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The American University in Cairo

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

RHETORIC: Spoken Discourse
A Systematic Appeal for Reasoning “*Pathos*”

A Thesis Submitted to

The Department of Philosophy

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts

By

Marwa Mohamed Adel Farid

Under the supervision of **Professor Steffen Stelzer**

December 2015

The American University in Cairo

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to the memory of my mother, Amira Mahmoud Fawzy, my soul, my ideal and my unsurpassed friend. Her rational capacity, wisdom, knowledge, and prayers have never left me for a single moment from the day I started my MA study and up to this moment. I am quite certain that she would have been proud that I am hereby taking the first academic step towards a study and a career that I have been for a long time passionate about, intellectually and emotionally. I owe her any goodness, authenticity and diligence in this research and in me. I am beholden by her moral values and teachings. Without the foundations that she embedded in me, I could not have achieved this degree.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgement	2
Dedication	4
Preface	7
Chapter 1 – Introduction	27
1.1 Defining Rhetoric	27
1.2 The Rhetorical Tekhnē: a tool with an ergon	29
Chapter 2 – Critical Philosophical Views on Rhetoric	34
2.1 Cultural Background	34
2.2 Plato’s Socrates on Rhetoric	35
2.3 Aristotle on Rhetoric	38
Chapter 3 – The Foundations of Spoken Discourse	41
3.1 The Need for Interpretation	41
3.2 The Shared Understanding	42
3.3 The Knowledge of the Good	44
Chapter 4 – The Demonstration: the good knowledge of the tekhnē	48
4.1 The Transformation	48
4.2 The Form of Reasoning	50
4.3 The Rhetorical Reasoning: enthymemes	53
4.4 The Skills: Ēthos, Logos and Pathos	58
Chapter 5 – Emotional Appeal in Spoken Discourse: Pathos	67
5.1 Faculties of the Mind and Emotional-States	68
5.2 Reason, Judgements and Emotional-States	71
5.3 Significant Emotional-State Behaviors	74

Chapter 6 – St. Augustine on Pathos	78
6.1 Cultural Background	78
6.2 Eloquence and Emotions	79
6.3 Conventional Signs and Emotions	81
6.4 Theory of Arrangement, Style and Delivery	83
Chapter 7 – George Campbell on Pathos	85
7.1 Cultural Background	85
7.2 Reason and Emotions	86
7.3 Theory of Invention and Presentation	89
Chapter 8 – Chaïm Perelman on Pathos	92
8.1 Cultural Background	92
8.2 The Communion, Reason and Emotions	93
8.3 Theory of Amplification	96
Chapter 9 – Conclusion	100
Bibliography	103

PREFACE

The objectives of this thesis are to (1) prove the *possible* compatibility of *reason* and *pathos*¹, and, (2) the necessary means to strengthen the *emotional-states* of the mind using rhetorical spoken discourse². These objectives are undeniably controversial; and they were dealt with over a long history of thought. In the light of these developments, this research does not argue about the validity or invalidity of concepts, but it intends to open possibilities for further studies.

Why rhetorical spoken discourse? Whether deliberately or non-deliberately, we practice the *tekhnē of rhetoric* in various forms, occasions and realms, be it educational, be it social, be it political, be it religious, along with others. As human beings, we unceasingly communicate with our respective contexts. During this communication process, either we argue different opinions and ideas, or we defend one opinion against the other. And, in a considerable number of occasions, we try to *influence* and *persuade* the other party(ies), engaged in the communication process, with a particular point of view or perspective.

Because there is, at all times, an objective or a goal is to be reached by communicating, there ought to be a method and a systematic means through

¹ The first objective is covered in Chapters 1 to 4 in this research.

² The second objective is covered in Chapters 5 to 8 in this research.

which the goal could be achieved. Otherwise, the objective of communication would be void and no end would be attained. This implies a very dynamic cultural³ context of diverse human interactions, situations, timings, knowledges, empirical values, judgements in addition to a vast amount of presentation and reception of particular intellectual and cognitive powers.

Pathos on the other hand plays a distinct role in our everyday experiences. Sometimes it motivates our behavioral responses and our actions, sometimes demotivates them. It is also interpretive during our communications⁴. This means that when *persuasion*⁵ is sought, there ought to be a method through which these emotions could be generated by a *rhētōr*.

Creating a state of an emotional impact as such can be irrational and can also be momentary. In other words, it could be built on invalid opinions or ideas;

³ Cultural in this research refers to the man-made environment, including government structures, political conditions, sociological conditions and psychological conditions among others. In addition, Prinz, in his article on *Culture and Cognitive Science*, argues that the cultural environment has a critical intellectual effect on the moral values and the emotions of the society. On emotions, he explains that: "Culture can clearly influence what arouses our emotions ... In addition, cultures can promote highly complex behavioral responses ... For those who take emotions to essentially involve judgments ... theories of emotion are attractive, because culture can influence how people construe situations ... Emotions are analogous to scripts, which include everything from canonical eliciting to conditions to complex behavioral sequae ... the evidence suggests that culture can influence every aspect of our emotional responses, and this suggests that, whatever emotions really are, culture can have an impact". And on moral values, Prinz argues that: "Morality is also influenced by culture ... Appeals to cultural history adequately explain why we have moral values" (Prinz 2011).

⁴ For example: when a speaker uses either linguistic terms or facial expressions which imply anger or happiness (during a discourse), these terms become the interpretation means through which the listeners could conceive/understand better the intentions of the speaker.

⁵ Persuasion can be for arguing different opinions and ideas, conveying knowledge and information, influencing a change in behavior or motivating for a particular action.

and it could be of short-term impact, which ends as soon as a spoken discourse is over. This implies that *reason* – in case of seeking rational and long-term outcomes – is indispensable. Why? *Reasoning pathos* contains more than one state of the mind, for instance: the intellectual state of the mind (for understanding), the judging state of the mind (for motivating a decision for change or action), in addition to the emotional state of the mind (for applying/employing the particular change or particular action). The interconnectedness of the three states can exert a sustained state of persuasion. This continued state of association can therefore increase the adherence level of the listeners to the discourse and as a result can lead to a state of change and accordingly a state of action.

Considering the reasons explained above, after thoroughly reviewing the available literature on *reasoning pathos for spoken discourse*, I found that the available texts essentially attempt to either prove or disprove an individual theory of spoken discourse. In a few cases, the text highlights a further developed thought or a trend emerging on the topic. As a result, the need to work on a systematic research on reasoning pathos for spoken discourse came into my mind.

Hence, for the purpose of better presenting the two objectives of this study, it is necessary to first lay down the connotations of the associated

theories, concepts and terms that constitute the core of this thesis. This enables us to cognize the level of influence caused by every interacting element on the other.

The topic of this thesis, “Rhetoric: Spoken Discourse, a systematic appeal for reasoning *pathos*”, has four components. These are (1) the cultural context that evokes an urge for a persuasive development of thought, (2) the qualifications of the rhētōr, (3) the reasoning method (using *ēthos*, *logos* and *pathos*), and (4) the listeners. Therefore, in all the theories discussed in this research these four elements are considered. On the other hand, when seeking objectivity, knowledge and truth, none of the constructs of this research excludes reason. Without the capacity for reasoning, the world around us would be meaningless. That is why the sequential argumentation is built with an open-eye to reasoning.

The first objective of this research is to attain a rational state of “possible” compatibility between *reason* and *pathos* at any particular time, place and occasion for the *tekhnē* of rhetorical discourse. This attempt moves in a systematic chain of theoretical developments. It articulates the methodology to practice effectively this *tekhnē*. For the *tekhnē* to be effective, it has to become persuasive. This implies that the research should first realize the “possibility” of compatibility between reason and pathos (the first objective of

the research) in order to explain further how they could be simultaneously employed to allow for the potentiality of action-change (the second objective of the research).

First Objective of the Research:

Standard texts assert that reason should exclude emotions; however, emotions could, in certain circumstances, facilitate or enable rational decisions and actions. On the other hand, reason relates to explicit or implicit facts, premises, inferences and judgements. Hence, provoking reason using emotional appeal could lead to the “need” to acquire knowledge, which implies another “need” of exerting change in the human mind and thereby in potential human action. Therefore, reason and emotional appeal are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

In order to elaborate this possibility, the discussion of the first four Chapters⁶ starts by defining the science and art of rhetoric. The main thoughts of each Chapter are:

Chapter 1: Rhetorical discourse is an intended means to change *particular* knowledge and to seek persuasion. This implies that we are dealing with a purposeful⁷ science which not only requires a method for the *tekhne*,

⁶ From Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 in this research.

⁷ Purposeful here refers to the objective of applying the spoken discourse. This objective is to change (either add, assert or deny) the situational understanding of the status-quo of the listeners in order to increment a potential change in behavior or action or both.

but also attention to the *particularity* of occasion, *kairos* and as a result a form of *reasoning*.

To preserve the *good* objectivity of any spoken discourse, the *rhētōr* should speak *knowledgably*. Unless the speaker is acquainted with his topic, is able to reason the categories of the constituents of this topic and is capable of molding both in a manner that is balanced with the reception of his listeners, this *rhētōr* would neither be objectively good nor attain the aim of his spoken discourse. Hence, any proficient *rhētōr* must seek to possess/acquire the necessary skills to accomplish his *tekhnē*.

Chapter 2: Plato and Aristotle founded the primary principles of the art of spoken discourse. The first was influenced by the turbulent political conditions of Athens during and after the Peloponnesian War. Thus, his conceptions of the *tekhnē* were built upon rejection to the sophistic manipulative discourses that deluded the people of Athens. Plato formed an *ideal* perspective of spoken discourse (towards the end of *Gorgias* and in *Phaedrus*). He asserted that if this *tekhnē* is to be used for the good of the listeners, it must contain simultaneously: genuine *knowledge* and absolute *truth*.

Aristotle's conception of the rhetorical *tekhnē* was more realistic/pragmatic. Being affected by his studies of dialectic and its

methodology of refutation, he reformed the definition of the art. He neither denied knowledge nor truth, but he added the attribute of *particularity*⁸ to both. He allowed the listeners to use their faculty of judgement⁹ to assess the truthfulness of the *rhētōr*. Furthermore, he asserts that to understand better the *tekhnē*, we need to observe and analyze how the established practitioners apply it.

Chapter 3: From the above Chapter, we can deduce that *understanding* is a pre-requisite for observation and analyses. Understanding, however, includes two simultaneous meanings: (1) realizing the art of understanding and (2) understanding the art itself. Gadamer argues that hermeneutics¹⁰ can assist us in attaining the two dimensions of understanding. According to him, a rhetorical discourse is balanced only when the *rhētōr* acquires a pre-understanding of the *particular* good (i.e. knowledge and truth) in addition to a pre-understanding of a *particular* “shared understanding”¹¹ (i.e. knowledge of the particular audience) of his listeners.

⁸ Particularity means here situational.

⁹ Aristotle allowed the listeners to use their faculty of *judgement* based on his perception that the human kind is capable of using *common sense* in distinguishing the right from the wrong in many cases. Common sense here means the majority of the listeners’ agreement or disagreement with any *particular* opinion.

¹⁰ Gadamer based his assumption on the historical interconnected association between rhetoric and hermeneutics to elaborate the meanings and intentions of various spoken discourses.

¹¹ The “shared understanding” concept, according to Gadamer, is a tool established by the *rhētōr*. The objective of this tool is to prepare the state of the mind of the audience to engage in any spoken discourse from the start. In other words, in order for a *rhētōr* to synchronize the

Therefore, the *particular* knowledge is, at this point, of critical significance and meaning. According to Sosa, it is possible to acquire this *situational* knowledge. Nevertheless, it is possible only when it encompasses: (1) truth¹², (2) a type of belief¹³, and (3) a complete justification¹⁴. Hence, a *rhētōr* can transform the particular/situational knowledge of his listeners when he satisfies these requirements.

Chapter 4: The direct implication from the above argument is that the subject of the rhetorical spoken discourse – the *rhētōr* – can transfer his *situational knowledge* to his audience through the object of the rhetorical spoken discourse – i.e. his *demonstration*. However, unless the attributes of the subject and the object of knowledge are similar, not only the transfer of knowledge will be disrupted, but also the objective of the discourse will not be attained. This, at the same time, means that there ought to be a method through which we can transform an intellectual form of reasoning into a tangible practical form of reasoning.

state of the mind of his listeners, he has to acquire the situational knowledge of the common language, subject and expectations (among other features) of his listeners.

¹² Truth in this context refers to the *Correspondence Theory of Truth* as explained in Section 3.3 in this research.

¹³ Belief in this context refers to “the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true” as explained in Section 3.3 in this research.

¹⁴ Justification in this context refers to the “*Public Justification Principle*”; it is explained in Section 3.3 in this research.

According to Aristotle, the medium of the transformation of particular knowledge is demonstration. Moreover, because the type of knowledge defined in this context requires particularity, the demonstration, too, requires particularity. However, it should still follow a logical¹⁵ form of reasoning and structure. The rhetorical¹⁶ form of reasoning satisfies this requirement. It is a logical form of argument, which permits the demonstration to use enthymematic propositions. A significant characteristic of the enthymemes is that they permit the structure of the statements to illustrate prior incidents, references and common opinions¹⁷. Hence, rhetorical reasoning permits the transfer of *particular* knowledge using (1) *reason*, and (2) *endoxa*.

The demonstration is presented to the listeners by three complementing skills that any proficient *rhētōr* must acquire. These are (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos*. Each of the skills has its distinctive role in the process of persuasion and thus in the potentiality of exerting change on the status-quo of the listeners.

¹⁵ Logical reasoning here refers to a group of principles or rules being demonstrated validly and in the order needed to elucidate the subject argued sufficiently. It is explained further in Section 4.2 in this research.

¹⁶ According to Aristotle, the rhetorical form of reasoning does not aim at covering every opinion and every subject; it is concerned with intended customized situations. In addition, it ensures that the topic is validly proven and it allows the listeners to reason an abbreviated mode of statements (i.e. the implicit statements).

¹⁷ Opinions according to standard texts refers to particular knowledge that is either “probably certain” or “probably true”.

Ēthos, according to the definitions of Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell and Perelman, denotes the character, the credibility, or the trustworthiness of the *rhētōr*. These attributes are manifested to the listeners only through the speech. They also assert that a *rhētōr* cannot convey any of them unless they are already embedded in his self. Otherwise, he will not be capable of conferring genuine persuasion to his listeners. Hence, the *particular knowledge* of the *rhētōr* can be transferred through the skill of *ēthos*. This, in addition, implies that *ēthos* carries/transfers the characteristics of reason, goodness and, as a result, truth.

According to the definitions¹⁸ followed in this research, *logos* is the spoken words of the *rhētōr*. These spoken words include *knowledge*, truth, apparent truth and *endoxa*. *Logos* is presented in the form of rhetorical reasoning. Thus, its structure institutes *reason* and the common sense association with the listeners to the discourse. It is a critical means that corresponds to the *rhētōr's possible* goodness and at the same time the good knowledge of the *tekhnē*. Therefore, *logos* and *ēthos* simultaneously satisfy the particular attributes of reason, goodness and truth.

Pathos is the third skill that any proficient *rhētōr* should acquire.

According to the discussed definitions¹⁹, the *good rhētōr* is the one capable of

¹⁸ The definitions of *logos* by Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell and Perelman.

¹⁹ The definitions of *pathos* by Aristotle, St. Augustine, Campbell and Perelman.

motivating the *good* emotional state of his listeners (i.e. an emotional state that accords with reason). The means of application of *pathos* convey the form of reasoning of the *rhētōr* himself. In other words, when the *rhētōr*'s reasoning is based on reason, knowledge and trustworthiness, the same characteristics are embodied in *pathos*.

Consequently, we can deduce that *ēthos*, *logos*, and *pathos* are the essential skills of any proficient *rhētōr*. Together they constitute the body/speech of the rhetorical reasoning; and the author of the spoken discourse establishes them. On the other hand, the subject and the object of the discourse institute reason in the theoretical dimension and the practical dimension of the discourse. They, furthermore, second an association of attributes between the subject and the object (i.e. the *particular* goodness, the *particular* knowledge, *reason* and common sense or shared understanding). Thus, the spoken discourse is a means that permits the *knowledge of the good* to be *transformed* by the *good knowledge of the tekhnē*. Furthermore, reason is a requirement for establishing any form of rhetorical argument/demonstration. Hence, *reason* and *pathos* are compatible in any *particular* spoken discourse.

