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Assembling the 'creative economy' : epistemic communities, policy transfer and the geography of expertise

Assembling the 'Creative Economy':

Epistemic Communities, Policy Transfer and the Geography of Expertise

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Abstract

The linking of 'creativity' with the economic in policy discourses marks a relatively recent attempt to rethink the constituent elements of a competitive economy and, by extension, the nature of adequate policy interventions upon it. While it is widely recognised that notions of expertise play a pivotal role in who does this kind of rethinking, comparatively little attention has been paid to how such expertise is produced and situated *in relation to* the policy process. This thesis explores the geography of this expertise, focusing especially on how it is situated in transnational epistemic communities, and its relationship with the geography of the policy process across transnational space.

The emergence of creativity is explored through a policy concept that centres this capacity: the creative industries. This policy strand is tracked through its emergence in the UK and transfer to other countries, focusing especially on New Zealand. There are three key findings. First, it is argued that policy is co-constituted with expertise. When the creative industries policy concept first emerged in the UK in 1998 through the production of the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* (DCMS, 1998), a variety of actors working in areas understood to be cognate with the concept recast themselves as creative industries experts and sought to use this emergent capacity to shape ongoing creative industries policy development. Second, policy transfer is a process of translation that changes the form of a policy. The transfer of the creative industries policy concept to New Zealand occurred through circuits of embodied and codified knowledge that linked policy-making sites in either country, but their policy-development has followed different paths and produced different policy programmes, resulting in transnational policy formation rather than simply formation in one place followed by transfer to another. And third, this transnational policy formation is occurring alongside the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts, a process analogous to that described in the first finding, supported by a transnational infrastructure of conferences, research institutes, policy networks and written texts. This epistemic community is a key source of expertise in the making of the 'creative economy'.

Acknowledgements

Author's declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original, except where indicated by special reference in the text, and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other academic award. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1: Creative world?

There is an incongruous regularity to creativity these days. No longer just the rare impulse of individual or collective genius, creativity is, we are told, everywhere (Osborne, 2003). While its presence has long been recognised in the arts, and even the sciences, creativity is now seen as a vital component in domains historically less associated with it, such as business, industry, education and even government. For example, the recent *Cox Review of Creativity in Business*, commissioned by the UK Chancellor at the time of the 2005 Budget, asserts that: 'creativity, properly employed, carefully evaluated, skilfully managed and soundly implemented, is a key to future business success – and to national prosperity' (Cox, 2005: 3). Creativity here is not something 'new', a recently discovered technique of business practice: rather it is understood as a latent condition only now being recognised for its utility. This is apparent in a Department for Culture, Media and Sport (henceforth DCMS) document entitled *Culture and Creativity: The Next Ten Years* in which:

> (e)veryone is creative. From the pre-school child to the most distinguished scientist or artist, imagination, innovation and original expression are vital components of what it is to be human and to be part of society... In the years ahead, people's creativity will increasingly be the key to a country's economic identity, to its economic success, and to individuals' well-being and sense of fulfilment (DCMS, 2001a: 5).

These arguments have been repeated *ad infinitum* with the remarkable production of policy and policy-oriented research around the world in the last ten years that emphasises or centralises 'creativity' in the economies and societies of the 21st century.

The place of creativity in the economy has been subject to a range of different research investigations that have directly and indirectly informed, drawn from, and expanded these policy developments. John Howkins (2001) populist book

The Creative Economy: How People Make Money From Ideas, for example, argues that the rapidly growing economic importance of the creative industries augurs the emergence of a new kind of economy:

> Creativity is not new and neither is economics, but what is new is the nature and extent of the relationship between them, and how they combine to create extraordinary value and wealth (2001: viii).

For Howkins, participation in this economy depends on exploiting one's inherent creativity within a strong intellectual property framework that balances private and public claims and maximises the value of a particular creative act for society. Such a framework is still very much in development but increasingly constitutes a key concern for national and international governing institutions around the world (see Bainbridge, 2006).

A different kind of policy orientation can be found in the work of Richard Florida (2002; 2005; 2008) on the rise of what he calls the creative class. For Florida this class is a stratum of individuals for whom creativity is a key aspect of their work – everyone from the 'super-creative core' of artists, film-makers, scientists, writers and other producers of 'new' things, to the 'creative professionals' who work in knowledge-intensive sectors like finance, technology development and so on working around what is produced by this core and participating in everyday problem-solving work. Florida argues that in the emerging 'creative age' (2002: 19), this group create a disproportionately high degree of economic value and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. This means that it is now imperative for cities and countries to find ways to attract and retain creative talent through policies that create the kind of place that this creative class will want to live. Programmes inspired by this vision have been put in place by many, especially urban, administrations around the world (see Peck, 2005).

Less policy-oriented and more academically-minded work has also emerged in recent years exploring the dynamics of creativity in economic processes and practices. Special issues of international academic journals have been dedicated to the topic. For example, the *Journal of Organizational Behaviour* featured a special issue on the paradoxes of managing creativity where contributing papers explored the practices and practicalities of balancing creative and routine work in cultural organisations (DeFillippi *et al.*, 2007). Similarly, within geography

Environment and Planning A has had a special issue on *Placing the Creative Economy: Scale, Politics and the Material* (Rantisi *et al.,* 2006) with contributions exploring creative industries including video games, advertising and art at the national and urban scale. Meanwhile, 2008 has seen the launch of the new *Creative Industries Journal* providing an outlet for research exploring issues specific to this economic sector (e.g. Cunningham and Higgs, 2008). It is clear that in academic, popular and policy discourses the creativity's importance to the economy is increasingly recognised, promoted and acted on.

This emphasis on creativity is relatively new, but as an attempt to rethink and redraw the constituent elements of the economy it is only one of the more recent endeavours. Indeed, Mitchell (1998; 2002; 2008) has argued convincingly that the very idea of 'the' economy was invented soon after World War Two through the efforts of a number of economists and politicians, most famously John Maynard Keynes, to create a system of government that would prevent the circumstances that led to the previous half century of conflict and economic instability from occurring again. Before this, the concept of economy referred almost exclusively to what are today called micro-economics – the study of the organisation and distribution of commodities through markets and the dynamics of trade between different places. Although this science of *political oeconomy* had been influential in the creation of systems of government for the previous few centuries (Polanyi, 1957; Foucault, 1991a; Buck-Morss, 1995), the significant move made by Keynes and his colleagues was to create a system for measuring and controlling economic activity at the *national* scale. This included, for example, practices of demand management which would act on employment and inflation to mitigate the extremes of the cycle of booms and recessions that had provided fertile ground for conflict to develop. 'The economy' came to be understood as coterminous with the territorial jurisdiction of the state and the contemporary nation-state was born.

Since then other concepts have reinvented the way that the economy is understood to work. In the 1980s 'the market' was reasserted as a central feature of economic life and a far more efficient and desirable mechanism for organising distribution than the demand management of the Keynesian state (Tickell and

Peck, 2003; Harvey, 2005). This period also saw the spectre of the 'global economy' haunting the national economy and taking increasing precedence over it, making the latter subservient to its dynamics (Hindess, 1998; Larner, 1998). Following on from this, the 1990s saw 'knowledge' and 'information' increasingly privileged in contemporary economies as the key to remaining competitive in an increasingly interconnected world (Leadbeater, 1999; Castells, 2000). Much like knowledge, in the early 21st century creativity is now seen as a very human capacity that drives the economy.

Although their significance has varied, each of these often novel ways of rethinking and reinventing the economy are linked to certain systems of government and policy programmes. As a result they have been implicated in different rounds of restructuring. Keynes's ideas were central to the development of the suite of policies and institutions that constructed the Welfare State model that was dominant in the Western world for much of the second half of the 20th century. The political possibilities of 'the market' and the threat of 'the global economy' were central to the deconstruction of this state form during the 1980s and 1990s and the creation of new multi-scalar governance regimes (Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004). This is often described as a period of *neoliberalism*, a term denoting this political philosophy of 'more market less state', taking hold around the world (Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2001; 2003; 2004; Harvey, 2005). More recently the idea of the centrality of knowledge to economic progress has resulted in the creation of programmes for instituting 'knowledge economies' and 'knowledge societies' which emphasise education and invest in knowledge-intensive economic activities. The rise of creativity has encouraged the development of similar 'creative economy' programmes which aim to increase this capacity amongst a population, but perhaps more significantly which have broken down the political distinction between culture and economy and resulted in policy interventions which claim to act on both.

This highlights the importance of what I will call *policy knowledge* to the policy programmes that shape economic practice. Policy knowledge is that knowledge which informs the development of policy by delineating, describing and analysing the social world it is to act upon. The economy is itself an object of this

knowledge, and as different approaches to describing its constitution and dynamics have emerged and developed over the course of the second half of the 20th century, the policies which act upon it have been altered in often profound ways. As policy knowledge changes over time so policy programmes, and their associated regimes of government, are constantly disassembled and reassembled. This means that the significance of the different kinds of research investigation into the economic role of creativity is not limited to producing a more detailed representation of a particular aspect of the economy: this research is implicated in a process of reinventing the economy for policy purposes, and as such in the reinvention and reconstruction of economic life.

1.2: Epistemic communities and the economy

This thesis examines the formation of policy knowledge about the economy from a geographical perspective. It builds on arguments that the taken-for-granted economy that exists 'out there' in much economic and political discourse is not as objectively real or tangible as it seems (Coe *et al.*, 2007: 31-55). Rather, these political and economic discourses, and the knowledge that informs them, shape the economy they purport to describe. This perspective has emerged in economic geography as a result of the 'cultural turn' (Thrift and Olds, 1996; Castree, 2004) and theoretical and methodological influences from outside and inside the discipline, including postcolonialism (Escobar, 1995; Power, 1998) and feminism (McDowell, 1997; Rose, 1997). As these approaches have become increasingly influential over the last three decades more and more questions have been raised about the ethnic, colonial-imperial and gendered nature of economic processes that have been subsumed in conventional accounts, about the supposed distinction between economic and socio-cultural processes, and about the apparent 'naturalness' of the economic sphere in general. Many of these accounts have been influenced by post-structuralist thought which argues knowledge, including knowledge about the economy, is not neutral, cumulative and essentially descriptive of the world around it but power-laden, multiple and constitutive of the world (Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2000; Doel, 1999; Massey, 2005; Murdoch, 2006). As such they ask how knowledge of the economy is produced, and how it engenders the particular discourses and practices described as

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'economic' (Barnes, 1996; Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2006; Callon, 1998; Mitchell, 1998; 2002; 2008; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Thrift, 2005; MacKenzie *et al.*, 2007).

While much of this research has focused on the moments where particular knowledge, such as that of the economist, is applied or translated into practice, this thesis considers the moment before this when knowledge that can be applied or translated is produced. This is an inherently geographical process, and not only because these moments occur in sites that have particular institutional geographies of their own (Peck, 2008). This is because knowledge is at all times situated in space: it does not emerge everywhere at once in the same abstract form. Explorations of the geography of knowledge have made a general distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, arguing that they have different spatial characteristics: while the former tends to be embodied in the 'know-how' of particular individuals and therefore tends towards being limited in its spatial extensiveness, the latter is codified in books, manuals and other texts and is reproducible in any site with the capacity to do so (Maskell and Malmburg, 1999; Bathelt *et al.*, 2004; Maskell *et al.*, 2006). Building on this basic insight, and demonstrating the variety of spatialities that different types of knowledge may have, geographers have explored the complex geographies of knowledge, and their consequences for particular industries, that have emerged as actors in economic space have sought to take advantage of or overcome the problems and opportunities produced by the spatiality of different knowledge forms (Allen, 2000; 2002; Grabher, 2002; 2004; Gertler, 2003; Amin and Cohendet, 2004; Williams, 2006; Weller, 2007; Hall, 2007; Faulconbridge, 2007). The particular spatial formations of knowledge that are revealed do not map easily onto pre-given spaces like cities, regions and countries, or institutional categories like states, industrial sectors and academic disciplines.

One of the spatial formations of policy knowledge that crystallises is the *epistemic community* (Haas, 1992). This concept, developed in the political science tradition, describes a community of individuals, such as climate scientists or free market economists, linked by their commitment and/or privileged access to a certain body of knowledge. For outsiders to the community its members possess a high degree of expertise and the ability to speak authoritatively on topics relating to

that knowledge. As political actors they are comprised of more specific expert systems that are strategically linked to certain policy-making sites. The ideas of Keynes and others like him are influential not just because they provide for the creation of workable policy programmes and institutions: their situation as experts occupying certain positions within policy networks allowed for their ideas to be heard. As a result epistemic communities have a high degree of political agency as it is through them that certain knowledges, including policy knowledge, are developed and deployed. They provide the strategically situated expert with the necessary knowledge to speak authoritatively on some aspect of the economy and so, as a collective, they can shape policy programmes. This means that in order to understand how some particular knowledge of the economy came to be dominant in policy circles it is necessary to understand how the particular epistemic community associated with this knowledge came to influence policy-makers.

As such, there are two principal aims of this thesis: first, to show how the concept of creativity came to be understood as a significant feature of the economy to the point that policy is now developing around it. This will emphasise the role of certain epistemic communities (and one in particular) and expert systems in generating this knowledge and how this is linked to policy processes. Second, I aim to provide an approach to conceptualising the relationship between epistemic communities and the policy process more generally. By considering how 'creativity' came to be seen as an element of the economy we can gain an insight into how the knowledge that informed previous rounds of restructuring emerged, consolidated and became hegemonic through the work of politically engaged epistemic communities. More than this, however, the thesis aims to show how space is an important element in the policy process as the always already spatialised nature of policy and their associated epistemic communities is one of the key drivers of change in dominant economic knowledges.

1.3: Policy transfer and the creative industries

Remaining true to the (linked) multiplicity and spatiality of knowledge requires an analysis of the emergence of creativity that does not attempt to account for it

'all at once' by locating it within the logic of some overarching narrative such as capitalism, modernity or globalisation. The emergence of creativity as a broad policy category has come from a number of interweaving strands of knowledge comprised of embodied and codified knowledge forms that circulate between different networked sites, changing these, and themselves, as they go. Starting from specific beginnings, as these strands have been weaved and articulated together they have become increasingly ubiquitous, to the point that the specificity of their emergence is obscured or dismissed as irrelevant and they take on the character of an accepted truth about the economy. This thesis tracks the dynamics of one of these strands.

There are a number of policy programmes and associated concepts that draw on or refer to the human capacity for creativity and the economic benefits this can entail: Richard Florida's 'creative class' in which certain creative individuals are the wellsprings of economic success; the concept of the 'creative economy' where human creativity is seen as the key resource; the 'creative cluster' of enterprises drawing on their own stocks of creativity as well as those in the enterprises agglomerated around them (see Gospodini, 2006; Mossig, 2008). The particular policy concept that this thesis will focus on, however, is the *creative industries*. The worldwide circulation of this concept over the last ten years has meant it is an important constitutive element of the transnational emergence of creativity in policy discourses and programmes.

The creative industries are a policy concept that describes a particular economic sector comprised of industries deemed to rely on human creativity for the production of value. It includes those industries that until the late 1990s were more typically referred to as the *cultural* industries – for example music, the performing and visual arts, film, television and publishing – as well as a number of other industries seen as dependent on creativity – for example advertising, architecture, video game production, design and fashion. For their proponents (e.g. Hartley, 2005), they are a reflection of the creative impulse translated directly into a profitable enterprise *par excellénce*. It is argued that they seem to capture so much about the future of the economy, not just on their own, but as creative enablers to other industries. Not only this, they are seen as having

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potentially ameliorative and empowering social effects and as the solution to the incessant problem of cultural funding shortfalls. The creative industries owe their existence in policy to their ability to be articulated with the solutions being rolled out for the kinds of problems governments are dealing with today. Hence, for Hartley,

> it is in this context that the idea of the creative industries makes most sense; not merely as an area of economic development but more as an idea – namely that creativity can have decisive economic and social effects (2005: 4).

What is interesting about the creative industries for the purposes of this thesis is that they are a historical project, albeit very recent history, invented at a specific moment (Cunningham, 2002; Hartley, 2005). This is generally recognised as occurring some time in 1997 in the UK soon after the election of Tony Blair's New Labour to power. With the creation of the Creative Industries Taskforce and the release of the first *Creative Industries Mapping Document* (CIMD) by DCMS (1998), the creative industries were first defined and described in a policy form. Chris Smith, then Secretary of State for Culture and responsible for the Creative Industries Taskforce, makes it clear that the crucible in which the creative industries were forged was fired by the implied powers and possibilities of creativity:

> Creativity... (is) important for what it can do for each of us as individual, sensitive, intelligent human beings; fulfilling ourselves and our potential. It is important for what it can do for our society, because creativity is inherently a social and interactive process, and it helps to bind us together as people. And it is important for what it can do for our economy, for those great surging industries that promise to provide real opportunities if we nurture them well... How can anyone possibly argue that this is not the proper province of governmental interest? (Smith, 1998: 148).

From here it has gone all over the world. Since being described at DCMS in 1998, the creative industries policy concept, often accompanied by the definition and constitutive industries listed in the CIMD, can be found in policy documents in places as diverse as New York, China, Tanzania, South Africa, Taiwan and the European Union.

Importantly, this transnationalisation of the policy concept has a complex geography. Policy programmes do not emerge everywhere at once in identical forms: the work of making a policy travel over space is far from simple. The

transnational spread of neoliberal policy to the developing world, for example, rested to a considerable extent on specially designed 'Structural Adjustment Programmes' that required countries receiving money from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank conformed to the policy imperatives of the 'Washington Consensus' (see Williamson, 1993) which would open those countries up to foreign investment, privatise their state assets, marketise their social provisioning systems and reduce the influence of the state. The creation of such coercive programmes shows how policy does not simply diffuse from one site to another but that such action relies on the creation of channels linking them up. In this case they ensured neoliberalism would not just be a 'Western' phenomenon (Kelsey, 1999; Harvey, 2005; Davis, 2006; Peet, 2007). But the need to overcome space in this way can have important impacts on the policies themselves: making policy transferable means turning it into a form removed from its original context and packaged in such a way that makes it able to move across space easily – as a set of bullet-pointed and universal directives like the Washington Consensus for example (Peck and Theodore, 2001). This process of universalisation inevitably means change in the particularities of the policy programme, as will the moment of *re*-contextualisation as a transferred policy is made to 'fit' with the perceived context of a different place. Thus space is not neutral here: the fact of policy always being situated in space is of consequence.

This thesis argues that it is through the engagement of this problem of space that the nature of an epistemic community and the particular kind of power it has to shape policy can be revealed. They will be implicated in these processes of universalisation and re-contextualisation and be responsible for explaining away or engaging and incorporating the different effects that pertain in different policy sites. Through this role they can continue to shape and reshape policy. But they too are situated in space and as such will need to change and reshape themselves as policy knowledge circulates to new and different sites. The process of transfer and its related creation of difference have consequences for the epistemic community and particular expert systems associated with the policy programme. The problem of space, and the situation of policies and expertise in it, means continuous change for both. The emergence of policy and its associated epistemic community is a highly spatialised process.

These issues are explored in this thesis through an analysis of creative industries *policy transfer*. In recent years the topic of policy transfer has come to be of increasing interest to social scientists as it provides an avenue for thinking about what are increasingly understood as transnational processes of change in a globalising world. Initially developed in political science, and breaking the developmentalist shackles of the discipline's policy diffusion and convergence studies (see Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Dobbin *et al.*, 2007), policy transfer studies have focused on policy transfer as a policy-learning *process* involving particular agents, institutions and infrastructures (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Stone, 2000; 2004; Evans, 2004). In doing so they have highlighted an important transnational process driving global change and identified the kinds of actors involved. The study of policy transfer can show how the globalisation of policy is actually occurring in space.

As a result this theme has been engaged by geographers in recent times (Peck, 2001; 2002; 2003; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Ward, 2006; 2007a; England and Ward, 2007; England *et al.*, 2007; McCann, 2008). The major contribution of these scholars has been to argue that policy does not simply transfer across a neutral platform of space; it fundamentally changes the spaces it travels between. Policy transfer, then, is not just the movement of a policy from one site to another site, it is a process constitutive of, in this work, neoliberalisation (Ward, 2006; 2007a; England *et al.*, 2007), urban policy (McCann, 2008), and a shift in the state system towards more multi-scalar governance regimes (Jessop and Peck, 1999; Peck, 2001; 2002; 2003; Peck and Theodore, 2001). At arms length from this work has been research in geography and other social science disciplines that have emphasised the importance of circuits and networks of knowledge for changing and producing new spaces and subjects (Bockman and Eyal, 2002; Dezelay and Garth, 2002; Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Thrift, 2005; Swain, 2006; Bockman, 2007). In different ways this work challenges ontologies organised in relation to the nation-state and suggests what is often called globalisation is a set of processes working at a more fundamental level, such as the level of social relations or circulating knowledges, than the zero-sum reduction of their significance.

This whole body of work, from political science, geography and other cognate disciplines, provides a useful avenue for thinking about the spatiality of policy and their associated epistemic communities. As I have argued, policy will often be associated with particular epistemic communities and their constituent expert systems, and as such policy transfer will also involve these groups. However, the relationship between them and the policy process has never been well specified in spatial terms. Rather, the tendency has been to see epistemic communities as little more than an explanatory variable providing the requisite knowledge and authority necessary for particular policy programmes to be developed. But when read through the lens of policy transfer, it becomes necessary to think about how these communities come to gather at certain sites and to create links between them, how they insert themselves in the policy process at key moments and in alliance with other kinds of actors, and how they clear the ground for transfers to occur. Epistemic communities take shape *in space*, and as that space they are situated in changes, they too will change.

In practice this means taking a methodological approach that focuses right in on the moments of a particular policy transfer. For this, the thesis examines the transfer of the creative industries policy concept between the central governments of the UK and New Zealand in the early 2000s. This means the focus is on two empirical 'zones'. The first of these is concerned primarily with policy formation and change through a focus on creative industries policy in its place of origin – the United Kingdom. This zone has been selected both because its 'ground zero' status makes it an obvious place to start if we are going to think about creative industries policy transfer, and because there have been important shifts in the policy within the UK that sheds light on how policy formation and change occur. The second zone will be a place where creative industries policy has (seemingly) been transferred to – New Zealand. The creative industries sit at the heart of the Fifth Labour Government's economic strategy – the Growth and Innovation Framework – alongside biotechnology and information and communication technology as a growth sector to be targeted for government support. This suggests that this is a textbook example of policy transfer. But a closer look at the story reveals that the creative industries first entered New Zealand via channels that had quite different concerns around cultural renewal

and development. This indicates immediately how complex policy transfer can be.

The analysis considers how policy develops and transfers in relation to expertise. In particular, it focuses in on how experts are involved in moments of *problematisation* and *translation*; respectively, the creation of particular political problems requiring policy or other governmental solutions (Dean, 1999) and the making of a policy solution feasible in a site other than that of its original formulation (Latour, 2005). These are the moments that experts are able to have a significant influence. They also constitute the points around which epistemic communities will orientate and develop. As the policy concept continued to circulate to more and more policy sites, more and more individuals became cast as creative industries experts linked in different ways to a growing epistemic community, and the different policy programmes enacted in different places as the concept was translated and recontextualised gave the members of the community something to talk about. There is now a rapidly growing infrastructure of conferences, journals, research projects and policy networks supporting, reproducing and growing this community.

Hence, by these means the creative industries policy concept has 'globalised' (Sheppard, 2005). It has been deployed in distant policy sites and joined with other 'creativity' policy concepts to become a constitutive element of the emerging policy focus on creativity in the economy. This has been conducted through a range of particular policy networks and expert systems linked to an evolving *transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts*. This community provides the requisite combination of policy knowledge and expert authority that makes the creative industries a practical and increasingly mainstream policy concept. Consequently, the creative industries are now regularly understood in many countries as a significant economic sector alongside manufacturing and finance. For example, one site of creative industries expertise, The Work Foundation headed by the economist Will Hutton, has recently claimed in a major report on the economic performance of the UK's creative industries that their size makes them 'a national asset in multiple ways' and that '(t)he livelihood of a growing proportion of British citizens... depend(s)

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upon the sector maintaining its trajectory of growth' (Work Foundation, 2007: 16).

As will be demonstrated, there is no simple causative link between the epistemic community and the prevalence of creative industries policy or creativity policy more generally: the community has developed alongside the continuing development of the policy. As the policy has transnationalised or 'globalised' so has the community. Despite this, the policy concept still depends on the authority that the epistemic community provides for its viability, but this authority comes not just from the community's claim to knowledge – it comes from their ability to engage with moments of problematisation and translation when and where they occur. Thus particular policy concepts, like creativity, that restructure the way that the economy is thought about and acted upon in policy circles do not necessarily emerge directly from the deliberations of particular epistemic communities: to be influential these entities must engage spatial aspects of the policy process which in turn serve to reshape the communities themselves and the very knowledge they engage with.

1.4: Structure of the thesis

This thesis argues that an epistemic community has emerged around the transfer and circulation of the creative industries policy concept, contributing to the apparently global uptake of the idea of creativity as a vital feature of the economy. The argument is developed in the thesis in two halves. Chapters 2 to 4 consider a range of conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues pertinent to this study and discuss the approach taken in this thesis. Chapters 5 to 7 develop the argument in relation to the empirical material through a discussion of the formation and transnationalisation of creative industries policy.

Chapter Two makes a case for thinking epistemic communities as grounded political actors that are not aligned or co-extensive with any particular institutional complex and yet are able to shape policy programmes in certain ways. They are especially useful for thinking about transnational processes of policy change because they are knowledge centred, agent oriented and do not

map onto pre-given social formations while still being situated in space. They provide for a conception of the policy process that is not disembodied, functionalist or centred on any particular set of institutions. However, it is argued that for these benefits to be realised it is necessary to think epistemic communities as *in process* alongside, and linked with, the policy process. This possibility is explored through a review of a diverse literature that in different ways explores the internationalisation of policy regimes as an important feature of the policy process. This includes the political science literature on policy diffusion, convergence and transfer, the geographical literature on policy transfer, and a more heterogeneous literature that explores the circulation of knowledge across transnational space. It is concluded that in order to understand the particular nature and power of epistemic communities it is necessary to see them not as an explanatory variable but as *co-constituted* with policy. This allows for a perspective on how epistemic communities are involved in the policy process and how the knowledge they produce shapes policy.

Building on this, Chapter Three theorises the co-constitutive relationship that pertains between epistemic communities and policy formation and transfer. Drawing on literature from the post-structural tradition, it is argued that knowledge does not so much more or less accurately represent the world as shape the kinds of practices and actions which are expected to act on it. Epistemic communities are a key actor in the production of this knowledge. However, it is not the case that what these communities produce is immediately converted to policy form. Rather, epistemic communities themselves take shape around particular *problematisations* and *translations*, concepts borrowed from the post-structural literatures of governmentality and actor-network theory respectively, which are moments that can result in policy forming or transferring. It is argued that a key element in this are material *circuits of knowledge* around which knowledge in embodied and codified forms move and which link up policy-making sites with different epistemic communities. By strategically engaging this circulation of knowledge at moments of problematisation and translation, epistemic communities are integrated into the policy process, but will themselves be changed as a result of the engagement. Thus policy expertise is constituted in relation to the policy itself.

Chapter Four lays out the methodological strategy utilised in this research. This involved an approach that combined the ethic of Foucauldian genealogy with an analysis of the data that allowed for a theory of creative industries policy transfer to be built from this basis. The spatialised genealogical approach deployed in this thesis traces the material links that exist between different instances of the creative industries policy concept being spoken in different places. It is a poststructural method consistent with the theoretical approach of this thesis because it deliberately avoids explaining linkages in terms of grand homogenising abstractions such as 'globalisation' and provides for sensitivity to difference across space and time. The Chapter itself discusses this methodological orientation before discussing the particulars of data collection and analysis. Three main data sets were used in the research: policy and policy-related documents; secondary documents that engaged with the creative industries policy concept; and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 38 participants who were involved in different ways with creative industries policy. The analysis of this data was a process of 'theory building' informed by the genealogical ethic out of which empirically and theoretically rich narratives of policy formation and transfer were produced for the remaining chapters.

The remainder of the thesis uses the empirical material to build on the theoretical base laid out in Chapters 2 and 3. The first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, explores the initial emergence of the creative industries policy concept in the UK and some of the effects that this has had in that national context. In doing so it shows how policy and expertise exist in a co-constitutive relationship. Beginning with the 'original' creative industries policy document, the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* (CIMD), it is argued that this emerged from the circulation of policy problematisations borne of new and inherited ways of knowing the economy and culture of the UK around the spaces of the newly elected New Labour Government. The CIMD's representation of the creative industries has resulted in the emergence of a framework of policies, agencies and institutions who act upon the newly constituted policy object of the creative industries. The Chapter emphasises the way that the policy concept has also seen existing epistemic communities recast themselves as possessing creative industries expertise

through a discussion of the role of a group calling itself the Forum on Creative Industries, or FOCI, in the creation of a policy document, the DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DET) (DCMS, 2004), that would guide future policy-oriented research on a number of the creative industries. Thus this particular epistemic community has changed itself in relation to the creative industries policy concept and allowed for an engagement that has changed a feature of the national creative industries policy programme.

Chapter 6 makes a more direct engagement with the way space shapes policy formation and development through an analysis of the transfer of the creative industries policy concept to New Zealand. The chapter explores the development of national policy for the creative industries in New Zealand: a story that is demonstrably different to that of the UK. But the differences, it is argued, are not trivial: they show how although spatially disparate policy-making sites are connected by circuits of policy knowledge, these circuits move through complex social, economic and political landscapes. As knowledge on these circuits make connections between different policy-making sites at different times and is translated into new circumstances alongside other policy knowledges, policy programmes in different sites that otherwise look very similar can end up going down quite divergent paths. Thus we see not so much policy formation in one site and then transfer to another as a process of transnational policy formation that is spatially and temporally distributed across a range of policy-making sites linked up by a variety of knowledge circuits.

Chapter 7 argues that the transnationalisation of creative industries policy, which I've suggested can be thought of as transnational policy formation, has been associated with the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries experts. This is a process analogous to that described in Chapter 5: in the same way that local or national policy formation will produce new epistemic communities, so transnational policy formation produces new transnational epistemic communities. However, the transnational nature means it has a different character which is sketched out in the chapter. Experts previously associated with local or national policy expert systems have found themselves resubjectified and needing to learn new practices and skill sets as foreign and

external policy systems have called on them to provide authoritative knowledge for their own creative industries policy development programmes. They have transnationalised as they enter transnational policy circuits and networks to become part of a more spatially extensive epistemic community. This community is supported by a transnational infrastructure of sites of knowledge exchange – conferences, forums, seminars and so on – and of knowledge production – university departments, research institutes, think-tanks and so on – where creative industries policy knowledge is exchanged and produced. These sites also facilitate the expansion of the community, and of the policy knowledge at their disposal, through the articulation of the creative industries with other policy concepts, particularly those concerned with creativity and the economy. Thus the circulation of the creative industries policy concept has been partly constitutive of the emergence of 'creativity' in economic policy discourses around the world.

The conclusion summarises the key contributions of the thesis. It is argued that the processes described here are part of the transnational assembling of the creative economy, not as a particular sphere or object 'out there' to which we must respond, but as a particular governmental regime. This is linked to the emerging transnational epistemic community. How epistemic communities have been conceptualised in the thesis is discussed through an argument that the geographical reimagining of the concept produces a different focus to that of political science, one that emphasises how these communities are both differentiated across space and how they are held together despite this differentiation. The conclusion also discusses some of the methodological issues raised by the type of investigation this is, how these were dealt with, and some of the shortcomings that resulted. It concludes with a discussion of how these shortcomings may be overcome in future research projects.

Chapter 2: Epistemic communities and transnational policy

2.1: Introduction

In a world that understands itself as modern, scientific knowledge has a particular significance. It suggests that it is possible to know and act on the world by providing the basis for truth claims to be made (Giddens, 1998a). As such, in the policy-making arena the testimony of those experts who are considered to have privileged access to this knowledge has a special status in processes of policy formation and transfer. These experts are housed in *epistemic communities* – held together by shared access and commitment to certain kinds of knowledge (Haas, 1992) - that form bastions of expertise whose power comes from the apparent neutrality that access confers upon them. As such, epistemic communities are a particular kind of political actors with a particular kind of power in modern society. They provide the basis for conceiving or deconstructing policy programmes with an air of scientific authority difficult to critique or dismiss as political. Even in policy arenas less connected with phenomena that can be studied under the natural sciences the recent vogue for 'evidence-based policy' suggests that this authority and neutrality is desired by policy-makers (see Labour Government, 1999; Wells, 2007). Given all this, epistemic communities constitute a fertile site for investigating the dynamics of power, policy and politics.

This chapter discusses the concept of epistemic communities and how they have been, and can be, used in the analysis of political change in relation to policy. Initially conceived as a relatively static explanatory variable for international policy coordination (Haas, 1992), diffusion and convergence (Dobbin *et al.*, 2007), the development of literatures that have focused on producing process-centred accounts of policy transfer (e.g. Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Evans, 2004; Ward, 2006) has provided an opening for more process-

centred conceptions of epistemic communities to emerge. Therefore, the chapter reviews and engages two strands of research: one that focuses on epistemic communities, and a more heterodox set of literatures that have been concerned with changing geographies of policy and knowledge. Thinking these literatures through simultaneously allows for reflection on, for one, the relationship between epistemic communities and policy and knowledge geographies and, in addition, how each can inform the other for a stronger understanding of both. This can give us an insight into the particular kind of power that epistemic communities have in relation to policy making processes.

The chapter is divided into four main sections after this introduction. Section 2 argues that the epistemic community is an appealing concept because of the way it centres knowledge in a world where expertise figures prominently in the production of governable subjects and spaces, the way it understands policy change through the actions of certain actors rather than disembodied macro-trends, and because these communities are not co-extensive with pre-defined institutional spaces like nation-states. However, the way that epistemic communities have been studied has analytically marginalised these strong points by treating them as an actor equivalent to agents like lobby groups, advocacy coalitions and policy networks, and therefore as having only a very particular role. Epistemic communities need to be rethought so that their integral influence on the form and knowledge of these other actors is understood and analysed appropriately.

Section 3 introduces theories concerning the internationalisation of policy regimes through an examination of some of the political science literature. The policy diffusion and convergence literatures treat epistemic communities as an explanatory variable which fails to grasp them as any more than mono-dimensional. The emerging policy transfer literature, on the other hand, emphasises process, providing more scope for analysing exactly *how* actors like epistemic communities impact on these tendencies. But these approaches remain tied to conventional methodologies which fetishise space and categories like the nation-state. The epistemic communities concept remains subservient to these other ideas and still acts as little more than an explanatory variable.

Sections 4 and 5 step outside of political science to engage with geographical and cognate literatures exploring issues of policy and knowledge transfer. These literatures are concerned with the need to overcome space in order for a policy to transfer and with the way that this effort reshapes space in its wake. Section 4 looks at a number of geographical studies that explore how policy transfer is a technique in the ongoing neoliberalisation of space. They argue that through these processes spaces and times are being reordered and the state restructured in line with, if not in exact replication of, neoliberal principles. This shows that policy change is often driven by epistemic communities that have been able to ingratiate themselves into strategic policy-making sites to make themselves more effective, but also that this process has resulted in the community having to reshape and reconstruct itself several times over. Section 5 provides a different take on this notion of epistemic communities as 'in process' by engaging the diverse literature that explores the transnational circulation of knowledge and the material circuits that support this. This invites us to see policy transfer as a moment which produces various subjects, spaces and socialities *and* the knowledge that animates these. Epistemic communities become something that is *produced* in part by the political and knowledge opportunities of policy transfer, as well as the other way around. This suggests a novel approach to thinking about policy transfer as a process co-constituted with the epistemic communities that shape our world.

2.2: Epistemic communities as political actors

In recent years the concept of the epistemic community has emerged to describe a particular type of collective policy actor. These are, according to a classic definition, 'network(s) of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' (Haas, 1992: 3).[1] The concept is

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[1] They can be contrasted with the concept of *communities of practice* which are united by engagement in a particular practice, such as census-taking for example, and regular communication across the community about how these activities are conducted. In reality, as Amin and Cohendet (2004) argue, the difference between these two categories is not particularly marked as both 'are deeply implicated in processes of non-deliberate

intended to describe a certain kind of collectivity of actors with a particular function in the policy arena discernable from other collectivities such as lobby groups, interest groups, advocacy coalitions and policy networks. This revolves around its members sharing particular epistemologies and ontologies which are expressed through certain knowledge practices and knowledge forms. Haas (1992) understands these as cohering around shared principled and causal beliefs, notions of validity and a common policy enterprise. To this extent the legitimacy that is bestowed upon the epistemic community is derived from the privileged access they are perceived to have to especially scientific knowledge and, crucially, it is this knowledge that is seen as the glue which holds the community together over and above any shared political or material interests and/or class positions (Gough and Shackley, 2001). Hence, although they are defined as collective *political* actors their unity as a community comes from this shared commitment to knowledge over and above their shared commitment to a political cause. This differentiates them from other collective policy actors which cohere around, and obtain their unity from, particular political issues or causes.

The epistemic communities concept has been used to analyse the involvement of a wide range of the natural and social scientists in the development of policy forms. These have included, for example, the development of programmes and policies for HIV/AIDS policy (Vandormael, 2007), 'safe motherhood' practices (Shiffman *et al.*, 2004), water management (Galaz, 2005), bioethics (Salter and Jones, 2005), innovation policy (Albert and Laberge, 2007), monetary and fiscal policy (Verdun, 1999; King, 2005) and data privacy (Newman, 2008). It has been used to understand particular social movements including 'environmental stewardship' (Gray and Hatchard, 2007) and international labour movements (Van Daele, 2005). Recent interest in the role of economists in the production of post-Welfare State economic policy has identified epistemic communities of 'free market economists' (Afonso, 2007), 'neoliberal economists' (Chwieroth, 2007), and competition policy officials (van Waarden and Drahos, 2002) shaping policy programmes across transnational space. Furthermore, as Chilvers (2007) shows,

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learning that are rooted in doing, despite the varying degree of the intentionality of the knowledge within each' (ibid.: 78). There is little to separate them in terms of how they function, sociologically or geographically.

they are not just useful for understanding the diffusion of particular policy knowledges, they can also help to reproduce particular *practices* of policy development, as in his example of an emergent epistemic community of participatory appraisal experts who facilitate public engagement with policy processes. Despite objections that in practice epistemic communities are difficult to identify and delineate and their impacts even more difficult to pin down (Dunlop, 2000), it is clear that the concept has a wide appeal to analysts.

There are several reasons why the epistemic community is a useful and appealing concept. For one, it is knowledge-centred (Cinquegrani, 2002; Ladi, 2005). It emphasises the ways knowledge shapes policy programmes around the world. Under modernity it is taken for granted that the world can be known and acted upon (Giddens, 1998a). As a result of this, expertise in a variety of forms has become a key aspect of regimes and structures of government (Rose, 1999a; Dean, 1999; 2007; Mitchell, 2002;). Epistemic communities are, by definition, policy actors situated in the production and mobilisation of particular kinds of knowledge. They are one of the bastions of expertise that render the world knowable for the policy-making process. The study of epistemic communities can therefore provide insights into the role that knowledge plays in political processes, not only through the reduction of uncertainty and the framing of policy (Haas, 1992), but through the privileging of certain knowledges ahead of others, such as monetarism ahead of Keynesianism in economics for example (Hall, 1993), resulting in the emergence of particular dominant conceptions of the world. Epistemic communities, then, are a key provider of the means by which differently constituted policy actors, such as lobby groups, advocacy coalitions and policy networks, are able to act by providing them with relevant knowledge resources and delineating zones for engagement between them (Sebenius, 1992).

Second, epistemic communities privilege a more agent-oriented approach to policy change over a systemic and/or structural one. For Haas, this stems from the assumption that 'state actors are uncertainty reducers as well as power and wealth pursuers' (1992: 4). This means that policy choices are not reducible to simple economic or geopolitical determinism – they need to be understood as negotiated settlements produced by actors drawing on the expertise different

epistemic communities provide. Taking this further I would argue analyses that emphasise the role of epistemic communities avoid explanations that reduce processes of policy change to consequences or features of the kinds of large-scale changes that they are, in fact, partly constitutive of. For example, describing an incidence of policy convergence on an international scale as the globalisation of policy comparable to the globalisation of capital, labour and production tells us little about how such circumstances coalesced and risks sliding into a teleological narrative of inevitable disembodied progression towards a global future. A focus on epistemic communities recognises the way that the policy changes which produce convergence depend upon a variety of actors facilitating and engaging the necessary linkages across space which constitute the process of globalisation in an uneven and undetermined fashion (Olds, 2001).

And third, epistemic communities do not map easily onto particular political formations, such as the nation-state, or institutionally-defined groupings, such as academic disciplines, but they do have consequences for their geographies (Gough and Shackley, 2001). Epistemic communities imply a network approach to the study of social forms in which the relational links between actors are emphasised rather than the particular institutional spaces they individually occupy (see Knox *et al.*, 2006). This has methodological and conceptual benefits. Methodologically, the emphasis on relations rather than structures means that cultural and institutional explanations for policy change can be accommodated without privileging either (O'Brien, 2003). Although Haas originally conceived epistemic communities in opposition to institutional explanations which analyse policy change and coordination as resulting from the self-interested actions of institutional actors by suggesting that the latter can be directed in their actions by the former, recent studies which emphasise their network character have suggested that there is no need to see the particular cultures these communities are situated in as entirely separate from those that institutional actors are situated in, or for the relationship between them to be only unidirectional (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; Halfon, 2006; Sharif, 2006). Epistemic communities are forced to contend with a variety of institutional and cultural imperatives, the negotiation of which is central to their existence. There is no need to limit an analysis of

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policy change to one type of explanation at the expense of another when epistemic communities constitute the focus.

Conceptually, thinking of epistemic communities primarily as networks means that they are relatively amorphous, but this does not mean that the shape they take is insignificant. Epistemic communities may be quite concentrated in a small number of agencies and comprised of a number of equivalent individual knowledge workers. Or they may be spatially diffuse, spread across transnational space through relationships of varying intensity and with a variety of individual roles within the community taken across space and time despite their shared epistemology and ontology. This will partly be a result of the variety of roles that individual actors within the community have, such as laboratory technician, academic, science communicator, journalist and so on. The relative influence of the epistemic community, however, will be dependent on its shape, especially with regard to how well integrated they are into policy-making sites. In Haas's (1992) formulation, under conditions of uncertainty particular epistemic communities can come to be influential in a variety of policy-making sites and scales. An epistemic community's presence can explain how the same policy might be reproduced in different nation-states. Conversely, the lack of an epistemic community can explain why such reproduction *does not* happen (Kim, 2007). This means that the shape of an epistemic community across space is intimately associated with changing policy geographies, and with changing political geographies more generally.

In sum, the notion of epistemic communities is appealing because it conceptualises expertise as an active and distinctive agent that is not necessarily reducible to a particular institution or bounded space. It allows us to talk about expertise as effective in non-abstract terms while avoiding centring it on particular spaces or socialities such as certain nations (e.g. the USA), institutions (e.g. the International Monetary Fund), disciplines (e.g. economics) or professions (e.g. accountants). But despite these strengths there are important weaknesses in the approach that need to be considered and overcome.

The most common complaint has been that approaches which centre epistemic communities overstate the role of scientists and scientific knowledge in the policy-making process while obscuring other equally important influences like national politics (Westrup, 2007), institutions and interests (Harrison, 2002), and non-expert political actors (Farquharson, 2003). These kinds of observations have led to the conclusion that epistemic communities are only effective and important under particular conditions and at particular times (Peterson, 1992; Houlihan, 1999; Zito, 2001). Mendelson (1993), for example, argues that an epistemic community will be effective under three conditions: access to leadership, partiality of the leadership to its ideas, and the ability of the leadership to take action. More stringent critiques argue that the approach fails because it does not recognise the social construction of knowledge and hence the importance of the conditions under which the knowledge of the community has been produced, resulting in the epistemic communities approach imagining a non-existent space of pure, unsocialised scientific knowledge (Toke, 1999; Harrison, 2002).

These critiques conclude that epistemic communities need to be understood as interacting with a variety of other kinds of groups when it influences policy (Dunlop, 2000). Some of the work that alludes to epistemic communities argues that it is most usefully conceived as complementary or ancillary to other concepts like advocacy coalitions, lobby groups or policy networks (Coleman and Skogstad, 1995; Elliot and Schlaepfer, 2001; van Waarden and Drahos, 2002; Meijerink, 2005). This is useful for demonstrating the relationships between different policy actors and suggests a way of relativising the role of scientists and scientific knowledge in the policy-making process.

However, treating epistemic communities as *equivalent* with these more specific policy actors risks reproducing the idea of them as situated in some separate scientific sphere and, as a consequence, situating knowledge there as well. These approaches line up epistemic communities to take on a very particular role in the policy-making process and hence to have only a very particular influence when scientific knowledge is called upon in 'conditions of uncertainty'. Such an analysis marginalises the role that they play in defining the terms and delineating the spaces of engagement for other policy actors. Epistemic

communities will interact *and* intersect with advocacy coalitions and such like through particular individuals and agencies involved in, or connected to, both scientific research *and* advocacy (Gough and Shackley, 2001). This means that while a particular policy action might be put down to the work of an advocacy coalition or lobby group, the possibility of conceiving and mobilising the action often depends on the translation of 'scientific' knowledge into 'political' action, hence blurring the line between the two (Barry, 2001). For example, the possibility of action on climate change, launching a protest at a major airport for example, depends to a large extent on the links that are drawn between particular activities and knowledge about climactic changes. Without the authority of the science, the politics would not be *conceivable*, let alone actionable. In this way knowledge is distributed through-out the policy-making process and epistemic communities are a key source of its authority. Epistemic communities are not simply a heretofore unrecognised policy actor but a distinctively modern social form that acts as a source of expertise facilitating authoritative action on the world.

The problem is that epistemic communities are theoretically coupled to particular conceptions of policy as produced in a sphere of action separate from but influenced by other spheres: 'society', 'economy' or 'culture' for example. If we are to take seriously the way that knowledge is integral to policy it is necessary to stop thinking of policy as being produced *in response* to knowledge claims alongside a variety of other influences by autonomous actors occupying a separate sphere. As I have discussed in this section, the epistemic community concept has a lot to offer in this regard. Later I argue that this still requires a more integrated conception than that provided by Haas (1992), one which recognises the co-constitutive nature of knowledge when it is engaged with policy actors (Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; Halfon, 2006). In the next section, however, I will consider the way that the diverse literature on the international spread of policy works with a conception of the epistemic community that gives it only limited analytical purchase.

