

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Theses and Dissertations

2-1-2015

European Union foreign policy towards Egypt during the Arab spring of 2011

Ahmed Adel Hassan

Follow this and additional works at: <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds>

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Hassan, A. (2015). *European Union foreign policy towards Egypt during the Arab spring of 2011* [Master's thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/333>

MLA Citation

Hassan, Ahmed Adel. *European Union foreign policy towards Egypt during the Arab spring of 2011*. 2015. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/333>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu.

European Union Foreign Policy towards Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011

A Thesis Submitted by

Ahmed Adel Hassan

To Department of Political Science

December/2015

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The degree of Master of Arts

Has been approved by

Dr. Gamal Soltan

Thesis Committee Advisor *Gamal A. Soltan*

Dr. Riham Bahi

Thesis Committee Reader *Riham Bahi*

Dr. Nadine Sika

Thesis Committee Reader *Nadine Sika*

[Signature]

Department Chair

10/01/2016

Date

[Signature]


Dean

Jan. 24, 2016

Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: LIBRARY
FROM: NATHANIEL BOWDITCH, DEAN
RE: MASTER'S THESIS DEGREE
DATE: JANUARY 24, 2016



Please find the attached signed copy of the M.A. thesis, which has satisfied the requirements of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and is ready for binding and display in the library.

Name of Student: Ahmed Adel Hassan

Department: Political Science (POLS)

Advisor: Gamal Soltan, associate professor of practice

Date Received: January 24, 2016

Title of Thesis: European Union Foreign Policy towards Egypt during the Arab Spring of 2011

cc: Department Chair
Registrar
Office of Graduate Studies and Research
Office of the Dean
Candidate

American University in Cairo
Thesis submitted
to
The Political Science Department

European Union Foreign
Policy Towards Egypt during
the Arab Spring of 2011

Advisor: Dr. Gamal Soltan

Prepared By: Ahmed Adel

Hassan

ID Number: 800081158

Fall 2015

Table of Contents

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION	5
Statement of the Problem	6
Hypothesis.....	6
Objectives/Significance of the Study.....	7
Literature Review	7
Conceptual Framework	17
Presence/ International Image	18
Opportunity/ external environment	19
Capability/ Internal factors.....	20
Methodology.....	22
CHAPTER II: THE NATURE OF EU FOREIGN POLICY	23
Mechanisms of the EU’s foreign policy.....	23
Goals of the EU foreign policy.....	24
Limitations and Restrictions of the EU’s foreign policy	26
Democracy Promotion of the EU	27
EU’s Image in the International Arena	30
EU Foreign Policy in Effect: Tunisia	31
Concluding Remarks.....	34
CHAPTER III: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING	36
Before the CFSP	36
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.....	37

European Neighborhood Policy	40
Union for the Mediterranean	44
Political conditionality and evaluation of the EU-Egypt relations before the Arab Spring.....	46
Concluding remarks	47
CHAPTER IV: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARAB SPRING	49
The Revolution and the EU's Initial Response.....	49
SCAF Period and EU Action	52
SCAF Transition	53
EU Action Throughout SCAF Period	55
Morsi- EU Relations.....	66
June 30th Revolt and the Transition	70
Al-Sisi's Egypt – EU relations.....	74
Democracy Promotion of the EU After the Arab Spring in Egypt	78
Concluding Remarks.....	79
CHAPTER V: THE IMPACTS OF EU'S STRUCTURE AND MEMBER COUNTRIES TO ITS FOREIGN	
POLICY EFFECTIVENESS	81
Impacts of the Member Countries on EU's policy toward Egypt.....	81
France.....	89
Germany.....	94
Italy.....	98
United Kingdom	100
Impacts of the EU's Structure and Decision-Making System to EU's Policies.....	105
Concluding Remarks.....	111

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION.....	112
Limitations of the Study	114
Future Research Direction	114
Bibliography	116

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In December 2010, Tarek Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor had set himself on fire to protest against the humiliation he suffered on the hands of a woman police officer. While the government tried to quell the potential impacts of Bouazizi's protest, his death served as a catalyst to the call for political change. Several Middle Eastern and North African countries – such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Algeria and Jordan – have been affected by the uprisings dubbed as the “Arab Spring”.¹

With the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolution, the Egyptian opposition groups took the opportunity to instigate demonstrations and labor strikes throughout the country to force Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign from office.² As the protests occurred in Egypt and in other parts of the Middle East, protesters sought the support of the international community to facilitate reform and democracy in the country– especially from the European Union (EU).³ With its closeness to the region and the implications of the Arab uprisings to the European nations, it is a question as to how the EU contributed to the unleashed political process.

¹ Katerina Dalacoura. “The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications.” *International Affairs* 88.1 (2012): 63-66.

² Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." *The World Factbook*. October 20, 2015.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html> (accessed October 24, 2015).

³ W Vandenhoe. *Child Soldiers and the EU Policy on Children on Armed Conflict*. Brussels: TEPSA, 2014.

Statement of the Problem

With the onset of the Arab Spring, external actors found themselves caught off guard by the democratic uprisings and the implications they hold to their respective national interests in the region. For the EU, the instability in the region presents challenges to the long relationship the European nations culminated with the Middle East, especially with Egypt. The uprising created a situation where the EU had to develop new policies to capitalize on the opportunity for democratic change while maintaining the decades long EU's interest in Egypt. Accordingly, the main question this study tries to answer is whether and the extent to which the EU was able to adopt the proper policies, particularly whether the EU was able to use the resources at its disposal to facilitate democratic change in Egypt.

The following secondary questions would also be answered throughout the study:

1. What is the nature of the EU's foreign policy in terms of its mechanism, limitations, major premises and factors influencing its effectiveness?
2. What is the history of EU-Egyptian partnership prior to the Arab Spring?
3. Where there any changes to EU-Egyptian relations after the Arab Spring to the present?
4. How does the situation of Tunisia and the EU's actions in the country differ from the EU's actions in the Egyptian case?

Hypothesis

This study will argue that while the European Union has established several channels that would aid Egypt in reemerging from the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU was not able to adjust its policies in a way that could have make it more effective to capitalize on Egypt's democratic window of opportunity. Consequently, the EU continued to prioritize its tangible

interests over democratization. The political instability in the region, the interests of EU member states and the complex nature of the EU's structure are the reasons for the EU's failure. The guiding hypothesis of this thesis are stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1

The existing differences in interest and lack of coordination amongst EU member states has affected an overall effective EU foreign policy; of which hindered EU institutions from promoting democracy in Egypt during the Arab Spring.

Hypothesis 2

The development of an effective policy towards Egypt during the Arab Spring did not take place due to the institutional setting and complex structure of the EU.

Objectives/Significance of the Study

This study aims to investigate if the European Union as an individual power can promote change in regions affected by the Arab Spring, especially democracy. Like other countries involved in international issues such as the EU, democracy promotion is a major component of their foreign policy. However, the EU often acts in support with US efforts when it comes to the resolution of a conflict and recovery of a certain country. Democracy promotion and reform are integral elements to the EU's foreign policy and the researcher hopes to understand if the Union can indeed deliver its promises. This study is also important because democracy is often considered by the Western powers as the key to Middle Eastern recovery but what do the people see over the Western-led programs to achieve this freedom.

Literature Review

In recent years, the Middle East has been a hot topic for the international community as the political instability in the region has brought immense conflict. The public started rebelling

against decades old autocratic regimes present in the region, ushering the beginning of the Arab Spring. However, the regimes they are trying to overthrow have fought extensively against protesters and paralyzed the entire country in the process. In Egypt, the impact of the Arab Spring not only triggered political unrest in the country, but also the political uncertainty as the country remained unstable even after the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak. The international community had been involved with the efforts to resuscitate Egypt through the Arab Spring and the European Union's actions have been seen by experts both as a beneficial and controversial in nature. This literature review will look in depth to the analysis of various experts with regards to the European Union's involvement with the Arab Spring, especially in the issue of Egypt.

Like the United States, the EU is supportive over the actions of protesters in fighting for democracy in Egypt. The EU made itself serve as an impartial mediator, sending emissaries consistently in the region to ensure that negotiations can be brokered in a neutral environment. It uses diplomatic pressure to ensure governments would agree to the dialogues set by negotiations, approving funding to ensure targets are met for reform to flourish.⁴ Various external policy objectives or instruments such as political, economic and military means were used by the Union in various degrees and the Union had also used civilian policing and judicial instruments to sustain its policies. In terms of its foreign policy, the Union uses diplomacy extensively to ensure that continuous dialogue between the Union and the developing country is sustained. The EEAS is an integral actor in utilizing continuous diplomacy between the Union and other nations. Economic policy instruments are used by the Union in terms of its foreign assistance programs. Military and civilian instruments are used in several critical events worldwide to ensure that

⁴ Richard Youngs. *From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed*. (Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014): 12.

political and economic policy instruments are usable by the Union to establish relations with recipient countries. When the Lisbon Treaty was introduced, a clear framework to the EU's actor capability was highlighted to ensure policy instruments are used without issues by the member countries.⁵

The EU immediately adjusted its policies in the first phase of the Arab Spring; but they knew that they cannot direct the tide to their intentions. Instead, the EU redirected its position to mirror the intentions of the Arab protestors. They also believed that sustainable stability must be restored in Egypt and in the Arab region. The EU's positions were clearly stated under the "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" and later on, "A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood", highlighting that the EU would actively support ongoing democratic transition processes.⁶ The EU also highlights three priorities when it comes to supporting democratic transition. The first priority deals with deep democracy, which would restore human rights freedoms and democracy. The EU also pledges to build people partnerships to boost civil society development and ensure they will be involved in the establishment of the new European Neighborhood Policy between the EU and Egypt. Finally, the EU also assures that they will aid Egypt's efforts to promote inclusive growth and sustainable development to ensure that democracy would run deep and ensure active participation from the

⁵ Bretherton & Vogler." 385-386.

⁶ Ivo Iliev, Gabriela Tabakova, Ivan Nikov, Mariela Koycheva, Krasimir Yankov, and Ralitz Trifonova. *European neighborhood policy- a new attitude towards the "Southern neighbors"*. (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012): 10-13.

public.⁷ Aside from these two policies, the EU also introduced the “3 Ms” in ensuring that reform and progress can be sent to the region through the EU’s assistance. These three M’s – Money, Mobility and Markets – would ensure the recovery of affected Arab countries by the Arab Spring and ensure the creation of new opportunities for progress to develop in the country. It is also expected that these three M’s would also open civil society participation and development to flourish, while helping businesses to get funding.⁸

In comparison to the policies stressed by the EU, the individual members of the EU had also expressed their own intentions with regards to their involvement in the Arab Spring. The positions of these individual member countries influences EU’s overall policies in the region, mostly highlighting these member country’s national interests and regional priorities in the region.⁹ The United Kingdom, for example, sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and protesters, calling for democratic elections.¹⁰ On the other hand, for France, it intended to use the

⁷ Timo Behr. *After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition*. Policy Paper No. 54, (Paris: Notre Europe, 2012): 8-10.

⁸ European Commission. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." *European Commission Press Release Database*. December 16, 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm (accessed October 5, 2015).

⁹ Elena Lazarou, Maria Gianniou, and Gerasimos Tsourapas. "The Limits of Norm Promotion: The EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine." *Insight Turkey* 15, no. 2 (2013): 179.

¹⁰ British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. *British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13*. (London: The Stationery Office, 2012): 67.

situation as a means to boost France's position as the leader of the EU and lead the efforts in pushing for change in the region. However, France's realpolitik policies in the region was not able to hold firmly, especially after Hosni Mubarak – an ally of France - was ousted in 2011. In a statement after the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the significance of these protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region.

11

During the period of the Arab Spring in Egypt and after the interim governments were put in place, experts have been divided with regards to the impact brought in by EU involvement and the extent of EU policies. The EU has regularly sent emissaries and its top leaders like European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy in Egypt to support continuous movements for democracy and human rights. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) published on March 8th, 2011 also highlighted the EU's initial policy response to the Arab Spring and how democracy and human rights protection would be attained through the improvement of civil society groups. Although there is a flexible clause on how the PfDSP would be applied for civil society improvement, its effectiveness is challenged by the document itself because it did not clearly define who are the 'social partners' and 'civil society' that should be supported.¹² The Morsi government had immediately resumed talks with the EU with the creation of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement and the development of the ENP Action Plan. The EEAS had also sent electoral experts to ensure that

¹¹ Barah Mikail. *France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence*. Working Paper No. 110, (Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2011): 5.

¹² Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." *Middle East Critique* 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.

the Egyptian Elections of 2012 will be in accordance to democratic standards and held fairly without interruptions. The EU has also offered to send in an EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) should the Egyptian government seek their assistance. Financially, the EU has opened 449 million euros for 2011-2013. Further financial pledges were also offered by the EIB and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) amounting to 5 billion euros, the SPRING Programme meant for socio-economic reform offered 90 million euros and 163 million euros would be offered by the Neighborhood Investment Facility. The EU has also agreed with the Egyptian government to further establish a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement to ensure economic reform in the country.¹³

Despite these proposals and aid reliefs, experts believe there is a necessity to review its current partnerships and programs in Egypt. First, considerations on the political balance in the country must be considered as President Morsi's policies are pragmatic, but somehow unstable.¹⁴ Although he had been vocal at first in continuing EU-Egyptian relations in order to resuscitate the country, the Egyptian political environment remained unstable due to Morsi's declarations that restricted opposition towards his control.¹⁵

¹³ European Commission. "EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years." *European Commission Press Release Database*. February 8, 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm (accessed October 5, 2015).

¹⁴ Timo Behr, and Aaretti Siitonen. *Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after the Arab Spring*. FIIA Working Paper No. 77, (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013): 15.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Furthermore, the EU remains divided as to how they can unify their foreign policy towards these ailing countries.¹⁶ There were experts stressing that the EU's revisions of its foreign policy were not done in preparation of their actions towards Egypt, but it was done out of bureaucracy. It is said that that the EU no longer had a clear goal and intent in changing its Southern neighbors, especially after the failed 2010 elections.¹⁷

There is also the issue of Egypt's continuous economic problems, thus the need for the EU's policies to be economic-centered.¹⁸ It is also noted by experts that the EU must ensure that their policies in Egypt are stronger similar to their actions in Tunisia, pressuring the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to deliver democracy.¹⁹ Further assurances must also be done to ensure that EU incentives are delivered in the region which would catch the attention and support of the donor countries. The lack of clear protocols and benefits Egypt will gain from EU's assistance causes them – and other Arab countries – to turn down any potential negotiations with the EU regarding EU's Action Plans.²⁰ Currently, it is notable that while Europe's assistance in the region does present opportunities for change and development in the region, it is uncertain as

¹⁶ Kristyn Greco. "The Arab Spring: Where Was the EU, and What is its Future Role in the Region?" *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 13, no. 4 (2013): 5-6.

¹⁷ Vera van Hullen. *EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015, 134.

¹⁸ Vanda Amaro Dias. "A Critical Analysis of the EU's Response to the Arab Spring and its Implications for EU Security." *Perspectives on European Society and Politics*, no. 1 (2014): 50.

¹⁹ Daniela Huber. "Mixed Signals" Still? *The EU's Democracy and Human Rights Policy Since the Outbreak of the Arab Spring*. IAI Working Papers 12, (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2012): 5-6.

²⁰ Richard Youngs. *The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy*. Policy Brief no. 100, (Madrid: Fudacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2011): 2-4.

to whether or not it would strengthen the possibility of agreements to hold.²¹ Experts also argue that should in case these transitioning countries fail to recover, Europe would have to face the security threats that would be brought by immigration, especially when returning migrants to the country.²²

The ineffective EU policies in Egypt makes a point of agreement among most scholars and observers. Some evidence suggests that policies were attempted but failed, while others simply suggest false flags on the part of EU institutions and member states in attempting to provide any real help. Hollis uses primary evidence or reference points by EU institutions, which admit to failure in the region.²³ She refers to 'EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' statements that admit to revisions needed to policies in Egypt. Hollis also cited inefficiency in the EEAS in keeping up with the changing Egyptian political environment. Vivien Pertusot added that the failure of the EU institutions was also attributed to its incapacity to coordinate with its member countries which prolonged their collective action to the Egyptian crisis. Each institution also varied on how the EU should act towards Egypt.²⁴

²¹ Michelle Pace, and Peter Seeberg. *The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean*. (London: Routledge, 2013): 121-122.

²² Micheline Ishay. "The spring of Arab nations? Paths toward democratic transition." *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 2013: 9-10.

²³ Rosemary Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'." *International Affairs* 88, no. 1 (2012): 87-89.

²⁴ Vivien Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." *Carnegie Europe*. May 27, 2011. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230> (accessed November 10, 2015).

This offers an interesting perspective as Pertusot and Hollis' opinions are drawn from EU rhetoric, as opposed to a more analytical perspective offered by Behr.²⁵ His argument suggests that EU foreign policy failure in Egypt originated from a handful of European states setting EU foreign policy, as the Union as a whole, was more entrenched in the handling of the global financial crisis.²⁶ It is unique how both scholars, along with the likes of Rosa Balfour, do agree that policy was set purely in favor of individual bilateral relations between member states and Egypt; working to benefit leading EU member states. Balfour; however, does go on to suggest though that this was a result of the ever growing competition for dominance of resources in the region between the US and EU member states.²⁷ We must be vigilant in the knowledge that this level of competition put mutual efforts in place between Europe and the US to secure mutually beneficial sources; while on the other hand ,creating a form of state-level competition. What is meant by this is the individual economic competition between the likes of Germany and the US, as well as Germany and France, to name but a few outside of EU institutions and establishments.

Pierre Vimont argues that the complex institutional setting of the EU framework for policy making generally hinders the EU ability to develop effective foreign policy. He claims that EU member states have no framework or criteria for foreign policy-making. Therefore, the 'added value' brought by EU foreign policy has never really been felt, but much rather based on the achievements of individual member states away from EU institutions.²⁸

²⁵ Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?" *Amsterdam Law Forum* (2012).

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Balfour. *Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring*. 31-34.

²⁸ Pierre Vimont. "The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy." (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2015).

Given that EU foreign policy during the Arab Spring was to advance democracy, in much the same way they preached all over Europe, the tools they disposed upon the Arab region suggest otherwise by scholars. Rosa Balfour's perspective is a stance of pragmatism, in that she isolates humanitarian assistance; military assistance by NATO forces also affiliated within the EU, as well as economic support, analyze as points for review of the issue; based on these pragmatic tools actually being carried out after the Arab Spring.²⁹ Her analysis suggests that these tools either did not go far enough, to bring any real change to the region; or were in fact counterproductive and served only to benefit strong states in the EU and their own foreign policies.³⁰ Case in point being the use of the EU to achieve specific access to resources following the Arab Spring, by using NATO forces to overthrow General Gaddafi in Libya; despite the legality of the operation being questionable. This contrasts with the expressions of Jon Marks who portrays the EMP, since its induction, all the way through the UFM and onwards, as to be the actual points of analysis to refer to for EU foreign policy tools in the region.³¹ His argument portrays these key methods as a way for the EU to tackle the worsening migration problem in Europe, through a questionable development policy in the Arab region, which covers up true intentions; serving to only cover areas in the economy, border security, and even constitutionally to repel migrant movements into Europe.

Hollis, on the other hand, again examines the rhetoric of the EU in exemplifying their successful exportation of democracy throughout Eastern Europe following the collapse of Soviet

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Jon Marks. 'High hopes and low motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative.'

Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (1996): 1-24.

Satellite states.³² Again, she does the job of balancing a positive and negative opinion by showing that the EU had a more successful record, especially in economic senses, in the Arab region, if compared with other external actors, such as the Americans or non-European NATO states. On the other hand, she does hold strong criticism for the credibility of the ENP. All source analyzed from a critical perspective, express the ENP as nothing more than a means of advancing EU individual member states own respective policies, rather than achieving the claims they set out to be of mutual benefit; securing a strong baring for the hypothesis on EU member states interfering in the ability of EU institutions to do the required job.

Again, Vimont additionally critiques the structure of the EU, in so far that it leads its decisions and toolbox on the powers originally given to the Union by its treaties and by the decisions of EU constitutional judges, therefore not allowing EU institutions responsible with issues of foreign policy to have all capabilities at their disposal.³³

This lack of framework for dialogue amongst EU member state is furthered by Timo Behr³⁴, who acknowledges the existence of tension or the lack of agreement between essentialist and contigencist interpretations of political Islam from within the EU and among member states, as a basic example in post revolution relations with the region. As a result of this, Behr argues that a bi-polar stance exists from within the EU, leading to an effective and ever-changing set of policies being put in place. Furthermore, he argues that this has led to conflicting policies by

³² Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'": 87-89.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Timo Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?" *Amsterdam Law Forum* 4, no. 2 (2012): 79.

member states within their bilateral relations.³⁵ His reference focuses heavily on the interpretations of Political Islam from within the EU in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Conceptual Framework

The EU's foreign policy is influenced by various factors that affects the continuity of its functions and changes the level of its effectiveness: presence (EU's international reputation and expectations to EU's actions), opportunity (external environment) and capability (internal factors).³⁶ These three factors make the analytical framework applied in this thesis.

