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FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ANDHRA PRADESH

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A MASTER'S THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1968

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1968
R36
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND

The importance of studying State politics in India as Myron Weiner has noted, "...is so evident that the case hardly needs to be argued...." He further pointed out that the "...importance of the study of regional politics as part of the study of political development in underdeveloped areas is so apparent that here, too, the case is clear."¹ This is particularly significant and has acquired added importance in view of the fact that political power in post-Nehru India is "passing into the hands of the new regional leaders..." at the State level.²

Marshall Windmiller has rightly pointed out that "Andhra makes an interesting case study for several reasons."³ Two of his reasons were that Andhra was the first state to be set up in response to linguistic agitation, and that in spite of its linguistic homogeneity the State was cursed with caste and regional tensions. It was Hugh Tinker who pinpointed Andhra, as a state "where the fight between the Communist and the Congress parties has been particularly bitter: here again, the division is largely based on the rivalry between dominant castes, the Kammas and Reddis."⁴ Referring to Andhra he pointed out that "group politics had, by the early 1960s, begun to take group leaders from the State to the summit of national power."⁵

As Tinker observed, the State of Andhra Pradesh has been active on the Indian scene in group politics as well as in agricultural production since 1960. And it is also certain of Andhra Pradesh replacing the Uttar Pradesh

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is indebted to Dr. Louis H. Douglas and Professor William L. Richter for their advice and guidance. The author is particularly indebted to Professor David N. Chamberlin for his patience in bringing the thesis to its present form.

The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Dr. Joseph Hajda, Dr. Merlin D. Gustafson, Professor Paul Hiebert and Reginald Thambiah for their useful suggestions.

For their continued cooperation from Andhra Pradesh, the author wishes to thank Dr. Arthur D. Weber and Mr. N. Seetaramaiah.

The author wishes to thank Mrs. Bonnie McCurdy for her secretarial assistance.

at the Center in playing the latter's dominating role in Indian politics. This has been already seen since the early 1960s--since then two of Andhra leaders have become president of the All India Congress party, the chairman of the All India Swatantra party hails from Andhra politics, and the All India Jan Sangh had its president from Andhra during 1962, and of course the rank and file of the Communist party in India comes from Andhra. All these parties since 1960 held their national executive meetings or working committee conferences in Andhra Pradesh one year or the other.

Besides, geographically Andhra Pradesh has some significance, in that it is centrally placed and serves as a link between the Northern and Southern parts of the country, and East and West of India mingles at its capital city. Further, it includes an extensive coastal territory whose strategic importance is bound to increase in the course of time, politically and otherwise. For it is the people in the coastal areas who generally attain a high level of political consciousness. The recent view of some of the legislators from Andhra over the Center's apathy towards the State's needs was that the North Indian leaders were afraid of Andhra becoming "strong" and playing a "dominating role."

Andhra Pradesh, in a way is "twice born." With the nation-wide 1956 States reorganization, the State of "Andhra Pradesh," as it exists today was founded by merging the nine Telengana districts of the then-existing Hyderabad State with the "Andhra State," comprising seven Circar and four Rayalaseema districts. At that time, Andhra--the "Pandora's Box" in redrawing the Indian map--itself was only three years old, having been carved out of the multi-

lingual Madras State after a State-wide agitation in 1952-53. Neither the Andhra nor the Telengana area had ever been a separate entity in itself. However, in 1917 the All India National Congress for the first time considered Andhra by itself a separate "Provincial Committee."⁶

Past elections in Andhra Pradesh, as it exists today, have had both significance and importance in Indian politics. It was only in the 1962 third general elections that both Andhra and Telengana areas went to the polls together in respect of the Assembly elections. For a closer look until that time, both areas have to be viewed separately, though for Lok Sabha elections they jointly participated in the second general election in 1957.

When the first general election took place in 1951, Circar and Rayalaseema districts were with the Madras State, and Telengana was a part of Hyderabad State. The Andhra State issue dominated the electioneering of the first elections. The separate linguistic state issue contributed to the strengthening of the Communist party in the areas of Circars where the movement for a separate state was first moved.⁷ In Andhra areas the fight in the elections was triangular--between the Congress, the Communists, and Prakasam K.M.P.P. and Ranga K.L.P. Prakasam and Ranga-- the two powerful leaders of Andhra (1947-57) contributed to the weakening of the Congress party by their defections from the Congress party and establishing the K.M.P.P. and K.L.P. respectively. The Communists, capitalizing on the Andhra state issue, came out of the elections with 41 seats, and Congress only 40, in a total strength of 140 seats for Andhra areas in the Madras Assembly. In the Telengana areas of Hyderabad State, the Communists managed

to capture 45 seats out of 175 by uniting with the influential local leaders like the late Dr. Jaisurya, brother of West Bengal Governor Miss Padmaja Naidu.

As a result of the first general elections, no one party won a clear majority in the Madras Assembly. The non-Congress legislators numbering 223 as against 152 for Congress, elected Andhra veteran Tanguturi Prakasam as their leader and formed the government for composite Madras State. But the Prakasam ministry did not continue for more than a year.⁸

After the first general elections, there was a considerable interest, in view of the Communists gaining strength, in the probable political composition of a potential Andhra State. "Political opponents of the Congress pointed out that redistribution of States on linguistic lines would weaken the hold of the Congress party in the South India where opposition parties, and especially the Communists, had won significant election victories."⁹ Contrary to this view, however, as the fourth general election of 1967 also was over, it was Andhra Pradesh that proved the existence of a powerful Congress ministry in the South India, as the Madras State also has gone out of the Congress party hands.

Soon after the first election, the linguistic agitation for a separate Andhra State was mounted and ultimately ended with the ugly climax in the death of Potti Sriramulu in October, 1953, and the announcement for formation of a separate State of Andhra followed it.¹⁰

Thirteen months after the coalition ministry formed by Prakasam as first Chief Minister of the newly formed Andhra State in 1953, it was brought

down on a motion of no-confidence on the issue of prohibition.

Following the no-confidence motion, elections for a new legislature were held in February 1955. These elections of Andhra were attached all India significance as the Communist party was expected to form the next Andhra Ministry. The Congress party, with Prime Minister Nehru, AICC president Debbar's campaigning and S. K. Patil supervising, centered its campaign upon the issue of communism as a danger to democracy and won the election with a significant majority.

The important feature of these 1955 elections was the way Congress fought the elections, as the combined opposition parties fought against the Congress in 1967 elections, by joining hands with the KLP (Ranga) and Praja Party (Prakasam) as United Congress Front. This was, as pointed out by Fisher and Bondurant, "one measure of the uneasiness over Communist strength" that led to the Congress party's agreement to support the KLP and Praja Party candidates in 49 constituencies.

The other parties who contested the elections--PSP, Communists, and Socialists--all campaigned vigorously but independently, while the Congress, KLP, and Praja Party jointly mobilized their men and material and campaigned together. The total number of seats in the Andhra Assembly meanwhile was increased from 140 to 196 following the delimitation of the constituencies. The United Congress Front contested for all the seats except five, while the Communists contested for 169 seats as against 63 seats they had contested in the 1951 first general election.

The Congress came out of the elections, using all their strategies, with a resounding victory, obtaining 98 seats as against 33 in 1951, and

on the other hand Communists were "surprisingly defeated." As against 41 seats in 1951, they secured only 15 seats. The KLP which later joined the Swatantra party after two more brief interludes with the Congress party, increased its strength from 12 to 21. The KLP's support to the Congress party was the significant factor that led to the striking success of Congress at the polls over the strong Communist forces in the State.

The major development that took place before the 1957 nation-wide second general elections was the integration of Telengana areas with the Andhra, naming the new State as Andhra Pradesh instead of earlier Andhra State, following the State reorganization. In the 1957 general elections Andhra areas elected their representatives only to the Lok Sabha as the elections to the State Assembly were just then held in February, 1955, whereas the Telengana areas elected their representatives both for Assembly and for Lok Sabha.

Thus for the Circars and Rayaleseema, the third general elections of 1962 were held after a seven year period, as the term of the 1955 mid-term members of the Andhra legislative Assembly was extended by two years so as to be coterminous with the rest of the country and Telengana legislators.

Chapter II

THE SETTING

The fourth general elections in India have a special significance in many ways unlike the earlier elections. These fourth general elections were held in a tense atmosphere of uncertainty and under the feeling of frustration and disappointment. Anxiety was expressed in certain Western quarters over the failure of democracy in India.

The scene after the 1962 general elections presents an interesting picture of stability and change both at the Center and in the State. The pre-election situation for the fourth general election in the State of Andhra Pradesh was no better than in any other State in the country. Student's unrest was the most common scene for two months, agitations over increased food-bills and taxes, Communist-led trade union strikes, Congress-led trade union demands, Andhra Bhand and satyagrahas, hunger strikes, all reached the high pitch of 1952.¹¹ Andhra Pradesh simply reminded the nation and its leaders at the helm of affairs of what had happened in 1953 over the linguistic state agitation. State wide agitation over the "steel plant issue" starting from the State capital Hyderabad to Vizag via Kurnool, Nelloore, Guntur, Vijayawada, Rajahmundry towns and vice versa, and finally all ended with 32 deaths and a few days standstill of normal life in the State. That was the state of affairs in pre-election Andhra Pradesh.

But to this staggering discontent among people over economic conditions, changing and often confusing conditions in the political scene were also added. Significant in the all-India setting was that there was no

longer the charismatic personality of Nehru to act as the biggest vote-getter for the Congress party. The increased defections from the Congress party at the all India level besides the bitter group rivalries and factions within it further confused the state of affairs. The more widespread open accusations between the two factions of the Communist Party, the unsuccessful agitation of the Swatantra Party over the increased land revenue, Jan Sangh's little inspired cow agitation, and increased activity of the Ittheadul Muslim Majlis Party in the capital city, all added to the confusion of the pre-election setting in the state thus making it easy to the "best exploiter" to exploit the situation.

A look at the composition of the State Assembly before it was dissolved for entering the election arena may provide a picture of the parties and where they stood. The Party-wise positions in the legislative Assembly soon after the 1962 elections and just before the 1967 elections (before the mass resignations of opposition parties) was as follows:

Party	Soon After the 1962 Election	Just before the 1967 Election
Congress	177	215
Communists (R)	51	32
Communists (L)		22
Swatantra	19	15
S.S.P.	2	2
Independents	51	10
Nominated	1	1
Vacancies	--	4

As seen from the table, the Congress party was able to increase its strength from 177 to 215 by admitting 35 members from independents and Swatantra group and by winning three seats in by-elections. The Communists were also able to increase their total strength by three seats by taking into their fold those independents who were elected with their support in 1962, whereas the Swatantra lost four of its members to the ruling party, one of them in a by-election.

Of the 51 'Independents' there were at least three parties which were not recognized by the Election Commission. However, one of them, the National Democratic party, was recognized by the Speaker of the Assembly. The "Independents" in the Assembly could be further divided as follows:

Party	Soon After the 1962 Election	Just Before the 1967 Election
National Democratic	33	6
Praja Party	1	1
Majlis Ittehadul Muslim	1	1
Independents (not attached to any party)	16	2

It is interesting to note how the 51 member strength of the so-called independents had gone down to ten as the Assembly concluded. Of those 16 independents who were not members of any party in the beginning, three had joined the Communist group and eleven joined the Congress. The two lone members of the Praja Party and Majlis Ittehadul Muslim had not yielded to any other party in the Assembly or outside.

The National Democratic Party was only a conglomeration of disgruntled Congressmen and a few powerful individuals from different regions elected in

the 1962 elections as independents. During 1965 the 27 member group led by Dr. K. V. Narayana Reddy, a leading member of Osmania University Syndicate and one time professor there, joined the Congress Party in the Legislature as associated members, and later in early 1966, they were admitted as full-fledged members of the Congress party by the AICC at the initiation of the Chief Minister Kasu Brahmananda Reddy (Kaus) and at the recommendation of the PCC.

As long as Sanjeeva Reddy was in the State as Chief Minister, this group of National Democrats led by Dr. Reddy did not evince interest to join the Congress ranks. It was only when Sanjeeva Reddy resigned as Chief Minister in line with the Supreme Court strictures against him for his conduct on the bus transport nationalization issue, that Dr. K. V. Narayana Reddy took the initiative. Kasu Brahmanada Reddy (Kaus) who succeeded Sanjeeva Reddy as Chief Minister, also took similar interest to strengthen his own position in the party and particularly in Telengana areas from where the Dr. Reddy group mostly hails. When Sanjeeva Reddy was All India Congress President during the period of the 1962 elections, some of the members of the National Democratic group who applied for Congress tickets were refused by him.

The Andhra Pradesh Assembly was free from the "...disorders and unpleasant scenes which had become a regular feature in some of the legislatures..." in India, as the Speaker of the House himself said.¹² However, incidents of adjourning the House when uproarious scenes were witnessed and ordering members of the opposition to withdraw from the House when this never happened in earlier Assemblies, were not unusual particularly during the last two sessions before the 1967 elections.

As the election dates drew nearer, the Opposition parties, collectively and individually played different "games" to capture the mood of the people through various issues but only unsuccessfully. The second motion of no-confidence after the 1962 elections on the Congress ministry was tabled by all the Opposition parties and independents unitedly just before the members of the House rushed back to their respective constituencies to begin their electioneering. But when their combined attempt failed to draw the attention of either the press or the public in the State through the no-confidence motion, it was necessary, naturally, to look for another issue through which to approach the electorate.

The ultimate strategy they used was to resign from the Assembly en bloc. All the members of the Right Communists, Left (Marxist) Communists, Swatantra, the remaining group of the National Democratic party, SSP and three independents, in all, 69 members resigned from their membership. Thus when the Andhra Pradesh Assembly met for the last few days before adjourning sine diem from November 19 to 21st, it functioned without any members on the Opposition benches except a lone member of Majlis Ittehadul Muslim, Owaisi Salaludhin.

To stir the masses it was necessary to take up some popular issue on which to resign and mark the beginning of their combined anti-Congress election campaign. The issues selected were the "steel plant", rising prices, increased dearness allowance to employees, and making Telugu as the official language of the State. One of the resigning members, Vandemataram Ramachendra Rao, also added to the above the "cow protection" issue and the government's apathy towards that issue. The Communist

members of Lok Sabha from Andhra Pradesh--both Right and Left--also resigned from their Lok Sabha membership in protest against the Congress government's attitudes towards the steel plant issue. However, the Opposition parties as they entered for electoral alliance talks could not keep up the unity they exhibited in the last Assembly session in criticising the government.

One of the salient features of the fourth general elections was that unlike past elections, the results were announced only after polling in all the constituencies ended. This way the Election Commission did a good service for this will certainly shield the voters at large from casting their votes in accordance with changing moods and election atmosphere. This method will eliminate the possibility of the election result in one constituency, whether it be a neighboring constituency or a constituency of a local leader or a prestige contest, influencing and affecting the poll in others.

The old method of counting and announcing the polling result soon after it was over, when viewed from the fact that the elections were held in alternative of two or three days will indicate the extent of possible influence over the next door electorate.

The most important pre-election activity that attracts, if they are alert, many MLAs and those aspiring candidates is the Delimitation Commission. After each decennial census a Delimitation Commission is set up under a Parliamentary statute. Accordingly, the Delimitation Commission was set up for revision of the number of seats for State Assembly, Council and Lok Sabha according to the 1961 census. The 1962 general elections

were conducted on the basis of the 1951 census. Under this new allocation of Lok Sabha seats, Andhra Pradesh was allotted 41 seats instead of the existing 43 Lok Sabha seats. As a result, the strength of the State Assembly, which will be an integral multiple of Lok Sabha seats, was also reduced from 311 to 287.¹³

Another significant pre-election measure of the government which certainly has had an impact on the behavior of the contesting candidates and their electioneering was the 19th Amendment to the Constitution abolishing the existing Election Tribunals. Under the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act of 1966, passed by the Lok Sabha, power was invested in the High Courts to hear the election petitions.

Meanwhile, the population of Andhra Pradesh has increased by 15.7 percent in 1961 over the 1951 population. The second and third general elections in the State and in the country were conducted on the basis of 1951 census, whereas the fourth general elections were held on the basis of 1961 census.

The electorate of Andhra Pradesh has increased by ten percent for 1967 elections over the 1962 elections. That is, the electorate has been increasing much faster than the population increase rate. If this rate continues, the "old guards" of the Congress party or of any other party soon will be on their way out of the elections and so from the political scene, as it has already been indicated in the fourth general elections. The number of polling stations in Andhra Pradesh was increased from 21,500 in 1962 to 23,800 in the 1967 elections because of the increased electorate, as indicated below:

The Growth of Population and Electorate in A.P.

Population		Electorate	
1951	1961	1962	1967
31,115,000	35,977,999	19,007,856	21,081,30

As seen from the above figures, there was an increase of 15.7 percent in population over a period of ten years, marking a 1.57 percent average increase in population every year. On the other hand, there was a ten percent increase of electorate over the 1962 elections or over a year period of five years, marking a two percent average increase in the electorate every year.

Chapter III

PARTIES IN ACTION

The reality is that at any given moment we have a party whose most important characteristic is not that it is Socialist, Liberal, or Conservative, but that it is providing the Government. It will not be dislodged until a combination of its own incompetence and arrogance drives together sufficient disparate groups of discontent to replace it.

--a Member of British Parliament¹⁴

Sigmund Neuman has rightly described the role of political parties in one sentence as "the life line of modern politics."¹⁵ But often confusing in developing countries is what makes and runs those political parties. Is it the ideology, any principles, issues, personalities or personal antagonisms, caste or religion or elections or what else?

Contrary to the similarities of Andhra Pradesh with the general picture in India, it represented a quite different picture of party positions on the eve of the fourth general elections. The deep differences before the 1967 elections within the Andhra Congress, though as old as 1950, shocked many, and of course were welcomed by others. "In Andhra it was not known clear (sic) who was more sharply divided--Congress or Communists,"¹⁶ It was, thus, a picture of "balancing of weaknesses" of political parties in the State. The Communists, unlike the Congress, divided into two parties and opposed each other whereas the Congress was without a split into clear cut parties. Swatantra, as a party failed to inspire and exploit the situation, the best opportunity it ever got. The other multi-State parties were only splinter groups in Andhra Pradesh.

Differences, both personal and ideological, if any, within and among political parties in general and Congress party in particular, which had been kept in leash during the years of the Nehru era have had to come more sharply into the open during the election period. And it was felt that the political parties were passing through a regrouping and realignment of policies.¹⁷ Perhaps it might have been a natural process in a pluralistic society where all are not pluralistic parties.

Where one party is dominant in a political system, it is but natural that all politics relate to or comes out of its functioning.¹⁸ By a look at the working of the Congress party--the "Giant Killer" among the political parties one can understand the politics of a State.

The Congress Party:

"If the Congress was out of power for some time then, all the filth and dirt would go over to the party that would come into power...." 19

Despite bitter disputes, factionalism, and development of a "dissident" group within the Congress party, as if a strong opposition party evolved in a struggle for power, none of those dissidents or those debarred from the Congress party on the election eve, could form a separate party as happened in other States in India.

The Andhra Congress never existed united and it was always faction ridden, but then interestingly, it never became weak to the extent necessary to be vulnerable to the opposition except during the period of 1952-55. But, that was because of the defection of two of the party champions in the State synchronizing with the increasing Communist organization and linguistic movement for a separate Andhra State. In fact, the first

Congress Government of the separate Andhra State collapsed because of factionalism within, and Communist harassment on a no-confidence motion.²⁰ Probably, the Congress party was nowhere else so weak and the Communist party nowhere else so strong and well organized as in Andhra (and in Kerala) during that period.

In fact, personal politics, caste politics, and factional politics existed in Andhra even before the formation of Andhra State. They were only more intensified than ever before in the initial years. The point here is, that with a change in the order of these factors and their intensities, the Andhra Congress was always divided whenever an election or selection for a party or government post took place. If it was at the district level or within a district, the Congress party in the district was divided into two or three groups, with one of them acting as an opposition party to the "office-holding" group. In that process, new alignments took place and loyalties shifted to the leaders and groups at the State capital. The sharpness of the factions varied only in degree from time to time with personalities changing their places as "tables turn."

