

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Theses and Dissertations

6-1-2015

Prospects of police reform in Egypt's changing political environment 2011-2015

Rabha Allam

Follow this and additional works at: <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds>

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Allam, R. (2015). *Prospects of police reform in Egypt's changing political environment 2011-2015* [Master's thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/58>

MLA Citation

Allam, Rabha. *Prospects of police reform in Egypt's changing political environment 2011-2015*. 2015. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/58>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu.

The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**PROSPECTS OF POLICE REFORM IN EGYPT'S
CHANGING POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 2011-2015**

A Thesis Submitted to

The Department Of Public Policy and Administration

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts/Science

By Rabha Mohamed Seifeldine Allam

(Under the supervision of Dr. Amr Hamzawy)

May 2015

In Loving Memory of My Late Father

Seif Allam

(1945- 1991)

ABSTRACT

Since the January 25, 2011 revolution, the Police reform has been an important priority on the political agenda in Egypt. Human rights violations, as well as the mediocre police performance presented good argument for the necessity of the reform. However, after the June 30, 2013 political change, the demands of police reform were less vocal, and the argument of the war on terror became a priority. This was the interest of this thesis entitled "Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt's Changing Political Environment" submitted by Rabha Allam and supervised by Dr. Amr Hamzawy at the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. The thesis addressed the question of the relation between the police reform and the changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 2015. And to answer this question, it introduced the experiences of four countries which conducted police reform through changing political environments such as Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. It also relied on 22 in-depth interviews with police officers and human rights advocates to assess the extent of the introduced reform and the prospects of any potential reform. The police reform was conceptualized and operationalized through four main norms of democratic policing which are political neutrality, de-militarization, professionalism and accountability. Although, the Egyptian case failed on the political neutrality and the de-militarization levels, it proved partial success on the professionalism and the accountability levels. The thesis concluded to admit a positive relation between the police reform and the democratic political change, and also the interdependency between the four norms of police reform. Egypt might have missed the chance to adopt a radical reform as in Poland or in South Africa but still can be inspired by the Brazilian and the Turkish model.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCA: Central Agency for Auditing

COP: Community Policing

CSF: Central Security Forces

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MOI: Ministry of Interior

NDP: National Democratic Party

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NSA: National Security Agency

SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces

SSI: the State Security Investigations

SSR: Security Sector Reform

GLOSSARY OF POLICE TERMS

molazīm awwāl: First Lieutenant

naqīb: Captain

rā'id: Major

muqadim: Lieutenant Colonel

'aqīd: Colonel

'amīd: Brigadier General

liwā': Major General

altaftīsh: Inspection

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the high hopes raised by the January 25th Revolution which has driven my interest in, and dedication to the topic.

Foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor, Professor Amr Hamzawy for accepting to supervise my thesis, and for his immense knowledge and high intellectual and academic standards.

I also would like to thank my readers for accepting to be part of my committee and for their generous insights without which my thesis would not have been the same. Dr Khaled Amin was first to introduce me to the essentials of Public Policy and Administration, and Dr Amr Shalakany for his attentive guidance since the beginning of my interest in the topic.

I am also indebted to the Yousef Jameel Fellowship for allowing me the chance to join this Master's program. Special thanks to Dr Laila ElBaradei, Iman Nabil and Amira ElBeltagy for their generous care and support in every step of the way.

Appreciation goes to the faculty and staff of the Department of Public Policy and Administration, especially Dr Emad Shahin for his tremendous support and enormous insights that helped deepen my understanding of the topic and the Public Policy in general. My sincere thanks and gratitude go to Dr Ghada Barssoum for her constant support which had sharpened my method and raised my awareness of the topic.

I also deeply thank all of my interviewees for accepting to talk to me despite their time limitations and for giving their candid insights and experiences.

Deep thanks and gratitude goes to my dear mentors; Dr Ahmed Youssef, Dr Nevine Mossad, Dr. Amr ElShobaki, Dr Omayma Aboud and Dr. Heba Raouf for their continued support. My deepest gratitude goes also to my late mentor Mrs. Iness Abul'eid whose ethics and compassion will always enlighten my way.

Finally, loving appreciation goes to my mother, whose emotional support was essential to overcome the challenges of my study and cushioned its hardships. Special thanks to my brother and his lovely family for their continued love. My warm gratitude goes to my friends Dina, Mona, Mai, Hanaa, Yasmine, Farah, Marwa, Nadine, Mavie, Noha, Heba, Rania, Saneya, Aly, Georges and Ahmed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| I. Introduction..... | 7 |
| II. Methodology..... | 9 |
| III. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Police Reform..... | 13 |
| A- Political Neutrality..... | 13 |
| B- De-militarization..... | 14 |
| C- Professionalism..... | 14 |
| D- Accountability..... | 16 |
| IV. Literature Review..... | 19 |
| V. International Experiences of Police Reform in Changing Political Environment..... | 35 |
| A- Brazil..... | 35 |
| 1. Context..... | 35 |
| 2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform..... | 35 |
| 3. Reform Initiatives..... | 36 |
| 4. Challenges | 38 |
| B- Turkey..... | 38 |
| 1. Context..... | 38 |
| 2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform..... | 39 |
| 3. Reform Initiatives..... | 39 |
| 4. Challenges | 42 |
| C- Poland..... | 42 |
| 1. Context..... | 42 |
| 2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform..... | 43 |
| 3. Reform Initiatives..... | 43 |
| 4. Challenges..... | 47 |
| D- South Africa..... | 47 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Context..... | 47 |
| 2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform..... | 48 |
| 3. Reform Initiatives..... | 49 |
| 4. Challenges..... | 53 |
| VI. Assessing the Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt..... | 55 |
| A- Historical Overview..... | 55 |
| B- Political Neutrality..... | 58 |
| C- De-militarization..... | 61 |
| D- Professionalism..... | 67 |
| E- Accountability..... | 77 |
| VII. Recommendations for Police Reform in Egypt..... | 88 |
| A- Political Neutrality..... | 88 |
| B- De-militarization..... | 92 |
| C- Professionalism..... | 94 |
| D- Accountability..... | 102 |
| VIII. Conclusion..... | 106 |
| IX. Bibliography..... | 110 |

I. Introduction

After the January 25th 2011 revolution in Egypt, many voices have risen to demand the reform of the police apparatus whose brutality was an essential reason for the masses to revolt. On the other hand, the complete collapse of the ministry of interior (MOI) after several days of attempting to suppress demonstrations has added more significance to the reform demands. For, the MOI was unable to function professionally under pressure for consecutive days. Right after the revolution, the debate regarding the police reform was quite clear about its mandatory nature. But, few months later, the reform debate has substantially faded. It has rather transformed into strong statements about preserving security, postponing reforms and regaining the state's prestige as well as the priority for countering terrorism.

Despite the fast changes that occurred in the Egyptian political environment in the last four years, only one constant prevails, the human rights violations conducted by the police¹. Thus, the police reform seemed to be a seasonal priority that shows up on the agenda when the violations rates go up. Hence, this study aims at contributing to the Egyptian debate about the police reform from an academic perspective and to reflect on its relation to the political change. The Egyptian literature concerning the topic is actually very few. Thereby, this study is an attempt to add to the literature by linking the Egyptian experience to other similar international experiences. It is also an attempt to clarify the prospects and the conditions of the police reform in the changing political environment in Egypt since 2011. In addition, this study aims at informing the policy makers about the main challenges of the police reform, the favorable conditions to overcome them, as well as the potential actors in this process. Despite the diversity of the actors involved in the police-reform debate, their respective impacts on the actual reforms introduced have not been the same. Certainly, the different attempts at police reform have been affected by political context and balance of power. Therefore, this study aims to explore the relation between the police reform and the changing political environment to determine the favorable context to promote the police reform agenda. It is also investigating how police reform was managed in Egypt between 2011 and 2015. The main idea is to assess the degree to which the

¹ For more details see the Human Rights Watch, "the World Report", Egypt, for the years 2012, 2013, 2014

democratic policing norms were applied and how they possibly could be introduced and applied in the Egyptian context.

In the following sections, the methodology of the study is explained followed by the conceptualization and the operationalization of the police reform. Then, the related international and local literature is extensively reviewed. Afterwards, four international cases of police reforms are presented to specify the political context, the major drivers and actors of the reform, as well as its substantial challenges. After that, the Egyptian case is examined to assess the reform experience in the changing political environment between 2011 and 2015. Then finally, the study suggests a bunch of policy recommendations on police reform customized to the Egyptian context.

II. Methodology

In order to answer the previously mentioned research question, the study rests on a variety of literature concerning police reform on the theoretical and the practical levels. First, the theoretical literature was extremely important in determining the analytical framework within which police reform is conceptualized and operationalized. Police reform was extensively tackled in the international literature to describe the defining norms and criteria of democratic policing. Four main norms were quite important to this study, which are police political neutrality, police demilitarization, police professionalism and police accountability.

Concerning the practical literature, four case studies were examined to determine the relation between the police reform and the changing political context. Accordingly, Brazil and Turkey stand as cases of gradual police reform where the changing political context consolidated democracy on the long term. However, Poland and South Africa give an example of radical police reform in a wider context of political change on the short term. Then the Egyptian literature was quite informative about the evolution of the police reform and its relation to the change in the political environment especially in the last four years.

Beside the local literature, the study relies for the Egyptian case on 22 in-depth interviews with 11 police officers (including three former officers) and 11 human rights experts. The interviews, conducted in February and March 2015, were based on the snowball non-random sampling technique. This sampling technique was chosen due to some police officers having neither the ability nor the willingness to discuss reforming their apparatus. Some officers were reluctant to talk to a stranger (the researcher), others found it inappropriate to talk about police problems with a non-officer, while others simply lacked any ideas to discuss. Moreover, it was quasi-impossible to apply a random sampling since police officer registers are inaccessible for researchers. Moreover, the general environment of political tension and the several terrorist attacks targeting police forces made it extremely difficult to gain the trust of the officers. Therefore, I approached the police officers through liaisons in order to gain their trust and consent to conduct the interviews. Although, I had several connections to higher ranks in the police, I have not contacted them about this study

fearing there unwelcoming reaction. For, by the time of conducting this study the ministry of interior was not open to criticism or objective analysis regarding its performance in the middle of the war on terror.

As for the human rights activists, the sample included several authors who have written some of the most important studies about security sector reform in Egypt, as well as activists who have taken part in police-reform initiatives in the last few years. Some of these human rights experts and activists recommended officers/former officers for interviews. The sample included eight police officers. Their ranks are as follows: two *molazīm awwál*, three *naqīb*, and one *rā'id*, *muqadim* and *'aqīd*, respectively. Of the three former officers, at the time of their retirements two had the rank of *naqīb* and the other had the rank of *'aqīd*. Thus, the sample includes two *molazem awaal*, five *naqīb*, two *'aqīd* and one *rā'id and muqadim* each. Only one of the police officers agreed to meet me in person. Most of them (eight) preferred telephone interviews while two wanted to conduct their interviews through emails/online texting. But I met all the human rights activists and experts in person, except for one who was living in another governorate at the time. These interviewees were affiliated with universities, research centers, NGO institutions; two hold PhDs, three have Master's degrees, while the others were either activists or journalists. As for gender representation, only two respondents were females, from the experts' category. The interviews were conducted following the instructions of the IRB of the American University in Cairo. The interviewees were fully informed about the purpose and the details of the study, before giving their written consent. Almost all of the police officers were reluctant to sign by their real names, rather preferred to write alternative names. This was also the case of three only from the human rights advocates' category.

The sample is extremely limited; I admit that only 11 officers/former officers can't determine the opinions of around 39,000 officers nationwide. Similarly, only 11 human rights advocates cannot represent the views of all human rightists in Egypt. The snowball non-random technique might also have limitations; it cannot be representative of the views of all officers. People belonging to the same network or who are related to each other in any way might share the same views concerning police reform. But for the exploratory nature of this study, such a sample can be

deemed satisfactory as a beginning. Nevertheless, this limitation is complemented/triangulated by the local literature covering the evolution of the police status between 2011 and 2015. This study tries to identify the common ground in the police officers and human rights activists' views in order to recommend a balanced policy for police reform. Moreover, by transferring the police officers' views to the human rights activists and vice versa, the study has a semi participatory purpose aiming to break the ice between two groups that seem to be antagonist. Yet, their views are complementary to design a balanced reform policy. For, incorporating the inputs of these two groups was essential to draw realistic strategies and successfully implement them in many countries that experienced police reform.

The research question in this regard is:

- How is the police reform related to the changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 2015?

Accordingly, few other questions are tackled as follow:

- What is the ideal reform conforming the Egyptian case?
- Which aspect of the four democratic policing norms is more likely to emerge in Egypt? And why?

The study tackles two variables which are changing political environment, as independent, and the police reform as dependent. Previously I was intending to incorporate democratization as an independent variable, yet the changes in the Egyptian political context between 2011 and 2015 cannot really be described as a democratization process. First, because some argues that what happened in Egypt was a clear revolution that is still developing until today. Hence, it does not correspond to the gradual and peaceful nature of a democratization process. Second, political change perfectly applies to what happened in Egypt, regardless of the orientation of this change towards a democracy or an autocracy. It only identifies the occurrence of certain aspects of change without specifying the direction and the description of this change. For that same reason, political transition was not adopted as an independent variable. Transition actually suggests a certain path towards a specific end, which was not the case in Egypt in the last four years, since this end was not that clear nor successfully reached. And by changing political environment I mean the change that occurred in the laws, regulations and constitutional principles and that impacted the

Egyptian political life. It also applies to the change that occurred in the different state institutions especially the executive (change of government), legislative (change of parliament) and judiciary bodies. Along the respective changes in the political culture of the people, that was reflected in their attitude and participation patterns. That was also reflected when the people chose to protest the police brutality on different occasions, then to abstain from protesting on other occasions. Then the repercussions of each of the two choices on promoting the police reform on the political agenda. In this regard, there are two distinct phases within the timeframe highlighted in this study, from January 2011 to June 2013, then from June 2013 to present (April 2015). Hence, the study tries to detect the change and continuity in the police policy when it comes to reform taking into consideration the respective changes occurring in the political environment.

On the other hand, the police reform corresponds to the bunch of policies that transforms police apparatus in order to be more effective, abided by the law and the human rights principles. More details on the analytical framework in this regard are included in the following section.

III. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Police Reform

In this part, police reform is examined through four norms of democratic policing to show how each of them contributes to democracy/autocracy consolidation in a changing political environment at large.

A- Police Neutrality

A crucial concept in democratic policing, neutrality refers to an apolitical apparatus, which provides public safety and security for all citizens without discrimination. It also refers to the police of the whole nation or people – not the police of a certain elite or political regime. The principle of neutrality contradicts police practice in authoritarian regimes, where political opponents are persecuted in order to undermine their participation in political life. Hence, in a country transitioning to democracy, the police should abide only by the law and not the directives of politicians or the ruling elite (Bayley 2006).

Such a principle is of huge importance in building the legitimacy of the police, which will as a result be perceived as serving for all. Therefore, democratic police should not manipulate evidence or crime rates for the sake of a government's political status; rather, it should act lawfully without any political affiliation or discrimination (Das 1995). Accordingly, a neutral police force equals one without any political narrative but the law. It should not, at least theoretically, adhere to a certain political, social, or economic narrative that values or discriminates against a specific social group. Otherwise, the police neutrality and legitimacy could easily be shaken (Das 1995).

In this regard, a democratic police force consists of two major procedures when it comes to neutrality: it should be independent of all political affiliation and it should enable all political parties to practice their civil and political rights without restrictions.

B- De-militarization of the Police

A major criterion for democratic police is de-militarization, which corresponds to a clear differentiation between military and police forces and their respective jobs. According to democratic norms, the police should rely on more than just its weaponry and armory in order to gain the public's trust. To better serve the public, the police should emphasize its civilian nature and be differentiated from the military. Extensive arming of the police can be an obstacle that impedes peaceful interactions between the police and the public it is serving. Accordingly, the police should realize that its job does not only rely on firearms but rather many other elements as well. The police should work with citizens to address their fears, mediate in social conflicts to prevent them from transforming into violent incidents, and work in criminal investigations in cooperation with prosecutors. Thus, force should be a minor aspect of police work and only applied if other methods are proven to be incapable of solving the problem in question (Bayley 1994, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).

Other forms of de-militarization correspond with the rupture in military traditions within the organization of the police. Civilian ranks and management patterns should be emphasized rather than the old military patterns. Nevertheless, some would argue that para-military forces within the police are necessary in specific contexts, such as the French *gendarmarie* and the Italian *carabinieri*. In this regard, the organizational structure of these forces should be separated from the rest of the police to preserve its civilian nature. Accordingly, some contexts, like a terrorist threat, can mandate para-military police activities. But still, the more police are heavily armed, the less they will interact closely with the public, thereby losing one of the most important tools in countering terrorism – people's trust (Kraska & Cubellis 1997, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). Hence, this study will focus on the separation of the police from the military forces, and the split of the military tradition from the police as well as the role of para-military forces, namely the central security forces- CSF, in Egypt's counter-terrorism strategy.

C- Professionalism

Democratic police should be professional and effective in performing their duties. In this regard, police violence and brutality reflects a serious lack of professionalism, when an officer is unable to solve cases without applying excessive force or torture.

Here, the problem of police brutality could easily be dealt with if officers receive proper training and education that enables them to act without violating the law and human rights. This perspective applies to police violence whether during investigations, arrest, and while handling mass demonstrations (Das 1995). Accordingly, applying physical and psychological force in criminal interrogations does not entail professional effectiveness as it can lead to false confessions and misleading results (Costanzo & Redleich, 2010).

Professionalism has different interpretations and procedures; it also involves providing adequate salaries that decrease officers' tendencies towards corruption. A decent salary and comprehensive financial package for policemen will decrease their inclinations towards accepting bribes or misusing their authority to generate an unlawful income.

Professionalism also corresponds to good education, training, and suitable tools that enable officers to perform their duties without breaking the law. Legal education on human and civil rights will decrease policemen's disposition to illegal behavior. Also, practical training that predicts different situations policemen might face will help them deal with future situations in a less violent way. Training in soft skills such as decision making, negotiations, and conflict prevention enables policemen to better decide when to use live ammunition and when to use language and persuasion (Stone & Ward 2000). Extensive training in investigation methods allows policemen to build their cases on solid evidence rather than violently-extracted confessions.

Professionalism also involves suitable patterns of management, recruitment, and promotions based solely on merit. If policemen are recruited based on objective criteria, they will more likely retain their training and then adhere to the force's internal regulations. Accordingly, merit-based promotions will help a good leader be promoted to a suitable rank within the management hierarchy. Likewise, a management based on objective systems of incentives means that rewards and punishment can be used to consolidate the police doctrine based on democratic norms and minimize wrongdoing and violations. Some writings include in the professionalism the internal control unit which evaluates police performance and punishes wrongdoings, while other writings consider this part as the internal aspect of

police accountability. Nevertheless, the internal control unit should be considered as an integral part of police professionalism. This is simply because professional police cannot function properly if they do not incorporate internal effective disciplinary mechanisms, favoring good performance and punishing offences. In this regard, the internal control unit should evaluate police performance according to two points: their ability to lower the crime rate and their respect of human rights (Stone & Ward 2000).

Some internal control units simply investigate reported misconduct or misuse of firearms after their occurrences; others keep track of all officers' records to identify those who commit repeated mistakes to a point where they are seen as dangerous to the whole apparatus and thus must be dismissed. A third type is more aggressive in protecting the integrity of the apparatus, such as staging a bribe to randomly test an officer's integrity or inclination towards corruption (Stone and Ward 2000).

Considering all of these measures, the democratic norms – in a democratic policing model – precisely define professional police performance. Thus, the degree of professionalism and institutional reform within the police is directly related to the force's legitimacy and public image. Legitimacy, which is "the consent of the governed," is a founding pillar of a democratic regime, without which the police will lose citizens' voluntary compliance with legal orders (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006).

Some would suggest that policy guidelines should be established to better structure police work in every way. These written guidelines must highlight both what is allowed and what is not in order to provide a variety of alternatives for the police to follow (Kelling 1999, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). These guidelines should emphasize transparency in managing the police, while also serving as a basis for accountability when investigating misconduct.

This study does not consider all of these measures. Instead, it focuses on salaries, anti-corruption measures, promotional criteria, recruitment, training patterns, and internal control mechanisms.

D- Accountability

"The police in democratic societies are created by that society and the police are therefore accountable to the citizens of that society" (Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). The

major criterion that differentiates a democratic police from other forms of police is civilian oversight over the police force's work. Apart from the internal control mechanism that holds police accountable within its own administrative chain of command, civilian oversight counts among the external accountability mechanisms. There are plenty of accountability mechanisms that target police work in a democracy.

The first level of external or civilian oversight is exercised by prosecutors, who scrutinize police work by reviewing evidence in criminal cases or launching investigations into controversial cases (Stone & Ward 2000). Another civilian oversight mechanism is granted to the courts or the judiciary, which have the authority to omit evidence or confessions if proven to have been collected illegally. The courts have another authority over police performance through civil litigation undertaken by victims of police misconduct. These trials are extremely important in a democratic policing model; if the judiciary is not able to hold the perpetrator of police misconduct accountable, then the whole legitimacy of the justice system will be shaken in the eyes of its citizens. Such an idea of judiciary failure corresponds to the impunity of some individuals in society, unacceptable in a democratic regime in which the rule of law should reign (Stone & Ward 2000). Parliaments in democratic regimes also have an authority of oversight over the police. This parliamentary oversight is exercised through budgets; it occurs when parliaments review budgets, grant funding for a certain project, or investigate corruption issues with regards to police spending. Moreover, parliaments have the authority to investigate a certain policy or case that results in controversy. But in other situations, parliaments review the police force's plan as a whole and evaluate police performance on a yearly basis. Above all other accountability mechanisms, parliaments have the authority to design a new policy/bill regulating police work in order to avoid misconduct or enhance its future performance (Stone & Ward 2000).

Between the political and the judicial accountability mechanisms comes the ombudsman, an oversight commission, also known as an inspector general or civilian complaint review board. An ombudsman usually receives complaints regarding police performance or misconduct, and investigates them thoroughly by checking official documents and, in some cases, interrogating witnesses. It might also have the

authority to transfer the case to a criminal court or to the head of the police force to decide on an administrative penalty. Another important part of an ombudsman's role is that it has the authority to advise the police on needed training or policy guidelines to initiate reforms that will help avoid potential misconduct in the future. Thus, it has the ability to shape the police's future protocol (Stone & Ward 2000).

In addition to state institutions, civil society also plays a significant role in the accountability process. Human rights and research organizations need to be involved in advocacy in order to foster a culture based on human rights, dismantle the impunity system, and support victims of police misconduct both legally and culturally. These organizations should work to promote police accountability on the political agenda of state institutions. This role should be complemented by the media to widen the circle of impact and forge a culture that respects human rights and does not tolerate violations. Accordingly, civil society should be active in explaining that a strong and effective police does not equal human rights abuses, but should rather perform its duties with full respect for human rights and liberties (Stone & Ward 2000, Pino & Wiatrowski 2006). Applying more of these mechanisms will translate into more democratic police norms being emphasized. Hence, this study will investigate these mechanisms to determine which are likely to exist in the Egyptian context and which are not.

IV. Literature Review

The topic of security sector reform at large and the police reform in specific is relatively new and has not been tackled enough in Arab literature. However, the international literature is sizeable in this record, and with multiple perspectives, among them being reform's relation to democratization and political change. International debate has focused primarily on three types or models for police work – professional policing, or the traditional way to do the job; community policing, the American innovative way to do the job; and democratic policing, the reformed way to do the job, with interaction with other civil authorities to protect human rights and balance the security/freedom dilemma.

In the professional model, policing is done solely by the police apparatus, which defines the determinants of security and implements them with no visible partnership with the community. In community-policing, an essential partnership is built between the police department and local community to define the sources of threats to public security and the best strategies to encounter them. Similarly, the democratic policing model involves a deep partnership with the community, but on a more national and macro level. Therefore, democratic policing presents a multiplicity of oversight mechanisms targeting police work, in which security is part of a wider plan for respecting human rights and consolidating the democratic regime in question.

The American literature took the lead in discussing the requirements and conditions for successful police reform, whether from the American experience itself or due to American involvement in rebuilding Germany and Japan after WWII. Nevertheless, the American literature primarily emphasizes the professionalism of a strong police apparatus, enabled with all professional tools and equipment to better protect the public safety. Therefore, American literature on police reform since the 1960s is anchored mainly in the major perspectives of management and organization.

These writings aimed to assess the ability of police departments in coping with new societal needs and improving their respective performances. Some studies focused on assessing the reasons for resistance to change and the best ways to introduce acceptable and applicable changes without stimulating protests from

frontline officers. Lingamneni's (1979) paper, "*Resistance to change in Police organizations: the Diffusion Paradigm*", tackled this issue precisely. The study considered the main reasons for police officers and leaders to refute an innovative policy, as well as different procedures that could facilitate improvements in police agencies. The study emphasized the nature of the policy, the degree of its compliance with the general culture within the police, and the nature of police leaders/officers who could best embrace advances. Other trends focused on assessing the structural reforms applied in different police departments and whether or not they had positive repercussions on police performance as a whole. Maguire, Shin, Zhao, and Hassell's paper (2003) on the "*Structural change in large police agencies during the 1990*" specified seven main structural reforms associated with the community-oriented policing (COP) and tried to track them in American police agencies in the 1990s. The COP perspective required functional and vertical differentiation to be decreased, along with formalization, centralization and administrative intensity. However, occupational and spatial differentiation should be increased. Based on federal police data, American police forces applied only some aspects of the COP's prescription, while other aspects still faced resistance to change. Despite the importance of the study in assessing major structural changes in American police forces, it was based only on quantitative rather than qualitative data and thus could have gained greater insight through the contextualization of these changes.

