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## Structuring the Croatian Party Scene<sup>1</sup>

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### *Summary*

In this article we started from the assumption that processes of profiling and constituting the political party scene of Croatia are at work and that, in spite of the inexistence of many conditions necessary for clear links between party programmes and social interests, we can already talk about a configuration that corresponds with party profiles in countries of a developed parliamentary democracy. Our study showed two essential characteristics: first, a pronounced unambiguousness, consistency and compatibility of the criteria applied to analyze the party scene; and second, a pronounced affinity among the electorates of specific groups of parties.

It is certainly no simple and short-term process to introduce a multiparty system in a country with no democratic traditions, under circumstances of social disintegration, during a struggle to establish an independent state and at a time when the total course of history is being questioned and the more recent past re-examined. It is similar in most so-called "ex-communist countries". In the first multiparty elections in Croatia a kind of opposition coalition developed against the party that had been in power until then, regardless of internal change within that party. The 1990 elections were strongly anti-communist and were followed by a move to attain national independence, which is again a common feature of all multinational communities when a value system and political order are breaking down. Under such conditions it is difficult to talk about a multi-party system as the expression of specific interests consciously arrived at and as an arena for the confrontation of different views on social development.

The 1992 elections were affected by the current political situation: Croatia's newly-gained independence, the war of aggression against her, strong ethnic friction and tension, the great burden of the war and the needs of displaced persons

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on the results of a questionnaire answered by a representative sample of voters in Croatia ten days before the 1992 elections. There was a total of 2,350 respondents.

and refugees on the Croatian economy. Thus they were geared more towards building up institutions of government (the Sabor and the President of the Republic) compatible with the new Constitution and confirming confidence in the ruling party, than they were, objectively, in the function of pluralistic development.

In the 1990 elections today's ruling party in Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Union, was a movement of protest expressing Croatian national dissatisfaction. In the 1992 elections it was a nation-building movement, reaping the fruits of the establishment of an independent Croatian state. In conditions like this, when the political scene is dominated by a general idea of such magnitude that all other social interests are pushed into the back-ground and when the great importance of what has been achieved makes it impossible to analyze the manner in which this was brought about and at what price, other political parties find it very difficult to form alternative programmes and impose them on the electorate.

This does not mean, however, that nothing at all is going on in the shade of the dominant movement, the CDU. It only means that what is happening is taking place much more slowly and that it is limited by the overall political situation and relations, which do not encourage an interest in structuring the political scene.

Economic transition is still in its embryonic stage and we still have the social structure that was established under a previous political and economic system. Party programmes are, therefore, based more on intellectual and value commitment than on a reflection of real social relations; they are founded more on *a priori* models (usually taken over from developed countries of West Europe) than on the attitudes of the electorate. All this has resulted in the present political scene in Croatia. After 1990 two populist movements have existed: the CDU, now in its full strength and which will sooner or later have to be transformed into a uniform political party; and the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change-Socialdemocratic Party of Croatia, which fell apart long ago as a movement and which is desperately seeking for a stronghold in European social democracy. There are also parties that, largely in name, insist on continuity with parties in Croatia which were historically important - the Croatian Peasant Party and the Croatian Party of Rights, and which are in danger of being blinded by tradition and in danger of being out of touch with the current needs of the Croatian electorate. And then there are parties which, in name and programme, want to be part of the pluralistic political scene of Europe, in the first place the Liberal Party, Christian Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party, but there is no rooted interest in their programmes in the social base.

All this, of course, does not mean that we are not in the process of forming political parties and their voters, but it is an indicator of how complex the political moment is and how important it is to study such processes exhaustively. In this article we will present some indicators of the structure of Croatia's political scene, placing an accent on the attitude of the electorate.

#### *Operationalization of the structure of the political scene*

When political parties are analyzed, two related approaches are usually used. One is connected with specific social groups whose interests a political party represents, so we talk about the party of "big business", the party of the "middle class" or the party of "repressed and marginal groups" etc. At present it is certainly

very difficult to analyze parties from this point of view in Croatia, the social basis of political parties, and this is similar in other "post-communist countries". Processes are certainly at work, but the main conditions for them to unfold lie in economic change, the development of a market economy, and thus also of a different social structure. The second approach to an analysis of political parties is to study the ideological-value orientation of their voters, i.e. the way in which voter attitudes differentiate political parties. In this case we usually talk about liberal or conservative parties, left-wing, right-wing or parties of the centre, radical parties, nationalistic parties and the like.

