

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
SYRIA AND TUNISIA

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
SYRIA AND TUNISIA

Introduction

Found within most political systems today are some forms of political party or parties. Although political parties started as a Western phenomenon and reached their modern development in the West, parties today can be found in most countries throughout the world whether communist, socialist, or capitalist. The Middle East¹ is no exception to this general pattern, perhaps carrying it to extremes in types and numbers of parties.

This paper will be an attempt to compare two Middle East countries, Syria and Tunisia, with highly different political systems, and to look specifically at political parties and their relationship to the awesome problem of political development in these two countries. Although much work has been done concerning political parties and political development, it is still not known what form of party or parties will contribute most effectively to the area of political development. While realizing that no two political cultures are the same and thus no one set of guidelines can be produced to follow for the advancement of political development, hopefully the analysis in

¹The Middle East as spoken of in this paper includes the countries stretching from Iraq westward to Morocco, i.e., the Arab countries of Southwest Asia, Egypt, Libya, Israel, and the Maghreb countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

this paper will at least illuminate some of the characteristics, whether positive or negative, that political parties can have in the process of political development.

Within the Middle Eastern countries can be found many divisive societal factors which are related directly to politics. These factors include strong tradition, an unbalanced ratio of urban-rural population, class, varying ethnic background, and strong sectional tendencies. With such vast differences stemming from these factors, the countries of the Middle East are in the precarious position of having internal upheavals occur all too frequently. One of the basic reasons for choosing Syria and Tunisia in this study is that Syria exemplifies most of the factors above, while Tunisia either has not been confronted as strongly by these factors or has been able to overcome many of them and has remained stable over the last decade. Another reason for dealing with these two countries is that both share the general characteristics of Arab countries, practicing the Islamic religion to some degree, having had the same colonial ruler, and having been affected by the Arab nationalist movement, although this latter aspect is more true of Syria than Tunisia.

Party growth and political development in Syria and Tunisia cannot be separated from the rise of nationalism which began around the beginning of the twentieth century in these areas. Consequently, nationalism became a major factor on the political scene. But here one should distinguish between two nationalist movements which

developed in the Middle East. The first embodied the idea of independence for the indigenous populations residing in certain geographic areas. Tunisia gives an excellent example of this type of nationalist movement, especially since its geographic boundaries tended to be natural boundaries--a situation far different from that found in Syria.

The second nationalist movement is a broader movement commonly called Arab Nationalism. Its beginnings are rather nebulous, but during the Second World War the movement was given impetus by the Fertile Crescent Plan of Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq and the Greater Syria Plan advocated by Amir 'Abdallah of Trans-Jordan. The Arab nationalist movement has been and is at least part of the basis of several parties in Syria, while the movement's effects have not been so far-reaching in Tunisia. Though the leadership of this movement is now split between President Nasir of Egypt and the ruling Ba'th party of Syria, it perhaps remains the strongest force in the politics of Syria.

Syria achieved independence in 1941, although its position in regards to France remained unsettled until 1946. Tunisia was granted independence by the French in 1956 after gaining autonomy in 1955. The problems both countries encountered before independence are well reflected in their actions since independence, although the problems were of different types and consequently had dissimilar effects for political development.

The following section sets up a framework of analysis. After this, there will be sections dealing with Syria and Tunisia respectively, followed by some concluding remarks.

Political Parties and Political Development

Political Parties: A Definition

Political parties, since the beginnings of their modern existence some two hundred years ago, have been defined in a continuing proliferation of terms and concepts. Some of these definitions stress what appears to be akin to the structural aspects of parties, while others tend to be more concerned with the functional aspects related to parties. Joseph La Palombara gives a definition of parties which combines the structural and functional aspects to a certain degree, although the stronger emphasis is on functions, when he refers to a political party as an organization that is articulated somewhat locally, that interacts with and seeks electoral support of the general public, that plays a role in political recruitment, and that is committed to the capture or maintenance of power, either alone or in coalition.² In contrast to this definition, others will define a political party as anything which labels itself as such. These two widely separated definitions should point to the fact that anyone dealing with political parties must reach some consensus on the definition of a political party. Therefore, the minimum components required for an organization to be classified as a political party will be developed in the following several pages.

Organization is the required condition for any political party to exist. Without organization, no political party can come into being,

²"Introduction," Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph La Palombara and Mark Wessner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 27.

and once a party loses organization it fails to act both functionally and structurally--though ideas may be carried on. This necessity for organization stems from a strong need in the human environment for the unorganized group to develop organization to become effective in society. However, as Kenneth Boulding points out, where there has been no previous consciousness of group solidarity (the group being the unorganized subpopulation of persons that exists as a social fact because of its presence in the image of the persons concerned as a significant classification of the total population) it is possible for the organization itself to create the group or groups that it expresses and embodies.³

Within organizations are found both solidarity and cooperation. Cooperation is related to organizations through the integration of diversified perspectives. Harold Lasswell observes that when operations are the primary aspects of organizations, coordination becomes purely mechanical. But when a closer relationship exists between cooperation and solidarity, cooperation becomes "doing" together, while solidarity becomes "thinking" and "feeling" together.⁴

For an organization such as a political party to exhibit solidarity, the members of the organization must take into account the perspectives of others, identify with the others, and be interested in

³Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1963), p. 145.

⁴Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 30.

other people's interests.⁵ No doubt within disparate types of political parties solidarity will fluctuate to varying degrees. In strongly ideological parties compatibility appears to become the major means of solidarity, with facilitation playing a secondary and minor role. Giovanni Sartori supports this idea when speaking of Communist organizations, "Marxist ideology is in itself a formidable communication stopper, . . . a stable Communist orientation is closely related to the ability of the party's organizational network to produce a culturally manipulated isolation of given social groups in given areas."⁶ Sartori continues when speaking of a fragmented party system, "Since most parties have no prospect of winning a majority, each party--except eventually the leading party--is more interested in securing for itself a stable electorate of ideologically safe believers, than tempted to run the risk of becoming an open party of the non-ideological variety."⁷ In the case of a pragmatic party, the opposite may be true, i.e., facilitation among groups becomes the overriding aspect of solidarity.

Up to this point a party is an organization in which varying degrees of solidarity and cooperation are found. To this concept one further aspect must be added which distinguishes political parties from other organizations. Political parties must in some sense be

⁵Ibid., p. 31.

⁶Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," Political Parties and Political Development, ed. La Palombara and Weiner, p. 145.

⁷Ibid., p. 159.

connected with and involved in the electoral process. In other words, there must be a desire on the part of the organization to seek supporters at the polls and in the election process, or at least strive in some manner for popular support. Seymour Martin Lipset has broadened this latter aspect of political parties to include the idea of taking part in public affairs.⁸

Synthesizing the above brings about this minimal definition of a political party: 1) a political party is an organization where some degree of solidarity and cooperation is found, and, 2) where there is a conscious effort on the part of the organization to gain electoral and/or popular support. Though this definition is not astrict, it is one which can be utilized effectively in party analysis. With this definition in hand, attention is now turned to the relationship of political parties to political development.

Political Development

What is political development? Though many definitions can be found dealing with political development, the discussion presented by Lucian Pye in Political Culture and Political Development⁹ will form the basis of political development as used in this paper. He establishes three important components in the process of political development:

⁸Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," in Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, ed. Roy C. Macridis (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 68.

⁹"Introduction," Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 13-17.

1) the organization of the political system is characterized by greater structural differentiation and functional specificity and better integration of all the participating organizations and groups, 2) systemic performance is marked by a greater capacity to cope with demands, control conflict, and manage public affairs, and, 3) the population as a whole is changing from a subject to a contributing status marked by greater participation, equality, and acceptance of universal laws.

Classification and Operational Aspects

In political development, parties can be viewed from two alternative perspectives. From one view parties can be seen as the outgrowth of the development process, i.e. the culmination of processes of social, economic, and political change. Parties here are seen as the result of other developments. Parties, in the second outlook, can be observed as independent variables affecting political development itself. Thus the kind of parties which have materialized may to a large degree affect the capacity of the entire system to come to grips with the crises of integration, participation, or distribution.¹⁰ The above two points are hard to separate in reality, though it may be said that the first point appears to be closely connected with socio-economic factors such as literacy, industrialization, and urbanization.

Political parties emerge in political systems when those who seek, win, or maintain political power are required to gain larger public support. This can come about in two ways. First, if citizens

¹⁰La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 41.

change their attitude toward authority, individuals may believe they have the right to influence the exercise of power. Second, if the dominant or aspiring elite seek to win public support so as to gain or maintain power, a non-participant population may be brought into politics.¹¹ Both of these points can be used to further political development. But both points also can be used so as to be detrimental to political development.

These two ideas are tied to the political socialization performed by political parties. Corresponding to the first point is the idea of initiating significant change in the existing political patterns. The second point can reinforce the existing political culture, providing continuity but enhancing participation. But many of the parties appearing in nations with strong traditional and ethnic subcultures appear, however, to be reinforcing divisive particularism.¹² It is hard for the Middle East to escape this tendency because of its strong traditional and ethnic subcultures.

Political parties can be classified in many different ways. Helpful in developmental analysis is the idea of mobilist and adaptive parties. Although there is a difference between the two, it is not as distinct as one might like. Generally, a mobilist party is interested in effecting behavioral and attitudinal change within society, while adaptive parties focus their attention on adapting to public attitudes

¹¹Ibid., p. 19.

¹²Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 121.

in the hope of gaining support. Although mobilist parties also seek to gain support and adaptive parties try to influence public opinion, the two groups appear to approach the center from basically opposite ends. The mobilist party is more ideologically-oriented while the adaptive parties have a more pragmatic approach.

Which position a party takes has tremendous influence upon political development. The mobilist position tends to push the system one way or another. At times it pushes too hard overloading the system beyond its capacity. Consequently, this brings about instability and impedes development.

Aside from the mobilist and adaptive classification of parties, another worthwhile distinction can be made between competitive and non-competitive parties. Immediately, it should be seen that competitive and non-competitive parties relate directly to the system in which they operate. Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara point out that competitive-party systems appear to materialize naturally and logically in societies where the pressure to create party organizations initially was felt in the legislature.¹³ This seems to be a basic Western tenet, but is it applicable to a newly emerging nation? If the foundation, i.e., the essence with the legislative structure, has not been laid in these countries, it appears impossible for parties to develop internally.

¹³La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 27.