Other American studies have presented the new techniques that police departments in different states have used to better investigate crimes, gain the community's trust, and conduct intelligence-led policing under the umbrella of COP. Bayley's paper, "*Police Reform: Who done it?*" (2008), presents an overview of most of the changes and reforms applied by American police agencies as well as their contextual implications. The study offered good insight into the practical and theoretical motivations for each reform that has taken place within police policies in the last few decades. Interestingly, Bayley stressed that most of these reforms were mainly inspired or encouraged by outsiders and not those within police agencies. Thus, he argues that police reformers are mostly ex-officers or experts from outside police organizations who provide valuable suggestions to improve police performance so as to better respond to society's needs. Other aspects of the American literature

focused on **the intersection between police effectiveness and the accountability mechanisms** to which they are subjected. These writings primarily argued that increased accountability procedures lead to better performance, thus demonstrating the positive correlation between good performance and accountability in police work. The importance of these studies lies in how they over-turned the long-standing argument that resisted accountability mechanisms on the grounds that they deprived police officers of the necessary authority to enforce the law. Ferdik's paper, "Perception is reality: A qualitative approach to understanding police officers' views on civil liability"(2008), assessed police perceptions of civil liability, a major accountability. The author's assumption, built primarily on previous literature, was that police officers view civil liability negatively. The study relied on 23 in-depth interviews with police officers working in a southeastern American city and presented their perceptions based on their occupational, personal, and emotional experience regarding civil liability. The paper's major finding was that police officers do not necessarily have negative perceptions about civil liability as such. On the contrary, the majority of responses supported the process of civil liability since it constitutes the basis for all civil rights protected by the constitution. However, the police officers recommended many procedures to be implemented – in terms of training, legal education, and technology – in order to give them suitable protection while performing their jobs. Despite the sample's limitation, which prevents the generalization of the findings, the paper was insightful in presenting a police viewpoint that favored accountability.

A similar study by Payne and Time, "Support for Miranda among Police chiefs: a Qualitative Examination" (2005), examined the evolution of police chiefs' views in terms of eliminating the Miranda rule. The Miranda rule, issued in 1966, states that police officers must notify persons under arrest that they have the right to remain silent, since anything they say can be used against them in the investigation². If a person is not read the Miranda rule at the time of his/her arrest, the future judge has the authority to consider any confessions unlawful, deeply damaging the case. The study focused on determining whether the police chiefs believed that the Miranda rule

² "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?"

enabled or impeded police work. The data was collected via 97 survey sheets filled out by the police chiefs in Virginia, including 75 who responded to the open-ended questions as well. On the contrary to previous literature from the 1970s and 1980s that presented the Miranda rule as an obstacle to law enforcement, the majority of the responses supported the Miranda rule, and even those who demanded it to be changed were merely requesting a more accurate formulation of the statement and not its cancelation. Therefore, this study presented the officers' positive views about the mechanisms that are tailored to make them more accountable while performing their job. The authors were not interested in explaining why opinions changed about the Miranda rule; instead, they clearly described why the officers supported it at the time. Most of those who supported the Miranda rule cited its effectiveness in enhancing police work, protecting civil rights, and implementing the constitution.

Apart from the American experience, a new context since the early 1990s has introduced new understanding on police reform – or, more precisely, security-sector reform in general. After the fall of the USSR, eastern European countries managed to formulate negotiated transitions to democratic regimes. In these circumstances, the major task of the new governments was to dismantle the coercive apparatuses of the old regimes and rebuild them on new norms respecting democracy and human and civil rights. These democratic transitions were guided with international organizations involved in security such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Accordingly, some western countries were more involved in the assistance efforts to guide these transitions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This trend developed a new flow of financial and technical aids focusing mainly on rebuilding the security agencies on democratic rules to be more professional, abided by the law, and accountable to civil authorities. Hence, experts who were practically involved in assistance programs in eastern European and Latin American countries from the early 1990s produced a large part of the related literature. They focused on the reform processes in the respective countries – the vetting, recruitment, training, and, most importantly, the legal framework linking the police apparatus with other public institutions. The major aim was to build or reform security agencies to be compatible with the emergent democratic rule.

Therefore, a large portion of the related literature dealt with the challenges faced by local and international reformers and foreign donors in order to present their experiences and to guide future reforms. An example was Pino and Wiatrowski's book, "Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries" (2006). The book consists of two parts. The first is primarily theoretical and conceptually links police reform and the democratization process. The second part focuses on case studies of police reforms in Iraq, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Kazakhstan. The main idea of the book is the interdependency between democratic policing and the democratization process, showing that democratic policing cannot exist without an interactive civil society and a high potential of social capital. The book underestimates the COP strategy, suggesting that it should be used in a wider context of human rights primacy to contribute on a deep level to building democratic policing practices. From this perspective, the book states that American police reforms based on the COP strategy are not enough to build democratic policing in countries that are going through the democratization process. Rather, the reforms must be a part of a comprehensive plan for democracy promotion based on transparency, legitimacy, rule of law, commitment to human rights accountability, and the subordination of the civil authority.

Another example is Bayley's book, "Changing the Guards: Developing Democratic Policing Abroad" (2006), in which he discusses the challenges encountered by international donors and reformers in establishing democratic policing in conflict-torn societies. Given the disparities of the different contexts where international assistance on building democratic policing is introduced, Bayley gives the minimal basic criteria upon which new institutions should rely in order to be defined as democratic policing. He argues that democratic policing should be absolutely accountable to the civilian authority outside its command, abided by the law, conformed to international standards of human rights, and highly responsive to societal needs in public safety and security. Adding to this, the book discusses in detail the major reform strategies that should be prioritized as well as other complementary reforms that can be introduced gradually and in parallel to the main reform process. Bayley carefully explains the interdependency between the democratization process and the main criteria of police reform. On one hand,

democratic policing should be accountable to the law rather than to the government, which should preserve police neutrality vis-à-vis politicians and hence provide a security service for everyone and not just certain groups or elites. On the other hand, a democratic police force should primarily protect the major rights that constitute the democratic nature of the government, such as freedom of speech, associations, and other political and civil rights. A second trait of democratic policing is its accountability to people outside the force, such as the parliament, judiciary, or other civilian boards that review police performance. Such a trait emphasizes the primacy of civilian authorities over police work in a way that should promote the authority of the elected over unelected officials. A third trait is the necessity for professionalizing the police apparatus in a way that enables it to better fight crime without undermining the basic rights of the people. The professionalism equation is not isolated from the greater context of democratization since an effective police force is indispensable in an emergent democracy, providing security that the people need to practice their political rights in order to enrich the democratization process. The book also offers an important insight about the efforts of international assistance in the Security Sector Reform- SSR to facilitate the evaluation and thus the improvement of these efforts in the future.

A similar attempt to draw the defining criteria for democratic policing was introduced by Ungar (2010) in his book, "Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America". Here, Ungar determines certain aspects of democratic policing that should be developed in parallel to provide a security policy based on citizens' basic rights. He highlights the importance of agency restructuring, whether in terms of enhancing geographical decentralization or specialization or changing the types of internal authority. A second aspect of reform that he presents is professional support based on salaries, job security, enhanced technology, and equipment. The third aspect is the control mechanisms that take different forms, ranging from an internal affairs unit within the police to the national ombudsman. He then focuses on the legal changes that should accompany all these reforms to provide a legal basis for change, changes that involve not just the police but also the entire criminal justice system. Finally, Ungar discusses community policing as a method to enhance police-citizen interactions and improve the

apparatus' responsiveness to the people's needs. After proposing a police reform model, the author then considers the experiences of several Latin American countries in evaluating their accomplishments in this regard, based on field work and in-depth interviews he conducted with local prosecutors, judges, and police officers. He concludes with recommendations on overcoming obstacles to reform in Latin American police forces.

Another important book – and in-line with Unger's – is "Policing Developing Democracies", edited by Hinton and Newburn (2009), which includes 12 case studies about reforming police apparatuses across four different continents, in countries going through different stages of the democratization process. In the introduction, the editors define the major norms that should guide reforms introduced in a new democracy: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of power, information, redress, and participation. On the other hand, the editors present the special circumstances in which new democracies survive, such as weak institutional structures, corruption, a weak rule of law, poverty, inequality, high crime rates, societal instability, and low levels of accountability. Hence, they discuss how different types of police reform should interact with each of these conditions in an emergent democracy in order to create a sustainable reform process within the police apparatus. The book is very useful in terms of looking at reform in action with regards to political context and the possible obstacles that any change might face.

Fuentes' "Contesting the Iron Fist: the Advocacy Network and the Police Violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile" (2005) offers a slightly different argument. By studying the network of human rights advocates who promote police reform as well as those who support the status quo in terms of the police's iron fist, Fuentes finds that introduced reforms are kept at the theoretical level and face real challenges in being implemented. Fuentes argues that the political reforms introduced in Latin American countries since the 1980s have failed to protect citizens' civil rights that have been desecrated by police violence. In countries where the state is implementing socioeconomic reforms or structural institutional changes, the government tends to introduce a strong police apparatus to manage social discontent. In this regard, the advocacy networks managed to promote police reforms on the political agenda, but they were less influential when it came to effecting the reforms' actual

implementation within the police apparatus or criminal justice system. The author incorporated other intermediary variables such as the structure of the political opportunity, the nature of the policy actors, both those promoting and resisting the reform, and the nature of the security problem as well as the security/liberty dilemma.

Stone and Ward (2000) introduce a more detailed vision of the accountability mechanisms that should govern police work in an emergent democratic regime. In their study, "Democratic Policing: a Framework for Action", they stress the importance of multi-leveled accountability mechanisms, which they say aren't contradictory but rather complementary in preserving wider control over police work in a democratic regime. They explore three different types of accountability mechanisms: internal control, governmental control, and civil society control. Despite the importance of all three types, the authors emphasize the special importance of internal control in promoting professionalism and discipline within police work. They survey reforms promoted through transparency, training, technology, and organizational and cultural change. The authors also discuss the external control mechanisms conducted by the government and the dilemma of civilian politicians controlling the police without undermining its neutrality. The study focuses greatly on prosecutors' authority in promoting police accountability through legal procedures, civil litigation, and public trials. Further, the issue of parliamentary oversight is presented through two perspectives – budget control and inquiries of police misconduct. The third level of accountability – civil society control – involves social control over police work through the media, civilian oversight boards that investigate police offences, and research and human rights organizations promoting change. This paper provides a wide overview of different procedures of accountability applied to police work, arguing that police work will be more democratic as more of these mechanisms are introduced.

The multi-ethnic conflicts that exploded in the 1990s have produced several **international peacekeeping missions** in Africa, the Balkans, Asia, and Central America. In this regard, the UN and other international organizations involved in these missions shifted their security angle from inter-country peacekeeping to intra-country peacekeeping. Therefore, civilian police forces were much needed as the military troops employed in these areas to preserve security and public safety. Many

guidelines and manuals have been published by international participants in these missions to highlight the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the basics of building new institutions, and the balance between local ownership and international expertise (USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction 2011 - OEDC/DAC Handbook on SSR 2007). These guidelines emphasize the inter-dependency of the political process and the security condition, thereby focusing on the balanced composition of the new apparatus to guarantee its legitimacy and representation. The SSR programs were complemented by Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration -DDR as well as transitional justice programs to ensure the new state's monopoly over arms and to allow it to control the circle of violence.

The most important **African experiences** in this regard, according to Bendix and Stanely (2008), were in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where UN missions were deeply involved with international donors and local stakeholders to design and implement a holistic SSR model. In both conflict-torn countries, the military, police, intelligence apparatus, and justice system were rebuilt upon the rule of law, civilian oversight, and political neutrality. The DDR and SSR plans were applied in parallel with heavy funding from the UK and the US, engaging a wide range of local stakeholders including parliament committees and civil society organizations. Therefore, Bendix and Stanley pose the impact of international donors as the main factor for these two countries' success, as opposed to other cases such as South Africa, where the SSR process was managed through national and local actors. Therefore, South Africa is in fact a better case to evaluate in order to get a deeper understanding about locally-managed SSR processes in transitions, as it will be examined in details in the international experiences part.

Despite the range of recommended policies, the literature also emphasized that there is no perfect solution to preserve security and public safety in this context. Most of the authors' recipes give priority to the local context in prioritizing the needed reforms. But the political context can be extremely manipulative, to the extent of refuting the core of these reforms. Besides, international actors/donors involved in these missions had a multiplicity of perspectives and motivations that influenced the outcomes. On one hand, the whole rationale of post-conflict peacekeeping and

reconstruction missions is to link the security issue with prospects of state building and governance. But this logic is also closely related to countries' chances for development. Thereby, there are some conflicting considerations guiding the missions' decisions regarding the stabilization angle and the reconstruction angle. In some cases, for instance, ex-combatants were reintegrated in the new police apparatus for reasons of political legitimacy, while the apparatus's personnel should be downsized for professional reasons to better operate and recruit on a merit- basis only. Additionally, the SSR programs were heavily co-funded by international development institutions based on the fact that the number-one step in development is to securitize or provide security in order to later introduce development programs. Several purely developmental institutions such as the British Department for International Development have been involved in security programs in multi-ethnic societies, especially in Africa, since the 1990s.

Taking into consideration the different types of literature regarding police reform, there is an additional trend that discusses **the failures of the reform experiences**. These writings essentially investigate the reasons for the resilience of old police practices that were subjected to radical structural reforms. Fetsch (2013) discussed the failure of institutional reforms in the Mexican police over two decades, starting from the mid-1990s. His main finding was that although the reforms were quite radical and structural, they could not challenge the persistent culture and pattern of authority within the Mexican state and society. Different forms of contextual, cultural, and societal obstacles blocked the reforms from being widespread, such as corruption, clientelism, corporatism, neo-patrimonial networks, a weakness of state institutions in the third-world countries, the legacy of colonialism, underdeveloped social capital, and informal "rules of the game." The same logic guided Chan (1996) when he wondered why the Australian police persisted in its wrongdoings after almost a decade of radical and structural reforms guided by the model of COP. The reforms saw a reformist leadership take control, with new personnel recruited and new organizational structures put in place, in addition to new policies and strategies being introduced and emphasized through extensive training. Nevertheless, the police's performance continued to be anchored in brutality and lacked the people's trust. Chan's major reason for this here was resilient police culture that impeded or even

manipulated the reforms. The police culture, as she saw it, was a combination of political and social culture, as well as an occupational culture that emerged from the nature of the job itself.

On **the Arab level**, literature about security sector reform has investigated the relationship between authoritarian Arab regimes and police apparatuses that have usually mixed together to form the "police state". Some of the literature discussed the relations of nepotism and corruption as well as their impacts on the security sector's performance. Other studies, though, firmly stressed the deep relationship between the nature of the political regime in place and the security sector, thereby highlighting the structural obstacles to reform. Sayigh (2007) adhered to the latter argument, pointing to the difference between re-building the security sector in Iraq and Palestine, and the experience of the rest of the Arab world. He also differentiated between America's proactive engagements in these two cases, and, on the contrary, the limited de-politicized involvement in other countries where authoritarian regimes are strong US allies. In contrast to US policy, European nations promoted gradual reform through the civil society's activity and oversight, rather than through deeper structural improvements in the security apparatuses themselves. After criticizing both western approaches, he finally recommends local ownership of the reform process through introducing legislative, organizational, and professional reforms that gradually shift the relationship between the political regime and the security apparatuses. However, he does not specify the motives of the authoritarian regimes to introduce such reforms and to undermine their own wide authorities.

Adopting the same logic, Wolff (2011) criticizes the western approaches in dealing with the Arab region through security rapprochement with authoritarian regimes. She argues that the supremacy of anti-terrorism and migration policies over western-Arab relations forced western policy makers to turn a blind eye to violations of basic human rights in the Arab region. Hence, democratization vs. stability formed the core of the west's approach to the region. However, the Arab revolts of 2011 have proven that the absence of basic rights in Arab countries could not sustain security on the long term. Thus, Wolff says, the west needs a new approach to engage with Arab states in reforming their security apparatuses, consolidating their judiciary independence, and deepening their governance measures, in order to create a more

viable security alliance between both sides. Her paper is primarily critical of gaps and contradictions in western-Arab security relations, while also precisely highlighting several platforms and recommendations to build a new approach to security relations, one that should comply with the norms put forward by the Arab revolts.

Accordingly, the Arab revolts introduced the SSR as a top priority in the Arab political context and opened the way for any literature in this regard. Ashour (2014) argues that security agencies' brutality was in fact a major cause for the Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Therefore, a successful SSR is an accurate indicator for the success of the Arab revolts' goals. However, the Arab SSR faced several challenges due to intense political polarization in the post-revolutionary context, internal resistance within security agencies, and weak knowledge about the SSR among political elites. Further obstacles came from limited financial resources, weak democratic institutions, an incomplete DDR in conflict-torn countries, and limited regional support for the SSR to take place in the Arab region. Ashour's paper thoroughly investigates the challenges of the SSR in the Arab region, yet it gives almost no room to discussing the possibility of the reforms taking place. An exception is Tunisia, which remains outside the pessimist context as it sought international assistance in this regard from the very beginning of its transition.

The Tunisian experience was actually quite similar to the Egyptian one, but for several specific variations. The different managements of the transitional period have given some spaces to invest in some of the SSR dimensions. However, Bouguerra (2014) is quite critical in evaluating the Tunisian experience, arguing that international assistance was important, but that it did not institutionalize civilian oversight nor created police accountability. He considers the SSR's big moment as occurring right after the revolution – but argues that the political elite lacked the knowledge to enforce it on a holistic approach basis. Nevertheless, ratifying international conventions against torture, establishing a national commission to fight torture, forming several police unions, and recruiting new police personnel (almost one-fifth of the police force have been newly recruited) were all important steps in breaking the old police tradition. Although over 12 countries are bilaterally cooperating with Tunisia to support "train and equip programs," the country's police budget and internal management still lack transparency, which impedes any real

assessment of the degree of progress in this regard. Therefore, Bouguerra suggests a comprehensive approach on SSR that includes the efforts of international donors along with the government and civil society, combining an equal interest in building capacities and setting checks and balances over police work. He also recommends establishing collective platforms for cooperation and information-sharing about terrorist threats among regional neighboring countries.

On the Egyptian level, literature about security sector reform is quite limited, focusing mainly on giving reform prescriptions to transform the police apparatus. Ashour (2012) succeeds in contextualizing the needed reform by introducing the meaning of the SSR and its implications, along with the history of Egypt's police and wrongdoing. He then analyzes the slight reforms that were applied and contrasts them with the civic demand to apply much more comprehensive reforms. He provides interesting analysis regarding the political context in Egypt, which was not favoring any deep reform. The main idea is that the balance of power within the Egyptian state after the revolution continued to preserve the status quo in terms of security. This is closely related to civil-military relations in Egypt's power equation in general, and to civilian control of the armed forces and security apparatuses more specifically. Therefore, the SSR was perceived as a dependant variable on a successful democratic transition in the country. Ashour's recommendations are quite tailored to the Egyptian case and do not merely highlight general principles that apply to any case of police reform.

Accordingly, Brumberg and Sallam (2012) stress the tight interdependency between the current security sector and the political regime in Egypt. Adopting a wider definition of the security sector, they include the military alongside the police apparatus and also underline the historical background of the two institutions, thereby concluding that any potential SSR in Egypt should rely on the will of the political elite, especially the president, along with the mandatory consent of the military. In this regard, the international community should support any enhancement of the security sector's performance to support civilian oversight and respect for human rights.

In his 2012 paper, *"Above the State: the Officers' Republic in Egypt"*, Sayigh builds upon his previous work to focus on the Egyptian case. Here, he introduces the deep involvement of military officers in Egypt's economy and political rule since the 1952 revolution. Different types of professional control and financial incentives were applied to distance the military from meddling in politics, especially in Mubarak's era. Therefore, the military was regarded as a caste of officers playing almost a single role in political life, preserving its essential social and economic interests. Sayigh also discusses the hidden political role played by military retirees who hold several posts across the entire all over the echelon of the state's bureaucracy, which in turn deepens the militarized nature of the state. In the same logic, the paper introduces the competition between the different security agencies in Egypt, namely the military, police, and intelligence, arguing that the role played by the military in ousting Mubarak placed it above other agencies in the post-revolutionary context. Therefore, the main aim of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during its transitional rule, and even after presidential elections in 2012, was to preserve a supra-constitutional status for the military in political life in order to maintain its social and economic interests. In this context, the drafting of the constitution and the creation of a permanent military council were planned to consolidate the military's position in politics, even after the end of the SCAF's mandate. Although the paper presents several aspects of the military's control over economic and administrative life in Egypt, it nearly ignores the implications of this control on national and internal security. The police's role is discussed briefly to show its competition with the military in certain areas, yet the military's impact on police conduct and performance is missing from the paper.

A more elaborated attempt to assess the competition between the military and the police and its implications on Egypt's security was undertaken by El-Houdaiby (2014) in his paper, *"Changing Alliances and Continuous Oppression: the Rule of Egypt's Security Sector."* Here, he carefully investigates the change that occurred in the alliances of the military, police, and ruling elite in Egypt, whether the National Democratic Party (NDP) before the revolution or the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) afterwards. Accordingly, the paper thoroughly presents the motivations of each party in concluding and then breaking these alliances in terms of the political context.

Similarly, the author highlights the repeated chances that were missed to refute the rule of the security sector in Egypt and introduce civilian control over these institutions. The paper's analysis underlines the growing competition between the military and the police in Egypt, without denying the supremacy that the military has gained after ousting Mubarak and then Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Therefore, the paper gives great priority to discussing political interactions related to the SSR, rather than discussing the core of the SSR itself. It also presents the internal cohesion in the military and the police as a major factor defining each institution's attitude in terms of preserving their interests on different occasions.

In light of the previous literature review, specific models of police reform in countries passing through changing political environments should be tackled. The literature guided me to examine police reform initiatives in Brazil and Turkey as cases of long term reform. Then, Poland and South Africa are presented as an example of short term reform. Both types of cases have witnessed different experiences of changing political environment which was reflected in the interplay of the reform and the challenges that faced it. Brazil was chosen because of its previous experience of military rule as well as its reactive reform policy of the police after each of the security crises it faced. Turkey was also chosen for its unsettled civil military relations and the primacy of its armed forces over the political scene on different occasions. Nevertheless, both countries have witnessed a certain level of democratic continuity despite the obvious role of the military on the political scene. Then, Poland was chosen to highlight the example of a radical police reform on the short term that went hand in hand with a wider political transformation to democracy. Yet, even in a general context of democratization, the political change that occurred in Poland via electoral means was reflected on the police reform with a respective change in police laws and regulations. This was obvious when the ruling elite changed several times since the beginning of the political transformation in 1989. As for South Africa, this model was chosen to highlight the difficulty of implementing a radical police reform, even if it was decided and designed by a political consensus. The South African case reflects the complication of applying a consensual reform plan in a context of growing crime rates. Despite the relative success in building the South African police legitimacy, fighting crimes required alternative policy to transform the police into an

effective and professional force. Thereby, these experiences are examined in the next section, in order to come up with some lessons for the Egyptian case.

V. International Experiences of Police Reform in Changing Political Environment

This chapter will examine international experiences of police reform in countries that have faced changing political environments in the last three decades and have since enjoyed a relatively stable democratic process. The cases of Brazil, Poland, Turkey, and South Africa are examined as follows:

A- Brazil

1. Context

Brazil was under authoritarian military rule from 1964-84, but in 1984 it held direct, free elections that marked the country's first step towards democratization. Nevertheless, police reform was not on the political agenda until the early 1990s, when consecutive security and public safety crises forced a discussion to take place. These crises were directly related to increasing crime rates as well as popular protests rejecting police violence, especially in poor neighborhoods and slums.

The police apparatus in Brazil is divided into two branches, the military and the civil police. The military police is uniformed, organized, and equipped like the military forces, and is in charge of patrols and arrests; the force numbers around 390,450 across all Brazilian states. The civil police is responsible for criminal investigations and preparations for prosecutions, and numbers around 155,960 (Hinton, 2009). Most of police work is conducted by the local, state-affiliated police, while the federal-level police is less involved in street policing and instead focuses on national cases related to terrorism and drugs that are investigated by an FBI-like apparatus containing around 10,000 sworn officers (Skogan, 2013 & Hinton, 2009).

2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform

Police reform in Brazil over the last three decades has taken different shapes, with several different strategies. Generally, the reform took place as a reaction to several security crises and not introduced as a group of reform policies to accompany the

democratic process. Additionally, the changes were induced on the local level through a decentralized series of reform initiatives that combined the effort of the human rights community, prosecutors, university professors, and several open-minded police chiefs. These efforts coincided with the international donors' will to reduce police violence and enhance law enforcement techniques to support the Brazilian process of development.