Although the opinion prevails that it is difficult to talk in terms of ideological differentiation and resulting party confrontation as found in developed, mostly post-industrial societies, this approach and classification are still part of people's political culture, and the "ordinary citizen" has no greater difficulty in expressing both his own political views and his support of a certain political party with this in mind.

In this investigation we approached the political scene of Croatia as a left-right continuum, a continuum that is also very often defined as radicalism-conservatism (Eysenck, 1953), or liberalism-conservatism (Ingelhart, Klingemann, 1979). We are interested in whether it is possible to distinguish, relatively unambiguously, the voters of one party from those of another, and thus establish the position of a political party on the left-right scale. We must emphasize that we have not analyzed party programmes, the political activities of their leaders, or "their opinion about themselves", but only the voters. In other words, the problem of research is: Are there significant ideological-value differences among the electorates of different political parties?

To answer this, we considered four indicators:

1. respondents' ideological self-identification on the left-right scale;
2. scale of attitudes for measuring the liberal-conservative dimension;
3. perception of the importance of specific social issues;
4. readiness for coalition with other political parties.


#### *Ideological self-identification on the L-R scale*

Notwithstanding criticism of the use of this scale, it is a fact that it greatly corresponds with everyday views about the position of a political party and is often used to describe them. We are always hearing or reading about "foment on the left", "a crowd in the centre", "the new constitution of the right" and so on. On the individual level people see themselves as more left-wing or right-wing. The validity of this procedure is certainly supported by the fact that the L-R indicator has been present for over a decade in longitudinal research carried out in countries of West Europe under the name of *Eurobarometer*.<sup>2</sup> In the post-communist countries of Central and East Europe the concepts of "left" and "right" for decades meant the difference between "good" and "bad". The "left" was good, desirable, progressive, in short, it was "US"; the "right" was the enemy, a threat, "THEY". This differentiation was a composite part of the process of political

<sup>2</sup> See in more detail in Toš, N. (1992).

socialization, mass-media activities and political disqualification, and it still is to a certain degree, but now turned the other way round. The validity of the approach will also be shown through the results of this investigation - if we show it makes sense to differentiate between the voters of political parties from this aspect, i.e. if we obtain data that are consistent with data obtained on the basis of other indicators.


Figure 1. CHANGES IN "LEFT-RIGHT" IDENTIFICATION IN THE PERIOD 1986 - 1990 - 1992



As we can see, the change of political system also led to changes in how the L-R orientation was evaluated. Since "left" was connected with the past and with what had been unsuccessful, "right" is rapidly losing its *a priori* negative connotation. Voters, like parties themselves, are increasingly identifying with an ideological centre. The main change occurred with the act of introducing multiparty elections in 1990, while the traumatic events of the war resulted in only a marginal shift to the right. A comparison of data for Croatia, Slovenia and the average for eight countries of Central and East Europe<sup>3</sup> shows that the L-R orientation in Croatia is very similar to that in other post-communist countries.

<sup>3</sup> The average refers to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania and the Ukraine. (See: Toš. N. 1992)

Figure 2. COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF L-R ORIENTATION WITH OTHER "POST-COMMUNIST" COUNTRIES



*Note:* Since the data for "left" and "left centre" were condensed, and also for "right" and "right centre", the data do not completely correspond with those for the arithmetical mean.

What is relevant for this article, however, is whether the electorates of political parties differ from each other, i.e. whether it is possible to determine the position of a party on the L-R scale on the basis of the conceptual self-identification of its voters. Or, in other words, can parties unambiguously be placed on the left, centre or right, or in some transitory position.

The data presented in next table say more through their order on the L-R scale than through the magnitude of the numbers themselves. Because of the obvious tendency towards mean values (the centre), and because of the as yet ambiguous "ideological selfnote: Since the data for "left" and "left centre" were condensed, and also for "right" and "right centre", the data do not completely correspond with those for the arithmetical mean identification" and party choice, the extreme values of the scale (1 and 2, and 9 and 10) were excluded and it starts on the left with the value of 3 and ends on the right with the value of 8. Regardless of this, the data correspond closely with the generally accepted views about specific parties. The only slight surprise was the attitude of CDP voters, since the leaders of that party emphasize it is a right party.