The two scholars mentioned above view externally created parties as a major threat to the continuation and development of a competitive system for several reasons. First, externally created mass parties sometimes develop a total ideology for society that often excludes a willingness to tolerate opposition. Second, the development of externally created mass parties tends toward a radicalization and intensification of the competitive process itself. Third, the fact that these parties are created outside the context of legislative institutions tends to make their identification with these institutions weak.¹⁴

From the foregoing, two important points can be made for parties and political development. The first is that internally created parties enhance stability and development, but undoubtedly much of the development must already have taken place within these systems. Secondly, externally created parties in general lead to instability and cause a problem for development. But here a paradox arises. If a country lacks either the essence and/or the structure, from where are political parties supposed to come? If parties cannot be internally developed, there are only two alternatives open for the system. Either external party development takes place or party development must be manipulated by the ruling elite of the system. Since most newly-emergent, developing nations do not contain both the structure and essence required for internal party development, evidently these new nations are placed in a serious predicament not easily overcome. Thus the choices open to

¹⁴Ibid., p. 27.

them are largely external party development or government manipulation and control.

Government control and manipulation of parties often leads to total party repression on the part of the ruling elite. Though this may tend to stabilize society and help in economic growth, this action does little to help build political participation, aggregation, articulation, or socialization. Parties that are totally repressed become clandestine and conspiratorial in character. If they survive, these parties affect long-range political development even if they are allowed to re-emerge from the shadows of illegality. It is "assumed therefore that in almost all places where parties are totally suppressed the ruling military and/or bureaucratic oligarchies have created conditions of great potential political instability."¹⁵ Exceptions to this assumption exist, e.g. Bourguiba's Tunisia, but in most cases it has been an accurate observation.

Party repression by the government is usually the result of three factors. The first involves the dominant elite and their system of values when the party system materializes. If the dominant elite view additional participation as a threat to their existence, one can expect to find a heavy incidence of resistance to additional participation. A second related factor depends upon the hierarchical system of values of the society. Thus the emphasis upon a representative

¹⁵ Ibid., p.21.

system depends upon its place in the hierarchical system of values. The third factor is psychological. Those that have power under a party system find it difficult to share with new claimants the political powers they themselves had to wrestle from the pre-existing system.¹⁶

This discussion leads to the non-competitive party or one-party system. Some of the factors discussed above encourage one-party systems, but a more thorough discussion is in order. Perhaps one of the biggest factors encouraging one-party patterns stems from nationalist movements and colonial relations, where often a serious crisis of participation developed. Where nationalist groups were repressed and forced to become clandestine, the art of responsible leadership and political compromise lagged. Thus, once independence was achieved, these groups were likely to show strong identification with the newly formed state. This led to viewing the opposition as illegitimate, with different groups becoming uncompromising and monolithic in their orientation.¹⁷

The first generation of post-colonial, ruling elite in any developing nation has problems hard to overcome, one of which is the participatory demands of the younger intellectuals long before the ruling elite have had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalize

¹⁶Ibid., p. 401.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 31.

party government.¹⁸ To meet this threat, a rigid one-party solution often becomes the best available answer.

Different types of one-party rule can be discerned within the framework of non-competitive systems. One-party authoritarian rule usually is ideologically-oriented but not completely totalitarian in outlook. These parties typically label the opposition as traitors to nationalist or revolutionary causes and as threats to security.

A step removed from the one-party authoritarian type is the totalitarian one-party found in non-competitive systems. Here the state itself becomes an instrument of a monolithic party. The party has an ideological goal for reconstructing the system which it tries to achieve through the total monopoly of power. Where this type of party develops and is found, it is unlikely that a pluralistic competitive-party system can emerge short of a major upheaval such as war or revolution.¹⁹

A third type of party in a non-competitive system, and perhaps the one which offers the most hope for developing nations, is the pluralistic one-party type. Others would prefer the term mass party to this type because, of the three types mentioned, this is the only one truly capable of gathering a mass basis and following. These parties tend to be pragmatic in outlook, pluralistic in organization, and absorptive in relationships to other groups.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., p. 402.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 40

²⁰Ibid., pp. 38-39.

The lack of a strong ideology and greater support separates one-party pluralistic types from the other two types of parties in non-competitive systems. The lack of a strong commitment to ideology helps keep this type of party from becoming authoritarian or totalitarian. With the acceptance of a strong ideology these parties can quickly degenerate into either of the first two types.

The one-party pluralistic situation suggests a beneficial approach for dealing with the persistence of traditional values and the problems traditional elites cause in many newly-emergent development nations. As Professor Rupert Emerson suggests, the single, mass political parties, more than formal governmental or purely social organizations which often seem to be the prime mediators between the elites and masses, provide the best hope for building the newest nations.²¹

Functional Aspects

It should be seen from the definition of political development given earlier that for the development process to be successful, change in both structures and functions are necessary. Starting from the axiom that all political systems have structures, and all structures are multi-functional, it would be a safe deduction that all parties as structures have varying kinds of functions which they perform. But here

²¹Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., Problems of the Developing Nations (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), p. 127.

a warning is necessary. First, all parties do not necessarily strive to carry on the same functions, i.e., some parties may believe their role is limited to certain functions, while others may take a narrower or wider view of functional perspectives. Secondly, the type of party or parties found within a political system affects functional action, e.g., a totalitarian party in a system where there is only one party would be less concerned with the participation function than would a pluralistic party in the same system. Third, the type of political, social, and economic system within which parties operate have varying affects on the functional aspects that parties may participate in and perform. With the above in mind, attention will now be focused on functions that political parties may be involved in political development.²²

All political systems have some way of articulating interests and demands for action, though the means of articulation may vary greatly. It is through interest articulation's structure and style that the pattern of boundary maintenance between the polity and society is established, and within the political system articulation affects the boundaries between various parts of the political system--parties,

²²The following discussion is based largely on the functional aspects set forth by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman in Politics of the Developing Nations (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960); the functional framework established by Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner in their edited work Political Parties and Political Development; as well as the functional approach set forth in Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell.

legislatures, bureaucracies, and courts. In a more developed nation the high degree of associational interest articulation is a possible indicator of good boundary maintenance between society and polity, and may contribute to such maintenance within the subsystems of the political system.²³

The party system is linked to interest articulation by standing between interest groups and authoritative governmental agencies. Being in this position, the political party is able to aggregate interests. Performing the aggregative function effectively enables a party to transform diversified interests into a smaller number of alternative general policies for the cabinet, legislature, or ruler to act upon. If the process from interest articulation to aggregation in political parties to legislative consideration is effective, there is strong assurance that the governmental bureaucracy will function as a neutral instrument of the political agencies. Thus, where there is an effective, aggregative party system operating, the role that the bureaucracy can exert in policy-making is limited. If the party system is weak in the function of aggregation, this function and its consequences must pass to another structure such as the bureaucracy.

In any nation the significance of institutional and anomie interest groups is related to the absence of an effectively aggregative

²³Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

party system, the uneven effectiveness of associational interest groups, and a fragmented political culture. Where institutional and anomic interest groups are the norm in a nation; "the result is a legislature penetrated by relatively narrow interests and uncompromising ideological tendencies, a legislature which can be used . . . for the protection of special interest, but not for the effective and timely formulation and support of large policies. And without a strong legislature, special interest and ideological tendencies penetrate the bureaucracy, and undermine its neutral, instrumental character."²⁴

From the above, two important points should be noted. First, the role the bureaucracy plays in political development varies to a large extent with the effectiveness in which political parties carry out the aggregation function. Secondly, the question is raised as to whether there can be an effective party system without working associational interest groups.

The aggregative function as distinguished from the articulation function finds few formal boundaries. But it is the party system that is the distinctively modern structure of political aggregation. Thus the aggregation function can be used as one measure of political development.

²⁴Gabriel A. Almond, Rapporteur, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process," American Political Science Review, Vol. LII, No. 1, March 1958, p. 275.

Turning to party systems, it can be said that some party systems aggregate interests much more effectively than others. Almond and Coleman classify party systems under four headings: 1) authoritarian, 2) dominant non-authoritarian, 3) competitive party systems, and 4) competitive multi-party systems.²⁵ By looking at each of these systems and the parties which operate within the systems, one gets an indication of the role these parties have in the aggregation function.

The first type of system, i.e., authoritarian, can itself be split into two different classifications; those where totalitarian parties are found and those where authoritarian parties are found. Where totalitarian parties exist, open interest articulation is possible only at the lowest levels, while interest articulation and aggregation are latent, or at best covert, above these levels. It is through the penetration of the social structure and by transmission of demands and claims solely through the party structure that totalitarian parties aggregate interests.

Where authoritarian parties are found there is less penetration of the party into the social structure than under totalitarian parties and some overt articulation by interest groups is permitted. "The absence of a free party system and an open electoral process usually reduces the aggregative function to the formulation of policy

²⁵Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 40. For a contrasting classification of party systems see Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, ed. Roy C. Macridakis, p. 22.

alternatives within the authoritarian party and authoritative governmental structures."²⁶ In general, the people under an authoritarian party system are given no chance to move from the subject to participant role, partially as a result of not being able to aggregate interest or demands to affect the input process.

