

A MULTI-GROUP MODEL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF BLOC POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS

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by

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B.A. in Law, National Taiwan University, 1962

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Manhattan, Kansas

1967

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Preface

One of the most striking developments of postwar world politics has been the growth of bloc politics. Such a development has made it possible for many states to exert an influence far out of proportion to either their population or political importance when they combine their voting strength on particular issues in the General Assembly. Notwithstanding the fact that a group's voting power may bear little relation to its military strength, economic resources or population, bloc politics has been a recognized diplomatic practice to achieve an overall settlement based on mutual compromises. A general conception of the naturalness and inevitability of bloc politics in the political climate of the Assembly has been accepted, though there is lacking a systematic and scientific examination of the total phenomenon. Bloc politics tend to represent a large part of world politics today.

In terms of theory of international politics, there have not been many general theoretical efforts at explaining world politics. In recent years, partial explanatory theories, such as power politics, systems theory, normative theory, equilibrium theory, game theory and the decision-making approach, have been frequent. All these efforts toward theory are admirable, but their postures are characterized in an accumulation of unrelated courses because each one is in its own fashion. Thus the applications of these theories

in real world politics are not entirely satisfactory.

This study grew out of the desire to explore the recent trends in international politics and to explain them on the basis of major ideas of contemporary theories. The idea of this study originated with Mr. Morton A. Kaplan's six models of system theory and George Liska's international equilibrium. The writer admires their pioneer work for a contribution to contemporary research on international politics; further he attempts to define a new model of the international system and suggest an equilibrium theory in a related course of theoretical research on bloc politics.

I. INTRODUCTION

The post-1945 world marked a totally new system of bipolarity--like N.A.T.O. and the Communist bloc--which may already be passing with the rise of atomic powers like China and France, and their deviations from the two blocs. At first, the emergence of independent "nonaligned" states contributed much to the transformation of "bi-polar" confrontations into an "East-Neutral-West" political configuration. Recently, Secretary-General U Thant suggested that this tripolar situation "has been superseded by a complex and fluid pattern of international relations."¹ The Sino-Soviet split, fissions within N.A.T.O., and the emergence of the new nations have drastically altered the conflicts preoccupying national foreign policies. In another context the Secretary-General predicted that the main political configuration of the 1970s would contain four centers of power--the United States of America, Europe, Russia and China.² Perhaps it will add to the present two nuclear blocs an indefinite number of units which will exist on the basis of equality as possessors of the new weapon. The international trend is the movement toward what has been called polycentrism, "the loosening of binding ties in the two great alliance systems and the

¹See a news item, "Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues," New York Times (December 3, 1962).

²"Thant Envisions 4 Power Groups," New York Times (June 29, 1963).

emergence of, if not cogent power, at least partially independent centers of policy."³

As the bipolar world loses its definite character, "extreme bipolarity is gone, perhaps for good. At the same time, a balance-of-power system, like that over half a century ago, has not been restored and will not be restored in the near future."⁴ We must look for something in between, something less familiar and for that reason less predictable. The possibility of an international system composed of a multiplicity of blocs has been considered by a number of writers in the past few years.

John Herz, having seen this possibility, has argued that a system of multipolarity would take the form of the "unit veto" system as defined by Kaplan.⁵ Stanley Hoffmann has contended that there remains a third possibility, a series of supranational communities, at first regional, and continuously enlarging themselves—a confederal or federal model.⁶ "Multi-polarity," Waltz maintains, will be for the foreseeable future a secondary fact within the general structure of relations established by the

³ Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "New Trends in International Affairs," World Politics, Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (October 1965), p. 118.

⁴ Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 153.

⁵ John H. Herz, International Relations in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 34-35.

⁶ See Stanley Hoffmann's essay, Organisations Internationales et Pouvoirs Politiques des Etates, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques, No. 52 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954), pp. 416-17. (Roger D. Master's translation.)

bipolar world.⁷ Roger D. Master's "Multi-bloc" Model may be considered as a theoretical extension of Kaplan's typology of international systems and as an alternative to his six models.⁸ Deutsch and Singer contend that the multipolar and bipolar models are connected with Richardson's model of arms races and similar kinds of escalating conflicts.⁹

To sum up, the outcome will be either the "multipolar power" system or "multi-bloc" system. The system will approximate a rivalry of power among regional blocs, assuming each is armed with nuclear weapons. Bloc members should rely on the leading member--the one possessing the new weapons--to survive. Arms races and military capabilities make the system unstable. In the long run, the system would tend to be substantially dangerous or to be self-destroying.¹⁰

In fact, the present situation probably falls somewhere between the bipolar and the multipolar characterizations. There are a number of conflict dimensions, but the East-West alignment is much more prominent than the others. As George Liska says, the contemporary system is "a mixed, bipolar-multipolar, one with respect to different forms of power;

⁷Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams, (ed.) Crisis and Continuity in World Politics (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 645.

⁸Roger D. Master, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System," American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 1961), p. 780.

⁹Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics, Vol. 16 No. 3 (April 1964), p. 391.

¹⁰Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, Ibid., p. 406.

and it is tripartite in policy, in function of two dominant conflicts."¹¹ Most of those efforts to construct models of the international system such as Kaplan's six models of international system, Masters' multi-bloc model and Deutsch and Singer's multipolar power systems have been tested by the application of models to real present world politics, but no one model can be proved perfect. Perhaps, as Kaplan has said, "There is a considerable difference between the real world and the model of an international system.... A model is designed to explore selected aspects of reality, and simplifying assumptions are used for this purpose."¹² It may be, however, that we have overlooked a number of possibilities from the informal pattern of world politics. For instance, there is a substantial body of theory about competitive multi-group politics in the United Nations which might profitably be applied to international politics.

The United Nations is an organization of more than 100 sovereign states, but it is questionable whether these states, each acting separately, can form a universal organization for the maintenance of peace. The United Nations has begun to explore the variety of techniques of diplomacy that are at its disposal to facilitate negotiations between states.

¹¹George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 161.

¹²Morton A. Kaplan, The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 251.

There has been a world-wide trend toward consolidation and in some cases integration of formerly isolated states since World War II. Apart from the United Nations, there are many international organizations and regional blocs, each reflecting some degree of interdependence and common action on the basis of common interests, whether they are social, economic, geographical, military, or political. It seems essential to "... speculate on the consequences, for world politics, of the replacement of nations by regional blocs."¹³

The United Nations is a center for reconciling differences. It is a machine by which measures of peaceful change and development can take effect. Ernst B. Haas, in describing the useful function of the United Nations, has concluded that the Organization might ensure the international breathing spell necessary to develop "a multi-polar and multi-functional pattern of policy expectations, and thereby further the habits of peaceful adjustment of basic tensions."¹⁴ It is also an instrument by which nations can give effect to their joint effort in a common cause.

The General Assembly in its day-to-day operation bears witness to the primacy of politics in the United Nations.

¹³See Walter Lippman's speech on "The Atlantic Community," at a Conference on "Regionalism and Political Facts," Philadelphia, May 6, 1949.

¹⁴Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," World Politics, Vol. VIII (January 1956), p. 263.

It is an arena of international politics in which states and groups of states seek influence, prestige, political advantages, or whatever other values may be at stake. More than this, an extra-legal political structure which has developed alongside the formal structure established by the Charter reflects the real power alignments and interests in the Assembly.¹⁵ Yet it cannot properly be said that the actions of the General Assembly merely reflect the power realities of international politics. It is the interaction between international politics and parliamentary politics that an understanding of the Assembly must be found.

The United Nations is a center for harmonizing the actions of nations toward the attainment of their common ends--to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations and to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character. "The presence at United Nations headquarters of representatives of Member States has facilitated the development of blocs and groups."¹⁶ The United Nations now has so many members that some informal grouping of states with similar interests facilitates the smooth operation of the Organization.

¹⁵Robert E. Riggs, Politics in the United Nations: A Study of U.S. Influence in the General Assembly (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1958), p. 1.

¹⁶Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1960), p. 17.

The present phase in the life of the UN system is earmarked by an inter-regional and inter-functional balancing process. The policies of the system were produced as "a result of continuous compromises among regional blocs which differ in internal cohesion with respect to specific UN functions."¹⁷ It is the principal instance where the groups do vie for votes, and where the one-state-one-vote principle holds. This quasi-parliamentary nature of the Organization gives the small and poor states an arithmetical advantage in its internal political process. Thus the new independent states have formed some coherent groupings. They are aware of the bargaining power conferred upon them by non-commitment in the cold war. They are active in a mediating, bargaining and compromising role.

The United Nations does not carry on power politics in the ordinary sense of the word. It is arrangement politics. "This reflects something which is of considerable interest in the world today, namely the decline of power politics which goes with the decline of the Security Council."¹⁸ On the other hand, the General Assembly is not established as

¹⁷Ernst B. Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the UN," Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 294.

¹⁸Address of William Clark to Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 19, 1960, International Affairs (July, 1960); as quoted from Ernst A. Gross, "Shifting Institutional Pattern of the United Nations," Francis O. Wilcox (ed.), The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 75.

a political forum in which the great powers play the game of power politics. The politics of the General Assembly reflect an interplay between the forces of pluralism, legal equality, and diversity among member states. Power perhaps is no longer "the immediate aim of the nation"¹⁹ or the ultimate aim of international politics. Trade, aid and alliance, for example, are essential determinants of conflict policies in international relations. The politics of arrangement between nations and blocs of nations tend to be the guiding principle in world affairs.

The bloc or group is a binding together of states so as to make it possible for them to act as a unit in foreign relations, employing coordinated policies, under the direction of its most influential member. A regional bloc or group may form as a "Great Power," which reserves sufficient capabilities to negotiate or bargain with other power blocs. Bloc politics will be considered as a new political phenomenon emerging from regional alliances and state coalitions. As early as 1949, Walter Lippman predicted: "The true constituent members of the international order of the future are communities of states."²⁰ The existence of groups in the General Assembly

¹⁹Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954, 2nd ed.), p. 25.

²⁰See Walter Lippman's speech on "The Atlantic Community," at a Conference on "Regionalism and Political Pacts," Philadelphia, May 6, 1949.

of the United Nations and the importance of their activities have been recognized ever since its establishment.

Because the various groups of member states play a conspicuous role in the decisions of the Assembly, the operation of these groups deserves study. If our central concern is to assess the pattern of international politics as it has developed and been reflected in the United Nations, a scientific and systematic study of bloc politics is significant and imperative. There have been few attempts at systematic examination of the total phenomenon. The present study is to review and evaluate bloc politics in the General Assembly and will attempt to build a theoretical system and theory in international politics.

This essay will not attempt to define an abstract model of the international system (such as Master's Multi-Bloc Model), but will attempt to define a multi-group model of the international system, playing "multiple equilibrium"²¹ among the bloc and groups of member states in the General Assembly. This suggests that it might be desirable to construct a multi-group model while ignoring the effects of nuclear weapons. Our hypothesis is that the United Nations is an organization not only for avoiding war through the peaceful reconciliation of conflicting interests but also for remedying injustices. Most of the groups are active in a mediating, bargaining and compromising role,

²¹The theory of multiple equilibrium may be considered as a theoretical extension of George Liska's typology of international equilibrium; for the details of the concepts and principles of this theory see Chapter VI of this article.

and they expand all their influences and social forces so that a general agreement or consensus among the member states may be achieved. Multiple equilibrium here means balance. The central concept, as Liska regards it, is institutional equilibrium--progressive, stable, and unstable equilibrium. This approach suggests an understanding of the techniques necessary to effect political, social, economic and cultural change without recourse to force. Multiple equilibrium may not significantly elucidate the whole political process of the General Assembly, but it is a convenient concept of this study, considering the balance of the interaction of different groups with one another. It provides an important focus for the study of group integration and cooperation.

The choice of the General Assembly as an arena for primary analysis may be revealed by U Thant's claim that the Assembly is "a realistic representation of the present day world."²² This is a projection based on both the practices of interrelations of the blocs and the contemporary theories of international politics. It is tentative, assuming the possible development of world politics into a multi-group (or multi-bloc) international system which would be distinguished from the classical nation-state system, bipolar system, multi-polar system and other international systems. The purpose of this article is to examine bloc politics in the General Assembly and to suggest a

²²See "Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues," New York Times (December 3, 1962).

multi-group international system and a theory of multiple equilibrium, in order to estimate its degrees of adequacy and possibility of future research. If the article helps in anyway to further such an understanding, it will have served its purpose.

The analysis of this paper is based largely on the documents of the United Nations, supplemented by theoretical aspects of international politics. This study--which focuses on five important and distinct aspects--embraces a general survey of the blocs and groups that have developed, an identification of the multiplicity of groups, the conflict dimensions and group coalitions, some characteristics of multi-group international system, a theory of multiple equilibrium, and some conclusions.

From the broader, or systematic point of view, we shall define the pattern of politics that has developed in the General Assembly with a model of a relatively stable international system. With such a model, specific changing conditions and patterns can be assessed "in terms of their impact on the stability and responsiveness of the world political system."²³ In making this comparison a set of hypotheses about how a nation might behave and work in the United Nations will be presented. At this stage of the analysis, we shall consider a delegation as equivalent to the representative of a nation, a group as a unit, the General Assembly as a major arena, and international politics at the United Nations as major world politics.

²³Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 4.

Such assumptions will be disputed by some readers. Nevertheless, this is in the spirit of theory as a set of questions, alerting us to variables and relationships we might otherwise overlook.

II. A GENERAL VIEW OF BLOC POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The most significant consequence of the General Assembly's growing pattern has been the emergence of groups and bloc politics. The Assembly has tended to become an international arena in which the political struggles of major groups of our time are being waged. This trend has promoted a rising interest in regional and other manageable forms of multilateral cooperation. From this trend, opportunities have developed for flexible adaptation of policies, programs, and techniques to fit the evolving conditions. Such a tendency has allowed the Assembly to take on the complexion of a multi-group system.

To belong to a group, or caucus, and preferably to more than one group, has almost become a diplomatic feature at the General Assembly. Some group division in the Assembly is necessary if the organization is expected to function at all successfully. "There would be much less stability or continuity to U.N. positions without some formal or informal groupings."¹ By providing a forum where the groups, geographical or political, must participate in continuing electoral competition or seek support for a resolution, the General Assembly performs a major function in preserving the system's stability.