Arithmetical means often conceal inner heterogeneity, so Table 1 shows answers condensed into three groups. As might have been expected, the three parties on the left, the CPR on the right and the CPP in the centre have relatively homogeneous electorates (if we take a 2/3 attitude as a criterion). It is clear that it would be unrealistic to expect complete agreement between voter attitude and party position, which is shown in research results in other countries with a somewhat longer tradition of parliamentary democracy.<sup>4</sup> These data, however,

Table 1. L-R IDENTIFICATION OF PARTY ELECTORATE

Conceptual position	Party	AM	L	C	R (in %)
Left (3-4)	PDC	3.62	71	27	1
	SDU	3.62	53	47	0
	SPC	3.64	80	20	0
	SNP	3.99	73	14	13
Left centre (4-5)	SDPC	4.06	53	47	0
	regional	4.88	33	48	19
Centre (5-6)	CSLP	5.42	24	56	20
	CNP	5.50	25	50	25
	CPP	5.98	6	67	27
Right centre (6-7)	CDP	6.08	13	50	37
	CDU	6.26	9	48	43
	CCDP	6.48	6	49	45
Right (7-8)	CPR	7.36	9	23	68

<sup>4</sup> Thus, for example, voter attitudes on the L-R dimension and party preference in Austria are as follows:


	L	C	R
Socialdemocratic Party	40	43	17
National Party	2	38	60

See: Toš N. (1992)

show the possibility of further shifts in the electorate and a movement towards higher correspondence between personal orientation and party position on the L-R scale.

The links between party identification and ideological self-identification are even clearer in graphical presentation, although, for the sake of clarity, we showed the ideological spectrum through only four characteristic parties.

Figure 3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE L-R ORIENTATION. POSITION OF THE ELECTORATES OF FOUR PARTIES ON THE LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM SCALE



Our criterion in the preceding analysis was conceptual self-identification, i.e. an application of the semantic difference between the concepts of Left and Right. Now we want to establish whether the voters of political parties differ on the scale of social and political attitudes that can be reduced to the classical dimensions of Liberal and Conservative. Based on classical research and approaches to this field (let us mention only some of them: Thurstone 1928; Ferguson 1939; Eysenck 1954), we designed a special scale for measuring that dimension starting from some ingredients of the liberal and conservative viewpoints that exclude each other. Since this is an investigation into the attitudes of the entire population (on the basis of our sample), we necessarily had to use very clear and distinct concepts,

in great measure black-and-white formulations, where none of the contents mentioned were given an *a priori* positive or negative value. In this research we approached the categories of liberalism and conservatism as equal-value orientations.

The starting point for the operationalization and construction of the scale was E. Ivoš's analysis (1989) of the phenomenon of American neoconservatism.

Table 2. SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

liberal consciousness	conservative consciousness
homocentrism	theocentrism
critical attitude and independence	religion and obedience
modernism and freedom	tradition and authority
materialistic culture	spiritual culture
democracy	autocracy
cosmopolitanism	nationalism
future	past
law	customs
unlimited civil rights	limited civil rights
society	communit
realism	romanticism
small families	large families
sexual freedom	sexual restraint

Ivoš, E. (1989, pp. 37-38)

The preceding table shows only some of the dichotomies that differentiate the liberal from the conservative consciousness. They are certainly not all equally important, their significance for forming a political attitude differs, and not all are equally useful for formulating statements that would serve as the foundation for a scale of attitudes. That is why we decided to limit ourselves to the relationship between the state and the church, between individual rights and the needs of the state, openness towards others and ethnic closure, an orientation towards tradition and seeking for what is new. Corresponding with those dichotomies, we formulated a series of statements and thus to a certain measure satisfied so-called face-validity; we used the procedure of factor analysis to establish the inter-relationships between those statements and the existence of a certain number of latent factors - so-called factor validity, and computed the position of the voters on the liberal-conservative scale - so-called "validity of known groups".

There are two basic starting assumptions. The first is methodological: that all the statements measure one common factor - the position of the individual on



the liberalism conservatism scale. The second is that it is possible on that scale to distinguish among voters of different parties and that this differentiation will correspond with the data obtained by using the LR scale.