Rhetorical discourse is, as a result, a purposeful critical *tekhnē*. It is applied *knowledgably* and adapts to *particular* situations of speech in accordance with the needs of the audience. In *particular* cases, the emotional

appeals could motivate a human decision for change or action which is based on sound *reasoning*.

Second Objective of the Research:

The second objective of this research is to present and discuss a few selected theories to weigh up the *emotional appeal – pathos* – using rhetorical spoken discourse. They are purposefully selected to discuss (1) a theological perspective, (2) a rational perspective, and (3) a social perspective.

To elaborate this, the following four Chapters²⁰ start by defining the faculties of the mind. Then the interconnected association between the faculty of reason, the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions will be developed. The meaningful emotional behaviors and their potential institution in beliefs and actions are necessary. They elaborate further the selected²¹ theories of developing *pathos* in spoken discourse. Thus, we need to explain the faculties of the mind and the role of reasoning to impose change on the states of the mind.

Chapter 5: Perler explains in *The Faculties* that the human mind can do “things in virtue of its rational faculties”²². The “first principle of a

²⁰ From Chapter 5 to Chapter 8 in this research.

²¹ The selected theories exemplifies a theological-based theory by St. Augustine (Chapter 6), a rational-based theory by George Campbell (Chapter 7) and a social-based theory by Chaïm Perelman (Chapter 8).

²² See Perler, Dominik. 2015. *The Faculties*. New York: Oxford University Press.

comprehensive science of living beings”, Perler asserts, is the Aristotelian account of the soul. This principle includes four distinct faculties of the mind, namely: (1) the “nutritive faculty”, (2) “the perceptual faculty”, (3) “the rational faculty”, and (4) “the locomotion faculty”. Through the history of thought and until recently, the definition of the faculties of the mind always denoted the capacity of the human mind to intelligibly interpret the world around it and thus to react accordingly. This implies the interrelated activity between the different faculties of the mind²³ and the settings-in-context of any human being. Recent theories of emotions like those explained by Kirman, Livet and Teschl²⁴ convey a corresponding line of reasoning between the faculty of reason, the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions. They assert that in *particular* occasions, the emotional-state of the mind enables the reasoning-state and sound judgements-state. In other *particular* occasions also, the emotional-state of the mind itself is an outcome of the capacities of reasoning and judging. We can deduce from this that reinforcing *pathos* using rhetorical spoken discourse is a *potential* asset for any proficient *rhētōr*.

This argument implies moreover that the emotional-state-interaction with the other faculties of the mind could play a significant role in *potentially*

²³ The different faculties of the mind include the faculty of reason, the faculty of desire, the faculty of cognition and the faculty of emotions ... among others.

²⁴ See Kirman, Alan, Livet, Pierre and Teschl, Miriam. 2010. *Rationality and Emotions*. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 365, pp. 215-219.

instituting behaviors or beliefs of human beings. For example, a few Cognitive Theories²⁵ clarify that the emotion-process accounts for a potentially reasonable association between the states of the mind. This process also enforces an affirmative correlation between the *particular* stimulating occasion and the individual's self-attributes and empirical contexts. Therefore, according to this perspective, the *emotional-state* of the mind refers to the faculty of *reason* and the faculty of *judgement* in order to postulate any potential change in meaningful reactions and accordingly the potential change in meaningful actions. Thus, demonstrating rhetorical spoken discourses, which deliberately escalate pathos, has a practical outcome and has a potential for exerting change on the status-quo of the minds of its listeners.

Chapter 6: St. Augustine of Hippo was a preacher and a philosopher during the early Middle Ages. His theory of arrangement, style and delivery is exemplary in inspiring *pathos* through religious discourse. He adopted Cicero's doctrine of rhetoric; however, he transformed the political discourse of Cicero into the theological discourse. His main guidelines were preaching using wisdom and truth in addition to attaining and sustaining an emotional-state with the listeners to attain persuasion.

²⁵ The Cognitive Theories here refer only to the Judgement Theory and the Cognitive Appraisal Theory. They are explained and commented upon in Section 5.3 in this research.

Augustine's conception of amplifying emotions employs eloquence. He also associates the understanding of Scriptural conventional signs with the faculty of reason. He asserts that the religious discourse affects the state of the minds of the listeners when it is characterized by knowledge and simplicity. He, furthermore, claims that using conventional signs is one of the tools to transform Scriptural knowledge and this is for two reasons. The first is their being already presented to us in the Scriptural texts. They cause a sort of incomplete or distorted understanding of the genuine meaning and implications provided through the texts); thus, when interpreting them (the conventional signs) with eloquence, they not only affect our understanding of the Biblical texts, they also affect our emotional state of the mind due to the values of wisdom and truth they convey. The second reason is that conventional signs contain in them intentions and implications that articulate knowledge.

As a result, Augustine develops a theory of persuasion using understanding (to correspond with the faculty of reason) and the conventional signs (to correspond with the faculty of emotions). The theory first argues that any Scriptural discourse must be presented in a hierarchical order that allows reason to conceive the embedded illustrations sequentially. Then, the proficient preacher should establish his argument in an

inspirational style/approach to his listeners and simultaneously augment this style with delivering the inferences, which correspond to the conventional signs in the Scriptural texts. Unless these three features are sustained in the religious discourse, not only the ambiguities in the Scriptural texts will remain un-understood, but also it is almost impossible to persuade the listeners. Hence, St. Augustine in developing his theory of arrangement, style and delivery with the aid of conventional signs, he emphasizes a persuasive means to transfer *knowledge* and *wisdom* using *reason* and the *emotional appeal*.

Chapter 7: George Campbell was a preacher, a lecturer of history and a college principal. Following the call for rational persuasion on the states of the mind formulated during the Enlightenment period, he established his theory of invention and presentation to increase *pathos*. He was influenced by the thoughts of Sir Bacon and his theories of the mind, which connect the state of the mind to psychology.

Campbell asserts that when persuasion is sought, the rhetorical skills are necessary. He argues that engaging the listeners in any discourse should use various means in order to reach understanding. In addition, arousing the faculty of emotion of the listeners is critical to convince their faculty of reason. According to Campbell, appealing to the faculty of reason is for the sake of

convincing; and, appealing to the faculty of emotion is for the sake of persuasion. Therefore, he built up his theory on invention and presentations.

Campbell's theory argues that invention aims at convincing the faculty of the mind (using *loci* because it enhances the speech with evidences).

Invention, being so, is:

A proof consisting of an uninterrupted series of axioms. The truth of each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of necessity gradual, and these axioms are all brought in succession. It must, then, be solely by the aid of memory that they are capable of producing conviction in the mind.²⁶

On the other hand, he adds that presentations (using auditors and descriptive language) aims at persuading the faculty of emotion. According to Campbell, presentation is:

To inquire what these circumstances are which will make the ideas he summons up in the imaginations of his hearers resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance; for the same circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections of the heart.²⁷

Campbell, furthermore, states that it is very rare that rational passions come alone; they are mostly associated with reason. Hence, for developing his theory of invention and presentation, Campbell emphasizes that the only

²⁶ See Campbell, George. 1868. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Harpers & Brothers Publishers.

²⁷ See Campbell, George. 1868. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. New York: Harpers & Brothers Publishers.

means to attain conviction is by appealing to reason; and the only means to attain persuasion is by appealing to emotions. Thus, none of them could be reached without the other. He sums up his thoughts by stating that “all the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech is intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will” (Campbell 1868, 23).

Chapter 8: Chaim Perelman was a lecturer of history with vigorous understanding of law and the role of logic and rhetoric in legal arbitrations. His awareness of the need of allowing argumentation to meet the practical and the actual state of existence of human beings made him insist on forming a *reasonable* theory of rhetoric that enables reason and emotions to reconcile. He, therefore, established his theory of amplification to provoke *pathos*.

The objective of his theory is to intensify the emotional state of the listeners by establishing a communion of values. He explains the concept of communion by arguing that when a rhētōr seeks a persuasive discourse, he should establish a state of unity between his listeners and himself. This state of communion is accomplished by the rhētōr only when he secures²⁸ a shared

²⁸ Perelman argues, “Securing an agreement on ... certain points is hence an objective which will determine the order to be followed in argumentation. A speech is not exclusively built up by developing the original premises; it consists also of establishing premises and of making agreements unambiguous and stable ... These agreements sometimes are the result of the attitude of the parties, and sometimes they are institutionalized by virtue of established custom or the existence of explicit rules of procedure” (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 110).

understanding with his listeners in order to adhere²⁹ to the minds of the *universal* audience. According to Perelman, examples of means for establishing communion are (1) particular values, and (2) abstract values. Both are tools to appeal to the emotions of the *particular* listeners. Particular values amplify abstract emotional states – like the state of emotion of behaviors towards ones’ country; and abstract values amplify concrete states of emotion – like the state of emotion of faith and loyalty.

Universal³⁰ audience, Perelman, argues is an invention by the *rhētōr*.

The role of this invention is to probe the appropriate values that appeal to the emotions of the *particular* audience. He elaborates that the universal audience “pass judgment”. In other words, the universal audience appeals to reason (i.e. they validate concepts).

²⁹ Mind adherence, according to Perelman, denotes: “adherence of the minds is its variable intensity: nothing constraints us to limit our study to a particular degree of adherence characterized by self-evidence, and nothing permits us to consider a priori the degrees of adherence to a thesis as proportional to its probability and to identify self-evidence with truth” (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 4).

³⁰ Perelman uses in this context the Aristotelian concept, which argues that the form of reasoning (in case of necessities and probabilities) that applies on categorical subjects (i.e. universals) applies as well on their derived subjects (i.e. particulars). Hence, according to Perelman the “audiences are not independent of one another, that particular concrete audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes them ... it is the undefined universal audience that is invoked to pass judgement on what is the concept of universal audience appropriate to such a concrete audience, to examine simultaneously the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who comprise it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether this criterion is legitimate. It can be said that audiences pass judgement on one another” (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 35).

Perelman sums up his thoughts by asserting that:

All language is the language of a community, be this a community bound by biological ties, or by the practice of a common discipline or technique. The terms used, their meaning, their definition, can only be understood in the context of the habits, ways of thought, methods, external circumstances, and traditions known to the users of those terms.³¹

Hence, he provides us with a reasonable conception of argumentation involving persuasion. This persuasion cannot be functional unless it employs simultaneously the faculty of reason to appeal to the faculty of emotions of the listeners.

Chapter 9: finally, the conclusion summarizes the main reflections on the attempt to justify reasonably the two objectives of this thesis. It is augmented by a final note on the mutual affiliation of *reason* and *pathos* in any rhetorical spoken discourse.

It is worth noting that the Chapters of this thesis include a deduced interpretation and a commentary on each theory and concept. These reflections are constructed *only* upon the theories, concepts and texts illustrated herewith. Hence, the research presented hereby is an attempt to reflect, in a logical sequence, the objectives of this thesis in a comprehensive and coherent manner.

³¹ See Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. 1969. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Translated by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

1.1 Defining Rhetoric

Rhetoric³², the skill (*tekhnē*³³) of persuasion: a universal art in the sense that it is resourcefully applied to any particular topic and at any particular occasion (Rapp 2010). The *tekhnē* is provided through spoken discourse and written discourse. The *ergon*³⁴ of this *tekhnē* is typically to provoke the states of the mind of the listeners at any particular time. Its outcome is to change (i.e. either add, assert or deny) the “situational”³⁵ understanding of the status quo of listeners. Hence, it ought to increment the potentiality of exerting change.

³² “Rhetoric is defined as the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case (Rhet. I.2, 1355b26f.). This is not to say that the rhetorician will be able to convince under all circumstances. Rather he is in a situation similar to that of the physician: the latter has a complete grasp of his art only if he neglects nothing that might heal his patient, though he is not able to heal every patient” (Rapp 2010).

³³ Thomas quotes best one of the contemporary descriptive explanations of the term “*tekhnē*”: “The rhetorical practice of textual production and reception seen as *tekhnē* – as more than simply the technical skill but the very art and craft of making the text” and “When you write, you lay out a line of words. Lay one word and then another. Each must fit perfectly to its neighbor, and do the job for which it has been selected. This is the work of the Laborer, and an artisan: one committed to the search for perfection, one prepared to work very hard indeed, one capable of infinite patience ... This approach to writing is the work of a person who can visualize the line in which the words are to be laid; one who can imagine how it should appear when it is done. An architect perhaps. A person who designs, describes and crafts the idea of an edifice that is capable of being transformed into something that will exist in space and time” (Thomas 2007, 60).

³⁴ Ergon, Höffe explains the term as Aristotle’s concept of the “function of man” using reason or logos (Höffe 2010, 12).

³⁵ Scenters-Zapico argues that the “situational” criteria for the rhetorical *tekhnē* is, not only to consider the particularity of the occasion, but also to consider the particularity of the time and place (i.e. *kairos*). He quotes “*kairos* came to mean that which is fitting in time, place, and circumstance, which means the adaptation of the speech to the manifold variety of life, to the psychology of the speakers and hearers” (Scenters-Zapico 1993, 362).

Mason in his book on *Philosophical Rhetoric: The Function of Indirection in Philosophical Writing* argues that "if any truth can be expressed in words, its expression will have a rhetorical shape" (Mason 1989, 93). He explains throughout his analysis that the aim of philosophy is to seek the truth. This ambition could not be accomplished by the standard modes of speech; however, the rhetorical discourse includes the means through which truth could be conveyed to the listeners (in a manner that needs an amount of "indirection"). By indirection, Mason, does not mean manipulation or any negative connotations. By using the term "indirection", he means an intended "particular" method through which the truth could be elaborated upon to expedite its comprehension by the listeners. Thus, for him, to transform any possible knowledge implying truth, predominantly in a philosophical context, requires a perpetual norm of forms of language, metaphors and analogy³⁶ in order to persuade the listeners with the subject matter (Mason 1989, 93-96).

³⁶ Bartha in his article on "*Analogy and Analogical Reasoning*" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains: "An analogy is a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, that highlights respects in which they are thought to be similar. Analogical reasoning is any type of thinking that relies upon an analogy. An analogical argument is an explicit representation of a form of analogical reasoning that cites accepted similarities between two systems to support the conclusion that some further similarity exists ... such arguments belong in the category of inductive reasoning, since their conclusions do not follow with certainty but are only supported with varying degrees of strength ... 'inductive reasoning' is used in a broad sense that includes all inferential processes that "expand knowledge in the face of uncertainty"" (Bartha 2013).

Thus, rhetoric is a purposeful means and a critical tool to knowledgably adapt to particular situations of speech³⁷ in accordance with the needs of the listeners. Its *tekhne* uses a method or a technique of application that could motivate rational human decisions for action.

1.2 The Rhetorical *Tekhnē*: a tool with an *ergon*

At this stage, it is significant to highlight a critical declaration. Any applied *tekhne* could be used either for good-reasons or for ill reasons. Such probability exists not only for the rhetorical *tekhne*, but also for any other craft by human beings.

Along the history of philosophy and up to the most recent texts, there have been interpretations of rhetorical practices to prove both applications. To illustrate the opposing usages of the art, Kennedy explains:

The debate over the role of rhetoric in society has existed ever since, and there are still people today for whom the word “rhetoric” means empty words, misleading arguments, and appeal to base emotions. There are dangers in rhetoric—political extremism, racism, and unscrupulous sales techniques, for example—but by studying rhetoric we can become alert to its potential for misuse and learn to recognize when a speaker is seeking to manipulate us. There is great positive power in rhetoric as well, which we can use for valid ends. The American Founding Fathers organized public opinion in the cause of American independence by use of the logical, ethical, and emotional

³⁷ “Rhetorical” speech in this context refers to “*Logos*”. Graham states a basic philosophical definition: “By the fourth century BCE *logos* is established not only as speech and the like, but as the faculty of reason. Speech becomes the manifestation of reason, and reason the source of speech . . . understanding of rhetoric presupposes a knowledge of souls—what would later be called psychology—and the use of dialectic to implant truth in souls (Phaedrus) . . . Thus speech becomes a model for thought, and ultimately a representation for the world” (Graham 2006).

power of rhetoric. Rhetoric has helped black leaders, women, and minority groups begin to secure their rights in society. It has also been an essential feature in the preaching and teaching of the world's religions, in the transmission of cultural values, and in the judicial process.³⁸

Kennedy's empirical examples of the outcomes of the good-use and the ill-use of the rhetorical *tekhnē* infers and assures that, along the time line of history, such an art certainly affected the rise as well as the decline of cultures and societies in diverse magnitudes.