The groups involving different states are created to satisfy specific needs for producing common or compatible policies among the states. They would not be formed unless their members had

¹ John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, How United Nations Decisions Are Made (New York: Oceans Publications, 1962), p. 64.

common attitudes based on common interests or common ideology. They would not be formed if "the members considered their common outlook a sufficient guarantee for concerted action on specific measures in the field of their shared attitudes."² Blocs and/or groups operate as units in the General Assembly--ranging from those with formal organizations and binding commitments to those with no organizations and only similar areas of interest. Their functions have been variously economic, political, military, and cultural.

Special attention to the phenomenon of bloc politics dates from the ascendancy of the General Assembly over the Security Council after 1951, and the consequent importance of votes in the Assembly--which was the adoption of the so-called "Uniting for Peace Resolution." The uniting for Peace Resolution, which was designed to enable the General Assembly to act more promptly and effectively in meeting threatening situations, extended the competence of the General Assembly and its responsibility for international security and peace. The preponderance of power once envisaged for the Security Council has never been marshalled. At the same time, because of the frequent use of the veto (by the Soviet Union), it was necessary to curb the Council's power to obstruct cooperative action. Since the Security Council has lost influence, the prospects of world peace turn not on the

²Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and A Proposal," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (December 1963), p. 904.

Council but on the importance of growing functions of the General Assembly and the effectiveness of regional group balances of power. "The General Assembly, like the Security Council, is a political body, and politics will inevitably be played therein."³ Groups of states will vote together, or differ, dependent upon their own policies and the national and international interests involved. As the activities of the General Assembly have expanded, the various blocs and groups of states have thereby played a more conspicuous role in the decisions of the Assembly.

Because the General Assembly has been organized to be able to operate on call within twenty-four hours and because the activities of groups have been expanded, most of the member-states have set up permanent missions in Manhattan, New York, rather than sending delegates to each session of the Assembly. A permanent mission can provide continual representation with a greater degree of efficiency and encourage the use of the Assembly as a propaganda forum as well as an arena for close political bargaining. Thus the growth of the Assembly into an increasingly effective organization facilitates the operations and activities of bloc politics in the United Nations.

With the passing years, the General Assembly has evolved into an instrument of quiet or private as well as of public diplomacy. It supplements the traditional processes of diplomacy. The traditional diplomacy, during the three centuries

³Margaret E. Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," International Organization, Vol. 5 (February 1951), p. 31.

ending in 1919, was predicated on the assumption that "everything important happened in Europe or was done by Europeans; it was based on the principle of the inequality of States; ..." ⁴ Political changes throughout the world have affected the environment in which diplomacy operates. "Europe's long-standing claim to centrality has been challenged." ⁵

Surveying the evolution of the diplomatic methods in the United Nations it appears that the system has been characterized in many ways. Generally, U.N. diplomacy has been called multilateral diplomacy, public diplomacy, conference diplomacy, or parliamentary diplomacy. Sometimes it has been termed bloc diplomacy, diplomacy by groups, and diplomacy by major ties. When the diplomatic processes in the United Nations have been more comparable to the classical methods of diplomacy, the methods there have been referred to as private or quiet diplomacy. ⁶ The development of the diplomatic method in the Assembly has seen an increasing recognition of the possibilities of supplementing conference diplomacy with quiet diplomacy. This blending of public and quiet diplomacy gives a uniqueness to the diplomatic method of the United Nations: the diplomacy of reconciliation or preventive diplomacy.

⁴Sydney D. Bailey, op. cit., p. 1.

⁵Ibid., p. 3.

⁶Thomas Hovet, Jr., "The United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1963), p. 29.

The General Assembly has constituted a diplomatic parliament--but not a true legislative parliament--or the "town meeting" of the world. The chief function of this deliberative assembly is to crystallize and express world opinion. It is the practice of public debate, followed by voting, which has given so much of contemporary multilateral diplomacy its "parliamentary" character. Many United Nations activities are initiated in the Assembly and are also to be approved by it. Member states attempt to increase mutual understanding, to acquire or give information, to win friends and influence people. The Assembly is frequently described as a body whose primary justification is that it provides for an exchange of views between governments. Members are required to express opinions, at least by voting, on international problems which, without the organization, would not have otherwise concerned them. Furthermore, it is the value which "the General Assembly seems to have as a forum for appealing to public opinion and building up support among the smaller nations for Great Power politics, which has been primarily responsible for the development of its position."⁷

To the smaller nations, the United Nations has enormous value. The United Nations can help these new and emerging nations find their places in the world. One of the bases of the United Nations is the principle of equality of its Members. It is designed to protect their independence and their sovereignties and to help

⁷Leland M. Goodrich, "Development of the General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 471, p. 278.

them advance their people's welfare. "It is also a center where a small state can greatly enhance its influence by joining with other like-minded states to achieve common objectives."⁸ If a major power can recognize the interests of smaller nations, it can work out arrangements which will provide adequate voting support for its views on the matters of its primary concern. The success of a major power alliance with smaller nations on major issues is not possible "unless an understanding of the issues vital to the smaller members is achieved as a basis for compromises that can be worked out to mutual satisfaction."⁹ Reviewing the role of the United Nations in bringing new developing nations into being and aiding them to achieve economic independence, U Thant said that "the interests of humanity are being served by a universal organization practicing the true principles of democracy on the international plane."¹⁰

The collective admission of sixteen new nations in December, 1955, symbolized a new period in the United Nations history. The increasing membership of the United Nations has been an important factor in the organization and development of blocs and groups.

⁸Francis O. Wilcox, "United States Policy in the United Nations," Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (ed.), The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 155.

⁹Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 11.

¹⁰See "U. N. Voting Shift Opposed by Thant," New York Times (June 11, 1962).

The United Nations increased its membership from 51 in 1946 to 117 in 1965. Of one hundred seventeen current members, only three remain unaffiliated. Most Member states associate with each other to achieve the common ends which seem to them desirable. A state which does not belong to any group is forced "to rely upon more subtle political and economic pressures for gaining support for its point of view and consequently must risk individual moves which may have lasting unfavorable effects."¹¹ Participation in groups can open avenues for a variety of diplomatic techniques. This growth of a diplomatic center at the United Nations has had an influence on the formation and development of political groupings in the General Assembly.

Membership in the United Nations is a symbol of each country's standing and dignity as a sovereign state. Each member of the Organization has one vote, and no distinction is made between large and small, old and new, strong and weak. A member state does not differ from other members in this respect. Smaller powers emphasize equality, great powers favor the hierarchical principle; for example, the General Assembly recognizes the equalitarian principle, and the Security Council the hierarchical principle. Of all organs of the United Nations, "the Assembly has received the greatest impact from the increase in the number of sovereign States ..., since it is the only

¹¹Thomas Hovet, Jr. Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 112.

principal organ to which all Member States belong."¹²

According to the voting rules of the General Assembly, each member has one vote. Decisions are made by either a simple or two-third majority, when the formal principle of equality is applied. Under the one-state, one-vote procedure, the newer Member states have voting strength out of all proportion to their populations, contributions, and responsibilities in the United Nations. One of the main consequences of this system has nevertheless been "to encourage what might be called 'voting power' politics, the aim of which is to muster the number of votes (either a two-thirds or simple majority) required to secure the passage of a resolution."¹³ Thus in the Assembly the Members often vote in groups, "either following a strong nation that represents the position they favor, or uniting behind some regional or political interest that they have in common."¹⁴ It is clear that, under certain conditions, some groups--if combined--may exercise what amounts to a "collective veto" over the decisions of the General Assembly. Theoretically, for instance, the Afro-Asian group, if united, could effectively block any important decision. In practice, however, this has not tended to occur. If in any case the prescribed majority of votes can be secured, the minority can then be voted down.

¹²Sydney Bailey, op. cit., p. 253.

¹³Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Role of the United Nations in World Affairs," International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1958), p. 28.

¹⁴David C. Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works (New York and Lond: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 206.

The growth of the bloc and group pattern is to a considerable extent a reflection of the expanding membership of the United Nations. "As the membership of the United Nations has increased, the attainment of consensus within the General Assembly for recommendations or other actions has become increasingly difficult."¹⁵ Differences in policy and judgment among the Members of the Organization are bridged to the extent possible by a continuous flow of diplomatic activity within and around the Assembly. The adjustment of different views and positions has drawn Members into group relations in order to have an effective vote bargaining power. "It provides an opportunity to create a combined voting power which can be a critical factor in negotiation with other groups."¹⁶ Group-members endeavor to align their participants behind predetermined stands and to cast as many of their votes as possible in a single direction on important ballotings. Thus the bloc and group arrangements have become a necessity for effective negotiation.

The organized groups or blocs which have developed at the United Nations are informal, but their existence is recognized. Occasionally a representative may speak at a United Nations meeting on behalf of a group or

¹⁵Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1962), p. 504.

¹⁶Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 112.

bloc. The connotations of the following samples from those records are unmistakable:

Mr. Cooper (Liberia): The Organization, instead of being united, is now shattered into blocs which seem to be...¹⁷

Mr. Pinard (Canada): Increasingly, also we are dividing ourselves as Members of the United Nations into smaller groups. I think that this is in many respects a healthy phenomenon...¹⁸

Mr. Maloes (Philippines): As chairman of the African-Asian groups, I want to bring a very important question to the Assembly...¹⁹

Mr. David (Czechoslovakia): It is a great honor for me to speak on behalf of the Eastern countries...²⁰

Mr. Banadaransike (Ceylon): I must tell the Assembly that it is my view, and the views of my colleagues, the other Asian Prime Ministers, ...²¹

Mr. Spaak (Belgium): I should first of all like to explain that I am speaking on behalf not only of my delegation, but also those of the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the three Benelux countries having agreed to speak with one voice...²²

Mr. Pinard, Canadian delegate, addressing the same session of the General Assembly two weeks later, said:

¹⁷United Nations. General Assembly. Eleventh Session. *Official Records*. Plenary Meetings (590th meeting, 22 November 1956), p. 244. Hereafter cited as UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary.

¹⁸UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 609th mtg., 5 December 1956, p.538.

¹⁹UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 679th mtg., 18 September 1957, p. 15.

²⁰UN. GA. XII. OR. Plenary, 690th mtg., 26 September 1957, p. 179.

²¹UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 590th mtg., 22 November 1956, p. 232.

²²UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 594th mtg., 24 November 1956, p. 295.

"Increasingly, also we are dividing ourselves as Members of the United Nations into smaller groups... It can be a partial solution to the problem of size... When there is not time to hear every voice, there is a good deal to be said for choirs. Most of our groups, moreover, are not hard blocs. They are flexible and they are fortunately, not exclusive. It is only natural and fitting that like-minded countries should work together; but it is neither natural nor fitting when a group is forced to become--superficially, at least--so united that it automatically votes as one, on even the most unimportant procedural issues....²³

Addressing the General Assembly November 22, Mr. Cooper, delegate from Liberia, said:

"Having formed ourselves into blocs in order to protect or foster some mode of life peculiar to our environment, or to enhance our position in world affairs, our stand becomes inflexible. The Organization, instead of being united, is now shattered into blocs which seem to be losing all power of cohesion... Offices, membership on committees, seats on various subsidiary organizations are all apportioned according to the strength of nations and the size of each bloc. In such conditions, no nation can afford to stand aloof, basing its interests upon right and justice. To exist in such conditions, it becomes not only necessary but imperative for a state to align itself with the group in which it thinks its interest may be best served and safeguarded...."²⁴

Each bloc or group, including a leader and loyal group members or bloc members, tries to convince other members that it is best able to fulfill their needs and respect their normative prescriptions. Blocs and pressure groups try to exercise their influence to win their points or arrive at compromises. Political and regional groups "see advantage in

²³UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 609th mtg., 5 December 1956, pp. 538-539.

²⁴UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 22 November 1956, p. 244.

establishing an agreed slate which protects their own as well as other candidatures."²⁵ All are apportioned according to the strength of states and the size of each group. Offices, memberships on committees, seats on various subsidiary organizations are decided by an unwritten gentleman's agreement in behind the scenes negotiations. "When there is a high coincidence of interest or common belief among the members of a regional or other organized group, bloc voting may be anticipated. And where there is a high coincidence of interest or belief as between regional or other groups, combinations of blocs may be anticipated..."²⁶ The results are therefore predicatable, to some extent, to those who have been in touch with the negotiations.

An important initial factor in the development of blocs and groups is to be found in the necessity of organizing a coalition of interests of sufficient strength to assure that each bloc will have as many seats on the councils and as many votes on the decisions of the United Nations as it can possibly obtain. The Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council are organs with limited membership. The seats of the Councils are generally allocated through negotiations, and usually distributed in accordance with the degree of representation of the interest group or bloc. Frequently informal or even formal meetings of the delegations concerned

²⁵John Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 48.

²⁶M. Margaret Ball, op. cit., p. 31.

are held for the purpose of establishing an agreed slate of countries in United Nations elections. Certainly delegates "prefer discussion of and agreement on a slate before an election to avoid uncertainty and repeated balloting in which personal and national susceptibilities will possibly be hurt."²⁷

It should be pointed out that the General Assembly is a body which reflects in its decisions on major questions the results of long and careful negotiations and consideration. During the process "common lines are elaborated and compromises reached which give the decisions the character of a confirmation of a negotiated approach rather than of a resolution achieved through the mechanics of voting."²⁸ Compromise resolutions, taking into account the interests of several of the main groupings in the Assembly, are most likely to receive a two-thirds majority vote. The chief business of groups is to create a consensus within the limitations imposed by intra-group and inter-group diversities. Group members attempt to attract support for their proposals from other sides. "Since no group can be assured of victory on a consistent basis, except on a few particularly favorable and often ritualistic issues, compromise and bargaining must be engaged in continually by all sides to obtain the best possible terms."²⁹

²⁷ John Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 49.

²⁸ See "Excerpts From Secretary G. Hammarskjold's Report to the U.N. Members," New York Times (September 13, 1960), p. 14.

²⁹ Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," International Conciliation, No. 557 (March 1966), p. 16.