In spite of these increased bitter rivalries (more than in any other State),²¹ the Congress party in Andhra Pradesh came out of the fourth general elections with an absolute majority as it did only in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh States. The success story of Andhra Congress in the 1967 elections like that of the Communists in 1951, is a striking case in point. The Andhra Pradesh Congress until now has given a typical impression that the more the party divided internally, with no considerable defections, the stronger it would be or at least it would be as strong as ever before.²²

The Swatantra Party:

The Swatantra party in Andhra Pradesh and Professor N. G. Ranga, the one time most popular leader of Andhra, go together. But professor Ranga has never regained his popularity after his leaving the Congress party nor the Swatantra party has ever reached the mass during its eight years of existence.

The Swatantra party in Andhra Pradesh, as in few other States, had always its fore-runner with brief intervals since the first general elections in 1951. Ranga is an unsuccessful politician of Andhra (for all his right decisions at wrong times). Many say that he cannot play political games and gimmicks that were necessary for a man to be in politics. He has never appeared to aspire for power. To aspire for power is essential for a leader to keep himself as well as his party up-to-date. These were the disqualifications of Ranga and also the Swatantra party, and reasons for their not gaining, if not regaining the old, deserved popularity in Andhra Pradesh.

The story of the Swatantra party and its fore-runners confirm that parties based around a few individuals or depending upon their personalities cannot keep up with the changing politics of India, particularly in the rural scene. Moreover, a party which does not really aim for power but looks for its prestige, cannot hope to appeal to the mass in the present day politics of India. This was one of the themes the Swatantra party Secretary M. R. Masani took up for 1967 elections at all India level. With his wooing speeches and election strategy, he filled his followers

of the party with confidence that the Swatantra party can form a strong opposition to the Congress, and was able to do so after February, 1967.

Though the Swatantra party formally came into existence in 1959, it could not attract a single leading member of the Congress or of any other party in the State. Between the third general elections and the fourth elections at least four to five short lived parties sprang up, but none of those parties ended by joining the Swatantra or without joining the Congress party. These parties, started by disgruntled Congressmen, would have joined the Swatantra party if that party would have exhibited any dynamism in leadership and confidence.

Masani's report on party affairs since the 1962 general elections though it did not point out the names of any State, confessed the "...failure in general to renew membership of existing workers and to enroll new workers."²³ The Report presented to the All-India Swatantra party Convention held in New Delhi just before the 1967 general election expressed concern over the "...grave implications for the efficient functioning of State, district and local units."²⁴

Communists:

Several writers, in and outside India, made studies on the Communist party of India. Every one of them confirmed the deep rooted strength of communism in Andhra Pradesh. Most of the studies were particularly aimed at the Communist party election success in Andhra in 1952. Andhra Pradesh--including the Andhra and Telengana areas--has always been the strong-hold of Communists in India. In fact, it was one of "their States" for some time. At one time the Communists were expected to rule the then newly formed Andhra State.

The conflict between the two rival Communist parties, that divided on Pro-Peking and pro-Moscow lines, was more marked in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal States than any where else in India. It was in these two States, and, of course, in Kerala, that the undivided Communist Party of India enjoyed considerable base and organizational hold.²⁵

But in Andhra Pradesh the division between the two factions was the sharpest and permeated to all levels. The 53 member strong party in the Assembly was split between 32 rightists (pro-Moscow) and 21 leftists (pro-Peking) or Marxists as they were otherwise referred. The bitter inner-party struggle among the Communists in India first reached its high pitch when the CPI had its sixth Congress in Andhra in April, 1961 at Vijayawada. The Congress, organized just before the electioneering for the third general elections, was well attended by all personalities in the party at the all India level and also by Suslov of the Soviet Communist Party who was specially deputed for that Congress for cooling down the "ideological--political and organizational battle" in Communist Party of India.²⁶

However, in spite of its inner-party differences, the CPI took part in the third general elections of 1962 as one unit and one party. But yet they could not win as many seats as expected. In the fourth general elections they "...even visualized the prospect of getting a hundred seats and of unseating of the Congress party with the help of the other parties and independents...."²⁷

The Communist Chinese aggression and its continued threat on India's borders after 1962 and the subsequent attitude of China had lowered the prestige of the Communist party in India. In fact, " any person or

group who supported, or even appeared to support, the position of China would have been branded a traitor..." by the people.²⁸ As against this general feeling, the Communists, particularly the leftists, did not dare to criticize the Chinese on the Indo-Chinese conflict.

With important Andhra Communists taking the lead in the National Council of CPI at New Delhi in April, 1964, 65 members of the party walked out of the meeting in protest against the pro-Moscow party Chairman S. A. Dange, and ultimately they all formed a new "Left" party at Tenali in Andhra Pradesh. The Tenali Convention was the first official organizational meeting of the "left" operating as a separate party. Since then Andhra Pradesh has been the scene for both the Communist parties to accuse each other and muster their own followers within the CPI. In Andhra Pradesh the Left Communists were better organized and prepared for the elections than the Right Communists. The strongholds of CPI in Andhra Pradesh--Nalgonda, Guntur, Krishna and Khammam district--consist of more active supporters of Leftists. This fact gave them the advantage in the matters of collection of election funds and mobilization of volunteers for the fourth general elections.

However, between November and December, 1966 both the Communist parties met at least five times to patch up their differences and to have a common manifesto and for an agreement to cease "open polemics" at least until the February, 1967 elections.²⁹ But their differences widened one meeting after the other, and finally they failed to reach any understanding on the eve of the elections.

The Left party Secretary M. Hanumanta Rao said of Rightists that the "Revisionalists were so much over estimating their strength and capacity that they are asking for the moon...."³⁰ On the other side, the Right party Secretary N. Rajasekhara Reddy, a brother of Congress party Sanjeeva Reddy, said that "...leftists desire that the Right Communists should be wiped out....Their aim is to fight first the revisionists and then the Congress."³¹ How many from each party should contest from stronghold districts was the main cause of their disagreement and for their inability to unite and fight the Congress Party. In the party stronghold, the known leadership was with the Rightists while the cadres were with the Leftists. The near-parity in their strength was responsible for the bitter feud over the terms of a working arrangement for the elections.

The situation in Andhra Pradesh was basically different from that of Kerala or Madras. In Kerala the Leftists dominated the political life of the State completely, while in Madras, both the Left and Right parties were equally weak to the extent to make their unity felt on the elections. But in Andhra Pradesh their unity would have had made some difference, if not any significant impact on the election results.

To the Left Communists the main objective of the fourth general elections was to defeat the Congress. But the Rightists, on the other hand, wanted that the Congress should not be replaced by "more reactionary" parties. This was one of the prime reasons for the Right party objecting to the Muslim League inclusion in the Kerala United Front, and the Leftists associating themselves with DMK in Madras and Swatantra candidates in Guntur district.

Other Parties:

Ever since the 1950s the Congress, Communist and Swatantra or its fore-runner have been the parties that dominated the politics of Andhra Pradesh. The other political parties were only minor parties with no significant impact on the politics of the State or on its electorate. The Jan Sangh and the Republican parties in the State until 1967 were only symbolic of their existence on the all India political scene. The PSP and the SSP after 1959 were only parties in exile from State politics. In fact after the formation of the integrated Andhra Pradesh the Socialists who had considerable say in undivided Hyderabad State, lost control of the party followers as well as the electorate.

Dr. Lohia's SSP which at one time was an up-coming party in Andhra Pradesh--until P.V.G. Raju and his followers joined the Congress in 1959--had not become popular nor had its organization or its men ever reached the villages and the districts. The PSP on the other hand never made any head-way nor has it ever had any organization of its own in Andhra Pradesh.

The better known of the minor parties even without any organization or strength in the district was the Praja Party, founded by Andhra Lion T. Prakasam, the first Chief Minister of Andhra State. Despite Praja Party chairman Tenneti Viswanatham's popularity and prestige in Andhra, the party remained only a one man show. A little known party in the State politics was the Republic Party. This party had no organization nor any activity except a State Council consisting of few individuals. The Ittheadul Majlis Muslim Party, mostly concentrating in the twin cities, was a little better known party in Telengana areas. But the party was

known not because of its organization or activities but because of its terrorist activities before the Hyderabad Police Action under Kasim Razvi leadership.

Much earlier before the electioneering started in any other State, the opposition leaders in Andhra Pradesh started the 'talks', 'meetings', 'conferences', and 'dicussions' on the need of the opposition parties forging a united front against the Congress.³² But interestingly enough, Andhra Pradesh was one of the two or three States where not even two parties could forge any such electoral alliance on the eve of the fourth general elections.

Chapter IV

CANDIDATES

For some months before the electioneering started, the energies of the political parties were centered on the choice of candidates for both Lok Sabha and State Assembly. No one will deny the fact that proper selection of candidates is the first and most important step toward winning an election. Selection of candidates will not only effect the performance of the party during the battle for the ballot, but the quality of its work in the legislature also will be effected. If a party comes to power, the cabinet and its efficiency will ultimately depend upon the candidates it selects.³³

The problem of selection of party candidates has mainly three aspects as pointed out by Sirsikar.³⁴ From who to select is the first question. The second aspect concerns the qualifications and personalities of the aspiring candidates. Thirdly, the selecting authority and its procedure for selection may become decisive elements.

Of the ten, small and large, recognized and unrecognized parties that took part in the election, only Congress, Communists and Swatantra had any procedure for the selection of their candidates. Of these parties Congress had an elaborate and complex procedure because of the keen competition between the aspirants in addition to the bitter factions within the party for party tickets. There were five to six applicants to the Pradesh Election Committee (P.E.C.) from Congress members to contest from each Assembly constituency.

The Congress Central Election Committee (C.E.C.), the top and final selection body of all Congress candidates in the country, had a tough time for three months after October in finalizing the Andhra Pradesh list of candidates. If the factions in State units were deep or if the Congress Party was expected to return to power after the elections, the rush for tickets was larger, and it took a longer time and became a special task for the C.E.C.

Andhra Pradesh was one of the three tough states where the Congress was in utter chaos that gave the C.E.C. a difficult time and made arriving at any decision very difficult. In regard to Andhra Pradesh, the C.E.C. had to appoint a high-power sub-committee to resolve the Andhra selections.

The process of the selection of Congress candidates may be divided into three stages: District Congress Committee (D.C.C.), Pradesh Congress Election Committee (P.E.C.), and the C.E.C. Of these three stages, the P.E.C. is the key to the other two stages. The candidates of those in the majority or in control of the P.E.C. are usually approved by the C.E.C.

The P.E.C., which is elected by the Pradesh Congress members, had eleven members in Andhra Pradesh. Of these eleven members one, a Minister Alapati Venkatramayya, died long before the election talk. Among the remaining ten members, both the groups in the State had an equal number of five on each side. Crucial importance was attached to the election of that vacant eleventh seat.³⁵

Both the groups selected their candidates from Circar districts, and the official group candidate was the Steelman Kakani Venkataratnam of Krishna district, a veteran Congressman. With the success of Steelman Kakani, the ministerial group "scored a first round victory over

the dissidents."³⁶ But the dissidents were not sufficiently disappointed over this defeat to discontinue their dissident activities. They viewed that the majority of one by the ministerialists was not an enduring one, and, second, and most importantly, they had their leader Sanjeeva Reddy at the center. He would also sit in the C.E.C. as its important member.³⁷

Long before February, 1967, on September 21, 1966, the P.C.C. invited applications from its members interested in contesting in the general elections. As per the schedule of the P.C.C., directions were given to the D.C.C.'s to meet and send their recommendations before October 25 to the P.C.C.

After the P.E.C. eleventh member election was over on September 29, both the groups were equally busy filing their applications but not without any object of defeating the other group's candidate if selected, ignoring their own applications.

Observers were sent to each district by the P.C.C. to be present at the D.C.C. meetings at the time of making their recommendations and to hear any representation from the party workers and the public in controversial constituencies. The aspiring candidates from those constituencies had to display their support in their respective constituencies. In order to display their support, both the groups began to muster and mobilize the support of Village Panchyats, Panchyat Samiths, Cooperative Societies as well as support from the party workers in the constituencies. Producing all of them before the P.C.C. observer when he was visiting those constituencies to see their display of respective support and strength was like that of two enemies gathering on a battle field.

The D.C.C.'s sent their recommendations to the P.E.C. But at the State level the P.E.C. can alter, delete or include any names it wishes. With the district recommendations reaching the P.E.C. the venue of pre-election inner-party tussle between the two groups was shifted back to Hyderabad. The two groups were active in planning their future strategies to get as many tickets as possible to their respective group followers. The reason for this planning was that the P.E.C. was almost evenly divided between the ministerialists (6) and dissidents (5). The dissidents had had their leaders at New Delhi to look after them.

By the first week in November the P.E.C. finalized the State list to be sent to the C.E.C. with a one member majority in the P.E.C. But the dissident five members of the P.E.C. who did not participate in the P.E.C. deliberations also prepared another "full-fledged alternative list" for the first time in the country to send to the C.E.C. along with the majority official P.E.C. list.

The official list of the P.E.C. included all the dissident ministers except the Health Minister, Challapalli Raja, and the Women's Welfare Minister, Mrs. Sadalakhmi.³⁸

Out of the 215 Congress members of the Assembly, including those who joined the Congress after the 1962 elections, 196 had applied for party tickets.³⁹ Of those 196, 127 were recommended by the six member official group of the P.E.C. Their lists also included 34 candidates who were defeated in the 1962 elections, 24 persons who were elected in 1962, opposing and defeating a Congress candidate, and four candidates out of the remaining 11 who had applied from among those who were denied tickets

in the third general elections but contested as independents. The P.E.C. recommended only thirteen of the sitting M.P.'s who had applied for Lok Sabha seats. Of these thirteen, six were women and two Muslims. For Assembly seats, of the sitting six Muslim M.L.A.'s who had applied, four were recommended; out of forty-five scheduled caste and eleven scheduled tribes' M.L.A.'s, only eighteen and two, respectively, were included in the P.E.C. list. The P.E.C. tried to keep at least 50 to 70 percent of those sitting, and the rest were recommended after a "hunt up for some veteran Congressman forgotten for years."⁴⁰ Among the new candidates recommended by both the groups for Lok Sabha was Dr. Hussain Zaheer, a former Director of the Indian Council of Scientific Research. Only with regard to five Lok Sabha seats and 30 Assembly seats out of 41 and 287, respectively, both the lists sent to the C.E.C. contained common names. "The position in Andhra Pradesh," writes The Times of India, "is much worse than U.P. and Bihar where the rival factions have agreed in respect to a majority of seats."⁴¹

With the dispatch of the P.E.C. list to the C.E.C., political activity shifted to New Delhi followed by a series of pilgrimages to Delhi by congressmen of both the groups to press their cases. The political correspondent of The Hindu reported from New Delhi that there were over 1,000 Andhra Congressmen in Delhi when the C.E.C. took up the Andhra list. There had been special flights of the I.A.C. (Indian Airlines Corporation) from Hyderabad to Delhi bringing prospective Congress candidates and their supporters.⁴²

When the two lists of Congress candidates from Andhra reached Jantar

Mantar Road, where the A.I.C.C. office at New Delhi is located, concern was expressed at the increased open rivalry within the party after the eleventh member P.E.C. election. The central leaders were concerned for the future of the Party in the State. Compromise efforts to patch up the differences and to review both the lists of candidates were made by Congress President Kamaraj and other leaders, and various techniques were used for ironing out the differences, but all were in vain. The Congress President meanwhile "advised" the Chief Minister Kasu to review the list of the P.E.C. He also advised him not to consider the application of rebel congressmen and stated that those "sitting members who desired to contest the elections against whom there were no complaints" be given tickets.⁴³

When the C.E.C. met on December 2, 1966, to consider the Andhra Congress candidates, it could not even discuss the matter because of the complications involved. However, the C.E.C. again asked both the groups in the Andhra Congress to make an attempt to submit a list of candidates upon which they agreed for both Parliament and State Assembly.⁴⁴ The C.E.C. also "suggested" that one person from each group sit together along with a third person agreed upon by both the groups to iron out the differences and to "submit an agreed list to the extent possible" without disturbing the sitting M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s. But to this proposal, Kasu preferred to talk with Sanjeevayya, representative of the dissidents, directly instead of before a third outsider from another State. However, their several hours of meeting "to agree to certain basic principles which should govern the selection of candidates" failed.⁴⁵ Following the failure of all other attempts, the C.E.C. had to take an "unusual step" by

setting up a "high-power sub-committee" consisting of Morarjai, S.K. Patil, and Y.B. Chavan to resolve the deadlock over the selection of Congress candidates in Andhra Pradesh.

It should be mentioned at this point that Sanjeeva Reddy did not decide about his future--whether to contest for an Assembly seat or for a Lok Sabha seat--until the appointment of the high-power committee. He was waiting only for a chance to go back to State politics which had slipped out of his control since his leaving the State affairs to Kasu. Some of his followers, who were dissidents in State politics, were already pressing him to contest for an Assembly seat and to take up the State leadership again. But, if Sanjeeva Reddy entered the State politics, Chief Minister Kasu's position would naturally be endangered, and there might be a contest between them for State leadership which might cause further deterioration of the conditions in the Andhra Congress. As such, the Congress President wanted to avoid a straight contest for leadership, and he did not "like any one of them to be completely eliminated from the political scene."⁴⁶

"An informal understanding," writes Rangaswamy of The Hindu, "as to who should fill which place after the elections, can help to sort out differences and a united front can still emerge in Andhra."⁴⁷

The three-man sub-committee could not take up the list, particularly that list of Assembly candidates because in its first sitting it was not decided whether Sanjeeva Reddy would be opting for Lok Sabha or State Assembly. But with Sanjeeva Reddy 'deciding' by the first week of December to contest for Lok Sabha, presumably at the initiation of Kamaraj, it was possible for the sub-committee to quickly finalize the Andhra list, With

Sanjeeva Reddy deciding to opt for a Lok Sabha seat, a threat to Chief Minister Kasu's leadership in the State was averted. With that the Ministerials, who were sure that no one other than Sanjeeva Reddy could pose a threat in State politics to their group, were willing to adjust the seats with the rival dissident's lists.

Thus, a great deal of controversy centers around personalities and not on any issues. The question was to find political positions for the leaders involved in the controversy, whether it be at State level or district level.

When the C.E.C. met on December 17, most of the candidates, bot for Lok Sabha and Assembly, were decided in two sittings, including that of Sanjeeva Reddy as a candidate for Hindupur Lok Sagha constituency. In selecting thirty-five of the forty-one Lok Sabha candidates, both the groups were given equal weightage.⁴⁸ The C.E.C. picked seventeen of the candidates from the recommended list of the P.E.C. and twelve from the list of the rival five member P.E.C.; the rest of the six were nominated by the C.E.C. from among those aspirants whose names were not there in both the lists.

Of the 269 candidates selected by the C.E.C. at the recommendation of the three man sub-committee, 169 belonged to the ministerialists, and the other 100 belonged to the dissident list. Thus, to avoid any showdown of any group, the sub-committee, upon whose recommendation the C.E.C. had finally selected and announced the candidates, had picked the candidates from both the lists of ministerialists and dissidents, keeping in mind the fact that one was backed by six and the other by five. The rest of the pending candidates for six Lok Sabha seats and eighteen Assembly seats

were later selected as per the agreement reached at New Delhi, some by Chief Minister Kasu, a few by Sanjeeva Reddy, and the rest by Congress President Kamaraj in consultation with the State Congress Chief.

Even with the completion of the selection process of Congress Candidates, the groupism had not ended nor had any cordial atmosphere been created in State politics. On the other hand, the breach had been further widened not only because of disgruntled elements in both the groups upon refusing tickets and sabotaging of the rivals by sponsoring powerful independents but also because of the group leader's open support to those rebel elements in the districts.