This, consequently, directs us to an inquiry. If this tool is operative in exerting change on the state of the mind of its listeners, then what are the requirements that are necessary to make it a tool of "good" objectivity?

The *tekhnē* of persuasion has two main anchors: the *rhētōr*³⁹, the subject, and the receptive listeners, the object. For the *rhētōr* to produce the outcome of this *tekhnē*, according to standard texts, he has to rationally acquire three⁴⁰ abilities, namely: (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and, (3) *pathos*. Any imbalance in these three concurrent abilities causes instability in the process of persuasion; and, this imbalance could as a result disrupt the objective of the rhetorical experience, be it educational, political, religious or social.

³⁸ See Kennedy 2007, x.

³⁹ *Rhētōr* is derived from the Greek noun *rhētorikē*. In standard texts, it is exchanged with either "orator" or "teacher of rhetoric". In the introduction of *On Rhetoric* by Kennedy, he interprets the term as the person who gives public speeches in assemblies or in the courts of law. The term *rhētorikē* appeared, for the first time in texts, in Plato's *Gorgias* (Kennedy 2007, 8-9).

⁴⁰ The three rational abilities of the *rhētōr* are discussed in details in Chapter 4 of this research.

If the *rhētōr*, is the *artist* and is the one in charge of guiding the subject matter (i.e. illustrating his thoughts in the form of a spoken discourse), then, he ought to possess fundamental qualities in order to be able to convey his message across – either for “good” objectives or for “ill” objectives. On the other hand, if the assumption taken into consideration in this research is the “good” objectivity of: (1) the message, (2) the *rhētōr* and (2) the *tekhne*, then, what are the necessary requirements for this tool to be objectively “good”?

Socrates, as documented by Plato, was the first to give us a recognized roadmap with a description for the “good”⁴¹ objectivity of the composer (i.e. the *rhētōr*) of a rhetorical speech. He argues that a speech could not be considered “good” unless he, who speaks, speaks knowledgeably⁴². Socrates explains that in order to speak knowledgeably, the speaker should know the essence of his topic. He should be able to break this topic into its original and

⁴¹ As quoted by Kennedy, “Until someone knows the truth of each thing about which he speaks or writes and is able to define everything in its own genus, and having defined it knows how to break the genus down into species and subspecies to the point of invisibility, discerning the nature of the soul in accordance with the same method, while discovering the logical category which fits with each nature, and until in a similar way he composes and adorns speech to a variegated soul and simple speech to a simple soul – not until then will it be possible for speech to exist in an artistic form in so far as the nature of speech is capable of such treatment, neither for instruction nor for persuasion” (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).

⁴² Sosa, in his article of the *Two Conceptions of Knowledge*, asserts that defining knowledge is a demanding inquiry, not because of the scarcity of information or evidences, but due the very numerous injected and developed theories that are attempting to re-define knowledge; however, after his comparative propositional investigation of the theory of knowledge, he states that: “in giving an account of knowledge it is surely correct to make allowance for a metaphysical element (truth), a psychological element (something like belief), and a “unique” epistemological element (warrant ... or complete justification)” (Sosa 1970, 59-63).

most truthful constituents and sub-constituents; he should also be able to categorize reasonably the constituents – each in its most convenient time and place in the speech – and in a manner that is in balance with the reception of his listeners (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).

The account illustrated by Socrates implies that the “good” rhētōr, who seeks a “good” outcome of his tekhnē, is the one who is capable of molding any particular topic into his *logoi*⁴³ knowledgeably, straightforwardly and in coherence with the cognitive receptive capabilities of his listeners. According to Socrates, this is the exclusive⁴⁴ means through which any rhētōr could use the art of rhetorical spoken discourse to influence the state of the mind of his listeners for “good” purposes.

From the above, we can deduce that we have three components/elements involved in the process of an applied rhetorical tekhnē: (1) the particular “good” knowledge that needs to be addressed by the rhētōr’s spoken discourse to his listeners, (2) the skills of the rhētōr, and, (3) the state of the mind of his listeners. Hence, in order to cognize how the emotional appeal could possibly be rationally suited to any of the three

⁴³ *Logoi*: plural of *logos*.

⁴⁴ “Will not the orator, artist and good man that he is, look to justice and temperance? And will he not apply his words to the souls of those to whom he speaks, and his actions too ... will he not do it with his mind always on this purpose: how justice may come into being in the souls of the citizens and how injustice may be removed, and how temperance maybe energized and intemperance removed, and every other virtue be brought in and vice depart?” (Gorgias (504e)).

components, we need to develop the foundation and the capacities of reasoning for each in the following Chapters of this research.

CHAPTER 2 – Critical Philosophical Views on Rhetoric

2.1 Cultural Background

The fifth and fourth century BCE – documented in the standard texts on rhetoric – introduced a reformation of the traditional concept of rhetoric through Plato, the student of Socrates. The Socratic character and the implications provided in Plato's dialogues shed the light on the past applications of rhetoric (i.e. the sophists' handbooks)⁴⁵ – through the eyes of Plato – and the current applications of rhetoric (at the time Plato wrote his dialogues).

The political situation, which Athens was witnessing at that time, had a strong impact on Plato's framework of rhetoric. Athens witnessed political disorders during and after the Peloponnesian War. Corruption was rife. The fraudulent rulers executed Plato's teacher, Socrates. The state conditions permitted a certain type of rhetoric to prevail, either at the courts or at the assemblies to convey the authorities' message to the polis. Plato's elementary perception of rhetoric was undeniably affected by the political circumstances, at later stages in his writings. He augmented his definition of rhetoric to a less looked-down-upon classification⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ See Kennedy, George A. 1959. *"The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks"*. The American Journal of Philology, 80, no. 2: 169 – 178.

⁴⁶ Plato's augmented definition of rhetoric is elaborated in Section 1.2 in this research.

On the other side, Aristotle, the student of Plato, who is viewed in many of the standard texts as the “father of rhetoric”, endorsed a systematic characterization of rhetoric to include a practical philosophy perspective. His perspective was greatly affected by his education (both scholarly education and the Platonic education). His conception of rhetoric expanded the possibility for the rhetorical tekhnē in a methodological manner. Aristotle’s approach in establishing the guidelines of the tekhnē, since then, has been widely adopted and referred by philosophers and scholars of rhetoric.

2.2 Plato’s Socrates on Rhetoric

The conceptions portrayed in Plato’s *Gorgias*, for instance, at first gives no definition or explanation of the term rhetoric. Kennedy asserts that Plato rejects the mode in which rhetoric was practiced. The rejection is due to the manipulative methods of applying rhetoric at that time. He explains his claim with an argument led by Socrates in *Gorgias*, where Socrates describes the practice of rhetoric as an art of flattery. Socrates deduced this characterization when all answers given to him throughout the dialogue excluded any form of genuine knowledge; and as a result, these same answers excluded truth.

Socrates expounds his argument by saying:

There are two different affairs to which I assign two different arts: the one, which has to do with the soul, I call politics; the other, which concerns the body, ... which I can designate in two branches as gymnastic and medicine ... there is some intercommunication, as both

deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences ... their care for the best advantage respectively of the body and the soul, are noticed by the art of flattery which, I do not say with knowledge, but by speculation ... Flattery, however, is what I call it, and I say that this sort of thing is a disgrace ... because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best; and I say it is not an art, but a habitude, since it has no account to give of the real nature of the things it applies, and so cannot tell the cause of any of them. I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is irrational ... But although, as I say, there is this natural distinction between them, they are so nearly related that sophists and orators are jumbled up as having the same field and dealing with the same subjects, and neither can they tell what to make of each other, nor the world at large what to make of them.⁴⁷

The illustration above provides an image of how rhetoric was actually practiced at that time. It was an ornament. One with which only external matters were to be treated. Though its speakers mastered the skills of persuasion, the demonstrations in spoken discourses excluded knowledge and truth.

However, Plato, towards the end of the *Gorgias* and in his later writings, restricted himself to an “ideal philosophical” definition of rhetoric that was illustrated by Socrates. The restriction is exemplified in Plato’s *Phaedrus*⁴⁸ towards its end (277b5-c6)⁴⁹. This ideal form establishes a universal

⁴⁷ See *Gorgias* 464–466.

⁴⁸ See Plato. *Gorgias*. 1871. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons.

⁴⁹ Kennedy quotes “Until someone knows the truth of each thing about which he speaks or writes and is able to define everything in its own genus, and having defined it knows how to break the genus down into species and subspecies to the point of invisibility, discerning the nature of the soul in accordance with the same method, while discovering the logical category which fits with each nature, and until in a similar way he composes and adorns speech to a variegated soul and simple speech to a simple soul – not until then will it be possible for

structure for the good rhetoric. The structure, on the other hand, allows a clear classification that distinguishes the good rhetorical application from the bad rhetorical application.

Plato's conception argues that for the art of rhetoric to be good, it must imply genuine knowledge and thus absolute truth for every element embodied in the constituents of the art. The speech must as well be transformed to the receptive listeners in the same form of genuineness and clarity. (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).

Though the renewed argument of Plato is perceived as a starting point of realizing a more "adaptable"⁵⁰ version of defining rhetoric, in many of the standard contemporary texts, it is understood to be a radical perception. The universality of knowledge and the absoluteness of truth do not sound attainable to the intellectual capacities of human beings.

From another perspective, if we consider the "broad" outcome or the utmost objective of Plato's "ideal"⁵¹ philosophical rhetoric" definition, it surely aims at the highest good, for the self and for the community. Indeed, it is appreciated, but attaining it is a challenge that might come close to the state of impossibility. This is considering the fact that the correct definition of

speech to exist in an artistic form in so far as the nature of speech is capable of such treatment, neither for instruction nor for persuasion" (Kennedy 2007, 14-15).

⁵⁰ Adaptable here refers to being moderately adjusted.

⁵¹ Ideal here implies the state of perfection that could be desirable, but unfeasible.

“genuine”⁵² knowledge and “absolute”⁵³ truth is subject of a debate that is ever lasting and will probably remain so.

2.3 Aristotle on Rhetoric

According to Kennedy, Aristotle’s critical reception of rhetoric was much less radical⁵⁴. He adds that the study of dialectic equipped Aristotle to form a pragmatic insight of rhetoric as a *tekhne* due to the similarities that exist between both (i.e. dialectic and rhetoric). Both arts, Aristotle argues are applied to “particular” topics of knowledge. Both arts allow a methodology of an argumentation or a refutation⁵⁵ that could embrace presentations of contradicting opinions in order to persuade the listeners (Kennedy 2007, 15-17).

Arnhart in his book *Aristotle on Political Reasoning* explains that Aristotle outlined the “good rhetoric”. Aristotle, according to Arnhart, distinguishes the good art from the bad art by allowing an evaluation⁵⁶ to be

⁵² Genuine means sincere authenticity.

⁵³ Absolute in this context refers to total or complete perfection.

⁵⁴ Kennedy states that Aristotle adapted “the principles of Plato’s philosophical rhetoric to more realistic situations” where Aristotle “posits three modes of persuasion that are an adaptation of Plato’s call for fitting the speech to the souls of the audience (1.2.3)” (Kennedy 2007, 15).

⁵⁵ “One should be able to argue on either side of a question ... not that we may actually do both ... but in order that it may not escape our notice what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to refute if another person uses speech unjustly. None of the other arts reasons in opposite directions; dialectic and rhetoric alone do this; for both are equally concerned with opposites” (*On Rhetoric* 1355a12).

⁵⁶ “Rhetoric is not an artless “knack” for persuading people; nor is it a collection of sophistical devices using emotional appeals for distracting audiences or for deceiving them with specious reasoning. Rather, it is a mode of argument, an art of reasoning that consists of

carried on its outcome. The listeners of the rhetorical speech perform the evaluation (Arnhart 1981, 34).

From the above, we can imply that Aristotle gave us a practical means through which we can apprehend the art of rhetoric. He neither criticized the art per se nor dismissed the knowledge and the truth embodied within it. He, however, narrowed the universality of the knowledge. Aristotle consequently narrowed the absoluteness of truth that are to be conveyed through a spoken discourse. He asserts that:

Rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that of judgements are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites] ... Further, even if we were to have the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade [some audiences]. Speech based on knowledge is teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather it is necessary for piteis and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the bases of common [beliefs].⁵⁷

In addition, for Aristotle, rhetoric is a tekhnē that could be used for good reasons and could be used for bad reasons. The judgement of either reasons depends on a natural existing evaluation skill in both: the rhētōr's

“proofs” as conveyed through the enthymeme ... Like many other beneficial instruments, rhetoric can be harmful if misused. But the virtuous speaker can be trusted to apply it properly, and the commonsense judgments of men as expressed in common opinion can be depended upon in most cases to restrain the speaker who would misuse it” (Arnhart 1981, 34).

⁵⁷ See *On Rhetoric* 1355a12.

usage of the art per se and the common sense perception⁵⁸ of the listeners (i.e. in judging the right from the wrong).

Aristotle expands his conception of the rhetorical tekhnē by stating that the art has two types of practitioners: (1) arbitrary practitioners, and, (2) practitioners, who learned or acquired the necessary skills for the art. Thus, if we observe how this tekhnē is applied (in practice) and if we analyze its distinctive demonstrative proofs, we can understand the essential means through which the tekhnē should be practiced and its form of reasoning (*On Rhetoric* 1354a1-2).

⁵⁸ As quoted by Arnhart from Aristotle's *Politics* "But speech [*logos*] is for indicating the expedient and the harmful, therefore also the just and the unjust; for this is the peculiarity of men with respect to the other animals – that only men have perception of the good and the bad, of the just and the unjust, and of other things; and it is the community in these things that makes a household and a city. (1253a 15-18)" (Arnhart 1981, 5).

CHAPTER 3 – The Foundations of Spoken Discourse

3.1 The Need for Interpretation

Hans-Georg Gadamer⁵⁹ argues that hermeneutics⁶⁰, as a philosophical doctrine, expedites the process of understanding rhetoric. For Gadamer, to understand the *tekhnē* of rhetoric, it is recommended to understand simultaneously the *tekhnē* of understanding. The two *tekhnē*(s) according to his account are sciences with boundaries⁶¹. Their interconnection could be perceived systematically in their corresponding understanding.

Gadamer bases his claim on his understanding of the companionship of hermeneutics and rhetoric. He describes this interconnected agreeableness as “rhetoric ... the art of articulating an understanding, while hermeneutics ...

⁵⁹ See Palmer, Richard E. 2007. *The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

⁶⁰ Ramberg and Gjesdal define the term in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as “hermeneutics covers both the first order art and the second order theory of understanding and interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions. As a theory of interpretation, the hermeneutic tradition stretches all the way back to ancient Greek philosophy. In the course of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, hermeneutics emerges as a crucial branch of Biblical studies. Later on, it comes to include the study of ancient and classic cultures. With the emergence of German romanticism and idealism the status of hermeneutics changes. Hermeneutics turns philosophical. It is no longer conceived as a methodological or didactic aid for other disciplines, but turns to the conditions of possibility for symbolic communication as such. The question “How to read?” is replaced by the question, “How do we communicate at all?” ... Now hermeneutics is not only about symbolic communication. Its area is even more fundamental: that of human life and existence as such. It is in this form, as an interrogation into the deepest conditions for symbolic interaction and culture in general, that hermeneutics has provided the critical horizon for many of the most intriguing discussions of contemporary philosophy, both within an Anglo-American context and within a more Continental discourse” (Ramberg and Gjesdal 2014).

⁶¹ Boundaries here refers to a set of limited usages/applications with specified techniques for application (i.e. not universal).

the art of understanding the articulation ... each in a way presupposed the other, since rhetoric presupposed understanding and understanding required a persuasive articulation of the meaning of the text” (Palmer 2007, 227).

3.2 The Shared Understanding

How, then, does hermeneutics provide us with the guidelines to comprehend the concept of “shared understanding”⁶² between the two communicating sides of a rhetorical spoken discourse: the rhētōr and the receptive listeners?

Gadamer in his *Plato's Dialectical Ethics* argues that:

The ultimate possibility of arriving at a shared understanding depends upon having in common a pre-understanding of the good. By going back to the ultimate reason-giver, the thing for the sake of which something exists, the later becomes understandable in its being, and thus the agreement about it becomes attainable. All further agreement is to be developed on the bases of this one. This pre-understanding of what is sought, as that on the basis of which things are understandable and thus as that on the basis of which justification is possible, determines of the search itself.⁶³

Thus, we can infer that when considering the state of a purposeful rhetorical spoken discourse, which should attain its objective at any particular occasion, the rhētōr, does not only need to provide a speech that is

⁶² Gadamer argues that by “shared understanding”, he does not mean the state of agreement on the topic discussed between the two parties engaged in a conversation. However, he means to “enable the participants themselves to become manifest to each other in speaking about it ... such a conversation is made no less fruitful by the participants’ inability to come to an agreement about the matter, as long as it enables each of them to become explicitly visible in his being to the other” (Gadamer 1991, 37).