Some of these negotiations take place outside the United Nations building at informal or semi-formal meetings in delegation offices. Each delegation usually bargains with other delegations to the United Nations, and also uses the Assembly as a political forum to influence world opinion. Many governments occasionally negotiate directly with other capitals on major issues. There is however a tendency for the greater part of these communications to take place in the U.N. building itself. Most important exchanges of view are carried out in informal meetings in the small committee rooms at the U.N. headquarters. Sometimes those groups are formed of individuals who want to work together towards some agreement. On other occasions groups are organized by one interested delegation after or during a formal U.N. meeting. On occasion, formal meetings are used chiefly as a place where individual delegates can be reached at certain time so as to arrange informal meetings.³⁰

Since much of the diplomatic effort in the Assembly is devoted to building the greatest possible degree of support for a resolution, the position of each group must be taken into account. It can progressively fuse into a complex decision-making apparatus jointly operated by a large group of voting power. It can establish itself as a bargaining unit; it can hold a reasonable position in terms of the range of attitudes acceptable to the majority. The degree of influence that a group can exercise "will naturally depend on its size, power,

³⁰ John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

and prestige, as well as on the diplomatic skill of its representatives and the tactical situation in the organization."³¹ Member states may attempt to use common group membership or ideological ties as reasons to support their positions in the Assembly. The group may also require that its spokesman participate in negotiations and its views be taken into account.

The United Nations operates far more through personal relations and informal discussion than formal exchanges and public debates. Delegates constantly meet one another, not necessarily careful prearrangement but rather because they so often have business to discharge in the same building. A continual process of consultation, arranged and casual, takes place among friends and leaps across barriers. The blocs and groups of states organize themselves far more actively in the negotiation processes. Each bloc or group plays a considerably integral part in the process of dealing with issues. These blocs and groups operate informally behind the scenes at the United Nations. This informal structure, "operating within the formal organization of the United Nations, has had a strong impact on the type and character of diplomacy in the organization."³² Many believe that personal contacts and informal consultations have as much, if not greater, importance than the formal decisions which are reached. They contribute to the

³¹ Robert O. Keohane, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

³² Thomas Hovet, Jr. *African in the United Nations* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 12.

promotion of useful decisions both within the organization's framework and outside it.

The General Assembly is not only a center for this kind of conciliation, but a major arena of competition. The basic technique of UN diplomacy is to endeavor "to persuade the representatives of another government by inducements and appeals to reason, friendly attachment, magnanimity, self-interest, pride, or even fear."³³ As group actors, their roles require them to try to influence other delegates by some combination of bargaining, coercion, and persuasion. If they can not be persuaded to adopt a position or action desired, explorations are usually conducted to ascertain a possible measure of compromise. Thus these "extra-parliamentary" means of coercing fellow-delegates have characterized the multi-group model of the international system.³⁴ The success of groups in achieving their own goals and satisfying their constituents depends primarily on their effective application of these means in the international arena.

³³Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, op. cit., p. 354.

³⁴For the details of characteristics of the multi-group model of the international system see Chapter V.

III. THE IDENTIFICATION OF MULTIPLICITY OF GROUPS

The size of the General Assembly makes some form of regular cooperation among states necessary; the increasing membership of the Assembly gives the apparent inevitability of the development of interest groupings in the political climate of the General Assembly. Since its diversity insures that such identification will remain essentially difficult in its complex nature, there has been no recognized system of identification of the multiplicity of groups. This study will examine and identify the distinct and major groups in the politics of the Assembly.

With a generalized multi-purpose mission, the United Nations is a global organization for furthering mutual interests. It is a machine for mutual action, "not an independent supra-national authority."¹ The Charter of the United Nations recognizes the importance of the regional arrangements and mutual cooperation. Mutual security, economic problems or other crises do not necessarily bind all states together under one world organization. The trend toward regional arrangements and a multigroup system has been gradual and steady. There were only three caucusing groups (such as the Latin American, Commonwealth, and Arab groups) in existence at the San Francisco Conference of 1945. Now, in addition to the Soviet bloc, six geographical distribution groups, eight caucusing groups, and twenty-one regional groups, there are some common interest

¹Dag Hammarskjöld, "The United Nations in the Modern World," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 2 (May 1955), p. 8.

groups and temporary groups. The formation of blocs and groups "is an historic development unforeseen and desired in 1945, to which the United Nations is now compelled to adjust itself."²

The blocs and groups of states with their special interests are exposed to a variety of divisions at the United Nations meetings. There are--at various times--divisions not only between the Soviet bloc and Western countries but also between developed and underdeveloped countries, between totalitarian and democratic countries, between donors and receivers of economic aid, between big powers and small powers, between colonial powers and anti-colonial countries, among the various regional areas, among the different color groupings, and a whole host of other divisions.

In her pioneering study of blocs and groups in the General Assembly, Margaret M. Ball considers that a bloc is "any group which consistently votes as a unit on all or particular kinds of issues."³ Thus some groups may conceivably be expected to vote together because they constitute regional groups within the meaning of the Charter (Organization of American States, Arab League, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or because they simply inhabit the same geographical area (Asia, Latin

²Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow" in the New York Herald Tribune, (April 11, 1949); as quoted from Anwar Husaain Syed, Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 189.

³M. Margaret Ball, op. cit., p. 3.

America, Middle East), or because they have a common ideology (communist states, democratic states), or because they have common interests (colonial powers, anti-colonial powers), or because they have common machinery for consultation in matters of foreign policy (British Commonwealth, Benelus, Scandinavian states).⁴

John B. Furey argues that a voting bloc is essentially a sense of solidarity and a definite purpose. He regards the existence of voting blocs on the basis of common characteristics (common interests, culture, tradition, ideology, religion, language or economic outlook; geographical contiguity; or membership in regional organizations; as well as activity in election campaigns and the numerous generalizations and "accusations" that have been made) and common objectives.⁵

In his study of balance of power in the United Nations, F. H. Soward asserts that there is only one "bloc" in the Assembly (the Soviet bloc), but he also identifies a number of "groups": the Afro-Asian, Latin American, Commonwealth, and European groups.⁶

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ John Bernard Furey, "Voting in the General Assembly," (doctoral dissertation, Columbia University), Doctoral Dissertation Series, Publication 6620, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1954, pp. 8, 16.

⁶ F. H. Soward, "The Changing Balance of Power in the United Nations," The Political Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October-December, 1957), pp. 317-318.

In his analysis of politics in the United Nations (1958), Robert E. Riggs makes a distinction between different types of blocs: those which hold regular caucuses (the Soviet, Arab League, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Commonwealth blocs), those which engage in ad hoc caucusing (the West European bloc, the "Sixteen", and NATO), and several others (Benelux, the Burma-India-Indonesia group, and Scandinavia plus Iceland).⁷

In a 1960 article, Geoffrey Goodwin has also assessed the voting behavior or the different caucusing groups on specific issues, including Hungary, Chinese membership, West Irian, and the future of the Cameroons. Goodwin asserts that there are only five "main groups" in the Assembly: the Soviet, Commonwealth, Western European, and Latin American groups, and the Afro-Asian group which includes the African group and the Arab League members.⁸ He argues that organized groups within the United Nations add much needed coherence to its political process and do, by and large, reflect the state of world politics as it is today.

Roderick C. Ogley in his essay of 1961 identifies eight different blocs on the basis of "geographical propinquity; kinship; the assumption of mutual or similar legal rights and obligations; and a common form of government." He lists the following blocs: the Communist, American, white Commonwealth,

⁷Robert E. Riggs, op. cit., pp. 21-27.

⁸Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Expanding United Nations, I--Voting Patterns," International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April, 1960), p. 176.

European colonial, European non-colonial, African, anti-Communist Asian, and uncommitted Asian states.⁹

In his study of the United Nations (1962), H. G. Nicholas defines a bloc as a group of states united by geography, history, race, or ideology, and identifies the following "principal groupings": the Arabs, the Africans, the Asians, the Latin-Americans, the Communists, the West European and North American countries, and the Commonwealth countries.¹⁰

Writing in 1966, Catherine Senf Manno maintains that the classification used by the General Assembly in allotting seats on elective bodies contains the following groups: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and West and others ("others" are Australia and New Zealand). Being largely divided on geographic lines, this gives a stable frame of reference whereas voting blocs are more transient.¹¹

Among these various identifications of groupings, some confusing descriptions can be found. There is some agreement; almost all authors mention the Afro-Asian, the Arab, the Latin American, and the Soviet blocs. The main reason for the unsatisfactory nature of these analyses of blocs and groups in the

⁹ Roderick C. Ogley, "Voting and Politics in the General Assembly," International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April, 1961), pp. 161-162.

¹⁰ H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations As a Political Institution (London: Oxford University, 1962), pp. 117-118.

¹¹ Catherine Senf Manno, "Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rational and Methods," International Organization, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), p. 58.

United Nations is their failure to distinguish between different kinds of groupings in the Assembly. This defect is remedied in Hovet's careful and thorough study. He identifies different types of blocs and groups, and defines each type in explicit terms: caucusing bloc, caucusing groups, geographical distribution groups, regional organization groups, common interest groups, and temporary groups.¹²

Generally speaking, there are three types of groups among states at the United Nations based on the nature and role of blocs and groups. In the first place, there is the ad hoc coalition which appears to deal with a particular issue, and which disappears when the issue passes or changes in character. For example, the sixteen states, which contributed forces to the action of the United Nations on Korean question, seem to have maintained regular consultations with respect to matters of joint concern; the Spanish-speaking countries have occasionally combined to press the claims of the Spanish language in United Nations affairs. Other temporary groups may organize and rely on specific issues in certain situations.

The second type of group consists of states which not only consult each other but also always operate as a single unit. The Soviet bloc with the union of ten members is the most cohesive and tightly organized group in the General Assembly. This group alone constitutes a "voting bloc" in the strict sense, since no

¹² For the details of descriptions of these groups, see Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 29-101.

deviations from the Moscow line are countenanced. Its members meet frequently and achieve a high degree of coordination in speaking and voting in the Assembly. From the viewpoint of give-and-take negotiations with other states, the Soviet bloc has not the flexibility of the other groups. The Soviet bloc which turns out to be the most unified is the only bloc of this kind at the United Nations.

The third type of group, in contrast to the temporary groups and the Soviet bloc, arises when states are organized to meet, either regularly or sporadically, to share a common basis for consultation on issues, though without any commitment to act in union. Several kinds of groups--caucusing groups, geographical distribution groups, regional groups and common interest groups--are based on certain common organizational features as follows: A caucusing group is a term applied to any group of member states in the Assembly which has some degree of formal organization, "holds fairly regular meetings, and is concerned with substantive issues and related procedural matter before the sessions of the General Assembly."¹³ The caucusing groups are the main political groups that operate in the Assembly and are involved in behind-the-scene negotiations on most of the crucial issues. They are concerned with attempts to mobilize strength to influence formal decisions of the various organs of the United Nations. They also perform a significant role in preliminary stages of negotiation before the public debates,

¹³Ibid., p. 31.

votes and resolutions. These groups constitute a channel of communications among countries with similar interests.¹⁴ A caucusing group can benefit from collective interpretations of factors present in other groups, a procedure which can often indicate subtleties that are pertinent to working out acceptable compromises. Participation in a caucusing group itself indicates "a willingness to seek areas of acceptable compromise, whereas failure to participate in caucusing groups can suggest an intransigent attitude which is hardly conducive to successful diplomacy."¹⁵

The growth of caucusing groups has been influenced by the increasing importance of the Assembly and the increasing desire of states to influence its actions. By 1964 there were eleven caucusing groups and one caucusing bloc apparent within the membership of the United Nations. Apart from the Soviet bloc (the only real bloc), the other eleven caucusing groups are the Afro-Asian Group, the African Group, the Brazzaville Group, the Casablanca Group, the Arab Group, the Western European Group, the European Community Group, the Benelux Group, the Scandinavian Group, the Latin American Group, and the Commonwealth Group. Most of the members of the United Nations belong to at least one of these groups, and some members belong to several.

¹⁴Thomas Hovet, "The United Nations Diplomacy," p. 37.

¹⁵Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 112.

The United States, China (Taiwan), Israel, and South Africa do not regularly belong to any caucusing group.

For the purpose of allocating seats on the General Committee, the three Councils, the International Court of Justice, and other less-than full membership committees, geographical distribution groups are created in accord with informal gentlemen's agreements in behind-the-scenes negotiations. They are the result of a working political interpretation developed from the phraseology of Article 23 of the Charter and any true geographical distribution in the groups is coincidental. In essence, they consult only to agree upon which of their members are to be "nominated" so as to give a geographical distribution to the composition of the smaller organs in the United Nations in accord with the number of seats allocated to the particular group.¹⁶

In addition to five geographical distribution groups, which show no overlap of membership, there is another group which has widely overlapping membership but which is also acknowledged in the distribution of elective seats: Commonwealth group. These five distinct geographical groups are: Eastern European group, Asian and African group, Latin American group, Western European and other states group, and Permanent members of the Security Council group. Most of these groups are identical with the caucusing groups: the Asian and African geographical distribution group is identical with the Asian-African caucusing group;

¹⁶Ibid., p. 33.

the Latin American geographical distribution group is identical with the Latin American caucusing group; the Commonwealth geographical distribution group is identical with the Commonwealth caucusing group.

Regional groups which are created on the basis of regional arrangements, treaties, or alliances, are groups of the United Nations members bound together either by common membership in a regional organization not connected directly with the United Nations or by common participation in important regional conferences. They are distinguished by the fact that for the most part they do not have any regularly procedural or organizational features operating in the General Assembly, nor do they have a geographical basis for allocating seats in the United Nations organs. Nevertheless, they display a high degree of cohesion in the Assembly, since their members are usually bound by mutual agreement on treaties or negotiations. It should be pointed out that the reflection of regional group consensus in the Assembly is generally limited to the particular issues upon which they have developed common points of views. There are a number of regional groups in the Assembly, using their original names.¹⁷ Several of the regional groups are

¹⁷For example, Anzus Council, Arab League, Baghdad Pact, Balkan Alliance, Bandung Conference, Colombo Plan, Commonwealth, Conference of Independent African States, Council of Europe, European Atomic Energy Community, European Coal and Steel Community, European Common Market, European Economic Cooperation, Europeans Payments Union, Nordic Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization of European Economic Cooperation, Organization of American States, Organization of Central American States, South East Asia Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact, Western European Union.

identical in membership with previously considered groups and blocs. In all of these regional groups, the highest degree of cohesion is on votes connected with collective measures and peaceful settlement issues.