Chief Minister Kasu said of the final list of candidates that though he was "not unhappy," "here and there, better people could have been put, keeping their success in view."⁴⁹

Whereas, the dissident leader A.C. Subba Reddy came out openly declaring that "his group had decided that he should be a candidate for the Chief Ministership."⁵⁰ A.C. Subba Reddy further stated before a press conference that the "dissident group would have a majority in the Congress Legislature Party after the elections...in the Legislative Council, the official group had now a majority of ten as the position stood today. But after the elections of the Assembly, there will be a definite swing to our side."⁵¹

A.C., as he is known among his close associates, summed up the attitude of the dissident group thus: "As far as we are concerned, we are anxious to see that the Congress wins a majority of seats in the Assembly. We will do our best to see that all the candidates of our group will come out successfully. We will also spare no pains to do what little we can for the

success of the Congressmen of the other group."⁵² When Press reporters asked A.C. how he could claim "his group's majority over the ministerialists," he said that "even though the official group had an edge of about 41 candidates over the dissidents, the latter would actually win a greater number of seats than the official group. In the Telengana area nearly 65 candidates were from the official group out of 101. But, the dissidents would win 25 out of the 36 seats given to them."⁵³ The Hindu further reported that A.C. "was confident that the official group would not win more seats than the dissidents in Telengana."⁵⁴

The P.C.C. President, P. Timma Reddy, said that "he was sorry that some deserving persons could not be given Congress tickets because of differences in the Congress."⁵⁵ One day, before this statement of Timma Reddy, the Prime Minister and the ministerialists' only hope at the center, Mrs. Indira Gandhi said that "Congress could have selected some better candidates."⁵⁶

Interestingly enough, the C.E.C. which began its task of selecting Congress candidates for the country by insisting that a certain proportion of the candidates chosen should be "new blood," ended with a main concern to retain as many of the sitting M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s as possible. With the receipt of the Andhra dissident's list as against the official P.E.C. list, the problem of immediate importance before the C.E.C. was that of selecting not the most suitable but the least controversial candidates. This means, that hurdles, if any, for the continuance of factionalism which had bedevilled the Congress organization, were to be removed. Because even after the elections, under the C.E.C.'s new plan, divisions or groups within each State would continue at least for another five years and which further might

lead to setting up broad-based ministeries of large contingents consisting of both the groups.⁵⁷ Hardly any member from the professional or technical group was attracted by any list of Congress candidates. A member of the Board of Revenue, who retired to apply for a Congress ticket, was not preferred. Dr. Hussain Zaheer, retired Director of the C.I.S.R., whose name was recommended by both the lists, was finally not given a ticket by the C.E.C. "An important member of the C.E.C. said that it was better that a scientist remained a scientist."⁵⁸

The C.E.C. refused to nominate in Bihar those candidates who in the 1962 elections left the Congress to fight as independents and who subsequently rejoined the Congress. But in Andhra Pradesh almost all the 31 member bloc of the United Democratic Party who joined the Congress in 1965 were given tickets.⁵⁹

As most of the names of candidates were announced by the C.E.C., those belonging to both the groups who were not given tickets and so were disgruntled began to work out their own plans for contesting as independents. Soon they were back in the villages from New Delhi and Hyderabad to consult their followers if they had any. As the nominations' date, January 13, approached, 50 rebelled against the Congress and filed their nominations as independents. The P.C.C. President warned all those "rebel Congressmen" who filed their nominations against Congress's official candidates to withdraw from the contest. But only a few headed after negotiations: but the rest knew that they could go back to Congress or Congress would take them back if they once won or even otherwise if the balance of power positions in the party changed from one group to the other. And that day might come

at any time for those rebel Congressmen.⁶⁰

Finally 48 rebel Congressmen who did not withdraw from the contest were debarred from the party for six years. It is interesting to note that both the groups encouraged those disgruntled men to contest against the strong men of the other group.⁶¹

Thus, the number of independent candidates who contested in the 1967 election had gone up to 402 for the Assembly and up to 61 for Lok Sabha. In fact, some of these independents were also financed by the other candidate, usually a Congress candidate himself, contesting in the same constituency to serve as a dividing factor among the voters.⁶²

Swatantra

The Swatantra Party has not had any long process of selection of its candidates nor has it had any good number of aspiring people to contest on its ticket. By December 10, the Swatantra Party announced its first list of constituencies where it was planning to contest and some of the candidates for those constituencies. Though they wanted to contest for about 136 Assembly seats and 20 Lok Sabha seats, by the time of the last date for nominations, it could find candidates for only 89 and 19 constituencies, respectively. But it was very liberal in allotting its symbol to those who contested even after being refused a ticket by Congress.

The elder statesman and founder-leader of the Swatantra Party, Rajaji, long before the electioneering appealed to the interested voters through newspaper advertisements to come forward and contest as Swatantra Party candidates, something which no other party had attempted before.

A look at the Swatantra Party list in Andhra Pradesh indicates that no candidate volunteered to contest on the basis of C.R.'s (Rajaji) appeal. However, the party was able, as elsewhere in the country, to put up some new candidates particularly from professionals. In Andhra Pradesh, except for twelve candidates, the rest were old members of the power politics. There were at least sixteen candidates who contested with the Swatantra Party star symbol for various reasons of their own. Some of them applied for a Swatantra ticket when Congress refused, and others with personal grudges against the Congress candidate.⁶³

The Parliamentary Board of the State Swatantra Party, after the Congress Party's full list was announced on December 16, reviewed its earlier December 9 list, and "decided not to set up Party candidates in constituencies where it felt it had not sufficient strength to win the elections."⁶⁴

Except for Professor Ranga and Latchanna, other local influential leaders like Bezawada Ramachandra Reddy, and sitting members of Assembly C. D. Naidu, Desh Pande, and Rajagopala Naidu did not contest though some of them were given party tickets. C. D. Naidu contested for a Lok Sabha seat in a far away Warangal district.

Of the fifteen sitting members of the party only seven contested again in the 1967 elections, and the rest had not applied for a party ticket or secured a Congress Party ticket.⁶⁵ The Party ~~could not nominate any~~ to candidate in two constituencies in the Cuddapah district where it won in the 1962 elections.⁶⁶ The Party also decided unanimously to withdraw its candidate, G. B. Appa Rao from Visakhapatnam Lok Sabha constituency in favor of Praja Party Tanneti. But Appa Rao did not withdraw his candidacy from the

contest.⁶⁷ Another feature of the Swatantra Party was that in spite of its relatively better local hold in Guntur Lok Sabha constituency area, it had not nominated any candidate against Congress' Candidate, K. Raghuramaiah, a man introduced to politics by Ranga himself, in spite of an applicant for that constituency. Govinda Rao, who applied for a Swatantra Party ticket to contest from Guntur Lok Sabha constituency was not given party nomination as such he contested as an independent. In the 1962 election also the Swatantra Party did not put up any of its candidates against Congress' R. ghuramaiah.

The paucity of candidates and the dependence of the party on a few individuals could further be seen by the fact that two of its leaders contested both for Assembly and Lok Sabha seats. G. Latchanna, the State Party Chairman, contested both for Srikakulam Lok Sabha and for an Assembly seat and won both while G. B. Appa Rao contested both for Visakhapatnam Lok Sabha and for an Assembly seat in the same Visakhapatnam district and won the Assembly seat.

Whenever the candidates' selection body, the State Parliamentary Board, met, its meeting usually ended with a unanimous authorization to the State Party President Latchanna "to examine and recommend suitable candidates."⁶⁸

Slightly over one-third of the final 89 candidates who contested on the Swatantra symbol for the Assembly were lawyers; slightly less than one-third were farmers; and the rest were from other professions. But all of them were either from the middle class or from above middle class families; and most of them were younger than an average Congress candidate.

Communist Candidates

The sharp division in the rank and file of the Communist Party of India down from the village level created a problem, both for Left and Right Parties equally, in the matters of selecting their candidates to contest in the fourth general elections. Where the Right Party had a sitting member, the party cadre was in the hands of Leftists. At the time of the unsuccessful talks between the two Communist Parties, the Rightists insisted that all their thirty-two sitting members be given party tickets from their respective constituencies. Whereas, the Leftists were of the opinion that all of the Thirty-two Right members had been elected in the 1962 elections only because of Left members' support and strength, and, as such, they could not allow all those members to contest again from those constituencies as compromise Communist candidates. This opinion was the basis of the two parties failure to come to any electoral understanding particularly in the selection of compromise candidates who were popular in the Communists strongholds.

Of the thirty-two sitting members, the Rightists could find constituencies only for twenty-three. Of the 102 candidates the Rightists had put up, 79 were fresh; of them twenty had been defeated in the 1962 elections, and the remaining 59 were contesting for the first time. But the Leftists contested for only 83 Assembly constituencies. For Lok Sabha the Rightists had put up their candidates for twenty constituencies to exhibit their supremacy over the Leftists who nominated their candidates only for eleven seats out of the total 41.

Both the Right and Left Parties could not put up any candidates from

any profession or from among the women. However, each Party had one woman candidate in two different constituencies in the Krishna district. One of the candidates belonging to the Left, Manikonda Suryavati, was an active Party worker and a member of the Legislative Council who had just then completed her term. The other Right Party lady candidate was completely new to politics. Both of the Parties together were able to put up three Muslim candidates--two by the Rightists and one by the Leftists. In the Kadiri Assembly constituency Muslim candidates of both the Parties were pitted against a Reddi Congress candidate (and were defeated with a wide margin).

Interestingly enough, the Communists for the 1967 elections could not nominate their candidates for any of the scheduled caste and tribe reserved constituencies for which they had contested in every earlier election. This fact indicates that the Communists were losing ground and were losing their hold over and among the backward section of the people. On the other side, in the twin cities where the employed and labor are concentrated, the Communists were able to put up their candidate only for one constituency out of eleven seats.

But despite the Communists' hold and organization in Guntur city and outside, they did not put up any candidate as they had done in the 1962 elections against Congress Raghuramaiah.⁶⁹

Most of the Communist candidates in the 1967 elections, as in the earlier elections, were drawn from among their party cadre who were not experienced in any political office. The majority of them were farmers, and a few were agricultural laborers. They were all from rural areas, and

very few candidates were from among petty businesses or other non-professions, and these candidates who live in the cities contested those city constituencies.⁷⁰

Leftist Party leaders Sundarayya and Ravi Narayana Reddy did not contest in the 1967 elections unlike the previous elections.⁷¹ The leaders of both the parties in Rayalaseema contested one against the other with an immediate object of defeating the other.⁷² Of the twenty-two sitting Left members, sixteen were put up as candidates again for the 1967 elections. These sitting members were put in jail early in 1966 under D.I.R. (Defense of India Rule). Important of these who were jailed and against whom the Rightists also put up their candidates with an object of defeating them were N. Prasada Rao, K. L. Narasimha Rao, Koratala, Bapa Inaih, and T. Nagi Reddy.

Compared to the Congress, Communists and Swatantra, the other minor parties in the State had no procedure at all in selecting their candidates. These parties had a paucity of candidates to contest on their symbols.

A most interesting point of Jan Sangh candidates in the 1967 elections was that there were two Muslims contesting on its banner from Adilabad and Karimnagar districts. Within the twin cities, not far from Nirmal and Karimnagar Assembly constituencies where the Muslims contested as Jan Sangh candidates, the contest between the Jan Sangh Hindu candidates and the Majlis Muslim candidates was open and bitter. In fact the growth of Jan Sangh in Telengana in recent years was a counterattack against the expanding Muslim Majlis activities.

The majority of the 79 Assembly and seven Lok Sabha candidates of Jan

Sangh were either from petty trading Varsya or from Brahmin communities. Jan Sangh of late had been able to attract the dismayed, and educated middle class in towns and cities. Almost all of its candidates were from this section of people.

Those who contested in other than the Nellore, the twin cities, the Vijayanagaram constituencies, were not active members of the Party. The Jan Sangh, as elsewhere in the country, had nominated its candidates in a majority of the urban Assembly constituencies.

It was the Parliamentary Board of State Jan Sangh, the selection body in the State, that announced its list on November 28, 1966, before any other party did so. The president of the party, Jupudi Yagnanarayana, went around the districts and announced that his party would contest for 120 Assembly seats, but on the last date of withdrawal there remained only 79 candidates on the run as against 67 in the 1962 elections. While on his trips to the districts, the party president "selected" his party candidates after consulting the few party workers it had in the districts. The former president of all India Jan Sangh, Avasarala Rama Rao, who was defeated in the 1962 elections, did not contest again in 1967.

The party had two women candidates for Assembly. The Parliamentary Board of Jan Sangh, like that of Swatantra, liberally obliged all those who applied at the last minute for its symbol.⁷³

The P.S.P. and the S.S.P each with nine candidates for the Assembly and one of the three candidates for Lok Sabha, respectively, could not nominate a single new member. The only sitting member of S.S.P., T.K.R. Sarma contested from the same constituency where he had won in 1962.⁷⁴

Two of the P.S.P. and S. S. P. trade union leaders in the twin cities, B.S. Mahadev Singh and S.B. Giri, contested from Secundrabad Assembly and Lok Sabha constituencies. In no other city could these parties put up their candidates. The rest of the candidates scattered here and there in the districts; none of them was popular nor did any have any backing in the villages. Those candidates were only old Socialists who had not yet fully deserted the defunct party in the State, particularly in the districts. In 1967, the S.S.P. was able to drag out a city millionaire, Badri Visal Pitti, to contest as its candidate for a constituency where the business community was dominant.⁷⁵

The Republican Party with no sitting member in the State Assembly and no organization, fielded eleven candidates for Assembly and two for Lok Sabha. In fact, the party and its leaders were little known in the State. All the candidates of the Republican Party were from the backward class, and, of the eleven, six candidates were from the East and West Godavari districts and the rest scattered. The Party Secretary, J. Eswari Bai, as in earlier elections, contested against her old rival, the Women's Welfare Minister, Sadalakshmi, also from the backward class.

The two candidates who contested for Lok Sabha were also from the East Godavari district and were the same candidates who also contested for Assembly seats.⁷⁶

The Majlis Ittehadul Muslim Party, restricting itself to twin cities, contested for two Lok Sabha seats and seven Assembly seats rather than the eight Assembly seats it had contested for in the 1962 elections. Its only sitting member and Chief of the Party, Salahuddin Owasi, who defeated a

powerful Congress Muslim Minister in the 1962 elections, was again a candidate for a muslim majority Chairman or Assembly constituency (to defeat in 1967 yet another Muslim minister). Its other active member, Khaja Nizamuddin, who was defeated in 1962 by a Congress Muslim Candidate, Rasheed, was again a candidate against the same Rasheed but this time defeated him. The Party could not put up its candidates to all the eleven constituencies in the twin cities. All its candidates were Muslims with little knowledge of State politics.

Tenneti Viswanatham, President and only sitting member of the Praja Party, contested in 1967 from Visakhapatnam Assembly and Lok Sabha Constituencies. In 1962 he contested from two Assembly constituencies. He was the only candidate of his party to contest.

Goparaju Ramachandra Rao, popularly known in India as "Gora", was one of the important candidates and was spokesman of the three Partyless Democracy candidates who contested in the 1967 elections in Andhra Pradesh. The Partyless Democracy, a movement started by "Gora" himself, should be watched in the future with care and attention for its impact on Indian politics.

There were also three Muslim League candidates, a branch of the Indian Muslim League, started just before the fourth elections in Andhra Pradesh. Osman Bin Saleh, the only candidate of the League in Muslim Majority areas of Hyderabad, was a splitter group member of Salahuddin Owasi controlled Ittehadul Muslim Majlis Party.

For 60 Assembly seats, except Congress, no other party was able to put up its own candidates, though some of those parties supported the independents

who contested against the Congress candidates. Never before were so many independents supported by parties nor were there ever so many constituencies left out by opposition parties in nominating their candidates.

The number of candidates, both independents and of parties who contested in 1967 for different Assembly seats, was:

55 constituencies	2 candidates (direct)
79 constituencies	3 candidates
76 constituencies	4 candidates
47 constituencies	5 candidates
18 constituencies	6 candidates
10 constituencies	7 candidates

Dr. K.L. Rao, a Union Minister, was declared elected unopposed in 1967 when no party, including the Communists, put any candidate to oppose him in Vijayawada Lok Sabha constituency, where the Communists were supposed to have had enough strength and party organization to oppose him. K.L. Rao's increased prestige and popularity in the area and the fact that he was not an active Congress worker prevented the Communists and Swatantra from nominating their candidates.⁷⁷

Similarly, two Congress candidates from two Telengana Assembly constituencies were not opposed by any candidate. In 1962 six Congress candidates were elected unopposed.⁷⁸

The final party and independent candidates in the contest in 1967 elections for both Assembly and Lok Sabha seats were as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Lok Sabha</u>	<u>Assembly</u>
Congress	40	285
Communists (R)	20	102
Swatantra	19	89
Communists (L)	11	83
Jan Sangh	7	79
S.S.P.	3	9

<u>Party</u>	<u>1st Stage</u>	<u>Assembly</u>
P.S.P.	1	5
Republican	2	11
Majlis	2	7
Praja Party	1	1
Partyless Democracy	0	3
Independents	<u>56</u>	<u>401</u>
Total Candidates	62	464

All the opposition parties announced their "tentative lists" of constituencies (but not candidates) that they were planning to contest by the first week of December 1966--two weeks before the final list of Congress candidates was made public. Some of the important names of candidates and their constituencies were only announced by the opposition parties in their tentative lists. These names and their constituencies were announced because they have to first study and observe the Congress candidates' list before they can nominate their own party candidates.

Various factors that might have influenced the Congress in selecting a particular candidate in a particular constituency should have to be considered by the other parties which were proposing to nominate their candidates for those seats. These opposition parties had to take into consideration other factors like caste, religion, family, and the local standing of the Congress candidate.⁷⁷

Caste was also taken into consideration in most cases when a particular caste was most prevalent in a particular constituency. When a particular caste was prevalent in a constituency, it was only natural for every contesting party to have its candidate from that caste. However, it was not always the case. When the Nellore district is taken here to cite as

an example, one finds that against a Reddy Congress candidate in Darsi constituency a Kamma Swatantra candidate won. In its neighboring Kandukur constituency the Swatantra Party nominated a Reddy candidate against a Kamma Congress candidate. In another neighboring constituency a Reddy Congress candidate was against a Reddy who was nominated as a Swatantra candidate. Similarly, in Pamarru Assembly constituency in East Godvari district against a Congress Kamma rich candidate who was also a former minister, a Reddy was sponsored as an independent in that majority Kamma population constituency; but still the independent Reddy won that seat.

But the caste factor cannot always be discounted. For example, the Congress selects its candidate in some constituencies on the basis of caste and religion. In Charminar and Asifnagar Assembly constituencies in Hyderabad, the Congress was particularly bent upon putting in Muslim candidates only, in spite of 40 percent non-Muslims in those areas. Even then in only one of these two constituencies was Congress able to win, while in others it stood third--behind the Jan Sangh candidate who was new to politics scoring far better than Congress and a Majlis Muslim candidate winning the seat. Sanjeevayya was defeated because he did not take the caste factor into account. He preferred non-Reddis in all the Assembly constituencies that constituted his Lok Sabha constituency where the Reddis were in the majority. But in Duggirala in Guntur district where Kammas and Reddis were almost equal in number, the Kamma independent candidate, Siva Prasad, lost even his deposit, and Congress Reddy candidate won the seat over another Reddy independent with a margin of less than 500 votes.⁸⁰

In all, the caste factor was well described when Joseph R. Gusfield said

that "caste is by no means the sole nor the dominant social base of the contesting forces."⁸¹ As he further rightly pointed out "in many elections the classic U.S. pattern of 'balancing tickets' occurs."⁸²

CHAPTER V
F
FACTORS AND FORCES

Indian voters submit to group pressures rather than to rational calculations of the national interest; but so, indeed, do far too many British voters, especially those who are bound to trade union discipline. 83

There are several factors which accounted for the striking success of the Congress Party despite all the odds against it prevalent in the pre-election period in the State as elsewhere in other parts of the country.

In addition to the issues and factors that played a significant part in the election and its results, there were some striking forces that were at work long before the electioneering started. To the ministerial group headed by Chief Minister Kasu, it was a matter of keeping up its leadership by getting as many of its supporters in the party as possible to succeed in the general elections. A look at the forces that worked as undercurrents within the Congress Party will give an understanding of the factors which played an important role in the general elections in Andhra Pradesh.

Awareness of the reasons for the "anti-Sanjeewa Reddy" growth in the State, besides the personal dislikes and the reasons that led to those personal dislikes, may help to gain an understanding of the "electorate" behavior and the forces that worked in the elections.⁸⁴

At the outset it should be made clear that as far as Andhra Pradesh politics are concerned there were no urban-rural politics as such--there were only rural politics. That is, the role of urban politicians was insignificant at the State level. Even at the district level those leaders in

the Congress Party, either holding some offices in cities or not, were never dominant.⁸⁵ In fact, 82 percent of Andhra's electorate lives in its 27,900 villages.