⁶³ See Gadamer 1991, 63.

knowledgeably balanced, he also needs to establish a common⁶⁴ ground for “shared understanding” among his listeners. This state of “sharing” allows the listeners to receive concurrently the demonstrations of the rhētōr. Without this coexisting common ground for “shared understanding”, neither the rhētōr nor the listeners would be at a well-adjusted state of connecting or communicating together during the discourse.

On the other hand, the rhētōr should first acquire a common “pre-understanding of the good” in its variant forms in order to be able to establish the “shared understanding” with his listeners. This instantly denotes that the acquisition of knowledge per se is obligatory; and, in the case of the “situational” application of the rhetorical discourse, the acquisition of the “particular” knowledge of the good in the topic sought is non-dismissible.

Hence, proposing our spoken words, statements and demonstrations to other human agents with the aim of allowing them to understand our

⁶⁴ Vanderschraaf and Sillari in their article on *Common Knowledge*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, explains that “A proposition A is mutual knowledge among a set of agents if each agent knows that A. Mutual knowledge by itself implies nothing about what, if any, knowledge anyone attributes to anyone else” (Vanderschraaf and Sillari 2014). For example (similar to the illustration by Vanderschraaf and Sillari), if an MA student is going to defend his thesis. Then, the panel/judges and the audience at the defense room know that this is a defense meeting and the student is going to defend his thesis. However, none of the attendants in the defense room knows for fact that everyone else in the room knows this statement. If it happens that one of the attendants say aloud (or openly) that the student is coming to defend his thesis, then, each attendant knows that each attendant knows ...etc. that the student is coming to defend his thesis now. As a result, the statement initiated by one of the attendants actually transformed the mutual known knowledge among the attendants from a “mutual knowledge” to a “common knowledge”.

discourse is a complex process. This presupposes synchronized time, language and subject matter along with other factors that facilitate the embodiment/demonstration process of an idea or a concept. In a rhetorical spoken discourse, the presentations of a speech could not progress without the establishment of the rhētōr-listeners' "shared understanding".

The inquiry that follows from the above argument is how could a rhētōr acquire the "knowledge of the good"?

3.3 Knowledge of the good

Gadamer claims that the method through which the "knowledge" of the good and the good "knowledge" of the tekhnē are attained by the listeners is:

Only the individual is truly capable as a speaker who has acknowledged as good and right the thing about which he is trying to persuade people and is thereby able to stand up for it. This knowledge of the good and this capability in the art of speaking does not mean a universal knowledge of the "good"; rather, it means a knowledge about that of which one has to persuade people here and now, a knowledge of how one is to go about doing this, and a knowledge of those whom one has to persuade. Only when one sees the concretization required by the knowledge of the good does one understand why the art of writing speeches plays such a role in the broader argumentation.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, knowledge theories are controversial. The term itself, (i.e. knowledge), requires critical attention. In addition, an understanding of it

⁶⁵ See Palmer 2007, 253.

cannot be reached unless we satisfy two conditions. The first is to be able to identify both: the subject – *the knower* – and the object – *the known* – of knowledge. The second is to be able to identify the likeness or similarity in the qualities or attributes of the subject and the object of knowledge in order to intellectually comprehend the idea of knowledge and allow its possibility.

In rhetorical spoken discourse, the subject of knowledge is the rhētōr. The object of knowledge is the topic of his speech. However, according to Gadamer’s “shared understanding” criteria mentioned in the prior section, the object of knowledge that needs to be attended to by the rhētōr is extended to include: (1) the topic/subject of the rhētōr’s speech, together with, (2) his establishment of a shared understanding with his listeners while demonstrating the topic/subject.

In consequence, Sosa’s argument on knowledge as developed in the article *Two Conceptions of Knowledge*⁶⁶ allows the possibility for “situational” knowledge, and the requirements to satisfy this inquiry include: (1) truth⁶⁷,

⁶⁶ *Two Conceptions of Knowledge*: explained in the footnotes number 12, 13 and 14 in this research.

⁶⁷ Dowden and Swartz in their article *Truth* on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy illustrate that one of the major accounts of defining truth is “the most popular theory of truth was the Correspondence Theory ... this theory says truth is what propositions have by corresponding to a way the world is ... a proposition is true provided there exists a fact corresponding to it. In other words, for any proposition p, p is true if and only if p corresponds to a fact. The theory’s answer to the question, “What is truth?” is that truth is a certain relationship—the relationship that holds between a proposition and its corresponding fact” (Dowden and Swartz 2015).

(2) a type of belief⁶⁸, and (3) a complete justification⁶⁹ for the subject matter.

The direct implication inferred from this account is that the criteria Sosa states for knowledge do not embrace “universal” knowledge. Therefore, the idea of knowledge could be “situational” and should complement the time of the discourse, the occasion of the discourse, the content of the discourse and the particular listeners to the discourse.

If we could argue a “possible” similarity in attributes or qualities between the subject – the rhētōr – and the object – the rhetorical spoken discourse content – of the “situational” knowledge of the good, we could then infer: (1) the possibility of knowledge within the tekhnē, and, consequently (2) within the good knowledge of the tekhnē (i.e. through the skills of the rhētōr – namely: *ēthos*, *logos* and *pathos*). Using a similar line of reasoning, we are similarly able to deduce the “possible” compatibility of pathos and reasoning. However, in order to be able to respond to this claim, we need to inquire

⁶⁸ Belief as explained by Schwitzgebel in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy “refers to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. To believe something, in this sense, needn't involve actively reflecting on it ... Many of the things we believe, in the relevant sense, are quite mundane ... Forming beliefs is thus one of the most basic and important features of the mind, and the concept of belief plays a crucial role in both philosophy of mind and epistemology... epistemology revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are justified or qualify as knowledge ... Contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express ... a propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true” (Schwitzgebel 2015).

⁶⁹ Justification: see the *Public Justification Principle* provided by Vallier, Kevin and D'Agostino, Fred. 2014. “*Public Justification*”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edited by Edward N. Zalta.

firstly into how each of the above elements are demonstrated – using reason –
in a rhetorical spoken discourse.

CHAPTER 4 – The Demonstration: the good knowledge of the tekhnē

4.1 The Transformation

The objective of the transformation process is to convert a theoretical conception into a practical one. In other words, we are to transform the theory of spoken rhetorical discourse to the tekhnē of rhetorical spoken discourse. However, the process should preserve – as much as possible – the attributes of the concepts dealt with in order to avoid gaps in knowledge transfer, meaning, and, as a result, gaps in understanding. These gaps could definitely cause imbalance in the process of persuasion; and, the imbalance could disrupt the objective of the rhetorical experience.

Hence, we need to transform the thinking-mode of the *rhētōr* into a form that is conceivable and comprehensible by its listeners. The *rhētōr* should portray his subject – *the knowledge of the good* – into a form of discourse that is realizable by his listeners. In order to do so, he needs to use a medium to conduct his object/topic. In the case of the rhetorical spoken discourse, the medium through which this is done is “*the demonstration*”.

The significance of the demonstration is that it not only transfers a theory to practice, it also transfers the abstract mode of thinking into a tangible mode of illustrations. The newly reproduced presentations ought to be understood by the listeners in order to allow the rhetorical spoken

discourse to reach its outcome (i.e. the persuasion state, which increments the potentiality of change or action). Kennedy, in his introduction to the translation of *On Rhetoric*, asserts the need to the demonstrative medium and its elements by saying:

The ideal rhetoric, intended primarily for one-to-one communication is clearly highly unrealistic if applied to public address, where the audience is made of a variety of “souls” with differing patience and grasp of detailed argument. What Aristotle does in *On Rhetoric* is adapt the principles of Plato’s philosophical rhetoric to more realistic situations. A speaker, he says, should not seek to persuade the audience of what is “debased”. He posits three modes of persuasion that are an adaptation of Plato’s call for fitting the speech to the soul of the audience. These become Aristotle’s *ēthos*, or projection of the character of the speaker as trustworthy; *pathos* or consideration of the emotions of the people in the audience; and *logos*, inductive and deductive logical argument. He seeks to provide a speaker with a basis for argument in “truth”: that is in knowledge of the proposition of politics and ethics and of how to use this knowledge to construct arguments.⁷⁰

This implies that *the rhētōr*⁷¹ is now urged to transform *the particular knowledge*⁷². Moreover, it is of utmost importance that the *rhētōr* acquires the necessary skills and capabilities for the demonstration process to produce an exposition, which does not alter the attribute of goodness and the attribute of knowledge in them. Furthermore, the *knowledge of the good* is to be demonstrated by the *rhētōr* to his listeners in the form of: (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*,

⁷⁰ See Kennedy 2007, 15.

⁷¹ *Rhētōr* refers to the good *rhētōr* as discussed in chapter 1 in this research.

⁷² The particular good knowledge refers to the knowledge of the particular good or the particular good topic.

and (3) *pathos* concurrently. These three elements are the tools or the means through which the rhētōr institutes his persuasive rhetorical spoken discourse. Hence, the literature to follow will discuss transforming the *knowledge of the good* through the *good knowledge of the tekhnē*.

4.2 The Form of Reasoning

According to the standard texts, the epistemic⁷³ function is the form through which knowledge is being presented to us. It ought to have the form of reasoning. This form or structure is what allows our conception of any science dealt with. The objective of any form of reasoning is to furnish our intellectual capacities with the basic understanding of any *particular* demonstration in a logical manner. Logical refers here to a group of principles or rules being demonstrated validly⁷⁴ in the order needed to elucidate the subject argued sufficiently.

Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* asserts that:

All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This becomes evident upon a survey of all the species of such instruction. The mathematical sciences and all other

⁷³ Epistemic function here refers to scientific information/knowledge (and in several texts it is referred to as “genuine knowledge”).

⁷⁴ Validity: the validity of the knowledge transformation process is critical in any scientific argument for preserving the *goodness* and as a result the *truth* attributes in the transformed knowledge.

speculative disciplines are acquired in this way, and so are the two forms of dialectical reasoning, syllogistic⁷⁵ and inductive⁷⁶.⁷⁷

This means that for embodying any form of genuine knowledge, it is necessary to constitute true propositions syllogistically.

But in the case of the rhetorical spoken discourse, the rigidity of the standard logical arguments (implying the rules in its formation) could cause inconvenience in the process of persuasion and consequently could negatively influence the objective of the rhetorical discourse. This inconvenience is due to three main reasons: (1) the particularity of the topic being illustrated for a particular purpose, (2) the variance in the cognitive receptive capabilities of the listeners, and, (3) the persuasion objective of the rhetorical spoken discourse (which implies the potentiality of exerting change or action). These factors inquire another form of *malleable/flexible* reasoning, while, at the same time, keeping in mind the validity of the good knowledge and thus the truth.

Thus, Aristotle introduced another form of reasoning that neither disrupts the validity of the argument nor the reasonableness of the demonstration. It is the form of reasoning used in dialectic disputes⁷⁸. The

⁷⁵ Syllogistic reasoning: “makes use of old knowledge to impart new, the syllogism assuming an audience that accepts its premisses” (*Posterior Analytics* Book I).

⁷⁶ Inductive reasoning: “makes use of old knowledge to impart new ... induction exhibiting the universal as implicit in the clearly known particular” (*Posterior Analytics* Book I).

⁷⁷ See *Posterior Analytics* Book I, part I.

⁷⁸ “The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premiss is the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his premiss, but lays it down), whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary's choice

method of this reasoning is *almost* the same as the scientific reasoning. The modification is *only* in the premisses. The premisses⁷⁹ of the dialectical argument could be formed in a manner that allows them to be agreed upon implicitly among the arguing discussants and simultaneously allows these implicit premisses to be deduced from “universal knowledge”⁸⁰.

This implies that rhetorical⁸¹ reasoning is, still, a logical form of argument (which follows *reason*). Its *particularity* is that it permits the argument to use statement structures (i.e. propositions) that embrace illustrations of prior incidents, references, common opinion⁸² and *enthymemes*⁸³. Hence, the rhētōr is urged to identify the essence⁸⁴ of the form of

between two contradictories. But this will make no difference to the production of a syllogism in either case; for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically after stating that something does or does not belong to something else” (*Prior Analytics*, Book I, Part 1).

⁷⁹ “A premiss ... is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. This is either universal or particular or indefinite” (*Prior Analytics* Book I, Part 1).

⁸⁰ “By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of something else; by particular that it belongs to some or not to some or not to all” (*Prior Analytics* Book I, Part 1).

⁸¹ “The persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use either example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism ... If our reasoning aims at gaining credence and so is merely dialectical, it is obvious that we have only to see that our inference is based on premisses as credible as possible” (*Posterior Analytics* Book I, Part 19).

⁸² Opinion: according to standard text, an opinion is “probably certain” or “probably true”.

⁸³ “The enthymeme is the sort of syllogism (and it is a function of dialectic, either as a whole or one of its parts, to see about every syllogism equally) ... for it belongs to the same capacity both to see the true and what resembles the true” (*On Rhetoric* 1355a 11-12).

⁸⁴ Essence here refers to the particular features of an element to facilitate its identification.

rhetorical reasoning⁸⁵ in order to be able to master it and consequently be able to transform the *knowledge of the good* using the *good knowledge of the tekhnē*.

4.3 Rhetorical Reasoning: enthymemes

The tekhnē of establishing *rhetorical reasoning* demonstrations by using enthymemes was introduced primarily by Aristotle; and, in the course of the history of philosophy, it has been modified further in order to adapt to the various contexts required by the necessities of political, religious, social or educational purposes.

According to Aristotle, rhetorical reasoning is an artistic means of persuasion. Its demonstration follows the same form of reasoning as *apodeixis*⁸⁶. Hence, it is composed of logically valid *enthymemes*⁸⁷. In addition, the *apodeixis* enthymemes are the strongest form of *pistis*⁸⁸ of enthymemes.

⁸⁵ Form here refers to the persuasive logical proof of an argument or a demonstration in a rhetorical speech.

⁸⁶ *Apodeixis* is the term that Aristotle uses for “scientific demonstrations” that are “logically valid” (Kennedy 2007, 33).

⁸⁷ “Since the persuasive is persuasive to someone (and is either immediately plausible and believable in itself or seems to be shown by statements that are so), and since no art examines the particular – for example, the art of medicine does not specify what is healthful for Socrates or Callias but for persons of a certain sort (this is a matter of art, while particulars are limitless and not knowable) – neither does rhetoric theorize about each opinion – what may seem so to Socrates or Hippias – about what seems true to people of a certain sort ... rhetoric [forms enthymemes] from things customarily deliberated. Its function is concerned with the sort of things we debate and for which we do not have [other] arts and among such listeners as are not able to see many things all together or to reason from a distant starting point” (*On Rhetoric* 1356b11–1357a12).

⁸⁸ *Pistis* is a Greek term that refers to faith, belief or conviction. In addition, Kennedy explains that “*Pistis*: has a number of different meanings in different contexts: “proof, means of persuasion, belief” (Kennedy 2007, 31). It is worth noting that Aristotle differentiates between artistic *pistis* and non-artistic *pistis*; in this research, we are concerned with Aristotle’s artistic

The rhetorical syllogism – the *enthymeme* – is a logical form of syllogism, but with a particular condition. Its premisses are deduced from an opinion agreed upon by the majority of those who listen to a rhetorical speech. When the listeners agree upon these premisses, they are at that moment assumed to be true (*endoxa*)⁸⁹. Aristotle asserts that as human beings we have the capacity of apprehending both: the true opinion and an opinion that resembles the truth (i.e. the apparent truth).

The reason for using rhetorical enthymemes is that during the course of persuasion, we use logical proofs, which are propositions either directly stated or induced. Because the rhetorical *tekhnē* does not aim at covering⁹⁰ every opinion and every subject, it is more concerned with customized situations that are intended (i.e. it is not randomly addressed). The *ergon* of a rhetorical enthymeme is, as a result, to demonstrate its syllogistic form. This is

(*entechnic*) *pistis*, which he defines as: “the logical proofs that are prepared by methods and by “us”” (*On Rhetoric* 1356a2).