3. Reform Initiatives

Inside the *favelas* (slums), police presence was almost impossible, unless through heavily-armed officers who usually raided the *favelas* for searches or arrests, causing many casualties among the inhabitants. In 2000, a new initiative was launched to establish police groupings in special areas (GAPE) in order to securitize one of the biggest slums in Rio. The GAPE force was unarmed, instead employing the Community Policing- CoP strategy to reduce the use of force and build trust within the population. The initiative was successful in establishing permanent police patrols in the slum, reducing rates of violence, boosting gun control, minimizing drug gangs' control over the *favela*, and empowering the population to move freely at any time. In 2002, the GAPE initiative was extended to three other slums in Rio, upon the request of their inhabitants; however, this initiative was highly dependent on the personal skills of its commander and funds provided by NGOs to introduce the slum's youth to alternatives to crime (Da Silva & Cano, 2008).

Some reform initiatives targeting improvements in police professionalism were the result of partnerships between police departments on the local level and public universities to develop nontraditional curricula in human rights and criminology for police officers. This project aimed to loosen the traditional military culture of the police, build trust and networks between officers and academic elites, and enhance officers' professionalism by channeling new skills and knowledge in action. This project was also extremely dependent on donors' funds as well as the personality of the military police commander (Leeds, 2007).

Similar initiatives were introduced through partnerships between civil society/the human rights community and police departments to hold dialogue over human rights in action. These panels enabled police officers to express themselves

and think beyond the human rights curricula they had studied, fostering a wider perception of their meanings. The panels also helped build alliances among antagonist stakeholders and transcending stereotypes. One of these initiatives began as an advocacy campaign to report police misconduct in the early 1990s and ended up becoming the most important NGO in police training and arms control, Viva Rio. (Leeds, 2007)

There was also a federal program conducted through the justice ministry – the National Program for Public Security and Citizenship (PRONASCI) – to enhance the local police’s capabilities and improve their work conditions. This program aimed to boost managerial and professional skills through comprehensive training and better equipment, as well as improve work conditions for low-level police officers. It also evaluated its own results through national surveys that analyzed changes in perceptions of police officers and the population. An example of this was a research on the impact of the program on officers' inclination towards the use of force in their daily work, which yielded the important finding that highly-educated and well-trained officers were less likely to use force. The same inclination was true for officers who were more experienced, compared to their lesser experienced colleagues. Likewise, the majority of those who had a positive perception about community policing were those who had received good training in different managerial and professional subjects. The same portion of surveyed officers coincided with high rates of job satisfaction (Skogan, 2013). Thus, we can conclude that a good training program to enhance police professionalism leads to higher rates of job satisfaction and a lesser inclination towards using force in a police force’s daily contact with citizens.

Unlike the professionalism initiatives that were received positively by the police, the accountability mechanisms had greater difficulty in being established in Brazil. The first ombudsman was first established locally in five different states in the mid-1990s, and is now present in almost half of Brazilian states (13 out of 27 states). The ombudsman can come from the human rights community or be a former prosecutor. Their purpose is to receive complaints from citizens about police abuses or from low-ranking officers about their departments. In both cases, however, they have limited investigative authority, given the lack of clear, official police records. A further problem is that they are tightly linked to the states’ public safety secretariats,

which questions their independence. Similarly, they are appointed by governors, meaning their jobs can easily become politicized. (Leeds, 2007)

4. Challenges

Despite these initiatives, police performance remains under the expected level and faces many challenges that impeded the reform process. The main challenge in this regard is the discontinuity of successful initiatives due to a lack of funds, a change of leadership, and low degrees of institutionalization. Additionally, there is a lack of awareness about human rights and the need for police abuses to be criminalized. In fact, public culture has played a negative role, since it perceives police violence as an effective factor for reducing crimes. On the other hand, the oversight mechanism, namely the ombudsman, has no substantial authority to suggest a comprehensive plan for police reform and oversight. Thus, political opportunities following significant crises could allow new initiatives to be born, but they can hardly survive afterwards, since they are highly dependent upon the political context.

B -Turkey

1. Context

Since the establishment of the modern Turkish state in 1923, the military has gained special status, enabling it to influence the political scene on several occasions, such as in 1960, 1971, 1980, and, much later, in 1997. Therefore, the military has successfully challenged civilian authority within the political regime by utilizing geopolitical arguments related to Middle Eastern instability and the Kurdish threat to Turkey's national security. The Turkish police are functionally divided into two major divisions – the Turkish National Police (TNP), which is in charge of policing, conducting patrols, and investigations in urban areas, and the Jandarma, a more military-like force deployed for policing rural areas. While the TNP is a professional agency affiliated to the interior ministry, the Jandarma is formed of young soldiers serving their military duty (15 months) under the authority of the defense ministry (Goldsmith, 2009). The TNP consists of 193,000 personnel that receive two years of police training, while the Jandarma consists of 300,000 conscripts who receive only

six weeks of intensive military training. Despite the distinct differences in composition and training, these two divisions of Turkish police almost fulfill the same job, with their respective authorities separated by vague boundaries. In some areas where rural migration has invaded urban centers, both police agencies are present, while in other cases, both of them might be absent, thus creating a security vacuum. Adding to this is that each division's internal regulations are not subject to open access, removing their work from public review.

2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform

Turkey has enjoyed a democratic tradition since 1945. However, the country is not considered a consolidated democracy due to the frequent military interventions on its political scene. Hence, the case of police reform has always faced difficulties in becoming a priority in such a securitized political milieu in which the military contests civilian authority. Nevertheless, Turkey's ambition to join the European Union has created momentum for police reform, serving as a veritable driver for a series of initiatives reorienting police work in Turkey (Goldsmith, 2009).

3. Reform Initiatives

Reform in Turkey is taking the shape of dispersed initiatives in different dimensions of police work, and is primarily motivated by the EU accession plan. The EU is funding a project tailored and managed by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) to enhance civilian control over police agencies by improving the administrative skills of the civilian authority (governors) in their respective relations with the TNP, Jandarma, and interior ministry. The core of this project is extremely problematic, since the whole regime has a deep problem in managing civil/military relations; however, it is approaching this subject through building capacities and training cadres in order to deepen the accountability of the police to the civilian authority (Goldsmith, 2009).

Other projects of reform are dedicated to improving the police agencies' capacities in investigations to better fight organized crime, money laundering, and narcotic-related activities. This trend of enhancing the police's professionalism is part of a larger trend in the Turkish government since 2005 to minimize losses resulting from crimes by employing a preemptive approach. The latter method involves providing

the police with new technology and sophisticated equipment to build and analyze huge databases of potential criminals and crimes' mapping. The project aims to prevent potential crimes and threats from occurring by adopting a community-policing project intertwined with a new model of technology-supported information systems. Such an approach cannot be implemented without an active model of intelligence-oriented policing that acquires data through surveillance cameras in public areas as well as screens citizens' personal information to enrich the POL-NET database. Along with this project, a new crime-analysis center and public-order project were established to better prevent crimes (Berksoy, 2013). Nevertheless, these projects have been criticized for their preemptive nature and for dealing with specific citizens as potential criminals, namely the Kurds, political opposition groups, and trade unions. Moreover, officials' access to a wide database of personal information has been deemed a threat to individual privacy.

Despite the advancement of the professionalism projects, steps towards greater accountability have faced much resistance. In 2001, the constitutional court in Turkey issued a ruling about an amendment to the criminal code that enables policemen to use firearms on a terrorist suspect if he does not comply with calls to surrender or shows an intention to use weapons. The court's ruling canceled the amendment of the law that was introduced earlier in 1996 for being unconstitutional, as it jeopardizes the lives of suspects without sufficient reason, especially as it is not conditioned by suspects actually using arms against police officers, but rather only the intention to use them. Hence, the cancelation of this amendment was considered a gain for human rights and an upholding of article 17 of the constitution, which emphasizes a citizen's right to life. Nevertheless, the criminal law was again amended in 2006, but this time it practically reversed the court's ruling by granting police officers wide authority to use firearms if a suspect does not show compliance with a call to surrender, without even mentioning the use of weapons. Since the court's objection focused on the intention to use weapons and whether their use would actually threaten an officer's life, the new formulation of the law omitted the weapons' issue altogether, and considered a lack of compliance to the call of surrender as a good reason for an officer to use firearms (Berksoy, 2013). The case resulted in legislators and the government showing solidarity with the police, defying the concerns of the constitutional courts

regarding human rights. In other cases, however, legislators were aligned with the judiciary against the wide authority of the police; still, though, the police was able to impose its will at the last minute. Generally, police investigators were given authority to define the nature of the crime they were investigating, before transferring it to the courts. Hence, the police oriented the work of the judiciary by defining the crime and preparing the indictment. But in 2005, a new law of criminal procedures was drafted to narrow the police authority in this regard and prevent it from defining the crime beforehand. Additionally, the draft of the law established a new unit of judicial police under the authority of the justice ministry to deploy the police's investigative apparatus under the supervision of prosecutors. Nevertheless, the amendment of the law was introduced without the judicial police unit due to fierce rejection by the interior ministry (Berksoy, 2013). Such a case reflected the power the police have against any attempt by another institution (outsiders) to impose reform, even if they are legislators and the judiciary. Moreover, the police continue to use its previous authority in defining crimes without minor compliance with the new law (Berksoy, 2013).

But EU pressure to establish accountability mechanisms to watch over police work was partly satisfied by the establishment in 2012 of two new institutions to oversee the police. The first, the Turkey Human Rights Institution, was created to work as an ombudsman that receives and investigates citizens' complaints of police misconduct before they are directed to the courts. However, the composition and funding of this institution has raised some doubts about its independence, since 10 out of its 11 members were appointed by different governmental agencies. An EU report on the institution questioned its independence and recommended amending its laws so that its members are elected by another state institution, unaffiliated with the executive (Berksoy, 2013). The second accountability initiative was an internal control unit within the interior ministry named "The Police Oversight Commission." This commission is in charge of investigating alleged violations of human rights committed by police officers, annually evaluating police work, and recommending new reforms to the MOI to improve police performance (Berksoy, 2013). Despite the positive influence that these two institutions might bring to police accountability in Turkey, their work seems to be constrained. Specifically, there is an active

administrative law preventing any legal investigation of a governmental official, including police officers, without the consent of his/her direct manager. Therefore, if the police leadership wants to maintain the impunity of police officers, they can easily challenge the authority of these new institutions.

4. Challenges

The main challenge to police reform in Turkey is obviously the wide authority that the military has on political life, considering the overlap between military and police functions. Some reform initiatives envisaging the downsizing of the Jandarma and the enhancement of its police training would directly affect the status of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is not easily tolerated. Therefore, no substantial reform can take place without the consent of the military. Besides, police control and oversight is not likely to happen if there is no real political will. But the Turkish government widely benefits from the huge authority granted to the police in its fight against the political opposition, especially leftists and trade unions. Thereby, the police work is politicized as long as it tends to criminalize political and social protests. Nevertheless, the EU's accession plan still plays a helpful role in pushing for police reform, as does the positive experience gained by the TNP and the Jandarma while serving in UN missions worldwide (Goldsmith, 2009).

C- Poland

1. Context

In 1989, Poland witnessed a negotiated political transition that allowed free parliamentary elections to be held and a new government to be formed. The new government was jointly formed by the figures of the solidarity movement (the main opposition movement, born from a workers union coalition) and the old communist regime. Therefore, the democratization process has directly resulted in a major transformation plan for state institutions, especially the security sector. The new leaders of the country were aware of the importance of reforming the security apparatus as a precondition for the whole regime's transformation. Nevertheless, some writings mark 1980 as the beginning of the democratization process, when the solidarity movement, then a workers union, conducted a major strike that forced the

communist government to lower the prices of goods after an earlier increase. A short window of political openness was quickly ended with the imposition of martial law in late 1981. Hence, some analysts refer to this short democratization process of two years to explain the success of the negotiated transition in late 1989, based on sharing parts of the government with the opposition and old regime figures (Paun, 2007).

2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform

The main driver of the reform was the transformation from a communist country to a democratic one; so, police reform was just a part of the wider reform plans. There was also a deep desire to break with the old practices of the communist police, which spied on society and controlled all political activity. Moreover, several prominent human rights figures were appointed to the top of the new police apparatus, to design the transformation plan and make sure it was properly implemented. Among the new designers of the security policy were also prominent police figures who were engaged in building police unions following the transition. But the most decisive driver was the funds and pressures that western European countries and the United States invested to accelerate the reform plan. They also participated in training new officers to respect human rights and democratic rules. Added to this was Poland's ambition to join NATO and the EU, a goal that was decisive in introducing several waves of reform within the security sector as a whole. Thus, Poland successfully joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (Paun, 2007).

3. Reform Initiatives

The reform of Poland's police was part of an extended reform aiming to place security forces under the oversight of civil elected authorities according to democratic rule. Therefore, the first step was to depoliticize police work by issuing a law in 1990 that prevented police members from involvement in politics or following political parties (Æwiek-Karpowicz & Kaczyński, 2006). Nevertheless, Polish police officers are allowed to be active in professional police unions which negotiate with the government for better wages and work conditions (Ivković & Haberfeld, 2000). Police reform in Poland occurred in several waves and was, interestingly, linked to the political affiliation of the ruling coalition. In 1990 and again in 1999, when solidarity was in power, reforms tended to decentralize the police service, bringing it

under the control of the civilian authority of provincial governors. But when the socialists governed in 1995 and 2002, reforms tended to centralize control over the police (Paun, 2007). The decentralization/centralization of the police had direct impacts on police organization, professionalism, and the accountability mechanisms that controlled their work.

In 1990, Poland abandoned its old communist militia and created a new police force, with new uniforms and commanders. A new post of national police commander was created at the top of the police hierarchy, to be appointed by the interior minister upon the approval of an advisory committee comprised of politically diverse members from the higher and lower houses of parliament. Thus, the national police commander was responsible to parliament, in addition to his professional responsibility vis-à-vis the interior minister. Right after the local elections of 1990, new local police forces were created to fulfill the police patrolling locally while investigative authority remained in the hands of the national police. The local police were supposed to be funded by the local budget, but due to a lack of funds, the police localities were dependent on the central authority. However, the lack of funds encouraged a serious wave of corruption within the local police authority, to the extent of institutionalizing the channels of bribes to coincide with the hierarchy of the organization (Paun, 2007). Such a deficiency affected the local police's effectiveness and helped back the post-communists' argument to recentralize the police structure when they gained power in 1993.

The 1995 reform abandoned the local police forces and brought them once again under central police authority, while also widening the prerogatives of police in using firearms. Nevertheless, when the different parties of the solidarity coalition were reunited in 1996, they won the elections and formed a government with an ambitious plan of decentralization. The new plan was implemented on the police in 1999, when new local police were created in each of the 16 provinces. The new local forces of the counties were subjected to a double mechanism of oversight by the local mayors and the provincial police chief to whom they were affiliated. Therefore, the local police were politically responsible to the local executive body and professionally responsible to the higher national police chief. Additionally, the local police chiefs had to present an annual report to the local legislative councils about their activities, deficiencies,

and challenges (Paun, 2007). Financially, the local police suffered from low resources, until 1999 when a new law required the national government to channel 80% of the police budget to the localities and preserve only 20% for the national police departments (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006). The last reform, introduced in 2002, returned the right to choose local police chiefs to the hands of the higher police hierarchy, rather than local mayors and governors, after only unbinding consultation with the local executive and legislative bodies. Such a reform was recommended by several foreign security advisers, as well as being dictated by high levels of corruption and crime (Paun, 2007).

Alongside the organizational and professional reforms, the new Polish police was subject to multiple accountability mechanisms. Among them was the firm differentiation between police work at large and the work of the secret police service, called the Security Bureau (SB), which was dissolved and replaced with a new entity, the State Protection office, which was strictly prohibited from spying on society. SB personnel, numbering around 25,000, were downsized to only 6,000 after verification to determine whether they should remain in office or be released (Grajewski, 2004). All leaders above 55-years-old were promptly released from office, while the younger generations were tested to make sure they were suitable for the new job. Almost 75% of the verified SB officers rejoined their work, whether with the office of State Protection or with the police in general. Similarly, the result of the verification process on ordinary police officers caused the release of almost 50% of commissioned officers and 30% of warrant police officers (Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). To compensate for these vacancies, new police officers were recruited and intensively trained by the US, UK, and Germany between 1990-95 on the basics of police work in a democracy (Paun, 2007- Ivkovic´ & Haberfeld, 2000). Other analysts suggest that almost 50% of Polish police officers were dismissed, with the newly recruited and trained officers numbering around 50,000 in 1995 (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006).

Another aspect of reform was the lustration of politicians and public figures to determine who was collaborating with the SB in spying on society. This reform didn't directly target the police apparatus, but was a wider initiative to politically condemn the old practices. The collaboration matter was extremely sensitive, but the lower

house of parliament issued a decision in 1992 that forced the interior ministry to release all the names of parliamentarians, officials, attorneys, and other public figures who were rendering secret services to the SB. After some resistance, the ministry revealed these names to parliament, yet the resulting debate did not lead to criminalize collaborators. The argument to avoid such criminalization was that a big part of the SB's collaboration documents was destroyed from 1989-90. Hence, the revealed names were just a small portion of the collaborators; while some names were protected, others would be punished if lustration was strictly applied. Later on, in 1995, a top politician was accused of collaboration with the Russians; this file was reopened, but this time, it was legally encountered. The parliament issued a new law in 1997 requiring governmental figures to present a report confirming or refuting their previous collaborations with the SB. This report was reviewed by the spokesman of the public interest to decide if they were eligible to stay in office or not. The lustration law did not criminalize actual collaboration with the SB, but rather only sent those who lied about their past to a lustration court (Grajewski, 2004). These procedures were definitely important in sharply breaking with the old practices of spying on society for the interest of the political regime. Despite the new State Protection office inheriting most of the old SB personnel, new practices were applied to oversee the office's work. However, in 1993, the British MI5 revealed the Polish State Protection office's illegal involvement in the arming of Irish terrorist groups. Therefore, the Polish parliament created a permanent parliamentary committee in 1995 to oversee the secret operations conducted by the special services affiliated to the State Protection office (Grajewski, 2004).

Additionally, the new police law introduced directly after the transition made it possible to sue police officers who committed human rights violations. Accordingly, low-ranked officers were exempted from punishment if they were ordered by their seniors to commit unlawful practices, while the senior officers who ordered these practices could be convicted with a five-year jail sentence. Police officers could also be subject to judicial trials for corruption or harming national interests, and police officers who violently dealt with prisoners in custody could be punished with a three to five year sentence, or even more if the violence led to death (NDI, 2008).

This law empowered the work of the ombudsman that was formed in 1987, before the transition, and made it possible to better investigate human rights abuses and sue the perpetrators. The ombudsman was in charge of receiving and investigating complaints of human rights violations on both the local and national level. Yet its main procurement was the dissemination of human rights culture and the belief that every public official is accountable for his/her actions.

4. Challenges

The transformation of the Polish militia to a professional police force faced several challenges, but the most important obstacle was replacing the large number of dismissed experienced officers with inexperienced young recruits. Despite the intensive training they received in western countries, the newly-recruited officers' lack of effectiveness held back police performance as a whole. In addition, the transformation time was an occasion for high rates of crimes, which conflicted with people's expectation of seeing professional police officers taking control. Additionally, the need to decentralize the police, in order to democratize it and render it more accountable to the people contradicted with the inability of the localities to fund their police budgets, which allowed corruption to escalate. Before 1999, local police forces were allowed to receive donations from different entities, which opened the door for organized crime organizations to pay for their immunity, despite conducting illegal activity. The police was also widely understaffed, since a large number of officers preferred to work in private security companies or joined international missions abroad. This tendency was primarily caused by the low salaries of police personnel, compared to the other opportunities in the security field elsewhere. At large, the polish experience mainly proved that good police reform should rest on the will of a strong, democratic, ruling political coalition. (Oliver & Klenowski & Dimambro, 2006)

D- South Africa

1. Context

South Africa suffered long decades of apartheid, when the police was the regime's tool to oppress the population. Therefore, the milestone of the democratic process in

the post-apartheid era was a police reform plan that was collectively formulated by different political actors. Between the 1940s and early 1990s, South African police was administratively divided to serve 11 conglomerations called "homelands," where white police officers comprised around 90% of the forces and black officers made up only 10%. Additionally, black officers were given authority over their black conglomerations only, and did not enjoy full police membership. Black officers were not allowed to give orders to white officers, and they were never promoted to higher ranks. Moreover, police work in the black conglomerations consisted merely of preserving the public order and countering insurgency, while the real police work in terms of fighting crime was applied only in the white conglomerations. Thus, the major goal of the reform was to include more black officers within the post-apartheid police apparatus, to make it more representative and trusted by the population (Pruitt, 2010).

2. Actors and Drivers of the Reform

In the South African experience, there was a strong belief that successful democratization should involve a respective radical change in the police. Thus, following apartheid, a negotiated transition allowed the drafting of a new doctrine for the police to change its conceptions, organization, and tactics. The main goal in reforming the police was to replace its bad image of partners in crime and oppression, with the new image of being protectors of the totality of the people, without discrimination. Hence, the priority for the first strategic paper introduced by the new police in 1994 was to build the legitimacy of the new apparatus by enlarging its representation of the population and through community policing on the local level. Nevertheless, the strategy of building legitimacy was not successful enough in countering the growing level of crime, which urged the government in 1998 to switch its focus from legitimacy to fighting crime by applying tougher methods (Shaw, 2002). This shift of focus was quite significant, especially as it enjoyed a high level of public support and opened large debates about different aspects of democratic policing, other than building legitimacy (Altbeker, 2009). The new president built the government's legitimacy in 1998 on a crime fighting plan that was adopted by the police to correct its previous deficiencies. Accordingly, the police received financial and capacity-building assistance from different local donors. Among them business

groups that were interested in protecting their respective interests as well as a group of local vigilantes that was mostly active in black and poorer neighborhoods. Police unions were also active in promoting police professionalism and overcoming inequalities among officers (Pruitt, 2010).

3. Reform Initiatives

Between 1990 and 1994, the police introduced two main reforms to help purify its image, before negotiations decided on a police new doctrine. The first reform was to create a separate, internal stability division to preserve public order from potential tensions produced by the enemies of the negotiations. This attempt aimed at saving the efforts and time of the station-level police to help build their capacities in fighting crimes. The second reform targeted the Security Branch (SB), which was in charge of internal intelligence, and placed it under the authority of the investigations division. Both reforms were orchestrated by police managers who expected the enemy of the past- the opposition- to come and rule over them, and so these reforms were intended to appease general protests against the police (Shaw, 2002).

In 1994, negotiations about police reform arrived at many recommendations that were later issued as the green paper of the ministry of safety and security. The new police doctrine prioritized the establishment of new legitimacy for the police, to gain the people's trust after so many years of being the enforcer of apartheid. The doctrine also allowed the police to decide on the reform's implementation plan. This was effected because no members of the African National Congress (the main opposition movement accessing power in 1994 elections) were in police cadres or had the necessary expertise to carry out the reforms. Therefore, they preferred to design the general features of the reform and give the police leadership the authority to implement them on their own. Hence, the option of dismissing a large number of police officers and replacing them with new recruits was never put on the negotiation table. The doctrine also allowed old police personnel to preserve their jobs, out of the fear that they would protest if dismissed, and requested those who had committed major violations to ask for amnesty in return for the truth about what had taken place. The officers involved in violations were asked to testify in details about the past in return for forgiveness and the continuity of their careers. Thus, the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was a means to avoid accountability, and served as a vehicle for old personnel to be reappointed in return for their publicized break with the past (Altbeker, 2009). Accordingly, the new South African Police Service (SAPS) preserved the same leadership as the old South African Police (SAP). This decision resulted in the problem of there being no new blood injected into the police leadership. Yet, this leadership was obviously lacking the required skills to implement such reforms (Shaw, 2002).

Another important outcome was the decision to centralize police authority in order to impose the new reforms equally on all police stations, in all provinces; otherwise, a decentralized police could easily be dragged into local political conflicts. Moreover, the police's uniforms, ranking, and organization were changed to signal a clear break from the past. The police demographically changed, since the black constables who served in the black conglomerations/townships were promoted and included as full members of the SAPS. This actually increased the representativeness of the police, but also hampered its effectiveness, since these new officers received only six-weeks of training and were widely illiterate. On the other hand, generous retirement packages were offered to decrease white personnel. But this policy caused many problems, since the leaders/managers were usually the most experienced, while the recently recruited or promoted were not. Such a problem was also exacerbated when black officers were rapidly promoted in the SAPS hierarchy for the mere necessity of creating equilibrium between the white and black components of the leadership (Pruitt, 2010). Hence, problems of antagonism in the work place and double standards in promotion policies affected police performance. Additionally, some argued that the less competent, newly-recruited black officers were responsible for the ineffectiveness of the post-apartheid police apparatus (Altbeker, 2009).

In an important organizational step, the police decided in 1996 to dismantle the 503 specialized investigations units and place their personnel in local police stations. This decision aimed to enhance the investigational skills at the station level in order to help police forces solve crimes in different provinces without turning to the national authority (Shaw, 2002). As a result, local police commissioners had higher authority over detectives, which sparked a kind of decentralization of authority, thus increasing police accountability. However, some argued that this decision fragmented police's

investigation capacities and harmed the independence that detectives should have vis-à-vis police commissioners on the local level (Altbeker, 2009).