2.3: Diffusion, convergence, transfer: mobile policy and epistemic communities

For the most part the epistemic communities concept has been used to understand and analyse the internationalisation of policy regimes. This refers to a complex process whereby policy-makers increasingly look to policy ideas developed within other national formations for inspiration, as well as the emergence of transnational policy development and coordination bodies (Jessop, 2002). Processes variously described as international policy coordination (Haas, 1992), diffusion (Simmons and Elkins, 2004), convergence (Knill, 2005), learning (Rose, 1991) and transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) are features of this trend. The argument developed here will also approach epistemic communities in the context of this trend, but suggests that how these processes are thought about effects how epistemic communities are understood as social formations. If the advantages of the epistemic community concept discussed above are to be realised, and its shortcomings overcome, it needs to be situated in a conception of policy change that does not underplay or marginalise their role. The remainder of this chapter discusses some of the different ways the internationalisation of policy regimes has been thought about and the consequences these have for our conceptions of epistemic communities.

2.3.1: Policy diffusion, policy convergence

The more established areas of study are those researching policy diffusion (Ingraham, 1993; Grossback et al., 2004; Simmons and Elkins, 2004) and policy convergence (Bennett, 1991; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Knill, 2005). While the latter is interested in the spatial patterns which track how a particular policy moves from one administrative setting to another and the latter focuses on how policies in different settings come to resemble each other over time, both share a common project which inherits the legacy of developmentalist and modernisation paradigms by focusing on the extent to which policies spread and even out across space (Bennett, 1991; Banks et al., 2005). As such their focus tends to be on policy only, not the institutional milieu in which they are situated or the specific links between particular policy programmes. Differences within what are

considered broadly comparable policy programmes tend to be written out or played down as reflecting local context. As a result these analyses are about tracking the extent of policy homogeneity across space.

These studies try to explain the presence or absence of policy homogeneity through the consideration of particular variables, resulting in a specific conception of actors like epistemic communities. Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett (2007) identify four approaches within the literature which each emphasise different variables for explaining policy diffusion and convergence: coercion approaches consider the influence of particular powerful nation-states or supra-national institutions, competition theorists argue that increased economic competition between countries will over time produce policy convergence in a race to the bottom, learning theorists suggest that countries learn from their experiences and from each other, and constructivists point to the role of certain expert groups and international organisations who define rules and norms. Epistemic communities are emphasised in this last approach. The focus on causality implied in these approaches which tries to explain policy diffusion/convergence by way of particular variables reifies the latter as objects with well-defined boundaries, consistency and integrity. It tells us little about the role of entities like epistemic communities in *shaping* the policy programme or indeed the way that they come to be integrated into the policy-making environment. Hence, although these studies recognise the existence of epistemic communities and therefore the importance of knowledge to policy, the nature of their agency is reduced to a causal association with a particular policy programme and the nature of their spatiality, while transnational, is so only in a mono-dimension of presence or absence.

2.3.2: Policy transfer

In recent years these limitations have generated the emergence of a new literature that self-consciously refers to policy transfer as a distinct *process* driving these wider trends (Bennett, 1997; see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). In a widely-cited review Dolowitz and Marsh define policy transfer as:

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a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place (1996: 344).

By emphasising *process* this approach is set apart from diffusion/convergence studies. While the latter start from the fact of parallel policies the policy transfer approach focuses on how this situation came about in specific instances. This has opened up a productive research agenda (Evans, 2004). Studies have included, for example, policy transfers in telephone regulation (Zarkin, 2005), environmental policy (Buhrs, 2003), health policy (Jacobs and Barnett, 2000), workfare/welfare policy (Deacon, 2000; Daguerre, 2004) and pay-for-performance in the public sector (Mintrom and Vegari, 1998). From a different perspective policy transfer has been used to examine transnational policy relationships; John and Cole (2000), for example, show how international policy transfer is more likely to occur in economic policy than in education policy. A number of studies have examined the British uptake of American ideas, suggesting a sender and receiver situation (Dolowitz *et al.*, 1999; Deacon, 2000; Daguerre, 2004). Other work has sought to problematise this by showing how policy flows often come from a range of countries (e.g. Pierson and Castles, 2002).

The approach of policy transfer studies is to discern the particular moments when and where an external policy came to be influential for a particular policy-making process. Not only does this introduce more specific policy-making agents but, unlike diffusion and convergence studies, this specificity means that there is more scope for considering the particular types of transfer that take place. This ranges from examining the nature of the process as coercive or voluntary, to the spectrum from direct emulation to partial adaptation and negative lesson-drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 2000; Evans, 2004). Each of these types and degrees of transfer can be far more easily observed through the policy transfer framework than that of diffusion or convergence.

Moreover, different approaches have emerged which highlight different aspects of the policy transfer process. Although much of this work still begins with elite policy actors situated in policy-making sites rationally seeking solutions in a 'marketplace of ideas', these are being extended or complemented by approaches

often borrowed from other traditions. For example, what Evans (2004: 16-18) refers to as 'ideational' approaches emphasise the systems of ideas and ideologies that shape the policy development process. These have focused on the complementary ideologies of sender and receiver policy-making sites (e.g. Dolowitz, 2001), policy paradigms such as Keynesianism or the competition state (e.g. Hall, 1993; Evans and Davies, 1999), non-state institutions like think-tanks (Stone, 2000) and new meta-discourses like globalisation or Europeanisation (Evans, 2004).

Policy streams theory (Kingdon, 1984; Zahariadis, 1999) takes this further by suggesting policy formation occurs at the intersection of three 'streams'; a stream of problems and events, a stream of policy ideas, and a stream of politics constituted by elements like national mood, lobbying and the electoral cycle. Michael Volkerling (2001) has already applied such an analysis to the adoption of creative industries policy in the New Zealand context. For Volkerling, the lack of a clear policy direction for the creative industries in both the UK and New Zealand, where they have been otherwise enthusiastically adopted, points 'to forces at work in the policy process quite unlike the procedures for rational choice that are often represented as normative' (2001: 447). Policy formation resulted from the coupling of a particular policy problem, in this case cultural funding, with a solution, the creative industries, by policy makers and policy entrepreneurs. However, there is a tendency for these studies to assert that ideas and ideologies matter without showing it empirically (Evans, 2004). Although, in response to Evans assertion research into the emergence of policy 'brands' offers a way of thinking about how ideas and ideologies get translated into the policy transfers themselves (Ogden *et al.*, 2003).

Another example has been the development of institutionalist perspectives on policy transfer processes. Bulmer and Padgett (2004), for example, show that in the context of the EU, transfer processes and outcomes have varied depending on whether they have been driven by hierarchical or multilateral governance systems. Other studies argue that institutional isomorphism is not only a condition in which policy transfer may occur (Erlingsdottir and Lindberg, 2005), but is a potential strategy for stimulating policy transfer in institutions lacking

legitimacy, such as within the European Union (Radaelli, 2000). In different ways these approaches highlight the politics of transfer and the role of actors, institutions and events in these processes.

This literature's focus on the moment of transfer allows for a more specific analysis of the particular type of agency that actors like epistemic communities have in policy formation. Rather than being just a causal actor that is either present or absent, epistemic communities are recognised as having a particular role within institutions or through the production of ideas. However, this emphasis on agency is let down within the literature by a tendency to retain the mono-dimensional quality that is given to epistemic communities and similar actors in the diffusion/convergence literature. They tend to be understood as working on particular platforms of space provided by the nation-state.

This stems from a tendency towards methodological nationalism in much of this work (Stone, 2004). Methodological nationalism refers to the propensity to understand processes in terms of the scale of the nation-state so that global space is constituted by a series of relatively self-contained political systems between which policy transfers. Although this may seem like an inevitable consequence of this kind of study given they focus on the movement of policy between the political systems that constitute, reproduce and reify these spaces, there is a tendency to conflate national politics with particular ideas about the national context. Hence Dolowitz (2001) argues from an ideational perspective that the adoption in the UK of American policy ideas concerning child maintenance stemmed from the shared neoliberal ideology each country was being governed under. Daguerre (2004), from an institutionalist perspective, argues that British adoption of American workfare policies occurred because each country has similarly structured labour markets and institutionally similar welfare state systems. These approaches tend to work with a single *national* dimension of effectivity in which particular policy-makers act in a manner determined at that scale. Such analyses further reify the nation-state as a container of co-extensive ideologies, labour markets, politics and so on, resulting in a limited analysis of policy transfer that understands this as a moment of connection between otherwise separately evolving national systems. While epistemic communities

may be recognised as particularly transnational or local in these formulations, their agency will be understood through their impact on nation-state platforms.

2.3.3: Transnationalising policy transfer

The tendency in social science to think in a methodologically nationalist fashion has been under challenge for a number of years by approaches which emphasise the multiple and relational scales, from the local to the global, at which state and economic systems are organised (Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004) and/or the myriad networks, commodity chains and material flows which cut across and constitute multiple, apparently national spaces (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Castells, 2000; Slaughter, 2005; Coe *et al.*, 2008). The policy transfer literature is increasingly embracing these approaches by emphasising the constitutive role of the transnational dimension to policy transfer.

Of particular significance has been the emergence of what have been called *multi-level* approaches to policy transfer (see Evans and Davies, 1999; and the works collected in Evans, 2004). These synthesise different aspects of policy formation and transfer with theoretical trajectories that emphasise scale especially. These have predominantly utilised a realist methodology and structuration theory to develop a multi-level model which places the actions of actors involved in policy transfer within a wider historical and socio-economic context. The highest level focuses on global, international and transnational structures, such as the global economy, which constrain the behaviour of actors at the two lower levels. The second level is the level of the relatively autonomous state, recognised in its historical context and its potential for strategic selectivity within the structures of the first level. Finally, the third level is the policy transfer network which is made up of indigenous and endogenous agents with some level of autonomy involved in processes of policy transfer. The model argues that events at this level can often be explained by reference to the interaction of levels one and two. This brings analyses of policy transfer into conversation with wider theoretical and empirical concerns associated with changes in the state and the global economy. Like ideational and institutionalist approaches, it moves policy transfer analysis beyond 'pluralist' description to frameworks that are capable of

considering questions about distributions of power. However, to date this analysis has tended to be about whether policy has been transferred voluntarily, through states independently seeking policies from elsewhere, or coercively, where states have been forced to adopt particular policies under pressure from more powerful actors like the International Monetary Fund (Evans, 2004).

In her recent work, Diane Stone takes the issue of methodological nationalism head on by emphasising the role of international organisations and non-state actors in 'transnationalising' policy (see Stone, 2004). Drawing on earlier work which sought to identify 'soft' forms of policy transfer by organisations like think-tanks which spread ideas and norms across international space (Stone, 2000), she combines this with an analysis of the transfer of 'hard' policy tools, structures and practices through policy agencies. She argues that transfer activity takes place within and between overlapping national and international agencies as emergent governance structures she describes as 'global public policy networks'. These networks transcend national and international space and need to be analysed as such. This frees the analysis of policy transfer from being about transfer between self-contained nation-states to think about the dynamics of these multiply-constituted global networks cutting across these spaces and carrying policies into them. For Stone (2004) this means thinking about policy transfer as the *transnationalisation* of policy: the emergence of transnational policy-making structures which increasingly shape policy at this scale.

Both of the approaches represented by Evans and Stone place the study of policy transfer in transnational perspective. It elevates the study of policy transfer from being about national political systems to consider how these are integrated into global systems *through* processes like policy transfer. Because this requires multi-scalar and multi-spatial thinking, actors like epistemic communities can be recognised as emergent and effective in a variety of sites situated at a variety of political scales. Working within these frameworks allows the analytical advantages of the epistemic communities conception – their focus on knowledge, their centring of agency, and their networked and multiple spatiality – to flourish. At this point, however, it remains tied to the initial project of Haas to identify an actor that could shape policy by virtue of its claim to scientific

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expertise. There is a lack of theorisation regarding how epistemic communities *form* or how they become influential in policy debates. This will be rehearsed in these approaches because of their focus on theorising policy transfer by identifying the actors involved in the process and the dynamic spaces they perform in. By going one step further and recognising that policy transfer, policy actors (including epistemic communities), and the spaces of transfer are all *co-constituted,* a more powerful conception of the place of epistemic communities can be advanced.

To be sure, despite their sophisticated approaches to policy transfer, both Evans and Stone still work with relatively static conceptions of space. This means that while they recognise that the international state system is changing they understand this as being the result of a global political-economic system being layered on top of the existing nation-state system, resulting in new roles for the latter. Hence Evans argues that global structures, such as the 'global economy', places constraints on the actions of actors at 'lower' levels. Stone's argument focuses on the emerging transnational governance system which she argues has similar impacts on nation-states. Although she does not wish to 'deny the continuing power and impact of nation-states', their role is reduced to producing 'difference and diversity' (2004: 561) in the face of the emerging governance regime. The power of the 'higher' scales is assumed rather than explained. Actors like epistemic communities become powerful because they are able to be effective in spaces located at these higher scales. But does their movement into them really explain this power? Or is it that their power explains the apparent power of these higher scales?

Epistemic communities, in their networked spatial form, need to be understood as constitutive of space, and spatialised power relations, through their involvement in the production of policy knowledge. This means thinking about epistemic communities as *in process* rather than as static formations. This requires that certain aspects of Haas's conception, particularly the idea of consistently 'common' notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, are suspended or treated as tendencies rather than empirical realities. This leaves space for the possibility the community will grow, shrink or fragment. It also requires a

conception of policy transfer that takes account of how these processes are integral to the constitution and production of space. The remainder of this chapter will turn to the critical human geographical and cognate literatures to reflect on how this can be achieved.

2.4: Policy transfer in human geography

The possibility of thinking about epistemic communities as in process is borrowed from Jamie Peck's argument that there is emerging a much needed focus on policy processes in general:

> the underlying parameters, ideological orientations, and conspicuous silences of the policy-making *process...* are beginning to receive increased attention in human geography and in the linked realms of political sociology and international political economy, particularly on the part of those concerned to investigate the myriad boundary skirmishes, turf disputes, and institutional struggles that are characteristic of state restructuring processes. One of the strengths of this work is that it conveys an understanding of the state, not as some lumbering bureaucratic monolith but as (political) process in motion (2001: 449, emphasis in original).

For Peck and a number of his colleagues this has set the agenda for a research programme exploring policy transfer and its role in the production of new kinds of spatial formations. There is now a small but growing literature within geography which engages directly with the concept of policy transfer and offers some solutions to the problems encountered in the political science literature through their more spatially sensitive accounts.

Research conducted by Peck and some of his colleagues (see Jessop and Peck, 1999; Theodore and Peck, 2000; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Peck, 2002; 2003) on the formation and transfer of workfare policy in the United States and United Kingdom has made several steps in this direction. The research has focused on the way that a set of local and state initiatives carried out in the US and characterised as 'workfare' have been particularly influential in the UK and around the world.[2] This work explicitly engages with conceptions of scale insofar

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[2] Workfare marks a shift from the entitlements system of the welfare state to one which renders 'residual entitlements to nonwage incomes strictly contingent on local labour market conditions in a general sense and individual employability in a specific sense: workfare seeks to maximise rates of employment by eroding benefits packages and activating transitions into work, a key objective being to foster localised institutional experimentation around these general goals' (Peck, 2002: 342).

as workfare entails the decentralisation of delivery and encourages local autonomy, responsibility and experimentation, leading to a reinvention of the relationship between the local and national scale which, under the welfare state, had the former in a subservient position delivering the programmes of the latter (see Jessop, 2002; Brenner, 2004). This approach to scale allows engagement with how scales are being actively reconstructed as policy transfers take place rather than assuming that ideology circulating at the global scale automatically translates down to local variations on the ground.

In this work policy transfer is implicated in changing state spatialities. They are linked to efforts to understand the transitions that are occurring in the state after the breakdown of the Keynesian welfare settlement in the 1970s (Peck, 2001). Given this concern, policy transfer is analysed in terms of the role it plays in the transition to new state forms around the world. Jessop and Peck (1999) analyse policy transfer as an integral aspect of the restructuring of the Keynesian welfare nation-state to what they describe as a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (SWPR) (see also Jessop, 2002). They argue that we are seeing a reordering of economic and social policy in space and time produced through a combination of 'fast policy' transfers and localised disciplinary mechanisms. The resulting rearrangement of social and economic space-time marks out the parameters of the emergent SWPR. Such a sensitivity considers spatiality and temporality as integral to policy transfer and not just the platforms and timelines of the policy transfer process.

A particular strength of these analyses is that they recognise the work that goes into making policy transferable across space. In effect, space must be made traversable for policy. The particular type of policy transfer that is described here is 'fast policy' transfer, a distinctive pattern of policy formation that has proven particularly apposite for the spread of 'neoliberal' policies like workfare (Peck, 2002; Jessop and Peck, 1999; Peck and Theodore, 2001). For these authors, the use of fast policy explains why so many policy-making bodies, including national, regional and urban administrations, have adopted neoliberal policies despite the probability that these will not be in their best interests (Theodore and Peck, 2000; Peck and Theodore, 2001). Fast policy operates in a political context privileging

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speed and seeking policy solutions to particular problems as soon as possible. Policy making is therefore conducted with haste in the context of a constructed crisis demanding urgent action, often justified by invoking the accelerated pace of the real world. Relatedly, fast policy demands quick results which affect policy targets, sites of implementation and the criteria selected for evaluation (Jessop and Peck, 1999). It is characterised by the use of local success stories as the basis of their argument combined, ironically, with the essentialisation and *delocalisation* of the reform itself in order to make it transferable, the use of charismatic 'agents of persuasion' to circulate the policies (see for example Peck, 2005; Gibson and Klocker, 2004), the decoupling of the moment of reform from the results of the reform, the creation of what Peck (2002: 349) describes as 'transferability packages' – effectively how-to manuals for particular policy transfers – and importantly the use of particular metrics of assessment which frame the debate in particular ways and close out other perspectives on the issue.

An outcome of the work that must go into the process of policy transfer is the production of particular transnational policy transfer channels and networks. In a study of the transfer of the Business Improvement District[3] (BID) model of urban governance across sixteen countries, Kevin Ward (2006, see also 2007b) has investigated how these programmes became 'policies in motion'. Focusing on the transfer of BIDs between 'export' and 'import' zones in the US and the UK, Ward shows how the 'local' political conditions of certain cities in each country were engineered to make the possibility of setting up a BID attractive *and* plausible. The forty-plus BIDs in New York City became constructed as 'models' of the BID programme in the UK as particular actors interested in setting up BIDs worked to produce the necessary institutional conditions – in this case in the form of town centre management partnerships with mixtures of private and public representatives – while conducting and drawing on studies of New York that marked it out as a success story. Eventually, the flow of certain actors and documents back and forth across the Atlantic, facilitated by think-tanks, trade organisations and such like, resulted in a more or less successful policy transfer

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[3] BIDs are usually private-public partnerships that manage public space in certain areas of a city in the interests of improving it for the business community and consumers (Ward, 2006; 2007b).

realised when the UK Government introduced legislation to allow for the creation of BIDs in the UK in the early 2000s.

Ward illustrates the complex geographies and politics that underlie the emergence of policy 'diffusion channels and distribution networks' (2006: 70) and demonstrates what occurs with policy transfer. Furthermore, he argues that processes of policy transfer involve not just the creation of new transnational structures but the re-subjectification of state actors involved in the process along the lines of certain values associated with the policy - in this case to be more enterprising and entrepreneurial in their execution of public roles. In conclusion he argues that this opens up the 'black-box' of neoliberalisation (2006: 71) and reveals how what we recognise as neoliberal is *constructed* and not as all-encompassing as it seems. Policy transfer is recognised as a constitutive process that changes and produces subjectivities and spatialities instead of simply a process that occurs across pre-existing spaces and subjects.

This nascent geographical literature goes some way to shoring up the shortcomings of the political science policy transfer literature described in the previous section. The work of Peck and colleagues on workfare recognises the inherent *spatiality* of policy, in this case the redefinition of interscalar relationships that result from a policy transfer, meaning policy transfer can often contribute to the apparent power of certain scales as well as being beholden to them. This work also tightens the link between the *nature* of the transfer, both in terms of the content and the particular strategy of transfer utilised, and the kinds of spaces and scales that are produced as a result, hence emphasising the importance of the former. Ward adds to this by focusing on the production of policy transfer channels connecting up 'export' and 'import' policy zones. By highlighting the work that goes into making the space separating two administrative units traversable by a particular policy, Ward shows how policy transfer needs to be analysed as a moment in the creation and/or maintenance of structures, what he calls policy transfer channels, which link disparate places.

Interest in policy transfer within this literature has coalesced around efforts to understand how broader processes of change are being worked out, in this case

the process of neoliberalisation (see England and Ward, 2007). Neoliberalism, the application of market principles in the management and governance of the state and its subjects, has for these authors become ubiquitous in state restructuring processes over the last thirty years. From a geographical perspective, rather than being the relatively unproblematic rolling out of an aspatial marketisation programme, the process of neoliberalisation has been highly uneven, negotiated and contingent (Peck, 2001; 2003; 2004). It is in this context that these studies understand policy transfer: as a way into studying how this process is occurring – an effort to open up the 'black-box' of neoliberalisation (Ward, 2006). Policy transfer is understood as a technology of neoliberalisation (England *et al.*, 2007).

Making policy transfer an integral feature of a state system 'in motion' (Peck, 2001: 449) suggests that static conceptions of policy actors like epistemic communities will be inadequate. As state systems change as will the means by which policy actors are integrated into the state policy-making apparatus. Peck (2008) conveys a sense of this in his discussion of the emergence of neoliberalism as a political project. For Peck any suggestion that neoliberalism can be portrayed as a coherent linear passage from the ideas of a self-contained group of intellectuals into a policy programme mistakes the nature of the project. Rather, it was cobbled together out of a number of critiques of *laissez faire* and the welfare state emerging from a variety of institutional sites situated in North America and Europe but connected together by networks like the Mont Pelerin Society. Through the negotiated formation of alliances between different intellectuals and eventually with powerful actors in Atlantic states, and the opportunistic deployment of neoliberal policy solutions and their subsequent negotiation of success or failure, the neoliberal project has been continuously *constructed* and periodically remade since World War Two. This is an epistemic community insofar as its members make a collective claim for a particular kind of non-Keynesian economic expertise, but it is held together by fuzzier notions than shared concepts of validity and causality. It is better understood through the shared commitment to a certain set of knowledges regarding the power of the market, the undesirability of the state for governing society, and, importantly, the policy enterprise associated with this. A commitment to this policy knowledge over shared notions of validity and causality, or a desire for power in itself, has

characterised the 'neoliberal' community's efforts to ingratiate themselves into policy-making circles, and the willingness to reconstruct that enterprise in more politically palatable forms to remain there.

This suggests a rethinking of epistemic communities which recognises that while it is shared knowledge that defines them, their relationship to policy, and to policy-making, is not one way. The neoliberalisation of the state system has been a negotiated process which has resulted in an epistemic community needing to reconstruct its knowledge, and itself, in line with the demands of negotiating alliances and the circumstances in which it has had to work. Driving policy transfer involves epistemic communities actively reshaping themselves and their knowledge to allow the traversal of space so that their broad policy enterprise might be realised. This 'in process' notion of epistemic communities prevents it from becoming a static conception.

However, this research, while empirically showing how epistemic communities are not external to the state system but linked into it in particular ways, centres the power of the state. The capacity of the state to produce policy is linked to its role shaping social relations at a variety of scales. Epistemic communities intervene on this process in an effort to make the state perform this role in a way that will accomplish their desired outcomes. As such, these approaches do not wholly overcome the separation of different spheres of action. While spheres where particular kinds of social action take place, such as the sphere of 'politics' (where policy-making happens), 'society', 'culture' and so on, are made to collapse onto each other or overlap, this approach reinscribes the separation in terms of power so that agency rests with state actors. The focus on broad trends of state restructuring in which particular political actors are implicated, including epistemic communities, reflects this preoccupation with the state as a powerful macro-entity.

2.5: Circulating knowledge

Overlapping with this policy transfer research is work less concerned with describing broad state restructuring processes like neoliberalisation than with the

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circulation of knowledge and how this is constitutive of emergent new, fractured and cyborg subjectivities and spatialities. At one end this research has sought to delineate the circuits in which knowledge is produced, transformed and distributed across space. At the other end research drawing more on post-structuralist and feminist approaches has tended to focus on the role of specific circulating material technologies and practices which condition and govern bodies through the ritualisation of certain performances. These approaches do not presuppose the state as an abstract principle 'holding' power, focusing instead on the way political power works on and through bodies and sites. Although this research has tended to not engage with the question of policy transfer directly (with the exception of McCann (2008) below), it can provide us with a number of insights into these processes and into their relationship to epistemic communities.

While there is a large amount of diversity in the approach and empirical focus of these studies, they all share a concern for how knowledge travels across space and takes on a transnational, and by association universalised and naturalised (Tsing, 2005), character. They suggest that the circulation of knowledge via certain actors and texts and through certain conduits and channels reflects the carving out of transnational relational geographies (Massey, 2005) which interact with spaces of policy to produce new policy geographies (e.g. Hall, 2007). This is not a new structure layered over existing ones and forcing them to adapt (e.g. Stone, 2004), it emerges within the existing structures and transforms them in the process. Recent work by Richard Peet (2007) argues that the involvement of certain institutional sites in promoting, both through coercion and persuasion, certain kinds of policy for circulation through these means has resulted in a global *geography of power* that has been shaping and reshaping economic policy around the world. In Peet's Gramscian model certain hegemonic institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, produce policy knowledge and policy ideas that are transferred to sub-hegemonic institutions situated in the policy centres of nation-states where they are made into something considered workable in that country's political and economic context. Through these means certain policy regimes (such as neoliberalism) become global, although there remain sites of counter-hegemony – in Peet's view

currently situated in events like the World Social Forum and the governments of South American countries like Venezuela and Bolivia where alternative policy knowledges are provided.

Peet's approach is highly reductive: it marks a clear line between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic policy knowledge when this division is historically, and in practice, decidedly blurry (Bockman, 2007; see below). It also continues to centre power in the state system and remains committed to drawing out the contours of neoliberalism (alongside neoconservatism and neo-imperialism). But it does draw the analytical gaze towards the transnational character of the institutional geography of policy formation. The circulation of policy knowledge, ideas and programmes requires the existence of such sites – whether they are relatively enduring or ephemeral – to drive them on. These transnational, networked structures are produced for, with, and through policy transfer.

Peet's project aside, one important difference this research presents to the geographical work discussed above is the focus on the particulars of the development and circulation of specific knowledges, rather than reading them as constitutive of wider trends and processes. Hence Sheppard (2005) takes a long view to the circulation of a particular idea – one that is nowadays associated with neoliberalism – through an analysis of the concept of free trade as a 'global knowledge'. Sheppard argues that free trade was initially, like all knowledge, a local epistemology (see Longino, 2002) that emerged from the particular conditions and concerns of certain economic and political actors in Manchester at the turn of the nineteenth century. After a successful episode of 'scale-jumping' through the repeal of the Corn Law in 1846 this local epistemology began to gain traction as more generalisable 'knowledge'. Sheppard shows how the knowledge then 'globalised' through an uneven and complex spatio-temporal path that at various times found a place in the spaces of the British Empire, Europe, the USA, and nowadays in the World Trade Organisation. What interests Sheppard is the way what remains still essentially a local epistemology managed to gain global truth-like status through these movements.

The question of the way these circuits are implicated in the production of truth becomes more apposite when we consider some of the more post-structuralist influenced work in this area. Eugene McCann (2008) has expanded conceptions of the processes by which policies transfer through a study of what he terms 'urban policy mobilities'. He refers to the transfer of a 'four pillars' drug strategy around North American, especially Canadian, cities seeking to ameliorate the illegal drug problem through treatment, education, enforcement and harm reduction. This last 'pillar' reflects the fact that drug abuse is defined in this approach as a medical rather than criminal matter. This point is important because McCann recognises that what is transferring is not just a set of policies written on paper or spoken by a policy maker, but a specific way of knowing and acting on the drug problem. McCann therefore locates policy mobilities in the global circulation of particular knowledges and recognises the role of travelling policy *experts* and their associated texts in producing this. These experts do more than just carry a policy from one place to another, they set up spaces of emulation and competition through practices like benchmarking, and they actively produce and reproduce the policy models by translating them into new contexts. McCann also recognises the necessary spaces of mediation which facilitate the circulation of policy further. This includes the work of the media itself (which he has written about elsewhere, see McCann, 2004), the production of documentaries about policy programmes in certain places, academic and practitioner journals which publish policy research, and regular international conferences where ideas and results can be shared and compared. McCann therefore recognises policy transfer as involving a myriad of actors and a range of types of expertise, and, importantly, as tightly bound up with the circulation of knowledge and the production of truth.

McCann highlights the means by which policies become mobile and transfer between places, but unlike Peck and Ward he is less concerned with describing a more general trend in state restructuring through identifying a policy transfer channel between two particular places than with describing the formation of a system of expertise about a *particular* policy programme and its object. The circulation of this expertise and the knowledge it carries with it is a key factor in

the transfer of policy. As McCann demonstrates, the emergence of such a system reshapes the landscape through which it passes.

Analyses of such circulatory systems can provide powerful insights into the nature of apparently structural forces. A significant example of this is Nigel Thrift's work on the nature of capitalism (see the collected studies in Thrift, 2005, on which the following discussion is based; see also Olds and Thrift, 2005; Bryson, 2000). Drawing together and synthesising a number of theoretical strains, Thrift has purposefully destabilised established notions of capitalism and reconceived it as an incoherent and cobbled together assemblage of networks, spaces and subjects attaining stability and consistency of reproduction for only short and spasmodic periods. For Thrift, capitalism is forever changing, forming and reforming into an unevenly distributed disunity, held together only by the networks that traverse it. Central to this has been his conceptualisation of the cultural circuit of capital (CCC), which is made up of practices such as business seminars, texts such as management books and similar literature, and experts such as management consultants and gurus. The CCC circulates around the spaces of capitalism, spreading new philosophies, new theories and new ideas about how the global economy works and how firms and individuals can and should behave within it. In its stead it produces new spaces of business practice and new types of management subject attuned to, and therefore reproducing, the (purported) fast-paced world of the global economy. For Thrift this represents what is distinctive about contemporary capitalism: its turn to being reflexive about itself and its status in the world.

For the purposes of the present work, it is clear that policy regarding 'creativity' policy similar to that of the creative industries is travelling on such a circuit. For example, Gibson and Klocker (2004) track the movement of particular Anglo-American books and experts concerned with the relationship between creativity and policy – such as Richard Florida and Charles Landry – south to Australia and the impact that they had as their visions are translated into policy. Peck (2005) has tracked the travelling of Florida and his 'creative class' discourse to seminars with local government around the United States and elsewhere. This allows us to think about what types of social practices are implicated in policy transfer of

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different types – indeed the CCC seems particularly amenable to the fast policy transfer described by Peck. But this adds something further. Policy forms off the back of the knowledges that travel around these circuits; from the expertise embodied in academics and business thinkers; the ideas codified in their texts; the communal production and dissemination of knowledge that occurs at the points in space where the circuit rests.

Thinking about how the CCC and similar circuits function opens up the potential sites of investigation into processes of policy transfer. For example, Swain (2006) draws on the concept of the CCC to explore the development of a 'transition industry' in the Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union. This comprised networks of experts, especially professional and academic economists, linked to various supra-national institutions, government departments from Western nation-states, universities, research institutions and think-tanks. As this developed a canon of 'transition theory' formed, backed up by new university departments and academic journals. This provided the blueprint for transition economies as they moved into capitalism. Circuits formed which allowed economists to visit, study, write about and advise the governments of these economies, backed up by the legitimated and potentially coercive hand of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and US State Department. Swain underlines the importance of this industry by showing how 'academic and professional economic discourses were, at least initially, more influential than money, markets and the state in forging, stabilizing and aligning economic identities' (2006: 209).

Although this account of the influence of foreign academics is convincing, the model of Western ideas being imposed upon a vacant East is less so. Bockman and Eyal (2002) reach further back in time in their analysis to show how a transnational network of economists that spanned the East and the West had been in place for some time, providing for 'neoliberal' thinkers an ideal laboratory to research and explain their ideas. They argue that the drafting of transition blueprints after 1989 was a continuation of this network with new power dynamics beginning to take hold. This elevated these economists to the status of experts with privileged insights into the workings of capitalism.

Bockman (2007) argues further that neoliberal knowledges developed in 'liminal spaces' between the capitalist West and Soviet East where academics of a variety of political persuasions, not just of the right, produced knowledge about socialism and capitalism that would be used in utopian neoliberal projects in the future. These projects *required* this knowledge to be able to take shape. In a similar vein, Dezalay and Garth (2002) have shown how the adoption of neoliberal policy in South America was the result of the combination of the circulation of individuals between North American universities and research institutes and South American policy centres and the political circumstances and histories of South American power struggles. The growth of neoliberal policy was not the result simply of American policy imperialism but the internationalisation of these regional and national struggles.

These studies suggest that the moment of circulation, and in the context of this discussion the moment of policy transfer, is a moment of *potential*. By emphasising the relationships between the production, movement and embodiment of knowledge, they show how expertise emerges in the figure of 'the expert' able to make links between the knowledge circulating and particular political contexts and situations. But the expert is not simply a cipher. They negotiate both the circuit and the political context. They produce new knowledge informed by both. They communicate this to the circuit and to other political actors. They cast themselves as a particular kind of expert that is nonetheless part of a wider community. The circuit is the continuous production of new and reconstituted knowledge and new and reconstituted experts.

This results in a subtly different take on epistemic communities to that suggested in the previous section. It suggests that we need to think about policy and epistemic communities as co-constituted. Policy initiatives can open up a space for a range of different, previously unconnected actors to cast themselves as policy actors, potentially forming into an emergent epistemic community. Hence it is not just that epistemic communities will drive processes of policy transfer, policy transfers will provide a space for knowledge that is potentially constructive, destructive or transformative of the community to emerge. The Soviet transition wasn't simply the rolling out of a particular neoliberal

hegemony, it was a space in which a cabal of actors was able to form itself into 'transition industry' experts (Swain, 2006). It was an opportunity for a pre-existing epistemic community to recast itself in policy terms (Bockman and Eyal, 2002). Policy transfer can be understood as more than a feature or technology of an existing, more general trend, but a site and a moment where something novel might take shape.

2.6: Conclusion

This chapter has rethought the concept of epistemic communities by sitting it alongside a variety of approaches to policy and policy knowledge transfer. In its initial form and alongside the policy diffusion and convergence literature, the epistemic community is a relatively static conception and amorphous explanatory variable, defined geographically in terms of presence or absence at a particular political site, and with waxing or waning influence. The growing political science policy transfer literature has forced the epistemic community concept to take account of how it is implicated in policy formation and transfer processes, opening the way for thinking about these as networked social formations which have a particular shape and influence on spatial power relations. By engaging the geographical literature this possibility is further developed through their concern to understand how space is traversed by policy and the way that an epistemic community will need to change and reshape itself to be able to achieve it. This idea of epistemic communities as 'in process' is enhanced when we engage with work on circulatory systems of knowledge which suggest that epistemic communities emerge and change in the space of expertise between these circuits of knowledge and the particular political situation calling on them.

The result of this rethinking is to situate policy and knowledge in an interactive dynamic through the concept of the epistemic community. This disintegrates the notion of epistemic communities as an explanatory concept which policies form 'in response' to in the political sphere. With regard to policy formation and transfer they need to be understood as a double moment. First, how they influence policy programmes and policy transfer. Second, how the transfer

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shapes and reshapes the community. Epistemic communities, and the knowledge they represent, are *co-constituted* with the formation and transfer of policy. This means that the particular power of epistemic communities stems from their ability to authoritatively intervene on policy-making processes, but these very processes will result in changes to the community.

In conclusion, the study of epistemic communities can be the study of political change. The tradition of studying epistemic communities has always been concerned with how certain knowledges have come to be influential in the formation of policy and providing an explanation for certain policy programmes that does not turn to narratives of structural change or institutional power games. This chapter has argued that by thinking about the expertise contained by these communities as formed through the interaction of policy and knowledge they can be thought of as a process within and alongside other processes of change. This means that understanding how particular communities form and change can give us a powerful insight into how political change is occurring more generally. The next chapter will develop this further by outlining more fully the theoretical approach that will be taken in this thesis.

Chapter 3: Policy, knowledge and the constitution of expertise

3.1: Introduction

The transnationalisation and internationalisation of policy regimes is one of the defining trends of the world today (Jessop, 2002). The previous chapter discussed how under conditions of modernity, where knowledge is understood as a neutral arbiter for informing policy, the epistemic communities that hold this knowledge have come to be recognised as powerful political actors (Haas, 1992), and how their transnational, networked character has made them a powerful explanatory variable for policy transnationalisation. However, this role of explanatory variable has failed to show how they are *engaged* with these processes. There remains an insistence on a separate policy-making sphere that epistemic communities are external to.

Recent literature focusing on *processes* of policy transfer has offered insights into how epistemic communities are involved in policy transnationalisation. These literatures can be used to analyse how epistemic communities are constantly in the process of integrating into emergent policy-making structures. However, this work has been preoccupied with processes of state restructuring at a variety of scales, leading to a conception of epistemic communities as powerful only *through* their integration into the state system and implication in restructuring processes. By drawing on post-structuralist inspired work on the circulation of knowledge that suggests these circuits have power of their own as they reshape and realign subjectivities and spatialities in the spaces that they pass through, it is possible to decentre power from the state and think about the *particular power* that epistemic communities express.

This chapter draws on a range of post-structural literatures to theorise the relationship between epistemic communities and policy formation/transfer. It is

argued that these exist in a co-constitutive relationship mediated by 'circuits of knowledge' through which different knowledge forms circulate and interact with both. At specific moments of *problematisation* and *translation*, circulating knowledge forms associated with particular epistemic communities will be implicated in the production of policy programmes. As those programmes circulate out of the site they will engage, and potentially change, different epistemic communities. Problematisation and translation, terms developed in governmentality and actor-network theory respectively, here refer to moments in processes of political change when knowledge about the world takes centre-stage. For problematisation: how particular problem-situations are rendered, understood, and acted upon through policy presupposes particular ways of knowing. For translation: how policies developed in one context can be used in another requires knowledge of both, or at least knowledge that is able to assume away any differences. These moments are significant because they do not necessarily occur under the auspices of 'the state', but they have consequences for policy and the constitution, government and transcendence of subjects and spaces.

The argument proceeds in a series of steps. First, the post-structural critique of knowledge is used to highlight the particular type of power that epistemic communities wield. Knowledge, it is argued, is not reflective but constitutive of reality. Most knowledge, however, especially that which informs policy, understands itself within a modernist frame which assumes knowledge to be singular, cumulative and neutral (Gibson-Graham, 2000). This means that policy is implicated in the constitution of reality in more ways than one, it also means that epistemic communities have power not just because the knowledge they possess is highly specialised but because that knowledge has constitutive effects on the world.

The next two steps show how knowledge is constitutive with regard to policy programmes. First, problematisation is discussed by drawing on the governmentality literature. This literature focuses on the way particular *problems of governing* emerge at particular times and in particular places which engage forms of knowledge that are able to define the problem and couple this with a

'solution'. The resulting governmental programme, which can include policy programmes, attempts to act on the conduct of individuals and collectives to constitute governable subjects and spaces. Second, translation is discussed with reference to actor-network theory. Within this approach, translation refers to the way that a network is extended through the negotiation of co-existence of previously separate and disparate actors and/or spaces. With regard to policy transfer it describes the knowledge work that goes into making a particular policy able to traverse space with the effect of changing both the space from which the policy transferred and the space into which it transferred. Through knowledge circuits epistemic communities are involved in both problematisation and translation, but are never in total command of either.

The final section of the main body of the chapter argues that while programmes of government, including policy programmes, are recognised, an aspect often underplayed in the post-structural literature is the way that epistemic communities form around processes of problematisation and translation. From here it outlines an approach to the study of epistemic communities and policy formation/transfer that understands them as co-constituted through these processes. Through the circulation of knowledge forms between them, both epistemic communities and policy programmes will form and reform in relation to each other. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the implications of this argument.

3.2: Post-structuralism and space

Post-structuralism has made a significant impact on the social sciences, including human geography, in recent years (Gibson-Graham, 1996; Doel, 1999; Massey, 2005; Murdoch, 2006). Beginning as a movement in French philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century, post-structural thought has found its way into geography as so many post-structuralisms (Murdoch, 2006) through a catalytic or guiding influence on such moments as the cultural turn (Barnett, 1998), the relational turn (Massey and the collective, 1999) and more recently the 'practice' turn (Jones, 2008). While not representing a coherent philosophical edifice or programme of research, post-structuralism emerged from critiques of

structuralism which had made its project to uncover the underlying processes and structures governing all social life (e.g. Levi-Strauss, 1963; Althusser, 1998). Through such strategies as Deriddean deconstruction and Foucauldian genealogy, post-structuralism focuses on how abstract and eternal truths and meanings are constituted in language and discourse and linked to particular social forms and material practices.

Post-structural approaches to geography have emphasised the multiplicity and constitutive power of knowledge. This stands apart from modernist or enlightenment conceptions of knowledge as singular, cumulative and neutral (Gibson-Graham, 2000). For post-structuralism, there is no knowable ultimate truth outside of the particular systems in which so-called truths are produced and spoken, leading to an anti-enlightenment critique of methods, ranging from science to hermeneutics, which claim to access this truth, and of the knowledgeable subject able to use these methods to stand back from the world and see it as a whole. The aim of post-structuralism, however, is not to claim that this knowledge is 'wrong', but to ask how it came to be privileged over other forms of knowledge, and how this privileging has given rise to particular social formations. Hence, knowledge does not exist only in an abstract and simple binary relation of right and wrong knowledge but in multiple relations with other knowledges expressed through material and discursive constellations of power. How, for example, scientific knowledge has at present come to claim the status of the ultimate producer of truth and meaning is a question of how particular institutions, discourses and practices have been able to dominate, absorb or marginalise other knowledges. The consequences of such rearrangements realises the constitutive power of knowledge. Hence, post-structuralism is not rehashed idealism in which the world is made in the image of the knowledge produced about it but a concern to recognise that knowledge is present in the world, not an abstraction from or reflection of it.

The work of the post-structuralist and post-colonial scholar Timothy Mitchell has indicated the nature of this 'presence' by conceptualising the way that knowledge about social science objects like 'the economy' contributes to their emergence. Mitchell's (1991; 1998; 2002; 2008) project has demonstrated the role

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of knowledge that understands itself to be 'modern' – in other words singular, cumulative and neutral – has had in the colonisation of Egypt. He argues that colonisation was not just a matter of dominance, civilisation and/or exploitation but the assertion of modernist knowledge in the colonial government of Egypt. For Mitchell, it was a particularly modern and distinctively Western *attitude* to knowledge about the world that would eventually produce the country of Egypt, its economy, its army, its population of peasants and so on as the particular social forms we 'know' today. This attitude is a separation between the representation of the world and the 'reality' that lies behind this (see also Foucault, 1970; Thrift, 1996). This refers to the way knowledge is produced after the Enlightenment as essentially an attempt to represent the world through theories, models, diagrams, metaphors – representations.[4] The apparent naturalness of this approach to knowledge is a result of the enlightenment tradition that dominates much Western thought. The way this binary works is not the replacement of the real with the representation but the suggestion in the mind of the observer of a 'really real' that representations represent in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of accuracy and/or ideological slant, but never with perfect simulation (see Derrida, 1981). The modernist mindset, therefore, does not think of representation itself as 'truth' but it does see critically-defined *good* representation as providing an insight to a truth that still exists 'out there'.

The effect of this is a process Mitchell (1991) calls 'enframing' which works at the supposed spatial and social boundary of the object being represented. When a social object is represented in such a way that convinces programmers of various types that it exists and needs to be acted on for some defined purpose, programmes of action will be put in place that 'act' on the object, producing a variety of expected and unexpected effects. Hence, enframing orders and

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[4] As Foucault (1970) has argued, this approach to knowledge in the West came after other approaches which had different systems, described by Foucault as 'resemblance'. What Mitchell indicates is that this was not a wholesale change across the world but something that has spread out slowly from Europe. What Mitchell's discussion of the shift to a form of knowledge that favours the representation-real binary shows is that there existed in the villages of Egypt the 'resemblance' form of knowledge (Mitchell, 1991: 34-62). But this unevenness is not a lag in the inevitable progression towards a 'better' form of knowledge, it is not a case of an approach to knowledge based on superstition or whatever else losing out to a necessarily more rigorous, accurate or productive way of understanding the world. It is, as Mitchell argues throughout his work, a colonisation of thought that results directly from the effect of the representation-real separation.

populates space in a way that makes particular categories visible, comparable and governable. It emerges as the rapprochement of systematic thought and the arrangement of human and nonhuman entities and spaces. In regard to the colonisation of Egypt, Mitchell (1991) shows how the production of model villages, reproduced across Egypt, ordered space so that the 'productive powers' of the nation could be measured and potentially improved. Enframing establishes potential objects of knowledge which are in themselves what Nikolas Rose (1999a: 32) describes as 'irreal'; not quite real, not quite imaginary. Thus, through the real-representation binary that Mitchell identifies we can see *how* modernist knowledge is constitutive of the social and spatial landscape.

The process of enframing marks the social science object upon the landscape. The economy is a relevant example of this.[5] Theories of how the economy works and how policy impacts upon it gather at certain policy-making sites. Based upon this knowledge, policy is constructed that polices certain 'economic' activities, such as exchange and property accumulation, in a way that expects the economy to develop in a certain prescribed fashion. Particular sites are created for, or enrolled, in this process, such as the courts, the customs service, the taxation department and so on, and arranged to enframe the economic. Within these sites 'each rule, procedure, understanding, constraint, enforcement and sanction' (Mitchell, 2002: 292) are what make the economy possible. They provide the arena for economic action without being the actions themselves. But every one of these framing devices is a point with a constitutive outside:

> At every one of these points the 'frame' opens up and reveals its dual nature. Instead of acting as a limit, containing the economic, it becomes a series of exchanges and connections that involve the act of exchange in a potentially limitless series of further interactions... The problem is that the frame or border of the economy is not a line on a map, but a horizon that at every point opens up into other territories (2002: 292).

