

War and Tolerance*

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Within what theoretical framework – the primordialist versus the instrumentalist orientation – can ethnic mobilization and conflict best be explained? Having in mind the debates in connection with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in our paper we address the question did an increase in ethnic tensions and subsequent armed conflict between the parties follow the increase in ethnic intolerance? Or, did ethnic intolerance increase as a consequence of the conflict itself. The first result would be more in accordance with the primordialist view. The second is what would be expected from the instrumentalist one. In order to answer the question we used three sets of survey data collected in Croatia in 1985, 1989 and 1996. The period between the first two surveys was one of rising tensions; the “explosion” and open armed conflict followed (1991–1995). The third survey was done in the initial period of peace.

Our conclusion is that intolerance did not precede but rather followed the outbursts of war and the atrocities connected with it. Therefore we argue that our findings are more in accordance with instrumentalist than with primordialist theories. Nevertheless, our analysis serves only to discredit primordialism rather than providing instrumentalism to be the best explanatory theory for the Balkans' conflicts.

Key words: ETHNIC MOBILIZATION, DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, WAR

Theories and derived predictions

The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia added one more example for theorists to sharpen their arguments. One more site was created to test different explanations of ethnic mobilization, conflict and genocide. The new term, ethnic cleansing was added to the vocabulary, regrettably describing an age-old practice.

Different theoretical approaches can be classified in two major groups. First are the primordialists whose essential explanation is based on the explosion of repressed “ancient” hatred between ethnic groups. The problem for the primordialist approach is not to explain conflict but the absence of it. How it is possible that ethnic group are not killing each other constantly? Why it is that ethnic groups living in close proximity are much more often collaborating than killing each other and even more groups engaged in mutual killing are not doing it all the time but the periods of massacres and killings are interspersed with periods of peace and collaboration. Primordialists give two possible answers. One is that in spite of permanent hatred, under normal conditions that will not explode into violence. Some triggering mechanism is necessary. The most common explanation is that some outside power is suppressing the confronted groups from attacking each other. That explanation is often used in the Yugo-

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slav case. Robert Kaplan says that processes of history and memory were “kept on hold” by communism for forty five years “thereby creating a kind of multiplier effect for violence” (Kaplan, 1993:1). In this perspective an event like the dissolution of Communism, dissolution of the state, or the empire are triggering mechanisms which remove the lid from suppressed hatred, which is then free to explode.

Another triggering mechanism can be “elite manipulation” and in this way the primordial position comes closer to instrumentalist theories. Instrumentalist theories regard the ethnic conflict as the result of elite manipulation. Groups having interest in mobilizing ethnic identities for material, ideological or political goals are doing so with more or less success. The explanation that the ideological vacuum created by the definitive delegitimization of Communism was filled with nationalism is often used.

It is important to notice that the same sequence of observable events can be used to confirm primordialist or instrumentalist theory. In the primordialist version for example the demise of communism unleashed suppressed hatred. In the instrumentalist version the demise of communism creates an ideological vacuum used by elite's to promote national mobilization. Where in the first case we have more “bottom-up” explanation where the crucial “agents” are “masses” and their hatred, in the second case the crucial actors are elites, which in the “top-down” process manipulate the “masses” in order to achieve their goals. Consequently, the fact that we have a triggering event (in our case the demise of communism) which creates ethnic conflict does not in itself prove or contradict either of these approaches. Where these two theories differ is the assumption about ethnic relations prior to conflict outbreak. Primordialists assume that the ethnic hatred, intolerance, animosity is high where instrumentalist would argue that it is low. Even more they (instrumentalist) would argue that there is a tendency of hatred, animosity, intolerance to grow as the result of elite manipulation. As stated for our case by Susan Woodward: “Outsiders explained the character of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the ethnic cleansing and brutal violations of humanitarian law, by citing ethnic conflict, historical enmities, and – in the actions of Serbs – genocide. But, in fact, these were the results of the wars and their particular characteristics, not the causes. The conditions of breakdown of a state and civil order, on the one hand, and the ideologies and goals of nationalist politicians, on the other, came together in alliance only with war to decide national sovereignty over land” (1995:237).

The two theoretical approaches predict different patterns of development regarding enmities between the confronted groups. Primordialists would predict the constant, high level of animosity before and after the conflict. The sequence would be high animosity under pressure; pressure removed; explosion of conflict. The theories are usually concentrated on explaining conflict so the aftermath of open conflict is usually not discussed. Extrapolating the primordialist argument we can assume that the conflict “solution” can be achieved either by new suppression, new balance of power where one group cannot suppress the other as many would argue as the most consequent conclusion derived from primordialism – by group separation.¹

¹ As argued for example by late Croatian president Tudman: “Croats belong to a different culture – a different civilization from the Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and Molière, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks and Albanians. They belong to the Byzantine culture... Despite similarities in language we cannot be together” (Viorst, 1991:74). Tudman is here claiming that the difference is the result of the long historical-development that created people of different two people belonging to different civilizations. For him it automatically follows – he does not feel any need to elaborate this – that people belonging to different civilizations cannot live together. The separation of two people is justified on the basis of their cultural differences. He even does not claim the existence of animosity – the existence of cultural differences is enough to justify (explain) separation.

On the other hand instrumentalist theory predicts that conflict is provoked in the top-bottom sequence and ethnic animosity raises (provoked from above) and leads to the explosion. Although both theories can be reconciled with the sequence of high ethnic hostilities predating conflict, from the instrumentalist standpoint hostility is much more a "variable" where for the primordialist it is a constant.

Hypotheses

We can derive empirical hypothesis from the two theoretical perspectives regarding the levels and dynamics of ethnic animosities. From the primordialist perspective animosities pre-date conflict and are more or less constant. From the instrumentalist perspective they vary, they respond to elite manipulation and although they can pre-date conflict that is a consequence of elite manipulation which brings them to that level from some previous, lower levels.

In our case we can expect that if the primordialists are right the high ethnic intolerance should be found before the conflict eruption. The instrumentalists are not denying the possibility that the hatred and animosity can predate conflict but in their perspective it is aroused by the elite manipulation. In the instrumentalist perspective intolerance is much more a variable. Consequently the eventual rise of intolerance after the conflict indicates that intolerance was provoked by the conflict and by elite manipulation and not other way around.

Ideological derivatives of theoretical debates

Any theoretical debate in social sciences has its ideological derivatives that are the consequences of the debate but very often the inspiration for the production of conjectures and hypothesis. The primordialist-instrumentalist debate is not an exception. Nationalists are primordialists and anti-nationalists are instrumentalists. The anti-nationalists could be primordialist if they distinguish between facts and values (example P. Van der Berghe) although it is difficult to imagine instrumentalists nationalists because for them values are facts.

We can mention here an interesting example of how theoretical debates can become practically relevant and be used in "non-theoretical spheres of actions." The War Crime Tribunal in Hague in the process against Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez used social scientists as defence and prosecution witnesses. The main goal of prosecution was obviously to implicate the Croatian president Tudman as a culprit in inciting ethnic hatred, violence, and ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia where the defense was trying to negate this. The invited social scientists framed their testimonies in the "top-down/bottom-up" dilemma. Was the conflict incited by the leadership – as claimed by Robert Donia and John Allcock, the prosecution's witnesses, or did leadership simply responded to the already existing (or increased) intolerance as claimed by the S. G. Meštrović, expert witness for the defence. The implication is that if the first is the case than the moral (and legal) responsibility could be placed on the shoulder of political leadership. If the second is true then the leadership does not share any greater responsibility than the average members of the ethno-national groups. The bottom-up approach is grounded in the primordialist frame where the top-bottom in the instrumentalist. The essence of the Meštrović's argument was that ethnic intolerance and animosity was on the rise before Tudman and HDZ came to power, consequently Tudman cannot be blamed for instigating the animosity which was already there. The argument was developed on two levels. The first level was based on the analysis of the historical processes of the "long run" – claiming that the history of Balkan's is the history of ethnic hatred and conflicts and not the history of cooperation and assimilation which was periodically interrupted as the consequence of broader geopolitical changes as claimed by Donia and Allcock. On the second

level the shorter period was taken into account where on the basis of some survey and similar type of research (including our own), Meštrović argued that the increased animosity and hatred can be detected before of HDZ's consolidation of power. Meštrović tried to depict the sequence: increased intolerance; Tudman comes to power; conflict where Tudman's coming to power happened as an intervening variable but without independent influence on increased animosities and consequently on the conflict which followed. The other side presented the sequence differently: Tudman's coming to power; increased intolerance; conflict.