Another attempt to enhance the investigative capacities of the police was the establishment of a new investigation apparatus called the Scorpions, which was placed under the authority of the justice ministry. The new apparatus, announced by the president in 1999, recruited the most skilled detectives and succeeded in building a good reputation of solving cases in a short period. It generally applied a combination of skills involving policing, prosecution, and intelligence to counter crimes (Shaw, 2002). Some analysts argued that the new investigation apparatus created a kind of duplication within the justice system, especially as it was not affiliated with the ministry of safety and security, which they said created a new source of police confusion. Nevertheless, other analysts saw it as a means of fruitful competition that would motivate the police, especially in terms of enhancing the investigation units' capacity to fight crime.

In all cases, this competition led the police to apply tougher methods in countering and tracking crimes. These methods consisted primarily of more military-like crackdown operations in towns and areas with the highest crime rates. The crackdowns relied heavily on armed forces applying road blocking, search operations, and cordons. These kinds of operations had, by definition, proven short-term success in arresting criminals and clearing criminal focal areas. However, a long-term process was still needed to enhance station-level police capacities to fight crime, and not just force its movement from one area to another according to the location of the police operations (Shaw, 2002). Additionally, these operations widely contradicted the community policing philosophy that should guide station-level police in building bridges of trust and understanding with the local population (Altbeker, 2009).

In parallel with these professional procedures to enhance police capacities, other accountability measures were applied to help monitor the police's respect of the new doctrine. At the top of these procedures was the appointment of a civilian as safety and security minister directly after the end of apartheid. This new minister arrived with a group of civilians, mostly lawyers and academics, to assist him in formulating policy and monitoring its implementation. The group was later institutionalized in

1996 as a civilian secretariat whose rank on the national level was equal to the head of the SAPS. These secretariats, established on both national and provincial levels, were largely in charge of monitoring the respect of police standards and promoting their accountability to civilian authority. However, such a civilian leadership created a duality within the ministry, particularly angering the head of the SAPS and creating conflict between the ministry's civilian and police leadership (Shaw, 2002)

Moreover, the SAPS embraced the community policing philosophy on the provincial level to gain the community's trust and address its needs closely. Such a philosophy was implemented through appointing a special officer in each police department nationwide to organize community policing forums (CPF). These CPFs were formed by unelected community representatives who met regularly to talk with the police about the community's needs and security-related issues (Shaw, 2002). However, the CPF encountered two main problems. First, the officers were not culturally open to execute what the community requested, which hampered the credibility of these channels. Second, the CPFs had minor impact on day-to-day policing since the officers were accountable to their seniors in the central police hierarchy and not to provincial communities or local authorities (Altbeker, 2009). Interestingly, police unions were active in reporting police officers' wrongdoings. These unions were unofficially formed in 1989 by reformist police officers, and were then increased after apartheid. They focused on complaining about poor work conditions, the slow transformation of the SAPS, and the lack of equality in terms of work opportunities. They were also particularly active in shedding light on several cases of police brutality, especially those conducted against blacks and which exemplified the continuity of racism (Shaw, 2002). The unions also embraced the community-policing approach in supporting the new legitimacy of the SAPS and enhancing its professionalism (Pruitt, 2010).

Among other reforms that were considered to enhance the degree of police accountability was the application of new rules for the use of firearms. Previously during the apartheid, officers were granted the right to shoot to disperse unlawful gatherings, without even issuing warnings. It was also legal to shoot to kill a fleeing suspect if there was no other way to arrest him, a prerogative that was largely misused

by police officers. Thus, the new law prohibited the use of firearms unless there was a real threat to the officer or any other citizen's life (Pruitt, 2010).

In line with these new regulations, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) was established in 1995 under the authority of the safety and security ministry to investigate any police abuse or brutality. The ICD was formed of civilian personnel, with several branches on the national and provincial level. It has since investigated the thousands of cases of death in police custody and police brutality cases that occur each year (Shaw, 2002). Despite the ICD's authority to issue recommendations to the relevant police commissioner, it is not empowered to make the police act upon them (Burger & Adonis 2008). Nevertheless, the ICD's mission of holding the police accountable to civilian authorities and constitutional norms has been relatively successful. It also gives regular citizens the ability to access relevant information held by the police (Pruitt, 2010).

Beside these accountability measures, the courts played an important role in correcting police deviations by refusing to adopt any evidence obtained by cruel methods. Such a procedure eventually helped change police culture about brutality being an effective method to solve cases (Pruitt, 2010). On the other hand, the adoption of crackdown operations to combat crime in the short run resulted in prisons being overcrowded with suspects waiting to be tried. In this regard, the government was obliged to implement a collective commutation, releasing around 24,000 prisoners with shorter sentences to allow room for newly-convicted prisoners (Altbeker, 2009).

4. Challenges

Generally, South Africa's police reform was centralized and highly developed in rhetoric that referred to international literature of COP and problem-oriented policing (POP), but was less articulate in terms of implementation. The centrality of the police limited the reforms to superficial changes and the continuity of old police leaders prevented the reforms from penetrating to the core of the service. The truth and reconciliation commission was a good driver for change in terms of police culture and philosophy, but it weakened the accountability mechanisms and reinserted human rights violators into the police apparatus. This fact increased the probability of the

violations' reoccurrence on a smaller scale. The community policing applied in each of the nine provinces were found to be deficient since the central organization of the service left little room for innovation and oversight on the local level (Altbeker, 2009). Moreover, there was an inclination towards old police techniques involving brutality and disrespect for human rights in order to achieve high crime-fighting statistics (Pruitt, 2010). Some of these cases were investigated by the ICD, which worked every year on around 5,000 cases, while others were left unchecked due to the ICD's limited resources. Additionally, the fact that the ICD reported to the minister of safety and security, who was also in charge of the police service, made it almost impossible for the minister to tackle any of the police abuse cases (Burger & Adonis 2008).

In general, police reform in South Africa was collectively planned with great political consensus. However, the implementation of the plan was widely unbalanced, with legitimacy building given more weight than crime fighting. Therefore, when the new reforms were later introduced to correct the initial plan, the new police's legitimacy had already been affected by inefficiency. Also, the different stockholders participating in the reform plan distracted its priority list, making it a good idea on paper, but with little tangible results on the ground (Shaw, 2002). Finally, it is important to highlight that given the economic difficulties and the inefficiency of the whole justice system, the task of crime reduction was not the responsibility of the police alone. The crime reduction strategy should incorporate alternative economic chances and a parallel reform of the justice system to ensure that those in prison have access to quick and fair trials. Meanwhile, police violence is still considered as a factor of crime reduction. Still accountability mechanisms are playing on the opposite side to reverse this conviction and consolidate the respect of the constitutional norms.

VI- Assessing the Prospects of Police Reform in Egypt

In this chapter, the Egyptian context of potential police reform is introduced in order to clarify the political environment which determines its design and implementation. Generally, the approach of democratic policing entails many norms and criteria. Only four of these norms are discussed here, however, to examine the extent to which they are absent/ present in the Egyptian context and what challenges they face in terms of being accomplished. The four norms of interest to this chapter are the political neutrality of the police, the de-militarization of its structures and tactics, the professionalism of its methods, and the accountability of its personnel to civilian oversight. These norms will be thoroughly examined to specify the different conditions defining their potential occurrence and their evolution in the Egyptian context. But first, a historical overview of the Egyptian police is introduced to reflect its general evolution in the light of the four democratic policing norms.

A-Historical Overview

Historians have registered an exceptional stance of a police chief under the authority of Ramses III during Pharaonic times. This police chief refused to oppress a strike since he was convinced that the workers have the right to request their withheld salaries. Rather than ending the strike with force, the chief endorsed their demands in front of the Pharaoh until they received their salaries (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.42). However, such an attitude reflecting the true nature of a politically neutral police is almost exceptional in Egyptian history. The Egyptian police are known in modern history as a direct tool to repress the people for the interest of the political regime. This has been clear during significant moments of popular mobilization against the political authority. For instance, during the 1919 revolution, the police was heavily applied to prosecute and intimidate political militants, especially those affiliated with the Wafd Party. The police was also systematically deployed to forcibly disperse any demonstration conducted by peasants to protest the high rents imposed by feudal families on their rented lands (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.52).

In this context, the political bureau was officially established in 1922 to prosecute Egyptians resisting British occupation, and it was later applied against all types of political activism (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.53). In this regard, the police was complicit

in the political and economic alliances of the rulers. But on January 25, 1952, an exceptional incident happened in Ismailia, when the Egyptian police director refused to surrender and turn over his men's weapons to a British force. The police force chose to fight, and died defending Egyptian sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Ismailia police force's stance had been agreed upon by the interior minister at the time, Fouad Serageldine, the emblematic nationalist figure of the Wafd Party. As a former officer explained:

The most obvious patriotic and honorable deed done by the Egyptian police was in this incident, yet it was not out of their own initiative, they were following the order of the interior minister, who was a civilian at the time (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly, after the July 1952 revolution, the police doctrine slightly changed to agree with the new regime's alignment with the lower classes, especially peasants and workers. This shift nearly ended police brutality against these classes, and a new type of relationship was initiated with citizens, based on the principles of dignity and respect. Nevertheless, the political militants opposing the regime of Gamal Abdel-Nasser continued to face political prosecution, arbitrary detention, and torture in custody. Despite the official abolition of the political bureau in 1952, it was shortly replaced with the General Investigations Department, which along with the military police was in charge of politically based prosecutions. Both apparatuses were involved in the repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, the prominent opposition movement to the Nasser regime (T. Aclimandos, 2012, p.2). In the last years of Nasser's rule, the military was less involved in political affairs, letting the State Security Investigations (ISS), created in 1968, take the lead in this regard (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.55). Under Nasser's rule, police violence targeted only political opponents within police headquarters, and was not generalized against the whole population. One exception occurred on February 21, 1968, when police used firearms to disperse students protesting the lack of accountability of military leaders after Egypt's 1967 defeat to Israel. Several casualties were registered (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.57). From this incident came the need to create the Central Security Forces (CSF) in 1969 to control mass demonstrations. The CSF began with only 189 officers and around 11,690 soldiers, and increased in number until it contained around 300,000 in Mubarak's era (O. Ashour, 2012, p. 7). Accordingly, during the rule of Anwar Sadat and then Mubarak, the SSI became the most prominent police department, influencing

appointments in public offices, intimidating political opponents, orienting media outlets, and forging election results. The SSI was largely involved in electoral fraud for the interest of Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) on different occasions.

Concerning the demilitarization, police structures were quite distinct from those of the military in ancient Egypt. The army had the well-defined task of defending the country while the police was in charge of preserving internal security and order within society. The police structures were even diversified to focus on certain segments such as the Nile River, temples, and public order within cities. Therefore, the police was directly under the authority of the minister, who was the second highest authority after the Pharaoh himself (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.40). However, during the different periods of occupation to which Egypt was subjected, the idea of a civilian police completely changed. Starting from the Ptolemaic era, the police was widely mixed with the military corps, which has entirely changed the police's function. As a military force, soldiers were trained to resist the country's enemies or enforce the rule of an occupying authority. The police force was trained to protect citizens from crime and widespread insecurities as well as preserve the public order (B. Abdelaziz 2013, p. 43 & 46). Hence, when the police's role was joined with military personnel and their respective tactics, the civilian nature of the police was altered.

Such a policy prevailed during the different phases of occupation that Egypt witnessed. However, the establishment of the police force in modern Egypt reflected a gradual orientation of distinguishing the police from the military corps. When Mohamed Ali founded a modern police force, it was mainly comprised of military soldiers who followed the command of a specific high ranking officer assigned for internal security. Later in the era of Khedive Ismail, the police force became more independent from military personnel, but it still relied on military officers who received some legal knowledge before working as police officers (M. Youssef, 2014).

The first school to train police officers in Egypt was established in 1896 and was led by a British officer. The school enrolled youth at early age, with priority for those who finished high school. In 1914, the school began only enrolling high school graduates for two years, and law school graduates for one year. In 1946, the length

was expanded from two to four years, and in 1953, it began issuing graduates with a law degree in addition to a policing degree (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 34-35). Such an evolution addressed the need to provide police graduates with legal knowledge and other soft tools, rather than just the weapons they carried. Although Nasser himself was appointed interior minister right after the 1952 revolution, and was followed by other ministers with a military background, the police chain of command and its personnel were clearly distinct from the military. Then, in 1975, a police academy was created to include the police college, for bachelor degree in law and policing, the high education college for master's and doctorate's degrees and the college of training and development for post-graduate training diplomas (Babawi, 2005).

B-Political Neutrality

Political neutrality means the existence of a professional police force which is able to serve the whole population equally, without specific preference or animosity towards any component of society. This neutrality should especially apply to the relationship between the police and the political and economic elites. Therefore, police work should reflect the rule of law, without exception.

Ashour (2012) compares the SSI to the brains protecting the regime, while the CSF was the muscles forcibly executed this protection. The SSI included several departments in charge of close surveillance for political, religious, and student activism, as well as syndicates, churches, and NGO activities. As one former officer explained:

the SSI agency under Mubarak was no longer doing its essential role in protecting the country. It kept shifting its role until it became responsible for all the mess that happened in Egypt... the officers were doing their job and working for long hours more than expected ... but some bad people among them, including the head of the agency, were positioning the agency to do other missions than really protecting the country. (Telephone interview with a former police officer, February 2015)

This pattern of unification between the police and the political regime has deeply damaged the norm of police neutrality in Egypt. The police are no longer protecting citizens but rather endorsing the regime's viability. Therefore, the minor attempt of any officer to reinitiate political neutrality by refusing to be involved in the electoral fraud (in the interest of the NDP) was violently repressed. Moreover, the police academy recruited from a certain social level that would eventually be aligned with

the political regime. Candidates with any political or religious affiliations are systematically excluded, specifically those related to the Muslim Brotherhood and graduates of Al-Azhar University, while Coptic Christians currently represent no more than 2% of the accepted candidates to the police academy (T. Aclimandos, 2012, p.8).

The politicization of police work transcended the SSI and the CSF to other police departments, since the whole police apparatus was applied to serve the political status of the regime. Unlike during Nasser's era, police brutality now affected ordinary citizens who had no connection to politics. In addition to the CSF's constant deployment to forcibly disperse workers' strikes, the police could also apply violence and torture against someone as a favor for another fortunate citizen who held some kind of authority. Accordingly, police brutality was applied to simply urge someone to withdraw a complaint he had previously filed against an officer (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.74, p88). An emblematic case of this was Khaled Said, who was beaten to death by sub-officers in June 2010, an event that served as the necessary spark to build wide consensus against police brutality. Khaled Said was completely apolitical, yet he was not spared from police violence. Such an incident crystallized public opinion against police practices, reflected in reactive violence that targeted police symbols and personnel. Police officers and soldiers were verbally and physically attacked on the streets, and more than 95 police stations and around 4,000 police vehicles were burned during the first few days of the 2011 revolution (O. Ashour, 2012, p.9).

The constant politicization of the police led officers to use violence for political reasons, and then to use general violence to settle their conflicts with ordinary people, until finally they were themselves the target of the people's violence and protests against the political regime. However, police neutrality is not completely politics-free, meaning that democratic policing cannot be implemented without a solid political will. Therefore, when the interior ministry's leaders were replaced during the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), there was no political will to introduce deep changes into the equation of a politicized police force. The police remained the tool of the political regime to weaken its political opposition, regardless of who was actually in power (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p.11). This applies to the SCAF

between February 2011 and June 2012, and then as well to the presidency of Morsi, until he was removed from power in June 2013. As one human rights expert explained:

Lots of opportunities were lost. We had an opportunity right after the revolution; we had another one during the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in 2011; and a third one right after the Port Said massacre in February 2012, and then right after Morsi's election in mid 2012. But all these opportunities were wasted; those who were in power were keen to support the Ministry of interior- MOI and not reform it. For three years, we had no real political will to reform the police, yet the political opportunity to push for reforms was very real and could have made a difference. Today [after July 3rd, 2013] , it is very hard to impose reform on the police. (Personal interview with a human rights expert, March 2015)

The events of Portsaid's stadium constituted another opportunity. Therefore, I blame the Muslim brotherhood for wasting this chance because they were in the parliament by then. They were capable of doing anything to reform. The MOI was weak after this failure, the street was protesting for a week in front of the MOI's headquarters. In these circumstances, the discontent with the MOI was wider than the political elite circle because the event was touching a bigger part of the society. (Personal interview with a security studies researcher, February 2015)

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) majority in parliament held back on police reform initiatives and passed only a few amendments to raise police salaries right before the parliament dissolution. In return, some MB supporters were accepted at the police academy, while some anti-MB officers at the National Security agency were excluded (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 18-19). However, we cannot say that Morsi's politicization of the police resulted in greater control over its ranks. During the protests in front of the presidential palace Ittihādiya in December 2012, following the issuance of a constitutional declaration by the president that immunized his decisions from potential appeals, the police refused to suppress the masses. Hence, the MB's leaders were obliged to bring their own youth to disperse the sit-in, which resulted in violence known as the Ittihādiya clashes. Nevertheless when the MOI's headquarters were approached by protestors a month earlier on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, police forces used excessive violence to defend the building. Such an attitude reflected that the Police were motivated to defend their own headquarters but they were not willing to repress the masses to consolidate the President's power. This tendency was the main reason for Morsi to appoint a new interior minister, with Mohamed Ibrahim replacing Ahmed Gamal El-Din (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, pp. 24-25). Later on, the police refused again to align with the President's will on the eve of June 30, 2013 protests, but this time the refusal emerged from mid- and low-ranking officers. As a former officer explains:

there were clear orders from the minister to launch an arrest campaign against the media and the youth leaders supporting the anti-Morsi *Tamarrod* (Rebel) movement, but the reformist mid- and low-ranking officers refused to execute these orders, defying the minister and the president and preferring instead to align with the masses. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

In the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the political and military elites had no interest in de-politicizing the police, thinking that they would eventually use the apparatus when needed to diminish any future opposition. From their side, police officers did not unconditionally align themselves with the ruling political elite; rather, they were in continuous negotiations to extract more benefits for their own interests. Nevertheless, they were not able to restrain from taking part in the political conflict, since they were aware that the January 25th revolution was more or less against them, and hence they were personally motivated to oppose it. Some police officers were individually inclined to avoid meddling in politics again, in order to secure their status in the long run. But on the other hand, when interior minister Habib Al-Adly and his deputies were dismissed and brought to justice in 2011, police officers refused to work to protest the humiliation and detainment of their leaders (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p 7). In addition, although the police stayed neutral vis-à-vis the June 30 rallies in 2013, they were motivated to suppress the pro-Morsi protestors few days later. Such an attitude reflected the police's political preference in removing Morsi rather than a consistent neutral stance towards political demonstrations in general. Thus, this continuing police politicization could not be resolved without a certain level of politics or political will to force a re-orientation of the police, from a coercive apparatus to a politically neutral law-enforcement body (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, p 13). Such a process is closely related to the status of a country's democratization and the balance of power among different political actors (Sedra & Burt, 2011, p.3).

C- De-militarization

One of the main principles of democratic policing is the civilian nature of the police. The police should not rely on its capabilities as a force but as a civilian service. The police structure and command should be ultimately distinct from those of the military. Accordingly, police techniques and working methods should be civilized in order to serve the people and not fight them. Moreover, the militarization of the police is a point of weakness for its legitimacy in the eyes of the local community and stands as an impediment to gain the people's trust (Friesendorf & Krempel, 2011)

Egypt has known an early distinction between the military and the police forces. Nevertheless, the police force was forged on the military model in many aspects. The officers' rankings, uniforms, military salutes, firearms, fighting training, and the military life, especially in the police school, all came from the army. The militarized nature of the police was further deepened by the creation of the Central Security Forces (CSF) in the late 1960s. According to ministerial decree number 31, issued by the defense minister in 1981, the MOI is considered a military entity through which military conscripts can serve their duty (M. Mahfouz, 2011, p. 118). Such a decree contradicts the police's nature as specified in consecutive constitutions as a "statutory civil body" (Egyptian Constitution, 2014, art. 206). Therefore, the CSF included thousands of young Egyptian males who served their military duty under the authority of the interior ministry. Generally, these conscripts had not received any basic education and were mainly trained to obey the orders of their superiors (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012, pp.8-9). However, the CSF is not the only paramilitary force within the MOI that receives military conscripts. As a former officer who served in these forces explained, the paramilitary forces in the MOI are divided into three main forces:

The first one is called the services forces. These serve as guards in front of banks, post offices and the traffic regulation authority. They are soldiers of the second degree; I mean they are not the best degree. They follow the authority of the security directorates, so these are the Security Forces (SF) which are organized locally. The second force type is the Central Security Forces (CSF) which are divided into the anti-riot forces and the fighting groups. The anti-riot forces are deployed in soccer matches, protests, sit-ins, and so on, and are organized into divisions. Each contains almost 110 soldiers, which are also divided into three divisions, with 33 soldiers each, plus two to four officers and two to four sub-officers, as well as soldiers as guards for the chiefs of the division. These are equipped with only tear gas bombs and some cartridge rifles; they do not carry any firearms, except the personal guns of the officers and the guns of the chief's guards. The last type of forces is the best in terms of weapons, equipment, and the quality of the soldiers. They are called the fighting groups, or the support groups, and are the ones who actually fight in dangerous situations. They serve in arrests of dangerous criminals, and in anti-narcotic, counter-terrorism, and state security missions. They are organized into five soldiers, with only one officer. They have other type of weapons, rifles or automatic weapons, and now they are all wearing masks and dressed all in black. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The total numbers of these forces grew extensively from 189 officers and 11,690 soldiers in 1968, to around 300,000 officers and soldiers by the end of Mubarak's rule (O. Ashour, 2012, p.7). Hence, these forces are the flagrant symbol of a militarized police, due to their paramilitary-like structure and the military conscripts that they enroll. However such a mixture with the military was never the same on the

leadership level. Accordingly, military leaders and commanders were always spared by the regime from police work, especially in Mubarak's rule, fearing the possibility of coups if they were too involved in the internal affairs. Therefore, the Egyptian people looked up to the military as a protector while considering the police, with all its brutality and misconduct, as threat. Such a perception was extremely obvious on the eve of January 29, 2011, when police forces were chased from streets, while the military forces were widely welcomed and saluted by protestors (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.8 & p.4).

Another problem with Egypt's militarized police is that its effectiveness widely depends on the crackdown operations led by paramilitary forces. This matter was entrenched in police tradition during Mubarak's rule and then continued after his ouster. Starting from the early 1980s, the crackdown operations on specific areas such as villages, neighborhoods, or other conglomerations became more and more frequent. They were widely initiated for different reasons, most of them political rather than criminal. Generally, paramilitary forces impose a closure over a targeted area, with tight searches of homes and, in some cases, burning houses, electricity cuts, and transportation deprivations (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp. 65-66). These types of operations continued after the revolution, but were widely accompanied by military forces for different reasons. First, the police was endorsed by the military as a way to renew its legitimacy following the withdrawal of the police from the streets on the eve of January 29, 2011. Second, the military was perceived as being better equipped and trained to enforce the law in the short term. Hence, several crackdown operations have been initiated jointly by military and police forces since 2011 to break up criminal or terrorist strongholds, especially in Sinai. The same case applied to Kerdasa, in Giza, where clashes between the police and armed groups led to the burning of the police station and the killing of police forces right after the *Nahda* and *Rabi'a* dispersals in August 2013. Shortly after the clashes, the town of Kerdasa was subjected to collective punishment by military and police forces, rather than precise criminal investigations to specify the real perpetrators of the violence. Such a heavy-handed and broad response eventually served as an impetus to increase terrorist attacks against state forces, rather than stabilizing the country or enforcing the law (Moheyeldeen, 2014, pp. 6-9).

The tight cooperation between the military and the police in these crackdown operations does not reflect, however, smooth interactions between the two institutions. Under Mubarak's rule, the MOI gained more importance in internal and political affairs, when the military was generally distanced from the political scene. Therefore, the MOI was a close partner to the NDP and the ruling elite surrounding the president's son, Gamal Mubarak, who was planning to inherit his office. In this context, the MOI's authority was widened to defy the military's in some aspects. For instance, the State Security Investigations (SSI) enlarged its surveillance activity to include military officers (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.10). As an ex-officer stated:

Under Habib El-Adly's rule, the officer of state security in Ismailia, for instance, might have greater authority than the commander of the second field army. (Telephone Interview with an ex-officer, February 2015)

Therefore, the MOI was a sort of a defying power to the military, relying on the close relationship between El-Adly and Gamal Mubarak's circle. The military was motivated to take part in ousting Mubarak in 2011 to stop the inheritance project of Gamal and the ascending ambitions of the MOI. Afterwards, when the police needed support to redress its authority, the military was present to endorse police work for several months. The military police and other units supported police officers and CSF soldiers on different occasions. This support reflected a new type of relation between the two institutions, in which the military was superior to the police. Hence, the military was keen to assure its supremacy over the police, rather than emphasizing civilian supremacy over police work. However, this new relationship engendered two types of reactions among police officers. The first was a feeling of disappointment about their new inferior status to the military, which initiated many incidents of conflict on low-ranking levels between officers of the two institutions. An example occurred in November 2012, when several military officers surrounded a police station in east Cairo to protest the arrest of a military officer by a police officer at a checkpoint. Another incident occurred in October 2014 at a checkpoint on the Portsaid highway, when military police arrested all the police personnel who were present to punish them for mistreating a military officer who passed by the checkpoint. These incidents were usually settled through mediations, after the intervention of the leaders of the two institutions; yet, no punishment for the conflicts'

initiators was announced (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 13-11-2014). As a police officer explained:

I believe the military has an upper hand over the police and the whole country. They have a veto authority, and if a police officer is mistaken, he must be punished for what he has done. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

The second reaction was a sense of excessive identification with the military, which deepened the militarized nature of the police and made it require more weapons and armories. This was reflected in the self image of police officers and how they constantly compared themselves to military officers in terms of work conditions and career path. As one officer explained:

We suffer from career stagnation. It takes us so long to be promoted from one rank to another. I wish we applied the same rules as the military or the intelligence. I wish we were equal to the military in everything. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer went even further:

I do not mind at all to be punished by jail if I commit a mistake, but I want to be tried in front of police courts and then imprisoned in special prisons for police officers, as with the military judiciary and military prisons. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

There was an attempt to initiate special police courts in order to prosecute military conscripts serving their duty under the authority of the MOI, but Egypt's current president, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, refuted this suggestion by issuing a law in October 2014 that assigned the military judiciary the right to try military conscripts from the MOI (Al-Badil, 9-10-2014). However, there was no confirmation about the inclusion of sub-officers in the decree, since they were previously exempted from military trials, thanks to a decree issued by the SCAF in April 2012 (Al-Youm Al-Sabae', 30-4-2012).

