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The American University in Cairo

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**A Prince and a Fractured Kingdom: The Case of the Sudan's
Power Relations**

A Thesis Submitted to

The Political Science Department

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

A Master of Arts Degree

By Jihad Salih Mashamoun

Under the supervision of Dr. Nadia Farah

April 30, 2015

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To the fond memory of my parents Salih Mashamoun and Siham Sayed, and to my family,
and relatives who were always patient and supportive of me.

Acknowledgement

The writing of this dissertation was a personal adventure, which is why I am happy to have studied at the American University in Cairo. In this page I would like to show my thanks to the individuals who aided me during my study at AUC.

First, I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Nadia Farah, who had accepted to take the gamble of being both my thesis advisor and for supervising me while I was her teachers' assistant. I am extremely appreciative of how she helped during the writing of this dissertation. I am also very thankful of Dr. Elnur's extreme patience during the writing of this thesis, for being my point of reference on Sudanese politics, for giving me helpful materials for this dissertation, and for also being source of inspiration as his writings and my discussions with him had proven to me that national activism for Sudan can be also pursued through academia, not only through the streets. Similarly, I would like to thank Dr. Marco Pinfari, who I am greatly and equally in debt to for I learned a wealth of knowledge from his courses, and conversing with him, for teaching me to be critical, and not to take things as a given, for accepting to be a reader for my dissertation at a critical time, and for also giving me his great feedback, along with the Dr. Nadia Farah and Dr.Elnur, that furthered the academic value of my dissertation.

Second, I would like to thank my family and relatives, for whom all I will always be in debt to for their constant support and patience with me, especially during the writing of this dissertation.

Third, I would like to thank every friend I have made while studying at AUC, life would have been boring without such friends. I know if I had written every name of my friends, this acknowledgement page will be very exhaustive. And So, I would like to say, if you are reading this, then you must be one of my friends. Also, I would like to wish my friends who are still writing their dissertations best of luck am sure they their contributions will be profound, and amazing.

Fourth, I would love to thank everyone in the Political Science department as they made feel a member of the Political Science department community. I am certainly indebt to the faculty, whom I surely took courses with or conversed with as I truly learned from what they taught me or what they strove to teach me.

Fifth, I would like to thank the director of Graduate Student Services & fellowships Mrs. Sawsan Mardini, who had provided me great support not only during my graduate studies, but also during my under graduate studies. Likewise, I would like to thank, if I might say, her team of great individuals such as John Sedky, Nashwa Abdel Salam, Yasmine Ibrahim, and the others as they all were always nice to me, helpful and very welcoming when I visited their offices.

Finally, but not least, I am in debt to the generosity of fellowships I had attained: The Charles Bailey fellowship, the University Fellowship, and the African Graduate Fellowship, as those fellowships had given me the opportunity to pursue my graduate studies at AUC.

I would like to conclude, by asserting that there are other individuals who I wanted to include in this acknowledgment, however, due to certain restrictions, I would like to apologize for not including them. Nonetheless, I would like to assert they equally have a profound impact on my life.

Acronyms

AENF	Alliance of Eritrean National Force
AIAI	Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (Somalia)
AIB	Arab and Islamic Bureau
AIRA	African Islamic Relief Agency
ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia
AU	African Union
CIPF	Council for International People's Friendship
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party; a Khatmiyya party
EDA	Eritrean Democratic Alliance
EF	Eastern Front
EIJM	Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
EIPJD	Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development; in Arabic, Al-Hizb Al-Islami-Al-Eritree Lil Adalah Wetenmiya
EIRM	Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement
EISM	Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front; based in Cairo, Egypt
ELF-RC	Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council
ELM	Eritrean Liberation Movement; based in Port Sudan, the Sudan
EMB	Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
EPC	Eritrean Popular Congress
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESO	External Security Organization, external security organ of the SIM government

FLN	Front de Libération Nationale, an Algerian national liberation movement
FYP	Five Year Plan
GMAG	Guardians of Morality and Advocates of Good; a SIM paramilitary organization
GNU	Government of National Unity (in Sudan)
HSBA	Human Security Baseline Assessment
IARA	Islamic African Relief Agency
ICF	Islamic Charter Front
IDO	Islamic Da'wa Organization
IFC	Islamic Front for the Constitution
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IIRO	International Islamic Relief Organization
ILM	Islamic Liberation Movement; in Arabic, Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Islamy
INGOs	Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations; Islamic business and charitable organizations
IR	International Relations- A field of study in Political Science
IRG	Iranian Revolutionary Guards
IS	International Security - A field of study in Political Science
IS-SOR	Internal Security-Security of the Revolution; a security organ of the RCC, composed of SIM members
ISO	Internal Security Organization, internal security organ of the SIM government
JEM	A Darfurian rebel group-Its leadership used to be part of the SIM/ the Sudanese regime suspects the group has ties to Al-Turabi and his party.
JICC	Joint Islamic Court Council
KUSU	Khartoum University Student Union
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
ML	Muslim League, a national movement in Eritrea

NC	National Congress, a governing system of the SIM regime; later became the National Congress Party
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NF	National Front; a Khatmiyya party
NIF	National Islamic Front
NIFLE	National Islamic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service; national security organization of the Sudan
NMPM	National Muslim Party of Massawa; a party in Eritrea
NUP	National Unionist Party
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAIC	Popular Arab and Islamic Congress
PDF	Popular Defense Forces; a SIM paramilitary organization headed by Ali Karti
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PF	Professionals' Front; trade unionist and leftist groups
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice; Eritrean party
PNC	Popular National Congress; SIM party headed by Al-Turabi
PP	People's Police; a SIM paramilitary/SIM watch organization
PTU	Patriotic Teachers Union; a SIM trade union
PTUC	Patriotic Trade Unionist Congress; a SIM trade union
PWF	Patriotic Women's Front; a SIM association
PYO	Patriotic Youth Organization; a SIM association
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council; military government of the SIM

RNP	Reform Now Party
RSG	Revolutionary Security Guards; a SIM paramilitary organization
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCIC	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SCP	Sudanese Communist Party
SGC	Sudanese Graduate Congress
SIM	Sudanese Islamic Movement/Sudanese Islamist Movement
SIMB	Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood
SMNL	Sudanese Movement for National Liberation
SNAF	Somali National Armed Forces
SPDP	Somali Popular and Development Party, the party now in power in Somalia. The “S” is used in this study to distinguish the party from the Sudan’s Popular Democratic Party.
SPLM/A	Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SSU	Sudan Socialist Union
STNG	Somali Transitional National Government
SWTUF	Sudanese Workers Trade Unions Federation; dominated by the SCP
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
UNF	United National Front; parties and groups included in the last government headed by Al-Mahdi before the June 30 of 1989 coup
UPF	United Parties Front; alliance composed of the Umma, the PDP, the NUP, and ICF
WFL	White Flag League; a nationalist Sudanese movement

Abstract

Religion has an important place in Sudanese society, and it has been used as a means of political domination. British colonialism had favored and empowered the Sufi orders of the Mahdiyya and Marghaniyya, with the result that the heads and families of those orders became the hegemonic Sufi establishment who used Sufism as a power capacity tool of political domination in the Sudan. The Sudanese Islamic/Islamist Movement (SIM), which appeared with a different religious ideology from that of the Sufi establishment, wanted to impose its ideology on the Sudanese masses. As the elites in the Sudan were fractured, allowing the SIM to impose its ideology as a means of domination, the SIM forcibly seized state power through the June 30, 1989 military coup. This capture of state power gave Al-Turabi, the head and ideologue of the SIM, the capacity to impose the SIM's radical ideology on the Sudanese masses. Thereafter, under Al-Turabi's leadership from the Sudan, the SIM supported likeminded radical religious movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Those countries faced their own factional conflicts for state power, which provided a great opportunity to expand the SIM ideology. While imposing the SIM ideology in and out of the Sudan, the SIM faced a power conflict within its ranks. Al-Bashir, the head of the SIM's military faction, used military power to oust Al-Turabi from state power, resulting in the palace coup of 1999. During that coup, most members of the SIM sided with Al-Bashir. The post-Al-Turabi regime is composed of competing factions of the SIM leaders and members who sided with Al-Bashir in the palace coup, and who hold sensitive positions within the regime. Therefore, so as not to be removed from state power, Al-Bashir is in a power relation with those factions. Thus, the Sudan's continued support for radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup is a byproduct of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime. This byproduct of power relations is a tactic conducted by Al-Bashir to discourage the competing factions within the regime from removing him from state power. It demonstrates that under Al-Bashir's leadership, the SIM expansionist ideology, to which the competing factions remain attached, has not been abandoned.

Introduction

Like other Third World Countries, the Sudan had its national boundaries imposed on it by its colonial rulers (the British Empire), and its national institutions had been formed to aid the colonial ruler in governing its own interest in the country. Like other British domains in Africa, the state of the Sudan was a periphery used by the British Empire to supply its needs. Moreover, the British used local agents of both tribal and religious leaders to effectively control the country, as the Sudanese territory extended too far and was too large to effectively govern alone.

With the withdrawal of the colonial rulers, the world had great expectations for the Sudan. The Sudan was one of the first countries in Africa to attain independence from its colonial rulers, in 1956. It was seen as a country that was moving towards a path of self-rule based on democratic principles. However, a closer look into the Sudanese politics reveals that independence was achieved by partisan politicians. For example, Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari¹ was removed from office as a result of internal pressure from Sayyid² Ali Al-Marghani, the patron of Al-Azhari's National Unionist Party (NUP), because Al-Marghani made an alliance with a rival, the Umma party, to take power from Al-Azhari.

As a result of the colonial rule, and before the Sudan gained its independence, there was a mutiny among south Sudanese soldiers stationed in south Sudan. The mutiny was a result of racial/ethnic fear of northern Sudanese domination. That fear, which started the first Sudanese civil war from 1955 to 1972, was a result of the British condominium policy that divided the Sudan into two administrative regions in order to prevent the development of another national Sudanese movement, such as the Mahdiyya movement, that could challenge British supremacy. With that administrative policy, the Sudan was divided into two zones of different languages and religions. More importantly, the British used northern Sudanese to fill administrative posts in the entire country. Consequently, southern Sudanese viewed the British withdrawal with worry, as they believed that the northern Sudanese, who were mostly Arabs and Muslims,

¹ Ismail Al-Azhari was the first prime minister of the country. Because he antagonized the Sufi establishment, the Sufi orders had removed him from the premiership and replaced by Abdallah Khalil.

² A Sayyid is term for the leader of a Sufi Order.

would dominate the southern Sudanese, who were mostly Africans and followers of traditional African religions (with a minority being from Christian-based religions).

After the Sudan achieved independence, the country experienced a period of political instability and military coups. Sometimes the coups were supported by the politicized Sufi orders of Al-Marghaniyya and Al-Mahdiyya, who were the patrons of the leading parties apart from the communist party). Consequently, because the ineffective political institutions that the country had inherited from the colonial rulers could not unify the factionalized Sufi establishment, the Sudan was governed by military and authoritarian regimes. The civilian regimes were politically weak, as they were based on coalition governments formed of the two competing Sufi orders.

With the military coup of June 30, 1989, the Sudanese people experienced a new form of control in the country through the imposition of a politicized Islamist ideology, that of the National Islamic Front (NIF). The NIF carried out the June 30 military coup to prevent the abolition of the September laws, (the sharia laws, which they had instituted as part of the Al-Nimeiry's regimethat they joined in the late 1970s), as they believed Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi would in fact abolish them in order to start peace negotiations with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

Once they were in power, the NIF wanted to enforce its religious paradigm (orthodox Sunni/Wahhabism) on the Sudanese people, who adhered mostly to popular Islam (Sufism). Additionally, the politicized Sufi orders (the Mahdist and the Marghanist) had hegemonic influence over the Sudanese masses to rule by consent. Consequently, in order to impose their influence, the NIF had purged the bureaucracy and the armed forces and banned civil societies that were not under their control, replacing them with NIF personnel that infiltrated those groups for a long time. The NIF also confiscated all the property of the leaders of the Sufi orders, and arrested their leading supporters.

The NIF regime also wanted to export its influence into nearby countries in the East African region by supporting radical Islamist movements in both Eritrea and Somalia. The motivation for supporting like-minded radical groups in those countries was that the NIF leaders admired the Iranian revolution of 1979, which had put in place a theocratic regime that was using every means possible to spread its revolution into the

Middle East region.³ Another possible motive was that the NIF wanted to challenge US influence in the region.

Once the Sudan began supporting radical Islamist groups in East Africa, the US started to pressure the Sudan and isolate it from the international community by listing it in 1993 as one of the countries that sponsored terrorism, and subsequently imposing embargos against it. Under the Clinton administration the US attacked a pharmaceutical factory, believing it was manufacturing chemical weapons for terrorists.

There seemed to be a division within the new state elites between a military faction, led by Omar Al-Bashir, and a civilian faction, led by the NIF's ideological father Hassan Al-Turabi. The factionalism resulted in the division of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM). This division manifested itself in the palace coup in 1999, in which most of Al-Turabi's Islamists sided with Al-Bashir's military faction and removed Al-Turabi from power in both the regime and the country. Al-Bashir's faction proceeded to take over important power centers in the post-Turabi regime, in order to maintain and expand their power within the regime. Importantly, the palace coup showed that the movement's ideology had become complementary to the interests of these factions within the post-Turabi regime.

The removal of Al-Turabi from power resulted in the division of the SIM and illustrated how the Islamists under Al-Bashir's rule are fractured in terms of interests. Some analysts and scholars have asserted that the Islamists under Al-Bashir have become pragmatist, since Al-Bashir's regime ended the Sudanese second civil war, which started in 1983 and ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. Moreover, analysts, scholars, and even the US were pleased with the Sudanese regime's support of the US in post-9/11 counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, those same analysts and scholars have failed to explain why Al-Bashir's regime continued to provide support for radical Islamists in both Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup of 1999.

³ After the Iranian revolution of 1979, the new theocratic regime sought to spread its revolution in the region. The oil-rich Gulf countries therefore aided and sponsored the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq against the new Iranian regime.

Objective

Using Michel Foucault's power relations approach, this study aims to trace the power conflict within the Sudanese political system, dominated by the SIM ideology that led to the palace coup of 1999 against the SIM's ideologue and to describe the impact of that change on Sudanese support for the radical Islamist factions in Eritrea and Somalia.

The Research Problem and Research Question

Since the palace coup of 1999, the post-Al-Turabi regime has created a paradox that scholars and analysts seem not to answer fully. While the post-Al-Turabi regime supported the US's post-9/11 counterterrorism operations and ended the Sudanese second civil war by signing the CPA in 2005, at the same time it continued to provide support for radical Islamist groups in Somalia and Eritrea. These two contradictory behaviors raise the question of whether or not the regime is pragmatic in its foreign policy with respect to satisfying both the US and the international community. The main question for this research would be as follows: Why did Al-Bashir's post-Al-Turabi regime continue its support for radical Islamic movements in East Africa after the 1999 palace coup? The power struggle that resulted in the division of the SIM is regarded as the result of pragmatism on the part of the individuals who joined Al-Bashir's military camp. According to that logic, the post-Al-Turabi regime should have stopped supporting radical Islamist groups. However, the support for these groups, and the radical Islamist rhetoric, continued. Additional sub-questions will guide the thesis: How powerful are the different factions in the post-Turabi regime? Is there a faction inside the regime whose support Al-Bashir tried to gain in order to continue his rule in the Sudan? How influential is that faction in controlling Sudanese foreign policy?

Hypothesis

Religion in the Sudan had always been politicized by the fractured elites as a tool of political domination. The power conflict within the factionalized Sufi establishment resulted in SIM's wanting to impose its religious ideology by capturing the state and using it as a means of political domination over Sudanese society. Importantly, once it had obtained the capacity to impose its ideology on the Sudanese society, the SIM worked to expand and impose its religious and ideological capacity outside of the Sudan as well. The palace coup of 1999 showed that Al-Bashir was able to rely on the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to help him remove Al-Turabi from state power.

However, the coup also showed that Al-Bashir's post-Al-Turabi regime is based on an alliance with Al-Turabi's previous supporters, who hold influential and sensitive positions within the regime. In other words, Al-Bashir is allied with former Al-Turabi loyalists who form the core of his regime. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the post-Al-Turabi regime continued to support radical Islamists in East Africa as a by-product of power relations. That by-product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime is a tactic by Al-Bashir to control the fractured elites that he heads, so they do not unite against him or remove him from state power. The hypothesis will be based on two guiding factors to explain why Al-Bashir's post-Turabi regime continued its support for radical Islamist movements in East Africa: the regime's internal vulnerability and its sponsorship of non-state radical groups.

Methodology and Sources

The thesis will employ a theoretical and conceptual framework for the analysis of how the internal factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime influenced the Sudan's foreign policy to support radical Islamists in East Africa. The Sudanese support for radical Islamists in both Somalia and Eritrea, by both the Turabi/NIF and the post-Turabi regimes, will be studied.

Secondary sources, such as books, academic journal articles, and old intelligence reports, would be used to study Sudanese politics, the SIM, and the Sudanese support for radical Islamist movements before and after the split within the SIM. Interviews will be used to analyze the internal factors that led the SIM to be factionalized. Primary sources, such as recent news articles and recent intelligence and situational reports from research centers and think tanks will be used to further illustrate how the post-Al-Turabi regime supported the radical Islamist movements in Somalia and Eritrea.

Some books and reports from SIM insiders have been used in the study. However, because these sources are from SIM and regime insiders who speak from their own interest, their contribution had been used with scrutiny, so as not to misguide the analysis of this study.

Limitations

An important limitation in this study is that scholars in both International Relations (IR) and International Security (IS) have not used any theory or conceptual framework to

link a regime's internal factionalism to its foreign policy. This may be because IR and IS have not utilized political economy to study such a case. Both IR and IS scholars have provided a theory of diversionary war, where a population's discontent against a given regime causes regime leaders to go to war against other countries to divert that discontent. Nonetheless, such a theory bases its analysis on the centrality of the state and on a state using its military. In a country such the Sudan, power is not in the state institutions but in the hands of a few individuals. Importantly, in the current era military confrontation between states has been reduced greatly compared to states using proxy agents to settle their interest against each other. Moreover, even theories of states supporting proxy agents disregard the importance of a state's ideology in the relationship between a principal (a state) and an agent (sponsored by that state).

Another limitation is that the author of this study intended to visit the International University of Africa (previously African Islamic Center) to conduct interviews with its students, as that university is well known to radicalize its students. Unfortunately, because the Sudanese regime directly owns that university and because previously curious individuals were arrested, the intended interviews could not be done.

The thesis has thus had to rely on the conceptual framework, selected literature, intelligence reports, and other recent reports and articles in order to bypass these limitations. The analysis from the collected literature has proven to be fruitful.

Significance

This study helps us to understand the post-Al-Turabi regime support for radical Islamist movements in Somalia and Eritrea in two ways. First, not much attention had been given to the study of the dynamic factional politics that have been influencing the post-Turabi regime in the Sudan. Second, equally little attention had been given to the study of states with radical ideologies sponsoring radical movements with similar ideologies in East Africa, in comparison to studies on states sponsoring proxy wars, such as those between Sudan and Chad, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and others. This gap led to the development of this research in order to add to our understanding of Sudanese foreign policy in aiding radical Islamist groups in East Africa, which has been little studied previously.

Outline of the Thesis

Chapter one will present the analytical gap in the theoretical literature and will illustrate how this study aims to fill that gap. First, a review of the theoretical literature will be presented. This literature had previously tried to explain how a country's foreign policy is formulated, how leaders deal with certain groups within their regime, and why a country would support non-state actors to achieve its goals. The limitations of this literature will also be presented. Second, two alternative theories will be offered to address the question that this study aims to answer. Third, after selecting one of those two theories, the conceptual framework that will guide the analysis of the study will be presented. The chapter will conclude by explaining why both Somalia and Eritrea were selected as case studies for the Sudan's role in supporting radical Islamist movements in East Africa.

Chapter two will describe how religion has been constantly used as a political tool by the reigning powers in the Sudan to rule both the country and its people. First, the chapter will explain both why and how the British Empire politicized Sufi orders (Marghaniyya and the Mahdiyya) in the Sudan, and how these orders benefited politically from the British sponsorship. Second, the chapter will explain how the two Sufi groups came to dominate Sudanese politics, even after the independence of the Sudan. Third, the chapter will discuss how and why the SIM appeared in the Sudan, and the common interests and the struggles they had with the dominant parties and other flourishing movements in Sudan, infiltrating civil society, the state bureaucracy, and even the armed forces. Finally, the military coup of 1989 will be explained by illustrating how the NIF wanted both to maintain its influence in Sudanese politics and to attain power in the country.

Chapter three will show how the NIF was imposing its religious ideology and how that changed after the palace coup of 1999, Secondly, the chapter will present why and how the NIF regime was so involved in supporting the radical Islamist groups in Somalia and Eritrea. Finally, the chapter will show the internal power struggle the new NIF elites faced, describe the cause of the power struggle, and explain why most of the Islamists (even the most loyal of Al-Turabi's Islamists) joined Al-Bashir in removing Al-Turabi from power in 1999.

Chapter four will illustrate the power relations within the post-Turabi regime and the power configurations of the Islamists who sided with Al-Bashir to remove Al-Turabi from power. First, the chapter will describe the positions the fractured Islamists hold within the post-Al-Turabi regime. Second, the relative power of each faction will be evaluated. Third, the chapter will present the channels of support the regime maintains with the radical Islamist groups in Somalia and Eritrea. Finally, the chapter will present the relationship of the post-Al-Turabi regime with the radical Islamist movements in Somalia and Eritrea, to demonstrate that the regime is continuing its support for these movements in light of the regime's pragmatism, as was described earlier.

Chapter One

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to reveal the analytical gap in the existing literature and to explain how this study proposes to fill that gap. First, a review of the theoretical literature will be presented. This literature seeks to describe how a country's foreign policy is formulated, how leaders deal with certain groups within their regime, and why a country would support non-state actors to achieve their goals. The limitations of this literature will also be discussed. Second, two alternative theories will be presented to address the question that this study aims to answer. Third, after selecting one of those two theories, the conceptual framework that will guide the analysis of the study will be presented. Fourth and last, the chapter will conclude by illustrating why both Somalia and Eritrea were selected as case studies for this thesis.

A Theoretical Literature Review

There is a body of literature that seeks to explain how a country's foreign policy is made, how regime heads try to maintain their authority within their regimes, and why states support proxy agents rather than their own militaries to achieve their domestic and foreign goals. This section of the chapter will present a critical review of the theoretical literature that has tried to answer these questions.

A great deal has been written on the role of agency in foreign policy. Foreign policy is made as a result of agency in the case when there are multiple actors with competing interests, and the policy of a country is a result of compromise among those competing actors and groups. Graham Allison's "Governmental Politics Model" illustrates the importance of agency in the making of foreign policy.⁴The model asserts that leaders within the government are not monolithic, because they are competing players who do not focus on a single strategic issue but on many intra-national problems, and their interest are based on various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals; their decisions are determined by politics within the government.⁵The leaders hold positions in different departments within the government bureaucracies, and their positions within those respective departments shape their perceptions and interests

⁴ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), 144–184.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 144.

against other leaders to fight for what they believe is a sound policy.⁶ Problems are varied, not straightforward strategic issues; management of decisions is more important than steady-state choices; and carrying out a decision is more difficult than identifying a preferred solution.⁷ Theoretically speaking, the leader of the regime—the president—might be a power broker; when a decision on foreign policy is made, however, the president needs to have consensus with his advisers and important senior leaders. Otherwise, the president’s policy might be ignored.⁸ Moreover, if no consensus is made on policy, opponents might take advantage of it.⁹ Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann further illustrate the complexity of the agency of foreign-policy making by describing the three different typologies of the ultimate decision unit: the predominant leader, the single group that relies on group think, and the multiple autonomous actors who need to work with each other.¹⁰ The ultimate decision unit is when one of those three actors is the authority on the decision, which cannot be reversed by the other actors.¹¹ According to their findings, single groups show the most extreme foreign policy behavior, followed by predominant leaders and then multiple autonomous actors.¹² Importantly, they assert that when multiple autonomous actors fail to reach an agreement on any course of action, a “deadlock” happens, where no entity can act alone on behalf of a given regime.¹³ In order for this not to happen, there needs to be governing institutions, governing procedures, norms, and rules. The agency model does not include factionalism in the analysis. Where a group aims to attain power by removing other groups from the governing regime, the role of the state institutions is central to the theory, and the head of the regime will always need consensus. Importantly, the theory is based on positivism of classification system and a rationalism that rationalizes behavior in foreign policy, reducing the importance of ideology and allowing the interests of various actors to be achieved through politics, resulting in a foreign policy of compromise and agreement.

⁶ Ibid., 144–145.

⁷ Ibid., 146.

⁸ Ibid., 144–184.

⁹ Ibid., 144–184.

¹⁰ Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry,” *International Studies Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (December 1989): 361–387, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600518> (accessed March 2, 2015).

¹¹ Ibid., 362.

¹² Ibid., 377–384.

¹³ Ibid., 368.

There is limited literature with regard to factionalism within an authoritarian regime, where the head of the regime might be displaced by those factions. Among the closest to addressing the issue of how a sitting head of a regime might secure his position are Jessica Weeks' theory and Brandon J. Kinne's poliheuristic theory. Weeks utilized Fearon's audience cost theory to assert that personalist regimes also face audience cost, like democratic regimes.¹⁴ Her contention is based on how elites within the regime react towards their leader. She claims that in authoritarian political systems some leaders are linked by blood relations to the regime head, or have no power or social support base to replace the leader.¹⁵ As it is politically costly to remove the leader (even if the leader is weak), the leader would be allowed to stay in power by the political elites in the regime.¹⁶ That might be the reason why executive leaders of personalist regimes fill top posts with relatives and close associates, so as not to be removed by internal regime revolt.¹⁷ However, it is also important for the regime's leader to have direct control over the security and intelligence agencies of the country to constantly monitor the other elites, in order to prevent a coordinated revolt against him.¹⁸ Therefore, in such a regime the intelligence and security organs are monitored by a collective rather than by an individual incumbent leader, and the coordination dilemma between elites can be solved by simple communication.¹⁹ Weeks asserts that there is no audience cost in personalist regimes, as the security organs are controlled by the regime's head.²⁰ Nonetheless, elites are tied to the leader too, and would not remove him.²¹ To link authoritarian regimes to foreign policy, Kinne's theory linked regime typology to foreign policy. His analysis uses poliheuristic theory along with different authoritarian regime classification typologies to determine the foreign policy of a given authoritarian regime.²² According to him, a personalist regime's use of doctrines or ideology is merely transitory, to allow a leader to pursue his strategic interest, and it in no way constrains his behavior.²³ Furthermore, Kinne asserts that a personalist leader faces both internal regime threats and external threats of removal, which depend less on specific

¹⁴ Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071874> (accessed April 26, 2014).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

²² Brandon J. Kinne, "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective," *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 1 (2005): 114–128, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00197.x/epdf> (accessed March 2, 2015).

²³ *Ibid.*, 116.

relationships and more on the overall status of the leader among his peers.²⁴The peers may include military leaders, rival factions, regional actors, or the mass public; therefore, a dictator's appearance among his peers is a way for the leader to judge his chances of remaining in office.²⁵That status develops from a personality cult.²⁶ Such events as military victories or opposition against imperialist powers contribute to the status of the leader—even though there might be objective losses—and hence improve his chance of political survival.²⁷ Both Weeks' and Kinne's theories ignore the importance of power relations and ideology in stopping factions within a personalist regime and other authoritarian regimes from removing a sitting regime head. Importantly, the positivism and rationalization of their analysis dislocates an authoritarian regime head's need for foreign policy to maintain his hold on power.

A compelling literature that links a regime's instability to interstate war is diversionary war theory. The literature of diversionary war started with Simmel's sociological hypothesis of in-group cohesion as a result of fighting an out-group (a foreign enemy).²⁸ Accordingly, the theory postulates that leaders who want to stay in power will use war to divert a population's discontent against the regime.²⁹ Amy Oakes uses this theory, along with the policy alternative approach of rational choice theory, to explain the underpinnings behind the Falklands war, where Argentina under the military junta invaded the islands, causing a war with Britain that it lost.³⁰ Oakes asserts that the motivation for the invasion was that the junta faced domestic unrest because of its economic and political policies, the government lacked the resources to either repress or appease the opposition by enacting reforms, and hence the regime selected the diversion of invading the Falklands to rally the masses to support the regime, unfortunately miscalculating the British response to the invasion.³¹ Nevertheless, she dismissed the importance of fragmentation of the military junta that might had caused the war by claiming that such an analysis would overlook the fact that elite division may be a result of domestic unrest, and that a united government will fear domestic

²⁴ Ibid., 120.

²⁵ Ibid., 120.

²⁶ Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 133.

²⁷ Kinne, "Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes," 120.

²⁸ Georg Simmel, *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, ed. and trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1950).

²⁹ Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 259–288.

³⁰ Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," *Security Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006): 431–463, <http://www.tandfonline.com.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636410601028354> (accessed March 2, 2015).

³¹ Ibid., 461–462.

unrest if it is sufficiently strong.³² Consequently, her analysis is based on popular discontent against the regime, and ignores the importance of elite divisions in causing the war.

Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani take a step further by combining their analysis of a rationalistic comparative institutional approach with a regime-typological reference to consolidating versus consolidated autocratic and democratic regimes. Importantly, they look at the propensity of each of these regimes to start an interstate war as a result of domestic pressures.³³ One of their claims is that a consolidating autocratic leader relies on the elite to maintain his rule, yet when there is elite dissension against him, he will use diversionary war to rally them behind him, as not all the elites might not be loyal to him: the military commanders might be loyal to the other elites and, importantly, the regime head might question the reliability of the internal security organs.³⁴ Pickering and Kisangani compare this situation to mature autocracy, where the leader does not need this kind of diversion, as he has already centralized power and has control over the security organs.³⁵ They also analyze consolidating and consolidated democracies. With their hypothesis testing and empirical findings, they found that consolidating autocrats will use diversionary war as a result of increasing elite unrest, while consolidated autocrats will not; however, they also find that, as elite unrest grows, the consolidating autocrat's ability to create a diversion decreases.³⁶

Another comparative approach to understanding an authoritarian regime's propensity for diversionary war is presented by Olga Chyzh, Brian Lai, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. They use a comparative approach similar to that of Pickering and Kisangani, but they empirically test the propensity of diversionary war in a variety of autocratic regimes.³⁷ They also used Slater's two-dimensional typology of authoritarian institutions.³⁸ They find that military regimes use diversionary war more than frequently than party regimes, and that within despotic power types, infrastructural authoritarian institutions will influence the propensity to engage in diversion.³⁹ This

³² *Ibid.*, 447–448.

³³ Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis," *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 1 (2005): 23–44, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693623> (accessed March 2, 2015).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁷ Olga Chyzh, Brian Lai, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Autocratic Regimes and Diversionary Uses of Force," 1–46, <http://www.saramitchell.org/clm.pdf> (accessed March 14, 2015).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

might explain why military regimes are more likely than party regimes to resort to diversion to legitimize their rule and for coup-proofing: party regimes have wider penetration within society than military regimes, which allows them greater control and surveillance over the population.⁴⁰ Importantly, party regimes use ideology as one method to legitimize their rule and mobilize popular support, while the military relies on their protection of the state as a basis of their legitimacy.⁴¹

None of this literature proved to be helpful for this study. Its limitations stem from the positivism of its categorization of regimes and the rationalism of the behavior of those regimes in the face of domestic discontent. These earlier studies are inconclusive in regards to the role of factionalism in diversionary war, and do not indicate whether ideology might be a significant part of the diversion policy or not. Importantly, since the end of the Cold War, conventional warfare requiring direct use of national militaries has declined, while proxy warfare and insurgencies that rely on non-state actors have become predominate. Consequently, in this era states have used and continue to use non-state actors to achieve their objectives, even for diversionary purposes.

The literature on delegation of war to non-state actors is important in understating why states would support non-state actors to achieve their objectives, rather than resorting to direct conventional wars against rival countries. Idean Salehyan, Daniel Byman, and Sarah Kreps have contributed to the literature that explains the reasons behind this tactic. The three scholars use the principal–agent model to explain the rationale behind delegation. “Delegation of war” is the relationship that results from a state sponsoring non-state rebellious actors in other countries. Salehyan illustrated how sponsoring countries (the principals) delegate wars to non-state actors (the agents) as they shape the insurgency and exert control over the insurgents.⁴² Importantly, he asserts that it is politically and economically cheaper for a state to sponsor non-state actors than to use its own military to confront a rival country, and he presents the mechanisms that sponsoring states can use against their agents to keep the agents from shirking.⁴³ One of the benefits of delegation is that the state sponsors avoid international condemnation, which might lead to the imposition of sanctions. Delegation can also help in intelligence

⁴⁰ Ibid., 10–12.

⁴¹ Ibid., 9.

⁴² Idean Salehyan, “The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 3 (2010): 501, <http://jcr.sagepub.com.library.aucegypt.edu/2048/content/54/3/493.full.pdf.html> (accessed April 29, 2014).

⁴³ Ibid., 493–515.

gathering, and can provide a local face for the sponsoring state in the rival state.⁴⁴ Byman and Kreps apply the same premise of delegation to the case of states supporting terrorist groups. What stands out in their analysis from Salehyan's approach is that they link delegation to a regime's status within its own country. An important reason why a state would sponsor non-state groups is to reinforce its influence in its own state.⁴⁵ For example, the Syrian delegation of Palestinian groups has been a way for the Assad regime to extend its influence at the domestic level.⁴⁶ Moreover, states would support proxy agents based on ideological inclinations, even if such proxy agents are weak.⁴⁷ However, the agents may shirk against their principal, which might be dangerous.⁴⁸ For example, Syria supported a lot of Palestinian groups, but its lack of control over them caused an escalation with Israel, resulting in the Syrian defeat by Israel in the 1967 war.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, delegation to non-state groups can be controlled by their principal through mechanisms such as monitoring and reporting behavior, which might sometimes lead to direct control of agents; careful screening and selection of proxy agents to minimize loss through shirking behavior; and sanctioning proxy agents by punishing them for negative outcomes and rewarding them for preferable outcomes.⁵⁰

On the other hand, the proxy agents face problems of their own. One of those problems is the unreliable resource stream, where they might run the risk of abandonment by their patrons.⁵¹ For example, since the reconciliation agreement between the Sudan and Eritrea in 2005, the Sudan has heavily controlled or stopped Eritrean opposition to the operations of non-state groups in the Sudan.⁵² In the end, proxy agents are used for political and military leverage by a sponsoring state against a rival state and will be abandoned when the sponsoring state has no more use for them.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 503–504.

⁴⁵ Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism," *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 1 (2010): 4, http://tr6rt9pf7u.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism&rft.jtitle=International Studies Perspectives&rft.au=Byman, Daniel&rft.au=Kreps, Sarah E&rft.date=2010-02-01&rft.issn=1528-3577&rft.eissn=1528-3585&rft.volume=11&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=18&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00389.&xrft.externalDBID=n/a&rft.externalDocID=10_1111_j_1528_3585_2009_00389_&xparamdict=en-US (accessed April 29, 2014).

⁴⁶ Ibid., 4.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 5.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 6–7.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 10–11.

⁵¹ Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations," 507.

⁵² "Sudan Detains Eritrean Opposition Members," *Sudan Tribune*, June 15, 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46965> (accessed March 24, 2014).

Although the principal–agent model provides a link between a regime’s foreign policy and its support for non-state actors to achieve its goals, the model has short comings as a result of its rationalistic and positivistic prism. It ignores the role of power relations within a regime and how that is related to a state supporting a non-state actor. Moreover, it ignores the importance of the centrality of a state and a state’s ideology in supporting movements with similar ideologies—for example, using weak examples of the Taliban supporting Al-Qaeda as a result of ideological affinity. This example ignores the fact that the Afghani state institutions had collapsed and that the country was ruled by multiple factions. Although one among many factions in the country had supported Al-Qaeda, there was no official state support, and the question of ideology is reduced to an ideology of one faction among other Afghani factions. Byman and Kreps’ analysis had an academic bias as it did not define what a terrorist group is or illustrate how such a group is different from insurgency groups. Importantly, their analysis seems only to link such movements with authoritarian regimes, neglecting the fact that democratic regimes such as the US had supported similar movements in Latin America during the Cold War.

