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1 **A checklist for safe robot swarms**

2
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
7
8 *Standfirst: As robot swarms move from the laboratory to real world applications, a routine*
9 *checklist of questions could help ensure their safe operation.*

10
11 Robot swarms promise to tackle problems ranging from food production and natural
12 disaster response, to logistics and space exploration¹⁻⁴. As swarms are deployed outside the
13 laboratory in real world applications, we have a unique opportunity to engineer them to be
14 safe from the get-go. Safe for the public, safe for the environment, and indeed, safe for
15 themselves. This will help build public confidence in their use, and counter hyped or
16 negative narratives about swarms in media and science fiction. Designing safe swarms is
17 also challenging, as the main benefits of swarms, namely their scalability, robustness, and
18 emergent properties, arise from self-organisation, a concept rarely used in engineering⁵.

19
20 Previous research has identified certain challenges for the deployment of safe robot
21 swarms, particularly in the areas of swarm agent fault tolerance⁶⁻⁹, human-swarm
22 interaction⁸ and swarm security¹¹⁻¹⁵, but limited consideration has been given to systematic
23 assessment of swarm safety. As a starting point, we propose a preliminary “safe swarm
24 checklist” with 10 questions that should be answered satisfactorily by engineers before a
25 swarm can be deployed in the real world, where real costs are at stake. Highlighting
26 potential risks early in the swarm design phase will allow mitigations to be introduced.

27
28 Safety in engineering can be defined as the absence of catastrophic consequences on the
29 user(s) and the environment. It is closely related to concepts of dependability, or the ability
30 to deliver a service that can justifiably be trusted¹⁶. We take a holistic view of safety that
31 goes beyond analysing failure modes and performing risk analysis¹⁷, to also include the
32 broader socio-technical context of deployment. In our proposed “safe swarm checklist”,
33 questions 1 and 2 on ethics and legality come first as a vital prerequisite for initial testing.
34 Ethical governance and training should be pervasive from the design to the deployment of
35 robot swarms¹⁸. Questions 3 and 4 relate to accountability and user-swarm interactions.
36 Then, because a defining feature of swarms is their emergent capabilities, we consider
37 individual and swarm-level risks separately for each of the dimensions of physical harm,
38 behavioural harm, and security in questions 5 to 10.

39
40 We briefly apply our checklist to a hypothetical swarm of 100 small floating robots – let’s
41 call them bubblebots – deployed to monitor water pollutants (Figure 1). The idea builds on
42 several examples of real-world robot swarm deployments in aquatic environments¹⁹⁻²¹. The
43 bubblebots are meant to distribute over an enclosed floating harbour and light up in ways
44 that communicate their local sensor readings. By sharing information within the swarm, the
45 robots can collectively communicate the overall state of the water in the harbour and
46 reorganise to highlight pollution sources.



48

49

50 Figure 1 Safety considerations for the deployment of bubblebots used in a floating harbour
 51 to signal pollutants.

52

53 (1) Ethics. Is this an ethical use of a robot swarm?

54

55 We will consult authorities such as the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and
 56 Intelligent Systems and its work on Ethically Aligned Design²², or the BSI standard for Ethical
 57 Design and Application of Robots and Robotic Systems²³. With bubblebots, we focus on an
 58 application for social good, namely environmental monitoring of water pollutants,
 59 considering privacy and potential harm to actors in the harbour. Mutual shaping of the
 60 technology between researchers and users will help embed local ethical norms²⁴.

61

62 (2) Legal. Does the swarm comply with all relevant laws and regulations for the
 63 domain(s) of deployment?

64

65 The bubblebot swarm will need to comply with all relevant rules: environmental, harbour
 66 and maritime, or relating to health and safety. There may be a need for public liability
 67 insurance.

68

69 (3) Accountability. Is there a way to analyse swarm failures?

