Political parties and immigrant associations: Alliances in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level

A comparative study

Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar

UPF DOCTORAL THESIS / YEAR 2015

THESIS DIRECTOR

Dr. Ricard Zapata-Barrero

DEPARTAMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

upf. Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona

Summary

The present PhD thesis studies *the way alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.* With this objective in mind, I introduce the importance of alliances between particular actors in the immigration literature following the political opportunity structure (POS) approach. To do so, I develop, in three articles, a comparative cases-study research based on qualitative methodology (desk research and semi-structured interviews). I analyze the emergence of alliances in three cases of PICs: the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in the city of Badalona, the burka ban in public buildings in the city of Lleida and the banning of undocumented immigrants from the local census in the city of Vic, all three in Catalonia, Spain. The results show that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations are: first, defined by the actors' incentives; second, deeply connected to the political environment where they emerge and finally, the outcome of different patterns of mobilization determined by the political parties responsible for politicizing immigration.

Resumen

La presente tesis doctoral investiga *la manera en que las alianzas entre partidos políticos y asociaciones de inmigrantes emergen en presencia de conflictos relacionados a la inmigración que han sido politizados a nivel local.* Con este objetivo en mente, esta investigación busca incorporar la importancia de actores determinados en la literatura sobre inmigración basada en las estructuras de oportunidad política. Con este fin, se desarrolla en tres artículos un estudio comparativo basado en métodos cualitativos (fuentes secundarias y entrevistas semi-estructuradas) donde analizo el surgimiento de alianzas en tres conflictos sobre inmigración que han sido politizados: la campaña anti-rumano-gitana en la ciudad de Badalona; la prohibición del burka o velo integral en la ciudad de Lleida y la prohibición de empadronarse para aquellos inmigrantes en situación irregular en la ciudad de Vic; las tres situadas en Cataluña, España. Al final es posible concluir que las alianzas entre partidos políticos y asociaciones de inmigrantes son: primero, definidas por los incentivos que tienen los

actores; segundo, profundamente conectadas al ambiente político donde surgen y finalmente, el resultado de diferentes patrones de movilización determinados por los partidos políticos responsables de la politización de la inmigración.

Index

CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION

ANNEX

List of tables

x

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1. The study of alliances

The fact that actors need of other actors to pursue their goals brings into the political life a basic reality: political allies are an essential component in their survival for practical and symbolic reasons (Diani, 2015: 88). For practical reasons, they allow obtaining quantifiable resources, access to networks and know-how. For symbolic reasons, they allow finding like-minded actors in regard to values that support claims. However, from here, there is a question pending in the air: who are these political allies? For whom are these political allies important? And what is the process surrounding their alliances? The answers are not straightforward, and they depend on the goals actors have and the resources they can offer to other actors. Also, they depend on external factors linked to the political moment surrounding their potential alliances (Kriesi, et al. 1995: 80).

The accomodation of immigrants is a field where the interaction between actors is essential in guiding the process through policy or social networks (Zincone and Caponio, 2006; Caponio, 2010; Zincone et al. 2011). In this sense, finding allies for institutional and non-institutional actors is part of the need for legitimacy for policies that enrich and favor the cohesiveness in receving societies (Vermeulen, 2006; Van der Brug, et al. 2015). This is more evident when dealing with a highly contested issue such as immigration.

As Koopmans et al. (2005: 148) pointed out, the accomodation of immigrants is one of the most politicized issues in the agenda of receiving societies. Such a politicized issue produces the reconfiguration of the actors' strategies and the cultural demands made by immigrants (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). However, this is not an exclusive domain of national level but also local level politics. As it is recognized in most of the recent literature on immigration studies (Garbaye, 2005; Poppeleers and Scholten, 2008; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011; Penninx, 2011; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2015); the devolution and federal reforms in multilevel states have made of the local level the context of proximity that gives practical answers to immigrants' needs.

As scholars have righlty stated, the interaction of the local population and immigrants at this level can be a source of conflicts (Zapata-Barrero, 2004; Koopmans, et al. 2005; Mouritsen, 2006). The origin of these conflicts can be interpersonal and of low magnitude and they can be connected to the way immigrants interact with the local population in the public space. Nevertheless, local governments and political parties in decision-making bodies, sometimes politicize them as immigration conflicts which are the consequence of the increased cultural, religious and ethnic diversity (Burchianti and Triviño, 2015: 245). Concrete examples are the controversies over the construction of mosques by Muslim communities of immigrant origin, the securitizing measures to dissuade immigrants from using public places (e.g. removing benches in parks where male immigrants get together on a daily

basis) or the implementation of local civility codes with an eye on certain immigrant communities blamed for uncivil behavior (e.g. the presence of Roma immigrants in deprived neighborhoods).

Against this backdrop, the general objective of this thesis is *to study the formation of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations.* The setting where they are studied is one of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level. As Table 1. shows, the general objective is guided by three particular objectives: the first one, theoretical, seeks *to propose an interpretive framework to study the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.* The second one, empirical and descriptive, seeks to *implement the interpretive framework to identify the emergence of alliances in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.* The third one, empirical and explanatory, seeks to *explain the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.*

Table 1. Objectives

Type of Objective	Objective
General	To study the formation of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations. The setting where they are studied is one of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.
1. Theoretical	To propose an interpretive framework to study the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.
2. Empirical and descriptive	To implement the interpretive framework in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.
3. Empirical and explanatory	To explain the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.

The present thesis is located within the immigration literature that studies the mobilization and organization of immigrants following a political opportunity structure (POS) approach (Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Vermeulen, 2006; Morales et al. 2009; Giugni and Morales, 2011). The POS refers to the opportunities immigrants have to participate in the receiving society (Vermeulen, 2006: 38). The study of immigration under the POS is based on its strength to analyze under the same framework, institutional and social characteristics that shape the individual and collective actions of immigrants. Therefore, the two main features that make its analysis so relevant are its focus on institutional and non-institutional actors and their interaction in terms of power and influence.

The POS was originally developed by scholars interested in the conditions surrounding the success or not of social movements in Europe and North America (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam et al., 2001). They sought to highligth "the importance of formal organizations in the development of insurgent consciousness" (Vermeulen, 2006: 40). Tarrow (1994: 85) defines political opportunities as "consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions in the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure." Under the POS, alliances between political actors are considered an important component in the chances that groups outside the State have to put forward their claims (Tarrow, 1994; Kriesi, et al. 1995; Diani, 2015). According to this literature, alliances emerge when there is a conjunction of factors that make

two potential allies have common interests or goals with the aim of strengthening each other's position (Rucht, 2004: 202).

The politics of immigration is a field based on the relations between a multiplicity of actors; this fact makes of the study of alliances a necessary task. Identifying the different patterns of interaction among actors can show how important allies are in the policy-making of immigration. Furthermore, the approach political elites assume towards immigrants in general and their organization in particular affects the opportunities of the latter to have access to the policy process. As stated by Vermeule (2006: 39), political elites can "forbid, condone, and stimulate immigrant organizations or some of their activities by the implantation of all kinds of policy measurements."

Framing this study around politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level is based on two realities: first, treating certain cultural traits or the legal status of immigrants as a problem that requires political action through reactive discourses and policies generates the conflictive politicization of immigration (Van der Brug, 2015: 6). In this sense, a PIC portrays salience and generates polarization among the political actors involved in their immediate context of interaction, in our case, the local level. Second, studying the local level shows the relevance that a context of proximity, such as the city, has for the day-to-day responses that political elites give to the management of immigration (Giugni and Morales, 2011). Additionally, it is the first setting where immigrants negotiate their accommodation with institutions in receiving societies.

The aim of the present introductory chapter is to establish the limits of the key concepts of my study (Alliances, political parties, immigrant associations, politicized immigration conflicts and the local level), their importance in the literature and the way I plan to operationalize them. To do so, I structure the chapter around three parts: first, the gap in the literature and the justification of the key concepts; second, the cases I plan to study and the methodology and finally, how the thesis will be organized.

1.2. Why to focus on alliances?

In this part I would like to focus on three important elements of the PhD thesis: the gap in the literature I am addressing to; the justification of the two actors I am focusing on (Political parties and immigrant associations) and the setting where I locate the alliances between these two actors (the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level). [1][2]

The gap: Why to introduce the debate on alliances in the immigration literature from the POS?

The immigration literature from the POS has mainly focused on exploring the interplay among political actors. It basically highlights how the political context shapes the patterns of participation,

---

[1]   The literature review and justification herein presented are also part of the articles 1 and 3 of this thesis. The overlap becomes more obvious in Article 1 because it is precisely here where I propose the interpretive framework based on the gap on alliances in the literature of immigration from the POS approach.

[2]   Due to the format of this thesis as the compilation of three independent articles, some   basic information (e.g. the background and cases) is repeated throughout the study.

organization and mobilization of immigrants (Ireland, 1994, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Garbaye, 2005). The mechanisms used by the receiving society and other social agents in their affairs with the immigrant population produce structures of opportunities and constraints that indicate the patterns of immigrants' political actions. The study of immigration from this approach mainly denotes the way powerful groups or institutions – and primarily the State –are susceptible or sympathetic to the new demands made by immigrants. This means that immigrants develop participatory forms that reflect the political opportunity structures they face.

The immigration literature following the POS approach has debated the relevance of the national and local political opportunity structures in defining the collective actions of immigrants. At the national level, the POS has been used to analyze the collective strategies adopted by immigrants in response to the openness of the institutional structures at the national level (Ireland, 1994; Bengtsson, 2007). In this perspective, political opportunities are related to citizenship regimes, that determine the formal access to residence, and integration models, that determine the cultural obligations that this access entails (Koopmans and Statham; 2000: 24). At the local level, the focus has been placed on the preeminence of local actors and institutions in guiding immigrants' mobilization. This has been done by laying the focus on policy networks of immigration actors (Però, 2005; Caponio, 2005; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Zincone et al., 2011); immigrant associations and their access to the local policy-making (Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011), immigrant elected

representatives and their role in policy-making institutions (Garbaye, 2005).

As the literature shows, the actors-centered logic in the POS approach makes its use so appealing to scholars interested in understanding how receptive political institutions are to immigrant claims in receiving societies. Therefore, this study attempts to expand the immigration literature by bringing in the debate on alliances from this approach. By doing so, it is possible to observe the characteristics of specific actors and their decisive role in enabling or constraining the mobilization and organization of immigrants as a collective actor. Moreover, by studying political parties and immigrant associations in a context where immigration is politicized as a conflict at the local level, the thesis highlights the role of institutional gatekeepers (i.e. political parties) in granting access to the political sphere. In this sense, the study of alliances can render important fruits in the debate by studying other aspects of the political opportunity and not only the ones presented so far (i.e. the mobilization and organization of immigrants at the national and local levels). After presenting the gap in the immigration literature from the POS approach, I would like to refer to the importance of studying political parties in the context of this study and in relation to immigrant associations.

The focus: Why to study alliances with political parties?

Political parties fulfill an essential role in bringing into the political agenda immigration and its related-issues (Koopmans et al., 2005: 148). In the literature on social movements following the

POS approach, political parties emerge as an elite ally that can facilitate the access to institutions (Kriesi, n.d.: 5). The relevance of political parties is that they compete for votes and "may modify their policies - even their ideological equipment - to maximize voting outcomes of their coalitional potential and consequent chances to become partners in a majority" (Zincone, 2011: 379). Based on this, political parties are potential allies with the ability of helping political actors achieve their goals (Van Dyke, 2003: 231). However, the potential divisions of political elites in the executive and legislative branches may put them closer or further away from some actors and others. This, in turn, makes some elites either more sympathetic or antagonistic to the claims made by groups outside the State (Van Dyke, 2003: 244).

Applied to this study, political parties emerge as a highly important elite ally that can improve the chances of immigrant associations to have a better access to the policy-making. Political parties are recognized as important determinants in the representation of ethnic minorities through the provision of membership and leadership to immigrants (Celis et al, 2011). This is mainly because political elites in recent decades have increasingly devoted attention to the socio-demographic representativeness of political institutions where immigrants are a concern and a target of inclusion (Bird, 2003). The policy initiative that political parties have in the executive and legislative branches can stimulate, condone or forbid certain aspects related to the presence of immigrants in receiving societies (Vermeulen, 2006: 39). In this sense, political parties with

representation in the local council act as a potential ally for immigrant associations.

For political parties, their ideological equipment may attract immigrant associations that provide them with access to potential constituencies that otherwise they would not (Toral-Martinez, 2009). For immigrant associations, political parties are the point of contact with those political institutions with decision-making power. Moreover, they are a fundamental component in the negotiation of the accomodation of immigrants in receiving societies. Immigrant associations as allies of political parties can become conveyor belts that mediate the claims and aspirations of their communities before institutions. As Penninx (2011: 15) states, immigrant associations are "the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions" of immigrant communities. In this regard, they must be seen as multifunctional entities, not exclusively oriented towards politics, with potential access to institutional actors and decision-making institutions (Rex and Josephides, 1987: 19). Next, I would like to justify the setting of this study.

The setting: why a conflict-driven research at the local level?

> "More difficult than democratic impatience, however, are situations in which a political climate of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiments –translated into political movements and a politicization of the topics of immigration and integration –prevents well-argued policy proposals from being adopted."

> (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004: 150)

Social conflicts are a reality in streets and neighborhoods of towns and cities worldwide. In this situation, political elites at the local level intervene through policies that should favor the coexistence of peoples (Zapata-Barrero, 2004: 25). However, the salience of immigration and the presence of newcomers in urban areas characterized by low socio-economic conditions may create an atmosphere of tension (Burchianti and Triviño-Salazar, 2015: 245). In this setting, local political elites can use social conflicts and turn them into political conflicts through restrictive discourses and policies (Van der Brug, 2015: 5). The emergence of political conflicts due to the presence of immigrants can produce a reconfiguration of the actors' strategies according to their interests and goals. It is precisely in this context where I would like to situate my study.

In the literature on social movements from the POS approach, conflicts have been an ever-present element that mobilizes social actors to make their claims (Kriesi, 2004: 80). Drawing from this logic, alliances between particular actors, such as political parties and immigrant associations, emerge in contexts where the conflictive politicization of immigration acts as the trigger that allows the interaction between them. I define politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) as the confrontation between institutional actors and immigrants derived from restrictive discourses and policies seeking to regulate the cultural traits and legal status of immigrants (Article 1).

The reasons that justify the conflict-driven logic in this study are: first, conflicts are situations external to the alliances between the two actors (political parties and immigrant associations). In this sense, conflicts set the ground for specific relations. Second, the politicization of conflicts, this is putting a social problem at the center of the political agenda, produce a reconfiguration in the actors's strategies based on the position each one assumes. This situation, in the end, has an effect on the formation of alliances. Third, the normative approach to the politicization of immigration conflicts entails treating them as a 'wicked problem' with no concrete endpoint (Zapata-Barrero, 2004: 38). Therefore, studying alliances in this context should allow witnessing a constant interaction between actors interested in shaping the management of immigration through discourses and policies.

Which research questions does this study address?

After doing a short review of the literature and justifying the actors to be studied and the setting, I would like to propose a set of questions that will operationalize the objectives presented above. By focusing on political parties and immigrant associations, the PhD thesis seeks to answer the following question: *how do alliances emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level?* The main question treats alliances as part of a process that occurs under given circumstances. Although in our cases the circumstances are related to the politicization of immigration as a conflict at the local level, I recognize that they can also be of diverse nature (e.g. an abrupt increase in the number of immigrants,

the need for political actors to have know-how to manage immigration, the entrance of immigration into the electoral debate, among many others).

The research question is completed by three sub-questions. The first question serves to propose the interpretive framework: *How do political parties and immigrant associations ally in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts?* I treat alliances in this question as part of a process that allows their formation and potential consolidation. The second question asks: *how do alliances emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts in the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic?* Empirical by nature, the question seeks to operationalize the interpretive framework on selected cases of PICs. Finally, the last question asks: *Why do alliances emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in the cases of Badalona, Lleida and Vic?* The question focuses on the elements in the political environment that facilitate the formation of alliances. In the next section, I will elaborate on the cases and methodology.

1.3. Cases and methodology: Why qualitative methodology?

The present thesis is a comparative case-studies research based on qualitative methodology. It is based on the interpretation of a social phenomenon that is comparable through the use of the same categories in different cases. As it was mentioned above, this thesis is composed by three parts: the first one focused on theory and the second and third parts focused on an empirical analysis of

three politicized immigration conflicts that emerged in three Catalan cities in the years 2010 and 2011.

Why a comparative cases-study research?

The reason to select the case-study as the unit of analysis is because it offers the experience-based identification of new variables and hypothesis in the development of the fieldwork (George and Bennet, 2005). With a case-study is meant a systematic collection, guided by theory, of the same information across carefully selected categories (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 45). In addition to the use of cases-study, the comparison among several cases using the same analytical framework can generate new theoretical and practical insights based on different politicized immigration conflicts (PICs). Pierce (2008: 55) states that by comparing several cases "researchers can identify connecting aspects which would not be detected from a single case."

The cases-selection is based on a conflict-driven analysis of three cities (Badalona, Lleida and Vic) in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, Spain, that mirror three politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) (based on ethnic, religious and legal-administrative grounds). As I explain in the second article of this thesis, the conflict then is the most important criteria to select the cases, along with their prominence in the media and the protagonist role of mainstream political parties in politicizing them. The time frame studied is the years 2010-2012 when the three conflicts emerged, and the different alliances were formed.

Spain as a new country of immigration witnessed the most rapid increase in the number of immigrants in the years 2000–2008 in Europe and the second largest among OECD countries (Arango et al. 2011: 3). The Spanish framework on competences grant to regions and cities attributions on the reception and accommodation of immigrants (Miret, 2009: 51). This situation makes of regions and cities important actors in the management of immigrant integration. The cross-cutting character of immigrant integration and the attributions the sub-national level has in the provision of basic services makes of immigrant integration a highly politicized process (Garcés-Mascareñas 2011: 18). Moreover, the relevance of this area in the political agenda makes it part of the electoral scenarios of many regions and cities. Based on this, political parties, when represented in legislative bodies at the sub-national level, are of paramount importance in the process (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2011: 23).

Against this background, Catalonia experienced the conflictive politicization of specific aspects related to the presence of immigrants preceding the May 2011 local elections. During this time mainstream political parties (namely, centre-right *Partido Popular*, PP; centre-left *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya,* PSC; and the centre-right, Catalan *Convergencia i Unio,* CiU)[3] hardened

---

[3] Other relevant political parties in the Catalan scenario, according to their presence in the   Catalan Parliament for the term 2011-2015 are: the centre-left, pro-Catalan independence, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC); the left-wing, pro-Catalan, INiciativa per Catalunya –Verds (ICV); the centre-right,

their discourse on immigration and diversity by targeting certain immigrant communities in some cities (Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2014: 419). In this situation, the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic emerged as visible cases illustrating this situation.

1. The anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona

The city of Badalona (pop. 132.000/15% immigrants), the third largest in Catalonia in terms of population, was ruled in the term 2007-2011 by a coalition of three parties: the centre-left PSC, the centre-right, Catalan CiU and the left-wing Catalan, ERC. In May 2010, Xavier Garcia-Albiol, then candidate for major for the centre-right PP, distributed in a local market a leaflet linking immigrants, and specifically Romanian-Roma immigrants, with crime and uncivil behavior. [4] The leaflet produced strong reactions against the PP´s campaign; however, Garcia-Albiol intensified his anti-Romanian-Roma discourse. In Badalona, the sharp increase in the number of immigrants and their arrival in neighborhoods in the periphery increased the perception that there were some communities less 'accommodated' than others (e.g. The Romanian-Roma residents). By the time the 2011 elections arrived, the PP won and Garcia-Albiol became the mayor. When he took office, he promised a safe and prosperous city to all legal residents and an iron

---

Ciutadans (C's); the left-wing, pro-Catalan, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP).

[4] Rosa, I. (2010). "Vótame. Prometo mano dura." Público. April 30. Available in:
http://blogs.publico.es/trabajarcansa/2010/04/30/votame-prometo-mano-dura/ (Accessed 9 February 2015)

fist against those who did not follow the rules.[5] Because of the campaign, the NGO SOS-Racisme sued Garcia-Albiol for hate speech; however, Barcelona's Criminal Court found him not guilty in 2013.

2. The burka regulation in Lleida

This city (pop. 137,387/21% immigrants) located in the west part of Catalonia, close to the Pyrenees, is the second case-study. On 29 June 2010, the local council, led by the centre-left PSC, approved a modification to the local law of civility where it forbade access to any public building to any person wearing *burka* or *niqab* or other accessories such as helmets or balaclavas.[6] This modification, popularly known as the burka regulation, was preceded by a debate on women's rights where the mayor stated in a local TV show that he would propose this measure to defend gender equality. Those against the politicization interpreted it as an attack against religious freedom and an approach that could stigmatize Islam even further. The regulation produced widespread reactions among civil society actors in Spain; especially, Maghreb associations at the local and national levels representing immigrants from Muslim countries. In Lleida, the second and third largest immigrant communities are nationals from Morocco and Algeria. In May 2013, the Spanish

---

[5]   Robles, F. (2011). "¿Quién es ese García Albiol?". El Pais. 8 July. Availble in: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/07/08/actualidad/1310142 897_026733.html (Accessed 9 February 2015)

[6]   Diari Segre (2010). "Les multes per usar el burca en edificis públics aniran de €30 a €600." Segre, 30 June, p.16

Supreme Court suspended the ordinance after ruling that it was an invasion of the Spanish competences.[7]

3. The local census ordinance in Vic

This city (pop. 42.000/ 26% immigrants), in the Barcelona province, is where the last case-study is located. The centre-right, Catalan CiU had ruled Vic through consecutive coalition governments. On 26th December 2009 the city made it to the national news when the coalition government formed by CiU, PSC and ERC decided to pass an ordinance to forbid any undocumented immigrant from registering in the local cencus (*padrón*).[8] In Spain, the no registration in the local census implies not having access to social services such as health and education. The measure was strongly criticized and produced widespread criticism among civil society organizations, political parties and the Socialist government in Madrid. Some months after the approval, the ordinance was declared not applicable by the State's Attorney.[9]

---

[7] (2013). "El Supremo declara firme la sentencia que anuló la prohibición del 'burka'." El Pais. July 11, Available in: http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/07/11/catalunya/13735695 24_814273.html (Accessed 7 April 2015).

[8] Clota, E. (2010). " El alcalde de Vic veta a los sin papeles." El Pais, 14 January. Available in: http://elpais.com/diario/2010/01/14/espana/1263423606_850215.h tml (Accessed 30 March 2015)

[9] (2010). "Abogacía del Estado concluye que "procede" empadronar a todos los inmigrantes". La Vanguardia. 20 January. Available at: http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100120/53873994832/aboga

Why qualitative methodology?

This PhD thesis is based on qualitative methodology. Doing qualitative research, takes us to study the inter-subjective meaning behind the actions carried out by specific actors in a given context (Bevir and Rhodes, 2010: 22). The fact that a qualitative researcher is not particularly interested in the facts and phenomena but in the interpretation of these facts and these phenomena is what gives sense to my choice (Zapata-Barrero and Sanchez, 2011: 45). The main reason to select a qualitative methodology is because I seek to *understand* the motivations and ideas behind the alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. Also, I seek to explain the way context is interconnected to the emergence of alliances.

As stated above, one of the principles behind the use of this methodology is the capacity to learn and understand the underlying values of individuals and groups (Pierce, 2008:45). In order to reach this understanding, the interpretation of meaning becomes very important. Bevir and Rodhes (2010: 21) state that an interpretive approach focuses on meanings because it holds that beliefs are connected to actions. Hence, the framing of the different meanings of conflicts, facts and political and social events is necessary to understand the information gathered in a given context. The context, under qualitative methodology, is significantly interconnected with

cia-del-estado- concluye-que-procede-empadronar-a-todos-los-inmigrantes.html (Accessed 8 April 2015)

events or attitudes derived from the interaction of groups and individuals.

For this research, I collected the information on the three cases through a multi-method approach that included two techniques: desk-research and semi-structured interviews. Multi-method research involves the use of two or more sources of information of research methods in order to answer a research question (Bryman, 2001: 383). Hajer (2006: 73) states that desk-research involves a general overview of the documents and positions in a given field of study; newspaper analysis and document analysis. The purpose of doing so is first to make a chronology and a reading of events. Also to identify main actors and connect them to the immediate setting studied. In this thesis, desk-research of newspaper article and local councils' proceedings had the purpose of understanding the framing of the studied conflicts and identifying the main actors involved. Also desk-research of local immigration plans and the use of electoral data were important to understand institutional elements (namely, the configuration of power and the institutional channels for the participation of immigrants). In the research design, this was the first method used because it offered easy access to the information needed and also because they served as a starting point to study the object of study: the formation of alliances in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts.

Semi-structured interviews were the most important technique used in this thesis. According to Bevir and Rhodes (2010: 214), semi-structured interviews allow having an insider's perspective on a

specific reality with enough detail and depth. My interest in this type of interview was to uncover the opinions and interpretations about individual or collective social phenomena (Zapata-Barrero and Sanchez-Montijano, 2011: 69). I did 38 interviews in Spanish and Catalan to relevant actors for this study. Specifically, I interviewed representatives of political parties and immigrant associations directly involved in the conflict. I also interviewed civil society actors who were very active during the controversy. By interviewing the second set of actors (civil society), I was able to expand and clarify the findings while capturing particular dynamics (alliances) between the studied actors.

For political parties, I chose councilmen from each one of the political parties represented in the local council. I specifically contacted those who acted as spokespersons for their party in the local council. In case it was not possible to contact the councilmen, I interviewed the presidents of the local section of their respective political parties.

In the case of immigrant associations, I based my selection on those that were prominent during the conflict. I sought to identify in newspaper articles those immigrant associations that made public statements on the issue. Selecting immigrant associations based on externals factors implied that I did not focus on the association *per se* but in their role in the conflict.

As it is possible to identify from the selection, I chose immigrant associations from an external perspective (conflict-driven). The literature on immigrant associations has concentrated on those

elements in the political environment which internally affect the associations and their representativeness. These internal factors are clustered on studies exploring levels of membership, ethnic social capital or representativeness (Fenemma and Tillie, 2001; Odmalm, 2004; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005; Morales et al, 2009). Through the choice of an external factor (i.e. PICs); I acknowledge that not always internal factors are determinant for an immigrant association to be prominent in the political sphere. In this PhD study, the importance of immigrant associations for political parties is not based on their number of members, or their horizontal or vertical social capital, but their role in the context of the conflict. It is important to clarify that by immigrant associations, I mean the collective and organized expression of political, ethnic, religious and cultural interests or identities present in the immigrant population. This definition also includes those residents who are not immigrants *stricto senso* but identify themselves alike and defend immigrants on mainly ethnic lines (e.g. the Roma people throughout Europe).

Since the *first article* of the thesis is theoretical, I based my writing on books and journal articles from well-known authors in the field of immigration and the political opportunity structure approach and in the field of social movements and the political opportunity structure approach. In the *second article*, empirical and descriptive, I used the two techniques mentioned above (desk-research and semi-structured interviews). As this article is focused on the conflict and the identification of alliances, newspaper articles were good to understand the position taken by different actors and interviews

were good to understand the incentives that the actors had to form an alliance. In the *third and last article*, empirical and explanatory, I also used the two techniques mentioned above. Since the focus was on those elements in the political environment that facilitated the formation of alliances, I used immigration plans and electoral data to understand the institutional-related elements surrounding the alliances and newspaper articles and semi-structured interviews to understand the conflict-related elements surrounding the object of study. The same interviews were used for the second and third articles; however, the questions in both parts were different and they responded to the interest of the researcher for that particular part of the study.

The selection of sources of information and techniques to gather the information aimed at fulfilling two basic requirements: saturation and triangulation. Saturation was achieved through all the material gathered in the proceedings, newspapers articles, and interviews. When it comes to triangulation, the combination of techniques to gather the information (desk-research and interviews) confirmed the story line stated in documents. Moreover, interviews, which are central to studying the subjective meaning of the events, expanded the information to areas that were not neccesarily mentioned in the newspaper articles or official documents (i.e. local council proceedings). To complement the validation of the information gathered, I asked for feedback to three experts on qualitative methods from the Interdisciplinari Research Group on Immigration (GRITIM) at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

The results were analyzed through the construction of dimensions that allowed the categorization of the information gathered. The categorization of information seeks classifying and organizing the information through the inclusion of abstract notions that allow understanding a reality (Zapata-Barrero and Sanchez-Montijano, 2011: 172). Since all the information from the interviews was transcribed and translated into English, it was not difficult to go through them and classify the different information through the different standards that composed the analytical dimensions. Moreover, the use of analytical dimensions allowed framing the information along similar research units. In the thesis, they implied, on the one hand, the identification of the actors' position on the conflict and the incentives that motivated the alliance (*Article 2*) and on the other, the identification of the institutional and conflict-based dimensions that explain the emergence of alliances (*Article 3*). While the institutional-based dimensions aimed to categorize in a more descriptive manner the context surrounding these relations; the use of conflict-based dimensions aimed to categorize the perceptions, values and ideas that informed the relations between the actors studied. In the next and last section, I summarize each one of the three articles this thesis is divided.

1.4. How is this PhD thesis organized?

This thesis is composed by three articles (chapters in the present manuscript) and the conclusion that show the emergence of particular alliances (political parties and immigrant associations) under circumstances of politicization of immigration conflicts at the

local level. The main contribution is to initiate the debate on alliances in the immigration literature from the political opportunity approach at the theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, the study seeks to introduce the importance of particular alliances in the dynamics underpinning the accommodation of immigrants. At the empirical level, the study contributes to the analysis of settings where immigration shapes the political context. The theoretical contribution is intrinsically connected to the empirical one where the actors-based logic is dominant. In this sense, the three articles have to be considered as a linear process where the theoretical debate on alliances open the study, the empirical understanding of how alliances emerge follows and the search for elements that explain their emergence ends the whole cycle.

In the first article, I propose the construction of *an interpretive framework to understand the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs).* Proposing the framework tackles the gap concerning the lack of studies in the immigration literature regarding alliances between particular actors. In this article, I defend alliances between political parties and immigrant associations as a mechanism to legitimize the position of the former when politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level occur. The framework is composed by three dimensions: the position of the selected actors (political parties and immigrant associations) in the PIC, the incentives that motivate political

parties to seek for allies and the incentives offered by political parties to immigrant associations to engage in an alliance.

The contribution this article makes to the literature focuses on the role of incentives and motivations in the formation of alliances. By doing so, I offer a theoretical tool applicable to the understanding of how alliances emerge in specific contexts. In this sense, the centrality of the political party as an elite ally with an important role in the politicization of immigration, its own goals and the capacity to offer incentives to immigrant associations becomes of paramount importance.

In the second article, I *empirically implement the interpretive framework to identify the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs)* in the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic. I argue that different incentives result in the formation of different alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. Alliances in this context seek to legitimize the position taken by political parties in the presence of PICs at the local level. In the end and based on the findings, I introduce a typology of alliances based on different incentives. The typology considers three types of alliances: clientelist, symbolic and activist-oriented.

In this article, I contribute to the literature in two ways: first, by adding a new study to the growing literature that defends the city as the level of proximity for the policy-making of immigration.

Second, by systematizing the patterns of interaction between actors in a way that might be used to study similar phenomenon at other territorial levels through the abovementioned typology of alliances.

In the third chapter, I *explain the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic in the years 2010-2011*. I argue in this part that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge because of the existing local political environment when politicized immigration conflicts (PIC) occur. The argument acknowledges that conflicts act as the catalyst for the formation of alliances between these two actors in the search for support and solutions. In order to answer this question, I propose two institutional-related and two conflict-related dimensions in the political environment in order to identify those elements surrounding these two actors that favor the formation of alliances. The first two dimensions refer to the configuration of power and institutional openness in the city; the other two dimensions refer to the conflict frame and the ideology behind the arguments defended by the selected types of actors (political parties and immigrant associations). I apply the dimensions on the three conflicts that emerged in the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic.