The presented literature, had shown that the role of intra regime behaviour, in an authoritarian regime, in regards to foreign policy, is understudied. The detectable biases and limited analysis of the previous literature have led this study to present two theories that value the importance of factionalism and ideology in presenting all the elements needed to illustrate how power within the regime of a state causes that state to support non-state groups.

Alternative Theories

Using Marxist political economy analysis, Antonio Gramsci presents an interesting theory to explain how established elites who rule the state have hegemonic influence over the masses, even if the elites do not care for the welfare of their masses. According to Gramsci, hegemony is when the ruling status quo (the political elite or the state) obtains the consent of the masses to be ruled.⁵³ Accordingly, the masses are dominated through a cultural norm that the political elites establish through a cultural process constructed by their agents. One group of the agents of the elites are the organic

⁵³Joseph V. Femia, *Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 24.

intellectuals who are the thinking and organizing element of a particular social class; they are distinguished less by their profession than by their function of directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they belong.⁵⁴ Those intellectuals can be ecclesiastic intellectuals who hold a monopoly of a number of important services such as religious ideology.⁵⁵ They may be bound to a landed aristocracy with which it has an equal status judicially, with which it shares the exercise of feudal ownership of land and the use of state privileges connected to property.⁵⁶ Therefore, when a political party is formed its organic intellectuals are involved in the political and philosophical field and not just in the field of productive techniques.⁵⁷ However, the monopoly owned by those ecclesiastic intellectuals in the superstructure field was not obtained without a struggle or limitations, which brought about the birth of other categories, favored and enabled to expand by the growing strength of the power of the monarch, right up to absolutism.⁵⁸ Thus that influence and dominance of those intellectuals expanded with the power of a given centralized power of a monarchy at the time, which also meant that the dominance of those ecclesiastic intellectuals was subordinate to the power of that monarchy. Moreover, according to Gramsci, when political parties have control over a state, the government of the party or parties in power operates to disintegrate the other parties, to detach them from the broad masses and to obtain the support of non-party individuals through populism.⁵⁹

Gramsci's analysis also explains two ways in which the hegemonic power of the established political elites can be removed. First, established elites in a given state can be conquered and removed efficiently through a process of what he calls "War of Position," in which a group struggles to assimilate and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional intellectuals by creating their own organic intellectuals.⁶⁰ The purpose of this process is to carry out a war of position against the established elites through a gradual shift in the balance of social and cultural forces.⁶¹ The second way to remove the established elites is through the Soviet model of communism that was established and expanded through a "War of Movement," which consists of momentary

⁵⁴ Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 227.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶¹ Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, 53.

practicalities of political and economic struggle, such as economic collapse, war, or a political vacuum.⁶² In studying the Sudan, although El-Effendi uses a historical-descriptive approach and Abdel Wahid uses social movement theory, both of their systems draw upon Gramsci's concepts of hegemony and war of positions through organic intellectuals. El-Effendi explains how the SIM developed first among individuals from rural areas,⁶³ who over the years had influenced the formation of a devoted Islamist educated middle class in contrast to the secular middle class. This devoted Islamist middle class later supported the movement throughout its existence. El-Effendi also highlights the satellite organizations that the SIM created to spread their religious ideology, such the Society of Women Vanguard of Renaissance, the Youth Society for Construction, the Association of Southern Muslims, the Association of Sudanese Ulama, the Islamic Da'wa Organization (and its offshoot, the African Relief Agency), the Namariq Literary and Artist Society, and the Union of Muslim Literary Men.⁶⁴ Abdel Wahid explains that when Al-Nimeiry's regime allowed the SIM to join its ranks, hundreds of SIM members who were teachers, lawyers, and physicians became the wealthiest business people in the Sudan.⁶⁵ Moreover, within the SIM there were the intellectuals who had developed Al-Turabi's cult of personality as a theoretician and leader; those intellectuals were Abdel Wahab El-Effendi, Mohammed Hamdi, and PhD holders such as Amin Hassan Omar, Al-Tigani Abdel Gadir, Muhammed Wagii Allah, Mohammed Haroon, as well as other educated individuals.⁶⁶ It is clear that the SIM tried to develop their intellectuals from the fractured middle class both before and after becoming part of Al-Nimeiry's regime.

Gramsci's theory explains both how elites have established their hegemony and how to remove and replace this hegemony. Nonetheless, the analysis presents analytical problems, as it focuses too much on ideology and how it becomes hegemonic. First, Gramsci's theory seems to accept the Weberian analysis of a state with given political authority and a legitimate right to use coercive force. However, although modern Sudan has its borders, both its political authority and its legitimate right to use coercive force within it have not been attained, as the country's religious and cultural diversity have

⁶² Ibid., 53.

⁶³ Abdel Wahab El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal Books, 1991), 49.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 115.

⁶⁵ Mustafa Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan (1945–1989)* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 102.

⁶⁶ Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 93.

prevented it from doing so. This explains why the Sudan has always faced armed rebellion in its peripheral regions. For example, before the independence of the Sudan in 1956, the Sudan faced its first civil war in 1955 in south Sudan as a result of racial/ethnic fear among south Sudanese soldiers. Second, Gramsci's analysis focuses too much on ideology and disregards the importance of interest. This is because his analysis is based on the power of the elites of a modern state, in which they are unified and politically coherent group. However, in the case of the Sudan, even though the dominant political groups were under the influence of the Sufi leaders, some political leaders under the Sufi establishment were guided by their own interest. For instance, in 1958 Abdallah Khalil, the prime minister of the Umma-Khatmi government, feared that he would be forced to relinquish his position, as there were contacts between the dominant political groups under the influence of the Sufi orders to form an alternative coalition government, therefore, he invited General Ibrahim Abboud, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), to carry out a military coup against his own government.⁶⁷ Third, Gramsci's theory takes power for granted as a tool of the elites who control the state. Consequently, he does not define what power is, nor does he explain how power is projected in a relationship between fractured elites. Fourth and last, Gramsci's theory stems from Marxist analysis of mobilizing the workers to counter the political elites in a modern industrial state. However, British colonialism of the Sudan had developed the landed elites, who held great political power. And because of British colonialism, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) which had great influence over students and workers, had developed as a nationalistic and anticolonial movement. For example, Abdel-Rahman Al-Mahdi's loyalty to the Sudanese colonial government was recognized by the colonial state when he was given the title of "Sayyid of the Ansar" and received sizable economic concessions in terms of land rights, leases of irrigations schemes, facilities for mechanized irrigation and farming, loans, grants in aid, and contract works.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), developed in 1946 to fight against British imperialism in the Sudan, later became the SCP.⁶⁹ Consequently, Gramsci's theory does not explain how a counter-hegemonic movement can appear and attain power when two very different social

⁶⁷ Tim Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898–1985: Class and Power in Sudan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 217–218.

⁶⁸ Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 26.

⁶⁹ Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics*, 199.

forces appear and develop in the same time and continue to coexist. The same phenomenon is illustrated by the efforts of the SIM to develop their organic intellectuals from the middle class. The attempt failed because both the middle class and the elites in the Sudan were fractured, which explained why the SIM had to use its military faction to capture state power and then to use that power as a capacity to impose its own religious and political domination.

Unlike Gramsci's theoretical limitation, Michel Foucault's theory power relations gives an insightful analysis of power as the theory explains how power is projected and between whom it is projected. As Foucault has presented a much more practical theory of power relationships, his theory does not fall into the same theoretical traps that Gramsci's theory by assuming that any given modern state has a coherent and unified ruling elite, which is not the case in the developing world where the elites are fractured. Importantly, unlike Gramsci, who focused on ideological hegemony, Foucault's theory of power relations takes into account the interest of the individuals and the subjects in the relationship. First, power is divided into two types: power as a "capacity," meaning when coercion is used, and power as a relationship which is based on acting according to the actions of others.⁷⁰ Accordingly, power relations are exercised, to an exceedingly important extent, through the production and exchange of signs, and they are scarcely separable from goal-directed activities that permit the exercise of power.⁷¹ Moreover, Foucault asserts that power exists only when individuals exercise influence on other individuals' behavior(s).⁷² Second, to establish power relations, violence can be used to obtain the consent of the subjects, by those who want to project fear to others in order to establish their power/influence over them in the relationship. For example, Stalin established himself as the most fearsome and unchallenged leader in the USSR as he centralized power around himself during the Great Purge of 1936 to 1938, in which anyone he suspected of their loyalty to him within the Communist Party, the government, the Soviet Army leadership, or the people in general was detained, killed, or sent to labor camps. It is therefore clear that the establishing of power relations does not exclude the use of violence any more than it requires the obtaining of consent; however, there is no doubt that the exercise of power always requires one or the other,

⁷⁰ Michel Foucault, *Power*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: New Press, 2000), 337.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 338.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 340.

often both at the same time.⁷³Third, power relations are less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual engagement than a question of “government,” where each of the partners in the relationship must calculate the behavior of the other.⁷⁴ Consequently, a strategy to impose power and influence on the other requires an action that disarms the other in the relationship, or a confrontation that transforms the partners in the relationship into adversaries.⁷⁵ Fourth and last, a power relationship can be analyzed by means of a system of differentiations, and by the types of objectives.⁷⁶ Along with other modes of analysis, these two can explain why a power relationship had developed and whether it will be confrontational or not.

The Conceptual Framework

The previous literature, and other theories such as realism, liberalism and their neo-versions, did not explain how power is exercised, and that is because they assume power is achieved through a confrontational struggle between adversaries. The utility of the Foucault’s theory explains how power is projected between adversaries in a relationship, where it is not confrontational.⁷⁷ That approach is useful as power in developing countries is not within the hands of state institutions, but in the hands of few individuals. Importantly, unlike developed states, where the elites are coherent, in the developing countries the elites are fractured, where power relations is exercised for a regime head to maintain state power.

Mainstream theories and studies, do not explain the origins of power in non-western states that have been colonized, where the colonizers had the help of local agents. Nonetheless, Foucault’s power relations theory explains how to analyze power relations from the stand point of institutions, where one must study the origins of such institutions, that is to explain in sum power by power.⁷⁸ That will aid this study to explain how religion in the Sudan had been used as an institutional tool of political domination. And why Islamist groups such as the SIM used religion as a means to attain state power in the Sudan.

⁷³ Ibid., 340–341.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 341.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 347.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 344.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 340–341.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 343.

Previously presented theories and other theories, explain how power is based on confrontation, and therefore did not prescribe the strategies for adversaries in a relationship to attain power, especially before the occurrence of a confrontation. Foucault's approach describes the strategies that can be used by individuals exercising power on others in a relationship (power relations), where victory, which is power, is attained. Accordingly, the first procedure to achieve victory is to designate the way in which a partner acts within the relationship, to have the advantage over others, and to deprive the opponent of the means of combat, to obtain victory.⁷⁹ Therefore, such methods, allow a vulnerable regime head to use an item such as a foreign policy where all, or most factions agree within a regime he heads, to disarm and therefore cannot remove him from state power.

The use of positivism and rationalism in the previously presented literature, such as regime classifications or the rationalism of states supporting proxy agents limits the contribution of those studies for other areas. For example, while the Sudanese Post Al-Turabi regime is authoritarian in nature, it can neither be classified as only military regime, or a civilian regime or even a hybrid regime. That is because regime classification studies are too narrow in their analysis, and importantly, they do not aid in analyzing a regime such as the post-Al-Turabi regime foreign policy behavior.

Because of the above reasons, this study will adopt Michel Foucault's power relations as a theory and as a methodology, as it most accurately depicts how power is reflected among fractured elites who value their interest first and their ideology second.

First, as power relations requires the subjects to have free will, the thesis will explain how religion in the Sudan was used as a tool of power relations by the British empire and their agents (politicized Sufi orders) to maintain power and influence over the masses. It will illustrate how a political religious group such as the SIM appeared in the Sudan and decided to impose their religious ideology on the country as a reaction to both the politicized Sufi orders and the leftist political groups in the Sudan. Second, since power relations do not exclude the use of violence any more than they require the obtaining of consent,⁸⁰ the thesis will explain why the NIF wanted to spread their religious ideology in both Eritrea and Somalia and how the NIF supported like-minded

⁷⁹ Ibid.,346.

⁸⁰ Ibid.,340.

radical Islamists in both countries to accomplish this. Third, using power relations this thesis will describe how the NIF regime and the SIM became internally fractured, causing most of the Islamists in the movement to join Al-Bashir's Islamist military faction and remove Al-Turabi from power in 1999. It will be shown that power relations influenced this action based on the system of differentiations and objectives.⁸¹ Fourth, the system of differentiations and objectives was solidified after the palace coup of 1999 by the factions in the post-Al-Turabi regime who hold important power centers within the Post-Al-Turabi regime and who constantly struggle against each other to maintain and expand their influence at the cost of the other. Fifth and last, since Al-Bashir heads the different factions in the post-Al-Turabi regime, he is vulnerable to being removed by them, as they hold key positions within the regime. Consequently, to prevent those factions from becoming strong enough to remove him from power, Al-Bashir continued to support radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup of 1999 as a tactic to illustrate to the Islamists in his post-Al-Turabi regime that, the SIMs' ideology, in its expansionist form is still being continued.

Conclusion

The limitations of the theoretical literature review uncover an intellectual gap in analyzing the post-Turabi regime's support for radical Islamist groups in East Africa after the palace coup of 1999. Previous analyses of the Sudan's support for radical Islamist groups in East Africa lack a suitable theory to explain how the internal factionalism of Al-Bashir's post-Turabi regime influenced the Sudan's support for radical Islamists in East Africa. However, using the conceptual framework presented in the preceding section, an insightful and in-depth analysis will explain the behavior of the post-Al-Turabi regime in supporting radical Islamist movements in Africa.

The conceptual framework will allow this study to identify the factors that caused the development of radical Islamist movements in the Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea, looking at the historical and socioeconomic factors that have contributed to this development.

There are two reasons why Eritrea and Somalia had been selected as case studies for this study. First, as stated earlier, the NIF regime under Al-Turabi's leadership

⁸¹ Ibid., 344. A system of differentiations is based on Foucault's power relations, in which the status of every relationship of power puts into operation differences that are, at the same time, its conditions and its results.

supported like-minded radical Islamists in both countries so as to expand their ideology in East Africa. Second, the NIF regime provided arms, financial and other forms of support for like-minded radical Islamists in those two countries. Consequently, with the palace coup replacing one Islamist faction with another, it is impossible that the post-Al-Turabi regime removed all forms of support for the like-minded radical Islamists in Eritrea and Somalia.

Chapter Two

Power Relations and Religion

Introduction

This chapter aims to explain how religion in the Sudan is synonymous with political power in the country. First, the chapter will illustrate how religion had been used as a political tool by religious leaders to serve their interests. The chapter will explain how Sufism became the dominant Sunni form of religion in the Sudan, and why the British Empire made use of the Sudanese Sufi orders of the Khatmiyya and the Mahdiyya. It will show how those Sufi orders were politicized and how their use of religion and their fractured state influenced Sudanese politics even after independence. Second, the chapter will describe how a political Islamist group such as the SIM appeared in the Sudan, and what struggles and shared interests that group had with the politicized Sufi orders and the flourishing political movements in the country. It will explain why the NIF infiltrated civil societies, the state bureaucracies, and the national armed forces. Third and last, as the NIF wanted to maintain its influence in Sudanese politics and attain power in the country, the chapter will explain why the NIF organized the coup of June 30, 1989.

Religion and Power: Islam and Islamic Creeds

Sufism can be defined as an aspect of external wisdom.⁸² It is the Muslim form of mysticism, as its goal is to pierce the opacity of this world to contemplate spiritual realities that lie beyond simple faith.⁸³ Its goal is to develop the spiritual capabilities of an individual within the circumstances in which God has placed him or her.⁸⁴ Knowledge is transferred from one master to another within a particular Sufi order. Thus, through Jafar Sadiq, Musa Kazim, and Ali Rida, who are descendants of Ali Bin Abi Talib, a spiritual chain of leadership of the Sufi orders was organized to pass down their wisdom, as they acted as spiritual masters to the subsequent Sufi masters Bishr, Bistami, and Maruf Kahari.⁸⁵ This chain continues as each generation of Sufi masters initiates the next. Importantly, Sunni scholars and the majority of Sunnis

⁸² Eric Geoffroy, *Introduction to Sufism: The Inner Path of Islam* (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2010), 1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

assert that Sufism is an integral part of Sunni Islam. It is regarded as the science of the heart, differing from *fiqh*, which is a matter of the intellect.⁸⁶

The institution of the *tariqa* is controlled solely by the head of the order, as he sets the rules and procedures of the order. Consequently, the head of the order has not just a religious role, but can also have a political role in controlling the behavior of his order's disciples in order to follow the interest of his order or his own interest.

Islam: Popular Islam Entering the Sudan and Consolidation of Two Orders

Between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, northern Sudan was dominated by the two kingdoms of the Funj, with its capital at Sinnar, and the Fur, with its region in west Sudan (Darfur).⁸⁷ In the sixteenth century, the Funj kingdom converted to Islam, and Islamic holy men were welcomed into the kingdom. The holy men were adherents of Sufi orders, they had introduced Sufi Islam into the Sudan.⁸⁸ Sufism was loosely organized, and centered on holy men and their families. Also, the holy men taught law and theology, which showed that a Sufi leader was both leader and religious teacher at the same time.⁸⁹ The Sufi holy men acted as agents of the faith and were also considered to hold a beneficent force of divine origin, causing superabundance in the physical sphere and prosperity and happiness in the physical order.⁹⁰ That beneficent force was inheritable through succession of leadership in the Sufi order, which usually stayed within the family of the Sufi leader.⁹¹

By the eighteenth century, established holy families began to rise. Their influence and that of their Sufi orders surpassed to a large extent the local *fakihs*, and the Sudanese *tariqa* became quite institutionalized.⁹² They also became more centralized, as part of a revivalist movement that climaxed during the mid-eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. The revivalist movement led to the development of neo-Sufism in the Sudan, where the blend of scholarly activities and the Sufi organization was able to produce a foundation of militancy that would become a major theme of Islam in the following century.⁹³ One such group is the Sammaniyya Sufi order, which appeared

⁸⁶ Jim McCrudden, *Islam FAQ*, (Xlibris Corp,2008), 64.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁹⁰ P.M. Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 121.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁹² DeGorge, *From Piety to Politics*, 36.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 38.

and developed in the Sudan beginning in the eighteenth century.⁹⁴ The order developed a hierarchical structure that surpassed the local religious leaders.⁹⁵ Muhammad Ahmad bin Aballah, the self-proclaimed Mahdi of the Sudan, was a Sufi sheikh of that order. Another Sufi order was the Idrisiyya order, started by Ahmed Ibn Idris, whose students were influential in the Sudan.⁹⁶ One of his students was Muhammed Uthman Al-Marghani, who founded his own Sufi order called Khatim Al-Turuq ('The Seal of the Paths'), later known as Al-Khatmiyya or Al-Marghaniyya.⁹⁷

Islam became consolidated in the Sudan after the Turkish-Egyptian forces united and captured all Sudanese lands. From 1820 to 1880, Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt, and his descendants until Khedive Ismail extended Egyptian control over what is known today as the two Sudans.⁹⁸ Once the Turkish-Egyptian monarchy had established control over the Sudan, they introduced their own version of Sunni Islam. A centralized judiciary system, based on sharia courts and dealing primarily with personal affairs, was established under the auspices of a Qadiumum al-Sudan, the chief of justice for the Sudan and lower courts at the provincial and district levels.⁹⁹

The colonial rule over the Sudan greatly influenced the ideological development of the Khatmiyya and the Mahdiyya orders with respect to independence. When Turkish-Egyptian rule began in the Sudan, the Khatmiyya order cooperated with them.¹⁰⁰ The order acted as intermediaries between its followers and the administration, in such activities as collecting taxes, announcing decrees, and even surviving in the armed forces.¹⁰¹ The order did not advocate revolt against the foreign rulers, but worked from within the administration to obtain what it wanted.¹⁰² The Mahdiyya order had challenged Turkish-Egyptian rule, which was imposing orthodox Sunni Islam. There was discontent with Turkish-Egyptian rule because of dislocation of economic policies, political inefficiency, and the growing slave trade from the south.¹⁰³ Similarly, the prestige and power of the Sufi orders (except the Khatmiyya, which had close ties with

⁹⁴ Ibid., 39.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 40.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 40.

⁹⁸ Abdelsalam Sidahmed and ElSir Sidahmed, *Sudan* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 8–9.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 9.

¹⁰⁰ DeGorge, *From Piety to Politics*, 47.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 47.

¹⁰² Ibid., 47.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 48–49.

the Turkish-Egyptian rule) were being diminished, as the Egyptians replaced most of the *fakihs* (Sufi holy men) with *ulama* and made access to Egyptian education much easier for the Sudanese.¹⁰⁴ This threatened to replace the indigenous Sudanese Sufi education with Egypt's Al-Azhar University in Cairo.¹⁰⁵ Importantly, some established Sufi orders such as the Sammaniyya were part of the revivalist movement, which allowed for militancy to develop in their orders. Therefore, when Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdallah, a sheikh of the Sammaniyya order, proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, the leaders of other Sufi orders united behind him because of his Sufi connections¹⁰⁶ and to get rid of the Turkish-Egyptian rule and their *ulama*.¹⁰⁷

Due to the Turkish-Egyptian authorities' favoritism to the Al-Khatmiyya order, factionalism had been created in the Sudan. When the Mahdiyya cause began to gain momentum and attracted supporters in Khatmiyya areas, the members of the Marghani family began to take measures against it.¹⁰⁸ For example, Muhammad Uthman Al-Marghani II used his headquarters in Kassala as a base to oppose Mahdism in eastern Sudan, and he traveled widely in the region to preach against Mahdism and to exhort the people to remain loyal to the government.¹⁰⁹

It should be clarified that both Al-Khatmiyya and Mahdiyya (Ansar) orders are not the only Sufi orders in the Sudan. However, because they had been politicized by colonial rule, and became part of the colonial establishment, and were politically dominant in post independence Sudan, they had been selected for the purpose of this study. Which is to show how religion is used as a tool of power relations.

The Sufi Orders: Agents of British Imperialism and Their Influence on the Sudanese

After the British under Lord Kitchener invaded the Sudan, the British understood that religion could be used to control the masses and sustain their rule over the Sudan. Lord Kitchener had instructed his officers to adopt a cautious attitude towards Islamic religion, advising them to be careful not to interfere with religious feelings and that the religion should be respected.¹¹⁰ He also asked them to prevent the re-establishment of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 49.

¹⁰⁵ Holt, *Studies in the History of the Near East*, 126.

¹⁰⁶ DeGorge, *From Piety to Politics*, 52–53.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰⁸ Ali Saleh Karrar, *The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1992), 93.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 99.

¹¹⁰ Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzo Press, 1997), 24. According to Sidahmed Lord Kitchener the first governor-general of the country after the invasion.

private mosques, *takias*, *zawiyas*, and sheikh tombs, as they generally formed centers of fanaticism¹¹¹ to prevent the reappearance of Mahdism or a similar Sufi political movement. As a result of understanding the importance of religion in the country, the authorities in the Sudan established the board of *ulama* in June 1901 to advise on all questions regarding Islam.¹¹²The board only represented orthodox Islam, as the British policy was to encourage Sunni orthodoxy in order to lessen the impact of Sufism, which was regarded as a potential force for the resurgence of Mahdism.¹¹³ Nonetheless, the chances of Sufism being replaced by orthodox Islam were very slim, as Sufism was the most practiced form of Sunni Islam in the country.¹¹⁴The destruction of the Mahdist state had allowed the resurgence of the multiple Sufi orders and creeds, which enhanced their position in the country.¹¹⁵ As the British lacked the necessary religious legitimacy, they monitored the activities of Sufi orders without much interference.¹¹⁶ Since the influence of the orthodox *ulama* was limited, the British sought the support of religious orders and tribes who rejected the Mahdiyya movement or had joined it reluctantly.¹¹⁷

With the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the Central powers against the Entente countries of Britain and France. In its role as the Islamic Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire declared jihad against the Entente countries.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the British tried to recruit the Sudanese Muslims, and it became important to remove Egyptian influence over the Sudan as Egypt in the future would gain its independence from British rule.¹¹⁹ Thus, the British had to rely on the support of the Sufi order leaders such as Sayyid Ali Marghani, the sayyid of the Khatmiyya order, and especially Sayyid AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar and the son of the Mahdi, as ex-Mahdists were known to be numerous, and both anti-Egyptian and anti-Turkish.¹²⁰ The British benefited from the efforts of Sayyid AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi, who toured Ansar strongholds where he preached to his followers that the Young Turks, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire were heretics and that the future of the Sudan would be best secured

¹¹¹ Kitchener's first memorandum to *murdir*s in Muddathir Abdal-Raḥīm, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 237–240.

¹¹² Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 24

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁸ Gabriel Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The Case of Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 24.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

by loyalty to Britain.¹²¹ Notably, once the Ottoman Empire declared a jihad against the Entente, all the leaders of the Sufi orders became recognized and gradually incorporated into the colonial establishment together with the other traditional leaders.¹²² For example, in 1919 the Sufi leaders Ali Al-Marghani, Abdal-Rahman Al-Mahdi, and Al-Sherif Yusif Al-Hindi headed the notables of the Sudanese delegation that traveled to London to congratulate the British monarch on Britain's victory in the war.¹²³

After the end of World War I, the British used the Sufi orders to remove the influence of Egyptian nationalism in the Sudan, which challenged British rule. During the 1924 revolt that was led by the White Flag League (WFL), an Egyptian inspired Sudanese nationalist movements against the British, both Ali Al-Marghani and Abdal-Rahman used their influence to prevent Egyptians from attracting a mass following among the Sudanese, as both of them despised the WFL.¹²⁴

The British support for the two Sufi orders of the Khatmiyya and the Ansar permitted and aided those orders to expand both their economic and political base, which had allowed them to influence politics in the Sudan. In return for supporting the British Empire, the Khatmiyya and Ansar chiefs were given material and moral awards that enhanced their social prestige, economic position, and political influence.¹²⁵

Under the British rule both Sufi orders were allowed to maintain and expand their influence. For example, the Khatmiyya order managed to regain its constituencies in northern and eastern Sudan¹²⁶ and the Mahdist revival under Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi had its support from West Sudanese tribes.¹²⁷ Thus, through their economic wealth and their enhanced prestige both the Ali Al-Marghani and AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi were able to extend their influence and patronage to other influential social groups such as tribal chiefs, lesser local religious leaders, and eventually the intelligentsia and political parties.¹²⁸ The also supported media organizations, as well as social, cultural, and charity associations.¹²⁹

¹²¹ Ibid., 24.

¹²² Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 25.

¹²³ Abdal-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, 99.

¹²⁴ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 40.

¹²⁵ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 25.

¹²⁶ Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism*, 28.

¹²⁷ P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* (Abingdon, Oxen: Routledge, 2014), 93.

¹²⁸ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 27.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 27.

Politicized Sufism: Power Relations of the Sufi Orders and Sudanese Nationalism

During the post-1924 era, both Sufi order leaders had influence and dominance over the *intelligentsia*. This influence later led to the formation of the Sudanese Graduate Congress ((SGC)—a hegemonic national political organization), political parties that were influenced by the sayyids, and eventually the independence of the Sudan.

Both of the sayyids attracted educated Sudanese into their ranks, which later led to the establishment of the SGC. AbdalRahman Al-Mahdi began in 1926 to establish wider contacts among educated Sudanese.¹³⁰ Al-Mahdi fostered the relationship with the Graduate Club in Omdurman, where Muhammed Ali Shawqi, who held the presidency of the club in the late 1920s and early 1930s, aided in recruiting prominent graduates to Al-Mahdi.¹³¹ Likewise, by declaring his support for Ahmad Sayyid Al-Fil and his group in 1932; Ali Al-Marghani drew a coterie of graduates around him and patronize their activities.¹³² Both the Abu Ruf and the Al-Fajr groups were part of a generation of graduates who were not active in the 1924 revolt and who were intent on learning from the mistakes of their elder graduates.¹³³ Although, they had a progressive and critical views of their senior graduates and the establishment, they were part of the establishment, and most of the members had religious backgrounds in the established Sufi orders.¹³⁴ Therefore, in the graduates' club elections, family links seemed to have great significance in determining how both the Al-Fajr and the Abu Ruf groups aligned themselves on the Shawqist–Filist division.¹³⁵ Afterwards, both the Al-Fajr and Abu Ruf groups had established the SGC on February 12, 1938,¹³⁶ as an organization dedicated to the interests of Sudanese graduates that would later become a nationalist movement.¹³⁷

The importance of the SGC lies in its factionalism that had resulted from the Sufi leaders and their views on how to achieve Sudanese independence. These different tendencies later developed into the important parties in the Sudan, whose patrons had to be a heads of the Sufi orders. When the confrontationists, led by Al-Azhari and his

¹³⁰ Tim Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics 1898–1985: Class and Power in Sudan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 177.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 180.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 181.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 181–184.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 185, 187–188.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 193.

Ashiqqa group, won the 1943 congress elections for council and committee, Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi withdrew his support for Al-Azhari and his group in favor of the moderates of Ibrahim Ahmed.¹³⁸ Thus, Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa sought the support of Ali Marghani to retain their leadership position in the SGC.¹³⁹ Additionally, in 1943, Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa took a trip to Egypt to seek the removal of British power from the Sudan, where they received financial assistance and other forms of support.¹⁴⁰ After the 1945 SGC elections, which the Ashiqqa had won with the help of their alliance with Ali Marghani, merchants, and Egyptian support, the moderates resigned from their positions in the SGC to form their own parties.¹⁴¹

The major parties in the Sudan developed between either the unionist camp, or the independence camp. The unionist parties except the Liberal Secessionist of the Ahrar all joined with Al-Azhari and the Ashiqqa group to form the National Unionist Party (NUP) in 1952, while the Qawmiyyin Club, registered in 1944 and led by two members of Al-Fajr group, called for an independent Sudan; they integrated into the Umma Party in 1945.¹⁴² The patrons of the two parties were Ali Al-Marghani, the head of the Khatmiyya Sufi order, and Abdal-Rahman Al-Mahdi, the head of the Ansar Sufi group.

The Sudanese Movement for National Liberation (SMNL), that would later become the Sudanese communist party (SCP), had developed outside of the SGC. This movement appeared in 1946 as a result of socioeconomic conditions in the Sudan.¹⁴³ It had great influence in the Workers Affairs Association (1946), the Womens' Association (1947), and the University College Student Union (1947).¹⁴⁴ Later, from 1949 to 1956, under Abd al-Khaliq Mahjubs' leadership, the SMNL focused on the anti-colonial struggle by mobilizing workers, peasants, and students.¹⁴⁵

Under the influence of the Sufi orders, both the NUP and the Umma parties played important roles that led to the establishment of the Sudan as an independent state. In the 1940s the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the status of the Sudan faced difficulties that ended in failure to reach an agreement for the future of the Sudan.¹⁴⁶ As Britain

¹³⁸ Ibid., 194.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 194.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 195.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 196.

¹⁴² Ibid., 197.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 199.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 199.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 200–201.

¹⁴⁶ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 50.

wanted to keep Egypt out of the Sudan, it had carried out several schemes of self-rule in the Sudan, where they proposed the participation of Sudanese moderates and their collaborators.¹⁴⁷ The first scheme was the Advisory Council, established in 1944, which the Umma party joined but the Ashiqqa and the other unionist parties turned down.¹⁴⁸ The second scheme was the creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1948. The Umma and a few tribal groups participated, but the Ashiqqa, the other unionist parties, and new groups in the nationalist movement refused.¹⁴⁹ The failure of the Assembly to present itself as a legislative body capable of leading the country to independence encouraged its opponents to resume anti-colonial struggle under the umbrella of the United Front for the Liberation of the Sudan.¹⁵⁰ Because of the collective efforts of the nationalist movements the British had relinquished their hold on the Sudan by signing the self-rule agreement on February 12, 1953.¹⁵¹

In the 1953 parliamentary elections the NUP won the majority of the votes, with 51 out of 97 seats in the lower chamber, the Umma party won 22 seats, and the rest were divided among other parties and neutral candidates who later sided with other parties.¹⁵²

With Al-Azhari and his NUP winning the elections, the union of the Nile Valley between Egypt and the Sudan was not achieved for two reasons. First, unionism was seen as a means of removing British rule over the Sudan.¹⁵³ That developed from the disappointment of the 1924 revolts in which the Egyptian forces did not aid the WFL revolutionaries as promised.¹⁵⁴ Unionism also served the purpose of resisting and counteracting the rumored plans of the Ansar for the creation of a Mahdist monarchy in the Sudan.¹⁵⁵ Second, on the opening of the parliament on March 1, 1954, the Ansar's refusal to accept their defeat in the parliamentary elections clearly and violently demonstrated that they would not accept any form of association with Egypt and that the unity of the Sudan would be jeopardized unless the Sudan became independent.¹⁵⁶ The opening ceremony of the parliament was canceled, and the guests, including President Najib of Egypt, left Khartoum that day or the next.¹⁵⁷ Also, the NUP was

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 50.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵² Ibid., 54–55.

¹⁵³ Abdal-Rahīm, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, 221

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 221.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 221.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 222.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 222.

suffering from factionalism, as it was formed from various unionist groups.¹⁵⁸ When the NUP assumed power its council of ministers was composed of all factions.¹⁵⁹ However, in less than a year the Khatmiyya faction felt marginalized by the Ashiqqa group that was led by Al-Azhari.¹⁶⁰ Three ministers from the Khatmiyya faction made their grievances public and were sacked.¹⁶¹ They later formed their own Independence Republican Party, in January 1955, which had the blessings of Sayyid Ali-Marghani.¹⁶² Al-Marghani regarded the union with Egypt as a way to remove the British from the Sudan and preventing Ansar from taking power.¹⁶³ Once it became clear that the British were leaving, and that the sayyid and his followers constituted only a small minority in the parliament, unionism with Egypt was no longer required.¹⁶⁴ Al-Marghani withdrew his support from the NUP in 1954 and made an agreement with Sayyid Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi in October 1955.¹⁶⁵ These factors led Al-Azhari to assert in April 1955 that he was in favor of independence.¹⁶⁶ On December 31, the parliament ratified the transitional constitution, where independence was formally declared as of January 1, 1956.¹⁶⁷

Power Relations and the Sufi Orders after Independence: From the Late 1950s to the Late 1960s

After Al-Azhari formed the national government in February 1956, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was formed the following May with the blessings of Sayyid Ali Marghani.¹⁶⁸ The PDP was formed from three groups of ex-NUP Khatmiyya members of parliament, who for different reasons opposed Al-Azhari.¹⁶⁹ By the end of June of 1956, the PDP and the Umma party succeeded in forcing Al-Azhari's resignation, and on July 5 an Umma–PDP coalition government was formed, headed by Abdallah Khalil.¹⁷⁰ Since then, the Sufi leaders Ali Al-Marghani and Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi were effectively controlling the Sudan.

¹⁵⁸ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 56.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁶⁰ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 56.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁶³ Warburg, *Islam, Nationalism and Communism*, 81.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹⁶⁷ Abdal-Rahīm, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, 226.

¹⁶⁸ Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics*, 209.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 209–210.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 210.