Common interest groups, as their name indicates, have some interests in common which tend to provide a common outlook on certain types of issues before the General Assembly. They are not bound together by any sort of formal arrangement or membership in a regional body; nevertheless, they have obvious common ties which provide a sense of cohesion in particular issues. At least seven groups of common interest may be distinguished: Moslem States, Arab States, Anti-colonial States, Big Three (France, United Kingdom, and the United States), Colonial Powers, Trust Administrators, Underdeveloped Countries. "Whether these common interest groups actually exist may be a moot question; some observers indicate that they do exist and have an influence."¹⁸

It should be emphasized that the identification of these groups depends upon their decision in the vote, not upon explicit bargaining among diverse coalitions which may change promises of support before the vote. It might be supposed that, for example, one set of states might offer its support to another set cold war issues, and in reciprocity demand the other's support on a self-determination issue. Voting groups in the General Assembly provide a relevant datum for an effort to

¹⁸Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 44

identify these groups.

Both the total membership of the United Nations and the group relationship of the members have been changed in the General Assembly. Although a number of groups in the Assembly retain their distinctiveness in the actual balloting, recent discoveries indicate a more complicated pattern or relationship, since the expansion of Assembly membership has in fact gone beyond the differentiation of new voting groups. With the exception of the Soviet bloc, the groups do not exist as rigid formations. In various matters they contest or cooperate and their members vote freely, in spite of frequent pressures from within and without the bloc, according to their interests and convictions. The groups are flexible and rigid formations hardly exist. They normally shift according to the question at issue.

On the other hand, within and across groups lines there are more or less well-organized subgroups arranged along political, historical, ethnic, or special interest lines. For instance, the Afro-Asian group consists of a number of subgroups, sometimes with overlapping membership, which are often at odds on policy matters--the Arab League, the Brazzaville group, the French Community, the Casablanca group, the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth, the three Asian members of S.E.A.T.O., and the three Asian members of C.E.N.T.O.¹⁹ In

¹⁹Norman D. Palmer, "The Afro-Asians in the United Nations," Franz B. Gross (ed.) The United States and the United Nations (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 140.

practice, one can find that on many issues the group is widely divided. Even though the Commonwealth group meets occasionally, the group is politically divided and no longer has a significant joint role in nominating candidates for Assembly offices.

It is argued that the Commonwealth group can "in no sense be regarded a voting Power, of economic 'have' and economic 'have-not,' many members will frequently be voting on opposite sides."²⁰ Thus group separateness and relationships are radically different from the present structure of dividing and overlapping ties or networks of alliances.

The so-called Afro-Asian group is not much of a bloc since it contains conservatives, moderates and radicals, since this spectrum shifts as governments change, since alliances and traditional associations with Western states continue sporadically to operate, since often uninstructed delegates do a great deal of freewheeling, and since common goals are not always shared by Africans and Asians or by subregional groups with these continental conglomeration.²¹ But in some conditions, it is a functioning and organized group, and its members have achieved a higher degree of unity on issues, such as colonial issues, that have come before the United Nations.

The Afro-Asian group seems to be most closely united on matters relating to economic development and self-determination

²⁰Geoffrey Goodwin, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

²¹Charles W. Yost, "The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence and Will," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1966), p. 30.

of peoples. The group has access to about sixty African and Asian countries--virtually half of the world's populations. The very size of the caucus group enables it to deny an overwhelming majority to any one. This gives the group great bargaining power. In that sense the group can paralyze the United Nations and can also elevate the Organization to new levels of achievement as a result of dependence upon, and attachment to, its principles and purposes.²² Nevertheless, a far from united voting record is presented in an examination of the over all votes of African-Asian states. Recently the group made a very conscious effort to stress harmony by not holding meetings on issues involving disputes between group members and thus preventing the spread of disharmony to those issues upon which the group might find common ground.

The Arab caucusing group has been operating as an interest group ever since the San Francisco Conference and is one of the most cohesive groups in the entire course of the U.N. history. "The members of the Arab League meet almost daily while the Assembly is in session to discuss questions of tactics and coordination of policy."²³ The group has been fairly effective in presenting a "united front" to the Assembly--much more so than most caucusing groups. It is true that the members of the group have a common religion, common historical unity, common

²²Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 190.

²³Robert E. Riggs, op. cit., p. 22.

cultural heritage, and common language. The voting record suggests that there is a high degree of cohesion in the Arab group and some lessening of cohesion in a few cases.

The African caucusing group was organized in May 1958 following the first session of the Conference of Independent African States. As African membership in the United Nations has increased, the group has grown correspondingly. Since 1962 the group has been divided into the Casablanca group, the Brazzaville group, and a number of other less organized but still distinguishable factions. The fact that French is the official language of members of the Brazzaville group has tended to set them apart from the other African states. Because of its nonalignment policy the Casablanca group constitutes itself as a lobby within both the African and the Afro-Asian caucusing groups. Other factions of the African group may be as a result of the various conferences or agreements that have brought together particular groups of African states.²⁴ All these sub-groups are very informal in the Assembly. As a whole, the African caucusing group is the most cohesive in the matters of self-determination, economic development and cold war.

The three Benelux countries, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, seem to have worked as a united group throughout the history of the General Assembly. The frequent consultations among the three states justify their existence as a caucusing group. The group has operated as a unit within the slightly

²⁴Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations, pp. 75-106.

larger Western European caucusing group. As a whole, it has displayed a high degree of cohesion in the General Assembly. The Western European group members share elements of common historical development, similar political organization, and regional organizational ties. An examination of the voting record indicates that the group is the most cohesive in the development of international law, self-determination and collective measures.

The Commonwealth group is bound not only by simple loose political ties but also by economic ties of integrated trade and the sterling area. The group has had a wealth of consultative experience which has been carried over into the United Nations. It remains a diverse group, interested in a common strategy where it is possible to agree, but in no sense a hard and fast organization. The voting record of the group provides considerable evidence as to the looseness of its organization. It presents a picture of fairly individualist action on any issues on which particular members may have strong convictions. It seems to comprise several factions none of which in itself is closely unified.²⁵

Unlike most of the other groups in the Assembly, the Latin American caucusing group has had nearly the same membership during the entire history of the organization. From the very first Assembly its representatives have met to decide upon

²⁵Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, pp. 69-73.

Latin-American candidates for Assembly elections and to discuss other matters of common interest. The group has the highest degree of identical votes on matters concerned with economic, humanitarian, and social cooperation. The voting record appears to indicate that the majority of the group tends to vote together most of the time, but the group has less cohesion. The group has some of the characteristics of a loosely organized party.

The Scandinavian group has a broad basis for common action and outlook in their geographical proximity, cultural ties, a similarity of languages, the existence of similar democratic political systems. The group is not divided at all on collective measures, and has a very cohesive voting record on peaceful settlement, self-determination, and economic, social, and humanitarian cooperation issues.

We find a very high degree of unity within most of the caucusing groups. Other groupings and evidences of leadership are not uniform, except almost always in the Soviet bloc; they normally shift according to the question at issue. All of groups are flexible and many have overlapping memberships. In many instances, one encounters not only confusion as to bloc and group identities but also only partial awareness of the full extent of the bloc and group structure in the General Assembly.

IV. CONFLICT DIMENSIONS AND GROUP COALITIONS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

After identifying the blocs and groups in the General Assembly, the next steps are the classification of issues and conflict dimensions and the measurement of coalitions of these groups. We shall concentrate on the examination and assessment of developing issues and alignments. The United Nations, as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations, promotes debates and the international exchange of ideas. The approach here will be to study the developments of issues and group coalitions as reflected in Assembly debates and decisions.

The General Assembly is an organization of some 120 sovereign states, but the arena of international politics in which it exists is militarily dominated by a small number of powerful groups. Since it exists in a world of tension, the General Assembly is very sensitive to the impact of external events and decisions. All member states are represented and are repeatedly required to take formal positions on almost every issue of importance. In the political climate of the General Assembly, various members, blocs and pressure groups are forced to or try to exercise their influence to get what they want or to arrive at some acceptable compromise for a solution. Perhaps no state or group can be well satisfied with the influence which it exercises in the United Nations. No group consistently succeeds in achieving all wants; it is impossible in any democratic organization. No one should

always "win." In terms of game theory, the world may be thought of as a political system in which the major groups are analogous to several parties which compete for the favor of the floating voters. Politics in the General Assembly consists of a set of potentially paramount contests, such as the cold war or self-determination, each with different antagonists, different diplomatic techniques and policies for winning the game, and positive goal values usually to be divided among the players. If the idea of competition is ever to become widely accepted in international politics, it must be through the realization that all players share at least some interests.

During the postwar period national objectives and alliance configurations within the Assembly were remarkably continuous. The most obvious continuity has been the emergence of the superimposition of the political process upon that of diplomacy. Supranationalist issues have increasingly moved to the heart of U.N. politics. An important implication is that "U.N. supranationalism efforts that tend to be most often successful in and outside of the United Nations are those issues appearing to most members"¹ as East vs. West and North vs. South. The trend toward more East-West and North-South conflicts is clear.

The General Assembly has been faced most frequently with two types of questions: those concerning relationships between

¹Hayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 81.

the two great power blocs and those primarily affecting the relations between economically developed states and economically less-developed states. Since 1947 East-West conflict has been a most frequent voting alignment in the Assembly. It consists of such cold war issues as U.N. membership, the Balkan crisis, and policy toward non-self-governing territories. In 1952 "U.N. supranationalism was more a North-South than an East-West issue."² The Assembly has become a principal political forum for "the nations which remain outside the East-West camps and pursue their own goals of political independence, economic improvement, and racial equality."³ North-South conflict, for various reasons, has been developed as the second most prevalent voting pattern.

The cold war political pattern is essentially bipolar, possibly "loose bipolar". In our discussion of bloc politics we have sometimes spoken largely in terms of two-bloc competition. Two-bloc competition is logically confined to a world where most conflicts form on a single dimension. But where a bipolar system will in fact emerge depends heavily on the distribution of preferences. Two blocs may converge toward similar positions, or a third may arise in the center. As we see, an East-West political pattern is by far the most common one in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, a third nonaligned group has appeared.

²Ibid., p. 78.

³Ibid., p. 127.

The nonaligned states have developed as a third force to counter great-power pressure. The so-called loose bipolar political pattern is revealed by the fact that the basic East-West conflict remains essentially bipolar, with some states in the middle. But the East-West dimension is not a single conflict. "It is composed of a number of issues on which state's positions do vary somewhat along the East-West line; issues like the Cold War, colonial self-determination, and Palestine questions."⁴

Change is inherent in the claim that "the East-West confrontation is no longer the primary one within the United Nations, or perhaps, even in international relations outside the General Assembly."⁵ A second set of issues is suggested by the degree to which the tripolar "East-Neutral-West" political pattern has gradually replaced the bipolar confrontation. North-South is the second most important dimension; it essentially pits the developed countries against the underdeveloped ones. After describing the evolution of an "East-Neutral-West" situation U Thant emphasized issues more of a North-South or supranational sort. "The time has come for us to direct our attention more to the economic and social structure of society and particularly to the disparity in the wealth of nations which is one of the root causes of political tension."⁶

⁴ Bruce Russett, op. cit., p. 154.

⁵ Hayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶ "Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues," New York Times (December 3, 1962).

Almost one-third of the Assembly's current membership joined in 1960 and thereafter; most of these states are relatively moderate, with no strong ties to either of the great powers. There are "at present no less than 72 Afro-Asians, almost two-thirds of the membership, and another 25, including all the Latin Americans, which line up with the 'have not' in 'North-South' controversies."⁷ The second and largest category of disputes dealt with by the Assembly has had to do with tensions between major Western powers and the developing countries. Many of these conflicts have arisen out of the liquidation of colonial relationships.⁸ On occasion, for instance, most of the states of Western Europe join with the Soviet bloc to vote against the undeveloped countries--a kind of North-South dimension.

Since 1962 the centers of gravity of world power have shifted--perhaps from bipolar to multi-polar confrontations. Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, chief U.S. delegate at the United Nations, considered that the growth of the General Assembly in its membership caused "the absolute majority" to pass from the West to the African and Asian states.⁹ The newly independent African-Asian group can prevent the Assembly from passing

⁷Charles W. Yost, op. cit., p. 29.

⁸H. Field Haviland, Jr., "The United States and the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer, 1965), p. 648.

⁹"Stevenson Asserts U.N. Balance Shifts," New York Times (April 9, 1962).

issues with an overwhelming majority. This group is therefore already in a strong position to urge other groups to consider the desirability of making concessions. Obviously the neutral group may much prefer a world where neither an East nor a West polar group wins the final victory. Rather than a tightening bipolar struggle between an Eastern and a Western party, however, such findings suggest that the decline of bipolar confrontation has been associated with the beginnings of a multipolar configuration, in which each of the poles is especially interested in and certainly influential on particular substantive issues before the Assembly.

Secretary-General U Thant has urged the great powers to use the General Assembly as a realistic representation of the present-day world, a world containing many other issues distinct from the cold war.¹⁰ The significance of his analysis is the assumption of growing diffusion of power in international relations. In contrast to the Security Council's veto privilege for great powers, the Assembly's political formula of one state-one vote is clearly decentralized. As issues distinct from the cold war arise, the power of cold war bloc leaders is also likely to decline. In this respect, to urge greater use of the Assembly is, therefore, to favor the continuation of this diffusion of power.

¹⁰"Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues," New York Times (December 2, 1962).

Slightly more encouraging is the decentralization of power, at least within the Assembly. There has been a gradual decline of the cold war dimension and an increase in the need for compromise on a remarkably stable set of vast Assembly conflicts. To say that strictly cold war divisions are far less common in the United Nations does not necessarily indicate that they are so in the world at large. The wider sharing of power on cold war issues indicates that more Assembly groups are willing to compromise their positions or bargain for additional votes in order to achieve support for their resolutions. Some of the resulting alignments have appeared on supranationalist or colonial intervention dimensions. This is reflected in the increased prominence of suprnationalist issues which are, frequently, attempts to limit the cold war in certain areas of special interest to "nonaligned." Certainly the nonaligned states are trying to keep the cold war out of the Assembly.