The dominant non-authoritarian party systems have usually developed where nationalist movements achieved independence and where the nationalist party continues as the dominant party. Because of the status of the party, there is little chance of a coherent loyal opposition forming. Thus the nationalist party is challenged by a complex problem of interest aggregation, since the nationalist movements usually include dissimilar groups. In this type of system the political elites have the paramount role to play. If the political elites are not committed to a process of political modernization, the dominant non-authoritarian party may turn into an authoritarian party of the type above. But if political modernization is the goal, the elites may introduce functionally specific associational interest groups and perform the political socialization function in such a way as to modernize the political culture.²⁷

Since the competitive two party system will not be found in the countries included in this study, it suffices to say that boundary

²⁶Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

maintenance between society and polity and among the articulative, aggregative, and other conversion functions is good. This stems partly from the fact that the parties are responsible to a broad electorate and are forced toward aggregative policies. Where a major purpose is the election of partisan candidates, the two parties have a strong incentive toward aggregating at least the most prevalent patterns of demands.²⁸

Competitive multi-party systems contain two classifications: 1) the "working" multi-party systems, and, 2) the "immobilist" multi-party systems. In the former system the interest aggregation function and general policy formulation occur at both the party and parliamentary levels in a fairly homogeneous culture.²⁹ Giovanni Sartori would label this party system as "moderate pluralism" in contrast to "extreme pluralism" which is characteristic of the "immobilist" multi-party systems. Sartori makes the observation that where moderate pluralism is found, there is a definite likeness to the pluralism as found in a two party system. Both systems are bipolar and centripetal, i.e., they tend to converge inward or toward the center. The only difference Sartori finds between these two types of party systems is the complete lack of "polarity" in the

²⁸Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

²⁹Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

simple two party system, while there is a small amount of "polarity" found where moderate pluralism is found.³⁰

In "immobilist" multi-party systems a fragmented, isolative political culture is usually found. As a result, the boundaries between the articulative and aggregative functions are poor. Any aggregation by parties is relatively narrow, and coalitions tend to fail because of cultural differences.³¹ In brief: "When the drive of a political system is centripetal one finds moderate politics, while immoderate or extremist politics reflects the prevalence of centrifugal drives."³²

Turning to integration as a function in political development, two problems emerge. The first can be labeled the "sack-of-potatoes" problem, i.e., the necessity of linking previously autonomous units with each other. This is the problem of changing a fragmented society into a national society, including all of the interdependence, specialization, and division of labor that the latter implies. The second problem is the "homogenization" problem, i.e., "the necessity of creating institutions and a political style which can bridge the gulf between the national elites and all others who at least nominally

³⁰Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," La Palombara and Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139.

³¹Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³²Sartori, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

are members of the same polity."³³ In both of these problems of integration, political parties can play an active and important role.

As further aid in discussing the integration function, the problems involved, and the role that political parties may perform concerning this function, integration will be divided into three variants: socialization, mobilization, and participation.

Political socialization is the process whereby political attitudes and values are inculcated as children become adults and as adults fill roles. Socialization is a continuing process throughout life and becomes the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed.³⁴ Mobilization is the extreme variant of socialization. Here the party attempts to rapidly bring large numbers of people into the political system, to inculcate interest and to secure mass support. Participation can be placed somewhere behind mobilization and in close conjunction with socialization. "It means" states Roy Macridis, "that through the party in all systems a medium of expression of interest and participation in deliberation and choice of policies and leaders is open to all. A degree of prior socialization and mobilization is a precondition for participation."³⁵

Political parties' effects upon the political socialization process depends in large measure upon the type of system. In competitive

³³Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), p. 127.

³⁴Almond and Powell, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

³⁵Macridis, op. cit., p. 18.

and multi-party systems, the socialization process can be viewed as reaching its apex with participation in the adaptive political party and consequently participation in the political system itself. Thus the party is not the main socializer (found rather in the family, school, and work), but the party is the basic link between the people and governmental elites. Thus an advantage of this type of system in the socialization process is that those who are able to participate in decisions (or at least believe they do) will thereby be more satisfied with the decisions. Consequently, people become greater attached to these systems than are people who cannot participate in their systems.³⁶

Also within the competitive and multi-party systems (where moderate pluralism exists), the "sack-of-potatoes" problem spoken of above is likely to already have been largely overcome--though at times multi-party systems (extreme pluralism) perpetuate this problem. "In highly developed systems where there exist widely read newspapers, effective education systems, and well established adult political attitudes, parties play a relatively minor role in inculcating feelings of being a national or being a citizen."³⁷ Thus, political parties are able to concentrate on the problem of "homogenization,"

³⁶Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 194.

³⁷La Palombara and Weiner, op. cit., p. 426.

i.e., the parties can work to close the gap between government elites and others of the polity through the aggregative function.

But even where the "sack-of-potatoes" problem has not been overcome, there is some evidence to suggest that adaptive parties, electorally oriented, can play an important role in affecting behavioral and attitudinal changes. As Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara point out, "In its efforts to win electoral support from conflicting ethnic and class groups the adaptive party may have greater success in achieving national integration than a party which relies more heavily on coercion and exhortation."³⁸ Thus it appears possible that mobilist parties may not be the only road to integration.

A very different picture appears where the system is authoritarian. Here the socialization process is quite different where mobilist and/or totalitarian parties exist. In this situation the party seeks to penetrate all levels of the social structure and inculcate its own norms within society. In order to do this, the schools and vocational habitations become prime instruments for the political party.

Where a fragmented culture exists, the means available to the party place it in the strong position to break down fragmentation and strengthen national integration. But in the process, one-party authoritarian systems often facilitate the emergence of oligarchical systems concerned with political survival and national aggrandizement

³⁸Ibid., p. 426.

rather than social welfare or democratic political values. Thus concern in overcoming the "homogenization" problem may be lacking. Perhaps long-run socialization in authoritarian systems depends upon the effectiveness of the single party in developing a sense of popular support even while effective political participation is absent.³⁹

Parties within the dominant non-authoritarian system take the form of pluralist or authoritarian parties. Where authoritarian parties are found, the socializing toward integration and development is apt to be weak, since these parties lack the planned control characteristics of totalitarian parties and the advantages of innovation and experimentation made possible by pluralistic systems. The result of authoritarian party rule in the long run means stagnation and socialization toward a status quo position rather than development. If there should be a drive started toward development the authoritarian party will almost have to move in the competitive-pluralist or totalitarian direction.⁴⁰ In other words, development as embodied in the functions of integration and socialization is not a strong point of authoritarian parties.

Where the pluralist party is found, there is concern for the political socialization and development of the society. But the concern is not so strong as to be ruthless. The pluralist party, with

³⁹Ibid., p. 426.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 38.

its pragmatic outlook and absorptive character, is far less concerned over the persistence of traditional elites and structures within the society than the totalitarian party. The socialization process followed by the pluralist party is undoubtedly slow but has the advantage of possibly giving years of needed stability to the system. Furthermore, the pluralist party can be an effective means of attacking the "homogenization" problem and "sack-of-potatoes" problem at the same time--two problems which most developing nations face.

As stated earlier, the mobilization function is used to inculcate interest and secure mass support. When used by a party, mobilization is concerned with people accepting party ideology and expounding it, as well as securing mass support for the party, system, or both. Where multi-party or competitive systems are found, chances are that ideology is rather unimportant. Also, support for the system is likely to be taught in the family and school. Consequently, adaptive and competitive parties become most concerned with securing party support for elections. In other words, these parties, operating in a democratic system, have no real cause to be involved with the mobilization function except for support.

Sometimes within the multi-party system can be found parties acting within the legitimate system, but still advocating a system change, e.g., the Communist Party in Israel. It may be necessary where a mobilist party is operating in a multi-party system to use the

legal system to exclude those who might possibly destroy it.⁴¹ For developing countries where the system is attempting to gain mass support, this point may become a necessity if the system is to continue. This action may also become a necessity in the dominant non-authoritarian system.

In an authoritarian system where totalitarian and authoritarian parties are found, the mobilization function is frequently resorted to. Often an external threat (real or not) is used by the party to gain support from the masses. Where mobilization is the emphasis for greater integration, the party is more repressive. "The party, through the government or directly, imposes sanctions upon members and non-members alike, controls the fate of all other associations and parties, and endeavors to exact obedience and to fashion the minds and loyalties of the adherents in a manner that not only does not allow for opposition but penalizes opposition and the dissent."⁴² Thus it appears that parties attempting to mobilize and integrate will have repressive phases connected with them.

Turning to the dominant non-authoritarian system where pluralist parties are found, the mobilist function plays a lesser role than is found in the authoritarian systems. Instead of being repressive, they are rather persuasive. Thus what mobilization takes place is geared

⁴¹Lipsot, op. cit., p. 71.

⁴²Macridis, op. cit., p. 18.

to development and the presentation of policy in order to gain as widespread support as possible. But a pluralist party is often hard pressed when support of the system is urgently needed and new interests are required for development. Although the pluralist political party may appear to have a great potential for mobilization and integration, it is a difficult task to translate the potential into reality.

Roy Macridis, speaking of mobilization and integration, gives a statement that should be testable in our later analysis when he states, ". . .one might state that the greater the emphasis upon mobilization, the less open and democratic the system; the greater the emphasis upon integration, the more repressive the party and the greater the likelihood of a one-party system."⁴³

A characteristic feature of political development is an increased demand for political participation. This demand is generally linked with increased urbanization, the growth of mass communications, and the spread of literacy. The political party becomes a major determinant in how the participation function is to be exercised as well as a means of its pursuit. In developing nations where there is increasing desire for participation, party government response moves between repression and accommodation of participation. Some party systems believe repression employed early will reduce the need for such later. Other systems only turn repressive with the growth of

⁴³ Ibid., p. 18.

violence or threat of new groups. Four over-all patterns of response to participation by party systems can be discerned: 1) repression, 2) mobilization, 3) limited admission, and, 4) full admission.⁴⁴

Repression is found dominantly in authoritarian party systems, i.e., where totalitarian and authoritarian parties are found. Where the ruling party elites adhere to a strong ideology, whether social, religious, or economic, and if increased participation in the political system is viewed as a threat to the elites and their value system, heavy resistance to additional participation will likely be found.

Another factor in repression stems from the notion that new elites operating under a party system find it difficult to share with others the political powers they themselves had to struggle for. This factor ". . . must now include the reactions to participatory demands by Western-educated elites in Asia and Africa who are manifestly not prepared to act on the very premises that presumably governed their own thrusts against colonial or other indigenous political powers."⁴⁵

In developing nations operating under party systems, strong participatory demands confront the elites before institutionalized party government can settle itself. Where the system is not already authoritarian, the new drives for participation may lead in this direction. Thus the probability of repression is much higher where the demands for participation are not spread over a length of time.

⁴⁴La Palembang and Weiner, op. cit., p. 401.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 402.

Not all one-party systems handle participatory demands through repression. Often under dominant non-authoritarian systems and where mobilist and/or pluralist parties are found, participation is encouraged--but under carefully controlled and prescribed limits. In other words, the guise of participation is wanted without giving up control of power. This often is attempted by developing a subjective sense of participation while at the same time preventing the populace from affecting public policy, administration, or the selection of those who will in fact govern.⁴⁶ No doubt the movement from a dominant non-authoritarian system to a competitive party system will hinge considerably upon trying to move beyond the subjective sense of participation.

