Regime Support in Croatia

Determinants of Regime Support in the Past, Present and Future[1]

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We dedicate this paper to professor Josip Županov whose sociological work has inspired us.

In this paper we use the case of Croatia to discover the determinants and patterns of support for the previous (communist) and the present political system, as well as expectations about the future. The conceptual and theoretical framework takes into account five dimensions: class, nationality, religiosity, economic well-being and heterogeneity of the region. There is a general pattern of support in Croatia which roughly corresponds to the findings in other post-communist countries. We find a negative evaluation of the previous system, more positive evaluation of the present political system (in the case of Croatia, more neutral) and optimism about the future.

Although this pattern holds across all groups, there are many significant differences. The previous regime is judged less harsh among females, professionals, less skilled manual workers, Serbs and less religious people. Satisfaction with the present political systems is mostly expressed among the less educated, farmers, people with lower income, the more religious, groups who identify themselves as "lower class" and those who created some savings in the last year. The more intensive support for the current political system is located on the lower end of the social hierarchy and on the top, managers-owners. We conclude that a new alliances foramina between the top and the bottom of social hierarchy, as it was in the previous system (Županov, 1983.) but this new alliance contains different social groups and it is based on different interests than before.

Key words: *REGIME SUPPORT, CROATIA, POST-COMMUNISM, POLITICAL EVALUATION, EASTERN EUROPE, POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY*

Introduction

Former Communist countries have gone through and are still undergoing dramatic change. The communist regime crumbled and many multinational states (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) disintegrated. The changes in Eastern Europe were not simply changes of government, but revolutions and complete changes of regime. The transition from communism to post-communism involves a shift in basic institutional arrangement. The communist systems were based on one-party domination, planned economy (self-management economy in the former Yugoslavia), limited or no private initiative, and high social security, combined with "political insecurity". The new institutional arrangements (characteristic of

modern capitalist industrial societies) are multi-party democracies with market economies and limited or no social security. All this represents a deep change in people's everyday lives. Deep economic crisis and the dramatic fall of living standards, which in many ways are of the same magnitude as the Great Depression of the 1930's (Fisher and Gelb, 1991; Czapinski, 1995), combined with increased social insecurity, are having a strong influence on political attitudes and regime support.

Economic transformation is combined with political democratization making governments more accountable, while at the same time, forcing them to make painful structural changes. In the last round of elections, the political shift in some former communist countries toward the left, bringing former communists back to power, may indicate the general exhaustion and saturation with the reform pains. Is this shift somehow contributing to the waning of the negative experiences of the previous regime? As we know, human memory is very selective and we tend to forget negative dimensions of the past and to retain only the positive ones. Maybe the hardship of today is helping to erase the negative experiences of communism and the positive dimensions of everyday life under communism (stability and social security) will start to overshadow the negative ones.

How are these processes reflected in the consciousness of the population? In this paper we will try to elaborate on the case study of Croatia to analyze the determinants and patterns of support for the **previous** and the **present** political regimes, as well as expectations about the **future**.

The main aim is to discover if present attitudes toward the previous regime can explain differentiated support for the communist regime during its existence. When using this approach we must keep in mind the fact that Croatia went through horrible experiences of war and destruction. The Serbian aggression and local uprising created a collective perception among the Croats which developed during the time between their support for the previous regime and their present perception of this support. Many people will say that they supported the previous regime, but after the experience of war and destruction produced by members of the previous regime, they changed their minds and now have a strong negative opinion toward it.

We can begin with the assumption that the general rating of the previous regime would be strongly negative, due to the fact that people generally blame the legacy of communism for the war. This hypothesis can be based on the findings of Mishler and Rose (1996) that, for example, the expressed ranking of the previous regime among six countries (Bulgaria, CSFR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Albania) was lowest in Romania, which went through the most dramatic violent change. The long disintegration and dramatic changes in the last ten years of the former Yugoslav regime probably erased the "positive" contribution of its relative openness and "reform" orientation. In the Mishler and Rose data, the "reform" orientation of the communist regime was positively correlated with the relative support for it. (Hungarians were relatively less negative toward the previous regime, taking into account its reformist orientation very similar to the Yugoslav one). We can speculate, in the case of Croatia, that the positive contributions of reformism and the relatively high standard of living are erased by the national war and disintegration.

Consequently, we can expect a positive evaluation of the current regime. The economic difficulties can be contributed to the war, the minuses of democracy to the abnormal conditions under which political development is occurring, so the present regime can be "free of guilt" for the present difficulties.

Theoretical Framework for Analyzing Regime Support

Here, we will develop the conceptual and theoretical framework for the analysis of the support for the previous, present and future political regimes, taking into account five dimensions: class, nationality, ideology, economic well-being and heterogeneity of the regions.

1. Class

There are different expectations of how class position is connected with support for the communist regime. The communist ideology of the "workers state", based on the classical Marxist theory, assumes that the strongest support for the regime should come from the side of the "working class", the manual workers (Brucan, 1990). In addition, communist regimes tend to reduce differences between blue collar and white collar incomes. We can, therefore, expect higher support for the previous regime among the manual workers than among white collars and professionals.

Konrad and Szeleny's (1979) **"intellectual class"** theory begins with the proposition that in the type of "redistributive society" that communism represents, the intellectuals are the most privileged group because they are the "redistributors". According to this theory, the strongest support for the regime should come from the side of the professionals and intellectuals. The main empirical support for this theory is the fact of higher levels of participation in the communist party among professionals. The higher the education, the higher the position in the socio-professional structure, and the higher participation in the Communist Party membership (Vušković, 1984; Sekulić, 1991).

Konrad and Szeleny's theory should be distinguished from the **"new class"** theory (Đilas, 1957). In the "new class" theory, it is not the professional class that is the main support for the regime, but the administrators, who are the collective owners of the state and the productive forces of society. The "new class" theory would predict much narrower support for the regime based on party administrators, whereas the "intellectual class" theory would predict broadly spread support among educated people for the communist regime. A recent empirical study of China (Walder, 1995) shed some suspicion on the validity of the theory by showing a deep division within the educated classes; one part was incorporated into the party and the administrative apparatus, while the other segment's activity was limited only to the professional arena and was not incorporated into the party. The findings were similar (Šporer, 1990:111-113) for former Yugoslavia, where the different professions had different degrees of membership in the Communist Party. From this, we can conclude very divided support for the communist regime among professionals. The part of the professional-political class directly connected with the regime will support it, but the other professionals, the section not participating in the party system and perceiving the system as an obstacle for greater income differentials, market reforms and the application of professional criteria without party interference (Sekulić, 1991), will oppose it and be a stronger supporter of the present regime.

Another theory which presents a combination of the "new class" theory and the orthodox vision of the Marxist ideology is the **"alliance"** theory. It states that the communist system is based on the specific alliance between the "top" of the social structure (party bureaucracy) and the "bottom", the workers, especially unskilled ones (Županov, 1983; Zaslavski, 1985). This alliance is based on the "extensive" mode of development which is based on unskilled labor, security of employment and social benefits extensively distributed across the system (Sekulić, 1990:10-12). This theory will predict very skewed support for the previous communist regime concentrated on the top (bureaucrats) and the bottom (workers) of the social hierarchy. Zaslavski's (1985) elaboration of the support for the Soviet system can be regarded an as elaboration of Županov's theory. Zaslavski claimed that, within the working class, the differences in support for the regime existed between the relatively "deprivileged" skilled and the "privileged" unskilled workers. We can expect that the support for the communist regime would be greater among the unskilled than among the skilled workers. Or to rephrase Zaslavski in Županov's terminology, an alliance actually existed between the unskilled workers and the bureaucracy.

There should be less support among the people in the private sector (peasants and urban entrepreneurs), because the system created the greatest obstacles to their expansion and deve-

lopment. (Hodson, Sekulić, Massey, 1996). We can expect than the greatest support for the current regime would come from the members of this private sector now that legal and political limits are not hindering their expansion. The other strong support for the current regime should come from the members of the new ruling groups, especially managers of state and para-state organizations and owners of large businesses.