In this article, I contribute to the literature in two ways: first, I highlight that the political environment at the local and not the national level might be responsible for the formation of alliances under certain circumstances of politicization. Second, I demonstrate

the role political parties have in the alliances with immigrant associations based on their position in the configuration of power. In this sense, to acknowledge their agency places them at the center of the interaction. Their role in this relation changes the traditional equation in the POS literature where social movements are the ones that seek for allies and not the other way around.

Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the contribution, the limits and the lines for further research, all three within the immigration debate. The three sections of this part are carried out from theoretical, empirical and methodological perspectives. In the final section of the conclusion, I give some policy recommendations on the governance of immigration at the local level and the role and responsibility each actor has in managing this area. Table *2* below summarizes the PhD thesis.

Table 2. Summary of the PhD thesis

Chapter in this manuscript	2.	3.	4.
Article	**First.** Alliances in contexts of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. The construction of an interpretive framework.	**Second.** Identifying alliances in contexts of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. The cases of Badalona, Lleida and Vic	**Third.** Explaining the emergence of alliances in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. A comparative study of Badalona, Lleida and Vic.
Approach	Theoretical	Empirical and descriptive	Empirical and explanatory
Description	The construction of an interpretive framework to identify the formation of alliances between political parties and immigrant	The application of the framework on the three cases. It also identifies differences in the alliances in the three cases.	The search for elements that can explain the emergence of particular alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the three cases.

	associations at the local level.		
Contribution	An interpretive framework identifying gaps and approaches for the study of alliances	1. Expanding the immigration literature on local studies. 2. A typology of alliances based on empirical results	1. Categorizing elements in the political environment responsible for alliances 2. Highlighting the central role of political parties in forming alliances
Publication	Triviño-Salazar, J. (2014). "Alliances in the resolution of politicized immigration conflicts in the city." GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series, 20, Summer Issue	1. Triviño-Salazar, J. (2014). "Immigrant organizations and the politicization of cultural diversity in the city." Analytic and Synthetic Notes; 2014/03; Best Participants' Essays, Summer School 2013. Migration Policy Centre. European University Institute 2. R&R to the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (June 2015)*	In preparation. To be sent to the *Journal of Government and Opposition*

1.5. Bibliography

Arango, J., Brey, E., Maldonado, Y., and Moualhi, D. (2011) 'Country context paper'. Research reports, *Universidad Complutense de Madrid*, October

Bengtsson, *B*. (2007). "Ethnic organisation, integration, and political opportunity structures – some theoretical considerations." *Comparative Social Research,* vol. 25.

Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R. (2010). "Interpretation and its others." In: M. Bevir. (ed.). *Interpretive Methods (vol. II)*. London: Sage. Interpretive Political Science

Borkert M. And Caponio, T. (eds.) (2010), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Bryman, A. (2001). *Social Research Methods.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burchianti, F. and Triviño-Salazar, J. (forthcoming). "La regulación política de los conflictos relacionados a la diversidad en el espacio público." In: R. Zapata-Barrero. *Las condiciones de la interculturalidad: gestión local de la diversidad*. Valencia: Tirant lo blanc (Book Chapter).

Burchianti, F. and Zapata-Barrero, R. (2014). "Is Catalonia immune to racism? An analysis of intolerant political discourses of mainstream party representatives (2010-2011)." Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 12(4), pp. 401-417.

Caponio , T. (2005). "Policy Networks and Immigrants` Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples." *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 31 (5).

Caponio, T. (2010). "Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy: Milan, Bologna and Naples compared. " in: M, Borkert and T. Caponio. (eds.), *The Local Dimension of Migration*

Policymaking. Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Celis, K., Eelbode, F. and Wauters, B. (2011). "Ethnic minorities in local political parties. A case study of three Belgiam cities (Antwerp, Ghent and Leuven)." Conference Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Reykjavick. University College Ghent and Ghent University.

Diani, M. (2015). "Building civic networks: Logics of tie formation." In: M. Diani (ed.). *The cement of civil society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*

Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2001). "Civic Communities, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups." *Connections* 24, pp. 26–41.

Garbaye, R. (2005). *Getting into local power. The politics of ethnic minorities in British and French cities.* Blackwell: Oxford.

Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2011). "Dimensió administrativa. Estudi exploratori sobre les polítiques locals en materia d'immigració a Catalunya" In: R. Zapata-Barrero (ed), *La gestio municipal de l'immigracio*. Barcelona: ACM

George, A. L. & Bennett, A., 2005, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press.

Giugni, M. and Morales, L. (2011). *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship*. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Hajer, M.A. (2006). "Doing discourse analysis: Coalitions, practices, meaning." pp. 65-74. In: M. van den Brink, and T. Metze (eds.). *Words Matter in Policy and Planning: Discourse Theory and Method in the Social Sciences.* Utrecht: KNAG: Utrecht

Ireland, P. (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ireland, P. (2004). Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State. Pittsburh: University of Pittsburgh Press King, G. Keohane, R. and Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Koopmans, R., and Statham, P. (2000). Migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention: An opportunity structure approach. In R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics. Comparative European perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Pessy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Kriesi, H. (2004). "Political Context and Opportunity." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kriesi, H. (n.d.). "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Social Movements." Working Paper Series. *European University Institute.* Available in: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON/Documents/Kriesipart ysystems.pdf (Accessed 26 December 2014)

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. & Giugni, M. G. (1995). *The Politics of New Social Movements in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*, Minneapolis and St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press.

McAdam, D., Tarrow S. and Tilly C. (2001), *Dynamics of Contention*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mahnig, H. (2004), 'The politics of minority-majority relations: How immigrant policies developed in Paris, Berlin and

Zurich', in R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S.Vertovec (eds.), Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies, 17-37. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Meyer, T. M. (2013). *Constraints on Party Politics.* ECPR Press.

Morales, L., Gonzalez-Ferrer, A., Jorba, L. (2009). "Políticas de incorporación y la gestión del asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local." In: R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.). *Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España.* Barcelona: Ariel

Mouritsen, P. (2006). "Political responses to cultural conflicts." In: P. Mouritssen and K.E. Jorgenssen (eds.). Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Differences. New York: Palgrave-McMillan

Odmalm, P. (2004). Civil society, migrant organisations and political parties: theoretical linkages and applications to the Swedish context. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 30(3)

Penninx, R. (2011). "Rethinking local integration policies in a multi-level governance framework." Conference paper presented in: Governing Migration and Integration in Europe's System of Multi-level governace. 28-29 October. University of Victoria

Penninx, R. and Martiniello, M. (2004). "Integration processes and policies: State of the Art." In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec. *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing

Però, D. (2005). Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case of Bologna. *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 28 (5).

Pierce, R. (2008). *Research Methods in Politics*. London: SAGE
Publications

Rex, J. & Josephides, S. (1987). "Asian and Greek Cypriot
Associations and Identity", pp. 11–41. In: J. Rex, D. Joly
and C. Wilpert (eds), *Immigrant Associations in Europe*.
Aldershot: Gower.

Rucht, D. (2004). "Movements, Allies and Adversaries." In: D.
Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). The Blackwell
Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Schrover, M. and Vermeulen, F. (2005). 'Immigrant Organisations',
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31: 823–832.

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements,
Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press

Toral-Martinez, G. (2009). "Social Capital, Legitimacy and
Integration of Imimmigrants' Organizations: A Three-
Dimensional Analysis of the Spanish Case." *Migration and
Citizenship PhD Workshop, University of Edinbourgh*. 27
November.

Van der Brug, W.; D'Amato, G.; Ruedin, D and Berkhout, J. (2015).
The politicisation of immigration. New York: Routledge

Van Dyke, N. (2003). "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effect
of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the
United States, 1930-1990." In: J. Goldstone (ed.). *States,
Parties, and Social Movements*. Pp.226-245. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Vermeulen, F. (2006). *The Immigrant Organising Process, Turkis
Organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese
Organisations in Amsterdam 1960-2000, IMISCOE-
Dissertation Series.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2004). Multiculturalidad e inmigración. Barcelona: Síntesis.

Zapata-Barrero, R. and Sanchez-Montijano, E. (2011). *Manual de investigación cualitativa en la ciencia política.* Madrid: Tecnos

Zapata Barrero, R. (ed.) (2015). *Interculturalism in cities: Concept, policy and implementation* . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Zincone, G. and Caponio, T. (2006). "The multilevel governance of migration", in R. Penninx, M. Berger and K. Kraal (eds.). *The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe. A state of the art. IMISCOE Joint Studies Series.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Zincone, G. (2011). "Conclusion: comparing the making of migration policy-making." In: G. Zincone, R. Penninx and M. Borkert (eds.). *Migration policy-making in Europe: The dynamics of actors and context in past and present.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

Zincone, G, Penninx, R. and Borkert, M. (eds.). (2011). *Migration policy-making in Europe: The dynamics of actors and context in past and present.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

CHAPTER 2

ALLIANCES IN CONTEXTS OF POLITICIZED IMMIGRATION CONFLICTS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK

The political opportunity structure (POS) debate emerged in the immigration literature as an analytical tool to study the interplay among institutional, political and social actors. However, a debate on alliances and their importance in the policy-making of immigration is still pending. Against this background, my objective is to propose an interpretive framework to study the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level. The framework, theory-driven, is located within the POS literature on immigration. I argue that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations serve to legitimize the position of the former when politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level occur. By proposing the framework mentioned above, I seek to introduce in the immigration literature following the POS approach the debate on alliances. Through this framework I highlight that the search for and the choice of allies are based on decisions connected to particular drivers and circumstances.

2.1. Introduction

The political opportunity structure (POS) approach emerged in the immigration literature as an analytical tool to explore the interplay among political actors (e.g. Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000). Under this debate, studies have mainly focused on how institutional and cultural factors shape the mobilization, organization and interaction of immigrants in receiving societies (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Hoschild and Mollenkopf, 2009). The inclusion of this approach in the immigration literature takes its logic from social movements' scholars studying political conflict and mobilization (Tarrow, 1994; Giugni 1995; Kriesi et al., 1995). In this literature, the formation of alliances emerges as a political opportunity for putting forward the claims of social actors. Interestingly enough, in the immigration literature, the incentives guiding the formation of alliances between particular actors and the role of specific circumstances (i.e. such as the conflictive politicization of immigration) on them have not been explored.

Against this background, my objective is *to propose an interpretive framework to study the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.* The question guiding the construction of the framework is: *How do political parties and immigrant associations ally in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level?* This framework is theory-driven and it is proposed within the immigration literature following

the POS approach. I argue that political parties and immigrant associations ally to legitimize[10] the position of the former when politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level occur. In this situation, immigrant associations become instrumental to political parties in a context of electoral competition.

By proposing the framework mentioned above, my contribution is to introduce in the immigration literature following the POS approach the debate on alliances. In this sense, I want to highlight that the search for and the choice of allies are based on decisions connected to incentives and circumstances. According to Dieter Rucht (2004: 202), alliances occur when there is a conjunction of factors that make two potential allies have common interests with the aim of strengthening each others' position. The POS literature on social movements considers alliances as a political opportunity which can provide political actors with more chances to put forward their claims (Kriesi, 2004: 69). With this contribution I acknowledge that political actors under certain circumstances follow a strategic interaction with the aim of achieving short-term and long-term goals. In this sense, the policy-making of immigration might be underpinned by the electoral calculations of political parties and by the needs immigrant associations have to obtain resources that otherwise they would not attain. *The theoretical contribution emphasizes the internal dynamics*

---

[10]   Legitimacy can be defined as the general belief that the actions of an organization or institution are desirable, suitable and appropriate within a social system (Vermeulen, 2006: 49).

reinforcing the formation of alliances and the central role that political parties, as an institutional actor, have in these dynamics.

I locate the present framework in a context of conflict and politicization at the local level. Locating the framework in a context of conflict departs from the acknowledgement of immigration as one of the most politicized issues in receiving societies in the last decades (Koopmans, 2005: 145, Van der Brug, 2015: 3). Conflicts related to the politicization of this issue could be translated into restrictive discourses and policies that seek to manage the confrontation between institutions, immigrants and local population in the public sphere (Zapata-Barrero, 2009: 10). This is connected to cultural aspects related to the presence of newcomers and their legal-administrative status in the receiving society (based on Koopmans, et al. 2005: 146). On the other hand, locating the framework on the local level implies acknowledging that urban contexts are the settings of proximity, of vicinity, where institutional actors act and react guided by the claims of newcomers and local population even before the national level (Giugni and Morales, 2011: 9).

Based on this, I define politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) as the treatment of certain cultural traits or the legal status of immigrants as a problem that requires political action through reactive discourses and policies. A PIC portrays salience and generates polarization among the political actors involved in their immediate context of interaction, in our case, the local level (In sections 2.3 and 3.1, I elaborate more on this concept).

I will divide this paper as follows: first, I will present the theoretical framework where I make explicit the gap in the immigration literature in regard to alliances. Then I will proceed to justify the focus on particular alliances (political parties and immigrant associations) and finally, I will justify the framing of this study within politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. Second, I will present the framework based on three dimensions directly related to the decision to ally. The three dimensions are: the actors' position on the politicized immigration conflict (PIC), the incentives for political parties to ally and the incentives for immigrant associations to ally with political parties. Finally, I will conclude by proposing the application of the framework on empirical cases.

2.2. Drawing the problem: the POS and alliances

In this part, I will refer to three blocks that will set the ground for the construction of the interpretive framework. The first block is an overview of the immigration literature following the political opportunity structure approach (POS). In this block, I seek to demonstrate the existing gap in regard to alliances between particular actors. In the second block, I use the social movements literature following the POS approach to justify my focus: alliances and particularly alliances with political parties. In the third and final block, I seek to justify the setting where this study is framed: politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. In this part, I mention the importance of exploring the alliances between actors

under these circumstances and in a context of proximity such as the local level.

2.2.1. Literature overview

The study of the mobilization and organization of immigrants following the POS approach is based on the original concept developed in the 1970s by *social movement scholars* studying political conflict and mobilization (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; Giugni 1995; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1996; Koopmans, 2004). It mainly explores the way powerful groups or institutions – and primarily the State –are susceptible or sympathetic to new demands made by groups that hold a marginal position in the political system (Schroeder and Vermeulen, 2005; Bengtsson, 2007). Political opportunity structures (POS) are defined as "consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions …that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure" (Tarrow, 1994: 85).

Overall, the literature has basically focused on four dimensions: the access to the political system (e.g. the level of state decentralization which may allow for more actors to intervene at more government levels), the configuration of power (e.g. majority, minority or coalition governments), the informal procedures and prevailing strategies used to deal with challengers (e.g. if members of the political system exclude or integrate challengers), and the availability of allies (e.g. political parties which can help social movements put forward their claims). Based on this, the availability

of allies, as a political opportunity, can provide social actors with more chances to put forward their claims in the political sphere (Kriesi, 2004: 69).

I*n the immigration literature* the study of potential allies for immigrants has not been explored; moreover, the study of the incentives that make two particular actors form an alliance (e.g. NGOs and political parties; media and immigrant associations or political parties and immigrant associations) has not been studied. Instead, the literature has focused on institutional and cultural factors that explain immigrants' choices and strategies to access institutions at the national and local levels (e.g. Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Caponio, 2005, 2010).

The national level

At the *national level,* the immigration literature focuses on those national features in the political system that defines the collective actions of immigrants. The mechanisms that receiving States and different actors use in their affairs with immigrants produce political opportunities that indicate the patterns of immigrants' social actions (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Fenemma and Tillie, 2001). This means that immigrants develop participatory forms which reflect the national POS they face (Ireland, 1994: 25).

Patrick Ireland (1994) illustrates the basic principles behind this perspective. In his comparative study between two French and two Swiss towns, he introduced the 'institutional channeling theory'.

This theory states that the way public institutions channels the political participation of immigrants, as a collective actor, determines how the opportunities for their involvement are structured. Ireland claimed in his research that the national institutional structure (i.e. immigrants' legal situation; social and political rights; citizenship laws, naturalization procedures, and policies of accommodation) and institutional gatekeepers (i.e. political parties, trade unions, parliament, religious organizations, judicial bodies and humanitarian non-profit organizations) shaped the participation of immigrants in the selected cities (1994: 10). Although he did not focus on alliances as such, his study covered a wide range of institutional and non-institutional actors that channeled the demands made by immigrants.

In this line of analysis, Koopmans (2004a: 452) state that field-specific political opportunities are related to citizenship regimes and integration models that shape immigrants' identities and their patterns of organization and participation. Citizenship regimes refer to the formal access to residence while the integration models refer to the cultural obligations that this access entails (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). These models depend on the State's incorporation strategies. They may range from assimilationist to pluralist approaches in the degree the State demands cultural homogeneity in granting full rights to minorities. The argument defended by Koopmans has not only been placed at the theoretical but also at the empirical level.

In an empirical study on immigrants' claim-making and mobilization in German, Dutch and British cities; Koopmans and Statham (2000) proposed a two-dimensional model based on citizenship regimes and integration model. They concluded that the incorporation of immigrants at the local level occurred along nationally-defined lines. Further, they observed that the patterns of mobilization of immigrants at the local level still clustered most of the characteristics of national level politics. On a similar line, Mahnig (2004: 18) studied immigration policies in three European cities –Paris, Berlin and Zurich. His basic aim was to explore whether the national level determined policy reactions at the local level. He concluded that the national level was connected to the POS for immigrants at the local level.

The work by Odmalm (2004) is also representative of this perspective. He studied the interplay between immigrant associations, individual participation of immigrants and their inclusion in political parties by comparing Rotterdam (The Netherlands) and Malmo (Sweden). These dynamics led him to conclude that the strong corporatist elements of the Swedish society were an obstacle to the mobilization of ethnic communities. This meant that these elements constrained the political opportunities for the involvement of immigrants in political institutions.

This body of literature pioneered in the study of the political participation of immigrants through the POS lens. However, it has been criticized for neglecting more localized dynamics between immigrants and institutions at other levels of government. Its state-

centered focus is blamed for not allowing the introduction of other elements which can explain immigrants' organization and mobilization such as local attributions on immigration, policy networks or the distribution of power in the city. As a response, some scholars developed another perspective which defends the local level as an arena with its own dynamics.

The local level

The understanding that the accommodation of immigrants occurs at the local level, making local authorities give a more practical and quicker response, informs this body of literature (Alexander, 2004; Hochshild and Mollenkopf, 2009; Penninx, 2009; Borkert and Caponio, 2010). The focus is on studying those aspects at the local level that shape the political involvement of immigrants. In other words, it explores how different institutional and social actors interact and the outcomes of this interaction. In spite of the focus on the actors' level, the local perspective has not focused on alliances either. Instead it concentrates on the incentives immigrant have to organize themselves and participate in policy networks (Caponio, 2005) or social networks (Giugni and Morales, 2011); their representativeness in political institutions as local councilors (Garbaye, 2005) and the mobilization of claims in urban contexts (Però, 2005).

Scholars under this perspective defend that the way citizenship regimes and national models of accommodation are understood at the local level define the political opportunities for immigrants

(Caponio, 2005; Morales et al, 2009; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Campomori and Caponio, 2011; Giugni and Morales, 2011). Furthermore, this perspective explores the local institutional and discursive framework that shapes the participation of immigrants and the main actors involved in the policy-making of accommodation (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004: 8). As shown by Borkert and Caponio (2010: 13), questioning the national-level is based on experiences that show that immigration poses similar challenges to local governments in cities throughout Europe. In some cases, the local policy reactions to these challenges have even come before than national legislation.

Different studies did empirical research on these interactions: the project Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC) illustrated how differences in national and local contexts resulted in a plurality of policies of accommodation in different European cities (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004:154). This perspective is also supported by the project Localmultidem (2010) which analyzed the local POSs for immigrants in sixteen European cities through questionnaires which assessed the institutional and discursive structures. The project offered evidence on the importance of local contexts on the mobilization strategies of immigrant communities. In this project the use of network analysis allowed mapping the relations immigrant associations had with civil society and institutional actors.

In the same line, Morales at al. (2009) analyzed the local POS for the political participation of immigrants in the Spanish cities of

Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia. They focused on policies which encouraged the political involvement of immigrants in associations. By assessing their effectiveness, they concluded that the institutional commitment to participation in these cities was correlated to the participation of immigrants in associations. Similarly, Tiziana Caponio (2005) studied the level of political influence exerted by immigrant associations in local policy networks in the cities of Bologna, Florence and Naples. Her aim was to explore whether different political majorities provided different political opportunities for immigrant associations. She concluded that differences in the political majorities affected the local POS for immigrant associations. This situation did not allow immigrant associations to carry a relevant role in their immediate context.

By refining Ireland's institutional channeling theory, Garbaye (2005) concentrated on framing the institutional structure which determined the minority politics at the local level. He explored how immigrants accessed local political elites by studying the election of local councilmen of foreign origin in Birmingham (U.K.) and Lille (France). He revealed that the local-central relation and the local political system were determinant in the chances of immigrant communities to have elected representatives in the local council.

Although the studies at the national and local levels are part of the growing debate on the subject, the study of POS in relation to immigration is still in a quite early stage. In spite of this, the study of actors has been a common denominator of both perspectives. In

order to complement the aforementioned characteristic, a more concise and specific approach on alliances between actors begs for more sophisticated theory-driven tools. The study of the power relations, through this theory, still gives more room for a deeper understanding of the political actors who shape the institutional side of the structure of opportunities. As it will be explained in the next section, it is precisely here where this research would like to make its contribution. It is through the study of the local politics where we can potentially appreciate new elements underpinning the opportunities for the inclusion of immigrant associations in the policy-making. After demonstrating that there is a gap in the literature in regard to alliance; I would like to justify why it is so relevant to focus on them, specifically on those between political parties and immigrant associations.

2.2.2. Focus: alliances with elite allies

In the literature on social movements following the POS approach, political actors are an important ally since their interactions determine the opening of opportunities for either protest or policy change (Kriesi, 2004: 69). Alliances are associated with partnership, closeness, and a spirit of mutual support among social actors and elite allies (Rucht, 2004: 203). However, they cannot be considered unproblematic unifications or fusions; they can also involve, in certain moments, competition and even conflict. The possibilities of mobilization of social actors are strongly linked to the presence of allies that can serve their interests or to the presence of antagonist elites that can be a threat to them (Van Dyke, 2003:

226). Therefore, potential alliances with political actors result from a process of coalition formation and strategic interaction (Kriesi, 2004: 74).

Actors in the POS approach can be divided in allies, opponents and those who are indifferent to the movements' claims or aspirations (Kriesi, 2004: 199). Furthermore, those who are not part of the social movement or organization should be considered potential elite allies or antagonists to the movement (e.g. the legislature, political parties, judicial system, president, businesses, organized labor, scientists, the church and intellectuals) (Van Dyke, 2003: 230). According to Kriesi et al. (1995:91), the type of claim (e.g. environment, peace movements, immigration, ethnic relations) and the type of ally (e.g. another social movement, an elite ally) will favor the type of support a political actor receives: symbolic (public recognition, organization skills) and material (money, members, etc.).

The literature on alliances from the POS approach has acknowledged that political actors mobilize in response to the availability of resources they may perceive or obtain. Accordingly, Diani (2015: 51) states that "…organizations secure resources through alliances, but also operate a reduction of systemic uncertainty." In this sense, resources are the glue that put together two actors that may empathize in their positions and ideals. Although resources become an important component in the formation of alliances, they are surrounded by significant components that should not be neglected: power relations, the

exchange of information and potential sentimental attachments. In this article, I take into consideration the power relations between two actors as a defining characteristic of the resources to be exchanged which are, at the same time, the glue that put together the alliance (I will come back to this point in *section 3* in this article). Based on the aforementioned points, political parties emerge not only in the literature on social movements but also in the one on immigration as highly important elite allies that can improve the chances of immigrant associations to have a better access to the policy-making.

Political parties as an elite ally of immigrant associations

In the POS literature on social movements, political parties are potential allies with the ability of helping movements achieve their goals (Van Dyke, 2003: 231). The potential divisions of political elites in the legislative and executive branches may put closer or further away some actors over others. This, in turn, makes some elites either more sympathetic or antagonistic to the claims made by movements (Van Dyke, 2003: 244). The literature in this sense acknowledges the role that the competing views represented by different political parties have in channeling certain claims and not others from groups outside policy-making institutions.

It is precisely the expedite access that political parties have to State institutions what makes their role essential in the inclusion of underrepresented groups –such as immigrants– in the political system (Celis et al, 2011:5). On the same line, Van de Brug, et al. (2015: 3) reminds us that political parties have the ability to put

certain issues on the agenda while preventing others from reaching this point. Moreover, the same scholars refer to the short-term strategies political parties may follow when certain problems appear as pressing issues in the political agenda. Based on the aforementioned points, political parties exhibit an important function: they provide the necessary majorities to shape the legislation in a wide range of issues while channeling various sectional interests (Business, labor, environment, immigrants) through their decisions (Celis et al, 2011:5).

In the study of immigration, political parties are acknowledged as actors responsible for the politicization of this issue. The presence of newcomers, the accommodation of their diversity and the role they play in everyday aspects of society are part of the different electoral scenarios in receiving societies. The salience of this topic in the political agenda of national and local governments have made of immigration an element to be included in the electoral programs and manifestos of political parties (Koopmans et al, 2005: 143). As stated by Celis et al. (2011: 10), political elites in recent decades have increasingly devoted attention to the socio-demographic representativeness of political institutions where immigrants are a concern and a target of inclusion.

In this context, alliances enhance the access political parties have to wider constituencies, strengthen their electoral potential and serve to legitimize discourses and policy proposals (Based on Van der Brug, et al. 2015: 15). They, immigrant associations, are considered an important part in the process of accommodation through their

political participation; this is because they serve as a collective platform of political influence (Strombland and Bengtsson, 2008). For immigrant associations, the role political parties play in the policy-making make them a target for access to tangible and intangible resources that otherwise they would not obtain (Diani, 2015: 279).

> "Host societies can have a decisive influence on the associational behavior of immigrants"
>
> (Vermeulen, 2006: 38)

As Diani (2015: 275) states: "very few organizations can afford to pursue their goals in total autonomy." The POS debate has unveiled the importance of political institutions in shaping the mobilization and organization of immigrant associations (Koopmans and Statham, 2000, 2003; Vermeulen, 2006; Stromblad and Bengtsson, 2008). For political parties, as for other institutional actors, associations are potential partners in developing and implementing immigration policies (Penninx 2011:5). As a rational actor, immigrant associations seek allies that can provide them with the recognition as valid interlocutors of their communities. They need to maximize their limited resources while being able to enter into different political and social fields. For them, political parties are the mediator that can better serve their interests and goals in the political system (Based on Rucht, 2004: 208).

I have defended in this section that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations are important because of their role in tackling the democratic deficit associated with the

position immigrants have in the political system. Now, it is necessary to justify the setting to study these actors.

2.2.3. Contextual framing: politicized immigration conflicts at the local level

In the POS debate, conflicts appear as a mobilizing factor that forces the interaction between institutional and social actors (Rucht, 2004: 197). Their emergence is not a phenomenon only limited to a situation external to the movement and organization; conflicts can emerge within and among social actors due to competing views, strategies or ideologies (Rucht, 2004: 209). They –conflicts– can trigger changes which increase the opportunities for their mobilization (Kriesi, 2004: 81).

Drawing from the POS literature on social movements, a conflict can promote the need for conflicting parties to reach certain level of mutual predictability and reliability in their interactions (Koopmans, 2004b: 36). The more channels opened by institutional actors should help in decreasing the polarization among them. Moreover, the literature has studied mechanisms where conflicting parties can reach cooperation by looking at those dimensions in the political environment that are more prone to change (e.g. the change in parliamentary majorities) (Rucht, 2004: 212).

In the study of immigration, conflicts have been considered part of the management of immigration in receiving societies (Koopmans, et al, 2005; Zapata-Barrero, 2009; Mouritssen et al, 2010). Koopmans et al. (2005: 205) states that "immigration and ethnic

relations have become highly politicized issues" and that "… state actors have largely contributed to this politicization by framing the issues and implementing immigration and integration policies." Accordingly, framing immigration in one way or the other puts it at the center of the political struggle that in the end influences social reality (Zapata-Barrero, 2009: 34). The politicization of immigration conflicts occur when political actors with decision-making power include them into the political agenda through restrictive discourses and policies (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2008: 17). These circumstances make of immigration a challenge that triggers the interaction among institutions, local population and immigrants.

At the local level, the politicization of immigration generates "a renegotiated modus vivendi between the local power and the ethnic interests" (Garbaye, 2005: 286). This implies accommodating these interests according to the local context. In this process, the "renegotiated modus vivendi" mentioned above makes institutional and social actors seek for mechanisms to manage and resolve the tensions that may emerge. In this context of interaction, the local level emerges as the one where policies may have a more direct impact on immigrants (Giugni and Morales, 2011: 3).

The importance of studying the local POS is that local governments are the first ones to act and react to the challenges brought by immigration. It is also the level where more immigrants can become politically active in everyday affairs through their involvement via conventional and less conventional avenues of participation (Giugni and Morales, 2011: 3). Because of proximity, it is at this level

where immigrants, as collective actors, can forge links with institutional and social actors.

In this section, I presented the POS literature regarding the political participation of immigrants based on two approaches: one which studies the national level as the setting that determines the opportunities for immigrants and another which acknowledges that the local level can also produce political opportunities connected to its contextual characteristics. In this section, I pointed out that this literature has not focused on the alliances between specific actors as an opportunity for immigrants at the local level. The situation becomes more evident when studying particular actors such as political parties and immigrant associations. Finally, I justified my decision to frame the alliances between the aforementioned actors in a setting of PICs at the local level. After presenting the object of study I am addressing to and justifying its study, it is time now to introduce the lens to tackle the gap this research refers to.

2.3. Drawing the lens: the interpretive framework

In this part, I will construct the framework to answer the question *How do political parties and immigrant associations ally in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level?* The way that I shall present it starts by establishing some general positions that guide the proposal of this framework.

2.3.1. What is the logic behind the framework on alliances?

The framework herein proposed takes as point of departure Rucht's reasoning (2004: 202) where he states that alliances occur when there is a conjunction of factors that make two potential allies have common interests or objectives with the aim of strengthening each others' position. I am particularly interested in understanding the dynamics that lead to the formation of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level.

The present framework revolves around the central role that political parties have in the formation of alliances with immigrant associations. As mentioned in the previous section, political parties are the main responsible actors, along with governments, in the politicization of immigration (Van der Brug, 2015: 3). This situation places them in a position where they are the ones that have to defend their discourses and policy proposals before the immigrant communities, the local population and the public opinion in general. It is precisely this situation that motivates them to ally with immigrant associations. Although there might be the situation where immigrant associations take the initiative to ally; political parties are the ones that ultimately decide. Moreover, there might situations where immigrant associations are part of social movements pressing for political action on certain issues (e.g. the US immigration reform). Still, political parties are the ones deciding first, to get involved on the contested issue and second, the

convenience or not of looking for allies (This is more evident among those political parties with options to be part of the government). The present framework acknowledges and reflects on this situation.

By doing so, I do not want to imply that immigrant associations are passive agents in the formation of alliances. As it is well-known, there is a large literature focused on the mobilization, organization and strategies carried out by immigrant associations in sending (transnational) (Baubock, 2003; Martiniello and Lafleur, 2008: Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2009) and receiving societies (Fenemma and Tillie, 2001; Odmalm, 2004; Vermeulen, 2006; Morales et al, 2009). However, the position a political party assumes in the politicization of an issue and its expedite access to the policy-making institutions are determinant power factors that shape their relations with social actors. As Patrick Ireland (1994: 25) states, political parties are institutional gatekeepers that can place immigrants closer or further away from the power structures.