Table 3. FACTOR STRUCTURE OF STATEMENTS  
LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM

Statement	Factors		Acceptance (in %)		
	1	2	Yes	?	No
Christian values and respect for authority in family, school and state are preconditions for social progress	.71	0	47	39	14
The Church should play as great and prominent a role as possible in the function of the state	.71	0	11	29	60
People should return to tradition and the original values of their nation	.62	0	43	49	8
It is best for the members of every nation to live alone in their own state	.59	0	20	30	50
It is justified to limit individual rights in the interest of nation and state	.58	0	34	39	27
The Church must be strictly separate from the state	-.57	.35	59	27	14
At the end of the 20th c. any closing into one's own nation is pointless	-.38	.49	75	19	6
The new should always be sought, new values, new challenges	0	.58	69	29	2
The only foundation of social progress in an independent, critical attitude towards everything, and science	0	.57	67	27	6
No principle, no value, can be greater and more important than the value of individual freedom	0	.55	79	17	4

Besides the factor saturations of certain statements, we also showed their acceptance, which gives us a description of the state of the "liberal" and "conservative" consciousness in Croatia.

#### Factor determination:

Factor I: composed of seven statements, five of which express a conservative attitude - greater influence of the church and religion, tradition, obedience, authority, honouring "higher" principles, and two (which are in negative correlation with the factor !) that support the division of the church from the state and oppose enclosure in constrained national frames. It seems justified to call that factor a *conservative orientation*.

Factor II: composed of five statements, all of which are in positive correlation with the factor, and which contain the basic liberal values: orientation to what is new, openness to the world, a critical attitude, individual freedoms and a separation between church and state.

It is interesting that these two factors are relatively independent of each other although a great negative correlation might have been expected, i.e. that they are the composite part of only one dimension. The reason is probably in the inconsistency of the liberal orientation. People know what they do not want and this gives them a negative attitude towards components of the conservative orientation, whereas the components of the liberal orientation are positively coloured and more or less represent the generally-accepted reaches of civilization. As is usually the case in similar investigations, components that vary from these "given" positive attitudes are much more revealing.

This can also be seen in the acceptance of individual statements. The statements that form Factor II are accepted by the great majority of respondents and refused by only an insignificant number. The statements that form Factor I, however, are much more discriminating and the answers are not as one-sided.

An analysis of individual statements shows that most respondents insisted on the freedom of the individual (79 per cent), opposed being enclosed in only their own nation (75 per cent), supported seeking new values (69 per cent), an independent and critical attitude (67 percent) and the separation of the Church from the state (59 per cent). At the same time they were strongly opposed to the participation of the Church in the functioning of the state (60 per cent) and for members of individual nations to live by themselves in their own state (50 per cent). It is interesting that respondents disagreed most on the issue of whether it is justified to restrict individual rights in the interests of the nation and state.

*Table 4. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND RESULTS ON THE FACTORS OBTAINED*


Party	Conservative orientation	Liberal orientation	Restriction of individ. rights (in %)
CDU	55.51	49.64	50
CDDP	53.98	49.13	33
CPR	53.94	48.20	40
CPP	51.60	51.55	38
CPD	51.22	49.74	43
CNP	47.12	51.14	27
CSLP	45.72	50.77	24
SPC	42.07	50.45	29
PDC	41.66	50.83	19
REGIONAL	41.65	50.18	17
SNP	40.89	48.05	13
SDPC	38.98	49.44	6
SDU	38.68	48.13	6

*Note:* Data for specific orientations given in so-called standard values (AS = 50)

For that reason we will show how the voters of specific parties answered this particular statement, and also their results for the two factors.

Data consistency within the scale of "conservatism" can also be seen on the following figure, which shows the results for the respondents-voters of individual parties on the scale, and data obtained for the most characteristic statements.

Figure 4. PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF SPECIFIC "CONSERVATIVE" STATEMENTS



The figure shows that, in spite of individual oscillations, a kind of regularity exists among the voters of particular political parties and the acceptance of statements that predominantly express a conservative attitude. It is interesting that CDU voters have a pronounced conservative attitude, although the party does not in most cases consider itself to be strongly right-wing! Here we must certainly say something. A pronounced right-wing attitude, or what is often called the radical right, is not necessarily conservative. Its basic feature is insistence on its own national group and a closed attitude towards others.<sup>5</sup> As Figure 4 shows, this attitude is the strongest in CPR sympathisers, who generally feel that they belong to the right, as we established earlier.

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to mention that N. Bulat (*Slobodna Dalmacija*, 15.9.1992) obtained similar data using different operators. CDU voters showed the highest results on the scale of *authoritarianism*, which can be considered an indicator of a *conservative* outlook, and CPR voters on the scale of *national orientation*!