As Gusfield pointed out, "Politically, the major cities of India are less and less the foci of political power. The support of the Congress Party increasingly comes to rest on rural bases...."⁸⁶ So far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned, even the minor or small towns do not play any significant role in the power politics of the Congress Party. The political situation was rightly assessed by Phillip Altaback, "The real power within the Congress Party lies within the regional-based political leaders."⁸⁷

The city politics, except for the twin cities (Hyderabad and Secunderabad) and to a small extent Visakhapatnam, Guntur, and Vijayawada, are played by rural-based leaders themselves. Even those politicians of the twin cities, Vijayawada and Guntur have never had an independent and dominating say in the State politics or in their district politics.

Under these conditions, it is the men who are in control of Samithi, Zilla Parishad, Village Panchyat, Village Taluk, and district cooperatives, and other "offices", "committees", and "Boards", that influence and direct the electorate at large.⁸⁸

The man who is able to win the confidence and support of all those men in the ring in the area will have bright chances in any election. And these people are the mainstay for anyone to become a leader either at State level or at district level. That is, those who can influence these men in the ring in a district will be in a position to turn the electorate at large towards his leadership, his group, and his Party. The methods and

messages he selects and uses for this purpose should be such that they effectively appeal to the men in the ring at the district level.

The Congress in the State has always been "a coalition of State and local factions based on various conflicts."⁸⁹ The more "partners" in the coalition the stronger it is, though the possibility of its breaking down and forming a new coalition is always present.

The basis for such a coalition may be regional conflict, caste rivalry, or, as is more often the case in Andhra Pradesh, personal interest and ambition. As Ram Joshi points out, "the operational style seems to be identical--to align and realign themselves with the factions in the party for the control of Party and Government offices."⁹⁰ But as Paul Brass brought out, the conflicts at lower levels are based "upon a struggle for personal prestige" also.⁹¹

The inner-Party fights may be found in (1) the Krishna district between Steelman Kakani on one side and the Rajas (Challapalli, Nuzvid, Mylavaram Rajas) on the other side; (2) the Guntur district, between the Kasu family and the Jagarlamudi family; (3) The Chittoor district between the Tambalapalli family and others; and (4) the Warangal district between Ramachandra Reddy and former Jagirdars. These conflicts are primarily for prestige in the district and then, as Josehi points out, to get control of the "offices". When sitting M.L.A., for example, is refused a ticket, he will consider it as damaging to his prestige in that constituency or area.

The Congress candidates are elected not for their policies or philosophies but for their influence and capabilities in championing local or regional demands, caste, and for bringing together the men in the ring in a constituency,

in a district or at State level for a coalition.

The bitter inner-party struggle for power and prestige within the Congress Party between the ministerialists and the dissidents and the method and message in this struggle by the ministerialists have made their decisive contributions to the victory of their own group first and then to the victory of the Congress Party at the 1967 polls.

Until the end of 1965 Sanjeeva Reddy was considered to be the "strongman" of Andhra Congress with solid backing behind him in spite of ever present anti-Sanjeeva Reddy feeling, though during a brief interlude (1960-1962) Sanjeevayya--Satyanarayana Raju managed the State Politics. With Sanjeeva Reddy's "nominee" and long time confidant Kasu, rebelling against his former "boss", the former became only a leader of the dissidents, struggling to keep his prestige and hold over the State Congress.⁹²

Before going further one has to understand the situation that prevailed during the period within the Congress and within the State in general. In general the Kammas at large were regretting the state of affairs under Sanjeeva Reddy--his managing the State affairs in the Party and the government was often referred to as "Reddi-Raj" by non-Reddis including Brahmins. Those strongmen of the district party who were overlooked at the instance of hand picked men were awaiting an opportunity; and those people--both Reddis and non-Reddis--in Telengana, who were not given ministerial or other posts or against whose local political enemy Sanjeeva Reddy was showing favor, were looking for a chance for Sanjeeva Reddy to realize their importance. While in the Circars, the story was a long one going back to the 1950's

Circar districts have always had a decisive role in Andhra politics.

Without the substantial backing of those areas and their leaders, no one is sure of getting control of the party and government in the State.

It was with the support of Krishna district leaders that Sanjeeva Reddy was able to win over N.G. Ranga in the crucial and deadly fight of 1951. Since that time Sanjeeva Reddy had used different tactics to keep his hold in the districts. In every district, he undermined or ignored the strong leaders and hand picked either old and retired or entirely new members of the Party as his men in the district. Keeping these men at the helm of affairs in the districts, he overloaded the government offices and public posts with "Reddis" or with his pocket-men, always trying to suppress Circar Kammas wherever possible and ignoring the area when it came to the important allocation of plan projects, saying that the other backward areas should be developed first.

Soon after the Andhra State was formed, the people of the Vijayawada and Krishna districts were particularly desirous of getting a bridge over the Krishna river to connect the Krishna district with the Guntur district. It is these two districts together with the Godavari districts that are most important, politically, agriculturally, and culturally, and it is in these districts that Kamma rich people were in the majority. When Sanjeeva Reddy did not evince much interest, the then Chief Minister Prakasam, a man from a Circar district with all his political hold in those districts, took interest and sanctioned the bridge.⁹³

Then, bus transportation was the most important industry of the Circar Kammas, the mainstay of the politicians of the area. With Sanjeeva Reddy becoming the Chief Minister of integrated Andhra Pradesh, he took up

the nationalization of bus transportation starting with the Krishna district against mounting discontent from Circars in general because the nationalization plan was aimed at nationalizing all bus transportation in all important Circar districts one after the other.⁹⁴

Whenever discontent mounted against Sanjeeva Reddy, he gave a "post" to a Circar Kamma or organized some high level conference of the Party and government in those districts.⁹⁵

The other issue was the Krishna-Godavari water dispute between Andhra-Maharashtra-Mysore. It should be mentioned here that this was one of the major issues for Alluri Satyanarayana Raju mobilizing his strength in the Party and directing that strength against Sanjeeva Reddy during the period of 1960-1962. On the Krishna-Godavari water dispute, passions were widespread throughout the State over the possibility of injustice to the State. There was criticism of Sanjeeva Reddy for his apathy on the issue and for his attempt to keep up his own cordial relations with Mysore and other Central leaders as in the case of the 1966-67 steel plant issue.⁹⁶

The other most important and more recent issues for the 1967 elections were the Godavari Road-Cum-Rail Bridge at Rajahmundry and the Steel plant at Visakhapatnam. The Godavari Road-Cum-Rail Bridge over the Godavari River near Rajahmundry was a demand of four Circar districts for about four years. During that period a Congress worker or a youth leader had undertaken a fast for every few months, and they had been given assurances by the Chief Minister (Sanjeeva Reddy) several times.

The bridge, when built, will connect Calcutta, Vijayawada, Madras, and Travancore by road, but it was more helpful to the people of the East and

West Godavari, Vizag and Srikakulam districts. The bridge required funds of over one crore rupees. The demand of the Congress leaders of the area was that Madras State was able to get things done at the Center for similar bridges, but Sanjeeva Reddy was not pursuing the matter at the Center with interest. The people of the area went to the extent of trying to raise half of the cost of the bridge, but they were only able to get "assurances."⁹⁷

The Visakapatnam steel plant issue was a more openly fought issue between Sanjeeva Reddy and Kasu, who was backed by anti-Sanjeeva Reddy forces within the Congress, and between the Congress and combined opposition parties. It was over this issue that an unusual condition prevailed in the State just before the 1967 elections, leading to the circumstances that reminded the nation of the 1953 Andhra linguistic violent agitation. And it was over this issue that a little less than one-fourth of the Legislative Assembly, all the opposition parties, resigned en bloc. Just before the electioneering started, there were sudden outbursts all over the State, particularly in Circars and Telengana, which led to large scale violence, and transportation and communications were completely paralyzed.⁹⁸

Tenneti Viswanatham viewed the Center's attitude on the issue as a "conspiracy against Andhras to kill the great movement for the fifth steel plant."⁹⁹ While the Swatantra leader, Latchanna, more accurately pointed out that "the steel plant issue had become a victim of group rivalry and regionalism in the Congress ranks."¹⁰⁰ The Chief Minister, Kasu, said that the denial of the steel plant would be "stark injustice" to Andhra.¹⁰¹

On this steel plant issue Sanjeeva Reddy, the Chief Minister of the State when the whole issue was taken up for the first time, and later

Union Minister of Steel, was solely blamed by all sections of people in Andhra, particularly by all opposition and Circar leaders. The feeling against Sanjeeva Reddy on the issue was so high in the Circars that a bronze statue of Sanjeeva Reddy, installed in Vijayawada City with great difficulty, was broken into pieces and thrown into a nearby canal though it was under continuous police guard.¹⁰²

As in the case of the river water dispute issue, Sanjeeva Reddy was blamed openly by both Congress and opposition members who believed that he was trying to avoid any conflict or differences with the Congress President, Kamaraj, and the Mysore Chief Minister, Nijalingappa, a Syndicate Partner, by pressing for the steel plant. He was blamed for not making any decision when he was Union Steel Minister and an important member of the Union Cabinet.¹⁰³ In fact, Sanjeeva Reddy was accused in the State by the opposition as well as Congress members in the Assembly for his not making any sincere attempt to get any big Central industries located in the State.

Under these circumstances, one is "free to excite the losers in past strife to new vengeance--and the victors to new aggrandizement," and cash in on the outcome.¹⁰⁴ That was what Chief Minister Kasu did to assert his leadership position and his group's victory within the Party first and then in the 1967 general elections.

No one will deny the fact that whether it be in India or the United States local issues make a forceful impact on the minds of the people of the locality. Chief Minister Kasu, first strengthened his position within the Congress Party by using the same issues as mentioned above among the legislators and then the P.C.C. members to win over the control of government

and Party organization. He appointed the disappointed leaders in the Party from different regions under Sanjeeva Reddy's leadership: P. Timma Reddy was made P.C.C. President, V.B. Raju was made chairman of the highly paid Road Transport Corporation, Sidda Reddy became president of the A.P. Land Mortgage Bank and P.C.C. Secretary. All these important anti-Sanjeeva Reddy leaders in the districts, discounted for years, were looked upon and favored in their works.¹⁰⁵

Then in the second phase Chief Minister Kasu's maneuverings included the appointment of two more ministers, both from Circar districts, one from the Nellore district to counteract the dissident leader, A.C., also from the same district and to discount his position. This new minister appointed from the Nellore district was a Kamma, Chenchurama Naidu.¹⁰⁶ The second minister was from the West Godavari district neglected by Sanjeeva Reddy for years by not giving the district any representation in his earlier Cabinets.

In the Telenganaareas Kasu took up the interests of the 32 member National Democratic Front in the Assembly and initiated their becoming full-fledged members of the Congress Party. He had already accommodated the unemployed Telengana leader, V.B. Raju, earlier. In Rayalaseema he joined hands with anti-Sanjeeva Reddy old Congress leader, K. Obula Reddy (Chairman of the A.P. Agricultural University until the February 1967 election). Later, with Sanjeevayya joining hands with his foe, Sanjeeva Reddy, Sanjeevayya's personal rivals in the district politics who were otherwise followers of Sanjeeva Reddy, became staunch supporters of Chief Minister Kasu's official group.¹⁰⁷

The episode of the P.E.C. eleventh member election has been dealt with

in Chapter III. The candidate selected by Kasu for that election was Steelman Kakani. Kakani Venkataratnam was a long time popular and sincere Congress leader of the Krishna district and the leading figure of the anti-Sanjeeva Reddy forces. Steelman Kakani long before the election in August 1966, when Sanjeeva Reddy-Sanjeevayya-Raghuramaiah and the A.C. group joined hands against Chief Minister Kasu, led a campaign among legislators and P.C.C. members in support of Kasu leadership in the State and at the same time regretted Sanjeeva Reddy's meddling in State politics. A series of Press statements containing the same by P.C.C. members and legislators of each district were published in all the daily newspapers in the State.

After the decisive victory in the inter-Party election, the ministerial group stage was the voters at large in the State. The P.C.C. President and Kasu long before the elections of February 1967, during July-September 1966, while canvassing for the P.E.C. election, met the district leaders and men in the ring and won the moods of not only P.C.C. members who were voters for the P.E.C. election but also of the voters of the 1967 general election in general.

As the anti-Sanjeeva Reddy feeling was more deeply widespread throughout the State, particularly after the November 9 convention of Congressmen, Sanjeeva Reddy went down to Hyderabad especially to distribute a written statement to the Press aimed at placing "a few facts before the public to clarify my position regarding the steel plant and to remove any misunderstandings on this account in the public mind which, I know, certain interested persons have created."¹⁰⁸ Sanjeeva Reddy further said in his statement that "some mischievous elements are going about misleading the public....I

know that this mischief is being done for political reasons.... It is the leaders (aiming at Kasu) who will have to make sacrifices instead of bringing suffering to innocent people by their selfish actions."¹⁰⁹ In his statement it was also mentioned that he did not believe in "exploiting" the feelings of the people of the State and "whipping up emotions."¹¹⁰ The Hindustan Times noted when Steelman Kakani won in the P.E.C. election against Sanjeeva Reddy's candidate that, "Mr." Brahmananda Reddy (Kasu), fully exploited the "conspiracy" of the two Central ministers "against the State leaders" to his advantage and got rich dividends."¹¹¹ A correspondent of The Times of India noted on this issue that "opposition parties in Andhra are not immune from these features, and it would have been surprising if they had not plumped for exploiting to the utmost in the impending general election the feelings that have been roused among the people of the State over the demand for the location of the fifth steel plant...."¹¹² When a Press reporter asked the P.C.C. president whether the steel plant issue would affect the Congress Party chances at the polls, he said that "he did not consider that the steel plant issue would affect the Congress chances for the facts were before the people and also the emphatic manner in which the Chief Minister had ably pleaded the State's case."¹¹³

Chief Minister Kasu and his group also added to their credit along with the Chief Minister's fight for the steel plant, the establishment of some big public sector projects and the creation of a new South-Central Railway Zone.¹¹⁴

Not surprisingly, the opposition parties, as noted in the first chapter, were able to resign from the Assembly en bloc and were able to encourage

some anti-social elements on the steel plant issue. But they failed to carry it down to the villages and to appeal to the men in the ring in the districts. Moreover, when the government, headed by the Kasu group, itself was so firm on the issue as any other opposition party was, and as the Chief Minister's appeal to all those men in the ring who had already been impressed with his maneuverings, the opposition message was not so appealing or attractive to the voters at large as to make an effect on them.¹¹⁵ However, the impact of the steel plant issue on the 1967 elections together with the organizational weakness of the Congress and the strength of the Swatantra Party in Srikakulam and Vizag districts will be found in Chapter VI.

Except for Nalgonda Zilla Parishad, all the other 19 Parishads and more than three-fourths of the 321 Panchyati Samithis in the State were firmly in the grip of the Congress Party--either in the hands of the Sanjeeva Reddy group or in the hands of those who were anti-Sanjeeva Reddy--supporting Kasu. With the firm changeover of the State leadership from the Sanjeeva Reddy group to Kasu, a change or shift of allegiances of those Panchyati Raj men was also seen in favor of Kasu, the man in power.

As Hugh Gray pointed out, "Key figures in rallying support for Assembly candidates are the presidents of Panchyate Samithis, who are powerful individuals able to dispense much patronage."¹¹⁶ These offices afford convenient levers to control the rural people. That is why the faction leader in the Congress and the Congress Parties make every bid first to get control of these organizations, including cooperatives, as pointed out by Paul Brass.¹¹⁷

After becoming Chief Minister, Kasu slowly approached and appealed to

the people in charge of those Ranchyati Raj institutions, through the strongmen of the districts, as well as directly, and he was able to turn the majority of them to his side. These strongmen of the district had already been approached, and in fact, they were also part and parcel of the ministerial group.

The administrative machinery, as mentioned in earlier chapters, was paralyzed subsequent to 400,000 non-gazetted officers going on strike during early January 1967. After prolonged discussions and negotiations which dragged on until the end of January, the government announced a "pre-election gift" of an "immediate D.A. raise and further promise to boost it to that of Central Government employees."¹¹⁸ The Chief Minister also announced that his "Government would introduce University Grants Commission pay scales in all colleges" costing the State government rupees 13 crores per year.¹¹⁹ With these two announcements by the Congress government just before the elections, no government employee was left out without a raise in his salary. On the other side, the procurement rate of Paddy was already increased to benefit the bulk of the voting community--farmers.

Andhra Pradesh, being the rice bowl and granary, had not worried much on the troubled food front in the country before the fourth general elections. The pre-election widespread discontent over rising prices was compensated just before the elections with a raise in D.A. and the Paddy procurement rate, both affecting about 60 percent of the voters. Many other promises and assurances and, of course, some new schemes for agricultural labor had already been taken up as usual.

One of the main election issues of a few powerful independents like Vavilala Gopala Krishnayya, Praja Party Tenneti, Swatantra Party Latchanna, and even the Communists in all the earlier elections was that of making Telugu an official language. In January 1967, just before the fourth general elections, Telugu was made an official language of the State before electioneering further intensified the issue.¹²⁰

The much publicized cow protection agitation in pre-election India was not at all an election issue in Andhra Pradesh at the State level. In fact the agitation itself had not entered the State nor had it become widespread enough to affect the electorate. However, one M.L.A. resigned from the Assembly on that issue, and a few Jan Sangh sympathizers attempted to spread it outside the twin cities but did not succeed.¹²¹

A Swatantra Party candidate said in Bombay before the elections, "Swatantra would have had a 'landslide victory' if the Sankaracharya had continued his fast. The breaking of the fast had taken away the Party's advantages."¹²² Still, wherever there were sincere workers of Jan Sangh, like Nellore, Vijayanagaram, Bhimevaram, Rajahmundry, Nizamabad and Warangal, they tried constantly to make the "cow" a major issue. But wherever they tried to make it an issue, there were Right Communists who particularly openly opposed the Jan Sangh activities including their cow protection agitation. The State Council of the Right Communists passed a resolution saying that its workers and people "should oppose the Jan Sangh activity on cow protection agitation as it was trying to rouse passions among the people on the basis of caste and community."¹²³ Further, the Congress Government in the State was very careful to avoid the cow protection agitation

as an election issue. The Government had agreed in December 1966 to introduce a legislation on cow slaughter. 124

Thus, most of the issues which the opposition parties, individually and unitedly, tried to make their important election slogans failed to rouse any passions or response.

Money was an important factor in the ability of not only the Congress organization and its candidates but also of other parties and their candidates, too. And its impact, directly and indirectly, on the voter was more visible than any other single factor mentioned. The Congress was able to use not only much more money than any other party but also its candidates were in a much better position to press in the money in their respective constituencies. In addition, the Congress was able also to encash the government patronage, at Samithi, Parishad, and State level, in the forum of more workers to work for it and more votes of minority communities.

All the parties and their candidates had known well the impact of money in elections since the 1955 elections when the Congress used all its "command" to collect "lump sums in amounts of hundreds of thousands of rupees without detailing their expenditures."¹²⁵ It was freely assumed in fact by all involved in elections that much money was spent particularly where the important personalities were involved. One who would be on the election scene particularly in the last two or three days could find how the purse strings would be loosened to win over the uncommitted among the voters. In certain areas large sums of money would be distributed through middlemen-- "contractors." B. Nageswar Rao, a seasoned journalist in Andhra politics, reported referring to the role of money in elections, "In most cases, the

giver is not sure that the receiver will faithfully discharge his contractual obligations. It is, therefore, stipulated that the voters, if they are a chunk, should refrain from exercising their franchise to qualify for the payment."¹²⁶

Government patronage would be encashed in the form of votes by Congress candidates. The local president of the Zilla Parishad or Samithi or a Cooperative Society, who was extending his support to the candidate, would assure, promise or pass orders for a connecting road, a water tank, a Dhobhi Khana, a community listening set, a village labor housing society for Harijans, a school or a building for any one of them, or a job opportunity to the sons or daughters of an important man of the washermen, barbers, Harijans or to some other village minority community or association, in return for their bulk votes. If the village were small and compact, the deal would be for a bus route to the village, a Cooperative Society, a school, a hospital, a connecting road to the nearby town, or the repairing of a village temple, and so on.