What can we expect from the professionals? If Konrad and Szeleny's theoretical approach is right, and the advantageous position of the professionals is disappearing due to the redistributive economy, they should be relatively less supportive of the present regime. On the other hand, if their perspective's are brighter and if the evaluation of education and knowledge is becoming greater in the market economy and the distance between them and the manual workers is increasing, then we could expect an increase in their support for the present regime.

The eventual difference in the rating of the present and the future regimes among professionals could be interpreted as an implicit critique of the present regime, in which the potential for the improvement of the position of professionals did not materialize. The war economy, still strongly controlled by the state, did not improve the position of professionals as they expected. Even more, the large segments of professionals closely related to the social services of the state (health, education and social welfare) are much worse off because of the budget cuts as a consequence of economic transition and war. Another important factor is the "populist" character of the present regime, which contains elements of anti-intellectualism. The support among intellectuals for the party winning the first democratic elections (HDZ) was meagre. Although the fact that from the first elections until the present there has been no change in the ruling party in Croatia means that many professionals and intellectuals have been "incorporated" into the regime, some elements of this initial opposition may still be present. The differences in the professionals' ratings of the present and the future regimes can, in that case, be attributed to the expectations that when Croatia transforms itself into a "normal" parliamentary democracy (some are saying that the crucial test of normality would be the first transfer of power from one party to the other as the result of an election, which still has not yet happened in Croatia), the position of professionals in the regime will improve.

If the "alliance" theory of the bureaucratic class and manual workers is correct, then we can predict that the workers would be relatively less satisfied with the present regime, especially taking into account the fact that social differentiation is increasing. How much can national integration and mobilization offset this?

Our intention is not to test these theories. This would be impossible because we are analyzing the support for the previous regime today, after it collapsed and after the people in Croatia experienced its dissolution and the social catastrophes of war, destruction and ethnic cleansing. If, in spite of this interposed experience, some differences in support of the previous regime can be detected, we will try to interpret them within the framework of those theories.

2. Nationality

Throughout history there has been an intensive interaction between communism and the "nationality question". Far from being "internationalist", as could be concluded from their ideology, communists have always exploited ethnicity and nationality as an important tool in their struggle for power (Burks, 1961). In modern Yugoslav history nationality was one of the key elements in the communist policy (Banac, 1984). In recent Croatian history, as a result of the genocidal policy of the Ustasha regime against the Serbs during World War II, the Serbs were pushed into the hands of communist partisans. This resulted in their overrepresentation in the Communist Party and there arose a strong perception among the Croat population that communism was "a Serbian plot". (The Serb nationalists were claiming that due to the fact that the key figures in the communist movement were Tito, a Croat, and Kardelj, a Slovene, the communist policies were aimed to undercut the Serbian domination in Yugoslavia.) In the perception of many Croats, communism was only a new form of Serbian exploitation. The

Serbs in Croatia perceived the Communist Party as their guarantor of security and peaceful living in Croatia. This feeling of insecurity was later exploited by Milošević and his expansionist policy. As a consequence of this, we can expect differentiated support for the previous regime among the Croatian majority and the Serbian minority. That different national groups supported the previous regime to different degrees was obvious from the data about their participation in the Communist Party. Due to historical circumstances, some national groups were overrepresented (Yugoslavs, Montenegrins, Serbs and Macedonians) and others were underrepresented (Croats, Slovenians, Albanians, Muslims and Hungarians) (Vušković, 1986). For example, the index of participation of Serbs in Croatia in 1981 in the Communist Party was 200,3; there were twice as many Serbs in the Communist Party than we would expect, according to population statistics. On the other side, Croats were underrepresented, with an index of 86,2 (Vušković, 1984:137). This should translate into differentiated support for the previous regime among Serbs and Croats in Croatia. Consequently, we can expect that nationality would be a significant predictor of support for the present regime. As we can expect relatively stronger support for the previous regime among the Serbs, we can also expect stronger support for the present regime by the Croats.

3. Ideological variables

The communist regime was a highly ideological one. We can expect that people whose deep beliefs were in contradiction with the proclaimed ideology were opposed to this regime. The key element is religion. The communist regimes were explicitly atheistic. Although the tolerance for religion in Croatia was relatively high, it was, in spite of this, regarded as something "reactionary". Being explicitly religious was an obstacle for social promotion, and it was more "tolerated" than accepted as a part of social life. On the basis of this, we can expect that the religious felt marginalized by the regime and, consequently, their support for the previous regime should be less than that of non-religious persons.

This also holds true for general ideological orientation. People leaning toward the political left, such as democratic socialists and social democrats, probably were more inclined to see some positive elements in the regime (regardless of the fact that they were maybe opposed to it), than people with more conservative political beliefs. The opposite holds true for the support of the present regime. Religious people, more oriented toward the conservative side of the political spectrum should support the present regime more intensively than the less religious.

4. Change in economic well-being

The fourth dimension which probably influences support for the regime is change in material standard of living. We know that the change of the regime produced dramatic changes in the economic well-being of the population. The erosion of living standard has occurred in every post-communist country, and in Croatia was exaggerated by war. The various strata were hit differently by this change in standard of living, and we can hypothesize that those suffering more in the transition would have a tendency to judge the previous regime less harshly. Consequently, relative worsening of the material standard creates less and less support for the present regime.

A particularly interesting question would be: How do the people who are worse off judge the future regime? Are they more optimistic or pessimistic than the rest of the population? If there is no difference between them and the others in judging the future regime, we can interpret this as an indicator that they perceive the worsening of their material situation as temporary. On the other hand, if they are more pessimistic than the rest of population, they are perceiving their loss as permanent.

5. Heterogeneity of regions

The last element that we will analyze is the influence of the regions. Croatia, although a relatively small country, is very heterogeneous. Historically and politically it was fragmented, and although the aspirations of the ruling nobility were to unify the country within its "historical borders", they never succeeded. The different positions of different regions created very heterogeneous political orientations. We know historically that the Dalmatian region, threatened by Italy, was more inclined toward Yugoslavism, which was perceived as a defence against the Italian pressure. The central part, under lesser outside pressure, was more inclined to support an independent Croatian state. During World War II this translated into much stronger support for the communist movement (because it advocated the preservation of Yugoslavia) in some regions than in others. This is obvious today where the support for the strongly nationalistic ruling party (HDZ) is weak in the coastal areas and much stronger in central Croatia. From this we can predict that support for the previous regime would be relatively stronger in the historically more pro-Yugoslav regions.

Research Design and Variables

1. Dependent variable

The dependent variable is expressed support for the previous, present and future regimes. The respondents were asked the following questions:
- People have different views on how the country has and is being governed. On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 meaning very bad, 10 very good):
- How would you, rank the political system from communist times?
- How would you rank the present political system?
- How would you rank the political system which you expect in ten years?

2. Independent variables

We used a set of independent variables which are used as indicators of some of the theoretical concepts mentioned in the previous discussion.

As control variables we used demographic variables: **sex, age, urban-rural birth** and the size of the place in which the respondent lives - **residence**.

Nationality was based on the respondent's self-identification.

As indicators of class position we used **education** (with eight levels from unfinished elementary school to the university diploma); **occupation** (with thirteen categories: managers and owners in charge of more than 10 workers, managers and owners in charge of less than 10 workers, professionals, supervisors, non-manual employees, foremen, skilled workers, semi-skilled workers, unskilled workers, farmers, agricultural workers, members of the armed forces and persons never worked). We also used **self-perception of the belonging to a class** (expressed in five grades: upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, lower class).

The relative **economic position** was rated on the basis of the following questions:

During the last year did your family: 1) save some money; 2) survive on what it earned in that period; 3) spend some earlier savings; 4) spend some earlier savings and borrow some money? There was also a question about the average total monthly family income.

The **religiosity** was measured on the basis of the self-placement of the respondent in one of three categories: 1) religious person; 2) non-religious person; 3) convinced atheist.

3. Sample

The representative sample of the Croatian population (N=1189) was used. Stratified random sample in two steps was used. We had a fixed proportion of regional representation and urban/rural proportionality. Some regions of Croatia are not represented because of war conditions. Data were collected in November 1995 using door to door personal interviews. The regions which were the arenas of military operations in August were not included. Also, Eastern Slavonia under Serbian control is not included. The demographic structure of the sample is very similar to the sex, age and educational distributions of the population of Croatia (excluding recently liberated territories and northern Slavonia).