70

71 Following work by Winfield et al.²⁵, it would be helpful to store short-term recordings of the
 72 actions of the robots based on sensory readings and communication in a so-called “black
 73 box”, inspired from flight recorders in the aviation industry. This could be done on board the
 74 robots, or using an external camera system monitoring overall operations. This information
 75 would help to investigate and reconstruct conditions that led to unsafe operations, and
 76 would be used to improve swarm implementation if things go wrong.

77

78 (4) User interaction. Can the users interact with the swarm to prevent unwanted
 79 behaviour?

80

81 It should be possible to easily deploy, interact with and retrieve the swarm. In this case, user
82 interaction will involve depositing the bubblebots in the harbour, and reading out the state
83 of the swarm from the harbourside by looking at the robot location and colour status.
84 Bubblebots can easily be stopped using a broadcasted message transmitted throughout the
85 swarm from an operator on the harbourside, in which case robots will home to one area of
86 the harbour for collection.

87

88 (5) Physical harm from individual robots. Can the individual robots cause physical harm
89 to humans, animals, or the environment?

90

91 Bubblebots will be designed to be small enough to avoid damage to boats in the harbour, or
92 other robots, but large enough to avoid seabirds and fish from eating them. Trials will be
93 done to check that they are compatible with actors in the harbour. They will be buoyant to
94 avoid them sinking and becoming a pollutant themselves, and will be easy to detect for
95 collection by harbour staff. Materials for the waterproof shell will be optimised for
96 durability to avoid breaches, and electronics will be low enough power to avoid possibility of
97 electric shock. Bubblebots failing (power loss, broken sensor or motors) will turn off,
98 avoiding further impact. In the future, bubblebots could even be biodegradable as an
99 additional safeguard – such research is moving beyond the conceptual stage²⁶.

100

101 (6) Physical harm from the swarm. Can the emergent swarm behaviour cause physical
102 harm to humans, animals, or the environment?

103

104 The swarm of 100 bubblebots could disrupt natural animal behaviour in the harbour by
105 being a source of distraction, changing their usual feeding habits. Studies will need to be
106 done to assess the impact of the swarm on wildlife. Likewise, the swarm could cause
107 damage to boats or the harbour if they all accumulate in the same location. Algorithmic
108 safeguards will be put in place to avoid dense robot aggregation.

109

110 (7) Behavioural harm from individual robots. Can the behaviour of individual robots
111 result in unsafe operation?

112

113 Poor programming or lack of consideration of noise in the environment (boats passing by,
114 local disturbance of the sensor from wildlife) may lead individual robot behaviours to
115 display erroneous or unreliable LED colours (constantly fluctuating, or inconsistent with
116 neighbouring robots), which may result in these individual robots unnecessarily worrying
117 the harbourside community and eroding trust in the overall operation of the swarm.
118 Individual behaviours will be thoroughly tested to determine the parameters that lead to
119 stable and reliable signal outputs, and, where possible, the programme will be formally
120 verified to avoid undiscovered use cases²⁵. Individual failures can also be detected and
121 signalled by other members of the swarm as a way to make them more visible⁶⁻⁹.

122

123 (8) Behavioural harm from the swarm. Can failure of the emergent swarm behaviour
124 cause unsafe operation?

125

126 Faulty swarm operation, either due to faulty individual robots impacting emergent swarm
127 behaviour, or due to poor engineering of emergent properties, may result in incorrect water
128 pollutant assessment. Consequently, pollution could go undetected or false alarms could
129 lead to disruption of harbour operations. Mitigations could include an initial focus on
130 detecting non-safety-critical pollutants that can be easily verified by a human on the
131 ground. For safety critical pollutants, swarm behaviours will either need to be formally
132 verified²⁷, or tested thoroughly in simulation and reality to gain confidence in the system. A
133 rigorous approval process could take inspiration from the approach used by other sectors,
134 such as the FDA approval process for medicine.

135

136 (9) Security of individual robots. Can individual robots be maliciously hacked?