What enframes the economy will also be constituted by unintended (on the part of the programmers) relations intersecting with these sites, producing new knowledges which can change the way the economy is understood. The frame in which the economy is conceived is necessarily constantly negotiated in techno-

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[5] For perspectives on how the economy is constituted as a 'natural' object for political intervention, see Mitchell (2002); Buck-Morrs (1995); Foucault (1991a); Polanyi (1957).

political disputes which claim to be about accuracy and ontology but, this analysis suggests, have more at stake (see Mitchell, 2005; 2008).

Social objects like 'the economy' take on an apparent material presence when they are performed into being by all the bodies that have their particular dispositions and practices shaped by these framing devices. The particular performances that constitute market exchange are one example. This is not to suggest that similar, or even the same performances of exchange did not exist before the emergence of 'the economy' as a represented social object. It is to argue that these performances are now understood as situated within broader processes that make them comparable with performances taking place in other spaces which could also be described as exchange, and also subject to changes in those broader processes (Callon, 1998; Callon *et al.*, 2007; Mackensie *et al.*, 2007). Hence, insofar as the social object of 'the market' is a site of exchange and therefore a constitutive feature of the economy, the way that this constitutive relationship is understood (for example where the economy is healthy if markets operate under conditions of perfect competition) will shape how particular markets are constructed, reconstructed and managed in terms of the arrangement of bodies, spaces and performances of exchange (Garcia-Parpet, 2007).

As a result we can see how the spaces in which our lives are conducted get reproduced by the very representational knowledge that purports to simply describe or analyse them. The economy is not the only example. Institutional edifices such as 'the state' (Bartelson, 2001) and networked groupings such as 'the community' (Rose, 1999a) are similarly produced, reproduced and changed through the particular practices that express knowledge about their limits and powers. We can also see how new and novel kinds of spaces emerge. New techniques of enframing can produce definable spaces policed at certain sites and in certain ways. Barry (2006) refers to the creation of 'technological zones' that are constitutive of the European Union where differences between certain procedures have been reduced and common standards have been established; the introduction of common food safety practices in different countries for example, or the development of a common form of measurement. These are managed at particular strategically situated sites where agencies perform the

necessary practices to ensure the integrity of the zone. The EU gains its coherence as much from these kinds of policy-based practices as from lines on a map. The result is a topology of relations interacting with space to produce new and different landscapes and geographies.

This section has described the particular kind of post-structural ethic informing the approach of this thesis to policy formation/transfer and epistemic communities. The next two sections will contribute to the development of this approach by discussing two more particular and systematised post-structural literatures, governmentality and actor-network theory, to show how post-structural thought has played out in specific research programmes and draw out key concepts from these literatures, problematisation and translation respectively, which are central to the approach to policy formation/transfer and epistemic communities outlined below.

3.3: Problematisation

Policy is a particular form of knowledge that emerges at particular times and in particular places. It is a form of knowledge because it establishes a particular world view on some social object, almost anything from single mothers to the national economy, and sets out a plan for acting upon it. But this action-orientation is not the unique feature: it is the ability for the action to be realised in some way through the particular powers that have accrued to policy-makers by virtue of their position in a state institution. In many instances it is a key step in the enframing of an object of knowledge. The sections that follow will discuss the concepts of problematisation (from governmentality) and translation (from actor-network theory) in order to think about processes of policy formation and transfer from a post-structural perspective in which this policy knowledge is a constitutive feature of social forms.

The notion of problematisation is drawn from the Foucauldian tradition of governmentality. This literature is known for providing post-structural analyses of governmental systems that *bracket out* questions of the state and other macro-actors, preferring instead to focus on specific moments of governing at the micro-

scale of the body. Problematisation describes those moments where such government became a problem and the kinds of governmental solutions that were put in place to 'fix' these. The focus on policy here means that certain 'state actors' are implicated, but they are state actors viewed through the lens of governmentality where their power *accrues* to them through their position in emergent and evolving constellations of power rather than from the state itself.

The first subsection will discuss the governmentality approach and the kinds of insights it can provide into political processes. This will be followed by a discussion of problematisation, how this is linked to governmentality studies, and how these moments produce governmental regimes.

3.3.1: Governmentality

Derived from Foucault's later work, governmentality is concerned with the 'conduct of conduct': how individuals come to conduct themselves in line with ideas about appropriate behaviour within a particular social formation (Foucault, 1991a; for overviews see Barry *et al.*, 1996; Rose, 1999a; Dean, 1999; Rose *et al.*, 2006). This plays on the notion of 'government' by understanding it not as a noun describing a particular institutional edifice but as the verb meaning 'to govern'. It suggests that if we are to understand how society is organised today we should not start from some macro-entity such as 'the sovereign', 'the state' or 'the economy' and work our way 'down', but from how individuals and collectives are governed in particular situations and work our way 'up'. As such, this approach brackets out notions like the state, civil society and the economy to focus on the micro-physics of power.

There are two linked ways that the term governmentality can be understood. From a historical perspective, Foucault argues that since the seventeenth century we can see the progressive 'governmentalisation of the state'. This formulation states that during this time liberal mentalities of rule have asserted themselves by arguing that individuals should be freed from the yoke of the sovereign in order to govern themselves. But this has not simply been the relinquishing of sovereign power. The rise of what Foucault calls biopower results from the proliferation of

new sites for the training and disciplining of individuals so that they had the necessary tools to conduct themselves appropriately as free subjects: these included schools, armies, prisons and mental hospitals (Foucault, 1977). This coincided with the rise of statistics which rendered the populace as a *population* visible as a new object of government. This object had its own characteristics, tendencies, trends and laws which could be manipulated still further. Sites of biopower became where this population could be simultaneously studied *and* instructed in the arts of self-government. The populace was simultaneously individualised and collectivised, and government could be 'of each and of all'.

Following on from this, governmentality can be seen as an analytics of government in which the way that individuals and populations are governed whether under a liberal, neoliberal, socialist, authoritarian or any other mentality of rule is analysed (Rose, 1999a; Dean, 2002; Hoffman, 2006). This approach adopts the same perspective on government by emphasising particular moments where individuals are governed, through what means, and with what consequences. Through emphasising the particular they show how power does not need to be thought of in a hierarchy with the state or the sovereign at the top acting on the powerless at the bottom. Government, rather, is enacted through dynamic constellations of agencies and institutions where power is never absolute but accrued through the arrangement of forces. The analytical arithmetic is reversed so that the apparent power of the state *emerges* from the arrangement of forces rather than from its ability to assert itself on society.

Governmentality studies focus on the rationalisation and programmatisation of particular technologies of government which simultaneously individualise and collectivise members of the population by marking, measuring, counting, classifying, orientating and/or activating them in some way. They include all the minutiae of modern life such as passports, audits, census forms, codes of conduct, welfare applications and self-help books which subjectify individuals and collectives by making them aware of their status, their potentialities, and their limitations. By making certain courses of action thinkable and possible, and others unthinkable and impossible, these technologies will direct, though not

compel, individuals and collectives to behave in certain ways: to have their conduct conducted.

At particular moments these technologies can be arranged in governmental programmes guided by particular political rationalities that frame up desired outcomes and the appropriate conduct required to achieve these. Hence, globalisation is not a descriptor of a particular set of economic arrangements but a political rationality that will demand certain kinds of conduct and hence new arrangements of governmental technologies (Larner and Le Heron, 2002). The result is emergent and often unstable *assemblages* of policies, concepts, agencies, institutions, practices, discourses, spaces and subjects held together and made coherent by particular political rationalities (Rose, 1999a; Larner, 2000; 2001; Ong and Collier, 2005; Collier and Ong, 2005; Collier and Lakoff, 2005; Collier, 2005; Olds and Thrift, 2005; Ong, 2006; Li, 2007a; 2007b). These assemblages give objects of government their material existence.

Governmentality studies seek to denaturalise the taken-for-granted nature of governmental systems through their focus on its technical aspects. One way they do this is by focusing on the genealogy of technologies. Technologies do not appear out of thin air or as the perfect realisations of some state project. They have often existed in previous incarnations intended to perform under different political rationalities, or they are amalgamations or hybrids of other existing technologies. By showing how the technologies that conduct conduct are often contingently produced assemblages or reimagined and reworked existing forms, governmentality is able to trouble the coherence of governmental programmes and reveal their often precarious nature. Furthermore, this focus can reveal the way that power is congealed in these often mundane and seemingly neutral technologies (Huxley, 2007), and the way that government does not occur only within the bounds of the state: many programmes of government emerge from distinctly non-state sites such as the insurance industry (O'Malley, 1996) and the self-esteem and empowerment movements (Cruikshank, 1999).

The aim and outcome of programmes of governmentality is the production of governable subjects and spaces (Rose, 1999a). This production relies on the ability

to both know a particular subjectivity or spatiality and to represent it in such a way to make it amenable to governmental intervention. These representations are made to line up with particular rationalities and mentalities of rule that can shape programmes of government which 'conduct conduct'. For example, Rankin (2001) shows how micro-credit programmes aimed at poor women in Nepal relied on the idea that this population could behave in an economically rational manner given the correct incentives and appropriate resources. The possibility of 'rational economic women' being able to break out of the cycle of poverty provided the impetus for the creation of the programme along these lines. In a study of the Latrobe Valley region in Victoria, Australia, Gibson (2001; see also Gibson-Graham, 2006) argues that various techniques of governmentality, particularly here the enrolment of the place of the valley and the people of it in tables of rational economic calculation, produced a view of the region as socially constructed and subservient to the 'reality' of the broader economy. This meant that the movement of the mining industry out of the region by large corporations were generally accepted as the result of changes in the national economy that overrode the needs of the people of the area.

Technologies of subjectification and spatialisation are accompanied by technologies of activation which discipline bodies and minds into producing certain types of performance (Dean, 1999). For example, Larner and Le Heron (2002) have argued that the explosion of benchmarking practices amongst private and public institutions has served to create spaces and subjects attuned to very particular codifications (usually numerical measurements) of who their peers are and how they compare in terms of aspects of their performance. These 'spaces of comparison' discipline individuals and workplaces in line with certain aspirations and direct them to compete on these terms, producing a particular type of globally-oriented subject. Academia has not been immune to these benchmarking technologies, the impact the rapid rise of numerous university ranking tables around the world is having on universities and governments is a testament to this (Larner and Le Heron, 2005; Dill and Soo, 2005). All of these governmental technologies work with ways of knowing the world that subjects internalise and reshape their practices through, resulting in their being rendered governable.

In sum, governmentality provides a way of thinking about how governmental regimes are constituted at the level of discursive and material practice as contingent, unstable and dynamic assemblages of spaces and subjects. It has troubled the coherence of governmental programmes by showing the extent to which they are contingent lash-ups of different technologies reimagined and reassembled under some emergent rationality. It has blurred the state/civil society/economy tripartite which informs much social science analysis by showing how populations are governed through the arrangement of different technologies that have their origin and their action in both 'state' and 'non-state' sites. The following subsection will discuss the role of knowledge and expertise in these processes and how these reproduce and change a governmental system through the process of problematisation.

3.3.2: Problematisation and expertise

Governmentality, as practice and analysis, proceeds from particular *problematisations*. This particularity is important. As Dean points out, 'problematisations are relatively rare. They have particular dates and places, and occur at particular locales or within specific institutions or organisations' (1999: 27). They are produced when the practice of governing, of conducting conduct, is presented with a problem that makes the way things have been carried out to this point no longer rational, conceivable or even possible. The art of government is to couple this problem-situation with a solution, a programme of government, which shapes conduct in new ways and produces new subjects and spaces. Hence, problematisations drive the constitution of governmental systems.

Problematisations rely on knowledge. A problem situation presupposes the existence of a normative framework constructed out of knowledge generally accepted as 'true' through an appeal to some arbiter of truth, such as scientific rationality. More than this, in order for a problem solution to become apparent it must be represented as such by drawing on that normative framework in a way which successfully marginalises counter-claims (Li, 2007a). Hence in processes of problematisation the apparent neutrality of scientific rationality can give great

power to scientific knowledge over other forms of knowledge. In this sense expert knowledge is central to problematisation, and by extension to the constitution of governmental systems. How the world is rendered intelligible by these experts, through certain representations of it for example, will present certain situations and contexts as problematic and hide or marginalise others (Rose, 1999a).

Studies of governmentality, then, set their analytical gaze on the need to make the world intelligible for governmental action through the utilisation and mobilisation of *expertise*. The figure of the expert, who will be situated in and largely constituted by one or more epistemic communities, is essential to the production of authoritative knowledge in particular areas of government. These experts provide the representations that make particular situations visible, the language that makes them analysable, and the programmes that make them solvable. The discursive resources and authority these experts offer is vital for the envisioning and successful implementation of governmental programmes. Experts, and their epistemic communities, are integral to the emergence of problematisations and the changes to governmental arrangements that ensue.

However, the governmentality literature does not situate expertise on a plane beyond the spaces of the political from which it exercises its influence on the latter: experts too are governed by the systems they are implicated in. Expertise, while realised in the individual, is as much based on their situation within governmental systems. The expertise of the psychologist, the economist, the climate scientist or the sociologist is constituted by the institutionalised networks of their epistemic communities, with all the particular rituals and practices associated with membership, *and* the networks through which they are connected to state hierarchies, resource distributors, publishers, journalists, research subjects and all the other actors that attempt to govern, or be governed by, them. While experts work with problematisations, they are also shaped by them. The deployment of usually calculative technologies of activation, like benchmarking (Larner and Le Heron, 2002), audit (Power, 1997) and contractualism (Yeatman, 1998), highlights the way that experts are governed along with other societal actors. While they are expected to render the world governable through the

deployment of their expert knowledge, they are also expected to perform in line with the requirements of these calculative technologies. This results in a 'diagram of power' (Deleuze, 1988; Rose, 1999a) where individual capabilities and constraints are realised in tables measuring targets, comparing performance and distributing rewards and punishments in a rationalised fashion.

Due to the central role of expertise, problematisations have a relationship with epistemic communities. They also have a relationship with policy programmes. This means the notion of problematisation is useful for thinking about the relationship between epistemic communities and policy, but also makes clear that this is a *complex* relationship. This will be returned to shortly. The next section will discuss the ANT concept of translation.

3.4: Translation

One of the consequences of post-structuralism, alongside other influences, has been the rise of 'network thinking' (Knox *et al.*, 2006). This focuses not on pre-formed containers in which social action happens but on the networks of human and non-human actors and objects that shape social formations. Hence network analysis allows boundaries produced through material concepts like the nation-state, the firm, the community and even the individual to be transgressed while still maintaining analytical coherence (Olds and Yeung, 1999; Hughes, 2000; Yeung, 2000; Faulconbridge, 2007). It is along such networks that policy transfer occurs and the conscious and unconscious production and reproduction of them, even if it is just for the time it takes to make the transfer, is a key component for understanding how policy transfer works (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2004; Stone, 2000; 2004). This section looks at a distinctive kind of network theory that has been, often uncomfortably, dubbed actor-network theory. The following sub-section will discuss first what the project and approach of actor-network theory (ANT) has been over the last twenty years and how it has come to be of interest to geographers. This will be followed by a discussion of a key concept in ANT, *translation*, and how this concept is useful for thinking about processes of policy transfer.

3.4.1: Actor-network theory

Whether networks are conceived specifically as a particular type of organisational form, or at a more general level as *the* basic social form, it is clear they require relational thinking, forcing us to 'theorize socioeconomic processes as intertwined and mutually constitutive' (Mitchell, 2000: 392). Methodologically this shares ground with ANT (see esp. Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 2005), although the latter is not strictly a network approach. The term network itself is nebulous within the literature, one of the main protagonists, Bruno Latour, has himself swung back and forth concerning the usefulness of the term and of the whole naming of ANT itself (compare Latour, 1999 and 2005). However, there is no doubt that it has been influential in human geography's relational turn. This is because the concept of the actor-network bypasses dualisms like structure-agency by postulating that the actor is a network of traces made up of various types of connections (Murdoch, 1997). As in governmentality there are no overarching structures like 'society' or 'the global economy' or some basic building block of 'the individual' or 'the family'. Actors are not distillations of 'global' processes, but they are not inherently 'local' either as they are realised through actor-networks that can stretch out over space. The ANT dictum of 'follow the actors' attempts to trace all the human and non-human connections that stabilise into a particular social formation.

Associated especially with the work of Bruno Latour (see Latour, 2005), Michel Callon (see Callon, 1986) and John Law (see Law, 1994), ANT concerns the creation and maintenance of the relationships that are constitutive of an actor or object and as such is a ruthless application of semiotics: 'entities take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relationship to other entities' (Law, 1999: 3; see also Bingham, 1996). The individual, for example, is de-centred because it is an artefact of an actor-network rather than a pre-defined and essential being inserted into actor-networks. This requires sensitivity to the work that goes into the formation of the actor-networks that make up institutions and formal networks as well as taken-for-granted societal stratifications such as class and ethnicity. The social world, then, is not composed of these social stratifications and institutions in the first instance but of heterogeneous actor-

networks of humans and non-humans assembled deliberately, contingently or accidentally in socio-technical arrangements.

ANT was developed to understand how science had come to attain the *power* it has in modern society in the wake of the 'science wars' of the 1970s when the self-evidence of scientific practice was questioned by sociologists studying the social construction of scientific 'truth' (Longino, 2002). Developing ideas that were in part attributable to Foucault, ANT theorists sought to understand how relations were developed between the laboratory and the 'outside world' wherein the knowledge produced in the laboratory (the science) came to be seen as authoritative. It is argued that through the active construction of networks connecting up humans *and* non-humans knowledge created in sites like the laboratory is able to circulate to a range of sites and be accepted by a range of other actors. If such work of construction is successful we see not so much the enlightenment of society based upon the knowledge as the rearrangement of relations and reconstitution of practices that are constitutive of social formations.

Latour's (1988) classic study of the 'Pasteurisation of France' demonstrates how this can occur. First, in the site of the laboratory, Louis Pasteur performed a number of tests which, for the first time, rendered microbes visible as a societal *actor* creating the plague of anthrax. These laboratory-like conditions were then reproduced, as best as possible, in the field, and the vaccine shown to have been effective in the laboratory was shown to be equally effective in this reconstituted field site. The movement from field – where samples were collected – to the laboratory, where the samples were made visible and connected to anthrax for vaccination development – and back to the field – where the vaccine was shown to be effective against anthrax – made Pasteur's laboratory a key site for the production of socially useful knowledge about anthrax, microbes and vaccination. As the possibility of the prevention of anthrax spreads, more and more farmers become enrolled in an extensive network with Pasteur and his laboratory in the centre. In the process farming society is transformed as new farming practices (e.g. vaccination) are utilised, farm space is reconceived (as requiring particular sanitation practices), and a new actor in farming, and wider society, is paid heed (microbes). Many French farms came to be enrolled in this

network through Pasteur. Through the role of his laboratory in reconstituting French society he became a powerful actor, despite this power coming from the existence of the heterogeneous network itself. The bundling of this with other laboratory-based work under the name of 'science' has made this a powerful source of knowledge in modern society.

The contribution of ANT in the last two decades has been to destabilise the giveness of seemingly stable entities by focusing on the connections and traffic of the networks that constitute those entities (Thrift, 2000). By bringing non-humans, everything from microbes to laboratory equipment, into the equation and treating them as symmetrical with humans boundaries between society and nature, structure and agent, and other powerful dualisms have been done away with. The focus becomes on the particular processes through which networks are formed and held together. The next sub-section discusses these processes in more detail with regard to how they can help us think about processes of policy transfer.

3.4.2: Translation

For the purposes of this thesis the key insight of ANT comes from its unrelenting focus on processes of network formation, particularly the role of *translation* (Latour, 2005). The enrolment of other actors in a network requires practices of engagement that consolidate their membership but that reconfigure the network in ways that can involve more than just its extension (Murdoch, 2006; see also Massey, 2005). Key to this is the *translation* of an encounter into a relationship. This process is central to the formation and maintenance of actor-networks. It refers to the way that relational associations are formed through the negotiation of the co-existence of two or more actors (see Callon, 1986; Law, 1999; Latour, 2005). Through the performance of these relationships they become ties that bind and the actor-network attains some stability. As a result actor-networks are forever in flux because of the constant process of translation, but conversely they are stabilised by the repetition of performance. This repetition is sought after by centres of calculation, such as Pasteur's laboratory, which want a stable network. Through the deployment of metrological systems and the routinisation of sets of

practices, achieved via the circulation of 'immutable mobiles' like documented sanitation procedures, relatively enduring actor-networks can result.

Processes of translation implicate knowledge in a number of ways. For one, the ANT literature describes the role of 'immutable mobiles' in holding a network together. These are materially stable knowledge forms, including documents, papers, reports, visual material, books and people, that circulate between the nodes of an actor-network and contribute to the reproduction of the relationships between them. These mobiles are the means by which a network is held together. Two, the process of translation often requires expertise of some form to ensure it is successful. A translation requires a *way of knowing* the two different nodes that makes them able to be linked in a relationship that will often change both of them in some way. This will often depend on the work of coalitions of expertise distributed across the different nodes. Finally, this production of some way of knowing two different nodes so that a translation can occur and a relationship can form will often result in *new forms of knowledge* that emerge from the work of expert coalitions (Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005; Lofgren, 2005). Hence Williams argues that:

> the notion of translation takes us beyond simplistic ideas about transferring immutable knowledge, and leads to consideration of knowledge creation. There is a very fine line between knowledge translation and creation (2006: 593).

Like problematisation, processes of translation implicate knowledge and expertise in a variety of complex ways.

Returning to the question of policy networks, what ANT suggests is that the formation of a network is about more than just creating a link between actors: it is also about negotiating a space in which the link is able to take hold. The process of translation in the formation of a network can result in changes in the network *and* in the localised site that the network is linking into (Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005). This is the key lesson for thinking about policy transfer networks which are often not as deliberate or centred as Pasteur's network. As Murdoch (1997; 2006) suggests, these latter networks are 'panoptic' because an established centre is able to exert a high degree of control over the aligned spaces and actors. He describes these as network 'spaces of prescription'. Policy

networks, however, will usually have more in common with network 'spaces of negotiation' in which the links are

> provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to establish and standards are frequently compromised. Here the various components of the network continually negotiate with one another, forming variable and revisable coalitions, and assuming ever-changing shapes so that no clear centre emerges. While this second type may be seen as an early version of the first – once relations are settled then a dominating centre will emerge and norms will be imposed – it does not always work out this way; sometimes networks take shape in non-centred ways (Murdoch, 2006: 79).

This tends to be the situation with policy transfer as these networks are often only formed temporarily and will dissipate or change into a different kind of network when the transfer is over. Policy transfer, then, will often be about the coordination of a policy transfer actor-network rather than the establishment of permanent and semi-permanent relations around a definite centre.

Drawing on ANT brings certain aspects of policy transfer into focus. The coalition of actors driving the policy transfer needs to make the connections between policy-making sites. This involves the enrolment of different kinds of policy actors at both 'sending' and 'receiving' sites and the translation of the policy, of the object of the policy, and of the objectives of the actors involved to the point that their interests are sufficiently aligned for the desired transfer, or some form of it, to be achieved. This means that the formation of a policy transfer actor-network will be a strategic enterprise as different and often competing interests are negotiated, marginalised and transformed. It is here that expertise, and the epistemic communities they are situated in, can play an important role. Through the strategic production, deployment and marginalisation of knowledge – about the policy, the object to which it is directed, and what it is expected to achieve – in other words processes of translation, policy actors with different interests can be aligned around a particular course of action and a particular policy transfer, however temporary that alignment may be. What ANT directs attention towards for policy transfer, then, is the need to make a policy transferable not *because* a policy network has been developed, but *through* the development of the policy network. Policy transfer is not just about connecting disparate policy-making sites, but making the connection a strong one by making the use of a particular policy in each site make sense.

3.5: Co-constituting expertise

Post-structural approaches have proven a very productive route for thinking about the role of especially modernist knowledge in producing and reproducing social relations. However, they have tended to focus only on the way that it is implicated in the *constitution* of social formations. Governmentality has been concerned with the way that government is made possible through the production of governable subjects and spaces. ANT has analysed how social formations have emerged out of socio-technical assemblages of previously disparate objects and subjects. Timothy Mitchell's (1991; 2002) post-colonial project has been about colonialism as the production of the nation, the national economy and the national population as objects of government for colonial powers. These all recognise the power of expertise but tend to underplay how that expertise is produced. In this section it is argued that by recognising knowledge and expertise as situated in epistemic communities there is an opportunity for thinking more systematically about how expertise is constituted and mobilised for the production of social relations.

While knowledge has been recognised as existing in a co-constitutive relation with the spaces and subjects with which it is entangled, the balance has tended to be towards a focus on the spaces and subjects that result from knowledge interventions. This has meant that while this work recognises the way that knowledge is changing – for example the way the 'economic' is increasingly thought to involve 'non-economic' factors – and the implications that has for the kinds of spaces and subjects that are being produced, the question of the specifics of who is producing that knowledge, and how and why they are doing this, have tended to be underplayed. While the spaces and subjects of governmental and other types of intervention are historicised and recognised as multiple, fractured and incomplete, there is a tendency to not extend this courtesy to the experts and programmers who are made the co-extensive embodiment of the governmental rationality in question (Wilson, 2006; Tamas, 2007).

This shortcoming leaves certain aspects of the literature open to criticism. At one level expertise is often treated as expressing, or expressive of, a broad rationality

often associated with a particular institutionalised space. Hence Mitchell's (1991; 2002) analysis gives the impression of a relatively homogenous 'Western' knowledge colonising a similarly homogenous 'Egyptian' knowledge: the possibility of difference or conflict within either is subsumed. At another level expertise is understood only in simple terms as definable under pre-given categories. Hence ANT theorist Michel Callon's analysis of the performativity of economics and its role in the production of the economy (see Callon, 1998; Callon et al., 2007) tends to treat economists as all similarly constituted and the economics discipline as coherent and consistent across space when it is neither (Fine, 2003). At another level the frequent failure to engage with the constitution of experts through their *relations* with each other and with those they govern, and how practices of resistance can subvert or denature expertise resulting in the expert being reconstituted themselves, does not do justice to the extent that knowledge is always already socialised, spatialised and implicated in relations of power (Allen, 2003, see especially his critique of Nikolas Rose, 1999a, pgs 139-151).

This does not need to be the case: the production of expertise is in itself a project, and a problem, of government. Recent work in critical development studies have emphasised the professionalisation of development as a process that engages with, and is implicated in, processes of neoliberalisation (Bondi and Laurie, 2005). This work highlights the way expertise is associated with certain forms of 'cultural capital' (see Bourdieu, 1986) resulting from particular kinds of Western university education, association with certain agencies from supranational organisations like the World Bank to smaller and more specific Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and access to particular technologies (Walker et al., 2008). This draws attention to the discourses, sites and techniques that constitute certain actors as 'experts' through the professionalisation of development both in Western-based NGOs (Kothari, 2005) and 'indigenous' agencies (Laurie et al., 2005). These experts, it is argued are produced in part through their enculturation with particular neoliberal technologies and cultures, such as audit and contractualism, that mark them as development professionals. Although there is a danger here of substituting 'Western' or colonial imperatives for neoliberal ones so that the *production* of expertise becomes co-extensive with

neoliberal rationality (Barnett, 2005), Laurie *et al.* (2005) show how 'counter-spaces' are able to open up through, in their example, indigenous leaders using their professionalisation to enable an engagement with neoliberal development while producing alternative development plans. What these studies show is the way that the constitution of expertise is entangled with the complications of instituting programmes of government. This means rather than thinking of expertise simply as the means through which these programmes are rolled out we need to situate them in a more complex relationship with each other.

This thesis responds to this challenge by situating expertise as emergent in a co-constitutional relational dynamic between epistemic communities and programmes of government; specifically, policy programmes. These specific social forms are linked in space by *circuits of knowledge* at moments of problematisation and translation. Through these circuits epistemic communities and policy programmes are able to influence and shape one another while never being entirely in control of the processes of problematisation and translation that link them up. The remainder of this section will draw on arguments made in this and the previous chapter in order to outline this approach in greater depth.

To begin with, epistemic communities are constitutive of expertise. They provide knowledge in some material form and authority for that knowledge through their shared commitment to certain principles of validity, causality and policy enterprise (Haas, 1992). An expert will be constituted as such by their membership in one or more epistemic communities and the access to knowledge that this supplies them with. By situating expertise in epistemic communities we can delineate its geographical, institutional and social situation, scope and limitations.

Epistemic communities are not static but in process. While they are constitutive of expertise they are also constituted by the people who are the experts. These people will be differentiated by their particular histories and the knowledge that they each 'have', meaning that the community will be uneven in its distribution of knowledge across space and time. It is preferable, then, to extend Haas's definition and argue that epistemic communities are unified by shared *tendencies*

to ideas of causality, validity and policy enterprise. This suggests the possibility that epistemic communities are multi-dimensional with sub-communities forming around differing degrees of acceptance of the core ideas. Going further, Halfon argues that epistemic communities can usefully be thought of as 'constrained space(s) of contestation: new rhetorics emerge and stabilize, but are disciplined by the community's knowledge practices' (2006: 795). By focusing on processes of contestation we can see how a community can maintain its integrity while certain dominant conceptions and ideas change over time. Alternatively, it can also alert us to how epistemic communities might fragment. By recognising how epistemic communities change over time and space we can get a sense of the multiplicity of the knowledge that is spoken in expert discourses.

Epistemic communities form in relation to dynamics of knowledge circulation. On the one hand epistemic communities rely on certain circulating knowledges that enable members to speak with one another in the same language and appear to be working within a shared project, even if oftentimes this disguises divergent goals across the community that could soon come to the surface (Sharif, 2006; Halfon, 2006). Secondly, it is the circulation of knowledge that can create new adherents to the message of the community, allowing it to extend its size and make-up. On the other hand the circulation of alternative or new knowledge from inside or outside the community can also change it, causing it to change its ideas of validity, causality and policy enterprise or to fragment. The integrity of an epistemic community is constituted, and threatened, by circuits of knowledge.

'Circuits of knowledge' describes the specific paths on which codified and embodied knowledge – all the documents, papers, reports, visual material, books and people – travel and circulate. The particular circuit a knowledge form travels on may be entirely unintentional: for example, a research report produced for a government department may end up on the desk of an academic in a university on the other side of the world who then hands it on to local community activists. Or it may be deliberately put together: for example a management book that is distributed to attendees at the kinds of organised business seminars Thrift (2005) describes as the cultural circuit of capital. Reflecting to a certain extent the distinction between tacit/embodied and codified knowledge (see Maskell and

Malmberg, 1999; Gertler, 2003), different knowledge forms will have different properties and travel by different means when they circulate (Bathelt *et al.*, 2004). Hence while codified knowledge can travel further, faster and through more channels than embodied knowledge, the latter provides for a more intense engagement with the actors and situations it encounters (e.g. Grabher, 2002; 2004). The important point is that these circuits are *material*: knowledge can only travel because there are appropriate channels for different forms to move down: knowledge does not diffuse through space in an agentless process (see the work reviewed in Hughes, 2007).

As well as epistemic communities, circuits of knowledge are implicated in moments of problematisation and translation. This means that the kind of expertise and knowledge constitutive of and available to these moments depends on the circuits of knowledge that have found their way into the 'particular locales..., institutions or organisations' (Dean, 1999: 27) where these have occurred. What may have happened, for example, is that a document produced by an expert, or even that expert themselves, has managed to engage governmental programmers and policy-makers to such an extent that they have been presented with an unmistakable problem situation (problematisation) and/or come to think of an external situation as equivalent to their own (translation). Out of these moments programmes of government, including policy formation and translation, emerge. Hence, material circuits of knowledge 'connect' epistemic communities with policy programmes.

As the circuit is material, any connection that occurs between an epistemic community and a policy programme through processes of problematisation and translation could range from deliberately engineered, through contingently lashed together, to entirely accidental. At one end of the scale, ensuring the circulation of a particular knowledge form produced within a particular epistemic community to a site where it would produce an unmistakable problem situation may have been strategically achieved through actors associated with that community organising themselves through lobby groups, advocacy networks or policy think-tanks to be able to access policy-makers, or even to become policy-makers themselves (e.g. Stone, 2004; Peck, 2008). At the other end,

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a paper written by an academic for an academic audience may find its way onto a policy-makers desk through a university intern working in their government department and foment new ways of thinking about certain problem situations. Indeed, a knowledge form produced in one epistemic community-context may be used in contexts and ways quite divergent from the intentions of the original author. It is not necessarily the case that a knowledge form will be associated with the epistemic community 'in which' it was produced, or even with just one epistemic community.

But knowledge forms are not produced only in the context of an epistemic community – processes of problematisation and translation can result in knowledge forms, particularly in the form of policy documents. Programming and policy-making sites are not singular states but coalitions of different actors and interests with links to different epistemic communities as well as other kinds of political actors. Often it will be a variety of knowledge forms coming together in a particular site that induce problematisation and translation. The 'friction' of this coming together is a productive moment in which new knowledge, and new knowledge forms, can be generated (Tsing, 2005). These forms will then 'circulate out'; if they are policy documents they will be mobilised in projects of governing that 'conduct conduct' and produce new subjects and spaces. But they will also be engaged, absorbed and critiqued by actors in epistemic communities. This returns us to that notion of epistemic communities as in process: these knowledge forms could challenge or supplement an epistemic community's notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, resulting in new alliances and associations being forged and/or old ones broken as epistemic communities realign themselves to contend with the new situation presenting itself.

As a result epistemic communities and processes of policy formation/transfer are *co-constitutive*. Epistemic communities do not so much drive processes of problematisation and translation as form and reform through them. But without the expertise that epistemic communities provide, policy programmes will lack authority in conditions of modernity. This means that we should not treat the production of knowledge and the production of policy as if they are happening in separate spheres (Jasanoff, 1996; Lidskog and Sundqvist, 2002; Knorr-Cetina,

2007). By focusing on the circulation of knowledge forms – including policy documents – and how they are involved in moments of problematisation and translation which produce new policy knowledges *and* reshape epistemic communities it becomes possible to discern, in a geographically sensitive fashion, how particular forms of expertise come to influence the formation of policy programmes and governmental regimes.

3.6: Conclusion

Epistemic communities are a powerful political actor with an important role in the transnationalisation of policy regimes. However, that role has been under-theorised and, as a result, the nature of their relationship with the policy process has been misunderstood. This chapter has theorised their role by thinking through the processes of policy formation and transfer from a post-structural perspective and showing how these implicate the knowledge that epistemic communities possess. By understanding both knowledge and policy formation as occurring in the same sphere and across sites linked up by circuits of knowledge, there is no need to see epistemic communities as only on one side of a causative equation driving along processes of policy diffusion or transfer. By using this approach to trace the dynamic between policy formation and particular epistemic communities we will be able to see how the latter have been able to shape policy and how they have been shaped by it.

Drawing on the post-structural perspective links epistemic communities to other work in this tradition that has been concerned to understand how knowledge shapes subjects and spaces. By bringing in this processual conception of epistemic communities we are able to link the production of particular spaces, subjects and policy objects, like the economy, to the particular actors producing the necessary knowledge. The geography and sociality of these epistemic communities gives an insight into the geography and sociality of the expert policy knowledge that is constitutive of social relations. This avoids linking that knowledge to monolithic entities like particular disciplines or 'The West' by providing a more nuanced perspective on where it comes from (compare Callon, 1998; Mitchell, 2002; 1991; Fine, 2003). It also gives a sense of how knowledge is

always already socialised and spatialised and not simply ascribed to particular 'centres of calculation' where the authority of knowledge is mobilised from (Rose, 1999a; see Allen, 2003).

In conclusion, if we are going to think about the transnationalisation of policy regimes there are two elements of the policy process we must consider. One, at a general level, we need to think about the material circuits of policy knowledge. It is through these circuits that epistemic communities are reproduced and find spaces in which they can assert themselves. They are the 'infrastructure' of a transnationalising policy regime. And two, we need to look closely at the processes of policy formation and transfer, how they involve problematisation and translation, and how experts and their associated epistemic communities play a role in this. What these elements look like and how they play out is an empirical question. The remainder of the thesis is concerned with this.

4: Researching creative industries policy transfer

4.1: Introduction

The methodological approach taken in this thesis stemmed directly from the initial observation that the concept of creativity was increasingly being used in governmental economic policies and strategies. It was clear that one particular policy concept, the creative industries, had been especially prominent in this area and the decision was taken to track the transfer of this concept across space in order to theorise how 'creativity' has gained prominence in economic policy discourse. Thus policy transfer became the 'way in' to understanding this more generalised trend. The chapter argues that this requires the use of particular intensive, multi-site methods that are informed by a poststructural ethic capable of recognising and dealing with the materiality of policy knowledge without substituting the particular representations and abstractions of this knowledge form for different, but similarly ordered, representations and abstractions.

The approach draws on Foucauldian genealogy to build a theory of creative industries policy transfer. It argues that producing a *spatialised* genealogy of the different instances of the creative industries policy concept emerging in policy form or any other policy discourse allows for a consideration of the way these instances are linked to each other but does not subsume them within a broader logic. A genealogical ethic requires that the *materiality* of these linkages is given full attention as it is from these that tendencies and trends emerge. Guided by this ethic, data was collected and analysed for these material links. Out of this a process of theory building was initiated that drew in a number of concepts from existing literatures to explain in theoretical terms what was being observed. This has produced theoretically and empirically rich narratives of creative industries policy formation and transfer.

The chapter begins with a discussion of why the creative industries policy concept was selected for this research. It also discusses the rationale for the methodological approach taken and for the selection of the main research sites of the UK and New Zealand. The remainder of the chapter is divided into two parts: methodology and method. Section 4.3 discusses the Foucauldian genealogical approach in greater depth as the methodological approach informing this research. It argues that it is possible to spatialise this approach to get a poststructural geographical perspective on policy transfer. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss method. Section 4.4 describes the three data sets used in the research and how they were collected. These were: policy and policy-related documents; secondary documents that engaged with the creative industries policy concept; and semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 38 participants who were involved in different ways with creative industries policy. Section 4.5 discusses the 'theory building' approach used to analyse these data sets. The chapter concludes with a brief summary and an introduction to the narratives that follow.

4.2: Approaching creative industries policy transfer

Creative industries policy constitutes the focus for this study. This needs to be qualified with the recognition that often the creative industries 'policy' that I will be looking at is not yet policy as we might traditionally define it insofar as it does not make any suggestions or directives for action by particular governmental agencies and actors. The original 'creative industries policy document', the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* (CIMD) produced by DCMS in the UK, is just such an example because all it does is define what the industries are, then list and measure them, arguing that they constitute a rapidly growing proportion of the UK economy. It contains no policy directives as such. In this study these documents are treated as transferable policy because, one, they are produced in designated policy-making sites with an eye to policy being developed in the future, and two, more significantly, they establish the creative industries as a *policy concept* that might be used by actors and agencies in other administrative sites.

There are a number of reasons why this policy concept is a good research object for this study. For one, although it was first conceived as recently as 1998, it has travelled rapidly around the globe and been utilised in a variety of administrative sites at a variety of scales (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). This means they are an excellent example of policy transfer and their distinctive formulation makes them easily identifiable as such. Second, as they have travelled they have overtaken a variety of other policy models, most notably those developed around the concept of the cultural industries, suggesting that there is something attractive about them to policy-makers (Garnham, 2005). Third, as observers have noted, there is a lot of variety in these programmes, but explanations for that variety have been limited. And fourth, the development of creative industries policy seems to be occurring in places where conceptions of the economy and how it needs to be governed and developed are changing, suggesting the study of creative industries policy transfer is a productive way into understanding these broader shifts.

It is tempting, therefore, to situate creative industries policy transfer in a narrative of global economic and policy change that carries the explanation for the transfer within itself. To suggest, for example, that the transfer of creative industries policy reflects the growth of these industries as the practices they involve become increasingly important in the changing global environment. An alternative critical perspective may argue that the creative industries are a chaotic concept (Sayer, 2000) that fails to systematically engage with these changes and are held together in policy form by a combination of ideology and political will. It is not the aim of this thesis to suggest that this is not the case; rather it suggests that such an account would move *too quickly* to explanations and criticisms reliant on abstract conceptions of the political and economic environment that creative industries policy is responding to and, as a result, possibly missing the significance of the transfer itself. Instead this research will respond to Peck's (2001: 449) call to analyse state systems as 'process in motion' by focusing in on how policy transfer processes shape, and are shaped by, how the world is known and acted on in policy. This keeps the focus on how representation is a constitutive feature of the 'real' for as long as possible (Barnes, 1996; Bingham, 1996).

This requires a methodological approach able to treat knowledge as a constitutive feature of the landscape rather than a reflection of it (Gibson-Graham, 1996; 2000; Rose, 1999a). It requires seeing knowledge as a materiality that orders space rather than an abstraction that represents or corresponds to it. It needs to be able to analyse the existence of seemingly abstract knowledge, like the creative industries policy concept, by attending to its material forms and material effects without resorting to similar abstractions. Fortunately, human geography's adoption of poststructural methodologies in the last two decades provides the kind of approach needed for this task (Murdoch, 2006; Barnes *et al.*, 2007). Although these methodologies are diverse, they are united in their rejection of the separation of knowledge from the world, seeing instead continuity, and asking how the apparent separation is effected and with what effects. These effects come about through knowledge imposing order through the reconstitution of relations between objects. Poststructural *methods*, then, focus on the relational constitution of their objects of study and how these are changing (Murdoch, 2006).

I will go into more detail on the particular poststructural methodology in the remaining sections of this chapter. The remainder of this section discusses site selection. Although the decision to use creative industries policy was based on an extensive survey that established that this was a rapidly and widely transferring policy, and the fact that it is this very characteristic of the policy that interests me, the approach I am taking demands an intensive study with a particular focus. It needs to find how a particular policy transfer occurred between two administrative sites. Because it is focused on the network that joins them, the selection of the two sites is to perform a transnational, rather than comparative, analysis that is concerned with how the two sites are linked (Kelly and Olds, 2007). The two sites are the national policy-making centres of the UK and New Zealand.

The first site, the UK, was an obvious choice for the study of creative industries policy as it is where the term originated from in the CIMD (DCMS, 1998). Examining what has happened to creative industries policy in the UK since this

time it is clear there have been a number of changes in how they have been conceived and what constitutes appropriate governmental action on them. The goal of this analysis, then, was to track the actors, agencies and institutions involved in forming and acting on creative industries policy. This can reveal the kind of knowledge that the policy programme has been working with.

The second site is about as far away from the UK as it is possible to get. New Zealand was selected in part because of my own familiarity with the country and the situation regarding creative industries policy there due to a previous research project which had encountered them. Further to this, the New Zealand case provides an example of creative industries policy being transferred from the UK to occupy a position of some importance on the New Zealand policy landscape. More important than both of these, however, and demonstrating why it is inappropriate to think of this as a comparative methodology, is New Zealand's assumed position at the periphery as a place easily constructed as a 'receiver' when it comes to policy transfer. Analyses of neoliberalism, for example, often assume that the policy experiences of the US and UK were of greater significance in terms of international tractability than the experiences of places like New Zealand (Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002; cf. Larner, 2003). There is no doubt that the idea of creative industries policy was conceived first in the UK before travelling to New Zealand, but does that mean it makes sense only to analyse what happened in the UK as the moment of creation and elsewhere as the moment of conformity (Larner et al., 2007)? The aim of this part of the study, then, was to find how a policy transfer occurred across transnational space, how this reshaped policy in both sites, and the kinds of practices and processes that were necessary for this to happen.

Performing this transnational study meant focusing on those sites and moments where transnational connections were made (Tsing, 2005) and local, national and global processes, actors and knowledges were weaved together (Amin, 2002; Latham, 2002; Massey, 2005) to produce some necessary aspect of a policy transfer event. Analysing this with the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter highlights how these events are linked to the emergence and reproduction of epistemic communities. Before this can be done, however, it is

necessary to discuss the methodology and methods that will be used to find the links. This is the task of the remainder of this chapter.

4.3: Methodology: towards a spatialised genealogy

To begin with, this research presupposed a link between the creative industries policy programmes being developed in the UK and New Zealand. This is confirmed by looking at the key creative industries policy documents of each country – the CIMD in the UK (DCMS, 1998; 2001b) and the Growth and Innovation Framework (GIF) in New Zealand (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002) – where the latter (and later) document draws directly upon the claims made about the nature and potential of the creative industries by the UK Creative Industries Taskforce that produced the CIMD. However, two things are clear. For one, despite this shared central concept these are two very different policy documents. The latter document situates the creative industries as a sector targeted for government support and intervention in a government programme of economic development while the former defines and measures the contribution of the creative industries to the UK economy and does not offer any real policy directives at all beyond an assertion that these industries are increasingly important. And two, even a relatively simple examination of the story of creative industries policy in New Zealand reveals that this seemingly straightforward imitation masks a complex history of attempts to make the creative industries policy concept usable in the New Zealand context.

The methodological approach of this thesis focuses on the links that join these observations up. It needs to track the moments where the creative industries concept travelled, and what happened when it got to where it was going. In this case, the immediate research question becomes: when did the creative industries concept get used in the UK and New Zealand and how did it get assembled with other concepts to form policy documents? By locating concepts that are common to two or more documents links between them can be revealed – often by looking at footnotes, bibliographies and reference lists – or inferred with coincidences of language to be triangulated or corroborated. But the key challenge at this stage of the research is not to move 'up' to a higher level of abstraction too quickly and

suggest that policy concepts like the creative industries are filler for policy directions already taken. Drawing this conclusion now blocks out the possibility that these policy concepts shaped policy thought in some small, but potentially significant, way. It is necessary at this point to keep the concepts, quite literally, in their material form as written down on paper and let the policy documents speak for themselves.

This draws on the Foucauldian genealogical method. Foucault described this as writing 'the history of the present' (1977: 32) because the goal was not just to reverse the standard historical orientation which seeks the present in the past but to dispense with the idea of a linear history that in any way, whether it is understood as metaphysically inevitable or consequent of revolutionary change and the efforts of 'great men', 'progresses' towards the present. These latter histories include those that commit the twin fallacies of presentism, in which the past is interpreted in terms of the present – for example by analysing rational individualism as a driving force in medieval villages, and finalism, in which the state of the present is understood as resulting from some point in the past and the time that elapsed between is represented as containing the necessary unfolding of events towards today – such as in teleological Marxist histories which follow a path from feudalism to capitalism (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 118). Other conventional histories which reject these tendencies work with the idea that present concerns, such as the environment or globalisation, offer up a chance to *interpret* history in new ways but do not eliminate the possibility of a meta-history – at best they have an auto-critique that recognises these histories *are* interpretations that may be, for example, ethnocentric, elitist or inaccurate. What all these types of histories do is unify time into a continuous flow, producing a sense of history as unfolding in a linear fashion which, with the use of the correct historical methods, can be observed, recorded and spoken of. Genealogy in effect rejects this enlightenment inspired idea that the historian can adopt a position external to time and base his or her judgements on an 'apocalyptic objectivity' (Foucault, 1991b: 87). It rejects the possibility of a totalising history.