⁸⁹ *Endoxa* is the concept introduced by Aristotle to refer to an opinion that is assumed true because it is shared (or held true) by the majority of the citizens or a particular population.

⁹⁰ “We debate about things that seem capable of admitting two possibilities; for no one debates things incapable of being different either in past or future or present, at least not if they suppose that to be the case ... It is possible to form syllogisms and draw inductive conclusions either from previous arguments or from statements that are not reasoned out but require a syllogism [if they are to be accepted] because they are not commonly believed; but the former of these [i.e., a chain of syllogisms] is necessarily not easy to follow because of the length [of the argument] and the latter is not persuasive because the premises are not agreed to or commonly believed. Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme ... to be concerned with things that are for the most part capable of being other than they are, the enthymeme syllogistically and drawn from few premisses and often less than those of the primary syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer supplies it” (*On Rhetoric* 1357a 12-13).

done in order to ensure: (1) that the topic debated in a particular occasion is validly proven, and, (2) that the convenience in its construction allows the listeners to reason the covered topic from a “distant starting point”⁹¹. Thus, we can infer that a skilled rhētōr, who can compose an enthymematic demonstration, should also establish a true commonly shared opinion.

This means that since we are discussing an argument that is logically proven and has the purpose of persuading the listeners of the topic of the subject matter, then the syllogisms used are claiming two potential opinions or possibilities. And, as agreed from the previous literature, the premisses should follow (1) reason, and (2) *endoxa*.

However, if premisses are built on each other until we reach the conclusion intended, the length of the argument would increase and thus the listeners could lose track of the subject matter. Consequently, Aristotle suggested that there should be fewer premisses. In addition, because the subject covered by the rhētōr is building a group of his premisses on *endoxa*, the listeners would be then capable of assuming the few omitted premisses during the discourse.

⁹¹ Piazza in his article *Pisteis in Comparison: Examples and Enthymemes in the Rhetoric to Alexander and in Aristotle's Rhetoric* explains: “the reasons for the success of brevity are explained by referring to cognitive processes. Being brief and simple (and so avoiding both unclearness and boredom) is a way to involve the listeners. To be more precise, it is a way of letting the audience obtain an easy and quick learning” (Piazza 2011, 317).

A question that follows from the above illustration is: if the body of persuasion consists of probable subjects as well as *endoxa* and at the same time it follows rhetorical reasoning, then how can we validate an opinion to be true – as definitely both are not the same, (i.e. an opinion might be false)? Hence, we are currently questioning probability and truth.

Aristotle's further explanation provides us with a conceivable argument. He states that rhetoric follows neither the strict scientific demonstration nor the random opinion. In addition, though the rhetorical enthymemes, which are sometimes directly spoken and at other times implied, are derived from *endoxa*, there are still means to validate their truth – as much as possible. The assumption that Aristotle gives is that, particularly in the case of rhetoric, *endoxa* holds two probabilities: either true opinions or partially true opinions. Hence, it is a science with its distinctive characteristics. It follows neither the rigid necessary conditions of scientific demonstrations nor the appeals or the appearances of the subjects (like the sophistical rhetoric).

On the other hand, he asserts that the function of rhetoric is not to address abstract or categorical subjects, but subjects that are derived from those at *particular* occasions. The subjects are not selected at random. They are also not infinite subjects. Furthermore, the form of reasoning (in case of

necessities and probabilities) that applies to categorical subjects (i.e. universals) applies as well to their derived subjects (i.e. particulars); and, the same applies to their validity. Therefore, rhetorical enthymemes are syllogistically valid and probably true in many cases⁹².

Hence, we can understand from the above that using the enthymematic form of *reasoning* permits the *possibility* of preserving the *particular* goodness in the knowledge, which is encapsulated in the discourse. It as well entitles the *rhētōr*, who administers this demonstrative *reason*-defined method, to formulate his rhetorical discourse when he masters the required *good knowledge of the tekhnē* using: (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos*. However, in order to support this claim, we need to elaborate further on the features of the three elements of the *rhetorical form of reasoning* ((1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos*) in order to assert further the correspondence or concurrent potentiality of attributes, namely: reason, goodness and as a result truth.

⁹² “Since few of the premises from which rhetorical syllogisms are formed are necessarily true (most of the matters with which judgment and examination are concerned can be other than they are; for people deliberate and examine what they are doing, and [human] actions are all of this kind, and none of them [are], so to speak, necessary) and since things that happen for the most part and are possible can only be reasoned on the basis of other such things, and necessary actions [only] from necessities (and this is clear to us also from the Analytics), it is evident that [the premises] from which enthymemes are spoken are sometimes necessarily true but mostly true [only] for the most part. Moreover, enthymemes are derived from probabilities ... so it is necessary that each of these be the same as each [of the truth values mentioned]; for a probability is what happens for the most part, not in a simple sense, as some define it, but whatever, among things that can be other than they are, is so related to that in regard to which it is probable as a universal is related to a particular” (*On Rhetoric* 1357a 14-15).

4.4 The Skills: *Ēthos*, *Logos* and *Pathos*

Ēthos, *logos* and *pathos* are the three elements or appeals that any proficient *rhētōr* should master. As explained above, the three skills are interconnected and complementing to each other. Each of them has its distinctive role in the process of persuasion and thus in the potentiality of exerting change or action on the status-quo of the listeners. In order to realize better the role of each skill in the rhetorical form of reasoning with their respective characterizations, a few of the selected intellectual accounts are illustrated in this section. They are collectively discussed and commented upon.

Aristotle on *ēthos*:

[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person ... Character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion.⁹³

St. Augustine on *ēthos*:

A man who is resting upon faith, hope and love and who keeps a firm hold of these, does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing others ... So that in their case, I think, the saying is already fulfilled: "Whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall

⁹³ See *On Rhetoric* 1356a4

vanish away". Yet by means of these instruments (as they may be called), so great an edifice of faith and love has been built up in them.⁹⁴

These men ... would do good to very many more if they lived as they preach ... What do you not do yourself what you bid me do? And thus they cease to listen with submission to a man who does not listen to himself, and in despising the preacher they learn to despise the word that is preached.⁹⁵

Campbell on *ēthos*:

As the soul is of heavenly extraction and the body of earthly, so the sense of the discourse ought to have its source in the invariable nature of truth and right; whereas the expression can derive its energy only from the arbitrary conventions of men, sources as unlike, or, rather, as widely different, as the breath of the Almighty and the dust of the earth.⁹⁶

Perelman on *ēthos*:

A speaker should inspire confidence: without it, his speech does not merit credence ... If the person of the speaker provides a context for the speech, conversely the speech determines the opinion one will form of the person.⁹⁷

Ēthos thus denotes either the character, credibility or trustworthiness of the *rhētōr*. Any of these attributes are manifested only through his particular speech⁹⁸ (i.e. not based on previous opinion).

⁹⁴ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book I, Chapter 39.

⁹⁵ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chapter 27.

⁹⁶ See Campbell 1868, 56.

⁹⁷ See Perelman 1969, 318-319.

⁹⁸ Speech here refers to the rhetorical reasoning form of speech as explained earlier in this research.

The definitions found in the four diverse eras of the history of philosophy (quoted above): the Classical⁹⁹, the Middle Ages¹⁰⁰, the Enlightenment¹⁰¹ and the Contemporary¹⁰², assert that unless these attributes are already embodied within the self-character of the *rhētōr*, he could not possibly deliver the corresponding attributes in his speech – no matter how he mastered the *tekhnē* per se. In other words, if the moral values of the *rhētōr* are not as such, this particular *rhētōr* will not be capable to confer genuine persuasion on his listeners.

Hence, we can say that if we agree on the *possibility* of the goodness of the *rhētōr* (as argued in the earlier literature in this research), we can deduce that the *possibility* of goodness is also manifested in the skill of *ēthos*. Therefore, *ēthos* has the *particular*¹⁰³ possible attributes of: reason, goodness and, as a result, truth.

The second *entechnic pistis* provided in establishing a rhetorical form of reasoning is *logos*.

⁹⁹ The classical rhetoric was developed for a political intervention – as discussed earlier in this research.

¹⁰⁰ The Middle Ages rhetoric was developed for a theological intervention – will be covered at a later chapter in this research.

¹⁰¹ The Enlightenment rhetoric was developed for a rational engagement intervention – will be covered at a later chapter in this research.

¹⁰² The Contemporary rhetoric was developed for a social intervention – will be covered at a later chapter in this research.

¹⁰³ Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the particular occasion, particular *kairos* and the particular rhetorical subject.

Aristotle on *logos*:

Persuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.¹⁰⁴

St. Augustine on *logos*:

To speak eloquently, then, and wisely as well, is just to express truths which it is expressed to teach in fit and proper words, --words which in the subdued style are adequate, in the temperate, elegant, and in the majestic, forcible. But the man who cannot speak both eloquently and wisely should speak wisely without eloquence, rather than eloquently without wisdom.¹⁰⁵

Campbell on *logos*:

It is also a useful art. This is certainly the case, if the power of speech be a useful faculty, as it professedly teaches us how to employ that faculty with the greatest probability of success. Farther, if the logical art and the ethical be useful, eloquence is useful, as it instructs us how these arts must be applied for the conviction and persuasion of others. It is, indeed, the grand art of communication, not of ideas only, but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes. Nay, without this, the greatest talents, even wisdom itself, lose much of their lustre, and still more of their usefulness. The wise in heart, saith Solomon, shall be called prudent, but the sweetness of the lips increaseth learning. By the former, a man's own conduct may be well regulated, but the latter is absolutely necessary for diffusing valuable knowledge, and enforcing right rules of action upon others.¹⁰⁶

Perelman on *logos*:

The goal of all argumentation, as we have said before, is to create or increase the adherence of the minds to the theses presented for their assent. An efficacious argument is one which succeeds in increasing this intensity of adherence among those who hear it in such a way to set in motion the intended action (a positive action or an abstention

¹⁰⁴ See *On Rhetoric* 1356a-6.

¹⁰⁵ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chapter 28.

¹⁰⁶ See Campbell 1868, 56.

from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a willingness to act which will appear at the right moment.¹⁰⁷

We are going to apply here the term *persuasive* to argumentation that only claims validity for a particular audience, and the term *convincing* to argumentation that presumes to gain the adherence of every rational being. The nuance involved is a delicate one and depends, essentially, on the idea the speaker has formed on the incarnation of reason.¹⁰⁸

Logos, as exemplified above, is the *particular* argumentation established by the *rhētōr* in order to persuade his listeners at a particular occasion. It is spoken words, which encompass knowledge, truth, apparent truth and common opinions. On the other hand, there is a broad consensus (among the authors quoted above) that *logos* in order to produce persuasion should follow the form of reason, conceivable language, clarity of ideas and principles in addition to the common sense agreeability between the *rhētōr* and his listeners.

Logos, though, has a unique feature among the three skills of a proficient *rhētōr*. *Ēthos* and *pathos* are established using diverse styles of rhetorical reasoning through his the skill of *logos*. This implies that if the *rhētōr* fails to administer this skill, he would be certainly fail to reach the persuasion state that is expected from his rhetorical discourse.

¹⁰⁷ See Perelman 1969, 318-319.

¹⁰⁸ See Perelman 1969, 28.

Therefore, we can deduce – so far – that *logos* re-asserts *ēthos*. *Logos* furthermore corresponds to the *possible* goodness of the *rhētōr* and the good knowledge of the *tekhne*. Both concurrent skills carry the same attributes of the *rhētōr*. Therefore, *logos* and *ēthos* simultaneously satisfy the *particular*¹⁰⁹ attributes of: reason, goodness and as a result truth.

Pathos is the third concurrent skill that a *rhētōr* needs to acquire in order to persuade his audience with the *particular* objective of his rhetorical spoken discourse. The *rhētōr* makes the emotional appeal on his audience by means of *pathos*.

Aristotle argues that in so far as we are human beings, the state of our judgments could alter from one situation to the other. In other words, our feelings could dismiss reason in a few occasions. However, he asserts that it is the duty of the *good rhētōr* to motivate the *good* emotional¹¹⁰ state of his listeners¹¹¹.

St. Augustine on *pathos*:

Who speaks with the purpose of teaching ... if he wishes to delight or persuade his hearer ad well, he will not accomplish that end by putting his thought in any shape no matter what, but for that purpose the style of speaking is a matter of importance. And as the hearer must

¹⁰⁹ Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the particular occasion, particular *kairos* and the particular rhetorical subject.

¹¹⁰ In Book 2, Kennedy explains, “Aristotle’s inclusion of emotion as a mode of persuasion, despite his objections to the handbooks, is a recognition that among human beings judgment is not entirely a rational act. There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is part of the orator’s duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience”, (Kennedy 39).

¹¹¹ The emotional states that accord with reason.

be pleased in order to secure his attention, so he must be persuaded in order to move him to action. And as he is pleased if you speak with sweetness and elegance, so he is persuaded if he be drawn by your promises, and awed by your threats; if he rejects what you condemn, and embrace what you commend; if he grieve when you heap up objects for grief, and rejoice when you point out an object for joy.¹¹²

Campbell on *pathos*:

Would we not only touch the heart, but win it entirely to co-operate with our views, those affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with our argument, as that, from the passion excited, our reasoning may derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding attention; and by the justness of the reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted and enforced; and that thus both may be made to conspire in effectuating that persuasion which is the end proposed. For here, if I may adopt the schoolmen's language, we do not argue to gain barely the assent of the understanding, but, which is infinitely more important, the consent of the will.¹¹³

Perelman on *pathos*:

The argumentation ... sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of means available to the rhetorician for purposes of amplification and enhancement.¹¹⁴

The texts above show that *pathos* share a number of features in its different formulations, but it differs¹¹⁵ in the mode of applying the emotional appeal itself. Among the shared features is that *pathos* is a critical element in

¹¹² See *On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chapter 12.

¹¹³ See Campbell 1868, 28.

¹¹⁴ See Perelman 1969, 28.

¹¹⁵ The differences between the mode of application of these emotional appeals will be discussed – each – thoroughly in the coming chapters of this research.

the persuasion process of any particular rhetorical discourse. Without considering the emotional appeal in spoken discourses, (that are expected to include different types of simple and complex reasoning forms), the possibility that the listeners either lose interest in listening or lose focus in following up with the argument increases. Thus, engaging the listeners' emotions cannot be disregarded. Another shared feature is the capability of the *rhētōr* to fathom the expected "common" or "shared" beliefs or notions. These assumptions should allow him to represent in his *logos* the required propositions based on which a *potential* emotional appeal of change or action can happen. Also, without this attribute, the *rhētōr* would not be able to establish a rhetorical discourse free from rejections or reversed judgements.

Pathos' collective attribute (according to the quotes above) is that the emotional appeal exerted by the *rhētōr's* reasoning should comply with *reason, particularity of the situation and topic, knowledge, trustworthiness* and clarity of the *shared/common understanding*. This particular attribute is based on the *rhētōr's* reasoning in embodying his spoken discourse.

So, we can deduce – so far – that *logos* re-asserts *ēthos* and re-asserts *pathos*. Thus, *pathos* corresponds to the *possible* attributes of goodness of the *rhētōr*; and, it is embodied as well in the good knowledge of the *tekhnē*. The three concurrent skills carry the same attributes of the *rhētōr*. Therefore, *logos*,

ēthos and *pathos* simultaneously satisfy the *particular*¹¹⁶ attributes of reason, goodness and truth.

Therefore, (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos* are the elements that constitute the body of the spoken rhetorical discourse. The three *entechnic pisteis* are established by the author of the rhetorical spoken discourse (i.e. *the rhētōr*). In addition, the subject and the object of the discourse follow reason in the respective theoretical dimension and practical dimension. The manifested similarity in the attributes of the subject and the object of the spoken discourse have been discussed and deduced. Thus, the spoken rhetorical discourse is a means that *possibly* allows the knowledge of the good to be transformed by the good knowledge of the *tekhnē*. In addition, reason is a requirement for establishing the rhetorical reasoning argument that institutes: (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos*. Hence, *reason* and *pathos* are *possibly* compatible, particularly¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁶ Particularity here refers to the non-universality of the attribute. It is concerned with the particular occasion, particular *kairos* and the particular rhetorical subject.

¹¹⁷ Particularity here means that the possible compatibility of *reason* and *pathos* is valid *only* for particular occasions, particular *kairos* and particular rhetorical subject.