Presence/ International Image

Presence involves the ability of one actor to exert its influence and for the EU, this meant a combination of the EU's identity and the impacts of its internal policies. The EU is often considered as "community of security and prosperity", allowing it to gain the cooperation of other nations supporting the ideals of the Union.³⁷ With the cooperation of other nations, it increases EU's presence in the international community and call for further cooperation. The presence of the EU in the global arena has been sustained by its internal achievements since the establishment of the customs union and the single market. The growing EU 's capabilities serves as a magnet for the Union to accumulate partners whom wish to gain benefits from the Union's resources.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Charlotte Bretherton, and John Vogler. "A global actor past its peak?" *International Relations* 27, no. 3 (2013): 376.

³⁷ Bretherton & Vogler." A global actor past its peak?" 377

³⁸ Bretherton & Vogler." 377-378.

According to the article of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, prior to the onset of the Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab nations, the EU was considered one of the pioneers of international human rights protections and democracy promotion after the United States. In light of this image, the EU had introduced various instruments to sustain its democracy promotion and human rights programs worldwide through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR-I) program. Under the program, the EU allocates funds meant for the improvement of human rights and democracy promotion in recipient countries. However, even before the Arab Spring, several reviews were done by the EU regarding the effectiveness of the EIDHR-I where problems have been indicated.³⁹

By the time the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, Andrea Teti stated that the EU still maintained its stance in protecting human rights and democracy promotion. The Union retained the conceptual framework which was used under the EIDHR-I, stressing that their action in Egypt and other Arab nations represents an innovation on how external relations can be done.⁴⁰

Opportunity/ external environment

Opportunity, on the other hand, refers to the external environment that influences foreign action. The external environment could mean the onset of events that opens the possibility for EU involvement. Globalization and the initial isolationist policies of the administration of George W. Bush, including the withdrawal of the United States in 2000 from the negotiations regarding the Kyoto Protocol are some of the instances where the EU stepped as the global

³⁹ “The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries” in 2001 (COM (2001) 252).

⁴⁰ Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." *Middle East Critique* 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.

leader.⁴¹ In the case of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU's foreign policy was challenged by the domestic politics of Egypt which remained unstable, generating conflicting demands on external actors, and defied external influence.⁴²

Capability/ Internal factors

Finally, the EU's foreign policy effectiveness and continuity is also influenced by the internal factors that redefines the capability of the EU's foreign policy. Experts often highlight that the EU's foreign or external action/inaction is determined by its capability on formulating policy and utilize various policy instruments to enforce these policies. In terms of policy formulation, the EU's policies are often influenced by three factors: coherence between levels of policy-making, coherence between policy sectors, and institutional coherence between EU institutions. The impact of these coherence issues vary in severity depending on the policy area in question with foreign and security policy included in the 'sensitive' areas that has greater importance when it comes to how these three factors affect EU's external policy. Under the problem of coherence between levels of policy making, member states' interests play role in establishing foreign policy because while these member countries can support EU action, many would prefer to continue old relations with countries they have long relations such as former colonies.⁴³ The influence of the member countries differ in nature in the EU's foreign policy capability because of six major factors: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic ideology and integration preferences. When it comes to foreign policy, the size, state structure

⁴¹ Bretherton & Vogler." 379.

⁴² Timo Behr, and Aaretti Siitonen. *Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after the Arab Spring*. FIIA Working Paper No. 77, (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013): 15.

⁴³ Bretherton & Vogler." 382-383.

and attitude towards integration preferences influence how the member countries develop their policies towards the particular developing countries.⁴⁴

Three member countries of the EU also influence the nature of its foreign policy and redirects the policies to match their respective foreign policies. Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Although there are other big member states, these three are generally perceived as global actors due to their permanent membership in UN Security Council (UK and France) and their position in the global economy. Collectively, the Big Three represent 40% of the EU's total population and a half of the EU's GDP. The three countries also possess the largest share of military expenditures and provide over 40% of the EU's diplomats.⁴⁵

EU foreign policy is also influenced by coherence between policy sectors such as trade, environment, and energy. With the multi-level nature of the EU, coherence between policy sectors is often difficult to achieve. Finally, coherence between the EU' internal policy coordination through its institutions also play a role in the capacity of EU foreign policy. Several of the policies and programs which were created by the EU to ensure integration between all institutions of the Union are fluid in terms of policy coherence such as the Cardiff Process in 1998.⁴⁶

The factors under policy formation in the case of Egypt can be seen in various parts of the Crisis. In the case of coherence between policy-making levels, each member country had

⁴⁴ Brigid Laffan, and Alexander Stubb. "Member States." In *The European Union: How does it work?*, by Elizabeth Bomberg, John Peterson and Richard Corbett, 74-98. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 76.

⁴⁵ Stefan Lehne. *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*. Publication, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012): 7.

⁴⁶ Bretherton & Vogler." 381-385.

their respective positions with regards to how the EU should react. The Big Three – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – for example, defined their own version of EU action on January 29, 2011 without considering the EU's overall stance in the issue.⁴⁷ There was also a lack of support from the EU member countries when it comes to the enactment of the revisions for the ENP as some members were against continuous EU-Mediterranean relations while others pressed their national interests in dealing with the region.⁴⁸

Methodology

In order to analyze the arguments properly regarding the EU's actions in the Egypt throughout the Arab Spring and its aftermath, this study utilized content analysis and a case study. Content analysis is one of the major tools used in political science research and the perfect research method to interpret the documents from the EU and its member countries throughout the duration of the crisis. This research method will also be able to permit the researcher to verify the facts. The case study, on the other hand, is also utilized by this researcher to provide a brief analysis of two different countries and indicate their similarities and differences. For this study, a case study is used to determine the nature of the EU-Egyptian relations before, during and after the Arab Spring and highlight the similarities and differences it has over another country which the EU has been involved with, such as Tunisia. The case study would also provide the researcher and the researchers an overview with regards to the nature of the entire crisis.

⁴⁷ Vivien Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." *Carnegie Europe*. May 27, 2011. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230> (accessed November 10, 2015).

⁴⁸ Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue."

CHAPTER II: THE NATURE OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter discusses the nature of EU's foreign policy and the EU's intentions of expanding its international presence. A thorough explanation of the region's foreign policy objectives and mechanisms will be included alongside its limitations and restrictions. The EU's democracy promotion would also be discussed. The EU's effectiveness as an international actor is also discussed, with a brief discussion of its actions in Tunisia throughout the Arab Spring will also be included to highlight similarities or differences in the EU's actions in Egypt.

Mechanisms of the EU's foreign policy

The EU's foreign policy mechanism is quite complex as it has a multifaceted system that divides EU's foreign policy into different levels. This multifaceted system of the EU takes into consideration two different treaties: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The TEU includes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), highlighting the influence of the member countries in terms of developing the EU's foreign policy through the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The TFEU, on the other hand, comprises the "Community method" wherein the Council of the EU, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the Court of justice tackles majority voting regarding external policies of the Union.

However, it is observed that the EU does not always adhere to the premises of the Treaties when it comes to foreign policy, especially depending on the foreign policy issue in question. The national and the EU level actors play a key role in developing EU's foreign policy,

ensuring that the national level remains influential in EU institutions while the EU's policies are applied by the member states. Foreign policy is also influenced by the international context through the organizations and alliances done by either the EU or the member countries. As a result, all of the Union's foreign policy is done in conjunction with other organizations and the organization's initiatives. The EU foreign policy also showcases the presence of national foreign policy despite the presence of a common foreign and security policy that would unite the EU's member countries on foreign policy. As signatories to the TEU, member states are expected to adhere to the CFSP. However, with the creation of the Lisbon Treaty's Declarations 13 and 14, member countries have the power to influence EU's foreign policy.⁴⁹

Goals of the EU foreign policy

The EU's foreign policy is not always influenced by external objectives which has the capacity influence the external environment, but it is also influenced by their internal objectives. The EU's internal objectives can be classified into three categories: interrelational objectives, integration objectives and identity objectives. Interrelational objectives often consider the mutual relations of each member country influenced by the Union's intentions on integrating its member states in one group. After the Second World War, European integration was one of the major concerns of the Union to improve relations between European states and create a medium wherein countries can achieve their national interests without resorting to war. Considering this intentions, the EU's foreign policy is designed to promote diplomacy to prevent conflict between member countries especially on issues on foreign policy. This framework is also designed to ensure that mutual understanding between countries can be achieved. However, this also means

⁴⁹ Stephan Keukeleire & Tom Delreux. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 11-19.

that member countries can opt out from supporting or resolving a specific foreign policy within the EU framework because it may cause further conflict between member countries.

Aside from interrelational objectives, the EU's foreign policy also takes into consideration internal objectives that would boost not just the European integration initiative, but also influence how Europe can grow as a united region. Member states can adopt foreign policies that would match this objective, proving to the rest of the world that the EU is a group that legitimizes their unity and create a collective identity that unites each member country. Of course, member states' support in this level may vary depending on the foreign policy issues that may influence their own national interests. These objectives also showcase that each member state and its actors have high expectations with the EU's capacity and show their capacity in influencing the EU's foreign policy.

Aside from these objectives, additional objectives are highlighted by the TEU and the TFEU that supports the EU's foreign policy. Under the TEU, the international action of the EU is based on the virtues that has designed its inception. Article 21(2) of the TEU also adds that the EU aims to ensure that its values, national interest, security concerns, and integrity through its foreign policy. The EU also aims to prevent conflicts and preserve peace in various regions in order to strengthen the capacity of international security worldwide. The Union also wishes to aid the development of sustainable development in developing countries which is currently having issues on stopping the growth of poverty. They also hope to introduce trade unions and an active participation of all nations in the world market. The TEU also highlights the intentions of the EU to boost environmental protection and better aid and humanitarian efforts worldwide.

Finally, the TEU also highlights that the EU also aims to use its foreign policy to promote a stronger international system that has active cooperation from all states.⁵⁰

Limitations and Restrictions of the EU's foreign policy

However, the foreign policy of the EU has three major limitations that restricts their actions in the international community. The first limitation the foreign policy has is the issue on task expansion. As the EU continues to expand, the EU has to consider how to integrate the new government within its complex framework. Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had more than 40,000 diplomats and took over 1,500 missions. However, while these diplomats ensured that the EU had a presence in these countries, it was difficult to initiate foreign programs as no government or minister can issue orders for these diplomats. Further issues were also caused by the fragmented infrastructure in Brussels where the EU headquarters is located. Upon the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the High Representative was given the power to order the EEAS and monitor the activities of the EU diplomatic corps worldwide.

Aside from the problems in task expansion, another critical limitation in the EU's foreign policy is its incapacity in uniting the Community into one cohesive unit when it comes to political and economic programs and positions. Normally, the European Union has the capacity to deal with 'low' politics or domestic politics that would ensure that issues such as economics, trade and common monetary policy would be supported by all member countries. In terms of trade, for example, the Community method of decision-making is used to establish the policy and provides power to the Union's infrastructure. The EU also flourished as one of the leaders in aid

⁵⁰ Keukeleire & Delreux. (2014). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. pp. 24-26.

and development policy and environmental diplomacy. However, when it comes to ‘high politics’ or issues pertaining to traditional diplomacy, the Union is unable to speak as one unit. Although the members of the EU are signatories to the Maastricht Treaty that introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there is still no common and singular foreign policy that would replace national foreign policies completely. It is also difficult for the EU to launch the CFSP because it needs intergovernmental consensus that would allow the EU to stand in for the member countries and member country support.

Finally, the EU is also limited and restricted in movement because of the expectations of the world regarding the capacity of the EU in fulfilling its targets and supporting their actions. Since the end of the Cold War, EU foreign policy-makers had exaggerated the capacity of the region’s foreign policy and stressed that the Union can respond to issues faster than other countries. However, for the past two decades, the EU’s narrative of being an effective global actor waned to the point they still are not considered as a major global power by the rest of the globe. In one statement, former EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten stated that Europe can be considered as a good support to the US when it comes to supporting the resolution of world issues and they can also be effective when it comes to solving problems close to the region like the issue in the Balkans⁵¹

Democracy Promotion of the EU

It is also under the EU’s foreign policy initiatives that it also aims to promote democracy in an international level. According to Article 21(1) of the TEU, the EU’s international stance is influenced by core objectives and principles that highlight the Union’s values:

⁵¹ John Peterson. (2012). The EU as a Global Actor. In E. Bomberg, J. Peterson, & R. Corbett, *The European Union: How does it work?* (pp. 203-223). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 207-208.

“The Union’s actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”⁵²

The EU’s intentions on spreading the growth of democracy holds merits as many experts have indicated that the region has been the most successful in promoting democracy and human rights worldwide. Prior to the creation of the EU, Germany had led the region’s initiatives in promoting democracy through the creation of training and seminar workshops that would introduce democracy. Political parties in the period even created international offices in order to support the democracy programs. British political parties also supported democracy development in the region and the government has provided funding for most of these efforts. When the EU had been established, it slowly incorporated the ideas by its member countries on how it can introduce democracy to their newest member countries and accession countries. This was important considering that the EU had processed the expansion of the Union to former communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Aside from the premises of the TEU, further efforts by the EU to improve its democracy promotion in its foreign policy was done through the improvement of its development assistance programs in 2005. The European Council adopted a resolution that would call new member states to contribute 0.17 percent of their gross national income to the Union’s development assistance program by 2010 and later on, contribute 0.33 percent by 2015. Although the

⁵² Keukeleire & Delreux. (2014). *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. p. 25.

percentage of the contributed funds of the member states were very modest, the active participation of each member state to the initiative shows that the EU has now grown as a significant actor in foreign assistance. Many member states had highlighted that these foreign assistance contributions are for the introduction of democracy and human rights. Democracy and human rights had also been the prime focus of European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso as he even introduced new institutions and programs to ensure that these democracy assistance funds and services are delivered to nations needing their support. Currently, the EU is even considered as the world's largest foreign aid donor.

One of the programs introduced and used by the Commission for democracy assistance is EuropeAid. Under the program's main mandate, EuropeAid's functions are the following:

“The Commission's support to democratization pursues both a top-down and bottom-up approach. This includes democratic institution building, such as capacity building of parliaments and local governments, electoral support and observation, reform and training of the judiciary, and anti-corruption measures. It also covers civil society programs, including projects supporting non-state actors in their advocacy, information and education activities in the areas of human rights and democracy, as well as lobbying to secure political change or to monitor the actions of public institutions.”

Aside from the EuropeAid, the EU also uses the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights program as a means to deliver assistance to recipient countries. The program has an annual budget of 140 million euros that would be used for the improvement of civil society organizations that would lead in democracy development in the country. The funding also supports EU's election monitoring programs around the globe. The EU also uses the funds to

assist in stopping programs like capital punishment and violence and support organizations like the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.⁵³

However, some critics indicated that EU's democracy promotion is quite vague in nation despite the fact it is considered one of the leaders in democracy promotions worldwide. The Union remains divided over the creation of a European Consensus on Democracy which would highlight a unified definition on democracy for the entire Union. Elements on what kind of democracy the Union also tries to pursue is very vague, even in some of its programs such as the EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. When the EU included the Central and Eastern European countries, there were inconsistencies on how the EU can introduce democracy in these countries now that they are a part of the EU. It is essential that the EU resolves this issue because it would prevent its effectiveness in promoting democracy.⁵⁴

EU's Image in the International Arena

When it comes to the EU's status in the international community, it has a very varied relation with the several members of the international community depending on their specialization and policies. The EU either takes a full membership participation when it comes to international organization or an observer status, depending on the policies supported by the organization. For example, the EU is only an observer in the International Labor Organization. However, if there are instances where the EU is prevented from taking part of international organizations, the EU retains some semblance of presence through their Member States. Although some Member States can be reluctant over representing the EU, these member

⁵³ Lindsay Lloyd. (2010). European approaches to democracy promotion. *International Journal* , 557-558.

⁵⁴ Anne Wetzel & Jan Orbie. (2012). *The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot*.

Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1-4.

countries are expected to represent the organization especially if the Union holds immense influence in an issue domain as part of their cooperation. After the Lisbon Treaty was enforced, several provisions were listed by the treaty when it comes to the Union's stance in international organizations and it is the High Representative who represent the Union in the international community.⁵⁵

EU Foreign Policy in Effect: Tunisia

Like other Mediterranean countries, the EU and Tunisia have shared a very long relationship that enabled the EU to retain a semblance of presence in the country. Tunisia is a signatory to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) which was established under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and political dialogue began between Tunisia and the EU in 1998. There were issues when it came to the negotiations with the country due to the quality and content of the dialogue as noted by the Association Council meetings between the EU and Tunisia. Tunisia also restricted some movement for the democracy promotion in the region with the EU because of meeting postponements and political dissonance as seen in 2005 and 2007. The EU was also unable to commit to new programs with Tunisia for democratic reform since 2005 due to the complications of imposing earlier projects raised under the MEDA and the EIDHR program. However, there were analysis stressing that EU-Tunisia partnership in establishing democracy promotion in the country from the 1990s to 2005 had failed because of little democracy assistance programs in the first place and the limited quality of projects.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Henri de Waele, and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. "The Emerging International Identity of the European Union - Some Preliminary Observations." In *European Union's Emerging International Identity: Views from the Global Arena*, by Henri de Waele and Jan-Jaap Kuipers, 1-20. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013): 7-10.

⁵⁶ Van Hullen. "EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean." 14-15.

When Tunisia had requested an upgrade with their bilateral relations with the EU after the Union granted advanced status for Morocco in 2008. The EU had boosted its negotiations with the country to suggest improvements in Tunisia's human rights programs. However, the EU showed contradictions when it comes to its actions because it had delayed negotiations with Tunisia and the Commission was set in setting a very strict political reform set for the country. Although the EU did promise in 2009 that they will work on negotiations with Tunisia, the EU-Tunisia Association Council did not meet in 2009. It was only in 2010 did the EU and Tunisia negotiating parties meet to discuss the proposals submitted earlier in the year.⁵⁷ Negotiations were put on hold when the protests began in December 2010 and the EU had taken until January 10, 2011 to release an official statement regarding the protests. In the EU's official statement, they only called for restraint and called for the Tunisian government to release the activists. On January 14, 2011, the EU welcomed Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's announcement that he will not take part in the electoral campaigns in 2014 while the public denounced the Ben Ali regime for the massacre of over 60 demonstrators in the country. The EU also supported the Tunisian government's announcement that they will no longer use live rounds against protesters, and the Union would still continue talks with Tunisia to improve relations to "advanced status" despite the brutality of the government towards protesters. The Union – through the joint statement of HR/VP Ashton and Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Fuele – did stress they will include human rights protections in their discussions with Tunisia. Critics such as the left-wing, Liberal and Green MEPs had opposed the EU's delayed actions to the killings,

⁵⁷ Van Hullen. "EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean." 102-103.

favoring on improving EU-Tunis relations first then putting human rights protections second in the negotiations.⁵⁸

A positive support from the EU was only stressed when Ben Ali departed Tunisia, stressing that they will support democracy promotion in the country. Observers also did highlight that the EU's actions in Tunisia still needs improvement, and stronger action should be done considering the delay in EU's response regarding the issue. According to Emelie Doromezee of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, the EU should stop negotiations with Tunisia and strongly condemn the Tunis action towards the people. In her statement, Doromezee stated that:

“Until now, the language has been so far from what one would expect and sees elsewhere. The EU has put out a very weak statement. It is past the stage of written statements. It is almost a month now that these protests have been going on. We need concrete actions from the EU.”⁵⁹

Aside from the subdued reaction of the EU upon the crisis, the EU member countries presented problems with the EU's actions to press for reform because some of them supported the Ali regime. France, for example, supported to Ben Ali by offering to dispatch the riot police to help Ben Ali's government to stop the protests. Southern European countries were also against a strong worded sanctions because of the possible influx of immigrants to their countries if

⁵⁸ Leigh Philips. “Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia.” EU Observer. January 14, 2011. <http://euobserver.com/foreign/31644> (accessed November 30, 2015).

