

EXPECTANCY STATEMENTS AS INFLUENCED
BY SITUATIONAL VARIABLES

by

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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

This study is an attempt to investigate the effect of a situational variable on verbal statements of expectancy. Specifically, the variable selected was that of goal value. It has long been recognized that there is often an intimate relationship between expectancy statements and goal value. However, just what that relationship might be is rather obscure.

The study was carried out within the general framework of Rotter's "Social Learning Theory" (14). Whereas social learning theory utilizes both expectancy and reinforcement, other current approaches tend to be classifiable into two major categories. One set of attempts stresses the application of reinforcement theory, for example, the work of Dollard and Miller (5), Mowrer (11), and Brown and Farber (1). Another set of approaches including Tolman (15), Brunswik (2), Krech (8), and Postman (13), stresses the construct of expectancy or hypotheses.

Rotter's theory utilizes as a basic formula for behavior the following (14):

$$B.P_{x,s1,ra} = f(E_{x,ra,s1} \& R.V.a)$$

This may be read as follows: The potential for behavior \underline{x} to occur in situation $\underline{1}$ in relation to reinforcement \underline{a} is a function of the expectancy of the occurrence of reinforcement \underline{a} following behavior \underline{x} in situation $\underline{1}$, and the value of reinforcement \underline{a} . The full theoretical formulation includes a number of additional constructs which relate to the two basic constructs of the formula. Prediction of behavior requires that at least two behavior potentials be calculated so that prediction may be stated in terms of the relative potentiality of one behavior or another occurring. It is assumed that this is a basic formula for complex behaviors in a social situation. Expectancy

is defined in social learning theory as a subjective probability held by the individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of, or in relation to, a specific behavior in a given situation(s). Behavior potential may be defined as the potentiality of any given behavior occurring in any given situation(s) as calculated in relation to any single reinforcement or set of reinforcements. Reinforcement value is defined as the degree of preference for any reinforcement to occur if the possibilities of their occurring were all equal. This concept of reinforcement, however, does not stem from drive-reduction theory but perhaps might better be described as utilizing an "empirical law of effect."

There can be little doubt that for the same behavior an individual expects different outcomes in different situations. Situations, experimental or natural, are composed of cues that lead to expectancies for various behavior-reinforcement sequences. Thus, the aggression on the playground may be highly acceptable and reinforced while that same behavior may be strongly negatively reinforced in the home situation. The individual's categorization of the situation determines his expectancy that a given behavior will be followed by a given reinforcement. To predict complete generality of behavior in all situations seems inconsistent with common sense observations.

One specific cue in situations that may be assumed to have an effect upon expectancies is the value of the goal object or reinforcement. That is, does a high reinforcement value tend to lower or raise stated expectancies, or does it have no effect? For example, when the individual is in a competitive situation where the stakes are high does he tend to raise or lower his stated expectancy for being successful as compared to a situation where the stakes are low?

Behavior expectancies do not always appear to be governed by "realistic" factors in a situation, but seem also to be a function of wishes, fears, and doubts. Observers disagree, however, about the manner in which differentially valued goals affect expectancies. Some believe, for example, that expectancies are lowered, in the face of highly valued goals, as evident in the student before an examination, while others maintain that they are raised, as in a gambling situation.

Marks(10) and Irwin (7) have done studies aimed at demonstrating that expectancies are biased by wishfulness. In the task devised by Marks and later used by Irwin, 20 packs of 10 cards each were assembled, with one, three, five, seven, or nine of the cards marked in some way. The subject was asked to state on each trial whether he thought that one of these marked cards would be drawn after the pack had been shuffled. In one condition, the subjects were told that they would gain a point, if such a card were drawn; in another, they would lose a point. The event of drawing a marked card was thus made desirable in one instance, undesirable in another. The number of marked cards in the deck constituted the objective probability of the event, ranging from 10 to 90 percent. Both authors found that, although the probability level did influence the expectancy statements, the desirability of the event greatly and consistently biased them: if the event were desirable it was expected at a much higher level than objective probability, and if undesirable at a much lower level.

Crandall, et al. (4) repeated the Marks and Irwin studies with certain modifications. The principle difference was that he put more of a premium on accuracy of guesses by emphasis in instructions. His results, nevertheless, resembled those of Marks and Irwin but had less magnitude. Expectancy

statements were raised when reinforcement values were high, especially when objective probability was equal to .50.