Results

1. Trajectory of Support

In Table 1 we give the general trajectory of support for the previous, present and the expectations for the future political regime. The means of the evaluations and standard deviations are given in the following table.

Table 1.
Trajectory of Support

	Means	Std. Dev.	N
Previous Political System	3.7879	2.1204	1169
Present Political System	5.2066	2.0663	1176
Future Political System	7.4144	2.0658	1139

What can be concluded from Table 1? The first conclusion is that we have a constant increase in the level support. As can be expected, the present political system is evaluated higher than the past one (5.2066), but people also expect that the future political system will be much better than the present one (7.4144). The distance between the evaluations of the future compared with the evaluation of the present system is greater than the distance of the evaluation of the present system compared with the evaluation of the previous system. In the first case (future-present) the distance is 2.2078, and in the case of the evaluation of the present compared with the previous system, the distance is 1.4187.

The fact that the rating of the previous regime is lower than the present (or the future one) does not require an extensive explanation. The reason why the system crumbled was, among many other factors, that it was never exposed to the test of popular support. Yugoslav "self-management" socialism produced a higher standard of living and relatively greater freedoms compared with other socialist countries, but these strengths were probably erased by the war experience, which in the eyes of the majority of people in Croatia, was a direct product of the previous regime.

What is more surprising is the difference between the support for the present and the future political regimes. This optimism regarding the future could also be understood as an implicit critique of the present system. Although the present is better than the past, it is below some expected standards. But the future will probably bring about a situation in which the present minuses will be corrected and the aspirations for democracy will be fulfilled.

This interpretation of the difference between the present and the future is consistent with the pattern of answers found from other questions in the survey. That democracy is an accepted ideal could be derived from the positive acceptance of the statement: A democracy may

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have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. 60.9% of the respondents strongly agreed with this statement and 33.4% agreed to a certain extent. When asked if Croatia is a democratic country today, only 15.6% strongly agreed with the statement, but 60.7% agreed to a certain extent. Dissatisfaction with the present system is obvious from the answers on two questions directly measuring the people's satisfaction with those currently holding power and about the leaders' general corruptibility. On the question "How are you satisfied with the way the current leaders are doing their job?" the answers are split: 50.9% are very satisfied or fairly satisfied, with 49.1% fairly or strongly dissatisfied. 57% of the respondents think that the country is ruled by a small group of people whose only goals are personal gains, rather than the betterment of the country.

2. Some Comparisons

The same pattern is detected in other post-communist countries. (Mishler and Rose, 1996). The rejection of the past is much more intense than the positive acceptance of the present situation. But there are generally positive expectations for the future. We can try to compare our data with those of Mishler and Rose. Before making any comparison, however, we must take into account two facts. First is that the New Democracy Barometer survey, on which Mishler and Rose are basing their analysis, was taken in 1991 in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (before the split), Hungary, Poland and Romania. Our data were collected in 1995. We can argue that the data are comparable, because the war limited economic activity during those years. We can start with the assumption that, in some dimensions of its social development, Croatia began in 1995 where the countries sampled in the New Democracy Barometer were in 1991. This makes the 1991/95 comparison meaningful. The second and more technical remark is that the question formulation in the New Democracy Barometer was about future expectations of the system of government in five years time and the scale was from -100 to +100. In our case we asked about expectations in ten years time and the scale was from 1 to 10. In order to make comparisons we transformed our data into a scale of 1 to 100. By putting our results in comparative perspective we then obtained the information in Table 2.

Table 2.
Support of the previous, present and future regimes in different countries

Country	Previous System	Present System	Future System
Croatia (95)	-31	- 5	+34 (In 10 years)
Bulgaria (91)	-24	+26	+48 (In 5 years)
CSFR (91)	-31	+20	+51 (" ")
Hungary (91)	+4	+ 8	+34 (" ")
Poland (91)	-21	+ 1	+25 (" ")
Romania (91)	-37	+21	+43 (" ")
Albania (91)	-23	+15	+40 (" ")

The general comparison of the support of the political regimes in Croatia compared with other countries shifted Croatia more toward the negative side of the spectrum. In the evaluation of the previous regime, Croatia is on the negative side of the scale, which is not surprising taking into account that only Romania experienced civil war, although not comparable in magnitude to the Croatian one. The Romanian average evaluation is 6 points more negative than the Croatian evaluation. The Croatian evaluation is the same as that of the CSFR (-31). The Czech result is interpreted as the feeling of people when they were most directly under Russian occupation, which in Croatia, could be compared to the occupation and destruction of the

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Yugoslav Army. The most negative evaluation of the previous regime in these three countries can be correlated with the negative experience of brutality (Romania), occupation (Czechoslovakia) and war (Croatia).

If we analyze the evaluations of the present systems compared with the previous ones, interesting dynamics emerge. We can start from the general hypothesis that there should be an inverse correlation between the support for the previous and the present systems. As much as the previous regimes were negatively evaluated, the changes must be positively accepted. We can state that this prediction holds for four countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and, to a certain extent, for Albania. They have low evaluations of their previous regimes (-24, -31, -37 and -23, respectively) and relatively high evaluations of the present regimes. Poland and Croatia show deviation from this pattern, both having low evaluations of the previous regimes (Croatia shows a very strongly negative evaluation). But these negative evaluations are not translated into strong support for the present regimes, and are much lower than the evaluations of the previous four countries. Hungary is a special case where evaluations of the previous and the present regimes are almost the same.

It can be concluded that, based on the comparison of the previous and present regimes, we have three groups of societies. The first group, the "satisfied" ones, are societies which are highly dissatisfied with the previous regimes and happy that these regimes have been replaced by new ones (Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia). "Dissatisfied" societies are Poland and Croatia, which in spite of there negative evaluations of the previous regimes, are not too satisfied (comparative with the evaluations of the "satisfied" societies) with the present regimes. Hungary shows a "normal" pattern with no big change in evaluations between the previous and present regimes. This can be explained by the highly reformist nature of the Hungarian communist regime, which had many elements of political pluralism and market economy present during the last period of the communist regime. On the other side, we can see today, with the benefit of the hindsight, that "satisfied" societies were not stable ones. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania have gone and are going through the turmoil of adapting to democratic regimes. Czechoslovakia did not go through turmoil of that type, but the country dissolved into its Czech and Slovak parts.

How can the "dissatisfaction" and disillusionment in Poland and Croatia be interpreted? In Poland it is probably the result of shock therapy. The relative disillusionment with the democratic regime, in spite of deep dissatisfaction with the previous one, brought reformed communists, back to power in 1995. In Croatia, the chances of the reformed communists to tap the dissatisfaction of the people is non-existent. This is a result of the war and the strong resentment of the Croats toward the Serbs and the communists who are perceived as connected with the Serbian influence in Croatia. (Although the same holds true for Polish communists, who were perceived as "agents" of the Soviet domination, this did not prevent their reformed heirs from taking power in the free elections in 1995.) Probably the low rating of the present regime compared with that of the previous one, for Croatia, is the result of the highly perceived corruption and dramatic fall of living standard.

This typology is evident if we present the differences (regardless of the absolute values) between the average evaluations of the past and present regimes.

The point differences between the evaluations of the *past and present regimes* are:

Romania	58
Czechoslovakia	51
Bulgaria	50
Albania	38
Croatia	26
Poland	20
Hungary	4

If we include the ratings of the expectations of the future political systems, then the picture is changed a little bit. Although the "optimism" of the Croatian citizens regarding the future is on the lower end of the scale (higher than in Poland and equal to that of Hungary) they have relatively the biggest jump between the rating of the present regime and the expectations of the future.

The differences in the average ratings of the *present and the future* political systems are:

Croatia	39
Albania	35
Czechoslovakia	31
Hungary	26
Poland	24
Romania	23
Bulgaria	22

This relatively largest jump (although the absolute rating of the future system is on the lower end of the scale, compared with other countries) can probably be interpreted with the prospects of peaceful developments in mind. In that light, the relatively low evaluation of the present system is probably the result of war and the resulting destruction. The future, which will be without war and destruction (the survey was done at the end of 1995), is bringing with it a higher evaluation of the political regime. This means that the negative aspects of the present political system are perceived a as result of the disorganization brought by the war. With the more peaceful developments, the Croatian citizens are hoping that the political system will "normalize" and that most of its negative characteristics will disappear.