When policy preferences cannot be placed nicely along a single dimension, choice must be considered from a multi-dimensional framework and small groups must often prevail in determining collective preferences. There remains a number of distinct dimensions, distinct enough to permit and even encourage compromising and bargaining. The emergence of new issues might eventually contribute to an increase in the dimensions of conflicts. Recently it has been estimated that although nearly a hundred issues may be on the agenda of a session of the Assembly, some four to five hundred issues are

negotiated between the states behind the scenes. Many have argued that "any proliferation in the number of issues brought before the United Nations should, in the long run, contribute to stabilizing the system."¹¹

As mentioned previously, a significant development in United Nations diplomacy has been the crystallization of caucusing and voting blocs at the Assembly, where the African-Asian group, the Arab League, the Soviet bloc, the Latin American group, and some other groupings of states regularly meet to seek united stands on questions before the organization. All groups, with the exception of the Soviet bloc, are much looser and their members often divide on votes and policies. Today no group can succeed in dominating the Assembly consistently on the whole spectrum of issues before it. But the attitudes of those African, Asian, and Latin American states that take independent and moderate courses in Assembly politics are crucial. This has meant that African and Asian states moderately and self-consciously have generally held the "balance of power." These act as an intra-Assembly interest group working for favorable trade and development policies. Other groups are not so large, but their importance in the political process of the Assembly is considerable.

Before a discussion of group coalitions in the Assembly, understanding the major influences on voting behavior would be

¹¹Hayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, op. cit., p. 164.

very helpful. Many variables appear relevant to Assembly politics: the regional, social, economic, and political forces mainly affecting national foreign policies. Geographical location can be so defined as to correspond generally with the various caucusing, geographical distribution, or regional groups in the Assembly. Per capita G.N.P. can be used as a measure of wealth and economic development. Treaty and compact can be employed as common ties for collective action. According to diplomatic and scholarly opinions on world politics, all social and political variables included in the factors of race, colonial status, political system, and military alliances may polarize East-West, North-South or other voting patterns in the Assembly.

These variables are explained as correlation with voting dimensions and alignments in the Assembly. Alliance, aid, political system, and trade all show high correlations with the East-West dimension. On the North-South dimension, colonial status, race and trade contribute to the Assembly's polarization. Aid and alliance polarize cold war alignments more than they do self-determination voting. Colonial status and per capita G.N.P. do not appreciably correlate with cold war alignments, but do polarize self-determination alignments. Any change in the substantive content of these two major dimensions "can be associated with East-West or North-South components, with changing environmental polarizations, or with the changing

membership of the United Nations."¹² These variables also help explain the voting and the per cent of the voting variation.

One of the easiest ways of determining the possible effect of a grouping arrangement in the Assembly is to examine the voting records of member states. Votes in the Assembly have provided unique data where many national governments commit themselves simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of major issues. Though the grouping does behind-the-scenes negotiations among the members, formal votes must be taken in the meetings, in which each member has one vote. Votes are not binding but imply a moral obligation. The voting records of the group members display the degree of cohesion and show the attitude toward an issue concerned.

A voting bloc has been defined as given number of nations voting as a unit a given percentage of the time on a given issue or all issues. It may also be considered as five or more nations voting as a unit at least eighty per cent of the time on all the issues selected. Groupings of caucusing or regional nature will be termed groups, since they reflect a lower degree on the cohesion of the voting. The group or groups might take the form of an active attitude toward a neutral policy, or might include a number of states which are flexible to constitute a body of floating voters, chiefly interested in more parochial concerns and ready to bargain with each of the major poles to further their own ends.

¹²Ibid., p. 280.

Roll-call votes provide an especially useful means of identifying a state's attitudes. Occurring on a very wide variety of issues, they force a state to take a position. All votes (yes, no, abstain) are recorded and analyzed in a high-speed electronic computer. A member state may abstain or be absent, and thus avoid stating a clear pro or con position. The use of voting in the Assembly symbolizes the principle of equality of states. Superficially all member states have equal right and obligation in the maintenance of international peace, but they do not have equal interests in every particular question that arises. Groupings of common interest become a normal phenomenon.

Since the first loyalties of states are to their own national interests, a remarkable fact about the way states associate in the Assembly is the tendency of member states to affiliate differently for different purposes. If many different kinds of issues are considered in the Assembly, the voting will show the different kinds of alignments. Each state may bargain for issues that it considers vital to its national interest. "The necessity for building majorities encourages the caucusing of groups with similar interests in achieving their national objectives."¹³

Member states associate with each other to achieve the common ends which seem to them desirable. Each delegation or group

¹³Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations, p. 15.

must maintain certain cooperative contacts with every other delegation or group, because it may expect to vote with them on at least one controversial issue or set of issues. In this complex process of association, each may sacrifice something for a concession, not through any disregard of principle, but because members know that their national interests can be promoted only by taking account of the national interests of others. If the recognition of an international interest can not be accepted, bargaining, competition or pressure will be the result.

"Bargaining--the exchange of support on one issue for backing on another--is facilitated."¹⁴ Vote trading--"you vote for me in this matter, and I will vote for you in that"--¹⁵ is probably most frequent on issues that affect some states very deeply but many others less; few states would like to trade their votes on an issue of general importance. The process of mutual accommodation is of a continuing nature. The quid pro quo system may operate between one state and another, or between two groups. For example, a group might offer its support to another group on cold war issues, in response to the other's votes on a self-determination roll-call. This kind of bargaining would occur, though an analysis of voting patterns alone would not find it.

In a competitive world there are many potentialities to be exploited by the voters. Competition between the great powers

¹⁴Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics, p. 85.

¹⁵U.N. GA. II. OR. Plenary. 167th mtg., November 3, 1947, p. 695.

is likely to necessitate concessions to lesser powers and the offer of substantial favors in the form of foreign aid or the achievement of other goals. While the great powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, see the United Nations primarily as a forum for promoting Cold War interests, the independents and the nonaligned find themselves in relatively weak bargaining positions. As the membership of the organization increases, there grows an even greater inclination to organize the voting strength of the new independent states. They can use their votes on East-West conflicts to bargain for concessions on other dimensions. Not only does competition provide these states with eager suitors for their favor, it furnishes them numerous opportunities to seek actively the fulfillment of their wishes. Even with the greater prominence of supranationalism and self-determination issues, many nations have substantial freedom of maneuver. Most of the voters including all the neutrals and even many others, prefer a world of continuing competition and no final resolution of the East-West division. "By making a public commitment to nonalignment, a state improves its bargaining position with those using pressure to influence its actions."¹⁶

In the General Assembly we often see the polarization of attitudes on the decline. The cross-pressured voters, by their relative independence, are more likely to shift allegiances or to make group competition for their favor meaningful. The

¹⁶Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

virtue of a group of "balancers" is that "they form a floating vote, aligning now with one side, then with another, and often being sufficiently uncohesive that some members of the group can be picked off by either side."¹⁷ The influx of the cross-pressure voters into the Assembly arena has meant not only that most voters now prefer a "middle" solution to East-West problems but that most voters are relatively apathetic toward any particular issue. Their preferences are reserved for "what are to them private matters--the independence, unification, and development of their own countries, by whatever methods."¹⁸ Moderation and flexibility are inevitable, because a too uniform cohesion and rigid noncommitment to either side would deprive the group of its value. They have considerable influences on the coalition of Assembly groups.

The most common alignment has been called "East-West" because of the content of the issues of which it is composed. The Soviet Bloc and the allies of the United States are at opposite ends of this continuum, as one might imagine. "The more overriding East-West issues become, the more flexibility is lost.... As the East-West alignment becomes frequently relative to other dimensions, bargaining becomes more difficult."¹⁹ The cooperation of new African-Asian states has formed a second

¹⁷ Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, op. cit., p. 271.

¹⁸ Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics, p. 61.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 85.

common alignment as a "North-South" dimension. Since 1963, there has been a moment of group fence-mending among the major participants in both the East-West cold war and the North-South "have" versus "have not" struggle. They are using the current tension in intergroup collisions to revise strategy and try to patch up divided alliances. Specifically, cross-group coalitions of African, Asian and Latin American states are evident. "A number of states in each of these groups agree more often with certain states in the two other groups than with members of their own group."²⁰ In another context, it has been alleged that "America, Western Europe, and the Soviet Bloc may someday decide that they share a common interest in preserving their wealth from confiscation by an aroused underdeveloped bloc."²¹ This could conceivably produce the emergence of a new "have" group, followed by the merger of the former opponents into a single group. These two comments suggest that many of the Assembly's voting patterns have regularly been based on intra-group and inter-group coalitions rather than strict adherence to group boundaries.

This whole pattern of shifting vote alignments can contribute a fluidity and flexibility to the system of multi-groups. The requirement of flexibility of alignment implies that a state can participate in more than a single group.

²⁰Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., p. 11.

²¹Bruce M. Russett, op. cit., p. 66.

Alignments on specific issues may cross group lines. What is now happening is a shift within the groups themselves, a fluidity of voting alignment reflecting the dynamic shifts within regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Afro-Asian group, for instance, has become four discernible sub-groups: the five Casablanca powers, the French community nations, the pro-Western, and the middle of the road group.²² Divisions among Latin American groups are often present, although the lines of cleavage are not as consistent as they are for the other regions. Moreover, cross-group coalitions are very much in evidence on a number of issues such as disarmament, peacekeeping, colonialism, social and economic questions, and other political issues. The composition of cross-group coalitions varies, but participating states are usually more moderate--closer to the political center of the Assembly--than most other members of their groups.

The present analysis suggests that groups in the General Assembly do not necessarily act as unified and disciplined blocs. For several reasons the stability of the international system will be increased if there are many different issues and alignments. The spread of voting patterns on multi-dimensions and group coalitions symbolizes the decentralization of polarizations in the Assembly.

²²Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The New Diplomacy in the United Nations," Francis O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., (ed.), The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 56-57.

V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MULTI-GROUP SYSTEM

A number of attempts have been made in recent years to build models of the international system, among which Morton Kaplan's six alternative models and Roger Master's multi-bloc model are the most clear-cut and consistent, based on bipolar or multi-polar images of the international system. Most of these efforts have been directed to the application of models more or less derived from military capabilities and natural sciences. The systems approach of Kaplan and Master is essentially based on relationships which are determined by the number and powers of the members of the system.

Kaplan's approach represents a courageous attempt to construct theoretical systems in international politics. Among the models described by Kaplan, the bipolar system (both "loose" and "tight" models) which corresponds to contemporary regional organizations has two major bloc "actors", with uncommitted nation-states on the margin and an "international actor" such as the United Nations playing a limited role in the former model.¹ Since bipolarity, as mentioned previously, may already be passing with the rise of atomic powers like China and France and its integration into a new multi-polar system may be in the offing, Roger Master attempts to define an abstract

¹Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), ch. 2; see also his "Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other Models of International Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (September, 1947), pp. 684-95.

model of the international system, "as a supplement to the types presented by Morton A. Kaplan."² Thus Master's multi-bloc model of the international system is a theoretical extension of Kaplan's typology of systems theory and an alternative to his six models. Referring to Kaplan's "balance of power" system, Master applies all Kaplan's rules in his own system of multi-bloc model. Formulation of a multi-bloc or polycentric pattern of the international system is an attempt in this direction. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer state that the most prominent models of the tight bipolar and multi-polar world can be interpreted in terms of the dynamic model of conflict by Lewis F. Richardson.³ The results of arms races suggest that multi-polar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be self-destructing, since the problem of nuclear-destruction has not been solved.

Wilfram F. Hanrieder argues that many important relationships of the contemporary international system combine both bipolar and multi-bloc characteristics. Consequently, "the terminology of Kaplan's loose bipolar system is too bipolar, while Master's model goes to the other extreme by neglecting bipolar attributes altogether."⁴

² Roger D. Master, op. cit., p. 780.

³ Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, op. cit., p. 406.

⁴ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. IX, No. 3 (September 1966), p. 301.

In terms of military capability, George Liska refers to the contemporary system as a mix, bipolar-multi-polar, one with respect to forms of power. In the last resort--represented by strategic nuclear weapons--it is still bipolar. He concludes that the strategic nuclear level is bipolar; the quasi-multi-polarity on the political-diplomatic plane is diffuse.⁵ Recently R.N. Rosecrance affirmed: "In the end we will discover that neither bipolarity nor multipolarity provides general solutions to basic conflicts in the contemporary international system."⁶

It is true that there is a considerable difference between the real world and the model of an international system. For reasons of theoretical convenience, a model is concerned with conditions which are consistent with stability; nevertheless, it is used to move away from reality. This essay will not define an abstract model of the international system but is based on the realities of international politics. The concepts and ideas of a multi-group model are derived from politics and diplomacy, not from military capabilities or natural science. This means that it might be desirable to construct a multi-group model while ignoring the effects of nuclear weapons, since the international system, as George Liska believes, is infinitely "multi-polar in political-diplomatic influence."

⁵George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 162.

⁶R. N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multi-polarity, and the Future," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI. X, No. 3 (September 1966), p. 317.

A great number of states, and groups within states, behave as if they were independent poles" in the politics of the state system.⁷

A principal mutual interest in the current international arena, though not the only one, is the avoidance of general war. New forms of international interdependence require that "the concept of power ... must be adapted to cover a control situation which is not a pure case of dominance submission from one state to another."⁸ National policies and values are considered within the framework of new institutional norms. Power in this context is measured by voting groups rather than by military alliances, and "the criterion of a nation's power is the ability to induce support in quasi-parliamentary dealings rather than the increase or decrease of territorial possessions."⁹

The decentralization of power within the United Nations has been noted. From one such view the reinstatement of a decentralized international balance of power system, supported by a nuclear stalemate, may be the key to world stability in the future. We shall define stability as the probability that the system depends on some degree of consensus on basis values

⁷George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 162.