⁵⁹ Philips. “Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia.”

sanctions are imposed in Tunisia.⁶⁰ Euromed and other independent bodies named France, Italy, Malta, and Spain in support of Doromzee's analysis and indicated that these four countries influence EU Council policies on EU action towards Tunisia and other northern autocracies. Euromed Human Rights Network Coordinator Matthieu Routier stressed, after his visit to Tunisia and Algeria, that the EU member states should be worried about regards to Tunisia because unless intervention is done, human rights and further political instability will continue to worsen in the next coming days.⁶¹

Concluding Remarks

The EU's foreign policy features a very complex mechanism that takes into consideration its history and the values that had brought to its inception. Every member country has a contribution to the creation of the EU's foreign policy and the EU aims to design its actions based on these member country's interests. However, given the complex nature of the EU's membership and its overall influence, there is an issue when it comes to ensuring that their foreign policy is effective in the international level. It is clear that EU's major foreign policy characteristic points out to the promotion of democracy, which is a very important virtue that must be introduced to developing nations. In the Tunisian example, EU's democracy promotion and reform campaign did not take root that easily due to political stability in the country, especially the changing attitude of the ruling regime prior to the onset of the Arab Spring. The EU's institutions were also divided as to how they would get Tunisia to become involved with the programs, often forcing the delays to occur. When Tunisia did agree to increase negotiations,

⁶⁰ Timo Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?" *Amsterdam Law Forum* 4, no. 2 (2012): 79.

⁶¹ Ibid.

the EU itself did not immediately meet with the Tunisian side before the onset of the 2010 demonstrations. When the Arab Spring occurred, the EU was unable to bolster the negotiations which were yet again halted by the protests to the point that they remained subdued and late with their response to the crisis. Considering the example of Tunisia and the nature of EU's foreign policy, it is possible that the EU will show the same type of reaction when it comes to their involvement in Egypt when the Arab Spring has occurred in the country.

CHAPTER III: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING

This chapter expounds on EU's relationship with Egypt even before the Arab Spring took place in 2011. The researcher will be expounding on the several partnership agreements between the two countries, from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for Mediterranean. Finally, this chapter would also expound on the extent of EU-Egyptian relations prior to the Arab Spring, as well as the political conditionality and evaluation of EU-Egyptian relations prior to 2011.

Before the CFSP

Europe has always been considering expanding its presence in the Mediterranean even before the 1990s. In the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed several trade and cooperation agreements with various countries in the region, including Middle Eastern nations. The agreements such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure, energy, education, training and scientific cooperation were just some of the few agreements done by the EU with the Maghreb countries, Mashreq countries, Israel and Palestine.⁶² In the case of Egypt, they first signed an agreement with the EC in 1977 which established EU-Egyptian relations. The cooperation agreement signed by both parties ensured that Egypt would receive assistance when

⁶² Federiga Bindi, and Irina Angelescu. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*. (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2012): 32.

it comes to economic, technical and financial programs to ensure its development, as well as commercial cooperation to ensure that Egyptian goods are also delivered in the European Market.

The Cooperation Agreement also enabled the EC to participate in the development of Egypt's critical infrastructure which would diversify its economic capacity. This partnership ensured that Egypt would slowly revolutionize its activities and eventually improved Egyptian industrialization and modernization. The Egyptians also flourished in the fields of science, technology and environmental protection. Europeans also brought in new income for Egyptians, as well as investments to improve the private-public companies in Egypt. Through the EU-Egyptian protocols and the Cooperation Agreements signed from 1977 to 1995, Egypt received the following funds and programs that aided its development: Private Sector Development Programme (45 million euros), Support to the Population Programme in Upper Egypt (10 million euros), Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization Programme (43 Million) and the Reform of the Financial Sector/Central Bank (11.7 million euros).⁶³

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The first major development that formally established EU-Mediterranean relations and stronger EU-Egypt relations was the Barcelona Conference in 1995. For the beginning of the discussions, the EU had begun negotiations with ten Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria. The negotiations included premises on the establishing relations between the

⁶³ European Institute for Research. (n.d.). *EU-Egypt Relations*. Retrieved October 21, 2015, from European Institute for Research: On Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation: <http://www.medeia.be/en/countries/egypt/eu-egypt-relations/>

two regions. The results of the negotiations were written and adopted the Barcelona Declaration, which created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The EMP includes three chapters: “Political and Security Chapter”, “Economic and Financial Chapter” and “Social, Cultural, and Human Chapter”. The first chapter covers the agreement of both parties when it comes to the promotion of peace in the region. The following chapter pertains to the slow, but gradual economic integration and finally, the third chapter addresses the enhancement of cultural and societal relations.

To achieve the target set by these chapters, the EMP acted on two levels: bilateral and regional. In the bilateral level, the EU and its Mediterranean partners would ensure that EU-Mediterranean relations are improved and promoted to the people even at an individual level. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements highlights the framework as to how each country can achieve relationship promotion and organize action. In a regional level, the EMP calls for the establishment of regional dialogue between countries to ensure that they would cooperate in improving political, economic and cultural ties between EU countries and Mediterranean countries. Further aiding the implementation of the EMP are organizations such as the European Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) which serves as a Forum for both the European Parliamentary and the Mediterranean partner parliaments for issues regarding intercultural dialogue and prepare for the establishment of a European Mediterranean Assembly. Other institutions included in the EMP aside from the EMPA also include the Euro-Mediterranean Summit, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, and the Euro-Med Committee.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ash Suel. From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean. *Perceptions* (2008): 94-100.

With the application of the EMP, the EU had been in negotiations with Egypt to finalize the new version of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which has been in development throughout 1994. However, the talks were only concluded in June 1999, and the text of the agreement was only completed in February 2001 because the support financial objectives under the Barcelona Declaration's Economic and Financial Chapter were not met such as the free trade area. The European Parliament approved the entire proposal in November 2001, but it was only in 2004 when the Agreement have been placed into action because of the negotiations regarding its bilateral provisions.⁶⁵ As the new Association Agreement was development, the MEDA program had been in action to provide bilateral aid to signatories of the EMP. The actions under the program aim to fulfill the objectives of the three sectors of the EMP⁶⁶:

- Reinforcing political stability and democracy;
- Creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic and social cooperation;
- Taking due account of the human and cultural dimensions.

The MEDA funds provided to partner countries do not have a fixed percentage allotted to each member; however, the amount these partners receive is dependent on their effort and progress. The regulation of the MEDA also considers two important details: first, MEDA partners do not need to be a country that allows decentralized support to its hierarchy, and it requires a high degree of active and equal participation on the site. Second, political

⁶⁵ European Institute for Research. (n.d.). *EU-Egypt Relations*

⁶⁶ Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership [Official Journal L 189 of 30.07.1996].

conditionality is included in the MEDA funds. Recipients of the MEDA program do not have to pay back the funds they receive from the EU. However, the EU does have the power to stop MEDA funds if the recipient country has violated the premises of the EMP. A second version of the MEDA was later on introduced in 2000 to be implemented until 2006 and had a better framework when it came to financial distribution. MEDA II had an overall budget of 5.350 billion euros from 2000 to 2006, and it was more capable than MEDA I as 90% of the program's funds were used for bilateral affairs and 10% were used for regional activities. The MEDA II program was different with MEDA I regarding its priorities because the program will support the provisions and programs that will be introduced by the Association Agreement for equal economic and social development for both sides.⁶⁷

The enactment of the Association Agreement in 2004 worked alongside the MEDA funds to ensure continuous political dialogue between the two parties and establish provisions for economic development and social improvement. The agreements paved the way for the creation of the Association Council and the Association Committee, which ensured the regular discussions by both parties are held.⁶⁸

European Neighborhood Policy

Although the EMP has been successful in bringing together the Mediterranean countries and opened negotiations between them and the EU, it was still very limited regarding its capacity to reach its targets. Critics emphasized that the problem's Action Plans be too broad in nature concerning their scope, especially with the security provisions of the program. Only the trade

⁶⁷ Ashraf Saleh.. Egypt and the EU: An Assessment of the Egyptian Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. *Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies*, 15 (1)(2013): 52-53.

⁶⁸ European Institute for Research. (n.d.). *EU-Egypt Relations*

policy of the EMP had been met due to the EU's growing economic interest in the region. The adoption of the EuroMed Internal Market Programme in 2002 also ensured the economic policy under the EMP flourished. The program pushed for market integration between the EU and partner country, especially in specific sectors of the economy. The EMP also received success in establishing a partnership for cultural and educational development because both parties believed it was a vital component to stop security threats. However, the security chapter of the EMP was challenged by several factors, especially after the September 11 attacks. The EU became anxious over the possibility of a similar threat happening in Europe, causing the Union to include security dialogues in other areas of cooperation such as in social and cultural dialogue. Aside from EU's anxiety over security-related concerns, the hostilities between the Arab partners and Israel also affected the EMP's institutions as representatives from these countries would walk-out from plenary meetings and prevent dialogue to flourish between parties.⁶⁹ Critics also highlighted that the EMP failed to achieve its goals due to the "gap between capabilities and expectations."⁷⁰ The Mediterranean partners argued that the EMP's policies only serve the European markets more than permitting equal benefits between the EU and the partner countries. It is not clear to experts if economic cooperation is improved through the EMP because the progress level for the improvement of conditions set for the establishment of a free trade zone set to launch in 2010 remains slow.⁷¹

The ENP was launched in 2004 as the parties' attempt to ensure peace and stability in the region; while improving programs on economic modernization and human rights protections.

⁶⁹ Suel. From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean 101-102.

⁷⁰ Suel. 102

⁷¹ Ibid, 102-103.

Originally, the ENP only comprised the Central and Eastern European countries which were trying to recover from their ordeal as former communist states. However, Spain and Italy had then suggested that the ENP's scope included the Southern countries as a means to increase the reach of the EU, giving it a more active role in aiding countries settle their issues or concerns. The core premises of the ENP was written in the 2004 Strategy Paper, highlighting the regulation of cooperation between the southern and eastern countries. This differentiation between the Mediterranean and former Soviet countries highlighted that the ENP was a "single, inclusive and coherent framework directed to all neighbors." The Commission recommended in 2006 to strengthen the ENP by providing incentives to "privileged partners" from both the southern and Mediterranean regions, which included Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. The ENP focused on the gradual opening of the Community's institutions and programs to the ENP; especially on free trade, illegal migration, and counter-terrorism.⁷²

For the ENP, security is in its top priorities, and one of this key objectives is to improve security at the borders of the EU and promote stability with partner countries. To attain this objective, the Union offers partner countries a bargain to gain their cooperation through policies and programs that would open the region to these partner countries. The conditions of the bargain would vary depending on the relationship and status of the partner country with the EU, and the Commitments and Offers are included in the Action Plans highlighting conditionality. Partners also greatly benefit from additional market access in exchange for their political and economic reform. Trade and free movement of persons were also introduced as incentives to

⁷² Ibid 103-104.

partner countries once they achieve the level close enough for these partner countries to stress they are similar to the Union's stability without being a member.⁷³

Under the ENP, EU and Egypt had developed EU-Egypt Action Plan, which was adopted in March 2007 that strengthened EU and Egypt's partnership. The Action Plan was considered as a means for both nations to pursue active economic integration and further cooperation in political, cultural and social level. Similar to the EMP, the ENP also aims to ensure that all areas of dialogue between countries can be done to improve Egypt's economy and society. The ENP also tackles principles such as joint ownership, development of national plans and reform programs and reciprocal commitments. The EU-Egypt Action Plan was adopted in the EU-Egypt Association Council in March 2007 and regularly monitored by several joint bodies to ensure that the plan is continuously applied. Observers also see that the EU-Egypt Action Plan contained several points reflected in the Barcelona Process and ensured that democracy and human rights are sustained while pursuing economic integration. Additional clauses in the Action Plan, which call for Egypt to negotiations to speak about provisions on external security with the EU. The EU is also ensuring that the Egypt can handle the improvement of energy sources and assist in resolving organized crime and other security concerns. Regular Yearly Progress Reports are also done under the EU-Egypt Action Plan that would highlight the recent improvements did under the system and the challenges to the effectiveness of the EU-Egypt Action Plan. It is also considered the major permanent communique between the EU and Egypt.

However, similar to the EMP, the ENP has several issues that reduce its effectiveness as seen in the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan. On a general extent, the entire ENP Action Plan

⁷³ Sevily Kahraman. "The European Neighborhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe." *Perceptions*, (2005): 16-17.

highlights the general problems in bilateral relations: the problematic authoritarian Egyptian state, the necessity of deep involvement in settling the development gap and boosting economic cooperation, and tackling concrete problems involving the peaceful EU. On a procedural level, the ENP Action Plan confronts the Egyptian government (and other Middle Eastern countries) with European governance policies which the Middle East does not regularly apply such as permanent monitoring and evaluation of binding agreements public consultation and publication of studies or programs, and the inclusion of non-state actors. These governance tools put Middle Eastern countries at a disadvantage especially as they are not aware of the extent of these European governance policies and how it would clash with the local system. Egypt, for instance, adheres to a strict hierarchical system that – in comparison to the European system – the Foreign Ministry does not have the same capacity as the European Foreign Ministry that could collect information and distribute a more condensed report to other ministries. In Egypt, the Foreign Ministry only has a few members who could coordinate with the EU with regards to negotiations on handling certain threats and even with these in mind, full application of the ENP is still difficult for Egypt due to the lack of competence and differences on which agency to call between its ministries on their roles for plan's enforcement.⁷⁴

Union for the Mediterranean

With the shortcomings of the EMP and the ENP, considerations were done by the EU to ensure that the setbacks seen in both programs would be resolved with another program. The newest means to revitalize EU-Mediterranean relations was the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) which French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to the European Union to aid the

⁷⁴ Christian Kaunert, & Sarah Leonard. *European Security Governance and the European Neighborhood After the Lisbon Treaty*. (London: Routledge, 2013): 68-69.

region to tackle security and defense measures better for the Mediterranean. He also proposed the creation of the Mediterranean Union that would also cover the resolution of issues relating to the environment, energy, and transportation. However, Sarkozy's proposal had been significant because he highlighted the key areas lacking in the previous agreements: open dialogue and a more cohesive EU-Mediterranean relation. Reforms on the leadership of the EU-Mediterranean Council is also pushed by the Sarkozy's proposal to ensure that meetings can be done equally by both parties, and all positions are considered when it comes to decision-making. The new Union would also ensure that the Union would be supporting action when it comes to security.⁷⁵

Sarkozy's proposal was immediately reviewed by the Union and slowly tweaked the program to include certain policies that would allow the new agreement to work even if the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Although there were still ambiguities in certain bits of the proposal, the European Council approved the proposal on March 14, 2008, and called the Commission to announce the "Barcelona Process: The Union for the Mediterranean." An official communique is released by the communique on May 20, 2008, and introduced the Union's framework while adhering to the Barcelona Process. The first UfM Summit was held on July 13, 2008, and highlighted the new structure of the EU-Mediterranean partnership. It also aimed to upgrade the relationship between both parties and Mediterranean states now had equal leverage in the Union. Although the UfM's promise was clear in helping equal leverage for both parties, the EU remains influential when it comes to the relationship of the UfM and the accession countries. The Arab-Israeli Conflict had also stopped the progress of the UfM as Egypt – which holds the co-

⁷⁵ Eduard Soler i Lecha, & Irene Garcia. *The Union for the Mediterranean: What has it changed and what can be changed in the domain of security*. (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009): 2-4.

presidency with France – had stopped all UfM activities when Israel attacked Gaza in December 2008.⁷⁶

Political conditionality and evaluation of the EU-Egypt relations before the Arab Spring

Considering the various programs that were designed to bolster EU-Egypt affairs, there were visible lapses that the programs that shook the legitimacy of EU-Egyptian affairs. Conditionality pertains to the benefits of partnerships with another state, especially in the improvement of democracy in the region. When the enlargement process took place, the EU developed its major principles to ensure that countries who wish to become members of the EU or partners to the EU are properly screened to determine their current political, economic and social structures and address the conditions that may pose problems for their partnership or accession to the EU. Upon their release of the EMP in 1995, the EU also added several clauses when it comes to adding human rights as a critical component of partnership. Negative measures will become active if a partner has violated the premises of the Association Agreements.⁷⁷ The UfM also sets in applying a “multilateral” model that would enhance Euro-Mediterranean partnership in a political, economic and civil society level that would enable better negotiations with regards to the programs that will be discussed through the UfM such as infrastructure development and civil rights protections. Under the UfM, the EU aims to bolster the modernization of the Mediterranean in order to emphasize the necessity of stability to develop democratic values and societies the EU wishes for the region to achieve. Experts indicated that the introduction of the Barcelona Process which instigated the development of the UfM should

⁷⁶ Suel. 109-120.

⁷⁷ Rosa Balfour. *EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring*. (Catalonia: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012)

be used by the EU to introduce projects that would establish the foundations for democracy to flourish which is shared by all partners. It is also the aim of the UfM to establish peace and stability in the Mediterranean to bolster reform and reduce the impact of any conflicts in the region.⁷⁸

However, throughout the EMPs applications in the Mediterranean, it was unable to exert its power to break off relations even if it was clear there were violations done by the partner country.⁷⁹ In Egypt, for example, the EU Delegation in Cairo stressed that while the authoritarian Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak had claimed they promoted the agreements under the EMP, this did not take precedence as the EU discovered that there were still human rights violations in Egypt. However, the EU never confronted Mubarak's regime for these cases and just continued their partnership with Egypt. President Mubarak even ratified Law 1533 of 1999 which restricted freedom of association the country while the discussions for an updated Associated Agreement were called. Human rights continued to become severe in Egypt throughout the EMP and even through the ENP. Furthermore, it is also clear that the various interests of the EU member countries have been hampering the attempts of the EU to impose political conditionality in Egypt. When the UfM was enacted, the ongoing issues in the global market and the volatile politics of the region failed to solidify changes in Egypt.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Senen Florensa. "Union for the Mediterranean: Challenges and Ambitions." *IEMED*, 2010: 62-65.

⁷⁹ Rosa Balfour. *EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring*. (Catalonia: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012)

⁸⁰ Joel Peters. *The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East*. (Lanham: Lexington Book, 2012): 50-54.

Concluding remarks

It is clear in this chapter that European-Egyptian relation goes back before the EU's establishment as the two have been in close negotiations even in the 1970s. The EU – even while it was the EEC – provided political, financial, social and cultural assistance to Egypt as a signatory to various cooperation agreements meant to bolster EU-Egyptian diplomatic affairs. While each agreement – from the EMP to the UfM – had established the standards on how EU-Egyptian relations can be improved and impose reform in Egypt, it was clear that the EU was not strong enough to make sure that Egypt will adhere to each principle underlined in the EMP, ENP, and the UfM. The EU does not actively engage Egypt for its violations and let it be for the sake of democracy. Considering these points, it is a question if the EU would utilize the same behavior when the Arab Spring affects the country.

CHAPTER IV: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARAB SPRING

This chapter focuses on the European Union's reactions towards the changing situation in Egypt, especially when the Arab Spring has struck the country. The discussions will first begin with the reports highlighting instability in Egypt before the uprising and the events which occurred throughout the 2011 Revolution. Following this brief discussion is the assessment of the EU's response to the January 2011 uprising and its similarities or differences with EU's actions in the Tunisian uprising. The discussion would then cover the EU's revised policy in the region in light of the Revolution and then highlight how the EU-Egyptian relations shifted with the succeeding administrations that took over after Mubarak.

The Revolution and the EU's Initial Response

The instability in the Arab region has already been noted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as they indicated in their research that the region possesses political, economic and social lapses that could trigger conflict if left unsettled by the Arab governments. In the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002 commissioned to indicate the challenges for human development in the region, the UNDP stated that:

“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions regarding participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 90s and the early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This

freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.”⁸¹

The data from the 2002 report was supported by the subsequent reports released by the UNDP in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009 and cited similarities in the region’s political systems such as the quality of public services, the onset of corruption and grave human rights violations. In Egypt, the UNDP indicated that while democracy is practiced through the national elections, their leaders often modify mandated term limits to remain in power. The country – like most Arab governments – also resort to “legitimacy of blackmail” to gain support from the public and the international community against the onset of Islamism. Egypt is also reported for its efforts to restrict the formation of political parties to prevent the growth of opposition to the government. Under President Hosni Mubarak’s reign, Egypt has also been under a state of emergency that ensures the government’s total control over the people. The UNDP also reported in its 2008 report that Egypt is amongst the seven nations reported by the Arab Organization for Human Rights to have grave human rights violations committed by the government as seen in its treatment of prisoners in the West Bank and Gaza.⁸²

However, it was only in the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolt did a revolution occur in Egypt, taking the international community in a state of shock upon its occurrence. The public has continuously pressed the Mubarak regime to impose reform and contain the largest religious party in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood. The public has also complained against the land conversion and privatization of state-owned businesses by the government as these conversions

⁸¹ James Gelvin. *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 4.