But where the voters of those minority communities were politically minded, they would accept the money from the candidate, not for the candidate's "conditions" which were to abstain from voting or to come and stay in the candidate's camp before going for voting or not to allow any other candidate or his men into their community. But candidates or their followers might even compete among themselves to accept those voters' conditions. For example, in Kavali, Mudinepalli, Vuyyuru, Tanuku, Pamarru constituencies of Nellore, Krishna, East and West Godavari districts, voters of those minority communities in certain villages had accepted the money or

other assurances or work from or by candidates, only if they were allowed to exercise their vote.

Two tendencies in this process should be mentioned here. A tendency on the part of the contesting candidates, whether it be a Panchyat election or a general election, was that of "subscribing" or "donating" a lump sum of money to a particular work or project the community was in need or might like to have instead of paying money through a middleman. In this way the candidate might not only develop more cordial relations with the community, but also even if he were defeated, some of his works would remain as a sort of investment for his future. The voters in the community or village also found this method acceptable because in the earlier "cash payment system," they all did not know how much money was involved in the "deal" between the middleman and the candidate. Moreover, because of an increased in their political consciousness, the new method was more acceptable than the earlier one.

This way, the particular community or village was also able to avoid pressures from all sides by contesting candidates or their followers, leading to groups or factions at village or community level. These voters would ask the candidates or their agents to come to an understanding between them so that they could cast their votes for the man who gave more or undertook a "big work." In the Kandukur constituency, Nellore district, three hundred voters of a compact village "put up a large banner at the entrance to the village that their votes would be available to the highest bidder."¹²⁷

Thus, candidates who were in possession of money or who were able to mobilize the local moneyed men or who had the support of men in control of

the local institutions always had better chances of winning an Assembly or Lok Sabha seat. Congress Party and its candidates had all those advantages over the other parties and their candidates. Those who had the above advantages but were denied a Congress ticket contested in the elections as independents with those factors as their "opening balance" or "stock in trade."

The electioneering is becoming costlier election after election not only because of the rise in prices but also because of competition among contesting candidates.

The Congress Party in the State was able to collect about rupees 1,300,000 from those who had applied for its ticket as a deposit besides their regular annual membership fund and donations from the public.¹²⁸ This money in addition to its candidates' own expense, was used for financing the few financially weaker candidates, for supplying the wall posters, for pressing into service transportation vehicles, for entertaining troops (drama, Burrakatha), etc.

Yet another Congress election strategy was to give Lok Sabha tickets to industrialists or locally rich men, provided they were ready to contribute to the Party election fund or to finance all those candidates contesting for Assembly in that Lok Sabha constituency. In the Guntur district, the Narsarao Peta Lok Sabha seat was given to a big business magnate, Maddi Sudarsanam, the Masulipatnam seat to a local Zamindar, I. Ankinedu, and the Ongolu seat to a cine actor, Kongara Jaggayya, all of whom were ready to finance the Assembly candidates.

In Andhra Pradesh, because of the bitter group rivalries with the

Congress Party, the group leaders also financed their supporters. When a Press reporter asked A.C., the dissident leader, about the election fund collection, he said that there "might be truth in the allegations that the official group had collected rupees 5 lakhs from P.W.D. contractors."¹²⁹ His allegation was that the money so collected was being used only for the official group. Writing on the Andhra Congress split and inner sabotage of the Congress candidates, The Overseas Hindustan Times commented that "prominent leaders will be special targets of the dissidents and a lot of money and energy is proposed to be spent in seeing them out."¹³⁰ The Hindu commented that "many Congress candidates feel that if they are to retain their seats, they will have to spend more and work harder."¹³¹ It further noted that "first and foremost is the feeling among opposition candidates that the Congress is weaker than in the past and that a little more determined effort in terms of men and money will be electorally rewarding."¹³²

The pattern of companies' contributions to political parties had undergone a significant change in the 1967 elections. The Congress and Swatantra parties received the lion's share of companies' contributions. In the 1962 elections the pattern of company donations to Congress and Swatantra was at 70:30 rate; but in 1967 this rate had changed to almost 50:50 between both parties.¹³³

In Andhra Pradesh, Congress has had contributions from all big businessmen though the details were not available. The Swatantra Party for the first time tried, though unsuccessfully, to collect rupees one million for elections in the State. The Party President, G. Latchanna, "appealed to the workers of the Party to raise a fund of at least Rs. 10 lakhs to fight the

Congress in 150 constituencies."¹³⁴ The Left Communists were able to collect rupees 150,000 within a few days before the electioneering started in order to start a daily newspaper.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESULTS

This chapter deals with an analysis of the results of the 1967 elections which were collected through various sources. This part, however, is no statistical substantiation for what has been said in the earlier chapters which described the setting, parties, candidates and the climate of the political community in Andhra Pradesh. It should be further made clear, that as no on-the-spot investigations were undertaken to interview voters, candidates, party leaders and election officers, no attempt is made here to build charts or graphs to reveal any voting behavior in depth or voters' motives. What is attempted in this chapter is to analyze the impact of literacy on election turnout, the number of candidates contested for each seat and its impact on the performance of parties, and the pattern of performance by parties in Andhra Pradesh since the 1955-1957 elections.

Literacy and Voters' Turn Out

Though "whether mere literacy makes a person more knowledgeable in politics is a debatable point," particularly in the Indian context, there is no doubt of a direct relation of literacy with the increased voters' participation in any voting.¹³⁵ The "percentage of people who go to the polls will increase with the increase of literacy."¹³⁶

However, irrespective of literacy, the election turn-out might increase in the background of the prevailing political atmosphere. That is, if the contest is between two popular and powerful candidates, they will make every

Table 2. Literacy and votes polled invalid*

No.	District in rank	Literacy rate percentage	Percentage of votes polled	Percentage of votes invalid of polled
1	Krishna	31.2	79.009	3.5
2	West Godavari	30.8	78.8	3.0
3	Guntur	27.7	73.4	3.008
4	East Godavari	26.0	73.8	3.6
5	Cuddaph	21.8	65.0	3.94
6	Kurnool	21.4	71.6	3.55
7	Nellore	21.1	72.2	4.0
8	Chittoor	20.9	70.55	3.263
9	Anantapur	20.6	67.1	4.55
10	Vizag	17.2	63.9	4.1
11	Srikakulam	15.7	60.1	5.3
12	Warangal	15.4	69.2	4.9
13	Khammam	15.2	78.8	3.8
14	Nizamabad	14.3	52.5	4.2
15	Medak	14.1	62.2	4.08
16	Nalgonda	14.1	68.8	3.34
17	Mahboobnagar	13.5	58.5	3.54
18	Karimnagar	12.9	55.9	4.7
19	Adilabad	11.7	63.0	3.99
20	Hyderabad	35.0	54.9	3.07

*The table was prepared by the author based on the individual Lok Sabha constituency results in the State. A study based on the Assembly constituencies instead would be much more detailed and might reveal in depth the difference of literacy, political consciousness, and keen contests to "turnout."

bid to reach every voter and bring him to the polling station, or if the constituency is politically advanced because of its involvement in the Independence Movement, more voters might turn out.

But when there is an increased literacy, an increase in the election turn-out is certain and will be accompanied by a fall in invalid votes. Table No. 2 confirms this statement. However, it needs further explanation and clarification.

The district wide level of literacy is given in the above table in the order of its ranking. Though the election turn-out of the fourth general elections mentioned in the fourth column in Table No. 2 does not necessarily tally with the literacy rank in the third column, the table indicates the difference between one district and the other on the basis of their literacy rates. The percentages of invalid votes out of the total polled mentioned in the fifth column further strengthens the influence of literacy on voting patterns. The table reveals that where literacy is high, the possibilities of educated voters invalidating their votes because of their not knowing the procedure will be limited. But because of other reasons, the invalid votes may not reveal any change in literacy. That is, a voter may consciously invalidate his vote for reasons indicated earlier.

The table indicates no change on the percentage of invalid votes even when there was a high literacy and high turn-out of voters (Krishna and Nellore districts). In those two districts, the election contests were more bitter, their political consciousness was higher, and the political climate was clouded with severe group rivalries in both the Congress and

Communist Parties. It was in these two districts that the official and dissident groups in Congress Party supported independents directly against each other's candidate with an object of defeating the other. In fact, voters often confused who was the Congress candidate and who was not between an official Congress candidate and dissident supported independent or vice versa. Those independents were even referred to as "cycle Congress" or "star Congress."¹³⁷ The other reason for Krishna district which has high literacy, showing 3.5 percent "invalid," was that for Vijayawada Lok Sabha no election took place as Dr. K.L. Rao was elected unopposed. The invalid votes of two city constituencies of Vijayawada were only 1.5 percent.

The Hyderabad district in the table in spite of its highest literacy (35 percent) shows a low percentage of election turn-out. This was because out of 17 Assembly constituencies in the district, six were outside the city besides the villages included in city constituencies. Those villages are backward with little education or other facilities. The high percentage of 35 to the district is because of the high literacy rate in the twin cities. Except in Charminar constituency, the other contests in the district were neither bitter nor keen. The Cuddaph district indicates a comparatively low turn-out and high rate of invalid votes; this was not only because of its slight political consciousness but also because of lack of any keen competition in the contests between the parties. On the other hand, the Khammam district, which is often compared with the Krishna district for its key role in Telengana politics, has registered comparatively high voters (78.8) because of the high political consciousness in the district in general and stiff fights between the two locally well organized parties--the Congress

and Communists, which had almost equal strength before the elections. The Nalgonda district with 68.8 percent of turn-out is similar to that of Khammam.

Parties and Their Performances

From Tables No. 3 and No. 4 the performance pattern of different parties in Andhra Pradesh elections since 1957 may be seen. Though in terms of percentage of valid votes there is little to know about Congress, a look at the seats won and their percentages in total seats reveals a continuous downfall. But the Congress Party seems to have a hard core of strength in Andhra Pradesh. Not more than 10 seats have been lost by the Congress Party since 1957, a loss which is insignificant in view of the wide gap between the Congress strength and that of the major opposition party.

The Congress. A closer look at the Congress Legislature Party further reveals that though the Congress won only 187 and 177 seats in 1957 and in 1962 elections, respectively, the strength of the Party was increasing with another 20 to 30 members joining the Party ranks shortly before or long before the electioneering for the next general elections approached. The present strength of 165 members immediately after the 1967 election will increase to over 200 by independents joining the Congress. Those who were elected as independents in good numbers in 1967 had already started their maneuvers to join the Congress--the group which was in power. For the 1955-1957 elections the Ranga K.L.P. and Prakasam K.M.P.P. joined hands with Congress on the eve of elections. Soon after the Congress strengthened and stabilized its own position in the combined Assembly after the 1957 elections in Telegana, this partnership came to an end. But as the 1962 elections

Table 3. Percentage of votes polled and seats won

No.	Party	Seats won out of:		Percentage of valid votes polled		Percentage of seats won in total seats				
		300 1957	300 1962	287 1967	1957 1962	1962 1967	1957 1962	1962 1967		
1	Congress	187	177	165	44.3	47.4	45.07	62.3	59.0	57.38
2	Communists (R)	37	51	9	29.2	19.53	7.4	12.3	17.0	6.7
3	Communists (L)			10			7.9			
4	Swatantra*	22	19	29	5.0	10.40	9.9	7.3	6.3	10.17
5	Praja Socialists	16	0	0	5.6	0.5	0.19	5.3		
6	Socialists		2	1		0.61	0.37		0.68	0.35
7	Jan Sangh	0	0	3	0.1	1.04	2.2			1.04
8	Republican	0	0	2		0.40	0.34			0.14
9	Independents (including Praja Party and Majlis	61	53	68	23.3	20.48	24.8	20.3	17.66	23.7

*In the 1957 elections there was no Swatantra Party as such. But there was its forerunner, K.L.P. in the Andhra areas.

Table 4. Seats contested and won

No.	Party	Candidates setup		Seats won		Total votes polled		Average votes polled by each candidate		Percentage of increase or decrease in the average votes polled by a candidate in 1967 over his 1962 average	
		1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967		
		(300)(287)									
1	Unanimously										
2	Congress	294	285	177	165	5,523,359	6,326,143	18,411	22,193	+ 17.4	
	Communists (R)	136	103	51	10	2,282,767	1,027,307	16,785	9,973	- 16.9	
3	Communists (L)		83		9		1,097,626		13,224	+ 13.4	
4	Swatantra	140	90	19	29	1,245,987	1,382,430	8,685	15,360	- 25.5	
5	P.S.P.	6	2			34,732	27,673	5,788	13,836	- 35.1	
6	Socialists	15	2	2	1	70,873	52,489	4,725	26,245	+ 61.5	
7	Jan Sangh	69	80		3	121,721	316,654	1,764	3,958	+ 16.4	
8	Republicans	18	12		2	46,338	48,300	2,575	4,025	+ 9.65	
9	Independents (including Praja Party and Majlis)	302	402	51	68	2,393,445	3,526,923	7,925	8,773		

approached, its strength again increased to slightly over 200 members. In the 1962 elections, it won only 177 seats, but as the 1967 elections approached, its strength in the Assembly was 215. With the 1967 elections this strength has declined to 165, but a group of about 30-35 members who were elected as independents have already formed a "Party", the People's Democratic Party, similar to that found just before the 1967 elections, and are awaiting a chance to join the Congress treasure benches in the Assembly. In the 1962 elections six Congress candidates were unopposed, but in 1967 only two candidates escaped the election contest.

When the total votes polled is taken into consideration, the performance of Congress candidates was far more on the reverse. That is, though there was a slight increase in the total votes polled, the increase in the average votes polled by a Congress candidate was far below that of a similar increase in some other parties. This should also be viewed from the fact that there was a ten percent overall increase in the total electorate in the State over the 1962 electorate.

The average votes polled by each Congress candidate contested in the 1967 elections has increased to 22,193 (Table No. 4) from 18,411 in 1962, making a 17.4 percent increase in the average votes polled by a candidate in 1967 over his 1962 average. Whereas, the increase for a Swatantra Party candidate was 43.4 and 61.5 for a Jan Sangh candidate. In this respect also, the increase in the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh Parties represents a general trend revealed in the 1967 elections in other parts of the country, particularly in Northern States. On the other side, the left forces in general, Communists and Socialists, decreased in their percentages.

In the 1962 elections the Congress percentage of valid votes increased from 41.3 to 47.4, but its percentage of seats fell. While the Communists' percentage of valid votes has fallen from 29.2 in 1957 to 19.53 in 1962, the percentage of seats has increased from 12.3 to 17.0 for the same period. That is, until 1962 the electorate viewed the Communists as an alternative to Congress, Whereas, in the 1967 elections the percentage of votes polled by Congress, Communists and Swatantra all fell, but Swatantra was able to increase its seats over the 1962 seats. An increase in the percentage of votes polled, matched by an increase in the percentage of seats captured by the independents, Jan Sangh and the Republicans, is seen. The Praja Socialists and S.S.P. not only lost their percentage of seats but also the percentage of votes. The increase of votes and seats by the Republican Party, without even having an organization in the State, was not because of any improvements in its organization but only because of the voters' anti-Congress feeling expressed in those two constituencies where it won. In one constituency the President of the Republican Party was elected with the lowest number of votes (12,543) in spite of certain sections of Congress supporting him. While its second candidate, its Secretary, Eswari Bai, polled even less than the president (12,401) as against the lowest votes of 12,243 polled by any other successful candidate. The Congress candidates in both these constituencies, Allavaram and Yellreddi, polled 8,625 and 7,959, respectively. The success of Eswari Bai was not important for the voters especially to the official group Congressmen, nor was it their concern, but defeating the dissident Minister Sadalakshmi, against whom the Republican contested, was their concern.

Jan Sangh. The success of three Jan Sangh candidates also occurred in the same way. However, the Jan Sangh did put some effort into revitalizing the Party as a whole in those areas where it won. The cow protection agitation issue was not responsible for their success at all. All three seats the Jan Sangh won were the pockets where the merchant (Visya) community was in good number, although not in the majority; Vijayanagaram, Nellore and Parkhal, where it won, were the local towns; and those were the constituencies where the dissident ministers belonging to those districts were greatly involved in defeating the Congress official candidate. In Vijayanagaram, the Minister, P.V.G. Raju, with whose support the Congress candidate won in the 1962 election with over 30,000 majority votes over a Jan Sangh candidate, was much concerned with defeating the Congress candidate, Bhattam Srerama Murty, who forged a new alliance with Chief Minister Kasu's group against the Raju. In Nellore, the dissident Minister, A. C. Subba Reddy, without whose blessings it was difficult to win his home town, worked for the defeat of the Congress candidate, an old leader, V. Raghavayy. In Parkhal, Warangal district, the other dissident Minister, N. Ramachandra Reddy, was involved as the other two dissident ministers were involved in their home towns. As such, the success of two Republican candidates and three Jan Sangh candidates and their fielding large numbers of candidates in different constituencies was not an indication of their Party's strength at the time of the 1967 election.

The Communists. Until 1967, the Communists in all the elections were increasing the number of seats in the State Assembly, but there was a gradual fall in the percentage of the votes they were receiving. In the 1967 elections,

both the Communist Parties together showed not only decreases in their percentage of valid votes (about 4.0) but also decreases in the number of seats and the percentage in the total seats (Table No. 4). This should be viewed particularly from the fact that the Communists as a whole were expected to capture about 100 seats in Andhra Pradesh Assembly.

The split in the C.P.I. camp, as such, has also cost them although not in all the districts. The major drawback that they faced was that they could not offer many leading personalities as candidates. The other drawback was that both the Parties divided the Communist vote in about 45 constituencies where they opposed and fought each other as bitterly as in the fight between the Congress and Communist candidates in 1962. This could be seen from the fact that even when all the other parties and independents increased the average votes polled by each of their candidates, the Communist candidate, both left and right, together and separately reduced their average considerably. There was a decrease of 46.9 percent in the average votes polled by a single Communist candidate, not to speak of left or right, (Table No. 5). But there was not much difference in the total votes they polled in 1962 and in 1967. Though the percentage of votes polled by both the Communist Parties was only 4 percent less than their share in 1962, the seats' percentage had gone down sharply from 17 in 1962 to 6.7 (Table No. 3).

Swatantra Party. Though the Swatantra Party appears from Table No. 3 and Table No. 4 to have increased its position in terms of the number and the percentage of seats won and the total votes polled, in reality the Party has not gained any strength outside the Srikakulam district than what it had in

1962 or even when compared to its forerunner, K.L.P., in 1955. That is, there were at least five to six successful candidates to whom the Swatantra Party loaned its election symbol. Actually, all the 29 successful candidates on the Swatantra banner were not its workers or even members. Two of those successful candidates were given the Swatantra ticket when they were suspended or refused by the Congress. There were also three more candidates to whom it lent its "star" symbol. One of these successful candidates, Raja Rao, a retired I.A.S. officer who won the election on the Swatantra ticket made it clear soon after the election in a public meeting that he was not a Swatantra Party member but was an independent. There were two candidates like this from the Nellore district who contested the election on the Swatantra ticket with an ultimate object of defeating the Congress ministerialist candidates. The President and the Secretary of the Nellore District Congress openly supported and appealed for support to those Swatantra candidates. Some of these candidates were even referred to as "star Congressmen". To quote an interesting report of B. Nageswar Rao, the Nellore District Congress President,

"Mr. Chandra Sekhara Reddy and his colleagues have an embarrassing situation when the Congress President, Mr. Kamarej during his visit to Sullurpeta, appealed to the voters to support the local Congress candidate. As soon as the Congress President, accompanied by the Chief Minister, left Sullurpeta, Mr. Chandra Sekhara Reddy called back the people and from the same dais advised the voters to ignore the Congress President's appeal and to vote for the Swatantra candidate!"¹³⁸

Similarly,

"Mr. Krishna Reddy, the D.C.C. General Secretary, spoke from the same platform from which Professor L.G. Ranga addressed a large public meeting in Kavali and endorsed the Professor's plea for support to the Swatantra Party candidate...."¹³⁹

In both these constituencies, the Swatantra candidates (star Congressmen) won, defeating the Congress candidates.