I operationalize alliances as those relations between two actors that emerge from the support lent by one side or the other with the aim of achieving short-term or long-term objectives. This relation must acknowledge the power imbalances in terms of access to resources that one of the sides has and the strategic interactions derived from this imbalance. The way I operationalize an alliance is not based on quantifiable standards (e.g. number of meetings, number of interactions, measuring the autonomy from each other), but on the perception both actors have of who an ally is under specific

circumstances. The qualitative approach to alliances is quite different to the one used in the original POS literature on alliances. Under the latter, alliances has been studied by measuring the availability of allies (Kriesi et al., 1995); the number of elite allies during student protests (Van dyke, 2003) or the density of networks of actors (Diani and Bison, 2004). Diani (2015) claims that *"it has long being shown that social actors' accounts of the actual frequency/intensity of their exchanges with other actors are less accurate than their qualitative assessment of the presence and relevance of specific ties… It is sensible to assume that each actor, when planning an activity, will look first for resources/support from its closest and most reliable partners…"* Therefore, when referring to alliances, I mean the perception two actors may have on each other based on an issue-specific relationship or a long-standing relationship. In this sense, two actors may not interact much; however, how they perceive each other or how the actors surrounding them perceive them when a conflict emerges is what defines their relation.

> "Conflict does not only divide those parties on the opposite sides... but they also unite actors who are on the same side. If collective actors   want   to win a   conflict,   they will invest time and energy into building a coalition with like-minded allies"

> (Van der Brug, et al. 2015: 5)

In this framework, conflicts act as the trigger for the formation of alliances. They are the causal mechanism that put in motion the positions of several actors that eventually will align their interests

and objectives accordingly. Although political parties and local governments may be responsible for the PICs, the formation of alliances is a political choice that the actors involved decide to start or not. As it was explained above, conflicts are an important characteristic in the POS approach and an important part in the policy-making of immigration. The conceptualization of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) builds on two ideas: social problems and politicization. Both concepts have been defended in the framework of immigration studies by authors sucha as Koopmans et al (2004); Mouritssen et al. (2006); Zapata-Barrero (2009) and Van der Brug, et al. (2015). It basically refers to the framing of a social problem as one that requires political action. When a social problem enters into the political agenda then we can consider it as politicized. The conflict enters into the picture of politicization when the social problem is portrayed as such to the public opinion through reactive discourses and policy actions. The politicization of a conflict portrays two characteristics: salience, meaning attention from the public opinion, and polarization, meaning the division the conflict produces (Van der Brug, et al, 2015: 5). We can consider a conflict to be politicized when it is said to require political action; otherwise, it cannot be considered as such. The framework is located in a setting where PICs occur at the local level. With this in mind, the dynamics underpinning the emergence of alliances occur in a context of proximity where immigrants and local population live and interact on a daily basis.

Based on the aforementioned points, there are three positions that guide the framework: first, an agreement on a common position is a

prerequisite for an alliance; second, alliances between political parties and immigrant associations are intrinsically connected to the goals the former have (e.g. addressing a specific part of the electorate or changing the policy direction of a specific area) and third, immigrant associations in an alliance respond to incentives offered by political parties.

In the first position, an alliance is formed by two parties that agree on specific or general points. This is a step that allows the interaction and cooperation between two actors seeking for support and resources. In the second position, alliances contribute to the goals political parties have by legitimizing their discourses and policy support. This serves to acknowledge the centrality of political parties in the context of the politicization and the role alliances serve to achieve their goals. Finally, in the third position, alliances represent the alignment of supply and demand mechanisms where political parties can offer resources that immigrant associations perceive as reachable through their involvement in the conflict.

2.3.2. How to construct a framework on alliances?

The framework herein presented studies alliances between particular actors in the presence of PICs at the local level. The way I shall organize it is by proposing three dimensions directly related to the three positions I mentioned in the previous section. These dimensions are related to the understanding of the dynamics underpinning the formation of alliances under the politicization of

immigration conflicts. The dimensions are: the position political parties and immigrant associations assume in the context of the PIC; the incentives[11] that motivate a political party to find allies and the incentives offered to immigrant associations to ally in the context of the conflict. The way the dimensions are laid out follow a process where the agreement on the position both actors have on the PIC becomes a prerequisite and the most important step in the formation of the alliance.

a) Positioning (when an issue is politicized)

A set of actors with similar goals have the capacity of strengthening their position when they join forces (Rucht, 2004: 135). In the POS literature on social movements, the position an actor assumes on specific issues or whether they agree or disagree with the claims made by other actors can signal the type of relation they will have (Giugni and Passy, 1998: 17). Accordingly, the position political actors have on certain issues implies seeking for other actors that can support them in order to create a common front (Rucht, 2004: 202). The departing point for exchanging support is the commonalities they find in their viewpoints. In the case of immigration, its politicization produces polarization –division – among the parties involved. This situation produces tensions among the actors defending one position or the other (Koopmans et al. 2005: 146).

---

[11] In this PhD thesis, incentives are understood as the reward that motivates an individual or an organization to perform an action (i.e. forming an alliance would be considered an action).

The position that a political party assumes in a PIC is very relevant for immigrant associations because it signals the type of relationship and potential alliance this set of actors will have. Based on this, *the dimension seeks to understand the position assumed by political parties and immigrant associations when an immigration conflict is politicized.* In this case, I use two standards: the position political parties and relevant immigrant associations take on the PIC (for or against) and how they justify their position. This implies understanding the reasons behind the decision to: politicize (in the case of the political party), support the politicization (in the case of political parties and immigrant associations in favor) or to oppose to the politicization (in the case of political parties and immigrant associations against the PIC).

b) The incentives for political parties

The incentive a political party with decision-making power has to engage in an alliance is to garner support from other political actors to legitimize their proposals and decisions. However, the incentive is pretty much connected to the goals they have in a context of electoral competition. This is, political parties seek to legitimize themselves as the container of the claims of society or part of it (Rucht, 1996: 187). As Van der Brug, et al. (2015: 6) states, the electoral competition becomes an essential component to understand how political parties interact with other political actors when some issues are politicized (i.e. immigration). In this sense, conflict triggers the competition among political parties that are defending their own positions of power. However, it is sensitive to

acknowledge that in some cases political parties favoring or opposing to the politicization of certain issues may have other motivations not necessarily connected to expanding their electoral base (Giugni and Passy, 1998: 17). At the end of the day, the goal a political party has is related to getting the votes to enter into office or remain in office or to strengthening their position to defend a specific policy direction (Strom, 1990: 566).

Departing from these premises, the incentive for a political party to form an alliance is related to the goal it has to either enter into or remain in office or to the goal of achieving a policy change. The seminal work made by the political scientist, Kaare Strom (1990: 566) illuminates the structure of this dimension. In this part, I seek to understand how the incentive to form an alliance is related to the goals a political party has. In order to do so, I divide political parties as: vote-seeking or policy-seeking. Both types are an adaptation of Strom's typology's of political parties' behavior[1213] to the particularities of this study.

---

[12]   The original typology does not refer to incentives but the goals political parties have. However, the evolution of studies in the field of political party behavior also refers to vote-seeking and policy-seeking incentives (See the work of Crisp et al., 2004; Wagner, 2012; Meyer, 2013). I follow the latter conceptualization (vote-seeking and policy-seeking incentives).

[13]   Strom (1990: 566) also includes office-seeking parties. However, for the purposes of this framework, I only used the two above-mentioned. The operationalization of the vote-seeking and office-seeking party in this study results in very similar types that could add an unnecessary level of complexity to the framework.

Vote-seeking: It basically refers to the fact that "parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies" (Downs cited by Müller and Strom, 1999: 8). In this case, the incentive for a political party to engage in an alliance is to maximize its effect on the electorate –voters. Kriesi (n.d.: 7) observes that in this case, political parties are motivated by opportunistic reasons that can expand their electoral base. In this situation, alliances reinforce the vote-seeking political party by legitimizing a particular position on the politicization of an immigration conflict.

Policy-seeking: a political party may emphasize "consistency in policy decision over winning elections" (Schlensinger, 1984: 393). In this case, the incentive for a political party to engage in an alliance is to maximize its effect on public policy (which is its ultimate goal). In order to do so, the political parties seek to attain the support of like-minded allies in the politicization of certain issues (such as immigration) (Müller and Strom, 1999: 7). Viewed from the party's perspective, getting the support of specific allies can contribute to "the party's long-term agenda in a given policy subsystem (Kriesi, n.d.: 7).

A political party under this situation will have the incentive to ally in order to legitimize the policy change they propose. In this sense, the change might go in counter-direction of reactive discourses and policies popular among the public

opinion. A typical example is the position of ethnic political parties that defend certain principles even if this affects their position of power or their chances to expand their electoral base.

c) The incentives for immigrant associations

Incentives are a vital component in the mobilization of political actors in the quest for common objectives (Knoke, 1988: 326). This is because they can facilitate the collective actions of different actors (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004: 116). When organizations offer to members (or to other organizations) a variety of inducements; they basically seek for support to undertake collective action (Knoke, 1988: 315). Kriesi et al. (paraphrased by Amenta and Carens, 2004: 474) mention the importance of the interaction context where different actors mobilize and take advantage of political opportunities. Accordingly, in this scenario political authorities create 'system of incentives' for social movements to influence their strategies, size and outcomes. In the same line, organizations, specifically, their leaders are seen as political entrepreneurs that mobilize resources to garner the support from other organizations (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004: 173).

In this dimension I seek to identify those concrete incentives offered to immigrant associations when a specific issue is politicized. The incentives to engage in an alliance with a political party are connected to the prospect of obtaining tangible or intangible resources that otherwise would not be easily accessible for immigrant associations. In this dimension, I take as point of

departure the seminal work of Clark and Wilson (1961) who proposed a typology for organizations based on quantifiable (material), solidary and purposive incentives. The types of incentives also draw their logic from the classical works by Zald and Ash (1966); Miller, et al. (1987) and Knoke (1988).

Quantifiable incentives: they are tangible rewards which could imply their monetization (e.g. prospects for employment, grants, money) (Miller et al., 1987: 520). Incentives under this type are considered by the receivers more important than other intangible rewards related to their collective action (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 139). In the case of immigrant associations, the quantifiable incentives offered through their alliances with political parties may take the form of public grants if the political party is in power, funding of the associations, jobs in the government or in the party for certain members or money.

Solidary incentives: they are intangible rewards that result from the action of associating (Miller et al., 1987: 520). They do not have monetary value as they are linked to the recognition of the status that one organization can make of individuals or another organization (Knoke, 1988: 315). These incentives basically derive from socializing. In the case of immigrant associations, the *solidary incentives* offered through the alliances with political parties are related to the prospect of achieving their recognition as valid interlocutors of their communities and the overall

respect that this brings along. In this sense, the socialization occurs through the constant consultation and participation of these associations in spaces offered by the political parties involved in the politicization of an immigration conflict.

Purposive incentives: they are also intangible rewards related to more normative aims linked to value fulfillment (Miller et al., 1987: 520). The prospect of achieving a major change in the status-quo is the incentive offered to those willing to engage in collective action (Clark and Wilson, 1961: 130). In few words, the accomplishment of changes that favor the common good overweigh the prospect of other incentives (Knoke, 1988: 315). In the case of immigrant associations, the purposive incentives offered through the alliances with political parties can be related to the prospect of contributing to a local model that favors the proactive management of immigration and the overall cohesion of the city.

Table 3. Summary of the analytical framework

Dimension	Description	Standard
Positioning	The way a political party and an immigrant association position on the politicization of an immigration conflict.	- For the politicization - Against the politicization
Incentives for the political party	The incentive a political party has to ally with an immigrant association according to their goals.	- Vote-seeking - Policy-seeking
Incentives for the immigrant associations	The incentives offered to immigrant associations to legitimate a political party.	Quantifiable Solidary Purposive

This part has aimed to build an interpretive framework which could be of use in future empirical research involving the study of actors, alliances and the policy-making of immigration at the local level. The importance of this framework involves going from a general context which studies the political environment to a very specific reality of interaction. As it has been seen, this framework has been constructed on foundations that allow understanding the meso-level, as the one contributing to the formation of the alliances between the studied set of actors.

2.4. Conclusion

Although the term alliances has been loosely used to describe the rapprochement of actors under certain circumstances or to describe wide alliances between a group of actors that form a coalition advocating for immigration, the truth is that this relation has been an unexplored field in the immigration literature. Both: their emergence, consolidation and finalization and the factors facilitating or constraining them have not been systematically studied. By doing a theoretical exercise of proposing a framework that could be applied to empirical cases, this paper has accomplished its main contribution which is to offer a specific research tool to understand the institutional dynamics that shape specific alliances of immigrant associations in the city.

In this framework, political parties emerge as the protagonists of the framing of the alliances. This is because of the politicized nature of the studied conflict at the local level. The intention of doing so was to use alliances as a mechanism that can show greater dynamics that differentiate how political elites manage the politicization of immigration at the local level. Moreover, focusing on alliances between political parties and immigrant associations is a good standard of how cities are confronting the rising politicization of immigration and how immigrants, as a collective actor, are included in the political decisions that affect their lives.

The next step in the use of this framework is to show its viability by making cross-city comparisons where PICs have emerged and where political parties have had a key role in their politicization and

resolution. The utility of such comparison might lead to possible explanations on why these alliances occur, their connection to party and local politics and the strategies immigrant associations employ when seeking for allies alliances as a political opportunity can show greater dynamics that differentiate how political elites manage conflicts and their resolution.

2.5. Bibliography

Alexander, M. (2004). "Comparing local policies toward immigrants: An interpretive framework, a typology and preliminary survey results. " In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec. *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Bauböck, R., 2003. "Towards a political theory of migrant transnationalism." *International Migration Review,* 37, 700-723.

Bengtsson, *B*. (2007). "Ethnic organisation, integration, and political opportunity structures – some theoretical considerations." *Comparative Social Research,* 25.

Bird, K. (2004). "Comparing the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Advanced Democracies." Paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association*, *University of Winnipeg.* 3 June.

Borkert M. And Caponio, T. (eds.). (2010), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Campomori, F. and Caponio, T. (2011). "Searching for a model of integration. Immigrant policy frames in the centre-right Veneto and centre-left Emila Romagna regions", *presented at 18th International Conference of Europeanists*, June 20-22, Barcelona, Spain.

Caponio , T. (2005). "Policy Networks and Imimmigrants` Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples". *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 31 (5).

Caponio, T. (2010). "Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy: Milan, Bologna and Naples compared. " in: M, Borkert and T. Caponio. (eds.), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Celis, K., Eelbode, F. and Wauters, B. (2011). "Ethnic minorities in local political parties. A case study of three Belgiam cities

(Antwerp, Ghent and Leuven)." Conference Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Reykjavick. University College Ghent and Ghent University.

Clark, P. and Wilson, J. (1961). "Incentive systems: A theory of organizations." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp. 129-166.

Crisp, B. F., Escobar-Lemmon, M. C., Jones, B. S., Jones, M. P., and Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2004). "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *Journal of Politics*, *66*(3), 823-846.

Diani, M. (2015)."Building civic networks: Logics of tie formation." In: M. Diani (ed.). *The cement of civil society.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Diani, M. and Bison, (2004). "Organizations, coalitions and movements." Theory and Society, 33, pp. 281-309

Edwards, B., and McCarthy, J. D. (2004). "Resources and social movement mobilization." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Fennema, M. and Tillie, J. (2001). "Civic Communities, Political Participation and Political Trust of Ethnic Groups." *Connections* 24. Pp. 26–41.

Garbaye, R. (2005). *Getting into local power. The politics of ethnic minorities in British and French cities.* Blackwell: Oxford.

Giugni, M. (1995). "The cross-national diffusion of protest." In: H. Kriesi, R. Koopmans, J. Willem Duyvendak and M. Giugni. *New Social Movements in Western Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Giugni M. and Passy, F. (1998). "Social Movements and Policy Change: Direct, Mediated, or Joint Effect?" *American Sociological Association Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Working Paper Series*, 1 (4).

Giugni, M. and Morales, L. (2011). Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hochshild, J. and Mollenkopf, J. (2009). *Bringing outsiders in: Trans-Atlantic perspectives in immigrant incorporation.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ireland, P. (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Knoke, D. (1988). "Incentives in Collective Action Organizations." American Sociological Review 53 (3) (June)., pp. 311-329. Available in: jstor.org/stable/2095641 (Accessed on 3 June 2015).

Koopmans, R. (2004a). "Migrant mobilization and political opportunities: variation among German cities and a comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 30 (3).

Koopmans, R. (2004b). "Chapter 2: Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Koopmans, R., and Statham, P. (2000). "Migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention: An opportunity structure approach." In: R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics. Comparative European perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Pessy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, H. (2004). "Political Context and Opportunity." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kriesi, H. (n.d.). "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Social Movements." Working Paper Series. *European University Institute.* Available in: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON/Documents/Kriesipart ysystems.pdf (Accessed 26 December 2014)

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. (1995). *New Social movements in Western Europe. A comparative analysis.* London: UCL Press Limited.

Localmultidem (2010). "Multicultural Democracy and Imimmigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level." Universidad de Murcia. European 7th Framework.

Mahnig, H. (2004). "The politics of minority-majority relations: How immigrant policies developed in Paris, Berlin and Zurich". In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S.Vertovec (eds.). *Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies*. Pp. 17-37. Aldershot: Ashgate.

McAdam, D. (1996). "Political Opportunities: Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions." In: D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. Zald (eds). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.* Cambridge University Press.

Martiniello, M. (2006). "Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Imimmigrants and Their Offspring in Europe." In: R, Baubock, *Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political Participation.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE.

Martiniello, M. y Lafleur, J.M., (2008). "Towards a transatlantic dialogue in the study of immigrant political transnationalism." *Ethnic and racial studies,* 31(4), 645-663.

Miller, P., Malcolm, E. and Sigelman, L. (1987). "Reconsidering a typology of incentives among campaign activists: A research note." The Western Political Quaterly. 40 (3) (Sept.), pp. 519-526. Available at: http://jstor.org/stable/448388 (Accessed 2 June 2015).

Morales L., Gonzalez A., and Jorba, L. (2009). "Políticas de Incorporación y asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local." In: R. Zapata Barrero (ed.). *Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Morris, A., and Staggenborg, S. (2004). "Leadership in social movements." *The Blackwell companion to social movements*, pp. 171-196.

Mouritsen, P. (2006). "Political responses to cultural conflicts" (pp. 1-31). In: P. Mouritssen and K.E. Jorgenssen (eds.). *Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Differences.* New York: Palgrave-McMillan.

Müller, W. and Strom, K. (eds). (1999). *Policy, office or votes? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Odmalm, P. (2004). "Civil society, migrant organizations and political parties: theoretical linkages and applications to the Swedish context." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 30 (3).

Østergaard-Nielsen, E., (2009). "La política a través de las fronteras: reflexiones sobre la dimensión transnacional de la participación política de los migrantes." En: A. Escrivá, A. Bermúdez y N. Moraes, (eds), *Migración y participación política. Estados, organizaciones y migrantes latinoamericanos en perspectiva localtransnacional.* Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones

Científicas, 17-41.Penninx, R. (2009). "Decentralising Integration Policies. Managing Migration in Cities, Regions and Localities." *Policy Network Paper.* November. London: Policy Network.

Penninx, R. (2011). "Rethinking local integration policies in a multi-level governance framework." Conference paper presented in: *Governing Migration and Integration in Europe's System of Multi-level governace.* 28-29 October. University of Victoria.

Penninx, R. and Martiniello, M. (2004). "Integration processes and policies: State of the Art." In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec (eds.). *Citizenship in European Cities. Imimmigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Però, D. (2005). "Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case of Bologna." *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (5).

Rucht, D. (2004). "Movements, Allies and Adversaries." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Schrover, M. and Vermeulen, F. (2005). 'Immigrant Organisations', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31: 823–832.

Schlesinger, J. A. (1985). "The new American political party." *American Political Science Review,* 79 (04), 1152-1169.

Strom, K. (1990). "A behavioral theory of competitive political parties." *American Journal of Political Science,* 34 (2) (Ma7), pp. 565-598

Stromblad, P. and Bengtsson, B. (2008). "Empowering members of ethnic organisations: Tracing the political integration potential of immigrant associations in Stockholm." *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 30(1), 1-19.

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution.* New York: Random House.

Van Dyke, N. (2003). "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effect of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the United States, 1930-1990." In: J. Goldstone (ed.). *States, Parties, and Social Movements*. Pp.226-245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Van der Brug, W.; D'Amato, G.; Ruedin, D and Berkhout, J. *The politicisation of immigration.* New York: Routledge.

Vermeulen, F. (2006). *The Immigrant Organising Process, Turkis Organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese Organisations in Amsterdam 1960-2000, IMISCOE-Dissertation Series.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Wagner, M. (2012). "When do parties emphasise extreme positions? How strategic incentives for policy differentiation influence issue importance." *European Journal of Political Research*, *51*(1), 64-88.

Zald, M. and Ash, R. (1966). "Social Movement Associations: Growth, Decay and Change." Social Forces, 44 (3), pp. 327-341.

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2009). *Politiques de Ciutadania. Collecció Estudis.* Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona.

Zapata-Barrero, R., Gonzalez, E. and Sanchez Montijano, E. (2008). *El discurso político en torno a la inmigración en España y la UE.* Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración. Subdirección General de Información Administrativa y Publicaciones.

Chapter 3

Identifying alliances in contexts of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level.

The cases of Badalona, Lleida and Vic

The present article seeks to implement the interpretive framework in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level. Using qualitative methodology (desk research and semi-structured interviews), I analyze the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in the city of Badalona, the burka ban in public buildings in the city of Lleida, and the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census (Padrón) in the city of Vic. The three cities are located in Catalonia, Spain. Through the paper, I argue that different incentives in the presence of PICs result in the formation of different types of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations. In this situation, it is possible to identify three types of alliances: clientelist, symbolic and activist-oriented.

3.1. Introduction

The present article seeks *to implement the interpretive framework in cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.*[14] In order to advance the aforementioned objective, the question I aspire to answer is: *how do alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts in the cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic?* I argue that different incentives in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts result in the formation of different alliances between political parties and immigrant associations. Alliances in this context seek to legitimize the position taken by political parties in the presence of a PIC at the local level. To answer the abovementioned question, I implement the interpretive framework on three politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in three Catalan cities –Badalona, Lleida and Vic –in the years 2010 and 2011. These cases are related to the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, the banning of women wearing burka from entering public buildings in Lleida and finally, the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census (Padron) in Vic. From here, a challenge that emerges is how to empirically translate the relevance of alliances following the POS approach to the immigration literature that studies the accommodation of immigrants.

---

[14]   The interpretive framework to identify the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations was developed in *Article 1* of this PhD thesis.

The interpretive framework is located within the debate on alliances following the POS approach (Tarrow, 1994, Kriesi et al. 1996; Diani, 2015; Kriesi, n.d). The logic behind the approach is that institutions matter in the mobilization, organization and the strategies of political actors. In this situation, alliances with elite allies (e.g. political parties, the legislature, the judiciary) are a political opportunity for those actors (e.g. social movements and organizations) interested in participating in the political process. In the immigration literature, the POS approach has been useful to study how the political environment shapes immigrants' organization and mobilization at the national (Koopmans et al, 2005; Garbaye, 2005) and local levels (Bousetta, 2000; Però, 2005; Martiniello, 2006; Caponio, 2005 and 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011).

The contribution this paper makes to the immigration literature is structured around three axes: first, the application of the interpretive framework contributes to the literature by introducing the debate of alliances in settings where immigration has been politicized. Second, placing the study at the local level contributes to the growing literature that defends the city as the level of proximity for the policy-making of immigration (Penninx and Martiniello, 2004; Penninx, 2011; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011; Zapata-Barrero, 2015). In this sense, studying the emergence of alliances at this territorial level and in the presence of politicized immigrations conflicts (PICs) allows identifying patterns of interaction that lead to the alliances. Finally, bringing in the importance of alliances at the local level allows systematizing the

patterns of interaction between actors in a way that might be used to study similar phenomenon at other territorial levels.

Under these conditions, political parties with access to decision-making bodies are considered highly important institutional allies (Van Dyke 2003: 231). They have the power to propose and take decisions in the light of influences from various sectional interests, immigrants included (Bird 2004: 20). In the case of immigrant associations, they are considered 'the expression of mobilized resources and ambitions' and a 'potential partner in developing and implementing integration policies' (Penninx, 2009: 5).

Politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) can be defined as the treatment of certain cultural traits or the legal status of immigrants as a problem that requires political action through reactive discourses and policies. A PIC portrays salience, attention from the public opinion, and generates polarization, division among the actors involved (Article 1). The role of institutional actors (e.g. political parties, government) in the conflict is what takes us to define this clash as a politicized conflict (Koopmans et al, 2005: 146). When this occurs, those actors involved in the PIC look for mechanisms to re-stabilize and re-routinize patterns of interactions in order to resolve the conflict (Koopmans, 2004: 36). This implies not focusing so much on concrete measures or policies but on the interaction derived from the PIC itself. This process is guided by how each actor interprets the PIC and the alternatives to solve it over time.

In order to apply the framework, first, I present the cases and the methodology I will use to answer the question. In this part, I describe the Spanish and Catalan context, the three PICs and the methodology. Second, I analyze the three cases according to the interpretive framework proposed. Third, I draw some conclusions in line with my argument; in this part, I propose three types of alliances: clientelistic, symbolic and activist-oriented.

3.2. Cases and methodology

This part is devoted to the methodological aspects behind a qualitative case-study comparative research of three conflicts that emerged in the Catalan cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic in the years 2010-2011. To this end I will discuss the Catalan context and case-selection, sources of information and techniques, and the interpretive framework I will use to analyze the three cases.

3.2.1. Background and cases

Spain as a new country of immigration witnessed the most rapid increase in the number of immigrants in the years 2000–2008 in Europe and the second largest among OECD countries (Arango et al. 2011: 3). While in 2000 the number of foreign residents was 1 million (2.3%) in 2009 it was 5.5 million (12%) out of 46 million inhabitants. The economic boom in that period coupled with its geographic location and historical bonds with Latin America facilitated this rise.

Regions and cities are very important arenas for the management of immigration in Spain. While the central government is responsible for controlling the immigrants' flows and providing legal status, the Spanish framework on competences grant to the sub-national level attributions on the reception and accommodation of immigrants (Miret 2009: 51). Due to the importance of this policy area at this level, immigration is a subject of debate and competing views in the local policy-making process. Moreover, the relevance of immigration in the political agenda of different actors makes it part of the electoral scenarios of regions and cities all over the country (Garcés-Mascareñas 2011: 18). In this context, political parties emerge as a very important actor in proposing policies related to the accommodation of immigrants at this level (Garcés-Mascareñas, 2011: 23).

In the case of Catalonia, this Autonomous Community (Region), located in the north-east of Spain, witnessed the most rapid increase in the number of immigrants in a relatively short period of time. While in 2000, its population was 6.2 million of which 181.000 were foreign residents (2.9%); in 2012, its population was 7.5 million of which 1.186.000 were foreign residents (15.68%).[15] The sharp demographic change mentioned above made of the accommodation of immigrants a major challenge for this Community and its cities. In this sense, Catalonia in the last two

---

[15] IdesCat (2013). "Anuari estadistic". Institut d'estadistic de Catalunya. Available in: http://www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=19

decades released several policy documents aimed at regulating immigration-related issues (Solé and Parella, 2007: 88). Examples of these documents are the 1993-2000 Catalan Intergovernmental Immigration Plan; the 2001-2004 Interdepartmental Immigration Plan; the 2005-2008 Immigration and Citizenship Plan; the 2009-2012 Immigration and Citizenship Plan, the upcoming 2013-2016 Immigration Plan and the 2008 National Agreement on Immigration (Zapata-Barrero, 2012). Also small, middle and large Catalan cities drafted immigration plans which responded to their local specificities. Examples of these cities are Barcelona and the 2012-2015 Immigration Plan, El Prat de Llobregat and the 2008 Local Plan for new citizenship or Reus and the 2006 Municipal Plan on Immigration, Coexistence and Citizenship.

Although it is not the main topic of this paper, the party system in Catalonia reflects the specificities of a territory with its own language, culture and history (Guibernau, 2007: 96). This situation has made parties to be located not only on the left/right cleavage but also on the nationalist (Catalan) one. This last characteristic has been important in how political parties propose the way immigrants should be accommodated. In this case, those parties considered to be Catalan-oriented have defended policies aimed at strengthening defining cultural factors for Catalan identity (namely language) among newcomers (Guibernau, 2007: 100).

Based on this, I summarize in *Table 4* the main political parties represented in the Catalan Parliament for the term 2012-2016. All of them have representation at the local level. These parties reflect

Sartori's (1976: 107) two specific rules on the relevance of political parties in the party system: 1. A party without the possibility to be in a coalition majority is irrelevant and 2. A party becomes relevant when it affect the tactics of party competition.

Table 4. Political parties with representation in the Catalan Parliament (2012-2016)

Party	Left, right / Pro, Against Catalan independence[16]
1. Convergencia i Unió (Convergence and Union) (CiU)	Centre-right / Pro-independence
2. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia) (ERC)	Left / Pro-Independence
3. Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Socialists' Party of Catalonia) (PSC)	Centre-left / Pro-Independence
4. Partido Popular (People's Party) (PP)	Centre-right / Against-independence
5. Iniciativa per Catalunya – Verds (Initiative for Catalonia– Greens) (ICV)	Left-Greens/ Pro-Independence
6. Ciutadans (Citizens) (C's)	Centre-right / Against independence
7. Candidatura de Unitat Popular (Popular Unity Candidates) (CUP)	Left / Pro-Independence

Against this background, Catalonia experienced the conflictive politicization of immigration preceding May, 2011 local elections. During this time, mainstream political parties (namely, PP, PSC and

---

[16]   Those parties considered to be Catalan-oriented defend policies aimed at   strengthening defining cultural factors for Catalan identity (namely language)   among   newcomers (Guibernau, 2007: 100).

CiU) hardened their discourse on immigration by targeting specific communities in certain cities (Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2014: 419). Therefore, the selection of the three cases in Badalona, Lleida and Vic is based on criteria related to the existence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs). These criteria should allow for a comparison of different cases in terms of conflict even within a similar institutional setting. The selection can offer the possibility to show how conflict in this case affects the local political environment of each city and how parties relate to immigrant associations under these circumstances.

1. Different type of conflict: the three selected conflicts are related to three different issues. In Badalona the PIC had an ethnic focus, in Lleida a religious focus and in Vic a legal-administrative one. This difference will be expanded when describing each case.

2. Role of mainstream political parties: the politicization of the three conflicts was carried out by mainstream political parties that introduced the discourses and policies. In this situation, the political parties that started the PICs were in power or about to be in power.

3. Salience among the political elites and the public opinion: the three cases received wide media attention in Catalonia in the years 2010-2011. This is mainly because the three cities were starting points to different politicized immigration conflicts. For example, in the case of Badalona,

it was the first city in Catalonia to bring into the electoral debate the presence of Romanian Roma people; or the case of Lleida, which was the first city in Catalonia and Spain to forbid women wearing burka from entering into public building; or the case of Vic which was the first city all over Spain to forbid undocumented immigrants from registering in the local census.