CHAPTER 5 – Emotional Appeal in Spoken Discourse: pathos

No matter which context we individually exist in, communication among us demands a common ground of understanding – including emotional-states understanding. This applies to both simple contexts and complex ones. Thus, having a common ground¹¹⁸ through which we communicate our interaction process is a necessity for spoken and written discourse. This objective of the common ground in a rhetorical spoken discourse is to establish mutual bases of interests, values and ideas among others.

As soon as we engage in any particular argument, it influences us and it causes – in a way or another – a change in us. This change could be intellectual only or intellectual and practical (i.e. involves action). In both cases, any type of communication has an influence on us – even if minimal.

Gadamer asserts that:

The intention of the text, together with the psychological factors related to the openness of the reader or listener to the text ... is a process of growing familiarity between the determine experience or the “text”, and ourselves ... We are continually shaping a common perspective when we speak a common language and so are active in the community of our experience of the world ... Discussion bears fruit when a common language is found. Then the participants part from one another as changed beings. The individual perspectives with

¹¹⁸ The common ground here refers to shared concepts or principles with any context we exist in (for example, language, images, metaphors, opinions ...etc.).

which they entered upon the discussion have been transformed, and so they are transformed themselves.¹¹⁹

In his book *Reason in the Age of Science*¹²⁰, he explains that as active human beings we are in a continuous course of change and are impacted by the psychological circumstances surrounding the diverse communications we experience. When this change occurs, not only our perspectives' change, but we ourselves also change.

Hence, the second objective of this research being the modes or the means of deliberating emotional appeal using rhetorical spoken discourse (i.e. using rhetorical reasoning argumentation), we need to develop an understanding of the process that occurs to produce the outcome of this deliberation. It is, accordingly, essential that a skillful *rhētōr* realizes why and how the change of emotional-states could potentially occur. This understanding could undeniably make him better in carrying out his *tekhnē*.

5.1 Faculties of the Mind and Emotional-States

Perler explains in the introduction of *The Faculties* that the inquiry of the co-relation between the activities exerted by a human being, which are diverse and composite in some situations, and the human being per se is an everlasting inquiry. Though different theorists and scientists, along history,

¹¹⁹ See Gadamer 1981, 110.

¹²⁰ See Gadamer, Hans-Georg. c1981. *Reason in the Age of Science*. Translated by Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

have been trying to resolve the multifaceted problems, no unified theory or concept has yet been formed. Thus, it is a controversial inquiry. However, an elementary consensus has been theoretically formed: the human mind, which can exhibit all sorts of activities, has the capacity to do “things in virtue of its rational faculties” (Perler 2015, 8).

Corcilius in the chapter of *Faculties in Ancient Philosophy*¹²¹ claims that the ancient Greeks established the following conception:

We have a grasp of things not only by attending to what they actually do or undergo at a given moment but also, and even more so, by attending to their *potential* to either do or undergo things in the future, that is, by attributing powers, abilities, and susceptibilities to them. These powers, abilities, and susceptibilities are the dispositional properties of the things around us. They are what these things either can, or are reliable to, do or undergo.¹²²

He argues that the claim developed by the ancient Greeks seemed too abstract and did not match any concrete cognitive grasp of the world around us. During his further investigations in the history of philosophy about the first definitions of the faculties of the mind, he elaborated extensively on what he named as “the first principle of a comprehensive science of living beings”. It is the faculties of the soul, the Aristotelian account of the soul in *De Anima* and its co-relation with the living body.

¹²¹ See Perler, Dominik. 2015. *The Faculties*. Oxford University Press.

¹²² See Perler 2015, 8.

The principle explains that the soul and the body co-exist in life and cannot dismiss one another. And in this unity, any human being performs four¹²³ basic activities that are governed by the soul. It is worth mentioning that these abstract Aristotelian concepts of the soul, the co-existing faculties/capacities and the living body have been examined and developed by philosophers, theorists, psychologists and historians.

Among the developed conceptions, the soul was perceived as a separate identity, where the capacities of the human mind that are to grasp and comprehend reality need not include the soul. Other accounts included theory of the mind and the evolution theory. A few others elaborated on the abilities of the mind to intuit every perceived subject through a correspondent capacity/faculty of the mind, one that is specialized in its particular interpretation; for instance: the ability of the human being to see objects correspond to a faculty of the mind for seeing, ...etc. Also, a hierarchical order of faculties has been elaborated, where there are capacities of different levels of intelligible order (Perler 2015).

¹²³ The four faculties of the soul are: (1) "the nutritive faculty ... the capacity for self-preservation", (2) "the perceptual faculty ... the capacity to take on perceptual forms without their matter", (3) "the rational faculty ... the capacity to take on intelligible forms", and (4) the locomotion ... involves a plurality of psychic and bodily factors (mainly perception, thought and desire); "all other activities ... such as desire, pleasure and pain, imagination, opinion, and others, should in one way or another be *derived* from these basic subprinciples" (Perler 2015, 20-42).

Yet, the original assumption stayed unchanged through the history of research on the faculties of the mind. Faculties of the mind are the capacities or the capabilities of the human being to intelligibly interpret the world he exists in and thus to react accordingly. These faculties include reason, desire, cognition, senses, and emotional-states¹²⁴ ... among others. This assumption however indicates that the relation between the faculties of the mind and the settings-in-context of any human being are interrelated.

5.2 Reason, Judgements and Emotional-States

The sequence of recently¹²⁵ developed theories of the faculties of the mind endorses the establishment of an intelligible connection between reason, judgements and emotions. In their article *Rationality and Emotions*, Kirman, Livet and Teschl remarkably illustrate a corresponding line of reasoning between these three faculties/capacities. They explain that it is unfortunate that along history the concepts of reason, judgements and emotions have been – in a way or another – discussed in a negative sense, where both exclude each other. Our existence is not mere black and white. On the contrary, the developments witnessed by various sciences allow us to re-establish the

¹²⁴ An emotional-state is a mental activity. It has the potentiality of both: producing behaviors and/or producing actions. The emotional-state persistently needs a stimulus to alter its state. The state could be internal (like, a memory) or external (like, being affected by external words or actions), (*Theories of Emotion*. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

¹²⁵ Particularly in Contemporary Philosophy.

potential interconnectedness of the three principles¹²⁶: reason, judgements and emotions. In support of their argument, Kirman et al. quote Patricia

Greenspan:

The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as 'enabling' causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which they are disabling) insofar as they direct attention toward certain objects of thought and away from others. They serve to heighten memory and to limit the set of salient practical options to a manageable set, suitable for decision-making (Greenspan 2002, p. 206).¹²⁷

Greenspan's conception of the emotional-state does not deny that emotions and their respective actions (based on these emotions) could contradict each other; and as a result, this contradiction could cause undesirable outcomes. However, she clarifies that there is no rationale to imply persistently that emotions could not be useful to reason and to judgements and vice versa.

Kirman et al. elaborate further by arguing that observing the performance of emotions and our understanding of them is a complex matter.

Still, in various *particular* contexts the non-contradiction of reason and

¹²⁶ See Kirman, Alan, Livet, Pierre and Teschl, Miriam. 2010. *Rationality and Emotions*. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 365: 215-219.

¹²⁷ See Kirman et al. 2010, 215.

judgements¹²⁸ is *possible*. Past learning experience, for example, could allow emotions to produce deliberate reasoning and thus actions to institute future relevant opportunities. Similarly, the social context interactions: they permit a reciprocal understanding of emotional facial expressions of others (for instance) and thus this understanding gives our reason a chance to better understand each other and accordingly judge situations in a reasonable manner. They assert that “emotions and affective states are not just sources of biased judgements, but may also serve as essential functions leading to more appropriate choices” (Kirman et al. 2010, 216-218).

So, we can infer from the above argument that the controversies between reason, judgements and emotions are critical. But even though, there are yet *possibilities* that in *particular* occasions the emotional-state of the mind enables the reasoning-state and sound judgements-state; and, in other particular occasions, the emotional-state of the mind itself is an outcome of the capacities of reasoning and judgements. Consequently, from this perspective, deliberating *pathos* using rhetorical spoken discourse is a potential asset for the proficient *rhētōr*. It is a benefit for him to conceive the

¹²⁸ Kirman et al. quoting Greenspan: “Contemporary Philosophy of emotion attempts something stronger, however, in according emotions a role in practical reasoning. Making this an integral role – understanding emotions as functioning within practical reasoning rather than just as spurs to it – means interpreting emotions in normative terms, as providing or expressing potential reasons for action, and as themselves subject to rational assessment and control, contrary to the traditional view of emotions as ‘passive’ phenomena” (Kirman et al. 2010, 218).

emotion-process in order to deliberate on emotional-states of the mind using his *tekhmē*.

5.3 Significant Emotional-State Behaviors

Feelings, emotions¹²⁹ and *pathos*: equivalent terms to indicate reaction based on stimulated factors or events. The reactions based on emotional-states could be only intelligible or could be followed by actions. Nevertheless, in both cases, the state is being processed by the mind of the human being in a way that engages the relevant reasoning faculty (or state of the mind) and thus the relevant judgements faculty (or state of the mind).

Based on this conception, the process through which an emotional-state is being transformed or translated involves – in different proportions – ethical values, morals, objectives, reciprocity, consciousness and awareness to the contextual settings of the particular emotional-state. The method, moreover, does not exclude the social settings¹³⁰, the religious settings and the educational settings. Each of these identified components has its own impact on the emotional-state in the corresponding situation.

¹²⁹ Emotions here refer to “emotions specific ... with respect to the following features: they are (i) focused on specific events; (ii) involve the appraisal of intrinsic features of objects or events as well as their motive consistency and conduciveness to specific motives; (iii) affect most or all bodily subsystems which may become to some extent synchronized; (iv) are subject to rapid change owing to the generation of action to the unfolding of events and reappraisals; and (v) have a strong impact on behavior owing to the generation of action readiness and control precedence” (Scherer 2009, 3459-3460).

¹³⁰ Settings refers to the related conditions, factors or circumstances.

Hence, when the emotional-state-interaction is being in persistent intelligible activeness, it plays a significant role in *potentially* instituting behaviors or beliefs of human beings. Scherer in his article *Emotions are emergent processes* elaborates four main categories that embody the observed features of emotions through which we can identify the variant behavioral emotional-states:

(i) Emotions are elicited when something relevant happens to the organism, having a direct bearing on its needs ... Relevance is determined by the appraisal of events on a number of criteria, in particular the novelty or unexpectedness of a stimulus or event, its intrinsic pleasantness or unpleasantness and its motivational consistency ... (ii) Emotions prepare the organism to deal with important events in their lives and thus have a strong motivational force, producing states of action readiness ... (iii) Emotions engage the entire person, urging action and/or imposing action suspension ... This means that emotions involve several components of the organism that tend to cohere to a certain degree in emotion episodes, sometimes to the point of becoming highly synchronized ... (iv) Emotions bestow control precedence on those states of action readiness, in the sense of claiming (not always successfully) priority in the control of behavior and experience.¹³¹

According to Scherer, these four categories correspond to the cognitive¹³² theories. They assume the subjective assessment of the human being regarding any particular stimulating occasion. The *cognitive*

¹³¹ See Scherer 2009, 3459.

¹³² Cognitive theories refer *only* to (1) the judgments theories and (2) the cognitive appraisal theories. Both theories indicate that for stimulated-based emotional-states, two factors ought to be observed: (1) the subjective evaluation of the human being to the particular stimulating event/occasion, and (2) this particular human being beliefs, ethical values, existing settings, and desires ... among others (Johnson 2015).

judgement¹³³ theory and the *cognitive* appraisal¹³⁴ theory allow the stimulated emotional-state to communicate with the respective faculties of the mind (i.e. the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement) to function on a consequent-based reaction to the particular stimulating event/occasion.

Scherer asserts, “it is only through the specific behavioral meaning of an event for an individual that the action preparation following the appraisal process can have adaptive value” (Scherer 2009, 3560-3561).

From the above discussions, we can deduce that the emotion-process is intricate. However, it accounts for a *potential* reasonable association between the states of the mind of: reason, judgement and emotion. And, it is a subjective process, which enforces an affirmative correlation between the particular stimulating occasion and the individual’s self-attributes and

¹³³ Judgement Theory: Johnson elaborates that the judgement theory encompasses the particular judgement of human being to himself and his existence. It thus assumes that this mental ability (i.e. judging) includes the human being’s own values, ideals and experiences. Furthermore, he asserts that all judgement theories “state that judgements are necessary for an emotion” (Johnson 2015).

¹³⁴ Cognitive Appraisal Theory: according to Johnson, psychologists have accounted to this theory. The sole difference between the appraisal theory and the judgement theory is that the appraisal theory does not count the judgement in the emotion process; however, it offers an analyzed account of appraisals based on stimulating events/occasions. The theory “has five appraisal components that can produce 14 discrete emotions. The appraisal components and the different values that each component can take are motivational state (appetitive, aversive), situational state (motive-consistent, motive-inconsistent), probability (certain, uncertain, unknown), power (strong, weak), and agency (self-caused, other-caused, circumstance-caused). The basic idea is that when a stimulus is encountered it is appraised along these five dimensions. Each appraisal component is assigned one of its possible values, and together these values determine which emotion response will be generated” (Johnson 2015).

empirical contexts. It also confirms that the emotional-state of the mind, from the perspective of the cognitive theories mentioned above, persistently refers to the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement in order to postulate the potential change in meaningful reactions and as a result the potential change in meaningful actions. Therefore, deliberating about rhetorical spoken discourses using *pathos*, in the dimension illustrated herewith, has a practical and a potential possibility for exerting change on the status-quo of the minds of its listeners.

CHAPTER 6 – St. Augustine on Pathos

6.1 Cultural Background

As teacher of rhetoric, a philosopher and a theologian, St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD) was behind the intellectual shift from the political rhetoric perspective to the rhetoric of theology during the early years of Medieval Philosophy. His rhetoric followed three different doctrines: Plato's, Aristotle's and Cicero's. However, he was affected mostly by Cicero¹³⁵, especially his treatise. McKeon elaborates that:

The influence of rhetoric on Augustine was by reaction and assimilation; he differentiated two eloquences and two arts, much as Plato had proved rhetoric to be a pseudo art in the *Gorgias* and yet had illustrated the method of the true rhetoric based on dialectic in the *Phaedrus*. Augustine was first attracted to philosophy by Cicero's *Hortensius* which he encountered in the course of his rhetorical studies, and he was put off in his further attempt to combine philosophy with the name of Christ by the contrast of the Scriptural and Ciceronian style.¹³⁶

Augustine adapted his rhetorical doctrine to Cicero's, where Cicero's chief political perspective was transformed wholly into the theological perspective of Augustine. McKeon explains that Augustine divided his

¹³⁵ McKeon in his article *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* describes the rhetoric of Cicero as "moral and political in its applications, and the influence of rhetoric extended to political doctrine. The differentiation of things according to ends loved and means used had already entered Christiane ethics in Ambrose's *De Officiis Ministrorum* which was based on the distinctions of Cicero's *De Officiis* and Cicero's rhetorically conceived political theory supplies, by virtue of the same distinction the terminology for Augustine's discussion of the city of God as well as the elements of the terrestrial city to which it is contrasted" (McKeon 1942, 7).

¹³⁶ See McKeon 1942, 5.

rhetorical doctrine into two groups of fundamental inquiries: (1) basic inquiries¹³⁷, and (2) Scriptural inquiries¹³⁸. The two sets of inquiries corresponded to: “on things” and “on signs”. *On Christian Doctrine*, as a result, is St. Augustine’s Scriptural method of discovery to establish “what should be understood” and “what has been understood” when it comes to the conceptions of Scriptural text (McKeon 1942, 3-8).

6.2 Eloquence and Emotions

Deliberating *pathos* in St. Augustine’s rhetorical discourse is significant. The means through which he recognized an unceasing association between emotions and the teachings of the Scriptural texts is evident throughout *On Christian Doctrine*. His communicative illustration of using *eloquence* and conventional *signs* in transforming political rhetoric into theological rhetoric is embodied within his preaching guidelines/methods along with the notions of: wisdom, truth and sustaining an emotional-state with listeners in order to attain persuasion. Hence, the literature in this section will elaborate St. Augustine’s deliberation on *pathos* within his framework of the *eloquence* of preaching a knowledgeable spoken discourse.

¹³⁷ McKeon argues that Augustine’s basic inquiries persistently resorted to “Cicero’s three ‘constitution of causes’ – whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort” (McKeon 1942, 5).

¹³⁸ McKeon argues that Augustine’s Scriptural inquiries, as well, persistently resorted to Cicero’s “two of Cicero’s five parts of rhetoric - discovery and statement” (McKeon 1942, 6).