Research design and measurement

In order to answer the questions posed above we used the data from three surveys done in Croatia in span of twelve years. The Institute for Social research in Zagreb conducted the first survey in the fall of 1984 and the winter of 1985. Using disproportionate stratified random sampling framework, approximately 3600 actively employed men and women in Croatia were interviewed, about 400 from each of nine major occupational groupings. Based on the 1985 census data of active population weights were applied to this sample to replicate the distribution of occupations in the active working population. After eliminating cases for which data are missing, the resultant sample for the analysis contains 3619 cases. Women constitute approximately one-third of the sample, concordant with the distribution of women in the paid labor force.

In the winter of 1989–1999 a second survey of randomly selected households was conducted, this time in all six republics and the two autonomous provinces of the former Yugoslavia. The Consortium of Social Research Institutes in former Yugoslavia conducted the survey. We are using here the data from the Croatian survey. Because of different sampling procedure it yielded greater numbers of respondents over 60 years of age and it included unemployed persons. The sample used here is 2510 cases. In 1996 a stratified random sample of the population of Croatia 18 years and older was used. The basis for the sample construction was the 1991 census. The assumption was that there were no significant changes in the basic proportions in sex, age and education. Assumed are changes resulting from the war and the transition from self-management to capitalist economy (increase number of unemployed and retired, shifts in territorial concentration depending on how much certain regions were exposed to war activities and dramatic decline in the number of ethnically Serbs). The interviews were conducted in 148 settlements. All 19 “Županijas” centers (regional centers) were taken into sample. The 128 other settlements were determined from the settlement list using random sampling procedure. For every settlement the quota's were determined based on education, employment status, sex and age based on the weight of the settlement in “Županija” and Županija weights in the total population. Within the settlement streets and districts were chosen randomly. The total sample consists of 2202 cases.

The battery of questions using five-point Likert scales measured the dependent variable, national tolerance. There was a set of four questions used in all three surveys (see Table 1) and set of five questions used in 1989 and 1996 surveys (see Table 2). All independent variables used in analysis – based on 1989 and 1996 surveys – are listed in Table 5.

There are four basic sets of independent variables: demographic (national identity, sex, age etc.), socio-economic status (education, unemployment, blue-collar, manager etc.), political participation (activity in civic and political organizations, reading newspapers, religiosity) and for 1996 war experiences and psychological war effects.

Historical periods

Every of the three surveys was conducted in completely different historical periods and our main interest is in detecting if (and how) this differences are reflected in the tolerance

levels. The year 1984 was still solidly a period of communism. After Tito's death in 1980 the system was in permanent economic crisis and more or less frustrated attempts to introduce economic and political changes which would allow overcoming of the permanent crisis. Living standards were seriously eroded. From 1979 to 1984 real personal incomes fell 34% and pensions 40%. The inflation was exploding 1980 – 30%, 1981 – 46%, and 1984 – 53% (Bilandžić, 1986:116, 118). This was the period when Yugoslavia was desperately looking for IMF help. In 1983 the federal parliament accepted a federal guarantee for all debts regardless if republics, companies, or federation owed them. Painful changes in accordance with classical IMF recipes (reduction in public consumption, moves toward convertibility of the dinar, price liberalization, inflation control, etc.) were accepted. The obvious crisis translated into the constant political debate and the production of political documents that were blocked by disagreements in the political elite's about the implementation strategy. The debate about the cure between centralizers and decentralizers become more and more heated.

In October 1984 the Serbian party issued a draft program advocating strong recentralization in the form of the strengthening of federal government and especially reducing the prerogatives of the autonomous provinces (both of which were in Serbia). That provoked strong backlash lead by the Slovenian and Croatian parties (Ramet, 1992:217–220). The political debate and debate among intellectuals about centralization and recentralization were dominating the public arena. In spite of this debate did not spill over into more open and intensive nationalist confrontation. With exception of Kosovo were ethnic tension erupted in 1981 (Bilandžić, 1996:70–78) political debate at the top did not spill over into the conflicts among the ordinary people. In Croatia from time to time there were some isolated expressions of the nationalist sentiments. At the time of our survey (September, 1984), for example, a group of young people from Duvno were arrested for singing songs praising the wartime pro-fascist Croatian leader Ante Pavelić and they all received prison terms. But that could not be taken as something special indicating the rise in inter-ethnic tensions.

The survey conducted in 1989 was conducted in completely different situation. Yugoslavia and communism were in agony. The rise to power of Slobodan Milošević in 1987 created definite turn toward open confrontation among republic's communist party leaderships. The tensions in Kosovo escalated with February workers strike in Trepča, the big mining complex, to protest the dismissal of Azem Vlasi, Kosovo's popular ethnic Albanian communist leader, on February 23. The Serbian Republican assembly amended its constitution to allow for greater Serbian control over Kosovo and Vojvodina against the wishes of the assemblies of these provinces, which provoked ethnic Albanian riots in March. At least 29 people were killed. (Power, no publication year: 1–2). In September 27 the Slovenian republican Assembly amends its constitution to describe Slovenia as “an independent, sovereign and autonomous state.” That provoked huge public protests organized by Milošević in Titograd, and Novi Sad with calls for military takeover in Slovenia. The big rally of hundred thousand Serbs in Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia, was called for 1 December. Slovenia banned it and closed its borders. Croatian Assembly (at the time still the Communist assembly) decided to support Slovenia against Serbia.

That was the time of first steps of political pluralism in Croatia. The political movements were legalized. Although the first free elections were held only in the spring 1990, the political propaganda with strong nationalist overtones started to dominate the public arena. The official recognition of the opposition happened on 10 December. As a response to the petition of twelve opposition parties and movements (at that moment half-legal) the presidency of the League of the Communists announced the multiparty elections for the next spring (Bilandžić, 1999:767). At the same time from the middle of that year, the strong claims for autonomy were put forward by the Croatian Serbs. Under the Milošević influence they claimed that if Yugoslavia were to become full-fledged confederation, Serbs would have

right to create an autonomous province in Croatia. In summer of 1989 an attempt to create a Serbian cultural society "Zora" was made. The Croatian authorities banned the society and the chief organizer, Jovan Opačić, was jailed. The cause was taken by the Serbia Writers union that started campaign for the Serbian autonomy in Croatia, paradoxically of the same type that was just taken away from the Albanians in Serbia. Bilandžić claims: "From day to day among the mass of people the fear of Serbian aggression spread, and also the readiness to stand behind those politicians promising to withstand it" (Bilandžić, 1999:761).

We can conclude that our survey in 1989 was conducted during the period of extreme political tensions in Yugoslavia, emerging national conflicts including the Serbo-Croatian in Croatia which will culminate a year later into the full fledged war, and in the period of rapidly emerging political pluralism.

The 1996 survey was conducted in the period immediately after the operations (summer 1995) in which the Croatian territories controlled by the Serbian insurgents. The long period in which the Serbian insurgents have cut the territory of Croatia was over producing the high enthusiasm on the side of Croats and exodus of Serbs from Croatia. The country was ravaged by the war. The total war damage was estimated on 65,330,635 DM (Družić, 2001:37). The extension can be understood from the fact that 10.2% of the houses and apartments were demolished. The whole parts of Croatia, previously inhabited by Serbs were emptied. At the moment of our survey parts of Slavonia (*općinas* Beli Manastir and Vukovar) were still under the UN (UNTAES) control. Basically the remaining Serbian population was living there under the UN protection with the ban for Croatian refugees to return. In this area the situation was extremely tense because its immanent return to Croatian control was "written on the wall." We did not enter this area and the survey was not conducted there.