The Sufi leaders benefited from being in control over the new state. The establishment used state resources to expand their class interest as businessmen and landlords, so that state power and public resources were manipulated for the service of the private sector.¹⁷¹ Moreover, their government denied similar economic concessions to other groups, who continued to pay the colonial poll tax as well as agricultural and livestock taxes.¹⁷² The government increased indirect taxation, a social security bill was rejected in the parliament, and loans were restricted to those with capital or guarantees of repayment.¹⁷³ The government thus maintained the structure of the colonial state apparatus and its repressive laws as a buffer against any social unrest from the lower classes.¹⁷⁴ The establishment sought to engineer their return to power in the 1958 elections through a favorable election law.¹⁷⁵ This law doubled the constituencies of the rural areas (sectarian strongholds), while the urban areas remained the same, resulting in the return of the coalition to power in the elections.¹⁷⁶

After winning power in the 1958 elections, the establishment faced divisions because of conflicting interests. The irrational and hurried expansion of the private pump schemes for cotton plantations embarked on by the government and the landowners had resulted in economic problems for the country.¹⁷⁷ The Umma party wanted to renegotiate with Egypt the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929, as the hurried pumping schemes had not taken the agreement into account.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, resulting in several complicated and prolonged negotiations among the coalition partners, and the divisions within the coalition was further shown up by the Halayeb land dispute between Egypt and the Sudan.¹⁷⁹ For example, the Umma party was not pleased with the PDP silence over the matter, and the PDP was not happy with the hostility of the Umma party against Egypt.¹⁸⁰ Because of the expansion of cotton plantations, there was plenty of cotton for sale at a time when there was no market for it because of low prices, the closure of the Suez Canal, and the refusal of the British to buy Sudanese cotton.¹⁸¹ Cotton, the Sudan's main export, had remained unsold for two years (1956–58), causing the country's

¹⁷¹ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 58.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

balance of payments to drop to only about half a million pounds, therefore, the government taxed most consumer goods, causing unrest in the urban areas, where demonstrations and strikes were led by students and workers.¹⁸² Also, the establishment was divided on the question of whether to accept US aid to counteract the economic crisis caused by their policies. The Umma party, the senior coalition member, opted for the US aid, while the PDP did not, because it was unpopular and would give political capital to the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the radical opposition.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, the government signed the US aid agreement in April 1958, and it was ratified in the Assembly. The US aid caused an estrangement between the partners in the coalition government, causing each partner to make contacts with the NUP to form an alternative government.¹⁸⁴ In either case, Abdallah Khalil would lose his premiership, therefore, on November 7, 1958, Khalil went to General Ibrahim Abboud, the head of the SAF, ordering him to launch a coup so Khalil could stay in power.¹⁸⁵ Abboud executed the coup on November 17, and took control over the state by forming the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).¹⁸⁶

The SCAF takeover did not change politics in the Sudan, since the Sufi orders had close relations with the military establishment. Two days after the coup, Sayyid Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi made a public announcement supporting the SCAF.¹⁸⁷ This was because the military coup had been instigated by Khalil (an Umma prime minister), two members of the Umma were members of the council of ministers, and the regime's initial strong man, General Ahmad Abdel Wahab, had been a known supporter of the Umma party.¹⁸⁸ Afterwards, with the removal of General Abdel Wahab from the SCAF, Siddiq al-Mahdi, the son of Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi, wanted the role of the military to be limited in both time and extent.¹⁸⁹ This led him to form the National Front (NF) in 1960, bringing together politicians who were committed to restoration of civilian rule.¹⁹⁰ Sayyid Ali Marghani supported the military coup, and became an active accomplice of the regime.¹⁹¹ When the NF declared its demand for return of civilian rule in 1960, the Khatmiyya establishment prepared a memorandum pledging its

¹⁸² Ibid., 60.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 60.

¹⁸⁴ Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics*, 218.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 217.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 217.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 219.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 220.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 220–221. Siddiq al-Mahdi, the son of Abdal Rahman Al-Mahdi had become the imam following the death of his father.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 220–221.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 221.

allegiance to the military regime.¹⁹² The SCAF was removed from power through the October Revolution on November 15, 1964 because of the combined efforts of the professional groups who mobilized the urban workers and the intermediate strata.¹⁹³ Those groups formed the Professionals' Front (PF).

Once the transitional government was formed, the traditional establishment had problems with radical partners in the government, causing the establishment to retake power again until the May coup of 1969. On October 31, the new council of ministers was formed under the leadership of Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa. It was composed of seven members of the PF, two southerners, and one member from each of the United Parties Front (UPF), an alliance composed of the Umma, the PDP, the NUP, and the Islamic Charter Front (ICF).¹⁹⁴ As the PF outnumbered the traditional establishment, and as members of the PF allied themselves with the communist party, the council had radical tendencies, a fact which was made clear by their policies.¹⁹⁵ Among other progressive policies they set up a committee to prepare recommendations on the phasing out of native administration, and they set up an illegal-enrichment court to investigate charges of corruption and suspected economic deals.¹⁹⁶ There was a suspicion that the illegal-enrichment court would be used by the PF as an instrument to purge the civil service of rightist elements (the NUP, the PDP, and the Umma), not just corrupt individuals.¹⁹⁷ The greatest concern from the rightists was the PF proposal that 50 percent of the seats of the new assembly be given to the workers' and peasants' representatives.¹⁹⁸ It also became apparent that the PF was seeking a long-term role in the country's policies, as branches of the PF were being established in different parts of the country and it seemed the PF would act as one unit in the forthcoming elections.¹⁹⁹ Therefore, the UPF campaigned against the domination of the PF in the government by demanding early elections, where the traditionalist followings of the establishment leaders were used to counter the transitional government's support among the urban populace.²⁰⁰ Accordingly, on February 24, 1965 Sirr Al-Khatim Al-

¹⁹² Ibid., 221. According to Niblock, General Abdel Wahab was an Umma supporter.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 227.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 227.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 227.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 227–228.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 228.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 228.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 228.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 228.

Khalifah formed a new government composed of the Umma, the NUP, the ICF, and the Southern Front, ending the radical experiment.²⁰¹

The Umma Party and the NUP won the April 1965 elections, because the elections were held only in north Sudan due to the state of insecurity in the south.²⁰² Since then, until the military coup of May 1969, the Umma party always headed a coalition government.

The Sudanese Islamic Movement: Their Origins and Development in the Sudan

In 1928 Hassan Al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The organization established branches in other countries in the Middle East and had considerable influence in them.

The nucleus of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) appeared in the early 1950s under the name of the Harakat Al-Tahrir Al-Islamy (Islamic Liberation Movement [ILM]). Babkier Karrar and Muhammed Yousuf started the group because in the late 1940s the Gordon Memorial College (later Khartoum University) was completely dominated by the communists.²⁰³ For example, in 1948 the communists won control over the student union, displacing the unionists who had traditionally dominated the college.²⁰⁴ The communists, through the trade unions, also became prominent in opposition against the Legislative Assembly, leading strikes and demonstrations.²⁰⁵ The goal of ILM the establishing of a new world order, based on Islam and transcending the East–West rivalry.²⁰⁶ In order to establish a society and a state based on Islamic socialism, it was imperative to liberate the Sudan from colonialism.²⁰⁷ However, the ILM was attacked by the communists, who branded them as a terrorist Muslim Brotherhood group, causing the ILM to deny any affiliation with the MB, and to recruit members without mentioning the name of the Ikhwan (“Brothers”).²⁰⁸

The group attracted a great number of their recruits from rural backgrounds. Communism and secularism in the Sudan grew mainly among the middle class, who were western-educated and had acquired western attitudes.²⁰⁹ Rural students, with their

²⁰¹ Ibid., 228. The Southern Front was an alliance of parties representing south Sudanese.

²⁰² Ibid., 228.

²⁰³ Abdel Wahab El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal Books, 1991), 48.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 48.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 48.

roots in traditional families and local cultures, reacted strongly against this tendency.²¹⁰ Islam was used in countering the communist movement. The early adherents of the Ikhwan spoke out against the moral laxity and their irreligiousness of their colleagues in secondary schools and colleges, such as neglect of prayers and widespread heavy drinking.²¹¹

In November 1945, Jamal Al-Sanhouri and Salah Abdal-Sid, two members of the MB visited the Sudan, toured the country and gave lectures to promote their organization.²¹² As a result, several loosely organized groups appeared and declared their affiliation to the Ikhwan.²¹³ In 1946, another official Ikhwan delegation was sent to the Sudan where they met with the existing groups, and toured the country to form new branches.²¹⁴ The ILM started to contact other Ikhwan outside of the university.²¹⁵ By the early 1950s, the dominant figure in these circles was Ali Talb-Allah.²¹⁶ In November 1947, he received a letter from Hassan Al-Banna appointing him as general supervisor of the Ikhwan in the Sudan and a member of the MB's constituent assembly.²¹⁷ In 1951 the Wafdist government in Egypt replaced Ibrahim AbdalHadi's anti-Ikhwan cabinet.²¹⁸ The work of the Ikhwan in the Palestine war, and their guerrilla activities in the Canal Zone, caused affiliation to the Ikhwan to be a source of pride, so the ILM no longer denied its relationship to the Ikhwan.²¹⁹ Al-Banna's letters became an important part of the education of the Ikhwan members in the Sudan.²²⁰ The Ikhwan and the ILM coordinated with each other in the colleges to carry out the task of the education and indoctrination of ordinary members, as the colleges were the centers of the Ikhwan activities; the majority of its followers were students, and the movement had not yet made much headway out of student circles yet.²²¹

Although the SIM was successful in counteracting the communists in the university settings, it suffered from factionalism, which resulted in centralizing the movement. In August 1953, Karrar engineered a party coup in which he reasserted the original

²¹⁰ Ibid., 49.

²¹¹ Ibid., 49.

²¹² Ibid., 51.

²¹³ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 51.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 51.

²²⁰ Ibid., 51.

²²¹ Ibid., 51-52.

socialist line of the movement and rejected the name of the MB; by the end of that year, he deserted the movement in protest against the identification of the group with the MB parent in Egypt.²²² Talb-Allah was kept in the dark about the proposed meeting to solve the factionalism, causing him to challenge its legitimacy and boycott it, since he considered himself the sole leader of the movement.²²³ In the Eid Congress conference it was decided that the official name of the movement would be Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon(the MB), representing a triumph for those who identified with the parent organization.²²⁴ Talb-Allah was removed from his leadership of the movement to please the dissidents.²²⁵ Consequently, Karrar and his group formed their own organization, Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, which adopted a radical program with socialist overtones.²²⁶ At the same time, the pro-Egyptian group of Talb-Allah rejected the resolutions of the conference.²²⁷ Talb-Allah requested the arbitration of the parent MB, so in 1952 and 1955 the parent MB sent missions to resolve the leadership issue and the factionalism.²²⁸ With the resignation of Muhammed Khair AbdalGadir as secretary of the movement's executive body, tensions were reduced.²²⁹ The new head of the movement, was Al-Rashid Al-Tahir, a Talb-Allah supporter who was known for his sympathy and ties with the parent MB.²³⁰ Thus the SIM became united and centralized under one single leader, allowing it to focus its efforts on Sudanese society.²³¹

Under Al-Tahir's leadership, the SIM moved to expand its influence in Sudanese society. The SIM tried to increase its support among the educated class by founding its own newspaper in 1956, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, to carry its message to the public.²³² The newspaper played a significant role in introducing the MB ideology to the Sudanese educated class.²³³ As the Sudanese MB was aware of its limited influence in Sudanese politics, the MB approached the Ansar and Khatmiyya parties to fulfill the MB's main goal of establishing of an Islamic order in the Sudan through their Islamic

²²² Ibid.,52.

²²³ Ibid.,52.

²²⁴ Ibid.,53.

²²⁵ Ibid., 53.

²²⁶ Ibid., 53.

²²⁷ Ibid., 53.

²²⁸ Ibid., 53. It should be noted that, the head of the ILM faction, did not accept the arbitration of the MB delegation, who told him it was necessary for the Sudanese movement to be integrated to the parent MB, as he thought it would alienate members from Ansar backgrounds.

²²⁹ Ibid., 53

²³⁰ Ibid., 53.

²³¹ Ibid., 54.

²³² Mustafa Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan (1945–1989)* (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 88.

²³³ Hassan Mekki Mohamed Ahmed, *Harakat al-ikhwan al-muslimun fi al-Sudan, 1944–1969 M: Tarikhuha wa-khatabuha al-Siyasi* (Khartoum: Mahadal Buhuthwa al-Dirasatal Ijtimaiah: Bayt al-Marifahil intaj al-Thaqafi, 1990), 63.

Front for the Constitution (IFC).²³⁴The IFC was composed of several different political and religious institutions and individuals, who joined together as a pressure group calling for an Islamic constitution in the Sudan.²³⁵Although, the SIM failed to impose an Islamic constitution, the IFC managed to pressure the two sayyids of the Sufi orders to issue a communiqué on February 20, 1957 announcing their support for an Islamic republic, and declaring the sharia to be the source of all legislation.²³⁶ The Sudanese MB continued to build its internal structures, adopting the Egyptian MB structure of *usar* (families).²³⁷Khartoum was divided into three *usar* councils: Omdurman, led by Sadiq Abdallah Abdel Magid; Khartoum North,led by Mohammed Yousif; and Khartoum, led by Omar Bakheit Al-Awad.²³⁸At the same time it tried to counteract the SCP influence among workers and trade unions by establishing the Workers Office.²³⁹However, it failed to influence the trade unions and the workers at this time because of the members' elitist attitudes and their own lack of experience in working with those groups.²⁴⁰ The MB had begun to engage in international issues of Islamic concern.²⁴¹In 1952, the MB used their newspaper to call Sudanese political figures to boycott the French embassy in support of the cause of the Algerian revolution.²⁴² The MB sought the support of the military junta led by Abboud in 1958, as the military was at first under the control of the Sufi establishment.²⁴³The MB news outlet supported the takeover and its regime.²⁴⁴ Nonetheless, the regime forced the MB news outlet to shut down like the rest of the press in the Sudan; and, the MB headquarters and other offices were ordered to shut down.²⁴⁵ Al-Tahir understood that an uprising was impossible, because the establishment (the Khatmiyya and Ansar Sufi orders) had endorsed the regime and because the corruption and shortcomings of the establishment had not yet been exposed to the masses.²⁴⁶ Thus, Al-Tahir chose the military option, conspiring with officers of different political persuasions to remove the Abboud regime.²⁴⁷The coup of November 9, 1959 failed, and revealed a rift in the SIM, as the

²³⁴ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 89.

²³⁵ Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 53.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

²³⁷ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 90.

²³⁸ Ahmed, *Harakat al-ikhwan al-muslimun*, 71.

²³⁹ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 90.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 90.

²⁴³ Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics*, 218.

²⁴⁴ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 61.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

attempt included communist elements and because Al-Tahir's colleagues were not adequately informed about the coup attempt.²⁴⁸

The Movement and Hassan Al-Turabi: From A Pressure Group to a Vanguard Political Movement

The failure of the 1959 coup had resulted in transforming the SIM from a pressure group to a political group that aimed to impose its ideology on the society. Al-Turabi had convinced the MB leadership at the time of the need to topple the regime and to direct the movement's members to work closely with other political groups as a united front to remove the regime.²⁴⁹ The MB used their students in the Khartoum University Student Union (KUSU) to rally support against the junta regime.²⁵⁰ The SIM also started to enter Sudanese politics through its party. In 1964, as the MB had limited political influence in the country, it formed an umbrella organization called the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), which was composed of individuals and organizations who shared the MB's interest in making an Islamic state; Al-Turabi was made its general secretary.²⁵¹

Through the ICF, the SIM participated alongside the establishment. For example, after the October Revolution, to counter the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), the Ikhwan helped form the United Parties Front (UPF) as a counterweight to the PF, which was dominated by the SCP.²⁵²

When it the radical PF, influenced by the SCP, was going to dominate Sudanese politics after the transitional period, the ICF helped the establishment to remove the PF from power in SIRR Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah's coalition government. Within two months, the MB activists got the signatures needed from the founding organizations of the PF and the UFP to remove the PF's domination in the SIRR Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah government, causing SIRR Al-Khatim Al-Khalifah to form a new coalition government based on the parties of the Umma, the ICF, the NUP, and the Southern Front (a collection of southern Sudanese parties).²⁵³

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 62.

²⁴⁹ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 92.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 92.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 94.

²⁵² El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 73.

²⁵³ Ibid., 73.

In the 1960s the SIM and the ICF greatly aggressive in imposing their ideology on Sudanese society. The ICF was pushing for an Islamic constitution, and made an alliance with Sadiq Al-Mahdi (the eldest son of Sadiqq Al-Mahdi) to head the new coalition government, as he had a long-established relationship with the Ikhwan.²⁵⁴ Their confidence in Al-Mahdi was rewarded when his government took measures that were demanded by the SIM, such as the forty-four-member constitutional commission that was tasked with preparing a draft constitution in 1967.²⁵⁵ The ICF got what it wanted from the commission, by putting intense public pressure on the representatives of the main parties whose legitimacy was mainly religious.²⁵⁶ Motions on the sharia law a basic source of legislation, that Sudan's state religion is Islam, and that Arabic is the state language were passed, and a motion to ban organizations based on anti-religious propaganda and atheism was upheld.²⁵⁷ Similarly, the ICF tried to reduce the power of the SCP, which still had great influence in the Sudan after the October revolution. Under Al-Turabi, the ICF became a mainstay of political activism and agitation, sometimes instigating violent campaigns against the SCP, on the campuses of universities and other institutes of higher education and elsewhere.²⁵⁸ In 1965, the ICF led a major political mobilization named Thawart Rajab²⁵⁹ that was violent religious campaigns and marches attacking the SCP.²⁶⁰ It led to the dissolution of the SCP and the expulsion of its members from the parliament.²⁶¹

The ICF was expanding into important sectors of society to impose its own ideology and to remove the leftists (especially the SCP, who challenged the power of the movement). In February 1965, the SIM set up the Patriotic Trade Unionist Congress (PTUC) to gain the support of anti-communist workers to rival the Sudanese Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF) that was dominated by the SCP.²⁶² Although the movement failed to take hold, in 1968 it set up the Patriotic Teachers Union (PTU), to counter the left and the SCP in the education sector.²⁶³ The PTU was supported by the

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 79. Al-Mahdi had been known for his close relationship with the MB since his university days in England, and his sister is married to Al-Turabi.

²⁵⁵ Ibid., 79.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 80.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 81. The ban seemed to be aimed at the SCP and other leftist parties.

²⁵⁸ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 64. Ansar also backed these marches; thousands of their members from rural areas were transported to the areas where the ICF marches to support the ICF initiative against the SCP.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 65. According to Gallab, Thawart Rajab was a political mobilization by the ICF named for the Muslim month of Rajab.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 65–66.

²⁶¹ Ibid., 65–66.

²⁶² El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 94.

²⁶³ Ibid., 96.

establishment.²⁶⁴ Then, in October 1964, the SIM re-launched Al-Manar, a weekly magazine, and established the Patriotic Women's Front (PWF), who's declared goals were the formation of the believing individual, the development and education of women so as to give them greater social and political roles.²⁶⁵ Similarly, in the mid-1960s the movement launched a campaign to attract female students; the campaign brought modest results, but not much of a breakthrough, by the time of the May 1969 coup.²⁶⁶ The SIM also founded the Patriotic Youth Organization (PYO) in 1965. It was broadly anti-communist.²⁶⁷ It was active in the cultural field, putting on plays and festivals celebrating Islamic themes and Sudanese history.²⁶⁸ The PYO established relations with anti-communist international youth federations, and youth groups in Muslim countries, such as the Saudi youth groups led by Prince Muhammad Al-Faisal Al-Saud.²⁶⁹

The Islamic Movement and the Nimeri Years (1969–1985)

After Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry carried out his military coup of May 1969, the SIM lost the great success in imposing its ideology and influence that were gained during the Sufi establishments' democracy. The SCP and leftist groups in the Sudan were behind the coup, in order to thwart the Islamists plan to make the Sudan an Islamic state.²⁷⁰ Babikir Awad Allah, who was the chief of justice in the 1960s, resigned from his position to reaffirm his protest against the unconstitutional banning of the SCP; he was also a presidential candidate for the left and a member of the RCC.²⁷¹ The new regime outlawed all political parties and their arrested the leaders, but gave favorable treatment to the SCP, leftist groups, and Arab nationalist organizations.²⁷² Sadiq Al-Mahdi, who was at the time a close ally of the ICF was selected to lead the opposition group, which included other parties such as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a Marghanist group that was led by Sherif Hussein Al-Hindi.²⁷³ Because of the ICF's

²⁶⁴ Ibid., 96.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 97.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 98.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 98.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 98.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 98. Later, in the 1970s, Prince Muhammed Al-Faisal Al-Saud established the Faisal Islamic Bank, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In the 1980s, it also established a branch in the Sudan that supported the movement there.

²⁷⁰ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 66. It also seemed that the ICF wanted to make the Sudanese government a presidential system under the Imam Al-Hadi-Al-Mahdi of the Ansar (Al-Sadiqq Al-Mahdi's brother, who took up the mantle after the death of his elder brother and Sadiq Al-Mahdi's uncle).

²⁷¹ Ibid., 67.

²⁷² Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 67.

²⁷³ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 98.

oppositional activities, most of the ICF leadership (including Al-Turabi) were arrested.²⁷⁴

The new regime moved to remove the power of the old religious establishment and their allies. In March 1970, Al-Nimeiry and his officers had a bloody confrontation against the old establishment that was led by Imam Al-Hadi-Al-Mahdi and their ICF in Aba Island, in which the resisters were crushed.²⁷⁵ By the end of March, the armed resistance to the regime was destroyed, Al-Hadi Al-Mahdi was killed near the Ethiopian border as he was trying to flee, prominent leaders of the ICF were killed, and the SIM was accused of playing a leading role in the insurgency.²⁷⁶ After the confrontation, the SIM and the Sufi orders established the National Front (NF) under the leadership of President Sherif Hussein Al-Hindi (DUP).²⁷⁷ The NF charter called for the creation of a democratic order with an Islamic orientation.²⁷⁸ Following the May coup, the ICF ceased to exist and the bulk of the opposition work was handled by the MB.²⁷⁹ In 1973, following the failure of their student-led protest, the MB and their NF allies instructed their members to join the students in the universities to create an uprising similar to the October Revolts.²⁸⁰ This uprising failed, as the regime quickly crushed those demonstrations.²⁸¹

After the coup, the new regime moved to implement leftist-oriented policies. The SIM later had an impact on the regime structures and the country's economy. The Five Year Plan (FYP; 1970–1975), was a transitional stabilization program that focused on capacity utilization.²⁸² The plan advocated a selective, gradual delinking of the economy from the world market via diversification of external economic relations, reduction of imports and superfluous consumption, an increase in the level of self-sufficiency in food and manufactured mass-consumption goods, and increased emphasis on internal resource mobilization through budget surplus.²⁸³ The plan's aim was to increase the provision of basic needs in material products and social services.²⁸⁴ Accordingly, in May 1970 the regime nationalized and confiscated all foreign and

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 98.

²⁷⁵ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 106.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 106.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 105.

²⁷⁸ Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 98.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 98–99.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., 98–99.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 99.

²⁸² Ibrahim Elnur, *Contested Sudan: The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 41.

²⁸³ Ibid., 41.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 41.

nationally owned private banks, export/import firms, and a number of manufacturing enterprises.²⁸⁵ It should be clarified that the foreign trade and financial sectors played a large part in the Sudan's post-colonial economy and were controlled by foreign companies and expatriate communities.²⁸⁶ In May 1971 the regime established the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) as the sole political organization to lead the country.²⁸⁷ The 1977 reconciliation between the regime and the old establishment and their SIM allies allowed the SIM to be part of the regime. There were several reasons that explain this turnaround. First, the communist members of the RCC, led by Major Hashem Al-Atta, led a short-lived coup against Al-Nimeiry's regime on July 19, 1971.²⁸⁸ Second, the rise of the SSU had created a personal cult around Al-Nimeiry, encouraged by his followers, who did not allow any kind of public deliberation without praise to Al-Nimeiry.²⁸⁹ The individuals behind the system gained more influence after the Addis Ababa agreement that ended the first Sudanese civil war, where they encouraged Al-Nimeiry to subdue the reactionary forces (the old establishment and Islamists) through the National Reconciliation of 1977.²⁹⁰ Third, Al-Nimeiry made use of his alliance with the MB keep the university campuses across the country quiet.²⁹¹ Finally, after the aborted communist coup in 1971, Al-Nimeiry changed the economic policies of the country from a leftist orientation to a more liberal one. Consequently, the Interim Action Plan that was implemented from November 1972, replacing the FYP, made no reference to capacity utilizations.²⁹² This and other liberal economic policies, especially the open-door policies of 1972–1976, encouraged student-led protest throughout the country against the regime. In May 1973, there was student-led protest against price increases announced by the government, where Al-Nimeiry was stunned by the level of opposition.²⁹³

With the reconciliation of 1977, the SIM, under Al-Turabi's leadership, became part of Al-Nimeiry regime. This allowed them to expand their political influence in Sudanese society. Importantly, it gave them enough social and military power to forcefully remove the establishment's order, to impose their religious ideology on Sudanese

²⁸⁵ Ibid., 41.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 41.

²⁸⁷ Niblock, *The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics*, 259.

²⁸⁸ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 69.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 70.

²⁹⁰ Ibid., 72.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 72.

²⁹² Elnur, *Contested Sudan*, 43.

²⁹³ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 108.

society, and to aid similar radical Islamist movements in East Africa later on. When SIM joined the regime, it acquired the freedom and political ability to rebuild the movement and to spread its religious ideology among the Sudanese masses.²⁹⁴ Al-Turabi was appointed to several influential and important positions within the SSU.²⁹⁵ The SIM also attained important ministerial and SSU appointments, with a strong presence in the National Assembly, regional assemblies, and various local levels of government.²⁹⁶ Thus, the movement became part of the regime and its influence continued to expand.

As the SIM was under the surveillance of the Al-Nimeiry security forces, the movement made satellite organizations to be more efficient and resilient to regime crackdowns.²⁹⁷ The most prominent of these organizations were the Society of Women Vanguarders of Renaissance, the Youth Society for Construction, the Association of Southern Muslims, the Association of Sudanese Ulama, the Islamic Da'wa Organization (and its offshoot, the African Relief Agency), the Namariq Literary and Artist Society, and the Union of Muslim Literary Men.²⁹⁸

The SIM started aggressive recruitment campaigns to increase its membership, especially among women and trade union members.²⁹⁹ Al-Turabi's writings played a great role in presenting the SIM as a liberal progressive Islamic movement; his writings about women's role in society, arts and Islam, Shura, and the position of non-Muslims in Islamic societies provided the needed ideology to counter the considerable influence of the communists in the Sudan.³⁰⁰

The SIM made use of Al-Nimeiry's liberal economic policies. Following the 1980 investment act, foreign and Sudanese joint-venture banks were allowed to operate in the country.³⁰¹ In January 1980 three Islamic banks opened, funded mostly by Saudi capital, and Islamic banking started to expand further.³⁰² The Faisal Islamic Bank, whose patron was Prince Muhammad Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and had helped the movement

²⁹⁴ Abdel Rahim Omer Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Sira al-hawiaa wa al-hawaa: Fitmat al-Islameen fi al-Sultah Mein Muzakirat al-Ashrah ela Muzakairat al-Tafahum Maa Garang* (Khartoum: Dar Kahil, 2012), 163.

²⁹⁵ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 101.

²⁹⁶ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 115.

²⁹⁷ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 101.

²⁹⁸ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 115.

²⁹⁹ Abdel Wahab, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 101.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 101–102.

³⁰¹ Elnur, *Contested Sudan*, 51.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 51.

to accumulate great wealth.³⁰³ Leading members of the SIM had dominated the upper administrative offices of the bank, creating a strong link between the bank and the movement.³⁰⁴ The wealth generated from running these banks was used to expand the movement's work around the country and to establish several Islamic non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the areas of education and health.³⁰⁵ By the 1980s the movement owned about 500 companies with a capital of more than 800 million USD inside and outside of the Sudan.³⁰⁶ SIM members became the wealthiest business people in the country; and SIM's INGOs expanded to all of the Sudan, virtually replacing the government in providing education, social, and health services after drought and famine struck the country, especially in the Darfur region.³⁰⁷

In the 1980s the movement took advantage of the black market and the declining economy. Thousands of Sudanese left the country to work in the Gulf countries as a result of the declining economy and constant harassment by Nimeiry's security forces for opposition against the regime.³⁰⁸ These expatriates earned more than 5 billion USD annually, which was channeled back to their families and friends through the black market that was controlled by the Islamic movement.³⁰⁹ While the opposition and the communists left the Sudan for better employment, the movement's professional cadres remained in the country, allowing the MB to control most of the workers' unions and associations.³¹⁰ Simultaneously, the newly created Islamic enterprises and the relatively peaceful relationship between the SIM and the regime guaranteed the MB membership full access to employment and prosperity inside the Sudan.³¹¹

After the reconciliation of 1977, the movement intensified its recruitment among the military.³¹² A military organization of the most loyal members of the SIM was formed, answerable only to Al-Turabi, the supreme leader of the movement.³¹³ Since 1955, the SIM infiltrated the military, recruiting a few members among the students of the military college.³¹⁴ Notable among the recruits were Bashier Mohammed Ali, Abdallah

³⁰³ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 91.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 91.

³⁰⁵ Abdel Wahab, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 102.

³⁰⁶ Haider Taha, *Al-Askar wa al-Inqdh* (Cairo: Markaz al-Hadara al-Arabia, 1993), 55.

³⁰⁷ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 102–103.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 103.

³⁰⁹ Sidahmed and Sidahmed, *Sudan*, 55.

³¹⁰ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 103.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 103.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 180.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 181.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 178.

Al-Tahir, Abdelrahman Farah, and Abdelrahman Swar Al-Dahab, all of whom later held important positions within the SAF.³¹⁵ In particular, Swar Al-Dahab, who became Al-Nimeiry's minister of defense, led a military coup against Al-Nimeiry as a result of the April 1985 *intifada* and afterwards headed the transitional government. After the 1977 accord, the leaders of the SIM issued a directive to its members to apply to the military college. Hence, the movement infiltrated the army in large numbers; this raised no concerns, as the military intelligence services were mostly preoccupied with the activities of higher-ranking military officers.³¹⁶ Ultimately, the SIM started to contact officers in the SAF who were members of the movement, but discontinued its relations with the movement following the May 1969 coup.³¹⁷ The SIM also instructed its members to join the military intelligence services, as these services were used to screen the recruits' backgrounds and affiliation.³¹⁸ By infiltrating the services the SIM increased its membership inside the military.³¹⁹

Al-Nimeiry's September Laws (the sharia laws) of 1983 represented the movement's greatest political success. The SIM supported Al-Nimeiry's Islamic reforms, and hundreds of MB members were appointed to specially created Islamic courts that handled criminal and civil cases.³²⁰ The MB used these courts against their political opponents.³²¹ Likewise, the SIM had used Al-Nimeiry's Islamization process in the military to introduce special training sessions at the Africa Islamic Center in Khartoum. Selected officers would undergo indoctrination and training, and were then sent to the Gulf through a special network to cash some money and the SIM then arranged for their *umra* and pilgrimage.³²²

The last years of the Al-Nimeiry regime were a honeymoon period for the SIM under Al-Turabi's leadership. Despite their growing influence within the regime and the imposition of their ideology, the movement lost significant support from the masses. The ICF/NIF also lost the support of Al-Nimeiry as it became clear that the implementation of the September laws was counterproductive.³²³ Al-Nimeiry began to

³¹⁵ Ibid., 178.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 181.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 182.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 182.

³¹⁹ Ibid., 182.

³²⁰ Ibid., 104.

³²¹ Ibid., 104.

³²² Sidahmed and Sidahmed, *Sudan*, 56. The Africa Islamic Center was funded by Gulf countries to Islamize Africans. Later it became dominated by the ICF/NIF, who controlled the institution. In 1992, it became the International University of Africa, which radicalized Africans and send them back to their home countries to carry out radical Islamist activities.

³²³ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 74.

distance himself from the September laws, paving the way to abolish it before his trip to the US in April 1985, and he arrested and jailed members of the movement, accusing them of attempting to remove the regime.³²⁴The SIM was not invited to the opposition meetings that planned the April 1985 uprising, as they were deemed untrustworthy.³²⁵However, the uprising against the regime succeeded through General Abdelrahman Swar Al-Dahab (a member of the SIM) leading a successful coup³²⁶and afterwards, establishing a one year caretaker government.

The Movement's Machiavellianism

After the collapse of Al-Nimeiry's regime, the SIM formed the National Islamic Front (NIF) party under Al-Turabi's leadership in May 1985. The party was composed of the movement's leaders, Sufi leaders, *ulama*, some tribal leaders, ex-army officers, youth and women members of the movement's satellite organizations, and the main support of the SIM, the sharia lobby who awakened to Islamic identity, and who chose to associate themselves with the NIF because their previous links with the traditional associations had weakened or taken new form.³²⁷ The NIF used its gains that the SIM attained from being part of the Al-Nimeiry regime to dispense patronage, promote Quranic schools, establish health clinics, and build mosques, and its associations for students, teachers, and women had branches in every major town in the Sudan.³²⁸ The NIF ideology was that sharia must guide all matters of life and be the source of law and principles for the economy, the educational system, and social programs.³²⁹

The April 1986 elections returned the old establishment to power in the Sudan, making the NIF an opposition force. Since its third-place finish did not allow it to impose its ideology on society, it challenged the establishment, especially in the case of the September laws. The party of Prime Minister Sadiq Al-Mahdi did not gain the majority of the seats needed to impose his political will, allowing the NIF to contest his annulment of the September laws. During the constitutional conference that Al-Mahdi planned to use to formulate a new legal code to replace the September laws, the NIF declared that it would be blasphemous to annul them, forcing him to defend his plan to

³²⁴ Ibid., 74.

³²⁵ Abdel Wahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan*, 104–105.

³²⁶ Abdel Rahman Swar Al-Dahab was Al-Nimeiry's minister of defense and was also a member of the SIM. later he was made the head of the Da'wa organization after he retired from the military. Da'wa was later used in south Sudan and East Africa to support the ideology of the movement.

³²⁷ El-Effendi, *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*, 136–137.

³²⁸ Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1998), 67.

³²⁹ Ibid., 67–68.

modify them and to accept the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as part of the coalition government.³³⁰ The NIF waged a fierce campaign against the government through both the parliament and its press network, and used its popular and economic muscles in the face of the paralyzed government.³³¹

When Al-Mahdi was re-elected as prime minister on April 28, 1988, he formed a coalition government that included the NIF, appointing Al-Turabi as attorney general and supporting an NIF candidate for speaker of the parliament.³³² With the NIF in the coalition government, Al-Mahdi's government supported the sharia laws.³³³ As the DUP leaders became wary of Islamization, they were disturbed by their marginalization in the government, and the governments' hardline approach to the civil war. Thus, when Al-Mahdi capitulated to the NIF's deadline to implement new Islamic laws, the DUP protested that the government could not be bound by that timetable.³³⁴ Later, the DUP signed an agreement with the SPLM/A on the November 16, 1988 that called for an end to the war, the freezing of the September laws, and the convening of a constitutional conference.³³⁵ Both Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the NIF protested against such a move and outmaneuvered the initiative through the assembly, disappointing the DUP and prompting it to leave the government on December 28, 1988. This gave the Umma and the NIF sole control over the government.³³⁶ Yet, the NIF lost its power to force the government to impose its ideology when the military intervened. On February 20, 1989, the General Command of the Armed Forces sent a memorandum to Sadiq Al-Mahdi demanding him either to secure the required arms for the civil war or form a broad-based government.³³⁷ When Al-Mahdi formed such a government under the United National Front (UNF), the Umma-NIF government collapsed.³³⁸ Once the new government set out to remove the September laws, the NIF created disruptions. The NIF led demonstrations against the government from April to June of 1989, vowing that the protests would continue until sharia law was applied or the government was removed.³³⁹ However, Al-Mahdi initiated on the 29th of June 1989

³³⁰ Ibid., 73.

³³¹ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 150.

³³² Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 80.

³³³ Ibid., 81.

³³⁴ Ibid., 81.

³³⁵ Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*, 156.

³³⁶ Ibid., 152.

³³⁷ Ibid., 153.

³³⁸ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 85.

³³⁹ Ibid., 85.

a bill to suspend the September laws.³⁴⁰ By June 30th 1989, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir along with other military officers (all were members of the SIM), carried out a successful military coup against Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi.