Worell (16) systematically examined the effect of desirability on expectancy statements and found in opposition to Marks, Irwin and Crandall a significant tendency for expectancies to be lower for the more valued events than for the less valued ones. He used elementary school boys as subjects, and gave them three level of aspiration tasks defined as measuring ability in motor skill, pointing out the pertinence of these to athletic ability. The three tasks were presented so that one was introduced as a "very important" test of athletic ability, the second as not quite so important, and the third as not nearly so important, or much more inferior to the others. In this situation, the subjects' D-scores (the difference between the expected score and the preceding performance) were significantly lowest on the "most important" test and the highest on the "least important" test. The effect of the value of the event, then, tended to lower, rather than raise, expectancy statements.

How, then, is one to explain the different results in the data of Marks, Irwin, Crandall, and Worell. If one examines the data, one can see that Marks and Irwin used almost strictly chance-guessing situations; Crandall, perhaps, lessened this influence by stressing accuracy of guess and Worell used an achievement-type situation. Therefore, it could be said that the experimental situations in these studies could be placed on a continuum. Also, it can be noted that the obtained results fall onto a similar continuum. Marks and Irwin got results indicating desirable events are anticipated more frequently than undesirable ones. Crandall got the same results but with less magnitude. Worell, using a very different situation, got reverse

results. Since Marks and Irwin used strict guessing situations with little premium on accuracy they undoubtedly got a lot of wishful guesses which could explain their data. Crandall probably reduced the wishful element. Then, Worell's results are certainly incompatible with the principle of wishfulness. They would seem understandable, however, in terms of the socially-expected behavior in such a situation. Here, stating expectancies for success might be perceived as bragging. Even if it were not, the cultural mode would seem to dictate a certain amount of self-effacing when asked to assess one's own competence in such a skill. The college basketball star, when complimented, is virtually expected to say, "It was nothing; it was the team that did it".

In Worell's explanation of the picture of inconsistency between the studies, he notes that at least two broad divisions of situations may be distinguished: achievement and nonachievement. In the former, performance is dependent upon ability and skill, and thus reflects the individual's competence. In the latter, neither ability or skill is prominently involved, and an individual's competence is not challenged. This distinction appears to assist in resolving disparities in the results of such studies as Marks' and Worell's. Marks' results strongly indicate that increased value led to increased expectations. According to Worell's analysis, her study would fall within the nonachievement category, since the children were expressing what they wanted to happen; no ability or skill was implied. In this sense, her subjects were faced with a form of gambling, and culturally, one may find a greater tendency to take risks in these situations. In Worell's study, performance was related to ability, so an additional goal value was introduced.

Additionally, Lasko (9) recognized a distinction between learning in a situation where the effects following behavior are a function of the behavior itself and learning in a situation where the subsequent effect or reinforcement is essentially controlled by someone else according to some prearranged sequence. It appears that the difference in situations lies in what the subject perceives the occurrence or reinforcement to be a function of, that is, as a result of his performance, or on a basis independent of his performance. Taking this analysis as a cue, Phares (12) employed two level of aspiration tasks. One was introduced to the subject as involving his skill in making discriminations. On the other the subject was told that success was almost entirely a function of luck. It was found that expectancy statements changed significantly more in the "skill" than in the "luck" task. This supported a previous suggestion by Worell that systematic differences in expectancy statements could be expected between "skill" and "luck" tasks.

It thus appears that the situation is an effective datum in the prediction of expectancies. The above cited research suggests that verbal expectancies may be higher in non-achievement than in achievement situations. It would also appear that skill situations may be classified under the heading of achievement situations while chance or luck situations are classifiable under non-achievement.

On the basis of the foregoing assumptions, the following hypothesis was formulated,

Expectancy statements will be lower in a situation generally categorized by subjects as involving his skill than in a situation generally categorized as chance.

Skill situation is defined as one wherein a subject's score (a reinforcement, either positive or negative) reflects his ability. Chance situation is

defined as one wherein a subject's score is dependent upon luck or experimenter's whim rather than ability. The skill situation represents a challenge to the subject's competence and is a situation in which the goal value is high. It is presumed that the high value of the reinforcement will induce a certain amount of defensiveness in the form of lowered stated expectancies. In the chance situations, on the other hand, there is no implication of competency and thus no apparent threat, so the subject can "afford" to have high expectancies. Thus, it is presumed that in skill situations that challenge subject's competency the high goal value of success operates as a cue which may lead to lowered expectancy statements.

Next, it was further assumed that people vary along a continuum of to what extent they tend to more or less categorize all situations as achievement situations. Presumably, some people have a generalized expectancy or set which leads them to categorize most situations as skill or achievement dominated. On the basis of these assumptions, the second hypothesis was:

Subjects with high achievement scores tend to state lower expectancies in both skill and chance situations than subjects with low achievement scores.