Interpretation

Table 1 gives us a general overview of the dynamic of ethnic tolerance measured by four identical questions in all three surveys. The first and most important finding is that the levels of tolerance are "behaving" differently in different periods. In the first period (1985-89), which is the period of rapid increase of inter-ethnic tensions, a period of increased hostilities although not war and ethnic cleansing, individual tolerance actually decreased or at least it stayed stable (the actual decrease is from 2.86 to 2.78 on the scale of 1-5 where indicates intolerance). We can see a decline (increase tolerance) in three statements and rise in intolerance in one statement. The increased intolerance (from 2.88 to 3.16) is based on the increased agreement with the statement that "Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust." This jump is obviously reflecting increased tensions among nationalities in Yugoslavia in the observed period.

Table 1. Trends in National Intolerance: Croatia 1985, 1989, 1996

Question	1985	1989	1996
Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust.	2.88	3.16	3.75
Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation(ality).	2.18	2.13	3.44
Without leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head.	4.20	4.04	4.00
Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others.	2.20	1.81	2.61
Average intolerance level	2.86	2.78	3.45
Sample Size	3,619	2,510	2,202

NOTE: All questions were asked using five-point Likert scales. High values indicate strongly agree.

The second thing to be observed is the highest agreement (in all three observed periods) with the statement that "Without leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head." In another article (Županov, Sekulić, Šporer, 1996) we called this the authoritarian syndrome, willingness of people to follow the national(istic) leaders. But we must emphasize that in the first observed period the agreement with this statement (although in both years being the highest) actually declined (from 4.20 to 4.04).

Another two statements declined (people expressed more tolerant attitudes). In the first case ("Man can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to its nation(ality)") the decline is minimal (from 2.18 to 2.13). In the case of the statement "Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others" the fall is more substantial (from 2.20 to 1.81).

From the observation of the attitudinal dynamics for the first observed period (1985-89) we can conclude:

a) The general level of ethnic tolerance stayed basically the same with the aggregate tendency of slight (probably insignificant) decline.

b) Our respondents clearly recognized and reacted to the general deterioration of political relationships in the Yugoslav federation – we can cooperate but not trust to each other.

c) The macro-political deterioration did not translate into increased intolerance on the personal level – there is no increased feeling that man can feel safe only when living amongst co-nationals and that nationally mixed marriages are unstable. We can almost argue that our respondents are recognizing the fact of general political inter-national tensions but that they refuse to translate this to the individual level.

Even more, the already high authoritarian beliefs that the nationality must be lead by strong leader, although still the most agreeable statement, relatively declined. This can probably reflect the mixed feelings toward newly emerging leaders of nationalist movements who started to profile themselves at that time.

Now if we move from the first observed period to the second period (1989-1996), the period in which the war actually broke out and endless arrays of horrific atrocities were committed, the main results show that the ethnic intolerance significantly increased (from the average level of 2.78 to the average level of 3.45). The tolerance increased on three measured items with the exception of the "authoritarian item" which did not increase but kept its first ranking as most "agreeable" item. The distance between this item and the other decreased in 1996 compared with 1989. Although people agree most intensively with the statement that "Without the leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head" the distance between it and the least agreeable statement ("Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others") decreased from 2.23 in 1989 to 1.39 in 1996.

We next turn to a set of tolerance questions, which we use to create standardized scales of tolerance for 1989 and 1996 (see Table 2). A new question, "Nationality is important in picking a marital partner" becomes available for these years. The question, "Without leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head" drops out of the scale because the extremely high level of agreement with this item makes it nearly an invariant constant. In other words, nearly everyone agrees with this item and so it does not help distinguish tolerant from less tolerant respondents. We should, of course, remember it as a background truth about people's attitudes even though it will not be part of the resulting intolerance scale.

The increase in intolerance between 1989 and 1996 is clear and significant. On the scale 1-5 the jump averages one whole point (the average increases from 2.18 to 3.15) and in all used items we have uniform increase in intolerance. The largest relative increase is in the item "Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation (ality)", from 2.13 to 3.44. (This is the item that decreased from 2.18 to 2.13 in 1985-1989 period). It is

Table 2. Factor Analysis of Intolerance Measures: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)

Tolerance Questions	Means		Standard Deviations		Communalities	
	1989	1996	1989	1996	1989	1996
Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust.	3.16	3.75	1.57	1.25	.306	.422
Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation(ality).	2.13	3.44	1.51	1.41	.577	.590
Every nation(ality) should have its own state.	2.03	3.15	1.46	1.50	.389	.242
Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others.	1.81	2.61	1.34	1.45	.518	.522
Nationality is important in picking a marital partner.	1.79	2.78	1.12	1.24	.514	.385
Average	2.18	3.15	1.40	1.37	.461	.432
1989 tolerance scale: 1 st eigenvalue = 2.30, 2 nd eigenvalue = 0.85, alpha = .69						
1996 tolerance scale: 1 st eigenvalue = 2.16, 2 nd eigenvalue = 0.88, alpha = .66						

NOTES: All questions were asked using five-point Likert scales except "nationality important for picking a marital partner" which has no middle category and therefore ranges from 1 to 4. High values indicate strongly agree. Communalities are based on one factor solutions.

worth noting that the standard deviations of the items are generally similar across the years but average communality decreased perhaps suggesting a loosening of the extent to which these variables hang together. But it is important to see that the general decrease in communality is the result of communalities of different items going in different directions in the two compared periods. There is a significant increase in communality of the item about possibility of cooperation but not full trust and small increases in communality of two other items – that men can feel completely safe only among co-nationals and that nationally mixed marriages are more unstable than others. But there is also significant decrease in communality in the statement that every nationality should have its own state and that nationality is important in picking the marriage partners.

The increase of intolerance is then also accompanied with the loosening of the communality structure of items. The loosening indicates the greater flux in attitudes in the second period.

The interim conclusions

How are our results fitting into the two main frameworks developed on the beginning of the paper? The clear conclusion that ethnic intolerance did not increase prior to the outburst of the conflict but it increased after the conflict. The conclusion is that our data does not support the "bottom-up" theory. The conflict cannot be attributed to the increased ethnic hatred and intolerance (at least not on the way we measured it) because increase in intolerance did not precede the explosion of the conflict. The opposite is true – after the conflict the intolerance has increased. It does not follow, however, that by this the opposite of "bottom up" theory, the "top down" is confirmed, unless we assume that this are the only alternatives and that by disproving one we are automatically confirming the other.

Explanation of change

Next we address the question of what contributed to the increase in intolerance in the 1989–1996 period. The obvious answer is of course the war and atrocities connected with it. This is our main argument – individual intolerance increased as a consequence of the war. It did not precipitate the war because it was flat in period preceding the war events. Here we try to detect social mechanisms through which the war “penetrates” onto individual level and influences the changes in tolerance. In the process we could test some alternative explanations. We must also allow for the possibility that the processes of change are happening on the level undetectable using individual level measures.

a) War experience

The most obvious explanatory mechanism of the influence of war on tolerance is the individual experience of war. We can hypothesise that because large numbers of people were exposed to the war events their intolerance will increase as consequence. The consequence of this hypothesis is also that there will be statistically significant difference in intolerance between those exposed to the war events and those who were not. This hypothesis based on the “individualistic bias” of the survey research. The social phenomenon, the average tolerance level, is simply treated as the sum of individual level tolerances. If something happened to the individuals (the participation in war or direct war effects) that will translate into their change of tolerance levels and the aggregate tolerance level will change.

As it can be seen from the Table 3 we have several indicators of the war experience. Almost 19% of people served in the military reflecting the nature of the armed conflict. Croatia did not have regular army, instead the war was fought with various militias, several party lead small armies, mobilized people to defend their villages and towns etc. The army was build during the war gradually incorporating various spontaneously emerged resistance groups. All of this resulted in such large number of people serving in different types of military units. It is estimated that over 300,000 people participated in military operations as members of some military units (this only on the Croatian side).