Conclusion

Before the Turkish-Egyptian domination that unified Bilad Al-Sudan into one country, Sufism had great influence in the Sudan. It also took on a political dimension as Sufi orders became established and centralized around Sufi leaders and their families. Some heads of certain Sufi orders became agents of the Turkish-Egyptian rule, while others were disadvantaged and marginalized, allowing the Mahdiyya movement to develop and to gain momentum against Turkish-Egyptian rule and their privileged Sufi allies. After the British re-conquest, Sufism was further politicized by the colonial state as the leaders of the Sufi orders supported the British colonial regime(s). While aiding the colonial state, the heads of Sufi orders amassed even greater economic and political capital than before, which allowed them to establish dominance over Sudanese politics. This same political capital allowed the Sufi orders to become the ruling elite of the Sudan after independence. Nevertheless, there was a constant power conflict within the ruling Sufi establishment that resulted in constant economic-political and social crises, leading to constant military coups and military regimes. The division within the Sufi establishment allowed the SIM to use Islam as a means to political domination. This explains why at first the SIM worked with the Sufi orders to attain its interest in imposing its religion as a state ideology, and it also explains why, later on, the SIM worked with Al-Nimeiry's regime to impose its ideology on the Sudanese masses from above. The SIM believed that it was being a counter hegemonic force by imposing its non-Sufi radical religious ideology in order to attain power. However, the SIM's power as a capacity was curbed as the elites in the Sudan fractured, preventing the SIM from having a dominating influence. Consequently, the only way for the SIM to impose its religious ideology on Sudanese society was to capture state power forcibly.

³⁴⁰ Ibid,84.

Chapter Three

Al-Turabi's *Umma*: Power as a Capacity

Introduction

Under Al-Turabi's leadership the SIM captured state power, giving it the capacity to impose its religious ideology as a domination tool over Sudanese society. Also, Al-Turabi wanted to export the SIM's religious ideology into other countries. To do this, he aided like-minded radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Both of these countries faced social and political peculiarities that led the leadership of the SIM to believe they could spread their religious ideology and their "civilization project" into those countries. Later, while Al-Turabi had ideological power as a capacity over the state, and was exporting his ideology, a power conflict within the SIM appeared between Al-Turabi and Al-Bashir, the head of the SIM's military faction. This power struggle led to the palace coup of 1999. Most members of the SIM had sided with Al-Bashir in that coup, as factionalism and a power conflict had appeared within the SIM. The factionalism appeared while SIM leaders and members were capturing state power, through attaining sensitive positions within the military, security, and state bureaucracies to impose their "civilization project" in and out of the Sudan. Hence, when the power conflict within the SIM/National Islamic Front (NIF) regime appeared irreversible and uncontrollable, many of the SIM/NIF elites had their own interests to secure, and so they sided with the Islamist military faction in the palace coup.

The Civilization Project from Above: Totalitarianism in the Sudan

Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the SIM installed its members in influential government positions to implement its religious ideology on the Sudanese society.³⁴¹ Gilles Kepel describes the SIM's ideological imposition after the military coup as "Islamization from the top."³⁴² The SIM imposed its own understanding of sharia in the country, centralized political authority in its own favor, created security and military organizations to secure its regime's survival, imposed its religious ideology on civil society, other religions, and traditional Sufi orders, controlled education in the country, and restricted press freedom. It created the Ministry of Social

³⁴¹ At first it was not clear that Al-Turabi was the mastermind of the new regime, as he had made a deal with the military faction that Al-Bashir would go to the presidential palace to be the president, and Al-Turabi would go to jail as a prisoner.

³⁴² Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 179–180.

Planning to help spread its civilization project throughout the entire country.³⁴³ A number of the movement's members who later became part of the ruling elite were part of the totalitarian process in Sudan: Ali Osman Mohammad Taha, Ghazi Salah Al-Din Atabani, Mustafa Osman, Omar Al-Bashir, Nafie Ali Nafie, Ali Karti, Abdel Raheem Hussein, Al-Tayeb Ibrahim, and Bakri Hassan Saleh.³⁴⁴ As means of political domination, the SIM had used the state as a capacity to impose its radical religious ideology on the Sudanese masses. As ideologue of the SIM and the head of its political wing, the NIF, Al-Turabi was the de facto leader of the Sudan, while president Al-Bashir was a nominal figure who had to obey the commands of Al-Turabi, since the regime and the state were controlled by SIM members.

In January 1991, Lieutenant-General Al-Bashir, then chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), decreed the enactment of the Criminal Act law, based on sharia.³⁴⁵ This new act was the same criminal bill of 1988 that Al-Turabi drafted when he was minister of justice and attorney general in Al-Mahdi's government.³⁴⁶ The legal underpinnings for an Islamist political system were consolidated in April and May of that year, during the National Founding Conference for the political system.³⁴⁷ The National Charter for Political Action produced by this conference asserted that "our intellectual, spiritual and cultural values spring from our subservience to one God, and our belief that he is the sole authority in this world and the world after."³⁴⁸ Adherence to those principles "is the only guarantee for a religious society," and jihad against internal and external threat is a religious obligation.³⁴⁹ Those principles were embodied in the 1999 penal code that restored amputations and flogging; crimes punishable by death included murder, apostasy from Islam, adultery, corruption, embezzlement, trafficking narcotics or black-market goods, disregarding currency regulations, and organizing strikes.³⁵⁰ In October 1993, the NIF civilian government made a commitment to use Islam as an obligatory guiding religion for citizens.³⁵¹ The government rejected the concept of *ahl al-dhimma*, which granted Christians and Jews communal legal status

³⁴³ "Civilization project" refers to the restructuring of the society towards the SIM's ideology.

³⁴⁴ Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 150–151.

³⁴⁵ Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 219.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 219.

³⁴⁷ Peter Nyot Kok, *Governance and Conflict in the Sudan* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1996), 156–157

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 156–157.

³⁴⁹ Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 1998), 129.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 129–130.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 130.

with specific obligations and separate communal courts.³⁵² For example, on each Friday, the Khartoum commissioner would close all public places and businesses, including shops owned by Christians and Jews, for midday Friday prayers.³⁵³ The NIF regime imposed their radical ideology on women in particular. The Family Code of 1991 enshrined the provisions for inheritance, divorce, and child custody, but limited women's rights. The government imposed paternalistic restrictions such as forbidding women to travel abroad without a male companion, to ride alone in taxis, and etc or to work in offices along with men, and enabled the husband to decide if the woman could visit her parents, relatives, and female friends. These restrictions peaked in October 1996, when Khartoum state separated men and women in public transportation, theatres, weddings, parties, and picnics, enjoined men not to look at members of the opposite sex, and forbade men from watching women playing sports. Likewise, the regime imposed the sharia laws on women in workplaces. For example, in January 1990, the government dismissed several women from the diplomatic service by insinuating that they had loose morals.³⁵⁴

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)/NIF regime moved to secure its control over the Sudan with paramilitary organizations. To secure their foothold on power the RCC had formed the Internal Security-Security of the Revolution (IS-SOR). The IS-SOR was under the command of Colonel and later Brigadier-General Bakri Hassan Saleh, was composed mainly of NIF members.³⁵⁵ The IS-SOR showed that it had independent authority by the use of extreme brutality.³⁵⁶ Its detention centers were known as "ghost houses," where it used brutal torture.³⁵⁷ In later years, the role of the IS-SOR was divided into external and internal security agencies. In January 1995, Nafie Ali Nafie was appointed director of the Internal Security Organization (ISO),³⁵⁸ and between 1993 and 1999, Qutbi Al-Mahdi was the head of the External Security Organization (ESO).³⁵⁹

After taking power, the RCC fired 400 police officers and later pensioned off thousands more, and the NIF operated its own units: Revolutionary Security Guards (RSG),

³⁵² Ibid., 131.

³⁵³ Ibid., 132.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 134.

³⁵⁵ J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 14.

³⁵⁶ Ibid., 14.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., 14.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 160.

³⁵⁹ "Qutbi Al-Mahdi," *Sudan Tribune*, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot778>, accessed January 6, 2015.

Guardians of Morality and Advocates of Good (GMAG), and the People's Police (PP).³⁶⁰ In 1989, the RSG was established to oversee all matters of security; they were well known for detaining political dissidents in the ghost houses.³⁶¹ According to Human Rights Watch/Africa, its torture techniques included immersing the head in cold water, hanging by the hand on the bars of the cell, burning with cigarette ends, electric shock, mock execution, rape, and pulling out fingernails.³⁶²

The PP was formed as part of the 1991 Defense Act: their alleged purpose was to assist in case of natural disasters or foreign attacks.³⁶³ However, their real purpose was to spy on their own neighborhoods and to report suspicious activities or infractions of the social laws, such as private parties held without permit from the authorities.³⁶⁴ The PP received three months' training, patrolled residential areas and markets to combat vice and enforce the public discipline law, and had wide latitude in defining moral offenses and imposing punishments.³⁶⁵ By 1995, they manned 120 police stations in Khartoum, and guarded camps for displaced persons outside the capital.³⁶⁶

Al-Turabi created the People's Defense Forces (PDF) as an alternative to the SAF to carry out the mission of a comprehensive call for jihad and to protect the regime from any SAF coups and the rebellion in the south.³⁶⁷ The PDF recruits were from tribal militias, volunteers, recruits from the ranks of the Islamists, compulsorily conscripted students and civil servants, and forcibly drafted males between the ages of 18 and 30.³⁶⁸ The recruits were given military training by instructors from the army and indoctrination from a group of Islamist ideologues headed by Ibrahim Al-Sanousi, a senior and close ally of Al-Turabi.³⁶⁹ After weeks of training they would be sent to war zones.³⁷⁰ The PDF was accountable to an SAF brigadiergeneral, originally Brigadier Babiker Abdel-Mahmoud Hassan, and answerable directly to President Al-Bashir.³⁷¹ Recruitment was managed by a hierarchy of civilian PDF coordinators at the

³⁶⁰ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 136–137.

³⁶¹ Diana Childress, *Omar al-Bashir's Sudan* (Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2009), 112.

³⁶² Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 137.

³⁶³ Childress, *Omar al-Bashir's Sudan*, 111.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁶⁵ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 137.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 137.

³⁶⁷ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 121.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 121.

³⁷¹ Jago Salman, "A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces," *Small Arms Survey* (2007): 14, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-10-Paramilitary-Revolution.pdf>, accessed January 4, 2015.

national, state, local, and community levels.³⁷² Ali Karti was the coordinating director of the PDF,³⁷³ making him a very powerful and influential NIF member within the regime and afterwards in the post-Al-Turabi regime.³⁷⁴

To impose its ideology the National Islamic Front (NIF) further controlled the state by manipulating its governing structure. In January 1992, the RCC announced the establishment of an appointed 330-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) leaders of the major tribes were appointed to this assembly in order to co-opt them and to bolster its legitimacy.³⁷⁵ The TNA was ineffective, as it was used merely to legitimize the RCC and to impose the NIF's influence. Most government bills were passed without serious debate, and some members expressed concerns that drafts were introduced by NIF task forces without the knowledge of either the attorney general or the relevant TNA committee.³⁷⁶

With the TNA lacking legitimacy and credibility, the new regime moved for elections of the National Assembly and the presidency, which were held March 6–17, 1996.³⁷⁷ According to constitutional decree number 13(24th of 1995), MPs were selected in a two-stage process. 125 members were chosen by the National Congress (NC), which the NIF stage-managed in January 1996 and for which Ghazi Atabani served as secretary general.³⁷⁸ The manipulation of the election process was in favor of the NIF, as Al-Turabi was elected as the speaker of the National Assembly, and Al-Bashir became the president of the Sudan.³⁷⁹ Additionally, the regime applied a federal system that was based on the NIF's Sudan Charter.³⁸⁰ This system gave the central government the authority over national defense, security, foreign policy, nationality, and similar areas, also, Khartoum controlled the judiciary and legal codes, the financial system, economic planning, natural resources, and education.³⁸¹

³⁷² Ibid., 14.

³⁷³ Jemera Rone, *Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), 326.

³⁷⁴ Ali Karti was a member of the SIM and the NIF. He served in many positions in the NIF regime to help impose its ideology on the Sudan.

³⁷⁵ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 121.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., 121.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 124.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 124. The NC would later become the National Congress Party (NCP). In effect, Atabani was the first secretary general of the NCP. Atabani was an important member of the SIM, a close associate of Al-Turabi, and served the SIM in the NIF regime. After the SIM split he held several posts in the NCP government.

³⁷⁹ Ibid., 124–125.

³⁸⁰ Ibid., 126.

³⁸¹ Ibid., 126.

The NIF regime restricted freedom, and controlled the educational system as a way to impose its ideology on Sudanese society from above. As the RCC failed to stop independent trade unions from protesting against the regime, the NIF/RCC decided to control the behavior of those unions and even installed NIF members in them. The RCC dissolved the bar association and detained ten of its leaders, who had protested against the removal of judges, the dissolution of unions, and the establishment of military tribunals, also the government then formed its own bar association, that endorsed the Islamic laws.³⁸² In March 1993, the NIF cadres won the bar association elections despite urgent appeals to the high court to cancel the elections.³⁸³

The regime imposed its religious ideology on the Christians and their institutions. The government removed hundreds of Christians from civil service and the judiciary, and the Christians faced mounting social and legal discrimination; for example, Christian civil servants had to be trained in the PDF even though its ideology promoted jihad and disparaged Christianity.³⁸⁴ The government relocated squatters from the capital to remote sites, blocking churches from assisting the people and operating schools in those new locations, while Islamic agencies opened Arabic-language schools and provided social aid, through which they encouraged conversions to Islam.³⁸⁵ After the Peaceful Coexistence Conference of April 1993 and the religious dialogues of 1994, which were designed to persuade foreign clergy and scholars that the government did not discriminate against non-Muslims, the government enacted the Organization of Voluntary Work Act in 1994 to transform churches into NGOs, to abolish the churches' autonomy and bring them under the state's control.³⁸⁶ The churches challenged this move; the government delayed its enactment and the churches' status remained in limbo.³⁸⁷

The regime further imposed its religious ideology by allowing NIF charitable associations such as the Islamic Da'wa Organization (IDO) and the African Islamic Relief Agency (AIRA), to expand since their proselytizing activities advanced the NIF's religious goals.³⁸⁸ Between 1990 and 1993, the regime confiscated the properties,

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 138.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 139.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 139.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 140.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 141.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 141–142.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

financial assets of both the Marghani and Mahdi families, and dissolved their respective Sufi orders.³⁸⁹ Although the regime tried to clamp down on the Ansar Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadiyah *tariqa*, Al-Bashir had allowed the order to resume its activities in November 1994, because he realized that the NIF's attack on such a group would damage the regime's credibility among pious Muslims.³⁹⁰

The NIF government also used the educational system to impose its religious ideology on the youth of the country. The new regime purged the Ministry of Education, replaced administrators and educators with NIF adherents, banned the elected faculty unions in the universities, and Islamized the curriculum, and allowed NIF-controlled student unions in the universities to continue its function because they supported the regime.³⁹¹

To secure the power of the regime and impose its religious ideology, the government moved to control the media and information in the country. It controlled and channeled information in the newspapers, radio, and television, and the RCC quickly banned the journalists' union, restricted the import of foreign newspapers, closed newspapers affiliated with political parties, and shut down nearly all independent newspapers.³⁹² Even NIF newspapers were closed if they were critical of the regime; for instance, *Al-Sudan Al-Duwali*, was banned on April 4, 1994, its printing presses were confiscated, and two of its editors were arrested along with Urawh.³⁹³ Additionally, the government harassed foreign correspondents and banned the import of satellite dishes.³⁹⁴

The regime took steps to purge the civil services and fill them with NIF individuals. Relying on the power of the second constitutional order, the regime entrusted this task to Lieutenant Colonel Al-Tayeb Mohamed Khair, then the cabinet affairs minister.³⁹⁵ In slightly more than four years, 73,640 people were laid off from various state organs and departments.³⁹⁶

The Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) developed the ministry of social planning to restructure Sudanese society towards accepting its radical religious ideology, by Islamizing it through its grand project of "Al-Mashru Al-Hadari" ('Civilization

³⁸⁹ Ibid., 142.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 142–143.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 143.

³⁹² Ibid., 145.

³⁹³ Ibid., 145–146.

³⁹⁴ Ibid., 146.

³⁹⁵ Abdel Salam Sidahmed and ElSir Sidahmed, *Sudan* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 58.

³⁹⁶ Sidahmed and ElSir Sidahmed, *Sudan*, 58.

Project’).³⁹⁷ The concept cannot be defined, except to describe it as the use of state power to socially transform a society. According to an interview conducted with Al-Turabi in March 1993 by the London-based magazine *Impact International*, the plan of his regime was “to Islamise public life—civil, business, police, military, economy and culture in all dimensions, and when I say ‘Islamise’ I mean not only in forms, according to Islamic Sharia, but also in attitude and in disposition...Madinah is our model.”³⁹⁸The Civilization Project’s core ideas were set out in the “Al-Dawa Al-Shamla”(‘Comprehensive Call’) that peaked between 1992 and 1996, but whose principles informed official Islamization policies before and after that period.³⁹⁹There is no single definition for Comprehensive Call, as it was molded to fit different situations.⁴⁰⁰In the Nuba Mountains it was associated with jihad, while northern Sudan it was a component of ‘Islamic social planning’.⁴⁰¹

Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, Al-Turabi’s NIF deputy, was an important player in imposing and implementing the Civilization Project in Sudan.⁴⁰²He established the ministry of Social Planning, and under him, the ministry developed the concepts of comprehensive *da’wa* and Islamic *inqilab*(literally ‘coup,’ but often used to refer to total social transformation), in accordance with the NIF interpretation of the sharia.⁴⁰³

The ministry gave Taha a great deal of power. He was the overseer of the internal affairs of the entire regime, during which time the totalitarian policy of the regime established its roots.⁴⁰⁴The ministry was like a mini-cabinet: it had five junior portfolios covering the areas of welfare, youth, sports, religious endowments, and *zakat*.⁴⁰⁵Under Taha’s tenure the ministry established the Department of Da’wa and the comprehensive Da’wa Funds Association; the latter brought together most of jihadist(radical Islamist) and *da’wa* organizations active in the Sudan, both parastatals and NGOs.⁴⁰⁶Thereafter, the activities of Islamic agencies expanded.⁴⁰⁷ The regime created a hybrid collection of

³⁹⁷ M. A. Mohamed Salih, *Economic Development and Political Action in the Arab World* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 80.

³⁹⁸ “Challenging Times, but Madinah Is Our Model,” interview with Hassan Al-Turabi, *Impact International*, February 12–March 11, 1993, 9.

³⁹⁹ Alexander de Waal and A. H. Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State, Jihad in the Sudan,” in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alexander De Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 89.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁴⁰² Ali Osman Taha was an influential member within the SIM, a deputy to Al-Turabi in the NIF, and one of his closest aides and associates. He planned the 1989 NIF takeover with the SIM military faction, and helped the NIF regime to impose the SIM ideology within and outside of the Sudan.

⁴⁰³ De Waal and Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State, Jihad in the Sudan,” 89.

⁴⁰⁴ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 119.

⁴⁰⁵ Sidahmed and Sidahmed, *Sudan*, 60.

⁴⁰⁶ De Waal and Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State, Jihad in the Sudan,” 90.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 90.

charitable companies, which enjoyed exemptions from business taxes and customs duties because of their contribution to the jihad effort in the south.⁴⁰⁸ For example, any company could qualify as a charitable organization and become eligible to receive government concessions on taxes and duties worth millions if it made a one-time donation of 5000 USD to the PDF.⁴⁰⁹ In a very short time, the jihad business was turned into a corporation with registered offshore NGOs; in addition to bankrolling the jihad and the comprehensive-religious-call enterprises, these NGOs were licensed to conduct business.⁴¹⁰ They formed a funding alternative by raising money in the Gulf, which the cash-strapped government encouraged.⁴¹¹ In addition, the *zakat* that was collected by the state became a source of support for the local jihad in the south and in the Nuba Mountains.⁴¹² Thus, Ali Osman Taha had control over the internal affairs and the organizational structure of local jihad, while Al-Turabi took charge of the global jihad.⁴¹³

The Civilization Project: Expansion of the Islamists' *Umma*

Under the unquestioned leadership of Al-Turabi, the SIM used the powers of the captured state to impose its radical religious ideology on the Sudanese masses as a tool of political domination. It also sought to export its radical religious ideology into other countries in the region. In late April 1992, Al-Turabi delivered a speech before the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, London, England, in which he defined his Muslim world view.⁴¹⁴ He said that the greatest prejudice to Muslim unity was the introduction of nation states, with nationalist ideology, state boundaries, sovereign authority, and “paramount national interest.” Decolonization and independence had only solidified the power of nationalism at the expense the Muslim community, the Dar Al-Islam. Although the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) had derived from the spirit of pan-Islamism, it had “turned out to be politically impotent, and totally unrepresentative of the true spirit of the community that animates the Muslim people. The Gulf War that did more than anything else to arouse the Muslim masses and gave impetus to the international manifestation

⁴⁰⁸ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 120.

⁴⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, *God, Oil, and Country: Changing Logic of War in Sudan* (Brussels: The International Crisis Group Press, 2002), 104.

⁴¹⁰ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 120.

⁴¹¹ International Crisis Group, *God, Oil, and Country*, 104.

⁴¹² Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 120.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁴¹⁴ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 94.

of pan-Islam. . . . Charitable, missionary, scholarly, and mystic orders of international dimensions are proliferating among Muslims.” Islamic banks, insurance organizations, and business enterprises were “operating multi-nationally.” The ease of travel made possible the diffusion of information to revive Islam throughout the Muslim world: “people are in general are associating more and more, indirectly through the media or directly through travels and reunions.” And from this web of Islamist interests there was emerging a “popular *khilafat* drive,” the faith by which the Muslim world’s “ultimate ideal” could be achieved.⁴¹⁵

Al-Turabi’s lecture confirmed, that, like other radical Islamists, he and the leaders of the SIM did not recognize state borders and wanted to resurrect the *umma* caliphate from the Sudan. He saw the Muslim world as an integral whole, and had positioned Sudan as a leader of radical Islam.⁴¹⁶ He was trying to turn Islam’s lack of a theory of nationalism to his advantage, by pretending that it had instead a theory of internationalism or, to be precise, international revolution.⁴¹⁷ Having been so successful in imposing sharia and jihadism in the Sudan, the SIM believed that its ideology could be exported to other countries in the region. Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, both local and global jihad were developed by a quasi-official entity named the Arab and Islamic Bureau (AIB).⁴¹⁸ The AIB included the other main Islamist political and security leaders, such as Taha, Nafie Ali Nafie, Al-Tayyib Ibrahim, Mahjoub Al-Khalifa, and Qutbi Al-Mahdi.⁴¹⁹ In the 1990s the SIM used the Sudan as their base for spreading their ideology by coordinating with other like-minded Islamist groups, using the SIM’s/the regime’s civil organizations to impose their civilization project in the targeted countries, providing safe havens to radical Islamists in the Sudan, and providing training and arms to radical Islamists. Possibly the SIM learned from its own experience that radical movements like theirs cannot, on their own, remove the established elites in their countries to become the new state elites; hence, the like-minded Islamists in other countries had to be supported by the SIM and its state power

⁴¹⁵ Hassan Al-Turabi, “Islam as a Pan-National Movement and Nation-States: An Islamic Doctrine of Human Association,” A lecture presented at the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce, London, April 27 1992, reprinted (London, The Sudan Foundation, 1992).

⁴¹⁶ De Waal and Abdel Salam, “Islamism, State, Jihad in the Sudan,” 82–83.

⁴¹⁷ Alexander De Waal, “The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989–2001,” in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alexander De Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 193.

⁴¹⁸ Alexander De Waal, “Averting Genocide in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan,” http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal2/, accessed December 27, 2014.

⁴¹⁹ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 120. All of these men are senior party leaders and security leaders of the SIM and the NIF regime.

in order to succeed. After capturing state power, Al-Turabi duly mobilized his cadres to set up alternative structures for international Islamism.⁴²⁰

Under Al-Turabi, the SIM opened a front to impose its radical ideology outside of the Sudan using the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC). The appearance of the PAIC was a response to the first Gulf War (August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991) as well as an attempt to develop an alternative to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).⁴²¹ The conference was the culmination of a quarter century of study, political activity, and international travels by Al-Turabi, during which he met with Islamists throughout the Muslim world where his rhetoric and ability were acknowledged in that exclusive fraternity.⁴²² The organization was a gathering of radical Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, individuals who would later form Al-Qaeda, and Islamists from other regions of the world. Iran, whose foreign policy included establishing Shia Islam in Africa, gave 100 million USD to encourage Al-Turabi's belief in the unity of Islam by supporting the conference as a bond between Sunni and Shia Islam.⁴²³ There were also numerous individual patrons, such as like-minded Saudis including Osama Bin Laden, who had begun to invest in the Sudan.⁴²⁴ The PAIC established a permanent secretariat in the Sudan with Al-Turabi as its secretary general and Al-Sanousi as deputy secretary general, the latter also retaining his post of directing indoctrination for the Sudanese PDF.⁴²⁵ With the success of the Iran-Iraq negotiations in lifting a decade-old blockade against Iraq, the PAIC had become a major institution in the Muslim world.⁴²⁶ Radical Islamist organizations such as Jama'at Al-Islami of Pakistan and India, Hizb-i-Islami and Jamiat-i Islami of Afghanistan, and Hizb-ul Mujahidin of Kashmir, joined it, providing assistance to and working closely with Islamists from Egypt, Hezbollah, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and the NIF in the Sudan.⁴²⁷ The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) was a member of the PIAC.⁴²⁸ In 1992, Al-Turabi established Somalia's Al-Itihaad Al-

⁴²⁰ De Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989–2001," 193.

⁴²¹ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 57.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴²³ Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 56.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, 60. Ibrahim Al Sanousi, a member of the SIM and a loyal ally and aide to Al-Turabi, was one of the few SIM members who sided with Al-Turabi during the palace coup of 1999. He later became deputy head to Al-Turabi in the Popular Congress Party that formed after the SIM split.

⁴²⁶ Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 62.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁴²⁸ Stefano Belluci and Massimo Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements: Islam and Politics in the Horn of Africa," in *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 109.

Islamiya (AIAI).⁴²⁹ Because of Al-Turabi's leadership in the PAIC, and his contribution in creating the AIAI, the AIAI was also a member of the PAIC.

Radical Islamism in East Africa

Under Al-Turabi's guidance, the SIM was exporting its ideology into East Africa, using the Sudan to support likeminded radical Islamist movements. African leaders were aware that the PAIC was promoting Islamic outreach (*da'wa*) south of the Sahara.⁴³⁰ The "civilization project" of Al-Turabi, devoted to the spread of Islamist ideology to Africa, accompanied by seminars and conferences for the "Islamization of Africa south of the Sahara," had caused widespread worry.⁴³¹ Like the Iranian regime wanting to export its religious ideology to other countries in the Middle East, the SIM wanted to export its Wahhabi radical religious ideology into East Africa by supporting similar radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia.

To explain why and how the SIM was supporting the EIJM and the AIAI (along with other Islamists), this section of the chapter will describe how these organizations appeared in their respective countries as a result of peculiar social-political situations. It will explain the importance and the influence of religion in Eritrea and Somalia, similar to the Sudan, and the way in which religion was politicized in both of these countries.

Two things linked the SIM to other like-minded radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. First, in terms of ideology, all three movements wanted to impose a "civilization project" in their own countries, disregarding the established borders. Second, the SIM provided practical support for the radical Islamists movements in Eritrea and Somalia.

In Somalia, this was an effect of the radicalization of political Islam and clan-based civil war, while in Eritrea, the situation was a competition between various insurgencies to liberate and shape the Eritrean state according to their competing ideologies. In both cases, the goal of the competing groups was the capture of state power. Therefore, the situations in both countries gave the opportunity for the SIM to use the EIJM and AIAI to export and impose its radical religious ideology of its "civilization project". This

⁴²⁹ Shaul Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror* (London and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 78.

⁴³⁰ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 181.

⁴³¹ Clark Staten, *Muslim Incursion into Africa* (Chicago: Emergency and Response Research Institute, 1996).

section will explain how the SIM helped each of these like-minded radical Islamist movements, ideologically and practically.

In Somalia, the SIM used its NGOs, Sudanese government NGOs, and the Sudanese state to provide direct military training and arms and direct coordination to AIAI. In the case of the EIJM, which was formed from radical Islamist groups based in the Sudan, the Sudan allowed EIJM to recruit from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan, and to use Sudanese borders to attack the Eritrean state. The Sudan provided them with weapons and training, and even coordinated with them on attacks against Eritrea. However, it should be added that the SIM also supported the Marxist Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), but this seemed to be more of a tactical alliance against the Ethiopian communist regime that sheltered and supported the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Nonetheless, after Eritrea became independent the SIM again supported the EIJM to spread its radical ideology into Eritrea, causing a rupture of diplomacy between the two countries and leading Eritrea to support Sudanese opposition groups against the Sudanese SIM/NIF regime.

Somalia: History and Political Islam

Somalia stands at the tip of the Horn of Africa, and directly faces the Gulf of Aden and Yemen to the north. Ethnically and culturally the Somali people belong to the Hamitic group.⁴³² The primary division in the Somali nation is between the Samale and the Sab.⁴³³ The Samale make up the bulk of the population of the Somali Republic.⁴³⁴ They are subdivided into the clan-families of the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye, and Darod, all of whom are pastoral nomads and physically distributed all across the land.⁴³⁵ The Sab tribes are less numerous, less widely distributed, and contain only two major divisions, the Digil and Rahanweyn clans.⁴³⁶ Their mode of production is pastoral-cultivation.⁴³⁷ From the beginnings of Islam, the religion found its way into Somalia. There is a strong belief that the ancestor of the Somalis is a descendant of the household of Prophet Muhammad, so that all Somalis belong to the Hashemite stock of the Qurayshi clan.⁴³⁸ In Somalia, it is hard to separate Sufism and orthodox Islam, as local Sufism

⁴³² I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1998), 4.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 6–7.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 6–7.

⁴³⁸ Mohamed Haji Mukhtar, "Islam in Somali History: Fact and Fiction," in *The Invention of Somalia*, ed. Ali Jimale Ahmed (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1995), 1–2.

displays some specifically Somali features.⁴³⁹ Among Sufis, as among Somalis generally, genealogy is important.⁴⁴⁰ However, clans have more power than religious orders. At the local level, Sufi lodges are affiliated with tribes, from which they acquire land and members and towards which they recognize an obligation.⁴⁴¹ Consequently, these Sufi sheiks are not normally political leaders, and only in exceptional circumstances do they assume political power.⁴⁴² The Sufi orders in Somalia are the Qadiriya, which was the first one established and which remained dominant throughout the colonial era with a strong missionary orientation, and the Salahiya and Ahmadiya orders, which were established in the nineteenth century.⁴⁴³

Unlike the Sudan and Eritrea, the colonial powers of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland did not collaborate with Sufi orders; however, the influence of political Islam was evident after Somalia's independence.⁴⁴⁴ The colonial powers were hostile to any attempt to give any type of Islam a political voice, and developed measures to prevent political Islam from gaining visibility and social recognition.⁴⁴⁵ However, it was rather difficult for the Europeans to put an end to the endless reorganization of political Islam within civil society.⁴⁴⁶ Moreover, during the decolonization period, when the colonizers were encouraging liberal democracies through secular parties, political Islam was prevalent. For instance, among the founders of the Somali Youth League, which was a nationalist party, were two religious figures: AbdulKader Sekhawe Din and Hajji Muhammad Hussain (president of the party from 1957 to 1958).⁴⁴⁷ From its independence on July 1, 1960 until October 1969, Somalia was ruled by civilian governments; though not fully democratic, the system was semi-competitive.⁴⁴⁸ The elections and the continuous debate on the writing of the Somali language were under Islamic scrutiny.⁴⁴⁹ In the 1969 elections, the role of the religious leaders was not specific, as everyone was campaigning among his kinsmen, and it would have been

⁴³⁹ Brock Millman, *British Somaliland: An Administrative History, 1920–1960* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴⁴¹ I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society* (London: HAAN Associates Publishing, 1998), 13.

⁴⁴² Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia*, 15.

⁴⁴³ Millman, *British Somaliland*, 10.

⁴⁴⁴ The two colonial territories were integrated in July 1960 to form the Somali Republic.

⁴⁴⁵ Belluci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 104–105.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁴⁴⁸ Roland Marchal, "Islam Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War before and after September 11," in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alexander De Wall (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 117.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 117.

difficult to claim that any Islamic trend was represented in the parliament, though some MPs were known to be more religious than others.⁴⁵⁰

Although the October 1969 military coup resulted in the removal of political Islam from influence in state power, the junta regime, along with outside factors, furthered political Islam and radicalized it. The Barre regime wanted to impose scientific socialism on a society that was not fully urbanized, causing the radicalization of the political Islamists. In 1972, the regime decided that the Latin alphabet should be used in the writing of the Somali language, which was a blow to Islamism.⁴⁵¹ In 1975, the regime introduced a family code that provided for equal inheritance rights for women and men.⁴⁵² Religious men found this law provocative and reacted accordingly, resulting in the execution of ten religious men and the complete prohibition of political parties.⁴⁵³ Therefore, the organization of Islamic opposition took place within the Somali diaspora abroad.⁴⁵⁴ In February 1974, Somalia became a member of the Arab League in order to gain increased international aid and support against Ethiopia's growing strength.⁴⁵⁵ This encouraged the influence of radical political Islam, because grants and scholarships from the Arab League helped increase the number of Somali students trained in foreign religious institutions, not only in the still quiet Sudan, but also at Al-Azhar and in Saudi Arabia where political Islamic trends were developing.⁴⁵⁶ The Somali defeat in the Ogaden war of 1977–1978 against Ethiopia, along with other factors, further contributed to the radicalization of political Islamism. The Iranian revolution of 1979 also significantly fostered the development of political Islam in the region,⁴⁵⁷ and in the 1980s there was mass labor immigration from Somalia to the gulf.⁴⁵⁸ Continuous crises at home contributed to the prolonging the stay of immigrants in host countries, so that young people attended schools managed by Islamic charities and organizations that did not teach the separation of religion and state.⁴⁵⁹ For example, in 1967 the African Islamic Center, now known as the International University of Africa, opened in the Sudan to provide training in Arabic and Islamic studies to young African

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁵² Bellucci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 107.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴⁵⁵ Marchal, "Islam Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," 118.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁴⁵⁹ Bellucci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 108. This happened to all the immigrants from the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

students.⁴⁶⁰The decline of communism opened a chance for political Islam in the region.⁴⁶¹ The next step was to develop an Islamic state,a development that was helped by funding from Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf States, and the diasporic *umma*.⁴⁶² Additionally, because of the repressive nature of the Siad Barre regime, many intellectuals and cadres were jailed in the 1980s and, like their predecessors, were denied any reading materials except for the Quran and the *tafsir* books.⁴⁶³ Thus, both endogenous and exogenous factors contributed to the development and the advancement of radicalized political Islamists in Somalia.

Islamist movements in Somalia showed a desire to establish a unique form of Islamic regime in Somalia.⁴⁶⁴ The differences between the movements were mainly doctrinal: Traditionalist, Reformists, Modernists, Salafis, Jihadists, and others.⁴⁶⁵ Other distinctions between the groups were based on differences of leadership, dominant clan affiliation, and sectorial interests.⁴⁶⁶ There are three categories of Islamic movements in Somalia: Political Islamism, Missionary Islamism, and Jihadi Islamism.⁴⁶⁷ Jihadi Islamism is based on a commitment to violence and armed resistance against what is perceived as the continuing onslaught of the enemies of Islam.⁴⁶⁸ Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) is an example of a Jihadi Islamist group.⁴⁶⁹

Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) wanted to capitalize on the collapse of the state of Somalia (which collapsed in 1991) as this would help the SIM to spread its radical ideology outside of the Sudan. To achieve the SIM's ideological goals in Somalia the SIM had used its NGOs, the Sudanese government organizations, to provide food and material support and to establish jihadist groups. The first goal of the Sudanese charities in Somalia was to destabilize other foreign charities, including the Islamic Da'wa Organization (IDO), Mercy International, the African Islamic Relief Agency (IARA), the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the Muwafaq Foundation.⁴⁷⁰ This was part of a strategy to eliminate western NGOs

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., 108.

⁴⁶² Ibid., 108.

⁴⁶³ Marchal, "Islam Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," 120.