This hypothesis would be consistent with our first one. That is, achievement situations tend to result in lower stated expectancies as a function of defensiveness, cultural factors, etc.

The instrument used to get achievement scores was the Edward's Personal Preference Schedule (6), which will be more fully described in the Methodology Chapter.

The third hypothesis was similar to the second hypothesis and based on the assumption that people vary in terms of how much they tend to generally categorize situations as chance. Thus, it was predicted that:

Subjects who obtain high scores on a test designed to measure one's generalized expectancy for chance determination of events will tend to state higher expectancies for success in both chance and skill situations than will people with low chance scores.

The instrument designed for this hypothesis is shown in Appendix B.

METHODOLOGY

Fifty-nine female students from general psychology classes were utilized in this study. After the first seven subjects were run, it was decided to rewrite the instructions, primarily for the sake of brevity and clarity. These seven subjects were then discarded. Two others were later discarded due to incomplete data. This left a total of 50 female students used in the study. Subjects were drawn from general psychology courses in which one of the requirements is participation in two hours of psychological experiments. The true nature of the experiment was disguised and none of the subjects appeared to question the experiment as structured to them (see instructions, Appendix C).

It will be recalled that the first hypothesis stated essentially that the subjects would state higher expectancies in chance situations than in skill situations. A major consideration centered about the notion that obtained results must rest on the subjects' categorizations of the tasks and not on some inherent quality of the tasks themselves. Thus, assurance was wanted that obtained results would not be merely a function of having used two different tasks. Therefore, what was needed was two tasks that could be interchanged as chance and skill. It was felt that this could be accomplished through changes in instructions with regard to the tasks. Thus, for half the subjects, Task A would be structured as chance and Task B as skill, and for the other half, Task A as skill and Task B as chance. The comparison of

expectancy levels would then be made between all skill situations vs. all chance situations, rather than between Task A and Task B. Two tasks, different from each other, and yet comparable enough that each could be structured in either of two ways were devised. Both tasks needed enough face validity to be convincingly both skill and chance, depending upon instructions. Each subject was used as his own control to obviate matching problems and also reduce the number of subjects necessary.

Task A (Color)

This task consisted of ten 2 by 3 inches sample paint chips of varying shades of yellow, on different colored 4 by 6 inches sheets of construction paper (Appendix A). These were, in turn, placed on a large board in two rows of five cards each. These will subsequently be called the standard colors. These same ten colored chips, reduced in size to 2 by 1 inch were pasted, separately, on regular 3 by 5 inches unlined, white filing cards (Appendix A). Each card's chip matched the color of one on the board exactly. These colors will subsequently be called the matching colors.

Task B (Length)

This task consisted of ten 1/2 inch wide strips of black construction paper ranging from 1 to 2-1/8 inches in length. The difference in length between any two adjacent size strips was 1/8 inch. Each of the ten strips was pasted, separately, on 3 by 5 inches white filing cards, but at varying angles (Appendix A). All of the cards were then mounted on a large board. These will subsequently be called the standard lengths. These same ten strips, color other than black, were pasted at varying angles on 2 by 2-1/2

inches white cards, and each card's strip was exactly the same length as one on the board (Appendix A). These strips will subsequently be called the matching lengths.

Red, white and blue chips, 1.5 inches in diameter, served as the objects used in the betting measure of expectancy. The subjects were informed that the color of the chips had nothing to do with the value of the chip.

Experimental Groups

The groups were set up in the following manner:

Table 1. Experimental groups.

Groups	Order of Presentation	
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>
I	Color (chance instructions)	Length (skill instructions)
II	Color (skill instructions)	Length (chance instructions)
III	Length (chance instructions)	Color (skill instructions)
IV	Length (skill instructions)	Color (chance instructions)

Each group of subjects was run in its entirety before going on to the next group. The groups were run in the order of II, IV, I, and III. It can be seen from Table 1 that order of presentation was balanced as was the manner in which each task was structured to the subjects.