Table 3. Independent Variables: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)

Analysis Variables	Means		Standard Deviations	
	1989	1996	1989	1996
Tolerance	.000	-1.034	1.000	.955
DEMOGRAPHIC				
Croat	.741	.922	.438	.268
Serb	.120	.031	.326	.173
Minority Nationality	.139	.047	.331	.182
Age	43.189	46.155	14.787	16.262
Male	.490	.475	.500	.500
Urbanism (1-6)	3.502	3.170	1.868	1.849
Mixed parentage	.107	.069	.309	.254
Mixed marriage	.153	.063	.360	.243
STATUS				
Education (1-8)	4.080	3.842	1.750	1.562
Not in labor force	.161	.357	.368	.479

Analysis Variables	Means		Standard Deviations	
	1989	1996	1989	1996
Unemployed	.040	.106	.196	.308
Peasant	.152	.084	.359	.278
Blue-collar	.268	.109	.443	.312
White-collar	.244	.230	.432	.425
Manager	.015	.032	.120	.176
Professional	.120	.082	.325	.275
PARTICIPATION				
Communist Party	.243	.126	.429	.332
Work Organizations	.224	.204	.417	.403
Civic Organizations	.354	.158	.697	.436
Read News (1-4)	2.298	2.601	.589	.786
Religiosity	.000	.768	1.000	.875
WAR EXPERIENCES				
Served in Military	-	.186	-	.389
Months Served (ln)	-	.430	-	.998
War Experiences (20)	-	1.995	-	2.726
War Losses (6)	-	.506	-	1.541
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS				
Fearful in Last 5 Years (1-5)	-	2.412	-	1.240
Post-Traumatic Stress Scale	-	2.567	-	3.306

NOTE: 1989 means and standard deviations are used to standardize both the 1989 and the 1996 tolerance and religiosity scales.

The war with no clear front lines and engulfing large segments of territory produced high levels of war experiences and losses. As in every modern war, and especially the type of ethnic – secessionist conflict having elements of the civil war, the casualties on the civilian side are very high. For example, according to the Croatian Ministry of Information in the period August 17 – December 30, 1991 the total number of killed on the Croatian side was 2853 of which 1405 were civilians. The total number of wounded was 15,110 of which 4882 were civilians. Half of the killed were civilians, which indicates the blurred front lines and heavy toll payed by the civilian population and which highlights at the same time the high incidence of direct war experience. In some places, like Vukovar, the estimates are that much higher number of civilians was killed than members of the active military. (The estimates at the time were 600 of 1100 total death). The psychological effects are also visible and are extremely high.

b) Demographic change

Croatia went in the 1989–1996 through period of the most dramatic demographic change that is also visible from the Table 3. More detailed data on ethnic composition change is given in Table 4.

The most visible and dramatic change is the ethnic-national composition of Croatia. The proportion of Croats jumped in our 1996 survey compared with 1989 survey from 74.1%

Table 4. The Changing National Composition of Croatia

Nationality	1980 Census ¹	1985 Survey	1989 Survey	1993 Census ²	1996 Survey
Croat	77.6%	72.7%	74.1%		92.2%
Serb	11.8	12.5	12.0		3.1
Yugoslav	8.4	10.8	9.2		0.5
Hungarian	0.6	0.5	0.5		0.3
Slovenian	0.6	0.3	0.8		0.3
Muslim	0.5	1.7	1.5		1.1
Czech	0.3	not asked	0.3		0.6
Italian	0.3	0.3	0.2		0.1
Montenegrin	0.2	0.1	0.3		0.1
Other Minorities	0.7	1.1	1.1		1.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

¹ Three census categories are excluded from the base population for the calculation of these percentages: (1) nisu se izjasnili ni opredijelili prema čl. 170. Ustava SFRJ (0.4%), (2) izjasnili se u smislu regionalne pripadnosti (0.2%), and (3) nepoznato (1.4%).

² Garth: Does the 1993 Croatian census provide some figures for this column? If not, we can delete it.

to 92.2% (1991 census indicated 77.9% of ethnic Croats in Croatia.). On the other hand the proportion of Serbs declined from 12.0% in 1989 survey to 3.1% in 1996 survey (with 11.8% Serbs in Croatia according to 1991 census). This dramatic shift is the result of the war, especially of its final stage. The most visible moment of the Serbian exodus was in August 1995 when with the fall of the “Republika srpska” army “... tens of thousands of Serbs began to pour out of Croatia in a mass exodus through two gateways left open deliberately by the Croat army, at Srb in Lika and Dvor in Banija” (Tanner, 1997:297). The estimate is that in this few days of successful Croatian offensive around 120,000 Serbs left their homes into the permanent exodus (Žunec, 1998:131, 139). The total number of Serbs who left Croatia in 1991–1998 period is estimated around 280,000 (Hrvatska vojska, 2000:95).

The total number of Serbs according the 1991 census was 580,762 (Statistički bilten, 1992:14). If we compare these two numbers we can conclude that 48.2% of Serbs left and were expelled (ethnically cleansed) from Croatia. If this numbers reflects the real social processes than we could expect that in our sample we would have 6–7% of Serbs. That we have only 3.1% probably reflects several processes. First, the tendency of “ethnic homogenisation” was going on even regardless of specific war events. That was the argument developed by R. Petrović (1987) and if that was the case than we can expect continuous reduction of Serbs in Croatia especially taken into account the political developments in the period. Secondly we could expect large number of “passing” where people who previously declared their nationality as Yugoslavs, (104,728 according to 1991 census), nationally undeclared 76,166 in 1991) or even some Serbs were now declaring themselves as Croats. More importantly the survey was not conducted in two municipalities (*općina*), Beli Manastir and Vukovar, which at the time were still under UNTAES control. The Serbs were significant minorities in this two municipalities and we can expect that their exclusion would produce decrease of Serbs in the total sample (in 1991 Beli Manastir had 25.5% Serbs in the population and Vukovar 37.4%).

The territories where the Serbian minority was concentrated before the war became totally emptied. “From Karlovac in the north to Split in the south, the interior of Croatia was a

charred wasteland – mile upon mile of burned-out houses and ruined churches. What had not been burned down by the Serbs in 1991 because it was Croatian had been burned down in 1995 because it was Serbian” (Tanner, 1997:301).

Such dramatic demographic change alone can produce significant shifts in aggregate tolerance levels. Namely, as we know from our previous research (Massey, Hodson, Sekulić, 1999) the tolerance levels differ according to ethnicity and structural position. (Table 3, Massey et al., 1999:688). The average level of tolerance (measured on the 1–5 scale) was 3.53 for Croats living in Croat dominated areas and statistically significantly higher for Serbian minority living among them (3.67). On the other hand for Serbs living in Serbian dominated areas (what later become Krajina region) was 3.36 – although not statistically significant but still lower than for Croats and significantly lower than for Serbs living dispersed among Croats. On the basis of demographic change we can than expect that average level of tolerance will be going up (the least tolerant group – Serbs in the enclave – Krajina region – are the dominant group among the Serbs who left Croatia). The average tolerance level of Serbs will appear higher because the Serbs that lived dispersed among Croats stayed mostly in Croatia while the less tolerant Serbs from enclaves were pushed out.

The long-term tendency of population aging is worsened as the consequence of the war. This is reflected in our sample structure where the average age is three years more in 1996 than in 1989 (see Table 3). This reflects war losses and the tendency of younger people to emigrate. On the other hand increase in age should influence an increase in tolerance levels because in our previous research we have found that age is positively correlated with tolerance (Massey et al., 1999:684).

But there are other demographic changes that should clearly operate in direction of decreasing the tolerance levels. In the first place we witness dramatic decrease in the proportion of people with mixed parentage and of mixed marriages. The first category decreased from 10.7% of sample on 6.9%, the second from 15.3% to 6.3%. As we know (Massey et al., 1999:684) both categories of people are more tolerant than the others. The decrease probably reflects shifts reflecting the consequences of war and pressure toward ethnic homogenisation. The people having mixed marriages were under social pressure resulting in large number of them leaving Croatia, anecdotal evidence suggest that many mixed marriages under pressure dissolved and probably some “passing” of marriage partners took place. The divorces, of course, are not decreasing the “mixed parentage” category (that is probably the reason why the decline in “mixed parentage” is slightly milder than in “mixed marriages”) but two other processes – leaving the country and “passing” are involved.