Augustine's Scriptural *eloquence*:

There are also certain rules for a more copious kind of argument, which is called eloquence ... they can be used to enforce the truth ... the expression of affection conciliates the hearer ... a narrative, when it is short and clear, is effective, and that variety arrests men's attention without wearying them. And it is the same with other directions of the same kind, which ... are themselves true just in so far as they are effective in producing knowledge or belief, or in moving men's minds to desire and aversion.¹³⁹

Eloquence was already present in non-religious texts; however,

Augustine's intentions in amplifying the usage of different forms of conventional signs in order to convey the meanings of the Scriptural text eloquently are for practical guidelines of teaching¹⁴⁰.

Biblical texts, according to Augustine, are perceived by many as complicated¹⁴¹ texts. Their ambiguities – sometimes – make the overall understanding quite difficult; hence, the process of understanding biblical texts becomes either incomplete or incorrect. Therefore, a proficient preacher

¹³⁹ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book II, Chapter 36.

¹⁴⁰ Teaching: Augustine elaborates further on the attributes or qualities of who should teach and interpret Scriptural texts. He explains that "if a man fully understands that "the end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned," and is bent upon making all his understanding of Scripture to bear upon these three graces, he may come to the interpretation of these books with an easy mind. For while the apostle says "love," he adds "out of a pure heart," to provide against anything being loved but that which is worthy of love. And he joins with this "a good conscience," in reference to hope ... by living uprightly we are able to indulge the hope that our hope shall not be in vain" (*On Christian Doctrine* Book I, Chap. 39-40).

¹⁴¹ Complicated here refers to the metaphors and the conventional signs presented in Biblical texts. Understanding the meaning behind their usage, in the contexts they are used in, is quite complicated for standard readers. Augustine asserts that "there are two causes which prevent what is written from being understood: its being veiled either under unknown, or under ambiguous signs" (*On Christian Doctrine* Book II, Chapter 10).

ought to rely on simplicity and pleasantness in approaching his listeners (i.e. using eloquence), particularly when he is seeking persuasion.

Augustine argues that conventional signs and any relevant eloquence tools do not alter the meaning behind the actual Script-texts. On the contrary, eloquence in interpreting the Scriptural discourses affects the listeners' minds more efficiently when it is equipped with both: knowledge, simplicity, and enthusiasm. The listeners not only listen with attentiveness, but also with joy.

6.3 Conventional Signs and Emotions

Augustine's Scriptural Signs:

When I come to discuss the subject of signs¹⁴² ... not to attend to what they are in themselves, but to the fact that they are signs, that is, to what they signify. For a sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself: ... when we see smoke, we know that there is fire beneath; and when we hear the voice of a living man, we think of the feeling in his mind; and when the trumpet sounds, soldiers know that they are to advance or retreat, or do whatever else the state of the battle requires.¹⁴³

Before Augustine can initiate his rhetorical theory of *eloquence* and conventional signs, he first has to explain what signs are and how to differentiate between natural and conventional signs. He elaborates that when we perceive *things*, sometimes our minds senses or renders them in terms of our prior-experience of them. The form in which the mind comprehends the

¹⁴² Signs: are of two classes, (1) natural signs; and, (2) conventional signs.

¹⁴³ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book II, Chapter 1.

thing is based on the implications it denotes and not the material *thing* in itself or its essence.

In this sense, *natural signs* are the *things* that do not need or do not bear any other intentions when we perceive them. Furthermore, they are the *things* that do not convey or contain any knowledge by themselves. The natural signs are irrelevant to the context of the Scriptural understanding and persuasion for Augustine. For what he is seeking is another class of signs that do imply within their perception thorough and valuable intensions.

Augustine's Scriptural Conventional Signs:

Conventional signs, on the other hand, are those which living beings mutually exchange for the purpose of showing, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts. Nor is there any reason for giving a sign except the desire of drawing forth and conveying into another's mind what the giver of the sign has in his own mind ... because even the signs which have been given us of God, and which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, were made known to us through men—those, namely, who wrote the Scriptures.¹⁴⁴

The purpose of Augustine's rhetorical intervention is to teach, explain, please and persuade the listeners with the wisdom and values of the Scriptural texts. Therefore, the plain/natural signs that contain no knowledge in them other than the *thing* perceived per se are not related to his objective. It is the conventional signs that embody within their intensions and implications the genuine means that persuade us with the truth. As

¹⁴⁴ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book II, Chapter 2.

Augustine argues, the conventional signs are the ones that need the teaching. For they are the ones presented to us in the Scriptural texts; and, by understanding them, our emotional state of the mind conceives the real meanings and values – i.e. wisdom and truth.

6.4 Theory of Arrangement, Style and Delivery: St. Augustine's

Development of *Pathos*

It is the duty, then, of the interpreter and teacher of Holy Scripture, the defender of the true faith and the opponent of error, both to teach what is right and to refute what is wrong, and in the performance of this task to conciliate the hostile, to rouse the careless, and to tell the ignorant both what is occurring at present and what is probable in the future. But once that his hearers are friendly, attentive, and ready to learn, whether he has found them so, or has himself made them so, the remaining objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case requires. If the hearers need teaching, the matter treated of must be made fully known by means of narrative. On the other hand, to clear up points that are doubtful requires reasoning and the exhibition of proofs. If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigour of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.¹⁴⁵

St. Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* establishes a decisive method for persuading the listeners with wisdom and truth. In doing so, Augustine sets up a road map for any wise¹⁴⁶ teacher to follow. Moreover, none of his criteria

¹⁴⁵ See *On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chapter 4.

¹⁴⁶ Augustine's conception of wisdom necessitate Scriptural knowledge; he explains, "the man who is bound to speak wisely, even though he cannot speak eloquently, to retain in memory the words of Scripture" (*On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chap. 5).

excluded deliberation on emotion. His theory¹⁴⁷ for attaining the purpose of teaching the Scriptural text includes a hierarchal arrangement of the speech; each of the steps is to be accompanied simultaneously by an inspirational style and a meaningful argument for delivery. In other words, the eloquent teaching of Scriptural texts implies concurrently using the appropriate style of approaching the listeners and at the same time embodying meaningful conventional signs to facilitate the conceptions of the texts and remove any ambiguities.

¹⁴⁷ St. Augustine elaborates on his theory by stating that: "a great orator has truly said that "an eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade." Then he adds. "To teach is a necessity, to delight is a beauty, to persuade is a triumph." Now of these three, the one first mentioned, the teaching, which is a matter of necessity, depends on what we say; the other two on the way we say it. He, then, who speaks with the purpose of teaching should not suppose that he has said what he has to say as long as he is not understood; for although what he has said be intelligible to himself, it is not said at all to the man who does not understand it. If, however, he is understood, he has said his say, whatever may have been his manner of saying it. But if he wishes to delight or persuade his hearer as well, he will not accomplish that end by putting his thought in any shape no matter what, but for that purpose the style of speaking is a matter of importance. And as the hearer must be pleased in order to secure his attention, so he must be persuaded in order to move him to action. And as he is pleased if you speak with sweetness and elegance, so he is persuaded if he be drawn by your promises, and awed by your threats; If he reject what you condemn, and embrace what you commend; if he grieve when you heap up objects for grief, and rejoice when you point out an object for joy; if he pity those whom you present to him as objects of pity, and shrink from those whom you set before him as men to be feared and shunned. I need not go over all the other things that can be done by powerful eloquence to move the minds of the hearers, not telling them what they ought to do, but urging them to do what they already know ought to be done" (*On Christian Doctrine* Book IV, Chap. 12).

CHAPTER 7 – George Campbell on Pathos

7.1 Cultural Background

George Campbell (1719-1796), a lecturer of religion, a preacher and a college principal, was one of the prominent Enlightenment philosophers.

During the eighteenth century in Europe, generally, then in Britain particularly, questions about religious ideologies and beliefs were prevalent. Thus, it was found necessary to re-inforce reason.

Campbell's theory established a conception to communicate the rhetorical discourse directly to the rational faculty of the human mind. Hence, his theory was the attempt to respond to the religious problems (i.e. ideologies and beliefs). The objective of his theory was to convey the discourse to the human mind using *reason* in order to pursue a *potential* change in their emotional-state.

In Campbell's book, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, the impact of Sir Bacon's theories of the mind and their connection to psychology is evident throughout his literature. Herrick explains that:

Campbell advanced a scientific rhetoric, but science for him meant something like what philosophy means today: an organized and a rational account of a subject ... His rhetoric, then, reflects what were taken to be advances in the fields such as ethics and psychology ... Through new discoveries, Campbell sought to understand how the human mind operates and to provide instruction in eloquence based on the understanding. Guided by Bacon ... Enlightenment writers tended to divide up the mind into two different capacities or faculties.

In the faculty psychology view, the mind consisted of the understanding, the imaginations, the passions and the will ... For Campbell, each mental faculty spoke virtually its own language. The understanding spoke the language of logic, while the passion spoke the language of emotion ... The understanding was informed, and when satisfied responded with conviction. The imagination perceived beauty. The passions and will moved one toward direction.¹⁴⁸

Thus, the sections to follow will attempt to demonstrate Campbell's rhetorical theory. The theory is expressively articulated to address¹⁴⁹ the psychological faculty of the human mind for deliberating *emotional appeals* by the means of rhetorical *reasoning*¹⁵⁰. In addition, the objective of the theory is to *potentially* produce action.

7.2 Reason and Emotions

Campbell's rhetorical theory encompasses a concurrent presence of reason and emotions; however, this reciprocal connection has boundaries¹⁵¹ and limitations.

¹⁴⁸ See Herrick 2001, 170-180.

¹⁴⁹ Herrick claims that for Campbell "persuasion was a matter of addressing both the emotions and the reason, as people are not convinced without arguments and do not act except in response to emotions. "When persuasion is the end, passion [emotion] must be engaged," he writes. Campbell explains the relationship between emotions and reason this way: "the former is affected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object, the latter ... by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits"" (Herrick 2001, 181).

¹⁵⁰ Campbell explains the necessity of reason and emotions simultaneously for persuasion by asserting that: "Would we not only touch the heart, but win it entirely to co-operate with our views, those affecting lineaments must be so interwoven with our argument, as that, from the passion excited, our reasoning may derive importance, and so be fitted for commanding attention; and by the justness of the reasoning, the passion may be more deeply rooted and enforced; and that thus both may be made to conspire in effectuating that persuasion which is the end proposed" (Campbell 1868, 28).

¹⁵¹ Boundaries and limitations refer to pointing out that his concept was to move from a widely spread religious misinterpretations or misunderstanding to a rational understanding

Campbell occupied the position of a preacher; and, as such, he was trying to seek limitations to Biblical texts interpretations. These limitations should allow the Enlightenment movement objective (of prevailing rationality) on a long-term basis. His argument regarding these boundaries were chiefly based on the idea that Biblical texts are facts; thus, they neither need persuasion nor need assertions. Accordingly, Campbell established a few limitations for those who preach and teach religions. He explains:

But an apostle or evangelist (for there is no anachronism in a bare supposition) might have thus addressed the celebrated Athenian: "You do, indeed, succeed to admiration, and the address and genius which you display in speaking justly entitle you to our praise. But, however great the consequences may be of the measures to which, by your eloquence, they are determined, the change produced in the people is nothing, or next to nothing. If you would be ascertained of the truth of this, allow the assembly to disperse immediately after hearing you ; give them time to cool, and then collect their votes, and it is a thousand to one you shall find that the charm is dissolved. But very different is the purpose of the Christian orator. It is not a momentary, but a permanent effect at which he aims. It is not an immediate and favourable suffrage, but a thorough change of heart and disposition that will satisfy his view. That man would need to be possessed of oratory superior to human who would effectually persuade him that stole to steal no more, the sensualist to forego his pleasures, and the miser his hoards, the insolent and haughty to become meek and humble, the vindictive forgiving, the cruel and unfeeling merciful and humane.¹⁵²

that allow a systematic interaction between the different faculties of the mind, namely: reason and emotions. This implies that there should be boundaries set to rigid preaching methods.

¹⁵² See Campbell 1868, 130-131.

Campbell does not exclude eloquence from preaching. On the other hand, if Biblical texts are in themselves factual, particularly for the listeners who attend the Church congregations, then why does an orator need to establish an emotional state with his listeners if he is not seeking persuasion? He asserts that Biblical texts include the best forms of speech and explanations¹⁵³, how then could a human orator compete with the sacred text and try to become more convincing? Even if the orator tries to do this, his effect will be momentary and non-worthy.

On the other side, when it comes to subjects that need convincing and persuasion, rhetorical skills are necessary. Engaging the listeners through various means in order to reach the state of understanding is allowed; and, arousing their faculty of emotions would be of value to convince their faculty of reason. For these particular occasions, the faculty of reason and the faculty of emotions are of the same relevance and should not cancel each other.

Campbell elaborates this by claiming that:

¹⁵³ Campbell elaborated further by saying: "I remember to have seen it somewhere remarked, that mankind being necessarily incapable of making a present of anything to God, have conceived, as a succedaneous expedient, the notion of destroying what should be offered to him, or, at least, of rendering it unfit for any purpose. Something similar appears to have taken place in regard to the explanation of the Divine nature and attributes attempted by some theorists. On a subject so transcendent, if it be impossible to be sublime, it is easy to be unintelligible. And that the theme is naturally incomprehensible, they seem to have considered as a full apology for them in being perfectly absurd. In the former case, what people could not in strictness bestow upon their Maker, they could easily render unfit for the stow of men; and in the latter, if one cannot grasp what is above the reach of reason, one can without difficulty say a thousand things which are contrary to reason" (Campbell 1868, 273-274).

A person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who, by words, and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the surest and most immediate claim upon our sympathy ... We are hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between his relation and our relation, his interest and our interest. So much for those circumstances in the object presented by the speaker which serve to awaken and inflame the passions of the hearers. But when a passion is once raised there are also other means by which it may be kept alive, and even augmented ... Nothing is more efficacious in this respect than a sense of justice, a sense of public utility, a sense of glory; and nothing conduceth more to operate on these than the sentiments of sages whose wisdom we venerate, the example of heroes whose exploits we admire. I shall conclude what relates to the exciting of passion when I have remarked that pleading the importance and the other pathetic circumstances, or pleading the authority of opinions or precedents, is usually considered, and aptly enough, as being likewise a species of reasoning.¹⁵⁴

Campbell's description of the need of the simultaneous connection between reason and emotions for the sake of convincing and persuading (which are the objectives of the rhetorical discourse) asserts that an appeal to emotions leads concurrently to an appeal to reason. As a result, he establishes his theory of invention and presentation in rhetoric to reach persuasion.

7.3 Theory of Invention and Presentation: Campbell's Development of *pathos*

Campbell argues that in order for an orator to attain the purpose of his rhetorical speech, he should empower his speech by using inventions and

¹⁵⁴ See Campbell 1868, 112-114.

presentations¹⁵⁵. His invention theory (using loci¹⁵⁶) aims to persuade the faculty of reason – by assuring the senses; and his presentation theory (using auditors and descriptive language)¹⁵⁷ aims at persuading the faculty of emotion – by arousing passion. When these theories are applied in their right order through implied arrangement¹⁵⁸ in speech, they act on the faculty of memory and the faculty of imagination respectively. The steps resemble a series of recalled incidents and places (for memory)¹⁵⁹ and demonstrated

¹⁵⁵ “It was observed of memory, that as it instantly succeeds sensation, it is the repository of all the stores from which our experience is collected, and that without an implicit faith in the clear representations of that faculty, we could not advance a step in the acquisition of experimental knowledge ... it is a proof consisting of an uninterrupted series of axioms. The truth of each is intuitively perceived as we proceed. But this process is of necessity gradual, and these axioms are all brought in succession. It must, then, be solely by the aid of memory that they are capable of producing conviction in the mind. Nor by this do I mean to affirm that we can remember the preceding steps, with their connections, so as to have them all present to our view at one instant; for then we should, in that instant, perceive the whole intuitively. Our remembrance, on the contrary, amounts to no more than this, that the perception of the truth of the axiom to which we have advanced in the proof, is accompanied with a strong impression on the memory of the- satisfaction that the mind received from the justness and regularity of what preceded. And in this we are under a necessity of acquiescing; for the understanding is no more capable of contemplating and perceiving, at once, the truth of all the propositions in the series, than the tongue is capable of uttering them at once” (Campbell 1868, 80-81).

¹⁵⁶ *Loci* refers to places; the concept of loci allows the orator to enhance his speech with evidences using the faculty of memory in his listeners.