The *time frame* goes from 2010, when the PICs emerged in the three cases, to 2012, one year after the 2011 municipal elections in the three cities. Deciding to extend the study one year after the local elections has the logic of observing how the alliances formed under circumstances of politicization endured or not the change of government. The choice of the time frame is not random. The politicization of immigration conflicts in Catalonia showed the full entrance of negative topics related to immigration into the agenda of political parties in mid and large cities for the first time.[17] Although the extreme right-wing Platform for Catalonia (PxC) was present in the previous municipal elections; it was the first time that a combination of mainstream political parties and media coverage coincided in laying the lens on negative topics related to immigration. Moreover, three cities belonging to the same Autonomous Community, defending restrictive discourses and policies against immigration and receiving the attention from the

---

[17] Although the extreme right-wing Platform for Catalonia (PxC) was present in the previous municipal elections; it was the first time that a combination of mainstream political parties and media coverage coincided in setting the lens on negative topics related to immigration.

national media was a new phenomenon in the Spanish scenario. After describing the Catalan context and explaining the selection criteria, I will describe the three cases:

The anti-Roma Romanian campaign in Badalona

Badalona, a city located in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, had a sharp increase in the number of immigrants in the years 2000-2012. While in 2000, foreign-born residents represented less than 2% of the population; in 2012 they represented 15% of a total population of 220.000 people. During this period, immigrants coming from all over the world settled down in low-income neighborhoods located on the outskirts of the city, namely: Artigas, La Salut, Llefia and Sant Roc.

In April 2010, Xavier Garcia-Albiol, then candidate for mayor for the PP, handed out a flyer in the local market of Sant Roc neighborhood.[18] The flyer included the words 'anti-social behavior', 'crime' and 'insecurity' and a question: 'Is your neighborhood safe?' It depicted a picture of a balcony with a banner stating 'We do not want Romanians.'[19] This situation produced widespread

---

[18]   (2010). "García Albiol defiende sus folletos." *La Vanguardia*, April 25. Available in: http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20100425/53915249694/garcia-albiol-defiende-sus-folletos-ya-que-hay-gitanos-rumanos-que-se-han-instalado-a- delinquir.html (Accessed 10 October 2014)

[19]   Rosa, I. (2010). "Vótame. Prometo mano dura." Público. April 30. Available in: http://blogs.publico.es/trabajarcansa/2010/04/30/votame-prometo-mano-dura/ (Accessed 9 February 2015)

reactions against the PP campaign, one of the two largest Spanish political parties. Instead of changing his rhetoric, Garcia-Albiol confirmed his words and pushed a campaign with the slogan 'Many think it, I say it'. As the date for the elections approached, PP's discourse in Badalona got 'louder' as well as Garcia-Albiol's popularity in the polls. Garcia-Albiol got elected and promised to control and expel 'problematic' immigrants, especially Romanian-Roma immigrants.[20] Because of his campaign, the NGO SOS-Racisme sued him for hate speech; however, Barcelona's Criminal Court found him not guilty in 2013.

The burka regulation in Lleida

On 29 June 2010, Lleida's local council (pop. 137.387) approved the modification to the local law of civility where it forbade the access to any public building to any person wearing *burka* or *niqab* or other accessories such as helmets or balaclavas.[21] Although the government accepted that the city had few women wearing burka, the measure was officially justified on security grounds and to prevent more from wearing it.[22] Civil society associations considered the measure an intrusion in religious affairs that provoked the stigmatization of Islam. It was also seen as an attempt against women's freedom of choice.

---

[20] Robles, F. (2011). "¿Quién es ese García Albiol?". El Pais. 8 July. Available in: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/07/08/actualidad/1310142897_026733.html (Accessed 9 February 2015)

[21] City of Lleida, Plenary session's proceedings, July 2nd, 2010: 10

[22] Ibid

The modification raised widespread controversy not only in the city but all over Spain, since Lleida became the first Spanish city to pass this kind of regulation. Therefore, this was perceived as an attack against well-established residents. It is important to remember that the presence of Islam in Lleida dates back from the 1990s when immigrants from Morocco, Algeria, Senegal and Nigeria arrived in the city to work in the agro-industrial and construction sectors (Garreta et al., 2011). In fact, the second and third largest immigrant communities are nationals from Morocco and Algeria. In the end, the Spanish Supreme Court considered that the city had exceeded their attributions and declared the ordinance unconstitutional.[23]

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census in Vic

This city (pop. 40.000/ 26% foreigners), located in the interior of Barcelona province, is the last case explored. On 26th December 2009, the local government passed an ordinance which forbade those undocumented immigrants from registering in the local census. Additionally, the major announced that the city would report to the police the presence of undocumented immigrants. In Catalonia, to get access to public healthcare, education or other social services, all citizens must be registered in the city they live. The government claimed that the city had detected 2% of applicants

---

[23] Batallas, M. (2013). "El Supremo revoca la prohibición del burka." *El Periódico,* 1 Mar. Available in: http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/tribunal-supremo-revoca-prohibicion-del-burka-lleida-2328912 (Accessed November 10, 2014)

in their local census without the proper identification and they also claimed that this decision was necessary in order to organize the local immigration flows[24].

The measure was criticized by NGOs across Spain and in the media because it targeted marginalized groups in the city; also because the local government was blamed on being influenced by the anti-immigrant discourse from the extreme-right party Platform for Catalonia (PxC) in the local council. Some months after the approval, the measure was declared not applicable by the State's Attorney[25].

After describing the cases and contextualizing them, I will now discuss the choice of methods and sources of information.

3.2.2. Information-seeking process

I used desk research and semi-structured interviews as the main techniques to gather the information in the three abovementioned cases. Through desk research, my main interest was to establish the positions different political parties and immigrant associations assumed, as well as, identifying key representatives from both sets of actors. The search for news related to the conflict was done by using the Spanish database on media

---

[24] Clota, E. (2010). " El alcalde de Vic veta a los sin papeles." El Pais, 14 January.   Available in: http://elpais.com/diario/2010/01/14/espana/1263423606_850215.html   (Accessed 10 October 2014)

[25] El Pais (2010). "Cuatro meses a vueltas con el padrón". *El País,* 27 April, p.3

and immigration Mugak and Dow Jones' Factiva. My search was based on key words related to the conflict: Romanian Roma, Roma community, burka regulation, local census. Although I am aware of the ideological bias that newspapers can carry, especially in the politicization of immigration, I tried to limit my search to objective elements: the position a political party assumed, same with an immigrant association. However, I contrasted the information with the interviews to the protagonists of the conflict. In total, I reviewed 204 newspaper articles from the most important Catalan newspapers as explained below.

The criterion to select the newspapers was based on their number of readers in Catalonia. Therefore, the six most read newspapers are: **La Vanguardia** (763.000 readers), El Periódico (563.000 readers), El País (180.000 readers), El Punt Avui (152.000), Segre (107.000), Ara (104.000) (Fundacc, 2013: 7). It is important to mention that El Punt Avui is also the local newspaper for Badalona and Segre is the one for Lleida.

Through semi-structured interviews, I focused on the two primary set of actors in this study: political parties and immigrant associations at the local level. These interviews were useful to triangulate the information obtained in the desk research; also to complement certain informal aspects of the conflict that otherwise would have been not possible to uncover.

The criterion to select interviewees in the political parties was based on:

- Councilmen from each one of the political parties represented in the local council. I specifically contacted those who acted as spokespersons for their party in the local council. The importance of selecting councilmen and specifically those who acted as spokespersons is because PICs are carried out by politicians who want to appeal to a portion of the electorate with discourses and policy proposals (Koopmans, 2004: 146).

The criterion to select immigrant associations and interviewees within them was based on:

- External factors to their association: immigrant associations which were prominent in the media during the conflict. This entailed a selection process focused on identifying in newspaper articles related to the PIC those immigrant associations that made public statements on the issue. In some cases, I also used snowball sampling to include those associations which were also relevant to the PIC but were not mentioned in the media.

Selecting immigrant associations based on externals factors implied that I did not focus on their association but in their role in the conflict. In this case, what matters for an immigrant association is the opportunity to ally with a political party and to eventually have a better access to resources. Internal factors such as size, democratic representativeness, membership or internal power relations were irrelevant because of the conditions under which the PIC occurred.

Choosing immigrant associations from an external perspective (conflict-driven) opens the scope to an unexplored terrain in the literature. This is because the literature on immigrant associations has concentrated on those elements in the political environment which internally affect the association and its representativeness. These internal factors are clustered on studies exploring levels of membership, ethnic social capital or representativeness (Fenemma and Tillie, 2001; Odmalm, 2004; Vermeulen, 2006; Bengtsson, 2007; Morales et al, 2009). Through the choice of an external factor, as a PIC, I aspire to make readers aware that not always internal factors are determinant for an immigrant association to become prominent in the political sphere. As the selection shows, the importance of immigrant associations for political parties was not based on their number of members, or the development of strong horizontal ties with other associations, but their role in the context of the conflict.

Although they were not my primary actors, I also interviewed representatives of Pro-immigrant NGOs who were involved in the conflict. These NGOs were identified in a similar manner as immigrant associations: through the media and the application of snowball sampling techniques. NGOs in the frame of this research refers to those organizations that do not exclusively advocate for immigrants' rights but the ones that deliver services to different immigrant communities and defend them before the controversies as the ones presented in the three cases. The purpose of interviewing them was to better understand the context of the conflict and detect possible relations that were not detected by

interviewing political parties and immigrant associations directly. They were also useful to make contacts with associations that otherwise would have been not possible to reach.

I conducted a total of 38 interviews[26][27] during the fieldwork in the three cities. I did 12 interviews to councilmen and three to local presidents from political parties and 13 interviews to representatives of local immigrant associations. For the purpose of deepening in the information gathered from my two primary actors, I also interviewed nine representatives of local Pro-immigrant NGOs and one local officer (Lleida). To keep the literary flow and respect the anonymity of some interviewees, I omitted the names of some immigrant associations and NGOs quoted in the interviews.[28]

The interview guide slightly changed between the primary (political parties and immigrant associations) and secondary actors (Pro-immigrant NGOs and local government officials). In the first set of actors, I intended to grasp their perceptions on the conflict, understand the development of the different issues, identify allies and understand how they engaged with these specific allies. For the second set of actors, I also intended to grasp their perception of the

---

[26] See the Annex for the list of interviews according to case, type of actor, date and length

[27] See the Annex for the interview guide

[28] I codified the interviewees by writing the type of actor (political party: pol; immigrant associations: ia; pro-immigrant NGO: ngo; city officer: cit), interview number and city initial (Badalona: b; Lleida: ll and Vic: v). For instance: interview with political party representative in Badalona (*pol.1b*). The relation of the codes with the names of the organizations can be found in the Annex.

conflict, understand the development of different issues, but I also intended to have a broader idea on the relations identified with the first type of actors. In this sense, secondary actors were important to have an ouitsiders'view of the alliances and their formation.

The selection of sources of information and techniques to gather the information aimed at fulfilling two basic requirements: saturation and triangulation. Saturation was achieved through all the material gathered in the proceedings, newspapers articles and interviews. It was possible to identify a repetitive pattern between the arguments given in one or the other. When it comes to triangulation, the combination of techniques to gather the information (desk-research and interviews) confirmed the story line stated in documents. Moreover, interviews, which were central in studying the subjective meaning of the events expanded the information to areas that were not mentioned in the newspaper articles. After describing the methods to gather the information, I will introduce the interpretive framework I will use to analyze each one of the three cases.

3.2.3. How to study alliances between political parties and immigrant associations

I operationalize alliances as those relations between two actors that emerge from the support lent by one side or the other with the aim of achieving short-term or long-term goals (Artilce 1). This relation must acknowledge the power imbalances in terms of access to resources that one of the sides has and the strategic interactions derived from this imbalance. The way an alliance is put

in motion is based not so much on measuring the strength of the ties (e.g. number of meetings, number of interactions, official statements claiming an organizations as an ally), but more on the perception both actors have of who an ally is for them in specific circumstances. Diani (2015) claims that *"it has long being shown that social actors' accounts of the actual frequency/intensity of their exchanges with other actors are less accurate than their qualitative assessment of the presence and relevance of specific ties…. It is sensible to assume that each actor, when planning an activity, will look first for resources/support from its closest and most reliable partners…"*

Therefore, the interpretive framework to study the emergence of alliances is based on the meso-level (the actors' level) and their context of interaction. In this sense, I propose to study the emergence of alliances based on three dimensions: The positioning (for or against) of the actors in the presence of a PIC; the incentives that motivate a political party to find allies; and finally, the incentives offered to immigrant associations to form an alliance.

a) The positioning (of the actors in the presence of a PIC)

In the POS literature on social movements the position actors assume on specific issues or whether they agree or disagree with the claims made by other actors can signal the type of relation they will have (Giugni and Passy, 1998: 17). Based on Koopmans et al. (2005: 146), the politicization of certain aspects related to immigration produces tensions between political actors. In this context, political parties and immigrant associations may develop

common positions on an issue that has been politicized. Against this backdrop, the dimension seeks to understand the position assumed by political parties and immigrant associations when an issue is politicized. In this sense, the position assumed by one side and the other can coincide in favor or against the politicization.

b) The incentives for political parties

The incentives for political parties to ally with immigrant associations seem quite obvious: to legitimize their position on a politicized issue in a context of electoral competition. However, this incentive is pretty much related to the goals they have within this context of competition. Dieter Rucht (1996: 187) states that political parties act as agents who mobilize the claims made by groups outside decision-making intuitions. The incentivea for political parties to ally are connected to their motivation to obtain the necessary votes to be or remain in office or to strengthen their power to achieve a change in the direction of a specific policy area (I.e. immigration). Departing from this premise, I adapt Kaare Strom (1990: 566)'s typology on political parties' behavior to classify the political parties' incentives (with intentions to form alliances) as:

> **Vote-seeking party**: it seeks for incentives to maximize the electoral support to get control over political office or remain in office.

> **Policy-seeking party:** it seeks for incentives to maximize their effect on public policy. In this case the interest to influence policy or change supplements the vote-seeking incentives.

c) The incentives for immigrant associations

According to the POS literature on social movements, incentives can facilitate the emergence of alliances between actors (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004: 116). Therefore in this dimension I seek to identify those concrete incentives offered by political parties to immigrant associations when a specific issue is politicized. The incentives to engage in an alliance with a political party might be connected to the prospect of obtaining tangible or intangible resources. Based on the classical work by Zald and Ash (1966: 329) on social movements, incentives can be classified as:

> **Quantifiable:** the access to monetary resources or those resources translatable to monetary resources (e.g. money, salaries, employment).

> **Solidary:** they have no monetary value and cannot be easily translated into those that have them (e.g. status among immigrant associations, recognition as a valid interlocutor by a political party).

> **Purposive:** value-based and with the aim of achieving major changes beyond the alliance itself.

After describing the cases, methodology and the interpretive framework, I will present the finding obtained from analyzing the three cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in Catalonia).

3.3. Alliances in the politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in Badalona, Lleida and Vic

Applying the framework on the three cases shows that alliances are present in each one of them. In these cases a common position on the conflict and the alignment of incentives for both sides helped forging this relation. As we will see next, forming the alliance followed a process underpinned by a common position on the politicization of the immigration conflict. This section is divided in three sub-sections which refer to the application of the three abovementioned dimensions.

3.3.1. The findings

Badalona and the anti-Romanian-Roma discourse

a) The positioning (of the actors when the presence of the Roma-Romanian community was politicized)

After the 2011 local elections, it was evident that the discourse against the Romanian Roma community had born fruit for the PP. The overarching argument during the electoral campaign was to defend the city against the threat posed by 'uncivilized foreign residents' mainly from the so-called Global South. In this context, the Romanian-Roma community was portrayed as concentrating all the evils brought by immigration –crime and abuses of the welfare state.[29] The *position* political parties and

---

[29]   Rosa, I. (2010). "Vótame. Prometo mano dura." *Público.* April 3

immigrant associations assumed on this particular issue was quite homogeneous; the only exception was the PP for obvious reasons.

The political parties in the local council against the politicization of the Romanian-Roma community were the ruling coalition formed by the PSC, CiU, and ERC and the opposition party ICV. Among these parties, ICV became one of the most outspoken critics against the PP's discourse. They considered it pure demagogy to use the Romanian-Roma residents as the scapegoat to the city's problems. In this sense, ICV and CiU agreed that poverty and marginalization were the real problems to be tackled.[30]

> "I must say that the problem is not that they are Romanian, the problem is that they must live in 40 square meters apartments… So people in the building suffer the consequences of overpopulated apartments and then you have this demagogue who comes and says: I will kick them out all of them. I will fix this in no time."

> ICV councilman (interview, 21/03/2013)

On the side of the Romanian-Roma community, they had informal leaders who were in contact with pro-immigrant NGOs and Roma associations from the Spanish-Roma community. Roma associations,[313233] mainly concentrated in Sant Roc neighborhood,

---

[30]   CiU councilman, interview, 10 June 13 (pol.1b)

[31]   When I refer to the Roma community and its associations, I mainly refer to associations   started by Spanish Roma residents who claimed their identity as Roma and not   along   national lines.   They did not intend to represent a nationality but the European Roma people. According to   the   interviewees,   their associations incorporated Roma people from   other nationalities and immigrants who felt identified with their claims.

were the ones that stood against the PP and the politicization of the Romanian-Roma people. For the Roma associations, the nationality of the Romanian-Roma people was irrelevant, what mattered to them was that they were Roma people no matter the country of origin.

> "We are co-founders of this country [meaning Europe]; however, the degrading treatment towards us is historical. Because with the gypsies they dare to do anything, there is no other group in Europe so mistreated as ours. There is an educational model that is not giving answers to the Roma people and Europe knows that."[34]

Although some Roma associations in Badalona positioned themselves against this discourse; the informal support provided by Roma patriarchs, who are considered the authority within this community, was very important in the way alliances with the PP later on evolved. Moreover, there was one association by the name *Rom i Romi* that publicly positioned in favor of the PP's position.

---

[32] Although they may not be considered an immigrant association *per se* (According to Rex, and Josephides, 1987; Vermeulen 2006); Roma associations are based on ethnic lines. It is precisely this situation that makes them a relevant actor in the representation of the claims of the Romanian Roma residents. The reason not to include Romanian associations in this study is because they are not based on ethnic lines as Roma associations. In the Barcelona Area, it was possible to identify only one Roma association with Romanian-Roma background (*Opre-Romale*). However, its apparent inactivity, as well as, the difficulties to interview its president left it out from the sample.

[33] By the time of the study, Romanian nationals were already EU citizens with full voting rights at the local level.

[34] Representative Roma association, interview, 4 May 2013 (ia.2b)

"The members of this association do not feel insulted by the distribution of this leaflet. We do not see the alleged racist content in it… We feel represented by the facts presented by Xavi Garcia-Albiol… regarding the problems of co-existence in the neighborhood [Sant Roc]."[35]

Official statement reproduced by La Vanguardia (2010c)

b) The incentives (that motivated a political party to find allies)

For the PP the main goal they had as a party was to enter into office. For them, alliances served to legitimate their position in the Romanian-Roma issue which had become an important component of their campaign (President Roma association, interview, 4/05/2013). In this sense, the PP's *vote-seeking* incentive during this period was fairly clear. They instrumentalized a specific ethnic community in such a way that they could get votes that otherwise they would have not got.

"The center-right vote of the center of the city remained the same [for the 2011 elections]; however, the vote in working-class neighborhoods went to the PP. They won in 18 out of 34 neighborhoods… The campaign was very aggressive. His big slogan [referring to Garcia-Albiol] was 'putting the house in order'."[36]

ICV's position against the politicization sought to change the local policy approach to immigration by addressing key areas related to conflicts and the management of public spaces. Connected to this point, the incentive ICV had to legitimize their position was

---

[35]   PSC councilman, interview, 15 June 2013 (pol.2b)
[36]   ICV councilman, interview, 21 June 2013 (pol.4b)

connected to their goal to change the direction of the integration policy in the local council. As stated by the ICV councilman:

> "There is no other solution than accepting that the world is the way it is and that people move from one place to another. Everyone who is working on this [politics] have the responsibility of facilitating their accommodation in the best way possible. This implies money, people, attention, mediators, social work, activism in the public space."

PSC, CiU and ERC, were the three parties in the ruling coalition when the Roma-Romanian issue emerged. The electoral strategy was to ignore the issue and use city channels to counter PP's discourse. In spite of their position they did not seek to form alliances with Roma associations through party structures.

c) The incentives for immigrant associations

The incentives used by political parties in their relations with Roma associations in the context of the anti-Romanian-Roma discourse were based on *quantifiable incentives* in the case of the PP and *purposive incentives* in the case of ICV. In both cases there were Roma associations that corresponded to them and interacted with these parties in different ways.

In the case of the PP, it is important to distinguish when this party was amidst the electoral campaign and when they won the elections in May 2011. During the campaign representatives of this political party had several meetings with Roma leaders who were influential

on the Roma community.[37] Moreover, some of these patriarchs were well connected to leaders from the Roma associations that publicly supported the PP's position on the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign. According to several interviewees from Roma associations and pro-Roma NGOs there was the promise of providing them with money on the elections day; also they promised these patriarchs that they will provide them with government grants in case they were the ruling party.

> "Yes, they [the PP] walked the streets and [talked to] the people: They went to the elder gypsies so they could influence on the younger gypsies; of course, that was the goal and they got it: '[with us] everything is going to be better because the only ones who should be here are the *payos* [White people] and you; the rest should not be here because they are crooks.' A horrible political manipulation."[38]

When the PP won the elections, they delivered to their material promises. According to some of the interviewees from Roma associations, the PP funded the creation of several Roma associations led by those leaders that supported them during the campaign. However, the financial constraints in the public finances made them short-lived.

> "It is interesting because there were some gypsy organizations before. However, there have been some attempts to create new organizations. At one point, during the first year of the PP's government, six associations

---

[37] Pro-Roma NGO representative, interview, April 12, 2013 (ngo.1b)

[38] Representative Roma association, interview, May 4, 2013 (ia.2b)

were created, six associations in the neighborhood. Why? Because they look for the grants. When they see the opportunity to get any benefit, all these gypsy organizations come to live."[39]

In the case of ICV, the incentives offered were very much related to joining forces with Roma associations in a way that could stop the PP from implementing a securitizing approach on immigration. As explained by ICV´s councilman, this situation was born from the need to offer alternatives to the discourse employed by the PP against this community. By joining forces, they created the Roma platform of associations in Sant Roc neighborhood. From this platform they denounced Garcia-Albiol's discourse and searched for answers to the problems within the community. The representatives from the Roma associations expressed in the interviews their trust in the work ICV was doing to counter anti-immigrant and racist discourses (Representatives Platform of associations of Sant Roc, interview, 22/04/2013).

It was not possible to detect any type of incentives offered by the other three parties (PSC, CiU and ERC) to Roma associations.

Lleida and the burka regulation

a) The positioning (of the actors when the burka issue was politicized)

---

[39]   Pro-Roma NGO representative, interview, April 12, 2013 (ngo.1b)

The burka regulation was voted favorably in June 2010 by the PSC, as the proponent, PP and CiU. Conversely, ERC abstained while ICV voted against.[40] When representatives from the three political parties which supported the burka regulation were interviewed, their arguments showed a strong perception of threat against the local system of values based on 'good western values' Vs. bad non-western values.' In more practical terms, the burka regulation was considered a symbolic measure to express the type of Islam that was acceptable in the city. These arguments became evident through the interviews made to the PSC councilwoman responsible for immigrants' affairs and the councilwoman from CiU:

> "If you present a proposal in a city where everyday there are more veils, everyday you see more people with burka and the people [local population] are not responding well to these inputs from the Muslim community ...something has to be done."[41]

> "I was shocked the first time I saw a woman wearing burka, it gave me goose bumps. Think of what we were talking before [referring to the diverse backgrounds of her students as a language teacher in a public school], I am a very understanding and tolerant person. But that image…. What is this?"[42]

ICV voted against the regulation. They justified their position on a perception of non-threat which was not based on a real problem but a created one. They believed in another approach to the issue based

---

40   City of Lleida, Plenary session, 2 July 2010: 10
41   PSC councilwoman, interview, 6 June 2013 (pol.6.ll)
42   CiU councilwoman, interview, 4 June 2013 (pol.4.ll)

on education and dialogue.[43] In the case of ERC, they abstained from voting. For them, the justification not to vote was based on the need to study in depth this issue and all its implications. [44]

When it comes to the position of Maghrebian associations, there was not a homogenous one on the burka debate. This situation was linked to the perception that the burka regulation was based on the use of Islam by the PSC, CiU and PP for electoral ends. This was also connected to the concern the PSC had on being identified as being too soft towards Muslim immigrants who followed Imam Houzi.

> "They only looked after their partisan interests… from that moment [the burka   regulation], it came out the problem with the Salafists that brought the mosque   issue   [Imam Houzi's community]. I mean… if you wear beard and a tunic….they hate us..."[45]

Some associations that supported the burka regulation saw it as a necessity based on the need to stop those more conservative sectors of the Muslim communities. They tended to justify the local government and the political parties' position based on the threat posed by these communities to the local system of (Western) values:

> You see a burka if you are not bothering anyone; however, if you are, you must adapt to the rules of that country…. I

---

43   ICV local president, interview, 3 June 2013 (pol.1.ll)
44   ERC former councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pol.2.ll)
45   President Islamic association, interview, 03 June 2013 (ia.2.ll)

always say, the burka is an adoption from Afghanistan, it has nothing to do with religion, and not even Moroccans wear it.[46]

b) The incentives for political parties

In Lleida the burka regulation was connected to the negative image among the local public opinion of certain Muslim communities connected to Imam Houzi and their stricter interpretation of Islam. According to several interviewees, the burka regulation was intended to show that the ruling PSC was not going to tolerate certain practices connected to immigrants in a context of electoral competition with other political parties. In this situation it is possible to identify a *vote-seeking* incentive of the party.

> "Yes, the burka issue has been much politicized. In fact, in Lleida there are not many women with burka to alarm the society or the institutions. There were a few that were not that visible and all of the sudden you have the politicization of the burka; especially because it came during the elections. It is the need to have a protagonist role: 'hey, I am going to ban the burka' and they got it right […] So this is hard politics. They made it because of the elections."[47]

Similar to the PSC, CiU was an opposition party in the local council that supported the burka ban. According to some interviewees, there were attempts by this party to pass a similar piece of legislation before PSC; however, the ruling party did it before they did. The politicization of the presence of Islam and CiU's position on the burka issue shows the *vote-seeking* incentive that this party

---

[46] President Moroccan socio-cultural association, interview, 05 June 2013 (ia.5.ll)

[47] Representative Islamic associations, interview, 4 June 2013 (ia.4.ll)

followed. As the representative of a Maghrebian association close to Maghrebian members of CiU's local section stated:

> "Regarding the decision on the burka regulation, this is purely a political decision. Why? Because the motion was presented before by opposition political parties [Meaning CiU]. The ruling party […] made the decision so they could take it away from the hands of the other parties. This is one year before the elections. By the time of the elections, the ruling party won with absolute majority." [48]

In the case of ICV, they based their opposition to the burka regulation with the spirit of finding like-minded associations that could support them. This denotes the *policy-seeking* incentive behind their need to legitimate their position. However, in their case it was not possible to find allies among the associations connected to Muslim communities.

> "The way the burka regulation was presented in the city council was particular. [Because] We had never had any problem with this issue in the city. It simply did not exist. The thing is that it was used with electoral ends. It always gives votes. We did terribly [in the elections] because this meant our disappearance. We talked about this among ourselves and the only thing in Lleida that had really happened was that there were 3 or 4 women wearing burka." [49]

Although the PP voted for the burka regulation, they did not attempt to form any alliance with immigrant associations since they did not

---

[48]   President Moroccan socio-cultural association, interview, 05 June 2013 (ia.5.ll)

[49]   ICV councilman, interview, 3 June 2013 (pol.1.ll)

see the need to do so. [50] For ERC the situation was quite similar, they did not deem necessary to ally with other immigrant associations under these circumstances[51].

c) The incentives for immigrant associations

The incentives offered are pretty much related to *solidary incentives* in the cases of *PSC* and *CiU*. In the case of the ruling PSC, they invited Maghrebian associations close to the party's local section to informative sessions where they explained the reasons behind their decision. It was possible to establish that some associations supported PSC's position based on the opportunity that being consulted by this party implied in the local context.

> "When you have a big problem (like this one), you need to look for people, political parties which can help you; allies so you can be reinforced and impose what you want …All the political parties try to establish a relationship with the [Muslim] collectivity. From this situation you can get one thing or the other. For example, if you have a relation with or you are member of a party and you tale with the leaders, then you can obtain certain things."[52]

For the associations that participated in these spaces of consultation, the invitation implied recognition and acknowledgement from the PSC. At the same time for those associations involved in these spaces, their presence institutionalize them as allies of a strong party that could look after their various interests. For the PSC, as a

---

[50] PP councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pol.3.ll)
[51] ERC councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pol.2.ll)
[52] President Moroccan socio-cultural association, interview, 5 June 2013 (ia.5.ll)

centre-left party supposedly immigrant-friendly, it was important to demonstrate that Maghrebian Muslims were on board and legitimized their position.

> "At the party level, before talking about the burka and all this…we had the inputs (from the communities and associations)…I spoke, before speaking as a local government, with people from the political party about this issue, people who come from other countries and belong to these communities and associations. The truth is that everyone perfectly agreed on this. Some of them even told me: it was about time. Imagine that...[53]

For CiU, the association *Nous Catalans* (New Catalans) legitimized their position through the use of *solidary incentives.* According to some representatives of some associations, Maghrebian members of this association were important to show that CiU's position was consulted with this association. However, it is important to mention that this association is close to CiU.[54] Therefore, the support given by the Maghrebian members was seen as a natural result of this relation.[55] Neither ICV nor PP found allies during the burka regulation issue. In the first case, ICV could not find any association willing to support their position in the local council.[56]

---

[53]   PSC councilwoman, interview, 6 June 2013 (pol.6.ll)

[54]   *Nous Catalans* (n.d.). "Editorial". Available in: http://www.nouscatalans.cat/ (Accessed   14 May 2015)

[55]   President Maghrebian association, interview, 03 June 2013 (ia.2.ll)

[56]   ICV President local section, interview, 3 June 2013 (pol.1.ll)

For the PP, they did not deem necessary to develop any relation that lead to an alliance in this particular context.[57]

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census in Vic

a) The positioning (of the actors when the local census ordinance was approved)

The local census ordinance was voted favorably by the ruling coalition formed by CiU, PSC and ERC. Interestingly enough, the extreme-right wing and opposition party PxC also voted in favor of the ordinance but they blamed on the coalition for stealing the idea of a similar proposal presented by them two years before.[58] The other two opposition political parties, CUP and ICV voted against.

On the coalition side, the three parties shared similar arguments that justified this decision: it was due to an excessive immigration flux that required more control and as a response to what voters were asking for. [59] In spite of the formal arguments that supported the coalition's decision, when councilmen from the three parties were asked about the influence of PxC in the conflict; they said that it did

---

[57]   PP councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pol.3.ll)
[58]   (2010). "Vic rechazó en el 2003 plan ultra para delatar 'sin papeles." *El   Periodico,* 8   January, Available in: http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/20100108/vic-rechazo-2003- plan-   ultra-para-delatar-sin-papeles/print-85733.shtml (Accessed November 25,   2013)
[59]   CiU councilman, interview, 2 May 2013 (pol.1v)

not have anything to do with it. Moreover, they said that the local census was an answer to a real problem.