In some nations parties are allowed to organize after a period of repression by the government. Where limited admission is prolonged, the consequence is usually alienated parties. "Forged during an era of political repression, the alienated class, ethnic-or regional-based party develops its own myths and legends. It thus alienates its members from the society at large and may institutionalize such alienation."⁴⁷ With alienation, the chances of integration and participation are decreased, as is stability.

In contrast to limited admission into the system is found full admission into the system. This action is possible in competitive,

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 403.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 405.

multi-party, and dominant non-authoritarian party systems. In the former two systems, participation can come about through existing parties or by the formation of new parties. In the latter system, participation in the dominant party may be increased though participation can only go so far in this form, or, participation may be enhanced by the formation of a new party or parties in the system. However participation is increased, it is conditioned by whether the governing party is an ideological or an electoral instrument since new participation demands are more easily handled by electorally oriented rather than ideologically oriented political parties.⁴⁸

In closing our discussion on participation, perhaps a statement by Myron Weiner and Joseph La Palombara concerning the causes for a fragmented party system is appropriate. They state, "If the impetus to participate comes from a social class, such as the industrial workers or agricultural peasants, and it is opposed or repressed, we can expect class-based parties to emerge; if the demand of participation is geographically based, or reflects a desire for previously denied participation on the part of a religious or ethnic minority, the failure to gradually absorb leaders of such groups into the prevailing system will almost certainly give rise to political parties that reflect these narrow impulses to organization."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 405-406.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 406.

With the above framework of parties and functions, Syria and Tunisia will be studied in an attempt to relate the parties in these two newly-independent nations to the functions of aggregation and integration found in the political development process.

Syria

Party development in Syria has all too often followed lines that enforced the already existing fragmentation of the Syrian political culture. Only the Ba'th has been able largely to overcome this basic deficiency in Syrian politics. From independence until 1958, parties, somewhat excluding the Ba'th, tended to extremes of adaptiveness or mobilism, with none having particularly successful luck. The trend toward enforcing cultural differences made most Syrian parties work for political integration only on their own terms.

The first recognized political parties in Syria after independence, i.e., the National and People's parties, both followed the adaptive position in their approach to politics. When independence was achieved, the National Bloc lost its unifying factor with cultural differences playing a large role in the break-up of the party. Both National and People's parties emerged from the Bloc and became geographically differentiated. Neither of these parties had an active program, though the People's Party made a greater attempt at such a move. Thus neither party seemed interested in attempting to integrate the existing political culture. Instead, they tried to profit from the fragmentation.

Because of the geographic ~~proximity~~ and the close attachment to the leaders, little participation of the masses came about in these two parties; rather they worked for maintaining the old order. Both were pragmatic in their approach, following the course they thought suited them best. Perhaps this can be seen plainly in the 1947 election when the National Party thought it beneficial to keep the old electoral law, while the People's Party sided with the Ba'ath in wanting to extend the franchise. It can be seen again in the musical chairs game they played with Arab nationalism. With opportunism of this sort forming the basis for action, little integration, socialization, and participation could be expected to develop for the entire system.

Perhaps both the National and People's parties' attitudes toward fostering a feeling of legitimacy in the public was affected by the non-competitive environment from which they stemmed. When either party was in power, there was little use for the opposition. The failure of Syria and the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war worked to make more of the public to seek the right to influence the political system. By the time the National and People's parties learned they would have to instill a feeling of legitimacy for their rule, several military coups became the source of legitimacy.⁵⁰ Thus both these

⁵⁰Patrick Seale brings these points out in varying sections of his work, The Struggle for Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). See especially pp. 28-31, pp. 77-79.

parties failed to instill the feeling of legitimacy required for the parliamentary system to operate effectively.

With little feeling of legitimacy working for either, especially after Shishakli's coup, the National and People's parties showed they could not cope with the conflicts that they encountered. They failed to even attempt a half-hearted try at integration, while holding political participation to a minimum. Thus much blame must go to these two parties for the instability of the Syrian political system. The short-sightedness of their leaders, the failure to achieve effective compromises, their lack of regard for the masses, and the failure to establish a plan and base for action all helped to make these two parties a failure in the picture of Syrian political development.⁵¹ They failed in establishing new patterns of integration regulating and containing the tensions and conflicts produced by cultural differentiation, in addition to refusing to recognize any equality or participation on the part of the masses.

The Muslim Brotherhood finds its place in the Syrian political scene as a result of the support it receives from fervent Muslims. Against a secular state, the Brotherhood has become more militant in its actions over the years. Although hardly ever an official party, it set up the Islamic Socialist Front in 1949 to espouse its views.

⁵¹For greater detail concerning this point see Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1957), Ch. 2-3.

With the switch of Akram al-Hawrani from the Front to the Ba'ith in the early 1950's, the Front lost influence. But by acting on the religious sentiments of the conservative Islamic elements in the Syrian society, the Brotherhood remained aloof from the more progressive elements of society, further strengthening fragmentation.⁵²

The Brotherhood appears to be interested in integrating society but on an Islamic order. To the more secular, this idea is unfavorable. Brotherhood suppression throughout the years and the clandestine characteristics it has had to adopt, plus its conservative character, makes suspect the role it might play in political development.

Also the Brotherhood is an externally created party which makes one question whether it can ever enter the political process with any real identification to the legislative institutions of this process. With its present repression the answer can only take on a negative aspect.

After Shishakli's takeover and the banning of all parties, Shishakli established the Arab Liberation Movement. This was hoped to become a mass party to strengthen the rule of Shishakli. Its ideology was a hybrid of Arab nationalism and progressive social economic reforms. But its monolithic structure gave no chance for

⁵²Seale, *op. cit.*, p. 180. For more information on the Islamic Socialist Front see Chapters 9, 10, 11.

grass-roots in voluntary association, though there was enthusiasm for the party at first. Dissolved in 1954 but reformed in 1956, it never became an adequate substitute for the political parties to which the Syrian electorate had grown accustomed.⁵³

With the union of Syria and Egypt, the Syrian Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was formed in Syria. It has repeatedly called for a rapprochement between Syria and Egypt, becoming a bitter foe of the ruling Ba'th. Because of Nasir's popularity it has gained a following in Syria although its size is unknown. What effects it has had on political development is small, as it has been underground throughout its existence except for the time of union. If anything, it has been an unstabilizing factor as it has repeatedly called for a Ba'thist overthrow. Reporting on a statement by the ASU against the Ba'th, the April 18, 1966 issue of the Arab World stated, "The Syrian Arab Socialist Union issued a statement yesterday again calling for elimination of the Ba'thist regime as a means for fulfillment of unity between Syria and UAR . . . It said that the Syrians should not rally around the new Ba'thist leaders, but rather should rally against them."⁵⁴ With such expressions as these, the Syrian Arab Socialist Union provides little help for political development at the present time.

⁵³Ibid., p. 125.

⁵⁴Arab World (April 18, 1966), p. 4.

We now turn to the Syrian Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Syrian Ba'ith Party, and the Syrian Communist Party. All three of these parties have had or have an ideology and plan of action hoping to effect behavioral and attitudinal change within society.

The following discussion on the SSNP points out an extremely important aspect for parties and political development in developing nations. This revolves around the idea that no party can expect to be a mass supported party if it is not willing to play down some aspects of its mobilist role for adaptive measures.

The SSNP had an ideology of mass action, but one which found itself too far from the mainstream of thought of the Syrian people to take effective hold. The party derived its inspiration from the genius of the Syrian Nation and its cultural-political-national history at a time when the broader Arab nationalist outlook was becoming popular in Syria. Thus instead of adopting an idea that was becoming popular, the SSNP accepted the Syrian national ideology of Antun Sa'ada. The party kept this ideology, with its seemingly anti-Islamic anti-Arab guise, making any attempt at integration of the political culture impossible for them. The strictness of its ideology, a concept often associated with externally created parties, made any attempt at compromise or toleration formidable for the SSNP.

The internal makeup of the SSNP created a situation which discouraged both participation and socialization into the political system. The party was vertically structured with authority concentrated

in the party leader and his appointed lieutenants. Thus a leader like Sa'ada was both lawgiver and legislator for the party.⁵⁵ The only participation for the common member was that given by the party leader which usually meant showing support when it was called for. Socialization was limited to what the party deemed relevant for the members. The party's total rejection of the traditional cultural values and its commitment to Western norms of bureaucratic organization helped spell its doom.⁵⁶

Other political parties linked SSNP nationalism with Western efforts to weaken the Arab nationalist movement. This, along with the party's social philosophy, placed the finishing touches on isolating the SSNP from the masses. Thus immediately after independence, the SSNP hindered integration at a time when political integration was so important for Syria's future.

The above is well summarized by Labib Yamak when he states, "The defeat of the SSNP can be interpreted as having resulted directly from its failure to build grass-roots support for its doctrine and general policies. By the end of 1954 it was quite alienated from the people and from the mainstream of political thinking in Syria which by then had decidedly turned to the left."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Labib Zawiyyo Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 121.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 139.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

The Syrian Communist Party is the oldest ideological party in Syria. Throughout its history it has tried to effect behavioral change in Syrian society. But unlike the SSNP, the Syrian Communist Party has used adaptive measures to try and increase its popular support.

With the early failure of gaining proletarian support, the party under Bakdash turned to the bourgeoisie for support. This move has several implications for political development. By turning to the bourgeoisie the party shied away from the lower working classes it supposedly stood for. Thus many of those needing the participation and integration for political development were excluded. Possibly the Communists cannot take the brunt of the blame for this action, as Syrian workers were little attracted to the Communist Party on account of several factors. Where there was only a small urban proletarian class, where agrarian unrest was small because of strong traditions and family loyalties, and where religion remained a social force there was little appeal to communism.⁵⁸ That the communists failed to integrate these sections of the society shows perhaps the biggest hurdle the party has been unable to overcome.

The Syrian Communist Party's appeal for Syrians is not based on classical Marxist doctrine. Rather it has shown its adaptive side by using the accumulated resentment of the West to be its first line

⁵⁸Michael W. Suleiman, "The Lebanese Communist Party," Middle Eastern Studies, III (January, 1967), p. 146.

of solicitation. In Syria this aspect takes on added meaning because of Israel's close connections with the West.⁵⁹ Here perhaps more than any other approach the Communists had an appeal that could engender mass support. But this suit was largely undermined by the Ba'ath and other Communist actions.