¹⁵⁷ Campbell explains: “This, I believe, it will be acknowledged to do principally, if not solely ... by communicating lively, distinct, and strong ideas of the distress which it exhibits. By a judicious yet natural arrangement of the most affecting circumstances, by a proper selection of the most suitable tropes and figures, it enlivens the ideas raised in the imagination” (Campbell 1868, 141-142).

¹⁵⁸ Arrangement: it is required in establishing and confirming the data processes by both memory and imagination. These confirmations acts as evidences that facilitates the persuasion of the faculty of emotion and the faculty of reason.

¹⁵⁹ The memory evidences assure the faculty of reason; thus, it allows it to be persuaded. Campbell asserts, “sense operates more strongly on the mind than imagination does” (Campbell 1868, 142).

images and ideas (for imagination)¹⁶⁰ that come together in the mind in order to allow the listener to reach the state of being convinced by the evidences.

Convincing the will results in persuasion for action and attaining this purpose could not happen unless a speech employs an arrangement to affect reason and emotions simultaneously¹⁶¹.

Therefore, for Campbell “all the ends of speaking are reducible to four; every speech is intended to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will” (Campbell 1868, 23).

¹⁶⁰ The imagination evidences assure the faculty of emotion; thus, it allows it to be persuaded. Campbell argues, “it is this power of which the orator must chiefly avail himself, it is proper to inquire what these circumstances are which will make the ideas he summons up in the imaginations of his hearers resemble, in lustre and steadiness, those of sensation and remembrance; for the same circumstances will infallibly make them resemble also in their effects; that is, in the influence they will have upon the passions and affections of the heart” (Campbell 1868, 103).

¹⁶¹ According to Campbell, “there is an attraction or association among the passions ... and the mind. Rarely any passion comes alone” (Campbell 1868, 152).

CHAPTER 8 – Chaïm Perelman on Pathos

8.1 Cultural Background

Chaïm Perelman (1912-1984), a lecturer of history with resilient understanding of law and the role of logic and rhetoric in legal arbitrations, initiated a rhetorical shift in Contemporary Philosophy. His awareness of the need of allowing argumentation to meet the practical and the actual state of existence of human beings made him insist on forming a theory of rhetoric that enables reason and emotions to reconcile. Perelman's *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* exemplifies his conception of a sincere adaptation to the requirements of this reality.

Long and Jarvis describe Perelman's contemporary reformation of the rhetorical argumentation by stating that:

"*Language: Pragmatic and Dialogic*" "*Logic or Rhetoric*," "*Philosophy and Argumentation/The Philosophy of Argumentation*," and "*Theories of Knowledge*", each essay illuminates the *ethos* behind the man who developed the theoretical system of argumentation that helped to foster the current renaissance of rhetoric. The *ethos* of Perelman, permeating these essays, places the theoretical system, which he delineated in *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* and elsewhere, back into the context from which it was derived: the context of rich, human interaction ... returns to terms that American readers, familiar with *An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking*, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, and *The Realm of Rhetoric*, have come to associate with Perelman's work--terms such as double hierarchy, notions, dissociation, and analogy. Perelman s offers relevant insights and useful tools for furthering connections among various bodies of knowledge.¹⁶²

¹⁶² See Long and Jarvis 1990, 87-89.

According to the explanation provided by Long and Jarvis, Perelman is behind the call for being “reasonable” – in the sense that it is indeed appropriate for value systems, structures and notions; however, it is as well our responsibility to redirect our intellectual deliberations to run parallel to the present-state of societies and cultures.

Before we move on to Perelman’s conceptions of rhetoric, we need to be vigilant to the regressive¹⁶³ order of his discussion. Though the demonstration sequence that he uses, in my opinion, sharpens the level of philosophical argumentation, unless the presentation of his theory in this research follows a systematic order, the understanding of his conceptions could err and lead to various controversies.

8.2 The Communion, Reason and Emotions

Perelman defines the objective of argumentation¹⁶⁴ by stating, “all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of the minds, and, by this very

¹⁶³ The regressive order, in my opinion, is due to his wide selection of argumentation theories and concepts to arouse attentiveness to the debate; to me, it projected an outcome of being persuaded by his theory; however, it might not be the case with other readers of his literature. Therefore, the following sections will be discussed in their logical sequence rather than the route that Perelman used in his argumentation – for the sake of coherence and clarity of this research.

¹⁶⁴ Argumentation, according to Perelman, is the means for realizing rationalization. He explains that: “those who do not see, or will not allow, the importance of argumentation cannot account for rationalization: for them it would be merely the shadow of a shadow” (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 42).

fact, assumes the existence of an intellectual contact"¹⁶⁵. His assertion implies that reason is his means to seek persuasion (i.e. when the minds of his audience adhere to the argumentation); this implies that reason is involved in any form of argumentation; however, this same "mind adherence"¹⁶⁶ could not be attained unless there is a reciprocal intellectual connection between the orator and his audience¹⁶⁷.

How then can an orator establish the intellectual connection with his audience? Perelman replies to this inquiry by stating that:

Unlike the demonstration of a geometrical theorem, which established once and for all a logical connection between speculative¹⁶⁸ truths, the argumentation in epideictic discourse sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience, and to this end he uses the whole range of

¹⁶⁵ See *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 14.

¹⁶⁶ Mind adherence, according to Perelman, denotes: "adherence of the minds is its variable intensity: nothing constraints us to limit our study to a particular degree of adherence characterized by self-evidence, and nothing permits us to consider a priori the degrees of adherence to a thesis as proportional to its probability and to identify self-evidence with truth" (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 4).

¹⁶⁷ Perelman divides the audience – who enjoys the rhetorical argumentation and communicate with it – to three genres: (1) "the whole of mankind ... we shall refer to it as *universal audience*"; (2) "the single *interlocutor* whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue"; and, (3) the subject himself when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions" (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 30).

¹⁶⁸ Perelman explains that when "self-evident" or "speculative truths" are demonstrated "the adherence of the mind seems to be suspended to a compelling truth, and no role is played by the processes of argumentation. The individual, with his freedom of deliberation and of choice, defers to the constraining force of reason, which takes from him all possibility of doubt" (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 32).

means available to the rhetorician for purposes of amplification and enhancement.¹⁶⁹

The above quote implies that when the rhetor is seeking a discourse to adhere to the minds of the listeners, he should establish a state of unity among them (based on a common or shared concept between both sides). In other words, the rhetor ought to deliberate on the means through which the listeners and the rhetor associate with each other. The objective of establishing this communion¹⁷⁰ is to “secure”¹⁷¹ a shared understanding between both parties of the discourse in order to move forward with the argument.

We can thus deduce from the above that Perelman’s conception of argumentation embodies communicating with the faculty of reason of audience. And, in order to attain this state, a sustainable emotional engagement between the rhetor and the audience is necessary. Furthermore, the two-sided engagement or connection could not be established except in

¹⁶⁹ See *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*¹⁶⁹ 1969, 51. ** *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* will be referred to till the end of this research as TNR.

¹⁷⁰ An example of establishing social communion – using shared forms of values or agreed upon maxims (they are expressed by language) – as argued by Perelman: “Slogans and catchwords are maxims developed to meet the requirements of a specific action. They are designed to secure attention through their rhythm and their concise and easily remembered form, but they are adapted to particular circumstances, require constant renewal ... They may be able to stimulate action ... their function is essentially that of compelling our attention to certain ideas, by means of the form in which they are expressed” (*TNR* 1969, 167).

¹⁷¹ “Securing an agreement on ... certain points is hence an objective which will determine the order to be followed in argumentation. A speech is not exclusively built up by developing the original premises; it consists also of establishing premises and of making agreements unambiguous and stable ... These agreements sometimes are the result of the attitude of the parties, and sometimes they are institutionalized by virtue of established custom or the existence of explicit rules of procedure” (*TNR* 1969, 110).

language expressions and forms that illustrate values, beliefs and social norms among other form of communion. Hence, according to Perelman, both reason and emotion are necessary for attaining the objective of rhetorical argumentation (i.e. for attaining persuasion). Communion, then, is the center or the conductor of the process of association.

8.3 Theory of Amplification: Perelman's Development of *pathos*

According to Perelman, values amplify the emotional state of the listeners and therefore intensify communion. Values are expressed in the discourse in two forms: (1) as particular values, and, (2) as abstract values. Each of the two forms has its distinct impact on the listeners; however, both – when expressed appropriately – allow the emotional state of the listeners to luring about the potential change intended¹⁷² by the rhetorical argument.

Perelman elaborates the concept of using values by stating that:

Besides facts, truths, and presumptions, characterized by the agreement of the universal¹⁷³ audience, our classification scheme must also find a place for the objects of agreement in regard to which only the adherence of the particular groups is claimed. The objects are the values hierarchies, and the loci of the preferable. Agreement with

¹⁷² The intended potential change refers to persuasion, which implies the potentiality of taking action.

¹⁷³ The highest state of amplification happens when the agreement is between the rhetor and the universal audience. Perelman defines the universal audience as “this refers ... not to an experimentally proven fact, but to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be universal, since for legitimate reasons, we need not take into consideration those which are not part of it ... Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of. Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of universal audience” (TNR 1969, 31-33).

regard to value means an admission that an object, a being, or an ideal must have a specific influence on action and disposition toward action and that one can make use of this influence in an argument, although the point of view represented is not regarded as binding by everybody. The existence of values, as objects of agreement that make possible a communion with regard to particular ways of acting, is connected with the idea of multiplicity of groups ... One appeals to values in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than the others and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others.¹⁷⁴

We can infer from the above that the concept of universal audience is – in reality – an invention of the rhetor. The objective of this invention is to have an abstract understanding of the values, beliefs and ideas that connect with the majority of the audience. This is not to seek the agreement of the entire audience, but – at least – to consent to a higher probability of agreement. Therefore, the rhetor can embody in his speech a communion by values based on a characterization that is appropriate to the universality¹⁷⁵ of them; hence, the values that apply to the universals apply to the particulars of the same class.

In order to elaborate the amplification theory further, we need to realize another attribute of the concept of universal audience. Perelman

¹⁷⁴ See *TNR* 1969, 74-75.

¹⁷⁵ This same concept has been discussed in section 4.3 in this research. It is an Aristotelian concept, which argues that the form of reasoning (in case of necessities and probabilities) that applies on categorical subjects (i.e. universals) applies as well on their derived subjects (i.e. particulars).

argues that the universal audience “pass judgment”¹⁷⁶. In other words, the universal audience appeals to reason (i.e. it validates concepts) and a particular audience appeals to emotions.

That much said – how does the amplification theory administer the association¹⁷⁷ between values and audience in order to attain its objective? Perelman elaborates that a rhetor can use both forms of values during the speech, each in its own place. He argues that particular values amplify abstract emotional states. For instance, the flag of a particular country: it is a particular object; it denotes a certain value for the universal audience of this particular country; as a result, this particular value when employed for the particular audience, amplifies their emotional sense of behavior towards their country.

On the other hand, abstract¹⁷⁸ values amplify concrete states of emotion. For example, in a religious congregation, when a Priest (located in the northern part of any particular country) refers in his discourse to a

¹⁷⁶ Perelman argues, “audiences are not independent of one another, that particular concrete audiences are capable of validating a concept of the universal audience which characterizes them ... it is the undefined universal audience that is invoked to pass judgement on what is the concept of universal audience appropriate to such a concrete audience, to examine simultaneously the manner in which it was composed, which are the individuals who comprise it, according to the adopted criterion, and whether this criterion is legitimate. It can be said that audiences pass judgement on one another” (*TNR* 1969, 35).

¹⁷⁷ According to Perelman: “knowledge of an audience cannot be conceived independently of the knowledge of how to influence it” (*TNR* 1969, 23).

¹⁷⁸ Abstracts is equivalent in this sense to unique; thus, abstract values refers to unique values.

Madonna statue (located in the southern part of this same country); this abstract religious value amplifies the state of emotion of faith and loyalty (TNR 1969, 75-79).

A skillful rhētōr is therefore the one who utilizes communion appropriately in order to reach the state of shared agreement with his listeners. Perelman's reasonable theory thus provides us with a better conception of argumentation involving persuasion.

Perelman eloquently summarizes his approach to argumentation by stating:

Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be exercised. If freedom has no more than adherence to a previously given natural order, it would exclude all possibility of choice; and if the exercise of freedom were not based on reasons, every choice would be irrational and would be reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual void.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ See *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* 1969, 514.

CHAPTER 9 – Conclusion

The *tekhnē* of spoken discourse is a critical tool for *particular* communications and is a substantial means to transform *good knowledge*¹⁸⁰. It is an objective *tekhnē* with an *ergon*, which is man-made. As such, it may be implemented for political, religious, social or educational purposes.

Thus, *understanding* the implications of spoken discourse and establishing a *shared understanding* between the *rhētōr* and his listeners is not just an option in this context. On the contrary, both elements are the mind/soul/heart of the discourse. For what is the value of a discourse if its implications and representations are not well perceived by its listeners? Why do we care to convey knowledge of the good, if we cannot construct an intellectual connection between the listeners and us? I believe it would be impossible to attain any tangible outcomes from such an experience without initiating a discourse that contains these two elements.

On the other hand, these two elements involve two concurrent prerequisites, which are: (1) the *knowledge of the good*, and (2) the *good knowledge of the tekhnē*. Consequently, converting the *knowledge of the good* using the *good knowledge of the tekhnē* are other central elements of the spoken discourse. Any *rhētōr* must exert all possible efforts to craft his argument

¹⁸⁰ Good knowledge here refers to *particular* good knowledge (i.e. not universal knowledge). The concept is discussed and argued in chapters 3 and 4 of this research.

using a *reasonable* form of *rhetorical reasoning*. Any proficient rhētōr can convey his *particular knowledge* to his listeners through this *exclusive* medium. His acquisition of the three skills¹⁸¹, namely: (1) *ēthos*, (2) *logos*, and (3) *pathos*, are his means to reach the minds of his listeners in their various states.

Furthermore, probability in rhetorical reasoning is not at all an enemy to strict logic. It also does not deconstruct universality. The natural capability of the human mind to use common opinions or common sense to perceive and infer the *self-evident* is not against logic, reason, knowledge and truth.

Chaim Perelman explains this further by affirming that:

It is the idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason, which we must assail, if we are to make place for a theory of argumentation that will acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing those of others. Self-evidence is conceived both as a force to which every normal mind must yield and as a sign of the truth of that which imposes itself because it is self-evident. The self-evident would connect the psychological with the logical and allow passage back and forth between these two levels. All proof would be reduction to the self-evident and what is self-evident would have no need of proof.¹⁸²

Correspondingly, intensifying the emotional states of the mind – *pathos* – using rhetorical spoken discourse has its power; and it is reasonable too.

Our faculties of the mind are our means to *rationally* cognize the cultural environment we exist in – including the emotion states that we experience.

¹⁸¹ Explanations in addition to examples to assert the importance of each of the three skills are provided in Section 4.4 in this research.

¹⁸² See *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise of Argumentation* 1969, 3-4.

Moreover, according to several recently developed theories¹⁸³ of the faculties of the mind, there is an intelligible connection between the faculty of reason, the faculty of judgement and the faculty of emotions. The meaningful *emotional behaviors*¹⁸⁴ and their *potential* institution of beliefs and actions are quite remarkable. The exemplary developments presented earlier in this research through a theological perspective¹⁸⁵, a rational perspective¹⁸⁶, and a social perspective¹⁸⁷ assert and amplify the important role of *pathos* for exerting a potential *change* in the status-quo of the listeners by means of reason.

Finally, it is apparent from the discussed reflections on the first and the second objectives of this thesis that a *knowledgeable* spoken discourse cannot afford to delete the emotional appeal – *pathos* – from its situational circumstances. Although *reason* and emotional appeal appear to be mutually exclusive, they support each other. The emotional appeal addresses the human mind in its particular states. In addition, the emotional appeal is one of the critical tools to *potentially* motivate both: *change* and *action* through any *objective* rhetorical spoken discourse.

¹⁸³ The selected theories are discussed in Chapter 5 in this research.

¹⁸⁴ Behaviors here refers to beliefs or actions that are formed based on emotional states; these emotional states are a result or an outcome of an agreeing state between the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgement.

¹⁸⁵ St. Augustine's conception of developing *pathos*.

¹⁸⁶ George Campbell's conception of developing *pathos*.

¹⁸⁷ Chaïm Perelman's conception of developing *pathos*.

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