> "Why did we propose the local census ordinance (*padrón*)? Because here we have a deeper problem. When immigrants arrive the Central State, which have more attributions, look to the other side; it has always looked to the issue to cities with no resources. And you have to [do something], you cannot leave all the people by themselves."[60]

On the side of those opposing to the ordinance, it was possible to identify that the position was pretty much linked to the perception that the measure was purely electoral. In addition to this, the two parties against (CUP and ICV) blamed on the ruling coalition for allowing the extreme right-wing party PxC's discourse getting to the core of their actions. Moreover, they said that to some extent the ruling coalition bought PxC's arguments. Based on the need to organize the immigration flux, they ended up with a measure considered by them as 'dehumanizing.'[61]

> "In the general frame, the people were in favor of our position. But at the local level and specifically, at the political level we were totally isolated, like if we had the pest, for defending an opposite position. In fact, we defended our position not in a timid or testimonial manner, but upfront, very tough."[62]

When it comes to local immigrant associations, all of them expressed their rejection to the ordinance approved by the local

---

[60]   PSC former councilman, interview, 7 May 2013 (pol.3v)
[61]   ICV councilman, interview, 9 May 2013 (pol.5v)
[62]   Ibid

council. Their arguments were also very much related to the ones expressed by the political parties that were against the ordinance.

> "The real problem was not the local census which was a rights violation; the real problem was that political parties were making concessions because of the pressure of a racist extreme right. This is even more serious than the violation of rights; now this disappears because they have allowed weird things such as the ordinance; however, the problem persists."[63]

It is important to mention that in Vic the position of most immigrant associations was channeled through the Coordination Platform of Newcomers Associations. I interviewed representatives from five associations which belonged to this platform and they agreed that this ordinance was not because of a perception of threat from the local population or the ruling coalition. The decision was related to a strategy to neutralize the rise of PxC in the city.

b) The incentives for political parties

The local census ordinance in Vic portrays two major traits: one among the political parties in the ruling coalition and another among the opposition political parties against the ordinance.

The political parties in the ruling coalition argued that the ordinance was necessary to organize the immigration flows. However, it was possible to identify that the political parties in the coalition government were concerned with the lost of votes *vis-a-vis* the

---

[63]   Representative immigrant association, interview, 9 May 2013 (ia.1v)

extreme right-wing Platform for Catalonia (PxC). In this sense, the motivation to first, support the ordinance and second, legitimize their position through alliances with immigrant association fulfilled a purely vote-seeking incentive. This was evident for the Socialist Party (PSC) that was trying to keep its electorate in a context of decline. According to the spokesperson from this party, their electoral base was mainly blue-collar workers that had felt disenchanted with the party on issues such as immigration amidst the financial crisis that Spain was living then.

> "And he [the mayor] acted without thinking, and he dragged those that were with him. It is either breaking up (the coalition) or staying with him. If we had left, we would have been seen by the electorate as a party who is for free immigration... It would have sent a horrendous message to the electorate…."[64]

On the other, opposition political parties against the ordinance did not believe that this measure was necessary and they advocated for another policy approach for the management of immigration. They thought that it was unnecessary to add more controversy to certain political tensions that existed in the city due to the presence of PxC in the local council. The motivation they had to find allies in this context was based on the need to garner support for their discourse and proposal aiming at changing the policy direction in the management of immigration.

> "The few people and organizations in Vic that dared to raise their voice [against the ordinance] were defenestrated at the political and personal levels. You don't win votes with

---

[64]   PSC former councilman, interview, 7 May 2013 (pol.3v)

this position. In fact, in the next elections we lost ¼ of the votes. To position in favor of the immigrants does not have any prize but punishment."[65]

"What really bothers me is that other parties say that our position on this issue is to get votes. What really worries us is to make a strong, common front to consolidate the social cohesion and the democratic way and all this for the city."[66]

c) The incentives for immigrant associations

When it comes to the *incentives for immigrant associations to ally with political parties, it is possible to identify two situations*: the no offer of incentives by the political parties in the ruling coalition and the efforts by CUP and ICV to offer *purposive incentives* to immigrant associations they shared a common position with.

The interviews with three councilmen representing the three parties who were part of the coalition in 2010 denote the apparent no emergence of specific alliances because of the conflict itself. This situation seemed to be confirmed through the interviews done to five different immigrant associations. Two possible reasons for not offering incentives to the immigrant associations to ally were first, the no need on the political parties' side to approach immigrant associations individually and second, the united position of the immigrant associations in regard to their approach of talking to the

---

[65]   ICV councilman, interview, 9 May 2013 (pol.5v)
[66]   CUP councilman, interview, 16 May 2013 (pol.6v)

government amidst the conflict and not to individual political parties.

On the side of the parties against the regulation, the Popular Unity Candidates (CUP) conceived the conflict as directly linked to the presence of PxC in the city. For them, the local census ordinance would not exist, if PxC disappeared from the local party system. CUP used *purposive incentives* to engage immigrant associations in the alliances. In this situation they organized demonstrations and gatherings in public spaces to reject the decision taken by the ruling coalition.[67] Through these actions they were able to establish a relationship with a local immigrant association that was very active in the local context in the defense of immigrants. Their relationship evolved to the point where they established a platform of social actors under the umbrella organization *Unity against fascism.*

> "And it is because of this situation [the ordinance] that from the CUP we make a call for the mobilization of Vic's society to show that we are not racists and that there are a lot of people who oppose to these actions. We did an open call with other organizations… The slogan was: for the social cohesion, let's end racism… And it is from this demonstration that *Unity against Racism* is formed."[68]

For Initiative-Greens, their position in the conflict was clear; however, for them it was more difficult to find an ally among local immigrant associations[69]. Although they recognized that they had informal relations with some of them, these associations were

---

[67] Interview, CUP councilmen, 16 May 2013 (pol.7v)
[68] Ibid
[69] Interview, ICV councilman, 9 May 2013 (pol.5v)

worried of the repercussions of a more formal relation could have on their relations with the local government.

3.3.2. Identifying alliances in the three cases

It is possible to identify that in the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, alliances emerged between the PP and some Roma association in favor of the PIC and the ICV and Roma associations opposing the conflict. In the first situation, the role the PP played in the politicization of the Romanian-Roma community was fundamental in the formation of alliances. They had to legitimize their position on an issue that clearly intended to attract the *votes* from those sectors that agreed with their campaign. The way they legitimized it was through the offer of *quantifiable incentives* to Spanish-Roma organizations that agreed with their position. In this sense, to them it was important to show that even the Roma people in Badalona supported their proposals on immigration management for the city. On the other hand, the ICV's role in opposing to the PP's campaign made them propose another model of inclusion for the city. In this situation, alliances emerged through the promise of a *policy change* and the offer of *purposive incentives* to those Spanish-Roma organizations that did not connect with the PP's discourse and policy approach.

In the case of the burka regulation in Lleida, it is possible to identify alliances between PSC and some Maghrebian associations and CiU and an immigrant organization. As in the case of the PP in Badalona, the role the PSC had in the politicization was an

important driver in the search for allies. For the PSC, the need for *votes* to remain in office with an absolute majority became a valid incentive to legitimize their position in regard to the management of Islam. The best way to legitimize their position was through the engagement of Maghrebian organizations that were closer to them and willing to accept *solidary incentives*. For CiU, the *vote-seeking* incentive combined with the legitimization of their position through the offer of solidary incentives to *Nous Catalans* facilitated the alliance.

In the case of the local census ordinance in Vic, it was possible to identify alliances between the CUP and an immigrant association that actively opposed to the local census ordinance. From here a combination of three elements contributed to their alliance: first, a common position against the ordinance; second, the incentive the CUP had to achieve a *policy change* in the city and third, the offer of *purposive incentives* to an association that supported their position and agreed with them through the creation of a platform of activism. After applying the interpretive framework and describing the results; I will now draw some conclusions based on the three cases.

3.4. Conclusion: alliances and the instrumentalization of diversity?

Nowadays cities face the challenge of accommodating immigrants and their descendants. How this process happens reflects the strategies and world-vision of the political elites in

charge of managing the process. The anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, the burka regulation in Lleida and the local census ordinance in Vic mirror the way local politics defines the dynamics of political parties and immigrant associations under the politicization of immigration. More importantly, it makes evident that circumstances of politicization redefine the configuration of the actors' strategies through the formation of alliances with the purpose of legitimizing a position.

3.4.1. A pragmatic and a symbolic approach to alliances

Alliances in the studied cases show that a common position on the politicization of a specific issue is a fundamental prerequisite to align two actors' interests. From here, the formation of alliances is strongly underpinned by the political incentives political actors perceive in a context of electoral competition. The emergence of alliances under these conditions illustrates how political parties, in a privileged position of power, offer incentives to immigrant organizations according to their calculations. Also, it illustrates how immigrant organizations, as rational actors, try to maximize alliances, as an opportunity, according to the incentives political parties offer. However, this is not always the case, especially in those situations where alliances emerge with the goal of improving the conditions of immigrants or specific communities. The *votes and policy incentives* for political parties to ally and the q*uantifiable, solidary and purposive incentives* they offered to immigrant associations to legitimize their position were central in

the formation of these particular alliances. In these circumstances, it is possible to identify a pragmatic and an idealistic approach to the formation of alliances.

In the first approach, associations tended to legitimize those political parties that could offer *quantifiable and solidary incentives* to them. In the case of quantifiable incentives, the alliance lasts as long as the quantifiable resources offered last. This is the situation of those Roma associations that allied with or where created as a consequence of the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign led by the PP in Badalona. Their existence was conditioned by the resources offered by the political party that politicized the issue. In the case of *solidary incentives*, the recognition derived from the alliance was based on previous relations the political party and the association had. This is the situation of the PSC in Lleida and some Maghrebian associations during the burka regulation. Immigrant associations that allied with this party felt that besides common positions, it was important to be close to a strong party that could look after the interests of their communities. In both cases, I do not want to imply that the alliances did not carry any ideological baggage. However, they are overshadowed by the electoral incentives for political parties and the *quantifiable* and *solidary incentives* for immigrant associations that make them dependent on political parties. Based on this, political parties have the power to shape immigrant association's mobilization.

In the second approach, the studied cases showed a more altruistic attitude where political parties were not particularly calculative

actors and they approached to those immigrant associations with whom they shared similar values and principles. The quantifiable incentives under this case were much less important than the ones mentioned before. This situation tended to be more evident under those alliances that emerged in opposition to those actors that politicized the issue. A good example is ICV in Badalona: the alliance that emerged through the platform of associations in Sant Roc was the result of a process where each side shared a common view on the city model. In these situations, alliances do not follow a purely instrumental stance based on receiving incentives. These alliances tend to have a normative view of what should be the rightful coexistence among peoples.

3.4.2. Typifying particular traits in the formation of alliances

From the present study, it is possible to extract very context-specific patterns in the alliances between political parties and immigrant associations. For the three cases, the position of the political party and the immigrant associations in the PIC was a prerequisite for the formation of these alliances. The common position facilitated the perception of incentives political parties had and the offer of incentives to immigrant associations. The abstraction of the cases allows the identification of different types of alliances, namely: clientelist, symbolic and activist-oriented alliances.

Clientelist alliances legitimize political parties seeking for *votes*. Under this type, alliances are underpinned by the offer of

quantifiable incentives to those immigrant organizations that support the reactive politicization of cultural diversity at a specific moment (e.g. elections). Through this provision, political parties expand their electoral base –votes –while securing support -legitimacy –from a sector of the affected community. For an immigrant association, the provision of quantifiable incentives strengthens their position and gives them visibility *vis-à-vis* the political party. In this situation, an immigrant organization needs a stronger incentive –money –to engage in an alliance which is the outcome of an issue they should supposedly oppose. The circumstamces surrounding the formation of these alliances make them issue-specific, short-lived and dependant on the continuity of the quantifiable incentives initially offered. The relation between the PP and some Spanish-Roma organizations in Badalona portrays all the characteristics of this alliance.

Symbolic alliances also legitimize political parties seeking for *votes.* However, the major difference in relation to the clientelist type is the offer of *solidary incentives* by political parties to immigrant organizations. In this case, the alliance serves to legitimize a broad-consensus in the proposition of restrictive policies to manage cultural diversity. In this sense, immigrant associations participate in consultative or informative sessions where political parties can show that their position is well supported. For those immigrant associations that are part of this alliance, the incentive is to be close to a strong political party that can look after their communities' interests. They also reinforce their position on the part of the community they are supposed to

129

represent by being considered a channel well connected to the local power structures. In this type of alliance, the relationship is based on a long-term interaction beyond the politicization of a specific issue. The burka regulation in Lleida and the formation of alliances between the PSC and some Maghrebian associations illustrate this situation.

Different from the other two types, **activist-oriented alliances** legitimize political parties seeking for a *policy change*. In this case, political parties offer *purposive incentives* to those immigrant associations opposing to other political parties' reactive discourses and policy proposals. This alliance reflects the strategy of political parties that defends a more proactive approach to the accommodation of immigration (i.e. more accommodating in terms of cultural diversity). For immigrant associations, an alliance with a political party based on purposive incentives allows them to have a representative, with whom they share similar interests and values, in the local council. The alliance is particularly important for those immigrant associations not considered to be valid interlocutors of their communities by other political parties because of their activism against specific political discourses or decisions. An example is ICV in Badalona: the alliance that emerged through the platform of organizations in Sant Roc was the result of a process where each side shared a common view on the city model.

The ideological approach in activist-oriented alliances does not imply that there are no ideological elements in the other two types of alliances. However, ideological elements in the other alliances

are overshadowed by a more calculated and instrumental strategy in a context of electoral competition. The Socialist Party (PSC) in Lleida illustrates this situation. A centre-left political party, considered to be a natural ally of the claims of immigrant communities sought allies to legitimize a reactive policy such as the burka regulation. Table 5. summarizes the typology and its connection to the alliances identified in the cases.

Table 5. Typology of alliances

TYPE OF ALLIANCE / DIMENSIONS	Clientelist	Symbolic	Activist-oriented
	PP and Spanish-Roma associations in Badalona	PSC and Magrehb associations in Lleida	ICV and Spanish-Roma associations in Badalona CUP and immigrant association in Vic
Positioning **1. Pol. Party** **2. Immigrant Assoc.**	1. In favor 2. In favor	1. In favor 2. In favor	1. Against 2. Against
Incentives for political parties	Votes	Votes	Policy
Incentives for immigrant associations	Quantifiable	Solidary	Purposive

Although the interpretive framework applied on these cases can be seen as context-specific, as well as the typology; the conditions under which they emerge (conflicts and politicization) have to be seen as salient issues that appears in the political agenda of diverse societies. Moreover, the politicization of a controversial issue can produce division and unity among relevant and specific actors and they can forge or not particular alliances. Although the politicization can actually occur at any administrative level; it is interesting to see that at the local level it triggers the realignment of the actors' strategies in the form of alliances that seek for legitimacy.

This study responded to the need for more qualitative, comparative and process-oriented analyses that explore the relations that shape the policy-making of immigration. It sought to acknowledge alliances as a political opportunity that may emerge at the local, regional, national or supranational level. This paper showed that it is possible to replicate this framework in apparently very similar cases while producing results which denote differences in the way the selected actors relate to each other. The interpretive framework herein applied should be seen as a theoretical endeavor applicable to those scholars interested in the interaction between actors as an outcome of particular circumstances.

3.5. Bibliography

Arango, J., Brey, E., Maldonado, Y., and Moualhi, D. (2011) 'Country context paper'. Research reports, *Universidad Complutense de Madrid*, October

Bengtsson, *B*. (2007). "Ethnic association, integration, and political opportunity structures – some theoretical considerations." *Comparative Social Research,* vol. 25

Bird, K. (2004). "Comparing the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Advanced Democracies." Conference paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association Winnipeg, Manitoba. 3 June.

Borkert M. And Caponio, T. (eds.). (2010), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Bousetta, H. (2000). Institutional Theories of immigrant ethnic mobilization: Relevance and limitations. Ethnic and Migration Studies. 26 (2), 229-245

Burchianti, F. and Zapata-Barrero, R. (2014). "Is Catalonia immune to racism? An analysis of intolerant political discourses of mainstream party representatives   (2010-2011)." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 12(4). Pp. 401-417.

Caponio , T. (2005). "Policy Networks and Immigrants` Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples". *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 31 (5).

Caponio, T. (2010). "Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy: Milan, Bologna and Naples compared. " in: M, Borkert and T. Caponio. (eds.), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Diani, M. (2015)."Building civic networks: Logics of tie formation." In: M. Diani (ed.). *The cement of civil society.* New York: Cambridge University Press

Edwards, B., and McCarthy, J. D. (2004). "Resources and social movement mobilization." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Fundacc (2013). "Estudi General de Mitjans de Comunicaciò. Resum 1era Onada." Available at: http://www.fundacc.org/docroot/fundacc/pdf/Resum_1a_onda_2013.pdf (Accessed January 27, 2014)

Fenemma, M. and Tillie, J. (1999). "Political Participation and Political Trust in a Multicultural Democracy, Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks in Amsterdam." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25(4), pp. 703–726

Garbaye, R. (2005). *Getting into local power. The politics of ethnic minorities in British and French cities.* Blackwell: Oxford.

Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2011). "Dimensió administrativa. Estudi exploratori sobre les polítiques locals en materia d'immigració a Catalunya" In: R. Zapata-Barrero (ed), *La gestio municipal de l'immigracio*. Barcelona: ACM

Garreta, J., Tamba, Mo., Ba, M., Ba, O., Bernad, O., Domingo, J., Guillem, X., Sabaté, M., Kokouvi, T. and Vila, S. (2011). *Barça o barzakh. Els impactes de l'emigració al Senegal.* Lleida: DeParis.

Giugni M. and Passy, F. (1998). "Social Movements and Policy Change: Direct, Mediated, or Joint Effect?" American Sociological Association Section on Collective Behavior and Social Movements Working Paper Series, 1 (4).

Giugni, M. and Morales, L. (2011). Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Guibernau, M. (2007). "Catalunya i la Unió Europea: identitat, immigració i cosmopolitisme." *Eines,* Tardor. Available in: http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Eines/article/download/141949/193455 (Accessed 27 January 2014)

Hochshild, J. and Mollenkopf, J. (2009). *Bringing outsiders in: Trans-Atlantic perspectives in immigrant incorporation.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Koopmans, R. (2004). "Chapter 2: Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Pessy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Kriesi, H. (2004). "Political Context and Opportunity." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kriesi, H. (n.d.). "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Social Movements." Working Paper Series. *European University Institute.* Available in: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON/Documents/Kriesipart ysystems.pdf (Accessed 26 December 2014)

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. (1995). New Social movements in Western Europe. A comparative analysis. London: UCL Press Limited.

Martiniello, M. (2006). "Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Imimmigrants and Their Offspring in Europe." In: R, Baubock, *Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political Participation.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE

Miret, A. (2009). "La gestión de las competencias en materia de inmigración." In: R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.). *Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España*. Barcelona: Ariel

Morales, L., Gonzalez-Ferrer, A., Jorba, L. (2009). "Políticas de incorporación y la gestión del asociacionismo de la población de origen inmigrante a nivel local." In: R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.). *Políticas y gobernabilidad de la inmigración en España.* Barcelona: Ariel

Odmalm, P. (2004). "Civil society, migrant associations and political parties: theoretical linkages and applications to the Swedish context." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 30(3)

Però, D. (2005). "Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case of Bologna." *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (5)

Penninx, R. (2009). "Decentralizing Integration Policies. Managing Migration in Cities, Regions and Localities." Policy Network Paper. November. Policy Network. Pierce, R. (2008). *Research Methods in Politics*. London: SAGE Publications

Penninx, R. and Martiniello, M. (2004). "Integration processes and policies: State of the Art." In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec. *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing

Rucht, D. (1996). "The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement and cross-national comparison." In: D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. Zald (eds.). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rucht, D. (2004). "Movements, Allies and Adversaries." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and party systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Solé, C. and Parella, S. (2007). "El modelo de gestión de las migraciones en Cataluña: ¿una "vía catalana" de integración?" *Política y Sociedad* 48

Strom, K. (1990). "A behavioral theory of competitive political parties." *American Journal of Political Science,* 34 (2) (Ma7), pp. 565-598

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Van Dyke, N. (2003). "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effect of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the United States, 1930-1990." In: J. Goldstone (ed.). States, Parties, and Social Movements. Pp.226-245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vermeulen, F. (2006). *The Immigrant Organising Process, Turkish Organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese Organisations in Amsterdam 1960-2000, IMISCOE-Dissertation Series.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

Zald, M. and Ash, R. (1966). "Social Movement Associations: Growth, Decay and Change." Social Forces, 44 (3). Pp. 327-341

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2012). *Una ètica política mínima de la immigració a Catalunya. Cohesió, autogovern, llengua i frontera.* Barcelona: Editorial Proteus

Zapata Barrero, R. (ed.) (2015). *Interculturalism in cities: Concept, policy and implementation* . Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Chapter 4.

Explaining the emergence of alliances in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level.

A comparative study of Badalona, Lleida and Vic

Taking as point of departure the political opportunity structure (POS) debate, I seek to explain the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level. I argue that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge because of the existing local political environment where the studied conflicts occur. In order to answer the research question, I do a qualitative comparative research on three conflicts that started in the Catalan cities of Badalona, Lleida and Vic in the years 2010-2011. In order to defend the argument stated above, I consider two institutional-related dimensions and two conflict-related dimensions: the first two are the configuration of power and the institutional openness for immigrants. The other two are the conflict frame, this is how political elites frame the PIC; and the ideology behind the position political parties has on the conflict. In the end, it is possible to identify that context-specific factors in the political environment are connected to the emergence of alliances under the conflictive politicization of immigration.

4.1. Introduction

The present article is located within the immigration literature following the political opportunity structure (POS) approach that explores how institutional and cultural factors account for the organization and mobilization of immigrants along national and local lines (Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Ireland, 2004; Garbaye, 2005; Giugni and Morales, 2011). This literature has neglected the role that alliances between institutional actors and immigrants play on the policy-making of immigration. Furthermore, the study of those factors in the political environment that accounts for certain alliances between particular actors (e.g. NGOs and political parties or political parties and immigrant associations) and under specific circumstances (e.g. politicization of immigration or urban conflicts) remains a quite unexplored area.

Alliances in the literature on social movements following a political opportunity structure (POS) approach holds that the possibilities of mobilization for political actors are strongly linked to the presence of allies that facilitate or constrain the chances they have to put forward their claims (Tarrow, 1994, McAdam, 1996; Kriesi et al. 1995; Kriesi, 2004; Diani, 2015; Kriesi, n.d.). As Rucht (2004: 202) states, alliances do not solely emerge from the common interests or goals between two actors. They also are the result of several factors related to an enabling political environment surrounding them.

Taking the political opportunity structure (POS) debate as a point of departure, I *seek* to *explain the emergence of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level.* The objective is operationalized by the following question: *why do alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) in the cases of Badalona, Lleida and Vic?*

Throughout the paper, I argue that alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge because of the existing local political environment in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PIC).[70] The argument acknowledges that conflicts act as the catalyst in the formation of alliances between these two actors in the search for support and solutions. In this situation, political parties are the ones that take the initiative to ally or not because of the need they have to legitimize their discourses and decisions on immigration (Triviño-Salazar, 2014). For political parties, alliances enhance their access to wider constituencies, strengthen their electoral potential and serve to legitimize discourses and policy proposals (Whittier, 2004: 547). For immigrant associations, finding allies among political parties respond to the need to have access to resources that otherwise they would not obtain. Therefore, the emergence of alliances is

---

[70] I define politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) as the treatment of certain cultural traits or the legal status of immigrants as a problem that requires political action through reactive discourses and policies. A PIC portrays salience and generates polarization among the actors involved in their immediate context of interaction, the local level.

connected to the incentives both actors perceive from the mutual support received (Article 1).

Studying the alliances between political parties and immigrant associations comes from the need to systematize those elements in the political environment that explain why actors form alliances under certain circumstances. I seek to contribute to the literature in several ways: first, to systematize the specificities of the local political environment as a particular setting for the formation of alliances. By doing so, I highlight that the political environment at the local and not the national level might be responsible for the formation of alliances under certain circumstances of politicization. Second, showing the role political parties have in the alliances with immigrant associations based on their position in the configuration of power. In this sense, acknowledging their agency places them at the center of the interaction. Moreover, their role in this relation changes the traditional equation in the POS literature where social movements are the ones that seek for allies and not the other way around.

As I will present in section 4.2.2., I place my study on the local level because it represents the context of proximity where immigrants, institutions and local population interact on a daily basis. Placing this study at the local level is based on scholars in the immigration literature interested in the way local governments and local actors contribute to the policy-making of immigration (Alexander, 2004; Garbaye, 2005; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Poppelaars and Scholten, 2010). As Giugni and Morales (2011: 25)

state, the relevance of the local level is connected to the reality that immigrants arrive in neighborhoods, towns and cities of receiving societies. Therefore, local political elites assume a context-based approach that complement, supplement or contradict national policies according to their own needs.

In order to answer the research question, I do a qualitative comparative cases-study research of three PICs in Catalonia, Spain that emerged in the years 2010-2011. The three cases are related to the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, the banning of women wearing burka from entering public buildings in Lleida and the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census (*Padrón*) in Vic. The selected cases mirror respectively ethnic, religious and legal-administrative conflicts. As I will detail in section 4.3.1., the results were obtained through desk research, which included local policy documents, proceedings from local councils' plenary sessions and newspapers, and semi-structured interviews with local councilmen representing all political parties during the PIC, representatives from immigrant associations, pro-immigrant NGOs and municipal officers.

I analyze the three cases using four dimensions (two institutional and two conflict-related) in the local political environment to help identifying those elements that account for the formation of alliances: the first two are the institutional openness for immigrant associations in the city and the configuration of power. The other two are the conflict frame, this is how political elites frame the PIC;

and the ideology behind the position political parties had on the PIC.

The article will be divided in four sections. In the first section, my objective is to frame my focus and the research question. Therefore, I will present an overview on the definition of alliances in the POS literature and the gap in the literature I aspire to tackle. In the second section, I present the background and cases, the information-seeking process and how I will analyze the information through dimensions in the political environment. In the third section, I present the results obtained from the application of the dimensions on the three cases in Badalona, Lleida and Vic. Finally, I draw some conclusions based on the three cases studied and the POS approach on alliances.

4.2. Studying alliances in local contexts where politicized immigration conflicts occur

In this section, I will refer to the way the literature on social movements following the POS approach studies alliances. After this, I will briefly discuss the lack of studies on alliances in the immigration literature with an eye on the local level, the setting where this study is positioned.

4.2.1. Alliances in the POS literature

The concept of alliances draws its logic from *social movement scholars* interested in political conflicts and the

mobilization of political actors (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; Giugni 1995). Alliances are considered a political opportunity that can provide social movements with more chances to put forward their claims in the political sphere (Kriesi, 2004: 69). However, their emergence is strongly shaped by the political and social contexts where different actors interact (Rootes, 1999: 80). The logic behind is that very few organizations can afford pursuing their goals in total autonomy; therefore, alliances imply the possibility of mutual support and facilitation in the quest of achieving these goals (Diani, 2015: 55).

The possibilities of mobilization for social movements are strongly linked to the presence of allies that facilitate or constrain the chances they have to put forward their claims (Tarrow, 1994: 85). According to Kriesi (2004: 305), the actors' configurations emerge as a vital component in the formation of alliances among social movements and between social movements and elite allies (e.g. the legislature, political parties, the judicial system, president, business). The importance of the actors' configurations is that they serve the movements' interests by introducing them into the political agenda (Van Dyke, 2003: 226). From a more instrumental approach, allies represent capabilities, resources and know-how for achieving the social movements' goals. From a more idealist view, they represent the legitimization of claims based on a common world-view, similar values and ideology (Kriesi, n.d. 7).

Talking about alliances imply acknowledging that they are embedded in the surrounding political environment. If alliances are

embedded in the surrounding political environment, a question that emerges is how to identify those dimensions that account for their formation. Diani (2015) studied the alliances between non-profit organizations and other actors in Glasgow and Bristol in the United Kingdom. For this purpose, he proposed focusing on resource mobilization and tracing the exchanges between actors. The results showed that in spite of having different political contexts, organizations in both cities considered allies those actors that portrayed a combination of similar goals, belonging to broader coalition networks and long-term bonds.

In their comparative study of social movements in France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland, Kriesi et al. (1995: 53) proposed focusing on the instability of the ruling alignments as a major explanatory factor for the emergence of alliances. They specifically concentrated on two aspects of the political context for social movements: the configuration of power of the left and the presence or absence of the left in the government. They claimed that left-wing political parties, when in opposition, favored alliances with new social movements[71] that could oppose to policy-specific issues proposed by the government. Conversely, when left-wing political parties were in government, they favored those social movements that articulated limited claims. They also tend to favor social movements align with their electoral interests while leaving

---

[71]   New social movements refer to ecology movements (with its antinuclear energy branch), the peace movement, the solidarity movement (solidarity with the Third World), the women's movement, the squatters' movement, LGTBI movements, among others (Kriesi, et al. 1995: 20).

out those that are seen as a potential threat (Kriesi, et al. 1995: 59). This was the case of France and the Socialist Party (PS) in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s the PS, as an opposition political party, supported and created alliances with ecology and peace movements while in the 1980s, the party got away from these allies in the search of movements that were more willing to support them without posing much opposition on the streets to their policies.

In a theoretical discussion to study the emergence of alliances with political parties, Kriesi (n.d.: 6) proposed not only focusing on the left but also on those political parties considered to be mainstream and peripheral. Drawing from Katz and Mair (1995), mainstream political parties refer to those that are part of the 'cartel': these are those that habitually rule and have high chances to be in the government. The importance of this distinction is because Kriesi (n.d.: 5) assumed that mainstream political parties, with the mainstream electorate, would not be accessible for social movements. Conversely, peripheral parties with little chances to be part in the government would not have such pressure and would tend to give voice to 'the people' through a rather more populist approach. Next, I would like to highlight the lack of studies on alliances in the immigration literature.

4.2.2. The lack of alliances in the immigration literature at the local level

Alliances are an important component for social movement scholars studying political opportunities; however, in relation to the *literature on immigration*, the studies done so far do not center on the

alliances between specific actors that can facilitate the emergence of opportunities for the participation of immigrants (Article 1). Instead, the focus is on those institutional and cultural dimensions that explain immigrants' choices and strategies in accessing national and local institutions in receiving societies (Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Ireland, 2004; Bloemraad, 2006).

At the national level, the literature defends that the mechanisms used by receiving States and other social agents in their affairs with immigrants produce political opportunities that indicate their social actions (Ireland, 1994; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 2000). In this sense, political opportunities are related to citizenship regimes, that determine the formal access to residence, and integration models, that determine the cultural obligations that this access entails (Koopmans and Statham; 2000: 24). Under this body of literature, different authors claim that the national level shapes immigrant identities and their patterns of organization and mobilization (Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Odmalm, 2004).

In his comparative study between two French and two Swiss towns, Ireland (1994) claimed that the participation of immigrants in the selected cities were shaped by the national institutional structure (i.e. immigrants' legal situation, social and political rights, citizenship laws, naturalization procedures, and policies of accommodation) and institutional gatekeepers (i.e. political parties, trade unions, parliament, religious organizations, judicial bodies and humanitarian non-profit organizations) (1994: 10). Similarly,

Koopmans and Statham (2000) focused on immigrants' claim-making and mobilization in German, Dutch and British cities. They concluded that the incorporation of immigrants at the local level occurred along nationally-defined lines.

As a response to the national perspective, a group of scholars questioned the primacy of the national-level in the institutional arrangement that provides political opportunities for the participation of immigrants (Caponio, 2005; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011). The study herein presented precisely ascribes to the local dimension following the POS approach. The scholars who defend this perspective study the incentives that make immigrants organize and participate in policy or social networks at the local level (Caponio, 2005; Giugni and Morales, 2011), their representation in local political institutions (Garbaye, 2005) and their mobilization vis-à-vis local political elites (Però, 2005). As stated by Borkert and Caponio (2010: 13), questioning the national level is based on experiences that show that immigration poses similar challenges to local governments in cities in Europe and North America.