Decreased urbanism reflects the demographic shift and influx of refugees into rural areas of Croatia. On the same scale as the Serbs were leaving, the Croats (and Muslims) were entering Croatia fleeing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska vojska, 1999:94). According to the official data (which are probably underestimating the real trends), in the 1991–98 period the influx of people from Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the magnitude of 262,432 people (Družić, 2001:43). It is important to note that the educational qualifications of these immigrants are much lower than the average level in Croatia. A. Wertheimer-Baletić (2000:16) estimates that in the 1991–98 period between 130,000 and 150,000 predominantly young and educated people left Croatia. Combining these changes produces an increase in the age of the sample from 43 to 46 years and a slight decrease in educational levels.

c) Occupational structure

The occupational structure reflects dramatic social changes and we can expect its negative influence on tolerance. There is a dramatic jump in those not in labour force and unemployed on the one hand and a decrease of blue-collar workers but also of peasants indicates

the devastation of industry and agriculture in Croatia. The economic activity declined and in spite of the fact that the government was efficient in curbing inflation the price paid was in suffocating the economic activity (Sirotković, 1996:168–191). Official data show an increase of unemployment of 3.5 times (1990–1999 period) (Lokin, 2000:220). In 1996 the number of unemployed (250,000) was 55% higher than in 1990 (Sirotković, 1996:166). There was also an increase in the retired population of 40% between 1990 and 1999 (Lokin, 2000:220). Much retirement was a way to hide increases in unemployment. We know that unemployment decreases ethnic tolerance, so on the basis of its dramatic increase alone we could expect an increase in intolerance.

d) Social participation and religiosity

On the basis of changes in social participation and religiosity we can expect an increase in intolerance. The elements that were positively correlated with tolerance decreased and the one's negatively increased. Social participation in work and civic organizations went significantly down. This probably reflects the social fact that lot of the participation in the communist period was of ritualistic nature. When pressure to participate decreased the participation also decreased. Conversely, the pressure for religious participation increased. To be a good Croatian meant to be a good and practicing Catholic. This switch in social pressure from civic participation to religious participation is clearly reflected in the data showing an increase in religiosity and religious participation.

Table 5: Factor Analysis of Religiosity Measures: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)

Religiosity Questions	Means		Standard Deviations		Communalities	
	1989	1996	1989	1996	1989	1996
How deeply do you believe in religion? (1–6)	3.71	4.83	1.55	1.33	.72	.68
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or (3) don't believe in the existence of God?	2.05	2.68	.84	.63	.76	.68
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or (3) don't believe in life after death?	1.64	2.27	.79	.80	.57	.50
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or (3) don't believe that God created people?	1.86	2.49	.85	.74	.74	.72
The presence of church on Croatian TV should be: (1) expanded, (2) kept as it is now, (3) reduced.	2.22	1.88	.74	.59	.32	.35
Religious instruction should be: (1) obligatory in school, (2) the choice of family and student, (3) thrown out of school.	2.06	2.22	.83	.56	.49	.29
How often do you go to church? (1) less than once a month, (2) monthly, (3) weekly, (4) daily?	1.52	2.56	.71	1.19	.56	.43
Average	2.15	2.70	.90	.83	.59	.46
1989 religiosity scale: 1 st eigenvalue = 4.16, 2 nd eigenvalue = .86, alpha = .87						
1996 religiosity scale: 1 st eigenvalue = 3.64, 2 nd eigenvalue = .97, alpha = .82						

NOTE: Communalities are based on one factor solutions.

As we can see every aspect of religiosity increased dramatically in the short period of seven years. Attendance and “deepness” of believe increased most dramatically. It is interest-

ing that the only item that decreased is the support for more Church influence on TV. We must take into account that in the 1989–1996 period church presence on TV dramatically increased so this reaction can be interpreted as a certain satiation with it. Of course, the increase in religiosity is not only the result of the reversal of social pressure (in communism in direction of atheism and in post-communism in direction of religiosity) but also of genuine turn toward sacred which is normal consequence of war and destruction. People confronted with the evils of war, confronted with dark side of human nature and witnessing the disappearance of a seemingly stable social order and its underlying values, are inclined to look for more permanent value basis for their individual lives and the explanation of the world surrounding them. Religion is perfectly suited to offer such answers. The fact that average communality (correlation of items with the underlying scale) decreases in 1996 suggests a loosening of this dimension. In other words, religiosity became more widespread and accepted among the people in Croatia but also became more amorphous in the process. By spreading more widely it become less coherent and religious had different meaning for different people. In 1989 it was relatively less spread and more coherent in meaning.

Increased religiosity is probably also influenced by demographic change. Croats were more religious than Serbs. In the same survey we established that 58% of Croats declared that they are believers compared with only 12% of Serbs and 9% of Yugoslavs (S. Bahtijarević, 1991:143). The total proportion of declared believers in Croatia was 47% and that jumped to 76% in 1996 reflecting demographic change and increased religiosity. Decrease in the number of Serbs should, net of all other factors increase religiosity of population.

The increase in religiosity, combined with decreases in political, work, and civic participation should, judging by previously established correlations, contribute to a net decrease in tolerance.

General hypotheses

On the basis of these changes we can formulate a general explanatory hypothesis that the decrease in tolerance in 1989–1996 period is the result of demographic and structural changes resulting from war which increase the characteristics connected with intolerance. These include an increase in Croatians' relative representation in the population, less urban population a drop in mixed marriages and in people with mixed parentage, increases in unemployment, decreases in civic participation and increases in religiosity. The second process which we hypothesize is contributing to decrease in tolerance is the experience of war. The large number of people having immediate war experience and the attribution of the war to ethno-national tensions should decrease the average ethnic tolerance level.

Hypothesis test

Table 6 presents standardized coefficients from the regression on tolerance on our explanatory model with test for change over time (1989–1996). Standardized coefficients enable us to compare effects to each other within columns. For example if we look at column (1) – coefficients in 1989 – we can immediately conclude that the factor that by far has the most negative influence on tolerance is religiosity. Inversely, the most positive influence on tolerance is mixed marriage; but the negative effect of religiosity is much stronger than positive effect of mixed marriages. If we look at the coefficients in 1996 we can see that religiosity is still the strongest predictor of intolerance. Its relative strength to the next factors declined because it is 2.25 stronger than being Croat in 1996 compared with 4.6 stronger in 1989. Mixed marriage and mixed parentage are the strongest positive predictors of tolerance in 1996 as they were in 1989.

Table 6. Standardized Coefficients from Regression of Tolerance on Explanatory Model with Tests for Change Over Time, Croatia 1989 and 1996

Independent Variables	1989	1996	Combined	Combined	
				Baseline (1989)	Interactions (1996)
Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
DEMOGRAPHIC					
Croat	-.093 ^a	-.130 ^a	-.088 ^a	-.072 ^a	-.112 ^c
Serb	-.002	.045	.019	-.001	.027
Age	-.042	-.026	-.025	-.040	.031
Male	-.098 ^a	-.110 ^a	-.090 ^a	-.088 ^a	-.005
Urbanism	.005	.025	.020	.004	.019
Mixed Parentage	.043 ^c	.070 ^a	.044 ^a	.036 ^c	.020
Mixed Marriage	.069 ^a	.103 ^a	.076 ^a	.055 ^c	.032 ^c
STATUS					
Education	-.051	.087 ^a	.012	-.044	.163 ^a
Not in Labor Force	.041	-.007	.008	.044	-.042
Unemployed	-.035	.037	.009	-.041	.057 ^c
Peasant	.014	.020	.019	.012	.005
Blue-Collar	-.029	-.024	-.020	-.023	-.002
Manager	.021	-.009	.005	.024	-.025
Professional	.025	.028	.013	.021	.004
PARTICIPATION					
Communist Party	-.102	.023	.008	-.010	.202
Work Organizations	.042 ^c	.034	.035 ^b	.037 ^c	-.005
Civic Organizations	.041 ^c	-.013	.021	.032 ^c	-.025
Read News	-.017	-.070 ^a	-.040 ^a	-.018	-.072
Religiosity	-.429 ^a	-.293 ^a	-.353 ^a	-.395 ^a	.070 ^a
1996	-	-	-.282 ^a	-	-.342 ^a
R-Squared	.275 ^a	.231 ^a	.406 ^a	.417 ^a	
Increase in R-Squared	-	-	-	.011 ^a	
Sample Size	2510	2202	4712	4712	

NOTES: The omitted (baseline) category for nationality is minority nationality. The omitted category for occupational position is white-collar. The Chow test includes all the 1996 interactions but not the direct effect of year. Significance levels denoted by: ^a = $p \leq .001$, ^b = $p \leq .01$, ^c = $p \leq .05$.