Let's summarize these interpretations. The past has been rejected and the present system has failed to achieve the expected, but the people have hope that the future regime will satisfy their expectations.

What can we speculate about the future on the basis of these findings? In the first place, it depends on the interpretation of this gap between the evaluation of the present compared with the future political system. First, it could be interpreted as the result of unrealistic expectations. Living in the communist system created an unrealistic, idealized picture of the democratic system. In confrontation with the harshness of reality it became obvious to the people that reality was very far from their expectations. This gap may represent hope that despite the difficulties of transition, their aspirations will be realized after these initial difficulties are overcome. If, sooner or later, the people become aware of the fact that their expectations were too high, they will become more realistic. That could, on the one side, lower their expectations, but at the same time could increase their evaluations of the previous system, especially after its worst problems were forgotten as a result of the normal tendency of the human memory to erase the worst experiences and to retain the more pleasant ones.

There is also the alternative interpretation that the gap between the present and the future reflects the corruption and low standards prevailing in all transition systems. In that case, people may think that after the first excesses of the privatization process run their course and corruption ends, the democratic institutions would start to function effectively and the rating of the system would go up. It may be that both processes are involved. Maybe the present corruption and the pains of transformation, combined with the over-idealized picture of the future are producing the gap. If this is true, in the future we will see two contradictory processes at work. The eventual waning of corruption and the normalization of the democratization process will push the evaluation of the present situation up. And at the same time the cynicism and realization that democracy and market are not "heaven on earth", but are also plagued with inefficiencies, as is every institutional arrangement in human society, will produce disappointment and will push the ratings down.

3. Correlates of Support

After the comparative analysis we will now examine the Croatian case more closely. As the first step in our analysis we will correlate some demographic, social and attitudinal variables in regards to the support for the previous, present and the future systems. This will allow us to give some preliminary answers to the previously stated hypothesis.

Table 3.
Correlates of Support (means of support)

Variable	Previous Polit. System	Present Polit. System	Future Polit. System
Sex			
Male	3.6340	5.1787	7.4026
Female	3.9110	5.2278	7.4197
Significance of			
2-tailed t-test	.027	.685	.889
Age			
<25	3.9198	4.9671	7.1943
26-40	3.6264	5.0168	7.2457
41-55	3.8621	5.0250	7.4341
56-70	3.7714	5.7714	7.7940
71+	3.8289	5.9103	7.6757
One-way ANOVA			
F-Ratio	.8279	8.4769	3.1823
F Prob.	.5074	.0000	.0130
Place of birth			
Village	3.7252	5.4219	7.4922
City	3.8477	4.9165	7.2813
Significance of			
2-tailed t-test	.332	.000	.092
Size of town			
<2000	3.5447	5.8790	7.9339
2-5000	4.2044	4.7247	7.1520
5-10000	2.7500	5.7500	9.0000
10-20000	4.2263	5.0145	7.1128
20-50000	3.7500	4.3750	7.6250
50-100000	3.1942	5.3398	7.3608
100-500000	4.5520	4.2880	6.9328
500000>	3.4667	5.0849	7.1053
One-way ANOVA			
F -Ratio	7.0485	11.8200	6.1965
F Prob.	.0000	.0000	.0000
Education			
No schooling	3.5882	7.0588	8.8235
Unfinished elementary school	3.7612	6.4925	8.2419
Elementary School	4.2662	5.9353	7.6846
Unfinished Skilled and			
Highly Skilled Workers Sch.	4.5263	5.5000	7.3500
School for Skilled Workers	3.6389	5.1006	7.6609
Unfinished High School	4.000	4.7813	7.1667
High School	3.5462	5.2832	7.5118
Unfinished University	3.7826	4.5571	7.0299
University Degree	3.8614	4.6254	6.8900

One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	1.9630	12.2084	5.8698
F Prob.	.0478	.0000	.0000

Occupation			
Managers-Owners (>10 workers)	3.8000	5.9000	7.6000
Managers-Owners (<10 workers)	3.1591	5.0667	6.9535
Professionals	4.1277	4.5131	6.8865
Supervisors	3.5484	4.5484	7.6207
Non-manual workers	3.8759	4.9247	7.6207
Foremen	4.3714	4.8857	6.8235
Skilled Workers	3.5714	5.2091	7.5893
Semi-skilled Workers	4.7879	5.8182	7.6471
Unskilled Workers	4.0192	5.5490	7.8750
Farmer	3.5294	7.0588	8.8750
Agricultural worker	3.8438	5.6250	7.5313
Member of Armed Forces	2.8421	5.9500	7.3500
Never worked	3.7366	5.6145	7.5076

One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	2.2652	5.0921	2.5785
F Prob.	.0078	.0000	.0022

Class Identification			
Upper Class	4.6842	5.2105	8.0556
Upper Middle Class	3.7277	5.2336	7.4076
Lower Middle Class	3.6580	5.0425	7.1912
Working Class	3.9233	5.1915	7.5659
Lower Class	3.8100	5.9109	7.7980

One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	1.7011	3.7224	3.0186
F Prob.	.1474	.0051	.0172

Income			
Up to 800kn	3.8081	6.1010	7.5895
801-1400	3.9653	5.4690	7.5540
1401-2000	3.6623	5.1765	7.3649
2001-2600	3.9000	4.8067	7.2808
2601-3200	3.6667	5.2667	7.6364
3201-3800	3.8870	5.1826	7.4775
3801-4400	3.9038	5.2952	7.3048
4401-5000	3.5701	4.8716	7.1827
5001-6000	3.7500	4.7831	7.1795
over 6000	3.6494	5.0519	7.3947

One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	.4921	3.8163	.6935
F Prob.	.8806	.0001	.7153

Savings in the last year			
Created savings	3.6742	5.7232	7.6057
Balanced earnings and spending	3.8532	5.2634	7.5063
Spent earlier savings	3.6147	5.0304	7.2273
Spent earlier savings and borrowed	4.1717	4.2929	6.8737

One way ANOVA			
F Ratio	1.9459	11.0947	3.7075
F Prob.	.1204	.0000	.0113
Religiosity			
Religious	3.5543	5.5475	7.6654
Non-religious	4.1310	4.5630	6.8902
Atheist	5.2329	3.9452	6.7917
One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	26.1047	39.6360	17.6686
F Prob.	.0000	.0000	.0000
Nationality			
Croats	3.7315	5.2132	7.4188
Serbs	4.5455	5.2059	7.3030
Others	3.8140	5.5952	7.7250
One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	2.3804	.6863	.4867
F Prob.	0.0930	.5038	.6148
Region			
Istria	4.4286	4.6667	7.3158
Rijeka	4.5248	4.0693	7.1959
Dalmatia	3.4170	5.2277	7.4550
Zagorje, Zagreb	3.7492	5.0776	7.1838
Međimurje, Moslavina	4.4293	5.0270	7.3090
Slavonia	3.3262	5.9946	7.8362
Central Croatia	3.2500	5.8700	7.7629
One Way ANOVA			
F Ratio	9.8092	13.1595	2.6698
F Prob.	.0000	.0000	.0141

The major conclusion from the present analysis is that the general pattern of increase in support of the regime from the previous to the future system holds true for every independent variable analyzed. However, we can detect some substantial differences within this general pattern. Some groups are more harsh in their evaluation of the previous (communist) system. Although all groups evaluate the present system more positively than the previous one, the intensity of this positive evaluation differs significantly among the various groups. The following analysis is devoted to descriptions of these differences and possible conclusions based on them.