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But genealogy is not the kind of cultural critique that has been put forward by the Frankfurt School or more latterly in 'postmodern' accounts of fragmentation, nihilism, despair and the decline of meta-narratives after the enlightenment (Dean, 1999). The latter portray a new world order marked by the growth of consumer capitalism, the breakdown of traditional social forms, the massification of consumption, the acceleration of life, the explosion of spectacle, and various other tendencies often said to increasingly characterise society over the twentieth century. Despite their aversion to the effects of (usually) the growth of capitalism, and perhaps the enlightenment itself, these accounts in fact share a basic assumption about the possibility of understanding the world as made up of describable epochs marking fundamental shifts in the nature of the world – as Dean points out, 'the period from the late 1960s has never been short of prophets of a new doom as well as a new dawn' (1999: 43). Genealogy refuses the 'blackmail' of the enlightenment which wants you to be for or against it (Foucault, 1991c: 42-43). What is produced instead is a different type of history, an *effective* history which 'will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending' (Foucault, 1991b: 88).

Dean (1999: 44) has described this orientation to the past as 'anti-anachronistic' insofar as history that is stripped of its progressive and developmental aspects which unify it within the ceaseless unfolding of time cannot, by definition, contain anachronisms. And yet a consequence of this orientation is that it is often concerned with those historical moments and events that don't seem to fit the patterns of history as they are often been presented to us – what might be described as the 'disreputable origins and unpalatable functions' (Rose, cited in Kendall and Wickham, 1999: 29) of particular orders (of knowledge and of other types, such as professions) which are held to be transcendent, the kinds of 'origins' that disrupt implicit appeals to enlightenment reason made in both standard and hagiographic histories. Genealogies, concerned with the constitution of an object at disparate moments of time, must reject the types of origins that feature in these other histories because they assume constancy in the object under investigation. They are not interested in the possibility of an essence to a historical object that holds it together over time, proposing instead a messy

and unstable story of political (or politicised) invention that can be captured by the genealogical method.

Genealogy is a reference to 'stock' or 'descent' but is not intended in the biological understanding of these terms where the past is still present. In other words, it is not concerned to show how the past has led up to the present but *where in the past particular present forms have been produced from*. By stating that 'as it is wrong to search for descent in an uninterrupted continuity, we should avoid thinking of emergence as the final term of a historical development', Foucault (1991b: 83) is emphasising the singularity of the emergence of any distinctive form of discourse or practice, and indeed the singularity of any event, of any moment of practice, of any utterance of a statement. These novel forms do not lie on a determinative path to some later eventuality or naturally follow on from something earlier. Any moment or event which contains within it a particular form of punishment say, made up as it is of certain practices, certain materials, certain attitudes, certain subjected bodies and certain intentions, is *actively* produced from the traces left by events before. The ritualisation of practice and the repetition of discourse allow these productions to bear a resemblance to each other over time, but the disparity between moments remains. It is when a different trace is introduced, a different form of knowledge about criminals or a new technique of punishment for example, that we see mutations occur.

In relation to the genealogical method we can understand the Foucauldian view of power. Foucault's vision of power rejects the societal equivalent of the totalising idea of history: the totalising view of power. Rather than descending 'down' from a position of authority, like the monarch or the state, through the echelons of society, power is 'diffused' in the micro-relations which taken together constitute society. This is not that there is an absolute amount of power which is evenly distributed, it is to argue that power appears as relations are put into effect by one or both of the parties involved. Nor is it to say that there are no actors with seemingly more power than others, it is just to reject the idea that the power comes from something other than the institutionalised and spontaneous relations that they are situated in. It is the qualitative micro-physics of those relations that are of analytical interest. Genealogy is not a history of powerful

classes or institutions but may offer insights into how such apparently powerful actors emerged.

This position has led to criticisms regarding the possibility for resistance or emancipation in work derived from this methodology (e.g. Fraser, 1981; Habermas, 1987; Pickett, 1996). Without a sense of the locus of power, of where the root of repressive structures can ultimately be placed, how, these critics ask, can forces of resistance mobilise effectively? For Foucault, the answer to this lies in the productiveness of power:

> We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth (1977: 194).

The mobilisation of practices of resistance are in themselves utilising power, it is not a 'capacity' held by the 'powerful' but a slippery and multi-faceted resource accessible via very particular strategies and technologies. There are no singular actors who move 'history' along but potentially resonant changes and shifts are always occurring.

One of the key shortcomings of Foucault's work, however, lies in his engagement with space. This may seem surprising as Foucault's work is replete with considerations of space, particularly regarding the strategic use of space in games of power. This has meant that for geographers Foucault's work has been a source of inspiration (Philo 2000a; 2000b; Elden, 2001; Allen, 2003; Crampton and Elden, 2007), particularly in the analysis of space as a governmental resource – such as in the arrangement of spaces in the manner of the panoptican for disciplinary reasons (e.g. Wood, 2007), its use as, or as part of, governmental rationalities (e.g. Hindess, 1998; Larner, 1998; Huxley, 2007), and the way that particular spaces, such as the confessional or the clinic, are constituted or changed with shifting power-knowledge configurations (e.g. Philo, 2000a; Elden, 2001; Kearns, 2007). Despite this, there remains a concern over the degree of absolutism in Foucault's conception of space. For Harvey (2007), this remains mired in a Kantian schema which separates space from time and, despite Foucault's own concerns regarding this, understands space as about difference, as in difference across space, but otherwise as fixed and immobile. As a result, Foucauldian work has been

concerned with the production of spatial *metaphors*, such as the panoptican, and the linked production of spaces, such as prisons, that are concerned with the manipulation of absolute space. They are the *outcome* of processes occurring *in time* and uncovered by the genealogical method. The effectivity of space itself is obscured.

Brown's evocation of the genealogical sensibility to history suggests a way forward here:

> History is figured less as a stream linking past and future than as a cluttered and dynamic field of eruptions, forces, emergences, and partial formations. As the discontinuities and lack of directional laws in history are pushed to the foreground, history is spatialised – conceptually wrenched from temporal ordering (2001: 116-117).

The use of a spatial metaphor is intended to evoke a vision of time that is unevenly distributed, eschewing a narrative of progress. But genealogy also happens *in space*; there is disparity between moments in space as well as time. Thus reconstituted spaces, in metaphorical and material form, are *integral* to the shifts in power-knowledge configurations as well as an outcome of them. This spatialises genealogy through the lens of the relationally-constituted site. This seems a reasonable thing to do; no utterance or statement echoes around the world the moment it is made. A genealogy is therefore always located in space – always spatial – the work of transmitting the statement or utterance that has created what Foucault refers to as 'mutations' in the discourse must be considered if we are to understand the way discourse works with space. A spatialised genealogy (cf. Peck, 2008) requires thinking in terms of spaces of dispersion in a substantive register which considers the sites where particular 'eruptions, forces, emergences, and partial formations' (Brown, 2001: 116) happen, and the way that they are separated from and/or connected to other sites (Philo, 2000b).

The use of the Foucauldian genealogical method has implications for how we conceive of the key orienting concepts of policy transfer and the creative industries: these provide a way into thinking about how particular policy objects emerge, change and are stabilised across time and space. By emphasising how particular mutations, emergences, eruptions and shifts in meaning occur in disparate sites as well as disparate times, this particular genealogy will highlight

this distinctive aspect of the role of space in the formation of policy objects. Furthermore, it provides an approach that resonates with the theoretical arguments made in Chapter 3. The focus it places on the spatial constitution of constellations of power-knowledge chimes with the focus of the thesis on the experts that shape policy. Thus, this is a spatialised genealogy not only of the creative industries policy concept, but of the very expertise that reproduces it.

4.4: Method: data collection

This research involved the analysis of three data sets collected from a variety of sites in two countries: the UK and New Zealand. The first data set was policy and policy-related documents that refer to the creative industries. It is the production of these documents that this research is focused on. The second data set was of documents that referred to the creative industries and creative industries policy in the UK, New Zealand and around the world. The third set was interview data collected from semi-structured interviews with 38 participants conducted in the UK and New Zealand. These data sets are interlinked in ways that will become clear below. In what follows I will discuss some of the issues around how and why I accessed and collected this data.

4.4.1: Policy and policy-related documents

These documents were collected primarily from New Zealand and the UK but included policy documents that could be found from any administration or policy actor around the world. The advantage of researching policy in liberal-democratic countries like New Zealand and the UK in the internet age is that most, if not all, policy documents produced in the last ten years are available online through Ministry and Government websites and electronic archives. As a result access was unproblematic, free, and could be achieved from my desk at the University of Bristol. There were some exceptions to this. Occasionally policy documents that were older than ten years were not available online but, again, access was for the most part unproblematic as the UK documents that I sought were available in the University of Bristol Library and the New Zealand documents at the University of Auckland Library. The one exception to this was

a pre-election policy statement put out by the New Zealand Labour Party before the 1999 general election in that country. I was unable to locate a copy of this document and was forced to piece it together out of press reports, speeches and statements. I triangulated my understanding of it with participants interviewed in New Zealand.

My strategy for locating and identifying important and relevant documents was both systematic and organic. Initially, the focus was on those policy documents in the UK and New Zealand that referred to the creative industries. This was achieved through searches of relevant Ministry websites – in the UK DCMS and in New Zealand the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the Ministry for Economic Development – and those of local and regional authorities and policy agencies. Occasionally documents were found on other Ministry sites, such as the Department for Children, Schools and Families. When searching for policy documents from outside of these two countries I relied on the internet search engine Google which indicated where else policy for the creative industries was being developed around the world. The location of some creative industries policy documents and, importantly, policy documents that were relevant to the creative industries documents – insofar as without them creative industries policy documents would not exist in the form they do, and vice versa – was derived from information collected in the second and third data sets described below.

The result of this data collection was a large amount of paper on my desk. Arranging these so that the more important and influential documents could be identified was achieved by examining their chronological order, the scale of referencing by the documents to each other and, importantly, the testimonies of individuals and documents in the other two data sets. The situation of each policy document in specific geographical sites meant these methods could also be used to identify which documents were being used in the transfer of policy. This simple mapping exercise showed where the creative industries have taken shape in textual form and which particular documents have been influential across a wide range of sites. The testimonies of actors involved and contained in the documents themselves is crucial to understanding how and why links between

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documents were made. By 'following the actors' (Latour, 2005: 12) and their reasoning in making these links as they produce or analyse these documents the means by which policy transfer actor-networks are built, and hence the reason policy transfer occurred, can be revealed. This is why the other two data sets discussed below were collected.

4.4.2: Engaging creative industries policy engagement

This data set is drawn from a relatively heterogeneous mix of secondary sources identified and united by their efforts to engage with the creative industries as a policy concept and/or an economic sector. Again, many of these could be located on the internet, and at the libraries at the Universities of Bristol and Auckland. They were identified through 'snowballing'. A policy document, newspaper article or book would reference other sources on the creative industries concept, which I would then seek out, only to be led towards more texts and documents. I would code these on their site and time of production (if this was available) and look for links they have or make with other documents. The number of texts that refer to the creative industries is growing every day so it was imperative on me to ensure I used this information to pinpoint the really significant textual events that were relevant to creative industries policy in the UK and New Zealand. As above, this was achieved through a combination of chronology, inter-referencing and the testimonies of interviewees.

One of the key sources for this data set were the ministerial statements, speeches and arguments that were put out in favour of instituting a focus on the creative industries. Added to this were statements put out by the two governments on themes that intersected with the creative industries concept, or which were suggestive of the approach to government and policy being taken at the time creative industries policy was being developed. These were especially useful for figuring the rationale for formulating creative industries policy in the words of the key politicians themselves. A particularly apposite example is a book published by Chris Smith (1998), the British Secretary of State for Culture when the creative industries were first identified in policy, entitled *Creative Britain*. This collected together a series of his speeches, bookended with a comprehensive

introduction and conclusion, that detailed the New Labour Government's approach to the relationship between culture and economy.

A second key source was newspaper and magazine coverage of the creative industries. These were accessed through Lexis-Nexis database in the UK and the Newztext database and New Zealand Herald website in New Zealand. These proved useful in two ways. One, they helped to establish a timeline for events and policy announcements with regard to the creative industries and creative industries policy. This allowed me to fill in gaps and, to a certain extent, gauge the significance of certain moments. And two, they were useful for showing the diverse ways the creative industries were being perceived and engaged with beyond government. The extent to which government claims about the creative industries in both the UK and New Zealand were contested and/or absorbed by the print media is an important proxy measure of the extent to which they had been naturalised as a policy object. The role of the media in encouraging or confirming policy transfer needs to be heeded (McCann, 2004; Bale, 2005).

The other important source for this data set came from explicit research engagements with the creative industries policy concept by actors situated in research and advocacy institutions including public sector researchers, think-tanks, consultancies and academia. The nature of these engagements ranged from policy-oriented position papers to scholarly academic research incorporating the creative industries concept. Some of these embrace the creative industries as a useful category for a range of reasons, some reject it outright, and others synthesise it with other concepts. The result is a developing body of knowledge on the creative industries that has a complex and multi-faceted relationship to the development and transfer of creative industries policy. How these research engagements, and their authors, impact on creative industries policy can be teased out by tracing the links between research and policy production through finding authors-in-common, tracking instances of cross-referencing between research and policy documents, and the question of who commissioned certain research, why, and whether it is intended to have a direct impact on policy.

As I gathered this information two things were apparent. One was the extent to which policy-making relied on actors formally external to the state. It was becoming increasingly apparent to me that I had to find a way to show how they were integrated into the policy-making apparatus. The other was that there was a developing, if fragmented, epistemic community interested in the creative industries and cognate issues. Both of these realisations were important to the direction my research finally took (Crang, 2002).

I attempted to immerse myself in this community in three ways. One was by interviewing certain key actors, which I discuss in the next section. The second was through joining a JISCMAIL mailing list on the cultural industries. This is primarily an academic mail-out but is also received by an assortment of researchers from outside academia. The fact that it is the *cultural* rather than the *creative* industries is indicative of the attitude of those who set up the list to the creative industries concept. Despite these limitations the list was used by participants to share resources and information collected on creative industries and cultural policy (which, this list showed, were linked in the minds of many of these actors). The academic Dr Andy Pratt of the London School of Economics was particularly active on this list. It provided two types of information useful to this project. It made me aware of policies being developed all around the world for the creative industries and of events, forums and symposiums that straddled the research and policy-making worlds. And it indicated the way that these issues about creative industries policy were being discussed, where, and who by. In a similar vein I kept a close eye on similar internet forums on the creative industries, such as one run by DCMS through their website during 2005 on what kinds of policies should now be developed for the creative industries with regard to intellectual property.

The third way I tried to immerse myself in the community was by participant observation at a number of events that brought together different kinds of actors involved in studying and policy-making for the creative industries and cognate areas. I have included these in Table 4.1, including events I was unable to attend but have been able to obtain transcripts for (Please refer to Appendix A for a

Table 4.1: Events attended or for which transcripts were obtained

Event	Date	Organisers	Location
'Cool Aotearoa' Forum (Transcript)	16/03/2000	Creative New Zealand	Beehive Theatrette, Wellington, New Zealand
Creative Industries Forum (Transcript)	08/09/2000	Creative New Zealand and the British Council	Maidment Theatre, Auckland University, New Zealand
'Cultural Planning for the Twenty-First Century', part of the Bristol 'Festival of Ideas'	18/05/2005	Bristol Cultural Development Partnership	The Watershed, Bristol
Ideopolis: Knowledge Cities: Understanding German and UK Experiences	20/10/2005	The Work Foundation	The Work Foundation, London
City Salon: 'Do-It-Yourself' Cities	21/11/2005	Demos	The Tobacco Factory, Bristol
'Economies of Enterprise, Innovation and Creativity', part of the Royal Geographical Society – Institute of British Geographers Annual Conference	01/09/2006	Dr Tim Vorley, Leicester University, and Dr Helen Lawton Smith, Birkbeck University of London	Royal Geographical Society
'Seminar 9: New Directions in Research: Substance, Method and Critique', part of the 'Cultural Industries Seminar Network' (called elsewhere the 'Cultural and Creative Industries Seminar Network')	11-12/1/2007	Dr Andy Pratt, LSE, and Dr Paul Jeffcut, Queens University Belfast	Royal Society of Edinburgh
'Spaces of Vernacular Creativity', part of the Association of American Geographers Annual Conference	19/04/2007	Dr Steve Millington, Manchester Metropolitan University, and Dr Norma Rantisi, Concordia University	San Francisco Hilton
'Creative Work' Symposium	18/10/2007	Cultural and Media Industries research centre (CuMIRC), University of Leeds	School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds

complete version of this table). These events ranged from think-tank-organised events to sessions at academic conferences. Their engagement with

the creative industries concept ranged from peripheral to central. Of more consequence was that these events all involved either thinking the relationship between culture and economy or thinking through possibilities for economies in the post-industrial, knowledge-driven era. I don't wish to claim that this was particularly ethnographic (Dunn, 2007), but it was certainly experiential learning for both how policy ideas are debated in certain contexts and for understanding the kinds of policy and research debates that were utilising the creative industries concept.

Two kinds of information were obtained from this data set. One regarded how the creative industries policy concept was being engaged with and developed into discourses by particular actors at particular sites. The knowledge about the creative industries being produced at these sites had the potential to shape policy if appropriately deployed. The second was the kinds of actors, agencies and institutions involved in acting on and through the creative industries and creative industries policy. This allows the movement of the concept to be traced and indicated the kind of people who would make appropriate and useful interview subjects.

4.4.3: Interview subjects

The third data set I have used in this project was drawn from semi-structured interviews with 38 participants. This was made up of policy-makers, council workers, consultants, academics and private-sector workers and entrepreneurs. A full list of interviewees is supplied in Appendix B. The purpose of this part of the research was to find out how actors have interpreted, been involved in, and responded to the emergence of the creative industries policy concept in the UK and New Zealand. This provides empirical richness and detail but, more importantly, through giving voice to the actors involved in policy-making and knowledge production, it can provide insights into the moments that links are made across space and the means by which the relationships that situate them in policy formation and transfer processes are formed, changed, maintained and broken.

The selection of possible interviewees was based on, first, information collected in the first two data sets, and, second, the recommendations of other interviewees. An effort was made to contact potential candidates from as wide a field as possible initially and then narrowed as the nature of what the research project could achieve became clearer. During my search I contacted individuals in Government Ministries, Non-Departmental Government Bodies, Quangos, non-governmental organisations, think-tanks, research institutes, consultancies and academia in both the UK and New Zealand. This provided a broad representation of actors from agencies and institutes that had some degree of involvement in creative industries policy development and transfer and in the production of the knowledge that informed each of these processes.

The interviews were conducted over four periods. First, two pilot interviews were conducted in Manchester on December 15th, 2005. During January and February of 2006 twelve interviews were conducted in Sheffield, Manchester, London, Bristol and Bournes Green in the Cotswald Mountains. In May and June of 2006 nine more were conducted in London and Leeds, including two telephone interviews. During June and July of that year I was in New Zealand and conducted 15 interviews in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. Two of the interviews I conducted in London were about the New Zealand situation meaning that I finished with 21 interviews for the UK and 17 for New Zealand. This part of the research came to an end once I had reached saturation with diminishing returns coming from interviews in both countries and once my main findings had been triangulated.

For the most part I entered this research field 'cold' with little in the way of prior contacts in the area. Two of my initial interviews in the English north were set up through one of my supervisors' contacts but apart from these I had to find a way to access potential respondents. The way I dealt with this was through a formal approach. I wrote each potential respondent a letter with a University of Bristol letterhead explaining who I was, the nature of the research project, and why I felt they could contribute to the study. I included on the letter a link to a website I set up on the School of Geographical Science's website which gave more details about who I was and what my research project involved. About a week after the

letter was sent I would contact the potential respondent by telephone to set up an interview. This was a time-consuming process as each letter had to be individually drafted to fit in with the person's particular concerns but it proved to be a very successful strategy. The vast majority of people I contacted responded positively even when an interview turned out to be unattainable. It was also clear to me that the letter and the website address were appreciated as a number of the interviewees brought copies of both along to the interview having just read them again beforehand.

An advantage of conducting research in this area was that, although it was cut across by political, technical and academic disputes and issues, it is not highly controversial on the national stage like issues around, for example, asylum-seekers or the invasion of Iraq. This did not prevent some I requested interviews with from denying access because of concerns about having to criticise people still in their positions or whether they could comment on certain issues. Others initially displayed enthusiasm but then began ignoring or avoiding my requests for interviews. Such attitudes inevitably shaped my research as it meant I could not get the personal insight into certain issues I would have liked. But these were exceptions as for the most part this aspect of the research process was pleasant with most willing to talk about their work and supply me with materials I may not have otherwise been able to access.

In the end my status as an outsider trying to make their way in the policy community may have been beneficial (Crang, 2003). As Herod (1999) has demonstrated, in some contexts outsider status provides myriad advantages, such as the possibility of a foreign researcher being perceived as less threatening than a domestic 'investigator', or the opportunity provided for 'ice-breaking' by access to small-talk concerning country-to-country differences. This certainly proved the case in the present research because in the UK my status as a New Zealander interested in local development projects seemed to be a source of some surprise and concomitantly some enthusiasm for speaking with me about them. Even on returning to New Zealand to conduct fieldwork there I received invitations from respondents I had not contacted, but who had learned of my

research from others I had, to speak to them under the impression I was a British researcher interested in what was going on 'downunder'.

The interviews themselves were semi-structured with the intention of letting the respondents tell the story of their involvement in creative industries policy in their own way. On the one hand this was about finding out how creative industries policy has formed, changed and been transferred. But the more general aim was to find out their rationales for making and breaking certain linkages and developing certain relationships and the way they went about this. I wanted to find out how they adjusted their own practices and their own way of knowing so that they were able to work with other people and ideas, and to find out their justifications for it. The interview strategy I used to achieve this was to get them telling the story of their life as regard to how they ended up where they were and how this resulted in the creative industries entering their consciousness. This included an exploration of their personal networks, both formal and informal, and how these shaped their way of thinking. Finally, how and why they engaged the creative industries policy concept was explored, with a focus on what they had achieved or otherwise. By letting the actors speak for themselves the means by which the relational geographies in which policy forms and transfers are held together can be revealed and the move to abstract explanation will not be made too quickly (Olds, 2001; Law, 1994).

In asking people about their work histories, engaging with what they produce, and learning about their networks while attending many of the same events and being part of their forums, these data collection activities have effectively involved the creation of my own network. My situation in this position, and the need for reciprocity, remains something I am conscious of. Every so often I receive an e-mail from a respondent asking about what has become of my research. As I have conducted my data collection it has also conducted me in terms of the kinds of questions I am able, and want, to answer. I have shaped my research field as it has shaped me (Rose, 1997; Crang, 2002; Gibson-Graham, 1996). For example, a policy document I was aware of but would have otherwise ignored, the DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DET) (DCMS, 2004), to be discussed in Chapter 5, became far more interesting to me after a discussion with its author

who made it clear it was intended to shape the policy discourse begun by the release of the CIMD. From here my interest in the kind of epistemic community making these interventions grew and I realised that understanding their dynamics would be important for understanding policy transfer. In the end what constitutes the research field is being ordered and historicised in a variety of ways by a variety of actors, *including the researcher*, and it is the negotiation of these myriad orderings that is both generative of tensions and conflicts and productive of new knowledge. Producing a genealogy is not a case of observing and writing about the research field, it is literally a case of inserting oneself into it, producing a particular type of ordering that has a particular type of critical edge, and making a contribution, however minor, to the production of the field itself.

4.5: Method: analysis

The strategy that best describes the analytical approach taken, given the above considerations, is of *theory-building* (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Bailey *et al.*, 1999; James, 2006). This is an approach that aims to create theories which explain aspects of the world rather than testing and embellishing existing theories. Therefore, it can be distinguished from more positivist approaches through its emphasis on *induction* rather than deduction. They are theories grounded in the empirical world being researched but that are *informed* by theories and concepts already developed. Therefore the aim of this approach is to produce work that provides insights into a particular aspect of the world, that speaks to other research which draws on the same or similar theoretical concepts, and which contributes to the development of meso-level theory.

The movement from a mass of raw data to a more analytical realm from which theories can be built involves a series of steps (James, 2006). First the data was read and analysed through a genealogical lens for particular important moments, incidents, observations and so on that were referred to by informants and in secondary material. This involved coding through the construction of timelines, the mapping of links between individuals, texts and events, and the representation of individual networks and circuits. This work helped to make

sense of the data and allowed particular themes, trends, tendencies and moments to stand out as significant. It also provided the opportunity for triangulation so that the significance of particular moments, individuals or documents could be checked against what the rest of the data indicated. As I mentioned above, this made particular moments or documents, like the DET, stand out as significant in sometimes unexpected ways.

From here initial ideas and theories were developed which were then checked against the data as a whole for validity and further refined in an iterative process. This also directed further data collection to develop, embellish and triangulate these ideas (Bailey *et al.*, 1999). At this point the analysis began to incorporate concepts and theories from different literatures that could contribute to the theories being developed. As these were cycled through the data different concepts were deployed with some being kept, notably, the concept of epistemic communities, and others dropped: Mitchell's (2002) concept of techno-politics – the politics inherent in the techniques through which the world is understood and acted upon – was discarded when it became apparent that the politics of policy formation and transfer were about more than just technical knowledge. Through the combination of analytical concepts drawn directly from the empirical work and those drawn from the secondary literature the theories developed and explored in this thesis were built.

It is also clear, given the theoretical and methodological claims I have made, that a certain idea of ontological distance needs to be sacrificed. This is not a new insight; the problem of being an 'outsider' and the need for *reflexivity* has long been accepted in human geography and the social sciences in general (Lynch, 2000; Rose, 1997; Crang, 2005). The researcher becomes implicated in the very world they are studying. To conduct an interview or to analyse a text is not to take a 'sample' from the research field that continues to exist as a coherent 'whole' in the hands of the academic in the ivory tower. It is a moment where the co-production of knowledge is occurring rather than the empty-vessel researcher is filled with information and insight by the informant (Herod, 1999). This is particularly so in the case of this research where the interview effectively

requires, and provides the opportunity for, the interviewee to 'step back' and consider how they order their world and the orders that they are beholden to.

Therefore this theory provides a partial perspective on the world and the people, agencies, institutions and events it describes. The theory that has been 'built' here is out of a research process that has been 'complex and messy... infused with personal subjectivities, practical constraints, and opportunities; a process unable to claim the title of 'objective'' (Olds, 2001: 260). This is reflected in the writing style which, in the next three chapters, takes a narrative form in an attempt to convey something of the complexity of what has occurred over time and space. Writing is a moment of extraction, a verbalisation of a diverse set of knowledges with the possible (and intended) effect of producing knowledge of its own. The text that is produced is not a definitive account of the field, it is now a part of it – even if it is a relatively minor one. Writing does not occur after method, it is inevitably a part of it.

4.6: Conclusion

This chapter has described the methodological strategy used in this research. Given the diversity of ways that policy transfer can be thought about, there is no prescribed way of conducting research on it. For this thesis I have developed an approach that draws on and extends Foucauldian genealogy to think about the material links that can be drawn between spatially disparate instances of what appears to be the same policy. A genealogical ethic demands that the nature of that link is prioritised rather than subsumed to a wider logic and reduced to trivial or anachronistic detail. This has been used to guide a process of theory building where the data sets that had been collected were analysed using a variety of concepts to produce a theory of creative industries policy transfer. These have been arranged as three narratives which constitute the content of the next three chapters.

Each narrative offers an account of different moments and different processes. They have been arranged to highlight key moments and key issues. Chapter 5 explores the original development of the creative industries policy concept in the

UK out of particular problematisations of the country's economy and culture. It traces the emergence of the concept and the way it has been engaged by a variety of actors in the UK, including one group who have made a particular effort to recast themselves as creative industries experts. Chapter 6 describes the formation of creative industries policy in New Zealand, a story that is different to that of Chapter 5 for more reasons than its being set in another country. By tracing the translation of the creative industries policy concept into New Zealand policy discourses, the chapter demonstrates how policy transfer is not simple homogenisation but, in this case, the transnationalisation of the policy formation process. Chapter 7 argues that the combination of these two processes is resulting in the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts supported by a transnational infrastructure of conferences, forums, research institutes, think-tanks, consultancies and policy networks.

Chapter 5: Constituting a space for expertise: the making of a creative industries sector in the UK

5.1: Introduction

The empirical component of this thesis begins not with an epistemic community but with a policy document. In 1998, amid the clamour of 'Cool Britannia' and the political turn down the 'Third Way', the recently elected New Labour Government of the United Kingdom produced the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* which showed that non-manufacturing based industries like music, theatre and advertising were five percent of the economy and growing twice as fast as any other sector. While Cool Britannia and the Third Way have since fallen by the wayside, this latter policy concept has continued to evolve. When it first emerged it was conceived at the national scale and focused on revenue-generation, exports and growth with a sideline in social inclusion. By the time this is being written there is a stronger regional policy presence focusing on local and urban cultural systems and the role of intellectual property has gone from being definitional criteria to a key agenda for central government. Over this period the creative industries have routinely been dismissed as little more than rhetoric and New Labour boosterism; at best a faddish and poorly conceived attempt to sell the idea of the knowledge-driven economy and at worst a new apogee in the 'instrumentalisation' of culture for economic purposes (see Greenhalgh, 1998; Littler, 2000; Hughson and Inglis, 2001; Belfiore, 2004; Oakley, 2004; Miller, 2004; Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007). But despite these criticisms and concerns, the creative industries have endured as a concept due in part to that very sense that there is something out there being captured, that there is a real economic sector being represented, however poorly or partially. As a result a community of experts has rapidly developed providing information, advice, criticism and commentary on this new policy object.

The CIMD itself was first produced by DCMS in 1998. A second version was published in 2001 and since this time regular updates on the performance of the creative industries have been produced (DCMS, 2002; 2006) but not in as complete a form as realised in the original mapping document and its successor. The significance of the CIMD does not stem just from the coining of the phrase 'creative industries'. It realises a set of discourses circulating around the spaces of New Labour which attempt to reimagine economy, culture and the policy-making process[6] and redeploys them in a conceptual and calculative form that was politically palatable and useful for the incoming government. Moreover, the CIMD rendered these as indicative of a previously unacknowledged sector of the UK economy, and in doing so made the sector visible in particular ways and available for political intervention by governmental and non-governmental actors (Christophers, 2007). This was achieved, firstly, through the sectoral definition:

> Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property (DCMS, 2001b: 5).

Secondly, the sector was populated with a particular set of industries:

> Advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio (DCMS, 2001b: 5).

And thirdly through the act of 'mapping' the sector, which involved the measurement of the contributions of each creative industry sector in terms of revenue, exports, employment and contribution to Gross Domestic Product.

This chapter makes two arguments. First, that the creative industries have been constituted through their representation in the CIMD initially, and later by their enframement through the emergence of a constellation of agencies and experts that act on this representation. And second, that the circulation of the CIMD has resulted in a variety of actors who have recast themselves as creative industries experts but in the process who have engaged, challenged and changed the representation and the enframement. To summarise, it is argued that the creative industries concept emerged at the confluence of governmental reimaginings of

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[6] For examples of these kinds of reimaginings see Leadbeater (1999), Smith (1998), Gould (1998), Blair (1998) and Giddens (1998b).

economy, culture and their relationship to each other. Their policy form was shaped by the way these reimaginings were realised through a matrix of calculative evidence. This was the 'mapping' method of the CIMD which used numerical measures to demarcate the extent of the sector, its constituent industries, and their particular growth patterns in relation to the rest of the economy. Drawing on insights on the technicality of politics from the governmentality literature, it is argued that this act of calculation provided an empirical object that tried, however imperfectly, to mirror the relationship between culture and economy that was being imagined in governmental discourse. It also rendered the creative industries as a describable and governable sector available to political intervention. The CIMD, then, provided a platform for the development of new kinds of policy directed at newly imagined spaces and subjects. But it also provided an opportunity for new types of political intervention and pressure to be brought to bear on and by the government, and opened up an unpopulated space of policy knowledge for different actors to recast themselves in as a certain type of policy expert. In the end, this technically rendered reimagination of the relationship between culture and economy has resulted in a rearranged, and still evolving, policy landscape populated with new kinds of policies, agencies and expertise existing in constitutive relationships to each other.

The chapter will begin with a discussion of the reimagined and retooled conceptions of the economy, culture and policy development which came together on circuits of knowledge associated with New Labour and resulted in the production of the CIMD. Although these reimaginings were underway before 1997, after the election of New Labour that year they were given a new impetus. Section 5.3 focuses on the CIMD itself, arguing, following Christophers (2007), that the technical and especially calculative nature of the CIMD was a key factor in making creative industries policy sensible and therefore possible. The result, as discussed in Section 5.4, is the availability of the creative industries as a policy object towards which policy actors, including but not limited to DCMS and the rest of the government, can act. The CIMD, in a small way, enframed the reimagined economy to include this sector and its distinctive dynamics. Finally, Section 5.5 argues that the emergence of the CIMD opened a space for an existing

epistemic community calling itself the Forum on Creative Industries, who until that point had little if any influence on central government policy, to cast themselves as experts in, specifically, the link between culture and economy that had been a part of governmental reimagining and insert their concerns into the policy development process. The result is a distributed array of policy documents, agencies, actors and experts that comprise the body of creative industries policy knowledge in the UK.

5.2: Cool Britannia: New Labour and the creative industries

The *Creative Industries Mapping Document* (DCMS, 1998; 2001b) was first conceived in a period of what Rose has termed 'political inventiveness' (1999b). The newly elected 'New Labour' Government was keen to show it had shed the connotations of 'old Labour' and demonstrate its capacity for a new kind of political thinking which reconciles

> themes which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic – patriotism *and* internationalism; rights *and* responsibilities; the promotion of enterprise *and* the attack on poverty and discrimination (Blair, 1998: 1, emphasis in original).

As such it has connected itself into knowledge circuits it perceived could provide it with ideas for this purpose. Most famously this circuit connected it with Bill Clinton's Democrats in the United States (Peck and Theodore, 2001), with the self defined new left think-tanks Demos and Comedia and their associated thinkers, including Geoff Mulgan (who became one of Blair's chief policy advisors) and Charles Leadbeater (who wrote the original knowledge-driven economy strategy in 1998) (Griffiths *et al.*, 2002), and with 'Third Way' guru and head of the London School of Economics Anthony Giddens (McLennan *et al.*, 2005). The rapid circulation of knowledge forms, both texts and people, between spaces like these in the late 1990s resulted in political *reimaginings* linked to emergent *problematisations* that in turn resulted in new programmes of government. One of these was the CIMD. This section will discuss the political imaginings associated with the knowledge forms circulating around the policy-making spaces of New Labour and how these resulted in the production of the CIMD. As such it demonstrates how the new policy knowledge realised in the CIMD emerges from

circuits of knowledge that connect up different kinds of experts through policy-making spaces.

5.2.2: Revisioning economy

One of these reimaginings coalesced around conceptions of the economy in the late twentieth century. One aspect of this was the acceptance of particular ideas about globalisation. Outlining his initial vision for New Labour, Prime Minister Tony Blair concedes that Britain is now part of a global economy: 'In macroeconomic policy, medium-sized countries cannot afford to 'go-it-alone': they must be continually sensitive to the international economy and its driving forces' (1998: 8). This is no idle observation; Labour had long ceased to be in favour of the nationalisation of production. In 1994 Blair made the symbolic gesture of removing the clause concerning nationalisation from Labour's manifesto in an effort to assuage fears that they remained at heart a socialist party (see Gould, 1998). This endorsement of what was increasingly regarded as 'economic orthodoxy' was continued after the election with the establishment of operational independence at the Bank of England. This deepening institutionalisation of the monetarist notions that had previously been espoused by the Conservative Thatcher and Major Governments meant the idea of Britain as ensconced in an increasingly determinate global economy was accepted and extended by the new government.

This said, the vision of the global economy is not entirely consistent from the preceding government to New Labour. Institutionalist ideas had found their way into New Labour thinking through new think-tanks like Demos which argued that the market did not function free of social constraints and, in fact, functioned better when their embeddedness in the social was recognised (Bevir, 2005). This rationalisation extended policies inherited from the previous Major Government that inscribed a national competitive in the global by fostering competitiveness amongst its business community (on the central role of the private sector, see Blair, 1998: 8-11). This became linked to politically fresh ideas regarding the knowledge-driven economy – the idea that in a globalised world developed economies like Britain's cannot compete on primary or secondary production

terms due to a lack of access to cheap resources or cheap labour power. Instead, it is in the knowledge of the workers of Britain, in their ability to innovate and create, that the future of the country's economy is deemed to rest (see Blair, 1998; and Department for Trade and Industry, 1998, for the Government's White Paper entitled *Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge Driven Economy*). Social measures like spending on education came to be seen as integral to economic policy (Bevir, 2005). Such intervention would not always be about spending, however. The supply side could be improved through tackling 'social exclusion', a 'New Labour' language replacing 'old Labour' concepts like 'class' and 'inequality'.

The growing clamour of these discourses in the late 1990s, and the accompanying problematisation of the structure of the British economy, would lend the creative industries a certain stature for being at the forefront of economic strategy in the face of such macroeconomic shifts (Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007). Certainly such an understanding was used in the advocacy of them by figures such as Chris Smith, who described the creative industries in his forward to the second edition of the CIMD as 'a key element in today's knowledge economy' and argued that 'in a knowledge economy the importance of these industries to national wealth is more commonly recognised' (DCMS, 2001b: 3). In the CIMD, the idea of 'individual creativity, skill and talent' as the defining feature of these industries aligns the sector with definitions of the knowledge-driven economy's 'distinctive assets' of 'knowledge, skills and creativity' (Department for Trade and Industry, 1998: 14). Both locate the distinctive source of competitiveness in the global economy most centrally in the capacity of the *individual* to produce something that cannot be easily replicated with the abundance of raw materials, land and cheap labour possessed by competing countries. This continues today with the incumbent Prime Minister Gordon Brown bundling the creative industries with other knowledge economy industries as key to the future of the British economy in his speeches (Brown, 2005; 2006). The creative industries provided a useful neologism and vision that fitted well, at a variety of levels, with the way the economy was being reimagined under New Labour.

5.2.3: Culture and economy in the UK

The creative industries were not just structured around a new economic imperative, however. The cultural activities included in the list of industries – performing arts, music, the arts market, film and video, and television and radio – point to New Labour's attempt to differentiate itself in the cultural field. During the 1997 election Labour had contrasted itself with the incumbent government by claiming they valued culture while their opponents were hostile to it. The Conservative Government had made no secret of its funding retrenchment and market exposure for the 'great' cultural institutions. But there was no simple answer to this problem: for New Labour there couldn't be a return to old funding regimes which had successfully been attacked by the Conservatives, as well as critics on the left, as elitist and reproductive of certain structures of privilege that were anathema to the increasingly individualist ideology of the previous twenty years. Instead, the new government weaved together certain governmental, economic and societal imperatives through the reimagining of the constitution and role of the arts and culture in British society.

To an extent this was a form of boosterism for a new sense of British identity in which New Labour could position itself. Initially this found form in the short-run 'Cool Britannia' campaign. Originally a media concoction, New Labour deployed this term in an attempt to link itself with all that made Britain 'cool' by promoting the creative industries, holding publicity-driven exercises like having the band Oasis over to a party at 10 Downing Street, and contrasting the Britain they would be governing as a young and stylish post-imperial nation with the 'warm beer and cricket greens' image of John Major's Britain. In response to the release of a Demos pamphlet on the idea of rebranding Britain through 'Cool Britannia' (Leonard, 1997), the government organised a taskforce on the subject led by foreign secretary Robin Cook. However, this particular attempt to create a new British identity was short-lived. As early as 1998 Chris Smith was referring to it as a 'flawed phrase' (1998: 5) because, he claimed, it failed to engage with great swathes of British identity and culture. It is also possible the government was reacting to the negative press coverage the concept often received and the way the idea was used to make the argument that New Labour was all style over

substance (Littler, 2000). But, success or failure notwithstanding, the attempt to rethink the idea of the nation is of significance here. Britain would no longer be defined by ideas about history but by the present and the future, by contemporary culture and the knowledge economy – even if this orientation to the future was backwards-looking in the identification of what constituted the contemporary (Blake, 1998). By renaming the Department for National Heritage as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith claimed that:

> important though the conservation of our heritage is, it did not represent all that our work should be. I wanted something that was a bit more all-embracing, and a bit more forward-looking. Our new title reflects much more the nature of what we are about (1997: 6).

DCMS became the institutional site where this new vision would be coordinated.

The idea of creativity, which was emerging as a key concept for the knowledge-driven economy, also allowed a reimagining of the cultural and its opposition to the economic. The speeches of the incoming Secretary of State for Culture Chris Smith, collected along with some other interventions in the volume *Creative Britain* (Smith, 1998; see also Smith, 1997), are indicative of a reimagining of the role of culture in society that did not institute a wholesale reorientation but served to move the political debate and the politics of culture along to (seemingly) fresh ground (Osborne, 2004). The speeches and essays proffer the policy approach to arts and culture of New Labour as revolving around their four 'key themes' of access, excellence, education and creative economy. This juxtaposes a desire to democratise culture and make it accessible to everyone with the possibility of a 'cultural democracy' where cultural forms are seen as producible by anyone anywhere, not just in certain elite institutions by certain types of individual (Hughson and Inglis, 2001). This is weaved together with economic and social concerns through the notion of creativity. Key to this is the collapsing of ideas of 'high' and 'low' culture. Thus Smith claims to 'loathe the distinction that some people try to draw between so-called 'high art' and 'low art'. What on earth counts as 'high' and 'low'?' (1998: 144). This is not just an opinion, it allows Smith to reference on equal terms ideas about the cultural value of both those considered traditional art forms, such as Shakespearean theatre, and more contemporary popular forms, particularly 'Britpop' and the 'Young British Artists' like Damien Hirst. The democratisation of culture is not

simply about exposing the masses to enlightenment via particular cultural and artistic forms but encouraging 'access' to 'excellence' in the cultural realm – a realm broadly defined in the fashion of cultural democracy. It is in the supposed transcendence of what is produced from the subjective force of creativity, in whatever form and context, that matters, a point emphasised in the concluding chapter of Smith's book, entitled *No Wealth But Life: The Importance of Creativity*.

The concept of creativity allows culture to serve particular governmental purposes apart from any simple 'civilising' function it may once have played (Finlayson, 2000). Thus, for the new government:

> In the years ahead, people's creativity will increasingly be the key to a country's economic identity, to its economic success, and to individuals' well-being and sense of fulfilment (DCMS, 2001a: 5).

New Labour have not so much instrumentalised culture as identified the root of culture in the individual and attempted to harness this to their goals. This proposes a capacity in the subject that can be put to work (in a governmental sense) for cultural and economic ends. By instituting the creative industries New Labour claimed to have identified a conduit through which the cultural and the economic come together and positioned this at the forefront of economic strategy.

5.2.4: Modernising government

The creative industries were defined in the CIMD as exemplary knowledge-driven economy industries that sprang from the capacity of individuals to be creative. They were the form in which cultural and economic production came together. In this sense the document was not entirely original. The industrial make-up of the sector overlapped with the concept of the 'cultural industries' that was forwarded in the London Industrial Strategy by the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1985. This document, however, produced by a socialist metropolitan council in a time of massive infrastructural collapse and unemployment in London following de-industrialisation, aimed to support independent cultural producers in the face of the growing dominance of mass market (and especially American) cultural forms as part of a strategy to generate a thriving and diverse urban economy (see Mulgan and Worpole, 1986). The strategy was never put into practice as the GLC was abolished by the Thatcher

Government in 1985. The cultural industries were not a simple precursor to the creative industries, however, despite links that can be drawn through individuals like Geoff Mulgan, who worked on the London Industrial Strategy in the early 1980s and by the late 1990s was the head of Tony Blair's Number 10 Policy Unit. The expanded scope in terms of qualifying industries – advertising and architecture for example were not included in cultural industry definitions – and the 'outward-orientated' focus on the industries as knowledge-driven and competitive in the global economy marked these out as conceived quite differently from the production focus of the GLC (Garnham, 2005). They imagined the economy in quite a different way to the GLC.

The CIMD draws in a more explicit fashion on a policy document produced by the Government of Australia in 1994 (Smith, 1998). *Creative Nation*, produced by the Keating Government, does not use the creative industries term invented by the CIMD but conceptualises the *cultural* industries in a comparable manner as a distinctive sector with the potential to have a significant impact on the Australian economy:

> This cultural policy is also an economic policy. Culture creates wealth. Broadly defined, our cultural industries generate 13 billion dollars a year. Culture employs. Around 336,000 Australians are employed in culture-related industries. Culture adds value, it makes an essential contribution to innovation, marketing and design. It is a badge of our industry. The level of our creativity substantially determines our ability to adapt to new economic imperatives. It is a valuable export in itself and an essential accompaniment to the export of other commodities. It attracts tourists and students. It is essential to our economic success (Government of Australia, 1994: Introduction).

The focus on the national scale and the emphasis on this sector as aiding the 'ability to adapt to new economic imperatives' means the document shares with the CIMD a concern to use this set of industries to position the country competitively in a global economic environment. Although the link between culture and economy is not as ingrained as in the CIMD, it still makes an analogous effort to link cultural production with economic outcomes. However, what distinguishes the CIMD from both the GLC and Australian documents is not only conceptual. The practice of 'mapping', or measuring, the contributions of each of these industries is a significant point of difference that makes the CIMD a particularly noteworthy text (Christophers, 2007).