The Soviet role in favor of a Jewish state in Palestine caused the near extinction of the Syrian Communist Party. Few people, except those highly ideologically oriented, were willing to follow and support their ideas. The suppression of the party in this period made it turn to militant tactics. Any idea of fostering legitimacy was lost, adding further instability to the already unstable system. Because of its tight organization, the party had a capacity to disrupt internal affairs far beyond its numbers.⁶⁰

Thus till 1958 the Communist Party played a small role in building political participation and integration. Its members were socialized, but in ways detrimental to political development. Its marching and rioting in the streets surely must be viewed as a disruptive force. Party repression led to a militant view toward conflict management. But the Communist Party of Syria has an immensely strong point that many other Syrian parties failed to have, the art of compromise and collaboration. The Syrian Communists became very

⁵⁹Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 419.

⁶⁰Torrey, op. cit., p. 262.

adept at this art to improve their own position. In the 1954 parliamentary elections, Khalid Bakdash even collaborated with Syria's 'Red Millionaire' Khalid al-Azem.⁶¹ But communist friendship always seemed short-lived.

With the union of Syria and Egypt in 1958, the Communists were caught in the dilemma of being forced to attend their own funeral. If they rejected the idea of union they would be alienating themselves from the strongest political force Syria had known. But Nasir's anti-Communist policy could not be called appealing for them. Finally party was placed over union, showing that the party was more important than the strongest integrating factor in Syrian society.

With union the Syrian Communists were repressed and went underground. This action pushed the Communists deeper into the role that we have ascribed to parties that are government repressed. The breakup of the UAR saw the Communists violently attack the ruling Ba'th Party in Syria, showing little respect. In the December 1, 1963 issue of Al-Akhbar, the Syrian Communist Party stated, "Citizens--all nationalists--no matter what their convictions--and even members of the Ba'th Party know from experience that the decisions taken by the Ba'thists at their conferences, and their slogans of Freedom, Unity, and Socialism are meaningless. The decisions and slogans are exploited

⁶¹Ibid., p. 370.

in an attempt to deceive the people and to mask the Party's policy of allegiance to imperialism and antagonism to the people."⁶² Attacks such as this can hardly be a help in establishing political legitimacy or integration.

What the future role of the Syrian Communist Party will be in developing the Syrian political system is uncertain. As long as the Ba'th remains preeminent in Syria the Communists' chances for rule are extremely low.* The lack of Communist appeal to the Syrian people expressed above would warrant a pessimistic view of the Syrian Communists in future political development, even though the Communists have been showing greater support for the Ba'th since the 1966 split within the Ba'th Party and presently have a few members among Syria's ruling hierarchy.

The Syrian Ba'th party is an externally created party, as are almost all parties in Syria. But the Ba'th alone has had the leadership of ideology needed to adapt itself to the Syrian masses. It has been the chief motivating factor behind Arab nationalism and has continually been anti-Western in its outlook. The Ba'th trinity of Unity, Liberty, and Socialism has had great appeal to the Syrian

⁶²Statement by the Syrian Communist Party Concerning the Political Situation in Syria and Iraq," Arab Political Documents: 1963 (Beirut, 1964), p. 489.

*The possibility does exist of Communist infiltration into the inner ranks of the Ba'th. If this should happen, Communist chances for gaining power would undoubtedly increase.

students and intellectuals. But the Ba'th road to power has not been an easy one.

The Ba'th's secular outlook did little at first in helping integrate the more religious elements, allowing them nowhere to turn but to the radical conservative Muslim Brotherhood. In 1954 the 'ulama or religious leaders of Damascus even issued a proclamation supporting the demonstrations of their colleagues in Aleppo against the atheistic tendencies of the Ba'th.⁶³ But with greater secularization of Syrian society and mass appeal the Ba'th has largely overcome the religious problem.

The Ba'th, even more so than the Communists, learned the value of compromise for its own enhancement. With a less radical attitude than the Communists, the Ba'th found itself in a position of greater adaptability to other parties. Throughout Ba'th history can be found alliances and cooperation, but always cooperation that suited Ba'th interests. After Malki's murder, the Ba'th found it to their advantage to side with the Communists in the destruction of the SSNP whose ideology ran counter to the Ba'th's. Many such related instances could be cited, but Kamal S. Abu Jaber summed up the situation when he wrote, "Relations of the Ba'th with other political parties in the Arab world are colored by the party's interests.. When such cooperation

⁶³"Developments of the Quarter," Middle East Journal, VII (Autumn, 1954), p. 458.

was profitable, the Ba'th did not hesitate to indulge in it whether the party was 'progressive' or 'reactionary.' The degree of cooperation was determined by Ba'th interests."⁶⁴ If nothing else this showed some refinement on the part of Ba'th leaders, at least until they achieved power.

The strong appeal of the Ba'thist ideology to the masses, especially that of Arab nationalism, has perhaps contributed to the integration of Syrian society more than any other factor except the Israel dilemma. Where the Communists worked predominantly with the middle class, the Ba'th achieved agrarian support. But it also acquired the greatest student and intellectual support in Syria. Thus by attempting a grass roots base, the party has helped bring the political system to the masses. This action by the Ba'th has been a major factor in integration and participation. But this is somewhat blurred by the Ba'th action of party repression once it achieved power.

During the first fifteen years of independence the Ba'th continually worked for greater voting participation. With the People's Party it appealed for universal suffrage--and won. After this, it appealed for completely secret ballots in opposition to the National and People's parties. While Ba'thist motives behind these moves may have been purely in their own interest, few things can help foster a feeling of participation and legitimacy as taking an actual role in elections.

⁶⁴Kamal S. Abu Jabor, The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press 1966), p. 134.

The Ba'th in the middle 1950's gained a backing in the Syrian army next to none. This infiltration of the army had serious effects on Syrian political development in the late 1950's and 1960's. With army backing, the party had the chance to remain in power, with Communist support, in the immediate years before union. Also, with army backing the Ba'th could breathe easier when conflict arose. With the breakup of the UAR in 1961, the army-backed Ba'th became critical of all other parties though it purported to allow other parties.

On May 29, 1963, Salah al-Din Bitar made this statement.

"I personally do not advocate the rule of one party despite rumors to this effect about the Ba'th Party . . . It is possible for other parties to be established, but their establishment must be natural and not artificial. The first condition is that the establishment of parties must be natural and represent Arab revolutionary trends as they are at present. The second absolutely essential condition, and this I say with all frankness, is that as long as we are in the phase of building the revolution of Liberty, Unity, and Socialism, and as long as we are deciding that the parties that are established naturally are the parties that represent these objectives, then it is necessary that these parties should combine in a Front, that they should co-operate, restrict their differences to matters of opinion, indeed sink their differences altogether and come to an arrangement the characteristic of which is cooperation, not envy, hatred and contentiousness. In my opinion, if we are able to secure these two conditions, it is possible, indeed it is essential, that we should not have a one-party state. It is also, of course, essential that this Front should be properly led.⁶⁵ But this does not mean autocracy or a monopoly of power."

Thus any participation of other parties and their legitimacy to exist rested with the Ba'th. If this remains the policy since the Ba'th

⁶⁵Official News Bulletin--Syria--May 29, 1963," Arab Political Documents: 1963, p. 281.

split of early 1966, remains unclear. But possibly with the split and the 'Neo-Ba'thists' trying to consolidate power, this position may become more extreme. If so, participation and legitimacy in political development outside the Ba'th may be curtailed.

Though the Ba'th has been taken over by the left-wing of the party, there have been statements that the new leadership would adhere to most former principles of the party. But former Ba'th Party leaders are now leading underground resistance against the new junta.⁶⁶ Since the Ba'th is the ruling party, this situation could undermine future political development. The ruling section may have to resort to methods giving little help in political development if they want to stay in power. The ousted section in return may undermine the political integration and legitimacy the Ba'th Party has built. But the left-wing appears to be making a strong effort to gain the support of the masses and to instill a legitimate attitude in the public sector towards it.⁶⁷ Only time can tell their success.

Tunisia

When the French, after a brief military campaign, established Tunisia as a protectorate in 1881, Tunisia had a population of about 1.3 million--half of whom lived in settled communities. Though Tunisia

⁶⁶Arab World, March 1, 1966, p. 1.

⁶⁷Arab World, May 13, 1966, p. 6.

followed a cautious status quo path under the French during the first years of the protectorate, there was already much in Tunisian society that was sound and could serve as a foundation for development. The size, geography, and historical tradition of Tunisia gave rise to a rather homogeneous population with a long tradition of living together and considering itself a single society. It was the most cohesive of Islamic societies in the late 1800's, except possibly Egypt.

Within Tunisia could be found one national language, Arabic, except for a few thousand Berber-speaking inhabitants of the mountain regions. Also a strong religious uniformity existed. Except for an integrated Jewish minority, the Maliki rite of orthodox Islam, i.e., Sunni, was followed by all Tunisian Moslems. Added to these factors was the unbroken tradition of settled life along Tunisia's coast line. A village every three or four miles could be found in the thriving Sahel (Arabic for coast) area. "With a certain shared tradition and an orderly life based on a relatively high level of urbanization, the Sahel, the real Tunisia, was much further along the road to modernization than the European might have realized. Great change could be made with the addition of only two major ingredients--greater public security and the concept of the positive state."⁶⁸

⁶⁸Leon Carl Brown, "Stages in the Process of Change," Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, ed. Charles A. Micaud (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 9.

The French Protectorate lasting for seventy-five years gave Tunisia at the time of independence the basis of a modern economy, which played an immeasurable role in conditioning the Tunisian mentality to modernist views. The French established a larger measure of public security by bringing the Bedouins under greater control. Also, the French were responsible for an orderly collection of taxes as had not existed before.

During the 1890's the French pushed for the colonization of more French citizens in the Protectorate. The aggressive capitalist spirit brought by the French colon, coupled with the feeling of stewardship toward the local population by the higher Protectorate officials, as well as the eclectic acceptance of the native Tunisians-- all helped push Tunisia into the modern world without destroying the foundations of Tunisian society.⁶⁹

Even though Tunisia had the highest concentration of European settlers in the Afro-Asia world, except for South Africa and Algeria, Tunisia never became an integral part of France as its neighbor Algeria did. While the effects of the French settlers were great, the French colon never became large or strong enough to threaten assimilation of the indigenous society.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁰For figures concerning this relationship see, Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 16.