Both demographic variables, **sex** and **age,** show some interesting influences on the political system support. Females are relatively less harsh in evaluating the previous regime, although there are no differences between the sexes in evaluating the present or future systems. The only plausible explanation for this could be that the policies of the communist regime toward equality of the sexes, regardless of being far from successful, were regarded as positive by women. With the new influences of the church on public life, more conservative attitudes toward the role of women have started to prevail. It is interesting to note the dramatic fall in the representation of women in the legislatures in all the former Yugoslav republics after the first democratic elections. In the case of Croatia this fall was from 15.0% in the last communist legislature to 1.5% in the newly democratically elected one. (Cohen, 1993:166). Also, the reduction of social welfare, health and unemployment hit women harder. All this probably contributed to statistically significantly less harsh judgment of the previous system by women, although

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the general pattern of the past receiving lower evaluations than the present and the present lower than the future, remains.

Age, does not produce a significant difference in the evaluation of the past system, but it does in the evaluation of the present and future systems. The positive evaluation of the present system rises with every category of age, as does also the optimism toward the future. The conservative nature of the regime is probably reflected in this correlation between age and positive evaluation of the current and the future political systems, although, interestingly, it does not produce a harsher evaluation of the previous system.

The place of birth (dichotomy city-village) shows that the only significant difference is that the people born in villages evaluate the present regime more highly than those born in cities. There is no difference in the evaluations of the previous regime or in the expectations of the future political system. **The place of residence**, measured in a more precise way through the number of inhabitants, shows that this variable is correlated with the evaluation of all three systems, although no clear linear relationship emerges.

If we move from demography to the indicators of class position, again, we find some very clear correlations. **Education** is clearly correlated with the evaluation of the present and the expectations of the future. The differences in evaluating the previous regime are close to being statistically significant. The differences between the arithmetic means of the groups shows that those who have finished elementary school evaluate the previous regime less negatively than those with high school or unfinished elementary school career. Education is negatively correlated with the evaluation of the present regime and the positive expectations for the future regime. The lower the education the more positive the evaluation of the present system. The same is also true for the expectations of the future system.

The second indicator of class position, **occupation,** also shows correlation with the evaluation of all three systems. If we look at the differences between the means within the general ANOVA model (not shown here), we can find some interesting patterns in the evaluation of the previous regime. Occupational groups, such as members of the armed forces, managers-owners (supervising less than 10 workers), and skilled workers, are more negative in their evaluations of the previous system. On the other side, clearly less negative are the semi-skilled workers, followed by the professionals and foremen. Unskilled and non-manual workers are also on the less negative side. It is important to note that the working class is clearly split in its evaluation of the previous system, as predicted by Zaslavski. Lower skilled groups are clearly less negative than highly skilled workers. Professionals are much more similar to the less skilled workers than to the highly skilled ones. Managers-owners of small companies were more negative toward the previous system than the managers-owners of the larger companies. This could be attributed to the fact that among the managers of the larger firms, we can expect to have more "left-overs" from the previous communist regime, which were left in their positions because of their expertise and experience. The small companies are probably newly established companies flourishing in the newly favourable climate for private entrepreneurship. Our difference here is probably, in a very rough way, tapping into the much more elaborate typology of new managers developed by Karajić, Milas and Rimac (1995.). There is a systematic tendency that the managers of the larger firms consistently evaluate the previous, present and the future systems more highly. This probably reflects the fact that many among them are "left overs" from the previous system. The better evaluation of the present system reflects their higher "incorporation" into the new regime, which is necessary, regarding the state controlled privatization and strong influence of the state on the larger companies. Karajic and others are also finding that there is a tendency among these managers to be active in politics, sport clubs and other associations. Managers of the smaller companies are more "business" oriented and less dependent on state patronage. Their relatively more negative evaluation of the previous regime reflects the fact that their entrepreneurship was curbed by the regime, and their relati-

vely less favourable evaluation of the present regime reflects their greater independence and suspicion of the new state and its interventionist inclinations. (Although we must add that in none of the evaluations did the differences between the two groups of managers reach statistical significance. The justification for the previous discussion is based on the fact that the differences in all three evaluations point in the same direction and are relatively large. The small sample size only 10 managers of the larger companies and 44 of the smaller ones, however, increases the probability of sampling error.)

What is interesting is that the evaluation of the previous regime is not the perfect predictor of the evaluation of the present regime. We could expect that those who are stronger in their negative evaluations of the previous regime would be more positive in their evaluations of the present regime, and vice versa. The most consistent groups are farmers, members of the armed forces, professionals, and foremen (the former having lower evaluations of the previous regime and higher of the present one, and the latter two higher of the previous regime and lower of the present one). The blue collar workers are interesting because they do not follow the "consistent" pattern. Skilled workers are among those who more negatively evaluate the previous communist regime, but this does not translate into a more positive evaluation of the present regime (their evaluation of the present regime is statistically significantly lower from that of peasants and those who never worked, although it is significantly higher than the professionals). A different, inconsistent pattern characterizes the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Semi-skilled workers have the highest evaluation of the communist system, and, at the same time, a relatively high evaluation of the present system. Unskilled workers show a very similar pattern to the semi-skilled.

We can create a typology combining the evaluations of the previous and present regimes. On the basis of the average evaluation expressed by the group and its statistical significance with the evaluation of the other groups, we can detect the existence of four basic types. The **"consistent "** types :

1) Those evaluating the communist regime more negatively than other groups and evaluating the present one more positively (the **"anti-Communists"**): members of the armed forces, managers-owners of small companies, farmers and those who have never worked.

2) Those evaluating the communist regime more positively than others and the present regime more negatively (**"pro-Communists"**): professionals, foremen and non-manual workers.

The **"inconsistent"** types:

1) Those evaluating the previous and present regimes relatively more favourably (**"opportunists"**): semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and managers of the larger companies.

2) Those evaluating the communist regime and also the present regime relatively more negatively (the **"critical"**): skilled workers and supervisors. (We can also classify the agricultural workers in this group, although they are somewhat more in the middle of the scale in their evaluations of both systems.)

Farmers are significantly more optimistic than others in their expectations of the future, opposite of the professionals and foremen who are more pessimistic than others. Unskilled workers are also outstanding in their optimism about the future, although less so than farmers.

Regarding class **self-identification,** we can see that it is not correlated with the evaluation of the previous political system, but rather it is correlated with the evaluation of the present and the future systems. In the evaluation of the present system, those identifying themselves with the lower class are clearly more positive. In evaluating the future, the pattern is a more complex one with "extremes". The upper and lower classes are more positive, the working class and upper middle class are in the middle of the spectrum, and the lower middle class is relatively more pessimistic.

Moving to **income,** we find the only significant pattern in the evaluation of the present regime. People with the lowest income clearly support the present regime more than the others. The change in material position in the last year does not show any correlation with the evaluation of the previous system, but it is significantly correlated with the evaluation of the present one and the future expectations. In both cases, as the relative economic positions have worsened in the last year, the positive evaluation of the present regime is going down and the relative pessimism about the future political system increases.

Identity indicators also show correlation with system support. The **national identity** shows a surprisingly statistically significant difference in evaluations of the previous system. Serbs are evaluating the previous system relatively more positively than Croats and the others. This probably reflects their privileged position within the previous regime. There is no difference in evaluating the present or expectations about the future among the national groups.

The **religiosity** shows a very clear correlation with the support for the regime. Religious people are more negative toward the previous regime, more positive about the present one and more optimistic about the future.

What can we conclude on the basis of this preliminary analysis? There is a general pattern of support in Croatia which roughly corresponds to that previously seen in other communist countries. There is a negative evaluation of the previous political system, a more positive evaluation of the present political system (in the case of Croatia it is more neutral), and there is optimism about the future. Everyone expects that the future political system will be better than the current one. Although this pattern holds across all groups, there are many significant differences in the intensity of "condemnation" of the previous system, intensity of support for the current system and the intensity of optimism regarding the future system.

The previous regime is judged less harsh among some groups than others. In general, females, professionals, less skilled manual workers, Serbs and less religious people are favourable toward the previous regime. Satisfaction with the present political system is mostly expressed among the less educated, farmers, people with lower income, the more religious and those who created some savings in the last year. Except for the last variable, all other variables indicate that the most intensive support for the current system is located on the lower end of the social hierarchy. It is interesting that the self-identification as a "lower class" member clearly indicates a relatively more positive judgment of the present system than any other category. The mean is 5.91 and the closest is the upper middle class with a mean of 5.23. Those identifying themselves as "upper class" are optimistic about the future (as are "lower class" identifiers), although they are not so distinctively positive about the present system.