Taking this relatively comprehensive numerical approach reflected the ethic of government New Labour was, in principle at least, adopting. The 1999 White Paper *Modernising Government* illustrates this by outlining how the new government would be approaching its task in relation to the production of policy and delivery of public services (Labour Government, 1999). This was described as a pragmatic approach, the 'Third Way' (Giddens, 1998b; Blair, 1998) between the ideological 'extremes' of collectivism and state provisioning that previous Labour governments subscribed to or the market driven rationality that the Conservative Party pushed when they were in power, especially during the 1980s and 90s. This approach to government foregrounded, in principle, evidence-based policy, target-setting, and the monitoring of delivery by those working in the service of the government's goals (Labour Government, 1999; see Newman, 2001; Bevir, 2005). By measuring the creative industries, then, they could be presented to the Government and to the public in a form which effectively carried the justification for their recognition, and politicisation, within them. As an academic involved in cultural mapping exercises points out:

> Creating the Mapping Document allowed there to be a measure, a marker for DCMS to be able to make its case to Treasury for money. The Treasury like figures and they looked good and they gave them some (Academic, interview with author, 2006).

The CIMD provided the necessary statistics for the creative industries to be seen as significant for the economy and to be taken seriously by the government. In this context the CIMD was produced in a calculative fashion because it was politically useful to DCMS, and to the government, to do so.

The creative industries concept was tied up with the reimagined economic and cultural spheres in which innovation, knowledge and creativity were increasingly important to the British economy and culture was increasingly comprised of activities from which a living could be made. These imaginings emerged from the knowledge forms circulating through and coalescing in governmental sites; forms ranging from knowledge-driven economy strategies, think-tank pamphlets, external policy documents and ministerial statements to individuals like Mulgan, Leadbeater, Blair, Smith and others. As these entered certain policy-making sites, like DCMS, they fed into the production of policy documents, like the CIMD, which would themselves circulate out as new

knowledge forms. The circulation of the CIMD has in many ways been highly effective in enframing a new governable sector dressed up to reflect these emerging imaginings and respond to the problematisations they produce: indeed this was not simply an engagement with a previously unacknowledged sphere of activity – the significance of the CIMD was its role in *bringing this sector into existence* (Christophers, 2007).

5.3: Mapping the sector: constituting the creative industries

The role of calculation in rendering social, cultural, political and economic objects as available for action from policy-makers and other such actors has been an abiding concern in poststructural analysis (e.g. Rose, 1999a; Mitchell, 2002; Ferguson, 2006; Li, 2007a) and the rise of statistics and numerical technologies in government practice is well documented. Foucauldian governmentality scholars in particular, and Foucault himself, have emphasised the growth and deployment of these technologies as a corollary of the rise of the human sciences in the last few centuries (see for example the studies collected in Burchell *et al.*, 1991; Barry *et al.*, 1996). Rose (1999a) has argued that the 'advanced liberalism' that has emerged in the last few decades can be described as and attributed to the development and diffusion of numerical technologies such as audit (Power, 1997), new public management (Hood, 1991) and benchmarking (Larner and Le Heron, 2002) which govern by providing seemingly neutral measures through which individuals are disciplined or form aspirations. Hacking has described the rise of the science of statistics as having

> helped determine the form of laws about society and the character of social facts. It has engendered concepts and classifications within the human sciences... the collection of statistics has created, at the least, a great bureaucratic machinery. It may think of itself as only providing information, but it is itself part of the technology of power in a modern state (1991: 181).

In many ways numbers have made modern government possible. *Modernising Government* and the CIMD both implicitly recognise this fact.

Despite not being a 'map' in the cartographic sense of the word, the term 'mapping' was used to describe the activity undertaken in the CIMD because, according to Chris Smith, 'it covers territory never systematically charted' by government' (1998, cited in Christophers, 2007: 236). Inscription devices like

maps, charts, graphs and so on have long been used to rationally reduce the complexity of space to a manageable form. They work through their appeal to neutrality and objectivity as able to, from a distance, produce a truth about a particular defined space in a form that makes action upon them possible (Latour, 1988; Rose, 1999a). The CIMD, despite being a statistical profile, is no exception. The calculative approach of the CIMD demarcates the creative industries as a recognisable sector within the wider economy with particular properties in this regard, most notably its relative size and rapid growth rate. The novel contribution it made, however, which explains why this really was 'new' territory, was the establishment of what Christophers (2007: 240) calls 'internal equivalence: the industries belong together because they all share the central, defining feature of creativity'. The CIMD unified a set of disparate activities, rendered them in a (calculative) fashion that was comprehensive and comprehensible, and delivered them up as a governable object for policy-makers.

Of course, the definitions and measurements used in the CIMD have been a bone of contention (e.g. Selwood, 2002; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; Taylor, 2006). But, as will be shown below, despite these protestations policy is being produced at all administrative levels through the UK that specifically target the creative industries. This engagement is not always uncritical and often tries to reshape the sector in policy discourses (e.g. Oakley, 2004). This is because the effect the CIMD has in constituting the creative industries sector is not about accuracy, conceptualisation or even ideology. As Mitchell (2002) has argued, what is important is not the statistics, or the knowledge the statistics represent, or the particular form that the statistics are in (although these are significant), but the new kind of calculating site that developed with these, such as DCMS. These sites have the capacity to act on constituted objects, such as the creative industries, because they produce a 'distance between reality and its representation, between the material and the abstract, between the real world and the map' (Mitchell, 2002: 116). The abstract and representational knowledge 'held' at DCMS in the form of the CIMD may be inaccurate or poorly conceived, but it induces the idea of a describable creative industries sector beyond its walls in the 'real' economy. The creative industries sector is constituted as a governable object through this effect (Mitchell, 2002; Christophers, 2007).

Finally, the positioning of the creative industries within 'the economy' is an important factor in their constitution. It is not just the intrinsic qualities of numbers themselves that has made them such a powerful governmental tool (Rose, 1999a). Calculative practices have become powerful because they establish a relation between economic concepts and correspondence with the 'real world economy'. Changes in one necessarily act in concert with changes in the other through the link drawn between them by calculation. Buck-Morss' (1995) argument that the predominance of certain economic models in policy programmes rests on their ability to 'envision political economy' in diagrammatic form suggestively links the collection of statistics to the conceptualisation of them – but these conceptualisations do not necessarily have to be diagrammatic. As Mitchell (1998; 2002) has argued, 'the economy' (definite article) emerged as an object after World War Two, largely through the work of John Maynard Keynes, as an organising concept for all the calculative representations of certain productive activities within the territory of the nation-state – in turn calculation allowed this representation to seem to correspond to 'reality'. The CIMD worked within this pre-existing object but reconstituted it both conceptually and calculatively by proffering the existence of the creative industries sector.

In sum, the ability of the CIMD to constitute a sector does not stem just from its calculative nature, although the dominance of numerical technologies makes this a necessary condition. It is the marrying of these calculations to a certain conceptual framework that positions the CIMD within knowledge of the economy as a whole. As discussed above, the creative industries are conceived at the forefront of the emerging knowledge-driven economy, as the clearest realisations of the economic value of culture, and as the expression of the 'creative' impulse that drives both economic and cultural activity. Through calculation the CIMD makes the vital link between the way the economy is imagined and the necessary representative practices that can make this correspond with 'reality'. There have been two main effects. For one, 'the economy' is understood as a slightly different reality in which 'creativity' and 'knowledge' play increasing roles (although the extent of this is contested in technical debates). And two, an economic sector that is the manifestation of these

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trends, and named here the creative industries (although this is also contested, as will be demonstrated below), comes to be seen as part of it.

Reflecting on the popularity of the creative industries model with policy makers around the world, Michael Volkerling (2001) has concluded that the creative industries as realised in the CIMD is a model rather than a policy *per se*. Insofar as the CIMD contains no redistributions of resources, no creation of any new agencies and no directives for action, other than an assertion of the need to encourage and develop them, this is certainly the case. But I have argued, following and extending Christophers (2007), that the achievement of the CIMD was not creating a policy but establishing an integral relation between the creative industries and the reimagined economy through calculation. By enframing certain industries as 'creative' and linking them to emerging conceptions of the British economy the CIMD made the creative industries into an object available to new kinds of policy intervention. Rather than a policy model it makes more sense to conceive of the CIMD as a platform bolted onto 'the economy' upon which policy could be constructed.

The result of this has been two-fold. First, policy and other governmental programmes, begun both inside and outside the spaces traditionally associated with the state, are indeed being built on this platform provided by the CIMD. This is enframing the creative industries as an economic sector. And second, the circulation of the CIMD has prompted a variety of actors to be recast, and to recast themselves, in line with creative industries governmental visions. These actors are the creative industries 'experts' engaging and implementing these programmes. But these actors are not 'blank' – they have each engaged with the creative industries concept with a reason and for a purpose. The circulation of the CIMD has caused changes in their epistemic communities, forcing them to respond and realign themselves. These two effects will be dealt with in turn over the next two sections.

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5.4: Creative industries policy after the CIMD

The evidence for the efficacy of the CIMD in constituting a governable object is apparent in the action directed towards the creative industries after 1998. Most apparently, this has been through the production of policy documents implicitly reliant on the work the CIMD had done in establishing the creative industries. In subsequent years numerous other documents regarding the creative industries were produced by, or in association with, DCMS, including *The Creative Industries: The Regional Dimension* (DCMS, 2000a), *Our Hidden Potential: The Report of the Creative Industries Export Promotion Advisory Group* (DCMS, 1999a) and more specific reports on sectors within the ambit of, and directly referential to, the creative industries, such as television (DCMS, 1999b) and the internet (DCMS, 2000b). A second CIMD was also produced (DCMS, 2001b). These documents perform the dual purpose of further deepening the demarcation of the creative industries sector as a governable object begun in the original CIMD, and developing policy for specific aspects of the sector. This latter element tended to come in the form of policy recommendations and the formation of working groups within specifically created forums like the Creative Industries Export Promotion Advisory Group and attached to pre-existing or recently constituted agencies like the Regional Cultural Consortiums (RCCs) established to further cultural development at the regional level (see Lutz, 2006).

Further to this, the creative industries provided a policy platform for more than just economic concerns. The problem defined as 'social exclusion' became a key theme early on in the deployment of the creative industries (Evans and Smith, 2006; Oakley, 2006), reflecting one of the potential roles conceived for the creative industries in the reimagined economy. The work of the Social Exclusion Unit explored the possibility of using arts and sports, which 'are associated with rapidly growing industries' (Policy Action Team 10, 1999: 8), as a way to connect individuals with their communities and with society at large (see Levitas, 2004). This possibility was developed further in the report on the regional dimension of the creative industries sector in which a greater role in community development, urban regeneration and the integration of ethnic minorities was advocated (DCMS, 2000a: 21-22). The CIMD was not just an economic report, it worked with

an idea of the economy straddling social concerns and more conventional economic concepts.

However, the success of policy that builds on the creative industries platform has been mixed, in both implementation and effectiveness. This suggests that some aspects of the reimagining were far from durable. With regard to social exclusion, the creative industries have proven less than successful and are rarely now seen as relevant to these concerns (Oakley, 2006). Creative industries policy implementation at the regional level has also been difficult, with some commentators arguing it is a 'lost cause' (Jayne, 2005), although creative industries policy is being produced by the RCCs in some regions (e.g. Culture South-West, 2006). On the other hand, at the national level, government agency NESTA (National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts) have embraced the creative industries concept and produced a report on the development of 'world class' creative businesses (NESTA, 2006). Notably, these policy interventions focus on the 'regional', the 'social' and the 'business' aspects of the creative industries. Creative industries policy, then, is being built on the platform laid out by the CIMD, although in an uneven and undulating fashion and often in league with conceptions of space and sociality other than those national-scale and consumptionist conceptions it had used.

It is important to note, as Christophers (2007) has, that the availability of the creative industries to policy intervention in this fashion was not innocent. Their constitution has important disciplinary attributes which attempt to direct the actions of economic and cultural actors. Christophers refers to the case of the formation of the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in the UK which converged all the big regulators of telecommunications media – radio, television and telephony. Early on these were linked to the creative industries through a study of television exports (DCMS 1999b), but the key moment came when the white paper setting out the vision for Ofcom drew upon the CIMD to argue that the media and communications sector was growing 11% faster than the rest of the economy (Department for Trade and Industry/DCMS, 2000, cited in Christophers, 2007: 241-2). This is not just about legitimation. Ofcom, while being focused on non-intervention, maintains a constant stream of information about

the media and communications sector (Hesmondhalgh, 2005). The CIMD and Ofcom both work with spatially and temporally continuous representations of their respective objects, the former for the purposes of demarcation and naming, the latter for the purposes of non-interventionist 'supervision' which, in governmentality parlance, conducts conduct. The CIMD and Ofcom work with a field of power that relies on the production of seemingly neutral knowledge and information that subjectifies and spatialises. Their linking, as evidence and action, extends this field of knowledge in a consistent manner and holds out the possibility of extending technologies of discipline developed within Ofcom to all the creative industries.

The CIMD has also made the creative industries sector available for policy action by non-state actors. Since 2005 the creative industries have re-emerged as a policy issue for the government after they dropped off the agenda since 2001 following the removal of Chris Smith from the Secretary of State position. This has involved the appointment of the first Minister for the Creative Industries, James Purnell, who instituted the 'Creative Economy Programme' (Purnell, 2005: unpaginated). This has several strands but a key one is a renewed emphasis on intellectual property (IP). This was part of the conception of the industries, but until this point it was relatively peripheral. The focus on it came about after an intervention by an organised coalition of non-state actors:

> (IP) has always been there but the music industry made a big play to (Prime Ministerial residence) Number 10 (Downing Street) about two and a half years ago. We realised this isn't just effecting the music industry, they were just at the coalface. (Government Official, interview with author, 2006).

Certainly this had not been considered as an issue to any great extent. For example, a DCMS report on the funding problems of the music industry released in 2001 makes no reference to the opportunities and threats posed by the advent of digital technology (DCMS, 2001c). Following the action by the music industry, however, the Creative Industries Forum on Intellectual Property was formed in July 2004. This involved a series of meetings between representatives of DCMS, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Patent Office, the Consumers Association and various creative industries actors. The result is that a significant part of the Creative Economy Programme has been about improving Britain's IP laws and developing strategies for reducing the threat of IP crime (Creative

Industries Forum on Intellectual Property, 2005). This demonstrates how the development of policy following on from the CIMD is not just a government prerogative. Following the conception of the creative industries sector, any number of actors can engage with it.

This section has demonstrated the way that the CIMD made certain spaces, such as the media and enclaves of 'social exclusion', available to new types of intervention based on the potential of these industries in the emerging governmental economic imagination. It has also shown that it can provide a conduit for certain actors to put pressure on the government and the policy-making process. This has two effects. One, as these policies are rolled out they further entrench the status of the creative industries as a significant sector and policy category. And two, an institutional framework is constructed that enframes the reimagined economy (Mitchell, 2002). This is not to suggest that this framework somehow produces the economy as it has been reimagined, it is to argue that the reimagining is realised in the creation of agencies and institutions that act on particular social practices and forms articulated through it. It is not always robust, as the fading of social exclusion from the agenda testifies, but it has the CIMD and a range of other related research to provide it with a sense of what it is acting on. And it is in the very spaces that this framework opens up that certain actors can cast themselves as policy experts and try to shape the direction of the policy knowledge being produced and the economy being imagined.

5.5: Production vs. consumption: contesting the creative industries

The circulation of the CIMD did not simply produce a new constellation of agencies and experts enframing a new creative industries sector. It engaged a variety of actors already 'out there' situated in a variety of epistemic communities to whom this new policy document had important ramifications for their knowledge, practices, and constitution. This section will look at one particular epistemic community that responded to the CIMD by changing their alignment and recasting themselves as creative industries experts. To this extent they contribute to the constitution of the creative industries as a sector by

providing authoritative expert knowledge. However, these actors were not a 'blank slate' upon which the CIMD has been written, they brought with them their own knowledge forms which, through their role as creative industries experts, they are now circulating into policy-making spaces and changing the way the creative industries sector is conceived.

During 1998 an existing, but relatively loose, network of practitioners, consultants and researchers who had an interest in what they would describe as cultural industry and cultural development planning at especially the local and urban scale formed themselves into an organisation called the Forum on Creative Industries, or FOCI. They described themselves as 'a network of experienced professionals concerned to inform and influence the current debates around the creative industries'.[7] Initially it was brought together by three individuals: Phil Wood, a consultant for the urban-cultural consultancy Comedia and former head of the Huddersfield Creative Town initiative of the 1980s; Justin O'Connor, an academic from Manchester Metropolitan University and associate of Manchester's Cultural Industries Development Service; and Josephine Burns, co-director of cultural consultancy the Burns-Owens Partnership. In effect, FOCI became a vehicle to develop and represent the views of this small epistemic community.

The formation of FOCI represents this epistemic community reshaping itself in response to the CIMD. FOCI's significance stems from their desire to engage with this new discourse of the creative industries – even bringing the term into the title of their network despite many of the members professing some contempt for it. They wanted to ensure their ideas and insights would influence the policies and programmes produced in the name of the sector. This presupposed an overlap and established a link between their work and the discourse of the creative industries. This move was made

> because... people like me who had been working in Sheffield and Manchester and so on all those years were thinking, 'great, finally somebody is speaking our language' but feeling at the same time they weren't actually talking to us about it... FOCI was formed to represent those people who had been working with the cultural industries for years and their concerns... we decided to do something about it and so we combined our address books

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[7] See www.foci.org.uk

and invited everyone to a meeting in Huddersfield to see what they think about it, and that's where FOCI was born (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

The formation of FOCI was a spontaneous, but deliberate, act emerging from the re-articulation of a pre-existing set of relations.

There were several motivations for FOCI to form. The possibility of funding from central government for cultural industry and cultural sector projects is a central concern for members of FOCI as many of the projects they had been involved in had survived through occasional injections of council money and European funding for special projects or for deprived areas, where many of the projects were based. As the nineties drew to a close however, this funding was beginning to dry up. Success in this area has been mixed, with most of the funding coming through Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), RCCs and occasional injections from interested bodies like the Arts Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

However, to focus only on resource distribution is to underplay the complexity of the engagement. This has allowed for a thoroughgoing reframing of the sector away from what DCMS had produced and towards some of the concerns of FOCI members. Like the CIMD, certain elements of FOCI's constitutive knowledge could be traced to the work of the GLC. According to one member:

> The GLC had been the incubator of cultural industries thinking... In the end the abolishment saw it disperse to all these Northern Councils... I went to conferences, I read voraciously the documents that they were putting out and a lot of the stuff that was coming out of Comedia at the time. People like Ken Worpole and Geoff Mulgan for example. (In the mid to late 1980s) I was trying to put some of those ideas into practice at the local level (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

Unlike the CIMD, however, FOCI's members remained faithful to the GLC's local and regional focus. This meant that, to an extent, they wanted to ensure that policy for the creative industries engaged with the local and regional level which had been conspicuously absent from the initial DCMS framework:

> We felt that when the government started up with the creative industries in 1997 a lot of the groundwork had been done at the local level. And part of the creative industries agenda had always been a local one, but that DCMS document didn't mention place anywhere. We wanted to stress the local dimension (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

But this was not all, there was a desire to challenge the way the sector had been enframed:

> Where the word creative came from nobody knows. The specific definition was very individualistic. It completely came from left of field for people who had been talking about cultural industries and value chains and complex ecologies of distribution systems, and suddenly it was just about creative entrepreneurs exploiting IP. It was quite a weak understanding (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

The CIMD's constitutive enframing of the economy to include 'creative' activity as an integral component invited attention on a creative industries sector that overlapped with the objects of actors in the FOCI network. This overlap became a conduit through which these actors could contest the constitution of the sector as it stood in existing policy documents and offer a different way of understanding, and a different way of enframing, the economic for policy purposes. FOCI became the mechanism through which this could occur.

FOCI's opportunity came as a result of the CIMD garnering broad political support but in itself not being a policy programme, resulting in something of an impasse for DCMS. One member described the role the network was able to take on:

> The regions were well placed to do something about (the creative industries) because in a way this was what they had always been doing. But, and this is an important point, that could never be admitted. Part of the reason that creative industries and not cultural industries was selected was so that New Labour could distance itself from 'Old' Labour. 'Old' Labour had much of its support in the old metropolitan counties and much of what it had done was local economic development which was against the neoliberal orthodoxy which New Labour had taken over. There was a tension there... So FOCI... became a convenient sort of method for DCMS to talk to the regions – it inserted itself into the process... serving as an intermediary between public and private and all those interests. It could talk to people between different spheres and pass information along (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

FOCI became a part of the creative industries policy network. It acted as a proxy for drawing in knowledge once linked to the GLC, but at the same time disguised the fact such a link existed. The result was the ability of FOCI members to influence policy through membership of DCMS taskforces and influence at the RDAs and RCCs:

> In the early days we were able to guide policy, particularly at the regional level because there was a complete lack of knowledge. The organisations had been set up at the regional level with people who didn't really know anything about the area. So we saw ourselves as befriending these regional

agencies and guiding them in a way that we wanted them to use their resources. Ultimately several FOCI members got into jobs as creative industry coordinators. I think FOCI members did just about every piece of research at the regional level which established policy for the RDAs (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

Hence members of the FOCI epistemic community were producing, and were themselves, knowledge forms circulating through policy spaces. The authority they now had as creative industries experts meant that, at particular moments, they have been influential in the formation of policy programmes. The DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DCMS, 2004) was FOCI's most conspicuous success in this endeavour.

The DET was ostensibly a response to 'the urgent need, expressed by all the English RCC's, for a more robust and reliable evidence-base on which to develop policies for the future' (DCMS, 2004: 1). It serves as a guide for the collection of cultural statistics, including the creative industries that are within the DCMS remit,[8] and is intended to standardise this practice at the regional level and become part of the institutional framework described above. Like the CIMD, the DET makes the link between a concept, in this case the cultural sector, and the need for calculation to constitute it as knowable and actionable:

> It is only relatively recently that this sector has been bought together in the same policy framework. There are no shared definitions, systems and methodologies... there has been a lack of knowledge and expertise in drawing together credible data for policy-making (DCMS, 2004: 1).

To this extent the DET continues with the approach of using calculation to render certain unified spaces and subjects as available to governmental intervention. However, the DET differs from the CIMD in certain key respects. This is not just that they target the 'cultural' sector which overlaps with the creative industries sector – the DET is a deliberate attempt to alter the way that both of these sectors are conceived in policy knowledge.

Apart from a reference to them in a section on definitions, the creative industries are not mentioned in the DET. However, it is clear that these two sectors overlap one another in terms of some of the 'cultural' industries referred to. But this is

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[8] At the time these were visual-arts, performance, publishing and audio-visual. The rest of the creative industries were looked after by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

not a case of shifting the analytical lens and using the same statistical approach as the CIMD for measuring the performance of a slightly different set of activities. The focus of the DET is on the cultural sector and the economies in which it is situated:

> Culture has both a 'material' and a non-material dimension. The definition of the Cultural Sector must focus upon material culture, and we understand this to be the sum of activities and necessary resources (tools, infrastructure and artefacts) involved in the whole 'cycle' of creation, dissemination, exhibition / reception, archiving / preservation, and education / understanding relating to cultural products and services (DCMS, 2004: 10).

While the CIMD measured output and revenue, the DET uses *production chain* logic to guide the development of the statistical framework. Set against the consumption-revenue generating definition of the creative industries that describes the 'present approach of DCMS', this productivist definition emphasises not just the returns of the industries themselves but the role of all the facets of production:

> an analysis of one function within Film, film production, would not simply cover film production companies, but would seek to include set design, costume hire, post-production, special effects and so on. In addition to the introduction of functions that are not presently considered by DCMS (e.g. film education), a more rigorously applied concept of the production chain works to 'deepen' the cultural domains when compared with the present approach of DCMS (DCMS, 2004: 11).

The result is a challenge to the CIMD. The statistical representations that would be produced under the framework, with its emphasis on *all* the inputs that go into cultural production, would suggest the presence of a creative industries sector that looks quite different to that suggested by the latter. The implication of this is recognised by the authors: 'the concept of the production chain enables policymakers to 'see' the totality and interrelations of an industry or domain, which improves their ability to properly target interventions' (DCMS, 2004: 11). The overlap of the two sectors aside, this language indicates that the DET is a deliberate attempt to force a different representational map of the cultural and creative industries sectors that would result in a different kind of policy focus for both.

The DET itself was authored by academic Andy Pratt and consultancies the Burns-Owens Partnership, Positive Solutions and Experian Business Strategies, but FOCI had a strong influence. According to one member:

> It was the subject of a lot of debate in FOCI. We all inputted into that. We had many, many long debates about it. There were several people from the FOCI group who were involved in developing it (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

It was Pratt, however, who was most responsible for the production chain conceptualisation of the creative industries – it was an approach he had worked with before when studying what he called the cultural industries sector (see Pratt, 1997). One of the authors is definitive about what they hoped this would achieve:

> The failing of the mapping document was its conceptual basis where it was concerned with consumption but not with the interconnectivity of cultural production. By creating this model about the circuit of production it was like inserting a time-bomb into the whole statistical framework... they're now beginning to realise that their entire framework is based around this (production chain concept) and they've actually got statistics on this and they have to think about cultural production more generally. It's (our) way of figuring policy. (We've) inserted this policy imperative in the centre. (Jokingly) It's like a virus (DET Author, interview with author, 2006).

By creating this alternative framework to the CIMD a different type of evidence base is expected to result. FOCI's goal is to change the way the creative industries, and the cognate cultural sectors they are also interested in, are understood and acted upon in evidence-based policy. Some members claim that it has already had some success in changing the terms of the debate so it is possible this strategic deployment of knowledge, taken when a political opening occurred thanks to the efforts of FOCI, may have shifted the terrain of the creative industries in a significant way.

The CIMD and the reimagined economy it partly represents provide a platform for policy action and for policy intervention. The way that this produces an institutional framework provides the space, and the deliberate reliance on certain kinds of knowledge the opportunity, for actors, like those that constitute FOCI, to recast themselves as creative industries policy experts. In the case of FOCI the rise of the creative industries gave them a path to get closer to centres of policy-making and the opportunity to intervene on the way the imagined economy is governed. Their's is not the only example of this kind of intervention, but their story does illustrate two things: that policy is not only reliant on expertise but constitutive of it, and that this expertise is not necessarily interested in reproducing the status quo.

5.6: Conclusion

This analysis denaturalises the creative industries as an object of government by demonstrating the extent to which they were initially a contingent invention, produced in response to specific problematisations emerging in a specific moment of political change, reimagination, and inventiveness. This brings to the surface the means by which the creative industries were constituted as an actionable political object in a reimagined British economy. The use of calculative, evidence-based policy in the first iteration of the creative industries – the CIMD – had the effect of constituting the creative industries as an economic sector with certain qualities and dynamics amenable to political intervention. The CIMD and its related documents achieved a transformation in the ideas about a particular set of economic activities that were unified by the idea of creativity into numerically-proven fact – not because these figures were not disputed but because they backed up a claim that this sector existed in some form in the 'real' economy. The result was an economy with a new institutional framework that acts on this sector. The economy imagined in the CIMD became a reality for those agencies tasked with acting through or on the creative industries sector. These spaces became the real substance of the policy possibilities imagined through the CIMD.

With regard to the broader theoretical arguments of the thesis, this chapter shows how knowledge circuits that link different epistemic communities and policy-making sites can produce changes in all of them. The creative industries initially emerged as a policy concept through the articulation of particular problematisations concerning the nature of the British economy, the multi-faceted desire for a cultural revival and the turn towards evidence-based policy. These problematising discourses had been drawn from epistemic communities linked into New Labour and were circulating around the newly minted government system where, in DCMS, they found expression in the CIMD. This articulated a governmental imaginary that could be used to shape discourses about the future of the British economy and how those formerly 'excluded' could be 'included' again, as well as of the place and capacity of culture in British

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society. From a governmental point of view it produced a field of intelligibility through which programmes which would conduct the conduct of certain organisations and individuals could be made manifest. But the circulation of the CIMD also invited other epistemic communities, such as that constituting FOCI, to intervene on these governing processes through their ability to cast themselves as creative industries experts. By adjusting their own knowledge to engage with the new creative industries concept, and using this to enter knowledge forms onto the knowledge circuits that intersect with policy-making sites, these epistemic communities not only reshape themselves in relation to a particular policy but contribute to the shaping of problematisations that can reshape policy. Hence new and reconstituted epistemic communities form around particular problematisations.

This demonstrates how representations are constitutive of expertise, as well as constituted by it, through the circulation of knowledge forms. While the representation of the creative industries in the CIMD relied on politically mediated expert discourses about the changing nature of the economy and culture in the UK, the document has also caused actors situated in other epistemic communities to cast themselves as creative industries experts and engage with the representation. The CIMD was a 'success' whose legacy has endured not necessarily because it represented a sector that was of increasing importance to the British economy, or because it produced certain subjects and spaces constitutive of that sector, but because it resulted in the reconstitution of experts, agencies and institutions who were willing to work through the concepts that it provided. In the end, this technically rendered reimagination of the relationship between culture and economy has resulted in a rearranged, and still evolving, policy landscape populated with new kinds of policies, agencies and expertise existing in constitutive relationships to each other.

Chapter 6: Transnational policy formation: importing creative industries policy into New Zealand

6.1: Introduction

Since the creative industries were first conceived in the UK, it has reappeared in policy form in a number of countries around the world (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). This chapter focuses on one of these, New Zealand, to demonstrate the kinds of processes that can occur when policy transfers. The creative industries have been taken up with some enthusiasm by the New Zealand Government – most significantly they feature in a major economic strategy, the *Growth and Innovation Framework* (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002), as one of three key sectors, alongside biotechnology and information and communication technology, that the government wishes to develop.[9] But, as the chapter will show, this is not a straight-forward case of policy transferring fully-formed from one site to another. Indeed the story of creative industries policy development in New Zealand follows a quite different path to that of the UK despite a number of apparent similarities between the two administrations themselves. The differences that will be apparent here are not trivial: they are indicative of the complex geographies of circulation associated with policy transfer.

This chapter suggests that the transfer of creative industries policy from the UK to New Zealand is effectively a process of transnational policy formation. What the difference between the two UK and New Zealand stories of creative industries policy development indicate is that despite moments of 'parallel' or 'near parallel' policy development when the CIMD is drawn upon in the New Zealand context, these are projects that, individually, have developed in quite distinctive ways. They are connected by the circulation of knowledge between

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[9] They have also been embraced at the level of urban governance (e.g. Auckland City Council, 2005) but here the focus will be on the creative industries in national policy.

them, but it is a circuit that must pass through complex political, economic and social terrain, resulting in the particular knowledge forms often taking on new meanings as it is translated and retranslated on its way across the landscape. Thus this chapter focuses on the moments when the creative industries policy concept 'circulated in' to New Zealand and was translated into a constitutive component of policy debates and developments. It shows how creative industries policy in New Zealand was shaped by policy developed in the UK, but also that its engagement with the concept was determined by political concerns that saw it take a novel form. Creative industries policy in New Zealand was *assembled* from a variety of circulating knowledge forms and was more than the simple reproduction of the British experience.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the political situation in New Zealand when the political party that would institute policy for the creative industries, the New Zealand Labour Party, came to power late in 1999. The self-identification of the new government as 'post-neoliberal' and social democratic while still seeking policy solutions led them to draw on overseas policy ideas associated with similarly constituted governments, including Tony Blair's New Labour. As discussed in Section 6.3, part of New Zealand Labour's strategy was to focus on reinvigorating the moribund cultural sector in the country. It was during the search for a policy solution that would achieve this, a search that involved a variety of state, non-state and quasi-state actors from inside and outside New Zealand, that different actors began making links between the creative industries programme (as far as it existed) in the UK and the potential for such a programme in New Zealand. The first significant engagement with the creative industries policy concept occurred in this context with the 'Heart of the Nation', or HotNation, project intended to develop New Zealand's cultural sector. HotNation proved to be a failure as its authors misread the political moment, but it seeded the possibility of the creative industries as an important economic sector and increased the circulation of the concept. As Section 6.4 shows, the creative industries then began to be articulated into *economic* discourses, resulting in the *Creative Industries Mapping Document* being reproduced again (more faithfully than had been conducted under Heart of the Nation) by a new national economic development agency. This allowed them to be deployed in the GIF as a

sector vital to the 'economic transformation' of New Zealand. The chapter concludes by arguing that what is called policy transfer in this case is transnational policy formation that is spatially and temporally distributed across a range of policy-making sites linked up by a variety of knowledge circuits.

6.2: Policy knowledge networks and the New Zealand policy apparatus

When New Zealand Labour was elected to power in November 1999 it found itself with a number of political problems for which it was still seeking policy solutions. Of particular concern was the desire of the party to present itself as having moved on from the problematised neoliberal style of government that had marked the previous fifteen years. Like the election of New Labour in the UK in 1997, the election of New Zealand Labour had heralded the end of a long period of conservative (in the New Zealand case, National Party) rule. Although the opposition party in this case was in power for half the time – nine years as opposed to eighteen – the neoliberal style of government that allows parallels to be drawn with Thatcherite Britain extended further back to 1984 when the deregulation of the economy and the privatisation of state assets was begun under the previous (fourth) Labour Government. National's extension of market reforms to social services like health, education and welfare after 1990, combined with particularly extreme anti-union legislation, meant the 'New Zealand experiment' (Kelsey, 1995; see also Hazledine, 1998; James, 1998; Jesson, 1999) became an international example, cast in both negative and positive lights, of what could be achieved under neoliberal rationalities of government. This presented a complex problem for New Zealand Labour. On the one hand, a mid-1990s referendum that introduced a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation system was seen as a reflection of widespread public dissatisfaction with the pace and scale of reforms that had dramatically changed New Zealand's economic and social landscape during this period – MMP was to be a check on the parliamentary power that allowed this to happen.[10] On the other hand, neoliberal discourses of what constituted prudent economic

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[10] The first MMP election in New Zealand returned the National Party to power in 1996 in coalition with the minor New Zealand First Party. The latter had found itself as a power broker and had unexpectedly, for the electorate, gone with National rather than Labour (Bale, 2003; Kelsey, 2002).

management were seen as by and large accepted by the populace, so there was a public (and statutory[11]) expectation that the New Zealand economy would be managed in line with the principles that had become 'economic orthodoxy'. Labour came to power even as it still searched for policy answers to this particular problematisation (Larner *et al.*, 2007).

This was not simply a search in a 'marketplace' of policy ideas, New Zealand Labour deliberately drew on particular national and international policy networks. At the time there was a convergence of self-identified social democratic parties around idea of the 'Third Way' (see Giddens, 1998b). This famously nebulous political construction's best known proponents were Blair and US president Bill Clinton, although it was the former who became most associated with it (see Blair, 1998). It offered a political approach claiming to pick its way between right and left, dispense with the left's conflict-ridden language of class and inequality and suggest that it is possible to have a dynamic economy *and* social cohesion in the newly globalising world. Despite a constant stream of criticism that argued it was an entirely insubstantial ideology (see Kelsey, 2002: 58 for examples of this), during 1998 and 1999 Third Way discourse became a defining vision for New Zealand Labour. Following a visit by Robert Reich, Clinton's former Secretary for Labour in mid-1998, in which the Third Way vision of 'globalisation with a human face' was propounded, the New Zealand version of Third Wayism began to develop (Kelsey, 2002). New, though short-lived, leftish think-tanks were formed by Labour Party members such as the Gamma Foundation and the Foundation for Policy Initiatives. The latter had links with the British Blairite think-tanks Demos and the Institute of Public Policy Research (Kelsey, 2002). One conspicuous outcome was the publication of *The New Politics: A Third Way for New Zealand* (Chatterjee *et al.*, 1999) prefaced by Joseph Stiglitz, the former president of the World Bank who had come to speak out against the neoliberal 'Washington consensus'.

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[11] For example, the Fiscal Reponsibility Act (1994) requires the New Zealand Government to always run budget surpluses and the Reserve Bank Act (1989) granted independence to the Reserve Bank to set interest rates in order to control inflation.

New Zealand Labour, committed down the Third Way route, sought to associate itself with Tony Blair's New Labour, at one point Clark said that they were so close together you 'couldn't even fit a slice of bread' between them (cited in Kelsey, 2002: 67). This was reinforced in a 2002 speech by Helen Clark to the London School of Economics (LSE). Reflecting on New Zealand Labour's first term in office, she stated that her:

> government in New Zealand is following a path parallel to those of other modernising centre-left governments. We do seek in Professor Giddens' words 'to reconcile social justice with an energetic and competitive economy' (2002: unpaginated).

In line with this, the UK was looked to for policy ideas – in her LSE speech Clark (ibid.: unpaginated) confessed to 'borrowing from a British New Labour initiative' concerning developing a protocol for managing relationships between central government and the non-governmental organisations that deliver particular social programmes – and even campaigning techniques – New Zealand Labour imitated the New Labour 'Pledge Card' approach in which key policy commitments were listed on a wallet-sized card.

It should be noted that this association was not driven only by New Zealand Labour itself: in the late 1990s the media became a key site for shaping policy lesson drawing from New Labour in the UK (on the role of the media in policy transfer see McCann, 2004). A study by Tim Bale (2005) suggests that the New Zealand media was especially involved in bringing interpretations of New Labour's policy programme to New Zealand in order to set an international policy context for New Zealand Labour to work towards. Highlighting the particular role the media can play in policy learning, this coverage was particularly media-ted with 'the bulk of the material... (turning) out not to be contained within news sections but within editorials/leaders and commentary/feature columns' (Bale, 2005: 389). The concern for these generally right-wing journalists, such as Fran O'Sullivan of the *New Zealand Herald* and Jeff Gamlin of the *National Business Review*, was to indicate, editorially rather than accurately, the extent to which New Labour did not resemble the socialist 'old' Labour of Britain, and to point the business-friendly direction New Zealand Labour would need to go to make it electable and successful. Of course, this media-tion cuts both ways as since New Zealand Labour's election articles

favourably highlighting their supposed 'progressive' credentials have appeared in left-leaning British newspapers such as *The Guardian* (Bale, 2003; e.g. Freedland, 2000).

But New Zealand Labour built on its own international policy knowledge networks as well. From 2000 it began attending meetings of the international Progressive Governance Forum. This forum was an extension and rebranding of the policy exchange events held under the Third Way umbrella for social democratic parties since 1998. It was to one of these events that Helen Clark was heading after her 2002 LSE speech, 'to swap ideas on how to meet the economic, social and international challenges which face us all' (2002: unpaginated). The UK, it is clear, was not the only source of policy ideas. In the same speech Clark (ibid.: unpaginated) makes reference to economic development strategies for which 'we have looked at models elsewhere, from those of Ireland, Finland, and Israel to Singapore, Korea and Silicon Valley. From them we borrow what we believe will work for New Zealand'. Initiatives like the Kiwi Expatriate Association (KEA) (see Larner, 2007) were the result of ideas 'borrowed' from overseas.

New Zealand Labour's policies were not developed in splendid isolation, but nor were they simply plucked from a 'free market' of policy ideas. Through the media, through political networks like the Progressive Governance Forum, through the organised movement of certain knowledgeable individuals like Reich, New Zealand's policy-making apparatus was ensconced in a particular set of policy knowledge circuits that were integral to shaping political problematics and providing policy solutions. It was, and is, linked to these circuits in myriad ways: for example through personal connections, formal associations, organised events, and the media. When policy knowledge shifts within these circuits, New Zealand's policy programmes will shift with it. As I will show in the remainder of this chapter, however, this is not a case of policy homogenisation. The circulation of policy knowledge into and out of New Zealand's policy spaces is a process of *translation* which sees policy knowledge interact with 'local' expertise to produce novel policy forms, which can, in turn, return to those circuits. This

will be examined by looking at the specific conditions whereby the creative industries policy concept was translated into policy in New Zealand.

6.3: Cultural policy and the creative industries

6.3.1: Cool Aotearoa?

Policy ideas and possibilities, and sometimes simply policy language (Solli *et al.*, 2005; Lofgren, 2005), came through the circuits discussed in the previous section, including, as we have seen, from the UK. One of these was the concept of the creative industries (Kaino, 2007; Larner *et al.*, 2007). Initially, they did not make an appearance as any more than a simple rhetorical concept. The first time they surfaced was in a November pre-election cultural policy statement entitled 'Uniquely New Zealand' by the Labour party in which the desire was expressed 'to back a strong creative industry sector which provides sustainable employment and is able to contribute to economic growth and prosperity' (Labour Party, cited in Wong, 2000a). At the time this echoed the claims of the CIMD but was no more than a superficial engagement. Unlike the CIMD they were not being explicitly attached to the knowledge economy despite the presence of this latter discourse in New Zealand policy circles (e.g. Information Technology Advisory Group, 1999). It was in some ways an act of political expediency, like the 'pledge card' approach one of many intended to ride the popular wave of the UK's recently elected New Labour Party. But the language of the creative industries, and the possibilities it offered, could be usefully integrated into New Zealand Labour's political positioning. This was borne out in the year following the election as the term came to be established in New Zealand policy discourses.

The new government sought to position itself as a 'progressive' administration. Clark (2002) deliberately described the previous fifteen years as a period of 'neoliberal' government they had moved on from, but they also wanted to mark themselves as different from the pre-1984 governments. Its interpretation of this period echoed those made during the neoliberal period which described New Zealand as an over-regulated, centrally controlled economic basket-case – the

Poland of the South Pacific (Goldfinch and Malpass, 2007). Neoliberalism, then, was not a clear villain. Drawing on Third Way discourse, Clark conceded that 'no doubt many of these changes had to happen' (2002: unpaginated) so that New Zealand could become an open and modern economy – especially now under conditions of globalisation. But the changes had been too rapid, too radical and too ideologically tainted. Clark concludes that the reason her party had been voted in, and the mandate under which they had to govern, was because:

> many New Zealanders agreed that the country was on the wrong track and that fifteen years of radical change had failed to deliver either prosperity, or a fair society. Nor was there an appetite for any more radical change (ibid.: unpaginated).

Clark's government needed to differentiate itself from the neoliberal approaches of the previous decade and a half but retain certain aspects that could be thought of as essential to a modern globalised economy – trade and fiscal policy especially – without doing anything that might be conceived of as overly radical or ideological. It would take a comparatively pragmatic approach (Bale, 2003).

Reemphasising arts and cultural policy was one tactic for achieving this. Helen Clark herself became the Minister for the Arts, Culture and Heritage as well as Prime Minister, an unprecedented move that symbolically placed the sector at the heart of power. The cultural sector was constructed as having suffered under an austere neoliberal regime – Clark at one point even referred to the 'philistines' that wanted to narrow the collections and functions of the National Library and National Archive (Clark, 2000a: unpaginated). This was not difficult to do. During the neoliberal period, the Trade Development Board had in 1989 released a document on the export potential for the arts, working with the rationality that the artist had to learn to pay their way by developing their business skills (New Zealand Trade Development Board, 1989). In 1994 the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of New Zealand that had been set up in 1963 to manage the subsidy the government provided for the sector was restructured into its present form as Creative New Zealand (CNZ) and populated with generic managers who imposed a commercial model (Easton, 1997). Perhaps most significant was the gradual reduction in central government funding for the Arts Council/CNZ after 1990 despite some partial offsets via lottery money (Skilling, 2005). Opposition to these managerialist, business-oriented and parsimonious policies contributed to

the new government's self image as an administration with an interest in the cultural sector absent under neoliberal rationales. But Labour also differentiated itself from the old subsidy regime by emphasising the role that the arts and culture could play in constructing national identity and generating economic returns.

In this context the creative industries were picked up as a term that could partially organise Labour's approach to cultural government. As pointed out above, this was not at this stage an in depth engagement with the CIMD. It was what Ward (2006) would refer to as 'shallow' rather than 'deep' policy transfer. Nor were the creative industries the only term that travelled in this shallow fashion from the UK for these purposes. In March of 2000 an event entitled 'Cool Aotearoa?',[12] organised by CNZ and chaired by its chief executive Peter Biggs, [13] was held in the Beehive[14] in an attempt to apply the 'Cool Britannia' concept to the New Zealand context as a way of fostering a new identity. Biggs' inaccurate characterisation of Cool Britannia as a 'series of policy initiatives introduced by the Labour Government over there in 1997 to foster creativity in the United Kingdom' (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 3) rather than the marketing slogan it really was shows just how 'shallow' the engagement was at the time. The British guests on the panel, brought in to discuss the concept, very quickly disabused Biggs and the audience of the possibility that it still had credibility in the UK. One panellist, Michael Billington, theatre correspondent for *The Guardian* newspaper, stated:

> I don't want to sound too provocative, but I think with the benefit of hindsight it seems to have done Labour quite a bit of damage actually... it came to be taken to mean that they were actively hostile to the traditional arts, because they were so busy inviting people like (Britpop band Oasis guitarist Noel) Gallagher to 10 Downing Street. So I think it's a phrase that needs to be handled with a good deal of caution (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 3-4).

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[12] Aotearoa is the Maori name for New Zealand.
[13] It is interesting to note that before the 1999 election Biggs, a successful advertising executive, had been appointed to chair at CNZ by the previous government. At the time Clark declared that this was an end of term game being played by the departing executive by make life difficult for the incoming government (Small, 1999), but fairly soon into the term it became clear Biggs had gained Clark's trust, becoming one of her closer allies (Biggs was made a member of Clark's 'kitchen cabinet', the trusted advisors who populated her Growth and Innovation Advisory Board (Prince, 2003)).
[14] The Beehive is the executive wing of the New Zealand Parliament Buildings in Wellington.

The panel's other British representative, Paul Smith of the British Council, concurred: 'I do (share that view) to a great extent, I think the label is now rightly neglected in Britain' (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 4). 'Cool Aotearoa' proved to be a false start and has not been heard of since.

The term 'creative industries' remained peripheral at this stage despite the government's signalling of it. At the 'Cool Aotearoa?' event they were mentioned only once by Paul Smith who described it as a 'ham-fisted' phrase but suggested it was 'maybe most constructively useful as an example to New Zealand... (After some statistical work was carried out) we were looking in the Arts and Creative Industries at the second largest sector in the British economy' (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 5). But the focus at this stage was on New Zealand arts and culture and the possibilities of the 'creative sector', the 'creative society' and the 'creative nation'. Associate Minister for the Arts Judith Tizard reflected on the emerging debate about the place of arts and culture in New Zealand that the 'Cool Aotearoa?' event was a part of:

> I think it is a sign that this government is as passionate as it is about doing something real about New Zealand being a *creative nation* that we are having audiences like this talking about the sort of issues we are... I hope that this debate will be part of the ongoing debate which I hope that this government will be able to put real resources and real energy behind (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 1, emphasis added).

Peter Biggs also made it clear that his organisation shared the government's goals on this matter:

> Why has Creative New Zealand organised this event? Simply one reason, we don't see ourselves as just funders of the arts, we want to see ourselves as a catalyst in making the *creative society* happen (cited in CNZ, 2000a: 2, emphasis added).