137

138 The minimal design of bubblebots will limit the ways in which they can be hacked, including
139 hijacking communication channels, reprogramming the robot controller, or faulting the
140 sensory readings. Securing these potential weaknesses will be a priority. A minimal design
141 will also contribute to privacy, as relatively less information will need to be stored and/or
142 processed onboard each robot.

143

144 (10) Security of the swarm. Can the emergent swarm behaviour be subverted by
145 malicious actors?

146

147 Swarm behaviours could be subverted by injecting robots with faulty sensory readings into
148 the swarm, or changing the environment, for example by inserting “fake pollutants”. A
149 swarm signature will be added to all bubblebots to ensure they are able to detect internal,
150 versus external actors. Additionally, swarms will aim to communicate unusual patterns in
151 pollutants by displaying a collective “confidence” status using their colour (e.g. orange for
152 unusual activities). One will also need to check whether swarm behaviour can reveal private
153 information, for example through chemical detection near boats, or imaging of personal
154 identifiers.

155

156 While this is not meant to be an exhaustive assessment, it provides initial insight into the
157 safety of the swarm. Redundancy in the questions asked, for example behavioural harm
158 leading to physical harm due to poor testing of the harbour water, is intentional and allows
159 for a thorough coverage of safety considerations from different perspectives.

160

161 The checklist will identify different risks for different use case scenarios and swarm
162 technologies. Consider applying the checklist to a swarm of robots designed to store and
163 retrieve goods in a warehouse. Swarms can be used ethically in logistics, though amongst
164 broad considerations we will assess their impact on human labour. The swarm will need to
165 comply with regulations in place regarding workplace safety. The user interaction part of the
166 checklist will consider workers in nearby proximity of the swarm unloading or requesting
167 items, those passing by on the shop floor, and supervisors monitoring and controlling the
168 swarm. Such a supervisory system could also allow for short-term recording of the
169 warehouse state, to be used as a black box for accountability if anything goes wrong, or
170 individual robots could locally store a log file for analysis. In relation to physical harm,
171 robots working in densely populated environments with workers, goods, and other robots
172 will need to avoid collisions. Hardware should be designed to be robust to failure, for

173 example detecting sensor or motor malfunction, or battery faults which could cause
174 damage or fires. Collectively, we will need to demonstrate the swarm is able to perform its
175 task without causing physical harm, for example transporting items, without toppling over.
176 To assess behavioural harm, we will consider whether individual robots thoroughly map all
177 possible sensory readings to appropriate actions (e.g. avoiding dangerous full speed motion
178 for example), we will also study the behaviour of the swarm to ensure they don't cause
179 unsafe configurations in the warehouse by blocking exit routes. Security in this scenario
180 might relate to industrial espionage, whereby competitors wish to gain business intelligence
181 about what products are being handled; robots could work effectively without needing to
182 identify the contents of their load. Hackers may also aim to disrupt operations, which would
183 necessitate safeguards to avoid external actors from interacting with the swarm.

184
185 Using our checklist, we have begun systematic, albeit theoretical, exploration of safe robot
186 swarm designs for real-world deployment. Designing such swarms is most likely feasible
187 with today's technology and making them thoroughly safe will improve public perceptions
188 in the crucial early trust building stage.

189
190 Safe swarms can take many forms, depending on the capabilities of the robots and numbers
191 used. Robots such as bubblebots rely on their simplicity, making them less likely to
192 individually fail in complex ways; less liable to subtle manipulation; and more likely to
193 biodegrade quickly and harmlessly. More capable warehouse robots may instead rely on
194 classical cybersecurity tools and reasoning to make them individually safe. In both cases,
195 swarms should benefit from the philosophy of 'complexity engineering', where we rely on
196 emergence of collective capabilities to get the task done. This puts the focus on getting
197 interactions right, whether within the swarm, with other robot systems or human users, and
198 with the physical world.

199
200 The potential for robot swarms to improve our world is enormous: first though, we must
201 build in safety from the beginning. Safe swarms are successful swarms.

202

203 **Competing interests**

204 The authors have no competing interests to declare.

205

206 **References and notes**

207

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