Experimental Procedure

Before the subject entered the room, 20 stacks of 10 chips each were placed on the table at which she was to be seated. The board containing the

standard lengths or colors was placed on a chair in a vertical position approximately 10 feet from where the subject sat. As soon as she was comfortable one of the sets of instructions was read to her depending upon the group to which she had been assigned. Basically, there were two types of instructions. The first type structured the initial task as chance and the second task as skill. The second type structured the initial task as skill and the second task as chance. However, for each type the form and color tasks were interchanged, thus making a total of four instructions. These are reproduced in Appendix C. The tasks required the subject to match the matching colors (or lengths) with the standard colors (lengths) on the board. Each subject was given 10 trials of matching on each task and the sequence of positive and negative reinforcement was the same for every subject in both situations. The sequence was as follows:

Table 2. Fixed sequence of reinforcement

<u>Trial</u>									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
x ⁺	x	-	x	-	-	-	x	-	x

x equals positive reinforcement (correct matching or success)

- equals negative reinforcement (incorrect matching or failure)

Although in fact both situations were chance as far as subject being correct was concerned, the instructions apparently exerted a strong effect. Subjects did not recognize that they were being reinforced similarly in both situations. Thus, because of initial structure, subjects categorized the tasks differently and, therefore, reacted differently. Many spontaneous comments attested to the fact that none of the subjects questioned the report

of failure or success for any given trial even though in reality it may have contradicted their actual performance.

Any of the instructions were repeated, explained or elaborated if the subject did not seem to understand fully.

The measure of expectancy used was a betting technique developed by Castaneda (3). This method correlates .99 with other verbal methods, although the betting method yields somewhat higher expectancies. Before each matching trial the subject was asked to bet from one to ten chips as to whether she would be correct in matching. Other work has indicated that chips are as feasible for betting as small amounts of money (Phares 12). During the betting the experimenter recorded the number of chips bet each time and also a cumulative total of chips won to lend reality to the situations.

In testing the second hypothesis, the subjects were given the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule if they had not already taken it during orientation week at the college. Those Edward's that the experimenter administered were scored by the experimenter. The rest of the scores were obtained from the Counseling Center.

The Edward's Personal Preference Schedule was designed primarily as an instrument for research and counseling purposes, to provide quick and convenient measures of a number of relatively independent normal personality variables. In addition to the 15 personality variables, the Personal Preference Schedule provides a measure of test consistency and a measure of profile stability. The description of the ach (Achievement) score is as follows: (6)

To do one's best, to be successful, to accomplish tasks requiring skill and effort, to be a recognized authority, to accomplish something of great significance, to do a difficult job well, to solve

difficult problems and puzzles, to be able to do things better than others, to write a great novel or play.

As yet, the Personal Preference Schedule can demonstrate no validity data of any consequence, although various self-ranking studies have been done. In some cases subjects, self-ranking, agreed perfectly with their Personal Preference Schedule rankings, but in others, there was little agreement. Correlations between the Personal Preference Schedule and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory were run. Some of the correlations were significant, but more were not.

For scores the experimenter used ranks because the strength of the achievement need could only be judged in relation to the other 14 needs.

In testing the third hypothesis, a specially devised 13-item questionnaire was given (Appendix B). This was administered at the conclusion of the experimental tasks.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The data from the first hypothesis were analyzed in the following manner: for each subject, two scores, one for the chance situation and the other for the skill situation, were computed from the stated expectancies (bets) by taking the mean of these bets in each situation. Only the first nine trials were used in the computation. The data for all hypotheses were computed from an N of 50.

Table 3. Results of hypothesis I

Mean: chance situation:	4.5
Mean: skill situation:	5.5
Difference between means:	-1.0
t:	-17.1
P:	< .001

It can readily be seen from the above results that the data turned out to be highly significant but in the reverse of the predicted direction. This study represented essentially an attempt to extend Worell's analysis to chance vs. skill situations. Instead, the obtained results would tend to fit into the framework of the Marks-Irwin-Crandall studies. The importance of the findings lie in a further, emphatic demonstration of the importance of the situation in determining human behavior. It will be recalled that the only thing different in the chance and skill situations was the instructions--number of positive reinforcements, sequence, etc., were all identical in each case--yet the resultant stated expectancies were quite divergent.

If the assumption is made that the methodology was adequate to test the hypothesis, then the framework behind the hypothesis must be rejected. However, it does not appear that Worell's achievement vs. non-achievement analysis should be summarily rejected. Further experimentation may reveal that his analysis is valid for certain classes of individuals, but does not possess complete generality. The possibility exists as well that chronological age is a factor. That is, perhaps the effect of goal value on stated expectancy varies as a function of chronological age.