We can conclude that those who were not hit extremely hard by the economic conditions and whose positions did not worsen significantly are the strongest supporters of the current political system. We see this support much more among the farmers than among the manual workers. Actually, the position òf farmers is much more clearly and consistently defined. Farmers are negative toward the previous system and positive toward the present one. This tendency is even more clear among the elite group of the new regime managers and owners. Manual workers are much more ambiguous. They are relatively less negative than other groups in judging the previous system, but they are also relatively positive, compared with the others, in judging the present system, although their positives toward the present system are less intensive, relative to others, than their positives toward the previous system. From this we can conclude that the previous system has some weak support among workers and professionals. Professionals, together with workers, are relatively less harsh toward the previous system but, together with foremen, are relatively less positive about the present system than any other occupational group. Regarding the optimism about the future, we again have the situation that the less educated, farmers, unskilled workers, the more religious, and people whose families created some savings are more optimistic than the others.

Preliminary Conclusions Regarding the "Alliance" and the "Intellectual Class" Theories

Županov's "alliance theory" and Konrad-Szeleny's "intellectual class" theory produce different predictions about the support for the communist regime among different groups. If the alliance between bureaucrats and workers is dominant, then the support for the previous regime should be stronger among the workers than among the professionals (minus the influence of that large number of former bureaucrats who are today among the professionals). In our instrument we cannot extract former bureaucrats from the group of professionals. Zaslavski would add that there would be a difference between the skilled and unskilled workers, where the skilled have a feeling of relative deprivation compared with the unskilled workers. The result of this theory is that there would then be a difference in support for the previous regime among the skilled workers on the one side, and manual workers on the other side. Contrary to this prediction, if Konrad and Szeleny are correct, we can expect that the support among the professionals for the previous regime would be higher than among the workers. Schematically, we can create the following:

Support for the previous regime according to three theories

	Professionals	Skilled Workers	Semi and unskilled workers
Županov	-	+	+
Zaslavski	nothing	-	+
Konrad-Szeleny	+	-	-
Observed pattern	+	-	+

None of the theories has produced an exact prediction of the observed pattern. Zaslavski is the closest, but he has not produced any prediction regarding intellectuals. According to Županov, the professionals should have lower support than the workers, and, according to Konrad-Szeleny, the professionals should have higher support. We found that the support for the previous regime among professionals and semi and unskilled workers was the same. We would suggest the interpretation that both theories were tapping important elements characterizing the communist system. The bureaucracy-workers (semi and unskilled) alliance existed, but maybe parallel with the penetration and amalgamation of the bureaucratic elite with the professionals.

This interpretation holds if we accept the premise that the theory can be tested using today's evaluation of the previous regime. Here, all the factors about memory, feeling and the present situation determine our perceptions. Maybe the results would be different if the people had been surveyed before the war and the dissolution of the state. The question was not formulated so that the respondents should reconstruct their support for the previous regime as it was when the regime existed. They were asked to evaluate it with the "benefits of the hindsight" and keeping all the events which happened after the disappearance of the previous regime in mind. In spite of this, we can still detect meaningful patterns according to the theories, explaining the attitudes and valuations of the people in the previous regime, which only increases the validity of these theories and the explanatory power of the findings.

Is the New Conservative Alliance Emerging?

The combination of the evaluations of the previous and the present systems can be interpreted as the basis of the **"new alliance"** theory. This new alliance is, the again alliance of the

top and the bottom, although top and bottom are differently defined. In the case of the communist regime, the "top" were professionals participating in the "redistributive economy"; but in the new post-communist system the "top" of the hierarchy are managers-owners. The elimination of the restrictions for the private sector created strong support for the new regime among the group of owners-managers. We don't have data about the previous careers of these managers, but from the anecdotal evidence, they are "political converts" who changed their loyalty from the communist to the new post-communist (nationalistic) regime. The fact that we have stronger support for the present regime among the managers-owners controlling more than 10 workers than among those controlling less than 10 workers probably reflects the strong influence of the government on the economy. This direct influence is much weaker on the small businesses. In larger firms political criteria and connections with government are important, and direct political influence on the appointment of managers (regardless of the formal status of the firms) are prevalent in the new system. The high evaluation of the managers of the "larger" firms reflects the fact that they owe their positions to the new regime. Relatively lower support for the regime in the smallest businesses (managers controlling less than 10 workers) reflects their greater independence among the large groups of new entrepreneurs as old craftsmen and small entrepreneurs. The source of support for the present regime is coming from the lower segment of the occupational hierarchy - it is strongest among farmers, semi-skilled workers and agricultural workers. From this we can conclude that the new alliance is formed: the top is shifted from the professionals (whose support of the new regime is significantly lower) to the managers-owners. The bottom is shifted a little bit "lower" now, including primarily agricultural sectors and lower levels of workers. The "labor elite"- supervisors, foremen and skilled workers- show lower levels of support for the new regime than the semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

Županov's explanation of the basis of the alliance was that the support of the working class for the previous regime was based on the relative privileged positions of the workers in the system. This "privileged" position was based on the security of employment, low intensity of work (with the possibility of extensive moonlighting), and, at the same time, on low income differentials. We can hypothesize that the emerging new alliance supporting the new regime is partially based on "material" interests (the main motivation of the top part) and partially based on the conservative ideology (the main motivation of the lower strata). Managers-owners are stronger supporters of the new regime because of the fact that the new regime guarantees the unlimited development of the private sector. The same argument can be used in explaining the support of the farmers. But then private ownership cannot be the explanation for the support of the agricultural workers or lower worker's class groups. Here, we can speculate that the political conservatism, especially the reliance on Catholicism, arouses resonance among the lower groups which are more religious and conservative. Ideological conservatism, then, is creating support even among the groups which are not directly benefiting from the new regime.

4. Regression Model of the System Support

In order to get a more precise picture of the relationships among variables influencing regime support we used a regression model. This model can give us more precise answers about the importance of some variables and can tell us if some of the hypothesized relationships on the basis of ANOVA are spurious. For example, we can hypothesize that the influence of religiosity on regime support will be cancelled out when included in the model together with education. If more educated people are less religious, then the fact that religiosity is connected with stronger support for the present regime (and a more harsh rejection of the previous one) is simply due to the intervening variable of education. In the same way, we can check to see if the statistical difference between village and city and size of town or region stays significant

even if controlled for education and occupation. In sociological analysis, the class position is usually taken as the most significant independent variable influencing political attitudes and beliefs. Will the class position (measured through indicators like occupation, education, income and self-perception) "explain" the influence of other variables, including ideological ones like religion?

In order to answer these questions we designed the regression models in five steps and in every step we added a new group of variables. This approach allowed us to see if the new group of variables adds to the explained variance of our dependent variables and if the regression coefficients are changed if new variables are added, indicating spurious correlation. In the first model only demographic variables: sex, age, place of birth and the size of the town in which the interview was conducted (place of residence) are included. The second step is adding occupation and education, the third, income and relative economic position compared with the last year, the fourth step is adding region, and the fifth "identity" variables like nationality, religiosity, and class self-identification. The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4.
Multiple Regression on Evaluation of the Previous Political System

Independent Variable	Beta coefficients (T significance in brackets)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Sex	.064643	.076395	.079344	.079088	0.089418
	(.0314)	(.0152)	(.0127)	(.0118)	(.0055)
Age	.015998	-.034312	-.045861	-.030267	-.033251
	(.6043)	(.3509)	(.2370)	(.4315)	(.3974)
Place of birth	.029736	.017667	.017377	-.001108	.011447
	(.3653)	(.6005)	(.6144)	(.9740)	(.7441)
Place of residence	-.005136	.015580	.007263	.018190	-.021891
	(.8727)	(.6686)	(.8445)	(.6511)	(.5953)
Occupation		-.054052	-.052049	-.030984	-.028226
		(.1563)	(.1876)	(.4315)	(.4822)
Education		-.091802	-.078380	-.063764	-.127111
		(.0439)	(.0911)	(.1642)	(.0095)
Income			-.020531	-.011175	-.021515
			(.6044)	(.7768)	(.6055)
Economic position relative to the previous year			.018599	.029188	.019427
			(.5773)	(.3797)	(.5714)
Regions: Istria				-.075624	-.024161
				(.0260)	(.4797)
Medimurje				-.163521	-.100421
				(.0000)	(.0133)
Dalmatia				Not in the Eq.	.042554
					(.2644)