Late 1999 and early 2000 was a period when policy ideas were used largely as a result of the new government 'feeling around' for possible policy solutions and ideas. The actors and agencies that linked to UK creative industries discourse at this time, like CNZ, predominantly identified themselves as part of the cultural sphere. This meant they looked to the UK through the networks they were linked into, meaning actors and agencies who similarly saw themselves as part of the cultural sphere in the UK. As a result the interpretations of the 'creative industries' and 'Cool Britannia' initially entering New Zealand were seen as possible solutions to what were considered *cultural* policy concerns.

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These events, policy statements and positioning speeches reflect attempts to translate policy concepts into a New Zealand context. This is not necessarily a difficult task: just the introduction of the creative industries concept suggests that there is an equivalent sector in New Zealand and therefore it will be possible to learn from what the UK is doing. But if it is to have any momentum and become a policy solution then it needs actors with the means and the motivation to champion the translation. Hence, certain agencies, such as CNZ, used this moment to try to position themselves as vital centres in this process of translation and therefore as indispensable components – 'a catalyst' (Biggs, cited in CNZ, 2000a: 2) – of the emerging policy solution. Like the actors from FOCI, the arrival of the creative industries concept as a possible solution to problems in the cultural sector allowed them to be cast as policy 'experts'. For CNZ this was rewarded with a generous funding boost, part of what was known as the Cultural Recovery Package, in May 2000 (Clark, 2000b). After promising in their pre-election campaign to provide an injection of funding into arts and culture of NZ$25m, the announcement of the Cultural Recovery Package in May saw this amount increased markedly to over NZ$86m plus NZ$18.5m extra funding per year distributed across several organisations. Table 6.1 summarises this spending. This increased the proportion of Crown expenditure on arts and culture from 1.2% to 1.7% between 1998/99 and 1999/2000 (Statistics New

Table 6.1: Summary of the Cultural Recovery Package (source: Clark, 2000b)

Organisation	Additional Funding provided (NZ$)
Creative New Zealand	20m
Film Production Fund	22m establishment costs
New Zealand Music Industry Commission	2m establishment costs
New Zealand On Air	27.9m plus 5m extra p/a
New Zealand Symphony Orchestra	3m plus 1.4m extra p/a
Te Papa National Museum	11m extra p/a
New Zealand Historic Places Trust	3m plus 0.5m extra p/a
New Zealand Film Archive	0.94m
Royal New Zealand Ballet	0.76m
Christchurch Art Gallery	6.74m development costs
Ministry of Culture and Heritage	1m plus 0.6m extra p/a

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Zealand, 2005: 6). The NZ$20m that CNZ received enabled the agency to increase its funding to 31 regularly funded cultural organisations by an average of 30% and provide funding for an additional seven organisations over the following three years (CNZ, 2001).

Clark justified the increase in spending by pointing out that New Zealand's established arts organisations were in a precarious financial position and needed serious monetary assistance if they were to continue being viable. But she also further emphasised the government's commitment to establishing a unique New Zealand identity which had the arts and culture at its centre and repeating the pre-election policy statement on the role that a 'creative industry sector' would have in the future of the New Zealand economy (see Clark, 2000a; 2000b).

6.3.2: 'HotNation'

Of more portent, however, was the commissioning of the Heart of the Nation (HotNation) project at the end of March 2000. The purpose of this project was to develop a strategic plan for the cultural sector within the context of the Government's 'vision'. The Terms of Reference for the project outlined this by repeating pre-election campaign lines:

- Vibrant arts and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can enjoy and through which a strong and confident cultural identity can emerge; and

- A strong and vibrant creative industry sector which provides sustainable employment and economic growth within an innovative environment

    (New Zealand Government, in Heart of the Nation Project Team, 2000: Annex A ii, refer Appendix C)

The creative industries, here still no more than a vague concept in a vague discourse, were about to undergo a deeper engagement.

The intention was for the panel to 'embark on a consultative process with key stakeholders and interest groups in the cultural sector' which would not rely on 'significant increases in government funding for its effectiveness' (ibid.: Annex A ii, refer Appendix C). Its strategic working group was led by arts consultant Hamish Keith although the quantitative and analytical research conducted in the report was by the consultancy McDermott Miller and especially the Wellington

academic, and former director of the Arts Council, Michael Volkerling. Volkerling is generally credited with writing the bulk of the report. The project was given two months to report back to the Minister. The process of producing the report involved the panel talking to arts organisations, collecting submissions, meeting with local community representatives across the country, researching the cultural sector, and drawing up a strategic plan. What was produced ran to over 60,000 words as *The Heart of the Nation: A Cultural Strategy for Aotearoa New Zealand* (HotNation Project Team, 2000). The report offered a conceptualisation and analysis of the cultural sector and proposed a fairly thoroughgoing restructuring of its existing governance arrangements. To this extent it was a relatively strong techno-political statement about the nature of the sector and an attempt to bind together the cultural sector ideologically, materially and institutionally. The plan was defended as a coherent architecture that was emerging from within the cultural sector (Keith, 2000). One individual involved with writing the report argued that it represented a distillation of the cultural policy discourses that had been fermenting in and around the Arts Council since the 1980s (interview with author, 2006).

The report drew on the Government's vision outlined in the terms of reference by conceiving of the cultural sector as comprised of cultural enterprises in which 'creativity embraces expressive and communicative purposes and where profit and commercial gain is not a primary motivator', and creative industries 'whose primary resources are creativity and intellectual property and which are sustained through generating profits' (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5). On top of this, the sector was conceived as necessarily including the recognition that Maori culture is distinctive from non-Maori culture and needs to be maintained as such under the obligations of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was expected that the cultural sector would provide both cultural and economic returns. Drawing directly on the CIMD, this possibility is fleshed out in the bulk of the report which analyses the size of the sector in terms of its cultural and economic returns, the possibilities for the growth of the sector given growing domestic and international audiences and the prospect of increased investment by private and public organisations. It concludes that the sector has great potential for enhanced economic and cultural returns if necessary strategic steps are taken.

The report proposed a significant programme of restructuring to acheive this end – in the words of the report, what was needed was not a 'tune up', but an 'overhaul' of the existing system (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 76). The most important elements of this were a new Ministry for Maori Arts, Culture and Heritage to sit alongside the existing Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the abolishment of CNZ to be replaced with an assortment of bodies concerned with training and support for cultural and creative workers, local government partnerships, sector specific arrangements, and the creative industries. The last of these would get its own Creative Industries Development Agency intended to work with existing practitioners in developing careers, markets and products for the sector. This was the first substantive engagement with the creative industries in a policy related document in New Zealand, a document primarily intended for the broader cultural sector.

6.3.3: HotNation and the CIMD

Texts like the HotNation report are forged from the articulation and translation of a variety of intersecting actor-networks (Barnes, 2001a). The report's primary author, Michael Volkerling, has an international reputation as a cultural policy scholar resulting from his constitutive actor-network that includes roles organising the biannual International Conference on Cultural Policy Research and on the editorial board of the *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. The HotNation report illustrates this in referencing cultural policy examples from Australia, Ireland, Canada and the United States. What is also clear however, despite these other examples, is the influence of the CIMD and other creative industry policy documents from the UK. The first CIMD (DCMS, 1998) is included in the bibliography along with the Creative Industry Task Force reports on exports (DCMS, 1999a), the internet (DCMS, 2000a) and the 'regional dimension' (DCMS, 2000b).

The report provides a definition for the cultural sector, of which the creative industries are a part, that adopts the same key components as that provided in the CIMD. Compare:

Those industries which *have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent* and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of *intellectual property* (DCMS, 2001b: 5),

with:

a range of commercially-driven businesses whose primary resources are creativity and *intellectual property...* a range of activities which *have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent* (HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5, refer Appendix D).

The method of listing the range of activities that make up the sector is also utilised. Although some different activities are included, it is notable that, like the CIMD, it groups together activities that may have once been seen as disparate, like design, the performing arts, advertising, film and the recording industry (see HotNation Project Team, 2000: 5, refer Appendix D).

This process is indicative of how the policy transfer is a matter of *translation* (Czarniawska and Sevon, 2005; Lofgren, 2005; Olds, 2005). After a possible equivalence was recognised between the New Zealand and UK cases it had become conceivable that a policy transfer could be effected between the two countries. The HotNation report did this directly by drawing on the CIMD and related documents. But despite its obvious influence it was not parachuted in fully-formed, it was translated through the knowledges that intersected at the site of production and a new knowledge form was created. The way the definition was taken apart and put back together in a different way – resulting in a definition for which arts and culture are not understood *only* in terms of the creative industries as they are in the UK (refer Appendix D) – is an allegory of this process. The ideas of the CIMD combine with ideas about culture as not just about profit and the need to make special provision for conceptions of Maori culture, along with myriad other knowledges brought into the site through other actor-networks, resulting in the alloy of the final report. Other constraints played their part as well (Routledge, 2008): the project team was only given two months to produce their report, meaning the statistical analysis was a pragmatic articulation of the CIMD approach and the approach taken by Statistics New Zealand several years earlier when they produced the *New Zealand Framework for Cultural Statistics* (Statistics New Zealand, 1995) using a set of similar categories. This provided the researchers with a ready-made proxy for measuring the cultural sector and its creative industries as it was argued that most of the

activities that make up the cultural and creative industry sector fit under these headings. Hence, the CIMD had a definite influence on what was produced, but the end result came out of the active translation of the CIMD and its articulation with other knowledges.

6.3.4: Heart failure?

To a considerable extent the process of translation is an exercise in negotiation between different knowledge claims. It is also a techno-political exercise as actors try to produce knowledge forms calculated to cause favourable shifts in policy. It was hoped that the HotNation report would be a central text, a circulating immutable mobile in ANT parlance, for producing an institutionalised actor-network that would govern the New Zealand cultural sector. It was not to be. After reviewing the report, Helen Clark responded in no uncertain terms that it did not fit in with what the government wanted. In their response, the government argued that the review did not address the terms of reference because the project was intended to 'facilitate the development by the sector of a strategic plan' in the context that:

> the Government wants to play a *supportive* role in relation to the sector, but to do this most effectively, we believe the sector must have a clear sense of its *own vision and strategies to achieve it* (Matthews and Clark, 2000: unpaginated, emphasis added, refer Appendix E; see HotNation Project Team, 2000: Annex A ii, refer Appendix C).

This vision conflicted with the strategy outlined in the report which the government saw as 'substantially a plan to implement structural changes to Government' (Matthews and Clark, 2000: unpaginated, refer Appendix E).[15]

The primary justification for the rejection was cost – the proposed reforms would cost millions to implement and be difficult to justify given the government's

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[15] This reflects the main thrust of the rejection, although there are some additional concerns expressed over the fact that the submissions received are not reviewed, giving the government no sense of what interests outside the project team were thinking, and some dispute over the figures used concerning the proportion of built capital against non-capital cultural expenditure (refer Appendix C). This latter conflict resulted in a longstanding bitterness as some of the researchers were left angry over the loss of reputation they may have suffered, reflecting the sour conclusion to the HotNation project as a whole and possibly to the new cultural sector that had been hoped for (Wong, 2000b).

limited fiscal base (Clark, 2000a) – and a related concern over the meaning of a restructuring programme of that magnitude: it was argued that, for one, there is already an established infrastructure in place, and two, that the cultural sector, and the country in general after almost two decades of reform, was 'all reorganised out' (Tizard, in CNZ, 2000b: 9). The most telling aspect of the rejection concerned how the government wanted to play a 'supportive' role and that the sector had to have 'its own vision and strategies to achieve it'. The government had an idea of the cultural sector as a definable entity that had for years relied on state funding but with the potential in a post-industrial age to become self-regulating and, at least partially, self-sustaining. Although funding had been injected to revive flagging cultural institutions, it was hoped the national debate and the Heart of the Nation project would then catalyse a self-aware and independently operated sector. What the HotNation report proposed was at odds with this rationale – it implied a continued heavy government presence in the cultural sphere and a wide range of institutions that would be costly to set up and into which government money would continue to be funnelled. According to Associate Minister for the Arts Judith Tizard: 'We asked for fish and chips and they (gave) us a fishing trawler and a flour mill' (cited by Harcourt, in CNZ, 2000b: 8).

In contrast, Volkerling, described in an interview with one of his work acquaintances as a 'structuralist' type thinker, was proposing thoroughgoing institutional changes that could not be easily reconciled with government thinking. For Volkerling, the problem was that 'the Heart of the Nation report overlapped but did not couple neatly with the government's readymade solutions' (2001: 449). The extent to which the government did indeed have 'readymade solutions' at this time is uncertain, but after signalling early in her premiership that 'mediative' ideas which provide for incremental rather than dramatic change, the Third Way for example, appealed to the kind of politics she wanted to conduct (see McLennan and Osborne, 2003), the restructuring programme of the HotNation report proved unpalatable. The articulation of the CIMD with knowledge produced through the particular actor-networks that informed the production of the HotNation report could not be reconciled with those that informed the conduct of the new government.

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For all intents and purposes, HotNation was a failure. It did not have any of its recommendations acted upon and its rejection was clear and public. As a knowledge form, this meant it was destined to not travel through the circuits intended or in the form intended – as such very few hard copies of the report are still in existence. The cultural sector never recovered the optimism that had marked the early part of 2000 despite Clark announcing that supporting the arts and culture would continue to be a priority for her government (Clark, 2000a). However, although it did not result in the formation of policy for the creative industries, the report proved to be pivotal in increasing the circulation of the concept around more than just cultural policy circles: indeed parts of HotNation remained instrumental as the creative industries came to be resituated in a different policy context, and substantive creative industries policy formation occurred.

6.4: The emergence of the creative industries

The arrival of the creative industries concept in New Zealand, combined with the more sustained engagement with the CIMD in the HotNation report, began to consolidate the concept in policy discourses. This was not simply 'free-floating' discourse: the term 'creative industries' was proving useful to policy, media and industry actors for understanding particular industries in New Zealand whose recent developments had received widespread media and government attention. Framing them in this fashion also fed into the image of New Zealand as a particularly 'creative' place. Three industries were especially prominent: popular music, designer fashion and film.

In July 2000 the New Zealand Music Industry Commission (NZMIC) was set up to cater for the national music industry which was seen to have an increasingly distinctive sound and an untapped potential for export earnings (see Music Industry Export Development Group, 2004). This resulted from the lobbying of government by musician representatives to get them to recognise the potential of a sustainable music *industry* that sat somewhere between the pure creative focus of CNZ and the commercial 'airtime' focus of the Government's broadcasting

funding agency New Zealand On Air. At the time of writing the Government had granted the NZMIC two packets of NZ$2m in 2000 and 2005.

Designer fashion in New Zealand was also achieving a degree of exposure that it had not experienced previously. 2000 was the year of the inaugural New Zealand Fashion Week which built on the acclaim and commercial success that New Zealand fashion designers had enjoyed the year before at London Fashion Week and since 1997 at Australian Fashion Week (Goodrum et al., 2004). Government support and extended media coverage of the event and the industry itself confirmed its perceived status as a pre-eminent post-industrial industry and purveyor of New Zealand's desired identity as an edgy and innovative place (Lewis et al., 2008).

Finally film-making in New Zealand was receiving a disproportionate amount of attention at the time due largely to the filming of The Lord of the Rings in New Zealand by local director Peter Jackson which utilised New Zealand designed special effects technology widely perceived as cutting-edge. The presence of Hollywood actors and the amount of investment from the American movie producers New Line Cinema, as well as the innovative business model of making all three films of the trilogy at once, saw media attention lavished on the production. As with designer fashion, film was perceived as representative of the creativity inherent in the people of New Zealand and an opportunity to leverage off the country's scenery (Jones and Smith, 2005).

By September 2000 the idea that these were all 'creative industries' was increasingly accepted. The creative industries concept served to arrange them alongside each other and in relation to the rest of the New Zealand economy. This was illustrated at an event similar in nature to 'Cool Aotearoa?' entitled simply the 'Creative Industries Forum' (CNZ, 2000b). Organised again by CNZ, this time in conjunction with the British Council, the forum's participants were a reflection of how these industries were being understood together as creative industries and in parallel with a similar sector being developed in the UK. The main speaker was the British Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith alongside Judith Tizard and a panel of New Zealand speakers

representing music, designer fashion and film: 'three of the key creative industries' (Harcourt, cited in CNZ, 2000b: 1). The presence of Smith and the industry representatives on the stage with Tizard was in marked contrast to the 'cultural' experts from the UK and New Zealand who spoke with her about 'Cool Aotearoa'. The focus now was on the creative industries – a fact quite explicitly laid out by chair Gordon Harcourt who linked Smith to the Creative Industries Taskforce in the UK and introduced the creative industries themselves through reference to the CIMD. While the event was a discussion of how New Zealand might learn from the UK example, its significance lay in the way it ordered these New Zealand industries as conceivable together through this British policy example.

To sum up, over the course of 2000 the creative industries concept made a substantial incursion into New Zealand policy discourses. During this period a knowledge circuit had developed between New Zealand and the UK on which different kinds of experts travelled, ideas moved, and documents transferred. This particular circuit was the result of multiple attempts to translate the creative industries idea into the New Zealand context by multiple overlapping policy networks. As these attempts at transfer began to run together, gradually a certain conception of the creative industries formed across a number of agencies and networks and the creative industries concept began to develop in the New Zealand context. One government official described this process of the creative industries becoming a potential policy object thus:

> The focus on creative industries as developed in New Zealand did result to a significant degree from the work on Heart of the Nation. This was more as a result from the process involved in developing the report and work on next steps after the report than necessarily from the content of the final HotNation report itself. This focus on creative industries was further reinforced by the mapping work going on in the UK, which the visit of Chris Smith further crystallized (Government Official, interview with author, 2006).

The movement of ideas, documents and experts had been driven by more than just one actor or agency: CNZ, the HotNation project team, the new Labour government and creative industry practitioners all had a hand. Each of them had different motivations and deployed the language for different purposes – not always successfully as the failure of HotNation made clear. But out of it the

creative industries emerged as a useful concept for policy development in the New Zealand context.

The creative industries concept is not the only way that the sectors the term describes might have been conceived for governmental purposes. In fact it was not the only attempt to do so: in an effort to gain more recognition and funding the New Zealand Film Commission commissioned a report that explored the concept of 'cultural capital' and whether the government should get involved in encouraging its production (see Barker, 2000). This was not as successful as the concept of the creative industries, not only in terms of its circulation in policy discourse but in the use of the term by actors in these sectors. This can be explained by the stronger actor-network that had formed around the idea of the creative industries, a characteristic of its translatability as a useful idea for a wide variety of actors.

The creative industries idea offered a variety of actors in New Zealand the opportunity to operationalise the idea that 'creativity' unified all these industries and their interests, and suggested that their parallel rise was not coincidence but the result of the growing importance of this capacity to the economy. As the cultural critic Stuart Cunningham has observed: 'for the first time (the creative industries concept) brings those industry sectors, those enterprises and those people who are creative in this broad sense, right into that mainstream of economic calculation and activity' (2003: 2). It was a policy with the potential to push aside existing tensions and problems by unifying the sector within itself and with the Government and, in a mediative fashion, act as a 'problem-solving device... that will simply 'move things along'' (McLennan and Osborne, 2003: 53). When the HotNation report 'landed uninvited at the door of Jim Anderton's newly created Ministry of Economic Development' (Smythe, 2005: unpaginated) later in 2000, it was in the context of this emerging conception that this piece of codified knowledge was now being deployed. It had gone from 'cultural plan' to economic 'mapping document'.

6.5: From culture to creativity?

6.5.2: Creative industries as economic policy

The transition of the creative industries from an amalgamation of cultural and economic imperatives to an economic sector was confirmed when responsibility for developing them passed from the cultural agencies like CNZ and the Ministry of Culture and Heritage to the newly formed economic development agency Industry New Zealand. The appeal of the creative industries had been such that Clark had remained true to her word in the HotNation response that the report would be a 'useful input' to policy development (Matthews and Clark, 2000, refer Appendix E). Judith Tizard had also referred to the document as 'a fantastic piece of work which has produced a creative and cultural map of New Zealand' (cited in CNZ, 2000b: 9). The use of the term 'map' here to describe the HotNation report despite it, like the CIMD, not being a map in the conventional sense at all, reflected the influence the CIMD approach now had on the thinking of these key government actors. The HotNation report served as an input to policy by tracing the contours of a creative industries sector in New Zealand, much like the CIMD had done in the British context. But its situation in a cultural policy document, and the perceived lack of rigour that was a consequence of the short time frame for the project, meant it was soon displaced as a key policy document and the CIMD was once again re-engaged by a different set of agencies and actors.

Following the British example of the Creative Industries Taskforce, a cross-departmental Creative Industries Working Group was set up with officials from the Ministry for Economic Development, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage and Industry New Zealand. The last of these had been set up as a new agency intended to develop New Zealand enterprises within a new paradigm of governmental intervention in the economy. This paradigm, located between the 'extremes' of laissez-faire marketisation and state economic management, would be based upon 'intelligent interventions' that combine indirect and direct support for industries (see Rodrik, 2004). Initially in November 2000, five creative industry sectors were identified as having the potential for significant returns – music, screen production, design, digital media and publishing. In 2001, under

the direction of the Creative Industries Working Group, it fell to Industry New Zealand to go further than what had been achieved with the HotNation report and explore the shape and potential of these sectors for the New Zealand economy. This would amount to a more sophisticated rendering of the creative industries sector, and of the industries within it.

The first such study was contracted out to the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) which produced an overview of the creative industries in New Zealand (Walton and Duncan, 2002). The brief given to NZIER by Industry New Zealand required that they model their approach on that used in the CIMD (ibid.: 1) and they did this through the adoption of the definition and the reproduction of the greater part of their methodology combining statistical data with estimation. Although they endeavoured to use the same categories, they had to reduce the number from thirteen to ten due to a lack of available data in the arts, crafts and antiques sector (ibid.: 3-4). The significant findings of the report were that the whole creative industries sector was 3.1% of the economy in 2001; comparable to sectors such as education and finance, and that it had grown faster than the economy as a whole since 1997. Like the CIMD and HotNation, this study was constitutive of the creative industries as a sector in New Zealand rather than a description of a pre-existing object. Because it was modelled on the CIMD, its effect was to produce a *comparable* sector to that which existed in the UK and understood in much the same terms as containing certain industries and collectively growing at a certain rate (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; McCann, 2008).

But in addition to this initial study, Industry New Zealand also commissioned a number of more specific 'scoping reports' of opportunities and impediments for growth on the creative industries of designer fashion (Blomfield, 2002), design (Haythornthwaite, 2002), music (Douche, 2001), film[16] (Yeabsley and Duncan, 2002) and interactive gaming (O'Leary, 2002). These studies delimited which activities carried out in which fashion at which sites and by which kinds of workers fall within each particular sector. This is more than just boundary

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[16] This report was commissioned by the New Zealand Film Commission but utilised by Industry New Zealand with special reference to the impact of *The Lord of the Rings*.

drawing: the creative industries are also activities defined by certain aspirational associations with creativity. Hence designer fashion was separated out from the production of textiles and other clothing due to the possibility it could 'gain an international profile for New Zealand' (Blomfield, 2002: 51). These studies work to make the creative industries, in particular and in general, exist as definable and describable entities with a degree of coherence that means they can be acted upon as a whole (Mitchell, 1991; 2002; Buck-Morrs, 1995; Christophers, 2007). During 2001 the New Zealand creative industries went from a vague object understood to be 'out there' to a solid and actionable space of industrious and creative activity.

The mapping study and the scoping reports constituted a platform on which policy could now be built. It is here that they began to be articulated with other policy knowledges circulating through Industry New Zealand. The nature of the economy, and the role that government could play in it, was being reimagined by and through a variety of commissioned studies, forums and agencies. Work conducted by Industry New Zealand, Trade New Zealand (formerly the New Zealand Trade Development Board) and the Treasury, supplemented by research on the 'kiwi diaspora' and foreign direct investment by private consultancies, produced an array of reports specifying the challenges the New Zealand economy faced (e.g. Boston Consulting Group, 2001; L.E.K. Consulting, 2001). Imported discourses of the 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge society' were standard motifs for these reports. Similarly influential and with greater media exposure was the 2001 'Knowledge Wave' Conference co-organised by the University of Auckland and the Government. This event focused on how New Zealand might become a 'knowledge society' and organised its recommendations around themes of innovation, creativity, human capability, entrepreneurship, sustainability and social cohesion (Prince, 2003). Much like in the UK, government directed research on the creative industries was conducted at the same time that a relatively wide-ranging reimagining of New Zealand's economy and society was occurring. The idea of the creative industries had emerged in the UK from the reimagining of the economy that produced ideas like the 'knowledge economy' which were now also circulating into New Zealand

(Larner *et al.*, 2007). But as these were re-articulated together by agencies in New Zealand they produced a different policy regime.

The main policy form that emerged was the *Growth and Innovation Framework* (GIF) (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002) released in 2002. The GIF serves as the centrepiece of the Government's attempt to intervene on New Zealand's economy and society: 'the framework government is following to create the innovative New Zealand we need to achieve our social and economic goals' (ibid.: 6). The stated intention is to reinvent the economy as a haven of high value-added production, leading to higher growth outcomes. To this end the GIF focuses on three sectors of the economy which are considered to have high growth prospects *and* the potential for significant impact across the economy. These are biotechnology, information and communication technology, and the creative industries. After the failure of HotNation to make them part of a cultural strategy, the creative industries had been translated into *economic* strategy. As an element of the knowledge economy they are seen as either industries where New Zealand is considered to have a competitive competency, like film, or as industries with an enabling quality providing innovative design and unique identity that cannot be replicated elsewhere. The creative industries are less the economically viable outcome of cultural production, as they were under HotNation, and more a realisation of an economic ideology that 'creativity is at the heart of innovation' (Office of the Prime Minister, 2002: 56).

More pertinently, the inclusion of the creative industries in the GIF strategy was made possible through the use of the calculative 'mapping' approach first developed in the UK. In one sense, this approach had supplied the necessary numbers to justify their inclusion in the Government's master strategy.[17] But in the end it was not the figures produced that were important, or even the evidence they provided that the sector was growing rapidly: already for one government official, the scoping studies are little more than a 'piece of history', meaning their role was to provide a foundation to get the creative industries into

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[17] Although several of the studies are dated after the release of the GIF, the fact of their existence was influential in justifying the inclusion of the creative industries (Government Official, interview with author, 2006).

the GIF (interview with author, 2006). Of more significance is the possibility of the sector as a policy object. It was not important that the calculation of the contribution of the creative industries was accurate but that the sector was calculable, measurable, and therefore real (Mitchell, 1991; 2002; Christophers, 2007). It was this effect, rather than accuracy, that the mapping and scoping studies achieved, and the reason the creative industries could be translated into the reconstituted economic strategy.

6.5.2: After the Growth and Innovation Framework

With their existence recognised through the studies, and their place in policy established through the GIF, the creative industries remain a contested presence, resulting in novel policy forms and interventions as they are re-translated and re-articulated in new policy roles. The rollout of the GIF, for example, involved the creation of four private sector taskforces for each of the three priority sectors. The biotechnology and information and communications technology sectors had a single taskforce each but the creative industries ended up with two, one each for screen production and design. The decision to focus on these two creative sectors within the creative industries spectrum reflects the influence the Ministry of Economic Development and Industry New Zealand now had on the direction of creative industries policy. Design was selected under the GIF rationale that it was the most likely to have a broad impact across the economy as a whole; in other words it was perceived to have potential as an *enabler* for other industries to increase the value-added contribution to their part of the value chain. The focus on screen production on the other hand is described as a case of 'strategic opportunism' borne out of the success of *The Lord of the Rings* in attracting investment and providing the opportunity for other industries, notably tourism and special effects technology (Jones and Smith, 2005), to leverage off the films (Government Official, interview with author, 2006).

While the policy for these programmes is managed by the Ministry of Economic Development, they are delivered through the agency New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) which had been formed in June of 2003 out of the amalgamation of Industry New Zealand and Trade New Zealand. At the time of

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writing NZTE remains the primary central government agency for the creative industries in New Zealand. The sector engagement strategy for 2006-07 (NZTE, 2006) lists the key initiatives as the Better By Design project,[18] a project to build a sustainable entertainment sector which focuses entirely on the screen production industry, and projects on developing exportable new generation textiles and 'designer'/'sustainable' lifestyles. By far the most significant of these is Better By Design which resulted from the design taskforce's recommendations for a 'design reference group' and focuses on linking New Zealand companies with the design industry. The screen production strategy focuses on bringing investment into New Zealand by attracting foreign film-makers, as occurred for *The Lord of the Rings*, and improving the sustainability of the New Zealand industry. Designer fashion had featured in the previous sector engagement strategy (see NZTE, 2005) and still has an official overseeing it, but has since been absorbed into the 'designer' lifestyles project. Music still rates a mention on the website but no strategy for engaging the sector exists with the agency. Two government officials interviewed made it clear that these industries are not considered economically significant enough to the agency to warrant sustained engagement (Government Officials, interviews with author, 2006).

On the other hand, the relative size, centrality and success of the Better By Design project is indicative of ideas about the value-chain in governmental discourses. It is also clear that the creative industries are regarded as central to producing a New Zealand identity as they had been during the commissioning of HotNation, but here they are now linked with the possibility of further developing the New Zealand 'brand' from which New Zealand enterprises might be able to gain leverage (see NZTE, 2004-5). This is connected to discourses of 'economic transformation' which conceive New Zealand as competing in a global environment and linked into this via value-chains (see Mallard, 2006; Cullen, 2006; Ministry of Economic Development, 2007). In explaining this, a government official directed me towards a paper by the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik (2004) which has been highly influential in thinking about the economy in New Zealand. The paper makes an argument for 'intelligent intervention' in the economy in which public and private actors work together to identify the most

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[18] See www.betterbydesign.org.nz

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widely beneficial way to act in the economy. Within this context the creative industries are regarded as *enablers* in the value-chain in that they enable New Zealand producers to extract more value from their particular node whether this is through improved design capability or through the reference of 'Brand New Zealand' and its many positive cultural associations which the creative industries are expected to provide. The Better By Design project represents the translation of the creative industries into the service of 'economic transformation' and, conversely, provides an important constitutive element of this process.

Meanwhile the place of culture in relation to the creative industries continues to be rethought. Officials from the Ministry of Culture and Heritage who feel marginalised from policy formation are currently seeking a fuller strategic engagement with the creative industries, through a renewed focus on the concept of the *cultural* industries and their role in the production of national identity, that they feel is currently lacking due to NZTE's dominant position and unrelenting commercial focus (see Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 2005; Maharey, 2007). Notably, CNZ has washed its hands of the creative industries after being so actively involved during 2000 around HotNation and the national debate on culture – when I requested an interview with the chief executive of CNZ in June of 2006 I received a response pointing out that they were primarily an arts agency and therefore did not have a creative industries focus. This is in marked contrast to a statement made by Peter Biggs in 2000 after HotNation called for the abolishment of the agency in which he argued that CNZ had moved 'beyond the pure arts and into the creative industries' (Cardy, 2000: 10). What is clear is that through these reshuffles, re-orientations, re-translations and re-articulations the substance of the creative industries discourse has shifted from cultural renewal and economic potential to national branding and value addition and the sites where that substance is produced have shifted from agencies concerned with arts and culture to agencies concerned with economic development.

6.6: Conclusion

Since 2000 the creative industries have been established as a policy object in New Zealand, but as a policy process this has followed a quite different path to that of the UK. Policies that explicitly target them have been developed within the context of broader economic policy after initial attempts to use them for cultural policy failed. When we consider the trajectory of these developments with those outlined in Chapter 5, it is clear that despite similarities in terms of definition, industrial constitution and mapping that resulted from New Zealand policy actors learning from the UK experience, the story of creative industries policy development and eventual policy outcomes is quite different to that of the UK. This underlines the theoretical point that policy transfer should not be thought of as diffusion or convergence where policies homogenise across space. The emphasis this chapter has placed on the complexities of translation reveal why simple policy reproduction as transfer tends not to happen. By focusing on the moments of transfer, and attempted moments of transfer, and how these are conducted politically, who by, and for what purpose, shows how policies drawn from across borders are established and assembled together with other policy concepts and tools into broader policy programmes.

The existence of transnational knowledge circuits can explain why policy transfer occurs *and* why transferred policies often end up looking different in different places. To begin with, as the chapter demonstrates, knowledge circuits play a role in policy transfer processes. New Zealand's policy-making and policy-shaping sites had various knowledge forms, including policy documents (like the CIMD), policy interpretations and analyses (like media reports), and policy and other actors (like Chris Smith, Paul Smith and Michael Billington), circulating through them, bringing the creative industries policy concept into the country via a variety of routes. But the chapter also shows how these circulating knowledge forms are central to the production of new policy knowledge. The need to translate these circulating knowledge forms and articulate them with other knowledge residing in a particular site resulted in new policy knowledges being created and entering circulation (Williams, 2006). As a result, the failure of 'Cool Aotearoa' and HotNation to produce policy directly did not mean they were not

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instrumental when creative industries policy was eventually assembled. They put into circulation knowledge forms that found their way to the eventual policy-making site and played a vital role in the production of creative industries policy.

The creative industries policy concept should not be thought of as a 'British' policy idea that has been transferred to other countries. As this chapter has demonstrated, in New Zealand it has been combined with notions of 'economic transformation' to assemble a creative industries policy programme quite distinctive from that of the UK. The CIMD itself, while at first a British initiative, has now been reproduced in New Zealand and (as we will see in the following chapter) elsewhere, producing myriad comparable representations of creative industries sectors across transnational space. The circulation of knowledge forms across transnational space, and their often contingent translation into other sites to produce new creative industries policy forms, means creative industries policy is developing unevenly but largely contemporaneously in sites dispersed across transnational space. It has been this circulation of knowledge, rather than the organisation of particular policy transfer networks or channels, that explains this particular policy transnationalisation (cf. Stone, 2004; Ward, 2006). This highly uneven and dynamic production of policy knowledge across transnational space has provided an opportunity for myriad actors to engage in a fashion analogous to that described in Chapter 5. Thus transnational policy formation can be linked to the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries experts. This is discussed in the following chapter.

7: Global policy knowledge? A transnational epistemic community for the creative industries

7.1: Introduction

The transnationalisation of creative industries policy has been spatially extensive. The concept has emerged in administrative sites around the world, including in Australia, South Africa, New York and the EU. It has not been limited to Anglophone places with Tanzania, Columbia, China and Taiwan all adopting policy for the creative industries in some form. This chapter argues that this transnationalisation has been accompanied by the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts. This has resulted from the processes described in Chapters 5 and 6. As national and local administrations have adopted creative industries policy they have co-constituted locally or nationally focused creative industries experts. Hence, the development and transfer of the creative industries policy concept around the world is resulting in more and more creative industries experts emerging. Meanwhile the translation of the concept into different sites, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, is producing a *variegated* policy geography cut across by circulating policy knowledge. These two trends, one producing the same policy concept and associated expertise in different sites across space, and the other resulting in often quite different and locally determined policy outcomes, has resulted in new circuits of creative industries policy knowledge through which issues of policy difference and similarity are grappled with. Although many of the members of what is being referred to here as an epistemic community disagree about these issues, indeed some reject the 'creative industries' label outright, their engagement and/or association with the CIMD and the creative industries policy concept means they are collectively recognised as having 'expertise..., competence... and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge' (Haas, 1992: 3).

This chapter will trace the contours of the emerging epistemic community by examining the actors involved, the texts that circulate within it, and the emerging supporting infrastructure of agencies and sites developing and disseminating the knowledge produced (compare Haas, 1992; Chilvers, 2007). The transnationalisation of creative industries policy is linked to the transnationalisation of the experts associated with it. They are embodied knowledge forms travelling on circuits of policy knowledge, a capacity requiring new skills and competencies. As more and more experts begin to circulate like this the epistemic community takes shape as a distinctively transnational entity. Second, it is argued that the epistemic community is reproduced through the emergence of particular sites that intervene on the circulation of knowledge by either facilitating increased circulation or actively contributing more to the knowledge forms of the circuit. This emerging infrastructure promotes and maintains the integrity of the community while supplying more knowledge forms to circulate to policy-making sites where they may be implicated in processes of problematisation or translation.

As with the experts described in Chapter 5, the status of the CIMD as the first description of the creative industries in policy or scholarly discourses provides the clear 'starting point' for building this epistemic community. A sense of the international circulation of the CIMD since its inception in the late 1990s is provided in the Section 7.2. This circulation almost immediately resulted in the emergence of a cabal of experts from the UK who became involved in policy development in distant places as well as within the UK itself through the CIMD. Section 7.3 shows how this has become increasingly professionalised with many of these experts becoming creative industries development officers for local and regional councils or getting involved with consultancies focused on creative industries policy. As the idea has become increasingly popular around the world more and more individuals are moving into this area, resulting in a rapidly expanding creative industries policy community. But this expansion has also meant that the community has become increasingly diffuse.

Nonetheless the organised circulation of policy knowledge around the world continues to hold this group together. Section 7.4 explores the infrastructures and processes that enable this to happen. Sites of knowledge exchange are where creative industries policy-makers, academics, researchers and so on come together to share their policy ideas and experiences and engage in a process of policy learning. Sites of knowledge production are sites in universities, research institutes, think-tanks and consultancies which are grappling with conceptual and research issues regarding the creative industries in order to produce authoritative policy knowledge. Both of these site categories are implicated in processes of articulation which make the creative industries cognate with other policy knowledges, particularly those that refer to creativity as an economic capacity, making it a constitutive part of larger, and potentially more durable, global policy circuits. The development of the epistemic community and the circulation of the policy concept are shown to be driving the 'globalisation' of the creative industries policy concept (compare Sheppard, 2005).

7.2: The CIMD as travelling policy

New Zealand is not the only place where the CIMD has influenced policy. Policy-makers from around the world have borrowed from it. According to one government official:

> There are a whole raft of countries looking to the UK and DCMS to learn about how the UK government is developing creative industries policy here. The mapping documents seem to be used world-wide as *a model of best practice* or as a reference. (There have been recent) approaches from South Africa, Holland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, New York (Government Official, interview with author, 2006, emphasis added).

The key elements drawn from the CIMD are the 'creative industries' moniker, the definition, the list of industries making up the sector, and the technique of measuring their impact on the economy. It has been cited in documents produced in and for a variety of administrative sites. These include, for example, Singapore (Economic Review Committee, 2002; see Yue, 2006), Hong Kong (Hong Kong Trade Development Council; 2002; see Wang, 2004), Columbia,[19] the European Union (EU) (Marcus, 2005), South Australia (Doust, 2005), Zurich (Held *et al.*, 2005) and Vienna (Ratzenbock *et al.*, 2004). Table 7.1 lists a selection

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[19] See http://tinyurl.com/5u4fhl

of policy documents from outside the UK that refer to the CIMD or the creative industries concept in some way (Please refer to Appendix F for a complete version of this table).

As in New Zealand, these have not been straightforward engagements. The way that the CIMD has been articulated with other knowledges as it has been translated into these sites has created considerable variety. For example, the Singapore (see Economic Review Committee, 2002: iii-iv) and Hong Kong (see Hong Kong Trade Development Council; 2002: unpaginated) cases adopt the moniker[20] and definition up front and perform an equivalent mapping exercise, although they designate a different set of industries as constitutive of the sector. This was the same translation strategy taken by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (Walton and Duncan, 2001). The EU (Marcus, 2005: 28, 30), South Australian and Viennese cases on the other hand adopt the moniker and reference the definition in their discussions of the conceptions of the creative industries, but set it alongside a range of other conceptions which makes the specificity of its influence more difficult to judge. The Vienna study offers an in-depth account of the history of the concept from Adorno and Horkheimer's formulation of the 'culture industry' through to the idea of creativity as a factor in production (Ratzenbock *et al.*, 2004: 9-12). The South Australian document argues in its discussion that the CIMD version 'is a very broad definition and there are inconsistencies between the criterion and the inclusion of industries' (Doust, 2005: 21) before going on to compare definitional approaches taken in other policy documents.[21]

Other strategies have the creative industries term articulated into them but do not refer to the CIMD at all. For example, an independent think-tank in New York City, the *Center for an Urban Future*, produced a report on *Creative New York* (Keegan *et al.*, 2005: 25-26) which argued for supporting the city's creative

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[20] The Singapore case slips between referring to the 'creative industries' and the 'creative cluster'.
[21] A follow-up document to the original strategy produced in Singapore in 2003 also compares the creative industries conception with cultural and copyright industry conceptions (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore; 2003: 52; see also Heng *et al.*, 2003).

Table 7.1: Creative industries policy documents

Document	Author	Year	Space of Action
Heart of the Nation	Heart of the Nation Project Team (for New Zealand Government)	2000	New Zealand
Creative Industries in Hong Kong	Hong Kong Trade Development Council	2002	Hong Kong
Creative Industries in New Zealand: Economic Contribution	New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (for Industry New Zealand)	2002	New Zealand
Creative Industries Development Strategy: Propelling Singapore's Creative Economy	Economic Review Committee, Government of Singapore	2002	Singapore
Cultural Policy White Paper	Council for Cultural Affairs	2004	Taiwan
An Analysis of the Economic Potential of the Creative Industries in Vienna: English Summary	Ratzenbock et al. on behalf of the City of Vienna	2004	Vienna
Creative New York	Keegan et al. for the Centre for and Urban Future and Mt Auburn Associates	2005	New York, USA
Future of the creative industries: implications for research policy: Working Document	Marcus, for the European Commission	2005	EU
The creative industries in South Australia: a report prepared for the Cross-Government Steering Committee: Arts SA	Doust, for Arts South Australia: Cross-Government Steering Committee	2005	South Australia
Snapshot: Auckland's Creative Industries	Auckland City Council	2005	Auckland, New Zealand
Zurich's creative industries: synthesis report	Held et al., on behalf of the Economic Development Departments of the Canton and City of Zurich	2005	Zurich, Switzerland
Creative Industries Development Framework of the Gauteng Provincial Government	Department of Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation: South Africa	2005	Gauteng, South Africa
Our Creative Potential: Paper on Culture and Economy	Brinkhorst et al., Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Education, Culture and Science	2005	Netherlands

Table 7.1 cont.

Document	Author	Year	Space of Action
The Economy of Culture in Europe	Kearn European Affairs (KEA), for the European Commission	2006	European Union
Understanding Creative Industries: Cultural Statistics for Public Policy Making	The Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity and UNESCO	2006	Global

industries and drew on research carried out on Creative London, the Creative Industries Development Service in Manchester, and the Round Foundry Media Centre in Leeds, all of which had previously articulated the CIMD into their own concerns in particular ways. In South Africa the Department of Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation produced a report on *Creative Industries Development Framework of the Gauteng Provincial Government* (2005: 7) which used the creative industries moniker but adopted a definition produced by the Government's Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology originally developed explicitly for the *cultural* industries (see Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology Cultural Strategy Group, 1998).

This shows that these sites are linked into circuits of knowledge in a similar way to New Zealand, and that processes of translation are occurring in these sites as well to produce novel policy knowledge forms: it is indicative of the spatial extensiveness of this process of transnational policy formation. Notably, many of the more recent documents that refer to the CIMD do so only in passing, if at all. Of those documents cited above, those that attempted to reproduce the method of the CIMD most faithfully were published in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and those that marginalised it were published in 2005. To an extent this reflects the way that the CIMD has been overtaken by other knowledges which conceptualise these industries in slightly different ways. These result from projects that, consciously or not, are trying to shift the terms of debate to those contained in new forms of policy knowledge. The DET (DCMS, 2004), discussed in Chapter 5, is a particularly deliberate example of this. One of the authors is cognisant of the possibilities of deploying an effective piece of codified knowledge:

Just at the moment I'm redoing the cultural framework for UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) with the hope

that the world will fall in line. A lot of countries have brought into similar models now so there's a chance (DET Author, interview with author, 2006).

So even as the circulation of the CIMD peaks its influence begins to wane. It has dissipated into other new knowledge forms and policy documents and increasingly become a historical policy example which has been developed beyond its original formulation. As Chapter 6 has demonstrated, this can be explained by the processes of translation that drive policy transfer and transnational policy formation. These produce new policy knowledge forms that are then put into circulation and occasionally supersede older forms. As the CIMD has had to compete with policy knowledge forms seen as 'fresher' and more developed its authority as a policy model has diminished. This chapter suggests that this is linked to the emergence of an epistemic community around the creative industries policy concept. This community was largely seeded by the CIMD but as it has grown and changed so policy actors and researchers associated with it have sought out and produced new and different ways of understanding its central object. The remainder of this chapter will consider how this has happened.

7.3: Negotiating expertise

As argued in Chapter 5, the formation of creative industries policy resulted in a number of actors being recast, voluntarily or by circumstance, as creative industries policy experts. These actors are now taking on an increasingly transnational character. As different administrative sites, initially within the UK, took an interest in the CIMD different kinds of actors stepped into roles that engaged directly with the creative industries policy concept. These actors, reconstituted as creative industries policy experts, became targets for actors from outside of the UK when they began looking for expertise to guide their own creative industries policy development. Their involvement in these policy transfer actor-networks shaped the policy as it travelled, but it also shaped them as they adopted subject positions within a fomenting transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy knowledge.

As discussed above, these experts include policy actors from DCMS (and as demonstrated in Chapter 6 Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith) whose authorship of the CIMD makes them an obvious candidate for anyone seeking to learn about the CIMD and policy-making for the creative industries. But policies developed by the Greater London Council and in places like Sheffield and Manchester are also now linked to the CIMD by foreign policy-makers seeking expert advice. This has provided an opportunity for actors an arms length from DCMS, such as the members of FOCI, to be part of this cabal of experts.

As discussed in Chapter 5, FOCI initially formed to formalise a network of academics, practitioners, council officers, researchers and cultural entrepreneurs who had an interest in issues relating to, especially, cultural development strategies at the urban and regional scale in response to New Labour's much publicised focus on the creative industries. These actors continued to push the creative industries line within the UK when central government commitment faltered following the demotion of Chris Smith in 2002 although, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, this involved an attempt to manipulate creative industries policy knowledge in a direction this group favoured. But since the CIMD was first produced in 1998 this has not been the only activity that actors in FOCI have been involved in with regard to creative industries policy knowledge. Through their respective institutions and agencies these actors have helped to transfer, develop and spread creative industries policy across international space. The aptly named FOCI network has become a focal point for these efforts and a forum through which this knowledge can be exchanged.