Column 3 simply combines the two years and tests the year effect that is large, negative and significant. That means that tolerance in 1996 was statistically significantly lower than in 1989. Column 4 is even more directed toward discovering change effects. It is based on one equation with a full set of interactions between year and each other independent variable. Thus the first column under (4) shows the 1989 effects and the second column shows any changes. In that way we can specifically address change and its significance. The increase in

R-squared (next to bottom row) is telling us that the changes between surveys are significant as a whole.

If we analyze changes in individual variables than we can see the following. The first and most important thing that we can notice is that Croats are now even more intolerant compared with minorities than they were before. Is this change the effect of demographic change – the movement of people because of the war – or is that the “genuine” increase in absolute levels of intolerance? It appears that the change is *not* simply reflecting demographic change because Croats are more intolerant but Serbs are not dramatically more tolerant, in spite of the dramatic exodus of the most intolerant Serbs from Croatia as a result of military defeat. Although change in tolerance among Serbs is in the positive direction it does not reach statistical significance. The conclusion is that regardless of demographic change (dramatic decrease of the most intolerant Serbs from Croatia) the average levels of tolerance of Serbs did not go statistically significantly up. Demography by itself then cannot explain the tolerance decrease among Croats, fewer of whom moved as a result of the war. Also the general increase in intolerance from 2.78 to 3.45 (see Table 2). It is important to notice that “Croats” are the only group who are significantly more contributing to intolerance (decreasing the tolerance) in 1996 than in 1989. The change for Serbs is that they are relatively more tolerance.

Perhaps the most interesting variable is religiosity. It is still the most important factor contributing to intolerance (column 2 standardized coefficient for religiosity is $-.293$ with the closest competitor – being a Croat – having the value $-.130$) but relatively less so in 1996 than in 1989. One possible interpretation could be a softening of the connection between religion and intolerance. The more probable interpretation is that the wider diffusion of religious sentiment introduced large number of new converts who are less adamant in their religious beliefs. This diffusion of religiosity weakened the original relationships (although the religiosity stayed relatively strongest predictor of intolerance in 1996 as it was in 1989). A similar process occurred with unemployment. In any particular year unemployment did not significantly contribute to tolerance. But there is evident change in direction of influence in two different years. Where in 1989 unemployment increased intolerance) in 1996 unemployment was positively correlated with tolerance. This change is significant. As with religion the widening of the number of unemployed (from 4% to 10.6% of our sample – see Table 5) not only weakened original relationship (as in the case of religion) but reversed it from the negative too positive.

Mixed marriage is the strongest positive predictor of tolerance in both years analyzed but more so in 1996 and the difference is statistically significant. The fact that those in mixed marriages are even more tolerant now than before the war signifies probably the “selection” process. We have seen that the number of “mixed marriages” significantly declined (from 15.3% to 6.3% of the sample – Table 5.) Those who stayed in mixed marriages, those who stayed in Croatia living in mixed marriage and those who did not manage or did not want to manage some form of “passing” of one of the partners are even more committed to tolerance than the same group before. These are the people who are living contra social pressure of “Croatization” and by their own example deny the thesis of incompatibility of two ethnicities. The social pressure on “mixed marriages” are maybe best symbolized by the election campaign statement by late president Franjo Tuđman in 1990 that “He is happy that his wife is neither Jewish nor Serbian” (Čulić, 1999:52).

Another important change is for education. In 1989 it is not a relevant factor and in 1996 it jumps to being major predictor of tolerance. The change is statistically significant. The change presents interesting problem for interpretation although the question can be posed more in the direction why education was not important in 1989 and is becoming now in explaining tolerance. There are two elements probably important in interpreting this

change. The first is that education was not a discriminating factor when tolerance was generally higher. In the situation of lowering the tolerance education is one factor which is preventing this slide into "intolerance". The other, not incompatible with the first, is that the net immigration/emigration effect produced lowering of the average educational level (Table 5) in which situation education becomes more important.

We must also note that the positive effect of civic participation disappears (column 2 versus 1). With decreased participation its importance for tolerance disappears. Here the effect cannot be attributed to the expansion of participation because it was reduced and not increased.

A final interesting change is in reading news. In 1989 it was not a significant predictor of intolerance but in 1996 it becomes so, although the change does not reach statistical significance. Reading the news more frequently in 1996 significantly increases intolerance. Two contradictory interpretations are possible. One is that in 1989 the news in Croatia were still not based on nationalist propaganda – that was still the period when the Communists were controlling the newspaper and although they were reporting extensively about the nationalist development in Serbia the tone was still not nationalist. This interpretation is attributing causality from the character of the news toward the recipients of the news. In 1996 when majority of newspapers were controlled by the extremely nationalist government and the tone of newspapers became nationalistic that produced changes in tolerance. The other interpretation is of course possible which is reversing the causal chain – those who are more nationalistic are simply reading more news because they are finding the content in them which is in accordance with their attitudes.

This analysis allows us to reject the first part of the hypothesis. Although demographic and structural change occurring in Croatia as a consequence of war is driving intolerance up this is not the whole explanation. Intolerance increased more than we could expect based only on the demographic and structural change. Something happened that has driven the intolerance of Croats up. Of course we know that this intermediate event is war. Now we turn to test the second part of the hypothesis that the individual war experience influenced intolerance. In order to test this hypothesis we turn to Table 7.

Table 7. Standardized Coefficients from Regression of Tolerance on Explanatory Model with Tests for War Effects: Croatia 1989, 1996 (N = 4,712)

Independent Variables	Combined		Combined		Combined	
	Baseline	Interactions	Baseline	Interactions	Baseline	Interactions
	(1989)	(1996)	(1989)	(1996)	(1989)	(1996)
Model	(1)		(2)		(3)	
DEMOGRAPHIC						
Croat	-.071 ^a	-.115 ^c	-.071 ^a	-.113 ^c	-.071 ^a	-.115 ^c
Serb	-.002	.029	-.002	.030	-.002	.031
Age	-.027		-.032		-.032	
Male	-.091 ^a		-.085 ^a		-.088 ^a	
Urbanism	.014		.012		.012	
Mixed Parentage	.037 ^c	.020	.037 ^c	.020	.037 ^c	.021
Mixed Marriage	.054 ^a	.033 ^c	.055 ^a	.035 ^c	.054 ^a	.035 ^c
STATUS						
Education	-.045 ^c	.173 ^a	-.047 ^c	.177 ^a	-.047 ^c	.176 ^a

Independent Variables	Combined		Combined		Combined	
	Baseline	Interactions	Baseline	Interactions	Baseline	Interactions
	(1989)	(1996)	(1989)	(1996)	(1989)	(1996)
Model	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Not in Labor Force	.016		.017		.018	
Unemployed	-.039	.059 ^b	-.041	.063 ^b	-.041	.063 ^b
Peasant	.016		.012		.012	
Blue-Collar	-.024		-.026		-.026	
Manager	.004		.004		.003	
Professional	.021		.021		.021	
PARTICIPATION						
Communist Party	.003		.003		.003	
Work Organizations	.038 ^b		.037 ^b		.037 ^b	
Civic Organizations	.032 ^c	-.024	.031 ^c	-.022	.032 ^c	-.023
Read News	.018	-.071	-.019	-.062	-.019	-.062
Religiosity	-.393 ^a	.065 ^a	-.392 ^a	.072 ^a	-.392 ^a	.073 ^a
1996	-	-.318 ^a	-	-.319 ^a	-	-.302 ^a
WAR EXPERIENCES						
Served in Military	-	-	-	.050	-	.051
Months Served	-	-	-	-.046	-	-.048
War Experiences (20)	-	-	-	-.024	-	-.020
War Losses (6)	-	-	-	-.048 ^a	-	-.047 ^a
PSYCH. EFFECTS						
Fearful in Last 5 Years	-	-	-	-	-	-.028
Post-Traumatic Stress	-	-	-	-	-	.006
Total R-Squared	.416 ^a		.421 ^a		.421 ^a	
Increase in R-Squared	-		.005 ^a		.000	

NOTE: Only the interactions in effects between years (Table 5, Model 4, Column 2) that are significant at the 10 level are included in the models estimated for this table. Significance denoted by: ^a = .001, ^b = .01, ^c = .05 (2-tailed t-tests).