⁸Kenneth W. Thompson, "Theory-making in international politics: a review of George Liska, International Equilibrium: a theoretical essay on the politics and organization of security," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, No. 2 (1958), p. 190.

⁹George Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 21.

as well as interests and that large-scale war does not occur. That is, as the international system moves away from bipolar to multi-group, the frequency and intensity of wars should be expected to diminish.

To do so, it has been necessary to make three assumptions: First, that nuclear forces are irrelevant; second, that all concepts and ideas examined previously apply; and third, that each group has a certain degree of cohesion, acting as unit. The following sections will remove these assumptions one at a time. This chapter will concentrate on the comparison of international systems and concentrate on the characteristics of a multi-group system.

The first is the "balance of power" system, which corresponds roughly to that which prevailed in the Western World in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is characterized by a small number of national states, of roughly equal size and strength. In this system, the actors are exclusively national actors to enable the system to work. The nation is the focus of solidarity sentiments for the members of the nation; "the nation-state itself must depend largely upon its own ability to survive."¹⁰ In contrast to the "balance of power" system, the actors within the multi-group system are group actors or bloc actors to facilitate the operation of the system.

¹⁰Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 31.

A specific interest or common interest will be the focus of solidarity elements for the members of the group. The group members must rely largely on mutual compromise and mutual agreement, otherwise the member will be isolated from the group, and even from the system. While the "balance of power" system is characterized by short-term alignments based on relatively immediate security objectives, the multi-group system is stabilized by the operation of common interests--long term and/or short term interests--which lead to the formation of groups.

The increase in the number of independent states will eliminate another area of mutual arrangement and ultimately perhaps reintroduce a new pattern of international system in world politics, displacing the nation-state scheme. Thus the traditional nation-state system--the "balance of power" system--which has been the dominant pattern of international politics for some four centuries is evolving toward a system in which regional grouping of states will be more important than independent sovereign units. Since World War II the trend toward regionalism has been so pronounced that it is now an acknowledged feature of the international scene, as nationalism tended historically to support the traditional system of nation-state politics. The multi-group system has probably stemmed from the idea that nothing in the United Nations Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements, provided that they are "consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization."¹¹

¹¹See Article 52, the United Nations Charter.

The multi-group has developed and marked a new international system of bloc politics in the United Nations. The classical nation-state is still in existence, although its influence is declining. The new system, at the present stage, has not in any real sense breached the barrier of sovereign state system; it has provided the impetus and the agency for much closer cooperation of the states on the various regional levels.

In the introductory chapter we identified the post-World War II system of international politics as essentially bipolar, with two super-powers leading alliances in direct conflict, and a number of weaker states attempting to maintain a nonaligned status. The "loose bipolar" system, according to Kaplan, corresponds roughly to what we have today. The system differs in many important respects from the "balance of power" system. Supra-national actors--bloc actors like N.A.T.O. and the Communist bloc or a universal actor like the United Nations--participate within the international system. Nearly all national actors belong to one or the other of the bipolar blocs.¹² The "tight bipolar" system will evolve if and when the nonaligned group disappears and the system is virtually reduced to two power blocs. Contrary to the "tight bipolar" system, the contemporary international system tends to move the bipolar to the multi-polar system, with the rise of atomic powers like China and

¹²Morton A. Kaplan, "Loose Bipolarity: A Model of an International System," in George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams' (ed.) Crisis and Continuity in World Politics: Readings in International Relations (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 645.

France as new "Supranational actors." Although the current discussions of the international system generally assume the existence of a bipolar situation, there are in fact a multiplicity of regional alliances of varying degrees of integration.

The multi-group system differs from the bipolar international system in many respects that have consequences for the operation of international politics. In the first place, there are many groups or voting blocs to facilitate the operation of the multi-group system, while "the loose bipolar system has two blocs of direct consequence for the operation of the system."¹³ In the second place, in the multi-group system all groups have international characteristics on the basis of equal status; the two leading blocs have supranational characteristics in a bipolar system. In the third place, the multi-group system is stabilized by the almost automatic operation of common interests--either long-term or short-term--which lead to formations of blocs and groups; in the bi-polar system alignment must be based on long term interests; "conflicts of short-term interest tend to be ignored."¹⁴ In the fourth place, an essential feature of stability within the multi-group system is that the multi-lateral method necessitates compromise and limits the freedom of action of the greatest among states; the "possession of a larger

¹³Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 50.

stockpile of atomic and thermonuclear weapons"¹⁵ by both major blocs is a factor for stability within the bipolar system.

In a situation of bipolar conflict, the superpower with the greater interest gains its advantage from its greater willingness to commit itself in gaining its objective. The relations between two powers would be competitive in that each would seek to prevent the other from attaining predominance either militarily or in connection with the emergence of multi-polar world. For these reasons, "any successful efforts by the United States and other powers to slow down the dissemination of nuclear weapons would tend to increase the stability of the entire international system."¹⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz believes that inflexibility of a bipolar world may promote a greater stability than flexible balances of power among a larger number of states.¹⁷ In regard to the bipolar states, there might be individual interests supporting military guarantees or economic assistance from one of the major powers.

Nevertheless, things have changed. A "multi-polar" or "multi-bloc" model of the international system has been suggested, because of the appearance of contradictions within each

¹⁵ Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 51 (September 1957), p. 692.

¹⁶ Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

¹⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams (ed.), Crisis and Continuity in World Politics: Readings in International Relations (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 728.

great power bloc of bipolarity. This is exemplified in the Western camp by General De Gaulle's independence from both the United States and Great Britain in many fields, especially in the creation of French atomic power and the withdrawal of N.A.T.O. troops from France. In the Eastern bloc, contradictions were evident in Communist China's demand that the Soviet Union share its atomic weaponry with China. Peking's refusal to recognize the principle of "peaceful co-existence," and recent successes of atomic tests will extend unlimited support to China's deviation from the Soviet bloc. Hence there may eventually be four Super-Powers in place of the present two, but that day does not appear to be imminent.

"Multipolarity" or "polycentrism," might be terms better fitting a situation, or system, in which each unit constitutes a center or pole of absolute power. It is applied to an international system in which each "actor," regardless of size, possesses an invulnerable nuclear capability such that it may destroy any other actor. In a world of roughly equal blocs, each actor would presumably have approached a level of "absolute" power. There would be rivalries stemming from the variety of national perspectives and positions; there would also be common interests in resisting the ambitions of the two big powers of the United States and the Soviet Union. While "multi-polarity" is defined in the case of a nuclear power system, the multi-group model is defined in the case of a United Nations voting system. In the politics of the United

Nations, neither bipolarity nor multipolarity provides general solutions to basic conflicts in the contemporary international system. For example, many of the Afro-Asian countries which serve as "mediators" in the bipolar tension relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union trade their own security issues, in which the superpowers are interested, for support on colonial and economic aid issues.¹⁸ Obviously this relationship is neither bipolar nor multi-power. Power is measured on the basis of the voting group rather than on nuclear weapons as in the multi-group system.

Kaplan's "universal international" system assumes that the "universal actor" (e.g., the United Nations) is sufficiently powerful to prevent war among the national actors. The national actors still retain individuality and jockey for power and position within the framework of the "universal actor." In the multi-group system, the United Nations is a center of conciliation among member states with little supranational authority. The United Nations primarily serves mediating functions--i.e. providing a locus for diplomatic contacts and implementing agreed solutions. In other words, the Organization would likely continue its current functions, rather than develop punitive sanctions, as in the case of a collective security system.

General characteristics of the multi-group system may be those of informal association, mutual compromise, flexibility of organization, the pursuit of peace, and other diplomatic techniques.

¹⁸ Wolfram F. Hanrieder, op. cit., p. 303.

As the foregoing analysis suggests, the forms of organized association which have developed in the United Nations are informal and unofficial, although their existence is recognized. Most U.N. decisions are settled by informal negotiating processes outside the formal meetings. The growth of an informal group system has been influenced by a number of factors: "the nature of the voting in the General Assembly, the process of election to organs on which not all the members are represented, the growth of U.N. membership, and the increasingly important role of the center of diplomacy."¹⁹

However, bloc politics in the General Assembly are inevitable. The organization of groups has given to the Assembly some of the characteristics of a parliament of the multi-party type. If the trend towards a more formal organization of groups continues, "it may be that there will be more contact between the chairmen of these groups on matters concerning the organization of the business of the Assembly."²⁰ In other words, the nature of the Assembly not only makes voting associations necessary, but it makes them easier to achieve in other organs. It is a normal part of diplomacy for states to consult each other on matters of common interest, and perhaps one of the chief reasons why this happens rather easily at the United Nations.

¹⁹Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations, p. 13.

²⁰Sydney D. Bailey, op. cit., p. 20.

Mutual compromise in the affairs of bloc politics characterizes the new multi-group model, and accords with the requirements of the multi-group system. To member states in the United Nations, it has become a normal diplomatic attempt to increase mutual understanding, to win friends and influence people, to acquire or give information, and to achieve an overall settlement based on mutual compromise. States are almost forced to accept some reasonable compromise on issues concerning them if their valid public objections are met. Compromises involve not only concessions by one group to another, but also feature bargaining on the basis of concessions by one group.

The Assembly is a political body searching for solutions based on compromises. Each issue or debate requires a different diplomatic technique and a different solution. Delegates and groups of delegates meet frequently outside the council chambers and committee rooms, often by prearrangement and in some cases with a fair degree of regularity, to discuss the important issues at hand. "Negotiations are initiated, compromises made, and decisions taken."²¹ Since no group can be assured of victory on a consistent basis, "compromise and bargaining must be engaged in continually by all sides to obtain the best possible terms."²²

²¹Robert Riggs, op. cit., p. 1.

²²Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., p. 16.

Flexibility of association--the present structure of overlapping membership among groups--is an essential characteristic of the multi-group system. With the exception of the Soviet bloc, groups rarely exist as rigid formations. These groups are flexible and fluid. They cooperate in various instances. Each delegation or group must maintain certain cooperative contacts with every other delegation or group, since "it may expect to vote with them on at least one controversial issue or set of issues. This whole pattern of shifting vote alignments can contribute a fluidity and flexibility to the system."²³ In this flexible process lies the hope for progress and cooperation among the members, where for the first time in history "all human races and civilizations--great and small, advanced and backward--can meet on a footing of legal equality."²⁴ The multi-group system develops a considerable flexibility and the group actors themselves constitute relatively loose organizations.

It is suggested here that a multi-group system would necessarily be peaceful, in accordance with the principle of pacific settlement of any international dispute. The Charter recognizes the importance of regional arrangements and their use in appropriate cases and the states' first choice to settle disputes by peaceful means. The United Nations is only one of

²³Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

²⁴Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Margaret E. Lerche (ed.), Readings in International Politics: Concepts and Issues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 244.

the tools which states have created to maintain international peace and security. It is reasonable to believe that group actors would be necessarily capable of preferring negotiation to war. There is no need to assume that the behavior of a group-actor would be more "aggressive" than that of a national actor. War in such a system would not arise from sources fundamentally different from those in a nation-state system. A multi-group model therefore is compatible with the rule of seeking solution by negotiation rather than by fighting.

The goal of negotiation may be the winning over of the other states to participate in some groups or organizations or in a mutual-security arrangement; it may be the securing of support for some proposal in the United Nations. Whatever it may be, negotiation entails the presentation of views and counterviews, the compromising of differences, the search for areas of mutual interest and common agreement and the conclusion of some form of agreement or accord.²⁵ Diplomatic negotiation may create the atmosphere of settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

In view of the intricacies of the political process at the Assembly, a number of extra-parliamentary means have been employed to achieve the objectives of national interests or common group interests. The exercise of political influence in the Assembly is many-sided and even subtle. As political

²⁵Padelford J. Lincoln and George A. Lincoln, op. cit., p. 353.

actors, their role requires them to try to influence other voters by some combination of bargaining, compromise, persuasion, coercion and even threat. Certainly the system is such as to provide some actors with greater extraparliamentary means of affecting their fellows than is true in the national system. In a multi-group model where bargaining, compromise, and responsiveness to the primary demands of other groups is repeatedly practiced, the chances for political stability and peaceful change have significantly increased.

In the future our projected utopias should set up expectations of security, stability and peace. This may be called "universalism" or "idealism". As a symbol of the interdependence of groups, the United Nations would primarily serve mediating functions--i.e. providing a locus for diplomatic contacts and implementing agreeable solutions under an "impartial aegis." A group, an intermediate unit, perhaps, is more likely to be the operative factor in the transition from nationalism to universalism or idealism, for regionalism has characterized the multi-group system. In many cases the nations of the world are making an effort to achieve the goal of universalism or idealism. Trends in this direction may lead to an approximation of what George Liska has defined as an "international equilibrium", in which regional and universal organizations complement one another. The objective of our research is to serve the ideal of our projected utopias. Therefore we shall tentatively define a theory of multiple equilibrium in the multi-group system.

VI. THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM

It seems for a moment that the era of the balance of power has been superseded by the era of multiple equilibrium. The need for a link between the old and the new balancing principle is disclosed the moment one inquires into the conditions of an effective system of multiple equilibrium. A multi-group system of international politics following Liska's theory of "international equilibrium" has been proposed, with the addition of the United Nations as a presumably unavoidable part of the structure. To do so, it has been necessary to make three basic assumptions: first, each group is a relatively integrated whole, acting as a unit; secondly, the General Assembly is concerned with an international arena of political struggle; thirdly, Liska's ideas of equilibrium on a regional scale apply.

Equilibrium is a pervasive concept derived from economics. The notion of an equilibrium has played an important part in contemporary theory partly because an equilibrium is felt to be desirable. While equilibrium is usually defined explicitly or implicitly by theorists of international relations such as Liska and Kaplan, it has received more political than economic explications. Liska's central concept drawn from economics is institutional equilibrium. He has suggested that international organization may be treated as part of "a dynamic interplay of institutional military-political, and socio-economic

factors and pressures,"¹ constituting to a greater or lesser degree, a multiple equilibrium. "He thereby pioneers and opens new pathways for others who may turn attention to equilibrium theory. To its credit, the model Liska develops is original."² Equilibrium is also central in Kaplan. He postulates the rules which actors follow, and the equilibrium conditions for six different models which will occur when disequilibrium occurs. The conditions of equilibrium may be regarded as the results of the operation of certain rules, limits, norms and goals. Liska's theory, however, is a more general equilibrium system transcending Kaplan's six situations.