⁴⁶⁴ Shaul Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* (London and New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 37

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., 38.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid., 42.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid., 42–46.

⁴⁷⁰ Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 126.

operating in Somalia in order to insure that the work of the Islamic relief agencies was not disturbed.⁴⁷¹

The Sudanese government used its Council for International People's Friendship (CIPF) to extend financial aid to Somalia, and other Sudanese organizations, including the Sudan Peace and Development foundation and the National Youth Organization Association, were active in Somalia as early as 1992.⁴⁷² In 1992–1993 the Sudanese government sent 100,000 tons of food aid to Somalia and supposedly provided scholarships for 10,000 Somali students.⁴⁷³

In 1992, Al-Turabi established AIAI, an umbrella organization of several radical Islamist groups, which was the main and direct platform for the funneling Sudanese influence into Somalia.⁴⁷⁴ AIAI believed that the only way to liberate Somalia from the corruption, oppression, and tribalism that had characterized Siad Barre's regime was to adopt political Islam.⁴⁷⁵ AIAI armed itself and established organizational rules to differentiate between sympathizers and full members, and thereby exercised effective organizational discipline, including confidentiality of its internal discussions.⁴⁷⁶ Its strategy for taking power by violence was one of its major differences with other Islamists groups. Another difference was that it recruited urban and semi-educated youth, while other groups were giving priority to nomads.⁴⁷⁷ To a large extent AIAI was the only group that set up a national or at least a regional strategy and tried to organize its activities all over Somalia, as well as in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.⁴⁷⁸ These activities were under Al-Turabi's express guidance.⁴⁷⁹ Mohammed Othman, the leader of AIAI, was based in London, and dealt mainly with informational and propaganda-related activities, while the fighting was done by the local commanders in Somalia, who received instructions directly from Sudan and Iran.⁴⁸⁰ AIAI was also used by the SIM to obtain relief supplies in order to secure its growing influence in Somalia. For

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., 126.

⁴⁷² Ibid., 126.

⁴⁷³ "Abd el-Bagi Mohamed Hassan," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, March 6, 1993, <http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/who-s-who/1993/03/06/abd-el-bagi-mohamed-hassan,18926-ART>, accessed February 17, 2015.

⁴⁷⁴ Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 78.

⁴⁷⁵ Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration*, 43.

⁴⁷⁶ Marchal, "Islam Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," 125.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., 125.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid., 125.

⁴⁷⁹ Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 78. There is controversy as to the exact year of the founding of AIAI. Shay asserts in this book that it was 1992, but in his other book he states that the movement's initial success started in 1991. Other scholars agree that the movement appeared in 1992.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., 78.

example, when aid shipments arrived at Merca port in late 1992, AIAI guarded them from being looted.⁴⁸¹

AIAI needed economic power to impose religious doctrine in Somalia, which is why it set up its own economic base. Because of the clan-based wars, AIAI could not manage to maintain control over its economic bases. Since Mogadishu was too unstable and violent, and any armed Islamic group could be seen as a direct competitor to the other more important factions (and therefore crushed), in late 1991 AIAI militias moved themselves to major coastal cities in the south: Kismaayo, Baraawe, Merca and even Boosasso in Puntland.⁴⁸² The AIAI strategy was to take control over them and use the resulting funds to increase its manpower and to fund socially-oriented projects, including mosques, schools, and the like, which they could then control.⁴⁸³ However, their control over ports such as Kismaayo was destroyed when the forces of General Aidid and Siad Barre confronted each other in the region in the spring of 1991.⁴⁸⁴ They refused to allow AIAI to manage the port, resulting in a bloody confrontation that splintered AIAI forces.⁴⁸⁵ Also, in Boosaaso in the late summer of 1992, militias led by the most secularist leader of the northeastern region, Colonel Ahmed Abdullahi Yousef, attacked AIAI forces and defeated them.⁴⁸⁶

With the defeat of AIAI, the Sudan became directly involved in the Somali theatre to aid the SIM's like-minded Islamist allies, in order to rescue the SIM's civilization project in Somalia. In August 1992, following the defeat in Boosasso, a delegation of experts headed by Rahim Safawi, the deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), and Ali Othman Taha from the Sudan arrived in Merca, Somalia to investigate the military and other needs of AIAI, together with the latter's commanders, and prepared plans for the improvement of AIAI's operational skills.⁴⁸⁷

Since the fall of 1992, weaponry was supplied and training camps were set up inside Somaliland, and in the Ogaden inside Ethiopian territory.⁴⁸⁸ The SIM was ideologically hostile towards the US-led UN mission to Somalia, believing that the mission would

⁴⁸¹ Burr and Collins, *Alms for Jihad*, 126.

⁴⁸² Marchal, "Islam Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," 127.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 128–129. The colonel was receiving support from Ethiopia. Later he became the prime minister of Somalia's Ethiopian-supported transitional government.

⁴⁸⁷ Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 79.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 79. According to Shay Bin Laden played a great role in the establishment of the training camps on Ethiopian soil.

have ended its ability to impose its ideology in Somalia. For the radical Islamists and the Sudanese regime, the UN intervention was believed to be a precursor to a “humanitarian military intervention” in Sudan.⁴⁸⁹ Indeed, some western relief agencies were calling for such an intervention in Sudan because of the humanitarian consequences of factional fighting in south Sudan.⁴⁹⁰ Importantly, the intervention spurred great interest in Somalia and its neighbors (especially Kenya) on the part of both Sudan and Al-Qaeda, as it looked to them as though, having defeated Iraq in the first Gulf War, the US was now turning its attention to the Horn of Africa.⁴⁹¹ Following the landing of the US marines in Somalia, a joint Sudanese–Iranian decision was made to initiate a struggle against the US presence, on the bases of the Sudan allies in Somalia and the terror infrastructure established in the country prior to the arrival of US forces.⁴⁹² In early summer 1993, both the Sudanese and the Iranian preparations for their campaign in Somalia were complete. Islamic terror cells started to attack UN forces in neighborhoods that were controlled by Aidid, and the Sudan had escalated the situation with propaganda asserting that the UN mission in Somalia was part of a US plan to control the Horn of Africa.⁴⁹³ In September 1993, the Sudan ordered AIAI to join in fighting the US, and an AIAI spokesman announced from Iran that his organization had prepared a series of attacks against UN forces in Somalia.⁴⁹⁴ What had allowed the SIM to achieve its secondary goal of removing the US from Somalia and the region so that it could enforce its religious ideology was the US decision to take action against Aidid’s forces. The US force was ordered to capture two of Aidid’s aides on October 3–4, 1993 in Mogadishu; however, the task force was ambushed by Somali and Islamic fighters.⁴⁹⁵ The main assault force was composed of AIAI fighters and Afghani jihadists who used 23-mm anti-aircraft artillery and RPG7s to shoot down the American helicopters.⁴⁹⁶ Aidid’s forces played the secondary role of isolating the battle area and instigating riots of unarmed civilians against the US force, making the rescue mission more cumbersome.⁴⁹⁷ As a result of the heavy American losses and traumatic film

⁴⁸⁹ De Waal, “The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn,” 196.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 196

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁴⁹² Shay, *The Red Sea Terror Triangle*, 79.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 85.

footage of mutilated American bodies, US public opinion forced President Clinton to end US task force activities in Somalia.⁴⁹⁸

Eritrea: History and Political Islam

Eritrea is a country in the horn of Africa. It shares borders with the Sudan in the west, Ethiopia in the south, and Djibouti in the southeast, and both its northeastern and eastern coastlines are on the Red Sea, overlooking Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The ethnicities in the country include Tigrinya, Tigre, Saho, Hedareb, Afar, Bilen, Rashaida, Kunama, and Nara.

As in the Sudan and Somalia, Islam has an important place in Eritrean society.⁴⁹⁹ Due to the country's proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, followers of Prophet Mohammed sought refuge there from the Aksumite emperor when they were being persecuted in Mecca in the seventh century.⁵⁰⁰ Eritrea⁵⁰¹ was therefore among the first countries in Africa to convert to Islam. In the sixteenth century, under Imam Ahmed Gran, the religion became an established part of Eritrean society.⁵⁰² In the nineteenth century, reformers changed some of the local Islamic practices and founded the first Islamic schools and courts in the country.⁵⁰³

Historically, Eritreans have followed different Islamic schools of thought over time.⁵⁰⁴ Sufism was also influential in spreading Islam in the country. Like the Sudan, Sufism had an important place in Eritrea, and power was eventually consolidated in the hands of influential Sufi orders. The impact of the Sufi orders was an important catalyst for religious expansion and dynamism, aiming at the revitalization of older Eritrean Sufi orders such as the Qadiriya and the Shadhiliyya.⁵⁰⁵ The Ad Shaykh holy family and the Marghaniyya Sufi order were also prominent in the country.⁵⁰⁶

Islam as a religion was supported in its development by both Italian and British colonialism in a way that later led to political Islam. The Italian "Muslim policy" in

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid., 85.

⁴⁹⁹ Before and during Eritrea's colonial period.

⁵⁰⁰ John L. Esposito, *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 75.

⁵⁰¹ Before it was a state with defined borders.

⁵⁰² Ibid., 75.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., 75.

⁵⁰⁴ Jonathan Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," *Die Welt des Islams* 45, no. 2 (2005): 178, http://modaina.com/PDF/the_study_of_islam_in_eritrea.pdf (accessed January 14, 2015).

⁵⁰⁵ Miran, *A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea*, 184.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., 188–194. The influential Marghaniyya order is a branch of the one in the Sudan. It used the same tactics as its Sudanese counterpart to survive Italian and British colonialism. However, its pro-independence stance was a political tactic and was not fully followed.

Eritrea was based on the colonial officials subsidizing and promoting Islamic religious activities and facilities to solidify government rule, under which Ibrahim al-Mukhtar ultimately came to fill the position of mufti.⁵⁰⁷ Al-Mukhtar served as the first head of Eritrea's Islamic court, and with the help of supporters, he had solidified his authority over what had been a largely decentralized community of clerics.⁵⁰⁸ Moreover, although he disdained both Sufism and Wahhabism, he was patient with them until he was able to take advantage of British colonialism to introduce new Islamic schools, appoint religious leaders to communities, and attempt to centralize orthodox Islam in the country.⁵⁰⁹

Both Italian (including the fascist regime) and British colonialism encouraged the advancement of political Islam in the country. The British encouraged the development of political Islam, as unionism between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not encouraged. With the blessing of the British administration, Asmara's leading pro-independence Muslim leaders convened an initial meeting at Keren in early December 1946 at the invitation of Sayyid Muhammad Abu Bakr Al-Marghani.⁵¹⁰ The Muslim League (ML) was founded; Al-Marghani became its president and Ibrahim Sultan its secretary general.⁵¹¹ Although the League leaders were later careful to avoid being labeled a purely "Islamic" organization, the founding conference illustrated that activists sought to build upon their basic strengths as a political outlet for Eritrean Muslims.⁵¹² The League was one of the important political Islam movements that called for independence. Other political Islamist movements also developed, such as the National Muslim Party of Massawa (NMPM), founded by Mohamed Umar Qadi in 1947, and the Muslim League of the Western Province, organized by Ali Muhammad Musa Rad'ay.⁵¹³

Political Islam became radicalized because of various factors. First, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 2, 1950 placing Eritrea as an "autonomous unit" under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. Under Haile Selassie's rule, Eritrean Muslims were persecuted. Ethiopia transgressed the freedom of expression

⁵⁰⁷ Joseph L. Venosa, *Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941–61* (Ohio: Ohio University, 2011), 75.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 75–86.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 100–101.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*, 100–101.

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 100–101.

⁵¹³ Haggai Erlich, "Muslim League," in *Encyclopaedia Aethiopia*, vol. 3, edited by Siegbert Uhlig (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), vol. 3, 1086–1087.

that Eritreans had enjoyed in the 1940s: it persecuted and incarcerated Eritrean Muslim nationalist activists, banned the ML's Arabic-language *Sawt Al-Rabita* newspaper, and imprisoned the members of its editorial board in 1954.⁵¹⁴ Ethiopia also imposed other measures that affected the Muslim identity in Eritrea. From the second half of the 1950s onwards there was discrimination against Eritrean Muslims in the fields of employment, business, political freedoms, education, and religion, which gradually led to their treatment as quasi-foreigners or second-class citizens at best.⁵¹⁵ The growing maltreatment and marginalization of Eritrea's Muslims under the federation pushed many into exile, mostly to Egypt and the Sudan.⁵¹⁶ Therefore, the Eritrean diaspora had founded the first national movement, the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), in the Sudan in 1958.⁵¹⁷ In the same year, in Cairo, Egypt, Muhamad Sa'id Nawd founded the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a secular-based organization that advocated for western-style democracy.⁵¹⁸ The ELF had an Arabist orientation, as the organization was founded in the heyday of Nasser and Arab nationalism. This explains why the ELF sought to build up support for its cause in the Arab world and drew its ideological and organizational inspiration in its early years from the Algerian nationalist movement, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN).⁵¹⁹

During the Ethiopian emperor Selassie's rule, from 1964 to 1974, Eritrea was annexed and repression against Muslims was intensified. For example, *qadis* were appointed as a reward for their allegiance to the government, and Muslim school curricula were abolished altogether.⁵²⁰ Ethiopian forces were given a free hand in quelling the separatists; the period was characterized by harsh and ruthless military repression in the Eritrean countryside, resulting in the shattering of Muslim communal vitality.⁵²¹ This caused a large number of Eritrean Muslims (especially from the lowlands) to flee the country, mainly to the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries of the Middle East.⁵²² When the Ethiopian communist regime came to power, the situation for the Eritreans became worse. Like Al-Nimeiry in the Sudan and Siad Barre in Somalia, the

⁵¹⁴ Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 207.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁵¹⁷ T. H. Faddab, *Harakat al-Tahrir Iritriyyawa Masiratiha al-Tarikhyya* [The Eritrean Liberation Movement and Its Historic Fate] (Cairo: Sharuf Press, 1994).

⁵¹⁸ Belluci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 106.

⁵¹⁹ Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea," 209–210.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁵²² *Ibid.*, 212.

Derg regime of Ethiopia introduced important social reforms in their country.⁵²³ The Marxist and socialist ideals that influenced those efforts did not allow for political pluralism.⁵²⁴

During the Derg regime, under the dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the situation only worsened this state of affairs, as greater force was used against various liberation movements, including the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was officially formed in 1977.⁵²⁵ Political instability and poor economic conditions in the region encouraged migration; in Eritrea and Ethiopia, most of the migrants came from the Muslim community.⁵²⁶ About one and half million of the Eritrean population moved to the Sudan, where Kassala became the main center for Eritrean political activity.⁵²⁷ Like their Somali and Sudanese counterparts, they also traveled to the Gulf countries, encountering the same education system and charity organizations. Throughout the 1980s some Eritrean refugees in Sudan were exposed to Wahhabi and Salafi influences in Sudanese schools.⁵²⁸ Two Islamist movements articulating radical discourses, the National Islamic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea (NIFLE) and the Islamic Vanguard, were created in 1982.⁵²⁹ Those organizations bonded together with another group to form the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) in late 1988, closely coinciding with the National Islamic Front's seizure of power in the Sudan in the summer of 1989.⁵³⁰ The aim of the group was to remove the Asmara government and establish an Islamic state.⁵³¹

After the military coup of June 30, 1989 in the Sudan, the National Islamic Front (NIF) hoped to extend its ideology into other countries. When Eritrea achieved its independence from Ethiopia in 1991, it seemed like a good candidate. Eritrea was then in the process of constructing a nation-state. Importantly, the lowlands of Eritrea, bordering the Sudan, are dominated by Muslims. After the EPLF defeated the Ethiopian army, there were other Eritrean factions, mainly from the lowland Muslim constituency,

⁵²³ Belluci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 107.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁵²⁵ The EPLF included both Christian and Muslim members and moved away from Arabism in favor of a more pronounced socialist and Marxist ideological orientation. Breaking off with past sectarian approaches, the EPLF emphasized the pluralist nature of Eritrean society. On the EPLF see David Pool, *From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People's Liberation Front* (Oxford and Athens, OH: James Currey and Ohio University Press, 2001).

⁵²⁶ Belluci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 107.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁵²⁸ Miran, "A Historical Overview of Islam," 212.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁵³⁰ Tom Killion, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 314.

⁵³¹ Angel Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), 69.

who were squeezed out of the ensuing political process, which was dominated by the EPLF.⁵³² Shortly after the 1989 coup, the Sudanese Islamists had armed some of the more Islamist-oriented Eritrean factions, but soon discovered that they only had the capacity to harass the EPLF and not the Ethiopian government.⁵³³ After liberation, discontent resurfaced in the Eritrean lowlands.⁵³⁴ The government failed to make headway among the communities because their leaders were not given political space, and most of those who joined the government and the party had been placed into marginal positions.⁵³⁵ With the fragmentation of command in the Sudan and overconfidence of foreign decision-making, Sudanese support for the Islamist organizations in Eritrea was resurrected.⁵³⁶ Beginning in 1993 an insurgency in Eritrea's lowlands was gathering strength; among the groups involved in the insurgency were guerrilla Islamists, including Arab Afghans.⁵³⁷ In May 1993, the Sudanese Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had provided generous funds for the EIJM, who were active among the Eritrean refugee camps in the Sudan and whose leadership was working to overthrow the Eritrean government.⁵³⁸ In December 1993, the EIJM initiated well-planned assaults from base camps in the Sudan⁵³⁹ shortly after the conclusion of the second PAIC conference in Khartoum, where Muslims from Eritrea had a substantial delegation.⁵⁴⁰ The Sudan was forcefully recruiting Eritrean refugees and training them in PDF camps, and planted anti-personal mines along the heavily traveled roads that crossed the frontier into Eritrea.⁵⁴¹ The EIJM, which was a member of the PIAC, was critical of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the ruling party in Eritrea, which they considered too secular.⁵⁴²

The SIM's Unholy Alliance with the EPLF: Machiavellianism Again

The determination of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) to expand their "civilization project" into Eritrea after independence explains why the Sudanese regime disregarded their alliance (tactical at first) with the EPLF, that had a secularist and

⁵³² De Waal, "Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa," 200–201.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, 201.

⁵³⁸ "Eritrea, Example of Judeo-Christian Plot against Muslims; Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Confronts Plot to Eradicate Arab Islamic Identity in Eritrea," Al-Rabit, Jordan, FBIS-AFR-93-147, "East Africa," August 3, 1993, 3–5.

⁵³⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Eritrea Human Rights Practices, 1994," last modified February 1995, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_africa/Eritrea.html, accessed January 20, 2015.

⁵⁴⁰ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 146

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁵⁴² Belluci and Zaccaria, "From Parties to Movements," 109.

Marxist-Leninist ideology. At the time, the NIF was also trying to impose their radical religious ideological project in South Sudan by battling the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), a secular-based opposition movement that was toying with Marxist-Leninist ideology at the time. The SPLM/A was being supported by the Ethiopian Mengistu Haile Mariam Marxist regime. Beginning in May 1983, when the Bor mutineers fled to Ethiopia, they received support from the Ethiopian regime in the form of training camps, arms, intelligence, and radio facilities.⁵⁴³ Mariam intervened directly in the leadership of the SPLM/A, insisting that the chosen leader should be loyal to him, sympathetic to his socialist ideology, and above all opposed to southern secessionism.⁵⁴⁴ The Ethiopian support for the SPLM/A was responsible for the fact that the Ethiopian opposition movements and the EPLF fused Sudanese territory as their rear bases.⁵⁴⁵ In October 1989, the SPLM/A launched its Kurmuk II operations in the Sudan.⁵⁴⁶ These consisted of SPLA troops backed by an unprecedented level of Ethiopian artillery support, and Ethiopian forces themselves were poised to cross the border to support the SPLA offensive to capture Damazin, the provisional capital of the Al-Gezira region in the Sudan.⁵⁴⁷ That city is also the site of the dam that provides water for the region and electricity for Khartoum.⁵⁴⁸ Consequently, if the area were captured the new regime would fall.⁵⁴⁹ It already had little support in the international community because it was arresting elected politicians, trade unionists, journalists, and lawyers.⁵⁵⁰ The NIF's post-coup dismissals from the SAF also reduced the SAF's military competence.⁵⁵¹ What saved the regime was its alliance with the EPLF, which led a counteroffensive by its crack commando brigade.⁵⁵² On January 1, 1990, that elite group launched a mechanized assault from Sudanese territory with coordination with the SAF, causing the defeat of the SPLA forces, capturing SPLA headquarters at Asosa, defeating Ethiopiangarrison forces in Asosa, and going deep into western Ethiopia.⁵⁵³ The NIF returned the favor by providing additional facilities to the

⁵⁴³ De Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn," 185. The Bor mutineers were members of the Sudanese army; later they became the nucleus of the SPLM/A under John Garang's leadership until his death.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*, 187–188.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, 187–188.

EPLF.⁵⁵⁴ Access to the Sudan was important to the EPLF to obtain relief supplies and fuel supplies (some of the latter were provided by the Sudanese).⁵⁵⁵ When the NIF regime first took power, they had supported Islamist-oriented Eritrean factions such as the EIJM.⁵⁵⁶ However, they quickly realized that those factions had the capacity to harass the EPLF but not the Ethiopian government.⁵⁵⁷ Moreover, realism had dictated that the Khartoum regime support the EPLF, especially after the Asosa operations.⁵⁵⁸ Consequently, from 1990 to 1992, security cooperation between the EPLF and the Sudan was extremely good, and President Isseyas of Eritrea employed Sudanese security officers.⁵⁵⁹ After the liberation of Eritrea in May 1991, the EPLF demanded the closure of the offices of the Eritrean opposition forces in the Sudan.⁵⁶⁰ Civilian and intelligence departments of the Sudan collaborated with the EPLF authorities in hunting down, arresting, and kidnapping members of the Eritrean opposition.⁵⁶¹ In early January 1992, the EPLF launched a military attack on the opposition forces in western Eritrea.⁵⁶² According to the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC), Sudanese government forces gave support to the EPLF in the offensive⁵⁶³ as the Sudanese forces crossed the border into Eritrea and attacked the oppositional forces including the Eritrean Jihad movement.⁵⁶⁴ By mid-1993, since there were excellent relations between the EPLF regime and the NIF regime, the NIF government pressured the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) to make a rapprochement with the EPLF regime, with the result that the EIJM was split into two groups.⁵⁶⁵ It was announced on August 25, 1993 that the military wing of the EIJM had dismissed its political bureau, headed by Sheikh Mohamed Arafa.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid., 188. The Sudan also supported the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in retaliation against the Ethiopian regime for supporting the SPLM/A. The EPRDF is an umbrella of political and armed groups, who were challenged the Ethiopian communist regime, and want to replace the regime and install itself in power.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., 188. The Sudanese route provided similar support for the EPRDF.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid., 201.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., 201.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid., 201.

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid., 201.

⁵⁶⁰ Tesfatsion Medhanie, *Eritrea and Neighbours in the 'New World Order': Geopolitics, Democracy and Islamic Fundamentalism* (Munster and Hamburg: Lit, 1994), 93.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid., 94.

⁵⁶² Abdul Wahab Bashir, "EPLF Accused of Repression," *Arab News*, January 26, 1992, accessed January 14, 2015.

⁵⁶³ Medhanie, *Eritrea and Neighbours in the 'New World Order'*, 94.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., 94.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., 94.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., 94.

The End of the Islamists Civil–Military Alliance: Power Conflict within the SIM

Under the leadership of Al-Turabi, the NIF regime was imposing its radical religious ideology through its totalitarianism and imposition of Al-Mashru Al-Hadari in the Sudan. It was also utilizing the civil war and clan unrest in Somalia, and the factionalized independence struggle of Eritrea, to impose its Al-Mashru Al-Hadari outside of the Sudan. By using civil society organizations, the SIM aided like-minded radical Islamists who had been educated and trained in the Sudan. The Sudan was able to provide a center of radicalization and training for these movements in East Africa because the PAIC had provided the necessary coordination. However, Al-Turabi's leadership of the "civilization project" in the Sudan and externally was now dispensable, because most of the members of the SIM had become pragmatic and wanted to maintain their own personal power in the Sudan. The Sudanese bureaucracies had changed the mentality of the leading SIM members, Sudanese oil had lessened the dependency of the regime leaders on Islamic banking, Islamic relief agencies, and the like, and the SIM was not able to subordinate its own military faction, led by Al-Bashir. Al-Turabi had seriously antagonized Al-Bashir, causing a power conflict, within the SIM that ended the duality of rule in the Sudan.

When the SIM members first infiltrated the bureaucracies in the Sudan, their purpose had been to impose their radical ideology. After the 1989 coup, when they were appointed to head and staff those same bureaucracies, the very nature of the job turned them into more pragmatic Islamists. Before this, they had never understood the effective power of state bureaucracy and its ability to shape reality at will on the basis of its monopoly over sources of knowledge.⁵⁶⁷ Any bureaucratic stratum, which is composed of government officials, salaried employees, and professionals, has a long history and chain of memory, including memories of past experiences with different dictatorial regimes.⁵⁶⁸ Because of this institutional memory and solidarity, taming this bureaucratic stratum has never been easy.⁵⁶⁹ This sector had been characterized by the exercise of delegated authority,⁵⁷⁰ making it a major mover of Sudanese politics behind

⁵⁶⁷ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 142.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁵⁷⁰ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 54.

the scenes.⁵⁷¹ Their position, potentially at the center of power and knowledge,⁵⁷² enabled them to define themselves as playing a dual role.⁵⁷³ One of these roles is as occupants of executive positions in the bureaucracy who were involved in the decision-making process of running their ministries and departments and the day-to-day running of the country.⁵⁷⁴ As the state apparatus expanded, and as the career bureaucrats began to discover that in order for the Islamist political appointees to remain in office with any degree of success they had to rely on the bureaucrats' specialized knowledge, the bureaucracy was also given a second role, which was to control and utilize their access to knowledge and information in order to counter, reduce, or neutralize the Islamists.⁵⁷⁵ As leaders and members of the SIM became part of the state bureaucracies, they thus had to become more pragmatic to secure their decision-making power.

In February 1995, there were significant cabinet changes in the NIF government. Ali Taha was appointed minister of foreign affairs, Ghazi Salah Al-Din Atabani was made state minister of foreign affairs, and Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, the interim secretary general of the PAIC, became chairman of the Sudanese People's Committee for the Defense of Sudanese.⁵⁷⁶ Ismail had previously been the secretary general of the Council for International People's Friendship (CIPF).⁵⁷⁷ The appointment of the two leading members of the SIM in the foreign ministry produced speculation that Al-Turabi had been confronted by a schism within the NIF.⁵⁷⁸

Since 1992, Taha had become more closely associated with Al-Bashir and his military colleagues of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), perhaps in order to remain in his position as minister of social planning, as he had no other choice.⁵⁷⁹ Taha began distancing himself from Al-Turabi and moving closer to Al-Bashir and his RCC

⁵⁷¹ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 142.

⁵⁷² Claude Lefort, *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 117.

⁵⁷³ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 142.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 142–143.

⁵⁷⁶ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 187. According to Burr and Collins, Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail was previously an interim secretary general of the PAIC until Al-Turabi took back his duties and functions after recovering from a coma from an attack he suffered in Canada. Ismail was also a member of the SIM and an associate of Al-Turabi. Ali Taha and Ghazi Atabani were members of the SIM, who had held various positions within the NIF in support of the SIM's "civilization project" within and outside of the Sudan.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 140. The CIPF participated in the "civilization project" in Somalia during the civil war. See Burr and Collins, *Alms for Jihad*, 126.

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

colleagues; for example, he denounced the kidnapping of Carlos the Jackal, a Venezuelan leftist, which had been arranged by Al-Turabi.⁵⁸⁰

In the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak on June 27, 1995 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, there were massive student-led demonstrations in the Sudan that threatened the regime.⁵⁸¹ Al-Bashir was disturbed that the security agencies did not anticipate those riots and that they used savage reprisals to end them.⁵⁸² Therefore, a reorganization of the security and intelligence apparatus was made. Interior Minister Al-Tayib was replaced by Bakri Hassan Salah and shunted to the Ministry of Labour and Administrative Reform; Nafie Ali Nafie was replaced in favor of Brigadier General Muhammed Mustafa Al-Dibi, a confidant of Al-Bashir; and General Dhahawi, state minister at the presidency, was replaced by Brigadier Al-Hadi Abdallah Hassan.⁵⁸³ Control of the intelligence apparatus was returned from the Islamists to the military.⁵⁸⁴ The appointments of Taha and Ghazi Atabani to important ministerial positions made them pragmatic in their relationship with Al-Turabi's leadership, as they had become part of the bureaucracy that was running the country. And when certain Islamists were removed from decision-making positions, losing their power in the institutions they had been running, they certainly became more pragmatic as a result. This may possibly have led them to join the military faction in the 1999 palace coup to regain their former power and influence in decision-making circles.

The change in the fortunes of the SIM was the driving force behind making SIM members become pragmatic in their ideology in order to maintain their own interest of having power in the Sudan. As stated earlier, the SIM relied greatly on the support from Islamic banking and their NGOs. That is why, when they captured the state, they imposed their banking system and supported their businesses under NGO names and charities. Once the NIF controlled the state, their economic empowerment became complete and the boundaries between public, private, and the party were entirely blurred.⁵⁸⁵ The hanging of a carefully selected group of three innocent young people in 1990 marked the start of a well-orchestrated process of using the state as a major tool for economic empowerment, using that state terrorism to intimidate rival elite

⁵⁸⁰ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 218.

⁵⁸¹ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 196.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, 196.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁵⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 196–197.

⁵⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

factions.⁵⁸⁶The Bank Act of 1991 effectively put the nation's entire supply of liquid money in the hands of the government, driving most of the old elite out of business.⁵⁸⁷ This allowed the state to erode the capacity of the old elite and assist the rising Islamic one. The new privatized state lacked no resources, from the selling of public enterprises, the issuing of import/export licenses, and the granting of tax exemptions, to undeclared bids for selling state-owned land real estate.⁵⁸⁸The strategy was successful in replacing the old elites or marginalizing them.⁵⁸⁹ Meanwhile, the lower and middle strata of urban entrepreneurs expanded to the extent that at least one-third of the 4,000 firms and commercial establishments registered during 1984–1994 were owned by the Islamists and their sympathizers.⁵⁹⁰

The SIM NGOs were important sources of financial aid to the SIM. The most important factor in the state's privatization and the ruling party's economic empowerment was the import tax exemptions for the Islamic NGOs.⁵⁹¹ The mushrooming of the Islamic relief organizations led by NIF members during the 1990s was instrumental in financing the party, first, through *zakat* and sympathizer funds from abroad, and second, through windfall profits accruing from local sale of customs-exempt goods.⁵⁹²The drains of these unjustifiable exemptions were huge.⁵⁹³In 1996 the minister of finance complained that exemptions had reached unsuitable levels, claiming half of the government's expected revenue.⁵⁹⁴

When oil began to be pumped out of Sudanese land, the military Islamists and the soon-to-be-pragmatic Islamists became economically and politically independent of the economic power of the SIM. Oil wealth emboldened Al-Bashir to marginalize Al-Turabi, and gave surviving members of the RCC a degree of freedom of action internationally that they did not have previously.⁵⁹⁵ In August 1999, at Port Al-Bashir, the oil terminal fifteen miles south of Port Sudan, President Al-Bashir presided over the opening ceremony for oil exports from the Sudan.⁵⁹⁶The port had a storage capacity of

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid., 70.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., 70.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid., 70–71.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., 70.

⁵⁹⁰ Atta El Battahani, *The Social and Political Impact of Economic Liberalization and Social Welfare in Sudan* (Helsinki: Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, 1996), 17.

⁵⁹¹ Ibrahim Elnur, *Contested Sudan: The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 76.

⁵⁹² Ibrahim Elnur, *Contested Sudan: The Political Economy of War and Reconstruction* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 76. *Zakat* is a system of obligatory almsgiving, whereby Muslims give a yearly percentage of their assets to help fortunate Muslims.

⁵⁹³ Ibid., 76.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid., 76.

⁵⁹⁵ Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan*, 255.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid., 255.

two million barrels, which was expected to increase to 3.2 million, while the billion-dollar pipeline would be expanded to 450,000 bpd in four to seven years.⁵⁹⁷ The Sudan became a major oil producer and a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).⁵⁹⁸ Oil certainly encouraged the SIM members of the regime to become pragmatic, since it gave them a source of economic power other than reliance on Islamic banking, the so called tax-exempted NGOs, and other financial organizations.

Even though both SIM civilian and military factions had the same interest in imposing the ideology of the SIM, they clashed over who should have a more direct role in governing, managing the country, and imposing the SIM ideology. The relations between the two factions were shaky, which eventually caused the military faction to lead the palace coup of 1999, resulting in a division within the SIM. Abdel Rahim Omer Mohi-Eldeen, who is a member of the SIM movement and who served in the post-Turabi regime after the division of the SIM, has used his insider's connections and to interview senior figures in the SIM, most of whom represent the core of the post-Al-Turabi regime (Nafie Ali Nafie, Taha, minister of defense General Abdel Raheem Hussein, etc.) and to write about the SIM, its division, and what happened to it afterwards.⁵⁹⁹ Mohi-Eldeen's book must be read with caution, as he is still a member of the movement and a member of the regime. Besides, those who were interviewed are unlikely to give the whole reason why they all joined Al-Bashir in his palace coup in 1999; they will not expose their desire for power at the cost of abandoning their godfather Al-Turabi. Nevertheless, the interviews he conducted are important as they reveal what the interviewees believed was happening to the movement before and after the military coup of June 30, 1989. Each interview is followed by a content analysis of it, which is informative as long as one considers the interviewees' point of view. The interviews will be relied upon in this section of the thesis to analyze the factors that contributed to the factionalism of the SIM after 1989 coup, the factors that led the SIM's military faction to the 1999 coup against Al-Turabi, and the reasons that most of the SIM, including Al-Turabi's closest and most loyal followers, joined the military faction in that palace coup.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid., 256

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid., 256.

⁵⁹⁹ Abdel Rahim Omer Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Sira al-hawiaa wa al-hawaa: Fitmat al-Islameen fi al-Sultah Mein Muzakirat al-Ashrah ela Muzakairat al-Tafahum Maa Garang* (Khartoum: Dar Kahil, 2012).

After the 1989 coup, Al-Turabi and other SIM leaders were not able to subordinate the SIM's military faction under their civilian authority. This ultimately explains why most of the civilian Islamists, along with the military faction of the SIM, removed Al-Turabi through the 1999 coup. After the military takeover in 1989, Al-Turabi ruled the Sudan directly, and he believed that Al-Bashir, Zubair Mohamed Salih, and other SIM military officials would not disobey orders and would be easily replaced if they did not fulfill their purpose towards the SIM.⁶⁰⁰ However, Al-Bashir, who was an ambitious member of the SIM, adopted a mentality that favored the military's point of view and eventually led him to perform his duties out of obligation rather than devotion.⁶⁰¹ It also seemed that Zubair, who was second in command in the RCC, believed that Al-Turabi wanted power; he told Al-Bashir: "Your people (the SIM) want to rule the country, and if we are not careful with them, we ought to give them the rule and return back to the army."⁶⁰² Accordingly, the SIM's military faction, under Al-Bashir's command, suspected Al-Turabi and his SIM civilians of wanting power exclusively for themselves. Al-Bashir wanted to keep his position in the military and to stay as head of state in the Sudan, but he suspected that Al-Turabi and the civilians in the SIM wanted to remove him after he and his military faction captured the state. On October 16, 1993, the RCC dissolved itself, on the condition that Al-Bashir become the president of the Islamic Republic of the Sudan.⁶⁰³ His justification for becoming president but not retiring from the military was that remaining in the military would aid in securing the revolution after the RCC was dissolved, and he did in fact use his military base later on.⁶⁰⁴ However, after dissolving the RCC, Al-Bashir became civilian president and therefore did not retain the RCC's power to issue decrees, declare war, impose a state of emergency, and abolish state legislatures, as those powers were transferred to the RCC-appointed Transitional National Assembly (TNA).⁶⁰⁵

When Al-Bashir became a civilian president, he sought to concentrate power in the hands of his allies in the SIM's military faction, as he mistrusted both Al-Turabi and the SIM civilian leadership. During his presidency, the other RCC military official was Zubair, who became his vice president.⁶⁰⁶ After the assassination attempt against

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., 218–219.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., 219.