The only district where the Swatantra Party had considerably improved and had solid success as a party against the Congress was in Srikakulam. In Srikakulam, the home district of State Party Chairman Latchanna, the Party improved from five seats in 1962 to ten in 1967. The personal hold of Goutu Latchanna and his individual effort to strengthen the party organization contributed more than any other factor to the success of the Swatantra Party in this district. Added to this, some of the Panchyata, Panchyat Samithis, and Cooperatives were in the hands of Swatantra Party (Latchanna) followers. However, the Vamsadara irrigation project, which was neglected by Congress for years, and the steel plant issues in a small way helped the Swatantra Party to mobilize their support.

The Swatantra Party was also cautious not to field too many candidates as in 1962. But still it could not successfully employ the "pocket technique" of concentrating its strength in a few selected areas. The total votes polled by the Swatantra Party in 1967 are significant. The total votes polled by it in 1962 were for 140 candidates whereas the increased votes polled in 1967 were for only 80 candidates, including those to whom it lent its symbol. But at the same time it should be recalled here that the Swatantra Party had a problem in finding suitable candidates.

Upon probing further into the electoral results since the 1955 elections in Andhra, it is seen that the Swatantra Party in the 1967 elections had not improved or made any inroads in areas where it did not have any strength even in 1955. The election success of Ranga-K.L.P. in 1955 in the Andhra

districts was similar to the election success of the Swatantra in 1967. However, the Swatantra improved in 1967 in terms of seats in Srikakulam, Nellore, Anantapur and Kurnool districts. It secured 7,5 and 10 seats in the Srikakulam district in the 1955, 1962 and 1967 elections, respectively. As stated earlier, the success of Swatantra candidates in Nellore was not a success of the Swatantra Party. Of the four candidates who won, only one, Dhanekula Marasimham, was an active party worker as a Ranga follower. Of the three candidates who won in the Anantapur and Kurnool districts one was not even a party member (Madakasira and Kodumuru constituencies). In the Cuddaph district four Swatantra constituencies unseated Swatantra candidates, and only one constituency returned a Swatantra candidate. One sitting Swatantra member, K. Mara Peddy, even after conducting a week-day's campaign as a Swatantra Party candidate for Rajempeta constituency, on the last day of nominations turned out as a Congress candidate for the same Rajempeta constituency where he had been elected in 1962 as a Swatantra candidate.

The defeat of N. G. Ranga in Chittoor Lok Sabha constituency in spite of Congress nominating its candidates with no hopes of winning is a case study for political analysts. The Congress could not "get hold" of any suitable candidate until the last days of nominations. Finally it was able to persuade Changalraya Waidu, a one-time "Pradham Shishya" of Ranga himself. He was also a brother of district Swatantra Party Chief, Krishnam Waidu, whose popularity was responsible for Ranga's earlier victory after the 1962 by-election. By nominating the one-time close follower of Ranga and a brother of the district Swatantra leader, the Congress was able to

make inroads into Naidu families and their popularity and divide their votes. At the outset, Changalraya Naidu agreed to contest against his "guru", not to defeat him but to get nominated to Rajya Sabha when he was defeated.¹⁴⁰

The pro-Sanjeeva Reddy Congress Party workers in the last days raised the bogey of regionalism against Ranga. Since Ranga was a native of the rich Guntur district, their slogan was that if Ranga was so interested in criticizing and defeating Congress, let him to to the rich circar districts and contest from there. A Congress candidate, if elected, could get some things done through the Congress Ministry, and what benefits had they gotten "by electing a circar leader in 1962" was their question to the voters¹⁴¹

Independents. From Table No. 3 and Table No. 4 it is found that in the 1967 elections "Independents", who included the Praja Party and Majlis candidate, reached an all time record both in terms of seats they obtained and the percentage of votes polled. However, the average votes polled by an independent candidate in the 1967 elections increased only 9.65 percent over his colleague in 1962. But this record was because of the increased number of independent candidates in 1967 (402) as compared with 1962 (302).

The percentage of votes polled by independents in Andhra Pradesh (Table No. 3) has always been less than the average of all india.¹⁴² Over 50 constituencies had been electing these independents regularly. Of the 287 constituencies in 1967, 68 elected independents. Of them, three contested as belonging to the Ithehadul Muslim Party and one contested as belonging to the Praja Party. Because of the rift-ridden Congress Party at all stages in the State, the independents polled and won a record number of votes and seats.

Table 5. Independents won in 1962 and 1967

No.	District	The average number of contestants for constituency	Independents	
			Won in 1962	Won in 1967
1	Srikakulam	3.1	2	5
2	Visakhapatnam	3.6	3	4
3	East Godavari	4.1	3	7
4	West Godavari	4.1	1	4
5	Krishna	3.1	1	4
6	Nellore	2.1	1	4
7	Mahaboobnagar	3.1	4	6
8	Hyderabad	4.2	2	5
9	Nizamabad	7.0	2	4
10	Warangal	4.4	2	4
11	Chittoor	3.1	3	2
12	Cuddaph	2.1	4	3
13	Anatapur	3.4	5	3
14	Kurnool	3.3	5	4
15	Guntur	4.0	4	2
16	Adilabad	3.2	2	1
17	Karimnagar	3.1	5	3
18	Medak	3.2	2	2
19	Khammam	4.4		
20	Nalgonda	4.1		1

Most of those 64 elected independents were either closely associated with Panchyati Raj or cooperative bodies, or they were people with financial resources or the backing of one section or another of the Congress Party.

From Table No. 5 it may be found that the more intense the division within the Congress Party in a district, the larger the number of independents who contested and won. That is, what the opposition parties together could no achieve--by forging a united front against the ruling Congress--the inner-Party groupism within the Congress Party had achieved in opposing official candidates by pooling and uniting the resources and men of at least certain opposition groups.

The larger the number of independents who won in Table No. 5, the more intense was the "sabotage" of Congressmen against the official candidates and the more bitter was the groupism in that district. Where one group of Congress was sufficiently strong, there, the other group could not support or put up actively many independents. In four Rayalaseema districts (Chittoor, Cuddaph, Anantapur, and Kurnool) where the dissidents were strong, the number of independent candidates who contested and won decreased over 1962. Similarly, in Guntur, Adilabad, Karimnagar, and Medak districts where the ministerialists were strong enough, the number of independent candidates who contested and won was less than in the previous election.

In districts where the groupism was deep there the number of contestants for each constituency was high. But, in crucial districts like Nellore and Krishna, where "men of prestige" of one group or the other or both the groups were involved, the number of contestants was less than in the other constituencies. Because, in those presitge constituencies, every attempt was made,

as mentioned earlier, to forge an understanding with other parties, whether it was Left or Right Communists or Swatantra, to nominate a common independent. To mention a few examples, in Vuyyuru and Mudinepalli constituencies where the steelman Kakani and big businessman B. Hanumanta Rao, key men of the ministerial group were involved, there was only a common independent against them, supported by all opposition parties and Congress dissidents. In Nellore district where the dissident leader, A.C., was contesting, there was an independent supported by the ministerialists and other opposition parties. In the neighboring constituencies there were also independents supported by dissidents and others against the Chief Minister's prestige candidates, G.C. Kondiah and Chenchurama Naidu.

In the Nalgonda and Khammam districts the number of candidates who contested was high for a different reason than what has been said above. In both the districts there were two Communist candidates belonging to right and left in almost all the constituencies. These two districts were "red forts" like Krishna and Guntur districts in Andhra areas for Communists. But unlike in Krishna where the dissidents offered a stiff fight against the Congress ministerial candidates by nominating all party independent candidates, in Khammam there was no such effort by either the dissidents or the ministerials to nominate united or all party independents. The dissidents were strong in the district in every respect under Jalagam Vengala Rao leadership, leaving no scope for any such united independents. As such, both the Communists were left out to torn their own mat.

In the Nalgonda district no Congress group was sure of winning so many seats--eight as against three in 1962--because of the well organized

Table 6. Pattern of contests*

Party	Number of candidates for constituency											
	Straight Seats %	Triangular Seats %	Four Seats %	Five Seats %	Six Seats %	Seven Seats %						
Congress	26	47.24	49	60.25	44	59.45	31	64.9	9	50	5	50
Swatantra	11	20.0	8	9.87	7	9.45	2	4.25	1	5.5		
Independents	17	30.9	19	23.68	16	21.6	7	14.9	6	33.5	3	30
Communitis (both)	1	1.8	5	6.17	6	8.1	4	8.5	2	11.1	1	10
Jan Sangh					11		22					
Republican							1		1			
S.S.P.									1			
Total contests under each	55	81	74	47	18	10	285					

*It should be mentioned here that the percentages under each head are calculated on the basis of total seats under that contest, not on the basis of seats each party contested in those constituencies. For example, in straight contest the Swatantra Party participated for only 17 seats as against 55 straight contested constituencies in the State. Out of these 17 contested, it won 11 seats; making 20 percent a success.

Communist strength and their hold over Panchyati Raj bodies. No independent was elected from this district before 1967, only Congress or Communist candidates.

In Srikakulam district, it was the independents supported by the Swatantra Party and the Bobbili Raja, who won the election. In other districts some of the independents who won were active Congress workers of one group or another until the ticket issue stage was completed. Of the 43 suspended Congressmen who contested for the Assembly, 16 won the election--two of them on the Swatantra ticket and the rest as independents with the support of one group or another. Of the four suspended who contested for Lok Sabha, one won the Nizamabad seat with the help of the dissidents.

The election of independents in large numbers in Andhra Pradesh since 1957 can also be attributed to people at large "getting bored" with the faction-ridden political parties and softening their attitudes toward a partyless democracy. Though the election of independents in large numbers was not because of any such intense attitude among the voters, the continued election of independents as well as factions might lead to the clearing of any obstacles from the way in popularizing the partyless democracy which the respected elder statesman "Gora" has been attempting.

Pattern of Contests. The weakness of the Swatantra Party, as seen from Table No. 6, was that it could not withstand the competition of a larger number of candidates. As the number of candidates in the contest increased, its chances decreased. The Swatantra Party stood a greater chance of winning when the contest was against the Congress in a straight fight. Of the 17 seats for which Congress and Swatantra contested opposing each other directly,

Table 7. Constituencies and parties* 1957 - 1967

Party	Won for the third time	Won in 1962 and 1967	Won in 1957, 1962 but defeated in 1967	Won in 1962 but defeated in 1967	Gains (won in 1967)	Seats 1962 1967
Congress	43	34	40	43	71	177 165
Swatantra	2 ^x	3	+	7	25	19 29
Communists (both)	1	6	10	32	19	51 19
Independents	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	23	45	53 68
Constituencies	47	52	53			

*The KLP in 1955 by elections in Andhra is taken here as Swatantra Party. All three are in Srikakulam district.

+The candidate who was elected as KLP members in 1955 elections subsequently joined the Congress Party as 1962 election approached, so they were not taken into consideration.

*The constituencies which were abolished for the 1967 elections were not considered. The details in the table are of the constituencies as they existed for the 1967 elections.

Swatantra scored a great victory by winning in 11 constituencies.

No one will deny the fact that there is a relation between the number of contestants and the number of seats the parties are able to win in Indian elections. E.P.W. da Costa, Director of I.I.P.O. postulated his pre-poll predictions on the basis of the "Congress multiplier." That is, the more rivals the Congress Party faces, the more seats it is likely to win.¹⁴³

The "Congress multiplier" as seen in Table No. 6 holds good only up to a point (five candidates per seat) and then begins to fall. The law of diminishing returns (Nizamabad districts where the average number of contestants was seven, Table No. 5) and increasing returns in economics can be applied to the Congress Party performance at the polls on the basis of the multiplier. For the Swatantra Party, when the multiplier factor is applied, it is the law of diminishing returns that applies more effectively.

Hard Core of Congress. As seen from Table no. 7, the strength of the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh lies in about 80 constituencies which could be described as the hard core of the Congress Party or the Congress candidate. It was these constituencies that were responsible for keeping the Congress in power without any uncertainty.

Of these 80 hard core Congress constituencies, 43 were returning the Congress candidates almost customarily while another 37 or 40 constituencies were definite in returning the Congress candidate.

In all, in the 1967 elections the Congress was defeated in 80 constituencies where it was elected in earlier elections. But, at the same time it gained 71 constituencies from other parties or independents, thus losing its grip on only nine or twelve constituencies in all. But to compensate

that gap there was a fall in the total constituencies in the State from 300 in 1957 and 1962 to 287 in 1967.

However, Congress lost the confidence of 40 constituencies in the 1967 elections which had returned it to power in all the earlier elections from 1955 to 1967. Another 40 constituencies which elected Congress in 1962 did not opt for Congress for a second time in the 1967 elections. Thus, 80 constituencies in all let the Congress candidates down in 1967 for different reasons.

It may be further said from Table No. 7 that the election of Congress candidates in 37 constituencies for the second time in 1967 does not indicate a general "favor for Congress" as strongly as the "dislike for Congress" was indicated in the 80 constituencies which did not vote for Congress for the second or third time.

A look at the district-wise details in Table No. 8 further reveals that despite the anti-Congress wave in the circar districts (which was directed against Sanjeeva Reddy with his pre-election strategies by Kasu) as seen from the high number of defeats for Congress in those areas where it won in earlier elections, the gains for Congress in 1967 were also high, with the exception of Srikakulam district where the Swatantra Party instead of the ministerial group was able to encash the situation combined with its organizational skills.

The hard core of the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh also lies in the key districts of circars as seen from Table No. 8. These districts are East Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, and Nellore. The hard core may be found here because of the important role these districts played in the Indian Independence

Table 8. Congress strength: 1955 - 1967

No.	District	Total seats 1962	Total seats 1967	Congress won for third time	Congress won in 1962 and 1967	Congress won in 1957 and 1962, but defeated in 1967	Congress won in 1962, but defeated in 1967	Congress gains in 1967	Total seats won 1962	Total seats won 1967
1	Srikakulam	20	19	1	2	3	4	4	13	4
2	Visakhapatnam	20	18		3	2	4	4	12	9
3	E. Godavari	22	21	4	5	3	5	2	18	11
4	W. Godavari	16	16	1	2	6		4	10	10
5	Krishna	17	17	5	1	3	1	7	10	13
6	Cuntur	25	24	6	1	2	11	11	11	19
7	Nellore	17	16	2	3	6	1	1	14	6
8	Chittoor	16	15	1	1	2	2	6	7	9
9	Cuddaph	11	11	1	1	1	2	6	2	7
10	Anantapur	14	14	2	1	1		3	7	7
11	Kurnool	16	15	1		3	2	3	7	6
12	Mahaboobnagar	14	13	3	2	2	4	4	9	6
13	Hyderabad	18	17	8	2	3	2	2	9	7
14	Medak	11	10	1	2	2	2	2	16	11
15	Nizamabad	8	8	3	1	1	2	4	6	8
16	Adilabad	8	8	1	4		2	1	6	3
17	Karimnagar	13	13	1	3		1	3	6	6
18	Warangal	12	12	1		1	4	1	8	8
19	Khammam	8	8	2	1		4	4	7	5
20	Nalgonda	12	12		2			5	3	7
	Totals	300	287	43	37	40	71	177	165	

Movement. But, surprisingly enough, the Hyderabad district was also a hard core for Congress. The Congress Party regularly won in eight constituencies out of a total 17 or 18 constituencies in the Hyderabad district.

It was again in those hard core circar districts that the Congress groupism was more bitter and prevalent at all levels than in any other district in the State. It was in these districts--the heartland of Andhra Pradesh--that literacy, transportation and communication, and the standard of living were high. Farming communities are predominant in these districts with the exception of Hyderabad. All the important cities, both politically and commercially, are in those districts and their political consciousness, among all sections of people, is considered to be high.

The Rayalaseema districts, as seen from Table No. 8, though they returned a good number of Congress candidates in 1967 for the first time, they were not the hard core upon which Congress could depend. In Telengana the picture since 1957 had never been formidable enough to worry the Congress Party. Except in the "Red Zones"--Nalgonda and Khammam districts up until 1967--the Congress Party had always had enough commandable strength over the Telengana masses including Hyderabad, as seen earlier. This strength might be the result of a spill-over effect of the Nizam rule and in particular Kasim Razvi's hostile activities in the area. By capturing more seats in the Red Zone and by Dr. K.V. Narayana Reddy joining the Congress, the Congress Party won in 23 constituencies for the first time as against 17 constituencies in which it lost its control in Telengana in 1967.

The Swatantra Party, as seen from Table No. 7, had only five constituencies where it had been winning since the 1955 and 1962 elections. Both

the constituencies where it won for the third time and two of the three constituencies where it was re-elected in 1967 for the second time were in the Srikakulam district. It lost seven constituencies where it had won in 1962. That is, the "doubtful seats" for the Swatantra Party were more than any "sure seats". But to its credit 25 out of the 29 constituencies it won elected a Swatantra candidate for the first time. On the other hand, the Swatantra Party's keeping all these constituencies in the 1972 elections, provided they do not slip out of its hold before that time, is uncertain.

Though the Communists increased their number of seats in the State Assembly during 1955 and 1967, their grip over the constituencies was also cracking simultaneously as seen from Table No. 7. The big breakdown of their grip over 42 constituencies in 1967, however, was followed by a sharp decline in the number of their seats in the State Assembly.

The Communists in Andhra Pradesh, despite the feelings that they might come to power one day, had only one constituency in 1967, as compared with the 43 of Congress, that elected a Communist for the third time and six constituencies that elected a Communist for the second time.

The "independents" were better placed than the Swatantra Party and had almost an equal hold over the constituencies in the State. There were six constituencies which returned independents for a second time in 1967. There was one independent, Vavilala Gopala Krishnaya, a prominent member of Andhra Assembly from 1952, who was elected for the third time in 1967 in spite of all out efforts by neighboring Chief Minister constituency workers. In the 1967 elections 45 constituencies had elected independent candidates for the first time while only 26 constituencies which had elected independents

Table 9. Old and new among the elected

No.	District	Congress		Swatantra		Independents		Communists	
		S	Ex. N	S	Ex. N	S	Ex. N	S	Ex. N
1	Srikakulam	2	2	3	7	2	3		
2	Visakhapatnam	3	4	1	1	1	4	2	
3	East Godavari	8	1			1	1		2
4	West Godavari	4	3				4		2
5	Krishna	4	2				4		
6	Guntur	7	6	1	2	1	1		
7	Nellore	4	2		4		5	1	
8	Chittoor	2	7		3		2	1	
9	Cuddaph	1	2	1			1		
10	Anatapur	3	1		3	1	2	1	
11	Kurnool	3	1		3		4	1	
12	Mahaboobnagar	3	2				6		1
13	Hyderabad	10	1			1	4		
14	Medak	3	1			1	1		
15	Nizamabad	3	4				4		
16	Adilabad	4	1				1		
17	Karimnagar	5	1				1		1
18	Warengal	2	3			2	4	1	1
19	Khammam	3	4						1
20	Nalgonda	3	5				1	2	1
		77	24	4	23	6	7	9	10

S = Sitting Members won again

Ex. = Members of Assembly before 1962, won in 1967

N = New, fresh candidates won

Table 9-A

Party	Fresh- first time elected	Ex-members of Assembly re-elected	Sitting members re-elected	Total	Fresh in each party, Percentage
Congress	64	24	77	165	38.6
Swatantra	22	2	5	29	79.0
Independents	53	7	4	64	82.8
Communists	10		9	19	52.66
Jan Singh (3), Republican (2), Praja Party (1), Majlis (3), S.S.P (1)	8	1	2	10	80.0
Total	157	33	97	287	

earlier rejected them.

Recruitment Process. Tables No. 7 and 8 reveal the constituencies as they were represented by parties and independents in elections since 1955. Table No. 9 indicates the recruitment process of parties as indicated by the elected members to the Assembly from each district in the 1967 elections. It is needless to mention here that the broadening recruitment process is one of the important indicators of trends in the modernization of the political system.

Broadened recruitment to the State Assembly and Lok Sabha is one of the silent and encouraging features of the fourth general elections in Andhra Pradesh. Never before in earlier elections had so many fresh candidates, belong to whatever party, been elected to the State Assembly.

As seen from Tables Number 9-A and 9, of the 287 M.L.A.'s elected in 1967, about 157 had never entered the Assembly before 1967. While only 97 were in the earlier Assembly. Of the 157 M.L.A.'s elected for the first time, 100 members were earlier experienced either in a local Panchyat, Panchyat Samithi or Zilla Parishad, in a cooperative, or in some other organization.

The party-wise division of recruitment as elected to the new Legislative Assembly in the 1967 elections is seen in Table No. 9-A.