In this body of literature, the local dimension is defined as the level of proximity where institutions, immigrants and receiving society interact more closely. Immigrants arrive in neighborhoods and cities where they must face different realities. Cities carry the responsibility of accommodating immigrant communities into the receiving society through policies concerning housing, culture and education, diversity or entrepreneurship (Penninx, 2009: 2). The

inclusion of immigration and its related issues in the local political agenda is part of the political struggle that defines local politics (Giugni and Morales, 2011: 11). Koopmans et al. (2005: 3) states that "the political mobilization around issues of immigration and ethnic relations… constitute since the early 1990s the most prominent and controversial field of political contention" in receiving societies (Koopmans, et al., 2005: 205).

In a context of proximity, such as the local level, the role of political parties is paramount in politicizing immigration. The politicization of immigration from a conflict perspective occurs when its related-issues enter into the political agenda through reactive discourses and policies (Zapata-Barrero, 2003: 17). The origin of these conflicts might be related to the use by political elites of culture (e.g. religious practices, preconceived ideas about specific ethnic groups or customs) and legal-administrative issues as divisive tenets to exclude those who are not seen as part of the receiving society. When immigration conflicts are politicized, institutional actors may experience the need to legitimize their position on specific issues through the re-stabilization and re-routinization of their patterns of interaction with non-institutional actors (Koopmans, 2004: 36).

In spite of the interest in the interactions between immigrants and institutions in receiving societies, the immigration literature following the POS approach has not sufficiently explored the role of particular alliances in facilitating or constraining their inclusion in the political system. This situation becomes evident at

the local level, the territorial dimension this study ascribes to. The way local political elites respond to different challenges posed by immigration have important repercussions on how institutional and non-institutional actors establish particular relations, such as alliances. Not focusing on political parties and their particular alliances with immigrant associations at this level underestimates the role the former have in the dynamics behind the politics of immigration. Based on this, the study of particular alliances, such as the ones between political parties and immigrant associations, should incorporate the impact that the conflictive politicization of immigration has on their interactions.

After discussing how the POS literature defines and studies alliances and how the immigration literature refers to the conflictive politicization of immigration at the local level, I will proceed to describe the background and the three different cases. I will also refer to the way I will operationalize the study of alliances in these cases by using four dimensions deemed as highly relevant by the POS literature: two institutional-related dimensions: the institutional openness, the configuration of power and two conflict-related dimensions: the conflict frame and the ideology.

4.3. Cases and methodology

The present article is a comparative case-study research based on qualitative methodology. Taking this into account, in this section, I will present the background and the cases; the

information-seeking process and the way I will analyze the information gathered.

4.3.1. Background and cases

In the years 2010-2011, Catalonia experienced the conflictive politicization of immigration preceding May 2011 local elections. This became more evident in mid and small size cities where mainstream political parties (i.e. PP; PSC, and CiU) brought into the political agenda negative topics related to the presence of newcomers in their cities. Depending on the particularities of each case, other political parties (i.e. ERC; ICV; CUP) opposed to these discourses and decisions.

Three of the best known cases in the period 2010-2011 were the ones that occurred in the cities of Badalona, Lleida, and Vic. The three cases were well-known because they constituted starting points to political discourses and decisions against immigrants never portrayed so openly by mainstream political parties in Spain. Interestingly enough, the politicization of these issues was brought about by mainstream political parties already in power or soon-to-be in power.

The three selected cases represent different types of conflicts related to the ethnic and religious diversity of newcomers and to the legal-administrative status of immigrants (Koopmans et al, 2005: 106). Methodologically speaking, the selection of three different conflicts is pertinent for giving foundation to my argument: the

153

alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge because of the existing local political environment where politicized immigration conflicts (PIC) occur. Therefore, the selection aims to highlight that alliances are interconnected to the political environment informing the emergence of alliances and not necessarily to the type of conflict.

The anti-Roma Romanian campaign in Badalona

The 2011 local elections in Badalona (pop. 220.000/ 15% foreigners) were preceded by the controversy created by Xavier Garcia-Albiol, candidate for major for the PP, and his anti-Romanian-Roma campaign. The conflict started when his party distributed in a local market a leaflet linking immigrants, and specifically Romanian-Roma immigrants, with crime and uncivil behavior.[72] Garcia-Albiol claimed that by expelling Romanian-Roma residents, his government would bring back security to the city. He reaffirmed his speech by stating that he would keep Romanian-Roma residents and uncivil immigrants in check during his term in office.[73] The campaign and the electoral results produced widespread reactions against the PP in Badalona, Catalonia, and Spain.

---

[72] Rosa, I. (2010). "Vótame. Prometo mano dura." Público. April 30. Available in: http://blogs.publico.es/trabajarcansa/2010/04/30/votame-prometo-mano-dura/ (Accessed 9 February 2015)

[73] Robles, F. (2011). "¿Quién es ese García Albiol?". El Pais. 8 July. Available in: http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/07/08/actualidad/1310142897_026733.html (Accessed 9 February 2015)

The position the political parties assumed on this particular issue was quite homogeneous: PSC, CiU, ERC, ICV were against the politicization (Article 2). Among the political parties opposing to the PIC, ICV became the most outspoken critic to the PP's electoral campaign and to Garcia-Albiol's discourse (Burchianti and Triviño, 2015: 256). In this situation, the PP received the support from Roma associations mainly based in the neighborhoods of Sant Roc, Artigas-Sant Adria and La Salut. Because of the PP's campaign, the NGO SOS-Racisme sued him for hate speech; however, Barcelona's Criminal Court found him not guilty in 2013.

The burka regulation in Lleida

In Lleida (pop. 137.387/ 21% foreigners), the local council approved in July 2010 the modification of the law of civility. In the law, it forbade the access to any public building to any person wearing *burka* or *niqab;* this modification was popularly known as the 'burka regulation.'[74] The modification was proposed by the Socialist Party (PSC) and supported by CiU and PP. Initiative-Greens (ICV) opposed while Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) abstained (Burchianti and Zapata-Barrero, 2014). The measure produced widespread reactions all over Spain because it was the first time a city decided to take a step perceived to be against the religious freedom of some immigrant communities. The major of

---

[74]   City of Lleida, Plenary session's proceedings, July 2nd, 2010. p.10

Lleida justified the measure on security grounds and the defense of gender equality.

In this context, those organizations representing immigrants coming from Muslim countries (Mainly Morocco and Algeria) positioned themselves either in favor or opposition of the politicization of this issue (Triviño-Salazar, 2014). Certain associations justified the burka regulation on allegations that this dress was not representative of Muslim women. Those against the politicization saw it as an attack against the religious freedom and an approach that could stigmatize Islam even further. After lawsuits from NGOs and immigrant associations, the Spanish Supreme Court ruled in May 2013 that the city of Lleida and its government did not have attributions over this issue.[75] Therefore, the ordinance had to be suspended.

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census in Vic

In Vic (pop. 40.000/ 26% foreigners), on 26 December 2009 the coalition government (CiU, PSC and ERC) passed an ordinance whcih forbade any undocumented immigrant from registering in the local census. The rest of political parties were quite divided on the issue: ICV and CUP against and the extreme right-wing party

---

[75]   (2013). "El Supremo declara firme la sentencia que anuló la prohibición del 'burka'." El   Pais. July 11, Available in:
http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2013/07/11/catalunya/13735695 24_814273.html (Accessed 7 April 2015).

Platform for Catalonia (PxC) in favor of the ordinance (Article 2). The measure created widespread controversy because it prevented a group of people, in this case undocumented immigrants, from having access to social services. In Spain, local residents are required to register in the city they live in order to have access to health, education or other social services. The official justification to pass the ordinance was to organize the immigration flows that the city was receiving.

Some non-government organizations (NGOs) and political parties interpreted the measure as an electoral response to the increasing popularity of PxC (Article 2). This situation made several local NGOs organize marches to request the local government the withdrawal of the ordinance. Some months after the approval, the ordinance was declared not applicable by the State's Attorney.[76] After describing the background and the three cases, I would like to describe the different techniques I use to gather the information needed.

4.3.2. Information-seeking process

I used desk research and semi-structured interviews as the main techniques to gather the information in the three cases

---

[76]   (2010). "Abogacía del Estado concluye que "procede" empadronar a todos los inmigrantes". La Vanguardia. 20 January. Available at: http://www.lavanguardia.com/vida/20100120/53873994832/abogacia-del-estado- concluye-que-procede-empadronar-a-todos-los-inmigrantes.html (Accessed 8 April   2015)

abovementioned. The time frame goes from 2010, when the PICs emerged in the three cases, to 2012, one year after the 2011 municipal elections in the three cities. Through desk research my main interest was to understand the institutional context surrounding the conflict, its background and the justification of the position assumed by the two sets of actors studied. Concretely, I used a combination of electoral data and sources of information from local immigration plans, local council proceedings, and newspaper articles. I selected articles related to the conflicts in the six most read newspapers in Catalonia (From most to least read: La Vanguardia, El Periodico, El Pais, El Mundo, El Punt Avui, Segre) (Fundacc, 2013).

Through semi-structured interviews, my main interest was to understand the process that led to the conflict, the perceptions of the actors involved and how they found in other actors allies for their positions and claims. In this respect, *interviews were the backbone of the information gathered.* Interviews allowed me to have more complete information about the interactions between actors amidst the conflict. Also, the information provided by the interviewees came to complement and expand the information gathered in newspapers or local council proceedings.

I focused on the two selected sets of actors of this study: political parties and immigrant associations. For the political parties, I interviewed councilmen who were spokespersons for their parties in the local council. In those situations where I could not contact any spokesperson, I interviewed the president/secretary of the political

party´s local section. These were the cases of ERC in Badalona, ICV in Lleida and CiU in Vic. For immigrant associations, I selected those associations that were relevant in the context of the conflict. I identified these associations through the media and the application of snowball sampling techniques. I also interviewed representatives of Pro-immigrant NGOs who were highly relevant in the context of the PIC. As in the case of the immigrant associations, the NGOs were identified through the media and the application of snowball sampling techniques. The purpose of interviewing them was to better understand the context of the conflict and the relations established by the different political parties with immigrant associations.

I conducted a total of 38 interviews[77][78] during the fieldwork in the three cities. I did 12 interviews to councilmen and three to local presidents from political parties and 13 interviews to representatives of local immigrant associations. I also interviewed nine representatives of local Pro-immigrant NGOs and one local officer (Lleida). To keep the literary flow and respect the anonymity of some interviewees, I omitted the names of some immigrant associations and NGOs quoted in the interviews.[79]

---

[77]   See Annex for a list of interviews according to case, type of actor, date and length of the   interview

[78]   See the Annex for the interview guide

[79]   I codified the interviewees by writing the type of actor (political party: pol; immigrant   associations: ia; pro-immigrant NGO: ngo; city officer: cit), interview number and city   initial (Badalona: b; Lleida: ll and Vic: v). For instance: interview with political party   representative in Badalona (*pol.1b*). The relation

The questions in the interviews were divided into the main sets of actors in the alliances, political parties and immigrant associations, and those actors who were also important in the PIC because of their presence in the media. The latter did not belong to political parties or immigrant organizations; however, they directly worked with immigrant communities. This is the situation of Pro-immigrant NGOs and local officers in the cities. It is important to mention that the NGOs interviewed were treated as outside actors that could better identify and understand the alliances formed between political parties and immigrant associations.

In descending order, from most important to least, the sources of information were used as follows: first, interviews; second, newspaper articles; third, local council proceedings; fourth, local immigration plans and fifth, electoral data. As said above, interviews were an essential component in capturing the explicit and implicit dynamics underpinning the relations between these two sets of actors. Next, I would like to set out the way I plan to analyze all the information gathered. This is, how I will study those elements that account for the formation of alliances in the three cases.

4.3.3. How to analyze the information

The present study is based on a system of categories that help identifying those elements in my research that explain the emergence of alliances. Based on this, I propose to analyze the

of the codes with the names of the organizations can be found in the Annex.

information through dimensions in the political environment where I shall use more descriptive (institutional-related) and more dynamic (conflict-related) dimensions. In this study, *I operationalize alliances as those relations between two actors that emerge from the support lent by one side or the other with the aim of achieving short-term or long-term goals (Article 1).* This relation must acknowledge the power imbalances in terms of access to resources that one of the sides has and the strategic interactions derived from this imbalance.

Departing from Kriesi et al. (1995) and Kriesi (n.d.)'s research, I would like to refer to a highly important institutional dimension in the political environment in the formation of alliances: the configuration of power. Studying the configuration of power implies studying the position political parties to the left and the right of the political spectrum has in a city. It implies studying the way those political parties when in power include immigrant associations in the local governance structure. It also implies understanding how the politicization of immigration conflicts produce divisions among immigrant associations and the communities they represent and how these dimensions facilitate the formation of alliances with certain political parties. Taking into consideration the specificities of the study and the POS literature, I consider the operationalization of two institutional and two conflict-related dimensions.

Institutional-related dimensions

a) The configuration of power:

Political opportunity theorists (e.g. Tarrow, 1994; della Porta and Rucht, 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995) defend the importance of the configuration of power in facilitating the mobilization of social movements. Adapted to the study of immigration, the importance of this dimension is that political parties with access to decision-making institutions can contribute in putting forward the claims and aspirations of immigrant associations (Bird, 2004: 2). Political parties are the institutional gatekeeper that can put them closer or further away from the power structures (Ireland, 1994: 25). This implies looking at the composition of the legislative bodies and the interests represented by different political forces in them.

More descriptive, this dimension looks at the composition of the local council. This is to identify which are the ruling political parties (part of majority, coalition or minority governments) and oppossition political parties in the local councils when the conflict emerged. The assumption is that if political parties represented in decision-making bodies are highly relevant allies of immigrant associations, then the position they have in these bodies will shape the type of relation both actors have. Electoral data from the elections covering the studied period will be used in this dimension.

b) Institutional openness in the city:

This dimension refers to the openness of the local political system to the claims and demands made by immigrant associations. Kriesi et al. (1995: 27) refers to the formal structures as those that determine the openness of the State to social movements. According

to the POS literature, the existence of avenues to channel the claims of groups outside the State help defining how these groups relate to institutional actors. In the study of immigration, the existence of specific channels may indicate a willingness to include immigrants in local decision-making structures (Martiniello, 2006). *De facto* openness is somehow dependent on the political will of the political elites in the city. In the formation of alliances, the existence or not of institutional channels of dialogue may favor certain alliances over others (e.g. a ruling political party that uses government channels may not need establishing any alliance, as a party, with an immigrant association; conversely, an immigrant association that do not have government channels to express their claims may find in alliances with oppossition political parties an alternative to voicing them).

I shall assess this dimension in each one of the cities by identifying the existence of channels of consultation for immigrant associations. Consultative politics is the most visible arena for the institutionalized participation of immigrant associations in the local policy-making (Martiniello, 2006: 20). Consultative politics, structured around consultative bodies or councils, can be defined as democratic bodies set up at the local level to provide a forum of discussion between elected representatives and immigrants (Martiniello and Gsir, 2004:11). In this dimension, I will look at the existence or not of consultative bodies specifically created for immigrant-related issues. This information can be found in local immigration plans, local participation departments or municipal charts on participation.

Conflict-related dimensions

c) Conflict frame

This dimension refers to the way each local political elite frame specific aspects related to immigration. Conflicts emerge due to the combination of ethnic and religious demands (e.g. the accommodation of the religious customs of certain immigrant communities and the opposition of the local population to the accommodation of these customs) and legal-administrative issues related to immigration (e.g. the 'need' to toughen up immigration policies, the access to public services and subsidies for immigrants) (Koopmans et al., 2005: 148). In this sense, the way political elites frame a conflict directs the relations with certain immigrant communities or immigrants, in general. The ethnic and religious frames imply considering that the immigrants' customs and traditions must adapt to the receiving society's (Western) values. The legal-administrative frame considers immigrants as predators of the receiving society's resources. It aims to control their impact on these resources by restricting the access to them.

In this dimension, I will study the way political elites politicize certain issues related to all or specific immigrant communities through ethnic, religious or legal-administrative conflicts. Based on the literature, frames have the potential to divide immigrant communities creating potential alliances with one side or the other (Koopmans et al. 2005: 143). The source of information is provided

by newspapers and semi-structured interviews to political parties and immigrant associations.

d) Ideology

As some scholars have rightly pointed out, the political parties' ideological stances on immigration are illustrated by a more social-egalitarian, universal approach based on solidarity and a more nationalist, particularistic approach based on the protection of the receiving society (Alonso and Da Fonseca, 2012; Hepburn, 2014). For political parties, these stances are illustrated through political discourses, electoral programs and manifestos.

Based on the aforementioned points, Zapata-Barrero (2007: 319) offers a typology on the immigration discourses carried out by political actors. Accordingly he identifies two types of political discourses: proactive and reactive. A proactive discourse defends the multicultural process that entails the arrival of immigrants as an irreversible historical reality. It aims to endow to the people (citizens or not) with resources and instruments to manage the conflicts that emerge from the multicultural process. Conversely, a reactive discourse acts against the multicultural process that the presence of immigrants triggers. The reactive discourse seeks to manage the conflict (which is seen as a threat and a negative factor) and the consequences it produces on the local population. The conceptualization of proactive and reactive discourses acknowledges that there is a link between the proactive discourse and the new political progressivism and the reactive discourse and

the new political conservatism of political actors (Zapata-Barrero, 2007: 319).

In this dimension, I will link the proactive or reactive approach to the conflicts studied to the arguments used by political parties to justify their positions. I will find this information through the way actors justify their positions on the PICs in the semi-structured interviews. In Table 6. below a summary of the four dimensions.

Table 6. Dimensions to study the emergence of alliances

	Dimension	Standard	Source of information
Institutional-related dimensions	Institutional openness	**-** Existence or not of consultative bodies/commission/boards specifically created for the participation of migrants	-Local immigration plans -Documents released by the Department in charge of immigration affairs
	Configuration of power	- Political parties with representation in the local council	-Electoral results
Conflict-related dimensions	Conflict frame	-Type of frame (Ethnic, religious or legal-administrative) - Potential for division (of the frame)	-Newspapers -Semi-structured interviews
	Ideology	Type of discourse (Proactive/Reactive)	-Newspapers -Semi-structured interviews

In this section, I presented those dimensions that I deem necessary in explaining the emergence of alliances in the context of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs). I also introduced the background and cases and the sources of information and the methods to gather this information. In the next part, I present the results obtained from applying the set of dimensions on the cases.

4.4. The political environment and the emergence of alliances in Badalona, Lleida, and Vic

In all three cases, it was possible to detect the formation of alliances. In some situations, it was possible to detect alliances between political parties –in the government and opposition –and particular immigrant associations. In other cases, political parties and immigrant associations either did not find allies or simply decided not to look for any. In all of them, the local political environment surrounding the politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) was decisive in facilitating or constraining the formation of alliances. This section is divided in two sub-sections. In section 4.4.1., I will present the findings obtained from applying the four dimensions in each one of the cases. I will mention the alliances identified through the sources of information and techniques and I will explore each one of the explanatory dimensions proposed in section 4.3.1. above. In section 4.4.2., I will do a summary of the findings and an analysis of the dimensions that account for the emergence of alliances in each one of the cases.

4.4.1. The findings

The anti-Roma Romanian campaign in Badalona

Based on the fieldwork, it was possible to identify particular alliances between the People's Party (PP) and some Roma organizations that lent support to this party during the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign. Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV) also formed particular alliances with some Roma organizations that opposed to the Romanian-Roma conflict. It was not possible to identify any alliance between the rest of political parties present in the local council and other Roma associations. In order to explain why the two aforementioned parties established alliances and the others did not, it is necessary to understand the political environment where the PIC occurred.

a) Institutional-related dimensions

Badalona was until 2011 a Socialist stronghold. For more than 30 years, the PSC was omnipresent in the city's decision-making institutions. However, it is in the last term they were in power, 2007-2011, when the PP's anti-Roma-Romanian discourse emerged. By then, the PSC ruled in a coalition government with CiU and ERC while the PP and ICV were in the opposition.

As mentioned before, the term 2011-2015 represented a radical turn in the city's government when the centre-right PP rose to power and

formed a minority government. The PSC was unable to repeat the coalition government they had before and became part of the opposition along with CiU, ERC and ICV. In the context of the PIC, this term meant that the PP, now as the ruling political party, had to deliver to its promises of a tougher stance on immigration and a tighter control on the Romanian-Roma community (Triviño-Salazar, 2014: 4).

The change from a centre-left to a centre-right government neither opened up nor closed down the scope for more institutional participation for immigrant associations in the city. In fact, Badalona offers a quite *restrictive institutional setting* for the political participation of immigrant associations in local politics. Since immigration became an important issue in the local context at the beginning of the 2000s, the city released three immigrations plans as the roadmap for actions.[80] The Socialist government released two immigration plans in 2005 and 2008 and the PP government one more in 2012. The three plans mentioned the political participation of immigrants as an important component of their accomodation into the city affairs. However, none of them included specific spaces through which immigrant associations could participate.

---

[80]   The three plans released by the city were: Plan de Convivencia en la Diversidad del 2005 (2005 Coexistence Plan in Diversity); Plan de Ciudadanía e Integración del 2008 (2008 Citizenship and Integration Plan) and Plan para la Promoción de la Convivencia de Badalona (2012 Plan for the promotion of Coexistence in Badalona).

The participatory framework of the city considered the creation of Coexistence Boards for the dialogue between political and civil society representatives in the eight districts that Badalona is divided.[81] By the time this study ended only one district had a Coexistence Board in place. In spite of this, there are none specific channels for the participation of immigrant associations in the local affairs.

The institutional-related dimensions were marked by the change in the *configuration of power* during the studied period. From the ruling PSC in 2010 to the ruling PP in 2011, the city council saw major changes. In spite of the change of ruling parties, the *institutional openness* of the city remained quite restrictive since it did not offer specific spaces for immigrant associations.

b) Conflict-related dimensions

The framing of the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign as an *ethnic conflict* favored the establishment of alliances between the PP and certain parts of the Roma community.[8283] The fact that they

---

[81]   2012 Plan for the promotion of coexistence in Badalona: 3

[82]   When I refer to the Roma community and its associations, I mainly refer to associations   started by Spanish Roma residents who claimed their identity as Roma and not   national-based. They did not intend to represent a nationality but the   European Roma people. According to the   interviewees,   their associations incorporated Roma people from   other   nationalities and immigrants who felt identified with their claims.   Although they   may not be considered an immigrant association per se (According to   Rex, and Josephides, 1987; Vermeulen 2006); Roma associations   are based on   ethnic lines. It is precisely

considered a group of people with a specific ethnic background not to share a common system of values with the receiving society favored this situation.

During the second half of the 2000s, Badalona started receiving Romanian-Roma immigrants who mainly moved to the neighborhoods of Artigas, La Salut, Llefia, and Sant Roc.[84] They moved to apartment blocks located in areas that were home to local Roma, Pakistani, Moroccan and local residents. This situation produced clashes between the local population, immigrants and members of the Romanian-Roma community because they were perceived not to be civilized and law-abiding.[85] The local Roma community was particularly sensitive to their presence because they felt these neighborhoods were a territory conquered by them decades ago.

> What happened when the Romanian-Roma people arrived? The [local] gypsies saw that the Romanian gypsies were occupying their spaces; so by occupying their spaces they [Romanian-Roma] started following a lifestyle not far away from the one they [Spanish-Roma] used to have some years ago […] So what happens? The Romanian gypsies occupied

---

this situation that makes them a relevant actor in the representation of claims of the Romanian Roma residents.

[83] By the time of the study, Romanian nationals were already EU citizens with full voting rights at the local level

[84] Pro-Roma NGO representative, interview, 12 April 2013 (ngo.1b)

[85] García, J. (2010). "Los gitanos rumanos son una plaga", *El Pais*, 16.04. Available in: http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/04/16/actualidad/1271405853_850215.html (Accessed December 10, 2013)

spaces; they bothered at the public space level […]. In the streets and squares they were problematic and they became the mirror where Spanish gypsies tended to look themselves. When you told them: Don't you see they are gypsies like you? They said: ah, but they are filthy and this and that. The same discourse the *payos* [white people] had about the [local] gypsies is the same discourse the [local] gypsies have with them [The Romanian-Roma].[86]

The anti-Romanian-Roma campaign was not the first attempt by the PP to stigmatize the presence of immigrants in Badalona. In the 2007 electoral campaign for major, Xavier Garcia-Albiol, then candidate, focused on the conflictive presence associated with foreign residents in the city. He released a video-documentary called '7 minutes' where laymen complained about the presence of immigrants in the city by linking it to incivility and crime.[87]

In 2010, the PP tried a similar electoral strategy to the one they had used in 2007; however, this time they picked a specific community: the Romanian Roma. Garcia-Albiol's discourse claimed that their presence led to all the evils associated with immigrants in Badalona. The overarching argument during the PP's campaign was to defend the city against the threat posed by 'uncivilized foreign residents' particularly from the 'global south.' As the Xavier Garcia-Albiol, mayor of Badalona stated:

---

[86]   Coordinator of Pro-Roma NGO, Interview, 12 April 2013 (ngo.1b)

[87]   Representative of Pro-Roma NGO, Interview, 6 May 2013 (ngo.2b)

> "Here integration policies do not work, but a strong police and judicial measures. Lock them up or send them back to their countries." [88]

There was a disconnection between the local Roma community that supported the PP in the politicization and the Roma associations of the affected neighborhoods that stood against the stigmatization of the Roma people. In this case, it is interesting to see that the division produced within the Roma community was beneficial for the PP in their attempts to seek for allies in the context of the PIC. This is because they could get on board those sections of the Roma community that agreed with their position.

> "They [the PP] did what it has historically been done with the gypsies: you come to the Roma community, and you say 'Ok let´s divide them.' You look for some patriarchs [informal leaders within the Roma communities] who help them [the PP] to blame on the Romanian-Roma community by saying that they do not know how to live, etc. Then you have a real fact which is the appropriation of roles by the Romanian gypsies, the street vending, the junk business done by part of the gypsy population […] then you have a division between the Spanish Roma community and the Roma community from Eastern Europe"[89]

The division produced by the frame of the PIC was beneficial for the formation of alliances between ICV and specific Roma

---

[88]   Rosa, I. (2010). "Vótame. Prometo mano dura." Público. April 30. Available in: http://blogs.publico.es/trabajarcansa/2010/04/30/votame-prometo-mano-dura/   (Accessed 9 February 2015)

[89]   Representative of Pro-Roma NGO, Interview, 6 May 2013 (ngo.2b)

associations that were against the politicization of the Romanian-Roma community. In this sense, ICV found in those associations against the politicization of this community an ally to reinforce their position against the PP's discourse.

Another important dimension in the formation of alliances was *ideology*. In the case of the PP and those leaders from the Spanish-Roma associations, the *reactive discourse* of a centre-right party that defended organized immigration flows permeated on their own discourses. The PP's argument was based on liberal values that favored immigration as an economic asset. The response to those immigrants that did not fulfill any of those conditions was hard measures based on a securitizing approach.[90] Furthermore, the PP considered civil society actors that were against their discourse, enemies of the values that made the Badalona society a modern one.

> "For me the neighbors of the city are those who are the autochthonous population who have lived all their lives in Badalona and all the legal immigrants […] Let me be very clear that for all those people in my city, national citizens or foreigners, who are working and have legal status, they will have a better city. Now, I am going to face up to those people who create difficulties, commit a crime in my city. This is something I will not allow."[91]

---

[90] Coordinator of Pro-Roma NGO, interview, 12 April 2013 (ngo.1b)

[91] Xavier Garcia-Albiol, the PP Mayor of Badalona, radio interview, 1 March 2011

It was pointed out by several interviewees that the PP in Badalona treated everyone as neighbors, as individuals and not collectivities. In this sense, the use of the individuals instead of the community guided the way the PP would manage immigration and diversity in the city. For the PP, the city should treat everyone as residents without recognizing the particularities and needs of socio-economically disadvantaged groups. In fact, this party was accussed of following two strategies; first, none or little financial support to immigrant and Roma associations and second a stronger focus on the securitization of those parts of the city considered to be 'problematic'[92]. The Romanian-Roma conflict fits the picture where this party, as the ruling party, stopped lending financial support to those organizations that had traditionally worked with immigrants and Roma communities.

> "The PP government would like to have a society without associations, without a social network or associational web, no interlocutors. For Garcia-Albiol what matters is to go to the coffee-bars and talk to the people directly. For them, the associational world… is a *chiringuito* (beach kiosk) with three people: the secretary, treasurer and an assistant and they do nothing. So the associations have to be shut down… The PP ignores and despises that, and it is not by chance: they want all this to die."[93]

A proactive approach supported the alliances between ICV and some Spanish-Roma associations in the neighborhood of Sant Roc. For ICV, the self-identification with the left made them advocate

---

[92]   Coordinator of Pro-Roma NGO, interview, 12 April 2013 (ngo.1b)

[93]   ICV councilman, interview, 21 March 2013 (pol.4b)

for those groups that had the higher risk of social exclusion. The way they responded to the issue was informed first, by the way ICV perceived the presence of the Romanian-Roma community in Badalona and second, how they linked their position and arguments to more universal values focused on all residents of the city.

> People don't see the problem; they say: No, it is not the capitalism, the capitalism is not guilty. However, the poor Moroccan that is worse off than me, he is guilty because I can see him. Or the Romanian that comes to take away my job, my food stamps and take all of that. If someone says: 'look, that is not the problem, we should think from a broader perspective' then the left is blamed for being naïve.[94]

In the conflict-related dimensions, it is possible to see that the conflict was framed as an ethnic one by focusing on a specific community, the Romanian-Roma. When it comes to the ideology, the PP's discourse assumed a reactive approach supported by the need to have organized immigration flows and immigrants who share the same values as the local population. Conversely, ICV assumed a proactive approach in favor of diversity and social cohesion.

The burka regulation in Lleida

In the case of Lleida, it was possible to identify particular alliances between the Socialist Party (PSC) and some immigrant

---

[94]   ibid

associations representing Muslim immigrants from Morocco and Algeria (Maghreb Region). In addition to this, CiU established an alliance with an immigrant association oriented towards immigrants in general rather than a specific nationality. ICV was not able to find any ally while the PP and ERC did not actively look for any. In order to explain why the two aforementioned parties established alliances and why the rest did not, I will apply the four selected dimensions on the case of the burka regulation to understand the political environment.

a) Institutional-related dimensions

The city of Lleida has traditionally been ruled by the Socialist Party (PSC) since 1979. In fact, in the last two terms (2007-2011 and 2011-2015) the PSC obtained absolute majority making of Lleida a Socialist stronghold in Catalonia (IdesCat, 2012). For the period 2007-2011, the political parties in the opposition were CiU; PP; ERC and ICV. It is during this term that the PSC decides to modify the law of civility and forbid women wearing burka from entering municipal buildings.

In May 2011, the local elections confirmed the PSC as the ruling political party, again with the absolute majority. CiU and the PP remained in the opposition. The other two political parties with representation in the previous term, ERC and ICV, did not get enough votes to retain their seats. The electoral campaign preceding the new *configuration of power* was strongly influenced by the studied PIC. As mentioned in the description of cases, the

management of Islam entered into the electoral campaign of this city.