### *Perception of urgency of social issues*

The programmes of political parties, especially as expressed in electoral campaigns, always reflect basic party attitudes and a particular social situation. During an election campaign certain issues are emphasized, voter attention focused on them, the party gives its own views and interpretation of the current situation, its causes and how to solve problems. It is an old psychological truth that people see and experience facts in different ways, depending on their own motives, attitudes, experiences and emotions.

What were Croatia's basic problems at the time of the summer 1992 elections? There are certainly great differences of opinion about this among people, but here we are primarily interested in whether there is a difference of opinion among the voters as a body of different political parties. Is emphasis on the importance of protecting the environment the field in which the "average" liberal voter differs from the average CDU voter? Is it the problem of human rights or the issue of specific regional development? Or is it something else? Is it possible to rationally distinguish among the voters of different parties from the aspect of the emphasis they place on specific issues? Are these the issues that are compatible with the basic value-programme position of a party on the pluralistic Croatian scene?

In an attempt to find an answer to those questions we asked respondents to chose *the three most important issues of Croatia*. Table 5 gives the answers in the order of the priorities obtained.


Table 5. THE PRIORITY ISSUES OF CROATIA

rank	problem	%
1	social justice and security	50.2
2	combatting unemployment	39.7
3	price stability	34.0
4	ensuring individual freedoms	31.1
5	harmonious life of Croats and minority ethnic communities	28.5
6	development of private entrepreneurship	28.1
7	integration of Croatia into the European Community	26.1
8	preservation of national unity	17.1
9	strengthening of military defence	11.3
10	spiritual renewal	8.8
11	environmental protection	8.2
12	specific regional development	7.7
13	demilitarization	5.6
14	stimulating population growth	3.1

As can be seen, the issues do not include the burning problems of liberating Croatia's complete territory and returning displaced people to their homes. It was logical to expect a concentration of answers on these issues, and we were primarily interested in problems that would reflect a more permanent pattern of political party profilation.

The fact that respondents chose three priority issues does not mean that they considered the other issues less important. However, our analysis of the difference between party electorates, and thus also of the formation of Croatia's party scene, is based on the priorities chosen, which means on the way voters experience social reality and choose a political party.

Figure 5. PERCEPTION OF PRIORITY ISSUES AND PARTY PREFERENCE



The figure shows only the issues for which the voters of different parties vary significantly. Problems that by their very nature are identified with social democracy (social justice and security, combatting unemployment), and which respondents consider priority issues in comparison with others (see Table 5), do not differentiate the voters of different parties so we did not show them on Figure 4. The reasons why voters agree on these issues vary, from the fact that the political scene is dominated by what is in fact a movement (CDU), the general defamation of the left and its "original sin" of the failure of the communist society, to the fact that

the overall social crisis is so very deep that it has struck people of very different political persuasions. Still, although these problems do not at present shape the political scene and the attitudes of voters, we can expect them to become the basis of political differences when the course of social development changes, social stratification increases and Croatia's internal and external position are strengthened.

Figure 4 shows that voters of so-called "left" parties emphasize the importance of individual freedoms and the harmonious life of Croats with members of minorities. These problems are also seen as important in a certain measure by voters of parties in the centre, in first place the CSLP.

With a pronounced accent on the importance of developing private entrepreneurship, the voters of parties in the centre also recognize the importance of individual freedoms.

As for right-wing voters, their common concern is emphasis on private entrepreneurship (with the partial exception of CDU voters because of its populist character). Parties that could be placed in the "right centre" emphasize the importance of spiritual renewal (a typical conservative value), and CPR voters, as the extreme right, lay more emphasis than others on the problems of national unity, and especially on strengthening military might.

Table 6. PROBLEM PROFILE OF THE "L-R" DIMENSION

ideological position	problems
LEFT, LEFT CENTRE	individual freedoms, coexistence
CENTRE	private entrepreneurship
RIGHT CENTRE	private entrepreneurship, spiritual renewal
RIGHT	private entrepreneurship, national unity, strengthening military might

The data from Figure 4, and those in Table 6, correspond with earlier analyses based on the operationalization of the L R scale and the liberalism-conservatism scale.