As seen from Table No. 9-A in all the other parties except the Congress Party the percentage of new recruits is above 50, while in Congress it is only 38.6 percent. However, 38.6 percent of new recruits in Congress looks definitely better when viewed from the standpoint of previous elections. Of the 77 Congress sitting members who were re-elected in 1967, 26 members were elected for the third time since the 1955 elections in comparison with the 43

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constituencies (Table No. 7) which elected Congress members for the third time during the same period. That is, 26 constituencies out of the 43 were returning the same persons who belonged to the Congress Party to the State Assembly. Seventeen constituencies, while voting for Congress regularly, changed their representation more than once. The remaining 51 sitting members were elected to the State Assembly for the second time since 1962. But all of them were not re-elected from the same constituencies where they had been elected in 1962. There were only 34 constituencies (Table No. 7) which were returning Congress Party candidates as compared with 51 members who were elected for the second time. That is, only 17 members were able to get elected from one constituency or the other.

The 24 ex-members elected in the 1967 elections had either been defeated in 1962 or in 1957 or in both. Of these, six were from Guntur district itself, mostly defeated in the 1962 elections by Communist Candidates.

A Silent Revolution. A silent revolution within the voters at large in Andhra Pradesh can be observed from Table No. 10. Despite the fact that Congress won a clear majority in the State as in earlier elections, the voters have expressed their disfavor of the sitting members, particularly those members of Congress, more than ever before.

Of the 169 sitting members contested, only 77 or less than half were re-elected by voters. Though some districts elected more Congress members in 1967 than in 1962, they defeated the sitting candidates and elected fresh nominees. Though there was sabotage of one group against the other to defeat the important candidates who were all sitting M.L.A.'s, a clear verdict of the voters, for a change, showed that a change for new people rather than

Table 10. Silent revolution

District	Seats	Sitting Contested *	Sitting Won	Seats Obtained 1962	Seats Obtained 1967
Srikakulam	19	14	2	13	4
Vizag	18	11	3	12	9
East Godavari	21	21	8	18	11
West Godavari	16	10	4	10	10
Krishna	17	8	4	10	13
Guntur	24	8	7	11	19
Nellore	16	13	4	14	6
Chittoor	15	8	2	7	9
Cuddaph	11	3	1	2	7
Anantapur	14	5	3	7	7
Kurnool	15	7	3	9	6
Mahaboobnagar	13	8	3	9	7
Hyderabad	17	12	10	16	11
Medak	10	6	3	6	8
Nizamabad	8	7	3	6	3
Adilabad	8	5	4	6	6
Karimnagar	13	10	5	8	9
Warangal	12	6	2	7	5
Khammam	8	3	3	3	7
Nalgonda	12	4	3	3	8
		<u>169</u>	<u>77</u>		

* Sitting included those who were elected in 1962 elections as independents but who joined Congress afterwards

a new party was evident.

This may be justifiable on the part of the voters. No party was able to offer a stiff fight against the Congress to win the voter's confidence as every one of those parties, like Congress, was in the doldrums. Deprived of financial resources, betrayed by its legislators who jumped on the Congress bandwagon, and lacking in suitable candidates, the Swatantra Party to the disappointment of many failed to impress the voters.

In almost all Andhra districts, in particular the circars, with the exception of Chief Minister's Guntur district, the voters refused a large number of sitting M.L.A.'s. In Guntur, Khammam, Nalgonda, and Hyderabad the sitting M.L.A.'s were elected in good number mostly because of a lack of capable and known opposition candidates. At large, the Andhra Pradesh voters closely followed the general trend that was expressed in the fourth general elections all over the country.

The voter's hostile attitude towards the sitting M.L.A.'s included not only the Congress but other parties as well (Tables No. 9 and No. 9-A). Of the 29 Swatantra candidates elected, 22 were elected for the first time. Similarly, of the 19 Communists (of both the parties) elected, only seven were sitting and ten for the first time. The independents who contested in 1967 were either ex-members of the Assembly or individuals refused tickets by Congress who were also refused by the voters. Sixteen independents of the 43 candidates who had been suspended by Congressmen and who won were mostly new to the election fray. Out of the 64 independents elected, only four were sitting and seven ex-members. Of the ten elected candidates belonging to different minor parties, only two--one each belonging to the Ittehadul Majlis

and Praja Party--were sitting and the rest of the eight were new and were elected for the first time.

The factionalism in Congress Party as well as the split within the Communists has greatly helped and caused the recruitment of larger numbers of new people to the Assembly than ever before.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

"Parties are fighting for power rather than for principle. But surely that is in the nature of any working democracy. Most democratic politicians are not, and cannot be, philosopher-kings. They have to build a majority by means which are often humdrum and unedifying but which reflect the needs and impulses of a free society. Only in distatorships, or in democracies doomed to early failure, are we likely to find ideological purity and consistency."¹⁴⁴

A Vote for Change: By and large, the verdict of the fourth general elections in India, including Andhra Pradesh despite its returning the Congress with an absolute majority, was a protest against the old guards of power politics. This protest was recorded necessarily on non-ideological considerations. All that voters wanted was a change in their representatives.

As the left wing leader of the Congress Party in Parliament, S.N. Misra, has rightly put it,

"The general election has been the revolt of the people against the status quo and those who seemed to uphold it. The Congress, of late, has not been able to present itself as the Party of crusade and change and had been steadily identified in the public mind as the agency for maintaining the status quo."¹⁴⁵

This revolt against the Congress status quo could be seen in Andhra Pradesh from the fact that so many long-standing key personalities in district politics were defeated, and at the same time many fresh candidates who contested for the first time were elected.

If a political party is an "organization formed for the purpose of winning elections in order to get control of the directing personnel of government" as defined by E. E. Schattschneider, the political parties in Andhra Pradesh, including the groups or factions within the Congress, are in no way anything more and nothing less.¹⁴⁶

The minor parties--Jan Sangh, Republicans and Socialists, and the personality minor parties--Praja Party, Democratic Party and Ithehadul Majlis, play a role of useful buffers, as described in Duverger, to one party or another, usually to one group or another in the Congress Party.¹⁴⁷

A Boost From Factions: The success of Congress in Andhra Pradesh in the fourth general elections is an obvious fact. The influential, wealthy landlords were in the Congress. While the parties, particularly Swatantra, could not kick the ball into the goal in spite of its having some rural appeal because of Rytu Ranga and Sardar Latchanna.

Local problems, the clash of local personalities, usually in Panchyati Raj, group rivalries and ministerial patronage were the determining factors for the success of Congress--the success of ministerialists. For only they were able to catch the attention of the men in the ring in the districts. But what the opposition had failed to do was to bring up a united front against the ruling Congress which the internal differences among the Congressmen could have achieved for them.

The reason for the continuous existence of groupism within the ruling party, and for dissidents always running around the Congress Party even when they were sent out or resigned themselves, was that when there are groups or factions, the party rank and file finds itself actively engaged in some political activity and its works will be easily accomplished at the district or State level.

Pastime Politics: The Congress Party has many institutions and organizations down to the village level in its control, for which elections or selections will always be going on. That is, people will always be aspiring to enter

into these "bodies" and to capture their control. The factions and groups are keeping the leaders and followers from village upwards active, and are taking part in the party organization (in one group or another). Particularly for those people who are in the Krishna and Godavari rich coastal deltas in Andhra Pradesh, politics and so the elections are a good pastime which they can afford. The rise and fall of groupism and its bitterness is always found in those areas at all levels. For people in these areas, as Almond and Coleman pointed out "Politics has become the avenue for personal advancement..." and they are "tremendously politicized" in this process.¹⁴⁸

Kept Opposition: After the 1967 election, from among the 69 independents elected, two parties were formed again as wings of different Congress factions. The People's Democratic Party, one of the new parties formed in the Assembly from among the independents, extends its support with 34 members as its strength to the Chief Minister. The other party, consisting of 23 (independent) members, sometimes calling itself the Jana Congress, extends its support to the dissidents in the ruling Congress Party.

Following the 1967 elections, the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly presented a unique picture for any case study of an Indian legislature. There was no official opposition party in Assembly. The newly formed People's Democratic Party was the main opposition party with 34 members as against 29 Swatantra, 10 Right Communist, and 9 Left Communist. But their business in the House was more to support the Congress-ministerial group, rather than to act as an opposition party. These "crypto-opposition" or the "kept" opposition groups in the Andhra Assembly, were only awaiting an early chance to join the Congress treasury benches.¹⁴⁹ In fact, some of

them--all the prominent ones in both the new parties--were debarred or resigned, themselves, from the party just before February 1967. By May 1967 rumors were already afoot in the State that very soon they might join the Congress.¹⁵⁰ Thus, the strength of Congress when these "kept Parties" are taken back will again be 215 or 220 members in the Assembly as usual.

The groupism at various levels in Andhra Pradesh is contributing to the increased competitiveness in politics, and this competitiveness is not primarily between ideologies or castes but between political groups cutting across all those lines. The groupism has also helped the political system to recruit more and more "new blood" into body politics.

In Andhra Pradesh politics there is always a negative feeling towards a leader or candidate rather than a positive feeling that dominates the coalitions of groups or factions. Then, it is the personal interest and pressure of power that influence one's political behavior when he is "in" an organization or leading a group. Caste might play a role but only after the above factors. But all these factors will be changing their order of places depending upon the issue, the personality involved, and the pressures at work.

Regional Factors: When a nation faces internal disorders, it tries to unite its people by focusing animosities and frustrations on some external enemy.¹⁵¹ In a similar way, a political party or a faction, when it faces a near collapse or crisis situation, does not hesitate to divert the attention of its members and the public in general by arousing regional feelings or by supporting an agitational approach, thus enabling the party or group to keep up its power or existence.

The faction-ridden Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh, particularly the ministerialists, which had to face at the polls not only a mounting dislike towards the party, as such, but also had to face the fact that its own party dissidents, having no other choice to keep up the party, took up the issues such as the steel plant, the Godavari Bridge and the neglect of the Circar districts by Sanjeeva Reddy. These agitational approaches served well as a "rallying cry" for the ministerialists and so for the Congress Party.

With an increase in the rate of population mobilization following the emphasis on rapid social and economic change, there was also an increase in the demands made on the government. These increased demands were taking the turn of continued agitations as had been occurring in India--over a steel plant, river water utilization, and location of a university or other central project. William J. Foltz observed that this mobilization was essential for building national sentiment. Although such mobilization is essential and unavoidable, it is leading to and arousing regional sentiment.¹⁵²

Caste or Opportunism? It is obvious that the increased political consciousness coupled with the universal franchise opened up the field of political power to those majority castes who were left out of the sharing of power before independence. In fact, in all the Southern States the Brahmins who ruled almost unopposed until the early 1950's have been totally eliminated from the political scene. (With Rajaji in Madras, Hanumantayy in Mysore, and with Pattabhi, Prakasam and Burgula fading out from Andhra State Politics). In Andhra Pradesh this meant a shift of political power from the Brahmins to the Kammas (Ranga, Chandramouli, Anjalai Anne) and then with the Reddy areas of Telengana amalgamating with Andhra areas, the political power has shifted to their hands (Gopala Reddy, Sanjeeva Reddy, Brahmananda

Reddy, Chenna Reddy). A shift in favor of the "Harijans" or less privileged also could easily be found in Andhra politics with a good number of them becoming important personalities (Kurmayya, Sanjeevayya, Raghavulu, Kota Punnayya, Ramaswamy).

Though one cannot yet strike down the importance of caste at different stages of the election process, one should also be careful to understand that caste becomes a detriment when other things are equal in a constituency. But usually, other things are never equal, and no caste has one political allegiance as alleged by Selig Harrison or as referred to by Almond and Coleman and by many other writers.¹⁵³ However, there are leaders who still look to their caste for support while, at the same time, supporting another opposing caste and opposing their own on other issues.

Moreover, it is not exactly the caste that will be at work in politics. Opportunism is often mistaken for a caste force. The voters are not so blind as to vote for a particular candidate because he or his party men say that so and so belongs to such and such caste because they know that the same candidate or leaders will be canvassing for another caste against their own in some other village or constituency. This is at the voter's level. At the political group level one cannot point to a group and say that it is a caste group. The groupism, if one deeply looks into it, is weakening the caste strength. It might be easy to say that groupism is based on caste. In Andhra Pradesh Reddies aligned with the Kammas in one group who had been enemies until the day before. In another group Kammas joined hands with Reddies against their own Kamma leader and vice versa. But certainly the campaigners wish to use "caste" as a vote catcher.

As John Grigg has pointed out, the caste in Indian politics "is no more apparent than the class basis of British politics."¹⁵⁴ As he further rightly observed, "Caste is a strange amalgam of fossilized 'trade unionism', snobbery, superstition, and color-consciousness."¹⁵⁵

Panchyati Raj: Since the introduction of Panchyati Raj, a clear shift of political power from the Center to the State and from the State capital to the Zilla Parishads and the Panchyati Samithis is clearly seen. Not only the leaders are much interested in heading these Panchyati Raj bodies and in remaining in State politics rather than going to the Center, but also the voters are evincing a similar interest in Panchyati Raj affairs and State politics.

In the allocation of party tickets it became a problem for the Congress Party to nominate its Assembly candidates because of the five to six applicants for each Assembly constituency in comparison with two and three for a Lok Sabha constituency. In fact, there was no quarrel or major disagreement between the groups over the distribution of Lok Sabha tickets.

Yet another tendency that has been developing among the State leaders and the electorate in general is their reduced concern over the Lok Sabha candidate and his capacities and qualifications. This could be seen from the easiness with which they select and elect a candidate. But a Lok Sabha candidate is ultimately expected, upon his elections, to take up bigger issues at the national level and to take a major part in the conducting of national affairs. Efficient conduct of national affairs is equally important if not more significant than the State legislatures. What will the future of national politics and Lok Sabha be if this tendency continues is a big question.

As it has been at the center, after Nehru, a major role is played by local district leaders in the State politics rather than a few "elder" or "Kept" leaders. This process ultimately is helping to infuse new blood in Indian politics at all levels.

The Panchyati Raj bodies were responsible for many candidates entering the election field as independents in Andhra Pradesh. Many of those who were getting elected to the Samithis and Zilla Parishads were aspiring to become active in State politics. To accommodate all those aspirants was a problem for the Congress Party. When it failed to give its ticket to those Panchyati Raj men, they resigned from Congress to contest as independents or were debarred from the party when contested as independents or on some other party's symbol.

The success and strength of the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh lies with the control of these Panchyati Raj and cooperative bodies in districts. The Swatantra Party, which was in control of the majority of Samithis and cooperatives in the Srikakulam district, was able to win more seats in the election. Most of the independents who were elected in 1967 were either presidents or former presidents of Panchyats, Samithis or Zilla Parishads or active members of these bodies and their district cooperatives. The success of a large number of independents and their continuous increase since the 1955 elections as the Panchyati Raj movement extends all over the State further confirms the fact that the control of these bodies is an important factor in deciding who wins the Assembly or Lok Sabha seats. In fact, as pointed out by Hugh Gray, the introduction of democratic decentralization has turned the State politics into an amalgam of Zilla Parishads, Samithis, and village politics.¹⁵⁶

FOOTNOTES

¹Myron Weiner, "State Politics in India: Report on a Seminar," Asian Survey, (June, 1961), p. 35.

²Selig S. Harrison, India and the United States, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 5.

³Marshall Windmiller, "Linguistic Regionalism in India," Pacific Affairs, (December, 1954), pp. 291-318.

⁴Hugh Tinker, Ballot Box and Bayonet, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 67-68.

⁵Ibid.

⁶For a detailed discussion please see: Joan V. Bondurant, Regionalism Versus Provincialism: A Study in Problems of Indian Unity, Indian Press Digest Series, (Berkeley: University of California, 1958), pp. 32-47.

Marshall Windmiller, op. cit., pp. 291-318.

Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1960, p. 284.

⁷Ibid., p. 235.

⁸Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 110-111.

⁹Joan V. Bondurant, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁰op. cit., p. 23-40.

¹¹Workers of about 157 industrial establishment in the State numbering 179,000 went on strike ignoring the Industrial Truce Resolution.

When Potti Sreramulu died in 1952 following the 56 days hunger strike, the whole Andhra State was in crisis; railway stations were put on fire, central offices and godowns were looted, electricity and wireless services were disturbed, firings, hartals were the frequent scenes in Anshra.

¹²The Hindu Weekly, (Madras), December 19, 1966.

¹³To these, one member from the Anglo-Indian community will be appointed for a period of five years by the Governor. He will have the same rights and privileges as any other elected members have.

¹⁴Jo Grimond, Member of Parliament, "Myths of Party Politics," Manchester Guardian Weekly, (U.K.), March 16, 1967, p. 12.

¹⁵O. P. Goyal and Paul Wallace, "The Congress Party - A Conceptual Study," India Quarterly, (April-June, 1964), p. 180.

¹⁶The Overseas Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), February 16, 1967.

¹⁷The Hindu, (Madras), February 1, 1967.

¹⁸Goyal and Paul Wallace, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁹The Times of India, (Bombay), January 3, 1967, (N. Sanjeeva Reddy).

²⁰For details see: Selig Harrison, "Caste and Andhra Politics," American Political Science Review, (June, 1956), p. 379.

²¹Even in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the factions within the Congress were not as bitter and open as in Andhra Pradesh.

²²More detailed discussion on the Congress party in the State will be found in the next two chapters.

²³The Hindu, (Madras), December 10, 1966.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵The Hindu, January 5, 1967.

²⁶For detailed discussion about the Communist Party and its split in India with notes on Andhra, please see: John B. Wood, "Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split," Pacific Affairs, (Spring, 1965), p. 51.

²⁷The Hindu, (Madras), "Will Groupism effect the Congress," February 1, 1967.

²⁸John B. Wood, op. cit., p. 51.

²⁹The Hindu, (Madras,) December 29, 1966.

³⁰The Times of India, (Bombay), December 23, 1966.

³¹The Times of India, (Bombay), December 23, 1966.

³²By early August, 1966, three rounds of talks among all the Opposition leaders in the State Assembly were held at the residence of Praja Party leader T. Viswanatham in New M.L.A. Quarters. The author's interview with the participants in the meetings.

³³When, after the February, 1967 elections, Mrs. Indira Gandhi formed her Cabinet, it was reportedly referred to in political circles that from Andhra Pradesh no M.P. was found eligible to make one more Cabinet Minister from Andhra Pradesh. Similarly, in the State when Kasu formed his new cabinet, it became a problem for him to pick on M.L.A. from the Circar districts to make a minister as the important personalities were defeated and the others who won were "not qualified" to be ministers. The Hindustan Times, March 7, 1967; The Hindu Weekly, March 12, 1967.

- ³⁴V. M. Sirsikar, Political Behavior in India, (Manktlal, Bombay) 1965 p. 112.
- ³⁵See Chapter III for details of the two groups and for P.E.C. eleventh member election controversy.
- ³⁶The Overseas Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), December 25, 1966.
- ³⁷Sanjeeva Reddy was elected as a member of the C.E.C. at the Bombay A.I.C.C. meeting in May, 1966.
- ³⁸The Challapalli Raja was openly working against Steelman Kakani who was elected to the P.E.C. as the prestigious eleventh member. Mrs. Sadalakshmi openly accused Chief Minister Kasu and his leadership of betraying Sanjeeva Reddy's leadership in State politics.
- ³⁹The other 19 members could not apply because their constituencies were made a reserved or a general from reserved or because they were abolished under delimitation.
- ⁴⁰The Hindu, (Madras), November 11, 1966, P.C.C. President Timma Reddy talking to pressmen.
- ⁴¹"Three Man Team to Resolve Andhra Impasse," The Times of India, (Bombay), December 5, 1966.
- ⁴²The Hindu, (Madras), December 4, 1966.
- ⁴³Ibid., December 2, 1966.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., December 3, 1966.
- ⁴⁵The Times of India, (Bombay), December 5, 1966.
- ⁴⁶K. Rangaswamy, "Leaders Press Sanjeeva Reddy to Contest for Andhra Assembly," The Hindu, (Madras), November 28, 1966.
- ⁴⁷Ibid.
- ⁴⁸Because of Sanjeeva Reddy being in the C.E.C. and Sanjuvayy-Raghuramaiah being at the center, it was possible to consider the dissident list also. Otherwise the C.E.C. with few changes was expected to accept the majority P.E.C. list.
- ⁴⁹The Times of India, (Bombay), December 19, 1966.
- ⁵⁰The Hindu, (Madras), January 3, 1967.
- ⁵¹"A. C. Subba Reddy to Try for Chief Ministership," The Hindu, (Madras), January 3, 1967.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., December 27, 1966.