The traditional pattern of balance of power is one-dimensional; it is concerned only with physical power and the relations of states in terms of territory and security. The contemporary balancing process is unique in its multiple aspects, in the complex system of interdependence created between distinct regional and functional aspirations, having little to do with security and territory so far as some of the chief protagonists are concerned.³ The balance of power is traditionally to preserve the nation-state system. It is a general rule that the smaller states should follow the interest of the balance

¹George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 15.

²Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit., p. 189.

³Ernst Hass, "Rationalism, Functionalism and Universal International Organization," p. 262.

and their own by allying themselves with the major power or powers. States may have opportunities for "balance plus" in power contests with others. In fact, of course, smaller states are most vulnerable when there is an imbalance among the Great Powers, for the balance of power may oscillate at the expense of the weak. According to multiple equilibrium, the network of equilibrium established in the United Nations especially gives the smaller states a substantial sense of security. Multilateralism tends to supersede bilateralism and enables smaller states to avoid an unequal confrontation with the Great Powers, since the United Nations guarantees their equal footing as sovereign states. The multilateral method of diplomacy--which implies less coercive methods and promises security through reciprocity--limits the freedom of action of the great states. Forcible subjection of a member would be resisted by collective sanctions. It also disperses rather than polarizes relation--either bipolar or multipolar. In a multi-group situation, a voting bloc rather than a military alliance is the typical means of increasing one's weight of multiple equilibrium in the General Assembly. A group cannot but strengthen the position of its members in the international arena of balancing and bartering influence in multilateral diplomacy.

Reference to the so-called "decline of power politics" is of particular interest. While the power-politics school stresses political military forces as major elements in the guidance of the traditional balance of power, Liska proposes a new pattern of international equilibrium based on normative and socio-economic

factors rather than the usual military and political power elements. Liska defines his idea of equilibrium as a norm, and actual dynamics with sufficient rigor. The concept of power in international politics, according to Liska, must be adapted to cover a control situation which is not a pure case of dominance and submission from one state to another. The relationship basic to this extend is the interdependence among nations in dealing with supranational phenomena which affect national politics, but over which no single state can exert an effective control independently of other states. Interdependence among nations is the very factor which brings nations together for the solution of problems which cannot be solved in isolation or by conquest. The power involved is not necessarily only a clear-cut dominance-submission nexus of control between individual states.

"The entire concept of balance of power, as a stabilizing force in international politics, has been criticized for its unreality, its imprecision, and its inherent danger."⁴ Historically, the balance of power has been among the facts of international life and its processes exist in interstate relations. As in some previous historical periods, it is argued that the contemporary situation is seen by some as relatively simple balance, or a bipolar distribution of power. But "a bipolar balance is usually regarded as being inherently even more brittle, unstable,

⁴William C. Olson, The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 83.

and dangerous than a more complex system."⁵

Since a mutual security commitment--collective security--influences the state of the military-political equilibrium, traditionally known as the balance of power, the United Nations becomes then a coactive rather than merely a passive framework of international relations and a real factor in the multiple equilibrium. It is enough to say that the General Assembly is ultimately a process of multilateral balancing of influence on the part of delegations of member-states who seek "to adjust conflicts so as to promote national values and policies within the framework of institutional norm and the actualities of a primitive international community."⁶ To some extent, the General Assembly is also a system of legal norms and general principles, agreed upon as standards of conduct and there is an existential interplay toward some kind of equilibrium among unequally powerful members with different policies, and among the various groups themselves. The present Assembly has been characterized by a harmonious relationship among coalitions or groups, each one taking great pains to avoid a showdown.

The norm of equilibrium is a joint recognition of new states, general reciprocal guarantees and collective measures against a threat to the peace, implemented by all members of the United Nations under definite rules and procedures. The norms are chiefly those of the law and of the shared purposes shaping

⁵ Ibid., p. 81.

⁶ George Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 20.

the interplay of policies in the Organization. The universally applicable norms of contemporary international politics are different in many respects from those of the nineteenth century. Many aspects of intergroup relations, for example, are not effectively regulated by "balance" of military capabilities, but, are, rather, regulated by norms sustained by international interest or community interest. Ernst Haas suggests that "balancing implies the preservation of security through a process of negotiation, conciliation and mediation."⁷

Having emphasized the moral force in the Assembly, David Cushman Coyle says:

"... the U.N. General Assembly ... is an organ set up to discuss world affairs and express as nearly as possible the moral judgments of the world. Voting is a part of this expression but not the chief part. The moral force in the Assembly, by which it can hurt a nation that is doing wrong and help one that is doing right, depends in the last analysis not only on the final vote but even more on what was said, who said it, and what people of the world think of the argument put forward and of the parts played by nations concerned."⁸

Accordingly, each group in the multi-group system stresses a normative principle against power and excessive political discretion and likes to visualize itself as a qualitative and moral factor in world affairs. As far as Prime Minister Nehru is concerned, the nonalignment (of the Afro-Asian group) implies what has been called a "Third Force." This is a contradiction

⁷ Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," p. 240.

⁸ David Cushman Coyle, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

in terms, because members do not create a force. They may create moral pressures, but not force. Most of the groups favor the expansion of the Assembly's function and jurisdiction and wish to shape the multiple equilibrium so as to maximize their influence and maintain "the balance of power" with other groups in the United Nations. Without a doubt they oppose extensive authority for the Great Powers, and they expect the Organization to be active or passive, an impartial mediator or partisan, according to their changing needs. Conceivably, those groups are determined to play the role of maintaining the peace and security of the world and present their views to be heard in the settlement of any international issue.

The idea of equilibrium is a convenient unifying concept-- a convenient tool of analysis. In the first place, states seek to maintain the best equilibrium instead of the best power position. Secondly, all groups seek to settle for themselves by all kinds of negotiations the best attainable position in the multiple equilibrium system. Thirdly, the majority of groups must act so as to promote the equilibrium of the multi-group system as the necessary condition for the system's survival and evolution by no other than peaceful means into higher forms of community. Fourthly, groups viewed as collective actors feel that the existing distribution of "security, welfare and prestige" is the best possible one relative to their power positions; the multi-group system is in equilibrium. Fifthly, "the dual character of the equilibrium concept as a theoretical construct and a desirable policy for safeguarding humane values brings together

the analytical and the normative perspectives."⁹ Finally, "equilibrium may be considered in terms of the over-all social and material environment of states individually and in combination."¹⁰

The theory of multiple equilibrium here submitted assumes that a mutual compromise or decision of the groups in the General Assembly requires that institutional, military-political, and socio-economic factors and pressures for and against stability be deliberately equilibrated, or be faced with the occurrence of a possibly oppressive disequilibrium. The importance of multiple equilibrium is that it is reflected in the attempt to combine political-military equilibrium through collective security and a cooperative approach to long-range socio-economic problems in a concentrated attack on the problem of war and peace through international organization.

Since much of the diplomatic effort in the Assembly is devoted to building the greatest possible degree of support for a resolution, a consensus or mutual compromise among major groups has been taken into account. The chief business of the group is to create a consensus within the limitations imposed by independent sovereignties and intra-group diversity. Thus drafting committees may be appointed to formulate compromise resolutions and negotiating committees may be appointed to deal with

⁹George Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 16.

¹⁰Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit., p. 190.

other groups. A "winning" resolution in the Assembly requires not only the accepted compromise of one's own regular allies and supporters, but also the support of other groups combined as a sufficient majority of votes.

A truly negotiated settlement entails concessions and compromise. Members of the United Nations must avoid a tendency to support compromise for the sake of compromise. "If a unanimously accepted compromise cannot be reached, no official group action is taken. None of the groups make decisions by majority vote that are binding on all members."¹¹ Each group holds a reasonable position in terms of the arrangement of attitudes acceptable to the majority, and its own position is dependent upon its established bargaining unit, not upon those of other Assembly members. The lack of control over the Assembly by any group of states, as well as the absence of large and cohesive groups, means that a powerful force for compromise is added to whatever self-restraint may be practiced by members for various reasons.

Although multi-group phenomenon is not especially new, a complex was recently discovered. Majority-voting has induced the members of the United Nations to coalesce in groups in order to make their arms prevail. A member of a group can participate in meetings and attempt to exercise leadership within its region. On the other hand, ambitious delegates can take advantage

¹¹Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., p. 16.

of group membership to exercise their bargaining power with other groups in the exchange of support on certain issues or other values. The main task of a group is to create a consensus among group-members and to expand its political influence in the General Assembly to achieve its ends by altering the behavior of other member-states without the exertion of physical force. All these efforts are based on gentlemen's agreements on the basis of negotiation behind the scenes. There is, of course, no assurance that agreements reached will be acceptable to the group as a whole. In this way, it may sometimes be possible to mold the consensus of a region a certain way. However, it is often frustrating and its results are frequently vapid. It is less desirable to belong to a large and powerful group, if a state's policy is not politically compatible with that of a majority of members. A delegation that is unable to take effective leadership within its own group is unlikely to be influential in the Assembly.

It has been argued that because of the majority-rule principle the smaller and poorer states have an incentive to band together in the United Nations that they do not have elsewhere. Almost one-third of the Assembly's current membership joined in 1960 or thereafter; most of these states are non-aligned with no strong ties to either of the great powers. Taking advantage of great-power divisions, these states have developed policies of non-alignment and corollary techniques at the United Nations to void the impact of power politics from great powers.

As an intra-Assembly interest group, these states influence the decisions and tendencies of the United Nations, and the latter, in turn, influences the destinies of these states which find in the world organization "not only a shield or protection from the dangers of global war, or local and limited ones, but confidence and dignity unequalled in modern history by the mere fact of equality of membership and voting."¹² The selection of Secretary-General U Thant, for example, is a recognition, in some form, of the growing influence of this group in world affairs as reflected in the United Nations.

The exercise of political influence at the General Assembly is both many-sided and subtle. The threats of retaliation or warning of adverse consequences can be defined as the essence of pressure. Attempts to achieve results by using extra-Assembly threats--for instance the threat to reduce foreign aid--are almost entirely limited to the two great rival powers. Member states may attempt to influence each other by other persuasive means without applying pressure: by nonalignment--threatening to request help from the other superpower if a great power threat is implemented, by taking initiatives that limit the effective alternatives of others, or by the use of the quid pro quo that receives the mutual accommodation of support. Bargaining in the lobbies of the Assembly is, perhaps, most frequent

¹²Kanlid I. Babaa, "The Third Force and the United Nations," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 362 (November, 1965), pp. 90.

in connection with elections. In view of the complicated diplomacy of bargaining at the Assembly, a keen sense of strategy and tactics is also prerequisite to an effective use of one's resources. "Effective use of these techniques is essential to any delegation aspiring to maximize its influence in the politics of the Assembly."¹³

Of more scientific interest, a study of voting groups can tell us about groups and coalitions in ways that can be related to broader theories about Assembly behavior. The alignments of member-states and coalition groups are very important dynamic factors in multiple equilibrium. These efforts are spent in maneuvering to ensure that the proposal finally voted on will be as favorable to one's interest as possible. Two or more groups must combine to make a majority, and majorities on each of the different super issues are of different compositions. In contrast to politics within national parliamentary assemblies, it may provide many fruitful insights and hypotheses. Naturally there are differences between national systems and the international model here suggested, though the system of multi-group coalitions was approximated in the French Third and Fourth Republics. The multi-party pattern of shifting coalitions is characteristic of the multi-party parliament. Coalitions are brought together by affinities of various kinds, such as geographic location, security concerns, ideology, cultural

¹³Robert O. Keohane, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

and historical kinship, and the desirability of an issue as a whole. Each issue and each debate require a different diplomatic technique and a different solution. Any particular resolution has to take account of the American position, the Russian position, the Nasser position, and just about every other position.

Since cross-group coalitions are very much in evidence on a number of issues, there is in fact a multiplicity of groups with varying degrees of cohesion. This is particularly true of issues relating to disarmament, while also true of votes on peace-keeping, colonialism, other political issues, and social and economic questions. The composition of cross-group coalitions varies but participating states are usually states more moderate than most other members of their groups. These groups may be treated as a major part of "a dynamic interplay of international, military-political, and socio-economic factors and pressures, constituting a multiple equilibrium."¹⁴

The contemporary pattern of multiple equilibrium is multi-dimensional because it is reflected in the attempts to combine political, economic, social, moral, cultural, religious equilibrium in a long range cooperative approach. Aid, trade, religion, political system and other social forces all show high connection with the equilibrium dimension. Resorting to the peaceful method of multi-cooperative character depends on the disposition to mutual promise under the pressure of common interests. According to Bruce Russett, military cooperation, economic interdependence

¹⁴George Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 23.

and foreign aid are partial determinants of conflict politics in international relations.¹⁵

The fundamental proposition of multiple equilibrium will rely mainly on ideas of progressive, stable, and unstable equilibrium. At best, the several groups should reinforce each other in a progressive equilibrium movement; at worse, their efficiency and that of the entire organization will decrease as a result of an unstable equilibrium. Theoretically, a multiple equilibrium can be progressive, stable, or unstable. An equilibrium is stable when various groups can attain their best positions of interests and values through negotiations. It is unstable when the distribution of powers or interests cannot be settled with an agreement particularly while a great power or an important group is involved. The refusal of the Soviet Union and other member states to pay assessments levied by the General Assembly to cover expenses of peacekeeping forces in the Congo, which has caused the United Nations financial crisis, can perhaps be considered as a case of unstable equilibrium, while the equilibrium of the United Nations is seriously threatened.

