighters
- 2= portrayed as victims
- 3= portrayed as brides/ wives
- 4= portrayed as criminals
- 5= portrayed as slaves/ sexual slaves
- 6= portrayed as mothers/ wives/ supporters of their husbands
- 7= portrayed as leaders
- 8= portrayed as teachers
- 0= other- please specify

15. **Presence of children/ youth in article?**

- 1= yes
- 2= No

16. **If no, skip category,**

If yes, framing children/ youth-

- 1= portrayed as fighters/ lions/ heros/ seeds of ISIS/ the next generation of ISIS jihadis
- 2= portrayed as victims
- 3= portrayed as criminals
- 4= portrayed as endangered (physiological danger, child labour, slavery, kidnapping)
- 5= taking part in social and institutional roles (learning, reading, in social care, in health care)
- 0= other- please specify

17. **Presence of inhumane, violent, graphic acts-**

- 1= Yes
- 2= No

Elements of moral disengagement-

18. Moral justification for inhumane acts-

1= aggressiveness is in the name of religious principles

2= reprimanding political states/ governments

3= Does not take place

19. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Soldiers-

Sanitized labels given to soldiers labeled such as mujahidin, martyrs

1= Takes Place

2= Does not take place

20. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS Victims/opponents-

Sanitized labels given to ISIS victims and/or opponents such as crusaders, mushrikin, kufar

1= Takes Place

2= Doesn't take place

21. Euphemistic Labels given to ISIS acts of violence-

Sanitized labels given to ISIS' acts of violence such as waste, finish off

1= Takes Place

2= Doesn't take place

22. Using the agentless passive voice-

Making inhumane acts appear as the works of nameless forces, not humans

Turning objects into agents

1= Takes Place

2= Doesn't take place

23. Using advantageous comparisons-

ISIS' acts are compared with more reprehensible acts, to make ISIS' seem righteous.

ex- Terrorists' behaviour is viewed as self martyrdom when compared to the cruelty of their enemies.

1= Takes Place

2= Does not take place

24. Displacement of responsibility-

1= Carrying out allah's orders/ religious duty/ duties of higher authority's orders, including ISIS

2= Acts carried out are the fault of the opponents (they brought it onto themselves)

3= Does not take place

25. Diffusion of responsibility-

Soldiers act alone- act together- collective violence in armies- with allah

1= Takes Place

2= Does not take place

26. Disregard or Distortion of Consequences-

Distorting consequences- rewards of heaven, not hell, suffering is good so the victims learn...

1= Takes Place

2= Does not take place

27. Dehumanization of victims-

Making the victim's suffering and pain more arousing, stripping victims of their human qualities and dehumanizing them, victims are merely regarded as sub-human objects, mindless savages, unfortunate creatures, attributing demonic and bestial qualities to the victims, visualizing them as low animal forms and satanic creatures, perpetrators become power holders who devalue those they wield control over

1= Takes Place

2= Does not take place