Rijeka				-.126236 (.0007)	-.043261 (.2201)
Slavonia				.015741 (.6938)	.069763 (.0702)
Middle Croatia				.013542 (.7108)	.046009 (.2131)
Zagreb				-.048984 (.2607)	Not in the Eq.
Religiosity					.189890 (.0000)
Serbs					-090278 (.0053)
Adjusted R square	.00136	.00378	.00241	.03354	.06971

In Model 1, with only the demographic independent variables included, the only significant predictor of the relatively less harsh evaluation of the previous system is sex (females having a tendency to less harshly evaluate the previous system). As can be seen from the inspection of the next four models, the influence of sex holds, regardless of all other variables included in the model. As in our previous discussion, the fact that women experienced significant change in their positions with a more conservative regime coming to power probably influenced their relatively less harsh rating of the previous regime. This is specially significant taking into account the fact that sex is not a significant predictor for the support of the present regime or for the expectations of the future.

In Model 2, education is negatively correlated with the evaluation of the previous regime. In Model 3, when income is added to Model 1,. equal values of Beta coefficients indicate that both variables exercise equal influence on our dependent variable. In Model 4, when the region is added to the model, the influence of education disappears. In three regions, Istria, Međimurje and Rijeka, the tendency of a more lenient evaluation of the previous regime appears. Looking at Beta coefficients, this influence is strongest in Međimurje and Rijeka, with Istria being at the same level as the influence of sex. In Model 5, when "identity" variables are included, the strong influence of region is diluted, with only Međimurje staying as availed predictor and education reappearing as significant. But what is most important is that the "identity" factors prove to be significant: the more religious people are the more harshly they evaluate the previous system, and being Serbs reduces the harshness of the evaluation of the previous regime. Looking at the Beta coefficients, religiosity looks to be absolutely the strongest predictor of the evaluation of the previous political system. What is interesting is that the "identity" variables, religiosity and Serbian identity, increase the explained variance two-fold, although from a merger .033 to .069. The gradual increase in explained variance, when more "objective" variables were added to the model, were more modest. In the first four models the total increase was from .013 to 0.033. This tells us that the "identity" variables (net of "objective" variables like positions in the social structure or socio-economic status) are the most important predictors in the evaluations of the previous regime.

Table 5
Multiple Regression Models of the Support for the Current Political System

Independent Variables	Beta coefficients (T significance in brackets)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Sex	.29325 (.3183)	-8.842E-04 (.9768)	.005831 (.8478)	.005495 (.8535)	-.004668 (.8792)
Age	.116740 (.0001)	.077101 (.0304)	.100852 (.0067)	.093091 (.0110)	.096113 (.0105)
Place of birth	-.046583 (.1465)	-.033266 (.3082)	-.038198 (.2419)	-.009733 (.7626)	-.013396 (.6888)
Place of residence		-.063633 (.0707)	-.048187 (.1724)	-.035713 (.3494)	-.029029 (.4609)
Occupation		.097099 (.0184)	.082339 (.0294)	.049884 (.1823)	.039399 (.3058)
Education		-.118903 (.0070)	-.116831 (.0084)	-.124210 (.0043)	-.103234 (.0270)
Income			-.010740 (.7783)	-.018788 (.6182)	-.041752 (.2970)
Economic position relative to the previous year			-.164661 (.0000)	-.168755 (.0000)	-.165236 (.0000)
Regions: Istria				.057525 (.0752)	.038370 (.2407)
Medimurje				.045813 (.2288)	.062127 (.1091)
Dalmatia				Not in the eq.	-.001290 (.9717)
Rijeka				.142142 (.0001)	.134004 (.0001)
Slavonia				-.106624 (.0051)	-.083367 (.0235)
Middle Croatia				-.073205 (.0352)	-.041475 (.2399)
Zagreb				-.012989 (.7542)	Not in the eq.
Religiosity					-.185134 (.0000)
Serbs					-.015908 (.6058)
Class Identification					-.056385 (.1423)
R square adjusted	.03960	.06007	.08463	.12541	.14985

The models for predicting the support for the present regime are given in Table 5. In Model 1 we see that the older people are more positive toward the present regime than the younger. Sex is not a significant predictor in the support for the present regime. As we can see from looking at the other models, age remains a significant predictor controlling for all other variables, education or occupation included. We can argue that the support for the present regime clearly goes up with age. In Model 2, education and occupation are both significant predictors. But the difference between these two variables is that occupation loses influence in Model 4 when the regions are included. It looks as if the influence of occupation is more the result of the different regional occupational structures, where regions, and not occupations, are the key determinants. Education is clearly negatively correlated with the support for the present system and this influence stays unchanged regardless of the inclusions of new variables into the model. In Model 3, income and comparison with the economic position of the previous year is included. The interesting result is that the absolute income level is not correlated with the support for the present system; but the worsening of the economic position, in comparison with the previous year, is the most important predictor. The Beta for it is the highest compared with all others. In Model 4, when regions are included, we found that support for the present regime is differently distributed among the various regions. There are two regions, Slavonia and Middle Croatia, which are more likely to favour the present regime, controlling for educational, occupational and demographic characteristics. In Rijeka that support is lower than in the other regions. It is interesting to mention that the less harsh evaluation of the previous regime does not automatically translate into a more favourable evaluation of the present regime. Međimurje, which is in Model 5 of Table 4 and less harshly evaluates the previous regime, is not among the regions which are more lenient toward the present regime. And in the opposite direction, Slavonia did not evaluate the previous system more harshly. In Model 5, religiosity again emerges as the strongest predictor for the support of the present system. The religious people are more inclined to positively evaluate the present system than the non-religious. In fact, considering the strong influence of religiosity, which caused a negative evaluation of the previous regime and a positive evaluation of the present system, religiosity emerges as the most important explanatory variable. Moving on to the next table, we can see that religiosity is also the strongest predictor of "optimism" - more religious people are the most optimistic about the future political system.

Table 6.
Multiple Regression Models for Rating of the Future Political System

Independent Variables	Beta coefficients (T significance in the brackets)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Sex	.010851 (.7181)	-7.716E-04 (.9804)	.003666 (.9072)	.007192 (.8196)	.015299 (.6417)
Age	.092696 (.0027)	.047773 (.1953)	.081913 (.0346)	.080015 (.0405)	.080309 (.0472)
Place of birth	.026428 (.4187)	.031166 (.3529)	.026609 (.4305)	.033056 (.3323)	.011451 (.7495)
Place of residence	-.151016 (.0000)	-.098352 (.0067)	-.093560 (.0107)	-.092129 (.0232)	-.073965 (.0803)
Occupation		.054120 (.1518)	.073885 (.0574)	.060135 (.1268)	.052719 (.1971)

Education		-.086738 (.0556)	-.097281 (.0337)	-.100698 (.0287)	-.083878 (.0936)
Income			.055465 (.1618)	.061016 (.1289)	.055634 (.1963)
Economic position related to previous year			-.096775 (.0034)	-.098257 (.0032)	-.084979 (.0153)
Regions:					
Istria				.026911 (.4361)	.001498 (.9662)
Medimurje				.032305 (.4257)	.032203 (.4355)
Dalmatia				Not in the Eq.	-.010968 (.7779)
Rijeka				.012739 (.7349)	-.024753 (.4928)
Slavonia				-.057378 (.1575)	-.044888 (.2522)
Middle Croatia				-.029009 (.4333)	-.016934 (.6538)
Zagreb				.012866 (.7736)	Not in the Eq.
Religiosity					-.130424 (.0002)
Serbs					-.004225 (.9232)
Croats					.011418 (.7939)
Class Identification					-.024069 (.5596)
R square	.02710	.03152	.04495	.04585	.04733

If we look at Model 5 of Table 6, we find that only three variables are significant predictors of the positive expectations of the future. Older people and more religious people are more optimistic than the younger and the less religious. Those who are economically less well off now than in the previous year are more pessimistic about the future, too.