⁶⁰² Ibid., 219.

⁶⁰³ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 197–198.

⁶⁰⁴ Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 218. All of the members of the SIM called the coup and the period immediately following it the "rescue revolution," to claim that they had changed Sudanese society by carrying out the coup.

⁶⁰⁵ Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities*, 118.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid., 118.

President Mubarak, Al-Bashir removed the minister of interior, Al-Tayib Khair, making him minister of public service; he reassigned both Nafie Ali Nafie, who had been director of foreign security, and presidential security adviser Brigadier General Faith Urwah, since they were both implicated in the Mubarak assassination attempt; and he elevated two former RCC members, Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih to minister of interior and Brigadier Salah al-Din Karrar to the presidential council.⁶⁰⁷ Al-Bashir at the time lacked the power to remove Nafie Ali Nafie, Urwah, and Khair altogether, as they were protected by Al-Turabi and could activate loyal security forces against him.⁶⁰⁸ However, as previously noted, after the student-led protests in 1995, Al-Bashir managed to bring in his military allies to lead the government and remove the heads of security that he feared.

Once he was assured that his military allies were in control in the government, Al-Bashir's support for Al-Turabi's internationalism changed. In late 1989, Osama Bin Laden, who had early discussions with Al-Turabi about investing in the Sudan, established his Wadi Al-Aqiq holding company in Khartoum, and in 1991 he moved from Saudi Arabia, where he was under house arrest, to the Sudan.⁶⁰⁹ Some of Bin Laden's agricultural investments in the Sudan were suspected to be training camps under the protection of Al-Turabi and the SIM/NIF regime.⁶¹⁰ Bin Laden was able to rebuild his Al-Qaeda in the Sudan by bringing to the Sudan his most important associates among the Arab Afghan leaders, including members of Islamic Jihad and other militant radical Islamists.⁶¹¹ As is well known, the NIF/SIM regime strongly supported Al-Qaeda. For example, it granted Al-Qaeda members passports, visas, and other consular documents, which allowed them to legally bypass certain security levels on the pretense of diplomatic immunity, easing their ability to travel across the globe.⁶¹² As the Sudan was being isolated by the international community, and the regime was not popular within the country, Al-Bashir's inner circle, composed mostly of the military heads of security, became convinced by 1996 that Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda were an unnecessary liability.⁶¹³ This was particularly true after the failed Mubarak assassination, because rumors were spreading in Khartoum that Al-Qaeda was

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid., 120.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., 120.

⁶⁰⁹ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 127.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid., 127.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., 127–128.

⁶¹² Ibid., 128.

⁶¹³ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 220.

planning to assassinate Sadiq Al-Mahdi.⁶¹⁴ This antagonized Al-Mahdi's followers, who represented a threat to the survival of the regime.⁶¹⁵ Thus, Al-Bashir proposed to the Saudi authorities to extradite Bin Laden.⁶¹⁶ That failed, because the Saudis feared domestic repercussions.⁶¹⁷ Al-Bashir then asked the Saudi authorities to act as intermediaries to facilitate the delivery of Bin Laden to the US.⁶¹⁸ To forestall a scandal that would have damaged his image, his political career, the PAIC, and his position as secretary general of the NIF, Al-Turabi contacted the Sudanese ambassador in Afghanistan, Atiya Badawi, a former Arab-Afghan fighter, to facilitate Bin Laden's return to Afghanistan.⁶¹⁹

After putting his military allies in power, Al-Bashir wanted to have control over the political system. According to Mohi-Eldeen's interview with general Abdel Raheem Hussein, who was a member of the SIM military faction, a friend of Al-Bashir, and minister of defense at the time, Hussein asserted that "Al-Bashir was not happy with the political system of the National Congress (NC), as it did not give him much or any powers, because all powers were concentrated in the hands of the NC's secretary general."⁶²⁰ Hussein further stated that this is why the "memorandum of ten" later appeared, as members of the SIM were not happy with that governing system and had given Al-Bashir powers to lead the country by virtue of his presence and leadership within the NC.⁶²¹ This memorandum was a document signed by ten leading members of the SIM, calling for reducing the power within the NCP of Al-Turabi, who was its secretary general and for transferring those powers to the chairman of the party, President Al-Bashir.⁶²² The death of vice president Zubair on February 12, 1998 encouraged Al-Bashir to expand his power even further, since he was suspicious of Al-Turabi and the SIM civilian leadership. After the death of Zubair, Al-Turabi went to Al-Bashir with a list of candidates from the SIM to take the position of vice president; one of the names was Al-Turabi himself.⁶²³ According to Yas Omar Al-Imam, who was

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., 220.

⁶¹⁵ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 220.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., 220.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., 220.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., 220. According to Collins, it was Urwah who met with the CIA officials to offer them Osama Bin Laden. However, the point is controversial. According to Collins, Urwah was a confidant of Al-Bashir, while Lesch asserts that is not the case, as Al-Turabi protected him and Nafie before the 1995 protest. It is possible he decided to follow his interest by joining Al-Bashir's group.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid., 220.

⁶²⁰ Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 227–228. According to Mohi-Eldeen's interview, Mohamed Hassan Al-Amin was the secretary general of the National Congress at the time.

⁶²¹ Ibid., 228.

⁶²² Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 321.

⁶²³ Ibid., 220. The list also included Al-Turabi's closest aides and his deputies in the NIF, Ali Osman Taha and Ali Al-Haj.

a senior member of the SIM, Al-Bashir was angry when he saw Al-Turabi's name on the list, because Al-Bashir had previously dissolved the RCC and Al-Turabi had tried to get Al-Bashir to retire from the SAF.⁶²⁴ Hussein, who had talked with Al-Bashir about the nomination list, asserted that when Al-Bashir saw the list, he informed Al-Turabi that he himself could not be president above Al-Turabi.⁶²⁵ Al-Bashir also stated that if he had to choose from among the others in the list, he would select Ali Osman Taha, as he was compatible with Al-Bashir in terms of age and had better relations with him than with Ali al-Haj, and because Ali Taha himself was the leader of the group that organized the June 30 takeover.⁶²⁶ Upon the death of Zubair and 25 senior officials in a plane crash on March 8, 1998, Al-Bashir announced the appointment of 15 new ministers and four new presidential advisers; Ali Osman Taha was vice president and 16 NIF members became ministers.⁶²⁷ Later, on March 28, 1998, the National Assembly passed a draft of a constitution that made sharia law the source of legislation and significantly increased the power of the presidency.⁶²⁸ After a referendum, that constitution was signed into law on June 30, 1998.⁶²⁹ As a result, Al-Bashir gained considerable power and influence in the Sudan.

Al-Turabi realized he needed to maintain control over Al-Bashir and his military allies, who were gaining power and influence. Al-Turabi relied on his capacity of ideological and political influence over the state and the SIM to reassert his power over the SIM's military faction. His political maneuvering caused the appearance of the "memorandum of ten" and increased the power of Al-Bashir and his military. In December 1998, Al-Bashir signed into law the Political Association Act that supposedly restored Sudan to a multi-party system, which had been banned since July 1989: a political party was not permitted to organize under the guise of a political alliance (*tawali al-sayast*).⁶³⁰ The Political Association Act was inspired by Al-Turabi in November 1998, when he urged many former Sudanese parties to become involved in the political process.⁶³¹ Al-Turabi was determined to seize control of the political system and sought to reorganize the NIF into the National Congress Party (NCP), including its leadership office and leadership

⁶²⁴ Ibid., 227. According to the author, those who encouraged Al-Turabi to become vice president included Ghazi, Al-Sansousi, and Al-Karouri. Ghazi, Al-Karouri, and Taha elected to side with the Al-Bashir faction. It is also possible that the RCC dissolved from orders of the SIM or it was a compromise to keep Al-Bashir as president if the RCC was dissolved.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., 224.

⁶²⁶ Ibid., 224-225.

⁶²⁷ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 224.

⁶²⁸ Ibid., 224.

⁶²⁹ Ibid., 224.

⁶³⁰ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 225.

⁶³¹ Ibid., 225.

council.⁶³²The latter was at the time under the control of Al-Bashir, who ratified all nominations for vice presidents, ministers, and senior officials before their names were submitted to the National Assembly for pro forma approval.⁶³³After Al-Turabi became the secretary general of the NCP, he dissolved both the leadership office and the leadership council and replaced it with a 60-member leadership authority loyal to him,⁶³⁴ making him very powerful and reducing Al-Bashir to near impotence.⁶³⁵At the December 10, 1998 meeting of the Majlis al-Shura of the NCP, ten of the NCP leaders surprised the meeting with a memorandum that stressed the lack of responsibility and consensus within the NCP, and the overwhelming power of the NCP's secretary general over the party and the country.⁶³⁶The signatories of the memorandum included one from the old guard, one from the military, and another from a second generation of the movement.⁶³⁷The full list included Sayyid Al-Khatieb, Ghazi Atabani, Ahmed Ali Imam, Ahmed Torien, Bakri Hassan Salah, Ibrahim Ahmed Umar, Bahaa al-Din Hanafie, Mutrif Sadiq, Nafie Ali Nafie, and Usman Khalid Modawi.⁶³⁸When Al-Turabi realized his authority within the SIM was being challenged by Al-Bashir and others, he moved to reduce the power of the president and to concentrate power directly in himself as speaker of parliament.⁶³⁹For example, in December 1999, as speaker of the parliament, he proposed legislation that would allow direct elections of state governors, which would have reduced Al-Bashir's authority to select them. He also tried to push through a constitutional amendment that would permit a two-thirds vote to depose a president.⁶⁴⁰Consequently, Al-Bashir had to rely on his base of power of the military, particularly the officer corps, which he had cultivated during his ten years as president.⁶⁴¹The senior officers had never trusted Al-Turabi or Ali Osman Taha and were determined not to permit the PDF to supersede the authority of the SAF.⁶⁴²This strategy led to the palace coup of 1999. Also, it should be noted that when Al-Bashir

⁶³² Ibid., 225.

⁶³³ Ibid., 225.

⁶³⁴ According to Collins, Al-Turabi also became the chairman of the leadership authority.

⁶³⁵ Ibid., 225.

⁶³⁶ Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 320.

⁶³⁷ Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic*, 129.

⁶³⁸ Ibid., 129. Ali Taha was not involved in this, nor was Abdela Rahim Hussein, who stated in his interview with Mohi-Eldeen that he did not even read the document. It seems that SIM members such as Ghazi and Nafie decided to side with Al-Bashir to stay in power.

⁶³⁹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 226-227.

⁶⁴⁰ Ibid., 226-227.

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., 227.

⁶⁴² Ibid., 227. It seems the military did not expect Taha to be vice president after the death of Al-Zubair, but believed instead that Bakri Hassan Salah would be the vice president because of his military background, and possibly because the military Islamists wanted to run the country alone. According to Mohi-Eldeen's interview with Hussein, in which he asked this specific question, the general answered that they had a feeling that Bakri Hassan Salah would become the vice president, as Sheik Ali (another military man) was deputy secretary general to the NC and minister of foreign affairs, and thus bore great responsibility already, and because the military did not sit together to decide on matters of the country. Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi waa al-Ingaz*, 228.

wanted to remove Al-Turabi from power, he got the support of most members of the Council of Forty, which was the SIM's central committee, which Al-Turabi chaired. On December 12, 1999, two days before the national assembly was to vote on curbing the powers of the presidency, soldiers and tanks surrounded the legislative building.⁶⁴³ Al-Bashir dismissed Al-Turabi as speaker and dissolved the Assembly, and announced both a state of emergency and new elections for the national assembly in December 2000.⁶⁴⁴

Al-Turabi had sought to contain the factionalism within the SIM that was directed against him by using the political and ideological capacity he held within the state and the SIM. Strangely, he disregarded the fact that Al-Bashir and his faction had the military as their source of power; Sudanese history has shown that the military institution is the most important power broker in Sudanese politics. Al-Turabi's underestimation of Al-Bashir and the power of his military faction stemmed from his belief that he had unchallenged authority over them as the head of the SIM, and he seemed to think he could contain Al-Bashir's insubordination by reasserting his power over him. Unfortunately, it seemed Al-Turabi had disregarded the fact that the SIM's military faction had adopted a military mentality of not wanting to share state power, or have civilian leadership controlling it.

Conclusion

The SIM had a different religious ideology than that of the dominant Sudanese Sufi orders. This is why it seized state power through a military coup; it understood that it could not otherwise dislocate and replace the hegemonic influence of the Sufi establishment. After the military coup, the SIM imposed its radical ideology on the Sudanese society. Since this ideology had an international dimension of wanting to establish the *umma* caliphate, the SIM leaders used their base (the Sudan) to support like-minded radical Islamists in Somalia and Eritrea, having learned from its own experience that the only way their ideology could be imposed on a society is through having state power as a capacity. At this time, both Somalia and Eritrea had suffered internal crises that caused various actors to compete for state power giving the SIM the opportunity to influence the situations in those countries by supporting radical Islamist

⁶⁴³Ibid., 227.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid., 227.

movements. However, because of competing interests within the SIM, it suffered from an internal power conflict that led to the palace coup of 1999, which later led to the development of the post-Al-Turabi regime based on an alliance headed by Al-Bashir. Within the post-Al-Turabi regime, different competing factions have attained various sensitive positions, which threatens Al-Bashir's rule over the regime and the country. As will be seen in the next chapter, Al-Bashir's continued support for radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia after the palace coup is a by-product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime.

Chapter Four

The Post-Al-Turabi Regime: Al-Bashir and Power Relations

Introduction

The removal of Al-Turabi ended his ideological power capacity over the Sudanese state and society. The palace coup of 1999 resulted in the hasty foundation of a new regime that lacked an ideological base, and proved that the post-Al-Turabi regime was founded on competing factions that Al-Bashir now presides over. Those factions compete against each other for power and influence over the regime and the state, threatening to remove Al-Bashir from state power. Likewise, Al-Bashir is in power relations with those factions to rule the country, as they hold sensitive positions within the state. Understanding that those factions still have an attachment to their radical religious ideology and its expansionism, Al-Bashir continued the Sudan's support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia. Thus, the current Sudanese support for the radical Islamist movements is a by-product of the internal power relations within the post-Turabi regime. This situation has been used by Al-Bashir to maintain his authority over those competing factions, or to neutralize their ability to remove him from state power.

Establishment of the post-Al-Turabi Regime: The Second Islamist Republic

The removal of Al-Turabi from state power in December 1999 did not guarantee Al-Bashir and his allies a hold on the new state power they had gained. They moved quickly to remove Al-Turabi's remaining power points in the government, the party, and the international arena. With the removal of Al-Turabi's influence, Al-Bashir headed a second Islamist republic (and then a third republic, after the secession of South Sudan) that was based on alliances between the civilian, security, and military factions of the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM)'s faction in power. Al-Bashir watches carefully over these alliances to maintain his rule.

In January 2000, Al-Bashir replaced nine ministers close to Al-Turabi, but retained several of his former protégés, including Ali Taha, who had made a transition from a determined Islamist to a pragmatic Islamist politician; Taha remained the first vice

president.⁶⁴⁵ Al-Bashir also reduced Al-Turabi's family business interests, and terminated the government's flow of funds that had subsidized the PAIC, whose buildings were seized on February 10.⁶⁴⁶ Between May and July 2000, Al-Bashir removed Al-Turabi from power in the National Congress Party (NCP) by accusing him of wanting to instigate another military coup. He dissolved the leadership authority, and led a meeting with the Majlis Al-Shura on July that removed Al-Turabi from his position as secretary general of the NCP.⁶⁴⁷ In response, Al-Turabi formed his own party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), from the dissidents of the NCP,⁶⁴⁸ and used the PNC's newspaper, *Rai Al-Shaab*, to publish political denunciations of Al-Bashir and his government.⁶⁴⁹ Thus the SIM was divided into a faction outside of state power and factions who have a hold on state power.

To regain state power, Al-Turabi allied himself with the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), an enemy of the SIM. This damaged his image as an Islamist leader and strengthened the Islamist faction who held state power. In February 2001, Al-Turabi signed a memorandum of understanding with Garang, the leader of the SPLM/A, to end the civil war, which was a serious mistake because it meant that the famous Islamist suddenly became an ally of the SPLM/A insurgency, which was viewed as treason. He was arrested on February 21, 2001, jailed, later placed under house arrest, and was threatened with criminal charges for communicating with the enemy.⁶⁵⁰ General Abdel Rahim Hussien explained the regime's excuse for jailing Al-Turabi. In his interview with Mohi-Eldeen, Hussein asserted that they had jailed Al-Turabi to save him from himself, to save the country he had built, and to save his ideology and what he had worked for.⁶⁵¹ That interview revealed that although the SIM ideology had become of secondary importance to the state Islamists, still the radical ideology and the "civilization project" were important for their self legitimization for holding state power.

⁶⁴⁵ Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 227.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 227.

⁶⁴⁷ Abdel Rahim Omer Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz: Sira al-hawiaa wa al-hawaa: Fitmat al-Islameen Fi al-Sultah Mein Muzakirat al-Ashrah ela Muzakirat al-Tafahum Maa Garang* (Khartoum: Dar Kahil, 2012), 322. According to Mohi-Eldeen, Ibrahim Al-Tahir replaced Al-Turabi as secretary general of the NCP.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 322–323.

⁶⁴⁹ Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan*, 227.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 227–228.

⁶⁵¹ Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 229.

The second Islamist republic has concentrated all powers in the hands of Al-Bashir, who completely manages the narrow ruling clique.⁶⁵² At the same time the NCP has become the party of the state. The ruling elite behind the second republic that makes up the core group of the clique can be divided into three distinct categories of Islamists, although certain people have overlapping affiliations: senior party bureaucrats, security personnel, and the military Islamists. The senior party leaders category is composed of Ali Osman Taha, Ibrahim Ahmed Umar, Usman Khalid Modawi, Mahdi Ibrahim, Ali Osman Yasin, and the group of physicians that Sudanese satire depicts as Médecins Sans Frontières, including Ghazi Atabani, Magzoub Al-Khalifa (who died in a car accident in 2005), and Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail.⁶⁵³ The security category is composed of Nafie Ali Nafie, Qutbi Al-Mahdi, Hasan Dahawi, Salah Gosh, Ali Karti, Abdel Rahim Hussein, Al-Tayeb Ibrahim, and Bakri Hassan Saleh.⁶⁵⁴ The military category is composed of Al-Bashir, Abdel Rahim Hussein, Al-Tayeb Ibrahim, Bakri Hassan Saleh, and Al-Hadi Abdalla.⁶⁵⁵ These three groups together formed the pinnacle of power in the Sudan as they freed themselves, the party, and the state from all vestiges of Al-Turabi's control and his troublesome way of conducting politics. Competition and feuds among those groups have been brewing, within the first group in particular. The competition has created its own dynamics, turning the transition to the second republic into a sort of domination without leadership, and turning Al-Bashir into a political entity who manages those groups. To strengthen their positions, each member of these groups continued to build around himself a smaller clique with total loyalty based on family or tribal relationship. Another aspect of the continuity of the process is to be found in the strategy employed by the Islamist regime within the first and second republics to appoint governors, senior employees, and even tribal leaders as a way of extending their power, empowering a class of Islamist elites through whom the regime could control all aspects of life. This explains why the choice of regional governor was one of the biggest battles that Al-Turabi and his supporters fought with those who unseated him.⁶⁵⁶

The three groups who form the post-Al-Turabi regime are working together because of their insecurity about losing state power, which encourages the different factions in the

⁶⁵² Abdullahi Gallab, *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan* (Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 150.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 150–151.

⁶⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 151.

regime to challenge each other to secure their own power and influence within the post-Al-Turabi regime. Al-Bashir has never been known for his vision or leadership, and the groups he manages and oversees have not promised to restructure the regime or to implement any serious democratic changes; instead, the transition to the second republic seem to have taken a different route. The regime is firmly linked to the element of fear, both as an expression of a deeper feeling of insecurity and as a tool of survival. Therefore, even though the groups are divided by their personal ambitions, fear remains the cement that keeps them together in the post-Al-Turabi regime. As a strategy of divide and rule, the regime started separate negotiations with different opposition groups to make those groups complicit with the regime, or to recycle the political process into a new form of power relations through which the regime would emerge victorious. Moreover, the regime continues to exercise new forms of intimidation and ways of inducing fear, using the state to extend or cut back rewards for those who have been opposing it. For example, the regime had given the national security forces a wide range of powers such as detention, investigation, surveillance, and access to the private homes and communications of the citizens, or the control and the use of court system to deal with special cases.⁶⁵⁷ As a result, the regime is effectively based on “limited liberalizing authoritarianism,” and those developments indicate a decline of the Islamist project and its regime, leading to the disintegration of the regime, on the one hand, and the regime’s attempts at transition and consolidation, on the other hand.⁶⁵⁸ In his inauguration speech on February 12, 2001, Al-Bashir declared that the objective of the regime is to establish a strong government.⁶⁵⁹ According to him, a government might pre-empt and constrain what are seen as growing challenges to the regime in the form of alternative centers of power. Therefore, the leaders of the regime are persuaded by their own logic that they will be able to fix their government without risking disintegration, and an authoritarian approach is thus planned and pursued as the ruling objective of the regime.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid., 152.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid., 152. The term “limited liberalizing authoritarianism” means that the regime will allow certain cosmetic openings in the political space that will help the existence of the regime. For example, the regime allows diversity in press, but does not allow them to write on sensitive issues such as corruption within the regime. Retaliatory measures include confiscation of newspapers, revoking newspaper licences of the newspaper, and other harsh punishments.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., 152.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid., 152.

The Recycling of Radical Islamism

After military coup of June 30, 1989, the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) was exporting and imposing its radical religious ideology of the “civilization project” into East Africa, using the Sudan as its base and its NGOs to aid like-minded radical Islamist movements. In this way, the SIM was making use of the peculiar situations in Somalia and Eritrea. As has already been discussed, many of the SIM influential leaders, who were also members of Al-Turabi regime, coordinated and supported the expansionist efforts. What is common to most of the SIM leaders who joined Al-Bashir in the palace coup of 1999, and who formed their own power centers in the post-Al-Turabi regime, is their previous support for expanding the SIM’s ideology, the “civilization project,” outside of the Sudan.

To maintain his hold on those powerful competing factions, Al-Bashir had to appeal to their ideological inclination of radical religious expansionism that was part of the SIM ideology, as this is an important part of their self-legitimization. Hence, Al-Bashir continued to support the radical Islamist movements in East Africa, to show that he had not abandoned the “civilization project” after the 1999 coup. His support for radical Islamist movements also gives him control over the competing factions within the post-Turabi regime and discourages them from trying to remove him from state power. Importantly, when Al-Bashir feels his power is threatened, he uses such paramilitary groups to reinforce his power. For example, in the West Africa, in December 2005, Chadian rebels supported by the Sudan, attacked the Chadian capital the attack was intended by the Sudan to cut of Chadian support for Darfurian rebels, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).⁶⁶¹ It should be noted, that the leader of the JEM, is a follower of Al-Turabi⁶⁶² Therefore, when an Islamists faction such as the the JEM leadership, that used to be part of the Al-Turabi’s NIF regime threatens Al-Bashir power, he will use paramilitary groups to reinforce his power.

In Eritrea, the Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) politically and diplomatically, providing it with shelter and weapons, allowing it to form a political party in the Sudan, allowing that party to oppose the Eritrean ruling regime, and allowing the EIJM to carry out attacks on Eritrea. Even after normalizing relations with

⁶⁶¹Alex De Waal, "Chad: Civil War, Power Struggle and Imperialist Interference," GreenLeft, February 8, 2008, <https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/39011> (accessed April 30, 2015).

⁶⁶²Diana Childress, Omar al-Bashir's Sudan (Revised Edition), (Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2010), 131-132.

Eritrea, the post-Al-Turabi regime allowed the EIJM and its political arm to continue operating from their office in the Sudan. In Somalia, the Sudan continued to support AIAI, when it was an important part of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), by several means: using diplomacy to aid it to continue its expanding influence and control over Somalia; disapproving any intervention in Somalia; not sending Sudanese troops as part of peace missions after the Ethiopian intervention; trying to reconcile the different factions of the SCIC; and strongly supporting the faction of the SCIC that gained internationally recognized state authority through humanitarian aid, financial aid, and other forms of support. Furthermore, the Sudan supported President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's Somali government, which is composed of a radical faction of the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) that took control over the Somali government through internationally recognized elections. The Sudan gave strong support to the Somali government, by helping it obtain financial aid, providing financial support of its own, providing training support for the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), and providing scholarships to Somalis to study at educational institutions in the Sudan known for religiously radicalizing its students, as a component of the "civilization project" that the Sudan had pursued during Al-Turabi's regime.

Some regime leaders who had previously supported the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia during the NIF regime days were also involved in the continued Sudanese support for the radical Islamist movements in their capacity as leaders within the post-Al-Turabi regime.

The radical Islamist movements in East Africa have followed two different paths. In Eritrea, they became factionalized by internal power struggles, causing the disintegration of the Eritrean Islam Jihad Movement (EIJM) into several competing radical Islamist factions with same goals and interests. In Somalia, AIAI reappeared more powerful than before in the form of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), having become factionalized by foreign powers into two competing groups, one with state power and the other without. Likewise, the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB), which is integrated into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB), was also supported by the Sudan as it became factionalized. The Sudan had strongly supported the radical faction of the SIMB that had obtained internationally recognized government power. In both cases, the radical Islamist groups have the same goals and interests. The support of the post-Al-Turabi regime for those factions is not

to expand the goal of the SIM, but to help Al-Bashir to maintain his influence and power over the competing SIM factions in the post-Turabi regime.

What links the competing factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime to the Sudan's continued support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia is the ideological inclination to impose the "civilization project" in those countries. Al-Bashir inherited the Eritrean and Somali that Al-Turabi had supported before, which made it easy for him to continue investing in the "civilization project."

There are four reasons why, the factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime is directly linked to Al-Turabi, and they illustrate how Al-Bashir's continued support for the civilization project should be understood more as a by product of the regime's internal power relations, and not as power politics. First, the post-Al-Turabi regime had fractured the opposition against it through making separate agreements with each opposition group. In 2005, the Sudan had signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A), and signed a deal with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). And in 2006, the Sudan had signed the Easertern Front Agreement (EF) with the armed eastern Sudanese oppositionthe Beja Congress.⁶⁶³ Second, the Sudan had improved its relations with Eritrea, which used to support both the SPLM/A and the NDA against the NIF and the post-Al-Turabi regime. In 2006 both Sudan and Eritrea had restored diplomatic relations with one another.⁶⁶⁴ The improved relations with Eritrea, gives no reason for Eritrea to support Sudanese opposition groups again. Third, within the post-Al-Turabi regime therestill seem to be factions to be influenced by Al-Turabi. For example, Ghazi Atabani, who was a leading a reformist faction within the post-Al-Turabi regime, was removed from his job as presidential advisor for communicating and having meetings with Al-Turabi in an effort to reconcile the two SIM factions.⁶⁶⁵ Finally, as was previously illustrated with the case of the JEMs' rebellion in Darfur, that shows Al-Turabi influence, through his followers within the regime, can challenge and remove Al-Bashirs' hold on state power.

⁶⁶³ "Political Parties in the Fray," Al Jazeera English. April 7, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/sudanelection/2010/04/2010479459467505.html> (accessed May 22, 2015).

⁶⁶⁴Unclassified U.S.-Khartoum Embassy Documents, "Sudan and Its Nine Neighbors. Part 2 of 4: The Highland States—Ethiopia and Eritrea," last modified May 14, 2006, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KHARTOUM1123_a.html (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁶⁶⁵Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 272-273.

The two case studies will illustrate the Sudan's support for those movements in East Africa, before and after the 1999 palace coup against Al-Turabi in the Sudan. They will show that Al-Bashir's continued support for radical Islamist movement in Eritrea and Somalia is not geared towards expanding his influence in East Africa, but towards controlling the competing factions within his own government. This explains why Al-Bashir's support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia is less ideologically confrontational and intense than Al-Turabi's support had been.

Eritrea: The Multiplicity of the Radical Islamist Movement

As explained in the previous chapter, the EIJM was supported and aided by the National Islamic Front (NIF) of the Turabi regime in the Sudan after the Asosa operations. Those operations allowed the NIF regime to safeguard its control over the Sudan state against the communist Ethiopian regime intervention. The Asosa operations were a counteroffensive led by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) from the Sudan and coordinated by the Sudanese Armed Forces. They resulted in the defeat of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (which was supported by the Ethiopian communist regime), the capture of the SPLM/A's headquarters at Asosa, and the defeat of the Ethiopian forces garrisoned at Asosa. It allowed the EPLF forces to go deep into western Ethiopia.⁶⁶⁶

Afterward Eritrea gained its independence, the SIM/ NIF regime, to spread its radical ideology into Eritrea, it aided the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement(EIJM),Nafie Ali Nafie, the head of the internal security agency in the Sudan at that time, was responsible for the military training of such groups.⁶⁶⁷ According to an interview with a non-commissioned Sudanese officer who defected in 1996, weapons were imported into the Sudan from China or Iran, where the Sudanese ministry of defense would hand them to Bin Laden's representatives for use in training the EIJM and other Islamists in guerrilla

⁶⁶⁶ Alexander De Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989–2001," in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alexander De Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 187–188. At the time the EPLF were allies of the SIM, fighting for Eritrean independence from Ethiopia.

⁶⁶⁷ Mark Huband, "African States Face Islamic Revolution Plot," *The Observer News*, June 25, 1995, http://tr6rt9pf7u.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rft_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=African+states+face+Islamic+revolution+plot&rft.jtitle=The+Observer+%281901-+2003%29&rft.au=Mark+Huband&rft.date=1995-06-25&rft.pub=Guardian+News+%26+Media+Limited&rft.issn=0029-7712&rft.spage=21&rft.externalDocID=1225122502¶mdict=en-US (accessed February 1, 2015). Nafie Ali Nafie is a member of the SIM, he took up several positions within Al-Turabi's regime, he was one of Al-Turabi's aides, he helped Al-Turabi in expanding the Civilization Project. He was a signatory member of the memorandum of ten, and he sided with Al-Bashir during the palace coup of 1999 against Al-Turabi.

warfare.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, the NIF regime allowed the EIJM to use the Sudan as a base to coordinate its activities. In late 1994, the EIJM held its second general conference in Khartoum, where it pledged to expand and continue its jihad until achieving victory or martyrdom.⁶⁶⁹ Afterwards, the EIJM launched cross-border attacks into Eritrea, during which the Eritrean forces killed half a dozen of its soldiers, including at least two from other countries.⁶⁷⁰ Thus, the Eritrean regime decided to terminate its diplomatic relations with the Sudan in 1995 when it openly called for the overthrow of the NIF regime in the Sudan; later Eritrea hosted the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and gave it the former Sudanese embassy as headquarters.⁶⁷¹ The NDA was an alliance of Sudanese political and armed opposition groups who sought to remove the NIF regime from power. It was composed of the SPLM/A, the communist party, the Mahdiyya and Marghaniyya Sufi orders, and other oppositional groups. With Eritrea supporting the NDA, the Sudan stepped up its support for the EIJM.⁶⁷² In an interview with the EIJM in early 1998, Abul Bara Hassan Salman, the second in command to Khalid Muhammad Amer of the EIJM, presented the objectives of the EIJM: liberating the region from Christian–Jewish control through armed struggle, engaging in regional diplomacy, and replacing the Eritrean regime with an Islamic one.⁶⁷³

The NIF/Al-Turabi regime supported the various factions and even tried to reunify them with similar factions of the EIJM to aid in spreading the radical Islamist ideology in Eritrea. At its third conference, in Khartoum in 1998, shortly after the outbreak of the Eritrean–Ethiopian war and after Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya had focused the global spotlight on the Sudan, the EIJM changed its name to the Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement (EISM) in an effort to defuse the increasing hostility from the international media.⁶⁷⁴ The conference renewed the EISM’s call for jihad and the EISM continued to carry out its attacks against Eritrea, seeking to capitalize on the dissatisfaction with the secular Eritrean regime and the perception that the government was controlled by Christian Tigrinya-speakers, who dominated the economy in most of western, Muslim-dominated Eritrea.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁶⁸ Dan Connell, “Eritrea: On a Slow Fuse,” in *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and World Peace Foundation (Cambridge: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 78.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

There is a historical context behind that radical religious declaration. The EISM's main base of support was among the Tigre population of Gash Barka, the region that borders Ethiopia's Tigray province and the Sudanese border. This area suffered greatly during the war of independence and the Eritrean–Ethiopian border war of 1998–2000.⁶⁷⁶ During the period of independence, thousands of its residents abandoned the region for safe haven in the Sudan or became internally displaced.⁶⁷⁷ Consequently, the EISM drew its main support from Eritrean Muslim refugees in the Sudan.⁶⁷⁸ Intentionally or otherwise, the Sudan under the NIF managed to unify the different factions of the EIJM. In March 1999, in the Sudan, representatives of ten Eritrean opposition groups formed the Alliance of Eritrean National Force (AENF), under the leadership of Abdullah Idriss, to overthrow the government of President Isaiyas Aferworki. Both the Eritrean Popular Congress (EPC) and the EIJM are members of the AENF.⁶⁷⁹ Those two groups were previously part of the EIJM, which split into competing factions in 1993; the EPC was the military faction of the EIJM.⁶⁸⁰ In 2003, the EIJM/EISM changed its name to the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (EIRM),⁶⁸¹ which was headed by Khalil Mohammed Amer.⁶⁸² In 2008, a new faction of the EIJM, the Eritrean Islamic Congress, appeared. It was led by Abul Bara Hassan Salman, who previously was deputy head of the EIJM/EISM.⁶⁸³

During the post-Al-Turabi regime, the EIJM was aided significantly by the Sudan, which provided it with material support and safe haven. However, the Sudan in turn used the EIJM as proxy agents, for the dual purposes of regime survival and keeping Al-Bashir's control over the factions in his government. Al-Bashir's regime helped the radical Eritrean Islamist movement to form a political party very similar to the Egyptian

⁶⁷⁶ Gregory Alonso Pirio, *African Jihad: Bin Laden's Quest for the Horn of Africa* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2007), 109.

⁶⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁶⁷⁸ Dan Connell and Tom Killion, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea* (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 206.

⁶⁷⁹ John Pike, "Alliance of Eritrean National Force," Federation of American Scientists, October 3, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aenf.htm> (accessed March 2, 2015).

⁶⁸⁰ For an explanation of the EPC and EISM as parts of the EIJM, see Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, William Overstreet, Sean M. Phelan, and Hal Smith, *Political Handbook of the World 1999* (CqPr, 2000), 314.

⁶⁸¹ Terje Østebø, *Islamism in the Horn of Africa: Assessing Ideology, Actors, and Objectives* (Oslo: International Law and Policy Institute, 2010), 21.

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*, 21, footnote. According to Østebø, in many sources Khalil Mohammed Amer is said to have been the leader of the EIJM, whereas in other sources he is listed as the leader of the EIRM. Also, in an interview he claims to be the secretary general of the EISM, yet in an overview of the members of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance from 2008, he is again listed as the leader of the EIRM. See "Eritrean Opposition Organizations: New Push towards Alliance," *Gedab News*, awate.com, January 21, 2008 (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁶⁸³ Østebø, *Islamism in the Horn of Africa*, 22. Østebø says that it is also referred to as the Eritrean Islamic Congress Party (22, footnote).

Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) to spread its radical ideology, and allowed the Eritrean Islamists to have its offices in the Sudan.