⁸² Gelvin. *The Arab Uprisings*. 5-6.

only benefit Mubarak's cronies.⁸³ With the outbreak of the Tunisian Revolution in 2010, the Egyptian civil society groups mobilized through social media and other channels to get support from the public and on January 25, 2011, 20,000 participants marched to Cairo and key cities in the country to call for Mubarak's resignation. Mubarak tried to stop the protests by announcing on January 29 that he will impose reform in the government. He filled the 30-year vacant Vice President slot with the appointment of Omar Suleiman, Egypt's Director of the General Intelligence Directorate to appease the public.⁸⁴ However, the public still fought for the resignation of Mubarak to trigger reform in the country. Although Mubarak announced on February 1 that he will respect the September election results, the public remained in Tahrir Square in Cairo to pressure Mubarak's resignation. When it was clear to Mubarak that he has lost control over the public and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which has been convened in light of the civil unrest. The 25-member body supported the calls of the public for reform in the group's first declaration on February 10, 2011. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak resigned from office.⁸⁵

When the Arab Spring's first wave had struck in January 2011 in Egypt, the EU had been caught off-guard as they did not consider the protests can present such an impact on the region and the EU-Mediterranean relations. The Union did not realize the significance of the entire crisis, but they realized that they had to keep up with the changing dynamics lest they find

⁸³ Katerina Dalacoura. "The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical implications." *International Affairs* 88.1 (2012): 63.

⁸⁴ Dalacoura. "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East" 63-64.

⁸⁵ Dalacoura. 63-64.

themselves unable to keep up with the new changes in the region.⁸⁶ There was a lack of consensus among the European capitals as to how they would act by the changes in the region. Their failure to recognize the importance of the conflict and the continued disagreements between member countries disabled the EU from establishing a unified framework that would respond to the Arab Spring. Throughout the duration of the Egyptian Uprising of 2011, the EU was hesitant in actively stressing their position because their actions would be detrimental to their political and strategic interests in the country.⁸⁷ Critics argued that the EU adopted a “wait and see” strategy to determine which protests would usher change. The idle strategy had earned the EU criticisms from critics and the Egyptian people who thought the EU would support their calls for Mubarak to resign from office.⁸⁸ However, member countries did make their stance known regarding the Egyptian crisis such as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi had praised President Mubarak’s actions on February 4, 2011 and stated:

“I hope that in Egypt, there can be a transition toward a more democratic system without a break from President Mubarak, who in the West, above all in the United States, is considered the wisest of men and a precise reference point.”⁸⁹

⁸⁶Bichara Khader. *The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring*. (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2013): 34.

⁸⁷Sally Khalifa Isaac. *Europe and the Arab Revolutions: From a Week to a Proactive Response to a Changing Neighborhood*. KFG Working Paper no. 39, (Berlin: Freie Universitat Berlin, 2011): 8.

⁸⁸ Isaac. *Europe and the Arab Revolutions*. 8.

⁸⁹Francesco Guarascio. "UPDATE 1- Berlusconi calls Mubarak wise man, urges continuity." *Reuters*. February 4, 2011. <http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFLDE7131GX20110204> (accessed November 7, 2015).

SCAF Period and EU Action

After Mubarak stepped down from office, the SCAF took over the country and assisted in the transition process on February 11, 2012.

SCAF Transition

The ease on assuming full executive and legislative authority in the country was easy for the SCAF due to the popularity it had from the public, dissolving the parliament and suspended the 1971 constitution. The SCAF appointed a committee on February 15, 2011 to identify areas for reform regarding the constitution and election process for both parliamentary and presidential elections. The committee was led by Tareq El-Beshry, a legal expert supporting an Islamist ideology, and under his leadership, the results of the study were released on February 26, highlighting several amendments to the constitution that would reorganize the election process. Some of these amendments included an eligibility criteria and term limits for both the president and parliamentary members. The committee also included amendments on the drafting procedures for the new constitution involving both houses of Parliament to select 100 members to assist with the writing the text of the constitution.⁹⁰

The committee's recommendations were approved through popular referendum on March 19 and integrated to the SCAF's March 23 declaration. The amendments were originally supported by the public due to the fact they believed these were "amendments"; however, the military had used this chance to slip in details from the previous constitution and give power to

⁹⁰International Crisis Group. *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF*. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report no. 121, (New York: International Crisis Group, 2012) 2-3.

the current military rule.⁹¹ With the enactment of the constitutional declaration on March 23, the roadmap for the parliamentary elections would begin in six months. However, observers argued that the provision's applied by the SCAF in light of the March 23 declaration would extend the transition and delay the start of elections from late September (the start of filing for candidacy for the lower house) to late February 2012 (the last round of voting for the upper house). The reason the SCAF applied the provisions is to allegedly provide non-Islamist groups time to organize their campaigns.⁹² The SCAF further stalled the parliamentary elections on November 28 by stressing some doubts over the original roadmap. In their statements, the SCAF feared the potential rise of an Islamist-dominated parliament that would control the drafting of the constitution. Although the March 23 declaration extended the transition process, the SCAF adhered to Article 60 of the declaration and cited that parliamentary elections were to precede writing the constitution and it would be the parliament who would decide the committee that would continue the rewriting of the constitution.⁹³

To prevent the possibility of an Islamist-dominated parliament, the SCAF tried to alter the course for the transition through media campaigns such as its declaration on October 20, 2011. General Mahmoud El-Assar suggested to move the presidential elections on mid-2013 which is the same time as the deadline for adopting a new constitution. This decision of the SCAF to influence the transition process alienated both Islamists and non-Islamists who saw it as a ploy to control the public. Insecurity started to spread throughout the country due to the

⁹¹Nathan Brown. "Tracking the "Arab Spring": Egypt's Failed Transition." *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 46.

⁹² International Crisis Group. "Lost in Transition." 3.

⁹³ International Crisis Group. 4.

SCAF's continuous delays on the elections. From September to October 2011, violent protests occurred throughout the country in an attempt to oust the military government. However, military prosecuted activists and handed them harsh sentences before military tribunals.

On November 25, protesters went to Tahrir Square to call for a transfer of power from the SCAF to a civilian government. Regardless of the protests, the parliamentary elections continued on November with the Freedom and justice parity capturing 36% of the vote and 43% of the total seats in the lower-house while the Al-Nour took 27% of the vote and 24% of the seats. Smaller parties created after the revolution like "The Revolution Continues" only won 3% of the votes and 1.4% in the lower-house. The results of the parliamentary elections still retained the tensions within Egypt as Non-Islamists argued that the SCAF should transfer its power to the civilians prior to the presidential elections. On the anniversary of the January 25 uprising, protests centered to the arguments the SCAF should consider on shifting its power to the civilian politicians. The Muslim Brotherhood also supported this call for a transfer of power on March 2012. The continuous arguments regarding the transfer of power persisted throughout the presidential campaigns with the parliament denying the candidacy of the several key SCAF members and former members of the Mubarak regime.⁹⁴

EU Action Throughout SCAF Period

Meanwhile, as the SCAF continued to usher transition in Egypt despite the criticisms of several parties, the EU's response on the Arab Spring was formally released on March 8, 2011 with the joint communique of the High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and the Commission proposing for "A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the

⁹⁴ International Crisis Group. 6-9.

Southern Mediterranean.” The proposal stressed the need for the EU to support the demand for active political participation and protection of equal opportunities for the public. It also proposed for the “more for more” principle which would open assistance to recipient countries on the basis mutual accountability and adherence to reform.⁹⁵The communique also indicated that the EU intends to revise the ENP to keep up with the changing southern developments because the EU was ill-prepared to respond to the crisis in the first two months of 2011 to deliver their Union’s full support. To prevent a potential setback to EU action, the new ENP proposed through the communique ‘should be a policy of the Union with the Member States aligning their own bilateral efforts in support of its overall policy objectives.’⁹⁶

The proposal to revise the provisions of the ENP was seen differently by the EU institution leaders such as EU President Herman Van Rompuy, Commission for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and HR Ashton. For Van Rompuy, a revision to the ENP is not essential to respond to the Middle Eastern crisis but a full enactment of the provisions of the ENP which were not applied in early years as these unapplied provisions on security and political change would ensure that democracy and restoration of relations is secured between the EU and the Mediterranean.⁹⁷ In the

⁹⁵European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New York. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." *European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New York*. December 16, 2011. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11717_en.htm (accessed November 20, 2015).

⁹⁶Esthe Barbe, and Anna Herranz-Surraelles. *The Challenge of Differentiation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Flexible Regional Cooperation of Fragmentation*. (London: Routledge, 2013): 144.

⁹⁷Hamed, Adham. *Revolution as a Process: The Case of the Egyptian Uprising*. (Bremen: Wiener Verlag, 2014): 234.

case of Fule, he supported the use of the old ENP because of the fact it already has a very clear framework on how to achieve cooperation, democracy promotion and human rights protection which the new Egyptian government may now be able to apply.⁹⁸ Despite these sentiments from van Rompuy and Fule, the ENP was revised under the request of HR Ashton and President Barroso to promote a three-fold response that would highlight the ENP's objectives: emphasizing "Deep democracy", economic development, and renewed connections between people. The New ENP would also try to promote "Sustainable stability" in order to ensure that Mediterranean countries experiencing transition like Egypt would be supported accordingly.⁹⁹

The new approach to the ENP was further elaborated in the May 25, 2011 with the launch of a "New Response to the Changing Neighborhood." The new approach to the ENP highlighted two major challenges that it aims to resolve on a short-term and long-term period. The first challenge the EU will tackle with the new ENP is the creation on "deep democracy" which would boost the improvement of civil society and enable them to take part in the transition process. The EU would also push for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development which would influence the stability of democracy in the region.¹⁰⁰ The new ENP – as highlighted by the "Partnership for Democracy and Shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean" in March 2011 – would also reflect the principles which it was based on.

- Differentiation: Advocates for flexibility for any type of development. This would also ensure that the developments and subsequent approaches would take into consideration the differences between the eastern and southern halves of the ENP, especially when it

⁹⁸Hamed. *Revolution as a Process*. 234.

⁹⁹ Hamed. 235.

¹⁰⁰European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New York. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'."

comes to full integration and partnership. The implications of this principle would indicate that the EU recognizes the fact not all countries would be able to achieve or willing to obtain a specific level of integration with the EU and to bolster these countries to achieve results, the EU would apply tailor-made strategies that would improve their success rate.

- More-for-more: this principle highlights the clauses on providing incentives to ENP partners, especially to ensure that these Mediterranean partners would adhere to the premises of the ENP (ex. Support for free and fair elections). This principle also opens the ENP partner to better cooperation with other members and achieve higher standards for political and social development.
- Less-for-less: Under this principle, the EU aims to utilize a restrictive set of measures to ensure that violators of human rights and democracy would be properly sanctioned and ensure that EU funding or assistance would be reduced in lieu of the crime committed. This principle would also highlight the EU's focus on strengthening civil society sectors and the reallocation of EU assistance if a recipient country fails to establish better reform in their countries.
- Joined-Up: This principle highlights the importance of regional partnerships and the involvement of critical EU institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to ensure assistance. Under this principle, the EU would be working closely with other international donors

through the Deauville Partnership, which was established as a coordination scheme for international financial institutions to reach out to key actors such as the EU.¹⁰¹

The new version of the ENP also has three major elements considered to ensure stronger relations: democratic transformation and institution building, sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development, and finally, strong partnership with the people. These three elements are elaborated in the “Three Ms” also included in the May 25, 2011 communique that detailed the ENP’s new frameworks, stressing that the incentives - money, mobility and markets – would ensure cooperation from recipient countries. Collectively, these three factors are expected to deliver the resources necessary for sustainable change.¹⁰²

Money

The EU announced on May 2011 that it will provide an additional 1.24 billion euros worth of funding for ENP partners on top of the original 5.7 billion euros already allocated for the ENP for the 2011-2013 period under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which handles the ENP’s budget. The EU had also created the Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) program that would open 350 million euros worth of financial assistance from 2011 to 2013 which would support the more-for-more principles of the new ENP. The Commission had also opened several programs and investments for small and medium enterprises. The Civil Society Facility had also been opened to distribute 22 million euros in order to boost the capacity of civil service organizations and their influence in boosting democracy promotion and application in their respective countries. The EBRD had also provided

¹⁰¹Timo Behr. *After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition*. Policy Paper No. 54, (Paris: Notre Europe, 2012): 9-10.

¹⁰² Behr. “After the Revolution” 10.

funding activities in 2011 in order to support Egyptian efforts to boost their commitments for multiparty democracy and market economics. The International Monetary Fund is also working alongside the EU to apply the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) for Egypt amounting to 500 million euros worth of loans. The MFA was created to complement IMF's financing to long-term loans or grants programs and can only be available to countries already assisted by the IMF's programs.¹⁰³

Market

The EU also applied several initiatives to boost the capacity of Mediterranean countries to access EU's internal market and enable investment to flow to these partner countries. One of the major initiatives the EU introduced in light of the Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab nations is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). The DCFTAs opens new opportunities for partner countries to gain access to the EU's internal market.¹⁰⁴ To establish easier adoption of the Free Trade Areas, the Council provided the Commission a mandate to initiate negotiations between the EU and Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia to take part in the DCFTAs on December 14, 2011. In the statement of EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht, he said that:

“We are offering Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia progressive economic integration into the EU single market and want to improve the conditions for market access to the EU for these WTO members as they engage in a process of democratic and economic

¹⁰³ Behr. 11.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

reform... Our door is open for other Southern Mediterranean partners once the same conditions are met.”¹⁰⁵

The creation of the DCFTA is also included in the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, which include several policies that would ensure trade and investment measures that would be applied by the partner country to ensure continuous progress. Regional integration is also taken into perspective by the Free Trade Areas, especially for countries who have joined the Agadir Agreement in 2001: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.¹⁰⁶

Mobility

Finally, to ensure that the ENP would boost further integration in the region, the revised ENP would include better means to allow Southern Mediterranean partners to move within the EU-Mediterranean partnership. The idea of improved mobility has already been introduced to the EU and the Mediterranean countries since 2007’s “Communication on circular migration and mobility partnership between the European Union and the Third countries.”¹⁰⁷ Mobility partnerships were designed to improve migration policies, border security and job opportunities. It is said that both parties would benefit the partnership greatly as the EU would be able to improve its border security while the partner country would ensure that their citizens can freely

¹⁰⁵European Commission. "EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia." *European Commission Press Release Database*. December 14, 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1545_en.htm?locale=en (accessed November 6, 2015).

¹⁰⁶European Commission. "EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia."

¹⁰⁷Marie Martin. "Extension of Mobility Partnerships with Euro-Mediterranean Partners." *Panorama*, (2012): 280.

travel in these European countries and get assistance in improving their security efforts. In light of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the Commission introduced on May 24, 2011 the ‘Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries.’ The Dialogue will begin discussions to ensure that migration, mobility and security would be considered for better mobility between the two regions.¹⁰⁸ Aside from the ‘Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries’, the EU launched better border management systems to ensure that security is airtight for the partner countries and for the EU without risking mobility. The EU created the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) to improve the EU’s security capacity to deal with border protection. The EUROSUR would also develop a “pre-frontier intelligence picture” which would help the EU and their partner countries in the Mediterranean to detect threats before they make it to the borders.¹⁰⁹

Aside from the March 8 and May 25 EU declarations that would revise the EU’s foreign policy in the Arab Region and Egypt, a clear statement from the EU regarding the Egyptian Revolution was released in December 1, 2011 in the 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of the EU Council. Six conclusions were raised by the EU Council regarding Egypt and they are as follows:

- The Council welcomed the peaceful start of the parliamentary elections in Egypt on November 28 and praised the high voter turnout to the political transition. The EU hopes that the peaceful and transparent process will continue especially on the June 2012 presidential elections.

¹⁰⁸ Martin. "Extension of Mobility Partnerships with Euro-Mediterranean Partners." 281-282.

¹⁰⁹ Martin. 281.

- The Council also pushed for the swift transition to civilian rule and the SCAF must protect the right people and ensure this transition is done as soon as possible. The SCAF is also asked to engage with all political and civil society groups in a open dialogue to uphold democracy, freedom and human rights.
- The EU also stressed their concern on the violence occurring in Egypt prior to the beginning of the election period. The Council urged restraint for all parties and investigations regarding the violence that occurred in the election period.
- The Council also indicated their concern regarding the dwindling economic situation in Egypt and the EU conveyed their support to Egypt for social and economic reform.
- The EU also iterated their support for a democratic and stable Egypt as a key partner in the Mediterranean and Middle East region.
- And finally, the EU will continue to stand by Egypt for their quest for freedom and democratic transition.¹¹⁰

In December 18, 2011, HR/VP Ashton also emphasized the EU's position over the Egyptian crisis. She stated that the EU is against the growing violence occurring in the country and also stressed that law and order must be protected despite public protests. The statement also called for the government and investigate those who have triggered the onset of violence in these protests and bring them to justice. Ashton also said that:

“Egypt is in a middle of a crucial and difficult transformation process. The democratic electoral process should continue in a safe and transparent environment.”¹¹¹

¹¹⁰European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York. "EU Council conclusions on Egypt." *European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York*. December 1, 2011. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11641_en.htm (accessed December 1, 2015).

In light of the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections, the EU sent members of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to oversee the campaigns and the election. The EIDHR was established to train local election observers, media, political parties and civil society sectors to boost their participation in the election process. Egypt also received technical support from the EIDHR for the presidential elections. The EIDHR also assisted nonpolitical actors and organizations which are not legally registered to take part in the elections.¹¹² However, in the application of the revised ENP, it was difficult for the EU to keep up with the expectations of the Egyptian people, especially in the issue of democratization. The Egyptian people wanted the EU to contribute not just economic support to the country, but also political, technical and legal support to help their ailing institutions. The people wanted a more assertive EU, especially in the parliamentary elections and help in the education of election officers and observers. The Egyptian people also wanted the EU to expand on its economic policies with the Egyptian people, especially now that the Egyptian economy needs assistance in recovering from the previous regime.¹¹³ The Egyptian people wanted the EU to work actively in designing a suitable economic program for the country. The EU is also expected by the Egyptian people to take an important role in developing the country's civil society. While the EU does

¹¹¹Statement by EU HR Ashton on the situation in Egypt." *European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York*. December 18, 2011. http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11726_en.htm (accessed November 8, 2015).

¹¹²Danya Greenfield, Amy Hawthorne, and Rosa Balfour. *US and EU: Lack of Strategic Vision, Frustrated Efforts Toward the Arab Transitions*. (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, 2013): 30.

¹¹³ Khalil Al-Anani. *Egypt and the EU in the Post-Mubarak Era*. *Europe in Dialogue* 2011/01, (Berlin: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011): 41-42.

have active policies for the assistance requested by CSOs and the economy, the Egyptian people see that it is not enough in pushing for democracy in the region. Considering all these expectations, the Union was unable to keep up with these points and the lack of dialogue also prevented progress from taking place between the Union and the SCAF.¹¹⁴

The first round of the presidential elections took place on May 23-24, 2012 and while the names Mohammed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party and former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq were prominent in the polls, the results of the first round reflected that 50% of the voters voted for “Revolutionary” candidates whom they believe could represent them in the government. However, both Morsi and Shafiq gained more leverage due to the political machinery supporting their campaigns. Before the second round of the presidential polls, the SCAF continued to pressure political parties in agreeing to a constituent assembly developed by the Parliament and agree to the guidelines on the drafting of the constitution. The military council spoke with both non-Islamist and Islamist parties regarding the constituent assembly despite the case before the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) that would dissolve the Parliament and pressure the SCAF to amend the Constitutional Declaration that may limit the power of the Presidency. Negotiations; however, failed to reach a definite conclusion as non-Islamist members from the established constituent assembly accused Islamist members for not following the 50% Islamist population on the assembly. Non-Islamists argue that the constituent assembly included even moderate Islamist parties and other religious parties gained seats even if these seats are reserved for the non-Islamist parties.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Al-Anani. *Egypt and the EU in the Post-Mubarak Era*. 41-42.

¹¹⁵ The Carter Center. *Presidential Election in Egypt*. (Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2012): 9-11.

On June 14, 2012, the SCC ruled that the Political Exclusion Law passed in May 2012 to prevent Mubarak's former officials from running into office was deemed unconstitutional. The SCC also ruled that the electoral law that was used to establish the People's Assembly was also unconstitutional. With this SCC's decision, the People's Assembly should be dissolved because it was created unconstitutionally. The decision also put into question the military-led transition and the results of the election process. The second round of the elections came on June 16-17, 2012 despite the lack of definite constitution and uncertain government structure with unclear responsibilities. Further uncertainty in the Egyptian voting population was also brought by the dissolution of the parliament as it signaled further uncertainty over the transition period. The SCAF tried to establish further changes by promulgating an addendum to the March 30 declaration which would make the military an autonomous entity that can legislate, taking over the position of the People's Assembly while a new body is established. The addendum also enabled the SCAF to select the 100-member constituent assembly and changed the rules on how parties can oppose the draft text of the constitution. Political forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, argued against the SCAF addendum, stressing that the military body does not have the power to put forward an interim constitution. Despite this unstable political atmosphere, the presidential elections continued and on June 24, Farouk Sultan of the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) announced that Mohammed Morsi won against Ahmed Shafiq with a vote percentage of 51.73%.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶The Carter Center. *Presidential Election in Egypt*. 11-13.