One member of FOCI is in no doubt about why British expertise is being called upon overseas:

> It's purely that document (the CIMD). Absolutely that document. It's amazing the story of a document. It gives a nice definition and some statistics and it's had a big effect (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

The CIMD has opened a space for FOCI members to participate in conferences and similar events for the creative industries being held by local, regional and national governments around the world. For example, in 2005 O'Connor

participated in 'From Made in China to Created in China: An International Creative Industries Conference'[22] held in Beijing, China where, the organisers claimed: 'the concept of the creative industries – almost unheard of in China in the lead-up to the forum – has taken root in policy, academic and entrepreneurial circles and is now a buzzword in many of the big cities' (Hartley and Keane, 2006: 261). This was not just an academic forum with the organisers deliberately inviting policy-makers and creative and cultural entrepreneurs.

International conference events are not the only way that these British experts have been engaged overseas. Through the Manchester Creative Industries Development Service (CIDS) that he helped set up and run, O'Connor became involved in a project developing the creative industries in St Petersburg, Russia. The partnership between the cities that produced this project was funded under the EU's Tacis programme which was designed in 1991 to transfer knowledge from Europe to the 'transition economies' of the former Soviet Union through grant-financed technical assistance (see Swain, 2006). The project's intention was to use the expertise of CIDS to help St. Petersburg develop its creative and cultural industries (O'Connor, 2005; Creative Industries Development Partnership: St. Petersburg and Manchester, 2004). In practice this involved two 'study visits' to Manchester from St Petersburg in 2003 and 2004, with a return visit from Manchester between these intended to be an opportunity to demonstrate in St. Petersburg the potential of the networking approach to sector development used by CIDS in Manchester. The most tangible end-result was the development of a Creative Industries Development Centre in St. Petersburg despite the fact 'four years ago the concept 'creative industries' was little known or understood in St. Petersburg' (Barbour and Brien, 2004: 91).

A number of agencies play a role in connecting overseas policy-makers with British expertise. The British Council has in recent years embraced the concept of the 'creative economy' in its work developing cultural links between the UK and overseas, especially its former colonies. Their Creative Economy Unit closely associates itself with DCMS, using the CIMD definition and list of the creative

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[22] See http://tinyurl.com/4cjov2

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industries to argue that it is these activities that constitute the creative economy. They define their work as involved in spreading this vision:

> DCMS helps the creative industries thrive by raising their profile and supporting their development. It believes that the most successful economies and societies in the twenty first century will be creative ones. The British Council works with the DCMS to promote the vision of the UK as the world's creative hub; and to share expertise and experience with other countries worldwide.[23]

The British Council have conducted creative economy 'study visits' to New Zealand and were involved in bringing Chris Smith to that country in 2000. They have also worked closely with several members of FOCI: the academic Calvin Taylor of the University of Leeds, for example, a Senior Lecturer in Creative Industries in the School of Performance and Cultural Industries, acted as the academic advisor to the British Council's CIMD-style mapping research and pilot creative industries development scheme in Columbia.

Private agencies casting themselves as creative industries experts have also emerged. Soon after New Labour came to power and began promoting the creative industries a number of private consultancies began specialising in researching and working with the cultural and creative industries. A number of these are listed in Table 7.2. They are headed up and staffed by individuals who have worked for public cultural and creative organisations such as the Creative Industries Development Service in Manchester and other regional and national arts organisations in the 1980s and 1990s. There are also a number of freelance researchers and consultants such as former Merseyside Arts Council head Peter Booth and author David Parrish (see Parrish, 2007). The websites of these agencies and individuals make it clear they have adopted the DCMS language of the creative industries by referring to the CIMD definition, industry list and the practice of 'mapping' – now seemingly accepted as the word of choice describing the calculative measurement of cultural and creative activity. Whereas most are nationally and locally-focused, the Burns Owens Partnership (BOP), by far the largest and most successful consultancy in this stratum, has a wide range of clients in the private and public sector and across all administrative scales in the UK and Europe and some international clients for policy and mapping work in

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[23] See http://tinyurl.com/4jb7tm

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Table 7.2: British creative industries development organisations

Title	Type	Description (in their own words)
Burns-Owens Partnership	Consultancy	'BOP is a leading consultancy on culture and the creative industries. Using our skills in research, strategy development and action-planning we bring government and industry together to develop the creative sectors and to achieve social and economic change.' (see bop.co.uk)
Comedia	Consultancy	'Since the mid-1980's our focus has been on how cities can revitalize their public, social and economic life and how cultural activity might help this process. We have drawn up urban strategies, quality of life studies and industry development projects for city and regions.... in over 35 countries.' (see comedia.org.uk)
Creative Industries Development Service (CIDS)	Local QuaNGO	'CIDS works to help new and established creative businesses in Greater Manchester, whilst also taking a strategic overview of the sector – developing projects in response to industry needs.' (see cids.co.uk)
Cultural Industries Quarter Agency	Local QuaNGO	'The CIQA has contributed to the development of high profile successes in Sheffield... (and) a host of smaller projects have also being supported, putting in place a growing infrastructure for the development of creative and digital industries in South Yorkshire and beyond' (see ciqa.org.uk)
David Clark Associates (DCA)	Consultancy	'DCA is a Birmingham based culture, creativity and regeneration consultancy and project development company working on arts, creative industries, media, heritage, regeneration and broader economic development projects.' (see dca-consultants.com)
David Parrish	Author and Consultant	'David is a business adviser, trainer and management consultant working with creative businesses and the agencies that support them. He helps his clients by drawing on his own experience as a creative entrepreneur combined with his knowledge as a professional advisor.' (see davidparrish.com)
Forum on Creative Industries (FOCI)	Expert Forum/ Network	'FOCI is a network of experienced professionals concerned to inform and influence the current debates around the creative industries - now given momentum by the high profile accorded the sector by the government.' (see foci.org.uk)
New Media Partners	Consultancy	'NMP is a research, analysis and strategic consultancy specialising in the technology, digital media and creative industries. Based in Glasgow, London and Manchester our three offices work collaboratively on projects across the UK and beyond.' (see nmp.biz)
Peter Booth	Freelance Consultant	'Freelance Arts & Creative Industries Consultant & Researcher' (see http://tinyurl.com/522cu9)
Tom Fleming Creative Consultancy	Consultancy	'In-depth knowledge of models for creative economy and cultural sector development (from Chicago to Cologne); regional policy; national policy; and European Policy. This includes consultancy services for creative industries strategies, feasibility work, specialist support services and investment initiatives.' (see tfconsultancy.co.uk)

South Africa and China. They have also been working with UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) on 'updating' their framework for cultural statistics. BOP formed in London in 1997 when Paul Owens and Josephine Burns (who also co-founded FOCI) detected a convergence under New Labour between an interest in regional government and region-led development, and the creative and cultural industries. Initially the bulk of their projects were in this area but over time the client base has shifted from local government towards larger scale and nationally based agencies like DCMS and the Arts Council. This shift has occurred as more than just local government agencies have taken an interest in developing creative industries policy. The BOP has been a key actor in mapping and policy development work carried out in the UK since the late 1990s. It has close, personal associations with FOCI and the British Council, and has worked on a number of projects with academics like Andy Pratt of LSE, including on the development of the DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DCMS, 2004). It is a key agency for connecting expertise with policy-making capacity in the creative industries.

The activities of these British-based actors have created a focus on Britain in the international search for policy leaders in the area. Sheffield is a case in point. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s Sheffield developed a Cultural Industries Quarter as part of a Greater London Council-inspired strategy to use cultural enterprises to ameliorate job losses in the steel industry and provide facilities for youth activity and training. Although it was not until the late 1990s and the rise of New Labour (and the release of the CIMD) that the strategy was fully embraced by the Sheffield City Council (see Sheffield City Council, 1998), since this time it has rivalled DCMS as a site for foreign policy-makers to visit in search of policy ideas. It has become so popular that one local cultural development agency uses it as a revenue stream:

> We have Prague next week – the Czech equivalent of the Department of Trade and Industry. We've had several visits from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Sweden, a lot of other cities from the UK. We charge for it now, we're not going to give it away (Agency Official, interview with author, 2006).

The way that these policy experts have developed *in response* to the need for policy expertise shows how this emerging epistemic community needs to be seen

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as integral and interrelated with processes of policy transfer rather than causative. Because the circulation of the CIMD has been a key factor in processes of creative industries policy transfer to be seen as an expert it is necessary to situate one's knowledge in relation to it, whatever a potential expert's opinion on it may be. This requires a resubjectification that engages the CIMD, whether this is motivated by a desire to reproduce or contest (like FOCI has) the vision outlined in the CIMD. The epistemic community finds its shape through the actors that undergo this subjectification in order to become creative industries experts.

This is not just about developing one's knowledge to engage with the knowledge contained in the CIMD. It means taking on new roles within and between old, new and reconstituted agencies as the creative industries institutional framework is erected. The boundaries between different sites of creative industries knowledge – consultancies, think-tanks, academia, local cultural and creative development projects – are increasingly blurry as actors and knowledge forms circulate between them (Oakley, 2004). FOCI Founder Phil Wood, for example, works primarily for the consultancy Comedia but is on the Board of Directors of the Huddersfield Media Centre and the business incubator Huddersfield Business Generator. Until recently he served as vice-chairman for the Yorkshire Regional Cultural Consortium. Andy Pratt is an academic at the London School of Economics Geography Department but works closely with BOP, UNESCO and parts of DCMS and the Council of Europe. One of Justin O'Connor's postgraduate students Kate Oakley, while not a FOCI member, has had a career moving between think-tanks like Demos and the Policy Studies Institute and academia and is currently freelance but associated with the consultancy BOP. She is also an adjunct professor at the Queensland University of Technology Creative Industries Faculty. There is a succession of embodied knowledge forms moving between different types of spaces in academia, consultancy, policy formation and so on, linking them together ever more tightly in both their policy research concerns and the types of knowledges they call upon. These actors did not necessarily set out to be creative industries policy experts or to work in creative industries focused agencies, but they have been placed in this position, and in the

epistemic community, by the demand for expertise associated with these policies forming and transferring.

Furthermore, the *transnational* growth of the community has meant that these actors need new skills, especially those individuals there from the beginning. For example, the CIDS – St. Petersburg project is not just a case of Manchester experts filling empty policy vessels in St. Petersburg. O'Connor noted the difficulty in this particular project of convincing officials in St. Petersburg of the usefulness of the cultural industries when the term was considered by them to be anathema to their history. Considering the lesson of this for his own work, he observes that:

> It is quite likely that, if the expertise is to be in any way effective, it must engage on this local cultural terrain, which at once puts limits on the role of 'expert' and opens up a new role of transnational cultural intermediary, who has to have an explicit cultural politics (O'Connor, 2005: 255).

The need to articulate and translate competing knowledges can produce new(ly) reflexively constituted expert subjects. This highlights the fact that these particular experts are multiply-constituted and working in transnational spaces between different layers of the state, academia and the private sector (Bockman, 2007). The development and expansion of a transnational epistemic community will not mean 'business-as-usual' for its members. The need to develop the skills which allow them to negotiate cross-border knowledge transactions will become imperative if actors wish to remain influential in a growing transnational epistemic community that has growing policy influence.

It is quite likely that this epistemic community will continue to grow and influence policy given certain observable trends. In recent years as the creative industries have grown globally as a policy object there has been a consequent growth in official positions dedicated to them in public organisations. Reflecting on the small network of individuals who made up FOCI when it began in the late 1990s, One FOCI member points out that 'five years on and you'd look at *The Guardian* and every week there would be an advert for a creative industries development officer in small towns around the country' (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006). Another has observed the same phenomenon:

> It's become bureaucratised the creative industries now. In the public sector now there's an infrastructure, a network of creative industries officers, both in the RDAs, in local authorities, in business links, in chambers of commerce,

they're all doing it, every town in Britain is sticking the word creative in front of its name (FOCI Member, interview with author, 2006).

In the UK, this reaches even central government: since the May 2005 election there has been a dedicated Minister for the Creative Industries running the new 'Creative Economy Programme'.

While some of these jobs have gone to FOCI members in roles that follow on from the work they were involved in before 1998 (hence their membership of FOCI), the availability of work in the area has brought in people from other backgrounds. The first Creative Industries Officer of Bristol City Council, whose job works between economic regeneration and arts sector development, had previously worked with the BBC, in graphic design and for a corporate branding company in London. The present director of the Sheffield Cultural Industries Quarter Agency had previously worked in regeneration around business development, housing and the built environment. He confesses to being unfamiliar with the Quarter before he arrived while the creative industries side of the job had to be learned quickly. FOCI has deliberately remained a small organisation and expanded very little from its initial group. It is now at a point where its members no longer dominate the creative and cultural industry policy landscape in the UK.

It is not just in the UK that these positions are becoming available. In New Zealand Auckland City Council, Wellington City Council and, until recently, the public sector Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) all have creative industry development officers working for them. These policy actors are forming networks of their own. Each of the three officers in these cities are known to each other and with cultural and creative industry actors in organisations like the New Zealand Music Commission and the British Council of New Zealand. Their networks are also international. The British Council has been especially active in the New Zealand case in connecting policy actors in New Zealand with their counterparts in the UK and elsewhere. A study visit to New Zealand in 2005 by the British Council listed as one of its objectives to find 'to what extent (the creative sector in New Zealand) were interested in engaging with the UK and East Asia on issues about the creative industries and creative economy to share

experience, ideas and practice' (Gortan, 2005: 2). The visit included meetings with the Auckland and Wellington City Council creative industry officers, HotNation author Michael Volkerling, and a Creative New Zealand representative. Since this time the Auckland Officer has been to the UK on a fact-finding mission that included a meeting with her Bristol counterpart and the former CDC officer now works for the British Government's Creative Sector Skills Council in London.

This transnational policy community forms an increasingly large part of the growing epistemic community. It is, for the most part, made up of actors who need to learn and embody the knowledges and skills that their posts are associated with - they need to be subjectified into the epistemic community. The next two sections will discuss the increasingly transnational institutional framework that supports this growth and maintains the integrity of the community.

7.4: The making of a transnational epistemic community

The emergence of the epistemic community is being facilitated through the parallel emergence of a number of new and reconstituted sites that produce, exchange and mobilise knowledge and expertise in the creative industries. These sites facilitate further creative industries policy transfer and the requisite expansion of the epistemic community. In addition they provide a means for different knowledge forms produced through these expansions to be recirculated back into the community for absorption and translation. Thus the epistemic community is developing a transnational infrastructure that serves to reproduce the community by facilitating the development and transfer of creative industries policy.

This infrastructure is comprised of *sites of knowledge exchange* and *sites of knowledge production*. Respectively, these facilitate the circulation of creative industries policy knowledge, thus contributing to the expansion of the knowledge circuits which carry creative industries policy knowledge, and contribute to the production of creative industries policy knowledge for circulation. They contribute to the development and influence of the epistemic

community in a number of ways. One, they provide means for the community to expand while also protecting its integrity through extending, enriching and reproducing interpersonal networks and knowledge production associations between existing and new members. Thus by providing forums in which notes can be compared and different ideas shared and tested, these sites maintain the collective authority of the community while ensuring any useful new ideas and innovations can be absorbed. Second, they increase the available knowledge for members of the community for use in whatever creative industries-related activity they are involved in. And third, they articulate with other knowledges and create zones of overlap with other epistemic communities, providing more opportunities for expansion.

7.4.1: Sites of knowledge exchange

The subjectification of the growing numbers of creative industries policy actors is achieved by the proliferation of *sites of knowledge exchange* (Ward, 2007a). These event-spaces, which are usually set up by policy entrepreneurs in coalition with policy-makers and interested academics, facilitate the circulation of knowledge forms and the policy knowledge and ideas contained within them. As a result, they are a key driver for reproducing the epistemic community. The annual 'Creative Clusters' conference is the longest running of these events to deal specifically with the concept of the creative industries. This was started by Sheffield-based cultural entrepreneur and FOCI member Simon Evans. Evans had been involved in the Sheffield Cultural Industries Quarter since its early days and set up the first 'Creative Clusters' event in 2002 in response to the number of people who had begun coming to Sheffield to learn from the city's experiences.

Creative Clusters is described on the website as 'an independent policy conference examining the growth of the creative economy'. The rationale for the event is made clear:

> Creative Clusters believes that creativity is the key factor driving development. Across the world, enterprises based on individual creativity are booming. Furthermore, knowledge and culture-based activities now play

a central role in the activities of all businesses. This is the era of the *creative economy*.[24]

The CIMD is a central influence on how this era is described. The creative industries are listed as a 'key concept' constituting creative clusters (clusters and agglomerations of creative industries) and the creative economy in general. The website quotes the CIMD directly in defining and listing the industries:

> Creative Industries.... are based on individuals with creative arts skills.... in alliance with managers and technologists.... making marketable products.... whose economic value lies in their cultural, or 'intellectual', properties. Defined by the UK's Department of Culture, Media and Sport as "...those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property", the Creative Industries include: Advertising; Architecture; Crafts and designer furniture; Fashion clothing; Film, video and other audiovisual production; Graphic design; Educational and leisure software; Live and recorded music; Performing arts and entertainments; Television, radio and internet broadcasting; Visual arts and antiques; Writing and publishing[25]

Although there are slight shifts in what are named as constituting the creative industries, including sectors like architecture, advertising and antiques shows the distinctive mix first described by the CIMD continues to be reproduced through this event.

In so far as attendance can be used as a proxy to indicate the contribution these events make to the reproduction of the creative industries policy concept and associated discourses and knowledges across transnational space, Creative Clusters is an important site. It is attended by policy-makers, consultants, politicians and academics 'engaged in the development of the creative economy to communicate and share resources with one another'.[26] The conference regularly attracts around 300 delegates, although the Brighton event in 2004 and the London event in 2007 attracted over 500. According to the website, approximately 75% of the delegates come from the UK, 15% from the rest of Europe and the remainder from elsewhere. The 2007 conference in London had delegates from 41 countries. The delegates bring case studies of their particular programme or region and attend themed sessions developing different policy approaches to the development of creativity. It allows for the exchange of policy

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[24] See www.creativeclusters.com/
[25] See http://tinyurl.com/67scz5
[26] See www.creativeclusters.com/

ideas, the opportunity for policy learning, and the development of transnational policy networks as the various delegates see each others presentations and socialise on field trips and at organised networking events.

It was through Creative Clusters that the creative industries became topical for the CDC in Canterbury when council workers from Christchurch, along with NZTE Creative Sector Head Cheryll Sotheran, attended the 2004 event after receiving advertising through the Creative Clusters strategy of contacting via email economic development agencies around the world. After making this trip Evans' expertise was used to set up a similar event in New Zealand called Converge which ran in 2004. Initially this was to be a Creative Clusters franchise operation but in the end the connection with the UK was severed for nebulous local political reasons and Evans and his company had no involvement with the final event. This highlights how these events are able to create transnational policy networks, but also how they can create a threat for themselves as they expand, and increase the density of, the epistemic community they are dependent on.

Although in the UK Creative Clusters is generally recognised as the key meeting for the sector and the means by which creative industry and other comparable policy is exchanged between different actors, as the community has grown and more international links are made more overlapping events with a similar policy development and exchange purpose are emerging. One interviewee involved with these conferences recognises this:

> There's definitely more competition. There was a big event in Singapore last year. There's an event called creative places and spaces that's now done annually somewhere in Canada, big government money in that. The British Council is talking about doing something on it. And there's one in the States that's in Philadelphia University... and one in an Australian university... These people have a lot of money behind them (Agency Official, interview with author, 2006).

Creative Clusters has been an important point of passage (Callon, 1986): a key site for developing and maintaining the integrity of the growing epistemic community of creative industry policy actors but there are now emerging more and more events that overlap with its purpose in different ways. Table 7.3 lists a selection of the policy events that have emerged in the last few years that draw

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on the creative industries concept and overlap with the remit of Creative Clusters (Please refer to Appendix G for a complete version of this table).

The spatial distribution of these events gives the epistemic community a distinctive geography as policy networks form through them. With Creative Clusters this has, for the most part, remained centred on the UK, but the arrival of other events in other places is changing this situation. As the epistemic community becomes increasingly transnational policy expertise will be less and less associated with the UK. Somewhat ironically, events like Creative Clusters which have sought to utilise the status of the UK on these matters to attract foreign delegates have played a part in this emerging transnational geography.

7.4.2: Sites of knowledge production

The CIMD continues to be the founding document for creative industries policy knowledge. The ambivalent attitude of some knowledgeable actors, such as Pratt and O'Connor, towards it has not prevented those same actors from recognising the key role it has played in establishing creative industries policy as a viable policy option and therefore in opening up a space for them to engage with and intervene on the policy-making process as policy experts. However, the approach the CIMD took to policy-making and the strong link it drew with research through the 'mapping' process has provided a research category for the social and economic sciences to develop further which potentially could feed back to the policy-making process. While the experiences of O'Connor and Pratt show that this is not completely separate from the policy knowledge production efforts of the actors and agencies referred to above, these spaces and sites have stronger interests in academic research and have adopted the creative industries as a useful organising term. The circulation of knowledge forms produced in these sites integrates them into the epistemic community, to which they are perceived to offer deeper, and more scientific, conceptualisations of the creative industries, providing the authority to further entrench their categorical existence within the economy.

Table 7.3: Conferences on the creative industries

Event	Organisers	Date	Location
Creative Clusters	Creative Clusters Inc.	Annually since 2002	Locations around the UK
From 'Made in China' to 'Created in China': International Creative Industries Conference	Chinese Academy of Sciences, Humanistic Olympic Studies Centre at Renmin University of China, and the Queensland University of Technology Creative Industries Faculty	7-9/7/2005	Beijing, China
CARICOM-WIPO Experts Meeting on Creative Industries and Intellectual Property	Caribbean Community (CARICOM and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)	8-9/2/2006	Georgetown, Guyana
Creative and Cultural Industries in Europe	European and International Information, Research and Consultancy Services (EUCLID)	20/3/2006	Tate Modern, London
MyCreativity: Convention on International Creative Industries Research	Institute of Network Cultures, HvA Interactive Media, and Centre for Media Research, University of Ulster	16-18/11/2006	Amsterdam
Culture-Creative Industries in Europe (sic) – Coherent Policies in a Global World	Office for Cultural Policy and Economy, European Commission	3-4/5/2007	Berlin
Creative Industries Workshop	University of the Arts London, London College of Communication	9/5/2007	London
Creative Industries Conference	Asian-Pacific Forum Berlin	19-22/9/2007	Berlin
Creative Industries: Ten Years On	Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change	27/2/2008	Open University, Milton Keynes
Caribbean International Conference on the Cultural & Creative Industries	National Cultural Foundation, Barbados	5-6/5/2008	St James, Barbados
Arte-Polis 2: Creative Communities and the Making of Place: International Conference and Workshop	Institute of Technology Bandung	8-10/8/2008	Institute of Technology Bandung, Indonesia

Again, members of FOCI are at the frontline of this academic research effort. Within the UK the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) co-sponsored the 'Cultural and Creative Industries Seminar Network' put together by Andy Pratt and Paul Jeffcut of Queens University Belfast to run from 2003 until February 2007. This seminar series focused on the role the creative and cultural industries play in economy and society and was held every few months in a different UK city. Geoffrey Crossick of the AHRC made it clear that this was understood as more than a one-off, instead being part of a wider agenda in which the creative and cultural industries are a key research area connected to the business and cultural sectors:

> We decided to offer funding to this seminar series because the creative industries, and the wider creative and cultural sectors, are a key element in the AHRC's developing agenda... They are supported by research in higher education which connects to a wide range of businesses and cultural organisations. The AHRC is keen to develop further this aspect of knowledge transfer and engagement (cited in AHRC, 2004).

The seminar series is an opportunity for the research councils and the organisers to appropriate the emerging discourse of the creative industries in order to frame up a proportion of their research and direct the term's conceptual development.

Since 2000 a number of university faculties and departments have been created or re-branded with the creative industries moniker and/or have begun offering degrees and diplomas in the creative industries. Institutions where this has occurred include the Universities of Portsmouth, Glamorgan, Auckland, Wales-Bangor and Kings College London. One such institute, the Creative Industries Faculty at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) in Australia, established in 2001, has sought to become highly visible in debates about the creative industries. It has used two main strategies. First, through the production of knowledge about the creative industries. This involves promotion of the term as analytically useful for a range of cultural and economic concerns and the publication of research that deploys the concept of the creative industries, often alongside the concepts of the creative economy, the creative nation, and the creative class.[27] This latter point highlights the fact that this work is also conceptual in the broadest sense and seeks a synthesis between international

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[27] See the list of publications on the faculty website at http://tinyurl.com/6ln2hn

scholarship that is regarded by the faculty members as closely aligned. An example of this is the Faculty Dean John Hartley's edited collection *Creative Industries* published in 2005. This volume collects together edited versions of work by a variety of authors, including Richard Florida on the creative class, Charles Landry on the creative city, Charles Leadbeater on the new economy, John Howkins on the creative economy, and Justin O'Connor on cultural industries, and juxtaposes them with the overarching concept of the creative industries. I will return to this in the next section.

The second strategy has been the involvement of members of the faculty in international networks of creative industry researchers and theorists. An attempt to establish such a network came early in the faculty's life in late 2002 through the 'New Economy, Creativity and Consumption Symposium' held on the campus. This event invited researchers from Australia, the US and the UK – including Andy Pratt and another FOCI member, the independent researcher Kate Oakley – in order to 'link universities where new things were being done institutionally in the general area of the creative industries' (Hartley, 2004: 5) and create a research 'chain or 'necklace' around the planet' (ibid.: 5). Some of the papers that were presented at the symposium are collected in a special issue of the *International Journal of Cultural Studies* (see Hartley, 2004). The faculty is attempting to situate itself in an influential position in the fomenting transnational epistemic community through the dual processes of linking internationally sourced research works and international researchers.

Importantly both the seminar series and the QUT Creative Industries Faculty are interested in furthering the creative industries as an academic concept, not simply a policy one. This possibility will be further realised in 2008 with the launch of a new *Journal of Creative Industries* by the publisher Intellect Books. Although this is intended for scholarly as well as practitioner audiences there remain traces of the policy origins of the concept in the description of the scope of the journal as it incorporates the definition of the creative industries offered by the CIMD:

The scope of the journal is global, primarily aimed at those studying and practicing activities which have *their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent, and which have the potential for wealth creation.*[28]

The activities they list as constitutive of these industries are also drawn from the CIMD. This shows the way the creative industries concept has made its way into scholarly research as a social scientific category in its own right (although its use is often problematised) rather than just as the New Labour policy concept (e.g. de Barranger and Meldrum, 2000; Banks *et al.*, 2000; Blythe, 2001; Caves, 2002; Drake, 2003; Turok, 2003; Uricchio, 2004; Cunningham, 2004; Oakley, 2004; 2006; Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2005; Jayne, 2005; Evans and Smith, 2006; Rossiter, 2006; Yue, 2006; Lovink and Rossiter, 2007; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2007).

The status of the creative industries as an objective economic category further solidifies with the production of more and more experts and texts producing increasingly sophisticated knowledge about them. Their presence in dedicated university faculties and departments, and in scholarly journals, suggests the beginnings of a nascent disciplinarisation of the creative industries (Barnes, 2001a; 2001b; 2002). The emergence of this substantial institutional framework means that space for studying and acting on them is growing and the infrastructure is in place to ensure their reproduction as an academic category. It is not just that this work continues and extends the constitutive process begun by the CIMD by rendering the creative industries in an increasingly multi-dimensional fashion and linking them to a broad range of economic, cultural and social processes – it expands the epistemic community to include these researchers who can be, and often are, incorporated into policy networks and whose institutional associations endow them with the kind of scientific-academic authority useful to the community.

7.4.3: Articulating policy knowledges

The sites of knowledge exchange and production discussed in the previous two sub-sections often play another important role in further expanding the epistemic community through the articulation of knowledge about the creative industries with other consonant or congruent knowledge. This kind of translation can create

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[28] See http://tinyurl.com/4b8hjy

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a link between different epistemic communities and potentially result in the creation of new knowledge. An example of how different knowledges can be made congruent through the simple work of juxtaposition was made in the previous section. The volume *Creative Industries* (Hartley, 2005) collects together writings which draw on the concept of creativity and arranges these into themes about 'creative world', 'creative identities', 'creative enterprises' and so on. In doing so it juxtaposes the work of Richard Florida, Charles Landry, Charles Leadbeater, Justin O'Connor and others writing around these themes. Importantly, the introduction Hartley penned for the volume attempts to synthesise the arguments and concepts used by many of these writers into a broader argument about the role of creativity in the economy. He argues that the rise to prominence of the creative industries and its accompanying discourses is indicative of this trend:

> The creative industries... are not merely an area of economic development but an idea – namely that creativity can have decisive social and economic effects... The 'industry' part of 'creative industries' links that human attribute with large-scale organised enterprise. It sees imaginative innovation as the very heart – the pump – of wealth creation and social renewal (Hartley, 2005: 4).

Such articulations do not only occur at universities and other research institutions. Policy-making sites often try to achieve a similar result. In 2005 the Auckland City Council produced a report on the city's creative industries (Auckland City Council, 2005). This drew on the concept of the creative industries as formulated in the Heart of the Nation report (HotNation Project Team, 2000) and reinvented in terms of their potential as enablers through the Better by Design project (Design Taskforce, 2003; NZTE, 2006). The result was a mapping document that produced quantitative measures of the city's creative industries augmented by an analysis of interviews conducted with 375 workers from the city's 'creative sector'. But the report goes a step further than the mapping studies carried out by HotNation and DCMS by marrying this research with arguments made about creative cities and the creative class by Charles Handy and Richard Florida. Florida's (2002) arguments in particular about the need to attract a certain type of 'creative' individual – considered the key for a vibrant economy – to a city by making it an interesting place to live are central to the argument of the report. The creative industries are economically significant in

their own right and as an enabler, but they are also part of what make the city attractive to Florida's creative class.[29]

Florida's 'three T's' formulation of talent, technology and tolerance has proved attractive and he has now spoken all over the world to cities in Europe, New Zealand, Australia and North America (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Peck, 2005). The creative class is an idea that has been articulated in one way or another to an extraordinary array of policy programmes. For example, of the creative industry mapping studies cited in the previous section, Florida's defining idea is referred to in South Australia (Doust, 2005: 16-17), Zurich (Held *et al.*, 2005: 8), the EU (Marcus, 2005: 11-14) and Singapore (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore; 2003: 65, 71). Florida's operation has expanded into an organisation called the Creative Class Group[30] which conducts studies invoking Florida's work all over the world. On the website a representative list of their clients includes organisations as diverse as New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the US Department of Labour, Newsweek Magazine, the International Development Council, the DaVinci Institute and City Capetown.[31]

Florida is one of a number of charismatic individuals – creative economy gurus – who are associated with particular policy brands (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; see also Bryson, 2000; Thrift, 2005). These people straddle the academic and consultancy worlds producing ideas which capture the imaginations of local government actors and offering solutions organised around particular conceptions of the role of creativity in different contexts. Charles Landry[32] in his 2000 book *The Creative City* draws on several years of experience in over thirty

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[29] Florida's thesis comes from his 2002 book *The Rise of the Creative Class*. This argues that the most significant contemporary economic trend is the growth of a class of people for who work is about being creative: producing creative solutions for existing problems and creative possibilities for the future. The significance of this class is that it now constitutes some 30% of the US workforce and contributes 50% of GDP and growing. This creates a new link between culture and economy –the creative class is populated by people who want to live in interesting, culturally diverse, tolerant, 'happening' places. The policy crux of the argument is that if a city or region wants to develop economically in the future it must attract this class to its door through the development of a vibrant cultural scene.

[30] See http://creativeclass.com/
[31] See http://creativeclass.com/clients/
[32] See http://www.charleslandry.com

countries to offer a range of solutions to common urban problems which oscillate between culture and creativity as their core driver. Landry's years as head of the consultancy Comedia have positioned him as a leading expert on the future of the city and has enabled him to travel all over the world working with organisations as diverse as the World Bank, Wellington City Council, the OECD and the Western and South Australian State Governments, in the latter cases as their 'thinker in residence' (Gibson and Klocker, 2004; Stevenson, 2004). Like Florida, Landry not only reinvents the links between culture, creativity and economy, he transports his vision to a variety of places. Again these will often be articulated with the creative industries in policy documents, if not by Landry himself then by the policy-makers. Of the reports cited in Section 7.2, Landry and Comedia's work is cited in the South African (Department of Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation, 2005: 3-4) and Viennese (Ratzenbock *et al.*, 2004: 42) documents.

The articulation of the creative industries concept with these other ideas serves to align these knowledges as of the same or similar orders. The circulation of the knowledge forms that achieve this across the different epistemic communities will cause them to overlap and converge into a larger, if less coherent, epistemic community and policy knowledge circuit. As a result the creative industries concept is perceived within a new tradition of books targeting politicians and policy-makers as well as academics and the general public which emphasise the role of 'creativity' in the economic and cultural futures of cities, regions and nations (e.g. Landry; 2000; Howkins, 2001; Caves, 2002; Florida, 2002; 2005; 2008; Hartley, 2005; Leadbeater, 2008; Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2007). Think-tanks, research institutes, consultancies, government departments and city councils have also been producing research reports and papers along these lines but usually with a more specific focus on a particular place, sector or research methodology (e.g. DCMS, 1998; 2001b; Auckland City Council, 2005; Keegan *et al.*, 2005; Gordon and Beilby-Orrin; 2006). Since the mid-1990s the London think-tank Demos has been one of the most visible with several of its freely available publications referenced in more recent policy documents and research reports (e.g. Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Seltzer and Bentley, 1999; Leadbeater and Oakley, 1999; Florida and Tinagli, 2004). These pieces of codified knowledge vary in their focus, methodology and style. Some are legislative in their approach

(Osborne, 2004), trying to work through a particular vision of the economic or cultural in the spaces of the city or the nation. Some are far more prosaic, concerning themselves with techniques of data collection and analysis (e.g. Selwood, 2002; Higgs and Cunningham, 2007).

The increasingly transnational epistemic community that has built up around the creative industries is a constitutive element of a larger, emerging community focused on the policy possibilities of the very concept of creativity in the 21st century global economy. Like the creative industries epistemic community this should not be thought of as amorphous. It is held together by diverse networks of actors linked across transnational space. It is co-constituted with creativity-centred policy concepts and programmes to produce distinctive policy geographies. It is located in the variety of agencies and institutions that try to act on the various aspects of creativity, whether this is the creative industries, the creative economy or the creative class. It is populated by actors who try to constitute themselves as expert-subjects in some area of creativity in a variety of ways. It maintains its integrity by bringing actors together at sites of knowledge exchange and expands its knowledge base at sites of knowledge production. It works in and with spaces, subjects and sectors imagined and represented as creative in one way or another. It is unified by the continuing circulation of certain knowledge forms. Thinking geographically about these overlapping epistemic communities means recognising this complex landscape it is situated in and the way that it produces uneven distributions of policy knowledge.

7.5: Conclusion

This chapter argued that the transnationalisation of the creative industries policy concept has resulted in the emergence of a transnational epistemic community of creative industries experts supported by an emerging infrastructure of sites of knowledge exchange and sites of knowledge production. The epistemic community is comprised of a variety of actors situated in a variety of roles: policy-makers, academics, management gurus, consultants, politicians, activists, council officers and practitioners for example. These actors are all arranged in relation to one another to maximise their expert authority, supplemented by all

the codified knowledge that continues to be produced about the creative industries: all the books, policy documents, research reports, quantitative and qualitative analyses, and conference and research papers for example. These actors have all been reconstituted as experts following the emergence of creative industries policy in their own sphere of influence, and in some cases reconstituted again as the concept becomes increasingly transnational. Taken together as a community they constitute a powerful political actor.

This collective transnational political actor is supported by a transnational infrastructure of knowledge production and exchange sites, including conferences, consultancies, think-tanks and research institutes. This infrastructure supports the continuing circulation of knowledge forms with regard to the creative industries and as such the continuing expansion and reproduction of the epistemic community. It is an infrastructure that has emerged through the production of new sites and the reconstitution of old ones around the concept of the creative industries. It is an emergence that, despite being actively assembled at particular moments, overall has been uneven and unplanned. Although it was initially focused on the UK it is gradually incorporating sites in a variety of places as circuits of creative industries knowledge, co-constituted with this infrastructure, extend and deepen outside the country. Through this emergence the creative industries policy concept, and the concept of creativity more generally, has 'globalised' (Sheppard, 2005) into an increasingly orthodox economic sector and policy object.

Finally, the previous section indicated that this epistemic community overlaps with other communities developing complementary ideas that have emerged around the concept of 'creativity'. This overlap has often been productive as different ideas are linked and hybridised into new policy concepts, ready to circulate through the different epistemic communities involved. Such linkages are not always welcomed and the integrity, or perceptions of the integrity, of the knowledge that defines the epistemic community will be policed by involved actors (Halfon, 2006). Nonetheless, the epistemic community described here is a constitutive part of wider communities and is linked into a variety of policy networks. This results in the creative industries becoming increasingly

naturalised in policy and academic discourses to the point where the idea that they are a political invention, put together in a particular place during a particular political moment (only a decade ago) and using particular (calculative) techniques, is forgotten, and they attain a character of *universal* application to the 21st century economy.

8: Conclusion

8.1: Assembling the creative economy

This thesis has argued that creative industries policy has been co-constituted with creative industries policy expertise, and as this policy has become increasingly transnational, so there has emerged a transnational epistemic community of creative industries policy experts. This community is not aspatial: it is held together and supported by an emergent infrastructure of conferences, research institutes, think-tanks, websites, journals and policy networks which are linked together across transnational space. It has emerged over a period of time from often initially contingent policy developments and transfers but is now a key source of expert authority on the role of creativity in the economy. This conclusion will summarise the key theoretical and conceptual claims made in this thesis regarding the creative economy, epistemic communities and policy transfer. It will finish with a consideration of some of the methodological issues of the thesis and how these can direct us to possible future research pathways.

The emerging policy focus on the role of creativity in the economy should not be understood as resulting from the perception that this is a previously unrecognised but increasingly important capacity for the economy, as is implied in many of these policy documents and their associated knowledges. For example, when the Cox (2005: 5) report on creativity in business, referred to at the beginning of this thesis, links the UK economy's future competitiveness to its 'creative capabilities', arguing that it is 'one of the UK's undoubted strengths', or Richard Florida (2002: 56-66) periodises recent history so that we have moved from 'industrial capitalism', through the 'organizational age' and now into the 'creative age', creativity is presented as a self-evident fact of economic life in the 21st century and, as a consequence, a capacity that must be nurtured, corralled, engaged and encouraged through policy interventions. Policy here is a response

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to processes occurring beyond the policy-making site, in the sphere of the economy or society, where creativity is increasingly consequential, or at least increasingly recognised as such. But, as this thesis has argued, this separation is not so clear-cut. It is, rather, an effect of the way that policy and policy knowledge claims to know and act on the world. By representing creativity as a capacity vital to the working of the economy, it invokes a world beyond the representation that more or less usefully maps onto it (Mitchell; 1991; 2002). Debates rage between epistemic communities and other policy actors about the extent to which the representation can guide policy actions that will be effective, but the debates are about different representations which maintain the separation and do not recognise the constitutive force of the representation itself.

The creative industries, a policy concept that is a part of the policy suite that claims to be responding to the growing importance of creativity in the economy, emerged at a particular place and at a particular time as a result of particular political circumstances. Part of a contingently assembled reimagining of the UK economy in the late 1990s, and of an attempt to reinject culture into political discourse, the creative industries concept was an attempt by a new government to disassociate itself from 18 years of Conservative parsimony and the socialist imaginary of 'old' Labour and their 'cultural' industries. While other political ideas from this period, such as the 'Third Way' and 'Cool Britannia', have dropped away, the creative industries have survived, not least because the calculative fashion in which they were presented suggested the presence of a sector previously unrecognised but, with the aid of the authoritative neutrality of numbers, now able to be pointed to, articulated, justified and defended (Hacking, 1991; Rose, 1999a; Mitchell, 2002; Christophers, 2007). And they have survived because a range of new and reconstituted sites and actors have mobilised the concept, in part because of the solidity the numbers of the CIMD lent it, multiplying the presence of the discourse and giving the concept an institutional framework that seems to confirm their presence as a coherent entity in the 'real'. Thus, here a particular kind of policy that centres 'creativity' (the creative industries) was not the result of the self-evident existence of the sector to which policy-makers responded. Rather, the development of the policy concept in the circumstances of a particular political moment was an important constitutive

moment for its object as its introduction saw spaces and subjects shaped and reshaped around it. The policy concept was an important moment in the constitutive enframement of the sector (Mitchell, 1991; 2002), not a response to its pre-given existence.

So the production of policy and policy knowledge is far more deeply implicated in the shape of the world than its usual presentation as a response to changes beyond its control. This is not only because policy produces, by definition, certain kinds of action on the world, it is a part of a wider social process of establishing what constitutes the 'real' through representation so that such actions can be taken. It is linked with the naturalisation of policy objects, such as the 'national economy', the 'global economy' and the 'knowledge economy', and of particular policy tools as the most appropriate response, such as marketisation, privatisation or welfare retrenchment. These are not neutral policy objects and tools arrived at after a period of reflection by policy-makers and closely calibrated with the 'real' conditions of the world, like the creative industries concept they are likely to have emerged in particular circumstances and for particular purposes, and have since been deployed in different ways and been linked with other objects and tools. As policy objects and tools circulate, they will often be disassociated from the conditions and intentions of their original conception to become a constitutive part of an emergent system. Thus regimes of government are assembled which link policies, concepts, agencies, institutions, practices, discourses, spaces and subjects (Rose, 1999a; Larner, 2000; 2001; Ong and Collier, 2005; Collier and Ong, 2005; Collier and Lakoff, 2005; Collier, 2005; Olds and Thrift, 2005; Ong, 2006; Li, 2007a; 2007b) and in which objects like the 'creative economy' achieve a material existence.

8.2: Spatialising epistemic communities, re-spatialising policy transfer

This thesis suggests that the epistemic communities concept defined by Haas (1992: 3) as 'networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to knowledge within that domain or issue-area' has a lot to offer analyses of political-economic change in the contemporary moment. For one, it can be used to analyse the kinds of

changes often described as 'globalisation' without resorting to the structuralist ontologies that have dominated social science. This is because they are networks whose boundaries are not coterminous with those of particular nation-states or other pre-defined institutions. And yet, despite the fact they avoid the kind of abstraction associated with structuralist ontologies, they provide a way for thinking about and explaining large scale change, or change that occurs across a large tract of space. And thirdly, it is useful for explaining the apparent power of expertise to shape the world today, and how particular types of expertise have come to be so widely influential.

However, this thesis has argued that the epistemic communities concept has been relatively under-spatialised. Political science approaches that emphasise their internal, sociological qualities have been dominant (e.g. Haas, 1992). But when the implications of space are seriously considered particular questions that problematise these points of emphasis are immediately raised. For example, the question of how epistemic communities are distributed across space, in what kinds of sites, and with what kinds of links to other, policy-making sites raises further questions regarding how this distribution is linked to differentiation in the community around Haas's (1992) criteria of validity, causality and policy enterprise that members are assumed to share. Actors at different sites are likely to have different political concerns, and therefore inevitably different ideas of validity and so on. Does this mean that space threatens the coherency of particular empirical epistemic communities, and as a result the coherency of the concept as a whole?

A geographical reimagining of the epistemic communities concept has been conducted through this thesis to make it more spatially sensitive. The key conclusions are as follows: one, epistemic communities are emergent. They do not pre-exist to the particular political and knowledge questions they are concerned with. Rather they emerge out of spatially distributed actors forming networks with one another around particular knowledges. As this thesis has shown, knowledge forms like the CIMD are key elements in this process: networks have developed as different actors have engaged with it, resulting in the emergence of the transnational epistemic community of creative industries

experts. This is not to suggest that *constituent* actors and networks did not pre-exist to this community, but as the case of FOCI shows, when these actors and networks mobilise around new knowledge forms and concepts, they will undergo particular internal changes – like FOCI becoming more formalised and focused on the creative industries concept – and external changes through the formation of new networks and new associations made possible by engagement with this knowledge form. Focusing on this spatially distributed emergence means a consideration of the politics – the hows and whys – behind the formation of the networks constituting the epistemic community.

Two, epistemic communities grow in size and extend their influence through this kind of political work, not from some logic internal to the community itself. Epistemic communities do not extend simply because more and more actors buy into the principles of validity, causality and policy enterprise – the thesis has shown that it is often a consequence of contingent political decisions. The community's extension to New Zealand occurred because a variety of politicians and agencies adopted the language of the creative industries for political purposes. The resulting policy developments saw the creative industries become an integral part of national policy discourses and an object of analysis for academics, consultants and policy-makers (e.g. Blomfield, 2002; Walton and Duncan, 2002; Kaino, 2007). Examining the way that these extensions occur can provide insights into how and why these epistemic communities are differentiated across space.

Three, this differentiation can result in tendencies towards incoherence in an epistemic community. As a result, epistemic communities can fracture, not only along geographical lines, but institutional, cultural or even individual lines. By considering epistemic communities as spatially distributed and differentiated, such fractures are conceivable. Just as likely, however, is that differentiation will be associated with disagreement and conflict between community members, but this will not necessarily mean they are not part of the same community. Although members of FOCI have tended to disagree on the validity and utility of the creative industries label, they still come together at particular events and conferences and in academic texts and edited collections (see for example

Hartley, 2005). Furthermore, understanding epistemic communities as cohering around notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise, as it is in political science treatments, writes out the conflict inherent in any process of knowledge development. Taking the geographical perspective advocated here keeps the focus on *how* coherence is maintained across a spatially differentiated community *despite* conflict and disagreement around these notions.

Following on from this, the fourth and final conclusion is that epistemic communities require a lot of work to be maintained. This includes all the work in and around the conferences, meetings, seminars, forums, websites, publications, books, research projects and networks, personal relationships, social events and all the other practices that keep an epistemic community, even a transnational one, 'together' and sharing a similar intellectual space. The way that connections are made and maintained across geographical space to constitute the 'networks of professionals' (Haas, 1992: 3) that constitute an epistemic community is an integral but largely unconsidered aspect of their existence. A geographical perspective recognises the work that must go into maintaining the community as relatively coherent across space.