A more basic factor probably resides in the nature of the situations themselves. Thus, we may be forced to accept the fact that no absolute prescriptions for the effect of goal value upon stated expectancies can be made aside from the particular situation. That is, the particular effect can be predicted only from an intensive study of the situational cues present and the past expectancy-reinforcement history of the individual. To simply classify a situation as achievement or as one in which the goal value is high may be too gross a description. There can be no assurance that subjects will

so categorize the situation. Any situation is composed of many cues. Which set of cues the subject fixes upon so as to stimulate a given expectancy may be at variance with those the experimenter is interested in. Most situations lend themselves to many different categorizations depending on the past history and the present state of the subject.

Then, too, it has often been noted that the statement of high expectancies is something that a subject may perceive as leading to reinforcement, either from the culture generally, or from experimenter in particular. Thus, the tendency to over-state expectancies and the reverse tendency, self-effacement, may be behaviors that are, to a large degree, situationally determined. To arbitrarily predict either tendency without study of the situational cues present may well be ill-advised.

Specifically, it had been hoped that the subject in this study would perceive the skill situation as a threat or challenge to their competency. The task was purposely structured as involving aptitude in interior decorating since it was assumed that, for females, this would arouse motivation. It was also intended that the subjects categorize the chance situation as one wherein they "had nothing to lose," and could afford to state high expectancies since no threat to their competence could be involved. However, it seems apparent that subjects did not categorize the situations on this continuum. Instead, they seemed to perceive the chance situation as being so difficult that they lowered their expectancies. In the skill situation they seemingly felt they had more opportunity for being correct and thus raised their expectancy. This analysis is essentially confirmed by subsequent interviews with 5 of the subjects. In this sense, the study did not test Worell's analysis. That is, it is unlikely that achievement-non-achievement

categorizations were aroused, but instead, some categorization on the basis of degree of difficulty. At any rate, it is apparent that achievement vs. non-achievement cannot be simply extended to skill vs. chance.

The data for the second hypothesis were handled in the following fashion: first, the 13 subjects who scored highest on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (on the basis of their r achievement rank) were compared with the 13 subjects who scored lowest on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. The comparison was a t test based on the subjects' mean expectancy scores in the two situations. Then, product-moment correlations were calculated between all subjects' mean expectancy scores in the two situations and their Edwards Personal Preference Schedule r achievement ranks. None of the tests were significant. Thus, on the basis of obtained results, Hypothesis 2 was not confirmed.

Table 4. Results of hypothesis 2.

Mean for High achievement scorers: chance situation:	4.69
Mean for Low achievement scorers: chance situation:	4.68
Difference between means:	.01
t :	.0146
Mean for High achievement scorers: skill situation:	6.01
Mean for Low achievement scorers: skill situation:	5.52
Difference between means:	.49
t :	.0768
r between Edwards and chance mean scores:	- .01
r between Edwards and skill mean scores:	- .18

The data for the third hypothesis was handled in the following fashion: first, the 11 subjects who scored highest on the 13-item chance questionnaire were compared with the 11 subjects who scored lowest on the chance questionnaire. The comparison was a t test based on the subjects' mean expectancy

scores in the two situations. Then, product-moment correlations were calculated between all subjects' mean expectancy scores in the two situations and their chance questionnaire scores. None of the tests were significant. Thus, on the basis of obtained results, Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed.

Table 5. Results of hypothesis 3.

Mean for High chance scorers: chance situation:	4.57
Mean for Low chance scorers: chance situation:	4.39
Difference between means:	.18
t:	.3867
Mean for High chance scorers: skill situation:	5.45
Mean for Low chance scorers: skill situation:	5.79
Difference between means:	-.34
t:	-.5434
r between Questionnaire and chance mean scores:	.09
r between Questionnaire and skill mean scores:	.06

It was assumed that individuals would vary along a dimension of how much they tend to categorize all situations as achievement or non-achievement. To measure this generalized expectancy the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule was used. The same procedure was utilized for the chance dimension using the "chance questionnaire." One would presume that individuals at either end of either dimension would over-generalize to any given situation, regardless of whether it be chance or skill, and tend to categorize it as either chance or skill, respectively. In other words, a highly chance-oriented person would tend to see the skill situation as more like chance than one who was skill (achievement) or non-chance oriented. The skill-oriented person would tend to see both situations more as skill.

The lack of significant results on both the Edwards and the Questionnaire may be explicable for either of two reasons. First, it may be true that

neither the chance nor the skill (achievement) dimension is generalized enough to permit the obtaining of measurable effects in all situations. Thus, for example, behavior may be enough situationally determined that prediction of behavior on the basis of non-achievement is not feasible. That is, no need is generalized enough to influence behavior in all situations.