Morsi- EU Relations

Upon the election of Mohammed Morsi on June 24, 2012, the HR/VP immediately expressed her congratulations to the new Egyptian president, stressing that Morsi's election is a "major milestone in Egypt's democratic transition and an historic moment for the country and the region." It is also the hope of the HR/VP to engage with Morsi's government whom she believes will represent the people and bolster civil participation from all political and social groups.¹¹⁷ Morsi's first few months in office promised changes to the EU as he visited Brussels on September 2012 to speak with the EU with regards to further assistance. Morsi's visit was vital for the country and his credentials because EU aid can ensure recovery from a sluggish economy. Morsi first spoke with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who offered macro-financial assistance worth \$647 million if Egypt signs an agreement with the IMF. However, to sign this IMF agreement, Egypt would have to agree to slash its energy subsidies which absorbs a fifth of the country's spending. The EU is also considering an additional \$259 million budget support for Egypt for an economic recovery plan. These new financial programs would come on top the \$581 million financial assistance the EU has already allotted to Egypt from 2011 to 2013 for the youth sector. In light of the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in Benghazi, Morsi raised a strong position and said. "We [Egypt] are eager to protect visitors, tourists, diplomatic missions, public and private properties. We are required by God to respect them and to be custodians of those visitors and we know that if one person is killed without

¹¹⁷European Union. "Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the election of Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt." *European Council: Council of the European Union*. June 24, 2012. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/131145.pdf (accessed November 30, 2015).

justification, it is as if someone has killed all of humanity.”¹¹⁸ He had also met with European Council President Herman van Rompuy to reestablish talks regarding EU-Egyptian relations.¹¹⁹

The revised talks between EU and Egypt enabled the establishment of the EU-Egypt Task Force in November 2012 under the chairmanship of HR/VP Ashton on November 13-14. Throughout the discussions of the Task Force, the EU and its financial institutions (EBRD and the EIB) pledged nearly 5 billion euros to provide long-term assistance to Egypt through various frameworks. The Commission committed to financial support of over 800 million euros for grants and loans. At least 303 million euros would be placed for grants and 450 million would be allotted to loans. The EIB would also be opening a lending program of over 1 billion euros per year and the EBRD also announced they would be increasing their lending volumes to Egypt by up to 1 billion per year.¹²⁰

. In her speech in light of the establishment of the task force, HR Ashton stated:

“20 months ago, people in Egypt gathered in Tahrir Square to demand political and social and economic rights. Since that day, this country has come a long way. But, the people continue to drive the demand and it is they that inspire us all to gather here today. The holding of democratic presidential elections is a historic landmark for this country.

¹¹⁸Magda Fahsi. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans." *MintPress News*. September 26, 2012. <http://www.mintpressnews.com/egyptian-president-morsi-in-brussels-seeks-to-reassure-europeans/37797/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹¹⁹Fahsi. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans."

¹²⁰European Commission. "Eu-Egypt relations." *European Commission: Press Release Database*. August 21, 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-751_en.htm (accessed November 30, 2015).

President Morsi has impressed the European Union not just with what he says but his commitment.”¹²¹

Although they were supportive over the promise Morsi’s regime would bring to Egypt, the EU did not realize that his election was not “democratic” despite the presence of the Constituent Assembly and the Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood had taken over every sector of the country and exploited democracy for their own agenda. The Morsi administration also established constitutional decrees to retain control over the public. The most notable constitutional decree applied by the Morsi administration was the November 22, 2012 decree which stressed that:

1. the public prosecutor would be dismissed, with the President appointing his replacement
2. All trials against government officials from the previous regime, including their conspirators, would be reopened while being monitored by an ad hoc prosecutor that has additional powers that they can use when intervening in issues brought before them.
3. No judicial authority could dissolve the Assembly or the Shura Council
4. No judicial authority can cancel any policy, declaration, and law applied since June 30, 2012 and any lawsuit that would be brought forward against these policies will be dismissed and voided.
5. The president could take any measures he sees fit to preserve the legacy of the revolution and protect national security.¹²²

¹²¹ Niklas Bremberg. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab Spring: legitimizing discourses and EU foreign policy practices at times of crisis." *Change and Continuity in Transatlantic Relations Conference*. (Stockholm: Swedish Network of European Studies in Political Science, 2015): 21.

With the control of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the country and the decrees the Morsi administration applied, it was becoming clear that the country remains volatile especially when the Islamist-inspired Constitution was finally adopted in the latter half of 2012. Considering Morsi's affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, they were blamed for the current status of the country and the failed political changes they promised in the elections. Mismanagement was reported in terms of the country's budget and political compromises were not done by the government to establish political stability.¹²³

June 30th Revolt and the Transition

With the unstable political environment in Morsi's Egypt, public protests took place in many critical parts of the country to call for Morsi's resignation. The Egyptian Armed Forces had imprisoned Morsi and his fellow Muslim Brotherhood members in July 2013. His removal had brought concerns to raise back to the EU, especially as they declared their support to president Morsi as the first democratically elected leader of Egypt after the Egyptian Revolution.¹²⁴ The EU immediately released a statement following the ousting of Mohammed Morsi on July 4, 2013. In the official statement of HR/VP Ashton, she stated that the EU calls for swift action in Egypt to stabilize the country. She expressed hope that all sides return to the democratic process and hold new presidential and parliamentary elections and the reenactment of

¹²²Tommaso Virgili. "The "Arab Spring" and the EU's "Democracy Promotion" in Egypt: A Missed Appointment?" *Perspectives on Federalism* 6, no. 3 (2014): 52-53.

¹²³Bremberg. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab Spring: legitimizing discourses and EU foreign policy practices at times of crisis." 20-22.

¹²⁴ Bremberg. 22-23

the constitution. The EU also condemned the violent clashes that occurred between rival political factions after Morsi was removed from office by the army.¹²⁵ It was difficult for the EU to highlight their position regarding the military regime under Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi because it may put EU-Egyptian relations in jeopardy. In a declaration made for the EU of HR/VP Ashton, the EU declared that:

“The military must accept and respect the constitutional authority of the civilian power as a basic principle of democratic governance. It is of utmost importance that Egypt returns rapidly to a legitimate government and democratic structures responding to the democratic and socioeconomic aspirations of the Egyptian people... The EU calls for a broad-based and substantial dialogue, inclusive of all those political forces committed to democratic principles... A successful outcome will depend on the free participation of all political actors, including the Freedom and Justice Party, which we encourage to do so.”¹²⁶

HR Ashton had also met up with US Secretary of State John Kerry to try organize a better solution to the situation in Egypt. Both Ashton and Kerry – in a joint statement – highlighted that both the US and the EU ‘support basic democratic principles, not any particular personalities or parties.’ HR/VP Ashton also made several high profile meetings in Egypt to speak with the new Egyptian officials Al-Sisi regarding the transition process. Several violent clashes had occurred throughout August 2013 between the government and the pro-Morsi

¹²⁵EUbusiness. "EU calls for swift Egypt elections after Morsi ousted." *EUbusiness*. July 4, 2013.

<http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.por> (accessed November 30, 2015).

¹²⁶*Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Egypt*. Presse Release 330; 10649/1/14 REV 1, (Brussels: European Union, 2014)

supporters, which led to several casualties. Ashton called for an urgent Foreign Affairs Minister Meeting on August 21, 2013 in light of the developments in Egypt. The results of the meeting were declared on September 11, 2013, stressing that the EU had been firm in their efforts to fight for democracy and will continue to support the fight of the people to aim for democracy.¹²⁷

It was also difficult for the EU to establish negotiations under the current leadership because the pro-EU Egyptian key figures have been removed from power after the crackdown of the interim government. One of those key figures Mohamed ElBaradei who resigned due to the violence triggered by the interim government. He is even charged for his actions because he resigned from his post. The Tamarod party used to support the US and the EU efforts in the region but they have slowly become nationalist in nature, triggering the calls for the boycott on the Israeli peace treaty and the American military aid. The resulting violence triggered by the violent manipulations of the current regime forced Europe to stop all arms sales that would permit these arms to be used within the country.¹²⁸ The measure is said to also ensure that small arms would no longer be permitted. However, this decision by the EU is not that strong considering the current hold of the military in the country. Even if the army would run out of bullets and weapons, they can still gain arms through their neighbors and other allies such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.¹²⁹ The EU was also unable to reach out to the Muslim Brotherhood even if they were in contact with the group since 2012. It became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was not even aware of the recommendations and

¹²⁷ Bremberg. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab Spring." 22.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Korteweg "Europe's struggle for influence."

criticisms being implied by the EU when its officials visit the country when the negotiations during the July 2013..¹³⁰

Experts indicated that if the EU asserted a stronger position in Egypt, they could do so by suspending aid, withdraw its emissaries, and call on a common demarche on the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their actions.¹³¹ While the EU can still enforce such actions, it was clear that they were unwilling to challenge the current government given the importance of the region to EU's political, economic and social interests. Egypt is an important defense against the growing influence of extremism in the region and caused the EU to accept the government. The EU and even the US even show signs that they agree with Al-Sisi's takeover because it would mean the Egyptian government would not stray away from the growing violence in the Sinai region. Individual member countries have even expressed hope that the Egyptian government would have immense power to restore order in the Sinai region. The EU also is now fighting against the growing influence of other countries trying to get ¹³²

When the Presidential elections was held, the EU was unable to monitor the event after their security and safety equipment was stopped from being brought into Cairo. With only elections assessment teams in the capital to monitor the Egyptian election, the EU expressed concerns that they will not be able to determine the veracity of the results and if the elections are

¹³⁰ Greenfield, Hawthorne and Balfour. "US and EU" 26-27.

¹³¹ Korteweg "Europe's struggle for influence."

¹³² Korteweg "Europe's struggle for influence."

done in consideration with the political issues called by the public. The EU also pushed for the election of a pluralist government¹³³

Al-Sisi's Egypt – EU relations

On June 8, 2014, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi had formally assumed office as the country's seventh president and many were not as surprised with his victory given his popularity with the public. In his inauguration speech, Al-Sisi said that Egypt will play an active role in the regional and international level as Egypt will recover and become a strong and just state under his rule. He also stressed that he hopes Egypt would enter a "full renaissance on both the internal and external levels." Al-Sisi stressed that security and change is a must in Egypt, but he only said terrorism once. He also stressed that the new Egypt in his tenure would emphasize in education and employment for the people.¹³⁴ It was also visible in Al-Sisi's speech that he thanked the Gulf nations for their support after the 2013 revolt. The Gulf provided financial assistance to the 2013 transition government that replaced Morsi in July 2013. Without Gulf assistance, Egypt would have been destitute and unable to establish reform under the transition period.¹³⁵ For the Gulf

¹³³Robert-Jan Bartunek. "EU will not monitor Egypt vote after equipment blocked: official." *Reuters*. May 17, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/17/us-egypt-election-eu-idUSBREA4G08C20140517> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹³⁴Aswat Masriya. "Sisi says "Egypt" 17 times in first speech as president." *Aswat Masriya*. June 8, 2014. <http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=0e1fb43b-93a0-463d-b2ee-401e0981263a> (accessed November 30, 2015).

¹³⁵Stephan Roll. *Al-Sisi's Development Vision*. SWP Comments 26, (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014): 2.

nations, they praised Al-Sisi and expressed their support in his leadership. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia called for the support of all the friends of Egypt to support Sisi and asked Egyptians to fight against the “foreign chaos” occurring in the region for the past three years. Aside from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran had also supported Sisi’s election and Iran’s attendance in the inauguration ceremony brought the message of a potential Egyptian-Iranian partnership to reassure the Gulf.¹³⁶

For the EU, their relationship with Al-Sisi’s Egypt was stable and congratulated him for his victory, hoping that the new government would work with the Union in a “constructive partnership.”¹³⁷ Following his elections, Sisi has visited Italy and France in November 2014 to re-establish bilateral talks between the two sides. Sisi also visited Cyprus and Spain in April 2015 to discuss bilateral relations between the EU and Egypt. Aside from these state visits, Al-Sisi’s Egypt had also made contact with the EU in the Sharm-el-Sheikh economic development summit on March 13-15, 2015. The summit, with the title ‘Egypt is the Future’ aims to support the development of the Egyptian economy and boost participation from the international partners to support Egyptian growth. According to Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb, the summit also aims to boost Egypt’s appeal to investors and implement economic and social reforms.¹³⁸ During the

¹³⁶ Allam, Ahmad. "Sisi draws regional leaders for inauguration." *AlMonitor*. June 9, 2014. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/egypt-sisi-inauguration-strong-gulf-support.html> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹³⁷ Andrew Gardner. "EU 'congratulates' el-Sisi." *Politico*. June 6, 2014. <http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-congratulates-el-sisi/> (accessed November 7, 2015).

¹³⁸ Ayyad, Mohamed. "Economic Summit to be held from 13-15 March in Sharm El-Sheikh." *Daily News Egypt*. November 22, 2014. <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/22/economic-summit-held-13-15-march-sharm-el-sheikh/> (accessed November 25, 2015).

Sharm-el-Sheikh summit, the EU and the Egyptian Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Joint declarations to support Egyptian development with a grant amounting to 130 million euros. The MoU highlights the development of the EU Single Support Framework (SSF) for Egypt for 2014-2015 that would indicate the bilateral agreements Egypt agreed with the EU for the period. The SSF for 2014-2015 includes the following priority areas: Poverty Alleviation and Economic/Social Protection (40%), Governance, Transparency and Business Environment (20%) and Quality of life (40%).

Meanwhile, the Joint Declaration between the Egyptian government and the EU reflects the agreement between both parties in 2014 to develop three grant programs that would increase EU contribution to 130 million. These grant programs are following: "Access to Education and Protection for at Risk Children" programme (30 million euros), "Household Natural Gas Connection" (68 million euros) and "Kafr El Sheikh Wastewater Expansion" programme (32 million euros).¹³⁹ The EIB had also signed a loan of 120 million euros for the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) to support private sector in Egypt; especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The EIB supported Egypt to improve the Egyptian SMEs to promote productivity and competitiveness of the Egyptian economy. The EU had also launched the EU Joint Rural Development Programme in the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit. The program has a budget of 39 million euros which would be used for the agricultural and rural sectors of Egypt. Rural

¹³⁹Delegation of the European Union to Egypt. "Europe mobilizes €272 Million to Egypt at the EEDC."

Delegation of the European Union to Egypt: Press Corner. March 14, 2015.

http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150314_en.htm (accessed November 30, 2015).

development under the project would be handled by the Italian Cooperation Office that would handle EU grants.¹⁴⁰

However, the EU could not easily influence the development of democracy in the country considering the shaky relationship it shares with the Al-Sisi government. Although Al-Sisi had made it a point to visit European countries after being voted into office, many EU leaders had called against his continuous use of violence to silence opposition leaders and called for the transfer of power in the country to civilian leaders and not from the military before they provide aid. The EU had even ordered the cancellation of its delegation's arrival in Egypt to monitor the elections in the country and pose an impasse between the two nations. The EU also rejected the current human rights status in the country and for Egypt, that is a major blow alongside its refusal to watch the parliamentary elections. These two decisions of the EU eventually curtailed its influence from affecting the Al-Sisi regime and disabled further talks from flourishing between each country. Egypt had prepared several ways for the country to regain EU's trust in the region, but analysts believe that the tactics used by EU regarding the Al-Sisi regime issues were a ploy to pressure the country in supporting EU's interests in the region.¹⁴¹

Despite the protests and concerns regarding the EU-Al Sisi relations, it has been reaffirmed by EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini that Egypt and the EU have very stable relations under the Al-Sisi government. In her visit to the recovering country, Mogherini had congratulated Egypt on the signs of a potential parliament that would match international

¹⁴⁰ Delegation of the European Union to Egypt. "Europe mobilizes €272 Million to Egypt at the EEDC."

¹⁴¹ Middle East Monitor. "Tensions between Sisi and Europe intensify." *Middle East Monitor*. January 29, 2015. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/16675-tensions-between-sisi-and-europe-intensify> (accessed November 9, 2015)

democratic standards and boost up Egypt's capacity to deal with several regional issues. Mogherini's visit was done to enhance discussions between Egypt and the EU and tackled critical issues such as the Libyan crisis and the common issues dealt in the country such as illegal immigration and terrorism.¹⁴²

Democracy Promotion of the EU After the Arab Spring in Egypt

With the end of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU has undergone several negotiations to determine how democracy can be reintroduced in Egypt considering its image as a major actor on democracy promotion worldwide after the US. In response to the crisis, the EU – through the EC and the EEAS launched the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), which aimed to establish a framework that would allow partner countries establish reform to accommodate the short-term effects of the Arab Spring to their respective territories. The PfDSP identified three major priorities in its framework that would assist in development: transformation of democracy and the establishment of associated institutions, the creation of people-to-people channels and the promotion of inclusive economic development. Upon its application in Egypt, NGOs and CSOs were provided financial reform by the EU to become involved with citizens' development.¹⁴³

The revised ENP also had provisions which highlighted democracy promotion, promoting a 'deep democracy' framework' which is deeply embedded in its more-for-more/less-

¹⁴²Daily News Egypt. "Al-Sisi, Mogherini affirm continuous Egyptian-EU relations." *Daily News Egypt*. November 4, 2015. <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/11/04/al-sisi-mogherini-affirm-continuous-egyptian-eu-relations/> (accessed November 10, 2015).

¹⁴³ Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." *Middle East Critique* 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.

for-less principle. The renewed framework of the ENP also indicated that aside from the encouragement of the free elections, it also aims to provide assistance to CSOs and NGOs which are integral in contributing the achievability of stable transition to democracy by the region.¹⁴⁴ Aside from the ENP and the PfDSP, the EU also introduced the European Endowment for Democracy which was also indicated in the revised ENP in 2011. The EED aims to promote democracy in countries like Egypt which currently has an unstable relationship with the EU. Since it is autonomous from the EU, it can provide funding for partner countries without seeking approval from the EU and assist in the establishment of the most effective means in introducing democracy and reform. The EED also offers its own range of programs that would aid relevant actors identified to be critical actors in democracy promotion. However, it does have limited budget of over 14 million euros for the entire region. It is also unclear as to the extent of the operations of the EED due to the lack of clear framework and aims of its actions in the region, especially in Egypt.¹⁴⁵

Concluding Remarks

It is undeniable in this chapter that the Arab Spring's impact in Egypt is profound, not just in the stability of the country but also for the continuous existence of the EU-Egyptian relations. Like the rest of the international community, the EU has been taken off-guard by the event and disabled immediate action from occurring especially due to the importance of the region to the political and economic interests of the EU and its members. However, once it has

¹⁴⁴ Timo Behr. *After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition*. Policy Paper No. 54, (Paris: Notre Europe, 2012): 9-10.

¹⁴⁵ Maciej Wilga, and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. *New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy*. (London: Routledge, 2014) 65-66.

taken time to understand the crisis, the Union launched several instruments to ensure that negotiations for democracy promotion and reestablishment of EU-Egyptian affairs such as in the revision of the ENP and the grants provided to the Egyptian government. Despite achieving some success in fostering change in Egypt especially with the introduction of democracy promotion programs like the EED and the PfDSP, the unstable political environment in Egypt disabled the EU's programs from taking root despite the grants given to the government. The following chapter adds additional arguments which supports the argument that the EU is still incapable of introducing reform through its foreign policy as discussion would be analyzing the impact of the EU member countries and the EU's institutions in influencing the capacity of EU foreign policy.

**CHAPTER V: THE IMPACTS OF EU'S STRUCTURE AND MEMBER COUNTRIES
TO ITS FOREIGN POLICY EFFECTIVENESS**

This chapter focuses on the structure and member countries of the EU aiming to assess the ways and the extent to which these two factors influenced the EU foreign policy towards Egypt following the Arab Uprising. A critical analysis of the impacts of the individual member countries of the EU – specifically the impact of the German, French, Italian and British action - on the coherence of EU action is the first topic discussed in this chapter. The discussions would include how member countries are influenced with their sentiments on political Islam, the Arab Spring and political conditionality. This chapter will also cover an analysis as to how the EU's complex structure and decision-making influenced the EU's foreign policy initiatives. The discussion would also include the limitations that was met by the EU in pushing for its policies in Egypt.