Another problem with the police's militarization is that it negatively impacts the effectiveness of law enforcement. A military officer is supposed to follow the orders of his superiors; in a military battle, the only law is the superiors' orders which are communicated to the soldiers. However, police personnel must follow the law in order to preserve security and public order. Thus, when the police are militarized, officers ignore the law and instead turn to their superiors for orders. Such an attitude requires an extensive chain of coordination between police officers and their leaders

in each incident, which impedes and decelerates police performance. As one former officer describes it:

When you face a situation, you do not think how to implement the law, but you turn to your superior for instructions, who then turns to his superiors, and so on. So some situations would generate a series of phone calls ascending the hierarchy of the police in order to decide what to do. (M.H. Abulezz, 2014, p. 91)

From its side, the military wanted to see the police take responsibility of internal security without really applying deep reforms. As previously mentioned, the amendments to the police law that were passed by parliament in June 2012, right before its dissolution, spared police sub-officers from military courts. Hence, the police became more civilianized; yet, all other suggestions to audit the police and make it more accountable were ignored and marginalized. This was the result of mutual cooperation between the Islamist parliamentary majority, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, and the SCAF, which was held the authority of the president at the time (El-Houdaiby, 2013, pp. 10-16). Despite several new appointments of consecutive interior ministers, the substance of the militarized police did not change, nor did the apparatus' security policy as a whole. Indeed, the SCAF's primary goal during its rule from February 2011 to June 2012 was the restoration of security and not its reformation (El-Houdaiby, 2013, p.25). The same can also be said about Morsi's rule from June 2012 to July 2013, which emphasized the supply of new weapons rather than the introduction of a new doctrine and norms. Hence, the same militarized nature of the police prevailed and was more intensified after the ouster of Morsi and the dispersal of his supporters' sit-ins at *Rabi'a* and *Nahda* squares. The changed political environment following these incidents and the ascending militant attacks on the police and military served to justify and emphasize the militarization of the police. In this regard, the war on terrorism was jointly launched by the military and the police, especially in Sinai, with little room for boundaries to be defined and tasks to be specified.

Moreover, after consecutive terrorist attacks, especially in Sinai, President El-Sisi issued a presidential decree in October 2014 assigning the military with some of the internal security tasks of the police for two years, especially in guarding vital institutions. Despite the several appeals against the decree for mixing the tasks of the military and the police, which are distinct by virtue of the constitution (Al-Shorouk,

10-3-2015), the decree stands, further deepening the problem of a militarized police in Egypt.

D- Professionalism

There are several aspects in which a democratic police force should be professional, in order to be effective and responsive to the people's needs. For example, a professional police force should receive suitable education and training to enable its personnel to solve cases without breaking the law or violating the basic rights of citizens. Also needed are the necessary tools of investigation and data analysis, which should be available to endorse the police's technical work in solving crimes. Meanwhile, the police's organizational culture should comply with official/written instructions and bylaws; otherwise, officers' performance will be impeded, with their motivations negatively affected. The motivational dimension of police work is very important, especially when considering work conditions, salaries, the force's organizational structure, and promotion criteria. Therefore, if suitably designed, these points can prevent inclinations towards corruption or police abuse. Additionally, a professional police should be supported with a network of police unions to promote the ethical code of the police officers, provide them with a positive organizational culture, and negotiate improvements in their work conditions.

Most of the organizational structures and bylaws regulating the MOI were established right after the 1952 revolution. New police laws were consequently issued in 1955 and 1964, followed by the law of 1971, which has prevailed until today with few amendments. Additionally, most of the modernized systems within the MOI were introduced under the rule of Habib El-Adly (1997-2011). As a former officer stressed:

On the contrary to all that was said about Habib El-Adly, he was the first minister to apply new methods and set new regulations for everything in the interior ministry. The people might hate him, but he was fair to us. He put rules and regulations for everything to make the job more institutionalized (. . .) He was an innovator. For instance, the simplest thing, the uniforms of the police forces, especially for low-ranking soldiers, their uniform was a shame, and he set new rules to circulate new uniforms for the forces every year. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The MOI has widely shifted its interest from criminal security to purely political security, given the fact that El-Adly arrived primarily to fight terrorism after militants

massacred tourists in Luxor in 1997. The MOI consists of three major branches: public security, investigations, and central security. Public security consists of police stations and police patrols on the streets, while investigations are divided into several sub-departments, such as investigations for criminal acts, public funds, tax evasion and drugs. In addition to the division for State Security Investigations (SSI) which in 2011 was turned into the National Security Agency (NSA). The third branch is the central security sector, which manages the paramilitary forces of the MOI and is divided into anti-riot forces and fighting groups/special operation forces, as specified earlier. But due to the ascending politicization of the police in Egypt, the SSI, which was essentially a part of the investigations division, gained a decisive role and dominated other branches of the MOI, even including a paramilitary division to fight terrorism (personal interview with a former officer, February 2015). Apart from these major branches, the MOI is divided geographically into security directorates, and by specialization into social, economic, criminal, and political investigations³. Hence, there are two ways to evaluate police work, whether in terms of specialization or geography, but from each perspective, the channels of coordination and information sharing are quite unclear. Although the public security division does most of the police work and employs around two-thirds of police officers, it receives the fewest resources, equipment, and training (telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015).

In addition to its role in ensuring the people's safety, the MOI is in charge of preserving public order and morality, protecting people's lives and property, and fighting crime and apprehending criminals (Said & Bakr, 2011, p.7). Moreover, the 2014 constitution underlined the police's role in the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 206). However, the MOI does more than those tasks prescribed by consecutive constitutions and laws. It is in charge of issuing security approval for almost every kind of activity in the country, which is a hidden way to control who does what. Some specified authorities are in charge of organizing religious pilgrimages, as well as civil defense, civil records and passport issuance (O. Ashour, 2012, p.15). Therefore, the MOI's work infiltrates almost all types of activity

³ For a detailed structural map of the interior ministry, visit the website: <http://www.interior.ministry.gov.eg/Arabic/Organization+Chart/>

on Egyptian soil, whether or not it is directly related to security affairs. As one former officer explained:

In theory, the police's role should be to protect and serve the people, or more specifically, to do what cannot be done by others. I mean they have to protect the safety and security of the public, especially in terms of criminality. They should enable citizens to be safe to practice their ordinary daily lives and daily business. Their main job is to make sure that everyone abides by the laws legislated by parliament. But I think today the police are doing lots of things that are beyond their job description. They are burdened by other tasks that should not be their responsibility, which takes away their energy. For instance, civil registrations, passport authority, traffic and driving and vehicles' licenses, tax evasion authority... etc. (Telephone interview with a former police officer, February 2015)

Another officer added:

The police are not doing their main task of protecting the people's lives and properties; rather they are doing things that should be assigned to other authorities. (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)

In order to fulfill these multiple tasks, the MOI employs almost 1.5 million people, equal to around 20% of the state's bureaucracy, divided into officers, sub-officers, conscripts, constables, and civilian personnel (Brumberg & Sallam 2012, p.6 / O. Ashour 2012, p.6). Around 830,000 of these positions are full-time jobs, while the rest consist of part-time, unofficial informants and collaborators. Hence, most of the growing budget of the MOI is invested to pay the salaries of this huge amount of personnel. According to official statistics, the interior ministry's budget amounts to almost LE23 billion, where LE19 billion is directed solely for salaries (Hashem 2014). Other unofficial estimations suggest that the actual budget of the MOI could amount to approximately to LE85 billion (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Yet, the difference between the two numbers could come from the unofficial economic activity that the MOI undertakes. Such economic activity is probably managed by the high-ranking colonels in the minister's closed circle, and is used to fund the loyalty payments for the high ranks of the MOI. The disparity in salaries' between the higher and lower ranking personnel of the MOI creates a deep feeling of alienation among officers, and opens the door for corrupt practices that will be explained later in this section.

Police candidates study three types of courses at the police academy. The first input comes from law school courses, public law, importantly. The second input is related to policing, which is divided into two sub-groups, theoretical courses and practical courses. The first subgroup is related to crime scene investigations, forensic

evidence, psychology, and human rights. Under the second subgroup, candidates are taught practical courses focusing on physical fitness, such as swimming, shooting, horse riding, boxing, climbing, martial arts, and self defense (interview with a former officer, February 2015). As one freshly graduated officer explained, not all studied courses are really useful in one's daily work:

I do not know why we were studying all the law school curricula, they were not useful except for the *sharia* law and the criminal law, as I think, but all the other courses are not related to our job. (Email interview with an officer, March 2015)

Other officers said they studied theoretical work techniques that were inapplicable in real work upon graduation.

We learned some useful courses, like for instance crime scene investigation. They taught us how we should enter the scene with our hands in our pocket to make sure we do not touch anything until the criminal lab guys are there collecting evidences and taking fingerprints. But in reality, when I graduated and worked in investigations, we had no criminal lab at all. So, even the limited stuff that was useful and might be used was wasted by the limited resources and the sad reality that you face after graduation. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The resources are extremely limited. The equipment of the criminal lab is only present in Cairo and Alexandria, and they cannot serve in all cases, because this would take time and delay the transfer of the case to the prosecutors. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

The equipment is available but not working. I mean there is a special officer assigned to criminal evidence, but here is the problem. If I am an investigation officer in a police station, I receive daily around 20 reports of theft - some are cars and apartments, others are forced theft, and so on. Generally, the criminal lab is not working, except for the big cases, like a murder of a celebrity, but a regular theft of an apartment, they do not even ask for the criminal lab to come and see the crime scene... it does not matter, just arrest the maid and the building guards and beat them until they confess. Or just think about the nephew or the son: if they are taking drugs, they might want to steal and so on. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

In the investigations in Egypt, we extract truth through torture; the investigative officer has no other tool to investigate the truth. They are not trained on discussions, interrogation, and presenting suspects with some evidence, analyzing their confessions to detect any inconsistency. These skills are not taught to them. The only way is to beat the suspect until he confesses or confesses about any other suspect. And unfortunately, in so many cases, some suspects would confess a crime they have never done just to escape the torture. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Torture was the main tool of investigations to solve criminal cases. The less we used it, fearing human rights NGOs, the fewer cases we solved. That is bad, but it is the truth. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.73)

When we stopped the beatings, the rate of solved cases dramatically dropped (telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Therefore, the police's major problem is that the officers lack objective tools to solve cases other than violating suspects' basic rights. This negatively impacts their ability to work effectively and deeply harms their public image. On one hand, some citizens refuse to report crimes, since they are aware of the police's limited capacities in terms of investigations and suspects' arrests. On the other hand, some avoid reporting a potential suspect to the police over fears that it will result in human rights violations against the suspect. A third part of society avoids interacting with the police altogether, even for reporting a crime, since they fear being taken in as suspects for any unresolved crime. Therefore, there is a growing possibility for falsely-solved crimes based on forced confessions, which reflects a deep mistrust of police performance (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, pp.97-99 and p. 65).

However, violence is not only used for functional reasons to solve cases or obtain a forced confession. In other words, police officers and sub-officers apply violence for a variety of reasons other than solving cases. Several incidents of torture have occurred in public places, not just in police stations or interrogation rooms, in order to enforce a certain level of deterrence for those who might consider breaking the law or contradicting police orders. As one officer explained:

The best way to preserve security was during El-Adly's era, when everyone was afraid of interacting with the police. By that time, a general policy of deterrence was applied on the whole society, which is missing today, and so, it is hard to address security deficiencies since 2011. (Telephone interview with an officer, March 2015)

Accordingly, most of the cases that are reported through checkpoints are illegally built, and thus they are not transferred to courts but will rather be disregarded by prosecutors. Nevertheless, these cases are of huge importance for the internal reports of the interior ministry, since they reflect what is commonly called "the effort." This concept reflects the performance rates of each directorate and department in the interior ministry, and thus the amount of activities undertaken by each director or department head. Because of this "effort", most of officers are required to increase their activity to meet or increase their previous records, in order to please their superiors, who in turn seek to please their respective superiors. Based on this effort, the interior ministry's effectiveness reports are built, regardless of the solidness of the reported cases and whether they are transferred to court or disregarded by prosecutors.

Therefore, the real interest of officers is directed to these fake performance reports and not to substantially preserving security (M. Abulezz, 2013. pp.81-87).

Another aspect of work techniques is the security presence, which was initiated by El-Adly to ensure the political visibility of the interior ministry. According to this technique, police forces are divided into small groups around vital establishments in urban areas to ensure their security. Hence, these forces solely serve the security of these establishments and do not have any authority to address citizens who might seek their help. As one former officer explains:

You are required to stand in front of these establishments for 12 hours a day doing nothing, but when any citizen seeks your help about any security incident on the street, you are not authorized to help him, except by calling the police emergency on the famous hotline 122. (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.112)

There was a general assumption that the large number of police officers and soldiers spread around every important establishment will automatically preserve security by deterring anyone from breaking the law. But in reality, these ineffective and distracting work techniques absorb the efforts of police personnel, without ensuring any improvements in security. Moreover, such a monotonous technique negatively impacts officers' willingness and enthusiasm to work (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.112). Therefore, most of the real police work regarding investigations, public order, and police patrols is actually carried out by the sub-officers. In terms of numbers, the police sub-officers are approximately eight to 10 times more than the police officers. Hence, assuming that police officers number around 40,000, sub-officers consist of around 320,000 to 400,000 (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015). As one officer explained, the sub-officers are in charge of most of the dirty work done by the interior ministry, whether during investigations, interrogations, or arrests. In some cases, officers are obliged to use work techniques adopted by sub-officers to solve a case, since they do not have other options, considering the poor work conditions and the pressure that they endure from their superiors. Thus, if a freshly graduated officer is keen to apply the right procedures that he learned at the academy, he will face resistance from his elder sub-officers, even if they work under his authority. He cannot replace them; indeed, he needs them, since they are more familiar than he is with the community (Email interview with a police officer, February 2015).

The Sub-officers receive legal and police instruction at the Institute of Police Sub-Officers. Yet their most valuable asset is that they deeply infiltrate the community in which they are serving, thus managing a wide network of thugs to support the MOI's dirty work when necessary. The MOI outsources these networks to intimidate political opponents or keep it unofficially informed about criminal gangs in rural areas or slums. Yet these networks are not keen to enforce the law. Rather, they enforce their own authority, benefiting from their relation with the MOI. They also apply multiple illegal techniques in the process, such as bribes and extortion (T. Acimandos, 2012, p.2-3). Moreover, some of these thugs use their authority to report their local enemies to the MOI, instead of those who are actually breaking the law, without any potential control over the credibility of the information they are providing (Moheyeldeen, 2014, p.6). These networks are used as information tools which help in building cases in their respective areas, with the relationship orchestrated by the sub-officers. (Personal interview with a human rights expert, February 2015)

There is deep tension between the officers and sub-officers, in terms of work division and salary disparities. Sub-officers legally have the right to join the officers' ranks if they accomplish 25 years of service or acquire a law degree and then join the police academy to graduate as *molazem awal*. Nevertheless, El-Adly was reluctant to apply this condition in order to preserve the interior ministry's social selection over its police officers. But after the 2011 revolution, sub-officers conducted several protests and strikes to call for the promotion of qualified sub-officers to the rank of officer (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p165). As one officer explained:

Mahmoud Wagdy (interior minister right after the revolution, between January and March, 2011) decided to accept some of them as officers and there are almost 40,000 waiting to be promoted. This way, the number of officers who were previously sub-officers will exceed those who were originally officers. This will deeply alter their jobs, because they are from lower social backgrounds and adopt illegal work techniques and are highly corrupt, even partnering with criminal gangs in different areas. (Email interview with a police officer, February, 2015)

I agree that the sub-officer manages most of the dirty work of the police, but they are not responsible for all the violations. There are plenty of officers who violate the people's rights, too. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, March 2015)

Being from a lower social background is not generally a crime, but it can be a disqualifying criterion for the MOI against those who wish to join the police academy. As one human rights' researcher explains:

The rationale behind establishing the sub-officer rank in the late sixties was to spare the police officer who is generally the son of the middle or higher classes from working in poorer areas and lower social backgrounds. Hence, recruiting a sub-officer from lower classes as an intermediary to support police work in marginalized areas was the major goal of the MOI at that time. This was an important idea to infiltrate these communities... so the sub-officer is the government in the eyes of poorer areas, but the officer is the representation of the government for the higher classes. (Personal interview with a human rights researcher, February, 2015)

The problem is that sub-officers might not solely be working for the police, since their low wages oblige them to work in other economic activities. Thus, they work with the police to illegally protect these activities, or financially benefit from their authority as policemen to receive bribes and practice extortion. As one former officer explains:

It does not matter if their salaries are increased, because they are already corrupted. For instance, they tend to gain LE15,000 through corruption, so when the MOI increases their salaries for instance from LE800LE to LE3,000 per month, it does not stop their corrupt activities. They might only decrease them, but they continue to gain the same amount of illegally earned money. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, corruption in police work is not only practiced in lower ranking levels, meaning it is not the sole responsibility of sub-officers. The MOI manages a variety of economic activities, the profit of which is not included in the official state budget. This explains the disparity between the official budget of the MOI of around LE23 billion and other estimation of the budget ranging around LE85 billion, as previously mentioned (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). As one officer explains:

There are plenty of profitable companies - bakeries, restaurants offering food and drinks for the security forces and Central Security Forces. There are also the farms and galleries of the prison authorities, where the workers are prisoners or the interior ministry's conscripts (. . .) these activities gain millions of pounds, and this is all illegal because they do not appear in the interior ministry's budget, and the Central Agency for Auditing is not aware of [this money]... from these millions, the big colonels of the MOI receive huge salaries that could amount to LE1 million per month for each of them... this is a fact that everyone knows, but tell me, how can I work properly knowing this, while my salary is barely meeting the effort I am putting out by working on the streets every day? (Email Interview with a police officer, February, 2015)

Such monetary figures could be exaggerated, even if it coincides with another estimation by former high ranking officers who stated that almost LE4 billion were allocated for annual loyalty payments for around 350 *liwā'* and *'amīd* from El-Adly's close circle, which means that each of them received almost LE1 million per month (O. Ashour, 2012, p.10). Nevertheless, these profitable economic activities could be legal, even if they do not appear in the official budget of the MOI. Yet, the problem is

that this "unofficial" budget is the reason for a long conflict with the Central Agency for Auditing (CAA) that started after the 2011 revolution. The MOI has constantly refused CAA auditors access to its financial documents, despite several mediations, especially by the current Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahleb. According to the CAA's head, Hisham Genena (2012 to present), the CAA was given access to the financial documents of the defense ministry but was denied the same with the interior ministry (El-Mogy 2014). Most of the interior ministry's hidden budget is managed through special funds which are legally put outside the State's budget. These funds include the officers' retirement payments, as well as the fines collected by the ministry itself. Some of the preliminary reports of the CAA concluded that the MOI runs many officers' solidarity funds, which receive monthly contributions from every officer who wishes to receive a large sum in return upon his retirement. However, the investment of these funds is not audited by the CAA and could amount to several billion Egyptian pounds (Alzanaty & Abufaddan 2014). Each police department has its respective solidarity funds, but the amount received by each officer upon his retirement varies according to the years of subscription and the report of his superiors prior to his retirement. Therefore, these funds are used to keep most of the officers loyal to the status quo within the interior ministry; otherwise, their retirement payments will be negatively impacted. Hence, this study does not claim to generate new findings regarding the budget figures of the MOI, it rather relies on several estimations to highlight that the current management of these funds deepens the sense of inequality among the interviewed officers.

Accordingly, the promotion criteria within the MOI help to preserve the status quo. After graduation, an officer gets his first rank as *molazīm awwāl* for three years, then *naqib* for seven years, and then he continues to escalate the ranking hierarchy according to his year of graduation and number of years in service. Nevertheless, starting from *'amīd*, promotions depend greatly on the reports of an officer's superiors, who decide who is promoted to *liwā'* and who is brought to retirement (email interview with an officer, March 2015). Therefore, whoever tries to expose corruption or apply changes that conflict with the interior ministry's policy, is generally sent to retirement with the rank of *'amīd*, with a lower retirement payment than his colleagues. As a former officer elaborates:

Any officer who tries to stop this corruption will be punished having his retirement payment decreased. They work as a network to isolate and punish any clean-handed officer who wants to report about them... Thus, we thought that we should create a coalition for the good officers in order to coordinate and protect ourselves in the same way as the corrupted officers... This was the main idea behind forming a coalition for police officers to demand their rights for a suitable salary and humane work conditions. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Hence, several officers, right after the 2011 revolution, decided to form a general coalition for police officers in order to expose corruption within the top ranks and support the civilian effort to cleanse the interior ministry. The idea was welcomed by thousands of officers who enrolled in the coalition, and the body began to voice officers' demands for improvements in salaries and work conditions. In March 2012, the coalition was transformed into a general syndicate which negotiated with the MOI for new raises in officers' salaries, which amounted to increases of 300% (Al-Shorouk, 21-6-2012), and limited the working hours of officers from around 14 to eight 8 hours per day. As one officer explains:

We used to work between 14 and 16 hours a day, but after the revolution the MOI positively responded to officers' demands and lowered the working hours to only eight or nine hours... Before, I used to work from 8am to 4pm, then have a break and start working again from 7pm to 12am, or maybe more. Now I am not required to return to work in a night shift. But in reality, there is no one to replace me, and the work is not done properly without my presence. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

Despite the visible attempt of the MOI to appease the demands of a wide range of officers, it firmly punished all active officers who insisted on creating an independent syndicate with an elected leadership. Hence, around 32 officers from the active group who helped create the general syndicate were subject to administrative investigations within the interior ministry (Al-youm al-sabae', 21-3-2012). Finally, the ministry managed to reach an agreement with the general syndicate group to disregard their punishments in return for abstaining from contacting the media. Afterwards, the purpose of the syndicate shifted to organizing free elections for the administrative boards of the officers' clubs, following the model of the judges' clubs (telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015). Accordingly, the first election was conducted in April 2013, via electronic votes, with a turnout of around 40% among officers on duty (Al-Watan 28-4-2013)⁴. Following this, officers' demands for reforms

⁴ 13,953 out of a total of 34,787 officers on duty, and 2,187 out of 9,776 retired officers, voted in these elections, with a turnout rate of 40 % for officers on duty and 22.5% for retired officers. For further information, see: *Al-Watan* newspaper, 28-4-2013

were generally met, which in return decreased the importance and the popularity of an independent syndicate among police officers.

E- Accountability

The accountability of the police is the major criterion that differentiates a democratic force from others. Therefore, as accountability mechanisms become more diverse and are exercised by different actors, the police apparatus will better correspond to democratic norms and values. In theory, police work can be controlled and overseen by multiple actors, whether civilian overseers or those from a police background. In all cases, the multiplicity of overseers does not hinder accountability but rather serves as a multi-layered system of checks and balances to guarantee a perfect implementation of police work. Thus, the police should have an internal authority to supervise officers' performance and investigate any complaint filed against its personnel. The judiciary has great authority in determining the legality of work techniques applied by the police, and this authority is utilized, whether by the final courts or preliminary prosecutors.