Opposite to Badalona, it is possible to see in Lleida a quite *open institutional environment* to the claims of immigrant associations. The Department of Civil Rights, Cooperation and Equality is responsible for immigrants' affairs in the city[95]. In 2009, the local government included in the Municipal Plan of Actions the project "Knitting a new citizenship".[96] One of the objectives of this project was invigorating and consolidating immigrant associations as a vital part of the associative life of the city. Through several workshops organized within this project, the city, and the workshop participants proposed the opening of the Citizens Forum for Social Cohesion (FOCCS). The forum has the aim of institutionalizing a space for the participation of immigrant associations in the management of immigration. [97] Another important space for the management of immigration, and more importantly the local management of religious diversity, is the Assembly of Religions. [98] Although it is not focused on immigrants *per se,* its aim is to

---

[95]   City of Lleida (2014). ReUria de Drets Civils, Cooperacio i Igualtat. Available in: http://www.paeria.es/cas/ajuntament/cooperacio.asp (Accessed 26 December 2014)

[96]   City of Lleida (2012). "FOCCS." La Paeria. Available in: http://www.paeria.es/dcci/Pages/Ciutadania/CiutadaniaDefault.aspx?area=8&idioma=0&id=75

[97]   ibid

[98]   City of Lleida (n.d.). "Tradicions: Asamblea de las Religiones." *La Paeria.* Available in: http://www.paeria.cat/tradicions/pdf/72-lassemblea-municipal-religions.pdf (Accessed 9 February 2015)

develop an environment of understanding among Christianity and the different religious confessions brought by newcomers.

In the institutional-related dimensions, we have then a quite stable configuration of power during the studied period. The PSC was the ruling when the conflict emerged and the rest of parties in the opposition (CiU, PP, ERC and ICV). When it comes to the institutional openness, the city offered various channels for the participation of immigration associations.

    b) Conflict-related dimensions

The way the political elites in the city framed the burka regulation as a religious one, favored the alliances between the ruling PSC and the opposition CiU with different associations. The frame was somehow consequence of the historical relation the city has had with particular Muslim communities.

The presence of Islam in Lleida dates back from the 1990s when immigrants from Morocco, Algeria, Senegal and Nigeria arrived to work in the agro-industrial and construction sectors. From their presence, two large Muslim communities and several smaller ones were formed. One of the two largest Muslim communities is the one led by Imam Morro Jaiteh; this community is considered to be more 'open and liberal'. The other one is led by Imam Abdelwahab Houzi and it is considered more "close and conservative."[99] Imam Houzi's community became prominent in the last decade because of

---

[99]   City of Lleida's officer, interview, 5 May 2013 (cit.1.ll)

Houzi's attempts to build a new mosque. As time passed, the planning and building of Houzi's mosque encountered opposition from the local population due to the location and Houzi's more fundamentalist view on Islam.

> If you see the process with the community, there are different issues and different moments. The city gives them some land [to Imam Houzi´s Mosque]; however, they do not get the money to build the mosque and they keep the construction stopped for two years. Then the city closes the mosque that they had and then you have the burka…[100]
>
> Even the Omar mosque, the one which has mostly Sub-Saharan population did not agree with Houzi's mosque because they did not see them as followers of a real Islamic current [referring to the allegations that Houzi and his community were Salafists]. [101]

The PSC tended to favor those associations that were closer to their views and dismiss those that were farther away deepening the gap between different Muslim communities. In this sense, the framing of the burka regulation and the division among associations representing immigrants from Muslim countries favored the formation of alliances with the PSC. This party, as responsible for the politicization of the burka, sought to validate the type of Islam acceptable in the city by giving institutional visibility to those associations that lent support to the measure.[102] Based on Mouritsen (2006: 79), a type of Islam adapted to the 'universal' and liberal

---

[100]   City of Lleida's officer, interview, 5 June 2013 (cit.1.ll)
[101]   Ibid
[102]   Pro-immigrant NGO secretary, interview, 11 June 2013 (ngo.1.ll)

values of European societies as opposed to an illiberal Islam connected to backwardness and incivility.

The ideology behind the positions assumed by the political parties in favor of the burka regulation denoted two things: first, a reactive approach to the issue and second, the accommodation of reactive arguments to the ideological lines of their parties. In this sense, political parties tried to justify a reactive approach to safeguard the local population against the violation of human rights provisions or the search of the general well-being.

The ruling PSC claimed that by taking this measure they were defending gender equality and eliminating those practices that posed an obstacle to this goal. The Maghrebian associations that allied with this party pretty much assumed this discourse that facilitated their accommodation into the receiving society.[103] According to the PSC, the measure was very much in line with progressive principles that the left should feature regarding groups such as women oppressed by socio-economic or cultural conditions.

> "We defended our position based on women's freedom and the dignity of the people. Because my understanding is, in a recent article I wrote replying to the MP from ICV, that it is interesting that the secular left is defending an attire that attacks women's dignity, and women, as far as I know, are also people, and people are communicators and we communicate with the face. At the party level, we have

---

[103]   President Maghrebian association, interview, 05/06/2013
(ia.5.ll)

never got into a religious debate; we are a secular party, and this does not mean that we should not establish a dialog." [104]

Interestingly enough, this general feeling was pretty much in line with the arguments of centre-right political parties that also defended a more homogenizing and securitizing approach in the cultural accommodation of minorities. However, they constantly mentioned 'their values' to justify measures that intended to protect liberal democratic values.

"For me, one thing is to defend the fundamental right of religious freedom, and the other is to set some limits within the remaining fundamental rights. For me, the equality between men and women is the most important thing. One thing is what you do in your home and another one what you do in public. When you express this religious freedom, you cannot go against those values."[105]

For oppossition left-wing political parties (ERC, ICV), their ideological positions were based on a proactive aproach that defended the particularities of each immigrant community as something that the State should not regulate by force. They defended gender equality, as the modern left should do; however, the approach is not by treating certain communities as a threat but offering redistributive policies that allowed those groups in a marginal position to get access to education. [106]

---

[104]   PSC councilwoman, interview, 6 June 2013 (pol.6.ll)
[105]   PP councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pol.3.ll)
[106]   ERC councilwoman, interview, 5 June 2013 (pp.2.ll)

In the conflict-related dimensions, it is possible to detect a history behind a religious conflict that denotes the difficulties in the relations between the local government and a specific Muslim community. The ruling political party (PSC) and the rest of parties supporting the regulation (CiU, PP) assumed a reactive approach to justify their position by offering gender equality and security arguments. Conversely, opposition left-wing parties (ICV and ERC) assumed a proactive approach to manage the issue.

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census in Vic

In the case of Vic, it was possible to identify particular alliances between the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP) party and an immigrant association. The other political parties CiU, PSC, ERC, ICV and the extreme right-wing Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) did not seek for allies or could not find any. In order to explain why the aforementioned party established alliances and why the rest did not, I will use the four dimensions of the political environment proposed before.

a) Institutional-related actors

The city of Vic has been ruled by the centre-right Convergencia i Unio (CiU) for more than 30 years. In the term 2007-2011, when the local census controversy emerged, CiU led a coalition government with the PSC and ERC. In the opposition, PxC, ICV, and CUP. For the term 2011-2015, CiU remained in power by getting most of the votes. However, this time they also

had to form a coalition government. In this term, ERC continued to be a coalition partner while the PSC became part of the opposition along with CUP, ICV, and SI. PxC, the anti-immigrant extreme right-wing party in the city of Vic, has had a steady increase through the demonization of particular immigrant communities, such as those coming from Muslim countries.

Vic portrays a quite *open institutional setting* where immigrant associations are included through different mechanisms in the policy-making structures. The participation of non-institutional actors in the policy-making is responsibility of the Department of Culture and Citizen Participation. This Department implemented in 2009 the Council of the City of Vic.[107] This non-binding body is composed by political representatives, public servants, associations and NGOs distributed in several working committees which cover a wide range of policy areas. Within the Council, the Immigration Commission, created as a consequence of the local census controversy, intends to be a consultative body for issues related to immigration. Also, the Housing Commission has seats reserved exclusively for immigrant associations. Additionally, in 2012 the Department of Co-existence and Security created the Consultative Commission of Co-existence and Security with the intention to work on the rightful coexistence and accommodation of diversity.[108]

---

[107]   City of Vic (n.d.). "Regiduria de Cultura i Participacio Ciutadana." *Ajuntament de   Vic.* Available in: http://www.vic.cat/viure-a-vic/cultura-i-ciutadania (Accessed 20 January 2014)

[108]   ibid

This body includes representatives from immigrant associations, NGOs, and government representatives.

Institutional-related dimensions show stability in the ruling political parties during the studied period. The only relevant situation is the PSC leaving the ruling coalition and the rise of PxC in the term 2011-2015. Vic has a quite open institutional setting for the participation of immigrants. Different mechanisms have been created to promote the participation of immigrant associations.

b) Conflict-related dimensions

The ordinance banning the registration of undocumented immigrants in the local census can be *framed as a legal-administrative* conflict based on allegations from local political elites on the need to organize migration flux.[109] The ordinance was preceded by a particular political process.

According to different interviewees, the presence of Platform for Catalonia (PxC) in the local political scenario and its electoral success in the local council, from one seat in 2003 to five in 2011, increased the concern of the ruling coalition. The grow of the immigrant population in the city and the diversity of its composition were the favorite targets of PxC; they based their discourse on showing immigration as an attack against the local system of values and the economic well-being of the local population. The political

---

[109]   City of Vic, Plenary Session proceedings, 13 January, 2010: 6

parties in the coalition government understood the rise of PxC as a message to toughen up their position on immigration affairs.

> "I think that more than a conflict on the streets, there was a political situation created by the PxC that promoted the idea that there was a conflict. Taking the decision [the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census] deepened this idea. I think that the political elites in the last year accepted that there was a conflict of coexistence because there is a lot of cultural diversity, and this produces conflict. From my point of view, there is no conflict, but there is the belief that there is one. However, the real conflict is that there is racism."[110]

When the ruling coalition made the decision to implement this ordinance, immigrant associations representing these communities got together since they understood it as an attack connected to PxC's presence. Opposite to the other two cities where the communities and immigrant associations representing them were divided, immigrant associations in Vic showed a quite unified position against this measure.

> "This came out [the local census conflict] and we [immigrant associations in Vic] got together, because all the associations are grouped under one organization called *Casal Claret*. Then they called us from *Casal Claret* for an emergency meeting to analyze the whole situation. We got together for the whole week." [111]

Ideology played a role behind the decision to support or oppose to the conflictive politicization of the local census in Vic. This is

---

[110]   CUP councilmen, interview, 16 June 2013 (pol.6v)
[111]   President of Immigrant association, interview, 2 May 2013 (ia.3v)

particularly relevant in the alliances formed between CUP and one immigrant association. In a similar situation, ICV tried to form alliances with immigrant associations based on their ideological commonalities; however, they were not able to find any allies.[112]

In the case of the CUP their alliance was based on a *proactive approach* to immigration. CUP ideology, as a left wing party formed by grassroots movements and with a history of activism, played decisively in their decision to go against the ordinance (CUP councilmen, interview, 16 May 2013) (pol.6v). CUP had a more cosmopolitan view of immigration, where immigrants were the outcome of an unfair economic system that produced inequalities between the Global North and the Global South. CUP stated that immigration was not an issue in Vic and that immigrants did not pose any major conflict besides the common problems of coexistence experiencing any neighborhood in Spain. Furthermore, they believed that immigrants in Vic were citizens of the city no matter their legal status. For them above all, undocumented immigrants were human beings who were in a vulnerable position.

> "We understand that this proposal goes against basic human rights. Or they try to give fewer life opportunities to those people newly arrived."[113]

---

112   ICV councilman, interview, 9 May 2013 (pol. 5v)
113   CUP councilmen, interview, 16 May 2013 (pol.6v)

Political parties in the ruling coalition based their positions in favor of the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census on the ideological lines of their respective parties. Their situation is remarkable in the context of this particular PIC because CiU, a center-right, nationalist party; ERC, a left-wing, nationalist party; and PSC, a center-left party, defended the same argument on the presence of undocumented immigrants: to organize the immigration flows in such a way that resources could be better allocated among the local residents.

The conflict-related dimensions showed that: first, the framing of the conflict is legal-administrative because it refers to limiting the access to public services for immigrants based on their legal status. Second, the ideological positioning of the political parties was based on a reactive approach from the ruling coalition (CiU, PSC and ERC) and a proactive approach from those parties that either formed alliances or attempted to form one (CUP and ICV). Next, I would like to present some points of analysis drawn from each one of the cases studied.

4.4.2. The role of the institutional and conflict-related dimensions in the emergence of alliances

The anti-Roma Romanian campaign in Badalona

The *institutional-related dimensions* show how the PP through the politicization of the presence of a specific community became prominent in the 2011 local elections. Its position on the

politicization of the Romanian-Roma community made them take the initiative to establish alliances with Roma associations that could legitimize their discourse. In this situation, a quite restrictive institutional setting left those Roma associations opposing the PP without institutional channels to discuss the issue.

According to McAdam (1996: 10), not having enough institutional channels to guide the claims of certain communities have, as a result, a more repressive environment to certain claims than others. The fact that the PSC, CiU and ERC, as coalition partners, did not use government or party channels of dialogue put them further away from certain communities and their leaders. This situation gave leverage to the political parties in the opposition to establish alliances. The PP saw in this lack of initiative from the coalition an opportunity to get support from the Roma community through their leaders and some associations. Similarly, ICV, also an opposition political party against the politicization of the Romanian-Roma community, took the initiative to find like-minded associations that could oppose to the PP vis-à-vis the lack of responses from the ruling coalition.

When it comes to the *conflict-related dimensions,* the ethnic frame created division among those leaders informally representing the Roma community and the established Roma associations that opposed to the PP's discourse. The division within the community and the different associations favored the formation of alliances with the party that politicized the whole issue. The gap in the relation between PSC and these leaders helped the PP have them on

board in their campaign. Conversely, the lack of responses from the ruling coalition made those associations that opposed to this issue to find in ICV an ally that could represent them.

The situation of ICV and some Roma associations that allied under these circumstances show how ideology in this case matters a great deal. The disconnect between some Roma associations and the Roma community in general made them look for allies that were closer to the views on how to manage this issue. For ICV, finding allies within this community responded to mainly ideological motivations against the politicization of the Romanian-Roma.

In the case of the PP, they also had an ideological luggage behind that made them look for allies that matched their view. In this sense, it was based on immigrants as legal residents that serve the economy and where culture should not be taken into consideration. In the context of the conflict, ideology played a more discursive role based on their need to justify an electoral strategy; also as a way to convince those associations and members of the Roma community that their arguments were valid.

The burka regulation in Lleida

Institutional-related dimensions played a role in the emergence of alliances between the PSC and some Maghrebian associations and CiU and immigrant associations. The absolute majority that the PSC had in the local council, and the

institutionalization of the party in the government structures throughout the years allowed them to have a well-founded network of Maghrebian associations supporting them. The fact that the city offered certain level of institutional openness through spaces of consultation with immigrants is connected to PSC's strategy to legitimize some of its decisions by showing wide consensus in several policy areas (e.g. immigration, religious affairs, development aid and housing).

For CiU, their support for the burka regulating combined with their role as an opposition political party made them compete for the same type of associations than the PSC. However, in their case, not having power and being in a city with a quite open institutional setting left them with no option than to resort to an association not particularly focused on Islam or Muslim communities.

Conflict-related dimensions helped defining with whom and how alliances were formed when the burka regulation emerged. PSC's view of itself as a pro-immigrant party contributed to the emergence of their alliance with some Maghrebian associations. It is possible to assume that the PSC perceived itself as inclusive, understanding and accommodating regarding the diversity brought by newcomers. Hence, the party's behavior somehow tried to portray an image of openness in the middle of the discussion of a sensitive issue such as the burka regulation.

Conversely, the no formation of alliances can be linked to the conflict frame because of the nature of the burka regulation issue: the management of Islam in a city where this could cost votes to those political parties which openly opposed to the issue. Similarly, immigrant associations abstained from forming alliances, especially with those parties against the politicization, in order to avoid damaging their relations with the ruling PSC (a party very much embedded in Lleida's political structures).

The exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the local census in Vic

In Vic only one political party formed alliances with an immigrant association while the rest did not seek any allies, or if they tried to (as in the case of ICV) they were not successful. Part of the explanation for the formation or not formation of alliances was that the ruling coalition relied on the institutional channels (e,g, Councils and commissions) to manage the issue. By doing so, there was the possibility that the coalition political parties did not have to argue on an issue that was clearly opposed by all immigrant associations. In this sense, the position of power and the threat PxC posed did not encourage these parties to look for allies. In the case of ICV, their impossibility to find allies was more connected to the perception of being a small political party in Vic (only one councilman in the opposition).

The emergence of an alliance between CUP and immigrant association was related to the lack of concrete responses from the

coalition parties to pacify the conflict. The profile of the association involved (activism and advocacy for immigrants' rights) along with CUP's strong position against the PIC made both sides coincide in similar points regarding the best way immigration should be treated in Vic. Moreover, their alliance implied offering solutions based on alternative forums of dialogue with social actors.

I would like to present in Table 7. below the summary of the results found from applying the four dimensions on the three cases. In the next session, I will draw some conclusions related to the study of alliances from the Political opportunity approach and connected to immigration studies.

Table 7. Summary of findings

Case	Political party/ Association (Alliance detected)	Institutional-related dimensions			Conflict-related dimensions	
		Institutional openness	*Configuration of Power*		*Conflict Frame*	*Ideology*
			2007-2011	2011-2015		
B A D A L O N A	**PP** / **Roma associations**	RESTRICTIVE	**Opposition**	**Ruling in a minority gov.**	ETHNIC/ Divisive	**Reactive**
	ICV / **Roma associations**		**Opposition**	**Opposition**		**Proactive**
	PSC		Ruling in a coalition	Opposition		Proactive
	ERC		Coalition	Opposition		Proactive
	CiU		Coalition	Opposition		Proactive
L L E	**PSC** /**Maghrebian associations**		**Ruling in a majority gov.**	**Ruling in a majority gov.**		**Reactive**
	CiU / immigrant association		**Opposition**	**Opposition**		**Reactive**

I **D** **A**	ICV	OPEN	Opposition	–	RELIGIOUS/ Divisive	Proactive
	ERC		Opposition	–		Proactive
	PP		Opposition	Opposition		Reactive
V **I** **C**	**CUP** / **Immigrant** **association**	OPEN	**Opposition**	**Opposition**	LEGAL- ADMINISTRATIVE / Non-divisive	**Proactive**
	ICV		Opposition	Opposition		Proactive
	CiU		Ruling party in a coalition	Ruling party in a coalition		Reactive
	PSC		Ruling party in a coalition	Opposition		Reactive
	ERC		Ruling party in a coalition	Ruling party in a coalition		Reactive

4.5. Conclusion: Alliances and the political environment

The analysis of the selected cases in Badalona, Lleida and Vic confirm the main argument this paper defends: alliances between political parties and immigrant associations emerge because of the existing local political environment when politicized immigration conflicts (PIC) occur. The results and their analysis show that the local political elites did much to determine how conflicts evolved in each setting and how alliances emerged under these circumstances. As this study defends, alliances in many cases are the outcome of the specificities each local setting has while considering some circumstances –e.g. PICs.

The conclusions are structured in two parts. The first one (Section 5.1.) seeks to explain the emergence of alliances according to the information organized along the four dimensions in the political environment. In this sense, this part connects the argument I defend with the results of the study. The second part (Section 5.2.) of the conclusion seeks to show how the contribution presented in the introduction was achieved throughout the paper.

4.5.1. The dimensions and their role in explaining the different alliances

Institutional-related dimensions showed their importance in defining the dynamics between political parties and immigrant associations during the PICs. In this sense, the findings confirmed

that the configuration of power is decisive in the formation of alliances as Kriesi et al. (2004: 69) points out. It became evident that the *configuration of power* strongly determines the way actors align and form alliances under the politicization of immigration conflicts. In this sense, the alliances with ruling or opposition political parties are defined by their openness to the claims made by immigrant associations. The configuration determines whose actors to approach and under what circumstances to do it.

When it comes to ruling political parties, they (either in a majority or coalition government) feel encouraged to look for allies only if they perceive that the existing *institutional channels* for seeking support are not sufficient. In this situation, ruling political parties deem necessary the use of their own channels of dialog through which they can legitimize their position. This was the case of the PSC and some Maghrebian associations in Lleida where the former consulted the latter through government and party channels. When ruling political parties opt to establish direct relations with immigrant associations, they do it with the idea of reinforcing the position they assumed in the conflict.

The *configuration of power* also reveals that oppossition political parties are the drivers of the alliances in the cases where they either politicized a conflict (i.e. Alliances in Badalona between the PP and Roma associations) or actively opposed to its politicization before passive ruling political parties (i.e. Alliances in Badalona between the ICV and Roma associations). In these cases, not enjoying a

position of power in the local council forced them to look for allies that can reinforce their positions in the conflict. A *restrictive institutional setting* combined with ruling political parties not actively looking for allies give to opposition political parties more chances to form alliances with those associations willing to do so. Alliances, in those cases, are somehow a response to the existing channels of consultation for immigrant associations. Furthermore, opposition political parties were more prone to form alliances in the absence of institutional channels for immigrant associations.

The position in the *configuration of power* also determines the no formation of alliances. In some cases, ruling political parties opt not to form individual alliances with immigrant associations based on three reasons: first, they perceive that the institutional openness of the city offers enough channels for the participation of immigrant associations; second, they perceive the conflict as a temporary one that does not require further interventions (i.e. both situations were present during the local census conflict in Vic with the ruling coalition formed by CiU, PSC and ERC) and third, they perceive that looking for allies prolong the 'noise' produced by conflicts that could eventually harm their electoral strategies (i.e. the PSC in Badalona did not seek for allies when the anti-Romanian Roma campaign started).

Opposition political parties also have their reasons not to form alliances with immigrant associations. Similarly to the ruling political parties, the way they perceive the conflict as a temporary

one makes them choose not to ally (i.e. the burka ban and the position that the PP and ERC had). In these cases, they preferred to preserve energies for other issues. In other cases, the no formation of alliances is related to the lack of possible allies among immigrant associations. This is connected to the perception on the immigrant associations' side that an alliance with an opposition political party can jeopardize their relations with the local government. ICV in the burka regulation in Lleida and the local census conflict in Vic illustrate the aforementioned situation (Article 2).

When it comes to *conflict-related dimensions,* their combination with institutional ones make of the emergence of alliances a reality in certain cases and not in others. The way political elites frame a conflict (*conflict frames*) determines the strategies employed by political parties in the emergence of alliances. In the frames, it is possible to identify that those cultural issues (namely religion and ethnicity) tend to have a more divisive power among the associations representing these communities. Conversely, legal-administrative conflicts tend to have a less divisive power among the associations representing these communities. In the first situation, it is possible to see that for those political parties politicizing certain issues, it is easier to find allies among the associations supporting their positions (i.e. Roma associations in favor of the PP's anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona OR Maghrebian associations in favor of burka regulation led by the PSC in Lleida). In the second situation, it is possible to see that a legal-administrative conflict that affects immigrants no matter ethnicity or religion (i.e. the local census controversy in Vic)

produce a more cohesive and solid position from the affected associations. This situation makes more difficult the emergence of alliances with those political parties that politicize a conflict.

The *ideological justification* in the position of the different political parties is relevant in the formation of alliances. Opposite to the belief that left-wing political parties are more accommodating to immigrants' needs while right-wing parties are less accommodating, the results show how the position of power weigh more in their ideological justification. In this sense, ideology is used to justify proactive or reactive discourses and decisions that are in favor or against immigrants and their related diversity.

Interesting to mention is the case of the left in the three different cases. While the left in the government has a more reactive approach to the conflicts (e.g. PSC in Lleida and Vic), the left in the opposition has a more proactive approach (e.g. ICV in the three cases and CUP in Vic). It is possible to observe that opposition political parties have more ideological freedom when supporting or opposing to the PIC as the cases of ICV in Badalona and CUP in Vic show. For them, their more proactive approach helped their alliances with those immigrant associations that felt closer to their arguments. In this situation, political parties and immigrant associations are actors that support the pacification of those issues that could affect the social cohesion of the city. Following this empirical line of thought, I will now explain how this study contributes to the literature on immigration from a political opportunity structure (POS) approach.

4.5.2. The contribution of this research to the study of alliances

According to the POS approach, alliances are a political opportunity that provides actors with legitimacy and support to make their claims. By introducing this element in the study of immigration at the local level, the present study shows that particular alliances reflect the power dynamics underpinning the policy-making of immigration. Moreover, the use of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) as a causal mechanism shows how it affects the political environment triggering the alliances among the studied actors. Under these circumstances of conflict, the specificities of the political environment have a strong influence on how political parties and immigrant associations ally.

By linking the emergence of alliances to the political environment, I challenged the traditional view of alliances in the POS debate as an independent dimension that influences mobilization (Rucht, 1996: 185). As this study shows, alliances are the consequence of an interaction informed by institutional and conflict-related dimensions in the local political environment. In this sense, it is possible to confirm how the configuration of power at the local level greatly defines how different actors ally with each other. From here, the institutional openness, the conflict frame and the ideology of the political parties complete the picture that allows the emergence of the studied alliances.

On the same line, this study defends the local level as the level of proximity where institutions, civil society and immigrants face the

challenge that accommodating diversity entails. Although the national level imposes a legal framework for the entry and residency of immigrants, cities are the arenas where institutional and social actors must directly cope with their claims and needs on a daily basis. To study the local level demonstrates how urban contexts are being shaped by the dynamics that arise between institutional and social actors. The results of this research show more closely how local political elites define the politicization of some aspects related to immigration and how these situations mobilize immigrant communities in one way or the other.

 Finally, the way political parties politicize immigration has important repercussions on the different electoral scenarios that they face in each city. Moreover, their role will affect how alliances are formed and with whom. Political parties are important actors in the mobilization of social actors; however, their role is limited by the strategies movements have. In the present study, placing the focus on political parties gives agency to an actor that is fundamental in opening the political system to the participation of immigrants. It is possible to observe that political parties, because of their role in the politicization of immigration, use their position of power to legitimize their discourses and decisions through their alliances with immigrant associations.

In conclusion, this study sought to acknowledge alliances as a political opportunity that may emerge at the local level. Moreover, the dimensions herein applied should be seen as a theoretical endeavor applicable to those scholars interested in the interaction

between actors as an outcome of a particular political environment. The research presented responded to the need for more qualitative, comparative and process-oriented analyses that explored the alliances shaping the policy-making of immigration.

4.6. Bibliography

Alexander, M. (2004). "Comparing local policies toward immigrants: An interpretive framework, a typology and preliminary survey results. " In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec. *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing

Alonso, S. and Da Fonseca, S. (2012). "Immigration, left and right." *Party Politics*, November 2012 18: 865-884

Bird, K. (2004). "Comparing the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Advanced Democracies." Conference paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association Winnipeg, Manitoba. 3 June.

Bloemraad, I. (2006). *Becoming a citizen: Incorporating immigrants and refugees in the United States and Canada.* Berkeley: University of California Press

Borkert M. And Caponio, T. (eds.). (2010), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Burchianti, F. and Triviño-Salazar, JC. (2015). "La regulación política de los conflictos relacionados a la diversidad en el espacio público." In: R. Zapata-Barrero. *Las condiciones de la interculturalidad: gestión local de la diversidad.* Valencia: Tirant lo blanc (Book Chapter).

Burchianti, F. and Zapata-Barrero, R. (2014). "Is Catalonia immune to racism? An analysis of intolerant political discourses of mainstream party representatives (2010-2011)." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 12(4), pp. 401-417.

Caponio , T. (2005). "Policy Networks and Imimmigrants` Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples". *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 31 (5).

della Porta, D., and Rucht, D. (1995) 'Left-Libertarian Movements in Context: A Comparison of Italy and West Germany, 1965-1990', in B. Klandermans, C. Jenkins (eds.). *The*

Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States a nd Social Movements, Minneapolis and St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 229-272

Diani, M. (2015)."Building civic networks: Logics of tie formation." In: M. Diani (ed.). *The cement of civil society.* New York: Cambridge University Press

Fenemma, M. and Tillie, J. (1999). "Political Participation and Political Trust in a Multicultural Democracy, Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks in Amsterdam." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25(4), pp. 703–726

Fundacc (2013). "Estudi General de Mitjans de Comunicaciò. Resum 1era Onada." Available at: http://www.fundacc.org/docroot/fundacc/pdf/Resum_1a_ond a_2013.pdf (Accessed January 27, 2014)

Garbaye, R. (2005). *Getting into local power. The politics of ethnic minorities in British and French cities.* Blackwell: Oxford.

Giugni, M. (1995). "The cross-national diffusion of protest." In: H. Kriesi, R. Koopmans, J. Willem Duyvendak and M. Giugni. New Social Movements in Western Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Giugni, M. and Morales, L. (2011). Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Guibernau, M. (2007). "Catalunya i la Unió Europea: identitat, immigració i cosmopolitisme." *Eines,* Tardor. Available in: http://www.raco.cat/index.php/Eines/article/download/1419 49/193455 (Accessed 27 January 2014)

Hepburn, E. (2009). "Regionalist Party Mobilisation on Immigration." West European Politics, 32 (3). Pp. 514-53. Available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/014023809027 79071 (Accessed21 July 2014)

Ireland, P. (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ireland, P. (2004). *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State.* Pittsburh: University of Pittsburgh Press

Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1995). "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics.* 1 (1). Pp. 5-28

Koopmans, R. (2004). "Chapter 2: Protest in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Koopmans, R., and Statham, P. (2000). "Migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention: An opportunity structure approach." In: R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics. Comparative European perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.13- 56

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Pessy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Kriesi, H. (2004). "Political Context and Opportunity." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kriesi, H. (n.d.). "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Social Movements." Working Paper Series. *European University Institute.* Available in: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON/Documents/Kriesipart ysystems.pdf (Accessed 26 December 2014)

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. (1995). New Social movements in Western Europe. A comparative analysis. London: UCL Press Limited.

McAdam, D. (1996). "Introduction: opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements. In: D. McAdam, J.McCarthy and M. Zald (eds.). Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mouritsen, P. (2006). "The particular universalism of a Nordic civic nation. Common values, state religion and Islam in Danish political culture" (pp. 70-93). In: P. Mouritsen and K.E. Jorgenssen (eds.). Constituting Communities: Political Solutions to Cultural Differences. New York: Palgrave-McMillan

Martiniello, M. (2006). "Political Participation, Mobilisation, and Representation of Imimmigrants and Their Offspring in Europe." In: R, Baubock, *Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political Participation.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE

Martiniello, M., & Gsir, S. (2004). *Local consultative bodies for foreign residents-a handbook. In Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe.* Strasbourg: Council of Europe.