#### *Possible matrix of party coalition*

Up to now we were primarily concerned with the attitudes of the voters of different political parties, on the basis of which we tried to single out certain similarities among parties and determine the configuration of Croatia's political party scene. Here we investigate possible links among parties, i.e. the establishment of coalitions. At least three conditions are necessary to establish a coalition: 1.

similarity of voter political attitude; 2. voter readiness to support a common candidate or lists; 3. readiness of party leaders to enter certain forms of cooperation. The third condition is not part of our analysis and research, but rather a matter for the evaluation of particular party leaders, their ability to place themselves in the background and cooperate with others.

Since the matrix containing all the answers about desirable cooperation would be rather large (13 x 12) and therefore unclear, our graphical presentation includes only certain "groups" of parties and their mutual links. We considered that great readiness for coalition exists if 60 per cent party voters accept a common front; medium readiness for coalition if 40-60 per cent accept it and small readiness for coalition if less than 40 per cent voters accept coalition. These are certainly *a priori* figures, but we started from the assumption that if less than 40 per cent party voters accept cooperation with another party, they would as a body refuse their leaders confidence and obedience. In the case of medium coalition readiness a certain amount of political preparation is necessary, and where great coalition readiness exists it is only a matter of time before the voters demand why their leaders are not working on it.

Figure 6. COALITION READINESS AMONG VOTERS OF PARTICULAR PARTIES



As might have been expected, the data show three groups of political parties that their voters consider close, and three political parties that are outside the coalition groups.

The first group are parties that are usually considered left-wing (PDC, SPC, SDU, SDPC). Regardless of the contention among their leaders, their voters desire cooperation. Bearing in mind how close their political attitudes are, this comes as no surprise. Besides pronounced orientation towards one another, the voters of this "left" group show a moderate readiness for cooperation with parties of the second group, the "centre", and with regional parties, as well.

The voters of parties of the "centre" (CSLP, CNP, CPP) are strongly turned towards mutual cooperation, but they show no inclination towards parties outside that group.

Parties of the right (CDU, CDP, CCDP) form a third group of political parties which is not potentially as closely internally linked as the preceding two, but is strongly dominated by CDU voters. The voters of the parties that form that group are moderately ready to cooperate with parties of the centre, but their love is not "returned".

As Figure 5 shows, there are three, in many ways specific, parties outside the three basic groups. Regional parties (as was shown in the election results, in the first place by the voters of the IDP) stand between the "left" and the "centre". They are outside all the groups because they were not constituted on an ideological basis, and their programme is to represent the interests of a certain region reflecting all the heterogeneity of its population, which means that they, too, have features of populist parties. Their voters are strongly inclined towards possible cooperation with the CSLP, and to a certain degree with the CNP, but the voters of those parties do not accept this. The moderate readiness for cooperation with parties of the "left" is mutual.

The Serbian National Party, as the national party of Serbs in Croatia, is by that very fact not a party of any special political programme that would represent any specific interests in competition with other interests, but is primarily concentrated on the general interests of Serbs as a minority group in Croatia. Readiness for cooperation with parties on the left is a logical result of the fact that one of the general characteristics of left parties in the world is to represent the rights of minority groups. SNP voters are also ready to cooperate with parties of the centre to a certain degree.

The CPR, as an extreme right party, is very isolated and the voters of other parties are not ready to cooperate with it, although CPR voters show a moderate readiness towards cooperation with the CDP and the CCDP in the centre.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> G. Milas (1992) reached similar results about the structuring of the party scene in Croatia, although his analysis was based on the *opinion of citizens about parties*. The only relatively significant difference is that he placed the CPP on the right, whereas our data show that this party's voters are mostly in the centre.



It is interesting to compare our data and that from the elections of 1990 (Grdešić, 1991), although the same parties did not "play" in the 1992 elections. We will describe only three parties - the CDU, LCC-PDC (today's Socialdemocratic Party of Croatia) and the CNA (we took the results of the CSLP, CNP, CDP and CCDP to represent the Coalition of National Agreement from 1990).

Table 7. CHANGES IN READINESS FOR COALITION

coalition relations	1990	1992	difference (%)
CDU > PDC	6	11	5
PDC > HDZ	5	23	18
CNA > PDC	23	30	7
SDP > CNA	20	45	25
CDU > CNA	70	40	-30
CNA > CDU	69	30	-39

This table offers several points of interest. In the 1990 elections there was a pronounced conflict, i.e. a deep rift between the voters of the LCC-PDC on one hand, and those of the CDU and CNA on the other. The voters of the CDU and the CNA were prepared to cooperate against the LCC-PDC, demanding changes in the political system. Anti-communism was the basis for coalition. In this process CNA voters were more tolerant towards the LCC-PDC than CDU voters.