This table retains only the interactions (changes over time) that are statistically significant at the generous 10 level. On that way the “real” changes are more visible without the distraction of statistically insignificant changes.

The main answer to our hypothesis comes from the “war experiences” panel of column 2 and “psychological effects” panel, which is added in column 3. The main surprising conclusion is that the changes over time in tolerance are not result of people's war experiences. Reported war experiences have very little effect and do not dampen or explain away any of the significant changes in 1996. We can reject the second part of our main hypothesis that the increase in intolerance is the result of individual war experiences. Croats are more intolerant regardless of individual war experiences. The only exception is war material losses (loss of house, apartment, etc.) which significantly increase intolerance. War experiences (being refu-

gee, wounded, being hungry etc), military service, the length of the service and psychological effects of war (being fearful in connection with war events or having post-traumatic stress symptoms) are not increasing intolerance. We can comfortably reject our hypothesis that the increase of intolerance can be explained using direct effects of war on the life of individuals and their families. War experiences are not the explanation of increased intolerance and only direct material losses are increasing intolerance.

We can conclude that neither the demographic change nor the individual war experience is full explanation of the increased intolerance in the 1989–1996 period. The increased intolerance is result of the process – we presume closely connected with the war – which is untapped by our indicators of demographic and structural change and by the individual war experiences.

Attempt to explain change

How can we explain the increased intolerance among Croats? The obvious answer is that the intolerance increased as a consequence of war. The most important interpolated factor between 1989 and 1996 was war. That as such has an important theoretical significance to which we will come later – the intolerance increased as consequence but was not the cause of war. But our attempt to explain this increase by mere demographic and structural changes and by individual experience of war events proved to be unsuccessful – the increased intolerance is not fully explained by the immediate war experiences as is not a direct result of ethnic homogenisation and other structural changes resulting from the war.

In our interpretation the war has produced change in intolerance on collective level which is untapped using individual level explanation. The effects of war are much broader than individual experience or even individual psychological effects of war. Although we accept that the war produced increase in intolerance we want to explain this phenomena. To explain means to find variables that can be put between the “war” and the “tolerance”. Namely, how or through what processes war event changes the tolerance levels? We have shown that demographic change or individual experience and individual effects of war are not adequate explanations of the increased intolerance.

The point is not that the people had individual losses (although material losses proved to be important in increasing intolerance) but that the collective perception has changed as the result of war. We can use here the framework developed by Herbert Blumer (1955/1988) for understanding prejudices. “A basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others. This process...is fundamentally a collective process” (Blumer, 1988:197). Blumer continues, “[This process] operates chiefly through the public media in which individuals who are accepted as the spokesman of a racial group characterize publicly another racial group” (Blumer, 1988:197–98). This framework can be used to understand the changes in ethnic tolerance (instead of prejudices, which was Blumer's subject). Among Croats the perception of the “others” has changed. In general terms the whole “frame” for understanding the reality has changed. Oberschall (2000) uses the concept of cognitive frame. There are cognitive frames for peaceful times and frames for war. The most important thing is to mobilize the frame for war that did not prevail before the war.

This process as described by Blumer is a continuous one where the constant redefinition of the other racial groups took place. The one dimension of this process is communication with the most important part played by the dominant group members. The dominant group members, in our case political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists, are influencing the creation of picture of others and contributing that the intolerance toward others increases. The attempt of the regime with its monopolization of TV and key printed media and the important roles of intellectuals and journalists who start to dominate the public space

made intolerance not only acceptable but also “required” social behaviour. In the previous communist regime social pressure created “downward falsification” (Kumar, 1998) of behaviour (of prejudiced people not transforming their prejudices into discrimination or in our case of falsifying beliefs toward reporting tolerant attitudes) – or what will in Merton's typology be a “timid bigotry.” The new nationalist regime and social expectations created by it, in contrast, are favorable for “upward falsification” (Kumar, 1998) or in Merton's typology a “Fair-weather liberal” in the sense that the intolerance was favored. As Blumer is saying the creation of image of the “others” is more influenced by those who are forming the people's opinion than the experience of individuals themselves. Or in other words, opinion (tolerance in our case) is not built as an aggregation of individual experiences (in our case measured by the experiences resulting from war), but the other way around: opinions come from opinion creators who are successfully changing the frame for understanding the events surrounding people and influencing their lives. “The building of the image of the abstract group takes place in the area of the remote and not of the near. It is not the experience with concrete individuals in daily associations that gives rise to the definitions of the extended, abstract group. Such immediate experience is usually regulated and orderly. Even where such immediate experience is disrupted the new definitions which are formed are limited to the individuals involved. The collective image of the abstract group grows up not by generalizing from experiences gained in close, first-hand contacts but through the transcending characterizations that are made of the groups as an entity” (Blumer, 1998:203). If the whole frame created by the public discourse is pushing the individual definition of the situation in the second direction we can expect that intolerance necessarily increase.

Blumer is saying that these definitions are forged in the public arena with the crucial role of big events. The war is such crucial event in our case. The interpretation of war in the public arena, the creation of public image of the “others” and pushing ethno-national interpretations into the center stage of the situational definitions increased the importance of the “national” and consequently intolerance toward those who are perceived and/or really are dangerous. Oberschall's (2000) finds the main explanation for the process in mass propaganda, the use of threat, repeat, plain falsification of truth, and on the fact that our knowledge is not based on personal experience but on what others are convincing for us. All these are “top down” processes, to use the previously mentioned terminology used in the Hague courtroom. In our opinion this is only partially true. Although those in political power and controlling the media are most responsible for directly influencing the opinions and beliefs and for providing the context in which the definitions are made, the process is much more complex and “democratic”. As formulated by Somer “elite strategies of inciting ethno-nationalism found a large and responsive audience among common people, which is a factor that needs to be explained not by resorting to ostensible ancient visceral hatreds but by examining ethnic and national self-images in modern Yugoslavia and the policies that cultivated them (2001:135–136). To return again to Blumer “the process of definition occurs obviously through complex interaction and communication between the members of the dominant group. Leaders, prestige bearers, officials, group agents, dominant individuals, and ordinary laymen present to one another characterisations of the subordinate group and express their feelings and ideas on the relations. Through talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, messages, pronouncements, news accounts, orations, sermons, preachments, and the like, definitions are presented and feelings are expressed” (Blumer, 1998:202). This constant redefinition goes in all directions, not only top-down, although the top creates important framework. This process explains how the people who lived peacefully together turned out against each other – but also explains why we have so many stories of neighbours of different ethnicities helping each other's in difficulties.

Županov (1995:38–39) explains the redefinition of friendly neighbouring relations (“komšiluk”) which existed in villages and cities of former Yugoslavia. He explains how the

people from the villages where the hostility started reinterpreted their neighbouring relations in the sense that the "others" just waited for the moment to "stick the knife in our back." The living together was a lie and based on false pretences of friendliness. "Such an interpretation was taken by the refugees into the areas unaffected by war, especially into Croatian cities. Besides, their live stories, (including the mentioned interpretation) were widely popularised by media (newspapers, radio, TV) and were through this brought to every Croatian family. That affected primary relations in unaffected areas, especially in cities, analogous the effect of hot fir-cones, which in fire spread throughout the forest. The people start to apply the refugees' definition on their neighbours in the apartment houses and on their colleagues on work who are of different nationality. They ask themselves if this neighbour and colleague is the hidden enemy who waits for his chance to kill me, rob me and cleanse me" (Županov, 1995:39-40).