Odmalm, P. (2004). "Civil society, migrant organizations and political parties: theoretical linkages and applications to the Swedish context." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 30 (3)

Penninx, R. (2009). "Decentralizing Integration Policies. Managing Migration in Cities, Regions and Localities." Policy Network Paper. November. Policy Network. Pierce, R. (2008). *Research Methods in Politics*. London: SAGE Publications

Però, D. (2005). "Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case of Bologna." *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (5)

Poppelaars, C. And Scholten P. (2008). "Two worlds apart. The divergence of national and local immigrant integration policies in the Netherlands." Administration and Society. 40 (4). Available at: http://aas.sagepub.com/content/40/4/335.full.pdf+html (Accessed 8 April 2015)

Rootes, C.A. (1999). "Political Opportunity Structures: promise, problems and prospects." *La Lettre de la maison Française d'Oxford* nr. 10. pp. 75–97

Rucht, D. (1996). "The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement and cross-national comparison." In: D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. Zald (eds.). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rucht, D. (2004). "Movements, Allies and Adversaries." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. New York: Random House

Triviño-Salazar, J. (2014). "Immigrant organizations and the politicization of cultural diversity in the city." Analytic and Synthetic Notes; 2014/03; Best Participants' Essays, Summer School 2013. Migration Policy Centre

Van Dyke, N. (2003). "Protest Cycles and Party Politics: The Effect of Elite Allies and Antagonists on Student Protest in the United States, 1930-1990." In: J. Goldstone (ed.). States, Parties, and Social Movements. Pp.226-245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Whittier, N. (2004). "Consequences of social movements for each other." In: D. Snow; A. Sarah & H. Kriesi (eds). *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements.* Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2003). "The 'discovery' of immigration in Spain. The politicization of immigration in the case of El Ejido". Journal of Internacional Migration and Integration, vol. 4, Autumn; 523-539

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2007). "Política del discurso sobre inmigración en Españadiscurso re-activo y discurso pro-activo en los debates parlamentarios." Discurso & Sociedad, 1 (2). Pp. 317-369

CHAPTER 5
GENERAL CONCLUSION

5.1. General Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis was to study the way alliances emerged between particular actors (political parties and immigrant associations) in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts at the local level. The main contribution was to initiate the debate on alliances in the immigration literature following the political opportunity structure approach (POS). So far this literature had focused on the role of institutions in shaping the organization and mobilization of immigrants and their multiple interactions with relevant political actors at the national and local levels (Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Alexander, 2004; Ireland, 2004; Garbaye, 2005; Caponio, 2005; Borkert and Caponio, 2010; Giugni and Morales, 2011). In regard to alliances, the literature had not systematically studied them as a political opportunity that allowed immigrants to relate to those institutional gatekeepers that facilitated or impeded their access to political institutions (e.g. trade unions, parliament, religious organizations, judicial bodies and humanitarian non-profit organizations) (Ireland, 1994: 10). It was precisely this gap the one I wanted to tackle.

The contribution has multiple implications for the immigration literature following the POS approach. This is because it explores alliances by focusing on central actors for the policy-making of immigration, such as political parties and immigrant associations,

211

and in a context that demonstrates the salience of this topic in the political agenda (i.e. the politicization of immigration conflicts at the local level). The thesis demonstrated the existence of informal dynamics rooted in the political environment surrounding the policy-making of immigration and strongly linked to the structure of incentives political actors have. In this sense, the dynamics of the studied actors reflected the specificities of the local setting they were embedded.

Within the literature, learning the dynamics of political actors in local contexts show, in simple words, that context really matters. Studying alliances in the presence of conflicts confirms that immigration is a salient and polarized issue in receiving societies at the local level. Moreover, it shows how the institutionalization of relations between institutional (i.e. political parties with decision-making power) and non-institutional actors (i.e. immigrant associations) is strongly shaped by the politicization of this issue by local political elites. The study also showed that these elites form alliances with immigrant associations depending on the electoral calculations specific to their territorial boundaries which is something that reinforce the contextual character of this relation.

The conclusion of this thesis revolves around four main parts: contribution, limitations, lines for future research, and policy recommendations. The general contribution mentioned above is composed by four main theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions that are worth mentioning. As I will explain below,

the first contribution, theoretical, is related to the relevance of incentives when forging alliances in the presence of a politicized issue. The second contribution, empirical, is related to the different types of alliances (clientelist, symbolic and activist-oriented) that emerge from the different incentives political actors have. The third contribution, empirical, acknowledges that the studied alliances are embedded in the political environment. In this part, the local level acquires a defining dimension for particular actors, such as political parties and immigrant associations. The fourth contribution, methodological, refers to the use of qualitative methods in the study of alliances following the POS approach. After describing the contribution, I will move to the limitations I encountered in the study of alliances. I will focus on theoretical, empirical and methodological considerations. Based on the contribution and the limitations, I mention future lines of research. Finally, I give some policy recommendations.

5.2. What is the contribution this thesis did?

Alliances and incentives

As the *first article* defends theoretically and the *second article* confirms empirically, the formation of alliances is a process underpinned by common positions that complement two actors' interests. In this study it became evident that alliances are a relation born from the need for support that an actor may have and the willingness of the other to give this support in exchange for

something (e.g. quantifiable goods, recognition, trust, inclusion to wider networks of actors, among others). In this sense, the politicization of immigration as a conflictive process triggered the mobilization of political actors to reinforce their position of power.

For political parties, legitimacy in a context of politicization was an important driver to offer incentives to immigrant associations to form alliances. However, the way they formed them was directly linked to the *votes and policy incentives* they had in their immediate context of interaction. In the first situation, the need for alliances that legitimized their position was framed in the vote-seeking incentive of the party: maintaining the voters content, widening the electoral constituency, and having a stronger position vis-à-vis local elections (i.e. the situation of the PP in the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, the PSC in the burka regulation in Lleida). In the second situation, the need for alliances fulfilled a legitimizing role by strengthening the position that political parties advocating for *policy change* in the management of immigration had (i.e. the situation of ICV in the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona, ICV in the burka regulation in Lleida and CUP in the local census ordinance in Vic). The latter situation involved a more idealistic position where electoral calculations were important, but coherence with the parties' lines became even more important.

The dynamics of legitimization that political parties followed in the context of the different conflicts led to the offer of incentives to immigrant associations. If a common position on the PIC was a prerequisite for the formation of alliances, the incentives offered by

political parties to immigrant associations was the step to consolidate the alliance under these circumstances. Although an alliance might be understood as a number of interactions within a period of time; the perception a political party and an immigrant association has about their allies was connected to the incentives the former (*votes and policy change*) and the latter (*quantifiable, solidary and purposive)* had.

For immigrant associations, it is possible to observe that their mobilization was shaped by their position and the incentives offered to them in the framework of the politicization of a particular conflict. In this sense, the choice to ally with a political party or not depended on weighting between the access to resources and the belief in an alternative model to the management of controversial aspects related to immigration (e.g. religion, customs, the allocation of resources). In these cases, a more pragmatic or a more idealistic approach played in favor or against interacting with political parties (e.g. Roma associations allied with the PP and Roma associations allied with ICV in the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona). After applying the interpretive framework on the three studied cases; it is possible to identify certain patterns in their formation as we see next.

Different types of alliances

By doing the empirical exercise of grouping the findings of the *second article*, I reaffirmed, first, the importance of alliances for political actors in the immigration literature, and second, the

different relations between actors. Even though, I was studying cities located in the same Autonomous Community, with similar characteristics and with salient issues related to the presence of immigrants; it was possible to notice that alliances are not all the same and that their formation may follow different paths.

The study of the three cases demonstrated that the different incentives political parties had informed their alliances with immigrant associations (i.e. the vote-seeking/policy-seeking dichotomy). On the other hand, it was also possible to show that immigrant associations responded differently to the incentives offered by political parties in the presence of a PIC (i.e. quantifiable, solidary and purposive). In this sense, the alliances that emerged in the three studied cases allowed systematizing them under *three types*: *clientelist, symbolic and activist-oriented.* All three were drawn from the empirical observations done in the field.

As evidenced in the results, the most problematic of the three types of alliances was the *clientelist* one since its consolidation strongly depended on the quantifiable incentives the political party may offer more than on other less tangible incentives (i.e. The situation of the PP and some Spanish-Roma associations in the anti-Romanian-Roma campaign in Badalona). The *symbolic type* can also be problematic in the sense that it is quite connected to the position of power a political party has and the opportunity that the alliance represents for an immigrant association in search for recognition and access to broader network of actors (i.e. The PSC and Maghrebian associations in Lleida). In this alliance, as long as the

political party has a direct access to power, the immigrant association will cooperate in the different spaces of participation and consultation the former can offer. Finally, *the activist-oriented one* turned out to be the least problematic for their consolidation because of the purposive incentives moving the associations and a more altruistic position of the political party seeking for a policy-change (i.e. The ICV and some Spanish-Roma associations that formed a platform of activism in Badalona and the CUP and an immigrant association that created a platform of activism in Vic).

As the study of the three cases show, the conclusions in *Article 2* are very much connected to an empirical approach to the study of alliances. Although they might be seen as context-specific; the framework and the resulting typology can become the starting point for more studies focused on other types of alliances that may emerge under specific circumstances in the immigration literature or other fields of study.

Alliances and the political environment

In the *third article*, I contributed to the immigration literature in two specific ways: first, by systematizing elements in the local political environment that allow the formation of alliances. By doing so, I highlighted that the political environment at the local and not the national level might be responsible for the formation of alliances under certain circumstances of politicization. Second, the role that political parties have in the alliances with immigrant associations places them at the center of the interaction. In this

sense, acknowledging their agency and role in this relation change the traditional equation in the POS literature where social actors are the ones that seek for allies and not the other way around.

As we saw throughout this thesis, the local level offers a context of proximity from the political and policy perspectives. At the political level, the fact that politicians representing a political party and leaders from immigrant associations live in the same territorial space provide them with the daily interaction that can forge ties that at the end can shape their alliances. At the policy level, a city with competences on the reception and accommodation of immigrants can for instance, design and implement reception policies targeting the specific communities they are receiving. These situations contribute to the creation of the environment where these actors relate to each other while signaling the direction that the policy-making of immigration can take (i.e. either in a small town in Catalonia, or a gateway city such as Berlin, Paris or New York).

The dynamics underpinning the policy-making of immigration at the local level can complement, supplement or even contradict the national level (Giugni and Morales, 2011: 11). The emergence of alliances in urban settings highlights the relevance that local politics have. In this sense, acknowledging that politics in a specific setting subsidizes to the rapprochement of two actors makes evident a reality: actors do not act disconnected of their environment. In fact, the political environment surrounding their interaction is responsible for the emergence of their alliances.

The framing of the alliances within a context of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) allowed understanding the centrality of political parties in the local policy-making of immigration and how their actions respond more to the context of proximity (i.e. the city) rather that to the national level. Connected to this, the thesis defended that the micro-dynamics among political parties and immigrant associations are a reflection of the local institutional setting and the political characteristics of the city. Both, setting and characteristics, are the byproduct of the local political environment. Moreover, how immigrants are perceived in local settings have important repercussions on how local political elites frame their accommodation and how this framing shapes the alliances with immigrant associations (as the collective and visible expression of immigrants' claims).

Alliances and methodology

The present thesis offers a qualitative approach in the study of alliances not so common in the POS approach. The early works of social movement scholars (Rucht, 1996; Kriesi, 1996, 2004) and the work of immigration scholars (Koopmans and Statham, 2000, Koopmans, et al. 2005; Giugni and Morales, 2011) show a strong tendency to use quantitative methods when studying social actors. In this sense, my intention was to contribute to the growing immigration literature following the POS through the use of qualitative methods (Però, 2005; Garbaye, 2005; Caponio, 2005, 2010). Since my approach to alliances is a novel contribution to the

immigration literature; this contribution is also an invitation for quantitative studies that can complement the understanding of alliances in this field. After presenting the different contributions this thesis did to the theoretical and empirical debates, I would like now to present the limitations I encountered in doing this research.

5.3. What are the limitations of this thesis?

Researchers always face different challenges that limit the reach of the expected findings. In the case of this study, the limitations are several, from a theoretical, empirical and methodological point of view.

From a *theoretical point of view*, this thesis has been navigating within the immigration literature following the POS approach. Using the POS approach has its own theoretical limitations because its premises can be considered essentially institutionalist as it takes the impact of institutions on policy outcomes and the behavior of political actors (Bousetta, 2000: 231). Accordingly, Bousetta (2000: 235) warns that the use of this approach requires a "cautious interpretation of the role of institutions and policies." He implies that the focus on institutions can portray different political actors (e.g. immigrants) as passive agents with no say in their interactions with institutions. Related to this point, the PhD thesis did not intend to portray immigrant associations as passive agents that just respond to the incentives of political parties. However, as the study shows, local politics are an arena connected to the salience of issues, political parties are actors that respond to this context and

immigrant associations are an actor that need institutional ones to survive.

Kriesi et al. (1995: xv) points out at the strength of the POS approach in studying the institutions underpinning the interaction between political actors under certain conditions (e.g. institutional dimensions). It is precisely this clarity that makes of its use so adaptable to the understanding of different relations. In spite of the criticism and limitations of the POS, my interest on the approach was related to its simplicity in studying the mechanisms to understand alliances as an outcome of the mobilization of different actors. The use of alliances from a POS approach was useful to differentiate on the one hand, the incentives political parties and immigrant associations had (*First and Second articles*) and on the other, the elements in the political environment that explained the emergence of alliances (*Third article*). However, there is more room for refinement in the way I studied them and the way I used the approach to understand their emergence and the elements surronding them.

Another limitation was the use of political parties as a central actor in the formation of alliances under the POS lens. In the literature on social movements from a POS approach, the central actors are social movements (Tarrow, 1994); however, there is a move towards the study of political parties as a highly relevant actor in the formation of alliances (Kriesi, nd: 3). In this sense, the literature has shown that political parties mediate between the claims of social actors and political institutions (Van Dyke, 2003: 228). Moreover,

political parties have been widely acknowledged as an essential elite ally of social actors that aim for relevance in the policy-making process (Ireland, 1994, 2004; Kriesi et. 1996, n.d.). In this research, political parties, because of their role in the politicization of immigration, have a central role in the formation of alliances. With this I do not imply that immigrant associations do not have any agency just that their mobilization is initiated by those institutional actors in the search for support to their position on a political conflict.

The last theoretical limitation is the conceptualization of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs). In the study, it seems that I am addressing to a very particular problem that may emerge in the political sphere in regard to immigration (i.e. conflict). However, the conceptualization of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) builds on the conceptualization of politicization defended by authors such as (Zapata-Barrero, 2003; Koopmans et al, 2005; Van der Brug, et al, 2015). It basically refers to the framing of a social problem as one that requires political action. When a social problem enters into the political agenda then we can consider it politicized. The conflict enters into the picture when the social problem is portrayed as such to the public opinion through discourses and policy actions. In this situation the politicization of an immigration conflict shows two characteristics that are present in the politicization of any issue: salience and polarization among the actors involved.

In regard to the *empirical limitations*, the policy-making of immigration is not an isolated policy area that only occurs in national parliaments or local councils in countries around the world. Immigration is a multi-level field that involves the interaction of a wide array of actors in supranational, national, regional and local settings (Scholten, 2013: 217). Moreover, immigration involves vertical and horizontal relations with multiple institutional and non-institutional actors (Zincone, 2011: 427).

The research studied the local politics underpinning certain aspects of the accommodation of immigration by focusing on the formation of alliances between a set of actors (political parties and immigrant associations); however, focusing on three cities in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, Spain, can limit the reach of the findings by not taking into account broader aspects in the institutional setting and other actors at other territorial levels that can also be important in the formation of alliances. By doing so, I did not want to imply that their alliances were completely isolated from other actors at other territorial levels. In the quest for focus, I decided to narrow down my research to specific elements of the whole picture that I considered highly relevant in the formation of alliances between the studied actors and under the circumstances of politicization.

Finally, in regard to the *methodological limitations* of the study, there are two connected to the selection: the choice of three cases of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) and the problems in the generalizability of the findings. The selection of extreme cases of PICs may lead to extreme observations in the results obtained. The

focus on alliances that emerge under the aforementioned circumstances may produce very context-based findings difficult to generalize to other fields of study. This can wrongly lead to the conclusion that I defend that the emergence of alliances occurs *only* under these circumstances.

Studying cases with no PICs may imply that there are no conflicts at all. However, the fact that a city or a town does not apparently portray the conflictive politicization of immigration does not mean that there are no latent social or political conflicts among the residents of the city and their political elites (Based on Van der Brug, et al. 2015). In this sense, alliances can be forged as a preventive mechanism to avoid the conflict from becoming visible while favoring the social cohesion of the city or particular areas of the city (e.g. the alliance between a political party and an immigrant association which include young leaders of immigrant origin in mediation activities in marginalized neighborhoods). Under these circumstances, alliances between other actors may also emerge, as well as the collaboration between immigrant associations and local governments.

Although the proposed interpretive framework (Article 1) may look very context-specific and 'tailor-made' for the needs of this study; it has to be understood as a framework interchangeable with other actors, other territorial levels and more importantly, it may occur under the politicization of other issues besides immigration (as stated above). Placing this study at the local level showed how the conflictive politicization of immigration triggered the realignment

in the actors' strategies that led to the formation of alliances to legitimize their position. In this sense, any political issue with salience and polarization can potentially produce similar relations to the ones defended in this thesis.

5.4. What are the lines for further research?

The study of alliances between political parties and immigrant associations in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts (PICs) at the local level opens the scope for further research in terms of actors, territorial levels, comparability and circumstances.

In regard to *actors,* the study of alliances can be expanded to other relevant actors in the policy-making of immigration, such as, national governments, local governments, the media, trade unions, pro-immigrant NGOs, among others. In this sense, studying the role that they fulfill in the formation of their own alliances and the interests motivating them can show different dynamics underpinning this policy field, as well as, it allows understanding why some topics related to the accommodation of immigrants (e.g. religious diversity, changes in the educational curriculum, diversity within State institutions such as, the police, the military, etc; among others) tend to be more pressing than others in certain moments.

The study of alliances at the local level is an important contribution to the study of the city as a context of diversities. However, as reality shows the policy-making of immigration also responds to the influence and impact of other actors at the European, national and

regional levels. In this situation, it is possible to see the emergence of vertical alliances between actors at the local level and actors at the national level. For instance, an immigrant association located in a mid-size city in Catalonia may consider as an ally, an umbrella organization in Madrid with national presence, or another immigrant association with strong ties with the ruling political party at the national level. With this in mind, alliances between the actors studied or other actors at the regional, national, European or International levels can also show the complexity of the policy-making of the accommodation of immigrants.

Another point for further research is related to the context where the alliances were studied. In this research, I studied alliances in cities within the same national context. It would be interesting to compare the existence of alliances in cities across different national contexts. The feasibility of doing so would tremendously contribute to the studies focused on the policy-making of immigration at the local level.

5.5. Which policy recommendations can be drawn from the PhD thesis?

The study of alliances in the presence of politicized immigration conflicts provides the opportunity not to only talk in theoretical, empirical or methodological terms but also in policy terms. I would like to give three policy recommendation based on the study of the three PICs in the three Catalan cities.

The first recommendation is to depoliticize the management of immigration at the local level. Depoliticizing the issue and dealing with it as a challenge rather than as a problem can produce a more positive interaction between different actors. By doing so, the answers to immigrant's claims are based on a pragmatic, non-electoralist approach. In this situation, local governments, political parties, immigrant representatives and the local media can sign agreements on the no use of immigration from a reactive approach by clearly defining what this means. At the same time the agreement should include the immediate use of judiciary measures for those actors that engage in reactive discourses against immigrants and their diversity.

The second recommendation is to promote a crosscutting policy for the political participation of immigrants at the local level. As we saw in two of the three cases, the existence of consultative bodies for immigrant associations was seen as a positive measure for their involvement in local politics. However, creating specific spaces with no binding power might be counterproductive because it institutionalizes certain representatives as the only ones at the expense of other less institutionalized, but very important, ones (e.g. ethnic leaders, religious leaders). Also the institutionalization of certain representatives and not other can lead to the replication of clientelist and symbolic alliances as the ones identified in the cases (PP and Spanish-Roma association in Badalona and PSC and Maghrebian associations in Lleida). Also, these spaces may be used as a rubber-stamp body to legitimize policies decided by the local government and not truly consulted with a wider spectrum of actors.

To supplement the lack of these bodies, cities should focus on identifying who these leaders are while creating programs that foster projects on certain neighborhoods where they can serve as a link with the community. At the same time, more important than consultation, the strengthening of an associational web can truly correspond to the goal of making all immigrants more connected to the institutions of receiving societies.

In conclusion, this PhD thesis was about a process-oriented research that aimed to track the circumstances and conditions underpinning the formation of particular alliances as the ones presented here. The thesis highlights the dynamic elements in the policy-making of immigration at the local level. Until very recently, this level started being considered a highly important arena for immigrants in their relations with other political institutions. Moreover, the fact that alliances were part of the specificities of the political environment and those political parties at that level had such a central role in their formation demonstrated how the city is the *de facto* starting point for the dynamics behind the politicization of immigration.

5.6. Bibliography

Alexander, M. (2004). "Comparing local policies toward immigrants: An interpretive framework, a typology and preliminary survey results. " In: R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec. *Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies.* Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing

Borkert M. And Caponio, T. (eds.). (2010), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Bousetta, H. (2000). "Institutional Theories of immigrant ethnic mobilization: Relevance and limitations." *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 26 (2), 229-245

Caponio , T. (2005). "Policy Networks and Imimmigrants` Associations in Italy: The Cases of Milan, Bologna and Naples". *Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 31 (5).

Caponio, T. (2010). "Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy: Milan, Bologna and Naples compared. " in: M, Borkert and T. Caponio. (eds.), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking.* Amsterdam: IMISCOE-AUP Research Series.

Giugni, M. and Morales, L. (2011). Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe. Migration, Minorities and Citizenship. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Ireland, P. (1994). *The Policy Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Ireland, P. (2004). *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State.* Pittsburh: University of Pittsburgh Press

Koopmans, R., and Statham, P. (2000). "Migration and ethnic relations as a field of political contention: An opportunity structure approach." In: R. Koopmans and P. Statham (Eds.), *Challenging immigration and ethnic relations politics. Comparative European perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.13- 56

Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., and Pessy, F. (2005). *Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Kriesi, H. (n.d.). "Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Social Movements." Working Paper Series. *European University Institute.* Available in: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/POLCON/Documents/Kriesipart ysystems.pdf (Accessed 26 December 2014)

Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W. and Giugni, M. (1995). New Social movements in Western Europe. A comparative analysis. London: UCL Press Limited.

Però, D. (2005). "Left-wing politics, civil society and immigration in Italy: The case of Bologna." *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (5).

Rucht, D. (1996). "The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement and cross-national comparison." In: D. McAdam, J. McCarthy and M. Zald (eds.). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Scholten, P. (2013). "The multi-level governance of migrant integration: a multi-level governance perspective on Dutch migrant integration policies." In: Korkut, A.O. (ed). *The Politics of Migration in Europe. The role of language, discourse and political parties.* Palgrave.

Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Van der Brug, W.; D'Amato, G.; Ruedin, D and Berkhout, J. (2015). *The politicisation of immigration.* New York: Routledge

Zapata-Barrero, R. (2003). "The 'discovery' of immigration in Spain. The politicization of immigration in the case of El Ejido". Journal of Internacional Migration and Integration, vol. 4, Autumn; 523-539

Zincone, G. (2011). "Conclusion: comparing the making of migration policy-making." In: G. Zincone, R. Penninx and M. Borkert (eds.). *Migration policy-making in Europe: The dynamics of actors and context in past and present.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

Methodological Annex

A. Chapter 3.

A.1. List of interviewees

Badalona

Code	Political Party	Interviewee	Length	Date
pol.1b	CiU	Councilman	1h02m	10/04/13
pol.2b	PSC	Councilman	1h28m	15/04/13
pol.3b	ERC	Local president	1h26m	16/04/13
pol.4b	ICV	Councilman	1h02m	21/03/13
pol.5b	PP	Did not respond to any request for an interview	–	–

Code	Association	Interviewee	Length	Date
ia.1b	Platform of Roma associations	Meeting with several Roma leaders	Informal meeting (60 min)	22/04/2013
ia.2b	Roma Association	President	47m	4/05/13

ia.3b	Roma Association 2	Member		

Code	Pro-Roma NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date
ngo.1b	Ateneu Sant Roc	Coordinator	1h25m	12/04/2013
ngo.2b	Associacio Juvenil La Rotllana	Coordinator	43m	6/05/2013

*Due to the nature of the conflict and the political polarization of the city, these informants requested not to have their names or their associations cited

Lleida

Code	Political Party	Interviewee	Length	Date
pol.1.ll	ICV	President local section	1h31m	3/06/2013
pol.2.ll	ERC	Councilwoman President local section	1h04m	5/06/2013
pol.3.ll	PP	Councilwoman	55m	5/06/2013
pol.4.ll	CiU	Councilwoman	35m (joint interview)	4/06/2013
pol.5.ll	PSC	Councilman		
pol.6.ll		Councilwoman	46m	6/06/2013

Code	Association	Interviwee	Length	Date
ia.1.ll	Associació Watani	President	49m	3/06/2013
ia.2.ll	Associació Cultural Àrab Atlas	President	1h22m	3/06/2013

Code	Interviewee	Length	Date
ia.3.ll	Associació sociocultural IBN Batuta Lleida	Responsible for Lleida	31m	4/06/2013
ia.4.ll	Comunitat Islàmica Aloumma	President	30m	4/06/2013
ia.5.ll	Associació Sociocultural Magrebeida	President	47m	5/06/2013

Code	Pro-immigrant NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date
ngo.1.ll	Associació Unesco per al Dialeg Intereligiós	Executive Secretary	42m	11/06/2013
ngo.2.ll	CCOO- Cite Lleida	Secretary	30m	5/06/2013
ngo.3.ll	AMIC- UGT	Coordinator	23m	5/06/2013
ngo.4.ll	Amnistía Internacional	Representative	23m	3/06/2013

| ngo.5.ll | Grup Interreligios UNESCO.CAT | Coordinators | 1h18m | 4/06/2013 |

Vic

Code	Political Party	Interviwee	Length	Date
pol.1v	CiU	Councilman	28m	2/05/2013
pol.2v		Local president to CiU	29m	9/05/2013
pol.3v	PSC	Councilman	47m	7/05/2013
pol.4v	ER	Councilman	58m	13/06/2013
pol.5v	ICV	Councilman	58m	9/05/ 2013
pol.6v	CUP	Councilman	1h22m	16/05/2013
pol.7v		Councilman		

Code	Association	Interviewee	Length	Date
ia.1v	Veus Diverses	Legal adviser	58m	09/05/2013
ia.2v	Tapis	President	1h13m	30/05/2013
ia.3v	Associacio de Equatorians de Vic	President	55m	02/05/2013
ia.4v	Associacio de Colombians de Vic	Vice-president	1h09m	16/ 05/ 2013
ia.5v	Catalunya Diverse	President	46m	13/06/2013

Code	Pro-immigrant NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date
ngo.1v	Cáritas	Local responsible	57m	16/05/2013
ngo.2v	Unitat contre el feixisme	Local responsible	1h07m	30/05/2013

A.2. Interview guide

a) Primary actors: political parties and immigrant associations

Guiding Question 1: What was the position your party/association assumed in the context of this conflict? (In the original language of the interview, the word conflict was replaced by *controversy*)

-(In favor). Why did you support it?

-(Against). Why did you oppose to it?

GQ2: Which political party/immigrant associations did you approach in the context of this conflict?

-Was it easy to find this party/immigrant association?

GQ3: Do you consider this political party/immigrant association an ally in the context of this conflict?

-Why do you consider it an ally?

GQ4: Do you consider they did a good job during the conflict?

-Did you meet them before, during and after the conflict?

b) Secondary actors: Pro-immigrant NGOs and local officer

Guiding Question (GQ) 1: What was the role political the political party/immigrant association had in the context of this conflict?

GQ2: Which political parties/immigrant associations sought for support to their position?

GQ3: Do you consider them allies in the context of the conflict?

GQ4: What things do you think the political party/immigrant association could   provide to their ally because of the conflict?

GQ5: Why did this political party and this immigrant association ally?

B. Chapter 4 (Article 3).

B.1. List of interviews

Badalona

Code	Political Party	Interviewee	Length	Date
pol.1b	CiU	Councilman	1h02m	10/04/13
pol.2b	PSC	Councilman	1h28m	15/04/13
pol.3b	ERC	Local president	1h26m	16/04/13
pol.4b	ICV	Councilman	1h02m	21/03/13
pol.5b	PP	Did not respond to any request for an interview	–	–

Code	Association	Interviewee	Length	Date
ia.1b	Platform of Roma associations	Meeting with several Roma leaders	Informal meeting (60 min)	22/04/2013
ia.2b	Roma Association	President	47m	4/05/13
ia.3b	Roma Association 2	Member		

Code	Pro-Roma NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date
ngo.1b	Ateneu Sant Roc	Coordinator	1h25m	12/04/2013
ngo.2b	Associacio Juvenil La Rotllana	Coordinator	43m	6/05/2013

*Due to the nature of the conflict and the political polarization of the city, these informants requested not to have their names or their associations cited

Lleida

Code	Political Party	Interviewee	Length	Date
pol.1.ll	ICV	President local section	1h31m	3/06/2013
pol.2.ll	ERC	Councilwoman President local section	1h04m	5/06/2013
pol.3.ll	PP	Councilwoman	55m	5/06/2013
pol.4.ll	CiU	Councilwoman	35m (joint	4/06/2013

Code		Interviwee	Length	Date
pol.5.ll	PSC	Councilman	interview)	
pol.6.ll		Councilwoman	46m	6/06/2013

Code	Association	Interviwee	Length	Date
ia.1.ll	Associació Watani	President	49m	3/06/2013
ia.2.ll	Associació Cultural Àrab Atlas	President	1h22m	3/06/2013
ia.3.ll	Associació sociocultural IBN Batuta Lleida	Responsible for Lleida	31m	4/06/2013
ia.4.ll	Comunitat Islàmica Aloumma	President	30m	4/06/2013
ia.5.ll	Associació Sociocultural Magrebeida	President	47m	5/06/2013

Code	Pro-immigrant NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date

ngo.1.ll	Associació Unesco per al Dialeg Intereligiós	Executive Secretary	42m	11/06/2013
ngo.2.ll	CCOO- Cite Lleida	Secretary	30m	5/06/2013
ngo.3.ll	AMIC- UGT	Coordinator	23m	5/06/2013
ngo.4.ll	Amnistía Internacional	Representative	23m	3/06/2013
ngo.5.ll	Grup Interreligios UNESCO.CAT	Coordinators	1h18m	4/06/2013

Vic

Code	Political Party	Interviwee	Length	Date
pol.1v	CiU	Councilman	28m	2/05/2013
pol.2v		Local president to CiU	29m	9/05/2013
pol.3v	PSC	Councilman	47m	7/05/2013
pol.4v	ER	Councilman	58m	13/06/2013
pol.5v	ICV	Councilman	58m	9/05/ 2013
pol.6v	CUP	Councilman	1h22m	16/05/2013
pol.7v		Councilman		

Code	Association	Interviewee	Length	Date
ia.1v	Veus Diverses	Legal adviser	58m	09/05/2013
ia.2v	Tapis	President	1h13m	30/05/2013
ia.3v	Associacio de Equatorians de Vic	President	55m	02/05/2013
ia.4v	Associacio de Colombians de Vic	Vice-president	1h09m	16/ 05/ 2013
ia.5v	Catalunya Diverse	President	46m	13/06/2013

Code	Pro-immigrant NGO	Interviewee	Length	Date
ngo.1v	Cáritas	Local responsible	57m	16/05/2013
ngo.2v	Unitat contre el feixisme	Local responsible	1h07m	30/05/2013

B.2. Interview Guide

a) Primary actors: Political parties and immigrant associations:

Guiding Question (GQ) 1: What were the causes that started this controversy?

GQ2: Does the controversy reflect a specific conflict within a community?

-(YES) If it does, does your organization think that the policy/discourse   was   the   best approach to solve it?

-(NO)   If it does not, why does your organization (political party/immigrant association) think this discourse/policy was   carried out?

GQ4: How do you assess the decision to propose/defend this policy? As based   on   a   more   pragmatic   or   a   more ideological approach?

-Do you think that your decision to support/oppose to this conflict reflect   the spirit of your organization? Why?

-How did other members of your political party/other immigrant associations react it at the Catalan and Spanish levels? Why?

GQ5: Did the political party/immigrant association X try to approach the political party/immigrant associations Y in order to find solutions to the conflict? If so, how was the procedure?

b) Secondary actors: Pro-immigrant NGOs and local officer

Guiding Question (GQ) 1: What were the causes that started this controversy?

GQ2: Does the controversy reflect a real conflict within the community?

GQ3: What do you think were the ideological reasons that political parties and   immigrant associations assume during the conflict?

GQ4:   What   was   the   procedure   for   political parties/immigrant associations to   engage   in   this collaboration during the conflict?