By the 1992 elections things had changed greatly. CDU voters and the voters of parties that had formed the CNA grew more distant, and parties of the centre (in the first place the CSLP and CNP) find cooperation with the CDU and with the PDC equally (un)attractive. At the same time the repulsion between the CDU and the PDC decreased somewhat.

These data certainly resulted, on one hand, from changes in the system, so that no 'final confrontation' is now necessary, and on the other from mutual cooperation among parties and the common struggle for the Croatian state.

### Conclusion

In this project we started from the assumption that processes of profiling and constituting the political party scene of Croatia are at work and that, in spite of the inexistence of many conditions necessary for clear links between party

programmes and social interests, we can already talk about a configuration that corresponds with party profiles in countries of a developed parliamentary democracy. Our study showed two essential characteristics: first, a pronounced unambiguousness, consistency and compatibility of the criteria applied to analyze the party scene; and second, a pronounced affinity among the electorates of specific groups of parties.

The electorates that placed themselves in a certain position on the scale of ideological self-identification (regardless of whether this was on the left, centre, right or radical right!), expressed latent tendencies (attitudes) in the liberalism-conservatism scale that correspond to their position on the L-R scale. Voters notice those particular issues in Croatia that form the basis of the political programmes of the parties they prefer. And finally, as a certain indicator of behaviour, voters recognize as kindred the political parties that express the same tendencies and are ready for mutual cooperation. It is difficult to say to what measure and in what direction further processes of structuring the political party scene in Croatia will go because that does not depend only on voters, nor even on the leaders, but often on the totality of political processes both in Croatia and in the politically relevant environment. It is a fact, however, that preconditions for cooperation and unity exist on the left, in the centre and on the right.

*Table 8.* FINAL PRESENTATION OF PARTY STRUCTURING ON THE BASIS OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1992 ELECTIONS

parties	SDU	PDC	SPC	SDPC	CSLP	CNP	CPP	CDP	CDU	CCDP	CPR
L - R	left			centre			right centre		right		
LIB-CON	liberal			mod.liberal			--- conservative ---				
problems	coexistence			----- private entrepreneurship -----							
				--- individual rights -----			spiritual renewal		nat.unity mil.power		
coalition	pronounced			pronounced			moderate				

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*Appendix I:*

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**List of Party Names and Abbreviations**

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Dalmatinska akcija - DA

Dalmatian Action - DA

Hrvatska demokratska stranka - HDS

Croatian Democratic Party - CDP

Hrvatska demokratska zajednica - HDZ

Croatian Democratic Union - CDU

Hrvatska kršćanska demokratska stranka - HKDS

Croatian Christian Democratic Party - CCDP

Hrvatska narodna stranka - HNS

Croatian People's Party - CP'sP

Hrvatska republikanska stranka - HRS

Croatian Republican Party - CRP

Hrvatska seljačka stranka - HSS

Croatian Peasant Party - CPP

Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka - HSLS

Croatian Social Liberal Party - CSLP

Hrvatska stranka naravnog zakona - HSNZ

Croatian Party of Natural Law - CPNL

Hrvatska stranka prava - HSP

Croatian Party of Rights - CPR

Hrvatski državotvorni pokret - HDP

Croatian State-Formative Movement - CSFM

Koalicija narodnog sporazuma - KNS

Coalition of People's Agreement - CPA (only 1990 elections)

Istarski demokratski sabor - IDS

Istrian Democratic Assembly - IDA

Kršćanska narodna stranka - KNS

Christian People's Party - ChPP

Riječki demokratski savez - RDS

Democratic Alliance of Rijeka

Savez komunista Hrvatske - Stranka demokratskih promjena - SKH-SDP

League of Communists of Croatia - Party of Democratic Change - LCC-PDC (elections 1990 title)

Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske - Stranka demokratskih promjena - SDP

Social Democratic Party of Croatia - Party of Democratic Change - SDP

Socijaldemokratska stranka Hrvatske - SDH

Social Democratic Party of Croatia - SDPC

Socijalistička stranka Hrvatske - SSH

Socialist Party of Croatia - SPC

Socijalno-demokratska unija Hrvatske - SDU

Social Democratic Union of Croatia - SDU

Srpska narodna stranka - SNS

Serbian People's Party - SPP