But the settler society in Tunisia had double consequences "that more foreign rule probably would not have brought about: urbanization, new patterns of land tenure, secular jurisdiction, the creation of a modern economy, the development of a settler politics, and new educational opportunities. Together these factors served not only to stimulate the spread of ideas and ways of living but also to create within the native society sets of alienated individuals and classes."⁷¹ Alongside the modern existed sectors unassimilated to the new order. The old native elite became unsure of itself, while many of the native landowners failed in modernizing. Students were without jobs, and many bedouins were landless.

What emerged after fifty years of French rule were new classes-- but classes that did not belong to either the old native class or the new modernized sector. Included in this number were students, industrial proletariat, a clerical class, agricultural workers of colon farms, and perhaps most important, the educated counter-elite. Even though the French government made efforts at reform, the strength of the Tunisian settlers undermined all efforts, and thus brought about the political tensions required for the unfolding of what Clement Moore has termed the "colonial dialectic." As Moore views it, "If the dialectic fully unfolds, a modernist elite absorbs most of the alienated sectors under its nationalist banner, while overpowering recalcitrant

⁷¹Ibid., p. 16.

traditional sector; by virtue of its long and difficult political conflict with the colonial powers, it absorbs modern political style and values Through the workings of the colonial dialectic, a modern political system was able to develop in Tunisia before independence."⁷²

The dialectic in Tunisia consummated in the Neo-Destour Party which led Tunisia to independence in 1956. But before dealing with the Neo-Destour, two earlier groupings must be viewed to place the Neo-Destour in the proper perspective--the "Young Tunisians" and the Destour (Constitution) Party.

At the turn of the century the Young Tunisians began to play a role in Tunisian society. Since no direct national leadership was allowed by the French, the Young Tunisians began to play a middle role between the French and the Tunisian people, i.e., they became a two-way channel. The success that the Young Tunisians had until 1912 is in a large sense due to the fact that the traditional, hierarchical society was still largely intact.

Most of the Young Tunisians were university educated and believed in the rights of man and a universal society transcending race and religion. By supporting a "liberal" France, the Young Tunisians hoped to aid the evolution of Tunisian society and more than offset the arrogance and presumptuous claims of the French settlers in Tunisia. Though the Young Tunisians were not against the Islamic

⁷²Ibid., pp. 25-26.

religion as such, their program was secular and made a clear-cut distinction between the religious institution and the state. Thus the early secular train of thought in Tunisia.

Four major themes were incorporated into Young Tunisian ideology: 1) the formation of a new brand of Tunisian patriotism within the colonial framework, 2) the concept of the positive state, 3) the role of education, and 4) the development of a critical faculty accompanied by an absence of apologetics.⁷³ The Young Tunisians placed their emphasis upon cultural, economic, and educational matters. The one real political leaning shown was the acceptance of the French Protectorate as a positive modernizing influence.

Up until the Young Tunisians, government in Tunisia was viewed as something to be avoided. But with most of the Young Tunisians having studied in France, they became convinced that a modern state could carry out a social revolution. Embodied within a modern state were two concepts the Young Tunisians were deeply concerned with: what the state should be and what the state should do. The Young Tunisians had seen what a government of men means and thus wanted a government by law. They preferred legal codes as found in the West, as well as a modern administrative system. Realizing that the general Tunisian population would be reluctant to accept their program in totality led to little emphasis on democracy or the contrary.

⁷³ Brown, op. cit., p. 26.

Their purpose was a government for the people that would eventually make possible government of and by the people. For this reason they believed government should be strong.⁷⁴

Government should be able to intervene in all areas except the press, thought the Young Tunisians. If the Protectorate Government would help with indigenous colonization, the Young Tunisians saw no reason for action against the Protectorate--an indication of the intensity of the Young Tunisians' belief in positive government.⁷⁵

In the realm of education, the Young Tunisians were a vehement voice demanding more and better education. This education was to be modern and patterned after the French system. Eventually both Koranic schools and Franco-Arab schools were accepted. But the importance of the latter is seen in that the real leadership, from the time of the Young Tunisians until the present, has come from the French and Franco-Arab schools.

The good feeling between the Protectorate Government and the Young Tunisians slowly ebbed away. Finally after several incidents in 1911-12, the Young Tunisians' fate was doomed with the declaring of martial law--lasting until 1921. But Young Tunisian ideas that had been rationally and frankly advanced were to survive the setback, though the Young Tunisians failed to reappear.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 27-29.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 30.

After World War I a new group of Tunisians entered politics. At the same time, a sense of grievance against the colonial regime was growing, helped partially by the exposure of many Tunisians to Wilson's idea of self-determination. These new politicians were mostly members of the old elite who had found no satisfying place in the system advocated by the Young Tunisians. In 1920 the Destour Party was established essentially as the party of these older elites. It became basically Islamic, traditionalist, socially reactionary, and inflexible. The party was able to mobilize the masses for demonstrations, but the party did not have a mass membership (nor did it want it), or an articulated modern structure.⁷⁶

The Destour followed the Young Tunisian movement in only one major way. By taking the position of accepting, at least implicitly, the existence of the French Protectorate, they took the position as advocate and interlocutor between the French officials and the Tunisian masses as had the Young Tunisians. In contrast to the Young Tunisians, the Destour rejected many of the innovations introduced by the French rule in the name of nationalism and anticolonialism. The Destour, by becoming the first coherent and broadly based movement against the French Protectorate, gave a strong contribution to Tunisian nationalism. "The Young Tunisians' ideas had been too modernist and moderate to

⁷⁶Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 27. For a different interpretation see, Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

reach beyond a narrow cultivated elite into the society as a whole. With the Destour the modernist idea of assimilation was unequivocally rejected, and the first groping gestures were made in search of a national identity."⁷⁷

The Destour reached its peak in Tunisia within two years after its conception, but from this point its strength and backing dissipated. Though many sympathized with the Destour from 1920-22, few were brought into the party to help in penetrating the Tunisian society. With the departure of its charismatic leader, Taalbi, on an extended tour of the Middle East, the Destour's fortunes steadily decreased, with the party becoming locked in the traditional segments of society it represented.

The lack of support by the Destour for other segments of the society is seen in their actions in regards to a strike by members of the CGTT (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens). Breaking away in 1924 from the Socialist CGT (Confédération Générale des Travailleurs) were thousands of Muslim workers who joined to form the CGTT. By 1925 the CGTT had gained widespread support and launched a number of strikes and demonstrations. After six months of this action the Protectorate authorities dissolved the CGTT, while the Destour did little in attempting to back the CGTT. "To the workers the Destour's fault lay not in its traditionalism . . . but in its modern bourgeois

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 28.

betrayal of the people. Actually, the Destour disdained the workers more for their bedouin origins than because of any Marxist class bias. Modern methods of political agitation, too, were hardly in accord with the Destour's legalistic approach to politics."⁷⁸

A new political style was introduced as opposition to the Destour with the forming of the Neo-Destour under Habib Bourguiba in 1934. For more than two decades the Neo-Destour was in opposition to foreign rule. The cohesion of the people in the Neo-Destour was greatly helped by the continued struggle against foreign domination seen in intermittent party suppression and the jailing of its leaders. From 1934-54 Bourguiba himself was imprisoned for a total time of ten years (1934-36, 1938-43, 1952-54). But the party used these years to build a positive program and new political style in the face of obstruction by the older Destour.

Bourguiba also used these years to develop the skills of a hero-statesman. He became an orator able to move his people, and the organizer of an effective mass political organization. During the two decades before independence, Bourguiba came to personify the new nation. His leadership became unchallenged and provided for the continuity of political ideals and tactics that effectively shaped Tunisia's modernist ambitions. Bourguiba advocated no rigid doctrine

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 29-30.

but did believe in democracy and the moral value of the individual. His policy and that of the Neo-Destour lacked commitment to any program except independence and modernization.⁷⁹

Four years after its establishment the Neo-Destour had a mass following far overshadowing that of the Destour. As Benjamin Rivlin has stated, "Soon after the appearance of the Neo-Destour, it became the leading nationalist party. Its activities, sparked by the exuberance of youth, eclipsed those of the Old Destour through an intensified campaign of mass education: organizing youth groups, holding demonstrations, and establishing a party organization throughout the country."⁸⁰

Despite periods of suppression by the French, the Neo-Destour realized French contributions to Tunisia. Though contesting the colonial status quo in much stronger terms than their conservative rivals, the Destourists, the Neo-Destour leaders did not develop an obstructionist mentality.

The Neo-Destour's belief in a moderate approach can further be seen in the absence of religious fanaticism, but keeping some identification with religious observances. Perhaps the moderation and pragmatism of the Neo-Destour before independence is best summed up by Lorna Kahn when she states:

⁷⁹Clement Henry Moore, "The Era of the Neo Destour," Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, ed. Charles A. Ricaud, pp. 75-76.

⁸⁰Benjamin Rivlin, "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement," Middle East Journal, Vol. VI, No. 2 (Spring, 1952), pp. 171-72.

In addition to providing flexibility in dealing with France and other countries, lack of commitment to any program save independence and modernization meant that the Neo-Destour was able to enroll, and to retain as members, almost all politically-minded citizens except members of the small and conservative 'Vieux Destour', occasional Communists, and those who for personal reasons opposed any changes in the status quo. Knowing that party policies would always be adjusted to satisfy the wishes of the majority, rather than party members having to conform to the dictates of a given platform, Destourians acquired the habit of arbitrating differences within party ranks, instead of founding opposition movements dedicated to achieving one specific objective or other . . . Most people thought of themselves as 'Tunisians' considered the Neo-Destour their party and Bourguiba their leader. This cohesion was to prove to be probably the country's biggest asset in the coming years.⁸¹

In the early 1940's several internal challenges faced the Neo-Destour which led to greater cohesion of the Tunisian society than party organization alone could provide. With the return of Taalbi after fifteen years of exile, the Destour tried a comeback. The Neo-Destour immediately discredited Taalbi in all but the old elites eyes. After this, as long as the Neo-Destour paid lip service to Islam, danger from the conservative element was small.