As stated previously, several Eritrean oppositional groups were operating in the Sudan. Two of the more significant military groups were the EISM/EIRM and the AbudllahIdriss Marxist group of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).⁶⁸⁴ The Sudan provided both groups with support, which may have included landmines, since a number have been detonated in areas in which the EIRF/EIRM has been operating in the past few years.⁶⁸⁵ The level of military activity along the eastern border is very low,⁶⁸⁶ which makes the activities of the EIRM more of a clandestine movement than an insurgent movement. The Sudanese regime has also directed its attention towards a number of Eritrean Islamist political organizations that operated in eastern Sudan, in particular the Beni Amar, a group sometimes said to be part of the Beja tribe⁶⁸⁷ in an attempt to undermine the Beja congress.⁶⁸⁸ According to the Eritrean Center for Strategic Studies, at the Sanaa summit in Yemen on October 15, 2002, the Sudanese minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Mustafa Osama Ismail, told Sudanese reporters that the mission of the Sudanese government is to rid Eritrea of the Afwerkigovernment.⁶⁸⁹ In 2003, EIRM was charged by the Eritrean government with the killing of a British geologist, which the EIRM denied.⁶⁹⁰ In March 2006, the EIRM claimed responsibility for a hotel bombing and ambush in Eritrea that killed 46 Eritrean military personnel.⁶⁹¹ Subsequently, according to an interview conducted by John Young of the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) with a security analyst on March 15, 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, “the EIRM maintained an office in Khartoum, and has about 2000–3000 fighters but little influence inside Eritrea.”⁶⁹² Consequently, the Sudanese regime continued its support for the EIRM to maintain its project of spreading

⁶⁸⁴ John Young, “Armed Groups along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier: An Overview and Analysis,” *HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan, Working Papers*, no. 9 (2007): 32–33, <http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=947> (accessed February 10, 2015).

⁶⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 33. Young cites the CMPT reports at <http://www.cpmtsudan.org>.

⁶⁸⁶ Young, “Armed Groups Along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier,” 33.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁶⁸⁸ John Young, “The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization,” *HSBA for Sudan and South Sudan, Working Papers*, no. 3 (2007): 27, <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-03-Eastern-Front.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2015). The Beja congress is an oppositional group in Eastern Sudan representing the marginalized Beja tribe. The Beja congress was also part of the NDA and the Eastern Front (including other marginalized eastern tribes) that the Asmira regime supported in order to remove the Sudanese regime.

⁶⁸⁹ Eritrean Center for Strategic Studies, “Practicing Terrorism and Supporting Terrorists (Part III),” last modified December 5, 2002, http://dehai.org/demarcation-watch/articles/ECSS_Sanaa_axis_of_belligerence_partiii.html (accessed February 10, 2015). At that time, Qutbi Al-Mahdi was the political affairs adviser to Al-Bashir. Also, Yemen, the Sudan, and Ethiopia formed an alliance of some sort at that time to fight Eritrean interests in the region.

⁶⁹⁰ David H. Shinn, “East Africa and the Horn,” in *Al-Qaida after Ten Years of War: A Global Perspective of Successes, Failures, and Prospects*, ed. Norman Cigar and Stephanie E. Kramer (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 67.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁶⁹² Young, “Armed Groups along Sudan’s Eastern Frontier,” 33.

radical Islam in Eritrea. After the Sudanese regime signed the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement on October 14, 2006 with the Eastern Front (EF), both the EIRM and the Abdullah Idris faction of the ELF were supposed to be dissolved.⁶⁹³ However, that did not happen, as the EISM/EIRM developed a political party to aid in its struggle to impose its radical religious ideology on Eritreans.

At its August 2004 general conference in Khartoum, under the leadership of Khalil Mohammed Amer, the EISM/EIRM formed Al-Hizb Al-Islami Al-Eritree Lil Adalah Wetenmiya (Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development, EIPJD),⁶⁹⁴ and dropped the image of an automatic rifle on its official emblem.⁶⁹⁵ However, it changed little in its strategic orientation.⁶⁹⁶ The party established a 50-member Shura leadership council, with a mandate for women to make up at least 10 percent of its membership.⁶⁹⁷ One possible reason that the EIJM decided to develop this party has been stated in an interview given by Abul Bara Hassan Salman, the deputy head of the EISM, where he stated the agenda of the EISM. Among its many goals, those that stood out were armed struggle and training of youth, the use of *da'wa* and education to fight against the fallacies of the Eritrean regime, and importantly, on the external front, to generate suitable resources to support their jihad through Islamic means.⁶⁹⁸ The party was formed to support this agenda. The EIPJD claims that they come as close as possible to being an Eritrean Muslim Brotherhood organization, but they could never be a proper brotherhood of that type because of the path of armed resistance chosen by its leadership and because they still had Wahhabi elements within their ranks.⁶⁹⁹ Interestingly, it might be concluded that the party has links to Al-Qaeda, since the EIJM itself is known to have such links; however, it is doubtful that all members and factions of the fragmented EIJM knew about the Al-Qaeda connection.⁷⁰⁰ After forming the party, the organization continued to use its radical struggle against the Eritrean regime to impose its radical religious ideology. For example, in 2007 the party, along with other opposition groups, laid new landmines along the Ethiopian–Eritrean

⁶⁹³ Young, "The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization." The EF is a rebel alliance composed of the marginalized Eastern Sudanese; its constituent groups are the Rashida Lions and the Beja congress.

⁶⁹⁴ Khalil Mohammed Amer was the head of the EIJM/EISM and of the EIRM.

⁶⁹⁵ Connell, "Eritrea: On a Slow Fuse," 82.

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁶⁹⁷ Connell and Killion, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea*, 206.

⁶⁹⁸ "The Deputy Amir of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, Abul Bara' Hassan Salman: The Governing Regime Is a Terrorist Regime Which Acts with Enmity against the Eritrean People," *Nida'ul Islam Magazine*, February–March 1998, <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/eritrea.htm> (accessed February 13, 2015).

⁶⁹⁹ Interview conducted by Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy. See Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR), 2009), 72.

⁷⁰⁰ Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, 72.

border.⁷⁰¹ Thus, the movement and the party are both seen to be connected to the Sudanese post-Al-Turabi regime, the Egyptian MB, and Al-Qaeda.

After signing the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2005, and the Eastern Front Agreement in 2006, the Sudanese regime reduced its support for the radical Eritrean Islamists. After the signing of the CPA, the Eritrean regime approached the SPLM members of the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU), including the first vice president Silva Kiir⁷⁰² and foreign minister Lam Akol, to improve bilateral relations with the Sudan.⁷⁰³ Later in 2005, Silva Kiir led a delegation to Asmara to solidify the Sudan's so-called neutrality in the Eritrean–Ethiopian border war.⁷⁰⁴ In January 2006, President Al-Bashir sent his advisor Ghazi Atabani to Asmara to personally invite President Isaias Afewerki to the African Union (AU) Summit held in Khartoum. By mid-2006 relations between the Sudan and Eritrea had improved; diplomatic missions were elevated to ambassadorial level and the Sudan allowed Eritrea to host and mediate the GNU–Eastern Front negotiations.⁷⁰⁵ The leaders of the Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA), which included the EIPJD and the EPC, therefore reported that military training camps in the Sudan had been closed at the request of the Sudanese government and moved into northern Ethiopia, and the EDA was told by Salah Gosh, the head of the Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), to close their camps and keep a low profile in the Sudan.⁷⁰⁶ The Sudanese regime allowed the EDA to keep their offices in the Sudan, and the EDA groups were allowed to hold meetings inside those offices; however, the Sudanese regime told them they could not conduct any other outside activities, such as public meetings or rallies.⁷⁰⁷ And while the Sudanese regime banned the activities of the EDA in June 2008,⁷⁰⁸ it still allowed members of EISM/EIRM and EIPJD to operate in the Sudan; in fact, the EIPJD had an office in

⁷⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2007* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 196.

⁷⁰² By virtue of the CPA the first vice president of the Sudan was also the president of the South Sudan semi-autonomous region. Vice President John Garang, the leader of the SPLM/A, died within weeks after the CPA, making Silva Kiir, his military commander, the new first vice president of the Sudan and the president of South Sudan, with the agreement with the other SPLM leaders. Ali Taha was the second vice president of the Sudan, in accordance with the CPA.

⁷⁰³ Unclassified U.S.–Khartoum Embassy Documents, “Sudan and Its Nine Neighbors. Part 2 of 4: The Highland States—Ethiopia and Eritrea,” last modified May 14, 2006, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KHARTOUM1123_a.html (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.* Atabani, previously mentioned, was part of the SIM. He was a close associate of Al-Turabi, but also signed the “memorandum of ten” against him. Afterwards he served in positions in the NCP government.

⁷⁰⁶ “Eritrean Opposition Group Seeking New Opposition Alliance,” last modified October 10, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA3016_a.html (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁷⁰⁷ “Eritrean Opposition Leader Says Not Ready to Rule,” last modified October 23, 2007, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ADDISABABA3101_a.html (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁷⁰⁸ “Sudan Bans Activities of Eritrean Opposition,” *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan*, June 2, 2008, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27375> (accessed February 14, 2015).

Khartoum that was still functioning after the 2008 ban on EDA activities.⁷⁰⁹ Similarly, on June 8, 2013 Sudanese security forces raided the homes of EISM leaders and members in Kassala, in the Sudan.⁷¹⁰ It is clear, therefore, that the regime allowed the presence of the EIPJD and EISM/EIRM after improving ties with the Eritrean regime.

The post-Al-Turabi regime continued to aid the Eritrean Islamist Jihad Movement (EIJM) in its different forms and factions over the years after the palace coup of 1999. Importantly, those Eritrean Islamist factions were under the control of the Sudanese regime, as was evidenced by the Sudan's troubled relations with Eritrea. Although relations between Asmara and Khartoum improved greatly after both the 2005 and the 2006 agreements, the Sudan continued to support the EIJM by giving preference to the EIJM, which had formed its own political party with an office in the Sudan. Consequently, it is possible that the Sudan's support for the Eritrean Islamists will continue as a precautionary card by Al-Bashir against the possibility of a threat to his rule over the Sudanese state by the Islamist factions he heads. Its support for the EIJM provided the Sudanese regime with the security necessary to rule the country, as Eritrea had supported the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which included every opposition group bent on removing the regime from power. The EIJM is being used by Al-Bashir as security for leadership, and to show the competing power centers within the regime that the expansionist agenda of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) continues and that Al-Bashir secured the SIM's rule in the Sudan by using the EIJM.

Somalia: The Multiplicity of the Radical Islamist Movement

As explained in the previous chapter, Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) was founded by Al-Turabi while he was controlling the National Islamic Front (NIF) government from June 30, 1989 until 1999. AIAI allowed the SIM to spread its influence and ideology widely into Somalia. The SIM under Al-Turabi financed, supported, and coordinated the AIAI activities in Somalia in the early 1990s. The SIM's coordination of AIAI was evident in 1993, when the SIM carefully planned a massacre of US troops who attempted to kidnap one of Aidid's stop aides. Aidid was a powerful warlord in Somalia, an important ally to the Sudanese NIF regime. He had allowed radical Islamist groups

⁷⁰⁹ "Eritrean Opposition on a Diplomatic Move," Awate.com, March 16, 2012, <http://awate.com/eritrean-opposition-on-the-move/> (accessed February 14, 2015).

⁷¹⁰ "Sudan Detains Eritrean Opposition Members," *Sudan Tribune: Plural News and Views on Sudan*, June 16, 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46965> (accessed February 14, 2015).

to attack the UN mission forces in areas in Mogadishu, Somalia that were controlled by his forces, and he was wanted by the UN.⁷¹¹ The massacre led US President Clinton to discontinue the activities of the US task force in Somalia and withdraw US forces from Somalia on March 1, 1994.⁷¹² Consequently, the Islamic entities, the Somalis, and Osama Bin Laden took the withdrawal of the US troops as proof of their ability to defeat the US—the global hegemonic power.⁷¹³

Religion is a unifying element in Somalia's clan-based society, and AIAI turned to it as a unifying force.⁷¹⁴ It worked independently of clans and sought to cut across clan divisions through its military and political organizing by working with local clan leaders.⁷¹⁵ AIAI had tried to impose its ideology in occupied areas of Somalia by setting up state-like structures, including Quranic schools and courts to enforce Islamic law in a country with rampant lawlessness and random violence.⁷¹⁶ AIAI represented a more radical religious ideology than that of Somali Sufism.⁷¹⁷ Moral rectitude, military aggressiveness, and ideological indoctrination emerged as hallmarks of its organizational ethos.⁷¹⁸

After the withdrawal of the US forces from Somalia, AIAI turned its ambitions against Ethiopia and entered into an alliance with Ethiopian rebel groups, Somali militia factions, the Sudan, Al-Qaeda, and eventually Eritrea in its struggle.⁷¹⁹ The strategic objective of the Sudan's NIF regime coincided with the AIAI's goal of establishing a strong Islamic state in the horn of Africa.⁷²⁰ AIAI's ideology also included pan-Somali nationalism. AIAI had started its political activities on the basis of a Greater Somali Nation, seeking to unite territories in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti inhabited by Somali populations into greater Somalia.⁷²¹ Near the Ethiopian border, three groups—the Beledweyne in the Hiraan region, AIAI with the support of the Sudanese regime, and Al-Qaeda—carried out small-scale actions in Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia: the Ogaden region by the end of 1993 and the Somali region a year later.⁷²² The Ethiopian

⁷¹¹ Shaul Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), 66–69.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*, 66–71.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁷¹⁴ Pirio, *African Jihad*, 49.

⁷¹⁵ Pirio, *African Jihad*, 49.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*, 60. According to Pirio, the Sudan was engaged in a number of proxy wars to undermine support for rebel movements in South Sudan. Ethiopia was supporting the SPLM/A as previously indicated.

⁷²² *Ibid.*, 64.

People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) responded to the AIAI attacks in various ways. One of the approaches was peace talks in 1994 between the Ethiopian government, AIAI, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).⁷²³ Hostilities resumed with the failure of the talks.⁷²⁴ AIAI carried out terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. In January 1995 it bombed a hotel in Addis Ababa; in May 1995 it exploded a bomb in a busy marketplace in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia's second largest city, killing 18 people; it also bombed hotels in Addis Ababa in January 1996 and in Dire Dawa in February 1996.⁷²⁵ AIAI also carried out assassination attempts against the Ethiopian military-government officials, such as the head of military operations in the Ethiopian ministry of defense and the minister of transport and communication.⁷²⁶ It said it would continue targeting senior Ethiopian officials and carrying out guerrilla activities in the Ogaden until it became independent from Ethiopia.⁷²⁷ Consequently, Somalis saw AIAI's military and terrorist actions inside Ethiopia as evidence that AIAI was playing Khartoum's hand and had become a foreign puppet.⁷²⁸

AIAI suffered losses that resulted in its transformation into the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC). In August 1996, Ethiopia invaded Somalia in order to destroy the military and terrorist capabilities of AIAI. The losses that AIAI forces suffered at the hands of the Ethiopian military provoked a strategic shift, where AIAI executive committee member Sheikh Aweys announced in Mogadishu at the beginning of 1997 that his organization would become an Islamic political party. Aweys asserted that AIAI had abandoned its military actions and was seeking to assume power through political means, and that it would support any Islamic leader who might undertake to declare Somalia an Islamic republic.⁷²⁹ Aweys was a central figure in the establishment of the Ifka Halane court, located in western Mogadishu, and another in Merka, the principal town in the Lower Shebelle region.⁷³⁰ These courts usually resembled less a court than an armed camp, bristling with gun-mounted vehicles known as "technical".⁷³¹ In the absence of a police force, each court has its own militia, paid by the contributions of

⁷²³ Ibid., 65.

⁷²⁴ Ibid., 65. ONLF is a separatist movement that aimed to establish the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as an independent state. That movement was also supported by the Sudan.

⁷²⁵ Ibid., 65

⁷²⁶ Ibid., 65.

⁷²⁷ Somalia Watch, "Ethiopia Coping with Islamic Fund before and after Sept 11," 19 May 2007, <http://somaliawatch.org/archivemar02/020316601.htm> (accessed February 18, 2015).

⁷²⁸ Pirio, *African Jihad*, 65.

⁷²⁹ Ibid., 67.

⁷³⁰ "Somalia's Islamists," *International Crisis Group* 100 (2005): 20, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somalias> (accessed February 15, 2015).

⁷³¹ Ibid., 20.

the clan's businessmen.⁷³² These courts would later combine with other similar courts to form the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), which would be used not just to govern the country but also to spread radical religious ideology.

The radical elements within the SCIC caused the intervention in Ethiopia. In October 2000, courts in north and southern Mogadishu banded together to create the Joint Islamic Court Council (JICC), with Aweys as secretary general and Sheikh Ali Dhere as chairman.⁷³³ Because of its united command structure, the JICC had the largest military force in Somalia, leading many to fear that it intended to impose Islamic rule in the country.⁷³⁴ The JICC's influence extended to the Lower Shabelle region, where Aweys and his militia from Ifka Halane court established another court in the town of Merka.⁷³⁵ On the contrary, rather than imposing AIAI's ideology, the court removed road blocks, established a central tax system, and made no attempt to impose an AIAI mayor for the town or a regional governor for Lower Shebelle.⁷³⁶ Importantly, the Islamic laws that were applied in the courts were not overly strict, and the courts usually guaranteed the security of humanitarian workers and aid personnel from the UN and Western NGOs. This cooperative behavior stemmed from the fact that the courts were financed by the same Mogadishu business traders who were trying to reduce the risk to their trading activities and investments by incarcerating a large number of uncontrolled militia and pacifying the region.⁷³⁷ Those traders also funded the Atrabased Somali Transitional National Government (STNG) that appeared in 2000, which explained why the JICC was willing to work with the secular STNG.⁷³⁸ Specifically, the JICC cooperated with the STNG when their demand to be given the Ministry of Justice portfolio of the STNG was declined, and their militias were integrated into the STNG's police force;⁷³⁹ when the court *qadis* were working under the Ministry of Justice, only a few courts did not integrate with the STNG.⁷⁴⁰ With the STNG not able

⁷³² Ibid., 20.

⁷³³ Andre Le Sage, "Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives" (2005): 45, http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/166StatelessJusticeinSomalia.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015). Sheikh Ali Dhere wanted to use the court in Northern Mogadishu as a first step to establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. See Yohannes Kassahun, *The Courts: Problems, Prospects and Role in Somalia's Emerging Regions* (Nairobi: European Commission Somalia Unit, March 1997), 39.

⁷³⁴ Ibid., 45.

⁷³⁵ Ibid., 45–46.

⁷³⁶ Ibid., 46.

⁷³⁷ Ibid., 46.

⁷³⁸ Georg-Sebastian Holzer, "Political Islam in Somalia," *Geopolitics of the Middle East* 1, no. 1 (2008): 31, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5337~v~Political_Islam_in_Somalia__A_Fertile_Ground_for_Radical_Islamic_Groups_.pdf (accessed February 19, 2015).

⁷³⁹ Ibid., 31.

⁷⁴⁰ "Somalia: Dealing with the Islamic Courts," Relief Web, June 22, 2001, <http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-dealing-islamic-courts> (accessed February 19, 2015).

to establish a functioning administration (and its mandate expiring in 2003), and not being relevant in southern Somalia, the Islamic courts experienced a revival, and formed the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) in 2004.⁷⁴¹ Aweys was the vice chairman of the grouping, while Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a Sufi adherent who had helped establish a court in Jowhar was the chairman.⁷⁴² In 2005, 11 courts were established in Mogadishu.⁷⁴³ Some of them were closely linked to Aweys' brand of radicalism while others had a more traditional character.⁷⁴⁴

The SCIC had a militia of 400 at its disposal, and its units differed greatly from other militias in terms of clan diversity and military professionalism. They delivered impressive military results.⁷⁴⁵ Although the SCIC were well received by the population, other Islamists movements such as the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) rejected them, and the general mood in Mogadishu was not supportive of the movement and its activities,⁷⁴⁶ especially those in the STNG and US allies who cooperated with the US in anti-terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa, who perceived the SCIC as a platform for radical Islamists to take power in Somalia.⁷⁴⁷ By 2004, the SCIC started impose its ideology, allying itself with enemy factions and other Islamists against STNG president Yousef, who wanted to get Ethiopian troops into Somalia. In December 2004, they led a mass protest against the president in Mogadishu.⁷⁴⁸ One faction within the SCIC began to adopt radical views, which cannot be attributed to Aweys's influence alone. For example, the SCIC's judgment concerning the New Year's celebration was that it was punishable by death, and one year later militias from several courts shut down cinemas, accusing them of showing immoral Western and Indian movies.⁷⁴⁹ In 2004 and 2005, the radical Salafist militia of Al-Shabab, led by Adan Hashi Ayro of the SCIC, was engaged in a dirty war against Somalis suspected of collaborating with the STNG, Ethiopia, and/or the US in counterterrorism

⁷⁴¹ Georg-Sebastian Holzer, "Political Islam in Somalia."

⁷⁴² Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, "The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance in Somali," *African Security Review* 19, no. 1 (2010): 90, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246021003736674> (accessed February 19, 2015).

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁷⁴⁴ "Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?" *International Crisis Group* 116 (2006): 10, [http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/20435/1/Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained.pdf?1](http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/20435/1/Can%20the%20Somali%20Crisis%20Be%20Contained.pdf?1) (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁷⁴⁵ Mwangi, "The Union of Islamic Courts," 90.

⁷⁴⁶ Holzer, "Political Islam in Somalia," 32.

⁷⁴⁷ Le Sage, "Stateless Justice in Somalia," 48.

⁷⁴⁸ Holzer, "Political Islam in Somalia," 32.

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

operations. For example, Al-Shabab was responsible for three or four assassination attempts on Prime Minister Ghedi and President Yousef.⁷⁵⁰

The SCIC's power started to increase tremendously, especially after it defeated the US Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in June 2006.⁷⁵¹ With their victory over the alliance, the SCIC started to adopt state-like structures by removing road blocks, clearing the streets in Mogadishu, reopening the airport and seaport in Mogadishu, and establishing special courts to deal with the restitution of property.⁷⁵² Similarly, they declared their goal was to install a new government, through the application of sharia law, and their rhetoric became more militant, including attacks on the STNG, which was based in Baidoa, Somalia.⁷⁵³ The SCIC's expanding influence was not without external support. A UN monitoring group reported in 2006 that the Sudan was one of the countries that provided the SCIC with arms, funds, and technical support.⁷⁵⁴

As a result of Aweys's leadership within the SCIC, its expanding influence over Somalia was subdued by the Ethiopian intervention in that country in July 2006. After the SCIC captured Mogadishu and while it was expanding its influence in the rest of the country, it formed institutions to govern the country and their own movements. In June 2006, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was the chairman of the executive council.⁷⁵⁵ The 93-member Shura body that approved the decisions of the executive council was chaired by Aweys.⁷⁵⁶ The radical's source of power within the SCIC was Al-Shabab, which was a militia of young Somalis trained and indoctrinated by Ayro with the help of foreign fighters.⁷⁵⁷ Aweys had been a mentor to Ayro and other radicals.⁷⁵⁸ Aweys was very militant in his criticism of Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia, especially after capturing Mogadishu.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., 33.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., 34.

⁷⁵² Ibid., 34.

⁷⁵³ Ibid., 34.

⁷⁵⁴ "UN Report Says 10 Nations Violating Arms Embargo in Somalia, Potential High for War," Associated Press, November 15, 2006, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/205/39457.html>. Stevenson includes the Sudan in the argument: Jonathan Stevenson, "Risks and Opportunities in Somalia," *Survival* 49, no. 2 (2007): 14, <https://www.iiss.org/-/media/Silos/Surival/2007/Surival-Global-Politics-and-Strategy-Summer-2007/49-2-03-Stevenson/49-2-03-Stevenson.pdf> (accessed February 24, 2015).

⁷⁵⁵ Roland Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat al-Shabaab," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009): 390–391, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050903273701> (accessed February 23, 2015).

⁷⁵⁶ Roland Marchal, "A Tentative Assessment of the Somali Harakat al-Shabaab," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009): 390–391, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050903273701> (accessed February 23, 2015).

⁷⁵⁷ Angel Rabasa, *Radical Islam in East Africa* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009), 60.

⁷⁵⁸ Markus Virgil Hoehne, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped to Produce Militant Islamism, 2009, 17, http://webarchive.ssrc.org/Somalia_Hoehne_v10.pdf (accessed February 24, 2015).

⁷⁵⁹ Holzer, "Political Islam in Somalia," 34.

Fearing the implications of the SCIC expanding influence in Somalia, and possibly outside the Somalia, in 2006 Ethiopia sent forces in to Somalia and defeated the SCIC.⁷⁶⁰

Ethiopia allowed members of the defeated SCIC to head the new Somali government because of strategic considerations. The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was economically costly, beyond Ethiopia's means. It was also politically costly, since Ethiopia is equally divided along religious lines between Muslims and Christians. The regime also faced many challenges from the civil society, especially from the Ogaden region, where the ONLF attacked Ethiopian targets.⁷⁶¹ The United Nations, the Arab League, and the African Union all called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces.⁷⁶² By the end of December 2006, the SCIC was defeated by STNG–Ethiopian forces. This defeat caused internal splits within the SCIC, where the Al-Shabab group, already a radical militia, became an independent radical Islamist movement. Also the defeat of the SCIC forced its leadership into exile.

In September 2007, Somalis from the diaspora, civil society, oppositional groups, and former members of parliament met in Eritrea and formed the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Although it was inclusive of people from different regions and clans,⁷⁶³ it also included Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as its chairman. In January 2008 the ARS, under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, informed a US congressional delegation that it would accept a humanitarian cease-fire, zones of tranquility, and negotiations with the SNTG and other stakeholders once Ethiopian forces were replaced by a neutral force. The proposal was not accepted by Aweys and other radicals within the ARS, which split the ARS into two competing factions.⁷⁶⁴ Sharif Ahmed led his ARS faction to Djibouti's reconciliation process between the May 31 and June 9, 2008. The Djibouti Agreement was signed by both ARS and STNG leaderships. Months afterwards, the more inclusive Somali parliament elected Sharif Ahmed as the president of Somalia. This was coupled with the parliament allocating 200 seats for ARS members in order to address the religious dimension of the conflict.⁷⁶⁵ The inclusion of Sherif Ahmed as president seemed a way to delegitimize

⁷⁶⁰Pirio, *African Jihad*, 98.

⁷⁶¹Moshe Terdman, *Somalia at War: Between Radical Islam and Tribal Politics* (Tel Aviv: S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2008), 79.

⁷⁶² *Ibid.*, 79.

⁷⁶³ Ted Dagne, *Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace* ([city?]: Diane Publishing, 2010), 10.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁷⁶⁵ Isak Svensson, *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars* (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2013), 99–100.

Al-Shabab.⁷⁶⁶ Ethiopia began its phased withdrawal in December 2008 and completed it by early February 2009.⁷⁶⁷ Ethiopia had accepted the new government headed by Sherif Ahmed, because it felt that it had fractured the SCIC and allowed what is believed to be its moderate faction to be part of the Somali governing system, thereby neutralizing the influence of Aweys and his radicals from having power-capacity influence in Somalia and in the Ethiopian regions inhabited by people of Somali decent.

As a by-product of power relations within the post-Turabi regime, Al-Bashir supported radical Somali Islamists from the SCIC who became part of the Somali government. Also, Al-Bashir had supported a radical wing of the Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) that gained power in the subsequent Somali government. The Sudan had tried to support the SCIC before the Ethiopian intervention. At a press conference on December 8, 2005, at a press conference, Al-Bashir said he was against any intervention in Somalia, and he considered any plots against the SCIC as an attack against Islam and Islamic countries in the region.⁷⁶⁸ Likewise, the Sudan tried to aid the SCIC in maintaining their influence in Somalia by mediating between them and STNG. After the SCIC victory over the US-allied warlords of the ARPCT in June 2006, the Sudan intervened to provide mediation to ensure that the SCIC would remain in control over Somalia. On June 22, 2006, shortly after the SCIC defeated the APRCT, the Sudan invited both the SCIC and the STNG for mediation talks to prevent a confrontation between them.⁷⁶⁹ The Sudan's Islamist credentials and its warm relations with Ethiopia gave it credibility as a mediator. Importantly, the Sudan had relations with AIAI in the 1990s, and that gave the Sudan a degree of access to the radical Islamists within the SCIC.⁷⁷⁰ Before the SCIC victory in June 2006, the African Union authorized the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to send a 7,500-man mission to Somalia to help the STNG to gain a foothold when it relocated from Nairobi to Somalia.⁷⁷¹ The mission was composed of troops from Uganda, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and

⁷⁶⁶ Bjørn Mølle, "Somalia: From Stateless Order to Talibanisation?" Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, March 13, 2009, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/africa/subsahariana/ari42-2009#.VOyiK_mUfLk (accessed February 24, 2015).

⁷⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, "Somalia's Divided Islamists," last modified May 18, 2010, 6, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B74 Somalia's Divided Islamists.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/B74%20Somalia's%20Divided%20Islamists.pdf) (accessed February 24, 2015).

⁷⁶⁸ "Sudanese President Vows to Continue Somali Mediation," *Sudan Tribune*, January 5, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19605> (accessed October 6, 2014).

⁷⁶⁹ Terdman, 69.

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁷⁷¹ "Sudan Declines to Participate in Somalia Peace-Keeping Force," *Sudan Tribune*, January 21, 2007, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19862> (accessed February 24, 2015).

Djibouti. However, in January 2007, after the Ethiopian intervention defeated the SCIC, the Sudan declined to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, and Ali Karti, the Sudanese foreign minister, asserted that any foreign forces deployed in Somalia would be targeted by the Somali Islamist militia.⁷⁷² Previously the Sudan had supported the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia after Ethiopia defeated the SCIC. The Sudan's reluctance to physically intervene in Somalia showed that it did not want to fight against the radical Islamists there.

The Sudan tried to reconcile the Somali Islamist factions. In April 2009, the Sudan tried to use its good relations with Somali hard-liner groups, such as Aweys's group, to convince them to end the war against the new Somali government headed by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed.⁷⁷³ In mid-August 2010, the Sudan reactivated its efforts to reconcile the factions. The Somali president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, thanked the Sudan for its supportive stance and asserted his government's determination to end the Somali crisis through peaceful means and to restore the authority of the state.⁷⁷⁴ Both reconciliation efforts failed to reunite the two Islamist factions.⁷⁷⁵ Nevertheless, in April 2009, the Somali Parliament endorsed the implementation of sharia law in the country.⁷⁷⁶ Although the Sudan failed to unify the two groups, the Sudanese government was satisfied with the inclusion of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as head of the Somali government and the Somali parliament's endorsement of the sharia law in Somalia. These two developments were good for Al-Bashir, who was continuing to support the "civilization project" in Somalia as a by-product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime.⁷⁷⁷ Therefore, the Sudan started to provide support for the Somali government. In early August 2011, Al-Bashir told his Somali counterpart that the Sudan would provide substantial aid to Somalia as it suffered from droughts and

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ "Sudan Launches Mediation to Reconcile Somali Factions," *Sudan Tribune*, April 1, 2009, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30728> (accessed February 24, 2015).

⁷⁷⁴ "Sudan to Renew Efforts to Bring Peace in Somalia—President," *Sudan Tribune*, August 18, 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article36001> (accessed October 6, 2014).

⁷⁷⁵ After the reconciliation efforts Aweys was fighting the Somali government and its allies until June 2013, when he surrendered himself to the government security forces.

⁷⁷⁶ "Somali MPs Vote to Establish Sharia Law," Reuters, April 18, 2009, <http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJ0E53H0CE20090418> (accessed February 25, 2015).

⁷⁷⁷ The implementation of sharia law seemed to be aimed at delegitimizing Al-Shabab and Aweys's group of Hizb Al-Islami. It seems Sheikh Sherif wanted to implement a so-called moderate version, rather than a strict version that would not allow girls to go to school, would force men to have beards and women to be veiled, and ban on music and television. See "Somali President Bends to Rebels' Demand for Sharia Law," CNN, February 28, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/28/somalia.sharia/index.html?iref=topnews> (accessed February 25, 2015).

famine.⁷⁷⁸Hence, the Sudan pledged three million US dollars in aid.⁷⁷⁹This came at a time when the Sudan was experiencing internal strife in the regions of Blue Nile, Darfur, and Southern Kordofan that had caused mass displacements and a great need for humanitarian aid in those regions.

Another Islamist movement that had been imposing its influence in Somalia is the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB). Like other Islamist movements, it appeared and expanded in Somalia as a result of radicalization that was attributed to Siad Barre's secular policies, the defeat of Somalia in the Somali–Ethiopian war, and the mass emigration of Somalis. The SIMB was founded in 1978 by diaspora university students in Saudi Arabia. Its founders were members of the non-Somali student Muslim brotherhoods. One leader was a member of the student Muslim brotherhood in Saudi Arabia while he was studying there; three others were members of student organizations affiliated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM).⁷⁸⁰The SIMB's uniqueness is that it has a direct connection with the parent Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB).⁷⁸¹ This might be why it refused to join Al-Turabi's attempt to create a pan-Islamic organization in Africa.⁷⁸²As the Siad Barre regime focused on the emerging armed oppositions, it reduced its targeting and surveillance against the SIMB, allowing it to expand its influence between 1987 and 1991.⁷⁸³After the collapse of the state the SIMB was engaged in charity works and reconciliation within Somali communities, and it organized and took part in regional and international reconciliation efforts to aid in rebuilding the Somali state.⁷⁸⁴Research has shown that the group takes a pacifist approach in presenting its ideology to Somali society.⁷⁸⁵Nevertheless, defectors from the SIMB had joined radical Islamist movements to impose the ideology. First, defectors from the SIMB joined radical Islamist movements to impose their ideology. These included Sheikh Ali Warsame, who joined AIAI,⁷⁸⁶ and Muhamed

⁷⁷⁸ "Sudan Announces Substantial Aid Package to Somalia," *Sudan Tribune*, August 2, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article39713> (accessed February 25, 2015).

⁷⁷⁹ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), "Donor Profile: Sudan in 2011: Funding per Emergency," http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_Rdonor6_DC200_Y2011__1502250301.pdf (accessed February 25, 2015).

⁷⁸⁰ Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, 38–39.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*, 43, footnote: interview with Sheikh Mohamed Ahmed Nur Garyare, Dubai, January 19, 2009.

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 44–58.

⁷⁸⁵ There is some debate as to whether it is truly focused on pacifist activities or militant activities, and whether AIAI is its militant faction, even though the two groups have different interpretations of Islam. See "Somalia's Islamists," 13–15.

⁷⁸⁶ Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, 45. According to Hansen and Mesoy, the defections from SIMB to AIAI, although troublesome, allowed better connections between those two movements, as former members had stayed in touch with friends in SIMB.

Ali Ibrahim, who was the head of the SIMB until 1999. (He was removed from this position in favor of Dr. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, but the change was made public after he appeared as head of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) delegation during the 2006 Khartoum negotiations between the SCIC and the STNG.⁷⁸⁷ Second, while the SIMB leadership condemned the Ethiopian intervention in 2006 and advocated pacifism and reconciliation, its radical members wanted to sanction an insurgency against Ethiopian forces.⁷⁸⁸ Furthermore, with SCIC's rising influence in Somalia, the SIMB had distanced itself from the SCIC and prohibited members from joining it, because it used violence against Somalis. Still, some members of the SIMB had joined the SCIC, causing their membership in the SIMB to be revoked.⁷⁸⁹ Third, as leaders and members of the SIMB joined the SCIC, they were also part of Sherif Ahmed's faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which later became part of the new Somali government.⁷⁹⁰ The former members of the SIMB who became part of the SCIC and later the ARS played a crucial role in the legislation to make the sharia the basis for Somali law, which previously had been the aim of the SIMB.⁷⁹¹ Fourth, oddly, during the factional struggle within the SIMB, its radical wing managed to become part of a recognized government. On September 10, 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, the chairman of the Somali Peace and Development Party (PDP), was elected as the new president of Somalia. The PDP's membership consists for the most part of past and present SIMB members.⁷⁹² Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud seems to be influenced by advisers from the DamulJadid (New Blood), a group who defected from the SIMB because of its pacifism and joined the SCIC in 2006.⁷⁹³ Both Abdikarim Hussein Guled and Omar Sheikh Ali of that group were members of Sherif Ahmed's faction of the ARS.⁷⁹⁴ Importantly, DamulJadid's ideological base is not far removed from Al-Shabab, but they consider themselves moderates because they refuse armed

⁷⁸⁷ حركة الإصلاح في الصومال, "Press Release," last modified June 21, 2006, <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan21-6-06.htm> (accessed February 25, 2015).