The reason why occupation did not show up as an important predictor in the regression model is that its influence is not linear. Whereas in the case of education it is clear that with the increase in education the evaluation of the present system goes down. Such a linear relationship does not emerge in the case of occupation. Regarding occupation (taken in this case as an indicator of the class position) the ANOVA model is more adequate, showing clear differences among different occupational groups and their ratings of the previous and present regimes.

Discussion and Conclusions

First, we can argue that we have a general agreement within the population that the previous political system was worse than the present one and that the future one will be better. The second element which must be taken into account is the fact that these are post-hoc evaluations after experiencing war, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, etc. These factors obviously significantly influenced the opinions and values of many people. We can assume that many people who supported the previous regime changed their minds not only because of the opportunism, but also because of the experience of the destruction, for which communism is blamed by many people in Croatia. Another factor is that we only have data about people's present occupations and not about their positions during the communist regime. From our data, we cannot detect what positions the present managers held during the communist regime, nor where the members of the previous communist elite are now.

What is more interesting and more justified by the data is constructing a pattern of support for the present regime. We can reconstruct some basic patterns which influence the support for the present regime. Religious people, older people, farmers, members of the armed forces and managers-owners are the backbone of the support. On the other side, professionals, supervisors and the more educated, in general, show significantly less inclination to support the present system. From this, we can conclude that the change in Croatia is going more in the direction of traditional conservatism than in the direction of liberalization and modernization. Anyway, the support for the regime is much stronger in the more traditional segment of the population than in the modernizing segments. It is also interesting that the two variables which indicate this more conservative complex, age (older people) and more intensive religiosity, are significant predictors of the optimism for the future. More older and more religious people are more optimistic about their evaluation of the future regime.

There are two concepts which are relevant to our analysis: economic positions and regions. Economic position is important in predicting support for the present regime, but the significance of economic factors is less in absolute than in relative terms. Income does not show up as a significant predictor in the regression analysis (although it shows as significant in ANOVA for the support in the present system, probably indicating that the relationship is not linear). We can see that the highest support for the present regime is given by those having the lowest income. What is clearly more significant is the influence of the present economic situation compared with the previous year. As the situation worsens (from creating savings to spending earlier savings and borrowing money), we see clearly how the positive evaluations diminish and how the expectations of the future decline, as well.

Finally, we can see that support varies significantly across different regions. One possible explanation for this can be found in the historical circumstances characterizing the different regions. The support for Yugoslavia was always stronger in the "peripheral" regions which were exposed to Italian pressure (such as Istria, Rijeka, and Dalmatia), than in the central regions like Zagorje and Central Croatia, which were always more Croatian nationalistic. The first parliamentary elections in Yugoslavia of 1920 showed much stronger support for pro-Yugoslav parties in Dalmatia than in central Croatia. In Croatia-Slavonia the Croat Peasant Party took the absolute majority of votes (52.55%). At the same time, in Dalmatia, the "Yugoslav Club" parties won almost 28% of the votes compared to less than 3% in Croatia-Slavonia (Banac I., 1984:387-392; Burks, 1961.). The same pattern repeated itself at the communist-led uprising at the beginning of World War II where the communists were much more successful in Dalmatia, Primorje and Gorski Kotar than in other parts of Croatia (Istorija SKJ 1977:118; Shoup, 1968:66) The division in support runs according to these lines and seemingly supports this explanation.

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We must also keep in mind the alternative explanation that the support for the present system is correlated with the exposure to the war and destruction. The regions having higher scores of support (Slavonia and Central Croatia) were also the regions which were most exposed to war. Istria and Rijeka, which had the lowest scores, were not exposed to war. Dalmatia presents the crucial test in deciding between these two opposing interpretations. On the one hand, it is the region where "Yugoslavism"ž was very strong (the same as in Rijeka and Istria), but it is different than these two regions because it was exposed to war. As a result, we can see that its average support is higher than in Istria and Rijeka (5.2 compared with 4.6 and 4.0), very similar to that of Zagorje and Međimurje, but lower than in Slavonia and Central Croatia. On the opposite side, traditionally nationalistic Zagreb and Zagorje have much lower levels of support (5.0) than Slavonia (5.9) and Central Croatia (5.8).

This fact gives strong support to the hypothesis that endangered regions support the present system more than the regions which were spared of war experiences. The cases of Dalmatia, Zagreb, and Zagorje support the endangered region hypothesis more than the explanation based on traditional geostrategical position. We also have support for this hypothesis on the individual level. The high support for the present system from the members of the armed forces points in the same direction because the large majority of the soldiers are volunteers from the regions directly hit by war. Here we can detect (the analysis is not shown here) that people affected by war evaluated the previous system more harshly. This harsher evaluation of the previous system does not translate into higher evaluation of the present regime, compared with those not directly hit by the war.

In conclusion, we can say that the support for the regime is under the influence of three sets of variables. The first set being general conservatism, with religiosity as the strong predictor of support. The second factor is an economic one, where the relative worsening of the individual economic situation decreases the support for the regime. The third factor is the exposure to the war, which increases the support for the regime.

If our analysis is correct, then we can predict that in the future these elements will influence the support for the regime in opposite directions. With the "normalization" of the situation and more robust economic growth, the negative influences of the worsening of the economic position will decline. As the economic positions of the majority of people improve, so will the support for the regime (or at least the negative influence on the support will decline). If the pressure of war declines, and if our analysis of the importance of pressure is correct, then the main support for the present regime will also disappear and the differences between the regions will decline. The factors which will provide a permanent support for the present regime are conservatism, religiosity, older people, and farmers, who will constantly be supporting the present regime.

Another caution is necessary in interpreting this data. The support for the present political system could not be interpreted directly as support for democracy against the previous regime (communism). We must take into account the fact that Croatia is the only post-communist country (except Serbia, at the time of writing this article, the first half of 1997) which, after the first post-communist election, did not go through a change of government. The ruling party (HDZ) is continuously in power. Taking into account its authoritarian, extremely nationalistic tendencies, and also experiences of war, we cannot say that Croatia has already entered the "normal", democratic path of development. "...A democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of the later election" (Huntington 1991:266-267). So the people, when evaluating the present system, are not evaluating democracy versus communism, but Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) and communism. "...The stability of democracy depends on the ability of publics to distinguish between the regime and the government of rulers" (Huntington 1991:260).

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PODRŠKA REŽIMU U HRVATSKOJ

Determinante podrške režimima u prošlosti, sadašnjosti i budućnosti

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U ovom radu na slučaju Hrvatske pokušali smo otkriti determinante i obrasce podrške prijašnjem (komunističkom) i sadašnjem političkom sustavu kao i očekivanjima za budućnost. Konceptualni i teorijski okvir polazi od pet dimenzija: klase, nacije, religioznosti, ekonomskog blagostanja i heterogenosti regija. Postoji opći obrazac ocjenjivanja sustava u Hrvatskoj koji uglavnom korespondira s nalazima u ostalim post-komunističkim zemljama. Našli smo negativno vrednovanje prošlog sustava, više pozitivno se ocjenjuje sadašnji politički sustav (u slučaju Hrvatske više neutralno) i optimizam u pogledu budućnosti.

Premda se ovaj obrazac očituje kod svih grupa ipak ima mnogo značajnih razlika. Prošli režim se ocjenjuje manje oštro kod žena, profesionalaca, manje kvalificiranih radnika, Srba i manje religioznih ljudi. Zadovoljstvo sa sadašnjim političkim sustavom izražavaju manje obrazovani, seljaci, ljudi s manjim primanjima, više religiozni, grupe koje su sebe identificirale kao "niža klasa" te među onima koji su ostvarili neku uštedu u prošloj godini. Dakle, više intenzivna podrška sadašnjem režimu locirana je među nižim slojevima hijerarhijske društvene ljestvice i na samom vrhu kod menagera-vlasnika. Zaključili smo da se formirala nova alianca između vrha i nižih slojeva socijalne hijerarhije kao što je postojala i u prijašnjem sustavu (Županov, 1983), ali nova alianca sadrži druge društvene grupe i bazirana je na različitim interesima nego prije.