Another challenge came from the Tunisian Communist Party which was never strong in Tunisia except in the labor movement after the Second World War. The leaders of the Neo-Destour had to combat the Communist-dominated CGT for the support of the Tunisian workers and thus wanted to create an autonomous Tunisian union. In January, 1946, Farhat Hached, supported by the Neo-Destour, founded a new all-Tunisian

⁸¹Lorna Hahn, "Tunisia: Pragmatism and Progress," Middle East Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 19-20.

federation, the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT). The UGTT almost immediately attracted a majority of Muslim workers away from the European-dominated CGT. With the affiliation of the UGTT with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the issue of Communism was settled once and for all within the nationalist ranks before independence.⁸²

The development of other national organizations before independence further shows Tunisian cohesion under the Neo-Destour. The Neo-Destour helped in the organizing of the Tunisian Union of Shopkeepers and Artisans (UTAC), the General Union of Tunisian Farmers (UCAT), the General Union of Tunisian Students, and the Tunisian Association of Chambers of Commerce. Many other organizations were also set-up such as the Muslim Scouts and Muslim Youth. "Thus, before independence a virtual political system already existed . . . Unlike most emerging nations, Tunisia already had its modern interest groups to articulate the special grievances of various sectors toward the colonial regime. Moreover, they had a history of cooperation with the dominant party that would be a vital precedent in the pursuit of national interests above group interests after independence."⁸³

The role that Bourguiba played in all these activities is hard to overstate. National identity embodied within the Neo-Destour was

⁸²Rivlin, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁸³Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence*, p. 37.

personified by Bourguiba. His exceptional leadership was crucial in forging a new national consciousness. At the same time shortsighted French colonial policies also worked to Bourguiba's advantage. Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour became the repository of the shared experiences of the anti-colonial struggle, while continually articulating the symbols of national identity.

Of the period before independence Clement Moore has stated:

By the time the Neo-Destour attained self-government, its synthesis seemed relatively complete. The party had imposed upon the naturally homogeneous society a new modernist consensus of a Western-educated elite. The consensus not only survived the challenges of the traditionalists and the Communists; the long struggle with France also assured that the consensus penetrated through the society as a whole . . . perhaps more than in any emerging nation, the colonial situation in Tunisia had set up the conditions for stable and permissive single party rule.⁸⁴

With the opening of the 1950's the Neo-Destour increased its drive for independence from the French. In October, 1951, a manifesto requesting self-government for Tunisia was submitted to the U. N. by a delegation headed by Bourguiba. The aims of independence were well expressed by Bourguiba. "What Tunisia demands is the status of an independent and sovereign country tied to France by a freely negotiated treaty of alliance which guarantees to the latter its strategic, economic, and cultural interests. The Government of Tunisia will be national, constitutional and democratic, under the aegis of the

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 39-40.

legitimate Sovereign of the country It is not administrative posts we want. We want to govern our country."⁸⁵

After a quick turn of events in 1955, Tunisia was granted independence in 1956. Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour were supreme. With the people behind them, they were now ready to progress as a nation. But one big hurdle to Bourguiba appeared in the person of Ben Youssef, general secretary of the Neo-Destour until 1955. Just prior to independence and immediately following, Youssef took a strong pro-Islamic and pro-Arab stand in contrast to that of Bourguiba and the majority of the Neo-Destour. Violence between these two factions erupted. Undoubtedly the absence during these transitional months of a coherent administration for law and order aggravated this situation, but resort to violence in competitive situations until this time often marked Tunisian politics.

Youssefism was overcome, but not until it had crucial consequences for political development. In the short-run the prestige and political power of those that had combated Youssefism was increased. But in the long-run Youssefism demonstrated a need for stronger organization than had been shown by the Neo-Destour. The liberal and orderly competition of different political groupings no longer became a realistic alternative to one-party rule.⁸⁶ On June 1, 1959 a presidential constitution

⁸⁵Rivlin, op. cit., p. 177.

⁸⁶Moore, op. cit., p. 80.

was promulgated which set up tight and single-party rule under Bourguiba--who has been President ever since.

In any single-party system, it is difficult to draw rigid distinctions between party and government. In Tunisia the party was supposed to represent the people, but the government was also supposed to emanate from the general will. Thus an ambiguous relationship was found between party and government. If the Neo-Destour was to play both an integrating and a representative role, such ambiguity was necessary. The Neo-Destour ". . . could mobilize popular support for government policies while representing (to a degree) the interests and aspirations of the rank and file. For the former task an efficient and disciplined apparatus was required: for the latter, a measure of internal discussion, compromise, and conciliation The Neo-Destour's word was not law, whatever its influence upon the government. Although the party's mission might, as Bourguiba suggested be 'permanent,' the Neo-Destour did not become a cult or an end in itself."⁸⁷

To give government leaders greater control over the party apparatus, the party was reorganized two years after independence. This reorganization reassured that the party which had created the state would be subservient to the state. Again in 1963-64 the party was reorganized, but as an effort to increase popular participation by democratizing its structure and increasing its influence upon

⁸⁷ibid., pp. 105-106.

the government. But neither the organizational changes, nor the new socialist ideology gave the party decisive jurisdiction over government policies.⁸⁸

After the 1958 reorganization, there were close to 1000 branches of the Neo-Destour. The branches were and are the great source of Neo-Destour strength. They serve as the local organ (fifty branches alone in Tunis) of social integration by bringing together diverse factions and classes. They also serve the important task of filling the vacuum left by the decay of traditional structures. The branch is the means of transmitting the demands and grievances of the people to the party apparatus, while participation in the local government is encouraged by the branch. Educating people into the political system is also carried out through the branch. By explaining the significance of government projects and training party cadres for further political responsibilities, the party mobilizes the people.⁸⁹

Much more could be written about the Neo-Destour--called the Destourian Socialist Party since the party congress of 1964. But the above should give a basis for comparison of Tunisia and Syria. To this we now turn.

Conclusion

Independence for Tunisia came a decade after independence had been granted to Syria. This difference of a decade has had several

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 107.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 132.

consequences for both Syria and Tunisia concerning political development. Syria worked for her independence, but not with the driving force that was found in Tunisia. In Syria, the independence movement brought little lasting cohesion because of the leaders' parochial and non-modernist attitudes. Consequently, divisive particularism remained on the Syrian political scene, possibly strengthened by independence.

The independence movement in Tunisia was a sustained effort for twenty years, in which time the Neo-Destour Party became the nationalist embodiment. Leaders of the Neo-Destour, Bourguiba in particular, gained the sound backing of the Tunisian people with their forward and modern ideas.

The simple fact that independence was won by the Tunisians from the French principally on their own helped to induce a lasting feeling of cohesion and integration. But the homogeneity found in Tunisia before the independence movement began, undoubtedly provided the basis of stronger cohesion brought on by the nationalist struggle.

In contrast, Syria had a heterogeneous culture, which the years before and after independence provided for a fragmented political culture. Also, the effort needed for independence was not strong enough to be a lasting value for cohesion and integration. By viewing Syria and Tunisia, it appears that the length and degree of time needed for both to gain their independence had consequences of lasting importance for political development.

The Nationalist Bloc in Syria was the only organization with party attributes that was not underground before independence. Since this

party was only working for independence, it would be difficult to connect it too closely to the development process itself, i.e., the culmination of processes of social, economic, and political change. Parties after independence were allowed to emerge from their earlier settings and become active. But these parties, as is so often found where parties have been clandestine, failed to produce responsible leadership and had little knowledge of political compromise. Thus the five major parties emerging after independence became mainly independent variables affecting political development rather than the outgrowth of the development process.

The rise of the Neo-Destour in Tunisia can be seen as an outgrowth of the development process, but at the same time as the most important independent variable emerging in the development process. Viewing the Neo-Destour in the light of the Young Tunisians, the Destour, and French modernization, it should be realized that all three of these factors helped lead to the creation of the Neo-Destour. Also, the place the Neo-Destour occupies in the "colonial dialectic" is another indication of the party's place in the development process.

The Neo-Destour early in its existence worked to gain public support. Throughout the last twenty years it has continued this policy, even increasing its efforts as seen through reorganization, education, and increased voting. With a strong belief in man, the party has been an effective way for people to exercise power--specially at the lower levels. The party's many branches reinforce both support and participation.

In Syria, both the National and People's parties tended to reinforce divisive particularism--specially on the geographic scale. Though the People's Party worked at times for larger voting participation, this effort was probably done with the idea of benefits to the party. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, because of its strict ideology and somewhat Christian leanings, was another force that led to continued fragmentation. The Ba'th and Syrian Communist Party made great efforts to gain popular support. Though succeeding to some extent, both parties in the process alienated certain segments of the society. With so many forces operating, little cohesion and integration into the political system appeared. The intensity of these forces is seen when H. B. Sharabi writes, "From 1949 until the union with Egypt in 1958, at least five forces, five attitudes, were engaged in the deadly struggle for political ascendancy in Syria; all of them manifested themselves through, or in collaboration with, the military establishment which throughout this period was inextricably involved in the struggle."⁹⁰

Parties with a strong ideology that are trying to affect behavioral and attitudinal change are undoubtedly mobilist. Under this category in Syria could be placed the SSNP, the Moslem Brotherhood, the Syrian Communist Party, and the Ba'th Party--all wanted and

⁹⁰H. B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 127-128.

called for a different form of Syrian society. Part of the success both the Ba'th and Communist parties had over the SSNP can be traced to a willingness to adhere less adamantly to their respective ideologies, i.e., they were willing to resort to adaptive measures when needed. No doubt the Ba'th became much more proficient at this than the Communists. A quick look at the Arab-Israeli War of the late 1940's should verify this point.

Both the National and People's parties had little ideology and few mobilist aspects. But it is difficult to label these parties adaptive either, since both parties did not seek widespread support except among the landed families. Perhaps the closest one could label these parties would be sectarian in nature and thought.

Since the Ba'th has had the greatest success of parties in Syria, and the Ba'th appears to have mixed adaptive tendencies with mobilist orientations to a greater extent than other Syrian parties, the conclusion might be reached that a party which follows a path between a strong mobilist and adaptive classification has a better chance for continuance and rule than those that do not, i.e., in developing countries.⁹¹ A look at Tunisia should help in verification.

As seen earlier the Neo-Destour has continually followed a pragmatic path. But this path before 1956 was led by the thought of

⁹¹Verification of this conclusion is difficult in Syria because of the continued military involvement in the government. For the extent of military involvement and its affects in Syria see Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military; Seale, The Struggle for Syria; and The Military in the Middle East, ed. Sydney Nettleton Fisher (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963).

independence, modernization, and a firm belief in man. Though the former has been achieved, the belief in man and modernization has continued. These points have been the loose guiding ideology of the Neo-Destour, coupled now with "Neo-Destourian socialism." The party has been adaptive when needed in the areas of religion, land reform, and local politics. Thus without losing its sense of direction, the Neo-Destour has followed a course charted between the poles of mobilism and adaptivism. Its continued existence and popular support should verify its success.