In the Egyptian case, the MOI has a special department for internal control, called *alatafīsh*, which reviews officers' performance and investigates complaints filed against them. As a result, the *alatafīsh* has the authority to conduct an administrative investigation with an officer and decide on a suitable punishment. Generally, the punishments can range from a verbal warning to registered mistakes in the officer's administrative file, which could impact his career path and determine the placement of his future service. Most of the officers interviewed for this study perceived the internal control department as very firm in investigating an officers' misconduct. However, there was wide divergence about whether the *alatafīsh* applies the same fair rules across all the cases it investigates. The internal control inspectors generally conduct random field inspections on police forces in different areas to check on their readiness, yet the exact criteria upon which they build their judgments are unclear. In fact, the interviewed officers were critical about inspectors' superficial remarks concerning their appearance and not their actual readiness and fitness. As a former officer explains:

All they care about is being in shape... clean shaven ... putting the whole uniform on, with shining shoes...if I was trained lately on shooting or not... how many bullets I have in my pockets and if I fired any of them lately (M. Abulezz, 2013, p.107-108)

This might appear superficial, but it is serious. Imagine the stress the officer will be in when he is wearing his white uniform and dealing with people involved in violent disputes, and is all covered in blood, and in the middle of all that he must keep his white uniform clean, or otherwise he might be punished by the internal control authority. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015)

Moreover, the internal inspection could investigate certain cases upon the request of officers, especially chief officers. As one officer emphasizes:

My boss reported on me because I fired several bullets in the air to foil an escape attempt led by the prisoners' relatives on our police station... nobody was killed, nobody was injured... but I solved the problem and saved the lives of my colleagues with these few bullets... My boss reported on me because he did not want to share the responsibility of wasting these bullets... you know, the bullets are '*ohda*' (legally guarded)... He testified against me, but the inspector did not listen to me and directly believed him... My career path was negatively impacted by this incident. I was arbitrarily transferred and I have served in bad places since then. (Telephone interview with an officer, March 2015)

Another officer explained:

They will never admit that a *naqīb* is saying the truth and that an '*aqīd*' is lying. They will directly believe the higher ranking [officer]... who can protect me if I want to report about my boss's deviation? Nobody (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

However, some officers feel that the punishment procedures taken by inspectors can easily be omitted if the officer in question has a strong connection in the leadership of the interior ministry. As one former officer described his experience with the inspection:

It was used against me, to punish me for trying to report on some corrupt colleagues, not to really investigate the matter of corruption. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Another officer elaborated on this point:

Nepotism is really common in this case... Let me tell you, if I commit a mistake jointly with another officer, and he has a strong connection, I might be strictly punished and he will probably survive without even an investigation... The case will be omitted from his file and inserted in mine... It's as simple as that. (Telephone interview with an officer, March 2015)

Generally, the internal control investigates matters of discipline, conduct, performance, and eventually, police brutality. However, it seems that the matter of discipline and following superiors' orders is more important to the inspection than other matters of brutality. Therefore, taken into consideration the limitation of the

sample, there is a general perception that the MOI tolerates the systematic brutality that leads to cases being solved, and some functional brutality to intimidate political opponents, especially that carried out by the SSI/NSA. Therefore, there are multiple cases of torture and extra-legal killings conducted by SSI officers during interrogations that have passed without a minor investigation (O. Ashour, 2012, p.7). Nevertheless, other incidents show that the MOI did not tolerate random brutality from off-duty officers for personal reasons; hence, these officers were accused of intended murder and transferred to courts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p83). A former officer considered the case of Khaled Said as an exception of the standard policy in this regard, explaining:

Khalid Said's case wasn't a political case to insist on protecting the sub-officers accused of his murder, because El-Adly was only keen to protect the SSI officers. But those working in criminal security did not receive the same attention and protection. He could have sacrificed one or two officers for justice to appease the public opinion, but he didn't... that is why the situation escalated to wide protests. (M. Abulezz, 2014. P.123)

The judiciary system serves as an oversight mechanism that scrutinizes police work on several levels. In the 1980s, when the police applied systematic torture to solve terrorism cases, the courts granted more than 190 acquittals after determining that the suspects' confessions had been violently extracted. Accordingly, around 41 officers were transferred to the criminal courts for applying torture during interrogations for these cases (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p.64). Yet this *a posteriori* oversight mechanism did not seem to stop police brutality in interrogations, considering that it still persists as a systematic tool for building cases. The cases of Khaled Said in June 2010 and Sayed Belal in December 2010, both occurring, in Alexandria, reflected the continuance of deadly police brutality. Both cases were reinvestigated after the revolution, under pressure from the revolutionary coalitions, and resulted in 10-year sentences for the two sub-officers involved in the killing of Khaled Said, a 15-year sentence for a SSI officer, and acquittals for four other officers who were previously accused in the killing of Sayed Belal (Marssadpress16-4-2013).

On the other hand, almost all of the public officials during the 2011 revolution, including high ranking officials from the interior ministry, were granted acquittals. Thus, the judiciary has distinguished between killings that occurred during the revolution and those that occurred in police custody. In fact, the acquittal verdicts for

those charged with killing protesters during the revolution were built upon the concept of the prevalence of mass killings, in a way that impedes collecting strong evidence or specifying responsibility. This totally ignores the extraction of several "official bullets" from the bodies of those who were killed across Cairo and Giza during the revolution (Hesham 2015). Yet the verdicts were guided by a different logic, which was the concept of self-defense applied by officers to protect their police stations from being invaded or burned following mass protests. As one officer explained:

The officers were only arrested to appease public opinion, but what they did to defend their police stations was 100% legal, as the law gives them the right to fire on whoever tries to break into a police station. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

A former officer further clarified the matter:

If I was serving in a police station at that time, I would think of protecting my station, the weapons and the legal registries in there, as well as the lives of the soldiers serving under my authority. Then I would leave to protect my own family. This would be my priority, so I cannot blame these officers, yet I cannot blame the protestors either. It was a complicated situation (...) the judges could not actually specify responsibility in these murders (...) it was insane to transfer these murders to ordinary criminal justice procedures... They should have been dealt with delicately. (M. Abulezz, 2014, pp. 126-127)

On the other hand, the only one of these incidents to be investigated was the case of 37 prisoners who were killed in a police truck at Abo-Za'bel prison right after the *Rabi'a* dispersal in August 2013. The prisoners were kept in the vehicle under the sun for 12 hours with no food or drink, and when they asked to be released they were hit with tear gas, resulting in the deaths of 37 out of 45 prisoners. Four officers were accused of applying violence that resulted in unintentional murder. One officer was sentenced to 10 years in jail, while the three others received one year. But later on, the officers' appeal was accepted and the case was transferred to the public prosecution for new investigations (Al-tahrir 22-1-2015).

As part of the justice system, prosecutors play an important role in reviewing the police's role, examining the legal procedures applied by the police and deciding if a case should be transferred to the courts. Hence, when a prosecutor decides to disregard a case, it means that he holds the police incompetent in building strong cases to be transferred to the courts. But it is quite controversial to use this issue as a measurement for the police performance or for the degree of the prosecutors' oversight over the police work. Prosecutors can confirm cases that are not strongly

built but that will be acquitted in future court verdicts (B. Abdelaziz, 2013, p. 121).

As one officer explained:

When the prosecutor disregards a case, that means that the procedures applied were wrong which is very common because no one in the police applies the right legal procedures in building cases. In the police report, they usually describe a completely invented story about the search and the arrest... but it could also reflect that the whole case was not worth reporting. (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015)

This was underlined by a former officer in a different way:

I was constantly called by the prosecutors to sign the disregarded cases that I reported at the checkpoint where I served... I knew that the cases were nothing, but I was obliged to report them to increase my reporting rates at the interior ministry... But I was truly relieved to learn that the prosecutors had disregarded the cases because they were nonsense. (M. Abulezz, 2014, p. 83 & 86)

Similarly, another officer discusses the authority granted to prosecutors:

We have no other choice than using violence against suspects to solve cases, but we should apply physical violence that does not leave any trace or evidence to be identified by the prosecutors, otherwise the case will be blown and disregarded. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer explained:

Judicial oversight is not just a theory; it is actually present and activated. There is no way that an officer who shot a suspect, causing his death, will not be tried. He is immediately transferred to the general prosecution and will be held in jail for four days and with his detention then renewed. Judicial oversight is activated and the general prosecutors maintain a really formal relationship with the officers when they commit a mistake that mandates a trial, there is no exception in that, I am telling you. (Telephone interview with a police officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, the oversight applied by prosecutors is neither absolute nor holistic. In theory, prosecutors have the legal authority to inspect a police station, its detaining cells, prisons, interrogation rooms, and to protect detainees from any potential torture. Yet they might not be keen to hold police officers accountable for these offences, due to reasons that include sympathies with the officers' personal networks, since a large portion of prosecutors were former police officers (I. El-Houdaiby, 2014, p9). As one officer explains:

They have the legal authority to check on everything, but do they do it? Or can they practically do it? This will depend on so many things, if they want to control everything they can, and if they want to let go, they will, and nobody can question their decision. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

The same logic was elaborated upon by another officer:

The prosecutor can, in theory, oversee all police work in terms of procedures and detention cells and everything, but if he does so and strictly controls everything, the police officers will not send a car or guarding soldiers to accompany the prosecutor at every crime scene investigation... the whole benefit-exchange formula between the officer and the prosecutor will explode. (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)

On the other hand, there are some legal limitations to prosecutors' oversight of police work. The law specifies that the party who filed the complaint must provide the related supporting evidence; hence, in cases of police brutality in custody, the detainee who faced torture is requested to provide evidence supporting his complaint. As a former officer clarified:

According to the law, if you said I was subject to torture, you have to prove it, but the whole situation is under the authority of the police and occurred in police custody, so it is always possible for the police to ruin evidence and upset the case. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

The prosecutors' authority to oversee the police is quite contestable and depends on the situation of each incident. In some cases, there is political support for the general prosecutor to investigate police brutality, like for instance the case of Shaymaa Al-Sabagh, a peaceful protestor who was shot dead in January 2015. The prosecutors thoroughly investigated the matter and even punished a senior police officer for misleading the investigation, then identified the police officer who was involved in shooting Al-Sabagh with a cartridge rifle (Al-Shourouk 17-3-2015). In this regard, the media played an important role in presenting clear evidence that proved the officer's responsibility, which forced the public prosecutor to act on the matter. However, other incidents which were not fully covered by the media received other treatment. In other cases such as the dispersal of *Rabi'a* and *Nahda* sit-ins, which resulted in the mass killings of a large number of protestors⁵, none of the police officers who served on that day were prosecuted for murder. The National Council of Human Rights official report on the sit-ins' dispersals criticized the interior ministry's

⁵ The National Council for Human Rights reported 632 cases of killings, including eight policemen in the sit-in dispersals and around 686 cases of killings, including 64 policemen in different clashes in several governorates following the dispersals. However, Human Rights Watch reported 817 cases of killings by the security forces in the sit-in dispersals, added to 246 others killed in different clashes in other governorates. Full reports are available at: <http://elbadil.com/2014/03/06/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5>-and at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814ar_ForUpload_0.pdf - retrieved on 18-12-2014

disproportionate use of force and recommended judicial investigation in this regard, yet none of these cases were examined by the public prosecutor. Hence, the decision to prosecute a police officer is quite controversial and depends on the political environment of each incident, rather than equally applying general rules to all cases.

Parliamentarian oversight on police work is widely impacted by political balance of power. The interior minister usually presents an annual report to parliament in a public session (when it is functioning), yet this does not mean that the parliament has any substantial authority over the MOI (Bakr & Said, 2011, p.9). On the contrary, during Mubarak's rule, this annual report was an occasion to show the interior minister's power over the parliament. For instance, Zaki Badr, interior minister in 1990s, slapped a parliament member in the middle of a hearing session for protesting the content of Badr's speech⁶. Later, between 2005 and 2010, most of the opposition parliamentarians presented multiple interrogations to the interior minister about torture at police stations. However, parliamentary bureaucracy manipulated the situation to avoid any serious employment of parliamentarian tools against the interior minister (Ne'matallah 2009). After the revolution, the minister addressed the parliament in February 2012, denying the use of firearms to control the popular protests following the Portsaid massacre⁷. But a parliamentary committee investigated the clashes near the MOI's headquarters in Cairo and collected evidence of the use of firearms and cartridges to forcibly disperse the protesters. Accordingly, a parliamentary committee investigating the Portsaid massacre highlighted the MOI's failure to secure the football match and confiscate weapons carried into the stadium by some of the fans (Al-masry al-youm 12-2-2012). Such oversight mechanisms had a limited role in orienting the police work, even though the minister was keen to emphasize the MOI's improved performance in respecting people's rights. Thus far, with the exception of inquiries and hearing sessions, parliamentarian oversight has never reached the stage of politically punishing a minister as a result of the police

⁶ A video of this incident is available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zOwwiF4vzBQ> – retrieved on 20-3-2015

⁷ In a football match held in Portsaid, 73 of Al-Ahly club supporters were killed when trying to exit the football stadium with visible police failure in protecting the masses, in an incident that was perceived as a police conspiracy against Al-Ahly club supporters who were in the frontline of the January 25th revolution.

deviation. Generally, parliamentary oversight has a limit in inspecting police work, as one officer explained:

Parliament members are not competent to oversee our work, you know why? They used to come to inspect the prisons and detention cells, especially the committee of defense and national security. But everyone in this committee has a relative that he wants to join the police academy or needs to be employed at a certain place but is waiting for a security approval. Tell me how they will be fair monitors in this regard. They will never try to escalate the situation if they find something wrong. This is not about us, it is the problem of the community as a whole. Why do you elect these people in the first place, when all they care about are their own interests? (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

This view could partly explain the parliament's limited authority regarding the MOI's misconduct. Yet, the MOI has a direct interest in keeping the bargaining with the politicians possible in order to escape any democratic control over its performance. Additionally, political balances in parliament have never resulted in a strong majority that is determinant to impact the ministry's security policy. In the 2012 Parliament, the comity of the Defense and the National Security was active in discussing the police reform initiatives, yet, it finally passed a bill that focused only on raising the salaries and exempting the police personnel from military trials (Personal interview with a human rights expert, February 2015). Hence, several opportunities have been wasted to build political consensus in order to enforce civilian control over police work.

Concerning the interior ministry's budget, it was never thoroughly discussed in parliament, since the ministry's budget is presented as a total amount without details of expenditure. Parliament has passed constant raises in the MOI's share of the state budget since 2005 (Abdel-Rady 2011)⁸, yet between 2012 and 2013, just one year, the MOI's budget jumped from LE18 billion to LE23.5 billion. Similarly, the 2013/2014 budget consisted of a LE10 billion raise in the MOI's share of the state budget (Al-masry al-youm 13-5-2013). The main argument for these raises was to provide the ministry with suitable resources to build its capacities and regain control over the country's deteriorating security conditions. Yet there was no reform regarding the arrangements of the budget, and it wasn't discussed, with the exception of some parliamentary complaints concerning its ambiguity (Gharib 2013). Moreover, the lower house of parliament did not get the chance to ratify the 2012/2013 state budget

⁸ Many estimations considered the interior ministry's yearly budget to be between LE3-4 billion, but between 2002 and 2005, the budget was raised to LE12 billion.

introduced under the authority of the SCAF, because it was dissolved before concluding the budget discussions. But the *shoura* council, the upper house of parliament, discussed the 2013/2014 budget and ratified it with no substantial amendments to the MOI's portion, just days before the June 30, 2013 mass protests.

From the governmental side, the oversight mechanism on the police is primarily practiced by the president, who usually tends to replace the interior minister after outstanding failures. For instance, Ahmed Roushdy (1984-1986) in the eighties was replaced by Zaki Bard (1986-1990) after the famous protest incidents conducted by soldiers from the Central Security Forces (CSF)⁹, which urged the military to intervene and repress the strike. Yet other analysis considers that Roushdy was dismissed for conducting serious corruption investigations that involved several ministers and government officials (Arafat 2013). Similarly, Hassan Al-Alfy was replaced by Habib El-Adly in 1997 after a terrorist attack on tourist attractions in Luxor that killed around 60 persons mostly tourists (the Economist 20-11-1997). Also, following the 2011 revolution, El-Adly was replaced by Mahmoud Wagdy, who stayed in office two months before being replaced by Mansour El-Essawy. Moreover, El-Essawy himself stayed in office for seven months only and was replaced in December 2011 by Mohamed Ibrahim Youssef. The latter stayed in office for nine months, until he was replaced by Ahmed Gamal El-Din in August 2012. Hence, every appointment of a new interior minister was received by the country's political powers as a chance for reform as well as a form of political punishment to the previous minister. This was especially the case of Gamal El-Din, who was dismissed in January 2013 after refusing to forcibly suppress anti-Morsi protests near the Ittihādiya presidential palace a month earlier. Therefore, Mohamed Ibrahim, who came to office following Gamal El-Din, was perceived as the minister of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. However, this turned out to be false, since Ibrahim was involved with the military in ousting Morsi on July 3, 2013, and violently dispersing his supporters' sit-ins in August 2013. Later, in March 2015, Ibrahim was replaced by Magdy Abdel-Ghaffar after consecutive security failures, among them terrorist attacks in Sinai and an enormous fire that ruined the Cairo International Conference Center in the east district of Nasr City (Thabet 2015).

⁹ In 1986, thousands of military conscripts within the central security forces staged a wide riot to protest a rumor of a potential extension of their military duty for one more year

However, the most effective type of accountability in Egypt was actually practiced by the human rights NGOs and the media. The most tangible reform initiative was presented by a group of civil society organizations, law professors and police officers that was called the National Initiative for Police Reform NIPR. The NIPR emphasized the different angles of the police reform especially the police accountability. As one security studies' researcher involved in drafting the NIPR formula explained:

In our first draft we emphasized the most radical suggestions for reform, and then we lightened it gradually in October 2011, then in 2012 and in 2013. Thus the first version was really sharp in requesting the prosecution of the officers involved in the killings during the revolution and this was particularly the demand of the officers involved with us who perceived an active accountability as a mechanism to purify the police from the bad elements, because they did not want to share responsibility in those killings (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015)

Another activist in the NIPR explained:

Our essential emphasize was on the accountability and on the settlement of the previous crimes committed by the MOI, which are committed until today, and will continue until the reform actually begins. The society is full of victims of the MOI's crimes who were not compensated by any means. So if we wanted to build a stable and productive society served by a legitimate police force, the police violations should be accountable for (Personal interview with a human rights' activist, March 2015)

Most of the cases of brutality which were investigated by prosecutors and transferred to courts were primarily supported with wide media coverage and accurate documentation by human rights NGOs. The Khaled Said case in 2010 was an example of this right before the January 25th revolution, followed by the Shaymaa Al-Sabagh case in 2015 after the July 3rd 2013. A prominent NGO that has been involved in holding the police accountable is the Al-Nadeem Center for the Rehabilitation of Violence Victims, which has played a prominent role in documenting the majority of police brutality incidents, whether those occurring in police custody or other places. The center also notably published a report after the first 100 days of Morsi's presidency to expose continuing violations. Afterwards, the center reported 359 cases of torture and 217 cases of killings by the police or in clashes that the police failed to control during Morsi's rule (Al-Nadeem Center, 2013). Similarly, the center published a well-documented report about incidents of torture and death committed by the police after the June 30 revolution under the rules of interim president Adly Mansour and elected President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi (Al-Nadeem Center 2014). These detailed

reports were based on the personal testimonials of hundreds who survived the violence and torture, as well as sources from both traditional and new media. Moreover, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published a similar and more elaborate report to document the killings that occurred in the summer of 2013, following the *Rabi'a* and *Nahda* dispersals (EIPR 2014). Although these reports documenting extrajudicial killings were important in raising awareness about the rate of the violations, they didn't put enough pressure on enforcing the prosecution of the incidents' perpetrators. However, the case of lawyer Karim Hamdy, who died from torture in a police station in February 2015, proved that the wide protests conducted by the Lawyers' Syndicate played a prominent role in forcing the prosecution of two NSA officers who were involved in his death (Al-Watan 1-3-2015). Hence, civil institutions endorsing specific cases of violence will likely play an effective role in police accountability, compared to other cases which were not endorsed. Moreover, the more visible the case is in the media and the wider the alliance is that requests its investigation, the greater the probability that its perpetrators' will be prosecuted. Yet, not all cases of violation are equally endorsed, and so not all cases are properly investigated.

Accordingly, when Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper published in April 2015 a well documented report about the police violations, the MOI threatened to prosecute the newspaper for publishing false incidents. The MOI has been always unwelcoming any type of criticism regarding its performance, claiming any abuse incident conducted by the police to be exceptional and unrepresentative of the general conduct of the MOI. However, the MOI is deliberately intimidating the media outlets which persist on exposing the wrongdoing of its personnel, since the wide media coverage of the police abuses will enforce the investigation of violence incidents and the prosecution of the perpetrators.

VII- Recommendations for Police Reform in Egypt

In this part the different views regarding the police reform are discussed and contrasted in order to highlight the reform formula that could be applicable in Egypt. The reform views are based on the insights of the interviewed police officers and human rights' experts, yet articulated around the four criteria of the democratic policing as discussed earlier in the analytical framework.

A. Political Neutrality

Despite the importance of the political neutrality of the police, the police reform itself requires a political will favorable of the reform. Hence, the main question in this regard was how to trigger the political will to introduce the police reform. Some of the interviewees considered that convincing the current authority to stop using the police as a political tool to suppress its opponents would be hard since a politicized police is definitely consolidating its power. In this regard, the trigger for the reform could be a second wave of police collapse which is similar to what happened on January 28th 2011. Such a collapse would oblige the current rulers to allow a political opening leading to a general initiative of institutional reform including the police reform. As a sociologist explained:

In some times, when the authority's structure reaches a certain level of depth and complexity, a certain level of violence is needed to penetrate this depth and dismantle its structure. The MOI is like a wildlife predator, it should be first beaten, then well fed and nurtured before you can expect anything from it (Personal Interview with a sociologist, March 2015)

In contrast, others considered that a complete collapse is not required, because the MOI is already aware of its deficiencies since the first collapse on January 28th, 2011. Therefore, this view perceives the adoption of the reform as applicable if approached from the professionalism angle which gives priority to improving the officers' salaries, work conditions and training. As explained by a human rights journalist:

The police was already engaged in June 30 as a partner with other political trends against the MB, thus we can build on this partnership to introduce a wider scale of reform based primarily on improving their work conditions, then come other aspects of reform such as the accountability and the de-militarization and so on... And this could easily happen without a need for a second beat, like the way it was in January 28th, we might not survive another beat for the police, the situation is already

precarious and fragile. We cannot actually control the scale of a second beat, so we cannot get its benefits, if any. (Personal interview with a journalist, February 2015)

Opposed to this view, another view considered that the reform should be tackled in a holistic approach where all angles of reform are introduced in parallel. As explained by a political science scholar:

The people will never accept to postpone the police accountability, even if there is no parliament for a while, the people will refuse that with lots of other mechanisms. The police accountability is crucial because with every victim killed, the political regime will gain more enemies and its stability will be at the stake, hence, the regime's legitimacy will be deeply harmed by the absence of the accountability (Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

In addition to that, a human rights activist explained:

The reform demands are really interdependent and interrelated. If there is no monitoring mechanism for every measure of reform we propose, it will not be implemented in a proper way, as if it was not applied at all. Therefore, without multiple mechanisms of accountability, the reform has no core (Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 2015)

Considering the same logic, the likelihood of the reform is tightly linked to the regime's ability to control the political situation through the current police status. Hence, the consecutive security crises will enforce the regime to adopt some substantial reforms; otherwise it will face a second collapse. Thus a sociologist put it in an "either/or" equation as follows:

Either the State allows certain spaces and discourses of reform that would eventually help it later to evolve, or it considers that as an attempt to destroy its structures and then ignore the reform until it is actually facing collapse by the constant failure and deficiencies in its institutions especially the police. (Personal interview with a sociologist, March 2015)

Regardless of the trigger for the introduction of the reform, a holistic approach should be adopted when tackling the different angles of the reform. Thus, the hypothesis of introducing some professional reforms before consolidating the accountability mechanisms was widely refuted by most of the interviewees. Even, the police officers requested a clear set of oversight mechanisms in order to properly fight terrorism, to counter corruption within the apparatus and to widen the legitimacy of the police action (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015). As one political science scholar put it:

The democracy consolidation is based on a bunch of sustainable reforms, amongst is the police reform. The police reform is a substantial part of the implementation of the social contract with the people ... We have to consider all the aspects of reform simultaneously, because they are interdependent, you cannot hold them accountable if you do not give them effective tools of professional investigation ... we need to

solve the dilemma of security and human rights. (Personal interview with a political science scholar, March 2015)

As another political scientist added:

We cannot set effective oversight mechanism without consolidating an independent judiciary and a strong parliament, the whole process of reform is interdependent, and the police reform is not an isolated exception (Personal interview with a political science scholar, February 2015)

Additionally, a police officer expressed the same view:

The security is better served if all of the State's institutions undergo a comprehensive reform to overcome the deficiencies of the bureaucracy, because the work of the MOI depends on many other institutions not only the police. (Email Interview with an officer, March 2015)

Moreover, a human rights researcher emphasized the importance of tackling the reform as a win/win situation for both sides; the police and the people. He elaborated as follows:

The reform discourse should be approached as a win/win game not a zero sum game between the MOI and the civil society, both sides should come out of it with respective gains it is not a matter of revenge (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

Despite the importance of the holistic approach in tackling the police reform, some interviewees stressed on gradual incremental steps to introduce the reform. As one officer stated:

It should definitely be gradual, slow, and led by strong insider figures because most probably the apparatus will not accept a reform plan from an outsider. There are some institutions who will never accept an imposed reform from outside its members, such as the judiciary and the police. Thus it should be introduced gradually through some compromises, for instance, the salaries will be raised in exchange of passing some reforms and additional tasks for the police and so on. If the reform is pushed forward through radical immediate changes, the apparatus will resist and as a result could stop functioning. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

On the contrary, other interviewees highlighted that the police is like any other public institution, the personnel of which will directly follow the instructions of their superiors. As a former police officer explained:

If the reform is adopted by a strong, competent and determinant minister, he would probably change the whole ministry in one year (. . .) that is how the police doctrine works, no matter who is in charge, the people in the organization will follow the new rules with no thinking. It is actually a negative point, but when it comes to reform, it turns to be positive because everyone will follow. A strong minister with a clear vision and nontraditional methods would actually succeed in reforming the ministry with no potential resistance (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Yet another former officer refuting the possibility of adopting an accelerated plan of reform has explained:

If an accelerated plan is imposed, the ordinary citizen would pay a high price. Yet to implement a real reform, we have to design two plans, one for the short term and the other for the long term. The short term means 6 months and the long term means from 3 to 10 years, it does not matter, but we need a complete plan in hand before starting to reform (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

On the other hand, a third former officer suggested specific steps to properly launch an effective reform process as follows:

First step should be a wide purge for all corrupted leaders in the MOI, then the second step is to promote the mid-ranking officers to manage the reform, then the third step is changing the curricula of the police academy. Those who might resist the reform are dismissed, those who might embrace it are promoted and those who would implement it are well educated and trained on new effective methods (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Yet a researcher in security studies articulated it differently by stating the following:

The first step should be forming an assessment committee to investigate all of the MOI's sectors then suggest a reform plan scheduled on both short and long term (. . .) there is no unique formula of reform, each country has its own characteristics determining the likelihood and conditions of reform, so we have to study our conditions and suggest the needed reform accordingly (Personal interview with a security studies researcher, March 2015)

Therefore, the preferable context of the police reform in Egypt would be a political opening, whether based on a voluntary intention of reform from the regime or urged by the severe collapse of the apparatus. Generally, a successful reform plan should be based on the work of an assessment committee with diverse backgrounds with the purpose of scanning all the capacities and deficiencies of the MOI to suggest where to begin a short term reform and where to schedule a long term reform. In all cases, a multiplicity of actors should be involved in suggesting and monitoring the potential reforms, yet the importance of a civilian minister was contestable. Some of the interviewees insisted on a civilian minister to undertake the reforms as a guarantee that the reforms are implemented in the interest of the people. Whereas, an important portion of the interviewees preferred an insider in order to avoid any potential resistance. Thereby, the substance of the reform plan is the most important in this regard, rather than the background of the minister who would initiate the reform. However, the content of the reform should definitely be the result of a joint work of a diversity of actors and experts from the different fields related to the police work.