⁷⁸⁸ Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, 55–56 footnote: interview with Garyare. According to Hansen, and Mesoy the EMB had sanctioned an insurgency against the Ethiopian forces, while the SIMB leadership was against it.

⁷⁸⁹ Abdurahman M. Abdullahi, "The Islah Movement: Islamic Moderation in War-torn Somalia," 2008, 20, <http://www.hiiraan.com/oct2008/ISLAH.pdf> (accessed February 26, 2015). The author was vice-head of the SIMB.

⁷⁹⁰ Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa*, 56, footnote: interview with Garyare.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 56. As a part of the Djibouti agreement, members of the ARS were included in the Somali parliament that elected Sherif Ahmed as the Somali president.

⁷⁹² "Hassan Sheikh Mohamud," *Africa Intelligence*, October 6, 2012, <http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/who-s-who/2012/10/05/hassan-sheikh-mohamud,107917850-ART> (accessed February 26, 2015). According to the report, his party includes students from Somalia Institute of Management and Administration Development (SIMAD), a private university he founded in 1999.

⁷⁹³ "President's Inner Circle," *Africa Intelligence*, October 6, 2012, <http://www.africaintelligence.com/ION/politics-power/2012/10/05/president%E2%80%99s-inner-circle,107917826-ART> (accessed February 26, 2015).

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.* As mentioned earlier, Sheikh Ali Ibrahim was previously a minister of social welfare in Sherif Ahmed's government.

action.⁷⁹⁵ Although SIMB advocated and still advocates pacifism in spreading its ideology, its leadership and membership defections to radical Islamist movements and its factionalism allowed it to continue to have the capacity to impose its religious ideology.

The Sudan provided support to the Somali government of Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud and his allies in the SIMB because both regimes came out of movements who that imposed their ideology on their respective societies. Like previous Sudanese support for radical Islamist movements in Somalia, the support for the SIMB faction in power accommodated the power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime.

After the elections of the new Somali government, the role of the Sudanese International University of Africa in radicalizing its Muslim students became clear. The university provided scholarships to Somali students to help Al-Bashir maintain his hold on the post-Turabi regime. According to an article published online on October 22, 2012, the university provided for 325 Somalis coming from all regions of Somalia, as well as from regions in neighboring countries inhabited by ethnic Somalis, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.⁷⁹⁶ The same article states that more than 2,000 Somali students pursued studies at that university and that most of them had scholarships.⁷⁹⁷ When the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime took power as a part of Al-Turabi's agenda, it was used to help spread his influence in Africa. The university continued to be used in this way after the palace coup of 1999. In January 2014, in the presence of a large group of scholars from the Sudan and abroad, Al-Bashir asserted that western colonization had sought to eliminate Islam in Africa and to limit education to Christian missions.⁷⁹⁸ In a meeting with its board of trustees, Al-Bashir pointed out the role of the institution in educating Muslims in Africa, saying that education is a main tool for advancing Islam and empowering Muslims, and he praised the roles played by its students all over the world.⁷⁹⁹ Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, the chairman of the institution's board of trustees, stated that the board wished to enhance the role of the

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid. Their reason for refusing armed action seems to be either from experience, after they joined the SCIC and lost against the Ethiopian forces, or because they became part of an internationally recognized government that Ethiopia will not challenge.

⁷⁹⁶ "Sudan Offers 325 Somali Students Scholarship," *Sunatimes*, October 22, 2012, <http://sunatimes.com/view.php?id=2306> (accessed February 27, 2015).

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid. The article states that the university is jointly funded by the Sudanese government, the Arab League, and other Islamic organizations, but fails to mention that the institution has always been one of the pillars of SIM's efforts to spread its radical ideology.

⁷⁹⁸ "Sudan's Bashir Says Western Colonialization Thought to Eradicate Islam from Africa," *Sudan Tribune*, January 12, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49533> (accessed February 27, 2015).

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

university domestically and regionally, announcing that several new facilities would be opened. He also expressed a commitment to modernize the university, to provide funding for its projects, and to provide sponsorship for needy students.⁸⁰⁰

The Sudan provided support for the SIMB faction in power to rule Somalia. On May 9, 2013, in a London conference on Somalia, Ali Karti, the Sudanese foreign affairs minister, pledged that the Sudan would send one million euros in support of Somalia.⁸⁰¹ The offer came at a time when the Sudan was facing internal civil wars and strife in both Darfur and its new southern frontiers, including mass displacements, hunger, and other atrocities. Karti also stated that the Sudan would continue to extend support to Somali by providing more than 10,000 scholarships for Somalis.⁸⁰² Furthermore, the Sudan would continue to provide training opportunities for the Somali police and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), as well as assistance in health and other fields.⁸⁰³

It seems clear that the Sudan took an active role in building the Somali military capacity. On May 23, 2013, Al-Bashir held talks with a Somali delegation headed by the Somali defense minister Abdihakim Hajji Mahmud Fiqi, in which Al-Bashir pledged to support the Somali government.⁸⁰⁴ During the meeting, an agreement was signed in the presence of Abdihakim Fiqi and the Sudanese minister of defense, Abdel Rahim, stating that the Sudan would help to strengthen the SNAF.⁸⁰⁵ This agreement followed an earlier initiative by the Sudan to help Somalia's radical Islamists develop a strong SNAF to secure their governance of Somalia. In November 2011, when President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed met with Al-Bashir, Al-Bashir called for the building of a strong SNAF capable of protecting the security and sovereignty of the state and expanding stability in the country.⁸⁰⁶ A strong army will help the radical Islamists and the SIMB faction to maintain their hold on power and to impose their religious ideology on the Somali state.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid. Dr. Mustafa Ismail was a member of the SIM and a close aid to Al-Turabi. He headed the Council of People's Friendship, and also the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference when Al-Turabi was injured in an attack in Canada. Later he headed the Sudanese People's Committee for the Defense of Sudanese, and also served as minister of foreign affairs. He was not involved in the "memorandum of ten" against Al-Turabi, but he joined Al-Bashir's side during the palace coup of 1999, and held various positions simultaneously in both the NCP government and the NCP party.

⁸⁰¹ "Sudan Pledges One Million Euros in Support of Somalia," *Sudan Safari*, May 9, 2013, http://english.sudansafari.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4366:-sudan-pledges-one-million-euros-in-support-of-somalia&catid=6:slid&Itemid=6 (accessed February 27, 2015).

⁸⁰² Ibid.

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, "News: Khartoum Pledges to Continue Supporting Somalia's Government," last modified May 23, 2013, <http://www.mfa.gov.et/news/more.php?newsid=2021> (accessed February 15, 2015).

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ "Al Bashir Affirms Sudan Support to Build Strong Army in Somalia," SUNA, November 18, 2011, <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=202045> (accessed February 27, 2015).

All of this support for the radical faction of the SIMB was mentioned in Al-Bashir's Independence Day inauguration speech for the celebration of the new Ed-Dmazin dam. Al-Bashir used the occasion to highlight the achievement of the regime in building the dam, and outlined the positive country's relations with neighboring countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya.⁸⁰⁷ He also stressed that the regime wanted peace.⁸⁰⁸ Attending these celebrations was the Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud in his first visit to the Sudan. Al-Bashir's speech confirmed to Hassan Mahmoud, in front of a large audience, that the Sudan was willing to help him make Somalia strong and united again.⁸⁰⁹

All Roads Lead to Khartoum: The Clash of Islamists

The post-Al-Turabi government's continued support for radical Islamist movements in both Eritrea and Somalia was a by-product of power relations within the Sudanese regime. The clash of the Islamist power centers within the regime was a result of the competing interests of Islamist individuals. However, their expansionist "civilization project," inherited from Al-Turabi's regime, had important value to their self-legitimation. Therefore, Al-Bashir and his allies used the Sudan's support for the radical Islamists in East Africa to maintain his hold on the regime. They did, however, remove certain competing personalities when the internal factionalism got out in the open and began to threaten Al-Bashir's power. At that point it was clear that the Sudan's support for the radical Islamist movements had exhausted its purpose in securing Al-Bashir's authority over the competing factions within the regime and the country.

With the removal of Al-Turabi ahead of the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) and from its governing organ, the National Congress Party (NCP), his old associates who became the elites of the state competed for power to head the SIM, which became subordinated to the NCP. That is because a leading position, such as secretary general, within the SIM constituted an opportunity for ideological influence for the leaders and followers of the different Islamist factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime. Ghazi Atabani, one of the signatories of the "memorandum of ten" document, realized later how that document had replaced Al-Turabi's totalitarianism with a military one. Therefore, he

⁸⁰⁷ "افتتاح تعليمة خزان الروصيرص تسجيل كامل" Web, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmXzLRWkERw>.

⁸⁰⁸ "افتتاح تعليمة خزان الروصيرص تسجيل كامل" Web, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NmXzLRWkERw>.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid.

wanted to reunite the SIM.⁸¹⁰ Along with him, there were others who shared the same view of needing to unite the SIM; consequently, they formed a reform movement within the NCP.⁸¹¹ Atabani was not comfortable with the military controlling the NCP, or with the factionalism within the NCP.⁸¹² And he was especially not pleased with Vice President Ali Osman Taha, who was running things as he saw fit.⁸¹³ Atabani wanted to head the NCP instead of Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Tahir, who Atabani believed was not fit for the job, and because his ambition to obtain that post was supported by individuals within the movement.⁸¹⁴ In April 2004, there was a conference in Khartoum for the SIM to elect a new secretary general to replace Al-Tahir. Both Atabani and Taha were candidates.⁸¹⁵ Taha, who had conspired with Al-Bashir in the palace coup; wanted to subordinate the SIM to the NCP. On the other hand, Atabani, who was removed from his job as presidential advisor for communicating with Al-Turabi in an effort to reconcile the two SIM factions, was supported by his reformist movement to strengthen the SIM if he was elected secretary general.⁸¹⁶ Nevertheless, Taha was elected as the new secretary general of the SIM, as he had more powerful support.⁸¹⁷ When Atabani applied again for the position during the SIM's eighth conference, held November 14–17, 2012, he failed again to win it. Before leaving his position of secretary general of the SIM, Taha outmaneuvered Atabani by changing and passing amendments before the conference, and establishing a supreme council within the SIM that was chaired by Al-Bashir and consisted of his deputies.⁸¹⁸ Atabani was disappointed that these unelected members of the SIM had direct power over it.⁸¹⁹ The secretary general of the SIM would be subordinated to the supreme council and the regime, unable to take any initiative without the approval of the higher leadership barred from the Shura council.⁸²⁰ Dismayed, Atabani, who was the head of the NCP parliamentary block in the Sudan at

⁸¹⁰ Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 650–651.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*, 650–651.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, 649.

⁸¹³ *Ibid.*, 649. According to Mohi-Eldeen, Ghazi started to correspond with Al-Turabi in 2002 to unify SIM again. Both Taha and Ghazi were members of the SIM, the NIF, and close aides and associates of Al-Turabi before the 1999 palace coup that caused the division within the SIM. They joined Al-Bashir in the coup against Al-Turabi, and then took up important positions in both the NCP and its governments. After the division within the SIM, Ghazi and Taha competed against each other for influence and power within the NCP.

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 649. According to Mohi-Eldeen, because Ghazi continued to criticize the organs of the NCP, the NCP hawks embarrassed him on a television show by presenting a negative view of Al-Turabi which Ghazi condemned. Taha laughed at Ghazi's contradictions. See Mohi-Eldeen, *Al-Turabi wa al-Ingaz*, 649–650.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 272–273. According to Mohi-Eldeen, there were those who also had a political interest in Ghazi replacing Tahir as the new SIM secretary general.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 273–274.

⁸¹⁸ Abdullahi Gallab, *Their Second Republic: Islamism in the Sudan from Disintegration to Oblivion* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), 206.

⁸¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, 206.

the time, withdrew his candidacy for secretary general of the SIM.⁸²¹ Al-Zubair Ahmad Al-Hassan, former finance and economy minister, was elected to the position,⁸²² and Mahdi Ibrahim was made chairman of its Shura council.⁸²³ Atabani was blocked by civilian Islamists for the position of head of the SIM, and consequently was unable to pass the reforms he had planned.

There was a power struggle between the civilian and security leaders of the regime, in which the security faction, which was connected to the president, got the upper hand but was removed later. Taha and his allies, Awad Al-Jaz, the minister of petroleum production, and Ali Karti, the minister of foreign affairs, constituted the core group of a new class that held power in the Sudan through their control of finance, the security apparatus, the army, and the militia.⁸²⁴ The other group consisted of Al-Bashir, his relatives, and the auxiliary team that included Nafie Ali Nafie, Qutbi Al-Mahdi, Amin Hassan Omar, and other members of the deep state.⁸²⁵ Previously, Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi never met without the presence of Taha and his team, who always filtered the reports that would reach the two leaders.⁸²⁶ When Taha returned to the Sudan after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), he found a new team of Islamists, including Salah Gosh, who was the head of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS), Osama, Abdallah and Kamal Abdullatif. These men became closer to the president, who in turn began to appreciate their views.⁸²⁷ Nafie took advantage of the 16-month absence of Taha to establish direct communication and a closer relationship with Al-Bashir.⁸²⁸ With the death of John Garang, the leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), who was Taha's CPA negotiation partner in 2005, Taha lost considerable authority and his policies of

⁸²¹ "'Plot' in Khartoum: Timeline of Events," Radio Tamazuj, November 26, 2012,

<https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/%E2%80%98plot%E2%80%99-khartoum-timeline-events> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸²² "Zubair/Al-Zubair Ahmed Hassan MP," *Sudan Tribune*, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot647> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸²³ "Mahdi Ibrahim," *Sudan Tribune*, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2353> (accessed March 1, 2015). According to Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Mahdi Ibrahim was a former military officer, held various positions within the regime, and served as Sudanese ambassador to the US. After the coup, he and Taha were sent to Iran to ask for their aid in helping them secure their power. While he was ambassador to the US he was the Sudan link with the Islamist civilian Somali community. He also served as head of the political department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during which time he visited Austria with Bashir to look into supporting the Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnia crisis. See Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan: Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989–2000* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 31, 113, 143.

⁸²⁴ Gallab, *Their Second Republic*, 165. According to Gallab, Salah Gosh was also an ally of Taha, and according to a WikiLeaks cable released in 2011, Gosh, as early as 2008 was considering exploiting the international Criminal Court's (ICC) indictments against Al-Bashir to enable Taha to take power. See Gallab, *Their Second Republic*, 141, footnotes.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*, 165. The persons mentioned are security and senior party members of the NCP regime. All were members of the SIM, and they joined Al-Bashir in the palace coup against Al-Turabi. They then took important positions within the NCP and its regime. For example, Nafie Ali Nafie was vice chairman to Al-Bashir in the NCP, and also presidential assistant to Al-Bashir in the NCP government.

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, 172.

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*, 186. Both Taha and Salah Gosh are from the Shaigiya tribe.

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*, 197.

concessions in the peace process to normalize relations with the US did not bear fruit.⁸²⁹ He was therefore attacked by the regime hardliners led by Nafie, who asserted that Vice President Taha had given many concessions to the SPLM/A when finalizing the CPA at Naivasha and was naïve enough to believe US promises.⁸³⁰ There were many rumors surrounding Taha, casting suspicions on his ambitions behind the Naivasha agreement, and they led to the deterioration of his relationship with Al-Bashir.⁸³¹ In 2009 Salah Gosh was removed as head of the NISS and replaced by his vice-head Mohammed Atta Al-Moua.⁸³² There were speculations that Gosh was suspected of plotting against Al-Bashir.⁸³³ He was appointed as presidential adviser on security affairs, but in 2011 he was removed from that position,⁸³⁴ because he clashed with Nafie, who was the vice chairman of the NCP and a senior aid to Al-Bashir.⁸³⁵ Nafie accused Gosh of plotting behind the president's back and bypassing the NCP by approaching two large opposition parties without the knowledge of Al-Bashir and the party; Gosh claimed he had informed the president.⁸³⁶ Al-Bashir decided to side with Nafie and sacked Gosh, weakening the position of Taha, who was a rival to Nafie and his followers in the regime.⁸³⁷ Subsequently, the influence of Taha and his group inside the regime was reduced by the rising influence of Nafie and his group.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) faced internal divisions because of the leadership of the defense minister and because of regime involvement inside the military. On January 29, 2012, an article appeared in the *Sudan Tribune*, reporting that a group of 700 military officers from the SAF had sent both Al-Bashir and Minister of Defense Abdel Rahim Hussein a memo listing demands for political and military reforms.⁸³⁸ In the memo, the officers called on both Al-Bashir and Hussein to urgently address the challenges faced by the SAF, emphasizing that the SAF had been unable to defeat the rebels in the border regions of the Blue Nile and

⁸²⁹ Ibid., 187.

⁸³⁰ John Young, *The Fate of Sudan* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 107.

⁸³¹ Gallab, *Their Second Republic*, 186.

⁸³² Ulf Laessing and Khalid Abdelaziz, "Sudan Arrests Former Spy Chief after a Failed Plot," Reuters Canada, November 22, 2012, <http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCABRE8AL0DM20121122?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ Jeffrey Sachs, "An Old Regime in New Sudan: Politics after Secession," *Jadaliyya*, August 24, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2464/an-old-regime-in-new-sudan_politics-after-secessio (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Ibid.

⁸³⁸ "Exclusive: Sudan Army Officers Warn Bashir and Hussein against Rush to War with South," *Sudan Tribune*, January 29, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41444> (accessed March 1, 2015).

southern Kordofan states.⁸³⁹ Likewise, the officers underlined the urgent need to combat rampant corruption within the SAF. As an example of the corruption, they mentioned a purchase of 200 tanks from the Ukraine in 2010, most of which were defective.⁸⁴⁰ The officers claimed that most of the military officials who objected to buying the tanks were sacked by the minister of defense.⁸⁴¹ They called urgently for the separation between the SAF and the NCP, stressing that the army should not protect the regime from its mistakes and become involved in Sudanese politics. They demanded governmental reform, as the status quo was a risk to the security of the country.⁸⁴² This occurred in the same month when Ghazi Atabani, in his capacity as leader of the NCP parliamentary block, was also calling for reforms.⁸⁴³ The group of military reformers was named Al-Saihun, led by Brigadier General Mohammed Ibrahim Abdel Galil, also known as “Wad Ibrahim.”⁸⁴⁴ The group is a faction within the military associated with the NCP, based on a core of military officers and paramilitary jihadists embittered by the loss of South Sudan after a long and difficult civil war.⁸⁴⁵ This group, along with Al-Turabi’s party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), had supported Atabani’s bid for secretary general of the SIM in the eighth conference, and were disappointed that the SIM fell under the control of the regime leaders.⁸⁴⁶ After the conference the group called for the dismissal of Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Hussein, citing his disputes with senior officers (some ending with dismissals), his failure to respond to attacks from Israel, and the inability to provide Sudanese forces and its paramilitaries with means to end the rebellions in the Sudan.⁸⁴⁷ Later, in November 2012, the group was implicated in a coup attempt and its leaders were arrested. A memo from its members who were not arrested asked Al-Bashir to release them and stated the reasons for their

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁴¹ Ibid.

⁸⁴² Ibid.

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ “Mohammed Ibrahim Abdel Galil, ‘Wad Ibrahim,’” *Sudan Tribune*, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot2397> (accessed March 1, 2015). According to the same page of the *Sudan Tribune*, Galil used to be close to Al-Bashir, was head of his security for six years, was one of the strongest candidates for minister of interior in 2011, and enjoyed tremendous popularity among Islamists.

⁸⁴⁵ Andrew McGregor, “Sudanese Regime Begins to Unravel after Coup Reports and Rumors of Military Ties to Iran,” Aberfoyle International Security, January 7, 2013, <http://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=141> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid. McGregor had asserted Al-Turabi’s party to be the Popular Congress Party (PCP), although its most often Acronym is PNC.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid. In late December 2012, Israeli planes had attacked the Yarmouk Sudanese arms factory, as Israel believed that weapons from that factory were being sent from the Sudan to Hamas. Israel had also been known to make previous attacks on the Sudanese borders. For details, see “Khartoum Fire Blamed on Israeli Bombing,” *Al Jazeera English*, December 25, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/20121024142531802810.html> (accessed April 7, 2015).

involvement, pointing that Abdel Rahim Hussein's leadership in the SAF had pushed them to that course of action.⁸⁴⁸

These factional struggles came out in the open during the 2012 revolts in the Sudan that were led by youth movements. The regime claimed it had discovered a military coup attempt on November 23, 2012 and had foiled it. On that day, the authorities arrested a number of individuals from the SAF, the PDF, the NISS, and the NCP.⁸⁴⁹ Those who were arrested and suspected of involvement included Salah Gosh, Wad Ibrahim, Major General Adil Al-Tayeb from the NISS, and Ghazi Atabani.⁸⁵⁰ Apparently, both Taha and Nafie have benefited from this situation. Taha claimed that the plotters should face prosecution and there should be no special treatment.⁸⁵¹ Nafie was firm in stating that the suspects should face trial, asserting that some of them had been detained in the past on similar charges.⁸⁵² In September 2013, there was a mass riot in the Sudan as a result of the government decision to lift subsidies. The regime responded to these riots by using its security forces to detain, attack, and kill rioters.⁸⁵³ In response, a memo signed by 31 NCP officials and their supporters, including Ghazi Atabani, Wad Ibrahim, and Hassan Osman Rizk, was sent to Al-Bashir, indicating the need for reform, stressing the need to reinstitute the subsidies, and stating that the legitimacy of his rule had never been so strongly questioned before.⁸⁵⁴ As a result, the NCP dismissed Ghazi Atabani and those with him from the party. They formed a new Islamist party called the Reform Now Party (RNP).⁸⁵⁵

Because Al-Bashir could no longer manage the factionalism within the regime, and because the revolts in the Sudan were challenging his rule, he carried out a reshuffle in both the government and the regime. The changes gave Al-Bashir and his military allies the opportunity they needed to gain more power in the regime, by reducing the influence of the security and civilian Islamist factions of the post-Al-Turabi regime. Bakri Hassan

⁸⁴⁸ "Sudan's NCP Power Struggle Comes to Surface, Bashir's Aides Suspected of Involvement in Coup Attempt," *Sudan Tribune*, November 22, 2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=44617 (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵¹ "Sudan's First VP Weighs in on Alleged Coup Attempt, Slams 'Treachery' and 'Betrayal,'" *Sudan Tribune*, December 1, 2012, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44703> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸⁵² McGregor, "Sudanese Regime Begins to Unravel."

⁸⁵³ "NCP Officials Call on Sudan's Bashir to Reinstate Fuel Subsidies and Stop Killing Protestors," *Sudan Tribune*, September 28, 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article48217> (accessed March 1, 2015).

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁵ "Top Sudanese Politician Breaks Away from Ruling Party," *Al-Arabiya*, October 26, 2013, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/africa/2013/10/26/Top-Sudanese-politician-breaks-away-from-ruling-party.html> (accessed March 1, 2015).

Salah, Al-Bashir's long-time ally, was made vice president. Abdel Rahim Hussein was kept as minister of defense even though he was not well liked within the party or the SAF. A new position of state minister of the Ministry of Defense was created and given to a popular military officer, Yahya Mohamed Kheir, whose family has close ties to Al-Bashir's late friend, vice president Al-Zubair Muhammed Salih. Salah Wansi, who hails from the state security sector and is an ally of Al-Bashir, became minister of presidential affairs.⁸⁵⁶ Ali Karti kept his position as minister of foreign affairs. Nafie was replaced by Ibrahim Ghandour as adviser and vice chairman of the party. Awad Al-Jaz, who has served in many government posts since 1989, had stepped down.⁸⁵⁷ Subsequently, Al-Bashir increased his power even further by giving more power to the military in the government, as he appointed a military figure to head the Ministry of Interior. In late June 2014, Al-Bashir made another, smaller reshuffle in the government.⁸⁵⁸ The most important appointment was the selection of former SAF chief of staff Colonel General Esmat Abdel-Rahman as minister of interior.⁸⁵⁹ Al-Bashir's rule was now more secure than ever, as he had given himself and his military allies more power than ever before.

Conclusion

With the removal of Al-Turabi from state power, power relations became more important in governing the Sudan, because the people who sided with Al-Bashir's military faction in the palace coup of 1999, took up important and sensitive positions in the post-Al-Turabi regime. The competing elites had formed their own factions, in the hope of expanding their influence and power at the expense of each other. As this chapter has shown, this competition was threatening to Al-Bashir's power and would

⁸⁵⁶ Mohamed Elshabik, "Omar al-Bashir's Cabinet Reshuffle and Absolute Rule in Sudan," *Muftah*, December 27, 2013, <http://muftah.org/bashirs-cabinet-reshuffle-and-absolute-rule-in-sudan/#.VPNjlvUfLI> (accessed March 2, 2015). Both Bakri Hassan Salah and Abdel Rahim Hussein were members of the SIM's military faction. Salah was a signatory of the "memorandum of ten" and had sided with Al-Bashir in the palace coup of 1999. Hussein was not a signatory of the memorandum, but also sided with Al-Bashir in the palace coup. Both men were also members of the Revolutionary Command Council that Al-Bashir headed. Salah was the head of both the internal security and external security of the RCC regime at the time of the IS-SOR, which was famous for the torture houses known as the "ghost houses." He was later the minister of defense, then the minister of the ministry of presidency. Hussein was secretary general of the RCC, and served as minister of interior before he became minister of defense. Importantly, Al-Bashir seems to trust both men, possibly because they all served in the Sudanese Military together.

⁸⁵⁷ "Sudanese Opposition Downplays Significance of Cabinet Reshuffle," *Sudan Tribune*, December 8, 2013, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article49117> (accessed March 2, 2015). Ali Karti, Ibrahim Ghandour, Awad Al-Jaz, and Nafie are all members of the SIM who either sided with Al-Bashir in the palace coup of 1999, or did nothing to stop him. Ali Karti was the coordinating head of the Popular Defense Forces, which both Al-Bashir and Al-Turabi had set up to model the Iranian Republican Guards. Ibrahim Al-Sansousi, Al-Turabi's deputy, was responsible for the ideological training of their radical Islamists before the recruits of the PDF were sent into a holy war in South Sudan, during the Sudan's second civil war. Ali Karti was made minister of foreign affairs in 2010.

⁸⁵⁸ "Sudanese President Conducts Mini Cabinet Reshuffle," June 25, 2014, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51482> (accessed March 2, 2015).

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

have ended with his removal as had happened to Al-Turabi before. However, realizing that those competing factions were still attached to their radical expansionist ideology, Al-Bashir continued the Sudan's support for the radical Islamist movements in Eritrea and Somalia, where Al-Turabi had initiated the expansionist project. Interestingly, the Sudan continued to support the same radical Islamist movements that Al-Turabi had previously supported even when those movements were fractured or transformed into other movements. In the case of the Somali Islamic Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB), the Sudan supported its radical wing, which managed to attain regional and international state power as it infiltrated the executive office of the government to impose its radical Islamist ideology. That infiltration into the recognized government guaranteed that no regional power in Africa, such as Ethiopia, would ever intervene in Somalia to remove it, as it did with the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC) in 2006. It is clear that many members of the post-Al-Turabi regime were involved in recycling radical Islamism in East Africa, just as they had previously been involved with Al-Turabi in expanding the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM) ideology into East Africa.

The factionalism within the post-Al-Turabi regime had been brewing since the 1999 palace coup. It eventually came out into the open. Dissidents within the regime formed a competing radical Islamist party, senior leaders clashed with each other for influence over Al-Bashir, and military and militant Islamists within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) allied with the dissident party were implicated in a coup attempt in 2012. The revolts in the Sudan, led by the youth calling for regime change, put additional pressure on Al-Bashir, as the revolts indicated that there were competing powers within the regime who could remove him. Since the recycling of radical Islamism was no longer enough to assure Al-Bashir's control over the competing factions, he did a government and regime reshuffle, giving more power to himself by placing his military allies in sensitive positions, thereby reducing the powers of both the civilian and security Islamist factions.

Thesis Conclusion

This study has attempted to analyze the Sudan's role in security in East Africa, using Michel Foucault's conception of power to describe how the Sudan's continued support for radical Islamist movements is a by-product of internal power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime.

The conceptual framework clarifies and illustrates the significance of this study. The study examines the internal dynamics of the factional politics that have influenced the post-Al-Turabi regime and its foreign policy in East Africa. Previous researchers seem to have disregarded the importance of this factionalism in understanding the regime's continued support for radical Islamist movements after the palace coup of 1999, after ending the Sudanese second civil war, and while aiding the US in counterterrorism operations. The study gives considerable attention to ideology of a regime that supports like-minded radical religious movements in East Africa, compared to the usual studies on proxy wars in Africa that disregard the role of ideology in a state supporting non-state actors and that rationalize proxy agent-state relationships through cost-benefit analysis. Foucault's approach allows this study to analyze the historical context that caused the development of the SIM and similar radical movements in Somalia and Eritrea.

While researching the Sudan's role in African regional security, this study unearthed some interesting details. First, like the Sudan, colonial powers had used local elites to maintain their rule in Somalia and Eritrea (before Eritrea became part of Ethiopia). However, there are some differences between the two countries. In both Eritrea, and Somalia Sufi orders were used by the colonial powers to maintain their rule. In Somalia, although Sufism was influential, the colonial powers relied on tribal and clan elites to maintain their hegemony. Second, while Sufism was predominant in all three countries, radical religious flourished greatly in those countries since in the 1970s. In the Sudan, Al-Nimeiry's regime sought to legitimize itself by imposing Islam as a state ideology. In Somalia, after the Siad Barre regime lost the Somali-Ethiopian war, it became very repressive, which allowed religious radicalism to spread further. In Eritrea, religion and ethnicity played a large role; after its annexation by Ethiopia, resistance became radicalized through religion. Third, a common trend that was found during this study was that the radical religious groups such as the SIM, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad

Movement (EIJM), Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), and the Somali Islax Muslim Brotherhood (SIMB) fractured into competing groups, renaming themselves or forming political parties and civil societies connected to them while still retaining the main ideology. Therefore, on the basis of this study it could be asserted that factionalism appeared within those movements not because of minor ideological differences, but because of factions competing for power to rule within those movements.

Sufism has had great influence in the Sudan, especially after it became centralized around Sufi orders and the families of the leaders of those orders. The Turkish–Ottoman invasion into Bilad Al-Sudan created the modern Sudan as a geographic expression. The new rulers wanted to impose an orthodox version of Islam. This led to the rise of Mahdism, which was supported by a number of Sufi orders, except Al- Khatmiyya and a few others. After the defeat of Mahdism in the Sudan by the British forces, the British colonial authorities finally understood the importance of Sufism, and managed to use the two Sufi orders of Al-Mahdiyya and Al-Khatmiyya as their agents to rule the Sudan. With British support for those two Sufi orders, Sufism in the Sudan became politicized, and that politicization of religion was used as a capacity of political domination over the entire society. It became clear that any nationalist leader who wanted to push his own agenda had to have the support of one of the Sufi orders to attain political power in the Sudan.

With religion being politicized and the Sudan being so close to Egypt, another group developed in the Sudan, wanting to impose its radical non-Sufi religious ideology on the Sudanese society. That group was the Sudanese Islamist Movement (SIM), a branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. At first the SIM sought to attain its goal by pressuring the Sufi establishment to work with it. It eventually formed its own political party, the Islamic Charter Front. In the late 1960s, the SIM had the capacity to impose its radical ideology on Sudanese society, as it was supported by its ally Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a leader of the Umma party and the Mahdiyya order, who became the Sudanese prime minister in the mid- 1960s. Al-Nimeiry's coup in 1969 halted their progress temporarily. However, after the reconciliation agreement among the religious orders, the SIM, and Al-Nimeiry, the SIM infiltrated every state institution, increased their numbers within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), created satellite organizations, and used Al-Nimeiry's wave of politicized Islam as a state ideology, all of which them power as a capacity to impose their religious ideology. The Sudanese intifada of 1985

stopped them short of a total victory, so they began working again with Al-Mahdi. However, once they were forced out of state power by the factionalized Sufi establishment and other political elites, the SIM decided not to share power any more. Instead, it used its military members within the SAF to carry out the military coup of June 30, 1989.

After capturing state power, the SIM was imposing its religious ideology from above on the entire Sudanese society. They used the state to remove the influence of the old Sufi establishment and the leftist movements; the latter were among the SIM's main concerns, as they were well organized. The SIM purged from the state institutions, the SAF, law enforcement, and civil societies everyone who was not a member of the SIM or who disliked the SIM. It used its NGOs and its Islamic banks, and set up its own paramilitary organizations, such as the Popular Defense Forces, to protect the regime from any future coups and to impose jihadism in south Sudan.

Secure in the Sudan, the SIM went on to impose its ideology in other countries such as Somalia and Eritrea. Both of these countries had radical Islamists similar to the SIM, who needed support in order to succeed. Both countries faced peculiar situations that the SIM wanted to capitalize on: in Somalia, the collapse of the state, and in Eritrea, competing factions who wanted to form a new state shaped by their own ideologies. The SIM had supported those likeminded radical Islamists by coordinating with them, by using its own NGOs and civil society organizations to aid them, and by allowing the Sudan to shelter them and send them weapons and other types of material support. Eventually, however, the SIM became factionalized, and Al-Bashir, backed by the power of the military, removed Al-Turabi from state power. Al-Bashir's power within the military significant that made most of the SIM members abandoned their leader Al-Turabi to join in the palace coup of 1999.

After the coup, the second Islamist republic was formed by the SIM members who had taken part in the coup, and who had attained sensitive civilian, military, and security positions. Nonetheless, even though Al-Bashir had the military power as a capacity to removal Al-Turabi from power, he still needed the SIM members to govern the Sudan. This is where power relations necessarily played a role in guiding Al-Bashir's hand in the Sudan's foreign policy. Radical Islamism in neighboring countries continued to be supported because the post-Al-Turabi regime is composed of competing factions who

are still interested in supporting radical Islamism, and who have the ability to remove Al-Bashir from power just as he removed Al-Turabi. In order to control those factions and continue to rule the Sudan, Al-Bashir continued the Sudan's support for radical Islamists in East Africa, to show that he had not abandoned their "civilization project." That tactic is based on understanding the value of the radical expansionist project to each of those factions: all of them were involved in that project with Al-Turabi, and it is important to their self-legitimization as part of the regime. Interestingly, Al-Bashir had provided support for the same radical Islamists Al-Turabi had provided before. Furthermore, the Sudan's support for the SIMB could be viewed as a winning situation for Al-Bashir: since one of the SIMB factions had found a place within recognized state power, he will not be attacked by outside powers for supporting them. At the same time, he can use that support to control the factions within his own regime by showing that the project is still continuing without Al-Turabi. As has always been true historically in the Sudan, religion as an ideology is important for the existence of Al-Bashir's leadership.

It seems that Al-Bashir was working with the regimes' security faction, composed of security members and a few senior party bureaucrats in guiding the Sudan's foreign policy.

The last chapter of the study describes the way where one faction left the regime and formed its own party with the same politicized religious ideology as the SIM, when powerful competing leaders within the regime were close to removing Al-Bashir power. Therefore, Al-Bashir took advantage of the revolts within the country and within the regime to secure his power by appointing a cabinet composed of military men and a few security men, the only ones whom he trusts to secure his rule over the Sudan. This situation showed that the recycling of the "civilization project" of radical Islamism had outgrown its usefulness, and that Al-Bashir and his allies within the post-Al-Turabi regime would need a different policy to retain control of the remaining factions within the regime.

Studying the Sudan's support for radical Islamists movements in East Africa as a by-product of power relations within the post-Al-Turabi regime leads to the conclusion that unless there is internal stability within the regime, the Sudan's support for radical Islamist movements will continue. The corollary is that if regional and international

powers want to achieve stability in East Africa by supporting the stability of the current Sudanese regime, it would sadly be at the expense of the Sudanese people's interest.

A possible area for future research is the question of why the SIM, which appreciated the Iranian theocratic regime and tried to model itself after it, became fractured after taking state power, while the Iranian theocratic regime remains coherent until this very day.

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