The ascendancy of the Neo-Destour in the 1930's over all other indigenous political parties and groupings has meant the party developed within the internal setting. Though the Neo-Destour was suppressed by the colonial authorities on many occasions, it continued to work within the established framework when possible. This action, together with the moderate approach to independence gave the Neo-Destour many of the qualities associated with internally developed parties, though the competitive aspect is still missing in the system.

In Syria, the National Bloc is all that would be considered as developing internally. But after independence it split and the factions took on external party characteristics. The other Syrian parties, i.e., Ba'th, Brotherhood, SSNP, and Communist, can be classified as externally developed parties. Consequently, most of these parties had or developed a strong ideology where little room for compromise existed. This led to a radicalization and intensification of the competitive

process itself. Only in the 1947 elections could all parties participate on at least somewhat of an equal level. After this, the party in power was likely to suppress all other parties--or at least those most hostile to it. The only real means left for gaining power, was through clandestine operations and involvement in the military.

At the present time both Syria and Tunisia are operating under one-party systems. This has been true of Tunisia since 1956 and Syria since 1961 (the break-up of the Arab Socialist Union). Before 1961 Syria ranged from a virtual military dictatorship (where the Arab Liberation Movement was tried and failed) to a multi-party system immediately after independence. The ruling Ba'th Party now operates in an authoritarian system, where it is the authoritarian party.

As noted earlier, an authoritarian party has drawbacks when working with the aggregation function. Syria, still predominantly agrarian, lacks the urbanization, industrialization, and educational levels to fully sustain effective and operational associational interests groups. Rather, a high degree of anomic and institutional interest groups are found. Thus much of the aggregation function resides within the Ba'th Party where formulation of policy alternatives is decided. The lack of effective associational interest groups in Syria is not entirely the fault of the Ba'th, but whether the Ba'th since the early 1960's has attempted to increase the number, organization, and effectiveness of associational interest groups has not been determined by this writer.

In Tunisia, where the Neo-Destour operates in a dominant non-authoritarian system, the aggregating situation is quite different. The low amount of institutional and anomic interest groups reflects the effective aggregative party system, the lack of a strongly divided political culture, and the effectiveness of associational interest groups. The strong, active part played by the Neo-Destour in the establishment of associational interest groups was pointed out earlier. Consequently, aggregation from these groups to and through the party has removed the need for strong anomic and institutional articulation.

Mention was made in an earlier section of the importance that political elites play in the dominant non-authoritarian system. In Tunisia these elites are committed to a process of political modernization and helped bring into being functionally specific associational interest groups. Consequently, relative stability has existed as found in few other developing nations.

If we look at the "sack-of-potatoes" problem associated with integration in Syria and Tunisia, we again find a large difference. The natural homogeneity of Tunisia and the early policies and actions of the Neo-Destour meant that this problem was not to be a stumbling block to development after independence. Thus the Neo-Destour was able to concentrate on a political style which could bridge and lessen the gulf between the national elites and others within the system.

In Syria at time of independence, the fragmented political culture meant that this problem was still to be overcome. But the

appearance of a number of strongly ideological parties hindered the solution to this problem, a problem which still exists today. Thus any hope of overcoming what we have called the "homogenization" problem rests to a large degree on overcoming fragmentation first.

The basic process of overcoming cultural and political fragmentation lies within the socialization process. If the same political attitudes and values can be inculcated into the society, fragmentation will likely be mitigated. But the political culture is also continued through the socialization process. With many parties holding power at different times in Syria, the socialization process never continued in the same order. Thus the system was confronted with no integrating, lasting socialization processes. The only real socializing aspect was one of power, i.e., the party with greatest military support ruled.

With the Ba'th in power for the last six years, it may become the force that is needed to break down fragmentation and strengthen national integration. Since it operates in an authoritarian system, its working through educational and vocational structures may facilitate an integrating socialization process. But for socialization to be effective in the long run, the Ba'th must develop a large sense of public support, even if limiting political participation.

Most people in Tunisia accept the Neo-Destour. Furthermore, the high rate of literacy enables widespread support for the system to be taught in the schools. Since the Neo-Destour does not use

repression or foster a climate of mutual suspicion in order to maintain itself, the people are socialized into a system where such beliefs are not valued. Whereas there has been a continuing socialization process over the last several decades in Tunisia, the process in Syria has never followed the same path for long--except the path of violence.

In the movement for independence, the Neo-Destour was effective in mobilizing the Tunisian masses. The support gained from the Tunisian people through the independence movement has meant continued support, or at least little resistance to the Neo-Destour. The need for mobilizing the people, done largely through the branch, has become one of persuading the people of needs for modernization. Tunisia has been lucky with its pluralist party in that there has always been support for the system. If the situation had been different, the Neo-Destour may have been hard-pressed to retain its pluralist character.

The Ba'th has made good use of both the call for Arab Nationalism and the defeat of Israel to mobilize the Syrian people. Because the socializing process in Syria cannot play the role it does in more developed countries, the Ba'th emphasizes mobilization for greater support and integration. But the same process means greater repression by the Ba'th within the system.

Syria and Tunisia tend to support the hypothesis advanced by Roy Macridis "that the greater the emphasis upon mobilization, the

less open and democratic the system; the greater the emphasis upon integration, the more repressive the party and the greater the likelihood of a one-party system." In Syria where there is great emphasis on mobilization, the system is authoritarian. Where more emphasis is on the socialization function in Tunisia, the system is more open and democratic. Since integration has already been achieved to a large extent in Tunisia, party repression is almost non-existent and there are signs that the one-party system is loosening. In contrast, through its emphasis on integration, the Ba'th remains repressive.

The repressive aspects connected with the Ba'th are closely connected with participation. Partially for fear of losing the position they have gained in the system, the Ba'th leaders fear active increased participation in the political process. Input influence is restricted, consequently a subject oriented society exists with strong parochial manifestations. Never has there been large scale voting participation, or even participation in the different parts of the political system. Possibly, increased integration through mobilization is needed before effective participation can develop. In this sense, the Ba'th may not be hindering political development by holding participation at a low level. But, since participation must increase at some point for political development to continue, the Ba'th may have to broaden participation--both in number and depth.

At the local level in Tunisia, the Neo-Destour has continually encouraged greater participation, not only in voting, but also in

actively engaging in local activities. Thus on the lower levels almost full admission into the political system exists. But the higher the level of government, the lower is realistic participation. Even though the guise of participation exists at the higher levels, there is in actuality only limited admission. Thus the government and Neo-Destour want a feeling of legitimacy to develop without giving up control of power. Whether this policy will continue its same path in the future can be only speculation on this writer's part, since there can be no guarantee that moderation will not give way to extremism if those espousing the moderate course are unable to produce results.

In Syria, the parties which had mobilist aspects could have played an important role in integration of the political system but failed. One reason is that these parties remained rigid in doctrine and structure. But perhaps the most important reason is that these parties were more interested in integrating people into the party than into the political system. A continuation of this lack of political integration can be seen in the low participation and socialization into the political system today.

With the fragmented culture at the time of independence, one must wonder if the structure of government that Syria adopted was in its best interest for aiding political development. Time has surely shown it not to be. The structure was there but the essence of operating that structure was absent--a facet all too common in the newly-independent nations.

The Ba'th with army support has the chance to become a dynamic factor in political development for Syria. If the party can maintain stability long enough to let political development take an active hold, perhaps political development may have the chance to become self-generating in Syria. But in any case, the road for Syria appears to be long and difficult.

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POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
SYRIA AND TUNESIA

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine the affect that political parties can have toward political development, primary in developing countries. The study was comparative in that two countries, Syria and Tunisia, were used for analysis. These two countries were chosen not only for their many likenesses, but also because of their vast differences.

To be considered a political party in this study minimal requirements were established: organization and a conscious effort on the part of the organization to gain electoral and/or popular support.

A comparative approach was established as the means and method for study. Basically this involved a functional apparatus, but coordinated with this were structural components. This approach was easily linked to the concept of political development in that political development was characterized by: 1) structural differentiation and functional specificity, 2) a greater capacity to cope with demands and control conflict, and, 3) the population as a whole acquires a contributing status in place of a subject orientation.

Parties were classified in several ways helpful to developmental analysis. The mobilist and adaptive classification helped show the differences between ideologically-oriented parties attempting behavioral and attitudinal change, and those parties which take a more pragmatic approach in hope of gaining greater support.

Another classification was made between competitive and non-competitive parties, which were shown to be related to the systems in which they operated. Non-competitive parties were further divided into totalitarian, authoritarian, and pluralistic one-party types. The pluralist party lacks a strong commitment to ideology which suggested that this type of party may be beneficial for dealing with persistent traditional values and become prime mediators between the elites and masses. Both authoritarian and totalitarian parties were shown to lack the ability of playing a mediating role except through force, but both have the capability of effectively dealing with conflict and demands--though highly different from the pluralist party approach.

The functional framework revolved around the broad function of integration. To aid analysis this function was subdivided into the functions of socialization, mobilization, and participation. These three functions were then analyzed in relation to the above named types of parties, and the interaction and consequences for political development were explored.

With the framework established, focus turned to the countries of Syria and Tunisia. Syria's past, plagued with continual unrest and instability emanating from many factors, has seen coup follow coup, each bringing a different party to power. Because succession has never been regularized, the party in power usually acquired authoritarian traits. Viewing Syria verified to a large extent the

limits established in the functional framework of authoritarian parties to political development. With the ruling Ba'ath party becoming stronger ideologically oriented, the future for Syrian political development remains vague, if not pessimistic.

Tunisia, in contrast to Syria, has enjoyed stability and internal tranquility. The Neo-Destour party has been the only party since independence was granted in 1956. But unlike many Syrian parties, the Neo-Destour has gathered the support of the masses through its pluralist approach.

Little doubt was left in the final analysis that Tunisia had far out-distanced Syria in political development. But the question remains, was this due to the parties found in these countries? The conclusion reached in this study is a qualified yes. No doubt the type of parties in these countries affected the progress of development, but other factors affected the parties and their make-up as much. Thus political parties are not only independent variables affecting political development, but also are an outgrowth of the development process itself.