On the other hand, almost all of the interviewees emphasized the importance of stopping the police interference in politics. The police officers and the human rightists' views coincided in considering the political burden on the police as an impediment to invest its capacities in the real police work. As one officer stated referring to the deadly Sinai bombings in January 2015:

We were so occupied with following every detail in the life of the political opponents, to the extent of not being aware that a complete brigade will be targeted by several bombings in Sinai (Personal Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Additionally, two other officers referred to June 30, 2013 as an ideal moment when the police forces were actually protecting the protestors rather than attacking them. As one of them clarified:

I believe the police should be involved when there is a protest or a rally, but to protect it, to make sure it will not turn into violence, to make sure it does not block the traffic not to forcibly disperse it... We should have like a special agency to analyze the reasons of each protest and try to address these reasons with peaceful methods rather than violent dispersal that causes death (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

B. Demilitarization

Demilitarizing the police was a controversial point when discussing the needed reform in Egypt. Some of the interviewees put it as a high priority if we aim at changing the police philosophy and make it more responsive to the people's needs, while other considered it a difficult step given the current war on terror. As a political science scholar explained:

The militarization cannot be easily decreased in the context of the war on terror, but they can use more accurate weapons and work on their training to be more specific, in order to decrease the side effects of this pattern of a militarized police. For anti-riots forces, they should use water only, and specify the most dangerous cases when they should use tear gas with certain restrictions (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Thereby a human rights' researcher admitted this fact by stating:

The militarization is not likely to be lightened in the short term because it is entrenched in the Egyptian context on different levels, and the police are not an exception (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

However, a police officer insisted on the needed de-militarization especially in the context of the war on terror not only in terms of weapons and tools but also in terms of the philosophy behind the police work. He clarified:

We need to deal with the police from a civilian point of view; we need to declassify its historical documents and to make them accessible to researchers in order to analyze the reasons of the new terrorist wave (. . .) The learnt lesson from the terrorist wave in the eighties and nineties was that we could not solve the problem solely by force, we needed to launch intellectual revisions amongst the radicals' leadership in prisons (. . .) now we need to understand that the militarized police is not the solution, on the contrary we are losing more people every day (Personal Interview with an officer, February 2015)

One angle of a demilitarized police should be a clear break with the military tradition within the police, especially the police academy, and to transform the police to be more of a civil service rather than a police force. Nevertheless, the Police forces would still be an important actor in specific areas when breaking in and forcible arrests are needed. Yet, clear rules need to be put to differentiate the military and the police. As one officer explained:

The police should be more civilian, it must have a clear break with the military traditions, it should be a civilian apparatus to better serve the people and get closer to them. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

One approach to civilianize the police is to change the education pattern within the police academy. As a researcher in security studies clarified:

For me some points of the militarization should be changed, for instance the ranks within the police should be civilian, because you are training an officer to serve a civilian community, not to serve as a killing machine in the army. The police students could be living in dorms in the police academy but without being isolated from the society. The focal point is to break this isolation around the police academy. They might be recruited starting from age 17 to teach them the fighting arts, policing and law courses, but they should not be isolated in a way that would be negatively reflected on their interaction later with the people. (Personal Interview with a researcher in security studies, March 2015)

Another angle of the demilitarization is the abolition of the military conscripts' inclusion in the MOI under the Central Security Forces- CSF's authority. The CSF need to be restructured to recruit professional officers and soldiers, rather than receiving military conscripts from the Ministry of Defense. As one former officer explained:

The MOI can recruit from ordinary people to build an anti-riot force, the recruitment criteria might include essential education only or a degree in sports or fitness and then train them to be better and educate them about how to deal with protests and riots ... But this process should be an intentional recruitment not as military duty. A one hundred well trained and well equipped professional officers would eventually succeed to disperse protest without any fatal injury, rather than 4 thousands who know nothing... it is not an innovation, it is adopted everywhere in the world, the professional anti-riot forces will be better because they are trained daily on anti-riots techniques. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Another officer has strongly emphasized the same logic:

I would prefer to have like 50 thousands well trained officers in an anti-riot agency than having a 200 thousands poorly trained soldiers serving their military duty. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

Despite the importance of this step, it could not be easily applied in the short term, as one officer clarified:

It is extremely necessary and extremely difficult in the same time. It could take 10 years to be successfully implemented. Because you have to carefully plan for it, in terms of costs and training to prepare physically and intellectually qualified and professional cadres. Now the CSF soldier may cost 100 LE per month, the officer who should replace him could cost 1200 LE at least per month if not more, So it is almost times 10 in terms of financial costs without mentioning the training and the education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

However, another officer seemed skeptical about this step, requesting not only to maintain the military conscripts' inclusion in the MOI, but also to higher their level to be similar to those included in the Armed Forces.

We need soldiers of a better quality, instead of a bad soldier serving for three years; I would prefer a good soldier who received high education to serve for only one year. We need the soldiers of the military, who are university graduates, they are extremely competent and they deal decently with the people. If this kind was allocated to serve in the police, it will definitely change the level of service because they understand, they actually use their minds, this way the State's budget will not be burdened with extra costs, the military will just direct some of the good quality soldiers to the police. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Nevertheless, this suggestion was widely refuted by almost all of the other interviewees. Some of them refused to drain the good quality soldiers from the armed forces to the police, while the others refused to emphasize the nature of the militarized police by including the good quality of military conscripts into the MOI. As a former officer argued:

We should rather think to recruit university graduates in the police as full officers not as military conscripts, because frankly what is the difference between a commerce school graduate or a law school graduate and the police academy graduate? They should all be on the same level and recruited for the same degree which is officers not anything lower than that. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

C. Professionalism

The MOI is in deep need of a multiplicity of reforms on the professional level, especially in terms of the doctrinal, managerial and technical dimensions. It was almost consensual amongst the interviewees that the MOI should not only halt its interference in political issues, but it should also shift its structures to permanently

disregard the non security tasks that are burdening its agenda. As one political scientist emphasized:

We need to lift the political burden off the MOI, so it can focus only on the security tasks. Thus all the security representatives who are spread in the Egyptian bureaucracy should be withdrawn and replaced by political civilian officials (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

Accordingly, an officer suggested that this withdrawal should be more institutionalized by splitting the MOI into two ministries with completely separate bureaucracies and leaderships. He elaborated as follows:

We should have two ministries instead of the MOI, one for managing the internal affairs and the other for only managing the security and the police work. So the Internal Affairs Ministry would manage all the civilian files related to serving the people such as civilian records, passports authorities and voters' records and so on, then the police work should be separate, and run by the Security and Safety Ministry. For, centralizing lots of tasks in the hands of the MOI permits it to control many files for despotic purposes, and as a result the police officers are burdened with lots of paper works that could be done by any civilian employee. (Personal Interview with a police officer, February 2015)

Within the same structural scope, some interviewees agreed to transfer the National Security Agency- NSA (previously known as State Security Investigations- SSI) to the intelligence agencies to be directly affiliated to the president rather than the MOI. The main argument for those interviewees was to avoid any potential deviation of the MOI to renew its involvement in the political affairs. Moreover, the aim was to stop the influence exercised by the NSA on the whole work of police for State security reasons and allow the room for the police to rather focus on the human security and the public safety. As one political scientist clarified:

There is no country in the world without a department for state security or an internal intelligence. In all consolidated democracies, there is an agency playing this role. We should not be against the existence of this agency; we should be against its bad performance, its deviated doctrine and its impunity. It should work on the internal affairs and report about that to the decisions makers in full respect of the law and the democratic standards. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

A former officer added to that:

I think this will be good for the NSA itself, but what is really important is to clearly define the relation between the agency and the other state institutions to guarantee a better performance and to monitor any potential deviation. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly, another former officer emphasized:

The whole process in forming this new agency should be completely managed outside of the MOI, yet a coordination comity is highly needed to link the NSA with the MOI and other security and intelligence agencies in full harmony. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, March 2015)

On the other side, a substantial part of the interviewees refused this suggestion, since it could add to the NSA's power and leverage on the political scene without really adding anything to its accountability. As one human rights activist explained:

This fact could add to the NSA's power and shed a new blackout on its activity, like the one already shed on the intelligence agencies; this could result in more difficulty when dealing with its accountability (Telephone Interview with a human rights activist, February 2015)

However, an officer clarified the bottom line in this matter by stating:

It should be controlled, whether it was a part of the MOI or elsewhere, but the affiliation does not really matter, what matters are its authorities and precise tasks assigned to it. For instance it could be transferred to work under the label of the intelligence, but if it works the same way, we will have no difference. If it is insisting on giving instructions in everything, in appointing the professor of university and the imam of the mosque, we got nothing new. The people do not really care if it is a part of the MOI or any other institution, the most important is what it is really doing. If you are saying so to weaken the MOI or to loosen its authority, let me tell you this was already done when the MOI collapsed in 2011, so no need to think this way. (Telephone Interview with a police officer, February 2015)

On the managerial level, the MOI needs clearly articulated rules to run its diverse departments. As an officer highlighted:

The MOI needs essential, clear and stable rules that cannot be broken and should be applied on all no matter who they are. Then you will find the whole MOI functioning perfectly and there will be no wrongdoing, because honestly, the corruption, the nepotism and the intellectual stagnation are all as dangerous as the brutality on the police legitimacy. (Telephone Interview with a police officer, March 2015)

Considering the same angle, other managerial reforms should be introduced, as one political scientist clarified:

The promotion criteria should be linked to their performance rates not only to their seniority. The circulation policy between different specializations and regions needs to be revised. I do not understand why insisting on the circulation on the expense of the accumulation of knowledge in a specific field? A professional police should be specialized and accumulating knowledge. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

The second dimension of the professionalism is the doctrinal reform. The police in Egypt should reform its doctrine, first to better respect the law and the human rights, and secondly, to embrace new work styles and to rely on soft skills and quality as much as on hard skills and quantity. Within the first scope, the theoretical education of human rights courses whether in the under graduation curricula or the

post graduation training should be altered. A more practical approach should guide this education process, as a political scientist suggested:

In order to teach them human rights properly you need some materials applied to their own work, inspired by the situations they face daily, to be able to psychologically convince them and to gain their support to the spirit of the human rights. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Then within the second scope, a large diversification of the police academy curricula is needed. As one political science scholar highlighted:

The police academy needs change, in terms of courses, instructors and techniques of education. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Adding to that, an officer described what they need to learn in the academy as follows:

They should make good use of the time we spend in the academy to teach us the skills that we really need, rather than teaching us other courses that are not useful in our daily work. For example, the negotiations skills and the interrogations techniques are almost absent in the academy curricula, we only pass through them very quickly as theoretical points in police courses. We need also to be trained on new technology to better solve cases. (Telephone interview with a police officer, March 2015)

Another officer pointed to the long duration of schooling in the academy and suggested to shorten it by accepting university graduates in the police academy, rather than high school graduates:

The police academy should accept the law school graduates to teach them the policing courses and the physical fitness courses, there is no need for full four years of education. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

A former officer suggested a new mechanism for recruiting candidates to join the police academy in order to make sure that the selected candidates are perfectly fitting the job:

The recruitment committee in the police academy should be composed of experts from different academic backgrounds such as policing, law, psychology and sociology to accurately choose those who really fit for the police job in terms of physical capacities and personality traits. The enrollment of the officers' sons in the academy is almost becoming a rule, which deprives the academy from other candidates who could be perfect for the job. Hence, we should freeze the enrollment of the officers' son for around five years in order to set a new rule in accepting the perfect candidates based on their capacities not on their family connections. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Another officer emphasized the need to change the recruiting criteria to enroll a better quality of candidates that would possibly well receive the new curricula of the academy:

We can ensure a better performance if we applied new mechanisms of recruitment to enroll officers with good morals, then train them in a professional way and feed their souls with good values to make them driven by noble philosophy. It is not the responsibility of the police that the people have no conscience in some cases, it is a disease in the whole community, but it is the responsibility of the academy to teach them good manners and noble values to minimize their tendency for deviation. We might not be able to test them in terms of values and convictions like we test them physically and medically but we can teach them all these values within the academy. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

This need for ethical and moral orientation in the academy has been also emphasized by a former officer when he contrasted what he was taught in the academy with what was taught to his late father, who was also an officer.

He used to teach me what he learnt in the academy in the sixties, he used to tell me do not ever try to forge a case, do not ever beat a suspect to force him to confess, the good officer is the one who solves the case with his own intelligence, the torture is the tool of incompetent officers, use your mind not your hand or weapons, these were the ethics of the old generation of officers, but what we learnt in the academy was completely the opposite, these ethics should be taught in the academy instead of the arrogant discourse that they teach nowadays. (Telephone Interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Besides, a strong reliance on new methods and work techniques should be put forward in any potential plan of reform. Yet, there was a divergence around if these new methods would necessitate new resources or only new allocation of the already existing resources. One officer highlighted the importance of increasing the MOI's share of the state budget to deliver a better security service:

Just give us more money and you will get a better security service, with more money we can buy a new technology to enhance the communication system between the police stations and the 122 emergency call center, a new technology to enhance the internal communication system of wireless voice network and to make it covering the whole country, a new technology to better protect the police vehicles, a new technology to equip the patrol forces with laptops or tablets directly connected to every directorate in order to check on the suspects' criminal records without arresting them and transferring them to the police station. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

However, a former officer considered that the MOI is not serious about applying new technology arguing that the problem is not lacking funds, it is rather lacking the will to change the old methods. He elaborated:

If the MOI has 1 billion pounds to purchase equipments, it would rather spend it on weapons, masks, uniforms, bulletproof vests and shoes. It would totally ignore that it

could purchase with the same amount of money surveillance cameras, computers, monitors, simulators, soft skills training such as psychological analysis and so on. The problem is in the mindset which tends to increase weapons on the expense of other needed soft technology, hence reflecting the state inclination towards coercion rather than negotiations and dialogue. It simply prefers to use the muscles over the mind. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

This mindset problem was described by an officer by stating:

They have to understand that new equipments do not equal new weapons. (Personal Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer added to this regard:

What we need the most is to apply a scientific method in criminal investigation and to generously invest in equipment and training to reach this goal. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Similarly, a journalist briefed this issue by stating:

They cannot even imagine that the machines can do better in some cases than exhausted personnel. But again if we think about the exhausted personnel, we can receive extraordinary results with little change on the organizational and managerial level, when we just improve their conditions and think about them as human. (Personal Interview with a journalist specialized in human rights and security issues, March 2015)

Accordingly a political scientist emphasized on the same matter with more elaboration:

The problem is solved when they understand that the cameras are as important as the weapons... Then downsizing would be applicable in Egypt but first we have to enhance the quality of the forces so we can let some of them go, to increase the quality in order to decrease the quantity, to replace some personnel with cameras, computers, equipment, and data analysis applications. (Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

The issue of downsizing is extremely important when aiming at transforming the police into a more effective force. But the downsizing could be quite controversial if we consider the constant complaint of the officers from the big work load and the extended working hours. As one officer describe this problem:

When I get my fair amount of working hours and I leave to home, there is no officer to replace me; we definitely need to increase the numbers of the officers. In Alexandria for instance, the total police service consists of 1100-1200 officers in all departments, we need to at least double this number. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Thereby, a security studies' researcher tried to solve this downsizing dilemma by highlighting the following:

Anyone with basic knowledge in police reform that might come to advise the MOI will right away advise them on increasing the numbers of officers and decreasing the numbers of sub-officers. (Personal Interview with a researcher in security studies, March 2015)

In this matter, the vetting process could be particularly important to guide the downsizing and the selective recruitment processes. As one human rights' researcher explained it:

The vetting is a tool for gradual change and democratization, not a mere purge. It is a long objective and not personalized process, where the rights of the personnel are preserved, it involves an administrative mechanism for selection not a criminal prosecution, according to which we can decide who should continue in his job, who should be promoted or removed, and even those who are removed would be compensated and have a retirement package. The vetting process is really complicated but to manage it successfully, we need to access the database of the MOI and its personnel's records, in order to accurately make the right decision. (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

Moreover, the downsizing is crucial if we considered that most of the MOI's budget is directed to salaries payment, thus, a substantial decrease in the personnel would positively impact the possibility of purchasing new equipment and including new technology. Yet this matter would not be possible if we do not put forward an effective auditing system to control the financial department within the MOI.

What I need as a reform is to honestly and adequately manage the finances of the MOI and to direct the surplus in this regard to purchase new technical assistance tools such as forensic medicine tools and criminal analysis laboratories. Then after that we should think about improving the officers' salaries and working conditions. I can wait longer for a raise in my salary but I cannot tolerate that the money is wasted on huge payments for the high ranking colonels, rather than purchasing useful tools to enhance our work. (Email interview with an officer, February 2015)

A similar stance was presented by another officer as follows:

I think that number one priority for resources allocation in the MOI today should be for the bomb disposal officers who might risk their lives to save ours, they need to get the best equipment and training in this regard, no matter how much it would cost. (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer pointed to the financial management of the MOI's resources from a different angle by stating:

Step number one in countering corruption and bribery on all ranking levels is to pay suitable salaries, I do not care how much would that be, but I need to be sure that it is a just reward for my work and that there is a general policy of equity in this regard, that means that everyone in my rank and doing the same job are equally rewarded, and that the high ranking colonels are not receiving exaggerated salaries. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

A firm counter corruption policy is very much needed to rationalize the public spending, to decrease the salaries' disparities and to improve the officers' motivation

to better fulfill their jobs. One angle to approach this policy is to modernize the police tools, as a political scientist stated:

Countering corruption is a substantial part of the police reform, the more you modernize the police tools the more difficult the corruption will be, because every wrongdoing and misconduct could easily be tracked and then punished. (Personal interview with a political science scholar, March 2015)

A second angle to approach a counter corruption policy is to set a firm transparency policy introduced through a clear law, as a former officer described it:

We need a special law to protect the officers who want to report on the corruption and the nepotism of their superiors, because there are plenty of them but they are afraid of potential punishment if they exposed the corruption. (Telephone interview with a former officer, March 2015)

Moreover, an important complementary measure to promote transparency and counter corruption is the protection of the whistle blowers within the police apparatus. Therefore, it is important to allow the formation of the police unions in order to serve as a legal medium to bridge the gap with people and a platform for the officers to channel their views. As one political scientist put it:

We need it as a feedback mechanism, for both sides, for the citizens to evaluate their interaction with the police, and for the officers who need to channel their complaints without fearing to be punished by their superiors for revealing the work deficiencies. (Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015)

Another important input to help designing an effective security policy was put forward by a sociologist, as follows:

We need to initiate a new apparatus within the MOI to be dedicated to the futuristic studies, to do research about the prospects of crimes and the new solutions that might serve the police work, this would recruit some researchers like anthropologists and officers with field experience to design plans and strategies for police work, this type of studies would be important to inform the security policy from a solid scientific background so it would be a knowledge based policy... or at least the MOI should engage in partnerships with the NGOs and the Universities in order to produce this type of studies. (Personal interview with a sociologist, March 2015)

The problem as articulated by an officer is not the lack of scientific knowledge within the MOI; rather it is the lack of political will to put this knowledge into action and to design effective policies

There is a plenty of studies produced in police training courses and master's and PhD degrees suggesting many patterns of reforming the MOI. The solution is in the

scientific approach, all what we need is a serious will to implement all these accumulated studies. (Telephone Interview with an officer, February 2015)

Another officer has gone further to request wider cooperation with international partners to learn about other experiences in improving the police performance whether on the soft training or on the high technology and equipment levels (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015). Yet, again all these measures need a strong political will to be accurately implemented.

D. Accountability

Almost the entire sample agreed to introduce several levels and mechanisms of oversight on the police work. The police officers agreed to be subject to external oversight mechanisms with one condition, which is preserving their rights and providing them with adequate working techniques and tools. On the other hand, the human rights experts and researchers emphasized the role of the internal control authority within the MOI as an important mechanism to correct the potential deviation of the police. Then the external mechanisms of oversight would come as a second option to complement the internal control and suggest better policies to enhance the police performance. As one political scientist put it:

If the internal control authority is serious about making the police more accountable, they should plan for that rather than just hiring a high ranking colonel to justify the police abuses or deny their occurrence. For instance, the internal control should announce that the police abuse cases were around 90 in 2014, but new mechanisms would be introduced to reduce this number to only 45 the next year, then 20 the following year and so on. These mechanisms could be like new training, new performance evaluation templates, and new incentives for police chiefs to report about their wrongdoing subordinates. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

An officer agreed to consolidate the work of the internal control and added to that:

We need to dismantle the nepotism network that might protect the misconduct and also to protect and reward the honest officers who refuse to execute the deviated commands of their superiors and insist on exposing their wrongdoing. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

A human rights' activist emphasized the need to constantly assess the police performance whether on the criminal or on the conduct levels

The officers' performance should be constantly rated to reward the ethical and effective officers, and punish the abusers and lazy officers; such a mechanism should enhance the general police performance and minimize the potential wrongdoing. (Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 2015)

A strong judicial oversight on the police work would definitely promote the police reform. Yet, it must go hand in hand with a general reform in the justice system that should include the judiciary, the prosecutors and the ministry of justice (Personal interview with a political scientist, March 2015). A police officer has precisely emphasized this matter by stating:

I can only trust the judges and the prosecutors in overseeing my work if they are truly abided by the law and do not seek to only hold me accountable for the sake of the superiority of their own profession over mine, the law should simply rule over us all. (Personal interview with a police officer, February 2015)

The judicial oversight might promote police accountability through civil litigation if the police would be obliged to financially compensate every victim that was abused at the hands of the police (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015). Moreover, the prosecutors should activate their original prerogatives in checking on the detention cells, making sure that every detainee is legally registered in the police station records and that the detainees are receiving adequate health care and are not subjected to torture or any type of abuse. Adding to that, a special judicial comity should be initiated to review all the violence incidents where firearms were used by the police to evaluate if the firearms' use was indispensable and the police were really at risk (Personal interview with a human rights activist, March 2015). This step would request some legal revisions to accurately specify the situations where police can use firearms and where they should use other non lethal tools instead (Personal interview with a security studies' researcher, March 2015). Moreover, a human rights expert suggested the need for initiating a new post of an investigative judge to precede the work of the public prosecutor. Thus, the authority to investigate a case, assigned to the investigative judge, would be separated from the authority to file an accusation, assigned to the public prosecutor. Such a diversification would eventually assure more equity to the justice system and narrow the police authority in manipulating and avoiding the prosecutor oversight over their work (Personal interview with a human rights' expert, March 2015)

A former officer suggested granting the authority of visiting the detention cells to the human rights NGOs' representatives to check on the police respect of human conditions for the detainees.

The police officers would be better protected from false claims of violations and abuses if each police station was under tight observation, conducted by human rights

NGOs or some notable figures in the local community to check on the respect of the detainees' rights. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

Accordingly a human rights expert emphasized this mechanism as one of the important tools of parliamentary oversight in this regard.

A special comity within the parliament should have the authority to conduct unpredicted visits to detention places. (Personal interview with a human rights expert, March 2015)

Nevertheless, a political scientist disagreed with this view, requesting the public prosecutors to preserve this authority and the parliamentarians to exercise another type of oversight.