Secondly, the potential inadequacy of both measuring instruments may have resulted in lack of results. Assuming that the above two dimensions are legitimate, there are no data demonstrating the validity of either instrument. The questionnaire was especially designed for this study and has not yet been fully studied. The same is true of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Although several studies have been published on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, they are basically not validity studies. So far, the user of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule must rely on "face validity"; a very risky venture.

Furthermore, in view of the results of the test of the first hypothesis, it is questionable whether the second and third hypotheses are legitimate. These latter predictions would be subject to the same criticisms and considerations that were made in relation to the first hypothesis.

SUMMARY

The major purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a situational variable on verbal statements of expectancy. It was hypothesized that the subject who categorizes a situation as skill would give lower statements of expectancy than subjects who categorized a situation as chance. This prediction was based in part on Werell's study where goals of high value, which

were related to ability or skill, resulted in lower statements of expectancy than in those situations which had low goal values.

In order to test this hypothesis two experimental tasks were designed. One involved the matching of colors and the other, the matching of lengths of lines. A total of 50 female subjects were used, broken down into four groups. Group one first received the color task structured as chance, then the line task structured as skill. The second group received the same tasks, but with structure reversed. Group number three first received the line task structured as chance, then the color task structured as skill. The fourth group received the same tasks, but with structure reversed. Each subject went through a series of 10 trials on each task and all received the same pattern of fixed reinforcement.

It was further hypothesized that people vary along a continuum of to what extent they tend to more or less categorize all situations as achievement situations or as chance situations. Consequently, subjects with high achievement scores would make lower expectancy statements in both skill and chance situations than subjects with low achievement scores. Subjects with high scores on the chance questionnaire would tend to state higher expectancies for success in both skill and chance situations than will subjects with low chance scores.

The major findings of this study were:

1. There is a significant difference in the expectancy statements given in a skill and chance situation, but not as predicted. Instead, the study showed higher expectancy statements in a situation structured as skill rather than a situation structured as chance. Various explanations for this result

were given. The subjects questioned said that they would rather bet more on their own ability, rather than on something over which they had no control.

2. It also could not be shown that people on either end of the chance-skill dimension over-generalize. That is, it could not be shown that a highly chance-oriented person would tend to perceive the skill situation as more like chance than one who was skill (achievement) or non-chance oriented; or a skill-oriented person would tend to see both situations more as skill. Two possible explanations for the results were offered.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TASKS



AN EXAMPLE OF A STANDARD COLOR



AN EXAMPLE OF A MATCHING COLOR



AN EXAMPLE OF A STANDARD LENGTH



AN EXAMPLE OF A MATCHING LENGTH

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

Name _____

Below are a number of statements which represent widely held opinions on various questions. These statements were selected from several sources such as speeches, books, newspapers, etc. They were selected in such a way that most people are likely to agree with some and disagree with others. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements, as follows:

Circle SA if you strongly agree.
 Circle A if you agree.
 Circle D if you disagree.
 Circle SD if you strongly disagree.

Please check the way you really feel, and not the way you think you "should" feel.

- SA A D SD 1. Many of the unsuccessful points in my life have contained a large chance element.
- SA A D SD 2. A great deal that happens to me is probably just luck.
- SA A D SD 3. I feel that many people could be described as victims of circumstances.
- SA A D SD 4. I have found that getting a good job is largely a function of being in the right place at the right time.
- SA A D SD 5. I've found that it's hard for me to really profit from my past experience because I don't know how much of it to attribute to luck or good fortune.
- SA A D SD 6. Almost invariably, when I have been sick (virus, infection, etc.) it was because I just happened to be exposed to it.
- SA A D SD 7. One's grades in class depend as much on such things as the instructor's mood, his choice of questions, marking system, etc., as on one's having been really prepared or not.
- SA A D SD 8. I have usually found that what is going to happen will happen regardless of my actions.
- SA A D SD 9. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental occurrences.
- SA A D SD 10. It seems to me that the behavior of others is so unpredictable that my actions are not too important.
- SA A D SD 11. I feel that simply because something good happens today does not mean that I should expect more of the same.

- SA A D SD 12. It is usually true that with successful people good luck outweighed the bad.
- SA A D SD 13. It usually turns out that we might just as well have made many of our decisions by flipping a coin.

APPENDIX C

EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTIONS
GROUPS I AND III

You are going to be given two tests. I'll explain the first one and have you finish it and then we will go into the second one.

The first one is a test that was constructed to measure interior decorating aptitude. However, the way I am going to administer it, it will not give any information about your interior decorating skill. It is purely a luck or chance sort of thing.

Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a shade of yellow (length) which will be exactly like one in the series of shades of yellow (length) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match it with one on the board. Read the number of the card on the board that matches your card and I'll tell you whether you are right or wrong. However, there's a trick here. Generally, you have to outguess me, because I will have already decided, according to a fixed pattern, whether you are going to be right or wrong. It still is important for you to try and match the shades of yellow (lengths), as there is a pattern, which I can't tell you about, which, if you discover it, will help you to outguess me. Is that clear? You can see that skill in matching here is not involved, but rather, how lucky you are in guessing whether I will tell you that you are right each time. Thus, even though it is a test of interior decorating aptitude, your score won't give much of an indication of your ability here.

Another thing, I want to get an estimate of whether you expect to be right or wrong in your matching each time. You will estimate how you are going to do by betting these chips each time. You can bet any amount from one to ten each time depending on what you think your chances are of guessing right. The better you feel your chances are, the more you should bet, and vice versa.

Is everything clear?.....(pause)..... All right, let's begin. Don't forget, this depends on luck rather than skill in interior decorating.

Presentation of the first task

Now let's do the second task. This is a test that shows how much ability and aptitude you have for interior decorating. Your score on this test is determined purely by how good you are. In other words, this tests your basic skill and competency by comparing your performance with that of other girls. I suppose every girl likes to think she has ability in this area. Well, this will give you a chance to really prove or demonstrate just how good or how poor you are. Let me say again that your scores rest solely on your basic aptitude and are compared with those of other girls.

Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a length (shade of yellow) which will be exactly the same length (shade) as one in the series of lengths (shades of yellow) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match it with one on the board like we did before and I will tell you whether you are right or wrong.

Another thing. As before, I want you to provide me an estimate of whether you expect to be right or wrong in matching each time. Remember you can bet any amount from one to ten each time according to what you think your chances are of being right.

Okay? Let's begin. Don't forget, this test depends on skill and will show definitely just how really good or bad you are. You bet according to what your expectancy for being correct is.

Presentation of the second task

INSTRUCTIONS
GROUPS II AND IV

You are going to be given two tests. I'll explain the first one and have you finish it and then we will go into the second one.

The first one is a test that shows how much ability and aptitude you have for interior decorating. Your score on this test is determined purely by how good you are. In other words, this tests your basic skill and competency by comparing your performance with that of other girls. I suppose every girl likes to think she has ability in this area. Well, this will give you a chance to really prove or demonstrate just how good or how poor you really are. Let me say again that your scores rest solely on your basic aptitude and are compared with those of other girls.

Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a shade of yellow (length) which will be exactly like one in the series of shades of yellow (lengths) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match it with one on the board. Read the number of the card on the board that matches your card and I'll tell you whether you are right or wrong.

Another thing. I want to get an estimate of whether you expect to be right or wrong in your matching each time. You will estimate how you are going to do by betting these chips each time. You can bet any amount from one to ten each time depending on what you think your chances are of being right. The better you feel your chances are, the more you should bet, and vice versa.

Is everything clear?.....(pause)..... All right, let's begin. Don't forget, this test depends on skill and will show definitely just how really good or bad you are. You bet according to what your expectancy for being correct is.

Presentation of the first task

Now let's do the second test. This test was also constructed to measure interior decorating aptitude. However, the way I am going to administer it, it will not give any information about your interior decorating skill. It is purely a luck or chance sort of thing.

Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a length (shade of yellow) which will be exactly like one in the series of lengths (shades of yellow) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match it with one on the board like we did before. I will tell you each time whether you were right or wrong. However, there's a trick here. Generally, you have to outguess me because I will have already decided, according to a fixed pattern, whether you are going to be right or wrong each time. It still is important for you to try and match the rectangles (shades of yellow), as there is a pattern, which I can't tell you about, which, if you discover it,

will help you outguess me. Is that clear? You can see that skill in matching here is not involved, but rather, how lucky you are in guessing whether I will tell you that you are right each time. Thus, even though it is a test of interior decorating aptitude, your score won't give much of an indication of your ability here.

Another thing. As before, I want you to provide me an estimate of whether you expect to be right or wrong in your matching each time. Remember, you can bet any amount from one to ten each time according to what you think your chances are of guessing right.

Okay? Let's begin. Don't forget, this depends on luck rather than skill in interior decorating.