¹⁵Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 1963) pp. 97-109.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The so-called East-West rivalry with two leading members of bipolarity is losing its definite character of political climate in the General Assembly. In bipolar confrontation, some analysts believe that a Cold War alignment is paramount in all voting at the United Nations and agree that at least two distinct voting conflicts underlie particular roll calls in differing degrees. Ernst Haas has interpreted Assembly politics in terms of a "balancing" process between Cold War demands and the political-economic and anti-colonial demands of underdeveloped countries.¹ In a similar way, Lincoln Bloomfield has described the General Assembly as a prime political forum for the nations which remain outside the East-West camps and pursue their own goals of political influence, economic improvement and racial dignity. In this situation, "what might be called the North-South conflict cuts across the East-West issues."² The General Assembly is faced frequently with two sets of issues: those concerning relationships between the two great power blocs (cold war issues) and those primarily affecting the relations between established, economically developed states and economically less-developed states, many of which have attained sovereignty only recently. The activities of the United Nations in transmitting colonialism into new forms and promoting a more

¹Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," pp.258-263.

²Lincoln Bloomfield, op. cit., p. 10

satisfactory distribution of welfare for long-range security are taking shape as an essential. It is evident that anticolonialism is the strongest force which binds the Afro-Asian states together in a common bond of determination to reduce the friction of the East-West rivalry. Thus "East vs. West" no longer dominates most issues in the Assembly.

The apparent simplified bi-polarity of the immediate post-war era may be giving way to a new configuration in which a growing number of "small" states refuse to commit themselves to either side. "Leadership possibilities in the General Assembly tend to open more for small states toward the political center of the organization than for those in the camp of either superpower."³ More opportunities may exist in the Assembly, since neither Great Power holds sway. Freedom of action is left to those who are bound to represent either rival camp. To them, it is not the influence of a group which unites them together, but the influence of common interests on important questions which creates the unity of the group.

The one-state-one-vote procedure weights the United Nations' operation in favor of the newer, smaller members. In recent years, the membership has increased by more than double its original number and has made more considerable progress toward true universality. By bringing the smaller and weaker nations together, the Organization has conferred upon them power greater than the sum of their separate national resources, along with

³Robert O. Keohane, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

a correlative responsibility in world affairs. Furthermore, the United Nations under Mr. Hammarskjold developed a strong executive which, when supported by a majority, can offer protection to the weak against the strong. It has become a living institution since majority rule became a deciding force.

Some observers are convinced that these smaller states contribute least to international security and to the Organization's finances, yet take the most out of it in terms of economic aid and political support. It is a fact that the multi-group system, particularly the voting system, in the Assembly is not entirely satisfactory. Under the one-state-one-vote procedure, the emerging nations have voting strength out of all proportion to their populations, powers, contributions, and responsibilities in the United Nations. The situation regarding formal voting strength is illustrated by the fact that after 1964, seventy-six member countries, paying about five percent of regular budget assessments and comprising sixteen percent of the population of all members, could form a two-third majority. However, it is often said that the equal voting formula understates the actual capacity of great powers to influence U.N. decisions.⁴

It is often said that the system of one vote for one state and the preponderance of votes by the middle and smaller powers

⁴ Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the U.N. General Assembly," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X, No. 1 (March 1966), p. 7.

damage the usefulness of the United Nations. It seems quite absurd that the smallest member should have the same voting strength as one of the great powers. It is certainly not a perfect system, but is there any proposal for weighted voting that would not have even greater defects? The only alternative to equality of voting is inequality of voting, which would require that each state should be given proportional votes determined by such factors as population, area and financial contribution to the budget of the United Nations. In fact, it is questionable whether the proposed weight voting system is practicable at the present time.

U Thant has criticized the proposal for weighted voting to prevent new African and Asian countries from "running away with" the world organization; weighted voting would give larger states proportionately more voting strength. He likens the General Assembly rule of one vote for each nation to the democratic principle of "one vote per adult human being, to rich or poor, strong or weak, learned or ignorant."⁵ He further argues that these critics of the United Nations ignore one of the fundamental principles of the Charter, which states that "the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members as also the principle of equal rights of nations, large and small."⁶ Archishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus

⁵"U.N. Voting Shift Opposed by Thant," New York Times (June 11, 1962).

⁶Ibid.

is also strongly opposed to any suggestion that voting in the United Nations be proportionate to the size or power of the members. Such suggestions, he says, are "undemocratic" and indicate a return to "power politics" in the world organization. Furthermore, "the concept of power voting would eliminate the moral influence of the small states toward an objective approach to world problems based on principle."⁷ Most countries agree that the United Nations system is necessary and desirable in its present form; very few strong demands for constitutional change are in evidence. All members adhere to the universality principle on membership questions.

A large increase in membership has had a deep effect upon the structure and performance of the Organization. In addition, the very nature and procedures of the Assembly have changed and developed. These developments do have one thing in common. They indicate a youthful vigor in the body, which increases as young nations enter it. They show the U N. functioning as an indispensable diplomatic tool in the hands of big groups and as a sort of new parliament in which the smaller members can find a degree of equality with the great powers never before known. They show that a sense of international responsibility is not a monopoly held by powerful, rich or large countries. Time and again in the affairs of the United Nations, voting groups have played a decisive role in efforts to preserve or

⁷"Makarios Opposes Shift in U.N. Voting," New York Times (June 12, 1962).

restore international security and peace.

Recently in actual voting results, it has been found that the great powers of East and West have not succeeded--in terms of voting victories-- in offsetting their small share of formal voting strength by informal sources of influences. In fact, a large array of developing states, known as the seventy-five, acts as an intra-Assembly interest group working for favorable trade and development policies. Fortunately this interest group is very flexible and less cohesive. Voting patterns will be changed, new alignments will come into existence, and the pressure of the small states upon the great powers will be proportionately intensified.

The gravity centers of majority power have shifted in a number of sessions of the United Nations. Early domination by the Latin American group in conjunction with the Commonwealth, Benelux, and Scandinavian groups was gradually altered as first the Arab group and then the Afro-Asian group joined Latin America in leading the majority. With the continuing division in the Western groups, the Afro-Asian and Arab groups led the majority (in the IXth Session). Later, the Latin American group and the Commonwealth group regained their earlier position, and then the Western groups were once again "in control" of the Assembly majority.⁸ The growth of the Assembly in the last several sessions has caused "the absolute majority" to pass

⁸Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 105.

from the West to the African and Asian states.

Bloc politics in the General Assembly can no longer be considered a temporary phenomenon. Blocs and groups constitute a regularized, though informal, aspect of the organization of the United Nations. They play an integral part in the process of dealing with issues and an increasing role in facilitating the operation of the United Nations. It is apparent that the groups which have a very cohesive internal voting record, such as the Soviet bloc and the Arab, Benelux, and Scandinavian groups, generally tend toward a minority position in the Assembly. They are therefore already in a bargaining position to urge other groups to consider the desirability of making concessions. Thus each member must evaluate its policies and role in the United Nations and the implications of the nature and extent of the bloc and group.

It is clear that participation in a group is advantageous to a member state, and participation in several groups even more advantageous. A "non-group" member is forced to rely on more subtle political and economic pressures for gaining support for its point of view and consequently must risk individual moves which may have lasting unfavorable effects. Participation in a group can open avenues for a variety of diplomatic techniques. It also provides an opportunity to create a combined voting power which can be a critical factor in negotiation with other groups.

Not surprisingly, whatever its advantages to individual member states bloc and group development can make a constructive contribution to negotiation within the United Nations only as long as the groups do not become intransigent. As the United Nations approaches universal membership of the world community of states, and if present trends continue, there is a very real possibility that group coalitions may prevent conclusive decisions by the major powers. In the interest of every member nation as well as in the interest of the United Nations as a whole, it would seem essential to encourage the development of smaller rather than larger groups.

Bloc politics have been both praised and blamed, depending upon the viewpoint of the commentator. The group creates a potential for manipulative dealing in votes to the detriment of the United Nations as a whole and to the development of peace. It has led to what Sir Carl Berendsen (the New Zealand delegate to the United Nations) called an "irresponsible bargaining" of votes which he and many others think is disgusting and menacing. Dean Rusk argues that the existence of an informal U.N. machinery for consultations affects the willingness of governments to discuss problems at the United Nations. He says that "debate without full advance preparation by negotiation is likely to be unproductive and disconcerting, and it can be dangerous."⁹ On the optimistic side, it has been argued

⁹Dean Rusk, "Parliamentary Diplomacy--Debate vs. Negotiation," World Affairs Interpreter, Vol. 26 (Summer 1955), p. 123.

that the Organization offers opportunities for furthering cooperation in many fields. It provides occasions not only for focusing world opinion, but also for negotiating diplomacy.

Internationally, the groups might improve the chances of general collective security and international equilibrium. Collective security efforts for the different regional groupings in the United Nations, as Ernst Haas suggests, are translated into two operational maxims--permissive enforcement and balancing. In line with permissive enforcement, different groupings of states have tried to obtain United Nations legitimization of their policies. After a related countermove, balancing attempts based on compromises within and between groupings have tried to avert a clear-cut victory by either side. The result may be a delicate negotiating process, 'with the world organization the forum, not of a community conscience or a concert of power, but of counterbalancing forces unwilling to seek a showdown, fearful of alienating friends or neutrals, and therefore willing to make concessions."¹⁰

A complete multi-group system of the equilibrium of all social forces might in itself encourage cooperative responses to interdependence, discourage aggression, and decrease the need while increasing the ability and willingness for applying sanctions. In this case, the new alignments would not constitute just additional "Great Powers," and would be restrained, if necessary

¹⁰ Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," p. 240.

by means of the power reserved to the world organization. The system of multiple equilibrium may promote the long range bases of security and facilitate peaceful change. It is also decisive for peace and tranquility.

A multi-group model of the international system, perhaps, may be considered as a theoretical extension of the traditional pattern of a balancing system, emerging from regional alliances of varying degrees of integration. Some major modern ideologies deny at least implicitly the adequacy of nationalism by aiming at ultimately global solutions. Idealists pay tribute to worldwide interdependence. However, universalism is today still premature and ambitious. Regionalism, as Walter Lippmann observes, provides an escape from the inadequacies of the nation-state and the impracticability of a world state.¹¹ The development of regional groups, which will not be considered incompatible with the goal of the United Nations, can be used as building groups in the construction of a future, international peace and order. This is one additional reason why a multi-group model of the international system proposed may be useful.

Bloc politics is perhaps the most pertinent system to present-day world politics of all patterns of the international system. The international system for the creation and maintenance of dynamic equilibrium is no longer dependent upon the balance of power. The groups seek to avoid conflict by

¹¹Anwar Hussain Syed, Walter Lippmann's Philosophy of International Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 189.

compromising disputes upon the basis of relative involvements of interests. If the relative involvements can be diplomatically determined and if the given object of controversy is one that permits such a technique of disposal, a compromise reflecting the differences in commitment is often not too difficult to arrange.

The multi-group international system would be able to promote political-military and socio-economic equilibrium, by being itself an internal equilibrium especially with respect to regional arrangements and normative principles. Only then can the system be stabilized on a sufficiently high but still equilibrium level; the group becomes a major factor for long-range security, combining stability with progressive peaceful change. The future of the United Nations and the purpose of peace can be fostered to "a greater degree by the development of a multiplicity of cross interests, none of which are exclusive..."¹²

To sum up, the Assembly's behavior cannot be satisfactorily explained either in its own terms, as expressed in the "one state, one vote" rule, or by reference to the outside world alone. It is in the interaction between groups and "parliamentary" politics that an understanding of the Assembly must be found. At all times, the Assembly provides an enormous area for genuine peaceful competition among the groups to the advantages of all concerned.

¹²Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations, p. 120.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere gratitude and indebtedness to Dr. Michael W. Suleiman for his guidance, correction and criticism in the completion of this paper. Special appreciation also is extended to Professor David N. Chamberlin for his valuable suggestions, comments and criticisms.

I am most grateful for the careful and considerate perusal of this thesis by Dr. William W. Boyer, Dr. Louis H. Douglas and Dr. Merlin D. Gustafson, members of the Advisory Committee.

I also sincerely appreciate Mrs. Kenyon N. Griffin for her helpful suggestions and valuable assistance which led to the final form of this study.

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A MULTI-GROUP MODEL OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF BLOC POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS

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AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

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1967

The purpose of the present thesis is twofold. First, it is to examine, to survey and to evaluate, in an introductory form, world politics on a "regional" scale in the General Assembly. Secondly, it attempts to define a new model of the international system, playing multiple equilibrium along the blocs and groups in the Assembly arena, on the basis of a tentative projection of theoretical approaches. The choice of the General Assembly as a model for primary analysis of international systems may be revealed by the fact that the Assembly is a realistic representation of the present day world.

The growth of bloc politics has been one of the most striking developments of postwar world politics. Such a development has made it possible for small states to exert an influence far beyond either their population or political importance when they combine their voting strength on particular issues. A major power can manipulate arrangements which will provide adequate voting support for its views on matters of primary concern provided it can recognize the interests of small states. Thus the criterion of a nation's power is its ability to induce support in quasi-parliamentary dealings rather than the increase or decrease of territorial possessions.

Bloc politics is perhaps the most pertinent phenomenon of present-day world politics of all patterns of the international system. It can not be considered temporary. Blocs and groups constitute a regularized, though informal, aspect of the organization of the United Nations. They play an increasing

role and facilitate the operation of the United Nations. Thus each member state must evaluate its policies and role in the United Nations by the implications of the nature and extent of the bloc and group. X

A multi-group model of the international system may be considered as a theoretical extension of the traditional pattern of balancing system, emerging from "regional" alliances of varying degrees of integration. The development of "regional" groups, which will not be considered incompatible with the goals of the United Nations, can be used as building groups in the construction of a future Utopia, international peace and order. The international system for creation and maintenance of dynamic equilibrium is no longer dependent upon the balance of power. The groups seek to avoid conflict by compromising disputes upon the basis of relative involvements of interests.

The political influence of groups in the General Assembly might improve the chances of general collective security and international equilibrium. A complete multi-group system of the equilibrium might arrange all forces to encourage cooperative responses to interdependence, discourage aggression, and decrease the need while increasing the ability and willingness for applying sanctions. The system of multiple equilibrium may promote the long range bases of security and facilitate peaceful change. It is also decisive for peace and tranquility. This is another reason why an equilibrium theory proposal may be valuable.

At all times, the General Assembly provides an enormous area for genuine peaceful competition among groups to the advantage of all concerned. The future of the United Nations and the purpose of peace can best be fostered by the development of a multiplicity of cross interests, none of which is exclusive.