The political accountability should not be exercised by a parliamentary comity which conducts visits to different prisons; those parliamentarians could easily be deceived and would probably not understand the tricks of the police in hiding the abuses. And also in young democracies where the authority is not well institutionalized, that could open the door for nepotism, clientelism and exchanged interests. So the parliament should practice a political oversight not a technical/professional one. That is why the internal control is important because they actually understand the details and technicalities of the police work. The political oversight should be practiced on the minister of Interior, to discuss a reform plan, to legislate a new law not to visit the prisons or the police stations. (Personal Interview with a political scientist, February 2015)

Adding to that, several officers have emphasized the role of the parliamentary oversight as a tool to investigate any complaint by a police officer who faced injustice by the internal inspection and control authority within the MOI. As one officer put it:

I need a parliamentary oversight to protect me if the internal control authority was tough on me; I mean we need an external oversight to watch the internal overseers of the police work. (Telephone interview with an officer, February 2015)

However another officer was suspicious about the competence of the parliament in overseeing the police work arguing that the parliamentarians might lack the needed technical expertise to do this job. Thus an oversight conducted by the judiciary or the executive body would be more welcomed by the police (Email Interview with a police officer, February 2015)

Here comes the importance of initiating a new body with both judicial and executive authorities to oversee the police work. The ombudsman was initiated in many countries as a mixed authority capable of overseeing the police. Its task consisted of transferring the criminal wrongdoing to courts, advising the police leadership on the needed reforms and recommending new legislative amendments to the parliament. Such a body if initiated in Egypt, would get some of the public prosecutors' authority in investigating cases with special focus on human rights abuses and misconduct done by the police. However, it would definitely be an added value in promoting the human rights culture and the legal knowledge amongst Egyptians. Some

of the interviewees refuted the need for initiating a new body arguing that the work of the prosecutors would be sufficient if properly activated. Nevertheless, the other part has welcomed the initiation of the ombudsman institution since all the people needed to enhance their human rights culture, whether they were regular citizens or police officers.

A human rights researcher emphasized the context of initiating this new body as follows:

If there is a serious political will, an ombudsman should be put in place with wide prerogatives to oversee the police work. Yet, if the political will is absent, all attempts to form new oversight bodies would be superficial and merely a new façade for old deviated practices. (Personal interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

Adding to that, a former officer stressed on the founding criteria for creating this new body:

The inspectors of this body should be carefully chosen from the police and the prosecutors' body, to ensure that the nepotism culture is not entrenched in their mindset; otherwise the whole experience would fail. (Telephone interview with a former officer, February 2015)

An officer has also emphasized the role of the media and the civil society in promoting a good legal knowledge and human rights culture in society. He had also requested the civil society to address the police officers with these legal knowledge promotion campaigns because a big portion of officers might have deficiencies as well in this regard (Personal interview with an officer, February 2015). In addition, a human rights' researcher suggested a wide campaign of oversight conducted by the civil society especially through the new media to map the police abuses in order to hold them accountable later on. He elaborated on that matter as follows:

The oversight mechanisms applied through the anonymity of the social media is extremely crucial when the political regime is closed and unfriendly with accountability mechanisms. The civil society has been consecutively targeted for trying to expose the police abuses. However, doing the same mission via social media and cyber space at large could lower the costs of challenging the MOI's extended powers. We should conduct a mapping of all police stations where abuses and torture are taking place in order to spread the knowledge and keep track of the human rights violators within the police body. We would need this map later to prosecute the abusers if we witnessed a political opening or to protect the honest officers if we witnessed a moment of total collapse and violence against the police. (Personal Interview with a human rights' researcher, March 2015)

VIII- Conclusion

This study aimed at exploring the management of the police reform in the changing political environment in Egypt between 2011 and 2015. It also aimed at assessing the degree to which democratic policing norms such as political neutrality, professionalism, de-militarization, and accountability were applied. It then suggested some strategies of reforms that could be applied in the Egyptian context to promote democratic policing. Relying on a sample of only 22 in-depth interviews this study has substantial limitations. Thus, its results cannot be subjected to any generalization. They could merely serve as a preliminary assessment of the police officers and human rights advocates' insights about police reform, taking into consideration the limitation of the sample.

One of the main findings of this research was that the police reform is tightly linked to the political environment, especially in the moments of political change. In other words, the police reform defined by its four main democratic policing norms is usually promoted when the regime in a changing political environment tends to democratize. Moreover, police reform is usually one part of several reform cycles that a specific political regime undergoes when transforming from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Such a remark was quite obvious when exploring the experiences of police reform in Brazil, Turkey, Poland and South Africa. In Brazil, the police was reformed on gradual basis following strong security crises that obliged the political leaders to decide to reform and the security actors to design and implement this reform. But in Turkey, the police tended to reform as a respond to political pressure put on Turkey to be more abided by democratic standards to prepare for the European Union accession. In the case of Poland, the police reform was a substantial part of a wider trend of political transformation that took place in the country based on a negotiated transition with the communist regime. Thus, the door was open to many cycles of alternation to power that have impacted the legislations regulating the police work. Similarly in South Africa, the negotiated plan of police reform was part of a general political transformation following the conclusion of the apartheid. In all cases of changing political environment whether it was gradual on the long term or comprehensive on the short-term, the progress of the police reform was positively related to the general progress in the democratic change. Thus, the police reform was triggered by major

security crises that yielded popular protests then a general opening in the political regime. Therefore, the design of the reform process was the joint effort of a diversity of actors such as political actors, human rights advocates, professional unions and bureaucratic cadres. Moreover, in the cases where certain external actors were involved, such as in Poland for instance, the reform was quite successful and integral.

However, assessing the success of the police reform is always relative considering the general political context. Thus, according to the four democratic policing norms, some of the four cases might not be a flagrant model of reform success. For instance, Turkey has deficiencies when it comes to the demilitarization. So is Brazil when it comes to the political neutrality and also South Africa when it comes to accountability. Therefore, the police reform is quite relative and does not consist of a universal formula that could apply easily in any place in the world. It is rather a tailored plan that should involve a variety of stakeholders but should be first endorsed by a firm political will.

Therefore, when tackling the Egyptian case, this study focused on assessing the extent of the introduced reforms under each of the four defining norms of democratic policing. Certainly, some angles of reform such as demilitarization and political neutrality failed to meet the theoretical standards in this regards. However, the professionalism and the accountability marked some positive reforms that should serve as solid basis for any future reform in Egypt. Yet, they are not sufficient to judge the Egyptian case of police reform as successful. Thereby, also in Egypt, the political environment matters since the reform is a political choice that requires a substantial consensus and a political will. After four years of the Egyptian Revolution, several opportunities for building such a consensus were not properly materialized. This fact has deeply impacted the extent of the introduced reform and has reduced it to incremental positive steps especially in the professionalism and the accountability angles. However, these steps could not stand as a real reform since they failed to change the nature of the police.

Indeed, the research tried to explore the possibility of passing some professional reforms in the police without necessarily introducing similar steps in the accountability, the political neutrality and the demilitarization dimensions. However, the applicability of this attempt was refuted by almost all of the interviewees, based on the assumption that a holistic reform would be more effective. Yet, we missed the

opportunity of applying a comprehensive reform following the 2011 revolution as it was the case in Poland. Considering the Brazilian case, Egypt still has the chance to invest in police reform if emerged a serious series of security crises. In this regard, Brazil stands as a model where strong oversight measures applied by the civil society targeting accountability programs turned to be integrated programs of partnership with the police departments to boost their professionalism. This idea of building partnership between the police and the civil society was frequently tackled by most of the interviewees whether under the professionalism or the accountability angles. Yet, the police culture stands an impediment to properly invest in this partnership approach. Despite, the wide common ground between the insights of police officers and human rights advocates regarding the reform, mutual trust needed to invest in partnership is still missing. Most of the police officers who agreed to conduct the interviews were at first suspicious about the outsider who wants to investigate about their job conditions. However, at the end of each interview a certain level of trust was built between us. Thus, their perception about this type of studies turned gradually to be positive.

Taking into consideration the limitation of the sample, this study tries to present an Egyptian formula for police reform based on the common ground between the views of police officers and human rights advocates. First, police reform is not an isolated aspect of the wider picture of a democratic political environment. Thus, an effective police reform is almost impossible without a wider circle of reform targeting the state bureaucracy, the justice system and the parliamentary authority. Hence, the interdependency between the police work and the justice system requires a parallel reform process conducted in all of the institutions in question. Moreover, such interdependency is quite applicable to the relationship between the four norms of democratic policing. Boosting the police professionalism without pushing for more accountability mechanisms would not result in an effective reform. Yet, the most important is that the political neutrality is the solid key that could decide on the prospects of the reform process altogether. Similar to that is the demilitarization, because it reflects the general balance of power and the civil military relations in a certain country. Therefore, unless there are substantial improvements in political neutrality and demilitarization, police reform could not be materialized. It is also important to highlight that some aspects of the demilitarization should be addressed on the long term. Therefore, some aspects of the police reform could be postponed or

scheduled on the long term. Yet, the political will for planning and implementing the reform agenda on a holistic and a comprehensive basis should be clearly stated before starting the reform.

On the other hand, the professionalism angle is quite important, especially on the doctrinal level, where a diversification of the police education inputs should be introduced. Additionally, a more rational allocation of the police resources should guide the spending towards purchasing new working tools and soft applications as much as purchasing new weapons and hard equipments. Concerning the accountability angle, it should be tackled as a comprehensive map of mechanisms that complement each other. Thus, an effective accountability does not consist of separated obsolete bodies. Rather, it consists of an integrated map of checks and balances, in which each institution is fully abided by the law. And in this regard, ending the dominance of the executive over the judiciary and the legislative bodies, is crucial, as well as, promoting the freedom of expression for media outlets. This fact obviously recalls the intertwining of an effective police reform and a general democratic political environment. Yet, until a clear political will is introduced, the civil society still has a bunch of scattered opportunities to build a wider popular demand for police reform. Promoting human rights culture through media outlets and civil society organizations is one option to building this demand. Constant exposing of police brutalities and security failures is another option. And approaching police officers themselves with an appealing discourse of human rights promotion is a third option, in order to widen the cycle of reformists within the police apparatus.

Resting on all of the above, extensive studies on democratic policing should be conducted in order to investigate further aspects of reform. And in this regard, the organizational culture change within the police should be prioritized, along with legal and administrative channels for promoting police accountability.

IX- Bibliography

Books and Reviews:

- ABDELAZIZ, Basma (2013), *The Temptation of the Absolute Power*, in Arabic, Cairo, Dar Sefsafa
- ABULELEZZ, M.H. (2014), *Following Your Commands Sir*, in Arabic, Cairo, Dar Merit
- ACLIMANDOS, Tewfick (2012), Healing Without Amputating?: Security Reform in Egypt, *Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform*, Arab Reform for Alternatives- ARI, September 2012
- ALDAKAK, Ahmed, (2012), Approaching Rule of Law in Post-Revolution Egypt, *U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy*, Vol. 18, Number 2, Spring 2012,
- ALTBEKER, Antony (2009), "The Building of the New South African Police Service", in Mercedes S. Hinton & Tim Newborn (ed.), *Policing Developing Democracies*, New York & London 2009, Routledge
- ÆWIEK-KARPOWICZ, Jarostaw & KACZYŃSKI, Piotr Maciej, (2006), *Assisting Negotiated Transition to Democracy Lessons from Poland 1980–1999*, Warsaw 2006, Institute of Public Affairs
- ASHOUR, Omar (2012), From Bad Cop to Good Cop the Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt, *Brookings Doha & CDDRL Stanford*, 2012
- ASHOUR, Omar (2014), Security Sector Reform and the Arab Spring, *SETA Perspective*, November 2014.
- BAYLEY, David (2006), *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, 2006, Oxford University Press
- BAYLEY, David (2008), Police reform: Who done it?, *Policing and Society*, Volume 18, Issue 1, 2008, 7:17
- BERKSOY, Biriz (2013), *Military, Police & Intelligence in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform*, TESEV Democratization Program, June 2013
- BOUGUERRA, Bassem (2014), Reforming Tunisia's Troubled Security Sector, *the Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Issue Brief*, October 2014
- BRUMBER, Daniel and SALLAM, Hesham (2012), the Politics of the Security Sector Reform in Egypt, *the United States Institute of Peace USIP*, 2012
- BURGER, Johan & ADONIS, Cyril (2008), a Watchdog without Teeth? The independent Complaints Directorate, in *South Africa Crime Quarterly*, No 24, June 2008, available at: <http://www.issafrika.org/uploads/CQ24BURGER.PDF>

- CAPARINI, Marina & MARENIN, Otwin (Ed.) (2004), *Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe: Process and Progress*, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004
- CHAN, Janet (1996), Changing police culture, *the British Journal of Criminology*, vol. 36, no.1, winter 1996
- CRANK, John & KADLECK, Colleen (ed.) (2011), *Policing towards an Unknown Future*, New York 2011, Routledge
- Czech Police Reform: Service under New Conditions, *Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic*, December 2008
- DA SILVA, Graziella Moraes & CANO, Ignacio (2007), Between Damage Reduction and Community Policing: The Case of Pavaozinho-Cantagalo in Rio de Janeiro's Favelas, Tom Tyler (ed), *Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives*, New York, the Russel Sage Foundation, pp. 186-214
- DAS, Dilip K. (1995), Challenges of Policing Democracies: a World Perspective, executive summary of the Second international Police Executive symposium, in *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management PIJPSM*, 20.4, 609:630
- DIAMOND, Drew & WEISS, Mead, *Community Policing: Looking to Tomorrow*, U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Community Oriented Policing Services
- EL-HOUDAIBY, Ibrahim (2014), Changing Alliances and Continued Oppression: the Rule of Egypt's Security Sector, *Debating Egypt Series*, Arab Reform Initiative-ARI, June 2014
- EL-KHAWAGA, Dina (2014), From Apparatus State to War State, *Debating Egypt Series*, Arab Reform for Alternatives, September 2014
- FEDRIK, Frank V. (2008), Perception is reality: a qualitative approach to understanding police officers views on civil liability, *the international Police Executive Symposium*, the Geneva center for Democratic control of armed forces, August 2008
- FETSCH, Jacob James (2013), *Institutional Reform of the Police in Mexico 1994-2012*, the San Diego State University, Fall 2013
- FRIESENDROF, Cornelius & KREMPEL, Jorge, (2011), Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police, *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt*, 2011
- FUENTES, Claudio (2005), *Contesting the Iron fist: the advocacy Network and the Police violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile*, Routledge, 2005
- GARRIOTT, William (2013), *Policing and Governance: the Anthropology of Police in Practice*, New York 2013, Palgrave Macmillan

- GOLDSMITH, Andrew (2009), Turkey: Progress Towards Democratic Policing?, in Mercedes S. Hinton & Tim Newborn (ed.), *Policing Developing Democracies*, New York & London 2009, Routledge
- GRAJEWSKI, Andrzej (2004), Poland: Continuity and Change, in *Demokratizatsiya: the Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol.12, No.3, pp.451-463.
- HINTON, Mercedes S. & NEWBURN, Tim (2009), *Policing Developing Democracies*, New York & London 2009, Routledge
- HINDTON, Mercedes S. (2009), Police and State Reform in Brazil: Bad Apple or Rotten Barrel, in Mercedes S. Hinton & Tim Newborn (ed.), *Policing Developing Democracies*, New York & London 2009, Routledge
- JACKSON, Paul (2011), Security Sector Reform and State Building, in *the Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 10, 2011
- JENKS, David A. (2004), The Czech Police: Adopting Democratic Principles, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (Ed.), *Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe: Process and Progress*, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004
- KELLING, George, (1999), *Broken Windows and Police Discretion*, Research Report, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice
- KERSTEN, Joachim (1999), *Police Powers and Accountability in a Democratic Society*, the Council of Europe, 1999
- K.IVKOVIC', Sanja & HABERFELD, Maria R. (2000), Transformation from militia to police in Croatia and Poland – A comparative perspective, *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol.23, No.2, 194:217.
- KRASKA, P B, & CUBELLIS, L. J. (1997), Militarizing Mayberry and Beyond: Making Sense of American Paramilitary Policing, in *Justice Quarterly*, Volume: 14, Issue: 4, December 1997, pp. 607- 629
- LEEDS, Elizabeth (2007), Serving States and Serving Citizens: Halting steps towards Police Reform in Brazil and Implications for Donor Intervention, *Policing and Society: an international Journal of Research and Policy*, 17:1, pp. 21-37
- LINGAMNENI, N (1979), Resistance to change in Police Organizations: the Diffusion Paradigm, in *Criminal Justice Review*, Volume:4, issue:2, Fall 1979, 17:26
- MAGUIRE, Edward R., SHIN, Yeunhee, ZHAO, Jihong, & HASSELL, Kimberly D., (2003), Structural change in large police agencies during the 1990s, *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, PIJPSM, Vol. 26 Iss: 2, pp.251 - 275
- MAHFOUZ, Mohamed (2011), Needed Guarantees for Not Reproducing the Security State, in ABDELRAHMAN, Amr et al. (2011), *Challenges of*

- Democratization in Egypt's Transition*, in Arabic, Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies
- MARENIM, Otwin (1996), *Policing Change: Changing Police: International Perspective*, New York & London 1996, Garland Publishing
- MATTEWS, Iole (2000), Government Responses in South Africa: Policy and Implementation, in *Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies*, 2000, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, pp. 185- 189
- MEHRAG, Sarah & ARNUSCH, Aleisha (2010), Security Sector Reform: A case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building, 2010, *Strategic Studies Institute*
- MOHEYELDEEN, Sherif (2014), State Terrorism and Resistance in Kerdesa: Battle Zone Report, *Arab Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform*, March 2014
- NDI (2008), Democratic Oversight of Police Forces: Mechanisms for accountability and Community Policing, in Arabic, 2008, *National Democratic Institute for International Affairs*
- OOSTERVELD, Willem & GALAND, Renaud (2012), Justice Reform, Security Sector Reform and Local Ownership, in *the Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 4, 194–209, 2012
- OLIVER, Willard M. & KLENOWSKI, Paul M. & DIMAMBRO, Andy (2006) Democratic Reform in Polish Policing, *the Police Chief*, Vol.73, No.7
- PAUN , Christopher (2007), *Democratization and Police Reform*, Freie Universitat Berlin, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin and Universitat Potsdam, Joint Master's Degree Program in International Relations.
- PAYNE, Brian K. and TIME, Victoria M. (2000), Support For Miranda Among Police Chiefs: A Qualitative Examination, in *the American Journal of Criminal Justice*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, pp. 65-76
- PERITO, Robert M. (2009), The Interior Ministry's Role in Security Sector Reform, *United States Institute of Peace*, May 2009
- PINO, N., & WIAROWSKI, M. D., (2006), *Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries*, Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate.
- PLYWACZEWSKI, Emil (2000), Government Responses and Policies: Poland as an Example, in *Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies*, 2000, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, pp. 177-180
- PRUITT, William (2010), the Progress of Democratic Policing in South Africa, in *AJCS; Volume 4, No. 1*, June 2010
- RAUCH, Janine, (2000), Police Reform and South Africa's Transition, *Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation*, Paper presented at the South African Institute for International Affairs conference, 2000
- SAID, M.K. & BAKR, Noha (2011), Egypt Security Sector Reform, *ARI Thematic Studies*, Arab Reform for Alternatives, January 2011

- SAYIEGH, Yezid (2012), Above the State: the Officers' Republic in Egypt, *Carnegie Endowment for international Peace*, August 2012
- SAYIEGH, Yezid (2007), the Security Sector Reform in the Arab Region: Challenges to Develop an Indigenous Agenda, *Arab Reform Initiative- ARI*, 2007
- Security Sector Reform, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, in *the Quarterly Journal*, Winter 2009
- SEDRA, Mark & BRUTT, Geoff, (2011), Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East, e-Dialogue Summary Report, *Center for International Governance Innovation*, August 2011
- SHEIRA, Omar (2014), *Towards a Way Out of the Egyptian Dilemma: New Lessons for an Old Regime*, Tilburg University, Law School
- SKOGAN, Wesly G. (2013), Use of Force and Police Reform in Brazil: a National survey of Police Officers, in *Police Practices and Research: An international Journal*, 14:4, pp. 319-329
- STONE, Christopher E. & WARD, Heather H. (2000), Democratic Policing: a Framework for Action, *Policing and Society*, 2000, vol.10, 11:45
- UNGAR, Mark (2010), *Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America*, the Johns Hopkins university Press, 2010
- VERMA, Arvind (2009), Democratic Policing in India, in Mercedes S. Hinton & Tim Newborn (ed.), *Policing Developing Democracies*, New York & London 2009, Routledge, 129: 130
- WOLFF, Sarah (2011), The Arab Revolts: Reconsidering EU-US Strategies for Freedom, Security and Justice, in PAWLAK, Patryk (2011), The EU-US Security and Justice Agenda in Action, *European Union Institute for Security Studies- EUISS*, December 2011
- YODER, Jennifer A. (2003), Decentralization and Regionalization after Communism: Administrative and Territorial Reform in Poland and the Czech Republic, *Europe Asia Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2003, pp. 263-286

Electronic Sources:

- ALZANATY, Abdelrady & ABUFADDAN, Ahmed, (2014) "the Interior Ministry's Special Funds Amount to Billions", in Arabic, in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, 2-12-2014, available at:
<http://almesryoon.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA/609067-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84> - retrieved on 15-3-2015
- ARAFAT, Ahmed Amin (2013), "Secrets of the Conspiracy Targeting Ahmed Roushdy", in Arabic, in Al-Ahram Al-Araby website, 9-11-2013, available at:
<http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1460214&eid=19> - retrieved on 20-3-2015

- ABDEL-RADY, Amr (2011), "The 20 billion yearly budget lost in the alleys of the interior ministry" , in Masress website, in Arabic, 5-10-2011, available at: <http://www.masress.com/alahaly/7210> - retrieved on 19-3-2015
- Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, "Egypt: the police and the military are not one hand", in Arabic, 13-11-2014, available on: <http://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/6f231f24-6bda-4515-ac53-452ca8e80e04> - retrieved on 3-3-2015
- Al-Badil newspaper, 9-10-2014, available at: <http://elbadil.com/2014/10/09/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1> - retrieved 19-3-2015
- Al-Nadeem Center 2014, "Diaries of the Torture in Egypt June 2013- May 2014", Al-Nadeem Center, May 2014, available in Arabic at: <http://alnadeem.org/ar/node/438> - retrieved on 21-3-2015
- Al-Nadeem Center 2013, "Torture in Egypt during a Year of the Brotherhood's rule June 2012- May 2013", Al-Nadeem Center, May 2013, available in Arabic at: <http://alnadeem.org/ar/node/438> -retrieved on 21-3-2015
- Al-youm al-sab'e newspaper, 30-4-2012, available at: <http://www.youm7.com/story/2012/4/30/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8> - retrieved on: 19-3-2015
- Al-Shorouk newspaper, 10-3-2015, available at: <http://www.shorouknews.com/mobile/news/view.aspx?cdate=10032015&id=3d152e69-b85a-47d5-82d6-6063980abc58>- retrieved on 20-3-2015
- BABAWI, Nabil luka, (2005), "the Police and the Universalism", in Arabic, in Al-Ahram newspaper, 21-7-2005, available on: <http://www.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2005/7/21/Opin6.htm> - retrived on; 1-3-2015
- The Egyptian Constitution, 2014, available in Arabic on: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf> - retrieved on 3-3-2015
- The Economist, "Bloodbath at Luxor", 20-11-1997, available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/106278> - retrieved on 10-3-2015
- EIPR 2014, "The Weeks of Killings: the State's Violence, Communal Violence and Sectarian Attacks", The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), June 2014, available on: http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/weeks_of_killing_en.pdf - retrieved on 21-3-2015
- EL-MOGY, Omnia (2014), "The CAA audited the financial documents of the Ministry of Defense", Al-Youm Al-Sabae', 12-1-2014, available at: <http://www.youm7.com/story/2014/11/12/%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9--%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9> - retrieved on 15-3-2015
- GHARIB, Mohamed (2013), "Shoura council's members: the budget of the MOI is unclear", in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, in Arabic, 25-5-2013, available

- at: <http://www.almazryalyoum.com/news/details/205021>- retrieved on 19-3-2015
- HASHEM, Hazem (2014), "Salaries swallow the interior ministry's budget", in Arabic, AL-Wafd newspaper, 25-8-2014, available at: <http://www.alwafd.org/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A3%D9%89/130-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%85> – retrieved on 16-3-2015
- HESHAM, Hagar (2015), "The prevalence of mass murder ... the acquittals for all", in *Masrelarabia*, in Arabic, 18-3-2015, available at: <http://www.masralarabia.com/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA/526463>- retrieved on 21-3-2015
- Human Rights Watch (2014), All According to Plan: the Raba'a Massacre and Mass Killing of Protestors in Egypt, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt0814_ForUpload_0_0.pdf - retrieved on 18-12-2014
- NE'MATALLAH, Walaa, (2009), "the Protected Ministers from the parliament's Interrogation", in Alyoum-Alsabe', in Arabic, 15-1-2009, available at: http://www.youm7.com/story/2009/1/15/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B7_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%82%D9%89_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%89_%D9%88%D9%81%D9%87%D9%85%D9%89_%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1_%D9%85%D9%85%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9_%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%85_%D9%81%D9%89_%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84/63805#.VRLsMPysUfQ- retrieved on 20-3-2015
- THABET, Yasser (2015), "7 mistakes toppled Mohamed Ibrahim", in Arabic, in Al-Tahrir newspaper, 9-3-2015, p.3
- YOUSSEF, Marwa (2014), "The Police Academy: from a Factory of Men to a Court for Presidents, in Arabic, in Cairo Dar website, 23-2-2014, available on: <http://www.cairodar.com/156561/%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7>