Impacts of the Member Countries on EU's policy toward Egypt

Considering the changing Egyptian political climate, the EU was unable to sustain its action's effectiveness because each member country had different intentions when it came to handling relations with Egypt and the ruling regime there and how the EU should act accordingly. Currently, the EU has 28 member countries with each member has his separate national histories, traditions, constitutions and political systems that make the EU unique in its way collectively. Six factors influence the relationship and role of member countries in the EU and they are the following: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic ideology and integration preferences.¹⁴⁶ In terms of the entry date, the 28 member countries are divided into

¹⁴⁶Brigid Laffan, and Alexander Stubb. "Member States." In *The European Union: How does it work?*, by Elizabeth Bomberg, John Peterson and Richard Corbett, 74-98. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 76.

five different groups. The first six countries were the founding members of the EU which have developed a consensus on European integration as an alternative for the repeated military conflicts between European powers. Germany and France had been the key countries that developed the idea of European integration. In the 1980s and the 1990s, European integration was further deepened with the introduction of aspects such as the European Monetary System and the single market. Both nations still remain at the center of the EU. The four remaining founding countries – Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands – are frontrunners for development and deeper integration. These four countries were also deeply committed to the Community method on law-making and push for a stronger Union.¹⁴⁷

However, this stance of the Benelux countries and Italy changed in recent years. For the Benelux countries, their cooperation in the EU was lukewarm at best after the introduction of the Constitutional Treaty.¹⁴⁸ The Constitutional Treaty was developed as a result of the Convention on the Future of Europe signed in 2004. The Treaty establishes institutional reform, adoption of a charter of fundamental rights and consolidation of existing treaties. The treaty was intentionally created to bring the EU closer to the people; however, before the treaty can be applied, there is a necessity that all member states ratify the treaty. By 2007, only 18 of the 27 member countries had ratified the Treaty but in the case of the Netherlands and France, the Treaty was rejected in referenda in 2005. To gain the support of the other countries who has yet to accept the Treaty, European leaders agreed to abandon the idea of developing a ‘constitution’ and just amend the pre-existing treaties. The 2007 decision also avoided all mention of the constitutional symbols and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This revised treaty is known today as the “Reform Treaty”

¹⁴⁷Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 78.

¹⁴⁸Ibid

or the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁴⁹ Despite the compromises imposed on the treaty, both Belgium and Denmark argued against the text of the Lisbon Treaty especially on the issue of scrutiny rights for national parliaments.¹⁵⁰ Italy, on the other hand, has alternated between active involvement in the EU's foreign policy and a passive stance in the system. Originally, the country is active in the European-institution building but it was not consistent. Italy's actions in the EU is also influenced by the lack of cooperation between Italy's governing coalitions that prevent collective action on the country's actions in the Union.¹⁵¹

For the remaining members of the EU who joined after the formative period starting 1978, they had to agree with the Union's current laws and obligations (or *acquis communautaire*) and its processes which have been established before the inclusion of this member states. With this factor in mind, these member countries cannot make a significant influence on the decision-making process of the EU's institutions. In each accession, adjustment makes it difficult for these member countries to catch up with each wave of accession. Adjustment is also made difficult by the growing policy areas that the Union needs to consider for every expansion. Under the *acquis communautaire*, member countries would have to read over 80,000 pages worth of legislation that would continue growing as the expansion continue to grow.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹Elizabeth Bomberg, Richard Corbett, and John Peterson. "Introduction." In *The European Union: How does it work?*, by Elizabeth Bomberg, Richard Corbett and John Peterson, 3-22. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 9-10.

¹⁵⁰Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 78.

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² Ibid.

Regarding size, the influence of each member country is dependent on their classification under the Treaty of Nice, and they are divided into four groups: large, medium, small and very small member countries. The Treaty reweighed the votes in the Council and the number of Commissioners every member state can appoint, preventing the onset of further conflict between large and small states regarding the right to vote. The large states – Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland – possesses a larger voting power but also they have political, economic and diplomatic influence in the functions of the EU. Larger states can call upon larger extensive administrative or technical resources when it comes to policy-making. Germany is considered the most powerful member of the European Union. Medium-sized states follow the broader cluster of EU member states and this group comprised the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, Portugal, Hungary, Czech Republic and Greece. Smaller states often have significant influence in negotiations because their national interests are often merged easily with the greater purpose. Completing the cluster of EU member states are very small member countries which include Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. However, while size does make some impacts in a state's power in the EU, it has small bearing for national approaches to EU policies involving economics, domestic interests, and reform efforts.¹⁵³ The wealth of each member country is also synonymous with their influence in the EU as those with large economies like Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria comprise the EU's 'net contributors club' which allows to control the increases in the EU's budget and limit costs. Poor member countries who are the beneficiaries of the EU's financial transfers, on the other

¹⁵³Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 78-80.

hand, often argue for larger budget allocation and financial instruments to keep up with their fellow member countries.¹⁵⁴

Regarding state structure, the influence of each member country also varies depending on their political structure. The Union currently has three federal states (Germany, Belgium and Austria) while the rest of the member countries have either unitary or quasi-unitary governments. The unitary states have a central government or the Republic government which tackles major issues while regional governments are provided the capacity to act on regional issues. At present, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Sweden are the Union's unitary states. In the case of France, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK's Channel Islands are considered federacies as these countries possess sub-state governments that has autonomy in comparison to the other territories or provinces of these countries. Spain, Italy and the UK are considered de facto federations or devolved states because these states can dissolve the power of autonomous governments and it is the central government dictating legislation in the region. State structure influences the EU's actions establishing its constitutional development. Subsidiarity is also an integral element in the influence of state structure as the principle states that action should be based on an action of a government that can achieve the policy goals without sacrificing citizen interest. Germany is known for being an advocate of the subsidiarity principle as the German government won the right in 1992 to send ministers to the Council of Ministers when the issue requires their specialties.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 81-82.

¹⁵⁵Laffan, and Stubb. "Member States." 83.

Economic ideology also varies per country and while there are six founding countries in the EU, their respective interests brings in different ideologies to the EU. For France and Germany, they strive for capitalist policies while Britain supports deregulation and economic liberalization based on the Anglo-Saxon paradigm. Finally, integration preferences influence a member country's influence in the EU as considering the majority on who supports a total integration of other countries while others fight for a more limited power for new countries. Domestic politics often influence how each member country support EU integration and citizens of member countries contribute to the member country's actions in the EU.¹⁵⁶

Throughout the conflict in Egypt, each member country had influenced EU progress in enforcing its policies in the country in several different ways as each member country utilized their own agenda when it comes to the stability of Egypt and sustained their respective national agenda. When the January Revolt had taken place, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy had defined EU action as they released a joint statement on January 29 – exactly the time Omar Suleiman was appointed as the vice president- without taking into consideration the discussions within the EU regarding its official stance regarding the issue.¹⁵⁷ According to the joint communique, France, Germany and the UK expressed concern regarding the violence occurring in Egypt and called for President Mubarak to show the same moderating capacity it has for many years regarding regional stability. The three EU countries also called for political, economic and social reforms promised by Mubarak and prevent the use of violence against demonstrators. The three states also

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 84-86.

¹⁵⁷ Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue."

supported the Egyptian people, citing that the public have legitimate grievances and it is the task of President Mubarak to ensure fair and free elections to foster transformation.¹⁵⁸

When the EU was discussing the actions in Egypt on February 4, five member countries had circumvented the EU to issue a joint communique that called for an immediate transition in Egypt.¹⁵⁹ Through the joint communique, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany stressed their concerns about the Egyptian situation and condemn the violence occurring in the country. The statement iterated the calls for immediate transition to allow Egypt to overcome the challenges it is currently facing.¹⁶⁰ When the ENP review was called after Mubarak's removal from office, only six member countries – France, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta – outlined actions the EU should consider in their relationship with the Mediterranean countries. These six countries also called for greater emphasis on the South and recognized the importance of differentiating its partners, introducing the “more for more” principle where the EU would reward the partner country if they manage to comply with the EU's request. The six countries also suggested that the 2011-2013 financial package meant for Egyptian aid revised in lieu of the Egyptian crisis. These member countries also stressed the need for the EU to emphasize on the “project” dimensions of the UfM. It was clear this declaration for the UfM's revival is brought

¹⁵⁸"Joint UK-France-Germany statement of Egypt." *Gov.UK News Stories*. January 29, 2011.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-germany-statement-on-egypt> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹⁵⁹Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue."

¹⁶⁰Reuters. "UPDATE 1-Five EU leaders urge rapid transition in Egypt." *Reuters*. February 3, 2011.

<http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE7120UV20110203> (accessed November 30, 2015).

forward by France who wished to get the UfM back on track after several constraints in its enforcement.¹⁶¹

The EU's stance in the region after Mubarak's removal had been quite weak especially as they took a while before they launched their actions in the region immediately after the Arab Spring in Egypt took place. On February 2011, the EU have called for negotiations between ministers to decide as to what the Union would do with the assets of Mubarak's top officials and how they can influence developments in the region. Cairo – under the SCAF- had requested the EU to freeze the assets of Mubarak's cronies and his family members. However, the European nations were divided over how the action can be done as the UK wished for a total 27 pledge from the EU member countries to freeze the assets of the Mubarak cronies while France pointed out that the EU must aid in the economic revival efforts for the country first before pushing for democracy.¹⁶² The decision of the EU to freeze the assets of the Mubarak family and their cronies took until March 21st due to the lack of consensus as to what extent should the assets be frozen to that the entire EU can contribute to it.¹⁶³ Under Decision 2011/172/CFSP restrictive measures were imposed to key Mubarak officials and related bodies due to proven graft and corruption charges. The decision was revised by the Council on November 26, 2012 through Decision 2012/723/CFSP which would allow the current government to release certain parts of

¹⁶¹Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue."

¹⁶²Agence France-Press. "EU ponders freeze on Mubarak henchmen's assets." *Al Arabiya News*. February 15, 2011. <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/15/137698.html> (accessed November 12, 2015).

¹⁶³Vivien Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." *Carnegie Europe*. May 27, 2011. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230> (accessed November 10, 2015).

the frozen funds belonging to corrupt officials and use it for reconstruction and reparations to affected citizens where these funds are taken from.¹⁶⁴

Aside from their direct involvement in the actions of the EU, the individual member countries also made it difficult for the EU to enact its policies due to the national interests of each nation as seen in the actions of four of its major members France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Their respective actions towards the new leaders of Egypt clashed consistently with the image the EU tried to convey throughout the period and the lack of respect to the EU had also instigated difficulties in terms of moderating the position of the EU in Egypt, especially on introducing democracy and reform.

France

When it comes to the foreign policy of France, the country does not support political conditionality unlike its fellow European countries. Since the 1992 Franco-African Summit, France has been keen on pursuing security first for its international initiatives, followed by development and democratization. French Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Daums indicated that economic reform must be first because it would provide the foundations for democratization. In 2006, the country introduced the “Governance Strategy for French Development Assistance” which highlighted that a “turnkey” human rights and democratic model would be null and void if it disrupts the capacity of the society to decide for themselves. With this remark, the French government stated that cooperation “should not be measured so much by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through

¹⁶⁴ Council Decision 2012/723/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt, OJ L 327/44, 27 November 2012.

conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specific experiences and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies.” France had reaffirmed their position on conditionality’s ineffectiveness in 2007 as they indicated that recipient countries of French Aid only needed to have a strong and sustainable macroeconomic program, a growth and poverty reduction program matching the MDG standards and a good public financial management system. In 2011, the government yet again reiterated its move away from conditionality with the “Development Cooperation: A French Vision”. This long-term strategy highlights that the country will now move “from a development assistance policy which implies an asymmetrical donor-beneficiary relationship over to a policy of cooperation with developing countries.” The government would also support the development of good governance, but the country will not interfere with how the recipient country would be developing their protocols. ¹⁶⁵

Similar to the rest of the Western European nations, France also has a significant number of Muslim communities in its midst. However, many French citizens were scared of the growing Muslim visibility in the 1980s. Since France had always adhered to secularism, French animosity towards Muslims have always been strong and indicated the growing misunderstanding between both groups. In recent years, the political position of France towards Islam has been growing away from hostility because of the peaceful prayer session in the mosques throughout the country and the misconceptions regarding home-grown Muslim extremism have been declining. The government had opened several key institutions that would provide Muslims representation in the country and protect the country from the growth of radical Islam. In recent years, the Islamic movements in France had been divided to different schools of Islam and the universalist schools formed by young Muslims. However, as the movements of these two groups of Islamist

¹⁶⁵ De Felice. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality" 32-34.

movements in the country, the French government is now trying means in ensuring that French Muslims could easily integrate to the country while still retaining their values and still stick to the modernity that France upholds in their country.¹⁶⁶

France's stance on political conditionality and political Islam can be seen roughly in its response to the Arab Spring while maintaining its support to EU action. President Sarkozy imposed an image that it is France that has the capacity to lead the EU leadership when it comes to the onset of the Arab Spring in comparison to its European counterparts, pushing for a more aggressive and active EU to respond to these threats. However, France failed to realize the capacity of the protests to predetermine the status quo in the entire Mediterranean which disabled their targets to be reached in the region. Despite this failure to the French approach to the Arab Spring, France had taken different strategies per country to responding the impacts of the Arab Spring in these countries as France takes into consideration their relationship with the country. In Tunisia, for example, France had backed ousted President Ben Ali. On the other hand; the country had taken a slightly discreet distance when the demonstrations in Algeria and Morocco began and supported the respective governments for its efforts to sustain democracy. There was also inconsistency in the prospect of human rights protections as seen in Bahrain because when the regime had used violence to repel the opposition, France had suspended their exports and indicated they would continue trade if the country respects human rights.

In a European level, the French government had continued to support EU action for democracy and reform, but it did act unilaterally to push for the application of their initiatives to aid recovery efforts. In Tunisia, for example, when the European Commission opened 258

¹⁶⁶Jocelyn Cesari. "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority." In *Muslims in the West, from Sojourners to Citizens*, by Yvonne Haddad-Yazbek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.) 40-45.

million euros to support the country, France had added 2 months later that they will contribute 1 billion euros for both Egypt and Tunisia, emphasizing that they believe in economic recovery as a means to then restore democracy with it. The unilateral moves done by France under Sarkozy also reflected how the country blends with EU multilateralism, especially when it came to the issue of immigration. France has been very opposed to hosting a huge number of Muslim communities in its midst due to the traditional stigmas brought by Islamism in the country in previous years. Critics did point out that Sarkozy's unilateralism had only disabled an effective EU action in the Mediterranean and their continuous movement only showed that it is not one with the southern territories and violated EU norms.¹⁶⁷

With the election of President Francois Hollande, he revised the French approach for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in October 2012. France would still be supporting financial aid in the region to improve infrastructure in the Maghreb region. Hollande also highlighted the improvement of the UfM and boost it with the ENP, incorporating the UfM as one of the program's implementation agencies. Hollande also opened the "5+5 Dialog" which would compensate for the failure of the UfM so EU and MENA countries could reach out better. France had also supported economic and logistical growth for Algeria, which is a critical ally to the country in the Middle East. France and Algeria had signed several financial agreements to boost economic and financial cooperation between France and Algeria.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷Barah Mikail. *France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence*. Working Paper No. 110, Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 5-8.

¹⁶⁸Nurettin Yigit. *Arab Spring in Berlin and Paris: German and French Policy Between Continuity and Change*. (Berlin: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015): 53-55.

When it came to the issue of Egyptian Uprising, the French had shown two opposing sides as they were previous allies with the ousted President Hosni Mubarak. In a statement after the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the significance of these protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region. He also admitted that the country had only understood the gravity of the situation in Egypt and in the rest of the region when Mubarak had been forced out of their position in the UfM. They were also unable to establish strong solidarity in the demonstrations because of their previous engagements with the ousted president.¹⁶⁹ When it became clear that Egypt's Mubarak will indeed fall, France's political Islam stance immediately caused them to challenge EU integration towards these nations alongside Italy. In a joint statement, both Sarkozy and Italy Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi demanded that the EU launches deportation pacts and return escapees back to their home countries. Both countries called for reform, especially for border-free regimes they wish to push with the Euro-Mediterranean partners.¹⁷⁰ Under Hollande's leadership, France maintained in better ties with Egypt as they have recently signed an economic deal with the country amounting to \$6 billion in military hardware. Egypt has recently requested France to shut down

¹⁶⁹Mikhail. *France and the Arab Spring*. 5.

¹⁷⁰Ian Traynor, and John Hooper. "France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake of Arab protests." *The Guardian*. April 27, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/eu-borders-arab-protests> (accessed November 12, 2015).

Muslim Brotherhood's satellite channel El-Sharq because it is affecting Egypt's efforts in restoring democracy in the country.¹⁷¹

Germany

Germany's foreign policy also supports political conditionality, especially when it comes to their aid efforts. Germany became one of the earliest key donors in Western Europe after the Second World War. Originally, the country's political conditionality effort involved the combination of diplomatic relations and foreign aid, while also pushing for the non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic. However, this attempt was not successful considering the fact the GDR was recognized by the United Nations. In their next attempt in the 1980s, development aid provided by the Federal Republic of Germany entailed the adherence of recipient countries to human rights and democracy protection. The federal government expressed that the country will fight for the establishment of democratic structures because this will improve the protections that would be able to be given to the oppressed population. Two years later in 1984, the Bundestag had yet again readopted this goal in their newest protocols and highlighted that recipient countries must reach a higher level in the protection of civil and political rights. Further political reforms to Germany's aid programs in 1989 and the 1990s to ensure that development programs would be better for the betterment of cooperation between parties. The country had introduced a five criteria system for Germany's development efforts and they are the following:

1. Respect for human rights and liberties

¹⁷¹Mary Atkinson. "Egypt asks France to shut down pro-Brotherhood satellite channel ." *Middle East Eyes*. May 13, 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-asks-france-shut-down-pro-brotherhood-satellite-channel-208107289> (accessed November 12, 2015).

2. Active civil society participation in political reform and activities
3. Respect to the rule of law
4. Application of market-friendly approaches for economic development
5. Active commitment of the recipient country to development.¹⁷²

Similar to France, Germany also has a growing distrust with regards to the Muslim population in the country, especially with the growing Islamisation in some of its Muslim groups. In an assessment done by Gatestone Institute, a majority of the German Muslim population believed in the strict adherence of its people to the Sharia law before taking into consideration the constitutions of their host countries. Although Germany has enacted policies that would protect the Muslim population in the country, several groups and critics indicated that these agreements with the German government do not bolster discussions that would improve Muslim integration in the country. It only fosters the development of a parallel Muslim society that separate these Muslims from the rest of the German people. Due to the growing crackdown in France, Germany has expressed concern over the possibility that the violence in the country may grow especially with the German Islamists already in the country. Germany is trying to crack down German Islamists in the country which is calling for violence towards the German people. Several Islamist groups have already been banned in the country in light of the growing Islamic propaganda transmitted in Dusseldorf, Gladbeck, Solingen and Frankfurt. The German people, in light of the numerous arrests and propaganda growing in the country, all expressed that they consider Islam as a threat to their security even if the government firmly claims that these people are welcome in Germany. Currently, continuous debates and arguments regarding Islamism continue to divide the country and its Muslim population due to the incapacity of the

¹⁷²Olav Stokke. *Aid and Political Conditionality*. (London: Routledge, 2013): 112-113.

German government to reach a compromise with the Muslim groups, especially in the application of certain aspects of the Sharia law to German policies.¹⁷³

Germany is undeniably one of the EU's most powerful countries and its influence in the EU's policy in the Arab Spring. Germany always saw the region as a region of limited strategic importance except for countries like Israel and Iran. It was content in allowing other nations to take part in the affairs of the region while establishing partnership with the country silently. If they had to intervene, Germany would only do it to stop French influence in growing in the region. With the establishment of the European Neighborhood Policy and its application in the region, Germany wished to establish reform in the UfM in order to reach out to influential parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood and establish continuous business partnerships in the region. However, when the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali had slowly fallen apart, it was clear to Germany that EU policy will no longer work in the region and called for reform, as well as criticized southern EU nations for not taking action in the region. While most of its actions and decisions tend to clash with the French government, it was clear that Germany was now looking at the region in a new light and reassess their regional position in the Middle Eastern issue now that its national interests are now at risks from the unstable conflict.¹⁷⁴

In the case of Egypt, the German government has signed the "Berlin Declaration" with Egypt and several other agreements with the country on August 12, 2011. Under the agreement of Egypt and Germany, Germany would support the calls for bilateral cooperation and enable Egypt to pay off its 240-million-euro debt for the ODA within the span of four years which

¹⁷³Soeren Kern. "The Islamization of Germany in 2013." *Gatestone Institute*. January 15, 2014.
<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4130/islamization-germany> (accessed November 8, 2015).