⁵⁶The Times of India, (Bombay), December 26, 1966.

⁵⁷The C.E.C. dropped virtually all those contestants who lost in the last elections except in Karala and Andhra Pradesh. The largest (63 percent) number of sitting M.L.A.'s were dropped in Gujarat and in Madhya Pradesh. In Andhra Pradesh only nine of the party M.L.A.'s ultimately did not find a place even though the number of constituencies in the State were reduced from 300 to 287.

⁵⁸The Hindu, (Madras), February 1, 1967.

⁵⁹The leader of this U.D.P., Dr. K. V. Narayana Reddy was also included in the Ministry formed after the fourth general elections.

⁶⁰Malla Reddy, a sitting M.L.A. from Karimnagar district won in the 1962 elections as an independent. He was an active Congress member, but the Party did not give him the ticket. So he contested against an official Congress candidate and defeated him. After his election in 1962 as an independent, he was taken back into Congress. But again in 1967, as the groups changed, he was refused the Congress Party ticket.

⁶¹Chief Minister Kasu supported indirectly all those independents who contested against dissident leaders, Sanjeevayya, Sanjeeva Reddy and other important dissidents like Food Minister Balarama Reddy, Women's Welfare Minister Sadalaksmi, Agriculture Minister A. C., and former Minister S. B. P. Pattabhi Rama Rao. On the other hand, the dissidents encouraged and helped those independents when they contested against the Chief Minister Kasu, Steelman Kakani, Battam Sreerama Murty, G. C. Kondiah, Obula Reddy, B. Manumanta Rao, and A. Bapineedu, all key supporters of Chief Minister Kasu.

⁶²For example, for the Guntur Assembly constituency, the Congress candidate, C. Manumayya, financed two Muslims to "contest" as independents against himself so that he need not worry even if he did not get the votes of these Muslims. Otherwise his other strong rival who had equal chances of winning might manage to get their votes.

⁶³Sreenivasa Reddy, who contested on the Swatantra Party ticket against Sanjeeva Reddy, was refused a ticket by Congress. B. Rajaratna Rao, who contested against Sanjeevayya in 1962 as an independent and missed narrowly, contested in 1967 as a Swatantra Party candidate for his symbol might get him a few more votes to fill the 1962 gap. Another candidate, B. Raja Rao, who retired from the Revenue Board to contest as a Congress candidate was not preferred by Congress. As such, he applied for a Swatantra Party ticket.

⁶⁴The Hindu, (Madras), December 26, 1966.

⁶⁵Mara Reddy, a sitting Swatantra Member even after the Party had nominated him for an Assembly constituency in Cuddaph district, finally at the last minute was successful in securing a Congress ticket to contest from the same constituency where he had been nominated earlier by the Swatantra Party.

⁶⁶Mydukur and Rayachote Assembly constituencies.

⁶⁷He polled 45,000 votes.

⁶⁸The Hindu, (Madras), December 9, 1966, December 25, 1966, and, The Times of India, (Bombay), December 10, 1966.

⁶⁹Though the keeping out of Communists and Swatantra from contesting against Raghuramaiah was often attributed to the caste factor, the truth, as known personally, was that Kotta Raghuramaiah, a barrister and a one time Under Secretary in the composite Madras Government, will always enter into a tacit agreement with opposing parties at the personal level either on the basis of extending his followers' support to them in the other Assembly constituency or by way of "contributing" some money. In the 1962 election he was able to make use of his boss, Defense Minister V.K.K. Menon, to withdraw any Communist candidate against him as was for Menon. Raghuramaiah then held the Portfolio of Defense.

⁷⁰Of the two Communist candidates for the two Vijayawada Assembly seats, one was the editor of the Right Party daily paper, and the other was a full-time Party worker with no rural base. Similarly the candidates for Guntur, Eluru, Nellore, and Visakhapatnam city Assembly constituencies were full-time Party workers. Most of them were either looking after trade union affairs or Party offices.

⁷¹Politbureau Member, M. Basava Punayya, said that "Leftists like Mr. Sunadaryya, Mr. B. T. Randev, and Mr. Surjit had decided not to contest...." The Indian Express, (Vijayawada), December 23, 1966.

⁷²Against Right Secretary Rajasekhara Reddy, the Left had put up a new and young Leftists, mobilizing all their men and material in the area. While when Left Leader T. Nagi Reddy contested from Anantapur constituency, the Rightists had put up a young and new candidate. Left Leader Rajasekhar Reddy is a brother and Right Leader Nagi Reddy is a brother-in-law of Congress Sanjeeva Reddy. All of them contested from the same Anantapur district.

⁷³The Jan Sangh candidate for Nalgonda Assembly constituency, who tried to get the Congress ticket but did not succeed when he approached for the Jan Sangh symbol at the last minute, was from Hyderabad City.

⁷⁴But in the 1962 elections he contested as an independent. In 1967 he contested on a S. S. P. symbol and lost his deposit also in the contest.

⁷⁵The only constituency where the Socialists were able to win.

⁷⁶B. V. Ramanayya, President of the State Party contested both from Allavaram Assembly constituency and Amalapuram Lok Sabha constituency against his old personal rival, a Union Deputy Minister, B. S. Murty. The second Lok Sabha candidate, G. Arun Kumar, filed his nomination for Assembly but withdrew at the last minute in view of his 1962 experience when he had lost his deposit also.

⁷⁷Election took place only for remaining 40 Lok Sabha seats in the State.

⁷⁸In 1967 G. Rajaran and K. L. Narasimha Rao, two sitting Congress M.L.A.'s were declared elected unopposed, as such elections were held only for 285 constituencies.

⁷⁹All the candidates of the Communist Parties who contested against a rich landlord or a former Zamindar were from a poor or below middle-class or working-class family.

⁸⁰Please see Chapter V for some discussion on this subject.

⁸¹Joseph R. Gusfield, "Political Community and Group Interests in Modern India," Pacific Affairs, (Summer, 1965), p. 133.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Taya Zinkin, Reviewing a book by Sirsikav, op. cit., in International Affairs, (January, 1967), pp. 171-173.

⁸⁴The "electorate" is used here with reference to the village and Samithi leaders whose efforts and actions over the electorate's behavior at large is overwhelming.

⁸⁵In both the Communist Parties, the urban politician always has a say in Party politics, and in many districts they dominate the Party organizations. The Swatantra Party has no hold at all in any of the towns or cities in the State except their offices.

⁸⁶Joseph R. Gusfield, op. cit., p. 126.

⁸⁷Phillip G. Altabach, "The Indian Political Scene on the Eve of the 1967 Elections," Orbis, (Fall, 1966), p. 885.

⁸⁸Usually if the local landlords and businessmen who have considerable influence over the electorate are not directly involved in those organizations in the area, the men who are involved will be either their partners or colleagues in the case of their not being political opponents. The M.P.'s and M.L.A.'s are usually the members of these organizations. All these people in control of those organizations could be called "men in the ring".

⁸⁹Ram Joshi, "Political Problems, Practices and Institutions in India" (paper read at the annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Chicago, March, 1967), p. 15.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Paul Brass, op. cit., p. 238.

⁹²When Sanjeeva Reddy resigned following the Supreme Court Strictures, he nominated Kasu Brahmananda Reddy to succeed him as Chief Minister.

⁹³This bridge, named after Prakasam, served as the connecting link of two parts of Andhra; the commerce of the area was doubled, and the possibility of Guntur and Vijayawada cities forming a corporation in the near future was brightened.

⁹⁴A case against the government decision on bus nationalization in Krishna district was at the High Court and later at the Supreme Court for months on the charge that the decision made by Sanjeeva Reddy's Ministry was politically and personally aimed. The case was struck down in favor of the State government. But strictures were passed against the then Minister for Transport, S.B.P. Pattabhirama Rao, a Kamma from Circars, who was made a minister by Sanjeeva Reddy to carry out this decision of nationalization. It should also be mentioned here that nationalization was not intended in the Nellore district where over 80 buses were owned by a Reddi supporter, Mir Alikhan. The Supreme Court, however, had passed strictures against Sanjeeva Reddy himself on the same issue when the bus nationalization was extended to the Kurnool district. The owner of the buses in Kurnool, who was a friend of Sanjeevayya, then political foe of Reddy, was able to convince the Supreme Court Judge Koka Subba Rao that the decision of the government headed by Sanjeeva Reddy was politically motivated. It was on these grounds that Sanjeeva Reddy finally resigned his Chief Ministership in 1964.

⁹⁵An old, unwanted Kamma Congressman in the Krishna district politics, G. Brahmayya, was made P.C.C. President so that he would not be of any threat to his leadership. These conferences will provide the Party members with some activity, close contacts with the Ministers and other important Party leaders and with government machinery as such. Almost any important conferences that took place in the State were held in Circar districts.

⁹⁶Alluri Satyanarayana Raju, who was the Secretary of A.I.C.C. and a close friend of the A.I.C.C. President, Indira Gandhi, suggested Sanjeeva Reddy's name as the "most suitable candidate of the A.I.C.C." in 1960 with an object of his replacing Sanjeeva Reddy in State leadership. As the Bangalore session of A.I.C.C., (where Sanjeeva Reddy would be elected A.I.C.C. President), was approaching, Alluri was canvassing in the State, particularly in the Circars, making the river water dispute issue his main slogan and "rallying cry". The Circar districts would be most drastically affected if the river water dispute went against the State. This enabled Alluri to win over the majority of Sanjeeva Reddy men and bring together the anti-Sanjeva Reddy forces for a while.

⁹⁷The issue was one of the reasons that contributed to the Andhra M.P.'s working against Morarji in first and second leadership transitions at the Center. Morarji being a Finance Minister had replied "no funds" while sanctioning funds for Madras and Gujarat, to the then State Finance Minister Kasu. After using the issue as a "rallying cry" for the 1967 elections, Kasu was successful in getting that bridge sanctioned immediately after the elections as promised to the leaders and voters in the area. Kasu was also happy when he successfully pursued the Center for financing the bridge, that he immediately rushed to Hyderabad from New Delhi to disclose the "happy news" through a surprise Press conference.

⁹⁸See for details: The Hindu, (Madras), "Political Undertones of Steel Plant Issue," November 29, 1966.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰The Times of India, (Bombay), November 18, 1966.

¹⁰¹The Hindu, (Madras), November 29, 1966.

¹⁰²In Vijayawada City there was a steel statue of Professor N.G. Ranga and Praksam erected in 1955. Sanjeeva Reddy was making every attempt to get his statue installed in that important city of Andhra politics. But until 1963-1964, no one came forward. Then an anonymous association (Sanjeeva Reddy Seve Dal) was formed to install his statue. When L.B. Sastry, the then Prime Minister, came to Guntur for the A.I.C.C. meeting, he agreed to install the statue. But on the day, upon studying the mood of the people and controversy and agitations going on, he cancelled his itinerary to Vijayawada. The statue was under police guard for two months night and day.

¹⁰³Madras and Mysore States were also pressing the Center for the location of this fifth steel plant in their respective states. Andhra's strong point was that an Anglo-U.S. Consortium which had conducted a survey of all the three states' proposed sites had recommended Visakapatnam. But the Center could not make any decision primarily because of cross-pressures from the aspiring states. The Congress M.L.A.'s, without mentioning Sanjeeva Reddy's name in the Legislative Assembly, indirectly accused him of neglecting the State to keep his own position in the Center. Tenneti Viswanatham more directly named Sanjeeva Reddy in his speech in the Assembly as responsible for Andhra not getting the steel plant.

¹⁰⁴Selig Harrison, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁰⁵Kasu tried to appoint Dr. P. Narasimha Rao, a Kamma renowned educationalist from the Guntur as Vice-Chancellor of Osmania University, to display that he was not an anti-Kamma and to win over the strong anti-Kasu elements, who were the followers of Congress Raghuramaiah and Swatantra Ranga in his native Guntur district. This appointment was further aimed at balancing what Sanjeeva Reddy did for the same vice-chancellorship by appointing a Rayalassema Reddi. Now Kasu attempted unsuccessfully to appoint a Circar Kamma to that same post.

¹⁰⁶Paul Brass, op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁰⁷K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy, an opponent of Sanjeevayya in Kurnool district politics was rewarded after the 1967 elections as a minister without his being a member of any of the lower or upper houses. Many reports confirm that this "reward" was also for his contribution to the defeat of Union Minister Sanjeevayya.

¹⁰⁸For details of the convention please see: The Hindu, (Madras), November 10, 1966.

¹⁰⁹For details see: "Reddy Offers to Quit: Steel Plant," The Times of India, (Bombay), November 20, 1966, and The Hindu, (Madras), November 20, 1966.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹"Leader's Feud Threat to Andhra Congress," The Weekly Hindustan Times, October 27, 1966.

¹¹²"Dispersal Cult, Roots of Regionalism," The Times of India, (Bombay), November 30, 1966.

¹¹³The Hindu, (Madras), December 27, 1966.

¹¹⁴Andhra Pradesh has been demanding for the last four or five years a separate railway zone to the State as the State was then divided between three railway zones. As long as Sanjeeva Reddy was in State politics, it was not approved by the Center. Upon the State's increased pressure after Kasu became the Chief Minister, the Center finally created a new zone on October 2, 1966.

¹¹⁵Some local newspapers even reported that Kasu indirectly supported the agitation over the steel plant. Amruta Rao, belonging to Gandhi Mission, who undertook a fast lasting over 20 days, leading to paralyzation of normal life, and went from Kasu's Guntur to Vizag.

¹¹⁶Hugh Gray, op. cit., p. 34.

¹¹⁷Paul Brass, op. cit., p. 236.

¹¹⁸The Times of India, (Bombay), January 28, 1967.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰See for detail: Andhra Prabha, (Vijayawada), January 16, 1967. The government announced that from January 26, 1967, Telugu would be used as the official language at all levels.

¹²¹When Mrs. Indira Gandhi was on tour in the State, the Jan Sangh volunteers made every bid to disturb her meetings in Hyderabad on the cow protection issue.

- 122 The Hindu, (Madras), February 3, 1967.
- 123 See for details of the C.P.I. resolution on cow protection and its secretary Mohit Sen statement in Andhra Prabha, (Vijayawada), December 8, 1966.
- 124 The Deccan Chronicle, (Secundrabad), December 25, 1966.
- 125 Phillip Talbot, "The Second General Elections, Voting in the States," American University Field Staff Reports, Vol. I-VI, pp. 5-9.
- 126 B. Nageswar Rao, "Rift Ridden Congress May Lose Majority in State," The Deccan Chronicle, (Secundrabad), February 13, 1967, p. 1.
- 127 The Deccan Chronicle, (Secundrabad), February 13, 1967.
- 128 For a Lok Sabha seat the deposit was rupees 1,000 and for the Assembly it was 500 rupees. In the case of reserved constituencies it was 500 and 250, respectively. However, the A.P.C.C. returned more than half of the money it collected to those who were not given its ticket.
- 129 "A. C. Subba Reddy to Try for Leadership," The Hindu, (Madras), January 3, 1967.
- 130 The Overseas Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), February 16, 1967.
- 131 "Electioneering Has Become Costlier," The Hindu Weekly Review, (New Delhi), January 23, 1967.
- 132 Ibid.
- 133 The Hindu, (Madras), February 7, 1967. The news item also reveals that between August, 1961, and March, 1966, the Registrar of Companies had showed a sum of rupees 1.27 crores as a contribution of companies to political parties. Of that sum, Congress' share was rupees 1.09 crores and Swatantra 1.6 million. The remainder was distributed between 12 political parties.
- 134 The Indian Express, (Vijayawada), December 5, 1966.
- 135 Sirsikar, op. cit., p. 169.
- 136 Bhaskara Rao N., "Communication System (Ceylon, India, Nepal)," (A seminar paper read at the Political Science Department, Kansas State University, March, 1967), p. 4.
- 137 Cycle and star were the election symbols of independents and Swantra Party, respectively.
- 138 The Deccan Chronicle, (Secundrabad), February 13, 1967.
- 139 Ibid.
- 140 It is known that the Congress leaders had assured Mr. Naidu that he would be nominated to Rajya Sabha if he contested against Ranga.

141 For details on this please see: The Andhra Patrika, (Vijayawada), February 11, 1962, p. 4.

142 The all India percentages of votes polled by independents were:

	<u>Lok Sabha</u>	<u>Assembly</u>
1952	48.6	50.59
1957	29.96	32.96
1962	24.2	26.53

143 The New York Times, March 5, 1967, p. 5, col. 1.

144 John Grigg, Manchester Guardian Weekly, December 16, 1967, p. 6.

145 The Times of India, (Bombay), May 9, 1967, p. 12.

146 M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler, (eds.), The Electoral Process, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 55.

147 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 290.

148 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

149 D. Sitaram, Link Weekly, (New Delhi), April 9, 1967, p. 15.

150 The changed atmosphere of "crossing the floors" after the 1967 elections in other State Assemblies had further smoothed the way in this direction. As a first step in that direction, the dissident leader, A. C., who was refused any place in the new Ministry, was favorably reconsidered by the first week in April.

151 William J. Foltz, "The Politics of the Developing Nations," in Lewis P. Fickett, Jr. (ed.), Problems of the Developing Nations, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966), p. 129.

152 Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," Dissent, (Spring, 1961), pp. 172-184. On the concept of "mobilization" see also: Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, (1961), pp. 493-514.

153 Almond and Coleman, op. cit., Selig Harrison, "Caste and Andhra Communists," American Political Science Review, (June, 1956), p. 378.

154 John Grigg, Manchester Guardian Weekly, March 9, 1967.

155 Ibid.

156 Hugh Gray, op. cit., p. 34.

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1968

The world's largest democracy went to the polls during February 1967. The electorate in India's fourth general election since independence--250 million--is larger than the total population of the United States of America or of Western Europe. One of the greatest achievements of Free India has undoubtedly been the way and the manner in which four general elections were held. Yet it is surprising, though few studies have been done, that such an inspiring phenomenon in world's largest democracy has gone unnoticed particularly by political scientists and academic analysts.

The first general election of 1951-52 was an unfamiliar experience to both voters, parties and election officers. The issues before the electorate during the 1957 and 1962 general elections and the mid-term State wide elections held in between were almost crystal clear. The mid-term and the second general elections were deeply affected by the controversy over the creation of linguistic states and its aftermath. In the 1962 third general election, however, there were no issues which evoked powerful interest in the general mass of voters; but the towering personality of Nehru was still there. It was only the recent fourth general election that was free of any such a "bias" and, in view of many observers, provided an accurate barometer of the developing tendencies in Indian political life after Nehru.

The decision to carry out the study with reference to Andhra Pradesh State was taken on several grounds. The decisive factor was the author's intimate personal knowledge of Andhra politics. In the study of any election, the knowledge of the local political party machinery, leaders, voters and of the setting of the elections naturally will have significant importance. Further it was thought that a study of fourth general election in Andhra Pradesh, on various grounds, will truly reflect the general nature of political picture that prevailed during the election period if not after the election.

To find out the impact and significance of the much publicised aspects of Indian polity--factionalism, castism, regionalism--was one of the objects of this study besides understanding some of the developing tendencies as found from the elections. In addition, an attempt was made to find out and to know the relation between the number of candidates contested for each constituency and the performance of the major political parties in Andhra Pradesh.

At the outset, before plunging into the subject of the thesis, a general review of the State of affairs in Andhra Pradesh before the February 1967 general election, and a brief background of the State was attempted in the first three chapters for a fuller understanding of the fourth general election in Andhra Pradesh.

By and large, the verdict of the fourth general elections in Andhra Pradesh as well as in India, as revealed from the study, was a protest and revolt against the old guards of power politics and the status quo. The groupism in the Congress party is contributing to increased competitiveness and to the recruitment of 'new blood' into the body politic.

Though there are some leaders who still look forward to their caste support, no caste in Andhra Pradesh can be said to have only one political allegiance. Political opportunism, in fact, is often mistaken for a caste force.

With the Panchyati Raj movement taking deep root, the control of its bodies has become an important factor in the general elections. In fact the Panchyati Raj has turned State politics into an amalgam of Parishads, Samithis and village politics.