In conclusion we can argue that the increase in intolerance is best explained as a collective process of the situation redefinition. The war changed the perceptions of others and redefined relationships toward others. This process was based on complex interaction of leaders on the one side combined with spontaneous processes of redefinition of the situation resulting from the isolated incidents of ethnic conflict and than spreading around like the bushfire. In this cascading process change of the definition of situation is nothing like the explosion of ancient hatreds. The people's friendly neighbouring relations were no less genuine than today's animosity and increased intolerance. Through the process which some author call "cascades" (Somer, 2001) the behaviours and perceptions of people change. "Cascades are self-reinforcing processes that change the behaviour of a group of people through interpersonal dependencies.... Cascade models explain situations in which the individual's incentives for taking an action, holding a belief, or confronting to a norm depend significantly on the behaviour of others" (Somer, 2001:129). The cascading process changes behaviour and attitudes and it is very difficult to stop it when it starts. As formulated by Kuran "...the greater the rewards for making public display of one's ethnicity and the larger the punishment for failing to do so, the stronger are the incentives to substitute ethnic behaviours for generic one" (Kummar, 1998:43). But as we argue, it is not only the conformism (although in many instances that is the case also) but also the redefinition of the situation. What psychologist call "AHA" effect – the individual feels that he discovered the fact that his neighbours were always hidden enemies although until yesterday they had friendly neighbouring relations. The individuals recognized the importance of ethno-national identity although until yesterday it was not crucial in his self-definition. In our case this spontaneous process was of course enforced from above by the definitions provided by the key political and intellectual figures of the regime. This complex collective process explains the increased tolerance of Croats resulting from war which occurred between our two points of data collection.

Discussions and conclusions

a) "Top-bottom" or "Bottom-up"?

On the basis of our data and previous analysis how can we look now at the debate dominating the Hague court room? Was the nationalism and hatred (measured in our analysis as ethnic tolerance) instigated from the "top", by political leaders in Croatia and especially by President Tuđman, or were the leaders simply responding to popular nationalist sentiments?

The crucial argument used by Meštrović was that intolerance was already high before Tuđman's rise to power so that cannot be accused for instigating something that was already there. "Intolerance and nationalism rose, and a sense of being Yugoslav fell, from 1984 to 1989, a time period in which Serbs began to articulate their plans for a "Greater Serbia" and Milošević gained more power, but **before Franjo Tuđman's rise to power.**" (Meštrović, 1995:

6). Although Meštrović is using our previous research (Hodson, Sekulić and Massey, 1994; and Massey, Hodson and Sekulić, 1999) as corroboration of his argument the fact was that the research was not designed to answer such question. It was a cross-sectional analysis more appropriate to answer the question if the differences in the outbreak of hostilities in different parts of the former Yugoslavia are explainable by differences in tolerance levels. (The answer we gave was a clear and unequivocal, *no.*) Our present analysis is much more suited to answer the question posed by Meštrović. The fact that the tolerance level did not change in 1985–1989 period but that intolerance increased in 1989–1996 period contradicts Meštrović's main claim. The intolerance level was not high before Tuđman came to power but it become high after his rise to power.

If we stay on very simplistic level of conceptual analysis used by Meštrović we could stop here and claim that we proved that he was simply wrong because of stretching his interpretations to far and not having data for more than one point in time. But first we should note that tolerance is just one dimension of social life and what Meštrović and other observers of events were claiming was increased political tensions, nationalism, and fear. What we claim here is simply that this increased political tensions and probably fear did not translate into increased intolerance. Tolerance as we measured it is just one dimension of complex web of social relations and beliefs.²

It is an undeniable fact that political tensions in the observed period (from 1984 to 1989) were rising. People were aware of it, were feeling it, were contributing to it and were reacting to it. But what we are claiming is that those objectively existing tensions did not translate into individual level. The best proof for this are the result from the survey reported by Dugandžija (1991). When asked to judge inter ethnic relations in Yugoslavia 43% of the sample responded that they are very bad. When asked to evaluate inter ethnic relations in their place of living only 2.7% evaluated them as very bad. Obviously the bad relations are somewhere “out there”, not “here”. That means that people were aware of the worsening of the situation but they did not translate it yet into their interpersonal relations in the place where they live. That is the context in which we should interpret the fact that in spite of the worsening of the general political situation based on strong exploitation of national feelings and nationalist propaganda this was still not translated on the individual level.

The combination of war, the reinterpretation of the whole situation by the leaders and opinion makers changed this dramatically in 1989 and intolerance on the individual level increased. The mechanism described by Županov is political propaganda: the “major influence in public discussion... by individuals and groups that have the public ear and who are felt to have standing, prestige, authority, and power” (Blumer, 1988:204). The fact that intolerance did not increase in 1984–89 period, although as we can see in Dugandžija's data the general perception of the worsening relations on global level did, made the interpretation that leaders were simply following the mass opinions to simplistic. The leaders were important in creating the new discourse, in defining the situation in order to “define and redefine the subordinate racial group and the relations between them” (Blumer, 1988:202). To claim that President Tuđman and his vitriolic statements (starting with that that he is happy that his wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish) did not contribute to “redefine” the situation and the Serbian minority is very difficult to understand. He personally and his party in general were impor-

² V. Katunarić (1991) showed that the social distance of Croats toward Serbs (measured in the dimensions of preferred marriage partners and friends) increased in the same period. Meštrović also uses this as evidence supporting his argument. Here he ignores the fact that the Serbs did not reciprocate increased distance by Croats; rather, the social distance decreased. Also he is ignoring the fact that Katunarić is attributing the increased social to macro political processes – mostly the electoral campaign which was taking place at the time of survey with parties sending their messages full of ethnocentric charge (Katunarić, 1991:134). The situation was obviously more complex than Meštrović wants to imply.

tant contributors to influence and change the public discourse, to redefine the “subordinate racial group and the relations between them” in Blumer sense. That this was not a simple “top-bottom” process is also clear. Tuđman and his party changed relatively high tolerance into intolerance in complex and interactive process defined the war instigated by the Serbian power holders. Our finding clearly indicates that the change of intolerance was significant and not explainable by individual war experiences. It was a change of how people (Croats) define the situation and the other group. This change was influenced by events and interpretation provided of the events by the leadership which changed the public discourse into direction of extreme nationalism and relatively high intolerance on the individual level.

b) Primordialism or Instrumentalism

What is the significance of our results for the primordialist-instrumentalist debate? Although our data are not designed to directly prove or disprove any of these theories we can argue that they are much more in accordance with the instrumentalist approach. Namely, the mere fact that intolerance varies significantly is at odds with primordialism. It predicts constant and high levels of intolerance. The pattern of variation is also much more in accordance with instrumentalist approaches. The increase in tolerance does not predate conflict (as we can expect from the primordialist approaches) but antedates it as predicted by instrumentalist theories.

We argue that changes in intolerance are not a result of simple top-bottom manipulation. The variation in intolerance does not correspond directly to mass manipulation of public media by political elites (Županov, Sekulić, Šporer, 1996:411–415) but must also be explained as a change in situational definitions in Blumer's sense.

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RAT I TOLERANCIJA

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Kojim se to teorijskim okvirom – a riječ je o primordijalističkom nasuprot instrumentalističkomu – ponajbolje objašnjava etnička mobilizacija i sukob? Uzevši u obzir rasprave u vezi s raspadom Jugoslavije, članak je usredotočen na pitanje: je li sve veća etnička netolerancija prethodila sve većim

etničkim napetostima i, susljedno tome, oružanom sukobu između različitih grupa? Odnosno, je li povećana etnička netolerancija bila posljedicom samog sukoba? Prvi bi rezultat bio u skladu s primordijalističkim okvirom objašnjenja. Drugi bi se rezultat očekivao na osnovu instrumentalističkog teorijskog okvira. U nalaženju odgovora na ta pitanja poslužili smo se trima skupovima podataka iz Hrvatske – anketnim istraživanjima iz 1985, 1989. i 1996. godine. Razdoblje između prva dva istraživanja označeno je povećanjem napetosti, slijedilo je razdoblje oružanog sukoba (1991–1995). Treće je istraživanje izvršeno na početku mirnog razdoblja.

Naš je zaključak taj da je do netolerancije došlo nakon izbijanja rata i zločina povezanih s tim. Stoga smatramo da su naši nalazi bliže instrumentalističkom negoli primordijalističkom teorijskom okviru. Ipak, naša analiza nije namijenjena promoviranju instrumentalizma kao najboljeg objašnjenja sukoba na Balkanu: prije će biti da je njen cilj bio da diskreditira primordijalističko objašnjenje.

ključne riječi: ETNIČKA MOBILIZACIJA, RASPAD JUGOSLAVIJE, RAT