¹⁷⁴Timo Behr. *Germany and the Arab Spring*. (Paris: IFRI, 2012): 1-3.

Egypt will reciprocate with the introduction of reform, especially in democracy. It also opens channels for discussions between the two nations to discuss critical issues affecting the region and the globe. Egypt greatly benefitted with their partnership with Germany as the funds provided by Germany to boost its civil society sector. Germany was also very open for active engagement by introducing new foreign aid commitments in exchange for better development cooperation and engagement by the recipient countries.¹⁷⁵

When Al-Sisi was voted into office, German Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to meet with Al-Sisi because she wanted to see Al-Sisi's initiative to start the parliamentary elections before meeting with the new president. Al-Sisi had postponed the elections and it was clear Merkel did not stick with her foreign policy initiative as Al-Sisi arrived in Berlin on June 3, 2015. Experts indicated that this visit had several national interests taken into consideration as it would boost business initiatives of German companies in Egypt. German companies would see Al-Sisi's visit as a go signal for starting investments in the country. Merkel had also stressed through her spokesman Stephen Seibert that she will meet the Egyptian president because "Egypt is an immensely important player in the Arab World" and would contribute greatly to the peace and stability of the region.¹⁷⁶ In their joint press conference, Merkel had expressed that they will aid Egypt in economic development and aid the country in its fight against extremism. Merkel had also stressed in her statement that: "Egypt is one of the central countries in a region marked by unrest and instability" and helping the country's business sector would reduce instability

¹⁷⁵Behr. *Germany and the Arab Spring*. 3.

¹⁷⁶Judy Dempsey. "Germany Welcomes Egypt's Sisi." *Carnegie Europe: Strategic Europe*. June 1, 2015. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60260> (accessed November 11, 2015).

greatly. Merkel did criticize the Al-Sisi regime in his visit in terms of its human rights policies, especially on the issue of the death penalty.¹⁷⁷

Italy

Like other European countries, Italy has a significant number of Muslim population in the country reaching up to 1 million Muslims. Most of these Muslim population come from Albania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh. With the 9/11 attacks and the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, Italy has enacted the law “Package Pisanu” which would empower the government to provide “urgent measures against international terrorism” in 2005. The package consists of 19 articles involving security, anti-terrorism and immigration policies; highlighting the suitable response of the country towards security threats.¹⁷⁸ Using the Package Pisanu law, the Italian police managed to investigate several imams in 2007 after tips of these imams teaching Islamic extremism. The most notable example of the 2007 probes was the case of Mohamed Kohaila who had been reported to commit anti-Western behavior and violence after official investigations. In 2008, Italy’s “best known anti-terrorism magistrate” Stefano Dambroso stated that Islamic extremism has already spread in Italy prior to the 9/11 attacks.¹⁷⁹

When the Arab spring occurred in 2010, Italy had expressed concerns regarding the regime stability of the South rather than the promotion of civil rights and equality especially in

¹⁷⁷ Agence France-Press. "Protests, mega-deal as Merkel welcomes Egypt's Sisi." *Daily Mail*. June 3, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3109489/Merkel-welcomes-Egypt's-al-Sisi-protest-marred-visit.html> (accessed November 10, 2015).

¹⁷⁸ "Islam in Italy." *Euro-Islam: News and Analysis on Islam in Europe and North America*. 2015. <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/> (accessed December 1, 2015).

¹⁷⁹ "Islam in Italy."

Algeria and Libya. The Italian government expressed concerns of the potential impacts of the political liberalization that would be produced once terrorism and immigration enter Italy from partner countries. In response to the changing situation in the Arab region, Italy concentrated on “immigration” coming from southern Mediterranean regions. Italy opened humanitarian permits to incoming migrants in order to enter the country freely. The country also took part in a joint proposal with France to revise the Schengen system to monitor free movement of people within the region. When the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, the Italy had declared a state of emergency to ensure full monitoring of the migrant flows from the region.¹⁸⁰

After the removal of Mubarak, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invited SCAF chief Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi to Rome on June 2 to take part in the celebrations for Italy’s establishment as a republic. The visit would also rekindle negotiations between Cairo and Rome regarding trade partnerships and more Italian investments in Egypt.¹⁸¹ Under the Morsi regime, Italy agreed to invest 800 million euros in Egypt when the Egyptian president visited Rome on September 2012. Morsi met with President Giorgio Napolitano and both leaders declared that they will work in partnership to boost bilateral relations and economic cooperation between the two countries. Prior to Morsi’s visit, Egypt signed an agreement with Italy in May

¹⁸⁰Ludovica Marchi, Richards Whitman, and Geoffrey Edwards. *Italy's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A Contested Nature?* (London: Routledge, 2014): 209- 212.

¹⁸¹Mohamed Ismail. "Egypt's SCAF chief to visit Italy in June." *Egyptian Gazette*. April 22, 2011. <http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/?action=news&id=17414> (accessed November 30, 2015).

2012 for the debt swap worth \$100 million for Italian investments.¹⁸² When El-Sisi assumed office in 2014, he flew to Italy to meet with both the Italian Prime Minister and President to discuss military coordination to combat Islamist militias in Libya and the improvement of Egypt-Italian economic ties. With regards to his meeting with Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Sisi is expected to broach the topic on investments and poverty reduction programs.¹⁸³

United Kingdom

The British government has often endorsed the adherence of the country to political conditionality to its foreign aid programs since the end of the Cold War. In order to make sure that political conditionality is applied in its foreign policy, the Labor government in 1997 had established the Department of International Development or the DfID) which would request recipient governments of British aid to “pursue policies which promote responsive and accountable government, recognizing that governments have obligations to all their people [and] promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights”. In 2005, the DfID had worked alongside the British Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in indicating the country’s aid commitments and revised them to match the current situation in the international community. Under the document “Partnership for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality”, the new aid commitment of the UK will have three objectives:

¹⁸² Ahram Online. "Egypt to see \$1bn in Italian investments." *Ahram Online*. September 15, 2012. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/52975/Business/Economy/Egypt-to-see-bn-in-Italian-investments.aspx> (accessed November 30, 2015).

¹⁸³ Agence France-Presse. "Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Visit France, Italy in First European Trip." *NDTV*. November 22, 2014. <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/egyptian-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-to-visit-france-italy-in-first-european-trip-703015> (accessed December 1, 2015).

1. Reduction of poverty and the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals
2. Respecting human rights and international laws
3. Empowering financial management and accountability of recipient countries.

If recipient countries would fail to achieve these objectives despite British aid, the country has the power to rescind aid especially if evidences of the recipient country's violations are forwarded to the British government. This conditionality policy has continuously been seen in various aid programs of the country around the world and in 2011, the DfID further boosted this policy under the "Technical Note on Implementing DfID's strengthened approach to budget support." The UK also expressed that they will be reviewing governments applying for British aid and push for domestic accountability before their aid would be given. Aside from political conditionality towards economic aid, the British government also applied shared commitments for human rights in developing countries.¹⁸⁴

When it comes to political Islam or Islamism, Britain currently has a sizable Muslim population which mostly are immigrants that entered the country since the 1950s either as refugees, immigrants or asylum-seekers. With the onset of the 9/11 attacks, Britain had been on alert for the possibility that these Muslims may conduct attacks on terrorism in the country. In 2003 and 2004, the British fears were justified when discoveries of weapons that can be used for attacks throughout London. In 2004, authorities arrested Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri for encouraging murder on Jews and non-Muslims to impose the sharia law. The 2005 London transportation bombings also caused the British government to reassess their position on Islamism in the country. The British government condemned extremists currently causing

¹⁸⁴Damiano de Felice. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid." *World Development* 75 (2015): 35-37.

terrorism to flourish in the country and even British Muslims expressed opposition towards political Islam. In order to counter Islamism's growth, the British government – like other Western European countries – applied a three-pronged approach:

1. Application of general counterterrorism policies that do not pertain to a specific sect of Islam
2. Use policies that would repress Islamism
3. Use of policies that would ensure that Muslims can integrate to their respective countries.

Britain had also reformed its anti-terrorism strategies to match the international standards against Muslim extremism. The country introduced the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy that sustains the following strands:

1. PREVENT – integrate Muslims to the British society and challenge extremist tendencies of these Muslims.
2. PURSUE – repress violence by monitoring Muslim terrorist movements through intelligence gathering and law enforcement operations.
3. PROTECT and PREPARE – reduce vulnerability of potential targets and ensure effective response towards any attacks.¹⁸⁵

When the Arab Spring had occurred in the Middle East in 2010, Britain's response had been supportive to the EU effort as the Arab Spring would now usher a more active democratic growth in the region. According to UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, Britain's actions

¹⁸⁵Erik Bleich. "Faith and state. British policy responses to 'Islamist' extremism." *Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades* 16, no. 31 (2014): 128-132.

regarding the onset of the Arab Spring comprises three principles.¹⁸⁶ The first major principle is the fact Britain would not dictate the change outside the country and they would not get involved in the issue directly. The British government recognizes that the conflict in the region is not Britain's revolutions and the country cannot decide as to what future these Arab countries should have. However, Britain would help in ensuring diplomatic pressures would be applied in transition governments to support change. The second principle entails the importance of human rights and freedoms and the British government believes these rights would be followed accordingly by transition governments. It is the belief of the British government that these transition countries would begin the process on democracy because it is expected of them by the international community. Finally, the British government's actions regarding the Arab Spring is also quite passive to the point that they would only become involved with funding and necessary international pressures that would assist in the development efforts. The British government had also expressed that the country would be working alongside other organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the EU in pushing for political transition and economic recovery for the Middle East, especially the Middle East peace process.¹⁸⁷

Taking into consideration the position of the British government regarding Islamism, political conditionality and the Arab Spring, its actions in the Egyptian Uprising had indicated their national interests in securing the country as a political ally while expressing their support to the EU in some of its policies. The country sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against

¹⁸⁶William Hague. "International Policy Responses to Changes in the Arab World." *BRISMES Annual Conference 2012*. (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012): 3-4.

¹⁸⁷Hague. "International Policy Responses to Changes in the Arab World." 3-4.

extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and protesters, calling for democratic elections.¹⁸⁸ Prime Minister Cameron himself had flown to Egypt immediately after Mubarak was removed from office and portrayed the country as a “candid friend” of the Egyptian government. He called for the Egyptian interim government to adhere to the existing commitments of the country with the international community and begin free and fair elections. Cameron also indicated that the British government would not just focus on economic trade, but also to push for political reforms, security improvements and improved commercial channels for British businesses.¹⁸⁹ By the time Morsi stepped into office, the British government sent their invitation to have the Egyptian leader visit the country so they can discuss effective partnership and democracy promotion in the new regime. The British government also promised that Egyptians hoping to escape would be returned to Egypt, including the members of Mubarak’s regime as a condition to get Morsi to acquiesce to British requests.¹⁹⁰

With the recent election of President Al-Sisi to the Egyptian government, it was clear to critics that Britain’s national interests would be affected especially in terms of Britain’s adherence to the promotion of human rights if they reach out to the Al-Sisi regime. With the EU still in somehow shaky terms in the region and human rights still a critical concern in improving

¹⁸⁸British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. *British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13*. London: The Stationery Office, 2012. 67.

¹⁸⁹Nicholas Watt. "David Cameron arrives in Egypt to meet military rulers." *The Guardian*. February 21, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/21/david-cameron-visits-egypt> (accessed November 9, 2015).

¹⁹⁰"Egypt's President Morsi invited to London by Hague." *Ahram Online*. September 11, 2012. <http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/52548.aspx> (accessed November 10, 2015).

democracy in the region, the British government had accepted the Egyptian president's visit to London despite the criticisms of such action. Cameron had invited Al-Sisi in order to discuss with him the review regarding the Muslim Brotherhood which would coincide with the country's aims to improve their action against extremism. Al-Sisi's visit was a way for him to express that Britain is ready for any form of attacks from extremist factions in the country. Britain's continuous relationship with Egypt through Al-Sisi's visit further boosts the country's cooperation with Egypt and ensure that they can protect each other from any threat and ensure that their national interests are still protected.¹⁹¹

Impacts of the EU's Structure and Decision-Making System to EU's Policies

Finally, EU action could not really work in the Egyptian Uprising because of EU's complex structure and decision-making system which disabled the country to establish better coordination with its member countries and handle the changing political environment of Egypt. Aside from the composition of its member countries, the EU is made unique because of the institutions that influence its decision-making capacity and influence in the region. The most powerful institution in the EU is the European Commission, which represents the the EU in the international community and also ensures that each member country adheres to EU treaties and legislation. The Commission also has the power to propose policy, lead in trade talks, establish competition policy and ensure member country compliance. Most of the powers of the Commission come from the Treaties that support the EU's structure and standards.

¹⁹¹Umberto Bacchi. "Sisi UK visit: 'Muslim Brotherhood review ready' David Cameron tells Egyptian president." *International Business Times*. November 5, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sisi-uk-visit-muslim-brotherhood-review-ready-david-cameron-tells-egyptian-president-1527423> (accessed November 10, 2015).

The Council of Ministers follows the Commission in terms of its influence in the EU's structure and it is considered the primary decision-making body of the Union alongside the European Parliament. The Council has a very complex system as to how it acts as a legislative body. Meetings done by Council members often entail different configurations depending on the issue in question. If the Council will be meeting for environmental protection, the ministers that should meet in the council are the environmental ministers. Ten additional Councils are also within the Council to ensure all critical subjects that the EU needs to take into consideration such as foreign policy, general affairs and budgets are taken into consideration by a specific sector. When it comes to voting, the Council of Ministers used to follow a majority voting system to decide on legislation. However, this had to change after the 2004-2007 enlargements since new governments had to be added with the system. The Council also follows a "Community method" to decide on sensitive issues such as foreign policy. Currently, the rules of voting require a triple majority before legislation can be brought into discussion from the Council of Ministers.¹⁹² Working groups are often established by the Council to scrutinize texts and proposals and then they determine if the proposal holds merits for the EU in general. Once a consensus is met, it is forwarded to the Coreper, which would then tackle the proposals and decisions before they are passed to the European Council. If the proposal is politically-sensitive, member countries are

¹⁹²Richard Corbett, John Peterson, and Elizabeth Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." In *The European Union: How does it work?*, by Richard Corbett, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, 47-73. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 48-55.

provided the chance to establish negotiations with other parties to reach a compromise to settle the legislation for the European Council.¹⁹³

The next agency within the EU that sustains its power is the European Council, which comprises the members of the Heads of Government and highlight negotiations between each member to discuss critical policies and issues. Members meet four times per year to discuss issues like enlargement, climate change and treaty reforms which had been brought forward in each meeting. The Council also tackles issues that cannot be resolved within the Council of Ministers. The Lisbon Treaty further boosts the role of the European Council to nominate the President of the European Council, which would be the counterpart of the President of the European Commission. The President of the European Council tends to serve as the mediator and facilitator of European Council Meetings and assist in the enlargement efforts of accession countries to the EU.¹⁹⁴

Similar to the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament also takes into consideration the legislative functions of the EU. Many consider the Parliament as the voice of decision-making in the EU. Unlike other Parliaments in a national level, the European Parliament cannot initiate legislator and it can only discuss aspects like spending when it comes to the budget of the EU. However, it does forcefully exercise its legislative powers and decides on all EU legislation before it can be passed to law. The Parliament also determines if the EU would accept a

¹⁹³Rory Watson and Richard Corbett. "How Policies Are Made." In *The European Union: How does it work?*, by Richard Corbett, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, 122-140. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 126-127.

¹⁹⁴Corbett, Peterson, and Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." 60-61.

particular policy and agreement.¹⁹⁵ Specialized parliamentary committees are established to ensure that legislation is properly analyzed and trigger political negotiations between member countries to establish compromises. Ministers are given the time to propose amendments to the proposals directed in the parliament before the legislation is sent to the full Parliament for review and voting. Political parties often get involved with the negotiation process and as a result, the Parliament tend to create a composite amendment to ensure that each party will support the legislation. Once it is approved by all parties, policies can be put into force after a year.¹⁹⁶

Finally, the EU also has its very own Court of Justice and unlike its other fellow EU institutions, it does not have a very strong power in the EU. The ECJ ensures that the Treaties of the EU are properly interpreted and applied. It is also the final arbiter should there be legal disputes between institutions or member countries. The Court also monitors the adherence of the EU member countries and institutions to their responsibilities. The ECJ can also fine member countries should they violate EU law at anyway. The ECJ also helps member countries to determine how EU law can be applied in the rulings of national laws, especially if it has European leanings. If the Court has a pro-integration agenda, it boosts the capacity of national courts to be included in the EU's legal system and assist in the resolution of conflicts. Oftentimes, critics of the ECJ state that it is a policy-making body rather than a judiciary body considering the influence they play to the interpretation of law for the national level.¹⁹⁷

With the various functions and systems within the EU, it was difficult for the EU to establish a strong response to the Egyptian Uprising. It was not clear for members of the EU as

¹⁹⁵Corbett, Peterson, and Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." 61.

¹⁹⁶Watson and Corbett. "How Policies Are Made.": 125-126.

¹⁹⁷Corbett, Peterson, and Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." 64-65.

to how they can utilize the Union's influence in the Egyptian region given the different positions of EU institutions on how EU action should be established. Since the EU could not coordinate its member countries, it took them a while before they can make a clear action in the Egyptian crisis as seen in the freezing of assets of Mubarak's people. The heads of critical EU agencies such as European Council President Herman Van Rompuy also had been assertive when it comes to stressing that Mubarak must show his sincerity while High Representative Catherine Ashton had expressed a simple statement that the government recognizes the human rights of protesters. The Council, Commission and the Parliament were also divided over the stance the EU must take. The Parliament wanted an assertive EU to take action in the Egyptian Uprising, releasing a resolution on February 17 stating that it will concentrate on Egypt's democratic transition and then review the ENP. The Council took almost a month before the assets of Mubarak's people were frozen in Europe on March. The High Commissioner was also unable to boost EU action without the support of the members of the Council and approval of the Parliament and Commission.¹⁹⁸

The Parliament continued to press on other EU institutions to resolve the succeeding conflicts in Egypt. When President Morsi gave himself expanded constitutional powers through several constitutional decrees, the head of the European Parliament Martin Schulz stated that the EU should put economic pressure on Egypt to stop the Morsi regime. In his statement, Schultz stated that "The European Union must make it clear that there can no political nor economic cooperation without pluralist democracy in Egypt." He stressed that only economic pressure can

¹⁹⁸Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue."

influence Morsi to stop his continuous rise to power.¹⁹⁹ In September 2013, the Parliament also released its resolution on the July 2013 coup. In their resolution, the Parliament stated that it is one with the Egyptian people in calling for justice for those who have been killed in the violent clashes throughout the country. The Parliament criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for failing to stop their supporters when it comes to their response to the protesters and condemned all forms of violence and terrorism spreading in the country. The Parliament also calls for an immediate political transition to ensure the transfer of power from the military to civilian authorities and call the active participation of the people. The Parliament had also urged the Union to consider the principles of conditionality and the economic challenges that may prevent Egypt from achieving the standards set by both parties in terms of its aid program. The resolution also reiterated the establishment of an EU mechanism that would provide legal and technical assistance to all Arab Spring countries under its May 23, 2013 declaration which had been postponed due to the Egyptian coup.²⁰⁰

The EEAS was also ineffective in pushing for immediate action and implementation of European foreign policy in the region. Upon its establishment, the EEAS was considered to be an autonomous from the Commission's control. It was also meant to be the first response team of the EU in times of crisis such as the Arab Spring in Egypt and serve as emissaries for the EU.

¹⁹⁹EUbusiness. "European Parliament chief urges economic pressure on Egypt." *EUbusiness*. December 6, 2012. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.14h> (accessed November 30, 2015).

²⁰⁰European Parliament. "European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 on the situation in Egypt." *European Parliament*. September 12, 2013. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/dv/3a_respe12sept2013_sitegypte_/3a_respe12sept2013_sitegypte_en.pdf (accessed November 30, 2014).

However, since the EEAS did not have a clear political vision or initiative in applying the EU's foreign policy goals overseas, the EEAS was unable to achieve its doctrine and caused problems for the EU by the time the Arab Spring had occurred. Further adding to the problem of the EEAS is the conflicts within the EU agencies with regards to the benefits to the EU's foreign policy. Some EU agencies argued that the EEAS should be disbanded as its tasks is similar to another DG's functions, while others argue that the EEAS does not have the mechanisms and policies needed that would legitimize its benefits as an agency for the enforcement of the EU's foreign policy.²⁰¹

Concluding Remarks

It is clear that the EU's action in the Egyptian crisis has been heavily curtailed by three factors which stopped any of its policies from taking into fruition since 2011 to the present time. Aside from the changing political environment in Egypt, muddling the EU's actions in the region is the different national interests of each one of the Union's member countries that posed complications for a strong EU foreign policy. As these member countries, especially the three major actors in the EU, have their own perspectives on the benefits of Egypt and the Middle East, they applied a variety of policy instruments to ensure that while they support the EU, they can still achieve their policy interests. Finally, the effectiveness of EU's foreign policy is greatly affected by the EU's complex structure and decision-making system because each division within the EU has a different sentiment as to how the issue in Egypt can be resolved. While the EU does have good intentions in reaching out to the Egyptian government and its citizens, it is clear that it cannot fully deliver its initiatives and promises to the people.