Presentation of the second task

APPENDIX D
RAW DATA

APPENDIX D

RAW DATA

Experimental Tasks

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Chance Mean</u>	<u>Skill Mean</u>
1	4.11	4.89
2	3.44	5.67
3	3.22	2.67
4	4.56	5.56
5	3.00	3.89
6	2.78	3.89
7	6.00	6.11
8	6.44	7.78
9	7.56	6.11
10	9.44	10.00
11	5.56	7.00
12	5.78	4.78
13	3.89	3.44
14	5.33	6.22
15	4.56	3.11
16	4.11	5.56
17	2.00	2.00
18 7.56	7.56	7.22
19	1.67	1.67
20	3.56	5.22
21	7.00	6.78
22	6.11	5.56
23	5.00	5.44
24	5.33	7.78
25	6.22	7.89
26	5.00	8.00
27	4.33	5.56
28	5.00	8.89
29	4.44	4.78
30	3.00	2.78
31	4.00	6.89
32	5.78	6.22
33	3.78	5.78
34	3.11	3.33
35	5.00	10.00
36	3.11	4.67
37	4.11	6.67
38	4.00	6.00
39	1.22	3.11

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Chance Mean</u>	<u>Skill Mean</u>
40	1.11	3.11
41	1.33	1.67
42	1.33	1.11
43	4.67	6.78
44	3.89	5.00
45	4.11	7.22
46	1.22	1.89
47	6.67	10.00
48	5.78	5.00
49	6.11	6.78
50	6.00	7.33

Questionnaire Scores

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Total Score</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Total Score</u>
1	34	26	40
2	38	27	42
3	31	28	41
4	26	29	41
5	35	30	39
6	39	31	35
7	35	32	42
8	35	33	39
9	41	34	43
10	37	35	34
11	40	36	35
12	32	37	30
13	39	38	34
14	48	39	39
15	37	40	41
16	35	41	35
17	35	42	35
18	33	43	32
19	37	44	43
20	43	45	33
21	39	46	28
22	41	47	36
23	36	48	35
24	39	49	37
25	38	50	36

Edwards Personal Preference Schedule

Achievement Rank Scores

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Rank Score</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Rank Score</u>
1	11.5	26	4.5
2	10.	27	14.5
3	11.5	28	10.5
4	12.	29	14.
5	10.5	30	11.
6	10.5	31	7.
7	9.	32	9.5
8	13.	33	12.5
9	9.5	34	12.
10	2.	35	10.
11	6.	36	8.5
12	14.	37	8.
13	10.	38	5.
14	8.5	39	9.5
15	4.	40	5.
16	12.	41	10.
17	13.	42	12.
18	14.	43	15.
19	13.5	44	12.
20	5.	45	13.5
21	10.	46	5.5
22	6.5	47	9.
23	12.5	48	13.
24	12.5	49	8.
25	2.	50	11.5

EXPECTANCY STATEMENTS AS INFLUENCED
BY SITUATIONAL VARIABLES

by

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The major purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a situational variable on verbal statements of expectancy. It was hypothesized that the subject who categorizes a situation as skill would give lower statements of expectancy than subjects who categorized a situation as chance. This prediction was based in part on Worell's study where goals of high value, which were related to ability or skill, resulted in lower statements of expectancy than in those situations which had low goal values.

In order to test this hypothesis two experimental tasks were designed. One involved the matching of colors and the other, the matching of lengths of lines. A total of 50 female subjects were used, broken down into four groups. Group one first received the color task structured as chance, then the line task structured as skill. The second group received the same tasks, but with structure reversed. Group number three first received the line task structured as chance, then the color task structured as skill. The fourth group received the same tasks, but with structure reversed. Each subject went through a series of 10 trials on each task and all received the same pattern of fixed reinforcement.

It was further hypothesized that people vary along a continuum of to what extent they tend to more or less categorize all situations as achievement situations or as chance situations. Consequently, subjects with high achievement scores would make lower expectancy statements in both skill and chance situations than subjects with low achievement scores. Subjects with high scores on the chance questionnaire would tend to state higher expectancies for success in both skill and chance situations than will subjects with low chance scores.

The major findings of this study were:

1. There is a significant difference in the expectancy statements given in a skill and chance situation, but not as predicted. Instead, the study showed higher expectancy statements in a situation structured as skill rather than in a situation structured as chance. Various explanations for this result were given. The subjects questioned said that they would rather bet more on their own ability, rather than on something over which they had no control.

2. It also could not be shown that people on either end of the chance-skill dimension over-generalize. That is, it could not be shown that a highly chance-oriented person would tend to perceive the skill situation as more like chance than one who was skill (achievement) or non-chance oriented; or a skill-oriented person would tend to see both situations more as skill. Two possible explanations for the results were offered.