In sum, taking a geographical perspective on the study of epistemic communities means a focus on the practices that produce, extend, differentiate, cohere and maintain a community across space, and on the particular institutions, agencies and people associated with these practices. This produces a different sense of what makes an epistemic community to that developed by Haas. Although it keeps the definition, it gives greater attention to the spatial form of the community instead of the notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise. Epistemic communities, as differentiated spatial forms, will come together around shared *concerns* (in this case, the relationship between 'culture' and 'economy') that will continue to drive members to debate with each other. Although some members will certainly have shared and fixed notions of validity, causality and policy enterprise for thinking about these concerns, this approach recognises that not sharing these notions does not disqualify an otherwise active and contributing member from being recognised as a part of the community.

Epistemic communities understood from this perspective will be more differentiated, blurrier at the edges, in greater flux, and with more scope for conflict. On the other hand, this perspective recognises the opportunities this provides for new knowledge to emerge as the knowledge of the community overlaps with other knowledges at particular sites. Thus the creative industries have become a part of New Zealand's 'economic transformation' when situated at NZTE. Finally, as the latter example also shows, they will not occupy a separate sphere to other actors, such as policy-makers, lobby groups and advocacy coalitions, but rather will be integrated and often inseparable from them. Epistemic communities are part of broader assemblages of government.

This approach to epistemic communities also has important implications for thinking about policy transfer. Policy formation and transfer are driven in part by the testimonies of particular experts, so the geographies of epistemic communities are linked to the geographies of policy transfer. Policy transfer, then, needs to be understood in the context of changing assemblages of government. The way that particular epistemic communities come to be influential in different policy-making sites has a co-constitutive link with the way that policy-making is structured in those sites. By tracing the contours of the community and staying close to the networks and people involved, it is possible to see the role that policy transfer plays in reshaping a governmental assemblage. In this sense international policy transfer indicates not just changes in policy in pre-existing governmental structures, but changes in those structures themselves that range from subtle to substantial.

This means recognising that apparently 'global' public policy networks, such as those described by Stone (2004), are not situated in some kind of global space 'above' nation-states and to which the latter are only ever able to respond through mitigation or acceptance. Rather, the actors, institutions and agencies that define these networks are often the same as those that define nation-states. The World Trade Organisation, for example, as one of the sources of what may be called a global public policy network, is both constituted *by* and constitutive *of* its member states through its work on the porosity of nation-state borders. The creative industries epistemic community described in this thesis is transnational

in scope but continues to shape and be shaped by the different national policy-making sites it intersects with. By considering the geography of the epistemic communities that shape these policies it is possible to see how they are situated in, and in different ways co-constituted with, a whole variety of sites. As a result, the emergence of global public policy networks is linked to changes in how the nation-state system itself is structured – they are not separated from them.

This also means recognising that policy transfer is not passive in the sense that it is not just an agent of wider processes. For example, analysing policy transfer as a way of showing the complex and uneven geographies of neoliberalisation (e.g. Peck, 2002; 2003; England and Ward, 2007) understates the potential for moments of policy transfer to cause a reshaping of the policy transferred and a redirection in those wider processes described as neoliberalism. Thus, at the time the creative industries concept was transferred from the UK to New Zealand it featured in the former mainly as the signifier of a sector that could be developed at regional and national levels, but in New Zealand it became a constitutive part of plans for 'transforming' the national economy into one with a higher 'value-added' component. Here the transfer is an active moment where the translation of the policy concept resulted in it being deployed in new ways.

Following on from this, an increase in policy transfer suggests that there are new geographies of policy formation emerging (cf. Peck, 2003). Policy is forming in sites that are parts of increasingly transnationally constituted governmental assemblages. These sites are cut across by increasingly spatially complex networks and relationships of varying spatial extensiveness, ranging from the government ministry next door to the other side of the world. These geographies resemble the kinds of 'geographies of globalisation' described by Amin (2002), Massey (1993) and Latham (2002). In their different ways these authors argue for a sense of place that is not caught in a binary between 'local' and 'global' but are always already multiply constituted by intersecting relations connecting particular places to a myriad of others. Epistemic communities are one source of such intersecting relations, and their spatial boundedness can range from being entirely in just one city to having multiple transnational dimensions. In this

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sense, investigations of policy transfer are investigations of the increasingly transnational nature of policy formation.

8.3: Tracing connections, making connections?

A key challenge of this research was finding a way to track and trace a policy object that was constantly in formation and constantly moving and evolving. The approach of this thesis was to be open to the idea of a policy programme changing as it travelled, possibly in ways that could be regarded as fundamental. This meant regarding the creative industries policy concept as not possessing an *essential* identity. Any identity the concept possessed emerged only from the material forms of knowledge that existed and circulated about it. As discussed in Chapter 4, the ethos of Foucault's genealogical method informed this approach. A genealogical history of a social form, such as a policy, is not a linear history that traces how the form developed from specific origins into the form it has today. Instead it traces how a social form at a particular moment of time was assembled together out of other, often quite disparate, social forms. Genealogical histories do not produce a smooth logic of development but a disjunctive history of continuous emergence and unexpected mutation.

By spatialising genealogy, this thesis argued that this disparity between social forms can occur in space as well as time. This is a way of thinking about a process like policy transfer that resists reducing it to a singular logic, such as neoliberalisation. Resisting such reductionism allows for the consideration of the spatial and temporal complexity that results from a travelling policy form: the different agents involved, the different forms the policy concept takes, the different directions the form travels in, and so on. The difficulty that immediately arises is how to account for this complexity without becoming incoherent, or, conversely, how to trace a travelling policy without essentialising its identity across different places.

The approach of this thesis was to focus on a very specific and distinctive policy concept – the creative industries – and, importantly, its material existence in policy documents, particularly the CIMD. The advantages of this approach are

clear. The CIMD was a material document that I could follow and build a case around. Its travels allowed for a linear narrative to be produced despite there not necessarily being a linear logic. It was an obligatory point of passage (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005) for any actor who wanted to claim to be a creative industries expert and for anyone wishing to develop creative industries policy, and it was the document that brought all those actors into a shared community. In sum, it provided a point of orientation for the investigation.

On the other hand, this approach had some risks. One of these was the risk that the UK would be unproblematically read as the 'origin country' for the creative industries. In one sense this is true; it was where the term 'creative industries' was first coined. However, placing too much weight on this could reproduce colonial notions of particular ideas forming in certain places and then transferring to other places: a binary logic of colonisers and colonised. I wanted to avoid this and instead assert that actors at policy-making sites outside of the UK also had an agency denied them in colonial readings. In addition, although I was following the creative industries concept, staying true to the complexity of the policy transfer process meant demonstrating that all policy-making sites were constituted by many and varied relational geographies – in other words to demonstrate the transnationalness of policy formation. Chapter 5 shows this empirically by demonstrating that the creative industries concept was translated from the transfer of the creative economy concept from Australia and the cultural industries concept from the Greater London Council. The theoretical and methodological point is that the idea of 'origin' is not that the concept was immaculately conceived out of nothing and from nowhere: it was simply where the concept was first 'spoken' and therefore, in pragmatic terms, a logical starting point for investigation.

A similar risk is that this approach would give the CIMD more agency than it deserves. By tracing and explicating the CIMD's travels to particular policy-making sites and its role in the shaping of policy at those sites, it can create the impression that it was a major, or at least significant, constitutive force – perhaps more than it really was. Conversely, staying true methodologically to just those policy sites and documents that were citing the CIMD or the creative industries

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concept in order to trace its travels may have meant missing sites and documents where it had more of an influence than was revealed in this fashion. Therefore it is important not to claim too much for the CIMD and the creative industries concept themselves. They provide a way of *tracing* links but it can be difficult to ascertain the strength or importance of those links. This requires a different kind of investigation.

This research made a number of steps in this direction. Through interviews with key actors it was possible to get an idea of where important links were made and the effect that they had. The risk here is that interviewees will often smooth over conflicts that may have occurred, giving a seamless account of policy transfer and development, and introducing an element of pluralist logic to explain these. To counter this problem, participant observation at particular events enabled some insight into both how different actors were engaging the creative industries and the CIMD, and how conflicts between actors were played out and handled. This also provided an opportunity to see the 'cutting edge' of policy and intellectual debates around the creative industries and the potential directions the creative industries concept may head as they emerge or get shut down.

However, entering cold into these events can be difficult. There is always the possibility that events are just shop windows for more significant debates going on in the background, not to mention the importance of less public forms of knowledge production and exchange, such as personal conversations and gossip. Arguably, participant observation is too superficial a form of knowledge production to engage these aspects. More depth to the study is necessary to delineate connections more precisely and ascertain their true significance.

8.4: Future research pathways

These shortcomings should not overshadow the core contributions of this research. These include conceptual contributions, which are the spatialisation of the epistemic communities concept, enabling more nuanced analyses and discussions of these increasingly significant transnational actors, and the perspective on policy transfer that reveals it as a way into thinking about the

changing spatial constitution of state structures and governmental assemblages. And they include empirical contributions which, apart from denaturalising the status of the creative industries as an economic sector also raise questions about how all economic sectors, and the economy as a whole, are known and acted upon. It brings to the surface some of the ways that these objects of knowledge and policy are produced and maintained in technical and policy discourse, and the geography of expertise implicated in this. The shortcomings do, however, direct us to some future research possibilities.

One of these is a closer consideration of the subjectification of experts. This research has shown that the resubjectification of experts occurs in certain directions as new possibilities for knowledge production and exchange emerge. This is often an active choice on the part of the expert and involves changes in their practices and discourses. How these changes are negotiated shapes what it is to be an expert with regard to the creative industries, and therefore how the particular power of expertise will be able to play out in emergent governmental assemblages. Linked to this is the possibility of investigating the practices of expertise, especially regarding the production of knowledge for different audiences and purposes. Both of these could be investigated using ethnographic methodologies, through an internship at a creative industries consultancy for example, with the intention for the researcher to become immersed in the day to day lives of creative industries experts – learning through doing of the practices and pressures of expertise. These investigations could shed light on the micro-politics of expertise and how it shapes, and is shaped by, shifting relationships between institutions of government and institutions of knowledge.

Finally, this approach could also be shifted horizontally to consider some other types of epistemic communities. The apparent prevalence of neoclassical economic thought in neoliberal styles of government raises questions about how epistemic communities of certain types of economists have come to be so influential. Unlike the recent study by Peck (2008), however, this would not be understood as all coalescing around a single project. Instead it would emphasise the temporal and spatial complexity of the epistemic communities associated with particular policy programmes. It would show how these programmes often

advanced across space and time in a contingent and disjunctive fashion (Larner, 2003). As this thesis has done, it can show how the categories and concepts that shape many of the policy interventions that shape our lives often had very specific and often innocuous beginnings, lashed together out of existing circulating concepts that were similarly constituted. But it can go further to show how the edifice of authoritative knowledge, the epistemic communities, that keep reproducing and using these concepts took shape. It can suggest that the power these communities seem to possess comes not from privileged access to some kind of truth, but from the strategies they use to make the knowledge they represent the basis of policy orthodoxy in a variety of places.

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Selected Abbreviations

AHRC – Arts and Humanities Research Council

BOP – Burns-Owens Partnership

CIDS – Creative Industries Development Service

CIMD – Creative Industries Mapping Document

CNZ – Creative New Zealand

DCMS – Department for Culture, Media and Sport

DET – DCMS Evidence Toolkit

FOCI – Forum on Creative Industries

GIF – Growth and Innovation Framework

GLC – Greater London Council

IP – Intellectual Property

NESTA – National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts

NZIER – New Zealand Institute of Economic Research

NZMIC – New Zealand Music Industry Commission

NZTE – New Zealand Trade and Enterprise

RCC – Regional Cultural Consortium

RDA – Regional Development Agency

Appendix A: Table 4.1 (full version)

Event	Date	Organisers	Location	Description	Significance
'Cool Aotearoa' Forum (Transcript)	16/3/2000	Creative New Zealand	Beehive Theatrette, Wellington, New Zealand	Panel discussion involving New Zealand and British cultural experts talking about the possibilities of New Zealand copying the British 'Cool Britannia' programme.	This event was one of the first times that the creative industries policy concept was discussed in New Zealand in relation to policy programmes and strategies.
Creative Industries Forum (Transcript)	8/9/2000	Creative New Zealand and the British Council	Maidment Theatre, Auckland University, New Zealand	Public event for British Secretary of State for Culture Chris Smith to talk about the creative industries in the UK with a panel discussion involving representatives of three New Zealand 'creative industries': music, film and designer fashion.	This marked a significant moment in creative industries policy thinking in the New Zealand context as an overseas policy actor provided direct legitimacy for the creative industries policy concept.
'Cultural Planning for the Twenty-First Century', part of the Bristol 'Festival of Ideas'	18/5/2005	Bristol Cultural Development Partnership	The Watershed, Bristol	Panel discussion on how to increase the embeddedness of cultural planning 'in community and economic life. Panellists include Phil Wood – Comedia, Paul Collard – Creative Partnerships, Guy Claxton – Creativity 'guru', John Holden – Demos, Clare Cooper – Arts and Business.	This event involved particular actors and agencies who have been involved in negotiating and translating the 'creative industries' policy concept into local and regional government discourses and policies through its articulation with the concept of cultural planning.

Table 4.1: Events engaged in the course of research

Table 4.1 cont.

Ideopolis: Knowledge Cities: Understanding German and UK Experiences	20/10/2005	The Work Foundation	The Work Foundation, London	Presentaion and discussion of four city case studies – Munich, Glasgow, Leipzig and Bristol – for the Work Foundation's Ideopolis Project.	I attended this event early-on in the research process to better understand how think-tanks and research institutes like the Work Foundation were talking about and acting on governmental themes that overlap with the creative industries policy concept in New Labour discourse, in this case on the potential of the knowledge economy as it applies to cities.
City Salon: 'Do-It-Yourself' Cities	21/11/2005	Demos	The Tobacco Factory, Bristol	This was one of a series of events run by the think-tank Demos in 2005 where local activists and other interested parties came together to discuss how cities can develop from the 'ground up' by involving the people involved in the life of the city itself rather than 'top down' through master planning strategies.	Demos was closely involved in the development of New Labour strategies and policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. They have since explored ways that 'creativity' can be developed and used in different settings. This event was an opportunity to see how they were negotiating and translating ideas through public forums.
'Economies of Enterprise, Innovation and Creativity', part of the Royal Geographical Society – Institute of British Geographers Annual Conference	1/9/2006	Dr Tim Vorley, Leicester University, and Dr Helen Lawton Smith, Birkbeck University of London	Royal Geographical Society	Academic conference session on themes that overlap with the creative industries concept.	This event involved researchers explicitly engaging with the creative industries concept and other concepts seen as cognate. Presenters included actors from inside and outside the academy involved in debates on the creative industries policy concept and surrounding issues.

'Seminar 9: New Directions in Research: Substance, Method and Critique', part of the 'Cultural Industries Seminar Network' (called elsewhere the 'Cultural and Creative Industries Seminar Network')	11-12/1/2007	Dr Andy Pratt, LSE, and Dr Paul Jeffcut, Queens University Belfast	Royal Society of Edinburgh	Final seminar in the series, intended to 'review some of the ground that has been covered and to pose issues and questions that will contribute to the development of future research agendas' (From the publicity material). The series was, ostensibly, a response to the 'chronic' lack of research in the area of cultural and creative industries despite its growing prominence in policy discourse.	This event involved researchers explicitly engaging with the creative industries concept and other concepts seen as cognate. The significance in the seminar series lay in the fact that it was funded by the AHRC and the ESRC and was attended and contributed to by scholars from the UK and around the world.
'Spaces of Vernacular Creativity', part of the Association of American Geographers Annual Conference	19/4/2007	Dr Steve Millington, Manchester Metropolitan University, and Dr Norma Rantisi, Concordia University	San Francisco Hilton	Academic conference session on themes that overlap with the creative industries concept.	This event involved researchers explicitly engaging with the creative industries concept and other concepts seen as cognate. The theme of the session meant they were engaging with the central ideas and practices held to unify the creative industries. It was indicative of how the creative industries were being thought about in the academy internationally.
'Creative Work' Symposium	18/10/2007	Cultural and Media Industries research centre (CuMIRC), University of Leeds	School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds	Symposium of academic researchers discussing issues arising from the emergence of creativity in policy discourses inn the last decade.	This event involved researchers explicitly engaging with the creative industries concept and other concepts seen as cognate. It included researchers who had previously engaged with concepts like the cultural industries before the release of the CIMD.

Table 4.1 cont.

Appendix B: List of formal interviewees

Note on Sources: The text of the thesis does not refer directly to any of the interviewees by name but by the particular capacity in which they are quoted. This provides for the anonymisation of the interviewees when they are quoted directly as each can be referred to in a variety of capacities, while each capacity describes a number of the interviewees. For example, an interviewee may be an academic, a FOCI member and a council official. However, each of these capacities will also describe a number of the other interviewees listed.

1. **Lyn Barbour**
   Director
   Creative Industries Development Service (CIDS), Manchester, UK
   15 December 2005

2. **Dave Carter**
   Director
   Manchester Digital Development Agency, Manchester, UK
   15 December 2005

3. **Phil Wood**
   Partner
   CoMedia, Bournes Green, UK
   16 January 2006

4. **Simon Evans**
   Director
   Creative Clusters, Sheffield, UK
   17 January 2006

5. **Martin Manning**
   Director
   Cultural Industries Quarter Agency, Sheffield, UK
   17 January 2006

6. **Kate Jordan**
   Economic Regeneration Officer – Creative Industries
   Bristol City Council, Bristol, UK
   19 January 2006

7. **Dr Andy Pratt**
   Reader in Urban Cultural Economy
   London School of Economics, London, UK
   23 January 2006

8. **Sarah Todd**

Creative Industries Marketing Consultant
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, London, UK
23 January 2006

9. **David Humphries**
    Project Manager and Export Policy Coordination – Creative Industries
    Division
    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, London, UK
    24 January 2006

10. **Dr Justin O'Connor**
    Lecturer
    Manchester Institute for Popular Culture, Manchester Metropolitan
    University, Manchester, UK
    25 January 2006

11. **Professor John Shutt**
    Centre for Urban Development and Environmental Management
    Leeds Metropolitan University, Leeds, UK
    8 February 2006

12. **Paul Owens**
    Director
    Burns-Owens Partnership, London, UK
    28 February 2006

13. **Richard Naylor**
    Consultant
    Burns-Owens Partnership, London, UK
    28 February 2006

14. **Dr Calvin Taylor**
    Senior Lecturer in Creative Industries
    School of Performance and Cultural Industries, University of Leeds,
    Leeds, UK
    10 May 2006

15. **Michelle Templar**
    Trade Commissioner
    New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, London, UK
    11 May 2006

16. **Tom Campbell**
    Policy Director
    Creative London, London, UK
    11 May 2006

17. **Pippa Warin**
    Executive Director
    Culture South-West, Exeter, UK
    19 May 2006

18. Richard Smith-Bingham
Head of Policy and Research
National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA),
London, UK
22 May 2006

19. Kate Oakley
Freelance Researcher, Adjunct Professor at the Queensland University of
Technology Creative Industries Faculty, Associate of Burns-Owens
Partnership
London, UK
22 May 2006

20. Ken Worpole
Author
London, UK
25 May 2006

21. Duncan O'Leary
Researcher
Demos, London, UK
30 May 2006

22. Simon Parker
Senior Researcher
Demos, London, UK
30 May 2006

23. Paul Skelton
Creative Industries Partnerships
Sheffield, UK
14 June 2006

24. Cath Andersen
General Manager
New Zealand Music Commission, Auckland, New Zealand
12 July 2006

25. Tara Pradhan
Creative Industries Manager
Auckland City Council, Auckland, New Zealand
12 July 2006

26. Jacqui Clarke
Editor
Big Idea Website, Auckland, New Zealand
14 July 2006

27. Cheryl Reynolds
Director

Mediarts Creative Industries Research Centre, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
18 July 2006

28. Jane Kominik
Deputy Chief Executive & Policy Group Manager
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington, New Zealand
20 July 2006

29. Matt Tait
Policy Advisor
Ministry of Culture and Heritage, Wellington, New Zealand
20 July 2006

30. Michael Bird
Manager, Sector Development, Industry and Regional Development
Ministry of Economic Development, Wellington, New Zealand
20 July 2006

31. Anna Cameron
Project Manager
British Council, Wellington, New Zealand
20 July 2006

32. Dame Cheryll Sotheran
Sector Director – Creative Industries
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Wellington, New Zealand
21 July 2006

33. Jenna-Lea Philpott
Creative Industries Sector Leader
Canterbury Development Corporation, Christchurch, New Zealand
24 July 2006

34. Cath Cardiff
Manager – Audience and Market Development
Creative New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand
26 July 2006

35. Ruth Harley
Director
New Zealand Film Commission, Wellington, New Zealand
27 July 2006

36. Dr Michael Volkerling
Head of Centre
Centre for Creative Industries, Wellington Institute of Technology, Wellington, New Zealand
27 July 2006

37. Dr Deborah Jones

Senior Lecturer
Victoria Management School, Wellington
28 July 2006

38. Brendan Smyth
New Zealand Music Manager
New Zealand On Air, Wellington, New Zealand
28 July 2006

Appendix C: Government Terms of Reference: Heart of the Nation Project

(Heart of the Nation Project Team (2000). <u>The Heart of the Nation: a cultural stretegy for Aotearoa New Zealand</u>. Wellington, McDermott Miller, pg. Annex A ii)

Obtained from: Dr. Michael Volkerling
26th July, 2006

GOVERNMENT TERMS OF REFERENCE

HEART OF THE NATION PROJECT

A.1   CONTEXT

- The Government's vision is for:

    - Vibrant arts and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can enjoy and through which a strong and confident cultural identity can emerge; and

    - A strong and vibrant creative industry sector which provides sustainable employment and economic growth within an innovative environment.

- The Government is committed to establishing structures and processes that work in the best interest of the cultural sector.

- The Government wants to play a supportive role in relation to the cultural sector, but to do this most effectively, we believe the sector must have a clear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieve it.

- The Government is committed to ensuring proper dialogue takes place through the Heart of the Nation project, with stakeholders in the cultural sector before any firm decisions are taken which will impact on the long term development of the sector.

A.2   HEART OF THE NATION

- The overall aim of the Heart of the Nation project is to:

    - Facilitate the development by the cultural sector of a strategic plan.

- The Heart of the Nation project will be convened by Hamish Keith and he will embark on a consultative process with key stakeholders and interest groups in the cultural sector to:

    a.   Identify overarching goals for the cultural sector and the principles that underpin these.

    b.   Identify objectives for the sector to achieve by 2010, which overall will contribute to the New Zealand economy and society.

    c.   Recommend strategies for achieving the goals and the objectives in (a) and (b) above.

    d.   Identify issues for government consideration, to support the implementation of the sector plan

- The purpose of the Heart of the Nation exercise is not to simply identify options for increased Government funding. While the Government is committed to more extensive support of the sector, the plan which is developed should not be dependent on significant increases in Government funding for its effectiveness.

- Hamish Keith will report to the Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage by May 31 2000.

New Zealand Government Heart of the Nation Press Release, 30 march 2000.

Appendix D: Defining the Cultural Sector

(Heart of the Nation Project Team (2000). <u>The Heart of the Nation: a cultural stretegy for Aotearoa New Zealand</u>. Wellington, McDermott Miller, pg. 5)

Obtained from: Dr. Michael Volkerling
26th July, 2006

2.	THE CULTURAL SECTOR TODAY

2.1	DEFINING THE CULTURAL SECTOR

The cultural sector comprises two diverse, but inter-related spheres of productive activity:

*   **Cultural Enterprises** – the arts sector, in its broadest definition, where creativity embraces expressive and communicative purposes and where profit or commercial gain is not a primary motivator.
*   **Creative Industries** – a range of commercially-driven businesses whose primary resources are creativity and intellectual property and which are sustained through generating profits.

Within these categories are a range of activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent. These include design (including craft and fashion), advertising, film, broadcasting (television and radio), multimedia, the recording industry, the performing arts, heritage, visual arts and literature. Most of these categories of activity are included within the *New Zealand Framework for Cultural Statistics* (1995) under the following headings:

*   Taonga tuku iho
*   Heritage
*   Libraries
*   Literature
*   Performing Arts
*   Visual Arts
*   Film and Video
*   Broadcasting
*   Community and Government activities.

5

Appendix E: Report to the Minister on the Heart of the Nation Document

Obtained from:
http://www.mch.govt.nz/publications/hotn/hotn.htm
4th June, 2007

TE MANATŪ TAONGA
MINISTRY FOR CULTURE AND HERITAGE

Report to the Minister on the Heart of the Nation Document

13 July 2000

Rt Hon Helen Clark Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage

cc: Hon Judith Tizard Associate Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage

HEART OF THE NATION

The Ministry received a finalised report on Heart of the Nation on 23 June 2000. We have reviewed the report and have a number of observations to make.

Overall Comment

1. In our view the report does not address the Terms of Reference.

2. The summary of the report contains what is purported to be "the proposed strategy" (pages xvii-xx). The strategy is also set out in Part 3 of the report (pages 120-125). The strategy is, however, substantially a plan to implement structural changes to Government.

3. The Ministry does not consider that the strategy presented is consistent with the overall aim of the project which was stated in the Terms of Reference as being to *"facilitate the development by the cultural sector of a strategic plan"*.

4. In the context set out in the Terms of Reference it was stated that *"the Government wants to play a supportive role in relation to the cultural sector, but to do this most effectively, we believe the sector must have a clear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieve it"*.

5. Heart of the Nation does not set out a vision and strategies that the cultural sector will, itself, pursue. Rather, it sets out a series of strategies which are primarily dependent on Government action and, particularly, a significant restructuring of governmental arrangements. Development of a strategy for governmental action was not the purpose of the project.

The Situation: Data and Commentary (pages 4-74)

6. A substantial part of the report presents data and commentary on a range of matters in connection with cultural activity. In many respects, the material provides an interesting stocktake of issues that could be used as an input to a programme of strategic policy development.

7. With regard to the use of statistics, McDermott Miller has addressed some of the Ministry's concerns in the final report and has made amendments, particularly in terms of explaining the assumptions on which its projections are based. The Ministry still takes issue with the way in which some of the statistical information presented and its interpretation

8. In particular, the final report continues to maintain that excluding broadcasting expenditures, over 50% of cultural investment was in "bricks and mortar" in 1990/91 and 1998/99 and even higher during the peak of construction of Te Papa. Bricks and mortar is categorised as capital in Vote appropriations. For Lottery Grants Board funding, estimates have been made of the proportion of cultural funding on capital projects. Our recent joint publication with Statistics New Zealand, *Government Spending on Culture*, shows that capital expenditure as a percentage of total Government cultural expenditure is much lower than 50%. In 1998/99 for example, capital expenditure was 15.7% or 10.9% of cultural spending depending on whether NZ On Air funding is included in the total. The percentage was considerably higher during the construction of Te Papa but even then was still below 50%, compared to the 70% asserted in the McDermott Miller report.

9. In the absence of any evidence to support McDermott Miller's contention, it can only be assumed it has developed its own very broad definition of "bricks and mortar" that it has not made explicit but presumably includes any Government funding to a national institution regardless of its purpose.

10. The data and commentary raise a number of issues that we would have expected might have been reflected in a Cultural Sector Strategic Plan. For example, strategies to:

- increase the share of domestic discretionary spending (pages 25-39);
- expand consumer choice (refer page 43);
- capitalise on new project opportunities (refer page 43); and
- increase exports (refer page 48).

The Issues (pages 76-107)

11. The report sets out a series of issues which it states have been identified from its research, consultation and feedback through the website.

12. From our review of the report we have no basis on which to assess the extent to which the issues reflect views expressed by those consulted. There is no summary that indicates the key issues raised by those who were consulted nor do we think the issues reflect, to any great extent, the commentary contained in the preceding section of the report.

The Strategy (pages 108-125)

13. In respect of the strategy to restructure government we would observe:

- the proposed expansion in the number of governmental entities will be costly and is likely to result in small, fragmented structures. This strategy would appear to be in conflict with at least two major concerns expressed elsewhere in the report:

  > i the claim that too much funding has been applied to supporting government's own structures (pages 60-63). A significant restructuring of government, with an increase in the number of government agencies, would only accentuate this concern further; and

  > ii the lack of sector wide strategy (page 104). A coherent government strategy is likely to be more difficult to achieve with a larger, more fragmented, set of government agencies.

- a separate stream of Māori cultural agencies within government is proposed. Concerns are expressed about governmental support for Māori culture (pages 106-107) and three options for enhancing support are identified (Annex B). The option of enhancing existing arrangements is not mentioned. It is not clear to the Ministry as to why the proposed arrangements are preferable.

Where To From Here?

14. The Terms of Reference for Heart of the Nation said:

"The Government's vision is for:

- *Vibrant arts and cultural activities which all New Zealanders can enjoy and through which a strong and confident cultural identity can emerge; and*

- *A strong and vibrant creative industry sector which provides sustainable employment and economic growth within an innovative environment."*

The development, by the sector, of its own vision and strategies was seen as key to the achievement of these ends. This has not been the outcome of Heart of the Nation, although the Government's vision and the overall aim of the project remain sound. The issue that therefore arises is what the Government might now do in pursuit of its vision?

15. We continue to believe the key to success is in the sector itself having a clear sense of its own vision and strategies to achieving it. Such a vision and strategies must be developed by the sector, for the sector. This challenge must be put to the sector. One possibility for doing this would be to bring together the leaders of key cultural sector organisations and to challenge them to work together to develop a cultural sector plan. The benefits and capacity to develop a plan could be illustrated by reference to similar such initiatives in areas such as the Tourism Industry.

16. The Ministry could give further consideration to this or other options if you require.

17. Heart of the Nation's report is extensive and contains a considerable amount of information and ideas in relation to government policy. Many of these could provide a useful input to the development of a strategic policy programme for the Ministry. They could also provide a useful input to the policy and programme development of agencies such as Creative New Zealand.

Recommendation

18. It is recommended that you:

(i) **note** the content of this report.

Martin Matthews
Acting Chief Executive

Rt Hon Helen Clark
Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage

Appendix F: Table 7.1 (full version)

Table 7.1: Creative industries policy documents

Document	Author	Year	Space of Action
Heart of the Nation	Heart of the Nation Project Team (for New Zealand Government)	2000	New Zealand
As discussed in Chapter 6, this document used the CIMD definition but changed it so that the creative industries could be understood as a commercial sector that sat alongside and fed off the core 'cultural industries'. Thus, the creative industries in this report were stripped of those industries seen as 'cultural': art, performing arts, film and music that was being produced not-for-profit.			
Creative Industries in Hong Kong	Hong Kong Trade Development Council	2002	Hong Kong
This document draws directly on the CIMD and incorporates its definition. The industrial list is slightly changed with crafts substituted for comics. The statistical analysis is presented in the same way as the CIMD and compared with the UK, Australian and New Zealand results.			
Creative Industries in New Zealand: Economic Contribution	New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (for Industry New Zealand)	2002	New Zealand
Under the direction of Industry New Zealand, who commissioned the report, this was expected to use the same definitions as used for the UK Creative Industries Mapping Document (pg. 1). Thus the report used the CIMD definition, the same set of industries (although it collapsed arts, antiques and crafts into the same category and did the same with music and performing arts), and measured their contribution according to: revenue/market size; employment; expense and value added; exports and imports; industry structure; regional dimensions; and secondary economic impacts.			
Creative Industries Development Strategy: Propelling Singapore's Creative Economy	Economic Review Committee, Government of Singapore	2002	Singapore
This document argues that the 'creative cluster' constitutes the Singapore 'creative economy' and defines the former using the CIMD definition. The industries that comprise the cluster are divided into three groups: Arts and culture – including performing and visual arts and such like from the CIMD list and adding museums, archives, auctions, festivals and heritage sites – design – advertising, architecture, fashion and so on – and media – film, television, music and publishing. A statistical analysis of the contribution of the industries is provided. A more comprehensive statistical analysis is carried out in Heng *et al.* (2003) in a report for the Minister of Trade and Industry in which the industrial classification used in the CIMD is followed more closely with the addition of photography and the collapsing of some industries in with each other due to the nature of the statistics.			
Cultural Policy White Paper	Council for Cultural Affairs	2004	Taiwan
The document refers to the approach taken in Taiwan of combining the creative industries concept with that of the cultural industries and makes it clear that the promotion of the 'cultural and creative industries' is a key part of Taiwanese economic development plans under conditions of 'globalisation'. In defining these it draws directly on the UK and			

UNESCO definitions, arguing that the 'British government's creative industry policies are the most comprehensive internationally (*sic*)' (Ch 3, Pg. 2). The list of industries included is the same as the UK with the exception of antiques and the inclusion of the so-called 'lifestyle' sector. The document is concerned with the role the cultural agency that produced it plays in promoting the cultural and creative industries. This programme has been on the agenda for the Taiwanese Government since 2003 when the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research carried out an analysis of the productive value of the cultural and creative industries in the country.

An Analysis of the Economic Potential of the Creative Industries in Vienna: English Summary	Ratzenbock *et al.* on behalf of the City of Vienna	2004	Vienna

This document contains an extended discussion of the creative industries concept, placing it in historical and geographical context as following on from the Adorno and Horkheimer concept of the 'culture industry' and the Greater London Council's cultural industries strategy. It argues that the shift to the creative industries made by DCMS allows for thinking of culture and creativity as factors of production. The industrial categories include all of those in the CIMD, with the exception of antiques and crafts, and introduce museums and galleries. The statistical analysis of the sectors draws on Andy Pratt's Cultural Industries Production System (in here referred to as the Creative Industries production System) which he would later develop for the DCMS Evidence Toolkit. The report emphasises the geographical specificity of the creative industries in Vienna.

Creative New York	Keegan *et al.* for the Centre for and Urban Future and Mt Auburn Associates	2005	New York, USA

This report uses the term creative industries to describe the kind of economic units that constitute the city's 'creative economy'. It does not refer directly to the CIMD or DCMS but does state that '(s)ince 1997, the UK has made its creative sectors a major focus of economic planning, with particular emphasis on supporting its workforce and entrepreneurs to spur future economic growth' (pg. 25) in the context of referring to initiatives carried out in UK cities developing their creative industries. As such, it refers to the work of the Greater London Authority's Creative London agency, the Creative Industries Development Service in Manchester, and the Round Foundry Media Centre in Leeds. The report bases its arguments for more of a focus on this sector on a statistical analysis of the contribution of the creative industries to the New York economy.

Future of the creative industries: implications for research policy: Working Document	Marcus, for the European Commission	2005	EU

This document begins with a discussion on the different terms that have been used to describe this particular sector, including the 'entertainment' and 'content' industries. It settles on the creative industries but explicitly argues that the cultural industries are an important subset of them. The definition it uses from this point for the creative industries is the CIMD definition. The report produces a number of recommendations for research, for example on the impact of technology and intellectual property law on the creative industries. One study it recommends follows a European Parliament call to the Commission to produce a 'European map of cultural industries'. The report notes that the UK is the only country to have done this through the CIMD.

The creative industries in South Australia: a report prepared for the Cross-Government Steering Committee: Arts SA	Doust, for Arts South Australia: Cross-Government Steering Committee	2005	South Australia

In defining the creative industries for South Australia this report refers to the UK definition, the Scottish definition and the Queensland State Government's definition. It

recognises the CIMD definition as influential but critiques it for being 'insufficiently discriminating' with regard to those sectors that are truly 'creative' as opposed to other sectors that are simply 'new' media or economy industries like software. As a result they recommend a set of industries that are basically the same as those in the CIMD with the exception of software, at the same time recognising that some software, such as games, will need to be recognised as exceptions and included in the creative industries sector. The report refers to Richard Florida in arguing that a well-developed creative industries sector will attract the economically powerful 'creative class'.

Snapshot: Auckland's Creative Industries	Auckland City Council	2005	Auckland, New Zealand

This report uses the definition of the CIMD. It splits the creative industries sector into six sub-sectors: design comprising advertising, architecture and graphic design; screen production and radio; publishing; visual arts, crafts and photography; performing arts; and music. The study measures their contribution to the Auckland economy and supplements this with interviews with 375 creative sector workers and 30 key informants from government, business and media. The report articulates the creative industries concept with that of the creative class (Richard Florida) and the creative city (Charles Handy), arguing the creative industries can attract the kind of creative professionals Florida claims are the key to the future of cities.

Zurich's creative industries: synthesis report	Held *et al.*, on behalf of the Economic Development Departments of the Canton and City of Zurich	2005	Zurich, Switzerland

This report uses the concept of the creative industries as an organising concept for a comparatively sophisticated analysis of the sector in Zurich. The UK is listed as a one of a number of European countries that recognises this sector, although their specific authorship of the term 'creative industries' is acknowledged. These industries are recognised as existing in state, private sector and civil society organisations and enterprises in the context of an argument that creative practitioners increasingly work across this tripartite structure, resulting in the particular organisations and enterprises previously separated into these three domains becoming increasingly interdependent. The creative industries themselves are separated into 'broader' and 'narrower' senses of the term, with the narrower industries being those directly concerned with cultural production, such as performing arts and music, and the broader industries being those that work with what has been produced, the advertising and recording industries for example.

Creative Industries Development Framework of the Gauteng Provincial Government	Department of Sport, Arts, Culture and Recreation: South Africa	2005	Gauteng, South Africa

This report elides any distinction between the cultural and creative industries arguing they are 'that bundle of activities where creativity is a prime condition of its existence' (pg. 7). They include the same sectors of the CIMD with the exception of architecture while advertising is referred to within the 'graphic arts' and software and computer games are part of 'multimedia'. It also brings in 'cultural tourism' and the 'cultural heritage' sector. The report also refers to the presence of 'soft' infrastructure such as libraries, festivals and markets as key aspects of the 'creative economy' and uses the concepts of the 'creative cluster', the 'creative workforce' and the 'creative community'.

Our Creative Potential: Paper on Culture and Economy	Brinkhorst *et al.*, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Education, Culture and Science	2005	Netherlands

This paper explicitly distinguishes itself from the approach of the CIMD by calling the creative industries *creative business sectors* because 'a considerable part of that industry is

not engaged in industrial production' (pg. 12). It uses, or the most part, the same industries as the CIMD, separating them into three broader categories: the arts – including theatre and visual arts – media and entertainment – including television and film – and the creative business services – including advertising and architecture. The paper performs a statistical mapping function and attaches this to a strategy for developing the sector, arguing that these industries, and creativity in general, are increasingly important parts of the Dutch economy. The statistics are taken from another paper published in Dutch which has as its only English phrasing the words 'Mapping Document' in the title (Raes and Hofstede, 2005). The paper also incorporates the 'creative class' concept of Richard Florida in describing the creative make-up of the country.

The Economy of Culture in Europe	Kearn European Affairs (KEA), for the European Commission	2006	European Union

The approach taken in the CIMD is referred to explicitly (and first) in a section discussing how this study would approach the 'economy of culture' alongside the approaches of France, the Nordic countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the 'content industries') and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (the 'copyright industries'). It is argued that these are comparable definitions and produces a synthesised definition of the 'cultural and creative sector' which ranges from the core arts and cultural industries – including the visual arts, film, television and video games – 'radiating outwards' (pg. 53) in concentric circles to the creative industries – such as architecture and advertising. The document makes an attempt to establish a statistical profile of the sector across the whole of Europe and describes this as 'mapping out the economy of culture in figures' (pg. 60, emphasis added).

Understanding Creative Industries: Cultural Statistics for Public Policy Making	The Global Alliance for Cultural Diversity and UNESCO	2006	Global

This position paper for UNESCO points to the CIMD as the key first document in establishing the concept of 'mapping' the creative sector: 'Cultural mapping has become the favoured approach at national level for governments to study and understand their creative industries sectors before making policy decisions... The UK is widely recognised as having played a groundbreaking role in developing these analytical models, with the government's Department for Culture, Media and Sport producing the first Creative Industries Mapping Document in 1998 and 2001' (pg. 6). The stated goal of the agency is to further develop this approach to provide relevant data to policy-makers on the sector.

Appendix G: Table 7.3 (full version)

Table 7.3: Conferences on the creative industries

Event	Organisers	Date	Location
Creative Clusters	Creative Clusters Inc.	Annually since 2002	Locations around the UK
'Creative Clusters is an independent policy conference examining the growth of the creative economy. We are interested in initiatives from around the world that are designed to have an impact in both cultural and economic terms... Our goal is to help people engaged in the development of the creative economy to communicate and share resources with one another' (From the website). (Website: www.creativeclusters.com, accessed 6/9/2007)			
From 'Made in China' to 'Created in China': International Creative Industries Conference	Chinese Academy of Sciences, Humanistic Olympic Studies Centre at Renmin University of China, and the Queensland University of Technology Creative Industries Faculty	7-9/7/2005	Beijing, China
This event was organised by John Hartley of the Queensland University of Technology's Creative Industries Faculty alongside colleagues from Australia, China and the UK, including Justin O'Connor of the Manchester Institute for Popular Culture. It was billed as 'the first event to discuss the theme of creative industries and innovation in China' (Hartley and Keane, 2006: 260) and brought together policy-makers, entrepreneurs, 'creative professionals' and academic researchers to discuss ' the pros and cons of thinking about China as a 'creative economy' in the international environment of globalized content, marketing and national branding' (ibid.: 26). (See the special issue of the International Journal of Cultural Studies, 2006, v. 9 i. 3, esp. Hartley and Keane (2006: 259-262)). (Website: http://tinyurl.com/4cjov2, 3/7/2007).			
CARICOM-WIPO Experts Meeting on Creative Industries and Intellectual Property	Caribbean Community (CARICOM and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)	8-9/2/2006	Georgetown, Guyana
'(T)he purpose of the Meeting was to discuss the mapping of the Creative Industries in the Caribbean, to determine appropriate strategies for their development and strengthening (with a view to increasing their social, economic, and cultural contribution to the Region), to assist in pointing the direction for future CARICOM/WIPO collaboration and to initiate the development of a Regional Creative Industries Mapping Network' (from the website). (Website: http://tinyurl.com/54b8ck, accessed 12/2/2008).			
Creative and Cultural Industries in Europe	EUCLID	20/3/2006	Tate Modern, London
'This conference will bring together experts from across Europe to present their analysis and practical experiences, for both information and debate. In the light of the recent report from DG research of the European Commission on the future of the creative and			

cultural industries in Europe, delegates will hear about specific projects and initiatives that seek to promote the creative and cultural industries and address the challenges faced by our European colleagues. This conference is aimed at both policy makers and practitioners, at local, regional or national level, as it will highlight examples of successful (and less successful) ideas, strategies and actions that have endeavoured to develop and sustain the creative and cultural industries in cities, regions and neighbourhoods' (from the publicity material).

(Website: http://www.euclid.info/, accessed 3/12/2007)

MyCreativity: Convention on International Creative Industries Research	Institute of Network Cultures, HvA Interactive Media, and Centre for Media Research, University of Ulster	16-18/11/2006	Amsterdam

'A Convention on International Creative Industries research. MyCreativity is a two-day conference that intends to bring the trends and tendencies around the Creative Industries into critical question. It seeks to address the local, intra-regional and trans-national variations that constitute international creative industries as an uneven field of actors, interests and conditions. The conference explores a range of key topics that, in the majority of cases, remain invisible to both academic research and policy-making in the creative industries' (from the publicity material).

(Website: http://www.networkcultures.org/mycreativity/, accessed 6/6/2007)

Culture-Creative Industries in Europe (sic) – Coherent Policies in a Global World	Office for Cultural Policy and Economy, European Commission	3-4/5/2007	Berlin

This conference, organised by the European Commission, draws directly on the study 'The Economy of Culture in Europe' (Kearn European Affairs, 2006) discussed in Table 7.1. It slips between the cultural and creative industries concepts.: 'Culture industries (sic) have gained a new importance for Europe, as the European Council of Ministers of Culture stated in 2006... This raises the issue of developing more efficient European policies to support the creative industries in their struggle to produce and sell cultural goods under the conditions of global competition... The conference aims at developing a strategy for the co-ordination of culture industries policies (sic)' (From the Website).

(Website: http://tinyurl.com/4sk3v6, accessed 4/2/2008)

Creative Industries Workshop	University of the Arts London, London College of Communication	9/5/2007	London

'The Creative Industry sector is an integral part of the new knowledge economy and in this workshop we are looking to develop new ideals and impetus for the businesses, infrastructure and governance of the Creative Industries' (from the publicity material).

Creative Industries Conference	Asian-Pacific Forum Berlin	19-22/9/2007	Berlin

Part of the 'Asia-Pacific Weeks' in Berlin intended to foster connections between Europe and Asia Pacific. This stated aim of the conference is to 'focus on the interplay between German-European and Asian-Pacific partners in the creative industries sectors (which) will increase mutual understanding, but also add most-needed intercultural value to the European enterprises in the East at large'.

(website: http://tinyurl.com/46te7x, accessed 12/2/2008)

Creative Industries: Ten Years On	Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change	27/2/2008	Open University, Milton Keynes

'What has happened in the decade since 1997? On the one hand the creative industries can be seen to have gone from strength to strength. The DCMS has re-launched its

creative industry strategy with renewed vigour. *The Creative Economy Programme* sets out an ambitious strategy which once again places the creative industries at the heart of the UK's economic future. The 'UK model' has been internationally exported, across Europe, and into territories as diverse as Australia, China and South Korea, shaping and being shaped by pre-existing policy frameworks, contributing to the rapid globalization of creative industry debate. Yet there are some hard questions to be asked and key issues to be addressed – this symposium attempts to address these issues and in doing so take forward an agenda for critical debate on the creative industries' (From the publicity material).

Caribbean International Conference on the Cultural & Creative Industries	National Cultural Foundation, Barbados	5-6/5/2008	St James, Barbados

'(The event will) stimulate discussion at the level of policy, programming and successful case studies' (from the publicity material).
(Website: http://tinyurl.com/5mohae, accessed 12/2/2008).

Arte-Polis 2: Creative Communities and the Making of Place: International Conference and Workshop	Institute of Technology Bandung	8-10/8/2008	Institute of Technology Bandung, Indonesia

'In an era of globalization, activities of the creative economy such as fashion, film, television, theater, music, dance, visual arts, design, architecture, advertising, publishing, multimedia and information technology, have contributed significantly to local economy, community life and the creation of places in cities. Such cities have taken advantage of the trend in natural agglomeration of creative industries as clusters, given that information, imagination, opinions and cultural sensibilities are transmitted through them... (The) objective is to share international experiences and knowledge regarding current issues, best practices and policy implications on the relationship between creative communities and place-making.' (From the email announcement). (Culturelink website: http://tinyurl.com/52sxh8, accessed 12/2/2008).