²⁰¹ Virgili. "The "Arab Spring" and the EU's "Democracy Promotion" in Egypt." 59-60.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate if the EU can promote change in regions affected by the Arab Spring and introduce democracy without US involvement or interference. This study also aimed to discover if the EU can introduce a more efficient reform program and deliver its promises to the people.

Similar to the sudden onset of the uprising, the study indicated that the EU has been taken off guard with regards to the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010 and was unable to instigate reform immediately due to the sheer extent of the entire revolution. In an interview with the EEAS Representative Patrice Bergamini, Head of the Middle East, North Africa Division in the EEAS, Bergamini stated that the EU's action towards the Arab Spring should not be criticized so deeply because the event itself was difficult to predict and immediately responding to it is difficult due to the different countries of the EU. He also stated that "*the crisis in both Syria and the Sahel, for example, still have unknown variables on how it could affect the entire region's stability and EU's actions' effectiveness. The Arab Spring entire impact cannot be determined for another 15 to 20 years.*" Bergamini also expressed that better successes could be reached if the EEAS and the European Commission can be improved in terms of their cooperation with one another in highlighting key issues in the Mediterranean such as education, human rights and development.²⁰²

With the onset of the Egyptian Arab Spring, the EU still pushed for democratic promotion in the country while providing economic aid to ensure that the Egyptian people can finally recover from the revolution. The EU has also been able to introduce new initiatives when

²⁰² Patrice Bergamini, interview by Ahmed Adel. *On EU's Actions on the Arab Spring* (November 10, 2015).

it comes to the security framework in the region now that terrorism and migration has become a concern for many nations. They were also considered key factors to the improvement of civil society groups and in promoting negotiations as to how such groups could become more active members of the transition process.

However, while the EU does have strong objectives when it comes to its policies for the region, including the promoting of exercising democracy and recovery, it was clear that EU policies were greatly influenced by its individual member states, Egypt's current political status, and its structure which affected its effectiveness. The changing political leadership in Egypt and their respective interests greatly clashed with the EU, disabling the Union from creating lasting partnerships with its leaders. The member countries have also taken several steps outside the EU which derailed its influence and the development of strong EU policies towards the region. The Member countries also indicated which image the EU should convey to the crisis, further complicating policy initiatives. Some member countries even had a passive stance as to how the EU should act upon the issue, further affecting the EU's capacity in introducing reform in the unstable country. In the interview with Rania Aurag, Head of Euro- Arab Cooperation division in the League of Arab States, she stated that 'the League would be supportive over the efforts for Arab solidarity but it would not become involved unless a state asks them to intervene.'²⁰³ Finally, the complex structure of the EU had hindered the advancement of policies in Egypt because of the differing opinions to EU's overall action in the region and the lack of unanimity.

²⁰³ Rania Aurag, interview by Ahmed Adel. (November 10, 2015).

Limitations of the Study

The study has experienced several limitations that affected the quality and depth of the discussions presented in the study. First, there has been a limitation with regards to the primary sources which were coming from the Egyptian government whom were at the time, the SCAF transition to President Al-Sisi's government, as they are written in Arabic or only accessible through offline means. In this regard, it disabled the researcher to highlight the Egyptian aspect of the EU action. The second limitation to this study was with the lack of availability of sources that would indicate the responses from other member countries –aside from the three major players of the EU – with regards to the Arab and the Egyptian uprising. Finally, it was also a challenge for the study to keep up with the conflicting sentiments of experts regarding the total impact of the Arab Spring in Egypt; since Egypt remains in a somewhat delicate situation with the recent election of President Al-Sisi, it can be said that the total impact of the Arab Spring cannot be determined completely at the present time so long as the country remains unstable democratically.

Future Research Direction

This study highlighted five major recommendations for future researchers to consider, and who wish to continue or further dig deeper into this topic.

1. Identify other positions of member states regarding where they stand on the Arab Spring in Egypt.
2. Compare Egypt's situation and EU's action with other nations affected by the Arab Spring such as Tunisia, Syria and Libya.
3. Study EU-Egyptian Relations under former President Hosni Mubarak.

4. Compare EU action in the Egyptian Spring with that of the US or the UN's actions regarding the same issue.
5. Determine the recommendations of which the EU could implement in order to improve its overall foreign policy.

Bibliography

Agence France-Press. "EU ponders freeze on Mubarak henchmen's assets." 15 February 2011. *Al Arabiya News*. 12 November 2015.

<<https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/15/137698.html>>.

—. "Protests, mega-deal as Merkel welcomes Egypt's Sisi." 3 June 2015. *Daily Mail*. 10 November 2015. <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3109489/Merkel-welcomes-Egypt-s-Sisi-protest-marred-visit.html>>.

Agence France-Presse. "Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to Visit France, Italy in First European Trip." 22 November 2014. *NDTV*. 1 December 2015.

<<http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/egyptian-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-to-visit-france-italy-in-first-european-trip-703015>>.

Ahram Online. "Egypt to see \$1bn in Italian investments." 15 September 2012. *Ahram Online*. 30 November 2015.

<<http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/52975/Business/Economy/Egypt-to-see-1bn-in-Italian-investments.aspx>>.

Al-Anani, Khalil. *Egypt and the EU in the Post-Mubarak Era*. Europe in Dialogue 2011/01. Berlin: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2011.

Allam, Ahmad. "Sisi draws regional leaders for inauguration." 9 June 2014. *AlMonitor*. 1 December 2015. <<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/egypt-sisi-inauguration-strong-gulf-support.html>>.

Aswat Masriya. "Sisi says "Egypt" 17 times in first speech as president." 8 June 2014. *Aswat Masriya*. 30 November 2015.

<<http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=0e1fb43b-93a0-463d-b2ee-401e0981263a>>.

Atkinson, Mary. "Egypt asks France to shut down pro-Brotherhood satellite channel ." 13 May 2015. *Middle East Eyes*. 12 November 2015. <<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-asks-france-shut-down-pro-brotherhood-satellite-channel-208107289>>.

Ayyad, Mohamed. "Economic Summit to be held from 13-15 March in Sharm El-Sheikh." 22 November 2014. *Daily News Egypt*. 25 November 2015. <<http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/22/economic-summit-held-13-15-march-sharm-el-sheikh/>>.

Bacchi, Umberto. "Sisi UK visit: 'Muslim Brotherhood review ready' David Cameron tells Egyptian president." 5 November 2015. *International Business Times*. 10 November 2015. <<http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/sisi-uk-visit-muslim-brotherhood-review-ready-david-cameron-tells-egyptian-president-1527423>>.

Balfour, Rosa. *Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring*. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies; European Policy Centre, 2012.

—. *EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring*. Report. Catalonia: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2012.

Barbe, Esthe and Anna Herranz-Surraelles. *The Challenge of Differentiation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Flexible Regional Cooperation of Fragmentation*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Bartunek, Robert-Jan. "EU will not monitor Egypt vote after equipment blocked: official." 17 May 2014. *Reuters*. 7 November 2015. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/17/us-egypt-election-eu-idUSBREA4G08C20140517>>.

- Behr, Timo. *After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition*. Policy Paper No. 54. Paris: Notre Europe, 2012.
- Behr, Timo and Aaretti Siitonen. *Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after the Arab Spring*. FIIA Working Paper No. 77. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013.
- Behr, Timo. *Germany and the Arab Spring*. Paris: IFRI, 2012.
- . "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?" *Amsterdam Law Forum* 4.2 (2012): 76-88.
- Bindi, Federiga and Irina Angelescu. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*. New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
- Bleich, Erik. "Faith and state. British policy responses to 'Islamist' extremism." *Araucaria: Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades* 16.31 (2014): 127-146.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Richard Corbett. *The European Union: How does it work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Bremberg, Niklas. "Making sense of the EU's response to the Arab Spring: legitimizing discourses and EU foreign policy practices at times of crisis." *Change and Continuity in Transatlantic Relations Conference*. Stockholm: Swedish Network of European Studies in Political Science, 2015. 1-27.
- Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler. "A global actor past its peak?" *International Relations* 27.3 (2013): 375-390.
- British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. *British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13*. London: The Stationery Office, 2012.

Brown, Nathan. "Tracking the "Arab Spring": Egypt's Failed Transition." *Journal of Democracy* 24.4 (2013): 45-58.

Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." 20 October 2015. *The World Factbook*. 24 October 2015. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>>.

Cesari, Jocelyn. "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority." Haddad-Yazbek, Yvonne. *Muslims in the West, from Sojourners to Citizens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 36-51.

Corbett, Richard, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. "The EU's institutions." Corbett, Richard, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. *The European Union: How does it work?* . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 47-73.

Dalacoura, Katerina. "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political chance and geopolitical implications." *International Affairs* 88.1 (2012): 63-79.

de Felice, Damiano. "Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality: The Role of Domestic Politics and International Socialization in French and British Aid." *World Development* 75 (2015): 26-45.

de Waele, Henri and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. "The Emerging International Identity of the European Union - Some Preliminary Observations." de Waele, Henri and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. *European Union's Emerging International Identity: Views from the Global Arena*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. 1-20.

Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Egypt. Presse Release 330; 10649/1/14 REV 1. Brussels: European Union, 2014.

Delegation of the European Union to Egypt. "Europe mobilizes €272 Million to Egypt at the EEDC." 14 March 2015. *Delegation of the European Union to Egypt: Press Corner*. 30

November 2015.

<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/press_corner/all_news/news/2015/20150314_en.htm>.

Dempsey, Judy. "Germany Welcomes Egypt's Sisi." 1 June 2015. *Carnegie Europe: Strategic Europe*. 11 November 2015. <<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=60260>>.

Dias, Vanda Amaro. "A Critical Analysis of the EU's Response to the Arab Spring and its Implications for EU Security." *Perspectives on European Society and Politics* 1 (2014): 26-61.

Douglas, Crystal, et al. *The Arab Uprisings: Causes, Consequences, and Perspectives*. Kennesaw: International Conflict Analysis and Transformation, 2014.

Dunne, Michele and Richard Youngs. *Europe and the US in the Middle East: convergence of partiality*. Policy Brief no. 149. Madrid: FRIDE, 2013.

"Egypt's President Morsi invited to London by Hague." 11 September 2012. *Ahram Online*. 10 November 2015. <<http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/52548.aspx>>.

EUbusiness. "EU calls for swift Egypt elections after Morsi ousted." 4 July 2013. *EUbusiness*. 30 November 2015. <<http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.por>>.

—. "European Parliament chief urges economic pressure on Egypt." 6 December 2012. *EUbusiness*. 30 November 2015. <<http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/egypt-politics.l4h>>.

European Commission. "EU agrees to start trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia." 14 December 2011. *European Commission Press Release Database*. 6 November 2015. <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1545_en.htm?locale=en>.

—. "EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years." 8 February 2013.

European Commission Press Release Database. 5 October 2015.

<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-81_en.htm>.

—. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." 16 December 2011. *European Commission Press*

Release Database. 5 October 2015. <[http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm)

[918_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm)>.

European Institute for Research. "EU-Egypt Relations." n.d. *European Institute for Research:*

On Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation. 21 October 2015.

<<http://www.medeia.be/en/countries/egypt/eu-egypt-relations/>>.

European Parliament. "European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 on the situation in Egypt." 12 September 2013. *European Parliament*. 30 November 2014.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmed/dv/3a_respe12sept2013_sitegypte_/3a_respe12sept2013_sitegypte_en.pdf>.

European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York. "EU Council conclusions on

Egypt." 1 December 2011. *European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New*

York. 1 December 2015. <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11641_en.htm>.

European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New York. "The EU's response to the 'Arab

Spring'." 16 December 2011. *European Union Delegation to the United Nations -New*

York. 20 November 2015. <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11717_en.htm>.

European Union. "Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on

the election of Mohammed Morsi as the President of Egypt." 24 June 2012. *European*

Council: Council of the European Union. 30 November 2015.

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/131145.pdf>

Fahsi, Magda. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans." 26 September 2012. *MintPress News*. 1 December 2015.

<<http://www.mintpressnews.com/egyptian-president-morsi-in-brussels-seeks-to-reassure-europeans/37797/>>.

Florensa, Senen. "Union for the Mediterranean: Challenges and Ambitions." *IEMED* (2010): 58-67.

Gardner, Andrew. "EU 'congratulates' el-Sisi." 6 June 2014. *Politico*. 7 November 2015.

<<http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-congratulates-el-sisi/>>.

Gelvin, James. *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Greco, Kristyn. "The Arab Spring: Where Was the EU, and What is its Future Role in the Region?" *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 13.4 (2013): 1-8.

Guarascio, Francesco. "UPDATE 1- Berlusconi calls Mubarak wise man, urges continuity." 4 February 2011. *Reuters*. 7 November 2015.

<<http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFLDE7131GX20110204>>.

Hague, William. "International Policy Responses to Changes in the Arab World." *BRISMES Annual Conference 2012*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 1-6.

Hamed, Adham. *Revolution as a Process: The Case of the Egyptian Uprising*. Bremen: Wiener Verlag, 2014.

- Hollis, Rosemary. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'." *International Affairs* 88.1 (2012): 81-94.
- Huber, Daniela. *"Mixed Signals" Still? The EU's Democracy and Human Rights Policy Since the Outbreak of the Arab Spring*. IAI Working Papers 12. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2012.
- i Lecha, Eduard Soler and Irene Garcia. *The Union for the Mediterranean: What has it changed and what can be changed in the domain of security*. INEX Policy Brief. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009.
- Iliev, Ivo, et al. *European neighborhood policy- a new attitude towards the "Southern neighbors"*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012.
- International Crisis Group. *Lost in Transition: The World According to Egypt's SCAF*. Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report no. 121. New York: International Crisis Group, 2012.
- Isaac, Sally Khalifa. *Europe and the Arab Revolutions: From a Week to a Proactive Response to a Changing Neighborhood*. KFG Working Paper no. 39. Berlin: Freie Universitat Berlin, 2011.
- Ishay, Micheline. "The spring of Arab nations? Paths toward democratic transition." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* (2013): 1-11.
- "Islam in Italy." 2015. *Euro-Islam: News and Analysis on Islam in Europe and North America*. 1 December 2015. <<http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/>>.
- Ismail, Mohamed. "Egypt's SCAF chief to visit Italy in June." 22 April 2011. *Egyptian Gazette*. 30 November 2015. <<http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/?action=news&id=17414>>.

- "Joint UK-France-Germany statement of Egypt." 29 January 2011. *Gov.UK News Stories*. 1 December 2015. <<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-germany-statement-on-egypt>>.
- Kahraman, Sevilay. "The European Neighborhood Policy: The European Union's New Engagement Towards Wider Europe." *Perceptions* (2005): 1-28.
- Kaunert, Christian and Sarah Leonard. *European Security Governance and the European Neighborhood After the Lisbon Treaty*. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Kern, Soeren. "The Islamization of Germany in 2013." 15 January 2014. *Gatestone Institute*. 8 November 2015. <<http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4130/islamization-germany>>.
- Keukeleire, Stephan and Tom Delreux. *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Khader, Bichara. *The European Union and the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring*. Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2013.
- Korteweg, Rem. "Europe's struggle for influence." 23 August 2013. *Centre for European Reform*. 10 November 2015. <<http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/europes-struggle-influence-egypt>>.
- Laffan, Brigid and Alexander Stubb. "Member States." Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Richard Corbett. *The European Union: How does it work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 74-98.
- Lazarou, Elena, Maria Gianniou and Gerasimos Tsourapas. "The Limits of Norm Promotion: The EU in Egypt and Israel/Palestine." *Insight Turkey* 15.2 (2013): 171-193.
- Lehne, Stefan. *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*. Publication. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.

Lloyd, Lindsay. "European approaches to democracy promotion." *International Journal* (2010): 547-559.

Marchi, Ludovica, Richards Whitman and Geoffrey Edwards. *Italy's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: A Contested Nature?* London: Routledge, 2014.

Marks, Jon. "High hopes and low motives: The New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative." *Mediterranean Politics* 1.1 (1996): 1-24.

Martin, Marie. "Extension of Mobility Partnerships with Euro-Mediterranean Partners." *Panorama* (2012): 279-283.

Middle East Monitor. "Tensions between Sisi and Europe intensify." 29 January 2015. *Middle East Monitor*. 9 November 2015.

<<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/16675-tensions-between-sisi-and-europe-intensify>>.

Mikail, Barah. *France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence*. Working Paper No. 110. Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2011.

Pace, Michelle and Peter Seeberg. *The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Pertusot, Vivien. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." 27 May 2011. *Carnegie Europe*. 10 November 2015.

<<http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230>>.

Peters, Joel. *The European Union and the Arab Spring: Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle eAST*. Lanham: Lexington Book, 2012.

Peterson, John. "The EU as a Global Actor." Bomberg, Elizabeth, John Peterson and Richard Corbett. *The European Union: How does it work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 203-223.

Phillips, Leigh. "Mediterranean EU states block stronger action on Tunisia." 14 January 2011. *EUObserver*. 30 November 2015. <<https://euobserver.com/foreign/31644>>.

Pollack, Mark, Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young. "Policy-Making in a Time of Crisis: Trends and Challenge." Wallace, Helen, Mark Pollack and Alasdair Young. *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 467-488.

Reuters. "UPDATE 1-Five EU leaders urge rapid transition in Egypt." 3 February 2011. *Reuters*. 30 November 2015. <<http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idAFLDE7120UV20110203>>.

Roll, Stephan. *Al-Sisi's Development Vision*. SWP Comments 26. Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014.

Saleh, Ashraf. "Egypt and the EU: An Assessment of the Egyptian Euro-Mediterranean Partnership." *Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies* 15.1 (2013): 39-63.

"Statement by EU HR Ashton on the situation in Egypt." 18 December 2011. *European Union Delegation to the United Nations - New York*. 8 November 2015. <http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_11726_en.htm>.

Stokke, Olav. *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Suel, Ash. "From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean." *Perceptions* (2008): 93-121.

Teti, Andrea. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." *Middle East Critique* 24.1 (2015): 9-25.

- The Carter Center. *Presidential Election in Egypt*. Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2012.
- Traynor, Ian and John Hooper. "France and Italy in call to close EU borders in wake of Arab protests." 27 April 2011. *The Guardian*. 12 November 2015.
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/eu-borders-arab-protests>>.
- van Hullen, Vera. *EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and Authoritarianism*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015.
- Vandenhoe, W. *Child Soldiers and the EU Policy on Children on Armed Conflict*. Brussels: TEPSA, 2014.
- Vimont, Pierre. *The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy*. Belgium: Carnegie Europe, 2015.
- Virgili, Tommaso. "The "Arab Spring" and the EU's "Democracy Promotion" in Egypt: A Missed Appointment?" *Perspectives on Federalism* 6.3 (2014): 43-75.
- Watson, Rory and Richard Corbett. "How Policies Are Made." Corbett, Richard, John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. *The European Union: How does it work?* . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 122-140.
- Watt, Nicholas. "David Cameron arrives in Egypt to meet military rulers." 21 February 2011. *The Guardian*. 9 November 2015.
<<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/21/david-cameron-visits-egypt>>.
- Wetzel, Anne and Jan Orbie. *The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot*. CEPS Policy Brief No. 281. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012.
- Whitman, Richard and Ana Juncos. "The Arab Spring, the Eurozone crisis and the Neighbourhood: A Region in Flux." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50 (2012): 147-161.

Wilga, Maciej and Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski. *New Approaches to EU Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Wouters, Jan and Sangerijn Duquet. "The Arab Uprisings and the European Union: In Search of a Comprehensive Strategy." *Yearbook of European Law* 32.1 (2013): 230-265.

Yigit, Nurettin. *Arab Spring in Berlin and Paris: German and French Policy Between Continuity and Change*. Berlin: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2015.

Youngs, Richard. *From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed*. Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014.

—. *The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy*. Policy Brief no. 100.

Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2011.

“The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries” in 2001 (COM (2001) 252).

Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership [Official Journal L 189 of 30.07.1996].

Council Decision 2012/723/CFSP of 26 November 2012 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt, OJ L 327/44, 27 November 2012.

Declaration on behalf of the European Union on the presidential elections in Egypt. Presse

Release 330; 10649/1/14 REV 1, (Brussels: European Union, 2014)

